

CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL SELF

Criticism of the Conceptual Adequacy of  
Political Culture from the Perspective of  
Plato, Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Kant

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by

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**Critique of the Political Self**

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### ABSTRACT

The last four decades' national bifurcation in Korea reflects not only the international power struggle between powerful foreign nations but also their ideological conflict. Under the assumption that the internalization by the Korean people of the conflict between incompatible ideologies developed in foreign countries is likely to have caused division in the mind of the Korean people, the conceptual adequacy of political culture to deal with the totality of the political self is examined.

An attempt to form a concept to deal with the total political mind is made by reviewing great Western political thinkers' conception of the political self. It is demonstrated that the political self has two component parts: the observed political self and the observing one.

In light of the broad conception of the political self, the examination of the definition of political culture shows its nature as being identical with the observed political self. The implication is that, without the synthetic and unifying function of the observing political self, the concept of political culture is likely to foster

division in the self. At the same time, it is also found that the observing political self is hidden behind the facade of value-free political science. There is a danger that this illegitimate part of the concept of political culture replaces the true observing self of the people who are under the great ideological influence of foreign nations.

### Acknowledgment

He has been a good teacher. They have been good helpers.  
I have been a great burden to them. I am truly sorry.

The unexamined life  
is not worth living  
for man. (Plato, Apology, 38a)

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## INTRODUCTION

### A. PROBLEM STATEMENTS

The purpose of this essay is to examine critically the adequacy of the concept of political culture in dealing with political reality of Korea and probably other areas of the world where there is a reason to believe that the identity of the political self is manipulated by foreign ideologies.

In contemporary political science literature, the political self is dealt with by the concept of political culture. Since political culture constitutes an important area of legitimate study, the "political self" seems to be treated adequately.

To elaborate, today's political scientists speak about the political system which has two dimensions: the behavioral and the psychological. The former is called political structure and the latter political culture.

Is political culture an adequate concept in dealing with the totality of political reality? My answer is in the negative. Since political culture is, by definition, the observed self, the political self is identified with the observed self. Therefore, we can immediately have a suspicion that the aspect of the political self which cannot be observed, if there is such an aspect, eludes the concept of political culture.

My negative answer is much more than the fact that since the observed self, like the observing self, is mental in nature, it cannot be observed. For I admit a validity in saying that political culture, unlike the observing political self, can be observed, if indirectly. Knowledge concerning political culture can be obtained through inference based on the observation of its behavioral expression. To the extent that the psychological dimension is expressed by means of the behavioral dimension, we can legitimately say that the psychological dimension, which is in itself not observable, can be observed.

Since knowledge in contemporary political science is limited to knowledge obtained through observation, whether direct or indirect, only the observed political self is accepted as the proper area of study. However, my contention is that observation necessarily occurs between the observed and the observer and, therefore, that the observed self necessarily presupposes the observing self.

Therefore, I raise two specific questions concerning the adequacy of political culture to deal with the totality of political reality. First, what aspects are there in the conception of the political self in general? Secondly, what aspects of the political self is missing in the conception of political culture?

## B. WHO ARE WE?

For me, the most fundamental political question is: Who am I? Or who are we whom I am a part of? Specifically, why should we

Koreans choose between being Communists and being liberal democrats (in the sense of being anti-Communists)? Why should we be Communist or anti-Communist? Why should we be anti-American or anti-Russian? Why should we not be anything else we choose? Why can't we define our identity by our own will? I raise these questions neither against Russians nor against Americans but against myself in the same spirit as Kant showed in "What Is Enlightenment":

Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! "Have courage to use your own reason!"--that is the motto of enlightenment.

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of mankind, after nature has long since discharged them from external direction (naturaliter maiorennnes), nevertheless remain under lifelong tutelage, and why it is so easy not to be of age. If I have a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth, I need not trouble myself. I need not think, if I can only pay--others will readily undertake the irksome work for me.

That the step to competence is held to be very dangerous by the far greater portion of mankind...is seen to by those guardians who have so kindly assumed superintendance over them. After the guardians have first made their domestic cattle dumb and have made sure that these placid creatures will not dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which they are tethered, the guardians then show them the danger which threatens if they try to go alone. Actually, however, this danger is not so great, for by falling a few times they would finally learn to walk alone. But an example of this failure makes them timid and ordinarily frightens them away from all further trials. 1/

### C. WHO ARE THEY?

For me, all other questions other than "Who are we?" are secondary in political inquiry. This statement will surprise those

for whom the question has long been out of date because it was already answered. It is futile to argue with them over the importance of the question because it is not important to them.

Some scholars of a settled society may be curious about other people for the sake of intellectual curiosity or for altruistic or selfish reasons. Taking a stand as an observer, they ask about other nations: Who are they? Amazingly enough, they even talk about the identity crisis in less developed countries or transitional societies. <sup>2/</sup>

Some other scholars of a settled society ask themselves the question "Who are we?" but in a manner which really implies "Who are they?" They say they find themselves in an identity crisis because they cannot agree among themselves about the major problems they face together, methods of observing reality, and a theory by which they can explain their problems. <sup>3/</sup> The way they present the problem of the identity crisis is so much a pedantic mannerism that one becomes suspicious that they are trying to create a problem where there is none. I wonder if they really know what they are concerned with; for, if they have so much difficulty in presenting the case, the problem may not be that serious in the first place.

#### D. MANIPULATION OF THE SELF: CULTURAL COLONIALISM

In Korean history, almost every movement of political thought, developed abroad, has been brought to bear, and has left

ineradicable imprints. In the name of ontological realism, a variety of value systems of foreign origin have provided us with guidelines for defining our political identity. As the ultimate reference points, however, one system has been replaced with another. Confucian ethics had long been the reference points in expressing Korean political identity. Under the Japanese rule, however, Confucianism was replaced with Hegelian philosophy. Those Koreans who expressed their own political identity were put to death, imprisoned, and suffered in many other ways. Since World War II, the Korean political identity has not only been imposed by foreigners, even worse, the Korean political self itself also has been denied by two opposing political ideologies of foreign origin. Even the concept of the political self has long disappeared. This lack of concept has led to a lack of thought. Today, Koreans in the North are forced to adopt Marxism; Koreans in the South are forced to adopt liberal democracy or something similar. We are not really sure what our political identity is, but most Koreans are absolutely certain what they should not be and most seem to feel that, for the definition of a Korean political identity, they must look to one or another kind of ontological realism developed by some great foreign thinkers. It does not surprise me to find that many Korean Christians and liberal democrats feel more at home in the United States than in Korea. What all this amounts to is that Korea has been caught in a trap of ontological realism used by powerful nations as an effective tool of cultural colonialism.

To a large proportion of the human race today, however, I believe that the crisis of identity is not only real but also extremely dangerous. Needless to say, it should be I who must be most seriously concerned with myself. In many parts of the world, however, though people are allowed to study other people, to ask questions and observe others, they are prohibited from asking questions about themselves. "Who are we", if not "Who are they?", is a forbidden question, implicit in many nations and under all too many regimes.

If the people like us ask the question "Who are we?" too seriously, they are threatened with ostracism, with the loss of jobs, with imprisonment, or even with death. They are living in an age in which their identity is imposed upon them by others. Other people presume to know about them better than they themselves do. For them, the identity crisis is not an academic question but a very obvious problem of life and death. In fact, many people have suffered greatly and died because they insisted on expressing their own identity as they saw it or as they felt it, instead of blindly adopting the identity imposed upon them by others. <sup>4/</sup>

Those who are in a similar situation to the Koreans--perhaps the majority of nations in the Third World--must develop the concept which will allow them to think and express their own political identity. At the same time, they must overcome the illusion that we Koreans have long held: that each epoch has had its own concept of the political self, while in fact it is imposed by external sources,

for example, by Hegelianism under the Japanese rule, Marxism in contemporary North Korea, and liberal democracy coupled with behavioralism in contemporary South Korea.

#### E. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL SELF

In this paper, I will try to express ideas on the question of the political self on behalf of those who find it much more important to ask "Who are we?" than to ask "Who are they?"

"Who are we?" and "Who are they?" are both questions of the political self, but there is a distinction between the two. For the former, "Who are we?", is intrinsically a question of expressive political identity which has become problematic because doubts have arisen about the imposed political identity. The latter, "Who are they?", is a question of political culture as we well know in contemporary political science literature.

To achieve the self-consciousness of our political self, we must explore the critical faculty of the human mind in order to form the conceptual organization which is called "we". Here, I am using the word "critical" in the Kantian sense that our mind has, in certain areas, creative potentiality or faculty whose limits we cannot tell and, in other areas, potentiality we can explain.

In order to center our attention on the critical faculty of the human mind to form the political self, I define the political self in terms of two aspects: the political self which observes and the political self which is observed. I will call the philosophical expression of the observing political self ontological

realism and that of the observed, ontological nominalism. Political discourse of any kind ultimately refers either to the discussion of the reflection by the observing self upon itself or to the discussion of the observation by the observing self of other political subjects--in a sense, the other political self. Political discourse therefore refers to the reflection upon, and the observation of, the self by the self in its generic sense. What I emphasize here is that political discourse is ultimately subjective.

Ontological realism. Ontological realism does not allow relativism of values and it therefore does not allow us to define our political identity in our own subjective terms. We see a typical example of realistic reasoning in Plato's Republic. In defining justice as the essence of man and the political system, Plato posits force against reason in the beginning of the book. He assumes that reason is an alternative to force as an instrument for securing agreement:

There is a rationale in the nature of things, a rationale that the mind cannot but follow if it listens at all. There is... a compulsion in reason that makes force unnecessary, at least among the rational elite. This is so because...when the mind thinks correctly, it transposes, and accommodates itself to an objectively real order. Truth is...a matter of the agreement of man's thoughts with reality.<sup>5/</sup>

In order, therefore, to maintain the agreement between our thoughts and reality, man has had to adjust himself to different versions of ontological realism ranging from Confucianism, Hegelian philosophy, Marxism, or liberal democracy, each of which I think is the expression of the political self of a variety of societies.

Ontological nominalism. To search in a deeper way for our political self or our political identity is to deny ontological realism and to accept some kind of ontological subjectivism. To ask ourselves the question "Who are we?" is to assume that our political identity can be defined by ourselves and that the political self resides in us, in the human mind. We ourselves must be the measure of our political identity.

In Truth, Protagoras presents the subjective position that man is the measure of all things. The dialogue goes:

--What "man" are you talking about?

Protagoras. Every man, you, me, anybody.

--Even men who haven't studied science or philosophy?

Prot. Aren't they men?

--But these men go by appearance; they haven't the sense to distinguish appearance from reality.

Prot. And they are perfectly right. Appearance is reality. Even what you philosophers call "reality" is just what appears true to them.

--But appearances are not consistent. The same wind often feels warm to me, cold to you.

Prot. Then it is warm for you, cold for me.

--But what is it in itself?

Prot. "Wind-in-itself"? I know of no such thing. Do you? The only wind you can know is the one you can feel: this is the wind-for-you, and you are its measure.

--If that is the way you reason, you might as well hold that all beliefs are true.

Prot. I do. All beliefs are true for those who believe them.

--But that is fantastic.

Prot. I can prove that no such thing as a false belief can exist. Suppose it did, it would have to be about something or about nothing. It couldn't be about nothing--something real for you, else why should you be thinking about it? And if your belief is about something real for you, how can it be false for you?

--Nonsense. There are millions of false beliefs.

Prot. Mention one that is false for him who believes it.

The position that political reality resides in the mind of man may be called ontological subjectivism or nominalism. The crisis of our political identity is not only caused by ontological realism but also by the extreme form of anti-realism, i.e. nominalism.

The dangers of nominalism are so subtle that we cannot detect them easily with unsuspecting eyes. However, the consequences of nominalism to the political self are as harmful and as certain as those of realism. For both realism and nominalism are logically incompatible with the political self or those people who live on the "cultural" periphery of the world, i.e. third world nations. While realism eliminates the political self of "minor" peoples in the name of absolute truth, nominalism suffocates their political selves and causes its gradual death in the name of value-neutrality and science.

Nominalism as the extreme version of subjectivism--the more moderate version being called conceptualism--expresses great antagonism against realism by denying the reality of universals, such as the enduring identity of the Korean people. Reality is admitted only to actual physical particulars, such as the individual persons in the Korean population. Nominalism denies that a whole is real over and above its parts. "Koreans" as the collective political self is considered as a mere name or word without any meaning, a mere breath of our voice when we say "Koreans", mere vocal utterances, or the wiggling lines of the "Korean" written on paper. <sup>7/</sup> The word "Koreans" is supposed to be the "expression of a ready-made,

exclusively individual, mental state" of the particular individual person who utters the word. <sup>8/</sup> Nominalism fails to see that the word "Koreans" presupposes an organized group whose members share a meaning of the word. <sup>9/</sup>

We have an example of the nominalist version of political theory in Hobbes's Leviathan. Hobbes recognizes the mental phenomena such as perceiving, thinking, imagining, remembering, etc. However, he first reduces man to nothing but body and then reduces all of man's mental phenomena to the mere names of, or the manipulations of the names of, bodily motions occurring within man's body.

However, we also find a realist line of reasoning which is interwoven with nominalist elements throughout his political theory. One could reconstruct, if wrongly as W.T. Jones interprets, the extreme version of the self out of Hobbes's Leviathan by eliminating realist elements to see where the purely nominalist theory of the political self would lead us.

According to Jones's interpretation, unlike Plato, Hobbes does not recognize reason by which certain individual minds can reach the absolute truth and they can thus have agreement among themselves about it. Without reason, individual minds do not have the medium of agreement through consent. Submission to force because of fear is the only alternative.

Whereas Socrates and Glaucon and Adeimantus believed themselves to be living in an intellectual community constituted by the fact that their minds were in contact with a common and rational

real, Hobbes held that there is a chasm between every individual mind and every other individual mind, and between all minds and material reality. Hence, whereas Socrates and his friends were confident that reason lead them to agreement, Hobbes maintained that men need a sovereign with unlimited powers to compel their agreement. 10/

Hobbes, Jones interprets, reduces the political self as a value image in the mind to nothing but difference in levels of force. Thus, "according to Hobbes, 'good' is whatever the sovereign says is good; 'lawful' is whatever he says is lawful; 'true' is whatever he says is true." 11/

This nominalist way of looking at the world is adopted by Montesquieu as well as by Kant. Both of them retained the idea that things as they are in themselves cannot be known. They can be known only insofar as they appear to us. 12/ It follows, then, that things in themselves outside us are irrelevant to values. They are neither good nor bad. Morality is in the mind of men. Montesquieu describes this type of subjectivism as follows;

Objects themselves are neither pure nor impure...Mud appears dirty to us only because it wounds our vision or some other of our senses...Our senses should therefore be our sole judges of the purity or impurity of things. 13/

I believe in the immortality of the soul by interval; my opinions are absolutely dependent on my physical constitution. Accordingly, as I possess more or less animal spirits, or as my stomach digests well or badly, as the air I breathe is fine or raw, as the food I eat is light or heavy, I am a Spinozist, a Socinian, a Catholic, a heathen, or a devout man. 14/

There certainly is a sense in saying, as Protagoras or Montesquieu says, that man is the measure of all things. Truth refers to what appears to us. Appearance is a part of reality. Since

we ourselves make the difference in appearances, we are the measure of things.

The observed side of the political self is the nominalist element. It is the product of man's physical nature. It depends on our bodily conditions. This materialist side of man who is ever in the state of flux is revived in the modern age and firmly established as the model of man in the conception of political culture.

However, we as the measure of all things are more than the physical side of man which is ever in the state of flux. Deep down below the fluctuating surface of our mind, Kant sees our unchanging transcendental identity, including the forms of pure intuition, the categories of the understanding, and above all moral consciousness.

It follows then that we as the measure of all things are the product of both our mind affected by external objects, i.e., the external nature; and our mind independent of the external nature, i.e., the internal nature. The former constitutes the observed side of the political self and the latter the observing side.

Being the product of physical nature, the observed political self is relative to particular social, economic, geographical, and historical experiences which a particular people undergo. However, the observed political self, if dynamic, is the source not only of growth but also of division and instability. It is subject to

desires and passions such as incentives and fear. It can be easily subjugated to force and other external factors when the physical conditions of life are systematically controlled.

The essence of the political identity, however, is in the observing political self. Since it transcends sense experiences, it is safely separated from the world of the senses, i.e., from the physical world. Under the threat of force, the observed self may yield, but the observing self will resist unless it is convinced otherwise. The substance of the observing political self has been described in the history of political theory as man's preference for justice, freedom, and equality. Since the observing political self is free, consent through persuasion is the only way to gain its agreement.

Knowledge concerning the observing self can be obtained only through the reflection of the self upon the self, i.e., self-reflection.

#### F. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I will argue, first, that the political self has the observed and the observing sides as the two different aspects of the same thing; secondly, that the concept of political culture as the observed political self can deal only with a half of the political self; and, finally, that the identification of the concept of political culture with the political self itself not only deprives the Koreans of the only means of restoring their

national identity but also fosters the divisive tendency in the name of science. This divisive tendency must be reconciled by the observing self.

## G. ORGANIZATION

In Chapter I, I will analyze the concept of political culture as defined by major contemporary political scientists such as Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, David Easton, and Karl Deutsch in order to reconstruct the philosophical assumptions of the concept of political culture in the concluding chapter.

In the next four chapters, I will review the ideas of some Western thinkers who have greatly influenced the development of political traditions in theory as well as in practice in order to explore the critical ability of the political self in general. In Chapters II through V, I will investigate the concept of the political self conceived by Plato in the Republic, by Hobbes in the Leviathan, by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, and by Kant largely in the Critique of Pure Reason.

In Chapter VI, I will, in light of the insights into the conception of the political self which the great thinkers under analysis would reveal in their efforts to understand themselves as well as others, reach the conclusion concerning: (1) the concept of the political self; (2) the problem of the conceptual adequacy of political culture; and (3) the possible consequences of the use of political culture as identical with the political

self as a whole, upon the political identity of Third World citizens who are in the grip of Western ideological conflict such as the Koreans are.

## CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL CULTURE:  
LITERATURE REVIEW ON  
THE DEFINITION

In the contemporary political science literature, the concept which deals with the political self is political culture. However, the concept as defined by those who adopt the tradition of the mainstream empirical political science is extremely inadequate to deal with the fundamental political question in Korea: How can we reunite the divided political self?

To begin with, I take the position that there are essentially two different aspects in the political self: the political self which observes and the political self which is observed. As far as the political theory of any kind is the expression of a particular political self, namely, a particular political group, working to cope with particular historical problems, the theory must contain both aspects or at least must not in principle exclude any of the two aspects of the political self either explicitly or implicitly. If a theorist emphatically denies in his theory a room for either one, we may be rightly suspicious of his interest in keeping the political discourse from the consequence of such denial.

In order to evaluate the conceptual adequacy of political culture, I will review literature<sup>1/</sup> which has established consensus on the definition of the term. I will analyze the philo-

sophical assumptions of the definition and its conceptual adequacy after I review the conception of the political self of Plato, Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Kant, in the concluding chapter.

### 1. The establishment of the Term

The term "culture" has a great variety of uses. However, despite variations in details, widespread consensus has been reached on the content of the concept of political culture among today's mainstream political scientists since Gabriel A. Almond introduced the term to compare political systems on the psychological dimension of the people in 1956. He says that "Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action." He finds it "useful to refer to this as the political culture." <sup>2/</sup>

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define the concept of political culture and give the essentially identical definition of the term in three places: (1) Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (1963), (2) Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (1965), and (3) Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (1966). <sup>3/</sup> Attracted by Talcott Parsons' attempt to incorporate psychological data such as attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms into a scientific theory of action, <sup>4/</sup> Almond and Verba borrow from Parsons three particular kinds of orientations--cognitive, affective, and evaluative--in relating them to political action structures. Since then, Parsons' Toward a General Theory of Action (1951) <sup>5/</sup> has become the cons-

tant source of concept formation.

In analyzing the philosophical assumptions of the term political culture, I will use, as a point of departure, the following Almond's and Verba's definitions of political culture. Almond and Powell defined the term in 1966 as follows;

Political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system. It is the subjective realm which underlies and gives meaning to political actions. Such individual orientations involve several components, including (a) cognitive orientations, knowledge, accurate or otherwise, of political objects and beliefs; (b) affective orientations, feelings of attachment, involvement, rejection, and the like, about political objects; and (c) evaluative orientations, judgments and opinions about political objects, which usually involve applying value standards to political objects and events.

Individual orientations toward any political object may be viewed in terms of these three dimensions. 6/

Almond and Verba defined the term in 1963 as follows;

When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are induced into it just as they are socialized into non-political roles and social systems..."Orientations" refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes (1) "cognitive orientation," that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system...; (2) "affective orientation," or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) "evaluative orientation," the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings. 7/

## 2. Typology

On the basis of the refined definition of political culture as quoted above, Almond and Verba developed its spatial and temporal types. For the comparison of political systems in terms of

their cultural differences requires, first, typology by which cultural differences between coexisting and yet differently located political systems can be recognized and, second, typology by which cultural changes of the same political system from one period of time to another can be examined.

The construction of these two kinds of typology is made possible through the variation in the distribution of orientations which constitute the content of political culture. For, although the concept of political culture in general is constituted by its three components--cognitive orientations, emotional orientations, and evaluative orientations, differences in political culture between existing political systems result from the different distribution of these three orientations. Therefore, they define the political culture of an existing political system as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation." <sup>8/</sup>

a. Spatial Typology

Depending on the particular distribution of component orientations of political culture, Almond and Verba, in The Civic Culture, construct the spatial types of existing political culture. For this purpose, they classify objects of political orientation into: (1) the political system as a whole, (2) the political input structures such as political parties, interest groups and the media of communication, (3) the political output structures such as bureaucracies and courts, and (4) the "self" as the political

actor. <sup>9/</sup> Thus,

The political culture becomes the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor. <sup>10/</sup>

By relating the three orientations of political culture to the four classes of objects of political orientation, they postulate three pure types of political culture as Chilcote summarizes, <sup>11/</sup>

Three types are postulated: parochial, implying that individuals have low expectations and awareness of government and generally are not involved; subject, in which individuals are aware of the outcomes of government but do not participate in the processes that result in policy decisions, and participant, in which individuals are active and involved in the system as a whole, that is, in both the input and output processes. <sup>12/</sup>

b. Temporal Typology

In the collaborative work with G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Almond relates his concept of political culture to political development, regarding development as "reflection of the degree of secularization of the political culture." <sup>13/</sup> According to Almond and Powell,

We need a concept to deal with the developmental aspect of political culture, a concept comparable to that of differentiation in the dimension of political structure. The term commonly used here is secularization. Secularization is the process whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action. <sup>14/</sup>

Almond's conception of cultural development clearly corresponds to the direction of modernity which are implied by Talcott Parsons' five pattern variables <sup>15/</sup> as follows;

1. Affectivity--Affective neutrality.
2. Self-orientation--Collectivity-orientation.

3. Universalism--Particularism.
4. Ascription--Achievement.
5. Specificity--Diffuseness. 16/

In fact, the degree of cultural development or underdevelopment is implied in the three spatial types of political culture, that is, parochial, subject, and participant cultures. For, as Almond and Verba themselves suggest, the participant culture "is" the "rationality-activist model," that is, the secularized version. 17/

### 3. Internalization through Socialization

Almond and Verba, in the aforementioned definitions of political culture, say that its content, that is, the content of the three components of political culture is "inducted" or "internalized." The process of this induction or internization is political socialization. In Education and Political Development (1965), James Coleman gives the definition of political socialization which approximates Almond's and Verba's as follows;

It refers to that process by which individuals acquire attitudes and feelings toward the political system and toward their role in it, including cognition (what one knows or believes about the system, its existence as well as its modus operandi), feeling (how one feels toward the political system, including loyalty and sense of civic obligation), and one's sense of political competence (what one's role is or can be in the system). 18/

The agents of political socialization includes the family, schools, peer groups, mass communication media, and political agents. Through these agents a given political culture is transmitted not only vertically from generation to generation in the same political system but also horizontally from one political

system to another in the same generation.

#### 4. Consensus on the Use of the Term

Other writers have accepted the concept of political culture as Almond and Verba defined. The consensus on the use of the concept seems to have emerged, or rather popularized, through "some discussions by a group assembled at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics" of Princeton University during the summer of 1962. <sup>19/</sup> The members of the group included such familiar figures as Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, Leonard Binder, James Coleman, Alex Inkeles, Joseph LaPalombara, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, Dankwart Rostow, Robert Scott, and Robert Ward. "Another earlier use of the term is in Samuel Beer and Adam Ulam, eds., Patterns of Government (1958)." <sup>20/</sup> However, in a much later methodological survey, Lawrence Mayer persuasively argues that Samuel Beer's use of the term is almost identical with Gabriel Almond's. <sup>21/</sup>

In the history of American political science, 1950's and 1960's may be considered as the era of behavioralism which started with the replacement of the so-called S-R (stimulus-response) model by the S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) model. <sup>22/</sup> With David Easton's American Political Science Association presidential address entitled "The New Revolution in Political Science," <sup>23/</sup> however, the era of post-behavioral revolution followed. During

this period, they have "critically" re-examined their "behavioralist" stand.

In the behaviorist era, the study of political culture was firmly established as an essential part of political science through the marriage between Eastonian behavioralism <sup>24/</sup> and the Parsonian social model. In the study of political culture, emphasis was placed on concept formation.

In the following post-behavioral revolutionary era which I would rather call the "critical" behaviorist era, the concept of political culture has been critically reviewed on the one hand and it has been applied in empirical researches, particularly in the study of political socialization of different political systems on the other.

In the self-critical reviews, <sup>25/</sup> the members of the "second generation" have re-examined, confirmed and continued to popularize the term of political culture as was conceived by the "first generation." The consensus on the conception of political culture did not suddenly emerge from a university seminar or from the thoughts of some prominent scholars. Rather, the consensus has gradually grown over a long period of time through a large number of literature stimulated and written within the philosophical tradition of empirical science. The concept formation of political culture can not only be traced back far before the publication of Talcott Parsons' Toward a General Theory of Action (1951). The concept of political culture has also been continuously

popularized through its application to empirical researches, particularly to the study of political socialization in the United States as well as in other countries, producing numerous studies on political culture. <sup>26/</sup>

## 5. Critique: Internal and External

### a. Insider's Critique

In the last quarter century, the study of political culture has come to dominate comparative politics and become an orthodox paradigm. <sup>27/</sup> However, in the era of critical behavioralism, there have emerged two kinds of critique on the conception of political culture, internal and external. It is natural that while insiders would have examined the concept more defensively than critically, outsiders would have been more critical than defensive.

Through the self-criticisms of their political culture studies, <sup>28/</sup> mainstream American political scientists themselves have found that the underlying assumptions of the concept of political culture "tended to reflect ideal rather than real situations and were biased in terms of Anglo-American experience." <sup>29/</sup> One of the reviewers finds that an examination of the literature of political culture justifies the following criticisms of his graduate students over the past decade:

Writers such as Almond, Verba, Pye, and others do no more than democratize the concept of development into an ideal of capitalist-technological political secularization, which even to the most naive reader will spell out a parochial, incomplete, and probably meaningless approach. <sup>30/</sup>

b. Outsider's Critique

As soon as it is admitted that the orthodox conceptualization of political culture reflects the Anglo-American ideological stance, other alternatives reflecting other ideological stances or cultural biases must also be admitted. Considering the polarization of the contemporary international society, it immediately becomes probable to think of two other possibilities, that is, the Marxist conceptualization of political culture and the one for the Third World countries.

Marxist conceptualization. If the conceptualization of political culture by writers such as Almond, Verba, Pye and others reflects an ideal of capitalist-technological political socialization, the conceptualization of political culture by Marxist theorists would reflect the Marxist idea of their countries. For example, Samir Amin identifies essentially two universal models for the ideologically oriented conceptualization of political culture.<sup>31/</sup> One is the North American model which is "rooted in the capitalist formation and ideology of Europe and its philosophy of Enlightenment based on a tradition of mechanistic materialism."<sup>32/</sup> The other, with two subtypes of the Soviet model and the Chinese model, is based on Marxism.<sup>33/</sup>

In anticipating the conceptualization of political culture from the Marxist point of view, Chilcote, after reviewing Marx's writings and cultural studies of three socialist countries--the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, summarizes a Marxist perspective on the North American model of political culture as follows:

In general, a Marxist perspective perceives the orthodox understanding of political culture and socialization as one manifestation of the ideological superstructure of a bourgeois capitalist society. A Marxist perspective also identifies the bourgeois tendencies that may underlie the ongoing class struggle of societies in transition from capitalism to socialism. In this way alienation, consumption patterns, and work incentives may be assessed within a radical context. 34/

Then, Chilcote characterizes the Marxist conceptualization of political culture and political socialization as an effort to substitute a bourgeois world view with a proletarian world view:

Ultimately, a Marxist orientation seeks the formation of the "new" person in a socialist or communist society. The new person implies a reshaping of the culture so as to eliminate specialization of work and sectarian bureaucracies and to ensure participatory democracy and unifying tendencies. Although some Marxists assume that the abolition of private property in the means of production will inevitably produce a classless society, the experiences of socialist nations demonstrate this not to be valid. What has emerged in countries such as China and Cuba is a theory that assumes the substitution of a bourgeois world view with a proletarian world view. Such a world view envisions the eradication of alienation and the promotion of selflessness, commitment, and creativeness on behalf of the society and culture at large. 35/

With these points in mind, we readily note, as Chilcote and 36/ some others remind us of, that much effort has been already made for the conceptualization of political culture with emphasis on political consciousness:

The emphasis on political consciousness is found in two strands of Marxist theory: one combines the thought of Marx with that of Georg Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci and the other integrates Marxist and Freudian ideas in the thought of Karl Mannheim, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Jean-Paul Sartre. 37/

Third-World conceptualization. After we have juxtaposed the North American model with the Marxist one in conceptualizing political culture, we hardly need to explain the possibility of the

third alternative for the political systems which we call the Third World. In fact, there has been some literature in which the American orthodox conceptualization of political culture is criticized as an effort to interfere in the internal affairs of the Third World countries. 38/

c. A Defense of Cultural Narcissism

From the outsiders' point of view, mainstream political scientist's conception of political culture reflects their cultural narcissism which is in conflict with the outsiders' own sense of cultural identity. However, from the insiders' point of view, the orthodox conceptualization of political culture reflects nothing but the formation of their own honest and natural way of looking at other people in the world on depth-level.

During the 1930's and 1940's the formal-legal assumptions of comparative governments were replaced by focus on studies of psychology in response to the need to know other political systems on the level much deeper than what their formal-legal institutions could tell. The concept formation of political culture in 1950's and 1960's likewise reflects the much more intense need on the side of Americans to know other people on a more depth-level, namely, not only to know them through the observation of political action structures but also to look into their minds. Without conceptual tools, one cannot look into mental states of other people.

There is nothing wrong with cultural narcissism. There is nothing wrong even with their attempt to universalize the use of

their conceptual tools as suggested in The Civic Culture;

We shall therefore consider the way in which political culture affects democratic government...Is there a democratic political culture--a pattern of political attitudes that fosters democratic stability, that in some way "fits" the democratic political system? To answer this question we must look at the political culture in the two relatively stable and successful democracies, Great Britain and the United States. As we have said, the political cultures of these two nations approximate the civic culture. 39/

To the contrary, if outsiders try to change the American conceptualization of political culture in such a way that the American bourgeois world view may be replaced or even influenced by a proletarian world view, those outsiders are in the wrong. For, we cannot expect Americans to look at, for example, Koreans from the Korean perspective. They should maintain their own conceptualization of political culture. However, it does not follow that Koreans should look at themselves or any other people from the American perspective by adopting the American conceptualization of political culture.

Therefore, my critique of the American orthodox conceptualization of political culture is not directed to American scholars but to Korean students. This criticism is justified because the way Americans look at the other people has also become the standard way of looking at other people in Korea.

Thinking is difficult to do. More difficult is thinking to know other people. Still more difficult is thinking to know oneself. Since thinking is not intuitive but discursive, it requires conceptual tools in advance. Only through concepts can we think. The

conceptualization of political culture refers to the formation of concepts whereby we can think of our collective political self in our relations with other peoples who have both bourgeois world views and proletarian world views. In a sense, the conceptualization of political culture corresponds to the initial stage for us to achieve our political self-consciousness so that we may maintain our political identity in a rapidly changing and struggling international society.

However, it does not require conceptual tools to know that there is something wrong either with the bourgeois world view or with the proletarian world view, simply because these two conflicting views have divided our political self. We can know this much intuitively, that is, without conceptual tools.

If the way of looking at things is related to what appears to us as well as what we become accordingly, we can realize without much thought that we have to seriously criticize the American conceptualization of political culture before we adopt it as our own. However, the evaluation of the conceptual adequacy of political culture requires an analytical framework. For this, I will review Plato's Republic, Hobbes's Leviathan, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason concerning their conception of the political self.

## CHAPTER TWO            THE OBSERVING POLITICAL SELF:                                  PLATO'S REPUBLIC

We have seen that the concept of political culture is defined in terms of the relationships between individuals' mental orientations and political structures. In fact, the study of the political self is important because of the systematic relationship between the state of individuals' mind and their political actions. Does Plato systematically relate the two? How does he describe the nature and origin of what is comparable to political culture? Does he include the rational discussion of the observing political self in his political theory? If he does, how does he relate the observed political self with the observing political self?

### A. MENTAL DIMENSION AND ACTION DIMENSION

The discussion of political culture in contemporary political science literature is systematically tied up with the structural aspects of the political system. The rationale of the discussion lies in the assumption that the working of certain political structures depends on their cultural counterparts. Political culture is considered to be the "infrastructures" of politics. Most scholars are concerned with the fitness between culture and structure. According to Verba,

By examining the relationship between political cultural tendencies and political structural patterns, we can avoid the

assumption of congruence between political culture and political structure. The relationship between political culture and political structure becomes one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability and change. Rather than assuming congruence, we must ascertain the extent and character of the congruence or incongruence, and the trends in political cultural and structural development that may affect the "fit" between culture and structure. <sup>1/</sup>

In the Civic Culture, the authors search the cultural counterpart to the structures of liberal democracy. And the idea of fitness between structure and culture guides the search. The ultimate purpose of political society is fixed as that of liberal democracy whatever it may be. Many Third World countries adopted the complex infrastructures of the democratic polity--political parties, interest groups, and the media of communications, but in actual political processes they turned out to be much short of Western liberal democracies. It follows that the structure alone does not guarantee the realization of the purpose of liberal democracy and that "freedom" results from the congruence between structure and culture. In the study of political culture, they start with the assumption that "Each kind of polity--traditional, authoritarian, and democratic--has one form of culture that is congruent with its own structure." <sup>2/</sup> Considering political culture as the "form of form" of political structures, contemporary political scientists expect the elites of the Third-World countries to learn and adopt not only the structures of liberal democracy but also its psychological infrastructures. "The image of the democratic polity that is conveyed to the elites of the new nations is obscure and incomplete"

unless the civic culture is also conveyed. "What must be learned about democracy is a matter of attitude and feeling." <sup>3/</sup> "It is harder to learn" than the structure of liberal democracy, but it is not impossible. <sup>4/</sup>

Plato also relates the forms of government with the mental aspects of man. He discusses the forms of government in the Republic, in The Statesmen, and in The Laws. The Republic includes such forms of government as (1) the republic (Chapters X to XXVIII), timocracy (Chapter XXIX), oligarchy (Chapter XXX), democracy (Chapter XXXI), and despotism (Chapter XXXII). He discusses these forms of government with regard to the psychological dimension of the individual. The relationship between the two is directly indicated by his comparison of the state to a large letter and the mental make-up of the individual to a small letter. He says,

Imagine a rather short-sighted person told to read an inscription in small letters from some way off. He would think it a godsend if someone pointed out that the same inscription was written up elsewhere on a bigger scale, so that he could first read the larger characters and then make out whether the smaller ones were the same...We think of justice as a quality that may exist in a whole community as well as in an individual, and the community is the bigger of the two. Possibly, then, we may find justice there in larger proportions, easier to make out. So I suggest that we should begin by ignoring what justice means in a state. Then we can go on to look for its counterpart on a smaller scale in the individual. <sup>5/</sup>

Here, he definitely refers by large letters to the structures of the state and by small letters to the make-up of individual psychology.

He says that there are as many types of character as there

are distinct varieties of political constitution. There are five of each. He calls the best form of government the republic. If the country is ruled by one man, it is a kingship or monarchy. If it is ruled by several persons, it is an aristocracy. The number of rulers, however, is not important to him. What matters is the type of man who rules, i.e., the psychological dispositions. He considers a monarchy and an aristocracy as "a single form" <sup>6/</sup> as long as only one condition is met, namely, that "genuine philosophers--one or more of them--shall come into power in a state." <sup>7/</sup> Thus, in chapters XII through XXVIII, he matches the structures of the republic, whether monarchy or aristocracy, with the psychological components of the individual. The three parts of the state --the rulers (philosopher-kings), the auxiliaries (soldiers), and the craftsmen class--exactly correspond to the three parts of the mind--reason, emotion, and desire.

The analogy between the big letters and small letters applies not only to the relationship between the just government and the just men but also to the relationship between four other degenerated forms of government and the four corrupt types of men. All of these four forms of government--timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism--are common in that they do not have a single philosopher-king as a ruler. In fact, since the rulers of these four forms of government are unjust men, they are degenerated governments. Concerning the interrelationship between the forms of degenerated government and the psychological constitution of the people, Plato says,

First there is the constitution of Crete and Sparta, which is so commonly admired; second and next in esteem oligarchy, as it is called, a constitution fraught with many evils; next follows its antagonist, democracy; then despotism, which is thought so glorious and goes beyond them all as the fourth and final disease of society...Do you see, then, that there must be as many types of human character as there are forms of government? Constitutions cannot come out of stocks and stones; they must result from the preponderance of certain characters which draw the rest of the community in their wake. So if there are five forms of government, there must be five kinds of mental constitution among individuals.8/

Just as he, in studying the moral qualities of the just man, starts with the state because the structures of the state stand out more clearly than do the moral qualities in the individual, he takes the constitution first in examining the mental qualities of unjust men, and then, in the light of his results, he examines the corresponding character. In accordance with our plan of taking the state first, Plato matches the forms of government with the personal characters of individual rulers. In the latter half of the book, he discusses; (1) timocracy (or timarchy) and the timocratic man (Chapter XXIX), (2) oligarchy (or plutocracy) and the oligarchic man (Chapter XXX), (3) democracy and the democratic man (Chapter XXXI), and (4) despotism (or tyranny) and the despotic man (Chapter XXXII).

In the timocratic form of government, the military class rules and honor and ambition are considered the highest virtues. This state corresponds to the timocratic man who is brave and ambitious and fond of physical exercise, hunting, and military achievements. In the oligarchic form of government, all the political power is

in the hands of the wealthy class and the poor do not share it. This state is congruent with the oligarchic man who values money above everything else and works hard to become rich. He is controlled in his mind neither by his reason nor by his courage but simply by his desire for wealth. In the democratic state, anyone who professes to be the friends of the people rules and everyone is free to do as he likes. Therefore, this state is ruled on the basis of the desires of the people. Democracy is congruent with the democratic man who is controlled completely by desire without any restraint as opposed to an oligarchic man who, if controlled by desire, restrains his pleasure and desires. There is neither order nor restraint in his life. Finally, the worst form of government in the Republic is matched with the worst kind of man in despotism. In the tyrannical form of government, all the citizens except the tyrant himself are enslaved. This form of government is linked with the despotic man the better parts of whose soul, i.e., reason and emotion, are enslaved by his lust. In other words, the bestial elements of human nature have set up a worst kind of government.

In conclusion, I clearly established the fact that Plato, in the Republic, linked the forms of government with the psychological propensities of the individual. He would completely agree with contemporary political scientists' view that "Each kind of polity... has one form of culture that is congruent with its own structure." <sup>9/</sup>

## B. THE OBSERVED POLITICAL SELF

Is Plato's political subject the observed political self or the observing one? Are the qualities of the Platonic political self externally generated but internalized? Or do they transcend the bounds of time, place, and therefore particular historical circumstances? Answering the question bluntly, Plato includes both the observed self and the observing self in the Republic.

Let us analyze his observed political self first. His discussions of the timocratic man, the oligarchic man, the democratic man, and the despotic man are clearly concerned with the learned or externally generated psychological qualities of man which Montesquieu emphasizes as the "form of form" of politics in his The Spirit of the Laws and which contemporary political scientists emphasize in their literature.

Indeed, Plato considers the psychological qualities of man as the form of form of government as modern and contemporary thinkers do. The degeneration of the form of government always starts in the secret place of the mind. If a mental type prevails in numbers and in influence in a certain society, the political constitution exhibits the psychological traits on a large scale. The change starts in the mind and it spreads in the society.

At the same time, however, the original change in the mind occurs under the external influence, which reminds us of the idea of socialization in contemporary political science literature.

In detail, timocracy as a form of government originates in the mind of the "son of an excellent father", <sup>10/</sup> i.e., a philosopher, through socialization including improper education, bad experiences, and bad companies. According to Plato,

His son's character begins to take shape when he hears his mother complaining that she is slighted by the other women because her husband has no official post. She sees too that he cares little for money...; and she finds him always absorbed in thoughts, without much regard for her...Nursing all these grievances, she tells her son that his father is not much of a man...Besides,...servants...sometimes talk privately to the sons in the same way. If they see the father take no action against a swindler..., they urge the son, when he is grown up, to stand up for his rights and be more of a man than his father. When the boy goes out, he sees and hears the same sort of thing...All this experience affects the young man, and on the other hand he listens to his father's conversation and...;and so he is pulled both ways. His father tends the growth of reason in his soul, while the rest of the world is fostering the other two elements, ambition and appetite. By temperament he is not a bad man, but he has fallen into bad company, and the two contrary influences result in a compromise:...he becomes an arrogant and ambitious man. <sup>11/</sup>

When the timocratic son of a philosopher grows up and becomes a ruler, he might have a number of intellectual interests, but he will emphasize military achievements much more than intellectual endeavor. He might despise money while he is young, but as he grows older, he will become more attached to wealth. For his soul is no longer controlled by reason. My concern here is not with reviewing Plato's accounts of transition from one form of government to another through the formation of mental qualities. What is important is that as mental qualities of man degenerate, the forms of government follow suit and that the change in mental qualities occurs under the external influences.

In addition, Plato's discussions of the four major types of man are meant as a criticism of states which actually existed in Plato's time. Therefore, we can say that his personality types as the infrastructures of the forms of government are theoretically empirical concepts which can meet such criteria of scientific statements of contemporary political science as falsification or verification.

In conclusion, Plato's psychological types of the timocratic man, the oligarchic man, the democratic man, and the despotic man are empirical concepts. As the observed or observable political self, his psychological type is not different from political culture.

However, his discussion of the observed political self makes sense only because its meaning is provided from the perspective of the observing political self. Here, we see the great difference between Plato's treatment of the political self and contemporary political scientists' treatment of the political self, i.e., political culture.

## C. THE OBSERVING POLITICAL SELF

### 1. The Philosopher-king

The mental type of the philosopher-king must be considered as the observing political self. More specifically, it refers to Plato's own conception of the ideal man.

The whole book of the Republic is meant to be the rational discussion of the ideal man or the just man. He defines the just man as one whose reason controls emotion and desire. In his mind righteous passion serves reason for the sake of justice against desire. Such a man is wise, courageous, and moderate. He is a good person. The psychological structure of this ideal man as described in Parts II and III of the Republic will not be reviewed here. However, the nature and the origin of the type will be discussed. In addition, the role which the type plays with regard to other psychological types which are empirical will also be discussed.

a. Transcendental

First, the type of the just man is not an empirical one as other types such as the timocratic man, the oligarchic man, the democratic man, and the despotic man are. His main quality, i.e., reason, is not shaped by the external influence. Of course, Plato emphasizes education for training some men into philosophers. In fact, there is a sense in saying that the Republic is, as a whole, a book of education for philosopher-kings. However, even though education and external influences or experiences are considered crucial in training a man into a philosopher, what is more important is the selection or discovery of those who already have "gold"--the predominance of reason--rather than "silver" or "iron" in his soul. The implication is that the psychological make-up of the ideal man or the just man transcends the empirical world.

It is not shaped through habits or custom: it is in accordance with nature. The four major types of the unjust man belong to the class of "human things," while the type of the just man belongs to the world which is not human but divine and natural. In the famous allegory of the cave in Book VII of the Republic, the psychological type of the just man belongs to the world outside the cave, i.e., the really real world of the truth in the light of the sun, while the psychological types of the unjust man belongs to the cave world.

b. The Initial Value Premise

Our second question about the psychological type of the philosopher is: if it is essentially different from the empirical types of the unjust man, what really is it and what kind of role does it perform? In a nutshell, it refers to the observing self. One cannot observe the observed self, i.e. the political culture of the four empirical types of man, except through the initial value premise of the observing self.

In the allegory of the cave, the cave world refers to the observable sense world. But the sense world cannot be observed except through the light of the sun, i.e., the power of the truth. To become the philosopher is to ascend from the cave to the light of the sun, i.e., the world of knowledge and wisdom. Only when you look down in light of knowledge or truth from outside the cave, the cave world is seen, that is, it becomes meaningful. In our

case, the empirical world of political culture is composed of the four major psychological types. However, this cave world can be seen only when the observable world of political culture is brought to light from the perspective of the ideal type of man. The discussions of the unjust man becomes meaningful only in light of the just man. Thus, right after completing the overall picture of the just man, he stands on the vantage point to which he climbed and, looking down the cave world and says,

we are now within sight of the clearest possible proof of our conclusions...If you will take stand with me, then, on this point of vantage to which we have climbed, you shall see all the forms that evil takes, or at least all that it seems worth while to look at...What I see is that, whereas there is only one form of excellence, imperfection exists in innumerable shapes, of which there are four that specially deserve notice...It looks as if there were as many types of character as there are distinct varieties of political constitution...Five of each...One form of constitution will be the form we have been describing, though it may be called by two names: monarchy, when there is one man who stands out above the rest of the Rulers; aristocracy, when there are more than one...That, then, I regard as a single form;... Such, then, is the type of state or constitution that I call good and right, and the corresponding type of man. By this standard, the other forms in which a state or an individual character may be organized are depraved and wrong. There are four of these vicious forms. (Underline is mine) 12/

The vantage point to which he climbed and from which he looks down the cave world clearly refers to the initial value premise which Plato assumes as a point of departure. In other words, it refers to his own original vision about what the just man should be. He can see what is wrong with the empirical world only in light of that original vision. This vision I call the observing political self in Plato's political theory.

## 2. The Essence of Man

### a. The Universal Man

In a more general sense, the observing political self refers to the mental qualities of the universal man. In justifying political obligation in the Republic, Plato searches the universal man through the discovery of the essence of man, not this or that particular man, as the foundation of his political theory. In the Statesman, he calls the science of the universal man the royal science and the sciences of particular men, tributary or secondary sciences. Thus, Plato contributes to our understanding of the universal aspect of the political self.

In Plato's political writings, the art of ruling changes three times: from the art of philosopher-kings in the Republic to the art of statesman in the Statesman and finally to the rule of law in the Laws. The philosopher-king is a god-like ruler who is different in kind from his subjects. The statesman, however, possesses the art of ruling his own kind. With the historical change which makes it impossible to attain either the philosopher-king or the statesman, the rule of law is proposed as a mere imitation of the rule of the statesman. Throughout all these changes, however, the art of ruling men which, as a standard of judgment, justifies political obligation on the side of the ruled remains essentially constant.

Without either the philosopher-king or the true statesman, the law as the system of written instructions must be absolutely

binding in the law-states. However, the binding power ultimately results from the art of ruling which the statesman is supposed to have. In the analogy of the relationship between the doctor and the patient, the latter must be absolutely bound by the former's prescription; however, the former is not bound to the prescription which he has written. What he is bound to is the art of medicine. In the same way, what justifies the rule of law is the art of true statesmanship. The same argument can apply to the relation between the statesmanship and the philosopher-kingship. In spite of differences which the analogies of the art of weaving and the herdsman-king's rule, respectively, the vision of the art of ruling still remains the same. Through the myth of Kronos and Zeus, Plato distinguishes between the art of true statesmanship, i.e., the art of ruling his own kind and the art of the philosopher-king's rulership, i.e., the art of ruling his subjects inferior in knowledge and physical stamina. Besides, "whereas the scale in the Republic is determined by the ever-increasing encroachment of the appetites, especially of the lust for pleasure and the lust for power, upon the rational element, in the Statesman, one might almost say, the predominance of the appetites is taken for granted as inevitable in the actually existing states and, instead, the yardstick becomes adherence to the curbing power of the law." <sup>13/</sup> For all this, there still is a sense in saying that the law is an imitation of statesmanship which is in turn an imitation of the rule of the philosopher-king. For in the Laws, Plato says,

The story has a moral for us even today, and there is a lot of truth in it: where the ruler of a state is not a god but a mortal, people have no respite from toil and misfortune. The lesson is that we should make every effort to imitate the life men are said to have led under Cronus; we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what little spark of immortality lies in us, and dignify this distribution of reason with the name of 'law.' 14/

He also says in the Statesman,

In no state whatsoever could it happen that a large number of people received this gift of political wisdom which would enable them to govern the city by the pure intelligence which would accompany it. Only in the hands of a select few or of an individual can we look for that one true constitution. For we must call all other constitutions mere imitations of this. Some are more perfect copies of it, as we said a little earlier, others are grosser and less adequate imitations...We may say, then, that there is only one constitution in the true sense--the one we have described. For the rest of them owe their very preservation to their following the written code of laws enacted for this true state and to a strict adherence to a rule which we now admit to be desirable though it falls short of the ideal. 15/

That which remains the same while the rule of a philosopher-king changes to that of the true statesman which in turn changes to a government of law is the function of what I call the observing political self in my paper. In the Statesman, Plato calls it the "royal art" or "royal science" not only "in the sense that it is the art proper to the king, but also in that it is supreme among all the arts." 16/ This is the classical sense of political science, that is, the science of ruling or statesmanship.

What, then, is the heart of the true art of ruling as the function of the observing political self? What is the fundamental tenet of ruling as "'a science' or 'expert knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) that is

governed by certain knowable principles"? 17/ What is that upon which the whole structures of the Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws are ultimately maintained? I think that it is the ability of the political self to see the form of the whole. It refers to man's mental power of unification, integration, or collection in the particular sense of the term which Plato adopts in his method of dialectic which Kant calls, as we will see later, the synthetic unity of the understanding. A commentator interprets Plato's method of collection as follows;

Collection consists in 'bringing together and comprehending into a unity the widely scattered particulars.' Though we find only comparatively few explicit examples of Collection in the words of Plato, it is quite clear that it should always precede Division: in order to arrive at the specific form or concept, which is the object of the inquiry, we must start from some general or generic notion of the area within which the object of our search is to be found. This area is, needless to say, larger than the specific goal and includes many elements that are only loosely related to it. Once the elements have been gathered together by the process of Collection, the Division can proceed. Its object is 'to divide into specific forms according to natural articulations without attempting to shatter any part, as in an inefficient butcher might do,' and 'to know how to distinguish, kind by kind, in what ways the several particulars can combine and in what ways they cannot.' In other words, the differences which are brought to light at each state in the Division must be real and not accidental, they must differentiate one specific form from another in a significant and meaningful way. When the process has been completed and constant division and subdivision have brought us to the specific form which we set out to seek, the applicable parts which have been retained in the various stages of Division can be brought together so as to form the completed definition. 18/

This mental power to have the original vision of the whole is the foundation of the classical political science. This function of the self is implied in the "Ideas" or "Essential Forms," culmi-

nating in the Essential Form of the Good. It is also implied in the shepherd analogy, in the analogy of weaving, and in any other places where the true art of ruling is discussed.

In brief, the very heart of the observing political self in Plato's political writings consists in the essence of man. Man conceived in terms of his essence may be called a universal man as opposed to a particular or partial man. Plato therefore searches the essence of man and obtains the vision of the society where man's essence may be realized. Thus, in the Republic, he defines justice in terms of the essence of man.

b. The Alternative Conception of Man and Society

So far, we have reviewed his political theory of the just society grounded on the essence of man. The implications of this theory proper will become clearer by contrasting it with the alternative conceptions of man and society which he presents in the introductory part of the Republic. The investigation of the alternative conceptions will serve the purpose of this paper in three different ways. First, instead of focusing on his theory of the essence of man proper, it allows us to understand the concept of essence. Secondly, the theory on essence itself will become clearer by investigating what it is not. Thirdly, the review of the alternative conceptions of man and society presented by Plato himself provides us with a link with Hobbes's theory of the political self where the arguments are largely reversed.

In the conception of political reality, then, Plato dichotomizes two ultimately different views: the world for the universal man and the world for particular men with accidental rather than essential qualities. For example, doctors, musicians, sailors, and the like are particular men. They are all men, but men are not identical with such particular men.

In presenting the picture of the world for particular men, Plato first opposes friends against enemies and then the stronger against the weaker. He almost presents the world where the rich are opposed to the poor, but this opposition is not elaborated. In this world of particular men, the universal man with man's essential qualities does not find his place at all. Even though the conflict between friends and enemies or between the stronger and the weaker are almost ubiquitous phenomena in any age and society, the concept of essence and the just society for the universal man, for Plato, transcends the conflict of any kind. How does he define the concept of essence as related to his theory of the observing political self? For the definition of this concept, he uses a number of analogies.

i. The world of friends and enemies

In criticising the conception of political reality grounded on the opposition between friends and enemies, Plato introduces the notion of art. For, if political reality is understood in terms of the struggle between friends and enemies, justice in the sense of the essence of man would mean an art of helping friends and harming enemies.

The term art refers to man's quality or ability by which he can "render to some object what is due or appropriate to it." <sup>19/</sup> Thus, the art of medicine refers to a man's ability to "administer the appropriate diet or remedies to the body." <sup>20/</sup> The art of cookery refers to a man's ability to "give the appropriate seasoning to his dishes." <sup>21/</sup> Then, the art of justice as the art of being a man would be the ability to help friends or harm enemies. What would be the art of justice as such more specifically?

Justice as an art to help friends and injure enemies would require not only the ability to protect friends against enemies in battle and to keep money safe against thieves in peacetime business partnership, but also the ability to steal enemies' plans in wartime and steal money in peacetime. Justice in this sense would mean cleverness: the just man, a clever man. It then follows that if the essence of man is to help friends and harm enemies, justice would mean cleverness as the art of "stealing, for the benefit, to be sure, of friends and the harm of enemies." <sup>22/</sup> "So the just man turns out to be a kind of thief...surpassing all men in cheating and perjury." <sup>23/</sup>

Can it really be the essence of man to harm any human being? Needless to say, Plato's answer is in the negative as Conford comments;

The argument now becomes more serious. Polemarchus, though puzzled, clings to the belief that it must be right to help friends and harm enemies. This was a traditional maxim of Greek morality, never doubted till Socrates denied it: no

one had ever said that we ought to do good, or even refrain from doing harm, to them that hate us. Socrates' denial rests on his principle, later adopted by Stoics, that the only thing that is good in itself is the goodness, virtue, well-being of the human soul. The only way really to injure a man is to make him a worse man. This cannot be the function of justice. 24/

In refuting the definition of justice, that is, the essence of man, as helping friends and harming enemies, Plato introduces the notion of virtue in the sense of excellence, i.e. nature, of something. A horse, a dog, a knife, a man--everything has its virtue or nature. The virtue of a horse is horseness, i.e. a horse's nature. The virtue of a man is man's nature which Plato defines as justice.

Just as harming a horse or a dog makes it "a worse horse or dog, so that each will be a less perfect creature in its own special way," 25/ injuries even to bad men make them of less human, that is to say, reduce the virtue of man. To harm any man, whether a friend or an enemy, would mean making him less just. 26/

Plato's refutation of the essence of man as helping friends and harming enemies also means that he does not conceive political reality in terms of the conflict between friends and enemies.

In brief, Plato shows the direction of his arguments toward universalism by connecting ruling as an art with the virtue of man. For the concept of the virtue of a man does not allow the particularistic world where friends are discriminated from enemies and where the standard of discrimination is personal and private.

ii. The World of the Stronger and the Weaker

Plato further develops his concept of essence of man by shifting his attention from the investigation of the world of friends and enemies to that of the world of the stronger and the weaker. The radicalization of the relation between friends and enemies leads to the relation between the stronger and the weaker. Here, man's nature is ultimately conceived in terms of the self-interest. In the unlimited-self-seeking world, the art of ruling, according to Thrasymachus' general argument, would let the possessor of the art have power to dominate others and seek his self-interest. Then, would the pursuit of the self-interest on the side of the ruled and the obedience of the ruled to the interest of the stronger be in conformity with or at least compatible with the essence of man?

Plato's answer is in the negative. For him, essence refers to the seeing of the whole, i.e., the qualitative unity. Anything that does not lead to unity or that which leads to division is not essential but accidental. He agrees that the essence of man is in a sense a matter of interest, not of the particular interest but of man in general, <sup>27/</sup> that is, the whole humanity.

Interest is the benefit or the product which the art of ruling brings about. The question is whether the interest is brought to the ruler or the ruled?

Plato thinks that the interest of ruling brought to the ruled is in conformity with the essence of man while the same brought to the ruler is not. For the justification of his argument, he uses

the analogies of crafts comparable to the art of ruling. Any art or craft "has an interest, other than its own greatest possible perfection." 28/ He says,

No art needs to have its weaknesses remedied or its interests studied either by another art...because no art has in itself any weakness or fault, and...In itself, an art is sound and flawless, so long as it is entirely true to its own nature as an art in the strictest sense. 29/

The only interest, Plato says, "it is required to serve is that of its subject-matter." 30/ Thus,

If you should ask me whether it's enough for a body to be a body or whether it needs something else, I would say: 'by all means, it needs something else.' The art of medicine has now been discovered because a body is defective...The art was devised for the purpose of providing what is advantageous for a body...

Medicine doesn't consider the advantage of medicine, but of the body...Nor does horsemanship consider the advantage of horsemanship, but of horses. Nor does any other art consider its own advantage--for it doesn't have any further need to--but the advantage of that of which it is the art. 31/

Though "every art has authority and superior power over its subject,...no art ever studies...the interest of the superior or stronger party, but always that of the weaker over which it has authority." 32/ He continues,

So the physician...studies only the patient's interest, not his own. For...the business of the physician...is not to make money for himself, but to exercise his power over the patient's body. 33/

In the same way, the ruler will not study what is for his own interest. "All that he says and does will be said and done with a view to what is good and proper for the subject for whom he practises his art." 34/ Plato therefore concludes that "no form of skill

or authority provides for its own benefit...It always studies and prescribes what is good for its subject...the interest of the weaker party, not of the stronger." 35/

True, it is a historical fact that the ruler as the shepherd of the people has been more concerned with his private interest than with the interest of the ruled. However, facts are accidental phenomena, not essential ones. The fact that most rulers have pursued their own selfish interest through the act of ruling most of the time does not make it right to do so. The essence of man cannot be derived from facts. In fact, the significance of the concept of essence lies in its absence in the existing world. That is why Plato emphatically deals with such factual, that is, accidental phenomena as the pursuit of the ruler's selfish interest as well as the reward of justice on the side of the ruled. For Plato, facts cannot lead to the definition of the essence of man or of the society.

Here, aside from the question whether we can agree with Plato's ontological realism or essentialism, we can clearly see what he means by the essence of man and society in terms of what it is not which in turn strongly suggests what it would be. His dialectical arguments toward the definition of man, that is, the essence of man progresses through the comparison of the genuinely essential nature of man with the seemingly essential but in fact false nature and through the refutation of the latter as the accidental qualities of man. For example, the physician qua physician is compared

with a false one: the shepherd qua shepherd with a false one: the ruler qua ruler with a false one.

c. The Ruler qua Ruler

The ruler qua ruler, as we have seen, does not conceive the world in terms of the conflict between friends and enemies or in terms of the domination of the stronger as the master over the weaker as the slave. The way Plato argues about the relation between the art and the interest which its power brings about strongly suggests that the political reality which he conceives transcends the factual or statistical world. His political reality is the world of essences toward which a progress must be made through the denial of the existing world. Therefore, his theory of politics as a royal science does not try to explain the existing world: it tries to improve it. Its goal is to provide the ruler with the vision of the good society to be realized in the future.

Plato does not deny the fact of undesirable aspects concerning the practice of certain arts including the art of ruling. What he tries to do is, first, to prove that facts cannot justify facts and, then, to suggest the direction toward which undesirable facts can be improved.

Plato does not argue against the factual judgment that the ruler of the people have commonly been concerned less with the interest of their subjects than with their private interest just as the shepherds have commonly been less concerned with the good of their flock than with shearing and butchering them for their own

profit and aggrandizement. What he argues against is the normative judgment that the ruler qua ruler should do so or even can be justified in doing so. He does not deny the factual judgment that most people lead a just life not because it is good in itself but because it brings about rewards. However, he does deny the normative judgment that the essence of justice consists not in itself but in its reward and therefore that man should acquire the appearance of a just life rather than justice itself.

His argument about the distinction between justice in itself and the reward which it brings about gives a clue to the concept of essence. As we have seen, in an effort to define the essence of man, his notions of "art" and "virtue" suggest a number of things for the apprehension of the concept of essence. The two notions suggest, first, that essence refers to the nature of a thing; secondly, that the knowledge of the nature can be discovered; and, thirdly, with the art as the knowledge of the nature, the nature of a thing can be nurtured, thus, the art bringing about its reward for the interest of the thing nurtured. However, his distinction between justice in itself and its reward is a warning against the possible confusion of essence with its appearance or shadow. He shows the possibility that justice can be confused with injustice with the appearance of justice. Justice in itself is unconditional like Kant's categorical imperative.

### 3. Plato's Warning against False Ontological Realism

Plato's distinction between the true ruler and the mere appearance of the ruler as is implied in the distinction between justice in itself and its mere appearance suggests the possibility of the abuse of political theory grounded on the concept of essence.

The authority of a ruler is justified by the sure art of ruling, that is, the knowledge of the essence of man in the sense we reviewed above. Plato clearly distinguishes between the art of ruling and cleverness. A ruler is a genuine ruler when he is a just man. In contrast, a ruler is a clever ruler when he practices justice because of its rewards only and therefore when he has only a reputation of being a just man. However, it is virtually impossible to discriminate a truly just ruler from a ruler who leads a just life because of the reputation of justice.

What complicates the problem is the fact that the reputation of justice itself means power to control the people. As Plato says, any art gives its possessor power. A ruler who has the art of ruling also has power not only because he is given a great organized force but also because he has the reputation of a just man. Because of the difficulty to discriminate a truly just man from a seemingly just man and therefore to discriminate a genuine ruler from a false ruler, a ruler can easily abuse power for the pursuit of his private interest while it is given him to nurture the essence of man by pursuing the interest of the ruled.

This dilemma is implied in the analogy of the magic ring which makes it impossible to discriminate a completely unjust man from a completely just man. Here, not only the possibility but also the danger of the abuse of essentialist political theory is examined. With the magic ring of the reputation of justice, the most unjust ruler can grab as much wealth, power, and pleasure as he can in the most efficient way without being detected.

Hobbes, in the last book of the Leviathan, shows that virtually all of these warnings given by Plato in the introductory part of the Republic were materialized in the institution of the Church of Rome. The Pope is accused of having been the false ruler. The analogy of the magic ring is referred to as the notion of "demon." The concept of essence supported demonology by making it impossible to discriminate phantasms from real things. In an effort to fight the rule of the Pope as a foreign prince through ideological manipulation, therefore, Hobbes tries to destroy essentialism as the philosophical foundation of the influence of the Pope and develop an entirely different kind of theory.

Even though his criticism of essentialism turns out to be the accusation of the abuse of essentialism rather than essentialism itself, Hobbes systematically reverses Plato's arguments. What Plato denies, Hobbes adopts. Their perception of the nature of man is opposite. In particular, the theory on the origin of justice and morality which Plato refutes constitutes the very important part of Hobbes's theory. As a result, Hobbes develops a very dif-

ferent concept of the political self; that is, the observed political self.

I see the most important link between Plato's concept of the political self as well as political theory in general and Hobbes's in the following paragraph. Plato criticises the following theory on the social contract which constitutes the essential part of Hobbes's theory.

Doing injustice is...good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it; so that, when they do injustice to one another and suffer it and taste of both, it seems profitable--to those who are not able to escape the one and choose the other--to set down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. And from there they began to set down their own laws and compacts and to name what the law commands lawful and just. And this, then, is the genesis and being of justice; it is a mean between what is best--doing injustice without paying the penalty--and what is worst--suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself. The just is in the middle between these two, cared for not because it is good but because it is honored due to a want of vigor in doing injustice. The man who is able to do it and is truly a man would never set down a compact with anyone not to do injustice and not to suffer it...Now the nature of justice is this and of this sort, and it naturally grows out of these sorts of things. So the argument goes. 36/

## CHAPTER THREE THE OBSERVED POLITICAL SELF: HOBBS'S LEVIATHAN

In the history of Western political thought, man's self-consciousness of the political self reaches its second stage of development in Hobbes's Leviathan. We have seen its first stage in Plato's Republic. The concept of the observing political self is further developed by Aristotle and, throughout the Middle Ages, provides the Pope of the Roman Church with the ideological tool to rule the minds in the Christendom. A new epoch in the history of Western political organization arises when Hobbes, in an effort to deprive the Roman Church of the ideological ground for the universal rule, develops a political theory founded on a new conception of the political self, namely, the observed political self as against the observing political self, theoretically supporting the establishment of the modern nation-state in England. While ontological realism grounds the universal monarchy, ontological subjectivism or nominalism serves the same purpose for the particularistic self-oriented sovereign nation-states.

### PART I

### THE POLITICAL OTHER

#### A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL OTHER

## 1. The Pope

In the last book of the Leviathan Hobbes describes his motive for writing the book. The major problem he sees in the existing political condition is in the mental corruption of the political self under the universalistic religious influence of the Roman Church. The establishment of the sovereign nation-state independent of any foreign influence requires the refusal on the side of the Englishmen to accept the authority of the Roman Church to rule their mind by the name of the absolute truth.

By the time Hobbes writes the Leviathan, the Church of Rome has been cast out from England, but he is concerned not only with its remaining influence but also with its return as well as the possible establishment of any universal kingdom of absolute truth which claims a power distinct from and superior to that of the civil state.

It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry VIII by his exorcism; nor for Queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him little fruit, may not return, or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabit this clean swept house, and make the end thereof worse than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only that pretends the kingdom of God to be of this world, and thereby to have a power therein, distinct from that of the civil state. And this is all I had a design to say, concerning the doctrine of the POLITICS. Which when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my country. 1/

## 2. Organization and Ideology for Penetration

Hobbes calls a kingdom of darkness a civil state where the political self is controlled by the political other on the inter-

national level rather than to a country which is ruled by morally corrupted leaders. Specifically, the kingdom of darkness refers to the possibility of England being ruled by the Pope who heads the Roman Church, a foreign universal monarchy. Here, the political self identified with the civil sovereign and the people of England in general is manipulated in both behaviors and mind through: (1) the clergy as the organization of the comprador-type of native agents and (2) the universalistic religious and philosophical ideologies.

In order to control civil princes, the Pope, being a foreign prince, established the organization of the clergy including bishops, all other priests, all monks, and friars. By having them owe obedience to him alone and exempt from the power of the civil laws, the Pope was "able, as he hath done many times, to raise a civil war against the state that submits not itself to be governed according to his pleasure and interest." <sup>2/</sup> The Pope not only pitted the clergy against the civil prince, but he also depended for the psychological corruption of the political self on universal ideology which caused the self-incurred tutelage on the side of the ruled. Hobbes sees the difficulty of dealing with the Roman Church in that the Pope ruled Christian princes and their subjects ultimately through doctrines or ideas rather than by violence. One of the major characteristics of any ideological rule is that the ultimate interest of the ruler is well hidden behind the highly sophisticated manifest justification for control. The ancient

analogy for ideological rule is the shepherd analogy in which the shepherd protects his lambs from wild animals while his ultimate interest is in meat and wool. Such ideological rule is intrinsically associated with the question of the political self because the former causes a self-incurred tutelage in the latter. Therefore, in attacking the Pope as a foreign ruler, Hobbes criticizes ideas or doctrines which the political other utilizes as a tool for the domination of others.

Thus, Hobbes criticizes the existing dominant theory of the political self which is based on or in conformity with the universalistic ontological realism of Plato and Aristotle, which Hobbes calls the "vain philosophy." In fact, the Leviathan can be divided into two parts. The Fourth Part which is the last is a negative critique of the then dominant theory of the political self as well as of the universal religious monarchy founded on that conception of the self. In reading the book, it seems to be essential to read this last part as an introduction to the positive construction of an alternative theory of the political self which the author develops in the first three parts. Together with the misinterpretation of the Bible and demonology, the vain philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, according to Hobbes, constitutes the political ideology which provided the Pope with a tool to rule Christian princes and their subjects.

### 3. The Authors of Ideologies: cui bono

Hobbes lists the four causes of mental darkness in the polit-

ical self, including the misinterpretation of the Bible (Chapter 44), demonology (Chapter 47), the vain philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (Chapter 46) and traditions and customs (Chapter 47). The way Hobbes defines the authorship of these ideologies clearly shows his intention of writing the Leviathan.

The original authors of them are intellectuals--priests, poets, philosophers, etc.--rather than the incumbent Pope or the members of the clergy. However, Hobbes regards the Pope as the author of all these ideologies by applying the principle of cui bono that "He that receiveth benefit by a fact, is presumed to be the author." <sup>3/</sup>

Cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge amongst the Romans, for a custom he had, in criminal causes, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, cui bono; that is to say, what profit, honor, or other contentment, the accused obtained or expected by the fact. For amongst presumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the author, as doth the benefit of the action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine, who they may be that have possessed the people so long in this part of Christendom, with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind. <sup>4/</sup>

Using this rule, Hobbes concludes that the Pope was the author of all those doctrines which helped his universal sovereignty by causing mental darkness in the mind of the political self.<sup>5/</sup> He asserts that the Roman Church set up the spiritual sovereignty over and above the civil sovereignty. He accuses the usurpation by the Pope of a sovereign power over the people which properly belongs to the sovereign ruler of the nation-state.

The Pope prevailed with the subjects of all Christian princes, to believe, that to disobey him, was to disobey Christ himself;

and in all differences between him and other princes, (charmed with the word power spiritual), to abandon their lawful sovereigns; which is in effect an universal monarchy over all Christendom. 6/

Hobbes lists twelve different ways by which the Pope ruled the people of other countries including England through universal ideologies and powerful men who owed obedience to him. 7/

## B. IDEOLOGICAL MANIPULATION

I define ontological realism as a philosophical position that what is really real, that is to say, the world of ultimate truth, exists objectively or independently of the knowing subject. Hobbes accuses the Pope of having combined three kinds of ontological realism for his political purposes: the misinterpretation of the Bible, demonology, and the "vain philosophy" of Plato and Aristotle.

### 1. Misinterpretation of the Bible

Hobbes's intention in criticizing the Pope for misinterpreting the Scriptures is clearly to expose the Pope's and any other possible universal monarch's political purpose to control the English sovereign and his or her subjects by the name of absolute truth. The Pope tried to accomplish this purpose, first, by establishing himself as the spokesman of God and therefore as the universal monarch above all civil sovereigns as we have seen and, second, by depriving the people of natural reason and thus causing darkness in their mind.

For Hobbes, "All truth of doctrine dependeth" not only on the Scriptures but upon reason. 8/ He thinks that natural reason is

the word of God built into man's heart.<sup>9/</sup> Thus, in the first two parts of the Leviathan, Hobbes is concerned with "the Divine laws or dictates of natural reason; which laws concern...the natural duties of one man to another." They are

the same laws of nature, of which I have spoken already in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of this treatise; namely, equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remaineth therefore that we consider what moral precepts are dictated to men, by their natural reason only, without other word of God, touching the honor and worship of the Divine Majesty.<sup>10/</sup>

"To obtain dominion over men in this present world," <sup>11/</sup> the Pope endeavored to "settle in the minds of men this erroneous doctrine that the Church now on earth is that kingdom of God mentioned in the Old and New Testaments." <sup>12/</sup> Almost all the rest of the misinterpretation of the Bible are either consequent or subservient to this "greatest and main abuse of Scripture." <sup>13/</sup> For consequent to the interpretation that the kingdom of God is the present Church, "there ought to be some one man or assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour, now in heaven speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person to all Christians." <sup>14/</sup> By this doctrine, "the Pope prevailed with the subjects of all Christian princes, to believe that to disobey him was to disobey Christ himself; and in all differences between him and other princes...to abandon their lawful sovereigns; which is in effect a universal monarchy over all Christendom." <sup>15/</sup>

In fact, Hobbes does not deny the absolute authority to represent Christ on earth. He thinks only that the Scriptures give this

authority not to the Pope or any other universal spiritual monarch but to civil sovereigns. <sup>16/</sup> Since sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators, it is the British sovereign that should have made all decisions "by the authority of the Church of England" <sup>17/</sup> unless there is a clear contradiction with the messages of the Scriptures. <sup>18/</sup>

The greatest damage which the doctrine that the Church of Rome is the kingdom of God spoken of in the Old and New Testaments does is on natural reason. The Pope's claim on the power under Christ on earth "putteth out the light of nature, and causeth so great a darkness in men's understanding that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience." <sup>19/</sup> The upshot of this darkness is that people can not discern their enemies from their friends; and, therefore, they become mentally confused and fight among themselves.

As often as there is any repugnance between the political designs of the Pope and other Christian princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a mist amongst their subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawful prince...; and in this darkness of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends, under the conduct of another man's ambition. <sup>20/</sup>

In brief, Hobbes denounces the Pope as the reification of the subjective image of God which Hobbes calls a "demon," a "fairy," a "phantasm," an "apparition," a "ghost," etc. and which, when worshiped, turns into an "idol." <sup>21/</sup>

## 2. Demonology as the Cause of Darkness: Reification of Images for Political Purposes

Against the genuine teaching of the Scriptures, Hobbes tries to make clear, the Church of Rome retained many false ideas and religious traditions of the ancient Greeks, Romans, and other Gentiles, for political purposes. One of the most important ideas is that of a demon. In his analysis of demonology, the concept of a demon, insofar as it helps the Pope to rule other people, has three components. First, a demon is an image without its object. Second, it is reified as an independent existence separated from the brain. Third, it is omnipotent so that it may perform miracles. With these three characteristics, a demon could serve the Pope by controlling the mind of the people.

To elaborate, first, Hobbes says that the origin of a demon is an image. As we will see later, he considers an image as a decaying sense, an impression left in the brain by the pressure on our sense organs.

Secondly, a demon, if a decaying sense left in the brain, acquires an independent existence. An image cannot be separated from the brain, but a demon which is thought to control the mind of the people is an idea or an image reified into a separate entity. Without knowing that it exists only in the brain, the ignorant people may conceive of an image "really without us". <sup>22/</sup> As a result, an image acquires either an absolutely incorporeal or immaterial body--a form without matter--or a material but invisible body such

as "air or other more subtle and ethereal matter." They "agree on one general appellation of them, DEMONS." Hobbes continues,

As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not phantasms but ghosts;...as if one should say, he saw his own ghost in a looking-glass, or the ghost of the stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the démon or ghost of that great sun that enlightens the whole visible world. 23/

Finally, to become a demon, an invisible and unknowable image acquires an unlimited power. People fear demons "as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them good or harm."24/

Here we have an ideological tool which the Pope as a foreign prince utilized in manipulating the desires and passions of the people of the other countries and thus in controlling them for political ambition. When used internationally, the concept of a demon becomes a powerful tool of imperialism by causing darkness in the mind of the political self and taming rebellious people into obedient slaves.

The worship of saints, and images, and relics and other things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed by the Word of God...(was) partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles; and afterwards,...countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of Rome.25/

Hobbes's analysis of demonology as above first implies that, by worshipping images as idols, one worships the image of one's own invention, which reflects one's own desires and passions.

Secondly, he denies the possibility of demons by developing a materialist philosophy. There cannot be any really real thing that is invisible, immaterial, and infinite. Demons or idols are

nothing more than the subjective reaction of the knowing subject to external objects which are visible, material, and finite. 26/

### 3. The Vain Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle

In order to deprive the Pope of the ideological tools for his universal political control, Hobbes attacks first the religious ground of his rule, and then its emotional foundation of demonology.

As the fairies have no existence, but in the fancies of ignorant people...: so the spiritual power of the Pope...consisteth only in the fear that seduced people stand in, of their excommunications; upon hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the Scripture. 27/

However, his final attack is on its rational and intellectual foundation, namely, the "vain philosophy" of Plato and Aristotle. Demonology turns ignorant people into natural fools, but it is the "vain philosophy" that theoretically supports the universal rule. In fact, Hobbes almost degrades the realist philosophy to demonology itself. For he says that, "by this doctrine of separated essences," the Pope would fright the people "from obeying the laws of their own country, with empty names," he continues,

as men would fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul, that is his life, can walk separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say that the figure and color and taste of a piece of bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no bread. And upon the same ground they say that faith, and wisdom, and other virtues are sometimes poured into a man, sometimes blown into him from Heaven, as if the virtuous and their virtues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will endeavor to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest that can make God, rather than his sovereign, nay than God himself? Or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will not

bear great respect to those that can make the holy water that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the errors, which are brought into the Church, from the entities and essences of Aristotle...? 28/

The central institutes for the socialization of the clergy were "well known to be the universities, that received their discipline from authority pontifical."29/ In the university of Rome, Aristotle's philosophy was taught as a handmaid to the Roman religion. 30/ Therefore, Hobbes's criticism of ontological realism in the Leviathan focuses indirectly on Plato "that was the best philosopher of the Greeks" 31/ and directly on Aristotle. Hobbes says,

I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called Aristotle's Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to government, that much of that he hath said in his Politics; nor more ignorantly than a great part of his Ethics. 32/

Thus, the Pope as a foreign prince and the clergy under him "endeavor by dark and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature, and of the gospel" 33/ and so to let the people "obey a priest that can make God, rather than his sovereign, nay God himself." In brief, together with demonology, the "vain philosophy" of Aristotle was utilized by the Pope for his political purposes to cause darkness in the mind of the political self. Thus, for Hobbes, the essences of Aristotle's Metaphysics are identical with demons which are expressed in philosophical terms.

Indeed that which is there written is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to the natural reason that whosoever thinketh there is anything to be understood by it must needs think it supernatural... From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture

to make School divinity, we are told, there be in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call abstract essences, and substantial forms. <sup>34/</sup>

With demonology and the "vain philosophy" hand in hand, the essence of man was interpreted as an incorporeal soul which was separated from the body<sup>35/</sup> and which could go without the body to heaven, hell, or purgatory and could be tormented in the fire of hell.<sup>36/</sup>

With the conclusion that ontological realism has been utilized by the Pope for the political control of other Christian states, Hobbes finds it necessary to replace it completely with an entirely different philosophical position. As a result, he adopts a nominalist position both in attacking ontological realism and in developing a new theory of the political self based on materialism, subjectivism, and nominalism.

First, Hobbes takes a materialist or physicalist position in understanding political reality. What is really real is corporeal, that is to say, body. Hobbes says,

The world...is corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth;... and consequently every part of the universe is body and that which is not body is no part of the universe. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing; and consequently nowhere...But for spirits, they call them incorporeal, which is a name of more honor, and may therefore with more piety attributed to God himself, in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honor him.<sup>37/</sup>

Secondly, from the perspective of nominalism, he reduces the essences of things to definitions by which he means signs.<sup>38/</sup> The

terms of entity, essence, essential, essentiality are "no names of things, but signs." <sup>39/</sup> For example, "to be a body, to walk, to be speaking, to live, to see, and the like infinitives; also corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight, and the like, that signify just the same, are the names of nothing."<sup>40/</sup> Seen from the perspective of nominalism, "the use of words is to register to ourselves and make manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Hobbes says,

Of which words, some are the names of the things conceived, as the names of all sorts of bodies that work upon the senses and leave an impression in the imagination. Others are the names of the imaginations themselves, that is to say, of those ideas or mental images we have of all things we see or remember. And others again are names of names or of different sorts of speech as universal, plural, singular, are the names of names; and definition, affirmation, negation, true, false, syllogism, interrogation, promise, covenant, are the names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another, as when one saith, a man is a body, he intendeth that the name of body is necessarily consequent to the name of man. <sup>41/</sup>

Thirdly, from the viewpoint of subjectivism, Hobbes accuses ontological realism in general as the expression of human desires and passions. As a materialist, he refutes idealism, or more accurately to say, idealist realism. As a nominalist, he reduces the essences of things to the definitions or signs of what the knowing subject has in thought. The upshot of the two leads to empirical subjectivism from the perspective of which he considers the essences of things and substantial forms either in natural or moral philosophy as nothing but the reflection of the knowing subjects's, particularly the Pope's, desires, passions, or ambitions.

According to Hobbes,

Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own passions. For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law of nature; and in it, the law civil, that determineth what is honest and dishonest, what is just and unjust, and generally what is good and evil. Whereas they make the rules of good and bad, by their own liking and disliking: by which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth, as far as he dares, whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of commonwealth. Their logic, which should be the method of reasoning, is nothing else but captions of words, and inventions how to puzzle such as should go about to pose them. To conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old philosophers, as Cicero saith (who was one of them,) have not some of them maintained. And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called Aristotle's Metaphysics; no more repugnant to government, that much of that he hath said in his Politics; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics. 42/

Having regarded the moral and political theory based on the vain philosophy as the expression of private appetite, Hobbes concludes that "this private measure of good is a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public state." 43/ For the price of adopting the "vain philosophy" is to submit to the private passions of a foreign prince "while every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign." 44/

### C. NOMINALIST DESTRUCTION OF REALIST THEORY

#### 1. Nominalism as opposed to realism

As we have seen, Hobbes's intention to develop his political theory is, first, to free the self of the Englishmen from the fear of phantasm caused by the philosophy of essence as well as demonology adopted by the Pope and, second, to build the commonwealth

upon the self liberated from the influence of the foreign prince.  
In a sense, Hobbes is involved in the politics of political theories.

He finds his solution in nominalism. The fundamental argument of nominalism is that "all things that exist are particulars." <sup>45/</sup>  
Except the fact that the term nominalism has been generally used, particularism will be a proper nomenclature for the following reasons;

"Nominalism" is sometimes restricted to the position which I call Predicate Nominalism. And, indeed, this would be the most appropriate nomenclature. Nominalism in the broad sense of the term, the doctrine that all things that exist are only particulars, would better be called "Particularism." But the tradition of calling the two main camps in the dispute about universals "Nominalists" and "Realists" is so deeply entrenched that I do not think it can be overthrown. Unable to beat it, I join it. In any case, the term "Particularism" can usefully be reserved for the doctrine that properties and relations, though objective, are particulars not universals. <sup>46/</sup>

In contrast, the mirror-image of nominalism may be called the "'Universalist' doctrine that nothing but universals exist." <sup>47/</sup>  
But in the history of Western philosophy, just as the "Particularist" doctrine has been more or less broadly interpreted and called realism. The realists as such "need not deny that all things that exist are particulars, but he must at least deny that there are only particulars." <sup>48/</sup>

The problems which either nominalism/particularism or realism/universalism faces are opposite in a way but similar in another way. For, while the "Universalist" must give an account of the apparent existence of particulars, the "Particularist" must account for the "apparent (if usually partial) identity of numeri-

cally different particulars." 49/

In the analysis of Plato's theory of the political self, we have seen that Plato tries to grasp universals in terms of the concept of essence through a number of analogies on the one hand and dispose of the apparent existence of particulars by considering them as the appearance of essence. For example, a concern with the rewards of justice means a concern with the reputation of justice, which is the appearance of essence; and therefore, the confusion of the universal with its appearance is itself injustice.

How does Hobbes explain away the apparent existence of universals? For example, "How can two different things both be white and both be on a table?" 50/ Nominalists have solved this question in many different ways.

Although all Nominalists agree that all things that exist are only particulars, they by no means agree about the way that the problem of apparent identity of nature is to be solved. I classify their attempted solutions under five heads which I call Predicate Nominalism, Concept Nominalism, Class Nominalism, Mereological Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism. 51/

Since our purpose is not to analyze the arguments between universalists and nominalists but to analyze how Hobbes uses nominalist arguments in order to solve the problem of the political self as he sees it, I will simply focus on Hobbes's nominalist arguments.

## 2. Nominalist destruction of Realist Theory

Taking a nominalist stand, Hobbes reverses almost every argument which Plato uses. In Plato's political theory, that which

is natural and essential is also good. He traces the origin of political reality in the essence of man, that is, in the nature of man. The art of ruling as the royal science is grounded on the knowledge of the essence of man. Therefore, the truly just society exists in the state of nature. In all of his arguments used in his theory of justice, the ultimate standard of judgment consists in the essence of man. The existing state of affairs is criticized in light of the essence of man.

However, Hobbes's picture of the state of nature is entirely different from Plato's. We have seen that, in the analysis of the kingdom of darkness, Hobbes criticizes the concept of essence in the "vain philosophy" as a mere phantasm, that is, a kind of self-deception just as an idol or a demon is. Furthermore, he thinks that "nature itself cannot err." 52/

For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood; error there may be as when we expect that which shall not be or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth. 53/

Then, in the main body of the Leviathan, he describes as the state of war the state of nature which Plato has conceived as a utopia.

During the time men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man against every man. For war consists not in battle only or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time where the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. 54/

We also have seen that Plato, in his royal science, denounces

as unnatural the world in which friends compete with enemies or in which the stronger dominate the weaker. Hobbes accepts as natural and amoral the picture of the world which Plato criticizes as unnatural and bad. Hobbes's state of nature is truly similar to what Plato attacks as unnatural, that is, the world in which "doing injustice is...good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it." <sup>55/</sup>

The difference in evaluation between Plato's world of essence and Hobbes's world of nature implies that they ground political reality on the different dimensions of life. In conceiving political reality, Plato focuses on one level of life: Hobbes on another. Plato grounds political reality on the reasonable part of mind which I call the observing self while Hobbes does on the appetitive part which we usually call passions and which I call the observed self.

## PART II THE POLITICAL SELF

### A. POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND HUMAN MIND: THE SOVEREIGN POWER AND FEAR

#### 1. Political Structure: the Sovereign Power

Hobbes's discussion of political structure is unique in that all the differences in the types of government virtually disappear

in the conception of sovereignty.

In classifying the types of government, Hobbes, first, uses the criterion of the number of rulers. Using this criterion, he concludes that there can be only three kinds of government: a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy. Hobbes says,

The difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth: when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be indivisible, entire. 56/

Secondly, he does not apply the rule of law as a standard for classifying governments. For, the government for him is, by definition, a commonwealth in which the ruler, whether one or a few or many, has an absolute power and therefore is above the law. He says;

It is true, that sovereigns are subject to the laws of nature; because such laws be divine, and cannot by any man, or commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the commonwealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws, is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is to the sovereign representative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion, and dissolution of the commonwealth. 57/

Hobbes's sovereign ruler is similar to Plato's true ruler in that both have the absolute power and are above the law. Other than that, the two represent the two extreme opposites. For, while Plato's true ruler is the personification of the divine quality of human reason, like Kant's moral consciousness, Hobbes's sovereign ruler is the artificial person which represents the cleverness of human reason. The former, like a completely just man, does not need the law because he is completely set apart from the baseness of human being: the latter, like a completely unjust man, does not need the law because he himself is base. Both have the absolute power of reason. However, one pulls humanity from above humanity: the other pushes it from below the bottom line. One is like Christ: the other is like Machiavelli's Cesare Borgia.

For Hobbes, since a ruler is, by definition, an absolute ruler, any ruler who is below the law is less than a ruler. For the same reason, all rulers, as long as they exercise the undivided absolute power, are the same kind. Therefore, first, the difference between a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy is trivial. The difference consists "but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people; for which end they were instituted." 58/

Secondly, he does not distinguish between law-abiding governments like monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy on the one hand and law-flouting governments like tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy on the other. He says,

There be other names of government, in the histories, and books of policy; as tyranny, and oligarchy: but they are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms mislikes. For they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy, call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a démocracy, call it anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want of government, is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they dislike it, or are oppressed by the governors. 59/

There can be essentially only one kind of government, namely, a sovereign government, tyrannical or not. Without the sovereign government, there is no political reality but the state of nature, namely, the state of war. He says,

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subject's disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the commonwealth hath its being. 60/

## 2. Political Mind: Fear

Just as Hobbes reduces all types of government to one kind, namely, the sovereign government with the absolute power, so does he reduce the politically relevant mental dimension ultimately to fear. Using contemporary political scientists' language, he constructs the political structure of the absolute government upon the political culture of fear.

For Hobbes, it is the fear to which the universal monarch such as the Pope appeals for the enslavement of the minds of man. His universal order is founded upon the fear which is generated by the misinterpretation of the Bible, demonology, and the philosophy of realism. By means of nominalist philosophy, Hobbes first frees the Englishmen from the false fear created by the universal monarch. However, after the false fear disappears, he still finds fear in the same place, this time, of a genuine kind which prevails in the state of nature. Thus, by changing the universalistic world of essences into the nominalistic world of particulars, he destroys the naturalistic universal order in the state of nature and finds in its place the chaos which he calls the state of war of every one against every one else. This world of particulars is the world of selfish individuals where each pursues his own passions against each one else's.

a. A Restless Desire of Power and Natural Liberty

Like any living organisms with the psychological dimension of sense data, man deliberates on the basis of sense experiences in order to satisfy his passions until he acquires the object desired. His dispositions and manners toward living in peace and security lead to a restless desire of power. This perpetual and restless desire would cease only in death. Hobbes says,

The felicity of this life consists not in the repose of a satisfied mind. For there is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, not summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more

live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and imagination are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The reason for that is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time but to assure for ever the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only to the procuring but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in the way which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions in diverse men and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which means to live well which he has present, without the acquisition of more. 61/

In the absence of external restraint, i.e., in this state of nature, man's actions are ruled by passions and every one struggles for power in his desire to maintain peace and defend his life. Here, man has the natural right or natural liberty which Hobbes defines as

the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation...of his own life, and consequently of doing any thing, which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 62/

#### b. Fear in the State of War

Hobbes defines war not just as the act of fighting but also as a mental state existing "in a tract of time where the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known." 63/

Hobbes gives international relations as a typical example of the state of war;

Though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon their neighbors, which is a posture of war. 64/

A state of war may result from the universalistic philosophy which corrupts the mind of the political self;

That all other bishops...have not their right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope, is a doctrine, by which there comes to be in every Christian commonwealth many potent men, (for so are bishops), that have their dependence on the Pope, and owe obedience to him, though he is a foreign prince; by which means he is able, as he hath done many times, to raise a civil war against the state that submits not itself to be governed according to his pleasure and interest. 65/

A state of war, Hobbes suggests, is, in fact, the state of nature which lies dormant because of the external restraints and yet ever lurks in our mind. Hobbes says,

It may seem strange to some man who has not well weighed these things that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another. And he may, therefore, not trusting to this inference made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests and this when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed to revenge all injuries when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? 66/

In the state of war, "There can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live." 67/ Here, man lives in the "continual fear and danger of violent death" and the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 68/

### 3. Nominalist Construction of Political Reality: Structure and Culture

In constructing political reality: Hobbes essentially tries

to overcome fear prevailing in the state of nature by means of the fear of punishment of the sovereign. Fear is to be overcome by fear.

As we have seen, Hobbes reduces the psychological dimension of man to passions which, through the restless desire for power, necessarily lead to the mental state of war in the state of nature. With the use of words in the state of society and government, man's passions would multiply themselves without an end. In this chaotic state of war, man suffers from the fear of violent death. In designing the commonwealth, Hobbes's task is to overcome this fear of unnatural death by curbing the struggle for more power of every one against every one else which is the cause of such fear. The only way to restrain the restless struggle for power is to keep every one in awe by the fear of death penalty.

In brief, he tries to create the political structure which can cause the mental state of fear under the threat of death penalty so that man can escape from the mental state of fear caused by the struggle for power. He tries to create the fearful sovereign state upon the political culture of fear.

a. The Unlimited Coercive Force of the Sovereign Power

The essence of the political structure which can keep the people in awe and tied by fear of punishment consists in the unlimited power of the sovereign ruler which Hobbes calls the Leviathan;

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government: together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two

last verses of the one-and-fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud. There is nothing, saith he, on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the children of pride. But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey; I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases, and the causes of his mortality; and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey. 69/

How sovereign is the sovereign power which distinguishes the sovereign ruler from the rest of the people?

In Chapter 18, Hobbes lists the twelve rights which make the essence of the sovereign power. Since they are "incommunicable, and inseparable," they are different from the rights which might be transferred by the sovereign.<sup>70/</sup> Since they are essential and inseparable rights, any covenant which, in establishing the commonwealth, separates any of these twelve rights from the sovereign would be void. If, however, the sovereign is established without fully listing all of these invisible rights, the sovereign must be granted all of them which are "inseparably annexed" to the sovereignty. At the same time, any grant which transfers any of the essential rights without renouncing the sovereignty itself will be void. The separation of these inseparable rights means "a kingdom divided in itself," which is essentially in the state of war. "A kingdom divided in itself cannot stand."<sup>71/</sup> Hobbes says,

If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil war; first between

those that disagreed in politics; and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion; which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right, that there be few now in England that do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been. 71/

The indivisible rights which turn a private person into "that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence" 72/ include rights; (1) not to be challenged by the subject in the form of government, (2) not to forfeit the sovereign power itself under any circumstances, (3) not to be challenged by those who dissent in the second covenant or to destroy them, (4) not to be accused by the subject, (5) not to be punished by the subject, (6) to be "judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them," (7) to make rules, "whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do," (8) to decide controversy, (9) to make "war and peace as he shall think best," (10) to choose all counsellors and ministers, (11) to reward or punish his subjects, and (12) to give titles of honor. Hobbes summarizes these sovereign rights as follows;

His power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: he cannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of injury: he cannot be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary for peace; and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator; and supreme judge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of war, and peace: to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers, and ministers; and to determine of rewards, and punishments, honour, and order. 73/

Hobbes thinks that these indivisible sovereign rights all together constitute the unlimited coercive force which would necessarily

be required for the prevention of the internal division of the political self as well as the external invasion by the political other.

b. The Political System as the Artificial Person

Hobbes compares the commonwealth with a man and further with a watch, considering all of them as automata, which are, in the contemporary literature, called cybernetic systems.

He conceives man as the "rational and most excellent work"<sup>74/</sup> of divine art. He compares this automaton with a watch as follows;

Seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body; such as was intended by the artificer? <sup>75/</sup>

Then, he describes the commonwealth as being created after man as an art;

By art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth,... which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members, are the strength; salus populi, the people's safety, its business; counselors, by whom all things beedful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity, and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the parts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation. <sup>76/</sup>

The commonwealth as an artificial automaton as above is com-

posed of three constitutive elements: language, the material of the political system, and its design.

c. Language: Nominalist Construction

From the nominalist perspective, both "political reality" grounded on the essence of things and political reality grounded on the sense data concerning the physical things are the products of speech, even though the former, according to Hobbes, is false and the latter true.

i. Construction of False Reality

Through the misuse of language, a false reality may be phantasmized. As a result, some people believe in demons and idols. Hobbes accuses Plato and Aristotle of leading men, through the abuse of speech, to believe absurdities caused by the errors of definitions and make them "excellently foolish." Hobbes says,

For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over their books...So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science; and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become

either excellently wise, or...excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters...; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, or Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever. 77/

He lists four different ways in abusing words and making men "more mad than ordinary";

First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conception, that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, by words, when they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another; for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend. 78/

ii. Construction of True Reality

Language also allows man to create the Leviathan which is true political reality. It can make man not only "excellently foolish" but also "excellently wise". Through ratiocination, that is, reasoning, names deliver us from all labor of the mind, for,

Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. 79/

Without language, man could create a society like the one which bees and ants do or perhaps a somewhat better or larger one by appealing to natural reason, that is, the ability of ratiocination without the use of words. With the use of words, however, man's natural reason, that is, the natural ability to add and subtract, multiplies with the exponential effect, and man acquires a new

kind of ability which Hobbes calls the acquired reason. With the combination of words and the acquired reason, man creates political reality.

Men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation, without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. 80/

Language which creates political reality specifically refers both to the first covenant by which social reality is created and to the second covenant by which political reality is created. Hobbes says,

The pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation. 81/

#### The First Covenant.

In the second natural law, Hobbes creates social reality through the partial renunciation of natural liberty. He calls the act of mutual renunciation of natural liberty among the multitude the social covenant or compact. It reads;

that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. 82/

In the state of nature, each man has the liberty "to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." 83/ Since this natural liberty, if necessary

in the state of nature, is the source of war and therefore of fear, peace requires the renunciation of natural liberty.

In fact, Hobbes's natural law as a whole is nothing but the elaboration of the social contract which Plato refutes in the introductory part of the Republic. To quote Plato's description of the social contract again,

Doing injustice is...good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it; so that, when they do injustice to one another and suffer it and taste of both, it seems profitable--to those who are not able to escape the one and choose the other --to set down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. And from there they began to set down their own laws and compacts and to name what the law commands lawful and just. And this, then, is the genesis and being of justice. 84/

#### The Second Covenant

However, the terms of the first covenant cannot be executed unless the subjects themselves are kept in awe and tied "by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters." 85/ For, "Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." 86/ The laws of nature themselves would not require the establishment of a commonwealth, but they will lack in binding force without the sovereign power. Hobbes say,

Covenants being words and breath have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the united hands of that man or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. 87/

Therefore, the multitude, in the second covenant, unite in one person by words and generate the great Leviathan. Hobbes describes the second covenant as follows;

This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe...our peace and defence. 88/

The person with the sovereign power is called sovereign and every one besides is his subject. By the terror of the sovereign power, the sovereign can restrain the struggle for power between his subjects and force mutual aid against their enemies abroad.

Political reality which is created by the second covenant is different from social reality which is created by the first covenant in that while peace in the society is acquired by the fear of the consequence of breaking their words or by the glory or pride in appearing not to break it, peace in the political society is secured by the fear of the coercive force of the commonwealth.

d. The material and the designer of the commonwealth

In the Introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes says that "To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider, first, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which is man." Before I separate, in reading the Leviathan, its matter from its artificer, it is essential for the purpose of my paper to note that both of

them represent the different aspects of the same thing, that is, the political self. In Hobbes's expression, "the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which is man." They represent the different aspects of the same self not only inside the mind. The same also holds on the structural level because the mental state appears in behaviors.

For example, at least in Hobbes's political theory, the sovereign ruler is not established as the political other against the subjects conceived as the political self. Rather, both the sovereign and his subjects represent the different aspects of the same political self, the former standing for the reasoning part of human mind and the latter its passions. Theoretically, the tension between the sovereign and his subjects on the structural dimension results from the tension between reason and desire inside the human mind, with the former ruling the latter.

The difficulty to distinguish between the matter of the commonwealth and its artificer in the art of creating political reality is in the fact that both are the human mind. Despite the difficulty, I will first locate the designing mind of man through the analysis of the rational calculation involved in the two aforementioned covenants and also through the analysis of the conception of sovereignty. Then, I will examine the human mind as the material of the commonwealth. In making a watch, an engineer as the designer must know the nature of the material, that is, iron, steel, diamond, etc. In creating the commonwealth, the artificer also must know

his material, that is, human mind. Hobbes describes his reading of human mind as the material of the commonwealth in Part One of the Leviathan under the title "Of Man." Specifically, it refers to the passions of man.

In my paper, the matter of the commonwealth corresponds to the observed political self and its artificer: the observing political self.

## B. THE OBSERVED POLITICAL SELF

We have seen that Hobbes constructs the commonwealth with the absolute power upon the political culture of fear. He ultimately reduces human mind as the material of the political system to fear. His contribution to our understanding of political phenomena consists in his emphasis on the material side of human mind which he analyzes in detail.

### 1. Motion and Mind: Mechanicalism

Motion which the political scientists call behavior or action ultimately constitutes Hobbes's reality. Only a thing or a body can move and therefore Hobbes is a physicalist. He understands man in terms of physical movements before he conceives man in terms of mental system.

He divides man's motions into two types: vital motions and voluntary motions. The former refers to the built-in automatic movements of vital organs like the heart, the stomach, etc. The latter refers to behaviors like going, speaking, striking, etc.

He properly thinks that only voluntary motions require explanation in his theory.

## 2. Passions: Sense Data

For Hobbes, human mind is the epi phenomena of bodily motions. He calls the epephenomena passions. Vital motions cause general passions and voluntary motions specific or particular passions, together constituting one of the two components of human mind in the state of nature, namely, natural passions and natural reason.

### a. General Passions

General passions are the same for all men because they are built into man's body, namely, because they originate in vital organs, which

begun in generation, and continue without interruption through their whole life, such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing,... to which motions there needs no help of imagination. 89/

Hobbes divides general passions into three kinds: positive passions or desire, negative passions or aversion, and neutral passions or contempt. 90/

This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto: and therefore such things as caused delight were not improperly called jucunda ...from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, moesta, offensive, from hindering and troubling the vital motion. 91/

The movement of our body "toward something which causes it, is called appetite or desire, the latter being the general name; the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely, hunger and thirst." 92/ The movement of our body "forward

something...is generally called aversion." <sup>93/</sup> In Latin, "these words, appetite and aversion, signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring." <sup>94/</sup> We are said "to contemn" those things which we neither desire nor hate, "contempt being nothing else but an immobility or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things." <sup>95/</sup>

b. Specific Passions

Specific passions mean man's philosophical orientations toward specific objects desired or avoided to satisfy general passions. These passions are not necessarily the same for all men. For the desire for or aversion from particular objects depends on the subjective conditions of the individual such as the different condition of the body and different experiences including education and custom.

Because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent in the desire of almost any one and the same object. <sup>96/</sup>

Hobbes calls passions for particular objects desired "good"; passions for particular objects avoided "evil." Good or evil passions are directed toward specific objects desired or avoided to satisfy the general passions of desire and aversion.

For whatever is the object of any man's appetite or desire... he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man where there is

no commonwealth; or in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge whom men disagreeing shall be consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof. 97/

He then calls the appearance or sense of good pleasure; that of evil displeasure. These feelings of pleasure and displeasure arise either from an object present or from its expectation in deliberation. Pleasures of the mind are generally called joy: displeasures, pain or grief. 98/ Since the appearance of good and evil depends on the diverse subjective conditions of the individual, he gives different names to different subjective conditions such as hope, despair, courage, anger, confidence, indignation, etc. 99/

c. Sense Data

Passions which constitute the entirety of human mind are nothing but sense data to which the individual subject emotionally responds either positively or negatively. Hobbes reduces natural passions to

that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original. 100/

As such, sense refers to the individual subject's psychological response to the stimulus coming from the external body. It means the seeming or fancy of the external body.

The cause of sense is the external body, or object which presenteth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately as in the taste and touch or mediately as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance or counter-pressure or endeavor of the heart to deliver itself...This seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense. 101/

Imagination and memory as the decaying sense. With the removal of the external body which causes sense in our mind in the beginning, the impression it makes still remains. However, since other more present objects succeed and work on us, the fancy or seeming of the object removed is obscured and weakened. Hobbes calls this decaying of sense imagination. "Imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as walking." <sup>102/</sup> He considers imagination and memory as the same thing. He calls the memory of many things experience. The imaginations of those who sleep are dreams: strong fancies while sleeping or walking are apparitions or visions. <sup>103/</sup> He reduces even understanding to "the imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining, by words or other voluntary signs." <sup>104/</sup> Understanding in the sense of imagination is, for Hobbes, "common to man and beasts. For a dog by custom will understand the call or the rating of his master; and so will many other beasts." <sup>105/</sup>

We have seen that, for Hobbes, human mind in the state of nature consists of nothing but the externally stimulated and internally formed senses including the decaying sense in train. The working of mind ultimately depends on the use of senses.

There is no other act of man's mind that I can remember naturally planted in him so as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man and live with the use of his five senses. <sup>106/</sup>

### 3. Prudence in Deliberation

Specific passions are connected and organized so that man may take voluntary actions. In Hobbes's state of nature, passions are organized by two innate mental abilities: natural reason and prudence. In the absence of language, however, it is mostly prudence that is in the service of passions.

Prudence refers to the mental ability to regulate the succession of one thought to another in terms of natural feelings of likes and dislikes, namely, entirely on the basis of sense experiences. It essentially means the recollection of the positive or negative emotional experiences.

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions...(This) kind of thoughts is called foresight and prudence, or providence; and sometimes wisdom. 107/

According to Hobbes, prudence consists "principally in two things; celerity of imagining, that is, swift succession of one thought to another and steady direction to some approved end." 108/

#### a. Swift Succession of One Thought to Another

Celerity of imagining means the ability to observe similarities and differences quickly. "A slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called dullness, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved." 109/ In contrast, swift succession of one thought to another results from (1) fancy, i.e., the ability to observe similarities in things, (2) judgment, i.e., the ability to

observe differences in things, and (3) discretion, i.e., the ability to observe differences in times, places, and persons.

b. Steady Direction to the Given Goal

Celerity of imagining alone leads to the multiplicity of images without being organized and therefore to confusion. It is the steady direction to some end that organizes confused images which are "so many and so long digressions and parentheses that they utterly lose themselves." <sup>110/</sup> He says,

But without steadiness, and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness;...similarities and differences ...entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose by every thing that comes in their thought into so many and so long digressions and parentheses that they utterly lose themselves...: but the cause of it is sometimes "want of experience" whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare which does not (seem) so to others; by which that seems great to him which other men think a trifle: and whatever is new or great and thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse. <sup>111/</sup>

As defined above, prudence depends on "much experience and memory of the like things and their consequences heretofore." <sup>112/</sup> As far as prudence is concerned, there cannot be much difference in man's ability "because the experience of men equal in age is not much unequal as to the quantity, but lies in different occasions, every one having his private designs," <sup>113/</sup> which are mostly irrelevant to governing kingdoms. <sup>114/</sup>

4. Natural Liberty

According to Hobbes, man dominated by natural passions have natural liberty. He defines natural liberty or freedom in the physical sense, namely, as "the absense of external impediments." <sup>115/</sup>

Liberty or freedom signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied or environed as it cannot move but within a certain space, which...is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned or restrained with walls or chains; and of the water, whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels, that otherwise, would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would. 116/

In the state of nature, namely, in the absence of organized political power, every man is free in the sense that he has the right to every thing.

Because the condition of man...is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies, it followeth that, in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. 117/

Therefore, a freeman is defined not mentally or spiritually but physically.

When the impediments of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say; it wants the liberty, but the power to move, as when a stone lieth still or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness. And...a freeman is he that in those things, which, by his strength and wit, he is able to do is not hindered to do what he has a will to. 118/

His conception of natural liberty reflects two important aspects of his political theory: (1) the natural tendency of mind to cause disorganization in the relations of the individual with other individuals and (2) the ethical amoralism as a type of nominalism.

a. The Tendency to Disorganize

Hobbes sees the tendency of human nature to disorganize in man's natural passions.. Without the unlimited coercive force of the society, natural passions lead to the state of war.

Peace results not when man's original or natural state of mind is restored but only when man's reason effectively restrains the ever increasing tendency of mind for destruction even under the influence of prudence and natural reason. The implication is that if passions are released from the restraint of reason, the state of war will be restored.

b. Ethical Nominalism

The conception of natural liberty also indicates Hobbes's ethical nominalism. Nominalists explain away universals as the product of names: they do not exist in things in themselves. As a result, in the absence of names, things in themselves cannot be known. Or, as Hobbes thinks, the things in themselves cannot be evaluated in the moral sense. For justice is the product of words, that is, covenants.

For Hobbes, human consciousness, whether intellectual or moral, "which distinguished men from all other living creatures" proceeds from speech. It is,

acquired by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of words and speech...They may be improved to such a height as to distinguish man from all other living creatures...by the help of speech and method. 119/

For,

The undertaking which is peculiar to man is the understanding not only his will but his conceptions and thoughts by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech. 120/

Hobbes establishes his political theory upon this unique human faculty and on the ruins of ontological realism.

### C. THE OBSERVING POLITICAL SELF

What Hobbes calls the "artificer," the "design", or the "maker" of the commonwealth organizes human mind as its "matter." He reduces the essence of all this active self to reason, natural and acquired. Acquired reason refers to natural reason augmented under the influence of language. It follows that, for Hobbes, political reality is created by man's ability of reason and speech.

#### 1. Natural Reason

Hobbes sees the difference between man and beasts ultimately in his ability of addition and subtraction. He calls this ability ratiocination, wit, or reason. Reason in the state of nature is called natural reason which is the ultimate ground of the observing political self.

By natural reason, "I mean not that which a man hath from his birth...But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only and experience, without method, culture, or instruction." 121/ He gives a couple of examples to show how man can add and subtract in his silent thoughts, without the use of words.

If therefore a man sees something afar all and obscurely, although no appellation had yet been given to anything, he will notwithstanding have the same idea of that thing for which now, by imposing a name on it, we call it body. Again, when, by coming nearer, he sees the same thing thus and thus, now in one place and now in another, he will have a new idea thereof, namely, that for which we now call such a thing animated. Thirdly, when standing nearer, he perceives the figure, hears the voice, and sees other things which are signs of a rational mind, he has a third idea, though it has yet no appellation, namely, that for which we now call anything rational. Lastly, when, by looking fully and distinctly upon it, he conceives all that he has seen as one thing, the idea he has now is compounded of his former ideas, which are put together in the mind in the same order in which these three single names, body, animated, rational are in speech compounded into this one name, body-animated-rational, or man. Again, whosoever sees a man standing near him, conceives the whole idea of that man; and if, as he goes away, he follow him with his eyes only, he will lose the idea of those things which were signs of his being rational, whilst, nevertheless, the idea of a body-animated remains still before his eyes, so that the idea of rational is subtracted from the whole idea of man, that is to say, of body-animated-rational, and there remains that of body-animated; and a while after; at a greater distance, the idea of animated will be lost, and that of body only will remain; so that at last, when nothing at all can be seen, the whole idea will vanish out of sight. By which examples, I think, it is manifest enough what is the internal ratiocination of the mind without words. 122/

## 2. Acquired Reason

He thinks that man's ability of addition and subtraction exponentially increases with the use of language. With the help of words, the natural ability of addition and subtraction turns into the acquired reason of science, if proper, and the "vain philosophy," if improper.

### a. Speech in the Service of Reason

Hobbes thinks that speech plays an essential part in the creation and the maintenance of political reality. He says,

But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; wehreyby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. 123/

Though it is possible to think of reason in the absence of language, reason as the summing up of the consequence of one saying to another is etymologically related with "names."

Subject to names is whasoever can enter into or be considered in an account and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money rationes, and accounting rationatio; and that which we in bills or books of account call items, they call nomina, that is, names; and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, logos, for both speech and reason; not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech: and the act of reasoning they called syllogism, which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. 124/

b. Acquired Reason

By the imposition of names, Hobbes turns the "reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into the reckoning of the consequences of appellations." 125/ By this change, the operation of mind is rapidly multiplied as the reckoning proceeds. 126/ Words do not allow Hobbes to create something out of nothing, but they deliver us "from all labor of the mind...and makes that which was found true here and now to be true in all times and places." 127/ As an illustration of the effect of names in reasoning, he gives an example as follows;

The use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroke of the clock and nod to it, or say one, one, one, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded that now our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five; and they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order will lose himself and not know when he has done. Much less will he be able to add and subtract and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being or wellbeing of mankind. 128/

### 3. Reason as the Natural Law

Using reason as the ladder, man escapes from the miserable state of nature toward the peaceful state of society. Hobbes says that the laws of nature are just the dictates of reason for the preservation of man's life and his commodious life. He identifies natural laws essentially with "conclusions" or "theorems" for the preservation of life.

A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. 129/

These dictates of reason, men used to call by the names of laws, but improperly: for they are conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law properly is the word of him that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called laws. 130/

Hobbes then summarizes the laws of nature as the rule which he thinks is "intelligible even to the meanest capacity." The rule is, "Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself." <sup>131/</sup> By applying this rule in the first covenant, man creates social reality. By applying the same rule in the second covenant, he creates political reality. Since both the natural laws and the second covenant by which the commonwealth is generated are nothing but rational calculation to escape from the state of war to peace, reason involved in the creation of society and government after all means intelligent calculation.

#### 4. Reason as the Sovereign Ruler

In the sense that the sovereign is established as a result of man's rational calculation to enforce the natural laws in general and particularly the first covenant, the sovereign is the personification of reason. The rule of the sovereign over its subjects means the rule of reason over passions.

##### a. Power of Philosophy and Physical Force Combined

The great philosophers of ancient Greece domesticate the power of gods into philosophy. As a result, philosophy comes to possess the power which gods used to have in the world of myths. In dominating the people in the Christendom throughout the Middle Ages, the Pope abused the power of philosophy. In order to deprive him of the power of philosophy, Hobbes destroys the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

However, Hobbes must have thought it still necessary, in securing peace in the society, to retain the power which only philosophy can give, that is, the mental power as opposed to the physical force. What he really wants is to transfer the mental power of philosophy from the Pope to the civil sovereign of England. For this, he has to develop an alternative political philosophy in which political reality is conceived largely in terms of the theoretically observable physical phenomena rather than the invisible spiritual ones. As in the case of Plato's philosopher-king, force and reason are combined in the person of the sovereign, even though Hobbes's conception of reason is different from Plato's.

Hobbes is aware of the possibility that this great power can be used improperly for the private interest of the sovereign as the natural person against the public interest. However, behind the creation of the absolute sovereign there is a rational calculation that even the tyranny is better than anarchy. 132/

b. The Sovereign as the Collective Reason

That Hobbes considers the sovereign as the collective self of the people is repeatedly emphasized throughout the eighteenth chapter. For example, since "every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth," to accuse the sovereign's actions is to accuse himself. 133/ For another example, since "every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign," to punish the sovereign is to punish "another for the actions committed by himself." 134/

i. The Sovereign as the Collective Reason

The sovereign represents the reasoning side of man. In the second covenant, every man separates his reason, namely, his right of governing himself from his passions and transfers it to the artificial man he creates. By putting together the reasoning self of every man in the hands of one natural man, each individual creates the artificial collective self. Such a voluntary agreement, according to Hobbes,

is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men,...This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. 135/

It is true that Hobbes's arguments are often legalistic and polemical. For example, his argument for demonstration that "there can be no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection" is highly polemical. For he says that it is "because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them." 136/

However, since Hobbes's Leviathan is not a legal document but a logical theory, unless we reach the logic behind his rhetoric, we really cannot appreciate his theory. The real reason why the sovereign is not a part of the covenant, why he cannot violate the covenant and why the subjects cannot be freed from his subjec-

tion under any circumstances is in the subjects' rational calculation that, otherwise, every man must return "to the sword again; and recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution." 137/

The same rational calculation is behind the formalistic argument that the subjects are the authors of all of the actions of the sovereign who in turn bears the persons of the authors. This is a legal theory on contract. However, behind this legal theory lies the reasoning that unless man's reason curb his passions, there cannot be the ultimate peace in the society; that, since the reasoning ability is nothing but the ability to think, unless the reason is combined with an unlimited coercive force, the passions of man cannot be checked; that unless the reason is completely independent of passions, the mind cannot make a clear and fair judgment in executing the laws of nature; that the suffering occurring because of the abuse of the unlimited power by the sovereign is less than the suffering occurring in the absence of the sovereign power, i.e., in the state of war; and that, since the great sovereign power after all results from the united hands of the subjects themselves, the sovereign cannot stand alone without the ultimate support of the subjects themselves. With all these rational calculations in mind, Hobbes's arguments that the authors must be rational, that they authorize, only in rational capacity, the sovereign to represent and bear their persons, and that they own all the actions of the sovereign are literally what he means re-

ardless of the polemical aspect of his arguments.

In brief, the creation of the sovereign by the multitude through the voluntary agreement among themselves to "own" his actions is the upshot of the rational calculation on the side of the ruled. He is the crystalization of human reason. Reason must command and passions must listen and obey. Therefore, the multitude

made artificial chains called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that man or assembly to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears. 138/

Once the sovereign is established, it is not the subjects but the sovereign that has to maintain peace and prevent a return to the state of war. Now, the art of rational calculation to keep peace is in the hands of the ruler.

For men, as they become at last weary of irregular jostling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice: so far want, both of the art of making fit laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able architect, be compiled into any other than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity. 139/

Just as the ruled have to know "how to obey," the ruler has to know "how to govern." 140/ As a result of rational calculation, both are the different aspects of the same thing: peace through the natural reason of the self. Just as the people establish the sovereign through rational calculation based on reason, so does the sovereign have to maintain the body politic and keep it from dissolution through rational calculation based on reason, natural

or acquired. <sup>141/</sup> Being above the positive laws and all men, for the maintenance of the commonwealth, the sovereign has nothing to depend on except his reason. He has to figure out, all by himself, "what laws of nature he is bound to obey" and all the principles and skills of government which Hobbes discusses in Part Two, in particular, in the eighteenth, twentieth, and thirtieth chapters. In addition, he has to understand the passions of man, "not this or that particular man; but mankind." <sup>142/</sup> After all, Hobbes writes the Leviathan to educate the ruler as Plato does. Hobbes says,

He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration. <sup>143/</sup>

Like Plato's true ruler, Hobbes's sovereign is a "philosopher" who materializes the rationality of the observing self of man. In the conclusion of the second part, Hobbes makes it very clear that man's reason is the foundation of the commonwealth as the artificial man. It is the reason through which the multitude create the commonwealth: it is the reason through which the sovereign maintains it. Hobbes says,

And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereign and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this doctrine is, from the practice of the greatest part of the world, especially of these western parts, that have received their moral learning from Rome and Athens; and how much depth of moral philosophy is required, in them that have the administration of the sovereign power; I am

at the point of believing this my labor, as useless, as the commonwealth of Plato. For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I consider again, that the science of natural justice, is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they are, farther than by good laws to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice. 144/

ii. The Sovereign as the Collective Unity

Through the establishment of the sovereign, the tendency of passions to disorganize is overcome. We have seen that Hobbes sees the origin of division and destruction in passions which eventually leads to the state of war. He also sees man's ability to overcome division and destruction in his reason. However, since passions predominate reason in the individual, he unites the unifying capacity of each individual in the person of the sovereign and let the collective reason rule the passions of each individual person.

A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person; and unity, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude. 145/

The unifying character of reason is clearly implied in his des-

cription of the process of establishing the sovereign in terms of the relation between the actor and the author.

To confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men...is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. 146/

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE POLITICAL SELF IN MONTESQUIEU'S THE PERSIAN LETTERS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS

In this chapter, I will analyze, first, Montesquieu's conception of the fitness between political structure and political self and, secondly, the nature and origin of his conception of the political self. In examining these topics, I will use The Persian Letters and the Spirit of the Laws.

#### A. FITNESS BETWEEN POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL SELF

We have seen that both classical thinkers and contemporary political scientists have been greatly concerned with the fitness between political structures and the political self. We find a good example of this concern in Montesquieu's political theory.

Most political thinkers, ancient and contemporary, have been preoccupied with the proper relationship between different parts or different levels of the society and the political system. The congeries of terms expressing such a concern include harmony, balance, congruence, compatibility, correspondence, fitness, mean and so on. Throughout the Spirit of the Laws (SL), particularly in Books I through VIII and XX, Montesquieu emphasizes the inter-

relationship which positive laws--the political and civil laws of a nation--maintains with the people, the nature and principle of each government. <sup>1/</sup> Positive laws, according to Montesquieu, should also be in relation,

to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine, they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they ought to be considered. <sup>2/</sup>

Of all these relations, Montesquieu first examines the fitness between the structure and culture of the political system as we understand today. In the first eight books of SL where he studies "the relations which laws bear to the nature and principle of each government," <sup>3/</sup> he emphasizes that "the government most conformable to nature<sup>4/</sup> is that which best agrees with the humor and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established." <sup>5/</sup> In the words of such contemporary political scientists as Almond and Verba, the stability and legitimacy of the political system depend on "the 'fit' between structure and culture." <sup>6/</sup>

#### 1. The Nature of Government: Political Structure

Montesquieu calls what we understand as the political structure the nature of government. In Book II, he uses two criteria in defining the nature of government: (1) the number of the rulers and (2) the presence or absence of the rule of law. In accordance with the

criterion of the rule of law, he classifies government, as Plato does, into two types: law-abiding and law-flouting governments. In accordance with the criterion of the number of rulers, he classifies the former into republics and monarchies. Though he could also divide law-flouting governments into two classes, he calls all law-flouting ones despotisms, ending up with three types of government: republics, monarchies, and despotisms.<sup>7/</sup>

What is important in examining his classification of government is not the number of rulers but the rule of law. For he does not apply the former standard while he does the latter consistently. Montesquieu strictly distinguishes between law-abiding governments and law-flouting governments, but he deemphasizes the number of rulers either within the category of law-flouting governments or within the category of law-abiding ones. In fact, he completely ignores the number of rulers concerning law-flouting governments; he probably thinks that all law-flouting governments, whether democracies or oligarchies, eventually end up with despotisms. Concerning law-abiding governments, he formally distinguishes between democracies where the body of the people rules, aristocracies where a part of the people rule, and monarchies where a single person rules; however, as long as they are ruled through established laws, they are all moderate forms of government. What is important for him is moderation and not the number of rulers. In fact, for him, the perfect form of law-abiding government is a democracy. For he does not see much real difference between a monarchy and an aristo-

cracy, as he says;

In monarchies the prince is the source of all power, political and civil. These fundamental laws necessarily suppose the intermediate channels through which the power flows; for if there be only the momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the state, nothing can be fixed, and, of course, there is no fundamental law.

The most natural, intermediate, and subordinate power is that of nobility. This in some measure seems to be essential to a monarchy, whose fundamental maxim is, no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch. 8/

Nor does he see a real difference between a democracy and an aristocracy, for "The more an aristocracy borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection: and, in proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more is it imperfect." 9/ Then, he says, "Abolish the privileges of the lords, the clergy and cities in a monarchy, and you will soon have a popular state, or else a despotic government." 10/

My assertion that the crucial division in Montesquieu's classification of government is between law-abiding governments and law-flouting ones and that the essential criterion of classification is therefore the rule of law leads to an assumption that all rulers become despots unless they are restrained by fixed fundamental laws.

This assumption is in sharp contrast with Plato's as well as Hobbes's thoughts. We have seen that Plato's best government is the one where the true ruler rules the country in accordance with reason and is therefore above the law. Hobbes's ruler is sovereign and, by definition, also above the law.

For Montesquieu, all governments which are not restrained

by the law are despotic: all governments which are restrained by fixed fundamental laws are good governments almost to the same degree. All other distinctions are secondary.

## 2. The "Principle" of Government: Political Culture

Behind Montesquieu's classification of government as above lies his understanding of the psychology of existent human beings. If we compare his republic with Plato's, we can interpret that while Plato emphasizes the innate ability of man to know and perform justice, Montesquieu is concerned with the protection of humanity from man's capability of destruction and injustice.

He clearly sees negative or destructive forces in the rulers or government. In his contrast between a state of nature with that of society, he pictures the former as a peaceful state<sup>11/</sup> as described by Rousseau seven years later in his Second Discourse on the one hand and he pictures the latter as a state of war on the other. Hobbes's description of the state of nature as a state of war of everyone against everyone else reappears in Montesquieu's description of the state of society.<sup>12/</sup> It seems that his characterization of the state of nature and the state of society in the SL, Book I, is the precursor of Rousseau's in his Second Discourse. Furthermore, his two essential ideas of the Social Contract, i.e., the sovereign as the union of individuals' strength and the general will as the union of individuals' wills, are also found in the same place of the SL.<sup>13/</sup> As in the Social Contract, "the united strength of individuals...constitutes what we call the body politic" or government.<sup>14/</sup>

As soon as a state of society occurs through the union of individuals' strength, individuals lose their sense of weakness because of the united force; equality between individuals ceases, "and then commences the state of war."<sup>15/</sup> A state of war between individuals occurs because they endeavor to convert the united force of the society to their own interest as opposed to the public interest.<sup>16/</sup> When the united strength is in the hands of a single person, we have a monarchy. When it is in the hands of many, we have an aristocracy or a democracy.<sup>17/</sup> Since he does not recognize a good ruler who is above the law, he considers all rulers as those who endeavor to take advantage of the united force for "their own emolument" unless they are externally checked. External checks may come from fellow rulers as in the case of a democracy or an aristocracy or from "the intermediate channels" of the nobility "through which the power flows"<sup>18/</sup> or the traditions or beliefs of the people. The power of rulers must be checked by established positive laws.

His greatest concern, therefore, is with the external check on the power of the rulers by taking into consideration the psychological dispositions of the ruled. He classifies these psychological dispositions into three types: virtue, honor, and fear. He calls them the "principles" of government as opposed to the "nature" of government. Even though he nowhere defines any of them, he deals with each of them in Book III of the SL.

a. Virtue

Montesquieu talks much about virtue without clearly defining it. In the SL, Book III, he says that virtue is something opposed to ambition and avarice. It is something like frugality.<sup>19/</sup> It is to restrain oneself.<sup>20/</sup> There is "a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility," through self-restraint, "in some measure on a level with the people." There is also "an inferior virtue, which puts" the nobility, through self-restraint, "at least upon a level with one another."<sup>21/</sup> He indirectly defines virtue as consisting, of the love of our country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and to us are known only by tradition.<sup>22/</sup>

By virtue, he speaks of

political virtue, which is also moral virtue as it is directed to the public good; very little of private moral virtue, and not at all of that virtue which relates to revealed truths. This will appear better, in book V.<sup>23/</sup>

In Book V, he defines it as "a love of republic," "the love of frugality" and "the love of equality." It refers to a sensation which limits the desire of "procuring necessaries to our family." It is a sensation which enables a citizen to use his riches for public expenses so that every citizen may be equal. It is a sensation which limits "ambition to the sole desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow-citizens."<sup>24/</sup> In a story about the Troglodytes in the Persian Letters (PL), Letter XIII, he refers by virtue to doing good for others by sacrificing oneself. In fine, it means a sensation which transforms man's

natural passions through self-denial into the love of the community and the desire for the glory of the country. <sup>26/</sup>

b. Honor

His second pattern of political culture is honor. It refers to personal ambition for "pre-eminence and ranks." It is a desire for "preferments and titles." <sup>27/</sup> Since it is "the prejudice of every person and rank," <sup>28/</sup> it is, strictly speaking, "a false honor" <sup>29/</sup> which is motivated by the love of the self rather than the love of others as in the case of virtue. Honor is

not so much what draws us towards society, as what distinguishes us from our fellow-citizens. Here the actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but as shining; not as just, but as extraordinary. <sup>30/</sup>

Being essentially a false honor based on vanity, i.e., ambition for greatness and distinction without being really so instead of passion for truth and justice per se, honor in principle allows the alienation of the fruit of greatness such as reputation in the sense of appearance from the source of greatness. Since emphasis is placed on the result of greatness as opposed to the source of greatness, honor allows any means to bring about the reputation of greatness without being really so. He says,

It allows of gallantry when united with the idea of sensible affection, or with that of conquest;...It allows of cunning and craft, when joining with the notion of greatness of soul or importance of affairs;...It does not forbid adulation, save when separated from the idea of a large fortune... <sup>31/</sup>

Since honor is associated with mannerism, not with "the things themselves," <sup>32/</sup> a man of honor is preoccupied chiefly with the

opinions of other men.<sup>33/</sup> A model of such a man is found in Plato's Republic, Book II, Chapter V, where a just man is contrasted with a man of injustice, i.e., a man of honor. Montesquieu's virtue associated with honor is symbolized by a gold ring in Plato's book. According to Plato, a man of honor

must be like any consummate master of a craft, a physician or a captain, who, knowing just what his art can do, never tries to do more, and can always retrieve a false step...if he is to reach perfection, must be equally discreet in his criminal attempts, and he must not be found out,...we must allow him to have secured a spotless reputation for virtue while committing the blackest crimes; he must be able to retrieve any mistake, to defend himself with convincing eloquence if his misdeeds are denounced, and, when force is required, to bear down all opposition by his courage and strength and by his command of friends and money.<sup>34/</sup>

For Montesquieu's man of honor as for Plato's unjust man, manneristic virtues such as politeness, boldness, frankness, etc. are important. "Truth is requisite only because a person habituated to veracity has an air of boldness and freedom," but the frankness of the common people, "which has nothing but truth and simplicity for its object" is despised.<sup>35/</sup>

c. Fear

The third and the last type of Montesquieu's political culture is fear. It is that part of man's psychological aspects which blindly submits to the absolute will of the master. It is not a human quality which involves intelligence, reflection, or any kind of thinking in loving others or the self. It is man's animal instinct which immediately seeks pleasure and averts from pain.<sup>36/</sup> It is not a human nature which, like virtue or honor, allows man of volun-

tary obedience but a bestial nature which man shares with animals and which, when the order is given, requires blind, the most passive, and immediate obedience in fear of punishment or death. It is a mental state not of a man but of a slave who must blindly obey the order of the master regardless of its reasonableness.

### 3. The Fitness between Structure and Culture

The very essence of Montesquieu's political thoughts is in the idea of fitness between the "nature" of government and its "principle." The nature of government refers to that by which government "is constituted," i.e., "its particular structure." <sup>37/</sup> The principle of government refers to "that by which it is made to act," i.e., "the human passions which set it in motion." <sup>38/</sup> This 'fit' between structure and culture is of crucial importance because the capability of the political system, as contemporary political scientists would say, depends on political culture expressing the life experience of citizens.

In Book III of the SL, he establishes the fitness between structure and culture by matching the republic with virtue, the monarchy with honor, and despotism with fear. He says, "As virtue is necessary in a republic and in a monarchy honor, so fear is necessary in a despotic government." <sup>39/</sup>

In a republic, "the government is entrusted to private citizens. Now,...to preserve it we must love it." <sup>40/</sup> As kings are fond of their monarchies and despotic princes arbitrary power, the citizens in a republic must love their country. In a republic, therefore,

"every thing depends on establishing this love" which he calls virtue. <sup>41/</sup> In the PL, Letter X, he raises the question "whether men were happy through the pleasures and satisfactions of the senses or through the practice of virtue." As an attempt to answer the question, he tells the episode of the Troglodytes. <sup>42/</sup> He first presents his position that the self-interest--"the pleasures and satisfactions of the sense"--is not the spirit of a republic. In this republic the people pursue their self-interest.

All the individuals agreed that they would no longer obey anyone and that each would look out strictly for his own interests without regard to the interests of others.

This unanimous resolution pleased all the individuals extremely well. They would say: "Why should I kill myself working for people I don't care a thing about? I shall think of myself and I shall live happily. What matter to me whether others can do so or not? I shall provide for all my needs and so long as I have managed that, it matters nothing to me that all the other Troglodytes should be miserable. <sup>43/</sup>

This republic was perished. He then describes another republic where the people feel,

that the welfare of the individual is always to be found in the common good, and that to want to stray from it is to seek destruction; they taught them that virtue is not something that should cost us effort, that it is not to be considered a painful exercise; and that justice to others is like charity to ourselves. <sup>44/</sup>

In the last part of the episode, he describes the evolution of a monarchy. At the end of the prosperous republic, Troglodytes agreed to ask an old man with a long record of virtue to become their king. The old man said with tears,

You are offering me the crown, and if you absolutely insist on it, I shall naturally have to take it. But realize that I

shall die of grief to have seen Troglodytes born free and now see them subjects...I can see what is happening, O troglodytes! Your virtue is beginning to weigh upon you. In the present state of affairs, with no chief, you must be virtuous in spite of yourselves...But this yoke seems too hard to you. You prefer to be subjects of a prince and obey his laws, for they are less restrictive than your customs. You know that from now on, you can satisfy your ambition, acquire riches, and languish in soft luxury, and that so long as you avoid falling into great crimes, you will have no need of virtue...O Troglodytes, I am coming to the end of my days...I shall soon see your sacred forebears. Why would you...oblige me to tell them that I have left you here under any yoke other than that of Virtue? 45/

Even though the examples of the republic reported by Montesquieu are those of ancient Greece and Rome, his vision on a monarchy which he let a Persian gentleman describe in the episode of the Troglodytes while the Persian was yet on the way to Europe is in fact his report of his contemporary Europe, particularly of his own country France. He reports on the spirit of a monarchy, i.e., honor, through the mouth of Rica, the more detached of the two Persian observers, before he became accustomed to European usages and customs and yet when he stayed in Paris long enough to understand them. Rica observes,

The king of France is the most powerful prince of Europe. Unlike his neighbor..., he has no gold mines. Yet he possesses greater riches, for he draws from the vanity of his subjects a wealth more inexhaustible than mines. He has been known to undertake and wage wars with no other funds than honorary titles to sell, and by reason of this miracle of human pride, his troops are paid, his fortresses armed, and his navies fitted out.

Moreover, this king is a great magician. He exercises his empire over the very minds of his subjects and makes them think as he likes. If he has only one million, he has only to convince them that one crown equals two, and they believe him...He even goes so far as to make them believe that he can cure them of all manner of disease by touching them, so great

is his strength and dominion over their minds. <sup>46/</sup>

In brief, according to Montesquieu, "Honor...is the prevailing principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic, to the laws and even to the virtues themselves." <sup>47/</sup>

Just as virtue is the ruling principle for republics, and honor for monarchy, he writes throughout the PL and the SL that fear is the principle for despotism. He considers both the ruler and the ruled in despotism as slaves. <sup>48/</sup> Both sides are less than humans. The subjects of a despotic prince "must necessarily be servile" ; therefore, the only aim of education in despotic governments is to "debase" humanity. "Excessive obedience supposes ignorance in the person that obeys" <sup>49/</sup> except two or three simple ideas for understanding orders as when we want to train a horse. "Thus an impression is made on his brain by two or three motions, and no more." <sup>50/</sup> "Here, therefore, education is in some measure needless...in order to make a good slave." <sup>51/</sup> Since "every tyrant is at the same time a slave," the same is true with "him that commands, for he has no occasion to deliberate, to doubt, to reason." <sup>52/</sup> Unaccustomed to resistance in his palace, "A prince of this stamp...is enraged to see his will opposed...; hence he is generally governed by wrath or vengeance." <sup>53/</sup> Though the end of despotic government is tranquillity, "this tranquillity cannot be called a peace: no, it is only the silence of those towns" under the threat of invasion by the enemy force. <sup>54/</sup> Since "Persons capable of setting a value upon themselves would be likely to create disturbances, fear must therefore depress their

spirits, and extinguish even the least sense of ambition." <sup>55/</sup> Though a moderate government supports itself by its own internal strength, fear is the spring of despotic government. "When a despotic prince ceases for one single moment to uplift his arm,...all is over." <sup>56/</sup>

The fitness between a despot and his servile subjects is wittily suggested by the matrimonial relationship of the Moscovites. He says,

It is unbelievable how many Moscovite women like to be beaten. They cannot understand how they can possess the heart of their husband if he doesn't beat them properly...; her husband beats her every day. She cannot even look at another man without being immediately beaten. And so they love each other tenderly and live together in the best mutual understanding in the world. <sup>57/</sup>

## B. THE OBSERVED POLITICAL SELF

We have seen that Montesquieu calls the politically relevant integrated inner principle of society the "principle" of government or the "spirit" of the laws or the general spirit of the nation and that he classifies the inner principle of government into three types: virtue, honor, and fear.

These three types of political mind are not Montesquieu's ideas. The concept of virtue is very close to the mental state of Plato's just man. The concept of honor reminds us of Plato's description of an unjust man, i.e., a sophist, or Hobbes's just man. The concept of fear is the psychological state of Hobbes's natural man.

### 1. Empirical Origin

However, while not only Plato but also Hobbes is concerned with the mental characteristics of man in general, Montesquieu is interested in the common characteristics not of man in general but of a parti-

cular group of men.

Plato and Hobbes deal with moral goodness, cleverness, and fear as the common characteristics of all men, even though each of them emphasizes different aspect of the universal mental types in developing his political theory.

The virtue of Plato's philosopher-king and the cleverness of Hobbes's sovereign ruler are the two a priori qualities of innate human nature, i.e., reason. The fear of Hobbes's natural man results from passions which represents the material side of man; however, he focuses on general passions which originate in built-in vital organs. Therefore, he says, "Nosce teipsum, read thyself," by which he means that "He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man; but mankind." <sup>58/</sup>

In contrast, Montesquieu is interested in the common psychological characteristics of particular group of men, i.e., nations. His treatment of virtue, honor, and fear is truly empirical in the sense that these mental types refer to the empirically generated differences of different political groups.

He considers these mental types as produced largely by factors which are external to human mind. Such empirical factors include the geographical location, the climate, <sup>59/</sup> the soil, <sup>60/</sup> the historically formed morals and customs, <sup>61/</sup> the economic situation of the people, <sup>62/</sup> the size of the population, <sup>63/</sup> and the education. <sup>64/</sup> Depending on the empirical conditions under which a people live, their overall psychological disposition, for example, of ancient

Athens is virtue; that of his contemporary France is honor; and that of most Asian nations, according to him, is fear.

Today, that part of politically relevant human mind which is formed as a result of such external or environmental factors is called political culture. In my paper, it is called the observed political self.

## 2. Relativity of Values

Montesquieu does not recognize the a priori vision on political goodness which Plato uses in distinguishing between political patterns, behavioral or mental, and also in grading them. The modernity of his political thought lies in his attempt to destroy the absolute values and to replace them with the relative values of the political self.

In fact, his emphasis on the empirically generated mental qualities of the people in choosing a proper form of government and also emphasis on value relativism may be traced back to the political theory of Machiavelli who lived about two centuries before.

Machiavelli, for the first time, views politics and society as purely human and natural facts. He disentangles politics from the restraints of theology. Based on the objective observation of reality and study of the past, he notes that men are "wicked, ungrateful, prone to dissipation, afraid of danger, greedy of gain." <sup>65/</sup> Therefore, in public affairs, it is rarely possible to respect the moral principles required of private individuals, "because human conditions do not allow it." <sup>66/</sup> His only concern is the effective reality of things; life as it ought to be remains outside his sphere of considera-

tion. For him, politics is not only something detached from morality, but it actually has a morality of its own. He who achieves public good deserves, as a prince, everlasting glory, even if as a man he may be condemned for his cruelty. But when a prince hesitates and, through hesitation, damages his state, he must be considered wicked and incapable, even if the cause for being irresolute is a morally good one and even if, as a private man, he deserves the highest praise. In brief, though his definition of a political virtue is apparently different from Montesquieu's, both thinkers allow politics its own autonomous reality and define a political virtue separately from a moral or religious virtue.

Machiavelli, like Montesquieu, emphasizes value relativism. The idea of choosing a form of government which fits the common psychological pattern of the people implies value relativism. In the Discourses, he writes,

Some of the writers on politics distinguished three kinds of government, viz. the monarchical, the aristocratic, and the democratic; and maintain that the legislators of a people must choose from these three the one that seems to them most suitable. 67/

He thinks that there are two forms of good government, republics and monarchies, focusing on the former in the Discourses and on the latter in the Prince. A political virtue of the people is a link between his republican and monarchical tendencies. When the citizen is not corrupted, the total sum of virtue is greater in the republic than in the monarchy. When the citizen is corrupted, the creative virtue of one individual (monarch) is essential, making the monarchy

the only good government. <sup>68/</sup>

To the extent that Machiavelli emphasizes the empirical psychological qualities of the people, <sup>69/</sup> he is clearly the precursor of Montesquieu. Machiavelli himself is aware of the fact that he is entering upon a road never trod by anyone, for he says in the Discourses,

I have resolved to open a new route, which has not yet been followed by any one, and may prove difficult and troublesome, but may also bring me some reward in the approbation of those who will kindly appreciate my efforts.

And if my poor talents, my little experience of the present and insufficient study of the past, should make the result of my labors defective and of little utility, I shall carry out my views with greater ability, eloquence, and judgment, so that if I do not merit praise, I ought at least not to incur censure. <sup>70/</sup>

Montesquieu carries out Machiavelli's views on politics more systematically, more extensively, and more thoroughly in the SL. While Machiavelli categorizes the psychological state of the people into two types, i.e., virtue and corruption in the sense of servility, Montesquieu classifies it into three types, i.e., virtue, honor, and fear. While the former considers the political culture of a people as being of a short duration, the latter regards it as enduring. Despite these and other differences between the two, as far as the purpose of this paper is concerned, they are similar: for both of them, the goodness of the forms of government ultimately depends upon the political culture of the people and the formation of political culture depends upon external or environmental conditions. In other words, both of them centers their attention on the value relativity of the observed political self. We will review his idea of value relati-

vity in the three areas of life: religion, the manners and customs of the society, and politics.

a. The Persian Letters (PL)

The central idea of the PL is the end of the absolute values. As a commentator says, "The single idea of the relativity of reality and the accompanying acceptance of a universal indeterminateness ties" all the letters together.<sup>71/</sup> The commentator says,

all things, including "reality" itself are subjective and relative, relative to time, to place, to climate, to religious belief, to racial and national prejudice, to intelligence.<sup>72/</sup>

In PL, he raises the fundamental question about the absolute nature of reality. He has doubts on the most familiar things in life. He asks why some things appear dirty to us.<sup>73/</sup> He asks how anyone can be a Persian, or a Parisian, or himself.<sup>74/</sup> He has a doubt on the nature of established religion.<sup>75/</sup> He has a doubt on his country, familiar customs of his society, and Western civilization itself throughout the book. In order to resolve these doubts, he compares two different civilizations. Like a philosopher who leaves the cave world in the Republic, he let two Persians, Usbek and Rica, leave, on behalf of Montesquieu himself, their familiar life world in order to reflect on the true nature of reality. Leaving their relatives, their friends, and their country to venture into climates unknown to Persians, Usbek writes,

Rica and I are perhaps the first among the Persians who have been moved by a desire for knowledge to leave their country and to give up the savors of a peaceful life that they might go seek wisdom the hard way.

We were born in a flourishing kingdom, but we did not believe that its borders should be those of our knowledge nor that Oriental insight alone should enlighten us. 76/

When the two Persians leave Persia, Montesquieu, by implication, critically questions everything in his contemporary France, too. Thus, he compares so many things of the two different worlds with the saying,

I shall teach you things far removed from Persian character and spirit. It is certainly the same earth carrying both countries, but the men of this country where I am and those of the country where you are are quite different. 77/

Therefore, his observations on the relativity of something in Persia are simultaneously his observations on the relativity of that something in France.

#### i. Relativity of Religion

Religion is established on absolute values as far as those who accept a certain religion is concerned. But by comparing and contrasting Mohammedanism and Christianity, he points to the relativity of values in general as well as religious values.

He attacks the very source of the absolute nature of religious belief, i.e., sacred books. Here, the collection of value premises is given to be blindly adopted as the foundation of religion. 78/ As sacred books which believers claim were brought down from heaven, Christians have The Bible and Mohammedans The Koran. 79/ There are the Jewish religion, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. "The Jewish religion is an old trunk that has produced two branches...I mean Mohammedanism, and Christianity." 80/ They consider each other as heretics, but since the truth of religious statements is dogmatic relative to

believers, <sup>81/</sup> there is not essential difference in truth value between religions or between heretics and orthodox within a religion. <sup>82/</sup> Mohammedans are unbelievers to Christians and the latter are unbelievers to the former. Theologians "were not looking in the Scripture for what you must believe, but rather for what they themselves believed...think(ing) of it...as a work capable of giving authority to their own ideas." <sup>83/</sup> The clergyman has "a certain desire to draw others out of our own opinions," which is "as ridiculous as if you were to see Europeans at work, for the good of humanity, trying to whiten the faces of Africans." <sup>84/</sup> A conscientious religious man prays every day,

I should like to serve you according to your will; but every man whom I consult wants me to serve you according to his own... All these things, Lord, throw me into inconceivable confusion. <sup>85/</sup>

His position on the relativity of religious values is clear in his description of the nature of God as follows;

We never judge of matters except by a secret reflex we make upon ourselves. I am not surprised that Negroes should paint the devil in blinding white, and their own gods black as coal...; nor that all idolator should have pictured their gods with human faces, should have advised them of all their own inclinations. It has been well said that if triangles were to create a god, they would give him three sides. <sup>86/</sup>

Though he accepts the relativity of values, he is critical of man's playing God. He says,

When I see men crawling about on an atom, I mean the earth, which is only a speck of the universe, and proposing themselves as models of divine providence, I don't know how to reconcile so much extravagance with so much pettiness. <sup>87/</sup>

The most reasonable philosophers who have reflected on the nature of God have held that he is a being completely perfect,

but they have sorely abused that idea. They have made an enumeration of all the different perfections that man is capable of having or imagining and have weighed down their notion of the divinity with them, without reflecting that often these attributes are mutually restrictive and that they cannot exist in the same being without destroying one another.

Poets of the West say that a painter who wanted to make the portrait of the goddess of beauty assembled the most beautiful Greek women and took from each her most pleasing feature, from which he reconstituted an entity that he believed to resemble the most beautiful of all the goddesses. If a man had tried to conclude from this that she was blonde as well as brunette and that she had both black eyes and blue eyes, that she was haughty as well as tender, he would have been taken for a fool. <sup>88/</sup>

He further condemns a spirit of proselytization as a common epidemic which has been passed from the Egyptians through the Jews to the Mohammedans and to the Christians, <sup>89/</sup> since a religious zeal is ultimately derived from a desire for domination over others. He says,

The man who wants to make me change my religion is doing so only because he would most certainly not change his own, even if someone tried to force him to. Thus, he finds it strange that I should not do something he would not do himself, even perhaps for the mastery of the whole world. <sup>90/</sup>

As above, he considers religious statements as relatively true, relative to the subjective desire of believers for influence and domination over others. At the same time, I think that his position on the relativity of religious values transcends the religious world as he observes in the beginning of the PL where he lets Usbek write,

Objects in themselves are neither pure nor impure...Mud appears dirty to us only because it wounds our vision or some other of our senses...Our senses...should therefore be our sole judges of the purity or impurity of things. <sup>91/</sup>

Because of the subjectivity and relativity of values, he, concerning religious matters, takes the position of a civil religion. He says, "under whatever religion one lives, the observance of laws, love for fellow men, and piety toward one's parents are always the first acts of religion." <sup>92/</sup> In fact, many political thinkers including Plato, <sup>93/</sup> Machiavelli, <sup>94/</sup> Rousseau <sup>95/</sup> as well as Montesquieu have opted for the position of a civil religion that religion is the roundabout expression of the intention of the political subjects. From the perspective of a civil religion, Montesquieu believes in religious pluralism and religious tolerance. For him, the role of a religion is not in imposing one's own will upon others but in "smooth(ing) off any excess of roughness left in their customs by nature." <sup>96/</sup> What is important therefore even in religious matters is the intention and the unintended consequences upon the political self, of religious ceremonies. Just as objects themselves are neither pure nor impure, neither ugly nor beautiful, religious ceremonies as religious behaviors or activities "contain no degree of goodness in themselves." <sup>97/</sup> Just as ugliness and beauty are in the eyes of the beholder, the goodness of religious ceremonies is in what makes citizen happy, for example, "by practising all the duties of charity and human kindness" on behalf of their neighbors and "never violating the laws under which they live." <sup>98/</sup> When one "must choose the ceremonies of one religion as over against two thousand," "one can easily be deceived," but one should not be in such a way that religious ceremonies intended for a group of people

be imposed upon another against the happiness of the latter by the name of God, i.e., the absolute truth. <sup>99/</sup>

In sum, what he tries to do throughout his discussions of religious matters is, first, to reject the universality and absoluteness of all religious values and, second, to regard religion as something like a common inner spirit of the people living in a society. The essence of religion is not in religious ceremonies or God's commands isolated from the welfare of the people for whom the religion is established. He centers his attention not on God isolated from the human life of a particular people but on a people living under particular circumstances.

ii. Relativity of the Manners and Customs of the Society

It is much easier to admit his position on the relativity of social manners and customs than to admit his position on the relativity of religion. For, while the foundation of religion is the absolute nature of its truths, the diversity of social customs is a common sense. However, he is not just concerned with pointing out the diversity of social customs. He is rather concerned with the fact that the manners and customs of the society as the patterns of behavior reflect a certain definite inner principle of society which he, in the SL, calls the "principle" of government or the "spirit" of the laws. A further implication of the relativity of social customs as the behavioral components of society is that it reflects the relativity of the inner spirit of society itself. For example, in Persia, everything capable of perplexing our reason

is forbidden. The drinking of wine is forbidden "since it buries reason." For the same reason, games of chance are forbidden by an explicit rule.<sup>100/</sup> When it is impossible to remove the cause of our passions as in the case of man's treatment of women, they are attenuated. He says,

Love among our kind involves no vexation, no rage. It is a languid passion, which leaves our soul in tranquillity. The plurality of women saves us from their despotism. Their numbers temper the violence of our desires.<sup>101/</sup>

In Europe, however, the drinking of wine is permissible to Christian princes.<sup>102/</sup> "Gambling is much in vogue."<sup>103/</sup> While Persian women are hidden behind the veil and confined to the seraglio, European women enjoy great freedom.<sup>104/</sup>

The manners and customs of society among the Persians endure long as among Muscovites.

Muscovites are not allowed to leave the empire at all, even to travel. Thus, separated from other nations by their own laws, they have preserved their ancient customs and with all the more attachment for not believing it possible that there could be others.<sup>105/</sup>

In contrast, the manners and customs of society among the French easily change. He says,

I find the whimsey of fashion among the French astonishing... A woman who leaves Paris to spend six months in the country comes back as antiquated as if she had moldered thirty years there.

The same goes for manners and customs as for styles. Frenchmen change their way of life according to the age of the king. The monarch could even manage to make a serious nation of them--if he undertook to do so. The prince impresses the character of his mind on the court; the court on the city; the city on the provinces. The sovereign's soul is a die that gives shape to all the others.<sup>106/</sup>

From the analysis of the letters of the PL, we can conclude that values, for Montesquieu, are subjective in the sense of being self-centered and that they are relative to the historical and environmental situation. He skillfully describes the generality of value-subjectivity by comparing an outspoken egotist with a man of modesty as follows;

"What! Must we always have dull people who paint their own portraits and bring everything back to themselves?"

"You are right," our (modest) talker took over again abruptly. "They have only to do as I do. I never praise myself. I have wealth and position, and I am generous. My friends say that I have some wit. But I never speak of all that. If I possess any good qualities, the one I pride myself most on is my modesty." 107/

In brief, he thinks that all values including political culture which he calls the principle of government and the spirit of laws are ultimately subjective and relative.

b. The Spirit of the Laws on the Relativity of Political Values

We have seen that Montesquieu considers a religion as a system of religious ceremonies and the social manners and customs as a system of regular behavior patterns. Like objects themselves, 108/ religious and social behaviors themselves are neither good nor bad. 109/ In the same way, political structures themselves are neither good nor bad.

In Plato's political theory, the best government is the Republic which is the a priori ideal type of all governments: all empirical forms of government as particular cases of the Republic are defective. The goodness of a government depends on the degree

to which it participates in the quality of the Republic. In contrast, Montesquieu does not recognize such an a priori form of government as the Republic. Instead, in principle, he regards any government as good insofar as it conforms to the humor and dispositions of the inhabitants of a society for whom the government is established. It is not a priori ideas but the culture of a particular people that determines the goodness in the form of government.

For him, such forms of government as a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, if not a despotism, are all good governments. As institutions, they are neither good nor bad. However, they are all good or adequate forms of government as long as they conform to the political culture of a particular people and as long as they allow the people to lead a happy life in them. He gives some thought about the best government in the PL. For him, the best government is one that conforms to "nature" or "human reason," or human "leanings and inclinations." 110/ Then, associating the goodness of government with "moderation" in a more substantive terms, he continues,

If under a gentle government, the nation is as submissive as under a strict government, then the first is preferable, since it is more in conformity with reason whereas severity is a motive foreign to it.

Be assured...that in a state the degree of cruelty of punishment does not cause people to obey the laws more. In countries where punishment is moderate, the laws are respected just as in those where punishment is tyrannous and frightful... A week of prison or a light fine impresses a European, brought up under a gentle government, as much as the loss of an arm frightens an Asiatic...A despair of losing his reputation will literally torment a Frenchman sentenced to the selfsame punishment that would make a Turk lose scarcely a quarter hour's sleep. 111/

The same idea concerning the goodness of government is elaborated throughout the SL after reviving it in the summary form in the first book as follows;

The government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humor and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established.

He distinguishes between such psychological states of the political self as "the human passions which set it(government) in motion" 112/ or "the spring which gives motion" to government. He says,

What I distinguish by the name of virtue, in a republic...is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political virtue; and it is the spring which sets the republican government in motion, as honor is the spring which gives motion to monarchy. 113/

By presenting the three categories of the psychological dispositions of the people, he believes that he has laid down the "first principles" of political theory, and has found "that the particular cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all nations are only consequences of them."114/ He continues,

I have a thousand times given the leaves I had written to the winds...I have found the truth, only to lose it again. But when I once discovered my first principles, everything I sought for appeared; and in the course of twenty years I have seen my work begun, growing up, advancing to maturity, and finished...When I have seen what so many great men, in France, in England, and in Germany, have said before me, I have been lost in admiration; but I have not lost my courage: I have said with Correggio, "And I also am a painter." 115/

He says that his ideas are new and therefore that he has been obliged to coin new words in order to convey his meaning.116/ What is the newness of these ideas? Needless to say, what he thinks so new is about the idea of a political virtue as against a moral or

Christian virtue. He refers by his new ideas to the concept of a political virtue.<sup>117/</sup> However, from the perspective of the history of political thoughts, his ideas are new not only because he defines virtue in the political theory different from a moral or a Christian virtue of the past but also because he, as the foundation of political theory, focuses on the psychological dispositions of the people which a political virtue is only a part of.

In short, he centers his attention on the observed political self rather than the observing political self. He does not start his political theory with ontological principles, like Plato, concerning what a good man and the best state ought to be. Rather, he starts it with the observation of the empirical qualities of the existing political subject.

In conclusion, all of Montesquieu's three principles of government are the sum total of the psychological qualities of each particular people. They are all empirical in the sense that their content results from the external factors of the human mind. They are all externally generated. They all refer to the common psychological qualities of a people shared by all or most of them. They all refer to the psychological qualities which can be experienced through bodily senses and therefore can be observed if indirectly through inference. Since they are formed by external factors, they can be inferred in terms of difference in external factors. Or they can be inferred through the observation of the external behaviors of the political self under the assumption that behavior is the

external expression of a certain mental state, i.e., inner state of man. However, his principles of government and the spirit of the laws are closer to national character in conception than to political culture because the former two, as sweeping generalizations, technically do not allow empirical investigation in the sense of verification or falsification while the last concept allows it. Since I am not concerned with the technicality of empirical investigation, I will not make any distinction between the principle of government, the spirit of the laws, national character, or political culture. As far as I am concerned, they all theoretically constitute the same observable political self as against the observing political self.

### C. THE OBSERVING POLITICAL SELF

It is clear that he has an intention of establishing the value-free science. It is not difficult to demonstrate such an intention. Therefore, the question is not whether he has such an intention but whether he has realized it. I do not think that he has. In fact, I do not think that anybody can.

His intention of establishing a value-free science is suggested or revealed in many prejudices. He clearly reveals his intention of seeing the world as it is. He attacks the religious prejudices of the Persians by questioning the idea of unclean meat. Objects themselves like pigs and rats are neither clean nor unclean. It is in the eyes of the beholder that makes them dirty. In other words,

it is Mohammedanism that makes them look dirty. Religious ceremonies themselves are neither good nor bad. Christians are unbelievers to Mohammedans and Mohammedans are unbelievers to Christians. He also attacks the absolute nature of the Persian despotism. There are republics and monarchies in Europe. They are much short of the ideal state such as Plato's Republic, but he accepts them as good or as adequate. He even criticizes the almost universally accepted social custom of incest taboo in the episode of the Ghebers.<sup>118/</sup> Here, it is suggested that even the incest taboo may be man's cultural prejudice. In the Preface to the SL, he declares it the ultimate purpose of his life "to make mankind recover from their prejudices."

He wants to make mankind recover from its prejudices by freeing man's true self from thoughts and impressions imposed by others upon him, for he says,

By prejudices I here mean, not that which renders men ignorant of some particular things, but whatever renders them ignorant of themselves. <sup>119/</sup>

He recognizes man's double capacity. One refers to his capacity, in the passive position, to get information from outside and conform "in society to the thoughts and impressions of others." <sup>120/</sup> By this capacity, man can have knowledge about particular things and other people. If man has only this capacity, to free him completely from all prejudices is to reduce him to nothing. However, he recognizes another capacity of man which I call the observing self as opposed to the observed self. By this another capacity, man "is equally capable of knowing his own nature whenever it is laid open

to his view, and of losing the very sense of it when this idea is banished from his mind." <sup>121/</sup> This second capacity of man refers to man's ability of self-consciousness. Because of this capacity, man cannot be reduced to nothing. He is always something. For he has the freedom to take initial value premises without being imposed by other people. One can find true love in one's sister or brother through marriage, or one can find true God by becoming a Mohammedan or a Christian, but only under one condition that one has the freedom to do so without outside influence. Only the subject himself has the ability to make the ultimate decision by taking into consideration all historical and environmental conditions he faces.

For Montesquieu, man has the freedom to be himself. But what is man himself? To be man himself is to take values from his own perspective and not from somebody else's perspective. To recover mankind from their prejudices does not mean to deprive them of all their values. To the contrary, it means to recover him to taking values for himself by giving up values imposed by others upon him. He reads in admiration what so many great men, in France, in England, and in Germany, has said before him, but he does not adopt their values blindly. Instead, he has the courage to say, "I also am a painter." He also has the freedom to take his own initial values.

In his political theory, we find the observing political self. We find the vantage point from which he makes value judgments as loud and as clear as in Plato's writings. His political theory is not free of values because he clearly adopts initial value premises

which he does not hesitate to reveal at all. His initial values by which he declares humanity and good society are only different, for example, from Plato's.

What are his initial value premises? He has two kinds of initial values. One is concerned with the observed political self and another with the observing political self. Here, I agree with Plamenatz in saying that there are two Montesquieus. According to the commentator, it is not true that

Montesquieu was interested only in how society functions, in the facts; he also had his own strong preferences which he hardly troubled to disguise. There are indeed two Montesquieus in De l'Esprit des Lois: student of society, and there is the lover of freedom insistently pointing to the advantages of the political forms which best preserve freedom. 122/

I just do not agree with him in his description of the first Montesquieu as being unprejudiced.

#### 1. Initial Choice of the Empirical World as Relevant Reality

Man is living among multiple realities. Plato distinguishes in the Republic, Book VII, between four kinds or levels of realities. He orders them. According to his order, the world of ideas is more real than the world of the senses. He completely rejects the idea of man as the measure of all things. In his political theory, he rejects the subjectivity and also the relativity of the political self. By recognizing the world of ideas as the only genuine reality, he subordinates the observed political self to the observing political self.

Montesquieu does not quite reverse the order between the observed

political self and the observing political self which Plato sets; however, Montesquieu not only recognizes the world of senses as equally real, but he also places much emphasis on that level of reality with regard to politics. He does accept such empirical forms of government as a democracy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy as good even though they are clearly not ruled by philosophers. They are the natural forms of government as far as they conform to the political cultures of particular societies.

He thus makes the initial choice of empirical world as political reality. This choice is implied in his subjectivism and relativism.

His choice of empirical reality takes the form of value-neutrality. Facts themselves are neither good nor bad. In other words, they are value-neutral. For him, facts refer to "objects themselves," "religious ceremonies in themselves," or any actually existing observable human behaviors.

His choice of empirical reality also leads to a particular type of subjectivism. By saying that facts themselves are neither good nor bad, he cannot make a negative value-judgment that a certain fact is bad, but he cannot make a positive judgment that it is good, either. However, he clearly makes both negative and positive value judgments with regard to the appropriateness of the forms of government. In fact, he makes three value judgments by the name of value-neutrality. First, it is a value judgment to decide that human mind is determined by the physical nature such as the climate and the soil on the one hand and

the senses of human body on the other. Secondly, it is also a value judgment to say that whatever is good for the subject is considered as good. The third value judgment is that the government which conforms to the general spirit of a particular nation is the proper government. They are all value judgments because there can be alternative positions to each of them.

## 2. Initial Choice of the Transcendental Subject

Montesquieu's analysis of slavery and freedom goes beyond the assumptions involved in the initial choice of empirical reality.

### a. Negative Value-judgment on Slavery

Montesquieu extensively deals with slavery in the SL. He writes five books (IX-XIII) for the analysis of freedom and another five books (XIV-XVIII) for the analysis of slavery. In the books XIV through XVIII, we find two lines of reasoning. First, he clearly relates freedom and slavery with the physical nature such as the climate and the soil. The servile culture is considered as the product of the climate. In Books XIV-XVII, it is assumed that human mind is moulded by the climate. In Book XVIII, it is assumed that human mind is moulded by the soil. Second, he reveals his personal preference in favor of freedom and against slavery regardless of his observation on the relationship between the physical nature and human mind. These two kinds of reasoning are mutually contradictory. He resolves this contradiction by placing one value-judgment above another.

i. Descriptive Analysis of Slavery

From the empirical perspective, Montesquieu descriptively analyzes the slave culture. Since he is interested in slavery ultimately with regard to its proper relationship with the political structure, he defines slavery in terms of the subject's state of mind rather than the degree of the master's power established by institutions in the society, established by force as well as by voluntary will. He calls slavery by will, i.e., based on servitude or servile attitude a natural slavery.<sup>123/</sup> He calls the emergence of natural slavery "the true origin of slavery."<sup>124/</sup>

First, he examines the concept of slavery as "the establishment of a right which gives one man a power over another as renders him absolute master of his life and fortune."<sup>125/</sup> Here, slavery refers to the relationship between the master and the servant established by social institution. However, since the power of the master over the slave widely varies, the meaning of slavery cannot be given in terms of the degree of the power of the master or of the slave's obligation.<sup>126/</sup>

He analyzes the unnatural slavery in which men are made slaves against their will. First, the prisoners of war are made slaves. Second, debtors are made slaves by selling their freedom. Third, the children of a slave are made slaves by birth. Fourth, religious dissenters are made slaves "in order to render its propagation more easy."<sup>127/</sup> Fifth, the negroes, according to Montesquieu, are made slaves because God made them less than human, i.e., because they are

too ugly and too low in intelligence to be considered as men.<sup>128/</sup>

Finally, he examines natural slavery. It refers to selling oneself in accordance with one's will. The act of selling oneself must conform to one's servile state of mind. True slavery, he says, "ought to be founded on the nature of things."<sup>129/</sup> Here, slavery founded on the nature of things refers to selling oneself in accordance with one's inclinations and tastes. He clearly defines slavery in terms of the political culture of the subject in that not only the master but also the slave must be satisfied with servitude.

He classifies true slavery into three types. First, civil slavery refers to true slavery existing between private persons.<sup>130/</sup> Secondly, domestic slavery refers to that between the husband and his wife or wives.<sup>131/</sup> Finally, political servitude refers to that between the ruler and his subjects.<sup>132/</sup> All of these three types of natural slavery are linked together through the servile psychological dispositions of the people which are produced by the physical nature.

Servile Nature. The primary factor which produces servitude in human mind is, he says, the climate, particularly, temperature. More specifically, it is the excess of heat. The servile culture which high temperature causes is slothfulness and laziness. He says,

There are countries where the excess of heat enervates the body, and renders men so slothful and dispirited that nothing but the fear of chastisement can oblige them to perform any laborious duty: slavery is the more reconcilable to reason; and the master being as lazy with respect to his sovereign as his slave is with regard to him, this adds a political to a civil slavery.<sup>133/</sup>

The servile culture also refers to the lack of courage which great heat causes. He says,

We have already observed that great heat enervates the strength and courage of men, and that in cold climates they have a certain vigor of body and mind, which renders them patient and intrepid, and qualifies them for arduous enterprises...In the north of China people are more courageous than those in the south; and those in the south of Korea have less bravery than those in the north. 134/

The servile culture which great heat causes in mind is also composed of the effeminacy of the people, according to Montesquieu,

We ought not, then, to be astonished that the effeminacy of the people in hot climates has almost always rendered them slaves; and that the bravery of those in cold climates has enabled them to maintain their liberties. This is an effect which springs from a natural cause. 135/

Great heat thus renders men "indolent, effeminate, and timorous." Dependence and passive attitude of such men constitute the servile culture. He says,

The heat of the climate may be so excessive as to deprive the body of all vigor and strength. Then the faintness is communicated to the mind; there is no curiosity, no enterprise, no generosity of sentiment; the inclinations are all passive; indolence constitutes the utmost happiness; scarcely any punishment is so severe as mental employment; and slavery is more supportable than the force and vigor of mind necessary for human conduct. 136/

Another important aspect of the slave culture is fear which is generated by excessive imagination in warm climates. He says,

In warm climates, where the cutis is relaxed, the ends of the nerves are expanded and laid open to the weakest action of the smallest objects...Now, imagination, taste, sensibility, and vivacity depend on an infinite number of small sensations...

In cold countries they have very little sensibility for pleasure;...in warm countries, their sensibility is exquisite...

From this delicacy of organs peculiar to warm climates it follows that the soul is most sensibly moved by whatever relates to the union of the two sexes: here everything leads

to this object. 137/

The sensitiveness of the people in hot climates, according to Montesquieu, lead through great power of imagination to exaggerated fear. 138/

Fitness between Structure and Culture. He says that if there be any natural slaves whom Aristotle endeavors to prove, "they are those of whom I have been speaking." 139/ Their psychological make-up is such that they sell themselves very readily. They choose their master on their own will for their own benefit. True slavery forms a mutual convention between the master and the slave. 140/

In Asia and Africa, he says, there reigns "a servile spirit, which they have never been able to shake off...; we shall never see anything there but the excess of slavery." 141/ Slavery, then, "is to be limited to some particular parts of the world." 142/ Therefore, "a wide difference ought to be made between...countries" where a servile spirit reigns, "and those in which even natural reason rejects it(slavery)" as in Europe. 143/

As far as what we have analyzed so far is concerned, Montesquieu's political self on slavery is the observed political self. It is perfectly consistent with his initial choice of empirical reality and subjectivism to say that the proper government in Asia and Africa is despotism or that that in Europe is not a despotic government. For, since the goodness of the forms of government depends on the political culture of the people, despotism fits the servile culture in Asia and Africa, of course, if his observation is correct.

ii. a priori value judgment on slavery

From the perspective of empirical reality, it is proper to make a conditional value-judgment that if the political culture of the people is not that of slavery, despotism is not a proper form of government or that if the political culture is servile, liberal forms of government are improper government. Otherwise, it is meaningless to discuss freedom and slavery. For as far as the perspective of empirical reality is taken, man always behaves as the physical nature including his senses commands him like animals. As far as we define human mind in terms of his inclinations and tastes ultimately determined by external influences, there is no meaning in distinguishing between the concepts of freedom and slavery.

However, Montesquieu clearly makes an a priori value-judgment that slavery is bad and freedom good regardless of the psychological make-up of the people. In his conception of slavery, we can see the dividing line between the debased quality of man which he considers less than human on the one hand and the quality of man, i.e., freedom which he thinks rightly belongs to man on the other.

In his justification of the negro slavery, he clearly considers the servile nature of man as subhuman, i.e., less than human. He says,

These creatures are all over black, and with such a flat nose that they can scarcely be pitied.

It is hardly to be believed that God, who is a wise Being, should place a soul, especially a good soul, in such a black ugly body...

The negroes prefer a glass necklace to that gold which polite nations so highly value. Can there be a greater proof

of their wanting common sense?

It is impossible for us to suppose these creatures to be men, because, allowing them to be men, a suspicion would follow that we ourselves are not Christians. 144/

Without making an additional value judgment other than one on the initial choice of empirical reality, Montesquieu can say that people in Asia or in Africa, on the basis of observation, willingly accept slavery or that slavery should not be practised in Europe. However, he makes a categorial value judgment that "slavery is in its own nature bad" as follows;

The state of slavery is in its own nature bad. It is neither useful to the master nor to the slave; not to the slave, because he can do nothing through a motive of virtue; nor to the master, because by having an unlimited authority over his slaves he insensibly accustoms himself to the want of all moral virtues, and thence becomes fierce, hasty, severe, choleric, voluptuous, and cruel. 145/

That slavery is in its own nature bad is not the kind of judgment which can be derived from his empirical concept of human subject. All he can say is that, if his observation is right, there is such a thing as slavery or liberty.

As we have seen, he says that objects themselves are neither good nor bad and that they appear bad to us because they wound our vision or some other of our senses. He says that our senses should be our sole judges of goodness or badness. Then, to the people with a slave culture and a servile spirit, slavery cannot be bad. It does not wound their senses. As long as he takes the position that our senses are the sole judges of morality, he can say that slavery is bad and liberty is good to some particular people with some anti-slavery culture and spirit, but he cannot say that slavery

is bad to all people. From the perspective of empirical reality, he can observe that the political self living in certain parts of the world or in certain climates has the servile culture. However, the judgment that slavery is bad in its own nature and therefore to all people is a judgment made prior to his observation of the empirical world. The question in focus is not what the eye of the beholder observes but what exists in the eye of the beholder itself.

Therefore, I conclude that Montesquieu simultaneously chooses two different levels of reality relevant to the constitution of the political self. One is the world of the physical nature which corresponds to the observed political self. The other is the world of the transcendental subject which corresponds to the observing political self. The observed or observable part is formed under the influence of the physical nature, but the observing part transcends it. The content of the servile culture such as slothfulness, laziness, lack of courage, effeminacy, indolence, timidity, the weakness of mind, dependence, passiveness, excessive sensitiveness and imagination, fear, readiness to sell oneself, etc. may be produced by the physical nature such as the climate and the soil. However, the judgment that such qualities are bad or wrong is not self-evident. The judgment must be a part of the observing self, if his judgment is correct.

b. The Mysterious Figure of "the Legislator"

One evidence that the a priori judgment in favor of freedom and against slavery is a part of his transcendental self is, in addition to his straightforward declaration, in his idea of the mysterious

legislator. He says that the inhabitants in hot climates "have much greater need than the European nations of a wiser legislator." <sup>146/</sup> He does not specifically define the role of a legislator in hot climates, but he at least says that bad legislators are those "who favors the vices of the climate" and good ones are those "who oppose those vices." <sup>147/</sup> Clearly, the legislator whose reason is to oppose the bad influence of the climate on human mind is placed beyond the influence of the climate. Hot climates render men slothful and lazy, but agriculture requires man's labor. The role of a wise legislator is to oblige slothful and dispirited people to perform any laborious duty through fear <sup>148/</sup> or through religion, philosophy, and laws. <sup>149/</sup> He says,

The legislators of China were more rational when, considering men not in the peaceful state which they are to enjoy hereafter, but in the situation proper for discharging the several duties of life, they made their religion, philosophy, and laws all practical. The more the physical causes incline mankind to inaction, the more the moral causes should estrange them from it. <sup>150/</sup>

c. The Moral Causes of Man

What is the reason of the legislator by which he opposes the vices of the physical causes? He gives a clear picture of the materialistic aspect of man. The content of human mind--"the passions, the spirit, the character, imagination, taste, sensibility, sadness and happiness"--is all "said to be determined by the state of the body...And the human body is like all other animal bodies." <sup>151/</sup> However, he does not give a clear picture of the moral causes of man, i.e., the transcendental subject except that they are the expression

of reason, and that they exist in religion, philosophy, and laws. He only leaves a clue, if ambiguous, as to what they could be in Book I of the SL.

He analyzes three different aspects of man: man as a physical being, man as a sensible being, and man as an intelligent being. Each of the three worlds--the physical world, the sensible world, and the intelligent world--has its own laws. He says that God established the laws proper to each of these three worlds. He also says that physical things invariably conform to their natural laws: that brutes do not invariably conform to their natural laws, but they fairly well observe their natural laws, that is, the laws of the self-preservation by the allurements of pleasure: and that intelligent beings incessantly violate their natural laws. He says,

This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on the other, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they do not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and even those of their own instituting, they frequently infringe. 152/

In fact, he says that since man tends to follow the natural laws of both the physical world and the sensible world too closely, he violates the natural laws of the intelligent world. He says,

Man, as a physical being, is like other bodies governed by invariable laws...; and as a sensible creature, he is hurried away by a thousand impetuous passions. 153/

As an intelligent being, he incessantly transgresses the laws established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is left to his private direction, though a limited being, and subject, like all finite intelligences, to ignorance and error; even his imperfect knowledge he loses. 154/

He is reminded of his natural laws, i.e., his moral causes, by religion, philosophy, or laws. He says,

Such a being might every instant forget his Creator: God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of religion. Such a being is liable every moment to forget himself; philosophy has provided against this by the laws of morality. Formed to live in society, he might forget his fellow-creatures; legislators have, therefore, by political and civil laws, confined him to his duty. 155/

He does not give a clear picture of the natural laws proper to the intelligent world, but it is shown at least that there is such a thing as is called the natural laws unique to the intelligent world. He calls the influence of these laws upon the human mind the moral causes. He also suggests that these laws can be reached through reason by religious men, philosophers, and legislators.

d. Human Reason as Law in General

For Montesquieu, human reason which is unique to man is the ultimate guide for human action. He characterizes the state of society ultimately as a state of war, first, between individuals and second, between nations. In society, conflicts occur because people try to take advantage of the "united strength of individuals" in pursuing their self-interest. Man formulates positive laws to regulate these relations of conflict. He says that positive laws "ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied." 156/

Human reason which he calls "law in general" seems to mean the ultimate purpose of life. That ultimate purpose of life for all men or for man in general, to be universally realized, must be adapted to the conditions of particular inhabitants of the earth. The ultimate

purpose of life is the same for anyone, but the conditions of the inhabitants of the earth vary depending on difference in the physical nature which influences their actual life. Therefore, the manner of realizing the ultimate purpose of life should be adapted, in positive laws, to the people, i.e., their inclinations and their tastes.<sup>157/</sup>

In brief, to adapt the ultimate purpose of human life to the particular conditions of each people "is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work," that is, the SL.<sup>158/</sup>

In his political theory, he essentially tries to adjust the observing political self, i.e., "law in general," "human reason," "the moral causes of man," "the reason of the 'legislator'," the ultimate purpose of life, etc. on the one hand to the observed political self, i.e., "the general spirit of a nation," "the principle of government," the political self as produced by the physical nature, etc. on the other. through the fitness between structure and culture.

### 3. Freedom as the Heart of the Observing Political Self

While Plato defines humanity in terms of justice, i.e., the rule of reason over desire, Montesquieu's original vision of humanity is freedom. Compared with Plato, Montesquieu gives much more importance to empirical reality. Unlike Plato, who considers empirical reality as the corruption of the world of ideas, Montesquieu accepts empirical world as the positive realization of ideas. He takes the positive position that freedom can be achieved and slavery can be avoided successfully in many empirical situations except in particular climates. Thus, his modern prejudice that humanity resides

in freedom is clearly revealed in Books XI-XIII which constitute the very heart of the SL. He also deals with freedom in the commercial states in Books XX-XXIII.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELF: KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

### A. INTRODUCTION

Kant writes very little about politics. He does not relate the power of philosophy with the political structures within which some people dominate some other people. However, his methodically conscious microscopic analysis of the internal constitution of human mind greatly helps us to evaluate and relate what Plato, Hobbes, and Montesquieu analyzed on the origin, constitution, and function of the component parts of the self.

So far, we have reviewed the three great thinkers' investigation of the political self with regard to its observable and its observing aspects. Each of them focuses on some particular aspects of the political self without necessarily relating them. Their analyses of the self are incomplete, partial, and disconnected.

In the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), the direction of exploration toward the structure of mind not only turns inside, but Kant's thorough and systematic investigation of the internal structure of the self provides a framework within which the fragmented analyses on different parts of the self performed by his predecessors may be

integrated not to mention his own contribution to the understanding of the self.

In the CPR, Kant presents four different aspects of the self. They are: (1) the observed empirical self, (2) the observed transcendental self, (3) the observing transcendental self, and (4) the noumenal self. The empirical self refers to that aspect of the self which is constituted by sense data. The other three aspects of the self, namely, the observing transcendental self, the observed transcendental self, and the noumenal self refer in the following quotation to "my self...only that I am," "my self...as I appear to myself," and "my self...as I am in myself," respectively.

In the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of my self, not as I appear to myself, not as I am in myself, but only that I am. 1/

As is suggested in the above quotation, Kant divides the self as a whole first into the self which can be known and the self which cannot be known at all. Next, he further divides the knowable self into the knowing self and the known self, i.e., the self as the object of knowledge. Finally, he still further divides the self as the object of knowledge into the self which can be known by other minds and the self which can be known only by the knowing self.

Out of these four aspects of the self, the self-affected self and the observing self have often been combined into the knower as opposed to the empirical self as an object of knowledge. In this conceptualization of the self, the noumenal self which Kant identifies with the moral self is outside the scope of the CPR even though

it is mentioned there.

#### A. THE EMPIRICAL SELF

When Lao Tzu says that "Knowing other people is wisdom and knowing the self is enlightenment,"<sup>2/</sup> he makes a distinction between the mind of man known by other people and the mind of man known by the self. In the CPR, Kant considers the self as the object of cognition or observation as originally constituted in two different ways. It is formed either under the influence of the physical world or through self-affection. It is clear that the empirical self which is formed by the sense data on the physical world constitutes the observed self. In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), he is mostly concerned with the self as affected by the physical world through outer sense. However in the same place, he also develops the theory of inner sense where the self is formed by itself without the influence of the physical world. Though he admits the difficulty of dealing with the question "as to how a subject can inwardly intuit itself",<sup>3/</sup> he, in the Transcendental Deduction (TD), makes a serious effort to understand the self which is not affected by the physical or external world and yet is the object of self-knowledge. Then, we may consider the self affected by the self as a kind of the observed self.

The notion of the empirical self is obvious. Hobbes first reduces it to passions and finally to sense data in the first part of the Leviathan. Montesquieu describes it as the product of the external factors like the climate and the soil. This self can be observed not only by the self but also by other observing subjects. Kant

excludes the consideration of this self from the scope of the CPR, for he is interested in the transcendental self.

In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore, first isolate sensibility, by taking away from it everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical intuition. Secondly, we shall also separate off from it everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply a priori. 4/

For Kant, the empirical component of the self refers merely to "the subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility, for instance, of sight, hearing, touch,...which, since they are mere sensations and not intuitions, do not of themselves yield knowledge of any object." 5/ This empirical self entirely depends upon the subjective condition of the self which may be different for different men and different even for the same person at different times.

The content of the empirical self is generated through the stimulation of the external objects, but it does not belong to the object. Instead, it belongs to the subject. He says,

The taste for a wine does not belong to the objective determinations of the wine..., but to the special constitution of sense of sight, which is affected in a certain manner by light... Taste and colors are not necessary conditions under which alone objects can be for us objects of the senses. They are connected with the appearances only as effects accidentally added by the particular constitution of the sense organs. Accordingly they are not a priori representations, but are grounded in sensation, and indeed, in the case of taste, even upon feeling (pleasure and pain), as an effect of sensation. Further, no one can have a priori representation of a color or of any taste. 6/

In other words, the empirical components of the self such as colors and taste "cannot rightly be regarded as properties of things,

but only as changes in the subject, changes which may, indeed, be different for different men."<sup>7/</sup> Kant continues,

In such examples as these, that which originally is itself only appearance, for instance, a rose, is being treated by the empirical understanding as a thing in itself, which nevertheless, in respect of its colors; can appear differently to every observer. <sup>8/</sup>

## B. THE TRANSCENDENTAL OBSERVED SELF

Kant presents a new conception of the observed self in addition to the empirical self which is constituted by the external objects. It refers to the transcendental self which is affected or intuited by the observing or knowing subject.

He distinguishes the thinking "I" from the intuiting "I". The "I" that is thought is different from the "I" that is intuited and also that the intuited "I" precedes the thought "I". He raises the question:

How the "I" that thinks can be distinct from the "I" that intuits itself (for I can represent still other modes of intuition as at least possible), and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter; and how, therefore, I can say: "I", as intelligence and thinking subject, in so far as I am given to myself (as something other or) beyond that (I) which is (given to myself) in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding. <sup>9/</sup>

When I, as the knowing subject, look into myself, I encounter two aspects of myself which appear to me. The one is the empirical self and the other the self-affected inner sense. Just as we know external objects "only in so far as we are externally affected," that is to say, only in so far as they appear to our mind, so do

we know our inner sense "only in so far as we are inwardly affected by ourselves," namely, only in so far as our inner sense appears to our mind. 10/

Of the two aspects of the self that appear to the observing self, the empirical self can be evidently observed by the self.

What then is inner sense as the second aspect of the self that appears to the observing self? What does he mean when he says that we know our own subject only as appearance?

According to Kant, inner sense as the intuited "I" lies entirely outside the concepts of understanding, for the "I" that is intuited must precede the "I" that is thought. Inner sense is not intellectual. It cannot be given by the understanding itself. He says,

Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require, besides the thought of an object in general (in the category), an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so far knowledge of myself I require, besides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought. I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lies entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded. Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its intuition were intellectual. 11/

The intuited I is neither the noumenal self, for the knowing subject cannot know itself as the self in itself. "So far as inner intuition is concerned," Kant says, "we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself." 12/

For Kant, inner sense as the intuited I refers to internal time-consciousness. Mind is affected not only by external objects but also by the self inwardly. The shape and magnitude of external objects and their relation to one another are determined or determinable in our mind through the capacity of the self to receive outer senses, namely, space. However, the mind intuits itself or its inner state in terms of internal time-relations. He says,

Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form (namely, time) in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time. Time cannot be outwardly intuited. 13/

Time as the form of pure intuition is the ultimate inner sense in which all perceptions of outer objects through space as another form of pure intuition take place. Thus, in the process of forming the empirical self, outer objects are perceived affecting the self when space-consciousness concerning the objects are rearranged inwardly in the context of time, namely, in terms of time-consciousness. Under the subjective condition of sensibility alone the perception of outer objects takes place in us in one of the two empirical modes of time, namely, coexistence and succession. 14/ Kant says,

Since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever. It is the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer appearances...I can also say...that all appearances whatsoever, that

is, all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in time-relations. 15/

Thus, appearances are in the end reduced to the determinations of inner sense under the receptive condition of the transcendental self. 16/

Since the inner sense or internal time-consciousness is the appearance of the self to the self, it is the appearance of the noumenal self. 17/ Since it is intuited, it is passive. We cannot know the appearing self as it is in itself, that is, prior to its appearance in time relations. However, it appears in the relations of time. Therefore, in so far as we know it, inner sense prior to its appearance in the mind becomes identical with time or internal time-consciousness after its appearance there. That is to say, the self in itself appears to ourselves or in the mind in time or in the relations of time.

The upshot of Kant's investigation of the transcendental self is that the phenomenal self is completely locked inside the network of spatio-temporal causality. It does not have any independent way of going outside the network of the causal connection which is determined not only by infinite space but also by infinite time. It is in the grip of the spatio-temporal causality of the Platonic cave.

### C. THE TRANSCENDENTAL OBSERVING SELF

So far, we have dealt with two kinds of the observed I: the empirical self that is constituted by outer senses and the transcendental self that is constituted by inner sense through self-affection.

The one is empirical and the other transcendental. However, they are both passive or receptive in that they, as aspects of the mind, appear to the mind. Within the mind, the two mental aspects appear to the third aspect. The I to which the two passive aspects appear is the active or spontaneous aspect of the self which Kant entitles the knowing subject: or the "I" that thinks. Thus, Kant raises the question, "How the 'I' that thinks can be distinct from the 'I' that intuits itself...and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter." <sup>18/</sup> What is the observing or knowing self which is active and spontaneous? What is the function of the active part of the self?

#### 1. Synthesis and Unity: the Function of the Active Self

In a word, the function of the active self as the knowing subject as opposed to the known subject is the synthesis and unification of the manifold which the intuiting subject brings into the mind.

##### a. The Manifold in Intuition

Our mind remains divided in so far as it is constituted through intuition, whether the mind is affected by outer senses or by inner sense. It remains divided until the divided aspects of the mind is unified by the observing self through its power of combination and unification.

The content of the self is intuited whether the objects of intuition is external objects or inner sense. Its intuited content remains divided until it is given forms by the observing self. Intuition is "that which relates immediately to the object."<sup>19/</sup> There-

fore, it, as representation, is "given prior to all thought." 20/

It is "antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything." 21/

Kant says,

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. 22/

Whether "pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and time," 23/ what we have in mind as the result of intuition alone is just isolated representations without being connected with each other. Without the aid of the active self, that is, the understanding, all we have through intuition is manifold representations.

b. Division in Inner Sense

The division of the transcendental observed self is overcome to a certain extent in inner sense, i.e., time. For,

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is a general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental. 24/

Inner sense considered as the transcendental observed self which is intuited in pure internal time-consciousness is synthesized by the spontaneous activity of the understanding, which is called the transcendental observing self in this paper.

The first application of the synthetic action taken by the understanding as the transcendental self upon inner sense with the aid of the imagination occurs through figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis is an answer to the question "how I can be an object to myself at all, and, more particularly, an object of intuition and inner perceptions." <sup>25/</sup> We can represent anything to ourselves only in terms of spatial relations. I as inner sense is time and therefore is not an object of intuition or of inner perceptions. Since space is the only pure form of appearances, inner sense as time, in order to be represented in the mind, must be changed into the spatial relations, namely, the figurative image. Kant says,

We cannot obtain for ourselves a representation of time, which is not an object of outer intuition, except under the image of a line, which we draw, and...for all inner perceptions we must derive the determination of lengths of time or of points of time from the changes which are exhibited to us in outer things, and...the determination of inner sense have therefore to be arranged as appearances in time in precisely the same manner in which we arrange those of outer sense in space. <sup>26/</sup>

For,

We cannot think a line without drawing it in thought, or a circle without describing it. We cannot represent the three dimensions of space save by setting three lines at right angles to one another from the same point. Even time itself we cannot represent, save in so far as we attend, in the drawing of a straight line (which has to serve as the outer figurative representation of time), merely to the act of the synthesis of the manifold whereby we successively determine inner sense, and in so doing attend to the succession of this determination in inner sense. Motion, as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an object), and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession--if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form...Motion, however, considered as the describing of a space, is a pure act

of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general by means of the productive imagination. 27/

In brief, inner sense appears in time, which in turn appears to the observing self in spatial relations through figurative synthesis. He says,

The determination of inner sense have therefore to be arranged as appearances in time in precisely the same manner in which we arrange those of outer sense in space. If, then, as regards the latter, we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally affected, we must also recognize, as regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves; in other words, that so far as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself. 28/

However, "each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity." 29/

Unless this absolute unity of each representation in the mind is overcome, it will remain divided. "If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise." 30/ Now, the self which is affected by what is first given to us, i.e., appearance, demands the combination of the manifold in it. He says,

What is first given to us is appearance...Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, (such as they cannot have in sense itself) is demanded. 31/

Now, we have a question of how it is possible to synthesize the divided self (or mind) into the unified one. Unless unified, i.e., combined and synthesized, "a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility" might lead to "much empirical consciousness

(which) would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself." 32/

c. Combination, Synthesis, and Unification  
as the Function of the Knowing Self

Kant shows, in his philosophy in general, a simultaneous tendency to divide and integrate the self. As we have already seen, he divides it into many faculties and then makes a serious effort to combine them. Throughout, he assumes that division ultimately presupposes combination. We may even say that his philosophy of the self is a search for the ultimate ground of all combination upon which division in the self can be overcome.

How is it possible that the manifold of intuition, i.e., division in the observed self, be overcome so that all the different aspects of the mind may be integrated into unity?

The synthesis and unification of the divided self, as far as it is considered as a part of the phenomenal world, correspond to the order in nature which reflects order in mind. Order in the transcendental self bridges the two kinds of the noumena, the nature as things in themselves on the one hand and the self as a noumenon on the other. The noumenal world including the nature and the self cannot be known except that they exist. However, the nature that appears to the mind refers to "the order and regularity in the appearances." 33/ Kant says that the necessary order in the appearances is introduced by us ourselves. Therefore, appearance must be related to the consciousness of the knowing self. He says,

Save through its relation to a consciousness that is at least possible, appearance could never be for us an object of knowledge, and so would be nothing to us; and since it has in itself no objective reality, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing at all. 34/

As we have seen, the transcendental self includes both the forms of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding. However, the combination of the divided self is not the function of intuition as the transcendental observed self but that of the understanding. For human intuition is purely sensible and nothing but a receptive mode in which the subject is affected.

The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity; and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation, without being anything more than the mode in which the subject is affected. But the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. 35/

Understanding is the active mode of the self to combine representations. "All combination--be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts--is an act of understanding." 36/ He says,

Of all representations, combination is the only one which cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself. 37/

To this act of combination Kant gives the general title synthesis "as indicating we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined." 38/

In seeking the source of combination in the understanding, he assumes, first, that division or analysis necessarily presupposes

the concept of combination. It follows that the existence of the divided self presupposes the existence of the unified self. According to Kant,

Its dissolution (i.e., the dissolution of what was previously combined in the self), namely, analysis, which appears to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined by the understanding can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation. 39/

Secondly, the representation of combination in turn presupposes the concept of unity. He says,

The concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the unity of the manifold. Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the combination. 40/

Specifically, Kant locates the general synthetic function of the transcendental self in the categories of the understanding and the unity of consciousness in transcendental apperception.

#### i. Categories

It is the understanding as the active part of the transcendental self that is the source of the laws of nature. 41/ The categories of the understanding prescribe laws a priori to appearances and therefore to nature as the sum of all appearances. 42/ By means of categories, we know a priori "whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their combination." 43/ According to Kant,

For unless the categories discharged this function, there could be no explaining why everything that can be presented to our senses must be subject to laws which have their origin a priori in the understanding alone. 44/

We have seen that appearances do not exist in themselves and yet must agree with the form of a priori sensible intuition. In the same way, the laws of appearances in nature are not derived from nature: they, instead, must agree with the understanding and its a priori forms, that is, categories as its a priori faculties of combining the manifold in general. In other words, it is the categories that determine a priori the combination of the manifold of nature. 45/

ii. Transcendental Apperception

Kant locates the ground of synthesizing the manifold of intuition into the knowledge of object in the unity of consciousness called transcendental apperception. When we shift our attention from the object as the known to the knower as the self, the faculties of the subject to know the object by synthesizing and unifying the manifold of all our intuitions are identical with the conception of the self as the unified faculties of the knower of the phenomenal world. In other words, the function of the knower constitutes the knowing self. Division in the faculties of the intuiting subject refers to the division of the self. The synthesis of the manifold through categories refers to the integration of the divided self. The unity of consciousness concerning the phenomenal world refers to the unity of the phenomenal self. In other words, the divided faculties

of the self concerning the phenomenal world are unified in the single consciousness of the knowing subject. Kant says,

Self-consciousness is of such a nature that since the subject which thinks is at the same time its own object, it cannot divide itself, though it can divide the determinations which inhere in it; for in regard to itself every object is absolute unity. 46/

How are "the manifold of all our intuitions, and also...the concepts of objects in general, and so...all objects of experience" 47/ unified into the single consciousness of the concept of nature? All knowledge without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition, i.e., transcendental apperception. Since the synthetic unity of the manifold of our representations reflect the unity of consciousness in our mind, our knowledge of objects requires that there must be in our mind "that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible." 48/ Kant says,

There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions; for this object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis. This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception. 49/

Unity of nature and unity of consciousness. To elaborate what we have said about transcendental apperception, first, unity in nature reflects unity in the consciousness of the knowing subject. For, if a universal unity of nature were "given in itself independently of the first sources of our thought,...we should not then know any

source from which we could obtain the synthetic propositions asserting such a universal unity of nature." 50/ For,

they would then have to be derived from the objects of nature themselves; and as this could take place only empirically, none but a merely accidental unity could be obtained, which would fall far short of the necessary interconnection that we have in mind when we speak of nature. 51/

This nature is not the noumenal world but merely an "aggregate of appearances" ordered inside the mind according to the unity of consciousness. Kant says,

Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had we not ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective ground of such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid. 52/

Therefore, unity in nature can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness. According to Kant,

It is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us--being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations--the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object. 53/

Numerical Unity. Secondly, as the ultimate ground of unity in nature, transcendental apperception must be a numerical unity. Kant says,

That it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time) is only possible through relation of the intuitions to such unity of consciousness. The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the a priori ground of the intuitions of sensibility. 54/

Transcendental. Thirdly, "What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data." 55/ He calls the consciousness of the self as the "I" in the sense of the undivided whole apperception. The empirical single consciousness of the self is referred to as empirical apperception and the transcendental one transcendental apperception. Apperception as the ultimate ground of unity in nature must be transcendental. For the empirical apperception is always changing. Kant says,

Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception. 56/

To render the presupposition of transcendental apperception valid, there must exist in us a condition which precedes all experience and which, as an active faculty, synthesizes the manifold of intuition into unity. 57/ "For knowledge is (essentially) a whole in which representations stand compared and connected." 58/ Kant says,

Apperception and its synthetic unity is, indeed, very far from being identical with inner sense. The former, as the source of all combination, applies to the manifold of intuitions in general, and in the guise of the categories, prior to all sensible intuition, to objects in general. Inner sense, on the other hand, contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and therefore so far contains no determinate intuition, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act

of imagination (synthetic influence or the understanding upon inner sense), which I have entitled figurative synthesis. 59/

Kant calls transcendental apperception "pure apperception to distinguish it from empirical apperception." 60/ As an act of spontaneity, transcendental apperception or the "I think" cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. 61/

Universal. Fourthly, transcendental apperception is "the 'I' in the universal proposition 'I think'" which "accompanies all thought." 62/ Kant says,

Since the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of the understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding...This employment excludes any admixture of experience. 63/

Logical (empty). Fifthly, pure apperception or original apperception as the representation of the "I think" is "the entirely empty expression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every thinking subject." 64/ According to Kant,

The formal proposition of apperception, 'I think', remains the sole ground to which rational psychology can appeal when it thus ventures upon an extension of its knowledge. This proposition, however, is not itself an experience, but the form of apperception, which belongs to and precedes every experience; and as such it must always be taken only in relation to some possible knowledge, as a merely subjective condition of that knowledge. 65/

In other words, the "I think" cannot be transformed into "a condition of the possibility of a knowledge of objects, that is, into a concept of thinking being in general." 66/ Kant says,

Through the 'I', I always entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject (simplicity). It does not,

however, follow that I thereby know the actual simplicity of my subject. The proposition, 'I am substance', signifies, as we have found, nothing but the pure category, of which I can make no use (empirically) in concreto. 67/

In conclusion, just as man knows nature through the senses, he knows himself through pure apperception. He knows himself considered as a purely intelligible object as object to his receptivity of sensibility. In the phenomenal self, everything except the "I think" is continually changing. According to Kant,

Man is one of the appearances of the sensible world, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must stand under empirical laws. Like all other things in nature, he must have an empirical character. This character we come to know through the powers and faculties which he reveals in his actions. In lifeless, or merely animal, nature we find no ground for thinking that any faculty is conditioned otherwise than in a merely sensible manner. Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason. 68/

Here, the consciousness of the self is different from its knowledge.

In order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence is not indeed appearance (still less mere illusion), the determination of my existence can take place only in conformity with the the form of inner sense, according to the special mode in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in inner intuition. Accordingly, I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self. 69/

The transcendental apperception as the "I think" which grounds the possibility of the categories is itself unconditioned. It does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself." <sup>70/</sup> It is the determining self as opposed to the determined self.

#### D. THE NOUMENAL SELF

##### 1. The Heteronomy of the Will and Political Reality

The phenomenal self is within the bounds of senses. The theoretical reason as the supreme faculty of this self is to penetrate "to the innermost secrets of nature" by connecting and unifying phenomena "but never to soar beyond its limits, outside which there is for us nothing but empty space." <sup>71/</sup> Placed within the boundary of the phenomenal world, the self as the knower of nature, i.e., as the transcendental observing self, being separated from nature, is the ground of unchanging laws for synthesizing appearances, while the observed self as a part of nature is subject to constant changes. Here, the knowledge of objects results only when the observing self rules the observed self in the mind.

As a part of nature, the phenomenal self is in the grip of spatio-temporal existential conditions. The action of this self is, without exception, motivated by external factors. <sup>72/</sup> According to J. Kempt,

Action on impulse or in accordance with desire or inclination is, like everything else that is empirically grounded, subject to the laws of physical causality. <sup>73/</sup>

As long as an action occurs in accordance with the heteronomy of the will, the most the self can accomplish through its theoretical reason is to be free from external influences. For Kant, man conceived in terms of the phenomenal self is "an animal who needed a lord, a Herr, to break his anarchic individual will and to force it to obey einem allgemeingültigen Willen--Rousseau's volenté général." <sup>74/</sup>

In organizing the political society in the pursuit of man's freedom, Montesquieu depersonalized the law. The self's search of freedom would be satisfied through the depersonalized mechanism of the separation of powers. However, for Kant, as in the case of Plato and Hobbes, not only positive freedom, i.e., "freedom to", but negative freedom, i.e., "freedom from", is to be achieved only if "the perennial problem of who guards the guardians" is resolved. <sup>75/</sup> The only certain way to guard the guardians is to transform their inner man into the genuinely moral man, i.e., the noumenal self.

## 2. The Autonomy of the Will and the Political Society

The self investigated in the CPR is the self which is under the sway of external forces. The self examined in the two other critiques is ruled "not by sensate desires, interests, contingencies, circumstances, external force, but by itself." <sup>76/</sup> Kant calls this self the noumenal self or the self in itself. He conceives the noumenal self in terms of the autonomy of the will,

that is the ability of the will to obey a law which it has imposed on itself as opposed to a law prescribed by some other being, such as God or a political sovereign. <sup>77/</sup>

The noumenal self conceived as above presupposes the ability of the self to choose "between doing what his inclinations, if unchecked by reason, would inevitably lead him to do, and doing what reason tells him in accordance with the moral law." <sup>78/</sup> Man as the noumenal self is genuinely free in his relations with other men. Freedom of the self as such can be achieved only if "pure reason by itself can determine the will." <sup>79/</sup>

Human reason has two sides. It is theoretical in one aspect and practical in another. The self has not only the ability to know the things of nature but also moral consciousness in accordance with which we can take morally proper actions in our relations with other persons. The reality of the noumenal self, for Kant, can be determined only on the practical grounds, not on theoretical grounds.

Kant clearly refers by the noumenal self as such to the Platonic observing self as I have analyzed before. For Kant says,

Plato made use of the expression 'idea' in such a way as quite evidently to have meant by it something which not only can never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even the concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself)...For Plato ideas are archetypes of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the categories, merely keys to possible experiences. In his view they have issued from highest reason...

Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are peculiar product of reason...

The Republic of Plato has become proverbial as a striking example of a supposedly visionary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker...We should, however, be better advised to follow up this thought, and, where the great philosopher leaves us without help, to place it, through fresh efforts, in a proper light, rather than to set it aside as useless on the very sorry and harmful pretext of impracticability. <sup>80/</sup>

Kant does not write any book of political theory comparable to Plato's Republic, Hobbes's Leviathan, or Rousseau's Social Contract. Therefore, there is no way to trace his thoughts on the political society with which his conceptions of the self may fit in. However, a study of three essays--"Idea for a World History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," "Eternal Peace," and "The Battle of the Faculties"--provides us with a valuable insight into Kant's political thoughts.

For Kant, the goal of history is to develop man's reason over and above his instincts and desires so that an ethical society may be constructed in which moral imperatives are obeyed and evil instincts repressed. According to commentators,

At the very outset of his essay on world history Kant posed the central question of a telos in the historical world and answered it affirmatively in a succinct formula of the Second Thesis: The goal of history was the development of man's reason. Reason (Vernunft) in this context is defined as a creature's capacity (Vermogen) to extend the principles (Regeln) and purposes (Absichten) of the use of all his forces far beyond his Naturinstinkt. Moreover, reason knows no bounds to its projects. The development of man's reason implies the flowering of all human faculties beyond the instinctual, those desires that man has in common with the other animals. By reason Kant here means man's capacity to know the physical world, to dominate it, to know himself and his passions, above all to control them and to construct an ethical society in which moral imperatives are obeyed and evil instincts repressed. 81/

The Kantian image of historical and political man is that of humanity training itself for the transformation of the inner man from the instinctual self toward the rational, moral self, that is, the noumenal self. According to the same commentators,

Reason is a capacity that grows slowly, it is not instinctive. Human capacities are fortified only through trials (Versuche),

exercise (Übung), education (Unterricht), and no individual can himself live long enough to go through the entire course, to attain the full rational capacity to which the species is destined. Kant's fateful decree of nature...has willed that every thing over and above the mechanical arrangement of man's animal nature...should be wrung from himself, and he is to have no reward but what he achieves beyond instinct through his own efforts...Nature denied him ease, gave him only potentialities. 82/

Man's fulfillment of rationality "could only come late in the history of mankind." 83/ Kant's conception of morality, i.e., the noumenal self, is "total and partial benefits of civilization failed to impress him." 84/ The ethical society in which the noumenal self would thrive could come only in the end of history.

The noumenal self which will build and be built by the utopian ethical society is investigated in such works as The Metaphysics of Ethics, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the Critique of Practical Reason. According to the afore-mentioned commentators,

The nature of man had to be prepared to receive the just civil constitution--the ideal of law had to be internalized, one would now say--yet at the same time man's nature could not really be perfected until a just civil constitution was in force...

It is only in other works by Kant, The Metaphysics of Ethics and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, that we gain an insight into the actual content of morality if man's reason should ever come to full fruition under a just civil constitution. Moral action would result from the reign of law internalized. 85/

In the final ethical society, man's actions are governed by himself in accordance with categorical imperatives as opposed to hypothetical imperatives which have been the basis of actions in all previous ideal systems of political organization including

Hobbes's Leviathan and the citizen society of Rousseau's Social

Contract. Here, an action is regarded good because it is a means to something else. In contrast, in the final ethical society, an action is good in itself. Kant says,

The categorical imperative from high makes its demands on moral man: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law," and "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a Universal Law of Nature." 86/

## CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this paper, I raised the question: Is the concept of political culture adequate enough to deal with the totality of political reality particularly in the peripheral part of the world like Korea which is under the strong ideological as well as socio-economic-political influence of the powerful foreign nations like the United States and the Soviet Union?

In an attempt to answer the question, I have to analyze the initial value premises of the concept of political culture, i.e., its philosophical assumptions. We have reviewed the definition of the concept in question in Chapter One. However, the philosophical assumptions of the concept cannot be obtained through the analysis of the definition alone. My question is not what aspects of political reality can be covered by the concept of political culture when the given definition is accepted. Rather, my question is: To what extent can the given definition deal with political reality? Or what aspects of political reality cannot the given definition deal with? The answer to my question requires us to go beyond the definition and to compare the aspects of reality which are covered by the definition with the aspects of the reality which are left out. For this, we need much more than analytical judgment; for, I assume the

existence not only of the reality which belongs within the definition but also of the reality which lies outside it. In other words, I refuse to accept the conceptual adequacy of the definition under analysis from the beginning: I ask about the initial value premises under which alone the definition of political culture becomes meaningful. I refuse to shrink the real world to put it in the straightjacket of the definition. Rather, I think it is essential to see the world as it is, whether we can manage it or not, by cutting the definition loose.

For this, we need a broader definition, if we can justify its use, within which we can see the implications of the smaller definition. In other words, we need a conceptual framework against which the limit of the implications of the smaller definition can be brought to light. The smaller definition is political culture: a broader definition is the political self.

For the conceptualization of the political self which includes the concept of political culture as a part, I look to the rationalist conception of man as opposed to the empiricist conception. Since I cannot justify the identification of either the rationalist conception or the empiricist conception of man with the conception of man in general itself, I will regard the two as the two different aspects of the same political self, calling the one the observed political self and the other the observing political self. Since the concept of political culture is defined within the tradition of empiricist conception of political man, I will consider the two as

identical.

Accordingly, I will understand the totality of political reality in terms of the total political man, i.e., the political self. Then, I will consider the political self as having two parts, the observed and the observing.

Within this concept of the total political man, that is the political self, the concept of political culture will be evaluated by comparing the observed political self with the observing one in terms of the origin and nature of each as well as the role each plays.

For the insight of the further conceptualization of the political self, I look to the great thinkers of the past who have greatly contributed to the growth of political self-consciousness of man over a long period of time. In this paper, I have selected four of them including Plato, Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Kant. In this concluding chapter, first, I will try to integrate what I have found in the reviews in order to formulate the concepts of both the observed political self and the observing one. Secondly, against the background of these two concepts, I will analyze the philosophical assumptions of the political culture in an attempt to reveal its conceptual inadequacy and its political consequences.

## A. THE OBSERVED POLITICAL SELF

### 1. Its Origin

What is the origin of what I call the observed political self? In Plato's political theory, the four different types of the observed

political self--the timocratic man, the oligarchic man, the democratic man, and the despotic man--are all ultimately formed through experience, or through what the contemporary political scientists call political socialization including, as we have seen, improper education, bad experiences, and bad companies.

Hobbes develops a much more systematic approach than Plato to the origin of the observed political self. He ultimately reduces it to the physical movements in the nerve system. He calls the physical movements transformed into the mental phenomena sense data. Man's subjective psychological response to the external stimuli is sense datum. He reduces such mental phenomena as imagination, memory, will, prudence, etc. ultimately to decaying sense. From the perspective of the observed self, man's mental activity essentially refers to the recollection of the past sense data.

In Montesquieu's theory of the self, the origin of the observed self becomes much more specific than in Hobbes. For Hobbes, the empirical origin of mind is defined generally, that is, as being physical motions and sense data. For Montesquieu, the empirical origin of mind is not only sense datum but also such specific factors as the climate, the soil, the economic situation of the people, the size of the population, and education.

Kant calls the world of sense data the phenomena. The self, as far as it is affected by the sense data is called the empirical self.

From the perspective of the origin and constitution of the self, they all agree that, in our mind, there is an area which is somehow

produced jointly by the physical world and the human mind. Hobbes calls reality prior to the occurrence of the joint production of the self the movement of things. Kant calls it the noumena including the things in themselves and the self in itself. He considers the empirical self as existing between the noumenal things and the noumenal self. He calls the physical world experienced by the self the phenomenal self. From the perspective of the phenomenal self, the passive faculty to receive the noumenal world is called the forms of pure intuition. The form of intuition to receive the noumenal things is space: the form of intuition to receive the noumenal self is time. The physical world appears to the mind in the relations of space: the spirit as a substance, even though we cannot know it, appears to the mind in the relations of time. Thus, space and time as the forms of intuition constitute the passive side of the transcendental self, that is, the mental side of the phenomenal self prior to the occurrence of the joint production between the noumenal things and the noumenal mind. We have seen that Hobbes considers the physical side prior to the joint production as the movement of things.

## 2. Its Nature

What is the nature of the observed political self?

For Plato, the empirical self which is constituted by the external influence is associated with desires and passions as opposed to reason. The empirical self is interested in physical and materialistic aspects of life such as military achievements and wealth.

Hobbes, too, understands the nature of the empirical self in

terms of passions for physical things. Man has two kinds of passions. General passions are caused by vital motions built into man's body and therefore they are the same for all men. Particular passions are caused by voluntary motions. They are desires for particular objects and therefore not the same for all men. They depend on the subjective conditions of each individual which are relative to specific experiences or socialization. The memory of the relative subjective conditions constitute such mental activities as imagination, prudence, deliberation, etc.

In dealing with the political aspect of the observed self, while Hobbes focuses on general passions, Montesquieu does on particular passions. As we have seen, Hobbes thinks that "He who is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man, but mankind." <sup>1/</sup> In contrast, Montesquieu notices the importance of particular passions with regard to politics. His conception of the observed political self is very close to that political culture in the sense that both of them are largely constituted by particular passions. In other words, they emphasize differences rather than similarities in the observed political self.

Kant does not relate the structure of human mind with the political structure and therefore does not distinguish between general and particular passions of the empirical self. However, even though he traces the sources and the processes of both constant and the changing aspects of the empirical self, we have a reason to believe that he focuses on the particularity of passions rather than its

generality. In his conception of the phenomenal self, the two forms of pure intuition, space and time, are constant, while everything that fills these forms of intuition is changing. Passions as the joint product of the forms and the content of intuition must be considered changing and particular.

Since the observed political self is ultimately constituted by the external influence, it is natural that all of the above thinkers have characterized the nature of the observed self in terms of its psychological responses to the external things, i.e., desires and passions.

### 3. Its Types

When we examine the political theories of the above four thinkers and compare their types of the observed political self, we find that different thinkers focus on different aspects of the observed political self. At the same time, however, we can also notice that their empirical conception of the political man is not unrelated. In fact, it can be shown that the typology has been gradually developed within a more or less common broad framework.

Depending on what kind of desires and passions man is mostly interested in, Plato divides the observed political self into four types. The timocratic man is mostly interested in such passions as honor, glory, and the reputation of justice rather than justice itself. The oligarchic man is preoccupied with wealth. The democratic man is interested in all physical desires. The despotic man is a violent man who is a coward inside and dominated by fear.

In Hobbes's political theory, the political man is completely under the influence of desires and passions. He eventually reduces all the passions to a single type of the observed self, i.e., fear. The only way to overcome the fear is to create the greater fear of punishment. Here, fear is not a common psychological characteristic of a particular group of people. Rather, Hobbes treats it as the universal human condition.

Montesquieu's three types of the observed political self--virtue, honor, and fear--reflects his overall conception not only of political reality but also of human life. Virtue as the love of others is a divine quality of man. Honor as the love of the self is a human quality of man. Fear is essentially an animal quality of man. Since they are all the types of empirical men, his conception of man is simultaneously as high as divinity and as low as bestiality. For Plato, Montesquieu's virtue is not a type of empirical man: it is the divine quality of a philosopher. For Hobbes, fear is a universal quality of man, not a debased animal quality of man. Montesquieu's conception of man as such is reflected in his conception of political leadership. He does not trust any ruler who is above the law. At the same time, he considers all moderate, i.e., law-abiding rulers as equally good rulers.

Kant distinguishes between the phenomenal man with the heteronomous will and the noumenal or moral man with the autonomous will. He extensively deals with the latter who is comparable to Plato's completely just man, i.e., the philosopher. However, he is not interested

in the different types of the former, even though he analyzes the overall sources of division and synthetic unity of the phenomenal self.

#### 4. Its Role

What is the role which the observed political self plays within the total political self?

Plato grades the timocratic man, the oligarchic man, the democratic man, and the despotic man in the descending order. He finds the criterion of grading in the extent to which reason controls desires and passions.

In fact, all other three thinkers accept the same criterion in evaluating the types of political man or in overcoming his defects.

What then is the role which the observed political self plays for the political self as a whole? We can ask the same question about the observing political self.

##### a. Division in the Self and Political Conflict

The desires and passions of man cause not only mental conflict but also political conflict within the society. This is one of the central themes in Plato's Republic. The lack of order and harmony is greater in democracy than in timocracy.

Hobbes almost dramatizes the vice of the divisive tendency of the observed self in his analysis of the state of nature. He calls the absence of order the state of war. In reducing the state of nature to the state of war, he emphasizes the tendency of human nature to disorganize in man's natural passions.

However, it is difficult to know whether Hobbes's reasoning is correct in saying that the observing self causes division in the self, resulting in the state of war. For Montesquieu tends to think differently. For him, the state of war commences as soon as man enters into a state of society. Besides, he presents some cases where man's natural desires and passions lead to the union of individuals. For example,

Fear, I have observed, would induce men to shun one another; but the marks of this fear being reciprocal, would soon engage them to associate. Besides, this association would quickly follow from the very pleasure one animal feels at the approach of another of the same species. Again, the attraction arising from the difference of sexes would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for each other would form a third law. 2/

It is in Kant's CPR that the divisive tendency of the observed self is systematically analyzed. He demonstrates that the function of the passive faculty of the observed self is to receive sense data from the physical world. He says that our mind remains divided unless the manifold in intuition is somehow connected, combined, synthesized, and unified. He also says that intuition without concept is blind.

#### b. Growth and Political Development

In the history of Western political thoughts, there have been two types of growth: growth in the sense of cumulative development and growth through negation of negation. The former is positivist and the latter is dialectical.

The positivist idea of cumulative development has been adopted and established in the modern period of empiricism. In the empiricist tradition, the observed self is considered as identical with

the self itself. Since the observed self is the only self there is, political development like structural differentiation results from cumulative development in the observed self like cultural secularization.

However, the dialectical idea of growth through negation of negation has long been conceived from the time of Plato. Even though dialectical growth refers to qualitative growth in the mind, it requires the mind to differentiate through the contact with the physical world.

Therefore, it seems that the observed self plays an essential role either in cumulative growth or in dialectical growth. In Plato's political theory, for example, in the Republic, there seems to be only degeneration from the republic to timocracy through despotism. However, the idea of dialectical growth that the republic will be restored after despotism underlies his whole political theory. This idea is implied, for example, in the story of the myth that the government of Kronos will be restored at the end of the age of Zeus. In the Statesman, Plato says,

At last, as this cosmic era draws to its close, this disorder comes to a head. The few good things it produces it corrupts with so gross a taint of evil that it hovers on the very brink of destruction, both of itself and of the creatures in it.

Therefore, at that very moment, the god looks upon it again, he who first set it in order. Beholding it in its troubles, and anxious for it lest, racked by storms and confusion, it sink and be dissolved again in the bottomless abyss of unlikeness, he takes control of the helm once more. Its former sickness he heals; what was disrupted in its former revolution under its own impulse he brings back into the way of regularity; and so, ordering and correcting it, he achieves for it its agelessness and immortality. 3/

In Hobbes's political theory, man overcomes the state of nature only after he experiences the continual fear and danger of violent death in the state of war where his life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Montesquieu does not write anything about the regular pattern of political development. However, Kant, even though he does not directly describe the overall pattern of political development, clearly reveals its overall picture throughout his philosophy. He describes the noumenal self who acts in accordance with categorical imperatives in his ethical writings. He describes the phenomenal self who acts in accordance with hypothetical imperatives in the CPR. The comparison of the two kinds of the self shows that there is a chasm which cannot be bridged easily, but there cannot be any doubt about the direction of growth in the mind as well as in the society. The noumenal self is the truly rational man while the phenomenal self acts in accordance with man's natural instincts, i.e., external force. It is clearly implied in many places that dialectical development somehow occurs from the phenomenal self to the noumenal self.

The role which the observed self plays in dialectical development in Plato, Montesquieu, or Kant is to get in touch with the sense world. Under the external forces, the self is divided. Through division, it ultimately grows.

## B. THE OBSERVING POLITICAL SELF

### 1. Its Origin

In Plato's political theory, the observing political self is represented by the philosopher-king. As we have seen, his main quality is reason. It is transcendental in that it is not formed by experiences or by any external factors of the mind. It constitutes the essence of man.

While Plato's reason is essentially a moral quality, Hobbes's reason refers to intelligence or cleverness. Natural reason refers to the natural ability of man to add and subtract. Acquired reason refers to science. It refers to rational calculation.

In Montesquieu, as in Plato and Hobbes, the observing self refers to man's transcendental ability to take values, that is, to make a value judgment, for example, that slavery is in its own nature bad. Reason as the transcendental subject as such is also shown in his idea of the mysterious legislator who opposes the bad influence of the climate upon human mind. It also refers to the moral causes of man as the expression of reason. It also refers to human reason as law in general. Above all, it refers to man's conception of freedom which Montesquieu elaborates throughout Books XI-XIII.

As we have seen, Plato, Hobbes, and Montesquieu refer by the observing self in the sense of reason to essentially two different things: first, man's ability to know moral goodness and, secondly, intelligence including cleverness. The idea of moral goodness is emphasized in Plato's political theory and the idea of intelligence in Hobbes's.

Kant clearly distinguishes between the two different notions of reason, calling one the theoretical reason and the other the practical reason even though both of them are transcendental.

## 2. Its Role

So far, it has become clear that the nature of the observing political self is something uniquely human and divine and also that it has two types, that is to say, moral consciousness and intelligence.

What then is the role of the observing political self particularly in its relations with the observed political self?

By "political" I mean domination. Political structures refer to the regularity of behaviors which legitimately allows one group of people to dominate other groups. Political philosophy refers to the power of philosophy which allows some people to dominate others. In tracing great thinkers' ideas of the fitness between political structures and political mind, I have tried to relate the structural arrangements for domination with the justification of the control of one part or mind like desire by another like reason. For example, in Plato's political theory, the rule of the philosopher-king is ultimately justified by the notion of the control of desires and passions by reason in the mind.

What role or roles does the observing political self play in its relations with the other part of the political self?

In Plato's political theory, the observing political self provides the initial value premise, namely, the vantage point from which

alone all political patterns can be made meaningful and can be graded. In a word, it provides the form of the whole within which alone the partial relationships of all political patterns can be recognized.

In Hobbes's political theory, the observing political self overcomes division caused by the observed political self, first, by establishing the political system through rational calculation and, secondly, by unifying the divided self in the person of the sovereign.

This role of unifying the self divided by the observed self is not only emphasized but also systematically analyzed in Kant's philosophy. Man completely realizes his humanity when his mind is ruled by pure reason alone.

### C. CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

In light of the conception of the political self as above, we can easily obtain the philosophical assumptions of the concept of political culture. If we examine its definition again, we find that, in its origin, in its nature, and in its typology, it refers to the observed political self.

Without the observing political self, the self will be divided: the self will differentiate, through division, as in the case of structural differentiation and cultural secularization. However, the political self will remain divided unless it is unified by the observing political self. It perhaps will grow pathologically

without the direction of growth being provided by the observing political self.

However, if we closely examine the conception of political culture, we find the observing political self hidden behind the mainstream political scientists' claim. First, the conceptual framework itself reveals their own initial value premises. Secondly, they do not even hesitate to hide their preference for liberal democracy. Since this normative preference cannot be contained in the definition of political culture as the observed political self, the observing political self must have entered through the back door. This indicates the double jeopardy. For, as we have seen in Hobbes's criticism of the "vain philosophy" of essentialism, the observing political self of the political other in disguise can virtually replace the true observing political self.

## NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup>Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p.85.

<sup>2</sup>Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p.63; Leonard Binder, et al. Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp.53-56; Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developing Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p.36.

<sup>3</sup>Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp.21-71.

<sup>4</sup>A typical example is the Declaration of Independence on March 1, 1919, in the history of Korea. For another example, see Suk Hun Ham, "Only the People That Have the Courage to Use Their Own Reason Can Survive," Thoughts, (August, 1958).

<sup>5</sup>W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: Hobbes to Hume, 2d ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1969), p.136.

<sup>6</sup>Gregory Vlastos, "Editor's Introduction," in Plato, Protagoras, trans. by Benjamin Jowett and rev. by Martin Ostwald (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956), pp.xii-xv.

<sup>7</sup>Jones, op. cit., Vol. II, p.189.

<sup>8</sup>Henri Louis Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1944), pp.152-4.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Jones, op.cit., Vol. III, p.136.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, A246=B303.

<sup>13</sup>Montesquieu, The Persian Letters, LXIX.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., LXXV.

## CHAPTER ONE            POLITICAL CULTURE: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE DEFINITION

<sup>1</sup>I will review only essential literature which has contributed to the concept formation of political culture.

<sup>2</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (1958), p.396.

<sup>3</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp.13-14; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.518; Almond and Powell, op. cit., p.50.

<sup>4</sup>William C. Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p.119.

<sup>5</sup>Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1951), pp.53-109.

<sup>6</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit.

<sup>7</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p.13.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p.14.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.16.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp.16-22.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p.224.

<sup>13</sup>Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p.224.

<sup>14</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p.77.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp.58-61.

- <sup>16</sup>Parsons, op.cit., p.77.
- <sup>17</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p.338.
- <sup>18</sup>James Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.18.
- <sup>19</sup>Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.512, \*Note.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid., p.513.
- <sup>21</sup>Lawrence Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1972), pp.164-165; Mitchell, op.cit., p.119.
- <sup>22</sup>David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p.12.
- <sup>23</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 63(December, 1969), pp.1051-1061.
- <sup>24</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).
- <sup>25</sup>The chronologically arranged list of major reviews of the definition of political culture since Almond introduced the term in 1956 includes:
- (1) Young C. Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics, 26(May, 1964), pp.249-255;
  - (2) Dell Gillette Hitchner, "Political Science and Political Culture," Western Political Quarterly, 21(December, 1968), pp.551-559;
  - (3) Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "Political Culture and Projective Techniques," Comparative Political Studies, 2(July, 1969), pp.249-255;
  - (4) Roberta S. Sigel, ed., Learning about Politics: A Reader in Politics: A Reader in Political Socialization (New York: Random House, 1970);
  - (5) Ronald G. Baker, "Political Socialization: Parameters and Pre-dispositions," Polity, 3(Summer, 1971), pp.586-600;
  - (6) Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure, and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science, 1(July, 1971), pp.291-305;
  - (7) Edward Lehman, "On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical Reassessment," Social Forces, 50(March, 1972), pp.361-370;
  - (8) Lawrence Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), Chapter 9;
  - (9) R. W. Connell and Murray Goot, "Science and Ideology in American 'Political Socialization' Research," Berkeley Journal of Sociology,

17(1972-1973), pp.165-193;

(10) Larry N. Stern, et al., "On the Dimensions of Political Culture: A New Perspective," Comparative Political Studies, 5(January, 1973), pp.493-511;

(11) Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," Political Science Quarterly, 88(June, 1973), pp.173-190;

(12) Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," American Political Science Review, 68(September, 1974), pp.1171-1191;

(13) Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975);

(14) Ronald H. Chilcote, op.cit., Chapter 6.

<sup>26</sup> See bibliographical references to political culture in Chilcote, op. cit., pp.251-269.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.234.

<sup>28</sup> They concluded that both the studies of political culture in general (Hitchner, Lehman, and Tucker) and political socialization (Sigel, Baker, and Connell) are Anglo-American culture-bound. For political socialization, see also Rajani Kanth, "Political Culture Revisited: Notes on a Coercive Ideology," Indian Journal of Political Studies, 39(January-March, 1978), pp.89-98; Armand Mattelart, Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture: The Ideological Apparatuses of Imperialism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979).

<sup>29</sup> Chilcote, op.cit., p.250.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.235.

<sup>31</sup> Samir Amin, "Universality and Cultural Spheres," Monthly Review, 28(February, 1977), pp.25-38.

<sup>32</sup> Chilcote, op.cit., p.244.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.251.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Wilhelm Reich, "Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis," Studies on the Left, 6(July-August, 1966), pp.5-46; Bruce Brown, Marx, Freud, and the Critique of Everyday Life (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); Joel Kovel, "The Marxist View of Man and Psychoanalysis," Social Research, 43(Summer, 1976), pp.220-245.

- <sup>37</sup> Chilcote, op.cit., p.241.
- <sup>38</sup> Kanth, op.cit.; Mattelart, op.cit.
- <sup>39</sup> Almond and Verba, op.cit., pp.337-338.

CHAPTER TWO                    THE OBSERVING POLITICAL SELF:  
   PLATO'S REPUBLIC

- <sup>1</sup> Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp.32-33.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.33.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.4.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup> Plato, The Republic, trans. by Francis MacDonal Conford (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1941), 368.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., 445d.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., 540.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., 544.
- <sup>9</sup> Almond and Verba, op. cit., p.33.
- <sup>10</sup> Plato, op. cit., 548.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 448.
- <sup>13</sup> Martin Ostwald, "Editor's Introduction," in Plato, Statesman, trans. by J. B. Skemp (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), p.xxvi.
- <sup>14</sup> Plato, Laws, 713.
- <sup>15</sup> Plato, Statesman, 297c-e.
- <sup>16</sup> Ostwald, op. cit., xi-xii.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., xiv.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., xii-xiii.

- <sup>19</sup> Plato, The Republic, 332c.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 332d.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., 334b.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup> See Francis Conford's comment in Plato, The Republic, op. cit., p.12.
- <sup>25</sup> Plato, The Republic, 335b.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 335c-e.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 338c-339b.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 341d.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 342b.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 342a-b.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 342.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 342e.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., 346.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 358-359.

## CHAPTER THREE

THE OBSERVED POLITICAL SELF:  
HOBBES' S LEVIATHAN

- <sup>1</sup> Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), Chapter 47, p.502.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., Chapter 47, p.502.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.496.

- <sup>4</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., Chapter 44, pp.439-440.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., Chapter 47, p.494.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp.495-497.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., A Review and Conclusion, p.510.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., Chapter 32, p.271; Chapter 36, p.307.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., Chapter 31, p.264.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., Chapter 44, p.437.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., Chapter 47, p.497; also see Chapter 44, pp.438-439.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., Chapter 44, pp.438-439.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.439; also Chapter 47, pp.494-495.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.494.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., Chapter 44, pp.438-439.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., Chapter 33, p.276.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., Chapter 39, pp.340-341.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., Chapter 44, p.439.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p.440.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., Chapter 47, p.500.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., Chapter 44, pp.437-438.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., Chapter 45, pp.460-461.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.461.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.473.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp.465-466.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., Chapter 47, pp.501-502.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., Chapter 46, p.485.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., Chapter 47, pp.500-501; see also Review and Conclusion, pp.510-511.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., Chapter 46, p.482.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p.481.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., Chapter 46, pp. 482-483.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp.485-486.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p.486.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p.483.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp.482-483.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p.484.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., Chapter 46, p.481.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p.489.

<sup>45</sup>D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism & Realism: Universals & Scientific Realism, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.12.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p.14.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p.12.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Hobbes, op.cit., Chapter 4, p.37.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p.36.

- 54 Ibid., Chapter 13, p. 100.
- 55 Plato, The Republic, 358e.
- 56 Hobbes, op. cit., Chapter 19, p.142.
- 57 Ibid., Chapter 29, p.240.
- 58 Ibid., Chapter 19, p.143.
- 59 Ibid., p.142.
- 60 Ibid., Chapter 20, p.157.
- 61 Ibid., Chapter 11, p.80.
- 62 Ibid., Chapter 14, p.103.
- 63 Ibid., Chapter 13, p.100.
- 64 Ibid., p.101.
- 65 Ibid., Chapter 47, p.495.
- 66 Ibid., Chapter 13, pp.100-101.
- 67 Ibid., Chapter 14, p.103.
- 68 Ibid., Chapter 13, p.100.
- 69 Ibid., Chapter 28, pp.235-236.
- 70 Ibid., Chapter 18, pp.139-140.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Ibid., Chapter 17, p.132.
- 73 Ibid., Chapter 20, pp. 151-152.
- 74 Ibid., Introduction.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Ibid., Chapter 4, p.37.
- 78 Ibid., p.34.

- <sup>79</sup> Ibid., p.38.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid., p.33.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid., Introduction.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid., Chapter 14, p.104.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid., p.103.
- <sup>84</sup> Plato, The Republic, 358e-359b.
- <sup>85</sup> Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 17, p.129.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid., Chapter 18, p.135.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid., Chapter 17, p.132.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid., Chapter 6, p.47.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid., p.49.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid., Chapter 6, p.47.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid., p.48.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., pp.48-49.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid., pp.49-50.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid., pp.50-53.
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid., Chapter 1, p.21.
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid., Chapter 2, p.23.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid., p.24.

- <sup>104</sup>Ibid., p.27.
- <sup>105</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>106</sup>Ibid., Chapter 3, p.31.
- <sup>107</sup>Ibid., p.30.
- <sup>108</sup>Ibid., Chapter 8, p.59.
- <sup>109</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>110</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>111</sup>Ibid., p.60.
- <sup>112</sup>Ibid., p.61.
- <sup>113</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>114</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>115</sup>Ibid., Chapter 21, p.159.
- <sup>116</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>117</sup>Ibid., Chapter 14, p.103.
- <sup>118</sup>Ibid., Chapter 21, p.159.
- <sup>119</sup>Ibid., Chapter 3, p.31.
- <sup>120</sup>Ibid., Chapter 2, p.27.
- <sup>121</sup>Ibid., Chapter 8, p.59.
- <sup>122</sup>Ibid., Chapter 1, p.21.
- <sup>123</sup>Ibid., Chapter 4, p.33.
- <sup>124</sup>Ibid., p.38.
- <sup>125</sup>Ibid., p.35.
- <sup>126</sup>Ibid., p.38.
- <sup>127</sup>Ibid., p.36.
- <sup>128</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>129</sup> Ibid., Chapter 14, p.103.
- <sup>130</sup> Ibid., Chapter 26 (See also Chapter 15).
- <sup>131</sup> Ibid., p.203.
- <sup>132</sup> Ibid., Chapter 20, p.157.
- <sup>133</sup> Ibid., Chapter 18, p.136.
- <sup>134</sup> Ibid., p.137.
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid., Chapter 17, p.132.
- <sup>136</sup> Ibid., Chapter 18, p.135.
- <sup>137</sup> Ibid..
- <sup>138</sup> Ibid., Chapter 21, p.160.
- <sup>139</sup> Ibid., Chapter 29, p.237.
- <sup>140</sup> Ibid., Chapter 31, p.270.
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid., Chapter 29, p.246.
- <sup>142</sup> Ibid., Introduction.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid..
- <sup>144</sup> Ibid., Chapter 31, p.270.
- <sup>145</sup> Ibid., Chapter 16, p.127.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid., Chapter 17, p.132; see also Chapter 16, pp.125-127.

## CHAPTER FOUR

THE POLITICAL SELF IN MONTESQUIEU'S  
THE PERSIAN LETTERS AND  
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS

<sup>1</sup> Almond and Verba, op. cit., p.33.

<sup>2</sup> Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. by Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949), Book I, pp.6-7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>4</sup>Montesquieu here refers by nature to human nature. In the very beginning of the SL, he says that "Laws...are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws." (Book I, p.1) According to difference in nature of things, he divides the world into five groups; the physical world, the plant world, the world of beasts, the intelligent world, and the divine world. Man belongs to the intelligent world. Concerning the nature of man, he says that man belongs somewhere between the world of beasts and the divine world.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.6.

<sup>6</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit.

<sup>7</sup>Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book II, p.8.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p.15.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.16.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., Book I, pp.5-7.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-7.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p.6.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p.4.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p.5.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., Book II, p.21.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p.16.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., Book III, p.21.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p.22.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p.23.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., Footnote j.

- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., Book V, pp.40-41.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., Book VII, p.96.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., Book III, p.25.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.24.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.25.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., Book IV, p.29.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.30.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp.30-32.
- <sup>34</sup> Plato, The Republic, 361.
- <sup>35</sup> Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book IV, p.30.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., Book III, pp. 27-28.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., p.19.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., p.26.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., Book IV, p.34.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup> Montesquieu, The Persian Letters, trans. by J. Robert Loy (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1961), XI-XIV.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., XI
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., XII.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., XIV.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., XXIV.
- <sup>47</sup> Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book III, p.26.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid., Book III, pp.27-28; Book IV, pp.32-33.

- 49 Ibid., Book IV, p.32.
- 50 Ibid., Book V, p.57.
- 51 Ibid., Book IV, p.33.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid., Book V, p.57.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Ibid., Book III, p. 26.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Montesquieu, The Persian, LI.
- 58 Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction, p.20.
- 59 Montesquieu, The Spirit, Books XIV-XVII.
- 60 Ibid., Book XVIII.
- 61 Ibid., Book XIX.
- 62 Ibid., Books XX-XXII.
- 63 Ibid., Book XXIII.
- 64 Ibid., Book IV.
- 65 Machiavelli, The Prince, XVII.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Machiavelli, The Discourses, I.
- 68 Ibid.
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- 70 Ibid., I, Introduction.
- 71 J. Robert Loy, "Introduction," in Montesquieu, The Persian, p.28.
- 72 Ibid., p.24.

- 73 Montesquieu, The Persian, XVII.
- 74 Ibid., XXX.
- 75 Ibid., LIX.
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- 89 Ibid., LIIIV.
- 90 Ibid., Ibid.
- 91 Ibid., XVII.
- 92 Ibid., XLVI.
- 93 Plato, Laws, Book X.
- 94 Machiavelli, The Discourses.
- 95 Rousseau, The Social Contract.
- 96 Montesquieu, The Persian, XII.
- 97 Ibid., XLVI.

- 98 Ibid.
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- 100 Ibid., LVI.
- 101 Ibid.
- 102 Ibid., XXXIII.
- 103 Ibid., LVI.
- 104 Ibid., XXIII, LVII, LV.
- 105 Ibid., LI.
- 106 Ibid., XCIX.
- 107 Ibid., L.
- 108 Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book I, p.6.
- 109 Montesquieu, The Persian,
- 110 Ibid., LXXX.
- 111 Ibid.
- 112 Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book III, p.19.
- 113 Ibid., Author's Explanatory Notes.
- 114 Ibid., Preface.
- 115 Ibid.
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- 119 Montesquieu, The Spirit, Preface.
- 120 Ibid.
- 121 Ibid.
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- 123 Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book XV, pp.79-80.
- 124 Ibid.
- 125 Ibid., Book XV, p.235.
- 126 Ibid., pp.241-242; 246-247.
- 127 Ibid., Book XV.
- 128 Ibid., pp.238-239.
- 129 Ibid., p.239.
- 130 Ibid., p.242.
- 131 Ibid., Book XVI.
- 132 Ibid., Book XVII.
- 133 Ibid., Book XV, p.240.
- 134 Ibid., Book XVII, p.264.
- 135 Ibid.
- 136 Ibid., Book XIV, p.269.
- 137 Ibid., p.223.
- 138 Ibid., pp.224-225.
- 135 Ibid.
- 136 Ibid., Book XIV, p.224.
- 137 Ibid., p.223.
- 138 Ibid., pp.224-225.
- 139 Ibid., p.240.
- 140 Ibid., p.239.
- 141 Ibid., Book XVII, p.269.
- 142 Ibid., Book XV, p.241.
- 143 Ibid., p.240.

- 144 Ibid., p.238.
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- 146 Ibid., Book XIV, p.225.
- 147 Ibid., p.225.
- 148 Ibid., Book XV, p.240.
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- 152 Montesquieu, The Spirit, Book I, p.2.
- 153 Ibid., p.3.
- 154 Ibid.
- 155 Ibid.
- 156 Ibid., p.6.
- 157 Ibid.
- 158 Ibid., p.7.

## CHAPTER FIVE

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELF:  
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

- <sup>1</sup> Kant, The Critique, B157. See also A109.
- <sup>2</sup> Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, XXXIII.
- <sup>3</sup> Kant, op.cit., B68.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., A22=B36.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., A28=B44.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., A28-29=B44.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., B45.

- 8 Ibid., A38-39=B45.
- 9 Ibid., B155.
- 10 Ibid., B156.
- 11 Ibid., B158-159.
- 12 Ibid., B156.
- 13 Ibid., A23=B37.
- 14 Ibid., A26-33=B42-49.
- 15 Ibid., A34=B50-51.
- 16 Ibid., A101.
- 17 Ibid., B152-153.
- 18 Ibid., B155.
- 19 Ibid., A109.
- 20 Ibid., B132.
- 21 Ibid., B67.
- 22 Ibid., A19=B33.
- 23 Ibid., B147.
- 24 Ibid., A98-99.
- 25 Ibid., B155.
- 26 Ibid., B154.
- 27 Ibid., B154-5.
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- 30 Ibid., A97.
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- 35 Ibid., B129-130.
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- 53 Ibid., A105.
- 54 Ibid., A107; see also A111-112.
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- 65 Ibid., A354.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid., A356.
- 68 Ibid., A546-547=B574-575.
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- 73 John Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.527.
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- 76 Ibid.
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- 78 Ibid., p.57.
- 79 Ibid.
- 80 Kant, The Critique, A313-316=B370-373.

<sup>81</sup>Manuel and Manuel, op. cit., p.519.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p.526.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p.528.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p.522.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p.528.

<sup>86</sup>Kant, Foundations, p.55.

## CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup>Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction.

<sup>2</sup>Montesquieu, The Spirit, op. cit., p.4.

<sup>3</sup>Plato, Statesman, op. cit., p.30.

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