

BLACK & BLUE:  
EXPLORING PROTESTS, AFRICAN AMERICAN ATTITUDES, AND LAW  
ENFORCEMENT BEHAVIOR

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A Dissertation  
presented to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School  
at the University of Missouri-Columbia

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy

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by  
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JULY 2017

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## DEDICATION

..... Praise God. I am here but by His grace.

..... To my parents: Ylonda, Charles, Kenneth Sr., and Cheryl.

..... To family: Sister-Friend-Cousin, Makeda, as well as uncles  
(Martin and Tony), aunts (Brenda and Angie), and the Ocheltrees.

..... To my friends and colleagues: Joni, Angi, Eva, Tiffanisha, Veronica, Frank,  
Kate, Patrick, Dustin, Theodore, and Thomas.

..... To my love, Tonaka.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to thank Professor Lael Keiser for being a constant guide and mentor throughout this dissertation process. She was an encouraging, honest, thorough, and wise presence. I would also like to acknowledge Professor Justin Dyer, who has played an immense role in my development as a scholar. It was through his encouragement that I chose to pursue my doctorate. Thank you as well to dissertation committee members, Ben Warner, Michael Minta, and Jake Haselswerdt for your ongoing support.

I would also like to acknowledge Professor James Endersby for taking a chance on me, as well as Professor John Petrocik for his sage advice, support, and words of encouragement.

This dissertation could not have been made possible without the support of the Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy. Thank you.

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## Chapter 1

Police behavior has been an enduring focus of the American public for generations. From the 1968 Democratic National Convention to the Los Angeles riots to the aftermath of the murder of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri to the protests sparked by the deaths of Eric Garner and Freddie Gray, social, political, and media speculation has placed police conduct under heavy scrutiny. Questions abound regarding the fairness, appropriateness, legality, and legitimacy of their methods, as critics have accused policing agencies of adopting punitive and repressive measures that target communities of color. Conversely, police advocates defend against these critics, arguing that maintaining “law and order” is paramount.

Despite this ongoing conflict between criminal justice reform and law enforcement partisans, the literature is limited on public opinion, protests, and police response within political science. Generally, studies have broadly examined public attitudes toward law enforcement or found implications for instances of police brutality (i.e. police shootings) on public opinion. Though I spend some time discussing these attitudes, the crux of this dissertation is less interested in broad public opinion of the police. It is being conducted to examine how attitudes, specifically those of black Americans, are shaped by distinct types of police behavior during protest situations. Furthermore, I will conclude that the intersection of black identity, gender identity, and age, as it relates to feelings about the police, influences how black Americans view police behavior, especially regarding how they respond to public protests.

## The Police

From its inception in the United States, law enforcement has given the public a rationale for ambivalence. Marred by widespread cronyism and corruption in the nineteenth-century, the institution of policing earned early praise (from its beneficiaries) and scorn (from the afflicted) for its decidedly selective use of authority. Big city political machines and the bosses who ran them used the local police as special enforcement squads, insulating themselves and their friends from the law, while running roughshod over enemies of the machine. As such, many small-time crimes that should have been under the purview of the police went unenforced. Petty theft and burglary were among them and not unlike the political corruption of the era, policing was accused of sparingly using its authority for its own benefit. Rampant political appointments in big city departments like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Kansas City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles meant that the police were not excluded from the corruption of patronage. As such, the institution was a large part of “a broader social and political problem” (Uchida, 2015, 14).

Early twentieth-century Progressive-era reforms attempted to curtail law enforcement corruption. A wider movement toward neutral competence meant police departments would be forced to purge political appointees for qualified, credentialed, professional officers who consider the letter of the law over their personal allegiances. Progressives, a group consisting of upper middle-class white reformers, who among other things, pushed for a prohibition of alcohol in addition to corruption-elimination in government, were becoming a powerful political contingent, and hastened the end of the

reign of powerful political machines. As such, from 1910 to 1960, police chiefs began promoting a professional model of policing (Uchida, 2015). This model mirrored those precepts of neutral competence. Here, it advances the idea that officers ought to be experts who apply their knowledge to their job duties, are the only ones who can do the job (because of this expertise), possess autonomous authority (forever divorcing themselves from the clutches of machine bossism), and efficiency. In short, it means operating police departments with business-like acumen. One key difference between the work of progressives and these reforms, however, is that police organizations made these changes from within, giving them a better chance for acceptance and success (Uchida, 2015). Walker (1977, 167) calls this professionalization model an “ambiguous” endeavor, as it fostered two unintended consequences: the conception of a police subculture and developing a gulf between police and the community. Each of these consequences would have an immeasurable impact on the relationship between the police and black Americans, as police subculture would encourage protective benefits for racist, abusive officers (and policies), and the gulf would further isolate the institution from communities of color.

The subculture of law enforcement is predicated on several noted concepts. First, the “thin blue line” connotes an officer’s belief that they are the last line of defense between order and lawlessness in society. This attitude engenders credence in the concept of not only legal, but *moral* authority in society (Weitzer and Tuch 2006; Doyle 2006; Greer & McLaughlin 2010; Loader 1997; Loader & Walker 2007; Reiner 2010). Second, because officers mostly encounter “problem citizens,” they have developed an adversarial outlook, an “us vs. them” depiction (Weitzer and Tuch 2006). Finally, the insulated

nature of their profession produces an impenetrable group loyalty and “code of silence,” a protective measure of inoculation from *legal* reprisal for bad behavior among fellow officers. Indeed, this “code” is so powerful, that to break it is to invite *social* and *professional* reprisal from peers (Christopher Commission 1991; Weisburd 2000).

Two recent cases illuminate how the code is enforced. United States Justice Department officials have written that the Baltimore Police Department has harbored code-retaliators, as “several officers told Justice Department investigators that they believe their fellow officers have retaliated against them for reporting misconduct or objecting to improper enforcement activities.”<sup>1</sup> A detective with the department went through the chain of command, intimating that he considered reporting on fellow officers who brutally assaulted a suspect. His superior officer warned, “If you’re a rat, your career here is done.” When the detective still decided to report on his colleagues, his life was made “hell,” and he is currently no longer an officer in Baltimore.<sup>2</sup> The officer-code echoes the street principle that “snitches get stitches,” a promise that “ratting” on a colleague will be met with swift and harsh punishment. This does not mean that police officers physically assault each other, but in the Baltimore case, it might mean that an officer who reports on another could be refused back-up when requested. In Cleveland, police officers who witnessed brutality at the hands of their fellow officer Michael Brelo adhered to their code, invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege, and seeking immunity from charges. They very well may have willingly obeyed the code, but one officer told the Cleveland Plain Dealer that he was “told to keep his mouth shut by the union.”<sup>3</sup> A

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<sup>1</sup> Sun, Baltimore. “Breaking through a ‘Stop Snitching’ Police Culture.” *Baltimoresun.com*, 10 Aug. 2016.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Naymik, Mark. “Cops Hate the No-snitch Rule - except When They Need It:” *Cleveland.com*, 06 May 2015.

reminder, indeed, that the “thin blue line” is fortified by a code of silence. Ultimately, that “thin blue line” is problematic because it drives a wedge between the police and the public.

Per Weitzer and Tuch (2006), police officers require low visibility and high discretion to do their jobs. The unvarnished truth is that policing can be an ugly profession, and that some activities, when placed under a microscope, could look unsavory. As such, police departments prefer to do their tasks outside of the purview of media and public focus. In fact, the media are just as adversarial (if not more) than the public. Law enforcement know all too well how striking of an impact even one media feeding frenzy on police misconduct can have on their credibility (Brody, 1991; Mutz, 1992; Tuch and Weitzer, 1997). Additionally, limited visibility from public scrutiny affords police officers with high discretion to perform tasks on-the-fly, without bureaucratic hindrances. It is argued that with discretion, officers (as street-level bureaucrats) have a greater ability to act in accordance with their ideal interests (Meier and Stewart, 1993). This is important because their obligation to “maintain order” is vague and open for interpretation.

Police have a great deal of latitude to do their jobs. Furthermore, their wanting to “maintain order” has directly influenced their behavior and impacted black communities. The reason police are given these broad powers is because they are considered “street-level bureaucrats.” As defined by Lipsky (1980), street-level bureaucrats are lower level employees who work on the frontlines (unlike, say, a career bureaucrat in the federal state department), and are the first to face the public. They include teachers, social workers, and yes, the police. Street-level bureaucrats *need* a great deal of discretion because the

work they perform is so fluid. Officers use it to decide whether someone looks “suspicious,” ought to be arrested, stopped, or even given a ticket. Under constant scrutiny, any one of these professions may prove too cumbersome and (perhaps) impossible, which is why the public entrusts them with discretionary privileges. Unfortunately, perception is that their great deal of discretion has often been used *against* black communities.

The implicit underpinning of those privileges is that police officers have the power to pursue their own agenda – and be effective in doing so. West (2009) argues that the fragmentation of institutional authority has given more power of independence to the bureaucrat. As such, street-level bureaucrats like the police exhibit an immense form of discretion. Epp et al. (2014) discuss the formal and informal rules that govern police conduct, and that behavior such as arrests are often left to the individual officer’s discretion. For example, the investigatory stop (which is often not predicated on a legitimate offense by the person being pulled over), could devolve into something else entirely, but most of this is dependent on the actions of the officer. They argue that this often includes the role of “implicit bias,” and how officer discretion allows for this condition to reign relatively free on the streets. These stops are not “extralegal” – because they have been deemed constitutional – but some of the tactics could be described as such, are not written in law, and in many ways, is a creation of law.

This is the downside of discretion, and charges of lack of responsiveness, abuse, unaccountability, and corruption are almost always afoot. The measure of responsiveness aligns with constituent demands, and the aim of responsiveness is to answer the public’s calls. But the divide between responsibility and responsiveness is also related to a

discussion on policing and street-level bureaucracy. As learned from Epp et al. (2014), certain policing practices are official (and unofficial), systemic rules. Police are responsible for making arrests – even those arrests that the public may deem unfair or discriminatory. Furthermore, Supreme Court decisions and outcome statistics have legitimized these arrests. In many ways, police accountability on this dimension has worked exceedingly well. But as Koppel (2010) describes, an increase in authoritarian practices has decreased police legitimacy with the public. The undermining of “fairness” and the democratic process has also undermined police responsiveness. Police – among many – are not fulfilling the expectation of the public.

The result of police subculture, as well as low visibility and high discretion is an ever-growing wedge between the public and police (Weitzer and Tuch 2006), as the problematic consequences of professionalization continue to metastasize. Law enforcement subculture renders internal reforms moot, because few officers are willing to buck systemic deficiencies, including rules and practices that bolster groupthink and group loyalty. Furthermore, the “code” of silence only perpetuates an existing arrogance of autonomy, which protects bad apples from legal recourse, lest whistleblowers accept the social stigma within the subculture. Next, low visibility and high discretion means that officer misconduct is unlikely to be *seen*, and when it is exposed, less likely to be deemed punishable, because of the wide berth provided to them. As such, implicit biases, prejudices, and flagrantly hateful attitudes are frequently imposed on the public. This has been especially true for African-Americans.

## The Public

Consequently, our public discussion about law enforcement has become a partisan affair. Instead of focusing on the nuances of policing practices, constraints, and liabilities, media sensationalism distracts us. As such, our collective conception of the citizen-police relationship is becoming discolored. Law enforcement is no longer seen as a necessary, but flawed entity. Instead, partisans label it “hero” or “foe.” Indeed, the flaw in partisan thinking is embracing a simplistic, dichotomous view of this relationship (i.e. citizens vs. police or black vs. white). Traditionally, the relationship between citizens and police is animated by the “to protect and to serve” motto made famous by the Los Angeles Police Department. This creed acknowledges the role of law enforcement in a democratic society, recognizing that the police function as bureaucratic agents who aspire to be effective, efficient, and act in the interests of their principal: the public. Unfortunately, given the inherent diversity of the public as a principal, “interests” vary, and public assessment of how well the police perform mirrors this heterogeneity. The public consists of populations who are both predisposed to accept (and approve) police behavior, and the converse. The demographic makeup of the population shapes these perceptions. Race is believed to be the chief determinant on attitudes toward the institution of policing and police behavior. Research finds disparate views on the police between blacks and whites (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000). A recent Pew Research poll found that black Americans (36%) were nearly forty-percent less confident than whites (71%) that local police treat both races fairly and equally.<sup>4</sup> Regrettably, the reality of the black American

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<sup>4</sup> Drake, Bruce. “Divide between Blacks and Whites on Police Runs Deep.” Pew Research Center, 28 Apr. 2015.

experience can be summed with CNN writer LZ Granderson's confession that he "don't trust cops and...don't know many black people who do."<sup>5</sup> Soledad O'Brien concurred, noting:

"African Americans feel they are treated differently in the criminal justice system, they are treated differently under the law. There is this aggressive targeting of black people that doesn't happen in white communities and it's that anger over so many years that is really percolating up now."<sup>6</sup>

Yancy and Butler (2015) argue that blacks are "targeted and hunted" by police, continuing that "institutionalized... racism has become a way of seeing, [and] entering into the presentation of visual evidence [a way] to justify hateful and unjustified and heartbreaking murder" (3).

This divide is partially the result of media framing citizen-police interactions as a racial struggle. The prevailing narrative is that majority white police agencies are disproportionately targeting young black people. Each new highly-publicized incident serves to compound these negative perceptions, driving a gulf between blacks and the police departments that patrol their neighborhoods. Recently, incidents in Ferguson (unarmed black man shot in the street), Baltimore (black man dies mysteriously in police custody), North Charleston (unarmed fleeing black man shot in the back eight times),

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<sup>5</sup> Granderson, L. Z. "Why Black People Don't Trust the Police." CNN. Cable News Network, 23 Mar. 2012.

<sup>6</sup> Kaplan, Rebecca. "How Do Police Improve Relations with Minority Communities?" CBS News. 07 Dec. 2014.

Cleveland (12-year old black boy killed while in possession of a toy gun), Chicago (unarmed black man shot walking-away from police officers), New York City (unarmed black man killed by chokehold), Prairie View, Texas (black woman dies mysteriously in police custody), Baton Rouge (unarmed black man shot while pinned to the ground), and Falcon Heights, Minnesota (black male licensed-gun owner killed in car while reaching for license), have heightened acrimony between law enforcement and black communities.<sup>7</sup> This antagonism is exacerbated because none of the offending officers have been convicted. Thus, per Yancy and Butler (2015), emboldening [officers] to “wage its race war by every grand jury decision that ratifies the point of view of state violence” (3).

The fact that young black men appear far more likely to be stopped, charged, arrested, and jailed has also animated recent public debates about citizen-police interactions. Discussions about the prison-industrial-complex (or the “new” Jim Crow)<sup>8</sup>, which claims about 1/3 of black men in America, highlight the glaringly disproportionate effect of stops, arrests, charges, and imprisonment of young black males. Many scholars and journalists blame the racial framing of “black criminality,” negative stereotypes, and

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<sup>7</sup> “After 9 High-Profile Police-Involved Deaths Of African-Americans, What Happened To The Officers?” Here & Now. WBUR. Boston, MA, 11 July 2016. Here & Now. Web. Transcript.

<sup>8</sup> Alexander, Michelle. *The New Jim Crow*. New York: New Press, 2011.

Schlosser, Eric. “The Prison-Industrial Complex.” *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 01 Dec. 1998.

Eric Schlosser of *The Atlantic* writes, “Three decades after the war on crime began, the United States has developed a prison-industrial complex—a set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the actual need. The prison-industrial complex is not a conspiracy, guiding the nation’s criminal-justice policy behind closed doors. It is a confluence of special interests that has given prison construction in the United States a seemingly unstoppable momentum. It is composed of politicians, both liberal and conservative, who have used the fear of crime to gain votes; impoverished rural areas where prisons have become a cornerstone of economic development; private companies that regard the roughly \$35 billion spent each year on corrections not as a burden on American taxpayers but as a lucrative market; and government officials whose fiefdoms have expanded along with the inmate population.”

systemic policies. Nevertheless, the resulting impact is that young black Americans are socialized (through personal and community experiences) to believe that their lives do not matter, their rights are compromised, and that their anger is unwarranted.

The relationship between the citizen and police is one built on trust and legitimacy (Jackson and Bradford, 2010). The public imbues law enforcement with the authority to protect a key constitutional mandate: the inalienable right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” in the form of rule of law. In turn, we the people legitimate the police, with the mutual understanding that their role is to maintain our laws, while ours is to embrace deference for them (Tyler and Fagan, 2008). Nevertheless, with respect to our role and Constitution, which guarantees equal protection under the law, we the people expect equal treatment from law enforcement. Unfortunately, many within the public believe that the police are not fulfilling this expectation. They are convinced that law enforcement undermines democratic society by depriving targeted citizens of their liberty. Many believe they are living through a “pandemic of police misconduct,”<sup>9</sup> and in recent years, their anger has manifest in growing, visible, and disruptive protests. The condition of this relationship and the growing number of incidents of misconduct have caused an unprecedented “mass movement against police brutality and racism that we now know as Black Lives Matter” (Chtalain and Asoka 2015, 54).

Following the deaths of Trayvon Martin, Brown, Garner and others, *The Guardian* declared that “black America is in a state of protest,”<sup>10</sup> and Black Lives Matter (BLM) quickly gained attention for mobilizing, organizing, and articulating this state of

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<sup>9</sup> Kaplan, Rebecca. “How Do Police Improve Relations with Minority Communities?” CBS News, 07 Dec. 2014.

<sup>10</sup> Day, Elizabeth. “#BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement.” *The Observer*. Guardian News and Media, 19 July 2015.

unrest. Mindful that media images primarily captured riotous activities (burning cars, looting, and violent clashes between protestors and the police), but failed to document the work of activists at ground zero in places like Ferguson (see the 2017 film documentary, “*Whose Streets?*”), BLM organizers successfully waged an aggressive social media strategy to raise international awareness. The movement’s open lamentations of white supremacy and racism within the criminal justice system, and specifically the institution of law enforcement, won both praise and ire. Unsurprisingly, public opinion polls showed a racial (and partisan) divide between blacks and whites on their approval of the movement. A Pew Research poll found that 65% of blacks (compared with 40% of whites) supported Black Lives Matter.<sup>11</sup>

Black Lives Matter’s predictable popularity among black Americans could only be matched by its status as a national pariah among law enforcement partisans. The movement was quickly derided as “anti-police,” and blamed for a spate of violence against on-duty officers.<sup>12</sup> The ensuing backlash produced defensive phrases like “All Lives Matter” and “Blue Lives Matter,” characterizing as racist the proclamation that *black lives* (exclusively) matter. The polarization of police-community relations, and the politicization of these high-profile incidents, often forced partisans to contort themselves into illogical pretzels to make their arguments for (or against) the police. A notorious example involved Congressman Peter King blaming Eric Garner’s “obesity” for his death by chokehold.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Horowitz, Juliana Menasce, and Gretchen Livingston. “How Americans View the Black Lives Matter Movement.” Pew Research Center, 08 July 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Johnson, Peter. “Black Lives Matter Leader: ‘Defund Police’.” *The Federalist*, 19 July 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Henderson, Nia-Malika. “Peter King Blames Asthma and Obesity for Eric Garner’s Death. That’s a Problem for the GOP.” *The Washington Post*. WP Company, 04 Dec. 2014.

Many police advocates also criticized BLM protests for being “unruly” and violent. They characterized its tactics as counterproductive and an “undermining” of “compelling” grievances.<sup>14</sup> To be clear, post-shooting angst has resulted in violence. In Ferguson, arsonists destroyed local businesses, and various forms of looting occurred in Baltimore, Baton Rouge, and Minneapolis. That said, nonviolent activism occurred too, with marches, sit-ins, die-ins, speeches, and human blockades. Nevertheless, in both cases (when protestors are violent or nonviolent), police are charged with responding to the demonstrations. This often leads to a tense impasse but sometimes results in violent clashes. As such, the legitimacy of police authority in communities across the United States, and the relationship that maintains civil order, is too often in crisis. What we do not know is how these crises impact public opinion toward the police. This is especially the case when exploring the attitudes of black Americans.

This dissertation explores the following: Chapter 2 examines the historical relationship between the police and communities of color. From the policing of slaves to the deaths of Gray, Scott, Garner and others, this relationship has been complicated by police subculture, unchecked implicit biases, as well as high levels of authority and discretion among officers. Historically, these conditions have created a far more hostile interaction between black citizens and law enforcement than white citizens and the police. Chapter 3 discusses the various ways in which police respond to public protests. I explore contemporary attitudes (by race) on law enforcement using national survey data. Chapter 4, using a national survey experiment, observes the intersectional impact of race, gender, and age on black American assessments of police response to protests. In the

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<sup>14</sup> Russell, Nicolle. “Black Lives Matter’s Violence Undermines Its Credibility.” *The Federalist*, 12 July 2016.

specific context of this dissertation, I ask whether response to protests impact black attitudes about the police. Chapter 5 summarizes the preceding chapters, as well as offers substantive conclusions for a police audience.

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## Chapter 2

Many black protests are the result of police provocation. Historically, black “outrage” has been in response to injustice, and this posture reaches as far back as slavery. From the slave revolts to early-and-mid twentieth century riots to today’s Black Lives Matter protests, black Americans have made a tradition of outward expression of discontent, directing their ire toward the police, who often directly participate in the cause for the protests.

Interestingly, a historical parallel between black Americans and the police explains so much of their relationship today. While examining the history of policing, I find that the very impetus for policing in America was enforcing against “black criminals.” I discover that its existence is rooted in white fear and that the institution has repeatedly been used as a tool to assuage it. I observe that policing (as an institution) has evolved since its earliest form and police behavior (specifically related to community policing and responses to community protests) have accordingly shifted. Indeed, I conclude that we cannot understand *why* black Americans (protest) and police (responding to protests) behave without a discussion of this history.

This chapter explores the following: to understand police behavior in 2017, we must examine how the institution has shifted in the past two-hundred years. From the vantage point of black Americans, I explore their long history of antagonism with law

enforcement. Here, I discuss the earliest iteration of policing in the South (the policing of black slaves), law enforcement's long history of criminalizing blackness, the proceeding black American outrage (often in the form of public protests), and the resulting police responses.

### **Historical Antagonism between Law Enforcement and Black Americans**

At its earliest form, the "institution" of policing was designed to guard against black "criminality." Prior to the corrupted beat squads of the party machine era were antebellum "patterollers" tasked with corralling black slaves. In fact, socially conscious scholars in police studies have written about the role of early-vigilantism and the policing of slaves. Wintersmith (1974), for instance, charges that "slavery and the omnipotent police mechanisms were synonymous." The former, they write, "could not have existed without the latter" (21). Indeed, the following pages will describe a relationship between law enforcement and black Americans that was born from and nurtured through racism, white hegemony, abuse, distrust, malice, resentment, and antipathy. They will explain how centuries of perceived mistreatment have animated black attitudes toward the police and police behavior.

Early slavers had a problem. Slaves routinely rebelled and ran-away, despite their false characterization as "docile." As such, slavers lived in a constant state of paranoia. In the beginning, slavers relied on state and federal militia to respond to a slave revolt or runaway, but their reaction time was far too slow, and news of slave revolts in other counties or states sparked widespread demand for more localized efforts. Consequently, the creation of "Black Codes" were designed to "regulate social intercourse," providing

for the “absolute and unlimited control over the life, liberty, and prosperity of slaves by their masters” (Wintersmith 1974, 13). These codes forbade slaves from leaving their designated plantations (unless they were given a “pass” by their slaver), and required any white person to stop, question, intimidate, and sometimes corporally punish slaves discovered away from their master’s property. It was a system designed to make every white person “the law,” while every person of color was inherently a “criminal.”

“Black Codes” did not temper slaver fear, which prompted the development of a “patteroller” system to systematically police slaves (Wintersmith 1974, 17). This is the earliest form of “police” in the United States, whose duties were noted for their brutality and wide latitude (17). A first sign of high discretion, if you will. These patterollers were vigilantes with legal sanction, financed by slave poll-tax levies (19), and were often, young, poor white males (18). The earliest iteration of this system was in South Carolina in 1690, followed by revisions in 1721, where legislation describes these patterollers as “beat companies” (which is still used today) (19). This system was established in 1794 in North Carolina, and became an official county functionary by 1802. By 1833, most Southern states had adopted this “very elaborate military, quasi-military” slave policing system (13). Unsurprisingly, patrollers were only used against blacks, except for white slave-sympathizers, and spent day and night “intimidating, brutalizing, and terrorizing slaves” (20). Most importantly, these patrols were firmly entrenched in the local bureaucracy, establishing official police sanction of violence against blacks.

The marriage of policing and slavery is an argument furthered by Finkelman (1997) and Fehrenbacher (2001), who each argue that slavery and race in America are parallel constructions that influence contemporary tensions between black citizens and

governmental institutions like the police. Finkelman (1997) writes, “For Americans, race has always been the central reality of slavery” (5). Furthermore, they assert that the evils of slavery have reverberated across generations, and its impact still exists today. Fehrenbacher (2001) contends, “To this day, aspects of the slaveholding republic’s legacy remain, both in whites unable to fathom the depth of black grievances, and in blacks’ deeply alienated by a long history of oppression” (343). Per Derrick Bell, “Blacks see their slave heritage more as a symbol of dishonor than a source of pride. It burdened black people with an indelible mark of difference as we struggled to be like whites” (7). Importantly, they also argue that the institution of slavery continues to haunt America’s contemporary criminal justice system (17). Moreover, because slavery in the United States “was black slavery,” even this long-abolished institution “cannot escape being caught up in the urgency of contemporary black-white tensions” (Finkelman, 1997, 5). Indeed, this “bitter harvest [of slavery]” was unhappily promised to continue well into the future (Fehrenbacher, 2001, 343). If our discussion is focused on contemporary questions of police-black citizen relations, each of the above passages contains words and phrases that immediately prejudice assumptions: *alienation*, *indelible mark of difference*, *urgency of contemporary black-white tensions*, and *bitter harvest*, all insinuate an abiding negative relationship between blacks and law enforcement.

After the Civil War, despite the illegality of slavery, once the North abandoned the South during the Hayes Administration, whites reestablished oppressive codes designed to regulate social intercourse. Furthermore, policing agencies (in the South *and* North) continued to selectively enforce laws. Former slaves were hunted, jailed, murdered, and mutilated for petty crimes (or for no crime at all), while law enforcement

watched or (worse still) participated. From 1880 to the early 1920s, an (as Wintersmith describes it) “Era of Lawful Lawlessness” reigned.

### **Lawful Lawlessness**

By the end of the nineteenth century, white lynch mobs “brutalized African Americans with savage regularity.” In 1904 Vicksburg, Mississippi, for example, a black man and his wife were captured, tied to a tree, and forced to hold out their hands while one finger at a time was chopped off. The fingers were given away as souvenirs. After torturing the couple with piercing corkscrews, the surrounding mob then mercifully threw them onto a fire to be burned to death. The man was being accused of murder. The wife was innocent. The punishment was equal. The details did not matter (Terrell 1904, 2; McDermott 1999, 61). For many whites of the era, the threat of black “criminals” assaulting white women, murdering white men, and frightening their communities was reason enough to take recourse into their own hands. Again, the paranoia of whites precipitated organized brutality against blacks. During the antebellum period, it was the creation of vigilante police. Here, the advent of organized mobs. In both cases, the role of law enforcement was in direct conflict with black Americans.

The menace of lynch mobs loomed large over the early-twentieth century America. Thousands of black citizens found themselves at the mercy of mob-justice, which provided no due process, flimsy reasoning, and a brutal end. Apologists (including local law enforcement) would feign ignorance, denying the existence of lynch mobs. When the number of victims began to increase in 1916 after a slight decline, justifications for mob-violence were made (namely, black criminality). Ford (1948) would later echo his southern predecessors, claiming that “action by courageous state officers has

contributed to” the achievement of overall decreased lynching statistics since the late 1800s (944).

Walter White, leader of the NAACP, was skeptical of reported “decreases” in lawfully lawless mob-violence, and reasoned that one could only *estimate* the number of unjust murders of blacks in the South. Importantly, he wanted to include death-by-officer in the official count of lynchings. The Tuskegee Institute, a prominent black organization founded by Booker T. Washington, disagreed with White and the NAACP. They preferred to recognize lynching as “an activity in which persons not officers of the law, in open defiance of the law, administer punishment by death to an individual for an alleged offense or to an individual with whom some offense has been associated.” The exclusion of officers of the law was a major point of contention between the two heavyweight organizations when it came to anti-lynching legislation.

Realizing that local and state officials, including the police, often neglected (and sometimes participated in) these lawfully lawless mobs, anti-lynching advocates argued that Congress needed to get involved. Congressman Leonidas Dyer claimed, “To bring an end to such deplorable conditions, it is necessary that some authority based upon a broader public opinion should be brought into play.”<sup>15</sup> In 1918, Dyer’s anti-lynching bill was introduced in the House, and constitutional debates over federal anti-lynching legislation ensued for more than thirty years, but a bill never became law.<sup>16</sup>

For their part, in addition to halting anti-lynching legislation, white politicians, newspaper editors, and local law enforcement focused on black “criminality” to temper

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<sup>15</sup> Dyer, George and L.C. Dyer. “The Constitutionality of A Federal Anti-Lynching Bill.” *Washington University Law Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 3 (1928): 187.

<sup>16</sup> “NAACP History: Anti-Lynching Bill.” *NAACP*. Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.naacp.org/oldest-and-boldest/naacp-history-anti-lynching-bill/>>.

public reactions to mob-violence (particularly in the South). As a tactic, this was used to convince “white reformers sensitive to the plight of southern blacks” of “the truth of black villainy.”<sup>17</sup> Black crimes, they reasoned, were an assault on entire communities. Thus, the community justified extralegal measures, as they felt threatened. Nonetheless, the:

“Blatant disregard for the need to protect black communities from both internal and external criminal elements, including the police themselves, moved some black communities to organize themselves for defensive purposes” (Wintersmith 1974, 45).

Accordingly, by the 1920s, blacks attempted to “develop several strategies to fight institutional oppression” (42). Chief among these strategies was the development of “black consciousness.”

By the 1920s, a new black cohort of emerging leaders introduced a collection of radical ideas designed to defend against the political, social, and legal constraints of white hegemony. Including the menace of mobs and police mistreatment. The advent of black labor organizations, communist groups, socialist thinkers, and race leaders brought about a fresh “stream of consciousness” that advocated an updated sense of “blackness.” It was this militant group of thinkers, these “New Negroes,” who emerged between 1915 and 1925 and transcended “the older ideological disputes.” They developed “a more pragmatic approach to the problems that the black community faced” (Kusmer, 1976, 236). By the 1920s, old guard black leadership, agrarian, “respectable,” and pacifist, in the vein of Booker T. Washington, began speaking to (and for) a “dwindling and rather

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<sup>17</sup> Waldrep, Christopher. "War of words: The controversy over the definition of lynching, 1899-1940." *Journal of Southern History* (2000): 75.

self-conscious minority” (236). This is in large part due to the Great Migration, when the “Fall of Cotton” forced many Southern blacks into larger metropolitan areas, exposing them to the new ideas of these “New Negroes.”

As blacks adjusted to urban life, and crises mounted regarding poor conditions for black workers, housing, and police mistreatment, the “New Negroes” emerged as a voice for a rising tenor of social militancy, impatience, and political action. These new voices, such as A. Philip Randolph, Cyril Briggs, Marcus Garvey, Angelo Herndon, and W.E.B. Du Bois, among others, did not, however, speak in unison. While some advocated for nonviolent political action, others promoted all forms of protests (violent or nonviolent). Nevertheless, they all called for (and contributed to) a growth in black consciousness, providing an outlet for the disaffected.

Physical protest became a part of black long-term strategies against poor treatment by local, state, and federal government official practices, as well as the two major parties. In his book, *Life for Us Is What We Make It* (2005), Richard W. Thomas cites 1915 through 1945 in Detroit, when “black protest took as many forms as there were incidents of racial discrimination” (229). Members of this generation, many of whom were recent migrants, refused to allow racial barriers to go unchallenged. Influenced by W.E.B. DuBois, the NAACP, publications like the *Chicago Defender* and *Detroit Tribune*, as well as Garvey and Randolph, this generation embraced a more hard-edged, radical view of politics and protest.

By the 1950s, Civil Rights movement protests adopted nonviolent civil disobedience measures like marches, sit-ins, and public rallies. But Charles Tilly’s (2003) book *The Politics of Collective Violence* also attempts to explain how ideas on (or

feelings about) injustice often lead to different forms of collective action (like violent unrest). His concept of *broken negotiation*<sup>18</sup> explains urban black protests in the 1960s to present day, those animated by violent destruction of property and looting, resulting from racialized incidents. Table 1 illustrates select examples of police related black unrest incidents from the 1940s to 2016. These are examples of violent and nonviolent demonstrations, where they occurred, and their reported provocations.

(Table 1 here)

Because of media attention given to various *broken negotiation*-style demonstrations (for examples, the rioting in Los Angeles and Ferguson) in the past, the public often misperceives movement protests. For instance, even in the absence of violence, demonstrations are *seen* as violent.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, most demonstrations are conducted through non-violent means, either through civil resistance measures such as symbolic protests, economic boycotts, political and social non-cooperation, nonviolent intervention, or more traditional political tactics like public demands and electioneering (please see footnote 19). Both Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) provide insight on how these forms of resistance look. Consequently, a distinction here is important. Black Lives Matter (BLM) and Civil Rights movement protests were not the urban riots of the mid-to-late twentieth century. While movement activists publicly articulated rage, theirs

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<sup>18</sup> *Broken negotiation* is defined as a form of collective action that creates the conditions for rioting. Sometimes threats of violence are made. Sometimes actual damage to persons and property occur. Anger and fear fuel this form of violence (Tilly 2003, 16).

<sup>19</sup> It should be noted that selections for table 1 describing forms of protest are derived from media sources. Earlier protests (pre-1990s) were not covered similarly to later protests (like Ferguson, MO), where multi-faceted accounts have been documented. For example, activists from Ferguson, MO have contradicted media coverage of protests on the ground through social media and other mediums. This did not and could not occur in the 1960s. As such, reporting from the “riots” of the 1960s, recorded violent protests, but did not necessarily capture the nonviolent aspects of the protests.

was a decidedly more strategic and deliberate effort. On the other hand, urban riots, particularly those in the 1960s, were spontaneous demonstrations of angst, fear, anger, as well as outrage, and were relatively commonplace during this period (Waskow 1966). The police's selective enforcement of the law often prompted these riots. Indeed, black communities were deeply bitter toward law enforcement during times of unrest, as the police were concerned with little else but disarming blacks (U.S. Riot Commission, 1968). Local political apparatchiks were also to "blame." For instance, in 1930s New York City, Mayor LaGuardia ignored the recommendations of a commission he sanctioned because it credited institutional racism as the cause for repeated urban outbursts. Yet, time after time, despite violent *and* nonviolent protestations, official acknowledgment of police misconduct and institutional racism was (and is) lacking. Ultimately, this begs the question, why protest at all?

### **Why Protest?**

In *Slavery and the Law* (1997), Derrick Bell and Eric Edmonds argue that racism's pervasiveness is a function of institutions that were designed to sustain both the implicit and explicit objectives of white hegemony. In the case of criminal justice and policing, it is an institution rooted in the precept that makes blackness inherently criminal. Because of this system, they argue that blacks can only tangentially effect change. Bell writes, "Despite what we designed as progress wrought through struggle over many generations, we remain what we were in the beginning, a dark and foreign presence, always the designated "other" (35).

Yet, Bell and Edmonds also argue that there is *utility* in action and engagement. Edmonds writes, "...engagement alerts the powers that be to the presence of persons like ourselves, who are not only not on their side, but are determined to stand in their way" (38). In other words, the political engagement of black citizens has (at the very least) symbolic power. Thus, public protests may be efficacious activities, even if policy outcomes are not ultimately recognized. Therefore, black citizens have used protests for a variety of reasons, including to create awareness around issues, to publicly demonstrate a level of support for issues, as an expression of outrage, and as an attention-seeking alternative, when it was perceived that their elected officials failed to acknowledge their conditions (Bourne 2011, 188). Not unexpectedly, these protests, whether nonviolent marches or riotous mobs, continuously reawakened the common thread of white fear and paranoia. As such, not unlike "ye olden days" of slave patrollers, police responses (often instigated by white politicians) to these public demonstrations have historically been acrimonious.

### **Police Responses to Protests**

For black Americans, their constitutional right of protest has largely existed in conflict with police "command and control" policies. This is in large part due to police agencies being more apt to embrace commanding and controlling black protests than their first amendment rights. The College of Policing (2013) defines "command and control" policies as follows: "The police service deals with a wide range of incidents and operations that are typically resolved by deploying available resources. There are, however, certain incidents or operations where the police response requires a different approach and it may be necessary to establish a dedicated command structure. Command

and control is the authority and capability of an organization to direct the actions of its personnel and the use of its equipment.”<sup>20</sup> Yet, it is important to note that these competing forces (police and protestors) have “coevolved,” mirroring one another and are driven by an “iterative process” (Oliver and Myers 2003). This “coevolution” has featured antagonistic early attitudes toward protestors (especially black protestors) who were perceived as disruptive, riotous, and violent (even when nonviolent) (Bourne 2011, 195). Police responded in-kind, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the protest, and imposing coercive tactics to squelch them. This approach was known as “escalated force.” Nevertheless, it eventually lost favor, as demonstrators (particularly during the Civil Rights Movement) became media-savvy and articulated nonviolent strategies. Thus, law enforcement was forced to alter response maneuvers, lest suffer sustained public outrage and risk local community legitimacy and cooperation. This prompted the adoption of negotiated management and (later) strategic incapacitation policies. Today, police departments vary in approach, often relying on a compromise strategy to command and control protests.

### **Protest Management**

Historically, public protests have been met with counter resistance from law enforcement. In the 1960s, policing agencies were met with their greatest existential crisis (Uchida 2004). In addition to rising crime, anti-war demonstrations and the Civil Rights movement, riots, and violent protests in cities and on university campuses compelled law enforcement to respond. The highest profile example of 60s-era citizen-

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<sup>20</sup> “Command and Control.” College of Policing., 23 Oct. 2013. Web. <https://www.app.college.police.uk/appcontent/operations/command-and-control/>.

police unrest was during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, where the most memorable historical occurrence was not the nomination of Hubert H. Humphry, but Mayor Daley's police using harsh force against protestors. Furthermore, riots were credited to police involvement in Harlem, Watts, Newark, and Detroit, as traffic stops of black citizens and police raids of popular African-American establishments, sparked them (Uchida 2004).

Research on law enforcement has confirmed that policing agencies think strategically when responding to public unrest. Police strategies reflect departmental values, which reflect community values, and attitudes towards the police may influence police policy making and strategy (Dowler 2003, 112). Consequently, their conduct is the byproduct of bureaucratic considerations, understanding the wide-ranging perceptual repercussions of agency response within the public sphere (Reicher, et al., 2007; Stott et al., 2008). Vitale (2005) writes, "How police departments choose to handle large demonstrations can have profound implications for police-community relations and the international reputations of the cities they represent" (284). As such, the prevailing level of response to public demonstrations has evolved over the past half-century.

### **Escalated Force**

In the 1960s and 70s, police philosophy engendered a policy of "escalated force," which embraced a mirroring of militancy from protestor to police. The scholarly consensus is that police repression existed at "high levels" (Rafail, Soule, and McCarthy 2012). Law enforcement would reciprocate any high levels of militancy, violence, or show of force among demonstrators (McPhail et al. 1998; della Porta 1995; McPhail and

McCarthy 2005). A “tit for tat,” if you will. During this period, demonstrations were a “threat” to the stability of the state, an affront to respected institutions, and an attack on their legitimacy. As such, the “appropriate” response to these incursions was to employ measures that were more repressive, to stamp out rabble-rousing, and restore order. Winter (1998) refers to this as the *Staatspolizei* period. Here, protests were a disruptive and inconvenient function, upsetting the lives of average citizens, and needed to be squelched. Crowds were “conceived as potentially riotous and as having the propensity to become violent” (Bourne 2011). This suspicion and cynicism provided ample rationale for coercive and forceful tactics.

Per Schweingruber (2000), escalated force consisted of five characteristics. First, freedom of speech, expression, and assembly rights were ignored. Second, there was little tolerance for changes to the community status quo (i.e. anything obstruction of normal community activities). Third, police infiltration and other intrusive measures were the only means of contact between law enforcement and citizens. Fourth, nonviolent civil disobedience did not absolve individuals from arrests. Finally, physical brutality, the use of batons, tear gas, fire hoses, and such, were used to disperse protestors instead of making arrests. Police approached demonstrators with strong-arming force, intent on dispersing their activity, and continually escalating until they were successful. Importantly, *show* of force came before *use* of force, as police *were* reluctant to expend resources when unnecessary. Police agencies would use intimidation tactics (using large contingents of officers equipped with visible weapons and riot gear). This was done to scare demonstrators into compliance without needing to actually use any force. Also, *selective* arrests (i.e. the biggest troublemakers) and division of the crowd (so it will not

grow) were used to coerce demonstrations to cease (Kluchesky and Lohman, 1947). Again, this shows that police response was *strategic*.

Infamous examples of these characteristics abound. For black Americans, memories of Alabama police commissioner Bull Connor's brutal handling of nonviolent civil rights workers are vivid. In April and May 1963, Connor's "tools of suppression" against student demonstrations, including first and second graders (he had already ordered the arrests of the adult protestors), were water hoses and dogs (Bowers et al. 2010, 85). Connor even directed officers to *pursue* fleeing demonstrators. These tactics were designed to intimidate and coerce civil rights workers and are quintessential examples of "escalated force" measures, principally, the lack of acknowledgment (through violence) of speech, expression, and assembly rights. These were also means toward maintaining the segregated status quo, as the southern establishment could not abide changes to the racial hierarchy (80).

Law enforcement infiltration and intrusion of movement organizations is best illustrated by the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a series of covert projects in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) monitored "fringe" or "radical" political organizations within the United States. The program began in 1956 and lasted until 1971, under the direct command of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, who used COINTELPRO to investigate and manipulate the Black Panther Party, Republic of New Africa, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and groups protesting the Vietnam War, among others. The program's intrusive techniques included wiretaps, microphone "bugs," surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins. In 1976, the Senate Church Committee concluded:

“Many of the techniques used [by COINTELPRO] would be intolerable in a democratic society even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity, but COINTELPRO went far beyond that...the Bureau conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence.”<sup>21</sup>

Accordingly, COINTELPRO became an infamous example of law enforcement excess and a “top-level” illustration of how police used escalated force maneuvers to suppress movement organizations, protests, and leaders. Despite their tenuous relationship with the First Amendment, escalated force measures continued because political elites had interests in squelching the “social dynamite” of movement protests (Loo and Grimes 2004, 61). They believed there was a public appetite for these tactics (or at least a tolerance), as “law and order” became a clarion call (some might argue a “dog whistle”<sup>22</sup>) of conservative politicians. Richard Nixon infamously used the phrase to exploit white middle-American fears of black unrest during his campaign for president in 1968. Scholars argue that this white paranoia resurfaced in the late 1960s, amid growing (riotous) outrage within urban black communities (Skogan 1995; Cronin, Cronin and Milakovich 1981). From the 1965 Watts Rebellion (sparked by community charges of police brutality) to the April 1968 urban riots after the assassination of Martin Luther

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<sup>21</sup> Church, Frank. “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.” *U.S. Senate: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.*, 23 Apr. 1976.

<sup>22</sup> “Coded communication is defined as language that has a special meaning for a subset of the population. This sort of communication has recently acquired the label, “dog-whistle politics,” drawing upon the way that dog-whistles are perceptible to dogs but not to humans due to their high frequency” (Albertson 2006).

King, white America watched with great fear, the outward expression of black American grief and fury, and flinched at the prospect of experiencing it firsthand. Consequently, political calls for “law and order” had a salving effect on white voters, as it intimated that politicians would be “tough” on protesters and demonstrators, as well as protect citizens (and their property) from harm. Furthermore, “street violence” became synonymous with “black criminality,” and establishment politicians like Nixon (as well as anti-establishment firebrands like George Wallace), knew how to exploit this intersection of fear, race, and violence (Witcover 1997). Even Robert Kennedy, a liberal Democrat running for president called for a “delicate balancing act,” understanding the importance of appearing “tough on crime” without alienating black citizens (at that point an integral part of the Democratic coalition) (174).

Fear of “black criminality” and urban outrage led many white Americans to embrace a “punitive justice model,”<sup>23</sup> considering it necessary that law enforcement was “tough on crime.” In political terms, these were “law and order” voters, principally white, low-to-middle income, less educated, and most fearful of crime. They rejected any softening posture on the part of law enforcement during times of unrest. They also happened to be the largest and most likely to vote segment of the electorate. Politicians *and* police departments were certainly cognizant of this reality.

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<sup>23</sup> Dowler (2003) measures this model by 11 items on a (0-1/yes-no) scale: (1) Favor government focus on punishment; (2) Favor retribution as the most important sentencing objective for adults; (3) Favor the Death Penalty; (4) Oppose Parole; (5) Oppose Early Release for Good Behavior; (6) Oppose Shorter Sentences; (7) Favor adult trial for juvenile accused of property crime; (8) Favor adult trial for juvenile accused of drug crime; (9) Favor adult trial for juvenile accused of violent crime; (10) Favor retribution as the most important sentencing objective for juveniles; (11) Favor Stiffer Sentences for Juveniles.

## Shift in Police Tactics

By the 1970s, the *Staatspolizei* era resulted in growing violence and increased antipathy between law enforcement and citizen activists. Consequently, a steady shift in police response measures began taking shape, because of the following developments.

First, in the shadow of the conflict in Vietnam, each new police-protestor clash became more high profile, creating a polarizing effect on the public (Roberts 2010). Beginning with the 1968 Democratic National Convention, and moving to college campuses all over the country (most infamously on the campus of Kent State University), escalated force measures against war protestors became increasingly unpopular in the media (Priest 1997). Furthermore, the deaths of nonviolent, *white* student protestors, at the hands of coercive police officers, turned many moderate whites against violent “tough on crime” tactics and sullied police reputations.

Second, several presidential commissions on the riots of the 1960s were critical of police tactics and began recommending reforms for law enforcement to respond to “civil disorder.” For instance, the Kerner Commission (1967) suggested “special training in the prevention of disorders,” “guidelines governing the use of control equipment and alternatives to the use of lethal weapons,” and condemned “moves to equip police departments with mass destruction weapons, such as automatic rifles, machine guns and tanks.”<sup>24</sup> The commission characterized these as “weapons which are designed to destroy, not to control,” and “have no place in densely populated urban communities” (Chapter 12).

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<sup>24</sup> United States Kerner Commission. *Report of the National Advisory Commission On Civil Disorders*. [Washington: United States, Kerner Commission, 1968.

Third, through a series of decisions known as “public forum law,” the Supreme Court began establishing clearer boundaries against police encroachment of the First Amendment rights of public protestors. Fundamentally, in response to state and local laws banning certain demonstrations on public property, the Court decided that the government *could* regulate (through permits) protests, but must do so with a “compelling” rationale that did not incorporate biases against certain forms of expression. These decisions were “important in shaping the dimensions of the shift between the two forms of protest policing, setting the stage for negotiated management” (McCarthy, McPhail, and Crist 1995, 58-59).

Fourth, perceptions of the effectiveness (and incentives) of escalated force were altered when thousands of police officers, administrators, and public officials went through a new civil disturbance orientation (SEADOC). (McCarthy, McPhail, and Crist 1995; Skogan 2004). This federally-promoted orientation encouraged (among other tactics), the “use of minimum force required” to maintain “law and order” in protest situations (64). The effectiveness of maximum (escalated) force had clearly been undermined on several fronts: first, public opinion soured against the police; second, widespread arrests did little to temper movement activities, but certainly drained police personnel; third, as a result of commission recommendations, federal resources would no longer prioritize these measures, thus, the incentive structure for state and local authorities had to shift accordingly.

### **Negotiated Management**

The aforementioned developments encouraged an evolved philosophy that treated demonstrations as a legitimate part of the democratic process. Since the 1980s, police philosophy transitioned to the *Bürgerpolizei* period (Winter 1998), employing a “negotiated management” approach to protests, calling for the “protection of free speech rights, toleration of community disruption, ongoing communication between police and demonstrators, avoidance of arrests, and limiting the use of force to situations where violence is occurring” (Schweingruber, 2000). It was a “more conciliatory” and “amicable” form of protest control (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998; Rafail, Soule, and McCarthy 2012).

Negotiated management is credited with significantly impacting the relationship between police and protestors during demonstrations (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Waddington 1994). Waddington’s (1994) study on London police found that concerted efforts of the police to negotiate with the protestor often increased compliance (della Porta and Reiter 1998). Also, the once derided permit system was used a way of demonstrating fairness and cooperation, as it engendered a need for public officials and demonstrators to communicate *prior to* the protest event. Furthermore, the adoption of standardized policing practices provided a roadmap for the management of protestors in public spaces. Also, the training of local police by the federal government inculcated the “principles of negotiated management in police departments around the country and was buttressed by enhanced federal funding” (Rafail, Soule, and McCarthy 2012).

Table 2 is a comparison of escalated force and negotiated management strategies, showing the latter’s high concern for both First Amendment rights and tolerance for

community disruption. Also, the rarity of arrests and force in order to control demonstrators.

(Table 2 here)

These strategies are designed to improve perceptions of police and their legitimacy, allowing for a deescalation of conflict between law enforcement and crowds (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Per Gorringe, Stott, Rosie (2012), this “dialogue policing” has five characteristics: negotiation, mediation, initiation, communication, and sensing. Essentially, it is perceptive-policing, constantly assessing susceptibility for violence and disorder, but also being mindful of prior agreements (between officer and protestors), deescalation measures, and changes in mood of the crowd. These efforts help to avoid conflict (Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007).

### **Limitations of Negotiated Management**

By the early 2000s, negotiated management’s limitations were being debated. Critics of non-escalating tactics grew louder. From hardline police partisans, the invariable charges of “softness” and treachery animated discussions about these strategies within police departments (Gorringe, Rosie, Waddington, & Kominou 2012; UK Home Affairs Select Committee, 2011). From civil libertarians, skepticism grew about negotiated management’s real effect on protest management, as many were concerned that these tactics were not nonviolent at all. Instead, rather than creating a safer, fairer environment for demonstrators (as advertised), police were simply finding alternative means of coercion (Waddington 1994; Wahlstrom 2007).

The 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle saw police organizations alter their strategies when confronting large demonstrations (Vitale 2005). Relations between the protestors and police broke-down because there was little opportunity for negotiation (i.e. the protests were unanticipated and became too large). Consequently, police reverted to “special weapons and other equipment to aggressively disperse protests, resulting in numerous injuries and arrests” (284). Some have observed that this shift back to escalated force tactics was an indication that advocates for “zero-tolerance” police strategies (which were in vogue during the late 1990s with “broken windows” philosophy) were again becoming influential (284). Negotiation was too nonviolent or “pampering,” and with their growing paramilitarism and “hierarchical micro-management of demonstrations,” police agencies were seeking alternative strategies aimed at managing large protests *without* resorting to 1960s-era coercion (284; Wahlstrom 2007, 397).

Yet despite police agencies’ public denouncement of “coercion” as a tactic, Wahlstrom (2007) notes that many civil libertarians speculated that the “dark side” of negotiated management was the use of dialogue as a means for control (396). Their ethnographic study with police officers in Göteborg and Stockholm over the course of two years unearthed a series of concerns regarding the use of “Dialogue Police Units” and “Psychotactics Units” to employ negotiated management strategies. First, these units were designed to use communication to influence human attitudes and behavior, immediately sparking concerns that police agencies would utilize “psychological warfare” against demonstrators (396). Second, the unequal power positions between the police and demonstrator undermined the efficacy of *talking*. In other words, as one

officer described, his being “tall,” “sturdy,” and forced to wear riot gear simply *scared* the people of with he was to converse (397). This “power privilege” (if you will) served as “coercive,” with or without the intent, further alarming watchdogs about the effectiveness of negotiated management.

### **Strategic Incapacitation**

Criticism from the right and left flank of policing policies created yet another opportunity for alternative strategies for protest management. For instance, Noakes and Gillham (2006) identified a new protest control strategy called “strategic incapacitation.” Here, the approach is more offensive, “putting a stress on selectively rearranging and incapacitating protesters considered to constitute risk” (Wahlstrom 2011). These tactics are decidedly up-the-middle, with increased proactivity toward incapacitation *and* negotiation objectives. Police departments have begun training more specialized liaison officers but have also moved to increase “use of coercive tactics selectively directed at transgressive protesters” (Wahlstrom 2007).

Selective incapacitation includes the “establishment of extensive protest zones,<sup>25</sup> the increased use of less-lethal weapons<sup>26</sup>, the strategic use of arrests, and a reinvigoration of surveillance and infiltration of movement organizations” (Wahlstrom 2007; Noakes and Gillham 2006; Vitale 2005). And consistent with a broader, more proactive contemporary approach toward crime and disorder control (i.e. Broken Windows policies), strategic incapacitation emphasizes risk-management and

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<sup>25</sup> Protest zones are designated, unrestricted spaces where demonstrators are permitted to express themselves. Several United States Court decisions have stated that the government can restrict when, where, and how protests may occur – but not their content.

<sup>26</sup> These include tear gas, rubber bullets, body armor, water cannons, flash grenades, as well as infiltration and disruption methods.

preventative measures. It is also beneficial in that it manages police time and effort, focusing on “ring leaders,” rather than en masse arrests (Noakes and Gillham 2006; Harris and McCoy 2001).

Scholars have found that the “interactional dynamics between police and violent protestor,” is explained by the “provocative effect of police action” (Wahlstrom 2011; della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Reicher et al., 2004). Soule and Davenport (2009) argue that there is a linear relationship between violent demonstrations and repressive police responses. This is “regardless of the temporal period in which a demonstration occurred” (Rafail, Soule, and McCarthy 2012). The autonomy of police departments means that universal abandonment of escalated force strategies cannot be taken for granted (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998). Thus, while police rely on negotiated management as a first resort, they have “developed a range of tactics” (Gillham and Noakes 2007).

## **Discussion**

In this chapter, I have discussed the slaver origins of policing, its institutional evolution, and harsh legacy with black Americans. Furthermore, I have noted rationales for black American protests and how police agencies have adopted (and evolved) responses to protests since the 1960s (from escalated force to negotiated management to strategic incapacitation). While shifts in strategies have occurred, police agencies have not completely abandoned or adopted any one form of protest control (Vitale 2005). Even as law enforcement embraces more compromised strategies toward commanding and controlling protests, has the public developed positive feelings toward the institution of policing? American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data indicates that

concerning feelings toward the police, blacks, whites, and the racial and ethnic issues that animate our national discussion have shifted little over the past forty-years of scholarship. The next chapter will examine these data to examine how even while police strategies have shifted, feelings toward policing is still racially polarized within the American public.

## Figures and Tables

**Table 1: Select Cases of Police-Related Black Unrest (1943-2016)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Form of Protest</b>	<b>Cause</b>
1943	Detroit	Rioting	Interracial communal disorder exacerbated by brutal police treatment of black rioters. <sup>1</sup>
1963	Birmingham, Alabama	Nonviolent protest	Staged to challenge racial segregation in country's most segregated city. Also, known for its violent police force. <sup>2</sup>
1964	Rochester, New York	Rioting	After an arrest of a young, intoxicated black man, rumors spread of brutal police misconduct (i.e. police dogs attacking a pregnant black woman) which prompted a crowd of civilians to become violent. <sup>3</sup>
1964	Harlem	Rioting	Black youth shot and killed by white police officer. <sup>4</sup>
1965	Watts, California	Rioting	Traffic arrest. <sup>5</sup>
1967	Newark	Rioting	Black cab driver beaten by white police officer. <sup>6</sup>
1970	Jackson, Mississippi	Rioting	Police fire 150 rounds of ammunition at a group of angry black students pelting rocks at white motorists. <sup>7</sup>
1980	Miami	Looting	The acquittal of four white police officers who had brutally beaten a black, handcuffed insurance agent to death with their flashlights. <sup>8</sup>
1992	Los Angeles	Rioting	The acquittal of four white Los Angeles Police Department officers in the beating of black motorist Rodney King in 1991. <sup>9</sup>
1996	St. Petersburg, Florida	Rioting	18-year-old TyRon Lewis had been shot and killed by a white police officer. <sup>10</sup>
2001	Cincinnati	Rioting	19-year-old Timothy Thomas had been shot and killed by a white police officer. <sup>11</sup>
2009	Oakland	Rioting	The acquittal of a white BART police officer in the killing of Oscar Grant. <sup>12</sup>
2014	Ferguson, Missouri	Nonviolent Protests and Rioting	Michael Brown had been shot and killed by a white police officer. <sup>13</sup>
2015	Baltimore	Nonviolent Protests and Rioting	25-year-old Freddie Gray died in police custody. <sup>14</sup>
2015	Milwaukee, Wisconsin	Nonviolent Protests and Rioting	23-year-old Sylville Smith shot and killed by black police officer. <sup>15</sup>
2016	Charlotte	Nonviolent Protests and Rioting	Police shooting of Keith Lamont Scott. <sup>16</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Capeci, Dominic J., and Martha Wilkerson. "The Detroit Rioters of 1943: A Reinterpretation." *The Michigan Historical Review* 16.1 (1990): 49.
- <sup>2</sup> Siemaszko, Corky. "Birmingham Erupted into Chaos in 1963 as Battle for Civil Rights Exploded in South." *NY Daily News*, 03 May 2012. Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/birmingham-erupted-chaos-1963-battle-civil-rights-exploded-south-article-1.1071793>>.
- <sup>3</sup> "Rochester Race Riot Timeline." *Independent Lens*. Public Broadcasting Service, Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/july64/timeline.html>>.
- <sup>4</sup> Flamm, Michael W. "Opinion | The Legacy of the 1964 Harlem Riot." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 15 July 2014. Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/opinion/16Flamm.html>>.
- <sup>5</sup> Queally, James. "Watts Riots: Traffic Stop Was the Spark That Ignited Days of Destruction in L.A." *Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles Times, 29 July 2015. Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-htmstory.html>>.
- <sup>6</sup> Mazzola, Jessica. "49 Years Later, Has the U.S. Learned Anything from the Newark Riots?" *NJ.com*, 12 July 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <[http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2016/07/49\\_years\\_later\\_has\\_the\\_us\\_learned\\_anything\\_from\\_th.html](http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2016/07/49_years_later_has_the_us_learned_anything_from_th.html)>.
- <sup>7</sup> Wyckoff, Whitney Blair. "Jackson State: A Tragedy Widely Forgotten." *NPR*. NPR, 03 May 2010. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126426361>>.
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- <sup>10</sup> Godfrey, Susan. "Not Much Has Changed, Says TyRon Lewis' Brother." *Tampa Bay Times*, 5 Feb. 2015. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/not-much-has-changed-says-tyron-lewis-brother/2216543>>.
- <sup>11</sup> Sakuma, Amanda. "How Cincinnati Learned from Riots in 2001." *MSNBC*. NBC Universal News Group, 30 July 2015. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-cincinnati-learned-its-2001-riots>>.
- <sup>12</sup> MacAskill, Ewen. "Oakland Riots after Verdict in Police Shooting of Oscar Grant." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 09 July 2010. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/09/oakland-riots-oscar-grant-shooting-verdict>>.
- <sup>13</sup> Vaidyanathan, Rajini. "Ferguson Riots: Ruling Sparks Night of Violence." *BBC News*. BBC, 25 Nov. 2014. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30190224>>.
- <sup>14</sup> Berlinger, Joshua. "Baltimore Riots: A Timeline." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 28 Apr. 2015. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-riots-timeline/>>.
- <sup>15</sup> Dzikowski, Jennifer. "Riots on the Streets of Milwaukee: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know." *Heavy.com*, 04 Sept. 2016. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://heavy.com/news/2016/08/milwaukee-riots-black-power-video-black-lives-matter-fire-photos-police-involved-shooting/>>.
- <sup>16</sup> Gordon, Michael. "Inside the 48 Hours That Shook Charlotte: As Rocks Flew, Riot Cops Fled for Safety." *Charlotte Observer*, 28 Oct. 2016. Web. 26 Apr. 2017. <<http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article111056262.html>>.

**Table 2: Comparison of Escalated Force and Negotiated Management Protest Policing Strategies**

	<i>Escalated</i>	<i>Negotiated</i>
<i>Major dimensions of protest policing</i>	Force	Management
<i>Concern for First Amendment</i>	Low	High
<i>Tolerance for community disruption</i>	Low	High
<i>Communication between police and protestors</i>	Rare	Frequent
<i>Use of arrests to control participants</i>	Frequent	Rare
<i>Use of force to control participants</i>	Frequent	Rare

**Source:** Rafail, Soule, and McCarthy (2012) and McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy (1998)

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## Chapter 3

In this chapter, I examine how attitudes toward the police differ on racial, gender, and generational lines. I discuss how whites and blacks largely disagree on perceptions toward law enforcement and explore why this phenomenon exists. Furthermore, I discuss how media narratives and academic literature ignore the roles of gender and age (and how they intersect with race) on this question of attitudes.

The importance of this discussion in the context of public assessments of police response to protests is that, ultimately, attitudes on police behavior have consequences. One such cost of negative attitudes is the loss of legitimacy and cooperativeness between the public and law enforcement (Tyler and Fagan, 2008). Examining these contemporary attitudes (especially those of black citizens) will assist in informing hypotheses in Chapter 3, as well as noting the overall status of the institution of policing and police behavior in 2016.

### **Race and Attitudes toward Law Enforcement**

Research finds disparate views on the police between blacks and whites (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000). Studies on the linkage between black and white attitudes on policing (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel, 2014; Brunson, 2007; Bradbury and Kellough, 2008; Wilkins and Williams, 2008) have found a sharp divide – with whites predominantly positive and blacks overwhelmingly negative toward law enforcement (Gamson and McEnvoy, 1970). Interestingly, others have found the opposite effect for blacks (Sims et al., 2002; Frank et al., 1996), confounding conventional wisdom on the relationship between racial attitudes and policing.

Police behavior has been an enduring focus of the American public for the past half-century (Benedict et al., 2000; Cao et al., 1996; Kaminski and Jefferis, 1998; Reisig and Giacomazzi, 1998; Thomas and Hyman, 1977). This has especially been the case for circumstances involving excessive force or “police brutality.” Visual images of police officer dogs, batons, and water hoses in the South, transported the matter into the living rooms of an entire nation during the advent of television in the 1950s and 60s. So, too, the beating of Rodney King and the proceeding riots after the exoneration of the participating police officers. Today, social media brings “brutality” to our fingertips, providing every American with a phone an opportunity to witness controversial police behavior and form an opinion regarding it. These incidents often lead to public outrage – demonstrations, riots, protests – requiring law enforcement to respond. Meanwhile, the cameras continue to roll, bloggers and journalists continue to write, opinion leaders speculate, and citizens consume it all - potentially impacting their perceptions (Brody and Shapiro, 1989).

Our dominant national meme frames citizen-police interactions as a racial struggle. The prevailing narrative is that majority white police agencies are disproportionately targeting young black men and women. Each new controversial incident serves to compound these negative perceptions, driving a gulf between blacks, whites, and the police departments that patrol their neighborhoods. Miller (1998) notes that residents of high crime neighborhoods *and* law enforcement *share* this perception – citing ten urban police chiefs who issued a statement in 1992 asserting that the “problem of excessive force in American policing is real” (151-152).

Accusations of excessive police force and brutality has created well-documented racial tensions between the police and black citizens (Websdale, 2001). Charges of racism and lack of “fairness” towards black Americans are widely discussed (Woo, 2015, *WIRED*). The belief that

young black men are far more likely to be stopped by the police has animated recent public debates about citizen-police interactions. Some scholars have found that the disproportionate effect of these stops on young black males is the result of racial framing and negative stereotypes (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014). These stops have been legitimated by scholars, politicians, and the courts. These institutions of power often use implicit messages and “intergroup bias” to target black citizens for crimes. As such, some argue that a “growing number of public policies undermine democratic equality” (16), and young blacks are socialized (through personal and community experiences) to believe that their lives do not matter, their rights may be compromised, and their anger is unwarranted.

Most blacks never personally encounter the police (Sharp & Johnson 2009). Instead of developing opinions based on personal encounters some scholars argue that their perceptions are formed based on how the people around them are treated or how the people around them claim to have been treated (Weitzer, 2002). This is called social-confirmation, and is defined as when second or third-hand accounts of citizen-government interaction influences attitudes. Among black adolescents, the influence of parents is highly connected to social-confirmation, as parental strategies are utilized to “buffer some of the cruel and demeaning messages black children receive” (Burt, 2009; Peters, 1990). Hughes & Chen (1999) and Marshall (1995) argued that parental life experiences with racism prompts them to have conversations with their children about race. These discussions are often predicated on external factors (for example, scholars have found that blacks who live in racially-diverse, as opposed to racially homogenous, neighborhoods are more likely to discuss racial antagonism). Social-confirmation is especially true for parents of young black men when discussing the police. The New York Times’ documentary “A Conversation with my Black Son,” highlights conversations where black

parents warn their sons about “*when* you get pulled over, not *if* you get pulled over,” and “every police officer is [not] inherently a bad person, but that institution does not look out for your best interest.”<sup>27</sup> Personally (and anecdotally), it is a conversation I once had with my own parents.

### **Gender, Age, and Attitudes**

Race is only one variable scholars tackle when discussing attitudes toward the police. The role of gender is also important. Nevertheless, taking race and gender as mutually exclusive properties has often left both white and (especially) black women out of focus in social scientific research. For instance, a major caveat to the media narrative on the disproportionality-of-stops between blacks and whites is the almost wholesale erasure of female experiences with the police. Its predominant focus on young black *men* tends to silence those interactions between the police and black women. Indeed, journalist Terrell Jermaine Starr asks the question, “Why is no one talking about black women abused by police?”<sup>28</sup> It is this failure to see police-citizen interactions through an intersectional<sup>29</sup> lens that has negatively impacted both journalistic reporting and academic scholarship.

On gender, we know that men and women have similarly divergent attitudes (as blacks and whites), and researchers have yet to definitively discover whether contact with the police explains these differences, too. Two things are for sure, women are less likely to encounter the

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<sup>27</sup> Foster, Geeta Gandbhir and Blair. “Opinion | ‘A Conversation With My Black Son’.” *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 17 Mar. 2015. Web. 04 May 2017. <[https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/opinion/a-conversation-with-my-black-son.html?smid=fb-share&\\_r=1](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/opinion/a-conversation-with-my-black-son.html?smid=fb-share&_r=1)>.

<sup>28</sup> Starr, Terrell J. “Why Is No One Talking about Black Women Abused by Police?” *The Week*. The Week, 07 Dec. 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Hankivsky (2014) writes, “According to an intersectionality perspective, inequities are never the result of single, distinct factors. Rather, they are the outcome of intersections of different social locations, power relations and experiences” (2).

Hankivsky, Olena. “Intersectionality 101.” *The Institute for Intersectionality Research & Policy, SFU* (2014): 2. Also, please see Chapter 3 for further discussion.

police than men and they have consistently more positive feelings toward law enforcement (Cao et al., 1996; Cheurprakobkit, 2000; Sims et al., 2002). Unfortunately, as with many social scientific research dependent upon survey data, these results largely report on white attitudes. As such, one might assume that the relative “warmth” or positivity directed by women toward law enforcement is largely a white female phenomenon. Similarly, while white men display “colder” feelings toward the police (driven perhaps by their increased probability of negative contact), their results do not mirror those of *black* men (who are traditionally the “coldest” group). Nevertheless, while scholars have spent a great deal of time on young black men (or black men in general), black women have received scant attention. This may be the result of assumption, as researchers often fail to disentangle the experiences of black men and women, therefore defaulting to narratives constructed around (and dominated by) men (Scott 1982, 85-90; hooks 2016).

Black women feelings toward law enforcement are built around two prevailing theories: their gender drives attitudes *or* their race drives attitudes. When gender is considered the dominant feature, absent data context, scholars might rely upon the “experience with the police” model – which posits that women’s relative lack of contact with police will drive-up their “warmth.” Conversely, the Feagin and Sikes’s (1994) “vicarious experiences” theory suggests that black women will be directed toward negative attitudes because of their proximity to black men (who speak of and experience more frequent negative encounters with police) (16). This proposes the dominance of race as a determinant of attitudes among black women. These approaches examine black womanhood as “separate systems” (blackness and womanhood) rather than exploring them as mutually constructed (Collins 2007, 63). Whether this separate identity approach is a good way of studying black women will be discussed in chapter 3. Nevertheless,

even within survey data, isolating out black women *from* black men (as well as white women from white men) may serve to identify just how determinant race or gender is to attitudes on law enforcement.

Age as a variable is also less accounted for, as the narrative presumes that *young* (especially young and black and male) people are more affected by law enforcement. Again, failing to broach the subject through an intersectional lens erases entire populations of people. In this case, older black Americans (particularly older black women) find their experiences are largely unknown.

Scholars have perhaps spent less time focusing on the nuances of race and age because the results are so strikingly *generational* when it comes to attitudes toward the police. For instance, countless studies have found that there is a significant linear relationship between age and attitudes toward the police (Reisig and Parks, 2000; Smith and Hawkins 1973). Younger citizens hold consistently less positive attitudes toward the police than older adults (Apple & O'Brien 1983, Hurst and Frank, 2000). Furthermore, Gamson and McEnvoy (1970) find a significant relationship between attitudes and “police violence,” noting that younger respondents have higher opposition. They are also more likely to perceive excessive police force, less likely to support aggressive police enforcement of laws, and more likely to be dissatisfied with how they are treated by law enforcement when encountered (Brown and Benedict, 2002; Jefferis et al., 1997; Weitzer, 1999).

Like gender, scholars have found racial discrepancies between black and white youth attitudes toward the police. However, it is not clear whether age is the *strongest* predictor of attitudes. While Levin and Thomas (1997) found that black college students were more likely than their white counterparts to perceive “violence and illegality on the part of arresting

officers,” Cordner et al.’s (1986) results show a significant divide among all students (regardless of color) and (presumably older) faculty on campus police evaluations. In short, the faculty were more favorable toward campus law enforcement. Some scholars believe the generational divide can be attributed to “youthful alienation” from police, due in large part to “lived experience of encounters with law enforcement, some of which include instances of excessive force” (Carr, Napolitano, and Keating 2007, 461). Again, there is a reliance on the “experience with the police” model, among white and black youths.

This is certainly a reasonable approach by scholars, particularly when assessing young *black* attitudes, as they are “dramatically more likely to be questioned and searched” by police, especially young black men (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014, 14). Brunson (2007) found that “frequent harassment and discourteous treatment were the most common forms of police misconduct” young black men reported, which contributed to “an accumulated body of unfavorable experiences that collectively shaped young men’s views of police” (95). These views promote mistrust and undermine the legitimacy of the police, which reinforce beliefs that young black respondents are more negative toward the police, particularly young black males.

Despite the hullabaloo surrounding police behavior (especially charges of excessive force), many whites fail to understand the black American experience. While these incidents do serve to make them more aware of (and sensitive to) excessive force, they are no more likely to lend credence to charges of pervasive racism in America, nor credit racial discrimination to the plight of black Americans (Sigelman et al., 1997). Indeed, white attitudes toward the police have been consistently positive (Benedict et al., 2000; Cao et al., 1996). Scholars have found that whites are less likely to perceive police behavior as violent or illegal (Levin and Thomas 1997, 582), and fail to discern race-prejudice during stops and searches (Bordua and Tifft, 1971).

## Hypotheses

Given that a preponderance of studies has found significant discrepancies between black and white attitudes toward the police, I hypothesize that black respondents will be significantly more negative (or “colder”) toward the police than white respondents (H1). These significant differences should also exist generationally, and I hypothesize that millennial respondents will be significantly more negative (“or colder”) toward the police than Generation Xers and Baby Boomers (H2). Furthermore, women will be significantly more positive (or “warmer”) toward the police than men (H3). I also hypothesize that black women will be significantly more positive toward the police than black men (H4).

H1) Black respondents will be significantly more negative (or “colder”) toward the police than white respondents.

H2) Younger respondents will be significantly more negative (“or colder”) toward the police than Older respondents.

H3) Women will be significantly more positive (or “warmer”) toward the police than men.

H4) Black women will be significantly more positive toward the police than black men.

## Methodology

### Sample

In this chapter, I examined the 2016 American National Elections Study (ANES) pilot dataset. According to its codebook, a simple, random sample of 1200 United States citizens were selected from a YouGov panel.<sup>30</sup> The sample was designed to match population demographics in the United States by gender, age, race, and education. Individuals from the YouGov panel were selected for the ANES Pilot Study to match the target population as defined by the American Community Survey, Current Population Survey, and Pew surveys (1). This study was conducted between January 22 through 28, 2016. Furthermore, after data was collected, the sample was weighted by YouGov using propensity scores.

Accounting for specific race exclusions,<sup>31</sup> this sample is comprised of 839 respondents. See the following tables to observe the demographical breakdown of the data – based on race, education, gender, age (birth year), partisan identification, and income.

(Table 1 here)

### Select Variables

This research operates within a racial dichotomy of black and white individuals. While I acknowledge that dichotomizing race is suboptimal – particularly with an ever-increasing Latino, Asian, and biracial population– this chapter’s focus primarily encompasses (and articulates) the black/white binary that has come to define racial politics in the United States since its founding. Thus, the exclusion of more nuanced racial demos is a deliberate attempt to emphasize *this*

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<sup>30</sup> YouGov is a third-party, online market research firm that cultivates a global online community of “panelists” to serve as sample data for researchers.

<sup>31</sup> Only blacks and whites were included. Latinos, Asians, and Indigenous people were excluded because their data was not necessary for this chapter.

history. As such, whites were coded as 0, blacks were coded as 1, and all other races and ethnicities were dropped from the dataset.<sup>32</sup> Dropping all other races and ethnicities formed the sample of 839 respondents (361 respondents were dropped). The gender variable was coded as males 0, females 1. Additionally, the age variable is continuous from the years 1946 to 2000.

Using OLS regressions, I tested the above hypotheses to determine if there are significant differences in “feelings toward the police,” between races, ages, and genders, as well as income, education, and partisan identification.<sup>33</sup> American National Election Studies (ANES) often asks respondents to share their feelings toward political leaders, people in the news, and prominent groups. It reads the name of a group and then asks respondents to rate that group using a “feeling thermometer.” Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that they feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that they do not feel favorable toward the group and that you do not care too much for that person. They would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if they did not feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. Here, the dependent variable is “feeling thermometer” scores of the police.

I systematically tested for violations of all assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In cases where the model failed to pass a test, I tried to solve the violation problem. Table 2 initially proved to have a specification error, with the Ramsey RESET test rejecting the null after I ran a regression on the original set of variables. The F statistic was quite significant ( $< .007$ ). According to Wooldridge (2008), this meant that the model did not properly account for the relationship between the dependent and the observed explanatory variables. Since misspecification was an issue, I needed to determine whether I had all the necessary variables for obtaining a functional relationship that fits the data well. As such, I suspected omitted variable

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<sup>32</sup> This dropped 361 respondents from the dataset.

<sup>33</sup> Please see the appendix for descriptive statistics table.

bias, and began including additional variables to the model. The only additional independent variable to “fix” the Ramsey test (allowing for a failure to reject the null) was the question of whether respondents felt that generations of slavery and discrimination accounted for the conditions of black Americans today. Respondents were asked if they strongly or somewhat agreed or disagreed (with strong agreement being 1 and strong disagreement being 5) with the statement. Including this variable in the model has some theoretical explanation, as Selmi (2016) finds a correlation between skepticism about contemporary discrimination and attitudes about police behavior (i.e. “discrimination skeptics” are less likely to see racial disparities in police behavior) (207-212).

I also tested for outlier influence using “*cooks*” and found none. This proved true in each of the models I tested, all of which share the same characteristics in terms of coding. Furthermore, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) showed no multicollinearity between independent variables, suggesting enough variation among categories to estimate their effects on feelings toward the police. Each model failed to reject the assumption of homoskedasticity. To test for this assumption, I used the White test, using the “*robust*” command, which calculates standard errors. After correcting for robustness, t-statistics remained significant. In each of the models, I also tested for normality. The Swilk test shows significance in every model, suggesting that the errors are normally distributed.

## **Findings**

The literature has shown that in the past four decades (since these questions began being asked), the gulf between black and white attitudes toward law enforcement has been vast. Indeed, these data show evidence that black respondents are significantly more negative (or

“colder”) toward the police than white respondents, consistent with Hypothesis 1 (H1). Table 2 displays an OLS regression on the dependent variable of feelings toward the police with race, gender, age, family income, education, and partisan identification as independent variables. Here, gender, age, and race all show statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ) relationships. On the race variable, black respondents show significant losses in “warmth” toward the police. When age is accounted for, increases in year of birth (1940-2000) decrease positive (or “warm”) feelings toward the police ( $p < .000$ ). There is a clear linearity between age and feeling as “coldness” grows when age decreases, while “warmness” diminishes in that same direction. This again comports with Hypothesis 2 (H2), that younger respondents are significantly more negative (“or colder”) toward the police than older respondents. Similarly, when the gender variable is female, we see significant increases in “warmth” toward police ( $p < .000$ ), confirming Hypothesis 3 (H3) that women are significantly more positive (or “warmer”) toward the police than men.

(Table 2 here)

Table 3 tells a familiar story, estimating the relationship between gender and age within racial groups. I do this to test whether black women are significantly more positive toward the police than black men (H4). In both racial contexts, isolating gender by race shows black *and* white women as warmer than their male counterparts. These differences are also statistically significant ( $p < .000$  for whites;  $p < .000$  for blacks) and confirm Hypothesis 3 (H3) and 4 (H4).

(Table 3 here)

In summary, Tables 2 and 3 show a familiar pattern on attitudes toward the police as it pertains to gender and age. They show that women (both black and white) have significantly more positive feelings toward the police, while men (both black and white) do not. Also, increases in birth year (from 1940 to 2000) show significant decreases in positive feelings toward

the police. This is true among black and white respondents. Furthermore, there is a significant decrease in positive feelings toward the police among black respondents overall, affirming findings from previous literature. These results suggest that the common narratives on attitudes toward the police were still relevant in 2016. While the analysis above estimates the relationship between gender, age, and race with attitudes toward police, the data-set above is limited in testing for another variable that researchers argue explains attitudes toward police. This is personal experience with the police.

### **Experience with the Police and Attitudes**

Beyond analyzing (and explaining) attitudes based on demographics, early researchers attempted to make sense of the racial disparity in attitudes toward law enforcement by linking them with *interactions* with the police. This is contrary to the social-confirmation theories. The *presumption* here was that because blacks are more likely than whites to interact with the police, and negatively perceived the encounter, this interaction effect colored their attitudes. Conversely, whites being less likely to have negative experiences with the police bolster their opinion of law enforcement (and its behavior). Indeed, this “experience with the police” model asserts that citizen satisfaction is predicated on prior contact, and it has been found that citizens who have been personally stopped by the police (for any reason) were more likely to rate them negatively (Smith et al, 1991; Bordua and Tuft 1971). Yet prior scholarship suggests that there is no such disparity between the races with rate of contact. Per other studies, there is *no* significant difference between whites and blacks in rate of stops or arrests (Jacob 1971; Erez 1984). It has been found that while blacks rely less on the content of the police interaction (i.e. whether the stop or arrest was perceived as bad behavior) to determine their attitudes toward law enforcement

(and the interaction), whites rely heavily upon individual police behavior to make judgments (Bordua and Tifft, 1971; Dean, 1980). In other words, for whites, the *substance* of the interaction matters.

Among blacks, charges of racial profiling (i.e. stop and frisk, as well as investigatory stops) have contributed to the compromised legitimacy of police authority, and resulted in the resurgence of black protest politics and unrest. The media have contributed to this development, too, as its framing of incidents such as the Michael Brown murder highlight repeated suspicions: white officers are serving majority black communities, white officers are killing black men, and the system is conspiring against justice for these dead black citizens. Acts of “unconventional dissent against the state” are the result of citizens believing these suspicions are true – and more fundamentally, that the system (i.e. criminal justice and law enforcement) is unfair and unresponsive (Muller, 1972; Shingles, 1981). For instance, Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel (2014) focus on the impact of investigatory stops by police – how they disproportionately affect young black males, are systematically “racially framed and grow from negative stereotypes,” and, most importantly to this research, establish a notion of second-class citizenship among black citizens (12 -15). That these policies excessively impact young black males only feed rationale for movements like Black Lives Matter and calls for criminal justice system reformation. Again, the Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) implication is that *contact* with officers erodes self-efficacy. It may not be a stretch to assume that this erosion also diminishes attitudes and legitimacy.

A popular media narrative is that these contacts between young black males and police officers, as well as the advent of movement organizations like Black Lives Matter, have contributed to lowered favorability for (or warmth toward) law enforcement. This narrative

argues that in recent decades, blacks (especially black men) have higher rates of stops and arrests than whites. Citing a study conducted by Ted Miller, principal research scientist at the Pacific Institute for Research, CNN's Jacqueline Howard writes, "Black people, Native Americans and Latinos were more likely to be stopped and arrested than whites and Asians."<sup>34</sup> Kim Soffen of the Washington Post states, "The fact that blacks get pulled over more than whites while on the road has long been a fact of American life."<sup>35</sup> These conclusions are taken for granted in reporting, because as Soffen notes, they are simply a fact of life in America.

Nonetheless, this disproportionality-of-stops narrative (and recent scholarship from the likes of Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014) directly contradict older national survey results (Jacob 1971; Erez 1984), as well as pushback from police-partisans in the media, who argue no significant differences in rate of stops and arrests between whites and blacks. This begs the question: Is it safe to assert that early studies and assertions made from police-partisans are simply outdated? This appears to be the case. After all, studies from earlier eras were conducted prior to the predominance of "broken windows" policing, which dramatically increased police presence in communities of color, presumably raising the probability of disproportionate stops and arrests.

### **"Broken Windows"**

Throughout American history, police departments have been accused of racism, corruption, profiling, and brutality toward black citizens (Johnson 2004). Scholars have done comprehensive work regarding treatment of black Americans on specific types of police

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<sup>34</sup> Howard, Jacqueline. "Police Acts of Violence Unbiased, Says Study." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 27 July 2016.

<sup>35</sup> Soffen, Kim. "The Big Question about Why Police Pull over so Many Black Drivers." *The Washington Post*. WP Company, 08 July 2016.

behavior, namely shootings, arrests, racial profiling, and excessive force. Critics of “broken windows” crime policies describe their impact as “concentrated,” disproportionately affecting predominantly black and brown neighborhoods because of legislative and bureaucratic conflation of “disorder,” “poverty,” and minority communities with crime (Fagan and Davies 2000). A tendency, mind you, shared by many Americans (Kluegel and Bobo 2001; Quillian and Pager 2001). As such, this “targeting” of minority communities, whether intentional or not, both reinforce widespread perceptions of racial profiling (and racial policing), as well as increase exposure of black and brown citizens to the police (Fagan and Davies 2000).

Community expectations also encouraged “broken windows” policies. Since the 1990s, public expectations of law enforcement have expanded. In addition to “protecting” and “serving,” police agencies have become an initial point of contact for community grievances and an organizing unit for city bureaucracies. Describing this expanded role for the Chicago police department, Skogan (2008) notes how officers now:

“Orchestrate neighborhood cleanups and graffiti paint-outs by volunteers and city workers, distribute bracelets that will identify senior citizens if they fall down, and take note of burned out street lights and trees that need trimming” (199).

Furthermore, officers field complaints from the public regarding a myriad of issues that law enforcement have not traditionally been responsible for handling (including “soft crimes” like soliciting, loitering, and public drinking). Skogan’s argument is derived from civil libertarian cries of “overpolicing,” Accordingly, the result of when officers encounter citizens for “soft crimes” (typically non-violent offenses like solicitation or drug possession) rather than merely protecting against violent and drug-related criminals, the disproportionate negative impact on black citizens (as well as their attitudes) increases.

The perception of racial profiling and over policing undermines police legitimacy among blacks. Consequently, the racial divide in public evaluation of law enforcement may have its roots in that very concept. In fact, perhaps crime rates do not actually determine public evaluation. Instead, *procedural justice* may determine performance assessments. Contemporary research has found that black people judge police performance based on whether they believe they have been treated fairly. Tyler (2001) cites a litany of findings, beginning with Thibaut and Walker (1975), to that effect. In his own piece, Tyler conducts two surveys, in which he interviewed residents of Chicago, Illinois, and Oakland, California, and finds that “people’s evaluations of the police are not linked primarily to their outcomes” (233). Minority group members are “focused on issues of quality of treatment,” and “this concern dominates over issues of performance” (Tyler, 2001, 233). People evaluate the police in terms of the fairness of the treatment they personally received (233).

Classic studies found that attitudes toward police are also based on local concerns (Walker and Waterman, 2008, 337; Wye 1943; Wilson 1964), in addition to contact with police, race, neighborhood, and age (Brown & Benedict 2002). For black Americans, high local crime rates in the 1970s and 80s created a political environment ripe for a drastic policy shift in policing. One that would disproportionately, negatively affect them. In New York City, for instance, political regime changes ushered in an era of decidedly aggressive policing strategies inspired by academia – most prominently, Wilson and Kelling’s *Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety* (1982). Their work keyed-in on neighborhood “disorder” as the principal culprit of spiking violent crime rates and low morale. They argued that disorder acts as a malignancy within a community, as it pushes residents away, traps and isolates those unable to relocate, and suffocates the life-force of a neighborhood – withering away its social capital. Most

importantly, disorder “begets an even broader range of problems and can, in short order, inundate an area with serious and victimizing crime” (Skogan, 2008). Xu et al. (2005) finds that disorder exerts a strong direct effect on both less serious and more serious crime. They also find that less serious crime, in turn, had a strong effect on more serious crime. Skogan (1990) argues that disorder affects a wide variety of community processes, from residents’ fear of crime to neighborhood decay to real estate prices. He also linked disorder to serious crime. As such, “disorder policing” was adopted to aggressively target lower-level offenses (for example, “squeegee” men began receiving citations and being arrested), and proponents credited it with the drop-in crime during the 1990s (Skogan, 2008; Kelling and Bratton, 1998). This despite minimal supporting evidence (Joanes, 2000; Karmen, 2000). Accordingly, police behavior morphed, and black citizen-police interactions *increased* astronomically.

Nevertheless, the existence of “broken windows” policies, as well as the ambiguity of results between Miller’s 2011 Police Public Contact Survey compel me to ask similar questions using 2016 national survey data. Do we see significantly different rates of stops and arrests between blacks and whites? And do these differences impact attitudes toward the police?

### **Hypotheses**

Testing the efficacy of the “experience with the police” model (and intersectionality), I hypothesize that black men will be significantly more likely than white men to be stopped, arrested, charged, jailed, and convicted (H5) and thus contact will impact attitudes (H7). Lastly, I hypothesize that black and white women will share no significant differences in rate of stops,

arrests, charges, being jailed, or convictions (H6). This would explain for their similar positive regard (in attitudes) toward the police.

H5) Black men will be significantly more likely than white men to be stopped, arrested, charged, jailed, and convicted.

H6) Black and white women will share no significant difference in rate of stops, arrests, charges, being jailed, or convictions.

H7) Contact with the police (stops, arrests, charges, being jailed, or convicted) will significantly impact attitudes toward the police.

### **Methodology**

Here, I examined the same 2016 American National Elections Study (ANES) pilot dataset as earlier in the chapter (839 respondents). I ran several crosstabs to establish outcome results. Once outcomes were found, I conducted a simple test of association. Using the chi-square-based Cramer's V, I tested the above hypotheses to determine the significance level of difference among the variables. I then ran a series of logistic regressions to test the "experience with the police" hypotheses.

Table 5 displays results from an ANES question asking whether the police had stopped a respondent in the past year. As shown, white males self-reported to being stopped more (35%) than black males (31%), though the Pearson chi-square ( $P < 0.692$ ) suggests the difference is insignificant.

(Table 5 here)

However, Table 6 shows that black men were arrested significantly more (Pearson chi-square = 7;  $P < 0.066$ ). Interestingly, rate of charges ( $P < 0.76$ ), having been jailed ( $P < 0.60$ ), convictions ( $P < 0.72$ ) were not significantly different between black and white men.

(Table 6 here)

These results show (at best) a mixed bag regarding contact with the police and race, and only partially confirm Hypothesis 5 (H5). The same story on stops exists for black and white women respondents (Table 7).

(Table 7 here)

The difference, however, is that black women were likelier to have been arrested (Table 8, Pearson chi-square = 6;  $p < .087$ ), jailed (Table 9, Pearson chi-square = 8;  $P < .049$ ), and convicted (Table 10, Pearson chi-square = 6.5;  $P < .090$ ). Failing to confirm Hypothesis 6 (H6).

(Table 8 here)

Nevertheless, a clear limitation of these data is the small sample size. Only a fraction of the 839 respondents either responded to the questions of being stopped, arrested, jailed, etc. or *had* been stopped, arrested, jailed, etc. For this reason, a larger sample will be needed to draw more definitive conclusions on these hypotheses.

Despite the smaller sample size, I tested those respondents who *have been* stopped, arrested, charged, jailed, or convicted (this sample was created by only including respondents who answered that they *had* been stopped, arrested, charged, jailed, or convicted in the past year and dropping all other responses), as it could provide a limited explanation on how interactions with the police affect attitudes (Table 11). Age was the only variable shown to have an impact on feeling scores toward the police. In fact, year of birth impacted feelings across the board, showing limited evidence for Hypothesis 7 (H7).

(Table 11 here)

This conclusion is echoed in Table 12, where interactions with the police (stopped, arrested, jailed, convicted) were included as independent variables in the model to test whether

experience affects attitudes (the whole respondent sample was included). Here, only having been jailed significantly impacted feelings toward the police.

(Table 12 here)

These results are mixed when considering the “experience with the police” model. They suggest that blacks and whites are stopped, arrested, charged, jailed, and convicted at similar rates, further begging the question why blacks have consistently more negative attitudes toward law enforcement. However, the glaring data limitation (relatively rare occurrences of stops, arrests, etc. among these respondents) renders these results as preliminary in nature, with a larger respondent sample a necessary component of future research.

## **Discussion**

Based on these results, there is reason to believe that race may not be the only determining feature of attitudes toward the police (although there is strong evidence to support assertions that race is important). Indeed, including other variables like gender and age, help to tell a more robust story. For example, there is evidence here to suggest that being female is positively associated with attitudes toward the police. Furthermore, being younger is consistently negatively associated with attitudes toward law enforcement. There is limited evidence that interaction with the police is significantly important toward attitude formation. Though as previously stated, these data may be biased by small-sampling size. Nevertheless, these results contradict the findings of Thomas and Hyman (1997), but comport with others who have found that attitudes toward law enforcement are regulated by “the social context in which the person is situated” (Cao, Frank, Cullen 1996). Both gender and age have been categorized as “social relational” contexts, defined as “any situation in which individuals define themselves in relation

to others in order to act” (Ridgeway and Correll 2004, 511). When these contexts are introduced, race is no longer the most significant indicator of attitudes. Yet for several reasons, it is difficult to fully accept these findings.

First, the ANES survey does not ask respondents to distinguish the *type* of interaction they experienced with law enforcement. Research has shown that blacks are more likely to be stopped for *investigatory* purposes (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014), particularly black men, which may not be contradicted by these data. Indeed, the implications of such findings is that the substance of the interaction matters, explaining for the discrepancy in attitudes among whites and blacks. Recent scholarship suggests that while being “pulled over,” whites and blacks have different experiences. While encountering police is a citizenship-affirming exercise for whites (bolstering their feeling of safety in a community “protected” by law enforcement), blacks suffer negative psychological effects (as stops serve to bolster their suspicions of being racially profiled and second-class citizenship) (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014).

Second, gender and age may simply provide nuance to a race story, instead of altogether usurping it. For example, black men *and* women are colder toward the police than white men. Yet, gender may explain why black women are far warmer toward law enforcement than black men, as they are less likely to be stopped for *investigatory* purposes (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Similarly, older respondent warm attitudes (even among blacks), despite not being significantly more likely than younger respondents to encounter police, may also be attributed to the substance of their interaction. All told, these results seem to confirm that it is not the encounter itself, but the substance of it, that determines attitudes toward law enforcement. An assertion that comports with Boggs and Galliher (1975).

I conclude that based on these results, the effect of age, gender, and race does not operate on separate planes, they intersect. That is, the experiences of a young, black woman cannot be assumed to align with an older, black man, nor does her blackness outweigh her age or womanhood in experience. These identities work in concert. More discussion on the intersection of age, gender, and race will come in the proceeding chapter.

That *substance* matters, suggests that it is not simply that law enforcement behaves (citizens expect as much), it is *how* they are behaving, and without fairness, public attitudes (particularly those within marginalized communities) sour. Yet because of bureaucratic discretion, police officers are given an immense amount of room to behave per their own instincts, precepts, rules, and biases, and the public is keenly aware of this reality. As such, expectations exist. Though the divergence of attitudes among race, gender, and age, suggest that these expectations operate on varying levels. Blacks have low expectations, because they perceive mistreatment at the hands of law enforcement (Bordua and Tifft, 1971; Dean, 1980). This means that their attitudes are cynical, they lack trust in the institution, and their tests of fairness in police behavior are heightened (Bordua and Tifft 1971). Research has already suggested that blacks almost automatically see *stops* as illegitimate, but what of other police behaviors? Well, these results appear to mirror with arrests (Carr, Napolitano, Keating 2007; Kaminski and Jefferis 1998), police interventions (Weitzer 1999), and shootings (Weitzer 2002).

Nevertheless, while it has been established that context and fairness matters when assessing police behavior, this dissertation is interested in how these measures intersect with police response to public protests. In other words, do blacks share similar cynicism toward police intervention within a response to unrest context? Are their actions perceived by blacks as fair or unfair based on the actions of the protests or do they matter at all? If age and gender

characteristics govern attitudes toward law enforcement within a general context, are they also influenced in specific instances of police behavior? Would age and gender also determine attitudes about police response to protests? These are a few questions I endeavor to answer in the proceeding chapter.

## Figures and Tables

*Table 1: Variable Demographics*

<b>Race</b>		<b>Gender</b>		<b>Income</b>	
Black	714 (85%)	Male	407 (49%)	Below Median Income	396 (47%)
White	125 (15%)	Female	432 (51%)	Above Median Income	357 (43%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>753</b>
<b>Age Cohort</b>			<b>Education</b>		
Baby Boomers			368 (44%)		
Generation Xers			206 (24%)		
Millennials			265 (32%)		
<b>Total</b>			<b>839</b>		
<b>Generations of discrimination have created conditions for black Americans today</b>			<b>Partisan Identification</b>		
Agree			330 (39%)		
Neutral			131 (16%)		
Disagree			375 (45%)		
(Skipped)			3		
<b>Total</b>			<b>839</b>		
			Democrat		
			332 (40%)		
			Independent		
			213 (25%)		
			Republican		
			294 (35%)		
			<b>Total</b>		
			<b>839</b>		

**Table 2: OLS Regression of Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Police (Gender, Age, Race, Income, Education, Partisan Identification, and Attitudes on Discrimination)**

VARIABLES	(1) Police Feeling Therm.
Female	<b>7.035***</b> (1.874)
Birth Year (1940-2000)	<b>-0.277***</b> (0.065)
Black	<b>-6.691**</b> (2.905)
Family Income	2.208 (1.947)
Post-Graduate Degree	0.025 (0.671)
Democrat	<b>-8.884***</b> (2.147)
Attitudes on Discrimination	<b>2.893***</b> (0.702)
Constant	599.494*** (129.152)
Observations	839
R-squared	0.141

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1

*Table 3: OLS Regression of Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Police by Respondent Race (Gender, Age, Income, Education, Partisan Identification, and Attitudes on Discrimination)*

VARIABLES	(1) Blacks	(2) Whites
Female	<b>11.425**</b> (5.632)	<b>6.266***</b> (1.977)
Birth Year (1940-2000)	<b>-0.722***</b> (0.209)	<b>-0.206***</b> (0.069)
Family Income	-5.304 (6.109)	2.888 (2.045)
Post-Graduate Degree	0.240 (2.202)	0.061 (0.698)
Democrat	<b>-16.192**</b> (7.493)	<b>-8.189***</b> (2.234)
Attitudes on Discrimination	0.241 (2.302)	<b>3.472***</b> (0.736)
Constant	1,488.739*** (415.408)	458.125*** (136.384)
Observations	125	714
R-squared	0.151	0.114

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1

**Table 4: Summary Statistics**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Feelings – Police	839	65.67	27.11	0	100
Stopped Ever	839	5.27	3.81	1	9
Arrested Ever	839	5.44	3.63	1	9
Charged Ever	839	5.46	3.60	1	9
Jailed Ever	839	5.47	3.59	1	9
Convicted Ever	839	5.46	3.61	1	9
Family Ever Stopped	839	5.28	3.81	1	9

**Table 5: Male Respondents Asked, "Have You Been Stopped in the Past Year?" by Race (Black and White)**

Race	Has	Never	Total
White	123 (35%)	50 (14%)	352
Black	17 (31%)	10 (18%)	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>407</b>

Pearson Chi-Square = 0.73 Pr = 0.692

**Table 6: Male Respondents Asked, "Have You Been Arrested in the Past Year?" by Race (Black and White)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Has</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Total</b>
White	58 (16%)	115 (33%)	<b>352</b>
Black	11 (20%)	15 (27%)	<b>55</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>407</b>

Pearson Chi-Square = 7 Pr = 0.066

**Table 7: Female Respondents Asked, "Have You Been Stopped in the Past Year?" by Race (Black and White)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Has</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Total</b>
White	86 (24%)	86 (24%)	<b>362</b>
Black	18 (26%)	22 (31%)	<b>70</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>432</b>

Pearson Chi-Square = 2.68 Pr = 0.444

**Table 8: Female Respondents Asked, "Have You Been Arrested in the Past Year?" by Race (Black and White)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Has</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Total</b>
White	22 (6%)	150 (41%)	<b>362</b>
Black	10 (14%)	30 (43%)	<b>70</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>432</b>

Pearson Chi-Square = 6.57 Pr = 0.087

**Table 9: Female Respondents Asked, "Have You Been Jailed in the Past Year?" by Race (Black and White)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Has</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Total</b>
White	19 (5%)	153 (42%)	<b>362</b>
Black	9 (13%)	31 (44%)	<b>70</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>432</b>

Pearson Chi-Square = 6.50 Pr = 0.090

**Table 10: Female Respondents Asked, "Have You Been Convicted in the Past Year?" by Race (Black and White)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Has</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Total</b>
White	14 (4%)	158 (44%)	<b>362</b>
Black	8 (11%)	32 (46%)	<b>70</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>432</b>

Pearson Chi-Square = 7.85 Pr = 0.049

**Table 11: OLS Regression of Police Feeling Thermometer Scores if Respondent Had Been Stopped, Arrested, Charged, Jailed, or Convicted**

VARIABLES	(1) Stopped	(2) Arrested	(3) Charged	(4) Jailed	(5) Convicted
Black	-8.950 (5.673)	-3.205 (8.564)	-15.866 (10.491)	-5.898 (11.066)	-7.924 (11.185)
Female	1.738 (3.753)	-5.183 (6.814)	-1.282 (8.153)	-9.043 (9.023)	-4.376 (7.925)
Birth Year (1940-2000)	<b>-6.856***</b> <b>(2.232)</b>	<b>-17.616***</b> <b>(4.003)</b>	<b>-12.949***</b> <b>(4.771)</b>	<b>-14.755***</b> <b>(5.213)</b>	<b>-11.757**</b> <b>(4.882)</b>
Family Income	-4.699 (3.844)	-11.106 (7.302)	-9.453 (8.410)	-12.302 (9.068)	-13.456 (8.617)
Post-Graduate Degree	-0.854 (1.285)	1.597 (2.501)	-1.374 (3.266)	-1.613 (3.683)	0.605 (2.823)
Democrat	3.442 (2.343)	5.152 (4.043)	5.603 (4.743)	1.443 (5.056)	3.890 (4.591)
Attitudes on Discrimination	<b>3.261**</b> <b>(1.388)</b>	0.615 (2.364)	0.524 (2.819)	0.366 (2.903)	-0.280 (2.838)
Constant	73.872*** (11.419)	110.330*** (18.434)	99.050*** (22.742)	120.238*** (24.227)	102.854*** (26.731)
Observations	212	87	68	62	72
R-squared	0.149	0.227	0.189	0.186	0.124

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1

**Table 11: OLS Regression of Police Thermometer Scores with Police Interaction (Stopped, Arrested, Charged, Jailed, or Convicted)**

VARIABLES	(1) Feelings toward Police
Black	<b>-8.872***</b> <b>(2.930)</b>
Female	<b>6.332***</b> <b>(1.895)</b>
Birth Year (1940-2000)	<b>-4.470***</b> <b>(1.117)</b>
Family Income	2.272 (1.973)
Post-Graduate Degree	0.137 (0.680)
Democrat	<b>2.040*</b> <b>(1.185)</b>
Attitudes on Discrimination	<b>3.549***</b> <b>(0.687)</b>
Stop ever	0.766 (2.616)
Arrested ever	0.679 (3.433)
Charged ever	7.494 (6.112)
Jailed ever	<b>-11.702**</b> <b>(5.488)</b>
Convict ever	2.970 (5.225)
Constant	57.189*** (6.330)
Observations	839
R-squared	0.132

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1

## Appendix

*Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics for Feelings toward Police*

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Blacks	125	52.7	29.63	0	100
Whites	714	67.93	26	0	100
Women	432	68.55	26	0	100
Men	407	62.6	27.7	0	100
Age	839	65.67	27	0	100

### *Other Variables*

#### *Race*

Whites were coded as 0, blacks were coded as 1

#### *Gender*

Males were coded as 0, females were coded as 1.

#### *Age*

The age variable is continuous from the years 1946 to 2000.

#### *Family Income*

While not a central focus of this chapter (which centers on the intersection of race, age, and gender), I use respondent household income to assist in bolstering (or undermining) theoretical assumptions regarding the impact of socioeconomic variables on attitudes toward the police. For instance, research indicates that income correlates with the neighborhood in which

one resides, as well as one's exposure to violent crime. Furthermore, low-income respondents who reside in low-income neighborhoods are also subject to increased police scrutiny. The converse applies to neighborhoods of relative wealth. Accordingly, low-income individuals ought to have a lower overall opinion of police and police conduct than those from higher income backgrounds. This variable is continuous.

### ***Education***

Respondents with a high school diploma or less were coded as 1. Those with some college, a 2-year degree, or a 4-year degree were coded as 2. Those who have a post-graduate degree were coded as 3. This variable was coded as such because previous research has shown that while attitudes grow sour toward the police *with* more education, the line between some college and a bachelors and being exposed to a post-graduate education is significant.

### ***Partisan Identification***

I collapsed the five partisan groups into three to make the lines clearer (and because there has traditionally not been much difference between a strong Democrat and somewhat Democrat respondent in survey results on police attitudes). As such, Democrats were coded as 0.

Independents were coded as 1. Republicans were coded as 2.

### ***Attitudes on Discrimination***

“Generations of slavery and discrimination accounted for the conditions of black Americans today.”

Strong agreement being 1, somewhat agreement 2, neutrality is 3, somewhat disagreement is 4, and strong disagreement is 5.

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## Chapter 4

In this chapter, I conduct a national survey experiment with black Americans, examining how black attitudes toward police responses to protests differ when analyzing them through an intersectional lens. The literature on black opinion, protests, and police response is limited, particularly within political science. When black attitudes *are* studied, they predominantly center on two explanations. First, contemporary black attitudes on the institution of policing are the result of decades of negative experiences under crime-control policies (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000). Second, black performance evaluations of the police are not, unlike whites, predicated on crime rates, but on *procedural justice*. Indeed, because of these factors, and because race is the best predictor of evaluations of police performance (Thomas and Hyman 1977, 77), distrust governs black attitudes on the police (Sharp and Johnson, 2009).

By extension, it is safe to assume that police response to public unrest is subject to more skepticism among black citizens (Sharp and Johnson 2009), an issue that has gone overlooked in the literature. Historically, whether violent or non-violent, civil resistance has been met with counter resistance from agents of government. Indeed, research on law enforcement has confirmed that policing agencies think strategically when responding to public unrest. Consequently, their conduct is the byproduct of bureaucratic considerations, understanding the wide-ranging perceptual repercussions of agency response within the public sphere. Vitale (2005) writes, “How police departments choose to handle large demonstrations can have profound implications for police-community relations...” (284). This is also true of the institution of policing, as its legitimacy and authority relies on public confidence and cooperation (Goldsmith 2005; Levi et al. 2009; Mawby 2010; Reiner 2010). Alas, black initiated protests

have been found to be significant predictors of arrests (Rafail et al. 2012, 751), further supporting assumptions about negative black attitudes and police response to unrest.

### **Police Presence in Communities of Color**

Increased police presence in communities of color has created conditions for perceived acts of police misconduct and resulting protests. “Broken windows” policies often lead to incidents of gross police misconduct (i.e. the killings of unarmed black men and women). Consequently, the issue of “illegitimate” (or unlawful) police conduct impacts attitudes (Brown, 2013), and anger among many blacks, because of this conduct, has exploded into movement outrage. Because of each new racialized citizen-police interaction, many take to the streets to express their discontent, and these moments of unrest often require law enforcement response. Indeed, it has been found that black initiated protests are also more likely to attract police presence (Rafail et al. 2012).

Inherent to police authority is the “legitimate” use of force to curb crime and disorder. Citizens rely upon law enforcement to stamp out criminal activity, civil nuisance, and mob violence. Police agencies are expected to adhere to (and serve) these public needs, and their performance evaluations are often predicated on crime rates. When police actions lower the level of crime in a community, public performance evaluations reflect their work (Tyler, 2001, 216). Still, public reaction to law enforcement is often the byproduct of highly publicized events of police *misconduct* (Weitzer 2002). When a resulting incident of civil unrest occurs, a police department is expected to respond and reestablish order. Its decisions and reactions are important, because they may have an impact on how the public evaluates the agency. Based on the literature (and history of antagonism), one might assume that regardless of *how* police

respond to unrest, blacks will consistently assess it as inappropriate (or “illegitimate”). The “legitimacy” of their crime-reduction tactics has evolved over time, but the real consequences of police conduct have racial implications. Nevertheless, blacks are found to be *more* supportive of *legal* (or lawful) use of deadly force by police than whites. It is *illegal* use of deadly force that is cause for their concern (Cullen et al 1996). Admittedly, these findings preceded viral social media coverage of police misconduct, and with the advent of movement organizations like Black Lives Matter, may prove to be outdated. As such, the more contemporary questions are whether blacks *will* support police conduct that results in the use of deadly force in protest situations and/or *when* might they support this conduct? For example, when demonstrations turn violent, might a violent response from law enforcement be perceived as lawful? Conversely, given nonviolent demonstrations, might blacks feel that nonviolence is the only appropriate police response? Unfortunately, existing research does not answer these questions, as *broad* black attitudes on police has dominated scholarly attention. Furthermore, questions about when intraracial attitudes diverge as they relate to police conduct have also received scant attention. Fortunately, using interdisciplinary theory will assist in my attempt to thoroughly answer these questions.

### **Intersectionality**

Intersectionality theory describes the “mutually constitutive,” “reinforcing,” and “naturalizing social identities held by an individual” (Shields 2008). Its theoretical origin is in feminist thinking, as Crenshaw (1995) articulates a concept of *political intersectionality*, or the inherent conflict between the different and often conflicting needs of the respective groups of which one identifies (Shields 2008, 301). Crenshaw (1995) focuses on black women and their political Catch-22, being forced to divide their efforts between fighting patriarchy and toppling

racism, and how focusing on one identity over the other does not sufficiently explain the plight of the black female experience. Indeed, Collins (1990; 2000) argues that gender cannot be analyzed without contextualizing the social location of an individual (i.e. socioeconomic status and age), and the “power relations embedded in social identities” (Shields 2008, 301). In other words, the experiences of an upper middle-class black woman Baby Boomer will not necessarily mirror that of a working-class black woman Millennial. Only by acknowledging the fact that class-status intersects with race (and influences experiences) might one understand the full story. This is also a central tenet of this dissertation. Since Crenshaw’s work, intersectionality has become the most important contribution to feminist thinking about gender (McCall 2005).

Unfortunately, this theory has not been fully embraced by all social sciences.

Intersectionality has proved a mainstay in sociological analyses, and perhaps by this very fact, has been somewhat avoided in other disciplines (Shields 2008). This includes political science. Yet, many political scientists risk losing insight as we continue to tackle issues of race, gender, and class. For example, without an intersectional lens, scholars using unclear categorical racial lines (while more easily quantified), often provides race with more substantive meaning than it merits (Helms et al, 2005). Similarly, Bograd (1999) posits that focusing solely on gender regarding intimate partner violence, as opposed to including more social identities, weakened empirical studies on the subject. Chiefly, I intend to avoid these results in this dissertation, hence my incorporation of intersectional theory.

Using an intersectional lens is important for this research because it allows this dissertation to reach beyond broad assumptions about black attitudes, and “see things from the worldview of others and not simply from our own unique standpoints” (Walker 2003, 991).

Here, highlighting the intersectional impact of gender and age may provide a more in-depth explanation of “black attitudes” regarding police conduct, particularly their response to protests.

Indeed, differing policing behaviors, historical context, and the demographic makeup of the population shapes public perceptions. Nevertheless, because studies tend to examine black attitudes toward law enforcement on instances of police shooting, arrests, stops, and excessive force, feelings about police responses, especially regarding how they respond to public protests, are less understood. This is only exacerbated by the reality that research in political science tends to ignore an intersectional lens.

### **Theory and Hypotheses**

The primary goal of this experiment is to see if police behavior changes attitudes. As such, the anticipated negative reaction to violent responses to nonviolent demonstrations assumes that violent state-sanctioned actions will be triggering and alarming to black respondents, as images of police violence against nonviolent civil rights activists are easily recalled. Conversely, I assume that nonviolent responses to nonviolent demonstrations are the most acceptable scenario, as empathetic (to the demonstrations) black respondents will require (and deem appropriate) a more nuanced and muted reaction from law enforcement. Therefore, I hypothesize that violent police responses to nonviolent demonstrations as compared to nonviolent responses to violent demonstrations will have a negative experimental effect on respondents’ measure of appropriateness.

Furthermore, as I explore earlier in this chapter, black attitudes are too often measured as a monolith. Intersecting characteristics within the black community are given short-shrift. Nevertheless, if the results of the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey, race and ethnicity scholarship, and intuition have substantive merit, intersectional characteristics are

important distinctions to consider when measuring black attitudes on police response to protest, as these views cannot be assumed to be homogenous. My theory is rooted in the assumption that, when considering individual characteristics, attitudes about specific responses will differ. These hypotheses suppose that the theory of intersectionality will shed a more sophisticated light on black attitudes within this context.

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Respondents will assess violent responses to nonviolent demonstrations as less appropriate than nonviolent responses to nonviolent demonstrations.

**Hypothesis 2 (H2):** Respondents will assess nonviolent responses to violent demonstrations as more appropriate than violent responses to violent demonstrations.

Less curiously, scholars have found that age is positively related to confidence in police (Correia et al 1996). Older folks are less distrusting of the police (Sharp and Johnson 2009, 172). Younger citizens (and juveniles under the age of 18) hold less positive attitudes toward the police than older adults (Apple & O'Brien 1983, Scaglione & Condon 1980, Hurst and Frank, 2000). Waddington & Braddock (1991) studied fifty-four black, white, and Asian adolescent boys who had interacted with police. Overwhelmingly, black adolescents described police as “bullies.” These views promote mistrust and undermine the legitimacy of the police, which suggest that young black respondents will hold antagonistic attitudes toward the police, regardless of the circumstances. On the other hand, older blacks’ more entrenched community stakes render them more in favor of law enforcement, as they act as a mechanism for maintaining order. Because older respondents are assumed to have higher confidence in, more trust in, and warmer feelings toward the police, law enforcement responses to demonstrations may be deemed as more legitimate means of force, especially when the protests are violent. As such, my

hypothesis assumes a negative reaction to the experimental effect of violent responses (as compared to nonviolent responses) among younger survey respondents.

**Hypothesis 3 (H3):** The negative effect of violent police responses to violent demonstrations will be stronger among younger respondents than among older respondents.

The opposite should be true among older respondents, as they are more likely to deem law enforcement actions as legitimate. Furthermore, the assumption is that older respondents have a greater stake in community stability (theoretically having more ties to community leadership, as well as investments in properties and businesses). As such, when demonstrators violently threaten order, older respondents may expect police to *act*, by embracing aggressive (or violent) tactics to restore it. Nonviolent responses to violent demonstrators may look too ineffectual. Therefore, nonviolent police responses to violent demonstrations as compared to violent responses to violent demonstrations will have a negative effect on older respondents' measure of appropriateness.

**Hypothesis 4 (H4):** The negative effect of nonviolent police responses to violent demonstrations will be stronger among older respondents than among younger respondents.

Research findings on the impact of gender on attitudes toward the police have vacillated between more positive female attitudes (suggested as the result of fewer interactions with the police and higher fear of crime) (Cao et al., 1996, Cheurprakobkit, 2000, Sims et al, 2002) and no significance (Frank et al., 1996, Ren et al., 2005). Most studies have failed to look specifically at black *women*, presumably because scholars assume little to no significant differences between their attitudes and those of black men. Furthermore, as described in Chapter 2, even while interactions between black women and law enforcement are *relatively* (though not significantly)

fewer than those of black men, researchers have claimed that “vicarious” experiences – or the perception of pervasive racism from authority figures – often imbue attitudes within the black community. In other words, black men sharing their experiences with black women (whether real or imagined) has a ripple effect of “anguish and anger” among blacks (Feagin and Sikes, 1994, 16). On face, this concept has merit. Nevertheless, national survey results show black women mirroring that of white women in general “feelings” toward law enforcement. Results show that women are less cold toward the police than men. In fact, the black women surveyed were almost as “warm” toward the police as *white men* (who have more interactions with the police than black women), suggesting the interaction effect (their womaness) may be more powerful than the vicarious experiences (their blackness). These feelings (and lack of interaction), perhaps, provide law enforcement with more legitimacy and trustworthiness with black women, even in times of social unrest. This may indicate more receptive attitudes toward law enforcement, and at the very least, higher levels of belief in the legitimacy of police actions. In this case, restoring order by violent means when demonstrations are violent. I therefore hypothesize that nonviolent responses to violent demonstrations as compared to violent responses to violent demonstrations will have a negative effect on female respondents’ measure of appropriateness.

Black men, however, are a unique sample, because by every measure, law enforcement actions disproportionately affect them. The prevailing narrative is that they are excessively targeted. Each new incident of violence between police and black men serves to compound these negative perceptions, driving a gulf between black men and the police departments that patrol their neighborhoods. Racial profiling is a controversial matter within the public discourse, as charges of racism and lack of “fairness” against the police are widely discussed (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001). These conditions animate my hypothesis that regardless of whether

demonstrations are violent or nonviolent, there will be a more negative response to violent police responses among male respondents. In short, the nature of the protest or the police response should not matter. In fact, black men (especially young black men) ought to be the surliest and most skeptical group within the sample.

**Hypothesis 5 (H5):** The negative effect of violent police responses to violent demonstrations *and* nonviolent police responses to nonviolent demonstrations will be stronger among male respondents than among female respondents.

**Hypothesis 6 (H6):** The negative effect of nonviolent police responses to violent demonstrations will be stronger among female respondents than among male respondents.

### **Experimental Design and Data**

To test these questions, I conducted a 2 x 2 full factorial experimental survey in which the experimental factors were 1) the type of demonstration (violent or nonviolent) and, 2) the type of police response to the demonstration (violent or nonviolent). My sample was comprised of 684 black American adults who were recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI),<sup>36</sup> using the following conditions: the sample must include relatively equal representation by gender (male and female), as well as age (Millennials, Generation Xers, and Baby Boomers), as graphed below.

The survey was hosted on Qualtrics and the protocol proceeded as follows: (1) an invitation to participate in the survey experiment. SSI was directed to assemble a panel comprised only of black Americans from within the United States. They were also instructed to

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<sup>36</sup> Survey Sampling International “reaches participants in 90+ sample countries via internet, telephone, mobile/wireless and mixed-access offerings. SSI offers samples, data collection, questionnaire design consultation, programming and hosting, online custom reporting and data processing.” Its online sample is “controlled by a suite of quality-control procedures including an extensive Partner Certification Program, digital fingerprinting, IP-verification, methodologically sound profiling, built in quality control questions, and strict reward claims verification procedures.” Marketing, SFA. "Survey Sampling FAQs." *SSI - Survey Sampling International*. Web. 19 Apr. 2017.

recruit relatively equal numbers of men, women, Baby Boomers, Generation Xers, and Millennials (2) respondent identification of personal characteristics, including gender, household income, zip code, partisan identification, level of education, and year of birth. Respondents were asked to provide these descriptors for several reasons. First, an analysis of gender and year of birth could not be conducted without this information. Second, using an intersectional lens compelled me to inquire about respondent socioeconomics. For example, income and level of education may also be important factors to consider when analyzing attitudes toward the police. Here I focus on age and gender but I do intend to use these data collected in future research (3) a request to answer feeling thermometer questions on “the Democratic Party,” “the Media,” “the Police,” “Planned Parenthood,” “Black Lives Matter,” and “Wall Street” (4) prompt for respondent, describing the survey process (5) respondents were then randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups (see table 2) and then provided with a (7) written description of a protest incident (see descriptions below), along with a (8) corresponding image. Use of images were designed to give visual, complimentary aid to the written description. Selection of these images were carefully made to follow as closely as possible with the written description without prejudicing the respondent with familiar faces or events. Therefore, for example, no images were used from the incidents in Ferguson or Baltimore. Nevertheless, they were not chosen for their subtlety, as the pictures capturing police and protestor violence are stark. Ultimately, I chose to use images because they are effective and influential experimental tools (Barker and Milivojevic 2016, 183). Furthermore, Brader’s (2005) study on the role of emotion in political advertising, suggests that images (particularly pictures) are good tools for encouraging emotional responses in survey experiments. After respondents had a chance to read the description and view the image, they were asked to give an (9) assessment of the initial response to the protests

made by law enforcement in the description and then provide a further (10) assessment of a range of potential nonviolent and violent responses by law enforcement.

Once respondents were randomly assigned to the baseline group or a treatment group, they were asked to read one of four corresponding prompts (effects have been bolded and italicized):

1. This afternoon, a large group of demonstrators took to the streets in force, upset by a recent police-related incident in which a deputy police officer killed an unarmed black youth. For hours, demonstrators have loudly demanded that the officer be arrested, ***chanting slogans, singing songs, forming a human-wall around city hall, and blocking traffic in the downtown area***. In response, law enforcement ***employed impact weapons, batons, tear gas, and rifles to quell the demonstrations and make arrests*** (NV).
2. This afternoon, a large group of demonstrators took to the streets in force, upset by a recent police-related incident in which a deputy police officer killed an unarmed black youth. For hours, demonstrators have loudly demanded that the officer be arrested, ***throwing rocks and bottles into the windows of city hall, flipping parked cars in the downtown area, as well as assaulting responding law enforcement with street debris***. In response, law enforcement ***employed impact weapons, batons, tear gas, and rifles to quell the demonstrations and make arrests*** (VV).
3. This afternoon, a large group of demonstrators took to the streets in force, upset by a recent police-related incident in which a deputy police officer killed an unarmed black youth. For hours, demonstrators have loudly demanded that the officer be arrested, ***throwing rocks and bottles into the windows of city hall, flipping parked cars in the downtown area, as well as assaulting responding law enforcement with street debris***. In response, law enforcement ***attempted to interact with the leaders of the demonstration, negotiating demands, and gaining cooperation through facilitation*** (VN).
4. This afternoon, a large group of demonstrators took to the streets in force, upset by a recent police-related incident in which a deputy police officer killed an unarmed black youth. For hours, demonstrators have loudly demanded that the officer be arrested, ***chanting slogans, singing songs, forming a human-wall around city hall, and blocking traffic in the downtown area***. In response, law enforcement ***attempted to interact with the leaders of the demonstration, negotiating demands, and gaining cooperation through facilitation*** (NN).

## Variables

Once respondents were exposed to their treatment scenario, they were asked to provide an initial assessment of the police response. Survey respondents were to assess, per the written description and visual images,<sup>37</sup> whether the police acted appropriately or inappropriately, in accordance with a five-point range of possible responses (*strongly inappropriate* is 1; *somewhat inappropriate* is 2; *neutral* is 3; *somewhat appropriate* is 4; *strongly appropriate* is 5). This range functions as my dependent variable throughout the survey. Highlighted potential modifiers of the experimental effects include gender (male = 0; female = 1) and year of birth or age (continuous from 1940 to 2000). Other independent variables include income (ordinal scale), partisan identification (ordinal scale), and level of education (ordinal scale).

After their initial response (IR), respondents were then tasked with assigning a level of appropriateness or inappropriateness to a slate of possible violent and nonviolent responses to their protest scenarios. The five-point range of responses applied to these tactics as well. Please see Table 4 for description of these responses.

(Table 4 here)

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<sup>37</sup> Descriptions of the visual images are as follows:

NV – Visual of multi-racial protestors locking arms peacefully marching down a street, along with images of police officers in riot gear, shooting tear gas from behind riot shields at protestors.

VV – Visual of mostly shirtless, black males in a semicircle, setting street debris ablaze, along with images of police officers in riot gear, shooting tear gas from behind riot shields at protestors.

VN - Visual of mostly shirtless, black males in a semicircle, setting street debris ablaze, along with an image of a bicycled police officer of color peacefully conversing with two black protestors who are wearing, “Am I Next” t-shirts.

NN - Visual of multi-racial protestors locking arms peacefully marching down a street, along with an image of a bicycled police officer of color peacefully conversing with two black protestors who are wearing, “Am I Next” t-shirts.

## Results

### Initial Response

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the four groups. The baseline treatment of “nonviolent (demonstration)/nonviolent (response)” assumes most demonstrator-law enforcement interactions are reflective of this treatment (particularly in this age of “negotiated management” and “strategic incapacitation” approaches to public demonstrations). The baseline assumption is that nonviolent responses to nonviolent demonstrations is face-acceptable across the board. Interestingly, the mean response in the baseline group is 3.18, a surprisingly low level of approval for the nonviolent response. Yet, as expected, the most problematic of the four groups (nonviolent protests and violent police responses) shows the lowest mean approval of 2.21, an intuitive result which I hypothesized (the violent protest/violent response mean was also low at 2.98 – though not significantly lower than the baseline group).

(Table 3 here)

Figure 1 displays the mean appropriateness scores for each treatment group with 95% confidence intervals. This figure is used to determine if the initial police response to the prompt in each group was different for groups with violent responses. Respondents were classified into four groups: the baseline of nonviolent protest and nonviolent response (n = 165), violent protest and violent response (n = 164), violent protest and nonviolent response (n = 163), and nonviolent protest and violent response (n = 165). As shown, there was a statistically significant difference between groups. It is revealed that there is a statistically significant decrease in appropriateness in the nonviolent/violent response group compared to the baseline group. This suggests that the violent treatment had an impact on “appropriateness,” especially in the expectedly “problematic”

group of NV. However, there were no statistically significant differences between the violent/violent response and violent/nonviolent response. Indeed, while the former (VV group) is not statistically significant, it does move in the negative direction away from the baseline group and reduce “appropriateness” of response. These results (while not statistically significant) suggest that the violent treatment could be having a negatively effect.

(Figure 1 here)

### **Intersectional Appropriateness**

So far, initial analyses of the violent treatment on violent and nonviolent demonstrations suggest black respondents are less likely to support violent police responses. Using an intersectional lens, which suggests that differences do exist among black men and women, as well as older and younger, further analysis of police responses reveal that (on the initial response measure), gender was not a significant indicator of differences of “appropriateness,” but age was. To measure potential differences based on gender and age on the initial response, an OLS regression was conducted to determine reaction to the initial police response to the prompt in the baseline and treatment groups. Table 6 show the effects of police responses in the NV group, as well as significant decreases in appropriateness when controlling for age.

(Table 6 here)

Figure 2 shows the insignificant differences in predicted appropriateness ratings of the initial response among black men and women.

(Figure 2)

Figure 3, however, shows the significant differences between Baby Boomers and Millennials in each of the treatment groups.<sup>38</sup> When the police response was nonviolent, Boomer ratings average around 3.5 on the five-point scale. Millennial ratings hover around 3. Among both groups, appropriateness drops when the police response was violent. But this drop is quite significant among Millennials. This suggests that the younger generation showed less approval when the police response is violent.

(Figure 3)

### **Violent and Nonviolent Police Responses**

This segment of the survey was designed to give respondents an opportunity to, especially if they disagreed with the initial police response, share their own feelings about what would be appropriate and what would not be an appropriate response to their prompt. This part of the experiment is being used to compliment the initial response results, telling us a little more about how *specific* types of police behavior can impact respondent attitudes.

To test how specific responses are measured (on the scale of appropriateness), I first categorized ten distinct police responses, as collected from Young (2012) and the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (2012), two sources which outline contemporary police strategies for crowd management, intervention, and control. These

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<sup>38</sup> Generation categories were broken up like such: Baby Boomers were respondents born between 1946-1964; Generation Xers were born between 1965-1982; Millennials were born between 1983-2004.

Bump, Philp. "Here Is When Each Generation Begins and Ends, According to Facts." *The Atlantic*. The Atlantic Magazine, 25 Mar. 2014.

responses were described in the source texts as either “hard” or “soft” responses, words used synonymously with “violent” and “nonviolent” or “aggressive” and “passive.” In this chapter, I use “violent” and “nonviolent” for categorization (mostly because these terms are clearer than “hard” and “soft”). The range of responses can be seen on Table 4.

(Table 4 here)

After categorization, OLS regressions were conducted to determine reaction to the violent and nonviolent police responses with age and gender interaction terms. Also, I illustrate mean appropriateness scores (highlighting gender and age) for each individual violent and nonviolent police response with 95% confidence intervals.

I first analyzed violent police responses (V1-V5) and gender. There were several significant differences between men and women on the violent responses (V1-V5) (see Table 7), where use of batons and bats (V2), deadly force (V3), pepper spray (V4), and arrests (V5), showed significant decreases in appropriateness for black women.

(Table 7 here)

Figure 4 illustrates that black women were consistently more likely than black men to measure these responses as less appropriate. This is true when protests were violent and nonviolent. Nevertheless, both men and women were likelier to deem these responses as inappropriate on the scale of appropriateness (no response rated above neutral/ambivalence for either group) (V1-V5).

(Figure 4 here)

Next, I analyzed violent police responses when considering age, where there were no significant ratings changes in the ‘violent’ responses variables (V1-V5) (see Table 8). Initially, this led me to believe that there was less generational distance among black respondents than I anticipated. Nevertheless, determining reaction to *specific* violent responses, significant

differences between Boomers and Millennials became more apparent. For instance, with “use of batons, riot control sticks, and bats” (V3), age mattered.

(Table 8 here)

Figure 5 (V2) shows the predicted changes in appropriateness ratings between Millennials and Boomers. Here, a change in predicted ratings when protests were violent, where Boomers were more likely to rate “use of batons, etc.” as more appropriate than Millennials. These results suggest that older respondents were more likely to indicate that this response was more appropriate in violent protest situations (there are no significant differences when the protests are nonviolent). That said, while differences between Millennials and Boomers are significant here, it is still a violent response (V2) that mustered (at best) a neutral/ambivalent response from these respondents. It cannot be stated that either group (Millennials or Boomers) deemed this response as “appropriate” overall.

(Figure 5 here)

Once violent police responses were measured, I then moved on to non-violent police responses, to gauge what impact (if any) they may have when highlighting the gender and age variables. As such, another OLS regression was conducted to determine reaction to the nonviolent responses (NV1-NV5) in each group. I first look at gender, where Table 9 shows significant results.

(Table 9 here)

Figure 6 shows a change in predicted appropriateness ratings for each of the responses. Overwhelmingly, there were few significant differences between men and women. Where these differences do exist, black men were more likely to skew toward neutral/ambivalence than black women (in both violent and nonviolent protest situations) (NV1, NV3, and NV5).

(Figure 6 here)

In Figure 7, when protests were violent and nonviolent, Millennials were significantly less supportive of nonviolent police responses (NV1-NV5). These results are confounding. As this suggests that Millennials are more likely to deem nonviolent responses as ‘inappropriate.’ These counterintuitive results may expose a limitation. The measure of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘inappropriateness’ may not fully capture a respondents’ reaction to the specific response. When protests are violent, an “inappropriate” reaction to nonviolent reactions could just mean that the respondent did not feel the response was *enough* of a response. In this study, perhaps Millennials had more complicated reactions to the potential police responses. For instance, if a young person did not believe the nonviolent response was enough of a response to violent protests, it does not mean they would support more violent means (like using pepper spray or dogs) against protestors. This could simply indicate that there is a nuance to the story that needs to be explored. It may mean that attitudes are difficult to reduce to either/or feelings. It may be folly to dichotomize reactions to complicated incidents.

(Figure 7 here)

Furthermore, the labelling of “violent” and “nonviolent” was largely police agency categorization. Broadly, I organized response labels as closely to police definitions as possible. I borrowed the litany of responses from Young (2012) and the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (2012), two sources which outline contemporary police strategies for crowd management, intervention, and control. The issue – as it relates to young black Millennials – is that POLICE Magazine’s (which is where Young’s piece was published) characterization of the responses could be out of touch. While it considers something like making ‘verbal commands,’ a nonviolent or “nonviolent” response to protestors, young black

Millennials could perceive those responses as “violent,” and thus be as inclined to deem it an inappropriate police endeavor. Future qualitative research (such as interviewing young black Millennials) could be used to scrutinize the efficacy of these labels among certain groups.

## **Discussion**

An analysis of these results reveal support for three of my hypotheses (H1-H3), while H4-H6 were not supported. This experimental study suggests several dispositions among black respondents. First, overwhelmingly, even accounting for age and gender, real opposition from black respondents comes when police respond violently to nonviolent protests. A result that comports with H1. There was simply no support for hardline, violent responses against demonstrators. An unsurprising result, given that this experiment did not exist in a vacuum, and most of these respondents had been exposed to the pervasive race-police politics of the past few years. Perhaps at play is Weitzer and Tuch’s (2005) “group-position thesis,” which argues that racial identity salience determines respondent’s level of open-mindedness as it relates to the police. Howell and Perry (2004) also note that higher racial salience is linked to more antagonism toward the police and their behavior. Accordingly, police departments ought to be keenly aware that their actions do impact the attitudes of black citizens, particularly when police responses to protests are perceived as violent or aggressive.

Furthermore, using an intersectional lens reveals some divergence within this respondent sample. Though respondents were more antagonistic toward violent police responses to nonviolent protests, there are results that suggest that attitudes on police response is conditional on the nature of protest. For example, older respondents were sometimes significantly likelier than younger respondents to deem violent police responses to violent protests as more

appropriate. Similarly, black men were (at the very least) more ambivalent about use of violent responses when demonstrations are violent. In other words, tolerance of police violence was contingent upon whether or not the respondent was older or male and whether or not the experimental protestors were violent.

Also, throughout the assessments, age divergence exists. For older black respondents, there is a preference for nonviolent response tactics when demonstrations are nonviolent, and less antagonism toward nonviolent responses when unrest turns violent. This defies H4, as older respondents were far likelier to score nonviolent responses to violent demonstrations as “strongly appropriate.” On the other hand, older respondents were also far likelier than young respondents to accept violent (or violent) responses when demonstrations were violent. As such, older respondents simply display a greater preference for nonviolent solutions. Nevertheless, young respondents do not show a preference for either form of response (perhaps a reflection of their colder feelings toward the police from the outset). They were, however, more receptive to nonviolent responses to both violent and nonviolent demonstrations, as well as less likely to support violent responses to violent demonstrations (H3).

As far as gender is concerned, the startling take-away is black men’s likelier ambivalence about violent responses in violent demonstration scenarios. While black men were not overwhelmingly more likely than women to positively score these tactics, their consistently higher neutrality (particularly when demonstrations were violent) suggests an ambivalence about violent police responses that does *not* comport with H5. Black men were also consistently less fervent in *strong* support for nonviolent responses to violent demonstrations. Women, on the other hand, were likelier to support nonviolent responses in both violent and nonviolent scenarios (Figure 6), as well as less likely to support violent responses in both circumstances (Figure 4).

These results do not support H6. Black women were less ambivalent and more consistent in their views about these responses. These results confound the literature on interactions between police and citizens. Explanations for these confounding gender results are unclear and provide fertile ground for future research.

In this chapter, I found that overall attitudes were mostly negative toward violent responses to protests, while generational and gender differences among black respondents tell a more nuanced story. Upon reading this analysis, a police agency interested in maintaining order *and* its reputation among the constituents of color it serves will be compelled to explore alternative means of responding to black protests. This is especially the case when the protests were prompted by perceived police misconduct (i.e. the killing of an unarmed person of color). Policy-wise, this may mean embracing more negotiated management strategies, as the nonviolent responses in this experiment, which in many ways echoed negotiated management, were largely seen as appropriate.

## Figures and Tables

*Table 1: Respondent Demographics*

<b>Gender</b>		<b>Income</b>	
Male	49.69%	Below Median	61.53%
Female	50.31%	Above Median	38.47%
<b>Age (Generation)</b>		<b>Party ID</b>	
Baby Boomers	30.96%	Democrat	72.73%
Generation Xers	31.58%	Republican	6.63%
Millennials	37.46%	Independent	20.65%
<b>Education</b>			
High School Diploma or Less		27.13%	
Some College, Associate's, or B.A.		57.93%	
Some Graduate or Advanced Degree		14.94%	

*Table 2: Baseline and Treatment Groups*

<b>Baseline Group</b> Nonviolent Demonstration/Nonviolent Police Response (NN)	<b>Treatment Group</b> Violent Demonstration/Violent Police Response (VV)
<b>Treatment Group</b> Nonviolent Demonstration/Violent Police Response (NV)	<b>Treatment Group</b> Violent Demonstration/Nonviolent Response (VN)

**Table 3: Respondent Demographics by Independent Variable**

	Baby Boomers	Generation Xers	Millennials	Total
Male	101	97	117	315
Female	98	105	123	326
<b>Total</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>641</b>

**Table 4: Violent and Nonviolent Response Options**

<b>Responses</b>	
<i>Violent 1 or (V1)</i>	Use wrist locks, twist locks, arm bars, and other painful pressure point measures to gain compliance.
<i>Violent 2 or (V2)</i>	Use batons, riot control sticks, and bats.
<i>Violent 3 or (V3)</i>	Use deadly force.
<i>Violent 4 or (V4)</i>	Use pepper spray, tear gas, smoke, and concussion grenades to disperse the group.
<i>Violent 5 or (V5)</i>	Move the crowd and make arrests. Use weapons like batons, bats, riot shields, Tasers, pepper spray, K-9 units, side arms, shotguns, rifles, smoke, and launchers.
<i>Nonviolent 1 or (NV1)</i>	Use loud speakers to get demonstrators to hear and follow orders.
<i>Nonviolent 2 or (NV2)</i>	Interact with organizers and gain their cooperation.
<i>Nonviolent 3 or (NV3)</i>	Make verbal commands.
<i>Nonviolent 4 or (NV4)</i>	Bring about facilitation, not confrontation.
<i>Nonviolent 5 or (NV5)</i>	Attempt to gain compliance by displaying a professional appearance, use verbal commands, try to negotiate with demonstrators, conduct squad formations, and use empty hand tactics.

**Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Four Groups**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>95% Confidence Interval</b>
Nonviolent Protest/Nonviolent Response (b)	165	3.18	1.36	(2.97, 3.39)
Violent Protest/ Nonviolent Response	163	3.17	1.40	(2.95, 3.39)
Violent Protest/Violent Response	164	2.98	1.33	(2.77, 3.19)
Nonviolent Protest/Violent Response	165	2.21	1.20	(1.93, 2.31)

**Table 6: OLS Regression on the Appropriateness of the Initial Police Response of the Baseline and Treatment Groups**

VARIABLES	(1) Gender	(2) Age
treatment = 2, VN	0.010 (0.210)	-0.137 (0.269)
treatment = 3, NV	<b>-0.914***</b> (0.211)	<b>-1.005***</b> (0.271)
treatment = 4, VV	-0.141 (0.211)	-0.418 (0.276)
agegroup = 1, Millennial		-0.317 (0.256)
agegroup = 3, Baby Boom		0.187 (0.285)
1b.treatment#1o.agegroup		0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#2b.agegroup		0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#3o.agegroup		0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#1.agegroup		0.184 (0.354)
2o.treatment#2b.agegroup		0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#3.agegroup		0.208 (0.391)
3.treatment#1.agegroup		0.044 (0.363)
3o.treatment#2b.agegroup		0.000 (0.000)
3.treatment#3.agegroup		-0.041 (0.384)
4.treatment#1.agegroup		0.432 (0.368)
4o.treatment#2b.agegroup		0.000 (0.000)
4.treatment#3.agegroup		0.153 (0.383)
Gender		0.026 (0.107)
Income	-0.094 (0.118)	-0.093 (0.118)
Party	<b>0.169***</b> (0.052)	<b>0.167***</b> (0.053)
Education	0.028 (0.044)	0.035 (0.044)
Female	0.089 (0.210)	
1b.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	
1b.treatment#1o.female	0.000 (0.000)	
2o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	
2.treatment#1.female	-0.025 (0.297)	
3o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	
3.treatment#1.female	-0.149 (0.298)	
4o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	
4.treatment#1.female	-0.146 (0.297)	
Age	<b>-0.012***</b> (0.004)	
Constant	26.916*** (7.285)	2.865*** (0.272)
Observations	630	630
R-squared	0.110	0.112

Figure 1: Mean Appropriateness Scores by Treatment Group (with 95% Confidence Intervals)




Figure 2: Changes in Predicted Appropriateness Ratings of Initial Police Response (Gender)




Figure 3: Changes in Predicted Appropriateness Ratings of Initial Police Response (Age)




Table 7: OLS Regression on the Appropriateness of the Violent Police Responses of Baseline and Treatment Groups (Gender)

VARIABLES	(V1) Wrist Locks, etc.	(V2) Batons, Bats, etc.	(V3) Deadly Force	(V4) Pepper Spray, etc.	(V5) Make Arrests, etc.
treatment = 2, VN	0.098 (0.187)	0.035 (0.184)	0.094 (0.165)	<b>0.494**</b> <b>(0.199)</b>	0.207 (0.186)
treatment = 3, NV	0.136 (0.188)	-0.133 (0.185)	0.130 (0.166)	0.224 (0.200)	0.097 (0.187)
treatment = 4, VV	0.133 (0.189)	0.295 (0.186)	-0.044 (0.167)	<b>0.728***</b> <b>(0.201)</b>	0.294 (0.188)
Female	-0.278 (0.188)	<b>-0.553***</b> <b>(0.185)</b>	<b>-0.331**</b> <b>(0.166)</b>	<b>-0.370*</b> <b>(0.200)</b>	<b>-0.409**</b> <b>(0.187)</b>
1b.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#1o.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#1.female	0.378 (0.265)	0.337 (0.261)	0.034 (0.234)	0.080 (0.282)	0.004 (0.264)
3o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
3.treatment#1.female	-0.201 (0.266)	0.251 (0.262)	-0.155 (0.234)	0.118 (0.283)	0.040 (0.264)
4o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
4.treatment#1.female	0.377 (0.265)	<b>0.536**</b> <b>(0.261)</b>	<b>0.533**</b> <b>(0.234)</b>	0.219 (0.282)	<b>0.446*</b> <b>(0.264)</b>
Age	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)
Income	0.051 (0.105)	0.170 (0.103)	0.112 (0.093)	0.068 (0.112)	0.067 (0.104)
Party	<b>0.127***</b> <b>(0.046)</b>	<b>0.135***</b> <b>(0.046)</b>	0.040 (0.041)	<b>0.120**</b> <b>(0.049)</b>	<b>0.120***</b> <b>(0.046)</b>
Education	<b>0.085**</b> <b>(0.040)</b>	-0.018 (0.039)	-0.020 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.042)	0.004 (0.039)
Constant	1.313 (6.501)	8.749 (6.402)	-7.087 (5.736)	9.571 (6.919)	5.416 (6.471)
Observations	630	630	630	630	630
R-squared	0.051	0.080	0.044	0.081	0.062

**Figure 4: Changes in Predicted Appropriateness of Violent Responses (V1-V5) (Gender)**





Table 8: OLS Regression on the Appropriateness of the Violent Police Responses of Baseline and Treatment Groups (Age)

VARIABLES	(V1) Wrist Locks, etc.	(V2) Batons, Bats, etc.	(V3) Deadly Force	(V4) Pepper Spray, etc.	(V5) Make Arrests, etc.
treatment = 2, VN	0.245 (0.240)	0.004 (0.235)	-0.059 (0.213)	0.303 (0.254)	0.134 (0.239)
treatment = 3, NV	0.258 (0.242)	-0.083 (0.237)	-0.002 (0.214)	<b>0.471*</b> <b>(0.256)</b>	0.176 (0.241)
treatment = 4, VV	<b>0.595**</b> <b>(0.246)</b>	0.271 (0.241)	0.163 (0.218)	<b>0.833***</b> <b>(0.261)</b>	<b>0.423*</b> <b>(0.246)</b>
agegroup = 1, Millennial	0.301 (0.228)	-0.044 (0.224)	-0.001 (0.202)	-0.029 (0.242)	0.013 (0.228)
agegroup = 3, Baby Boom	-0.027 (0.254)	-0.245 (0.249)	-0.233 (0.225)	-0.026 (0.269)	0.021 (0.254)
1b.treatment#1o.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#3o.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#1.agegroup	-0.063 (0.316)	0.211 (0.310)	0.280 (0.280)	0.317 (0.335)	0.094 (0.315)
2o.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#3.agegroup	0.317 (0.349)	0.439 (0.342)	0.213 (0.310)	0.409 (0.370)	0.159 (0.348)
3.treatment#1.agegroup	-0.550* (0.324)	-0.108 (0.317)	0.057 (0.287)	-0.275 (0.343)	-0.182 (0.323)
3o.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
3.treatment#3.agegroup	-0.017 (0.343)	0.393 (0.336)	0.105 (0.304)	-0.268 (0.363)	0.022 (0.342)
4.treatment#1.agegroup	-0.608* (0.329)	0.049 (0.322)	-0.130 (0.292)	-0.206 (0.348)	0.082 (0.328)
4o.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
4.treatment#3.agegroup	-0.096 (0.342)	0.843** (0.335)	0.303 (0.303)	0.233 (0.362)	0.220 (0.341)
Gender	<b>-0.148</b> <b>(0.095)</b>	<b>-0.266***</b> <b>(0.093)</b>	<b>-0.230***</b> <b>(0.084)</b>	<b>-0.262***</b> <b>(0.101)</b>	<b>-0.282***</b> <b>(0.095)</b>
Income	0.066 (0.105)	0.182* (0.103)	0.122 (0.093)	0.076 (0.112)	0.074 (0.105)
Party	<b>0.117**</b> <b>(0.047)</b>	<b>0.138***</b> <b>(0.046)</b>	0.044 (0.042)	<b>0.119**</b> <b>(0.050)</b>	<b>0.120**</b> <b>(0.047)</b>
Education	<b>0.078**</b> <b>(0.040)</b>	-0.013 (0.039)	-0.028 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.042)	0.001 (0.039)
Constant	1.556*** (0.243)	1.761*** (0.238)	1.624*** (0.215)	1.760*** (0.257)	1.610*** (0.242)
Observations	630	630	630	630	630
R-squared	0.052	0.092	0.035	0.090	0.059


Figure 5: Changes in Predicted Appropriateness of Violent Responses (V1-V5) (Age)



*Table 2: OLS Regression on the Appropriateness of the Nonviolent Battery of Police Responses of Baseline and Treatment Groups (Gender)*

VARIABLES	(NV1) Loud Speakers, etc.	(NV2) Cooperation	(NV3) Verbal Commands, etc.	(NV4) Facilitation	(NV5) Negotiation, etc.
treatment = 2, VN	0.151 (0.169)	-0.071 (0.164)	0.256 (0.193)	-0.122 (0.204)	0.058 (0.184)
treatment = 3, NV	0.035 (0.170)	<b>-0.450***</b> <b>(0.165)</b>	-0.142 (0.194)	-0.266 (0.205)	0.179 (0.185)
treatment = 4, VV	<b>0.361**</b> <b>(0.171)</b>	-0.122 (0.166)	<b>0.439**</b> <b>(0.195)</b>	0.235 (0.206)	0.198 (0.185)
Female	-0.055 (0.170)	-0.257 (0.165)	-0.297 (0.194)	-0.280 (0.205)	0.129 (0.184)
1b.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#1o.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#1.female	0.312 (0.240)	0.271 (0.233)	0.239 (0.273)	0.394 (0.290)	0.140 (0.260)
3o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
3.treatment#1.female	<b>0.520**</b> <b>(0.241)</b>	<b>0.472**</b> <b>(0.233)</b>	<b>0.657**</b> <b>(0.274)</b>	0.393 (0.290)	-0.273 (0.261)
4o.treatment#0b.female	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
4.treatment#1.female	0.134 (0.240)	0.245 (0.233)	0.329 (0.273)	-0.062 (0.290)	-0.196 (0.260)
Age	<b>-0.010***</b> <b>(0.003)</b>	<b>-0.005*</b> <b>(0.003)</b>	<b>-0.009**</b> <b>(0.003)</b>	<b>-0.009**</b> <b>(0.004)</b>	<b>-0.012***</b> <b>(0.003)</b>
Income	-0.011 (0.095)	-0.013 (0.092)	0.103 (0.108)	-0.002 (0.115)	-0.070 (0.103)
Party	0.010 (0.042)	0.020 (0.041)	0.070 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.051)	0.035 (0.046)
Education	0.006 (0.036)	<b>0.066*</b> <b>(0.035)</b>	<b>0.068*</b> <b>(0.041)</b>	<b>0.113***</b> <b>(0.043)</b>	<b>0.082**</b> <b>(0.039)</b>
Constant	23.054*** (5.889)	14.058** (5.709)	20.421*** (6.705)	21.611*** (7.102)	27.166*** (6.386)
Observations	630	630	630	630	630
R-squared	0.058	0.030	0.067	0.043	0.039


**Figure 6: Changes in Predicted Appropriateness of Nonviolent Response Battery (NV1-NV5) (Gender)**



*Table 10: OLS Regression on the Appropriateness of the Nonviolent Battery of Police Responses of Baseline and Treatment Groups (Age)*

VARIABLES	(NV1) Loud Speakers, etc.	(NV2) Cooperation	(NV3) Verbal Commands, etc.	(NV4) Facilitation	(NV5) Negotiation, etc.
treatment = 2, VN	<b>0.434**</b> (0.218)	0.091 (0.210)	0.210 (0.247)	-0.092 (0.262)	0.371 (0.236)
treatment = 3, NV	0.329 (0.220)	<b>-0.464**</b> (0.211)	-0.238 (0.249)	-0.385 (0.264)	-0.073 (0.238)
treatment = 4, VV	<b>0.735***</b> (0.224)	0.087 (0.215)	0.208 (0.254)	0.015 (0.269)	0.057 (0.242)
agegroup = 1, Millennial	0.129 (0.208)	0.004 (0.200)	-0.294 (0.235)	-0.033 (0.249)	-0.006 (0.225)
agegroup = 3, BabyBoom	<b>0.395*</b> (0.231)	0.077 (0.222)	-0.085 (0.262)	-0.264 (0.278)	0.166 (0.250)
1b.treatment#1o.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
1b.treatment#3o.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#1.agegroup	-0.109 (0.287)	-0.146 (0.276)	0.154 (0.325)	0.142 (0.345)	-0.382 (0.311)
2o.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
2.treatment#3.agegroup	-0.251 (0.317)	0.134 (0.305)	0.351 (0.359)	0.423 (0.381)	-0.316 (0.344)
3.treatment#1.agegroup	-0.067 (0.294)	<b>0.488*</b> (0.283)	<b>0.552*</b> (0.333)	0.209 (0.353)	0.048 (0.318)
3o.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
3.treatment#3.agegroup	0.028 (0.312)	0.297 (0.300)	<b>0.717**</b> (0.353)	<b>0.853**</b> (0.374)	0.363 (0.337)
4.treatment#1.agegroup	-0.486 (0.299)	-0.274 (0.287)	0.544 (0.338)	-0.039 (0.359)	-0.026 (0.323)
4o.treatment#2b.agegroup	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
4.treatment#3.agegroup	-0.361 (0.311)	0.040 (0.299)	<b>0.613*</b> (0.352)	<b>0.690*</b> (0.373)	0.228 (0.336)
Gender	<b>0.180**</b> (0.087)	-0.011 (0.083)	0.022 (0.098)	-0.105 (0.104)	0.047 (0.094)
Income	-0.021 (0.096)	-0.015 (0.092)	0.100 (0.108)	-0.011 (0.115)	-0.083 (0.104)
Party	0.002 (0.043)	0.027 (0.041)	0.074 (0.048)	-0.023 (0.051)	0.029 (0.046)
Education	0.021 (0.036)	<b>0.078**</b> (0.035)	<b>0.084**</b> (0.041)	<b>0.134***</b> (0.043)	<b>0.091**</b> (0.039)
Constant	3.456*** (0.221)	3.955*** (0.212)	3.154*** (0.250)	3.462*** (0.265)	3.604*** (0.239)
Observations	630	630	630	630	630
R-squared	0.053	0.039	0.072	0.045	0.037

**Figure 7: Changes in Predicted Appropriateness of Nonviolent Response Battery (NV1-NV5) (Age)**



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## Chapter 5

This dissertation has examined the historical relationship between the police and black Americans – unearthing contemporary data that reveal sustained negative attitudes toward the police – and little support for violent and aggressive police strategies against protestors.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the impetus for early policing (to establish and control “black criminality”), its evolving state as an *institution* (nineteenth-century political corruption reformed by progressives into a professionalized agency of local government), and how the parallel relationship between black Americans and the police has been defined by bitter conflict that eventually resulted in outward expressions of discontent in the twentieth-century. These “expressions of discontent” were both violent and nonviolent, but Chapter one concluding discussion revolved around how the police have evolved in their responses to these demonstrations.

Chapter 3 featured a discussion on contemporary attitudes toward the police. Using the 2016 American National Elections Studies as a focal point for analysis, I found that attitudes toward the police among blacks and whites (even through an intersectional lens) have not changed much since scholars first began measuring them in the 1970s. Nevertheless, I do find some evidence that common discussions in the media about number of interactions between the police and black Americans (as compared with white Americans) may be inaccurate. Indeed, there were no significant differences in self-reported stops or arrests between white and black men. These findings cannot be stated emphatically, however, as the sample sizes were small.

I also find that while black women were significantly more likely than white women to be stopped or arrested, their experiences are too often ignored in broader conversations about

“black criminality” and the American criminal justice system. Nonetheless, a relevant limitation is that the survey data included only a small sample of people who had been arrested. In future, a larger sample should produce more robust (and explanatory) findings.

In Chapter 4, I conduct a national survey experiment with black American respondents, analyzing black attitudes toward police responses to protests through an intersectional lens (focusing on the intersection of race, age, and gender), and finding both intuitive and counterintuitive results in the process. For instance, I find that older black Americans were more likely than young blacks to deem violent police responses when protests are *violent* as more appropriate, introducing a notion that support for potential violent police responses is *contextual*. However, I also find that black men (who are disproportionately impacted by police violence) were (at best) more ambivalent (than black women) toward violent police responses to violent protests, confounding my pre-survey assumptions and opening the door for future research questions. This is especially true when police agencies consider strategic approaches to responding to protests.

Research on law enforcement has confirmed that policing agencies think strategically when responding to public unrest. At Ferguson, Missouri, the police response to activist ire was polarizing. Proponents defended police behavior, arguing that protestors were “rioting,” disturbing order, and preying on their own community. Opponents accused police of employing racially biased tactics. Again, popular framing pitted whites against blacks, embracing a dichotomy, which argues that public opinion regarding the police, and how they do their jobs, is largely divided by race. Nonetheless, I believed the more credible endeavor was to reject assumptions that black attitudes are monolithic and examine them in-depth. While race is an

important determinant, intraracial attitudes, particularly among black Americans, are influenced by intersectional identities.

Recent national election survey data reveals a divide between black men and women on general attitudes toward the police. Comporting with longstanding scholarship on gender and policing, in 2016, black women were still significantly warmer toward law enforcement than black men. This despite the insignificant difference in personal experiences with police (black men and women did not significantly differ on stops or arrests). Explanations for this difference in attitudes vary. Some scholars argue that gender differences are based on personal experiences. That individual interactions negatively impact attitudes. This is especially the case for blacks, who have been found to be almost innately suspicious and skeptical toward police behavior (i.e. being stopped or questioned is automatically perceived as unfair). Yet, in chapter two, I find no evidence that black men and women have different levels of interaction with police. While other scholars credit “vicarious” experiences, the chief assumption is that black women rely on testimony from black men (as opposed to having their own experiences) to shape their attitudes. This is an area of the literature (the conflation of black male and female experiences with law enforcement) that requires further scrutiny in future research.

### **Conclusions for Police Audience**

If police agencies are to act strategically, to improve their standing with black Americans, they must understand its complicated (and historically problematic) relationship with communities of color. Based on this research and careful analysis of the literature on black Americans and law enforcement, I conclude the following:

Police subculture only reinforces black skepticism toward law enforcement. Whether real or imagined, the dominant belief is that officers can behave badly with impunity. The more continued high-profile cases of officer misconduct ending with no punishment for the offending officers – the more embittered the black population. At hand, chapter two’s description of the “code of silence,” which prevents colleagues from testifying against each other, only exacerbates community “no snitching” codes (i.e. what’s good for the goose...). Furthermore, it undermines the expectation of fairness, sending a non-too-subtle message that officers are above the law (Weisburd 2000; Wintersmith 1974).

In addition to the code, the “us vs. them” attitudes only serve to elevate antagonism, decrease the legitimacy of police action in communities of color, and stifle cooperation. All citizens are not (what Wintersmith 1974) “problem citizens.” As such, all public protests are not potential riots. Shouting “Black Lives Matter” is not an assertion that officers’ lives do not. Publicly criticizing systemic issues within the institution of policing is not tantamount to endorsing lawlessness. And (as this research has indicated) all black citizens do not “hate the cops.” Instead, as chapter four indicates, black attitudes are very much influenced by police behavior. Black American attitudes toward the police are complicated.

Another lesson for law enforcement is that its long history of acrimony and brutality with black citizens should never be forgotten. This history imbues every facet of this relationship today, and without an acknowledgment that the origin and maintenance of policing has been largely rooted in the controlling of black communities, unearthing solutions to deeply-held attitudes will be impossible.

Black citizens need to *perceive* officers as fair and just. Stop and frisk, investigatory stops, racial profiling, and the entire prison-industrial-complex are poisonous endeavors. If they

continue, the legitimacy of law enforcement will be damaged in black communities.

Systematically challenging both the implicit and explicit biases of officers is important, as some might argue, for example, the death of Michael Brown could have been avoided save the implicit fear of the white police officer (i.e. he saw a young black man as more of a threat than he was because we have been conditioned in society to fear young black men above anyone else).

Scholars Colin Holbrook and Steven Neuberg also found this to be the case with the deaths of Alton Sterling and Philando Castile. Neuberg says:

“You see why police are wary, why people of color are wary... from both perspectives, the other one is considered dangerous. And so much of that comes from thoughts each group has about the other groups background: for young black males, the fact that white cops see themselves in a position of power and able to dole out punishment at will and for no apparent reason; for white cops, a sense that young black males are out to stir up trouble. And when you toss in the fact that young black men might be more likely to be economically distressed, it further alienates each group.”<sup>39</sup>

Wariness, fear, and alienation produce reciprocal ire. And when the “doling out of punishment at will and for no apparent reason” results in the deaths of unarmed men and women of color, a powder keg of resentment is often ignited in the streets. Consequently, the very entity responsible for the protest is charged with responding to it, and findings from this dissertation present several explanations as to how those responses shape the attitudes of black Americans.

First, it is evident that aggressive policing strategies have traumatized black communities. As such, there is little appetite for escalated force tactics against even violent protestors. Overwhelmingly, there is no context in which most black Americans will approve of violent responses to nonviolent protests. Yes, older black respondents are slightly more approving of *some* tactics when protests are violent. Yes, black men (despite being disproportionately affected

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<sup>39</sup> Basu, Tanya. "Science Explains Why Americans See Black Men as a Threat." *Inverse*, 12 July 2016.

by police violence) display more ambivalence toward violent responses to violent protests. Nonetheless, these results show overwhelming evidence that most blacks do not support violent responses to protests.

Second, nonviolent responses (such as ‘facilitating dialogue with protestors’) were met with wide approval, even when protests were violent. Yet in this study, while nonviolent responses were more popular, specific “nonviolent” responses elicited counterintuitive reactions. For instance, black Millennials were likelier to disapprove of “nonviolent” responses (such as ‘make verbal commands’) in both violent and nonviolent protest situations. I speculate that this is the result of flawed categorization. In other words, the “nonviolent” or nonviolent descriptor that myself and sources like *POLICE* Magazine take for granted, may not hold the same meaning to young black Americans. In this context, “violence” is most certainly subjective. Indeed, perception and tone are important indicators. For instance, making verbal commands may be perceived as relatively innocuous and “non-violent” coming from a non-threatening source. This is analogous to a child, as opposed to an abusive partner, making a verbal command. In each context, “violence” is perceived differently. That may be the explanation here. Law enforcement must realize that they have earned their reputation in black communities. Accordingly, their every move is hyper-scrutinized, and must not take any actions for granted (in terms of how they will be received).

I intend to expand this dissertation with future research on the following subjects: Attitudes toward police and protests across multiple racial/ethnic groups. Research (and intuition) suggests that white attitudes on police response to protests will diverge from black attitudes. Furthermore, recent scholarship would indicate that Latinos might fall between whites and blacks. These questions have not been posed, however, but they may illuminate why

attitudes with response to incidents in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York, and Baton Rouge were so polarized. Were these racial/ethnic, gender, partisan, age, or socioeconomic differences?

Speaking of socioeconomic differences, further analysis on intersectional findings among black citizens deserve examination. For example, the intersection of race, income, and education. Furthermore, geographical data was collected (by zip code), which may assist in analyzing whether neighborhood context, as some scholars claim, significantly matters. Dowler (2003) reports that those who believe that “there are a high number of problems in their neighborhood” are more likely to negatively judge police performance. Weitzer (2002) argues, “People residing in disadvantaged neighborhoods tend to report more negative personal experiences, observations, and opinions of the police than do residents of middle-class neighborhoods” (397). Also, Kusow, Wilson and Martin (1998) find that both black and white suburbanites are more satisfied with police performance than are white and black urban residents, further suggesting that viewing black attitudes as a monolith in this context is folly.

It is also important to explore those counterintuitive gender results. There was simply no expectation that black male respondents would show more ambivalence toward violent responses (in any context) than black women. Additionally, a more person-to-person approach to examining the black female experience with law enforcement should expose the nuance between their more approving attitudes of the police and less approving attitudes toward police responses.

One possible rationale for black women’s more negative reaction to violent police responses is gender-specific socialization. Many might argue that women are simply disinclined to support use of violence because of how they are socialized against it. Smith’s (1984) meta-analysis of national polling data reveals women’s likelier embrace of “middle alternatives” when asked about use of violence. Conversely, he finds that men tend to strongly back violent options

(384). Eichenberg (2003) found another example of these gender differences in a military context. He reveals that women reacted far more negative towards use of force against Iraqi civilians and military personnel. Some scholars believe these differences are “completely explained” by socialization. Parents and teachers teach girls to avoid violence and aggression, while it is “accepted” that boys will gravitate toward them (Smith 1984, 385; Goode 1971).

Nevertheless, gender socialization may not be telling the story of differences between black men and women on this issue. Smith (1984) asserts that “gender differences on violence seem to decrease where a social norm exists and tend to increase in situations where society has not promulgated clear and established standards” (385). It cannot be argued that clear and established social norms (as it relates to even discussing the police) are not present within the black community. Police-citizen relations have been salient among black Americans for decades (if not centuries), and theories such as social-confirmation and vicarious experiences (see Chapter 2) certainly suggest that conversations about police violence against black Americans are had. As such, gender-specific socialization may not be the explanation for this chapter’s counterintuitive results on violent responses to violent protests.

Another possible explanation is a “mother-effect.” Simply put, perhaps a great deal of this respondent sample were mothers with black sons, which would make them far less likely to support aggressive policing responses in any protest context. Ruddick’s (1995) book on “maternal thinking” provides a complex view of mothers. Some mothers “engage in work that require nonviolent battle, fighting while resisting the temptation to assault or abandon opponents” (220). In our context, a black woman’s resistance to violent police behavior could simply be a facet of her “motherliness.” Yet Ruddick also notes that “not all women’s politics are politics of resistance,” citing mothers of military heroes and martyrs who join to support the

military state and its politics of aggression (223). She offers competing perspectives on potential attitudes of mothers that one might assume exists among black women. Indeed, the role of “parent” is but another identity which intersects with race, age, and class. Future research ought to include a more in-depth exploration on the role of black parenting (especially *young* black parents) and violent police responses to protests.

Per Shields (2008), using intersectionality theory can suffer by way of methodological approach. She argues that quantitative analysis may “oversimplify or disaggregate the very relational, emergent properties of identity that intersectionality theory captures” (307). Citing Audre Lorde (i.e. one cannot dismantle the master’s house while using the master’s tools), she notes that defying more quantitative methods has sparked debate in “all areas of the social and behavioral sciences that have a strong tradition of relying on quantitative methods” (Shields 2008; McCall 2005; Walker 2003). Conversely, proponents of qualitative methods argue that this approach is more compatible. Because qualitative research relies on more prose and less crude categorical data, proponents claim that there is more room to focus on the nuances of social phenomena, and capture the substantive impact of intersecting identities. On face, these assertions present a dilemma for this research, as quantitative analysis is a prominent component. Nevertheless, many researchers are not comfortable assigning a universal method for intersectional analysis. Indeed, incorporating both approaches is the most pragmatic and robust method (Shields 2008; Risman 2004). As such, I intend to incorporate qualitative interviewing and ethnographic fieldwork in future iterations of this project.

Lastly, I intend to measure attitudes on excessive vs. “not enough” responses to protests. As revealed by the experiment, measuring what is “appropriate” and “inappropriate” is not enough. Nonviolent responses to violent protests could be deemed inappropriate, because the

response is “not enough.” The default assumption that every police response will be considered “excessive” is false, and taking the battery of responses used in the experiment and asking the “excessive” or “not enough” question may serve to illuminate how police responses to protests shape black attitudes.

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## VITA

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