STUDYING JANUS BEHAVIOR:

HOW SUPPORT, DETERRENCE, GRIEVANCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE SHAPE VIOLENT AND PEACEFUL BEHAVIORS

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Presented by Leah Graham

A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

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Professor Kenneth Chauncey Morrison

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Professor Jay Dow

I dedicate this work to my family
Your unconditional love makes anything seem possible.

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ABSTRACT

Examples abound of movements once entirely fixated on violence who choose to enter the political arena, exchanging politics by force for politics of a gentler sort. These groups exhibit "janus-faced" personalities, simultaneously including militancy and non-violent mobilization in their toolbox of behavioral options. In order to be seen as legitimate actors in the political arena, these groups eventually must forswear violence. However, environmental incentives for violent behaviors can make the total disavowal of violence untenable. In this environment, distant threats of political exclusion would be overshadowed by short-term fears of demise. The research proposed in this work seeks to explain how social, political and historical context influence changing methods of politics by sub-state actors. I explain how context shapes shifts in the choice between politics carried out by sword or by ballot, looking at the behavior of organizations that have one time or another included militancy and non-violent mobilization in their toolbox of behavioral options. This work examines transitions in organizational tactics from violence to non-violence in two ways. First, a cross-national time-series study using Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) evaluates how macro and meso-level forces shape political evolution over time. Second, I augment these findings with a brief comparison of the experience of political tactic-choices in Hezbollah, HAMAS, IRA and ETA, refining the theory of the original model, culminating with a test of the reconfigured theory.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

> *…dimensions of a revolution give communal expressions to man's most moving precept: discontent. A deeply rooted desire to modify, to transgress, and ultimately to become another seems to lurk beneath every veneer of calm civility that the status quo demands and rewards* (Dabashi, 1993,19).

The *Front Islamic du Salute* (FIS) provides a notorious example of an entity—once on the path to peaceful political engagement—that deteriorated into violence once the door to participation was closed. In the period leading up to the first free election following Algeria's civil war, the FIS was poised as a viable Islamist political party with moderate leadership. The party emerged as a political contender in 1989 at the start of the multi-party system and its pragmatic leadership and open platform made it seem pluralistic and democratic in nature (Metz 1994). The party was free-market, pro-west and only vaguely religiously identified; in total quite liberal in nature (Metz 1994). However, the electoral hopes for the FIS were dashed after winning parliamentary elections in the early 1990s by a secular party-backed military coup, claiming to fear the implementation of an Islamist state. Following this coup, the FIS went from being a political party with a military wing to a terrorist organization with little to no emphasis on congenial politics. After being shunned from political engagement, a terrorist emphasis trumped the now futile political focus of the group.

The FIS is seen as an anomaly because after fully forswearing violence, it chose to again pick up the sword, *devolving* politically. Is the FIS truly an anomaly? Many old political parties in the modern democratic world once had ties to militias. Examples abound of movements once entirely fixated on violent aims choosing to enter the non-violent political arena; exchanging politics by force for politics of a gentler sort. The FIS

could simply show how that path could be halted or reversed. A modern example of *forward* evolution would be seen in the gradual shifts of PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) policies. In a 2003 personal interview with a long-time managerial member of the PFLP who wished to remain anonymous[1], I was told that the PFLP realized that medical care, education and economic and political advancement of Palestinian people had become more important than fighting the Israeli state and that they had shifted their mode of operations in the past decades to suit this change in focus. The divide between this group and its explicitly terrorist wing in the late 1960s and more recent reappearances of this divide signal at least a grain of truth to this claim. Are the two examples, FIS and PFLP, alone or do many social movement organizations shift tactics between violent and peaceful politics?

The "life cycle" approach used by some sociologists notes patterns of behavioral change, viewing organizations as evolving entities (Lang and Lang 1961). Much like that and other evolutionary approaches to political process, this work will imagine organization behavior as a form of political evolution—wherein groups necessarily evolve both to meet changing threats and to broaden their scope of support—whose trajectory is at least partially determined by the context of behavior.[2] An ideal type of this evolution would flow from an early emphasis on violence and end with "realization" or cooptation into the existing political sphere with proportionately decreasing reliance on violent politics and increasing emphasis on non-violent political tactics. Yet, as the FIS example illustrates, this path is not always so direct. While history has generally shown

[1] conducted in the Southern Beirut refugee camp, Mar Elias

[2] The term "evolution" in this work is meant to explain a process or change in types of behavior. While the term evolution connotes an underlying judgment (i.e. a movement from "lesser" to "greater" or from "bad" to "good") this story is not meant to have that normative element.

movements to favor a forward trend, the path normally contains a number of spikes and declines before the possibility of leveling out even arises. It is this indeterminate "meantime," and end-point of my stylized evolutionary cycle that will be emphasized in this work. Specifically, what exogenous forces, both structural and organizational, help explain the speed, scope of setbacks and degree of success in political evolution? What forces determine the attractiveness of violence or non-violent political behaviors? The research proposed in this work explores this phenomenon. I augment a multi-national comparison with a comparative historical approach in order to explore how both the systemic and organizational-contexts shape the nature of political behavior, particularly oppositions' choice to grasp or spurn the sword.

Janus-faced Organizations

Janus groups are essentially social movement organizations with a wide repertoire. Social movements are defined as "collective challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities" and these movements are often codified in representative organizations (Tarrow 1998). The behavior of organizations that claim to represent these movements can be collectively defined as contention if the purpose of the behavior is oppositional in nature. The violent form of this behavior includes "subversive acts that challenge systems of authority" such as riots, violent uprisings, militia attacks, terrorism and revolutions, to name a few (Bessinger 2002 in Ulfelder 2005, 312). Non-violent contentious behaviors, on the other hand, include subversive elements yet do not actively attempt to physically harm opponents. Non-violent actions would include non-violent protest, the provision of social services that replace those provided (or more frequently

not provided) by the state in order to weaken state credibility, pamphlet distribution, civil disobedience and the like.[3]

The behavior of social movement organizations can be classified into violent and non-violent tactics. Often, the scholarship of groups that use violence (such as terrorist tactics) is separate from scholarship on movements that use more peaceful methods even though these behaviors are all variations of contention. In separating these groups in study, the literature has failed to present these organizations in their full complexity so scholars often miss or conflate an important subset of organizations that utilize a full range of political behaviors. To correct this shortcoming, this work would suggest that terrorism (like other behaviors) is simply one of many tactics—both violent and peaceful—within a behavioral continuum of political action. The organizations whose behaviors fall somewhere between the two extremes on this continuum are, as the title suggests, *Janus-faced* groups. These organizations can teach us much about behaviors at both ends of the spectrum by simultaneously including militancy and non-violent political mobilization in their toolbox of behavioral options.

The research question: how to study Janus-faced movements?

The evolution of social movement organizations' tactics between the peaceful and violent ends of the political spectrum would ideally follow the direction of peaceful politics because in order to be seen as legitimate actors and survive in a liberalizing arena, these organizations eventually must forswear violence. But what defines this term, "eventually" and what determines whether a group moves forward or away from the non-

[3] See, as examples, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement or the resistance to South African rule or British rule in India.

violent ideal in the meantime? In reality, factors exogenous to the party might create an environment of fear or offer incentives for violent behaviors that make the total disavowal of violence an untenable option. In this environment, the long-term aims of democratic inclusion would be overshadowed by short-term fears of demise. To address this conundrum, this work will seek to uncover how the *context* of politics—such as the availability of peaceful alternatives—changes the entity's behavioral calculus along that continuum.

Scholarship has given limited attention to the political, social, economic and historical context of action for our Janus groups outside of studies of violence and terrorism. However, three discrete realms of scholarship can help to address their behavior: political violence, social movement theory and party liberalization theory. All three literatures contribute something to our understanding of these groups. Each can help us to understand how the context of politics determines shifts between contention and congenial politics—and in the process, help us to understand how the shifts between social movement organizations and political parties occur.

The context of political behavior has been studied in two separate enterprises: violent and non-violent. Context is an important element of this study, as is the bridging of these two enterprises. For example, it could be argued that engagement in the political realm broadens an organization's constituency and thus makes radical tactics/rhetoric less fruitful, whereas disengagement from avenues of peaceful politics makes radical tactics beneficial. Other contextual elements, as shown in Appendix 1, are theorized to similarly influence the choice of both types behaviors.

Della Porta (2006) explains that a major gap in social movement scholarship has been the lack of bridging of levels of analysis. This work answers that call by incorporating macro and meso levels of analysis in order to explain the variations in the full continuum of social movement organization behaviors. The research agenda begun here will explore how the context of politics shapes social movement organization behavior. I break down how social, political and historical forces help to determine the direction of political behavior in these organizations. I incorporate the macro and meso-level context of politics through the inclusion of four general factors from the literatures that are said to influence tactical shifts in political behavior over time. The systemic or macro context of politics will be broken into two parts. The first variable, *support*, is broadly defined as sympathy, facilitation, influence and aid; it describes the depth of opportunity in the political system. The second factor, *deterrence*, includes suppression by domestic or international actors and describes the breadth of political opportunity. The meso-level context of organizational politics has two factors of interest. First, *grievances*, includes state failure to offer satisfactory redress for perceived marginalization. Second, *organization* incorporates formation and makeup of the organization as a proxy for competition within the general social movement. Thes factors are summarized in Figure 1.1 below.

The outline of this project

The first stage of this project includes a theory building exercise, incorporating ideas from three disparate literatures that all contribute to our understanding of political evolution: political violence, social movement and party liberalization theories. The resulting combined theoretical approach informs the second stage of this project, an

empirical analysis based on Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis approach. Per Lieberman's method, after an initial, abstract large-N analysis of the combined theory, I utilize case study analysis to trace and further explore the theorized process. The primary case study will trace the factors theorized to contribute to political maturation over within the early evolution of Lebanon's Hezbollah. This primary case study emphasizes the first decade of its existence, which illustrates both ends of the continuum: political violence and partial political co-optation. Next, a series of minor cases will analyze this process in a similar case (HAMAS) and glean information from how this theory travels to Janus groups in the developed world (ETA and IRA). The information accrued from these case studies will then inform a theoretical reconfiguration, tested in a final, arguably more complete quantitative analysis.

The rest of the story

In the following chapter, I relate the disparate literatures to each other in order to find the theoretical common ground. From this exercise, I am able to disentangle four contextual factors that should shape the patterns of mobilization in our organizations, followed by the creation of testable hypotheses of these factors. In Chapter 4, I test these factors using cross-national data. I find interesting patterns of statistical association between organizational behavior and the four explanatory factors based on a sample of 1,789 organization years within twelve countries of the greater Middle East. Specifically patronage, suppression by the state and money woes all contribute handily to organization's behavioral patterns. However, the original model leaves much to be desired. Specifically, it finds null or contradictory patterns in behavioral patterns associated with changes in domestic popularity of the group and political grievances of

an organization. Further, while the model explains some violent behaviors, it explains little peaceful actions. Consequently, the model requires work, leading to the use of case analysis. From this starting point, four cases are investigated—two found in the sample analyzed in Chapter 3 and two from an entirely different region—in order to find theoretical gaps that might help expand model of organizational behavior. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of one period of Hezbollah's lifespan and Chapter 5 provides brief comparative case studies of HAMAS, the IRA and ETA. In each of these four cases, the model's four components are considered in turn along with additional factors that help explain behavioral patterns for the groups historically. Chapter 5 ends with a discussion and re-conceptualization of the original theory, utilizing knowledge embedded in the comparative historical analysis. This re-conceptualization forces me to reconsider how to operationalize each factor and how the model should be tested. The reconsidered model provides an additional seven testable hypotheses and an arguably much stronger model of organizational behavior. Chapter 6 then tests these new hypotheses in turn before closing with a cumulative expanded statistical analysis of organizational behavior. Chapter 7 then provides a discussion of the model in total, explaining problems and solutions for this model and discussing ideas for future research. While the statistical findings of Chapter 6's cumulative model are somewhat less than awe inspiring, I argue in Chapter 8 that this model provides an important first step towards a comprehensive view of organizational behavior.

Figure 1.1: proposed explanatory factors explaining behavior shifts of Janus groups.

Resources
Allies
Constituency
Environment
Level of repression
Grievances
Political deprivation
Economic deprivation
Organization
Clandestine
Hierarchy

CHAPTER 2: Literature and Theory

If you could wipe away debates on methods or other trivialities dividing the discipline today, I argue you would find that the underlying drive behind much of modern political scholarship is not just describing political conditions or even predicting political outcomes. Rather, it is the search for political evolution toward social, human ideals. For example, we explain the social and political impacts of poverty not as impersonal onlookers. We study poverty in order to find its causes and, thereby, its cures. Similarly, we study political oppression so that we can find routes toward social empowerment. We study institutional structures not in order to list constraints alone but also to find ideals. Finally, we study violence among and within nations, between state and non-state actors, as well as all violence in between, because—somewhere deep down—we hope to explain a path toward peaceful politics and non-violent social empowerment. In this scholarship, the quest of Enlightenment thinkers lives on in the search for the *causes* of our political ideals.

Even if one disagrees with my optimistic appraisal of the discipline, it is apparent that whatever the underlying cause, much of social science research seeks to explain the evolution of politics from violent and authoritarian politics to peaceful, liberal interaction. In this arena, at least, scholars seek the ideal: that eventually politics grows to become better than before. "Better," as it is defined in modern scholarship means: more peaceful, more organized, and more stable than in the past. Specifically, people are able to change their lives/environments without needing to resort to bloodshed. To this effect, scholars often view states, groups, people, and their political interactions as

"modernizing," breaking from violent struggles of the past and beginning to compete in less violent ways than previously known. For some scholars, the end point of this process is consolidated, liberal democracy in which uncivil competition is co-opted by civil competition.[4]

Those championing the "End of History" claim that the liberalization of politics will to produce a political ideal and a political good. Liberalization, generating "collective influence over social conditions" (Struhl 2008), and placing a check on elite power in the hands of the people, eventually seems to result in relatively more peaceful, more efficient politics.[5] The evidence for this claim comes from every sphere of political scholarship. Democracies don't fight with each other (Doyle 1983; Oneal and Russett 2001); democracies are better suited to respond to natural disasters and hence have reduced famines and related violence (Dreze and Sen 1990; Sen 1990, 1999; 2003). Further, democratic competition can help generate bridging ties that, in turn, increase cooperative interaction between disparate domestic groups and strengthen the regime's institutionalization (e.g. Rahn, Brehm and Carlson 1999). Democracy is even said to directly or indirectly promote cultural development (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al 2001; Lipset 1959; North 1990). Thus, the list goes on. It could easily be argued that democracy alone does not independently create Kant's ideal; rather, it democracy one of a list of necessary conditions for peace including economic development, institutional

[4] Fukuyama's (2002) *End of History* is a compelling, literal interpretation of this underlying current in the discipline. Whether democracy or liberal economic policies are the only paths to this endpoint is debatable. However, one need not buy into Fukuyama's arguments to agree that the endpoint of stable politics with real human agency is nevertheless an ideal.

[5] Democracy can generally be seen as reducing conflict once consolidated, though democratic *transition* is hardly seen as peaceful (e.g. Snyder 1995)

development, the rule of law, etc. However, democracy is an integral component (or at least one means to an end) in the development of "better" politics generally.

The broadening popular acceptance of liberalization—that people genuinely want to liberalize politics—reinforces the case of those championing democracy by illustrating its universality. Indeed, it would seem that nothing inherent in any religion, culture, or society would automatically make a people opposed to any of the key features of democracy (even if they dislike the specific term) as defined by Diamond (2008) "popular sovereignty, accountability of rulers, freedom, and the rule of law." Therefore, if democracy does indeed correlate to the pacification of politics, increased state responsiveness, civic bonds, cultural development and it is even seen as a commonly valued commodity, then it is indeed something worth understanding.

While scholars' arguments reinforce the modern belief in the "better" situation provided by the institutionalization of popularly accepted liberalized politics as one path to a peaceful ideal—we still know little of this political liberalization process. We still struggle to understand how political interactions move between the sphere of illiberal politics and uncivil interactions to liberal politics and civil society. The work proposed in this project expand our knowledge of this process, in the hopes of better understanding the broader subject of democratization.

Democracy in our literature follows a common narrative. The usual story mentions states that become liberal, consolidated democracies through modernization or even through popular agency. The popular will is then expressed collectively through parties and sub-national organizations. Party systems with their component parties consolidate and institutionalize the competitive interaction– becoming competitive and

liberal– a process that reinforces the consolidation of democracy and leads to all the benefits listed above. Case closed, story finished – or is it?

A number of glaring gaps appear in my narrative that either ignore our Janus-faced groups or relegate them to some space outside of civilized politics and outside of the story of democracy. In the usual story, politics *proper* occurs between bureaucratized, civil, institutionalizing parties in liberal, competitive environments. Violent politics then happens in the small space of semi-freedom created by budding civil societies in illiberal regimes or by the pathogenic "others" (i.e. groups of psychologically unstable individuals or those actively rejecting the space of freedom) in a democracy. Yet, neither of these stories fully embraces or ties together the very real stages of ever increasingly proper politics occurring within illiberal regimes or the rational but un-civil politics that occurs within liberal regimes.[6] The former is perhaps easily accepted as forming the basis for democratization, but the latter is often eschewed entirely as a separate phenomenon. Politics is never so easily categorized—the Janus-faced groups illustrate that. Scholarship has a need for a bridging of at least three disparate studies: political violence, social movement contention, and party institutionalization. This bridging will form the basis for a conceptual framework of how politics move between *illiberal* and *liberal*.

I form a theoretical approach to Janus-faced behavior that bridges the divide between social movements and party institutionalization—illustrating that the two concepts are not distinct as conventional wisdom might suggest. Instead, by studying

[6] Other than the vast literature on terrorism in democracies (e.g. Wilkinson 1977)—however, even this literature quarantines terrorism as a separate beast from democratic politics. It views violence as something that occurs within democracies (e.g. institutionally: because of the state's inability to contain it) but not something that is *part* of democratic politics.

political methods of organizations as moving between violent to non-violent methods, one can explain how political behavior vacillates in the space between social movement organizations to political parties. The theoretical contribution of this work occurs in its illustration of the process that weaves among subjects studied in political violence, social movement contention, and party institutionalization scholarship, connecting the three disparate literatures. The interwoven segments of these three literatures form the neglected space in which politics are able to liberalize and become civil or alternatively, reverse to illiberal, uncivil behavior. Following this chapter, the theorized connection between social movements and political parties develops in empirical analysis, showing how the circumstance of behavior determines where an organization will fall within the continuum from pure violent movement to purely peaceful party.

In order to explain the connections between these disparate areas of scholarship, this review will include three segments. First, I explain how these three subjects are mostly treated as conceptually distinct phenomena, briefly reviewing the contributions of the three disparate literatures. Then, I will view what links between these subjects have been made in previous scholarship. The first and second sections will then inform the third section: The construction of an exploratory theoretical framework of Janus-faced groups with testable hypotheses of political evolution.

Three conceptually distinct literatures

The study of sub-state political behavior (violent or peaceful) can occur primarily within two relatively isolated fields, sociology and political science. Each of these two fields offer a way to understand the behavior of groups that utilize violence and each has

its shortcomings. Collectively, these two fields inform a third area of sub-state behavior research: political parties.

The three areas of study, though limited alone, overlap to provide leverage in explaining Janus behavior. First, the political studies of violence seek to highlight the motivational factors for violent behaviors, though they do not extend those motivations to include more congenial forms of contention. Second, the social movement literature has the capacity to explain opportunity in both forms of contention though it has two serious limitations. With the exception of a small and historically underdeveloped portion of social movement scholarship interested in political violence, the social movement literature has primarily been concerned with behavior of more moderate groups (McClurg Muller 1992). Third, the party institutionalization literature informs an endpoint of behavioral evolution. This literature is limited in its failure to understand the trajectory of pre-party behavior, which could be informed by the other two areas of scholarship.

Both the political violence literature and the social movement literature often separate violent means of contention from peaceful means of contention. In the political violence literature, violence, civil war and riots are all isolated from other forms of behavior despite the fact that motivations for each can overlap. Social movement scholars study the organized social movements that participate in sustained collective actions of peaceful and even violent contention separately from violent politics like insurgency and terrorism; though both are contentious performances expected to be affected by the same causal mechanisms according to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), "Social movements, by definition, include the willingness … to adopt unconventional or disruptive actions to bring about (or oppose) change." Consequently, while the literature

on contention fairly well establishes the connection between political violence and social movements, the two are generally not bridged.

The plausible end point of these areas of scholarship is also isolated from other studies. Eventually groups (be they "terrorist," "rebels" or other social movement organizations) institutionalize, die, or polarize into institutionalized groups that reject violence and their radical competitors who condone violence. Thus, all such movements are capable of becoming or replacing political parties. Yet, the social movement research is often focused on congenial entities, distinguished from the "separate" process political violence. Per the "life cycle" theory, social movements are on a trajectory toward formalization and institutionalization (Lang and Lang 1961). However, social movement organizations differentiate from political parties and institutionalized interest groups by their willingness to use unconventional and disruptive methods (Aminzade 1995). Whereas parties and interest groups relate to the state and thereby accept the state's monopoly on power. So, the underlying logic behind the separation of violent contention and formal politics is the assumption that party institutionalization begins only once it has reached the institutionalizing (and thus peaceful) threshold, missing other possible connections.

There is a connected process flowing among all three phenomena. The mechanisms that determine methods of contention (including everything from terrorism and insurgency to peaceful protest and ballot casting) also determine when and how an organization or a movement will cross the threshold into basic institutionalization and, eventually, party institutionalization. The institutionalization of parties then determines the stability and institutionalization of party systems, contributing to the consolidation of

democracy and the democratic process's capability to channel dissent through legitimate political procedures. The process that flows through all of these phenomena is continuous, even if scholarship of the subjects is isolated. Because this scholarship forms into separate niche networks for political violence, social movements and party institutionalization—only rarely forming connections among any of the three[7]—the process that I suspect exist among all three is missed. That very connection—the interwoven process of long-term party evolution—would allow us model behavior from early contention into co-opted politics.

Political Violence

Political violence is the use of force for political ends and it can include everything from the state's exercise of power to the struggle for power by sub-state actors. The clearest manifestation of political violence is war, inter or intra-state, though political violence can also include such events as terrorism, revolution, coups, police repression and riots.

In the vast literature on political violence, scholars seek to identify the *motivations* for violence. While some of the scholarship on political violence is theory-building, the dominant focus of the political violence literature has been exploring empirical regularities, asking why violence exists at certain times and places and why it takes on certain manifestations (Besley and Persson 2009).[8] Scholars of political

[7] For the literature that overlaps between these subjects see the section titled "Plotting the theoretical overlap" below.

[8] Davenport (2007) explains that the core of the research agenda on state repression of sub-state actors revolves around the pacifying influence of political (and to a lesser extent, economic) liberalization, though otherwise this agenda is under-theorized. Assessing the broader civil war literature, Blattman and Miguel (2009) have similar complaints. They claim that the political violence literature is theoretically

violence try to reduce the accounts of political violence to a common logic of conflict.[9] Whatever the common logic of political violence or the level of analysis used, scholars of political violence seek to understand how political competition becomes lethal.

Before detailing the multiple ways in which scholars have attempted to understand political violence, we must first understand what we mean by political violence. Walter Benjamin writes, "All violence is either law-making or law-preserving"; and at the moment in which law is made and the state found, violence becomes bound to the state—and hence, monopolized by the state.[10] However, even Benjamin does not view this as an end to the cycle, he argues that violence is necessary in law making. Therefore violence is a precursor to the state as well as a result.

Benjamin, like Hobbes before him, also attributes legitimate violence only to the state or the sovereign—created in order to limit the necessity of intra-state violence. However, if the state's monopoly is granted by social contract, then the state's monopoly and the *permanence* of its legitimacy (if granted by the population) are in contradiction, as illustrated by Nagengast (1994):

> The ways in which nation and state are constructed and the manner in which those constructions enter into social knowledge have to do with consensus about what is and what is not legitimate. When consensus fails, ethnic or political opposition, which is otherwise suppressed or subtle, becomes overt.

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incomplete—in that theory often fails to specify empirical expectation—leading to disconnect between theory and analysis in this literature.

[9] Blattman and Miguel (2009) list the competing common explanations for intra-state violence as: competition for resources (e.g. the contest model or the "greed" model of civil war and violence), asymmetric information (e.g. overestimation of power) and issue indivisibility (e.g. grievances, ethnic alliances, etc), among others. This list is not exhaustive but it gives a glimpse of the various approaches to explaining political violence, particularly civil war.

[10] in *Reflections* 1986

Therefore, political violence can be viewed as a two-part continuum divided into top-down and bottom-up forms. Top-down is the "legitimate" use of violence by the state to preserve and make the law. Bottom-up violence is the use of political violence by others actively attack or, at minimum, ignore states' presumed legitimate monopoly. The bottom-up arena of political violence, violence practiced as human political agency, is the concern in this work.

Political violence, as it is treated here, means violence that occurs with political motivation outside of state control, and it takes many forms. While forms of violence including terrorism and insurgency arguably represent conceptually distinct phenomena, the line between them can easily blur, particularly when considering each as a mode of warfare rather than only as a mode of political behavior. The line further blurs when the many forms of political violence are subsumed into categories like methods of insurgency or civil conflict.

This blur is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it has been argued that the conceptual lines between forms of violence should be blurred a little in order to understand their root cause. For example, Gurr (1972) makes a strong case for subsuming the disparate forms of political violence. He incorporates all collective conflict within nations (from "instability events" that can include everything from contentious collective actions and demonstrations to coups and political revolutions). Gurr (1972) argues that all stem from the same genus: forms of overt group conflict with common properties, even though they are hugely diverse events. Merari (1993) distinguishes this combined conceptualization as *political* violence (though he specifically studies terrorism) enacted by groups as, "a mode of struggle rather than a

social or political aberration," providing general typology of political insurgency—a technical definition that avoids moralistic labeling.

The literature that tries to explain the motivations for engaging in political violence is broad, encompassing both studies of the specific facets of political violence (e.g. terrorism, revolution, civil war) as well as general political violence studies. In general, this literature attempts to isolate the coincidence of antagonisms, external and internal. In this far-from-exhaustive review of the political violence literature, I will briefly introduce the broad field of scholarship. For the sake of brevity, this review emphasizes ways in which these disparate literatures overlap in theory and empirical study. The categories of overlap run the gamut from individual motivations (Gurr, 1979; Kaplan 1978; Nieburg 1969) to structural or situational preconditions (Midlarski 1988; Mueller 1985). I will divide a review of this literature into two parts. The first part looks at theories of violence that see the individual or the group at the core of explanation. These theories include psychological models of violence and group organization literatures as well as the rational actor model of violence. The second area of scholarship sees the roots of violence in the context of behavior. Specifically, this group views human behavior as influenced by the structure of behavior.

Violence stemming from individuals

This viewpoint explains violence by looking at the individuals and groups participating in it. At the root of political violence research are key assumptions about behavioral motivation. Dollard et al (1939) states "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration…[and the] existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression." This explanation, though rooted in individual

behavior, can be voiced for the collective as well: the occurrence of aggressive behavior in the collective is rooted in some form of frustration. Political violence then represents a natural response of the collective to real or imagined socio-political frustrations. This literature is diverse, including psychological theories of violence (e.g. Lebon 1896), relative deprivation literature that explains individual justifications for violence by the aggregate (Gurr 1970), social structure theory, and group organization models. I will briefly describe each area of research and their corresponding theories below.

Psychological: Early psychological theories viewed violence as antisocial behavior rooted in radical personalities and individual pathology (e.g. LeBon 1896).[11] The psychological theories often view those engaging in political violence as extreme narcissists (Victoroff 2005) and study personality disorders in leaders of violent groups and their followers.[12] However, lacking widespread empirical support, the psychological study of terrorism has, for the most part, evolved to focus primarily on the individual within his social context. The social-psychological models of political violence couch the study of cognitive processes within the social environment (Southwood 1969). Thus, the core of the psychological approach states that frustration and its violent result are best explained by, "a focus on the *psychological interpretation* of material conditions and the options *seen* to be able to overcome *perceived* [political] injustices," (Moghaddam 2007).[13] In this scholarship, it is not objective conditions that universally result in the use of violence by individuals. Rather, this approach would theorize that the ways individuals translate their conditions and behavioral options shape behavioral outcomes.

[11] For a review of this early literature: Wilkinson 1979.
[12] For a review of this literature: Merari 1993.
[13] italics in original

The social-psychological study of violence has had intermittent empirical success forming aggregate conclusions about political violence: The field of psychology has found some evidence that, controlling for salience of identity, the experience of systematic discrimination strongly predicts an individual's acceptance of violent behavior (Caldwell, Kohn-Wood, Schmeelk-Cone, Chavous and Zimmerman 2004). Although risk factors alone do not explain individual use of violence, structural violence from the state does increase violence in the aggregate as well as the acceptability of violence as a form of behavior at the individual level (Kosterman et al 2001). The environment of discrimination, and its resulting lessened opportunities, helps to shape individual *susceptibility* to the use of violence, even if it does not directly determine individual *choice* to use violence.

Relative Deprivation: One particular theory to come from the social-psychological approach to violence is relative deprivation. This theory specifically studies the *perception* of deprivation, specifically. The relative deprivation approach, spearheaded by Gurr (e.g. Jan. 1968 (a); 1968 (b); 1970), is rooted in theories of frustration but formed for the aggregate in a context of economic or political inequality.[14] Gurr (1968 b) defines relative deprivation as "perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectation (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods they think they are able to keep)" (1104). By focusing on real or perceived discrepancies between optimum and premium achievement levels for a group, relative deprivation theory

[14] However, the theory was considered even before (e.g. Davies 1962; Galtung 1964; 1971)

explains how aggregated perceptions of inequality leads to the use of political violence by the group.

Relative deprivation usually views grievance effects as linear. As perceptions of inequality rise, the chance that a group will use violence also rises. However, other scholars have viewed the effect of deprivation in a more complex form. For example, Schock (1996) theorizes a complex causative relationship between political and economic deprivation. She argues that simultaneous political and economic grievances produce violence, while having only one of these grievances would make a group relatively less likely to use violence. To disaggregate her model, one would assume that simultaneous political and economic grievances would denote a thoroughly dislocating political-economic environment.

Social Structure Theory: One area of research in individual and individual-in-aggregate explanations for political violence comes from the criminology field. Social structure theory ties structural forces with individual theories of behavior and represents the theoretical predecessor of the social disorganization literatures.[15] Social structure theory argues that violence stems from inequality in socioeconomic conditions. Socioeconomic inequality leads to violence, according to this theory, because it brings to stark relief "the disjuncture between cultural goals (economic success) and structural arrangements (socioeconomic resources)…[producing] feelings of frustration and

[15] Social disorganization theory is the criminology group-level peer of relative deprivation: linking structural justification to aggregate violence. The theory argues that structural discrimination determines neighborhood effects. This translates to mean that poverty of minority communities results in a decrease of social indicators across the board, creating ecological conditions in a community that magnify AND justify violent behaviors (Krivo 1999; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; De Coster, Heimer and Wittrock 2006). The disorganized community is created and maintained through systematic social isolation and exclusion from resources of the broader community (DeCoster et al 2006).

alienation that are, in turn, reflected in deviant behavior," (Peterson and Krivo 2005, 332).

Organization Theories: A final component of the individual-level theories focuses explicitly on how individuals align themselves in organizations. Group organization research bridges an important gap between individual level frustration and aggregate level collective actions necessary for political violence (Zald 1992). Specifically, this group of theories looks as the way groups mobilize followers and the structure their behaviors take. Often using surveys of former combatants, this scholarship assesses the similarities of individuals in order to create a theory of behavioral motivation in political violence (e.g. Clapham 1998). One area of research from this group of literature looks primarily at ideological characteristics (e.g. religion) of the group that underlie the use of violence (e.g.: Amon 1982; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Jurgensmeyer 1997; Lincoln 1985; Robbins 2006; Tambiah 1992). Additionally, organizational theories look to the structure of group formation and hierarchy to explain behavioral outcomes (e.g. Mayntz 2004). In total, these studies look at how groups form, organize, and offer incentives to individuals to participate in violence.

Rational actor theories: The rational actor model, while imbedded in much of the political violence literature above, also has its own unique contribution to the study of political violence. The rational choice approach to political analysis is developed around the postulation that the behavior of individuals will conform to assumptions of rationality. The assumption of rationality, borrowed from the field of economics, generally states that individual actors have preferences that can be rank-ordered so as to maximize their own utility. "Rationality" is a core theme of this literature—individuals

are viewed as inherently motivated by self-interest, as self-utility maximizers. This assumption represents a simple starting point—that actors behave in a manner that will benefit themselves—from which empirically testable hypotheses flow.

The rational model of violent behavior weighs the benefits of participation in a group or organization against the costs of violence in order to understand the *rationality* of violence (e.g. Pape 2003; Berman and Laitin, 2005). The rational actor model of violence imagines two separate situations. One, that violence is a rational response to changing conditions. Two, that those engaged in political violence deviate from narrow self-interest and rational expectations and necessitate a relatively broader understanding of rationality assumptions (e.g. Caplan 2006). Both imagined situations would suggest that viewing the individual within his context represents an exercise in understanding the complex incentive/options matrix that leads to participation in collective political violence.

One important trend in rational choice literature helps to explain different utilities for violent behavior. This trend changes the way scholars view rationality, moving from self-interested utility maximization to group-focused utility maximization. For example, Gupta (2008) models shifts in individual preferences from self-utility to collective utility in response to the environment. This shift, he claims, embodies the calculus for all forms of activists' violent and non-violent activities. Another important trend considers hidden costs and benefits as well as differing views on the outcome, looking beyond the surface-level utility calculation. These hidden calculations include threats to family, added economic benefits of group membership and information scarcity that, collectively, lead

to an overvaluation of the individual's contribution to the goal (e.g. Berman and Laitin 2005; Caplan 2006; Gambetta 2005).

A final trend in the rational choice literature on violence is the concept of *rational irrationality* in which the benefits of clinging to a hoped-for outcome outweigh the costs of a more informed decision process (Caplan 2006). In this literature, the cost of rationality outweighs the price of irrationality because the game is seen to be fixed, making the outcome external. For example, if with any conceivable outcome of their calculations, the individual feels that they will die, they are more apt to buy into an irrational belief system that makes the value of their death seem higher than it might otherwise be. Collectively, these trends add a compelling way to look at how violence comes about.

Violence stemming from the structure

The final group of literatures on political violence discussed in this review are those that look at how the external environment—the structure in which a group operates—shapes violent outcomes. I will focus specifically on two primary components of structure. One, political structure and two, economic conditions that influence propensity to violence by groups and individuals.[16] The first is the most widely studied structural explanation of violence, explaining the source of violence in low economic development or economic inequities. The second category, political space, is said to determine the opportunity for violence. In this literature, limited freedoms and repression in authoritarian regimes are conducive to violence (e.g. Welmer 1981). Alternately, too

[16] We could also look at cultural structure and social structure in this literature but for the sake of brevity, these are excluded

little repression and too much political space is also conducive to violence by allowing free reign to groups bent on the use of violence. Both explanations of political structure view the political space as granting more or less opportunity to utilize violence, shaping the types of violence that will occur within different political regimes by either creating or alleviating political frustrations.

Economic structure: Marxist theory claims that political actions—as a struggle against oppression—are economically determined. Modernization theories also view violence as determined by economic forces. Specifically, modernization theorists view violence as a response to rapid societal changes that go hand in hand with economic development, called a "birth pang for…deliverance" of economic development (Gupta 2008, 24). All scholars of economic structure would expect that during the process of economic change, if portions of the population are excluded from advances of modernization, they view the state as illegitimate and turn to violence for redress (Deutsch 1953; Lipset 1963).

The environmental syndrome of violence combines the modernization and Marxists views above. This theory envisions key factors (resources scarcity, conflicting interests, and discrimination) combining to create a political climate prone to violence. The combination of these factors form a reality in which the environment limits material resources and promotes scarcity. This reality, in turn, leads to group discrimination and a climate of violence (Baechler 1999).

Political structure: The area of research that studies the impact of political structure illustrates two contradictory evaluations of political regimes. One, political freedoms in liberal regimes (along with restrictions on the state's ability to repress) allow

opportunities for the organization, recruitment, and accommodation of political violence. Therefore, certain types of violence (e.g. terrorism) will be more prevalent in these states than elsewhere. Two, liberal regimes also offer more opportunities for the expression of dissent than authoritarian regimes. Liberal regimes are also more able to co-opt dissent on its path to violence and offer greater political and economic opportunities. So presumably, political violence should also be lower in these regimes than in others (see: Eubank and Weinberg 1994).

Repression represents an important component of this structural account. Levels of repression are determined both by regime type and capacity. Illiberal regimes are more likely than liberal regimes to incite collective violence in response to human rights violations, withholding access to valuable resources (power, money, etc.), or other real or perceived problems. State capacity additionally plays a role in how we calculate the repression's impact on behavior (Davenport 1995). Low end capacity states and failed regimes become unable to provide social services and are also unable to amass the police forces necessary to pose a deterrent to violence, so these regimes will generally experience the highest levels of violence, whatever the regime-label may be. Alternatively, heightened repressive capacity magnifies the regime type effect in authoritarian or totalitarian systems where repression can become so overwhelming as to cut off all dissent, including political violence.

Repression is thought by some to have a curvilinear influence on the use of violent tactics in dissent (Muller 1985; Gartner and Regan 1996). While repression is argued to instigate violence in the recipients, once state violence/repression reaches a tipping point or threshold of violence, it diminishes violence. Therefore, while high

increases in repression, specifically "indiscriminate, reactive state repression," should result in a reduction of non-violent behavior and an increase in violent contentious action (Wiktorowicz 2004), excessively high repression should quash all actions. Very large-scale repression should hinder all activities of an organization because it will fear annihilation, or at minimum, burnout by its constituents. Inconsistent repression, should lead to higher levels of violence, all things equal.

In summary, the political violence literature forms a complex web of explanations for violent behaviors. It incorporates the individual and the individual in aggregate as well as the structure of behavior into explanations of violent actions. Next, I discuss the social movement literature. Social movement studies substantiate and expand on the political violence literatures; looking at political action from both angles.

The study of social movements and political mobilization

Before discussing elements of social movement theory, we must understand what social movements are. Social movements are defined as expressions of, "collective challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow 1994, 3). Social movements are formal or semi-formal organizations of people consciously challenging an existing order, system, or value (Walton and Smith 2000).

The social movement literature, like the political violence literature discussed above, is a vast collection of theories and ideas geared toward understanding the individuals in collectives. Social movement theorists seek to explain how sub-state individuals with political claims collectivize; how those collectives organize and institutionalize; and finally, what forces structure the contentious collective actions that

come out of these collectives (Tilly 1998). Because this literature includes such depth, no brief review could do it justice. Instead, I will focus on drawing out the two key areas of overlap with the political violence literature above and one key addition that could connect these two areas of study to the next subject covered, parties.

I will first look closely at the mobilization structure and opportunity literatures. These two literatures correspond closely with the individual/group and structural categories above and additionally bridge the two. Collectively, they form an expanded understanding of how these two views of behavior could extend beyond the study of violence and into the study of all political behaviors. Following a discussion of these two contributions from social movement theory, I will consider an additional component of social movement theory that informs this work by providing a route between violent and non-violent actions. Specifically, I consider the theory of change embedded in social movement literature.

Mobilizing structures: The sine qua non of social movement research came typically in the question of why movements form and how they organize thereafter. Much like the political violence literature discussed above, frustrations were considered a primary component of this calculation. Traditionally, a new grievance or other precipitating cause explained this phenomenon. However, many social movement theorists argue that grievances, even rising ones, are relatively constant. Therefore, grievances are only a necessary cause for group formation and actions, not sufficient cause. Social movement theorists studying mobilizing structures provide additional caveats to the traditional frustration/grievance approach, citing other necessary factors that explain why social movements arose at particular times and places.

One key necessary condition found in this literature involves resource mobilization. These scholars point out the importance of resources (fiscal, human, etc) in determining the movement from individual frustrations to group mobilization. In this theory, internal and external resources are gathered to meet a minimum threshold for the creation of a movement and then are strategically deployed by "entrepreneurs" to maintain mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1997). Thus, social movement organizations and the individual entrepreneurs within them enable individuals to collectivize around their grievances. These collectives could mobilize in peaceful and/or violent actions and could even eventually change into something like institutionalized political structures such as interest groups and political parties.

This scholarship contributes to the political violence literature by illustrating that both grievances and resources add to group organization and behavior. Specifically, forms of financial and human support become integral components of the understanding of political violence as well as political behaviors in general.

Political opportunity: Another overlapping theme between the two literatures is the role political space plays in group behaviors. Social movement theory contributes a wealth of information on political opportunity to this conversation. The simplified definition of political opportunity includes the semi-permanent dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or discourage group action by providing support for (or threats against) political challenge (Tarrow 1994; 1998). The opportunity literature explains how the environment impacts the formation of organizations and constraints on their subsequent behavior (Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Political opportunity study overlaps with the political structure of political violence

discussed above and expands on it. This literature emphasizes the context in social movement development and behavior over time including: political constraints, access to power, stability of power relations/elite alliances, and institutional capacity (Tarrow 1994).

Much like the political violence literature, the political opportunity literature also views the openness of a society as constraining or enabling action. Of particular interest, like the political structure studies above, is the degree to which group action is squashed by (or incentivized by) authorities (Eisinger 1973). "Openness" in cross-national analysis of this phenomenon is often conceptualized as levels of state deterrence or repression though this has slightly more complex implications than in the political violence literature. Repression in this literature not only limits the space in which groups can act but also independently forms a justification for action. For example, Lichbach (1987) and others argue that political actions, particularly violent behaviors, links to degree of state repression; concluding that violence from above (military repression or other means) creates an environment of brutality mirrored in the behavior of sub-national units (see: Snyder 1976; Zimmerman 1980). Repression thus creates "a sense of injustice, legitimates a call to arms, and forces insurgents into clandestine organizations that become increasingly isolated from…society and countervailing pressures" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 21)—creating a political environment of brutality.

Evolutionary frameworks in social movement theory

To create a space for multiple theories of social movement behavior, many scholars tie the disparate areas of social movement scholarship together into a pathway. These scholars assume that all of the processes involved in the creation and activism of

social movement organizations become in some way additive, contributing to a path of evolution. Those who adopt the evolutionary framework of a "life cycle" approach to social movements treat the formalization and institutional accommodation of social movement organizations as part of a single process (Lang and Lang 1961 in Aminzade 1995). These scholars imagine that, with formalization and institutionalization, social movements will become less accepting of disruptive actions and generally become co-opted into formal political sphere. Some scholars dissent against this view, imagining the possibility for concurrent development. These scholars argue that the formalization of an organization is compatible with embracing militant strategies and a disruptive set of actions (see, for example Gamson 1975).

In total, social movement scholarship ties in with studies of political violence and sets the groundwork for this present analysis. Both the opportunity and mobilization literatures link group behaviors to the structural constraints of violence as well as to the individual motivations explained in political violence scholarship. Further, the evolutionary pathway, even if viewed as a concurrent evolution, ties movements from violence to party institutionalization. While the social movement and political violence literatures will be emphasized in the theory of Janus behavior designed below, an imagined evolutionary endpoint for these groups is important to discuss. To that purpose, I will now consider the party institutionalization literature.

Party Institutionalization

I argue here that the three literatures covered overlap and importantly that the social movement organizations emphasized in this work will span the breadth of all three areas of scholarship: violence, social movement, and eventually (ideally) political parties.

Much of the individual party institutionalization scholarship begins at a later stage of party development than what I argue is at play in this work. When parties are already established within a relatively competitive system, party institutionalization literature tries to explain their later consolidation. In contrast, the view imagined in this work tries to formulate the theoretical predecessor to the party literature. Specifically, I set the groundwork to study the theoretical starting point of party, particularly in the Janus movement cases. I will first briefly explain where the party institutionalization literature sits currently.

Party system institutionalization often ties to democratization and liberalization. It has been argued that the development of political parties and the open political space for their participation comprise the primary components of a transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005).[17] Despite plausible destabilization caused by extremist parties (see: Linz 1978; Powel 1982), the general consensus is that parties do more good than harm and contribute to state democratization.[18] They transmit democratic norms, provide forums for conflict, and compromise; facilitating civil competition—all key political goods (Coppedge 1993; Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005). With such grand expectations, it comes as quite a surprise that the individual party institutionalization literature is still stunted by a lack of scholarship on the disaggregated units of the equation. This section will discuss the party system institutionalization literature generally and the small literature devoted to party-specific institutionalization that occurs within that literature. Then, I discuss areas in which this literature needs to be expanded, areas addressed by this project.

[17] Other examples include: Huntington 1968; McAllister and White 1995; Satori 1976
[18] See, for example: Diamond 1988; Merkel 1996; Mainwaring 1998.

Party system institutionalization

Political parties have a number of roles, "[parties] aggregate preferences, channel demands from voters, recruit leaders, represent constituents, and mobilize citizens on political interests" (Lindberg 2007, 218). However, the party institutionalization literature primarily focuses not on individual components but how they are configured in relation to each other and the stability of that configuration: the party system. The idea here is, in order to carry out their roles, parties must be able to present stable alternatives to voters (Satori 1976). To determine if a party system is institutionalized, scholars study the stability of the number of parties relative to constituent lines. In this study, scholars assess whether there is fluidity in the number of parties or if the parties—like their roots in society—are relatively static. If the relative number of parties is static, the party system is thought to contribute to democratization. If parties are fluid, increasing levels of mobilization (party activities) combined with lack of organizational stability and institutionalization will destabilize democracy (Huntington 1968).

Party (single) institutionalization

Though party systems' theorists believe that it is the stability of the configuration of parties, the disaggregation of this process—individual party institutionalization—is relatively less thoroughly treated in this field of study. In fact, until the past decade, individual party institutionalization was subsumed or overlooked in the party system institutionalization literature. Individual parties were largely ignored despite the fact that a party system represents a separate entity from the sum of its parts, and that parties are separate from the system that structures their interaction. What analysis has addressed within-party institutionalization has primarily emphasized parties of new democracies of

the third wave (e.g. Basedau and Stroh 2008; Panebianco 1998; Randall and Svasand 2002). However, some scholars have attempted to show the importance of individual party institutionalization *separately from* (Panebianco 1988) and *relating to* party system institutionalization (e.g. Randall and Svasand 2002).

The individual party institutionalization literature gives brief treatment to early parties. Randall and Svasand (2002) label the early process of party growth "party-building" which they claim is the construction of a party out of one or two processes. First, the party can be created from "penetration," growing out of a central core; and second, the party can arise from a process of diffusion "in which the party emerged more diffusely out of 'spontaneous germination' from below." The entire process is reversible—a party may die or become deinstitutionalized when it is marginalized by new (replacement) parties or during regime changes, etc. However, parties often retain some shell of their former selves (i.e. a preexisting organizational base) and therefore can be said to be ahead of the game when a space opens up for them to compete again.

The evolutionary process subtly imagined in this literature begins at the organizational level. Rudimentary parties are organizations, rather than institutions, that later become institutions as the process develops. However, this fetal stage of party evolution is not often of interest to party institutionalization scholars. The party institutionalization process in this literature often does not begin at the organizational stage.[19] Rather, it begins at the point the party becomes established. In order to pave the way for my own project, I will now discuss the ways that the party literature could be expanded and linked to the social movement and political violence literatures.

[19] The scholarship that does address the organizational stage is generally descriptive, rather than theoretical or empirical analysis, and separated from the system institutionalization scholarship.

Expansions

Two related elements of party institutionalization literature need expansion to fully cover the earliest phases of party institutionalization that would make the leap of faith between parties and their contribution to *democratization* (rather than just democratic consolidation) plausible. With an eye to the neglected area of study that is of interest in this work, I look closely at transitioning regime space and transition "parties." I will address two important questions in this discussion. First, *what is a real party system*? The party system institutionalization literatures as well as the party institutionalization literature focus primarily on parties' operation within relatively open regimes despite the claim that parties influence the transition of authoritarian regimes to democracy. If the party system literature is limited to only explaining established party competition, it misses one fundamental element of the argument, that parties shape transitions *to* democracy.

Second, *what is a party?* When that space of semi-freedom appears in an authoritarian regime or an early liberalizing regime, what groups are parties? Are only the established and legally defined groups (those that perfectly mimic their cohorts in western democracies) considered part of the party system? If so, what about groups transitioning between social movement organizations and official parties: the organizations representing early parties, the *Janus* groups? The answer to both of these questions will help determine if there is connecting behavior between political violence, social movements that engage contentious collective actions, and the parties that eventually help render consolidated democracy in liberalizing states. Specifically, it will

help to explain how party competition reigned in and how it becomes focused into the pluralistic space of the new regime.

1) *What is the party system:* Party system scholars say systems involve relationships between the aggregate. Therefore, in spaces of semi-freedom where party competition is limited, party systems are essentially not "real." Randal and Svasand (2002) provide a counter-argument. They inform us that party systems can institutionalize without a competitive environment (e.g. Mexico under PRI dominance or Ghana's CPP under Nkrumah).[20] Not only that, individual parties can also institutionalize within an unstable and, hence, slowly institutionalizing party system. This is not to say that a competitive environment is not beneficial for both party and party system institutionalization—but both can exist without the other. Therefore, I would argue that there is nothing inherent in the logic that parties or their early precursors can only exist within already competitive environments.

2) What are parties? Party institutionalization literature tends to look only at formal parties in the political system. Formal parties are effectively treated as the only "real" parties by this scholarship. However, in reality, parties – or at least the social movement organizations that predated them – often exist long before democracy. These studies then exclude some parties in Africa, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere because they have not already passed a threshold of institutionalization.[21] It seems problematic that these scholars conflate the groups being studied with a desired outcome. Consequently, the previous incarnation of a party is a fundamental part of the considered process. In reality, the previous alias of a party often determines the trajectory of its

[20] Examples provided by Morrison 2010, personal correspondence.
[21] See the example of Eastern Europe see Hayden 2005; Africa, see Manning 2005.

institutionalization. For example, a party with ties to a previous regime—one led by an important revolutionary figure or one that spearheaded a revolution—would have greater access to resources and recognition than others. Alternately, like the post-communist Communist parties, a party could also be hindered by guilt by association for the previous regime's failures. In every example, these precursors are *part of* the institutionalization process.

A party that forms out of an institutionalized social movement organization would additionally have organizational structure, resources and recruitment knowledge (and constituency) available to allow it to quickly bypass the gangly adolescence of a newly organized party. For example, the India National Congress's ties to the pre-independence nationalist movement put this party leaps and bounds ahead of other party competitors, partially (or fully) explaining the lull in party competition within the first decades of Indian electoral democracy. Coming from any of these plush starting points, a party could all but step into a ready-made party mold and more quickly institutionalize than other, truly new parties. Similarly, parties built out of institutionalized social movement organizations have the structure and resources that translate into a formal party hierarchy, making them quick to institutionalize. In fact, these examples serve to illustrate how parties themselves can institutionalize even though they enter into a slowly or not-institutionalizing party system. Presumably then, individual party institutionalization would then influence whether the system remains stagnant or progresses through institutionalization.

In conclusion, I would argue that analysis of pre-party and early-party social movement organizations remains an important initial step to a fuller understanding of

party institutionalization. Further, I would argue that this analysis could contribute to the democratization literature by explaining the neglected infancy of democratic components. Both of these stunted areas of the party literature would benefit from analysis of how groups behave in the grey areas listed above.

Bridging the Divides (how violence → social movements → parties → violence)

Both of the blind spots in the party literature hinder the establishment of an early party development theory that works in conjunction with the party liberalization literature as a whole. Further, other areas of scholarship have been unable to fill these blind spots. In order to explain the theorized connection between the three literatures, I will navigate how these literatures overlap. But before continuing with that, I will first make note of how scholars have previously tied the three disparate literatures.

The boundaries among our three literatures hinge in no small way on the first divide (violence → social movements) exemplified by the study of contentious collective actions, which also include non-violent contentious politics connecting (social movements → parties). Second, the study of social movements looks at collective processes in understanding sub-state group behavior, and these can become institutionalized into interest group and even party behavior forming a second connection between the second and third literatures (social movements → parties). Third, a rarely studied phenomenon occurs in the use of violence by parties, forming a connection within scholarship between our first and last fields (parties → violence).

Social Movements and Contentious Politics

The politics of contention forms a bridge between political violence and political parties—explaining the methods used by social movements. Contentious politics are disruptive, but they are not always violent. People have always participated in contentious politics – broadly defined as "subversive acts that challenge systems of authority."[22] Contentious collective actions include violent means: riots, violent uprisings, militia attacks, terrorism, and revolutions. Contentious actions also include non-violent means such as civil disobedience and protest.

When people participate in collective actions including contentious collective actions, the group makes decisions about goals and strategies. Therefore, group dynamics, processes, and resources will influence outcomes. In addition, the socio-political context will influence ways the group operates. The study of contentious collective action incorporated into the study of social movements bridges the gap between violent and non-violent political behaviors.

Political Violence and Contentious Politics: Violent action, it can be argued, rises in response to a number of situations. Both "banal" violence—that which is socialized into the structure of dominance and hence becomes an acceptable weapon (Gorringe 2006)—and exacerbated violence (that as a last resort) fall under this heading (Tarrow 1994). The latter (studies of exacerbated violence) overlaps between political science and sociological analysis of group behavior.

Contentious politics as "normal" politics: The prevailing thought just a few decades ago said that "proper" politics occurred within a certain liberal sphere; and social movements, their organizations and their collective actions were some sort of aberration

[22] Bessinger 2002 in Ulfelder 2005, p. 312.

against this rule. However, non-violent contentious behaviors—including quasi-subversive elements that do not actively attempt to topple or harm opponents—are currently accepted in common political discourse as part of politics proper, making the distinction between the two nebulous. For example, non-violent "creative disruptions" such as the sit-in or strike are now commonly accepted means of protest (Tarrow 1994). Commonly accepted forms of contentious actions can also include non-violent protest, pamphlet distribution, social services that replace those provided by the state, civil disobedience, etc. (see, for example Gandhi 1961).

Connecting violence to social movements and social movements to parties: Contentious Collective Actions

Collective actions can be viewed as both a cause of political change (Ulfelder 2005) and the result of political change (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Unfortunately, little work has been done to explain transitions between forms of contention—particularly shifts between violent and non-violent forms of contention—be it in the social movements literature or otherwise (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2007). Early findings are indicative of a connection among the three. For example, Ulfelder (2005) illustrates evidence of a connection between the form and quantity of contentious collective action events on reduced durability of regimes. Specifically, he argues that there is a correlation between the type of collective action and a weakening of regimes, based on the form of social contract. For example, a violent collective action is relatively less likely to threaten a military regime (and will possibly do the reverse) while widespread non-violent collective actions would destabilize that same regime. Civil war scholars have also attempted to bridge the gap by explaining how peaceful protest can

spark violent conflict (Collier and Sambanis 2005). However, in both of these instances, the theoretical logic tying the two forms of contention never becomes fully fleshed out. Yet, the underlying logic appears informative. The aims of either behavior can be met by overlapping methods (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2007). If the aim is separatist, for example, either method can be seen as viable (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2007).

Social Movements and Party Institutionalization

Both parties and social movements are seen as powerful political actors that contribute to political liberalization and democratic consolidation (Lee 2007). Scholarship on the impact of social movement organizations on policy outcomes finds that social movement organizations can influence policy by helping/hindering reelection campaigns, providing information and mobilizing resources (e.g. Aldrich 1995) though this is not always the finding.[23] Therefore, it becomes nearly a truism to say that activists and scholars alike view social movement organizations as forces for change equal to or beyond the scope that parties can achieve (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988). Similarly, scholars considering political parties view these organizations as providing a mechanism to stabilize and integrate political competition. In fact, the sociological perspective has arguably already infiltrated the party institutionalization literature: providing the value-infusion concept, for example.

These organizations (parties and social movements) are sometimes artificially separated in scholarship despite obvious overlaps between social movement organizations and political parties, including blurred distinctions between the two (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 1996). The fact that parties are rooted in social movement

[23] See a review of the difference: Bernstein and Linton , 2002.

best explains this blurring. Even their common adolescence ties the two: Parties, like social movements, do not emerge fully formed; and both are constituted within social and historical context. Particularly in developing and transitioning regimes, parties remain close to their roots in civil society and clearly resemble the social movement organizations out of which they are formed (Kohli 2001).

Despite conceptual blurring, the two often become compartmentalized in study as "conventional" (parties) and "unconventional" (social movements) creations. As I show below, this distinction is not necessarily valid. Further, while social movements and political parties operate in different spheres—and hence their core constituencies and some parts of their organization differ—they often draw on the same repertoires of behavior. Some scholarship has embraced these similarities reflecting the connection among parties and movements in the field (e.g. Bates and Basu 2005) or even the fact that social movements replace parties in certain contexts (Hochstetler and Friedman 2008; Sanchez 2008) though while these studies might be commonplace, they generally fail to link their movements to violent renditions of the same.

Political parties and violence

In scholarship as well as in popular perception, parties and militants represent completely different things. We view parties as public, peaceful, bureaucratic conglomerates that unify and pacify political competition. Despite any scandals they may incur, they are white knights in comparison to violent sub-state actors. In the common mind, those "rare" parties that use political violence remain antithetical to the state, a throwback to wilder times of yore when violence was more democratically shared among all actors (Crenshaw 2000). The use of violence in the modern era by any group

other than a state "violates the formal rules and informal norms of the contemporary state-dominated international system…[and] undermines the centralized and hierarchical organization of global violence (Crenshaw 2000, 3). Therefore, in the common mind, militants appear shady: terrorists are small, clandestine bands of disaffected youth, militia men are simply armed zealots; and all violent actors are either apolitical or hyper-radical. In sum, unlike parties, militant actors are not conducive to democratic politics.

Despite the distinction, the two sides of this coin (parties and militants) have more in common than we think. In fact, the line between them can be said to blur in quite a few places. Weinberg (1991) cites bountiful circumstantial evidence of a tie between two political organizations—one peaceful and one violent—that scholarship often imagines as discrete phenomena. Political parties and terrorist organizations appear not so distinct, he argues, damaging the imagined "clear" dividing line between a modern, large, open bureaucratic and peaceful political party on one side and small clandestine bands of outlaws. The description of both can be used to provide contrasts from the other while the methods, organization, and environments of each can overlap. For example, many old political parties in the modern democratic world once had ties to militias.[24]

Additionally, parties can be clandestine within authoritarian regimes and militants (including terrorists) can operate in relatively open environments in some states (Weinberg 1991). Alternately, terroristic and other militant organizations can utilize peaceful methods as well as violent ones, either making strategic shifts or simply using the means at hand (see Crenshaw 1987). Therefore, these separate typologies of party and militant are not mutually exclusive. In fact, I would argue that while some characteristics

[24] See the Polish case in: Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past* 2002; or explanations and examples by Maurice Durverger in *Political Parties* 1954.

vary, the same environmental factors influence the organizations (i.e. neither can thrive in thoroughly closed political spaces), and both can participate in the same behaviors.

The evolutionary process of parties and militant organizations are of particular interest in this work. Therefore, commonalities in the two are of particular interest. One, crises and changes that form the impetus for parties are often cited as doing the same for militant groups, despite the prevailing logic that the latter is somehow relatively more random. Modernization and resulting segmentation of the population and their discontents can be seen as impetus for either (Crenshaw 1981; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Two, the two groups can even be conceptualized as resulting from the same political processes. On one hand, groups can resort to violence and terrorism when peaceful politics fail; for example with the Russian Social Revolutionaries (Geifman 1995). On the other hand, organizations can turn to "proper" politics, even forming official parties, after terrorism has run its course or failed to achieve the desired ends as with the empowerment of Sinn Fein under the IRA (Crenshaw 1981).

Finally, groups can splinter, simultaneously creating both militant and political wings. Whether the bridge between militant groups and official parties occurs naturally or as some freak exception to the natural evolution of liberal parties, Janus groups are a political reality. Table 1.1 at the end of the chapter includes an illustrative (but very condensed) list of examples that span the gap between politic civic and uncivic, providing evidence for this claim.

In sum, the three disparate literatures have more common ground than one might expect. Cumulatively, the three literatures inform a study of Janus groups by providing explanations and expectations for behavior and an endpoint to their development. In the

following section, I will tie some of the key overlapping themes between these theoretical approaches to model the violent and nonviolent behavior of social movement organizations I term Janus groups.

Plotting a theoretical common ground for behavior

In order to make a case that these three realms of scholarship connect violence to early party organizations, two questions must first be answered:

1) Is political behavior substitutable or unique to the case?

Are political messages able to be expressed through both violent and non-violent behaviors? Gamson (1975) explains that forms of political violence are, "simply politics by other means" (139). In fact, much of the contentious collective action theory of social movements views the disparate methods as multiple options of collective action, all influenced by the same context and processes (for example: Tilly 1978). Repression, for example, influences forms that action takes. Lichbach (1987) utilizes a variation of this argument to claim that actors will substitute violent protest behaviors for non-violent protest behaviors, dependant on the level of repression. Further expansions of this theory include a curvilinear impact of repression and cite additional factors at work such as regime type, costs of each method, level of accommodation, and political or social shocks.[25]

The take-away message is that not only are violent means and non-violent means not exclusive to their users, but the choice between the two can be at least partially explained by the same contextual factors like repression. In other words, regardless of

[25] See Moore 1998 for a review of these arguments.

individual preferences, the toolbox of behavioral options always includes an array of options, and the choices picked from that toolbox are dependant on the most effective tool within the context of action. With substantial empirical evidence of this theory available and logical consistency with history, it seems that behaviors are substitutable.[26]

2) If political methods are substitutable, can the study of these patterns of behavior overlap?

If convinced by the argument and logic of substitutability, then it would follow that an overlap of study between these two types of behavior is possible. In other words, it makes as much or more sense to study the two types of behaviors together than to artificially separate the two along some arbitrary boundary. If this is the case, can the argument be made that similar enough forces (like repression mentioned above) affect substitutable behaviors as to make a large-scale comparison plausible? I would argue: Yes, this is possible. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) agree with me, theorizing that the same causal mechanisms influence all political behaviors by individuals, groups, and parties. If Lichbach is correct and varying behaviors can be calculated as rational methods to achieve aims—further, if Tully and Tarrow are correct and these behaviors all have similar sources—then the context of politics determining this calculation is comparable. I will argue below that the social movement and political violence overlap to inform this comparison.

The Overlap: Structure and Organization

Because the specific phenomenon of evolving behavioral choice by complex organizations is not directly addressed in the three literatures, this work stays in a

[26] *Ibid.*

theoretical grey area: my subject of interest is simultaneously social movement organization contentious collective actions (including political violence) and possibly even early party behavior.

So, I ask; what determines Janus group acceptance of the "rules of the game" and movement into civil politics? While individual decisions should not be downplayed in this process, it remains the aggregate outcome that is of interest—specifically how these *groups* behave under different contexts. Additionally, I follow Lichbach's (1987) argument that substitutability becomes a rational response to external triggers; so the rational approach is embedded in this study, and only the composition of "triggers" is in dispute in this analysis. These triggers will be derived particularly from the first two literatures.

While not an exhaustive list of overlap, I focus on four specific factors that are of importance in both literatures. The first two factors appear fully or partially structural, capturing segments of the political opportunity structure for a group. One, the level of support, explains the facilitating structure for a movement. Two, repression of a movement, captures the political space in which the group operates as well as the environment of violence. The remaining two factors are at a purely meso- or group-level. In this group the first factor (third in my list), grievances, explains the frustration component of behavior argued in both literatures to be a condition for action. The final factor, organizational makeup, expresses how the individuals have organized. This factor assesses both the competition within the group as well as the chain of command. All four factors come with empirical expectations for behavior change based on their study in social movement and political violence literatures, and all four are seen to *matter* with

some type of consensus across the literatures. In light of the exploratory nature of this work, these four factors will be considered here and expanded upon in later chapters.

Structural factors

Two overlapping structural connections between the literatures exist that could be seen to contribute to the choice of violent or peaceful tactics: the first is group resources and the second is political openness.

Resources: Both the social movement and political violence literatures consider the socio-economic condition of the populations involved in collective actions. The resource mobilization literature takes that assumption a step further, showing how group conditions structure organizational development. This theory illustrates how resources determine the development and capacity of an organization. In resource mobilization theory, resources are viewed not only in financial terms but also in human terms. Thus, both should be considered—the financial situation of an organization as well as the constituency.

1) Financial resources: the financial support of a social movement organization allows it to formalize and institutionalize. Having an external source of funding would seem to permit these processes without limiting the organization to its base of support—granting the organization autonomy, a necessary component of Huntington's party institutionalization. Resource mobilization from patrons determines behavior/tactics (e.g. Gamson 1975; Tilly 1975, 1978). Additionally, support in the form of aid or contributions influences the types of behavior that the organization is capable of using (e.g. expensive social services often require some form of sponsorship in early years). In total, there are a number of expectations that the literature provides for the effect of

patronage on funding. Economic support from domestic and international actors enables increased behaviors of all kinds—violent and non-violent—by providing the necessary monies to defer costs of all behaviors. Therefore, I can expect an organization with patronage to have higher levels of both violent and non-violent actions, all else equal. However, strategic pressure in the international arena would limit the sources of funds to groups seen as violent thus, limiting the net patronage for violent behaviors.[27] Therefore, we can expect that the overall effect of patronage would be to enhance peaceful mobilization over violent, while contributing to both.

2) Non-economic resources also become important in this equation because domestic constituencies (and even international patronage) enable leverage for mobilization around a group's raison d'être. Particularly, the size of a domestic constituency grants legitimacy to the behaviors of a group. Therefore, both international patronage and domestic constituency should provide incentives for all forms of behaviors, all else equal, leading to the first hypothesis:

H(1) Foreign and domestic support will increase both violent and non-violent behaviors.

However, like patronage, we can also expect that there is a somewhat more complex relationship between support and the *types* of actions in which a group can participate. In general, one can expect a movement away from violence as the domestic constituency grows. Per both social movement theory and party literatures, the size of a domestic constituency would necessarily generalize its behavior. An increased

[27] This is not to say that these groups are objectively labeled. In fact, there is a substantial debate on the subjective nature of these labels (e.g. rogue, terrorist). Wile I expect non-violent groups to receive the bulk of patronage, there are obviously quite a few exceptions to this rule—often including those very groups under debate. My assumption here is only that the non-violent groups are *easier* to openly give patronage to so they should receive a disproportionate share of patronage.

constituency would require that the group broaden its "calling" to become more accessible. Therefore, I make the assumption that with greater domestic popularity an organization would necessarily become somewhat less violent than in the past.

So, patronage and domestic constituency should both see differing effects on violent behaviors than violent ones. Fearing international pressure, external patrons would bestow their gifts primarily on the "good guys;" and, therefore, patronage would be concentrated on supporting peaceful politics. Additionally, domestic constituency broadens a base of support, pulling control away from radical elements. Therefore, both forms of support would favor non-violent behaviors over violent behaviors, leading me to hypothesize that:

H(2): Foreign and domestic support will more strongly benefit non-violent behaviors by organizations than violent behaviors.

Opportunity: The second overarching structural component of these literatures involves the role of what has been called here political opportunity, or simply the "political space." In all three literatures, the available space for participation shapes the frequency of actions as well as the form actions take. Additionally, the political space shapes the institutionalization of groups and their deinstitutionalization.

The opportunity literature in sociology gives a systemic view of how an organization is formed and the constraints on its subsequent behavior (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Dimensions of political opportunity include both the openness of the political system and states' repressive capacity. Openness and repressive capacity seem to provide our clearest overlap between the literature on political violence and social movement theory. Therefore, degree of open space should be included in this analysis.

Openness can be at least partially captured by repression of dissent within a state. Lichbach (1987) argues that group behavior, particularly violent behavior, links to the degree of state repression. This idea is not new. In fact, a number of authors attempt to explain the tie between state action and degree of dissent behavior, concluding that top-down violence creates an environment of brutality mirrored in the behavior of sub-national units (Snyder 1976; Zimmerman 1980; Bueno de Mesquita 2005).[28] Repression in theory works on two planes, structural and psychological. A state or other actors' repressive policies can limit the available behavioral options for a movement, defining the structure within which it can achieve its aims. High levels of repression can also hamper morale and exacerbate cynicism in the situation, allowing forms of contention, previously excluded as overly harsh, back onto the table. Therefore, I hypothesize that there is a linear relationship between repression and violent behaviors:

H(3): Repression is incendiary, increasing all forms of protest behaviors. Violent protest behaviors will be particularly evident as repression increases.

Group-level factors

Relative deprivation

A third overarching tie between theories appears in the role of social and economic factors in changing political behaviors. Aristotle blamed poverty for political

[28] The curvilinear influence of repression on the use of violent tactics in dissent is the most persuasive of these theories (Muller 1985; Gartner and Regan 1996). Once state violence/repression reaches a tipping point, this violence instigates reciprocal violence from recipients. However, excessively high increases in repression, specifically "*indiscriminate*, *reactive* state repression," should result in a reduction of non-violent behavior and an increase in violent contentious action (Wiktorowicz 2004). Very large-scale repression should hinder all activities of an organization because it will fear annihilation or, at minimum, burnout by its constituents. Additionally, inconsistent repression, because it gives a mixed signal of the state's commitment to any course of action, should lead to higher levels of violence than before, all things equal. However, repression will be modeled in a linear form in the first test of the model, to be expanded in future models.

violence. De Toqueville (1836)[29] also argues that, if we "remove the secondary causes which have produced the great convulsions of the world, and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom." While a debate appears as to whether *inequality* or *economic development* is the causal force at hand,[30] economic factors seem to influence political conflict separately or in combination with other factors, despite some studies to the contrary.[31]

However, what this scholarship often fails to address is how frequently these structural conditions exist without the presence of violence. By bringing structural conditions to a group or individual level, the relative deprivation theory provides one move in the direction of explaining how the structure can be translated by those within it. Gurr's theory of relative deprivation, which spans the political violence and social movement literatures, makes a good argument for a bridging of the structural view of social and economic hardships with a group-psychological view of perception. Though the economic and political structures are often cited as influencing behavior of all kinds, Gurr makes a compelling argument that the structure is mediated by perception of individuals and groups. Therefore, the complaint that motivates mobilization is grounded in a socially constructed grievance, rather than outright poverty. These grievances shape incentives for joining in actions and the payoff for actions.

In sum, actions are often rooted in a socio-economic complaint. However, simply being poor or being disenfranchised is not enough. Relative deprivation theory informs

[29] volume 2
[30] For the impact of inequality, see Russet 1964; Nagel 1974; 1976. For economic development, see Krueger and Laitin 2003.
[31] Abadie 2006, for example, shows a mitigated effect of economic factors when combined with political freedom, regime shocks, and geography.

us that the impact of either complaint is shaped by the following question: does the group view this problem as valid? While a group may suffer from structural inequality or a lack of development, without the perception that they are receiving less than what they think they are entitled to, the inequality and poverty are meaningless. Therefore, expressed grievances rather than universally defined thresholds of poverty or political exclusion, are the motivating conditions for political action. The historical context of deprivation of the group relative to others in society helps to determine the form that political action will take. If a group perceives that it is unfairly treated, it will mobilize, as that perception of treatment increases, the group will broaden its repertoire of behavior to include violence. Therefore, another hypothesis is proposed to explain the methods of group politics:

H(4): Political and economic grievances will both increase violent activities.

Organizational structure: A social movement organization's construction and makeup will greatly influence the behavior of that group. Irvin (1999) and della Porta (2008) both explain that competition within the broader social movement *writ large* as well as resource mobilization of the organization helps to explain the resulting organizational form including compartmentalization and the degree of hierarchical ordering. Effectively, then, the way that an organization forms within the competitive environment of a social movement will help to define much of its behavior. When an organization moves underground, according to della Porta (1998), it necessarily becomes compartmentalized, focused on one behavior, and excluded from the broader social movement organization, effectively disengaging it from peaceful politics. The movement underground can be seen as a proxy for a compartmentalization of the group. Therefore, the degree to which and organization is clandestine should capture its mobilizing capacity and focus of behavior.

H(5): Openness of an organization will increase nonviolent behaviors while decreasing violent ones.

All five hypotheses are included in table 2.1 below.

Bridging Gaps

This work bridges two key overlapping gaps in the literature. First, this paper will combine systemic and organizational levels of analysis, often viewed disparately in the literature. Second, this work provides an exploratory study combining forms of contention generally studied separately within the literature; incorporating all behaviors from political violence to politics proper into behaviors to be explained.

More important than anything else, this work will seek to form a way to look at a phenomenon that is important to policy but has been left unstudied. This exploratory study forms the preliminary groundwork on Janus-faced movements and changing behaviors. It forms a tandem assessment of behaviors of movements caught between violent and congenial politics. Scholars in the social sciences have often viewed these groups monolithically—viewing only a specific behavior of interest. Where once the specific groups included in this work were studied mostly for their use of violence, they and other similar movements can be seen as something more complex than how they were originally perceived. Terrorism, riots, and unrest are simply methods in a toolbox of behavioral options that includes civil disobedience and ballots. The usage of each strategy—it is argued here—is determined by the context of behavior.

Table 2.1: A typology of Janus organizations

The table below represents a representative sample of Janus groups with a variety of backgrounds. What each of these movements share is having been in contact with both congenial and uncivil politics. The Janus examples can be separated into 5 types: evolvers, devolvers, simultaneous growers, splinters and loose associations. The first category of groups, evolvers, began as terrorist groups or militias and later evolved into political parties.[32] The second category of groups show the opposite progression. These groups began as relatively congenial political parties and devolved into militant groups later in life. Oftentimes, devolvers are "formed" through a collective party decision to abandon congenial politics (Weinberg 1991). The next category, simultaneous growers, includes Janus groups that emerge with the simultaneous capacity for congenial and militant behaviors. This group can include parties with core militias. The next category includes splinter groups. Splinters are essentially militant groups that have splintered off of more congenial entities and operate as independent entities. The final category are "loose associations" or groups that have official or unofficial ties to congenial entities but operate independently of these entities.

Type	Example	Location
Evolvers 	Irgun → Herut	British Mandate Palestine
	IRA → Sinn Fein	Northern Ireland
	M-19 → AD/M-19[33] *April 19th Movement*	Colombia
	Farabundo Marti Liberation Front →FMLN[34]	El Salvador

[32] This category could also include groups who had a shift in power from one based in the militant chain of command to one headed by the congenial wing's chain of command (e.g. IRA ad Sinn Fein).
[33] M-19 Democratic Alliance
[34] The early history of this case could also fit in the "devolvers" category (movement from the Communist Party of El Salvador to Farabundo Marti Liberation Front)

Devolvers 	Italian Social →Social Order movement *Front Islamic du Salute* (FIS)	Italy Algeria
Simultaneous Growers 	Hezbollah HAMAS	Lebanon Palestine, Occupied Territories
Factions/splinters 	Communist Party of India → Naxalites	India
Loose association 	Grey Wolves ------- > MHP *Nationalist Movement Party*	Turkey

Table 2.2: Hypotheses

Resources
H(1) *foreign and domestic support will increase both violent and non-violent behaviors.*
H(2) *foreign and domestic support will more strongly benefit non-violent behaviors by organizations than violent behaviors.*
Repression
H(3) *repression will incite a response in the population, increasing all protest behaviors. Violent behaviors will be particularly effected.*
Grievances
H(4) *Political and economic grievances will both increase violent activities by organizations and make nonviolent activities less likely than in the past.*
Organizational structure
H(5) *Openness of an organization will increase nonviolent behaviors while decreasing violent ones.*

CHAPTER 3: Research Design and Preliminary Cross-National Analysis

Chapter two introduced three disparate literatures related to the Janus faced groups of interest in this work and made a case for bridging the analysis of violent and non-violent means of politics. Further, it formed an aggregate approach to Janus behavior and provided several testable hypotheses that probe into behavioral effects created by both structural and group-level context. This chapter proposes a research design to analyze Janus-behavior, using nested analysis. It also provides a preliminary, exploratory cross-national analysis of the four factors hypothesized to shape political behaviors.

This work attempts to model the processes of organizational change in a way that can be applied to varied Janus groups. The broad, exploratory method in this work weds two specific strategies, deductive and inductive in order to account for potentially generalizable trends. The three disparate literatures (violence, social movement and party institutionalization) provide the theoretical background of four crucial elements modeled in cross-national study: support, deterrence, grievance and organization. Following this starting point, case analysis provides inductive theoretical tweaking based on Stinchcomb's (1978) "causally significant analogies between instances."[35] The model that results from inductive and deductive approaches then informs a final model of group behavior. While some of the depth of difference between Janus groups is necessarily lost

[35] Cited in Skocpol (1984) *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* p. 375

in the search for the generalizable regularities, the combined comparative methodologies used in this work allows for both depth and breath of analysis.[36]

Methodological Summary

This work will utilize a variation of nested analysis as encouraged by Lieberman (2005), combining the benefits of breadth provided by the large-N analysis and depth given in small-N analysis. The order of analysis is as follows. I will begin with a preliminary exploratory cross-national analysis of the four factors determined to impact group behavior: support, deterrence, grievances and organization. Case studies in the next two chapters will then expand on the knowledge formed in that preliminary cross-national study. Lieberman, (2005) argues that analysts should play up the relative complimentary strengths of the two forms of analysis instead of repeating the same tests in each, particularly when all of the hypothesized processes/variance cannot be accounted for in the first large-scale test.

Following Lieberman's advice, the small-N study in the following chapters will not repeat the statistical models provided in the large-N analysis. Instead case studies will be utilized to discuss the historical process of behavior and examine the role of the variables studied in the original cross-national model. Because this analysis is exploratory, other causal forces will be discussed along the way but the four theorized factors are emphasized in case studies. The comparative case analyses in Chapters 4-5 gauge to what extent the processes found in the Hezbollah case are generalizable to the other movements, and to what extent model improvements suggested by the Hezbollah

[36] I would also argue that the combined methods aid in avoiding "the extremes of particularizing versus universalizing" by incorporating both wide-ranging comparisons as well as case comparisons (Skocpol 1984, 384).

case can be supported by the existence of similar cases. At the conclusion of the historical analysis in Chapter 5, I will compare the patterns experienced across the four cases in order to refine and reconsider how to study group behavior in cross-national analysis. The cumulative effort of the case discussion is to provide small-N-analysis-directed model building (Lieberman 2005). After comparing the four cases, I will use the results of small N analysis to inform a final model of organization behavior, presented in chapter 6. I begin this project here with a preliminary cross-national model of Janus behavior.

Large-N Analysis

In this section, I design an empirical analysis that separates and tests the potential positive and negative effects of macro- and meso-level forces on incidents of violent and non-violent political behaviors by sub-national groups. The unit of analysis is the group-year, analyzing organizations representing minority groups in twelve countries[37] from 1980-2004, with a total of 1,789 organization years. Because the arguments on the effects of macro and meso-level trends are expected to apply to comparisons both cross-nationally and over time for individual countries, I employ a pooled time-series, cross-sectional (TSCS) design. The estimation sample for the statistical model is smaller than the size of the data on the dependent variable because of data limitations on several independent variables. Summary statistics for all variables included in preliminary models tested here are included below in Table 3.1 at the end of this chapter.

Variable list

Dependent variables: methods of contentious politics

[37] Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey.

The phenomenon of interest in this work is the evolution to practical politics by formerly violent political actors. The dependent variable is conceptualized as an evolutionary continuum from violent means to practical means. Organizations whose patterns of behavior are mainly violent are on the left hand side of that continuum: the *unevolved* end. Then as patterns of behavior favor rejection of political violence as a method of politics, the behaviors move to the right-hand end of the continuum, towards a *full evolution*.

The dependent variables used in this work are taken from the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset (MAROB 2008)[38]. Two general indices of organizational behavior are created.[39] The first, *Summary of non-violent* is an additive index of five variables from the MAROB dataset. This index includes education and propaganda (termed "orgst1" in the original data), representation of interests to officials ("orgst2"), participation in electoral politics ("orgst3"), soliciting external support ("orgst4") and the non-coercive collection of local support ("orgst5") and providing social services ("orgst12").[40] The second, *Summary of violent behaviors* is an additive index from AMROB variables that includes the forceful collection of local support ("orgst6"), terrorism and attacks on civilians ("orgst7"), insurgency ("orgst8"), administering rebel areas ("orgst9"), and ethnic cleansing or genocide ("orgst10").[41] The final dependent variable, *SUM of violence and non-violence* adds the negative of

[38] Hereafter MAROB
[39] While it could be argued that the components of these additive index are not equal (e.g. participation in genocide is more severe than administering rebel areas and participation in electoral politics might be a bigger deal than representing interests to officials) the purpose of this study is to explain *behaviors.* Specifically, this is an exploratory study of how structural and organizational-level factors contribute to levels of behaviors (violent and non-violent) across the board. In future research, these additive indices will be broken down in order to explain how structure and organization contribute to *types* of behaviors.
[40] Each of these variables is coded as 0 for non-use as a strategy, 1 for infrequent use and 2 for frequent use.
[41] Each of these variables is coded as 0 for non-use as a strategy, 1 for infrequent use and 2 for frequent use.

Summary of Violence to *Summary of Non-Violence* to create a continuum from violence (negative) to non-violence (positive) in order to determine the preponderant tactic.

Explanatory variables: MACRO-level factors proposed to explain tactic change

Support: In order to measure international support, the dichotomous measure for foreign state financial support, *foreign state patronage,* is used.[42] This variable is taken from the MAROB dataset and measures whether a foreign state gave the organization financial support during the year.[43] Another variable is included to gauge domestic support, *domestic support*, which ranged from 1 (fringe—no domestic support) to 3 (dominant organization).

Deterrence: The variable used to measure deterrence in quantitative analysis is an ordinal measure taken from the MAROB data, *repression*. This variable measures whether the state uses lethal violence against the organization and ranges from 1 (no lethal repression of the organization) to 3 (consistently high lethal repression of the organization). Though this variable is limited by it's ordinal nature and lack of detailing in the forms that repression takes, it is preferable to other available measures in that it represents an organization-specific level of repression, unavailable in other data sources.

Explanatory variables: MESO level factors proposed to explain tactic change

Grievance: The two variables included in the large-N analysis for grievance (*economic grievance and political grievance)* are taken from the MAROB data. *Economic grievance,* an ordinal measure for the dominant economic grievance of the

[42] Though similar in name, the *foreign state patronage* variable and the Summary of Non-violent behaviors component "soliciting external support" are not synonymous. The first is receiving monies from foreign states and the latter is holding foreign offices. These two variables correlate at an unproblematic 0.26.
[43] In MAROB, *foreign state patronage* is labeled "forstfinsup" for foreign state financial support.

organization includes measures for whether economic grievance is a major goal for the organization. A measure of 0 denotes that there is no expressed economic grievance, 1 means that eliminating economic discrimination is a major goal and 3 tells us that the organization focuses on creating or strengthening remedial policies. The dominant political grievance is also included in an ordinal measure, *political grievance*. This measure includes 1, that a major goal of the organization is eliminating discrimination. Two signifies that the organizations' goals are focused on creating or increasing remedial policies and 3 shows goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for group. Finally, 4 illustrates goals of creating a separate state for the group or revanchist change in border of state.

Organization: An admittedly imperfect proxy for the form and competitive nature of an organization is used in the quantitative analysis. The variable, *open* is taken from the MAROB dataset variable "orgopen". *Open* is a dichotomous variable that explains if an organization is clandestine (0) or open (1) in its behaviors.

Control variables

Controls from country-year data are included in this study. These control variables are taken from the literature on group behavior, particularly that on insurgency and terrorism. First, in terrorism risk assessments as well as literatures on civil conflict, general fiscal stability of the population is said to influence propensity to violence (see: Abadie 2006; Murshed 2002). *Unemployment level* illustrates fiscal stability and is included from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2008) data. A number of demographic trends also influence both violent and non-violent behaviors. *Migration* and *urbanization* are two key variables that capture these pressures, both included from WDI

data (2008). Missing data for the migration dataset was augmented by the U.S. Census international database, with the final measure capturing net migration per 1,000 people within the country-year. A measure of democracy, *polity2,* was included – capturing the combined democracy and autocracy scores per country year given in the Polity IV data (2009).[44] Additionally, year was included in this analysis to control for two possible effects. First, controlling for year can capture the temporal variance imagined in a theory of evolution. Second, because there is evidence of a small amount of temporal dependence in the dependent variable, year was included in attempt to minimize serial correlation.[45] Finally, in alternate tests (i.e. models 2 and 4 in Table 3.3) analyzing the index variables for violent and non-violent behaviors, each index was used as a control in

[44] The democracy indicator is an additive positive index of the institutionalization of competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive while the autocracy score is an additive index of the institutionalization of constraints to these variables (polity IV 2010). The combined score subtracts the autocracy score from the democracy score, which gives a unified range of the institutionalized competitiveness of a political system from -10 (full autocracy) to + 10 (full democracy). This study uses the polity2 variable that in almost every way is the exact replica of the original polity variable. The polity2 variable includes one clear difference from the polity variable in that it includes a computed polity score for periods of interregnum and transitional periods. While the full validity of this measure is not universally accepted, because these periods represent a very small number of data in this time period and we are additionally not trying to explain these periods. of instability, these computed data should not dramatically bias empirical results (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). However, to err on the side of caution, when regime type is considered as an explanatory variable, the model is tested using both polity and polity2 scores.
Vreeland (2008) notes that the polity2 score includes categories for "factional" politics (for "intense, factional and frequently violent" competition) that can make the variable problematic in studies explaining violent conflict or violent behaviors (403). Specifically, by including factional components, the author claims that polity can separately and tautologically capture the propensity to conflict in studies of conflict. Three components could be influenced by this effect in this data. The two portions of polity that Vreeland considers possibly problematic one component, each in parts of the 5-point scale to access competitiveness of participation (factional competition is one indicator in the 10-point scale of democracy, one on the 10-point scale of autocracy as onee of two indicators in the "PARREG" category) and the regulation of participation category (sectarian is one indicator in the 10-point scale of autocracy and one of two indicators of the regulation of participation). Both of these components of the total polity score are weighted at one. Because this work concerns the theoretical effect of competitive elections, the inclusion of these problematic components is unnecessary if they do negatively impact the results. However, when broken into their relative components, the "acceptable" components (competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on Chief Executive) and "problematic" components (regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation) the two cohorts were nearly perfectly correlated. In other words, this small subset of the polity score does not seem tilt the basic polity score in either direction in this study.

[45] Additionally, the results of fully differenced models were compared to those of regressions in every analysis (noted in text where the substantive results differ).

tests for the other in order to attempt to control for an across-the-board increase in activities

Preliminary cross-national analysis

In Chapter 2, a theoretical model for organizational behavior was built from combined literatures on violence, social movements and parties. This analysis represents the preliminary, exploratory cross-national study of this model. The statistical findings of this preliminary large-N analysis will inform case studies and the final statistical analysis in chapters to come.

There are five testable hypotheses gleaned from earlier theoretical discussion, condensed in Appendix, Table 3.2 below. In this section, I discuss a combined but still preliminary statistical model of organizational behavior, considering all of the hypothesized factors gleaned from our theories. Table 3.3 illustrates the combined statistical models. In total, there are five models; two each for summed violent and non-violent behaviors and one for the combined index of both behaviors.[46] The independent variables shown in each of the models in Table 3.3 below do not uniformly conform to the theoretical expectations expressed in our hypotheses 1-5 listed in the Table 3.2 of the appendix. The first set of hypotheses illustrated my expectations that support would increase all forms of actions, specifically non-violent behaviors. I tested for the effect of support by including measures of *international patronage* and *domestic popularity*. The two hypotheses are partially supported, showing the expected effect in tests of international patronage but very little impact of domestic constituency.

[46] Xtfischer tests suggest that there is small unit root in the DV. However, differenced models were deemed unnecessary and simple time-series regression was used, corroborated by differenced models with similar findings (available upon request). Additionally, while there is a minor amount of serial correlation in the explanatory variables, the fixed effects model returned similar findings.

The first hypothesis—that foreign and domestic support will increase all behaviors by an organization—holds up very well in each model for international patronage. As foreign assistance nears one, both violent and non-violent behaviors increase. Further, the strong and significant effect of *foreign patronage* on total behaviors in model 5 supports this hypothesis. In my second hypothesis, I argued that support would have a greater effect on non-violent behaviors than violent ones. This is also upheld in tests of *foreign patronage*, showing a substantial difference between its effects on the two types of behavior. To illustrate, the significant difference in the comparison of aid's effect on violent (0.408/0.301) and non-violent (0.974/0.683) as well as the total behavior set (model 5).[47] On the other hand, neither hypothesis was upheld by tests of domestic support. I hypothesized that an expanding domestic constituency—operationalized by *organizational popularity* in this model—would contribute to all behaviors, particularly peaceful actions. Contrary to these expectations, *organizational popularity* has no significant relationship with either violent or non-violent behaviors. While there is no significant effect of *domestic support* on behaviors, it is clear that hypothesis one and two are strongly supported via *international patronage*.

The third hypothesis looks at how an environment of repression might lead an organization to respond in kind. In this hypothesis, repression levels capture both the environment of violence and limited political space caused by repression, leading to increased levels of violence. I hypothesized that higher levels of *repression*—operationalized as state violence against the organization—would result in higher levels

[47] Using a hausman test for the two models, violent and non-violent, the difference in the effect of patronage (difference is 0.566) is significant with a standard error of 0.141. Further, the hausman test illustrates that the difference of coefficients for the two models are not systematic, with a probability of less than 0.001.

of protest behavior. Because repression can deter some peaceful protest, I expected the effect of repression to be particularly evident in regards to violent behaviors. A strong and significant response in kind by organizations—answering repressive violence with violence—is shown in models 3 and 4. The fifth model is also negative and significant, showing that repression could both hinder mobilization and necessitate a move toward violent behavior across the board within groups. However, the only significant impact of repression on peaceful behaviors is seen in model one, in which repression leads to the small increase in peaceful behaviors. However, the unstable significance of this variable leaves strong reason for doubt that the theory was properly captured in these models. These interesting finding can perhaps be better considered in the case study considered in the following chapters.

The fourth hypothesis tested in these models addresses the effect of political and economic grievances championed by the organizations of interest. I hypothesized that while both forms of grievances will contribute to actions, organizations will respond differently to different stimuli. This first part of this hypothesis—that both forms of grievances will fuel violent behaviors—is partially upheld. *Economic grievances* are strongly related to an increase in violent behaviors. However, *political grievances* do not fuel violent struggle in this analysis. The second part of this hypothesized relationship is also only partially upheld. In this second part, I argued that beyond a general linear relationship between grievances and violence, the two forms of grievances would separately stimulate different outcomes. Specifically, *economic grievances* will strongly increase non-violent activities while *political grievances* will strongly decrease non-violent activities. Contrary to my expectations, *economic grievances* had no relationship

to non-violent behaviors. *Political grievances*, do negatively impact the organization's propensity to peacefully organize. The logic of this finding could be that one would use every available weapon in their political arsenal to fight economic grievance but with a perceived a lack of political redress, non-violent behaviors would be considered an impotent action. The theory behind this hypothesis, like the third hypothesis, might be more carefully considered by tracing the experience of deterrence in later case analysis.

The fifth and final hypothesis partially addresses the groups' organizational form in an attempt to gauge the political competition within the social movement the group represents. *Open*, the clandestine nature of an organization, is a proxy for both competition and organizational hierarchy. It is an imperfect proxy and its use in this analysis provides underwhelming results, explaining a small portion of non-violent behaviors and no violent ones.

Results for control variables in all five models are surprising, having nearly universally weak or unstable significance in all five models. For example, it seems intuitive that the level of democracy would matter as it captures part of the political opportunity for organizations. I would expect it to positively influence a propensity to non-violent action (by giving an outlet for these behaviors) or even allowing for violent behaviors, per the literature—and neither expectation is supported in these models.[48] Perhaps these two competing forces of democracy cause the variable washout, though it begs further consideration in the next chapters. Additionally, the demographic factor was consistently insignificant—a surprising and worrisome pattern. However, at least

[48] the literature has actually shown that the freedom of association and movement associated with democracy reduces the operating costs of violence and makes it (or at least its reporting) more likely (e.g. Eubank and Weinberg 1994; 2001; Li and Schuab 2004).

two controls preformed as expected. The temporal pattern found in these models conforms to the theoretical expectations here—that as a organization matures, it is *more likely* to emphasize non-violent behaviors (even if it occasionally falls off the proverbial wagon) though the converse expectation is not upheld, an interesting finding in itself. Also, controlling for the alternate method does illustrate that active organizations are often active on all fronts.

The cumulative effect of this model is valuable but not final. Little of the overall variance in a group behavior is explained, despite the inclusion of contextual factors that, theoretically, *should* be directly related to behavioral decisions. However, this model is only a first stab at the general behavioral model, an exploratory first model to be expanded on in historical analysis.

The next step: case study analysis

The case study section will include a major exploratory case study of Hezbollah with minor cases of the IRA and its militia, the ETA, and HAMAS. These case studies will inform relationships considered in the cross-national analysis and provide re-direction of model, culminating in a final cross national analysis in Chapter 6.

The case selection reflects the mixed method approach proposed. The first two cases represent the mid-range of behavior—the ideal Janus movement. These two cases are taken from the MAROB data and illustrate a gradual variation in behaviors over time. These cases are Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Palestinian organization, HAMAS. An integral part of the research question addressed here is political evolution. Both of these cases incorporate variations of this theorized trend in the reality as shown in Table 3.4 below.

Despite intermittent spikes, the initial equality of the two methods (if not a preponderance of violence in the early stages) eventually becomes dispersed into a peaceful-actions-heavy agenda. Visually, the evolutionary assumption would be illustrated with the blue line surpassing the red overall and this does begin to occur in both cases. Though the red line only drops to zero in one year for Hezbollah, an evolution (even if stalled at a mid-level) still seems apparent, if incomplete. Therefore, these two cases illustrate an ideal form of the Janus group. Both cases were chose form the MAROB with one additional consideration in mind. In analyses of each group, cultural variables are frequently cited as shaping, if not determining, their behavior. Specifically, it has been argued that states or groups within the Middle East exhibit an "exceptional" nature through Arab or Muslim cultural influence leading them to reject democratic norms of non-violent political activism.[49] In order to hold these cultural variables constant and alleviate possible doubts that the inclusion of a Muslim or Arab case does not evidence an exception to the rule, two similar Muslim Arab groups are included, both sharing an active Islamist agenda. Hezbollah and HAMAS are also most similar in background conditions such as shared history, Muslim, specifically Shi'a religion, "Arab culture," region and language. Additionally, in order to avoid the possibility that findings from these similar cases might be skewed by their shared "exceptionalism," two additional cases were selected that greatly differ from these groups. These two additional cases (ETA and IRA) were selected on two points. First, both are vastly different from the first two cases with different (non)religious underpinnings, cultural influences, language and aims, thereby illustrating that conclusions drawn from historical analysis can "travel" elsewhere in the cross-national

[49] See examples: Korany, 1994; Karatnycky 2002; Munson 2003

study.[50] Second, these cases were chosen by variation on the dependant variable in order to show more extreme cases than Hezbollah and HAMAS on either end. The IRA and ETA perfectly illustrate the broader continuum of behaviors.

The use of these four cases in the total work will allow a combination of the method of agreement and method of difference by utilizing a combination of Platt's (1992) patterns of case selection, grouping the cases both to include polar opposites and presumed uniformity. For example, the cases of HAMAS and Hezbollah—as Islamist organizations within the same region with similar shared histories as well as ideological and real influences—share uniformity though not the same level of outcome. In contrast, these two cases have little to nothing in common with either the ETA or the IRA, allowing for confidence in a small to nonexistent interaction effect beyond the first two cases.

The cases are selected to maximize variance both on the dependant variable (violence or non-violence) and on the independent variables (support, deterrence, grievances). The variance on the dependant variable includes a continuum from complete cooptation and rejection of military means (the IRA years after the Good Friday Peace Accord) to the perpetuation of militancy without any direct legitimate political capability (ETA). The two mid-range parties covered herein, Hezbollah and HAMAS, have both taken part in elections and even government cabinets but maintain active militias and/or military wings. Each of the four parties has changed their location on this continuum, in both directions, over their lifespan.

[50] While there is concern about comparability of groups from such divergent backgrounds (levels of development, political opportunity, etc) the inclusion of such divergent cases will allow me to highlight contrasts between the groups as well as their similarities. Further, when similarities are found, I can have greater confidence that these similarities *matter* to the total model.

Some notes on the full analysis

In both cross-national and historical analyses in this work, some background factors are held constant while others are specifically chosen with variance to exclude potential intervening factors. Two specific factors were held constant as part of the theory of this work. One, each group studied in both cross-national and historical analysis is a minority or is essentially treated as a minority population by the ruling power within their state of origin. In the large-N analysis, only data on ethnic, racial or religious minorities is used and the case selection follows those same parameters. This means that the range of generalizability of this work is limited—this analysis cannot be generalized to dominant majority groups that use both force and politics. However, I would argue that this selection provides a natural experiment. By focusing on minority population organizations around the world, we have a natural control group, understanding why some organizations choose violence and terrorism and others do not (see CICDM Web tutorial 2010). A list of the organizations included in this analysis is included in table 3.5 of the appendix. Second, each of the cases included must have the *ability* to utilize either violence or non-violence, making them capable of acting as Janus-faced organizations. Each of these cases has a party platform, albeit differently matured, which emphasizes specific local and national political messages that it means to disseminate and problems that it seeks to solve. Each of these cases also has the capability to use violence including militias or military wings, as are common in transitioning groups.[51]

[51] See the Polish case in: Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past* 2002.

The models' trajectory in theory

The general phenomenon addressed in this paper is the trajectory of maturation from isolationist militancy to organized intra-governmental political activism. Although political behaviors are relatively stable, they do change over time. The use of predominantly violent or "contentious collective action" tactics versus pacifist or practical ones is theorized as an evolutionary process (Tarrow 1998; Ulfelder 2005). This is neither to say that this project expects a linear or mirrored process to emerge in the cases examined nor that the process could not be reversed or halted. Instead, linear directionality is used as an ideal type against which a multistage process of development can be formulated to gauge the influence of the multiple theorized components.

Through the integration of structural and organizational-level factors within a historical perspective, this paper illustrates that a fully functioning comparative model of social movement organizations' actions incorporates not only multiple levels of analysis but also the full range of political behavior. The multi-layered model first proposed in this work will represent group behavior that is not static or entirely determined by its historic political trajectory but, in fact, reacts to the environment and the changing experience of abuse.

Table 3.1 Summary Statistics

Variable	Source	Obs	Mean	Mode[52]	St. Dev	Min	Max
Dependent variables							
Non-violent	MAROB	1604	3.51		2.23	0	11
Violent	MAROB	1723	0.57		1.18	0	9
Sum violent and nonviolent	MAROB	1559	2.96		2.28	-4	11
Independent variables							
Foreign state financial support	MAROB	1789	0.26	0 (74%)	.44	0	1
Organizational popularity	MAROB	1750	2.03	2 (79%)	.46	1	3
State repression of organization	MAROB	1751	1.17	1 (87%)	.46	1	3
Economic grievances	MAROB	1766	0.26	0 (84%)	0.62	0	2
Political Grievances	MAROB	1775	3.06	4 (49%)	1.14	1	4
Organization openness	MAROB	1754	0.74	1 (74%)	0.44	0	1
Control variables							
Polity two	POLITY IV	1406	5.18		3.77	1	10
Unemployment[53]	WDI	1187	19.29		14.53	-11.5	65.1
Migration[54]	WDI & US census	1785	1.85		11	-30	97
Urbanization	WDI	1789	2.67		1.32	-0.05	12.88

[52] For ordinal or dichotomous variables
[53] The rare very high unemployment rates come from Algeria.
[54] Migration levels are skewed by a few exceptional cases. First, Jordan was a hotspot for relocating in 90-91 for Lebanese and Iraqi's. Second, Iraq pre-war along with Saudi Arabia had high numbers of migrant guest workers. Finally, Iraq's high negative migration rates at wartime provided the large negative data for two years.

Table 3.2: Hypotheses

Number	Topic	Hypothesis
H(1) Support	Foreign state patronage and domestic constituency	Foreign and domestic support will increase both violent and non-violent behaviors.
H(2) Support	Foreign state patronage and domestic constituency	Foreign and domestic support will increase non-violent behaviors more than violent behaviors.
H(3)	Repression	Repression will increase both types of behavior, particularly violent behavior.
H(4)	Grievances	Political and economic grievances will both increase violent activities. Economic grievances will increase non-violent activities while political grievances will decrease non-violent activities.
H(5)	Organization	Openness of an organization will increase nonviolent behaviors while decreasing violent ones.

Table 3.3: time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent		**Violent**		**Summed behavior**
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent Index	Model 2: Non-violent Index	Model 3: Violent Index	Model 4: Violent Index	Model 5: Summed Violent and Non-violent
Foreign state patronage	0.974***	0.683***	0.408***	0.301***	.461*
	(0.162)	(0.171)	(0.081)	(.082)	(0.176)
Domestic support	0.309	0.322	0.049	-0.475	0.329
	(0.245)	(0.244)	(0.104)	(0.115)	(0.254)
Repression	0.253*	-0.080	0.703***	.739***	-0.524***
	(0.097)	(0.112)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.103)
Economic grievance	0.127	0.013	0.323***	0.294***	-0.156
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.185)
Political grievance	-0.306*	-0.323*	0.078	0.068	-0.338*
	(0.13)	(.130)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.135)
Open	0.369*	0.335*	0.0009	-0.063	0.350
	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.184)
Controls					
unemployment	-0.015*	-0.010	-0.008*	-0.01*	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
migration	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-0.002	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Urbanization	0.11*	0.092	0.024	0.02	-0.075
	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.053)
Polity (dem)	-0.004	0.010	-0.024	-0.022	0.022
	(0.036)	(0.37)	(0.016)	(0.172)	(0.017)
Year	0.041***	0.045***	-0.002	-0.006	0.46***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.000)
ViolSUM		0.412***			
		(0.069)			
NViolINDEX				0.094***	
				(0.157)	
R^2 within	0.11	0.13	0.19	0.25	0.10
R^2 between	0.13	0.18	0.62	0.59	0.17
R^2 overall	0.12	0.15	0.59	0.58	0.19
Observations	927	903	968	903	903

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 3.4: visual depictions of temporal variation (Hezbollah and Hamas)





Table 3.5. List of organizations included in the MAROB data Country

Country	Organization	Communal Group
Algeria	Front des Forces Socialistes	Berbers
Algeria	Rally for Culture and Democracy	Berbers
Algeria	Berber Citizens Movement	Berbers
Algeria	Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie	Berbers
Algeria	Front des Forces Socialistes	Berbers
Bahrain	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain	Shi'is
Bahrain	Bahrain Freedom Movement	Shi'is
Bahrain	Al Wefaq	Shi'is
Bahrain	Islamic Action Society	Shi'is
Bahrain	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain	Shi'is
Cyprus	Turkish Republican Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Democratic Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Democratic People's Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Toplumcu Kurtulus Partisi	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	National Unity Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Turkish Unity Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Patriotic Union Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Democratic Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	New Birth Party or New Dawn Party	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	Toplumcu Kurtulus Partisi	Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus	National Unity Party	Turkish Cypriots
Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iran	United Azerbaijan Movement	Azerbaijanis
Iran	National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan	Azerbaijanis

Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Free Officers' Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Homeland Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Hizbullah	Shi'is
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Toilers' Party	Kurds
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	Kurds
Iraq	Conservative Party	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Iraqi Islamic Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Alliance	Sunnis
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Baath Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Free Officers' Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	Shi'is

Iraq	Iraqi Homeland Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Democratic Centrist Tendency	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi National Salvation Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Islamic Labor Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi Officers Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Accord Movement	Shi'is
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	Sunnis
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Salvation Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shi'is
Iraq	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shi'is
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds

Iran	Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iran	The Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Free Officers' Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Homeland Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Hizbullah	Shi'is
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Toilers' Party	Kurds
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	Kurds
Iraq	Conservative Party	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Islamic Union	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan People's Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Iraqi Islamic Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Communist Party	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Alliance	Sunnis
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi Baath Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Free Officers' Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	Shi'is

Iraq	Iraqi Homeland Party	Sunnis
Iraq	Democratic Centrist Tendency	Sunnis
Iraq	Iraqi National Salvation Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Islamic Labor Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi Officers Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Accord Movement	Shi'is
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdish Islamic Group	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Action Organization	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	Sunnis
Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shi'is
Iraq	Iraqi National Salvation Movement	Sunnis
Iraq	Workers' Communist Party of Iraq	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shi'is
Iraq	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shi'is
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds

Iraq	Iraqi National Accord	Sunnis
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan	Kurds
Iraq	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurds
Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	Kurds
Israel	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Israel	Hadash	Arabs
Israel	Palestinian Hezbollah	Palestinians
Israel	Islamic Movement	Arabs
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Palestinians
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Palestine Democratic Union	Palestinians
Israel	National Movement for Change	Palestinians
Israel	Ta'al	Arabs
Israel	Arab Democratic Party	Arabs
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	Palestinians
Israel	National Democratic Assembly	Arabs
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian National Initiative	Palestinians
Israel	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	Palestinians

Israel	Hadash	Arabs
Israel	Hamas	Palestinians
Israel	Progressive List for Peace	Arabs
Israel	Sons of the Village	Arabs
Israel	Islamic Movement	Arabs
Israel	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Israel	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Palestinians
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian People's Party	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Liberation Front	Palestinians
Israel	Hamas	Palestinians
Israel	Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Palestinians
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Hadash	Arabs
Israel	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Israel	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Israel	Hamas	Palestinians
Israel	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Israel	Hamas	Palestinians
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	Palestinians
Jordan	Hamas	Palestinians
Jordan	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Jordan	Black September Organization	Palestinians
Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	Palestinians
Jordan	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	Palestinians

Jordan	Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front	Palestinians
Jordan	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Jordan	Hamas	Palestinians
Jordan	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Jordan	Hamas	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyia	Sunnis
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Fatah Revolutionary Council	Palestinians
Lebanon	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Mourabitoun	Sunnis
Lebanon	al-Ahbash	Sunnis
Lebanon	Popular Nasserist Organization	Sunnis
Lebanon	Palestine Liberation Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Sa'iqah	Palestinians
Lebanon	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	National Liberation Party	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Amal	Shi'is
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	Palestinians
Lebanon	Phalangist	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Al-Mourabitoun	Sunnis
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	Druze
Lebanon	al-Takfir wa al-Hijra	Sunnis
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	Sunnis
Lebanon	Palestine Liberation Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party	Palestinians

Lebanon	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Fatah Revolutionary Council	Palestinians
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	Palestinians
Lebanon	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Phalangist	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command	Palestinians
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	Sunnis
Lebanon	Palestine Liberation Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Sa'iqah	Palestinians
Lebanon	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hamas	Palestinians
Lebanon	South Lebanon Army	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Fatah Revolutionary Council	Palestinians
Lebanon	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command	Palestinians
Lebanon	Palestine Liberation Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians

Lebanon	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Sa'iqah	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Sa'iqah	Palestinians
Lebanon	Amal	Shi'is
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Amal	Shi'is
Lebanon	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Lebanon	Fatah the Uprising	Palestinians
Lebanon	South Lebanon Army	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	Druze
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Fatah Revolutionary Council	Palestinians
Lebanon	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Lebanon	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front	Palestinians
Lebanon	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Mourabitoun	Sunnis
Lebanon	Al-Sa'iqah	Palestinians

Lebanon	Amal	Shi'is
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	Druze
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	Sunnis
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Phalangist	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Lebanon	Al-Mourabitoun	Sunnis
Lebanon	Islamic Unity Movement	Sunnis
Lebanon	Popular Nasserist Organization	Sunnis
Lebanon	South Lebanon Army	Maronite Christians
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	Druze
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Shi'is
Lebanon	Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestinians
Morocco	Popular Movement	Berbers
Morocco	National Popular Movement	Berbers
Morocco	Polisario	Saharawis
Saudi Arabia	The Reform Movement	Shi'is
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Hizbollah	Shi'is
Saudi Arabia	The Reform Movement	Shi'is
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Hizbollah	Shi'is
Syria	Kurdish Democratic Unity Party	Kurds
Syria	Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party	Kurds
Syria	Ba'ath	Alawi
Turkey	Partiya Karkari Kurdistan	Kurds
Turkey	Halkin Emek Partisi	Kurds
Turkey	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi	Kurds
Turkey	Democratic Mass Party	Kurds

Turkey	Partiya Karkari Kurdistan	Kurds
Turkey	Partiya Karkari Kurdistan	Kurds
Turkey	Partiya Karkari Kurdistan	Kurds
Turkey	Partiya Karkari Kurdistan	Kurds
Turkey	Partiya Karkari Kurdistan	Kurds

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Chapter 4—Nested qualitative analysis: Hezbollah

Understanding the context-dependant nature of the changes in political behavior by organizations requires a systematic historical comparative illustration that can only be provided in the case study (Ragin 1987). In this analysis, I will provide a brief historical sketch of Hezbollah and then look closely at behavior relative to the four factors of interest, support, deterrence, grievances and organization, considering each in turn relative to the cross-national analysis shown in the previous chapter. In this study, I assess the transformation of Hezbollah's tactics over time, focusing closely on how these four factors impacted any change in tactic use. Further, I consider additional factors that might have been overlooked in the original model. Preliminary insights into Janus behavior gleaned by Hezbollah will be discussed in some detail here and throughout the following chapter. This study culminates at the second case study chapter (Chapter 5), where I compare the findings of all four case studies in order to expand the cross-national model.

There are a number of benefits to incorporating exploratory case study analysis into this study. Tracing the expected effects of our variables through one case study (augmented by minor, comparative case comparisons in the next chapter) will corroborate and explain the findings in the quantitative models above and disentangle their effects over time. Additionally, through this exploratory comparison, I can estimate ways that the model might have been mis/under-specified in the preliminary analysis.

The previous chapter introduced the analysis of organization behavior in context. In this chapter, I expand that study to look in-depth at the processes found in one case,

Hezbollah. This chapter begins with brief summary of the historical, social and political context of the Lebanese Shi'a that set the stage for creation of Hezbollah and its evolution over time. I will then focus specifically on effects of the four primary factors (support, deterrence, grievances and organization) as they influence the progression of progression the early life cycle of Hezbollah also considering additional factors that might have been overlooked in cross-national analysis.[55] I conclude with a discussion of more recent changes in the movement. In the following chapter, I compare this case to the experience of other organizations, HAMAS, IRA and ETA.

Hezbollah: history of creation and change

Hezbollah was radically militant in the earliest years. It was probably the group behind the kidnappings and murders of several Westerners and definitely made numerous vows of war against the Israel and its supporters. The early organization was radical: calling on Lebanese Shi'a to emulate the Iranian revolution. It gradually tempered this view and began pushing for the acceptance of a freely and peacefully chosen (i.e. democratically chosen) Islamist government (Harik 1996). Even with this change in platform, the group has remained viewed as somehow outside of the fray. Even recently, it has refused to join the parliament or the government of Lebanon, despite the fact that it later did just that.[56] For all these reasons, in parts of the world Hezbollah's popular image is a radical, apolitical and violent organization that cannot be held accountable by rational explanations. However, that popular view is too simplistic. Just in the two and a

[55] This case study will look in detail at the period between the origin of Hezbollah in the mid-1980s through their first participation in elections. I argue that this period provides a glimpse at one full evolutionary cycle (albeit incomplete and later re-experienced) for the group.

[56] During my interview with him, Sheikh Dikmak was adamant that Hezbollah would not take part in the government without a complete transformation of the political system (until a more equitable version of the confessional system full democracy was in place). His voice proved outnumbered in the not-so-long run when Hezbollah formed a coalition cabinet in 2005, less than two years after we spoke.

half decades since its formation, Hezbollah has transformed from a radical band of ideologues preaching violent, social revolution to a more pragmatic band of relatively sedate outlaws[57] who claim that the ideological goals of the organization can work within the democratic structure of Lebanon. Coming from the simplistic popular view, their decision to join parliamentary elections in 1992 and later the cabinet in 2005 was a surprise. However, considering the organization's fuller Janus-face, these decisions were part of a general trend towards politicization though not necessarily full pacification. This is not to say that Hezbollah's politicization is linear. It has been known to completely reverse (to an emphasis on violent tactics over all others), particularly in times of violent upheaval within Lebanon. However, a gradual process of political evolution towards an emphasis on peaceful politics has reasserted some linearity in times of peace. While Hezbollah's violent repertoire has intermittently spiked and declined, its non-violent repertoire has steadily increased since inception. In order to understand this process, I will start from the beginning, as it were, and explain the social and political context of the creation and maturation of Hezbollah, ending with a description of the environment around the 1992 elections, the culmination point for the group's first life cycle.

Historical and political background

The origin and evolution of Hezbollah is shaped by the political environment and history of Lebanon. In order to understand Hezbollah's origin, one must understand two cyclical forces in Lebanese history. First, the Lebanese state is frail, in no small part

[57] Outlaw is still hyperbolic. They resist the Lebanese fashion norms, they resist the Lebanese preference for anarchic party organization and they resist pressure to disarm. Perhaps only the latter make them outlaws but the former two differences make them unique enough to be outlaws.

because it is formed on a disaffecting political regime that attempts to create democracy by reinforcing primordial bridging ties. Groups have historically been pitted against each other in the zero-sum competition for power within the illegitimate regime, leaving to civil strife. Civil strife then results in a weakened state that cannot maintain sovereignty. Second, state frailty has also simultaneously *caused* and been *caused by* another problem: external intervention. State and non-state actors are lured by Lebanese instability, rooted in the defunct and decayed political regime. External actors see Lebanon as a locale to carry out their fight for regional dominance without seriously threatening their own borders. They intervene, claiming to bring stability to the nation or to protect one or more of the sects threatened by the failed political system, but most just perpetuate the cycle of violence. Without a capable state, there is nothing to stop these warring outside forces from coming in. Consequently, the influx of outside actors further destabilizes Lebanon, contributing to civil strife and further weakening of the state. This leads to more intervention, and the cycle continues. In order to understand these interrelated forces, I will discuss each in turn, beginning with a discussion of the historically defunct political regime and ending with a discussion of external intervention.

The confessional system in Lebanon has a long, turbulent history. According to Nizar Korayem[58] of American University of Beirut, the confessional system was first implemented in 1861 with the creation of a special regime under the Ottoman Empire in Mount Lebanon with two separate governing systems; one Druze and Muslim and the other Maronite and Greek Orthodox (2003). This regime was created by the Ottoman Empire at the behest of several interested states with each vying for a confessional group

[58] personal interview, July 2003.

within the locale: British for Druze, French for Maronite, Russian for Greek Orthodox and the Ottomans for the Sunni population (Makadisi 2000). Then, under the French colonial system, the 1926 constitution and National Pact of 1943 (adopted with independence) collectively solidified the confessional formula based on a census taken in 1932. The confessional system distributed leadership and cabinet posts within a Maronite-weighted, super-presidential system and divided positions below the president by according by sect. The positions of power did not automatically change with changing demographics. Instead, they were tied to the 1932 census.[59]

Lebanon's confessional system helps to create the political environment rife with dissent, specifically among the disaffected Shi'ia population (Korayem 2003). I argue that this system is at the root of conflicts over uneven distribution of power which spot Lebanese history. The Lebanese confessional system has been historically divisive, perpetuating social divisions along sectarian lines. The individual's identity is rooted in the sect because he does not legally exist separate from it (Korayem 2003). In effect, the confessional formula forces the individual to adapt to the civil space provided by the sect. In combination with a weak state, the usurpation of individual political identity creates an environment in which civic virtue is not bred; there is no deference to the state, or to the broader community beyond the sect. Consequently, there has been great tension between sects throughout the history of the confessional system, erupting into violence multiple times when simultaneous regional pressure would break the precarious peace. The confessional system works contrary to the creation of civil society in and nation-building of Lebanon and therefore, has only exacerbated the strains between groups.

[59] With expanded borders (beyond Mount Lebanon), there were now 18 sects in total (Jaber 1997)

War and occupation: Already a weak government with limited reach, Lebanese sovereignty was weakened further by civil and regional warfare. In fact, from independence to the timeframe of our study, no two complete decades have passed without some violent flare-up. The most destructive of all of these conflicts is the civil war that began in 1975 and lasted into the early 1990's.

The civil war officially ended after 14 years with the signing of the Ta'if accord[60] in 1989. In reality, the civil war continued well beyond 1989 because after the assassination of newly elected moderate Christian president, the parliament elected Ilyas Harawi and certain groups including radical Christian elements (e.g. General Awn) refused to give up power to the new leader (Goldschmidt 1999)[61]. The civil war had many long-lasting implications, particularly in the role it played in the creation of Hezbollah.

The civil war is part and parcel to the creation of Hezbollah in a number of ways, the most important being the war's international dimension. As was mentioned before, the civil war weakened state control and created a porous sovereignty, which then drew in any number of outside actors. Over the course of the civil war, many outside actors—both state and sub-state—became involved in Lebanon's conflict directly or indirectly. In studying Hezbollah, perhaps the most important impact of the internationalized civil

[60] The Ta'if accord is officially named the Document of National Accord. The Ta'if accord is a constitutional amendment purportedly reforming the regime to put an end to the unequal distribution of political power and the executive-dominant system. Ta'if created a formula of "equal" representation, placing the Council of Ministers (purportedly representative all of the sects) as the executive authority (Korayem 2003a). This formula perpetuated the confessional system but reformulated it in order to equalize representation between Christians and Muslims. This change shifted the balance of power in Lebanon, previously tilted in favor of the Maronite community since National Pact of 1943. However, it is still not realistic according to actual population figures, which would have the Shi'a, Sunni and Druze communities holding two-thirds of the political positions (Korayem 2003).

[61] It is more accurate to say that the civil war effectively ended in late 1990 or 1991.

war was that it allowed for a "spilling over" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict onto Lebanese soil. In response to actions by non-state Palestinian groups enjoying the anarchy of Lebanon to continue their fight, Israel invaded Lebanon twice during this time, in 1978 and 1982. I will now discuss each in turn as they relate to the creation and growth of Hezbollah.

Operation Litani: In March of 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in what was termed Operation Litani, referring to the goal of pushing the Palestinians north of the Litani River. This offensive was justified by a Fateh bus hijacking (Norton 2000). The United Nations response was twofold with the Security Council Resolution 425 calling on Israel to, "withdraw forthwith its forces" and the creation of a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, hereafter UNIFL (Norton 2000). The US administration also responded quickly, condemning the attack and taking part in the creation and administration of the UNIFL to oversee a quick Israeli withdrawal. The UNIFL was 4,000 strong and eventually enforced the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces, hereafter IDF (Goldschmidt 1999). The withdrawal pressured by the international community was not complete, however. Israel secured semi-permanent occupation of a self-proclaimed security zone, an area consisting of about ten percent of Lebanon and about 150,000 residents (Norton and Schwelder 1993).

This early invasion set the stage for the use of Lebanon as a battleground for two fronts of the Arab Israeli conflict. Not only was it the battleground for Palestinians and IDF forces, it also became the battleground for IDF and Syrian forces. Syrian troops were already involved in Lebanon as part of the Arab Army to help end the civil war but Operation Litani lent an entirely new purpose to their troops there, resisting Israeli

troops.[62] In the process of Operation Litani, Israel also became more intricately involved within Lebanon. Specifically, as a guard against the Syrian and Palestinian threats, the IDF helped to create the precursory militias of the South Lebanese Army (hereafter, SLA)[63] from their base in the security zone. IDF ties to the SLA would perpetuate Israeli involvement in Lebanon for quite some time and help spark the 1982 invasion, discussed below.

1982 invasion: The 1982 invasion, initially termed "Operation Peace for Gallilee" had been in planning for some time, though never in the form that it actually took.[64] After shelling Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter PLO) positions in an attempt to spark the battle, Israel found cause for invasion: an attempted assassination on its ambassador in England. While this assassination was actually carried out by an Iraqi-based terrorist organization, Abu Nidal group, it was pegged on the PLO to justify invasion (Norton and Schwelder 1993).

With this invasion, the IDF penetrated as far as the Beirut submitting all territories to a devastating siege (Jaber 1997). The IDF siege of Beirut had two primary goals. First, to force the PLO from its organizational center—Beirut—where it had kept its base of operations since Black September of 1970. Second, to install a pro-Israeli government (Goldschmidt 1999). The first goal was achieved and Palestinian groups were withdrawn from Beirut under the observation of multinational forces, hereafter MNF, that had become involved following the massacres at Sabra and Shatilia refugee camps by

[62] at the behest of the Arab League in 1976
[63] Though this name was not used until 1984, I will use the term SLA before this time as a description of all militias which—later combined—became the SLA.
[64] Specifically, the original invasion was meant to expand the security zone by an additional 25 miles but under the direction of commander Ariel Sharon, the IDF went further (MEJ 1982d).

"Philanges" Christian militia personnel under the observation and protection of the IDF (Norton 2000). Israel also had short-term success in its second goal. However, the elected puppet president, Bashir Jemayyel, was assassinated in September and replaced with his brother, Amin Jemayyel, a less likely collaborator (Norton and Schwelder1993).

Initially, this invasion was—if not welcomed with "perfumed rice and flowers"—at least tolerated.[65] But as occupation persisted, public opinion began to shift. There was a fear that south Lebanon would be indefinitely occupied becoming a Lebanese version of the West Bank or Golan Heights. This fear was further solidified with the IDF-proposed "Organization for a Unified South" which strongly resembled the administration in the West Bank (Jaber 1997).

Israel began to experience resistance to its occupation. Resistance formed particularly in response to the Iron Fist policy used against occupied populations and in response to additional small but devastating military and policy blunders. One example of a military blunder occurred on October 16, 1983 in Nabatiyeh,

> The Shiites were commemorating Ashura, the most sacred religious festival in Shia Islam, in the market town of Nabatiyeh…The ceremony, attended by 50,000 southern Lebanese, was at its height when an Israeli military convoy drove into town. The Israeli commander insisted on driving through the crowds, infuriating the Muslims who saw the act as an outrageous violation of their holy day. The Israelis, on the other hand, regarded the crowds' behavior as a rebellion against their authority. Then the convoy forced its way through the throng, people reacted furiously at the intrusion…In the mayhem that followed, an Israeli truck was overturned and set alight. The soldiers who were caught in the midst of the hysterical crowd called in reinforcements and started shooting. (Jaber, 1997, 18).

[65] Statement by Ehud Barak, 2006 (quoted in Norton 2007).

The 1982 invasion has been fodder for conspiracy theorists since it began. They ask: how did what was planned to be a minor incursion become a full-blown invasion and occupation, particularly without the support of the US?[66] July statements by Israeli officials that the invasion had shifted the future balance of a West Bank settlement into the favor of Israel added fuel to the speculation of conspiracy theorists (MEJ, 1982d). Some claim this invasion was, at least in part, conducted to distract the world from Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories. One Israeli Tourism Minister, Abrahim Sharir, goes so far as to argue that the cause of the invasion was to sabotage a secret nonaggression pact that the PLO was seeking with Israel (MEJ 1983a). More likely the excesses of this invasion stemmed from over-enthusiastic military leaders or contradictory commands from political leadership. Whatever its cause, the invasion served to mobilize the Shi'a in Lebanon—an already peripheral group—and further encourage their radicalism by adding to the violent context of their mobilization.[67] To understand how Hezbollah could rise out of such an environment, we look now to the Lebanese Shi'a, the social base for Hezbollah.

South Lebanon and the Shi'a: The Lebanese Shi'a are geographically concentrated in southern Lebanon. Even prior to the civil war, the government neglected the south economically and politically. For example, The Shi'a areas of southern Lebanon were "absolutely undeveloped" according to a 1963 study by the *Institute Internationale de Recherché et de Formation en Vue de Development* (Harik 1996). The

[66] The U.S. administration was even quoted as stating that the IDF actions in Lebanon were "disproportionate" and questioned the validity of the Israeli claim that in acted in self defense (MEJ, 1983a)
[67] This is not to lay the full force of the blame on Israel. The civil war alone would have likely been enough to render any political interaction bloody, but there was more that just that war. Israeli invasions, concurrent involvement by Syria, Iran, the US (until the 1983 barracks bombing) and even France all further destabilized the country and contributed to the rebirth of Shi'a activism.

Civil War and additional invasions created a state infrastructure vacuum, so that by the early 1980's, the most or all of the state services were absent and development levels in the south became even worse than before. Various militias filled the void in public services left by the state, gaining legitimacy from the patron-client relationship the state spurned.

The vacuum of state power in Lebanon was filled by militias but militias are no replacement for central authority. Militias can provide charity but they cannot fill a complete infrastructure void. Perhaps even more importantly, considering the cycle of violence discussed above, militias are generally less apt than the state at enforcing sovereignty.[68] Lebanon's southernmost border therefore became even more porous, continuing the cycle of civil crisis, state decay and external intervention. Because the south was ignored by the weak government, it provided nations and subs-state actors with a launch pad for "safe" attacks, as explained by Norton (1993):

> Long neglected by the government in Beirut, the south, with its absence of legitimate authority, has acted like a magnet for regional powers intent on engaging Israel without jeopardizing their own borders. Over the years, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria have found the pull of the south irresistible (p. 63).

As a result, the Shi'a who were the dominant population in the south, were placed in the middle of a civil and an international warzone, further deteriorating their situation.

Shi'a dissent: Of all the groups residing in Lebanon, the Shi'a have arguably been most deprived of their share of economic and political power. Residing primarily in southern Lebanon, the Shi'a have been economically deprived through most of Lebanese

[68] This is not to say that the Lebanese state was ever good at this job either. Actually, Hezbollah might have been better suited for the role. However, its presence as the quasi-border protecting militia was more aggravating to local militias (e.g. the SLA) and later, also Israel, than state forces might have been.

history. Further, with their population growth, they should have comprised a bulk of total political power in the confessional system prior to and after the Tai'f but have always been below Maronite and Sunni powers in Lebanon. If relative deprivation theory is right, people will mobilize around grievances. Therefore, if any group within Lebanon were to mobilize it should be the Shi'a, and they do not disappoint this expectation.

Imam Musa al-Sadr first came to Tyre in 1960 to be a Shiite religious leader following the death of Sayyed Abdelhussein Sharafeddine (al Manar 1997). In 1969 the Higher Islamic Council was created in Lebanon, and al-Sadr became its president (al Manar 1997). Using the council as a mouthpiece, he became a prominent promoter of the economic and political rights of the Lebanese Shi'a. Al-Sadr took a particular interest in plight of southern Lebanese (predominantly Shi'a with some Christians), and spearheaded a variety of co-confessional councils regarding threats to these populations including Israeli aggression (al Manar 1997). Prior to the appearance of al-Sadr, the politicization of the Shi'a population had occurred mainly in secular opposition groups. However, with the persistence of economic and political dislocation, the Islamist ideology (and promise of charity) began to become more prominent. Combining that with the popularity of charismatic al-Sadr, the Islamist movement became an increasingly prominent political alternative. As one Hezbollah member later explained, the increasing popularity of Islamist thought was based in a combination of frustration with the inability of secular groups to accomplish change and the source of hope in al-Sadr's magnetic personality, "…they were feeling deprived, especially that the majority of the Shiites were poor and repressed, until the coming of the Imam Musa al-Sadr to Lebanon" (Dikmak 2003a).

In 1974, Shi'a dissent consolidated into the "movement of the deprived" under the leadership of charismatic al-Sadr. The movement of the deprived almost immediately founded the first Shi'a political militia and formed the impetus for the political party, *Harakat Amal*, hereafter AMAL (Harik 1996). AMAL created and manned the first political protests for an end to economic and political dislocation of Lebanese Shi'a and was set to become a very power political force for the Shi'a (Dikmak 2003).

However, AMAL's upward trajectory quickly met with obstacles. al-Sadr's disappearance in August of 1978 was the first blow against the group. Then, the prolonged Israeli occupation after the 1982 invasion (lasting to some extent until 2000) further destabilized the group.[69] The occupation quickly created divisions within the fledgling and now leaderless AMAL. To explain, AMAL was accepting of the Israeli invasion at its outset, as most Shi'a initially were. However, as IDF occupation began to seem unending, that initial acceptance came back to haunt the Shi'a party who was now portrayed as collaborators. Splinters within AMAL began to rise to the forefront around the invasion, with dissenters claiming that the organization had failed to protect the people. Specifically, dissenters argued that AMAL had been proven unable to defend the Shi'a population against external aggression in Operation Litani or the 1982 invasion. These complaints were compounded with what they perceived to be increasing secularization of AMAL. Dissenters—incited by the Iranian revolution—saw the advantage of Islam in overcoming oppression and foreign dominance and thought that AMAL had lost its focus on this front as well.[70] These combined internal divisions

[69] This date does not include the debate over ownership of the Sheba farms-which is argued to be part of the Jabal Amil, a historic region in the Shi'a collective narrative.

[70] The ideological and intellectual origin of this splinter organization predates the revolution and can be traced to ideas presented by Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in *al-Islam wa Mmantiq al-Quwwa* (Islam and

eventually culminated in the splinter movement, Islamic Amal, which announced itself as Hezbollah in 1985 (Jaber 1997).[71] Hezbollah attracted the more radical Shi'a in this splintering, promising a more ideologically-driven, revolutionary posture than AMAL.

Hezbollah was created in a climate inhospitable to congenial politics: occupied, civil war torn-Lebanon. By the time Hezbollah was created, Lebanon was in chaos. True to their promise of revolutionary activism and resistance, they played no small part in the perpetuation of Lebanon's bloody chaos. For example, their first suicide bombing (credit is now accepted by Hezbollah, which did not formally exist at this time) was conducted on November 11, 1982 (Jaber, 1997). This bombing targeted the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre and was carried out by Ahmad Qassir, a member of the Lebanese National Resistance, whose rosters included later members of Hezbollah (Jaber 1997). By 1985 there had been at least thirty such attacks pointing to a rise in overall violent activities by Hezbollah and its predecessors (Jaber 1997). After 1985, the vast majority of resistance attacks against the SLA and IDF were actually conducted by Hezbollah (Hamzeh 1993). These suicide bombings startled Israel and would lead to a cyclical pattern of violence. This cycle would begin with a suicide bombing followed massive, (sometimes indiscriminate) retaliation by the IDF. IDF retaliation then led to an increase of support and membership of the resistance, producing more resources for bombing.

During the first five years of it's life, Hezbollah even tried its hand at more extreme forms of violence. For example, its members were involved in the June 1985

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the Logic of Force) (al-Mutari 1994). However the revolution did bring the thoughts set forth in this book expanded appeal following the Iranian Revolution and together with the theories that impacted the revolution, formed the intellectual basis for extended Shi'a politicization in Lebanon.

[71] The name Hezbollah is rooted in the Quranic Verse, "And verify the party of Allah that must certainly triumph" (al-Mutari 1994).

hijacking of a TWA jetliner between Athens and Rome where hostages were held for the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli prisons (MEJ, 1985d). This hijacking was reportedly without the support of Iran and against the wishes of Syria (MEJ, 1985d). Though the use of hijacking waned, hostage-taking was a fairly commonly used method especially during the civil war.

However, despite its revolutionary fervor, not all of the activities of the organization were violent, even its fledgling form. Some of its earliest activities will illustrate this fact. First, Hezbollah utilized non-violent demonstrations to legitimize its revolutionary behavior. In June 1984, on the anniversary of the Israeli invasion, there were large protests in west Beirut and southern Lebanon (MEJ 1984c). Scores of other protests, rallies and demonstrations by Shi'a groups including members of Hezbollah were held with increasing frequency over the next several years. The demonstrations protested the actions of the IDF and SLA, marked key politicizing events such as the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and even rallied against Syrian involvement in Lebanon (when Hezbollah and Syria were on the outs). Second, Hezbollah quickly organized its political wing, the side in charge of increasing political actions. In 1985, only months after announcing their existence, the committees affiliated with the Politburo (the supervisory apparatus of Hezbollah's political wing) had become formally consolidated (Hamzeh, 1993). This expedited creation of the political wing and its subsets illustrates that the organization had aspirations beyond militancy and that the groundwork for these aspirations was in place early. Third, through Iranian funding, the fledgling Hezbollah was also to provide social services. They focused on reconstruction and the opening of the Islamic Health Committee to provide clinics for southern Shi'a. These clinics were

initially meant to benefit those wounded in resistance but they set the groundwork for an expanded modus operandi including services and political operations beyond their original base of support. Finally, Hezbollah quickly created its own venues of information. Though originally created to disseminate propaganda about violent campaigns, these venues also enabled the dissemination of information to form non-violent protests and other, more congenial forms of politics. For example, Hezbollah's newspaper, *Al-Ahed* was introduced in June of 1985 followed by the 1987 opening of its television station *al-Manar* (Jaber 1994).

The development of Hezbollah continued through this period with a parallel emphasis on both violent and congenial politics. Even though its founding was revolutionary, emphasizing violent resistance, the organization has always been basically two bodies attached to one head. One body focuses on violent behavior while the other focuses on peaceful behavior. Both bodies are led by this head to focus separately but intensely on their methods: one conducting militant actions the other, more peaceful actions. In the first few years of its life, the violent body was the priority. Later, the two became equal. Towards the end of the civil war the peaceful entity gradually began to partially eclipse the violent entity. This shift culminated in the first parliamentary elections following the civil war. While at no point in this development did either body cease to exist, entry into the political sphere in the 1992 elections did denote that the militant body had been downgraded to a militia rather than the heart and soul of the organization.

1992 elections: The elections of 1992 proved to be polarizing and had the effect of reigniting sectarian tensions (Khazen 2003). Voters were completely unfamiliar with

some of the candidates in the recently (sometimes only days before the vote) expanded *muhafaza* type districts, leading to disassociation with the process as well as radicalization of candidates who sought name recognition (Khazen 2003).[72] Rumors of fraud, vote trading and other problems caused a large percentage of the Christian population to boycott the elections, especially in the Mount Lebanon area. Those boycotting claimed that selective disarmament of militias created a power imbalance, hindering the validity of the election (Khazen 2003)[73].

In an atmosphere of heated debate over what was perceived by some as a rushed and uncontrolled election, Hezbollah took a stance in favor of having the election and was the first to announce its candidates in most districts (Khazen 2003). Even within the organization, there was a minority movement that claimed that if it were to participate in parliamentary politics, Hezbollah would become co-opted by the state. However, the majority of the organization wanted the chance to receive a stronger political voice in Lebanese politics (Norton 2000).

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[72] With the 1992 election laws, electorate divisions were both broadened and narrowed to include or exclude various sects within electoral districts. The 1992 election law created three diverse styles of elections: *muhafaza*, or election by province, *qada'*, election by district and a combination of the two. The *muhafaza* districts were larger, including a variety of sects and alluded to more regionally-based politics while *qada'* districts were made up of a smaller landmass with a particular sectarian affiliation; with leadership usually representing a patronage relationship. Beirut was contained within one large *muhafaza* that was the most direct implementation of Ta'if procedural direction, where officials ran on platforms of regional politics, instead of power granted from sectarian patronage during the war (Khazen 2003). The North and the South both voted within a *muhafaza* region, but the election lists were more *qada'*, putting sectarianism first (Khazen 2003). Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa' were both entirely *qada'*, which represented stronger sectarian ties and patronage relationships (Khazen 2003). As is obvious, a great deal of gerrymandering went on with the creation of these districts to favor the political whims of the more powerful actors—widening their base of power or solidifying an election by reducing sects or other groups which might threaten their election.

[73] Christians claimed that the Ta'if disproportionately disarmed, forcing their militias such as the Lebanese Forces to turn in all weapons yet allowing Hezbollah, AMAL and the Druze PSP to remain nearly/fully armed.

Hezbollah proved itself to be notably politically savvy in this, its first election; winning 8 seats individually and a 12-seat block overall in the 128-seat parliament (Hamzeh 1993). Of course, Hezbollah might not have had such results if it were not for three important factors. First, a boycott of the elections by some Christian groups demanding that the elections be postponed until all foreign troops are removed from the country. Second, recent Israeli attacks strengthened the image of the only group that had consistently fought the Israeli invasion. Finally, logistical support from Syria and Iran including campaign training and analysis of fruitful districts strengthened Hezbollah's effect. Nevertheless, its impressive first foray into politics had lasting effects, signaling that even if it still sat on the edges, it had become part of the political fray.

This brief summary of Hezbollah's first decade illustrates a dramatic shift in tactics used by the organization. From an origin of militancy, in one decade Hezbollah was able to functionally participate in parliamentary elections, with positive outcomes. So, what explains this change? In the next section, I will look closely at the four factors (support, deterrence, grievances and organization) that are theorized to shape the course of behavior in a Janus group to determine what role, if any, if these factors played in the partial politicization of Hezbollah. Further, I will consider what other generalizable factors might have influenced Hezbollah's transition that might have been missed in the cross-national analysis.

Explaining evolution? The four factors at work

In this section, I look specifically at the four factors studied in the previous cross-national analysis within the case of Hezbollah. I display the role that each might have played in the process of change in Hezbollah between its militant origin and later

parliamentary involvement; looking closely at the ways that these factors confirm and add to our theoretical assumptions for cross-national analysis.

Support

International patronage: The role of international actors in the evolution of Hezbollah is exceptionally complex, in part due to the frailty of the Lebanese state and the draw of this power vacuum to other nations wishing to hash out their own battles. Syria, Israel, the US and USSR influenced Hezbollah's changing emphasis. Additionally, though not by definition a state actor, the Palestinians displaced in numerous wars following partition with Israel and dispossession by other refugee states (e.g. Black September in Jordan) formed a non-state entity in Lebanon's south. The Palestinians greatly influenced the behavior of groups within Lebanon as well as the behavior of outside states and thus directly impacted the changing nature of Hezbollah. While multiple state and sub-state actors did influence Hezbollah, and some even provided a small amount of patronage to the group, I would argue that Iran had the most direct influence on the group's evolution via its substantial patronage. Therefore, this section will emphasize the key role of Iran.

Throughout the history of Hezbollah, Iran has been in the background in some capacity. However, its role shifted dramatically during the era considered in this work. Directly following the revolution, Iran supported Hezbollah with all means necessary in hopes of internationalizing the revolution. However, Iran's gradual movement toward quasi-pragmatism subsequently reduced its spoken and actual support for violent

revolutionary change.[74] As a result, its role as Hezbollah's patron has also changed over time, particularly as Hezbollah became more fully entrenched within Lebanese domestic affairs. Iran changes in patronage are not fully linear—they spike and dip—changes that infect their client. Despite the spikes and declines, there has been a noticeable shift in patronage over time, from constant aid that is supportive of violence to unsteady aid that is supportive of congenial political change. It is that general shift that I will discuss below after a brief description of the total influence of Iran on Hezbollah.

Key areas for the role of Iran in Hezbollah's lifecycle include three spheres of influence: ideological, diplomatic and tangible. Though the latter, tangible patronage, was emphasized in the cross-national study before, the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran illustrates that the first two are also very important in shaping the organizations behaviors. Therefore, I will discuss these two briefly. The ideological influence of Iran is substantial, particularly after the Islamic Revolution. The impact of ideology should not be underestimated, particularly in this case. The creation of a group as well as its ability to mobilize a population around a platform is determined by the foundation on which it can uphold itself: its raison d'être. In the case of Hezbollah, the foundations upon which the organization was built were historical Shi'a political activism. This foundation was invigorated by a utopian ideal of Islamic governance, as partially espoused by the Iranian revolution. The second role that Iran played in the behavior of Hezbollah was diplomatic. Iran played a key role diplomatically by stepping in to organize agreements, such as those deciding if Hezbollah, like other militias, ought to become disarmed

[74] I use the terms radical/extremist vs. pragmatic/moderate in this work to illustrate swaying views within Iran's post-revolutionary leadership. The use of these terms is not meant to imply that any Iranian leadership (political or cleric) became "moderate" or "pragmatic" in the ideal sense of the word, rather that there was a shift from revolutionary fervor to something more along the lines of day-to-day fervor within Iran.

following the last civil war. The third and most important impact of Iran is patronage, the tangible patronage provided by Iran. While influential in its own right, patronage is connected to the other two forms of influence as well.

Iran's tactile support, including funding and troop deployment, influenced the evolution of Hezbollah. Iran's tactile support is rooted in ideological and diplomatic sources but there is also something much simpler at play here: political strategy. During the early post-revolution years, fighting the Israeli invasion secured legitimacy for the Iranian regime in the Arab world. Consequently, Iran deployed 1,000-1,500 Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards, in the Biqa' Valley in the summer of 1982 both to "internationalize" the revolution and to gain political capital in the Arab world. The troop support, like the financial support, varied over time but never cut off entirely. Both gave Iran leverage over Hezbollah and directly contributed to their behavior, both violent and non-violent. This effect mirrors the findings of cross-national analysis in Chapter 3, though the ability to *change* behavior through patronage change was not captured there.

Tactical patronage: Large and somewhat open-ended funding by Iran gave Hezbollah the resources necessary to dive headlong into both violent and peaceful behaviors from their inception. On top of funding an organized militia, patronage also allowed Hezbollah to broaden its political legitimacy within the state by performing multiple services. For example, after an early emphasis on Israel's ouster, Hezbollah quickly added a grassroots effort to its repertoire. Heavily funded by the Iranians, Hezbollah was able to provide a number of services to all sects, thereby increasing their esteem in the eyes of the entire population (Korayem 2003). For instance, the first infirmary created by Hezbollah in the southern suburbs of Beirut, *al-Imam al-Rida*, was

established in 1983. By 1987, 29 other hospitals and infirmaries had been established in Beirut and the south catering to every sect (Hamzeh 1993).

Substantial Iranian patronage enabled the simultaneous growth and institutionalization of the militia and the service-oriented political unit. Beirut's Daily Star journalist Hussein Abdul Hussein viewed Iranian patronage ominously, "They gave them money and gave them conditions on how to use that money. They had to embody the Iranian rhetoric" (2003). Undoubtedly, Iranian funding has given the regime great leverage over Hezbollah since its inception. However, the use and effect of this leverage has demonstrably shifted over time—allowing Hezbollah to politicize.

Iran often held its patronage hostage to enact changes in behavior by Hezbollah. As the goals of Iran shifted, especially following the death of Khomeini and subsequent rise of Rafsanjani's power (who favored greater courting of Western powers), Iran began pressuring Hezbollah shift from the revolutionary vision to something more pragmatic, using its purse-strings to enact changes. Therefore, while Iran played a role in forming a revolutionary and militant vision for Hezbollah, it just as equally played a role in pushing it further into the political realm.

The influence of Iran's changing patronage can be illustrated clearly in the decade that spanned the creation of Hezbollah and its entry into politics. Iran's internal divides were contagious—with each side finding supporters in the ranks of Hezbollah—eventually leading to similar divides within Hezbollah. Important leadership shuffles within Hezbollah[75] consequently mirrored a rift between revolutionary and quasi-

[75] Tufayli (a militant) ousted in favor of a faction pleading for an end to calls for revolution (Hamzeh 1993).

pragmatic leadership in Iran[76] in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These leadership changes mirrored policy changes in both groups. 1988 can be seen as a start-point for the watershed power struggles in Iran and Hezbollah. This year began the gradual culmination of a rift between the more moderate and more radical elements within Iran—at this point spearheaded by Rafsanjani and Khomeini, respectively. The final ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war was primarily the cause for this rift, opening up competition between competing factions. As the quasi-pragmatic elements began to win this battle, Iran became a more active player in the world—mirroring the thermidor post-revolutionary phase. To illustrate, Iran and France restored diplomatic relations later this year and opened direct talks over hostages with West Germany, the U.S. and Britain. These changes reiterated the moderate rift's move away from revolutionary fervor and isolationism. While this situation dramatically worsened with the July 3rd U.S. downing of Iranian Air flight 655, the moderates still mostly maintained their hold on Iranian policy.

The power struggles in Iran did not stay local, they also leaked into the state's dealings with Hezbollah. Consequently, as the more pragmatic forces began to win out in Iran, the states dealings with Hezbollah also shifted. Following the release of the last U.S. hostages, Iran cut its patronage of Hezbollah by up to 90%, signaling a dramatic change in the patron-client relationship.[77] At this time, Iran's revolutionary support for militancy

[76] Rafsanjani gains more power over Muhtashemi (Middle East Journal Chronology 1990)
[77] September 1988 reduction in funding from $11 million to $1 million (MEJ, 1989a). The $1 million cap is not permanent—the amount varies over time and increases again to about 50% of the previous dollar amount by the end of the decade although Iran continues to hold its patronage hostage in order to direct Hezbollah's behavior. For example, in 1989, Iran steps in on local Lebanese disputes and uses a heavy hand with its funding to pressure Hezbollah to coordinate/cooperate with Amal and others, deciding to redistribute the funds of $3-5million formerly specifically given to Hezbollah instead between Hezbollah, Amal and various Syrian backed factions (MEJ 1989c)

was reduced Iranian moderates began use patronage to pressure Hezbollah to transform. Specifically, Rafsanjani made a public statement in 1988 challenging Hezbollah to maintain its legitimacy as an innately Lebanese organization by working through the Lebanese politics, rather than rebelling against it.[78] Finally, by 1991 Iran's internal power struggles of the late 80's reached had reached a culmination.[79] The Gulf War ushered in a shift in the balance of power in the region as US battleships gathered in the Gulf. In response, Iran (as well as Syria) became progressively quieter. This shift reinforced both the power of Iranian moderates and their pressure to pacify Hezbollah. The withdrawal of all Iranian Guards from Lebanon in October of 1991 confirmed the change in patronage for Hezbollah, signaling end to Iranian support for basic militancy, an obvious move away from the initial revolutionary export.

This discussion should not be construed to paint Iran as some sort of beacon of democracy and peace for Lebanon. Rather, reflecting revolutionary *thermidor* and strategic pressure from the international community, Iran's plans for Hezbollah simply changed. As a result, Rafsanjani's (and other moderate's) vision of revolution for Lebanon was one of a gradual change from below. This vision was reflected in pressure on Hezbollah to co-opt itself into Lebanese congenial politics in order to enact change. Iran even began sending in political advisors to help Hezbollah compete in the 1992

[78] Most clearly illustrated by the public statement of Rafsanjani in 1988 that as a Lebanese movement, Hezbollah must work within the Lebanese political structure for change (Middle East Journal Chronology, 1989).

[79] The 1989 death of Khomeini shifted the course of Iranian politics, and Rafsanjani's position, towards pragmatism following struggles between the more militant leadership such as Ayatollah Montazeri who led the Revolutionary Guards and the pragmatic Rafsanjani. In Khomeini's will, Khameni—rather than Montazeri—was to take over his role with Rafsanjani as the chief executive. The will abolished the role of prime minister and gave Rafsanjani wider powers of the executive, which was solidified by a popular vote in July of this year (MEJ, 1989d-1990a). Once Rafsanjani "won" the struggle against the extremist elements within Iran, he made a wide array of policy changes including the reduction of funding to Hezbollah, the furthering of diplomatic overtures to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well as severe restrictions on the Revolutionary Guards, including the execution of several of its leaders.

elections and by June 1992, Hezbollah formally announced that it would field candidates in the fall elections.

Iran's pressure on Hezbollah to reform—bolstered by threats to the group's purse-strings—contributed to changing behaviors by the group. The impact of patronage change can be seen dramatically at the level of the leadership. Even in the late 80's, rifts began appearing between actions of more moderate and radical factions in Hezbollah. These rifts mirrored those in Iran and as the balance of power shifted in Iran, the behavior of Hezbollah's leadership gradually followed suit. While I cannot claim to know the intimate details of exchanges between the patron and client, there are public examples of the result of this pressure. For example, during the transition period, statements made by the relatively moderate Fadlallah—claiming the downing of Iranian Air flight did not justify the taking of more hostages (and a later call for a happy ending to the hostage crisis)—seemingly contradict actions of the more radical military wing of Hezbollah still involved in these actions (MEJ, 1989a). Yet, this pressure from above eventually moved its way down the ranks and the military wings followed suit. The divisions eventually culminated in the temporary success of the relatively pragmatic factions supportive of Hezbollah's participation in the 1992 elections, due in no small part to pressure from Iran.[80] Even when Nasrallah, a former group radical, took over power from Musawi after his assassination in 1991, he followed the goal of participation in Parliament.

[80] This is not to say that this transition was a simple one. Particularly between 1989 and 1991,when the power struggles became public knowledge, the transition led to conflict within the group. For instance , in1990 Hezbollah publically stated that it would only accept orders from former interior minister Muhtashemi (one of the more extremist elements within Iran ousted under the start of Rafsanjani's rule). This statement shows temporary sway in power of the radical faction (probably a reprisal for Rafsanjani's November 1989 dismissal of four of Hezbollah's leadership following a visit to Lebanon by Muhtashemi). Also, contradictory public statements by Hezbollah and Iran about the release of hostages throughout this time frame illustrate internal strife. Further, even in late December of 1991, there were hold outs among

Whatever assistance Iran might have given in supporting the politicization of Hezbollah, I would argue that its patronage is not entirely politicizing. Iran's role as patron actually hinders the full realization of Hezbollah's evolution towards congenial politics. In order for Hezbollah to ever fully evolve, this relationship must become more distant as journalist Antoine Youssef told me in an interview,

> The biggest challenge of Hezbollah at the end of the day is that its ideological and religious base of reference is Iran, so it's very hard to disassociate with [sic] Iran. But Hezbollah needs to do this if the party wants to go on in the Lebanese political system (2003).

Domestic constituency: Contrary to a lack of empirical support for the effect of domestic constituency in the cross national analysis, this case illustrates some empirical evidence for the influence of domestic constituency in group behavior. Domestic support played an interesting role in the behavior of Hezbollah, though perhaps a less important role than patronage. The group's earliest years coincided with heightened popular disillusionment with IDF occupation across most of the population. Therefore, there was a conducive environment to violent resistance favored by the fledgling organization (Korayem 1999; MEJ 1985; 1986). However, as the IDF withdrew to hold only a small portion of Lebanon, this incendiary public opinion faded. Without public support for violence, the organization had to expand its modus operandi in order to gain a broader base of support with the population. Here, the expanded social services and propaganda wing of the organization came into play along with gradually shifting rhetoric from "Islamic state of Lebanon" to "Islamist party within a democratic Lebanon." This strategic shift illustrates the organization's consideration of the broader domestic

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Hezbollah leadership elites as evidenced in Shakyh Fadlallah's statement that Hezbollah would not join the new government or take seats in Parliament. Despite these "hiccups" the eventual transition did occur, as evidenced in Hezbollah's participation in the 1992 elections.

constituency. However, it does not provide conclusive evidence that the organization changed its behaviors, only its propaganda.

I would argue that the influence of domestic support on Hezbollah did not fully take effect until it became a part of formal political competition. With the inclusion into formal politics, the constituency of Hezbollah broadened with a concurrent platform shift to attract followers outside of the historically deprived southern Shi'a. Nizar Hamzeh (1993) explains this transition,

> When Hizbullah took [sic] its decision to participate, it was clearly admitting not only the realities of the Lebanese system but also that the road to an Islamic State could be a model of participation rather than a revolutionary approach. (p. 5)

Hezbollah's constituency is not just the impoverished Shi'a who benefit from Hezbollah's patronage. Instead, the social base of this organization is relatively broad (Hamzeh 1998; Norton 2000). In fact, some studies suggest that the organization's constituency is predominantly educated and middle class (Harik 1996; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). While even those in other sects explain respect for the efficiency of the organization, the Shi'a support base is the core of the organization's domestic constituency.[81] While Shi'a (especially pious Shi'a) are the core supporters of Hezbollah the inclusion of Hezbollah into politics necessitated some expansion (Haddad 2006). Particularly in periods of unrest, the Lebanese community generally (Maronite, Druze, etc) tends to temporarily

[81] A particularly widespread response given when I answered the reason for my visit to Lebanon was a positive portrayal of the group's efficiency, even by its most ardent detractors. While this might be an artifact of Lebanese social niceties, one particularly poignant response came from a Maronite teen, fearless enough of civil conflict to have multiple crosses tattooed across his body and angry enough to lambast anyone and everyone: "Hezbollah, eh? Bastards, but bloody efficient bastards…" (translation from slightly more harsh language).

rally around the organization, as evidenced following the 2006 IDF invasion (Rogers 2006). Further, the ability of Hezbollah to form coalitions relies on minimal antipathy from the broader population. Therefore, Hezbollah has moderated its stance and increased its congenial politics in response to public opinion.

In total, there is an obvious impact of support on Hezbollah's behaviors. Like with the cross-national analysis, this is most clearly evidenced through external patronage, with less evidence from domestic constituency. However, what the cross-national account did not capture from this case was the influence of changing patronage as a signal of policy pressure from a patron. Further, domestic constituency, though weak, does seem to play some role in the face that Hezbollah presents to the population, at least following its inclusion into the formal political sphere.

Deterrence

Without a viable state to enforce deterrence, one would expect that deterrence played little role in Hezbollah's development. If this is the case, Hezbollah would be an anomaly compared to the cross-national study in the previous chapter. However, as I mentioned before, the vacuum of power caused by an impotent state made Lebanese soil a platform for foreign states to attack without endangering their own sovereignty (Norton 1993). Therefore, even without a strong state (or perhaps because of this lack) there were plenty of parties able and willing to repress Hezbollah.

Deterrence matters in this case, much as it mattered in the cross-national analysis. The role of violence—especially violence introduced by foreign states—counts substantially in how Hezbollah evolved over the years. In my second interview with, Sheikh Dikmak (2003) he commented,

> As long as there is occupation of our lands, resistance will continue to use whatever means it has to resist. As long as there are detainees there will be a resistance to bring them back. As long as there is constant aggression and a threat on Lebanon, there will be a resistance to defend its people.

In other words, external intervention and attempts at repression by outside actors has created an atmosphere in which the militancy and resistance can flourish, at least in the common mind of Hezbollah's followers. One might consider a counterfactual. If left without a security threat or one that merited only rhetorical mention, would Hezbollah exist? If it did—it would undoubtedly need to revert its attention elsewhere; it would have experienced much stronger pressure to evolve politically in order to survive within Lebanon. In reality, the environment of violence did exist, and it greatly contributed to how Hezbollah matured, particularly during its early life cycle. Two brief examples, the 1982 invasion and attacks by Israel prior to the 1992 election will illustrate this point.

1982 invasion: During the 1982 invasion, Israeli attempts to deter Shi'ia mobilization impacted the early development of Hezbollah. One could argue that invasion alone would not have provoked the radicalization of Lebanese Shi'a. However, IDF actions once within Lebanon, did incite radicalization,

> Oddly, the Israelis did not seem to grasp that the Shi'a in the current enmity towards PLO were in fact objective allies. To the contrary, it was sometimes as though the IDF [Israeli Defense Force] was intent on humiliating the Shi'a and provoking them (Norton 1993, 69).

Israel began to experience resistance because of its Iron Fist policy against the occupied population. Additionally, policy blunders such as those with Sabra and Shatilia, the Nabatiyeh riots, and the imposition of an unpopular "friendly" regime in Lebanon all contributed to growing distaste for the occupying force. Israel's policies in Lebanon along with their prolonged presence not only perpetuated the existence of Hezbollah, they actually increased its legitimacy exponentially. Furthermore, Israel's prolonged presence justified prolonged Syrian and Iranian interference, relating back to the subject of patronage.

Attacks around the1992 elections: The prolonged presence of Israel, even after the invasion officially ended, had an effect that persisted well into the 1990s. Specifically, IDF presence garnered support for Hezbollah even in parliamentary elections. For example, in its first election in 1992, Hezbollah's results were surprisingly positive for such a new party. Importantly, however, their electoral victories were at least in-part a byproduct of recent Israeli attacks that served to reinforce and strengthen the "resistance" image of Hezbollah. Hezbollah garnered electoral results by tugging at the collective Lebanese memory of the Israeli invasion and collective fear of a renewed occupation. Hezbollah and others made multiple claims around the elections, saying that the IDF was attempting to expand the boundaries of their "security zone" (MEJ 1992c). These claims might have rung hollow in any other environment, seeming like a pathetic attempt to relive the glory days of occupation. However they were somewhat legitimated by daily bombings by IDF forces, effectively empowering Hezbollah's image as "the resistance" and the collective force of that image (MEJ 1992c). The invasion and

continued attacks fueled the popularity of Hezbollah politically because they increased its legitimacy as a militia.

Both of these examples illustrate the linear model of deterrence imagined in the cross-national analysis, though with a different source than the state. The environment of violence does seem to exacerbate/increase actions, both violent and non-violent, rather than killing it off.

Grievance

As I've mentioned before, the confessional system in Lebanon has been historically divisive, perpetuating social divisions along sectarian lines.[82] In combination with the historically impotent state, this usurpation of individual identity creates an un-civil community without ties beyond the sect and reinforces sectarian tensions that result in factional violence and civil wars. Further, the division of power inherent in the confessional system perpetuated an unequal super-presidential system[83] even after the civil war. In combination with the destruction to state infrastructure wrought by civil wars, the confessional system contributed to a vacuum for goods and services to "minority" groups within Lebanon neglected by the patronage-based system (Harik 1996). It was from within this environment and that the southern Shi'a, whose areas were "absolutely underdeveloped" (Harik 1996), particularly compared to the rest of Lebanon, that the "Shi'a awakening" took place in the late 1960's (al Manar 1997). According to the author's unpublished interview with Sheikh Dikmak of Hezbollah (2003), the primary platforms of this mobilization were both the systematic economic neglect by the

[82] Unpublished personal interview, Korayem, 2003. According to this scholar, there are 18 different sects in Lebanon. Though some public estimates are higher, they have usually over-disaggregated sects along political fractures.
[83] Weakened after Ta'if accord in 1989.

government and the outdated political system. Both of these problems resulted in a perception of political and economic disenfranchisement that necessitate violent struggle.

While changes in the political and economic environment instigated by the Ta'if accords and other constitutional changes have mirrored a general reduction in Hezbollah's violent actions, continued neglect of these populations grants the organization an additional platform (beyond resisting occupation) upon which to hang their hats. Therefore, the experience of Hezbollah illustrates some of the theorized effect of grievances on behavior. However, in this case, grievances have at least two different effects from those tested in cross-national study. One, grievances for the Shi'a were a starting point for action. However, they were seemingly only additions to a laundry list of complaints in later group behavior. Two, the combination of both political and economic disengagement of the community was a necessary contributor to the awakening. However, it seems that deterrence and patronage might more significantly explain change in behaviors than grievances, in this case.

Organizational structure

The initial logistical aim of Hezbollah's organization was to follow the loose structure of the Iranian revolutionary government. However, the fledgling group quickly realized that there wasn't a charismatic leader who would provide the adhesive for this form of governance. Consequently, they created a hybrid of the Iranian system, providing some fluidity in the chain of command with a rigid leadership infrastructure (Jaber 1997). As a result, a fairly rigid hierarchy of command was developed including direct links between organizationally separate organs. As the organizational structure became more fully entrenched, leadership of this movement became collective, led by a

Supreme Shura Council composed of 17 members, primarily clergy, who make decisions based on majority vote (Hamzeh 1993).[84] Day to day administration of the party carried out by a General Secretariat made up of members of the Council (Hamzeh 1993).

Though the leadership of Hezbollah was initially clandestine, the elements of Hezbollah's organizational structure eventually became public. These newly transparent portions include: the Secretariat that oversees the Politburo and the Executive Committee that directly dictates the activities of the Politburo (Hamzeh 1993). The organization of the three primary forces below the Politburo (though further specialized under these headings) includes a basic internal security apparatus, a recruitment and propaganda apparatus and the apparatus of social services (Hamzeh 1993). The fourth division of activity is focused on resistance. The Combat Organ falls directly under the Supreme Shura Council and is involved with all resistance activities. Hezbollah can be said to have a *centralized* hierarchical structure in which a core group makes decisions that are then passed along the interconnected, hierarchical structure and carried out using resources provided by the central authority (Shapiro 2005)

The bureaucratization of Hezbollah is a key factor in this case. Strict hierarchical ordering forms a neat divide between apparatus of the movement focused on disparate behaviors. The hierarchic division between the wings of Hezbollah formed separate entities that could operate toward separate goals without necessarily detracting from each the other. The power of these separate wings developed separately as well. Early emphasis on the activities of the Combat Organ gave way to equal (and sometimes greater) emphasis on the Politburo. This change was necessary for political survival

[84] See Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter for a full description of the separations of authority/duties within Hezbollah

since a militant group too narrowly defined would be entirely dependent on the continuation of conflict to survive. Under the same pretext used for fighting the invading forces, it realized that it must attempt to revive the oppressed populations and so Hezbollah began grassroots efforts early on. The simultaneous development of the Combat Organ and Politburo meant that both sides of Hezbollah's behavior were simultaneously reinforced. As a consequence, of the two sides to Hezbollah's behavior—providing for the "security" as well as the basic needs of the population—both still remain. However, the relative strength of the disparate organs has changed in time.

There has been a strategic shift to emphasize the non-violent behaviors of the group. One example of the strategic shift was a reduction in power of the Security Organ (the organ of the Politburo that oversees internal security matters) during power struggles between radical and moderate factions leading up to the parliamentary elections. In reducing the power of this group, Hezbollah greatly reduced the power of militancy in the organization (Hamzeh 1993). By limiting the Security Organ's role, Hezbollah's focus became the political and social activities of the other wings. With this shift the Combat Organ was left as the sole militant wing of the group and focused almost exclusively on resistance.

However, even with strategic shift in the movement, *both the violent and non-violent organs remain.* I would argue that the simultaneous institutionalization of separate organs for peaceful and military means in Hezbollah—all under a canopy of central authority—is important to this story. This structure can be seen to do two things. First, separation of wings within a unified whole has perpetuated the existence of both sides of this group. While the central authority can decree changes (e.g. moving funding

from one wing to the other and making political aims more important at one time or another) both are fully integrated into the organization so neither is likely to decay or cease to exist without a dramatic restructure of the whole. Second, and more optimistically, it has allowed for ease in transfer between the two methods. With one central authority declaring means and goals, and more importantly, controlling the purse strings down the hierarchy, change can be made quickly. If a tactical shift is at hand, it can be expedited. Further, pressure on the movement from above or outside need only shift the top of the group to force change.

In sum, the case of Hezbollah has provided substantial new dimensions to how organizational structure was viewed in the preliminary cross-national analysis. These contributions help to explain the lackluster impact of my clandestine measure on both violent and non-violent behaviors. Specifically, covert organizational behavior captures little of the actual effect of group structure on group behavior. This case can suggest a number of additions to how we might look at organizational patterns, specifically the hierarchical structure and longevity of that structure might be considered.

Implications, etc.

While the implications of each case will be discussed in comparison in the next chapter, a few notes of Hezbollah's contribution to the theory are in order here. The Hezbollah case has provided evidence for some of the processes imagined in the cross-national study including the impact of repression and international patronage on behavior and evolution. It has additionally provided more than a few points to ponder on the factors included in cross-national study, which I will now discuss in order. One, patronage might provide resources for actions but it also gives some degree of policy

control to another body, enabling the hijack of behaviors from above. Specifically, changes in patronage might function as a signal of policy pressures. Second, domestic pressures are at their peak in competitive environments, though it is not clear that their impact is stronger than the other forces combined. Third, while this case has reinforced the linear model of repression imagined in cross-national analysis, it has also illustrated a problem in how I operationalized a repressive environment. Specifically, repression is not owned only by the state. Other actors can influence an environment of violence sometimes better than a state. Fourth, political and economic grievances can form the basis for action even if they cannot always explain changes in levels of actions. Instead, change might occur through the concatenation of forms of grievances over time. Fourth, organizational composition is far more complex than, and even separate from, the clandestine nature of a group.

Conclusion—since 1992: The history considered in this case study has emphasized the life cycle between the militant birth and the more non-violently focused current form. This cycle did not end there. In fact, Hezbollah has warred with itself, swaying back and forth ever since. Norton (2007) notes two key points in time where the debate over whether to be fully co-opted into the system or maintain its identity as a *resistance* movement culminated: 2000 and again around the Israeli invasion of 2006. He refers to this as a debate over the decision to play politics. In each case, though those arguing in favor of playing politics have held sway, those in favor of playing cowboys have not been silenced—and thus the balance between the two remains. This balance was greatly altered in the first ten years of Hezbollah's existence but since it seems to have entered into a sort of steady flight pattern, rarely falling off either end of the

spectrum. Illustrating this stagnation, with the possible exception of Hezbollah's coalition win in 2005, they have not seen substantial increases in their political hold of Lebanese politics.

Though some of the factors have changed since the 1992 election, many have not. Iran continues to play an important role in Hezbollah's direction though Syria also played a dominant role until 2005 cedar revolutions. Deterrence by the state has become *more* real, and yet still pretty empty. Conversely, deterrence by Israel has remained. Though the two fought battles throughout this time; particularly after 2000, their interactions were relatively quiet. According to Norton (2007) this period was quiet precisely because war was legalized, "In general, clashes respected 'rules of the game', which had been codified in writing in 1996 and specified that Israel would not attack civilians in Lebanon and Hezbollah would not attack Israel," (p. 479). However, this balance was precarious and as the invasion of 2006 illustrates, and each was capable of miscalculation. Following this war, sectarian and other divisions ran very high, in no small part because of inflammatory rhetoric actions of Hezbollah (still riding its postwar glory). Amidst protests, demonstrations, resignations from governments, etc by each side—politics in Lebanon seemed poised at the breaking point, mirroring stalemates that resulted in the last civil war. However, Hezbollah took a step back and thus far the tenuous peace has been maintained (Norton 2007).

Figure 4.1



source: "Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation" by A. NIZAR HAMZEH as cited in http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/hamzeh2.html

Chapter 5: Nested Qualitative Analysis: minor cases and discussion

Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland? — Danny Morrison[85]

The above quote by writer and IRA activist, Danny Morrison, vividly illustrates the phenomenon studied throughout this work: the competing pull of the ballot and the gun. As the IRA quote illustrates, Hezbollah is not a unique case in this respect; multiple groups throughout history have weighed out the relative costs and benefits of the gun and the ballot to further their goals. This chapter will introduce three additional minor cases that, like Hezbollah, experienced these competing pulls: HAMAS (*Harakat al-Mawqawama ak-Islamiyya*) IRA (Irish Republican Army), and ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*) to corroborate and expand on the nested historical case of Hezbollah. In each minor case, I follow the format of the previous case study. I begin with briefly considering the historical context of each movement. Next, I focus on the four factors of interest from cross-national analysis: support, deterrence, grievances and organization. These cases, like Hezbollah, provide tests of the cross-national model considered in chapter 3. However, they are also exploratory, functioning to expand on the original model. Therefore, throughout each case, I consider additional ways of looking at the four factors of interest (along with additional factors of interest in cross-national study). The chapter culminates with a discussion of the combined knowledge gleaned from all four cases and how that knowledge can shape a reconfigured cross-national analysis, presented in the next chapter.

[85] Quoted in Taylor *Beyond the Mask* (1997, 328) and in McAlister "The Armalite and the ballot box" (2003, 124).

Minor Case Studies

Harakat al-Mawqawama al-Islamiyya (HAMAS)[86]

Though regularly included on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist organizations, HAMAS is widely seen both in the Arab world and elsewhere as a legitimate social organization in a struggle for national liberation (Robinson 2004). HAMAS arose out of increasing Palestinian frustrations that erupted during the first *intifada* of 1987-1988.[87] HAMAS was linked to activism in the first intifada but distinguished itself as a political entity with a religiously inspired, universalistic-charter in 1998. It arose in response to the perceived inability of other groups to achieve the popular goal of national self-determination.[88]

In a relatively short period of time, HAMAS was able to move through multiple stages: from its birth as a relatively spontaneous eruption of civil disobedience and protest, through a militant adolescence, to its current state as a politically inspired social movement organization.[89] The final stage of this organization has been as a pure Janus-faced group—a hydra of politics and militancy. This last stage of its modern adolescence combines the militancy of its youth with surprising political finesse as a political party.

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[86] HAMAS simultaneously means: "Islamic Resistance movement" and "zeal (Frisch, 2005).
[87] The local Muslim Brotherhood can be said to be at the root of this movement though the clear break of HAMAS' behavior from the inwardly-focused brotherhood activities in the Gaza Strip illustrates that these roots are more distant than those between Hezbollah and AMAL in the last example (Mishal 2003). The brotherhood likely provided a membership base, but the organization that formed into HAMAS was essentially separate from the brotherhood—and codified by the popular uprising (intifada). Consequently, it can be seen as having an essentially spontaneous creation.
[88] Popular perception of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—the reigning "resistance" of the day who had just been booted from Lebanon—was that they were politically and militarily bankrupt and that Palestinians were in need of an alternative (Mishal 2003).
[89] Its political aspirations were partially illustrated in its very dramatic boycott of the first Palestinian Authority elections.

This stage began as HAMAS threw its hat into the ring in the second Palestinian Authority (PA) elections.

In no small part, the timing of the HAMAS decision to join this election was calculated strategically. With Arafat's death in 2004, Fatah's position was in disarray. The new leadership of Abbas left much to be desired, popular support for Fatah dropped steadily, and corruption scandals rocked the group (Herzog 2006). With Fatah weakened, HAMAS was able to strategically position itself to enter the political fray as it joined the PLO in 2005. From its weakened position of power, Fatah agreed to the continued existence of HAMAS' militia. The timing of their entry into the political fray staged a perfect coming out for HAMAS. They placed high in all polls on a platform of reform and gained a mandate in subsequent elections (Herzog 2006). In 2006, HAMAS gathered 74 of 132 seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council, showing its capability as a viable political force (Gray and Larson 2008). Again more recently, HAMAS has become relatively more integrated into the politics of the occupied territories, signing agreements to form a national unity government with Fatah.

The entry of HAMAS into competitive politics has not signaled an end to the violent face of the group. Instead, Al-Zahar argues: the war is not over just because HAMAS joined the Palestinian Legislative Council (Herzog 2006). As a consequence, HAMAS, like Hezbollah, is a Janus movement without full realization of evolution. Though it now participates in competitive elections, HAMAS also has a varied repertoire of behavior that includes violent and non-violent mobilizations. Throughout its life span, it has participated in political violence including kidnappings, riots, attacks on IDF soldiers, and—after 1994—suicide bombings. Their use of violence increased

exponentially after the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2002. HAMAS has also utilized non-violent mobilizations including general strikes and demonstrations (very common of the *al-Aqsa* intifada, the second uprising). Even in their movement to join the political fray from 2004 to 2005, their use of the ballot box, as Danny Morrison might say—has been hand-in-hand with the proverbial Armalite.

HAMAS today is correctly portrayed in both a militant and political light. However, until recently little research appeared to combine the two aspects of its nature despite a fairly dramatic shift in the organization following its inclusion in politics (for example: Hroub 2000; Mishal and Sela 2000). The rare scholarship that does attempt to assess the totality of the organization provides some empirical evidence that the violent and non-violent behaviors of HAMAS are "dynamic and mutually reinforcing," being influenced by malleable environmental forces (Robinson 2004).

The environmental forces shaping HAMAS are at least partially captured in the four factors considered in the cross-national analysis. For one, HAMAS has a very large base of patronage though, like Hezbollah, that patronage has changed over time. Further, the organization enjoys relatively wide popularity within the Palestinian population, even for violence. Second, repression of the group has led to widespread support actions, even violent ones. Occupation has created a violence-legitimating environment for the organization, despite its foray into congenial politics. Third, the popular grievances expressed by the organization have been steady throughout the organization's tenure. Finally, HAMAS reiterates the importance of hierarchical ordering found in the case of Hezbollah in the last chapter. I will now discuss these factors in detail, considering alternative approaches.

Support

Much like Hezbollah in Lebanon, HAMAS has garnered legitimacy and support of the Palestinian population through grassroots popular activism, the provision of social services, and militancy. Portrayals of HAMAS often mirror the freedom fighter/terrorist debate. As problematic as this political labeling may be, it serves to illustrate the divide in support due to HAMAS. On one side, there is fairly consistent sanctioning and attempts to dismantle the group by states like the U.S. and Israel while on the other hand, exponentially growing popular support for the movement exists across sectarian divides domestically and to a lesser extent, internationally.

International patronage: The political divisions discussed above mirror the clear division of its international support: while there is a fairly strong attempt to discredit or destroy this movement, these attempts have been limited to a few key international players. Generally, HAMAS has been able to keep a patronage base, and maintain and even expand operations in no small part due to the symbolic power of the Palestinian story in the Arab world. Much like Hezbollah, HAMAS has also been on the receiving end of patronage from Iran. Unlike Hezbollah, HAMAS and Iran did not begin with a close relationship. Instead, the patronage to HAMAS began a few years after its inception.

Specifically, Iran's patronage began after a HAMAS delegation visited Iran in 1990 (Gulf News 2009).[90] While small (est. $30 million per annum) until after the Iran-Iraq war and particularly the second intifada, the line of patronage has steadily increased

[90] Other sources cite this starting date as October 1992. I do not think that the date disputes here are material to the outcome. Suffice it to say, patronage began in the early 1990s

since that time. The CIA estimated that patronage had tripled to $100 million per annum as early as 1995 (Gulf News 2009). By 2006, this amount was increased to $120 million per annum. Iran has less strict controls on the use of funds by HAMAS than it does with Hezbollah. In fact, violent behaviors are consistently supported with the monies. However, Iran has used funding as a sort of carrot for some degree of behavioral change. The transition to quasi-pragmatism in Iran discussed in the previous chapter predates this story. However, the effect is essentially the same. Rafsanjani and others connected their funding to a policy of revolution from below and saw resistance as a cursory aspect of that fight. Specifically, though HAMAS was given greater leeway to participate in violent actions, they were *rewarded* for their participation in the 2006 elections. This "reward" included the steep increase in yearly funds *and* a pledge of greater monies to counteract the western boycott (Wurmster 2007).

Iran is not the only source of patronage for HAMAS. During the first *intifada*, the media presence provided fairly empathetic reporting of strong-armed Israeli Defense Force (IDF) response, casting the Palestinian uprising in a good light. This coverage gained broad international support for the plight of the Palestinians. However, the more violent overtures of the second *intifada* resulted in a media shift. Less empathetic reporting also reduced some international support, dividing patronage into specifically militant or grassroots channels. The patronage that HAMAS receives comes from more varied sources than Hezbollah, even if the additional patronage sources are less steady than their shared patron. Intermittent support from Europe, expatriates, moderate Arab states, and NGOs have provided the funding for HAMAS to provide schools, healthcare,

etc. to the population. Yet, frequent changes in patronage levels affect services that the organization can provide.

During periods of high international support (as with the first intifada), concern for Palestinians translated into increasing funding for all Palestinian groups, including fledgling HAMAS. These funds were mostly earmarked for social service provision and peaceful demonstrations. These monies contribute to the organization's social services budget, which is said to be upwards of 75-80% of HAMAS' total budget (Gray and Larson 2008). However, during periods of declining support (as in the second intifada), reduced empathy for the Palestinian cause translated into a reduction in foreign patronage. During these periods, even funds for social services became limited.

Collectively, patronage for HAMAS is a complex phenomenon. The multiple sources of patronage do enable HAMAS behaviors—both violent and peaceful—but only one is a reliable source, Iran. Iran's patronage, while partially tied to electoral participation, is also rooted in a violent vision of the Palestinian cause. Alternately, patrons supporting non-violent actions and social services, offer more unsteady patronage of HAMAS.

The result of HAMAS' sources of patronage therefore both resemble and differ from Hezbollah. While funds can increase the ability for action, they can also tie each organization to a trajectory of behavior. Additionally, changes in funding can restrict behavior overall, particularly peaceful behaviors. HAMAS has experienced funding changes at a relatively higher rate than Hezbollah, particularly those funds tied to peaceful behaviors. As a consequence of source and stability of funding, HAMAS has

become wedded to a violent repertoire of behavior even as peaceful behaviors becomes more institutionalized in practice.

Domestic support: The domestic constituency for HAMAS is widespread but unstable relative to that seen in the Hezbollah case. A brief comparison of the effects of the two great Palestinian uprisings (*intifada)* will illustrate how domestic support for HAMAS swings. Public opinion—both domestic and international—swung greatly in favor of the fledgling HAMAS during the first intifada. This increase in political support for HAMAS was then argued to legitimize its use of militant tactics in the second uprising (Tessler 2002; Ghadbian 2003). However, domestic support of militancy appears short-lived. It could actually be equated to a sort of the sort of rally effect halo experienced by foreign policy decision-makers in wartime. Specifically, it occurs in short lived bursts of patriotic zeal surrounding the local freedom fighters that fades away once the reality of tit-for-tat violence kicks in.

Therefore, HAMAS' domestic support—though relatively higher than Hezbollah's—is not as stable or consistent as Hezbollah's or even as stable as its own rates of domestic support in the first *intifada* (Robinson 2004). Despite instability, support for HAMAS is relatively substantial. The domestic support base contributed to the 2006 victory, gaining them more than 50% of the legislative seats in the Palestine Legislative Council elections. Despite economic downturn in that first year in power, popular support for the movement remained high, blaming problems on outside interference.[91]

[91] January 25, 2007 *Jerusalem Post* "A year after elections, Hamas running high"

The domestic constituency of HAMAS differs greatly from Hezbollah. In particular, it remains somewhat more willing to accept militancy than the Lebanese population, perhaps because its civil strife is still ongoing. Additionally, HAMAS made an earlier entry into competitive politics than Hezbollah. As a result, the domestic constituency could legitimize or dispute the group's methods publically at a much earlier stage of its development than occurred with Hezbollah. In total, the effect of domestic constituency also differs between the two. However, in neither case has public opinion substantially changed the overall tenor of behavior for these groups, except possibly through elections.

Deterrence

Robinson (2004) has argued that there are notable external changes that impact opportunity structure for HAMAS, specifically the level of coercion used against the Palestinian population. One key change in this structure historically involved the election of the Lakud party in Israel in 1977 and its continued influence in the years since (Robinson 2004). Robinson refers to the deterrence policies of this party as "starkly different" from what had been seen before, emphasizing containment rather than parallel existence (Robinson 2004, 124). Initially, the Islamist movement slated to become HAMAS benefited from this policy aimed at the PLO. However, it eventually began to also suffer the PLO's fate following the Iranian revolution and rise of Hezbollah. Particularly after the start of the second *intifada*, severe oppression of Palestinian groups began. This increasing repression can be illustrated by the Minorities At Risk (2008) assessment:

> In response to Palestinian protests (both violent and peaceful), the Sharon government has used unrestrained force against protesters, confiscated property, assassinated Palestinian leaders, and sought the arrest or death of those deemed to be terrorist members of militant Palestinian organizations such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Variants of the Lakud policy of containment had a two effects above-and-beyond creating a violent environment for politics. First, containment limited the public sphere of contention, pushing political debate into the private sphere. The Mosque then became a particularly attractive private space for political debate. Therefore, political debate became influenced by Islam, strengthening HAMAS and its predecessors (Zakaria 2003). In effect, by attempting to limit actions through repression, containment simply served to funnel mobilization into one type of organization. Consequently, increasing levels of containment actually benefited the human capital of Islamist organizations and allowed these groups to quickly institutionalize. Second, when the limitations of containment loosened—as occurred following Oslo or following the Labor party win in 1992—contention could be made publicly, weakening the pull of the mosque as a place for the expression of grievance. During these periods, the human capital previously directed toward Islamist groups became more generalized.

Even with high levels of repression, both violent and non-violent actions were used by HAMAS. However, violent responses by HAMAS increased more rapidly in response to repression. At no point was containment ever able to completely mollify violent Palestinian actions. However, it became able to effectively quash some peaceful protest.

Grievances

HAMAS is still a part of a stateless nation. As such, Palestinians have experienced both forms of grievances: a perceived or real economic dislocation and absence of perceived opportunities for political redress (Tessler 2002). Grievances of the Palestinian population have not dramatically shifted over the lifetime of this movement and are fairly extreme as noted by the Minorities at Risk (2005) qualitative assessment of this movement:

> Palestinians experience complete exclusion from the Israeli political process [although note that free and fair elections do occur within the PA] and since the rise of the new intifada in 2000 they have additionally suffered economic exclusion as the border with Israel proper has been closed… [with] the Israeli "security wall" …built cutting several kilometers into West Bank land.

This assessment illustrates multiple grievances: economic, including rights to land or property and access to opportunity; and political, including restrictions on political liberties. The situation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories has been particularly dire, especially in Gaza.[92]

Much like the experience of Hezbollah, grievances for HAMAS have remained relatively high and constant. Neither case has substantially expanded the concept of grievances considered in the first analysis. However, both cases have illustrated that these grievances are an underlying source for behaviors, if not behavioral *change*.

Organization

The organizational structure of HAMAS closely resembles that of Hezbollah. It has a relatively centralized, bureaucratic structure. Decisions are passed down a fairly

[92] See: Amira Haas. 2001. *Drinking the Sea at Gaza*, Picador Publishing.

rigid hierarchy within the structure, usually stemming from the political bureau (Gray and Larson 2008). Like Hezbollah, there is also a Supreme Shura Council with a leadership structure. Decisions are made using consultation among the leadership, particularly that in the Shura Council, rather than by decree. Also like Hezbollah, the umbrella organization covers two separate wings that participate in different forms of politics, violent and non-violent. Both wing are relatively institutionalized though because the organizational structure is newer and less transparent than that in the case of Hezbollah, they are not as concretely situated as their Lebanese counterparts. However, unlike Hezbollah, HAMAS's leadership still operates with relative secrecy, and its leadership hierarchy remains relatively clandestine for security purposes (al Naeimi 2010).

HAMAS provides further corroboration of the findings of the last case study. Specifically, while patronage enables an expanded total repertoire of behavior, changes in or instability of patronage also influences behavioral outcomes of Janus groups. Both cases hint at a change in the importance of domestic constituency with elections. HAMAS also conforms to the linear model of repression tested in the initial quantitative analysis. Finally, like Hezbollah, HAMAS illustrates the importance of grievances for sparking mobilization though neither fully explains the role of grievances in behavioral change. Two vastly different cases will now be addressed in order to test the basics of this theory and expand its applicability.

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

The story of the Irish Republican Army represents the oldest covered in this work. In fact, the IRA is not just the oldest organization discussed, it is also exceptional in another way: it is the only organization that has participated in what now seems to be a

permanent ceasefire.[93] In many other ways, the IRA resembles the other groups discussed in this work. Like the other groups here, the individuals that comprise the IRA view themselves as battered and oppressed by some greater power.

The Treaty of 1921 officially partitioned Ireland into two sections: the independent and primarily Catholic south; and the largely protestant North, which was ruled indirectly (at first, then directly) by London (Cairns and Darby 1998). A series of events including the 1916 Easter Rising and the declaration of the Republic of Ireland defined the Nationalist struggle for North Ireland's independence well into the 1980's. This struggle was to incorporate large-scale revolutionary and smaller scale militant actions in the nationalist fight to reunify Ireland. In effect, it was a military struggle, with no role for congenial politics.

The Irish Republican Army arose even before the Easter Rising, presumably during the "Home Rule Crisis" of 1911-1914 that created conditions leading to the Easter Rising (Neumann 2005). The movement's ideology was strongly ethno-nationalistic, pushing for Irish self-determination, though later hints of Marxism would come. The IRA represented a major force in the Irish civil war though it became a somewhat minor actor in the decades directly thereafter. Between the time of the Treaty and the 1960s, Northern Ireland was relatively peaceful, broken only with sporadic communal violence in the early 1930s. However, the IRA remained active—primarily as a defensive force—

[93] Though having completed the process of decommissioning its arsenal in 2007, some sources claim a less final view of the peace, arguing that the modern "peace" period is full of inconsistencies. For example, some sources claim the organization continues to train members in violence (statements by the Independent monitoring commission in 2005 and again in 2006 and 2007), has participated in a bank robbery after peace negotiations in 2005 (bbc.uk), and vigilante murder of at least one person since 2005 (bbc.co.uk, pbs.org, guardian.co.uk).

in response to repression by unionists (including the paramilitary force, B Specials) and the British under the Special Powers Act of 1922.[94]

Following a decline after the 1930s and flirtation with peaceful civil rights movements in the mid-1960s, the IRA regenerated. This new growth came in a divided form with the most militant grouping, the Provisional's, taking charge of the most violent stage of the IRA history from the late 1960s through the early 1990s.[95]

Despite the militant emphasis of the nationalist struggle, some early elements of a political wing did exist, albeit one with little-to-no separate platform from the IRA. Sinn Fein was "founded" in 1905 though not officially organized until 1917.[96] It won handily as the political incarnation of the IRA in the first Irish elections of 1923. However, once in office the party's unwillingness to accept co-optation into competitive politics became apparent. Its full purpose was abstention from any state institutions—even while in office—quickly pushing it to the fringe and then out of the political sphere (McAllister 2004). The abstentionist platform remained a product of IRA dominance of the party and contributed to the minor role that Sinn Fein would play during this time. Because the nationalist struggle was inherently a military fight, the IRA downgraded the role of parties because they were seen to be tools for competition in an inherently illegitimate system. Therefore, Sinn Fein was purposefully created as a weak institution and consequently, the party stayed weak for quite some time. Lacking any sort of clout in the nationalist struggle, Sinn Fein was simply a mouthpiece of the IRA until the death of

[94] 1922—gave sweeping powers of arrest and detention and exceptional police powers of suppression. (See Moloney 2002 for a description or view the text at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/spa1922.htm)
[95] From here on, the IRA refers to the Provisional IRA. This group is the focus of this case study.
[96] http://www.sinnfein.org/documents/intro.html

Bobby Sands forced the two groups to reevaluate mixing political and military strategy to push the British out of Northern Ireland (McAllister 2004).[97]

For much of its life, the IRA was much less Janus-faced than Hezbollah or HAMAS. It was a militia with a political agenda rather than a hydra. While it provided local security of a primarily vigilante-variety and small-scale social services, it offered fewer social services than either HAMAS or Hezbollah. Early on, the core purpose of the IRA was military struggle and even social control was secondary. The close association of the IRA to Sinn Fein makes it Janus faced, though as I've mentioned before, the party's role was clearly subjugated to the military aims of the whole. In later years, the increasing power of Sinn Fein vis-à-vis the IRA allowed for a transition of the whole into the evolutionary process. Before continuing into the analysis of these factors, I will briefly explain this transition of power.

Until the early 1980s, the electoral successes of Sinn Fein appeared as nothing more than a popular referendum on the military activities of the IRA. However, in the mid 1980s Sinn Fein's electoral advances seemed to diminish. Coupled with other problems, these losses placed the nationalist struggle in perspective, reinvigorating debate on the role of Sinn Fein vis-à-vis the IRA. Specifically, Sinn Fein began to assert its own political ambitions separate of the IRA (Neumann 2005). Finally in 1986, the policy of abstentionism was officially rescinded (McAllister 2004). Once officially involved in politics, Sinn Fein was able to garner a substantial (though still small) portion of the popular vote, moving from an average of a little over 10% of the popular vote to 15 %

[97] The abstentionist policy was hotly debated historically, especially in the south: for example, in a narrow defea, Eamon de Valera leaves Sinn Fein in 1926 after failing to change this policy at a party conference. Sinn Fein's subjugation to the military struggle and the IRA would not change until much later.

and 17.5% of the vote in the 1996 forum vote and 1998 assembly elections, respectively (McAllister 2004). The newly empowered party participated in a number of community mobilization campaigns throughout this period in order to increase turnout of non-voters. As a result, Sinn Fein began to win elections again, with previously unrepresented portion of the population as their support base.[98] The dramatic emancipation of Sinn Fein was a turning point for both the party and the militia. Sinn Fein's increased popular legitimacy enhanced its claims supporting the necessity of non-military strategy. Further, the entire shift in the balance of power between the two groups provoked uncertainty in the legitimacy of violence. Sinn Fein's control of the movement signals a shift toward congenial politics and away from pure militancy. Therefore, it is as a consequence of Sinn Fein's usurpation of the IRA that the option for ceasefires occurred.

The transitional period between IRA and Sinn Fein control is of particular interest to this work, as it illustrates a change in behavioral strategies. I will now look at the four factors of interest (support, deterrence, grievances, and organization) to see what, if any, of this transition that for which each accounts. Additionally, I will consider what elements I might have missed in the cross-national comparison.

Support

International patronage: The IRA historically had a wide range of international supporters, from Nazi-era Germany to elements within the United States (English 2003). Funding and some diplomatic influence were extended on behalf of the IRA from these groups, particularly the latter. Even Libya provided patronage, such as with arms

[98] See McAllister (2004) for an explanation of how Sinn Fein was able to gain an electoral foothold without eroding the Social Democratic Labor Party nationalist vote.

shipments found in 1974 (pbs.org 2010). Libya continued to make increasingly large financial and tactical contributions through the 1980s, replacing some of the funding and supplies cut off from American sources under increasing FBI scrutiny. Libya's patronage lasted until the 1987 capture of the *Eskund* (Moloney 2002). Each of these sources of patronage was earmarked for *fighting* the colonial regime and thus all contributed funds for militant actions. Patronage declines in the late 1980's—particularly the loss of the Libyan patron—slowed actions by the IRA.

Arguably, none of these patrons could be said to directly contribute to a shift to congenial politics. Instead, funding that later contributed to the rise of Sinn Fein (and eventual consideration of congenial political competition and ceasefire), came from an unlikely source, Great Britain. In the 1974 cease-fire, British funds were used to create "incident centres," or logistical centers where the IRA could police any individual acts that would cause a breach of the ceasefire (Silke 1999, 71). Though the patronage of the colonial power was short-lived, its effect was not. These centers quickly took on a life of their own as a local quasi-justice system. It was from these centers, rather than through the IRA that Sinn Fein first began to resemble a real political party.

Importantly, the centers formed a bureaucratic-administrative training base for Sinn Fein. Their role in the centers was not only organizing IRA responses to breaches of the peace but also dispute resolution, publicity, and propaganda. Through these roles, Sinn Fein became something more than a mouthpiece for the IRA: it became an institution of its own. It has been argued that a good portion of the popularity of Sinn Fein arguably is linked to their role in community policing, particularly in Northern

Ireland (Silke 1999; Silke and Taylor 2000). Therefore, these centers also contributed to the popularity of the party, enabling its usurpation of power.

For the IRA, like Hezbollah and HAMAS, a preponderance of external funding had the effect of tying behavior to the whims of those external sources as well as lessening the need to develop a broader base of domestic support. Specifically, the IRA became tied to the visions of violent struggle imagined by their patrons. However, a combination of three factors could be seen as contributing to a change in their political tactics. First, these violent visionary patrons were weeded out by the British, leading to a decline in funding overall. Second, that unlikely source of early funding from Britain—though long gone—had already enabled the growth of Sinn Fein relative to the deteriorating IRA. Finally, these two forces came together in a third important event: their inclusion in electoral participation in the 1980s, which I argue, increased the importance of the ballot box. At this point, the balance of support for nationalist aims within the population of greater Ireland—and what that meant for IRA tactics—superseded international influence as the most important aspect, as I will discuss now.

Domestic constituency: The IRA's base of domestic support since the civil war has been mostly limited to Catholics in the North. Some scholars have argued that by including the IRA in electoral politics, they were made directly answerable to a grass roots' opinion with an inherent distaste for terrorist violence (Neumann 2005). The public's view of violence then directly challenged the strategic benefits of the IRA's violent methods (Neumann 2005). Though there were elections prior to this point, the present argument relies on one important watershed election. Specifically, following Peter Brooke's statement in 1990 that reunification of Ireland could take place if that was

the *will of the Irish people,* the IRA faced with the need to woo a public beyond Northern Ireland (McVeigh and Rolston 2007).

Even with later declines in support for violence, the northern Catholic nationalist population was comparatively supportive of violence, viewing it as inappropriate yet effective (Burgess et al. 2007). Alternately, the broader Republican populations had a relatively low threshold for violence (Burgess et al. 2007). Therefore, following Peter Brooke's statement, the IRA faced a substantial change in their constituency. In order to gain support beyond Northern Ireland, the image of the IRA had to change. Part of that image remake was giving power over to Sinn Fein. To make this portrayal believable, the movement was temporarily placed under strict central control. The IRA made a strong effort to distance itself from violence and gain widespread popular support, eventually culminating in a transfer of decision-making to Sinn Fein.

The cross-national model in Chapter 3 showed no effect of domestic support on group behaviors in either direction. The IRA's experience thus offers a crucial alternative explanation for this null result that expands on inferences from the previous cases. Specifically, domestic constituency is considered in a groups' behavioral choices only when it becomes an essential component of their aims. For the IRA, until the Republican distaste for violence actually threatened their goal, it was not a point of consideration. Further, the Northern Irish acceptance of violence mattered little when they were not asked to participate.

Deterrence

With the 1922 Northern Ireland Special Powers Act, the full brunt of British repression began. British repression accelerated exponentially during the troubles.

Assassinations and large-scale imprisonment began at this time; and by 1971, imprisonment without trial became common (MAR 2008). As the scope and degree of civilian repression by British forces (and those representing British interests) intensified, it was reciprocated with systematic ostracism, violence, and harassment by the IRA.

Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) notes a pattern of repression in the IRA case. He argues that in early years, the British had little intelligence about the IRA, so their response was relatively impotent. However, with every attack more and more troops could be dispersed using better information from infiltration, countering the ability of the IRA to carry out attacks. British troop levels increased and repressive means used throughout the 70s though it took nearly a decade for these troops to fully gain a foothold in repressing the population (White 1993). These trends, he says, eventually created an internal balance of power that limited the IRA's ability to continue to participate in a war of attrition, leading to a strategic shift to their nationalist aims and allowed coming peace talks.

However, the trends in British response had a lag; they did not automatically produce a dramatic reduction in violence by the IRA. What was often viewed as exaggerated responses to activity in Northern Ireland prompted deepened anger at British troops, boosting morale and recruitment for the IRA. Particular attacks, such as the Bloody Sunday Derry attacks or "Operation Motorman" that same year, would briefly heighten the violence against northern Catholics and nationalists as well as troop targets (English 2003).

Though there were spikes, repression in total was moderate in this case. The repression of Northern Ireland and the IRA is not as consistently bloody or all

encompassing as that found in the other cases in this chapter. However, spikes in repression did later create (at least temporarily) a spike in violent action before effectively quashing it (also temporarily) later. No evidence exists that repression also led to non-violent action though this could be an artifact of the relatively short tenure of the "non-violent face" of the IRA. While the linear model of repression found in cross-national analysis is upheld for violent behaviors by the IRA, this case also contributes evidence that the linear relationship might just be part of the upward slope in a parabolic-shaped model of repression as theorized Muller (1985) and Gartner and Regan (1996).

Grievances

On top of intermittently high levels of repression, northern Catholics were additionally discriminated against for employment, housing, and electoral politics (English 2003). As a result, this population had lower economic indicators generally than the Protestant equivalent population or the Republican population (English 2003). Compared to other cases studied in this work, northern Catholics remained relatively prosperous, despite real differentials (Maney 2005). Northern Ireland is considerably more economically depressed than the UK or even some other areas of the EU, but they are not entirely dispossessed (Cairns and Darby 1998). Therefore, abject poverty does not seem to be a culprit in this case, only wealth *differentials*.

Catholics in Northern Ireland have a particularly low level of economic wellbeing compared to Protestants or even other Irish Additionally, trade—even to the present time—has been disproportionally top-heavy with Britain, forcing a economic dependence on London even following devolution. Consequently, this case illustrates the relationship of economic grievances to violence drawn in the earlier cross-national analysis. That said,

nationalists and even the IRA sympathizers are not disproportionally poorer than the rest of the population (Maney 2005).

Northern Catholics participated in electoral politics so one could say that no cause existed for political grievances of the IRA. However, for two reasons, this might not be the case. One, political rights, when they were available, went to unstable or unpalatable political entities. For example, while everyone in Northern Ireland could vote in the provincial assembly elections; the short life span of the provincial assemblies make them inherently suspect as political units, with voting an essentially meaningless act. Second, a right to vote clearly did not translate to political *representation* for nationalists, a problem also seen in the case of the ETA. For a nationalist movement, being given a vote on all but the instrumental question (national self-determination) can in itself be seen to be political disenfranchisement. Therefore, the perception of political disenfranchisement by nationalists was high. However, one cannot make the argument that Northern Catholics and even Irish nationalist actors were fully *excluded* from electoral politics during the entire time period, even during the struggles. As distasteful as inclusion in a colonial government (i.e. politics in Westminster after 1972) might have been, Neumann (2003) argues that it was real political power, tied "*only"* to the rejection of violence as politics (Neumann 2003).[99]

The IRA supports some theoretical assumptions from the cross-national analysis. Specifically, it illustrates that the *perception* of deprivation can lead a group to mobilize. It also contributes an important concept to the model: the importance of nationalist aims.

[99] The author's emphasis on simplicity of the rejection of violence seems to illustrate a somewhat skewed perception. The author who further offhandedly mentions that Ireland is a part of the UK without valid claims to self-determination. However skewed, his thoughts are illustrative of the unionist, and even—to some extent—the non-nationalist and peaceful nationalist views.

In this case, only after devolution from Westminster would the prospect of a permanent ceasefire be considered, meaning that nationalism could be a unique grievance to consider.

Organization

The IRA was originally organized along a traditional military-style hierarchical line. However, after 1977 heavy losses forced the organization to dramatically reorganize. This reorganization resulted dramatic structural changes, reformatting the group into a clandestine, classic cell structure (Silke 1999).

The cells are highly organized and specialized per the individual member's capabilities (Horgan and Taylor 1997). Outside of these specialized cells, auxiliary members primarily focused on local security and as lookouts or simply kept in reserve (Silke 1999).[100] All cells are still answerable within a hierarchically structured chain of command, though each of the specialized cells (the active service units hereafter, ASU's) would be kept separated from other cells logistically. The auxiliary units were kept distant from the ASU's but still within the chain of command. The only groups mostly outside of the IRA chain of command were the Nutting Groups, the elite cells in charge of self-policing (Silke 1999).

Important to consider here, is the relative organization of the IRA to Sinn Fein. Always quite intermeshed (see: Gerry Adam's cross-over, for example), the two

[100] The "auxiliary members" include those previously a part of specialized cells who would endanger the integrity of their previous cells if returned (e.g. they had been in prison and were now watched by the powers that be). Youth who have not yet proved their worth, and non-member recruits were also a part of this category.

organizations held an overlapping chain of command. Though later becoming officially *separate* groups, the IRA originally dictated policy to Sinn Fein, a role that later reversed.

Without strong results in the cross-national analysis, fleshing out the organizational patterns (and their possible effects) is an integral part of this chapter. The IRA illustrates a full continuum of organizational design, from hierarchy to cellular structure. However, for most of the period covered in this work, it held a cellular structure, making it an important comparison to the other two cases. Yet, a convoluting factor in assessing the impact of this organizational form is the centralized chain of command that overlapped with Sinn Fein, a somewhat exceptional situation. The ETA, discussed below, forms an important match for comparison. Like the IRA, it has a cellular structure; but unlike the IRA, its chain of command has become comparatively more diffuse over time. Therefore, I will consider the IRA's organization makeup in comparison to that group later in the chapter.

In total, the IRA case has both reinforced some of the findings of cross-national analysis and also added a number of contributions to the theory of Janus behavior. It reinforced the findings relating international patronage to types of actions, particularly the input given in other cases that shows *changes* in patronage matter. Secondly, it provided evidence of a missed step in the cross-national analysis on domestic support, showing that domestic constituency matters when the group is engaged in electoral competition. Next, it illustrates that the linear model of behavior gauged in Chapter 3 might be an artifact of the upward slope of a parabolic-shaped curvilinear model of repression on group behavior. Finally, it provides an alternative model of organizational format to consider in later comparison.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

ETA shares an important commonality with the last case. It also came into existence much earlier than our first cases, Hezbollah and HAMAS. ETA was born in proximity to the splintering Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in the late 1950s (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). ETA was created by students as a nationalist movement under the Franco dictatorship. Though active under the dictatorship, it did not begin to consistently carry out acts of terrorism until the early years of the Spanish democracy, particularly after the first small movement toward devolution of the region's autonomy.

The historical context of the Basque region is an important influence on the creation of ETA. ETA developed under a conservative dictatorship that feared a resurgence of Basque nationalism popular in the early 1900s (Zirakzadeh 2002). Because Basque nationalism was seen as a threat to national unity, much of the Basque culture (including spoken and written language and even folk music) were outlawed under the Franco regime and actively removed from the public sphere (Zirakzadeh 2002).[101] The nationalist party/government in exile became an increasingly weak voice for their followers, locked into a waiting game for what they saw to be the inevitable collapse of the dictatorship (Douglass and Sulaika 1990).[102] Nationalist leaders, at home and in exile, counseled that rather than endangering the people under the repressive regime, the nationalist struggle should be postponed until the death of Franco, when opportunities for

[101] Zirakdeh notes that Basque names were removed from all public places, including headstones in cemeteries.

[102] The Basque government from the civil war was forced into exile after their defeat by Franco's forces. So, the government in exile was, in effect, simply the party elite in exile. This group became effectively impotent during Franco's regime. Their decline culminated once it became clear that Cold War concerns would trump the political capital gained during WWII and that the U.S. and others would back the Franco regime rather than the Basque nationalists. However, the PNV gained power again following the end of the dictatorship and became the largest political party of the region during the early democracy. For a fuller explanation of this history see Douglas and Zulaika 1990, Woodworth 2001 or Woodworth 2002.

liberation would be more available than at present. Dissenting nationalist voices in Basque youth (some of which contributed to ETA's founding) argued that violence offered the only alternative, often with the same justification: the regime's repression made national determination an even more important aim than before.

When ETA was formed in the late 1950s, it offered an alternative for nationalists dissatisfied with the quietist approach favored by the early nationalist leaders. Though preaching a more activist, violent policy, the organization mainly participated in relatively small acts of civil disobedience rather than active violence. This reflected the generally populist organization and view of the early ETA, mirrored an array of political leanings and socioeconomic backgrounds of its members.

From its inception, a certain portion of the ETA membership advocated the use of violent rebellion to expel the Spanish state from its occupation of the Basque region. Militants within ETA argued that the surest way to realize nationalist aspirations was through an action-repression-action spiral: engaging in violence that sparks over-the-top repressive action by the state which incites the people to ultimately join in the rebellion *against* the state (Woodworth 2001). Early in the 1960's, this militant faction first attempted to spark militancy in the broader movement though terrorism, assassinations, and other acts of violence beginning in the early 1960's with a failed bombing (Zirakzadeh 2002). The initial response of ETA leadership was to attempt to centralize organizational coordination in order to control member behavior. However, in the face of the (expected) states' repressive response, the centralization attempt largely failed (Shapiro 2005). In fact, the Spanish crackdown resulted in further disorganization within ETA. As a result, ETA became comprised of differently oriented "cells," more or less

pacifistic. The less-pacifistic cells included guerilla and terrorist cells that advocated a blackmail strategy of terrorism, at odds with even the previous ETA generation.

ETA officially splintered into a few organizations during transition to the new democracy, as members disputed over how best to gain independence under the new regime. Divisions arose within the Basque nationalist party. These divisions mainly centered over the fault line of a debate on the use of violent methods. The first side wished to pursue their nationalist aim with both political and military means, while the other focused entirely on military activities. The side included *Herri Batastune* (Popular Unity, hereafter HB). HB officially formed during the 1977 period of general amnesty, laid down their weapons and become a legalistic political entity within the democratic sphere. The HB is officially incorporated into politics (albeit conflictually) and officially denies ties to the terrorist wing of ETA. Another faction from this split self dissolved during the period of general amnesty under the new democratic constitution. The final side that emerged from the splintering became the organization studied here as ETA. It has continued to use violence including assassinations, car bombs, and political vandalism, with gradual decline and decay over their lifespan but few overtures into the realm of civil politics.

ETA has gradually changed over time, much like the other cases studied in this work. As democracy has progressed, the character of ETA has altered. Under the dictatorship in ETA's youth, their repertoire was primarily contentious and fairly well accepted within the region; and as a result, the group enjoyed broad social sympathy and tolerance (Funes 1998). In the transition period, the early democratic regime was still closely linked to the dictatorship. As a result, the support for ETA remained; and

terrorism and assassinations were common. In fact, deaths by ETA attacks spiked dramatically from 1978-1980, nearly quadrupling the numbers in any previous year (Funes 1998).

However, the real transformation of ETA occurred with democratic consolidation in the 1980s and into the 1990s. First, after the 1980 establishment of a semi-autonomous Basque political community, general popular sentiment began to turn against violent methods as a means of achieving full self-determination. Second, as the Spanish regime consolidated, it also became more capable of repressing the organization. As a result of consolidation, government antiterrorist policies further reduced the number of activists' number on-the-ground available to carry out missions (Reinares 2004). Consequently, throughout the 1980s the frequency of attacks declined; and by the 1990's, violence decreased dramatically and the organization also began to perceptively decay (Reinares 2004).

In 1998, ETA again participated in a tenuous and ultimately failed truce (Woodworth 2001). The Declaration of Lizarra included a united front of radical and moderate nationalists. However, when a parallel Basque government was not created quickly enough, ETA activists returned to armed struggle (Woodworth 2001). Another short-lived "permanent" ceasefire in 2006 also led to preliminary peace talks. Both attempts have lasting implications for Spanish politics. Though decried as a truce trap by some in government, the declaration of Lizarra and other peace talks could illustrate an important change in the game. Not only will "terrorists" talk, but also with enough political support buttressing their stance, they will be *spoken to* in negotiations.[103] ETA

[103] See Woodworth 2001

has shown at least the tentative initial step toward truce, showing that it would consider a step toward congenial politics. Further, each tentative step by ETA is legitimized in the government response, showing that they might accept this transition. This is not to say that they have neared evolution into political cooptation. Quite the contrary, they are still strongly wedded to their violent repertoire. However, it does illustrate that they could move in that direction, or fade away, particularly if given full autonomy.

Support

International patronage: ETA has never boasted high levels of international funding or even a high degree of international support outside of their home base. Most of their funding comes from members, kidnapping, and extortion including a "revolutionary tax" imposed on Basque businesses (Solomon 2010). While they have been able to mobilize based on these funding sources, their weakness relative to the IRA, Hezbollah, and HAMAS illustrates that the lack of patronage limits their ability to participate in widespread actions, mirroring the finding of cross-national analysis in Chapter 3.

Domestic support: While the nationalist movement originally had widespread popular support, their constituency steadily declined as violent attacks increased. Looking at popular support of violence as a means for political change is illustrative. In the late 1980s, less than half of the population strongly rejected violent methods of politics but within the next decade, rejection of violence increased exponentially (Funes 1998). Then, after temporary truces in the late 1980s and late 1990s, popular expectations for peace were artificially raised, leading to increased disenchantment with ETA after each subsequent bout with ceasefires (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007).

Moreover, outright rejection of ETA gradually increased over that time. In fact, by the mid-1908s, demonstrations against ETA became commonplace; and in a 1997 survey, almost 50% of Basques reported having participated in a demonstration against ETA.[104] However, a substantial minority of the Basque population (around 15% for HB) supports ETA, including their violent means of politics, as a necessary device for self-determination (Woodworth 2001).

In total, ETA has a rapidly declining base of popular support and no base of international support. Its relative inability to mobilize for action reflects these weaknesses. However, per conclusions of previous case studies, its disassociation from competitive politics would make the lack of domestic constituency a moot point.

Deterrence

Under Franco, the Basque region was severely repressed, as was discussed before. This repression was relatively minor compared to the transition period. Under the new democracy, repression *increased* exponentially. Anti-terrorist policies of the new regime imposed even greater reduction of civil liberties than before, heightened detention for Basques, and installed secretive military tribunals for suspected ETA members. Rather than opening up the civil space under the post-Franco parliamentary monarchy, the new government stepped up its oppression. For example, new anti-terrorist policies incorporated most nationalist expressions—even non-violent ones—as "terrorist" behavior. In effect, the new regime increased the repression of the Basque region,

[104] Mees 2000, quoted in Zirakzadeh 2002.

increasing detention without outside contact, and aided sub-state actors to further fight the state's battles (Zirakzadeh 2002).[105]

Unlike previous cases, these policies were able to limit the large-scale activities of the ETA, particularly with the surgical used by police of the later democracy. With the incarceration or death of most of the early militants, remaining activists were unable to continue with the quantity of attacks under the new regime. Instead, remaining ETA members resorted to vandalism and riots. After a tumultuous early phase of the democracy, indiscriminate repression lessened; and concurrently, civil liberties again became available to those in Euskara. With the establishment of local police forces under the new semi-autonomous government, widespread repression of civilians has reduced dramatically. However, the new regime has also been able to more strategically target ETA than in the past and has contributed to their weakening over time.

The effect of repression on the ETA illustrates that the significant linear model of repression tested in the cross-national model was simply the upward trend of what is a more parabolic-shaped impact of repression. Widespread and indiscriminate repression of the Basque population (as occurred under Franco or the early democracy) does simply function to incite more activism by the group than without repression. However, this case also shows a possible curvilinear effect of repression, able to quash ETA activities under the new regime.

[105] The sub-state actors mentioned here are collectively known as GAL, the "anti-terrorist liberation groups," well-known death squads who were basically the government-friendly anti-terrorist-terrorists. Though the GAL officially acted on its own, senior government ministers have since been convicted for their relationship to the group and the ministry was found to have funded the organization. So, it seems obvious that the organization was acting on government direction (BBC 2010).

Grievances

The Basque region was actually *more* wealthy mid-century than other Spaniards. The per capita income in the four southern provinces was 50% higher than the rest of Spain (Zirakzadeh 2002). However, the region also had to contend with an increasingly massive influx of immigrant workers taking advantage of this economic surplus. Competition with the increasingly high immigrant population increase, particularly in the 1970s, made resources, housing, employment, and service scarcity particularly acute thus leading to general dissatisfaction and a dramatic reversal within quality of life measures by the 1980s.

The political grievances of the Basque region are as changing, or even more changing, than those experienced by the cases above. The general population experienced both the outright absence of political rights *and* full participatory rights within the life span of ETA. While certainly lacking *any* access to political redress under the dictatorship, this political situation of the population has improved at least in name. Certainly, little changed during the regime transition period: civil liberties in the new regime were as (or more) curtailed as under the dictatorship. Yet, gradually, the rights and freedom of nationalist expression have become acceptable in the pluralist democracy.

The constitution of Spain claims that it is territorially indivisible and grants the military the right to defend the territorial integrity of the state (Woodworth 2001). Under the new democracy, the Basque region is partially devolved and enjoys independence above any other region in Spain, even Catalans. However, even those most benefitting from the improved political rights, the HB, would argue that the Basque region only enjoys a quasi-democracy because integral political wishes of the population are entirely

limited by the constitution. Independence—an inherent element of the HB political platform—is not up for consideration: "Spain…refuses to accept the rights of Basques to decide their own future independent from Madrid."[106] Some argue that a combination of quashed nationalism and the democratic-regime supported GAL dirty war provided just enough evidence to cause a new generation of activists to give up on democracy before it was actually in effect:

> The impact of the dirty war on the first generation of Spanish Basque generation to grow up in democracy was very damaging. It has provided just enough hard corroborative evidence, for those already inclined to accept it, for the belief that Spanish democracy means continued lawless repression for the Basque country (Woodworth 2001, 7).

Therefore, democracy in Spain—though liberal and consolidated—is considered by some to be fundamentally flawed for the Basques. As evidence of the lack of a legitimate social contract, the social contract that formed the democracy (a December 1978 constitutional referendum) was arguably also "rejected" by the Basques. Less than 1/2 of Basques voted, so less than 1/3 of the entire population approved (Woodworth 2001). Yet, within the democratic arena, concessions *have* been granted—including devolution—whatever the perception of participants. However, the zero-sum view of negotiations held by some Basques is not something that can be easily disregarded. The possible lack of a legitimate social contract that purportedly ties them to a unacceptable political entity cumulate in a zero-sum view of politics. Specifically, for an organization with an ethnically rooted nationalist claim to be unable to assert their nationalist claim within a democracy—they argue—is tantamount to disenfranchisement. Therefore, the

[106] Interview with Loren Ankotxa, HB mayor of Onderosa (in *Why do they kill?* Woodworth 2001).

more democratic Spain becomes, the more stark this viewed disenfranchisement seems, set in contrast.

This case reiterates the importance of nationalist claims found in the IRA case study. Both cases also suggest further disaggregation of the political grievance scale in order to assess this arguably immutable grievance and a more complex model of repression.

Organization

The ETA started out with a hierarchical structure, much like the other groups discussed here with a clear chain of command down military, political, and logistical/technical lines. Security threats of the dictatorship and early democracy resulted in fragmentation of the organization. The group has become progressively more fragmented over time. It is currently headed by an executive leading committee though their chain of command is immensely diffuse.[107] Rooted in the inability of leadership to centralize governance, the modern ETA has a relatively autonomous cellular structure outside of this committee (Douglas and Zulakia 1990). The organization also remains the most clandestine of the cases covered here, with only unclear ties to a sympathetic political party (HB).

Comparing the IRA and ETA, I consider that the chain of command—rather than the exact structure—both reflects and shapes policy. Without a coherent chain of command, radical elements have control over ETA's behavior whereas in the IRA, the centralized chain of command enforced policy change.

[107] From FBIS translated Madrid El Mundo article, April 25, 2001.

In summary, the ETA provides further evidence of three missed concepts from the original cross-national analysis. First, it experienced both a curvilinear impact of repression on actions, being incited but eventually quashed faced with strong state actions. Second, like the IRA, ETA's nationalist claims put a new spin on political grievances, suggesting that this concept be further disaggregated in the model. Third, reinforcing the story gleaned in the previous three case studies, the ETA's lack of a centralized chain of command rather than its clandestine character does seem to influence its propensity toward violent action.

Discussion and theory reconfiguration

A preliminary model was included in Chapter 3, illustrating cross-national support for some of the hypotheses proposed by the combined theory of Janus political behavior using statistical analysis. In summary, support, in the form of external patronage contributes to increases in both violent and non-violent behaviors. Domestic support, alternatively, seems to have no effect on behavior. Repression leads to a small increase peaceful actions and can heavily exacerbate violent actions. Economic grievances increase violent behaviors and political grievances (presumably capturing a lack of opportunity) limit peaceful behaviors. Finally, the ability of the group to operate in the open greatly contributes to its peaceful political behaviors and even allows it to participate in more violent politics.

The results of Chapter 3 are not fully satisfying. Obvious problems exist. For example, the fact that I've only explained expansions of the violent repertoire rather than expansions and limitations of it, creates obvious drawback of this model. Further, many hypothesized explanatory variables seem to have inconsistent or even counter-theoretical

effects, leading me to surmise that some of these variables have not been considered in their full complexity. For example, theoretically I would expect, that an expansion of the popular base of support (increasing levels of domestic support) would necessarily limit support for (and thus the manifestation of) violent tactics; and yet no such finding exists in our data. In fact, no significant relationship between a domestic support base and violet or peaceful behaviors appears over time. In order to put forward a model that will hopefully bridge the explanation of violent and peaceful politics, I must consider the knowledge gained through historical analysis in this and the previous chapter.

Following all four factors through multiple cases is educational—as it has shown both missing components as well as missing complexities not considered in the original model. This exercise also illustrates where the original model seems to have it right. After discussing the findings of this case-comparison, I will use this knowledge to reconsider the theoretical model used in statistical analysis of the MAROB data. I make a case for a reconsideration of the model. The reconsidered model, which includes some original factors, also expands to include omitted variables and the remodel of particular factors.

Discussion

ETA, the IRA, HAMAS, and Hezbollah all represent expressions of a population experiencing neglect and/or outright alienation from social, political, and economic spheres. This commonality shows that some type of disaffection is a necessary—though obviously not sufficient—component of the use of violence. Though couldn't the same be said of any political action? If one is happy with the status quo, what instigates *any* political action? The severity of disaffection—popular in the greed-grievance debate on

political violence—seems plausible candidate. However, this cannot be the end of the story—some groups that suffer severe poverty live in peace, while some that live in relative prosperity fight—other contextual factors also come into play. Some commonalities and some important differences across the four groups can clue us in to more general contextual factors to consider.

Despite major similarities, disparity exists in these groups. All were colored by violence in their early years, so all contain the acid of war. All four organizations came into existence—or prominence—during a period of internal turmoil. Civil wars or their non-state equivalent (i.e. the Palestinian intifada) colored the adolescence of each movement. The one group created from a splinter off an original civil-war era movement (the ETA) was influenced by an environment of repression and active aggression from the repressive dictatorship and even a repressive democracy. Yet, some have been more or less swayed by a willingness to use the ballot box while others still have not. So, now I look at how the four factors fared in comparison.

Three of the four groups have/had strong external donors. For the IRA and HAMAS, these donors are multiple.[108] For Hezbollah, the donor tie is relatively more bonding. Alternately, ETA primarily relies on domestic sources of revenue. Donors, in these examples, served as both sparks of violence as well as peaceful activities. However, they also serve to dictate the organization's behavior on an external agenda, limiting the group's ability to become a congenial participant in domestic politics. Reductions in tactical and financial support for the IRA helped change the group's behavioral calculus. Without steady financing and arms supplies (particularly after the

[108] Hamas has more funding sources than Hezbollah though both receive a substantial portion of their revenue from Iran.

capture of the *Eskund*), the war of attrition with London became too costly and a dual option was considered. HAMAS has also "suffered" from less stable funding sources, though it has considerably more stability than the IRA.

Bringing funding change in: While the logic that money pays for action was illustrated in our first analysis, the impact of funding *changes*; what the cases have illustrates to be instrumental in behavioral change was not considered. In the IRA, a loss of funding was tied to a changed course of action. Similarly, with Hezbollah and HAMAS, limitations on the use of funds were instrumental in changing behavioral calculus of these groups to a lesser extent than that of the IRA. Finally, the ETA case further explains how a lack of external support can free the hands of activists; though it also means that no patron to step in and diffuse violence nor provides any funds to maintain activity. Change in foreign state support can and should be modeled into our analysis. Therefore, the following hypothesis will also be considered. Because there would presumably be a lag in effect along with a window of opportunity, this effect will be considered for three years from onset.

H(1.5) *a <u>change</u> in external patronage (within 3 years) will decrease violent behaviors.*

Domestic support represents an important factor in each of the cases included as well, except ETA who was literally split from its political wing. Particularly, when each of these groups became part of electoral politics, they all became answerable to a group outside of direct supporters. Consequently, when the IRA (and to a lesser extent, Hezbollah and HAMAS) became involved in important competitive elections, public opinion shaped their behavior. Expanding a base of support forced the groups to—at

minimum—be more selective in their violent activities and—at best, halt violent methods and participate in showy displays of peaceful politics.

Bringing democracy in: Theoretically, there are three forms of domestic support for these groups. First, those who are vaguely sympathetic with the aims of the group, if not the means, will legitimate the goals of a group in a democracy. Second, active voters and participants in the social movement from which the organization arises create local legitimacy for the group. Finally, those who join and actively involve themselves in the activities of the organization maintain and reproduce the organization but do not determine its legitimacy (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007).

Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) argues that the more isolated an organization is from the first two support groups, the greater leeway the organization has in utilizing indiscriminate violence: as popular support becomes more important—such as with key votes—the first and second groups shape organization behavior. For all of these groups, when the first and second groups were brought in with popular elections, their freedom of action was limited in a trade-off for popular support.

The effect of domestic inclusion seems to have universal relevance. For example, Ottaway claims that the inherent effect of electoral inclusion is pacification, stating: "there is ample evidence that participation in an electoral process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position."[109] If Ottoway is correct and this finding is not unique to these cases, the popular support variable used in the first quantitative analysis (Chapter 3) was incomplete. This limitation perhaps explains the model's weak relationship to behavior. The domestic support variable comes in to play only when it *can*

[109] In Herzog 2006

legitimize the organization in popular elections. Therefore, the impact of domestic constituency size on group behavior must be modeled to account for the availability of political competition.

H(2.5) *in an electoral democracy, domestic support will increase non-violent behaviors and decrease violent behaviors, while the pacifying influence domestic support will be substantially smaller or non-existent in autocratic regimes.*

In the cross-national study, a positive and significant relationship between repression and both forms of behavior could be seen, though the effect of repression on non-violent behaviors had unstable significance. The unstable significance of repression on non-violent behaviors leads me to presume that the theorized relationship had not been properly modeled in the original analysis and that a linear relationship was perhaps incorrect.

Bringing the complexity of repression in: The findings in our case studies illustrate a complex repression-behavioral relationship. Each of the four cases experienced various levels of repression; and while most illustrated a linear relationship, particularly for violence, the IRA and ETA illustrated experienced a parabolic model of repression: higher actions tapering off at extremely high levels of repression. While heightened repression did increase the legitimacy of the use of violence, there was more to this story. The difference in the ETA's experience is illustrative—the intense, surgical repression *of the organization only* led to decline and decay of the group. Whereas, conversely, prior repression of a similar degree aimed *against the entire social movement population* legitimized the use of force, reinforcing the very violence it was meant to repress. Indiscriminate repression, though making some of the non-violent campaigning behaviors impossible at the time (or at least minimized), served to generate popular

sympathy and even political support for each group. While the threshold at which the repression could start to quash violent behavior and even non-violent is likely high, there is obviously some threshold for the positive relationship between repression and actions. At extremely high levels of repression or surgically precise repression of the organization (such at with the ETA), it would cause the organization to hibernate or decay.

H(3.1) *Repression will have parabolic-shaped effect on both violent and non-violent behaviors. Moderate levels of repression expand both types of behaviors, while high levels of repression quash all behavior. However, the threshold for non-violent behaviors is lower than that for violent ones.*

This hypothesis is a complex one. While two cases illustrated a curvilinear effect, all cases have also illustrated that an environment of violence can breed more violence in response and hence the threshold for violent behaviors should be higher than non-violent ones. Our preliminary quantitative model supported this finding, that repression *can* exacerbate violent behaviors. Therefore, while we should see a steep upward slope between repression and both types of actions, there is an eventual threshold to this relationship leading to a parabolic-shaped influence on both types of actions. Specifically, non-violent behavior should be quick to turn downwards as repression increases. However, violent behavior is expected to be a more tricky relationship to model. Surely, a complete crack-down by authorities would eventually make even the most covert terrorism more difficult, but I can expect that the threshold for repression would be understandably higher for those utilizing violent responses to state violence than those peacefully protesting the actions.

As mentioned before, all of our cases were politically and economically disenfranchised at the start of their life spans. In fact, it would seem that economic

grievances are in these cases, a necessary, though not sufficient, cause for mobilization of people across the board. In none of the cases did the economic situation get substantially better or worse—excepting maybe HAMAS during the second intifada—so these cases do not substantially contribute to an expansion of the theory on economic deprivation. In fact, it is difficult to determine what, if any, role that economic grievances play in change in behavior outside of that initial spark for creation.

Political grievances, though showing less across-the influence on behavior in the initial large N analysis, were also present at the founding of each group. A lack of political redress, on the other hand, when coupled with the standing economic disaffection, did enhance the attractiveness of violent means of politics and acceptability of it to the public. On the other hand, once political redress occurred, general public support for violence declines. For example, I can compare support for violence by force both before and after Ta'if in Lebanon; and this effect is readily apparent. Similarly illustrative was the gradually waning support for violent nationalism in the Basque region as democracy became entrenched there. Economic grievances, both directly and indirectly shaped each group's decisions to participate in peaceful and violent behaviors.

This discussion leads me to believe that there is something to be said for Schock's (1996) complex causative view of relative deprivation. While economic grievances might form the underlying logic behind mobilization, alone neither they nor political grievances play a real role in violent behaviors when the population can act peacefully. It is full alienation of a simultaneous experience of both grievances that might determine violent behaviors. Consequently, I suggest the following hypothesis:

H(4.1): *having both political and economic grievances simultaneously leads a group to utilize violent political means. Without the combined experience, a group will utilize peaceful means.*

However, as evidenced in my cases, the analysis did not fully consider a range of possible grievances and missed important ones that cannot be cured with political redress. It could be argued that some claims are inherently more zero-sum than others. Both nationalist and universal Islamist ideology could fit these criteria. While the later has its basis in Islam which is arguably more malleable and can therefore be reconfigured to function within a democracy—as it is was in the case of HAMAS and Hezbollah—the latter is much more static, as evidenced in the Irish and Basque cases.[110] Therefore, at minimum, competition for national self-determination should be considered as perhaps more capable of being viewed in a more zero-sum light than other claims.

Bringing nationalist grievances in: Are nationalist claims less co-opt-able than other claims or are these claims remediable with some middle ground of autonomy, like regional devolution in Great Britain or Spain? One side of this argument would say: Yes, spatially defined nationalist claims are zero-sum, incompatible with co-optation at their very source. Yet, two other nationalist groups in Spain have been co-opted into proper politics, pacified by devolution, even when ETA was not. Further, the IRA committed itself to a ceasefire with the promise of devolution; and even HAMAS has reduced its

[110] I would argue that because it lacks a centralized clerical authority and has inherent divisions between sects, Islam (and particularly Islamist thought) is inherently more open to interpretation than some other religions and particular secular claims such as nationalism. HAMAS also has a self-determination claim, however, which could lead to a more zero-sum external view if not internal view.

stance on reclaiming the greater Palestine area.[111] Yet, ETA remains, a nagging reminder that something is missing from the equation.

Though specifically dealing with ethnic conflict, Monica Toft's theory can be instructive here. Toft (2003) provides a theory of territorial indivisibility, where territorial claims by ethnic groups are likely to erupt into violence when the state and the ethnic group are at an impasse: when both stake their claim on indivisibility. If the ethnic group can point to a tangible homeland where they have concentrated settlement patterns, it is likely to view its nationalist claim as indivisible. Alternatively, if a state has to deal with other contending nationalist claims (a multi-national state) and fears precedent setting, it is likely to see state borders as indivisible. When these two conditions meet, violence erupts. So homeland claims must be taken seriously and taken into consideration in my final analysis.

H(4.2) *a group with nationalist claims is more likely to maintain a violent repertoire than a group without such claims, and less likely to "legitimate" the status quo by participating in politics proper.*

The final topic to consider is group organization. While the logic of early analysis illustrates the effect that "hiding out" has on the extremeness of political behavior and the levels of mobilization in total, the case studies illustrate that there is more to this story than previously shown in cross-national analysis. First, it seems that the clandestine nature of a group might simply be reflective of the state's strategy of repression—such as ETA's highly clandestine organization under more surgical anti-terrorist policies of the new Spanish regime. While this does seem to distance a group

[111] A corollary or at least mutual reflection of the Greater Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*) claims

from the social movement and hence allow for hijacking by extremist elements within the movement, it does not reflect the full organization effect theorized in this study.

Bringing organization in: One clear difference between organizations studied is the cleanness of the break between the political and military arms of the organization. Moving along a continuum from separate to completely intertwined, you would find ETA on one end of the spectrum. It had a pure break with the political faction partway through its life; and though able to ally with HB, it operated separately of the organization. On the other end of the spectrum would be HAMAS and Hezbollah, with the IRA fluctuating in the middle-range. The IRA experienced both ends of the spectrum. Sinn Fein was a politically impotent puppet of the IRA until the 1980s. However, once the dual strategy was implemented and electoral support for the increasingly autonomous Sinn Fein was illustrated, Sinn Fein began to surpass the influence of the IRA and thus be able to dictate policy to the IRA. Effective separation for the IRA meant—rather than independence of the two—a subjugation of the military to the political wings. At this point in time, the IRA then meets HAMAS and Hezbollah on my continuum, though to a unique extent.

The parallel development of political and military factions seems to be a commonality among these three cases that have effectively or partially evolved their tactics. Hezbollah and HAMAS had concurrent development of both military and political wings; and both have a central authority that dictates policies to the two arms. The IRA represents a somewhat different case, with parallel existence but sporadic development of each wing. In all three cases, the two wings (whether concurrently institutionalized or not) connected both strategic elements in gaining the ultimate aim. When a dramatic shift in one wing occurred, these ties forced a shift in the other. So,

whether both wings remain under control of a centralized authority (HAMAS and Hezbollah) or hold shifting policy control between the two wings (IRA), the maintenance of this connection seems to influence organization behavior. This connection weds the fate of both wings and moderates each to be shaped into the shared strategy. However, the dual development and institutionalization in both Hamas and Hezbollah lead to a perpetuation of both, despite policy shifts in one direction or another. In the final case, effective separation of the ETA from HB—much stronger than that seen in even the early stages of the IRA—formed a barrier to concurrent development and change, allowing a hijack of each wing's policy by its extreme elements.

The separation of the ETA and HB (while the IRA, HAMAS and Hezbollah all maintained connection) also seems to reinforce a centralized authority. While each of these organizations has formed cellular organizational structures for the most security-threatened elements (those participating in violence), it was done as a response to state repression. A chain of command became the norm and separate authorities the exception. Having a centralized authority concentrates the decision-making process for each group; and when a policy shift is enacted, that is the end of the story. This is quite unlike the relative independence and instability of the ETA. Therefore, dual development and maintenance of this connection should be considered in final analysis. A much more complex organizational impact is apparent through the case study. While clandestine nature matters, it is rather where orders originate in combination with the strength of the relative wings that makes a difference in the forms of politics used. Two effects might be considered here. First, has there been a historic split in the organization (that might proxy a split between political and military factions)?

H(5.1) *If the organization has split in the last 15 years, it is more likely to utilize violence than without a split.*

Second, the structure of an organization should also determine its ability to carry out actions of all kinds.

H(5.2) *an organization with a hierarchical structure/centralized authority is better able to conduct actions in both violent and peaceful manners. A dispersed or cellular structure will only contribute to violent actions.*

The purpose of Chapters 5 and 6 was to follow the evolution of political behavior in four Janus faced groups and determine ways in which cross-national analysis of this phenomenon can be advanced. Cumulatively, the case studies were informative for analysis. Early analysis was performed in Chapter 4 assuming that a particular set of factors would collectively shape the behavioral outcomes of these groups, determining their use of the ballet box or the gun. However, through the historical analysis of this process, many of these assumptions were shown to be overly abstracted from reality, too simplified to be of relevance in this study. While the variables originally considered in Chapter 3 were appropriate for the most part, they had been modeled linearly or without the natural interactions that case study evidence pointed out. Further, some variables (such as nationalism) were entirely omitted. Tests of these theoretical reconfigurations in cross-national analysis will follow.

Chapter 6: Final Quantitative Analysis

This project has focused on explaining behavioral outcomes of organizations that sit in a conceptual grey area between violent movements and peaceful, institutionalized political parties. In the preceding five chapters, determinants of organizational political behavior have been addressed in detail. The theoretical approach combines theories from the political violence, social movement, and party institutional literature informs the preliminary analysis of structural and meso-level factors that help shape the behavioral outcomes of Janus groups. The preliminary cross-national analysis included five testable hypotheses. Following the preliminary analysis, four case studies were considered in order to both explain how the hypothesized forces translate into behavioral change and explain what important omissions might have been made in the original conceptualization of the behavioral model. As a result of these case studies, six additional—and arguably more coherent—testable hypotheses were formed. All hypotheses (old and new) are relisted in table 6.1 below.

This chapter will test for the hypotheses derived from a comparison of the case analyses. In this process, the present chapter seeks to correct for omissions in the preliminary model; forming a more complete, if still imperfect, model of Janus behavior. This model presents a step forward in our understanding of how a wide range of political behavior is related to and dually impacted by context. In this chapter, I will briefly review methods and variables used in analysis before discussing the conclusions of the expanded study. Although the findings in this probe into Janus behavior sometimes fall short of my expectations, I would argue that they are still a great expansion of our knowledge of the

combined behavior of Janus groups and provide a great expansion of the original model. Questions left unanswered in this model admittedly beg future consideration, which will be discussed in great detail in the following chapter.

Data

Like the previous analysis found in Chapter 3, the data used in this model are primarily borrowed from the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset. As before, the unit of analysis is the group-year, analyzing organizations that represent minority groups in twelve countries[112] from 1980-2004 for a total of 1,789 organization years. The estimation sample used in statistical models remains smaller than the size of the data because of data limitations across the board.

Many of the variables used in previous analysis are also included in this chapter. Though described in Chapter 3, I will briefly rehash these variables here along with an explanation of the new variables included in the expanded statistical analysis. Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables included in this study.

Variables

Dependent variables: methods of contentious politics

Conceptually, my dependent variables represent the peaceful and violent behavioral options available to an organization wishing to lobby for political change. Two different variables are created to capture each of these behavioral repertoires along with a summary variable that captures the combined toolbox of group behavior.

[112] Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey.

The dependent variables used in this work come from the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset (MAROB 2008). The general index of nonviolent behavior, *Summary of non-violent,* is an additive index of six variables including education and propaganda, representation of interests to officials, participation in electoral politics, soliciting external support, the non-coercive collection of local support, and the provision of social services.[113] The additive index for violent behaviors, *Summary of violent,* includes the forceful collection of local support, terrorism and attacks on civilians, insurgency, administering rebel areas, and ethnic cleansing or genocide.[114] The final dependent variable, *SUM of violence and non-violence* adds the negative of *Summary of Violence* to *Summary of non-violence* to create a continuum from predominately violence (negative) to predominately non-violence (positive).

Explanatory variables

Support: In order to measure the existence of foreign state patronage, the dichotomous measure from MAROB for foreign state financial support, named here *foreign state patronage,* is used. This variable measures whether a foreign state gave the organization financial support during the year. For this chapter, an additional variable is created in order to capture instability in foreign state patronage. *Patronage change* captures the existence in a change in patronage in the previous five years.

In order to capture the effect of domestic constituency size on organizational behavior, a measure from MAROB is used. MAROB's *domestic support* variable ranges from 1 (fringe—no domestic support) to 3 (dominant organization). Because the case

[113] Each of these variables is coded as 0 for non-use as a strategy, 1 for infrequent use, and 2 for frequent use.
[114] Each of these variables is coded as 0 for non-use as a strategy, 1 for infrequent use, and 2 for frequent use.

study analysis provided evidence that domestic support would only influence behavior when elections made that support a tangible commodity, a control variable from the previous analysis helps to capture this effect. *Polity2* is a variable borrowed from the Polity IV data that captures the combined democracy and autocracy scores per country year.[115] Polity represents the competitiveness of political institutions. In the previous chapter, polity was condensed into a ten-point scale. For use in capturing the influence of domestic constituency in a democracy, this measure was further condensed into a dichotomous variable with one representing democracy.[116]

Deterrence: The variable used to measure state repression of the organization in Chapter 4 was taken from the MAROB data, *repression*. This variable measures whether the state uses lethal violence against the organization and ranges from 1 (no lethal repression of the organization) to 3 (consistently high lethal repression of the organization). In this analysis, an additional measure was created in order to capture the curvilinear impact of state repression. This measure *repression^2* is simply the square of the original repression value.

Economic and Political Grievances: In the preliminary analysis, the variable *Economic grievance,* the dominant economic grievance of the organization includes measures for whether economic grievance is a major goal for the organization, was borrowed from the MAROB dataset. This variable is ordinal flowing from a low measure illustrating little to no economic grievances in the broader social movement population to a high value with extreme economic grievance in the population.

[115] The difference in polity2 and polity is that polity2 provides estimates for periods of interruption and intergenum rather than setting these values to missing.
[116] Per the comparative democratization literature, the cutpoint for this transformation was set at 7 in the 1-10 scale.

Specifically, zero shows absolutely no expressed economic grievances, one illustrates that the organization has a major goal of eliminating economic discrimination, and three tells us that the organization focuses on creating or strengthening remedial economic policies.

The dominant political grievance, *political grievance*, is also borrowed from MAROB and compiled much like the economic grievances measure. With a value of one, a major goal of the organization is eliminating political or social discrimination. If the value is two, the organization's goals are focused on creating or increasing remedial policies while three shows goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for group. Finally, one additional value, four illustrates goals of creating a separate state for the group or revanchist change in the state's border.

An additional variable was created to operationalize the argument that simultaneous grievances, denoting a truly disaffected population, will lead to greater violent outbursts. This variable, *both,* is a dichotomous variable valued at one for the years that both economic and political grievances were included in the organization's political goals.

Nationalist organization: An additional grievance entered in this analysis for nationalist organizations. The use of this variable attempts to capture the argument that nationalist aims could be immutable and by themselves determine a rejection of peaceful means in favor of violent ones. Therefore, a dichotomous variable *nationalist* was taken from the MAROB variable denoting nationalist aims of a group. Because it could also be argued that similarly religious aims of a movement are likely to be seen as zero-sum, a dichotomous variable for *religious organization* was also included in analysis. I am not

convinced of the practicality of this argument since there is nothing inherent in any religious claim that makes it violent or inherently anti-state or anti-democracy—so this variable is not included in the reported findings.[117]

Organization: The variable used in the first analysis was *open,* a dichotomous variable borrowed from MAROB that explains if an organization is clandestine (0) or open (1) in its behaviors. Two additional variables are included in this analysis. The first, *Splinter,* is a dichotomous variable that captures fractionalization of the organization. If an organization has split in the last 10 years, this variable is coded as 1.[118] This measure is created from the MAROB variable *"orgsplit"* which is valued at 1 if the organization split within that year. The second new variable created, *centralized leadership* is also a dichotomous variable created from the MAROB data. The original variable, "lead" was valued at one if the leadership was factionalized, two with decentralized leadership, three for a strong ruling council, and four for a strong individual leader. For simplification, the first two values were combined to illustrate weak centralization (or zero) and the latter two values combined (at one) to denote a strong hierarchy of command.

Control variables

Unemployment levels, as a measure of fiscal stability are included from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2008) data. *Migration* and *urbanization* capture demographic pressures, both included from WDI data (2008). The U.S. Census international database augmented missing data for the migration variable with the final combined value of this variable measure capturing net migration per 1,000 people within

[117] The results are available upon request. This variable has no noticeable impact on behaviors in analysis.
[118] To test the validity of this measure, splinter was also tested using 5 and 15 year increments.

the country-year. A measure of democracy, *polity2,* was included in those models excluding the ones with the dichotomous democracy indicator above. Polity2 captures the combined democracy and autocracy scores per country year given in the Polity IV data condensed into a 1-10 measure (2009). A control variable *year* also remained in the study in an attempt to minimize the effect of temporal dependence in the data and to account for a temporal pattern in behaviors. Finally, the index variables for violent and non-violent behaviors were used as controls in tests, to reveal the existence of across-the-board increase in activities in the disaggregated models.

Methods

Because the arguments on the effects of macro and meso-level trends are expected to apply to comparisons both cross-nationally and over time for individual organizations, I continue to employ a pooled time-series, cross-sectional (TSCS) design. Some unit-specific error appears in the dependent variables and a though the variables have low correlation, there is a small amount of serial correlation in the explanatory variables. For that reason, both a fully differenced model and a fixed effects model were compared to those illustrated below.[119]

Before inspecting the results of the combined model, I turn to analysis of the individual hypotheses in order. The combined effect of these analyses illustrates the theorized new components of the final model of organization behavior.

[119] Surprisingly, all significant relationships hold in both the differenced and fixed effects models except where noted, so a basic model is included in the tables below since theoretically, at least, the differenced model is not valid in this analysis. However, the results of both models are available upon request.

International support and changes in patronage

The first new hypothesis inferred from case analysis specifies the impact of changing international patronage on regime behavior. I hypothesize that changing international patronage will reduce all behaviors by reducing the capital available to mobilize the population. Specifically, this hypothesis deals with the effect of changing patronage on violent behaviors in that changing patronage can signal behavioral expectations by the patron to an organization and will therefore, have a specifically strong impact on the ability of an organization to carry out violent actions. The findings illustrated in Table 6.3 below uphold the general assumption, that changing patronage will reduce the opportunity and capital available for a group to mobilize generally. However, the assumption that this change will have an even more dramatic impact on violent behaviors is not upheld. In fact, while violent behaviors are significantly reduced, they are not reduced by an even greater rate than non-violent behaviors. This is perhaps an unintended consequence of a selection effect in the data. While multiple states will openly provide patronage to outwardly peaceful behavior, the rogue-state title and consequences for those funding violent groups would necessarily limit the patronage of a violent group.

Domestic support: elections and the constituency effect

In the second analysis, I address how the impact of domestic popularity might hinge on the ability of this popularity to be translated into real effects through elections. The second hypothesis, tested in this model, comes from case study analysis and specifies the relationship between domestic popularity and group behavior in different regime types. The original model explained in Chapter 3 upheld the theoretical expectation that

having a domestic base of support would necessarily improve the organization's ability to act non-violently. However, the counter argument was not upheld. Drawing on a broader base of support—thereby widening the organization's constituency—did not have a significant pacifying effect on groups. Through case analysis, I was able to construct alternative explanations for this surprising finding. Domestic popularity—in some exceptional cases—can both grow from and alternately, legitimize continued violent actions. For example, under repressive regimes with no political outlet, both the IRA and ETA had relatively strong public support for their fight. Additionally, in the case of Hezbollah, during periods of perceived threat, violence was deemed more acceptable than at other times. In order to control for that exceptional situation in which the population also views their situation as zero-sum, this hypothesis controls both for levels of repression and, importantly, for the existence of a democratic outlet. The ability to participate in competitive politics would arguably capture the argument by Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) that isolation from—or, alternatively—contact with political support would determine the leeway that a group has in its behavioral repertoire. In this analysis, two models are analyzed for each behavior, one where there is political redress available (a competitive democracy) and one in which there is little or no political redress available (an autocracy). In table 6.4 below, all models are shown using populations divided by regime type.[120] The findings, though not all significant, are instructive. Much like in the original analysis, domestic popularity positively influences non-violent behavior. Importantly, however, the only significant relationship occurs in a democratic regime. Domestic support still fails to have a significant effect on violent behaviors in this

[120] Using a Chow test (1960), the coefficients in the separate subsamples were significantly different, showing that even if the effects are not entirely as expected, regime type does influence the outcome of this explanatory variable.

disaggregated study and rather, taking only the variable direction into account, might seem to offer an arena for the legitimating of violence.[121]

This model is also interesting in other ways: By separating the models into subsamples by regime type, this model illustrates far more than the polity control variable has shown in other models. For example, noting the impact of openness of an organization on behavioral methods in different regime types shows that the significant relationship driving the results of *openness* in Chapter 3 occurs only in a democracy.

Repression –curvilinear

In the original analysis, a measure of repression was included to account for the available political opportunity for political mobilization as well as the base level of violence used by a regime against an organization. Specifically, per theories that violent from above creates an environment of brutality mirrored in substate actors, I hypothesized that repression would have a linear, inciting effect on behavior of groups (see: Snyder 1976; Wiktorowicz 2004; Zimmerman 1980). While the linear measure included in this original analysis was able to capture a significant effect showing that violence from above corresponds with violent behaviors of sub-national units, it was unable to capture the full effect of repression on non-violent behaviors. Others theorize that the impact of repression is actually curvilinear, an effect found in at least one of the case studies (Muller 1985; Gartner and Regan 1996). As repression grows worse, an organization will be incited to fight back "fire with fire" and consequently become more active and even more violent. However, at severely high levels of repression, it would be

[121] Though not changing the variable levels of significance (only strong for domestic support in a democracy), the direction of the variables were also as expected (negative effect on violence) in a fully differenced model accounting for USE.

unable to do so. If an organization's leadership is imprisoned, its members lacking freedom of movement and its capital locked down—such as in the ETA case study—it would necessarily hibernate or even decay, no matter its wish to fight back. Therefore, the next model addresses this theorized relationship: that while moderate levels of repression will initiate violent responses and even heightened non-violent responses in protest, as repression increases, it will reach a tipping point and quash all dissent. It would seem logical that the theorized tipping point would be higher for violent behaviors than non-violent ones though both relationships should hold.

In table 6.5 below, a parabolic model of repression is included in a preliminary analysis. The inclusion of both should capture curvilinear effects of repression on organizational behavior. The important measure of the curvilinear model is the cut-points of the parabolic model.[122] These describe the point of inflection—where the threshold exists that would make a group cease to act and begin to run and hide. This point of inflection will explain whether there is indeed a different threshold of the linear effect of repression on the separate behaviors; and further, it will allow us to see the threshold on behavior in general in response to top-down violence. The cut-point assessed from model one for non-violent behaviors—the only disaggregated model with a significant curvilinear *and* linear relationship—is 2.27. Because repression is conceptualized in this data as a three-point scale, this can be translated to mean that organizations will respond to increased repression (slightly past moderate levels) with non-violent actions; but as repression surpasses the mid range, even slightly, this form of dissent will be suppressed. Alternately, for violent behaviors, the cut-point is

[122] The cut-points, or the point at which the slope of the line changes direction, was determined using the following formula: ß1*x= ß2*x^2, solving for x. (x= ß1/ ß2)."

substantially higher than peaceful behaviors at 4.55, a number out of the range of analysis. Therefore, while extremely high levels (read: off the charts) of repression could conceivably constrain violent dissent, they are more likely to spark more of the same. Consequently, repression is only significantly shown as a linear relationship in the model of violent behaviors. In the total behavioral model, only curvilinear relationship is evidenced. A slightly lower point of inflection is evidenced at 2.08. Significantly in this model, the negative direction could point to an overall decrease in behaviors *or* a turn to violence. Both the total and non-violent models show that behavior can be decreased somewhere around the moderate level of repression, though the strong and significant linear relationship with violence might evidence that these groups could rapidly decline peaceful behaviors in exchange for violent methods that require fewer resources to mobilize but produce a greater cost to the target. While these findings don't show support the specific curvilinear hypothesis at least for violent behaviors, they do seem to provide significant evidence for the *concept* that repression can be both a cause and a counter to action.

Grievances – separate, combined, and different

In the original model, grievances were modeled separately in order to account for the impacts that perception of discrimination had on each relative axis of behavior. In going through the cases, I found evidence that the perception of—or reality of—some sort of deprivation was occurring in every case. The reason for existence of each group studied—despite their wide variety of ideological underpinnings—was addressing this grievance. However, while the organization must perceive some form of discrimination to act, neither form of grievance in our cases seemed a sufficient factor in the decision to

use violent methods. Much like the findings of social movement theorists, historical analysis showed that singular grievances, even changing ones, seem to be a necessary but not sufficient cause for any action. Singular grievances cannot be the end of the story, however, as our case study organizations did react to a compounding of problems. Full alienation—a combination of both grievances and an expression of Shock's (1996) view of relative deprivation—would denote a complete out-grouping of the general organization and ready the path for violence, per these cases.

Therefore, I hypothesized that groups expressing the experience of simultaneous grievances would be more prone to "give up" on proper politics and consequently become more likely accept rebellion than groups without shared grievances. This hypothesis was not fully upheld, as is shown Table 6.6 below. While organizations do "give up" on proper politics to a substantial and significant degree, they "give up" on violent politics at almost the same rate. In fact, it would seem that simultaneous grievances might denote a loss of hope entirely and therefore completely retard all behavior.[123] Separate of these poor souls, those organizations that have economic grievances will both fight and peacefully assemble in search of redress. Alternately, the search for political redress seems to lead only to violence. However, this latter finding could be influenced by a lack of opportunity for at least one of the variables included in the additive index (competing in elections) though the relatively strong and significant impact, even in a fully differenced model, makes this problem unlikely.

While general economic and political grievances tell us something about the composition of an organization and their goals, something is missing from this equation.

[123] This finding might relate to the loss of efficacy found in institutionalized powerlessness and deserves further study.

Specifically, I examine what happens when the organization's goals are perceived to be incompatible with congenial politics. In the case chapters, both the IRA and ETA brought this problem to light. While those happy with semi-autonomy may lay down their arms and separate from the group, those that retain nationalist aims see politics as more zero-sum. If the end result is to form an autonomous entity—particularly while operating within a state that jealously guards its sovereignty that will not consider this option—it might seem that even in a post-Wilsonian world, the quest for national self-determination is best won through violence. Therefore, an additional grievance, nationalist aims, was also considered in this analysis. Not surprisingly, as illustrated in Table 6.7 below, this is exactly the case. Nationalist aims have a strong, positive and significant relationship with violent methods. While not a significant relationship, the negative direction of the relationship between nationalism and non-violent methods does indicate that the assumed relationship holds.

Organization: splintering and hierarchies

Splintering: If we view the evolution of an organization from the social movement perspective, we should expect that as the organization institutionalizes and broadens its base of support, it will become more like the formal political sphere and therefore, more peaceful over time. Even if concurrent evolution can take place (institutionalizing both peaceful and violent political methods), the underlying assumption is that behaviors become institutionalized as part of the movement's repertoire. However, what either assumption fails to adequately address are shocks to institutionalization: when rather than becoming co-opted, elements within a group break away. Based on the same logic driving analysis of nationalism, group splintering would

necessarily have a polarizing effect. As mentioned in the discussion of nationalist goals, portions of a social movement organization can become satisfied with the status quo and lay down their weapons—providing support for pacifying in the life cycle approach to social movements. What remains (for those dissatisfied with the status quo) is either to splinter off and continue fighting or remain part of the whole and give in to the trend.

When the splintering option occurs, the extreme elements form the new majority, creating an entirely different base level of action than the previous social movement organization. Splintering, consequently, disrupts the life cycle trajectory for the original organization and forms a new starting point. In historical analysis of the Janus cases, this was readily apparent. At its birth, Hezbollah was created out of a splintering off of more radical elements within AMAL who believed that AMAL had become too docile and lost its focus. During that early time, Hezbollah was attractive to more militant elements simply because it was a fresh attempt at an old story. HAMAS, while not necessarily a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood, did denote a siphoning off of resources and personnel from this group—and a more outwardly focused agenda than the Brotherhood, thus attracting more radical elements from its quasi-predecessor. Similarly, when the IRA splintered, the group that remains the focus of our story—and history in general—is militant. ETA, while sharing the experience of the other groups (radicalizing with splinters), has perhaps splintered a few too many times to the point that it is unable to maintain a bare minimum level of resources or personnel for any action. Nevertheless, with each splinter, it has become more truly militant than before.

In Table 6.8 below, I test the hypothesis that a recent splinter in the organization will denote a more condensed group of radicals spearheading the group. Tested in 5, 10

and 15-year increments, very little support for this hypothesis appears across the board. In each analysis, a splintering did correlate to a decline in non-violent behaviors and similarly in a turn to violent behaviors in the aggregated model, yet the lack of significant correlation between splintering and a move to violence makes the first two results suspect.

Hierarchy of command: While splintering might be able to explain changing membership of a group and additionally, how diffuse or condensed their ties are, more importantly to the organizational aspect of group behavior is the chain of command or group hierarchical structure. Jung (2007) provides evidence that this structure relates to other aspects of an organization such as operating costs that might conflate analysis. However, in later work, Jung and coauthors Wong and Hegel (2008) illustrate that despite these conflating effects, vertical command structure creates specialized units that steer group focus into non-violent arenas. In contrast, "flatter" groups are unable to provide anything but one good, and are therefore more violent than their vertical counterparts. The contrast provided in Jung et al.'s (2008) study was mirrored in the historical analysis of previous chapters. In both HAMAS and Hezbollah, the vertical command structure has allowed for the simultaneous creation and institutionalization of political wings and militias.

While this same structure may in fact perpetuate the existence of outdated militias (as with Hezbollah), this structure may also allow for early integration into politics proper through the political wing, allowing for an easier transition through the theorized evolution than otherwise possible. Alternately, the disperse organizational structure evidenced through some of the IRA's life span and through most of the ETA's life, while

not preventing the development of non-violent actions entirely, clearly retarded the ability for the organization to evolve politically. Therefore, I contend, with Jung et al, that the vertical chain of command represents an integral element of group behavior that allows for simultaneous institutionalization of both violent and non-violent specialized units. To test this argument, I proposed the hypothesis that organizations with a hierarchical structure/centralized authority are better able to carry out all political actions, violent and non-violent, while those with dispersed or cellular structures will primarily participate in violent actions.

In table 6.9 below, a model is presented that tests for this hypothesis and its results are surprising. While centralized hierarchy has no significant influence on violent behaviors, it actually has a negative and significant relationship with non-violent behaviors. I am at a loss to explain this finding; it is entirely counterintuitive. Possible contributing factors to this odd finding are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

While the case analysis did little to advance the total model in terms of organizational structure, it is otherwise substantially improved in its final form. Improvements were made despite admittedly dwindling degrees of freedom resulting from a model this size being tested on a relatively small sample. In Table 6.10 below, the full model is presented. Table 6.10 represents analysis of an expanded model of group behavior. Model 1 provides disaggregated non-violent actions by groups. Model 2 provides disaggregated violent actions by groups, and Model 3 illustrates tests of factors that influence the aggregate behaviors. Support, deterrence, grievances, and organization—to greater and lesser extents—all contributed to an explanation of organizational behaviors in this model.

As expected, in all three models, *foreign patronage* has a strong and positive impact on all forms of behavior; and as the money sources multiply, so too do all forms of behavior. Interruptions in access to the coin purse—a proxy for both intermittent support and signals for change from the patron—were tested through *changes in patronage. Changes* necessarily reduce all forms of behavior, particularly non-violent behavior. Domestic support also related to an increase in non-violent behaviors and had a negative, though not significant, impact on violent behaviors.

The combined model of repression within this analysis evidenced a consistent relationship between *repression* and increased behaviors of all kinds. However, the curvilinear model of repression was only evidenced in non-violent behaviors. It would seem that that this is a by-organization effect, as shown in model 3. Because this model examines total behavior by group, groups on average do tend to respond to repression until it passes a threshold, though this could signal that they have resorted to violence rather than a total reduction in behaviors. When controlling for other factors, the point of inflection for the curvilinear relationship is also substantially higher in both model 1 and 2 than previously measured.

In the combined model, as the perception of unfair poverty increases—measured by *economic grievances*—the use of all forms of behaviors substantially increases. The perception of political discrimination—measured by *political grievances*—on the other hand, leads to a decrease in all behaviors. The completely disaffected groups, represented by organizations with *simultaneous grievances* saw a reduction in all behaviors, particularly nonviolent ones. Additionally, groups with *nationalist aims* had a

positive and significant relationship with violence and no relationship with non-violent behaviors, illustrating that there is something immutable about the quest for nationalism.

Attempting to capture the vertical chain of command, I also included a measure of centralized versus dispersed chain of command. The impact of c*entralized authority structures* remain strangely negative in this model—significantly so for combined behaviors as well as non-violent behaviors.

The control variables in this model are also quite interesting. Particularly *year*, which would partially capture the institutionalization of an organization with the passage of time, has the hoped-for result of illustrating a temporal sequence to peaceful evolution in a movement. Non-violent behaviors become more commonplace and violent ones become less so in time. Despite the washout in previous models, the *polity* score does show that democracy can co-opt dissent before it becomes violent, leading to a negative and significant relationship with violent behaviors. Despite—or perhaps because of—the overlap between the measure for competitive democracy and one of the components of peaceful actions, no significant relationship exists between the two variables. The indicator for economic environment, *unemployment*, has a negative and weakly significant relationship with behaviors in total though demographic pressures such as *migration*, does not hold up in this model.

In total, this chapter has served to further disaggregate the effect that context of action has on organizational behavior. Separately and collectively, extensions of the support, deterrence, grievance, and organizational factors were considered to great effect, further enhancing the understanding of organizational behavior. At the same time, however, it seems that more questions remain than answers. Why are some of the

hypothesized expectations—with strong support in theory and case analysis—not upheld in historical analysis? Why do some factors provide minor contributions when they are thought to be major effects, and vice versa? More importantly, where do we go from here? In the concluding chapter, I will discuss possible explanations for weak results as well as strong results of this final model, summarizing it in context of the entire work. Additionally, I will address some of the manifold questions that this research has unearthed and use these questions to guide my plan of future research.

Table 6.1: all hypotheses – new shaded

Number	Topic	Hypothesis
H(1)	Foreign state patronage and domestic support	Foreign and domestic support will increase both violent and non-violent behaviors.
H(1.5)	Foreign state patronage	*A change in external patronage (within 5 year)s will decrease violent behaviors.*
H(2)	Foreign patronage, domestic support	Foreign and domestic support will increase non-violent behaviors more than violent behaviors.
H(2.5)	Domestic constituency	In an electoral democracy, domestic support will increase non-violent behaviors and decrease violent behaviors.
H(3)	Repression	As repression increases, all behaviors increase while groups will be more likely to utilize violent means of politics than before.
H(3.5)	Repression	Repression will have a curvilinear effect (inverse U-shaped) on both violent and non-violent behaviors. Moderate levels of repression expand both types of mobilization while high levels of repression quash all behavior. However the threshold for non-violent behaviors is lower than that for violent ones.
H(4)	Grievances	Political and economic grievances will both increase violent activities. Economic grievances will increase non-violent activities while political grievances will decrease non-violent activities.
H(4.1)	Grievances	Simultaneous political and economic grievances will increase violent behaviors.
H(4.2)	Grievances	a group with nationalist claims is more likely to maintain a violent repertoire than a group without such claims, and less likely to "legitimate" the status quo by participating in politics proper. Therefore, nationalist organizations will participate less in peaceful politics and more in violent politics, all else equal.
H(5)	Organization	Openness of an organization will increase nonviolent behaviors while decreasing violent ones.
H(5.1)	Organization	If an organization has split within the last 15 years, it is more likely to use violent methods.
H(5.2)	Organization	An organization with a hierarchical structure/centralized authority is better able to carry out all political actions, violent and non-violent than other organizations. A dispersed or cellular structure will only contribute to violence actions.

Table 6.2 Summary Statistics							
Variable	**Source**	**Obs**	**Mean**	**Mode[124]**	**St. Dev**	**Min**	**Max**
Dependent variables							
Non-violent	MAROB	1604	3.51		2.23	0	11
Violent	MAROB	1723	0.57		1.18	0	9
Sum violent and nonviolent	MAROB	1559	2.96		2.28	-4	11
Independent variables							
Foreign state financial support (patronage)	MAROB	1789	0.26	0 (74%)	.44	0	1
Patronage change	MAROB	1798	0.2	0 (80%)	0.46	0	1
Organizational popularity	MAROB	1750	2.03	2 (79%)	.46	1	3
State repression of organization	MAROB	1751	1.17	1 (87%)	.46	1	3
Repression^2	MAROB	1751	0.37		1.68	1	9
Economic grievances	MAROB	1766	0.26	0 (84%)	0.62	0	2
Political Grievances	MAROB	1775	3.06	4 (49%)	1.14	1	4
Both (economic and political grievances)	MAROB	1752	0.16	0 (84%)	0.37	0	1
Nationalist political aim	MAROB	1764	0.36	0 (64%)	0.48	0	1
Organizational splinter (10 yr)	MAROB	1789	0.29	0 (71%)	0.45	0	1
Organizational splinter (15 yr)	MAROB	1789	0.54	1 (53%)	0.5	0	1
Organization openness	MAROB	1754	0.74	1 (74%)	0.44	0	1
Centralized leadership	MAROB	1789	0.79	1 (79%)	0.41	0	1

[124] For dichotomous or ordinal variables

Control variables							
Polity two	POLITY IV	1406	5.18		3.77	1	10
democracy	POLITY IV	1406	0.37	0 (64%)	0.48	0	1
Unemployment[125]	WDI	1187	19.29		14.53	-11.5	65.1
Migration[126]	WDI & US census	1785	1.85		11	-30	97
urbanization	WDI	1789	2.67		1.32	-0.05	12.88

[125] The rare very high unemployment levels come from Algeria, which is no big surprise.

[126] Migration levels are skewed by a few exceptional cases. First, Jordan was a hotspot for relocating in '90-'91 for Lebanese and Iraqis. Second, pre-war Iraq and Saudi Arabia had high numbers of migrant guest workers. Finally, Iraq's high negative migration rates at wartime provided the large negative data for two years.

Table 6.3: Change in foreign state patronage
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	**Violent**	**Summed behavior**
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent Index	Model 2: Violent Index	Model 3: Summed Violent and Non-violent
Foreign state patronage	1.12***	0.435***	.498**
	(0.167)	(0.081)	(0.176)
Change in patronage	**-0.72*** **	**-0.27** **	**-0.644** **
	(0.214)	**(0.104)**	**(0.254)**
Domestic support	0.184	0.006	0.182
	(0.247)	(0.104)	(0.293)
Repression	0.257***	0.699***	-0.499***
	(0.96)	(0.047)	(0.107)
Economic grievance	0.099	0.316***	-0.198
	(0.179)	(0.083)	(0.189)
Political grievance	-0.311**	0.077	-0.34**
	(0.135	(0.056)	(0.141)
Open	0.334*	-0.0156	0.296
	(0.177)	(0.080)	(0.192)
Controls			
unemployment	-0.016**	-0.008**	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)
migration	0.004	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)
urbanization	0.113**	0.027	0.096*
	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.054)
Polity (dem)	-0.011	-0.024	0.013
	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.04)
Year	0.040***	-0.003	0.048***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.009)
R^2 within	0.11	0.20	0.10
R^2 between	0.18	0.56	0.15
R^2 overall	0.12	0.58	0.15
Observations	927	968	860

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 6.4: Domestic support in democratic and autocratic regimes
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent		**Violent**		**Summed behavior**	
VARIABLES	Model 1: democratic	Model 2: autocratic	Model 3: democratic	Model 4: autocratic	Model 3: democratic	autocratic
Foreign state patronage	0.974***	0.909**	0.315***	0.525***	0.65***	-0.115
	(0.185)	(0.411)	(0.081)	(0.16)	(0.182)	(0.394)
Domestic support	**0.777****	**0.525**	**0.104**	**-0.161**	**0.665***	**0.781****
	(0.341)	**(0.343)**	(0.118)	(0.158)	(0.0.348)	(0.364)
Repression	0.553**	0.101	0.787***	0.687***	-0.196	-0.672
	(0.175)	(0.153)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.182)	(0.139)
Economic grievance	0.055*	1.178***	0.338***	0.507***	-0.244	0.623*
	(0.195)	(0.315)	(0.082)	(0.125)	(0.197)	(0.33)
Political grievance	-0.433**	-0.091	0.132*	0.052	-0.531	-0.831
	(0.170)	(0.157)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.181)	(0.167)
Open	0.457*	0.496	-0.151*	0.025	0.586**	0.443
	(0.217)	(0.316)	(0.09)	(0.136)	(0.216)	(0.344)
Controls						
unemployment	0.027*	-0.008	-0.0005	-0.006	0.026*	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.01)
migration	0.017	0.002	-0.004	0.0008	0.021*	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.007)
urbanization	-0.033	0.157**	0.054	-0.012	-0.094	0.164**
	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.010)	(0.079)
year	0.033**	0.056***	0.007	-0.009	0.027**	0.067**
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.086)	(0.015)
R^2 within	0.12	0.07	0.16	0.21	0.08	0.13
R^2 between	0.41	0.21	0.62	0.54	0.35	0.27
R^2 overall	0.43	0.18	0.60	0.57	0.46	0.34
Observations	510	479	505	500	505	464

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 6.5: Curvilinear model of repression
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	**Violent**	**Summed behavior**
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent index	Model 2: Violent index	Model 3: Summary index
Foreign state patronage	0.964***	0.414***	0.431**
	(0.162)	(0.08)	(0.176)
Domestic support	0.301	0.047	0.339
	(0.245)	(0.1)	(0.253)
Repression	**1.30****	**0.856****	**0.615**
	(0.549)	**(0.276)**	**(0.591)**
Repression^2	**-0.286***	**-0.036**	**-0.312****
	(0.147)	**(0.074)**	**(0.16)**
Economic grievance	0.128	0.389***	-0.145
	(0.179)	(0.079)	(0.185)
Political grievance	-0.299**	0.105**	-0.325**
	(0.13)	(0.051)	(0.135)
Open	0.357**	-0.016	0.340*
	(0.177)	(0.078)	(0.183)
Controls			
unemployment	-0.017**	-0.078**	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)
migration	0.003	-0.001	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
polity	-0.005	-0.024	0.021
	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.038)
urbanization	0.108**	0.026	0.07
	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.053)
year			
R^2 within	0.11	0.19	0.10
R^2 between	0.13	0.62	0.18
R^2 overall	0.12	0.59	0.20
Observations	927	968	903

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 6.6: simultaneous grievances
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	**Violent**	**Summed behavior**
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent index	Model 2: Violent index	Model 3: Summary index
Foreign state patronage	0.983***	0.408***	0.462**
	(0.162)	(0.080)	(0.176)
Domestic support	0.32	0.058	0.341
	(0.245)	(0.103)	(0.254)
Repression	.238**	0.689***	-0.532***
	(0.096)	(0.047)	(0.104)
Simultaneous grievances	**-1.96****	**-1.22******	**-0.854**
	(0.703	**(0.328)**	**(0.728)**
Economic grievance	1.50**	1.16***	0.446
	(0.525)	(0.239)	(0.545)
Political grievance	-0.346**	0.049**	-0.355**
	(0.13)	(0.056)	(0.136)
Open	0.370**	0.003	0.351*
	(0.177)	(0.079)	(0.183)
Controls			
unemployment	-0.015**	-0.009**	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)
migration	0.004	-0.00003	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.024)	(0.006)
polity	0.001	-0.020	0.025
	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.038)
urbanization	0.113**	0.03	0.075
	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.053)
year	0.42***	-0.002	0.046***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
R^2 within	0.11	0.19	0.10
R^2 between	0.13	0.62	0.16
R^2 overall	0.12	0.61	0.18
Observations	927	968	903

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 6.7: nationalist aims
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	**Violent**	**Summed behavior**
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent index	Model 2: Violent index	Model 3: Summary index
Foreign state patronage	0.978***	0.396***	0.476**
	(0.164)	(0.081)	(0.177)
Domestic support	0.285	0.056	0.298
	(0.248)	(0.104)	(0.255)
Repression	.267**	0.707***	-0.518***
	(0.098)	(0.047)	(0.105)
Economic grievance	0.137	0.285***	-0.116
	(0.182)	(0.084)	(0.187)
Political grievance	-0.251*	-0.019	-0.190
	(0.15)	(0.065)	(0.156)
Nationalist organization	**-0.255**	**0.428****	**-0.707***
	(0.359)	**(0.15)**	**(0.372**
Open	0.416**	-0.015	0.419**
	(0.183)	(0.081)	(0.189)
Controls			
unemployment	-0.017**	-0.007**	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)
migration	0.003	-0.0009	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)
polity	-0.0003	-0.034**	0.038
	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.04)
urbanization	0.107**	0.035	0.066
	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.053)
year	0.041***	-0.001	0.044***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
R^2 within	0.11	0.20	0.10
R^2 between	0.13	0.61	0.18
R^2 overall	0.12	0.60	0.20
Observations	912	953	903

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 6.8: Recent group splinter
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	Violent	Summed behavior
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent index	Model 2: Violent index	Model 3: Summary index
Foreign state patronage	0.980***	0.408***	0.464**
	(0.162)	(0.081)	(0.176)
Domestic support	0.201	0.043	0.211
	(0.253)	(0.106)	(0.262)
Repression	.247**	0.703***	-0.531***
	(0.96)	(0.047)	(0.103)
Economic grievance	-0.098*	0.323***	-0.187
	(0.18)	(0.084)	(0.186)
Political grievance	-0.303**	0.079	-0.334*
	(0.13)	(0.056)	(0.136)
Splinter	**-0.579***	**-0.033**	**-0.615***
	(0.344)	**(0.148)**	**(0.361)**
Open	0.371**	-0.0006	0.348**
	(0.178)	(0.079)	(0.183)
Controls			
unemployment	-0.044*	-0.008**	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
migration	0.003	-0.0006	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
polity	-0.009	-0.024	0.017
	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.039)
urbanization	0.113**	0.029	0.078
	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.053)
year	0.042***	-0.002	0.047***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
R^2 within	0.11	0.19	0.10
R^2 between	0.13	0.61	0.18
R^2 overall	0.12	0.59	0.19
Observations	912	953	903

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?).

Table 6.9: Centralized authority structure of organization
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	**Violent**	**Summed behavior**
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent index	Model 2: Violent index	Model 3: Summary index
Foreign state patronage	0.985***	0.408***	0.469**
	(0.162)	(0.081)	(0.176)
Domestic support	0.318	0.0495	0.343
	(0.246)	(0.104)	(0.254)
Repression	.245**	0.702***	-0.532***
	(0.96)	(0.047)	(0.103)
Economic grievance	-0.174	0.323***	-0.105
	(0.181)	(0.084)	(0.188)
Political grievance	-0.293**	0.077	-0.322**
	(0.13)	(0.056)	(0.136)
Central authority	**-0.438****	**-0.013**	**-0.422***
	(0.344)	**(0.099)**	**(0.218)**
Open	0.401**	0.002	0.38**
	(0.178)	(0.08)	(0.184)
Controls			
unemployment	-0.014*	-0.008**	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
migration	0.003	-0.0006	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
polity	-0.0007	-0.024	0.028
	(0.0358)	(0.016)	(0.039)
urbanization	0.096*	0.028	0.061
	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.053)
year	0.040***	-0.002	0.046***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
R^2 within	0.11	0.19	0.11
R^2 between	0.09	0.62	0.13
R^2 overall	0.09	0.59	0.16
Observations	927	968	903

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (clandestine?).

Table 6.10: A Full model
Time-series regression coefficients for the indexes of violent, non-violent, and summed behaviors, 1980-2004

	Non-Violent	Violent	Summed
VARIABLES	Model 1: Non-violent index	Model 2: Violent index	Model 3: Summary index
Foreign state patronage	0.785***	0.324***	0.532**
	(0.173)	(0.082)	(0.178)
Patronage Change	**-0.922*** **	**-0.254** **	**-0.692*** **
	(0.231)	(0.106)	(0.238)
Domestic support	0.161***	-0.065	0.227
	(0.246)	(0.113)	(0.256)
Repression	1.29**	0.835**	0.658
	(0.575)	(0.277)	(0.599)
Repression^2	**-0.369** **	**-0.025**	**-0.326** **
	(0.153)	**(0.074)**	**(0.160)**
Economic grievance	1.26**	1.017***	0.613
	(0.54)	(0.242)	(0.555)
Political grievance	-0.218*	-0.334	-0.17
	(0.151)	(0.065)	(0.156)
Simultaneous	**-1.67** **	**-1.061** **	**-0.959**
	(0.717)	**(0.329)**	**(0.742)**
Nationalist aims	**-0.51**	**0.449** **	**-0.763** **
	(0.367)	**(0.157)**	**(0.376)**
Open	0.339**	-0.123	0.395**
	(0.182)	(0.085)	(0.19)
Central authority	**-0.449** **	**0.042**	**-0.44***
	(0.22)	**(0.102)**	**(0.229)**
unemployment	-0.015**	-0.01**	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
migration	0.004	-0.002	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
polity	-0.022	-0.033**	0.047
	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.054)
urbanization	0.071*	0.029	0.047
	(0.051)	(0.025)	(0.054)
year	0.040***	-0.033**	0.041***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Other behavior	0.366***	0.083***	
R^2 within	0.17	0.26	0.12
R^2 between	0.18	0.62	0.19
R^2 overall	0.13	0.65	0.17
Observations	888	888	888

*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10 Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Foreign state support = financing by a foreign state; Domestic support = domestic popularity; Open=organization openness (is the organization clandestine?). other behavior = control for alternate behavior index

CHAPTER 7 – Conclusion

If you're interested in freedom, you need some judo, you need some karate--you need all the things that will help you fight for freedom. If we don't resort to the bullet, then immediately we have to take steps to use the ballot…

That's why, in 1964, it's time now for you and me to become more politically mature and realize what the ballot is for; what we're supposed to get when we cast a ballot; and that if we don't cast a ballot, it's going to end up in a situation where we're going to have to cast a bullet…

It's either a ballot or a bullet.

Malcolm X speech, March 29, 1964

The speech partially quoted above was made by Malcolm X less than a year after southern Democrats blocked the first attempt at civil rights legislation but before the Civil Rights Act's eventual passage in 1964. In a complex critique of the established order and "acceptable" means of politics, Malcolm X turns Lincoln's phrasing[127] on its head, questioning the assumption that the ballot is a preferable method in context. This famous "ballot or bullet" speech illustrates growing frustration and resentment at social roadblocks and congressional filibuster. He directs his own frustration at the existing impasse between the entrenched and violently guarded status quo and the unacceptable situation for African Americans. This speech declares Malcolm X's perception of a finite willingness of the black population to continue to utilize congenial politics without real change, particularly when pitted against violent repression from the established order. In this speech, he suggestively harkens to a history of subjugation while pointing out Lincoln's discarded alternative option, the bullet. The underlying threat here is as palatable as it is an arguably natural response: The rules of the game only apply when my opponents follow them, and if the game is fixed, the rules no longer apply. This speech is

[127] "The ballot is stronger than the bullet"

a reminder that as much as peaceful politics may be the ideal endpoint, one must look at the playing field to understand why so much of politics falls short of that ideal.

In this project, I have attempted to answer this need by pulling together the ways we might understand the playing field for the organizations that still teeter on the verge between the ballot and the bullet. I began this work by suggesting that, in order to understand these multi-faced movements, I must integrate structural and group context into analysis of their behavior. In this vein, I applied complementary historical and cross-national methods to the study of organizations representing minority social movements within their context, accounting for elements of structure and group-level context. In total, this project provides a substantial leap forward to the understanding of this complex middle ground of politics, though it is only an exploratory first step.

In this final chapter, I summarize the findings of historical and cross-national analysis of behavioral context, organizing these around the four key concepts considered in this work: support, deterrence, grievance and organization. I also venture to answer some of the greater questions brought up through this analysis, suggesting explanations for some of the null findings as well as the implications for the robust results found in analysis. Because this project represents a broader research agenda in progress, I make particular note of where this project could be expanded, including plans for future research in this vein. I conclude with the implications of the project for both policy and scholarship.

Summing up the connection between behaviors and context

Is organizations' choice between the bullet and the ballot—or even attending to the ballot box with the Armalite in hand—at least in part a consequence of the context in

which they operate? Further, can aspects of the systemic environment or even group environment shape both forms of political behavior? The findings from this project suggest that the use of both the ballot and the bullet can and should be studied in tandem because both are a result of the behavioral context of mobilization. While observers often view the groups who utilize violence as separate political entities from proper political organizations, this work would suggest that there is commonality. These organizations are responding to some of the same contextual stimuli. Further, it would suggest that this very middle ground of behavior provides a glimpse of the early interim space between mobilization and party construction. Despite the less than spectacular results for some of the four concepts covered in cross national analysis, I would argue that the research question is still an important one to ask and that these factors contributed to the exploratory model of Janus organization behavior. Below, I will discuss these findings in detail, along with their implications.

Chapter 3 represents the first test of the combined literature's model of behavior. This model showed a significant positive contribution of external patronage on violent and non-violent behaviors. Further, it showed separate impacts of political grievances, economic grievances, and a linear model of repression on the separate patterns of behavior. A number of expectations were not upheld—including the influence of domestic popularity and organizational openness—which led to a reconsideration of these factors in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 included an in-depth case study of Hezbollah between its birth and first participation in parliamentary elections. Chapter 5 looked briefly at three additional organizations, HAMAS, IRA, and ETA and compared these to one another and the original case study. The original four factors were followed

throughout all four cases and other historical factors were additionally considered in order to expand and better specify the model of behavior. From this exercise, new variables were constructed and others better specified, providing an additional six testable hypotheses for in Chapter 6. This exercise built to a more complete model of organizational behavior than that seen in Chapter 3.

Discussion of the cumulative model

Chapter 6 did not produce a volume of results compatible with the findings of historical analysis. The findings that exist are valuable in that they tell us more of the dual model of behavior than has been considered in previous studies. The variables without support—the null findings of analysis—are perhaps equally valuable in that they can tell us even more about how this model functions and guide future analysis of this subject. I will briefly overview the primary results and non-results and discuss their combined implications below, considering the four factors and their multiple hypotheses in turn.

Support—patronage and popularity

Patronage from an outside source is shown to increase a group's ability to act in no small part because it contributes to the funding needed for action. This finding from Chapter 3 was unsurprising, but after considering the case studies, a more complex model of patronage would be considered in the final model. I hypothesized that while external funding would increase the ability of a group to act both violently and non-violently, *changes* in funding or unstable funding would contribute to a decline in all behavior. Changes in funding as they serve as a proxy for signaling displeasure of the benefactor, would specifically contribute to a decline in violent behaviors.

In the final model, these concepts were tested. While patronage does increase mobilization resources and strongly contribute to increases in both behaviors, changes in patronage did significantly decrease a group's ability to act. The surprising part of these results, however, was that changes in patronage actually more dramatically decreased non-violent behaviors than violent ones. This unexpected result could stem from a few sources, but most likely it stems from the chance that I conflated my theoretical assumptions in this study. Specifically, there is a difference between funding changes (by chance or due to financial constraints of the patron) and those tied to a message (the "signals of displeasure"). Therefore, the public signals from patrons to organizations—when they exist—should be specified in this study. One option to evidence signaling would be to use operational code analysis in order to explicitly code for challenges by the patron.[128] A second problem in this analysis is the fact that change of any sort was conflated into our measure, not considering the scope of that change. Incorporating the scope of change or even an ordinal measure for change might help differentiate the general effect of funding changes. Perhaps these combined approaches would better differentiate the scope of funding changes and allow tests for both signaling and erratic funding, rather than conflating these into one measure. One additional consideration is that changes could mirror an even more complex series of pressures. Specifically, in the case of Hezbollah, shifts in funding often mirrored pressure from the United States. Third party contribution could additionally be considered in future studies.[129]

[128] Also, simply coding newspaper reports for explanations of the funding changes, looking for explanations such as that which accompanied some of the more dramatic funding changes from Iran (See Chapter 5) urging Hezbollah to focus its efforts on the Lebanese political system.
[129] I thank Dr. Morrison for suggesting this additional possibility.

Following the analysis of external patronage, domestic support was also considered in the model. I hypothesized that domestic sources of support would force organizations to pacify behavior by enlarging the constituency, thereby reducing general support for violence. After a lack of support for the simple model of domestic support levels in the initial cross-national analysis, this hypothesis was considered within the historical case studies. From these examples, I inferred that domestic constituency really only has the possibility of substantially altering behavior when this support can be translated into something tangible for the groups—namely, votes. Therefore, in the latter analysis, the population was broken into subsample groups by regime type. While cross national analysis showed support only for the assumption that peaceful behavior would increase and showed no evidence for a significant decrease in violent methods, the model of combined behavior showed some support for this hypothesis. Because this dependent variable illustrates the total behaviors of an organization, its positive and significant coefficient would illustrate that domestic support pacifies behavior overall in a democracy as well as an autocracy.

The predominately null findings for my domestic support hypothesis illustrate a few possible problems in this study including: measurement and sample size. First, a problem could exist concerning how democracy and support were constructed in this analysis. By using Polity scores, this analysis emphasizes a limited definition of democracy (e.g. institutional constraints) compared to other data sources (e.g. Freedom House). The current analysis is conducted only with states of the Middle East and North Africa, a region with some democratic deficit. Even considering Israel—arguably the most democratic nation in this study—to be a democracy because it holds competitive

elections disregards the very real problems in that state which limit the accessibility and representativeness of democracy to some segments of the population. Perhaps a more complete measure of democracy could have been used (e.g. Freedom House).[130] Second, the sample available for this study is limited. Most problematically, the population available currently in the MAROB data leaves us with very few—if any—complete democracies for all populations considered. Further, the ordinal variable for organizational support available in MAROB leaves much to be desired. While the social movement popularity base for the movement is an important component, popularity should also be considered at a national level.

An additional third possibility to explain the lack of support for the domestic constituency variable would be that some additional factors contributing to the interaction of democracy and popular support (and their relative impacts on behaviors) were omitted. For example, Sambanis (2004) notes that institutional legitimacy determines the actual impact that domestic support will have.[131] His argument would carry over to the relatively new democratic institutions in our sample where the institutionalization of elections is still a work in progress. Consequently, something akin to the institutional legitimacy factor should also be considered in future analysis.

Repression/deterrence

After testing for the impact of domestic support, I turned to the impact of repression on group behavior. In the original analysis, I hypothesized that repression would have a linear effect, fueling organization's ire to respond with increased protest,

[130] Although, arguably, Freedom House conflates some aspects of repression with its measure of liberal democracy.
[131] Though he references an effect on the state, his argument could carry over to sub-state units as well.

particularly violent protest. This effect was substantiated in the original model as well as within at least three of the historical analysis cases. However, another finding of the historical analysis—particularly in the ETA case study—was that intense, surgical repression could indeed quash a group's capacity to act, even violently. Therefore, in the final analysis I addressed the curvilinear model of repression and found that while repression does significantly breed action, there is a threshold for this model, at which all political behavior decreases. Perhaps not surprising, considering the capacity of some of the states included in analysis (many are relatively low compared to Spain), that threshold was only obvious in analysis for the non-violent behaviors, which tended to decrease steadily at high rates of repression. This finding has two specific implications. First, that repression can stroke the fire—it will instigate rather than put down uprisings—is readily apparent for both violent and peaceful behaviors. Second, the curvilinear effect seems to simply kill off "good" politics. Specifically, the threshold at which repression starts to limit non-violent behaviors is relatively low while that for violent behaviors is relatively high. While the curvilinear effect of repression on violent behaviors is in no doubt a real possibility in extreme cases, it likely requires substantial state capacity (and chutzpah) to carry out.

While the findings for the parabolic model of repression appear logical and conform to expectations, I should address strengths and weaknesses of this measure. I realize that the repression variable is not ideal because its three-part ordinal scale conflates a much wider variety of repression. However, its strengths outweigh this weakness. I would argue that because it is organization-specific, it directly measures the concept of interest unlike alternative national level measures. Consequently, because this

analysis addressed organization-specific levels of repression, the robust finding for an *organization-specific* effect of repression on organizational behavior is far more substantive than studies utilizing a wider measurement of repression. Nonetheless, expansions of the repression measure would be useful. Even if expansions cannot add detail to the scale, they can fill out some missing links of that scale. Specifically a new scale might include a consideration of repression by non-state agents—those not a function of the state but condoned by the state as well as repression by extra-national forces—such as was seen in the case of Hezbollah. This type of repression is partially captured in the MAROB measure but not entirely. Additionally, state capacity should also be included as a component of repression per Davenport (1995).

One additional complaint related to the analysis of repression is that this analysis fails to address the conditional nature of repression itself and how it might be simultaneously determined by the same context of behavior that this work claims will shape the group behavior. Christian Davenport (1995) provides evidence that states exert repressive force in response to a multi-dimensional view of the threat that organizational behavior poses. He provides evidence that the state views sub-national threats through a combined lens of economic, normative, and capacity-factors, all further influenced by its regime type. Therefore, per his argument, this study would need to consider how some of the same structural factors simultaneously shaped each actor in the repression-organization nexus. Further, Walter (2006) provides evidence that groups are strategically motivated by their own competitive environment relative to the state and that their view of behavior options is constructed by history. Specifically, groups will base their behavior on the past willingness of the state to make concessions and the number of

other groups competing for future concessions. In future analysis, this mind-boggling integrated cycle might be considered in greater detail.

Grievances

After analyzing the repression, I turned to the analysis of incentives for political action. I hypothesized that grievances, while exacerbating both forms of behavior separately, would have a different effect in tandem. Specifically, a combination of political and economic grievance would denote pure disaffection of the group, leading groups to give up on collegial politics and pick up their guns. I found no support for this hypothesis. In fact, my analysis indicates the reverse to be true: If purely disaffected, a group will put down their ballots and their guns and give up entirely. Though purely conjecture, I must guess that this result was a product of improper specification of the simultaneous grievance measure. While some grievances were apparent in all of the cases in historical analysis leading me to assume that the existence of *any* of both grievances would light a fire under a group, this was perhaps a simplification of reality. Perhaps an expansion of this variable should include disaggregation of two low-level grievances, differential grievances, and two high level grievances in order to properly capture reality. If this expanded model could infer that organizations experiencing simultaneously heavy problems (the social group represented struggles with high economic *and* high political woes) fall into some sort of efficacy gulf from which they struggle to escape or experience institutionalized powerlessness, that is an interesting phenomenon in and of itself, deserving future interrogation.

The consistently strong impact of economic grievances is surprising, given the total lack of support for the influence of political grievances.[132] Does this mean that given a reduction in poverty and inequality facing the social movement, groups will become complacent while political complaints mean little either way? Not necessarily. I find it doubtful that the greed angle can explain all of political behavior without even considering political grievances, so I necessarily consider the strong finding for economic complaints (relative to a weak effect of political complaints) somewhat suspect. As I expressed in chapter two, economic forces are often rightfully implicated in studies of political violence as a necessary or even sufficient factor for action (e.g. Russell 1964; Sambanis 2004). However, for political grievances to have so entirely washed out leads me to believe there is something more at play in the model. In part, this might again be a result of the population sample. In this analysis, economic grievances are a comparatively rare event while political grievances are nearly a necessary condition for existence within the data with over 76% of the organization expressing high levels (3+) of political grievances. This would denote that something of comparison between the two is lost in translation for the model. While the inflated effect of economic grievances might be a product of the data population—heavily populated by high rent or quasi-high rent states (those with second level rents such as monies from pipelines) where some degree of liberty is theoretically exchanged for tangible goods and services—I am not confident that this explains the consistently strong effect found in cross-national analysis. Rather, this might be indicative of something more along the lines of an organizational-level disorganized community that justifies violence at the aggregate level based on long-term

[132] Despite the general agreement from the civil war literature, I still expect *some* degree of impact of political grievances generally.

structural complaints such as the constant political dislocation. To illustrate, in Table 6.4 of, regime type significantly changed the effect of both grievances pointing to a more complex interaction of these factors than was considered in this model. This complexity should be considered in greater detail in future analysis.

The primary limitation of the final cross-national model of grievances—and in fact, the final model across the board—is data availability, as I have mentioned multiple times. Fortunately, this problem will be remedied in time. An expansion of the Middle East and North Africa to 2007 in MAROB is due out within the year; and data for Latin America, South Asia, and Europe is due out in the coming years.[133] With additional data, a number of problems could be corrected including disaggregating the full effect of economic and political incentives for behaviors. With additional data available in the coming batches of MAROB, I could extract subsamples from the data in order to provide systematic evidence of the impact of economic and political grievances and *change* in grievance levels over time. The tandem analysis proposed in this work could disentangle the full effects and show how economic *and* political woes might contribute to behaviors across regime types. It might even be argued that they both indirectly contribute to differential risks of either form of action, rather than the assumed linear model. With the coming larger sample size, I will be able to assess risks fully in a hazard model of change in behavior.

An additional consideration provided by historical analysis was the expansion of grievances to include an indicator for nationalist grievances. I hypothesized that nationalism is more immutable than other political grievances and thus would at the very

[133] http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/marob/

least explain violent behaviors. When separating out this grievance, an expansion of violent action was evidenced. This finding provides evidence that political grievances should be disaggregated further, since it would seem that major and minor grievances are being conflated, as with the case of nationalism.

Organization

The model was rounded out with the inclusion of tests for three hypotheses concerning the format of an organization. These three factors were included in order to address organizational dynamics that might influence the methods of contention. In the first model, the clandestine nature of an organization was included in analysis. This inclusion followed della Porta's (1995) argument that a movement's existence in the underground can represent, at least in part, its segmented/concentrated nature—a nature that will determine the strategies chosen by the organization. Because of the lackluster ability for this variable to explain even violent behaviors in the cross-national analysis, the conceptualization of organizational dynamics was further considered in case analysis.

The differential impact of segmented and hierarchical dynamics found in the different cases—and across time within some cases—illustrated a need to consider the relative spikiness of the chain of command, beyond that captured in the clandestine variable. This discussion led to an additional organizational hypothesis that captured the centralization of command as contributing to the ability of an organization to diversify its repertoire, ideally leading to an increase in non-violent behaviors. The actual reverse finding for this variable—that centralization of command leads to a decrease in non-violent output and no change in violent output—was surprising, to say the least. However, these odd findings do not necessarily indicate that centralized organizations are

less capable of mobilizing or that dispersed organizations are more able to organize. Rather, I would argue that results are driven by an unusually high number of purportedly hierarchically ordered groups within the data (78%). Perhaps the variable used here was mis-specified in analysis (unlikely) or (more likely) requires manual recoding. If this is a reflection of reality however, additional re-conceptualizations of organizational dynamics might need to be considered.

Finally, in reflection of changes within the ETA and the IRA, and the origin of Hezbollah and HAMAS, an additional hypothesis was considered to account for group splinters. Splintering was seen as a shock to the developmental trajectory, removing the more moderate elements from a group and increasing the proportion of radicals in the population.

Bueno de Mesquita (2008) argues that negotiated settlements lead to increases in terrorism because it is the moderates that accept concessions and thereby exit the game, leaving extremists in control of the ship. Though dealing explicitly with terrorism, this logic can be extended to political violence and political mobilization in general. Consequently, it was exactly this logic—that the organization following a splinter would result with a new population manned by only one end of the spectrum, rather than the full population—that was behind the hypothesis that a split would radicalize organizations. However, the lackluster (and counterintuitive) support for this variable indicates that this effect was not at all captured in the splinter variable. In fact, it is highly likely that this analysis simply captured fractioning of organizations rather than full splinters. One option for future research would be to follow the theoretical (if not the actual) lead of Bueno de Mesquita and disaggregate splinters that surround negotiated settlements. In

practice, this would mean that splintering would have to include at least one portion of the organization that has agreed to a compromise with some authority, while the remaining group would then be composed of the radicals. If I could then divide splintering groups into separate categories for the conceding group (if they remain organized) and the dissenting group, the splinter factor would likely be a more important component of the model of behavior than other factors.

Evolutionary?

While not a noted hypothesis, an integral part of the research question addressed in this study is political evolution; and that includes something like an assumption of temporality. This is not to say, as mentioned in the introduction, that I assume a perfect linear evolution between violent and non-violent politics—rather, that the end point of organizational evolution would necessarily see a gradual pacification of politics.

Consequently, the significance of year throughout the final model seems a small indicator that this assumption is correct. The inclusion of year in analysis, while by no means the final test on this assumption, is illustrative. Year is positive and significant for non-violent behavior and, importantly, negative and significant for violent behavior which does lead me to believe that politicization occurs more often than not. This hints at the possibility that there is some type of temporal sequence cross-nationally in addition to that found in the case studies.

What else is missing?

I would argue that my analysis misses two additional integral components that might contribute to the model of behavior imagined in this work. One omission could be

remedied; the other would be more difficult to include in analysis. The first is international environment and the latter is individual decision-making processes.

International environment forms a broader context for mobilization, creating strategic pressures for sub-state actors that could influence their behaviors across the board. For example, international shocks (economic and political) make inter and intra-state war more likely and it would seem that this effect could carry over to our organizations. Conversely, periods of international peace or changes in state sovereignty that empower a group should make it seem as if the end is on the horizon, compelling greater popular participation in peaceful actions. An example of the latter from the historical analysis would include European integration, and the "post-Maastricht" environment. The process of political integration has added arguments to both camps regarding the IRA and ETA. The fact that national boundaries are no longer the issue they once were has led to increasingly vocal debate over national-self determination, what I've shown here to be a hotly contentious subject. Many argue that through regional integration, national self-determination is no longer a goal worth aspiring to. The remaining dissenting voices argue conversely, that if boundaries are no so longer important, states shouldn't mind giving them up. Despite the logic of the latter argument, regional integration has swayed many into the former camp, illustrating how a regional structural shift might also impact organizational dynamics. This illustration shows the importance of international environment in this analysis. Though controlling for neighborhood effects through the use of data in only one region would probably be fruitless, they should still be considered. Particularly in future analysis with the expanded MAROB data, systemic effects must be brought to account in analysis.

Individual decision-making also should factor into this analysis though in order to capture changes in these decisions over time in the groups already studied, a flux capacitor (and 1.21gw) might be a necessity.[134] Jokes aside, there are two very real possibilities to address the individual in this study. First, I could compile a wealth of interviews from other sources with leadership of these organizations over time, where available.[135] Alternately, I could ingratiate myself with a young movement and keep in contact with both leadership and the grunts of this group, following their decision-making processes over time. This second option would allow the model to be viewed through a natural experiment and help to gauge how it holds up against future behavior, but it would likely have ethical implications. Nevertheless, incorporating the individual into this study would have many beneficial results. Though this factor might not lend itself to the cross-national study it would greatly enhance this study in every other respect by providing greater information on how behaviors are modeled.

The final model of behavior thus requires even more work, both internally and externally. Though this model provided an exploratory analysis of how context shapes the types of political behaviors of Janus organizations, for each set of answers there are perhaps two new questions. Understanding these questions will extend into future scholarship as the process of modeling behavior continues.

Implications for scholarship

The model in this analysis is exploratory but some implications are clear. First, it would seem that substitutable behaviors do share some common ground even if they do

[134] This is sadly not included in my research budget.
[135] More readily available with the newer, more media-savvy groups like Hezbollah and HAMAS, while less so for older groups.

diverge in some effects. Consequently, the study of these behaviors should be done with an eye to the other. If organizations can utilize both methods of contention for political aims, then analysis of only one falls far short of explaining behavioral outcome. Further, analysis of group behavior has specifically neglected the very organizations that form the basis for early citizen participation in liberalizing states. The neglected Janus groups, in particular, have a foot in each field of politics and yet are almost always conflated as practitioners of political violence. To remedy this omission, I have illustrated how their study can be nestled between three separate literatures, evidencing both the theoretical and the very real overlap between disparate literatures and how each can inform a more complete view of Janus behavior than previously considered.

Second, the model formed in this study could contribute to an expansion of the democracy literature. For instance, some scholars argue that democratization is most likely to occur when modernization has begun and it has created an organized civil society that is able to act collectively. If, under these conditions, a regime is not flexible enough to respond crises (both political and economic) and placate the population with credible concessions, then the "civil" society will revolt and push for changes in government (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Robinson 2006). This model appears flexible enough to be able to account for varied responses (civil and uncivil) to both economic and political change, in order to test this theory of democratization. This analysis would be particularly relevant in the rapidly changing region of the Middle East. While Stephan and Robertson (2003) find evidence that the prevailing "democracy gap" in the Muslim World is not caused by the cultural influence of Islam but instead by the dearth of democratization by Arab states, this finding (though intuitive for those studying Islam) is

still somehow not satisfying. Its particular weakness lies in its failure to address the existence of pressure both *through* and *despite* the influence of Islam: not only is Islam not a hindrance to democratization, it is not a hindrance to the creation of pressure from below against regimes. With the evidence of complex (civil and uncivil) pressure from below, this model could test my strong corollary to Stephan and Robertson. This region, while currently experiencing a democratic deficit (often claimed to be a permanent curse), could easily be posed for a revival from below, something often missed when emphasizing the culture "foreign" to democracy. Incorporating the organized expressions of discontent studied in this analysis could pinpoint movements in both civil and uncivil society toward regime change that would otherwise be missed.

Implications for policy

This work has a number of policy implications. Perhaps the most important relates to the implications of how states deal with contention. Within the current era of unilateralism, war and intervention, it is imperative to realize that these actions do not take place in a vacuum. Instead, a violent environment can beget violence. Actions of one state can and will create corresponding changes in how populations react. If the methods of nations, as my evidence suggests, are mirrored in the actions of organizations below—then focusing solely on containing violence without an eye to dealing with the deeper problems those actions represent, will simply exacerbate the problem.

Additionally, denigrating the organizations that utilize violence as something that cannot be co-opted into congenial politics ignores the real possibility of evolution imagined and evidenced in this work. Particularly since the onset of the "War on Terrorism", monetary contributions (such as patronage) to these movements have been

debated and actively legislated against, demonizing the states and organizations that provide these monies. One article from Fox News, for example, notes debates to attempt to limit funding to UNRWA and other relief organizations simply for the fact that this money might "slip" into the hands of HAMAS.[136] This type of debate has been cycling in policy circles for years now; and, as informed by this study, the logic of the debate is faulted on two fronts. First, limiting aid to organizations (such as UNRWA) devoted to addressing the very real economic plight of the Palestinian people (particularly in Gaza, the topic of this article) could arguably contribute to economic dislocation and thus increase violence with or without a HAMAS middleman. Second, if HAMAS is the new face of a young political party in the liberalizing Occupied Territories, this sort of strategic effort—even if it does limit their violent behaviors—also confounds their possible forward evolution. While fighting terrorism is a necessary goal, policymakers have been even more guilty than scholars of conflating pure, millennial terrorism and mid-range Janus groups. This conflation ignores the possibility that the latter are capable of reforming even if the former are not. Once we reach a better understanding concerning this reform process, a policy shift to support reform and evolution separate of the fight against terrorism is in order.

In sum, this study has provided an exploratory foray into the nature of Janus behavior. Despite a few less than spectacular findings in the final cumulative model, the research question is still an important one to ask, and the cumulative results of this project contribute to a model of Janus behavior. Given the increasing importance of and

[136] See: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/02/lawmakers-worry-gaza-aid-away-hamas/

increasing attention to sub-state actors in democratization and war, this project should maintain its relevance both inside and outside of academia.

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