From conflict to cooperation : settlements, alliances, and lasting peace
No Thumbnail Available
Authors
Meeting name
Sponsors
Date
Journal Title
Format
Thesis
Subject
Abstract
This dissertation examines how conflict settlements influence alliance formation and the duration of post-conflict peace. The research addresses gaps in existing literature by focusing on how the nature of conflict resolution--whether imposed or negotiated--affects the formation and stability of alliances. Existing theories often overlook the importance of settlement types in alliance behavior. This study uses data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, employing Cox proportional hazard models and multinomial logit models to test hypotheses about settlement types and alliances. My findings reveal that imposed settlements tend to lead to more stable alliances. Negotiated settlements carry risks of dissatisfaction and future conflict, but when former enemies form an alliance, negotiated settlements do a better job of preventing recurrent conflict. By integrating deterrence theory and conflict settlement literature, this research provides new insights into post-conflict alliances and offers policy recommendations for designing effective post-conflict strategies. I highlight the importance of carefully crafted post-conflict alliances in maintaining international security and preventing the recurrence of conflict.
Table of Contents
DOI
PubMed ID
Degree
Ph. D.