Do elections prevent regulatory capture? An examination of public utility commission selection and regulatory outcomes
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Energy and water utilities in the United States have been subject to State-level rate and pricing regulation for a century. In most states, members of the State's regulatory commission are appointed or nominated by the governor, in most cases with legislature confirmation. However, a handful of states choose their utility regulators by popular ballot. This difference in institutional arrangement raises the question of whether differences in regulatory selection methods affect regulatory outcomes. Specifically, the paper aims to address whether elections prevent regulatory capture. This is tested with two case studies that utilize electricity and natural gas pricing and natural gas rate case outcomes. The results suggest that public utility commissioners produce pro-consumer decisions in cases for residential and industrial consumers, providing some evidence that elections may prevent regulatory capture.
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M.S.