Principals and proxies: how foreign interventions promote intercommunal violence through sponsorship of nonstate militias
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In this dissertation I explore the link between government sponsorship of nonstate militias in proxy conflicts and increases in intercommunal violence. I develop a theory explaining how nonstate militias experience resource limitations much more acutely than states and how resource inflows from government sponsors provide opportunity for these groups to engage in attacks on rival militias, against the sponsor's desires. I test this theory using a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis focused on three cases of US sponsorship of nonstate militias: The Ogaden clan militia in Somalia, the Free Syrian Army, and the Syrian Democratic Forces. The results provide evidence for the theory, suggesting that government sponsorship of nonstate militias in proxy conflicts can lead to increases in intercommunal violence unless sponsors make use of a regime of agent selection, contract formation, and punishment or enforcement of their will upon the militia as agent. These findings will be of interest to analysts and policymakers seeking to understand the negative externalities of proxy warfare and foreign intervention.
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Ph. D.