THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONGRESS
OF BERLIN *7D*

by

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INTRODUCTION

The distinguished French historian, Sorel, has said that "since the first entry of the Turk into Europe, there has been an Eastern Question; and since first Russia became a European Power, it has been her aim to solve this question to her own advantage!"¹ This strikes the keynote of the situation for, although, since 1908, Pan Germanism has been an ever-increasing factor in the problems of the Near East, it is, primarily, the desire of Russia to possess Constantinople that has threatened the Balance of Power, and made the dominions of the Porte a matter of deep concern to Europe.

The history of the Eastern Question since the seventeenth century is, properly, the story of the progress of neighboring states to the detriment of the Turks. Thus, it was only when the tide of Turkish conquest had begun to recede, that the problem became acute. Between the Turk's triumph at Mohacs, 1526, and his final expulsion from Hungary at the same place, 1687, Western Europe had been concerned solely in self-defense. However, European interest in the Balkans increased with the decline of Ottoman power. Upon the retreat of the Turk at the close of the seventeenth century, the Peace of Carlowitz gave Hungary and the greater portion of Transylvania to Austria. Simultaneously with the Porte's withdrawal from the Habsburg possessions, Russia, under Peter the Great, was making her debut as a European Power.

Therefore, the early decades of the eighteenth century found the Romanov fighting for an ice-free port, although anxiously watched by the Danubian Monarchy. But there were other Powers interested in the situation in the East. In becoming a European State, Russia had to reckon with Prussia, so

that the latter, which had no direct interest in Turkey, often played a conspicuous part in the Eastern complications. Thus it was that the Polish Question became inextricably bound up with the Eastern Question, and there followed a partition of Poland, instead of a dismemberment of Turkey.

Subsequent to the firm establishment of England's Indian Empire, this Power, too, became possessed of a very vital interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, and asserted her right to be consulted in any dispute arising over European Turkey. Thus, while refusing to permit the Tsar to settle the Eastern Question after his own fashion, the States of Western Europe were prevented, by their mutual jealousy and distrust from concluding a permanent agreement. In 1829, during the Greek War of Independence, Russia had cast longing glances at Constantinople, but the fear of Western intervention had caused her to desist from attempting to occupy the city. Again in 1854, the Tsar took the bit in his mouth, only to have his plans frustrated by the resistance of England and France, and by the armed neutrality of Austria, upon whose support or benevolent neutrality he had reckoned.

When, therefore, in 1875-1878, the Eastern Question again became acute, and Russia imposed her will upon the Porte at the Treaty of San Stefano, it was a foregone conclusion that England and Austria would not submit, passively, to the Tsar's aggressive policy. Thus, the Congress of Berlin was not an innovation, not a departure from the established order of things. It was simply a continuation of the traditional policy of maintaining the Balance of Power, of substituting the European Concert for individual action, and it is not strange that the mutual distrust of the Powers should have rendered a permanent solution impossible.

CHAPTER I.

FROM PLEVNA TO SAN STEFANO

The tragic scenes leading to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and the chief events of that struggle, form a familiar chapter in the pages of European history. The heroic fighting about Plevna, replete with instances of Russian and Roumanian bravery, and with the stubborn resistance of the Turk, is well known to the student of military tactics. But the fall of Plevna has a far greater significance than that which we would attach to a Russian military victory. With the fall of that stronghold, it appeared that the gates of Constantinople were open to the triumphant Romanov. This was sufficient to arouse the continental Powers from the complacent attitude they had taken toward the war, while Great Britain suddenly abandoned the splendid isolation, which she had enjoyed since the outbreak of hostilities, and again became the protagonist of the European Concert.

The capture of Plevna by the Russian forces marks the beginning of that series of diplomatic negotiations which was to terminate in the Congress of Berlin. However, it was only when the Tsar had, in triumph, bound Turkey to the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano, that he would seriously consider the question of a European Congress. In this chapter,

therefore, we shall endeavor to trace the two chief threads of negotiation, the one of which was designed to prevent Russian occupation of Constantinople, the other to thwart the Tsar's desire to conclude a separate peace with the Porte.

On May 6, 1877, shortly after the Russian declaration of war, Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, communicated to Count Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador at London, a statement of England's position in the impending crisis¹. The English Minister disclaimed any intention of concerning himself, further, with the question of the justice of the war, and concluded with an enumeration of British interests in the Suez Canal, Egypt, Constantinople, the Bosphorous and the Dardenelles, and the Persian Gulf, all of which must be respected².

The Despatch drew a prompt reply from the Russian Government, when, on May 30, Prince Gorchakov instructed Count Shuvalov to present the Russian position on each point. This document admitted that Constantinople was a question of common interest, which could be settled only by a general understanding, and denied any intention on the part of the Tsar to occupy that city³. England, however, clamored to be reassured. Consequently

¹
For the text of the Despatch, see Hertslet, Sir Edward, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV., 2615-2617.

²
Ibid.

³
See Hertslet, op. cit., 2624-2627. As regards Constantinople it said: As far as concerns Constantinople, without being able to prejudge the course or issue of the war, the Imperial Cabinet repeats that the acquisition of that capital is excluded from the views of His Majesty, the Emperor. They recognize that, in any case, the future of Constantinople is a question of common interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding, and that if the possession of that city were to be put in question, it could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers."

immediately upon the capture of Plevna, and while the Russian army was approaching Constantinople, the English Foreign Secretary reminded Count Shuvalov of this solemn promise, and expressed the hope that the Ottoman Capital would not be occupied.⁴ The reply of Prince Gorchakov, dated December 16, was indefinite in the extreme. While reiterating his opinion that the Turkish Capital was a matter of common concern, he, nevertheless, believed it the Tsar's duty to force the Porte to conclude a lasting peace, which would offer effective guarantees against the recurrence of events which had disturbed the peace of Europe.⁵ In conclusion, the Russian Chancellor desired a clearer explanation of the British interests which might be affected by ~~the~~⁶ Russian policy.

The equivocal policy of the Russian Government was plainly irritating to the English, so that on January 3, 1878, Lord Loftus forwarded to Prince Gorchakov, a communication in which the Russian Chancellor was given to understand

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"It is with the view of avoiding what might endanger seriously the good relations happily maintained between the two countries that Lord Derby has been charged by the Cabinet to express to the Russian Government their earnest hope that, should the Russian Government advance to the south of the Balkans, no attempt will be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles" (Hertslet, op. cit., 2647.)

5
".....At the same time His Majesty the Emperor considers that it is his right and his duty to oblige Turkey to conclude a solid and real peace, which shall offer effectual guarantees against the return of the incessant crises which disturb the peace of Russia and that of Europe. (Hertslet, op. cit., 2654)

6
"The Imperial Cabinet, appreciating the friendly intentions which have prompted the communication of Lord Derby to Count Shuvalov, and animated by the same desire to maintain the good relations between the two countries, believes that it cannot better respond to them than by requesting her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State to have the goodness to define more clearly what are the British interests which he considers might be touched by the eventualities of the war within the limits to which the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet have restricted them, with a view of seeking in common the means of reconciling those interests with those of Russia, which it is the duty of His Majesty, the Emperor, to protect. (Hertslet, op. cit., 2655).

that operations tending toward Russian control of the Dardenelles would seriously impede progress toward a final settlement . Nor was that all. The English Ambassador was requested to learn whether or not the Tsar would guarantee that Russian forces should not be landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula . On January 15, Prince Gorchakov transmitted to Lord Loftus a memorandum containing a contingent guarantee. That is, he informed the British Ambassador that Russia had no intention of undertaking military operations upon Gallipoli unless the P^orte should concentrate troops there .

In spite of these assurances, on January 22, a message was received at London, from the British Ambassador at Constantinople, stating that the Russians were marching upon the Dardenelles . This caused great alarm in Cabinet circles, and, by mistake, the English Mediterranean fleet was immediately ordered to proceed to Constantinople . Before reaching its destination, however, the order was countermanded and the fleet retired to Besika Bay . But with the arrangement of the Preliminary Bases of Peace at Adrianople, January 31, and the consequent advance of the Russians to the Tchekmedje lines, the situation again assumed serious proportions .

⁷
Hertslet, op. cit., 2656.

⁸
Ibid.

⁹
Hertslet, op. cit., 2656. The memorandum also stated that the Imperial Russian Cabinet supposed that the British Government had no intention of occupying that peninsula, since it would violate English neutrality and might give rise to serious complications in Constantinople.

¹⁰
Thompson, George Carslake, Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875-1878, Vol. II., 335.

¹¹
Ibid.

¹²
Ibid.

¹³
Thompson, op. cit., 335-336.

At this juncture, the Cabinet at London once more directed the fleet to proceed to Constantinople, and, on February 13, it entered the Sea of Marmora¹⁴ and took up its position at Prince's Island before the city. Unfortunately, this merely added to the difficulty, since it was announced that the Russian army would enter the Ottoman Capital, for the protection, primarily, of the Christian population, and, incidentally of Russian interests.¹⁵

At this, the English became all the more anxious, and Lord Derby expressed the hope that the Tsar would not move his troops toward Gallipoli.¹⁶ This was followed by reciprocal communications between the English and Russian Governments, in which each denied any evil intentions on its part. On February 18, Prince Gorchakov informed Lord Derby that the Tsar thoroughly maintained his promise not to occupy Gallipoli nor to enter the lines of the Bulair, and that he expected similar assurances by the British Government.¹⁷ The desired promise was forthcoming from London, for on the 19th. Lord Derby informed Count Shuvalov that England would not land troops on the European side of the Straits, and that she desired to extend the engagement to the Asiatic side, a desire with which Russia complied on

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Bamberg, Felix, *Geschichte Orientalische Angelegenheiten*, 590.

¹⁵

Thompson, op. cit., 337 and note. The Russian government pretended to believe that the entrance of the British fleet, justified this action on their part.

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Thompson, op. cit., 342.

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Hertslet, op. cit., 2670.

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February 21.

In the meantime, however, the English had been concerned with matters other than the dread of Russian occupation of Constantinople. They were obsessed with the fear that the Tsar might attempt to force his own terms upon the humiliated Porte. On January 3, Turkey had sought the diplomatic intervention of the Powers. When it became known that Germany had flatly refused, the Government at London became alarmed lest the Romanov, taking courage in the attitude of the Hohensollern, should choose not to consult Europe as to terms of peace. In an attempt to discourage such action on the part of Russia, Lord Loftus, on January 15, conveyed to Prince Gorchakov, a memorandum, stating that any Treaty between the Tsar and the Porte, affecting the Treaties of Paris and London, must be a European Treaty, signed by the Powers .

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For the text of the English Memorandum, see Hertslet, op.cit., 2670.

The Russian Memorandum of Feb. 21, read as follows: "Prince Gorchakov charges me to communicate to your Excellency that the Imperial Cabinet does not intend to occupy the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, if England also abstains from doing so.

Should this condition be fulfilled, as well as that of not landing English troops on the European coast of the Straits, we will not occupy Gallipoli and will not enter the lines of Bulair". (Hertslet, op.cit., 2670-2671).

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"Her Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to state to Prince Gorchakov that in order to avoid possible misconception, and in view of reports which have reached her Majesty's Government, they are of opinion that any Treaty concluded between the Governments of Russia and Turkey, affecting Treaties of 1856 and 1871, must be a European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were Parties to those Treaties". (Hertslet, op.cit., 2657).

Russia, nevertheless, had not heeded the warning sounded by the British Memorandum. They had steadily advanced, occupied Adrianople, and there, on January 31, had triumphantly dictated ~~there~~ the Preliminary Bases of Peace to their vanquished foe²⁰. Bulgaria was to be very materially enlarged and made an autonomous, tributary Principality, while the Porte was to recognize the independence of Serbia, Roumania, and Montenegro²¹. Thus, it appeared that the Tsar did not intend^{to} consult the wishes of England and Austria. However, in dictating terms of peace, the Russians had overreached their mark. The Greater Bulgaria apparently blocked the Habsburg's long-cherished desire to reach the Aegean. Furthermore, in her hour of victory, Russia might ~~might~~ neglect to compensate Austria for her neutrality during the late war. Therefore, it behooved the Danubian Monarchy to come to the assistance of Great Britain. Austro-hungarian troops were mobilized and on February 5, the Austrian Government proposed that a European Conference, not a Congress, should be held at Vienna, to determine upon the modifications to be made in the Preliminaries of Adrianople.²²

While these negotiations were taking place on the question of a European Conference, the Russian army advanced beyond the line of demarcation fixed by the armistice arranged at Adrianople on January 31.²³ The Tsar used the entrance of the English ships into the Dardenelles as a pretext for this action, although the real reason, very probably, was the tendency of the Turks to delay the conclusion of peace.²⁴ But further resistance on the

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For text see Hertslet, op.cit., 2658-2660.

21

Ibid.

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For Count Beust's proposal to England, see Hertslet, op.cit., 2668-2669. Subsequently, the Austrian Government proposed Baden as the place of meeting.

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Thompson, op.cit., 342-343.

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Thompson, op.cit., 343.

part of the Porte was useless, and on March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was drawn up, in which the essentials of the Preliminaries of Adrianople²⁵ were embodied. Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were united into a Greater Bulgaria; the Porte recognized the independence of Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro, and agreed to cede Kars, Ardahan, Batoum, Bayazet, and the territory as far as the Saganlough, in Asia Minor, together with certain districts in European Turkey, as the equivalent of a payment, by Russia, of 1,100,000,000²⁶ roubles. ?

Thus Russia had absolutely ignored England's admonition that any Treaty between the Tsar and the Porte must be a European Treaty. What attitude would Europe take in the affair? The answer was not long delayed. March 7, four days after the conclusion of peace, the Austrian Government forwarded to the Powers a proposal for the meeting of a European Congress, instead of a Conference, at Berlin, to decide the grave questions confronting Europe.²⁷ As to the readiness of the various States to participate in a Congress, there was little doubt. Bismarck had declared in the Reichstag, February 19, that he was prepared to play the part of an "honest broker", harmonizing the interests of the Powers most nearly concerned. Likewise, England and Russia were, no doubt, favorably disposed toward the Congress,²⁸ but each desired to define the scope of the activities of that body. This formed the crux of the whole situation, and three months of negotiation were to elapse before a working agreement was established.

²⁵
For the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano see Hertslet, op.cit., 2672-2696.

²⁶
Ibid.

²⁷
For the text of the Communication, see Hertslet, op.cit., 2697.

²⁸
That is they disagreed as to what portions of the Treaty should be considered by the Congress.

CHAPTER II.

THE SECRET AGREEMENTS

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the situation was one of unusual gravity. Russia, fresh from her late triumph over Turkey, was not in a conciliatory mood. Unwilling to be deprived of the fruits of her victory, she appeared firm in her resolve to maintain the Treaty of San Stefano, in so far as Russian interests were concerned. But England was equally firm. Once having determined upon the course she should pursue, she held unswervingly to her demand that the Treaty should be submitted to the Powers, thus making Europe the arbiter of affairs in Turkey and once more establishing the European Concert of 1856, whose chief duty was believed to be the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

Under such circumstances, with Russia and England diametrically opposed to each other, the chances of holding the Congress seemed remote indeed. The war-clouds which had hung over Europe for the past two years grew darker than ever. But, in the midst of the gathering gloom a ray of light was soon to appear. During the next three months events were to take a sudden turn, the darkness was to vanish, and, through the medium of the Secret Agreements, the Congress of Berlin was at last made possible. It shall, therefore, be the object of this chapter to discuss the genesis, the provisions, and the importance of the Secret Agreements, a knowledge of which is necessary to one ^{who} would understand the workings of the Congress

of Berlin.

The fundamental question confronting the Powers, and upon which depended the peace of Europe, was that of the form in which the Treaty of San Stefano should be presented to the proposed Congress. Russia did not object to the Congress, but she wished to determine the details of which that body should take cognizance. England was equally obstinate. She was resolved that the Tsar must either forego his attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the Congress, or else come to an understanding concerning the essential modifications which Great Britain demanded.

Immediately upon the receipt of the invitation to the Congress, England, staunch in her resolve of January 15, that any Treaty between the Tsar and ¹ the Porte must be a European Treaty, let it be known that she would enter the Congress on the condition that all parts of the Treaty should be ² subject to discussion by the diplomats. On March 13, the Cabinet at London amplified this point by stipulating that the Treaty of San Stefano should be placed before the Powers in its entirety, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order to determine what articles required European sanction and ³ what did not.

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See page 8 above.

²

Hertslet, op. cit., 2700.

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The stipulation read as follows: "That they must distinctly understand before they can enter into a Congress that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what Articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several Powers, and what do not". (Hertslet, op. cit., 2700).

However, this did not succeed in obtaining the desired assurance from Russia. The Tsar's Government announced that the text of the Preliminary Treaty would be communicated to the Powers, and that, in the Congress each State should enjoy full liberty of its appreciations and its action.⁴

On March 18, the intelligence reached London that Prince Gorchakov would permit a discussion only of those portions of the Treaty which affected European interests.⁵

Russian obstinacy was equaled only by the tenacity with which England held to her original position. On March 21, Lord Derby announced that Great Britain remained firm in her stand as declared on March 13, and that the Cabinet was unable to accept the view that a preliminary understanding would restrict the freedom of opinion and action of Russia more than of any other Power.⁶

Whatever hope statesmen at London may have entertained of Russian concession on the disputed point, was dispelled by Count Shuvalov's communication of March 26, in which he gave the Russian interpretation of "liberty of appreciation and action". The Government at St. Petersburg "left to the other Powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they might think it fit to discuss, and reserved to itself the liberty of accepting or not accepting these questions".

⁴
Hertslet, op. cit., 2701. Also D'Avril, Adolphe, *Negociations relatifs au traite de Berlin et aux arrangements qui en ont suivi*, 334.

⁵
Hertslet, op. cit., 2701, contains the following from Lord Salisbury: "In a despatch received on the 18, Lord Loftus stated that Prince Gorchakov had said to him that of course he could not impose silence on any member of the Congress, but he could only accept a discussion of those portions of the Treaty which affected European interests".

⁶
Hertslet, op. cit., 2701. D'Avril, op. cit., 335 says: "Le gouvernement de Sa

This arrogant reply appeared to be the final word. Those most pacifically inclined now lost hope of arriving at an understanding through negotiations. War was imminent and England began preparing for it. A royal message was communicated to Parliament on April 1, announcing that reserves had been called out ⁷, and Indian troops were ordered to be sent to the Island of Malta. Disraeli justified this bellicose attitude on the grounds that the policy of the Tsar's Government as formulated in the late Treaty, was a violation ⁸ of the Treaty of Paris, the fundamental feature of which England conceived to be the maintenance of Turkish integrity. On the same day Lord Salisbury, ⁹ who had taken Lord Derby's place as Foreign Secretary, issued a circular addressed to the Powers, in which the English view of the Treaty of San Stefano, together with the conditions ¹⁰ under which she would enter the proposed Congress of Berlin were set forth. The Circular pointed out that the new Bulgaria of San Stefano would be a strong Slav state under Russian ¹¹ domination, and a tool in the Tsar's hands; that people who were Greek in race and sympathy would be merged in the dominant Slavic population; and

Majeste ne peut pas admettre l'opinion exprimee aujourd'hui par le prince de Gorchakov, et d'action de la Russie serait plus restreinte que celle de toute autre puissance par cette entente preliminaire".

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Thompson, op.cit., 409.

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Lord Beaconsfield said that every article of the Treaty of San Stefano was a deviation from the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, and when all Powers were armed England should not remain unarmed. (Thompson, op.cit., 409).

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Lord Derby resigned because he could not concur in certain important conclusions reached by the Cabinet in regard to the impending situation.

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Hertslet, op.cit., 2698-2706. For comments, see Bamberg, op.cit., 597.

¹¹

"By the Articles erecting the New Bulgaria, a strong Slav State will be created under the auspices and control of Russia. (Hertslet, op.cit., 2703).

that, in general, the effect of the Treaty would be a marked increase in the power of the Russian Empire in regions where the Greeks predominated, thus prejudicing the vital welfare of every state having interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was further pointed out that the Black Sea was about to be made a Russian lake, and that the political independence of the Ottoman Government, whose jurisdiction extended over territories of deepest concern to Great Britain, would be greatly depressed¹².

However, the contravention of British interests was not the sole thesis of the Circular. Above all, England now took her position upon the high ground of European law and equity, and posed as the defender of the sacred obligations and the inviolability of treaties, a stand quite in contrast to that announced on May 6, 1877, when Lord Derby had declared that the question of the justice of the attack of Russia upon Turkey was no longer to be considered, and that so long as British interests were not endangered,¹³ Turkey would receive no aid from England¹⁴.

Thus the Court at London had withdrawn, temporarily, from the European Concert and assumed a position of conditional neutrality. But, in the mean-

¹²
Hertslet, op. cit., 2704-2705.

¹³
Hertslet, op. cit., 2615-2617.

¹⁴
"Lord Derby said he did not propose further to discuss the question of the justice of the war. As long as Turkish interests alone were involved Turkey would have no assistance from the English Government. (Ibid)

time, English policy had undergone a change of faith, and conditional neutrality had given way to (so called) collective European action. Her Majesty's Government now emerged as the champion of international law, and as a full-fledged member of the European family. Lord Salisbury pointed to the London Declaration of 1871, and imputed the Russian Government with failure to adhere to its provisions¹⁵. In the following words he attempted to show that it was the duty of the London Government, as one of the signers of the Declaration, to demand that the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted to the Powers: "It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, without violating the spirit of this Declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the cognizance of the Powers of articles of the new Treaty, which are modifications of existing Treaty engagements and inconsistent with them".¹⁶

Thus England remained firm and determined, and it appeared that, if necessary, she would assert herself at the point of the sword. Yet, Russia did not appear greatly perturbed. The Tsar expected to gain an ally by dividing the spoils of the late war. As Austria possessed vital interests in the Balkans, the Government at St. Petersburg, quite naturally turned to Vienna first, although the fact that the Habsburgs had first suggested a Conference of the Powers, and had assumed a bellicose attitude by mobilizing troops on her southern frontier¹⁷, did not augur well for the success of the Romanov negotiations. Resolved, however, to exhaust all available diplomatic

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The Declaration reads: "It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable agreement".

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Hertslet, op. cit., 2703.

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Driault, E., La Question de Orient, 230.

means before reconsidering his stand, the Tsar sent General Ignatieff on a mission to the Austrian Government, whence he should return with a promise of neutrality. Certain things were promised by Russia, among which was
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 probably Austrian control of Bosnia and Herzegovina . However, this failed to meet the wishes of the Dual Monarchy. They demanded that those territories should be formed into an autonomous principality dominated by the Habsburgs; that the same disposition should be made of Albania and Macedonia together with Salonika; that military and commercial treaties should be made with Serbia and Montenegro, carrying special advantages to Austria; and that a Zollverein should be formed between the above mentioned states and principalities, all of which should redound to the glory of the Government
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 at Vienna .

Much as Russia desired to detach Austria from a possible alliance against her, Ignatiev could not accede to these exorbitant demands. The Tsar had

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Debidour, op, cit., 515.

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Debidour, op. cit., 515, reads as follows: 1. à occuper la Bosnie et l'Herzegovina; 2. à faire de ces territoires une principauté autonome, comme la Bulgarie, mais qui eût été dominée par l'Autriche-Hongrie; 3. à traiter de même l'Albanie, la Macédonie avec Salonique; 4. à pouvoir contracter avec la Serbie et le Montenegro, reconnus indépendants, des traités militaires et commerciaux qui eussent en réalité inféodé ces Etats au Cabinet Vienne; 5. à former avec eux et avec les nouvelles principautés une espèce de zollverein, tout à l'avantage de la grande monarchie danubienne, etc ".

carved out the Greater Bulgaria of San Stefano with some intention of preventing Austrian expansion in the Balkans, and he could never permit the Aegean to become a lake in the hands of the Habsburgs. Thus, on the whole, the above mentioned negotiations failed to turn to the advantage of Russia. Lord Beaconsfield's position now became all the more secure. Despite the open hostility of the Liberal Party at home, whose stern opposition his belligerent attitude had called forth, he might take courage in view of the assured assistance of Austria and the moral support of France.²⁰

Unable to conduct a war with England and Austria single-handed, the Tsar was forced to play another of his diplomatic cards. The peace of Europe and the future of Russia lay in the hands of Germany. Should the latter Power consent to an alliance, Romanov and Hohenzollern might hope to combat successfully the combined strength of Austria and England. Should Bismarck even do so much as to make a demonstration against the Dual Monarchy, thus forcing her to remain neutral, the Tsar might still entertain high hopes for the future. What position would Germany take at this crucial moment? The benevolent neutrality of the Tsar had made possible the German triumphs at Sadowa and Sedan. Would Germany return the favor in the hour of need? Emperor William I, who had ever maintained the best of relations with the Court at St. Petersburg, was undoubtedly inclined at least to use his influence in the Tsar's behalf.²¹ However, as had so often been the case, the Emperor was unable to act according to the dictates of his own conscience. The power behind the throne was yet to be reckoned with. In March,

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France at this time assumed a friendly attitude toward England because of the English sympathies of Waddington, who now entered the Ministry. (Debidour, op. cit., 516).

21

Debidour, op. cit., 517. William I once hinted to the Princess Radziwill that Russia would have received better treatment at the Congress of Berlin

Bismarck had declared, in effect, that he could not conceive of a Congress²² convening without the participation of Great Britain. What position would he now take? The suspense was not prolonged. Early in April, the German Chancellor let it be known to Gorchakov that he was not disposed to²³ concur in the Russian policy. At the most, he would **only** remain neutral, while it was certain that he would not attempt to restrain Austria, should the latter join England in a war upon Russia. The Tsar's Government at once became indignant at this, seemingly, bad faith on the part of Germany and from that time the estrangement between the two Powers became more and more pronounced. To Russia, the conduct of the Cabinet at Berlin seemed a most cruel deception, an act of base ingratitude for the Russian stand in 1866 and 1870.

What is the explanation of Germany's desertion of her ancient ally at this critical moment? In the light of the diplomatic situation of 1870, the two Powers should have stood and fallen together. But, in the meantime

had he been at the helm. (For this statement see Rose, J. Holland, *The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900*, Vol. I., 270. Taken from Princess Radziwill's *Recollections*).

²²

See Bourgeois, E., *Manuel Historique de Politique Etrangere*, 809.

²³

"Donc au commencement d'avril, M. de Bismarck ne laisset plus ignorer au chancelier russe qu'il n'etait pas dispose à le seconder dans sa politique". (Debidour, *op.cit.*, 517).

the alignment of the Powers had undergone a marked change. The sensational charge made by Prince Gorchakov in 1875, to the effect that France was about to fall prey to German militarism, had undoubtedly made Bismarck an implacable enemy of Russia.²⁴ Thus he no longer felt obligated to the Tsar, and would do nothing to check the possible expansion of Austria in the Balkans, since that would compensate the Habsburgs for the loss of territory and of prestige which they had suffered in 1866. Finally, in considering the motive force back of Bismarckian diplomacy during these years we must not lose sight of the fact that Germany desired an ally in eastern Europe. Russia, for the moment, would gladly have placed herself at her neighbor's disposal, but, if we are to accept Bismarck's own version, the course of events since 1875 had emphatically driven home the danger of relying exclusively on the strong arm of the Romanov.²⁵ The German Chancellor feared the Russian friendship of the past was the result of the Tsar's underestimate of German strength, rather than of a sincere devotion to the interests of Germany. That Russia realized her mistake, Bismarck was morally certain. At best, an agreement between the two governments could serve only as a temporary makeshift to rescue Russia from the grasp of her enemies. It is

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After speaking of the activities of Gontaut-Biron, French Ambassador at Berlin, Bismarck says: "Gontaut's activity in the services of France was not confined to the domain of Berlin. In 1875 he went to St. Petersburg to concoct with Prince Gorchakov, the theatrical coup which was to make the world believe, on the occasion of the Emperor Alexander's visit to Berlin, that he alone had saved defenseless France from a German attack by seizing our arm with his Quos ego, and that this was his object in accompanying the Emperor to Berlin". (The Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto Prince Von Bismarck, Vol. III., 107).

25

For Bismarck's view of the danger of an alliance with Russia alone, see The Reflections and Reminiscences of Bismarck, Vol. III., 163-166.

not improbable that this was the time when the idea of the Dual alliance ^{of} 1879 was first conceived by the resourceful brain of the "Iron Chancellor". Austria was Germany's logical ally, but, in 1878, she was yet to be brought to a realization of the need of an alliance with the Hohenzollern. Bismarck, with his keen insight into international affairs, may have perceived that his Government, by making use of this situation, could prove the determining factor in shaping the course of European politics. By holding aloof from the situation which was about to engulf all eastern Europe, he was bringing Habsburg and Romanov face to face, and the imminence of the Slavic peril was driving the Danubian Monarchy into the waiting arms of the German Government.

Thus the international situation at the beginning of April was not roseate. With England and Austria openly hostile, and Germany, at best, only neutral, it was inevitable that Russia should make certain concessions. The Tsar realized that England's desire for material modifications in the Treaty was responsible for her demand that it should be submitted in its entirety. Therefore, he would know the nature of the demands, and, if compatible with self-respect, he would acquiesce in them.

On April 9, 1878, Prince Gorchakov forwarded to Count Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador at London, a Despatch in reply to Lord Salisbury's Circular
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of April 1 . The real thesis of the Despatch was the suggestion that the

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The Despatch consisted of a lengthy pro-memorandum attached to a short note. It was communicated by Count Shuvalov to the Marquis of Salisbury on April 12, 1878. (Hertslet, op.cit., 2707).

English Government should make known its wishes and offer any proposals²⁷ looking toward a solution of the crisis in the near East .The Cabinet at St.Petersburg further announced that in communicating the text of the Treaty of San Stefano to the Powers,each had been given to understand that in the Congress,should it convene,full liberty of appreciation and action would be enjoyed by all,and that the same would be claimed for Russia.

In reply to the arguments set forth in the British Circular,the Despatch gave the Russian interpretation of the meaning of the Treaty of San Stefano, and disputed the English assertion that Bulgaria was to become a tool in

Russian hands²⁸ .It further denied that the Black Sea was to become a Muscovite lake,and pointed out that neither the integrity of the Ottoman Empire nor of British interests would be imperilled. By way of constructive argument,the Russian Chancellor declared that the Tsar's demands upon Turkey were light in comparison with the sacrifices he had endured in

carrying the war to a successful conclusion²⁹ .Last,but not least,in reply to the English charge of Treaty violation,the Russians observed that the

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"We find,however,the objections of the English Cabinet there set forth in great detail,but we looked in vain for any proposals which it would be disposed to suggest towards a practical solution of the present crisis in the East. The Marquis of Salisbury tells us what the English Government does not desire,but does not tell us what its wishes are. We think it would be useful if his Lordship would be good enough to make this latter point known,with a view to arrive at a clear understanding upon the situation.(Hertslet,op.cit.,2707).

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"It is not accurate to say that the Treaty of San Stefano has created a new Bulgaria or a strong Slavic State under the control of Russia. Bulgaria existed,though in a state of oppression..... The Preliminary Treaty in no way places Bulgaria under the rule of a chief chosen by Russia." (Hertslet,op.cit.,2708-2710).

29

"The objections taken to the Treaty of San Stefano in regard to the indemnity claimed from Turkey are not better founded. Assuredly the amount of this indemnity is out of all proportion to the overwhelming charges which the war has entailed upon Russia".(Hertslet,op.cit.,2714).

Treaties of 1856 and 1871 had been repeatedly violated for twenty-two years,³⁰
not the least of which was the entry of the British fleet into the Straits .

Upon the publication of the Despatch in London, it at once became evident³¹
that the way was prepared for additional negotiations . The official policy of the English Government now assumed a new form. Their demands were made known to Count Shuvalov, who departed from London May 12, to present the terms to his Government at St. Petersburg. As a last resort he passed through Berlin, where he had a conference with Bismarck. In this, he proposed an alliance between Germany and Russia, but his overtures were rejected by Bismarck, who refused to make a choice between Russia and Austria if the³²
understanding of the three Emperors should not be maintained . Unable to rely upon German aid in case of war, an agreement with England was a necessity. After consultation with the Tsar, Count Shuvalov returned to London, whereupon the crisis over the Eastern Question began to clarify. From this time forward, we hear practically nothing of the English contention that any Treaty between Russia and Turkey must be a European Treaty, approved³³
by the Powers . One may ask why the Treaty of San Stefano was not as much

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Other infringements were the failure of the Turkish Government to fulfill certain obligations towards the Christians, by the United Principalities, by the French occupation of Syria, and by the Conference of Constantinople, which constituted an interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. (Hertslet, op. cit., 2716).

31

Thompson, op. cit., 451.

32

"Le comte Shuvalov proposa à M. de Bismarck, une alliance entre la Russie et l'Allemagne. M. de Bismarck déclina la proposition. Il se refusait à faire un choix "entre la Russie et l'Autriche, si la triple alliance des puissances de l'Europe centrale ne se maintenant pas".

(Dupuis, Ch., Le Principe d'Equilibre et le Concert Europeen, 365, note. Quoted from Prince de Bismarck, Pensees et Souvenirs, tII., 266).

33

Thompson, op. cit., 452.

a matter of European concern as it had been two months before. What had dampened the English enthusiasm for the sanctity of treaties, and caused her to abandon her role as the champion of European law? The answer is to be found in the fact that the opportunity of negotiating separately with Russia offered Great Britain a means of gaining her demands, thus making the question of "submitting the Treaty" one of complete indifference to the Cabinet at London. England did not desire to efface completely the results of the late war, but, at the same time, she was unable to accept all the consequences, so that she was resorting to the Secret Agreement with Russia in order to gain her point.

The negotiations between Lord Salisbury and Count Shuvalov were conducted with the utmost secrecy, and although the two memorandums were signed on May 30, it was not intended that the contents should be known to the public as yet. However, the indiscretion of a sub-altern in the Foreign Office revealed the substance of the agreement and a summary appeared in the London Times of May 31.

The Agreement provided that there should be two Bulgarian provinces, one north of the Balkans, under the government of a Prince, the other, on the south, not touching the Aegean Sea, with a Christian Governor and a large amount of administrative autonomy. The Powers, especially England,

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Thompson, op.cit., 452. That is if England could secure Russia's consent to the desired modifications, it was not imperative that the other portions of the Treaty should be submitted to the Congress. However, since the Agreement involved a rearrangement of the cardinal features of the Treaty of San Stefano, it was highly probable that the Tsar would not deny the right of the Congress to consider the less important provisions.

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D'Avril, op.cit., 344.

36

For the full text of the Agreement see London Times, June 15, 1878. For summary, D'Avril, op.cit., 345-346.

were to have a voice in the further organization of Epirus, Thessaly and the other Christian provinces resting under the domination of Turkey, while it was understood that the war indemnity required of Turkey by Russia would not deprive the English Government of their rights as creditor. Great Britain expressed regret at the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia, but since the other signatories of the Treaty of Paris were not disposed to take up arms in defense of Roumania, England did not consider herself obligated to undertake the task alone. Lord Salisbury agreed not to contest the desire of the Tsar to occupy the port of Batoum and to guard his conquests in Armenia, but at the same time, the Government at London revealed the solicitude which it entertained for the safety of Asiatic Turkey³⁷. It was further stipulated that, in the opinion of Great Britain, the duty of protecting the Ottoman Empire from the Russian peril, which would devolve for the most part upon England, could be discharged without resorting to the use of force³⁸. Finally, the Agreement "was destined to serve as a mutual engagement in Congress for the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Great Britain"³⁹.

It is clear that, in so far as material interests were concerned, the Agreement was a victory for British diplomacy. The Congress was assured, while it was equally certain that the Treaty of San Stefano would be submitted in its entirety. England had, to a great extent, secured her demands.

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Thompson, op.cit., 458.

38

It is quite evident that England's action in assuming the duty of protecting the dominions of the Porte, and her belief that the duty could be discharged without the use of force, was a good pretext for the English occupation of Cyprus, which was undertaken, ostensibly, for the purpose of defending Asiatic Turkey from a possible Russian attack.

39

See the text of the Agreement, London Times, June 15, 1878.

The greater Bulgaria had been cut in half and taken from Russian tutelage, thus precluding any possibility of Russian expansion to the Aegean. England had wrung certain definite concessions from the Tsar and could look forward to the meeting of the Congress with some degree of satisfaction. In the course of the negotiations, British diplomacy is not without certain interesting features. We have noticed how the banner of European law had been flaunted in the foreground by England. Yet, it is evident that, in the end, she was guided largely by considerations of self-interest. She consented to the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia, in itself as much a violation of the Treaty of Paris as the Greater Bulgaria. While condemning Russia for her disregard of treaty obligations in forcing the Treaty of San Stefano upon Turkey without the consent of Europe, the British Government, at the same time, entered into private and secret negotiations with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg. It may be said that treaty obligations had lapsed since the Treaty of San Stefano, but the Treaties of Paris and London had been violated before March 3, 1878.

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Again, as Mr. Gladstone pointed out, by entering into private negotiations with Russia, England pursued the very policy for which she rejected the Berlin Memorandum of May 30, 1876, namely, because it prevented free discussion and the equality of states. Finally, by specifying in the Secret Agreement of May 30, that the duty of defending the Ottoman Empire would, in the future, devolve largely upon Great Britain, The Cabinet at London was preparing the way for the next diplomatic move, which was to begin on the very day the Memorandums with Russia were signed, and which was

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See Nineteenth Century, June 1878.

to be consummated on June 4, 1878, in the form of the Cyprus Convention with Turkey.

On the Continent, the Secret Agreement of May 30, produced a variety of impressions. In Berlin, the belief was current that the German Government had acted as mediator in some fashion between England and Russia⁴¹. Paris felt that Great Britain had abandoned the broad platform of principle, based upon European law, for the more restricted field of British interests⁴². The opponents of Count Andrassy in Austria entertained some fears lest Habsburg interests were being disregarded, while St. Petersburg considered the arrangements so favorable that they were able to look forward with hope⁴³ to the meeting of the Congress⁴⁴.

If a diversity of opinion was the result in continental Europe, the same was not untrue of the British Isles. Those who were hoping that the Government would continue its lofty role as champion of the rights of the weaker states and defender of the authority of treaties, were disappointed that the Cabinet should have resorted to secret negotiations⁴⁵. Again,

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London Times, June 1, 1878.

42

London Times, June 3, 1878.

43

London Times, June 5, 1878.

44

St. Petersburg. "The terms of the arrangements between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg are kept strictly secret, but they are said to be more satisfactory than was expected, and great confidence is felt in regard to the result of the Congress" (London Times, June 8, 1878).

45

"This agreement is not only a surrender of the good and strong position asserted in the original English conditions of entering the Congress, but it is a complete bouleversement of that principle. Great, indeed, is the

those who wished to destroy the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano because of the contravention of previous European Treaties, were equally disappointed. Thus Earl Grey wrote in the Times of June 18, as follows:

"A few weeks ago both our people and the other nations of Europe were led to believe that England was going to resume her more generous policy of older times. The attitude she seemed determined to take in maintaining the authority of treaties and imposing a barrier to wrong and violence was hailed with general applause at home and abroad. How little did I suspect that while such high language was being publicly held by the Government, a private negotiation was being carried on with Russia by which we have assented to what was most objectionable in the Treaty of San. Stefano, and are made accomplices in the flagitious spoliation of Roumania" ⁴⁶ .

Nevertheless, there were those who actively supported the policy of the Government, and who felt that the division of the Greater Bulgaria, together with the Russian acknowledgement of the right of an English protectorate over Asia Minor were victories for British diplomacy. ⁴⁷ The Daily Telegraph openly rejoiced over the restoration of Roumelia to the Sultan, while the Globe regarded the maintenance of the rule of the straits

descent from the "lofty moral position". We may at least be allowed to ask perhaps, that evasive and misleading statements should be abandoned. Nothing can justify the sort of answers given by Lord Salisbury and Sir Strafford Northcote on the subject of this memorandum hitherto", (P. M. G., June 15, 1878, quoted in Thompson, op.cit., 462).

⁴⁶

Quoted in Thompson, op.cit., 462.

⁴⁷

Thompson, op.cit., 463.

48

as a glorious triumph .

In spite of the diversity of opinion, all could now look forward with no small amount of satisfaction to the meeting of the Congress. But even though *it* appeared that war had been averted, men were still at a loss as to the proper interpretation to place upon the ominous reference to the English duty of defending Asiatic Turkey. Their suspense, however, was not to be of long duration, since the ominous reference shortly materialized as the Cyprus Convention.

Indeed, the idea of assuming a protectorate over Asia Minor, in order to checkmate Russian expansion, was not an altogether new one in the mind of the British Cabinet. During the last days of March, 1878, at the time when Lord Derby resigned from the Ministry, such plans were being entertained. It was pointed out that a naval station in the Eastern Mediterranean was a necessity, a fact which would require the seizure of Cyprus, together with a point on the Syrian coast . Immediate steps for the realization of this plan were not taken, and it appears that the attention of England turned to Egypt as a convenient place from which to guard British interests.

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Thompson, op. cit., 463.

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"When I quitted the Cabinet in the last days of March I did so mainly because it was said it was necessary to secure a naval station in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, that for that purpose it was necessary to seize and occupy the Island of Cyprus, together with a point upon the Syrian coast, and that was to be done by means of a Syrian expedition, sent out from India, with or without the consent of the Sultan, although part of the arrangement was that full compensation should be made to the Sultan for any loss he might incur" (Lord Derby's speech in the House of Lords, July 18, 1878. Cited in Thompson, op. cit., 406).

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Of this, however, France would not permit . Although Waddington was a man of pronounced English sympathies, he was not inclined to sacrifice the interests of his Government in favor of the whims of the English Cabinet. Thus, he very explicitly outlined the conditions under which France would participate in the Congress. He demanded that the signatory Powers of the Treaties of Paris and London should be represented; that only the questions arising from the late war should be considered; and he made it clear that France would treat neither of Egypt nor of Syria, and that the rights of France in the Holy Places should not be contested .⁵¹ The reservations of the French Government having been accepted by all the other Powers, England⁵² could not, on her part, reject them . Confronted by powerful opposition in her Egyptian policy, the Government at London endeavored to accomplish its purpose by other means. Great Britain would conclude a profitable

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Debidour, op. cit., 520.

Bourgeois, op. cit., 810.

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"1. que toutes les puissances signataires des traités de Paris et de Londres y seraient représentées; 2. que les questions soulevées par la dernière guerre y seraient seules agitées; 3. qu'il n'y serait traité ni de l'Égypte ni de la Syrie et que les droits de la France dans les Lieux Saints n'y seraient pas contestés". (Debidour, op. cit., 520. Also Bourgeois, op. cit., 810).

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Debidour, opus cit., 520.

53

agreement with Austria ,in which the Habsburg Monarchy would be asked to participate in a division of the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, England assuming control of the Asiatic possessions, while Austria should

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take over European Turkey . Fearing the maze of complications attendant upon such an undertaking, and believing war with Russia to be the inevitable

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result, Andrassy turned a deaf ear to the proposition. Having failed thus far, the conclusion of the Agreement of May 30, made it imperative that England should secure a foothold at once, or fail in her lately assumed duty of protecting Asiatic Turkey.

Negotiations were at once opened looking toward an arrangement favorable to British interests. On May 30, the day on which the Memorandums with Russia were signed, Lord Salisbury forwarded to Mr. Layard, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, a Despatch containing proposals for a conditional

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alliance with Turkey . The dangers of Russian encroachment upon Asiatic Turkey, together with the process of disintegration going on within the

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"Par compensation, elle eût bien voulu contracter un accord profitable avec l'Autriche-Hongrie" (Debidour, op. cit., 520).

54

"Aussi avait-elle proposé radicalement à cette puissance de partager avec elle le protectorat (c'est-à-dire la domination indirecte) de l'empire ottoman; elle se fût chargée des provinces d'Asie et eût laissé l'Europe à la cour de Vienne". (Debidour, op. cit., 520. See also Driault, op. cit., 231).

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Debidour, op. cit., 520.

Driault, op. cit., 231.

56

Hertslet, op. cit., 2717.

57

were clearly set forth.
 possessions of the Porte. In the opinion of the English Foreign Minister it was impossible for his Government to accept passively the effect which the Russian advance into Asia Minor would have upon the tottering Turkish Empire. For the purpose of guarding British and Ottoman interests an alliance between the two seemed the most practical move. Such an eventuality would depend upon the adoption of sweeping reform policies in Asiatic Turkey. Thus the Marquis of Salisbury suggested to Layard the importance of obtaining from the Porte the guarantee of certain reforms under English guidance. The Despatch further made it clear that for England to perform her part of the bargain it would be necessary for her to occupy a position near the coast of Asia Minor, preferably the Island of Cyprus. Mr. Layard was to

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"... But the Government of the Ottoman dynasty is that of an ancient but still alien conqueror, resting more upon actual power than upon the sympathies of common nationality. The defeat which the Turkish arms have sustained and the known embarrassments of the Government will produce a general belief in its decadence and an expectation of speedy political change, which in the East are more dangerous than actual discontent to the stability of a Government. If the population of Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia see that the Porte has no guarantee for its continued existence but its own strength, they will begin to calculate upon the speedy fall of the Ottoman domination, and to turn their eyes toward its successor. (Hertslet, op.cit., 2717-2718).

58

Hertslet, op.cit., 2719.

59

"It will further be necessary, in order to enable Her Majesty's Government efficiently to execute the engagements now proposed, that it should occupy a position near the coast of Asia Minor and Syria. The Island of Cyprus appears to them to be in all respects the most available for this object". (Hertslet, op.cit., 2719).

submit to the Porte a Preliminary Convention, with a view to carrying out
 60
 the proposed plan .

The Ottoman Government required no great amount of persuasion to enter
 into the Agreement. Therefore, on June 4, 1878 a Convention of Defensive
 Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey was signed by the representatives
 61
 of the two Powers . By the provisions of this alliance, should Batoum,
 Ardahan, or Kars be retained by Russia, and should the Tsar in the future
 make any attempt to take possession of further territories belonging to the
 Ottoman Government, England would join in defending them by force of arms .
 62
 On his part, the Sultan agreed to introduce the reforms necessary for the
 protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte, while Great Britain was to
 63
 occupy Cyprus, which would enable her to fulfil her duty to Turkey . On
 July 1, an annex to the Convention was signed, the chief importance of which
 lay in the conditions of the British evacuation of Cyprus. Should the
 the Russian Government restore Kars and the other conquered Armenian ter-
 ritory to the Porte, Cyprus was to be evacuated by England and the Conven-
 64
 tion of June 4 would be at an end . At first sight it may appear that there
 was some ground for Turkish consolation in the latter provision, but when one

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 " I request, therefore, your Excellency to propose to the Porte to agree
 to a Convention to the following effect....." (Hertslet, op.cit., 2720)

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 For the text of the Convention see Hertslet, op.cit., 2722-2723).

62
 "If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars or any of them shall be retained by Russia,
 and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take
 possession of any further territories in Asia, as fixed by the definitive
 Treaty of Peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty, the Sultan
 in defending them by force of arms" (Hertslet, op.cit., 2722-2723).

63
 Hertslet, op.cit., 2723.

64
 Hertslet, op.cit., 2725.

considers the fact that it was practically certain Russia would not permit the retrocession of her lately acquired possessions, Cyprus could not hope soon to escape the British yoke.

From the above, it is clear that the two Agreements had paved the way for the meeting of the Congress. Although Great Britain had not been able to rid herself entirely of the objectionable features of the Treaty of San Stefano, she had abrogated the more flagrant contraventions of her Imperial interests, even though she had been forced to resort to backstairs bargaining and secret intrigue, a course quite in contrast to her once high moral stand. She had, of necessity, acceded to a considerable acquisition of territory by Russia, but, at the same time, she had acquired the protectorate of a strategic position in the orient, whence she could guard her eastern possessions. Evidence strongly indicates that after all Her Britannic Majesty was more concerned with the protection of English interests, than with European law, and if this be true, her purpose had been accomplished. The point of English contention had triumphed, in so far as the Treaty was to be submitted in its entirety. Thus, when, on June 3, the German Government tendered the invitation to the Powers to assemble in Congress, England could look out from her abode across the Channel with the utmost complacency upon the approaching assemblage of diplomats, and she could take comfort and consolation in the thought that their task had been materially lightened by the skill of British diplomacy.

CHAPTER III.

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

Just a fortnight after the signing of the Agreement with Russia, the European Congress assembled at Berlin. Opinion as to the merits of its work has been characterized by a lack of unanimity, as well as by a failure to comprehend its real purpose and the nature of the problems confronting it. Some, possessed of a thorough-going conviction as to the failure of the Congress, have been blind to any intelligent reflection upon the subject; others, deluded by the apparently stormy sessions of the diplomats, have formed false ideas in regard to the gravity of the situation confronting Europe. But, in each case, the opinion is the result of a fundamental misconception, of an illusory belief as to the expected outcome of the assembly and the conditions calling it into existence.

To understand the real significance of the Congress of Berlin, and properly to evaluate the results of its labors, one must first arrive at a clear conception of its purpose, of what it could reasonably hope to accomplish. In the beginning, it is necessary to dispel from the mind the fallacious notion that the Congress was called to settle the Eastern Question. Manifestly, such an idea was absurd, a figment of the imagination, a consummation only to be wished for. Why should this Congress, called together

largely as a result of the threatened disruption of the equilibrium of the European Powers, be expected to solve, for all time, the most vexatious problem of the age, a question which, for a century and a half, had repeatedly embroiled Europe in warfare? In the logical course of events this was not to be expected, least of all in 1878. Final solution of the Eastern Question implied a great European conflict, in which some Power or Powers should be overwhelmingly victorious. In failing to occupy Constantinople, Russia had missed a golden opportunity to impose her will upon Europe, and dictate the final settlement of the Balkan question. As for the other Powers, it appears that not one wished to resort to force as a means of permanent solution.

Therefore, in considering the Congress of Berlin, let us keep in mind the fundamental fact that its purpose was, not to effect a permanent solution of the Eastern Question, but to reconcile the Treaty of San Stefano with European interests. Upon that basis must its labors be judged, and in proportion as it accomplished the object in view, was it a success or a failure.

Again, he who would acquire a comprehensive understanding of the subject, must rid himself of the erroneous impression that the situation was an unusually grave one. England's Secret Agreements with Russia and Turkey had largely cleared up the situation, although this was not understood except by the parties directly concerned. The understanding of May 30, between England and Russia had established a working basis for the Congress. Although differences of opinion and policy were to arise, they were essentially disagreements on matters of detail. The outlines, the broad basis of the diplomatic structure had been laid in the Secret Agreements; the Congress was

to place the stamp of European approval upon it. There were stormy sessions and sharp exchanges of opinion; equally true is it that Prince Gorchakov gathered up his maps and threatened to leave the room, and that Disraeli ordered a special train to carry him to Calais. But, after all, this merely depicts the sensational character of the men, swayed as they were, by personal animus, rather than any serious difficulties standing in the way of peaceable settlement. Indeed, when one considers the earnest, sincere and pronounced desire of English public opinion to preserve the peace, and the isolated position of Russia, it is difficult to conceive of a situation which could have disrupted the Congress and disturbed the peace of Europe. Thus, it should be remembered that the alleged seriousness and gravity of the situation has been greatly overemphasized.

From the discussion of the previous chapter, one would naturally expect English and Russian interests to clash at every turn, and such was to be the case. From the opening session, when Lord Beaconsfield interposed an objection to the proximity of Russian troops to Constantinople, to the fifteenth sitting, in which Prince Gorchakov asked "by what principles and in what manner the Congress proposed to insure the execution of its high decisions", we have one long story of Anglo-Russian antipathy, but, as has been said above, an antipathy tempered by a heartfelt desire to maintain the peace, and regulated by the Secret Agreements.

In general, the Congress resolved itself into a discussion of six lead-

ing questions, namely, those pertaining to Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania and the conflict of Russo-British interests in Asia Minor. It shall, therefore, be the object of this chapter to show the points at issue between the Powers in each of these questions, the arguments, pro and con, and the final settlement in each case.

I.

PRELIMINARIES

Before engaging in a consideration of these leading questions, however it is necessary to take note of certain preliminaries, which, while not bearing directly upon the chief points at issue, give no small amount of insight into the general attitude of the Powers.

On June 8, 1878, Secretary Cross issued from the British Foreign Office, a communication to the English Plenipotentiaries, in which¹ the broad outlines of the policy to be pursued by Great Britain in the preliminary discussions, were roughly sketched. The British representatives were first expected to invite a discussion of the Congress, as to the advisability of withdrawing the Russian troops from their position before Constantinople. The despatch pictured the manner in which Russia had violated the terms of her armistice with Turkey, and the constant menace afforded by the

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See the Protocols of the Congress, English Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 39, (1878). Hereafter to be indicated by the abbreviation, Parl. Papers.

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presence of the Tsar's forces before the Ottoman capital. Nor was that all. The Romanov Plenipotentiaries at the Congress might attempt to explain that the encampment of their troops was conditioned by the presence of the English fleet in the Sea of Marmora. Should such an eventuality arise, the English representatives were authorized to undertake the withdrawal of the fleet simultaneously with the retirement of the Russian army. One other duty was urged upon them. Certain governments, not signatories of the Treaty of Paris, would, in all probability, apply for admission to some of the sittings of the Congress, particularly those in which the future of those States were to be discussed. In the estimation of the English Secretary, Greece possessed an indisputable right to such a privilege, and no stone was to be left unturned in an effort to gain recognition of that Power's claims. . . . Although Roumania and Serbia were not independent states, and

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"But the Russian troops stationed in the immediate neighborhood of Constantinople occupy positions far in advance of those which the armistice prescribes. This condition of things is not only at variance with conditions of the contract into which Turkey and Russia have entered, but it is full of practical hazard. The danger of collision can never be absent while troops recently in conflict are stationed in close proximity to each other, and the possibility of capturing such a prize as Constantinople tempts the more reckless spirits of the one army to aggression, while it disposes the other to constant apprehension and frequent panic" (Parl. Papers, 1-2).

3

"If any attempt should be made to represent the advanced position of the Russian lines as being, in any degree, dependent on the presence of the British fleet in the Sea of Marmora, you are authorized to undertake that the fleet should be withdrawn simultaneously with the retirement of the Russian army". (Parl. Papers, 2).

4

"You will urge this claim of Greece on behalf of her Majesty's Government at the opening of the Congress and will make every effort to procure the concession of it in a large and liberal degree". (Parl. Papers, 2).

hence did not have such a clear and incontrovertible title to participate in the High Assembly, the English Government would, nevertheless, be tempered⁵ by clemency and graciously support their aspirations .

While comparatively unimportant in themselves, each of the above mentioned points are straws which show the way the wind was blowing, and, since each bore fruit in the Congress, it is important that we keep them in mind.

More striking, as affording a working basis for English diplomacy, was the letter of the Marquis of Salisbury to Lord Odo Russell, British Ambassador to Germany, and who was to participate in the Congress.⁶ The Foreign Secretary counselled the English representative not to "forget the ancient alliance between Austria and England, and the general coincidence of their interests", and urged him to "support any legitimate proposals tending to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy".⁷ But, should Russia persist in her adhesion to the provisions of the Preliminary Treaty, in points touching Habsburg affairs, the English espousal of Habsburg interests was⁸ not to be indulged to the point of disrupting the Congress . In addition, Lord Russell was earnestly to urge the Tsar to renounce his claims to Kars, Ardahan and Batoum, and to abstain from making annexations inimical to the interests of the Ottoman Empire and detrimental to the welfare of the populations of Asiatic Turkey .⁹ The communication further reflected

5

Parl. Papers, 2.

6

The communication bore the date of June 8, 1878. (Parl. Papers, 2).

7

Parl. Papers, 2-3.

8

"But in doing so, you will bear in mind that, if Russia should ultimately adhere to the proposals of the Preliminary Treaty, these do not touch the interests of England so closely as to justify the Plenipotentiaries in pushing their opposition as far as to break up the Congress". (Parl. Papers, 3

9

The Communication contained the following in regard to this particular

English policy by pointing out that the Russian demand to be exclusively consulted in regard to the institutional organization of Bulgaria, Thessaly, Epirus and Crete was inadmissible, while the boundaries of Bulgaria, as outlined by the Treaty of San Stefano, would require very considerable de-
 10
 limitation . In general, the reduction proposed by Lord Salisbury, in the Despatch, corresponded roughly with that provided for in the Secret Agree-
 11
 ment of May 30, and with that later adopted at the Congress .

When, on June 13, 1878, the Congress assembled at Berlin, Bismarck was im-
 12
 mediately elected President of the High Assembly. Before proceeding to a consideration of the Treaty of San Stefano, the diplomats were to witness a duel of words between the Representatives of Great Britain and Russia, an incident which fully illustrates the estrangement between the two
 13
 Powers . Pursuing the policy outlined by Secretary Cross, in his Despatch of June 8, Lord Beaconsfield immediately pointed out the dangers presented

point: "In the event of the failure, in this respect of the efforts of the English Plenipotentiaries, you will be made acquainted with the course which Her Majesty's Government have decided to pursue". This, in all probability refers to the Cyprus Convention.

10

"The Constitution of the Province of Bulgaria will especially merit the attention of the English Plenipotentiaries. The tributary Principality which, under the Treaty, extends to the Aegean on the south and beyond the Lake of Ochrida on the West, and trenches closely on the important towns of Adrianople and Salonica, require very material reduction" (Parl. Papers, 3-
 11

Parl. Papers, 3-4.

12

For the invitation from the German Government, see Hertslet, op. cit., 2721.

13

Parl. Papers, 13.

by the proximity of the Russian troops to Constantinople and asked that
¹⁴
 the attention of the Congress be given to the question . A reply from the
 Russian Chancellor was promptly forthcoming. He made it clear that the
 Tsar had entered the Congress with the expectation of avoiding all recrim-
 ination in regard to the past, and that he was desirous of removing all un-
 certainty and distrust; that it was the purpose of the Russian Emperor to
¹⁵
 guarantee to the Christian subjects of the Porte an autonomous existence .

Nor was Prince Gorchakov alone in his resentment of the English Prime
 Minister's observations. Count Shuvalov remarked that the forward movements
 of the Russian army were the result of the entrance of the English fleet
 into Bosphorous; that the presence of the troops during the past three
 months had given rise to no serious collisions, and their withdrawal might
 be the occasion for very grave consequences. Finally, he urged the Congress
 to remember that the retreat of the Tsar's forces would arouse the appre-
 hensions of the Christian population of Constantinople, all of whom would be
¹⁶
 forced to seek places of safety in a more congenial abode. These facts once
 established, the Romanov representatives experienced little difficulty in
 convincing the diplomats that the withdrawal of the troops was, in no way,

14

Parl. Papers, 13.

15

Prince Gorchakov further made it clear that "if to attain such a result
 the Congress discovers other means than those which have appeared to Russia
 to be the best, the Government of the Emperor will examine them, but its only
 object is to secure and guarantee effectually an autonomous existence to
 all the Christian populations". (Parl. Papers, 13).

16

Ibid.

17

necessary to the calm consideration of the problems confronting them .

Thus it appeared that the preliminary difficulties were disposed of, but the question of Greece remained to be reckoned with. True to its earlier predilections, the English Government was to take its stand for the representation of the Hellenic Kingdom. At the second sitting of the Congress, Lord Salisbury read a motion setting forth the alleged reasons why Greece should be represented. He pictured the growing estrangement between the Greek and Slav subjects of the Porte, due, in a large measure, to the fact that the Slavs had renounced their allegiance to the authority of the Greek Patriarch. Although the Government at London had never seriously protested when the iron heel of the Sultan had ground his Slav subjects into the earth, the Foreign Secretary now entertained very grave fears for the future of the Greek race and language should the Slavs once obtain an ascendancy . He saw as the champion of the Slavs in the Congress, the Great Russian Empire, but he saw no such protector of the Greeks. As a guarantee for proper consideration, he proposed that the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire should be represented by the Kingdom of Greece .

17
M. d'Oubril, of France, concurred in the view of Count Shuvalov, while Prince Bismarck considered the explanation of the Russian Plenipotentiary as quite satisfactory. The Iron Chancellor suggested that the matter should form the subject of private agreement between the representatives of Great Britain and Russia. Lord Beaconsfield having agreed to this, the President declared the incident closed. (Parl. Papers, 14).

18
Parl. Papers, 21.

19
"The Congress is well aware that during the late years the bonds of friendship which formerly united the Greek and Slav subjects of the Porte have been broken. From allies they have become rivals. The Slavs who formerly recognized the authority of the Greek Patriarch have given their adherence to a new ecclesiastical organization which has claimed their submission" (Parl. Papers, 22).

20
Ibid.

21
The President, Prince Bismarck, suggested that the discussion upon this

M. Desprez, desirous of facilitating the solution of the problem, proposed that the Hellenic Kingdom should be represented when the future of the border provinces was under consideration²². The discussion was continued at the third sitting of the Congress, at which time Caratheodory Pasha, one of the Ottoman representatives, made the observation that the diplomats were inclined to view the different categories of the population to the exclusion of territorial considerations²³. The Turks declared to the Congress that they represented the State which embraced the various elements of population, for whose future the British Government had been so solicitous²⁴.

point be postponed until the next meeting. In the meantime, he would arrange for the printing and distribution of Lord Salisbury's motion (Parl. Papers, 23). By way of answer to Lord Salisbury's charges, Prince Gorchakov showed that Russia was as sincerely concerned with the future of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire as with that of the Slavs. He also pointed out that the difference between the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate was essentially one of liturgy (Parl. Papers, 23).

22

M. Desprez's proposal read as follows: "The Congress invites the Government of his Hellenic Majesty to name a representative who shall be admitted to give expression to the observations of Greece when the question of determining the future of the provinces bordering on the Kingdom shall come up for discussion, and who may be summoned into the Congress itself whenever the Plenipotentiaries shall deem this advisable". (Parl. Papers, 23).

23

Parl. Papers, 35.

24

"The Ottoman Plenipotentiaries hold that it is their duty to declare that, in the Congress, they represent the State itself, which embraces the totality of all these elements, whatsoever they may be, whatever the origin and whatever the date which may be assigned to the conflicts to which allusion has been made". (Parl. Papers, 35).

However, Russia was yet to be consulted. It was at this juncture that Prince Gorchakov explained the Russian attitude in the matter. He reiterated the deep interest which the Tsar^how, and always, had possessed in the Christians of Turkey, without distinction of race, and that he had been more specifically concerned with Bulgaria only because of its being the chief center of the late war²⁵. The Russian Government recognized no well founded reason for the alleged antagonism between the races, and emphasized the fact that it could not have been the result of religious differences, but of "certain private influences and intrigues", attention to which would²⁶ merely encourage their continuance. With these observations and with this expression of sentiment, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia expressed their²⁷ desire to adhere to the French text mentioned above. Lord Salisbury, in

25

Parl. Papers, 35.

26

"All the nationalities belonging to the Eastern Church have successively claimed the right of having their autocephalous Church, that is to say, their independent ecclesiastical hierarchy, and their national tongue for public worship and schools. Such has been the case in Russia, Roumania, Serbia, and even in the Kingdom of Greece. There is no sign that this has led either to the rupture of the bonds which unite these independent churches with the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople, or to any antagonism whatsoever between the races. The Bulgarians do not ask more than this, and their rights to it are absolutely the same. The causes of the difference of opinion and of the casual disputes which have occurred is, therefore, to be found in certain private influences and intrigues, which would appear to be neither consonant with the real interests of the races of Europe, and which therefore ought not to be encouraged". (Parl. Papers, 35).

27

The proposal of M. Desprez.

behalf of England, then announced his willingness to concur in the proposal of the French Plenipotentiary, provided it were amended to read "Greek Provinces" instead of "border provinces of the Kingdom of Greece" ²⁸. The French text having carried, and the amendment failing a majority, the High Assembly decided that the Greek Plenipotentiary should be invited to attend those those sittings in which the future of the Greek border ²⁹ provinces was discussed.

II.

BULGARIA

Among the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano, the first to be considered was the question of Bulgaria. Would the Powers concur in the wishes of the Tsar to maintain the Greater Bulgaria of the Preliminary Treaty, or would they agree to the division as outlined in the Secret Agreement of May 30? In any event looking toward the diminution of Bulgaria, England could count upon the support of Austria-Hungary, and the Dual Monarchy reckoned upon English cooperation in matters relating to Habsburg interests.

However, there seems to have been some misunderstanding as to the extent of this reciprocal indorsement. At the Congress there was a feeling,

28

On this amendment it was agreed to vote in reverse order to Parliamentary custom. The Congress first voted on the French proposition, and then on the Salisbury amendment. The French text having carried, and the amendment failing a majority, the vote on the French text was regarded as conclusive (Parl. Papers, 36). Lord Salisbury preferred the words "Greek provinces" because they included territories inhabited by Greeks, but not bordering on the Kingdom of Greece.

29

Parl. Papers, 37.

at least on the part of some, that Austria was assuming an uncompromising
³⁰ attitude . It was reported that she wished to be forced to invade Bosnia
³¹ and, possibly, Serbia and Montenegro . Thus it was feared that should the
³² Government at Vienna become dissatisfied, it might leave the Congress .

But it did not seem probable that she would act alone, and hence it was
 believed that the Habsburg had consulted Great Britain as to the latter's
³³ course, should the necessary concessions in Bulgaria not be forthcoming .

This is significant, since it shows a lack of appreciation of the real
 nature of the situation. Whatever may have then seemed to be the danger of
 a disastrous termination of the Congress, when viewed in the clearer light

30

See Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst, Vol., II.,
 218.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

33

The passage reads as follows: "Blowits came to me this morning.
 He said he was beginning to be uneasy about the result of the Congress.
 Austria was showing more determination and resolution than he had hitherto
 credited her with. She did not at all wish that Montenegro should be al-
 lowed to receive Antivari, and that the Serbs, with Bosnia and Montenegro
 should proclaim an Empire under Nikita. But the latter would be the case
 if Austria did not take measures. Austriawishes, however to be forced to
 invade those countries. It might therefore happen that Austria might become
 dissatisfied and might contemplate the possibility of leaving the Congress.
 But she did not wish to act alone, and therefore sounded England to see if
 she also was prepared to retire from the Congress in case the necessary
 concessions in Bulgaria were not made her. The Englishmen had not an-
 swered that. Blowits thought it would be a good thing if the Englishman's
 demands were satisfied, for then there would be a certainty that Austria
 would not by herself abandon the Congress".
 (Prince Hohenlohe's Memoirs, op. cit. 218.).

of the present ,there seems to have been little chance of a break. By the Secret Agreement,England had secured the Russian concession on the essential points of the Bulgarian question,while the Cyprus Convention had met the possible difficulty concerning Asia Minor. Thus it seems that England was not seriously considering the idea of withdrawing from the Congress.Furthermore,Lord Salisbury's Despatch to Lord Russell,on June 8, provided that the English espousal of the Habsburg cause should not be carried to the point of breaking up the Congress ³⁴. Thus,it appears that the diplomats might well have entertained high hopes of an amicable settlement of the question.

The work of the Congress on the Bulgarian problem consisted in the settlement of minor points and in placing the approval of the Powers upon the provisions of the Secret Agreement of May 30. The debates on the subject occupied four long sessions and involved a discussion of the territorial basis of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia,their Governmental organization, and their occupation by Russian troops.

In considering the territorial basis,one readily finds many differences of opinion,but they were chiefly on matters of detail.First of all,the Greater Bulgaria of San Stefano was to be divided. At the second session of the Congress, June 17,Lord Salisbury made a very lengthy observation, in which he portrayed the evil effects which the Greater Bulgaria would have upon the Ottoman Empire,and presented his views as to a practicable means of settlement ³⁵.Accordingly,he introduced a proposal providing that the autonomous Bulgaria should be restricted to the north of the Balkans,

34

Parl.Papers,3.

35

In Lord Salisbury's opinion the cardinal feature of San Stefano had

and that Roumelia and the other territory south of the mountain range
 36
 should be subject to the direct control of the Sultan .

This called forth a reply from Count Shuvalov who pointed out that the limits fixed by the Conference of Constantinople, 1876-1877, offered certain advantages over that just presented, in that it conformed to the ethnographical conditions of the Bulgarian nation . At this juncture, upon
 37
 the suggestion of Lord Salisbury and the concurrence of Prince Bismarck, it was decided that the cabinets interested in the question should confer with each other and endeavor to arrive at an understanding upon the subject. Count Andrassy, in a sharp observation, made clear the desire

been the reduction of Turkey to absolute dependency upon Russia. He believed that, although "it would be impossible to entirely annihilate the results of the war" by restoring her former independence, Turkey should possess the independence requisite for the protection of the political and commercial interests of which she was to be the keeper. Thus the astute Foreign Secretary, under the guise of making a plea for Turkish independence, would delimit Bulgaria, thereby throwing an obstacle in the way of Russian expansion. Continuing in the same vein, he believed that the entrance of a new maritime power to the Aegean Sea, would meet with the disfavor of the Mediterranean Powers; that if, instead of extending to the Aegean Sea, Bulgaria should be limited on the south by the Balkans, the other part remaining under the control of Turkey, very grave dangers would be averted and the Porte would possess a strategical frontier capable of being defended against possible invasion (Parl. Papers, 24).

36

The text read as follows: 1. "That the tributary autonomous principality of Bulgaria, should be restricted to the part of European Turkey north of the Balkans" 2. "That the Province of Roumelia and all other territory south of the Balkans, shall be under the direct political and military authority of the Sultan, all necessary precaution being taken that the welfare of the population shall be protected by sufficient guarantees of administrative autonomy or in some other manner". (Parl. Papers, 24).

37

Parl. Papers, 24-25.

which Austria-Hungary entertained for a speedy solution of the Bulgarian
³⁸
 problem . It was more particularly the demarcation of frontiers which
 interested the Habsburg Monarchy, both as regarded Serbia and Montenegro,
³⁹
 and also the western frontier. For these reasons, the Austro-Hungarian rep-
 resentative deemed it advisable that his State should be represented in
 the private interviews between the diplomats of England and Russia, a sug-
⁴⁰
 gestion to which the Plenipotentiaries of the latter States agreed .

The private negotiations soon bore fruit. By June 20, Russia had defi-
 nitely conceded the Balkan frontier as provided by the Secret Agreement
⁴¹
 and by Lord Salisbury's proposal noted above . Negotiations continued all
 day on the twenty-first between Shuvalov, Beaconsfield and Bismarck, and a
 favorable reply was received from St. Petersburg in regard to the further
⁴²
 concessions to be made on the Bulgarian question .

Thus, at the sitting of June 22, Lord Salisbury submitted, for the ap-
 proval of the Congress, the development of the English proposal. The Bal-

38

Parl. Papers, 25.

39

Ibid.

40

Ibid.

41

Prince Hohenlohe's Memoirs, op. cit., 219. Waddington, the French Plen-
 ipotentiary, thought that the partition of Bulgaria with two differently
 organized countries carried with it the germ of future trouble. He favor-
 ed complete independence for Bulgaria, leaving Eastern Roumelia to the Turks.

42

Ibid.

kans were to constitute the southern frontier of Bulgaria, and the portion south of the mountain range was to assume the name of Eastern Roumelia. It was to be under the direct military and political control of the Sultan, who was to be empowered to make use of the militia in defending the sea and land frontiers and in securing internal order .⁴³

Little time was lost in reaching an agreement on this point. Count Shuvalov, in a dramatic speech, announced that, despite serious objections, the Russians had agreed to the division of Bulgaria by the line of the Balkans, and consented to the rectification of the western and southern frontiers of the principality, despite the injurious consequences it would entail .⁴⁴ The Tsar's representatives were also prepared to accede to the Sultans right of defending the sea and land frontiers of Eastern Roumelia and maintaining internal order with due consideration to the religion of the population .⁴⁵ But, in addition, Count Shuvalov desired that an European Commission should guarantee that the interior would be occupied only by native troops .⁴⁶ Besides, he would accept "the right of the Governor General to call in Ottoman troops in case the internal or external order should be threatened" but he considered it the duty of the Congress to prescribe the occasion and manner of such entry.⁴⁷

43

For the full text of the proposal see Par. Papers, 46.

44

".....They have in like manner consented to remove the boundaries of the new province from the Aegean Sea. They have, moreover, allowed a rectification on the western frontier of Bulgaria, which they consider as a mutilation because it divides compact Bulgarian populations". (Parl. Papers, 47).

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid.

47

Parl. Papers, 47-48.

Naturally, this immediately called forth an objection from Lord Beaconsfield, who interposed the observation that the Congress had reason to feel proud of the result of the private negotiations carried on between the representatives of England and Russia, and that they had guaranteed to the Sultan "a real frontier and a military and political power sufficient to enable him to maintain his authority and protect the life and possessions of his subjects".⁴⁸ Therefore, he considered the establishment of the European Commission, proposed by Count Shuvalov, as derogatory to the sovereignty of the Sultan.⁴⁹ As for the second Russian amendment, the English Prime Minister thought it even more inadmissible than the first, since the Governor General was manifestly the only one competent to judge as to the time and circumstances of invoking assistance.⁵⁰

A considerable exchange of opinion resulted, in the course of which Prince Bismarck expressed his sympathy for the Russian amendments and his regret should they not be admitted.⁵¹ The Congress was unanimously agreed that the Principality of Bulgaria should be limited on the South by the Balkans, and that Roumelia and all the territory south of the Balkans should be given over to the direct military and political control of the Sultan, with a view of guaranteeing the welfare of the populations.⁵²

48

Parl. Papers, 48

49

Ibid.

50

In reply to Lord Beaconsfield, Count Shuvalov observed that since the situation of Eastern Roumelia was abnormal, it could not be governed according to absolute principles.

51

Parl. Papers, 49.

52

Parl. Papers, 50

Furthermore, Count Shuvalov, in the name of Russia, adhered to the English proposal in regard to the defense of the land and sea frontiers and the maintenance of internal order in Eastern Roumelia, but with the reservation of the right of reverting to his amendments, should his Government demand it. At this juncture, Prince Bismarck wielded his great influence in an effort to expedite the work of the Congress, by appealing to M. Waddington, the first Plenipotentiary of France, to draw up a draft which would enable the present vote to stand, and, at the same time, meet the wish expressed by Count Shuvalov's amendments.

Having conferred with the English and Russian Plenipotentiaries, M. Waddington submitted his draft at the sitting of June 25. In addition to Lord Salisbury's proposal for the use of Ottoman troops in the event of the internal or external security being endangered, the French diplomat would provide for the communication of this intention, together with the occasion demanding it, to the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople. This, together with the other amendments providing for the maintenance of internal order by a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia, was readily adopted by the Congress. Thereupon, M. Waddington

53

Parl. Papers, 50.

54

Ibid.

55

Parl. Papers, 76.

56

This amendment read as follows: "Internal order is maintained by a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia.

"In the formation of these two corps, the officers of which are named by the Sultan, the religion of the inhabitants according to the different localities will be taken into consideration" (Parl. Papers, 77).

read an additional proposal whereby the Sultan engaged to employ only regular troops in the frontier service, and agree not to billet them on the inhabitants.⁵⁷ This too, Count Shuvalov accepted, but with the reservation of the right to add an additional clause relative to placing these arrangements under the surveillance of a European Commission, concerning which he would speak at a later sitting.⁵⁸

With the territorial basis of the New Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia established, we now pass to the problem of constructing a governmental system for them. Article VII. of the Treaty of San Stefano had provided that the "Prince of Bulgaria should be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Porte, with the assent of the Powers".⁵⁹ Lord Salisbury immediately brought up at the sitting of June 24, the question of the meaning of the phrase "assent of the Powers", and was informed by Count Shuvalov that it implied the unanimity and not the majority of the Powers.⁶⁰ The English Foreign Secretary, fearing lest this should be an attempt on the part of the Tsar to delay the election of a Prince, and thus prolong the control of the Russian Commissioners, observed that Bulgaria might be left without a government.⁶¹ Consequently he proposed to substitute "the majority of the Powers", but, in view of strong opposition, did not maintain it and withdrew it at the sitting of June 26.

57

Parl. Papers, 77.

58

The points which the French Plenipotentiary had in mind were: 1. Non-employment of Bashi-Bazouks; 2. Turkish soldiers to be lodged in Barracks or Khans or under canvas, and not to be quartered on the inhabitants; 3. Turkish troops not to stay in the interior of the Province in their passage to the frontier for the service of the garrisons. (Parl. Papers, 77).

59

Hertslet, op. cit., 2680.

60

Parl. Papers, 64.

61 Count Shuvalov replied by saying that he could not answer for

The Treaty of San Stefano had also provided for a Russo-Turkish Commission to trace the frontiers of the Bulgarian Principality, and a Russian Commissioner who should superintend the workings of the new government for

62

two years. This now became the storm center. On June 24, Count Andrassy proposed to the Congress that the functions assigned by the Preliminary Treaty, to a Russian Commission of Commissioners should be transferred

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to a European Commission. In the session of June 25, Lord Salisbury, pursuing the English policy of checkmating Russia by every conceivable means, and thereby furthering the interests of Austria-Hungary, warmly sup-

64

ported Andrassy's proposal.

Count Shuvalov retaliated by admitting that a European Commission might well be substituted for the Russian, but that in Bulgaria the European Commission was not particularly needed. Control by the Consuls in Bulgaria was sufficient, and, if necessary, the European representatives at

all contingencies of the future, but could assure the Congress that Bulgaria would not become a Russian annex.

Prince Bismarck agreed that the Congress could not be expected to find a remedy for all dangers, while Count Andrassy thought that the suppression of the words "assent of the Powers" would weaken the guarantee of Europe. (Parl. Papers, 64-65).

62

Hertslet, op. cit., 2679-2681.

63

Parl. Papers, 65. The discussion on this point was deferred to the next meeting.

64

He incidentally revealed the contents of a telegram from the English at Constantinople, which gave some very alarming details in regard to the policies of the military governor of Bulgaria. Prince Bismarck, Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield now agreed that Lord Salisbury should present to the Secretariat a "written proposal, recommending the prompt adoption of Count Andrassy's motion". (Parl. Papers, 77-78).

65

Constantinople might be brought into play . In the opinion of the Russian representative, the Tsar's government was thoroughly justified in pursuing a more direct line of action in Bulgaria, since the Romanov had played a more conspicuous part in the formation of the autonomous Principality .

66

For the moment, it appeared that the congress had struck an insurmountable barrier. Count Andrassy remained firm in his proposal. Lord Salisbury was unable to understand why Russia should wish to inflict a Russian Commissioner upon the autonomous Bulgaria . Happily for the Powers concerned, Count Corti, of Italy, came forward, tendered his good offices, and consented to act as mediator between the disputants. He recognized no fundamental, well grounded reason for the antagonism between the Powers . The Commission of Consuls demanded by Count Shuvalov really conformed to the wishes of Count Andrassy. In naming the Consuls, the Powers would virtually be choosing their Commissioners. . Therefore he suggested that the Plenipo-

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Parl. Papers, 78.

66

Ibid.

67

"Lord Salisbury does not understand why Russia, which appears to wish to render Bulgaria as independent as the other autonomous and tributary provinces formerly were, should insist upon the maintenance of a Russian Commissioner. (Ibid)

68

Parl. Papers, 79.

69

Count Corti, however, did not have a great amount of faith in the Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, suggested by Count Shuvalov. Judging from his experience, he believed it very difficult to arrive at an understanding under such circumstances. (Parl. Papers, 79).

tentiary of a neutral Power should be entrusted with the mission of establishing an agreement between Count Shuvalov and his colleague from Austria-Hungary. Prince Bismarck, with the consent of the Congress, then asked Count Corti to confer with the representatives of the Powers immediately concerned, in an endeavor to harmonize the conflicting opinions .

In private conference, they quickly arrived at an understanding on the disputed point. The first two paragraphs of Article VII. of the Treaty of San Stefano were to remain intact . An assembly of Bulgarian notables was to convene at Tirnova, before the election of the Prince, and determine upon the organization of the future administration of the Principality. Until the new organization should be perfected, the Provisional Administration of Bulgaria would be conducted by a Russian Commissioner, a Turkish Commissioner and the Consuls nominated by the Powers . The new organization was to be formally instituted upon the election and installation of the Prince. As for Eastern Roumelia, a European Commission would be established for the organization of the province, and for its financial administration until the completion of the work of organization .

70

The Powers were England, Russia and Austria-Hungary. (Parl. Papers, 79).

71

They read thus: "The Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sultan with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the great European Powers shall be capable of being elected Prince of Bulgaria.

"In the event of the dignity of Prince of Bulgaria being vacant, the election of the new Prince shall be made subject to the same conditions and forms". (Hertslet, op. cit., 2680).

72

It also provided that: "In case of disagreement between the Consular delegates, the majority will decide, and in case of divergence between this majority and the Imperial Russian Commissioner, the Representatives of the Powers at Constantinople, assembled in Conference, will give their verdict". (Parl. Papers, 94).

73

Parl. Papers, 94.

The governmental organization would be complete with the establishment of the basis of public law. This included the guarantee of civil , political and religious liberty. On June 24, M. Waddington proposed that all Bulgarian subjects, irrespective of religion, should enjoy complete equality of rights, including eligibility for "all public enjoyments, functions and honors"⁷⁴ Freedom to exercise any creed should be guaranteed, without restriction, to the organizations of the various religious sects . The discussion was resumed on the 26th, when Lord Salisbury expressed the desire to extend the French proposal to the entire Ottoman Empire, a wish which called forth the observation from Caratheodory Pasha, the Turkish Plenipotentiary, that religious liberty within Turkey was guaranteed by legislation and by treaties⁷⁵ . However, after a brief exchange of opinion, the Congress unanimously acceded to the French proposition, but with the reservation, by Lord Salisbury, of the right to recur to the subject in the consideration of Article XXII. of the Treaty of San Stefano⁷⁷ .

The one remaining aspect of the Bulgarian question, which was fraught with difficulties of consequence, was that of Russian occupation. The Treaty of San Stefano had provided that the Ottoman army should be withdrawn from the Greater Bulgaria; that until the complete formation of a native militia, a Russian army corps should occupy Bulgaria; and that the length

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Parl. Papers, 63.

75

Thus far the provisions applied only to Bulgaria. The following was to apply to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia conjointly:

"A full and entire liberty is guaranteed to foreign Catholics, members of religious orders, and to foreign Catholic Bishops, for the exercise of their religion in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The exercise of their rights and privileges shall be secured to them, and their possessions shall be respected. (Parl. Papers, 63).

76

Parl. Papers, 93.

77

Ibid

78

of the occupation should be about two years . Since Eastern Roumelia had been restored to Turkey, a new dispensation must be made. On June 24, Count Andrassy, in a somewhat prolonged observation, reminded the Congress that the matter required attention. Although the Habsburg representative recognized the crying necessity for the maintenance of order within the principality, he could not understand why the period of Russian occupation should have been fixed at two years, or upon the complete or-

79

ganization of the militia . The ill-defined order of things, attendant upon the presence of Russian Troops, would necessarily be detrimental and in-

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imical to the public credit and prosperity of neutral States . Therefore, Count Andrassy introduced a resolution limiting the Russian occupation of Bulgaria to six months and providing for the complete evacuation of

81

Roumania within nine months .

78

Hertslet, op.cit., 2681-2682.

79

Parl. Papers. 66-67.

80

In addition, he said: "The right having been reserved to Turkey to occupy militarily its frontiers of the Balkans, it must not be lost sight of that the troops who have lately been enemies will find themselves face to face, even after the conclusion of peace". (Parl. Papers, 67).

Count Andrassy also feared that if occupied by Russia for two years, Bulgaria would consider herself deprived of the enjoyment of her independence.

81

The full text read as follows:

"The duration of the occupation of the Principality of Bulgaria by the Russian Imperial troops is fixed at six months, to date from the conclusion of the definitive peace.

"The Imperial Russian Government undertakes to terminate within a further period of two or three months, or sooner, if it can be managed, the passage of its troops across Roumania and the complete evacuation of this Principality.

"If, contrary to all prevision, at the expiration of the term of six months the presence of the foreign auxiliary troops in Bulgaria should be considered, by common consent necessary, the Great Powers would supply contingents of which the total would amount to about 10,000 or 15,000 men; which contingents would be placed under the orders of the European Commission, and their maintenance would be at the expense of the country occupied" (Parl. Papers, 67).

To this Count Shuvalov offered practical objections in which Prince
 82
 Bismarck concurred . Lord Salisbury commented upon the difficulty of
 holding free elections in the presence of foreign troops, whereupon Count
 Shuvalov consented to postpone the election of the Prince of Bulgaria
 83
 until after the Russian departure . At this moment, when the prospect of
 reaching an agreement seemed somewhat remote, Count de Launay, the first
 Plenipotentiary of Italy, came forward and asked whether six months would
 not be sufficient for the evacuation of Roumelia, nine months for Bulgaria
 84
 and twelve months for complete evacuation . Count Shuvalov was favorably
 disposed toward the evacuation of Roumelia within six months, but only with
 the understanding that one year should be granted for the exit from Bul-
 85
 garia and Roumania . Count de Launay pointed out the expediency of a com-
 86
 promise upon this basis and an agreement was soon reached.

82
 Three objections were offered: 1. Count Andrassy was not taking into
 account the separation of Bulgaria by the frontier of the Balkans. 2. The
 period of six months for the evacuation of Bulgaria was far too short.
 3. Joint occupation by the Powers presented many difficulties. Count Shu-
 valov agreed that Eastern Roumelia might be evacuated within six months,
 since Turkish troops might take the place of the Russians. (Parl. Papers,
 67-68).

83

Parl. Papers, 69.

84

Ibid.

85

Ibid.

86.

Count Andrassy agreed rather reluctantly. (Ibid).

Thus the Greater Bulgaria of San Stefano had been partitioned as stipulated by the Secret Agreement of May 30. A government had been established and an understanding reached in regard to the duration of the Russian occupation. As to the territorial basis and the delimitation of frontiers, it appears that there was little difference of opinion, Russia readily making the desired concessions. However, the same cannot be said of the governmental organization and the withdrawal of the Russian troops. The discussion on the latter points had been marked by a sharp clash between England and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other. That there was mutual distrust no one can deny. Each was determined to circumscribe the actions of the other to the utmost, but, from the very nature of the case, neither was able to effect a complete realization of its policies. Consequently, reciprocal concessions were the result, and an amicable disposition was made of the most momentous question under consideration.

III.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Of the other questions under discussion, perhaps none was of so great importance and significance, from a European standpoint, as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These unfortunate provinces, conspicuously lacking in efficient organization and reeling under the burdens of Ottoman corruption and mismanagement, had been the scene of periodical disorders threatening the peace of Europe, and had witnessed the revolts which

had led up to the late war, for the settlement of which the Congress was now convened. Thus, the immediate problem before the Congress was to make such disposition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as would guarantee intelligent and systematic government in the future, and to place them in a position where they would cease to afford a constant menace to the tranquility of the continent.

To do this, it was absolutely necessary that they should be taken from the control of the Porte. Would this Congress, engaged in the work of maintaining the status quo, as far as possible, and thoroughly resolved to bolster up the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to Russian aggression, consent to dismemberment? Surely such an eventuality appeared utterly incongruous with the general program of the Congress, but the precedent for such a step had been taken. As early as July 8, 1876, Tsar Alexander of Russia and Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria had a conference at Reichstadt, at which it was tacitly understood that, in return for Austrian neutrality in the impending crisis between Russia and the Porte, the Habsburg Monarchy should receive Bosnia. On Jan. 18, 1877, this understanding was recemented and given more definite shape, and it was under these circumstances that

87

It appears that Russia was not altogether satisfied with the demands of Austria, since the Tsar's Government approached Bismarck as to the position he would assume in the event of war between Austria and Russia. The reply was evidently unfavorable since Russia began negotiating with Austria, in order to obtain her neutrality in the event of war with Turkey. (Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, op. cit., 150-154). Bismarck says: "The result of the unequivocally plain declaration that Gorchakov prevailed on his Sovereign to wrest from us, in order to prove to him the Platonic character of our love, was that the Russian storm passed from Eastern Galicia to the Balkans, and that Russia, in place of the negotiations with us which were broken off, began similar negotiations with Austria—first of all, so far as I remember at Pesth—in the sense of the settlement come to at Reichstadt, where the Emperors Alexander and Francis Joseph had met July 8, 1876, and requested that they should be kept secret from us. This Treaty, and not the Berlin Congress, is the foundation of the Austrian possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

88

the Tsar began the Russo-Turkish war .

Having humiliated the Porte, and forced it into submission, the Treaty of San Stefano was arranged in which the definite solution of the question was deferred, pending an understanding with Austria-Hungary.⁸⁹ The question now awaited the dispensation of the Congress. Could Austria justly claim her reward? She had maintained neutrality during the late war, but when Russia had hesitated before entering the Congress, the Dual Monarchy had mobilized her troops and demanded a larger portion of the spoils in return for her continued neutrality.⁹⁰ Although the Tsar probably felt that the Habsburgs were not acting in the best of faith, he realized, no doubt, the close understanding existing between England and Austria, and hence could not contest the claims of the latter power. Furthermore, the Romanov was sincerely desirous, as was all Europe, of rescuing the unfortunate territories from the Ottoman grasp. Thus, as we shall see, the Tsar's representatives offered no great objections to the steps taken by the Congress in behalf of the two provinces.

It was at the sitting of June 28, that the Bosnian question came up for discussion. Count Andrassy immediately read a lengthy memorandum, in which he depicted the Austrian position and interests in the matter. The attention of the Congress was called to the fact that, although the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, primarily, of concern to Austria-Hungary, it was not altogether void of European interest.⁹¹ It was there that the late war had

88

See Debidour, *op. cit.*, 502.

89

Hertslet, *op. cit.*, 2685.

90

For the mobilization see Driault, *op. cit.*, 230. For her new demands, see Debidour, *op. cit.*, 515.

91 Parl. Papers, 113.

had its inception. The prolonged insurrections had led to a continual exodus of population from the unfortunate provinces into the Habsburg Empire, with the result that there had been a severe drain upon the finances of the Danubian Monarchy.⁹² The frontier populations of the Empire had suffered untold hardships as a result of this unsettled state of affairs. Thus, Austria-Hungary would naturally welcome a guarantee of future stability.

The Treaty of San Stefano had attempted solution by the introduction of form of autonomy similar to that proposed by the Conference at Constantinople.⁹³ But Count Andrassy did not think that such an arrangement augured well for the future and for the peace of Europe. First of all, the antagonism and lack of harmony existing between the different religious elements offered insurmountable obstacles.⁹⁴ In the opinion of the Austrian Minister, the Sublime Porte would prove unequal to the task "of reuniting all these opposing elements in the mould of an autonomous administration".⁹⁵ The agrarian question would prove more than a match for the ingenuity of the Sultan, while the financial burdens would entail obligations capable of being assumed by none but the wealthiest States of Europe.⁹⁶ Finally,

⁹²
Ten millions of florins had been spent in their support.
Parl. Papers, 113.

⁹³
Ibid.

⁹⁴
"The population of these countries is composed of Mussulmans, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics, fanatical in their antagonism which divides them, and living not in separate districts, but pell-mell in the same localities, the same towns, the same villages". (Parl. Papers, 113).

⁹⁵
Ibid.

⁹⁶
All the real estate was in the hands of the Mussulmans, while the majority of the inhabitants consisted of Christian laborers. (Ibid).

the Habsburg Power could not overlook the geographical considerations connected with the future of the two provinces, since Austrian communication with the East demanded a favorable settlement of the matter. For these reasons, Count Andrassy would call the attention of the Congress to the imperative need of permanent arrangements⁹⁷. As a limitrophe Power, Austria could only accept a solution likely to prove durable and lasting, and which would alleviate the intolerable conditions of the past⁹⁸.

At this point the friendship and complete understanding between England and Austria was again made manifest. Lord Salisbury communicated to the Congress a proposition in which he voiced the sentiments which Count Andrassy had just expressed. The British Foreign Secretary perceived in the antagonism between Mussulman proprietors and peasant tenants the source of grave dangers for the future, which could only be avoided by the wise statesmanship and the strong arm of a Great Power⁹⁹. Nor did he lose sight of the geographical position of the provinces. Should they be entrusted to the care of Serbia or Montenegro, a chain of Slavic States would be formed across the Balkan Peninsula, which might easily prove a menace to the independence of the Porte¹⁰⁰. At the same time, England doubted seriously the ability of the Porte to administer, successfully, the turbulent territories, although, in 1875-1876, the Government at London had shown a decided disinclination to act in concert with the

97

Parl. Papers, 114.

98

Ibid.

99

Ibid.

100

Ibid. No doubt Lord Salisbury was also desirous of checkmating Russian expansion.

101

powers for the betterment of conditions .

But, in the meantime, the Cabinet at London had undergone a change of faith. Grateful to Austria for her (moral, at least) cooperation in checking the onward march of the "Slavic Peril", the English Ministry was quite willing that the Danubian Monarchy should share the spoils. Thus, under the guise of altruism, and shouting loudly her apprehensions of future dangers, should the Congress not take decided action, Lord Salisbury believed that the Sultan would show "evidence of the highest wisdom" should he part company with the ill-starred provinces and entrust them to the fostering care of another. Therefore, he proposed that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
102
occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.

Prince Bismarck and Prince Gorchakov, together with the Plenipotentiaries of France and Italy readily concurred in the English proposal, while the Austro-Hungarian representatives quite readily acquiesced in the decision
103
of the Congress in thus assigning to them such a momentous task .

Naturally, the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries disagreed, fundamentally, with the thesis of the whole program, and flatly refused to indorse Lord Salisbury's
104
proposition . At this point Prince Bismarck wielded his great influence in an endeavor to force the recalcitrant Turks into line. He pointed out that they should feel grateful to the powers for their efforts in the Porte's behalf, and that, without their intervention, Turkey would have been face to face with the Treaty of San Stefano, which would have alienated

101

"There would be great danger to be apprehended, both for the provinces and for the Porte, if the latter continued to occupy and administer them" Parl. Papers, 114.

102

Parl. Papers, 115.

103

Parl. Papers, 115-118.

104

Ibid.

105

from the Sultan the much more fertile Province of Eastern Roumelia .

Therefore the "Iron Chancellor" expressed the hope that, since the six Great Powers were agreed as to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the progress of their labors would not be retarded by the opposition of the

106

Porte.

The Powers having thus agreed as to the dispensation to be made of the two Provinces, it appeared that the matter would be quickly settled, despite the opposition of the Turk. But Austria-Hungary had one more ambition to realize. Extending southward between Serbia and Montenegro was a horn-like projection known as the Sandjak of Novibazar. At first sight, it might appear that such a small piece of territory was not of sufficient importance to come under consideration. But it contained certain latent possibilities, which, if taken advantage of, would prove of no inconsiderable value to the Danubian Monarchy. The Sandjak kept open the line of communication to Salonika, the goal which the Court at Vienna hoped some day to attain. Furthermore, by keeping apart the Serbians and Montenegrans, it made impossible the formation of a strong Slav State, which might prove a menace to Habsburg ambitions. Therefore, it behooved the Austrians to take such steps as would secure the lines of communication against

105

Continuing, Prince Bismarck explained that the resolutions for the High Assembly formed a total of which it was impossible to accept the advantages while repudiating the drawbacks. "The Porte, therefore, had nothing to gain by throwing aside the labors of the Congress, whilst refusing its agreement and whilst putting the Powers in the position of giving advice in their own interest as distinct from that of the Porte". (Parl. Papers, 118-119)

106

The Protocol was left open to include further instructions from the Porte. (Parl. Papers, 119).

any possible designs of the Turks or of the newly formed Slav States.

Thus, while not wishing to undertake the administration of Novibazar, the Austrian Plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of safeguarding the new political arrangements and the communication to the South, reserved the right to garrison the whole extent of the district¹⁰⁷. This met with the approval of all the Great Powers except Russia, which, in the person of Count Shuvalov, expressed its desire to confer with Count Andrassy as the effect such a move would have upon the frontiers and territorial extension of Serbia and Montenegro¹⁰⁸. As this afforded little or no difficulty, the Congress now awaited the decision of the Ottoman representatives, who, at the sitting of July 10, declared their intention to abide by the communication they had previously made¹⁰⁹. Later the Turks proposed an addition on the subject, reserving to the governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey the right of coming to an understanding on matters of detail¹¹⁰. This being accepted by the Congress, the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina was settled and the diplomats could turn their attention elsewhere.

Therefore, while of great importance from the standpoint of European interests, the question had been solved with little difficulty. The Powers were of one accord in wishing to entrust the care of the Provinces to a

107

"Nevertheless, in order to maintain the new political position—liberty and security for the means of communication, Austria-Hungary must reserve the right of garrison, and military and commercial roads along the whole extent of the district described as the ancient "Vilayet of Bosnia". (Parl. Papers, 118).

108

Parl. Papers, 119.

109

Parl. Papers, 256. This did not alter the provisions made by the Powers for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

110

Parl. Papers, 269.

firm hand. Austria appeared to be undertaking a stupendous task in engaging to administer the troublesome territories, but, since administrative occupation was to ripen later into full ownership, she has had ample reason to congratulate herself.

IV.

SERBIA

The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina naturally calls to mind that of Serbia. The problem here presented carried with it much less of general interest and importance than either of the others which the Congress had settled, and, hence, was readily disposed of. The chief points discussed were those of independence, commercial and consular regulations, and the delimitation of frontiers.

111

The Treaty of San Stefano had recognized the independence of Serbia, and it seemed improbable that the Congress would alter this provision. Bismarck materially helped the Serbs when he announced it inadmissible that Turkey should now withhold the assent she had given on this point.
112
at San Stefano. Little difficulty was experienced in securing the recognition of Serbian independence. There were, however, differences of opinion on matters of detail. Lord Salisbury recognized the independence of the Principality, and favored a clause guaranteeing religious liberty. Waddington, likewise, recognized her independence, on the condition of legal

111

Hertslet, op. cit., 2676.

112

Caratheodory Pasha, the Turk, had just made ~~known~~ some observations in which he conveyed the impression that, under Turkish suzerainty, Serbia had enjoyed "de facto" independence. (Parl. Papers, 119)

and political equality, regardless of creed¹¹³. The principle of religious liberty met the approval of Gorchakov, but he emphatically condemned¹¹⁴ the idea of granting full civil and political rights to the Jews of Serbia. However, the Russian Chancellor did not persist in his objections, so that¹¹⁵ the difficulty was easily adjusted.

The question of commercial liberty and consular jurisdiction occasioned little dispute. Upon the introduction of a proposal by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, and Italy, the Congress voted for the maintenance of the status quo, pending the ratification of new commercial arrangements, and for the non-abridgement of the right of consular jurisdiction¹¹⁶. Attention now turned to a consideration of the frontiers. Strange as it may seem, Baron de Haymerle of Austria proposed that Serbia¹¹⁷ should be favored with an increase of territory. The explanation of

113

He introduced the following proposition: "The inhabitants of the Principality of Serbia, of whatever religion, shall enjoy a complete equality of rights. They may offer themselves as candidates for all public offices, functions, and honors, and may practice in all professions, and difference of creed shall not be brought against them as reason for exclusion

"The exercise and open practice of all rituals shall be entirely free and no hindrance shall be allowed to be offered, either to the hierarchical organizations of the different communions or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs" (Parl. Papers, 119-120).

114

He distinguished between the Jews of Western Europe and those of the Balkans where they were a real scourge to the native population. (Parl. Papers, 120).

115

Ibid.

116

Parl. Papers, 121.

117

Ibid.

this stand by the Habsburgs is not entirely apparent, but it, very probably, foreshadowed their later policy of tacitly supporting Serbia as a check to Russian ambitions in Bulgaria. No division of opinion appeared on Haymerle's proposal, but, since it was impossible to arrange the delimitation of frontiers in the full session of the Congress, a Commission, composed of one representative from each Power was to trace the boundaries in private sessions. The result of their labors was later reported, and it developed that Mali-Zwornik and Sakhar were given to Serbia, while Prepolac¹¹⁸ was given to Turkey.

V.

MONTENEGRO

Closely associated with Serbia was the question of Montenegro, and, indeed the provisions of the Congress in regard to the two States were very similar. The discussion centered chiefly about the delimitation of frontiers and the question of independence. Although lacking in the spir-

ited rivalry which had characterized the discussion of the Bulgarian question, the problem was not without interest, as shown by the sharp conflict of opinion between the Porte and the other Powers concerned.

The boundary question was introduced at the sitting of July 1, when Haymerle proposed a territorial aggrandizement, similar to that of Serbia .
 It was on this point that the disapproval of the Turk was manifested.
 Count Shuvalov having announced that the representatives of Russia and Austria had reached an understanding upon the general principles of the boundary, Caratheodory Pasha made known the objections of the Porte to the extension of the frontier too much in the direction of Albania. Although he did not hesitate at parting with Spizza, he would look with disfavor upon the cession of Antivari to Montenegro, since that would involve the new State in difficulties with the Albanians, the rightful owners of Antivari . Had the Porte, in the past, been recognized as the champion of

119
 The boundary commission was to define the boundaries. (Parl. Papers, 156).

120

Ibid.

121

To this Count Shuvalov replied that the first Ottoman Plenipotentiary was not aware of the limits proposed by Austria and Russia. He hoped Turkey would be satisfied, since they gave back part of the territory the Porte had conceded at San Stefano. (Parl. Papers, 156).

nationalism and the freedom of the races, these words might not have fallen upon deaf ears, but coming, as they did, from the most intolerant of masters, they failed to make an impression.

At the sitting of July 4, the report of the Boundary Commission was presented. Antivari was to be given to Montenegro, Dulcigno to Turkey, and Spizza to Austria Hungary¹²². But there was another power whose wishes had not been consulted. Italy possessed very material interests which were at stake in the Adriatic, and Count de Launay inquired as to the motives back of the Austrian retention of Spizza. In reply, Haymerle assured him that the Habsburg Power was actuated solely by a desire to maintain the purely commercial character of the port of Antivari, for which the control of Spizza was absolutely necessary. Caratheodory Pasha protested long and loudly against the annexation to Montenegro, of territories inhabited by Mussulmans and Catholic Albanians, and observed the inconvenience which the loss of Antivari would cause to the Porte¹²³. However, his protests were in vain. The report of the Boundary Commission was referred to the Drafting Committee and the discussion turned to a consideration of Montenegrin independence.

By the Treaty of San Stefano, the Porte recognized definitively the independence of Montenegro¹²⁴. Lord Salisbury observed that England had never recognized its independence and demanded the suppression of the word "definitively". However, the exchange of opinion upon the point revealed the fact that the other Powers had, in one way or another, recognized the independence of the Principality, whereupon Bismarck declared the incident closed¹²⁵ and referred the article to the Drafting Committee. Baron Haymerle

¹²²

Parl. Papers, 181. Navigation of the Boyana was to be free to Montenegro.

¹²³ Parl. Papers, 182.

¹²⁴ Hertslet, op. cit., 2675.

¹²⁵ Parl. Papers, 157.

then introduced a resolution providing for religious liberty, while Lord Salisbury read an additional article relating to property in the annexed territory . Both were promptly referred to the drafting committee, thereby bringing the Montenegrin question to a close.

Thus one more inroad had been made upon the possessions of the Porte and another independent state had appeared upon the European stage. Europe, aside from the Porte, was beginning to depart from the time honored custom of maintaining Ottoman integrity. With the exception of the Turk, there had been little difference of opinion, and the Tsar had witnessed another vindication of his stand at San Stefano.

VI.

ROUMANIA

We pass now to the problem of Roumania. The discussion of this

126

Baron Haymerle's resolution read as follows: "All the inhabitants of Montenegro shall enjoy full and entire liberty in the exercise and in the public observances of their religious worship, and no obstacle shall be placed in the way either of the hierarchical organization of the different communions or of their relations with their spiritual head".

The following is Lord Salisbury's draft: "All the inhabitants of the territory annexed to Montenegro shall preserve their property and those who may fix their personal place of abode out of the Principality shall be able to preserve their real estate, either by letting it to, or having it administered by others.

"A Turco-Montenegrin Commission will be charged with regulating, for a period of three years, everything relating to the mode of alienation, and of management of lands, or of use on account of the Porte of State property and of pious foundations" (Parl. Papers, 157).

question was marked by more bitterness than had characterized the debates upon Serbia and Montenegro, Bessarabian retrocession bringing to light again the Anglo-Russian rivalry. The Congress concerned itself, for the most part, with the admission of the Roumanian representatives to the sessions, and with the independence of the Principality, with which Bessarabia was inextricably bound up.

England heartily favored the admission of the Roumanian representatives to the Congress, just as she had demanded the admission of the Greeks.¹²⁷ Therefore, on June 29, Lord Salisbury introduced a proposal to that effect. Andrassy, Corti, and Waddington immediately accepted the English proposal,¹²⁸ but Bismarck and the Russian Plenipotentiaries, at first objected. Later, however, seeing they were alone in their objections, and not wishing to interfere with the speedy conclusion of the labors of the Congress, withdrew their protests and Bismarck announced his intention to invite the Roumanian delegates.¹²⁹

The next point to be considered was that of the independence of the Principality. Article V. of the Treaty of San Stefano had specified that the Porte recognized the independence of Roumania.¹³⁰ Bessarabia had been taken from the new state in exchange for the less valuable Dobrudscha, but the Roumanians refused to acknowledge the validity of the act. The question

127

"Lord Salisbury, calling to mind the question he put at the last meeting, proposes to decide whether the representatives of Roumania shall be heard by the Congress. In the opinion of his Excellency, the High Assembly, after listening to the delegates of a nation which demands foreign provinces, would act fairly in listening to the representatives of a Country which seeks to retain territories which belong to it." (Parl. Papers, 135).

128 "Prince Bismarck does not think that the admission of the Roumanians presents, from the point of view of the success of the labors of the Congress, the same interest as the admission of the Greeks, whose demands, whatever might result from them, could not have very considerable influence on the issue of the deliberations of the Congress". (Ibid).

129

Ibid.

130 Hertslet, op.cit., 2678.

confronting the Congress was whether or not the independence of the Principality should be subordinated to a territorial redistribution .¹³¹

Count Corti thought it should not, while Count Shuvalov thought it should,¹³² which was only natural, since Russia had received Bessarabia . Lord Beaconsfield protested loudly against the retrocession of Bessarabia, as a violation of the Treaty of Paris, and an infringement upon the free navigation of the Danube .¹³³ He added, however, that the affair was not of sufficient concern to Great Britain to warrant the use of force.¹³⁴

Prince Gorchakov came forth with the observation that he could not see what influence the retrocession of Bessarabia would have upon the free navigation of the Danube, and since Russia could not give way on this point ,¹³⁵ he hoped Lord Beaconsfield would not persist in his objections . Thereupon, Shuvalov, in a somewhat lengthy speech, gave a clear cut explanation of the Russian case and the motives guiding Russian policy, in which Bismarck¹³⁶ thoroughly agreed. The distinguished Russian diplomat believed that for the Roumanians really to maintain their independence and integrity, they must

131

Parl. Papers, 136.

132

Ibid.

133

Ibid.

134

Ibid.

135 Parl. Papers, 137.

136

Ibid.

cease to live upon the spoils of Russia, which had a legitimate right to
 137
 reclaim Bessarabia . Therefore, Count Shuvalov thought the interests of
 ed
 of all concern, demanded the retrocession of Bessarabia to the Tsar. The
 Roumanian representatives were admitted to the session of July 1, and gave
 an analysis of the Roumanian position, in which they explained their
 claims to Bessarabia and the grief its retrocession would bring to the
 138
 people of Roumania . M. Waddington now proposed that the Congress should
 grant the independence of Roumania on the same condition as that of Ser-
 139
 bia . This was adhered to by all the Great Powers except Russia, whose
 140
 acceptance was conditioned by the retrocession of Bessarabia . After
 a brief exchange of opinion upon this point, the President announced that
 the Congress recognized the independence of Roumania upon the same condi-
 tions as had been imposed upon Serbia, and upon the further condition that
 141
 Roumania should accept the Dobrudscha in exchange for Bessarabia .

Another of the difficulties confronting the Congress had been settled ,
 and again the Porte's dominions had suffered material diminution. But while
 Russia might look with satisfaction and complacency as the Turk retraced
 his footprints toward Asia, her conduct in regard to Bessarabia had alien-
 ated the affections of an ally and changed Roumania into a bitter enemy.

137

Parl. Papers, 137.

138

One of the Roumanian representatives had the following to say:
 "We are of opinion that in strict justice no portion of its present ter-
 ritory ought to be taken away". (Parl. Papers, 151).
 M. Bratiano said: "I beg simply to add that the withdrawal of a part of our
 inheritance would be a matter of profound grief to the the Roumanians, and
 it would destroy in her the confidence in the efficiency of Treaties and in
 the observation both of natural equity and written law" (Parl. Papers, 153).

139

Ibid.

140

Parl. Papers, 155.

141

Ibid. A small amount of territory was added to southern Dobrudscha.

VII.

ASIA MINOR

The one remaining consideration engaging the attention of the Congress was that of Asia Minor. As we noticed in the previous chapter, the advance of the Tsar's forces upon the possessions of the P^orte and the consequent threat to British interests in the east, more than aught else, had aroused the fears of the English Cabinet and led to conclusion of the Secret Agreements, particularly the one with Turkey.

England had secured the desired concessions in Bulgaria as outlined by the Agreement of May 30. But this Agreement had not been so explicit in regard to Russian concessions in Asia Minor. The Tsar had agreed to restore only the valley of the Alachkerd and the town of Bayazid to Turkey on the condition that the P^orte should return the territory of Khotour to Persia. Indeed, this was no inconsiderable admission on the part of the Romanov, since the valley of the Alachkerd carried with it great commercial considerations and advantages. By virtue of the Cyprus Convention, England was prepared to accept these terms, but she would not do so until further efforts had proved futile. Thus, the discussion resolved itself into a conflict between England and Russia, with the result that the latter conceded another very important point.

It was July 6, that the debate began, and the future of Ardahan and Kars at once occupied the attention of the diplomats. Lord Salisbury pictured the evil influence which Russian possession of these places would have upon the Ottoman Empire, and declared that, should the Tsar persist in his intention, England would reserve the right to guarantee her own interests by whatever means she considered expedient, a step for which the Cyprus

142

Convention had well prepared her .

The Tsar refused to meet the English desire on this point, but Prince Gorchakov announced the concession of Erzeroum, Bayazid and the valley of the Alachkerd, the latter being the location of the chief caravan and commercial routes to Asia . Thus far, the Russians had only complied with the stipulations of the Secret Agreement. However, the wrath of England was further appeased when the Russians announced that they would declare Batoum a free port, a step favorable to the commercial interests of Great Britain . Prince Bismarck then wielded his great influence in the interest of peace by expressing the hope that the British Government would be satisfied with the concessions of Russia. Lord Beaconsfield was able to express gratification at the conduct of Russia, but, at the same time, he preferred that Batoum, in becoming a free port, should not be comprised in Russian territory, and expressed the hope that the Congress would diligently inquire into the details of the situation . Bismarck, however, did not see the occasion for alarm, and was agreeably surprised that the distance separating the representatives of the two Powers was so small.

The German Chancellor then had recorded that the Tsar consented to the retrocession of "Bayazid and the territory as far as the Saganlough",

143
Parl. Papers, 207.

144
Ibid.

145
Ibid.

146
Parl. Papers, 207-208.

147
Parl. Papers, 208-209.

whereupon Count Shuvalov suggested the substitution of "Bayazid and all the valley of the Alachkerd," with the reservation that Turkey should return the territory of Khotour to Persia .

At the sitting of July 8, Article XVIII. of the Treaty of San Stefano, which related to Khotour, came up for discussion, and the Persian representative was introduced to the Congress . Nothing definite was done at this session, but on July 10, the Turks declared the willingness of the Porte to restore the town and territory of Khotour to Persia . On July 9, the Russians announced that Batoum was made a free port , while at meeting of July 10, the Boundary Commission announced the settlement of questions of detail relating to the frontier of the district of Batoum, thereby removing the last difficulty in the matter .

With the settlement of the conflict of Anglo-Russian interests in Asia Minor, the really important work of the Congress was finished. In making Batoum a free port the Tsar had exceeded the stipulations wrung from him in the Agreement of May 30, and had thereby aided in bringing about a speedy solution of the difficulties. However, by retaining Kars and Ardahan, he had made operative the Cyprus Convention, which England had signed with Turkey, and when, on July 8, this fact was proclaimed to an astonished world, Great Britain took her place as the arbiter of the eastern Mediterranean .

148

Parl. Papers, 209.

149

Parl. Papers, 224. He was Malcolm Khan. He merely expressed the readiness of his Government to submit to the decision of the Congress.

150

Parl. Papers, 251.

151

Parl. papers, 239.

152

Parl. Papers, 251.

153

Hertslet, op. cit., 2720.

CONCLUSION

A study of the diplomacy of the Congress of Berlin, necessarily, calls for a brief review of the work of the Congress and some notice of its more important features. In this connection, three aspects of the situation present themselves for consideration, namely, the changes wrought in the map of Europe, the alignment of the Powers on vital questions, and the significance of the Congress in the history of the Eastern Question.

Three new members had been admitted to the family of European nations, while other territories had been wrested from the domination of the P^orte. Although Montenegro's hopes of territorial gain had not been fully realized, she had, at last, reached the sea at Antivari. The Serbians, likewise, had aggrandized themselves, but they, too, had certain grievances. Feeling that their cooperation in the late war with Turkey merited more considerate treatment than they had received at the hands of the Tsar, the Serbians turned for a time, toward Austria, and this, together with Russian activities in the new Bulgaria formed the basis of Balkan political activity of the next decade. But Serbia was not alone in her resentment of Russian ingratitude. Roumania had rendered valiant service to the Russians, only to see Bessarabia torn from her in exchange for the Dobrudscha, which they did not want. Although this imprudence on the part the Tsar forced the new state to place its reliance upon Austria and the new Triple Alliance, it should be said, in justice to Russia, that this was small compensation for the sacrifices the Romanov had made. Of equal importance were the spoils which

fell to Austria. Neutrality had netted the Habsburg much more, in proportion to the effort, than the Tsar had gained as the result of a successful war. Nor was that all. In entrusting the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ^{the} Dual Monarchy, Serbian nationality had been disregarded, and, on that day, was planted the germ of discontent, the fruits of which have not been entirely reaped.

Less significant, perhaps, but equally interesting, was the division of the Powers on important questions. Throughout, the Congress was one long story of Anglo-Russian rivalry and antipathy. From the very nature of the ideals and motives actuating their policies, there was a sharp conflict of interest on practically every point. Each had a definite program to maintain, England to bolster up the Ottoman Empire and throw every conceivable obstacle in the path of the Tsar, Russia to make the utmost possible inroads upon the integrity of the Porte's dominions.

Equally patent is it that a clear understanding, not to say agreement, existed between the representatives of England and Austria-Hungary. This was presaged by Lord Salisbury's letter of instruction to Lord Russell, and the reciprocal support accorded the policies of each, testifies to the solidarity of their interests in this particular crisis. If the Russian advance into the Balkan Peninsula was incompatible with British interests, so was it opposed to the Austrian program of expansion to the Aegean.

While Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Austrian relations have been so well understood, the same cannot be said as to the position of Bismarck. The impression seems to have spread abroad that the German Chancellor played a very ungrateful and faithless part with Russia. Viewed from the standpoint of the Russian Chancellor, and certain influential Russian newspapers, this

is undoubtedly true. If to be grateful, Bismarck was expected to support every Russian proposal, at the expense, and to the detriment of the other Powers concerned, then he was guilty of base ingratitude. But, on the other hand, if he were expected to maintain an attitude of fairness and impartiality, such as was fitting to the President of a great European Congress, then his efforts were rewarded with a full measure of success.

A careful perusal of the various sittings of the Congress reveals the fact that, on a number of occasions, Bismarck and the Russian Plenipotentiaries stood in an, apparently, hopeless minority, not the least of which were the "Iron Chancellor's support of Count Shuvalov's amendments on the Bulgarian question, and his hearty approval of the Russian stand in the Anglo-Russian conflict over Asia Minor.¹ Furthermore, at different times, when the chances of an agreement seemed most remote, the German Chancellor had wielded his enormous influence to induce the English and Austrians to meet Russia half way and effect a compromise. But this was not sufficient. The Tsar had observed rigid neutrality in 1866 and again in 1870, during an age in which neutrality carried with it a just reward. Russia expected this compensation in 1878, in the form of moral or active support from Germany. Instead of this, Bismarck had observed the strictest neutrality, playing, as he himself said, the part of an honest broker, harmonizing the conflicting interests of the chief disputants. At this, the Russians were sorely disappointed, and hence the bitter storm of denunciation which they have since heaped upon the Hohenzollerns.

¹

For these, see Parl. Papers, 49 and 207.

Finally, it becomes our task to place an estimate upon the work of the Congress. That it should have utterly disregarded the principle of nationality by dividing the Bulgarian nation and by giving over Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria Hungary, does not speak well for the foresight^{of} the diplomats there assembled. That the provisions of the Treaty should have been violated by the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, in 1885, and by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1908, is no tribute to the permanent value of the work of the Congress. Whatever else these changes may indicate, they seem to demonstrate the fact that the Congress was not attempting a final solution of the Eastern Question. Surely, a body of able diplomats, intent upon relegating this troublesome question to the past, would not have entrusted Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria for an indefinite period, would not have sanctioned the arbitrary division of Bulgaria, and would not have placed the stamp of approval upon the English occupation of Cyprus. Thus, it would appear, that the best we can say for the Congress, is that it was a temporary makeshift; that, by harmonizing the Treaty of San Stefano with European interests, it averted a disastrous war; and that it was simply postponing the inevitable conflict until the, not very distant, future.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

One attempting to write of the diplomacy of the Congress of Berlin immediately finds his course beset with difficulties, not the least of which is the paucity of material. Although the period was prolific of diplomatic negotiations, much of the documentary evidence remains unpublished, and, until such time as it shall become available, many points must necessarily remain unexplained. Thus it has not been the aim of this paper to shed a considerable amount of new light upon the situation, or to make startling revelations regarding the policies of the Powers, but it is hoped that the work will present a connected narrative of what is to be found in the more or less disjointed account of writers in the different languages.

PRIMARY MATERIAL

Of the primary material used in this thesis, British Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 39, 1878, have been invaluable. They contain a complete record of the various sessions of the Congress, including the position of the Powers on every important question. They fail, however, to reveal the inner workings of the Congress, since policies were predetermined behind the scenes. Parliamentary Papers have been ably supplemented by Hertslet, Sir Edward, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV. ; London, 1891. Indeed, his work has been indispensable, as he gives the diplomatic correspondence between England and Russia, showing the various steps leading up to the Congress. It, too, has its shortcomings in that it does not sufficiently indicate the nature of Anglo-Austrian or Austro-Russian relations. The Reflections

and Reminiscences of Otto Prince Von Bismarck, Vol. III.; Leipzig, 1899, has the merits, as well as the demerits, of a work written to justify a career. As a history of the period it fails, but, nevertheless, it succeeds in presenting the broad outlines of Bismarckian diplomacy, particularly, his relations with Austria and Russia. The Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe Schillingfuerst, Vol. II.; New York, 1906, are of value in showing the alleged gravity of the situation confronting the Congress. The London Times, June, 1878, like all newspaper sources, has numerous sidelights on public opinion, particularly, its reaction toward the Secret Agreement. Avril, Adolph, Negociations relatifs au traite de Berlin et aux arrangements qui en ont suivi, 1875-1886; Paris, 1906, and Holland, T.E. The European Concert in the Eastern Question; Oxford, 1885, contain many source extracts, the greater number of which are, however, available in Hertslet.

SECONDARY MATERIAL

Of the secondary material, Debidour, A., Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, T. II.; Paris, 1891 has been the most valuable. It is, on the whole, the most comprehensive study of the diplomacy of the period. Other writers have made little progress in advance of Debidour, and, indeed, several of them have made valuable use of his work. Bourgeois, E., Manuel Historique de Politique Etrangere; Paris, 1910 gives a well-rounded treatment of the diplomacy of the years, 1875-1878, being more detailed on some points than Debidour. Driault, E., La Question d'Orient; Paris, 1904 has been valuable

chiefly in corroborating Debidour. It is a clear, concise account of the entire history of the Eastern Question. Bamberg, Geschichte orientalische Angelegenheiten; Berlin, 1891 is written from the German point of view and, in general, stresses military rather than diplomatic history.

Dupuis, Charles, Le Principe d'Equilibre et le Concert Europeen; Paris, 1909, is a very general treatment, its chief contribution being the light which it throws upon the negotiations between Count Shuvalov and Bismarck, in behalf of a Russo-German alliance. Last, but not least, Thompson, G.C., Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875-1880, Vol. II., London, 1886 has been of great service in working up the Secret Agreements, but beyond that it is of little value.

While Anglo-Russian relations are revealed through Parliamentary Papers and through the Despatches contained in Hertzel, the position of Austria Hungary is often not clear, due to the inaccessibility of the Austrian foreign correspondence (Austria, Ministerium der Aussern, Actenstücke aus den correspondenzen des Ministerium über orientalische angelegenheiten, 1873-1881; Wien, 1881). Unfortunately, to date, there exists no work in English, dealing solely with the Congress of Berlin. The best treatments are to be found in general works, the chief of which are Rose, J. Holland, The Developement of the European Nations, 1870-1900; London, 1905, Duggan, S.P.H., The Eastern Question, A Study in Diplomacy; New York, 1902, and Murray, W.S., The Making of the Balkans; New York, 1910. Of these, Rose is,

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perhaps, the best balanced and most comprehensive study, as Murray is conspicuously lacking in his treatment of the Congress itself, while Duggan fails to do justice to the Secret Agreements. Finally, the other general works on this period, such as Andrews, The Development of Modern Europe; New York, 1906, the Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII.; New York, 1910, and Low and Sanders, The Political History of England, Vol. XII.; London, 1907, contain little of value on the Congress of Berlin.

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