ANTONY'S ORIENTAL POLICY UNTIL THE DEFEAT
OF THE PARTHIAN EXPEDITION

by

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CHAPTER I.

Antony's First Experience in the Orient.

For a comprehensive study of Antony's relations to the Orient, it is necessary to take up in some detail the proconsulship of Gabinus in Syria, for it was as commander of the cavalry that Antony first became acquainted with the problems of the land which was to play so important a part in his later life. At the expiration of his consulship, Gabinus succeeded to Syria (57 B.C.). On account of the disturbed conditions there, Rome began to appoint for this country proconsuls with the power to levy troops and to engage in war. The first of these sent out was Gabinus.¹ When en route for his province, he was joined by Antony as commander of the cavalry.²

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1. Appian, Syr. 51. Appian, however, cannot always be relied upon for constitutional matters. Vid. Shürer, Hist. Jews, p. 330 n. 2.

2. Plut., Ant. 3. For some time Antony had been embroiled in the disturbances of Clodius, but had left Italy for Greece to escape trouble from the combinations forming against Clodius at Rome, and was spending his time in military training and the practice of oratory. Coming at this time, the offer seemed most opportune, but Antony refused on the ground that he did not wish to join the expedition in a private capacity. On his appointment as commander of the horse, Antony accepted and set sail with Gabinus.

Their military campaign lay in Judaea.³ Until the time of Pompey, Rome had not directly interfered in Jewish affairs. The relation of socius atque amicus had been established as early as 166 B.C. when Judas Maccabeus, to strengthen his position as first Hasmonean ruler, sent an embassy to Rome to form an alliance with that but vaguely known people, which was beginning to exert such a powerful influence in the East.⁴ Rome, on her part, was glad to receive as a socius a people who had held out so successfully against the troublesome Antiochus, provided that such an alliance entailed no more definite aid than prestige of the Roman name. Accordingly, until the time of Pompey, Rome had contented herself with vague alliances,⁵ but by playing one party against another, she was imperceptibly establishing her influence as predominate.

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3. Conditions in Judaea are given in detail, for the abundant source material shows many phases of Roman policy and provincial administration not so well preserved in the records of other nations of the East.

4. I Macc. 8,17; Joseph., Antiq. Jud. XII, 5,8.

5. Jonathan (I Macc. XII,1; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIII, 5,8.) and Simon (I Macc. XIV,16; XV, 15-24; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIII, 5,8.) renewed the alliance. John Hyrcanus not only renewed the alliance, but after a second appeal gained actual interference from Rome in favor of Judaea, in that the senate

On the defeat of Antiochus and the establishment of Syria as a province, Rome changed her policy in regard to Judaea and interfered more openly in its affairs. There seem to have been three distinct parties in Judaea: the Sadducees or Hellenizing aristocracy, distinctly pro-Roman in sentiment; the Pharisees, democratic, religious, and somewhat pacifist in tendency; and the zealots or nationalists, strongly pro-Parthian in sympathy.⁶ At the head of the pro-Roman party was Antipater,⁷ a native of Idumea (Idum) of which he was military governor,⁸ friend and minister of Hyrcanus II,⁹ a man who had already recognized Rome as a potent factor in Jewish affairs, a factor in which lay his chief hope for the realization of his own ambitious designs. Thruout Antipater's entire career, he always came forward as the champion of Roman interests

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ordered Antiochus to restore territory taken in war (Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIII, 2,2sq; XIV, 8,3sq.) Aristobulus and Alexander Jannaeus were able to maintain their power without Roman alliance (Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIII, 11,1sq.).

6. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms. p.216. For a detailed history of the development of the anti-Hellenistic Jews with Pharisees see Hereford, Phar. pp. 1-57; Radin, p. 156, says he does not believe ^{the} Pharisees were related to or ^a continuation of ^{the} anti-Hellenic Hasadim.

7. Nicolaus of Damascus, F G H. Vol. III, p. 417.

8. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 8,1; Bell. Jud. I, 6,2.

9. Ibid.

in Judaea. His first opportunity came in the civil war between Hyrcanus, the legitimate heir, and his younger but more capable brother, Aristobulus. Backed by the nationalists, Aristobulus had gained the kingdom and the high priesthood,¹⁰ and had reduced Hyrcanus to the standing of a private citizen.¹¹

Antipater recognized this opportunity and came to his aid. Hyrcanus re-engaged in the struggle with no little success,¹² but before the quarrel was settled, the Roman general Scaurus appeared in Syria. Each contestant sent an embassy to him with the promise of 400 talents for a favorable decision. Aristobulus succeeded in establishing his power through the influence of Scaurus who felt that Aristobulus was the wealthier of the two claimants and consequently the more able to fulfill his promises.¹³ No one regarded the matter as settled, however, for when Pompey arrived in Damascus (B.C. 64) there was a renewal of the embassies from Hyrcanus and Aristo-

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10. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 3,1; Bell. Jud. XX, 10.

11. Ibid. XIV, 1,2; Bell. Jud. I, 6,1.

12. Ibid. XIV, 2,1-2.

13. Ibid. XIV, 2,3.

bulus.¹⁴ Pompey showed himself a better judge of conditions in Judaea as well as a truer exponent of Roman policy by supporting the weaker party, lest later on he should find in the ambitious Aristobulus a man unwilling to submit to Rome's domination in the internal affairs of Judaea. The influence of the politic Antipater must have had weight with Pompey in his decision. Aristobulus, however, defied the Roman authority. He made his final stand on the Temple Mount where he was besieged for three months, until, by an attack on the Sabbath, the fortress fell and the Holy City came under a Roman commander.¹⁵

At Pompey's command the city walls were destroyed and Jerusalem and the surrounding territory made tributary.¹⁶ The Hellenistic cities of Coele-Syria were taken from Judaea and added to the province of Syria.¹⁷ The contracted Jewish territory was given to Hyrcanus II,

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14. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 3,2.

15. Ibid. XIV, 4,2-4; Bell. Jud. I, 7,3-5; Dio, XXXVII, 16; Strabo, 16, 2,40; Liv. Epit. 102; Tac. Hist. V,9; Appian, Syr. 50; Mith. 106.

16. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4,4; Bell. Jud. I,7,6. The tribute was levied on the Jews as a people, not on Hyrcanus as a ruler. Ibid. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4,4sq; Bell. Jud. I,7,6; Dio, XXXIX, 56,6.

17. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV,4,4; Bell. Jud. I, 7,6-7.

who was recognized as high priest without the title of king.¹⁸ Judaea itself seems to have been under the general supervision of the Syrian proconsul.¹⁹ Pompey took Aristobulus and his children as prisoners to Rome where they were used in his triumph.²⁰ Pompey had not crushed the nationalist party, however. Alexander, the son of Aristobulus had escaped from Pompey. At the coming of Gabinius, (57 B.C.) he was rallying the anti-Roman element to his standard with great success. Indeed he had gone so far as to come to Jerusalem and to begin to rebuild the walls. On hearing that Gabinius was advancing in Judaea, Alexander quickly assembled and armed his forces and fortified Alexandrium, Hyrcanium, and Macherus.²¹ Gabinius sent Antony in advance to arm the pro-Roman Jews and the Idumeans whom Antipater had collected in persuance of his policy of establishing his own position firmly by making himself indispensable to the Romans.²² Through

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18. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV,4,4; Bell. Jud. I,7,6-7.

19. Amm. Marc. XIV, 8,12; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 79.

20. Ibid. XIV,4,5; Bell. Jud. I,7,7. According to Morrison, Jews under Roman Rule p. 37, Psalm VIII, 16-26 refers to Pompey.

21. Ibid. XIV,6,2; Bell. Jud. I,8,2; Zonar. V,7.

22. Hegissip. I,19. Cf. article Gabinius in Pauly-Wissowa.

the confidence that Gabinius thus placed in him, Antony was enabled to become acquainted with the leaders of the pro-Roman Jews. Josephus says that he even formed a guest friendship with Antipater at this time.²³ When Gabinius came up, Alexander was defeated in battle near Jerusalem and retreated with what remained of his forces to Alexandrium.²⁴ For his distinguished services in the first attack on this fortress, Gabinius left Antony in charge of the siege while he himself made a tour of Judaea.²⁵ On his return the siege was pressed with vigor until Alexandrium surrendered.²⁶ In this campaign Antony had had an opportunity to learn the political factions at work in Judaea, to see the advantage to Rome in fostering the interests of the Idumean family, and in Gabinius's subsequent reorganization of Judaea, to observe the methods

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23. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV,13,1. The fortress of Alexandrium was situated on one of the mountains somewhere between Jerusalem and Scythopolis. It seems probable that it can be located as the ruins on Qarn Sartabeh. Cf. Schmidt, Alexandrium, Journal of Bibl. Lit. 78 sq.

24. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV,13,1; Bell. Jud. I, 8,3; Zonar.V,7.

25. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV,5,3; Bell. Jud. I,8,4. On this tour Gabinius gave orders for the rebuilding of such cities as had been destroyed. Among them were Samaria, Ashdod, Scythopolis, Anthedron, Raphia, and Dora.

26. Ibid. XIV,5,4; Bell. Jud. I,8,5.

of organization employed by a Roman governor in his provincial administration.

In this work Gabinius followed the policy established by Pompey, that of reducing the large powers that were developing by breaking their territory up into smaller units.²⁷ Accordingly he divided Judaea into five districts with a Sanhedrin²⁸ in each, which held the governing power.²⁹ Hyrcanus was deprived of political power and as high priest dictated to the Jews in religious matters alone. Rome was always opposed to small theocratic states having extensive territory governed and taxed by the priests of the Temple. Strabo³⁰ cites several other instances of this Roman policy of diminishing the power and privileges of the priest.³¹

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27. Hegissip. I, 19.

28. Joseph. Antiq. Jud., XIV, 5,4. This is the first mention of the Sanhedrin in Josephus. The supreme court of justice had probably been called the Sanhedrin for some time, but after the settlement of Gabinius the court at Jerusalem was known as the "Great Sanhedrin" as a distinguishing mark. Cf. Hastings, Dict. Bib. IV, p. 397, Art. Sanhedrin.

29. The capitols were at Jerusalem, Amathus, Jericho, Sapphoris and Gadara. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 5,4. For a summary of the reorganization of Judaea vid. Sands, Rom. Client Princes, Appendix A, XV.

30. Strabo, XII, 8, 14; XII, 3, 37.

31. Cf. Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 227.

The anti-Roman element was still restive.

Under the leadership of Aristobulus, who had escaped from Rome, a second revolt arose. Pitholaus, who had been a Roman lieutenant at Jerusalem, deserted to him with 1000 men. Their first plan was to fortify Alexandrium, but at the advance of the Roman forces under Sisenna, Servilius, and Antony, Aristobulus retreated to Macherus,³² the second fortress of Judaea after Jerusalem according to Pliny.³³ Here again Antony distinguished himself for valiant conduct.³⁴ Aristobulus was taken prisoner and sent back to Rome.³⁵ With the anti-Roman Jews temporarily in check, Gabinius turned his attention toward the Parthians.³⁶

Mithridates, king of Parthia, had declared war on Armenia to regain Gordyene,³⁷ Since this territory had been granted to Armenia by Pompey, such action was an encroach-

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32. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 1; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 6.

33. N. H. V, 72.

34. Plut., Ant. 3; Hegesipp. I, 19-20.

35. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 1; Bell. Jud. 18, 6; Zonar. V, 7; Dio, XXXIX, 56, 6; Strabo, XVII, 11, 11.

36. Since Gabinius did not complete his Parthian campaign, the discussion of the Parthian question will be taken up later.

37. Just. XLII, 4.

ment upon the authority of Rome. Mithridates met with some success,³⁸ but civil strife in Parthia soon put a different aspect on affairs. Mithridates was driven from the throne on account of the cruelty of his rule.³⁹ Orodes, his brother, however granted him the government of Media, but, when this too was taken from him,⁴⁰ he sought refuge with Gabinius who now continued the war begun by Mithridates with the expectation of achieving lasting fame in establishing Mithridates on the throne as a client prince of Rome.⁴¹ Gabinius had just passed the Euphrates when he received instructions from Pompey to give up this expedition and to reinstate Ptolemy Auletes on the throne.⁴²

Antony was to have an opportunity to gain first hand knowledge of one of Rome's most serious problems. The settlement of the Egyptian question was one of the most important political tasks of Rome. It was taken more and more into consideration by each of the great leaders in

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38. Cf. Rawlinson, Parth. p. 147, n.4.

39. Just., XLII, 4.

40. Dio, XXXIX, 56.

41. Appian, Syr. 51.

42. Dio, XXXIX, 55-56; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6,2.

turn, until it was finally settled by Octavian.⁴³

In 65 B.C. Caesar and Crassus had looked to Egypt as a base in which to establish their power while Pompey was otherwise engaged. They tried to have a measure passed by a plebescite, granting to Caesar, for the purpose of settling affairs in Egypt, a command extraordinary, such as Pompey had held. Here he was to create for himself a military and political position - a counterpoise of the Democrats to the power of the Optimates represented by Pompey and his army.⁴⁴ The united power of Caesar and Crassus, however, failed to overcome the hostile influence of the Senate. The Senate did not wish to entangle itself by forming into a province a land with such economic advantages, for by commanding its financial organization and naval power to his own use, a strong governor would be but a step from monarchical power.⁴⁵ Consequently the question was dropped for the time being.

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43. Cf. Röm. Geschichte, p. 229, 235, 248, cited by von Mess, Caesar, p. 29, n. 44.

44. Cf. Mommsen, Röm. Hist., Vol. IV, 201; Adolph von Mess, Caesar, pp. 29, 30; Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt., p. 228.

45. Cf. Mommsen, Röm. Hist., Vol. IV, 67; von Mess, Caesar, pp. 29, 30. Suet. Caes. 35 states that Caesar kept Egypt under rule of Cleopatra for fear that under a headstrong governor the province would become a source of revolution.

45. Suet. Caes. 54.

After the triumvirate had been renewed at Luc-
ca, it seems that an agreement must have been made by
the triumvirs as to Egypt. The very fact that Gabinus,
already launched with seeming success upon a Parthian cam-
paign, would, at a suggestion from Pompey, immediately drop
his own alluring plans, points to the fact that the trium-
virate had in all probability selected the staunch Pompeian,
Gabinus, as Syrian proconsul with the Egyptian question in
view. His value as a tool had been demonstrated in his
work on the Gabinian law. Ptolemy, who had purchased his
first recognition as sovereign at a price of 6000 talents,⁴⁶
had agreed to a further payment of 10,000 talents for his
restoration.⁴⁷ The Senate, however, passed no decree
giving Gabinus authority to wage offensive war outside
his province, and even brought forward a prediction from
the Sibylline books forbidding such action.⁴⁸ Perhaps
this accounts for Gabinus's hesitancy, for Plutarch says
that most of the officers as well as Gabinus himself were
opposed to the enterprise, but that Antony joined in per-

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46. Suet. Caes. 54.

47. Plut. Ant. 3; Dio 39,55-58; Appian, B.C. II, 24; Joseph.
Antiq. Jud., XIV, 6,2; Bell. Jud. I, 8,7; Cic. pro. Rob. Post.
VIII, 22; Plut. Cat. Min., 35.

48. Appian, B.C. II, 24; Syr. 51.

suading Gabinus. Plutarch assigns Antony's eagerness to a longing for great exploits and a desire to gratify Ptolemy's request.⁴⁹ Perhaps Antony felt that the surest way of advancement for a young man at Rome was to cater to the wishes of the great political leaders until his own position was somewhat assured. Accordingly Gabinus made a pretext of the alleged support of piracy by the Egyptians and the building of a fleet by Archelaus to start immediately for the Egyptian frontier.⁵⁰

The most dangerous point in the expedition was the march through the sandy desert between Gaza and Pelusium where no fresh water could be obtained. Antony was sent ahead to make himself master of the passes and to win Pelusium. By his eminent success he rendered the march safe for the army.⁵¹ In the military engagements following Antony was rewarded with especial marks of distinction for bravery in action.⁵²

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49. Plut. Ant. 3.

50. Strabo, XII, 3, 34; Cic. pro. Rab. Post. VIII; Phil. II, 19.

51. Joseph. Antiq. Jud., XIV, 6, 2, attributes this entirely to the influence of Antipater, but here, as in regard to the aid rendered Caesar in the Bellum Alexandrinum, he probably has exaggerated the importance of the services of Antipater, for he is not mentioned by Plutarch in this instance nor by the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum in the case of Caesar.

52. Plut. Ant. 3.

On his recall to Judaea by the renewed uprisings of the anti-Roman Jews⁵³ soon after the final defeat of the Egyptians, Gabinius left a garrison of Roman troops in Alexandria to maintain the authority of Ptolemy.⁵⁴ Antony also probably remained in Alexandria for some time for Josephus makes no mention of him in the subsequent campaign in Syria.⁵⁵ By assuming many of the prerogatives of the palace guards, these troops which were left in Alexandria became a powerful factor there. It is important to note that it was among these troops that Antony had won a great name for personal valor and military ability in his conduct of the campaign at Pelusium. The populace of Alexandria likewise honored him for his clemency toward the Egyptians after the victory.⁵⁶

In these years in which Antony had been with Gabinius he had had unusual opportunities to become acquainted with three of Rome's great problems in the East: Judaea, Parthia, and Egypt. First, in his stay in Judaea he could

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53. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6,2; Bell. Jud. I, 8,7.

54. Val. Max. IV, 1,15; Caes. B.C. III, 103; Dio. XLII, 5.

55. Appian, B.C. V, 8, states that Antony met Cleopatra and became infatuated with her, although she was only about fourteen years of age. The early maturity of the peoples of the East must be taken into consideration, however. Appian's statement is one of interest rather than of importance.

56. Plut. Ant. 3.

see the strong anti-Roman party dependent on the Hasmonean house for its leaders. That this party was strongly pro-Parthian was a fact little realized by Rome. Actual experience in Judaea seemed to be requisite for a comprehension of the hearty support that the Parthians gave every Syrian state against Rome. After Antony's early experience in Judaea, he could judge the value of the Idumean family in furthering Roman interests; he could observe in the work of Gabinius the tasks which lay before a governor in dealing with such conditions.

While the expedition against the Parthians had been of short duration, Antony had at least become acquainted with Parthian modes of warfare, had heard some discussion as to routes to be pursued, and had seen the advantage to Rome of the constant intrigue in the Parthian court. The experience gained on this expedition, combined with the knowledge acquired in Judaea, enabled Antony to judge the importance which Parthia held in the Orient, a place not sufficiently recognized by the Roman leaders. With all this in mind after the Ides of March he was able to appreciate at the moment more than any other man the value of Caesar's plans for an Oriental campaign.⁵⁷

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57. It is strange that Ferrero has not noted the probable influence on Antony of this campaign with Gabinius. He merely mentions that Antony was an officer with Gabinius. Greatness and Decline of Rome, II, p.64.

In the Egyptian expedition he had seen the economic and political condition of Egypt at first hand, the dominating part that Alexandria played in Egyptian affairs, the dominating place that the mob and the palace soldiery held in Alexandria, and especially the vast financial resources of the rulers. All of this knowledge was to stand him in good stead in his later work in the Orient.

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CHAPTER II.

Conditions in the East.

After Philippi (October 42, B.C.) the position of Antony was assured, since the soldiers considered that the victory was due largely to him, on account of Octavian's illness at the time of the battle.¹ Accordingly his was the deciding voice in the arrangements which followed. He chose the East.² Moreover he took Gallia Narbonensis from Lepidus, and retained Gallia Comata and Cis-Alpine Gaul, which he held by a previous arrangement of the triumvirs.³ It is important to note that he retained these large interests in the West.

It seems hardly probable that Antony had a dream of a great empire such as had been the hope of the great leaders of the East since the time of Alexander, nor on the other hand did he choose the East for the easy indulgence of his sometimes exaggerated sensuality. He was a faithful pupil of Caesar under whom he had served in Gaul as a trusted lieutenant, at the outbreak of the civil war as

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1. Appian, B.C. IV,108; V,14; Suet. Aug. 13.

2. Eutrop. VII,3; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV,12,2; Liv.Epit. CXXV; Strabo XVII, 1,12.

3. Dio, XLVI,55; Appian, B.C. IV,2. For a discussion of the division of the provinces vid. Ganter, Prov. Verw., pp. 1-8.

champion of his interests, at Pharsalia as commander of the left wing, during Caesar's absence from Italy as his special representative in Rome, and on his death as guardian of his papers. Under Caesar's influence for so long a time, Antony must have come to regard the East as the proper sphere of Roman aggression. In the East were highly cultivated lands, important trade routes from the Orient, and wealthy cities famed for commerce and manufacture. From an economic viewpoint Syria especially was second only to Egypt in importance. Altho by means of irrigation agriculture thrived in these highly cultivated lands, it was in manufactures that Syria laid her chief claim to riches.⁴ The seaports were commercial centers not only for their own products, but also for the great quantities of goods brought along the Euphrates trade routes.⁵ When Cicero says that the land of Asia is so fertile that in the productivity of its fields, in the variety of its produce, in the extent of its pasture lands and in the variety of its exports it excells all other lands, can it be wondered then that he should maintain that in the East were Rome's largest and most certain revenues upon which

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4. Sidon was famed for her glass manufacture; Tyre, Sarepta, Dora, and Caesarea for their purple dyes; Berytes. and Tyre for their fine linens and silks.

5. Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, pp. 148-152.

her very life depended.⁶ Antony needed money. In addition to the vast sums required for the maintenance of their power, the triumvirs owed 5000 drachmae to each soldier. To collect this money was one of Antony's tasks,⁷ but before regular payments could be assured, steps had to be taken to reestablish Roman administration in the East, so completely disorganized had it become during the years of the civil wars. To reestablish the authority of Rome in that district upon which the revenue of the Roman people was so largely dependent was to be Antony's greatest work.⁸ In the accomplishment of this work it appears that Antony, instead of establishing kingdoms here and there as his fancy dictated, followed a most consistent plan, a plan which the great powers of to-day still employ, that of the buffer-state. What could be more in accordance with Roman method than to organize the numerous peoples of Syria and Asia Minor⁹

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6. Cic. ad. Fam. XV,1; Man. Leg. II,VI,VII. The annual tribute acquired by Pompey in the East was 35,000,000 drachmae. Before this the entire annual revenue of Rome had been 50,000,000. (Plutarch, Pomp.45; Cf. Tenney Frank, Rom. Imp. p.327)

7. Plut. Ant. 23; Appian, B.C. V,3; Dio, XLVIII,30.

8. Vell. Pat. II,74; Suet. Aug. XIII.

9. The term Asia Minor is first found in Oros. I,2 (about 410 A.D.) Ancients used the terms "On this side of the Taurus". Cf Bevan, House of Seleucus, Vol.I, p.76.

into buffer-states against the power of Parthia and to insure the safety of these states against the inroads of this country by a successful predatory raid into its territory? To comprehend the magnitude of the task which lay before him, a consideration of the complications in Asia Minor and In Syria and the forces at work to produce these conditions will be necessary.

From the earliest times there had never been either a national or a political union in Asia Minor. The Persian subjugation of Asia Minor was very incomplete. That empire could never establish its power firmly at any great distance from the great highways, consequently the mountain-peoples continued to obey their hereditary chiefs with the necessity now and then of furnishing troops or tribute to the government. Often, to eliminate trouble so far as was possible, these chiefs were recognized as the representatives of the imperial government in return for payment of tribute. No central government therefore was able to form a real political union in Asia Minor.

The Greeks had early replaced, by their highly organized network of self-governing cities, the rudimentary social and political organizations, in which as a rule the village was the unit.¹⁰ While, with a few exceptions along the roads, there were no Greek cities more than fifty

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10. Cf. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 227; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.103.

miles from the coast, these cities have been estimated to have been 500 in number¹¹ and in many cases rich and populous centers of Greek life and civilization. They were compelled to carry out their administration to a large extent with and through these cities.

In Syria during the last years of the House of Seleucus, the actual masters were the Arabian princes of the desert, the Jews, the Nabateans and robber chieftains.¹² In constant conflict with one another, these princes had brought Syria to a state of ruin. On the coming of Pompey (64 B.C.) the usurpers were set aside, the Arabs restricted to their own domain, and the robber chiefs forced to give up their strongholds or to pay large tribute.¹³ Syria, with the exception of the cities which were given their freedom and districts left to national dynasts under Roman influence, was made a Roman province and put under the

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11. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 232; Duruy, Hist. Rome, p. 711.

12. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. p. 422. Of the last class, for example, was the powerful Ptolomaeus, son of Mennaues of Chalcis, one of the richest men of the period. He ruled over the territory between the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon as well as along the lower half of the valley of Coele-Syria, including the cities of Heliopolis (Balbec) and Chalcis. He maintained 8000 horsemen at his own expense.

13. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 3,2.

direct rule of a Roman governor.¹⁴ The kingdom of the House of Seleucus had come to an end.¹⁵ The Roman organization, however, was more nominal than real. With civil war raging in Rome the deposed princes appear again to have profited by the general disorganization.¹⁶ In the disaffection of these princes was a very real danger to the Roman East. On the other side of the Syrian desert were the Parthians, ever watchful and alert, the hereditary enemies of the Greek East and its successor, the Roman Empire.¹⁷ "When the Romans in the last age of the Republic came into immediate contact with Iran they found in existence the Persian empire regenerated by the Parthians".¹⁸ The latter had championed the cause of the Syrian princes in pursuance of their policy of strengthening any resistance to the power of Rome. Parthia was rapidly becoming a most important factor in the Roman policy in the Orient. It was the only great state upon which Rome bordered.

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14. For a discussion of Pompey's work vid. Mommsen, Rom. Hist., IV, pp. 400-453.

15. Bevan, House of Seleucus, II, p. 267; Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV, pp. 162-170.

16. Cassius encouraged many of them in return for money payments.

17. Cf. Radin, Jews Among Gks. and Roms., p. 287.

18. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 2. Cf. Radin, Jews Among Gks. and Roms., p. 267; p. 370.

As long as Armenia maintained itself as a power to be feared in the Orient the Parthians had been more or less friendly to the Romans¹⁹ as the enemy of their common foe, Tigranes. Pompey and Phraates even made an alliance with the provision that Phraates should invade Armenia while Pompey fought Mithridates and as a reward Gordyeme, which Armenia had seized, should be returned to Parthia. After the fall of the Pontic kingdom Pompey, true to the Roman policy of favoring a weakened and powerless foe at the expense of an ally who was in a position to become dangerous, left Tigranes in full possession of his kingdom, the province of Gordyene included.²⁰ When Phraates attempted to seize the province Pompey's legate Afranius promptly drove his troops from the country. Nor did the Romans respect the Euphrates as the boundary granted by Lucullus,²¹ for rulers of Edessa were received under Roman protection. Everything seemed to point toward the establishment of the great Syro-Mesopotamian desert as a boundary, with Armenia

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19. Strabo, XVI, 1,28.

20. Ibid. VI, 1,24; Appian, Mith. 105.

21. Vid. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV, p.343, for ^{the} treaty between Lucullus and the Parthians.

in the position of a Roman client state. Permanent peace between Parthia and Rome was impossible. "The subsistence side by side of great states with equal rights was incompatible with the system of Roman policy, we may even say of antiquity in general. The Roman empire knew as a limit in the strict sense only the sea or a land district unarmed."²² On the murder of Phraates by his sons Mithridates assumed the offensive against Rome by declaring war on Armenia in a dispute over boundaries, but civil strife arose in Parthia and Mithridates fled to Gabinius, as has been mentioned before. Crassus took up the interrupted plans of his predecessor only to meet with disaster at Carrhae. The Parthians now had absolute control beyond the Euphrates, and Armenia became a Parthian dependency. The policy of aggression, which the Parthians consistently pursued until after the defeat of their leaders, Labienus and Pacorus, now brought them into alliance with the Jews and other peoples of Syria who were eager to be relieved of Roman domination.

The importance of Parthian influence in Judaea must not be underestimated. It must be remembered that Parthia was a continuation of Persia and that of all foreign domination the Persian rule was the one which the Jews most

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22. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p.22.

highly respected.²³ While it can be assumed that there had long been a pro-Parthian party in Judaea fostered by the communication of the Jews in the two countries, it was not until after the defeat of Crassus that the first record of an actual alliance is found. The Roman disaster at Carrhae stimulated the anti-Roman Jews to action, and an alliance was formed with the Parthians in the hope that through them Roman influence could be destroyed and the old theocratic government restored. Pitholaus, who, since his desertion to Alexander at the time of the revolt against Gabinus,²⁴ had established himself as the leader of the Nationalists, joined the Parthians in their attack on the remnant of the army of Crassus, which had been reorganized under Cassius Longinus. The time seemed opportune, for large bodies of Parthians had crossed the Euphrates and were ravaging Syria. The Roman troops were inadequate, and there was little confidence to be placed in a levy to be raised in the provinces; for auxiliaries from the allies, owing to the harshness and injustice of Roman rule, were either so disaffected toward Rome that it was impossible to trust them or were too weak

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23. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p.267.

24. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6,1; Bell. Jud. I, 8,6.

to be of any considerable service.²⁵ Contrary to all expectations, Cassius drove the Parthians from the neighborhood of Antioch and, after defeating them in an ambushade, killed their leader Osaces.²⁶ The army of Pitholaus was also defeated and he himself put to death, largely through the influence of Antipater, who feared his power among the anti-Roman Jews.²⁷ The Parthians withdrew into winter quarters in eastern Syria, where they remained during the winter months in the expectation of a renewed attack in the spring of 50 B.C.; but, owing to civil dissension at home, the troops were recalled and the danger to Roman interests averted.²⁸

During the civil war in Rome, most of the great leaders in turn came to Syria, some to recruit money and supplies, others to put down disturbances. The politic Antipater, changing sides as the fortunes of the leaders changed, made himself so useful to each in turn that his former alliances were overlooked. In return for aid given

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25. Cic. ad Fam. XV, 1.

26. Cic. ad Att. V, 20; 18; ad Fam. II, 10; XV, 14; Frontin. Strateg. II, 5, 35; Dio, XL, 29.

27. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 7, 1.

28. ad Att. V, 21; VI, 1; Dio, XL, 30; Just. XL, 11, 4, 5.

when victory seemed hopeless at Alexandria,²⁹ Caesar restored to the Jews many of the privileges of which Pompey had deprived them. He confirmed Hyrcanus as hereditary High Priest,³⁰ and appointed him ethnarch of the Jews, thus restoring him to the political status taken away by Gabinius.³¹ He made Antipater a Roman citizen and procurator of Judaea.³²

Now that Antipater was established as the representative of Rome in Judaea, he set about restoring order. He made his son Phaselus governor of Jerusalem and its surrounding territory and his younger son Herod governor of Galilee.³³ The energetic Herod soon quarreled with the anti-Roman Sanhedrin, and was forced to flee for his life to Sextus Caesar³⁴ who championed his cause and made him

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29. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 8,1-2.

30. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 8,3-5.

31. Ibid. XIV, 117, gives the powers of an ethnarch. Cf also Sands, Rom. Client Princes, appendix.

32. It is impossible to determine exactly what Josephus means by procurator, for his use of technical terms is extremely vague. Cf Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p.189, n.

33. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9,2; Bell. Jud., I,10.

34. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9,1.

general of the army of Coele-Syria. He was deterred from his intention of making war on the anti-Roman faction in Judaea³⁵ and was for some time engaged in helping Sextus with his work as governor of Syria.

At this juncture (46 B.C.) the Pompeian party rallied about Caecilius Bassus and put Sextus Caesar to death. Bassus seems to have been seeking an independent principality for himself in Syria.³⁶ Antipater sent aid under his two sons to Antistius Vetus, Caesar's representative,³⁷ while the Parthians, with whom Pompey himself had made negotiations and who had remained friendly to his cause,³⁸ sent aid to Bassus then besieged in Apamea.³⁹ With their assistance Bassus continued to maintain his position during the year 45. This aggression on the part

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35. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9,5; Bell. Jud. I,10.

36. Dio, XLVII, 26-27; Liv. Epit. 114; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11,1; Appian, B.C. III, 77; IV, 58.

37. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11,1; Bell. Jud. I,10.

38. Appian, B.C. II, 83.

39. Cic. ad Att. XIV, 9; Dio, XLVII, 27.

of the Parthians probably hastened Caesar in his plans for a great campaign in the Orient.⁴⁰ His assassination put an end to these plans.

In October 44 B.C.⁴¹ Cassius went into Syria to gain this province for the Liberators and to raise money for their cause.⁴² He won over the forces besieging Bassus at Apamea⁴³ and later even the forces of Bassus himself.⁴⁴ In this way a division of Parthians came into the power of Cassius.⁴⁵ An opportunity seemed to offer itself to Cassius to carry out Pompey's plan of seeking aid from Parthia.⁴⁶ He dismissed the Parthians with gifts and sent with them an embassy to Orodes, the king, to ask for aid.⁴⁷ The Parthians recognized the fact that it was to their advantage for

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40. Appian, B.C. II, 110; Illyr. 13.

41. Vid. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. III, p. 107.

42. Dio, XLVII, 21; Vell. Pat. II, 62; Cic. Phil. XI, 27.

43. Dio, XLVII, 28; Appian, B.C. IV, 58.

44. Cic. ad Fam. XII, 11, 12; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11, 12; Bell. Jud. I, 11, 1.

45. Appian, B.C. IV, 59.

46. Ibid. II, 83.

47. Ibid. IV, 63.

Roman arms to be engaged in civil war rather than to be turned against them. Accordingly they sent a body of Parthian horse.⁴⁸

After his victory at Apamea, Cassius set to work to obtain funds for the Liberators by levying exorbitant tribute. Antipater, consistent to his policy of proving himself valuable to each Roman leader in turn, immediately made efforts to collect the portion assigned to him. It was through such financial speculations as this that the pro-Roman Jews had grown apart from the reactionary element. The life of these capitalists involved a close association with the Roman officials. Marked discrepancies of social custom such as dietary regulations and differences in dress were untenable. The pro-Roman Jews were largely the moneyed class, composed not of the great landholders, but of men whose fortunes had been made by the Roman system of taxation; whose very existence depended upon the supremacy of Roman power.⁴⁹ Herod, working for his own interests as well as those of the Romans, then, was the first to hand in his quota, and as a reward Cassius appointed him general of Coele-Syria.⁵⁰ On the other hand, when a city failed to raise its

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48. Appian, B.C. IV, 88.

49. Cf Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms. pp. 129-130.

50. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11,4.

assessment, Cassius sold the inhabitants into slavery.⁵¹ As a result war broke out again in Judaea, for this outcome of affairs was a great blow to the Nationalists who had held high hopes of the fall of the Idumeans on the death of Caesar. They had not realized that the Idumeans were supporting the Roman interests for selfish motives and that the wily Antipater would ingratiate himself into the favor of each faction in turn. When it was rumored that Herod was to be made king of the Jews, the Nationalists contrived to have Antipater poisoned.⁵² Cassius supported Herod in his efforts to have the murder avenged, and Hyrcanus, although the murderer had been his friend, took no steps to protect him when he realized that he was being punished with the approval of Cassius. Thereafter Hyrcanus was under the control of the pro-Roman Herod and Phaselus, his brother. Cassius soon went to join Brutus in their final stand at Philippi. The anti-Roman Jews found a leader in Antigonus, son of Aristobulus II, who endeavored to regain Judaea for

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51. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11,2; Appian, B.C. IV, 64.

52. Ibid. XIV, 11,3-4.

his family.⁵³ His father-in-law Ptolemy of Chalcis, who had regained much of the power taken away by Pompey, and Marion, tyrant of Tyre, came to his support. They seized three fortresses in Galilee.⁵⁴ It was with affairs in this state of disorder that Antony took up his work of re-organization.

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53. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11,7; 12,1; Head, Hist. Num. 682.

54. Ibid.

CHAPTER III.

Antony's Provincial Administration.

Soon after the settlement at Philippi Antony set out for Greece.¹ On his way he stopped at Thasos² where the Liberators had located a depot of supplies³ and whither many of the nobility had fled after the battle. An arrangement was made with them whereby they delivered to Antony the money, arms, and supplies stored there.⁴

From Thasos Antony proceeded to Greece. Here he attended the various games and was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. Plutarch⁵ attributes his conduct in Greece to a mere love of pleasure and a passion for amusement. There seems to be a deeper reason, When Octavian

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1. Plut. Ant. 23. No other source mentions this stop in Greece, but, since his conduct there, as given by Plutarch, corresponds with his policy in general, there is no reason to doubt his stay there. Gardthausen, II, 84, n. 6, accepts the stop in Greece, and offers as the reason Antony's well known love of Athens.

2. It is curious that with the exception of Drumann, Gescht. Roms. I, 388, this seems nowhere mentioned in the secondary works. Appian, B.C. IV, 136, the only source, mentions it in connection with the battle of Philippi, not with Antony's expedition into Asia.

3. Appian, B.C. IV, 106. 4. Ibid. 136.

5. Plut. Ant. 23.

went into the East(22B.C.) he visited Athens, where he also was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, and Sparta where he partook of the famous broth of the syssitia.⁶ Yet sentimental enthusiasm of any kind could never be assigned to Octavian and it would be an exaggeration to call him a Philhellene.⁷ Surely he, as Antony before him, saw the value of such steps in influencing public opinion in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The Parthian kings followed the same policy. It was because of the influential Greek cities⁸ in their domain that they placed Philhellene as a title on their coins.⁹ Much of Antony's work lay in Asia Minor, where the Greek cities with their abhorrence of everything which restricted the sovereign autonomy of each

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6. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 192.

7. Ibid; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, V, p.7.

8. Greek towns in large numbers were scattered throughout the empire. Rawlinson, Parth. p. 88. Appian, Syr. 57-58 names these cities. One of the most important was

Seleucia, Plin. N.H. VI,30; Tac. Ann. VI,42; Appian, Syr. 57; Mommsen, Rom.Prov.^{II}, p.10 discusses these cities.

9. Head, Hist. Num. pp.692-3.

city-state created a problem for any power aspiring to rule Asia.¹⁰ Antony, therefore, entered into the various phases of Greek life not merely to gratify his own pleasure, but rather to become recognized as an enthusiastic Philhellene.¹¹ In this fact lies the importance of his stay in Greece.

In the early spring¹² Antony left Lucius Censorius to continue the government of Greece¹³ and sailed for Asia, in all probability landing at Ephesus.¹⁴ Josephus¹⁵

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10. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, p.88.

11. Plut. Ant. 23. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, pp. 100-126 discusses the problem of the Greek cities.

12. Ganter, Prov. Verw., p. 33, p.35.

13. Macedonia, Greece, and Illyria seem to have been united into one province known frequently under the name of Macedonia. Ganter, Prov. Verw., p. 31, n.3, by CIL. I, p.461 shows that he had charge of Greece and Macedonia, not Greece alone. Plut. Ant. 23.

14. Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 139, assumes from Appian, B.C. V, 4, that he landed at Ephesus.

15. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12,2.

evidently supposes that Antony entered Asia by the northern land route, since he states that a commission of Jews met Antony in Bithynia before he came to Ephesus.¹⁶ It seems more probable that the larger and more important delegation, composed of Herod and the prominent Jews of the Nationalist party which met him in Bithynia, would be preceded by the smaller delegation which brought him propitiatory gifts at Ephesus. Furthermore, in the decrees¹⁷ which Antony issued at the request of the delegation which met him at Ephesus he mentions a former embassy to Rome, but does not mention a previous delegation to him in Bithynia. Therefore it seems better to place the delegation to Bithynia after that to Ephesus and as a consequence to conclude that Antony entered Asia by the way of Ephesus rather than by the way of Bithynia.

The fact that Antony would be compelled to transport his troops to Asia by the northern route because of lack of ships¹⁸ would not have prevented his own visit to

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16. Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, p.233, n.3.

17. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12,3.

18. Canter, Prov. Verw. p. 33.

Athens and Ephesus before rejoining his troops in the north. Furthermore Ephesus was the seat of the Roman proconsul in Asia,¹⁹ where were kept the public records²⁰ and the treasury of the province.²¹ Therefore, if Antony's visit to Athens is accepted, it is not illogical to conclude that he sailed from Athens to Ephesus as the most feasible place to begin his work of reconstruction in Asia.²²

Modern historians, placing full reliance on Plutarch's stories of Antony's excesses while in Asia, lay great emphasis on the extravagant reception accorded to him on his arrival at Ephesus and see in his succeeding actions nothing of the proceedings of a Roman magistrate, but only the erratic conduct of a man given over to gratifying his own lusts and desires.²³ It seems, however, that by

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19. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 292.

20. CIL. III, 6075, 6081, 6082; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 138.

21. CIL. III, 6077; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 138.

22. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 138, states that so strong a precedent arose for governors to enter Asia at Ephesus that Caracalla issued a decree to that effect. For a discussion of Ephesus as the *κοινὸν Ἀσίας* vid. Chapot, Prov. Rom. pp. 454-467.

23. Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 232; Gardthausen, Aug. I, p. 183; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, 227; Duruy, Hist. Rome, III, p. 615; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 55.

a careful culling from the stories of cooks, harpists, and courtesans those statements which, although given incidentally, point toward his general policy of administration, the conduct of Antony in the Orient can be shown to correspond in a remarkable degree to the customary procedure of a Roman proconsul.

Plutarch²⁴ says that women met him dressed as Bacchae, men as Fauns and Satyrs,²⁵ all addressing him as Dionysus in their songs. This enthusiastic reception as a means of winning the favor of the new governor was usual, especially in the East, where the people, accustomed to a servitude which carried respect for a master almost to adoration, made the governor the object of the most flattering and impressive demonstrations.²⁶ To the Oriental mind the relation between governing and governed was that between master and slave.²⁷ Cicero²⁸ boasts of the crowds

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24. Plut. Ant. 24.

25. Vid. Brown, The Great Dionysiac Myth, II, p.66, for the place of Satyrs in the worship of Dionysus.

26. Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. p. 273.

27. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, p.5.

28. Cic. ad Att. V,13;14;20.

which met him even at Samos.²⁹ There is extant an extravagant decree of the Ephesians in honor of Caesar.³⁰ Even Paul and Barnabas were addressed as Jupiter and Mercury on their entrance into Lycaonia.³¹

Antony, on his part, offered a splendid sacrifice to the city-goddess Artemis³² and doubled the area of sanctity for the temple.³³ Here again censure has come to Antony for such a "reckless arrangement".³⁴ Yet in earlier times Alexander had granted an extension of the right of asylum at Ephesus. Indeed to extend the privilege of Greek temples and to make contributions to their enlargement was the easiest way for a ruler to demonstrate his usefulness to the Greek cities.³⁵ The prestige and splendor

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29. D'Hugues, Prov. Rom. pp. 216-218.

30. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 62.

31. Acts XIV, 11.

32. Appian, B.C., V, 4.

33. Strabo, XIV, 1, 23.

34. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 232.

35. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, p. 109. Caesar also gave Antony precedent, in that he enlarged the territory of the Comana and Zela priests. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, pp. 117, 156.

of the city shrine brought worshippers and visitors, who made the festivals popular, quickened trade and brought money to the city. To gain the good will of the cities similar concessions had been given by the various competitors for power in Asia. These cities, aside from commercial reasons, considered it advantageous to have large sacred asylums in that this was a guarantee against devastation in time of war.³⁶ Furthermore the influence of the priests at the head of such largely endowed sanctuaries must not be underestimated. Since the Lycians were lacking in large city buildings they assembled in the temples to discuss public affairs, often with the priest presiding. Therefore the Greeks, although usually intolerant of priestly supremacy, found the cult of Artemis useful as a fusion of Oriental and Hellenistic ideas.³⁷ The immense sacerdotal interests which had developed here were too strong to be treated disrespectfully even by Octavian.³⁸

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36. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 40.

37. Ibid. p. 398.

38. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 232.

Accordingly it seems that Antony had ample reason for his action in the influence he would thus gain at Ephesus.

In criticizing Antony for increasing the area of sanctity it has been held that this right increased lawlessness by furnishing a place of refuge for criminals. It must be remembered that the Roman conception of the right of asylum differed from that of the Greeks in that it took little account of the religious sentiment when it came into contact with the proper punishment of evil-doers and criminals. The right of asylum was limited to temporary protection until formal trial could be made and judgment based on evidence could be given. In this way it became an aid rather than a hindrance to criminal procedure.³⁹

That Antony held the Roman rather than the Oriental view of sanctuary is shown by the fact that, of those refugees who had fled to the temple after the defeat of Brutus and Cassius, he refused pardon to Petronius who had taken part in the murder of Caesar and to Quintus who had betrayed Dolabella to Cassius at Laodicea.⁴⁰ Loyalty to

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39. Trenholme, Right of Sanctuary in England, pp. 6-7.

40. Appian, B.C. V,41; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.407.

the government was a condition essential to the recognition of the right of sanctuary.⁴¹ This fact, rather than the influence of Cleopatra, explains the execution of Arsinoe when she was a suppliant at the temple of Artemis.⁴²

In a comparison of Antony's work in the Orient with that of a Roman proconsul, it is necessary to keep in mind the absolute power of a governor in his province. Under the republic there was placed at the head of each province a magistrate, sometimes a consul or praetor, more often a proconsul or a propraeor.⁴³ From the day when

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41. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 407.

42. Appian, B.C. V, 9, states that she was killed at Miletus; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, at Ephesus. Dio XLVIII, 24, says Ἀρσινόη. Gardthausen, Aug. II, p. 86, n.18, suggests that Dio was thinking of the false Ptolemy, who called himself a brother of Cleopatra and who was given into Antony's power. Chapot, referring to Mommsen's Strafrecht, p. 460, n.1, says that the Romans may have considered the right of asylum a hindrance only to the local authorities. He explains Antony's action accordingly.

43. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 282, discusses the various appointments of these magistrates.

he received the office from the hands of his predecessor his authority was supreme. As far as the province was concerned, he was an absolute dictator who had every power over it and over whom it had no power. As far as Rome was concerned he was practically independent. No one could force him to resign or prescribe his line of conduct. In his province he was the equal of the consul at Rome. Like him he had his lictors and all the appurtenances of public authority. In reality he was more powerful than the consul, for he was not hampered by the senate, tribunes, and censors. An unscrupulous governor could uniteⁱⁿ his own authority the powers of most of the magistrates of the capital.⁴⁴

The first duty of a governor was to issue an edict which set forth the rules and regulations of law and equity that he intended to follow in the exercise of his jurisdiction.⁴⁵ The edict consisted of two parts. In the first division were the affairs which were properly within the jurisdiction of the governor, such as the accounts of the cities, their debts, the rate of interest, and all matters pertaining to the collection of taxes.

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44. Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. p.366.

45. Ibid. pp. 270-3; Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin. p.54; D'Hugues, Prov. Rom. p. 298; Cic., ad Att. VI, gives a summary of his edict.

In the second division were matters which would be decided according to the edict and for which the edict had to provide, such as wills, acquisitions, and mortgages.⁴⁶ For matters not treated in the edict the governor formally referred to the edicts of his predecessors which formed a legal code in themselves, the edictum tralatitium.⁴⁷ While there is no mention of Antony's issuing an edict as such, he did summon to an assembly at Ephesus the peoples of the surrounding territory, as was customary, and delivered to them an address corresponding in part to the first division of a governor's edict in that it was a statement of his policy, of the levies expected from these peoples, and the time of payment.⁴⁸ It is probable that such matters as were usually taken up in the second part of the edict were included in a formal publication, but Appian would scarcely incorporate such material into a speech even if he had the source material for so doing.

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46. Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. pp.270-273,

47. Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin. p.55; Cic. ad Att. V,21; ad Fam. III, 8,4.

48. Appian, B.C. V, 4-5.

As soon as possible after issuing his edict the governor began a tour of his province,⁴⁹ holding court at the towns set apart as convenient centers in which he was accustomed to stop and hold court.⁵⁰ For convenience the provinces were divided into conventus iuridici.⁵¹ Pliny⁵² enumerates the conventus of the provinces after the reorganization by Agrippa, naming the important cities of each.⁵³ In planning his route the governor included so far as was possible these cities, but it was by no means necessary to visit each one. Cicero⁵⁴ carried on the greater part of his judicial work in Laodicea where cases were tried from the districts of Cibyra, Apamea, Synada, Pamphylia, Lycaonia and Isauria.

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49. Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin. p.59; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 352; Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. p. 278.

50. Cic. in Verr. V,11.

51. Strabo, XIII, 4,12; Cic. ad Fam. XIII, 67, where he uses the Greek term; ad Fam III, 8, where he uses the latinized dioecesis.

52. N.H.V., 25 sq. He mentions Laodicaea, Synnada, Apamea, Alabanda, Sardis, Smyrna, Ephesus, Adramyttium and Pergamum.

53. Vid. Chapot, Prov. Rom. pp. 351-358 for a discussion of the conventus iuridici.

54. ad Att. V,21. Cicero's province consisted of Cilicia,

Antony set out on such a tour as soon as his work at Ephesus was completed.⁵⁵ In a discussion of this tour it must be remembered that Antony's work did not lie in one province alone, but included the administration of all territory in the Orient dominated by Rome. Appian⁵⁶ gives the only definite statement of the districts included in Antony's tour. He states that Phrygia, Mysia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, Coele-Syria, Palestine, Iturea, and the other provinces of Syria were included. Josephus includes Bithynia.⁵⁷ A conjectural route would pass through Ephesus, Smyrna, Sardis, Magnesia, Pergamon, Adramyttium, Cyzicus, Nicaea, Ancyra, Pessinum, Synnada, Iconium, Cybistra, Tyana, Tarsus, Antioch, Laodicea, Apamea, Epiphania, from which a cavalry expedition was sent to Palmyra, Damascus, through Iturea, across Palestine to the coast and thence to Egypt.

On his tour it was the duty of the governor to attend to the repair and maintenance of all public build-

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Aspera and Campestris, Pisidia, Isauria,^{and} Lycaonia. To these had been temporarily added three "dioceses" in Phrygia - Laodicea, Apamea, and Synada, and the Island of Cyprus. Vid. Shuckburg, Introduction to Letters of Cicero, Vol. II, p. IX.

55. Appian, B.C. V, 7.

56. Ibid.

57. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 2.

ings, roads and fortifications.⁵⁸ Accordingly, while in Greece, Antony made rich gifts to Athens, ordered that repairs be made on the senate-house at Megara and that the temple of Pythian Apollo be surveyed preparatory to certain additions.⁵⁹ While on his tour of the East he gave relief to the cities which had suffered devastation during the civil wars,⁶⁰ established a gymnasium at Tarsus,⁶¹ and ordered the rebuilding of Xanthus.⁶²

In his military capacity the governor directed that levies be made⁶³ and could in case of need call out any veterans who might be living in the province.⁶⁴ Antony incorporated the garrisons of the country around Apamea into his own forces and assigned them to garrison duty in Syria because they knew the country.⁶⁵ For naval purposes he ordered two hundred ships to be built and manned.⁶⁶

It was, however, in the capacity of supreme judge

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58. Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. p.279.

59. Plut. Ant. 23.

61. Strabo, XIV, 5,14.

63. Bell. Alex. 50.

65. Dio, XLVIII, 25.

60. Appian, B.C. V,7.

62. Appian, B.C. V,7.

64. Cic. ad Att. V,18.

66. Appian, B.C. V,55; Plut. Ant. 30.

that the proconsul impressed himself most strongly upon the minds of the provincials.⁶⁷ Although the inclination of the governor largely decided the extent of his authority,⁶⁸ in the performance of his judicial function the governor was endowed with absolute power, for, in theory, the province was perpetually under martial law.⁶⁹

There are but few references in the sources to actual judicial work on Antony's part with the exception of dynastic disputes. Plutarch states first that Antony's judicial decisions at Athens were just and equitable,⁷⁰ secondly, that when Cleopatra arrived at Tarsus Antony was seated in the tribunal with the people assembled before him in the agora,⁷¹ and thirdly that frequently when he was administering justice to tetrarchs and kings on his tribunal, he would receive from Cleopatra love letters written on onyx or crystal and read them.⁷² It is therefore to be assumed that he held court in the important towns on his tour.

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67. Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin. p. 59

68. Ibid. p.61.

69. Ibid. p.62.

70. Ant. 23.

71. Ibid. 26.

72. Ibid. 58.

In case of quarrels between cities, tribes or contestants to the throne the governor was frequently called in as arbitrator.⁷³ When he felt that he was not in a position to settle such questions he referred the case to Rome for instruction.⁷⁴ Cicero was called upon to settle a dispute between Ariarathes and his brother Ariobarzanes.⁷⁵ Antony likewise judged between rival claimants to thrones.⁷⁶ Among such cases was the dispute between Ariarathes and Archelaus (Sisena).⁷⁷

Appian attributes Antony's award of the kingdom

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73. Person, Admin. Prov. Rom. p.278.

74. Ibid. p.279.

75. Cic. ad Fam. XV,2; ad Att. V,20; ad Fam. XV,4.

76. Appian, B.C. V,7; Plut. Ant. 24.

77. Appian, B.C. V,7 places this decision in the year 41; Dio XLIX,32, in the year 36; Val.Max. IX,15,2, gives no date; Tac. Ann. II,42, in 34. Since Tacitus states that the decision took place 50 years before 16 A.D. Gardthausen, Aug. II, p.185, n.12, says that Tacitus was using round numbers and did not contradict Dio. He says that Ariarathes ruled from 42 to 36 and struck coins as king during that period. (Head, Hist. Num. p. 633). Niese (article in Pauly-Wissowa under Ariarathes) states a preference for 41 without entering into the discussion. It seems probable that Antony made the decision in favor of Archelaus in 41, but did not

to Archelaus in preference to Ariarathes to the influence of his beautiful mother Glaphyra.⁷⁸ Consequently modern historians cite this as an instance of Antony's favoritism and caprice.⁷⁹ When the relationship between Archelaus and Herod is recalled, a different light is thrown on the situation. Archelaus was exceedingly friendly with Herod.⁸⁰ His daughter, Glaphyra, married Herod's son, Alexander. Ariarathes had had constant trouble in maintaining his

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enforce it until 36 when he was again taking up such matters. Hence I put the decision in 41. This explanation would eliminate the seeming contradiction in Appian and Dio. 78. B.C. V, 7. It is amusing to note that Plutarch, Ant. 58 insists that Antony was so infatuated with Cleopatra at this time that he would interrupt the procedure of such cases to read her love letters.

79. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p.390; Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, p.233; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p.292; Drumann, Gescht. Roms. I, p.390. Martial XI, 20 lends weight to this opinion.

80. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XVI, 8,6.

position in Cappadocia. Although a portion of lesser Armenia had been assigned to him by Caesar in 47 B.C.,⁸¹ not a foot of his possessions remained in his power by 45 B.C., when he came to Rome to attempt to buy a kingdom of Caesar.⁸² In the time of Cicero's proconsulship he had been party to a conspiracy to win the power from his brother Ariobarzanes, who was under the special protection of Rome.⁸³ On the other hand Archelaus had proved himself a most efficient ruler. Later Octavian also recognizing his ability, not only confirmed him in his power but also gave him Cilicia with the difficult task of overcoming piracy. He ruled from 36 B.C. to 17 A.D.⁸⁴ Since Cappadocia was a region which it was essential for the Romans to hold in case of a Parthian invasion,⁸⁵ in the choice between these men Antony seems to have been influenced by the ability of the man to render him effective assistance rather than by the wiles of the charming Glaphyra. This is the first instance of An-

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81. Bell. Alex. DXVI,6.

82. Cic. ad Att. XIII,2. 83. Cic. ad Fam. XV,2.

84. Head, Hist. Num. p. 633.

85. Cic. ad Fam. XV, 2.

tony's use of a policy which he maintained throughout his entire administration of the Orient, the appointment of pro-Roman native princes to the thrones of border kingdoms to protect the Roman interests. Their territory became buffer states against the power of Parthia. Caesar had adopted the same policy after the battle of Zela.⁸⁶ Octavian continued the policy. He surrounded the Euphrates frontier with a series of states which acknowledged Roman influence as supreme by accepting princes of his appointment.⁸⁷

Antony also showed excellent judgment in his dealings with the Jews. It has already been suggested that while he was in Ephesus ambassadors had come to him from Hyrcanus bringing a golden crown and requesting that he command that those Jews be set free who had been carried away into captivity by Cassius, and that the country that Cassius had taken away from the Jews be restored. The request was granted, and decrees were sent to the Tyrians, Sidonians, Antiochians, and Aradians, commanding any property taken from the Jews in the time of Cassius to be restored and all Jews

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86. Bell. Alex. 78; Judeich, Caesar in Orient, pp. 149-159.

87. Arnold, Rom. Imp. p. 213.

sold by him as slaves to be freed.⁸⁸

A second deputation came to Antony in Bithynia. This delegation represented the Nationalist party, who again had hopes of the downfall of the Idumeans since they had but lately given their full support to the Liberators. They had complained to Antony that although Hyrcanus had the nominal authority, in reality Herod and Phaselus held the power. Herod, who appeared in his own defence, had not been trained in the Roman methods in vain. Josephus⁸⁹ states that because of bribes⁹⁰ Antony paid great respect to Herod and that his adversaries obtained no hearing. It is probable that Antony well remembered the pro-Parthian proclivities of Herod's opponents of the Hasmonean house and the loyal support which the Idumeans had always given Roman interests whether of one political faction or of another; consequently he felt fully justified in refusing to

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88. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 8-6, where the decrees and the letter to Hyrcanus are given in full.

89. Ibid. XIV, 12, 2.

90. Bribery was very prevalent. Cicero, ad Att. V, 20, states with great pride that he did not accept the bribes of those coming for judgments.

hear the nationalists. This was not an unusual procedure on the part of the governor. Cicero⁹¹ takes great credit to himself because he had not been so difficult of access to ambassadors as former governors, but he says that even he sometimes refused to grant a hearing.⁹²

When Antony came to Antioch,⁹³ a delegation of one hundred prominent Jews met him to accuse Herod and the Idumeans of misgovernment. A certain Messala⁹⁴ spoke in refutation of the charges. The hearing was held at Daphne⁹⁵ in the presence of Hyrcanus. By an appeal to Hyrcanus to state which party ruled most beneficially for the people, Antony compelled him to ally himself openly with one party or the other. He took his stand with the pro-Romans. As a result Antony appointed Herod and Phaselus tetrarchs.⁹⁶

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91. ad Att. VI, 2.

92. ad Att. V, 20.

93. It is interesting to note that neither Caesar nor Antony carried on negotiations with the Jews in Judaea.

94. Probably M. Valerius Messala, distinguished in both politics and letters. At this time he was a partisan of Antony. Vid. Smith, Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biog. p. 1051.

95. A pleasure ground about five miles from Antioch. Vid. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, pp.140-141.

96. This title, which primarily denotes the collegiate tetrarchate such as was usual among the Galatians, was later

By this appointment they became independent allied princes with full political powers, but in rank inferior to a king. Hyrcanus retained, as under Pompey, the power of high priest alone. A subsequent embassy of a thousand Jews came to Antony at Tyre to try to persuade him to change his decision. Admittance to Antony was refused and a riot ensued in which several Jews were killed and others arrested. The outraged people arose against Herod and in retaliation Antony put the prisoners to death. For the time being the Nationalist party was forced to submit to the rule of the Idumeans.

This course seems rather arbitrary on Antony's part, but in passing judgment it is necessary to keep in mind the importance of the loyalty of Judaea to Roman interests. At the beginning of the present war Lord Cromer, late viceroy of Egypt, hastened to point out the fact that Palestine is likely to prove one of the most important buffer states after the war, both because it borders on the Suez canal the present great trade route from the East, and because it also borders on Egypt, the great source of the grain supply. Practically the same conditions, with

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more generally used for their rule as a whole and then for the rule of one man, but always of a ruler in rank inferior to a king. Cf Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 192, n. 1; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13,1.

the order of importance reversed, were true in the time of Herod. Furthermore defection in Judaea threatened the very existence of the Eastern Empire by opening the frontier to the Parthians.⁹⁷

Antony has also been criticized for his treatment of the Syrian princes. It has been shown that the reorganization of Syria under Pompey had been more nominal than real and that during the civil wars the deposed princes had profited by the general disorganization. The Parthians, as usual, had been of great assistance to them.⁹⁸ On Antony's advance into Syria he overthrew the rule of these princes and attempted to reestablish the power of Rome, as Pompey had done. By this step he hastened the inevitable conflict with Parthia, as these client princes of Parthia, for such they really were, fled thither for protection.⁹⁹

It seems that, in Antony's dealings with the political questions arising in the Orient, he followed the precedent set by Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar in placing in power those claimants to the throne who could most ably maintain

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97. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms. p. 187.

98. Appian, B.C. V, 10,17.

99. Ibid. V, 10.

and protect the interests of Rome. In his course of action he followed the regular proceedings of a Roman proconsul. He landed at Ephesus, he received the usual flattering demonstration of the people on his arrival, he issued a form of edict, he made a tour of the provinces, stopping at the most important cities to hold court, he repaired and constructed public buildings, he provided for naval and land forces, and he decided dynastic disputes.

Regarding those matters which were outside the province of a Roman proconsul, such as the granting of freedom to cities, it will be necessary to compare his course of action with that of Caesar and Octavian. After the Mithridatic war, Sulla inaugurated a system of rewarding cities which had shown their loyalty to the Roman government by granting them libertas.¹⁰⁰ Although the practice was gradually discontinued until it was practically abolished under the early emperors,¹⁰¹ freedom was granted to certain cities by Caesar and Octavian as well as by Antony. Caesar gave freedom to Amisus,¹⁰² Apamea,¹⁰³

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100. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 112.

101. Ibid. 103; Pauly-Wissowa under Asiap. 1542; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.4.

102. Strabo, XII, 3,14; Dio, XLII, 48; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.65; Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 117.

103. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 111.

Cnidus,¹⁰⁴ Aphrodisias,¹⁰⁵ Ilium,¹⁰⁶ Antiochus Epidaphnis,¹⁰⁷ and confirmed the freedom of Rhodes.¹⁰⁸

Antony freed Laodicea,¹⁰⁹ Tarsus,¹¹⁰ and Heraclea,¹¹¹ and confirmed the freedom of Seleucia in Cilicia,¹¹² and of Tyre,¹¹³ Sidon¹¹⁴ and Aphrodisias¹¹⁵ while he deprived of freedom Amisus¹¹⁶ and Antioch of Pisidia.¹¹⁷

Octavian, following the same policy, granted free-

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104. Plut. Caes. 48; Chapot, Rom. Prov. p. 115; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.55.

105. Pauly-Wissowa, Asia, p. 1542; Henze, De Civ. Lib. pp. 52-54; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.114.

106. Pauly-Wissowa, Asia, p.1542; Strabo, XIII,1,27.

107. Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.75; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.117.

108. Appian, B.C. IV, 70; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.119.

109. Appian, B.C. V,7.

110. Ibid.

111. Henze, De Civ. Lib. pp. 68-69.

112. Strabo XIV, 5,6; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p. 72.

113. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4,1; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.76.

114. Ibid.

115. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.114.

116. Strabo, XII, 3,14; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p. 65.

117. Dio, XLIX, 32; LXIII,26; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.48; p. 71.

dom to Samos,¹¹⁸ Mytilene,¹¹⁹ and Ilium. He confirmed the freedom of Stratonicea.¹²⁰ He deprived of freedom, usually because of lack of loyalty to Roman interests, Chersonesus Heraclea,¹²¹ Cyzicus¹²² for a period of five years, Tyre,¹²³ and Sidon.¹²⁴ The freedom of Astypale was discontinued for a period.¹²⁵

Antony then in granting freedom to some cities as a reward for loyalty to his cause was but pursuing a policy already established. Likewise he was in full accord with a tendency followed by his successors when for various political reasons he deprived other cities of their freedom.

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118. Plin. NH.V., 135; Dio. LXIV,9; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p. 46; Arnold, Rom. Imp. p.212; Firth, Augustus, p.229; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.120.

119. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.118.

120. Plin. NH.V., 109; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.120.

121. Henze, De Civ. Lib. p. 69.

122. Dio. LXIV,7; Arnold, Rom. Imp. p.212; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p.115.

123. Dio. LXIV,7; Henze, De Civ. Lib. p.76.

124. Ibid.

125. Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 114.

He has been severely censured by both ancient and modern historians for the important part which the influence of his friends played in his administration.¹²⁶ Yet, even a cursory reading of Cicero's letters shows the insurmountable difficulty which that conscientious statesman met with in attempting to maintain an impartial government. When a man became a provincial governor he paid off all his obligations to his friends.¹²⁷ He received requests of all kinds varying from obtaining panthers for the shows¹²⁸ to preventing the trial of a friend's friend's mother-in-law.¹²⁹ Even the "noble Brutus" felt that a friend's interests were of more importance than the rights of the provincials.¹³⁰ Therefore Antony was only following a precedent already set, when he appointed his favor-

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126. Plut. Ant. 24.

127. For examples of the letters of recommendation received and written by Cicero vid. ad Fam. XIII, 53; 55; 56; 61; 62; 63; 64; 65; 57; 54; 12; 13.

128. ad Fam. II, 11; ad Att. V, 21.

129. ad Fam. XIII, 54.

130. Cic. ad Att. V, 21; VI, 1; 2; 3.

ites to office.¹³¹ To the great expense caused by the extravagance of Antony's staff¹³² a parallel can be found in that of the average Roman governor's attendants. Cicero¹³³ tells of the amazement of the people at the admirable character of his staff, but even Cicero was forced to admit that not all of the members conformed to his request that they be of no expense to the provincials.¹³⁴

In thus outlining Antony's work in the Orient, the purpose has not been to defend his personal life, but to point out that his general policy in the Orient corresponded in a large measure to that of the average Roman governor. His whole course of action points toward the foundation of a strong provincial government patterned upon the precedent of those who had preceded him and continued by his astute successor, not to the establishment of a great empire for himself, for Antony after all was but a "first rate second rate" man.

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131. Strabo, XIV, 1,41; 5,14; Plut. Ant. 24.

132. Plut. Ant. 24.

133. ad Att., V, 16; 17; 18; 20; 21; VI,1.

134. ad Att., V, 21.

CHAPTER IV.
Antony in Egypt.

There now arises the question as to Antony's purpose in spending the winter in Alexandria rather than in the further administration of provincial affairs in Asia Minor and Syria. With his work there well under way, but by no means completed, he hastened to Egypt, leaving Syria especially in a state of unrest. The people were ready to respond to the first incentives to revolt found in the Parthian incursions of the following spring.

Antony lacked patience and the ability for careful and painstaking work. Big enterprises appealed to him, but the tedious labor involved in the actual accomplishment of these undertakings was irksome. The first step in Caesar's plans, whether of Oriental conquest or for the security of the provinces, was, in all probability, the reorganization of Asia Minor and Syria so that he could rely upon that region as a secure base of supplies in his rear. Antony had set to work to carry out this reorganization with his usual energy and despatch, but when his first enthusiasm began to wane, when the assigning of kingdoms, the hearing of embassies, the levying of tribute, and the settling of disputes between the petty princes was over, he was ready to begin the second step rather than to complete what promised to be a tedious task,

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the establishment of these first larger and more interesting measures on a firm foundation.

If Antony was to establish the supremacy of Rome in the Orient, a successful raid into Parthian territory was essential to offset the prestige gained by the Parthians from the defeat of Crassus; but, as Caesar, his own general had said, "There can be no army without money".¹

Therefore, the second step in Antony's establishment of the power of Rome was the financing of the expedition against Parthia. Antony had not found Asia the lucrative source of revenue which he had hoped. From the time of Pompey Asia had been drained of money by constant and exorbitant levies and exactions until the country had come to a state of financial exhaustion not at first appreciated by the triumvirs.

Egypt, on the contrary, was still abounding in riches. It was the only important state of the Eastern Mediterranean which was nominally independent. The Ptolemies possessed great and unexhausted treasure. Antony must have had all this in mind when he sent for Cleopatra to meet him at Tarsus. In light of these conditions the

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1. Dio, XLII, 49; Plut. Caes. 17.

meeting at Tarsus is shorn of all the romantic glamor which has been so emphasized throughout the ages and becomes a political move on the part of both Antony and Cleopatra. The woman at the head of Egypt was the cleverest of a line of clever women. The Macedonian Cleopatra, as the Cleopatras and Arsinoes before her, had aims and ambitions of her own in the accomplishment of which she was ready to use the same unscrupulous means. The Macedonian blood and tradition showed clearly in the character of the Ptolemaic queens. These women plotted and intrigued for power as did the queens of the old Macedonian line. Arsinoe II married first the king of Thrace. On his murder by her half-brother Keraunos, she married Keraunos, while for a third husband she won her own brother after disposing of her step-daughter (perhaps her own daughter) to whom he was already married.² The stories

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2. Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt., p.77, states that in the royal family of Egypt the marriage of full brother and sister was considered highly desirable and quotes Maspero, Annuaire de l'ecole des hautes etudes, for 1916, p.19: "The nobility of each member of a Pharonic house and his claims upon the crown corresponded to the amount of divine blood which he could show; he that derived it from both father and mother had a higher claim than he who had it from one

of the marriages of Cleopatra II and III are even more harrowing, if we can accept Justin.³ Can it be wondered that Cleopatra adopted as a means to establish her power first an intrigue with Caesar and then a marriage with Antony?⁴ "The last Cleopatra is the best known of her line, but she is only a type of her class. There was

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parent only. Here the Egyptian social laws permitted what would be impossible in any modern civilization. The marriage of a brother and a sister was the marriage par excellence, and it contracted an unspeakable sanctity when this brother and sister were born of parents who stood in the same relation." Ptolemy II was the first Macedonian to make this concession to the Egyptian tradition, a concession which was adopted by his successors.

3. Vid. Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt, for a discussion of this point.

4. Polygamy was common among all the successors of Alexander as well as in the earlier Macedonian court. Cf. Mahaffy, Gk. Life and Thought, p.23; Hist. Egypt, p. 76.

no relegation of queens to the obscurity of the harem. They mingled in the political game as freely as men. It was indeed in the political sphere rather than in that of sensual indulgence that their passion lay and their crimes round a motive."⁵ Cleopatra was determined that Egypt should not meet the fate which had overtaken the other kingdoms of the East, incorporation in the Roman Empire. The splendor and magnificence displayed on her journey to Cilicia was not the mere gratification of vanity, a woman's foolish whim. Every detail was planned to impress the observer with the evidence of unlimited wealth. Antony needed money. Cleopatra needed Antony.

Cleopatra was too perfect a mistress of the art of intrigue not to know that undue haste in unfolding her design of a great empire in Egypt would be fatal to her success. Cleopatra had many enemies among the upper class who were bitterly opposed to her rule.⁶ It must be remembered that the Ptolemies were not native Egyptians but Macedonians, who, like the other kings of the Hellenic East, were bidding for Roman favor and dreading Roman wrath. There were never any national uprisings

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5. Bevan, House of Seleucus, II, p.280.

6. Dio, LI, 5; Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, p.181.

Here as elsewhere Ferrero follows Bouché-Leclercq.

in favor of these sovereigns for they made but little effort to inspire loyalty in their native subjects.⁷ It may have been with a pretext of establishing her power against them that she asked Antony to come to Egypt, where, on his part, he hoped to obtain the funds necessary for his further work. Consequently, in the autumn of 41 B.C. Antony left Syria to spend the winter months in Alexandria.

Much emphasis has been laid by the ancient historians on the fact that, on Antony's entrance into Alexandria, he laid aside the insignia of his office. They assume that he intended this act to be emblematic of his putting aside the cares and duties of a general and that he regarded his wintering in Egypt as a festal occasion.⁸ One needs only to look back at the entrance of Caesar into Alexandria⁹ to realize the wisdom of Antony's step. Caesar entered Egypt in full regalia of office. It seems strange, perhaps, that the populace of Alexandria, so ac-

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7. Cf. Mahaffy, Emp. Ptol., p. 341.

8. Appian, B.C. V, 11. Appian says it might also have been because he was in foreign jurisdiction. This is a more probable reason.

9. Dio, XLII, 7; Lucan, Phar. IX, 1007; Liv. Epit., CCLI; Frontin, Strateg. I, 1,5; Caes. B.C. III, 106; Appian, B.C. II, 89; for a discussion of Caesar's landing vid. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 78sq.

customed to the pomp and ceremony of the royal court, should take offence at this. The large Roman element in the mob at Alexandria and the effect of such a procedure on them must be taken into account.

Caesar himself describes the composition of the forces which so nearly defeated him at Alexandria. "There were soldiers of Gabinus who had accustomed themselves to Alexandrian life and license, had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had married Egyptian wives by whom very many of them had had children. To these were added men collected from among the freebooters and brigands of Syria, of Cilicia, and of the neighboring regions. Many condemned criminals and exiles had joined them. All our own fugitive slaves had a sure place of refuge at Alexandria. Assurance of their lives was given them on their being enrolled in the army. If any one of them was arrested by his owner he would be rescued by the common consent of the soldiery, who repelled violence done to their comrades as a peril to themselves, since they were all alike involved in similar guilt." 10

"Haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus, qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxores-

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10. Caes. B.C. III, 110.

que duxerant ex quibus plerique liberos habebant. Huc accedebant collecti ex praedonibus latronibusque Syriae Ciliciaeque provinciae finitimarumque regionum; multi praeterea capitis damnati exsulesque convenerant. Fugitivis omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus certaue vitae condicio, ut dato nomine militum essent numero; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu militum eripiebatur qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant." These Romans fully understood the significance of the fasces. The appearance of a Roman general in full insignia of office meant the probable loss of their much cherished freedom.¹¹ The Alexandrian mob was a power that had to be reckoned with. "The people of Alexandria spoke the voice of Egypt more completely than Paris does of France."¹² These mercenary troops had lived in close relation to the court and had assumed or drifted into the prerogatives and dignities of the old Macedonian household troops.¹³ Ac-

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11. Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. Vol. IV, p. 511; Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt, p. 239sq.

12. Mahaffy, Emp. Ptol. p. 333.

13. Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt, p. 241.

according to Caesar¹⁴ they had been in the habit of demanding the execution of friends of the royal family, of plundering the property of the wealthy, of besieging the kings' palaces to secure more pay, of driving one man from the throne and summoning another to fill it, after the ancient custom of the Alexandrian army.

It must be remembered too that Alexandria was no more a typical Greek city than an Oriental one. It lacked those all essential parts of a polis, the boule and the demos. In the great mass of papyri that have come down from Egypt there is nowhere any indication that a Senate met or that the people assembled.¹⁵ In place of an assembly in Alexandria was the soldiery backed by the great mob whose influence in disturbed times increased to despotism.¹⁶

Antony profited by the knowledge gained both from his stay in Egypt with Gabinus and from the experience of Caesar. During his entire stay in Alexandria, he made every effort to gain the favor of the populace. Often at night both he and Cleopatra would sally forth in servant's disguise and mingle among the crowd where they were often recognized. The Alexandrians took delight in

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14. Caes. B.C. III, 110.

15. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms. p.107.

16. Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV, p.188; Mahaffy, Emp.

Ptol. 78; Merivale, Rom. Hist. Vol. I, p. 350.

his extravagances and joined in his frolics, saying that they were thankful to Antony for playing his tragic roles for the Romans and keeping his comedy for them.¹⁷

While the lower stratum of the Alexandrian population consisted in a large part of natives,¹⁸ Alexandria was primarily a Greek city, founded by Alexander for the Greeks.¹⁹ The selection of a site in a remote corner of the delta indicated clearly his intention of making this Hellenic city which was to dominate Egypt as free as possible from Egyptian influence.²⁰ The Macedonians formed a specially privileged group. Just what these privileges were is uncertain but they probably lay chiefly in fiscal exemptions.²¹ The Ptolemies had fully carried out Aristotle's words to Alexander,²² when he advised him to be a leader of the Hellenes and a master of the

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17. Plut. Ant. 29.

18. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 287; Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt. p. 10.

19. Just. 11,2.

20. Wiegall, Life and Times of Cleopatra, p. 19.

21. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p.108, for a further discussion.

22. Murray, Ancient Gk. Lit., p. 374.

barbarians, to provide for the former as friends and to use the latter as plants and animals.²³

Antony did not fail to recognize the importance of the Greeks. Again he appears as Philhellene. He spent much time with the Greeks. He wore their square-cut garment and the white Attic shoe of the Athenian and Alexandrian priests.²⁴

Mahaffy has shown from a study of the papyri of the middle of the third century B. C. that Jewish settlements had existed for many years in Egypt.²⁵ There can be little doubt that Jews were found in all classes from the highly privileged Macedonians to the lowest slaves.²⁶ Here as in Judaea it was the tendency of the wealthy class

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23. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 262.

24. Appian, B.C., V, 11.

25. Hist. Egypt, p. 193. Strabo XVII, 1, 12, when naming the citizens at Alexandria does not mention Jews.

26. In discussing the condition of the Jews in Alexandria Radin, Jews among the Gks. and Roms., p. 112, refers to Berliner, Griechische Urkunden, IV, 1068, 1140, 1151.

to become completely Hellenized.²⁷ Antony's friendship with this element in Judaea must have been recognized by the Egyptian Jews. In the popularity won by Antony during his stay in Alexandria under Gabinius, coupled with his renewal of friendly relations with as many classes of the population as was possible, can probably be found the reason why he found less opposition among the Alexandrians than did other Roman leaders.

The ancient historians lay great emphasis on the revelries which took place in Alexandria during the winter of 41-40 B.C.²⁸ Plutarch²⁹ describes a band which they called the "Inimitable Livers", the members of which vied with one another in daily entertainments of an extravagance beyond belief. Most modern historians take the same view.³⁰

The prejudice of the sources must be taken into consideration.³¹ It must be remembered that the original

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27. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 116.

28. Dio. XLVIII, 27; Appian, B.C. V, 11.

29. Plut. Ant. 28.

30. Gardthausen, Augustus, p. 186; Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, 239; Merivale, Hist. Rome, III, p. 176; Chapot, Prov. Rom. p. 56.

31. For a discussion of the sources vid. Büchlein, Quellen und Chronologie der römisch-parthenische Feldzüge; art. Appian, Pauly-Wissowa; art. Dio Cassius, Pauly-Wissowa.

sources were written by men who were the supporters of Octavian. Every calumny against Antony made any odium which might attach itself to Octavian through Antony's downfall less effective.

Cleopatra would not have permitted Antony to be altogether forgetful of the business at hand. Plutarch tells an anecdote of a little fishing expedition to illustrate Antony's love of pleasure and thereby misses the point of the story, Cleopatra's words to Antony, "Leave the fishing rod to us poor sovereigns of Pharos and Canopus. Your game is cities, provinces, and kingdoms."³² Cleopatra had induced Antony to come to Alexandria for a purpose. She hoped to maintain the power of Egypt by the means so often employed by the women of the Macedonian line, an alliance by marriage. With the Roman legions at her command she hoped to extend Egypt to its old limits.

The power of the women of the Ptolemies must not be underestimated. The men of the later Ptolemies, it is true, were largely degenerate, but one needs only to review the history of the Macedonian queens from Olympias to Cleopatra VII to realize why the people of Alexandria so

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32. Ant. 29. „Παραδος ἡμῖν ἔφη τὸν κάλαμον, αὐτόκρατορ, τοῖς φερρίταις καὶ Κανωβίταις βασιλεύειν· ἡ δὲ σὴ θήρα πόλεις εἰσὶ καὶ βασιλεῖαι καὶ ἡῖροι.

frequently permitted a queen to reign in the presence of legitimate male heirs.³³ They were women who knew how to use their great power and wealth.³⁴ This made an alliance with them imply the command of large resources in men and money.³⁵ The Ptolemies, as the Pharaohs before them and the Roman emperors after them, regarded Egypt as little more than a crown estate to be managed with a view to the interests of the sovereign alone.³⁶ The revenue of the court at Alexandria was nearly equal to the public income of Rome even after its augmentation by Pompey.³⁷ Thus an alliance with Cleopatra would provide Antony with abundant funds for a victorious Parthian campaign by which he hoped to win the prestige in Italy upon which his hopes for power there depended. The weak point in Cleopatra's plan lay in

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33. Mahaffy, Emp. Ptol. p.405, says that authorities do not explain this fact. For degeneracy of men vid. Strabo XVII, I, 11.

34. Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt., p. 212.

35. One of the last kings of Egypt had an income of 12,500 talents, Strabo, XVII,1,12, who quotes some speech of Cicero probably not now extant.

36. Mahaffy, Hist. Ptol. p. 147.

37. Mommsen, Rom. Prov., II, p.188.

the fact that the triumvir³⁸ did not personify the state as did a king who reigned by dynastic right. His power was temporary and therefore an alliance by marriage was not an expedient which a representative of Roman authority might use.³⁹ Antony fully realized from Caesar's experience the impossibility of forming an actual marriage alliance with Cleopatra, if he wished to establish his power in Rome. Of what value would funds for his Parthian campaign be, if in gaining these funds, he lost the end for which the Parthian campaign was but a means, namely final supremacy in Italy? Cleopatra likewise from her experience realized the futility of anything but a legal marriage as a means of establishing her power. Hence the winter came to an end without an understanding having been reached and Antony left Egypt without funds.⁴⁰

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38. Technically the triumvirate was merely a board rei publicae constituendae. It had taken the place of a temporary dictatorship, for a board was always more according to Roman ideas than a dictatorship.

39. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p.243.

40. After the treaty with Octavian at Brundisium Antony was roughly handled by the troops because he lacked the funds with which to pay them.

Meanwhile grave disturbances had arisen in Italy where Fulvia, Antony's wife and Lucius, his brother, with the alleged purpose of supporting Antony's interests had provoked a would-be civil war ending with their defeat at the fall of Perugia.⁴¹ During these disturbances no word had come from Antony except a letter, probably fictitious, which had been shown in the senate stating that "They (Fulvia and Lucius) should fight if any one assailed his (Antony's) dignity."⁴² Ancient as well as modern historians have been too ready to attribute this delay of Antony's at such a crisis, just as they do Caesar's stay when his interests at Rome were in a perilous condition, to the charms of Cleopatra.⁴³ Although it must be admitted that Antony gave much of his time to gratifying his own pleasures, this cannot be given as the sole reason for his lack of communication with Italy.⁴⁴ The siege of Perugia took place in mid-winter when all navigation in the Mediterranean had ceased.⁴⁵ He could not have received this news until the

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41. Appian, B.C. V, 12 sq; Dio. XLVIII, 5, sq.

42. Appian, B.C. V, 29.

43. Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 213; Merivale, Hist. Rome, III, pp. 181-2; Duruy, Hist. Rome, III, p. 623.

44. Plut. Ant. 28; Dio, XLVIII, 24; Appian, B.C. V, 11.

45. For a discussion of the difficulty of travel during the winter vid. Duruy, Hist. Rome, IV, p. 228. The difficulties that St. Paul met with are well known.

spring of 40 B.C. after the fall of the fortress, too late to send aid. Deputies from the colonized veterans had come to him on the last transports to sail from Italy, it is true, but they would have arrived too late in the season for aid to have been sent to Lucius. Appian says that Antony retained the veterans and concealed his intentions.⁴⁶

Trouble threatened Antony from the East as well as from the West. The time seemed ripe for Parthia to extend her power westward. The enormous tribute levied by Antony had caused unrest and dissatisfaction.⁴⁷ The tyrants who had been driven out of the cities in Syria had fled to the Parthians for support.⁴⁸ In addition to this the Parthians had the exceptional good fortune to have at their service a Roman versed in military affairs, Quintus Labienus. He had been sent to Orodes before the battle of Philippi to ask for help for the "Liberators".⁴⁹ The king had detained him for some time in Parthia for he hesitated to conclude an alliance and feared to refuse. With the news of the defeat of his party and of the renewed proscriptions, Labienus decided to remain among the Parthians.⁵⁰

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46. Appian, B.C. V, 52. 47. Dio. XLVIII, 24.

48. Appian, B.C. V, 11.

49. Flor. IV, 9; Vell. Pat. II, 78.

50. Dio, XLVIII, 24.

An incitement to war was found in the attitude ^{the} of Aradii toward the messengers sent by Antony for tribute. One leader of this embassy, Curtius Salessas, was burned alive.⁵¹ The Parthians thus finding ^{the} Syrians already inclined toward aggression were the more readily persuaded by the arguments which Labienus set forth to the king Orodes. He stated that the legions were at the point of revolt and advised an immediate expedition into Syria while Octavian was detained in Italy by Sextus Pompey and Antony given over to enjoyment in Egypt. He offered himself as leader and promised to detach the provinces from the Romans easily because of the hostility which their treatment had aroused.⁵² In the early spring Orodes sent his forces across the Euphrates under the joint leadership of his son Pacorus and Labienus.⁵³ They rapidly overran the open country between the Euphrates and Antioch.

News came to Antony of the invasion of the Parthians while he was in Alexandria.⁵⁴ He wasted no time in

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51. Dio, XLVIII, 24; CIL, III, 546; vid. Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 84, n.10.

52. Dio, XLVIII, 24.

53. Plut. Ant. 28; Appian, Syr. 51.

54. Plut. Ant. 30 and Dio XLVIII, 27, state that the news came simultaneously with that of the fall of Perugia. Before accepting such a statement Plutarch's love of dramatic effect

delay, but set sail for Tyre immediately.⁵⁵ The question now arises as to why Antony did not proceed to a vigorous campaign against the Parthians. From statements of Dio Cassius⁵⁶ concerning Antony's troops one reason can be inferred. The larger part of Antony's legions were in Italy, Gaul and Macedonia.⁵⁷ On the other hand the garrisons stationed in Asia by Antony were mainly troops of Cassius and Brutus which he had incorporated into his own forces and assigned to garrison duty because they were familiar with the country. These men were easily won over to the cause of Labienus since they knew him of old.⁵⁸ This left An-

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must be taken into account. Appian, B.C. V, 52, says that only the Parthian news reached him in Alexandria, while the news from Italy came later, probably in a seaport of the province of Asia. Appian's account seems more probable. The fall of Perugia and the outbreak of the Parthians took place about the same time, but the inclement condition of the Mediterranean did not hold back news from Asia. Cf. Kroymayer, Hermes, XXIX, p.562; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. III, p.245, n.

55. Plut. Ant. 30; Dio, XLVIII, 27; Appian, B.C. V, 52.

56. XLVIII, 24-26.

57. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, p. 245, n. 2.

58. Strabo, XIV, 2, 24, states that Labienus used cohorts of the Roman soldiery which had been stationed in Asia.

tony without the troops necessary for a military expedition such as the campaign into Parthia now promised to be. Hence it can be assumed that he abandoned Syria for the time being to return to Italy for his legions.⁵⁹ Plutarch, however, states that he departed from Phoenicia because of letters received from Fulvia lamenting the condition of affairs in Italy.⁶⁰ The latter reason seems the more probable; for with such pressing need of action against the Parthians it seems that Antony would have sent for these legions while he himself rallied what forces he had in Syria, had he not seen a greater need for his presence elsewhere. This need was the maintenance of his power in Italy. If Antony's great aim was to establish an empire for himself in the Orient, would he not have felt that the need of successful action against Labienus and Pacorus was too urgent for him to have gone in person for additional troops and to have stayed over two years before returning? It seems that his position in Italy was of paramount importance in his eyes and the campaign against the Parthians but a means to this end. This means, as was shown in his decision against a marriage with Cleopatra, was not to be adopted if the accomplishment of his great ambition, supremacy at Rome, would thereby be imperiled.

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59. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. III, p. 245, holds this view, although he maintains that Antony's Parthian campaign was the great aim toward which all his other actions tend.

60. Ant. 30.

Antony left Decidius Saxa in charge of Syria with orders to defend himself as best he could while he himself sailed for Asia by way of Cyprus and Rhodes and thence to Greece.⁶¹ Deserted by large numbers of his troops Saxa was defeated in open battle. The casualty list was large. As a result Saxa fled to Antioch, and Apamea, which had been holding out against the Parthians, yielded on the report that Saxa had been killed. Saxa then abandoned Antioch and fled to Cilicia,⁶² while Labienus and Pacorus, emboldened by their success, decided upon a division of their troops in order to engage simultaneously in two great campaigns, Labienus in Asia Minor and Pacorus in Syria.⁶³

Labienus met with unbounded success. Saxa was soon defeated and slain⁶⁴ and Labienus seized Cilicia. Although most of the towns were easily taken, Stratonicea⁶⁵ and Mylasa stubbornly resisted. When Mylasa was finally taken and razed to the ground, Labienus levied tribute, robbed temples to gain funds and, in honor of his victories, styled himself Imperator Parthicus.⁶⁶ Pacorus likewise

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61. Appian, B.C. V, 52; Plut. Ant. 30; Dio, XLVIII, 27.

62. Dio, XLVIII, 24.

63. Ibid.

64. Flor. IV, 9, says that he committed suicide.

65. Tac. Ann. III, 62.

66. Not, as was the custom, the man who conquered the Parthians, but the man who, as a Parthian, conquered the Romans. Dio, XLVIII, 24; Appian, B.C. V, 65; Flor. IV, 9; Vell. Pat. II, 78; Just. XIII, 4; Liv. Epit. CXXVI-VII; Plut. Ant. 30.

met with success. He conquered all Syria and Phoenicia with the exception of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want of naval forces;⁶⁷ then he advanced into Palestine.⁶⁸

Relations between Antony and Octavian were becoming more and more strained, and civil war seemed imminent.⁶⁹ In Antony's conduct in this crisis his decision to maintain his power in the West against any encroachment on the part of Octavian seems clear. His energy and dispatch are hard to explain if the influence of Cleopatra and of the East were already at work. The determination of the legions to bring about a reconciliation,⁷⁰ combined with the death of the turbulent Fulvia,⁷¹ were the saving factors which averted civil war for the time being. In September 40 B.C.⁷² an

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67. Strabo, XIV, 2, 24.

68. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 3; Dio, XLVIII, 24.

69. Dio, XLVIII, 28; Vell. Pat. II, 26; Appian, B.C. V, 57.

70. Appian, B.C. V, 57.

71. Dio, XLVIII, 28; Appian, B.C. V, 59; Plut. Ant. 30; Liv. Epit. CXXVII.

72. Kroymayer, Hermes, 29, p. 563.

agreement was reached and a new partition of the empire was made. The boundary line was through Scodra,⁷³ a city of Illyrium supposedly midway up the Adriatic gulf. All provinces east of this place as far as the Euphrates were granted to Antony, all west of it to the Ocean to Octavian. Lepidus was to retain Africa.⁷⁴ There was no discussion of the accusations which had been made on both sides.⁷⁵ Even the soldiery seemed to feel that the reconciliation was not firmly established, and consequently demanded the marriage of Antony to Octavia, Octavian's sister, as a pledge of peace.⁷⁶

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73. Plin. N.H. III, 26. A town with rights of Roman citizens situated at a distance of eight miles from the sea.

74. Appian, B.C. V, 65; Vell. Pat. II, 76; Ferrero, III, p. 225, sees in this arrangement the first consequence of Cleopatra's influence, since at the division after Philippi, Antony had claimed provinces in the West for himself. He probably realized now that he needed all his troops in the East, and consequently left the task of the defence and administration of these provinces to Octavian.

75. Appian, B.C. V, 64.

76. Plut. Ant. 37; Appian, B.C. V, 64; Dio, XLVIII, 30.

Antony determined not to make the mistake of risking his power in the West a second time by returning too hastily to the East. He set out for Rome with Octavian, where in October⁷⁷ the marriage of Antony and Octavia was celebrated.⁷⁸

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77. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 562.

78. Appian, B.C. V, 65; Vell. Pat. II, 78; Tac. Ann. I, 10; Plut. Ant. 31; Liv. Epit. CXXVII.

CHAPTER V.

The Preparation for the Parthian Expedition.

As soon as the treaty with Octavian was completed, Antony turned his attention to checking the further advance of the Parthians. He sent Ventidius into Asia to command the campaign against them.¹ Ahenobarbus had already been appointed governor of Bithynia.² He made Lucius Munatius Plancus governor of Asia and gave him all the legions then available at Brundisium and in Macedonia.³ He ordered Asinius Pollio to mobilize the legions in Europe for immediate transportation to the East from Macedonia, of which Asinius was to be governor in 39 B.C.⁴

During the spring and summer of 39 B.C. Antony remained at Rome busy with Octavian in conciliating as best they could the hostility toward them. More and more Antony became convinced that to regain popularity and to put his power on a stable foundation some brilliant and lucrative enterprise was necessary. For this purpose a successful raid against the Parthians seemed best suited. To regain the standards lost by Crassus would bring popularity in Rome and to reestablish the prestige of Rome in the East would put provincial administration on a firm basis conducive to financial prosperity.

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1. Appian, B.C. V, 65; Plut. Ant. 33; Dio, XLVIII, 39.

2. Appian, B.C. V, 63.

3. Cf. Ganter, Prov. Verw., pp. 37-41.

4. Ibid. 71.

The need was urgent, for Pacorus had supplemented the successes of Labienus by gaining control of all Syria except Tyre and had advanced into Palestine where he had made an alliance with the anti-Roman Jews who had again revolted. Antigonus had offered Pacorus 1000 talents for assistance in establishing him on the throne as a client prince of Parthia. It must be remembered that all Jews did not live in the Roman empire. Jews high in rank and culture had dwelt in what was now the Parthian kingdom since the time of Nebuchadnezzar. These Jews were not held as apostates as were those of the West but were a great source of orthodoxy upon which the Jews of other countries could draw. Furthermore they were in constant communication with Judaea. Radin⁵ says that with Parthia the only power still existing which was formidable to Rome, the uninterrupted communication between the Jews of that section and the mother country must have created a political situation of no slight delicacy and may have played a much more important part in determining the relations of the governing Romans to the Jews than our sources show.

For many years there had been a pro-Parthian party in Judaea, but it must be remembered that this nationalist

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5. Radin, Jews among Gks and Roms., p. 370.

party fostered hatred against Rome not for political reasons alone. Arrayed with it were the Pharisees⁶ who seem to have hoped to find a greater sympathy and understanding for their religious philosophy from the Parthians than from the Romans. To the Roman the careful performance of the ancient rites of his own **cults** was largely an impersonal duty toward the well being of the state, while the Pharisee made the Torah⁷ a complete guide to his life not merely in theory but in actual practise. His aim was to learn from what God had revealed His will in regard to every slightest action that a man might do. He felt that he must give his whole concern to religious life, to meditation, prayer and the accomplishment of his duty toward God and man. The Roman could sympathize with the ceremonial display and parade of many Oriental cults, but he could not understand the cold reserve and aloofness of the Pharisee. Then too from an administrative viewpoint the Roman was opposed to the Pharisee. The Pharisee believed that it was

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6. Vid. supra p. 3.

7. The Torah was not merely the written word of the Pentateuch, consequently the term "Law" is not a good translation. Torah includes all the divine thought back of the "Law" and might be defined as the written word and the unwritten tradition taken together. Cf. Travers Hereford, Pharisaism, pp. 57-111.

necessary to separate himself as far as possible from the peoples of the land with the purpose of setting up a closed corporation distinct from the surrounding peoples and of providing for the maintenance of the Jewish cultus. Here he was to live his whole life with the Torah as a guide. The Halachah⁸ naturally included a large part of the law usually covered by a nation's civil and criminal code. Here was another point of conflict between the Roman governor and the Pharisee.

Little is known definitely as to the Parthian religious philosophy, but, as has been said, the Pharisees seemed to feel that they received a greater measure of understanding from the Parthian than from the Roman and consequently became loyal adherents of the pro-Parthian party.

Herod himself brought to Rome the news of the disasters ensuing from the rapprochement between Pacorus and Antigonus. Hyrcanus and Phaselus had been treacherously captured.⁹ The Parthians had plundered Judaea and left Antigonus to rule as high-priest and king.¹⁰ Herod

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8. The Halachah was the detailed statement of rules of right conduct derived from the study of the Torah. Cf. Travers Herford, Pharisaism, pp. 95, 96.

9. Joseph, Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13,8.

10. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13,9. While Josephus says "plundered" it was really a just levy on a subject province for aid given. Antigonus was but little more than a Parthian satrap.

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10 7. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13,9. While Josephus says "plundered" it was really a just levy on a subject province for aid given. Antigonus was but little more than a Parthian satrap.

asked that Aristobulus, grandson of Hyrcanus, be made king.¹¹ He accompanied his request with a large sum of money which he had sent to Idumea for safekeeping when the Parthians were threatening Jerusalem.¹² Antony however wished to see Herod himself king. Roman interests in the East were in a critical position. The Parthian invasion and the existence of so strong a pro-Parthian party in Judaea made the maintenance of Rome's power in Judaea a matter of the highest importance. Neither Antony nor Octavian could leave Rome with complications such as there were in the city. It seemed better, therefore, contrary to the usual Roman custom, to have a strong king rather than a figure-head, since he was to be relied upon to further Roman interests even at the expense of the enmity of his own people. The hatred of Herod was especially strong in those who hated Rome, either through Parthian proclivities or because Rome seemed a danger to the maintenance of their institutions.¹³ Herod in turn was at enmity with the Parthians, whose power threatened his

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11. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14,5.

12. Ibid. XIV, 36,4.

13. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 271.

very existence. With this fact set forth as the chief consideration the senate constituted Judaea a kingdom and appointed Herod king.¹⁴ Thus Herod became a client prince of the Romans as Antigonus was of the Parthians, each nation using Judaea as a buffer state against the other. With affairs in this condition in the Orient and the Parthians as Strabo said "Masters in the East",¹⁵ Antony set out in August or September 39 B.C.¹⁶ for Athens, where he intended to make preparations for his raid into Parthian territory.¹⁷ He planned to winter at Athens¹⁸ while he arranged affairs in the East.¹⁹ His appointment of Amyntus was a case parallel to that of Herod. By making this able Galatian officer king of Pisidia he turned over to him the subjugation of that unruly people²⁰ probably because they had un-

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14. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14, 4.

15. XIV, 2, 24.

16. Kromayer, Hermes, XXIX, pp. 561-2.

17. Plut. Ant. 33; Dio, XLVIII, 39.

18. Plut. Ant. 33; Appian, B.C. V, 75.

19. Appian, B.C. V, 75.

20. The tribes in Pisidia, Isauria, and western Cilicia practically maintained their independence until the time of the empire. After the overthrow of the Egyptian naval power western Cilicia especially became the refuge of pirates. From Amyntus' rule in this place is explained the fact that he built himself a residence in Isauria. Strabo, XII, 6,3; Mommsen, Rom. Prov., I, p. 362, n. 1.

very existence. With this fact set forth as the chief consideration the senate constituted Judaea a kingdom and appointed Herod king.¹¹ Thus Herod became a client prince of the Romans as Antigonas was of the Parthians, each nation using Judaea as a buffer state against the other. With affairs in this condition in the Orient and the Parthians, as Strabo said "Masters in the East",¹² Antony set out in August or September 39 B.C.¹³ for Athens, where he intended to make preparations for his raid into Parthian territory.¹⁴ He planned to winter at Athens¹⁵ while he arranged affairs in the East.¹⁶ His appointment of Amyntus was a case parallel to that of Herod. By making this able Galatian officer king of Pisidia he turned over to him the subjugation of that unruly people¹⁷ probably because they had un-

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11. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14, 4. Rom. num.
12. XIV, 2, 24. 16 13. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, pp. 561-2.
14. Plut. Ant. 33; Dio, XLVIII, 39.
15. Plut. Ant. 33; Appian, B.C. V, 75.
16. Appian, B.C. V, 75.
17. The tribes in Pisidia, Isauria, and western Cilicia practically maintained their independence until the time of the empire. After the overthrow of the Egyptian naval power western Cilicia especially became the refuge of pirates. From Amyntus' rule in this place is explained the fact that he built himself a residence in Isauria. Strabo, XII, 6, 3; Mommsen, Rom. Prov., I, p. 362, n.1.

dertaken another inroad upon Roman territory. Strabo says²¹ that it seemed best for the suppression of robbers and pirates that Pisidia be ruled by a king rather than by a Roman leader who would probably not be there at all times²² nor always under arms. Amyntus seemed fitted for the task, for he had held a prominent position in the government of Galatia under Diotarus as secretary and general.²³ As such he had, before the battle of Philippi, effected the transition of his country from the "Liberators" to the triumvirs.²⁴

Antony appointed Polemon, son of a rhetorician of Laodicea, to the throne of Lycaonia because of his valiant and upright conduct.²⁵ Zeno, his father, and Hybrias of Mylasa had raised a force of soldiers and held their cities against the Parthians.²⁶ In Pontus he reestablished the national

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21. Strabo, XIV, 5,5.

22. The proconsuls traveled on a circuit.

23. Dio, XLIX, 32, says only secretary, but Dio, XLVII, 48 says general also.

24. Dio, XLVII, 48.

25. Strabo, XII, 8,16.

26. Strabo, XIV, 2,24; Appian, B.C. V, 75.

dynasty by placing on the throne Darius son of Pharnaces and grandson of Mithridates.²⁷ His reasons for the appointment of Herod as king of Judaea have already been stated. In these appointments it is hardly possible to agree with Appian in his statement, "He set up kings here and there as he pleased on condition of their paying a prescribed tribute".²⁸ Antony seems to have had a very sufficient reason in each case in addition to the tribute received.

Antony does not appear to have had in view, as Mommsen states "the erection of an Asiatic great-kingdom after the model of that of Alexander",²⁹ and for this reason made all the regions of the East once occupied by Occidentals subject to himself in the form of satrapies. He was following a policy recognized by Caesar³⁰ and followed later by Octavian,³¹ the use of the client prince. True to Roman policy he used these princes in forming a chain of buffer states against the power of Parthia, thus securing for himself the security of the Eastern provinces demanded by the capitalists in Rome.³²

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27. Appian, B.C. V, 75.

28. Ibid. ἵστη δέ πη καὶ βασιλέας, ὧς δοκιμασεῖεν, ἐπὶ ~~καὶ~~ φόροις ἕρα τε ταγμένοις.

29. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 26.

30. For a discussion of Caesar's division of the Asiatic principal cities after Zela vid. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p.149sq.

31. Cf. Mon. Ancyrr. 27.

32. Cic. de Imp. Cn. Pomp., VII, 19.

The time seems long between the spring of the year 40, when Antony sailed from Tyre to make preparations for his expedition, and the summer of 38, when he returned to Asia, but this goes but to show that Antony was striving to maintain his position in Italy at all costs, while the expedition against the Parthians was of secondary importance.

While in Greece Antony followed the customary methods of a Roman general. To obtain funds as well as to keep the soldiers, who were to go with him into winter quarters, in training, he sent a part of them against the Partheni, an Illyrian tribe which had supported Brutus, and defeated them.³³ Another division of soldiers was sent against the Dardani, who were constantly making incursions into Macedonia. The remainder he kept within easy reach at Epirus. He sent Furnus to Africa for the purpose of bringing four additional legions.³⁴

Meanwhile he collected as much as possible of the tribute due. The Peloponnesus had been ceded to Sextus Pompey on condition that the tribute then due from it should either be given over at once or should be guaranteed by Sextus to Antony.³⁵ In his zeal to collect money it is said

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33. Appian, B.C. V, 75.

34. Ibid.

35. Appian, B.C. V, 77; Dio, XLVIII, 39.

that Antony ordered Lachares, the richest landholder in the Peloponnesus to be beheaded on the charge of robbery.³⁶

Antony was but following the example of his illustrious predecessor in employing such means. Dio Cassius says that Caesar resorted to assassination to obtain funds.³⁷

When the stormy season interfered with his work outside Greece, Antony gave himself over to a life of pleasure with Octavia, just as he had spent the winter of 41-40 with Cleopatra, merely looking over the reports sent out from the armies. He exchanged the display of a general for the simplicity of private life, wore the Attic dress, took his meals in Greek fashion, and attended the lectures and discussions of public teachers.³⁸ He even went so far as to entitle himself the younger Dionysus and insisted on being so called by others.³⁹ This was not an unusual practise, for the Dionysiac ritual differed from others in that in the common Greek nomenclature attached to it the inspired male votary was himself Βάκχος. The spirit of the god was supposed to enter into him, and therefore for the time

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36. Plut. Ant. 67; Cf. Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique, 1896, p. 155.

37. XLII, 49.

38. Appian, B.C. V, 76.

39. Dio, XLVIII, 39; Vell. Pat. II, 82; Athen. IV, 29.

being he bore the name.⁴⁰

During the winter had come news of the victory of Ventidius over the Parthians. He had landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia Minor where Labienus with the Roman soldiers that ~~had been~~ won to his standards was ravaging the country. Labienus was panic stricken, and sent urgent messages to Pacorus for aid. Ventidius forced him to retreat as far as the Taurus range where he overtook him. Both armies remained in camp for several days, for Labienus was awaiting the Parthians and Ventidius his heavy armed soldiers. Both arrived on the same day. Ventidius, through fear of the much famed Parthian cavalry, remained on the high ground where he was encamped. The Parthians, overconfident from their former victories, acted independently instead of placing themselves under the command of Labienus. They charged up the incline and were easily routed. They then deserted Labienus and fled into Cilicia. Ventidius, on hearing that the soldiers of Labienus intended to escape by stealth during the night, laid an ambushade and killed or captured the greater part of them. Labienus himself escaped to Cilicia, only to be later captured and put to death.⁴¹

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40. Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, V, p. 151.

41. Dio, XLVIII, 39-41; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15,1; Bell. Jud. I, 15,3; Flor. Epit. II, 19; Frontin. Strateg. II, 5,36; Macrob. Sat. I, 11-18; Liv. Epit. CXXVII.

After this victory Ventidius regained Cilicia, and while he was reorganizing the country, sent ahead Pompaedius Silo with cavalry⁴² to the narrow pass, the Syrian Gates, leading into Syria.⁴³ Here Pacorus had sent a detachment under Pharnapates to guard the passage. Pacorus left Antigonus to defend himself as best he could against Herod, who was energetically maintaining his position against the Parthians, and concentrated his forces in Northern Syria and Commagene.

Silo attacked Pharnapates and was on the verge of defeat⁴⁴ when Ventidius came up and by his aid brought about a victory. Pharnapates with a great number of his followers was killed. On the news of this defeat Pacorus retreated across the Euphrates for the winter, in order to prepare for a renewed invasion of Syria in the spring.⁴⁵

In Palestine Ventidius did little to aid Herod. Josephus⁴⁶ even accuses him of coming merely for the purpose of extracting money from Antigonus. Ventidius was following the principles of strategy in striking the main body rather than the small divisions.

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42. Dio, XLVIII, 41.

43. Ibid. Dio says that the pass was so narrow that a wall and gates were once built across it, hence the name.

44. Frontin. Strateg. II, 5, 37, says the retreat was planned as a ruse. He also spells the name Pharnastanis.

45. Hor. Carm. III, 6.

46. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14, 6. Josephus never displays

The campaign of the fall of 39 ended with Ventidius in possession of all Syria except the district of the Ariadii, who were holding out desperately in fear of punishment for the murder of Antony's legates.⁴⁷ On the news of these victories Antony instituted a public festival throughout Greece in thanksgiving.⁴⁸

At the opening of the spring of 38 Antony laid aside all frivolity and continued with his preparations, Lictors, army officers, and guards appeared. Embassies were received that formerly had been kept waiting, lawsuits were decided, ships launched, and all the work preparatory for the campaign set in motion.⁴⁹

Everything was at last in readiness for the retaliatory raid into Parthian territory. Each side was awaiting the opening of spring to begin hostilities. Much to Antony's irritation, at this most inopportune time, word came from Octavian asking him to come to Brundisium for a consultation. War with Sextus Pompey seemed imminent and Octavian was in need of assistance. The summons could not have come

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a clear comprehension of military tactics.

47. Dio. XLVIII, 41.

48. Plut. Ant. 33.

49. Plut. Ant. 33.

at a time more illsuited to Antony's interests. Nevertheless, he set sail for Brundisium and arrived there on the day appointed. Antony was not yet ready for a break with Octavian. He needed the prestige which he hoped to gain from a victorious Parthian campaign. Furthermore he was still lacking in funds.

Octavian did not appear. Antony wasted no time in waiting, but leaving a note to Octavian advising him not to violate their previous arrangement, sailed back to Greece.⁵⁰ Appian⁵¹ gives several reasons which may be assumed for his hasty departure: either that he did not approve of the war, because he considered it a violation of the treaty of Misenum, or that he saw the great preparations of Octavian which he judged to be indicative of a future struggle for supreme power, or that he was frightened at the prodigy of a wolf, which entered the camp and devoured one of his guards all except the face.⁵² It seems clear, however, that, when Antony had made every preparation for his Parthian campaign upon the success of which he felt that the stability of his power rested, he would seize upon any pretext to avoid becoming embroiled in a war with Sextus which

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50. Dio, XLVIII, 46; Appian, B.C. V, 78-79.

51. B.C. V, 79.

52. Dio, XLVIII, 46; Appian, B.C. V, 79.

would, in all probability, postpone his own active participation in the affairs of the Orient for a year and leave too much opportunity for glory to his lieutenant, Ventidius, reports of whose further success had already reached him.

Hostilities between Ventidius and Pacorus had begun unusually early in the season. In fact Ventidius heard that Pacorus was ready to invade Syria before his own troops were assembled from winter-quarters. By false reports circulated among the Parthians he led them to cross the Euphrates considerably lower down the stream and in this way forty valuable days were consumed which he used in collecting his own forces.⁵³

Ventidius took a position on high ground at some distance from the river in Cyrresticia, offering no resistance to Pacorus' crossing nor taking the offensive after it had been accomplished. Once more the Parthians became over confident and assumed the offensive. They approached the Roman defenses and boldly charged up the hill. The Romans made a sudden sally, and the enemy, taken at a disadvantage were driven down the hill. Pacorus was slain. For a time his personal guard defended his body, but, when these too had fallen, the rest gave way and fled in all directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by which they had crossed the

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53. Frontin. Strateg., I, 1,6.

river, but were cut off and slain. The remainder took refuge with Antiochus king of Commagene.⁵⁴ By the Parthian defeat the death of Crassus was avenged.⁵⁵

With the expedition of Labienus and Pacorus terminated any advance of the Parthian dominion toward the West. So far the Arsacids had adopted the Roman policy, following aggression by aggression in its effort to push the Western boundary to the coast of the Aegean and the Mediterranean, but from the defeat of Pacorus their policy became defensive rather than offensive. The Parthian method of warfare was suited for defence on the broad plains of inner Asia, but ineffective for offense in the rougher regions near the coast. The Parthians seemed unable to adapt their military system to changed conditions. It remained the same throughout their entire history. The Romans, on the contrary, were always ready to adapt their mode of warfare to meet new situations. By a modification of their tactics the Romans compelled the Parthians to give up hope of dominion in the West.^{56.}

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^{54.} Flor. II, 19; Dio. XLIX, 20; Strabo, XVI, 2,8; Plut. Ant. 34; Just. XLII, 4; Livy, Epit. CXXVIII.

^{55.} The defeat of Pacorus is said to have taken place on the anniversary of the defeat of Crassus. Dio, XLIX, 21; Eutrop. VII, 5; Oros. VI, 18,23.

^{56.} Cf. Rawlinson, Parth. pp. 198-200.

Ventidius easily reduced the rest of Syria, for its allegiance to the Parthians was based largely upon the personal influence of Pacorus whose administration had been just and mild.⁵⁷ He then turned his forces against Antiochus at Samosata, both because he had not delivered up the fugitive Parthians and because of the opportunity for vast plunder in his rich kingdom. The king entered into negotiations with Ventidius and offered to pay an indemnity of 1000 talents. Ventidius came to no terms with him, however, but awaited the heralded arrival of Antony.⁵⁸

Meanwhile Antony had set out from Greece amid great pomp and ceremony. He took a crown of sacred olive in conformity to an oracle,⁵⁹ and filled a vessel with water from the Clepsydra⁶⁰ to carry with him.⁶¹ On his arrival

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57. Dio, XLIX, 20.

58. Plut. Ant. 34; Dio, XLIX, 20.

59. The sacred olive grew near the ~~Erechtheum~~ Erechtheum on the Acropolis.

60. Paus. mentions a fountain of the Acropolis near the Propylaea. A spring is still to be found enclosed in a chapel in the rock on the north side of the Acropolis.

61. Plut. Ant. 34.

in Asia he ordered Macherus to go to the assistance of Herod with a considerable force. The adherents of Antigonus had resisted every effort of Herod, confident of the final supremacy of their patrons, the Parthians. The Romans had been able to give Herod but little assistance occupied as they were in their efforts to regain their power in Asia. Josephus claims that Macherus was bribed into inaction by Antigonus.⁶² Herod, therefore, determined to make a personal appeal to Antony himself.⁶³ The time seemed opportune, for Antony had assumed command at the siege of Samosata, but had met with far less success than he had anticipated. After the first refusal of terms by Ventidius the people had set to work desperately on the defence of the town. Their efforts had met with such success that Antony had made but little progress. Herod arrived with a cavalry and infantry force of his own and a division which he had persuaded to join him at Antioch.⁶⁴ Soon after the arrival of Herod

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62. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 7. Josephus is too ready to attribute the Roman lack of success in Judaea to bribery. It must be remembered that the Romans were unable to concentrate there, that there were large numbers of Jews in the Oriental party supporting Antigonus, and that the natural defences of Jerusalem were excellent. Strabo, XVI, 2, 40, describes the difficulty of a siege.

63. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 7.

64. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 8.

with these reinforcements Antiochus delivered up the fortress to Antony, although probably paying a smaller indemnity than was originally demanded.⁶⁵ The fall of Samosata closed the season's campaign.

Here has been found another instance of Antony's good judgment in fostering the power of the Idumeans. Herod had come to Antony when aid was urgently needed. He had recognized the principle of military tactics whereby the completion of the main campaign is required before troops can be sent to a less important one. As a reward for his services Antony despatched Sossius to Judaea to see that the campaign there was carried on with expedition,⁶⁶ as a part of his duty

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62. Plut. Ant. 34; Oros. VI, 18,23; Dio, XLIX, 22, says that Antony received neither hostages nor money, but granted Antiochus the death of Alexander, who had deserted to the Romans. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 9, says that in a little time after Herod's arrival with aid Antiochus delivered up the fortress, stating nothing as to lessened indemnity and implying that Herod's aid brought the siege to a successful close.

Since the source of the military affairs in Plutarch is probably Dellius, one of Antony's lieutenants, it might seem that more reliance should be placed on his account, but it must be remembered that he deserted Antony and became a staunch adherent of Octavian, so that he would be ready at all times to assign as little success as possible to Antony.

65. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15,9; Oros. VI, 18,23.

as governor of Syria and Cilicia.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Antony appointed Canidius to carry on offensive warfare in Armenia.⁶⁸ He sent Ventidius to Rome to enjoy a triumph after bestowing upon him suitable decorations.

The enthusiasm at Rome was unbounded. The senate voted Antony a triumph in accordance with the law for he was commander, but it voted one also to Ventidius, for it felt that he had paid the Parthians in full for the death of Crassus by the death of their prince, Pacorus.⁶⁹ Fate decreed that the first man⁷⁰ to celebrate a triumph at Rome over the

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67. Dio, XLIX, 22; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15,6. Oros, VI, 18,23, states that Antony placed Ventidius in charge of Syria with instructions to carry on war against Antigonus, but this is obviously a mistake for Ventidius celebrated his triumph that fall at Rome. CIL. Acta Triumphal, 716, Nov.28.

68. Plut. Ant. 34.

69. Dio, XLIX, 21; Flor. II, 19; Plut. Ant. 34.

70. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p.278, states that Asinius Pollio celebrated a triumph over the Parthians, Oct. 25, 39 B.C. He mistakes the tribe of the Partheni for the Parthians.

Parthians had once been led captive in a triumphal procession through these very streets.⁷¹

In order that Antony might be in easy communication with both Italy and Asia, he decided to winter in Greece.⁷² It was imperative for Antony to maintain his position in Italy. The lesser campaigns in Asia could well be entrusted to his subordinates, while the loss of influence due to his absence during a campaign would endanger his power at Rome. Caesar had followed this same plan when he was proconsul in Gaul, leaving the legions in winter quarters under his lieutenants while he himself hastened into Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar also furnished a precedent for Antony in leaving Sextus Caesar to carry on the work of reorganization in Asia when there was need of his own presence elsewhere.⁷³

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71. Vell. Pat. II, 65. For references to the triumph celebrated by Ventidius vid. Val. Max. VI, 9,9; Plin, N.H. 7,44; Plut. Ant. 34; Suet. quoted in Gellius, XV, 4; CIL. Acta triumpha, 716, Nov. 28; Juv. Sat. VII, 199; old epigram given in Gellius, XV, 4; Eutrop, VII, 5; Dio, XLIX, 21.

72. Plut. Ant. 34.

73. Bell. Alex. 66; Dio, XLVIII, 26; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9,2; Bell. Jud. I, 10,5.

The present time was most suited to make Antony's authority dominant at Rome, for Octavian had disregarded Antony's note left for him at Brundisium in favor of peace with Sextus and, as a consequence, his fleet had been destroyed off Scylla.⁷⁴ His funds were low and he feared to levy new taxes because of the ill feeling toward him already manifest in Italy.⁷⁵ In so difficult a situation, the support of Antony was imperative.

Furthermore the year 38 B.C. marked the end of the five year agreement between Octavian, Lepidus and Antony.⁷⁶ The triumvirate could hardly be renewed without discussion between the colleagues. In addition to this Antony wished to exchange his fleet, which was but an added expense and of which Octavian was in need, for a part of the legionaries of Octavian, which he required.⁷⁷ For these reasons Antony felt the necessity of leaving the winter campaign to his subordinates and returning to Greece.

Octavian recognized the strength of Antony's position and resolved to send to him at Athens, Maecenas, Cocceius and Fonteius Capito to treat and, if possible, to ar-

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74. Appian, B.C. V, 85-90; Dio, XLVIII, 47-48.

75. Appian, B.C. V, 92.

76. Appian, B.C. IV, 2.

77. Ibid, V, 93.

range for a renewal of the triumvirate.⁷⁸ What message Maecenus brought back with him from Greece is uncertain. It is probable that Antony agreed to some sort of an alliance and promised assistance.⁷⁹ Appian⁸⁰ says that, on receipt of the message, Octavian cast off his despondency and set to work building ships. Relying on Antony's support in case of trouble, he dared to raise money by renewed taxation.⁸¹ Octavian's efforts at preparation met with such success that he assumed a far different attitude toward Antony in the spring of 37 B.C. Octavian feared that his own position in Italy would be greatly weakened by showing too open a dependence on Antony. He had done all in his power to put himself in a position to demand favorable terms from Antony, for he knew that Antony would be eager to be back in the Orient and that forces for his expedition and freedom from worry over political affairs in Italy were essential. Accordingly when Antony arrived at Tarentum⁸² with

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78. Appian, B.C. V, 92; Hor. Sat. I, 5, 32.

79. Appian, B.C. V, 93.

80. Ibid. 92.

81. Dio, XLVIII, 49.

82. Cf. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 293, n. 5.

his three hundred ships,⁸³ Octavian postponed his coming and offered numerous pretexts for the delay. Antony persisted in his efforts, for he wished to effect the exchange of ships for the needed soldiery. At this crisis Octavia acted as mediator, and Octavian finally agreed to an interview.⁸⁴ The triumvirate was renewed for a period of five years dating from January 1, 37 B.C.⁸⁵ The reconciliation was but a mutual pretence and none felt it to be more so than Antony.⁸⁶

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83. Appian, B.C. V, 93.

84. Ibid; Plut. Ant. 35.

85. Dio simply says that they granted themselves the chief authority. Appian, B.C. V, 95, says they renewed the triumvirate for five years without asking the people. Appian, Illyr. 28, says that the triumvirs themselves ordained it but that the people confirmed it. The last statement seems the most probable, nor do the other statements contradict it. The formality of having the law approved by the people gave a legal significance to their authority. This sanction could have been obtained after Antony had left.

86. Dio, XLVIII, 54.

It was with but little satisfaction that Antony set sail for Syria, leaving Octavia with her brother.⁸⁷ The events which had just transpired had a marked influence on Antony's future conduct in the Orient. From the overbearing manner in which Octavian had acted, Antony came to a realization of the power his rival had gained both from his absence from Italy and from his inability to gain funds for the soldiers in Asia, a task which, it will be remembered, had been assigned to Antony by the agreement after Philippi. The bankrupt condition of Asia was not appreciated in Italy and Antony's enemies were all too ready to attribute his lack of funds to his excesses while in the East.⁸⁸ He realized that the inevitable struggle with Octavian was imminent, but was determined to be as prepared as possible before the conflict. These conditions must be kept in mind in a consideration of his subsequent conduct in the East.

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87. Plut. Ant. 35; Dio, XLVIII, 54, says that Antony sent Octavia to Italy from Corcyra. She might easily have accompanied him that far on his journey.

88. Plut. Ant. 24.

CHAPTER VI.

The Parthian Expedition.

Since the agreement reached at Tarentum had promised to be of so little advantage to Antony, he could not but feel that, if he wished to counter-act Octavian's rapidly increasing claims to popularity in Italy, haste in the preparations for his Parthian expedition was imperative. Everything was in readiness except the financial backing necessary for the execution of his project.

During Antony's absence in Italy, his lieutenants had been most successful in their work in the East preparatory to the expedition. Publius Canidius, who had been sent against the Iberians,¹ had conquered them, brought them into an alliance, and with their aid had pushed on against the Albanians, whom he likewise had overcome.² In July 37 B.C. Herod and Sossius had captured Jerusalem.³

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1. Plut. Ant. 34; Dio, XLIX, 24; Drumann, Gesch. Roms. p. 450. Drumann thinks that the king of the Iberians took this stand in hope that Canidius would meet disaster in the continuance of his campaign.

2. Dio, XLIX, 24.

3. Joseph, Antiq. Jud. XIV, ; Dio, XLIX, 22. For a discussion of the date vid. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, pp. 563-571; Schürer, Hist. Jews, I, p. 397, n. 11.

The fall of Jerusalem was of great importance to Antony for it not only placed the troops which had been engaged in the siege of this city at his disposal, but it also furnished him with a small part of those funds for which he had such need, since it was only by means of rich gifts that Herod induced Sossius and his troops to depart.⁴ On the fall of the city Antigonus was put to death, for much as Antony wished to use him in a triumph he realized that, as long as a pro-Parthian prince of the Hasmonean house was alive, the Jews and Parthians would conspire to replace him upon the throne. Josephus, as usual, attributes Antony's decision to Herod's bribes.⁵ This was the first time a Roman had ever ordered the execution of a king.⁶ In addition to this success at Jerusalem, Sossius had conquered the Aradii, who had held out against the Romans most resolutely.⁷

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4. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 16, 1-3; Bell. Jud. I, 17, 9; 18, 1-3.

5. Ibid. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 16, 4.

6. Ibid. Antiq. Jud. XV, 1, 2, where he quotes a passage from a history of Strabo not now extant; Dio, XLIX, 22; Plut. Ant. 36; Zonar, 5, 11; Hegessip. I, 31.

7. Dio, XLIX, 22.

Immediately on Antony's arrival in Syria in the late fall of 37 B.C.,⁸ he took up again the work of administration which he had begun in 41 B.C. Again Plutarch⁹ states that Antony conducted affairs in a reckless fashion, that he gave tetrachies to private persons and took kingdoms from many rulers. The only example which he cites, however, is Antigonus. For Antony to deprive this Parthian client-prince of his throne in order to establish the pro-Roman Herod in his place, showed no lack of judgment.¹⁰

It is probable that at this time Antony also enforced his earlier decision against Ariarathes by establishing Archelaus on the throne.¹¹ In 39 B.C. Antony had made

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8. For a discussion of the date vid. Bürcklein, Röm.-parth. Feldzüge, p. 24.

9. Ant. 36.

10. Gardthausen, Augustus I, p. 292, following the view of Plutarch, cites the case of Lysanias, son of Ptolemy, king of Iturea (Dio, XLIX, 32). He too was charged with giving aid to the Parthians, (Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4,1), perhaps unjustly, but Antony cannot be censured for taking drastic measures against him, since at least he was on intimate terms with Antigonus. (Bouché-Leclercq, Lag. II, 254.)

11. Vid. supra p. 49, n. 77.

Amyntas ruler over Pisidia.¹² On the death of Diotarus, king of Galatia, the rule had reverted to his heirs.¹³ Antony now took Galatia from them and bestowed it, together with Lycaonia and Pamphylia, upon the capable Amyntas.¹⁴ This was good policy, for Galatia was a region of Asia best organized in a military point of view and most ready for action.¹⁵ Indeed the Romans always found its race of fighting men both useful and congenial and under the empire recruited largely from them.¹⁶ Therefore in preparing for his Parthian raid it was essential for Antony to have the Galatians under a ruler upon whom he could depend.

Everything now seemed in readiness for the campaign, with the exception of financial backing. Antony had become convinced that all his efforts to secure funds had been inadequate. These sovereigns whom he had established could furnish him with but little in comparison with

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12. Vid. supra p. 91.

13. Dio, XLIII, 33.

14. Ibid. XLII, 32; Plut. Ant. 61; Strabo, XII, 5, 1.

15. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. I, p. 363.

16. Arnold, Rom. Imp. pp. 229-230.

his needs, for as has been shown¹⁷ Asia was bankrupt. A most convincing proof of Antony's desperate need of money is the debased coinage which he issued at this time.¹⁸ He had tried every expedient to finance his expedition in the years since the winter of 41-40, when his hope of gaining unlimited resources through an alliance with Cleopatra had failed.¹⁹ As a last expedient to attaining his ultimate goal of supreme power at Rome, Antony was forced into a marriage with Cleopatra. The changed attitude of Octavian, the unsatisfactory settlement at Tarentum, and his own bankrupt condition had brought matters to a crisis. Antony realized that the inevitable conflict with Octavian could not long be postponed and that before an open conflict should take place he must regain his popularity with the Roman populace. The only sure means seemed to be a successful raid into Parthian territory and the regaining of the standards lost by Crassus. With these considerations in mind therefore he sent Fonteius Capito to Alexandria to bring Cleopatra to Antioch.²⁰

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17. Vid. supra p. 63.

18. Pliny; N.H. XXXIII, 46.

19. Vid. supra p. 76.

20. Plut. Ant. 35, Bouché-Lecclerq, Lag. II, pp. 252 sq., Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 291, see no other motive in Antony's renewed intercourse with Cleopatra than his love for

By a careful study of the coins Letronne²¹ has shown that in the beginning of the year 36 B. C. Antony and Cleopatra celebrated their marriage at Antioch with due legal procedure. There is also evidence that the legality of this marriage was recognized in antiquity, for Plutarch²² states that at this time Antony had two legal wives. Furthermore by acknowledging Caesarion as Caesar's heir²³ and thus sanctioning Caesar's relation with Cleopatra, Antony showed that he believed that his own marriage with her could be considered legal.²⁴ Furthermore it was not after his divorce from Octavia but in 36 that Antony recognized his children by Cleopatra as legal. Clearly then he at last had acceded to Cleopatra's demand for a legal marriage. Un-

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her. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, p.3, sees only a political motive, but thinks this motive was to obtain funds for the conquest of all Persia.

21. Recueil des inscriptions grecques et latines de l'Egypte Paris, 1842-1848, II, p. 90 sq. referred to by Bouché-Ledlerq, Lag. II, p. 257, n. 1, and by Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, p. 6-7.

22. Com. Dem. cum Ant. 4.

23. Dio, XLIX, 41.

24. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, pp. 582-3.

der no other circumstance would she furnish him with funds to finance his expedition. It is important to note, however, that the marriage was celebrated without any display or ostentation, in a Syrian town, not at Alexandria, that Antony did not accept the title of king on his coins, and that he took no step to break with Octavia.²⁵ This seems to indicate that Antony's aim was still to attain supremacy at Rome not to win an empire in the East. With a successful Parthian campaign with which to command popularity at Rome he would no longer be in need of Cleopatra and her wealth. The triumphant Roman general could easily ignore the obscure marriage with the Egyptian queen. It was not until his raid into Parthia ended in failure that he gave up hope of supremacy in Rome and, yielding to the persuasions of Cleopatra, turned his eyes to a kingdom in the Orient. Until that time his entire policy had corresponded to that of former Roman generals aspiring to supremacy at Rome. Another proof of the legality of the marriage is that Cleopatra followed the custom of Egyptian sovereigns when they contracted a new marriage, by beginning to count the years of her reign

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25. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, V, p. 266.

from that date.²⁶

Now that Antony felt that financial backing for his expedition was assured he hastened his preparations. In return for the aid given him by Cleopatra he presented her with the kingdom of Lysanius of Chalcis.²⁷ In the

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26. Por. Tyr. F G H. III, p. 724. For a full discussion of the change in date vid. Bouché-Leclercq, Lag. II, p. 257, n. 1 and Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, p. 7, n. 2.

27. Por. Tyr. F G H. III, p. 724; Dio, XLIX, 32. Sources disagree concerning the gifts to Cleopatra both as to date and whether they were all granted at the same time. That the kingdom of Lysanius was granted her before September, 36, is generally accepted. (Schürer, Hist. Jews, p. 402; Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 575; Gardthausen, Augustus, I., p. 292; Bouché-Leclercq, Lag. II, p. 256). Plutarch, Ant. 36, places the entire gift and the recognition of the twin children in 36 before the Parthian expedition. Dio, (XLIX, 32), places the entire gift and the recognition of the twin children and also that of Ptolemy in 36, but after the expedition. Josephus, Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 1-2, divides the gifts and puts the date in 34 in connection with the summons of Herod to Laodicea to answer for the murder of Aristobulus. Schürer, Hist. Jews, p. 402, n. 5; p. 344, accepts Josephus. Gardthausen, Augustus, I, 292, seems to accept Plutarch without

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discussion. Bouché-Leclercq, Lag. II, p. 255, follows Plutarch without discussion of the date. In an article on Herod in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie, Kromayer's investigations are discussed and accepted. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, p. 9, accepts Kromayer without discussion. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, pp. 571-585, places the donations in 36 before the Parthian expedition. He attributes the difference in time between Dio and Plutarch to Dio's carelessness in the chronology within the year. However he fails to note one other point of difference between Dio and Plutarch. In the recognition of Antony's children as legitimate Plutarch includes only the twins. Dio includes Ptolemy who was probably born during the Parthian expedition. It seems that Dio did not place the recognition of the children and the donations after the raid into Media because of carelessness in chronology but because he wished to include Ptolemy. It seems that the birth of a child after the legal marriage would be a most suitable occasion for the recognition of all three children as legitimate, a step upon which Cleopatra was most likely to insist. Therefore I follow Kromayer in placing the donations in the year 36, but I accept Dio rather than Plutarch in putting the date after the Parthian expedition.

early spring everything was in readiness and Antony set out on his campaign, accompanied as far as the Euphrates by Cleopatra.²⁸ Practically all modern historians maintain that Antony opened his campaign too late in the year,²⁹ and on the authority of Livy³⁰ attribute the delay to his desire to remain as long as possible with Cleopatra. Kromayer, on the contrary,³¹ has proved that Antony entered upon his campaign even earlier than preceding Roman commanders, since he arrived at Zeugma in February or March.

Furthermore, even before his actual departure, he was busily engaged in negotiations with the Parthian noble Monaeses. On the death of Pacorus, the king Orodes had abdicated in favor of his son Phraates.³² There ensued a series of atrocities begun by the murder of all possible claimants to the throne. Since any of the nobility who ventured to protest were executed, many prominent men,

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28. Plut. Ant. 37; Joseph, Bell. Jud. I, 18, 5; Antiq. Jud. XV, 4,2; Strabo, XI, 13,4.

29. Drumann, Gesch. Roms. I, 453; Rawlinson, Parth. p. 201; Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 30; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 293; Bouche-Leclercq, Lag., II, p.255.

30. Epit. 130.

31. Hermes, 31, pp. 90-101.

32. Dio, XLIX, 24; Justin, XLII, 4; Head, Hist. Num. p. 694.

among them Monaeses, fled to Antony for protection.³³

He represented to Antony that, with Roman support, he could easily overcome the Parthians. Antony was greatly impressed by his proposals and an agreement was reached.³⁴ Meanwhile, Phraates, seeing that he had carried his persecutions to a point dangerous to himself, had come to terms with Monaeses. Antony learned of the infidelity of Monaeses, but, in order to take the Parthians the more unprepared, sent him back to Parthia, to negotiate with the king, as if he still believed him faithful to Roman interests.³⁵ Antony himself, however, entered into negotiations with Artavasdes, king of Armenia.³⁶ These negotiations terminated in his decision to attack the territory of the king of Medea. Atropatene, a Parthian client-prince,³⁷ who had left his country practically unguarded by joining his troops to those of the Parthians on guard at the Euphrates frontier.

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33. Plut. Ant. 37; Dio, XLIX, 24.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid; Flor. II, 20; IV, 10.

36. Head, Hist. Num. p. 636; Dio, XLIX, 25.

37. Dio, XLIX, 25.

In execution of this plan Antony turned to the north on reaching the Euphrates, instead of crossing the river as the Parthians had expected. In order to take Medea Atropatene the more unprepared Antony divided his troops. To Oppius Statianus he entrusted the baggage train and siege batteries, while he proceeded by forced marches toward Praaspa, the capitol of Medea Atropatene.³⁸ He at once laid siege to the stronghold. The Median king returned to the defence of his country, but, instead of attempting to relieve the siege, made a surprise attack on Statianus. The Roman leader was defeated and slain with 10,000 of his men, and the baggage train and siege-engines were captured.³⁹ Even more disastrous for Antony than the loss of this division of his army was the desertion of Artavasdes, who inspired either by treachery or by fear that Antony's expedition was destined to failure, withdrew his troops and left Antony without the support of his all essential cavalry.⁴⁰

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38. Plut. Ant. 38; Dio, XLIX, 25.

39. Plut. Ant. 38.

40. Plut. Ant. 39; Dio, XLIX, 25. Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 294, sees no trace of treachery. Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 258, n. 2, follows Strabo, XI, 13, 4, and Plut. Ant. 50, in accepting treason as the cause. H. Rawlinson, Geographical Journal, Vol. X, pp. 113-117 identifies Praaspa with the modern Takht-i-Suleiman. Dio uses the name Phraaspa or Praaspa and Plutarch Phrasta.

Antony, nevertheless, continued to push the siege, until his supplies began to fail and he was forced to send his foraging parties to such a distance that they were frequently attacked and destroyed by the enemy.⁴¹ Consequently, feeling compelled to relinquish the siege and retreat to Armenia before winter set in, he began to retire to the Araxes⁴² guided by a Mardian who was well acquainted with the country. Under constant attack from the Parthians and suffering from cold and lack of food and water, he fought his way back to Armenia,⁴³ but did not winter in that country, choosing rather to push on into Syria, where he was met by Cleopatra with money and supplies for the army.⁴⁴ Here he left the army in winter quarters, and departed with the queen for Alexandria.⁴⁵

In a discussion of Antony's expedition against Parthia, it is necessary to keep in mind the purpose that he had in view. Modern historians, without exception, see in this expedition a great campaign of conquest for the purpose of

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41. Dio, XLIX, 26.

42. Plut. Ant. 41; Dio, XLIX, 28; Frontin. Strateg. IV, 1,37.

43. Plut. Ant. 41-50; Livy, Epit. 130.

44. Plut. Ant. 51; Livy, Epit. 130; Dio, XLIX, 82; Vell. Pat. II, 82; Flor. IV, 10.

45. Appian, B.C. V, 133; Dio, XLIX, 32.

completely overthrowing the power of Parthia.⁴⁶ It seems, however, from a consideration of Antony's earlier conduct in relation to the expedition and from a careful observation of various phases of the expedition itself, that this could not have been his purpose. The postponement of the expedition whenever affairs of importance seemed to need his personal supervision at Rome, the point of attack, the route taken, the fact that he did not plan to take up winter quarters in Armenia after the campaign, his establishment of buffer states along the frontier instead of forming the territory into Roman provinces, the fact that he had planned for the construction of no great military roads or for placing troops on permanent garrison duty throughout the border territory, all seem to point to the expedition's being a *razziā* into the territory of a Parthian client-prince rather than a great campaign of conquest.⁴⁷

Conditions in the Roman empire demanded such a frontier policy. By the end of the republic Rome had reached the great permanent boundaries of her empire, with but two exceptions, Armenia on the north-east and Germany on the north-west. On the north-east was the great Taurus

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46. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 30; Kromayer, Hermes, 31 p.90.

47. For a discussion of this policy vid. Illinois Studies, June, 1915, Oldfather and Canter, The Defeat of Varus.

range whose trend is in the main east and west so that neither the crest of a long line of mountains nor the course of a large river supplied a satisfactory north and south line between the Roman and Parthian empires.⁴⁸ As has been seen, Rome had adopted the plan of protecting this frontier by a series of buffer-states under the rule of native princes dependent upon Rome for their authority. That Parthia had followed the same policy has been shown in the case of Palestine and the other Syrian states. Media Atropatene was also a Parthian buffer-state.

Parthia had gone farther than the establishment of these buffer states. To maintain her influence as supreme, she had sent troops into the territory under the protection of Rome. By the successful raids of these forces Parthia had materially increased her influence. Antony had in mind a similar plan, a retaliatory raid into Parthian territory.

Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in antiquity without any attempt whatsoever to make the conquest permanent.⁴⁹ Caesar had employed this policy both in his raid into Britain and into Germany. It was also in all probability such a raid that he planned to make into Parthia. Octavian was following the same policy later in his

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48. Illinois Studies, June, 1915, Oldfather and Canter, The Defeat of Varus, p. 83.

49. Ibid. pp. 105-106.

expedition into Arabia, 25-24 B.C., where there is no evidence that a permanent seizure of the land was contemplated, the main purpose being rather to make a demonstration of the vigor of the new Egyptian administration.⁵⁰ In the invasion of Dacia, 12-9 B.C., and the later raids during the Pannonian revolts, 6-9 A.D., Octavian merely wished to assert the authority of Rome without any intention of making additions to the territory of the Empire.⁵¹ The success of these expeditions tended to promote his popularity at home as well.

Antony likewise wished to demonstrate the renewed stability of Roman rule in the Orient and by a victory over the Parthians, to gain favor at Rome upon which he might depend later in his conflict with Octavian for supreme power. Antony was merely following a policy which Caesar had adopted before him and which Octavian favored after him.

The first objection to Antony's expedition⁵² as a

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50. Oldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, June, 1915, pp. 106-107.

51. Ibid, p. 107.

52. The sources for the Parthian campaign can be traced back to a certain Dellius, who took part in the campaign with Antony. Strabo, XI, 13,3, cites as his authority for a statement, "Dellius, the friend of Antony, who wrote an account of Antony's expedition against the Parthians in which

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he himself took part and held a command." (ὥς φησιν ὁ Δελλῖος
ὅτι οὗ Ἀντωνίου φίλος, συγγράψας τὴν ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους αὐτοῦ στρατείαν
ἐν ᾗ παρῆν καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγεμονίαν ἔχων.)

After he had taken an important part in Antony's administration of the Orient (Plut. Ant. 25; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15,1; Ibid. XV, 2, 6; Strabo, XI, 13, 3; Dio, XLIX, 39) he deserted him for Octavian just before the battle of Actium when he feared Antony's cause was hopeless. (Dio, I, 13; Vell. Pat. II, 84; Plut. Ant. 59). He bought his pardon from Octavian by a betrayal of Antony's plans. He seems to have gained entrance into Octavian's circle of literary friends (Sen. de Clem. I, 10; Hor. Carm. II, 3). Consequently he was ready to follow the example of the other writers of the day in lessening any odium which might fall upon Octavian as a result of the fate of the less fortunate Triumvir by emphasizing the fault of the "Egyptian Woman". Likewise he felt that he had need of justifying his betrayal of Antony and therefore probably exaggerated the sufferings of the army and laid the blame for the disaster to poor management on Antony's part. (Cf. Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag., p. 261, n.1) The story furnished excellent rhetorical matter for the later writers and grew with the years. (Flor., II, 20; Serv. ad Aen. VIII, 678; Oros. XIX, 1-2) For a discussion of Dellius vid. Büchlein, Quell. und Chron. der rom-parth. Feldzüge, pp. 7-15.

great campaign of conquest upon the success of which he based his hopes of an empire in the Orient, is the postponement of this expedition every time affairs at Rome seemed to need his attention. First in the spring of 40 B. C., when the raid of Pacorus and Labienus made the need of Roman support in Asia imperative, Antony left his interests in the Orient to take care of themselves as best they might, while he himself hastened to Italy to adjust the difficulties threatening his power there. He remained away from the East from the spring of 40 B.C. until the summer of 38 B.C. If his aim had been supreme power in the East rather than in Italy, it seems strange that he would have spent so long a time in Italy rather than in the Orient, especially when the Parthian victories were weakening the power of Rome in that part of the empire.⁵³ Again in the spring of 38 B.C. he did not sail directly from Greece in

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53. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 245, n. 2, finds the cause of Antony's departure for Italy and the consequent postponement of the Parthian expedition, in his need for the troops which were then in Italy. This explanation neither accounts for his long stay in Italy nor for the fact that he himself went to Italy for the troops instead of entrusting their transportation to a lieutenant while he took command against the Parthians, who were so seriously threatening the power of Rome. This plan would have been more in accordance with the example set by Caesar before the battle of Dyrrachium.

order to open his campaign in Asia seasonably, but at the bidding of Octavian returned first to Italy. Although he did not linger there, much valuable time was lost. In the spring of 37 B.C. he returned to Italy again in an endeavor to protect his interests there before entering upon his long postponed Parthian expedition. Antony's readiness to defer this expedition whenever affairs of importance seemed to make his presence at Rome advisable seems to point to the fact that it was supremacy in Italy rather than in the Orient for which he was planning and that the Parthian campaign was but a means to this end, a means to be employed only when best suited to further his interests in Rome.

In Antony's point of attack, the Parthian buffer-state, Media Atropatene, modern historians have seen the predominate influence of the Armenian king, with whom Antony was allied. Consequently they consider the choice of this objective as his first grave mistake.⁵⁴ They picture Antony as duped by Artavasdes, who wished to turn the attack on Media to his own personal advantage. Mommsen⁵⁵ considers the direction which Antony chose most surprising, since all aggression of the Romans against the Parthians, both earlier and later took the route for Ctesiphon, which

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54. Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 258; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, pp. 293-4; Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 201.

55. Rom. Prov. II, p. 30.

was the capital of the kingdom and so situated on the frontier that it was the natural aim of operation for armies marching downward on the Euphrates or Tigris. He thinks that Antony may have wished to push forward from Atropatene into the heart of the enemies' ^{country} but that if this was his purpose, he both acted without knowledge of the difficult ground and underestimated the strength of his opponents. This objective, however, has many points in its favor, especially if the attack is considered as a razzio. This point of attack had been suggested to Crassus by Artavasdes but had not been accepted. After the crushing defeat of Crassus, the plan which he did not adopt must have been thoroughly discussed and probably considered in a rather favorable light in view of the disastrous result attendant upon its rejection. Caesar, on the contrary, accepted this plan and it was therefore Caesar's plan as well as that of Artavasdes which Antony followed.⁵⁶ Caesar had excellent reason for his choice. First, the way to Ctesiphon lay through open country in part desert, where the army was always exposed to attack by the Parthian cavalry. On the other hand, ^{that part of} the route to Phraaspa ~~the route~~ which was not through the friendly Armenia lay through a country which although hostile to the Romans was unfavorable to the Parthian cavalry. Secondly, in the case of the objective adopted, supplies were

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56. Suet. Caes. 44.

abundant,⁵⁷ while, as has been said, in the other case the route lay in part through desert land. Thirdly, it was only with Phraaspa as the point of attack that Artavasdes would furnish the all important Armenian cavalry which was experienced in Parthian methods of warfare. Fourthly, in case of a defeat at Ctesiphon, a safe retreat was practically impossible because of the desert character of the country and of its advantages to the Parthian cavalry, while in case of defeat in Atropatene the country was unfavorable to Parthian methods of warfare, and when Armenia was reached there would be a protected line of retreat.⁵⁸

A lack of knowledge can scarcely have been responsible for the project. Caesar always based his plan of campaign on a thorough acquaintance with the topography of the land.⁵⁹ As a result of the constant warfare between Armenia and Atropatene, Artavasdes must have known the country perfectly from a military point of view.⁶⁰ Caesar probably had gained much valuable information from him. Antony himself had probably acquired first-hand knowledge of the routes to be pursued when he was commander of the horse

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57. Strabo, XI, 13, 3-4.

58. Kromayer, Hermes, 31, pp. 86-90

59. Suet. Caes. 53.

60. Kromayer, Hermes, 30, p. 87.

with Gabinius on his raid against Parthia. As Caesar's trusted lieutenant Antony must have taken an important part in the discussions of the Parthian campaign which Caesar was planning just before his death. Accordingly it seems hardly possible that Antony chose his objective because of lack of knowledge of the land.

If the campaign is considered as a razzio rather than a campaign of conquest, the objective seems most suitably chosen. As has been shown, the approach lay through a friendly country to a point where a rapid march could be made to the objective before the enemy was aware of the hostile attack. In case of defeat there was a protected line of retreat. The razzios made by the Romans were not conducted according to the methods of actual campaigns. Pitched battles seldom took place.⁶¹ Its purpose was to demonstrate the power of Rome and to show "how far beyond the actual frontier its outstretched arm could strike".⁶² Consequently one of the first essentials for the success of such a raid was rapidity of attack. For this purpose Praaspa was an excellent objective.

Gardthausen⁶³ is of the opinion that Antony's route is incomprehensible. This seems hardly true. When

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61. Oldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, p. 89, n.14.

62. Ibid. p. 88.

63. Augustus, II, p. 153, n. 18.

Antony reached Zeugma, the starting point for his expedition,⁶⁴ not all of his army was mobilized. Part of his legions were with Canidius north of Armenia in Iberia. His greatest lack, however, was the cavalry force which the Armenians were to furnish him. None of the Armenian horse, which was experienced in Parthian methods of warfare, was with him in Zeugma,⁶⁵ but was to meet him either in Armenia itself or on the way to Armenia. Antony's first care was to avoid a conflict with the Parthians until his army was entirely mobilized. Therefore it was but natural that by turning to the north he avoided an encounter with those Parthians who were on guard at the Euphrates.⁶⁶ His whole plan was to make Atropatene the field of campaign, with Armenia as the base of supplies, thereby postponing the conflict with the enemy until he was fully prepared. Furthermore by swinging around toward the north, and choosing the route along the Araxes river, as has been shown, the supplies were assured for the army, the passage was protected from the attacks of the Parthian horse, in which the main strength of the enemy consisted, and there was an opportunity for a surprise attack while the latter were still on guard at the Euphrates. By adopting any other route than the one along the Araxes river, all the advantages to be gained by choosing Media as an objective would be lost.⁶⁷

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64. Strabo, XI, 13,4.

65. Plut. Ant. 50.

66. Dio, XLIX, 15.

Historians find a third problem in the haste with which Antony carried on his raid. Following Dellius in his desire to place a large share of blame on the baneful influence of Cleopatra over Antony,⁶⁸ modern scholars attribute the disastrous outcome of the expedition to Antony's desire to finish the raid in the shortest possible time in order to spend the winter in Alexandria with Cleopatra. If the campaign is considered as a razzio, it seems that a more satisfactory explanation can be found. As has been shown, one of the essentials for the success of such an expedition was rapidity of attack. The armed force of the Romans must appear in the heart of the enemies' territory before their proximity was even suspected. Antony planned just such an attack. He risked a division of his forces that he might ensure this necessary rapidity of action. The failure of the maneuver was not due to a lack of wisdom in its conception but to the treachery, or at least to the cowardice, of the Armenian king.⁶⁹ Because of^a lack of the provisions necessary for a long winter campaign, Antony was forced to relinquish the siege of Praaspa and retire into Armenia. Here again there seems to be evidence that he had in mind a retaliatory raid rather than a great campaign of conquest. If Antony had spent almost six years in preparation for the campaign, it seems hardly probable that he would be forced to give up his first objective be-

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67. Vid. Lromayer, Hermes, 31, pp. 79-90, for a full discussion of the route.

68. Plut. Ant. 37. 69. Dio, 49, 25; Plut. Ant. 38.

cause of inadequate provision for supplies. One and the same explanation can be given both for the haste shown in the expedition and for the failure of the siege. Antony was not careless in his preparations or hasty in the execution of his scheme from a desire to be with Cleopatra. He had in mind a razzio into the Parthian buffer-state Atropatene, and this he carried out with energy and despatch. It is not to be questioned that he met with great suffering on his retreat.⁷⁰ By the loss of the Armenian cavalry he was forced to choose a difficult route through mountainous country in order to escape the attacks of the Parthian horse.⁷¹ The easy line of retreat through the plain had been rendered impossible by the desertion of the Armenian cavalry.⁷² Nevertheless the entire plan had been carried out energetically along lines which Antony had learned under Caesar, and the risks assumed, such as the division of the army, were no greater than Caesar frequently took. The ultimate failure of the expedition detracts in no way from the brilliance of the plan of campaign as conceived by Caesar

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70. Delliuss, writing to please Octavian, undoubtedly has exaggerated the suffering of the army. The story grew as it was retold. Orosius, VI, 19, 1-2, states that he returned to Antioch with only a few men. Vid. note 47.

71. Rawlinson, Geog. Jour. X, pp. 115-117.

72. Plut. Ant. 50.

or from Antony's energy in its execution.⁷³

After the retreat of Antony into Armenia it seems as though he would have taken up winter quarters there preparatory to a renewed attack in the spring, had he been planning the conquest of Parthia. Instead of doing this, however, in order to winter in Syria,⁷⁴ he braved the dangers of a march through a bleak mountain country where he lost many of his men from hunger and cold. This seems to be an important indication that Antony planned only a retaliatory raid, for in these raids the Romans never took up winter quarters in the enemies' territory.⁷⁵ Ancient historians maintain that his return to Syria was due to a desire to be with Cleopatra and many modern historians see only this reason for his return. Ferrero⁷⁶ maintains that Antony had in view the conquest of Persia, but that the political situation in the Roman world was such that his absence for a longer period was impossible. If Antony had spent five years in so arranging his affairs that he could undertake this expedition, as Ferrero maintains, it seems that he would have taken into consideration the necessity of wintering in the interior. Bouché-Leclercq⁷⁷ assigns as a

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73. Kromayer, Hermes, 31, p. 104.

74. Plut. Ant. 51; Livy, Epit. 130.

75. Oldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, p. 91.

76. IV, pp. 26-28. 77. Hist. Lag. II, p. 261.

reason the fear of further treachery on the part of Artavasdes. If the flight of the Armenian cavalry was due to treachery rather than actual panic, Artavasdes would be only too ready to ward off the punishment which was sure to fall to his lot by conciliating Antony in every possible way. The risk of treachery on the part of the Armenian king does not seem to be a sufficient cause for the exposure of his men to the actual dangers of cold and starvation in a winter march across the mountains, if Antony had expected to renew his campaign in the spring.

Antony, like the other great Roman leaders, had but two ways of dealing with the frontier, "either the constant pushing forward of the lines of the empire or the buttressing of the frontier by forming a series of buffer states".⁷⁸ In the pursuance of the latter plan there was need to keep fear of the military power of Rome constantly in the minds of the people.⁷⁹ As has been shown by numerous examples, the razzio seemed the best means of accomplishing this end.⁸⁰ It has been shown that from Antony's first entrance into the Orient he consistently followed the policy of establishing states on the frontier under native princes, whose authority rested solely on the authority of Rome. It seems only natural that he would continue the line of policy thus far established by gaining prestige for Roman arms by means of a raid into Parthian territory. Antony had taken

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78. Oldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, June, 1915, p. 85.

79. Ibid. p. 87.

80. Vid. supra pp. 125-126

no steps to form the territory along the frontier into Roman provinces where Roman troops would be stationed on permanent garrison duty, nor had he made any efforts to construct in these districts the Roman roads so all-important for military success, if permanent conquest was in view. In the actual conduct of campaigns of conquest such steps were essential.⁸¹ Therefore Antony's postponement of the expedition whenever affairs in Italy demanded his presence there, his choice of a buffer-state of Parthia as the point of attack, his selection of a route by which a rapid descent into the enemies' territory could be made without their knowledge, the fact that he considered rapidity in attack of such importance that he endangered the success of the expedition by a division of his troops, his omission to make provisions for taking up winter quarters in the interior, and his adoption from his entry into the Orient of a policy of defending the frontier by establishing buffer-states rather than by pushing forward the boundaries of the empire, all are cogent reasons pointing to the fact that Antony's expedition into Parthia was a retaliatory raid rather than a campaign of conquest.

With the disastrous termination of the Parthian campaign Antony's hope for supremacy at Rome appears to have ended. Henceforth all his actions indicate that he felt compelled to base his hopes for power on a kingdom in the East

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81. Oldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, June, 1915p.89.

with Egypt as the corner-stone.

Immediately upon Antony's return to Syria, Cleopatra met him with supplies for the army.⁸² He no longer made any effort to keep his marriage secret, but openly recognized Cleopatra as his wife by declaring their three children legitimate.⁸³ In addition he granted her the central portion of the Phoenician coast, namely from the Eleutherus river south to the territory of Sidon,⁸⁴ the balsam lands of Jericho from the kingdom of Herod, and certain portions from the kingdom of the Nabateans.⁸⁵ After these arrangements had been made, Antony returned to Egypt with Cleopatra to spend the winter in Alexandria.

A change in Antony's policy seems clearly evident from this time on. The news of his gifts and of his recognition of his children by the Egyptian queen created, as Antony could well expect, an outspoken feeling against him in Rome.⁸⁶ The astute Octavian now adopted a plan whereby

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82. Plut. Ant. 51.

83. Ibid. 36; Dio, XLIX, 32.

84. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 12; Bell. Jud. I, 18, 5; Dio, XLIX, 4; Plut. Ant. 36.

85. The statement that the entire coast from Palestine to Egypt was presented is a mistake of Josephus who is our only source for this gift. Vid. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 580.

86. Dio, XLIX, 32.

Antony would be compelled to disclose his aims. He sent Octavia to Antony with reinforcements and supplies. On reaching Athens she received letters from Antony in which he commanded her to remain there, since he was now in Syria preparing for an expedition against Armenia. Antony, however, did not carry out this intended expedition, but, after he had accepted the gifts which Octavia had brought him, remained in Syria for some time with Cleopatra and finally returned to Alexandria in her company.⁸⁷

Antony had given his answer to Octavian. Heretofore he had made every effort to avoid a break with his colleague. Again and again he had postponed his Parthian expedition in order to maintain his influence at Rome by peaceful means. The repudiation of Octavia is significant, not alone as a challenge to her brother, but as an indication that Antony no longer sought popularity at Rome. Octavia was one of the most highly revered women of Roman history. Antony could not but have realized the hatred that he would arouse by the insults which he heaped upon her. When it is remembered that upon popularity with Roman civilians as well as with the soldiery depended to a large extent his success in attaining his goal of supreme power at Rome, this change

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86. Dio, XLIX, 32.

87. Ibid. 33; Plut. Ant. 53.

of attitude appears most significant.

It seems then that Antony was determining upon dominion in the Orient at the cost of power at Rome. Once having come to this decision it is characteristic of the man that he was as zealous in his efforts to antagonize the Romans as before he had been eager to conciliate them. After a successful raid into Armenia for the especial purpose of plunder⁸⁸ Antony placed the crowning insult upon the outraged feelings of the Romans by celebrating a Roman triumph at Alexandria.⁸⁹ At this triumph he granted territory to Cleopatra and her children and filled out Egypt to the boundaries of its former power, and this too at the price of such Roman territory as Cilicia and portions of Syria. As a further insult to Octavian he proclaimed Caesarion the legal heir of Julius Caesar.⁹⁰

With the defeat of the Parthian expedition by the

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88. Oros, VI, 19, 4.

89. Appian, B.C. V, 145; Dio, XLIX, 39; Vell. Pat. II, 82; Livy, Epit. 131; Tac. Ann. II, 3; Plut. Ant. 50; Plin. N. H., XXXIII, 82; Strabo, XI, 14, 16; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4,3.

90. Plut. Ant. 54; Dio, XLIX, 41.

success of which Antony had hoped to establish his popularity at Rome, it seems clear that he changed his aim for supreme power at Rome to the hope for a kingdom in the East with Egypt at its head. His open recognition of Cleopatra as his wife by the declaration of their children as legitimate, his large grants of territory to her, his direct answer to Octavian's clever device of sending Octavia to him with troops, his conquest of Armenia and the subsequent addition of that territory along with portions of the Roman provinces to Cleopatra's domain, the great triumph which he celebrated at Alexandria, and his recognition of Caesarion as the heir of Julius Caesar, all are evidence that Antony's policy in the Orient was no longer that of a Roman general following in the footsteps of his predecessors in their struggle for supremacy at Rome.

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I was born in Kansas City, Missouri, April 1, 1890. In 1905 I was graduated from the Central High School of that city. After a two year post-graduate course at the Central High School, I attended the University of Kansas during 1907-8, leaving after one year to accept a position as student assistant in Latin at Lombard College, Galesburg, Illinois. There I received the A. B. degree in 1910. As valedictorian of the class I was awarded the Lombard Graduate Scholarship at the University of Illinois and there received the degree of A. M. in 1911. After serving as principal of the Hindsboro, Illinois, High School for the year 1911-12, I returned in 1912 to the University of Illinois and continued my graduate work in the Classics. I then taught Latin and Greek in Forest Park College, St. Louis, Missouri, from 1913 to 1916. In 1916 I was appointed fellow in Latin at the University of Missouri. In 1917 I was reappointed to my University Fellowship and also received the Pi Beta Phi National Fellowship.

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