2460

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH MEXICO
1910-1917.

192

by

Launa Maria Smith, B. S. in Education

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the

GRADUATE SCHOOL

of the

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

1919

~~UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. The Madero Revolution. July 1910-May 1911.
- A. Madero revolution begins.
1. Madero is released from prison.
 2. Plan of San Luis Potosí issued.
 3. Causes of revolution.
 - a. Unfair distribution of land.
 - b. Development of a middle class.
 4. Revolution succeeds and Diaz resigns.
 5. Madero elected President, Oct. 1.
- B. Complications with United States arise.
1. Anti-American riots take place in Mexico, in which lives and property of Americans are endangered.
 2. Public works, in which Americans are interested, threatened.
 3. Fighting in North causes border troubles.
 - a. Federal forces on border strengthened.
 - b. Several citizens killed in April by shots fired from across the border.
- C. Question arises as to whether the United States should intervene in Mexico.
1. Small party in Congress favors it.

2. Resolution introduced by Senator Culberson that United States not intervene.
3. States on border sympathize with revolutionists and request Congress not to intervene.
4. Treaty of 1848 binds the United States Government to first try diplomatic measures and arbitration to settle any dispute with Mexico.

III. The Rise of Huerta. May 1911-February 1913.

A. Conditions remain unsettled under Madero.

1. Rebellion in South continues.
2. Revolt in North begins again and grows.

B. Madero falls from power.

1. Military cadets in Mexico City revolt.
2. Huerta joins revolutionists.
3. Madero forced to resign and Huerta takes over the government.
4. Madero is killed.
5. Washington Government delays in recognizing Huerta.

C. American relations during this period.

1. Fear Japanese aggression at Magdalena Bay.
 - a. Senate investigations show no grounds for suspicion.
 - b. Lodge resolution passed.

2. Embargo on arms passed March 14, 1912.
3. Conditions in Mexico cause the endangering of American life and property.
 - a. Many refugees flee from country.
 - b. \$100,000 appropriated by Congress to provide food, shelter and transportation.
 - c. Demand for intervention in Mexico grows in the United States.
4. Claims arise out of these troubles.
 - a. Border claims not taken up diplomatically but through local means and no payment obtained.
 - b. Congress passes resolution to investigate claims against Mexico.
 - c. These presented to Mexican Government but never paid.
 - d. Claims against property in Mexico never paid.
 - e. Senator Smith favors taking over part of the country as payment for such claims.

IV. The Rule of Huerta. February 1913-July 1914.

A. Wilson refuses to recognize Huerta.

1. Reasons.
2. Criticisms.

- B. Lind -- Representative to Mexico. August 1913.
 - 1. Messages to Huerta -- terms.
 - 2. Answers of Gamboa.
 - 3. Election of October 26.
 - 4. Withdrawal of Lind.
- C. President's plan of "financial blockade".
 - 1. Adopted upon failure of active negotiation.
 - 2. Attitude of Europe.
- D. Growth of Constitutionalist cause in North.
 - 1. Relations with Carranza and Villa.
 - 2. Talk of mediation and intervention.
 - a. Attitude of South America.
 - b. General idea that purpose of United States was to gain territory.
 - 3. Raising of embargo on arms.
 - 4. Destruction of American life and property.
 - 5. Killing of Benton.
 - a. Attitude of Great Britian.
 - b. Our attempt to settle matters.
- E. Tampico Incident.
 - 1. Question of salute.
 - 2. Resolution of April 22, 1914 and occupation of Vera Cruz.
 - 3. Opinions as to meaning of resolution and outcome of the occupation.
 - 4. Attitude of Carranza.

5. Trouble at Tampico after withdrawal of gunboats.
- F. A. B. C. Powers offer to mediate.
- G. Should Huerta have been recognized?
- V. The Rule of the Constitutionalists. July 1914-April 1917.
- A. Carranza obtains control of the government.
1. His dictatorial policy displeases the people.
 2. Counter-revolutions break out.
 3. Convention of October 1 is a failure.
 4. Peace Conference of October 10 held.
 5. American troops withdraw from Vera Cruz.
- B. Effects of troubles in the North.
1. Attempt to neutralize the border fails.
 2. President issues warning June 2.
 3. Ambassadors of Latin-American countries invited to a conference and send joint note to Mexico.
- C. Recognition of Carranza. October 9.
1. Recommended by the Pan-American Conference.
 2. Embargo put on arms to all factions but Carranza.
 3. Villa weakening by end of 1915.
- D. Affairs in Mexico in 1916.
1. Santa Ysabel massacre.
 2. Columbus raid.
 - a. American punitive expedition sent after Villa.

- b. Misunderstandings bring about a conference at El Paso.
 - 3. Raid on Glen Springs.
 - a. Second punitive expedition sent.
 - b. Carranza objects to both expeditions in note May 22.
 - 4. Raids between Laredo and Brownsville.
 - a. Third and fourth expeditions sent.
 - b. Lansing answers Carranza's note of June 20.
 - 5. American-Mexican Joint Commission agreed upon.
 - 6. General election held in Mexico.
- E. Events in 1917.
 - 1. New constitution adopted and elections held.
 - 2. More peaceful conditions existing.
 - 3. Withdrawal of American forces.
 - 4. Ambassador Fletcher sent to Mexico.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

It is the purpose of this thesis to give an historical account of the international relations existing between the American and Mexican nations from 1910 to 1917.

Since the French episode following the American Civil War there had been no time when relations were not comparatively peaceful. This short period, however, was very different in character. It was a time in which any day might have brought forth international conflict. Mexico had been under the rule of a dictator for the previous three decades, during which time there had been peace in Mexico. Conditions had become more and more intolerable, however, for the common man. Concessions had been granted to foreigners until over three fourths of the wealth of the country was in their hands. A comparatively few wealthy families owned all the land and kept the peons down until their condition was little better than that of serfs. A few public schools, mostly industrial, had been established. From these grew the middle and industrial class with capabilities but unable to exert much influence because of existing conditions. These people started the

revolution against Diaz. It overthrew the government but failed of its final purpose and revolution followed revolution. Naturally various factions sprang up in different sections of the country, some sincerely fighting for better government, others, simply for the love of brigandage and banditry.

American citizens in Mexico owned more property than those of any other country and the American nation bordered Mexico with no natural barrier for a boundary line between the two. As a consequence, it was to be expected that American interests should become involved, both within Mexico and on the border.

CHAPTER II

The Madero Revolution July 1910 -- May 1911

On July 26, 1910, General Porfirio Diaz was, for the eighth time, chosen President of Mexico with Francisco I. Madero, the opposition candidate in prison at the time of the elections.

Francisco Madero was from a wealthy family of land owners and manufacturers. He was well educated, a liberalist and an idealist. He began to be interested in politics about 1900 and in 1903, after the election massacres at Monterey, he began to take an active interest in government affairs. By 1905 he had become the leader of the independent voters of Mexico, and in that year he came out openly against the Diaz government in the campaign for the election of a governor of Coahuila; but the independent voters were defeated. After this, he immediately began work for the next presidential campaign (1910), and, in 1908, published his book, The Presidential Succession of 1910, attacking and criticising, but with fairness and justice, the then existing regime. The book was immediately suppressed and its circulation prohibited; nevertheless, he was nominated as a candidate for the presidency in 1910 by the National Democratic or Anti-

re-electionist party and proceeded to carry on a vigorous campaign in all parts of the country until his arrest June 27.

The Diaz government did not last long after the 1910 election. During that election discontent was aroused thruout the country because of the suppression of Madero for the Presidency. He had been arrested at Monterey before the elections, but the warrant for his arrest contained no formal charge and did not bear the seal of the judge who had committed him.¹ After the reelection of Diaz the friends of Madero obtained his release on ten thousand dollar bail. As soon as this was done, he went to San Luis Potosi and on October 15, 1910 published his "cry to arms". His platform, the plan of "San Luis Potosi", embodied two main principles: effective suffrage and no re-election. It contained also demands for reforms in the distribution of land; free restitution of land wrested from Indian tribes; the liberation of all political prisoners; the abolition of the military practice of making soldiers out of confirmed criminals; and positive guarantees of the constitutional rights of free speech and free press.¹

Madero gained many followers under this platform, and the night of November 29 was set as the time for the general uprising against the existing government. In the

¹Int. Year Book, 1911, p. 422.

meantime, however, the plan was discovered. Madero fled to the United States, and his followers decided to start the uprising sooner. Consequently, on November 20, the revolution began. During the first part of his stay in the United States, Madero purchased arms and ammunition and then went to San Antonio and El Paso, Texas, where he established revolutionary juntas. After a warrant was issued for his arrest for the violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, he, with a few followers, crossed the border into Chihuahua and entered the campaign actively.

Diaz, the man against whom this rebellion was directed, had ruled Mexico almost continuously since 1877. He had ruled with an iron hand, and Mexico was comparatively peaceful so long as he was in control. Investment of foreign capital and rapid industrial development had begun shortly after Diaz was established in power. He favored foreigners and permitted the great land barons to fraudulently wrest vast tracts of territory from the rightful owners. These poor people, with no education, became practically bound to the land. They had no other means of earning a livelihood and came to be on almost the same level as serfs. The land owners managed to evade the taxes, and these were also pushed on the laboring classes. Thus, the ordinary citizens did not prosper under Diaz. Often they were even in want of food to eat

and their condition was rapidly approaching that of industrial bondage if not actual slavery.¹

Land reform, also, was a necessity in Mexico. This was acknowledged by all thinking men there. Even Señor Limantour, Minister of Finance under Diaz who later helped bring about his downfall, admitted that the huge estates had to be broken up.² Some writers went so far as to declare that the revolution was purely and simply a fight for land. Fernando Gonzalez Roa, Assistant Secretary of Interior under Madero, said that the distribution of land in Mexico could hardly be worse, and that Americans should not be surprised that this was the cornerstone on which the revolution rested.³ The land law of 1896, which permitted the denunciation of all property in the republic not secured by a legal title, allowed most of the land to pass into the hands of the *Lacienados*, the great land barons. Zapata had rebelled against the existing order a year before Madero did and demanded confiscation and distribution of the land. Madero's proclamation appealed to the Mexican people because it made this promise.⁴

¹Senate Document No. 153, V 21, 63 Cong. 1st sess.

²Hamilton Fyfe: *The Real Mexico*, p. 67.

³Roa: *The Mexican People and Their Detractors*, p. 5.

⁴After Madero became established in power, however, he either became conservative or was unable to carry out his plans and, consequently, had another revolution on his hands. Later, when Carranza became "First Chief of the Revolution" he placed most of the emphasis on constitutional government and as a consequence many of the peons were dissatisfied and followed Zapata and Villa. In every instance the revolution has been a fight for land. Reid: *Causes Behind the Mexican Revolution*. N. Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1914.

Other writers affirmed that the revolution was caused, primarily, by the development of a middle class which supported the rebellion of Madero. This class comprised the skilled workmen and those who had taken advantage of the few industrial schools and other schools which Diaz had established. These people were not willing to remain in the rank of the peasant class, and they could not rise because of the oppressions of the unjust and tyrannical government.¹ Francisco I. Madero belonged to this class.

Just before his downfall, Diaz saw his mistake of allowing the people no privileges. On April 1, 1911 he offered the following reforms: (1) safeguard of suffrage, (2) reform of the federal judiciary, (3) removal of abuses on the part of the local officials, (4) division of the large estates to allay discontent with the existing land laws, and (5) provision that the president should not succeed himself.² These, however, came too late; the Maderistas had gained too much power and were sure of success. In addition there appeared at this time a popular demand for the retirement of President Diaz.

On May 25, 1911, President Diaz and also the Vice-President and Cabinet retired and Francisco Leonde

¹Fyfe: Real Mexico, p. 143.

²Int. Year Book, 1911, p. 439.

de la Barra became provisional president. At an election held October 1, the returns favored Madero, though it was held by some that there were just as many election frauds as under Diaz. On October 15 the electoral college chose Madero as president. De la Barra resigned November 4 and Madero was inaugurated November 6.

Conditions of the country became more stable after the triumph of Madero, but still there were frequent disturbances. In October there were conflicts between Madero and the rebel forces of Zapata in the South. In November General Reyes, who had served under President Diaz, was arrested by United States officials at San Antonio, Texas on charge of breaking the neutrality laws; but he was released on bail. He returned to Mexico, tried to raise an army, but failed and surrendered to the Madero government.¹ Fighting continued at intervals in the North and it was only a few months until a new revolution had begun.

In the meantime complications with the United States had arisen because of the Madero revolution. It is estimated that there were, in 1911, sixty thousand Americans in Mexico doing business there. According to our treaties with Mexico they were lawfully there; and, so long as they were orderly, the protection of the

¹ Int. Year Book, 1911, p. 440.

Mexican government was due to them. Property holdings of Americans in Mexico were estimated at \$ 1,000,000,000, approximately double those of all other nations combined.¹

Considerable anti-American feeling had been shown in Mexico during November, 1910 as the result of the lynching of a Mexican, Antonio Rodriguez at Del Rio, Texas on November 2. Rodriguez had killed the wife of a ranchman who had refused him food. He was captured and placed in jail at Rock Springs; but the ranchmen of the vicinity broke into the jail, took him out and burned him at the stake. Riots occurred in many parts of Mexico; and the American Ambassador to Mexico, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, protested, declaring that the police were not endeavoring to protect him and other Americans. The Mexican minister at Washington protested against the lynching to the United States' government and asked for reparation. The government asked the State of Texas to make inquiry and the amount of two thousand dollars was paid as a claim to Mexico.

In June 1911 there was much complaint in the Mexican press of the laxity of American authorities in punishing the lynching of a Mexican boy at Thorndale, Texas²; and anti-American riots were common in many places about this time, even in as large centers as

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 447.

²Int. Year Book 1911, p. 439.

Guadalajara and in the City of Mexico itself. These were due partly to personal enmity and hatred of Americans because of incidents such as the preceeding one, but the majority of the damage was done for another reason. Americans were accused of helping to incite the people and of participation in the revolution. It is true that some Americans did cross the border and join the insurgent forces. Retaliation, then, was the reason given for a large majority of the anti-American riots. The Americans who were attacked had no means of self-defense; many were killed and numerous instances were reported of the forcible confiscation and appropriation of the property of Americans.¹ Much damage was done and over five hundred claims were filed against Mexico as the outgrowth of the Madero revolution.²

Not only were the lives and property of Americans endangered but also public works, in which Americans were concerned, were interrupted. The work for the reclamation and preservation of the Imperial Valley was an example of this. Congress appropriated \$ 1,000,000 for this work and as Lower California was, practically, in a state of anarchy much of the time during the Madero revolution, this work received serious interruptions. Work on the Mexican side was done by

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 449.

²Int. Year Book 1911, p. 439.

American contractors and engineers according to an agreement with the Mexican government. On several occasions bands of armed men took possession of the construction camps and forcibly appropriated arms, commissaries, live stock, wagons and so forth, and seized and used cars and railroad tracks employed by contractors for the successful prosecution of their work. They threatened the lives of Mexican and American workmen and by these means greatly disorganized the working force. This delay came at a critical stage; it was about time for the spring floods.¹ The Mexican government was appealed to; but it would do nothing on the grounds that the United States had not remained neutral, but had allowed her citizens to cross the border and join the insurgents.

Because of the revolution in Mexico and especially because of what was taking place in the North near the international boundary line, the American forces at the border were strengthened early in 1911. By March there were over twenty thousand men on the border and four fast cruisers had been dispatched to Galveston. This was done to guarantee neutrality, stop filibustering and protect American interests if it became necessary.²

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 449.

²Int. Year Book 1911, p. 438.

Trouble arose in March over the kidnapping of two Americans February 20, 1911 by Mexicans on American soil. The United States asked for their release, but Mexico refused saying they were taken on Mexican soil and were regularly enlisted in the insurgent forces. After being kept in prison for about two months, both prisoners were released by President Diaz.¹

During April and May there was much fighting around Agua Prieta, just across the boundary from Douglas, Arizona and Juarez, opposite El Paso, Texas. During the latter part of April several people were killed or wounded by Mexicans who were shooting across the boundary line at Agua Prieta. President Taft, thru the Department of State, notified the responsible authorities of both federal and insurrectionary forces that such an action as that at Agua Prieta must not happen again.² However the fighting continued, and on May 8 five people were killed and twelve wounded in El Paso, Texas.

Many people felt at this time that the United States should intervene in Mexican affairs. One of the firmest believers in this policy was the senior senator from Missouri, William Joel Stone. In April he introduced

¹House Report, V.16 No. 1168, 62 Cong. 3rd. sess.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess. p. 450.

a resolution in the Senate that the Committee on Foreign Affairs be directed to make speedy inquiry into the facts, and make a report of their findings with such recommendations as the Committee might deem advisable respecting the duty of the United States.¹ In a later speech in which Stone again brought the above resolution to the attention of the Senate, he said it was his opinion that Congress should pass a resolution permitting the President to use armed force to stop injury to American citizens, if fighting like that at Juarez and Agua Prieta should be repeated.²

Only a very small minority, however, favored this view. The majority felt that the grant of this power to the President and his subsequent use of it, would constitute an act of war and that it was best to avoid a war with Mexico if possible. With respect to intervention, Hall says, "Intervention takes place when a state interferes in the relations of two other states without the consent of both or either of them or when it interferes in the domestic affairs of another state, irrespectively of the will of the latter, for the purpose of either altering or maintaining the actual conditions of things within it. Prima facie intervention is a hostile act because it constitutes an attack upon the

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 307.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 450.

independence of the state subjected to it. Regarded from the point of view of the state intruded upon, it must always remain an act which, if not consented to, is an act of war."¹

A resolution was submitted to the Senate by Mr. Culberson of Texas on April 20, 1911 concerning the same subject. This resolution was as follows:

"Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate:

"First, That intervention by the United States in the existing revolution in Mexico would be without justification and contrary to the settled principles of this government of non-interference in the domestic concerns of other countries.

"Second, That the extent to which the United States should go in the present emergency in Mexico is to enforce their neutrality laws with vigor and fully protect lives and property within their limits along the Mexican boundary line. The rights of citizens of the United States residing in Mexico are those of neutrals in belligerent territory."²

In support of his resolution, Senator Culberson showed that, with the exception of Cuba, it has been the past policy of this government not to intervene in the

¹Hall: Int. Law, p. 284.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 439.

affairs of other nations. Mr. Clay, Secretary of State in 1828 said, "The government of the United States scrupulously refrains from taking part in the internal dissensions of foreign states whether in the Old World or the New." On October 16, 1829 in a note to Mr. Butler, minister to Mexico, Mr. Van Buren, Secretary of State, stated, "An invariable and strict neutrality between belligerents and an entire abstinence from all interference in the concerns of other nations are cardinal traits of the foreign policy of this government." Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. McLane, Minister to Mexico, March 7, 1859, declared, "No matter how strongly the sympathies of the United States may be with the liberal constitutional party in Mexico, our government can not properly intervene in its behalf without violating a cardinal principle of our foreign policy."

In respect to citizens of the United States in Mexico, their standing was that of neutrals residing in belligerent territory. Wharton says, "A sovereign is not ordinarily responsible to alien residents for injuries they receive on his territory from belligerent action or from insurgents whom he could not control or whom the claimant government has recognized as belligerent."¹

On the contrary, according to Moore, in his Digest of International Law, an act on the part of the

¹Wharton: Int. Law Digest, II, p. 576.

United States to protect its nationals in Mexico would not necessarily constitute an act of war. He says that a state is obligated to protect its citizens abroad. So long as it can obtain from the state involved in civil war sufficient protection, it is content with diplomatic measures; but when that authority becomes so weak it cannot protect foreign nationals, the foreign power can intervene if necessary. A state involved in civil war is bound to permit this protection and cannot see in it an act of war if the state itself is incapable of discharging the duties of protection of foreign subjects.¹ Although the United States may have had a legal right to intervene in Mexican affairs at this time, it was perhaps best that she did not do so. A war with Mexico would most probably have followed and would have been much more costly in both lives and money. At the same time the United States would have forfeited any hope which she had for the respect and sympathy of the remainder of Latin America.

The inhabitants of those states on the border did not favor intervention at the time of the Madero revolution. They felt that the struggle of the Maderistas against the Diaz regime was a struggle for life and for liberty on the part of the insurrectos and

¹Moore: Dig. Int. Law, VI, pp. 951-2.

they preferred that the United States should not interfere in the struggle.¹ Senator Works from California said that the people on the border in California did not want American troops sent across the border because their going would endanger the life of every American in Mexico and, besides troops, more lives would be lost than under the situation existing at the time.² A memorial presented by Senator Culberson and signed by four hundred and eighty-eight citizens of El Paso County, Texas, requested the United States to take no part in the revolution in Mexico at that time, and if any steps had been taken, to have them rescinded provided they in any way interfered with the work of the revolutionists.³

The government of the United States did the best thing it could do at this time -- guarantee its neutrality and protect its border. The Mexican government was a recognized government and had a right to put down rebellion even if it occurred near the border. If the situation had been directly reversed and the uprising had been in El Paso, the United States would probably not have hesitated to put it down even if in doing so Mexican lives on the other side of the border were endangered.⁴ No life was endangered or taken by deliberate purpose either

¹ Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 118.

² Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 1134.

³ Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. sess., p. 118.

⁴ Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 1st. Sess., p. 1132.

of the revolutionists or of the federalists. Intervention, at this time, would have been a hostile act, or at least it would have been so considered in Mexico. It might have had the effect of uniting all Mexico, and, very probably, of involving the United States in a war with her.

Furthermore, the United States had a treaty with Mexico, made in 1848 -- the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,¹ in which an agreement was made with reference to differences between the two nations. Article XXI of this treaty is in substance, "If differences occur the two countries shall strive to settle them by mutual representations and pacific negotiations. If this means fails, a resort shall not be had to reprisals or hostilities until the aggrieved government has considered if it would not be better that such differences be settled by the arbitration of commissioners from the two countries or by that of a friendly nation. Should such a course be proposed by one party, it shall be acceded to by the other unless such action is considered by it altogether incompatible with the circumstances of the case." Article XXII provides, among other things, "that neither the event of war nor some other treaty shall annul this treaty." In adhering to the spirit of this treaty, the Washington

¹ Sen. Doc. 61 Cong. 2nd. sess., Vol. 47, p. 1107.

government made it much more possible for friendly relations between the two nations to exist in the future.

It is true that injuries were done to American citizens in Mexico at this time, that lives were taken and that property was destroyed; but, according to the letter as well as the spirit of the treaty with Mexico, America was bound to first seek redress thru diplomatic channels and this is what she did.

CHAPTER III

The Rise of Huerta, -- May 1911-February 1913

Francisco Madero, the leader of the revolution against Diaz, was a dreamer. His relatives were rich landowners and manufacturers and most of them were blessed with more common sense than he. He is spoken of as a spendthrift of glowing words; and it is said that had he been a man of even moderate ability, he might have led his country safely thru the difficult transition from despotism to the beginnings of constitutional government.¹ He possessed a magnetic personality, was a good leader in his cause, and seemed to have but one idea, the regeneration of Mexico.² These qualities did not save him from disaster.

However, though Madero wished to give Mexico a better government, it was impossible for anyone to carry out the extreme demands of the radicals. Because of this fact he began to lose support; and at the time of the elections the people were not so unanimous in his favor as they had been upon the success of the revolution a few months earlier.³ Also, after his inauguration,

¹Fyfe: The Real Mexico, p. 116.

²O'Shaughnessy: Diplomatic Days, p. 24.

³O'Shaughnessy: Diplomatic Days, p. 115.

though there were times when it seemed that the country was on the eve of peace, matters remained unsettled. He had promised much but proved to be such a weak, vacillating ruler, neither giving Mexico any better government than she had had under Don Porfirio nor fulfilling any of his pledges, that it was not long until many who had supported him had lost their faith in his ability to rule wisely.

Madero was inaugurated November 6, 1911; but this was, by no means, an assurance of peace for Mexico. The hostility of Zapata and his followers in the South continued to cause alarm, and in the early part of 1912 there were several other revolutionary movements though they were not well organized. The new president was blamed for a lack of firmness in not dealing more effectually with the revolt in the first instance. It was held that vigorous and prompt action was necessary to inspire respect for the army and the government. Warnings were addressed to President Madero by the United States government, that fighting should be avoided in quarters that would endanger the lives of American citizens¹; and a large force of American troops were held on the border.

The revolt grew in the North and on February 27 the rebels captured Juarez. About this time General Pascual Orozco, who had been a lieutenant under Madero in

¹Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, pp. 335-336.

1911, joined the rebels and became military and civil governor of Chihuahua.

During May, June, and July the federal forces sent against Orozco were comparatively successful, and Orozco's troops were scattered. However, they still continued to do much harm by endangering life and destroying property thruout the northern part of Sonora.

Moreover, rebellion gathered headway both in the South and in the North. On October 16 General Felix Diaz, nephew of the ex-president, placed himself at the head of a revolutionary body and captured Vera Cruz. With almost no resistance the federal forces recaptured the city. The sentence of death was imposed on Diaz; but this was lifted by Madero, and he was instead put in the federal prison at Mexico City.¹ After the collapse of the Diaz movement there was a period of comparative quiet, and Madero announced that peace was assured.

Any quiet which there was, however, proved to be only a calm before the storm, and on February 9, 1913 the military cadets in Mexico City mutinied and released General Diaz and General Reyes from prison. General Reyes was killed in the street fighting that followed, and Diaz and his followers fortified themselves in the arsenal. General Victoriana Huerta was sent against them, but after

¹Int. Year Book, 1912, p. 407.

fighting several days he joined the rebels. On February 17 General Blanquet arrived in the city with twelve hundred federal troops; but instead of coming to the assistance of the president, he also joined the revolutionists. On the next day President Madero and Vice-President Suarez were arrested. A meeting was then held in the American Embassy by the leaders of the revolt at which it was decided that Huerta should take charge of the executive power and Diaz should wait and present himself at the next presidential election.¹ Madero and the Vice-President resigned office on February 20, and three days later they were shot. Thus Madero lost his power. He fell by reason of his unfulfilled pledges, of the poor impression he made, and of the immense sums that were squandered or stolen from the public purse.²

Huerta wished his actions to appear legal. Accordingly the following plan, which Madero accepted, was contrived. Upon the acceptance by the Chamber of Deputies, which, under the Mexican Constitution, is

¹Calero; Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 7.

²When he took office there were some £7,000,000 in the Treasury and he borrowed £4,000,000 more. All that he spent in addition to the yearly revenues of the country. When General Huerta succeeded him the balance stood at less than £200,000. -- Fyfe: Real Mexico, p. 147. This financial situation is supposed to have been due to bad management of Ernesto Madero.

competent for the case, of the resignations of the President and Vice-President, the Minister of Foreign Relations would become provisional president. He would appoint Huerta to the chief position in the Cabinet and then resign, leaving the newly appointed cabinet member provisional President. This plan was executed to the very letter.¹

As has been said, Madero accepted this plan. He knew that the immediate effect of his resignation was to give the Presidency to Huerta and to make that seem legal, which was to all intents and purposes a usurpation.

Three days after the resignation was accepted both Madero and Suarez were killed. Some say that they attempted to escape and were shot under the "Ley Fuga", the law which permits flying prisoners to be shot. Others say they were murdered by "Felixistas" or the friends of a Colonel Ruiz who had been assassinated in the palace before Madero's fall. The Washington government felt that the crime was due to Provisional-President Huerta, though there was no absolute proof of this.² Judging from the average Latin-American character, this would be a very natural thing for Huerta to do. If committed by order from Huerta, it was a political crime and was most probably executed because of the fear that Madero could

¹Calero; Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 8.

²Fyfe: Real Mexico, p. 126.

initiate a new and powerful revolution should he ever again regain his freedom.

On the other hand Senator Sheppard from Texas says that the Huerta government was not founded on legality. He says that the resignation secured from President Madero was secured thru duress. The Chamber of Deputies which met in extraordinary session to accept that resignation did not have a legal quorum, having no more than ninety of the one hundred and twenty members necessary for a majority. Furthermore, when the acceptance of the resignation was obtained from the Chamber of Deputies, moral and material violence were employed against its members. It was threatened that if they did not at once accept the resignation, Madero would immediately be sacrificed without mercy. At the same time a battalion of troops was stationed under the arches and in the galleries of the Legislative Palace for the purpose of intimidating the deputies.¹ In spite of this there were six members who voted against the acceptance of the resignations.

Letters were sent from Huerta to all the nations with which Mexico maintains relations. These were answered, thus formally recognizing Huerta, by all but five nations, the United States being the only great power among them. Thus began President Wilson's policy of non-

¹Sen. Doc. 63 Cong. 1st. sess., No. 153, p. 9.

recognition.

During the time which has just been discussed the American attitude toward Mexico was comparatively friendly, but relations between the two countries became strained in more than one instance.

In the early part of 1912 the report was in circulation that Japan was attempting to gain a foothold in Mexico. A concession of land had been given to an American company in which the stock was held in large part by Japanese.¹ Also exclusive fishing rights had been granted to Japan, and also to Great Britian on the West coast of Mexico.² Many people believed the rumors and an article was printed in the El Paso Times giving an account of an interview with Aiken, a spy in the service of Orozco. According to his statements Mexico was to give Japan concessions in Magdalena Bay and whatever additional concessions they might see fit to take, and in return Japan was to furnish Orozco the necessary sums of money to carry on his revolution. Magdalena Bay was to become a Japanese port and base of supplies for operations against the United States. Other points were selected by the Japanese commissioners, Vera Cruz being one of them.³

The matter was referred to the Committee on

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess. 5662.

²Ibid., p. 5663.

³El Paso Times, May 15, 1912. Also Cong.Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess. 6477.

Foreign Affairs for investigation. The resolution doing this stated that the Committee on Foreign Affairs should ascertain if in the law of Mexico aliens could acquire territory within her boundaries, and also what power was conferred by law upon the Mexican government to grant exclusive fishing rights, and whether or not such an acquisition of property, if allowed, was an encroachment upon the Monroe Doctrine.¹

It was found that, under the laws of Mexico, citizens of Mexico were prohibited under the severest penalties from transferring any land in Mexico to a foreign government without the sanction of the Mexican government; but that there was nothing to prevent a Japanese citizen from acquiring land. If this concession to Japanese citizens should be turned over to the Japanese government, we might then have had the right to intervene.²

These rumors, that the Japanese government was trying to establish a military base in Mexico, were denied by the Japanese Ambassador³ and this seemed to be further proven when the Japanese government refused to recognize the Diaz mission to Japan.

Still the occasion gave rise to a resolution by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts in the Senate July 31, 1912:

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 5664.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 5663.

³Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 5664.

"Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American Continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government, not American, as to give that government practical power of control for national purposes."¹

This resolution passed the Senate but went no further since investigation showed that no foreign government was concerned in taking possession of Magdalena Bay. It was generally declared to be a considerable extension of the Monroe Doctrine. Still it is regarded by some as simply an interpretation made to meet a condition that had never arisen before. It is the substance of the thing to which the American nation holds, and that is that the safety of the United States demands that American territory shall remain American.²

It was a well known fact that the revolutionary conditions in Mexico were promoted by arms and other munitions of war from the United States. Consequently,

¹62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 10047.

²Stephens: The Monroe Doctrine, p. 23.

on March 14, 1912 a joint resolution was passed by Congress amending the resolution of April 22, 1898 which gave the President power to prohibit, at his discretion, the exportation of coal or other material used in war. The resolution of later date so amended the former that, if conditions of domestic violence existed in any American country promoted by arms or munitions of war procured from the United States, the President could prohibit the exportation of such arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to that country. This made traffic across the border illegal the same as traffic from a seaport, but it did not include the exportation of coal. It also gave the President the right to make exceptions in the carrying out of the law. It said that the President might prohibit "with such limitations and exceptions as shall seem to him expedient." A violation of the act was made punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both.¹

The President lost no time in issuing the needed proclamation and on the same day that the resolution passed issued an order prohibiting the export of munitions of war from any place in the United States to the warring factions in Mexico. Still he used the power given him by

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 3257.

Congress and made an exception of Madero, the recognized President of Mexico. This action was backed by the theory that only rebels promote domestic violence. Though forces of a recognized government might do so, they can not be so described in the contemplation of law.¹

This resolution went thru Congress with very little debate. It was introduced, passed and was signed the same day. Most people felt that it was a very wise measure and that our responsibility would be lightened. Nevertheless it gave much trouble later. It even began to cause misunderstandings before Madero fell from power and increased the hatred of Americans among the revolutionary classes. They had been able to get arms to establish Madero in power but, when he failed in his promises and they lost their faith in him, they could not get arms from across the border to remove him from power as they had done to place him there. It was suggested by some as early as August 1912 that it might be well for the United States to recognize the belligerency of Orozco and Zapata, and thereby be able to sell them arms. Madero had already recognized their belligerency by negotiating with them; and had we done this, it would have relieved us from any criticism for partisanship.²

After the passage of the resolution of March 14,

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 9423.
²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 11232.

1912 the destruction of American property and the endangering of American life became much more common. On April 14, 1912 President Taft notified Madero and Orozco that the United States would hold Mexico and the Mexican people responsible for any illegal acts sacrificing or endangering American life or property. Madero promised to send a larger force against the insurrectos but was, nevertheless, unable to get control of the northern part of the country, and the riots against Americans continued.¹ One whole colony of Mormons were driven from their homes and hundreds came across the border into the United States. By the latter part of July there were almost three thousand refugees at El Paso, Texas² and El Paso was only one of the several places where the fleeing people crossed the border. These people had left their homes hurriedly; the majority of them had no funds to provide themselves with food and shelter or transportation. As many as could be cared for were provided for by military authorities but this proved wholly inadequate. On July 29, 1912 a resolution was passed to supply these refugees with tents and rations.³ On August 2 a joint resolution was passed appropriating \$100,000 to provide transportation from the border to

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd.sess., p. 11231.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd.sess., p. 10047.

³Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 9793.

other places within the United States for those who had fled from Mexico and were unable to provide for themselves.¹ This applied at first to only El Paso, Texas; but, because of the large numbers who had come to Naco and Douglass, Arizona, it was changed to include them also by a resolution stating that \$20,000 of the \$100,000 should be provided for use in Arizona. Later these resolutions were changed so that the money could also be used in California and New Mexico.²

The above refers only to the northern part of Mexico, but the next spring, during the February revolution, American life was not safe even in the City of Mexico itself. American residents of that City were forced to take refuge in the American embassy; and, as the embassy itself was under fire part of the time, life there was not safe. In the street fighting which occurred, two American lives were lost. The President was asked to transmit to the Senate a statement of any diplomatic measures that had been taken by this government for protection of citizens of the United States from violence in the disorders in Mexico.³ This was deemed by the Secretary of State and President Taft not to be to the best interest of the nation so it was refused.

¹

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 10047, 10396.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd. sess., p. 11165.

³Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 3rd. sess., p. 3275.

The desire for intervention by the United States on the part of the border states seemed to grow. Senator Fall stated that there were not enough federal troops in the northern part of the State of Sonora to guard the frontier, and that the Americans in that state had gotten together and were determined to protect themselves and their property. He said that during the latter half of July and the first of August over two hundred rifles were bought from one store in Arizona by American residents of Arizona who declared that when the first American was killed in Sonora, they would cross the border.¹

The citizens of Graham County, Arizona asked that the federal government protect American citizens residing at that time in Mexico. They did not urge intervention, but said that the Washington government was warranted in demanding that the Mexican government give proper protection to United States citizens and property belonging to them. Then, in case this demand was not complied with, they held that the Washington government should compel its recognition.²

Senator Culberson of Texas, however, did not believe that the situation would then justify intervention

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 11231.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 10784.

or even the recognition of the belligerency of the insurgents as this would only tend to bring about a continuation and not a cessation of hostilities.¹

Many claims arose out of the revolution of 1911; and after Madero was established in power, these were pressed for payment. In the firing across the border during April and May 1911 several people had been killed or wounded by Mexicans on American soil. The first claims to come into notice were of this sort.

Those injured and the representatives of those killed prepared their claims against the Mexican government, together with proof, and presented them to the Secretary of State. The Secretary refused to press them for payment thru diplomatic channels, but advised the claimants that the American Embassy at Mexico City would file their claims at the Mexican foreign office for presentation to the consultative claims commission which had been established for this purpose by the Mexican Government. He added that if Americans were dissatisfied with the findings of that commission they could press their claim thru an ordinary court. "At any rate," he said, "the claimants must exhaust their local means before the claims could be taken up diplomatically."²

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 11233.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 9416.

This commission proved unsatisfactory. At one time the Mexican government offered to pay five hundred dollars for each American killed by Mexicans firing across the line into the cities of Douglass and El Paso.¹ This offer was rejected. The cases of William Griffiths and Walter Chandler, who were killed in the streets of El Paso, May 8, 1911 from shots fired across the border, were presented to the Mexican Commission thru Mr. Llorente, the consul at El Paso.² An award of two thousand dollars had been made previously in each case.³ When this was not accepted nothing further could be done.

A joint resolution was passed by Congress directing the Secretary of War to investigate claims of Americans injured within American territory and growing out of the late insurrection; to determine the amounts due, if any and to press them for payment.⁴ The commission provided for by this resolution comprised Lieutenant-Colonel Francis J. Kernan, Adjutant-General, Major Eli A. Helmick, Inspector-General and First

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2234.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 10967.

³This amount had been offered to Mexico by the United States for a Mexican killed in Texas by a mob. The circumstances in that case were, however, distinctly different. In this case the Mexican citizen was under indictment and arrest, charged with the commission of a felony and sought to effect his escape from the officers of the law. Furthermore this case took place outside the territorial jurisdiction of Mexico.

⁴Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 10705.

Lieutenant Aristides Moreno, twenty eighth infantry. Twenty two claims were examined by this commission. Of these twenty were cases of bullet wounds resulting in either death or some disability. With regard to these claims the Commission concluded that Mexico was wholly unjustified in carrying on active warfare when it endangered life on the American side of the border and that since the Mexican action was indefensible on the ground of international law, the damages should be heavy not only to include compensation but to deter for the future. However, they added that the Mexican government was fighting for its life and the insurgents to overthrow what they considered an unjust government -- both worthy motives for war -- and since these two cities were strategic points, the commission thought that Mexico was justified in fighting on the extreme border. But at the same time she should feel regret and make amends for those injured.

As to those sufferers who were American citizens, the Commission considered it the duty of the United States government to urge a just and liberal settlement upon Mexico, especially so, since Mexico had admitted her liability and had offered to make amends in a number of cases.¹ In the case of domiciled aliens the United States was not held duty bound to present the claims as their

¹ All but one of these were rejected.

paramount allegiance was to the land of their citizenship.¹

One other class of cases came before this commission. This was for illegal kidnapping, carrying into Mexican territory and subsequent harsh treatment. There were two of these: the cases of Converse and Blatt. Both men were kidnapped on American soil by Mexican federal officers, were taken into Mexico where they were imprisoned for two months, when they were released by President Diaz. For circumstances of discomfort and humiliation connected with their captivity they each claimed fifty thousand dollars by way of damages. The commission agreed that at the time the claims had origin, both men were in the regularly enrolled forces of the insurgent army, were breaking the neutrality laws of the United States, and were consequently barred from asking protection from that government. Although the pursuit should have stopped at the boundary -- the crossing of it was a violation of the sovereign rights of the United States -- the Commission did not deem that any amount was due either party.²

These claims were presented to the Mexican government but were never paid. In February 1913 a bill

¹House Documents V. 16, No. 1168, p. 16, 62 Cong. 3rd sess.

²House Documents, V. 16, No. 1168, pp. 9, 10, 62 Cong. 3rd. sess.

passed the Senate to pay those injured at El Paso and Douglass out of the United States treasury and thus make the claim one of the Washington Government against Mexico. This bill provided for an appropriation of \$ 71,000 for the purpose of paying these claims but failed of final passage.¹

The next class of claims came from injuries to American life and property within the borders of Mexico. Most of these claims arose after the embargo on arms of March 14, 1912. The insurgent forces felt that the United States was behind the Madero government and resented the aid which it received. They had been able to obtain a plentiful supply of arms to place Madero in power but when they found that he could not fulfill his promises, that he was weak and vacillating and turned against him, the supply was cut off. This, in addition to their claim that troops were recruited in the United States, fired the latent hatred of Americans in the hearts of the Mexicans and many crimes against Americans were committed. The insurgents were warned to leave Americans and their property alone, but they paid no heed whatever to the warnings. By July 1912 it was estimated by Senator Fall from New Mexico that American property had

¹ Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 3368.

been destroyed in Mexico to the value of \$500,000,000.¹ Claims were presented to the Secretary of State, but he refused to take them up saying that, thru international law, they should go to the courts of Mexico and that those Americans injured in Mexico should exhaust the local means of redress before appealing to the Washington government.²

The claimants were able to obtain no satisfaction thru Mexican means. In one case a Madero general was encamped for four months before the battle of Agua Prieta on an American cattle ranch. The owner filed a claim with the State Department for beef eaten by the troops. He was told to take the matter up thru a local tribunal. When he was called before the Commission's representative for that locality, he found that the representative was the insurgent commander who had been encamped upon his ranch. As a result he was paid for twenty of the three hundred cattle which he claimed had been destroyed.³ This was not an isolated case. Reasonable claims have never been paid Americans and in the larger percentage of cases no compensation at all has been obtained for injuries done.

This has been different to some extent with other governments. One hundred thousand dollars was paid

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 9411.

²Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 9417.

³Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 9421.

to the surviving relatives of four Germans who were killed in a factory riot in Pueblo, Mexico.¹ China has also gotten payment for damages to the extent of \$1,500,000.

Senator Smith from Arizona favored the forced payment of the claims. However, he did not advocate their payment in money; heavier taxes would throw the burden largely on the American property holders themselves. Instead he favored taking over the Colorado river valley from its mouth to the United States' border. He would also extend the line of Arizona from the corner of New Mexico until it struck the northern part of the Gulf and would in addition take over Lower California.²

This imperialistic plan, though favored by a few, was not advocated by a large group. Neither was the plan for intervention to force the payment of the claims favored by many and at the present time³ the claims remain unpaid.

¹Cong. Rec. 62 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 9422.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2235.

³July 1919.

CHAPTER IV

The Rule of Huerta -- February 1913-July 1914

One of the main questions which confronted Woodrow Wilson when he took his office as president on March 4, 1913 was whether or not the government established in Mexico by Huerta should be recognized. There was a strong minority in Congress in favor of the policy of recognition; but the people thruout the country were prepared to follow the President in either line of action. The American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, urged unconditional recognition very strongly.¹ However the American President decided to follow the opposite policy.

Huerta had usurped the presidency on February 17, 1913. Madero was killed February twenty-third, and it was generally held that his death was an official act of Provisional President Huerta. Although Huerta testified that he had no part in the murder, and our Ambassador expressed a feeling of certainty that Madero's death was without governmental approval,

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8873.

President Wilson refused to recognize the usurper.¹ He declared that his chief desire was to deserve the confidence of the Mexican people and to cooperate with them. However, it seemed to him that cooperation was possible "only when supported at every turn by the orderly process of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force."² In addition to this reason for non-recognition was the additional fact that Huerta had not given any evidence of being President of the Mexican republic or of being the choice of the Mexican nation for any office or dignity.³ There were still many people in rebellion against him, one third of Mexico, at least being outside his power; and there had been no election by which he had obtained the Presidency.

In the North only a small percentage of the people favored Huerta. The legislature of the State of Coahuila immediately passed resolutions supporting Madero.⁴ This showed to Huerta the danger he faced with Madero alive and within a few days Madero had been killed.

The "plan of Guadalupe" was then adopted by Governor Carranza of Coahuila and was approved by a large number of military chieftains who rallied about

¹Robinson and West: Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p.7.

²Ibid. p, 179 (Statement of President Wilson March 13, 1913)

³Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6278. (Also by A. B. Hart in New York Times, April 5, 1914.)

⁴Ibid. p. 8508.

him with their respective commands.

This plan was as follows:

"1. We repudiate Gen. Victoriano Huerta as President of the Republic.

2. We repudiate also the legislative and judicial powers of the Federation.

3. We repudiate the governments of the states, which thirty days hence, shall recognize the Federal authorities which form the present administration.

4. For the organization of the military forces necessary to make compliance with our purposes we name as first chief of our forces, which shall be called "Constitutionalists," Don Venustiano Carranza, Governor of the State of Coahuila.

5. On the occupation by the constitutionalist forces of the City of Mexico, the executive power shall be then taken charge of by Don Carranza, first chief of the forces or whoever may be substituted in command.

6. The president ad interim of the Republic shall convoke general elections as soon as peace shall have been established delivering the power to the person who shall be elected.

7. The person acting as first chief of the Constitutionalist forces will assume charge as provisional governor of such states as have recognized Huerta and

shall convoke local elections after which the persons elected shall assume their duties.

Signed at the estate of Guadalupe, Coahuila on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1913."¹

Carranza aimed, in short, to restore constitutional order, to punish the guilty, to vindicate the national honor, and to carry out the reforms that the political and economic situation demanded. He proposed to establish a government that would be constitutional in all respects, to reform the judiciary to make free election possible, and to apportion parts of the vast estates among their legitimate owners so that they might provide food, clothing and education for their families.²

With these aims he had, according to some reports, ninety per cent of the people back of him³; and before many months, by August 1913, over three fourths of the Republic of Mexico was in rebellion against the usurper.⁴ Huerta seemed to continue to hold most of the capital cities; this made it seem that he controlled more than he did.⁵ Those interested in misrepresenting the movement reported that it was chaotic and lacked systematic coordination. These reports, Senator Sheppard said

¹Senate Document 153, p. 10. 63 Cong. 1st sess.

²Ibid, p. 10.

³Senate Document 153, p. 11.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3130.

⁵Senate Document 153, p. 11.

were false. Carranza had already by August established an embryo government and two members of his cabinet, the ministers of war and finance, had been appointed.¹ By May 1913 he had issued a decree binding the constitutional government to the principle of international arbitration for the immediate settlement of claims of American citizens and other foreigners against Mexico upon the triumph of his cause.²

There was some criticism of the President's policy at that time. Many people felt that we should follow our past policy of recognizing the government if we had reasonable assurance that it would stand. However, it was not until the late summer and fall that criticism became very severe against the policy of the administration.

In August 1913 President Wilson sent John Lind, former Governor of Minnesota, as his personal representative to Mexico. He reported to a joint session of Congress on August 27 that Mr. Lind's instructions were as follows:

"Press very earnestly upon the attention of those who are now exercising authority or wielding influence in Mexico the following considerations and advice:

¹
²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3133.
Ibid.

"The Government of the United States does not feel at liberty to stand inactively by while it becomes daily more and more evident that no real progress is being made toward the establishment of a Government at the City of Mexico which the country will obey and respect.

"The Government of the United States does not stand in the same case with the other great governments of the world in respect to what is happening or what is likely to happen in Mexico. We offer our good offices, not only because of our genuine desire to play the part of a friend, but also because we are expected by the powers of the world to act as Mexico's nearest friend.

"We wish to act in these circumstances in the spirit of the most earnest and disinterested friendship. It is our purpose in whatever we do or propose in this perplexing and distressing situation not only to pay the most scrupulous regard to the sovereignty of Mexico -- that we take as a matter of course to which we are bound by every obligation of right and honor -- but also to give every possible evidence that we act in the interest of Mexico alone, and not in the interest of any person or body of persons who may have personal or property claims in Mexico which they feel that they have the right to press. We are seeking to counsel Mexico for her own good and in the interest of her own peace, and

not for any other purpose whatever. The Government of the United States would deem itself discredited if it had any selfish or ulterior purpose in transactions where the peace, happiness and prosperity of a whole people are involved. It is acting as its friendship for Mexico, not as any selfish interest, dictates.

"The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the fulfilment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself and with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America. It is upon no common occasion, therefore, that the United States offers her counsel and assistance. All America cries out for a settlement.

"A satisfactory settlement seems to us to be conditioned on

(a) An immediate cessation of fighting thruout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed;

(b) security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part;

(c) the consent of General Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election; and

(d) the agreement of all parties to abide by the

results of the election and cooperate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration.

"The Government of the United States will be glad to play any part in this settlement or in its carrying out which it can play honorably and consistently with international right. It pledges itself to recognize and in every way possible and proper to assist the administration chosen and set up in Mexico in the way and on the conditions suggested.

"Taking all the existing conditions into consideration, the Government of the United States can conceive of no reasons sufficient to justify those who are now attempting to shape the policy or exercise the authority of Mexico in declining the offices of friendship thus offered. Can Mexico give the civilized world a satisfactory reason for rejecting our good offices? If Mexico can suggest any better way in which to show our friendship, serve the people of Mexico and meet our international obligations, we are more than willing to consider the suggestion."¹

President Wilson announced further that if Huerta would accept these terms the United States would pledge itself "to recognize and in every way possible

¹House Document 205, V. 11, pp. 4-5, 63 Cong. 1st sess.

and proper to assist the administration chosen and set up in Mexico." He counselled patience. "Every act of ours must be done with calm and disinterested deliberation", he said. Further, "We can afford to exercise the self restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it." Until this policy should work, he advised all Americans who could leave Mexico to do so and he said that the United States should help them get away. He added that the Washington Government should notify every one who should assume authority in Mexico that the fortune of those who remained there would be guarded by the United States.¹

In short Mr. Lind was to say to the Mexican foreign minister that if Huerta did not get out he would be put out. It was the preference of the President that it be accomplished by domestic means, if possible; but if it could not be done by domestic means, other means adequate for the purpose would be resorted to.²

Secretary of Foreign Relations Gamboa answered that,

1. The President's statement of affairs in Mexico was incorrect.

¹Independent, V, 75, pp. 589-592.

²Independent, V. 88, p. 103.

2. He suggested that the United States could best accomplish neutrality by refusing to permit the rebels to get aid across the border.

3. He said that an armistice was impossible because it was an accepted doctrine that no armistice could be concerted with rebels.

4. He answered that the suggestion that Huerta should not be a candidate for President could not be considered as there was a risk that it might be a matter of personal dislike. That point would have to be determined by Mexican public opinion at the polls, and

5. He declared that the Huerta government was legal and suggested that the United States recognize it and resume formal diplomatic relations.¹

The proposals were rejected, according to the President, because the authorities at Mexico City had been misinformed upon two points. First, they did not understand that the American people were friendly yet determined that some solution be found for the Mexican difficulties; and second, that they did not believe that the administration spoke, thru Mr. Lind, for the American people.²

In the second Lind note only two conditions were insisted upon: the holding of a constitutional election, and the pledge that Huerta not be a candidate.³

¹Independent, V. 75, p. 591.

²Independent, V. 75, p. 590.

³Review of Reviews, V. 48, p. 413.

In reply Senor Gamboa called the attention of the United States Government to the fact that the constitution of Mexico forbade what was described in the note as "the constitutional ad interim President" from being a candidate at a regular following election. The note also repudiated the suggestion of a loan to be brought about thru the United States Government on the ground that this offer was a bribe.¹

Lind remained in Mexico City for some time² attempting to bring about more friendly relations but accomplished little.

The constitutional election to which Huerta had pledged himself, was to be held October 26. We had asked in each of the notes presented by Mr. Lind that Huerta not be a candidate for President and said that if he would agree to that condition we would accept and recognize the president elected. However, we received no satisfaction except what Senor Gamboa gave in his answer to our second note when he said that the Mexican constitution debarred the Provisional President from being a candidate at the regular following election. Additional assurance, however, was given by Provisional President Huerta thru a declaration which he issued September 21, 1913 to the people of Mexico. In this he said that the government had no candidate for the Presidency and would show no

¹Review of Reviews, V. 48, p. 413.

²In order to prevent misunderstanding it should be added that Lind remained at the Mexican Capital, his first stay there, only from August 11 to August 26. At this time he retired to Vera Cruz which he made his headquarters until November 7 when he returned to Mexico City remaining there until November 11.

favoritism.¹

On October 10 before the election, the world was astounded by the high handed measures Huerta took. Senator Dominquez of Chiapas, in a very bitter speech in the Senate on September 23, 1913, denounced Huerta as a usurper and a murderer and accused him of trying to force intervention by the United States in order to unite all the Mexican factions.² The Senator disappeared the following night. He was taken from his home by men, generally supposed to be agents of the government³, and killed. The Mexican Congress passed a resolution asking for an investigation of the sudden disappearance of Senator Dominquez and demanded a safeguard of their own lives by Huerta.⁴ When requested to withdraw this resolution they refused to do so.⁵

After this action Huerta, knowing that he could no longer control his Congress, attempted to establish himself as dictator. On October 10 he had two Senators⁶ and one hundred and ten members of the Chamber of Deputies arrested and sent to prison⁷ on the charge that they had usurped the prerogatives of the executive branch of the government.⁸ After this he immediately published a decree

¹Literary Digest, v. 47, p. 612.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8511.

³Independent, v. 76, p. 155.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8511.

⁵Independent, v. 76, p. 155.

⁶Independent, v. 76, p. 155.

⁷Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8516.

⁸Independent, v. 76, p. 155.

declaring the Mexican Congress dissolved and without further power and declared the judicial and legislative power vested in himself. He further announced that the constitutional guarantees against the arrest of Members of Congress were suspended.¹ He also called for an extraordinary election of Representatives and Senators on October 26, which would pass on the presidential election of the same date.²

Secretary Bryan telegraphed to the American Embassy in Mexico a message for Huerta to the effect that if the Deputies should be harmed, the United States would be displeased. Other telegrams were sent. President Wilson wrote one in which he said he was "shocked at the lawless methods employed by General Huerta" and that he must regard the arrest of the Deputies and the dissolution of Congress "as an act of bad faith toward the United States."³

By October 15, 1913 it became obvious that Huerta would not permit Diaz to stand as a candidate for the presidency, notwithstanding his agreement with him of February 18, 1913.⁴ This agreement had been signed by both at the American Embassy; it provided that Huerta should be the Provisional President, that Diaz should

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8516.

²Independent, v. 76, p. 155.

³Independent, v. 76, p. 155.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8517.

name the Provisional Cabinet and that thereafter Diaz should have the support of Huerta in being elected as the permanent President.¹ It seemed inevitable to nearly all the powers but Great Britian that the United States would intervene.²

Huerta, undaunted, went right on with his plans. On October 22 he sent out secret instructions that the votes cast for Senators and Representatives should be counted for his followers and that, despite the fact that the constitution definitely states that election returns should be made promptly, the returns should be purposely delayed.³ Immediately before the election the country was flooded with immense circulars urging the people to vote for Huerta. Immediately after the election, on October 27, Huerta's minister of gobernacion announced publicly that the returns from Puebla, San Luis Potosi and other places showed overwhelming majorities for Huerta.⁴

On November 20 the newly elected Congress convened. On December 10 the Committee reported to Huerta that of 14,425 precincts only 7,157 had reported and consequently there had been no election of a President. Congress recommended that Huerta continue to act as President until a lawful election could be held at some future time.⁵

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8513.

²Ibid. p. 8517.

³Ibid. p. 8508.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8517.

⁵Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8517.

President Wilson thru Representative Lind at Mexico City had asked the assurance of Huerta that he would not convene the new and unconstitutionally elected Congress. The dictator failed to reply within the time specified and on November eleventh Mr. Lind retired to Vera Cruz sending his communications for a time thru Mr. O'Shaughnessy, the American Charge d'Affaires at Mexico City.¹ Mr. Lind soon after returned to the United States and the exodus of foreigners from Mexico suddenly increased.² After these acts Wilson announced that he could not recognize the government set up at this time.³

Since Representative Lind did not accomplish his purpose, his trip to Mexico could not be called a success. Former Ambassador Wilson declared that the Lind mission to Mexico was doomed to failure for three reasons:

1. His dispatch thither without formal diplomatic character was an act of offensive intervention in the affairs of a friendly nation.

2. His mission was personally offensive to the Provisional President of Mexico.

3. The demand that a constitutional election be held in Mexico was impossible because the machinery of constitutional election did not exist in Mexico and

¹On December thirty-first Mr. Lind returned to the United States for a brief consultation with President Wilson, who was at Pass Christian, Mississippi. He returned to Mexico the first part of January and remained there until April seventh. The policy of the Administration remained unchanged after Mr. Lind's consultation with the President.

²Literary Digest, V. 47, p. 987.

³Independent, V. 76, p. 155.

besides eighty per cent of the people had no idea of the obligations of citizenship.¹

Upon the failure of negotiations the Washington administration adopted other means. This was known as a "financial blockade".² It was agreed to by the chief European powers that had heavy financial interests in Mexico to discourage their bankers from making any loans to the Huerta Provisional Government. It was also made clear to foreign investors that the obligations incurred by the present regime would not be recognized and must inevitably become worthless.²

It was rumored at that time that Huerta had funds for only thirty days²; after which he would be unable to pay either soldiers or civilian employees, thus bringing about the downfall of his power by bankrupting the government.

It was reported by many and backed by some of the American newspapers and magazines that Great Britain and France were not back of the President in this policy. With regard to this Premier Asquith said, "There have been rumors that after the United States had adopted a line of their own in regard to Mexico, we took a line calculated deliberately to thwart America. There is not a vestige of foundation for such a rumor."² The London Daily Times

¹Independent, V. 76, p. 297.

²Literary Digest, V. 47, p. 987.

said that the only interest England had in Mexico was a money interest; and all of this would not be a compensation for losing American friendship. The article continued that under the circumstances it was England's duty to acquiesce in America's policy. All that had happened in Mexico confirmed the keenness of President Wilson's insight and justified the courage of his conduct.¹

The British minister at Mexico City, however, was unfriendly. With regard to this the London Daily News for November 8, 1913 said that "the interests of our friendship with America require the recall of a minister who does not appreciate that the maintenance of such friendship is the keystone of British policy". The London Telegraph desired the recall of British recognition of the Mexican ruler.¹ The London Morning Post for the same date went even further. It stated that London should "stand with the United States right or wrong, that the destiny of Mexico is inevitable, that it is only a question of time when the great Anglo-Saxon race will possess it. This should be understood by Anglo-Saxons of Britian," the article continued, "and her officials should not try to put a brake on the wheels of progress."²

Some said that Great Britian and the United States had struck a bargain. Great Britian was to

¹Literary Digest, v. 47, p. 863.

²Ibid. p. 863.

support the American Mexican policy and the Wilson administration was to obtain a repeal of the exemption clause of the Panama Tolls Bill. Wilson answered that this accusation was an insult.¹

The editor of *Soleil*, Paris said that European countries approved of President Wilson's policy and that he was justified under the Monroe Doctrine.² France asked the United States to send warships to Mazatlan for the protection of French citizens at San Ignacia. The New York papers recognized that this proceeding of the French government was a recognition of the supremacy to which American interests in Mexico was entitled.²

The French Government went even further than that in supporting the American policy. It notified the Paris bankers that the government would be displeased if they supplied money to the Huerta government.³

Germany also agreed with France and England to keep her hands out of Mexican affairs thereby, supposedly, approving the action of the United States.

This policy, to drive Huerta from power by cutting off his credit, was upheld more generally, at this time, than talk of armed intervention.³

The constitutionalist cause continued to gain adherents and territory in the North. Dr. William Bayard

¹Nation, v. 98, p. 347.

²Literary Digest, v. 47, p. 1055.

³Ibid. p. 987.

Hale, who was a personal representative of President Wilson in Mexico¹, had a four hour conference with Carranza at Nogales¹ in November 1913 about the same time that Mr. Lind was in Mexico City awaiting a reply to our government's demands. This conference is interpreted as the first open move by the United States to show its interest in the Constitutional movement.² Dr. Hale remained in Mexico for some time and made several later trips there as the supposed Wilson representative to Carranza and Villa. As Congress knew nothing of his official position or instructions, a resolution was introduced asking the State Department for information as to his official standing, if he had any, and for the instructions given to him.³ The resolution was referred to a committee but was never brought up again. Nevertheless, both Americans and Mexicans continued to criticize his activities. A Mexican, thru the New York Times, said that his presence in Mexico City was responsible for some of the irritation between Mexico and the United States; and it made the way much harder for Mr. Lind.⁴ The next spring Wilson sent George R. Carothers, the United States consular agent at Torreon, as a special representative to

¹Literary Digest, v. 47, p. 989.

²Ibid. p. 989.

³Dr. Hale was a divorced ex-preacher and some members of Congress did not like his record.

⁴New York Times, Aug. 14, 1913 (Also Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3385.)

Villa to consult with him.¹

In the meantime much loss of American life and property had occurred in Mexico, particularly in the northern part. This was due to the constant state of turmoil that that part of the country had been in for the last few years. The American State Department attempted to hold both Huerta and the Constitutionalist forces responsible for any destruction; but they could not force an indemnity or restitution since there was no recognized government.

The Constitutionalist forces appealed to Washington to recognize the belligerency. A resolution was introduced into the Senate July 29 by Senator Sheppard from Texas² and one into the House by Representative Stephens from the same State³. Both said that such a resolution was necessary to maintain complete neutrality; since, under the act of March 14, 1914, Huerta could purchase munitions in the United States under the exceptions to the joint resolution while the constitutionalist forces were unable to do so.⁴

Several attempts were made to influence the administration to mediate the question. A resolution was passed in the House proposing mediation, under the provi-

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 4519.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3212.

³Ibid. p. 3128.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3130.

sions of the Hague Convention, between the contending forces in the Republic of Mexico, on the part of the Government of the Republics of Brazil, Argentine and the United States.¹

There was also some talk of intervention. On August 21 a resolution was introduced by Senator Penrose to the effect that the President be requested to take such steps as are necessary to place a sufficient number of troops in the Republic of Mexico to protect American citizens and their property.² He added that such policing and protection should not be construed as an act of hostility or unfriendliness toward the Mexican nation. To provide for this he introduced an amendment to the deficiency appropriation bill appropriating \$25,000,000 to be available until July 1, 1914 for the use of the President in the protection of lives and property of American citizens in Mexico.³

These measures were referred to a committee and dropped. They sounded too warlike for the large majority of Congress who did not, as yet, favor intervention. Senator Smoot said that Utah people, and many Utah citizens lived or owned property in Mexico, would rather lose every dollar of property they owned in Mexico than to see intervention by this government.⁴

¹Congressional Record, 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3531.

²Ibid. p. 3568.

³Congressional Record, 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3568.

⁴Ibid. p. 3569.

September 15, 1913, \$100,000 was appropriated for destitute citizens in Mexico¹; and though there was considerable criticism of the President's policy of "watchful waiting", intervention was not seriously considered by many at this time. By February the desire had grown somewhat. Mr. Kahn introduced a resolution February 26 urging friendly intervention by the United States and the more friendly governments of South America and on March 9, 1914 Senator Fall called for the immediate use of the army and navy to restore order and maintain peace.²

Nevertheless, according to Senator Sheppard, intervention would favor only Huerta and the reactionary party. The interests of the people would be greatly prejudiced as they would be compelled to enter into some sort of a compromise with their oppressors. The idea of intervention was very unpopular among the Mexican people; and Senator Sheppard felt that it would originate evils greater than those it intended to remedy. There was little anti-American feeling among the people at that time and he felt that intervention would only serve to inflame the whole Mexican people against the United States and especially against those Americans in Mexico.

¹House Joint Resolution 130. 63 Cong. 1st sess.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 4310-4528.

³Senate Document 153, p. 13. 63 Cong. 1st sess.

South America was also watching to see what we were going to do and, if the United States expected to keep her friendship and trade, it seemed that she could not afford to take such a step. In 1909 the United States had bought from and sold to Latin American countries \$600,000,000 worth of produce. In the last ten years, since the United States has gained their confidence, the trade with them had more than doubled. This trade, growing all the time, would be ruined if they saw the United States invade one of their number.¹

The Prensa of Buenos Aires, leading paper of Argentina, said, in December 1913, that the United States had not considered the Latin-American republics as fully sovereign. This sovereignty had been outraged for the sake of the vast commercial interests of the United States in Mexico. The United States had no right to intervene in Mexico. She had a right to recognize or not to recognize a new government in Mexico but did not have a right to dictate the policy of that government. If the United States intervened in Mexico, it would destroy any germ of Pan-Americanism. "The United States may be sure of receiving sincere and profitable hospitality in South America on condition that Washington recognize in each state an unshackled sovereignty not less absolute than that of any other state on earth. All ideas of a

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 5347.

protectorate must be abandoned as unjust, oppressive and bound to cause disorder."¹

Many press statements declared that the American policy in Mexico was for the purpose of acquiring additional territory and that intervention on our part would end in such acquisition. Representative Bacon, on June 27, 1913, said, "Intervention in Mexico does not mean a temporary incursion or a temporary occupation. It means an occupation of that country by a great American army to stay there for a generation and then, in all probability and in the judgment of those who have given the matter the most thought, for all time."²

Representative Mann, from Illinois, in discussing the proposed appropriation of \$10,000 for the maintenance of the international boundary commission, asked if it was worth while fixing a boundary when it would soon have to be relocated a little further south.³

Some said that this tendency toward expansion was due to our acquisition of the Panama Canal. They felt that it had enlarged the political horizon of the United States, directed her eye to the South, and created among many patriotic Americans the desire for the United States to own all territory which separated her from the canal.⁴

¹Literary Digest, v. 47, p. 1218.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2229.

³Ibid. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8672.

⁴Living Age, Vol. 281, p. 586.

This feeling not only existed in the United States and South America but was also felt in Great Britain. The London Daily Times stated that the United States would insist on the elimination of Huerta even if it were necessary to go in and put him out and stay there.¹ It seemed to the administration, however, that it had been made sufficiently clear to all nations that nothing would induce the United States to acquire territory as a result of intervention. This attitude was shown in every message which the President delivered to Congress and in every statement he gave out to the press, -- that there was nothing grasping in the American policy toward Mexico. Mexico and South America were assured that the United States would not seek to gain a foot of Mexican territory.²

In the meantime the financial blockade was becoming effective. On January 14, 1914 Huerta announced that Mexico would default in the payment of interest due on both the domestic and the foreign debt. This meant a suspension of payment for at least six months of more than \$13,000,000.³ This was true in spite of the fact that De la Barra and De la Lama were both in Europe trying to obtain funds.

This failure to meet its obligations seemed to weaken the provisional government considerably. President

¹Literary Digest, Vol. 47, p. 987.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 9096.

³Review of Reviews, v. 49, p. 151.

Wilson in his Mobile speech said, "By a little every day his (Huerta) power and prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting; and then when the time comes, we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions."¹ President Wilson's restraint, therefore, had apparently been wise. It had convinced Latin-America in general as well as Europe of the disinterestedness of American feelings.²

Governor Colquitt, of Texas, urged intervention strongly and threatened to send the Texas rangers into Mexico independently of the Federal government.³ Senator Sheppard announced in the Senate in March that the people of Texas did not agree with this attitude. On the contrary, however, he said that nine-tenths of the people of Texas approved the policy of Woodrow Wilson without qualifications.⁴ Nine telegrams from cities in Texas, supporting the administration policy were read in Congress at this time and many petitions against intervention were sent in from other parts of the United States.⁵

The Constitutionalist forces had asked for

¹

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 176.

³Review of Reviews, Vol. 49, p. 150.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 4533.

⁵Ibid. p. 4719.

⁵Ibid. pp. 7116, 7181.

recognition, but the United States had failed to give them that. They then asked that the embargo on arms be repealed and declared, if such were done, they could soon bring hostilities to an early and final conclusion.¹

As early as June 18, 1913 a resolution had been introduced by Senator Fall asking that the resolution of March 14, 1912 be repealed. He believed that the enforcement of the law had caused attacks upon American citizens residing or temporarily being in Mexico, the destruction of property of such American citizens and the holding of such citizens for ransom. It had further resulted, he stated, in engendering between American citizens and the great mass of Mexicans feelings of antagonism and distrust and was destroying the traditional friendship between the people of the two countries. Moreover it was his opinion that it was impossible for the United States to remain neutral while this act was in effect.² He further said that the resolution had been accepted under a misunderstanding of its effects and the object in view had not only not been attained but the results were diametrically opposed to those which the persons introducing it stated they wanted to bring about.³

It does seem true that the embargo was the cause for much destruction of American life and property

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 3130.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2074.

³Ibid. p. 2222.

since, before the enforcement of the resolution of March 14, 1912, there had been little loss of such. Only in a few isolated cases had there been any attempt to interfere with Americans, or to prevent the full enjoyment of their property rights and of their liberty. Not an American up to that time had been seized by either of the contending factions in Mexico or held for ransom.¹ Since that time many have been seized and held by the partisans of one or the other contending factions; and in arresting them, invariably the statement was made that it was in retaliation for the action of the United States in the enforcement of the act of March 14, 1912.¹

Some time earlier a commission had been appointed by the Senate to investigate matters along the Mexican border and in Mexico, and to investigate whether American citizens had had anything to do with inciting or fomenting the revolution against Diaz. Every American citizen who was questioned testified that prior to March 14, 1912 their property had been practically exempt from seizure, and that none of the armed forces had interfered with Americans because they were Americans.²

Furthermore it had always been the policy of the nation to encourage trade.³ Of course if such were

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2224.

²Ibid. p. 2224. (Provided for by 62 Cong. 2nd sess.

Senate Resolution No. 335.)

³Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2222.

contraband it was liable to seizure.¹ Jefferson himself said, "The purchasing within and exporting from the United States by way of merchandise articles commonly called contraband, being generally warlike instruments and military stores, is free to all parties at war and is not to be interfered with."²

This policy was laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Santissima-Trinidad Case and in all other cases which came before it prior to the Chaves Case,² which reversed the earlier decisions. This later decision was in keeping with the resolution of March 14, 1912, whereby any American selling arms into Mexico was guilty of a crime for which he might be punished by two years imprisonment in the penitentiary or by the infliction of a ten thousand dollar fine or by both.³

Senator Fall said that the Hague Tribunal had never sought to go further than simply to provide for the seizure of contraband of war. It had never sought to prevent any nation from selling freely to any other nation, whether at war or not, except under that penalty.⁴

In addition to that, conditions had changed very materially since the passage of the resolution. Then

¹

²Lawrence: International Law, p. 721.

³Cong. Rec, 63 Cong. 1st sess. p. 2224.

⁴Ibid. p. 2223.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2226.

Madero was the recognized head of the government. Now there was no recognized head of the government so far as the United States was concerned. The Huerta government was as distinctly a revolutionary government as was the government headed by the other Mexican chieftains. There were two contending factions in Mexico, each of which was entitled, one as much as the other, to whatever privileges Congress might confer in the way of opportunities for carrying on the war.¹ No further action was taken at this time, but in December 1913 the embargo was raised by the President. This showed even more than ever that President Wilson intended letting the Mexican people settle their own quarrels if at all possible.

It was often stated that those who wanted intervention in Mexico wanted it for purely pecuniary reasons² and that American money promoted the Madero and Carranza revolutions. It was true that Americans controlled much of the wealth of Mexico and would, as a consequence, find it hard to leave the country on short notice. They would, therefore, desire an orderly state of affairs. Of the total valuation of the property of Mexico in 1913, Americans from the United States owned forty eight per cent while Mexicans owned only twenty eight per cent.³

¹Cong. Rec. 65 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2228.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8803.

³Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2231.

Leaving out the land holdings and the land lot values, Americans had \$ 1,057,770,000 worth of property while the Mexicans had only \$792,187,242 worth¹ and it is true that most of the requests for intervention came from property owners.

Many accusations were brought against the administration on the ground that it favored Carranza because under Huerta North American interests were not sufficiently promoted² and American finance consequently went to back Carranza. Sherburne G. Hopkins, the representative of Henry Clay Pierce of the Pierce-Waters Oil Company, had his headquarters in Washington for some time. He did not want Huerta recognized³ and some think that he influenced the administration against the provisional government.⁴

An investigation was carried out to find if any American corporation or company had furnished money to the insurrectos and it was reported that no American company, corporation or individual furnished any money by which the Mexican insurrections were brought about⁵ and it is very probable that all such accusations were simply anti-administration, or perhaps German propaganda.

The removal of the embargo on arms seemed only to

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2231.

² Literary Digest, v. 47, p. 935.

³ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 194.

⁴ Ibid, p. 6980.

⁵ Ibid. 63 Cong. 1st sess., p. 2227.

intensify the disorder¹ which was followed in March 1914 by the killing of Benton, a British subject and wealthy ranchowner in Chihuahua. All evidence in the case showed only cold blood murder. Benton had asked permission of Villa to take his cattle out of Mexico. This was refused as Villa said that Americans and other foreigners were not treating him right and they could not take their cattle out of the country.² Benton, therefore, went to Juarez to protest against this action and the confiscation of a part of his property³ and while there, as reports went, was killed by Villa himself. Because of this and other reports of disorder two additional regiments of infantry were sent to the border making the force there eighteen thousand.⁴

Great Britian was very indignant. Her policy depended on two things: first, whether or not Benton was a harmless and peaceable British subject brutally killed; second, whether he actually took a hand in Mexican politics.⁵ If it could have been proven that Benton had remained a peaceable and neutral British subject Great Britian would probably have asked for the punishment of the assassin.

Secretary Bryan appealed to Great Britian to allow Washington to act as intermediary in this matter.⁶

¹Living Age, v. 281, p. 58.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 4521.

³Ibid. p. 3743.

⁴Independent, Vol. 77, p. 440.

⁵Living Age, v. 281, p. 56.

⁶Fish: American Diplomacy, p. 486.

He asked for this on the grounds that since Great Britian had recognized Huerta and had not recognized belligerency she could not treat with the Constitutionalists. Great Britian agreed to let us investigate the case but one member of Parliament said that England would look to the United States and not to Mexico for every dollar of damage done to British property and every English life lost there.¹ However, the United States did not agree to assume any responsibility. Carranza, after some hesitation, also agreed to let Washington handle the case.

An investigation was held by the State Department but little reliable information could be obtained. According to Villa's report, Benton tried to kill him after insulting him and in consequence he was tried and punished according to martial law.² An official explanation was made public April 6 according to which Benton was not killed by Villa but by a rebel major in whose charge he had been put as a prisoner. According to this report the tale of the court-martial was a pure fabrication.³

Very shortly after this matter had been settled an affair occurred which threatened to be more serious than any previous trouble. On April 9, 1914 a paymaster of the United States Ship Dolphin and a boat's crew

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 195.

²Independent, v. 77, p. 293.

³Nation, April 6, 1914.

landed at Tampico, Mexico at Iturbide Bridge for supplies. While loading the boat they were arrested by an officer and a squad of men in the army of Huerta. Two of the men were taken off the boat. The Americans were unarmed; and the boat carried, both at bow and stern, the United States flag. Within one and a half hours orders were received from the commander of the Federal forces for the release of the men and this order was followed by apologies from the commander and later by an expression of regret from Huerta himself. The Constitutionalist were attacking Tampico and Huerta held that martial law was in force there at the time and that no one was allowed at Iturbide Bridge. However, our naval commander had not been notified of any such prohibition. Even if this were the case, the only course open to local authorities, according to President Wilson in his address to Congress on April 20, was to request the paymaster to withdraw and lodge a complaint with the commander of the fleet.

Admiral Mayo, commander of the fleet, regarded the Tampico affair as such an affront that he was not satisfied with the apologies offered but demanded that the United States flag be saluted with special ceremony.¹ The President upheld Mayo and demanded a salute of twentyone guns but Huerta failed to comply with the request and on April 14 Secretary Daniels ordered the concentration of the

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6908.

Atlantic fleet at Tampico.¹ On April 16 Huerta agreed to fire the salute but the next day said it must be returned gun for gun by the United States.² On April 18 an ultimatum was sent giving him until April 19 at six P. M. to agree. His only reply was to ask for a written protocol.

By this time warships were on their way, thirty six on the east and sixteen on the west coast with 22,775 men.³ The request for the protocol was refused and on April 20 President Wilson came before a joint session of Congress and asked that he be justified in the use of the armed forces of the United States in such ways as might be necessary to obtain from Huerta a recognition of the rights and dignities of the United States.⁴

In complying with the request a resolution was introduced in the House and later amended in the Senate to read as follows:

"In view of the facts presented by the President of the United States in his address delivered to the Congress in joint session on the twentieth day of April 1914 with regard to certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States in Mexico, Be it

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-

¹Nation, v. 98, p. 415.

²Ibid.

³Independent, v. 78, p. 156.

⁴Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6908.

tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is justified in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States; be it further Resolved, That the United States disclaims any hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico."¹

This resolution called forth a great deal of debate in both House and Senate. The whole policy of "watchful waiting" was taken up and in some cases severely criticized, being characterized a few times as "careless drifting" instead of "watchful waiting".

Representative Campbell said that the purpose of the resolution was not for avenging wrong and insult or ending disorder in Mexico but "to satisfy the administration's morbid obsession to make good its prophecy that the Huerta government would fall."² He said further that if the administration was really desirous of maintaining American honor and dignity and protecting American people and their property it should make demands not on the Federal Government but upon Carranza and Villa.²

Senator Clapp of Minnesota said, "As to the demand for recognition being made upon a man whom the

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6908.

² Ibid, p. 6941

President had refused to recognize because of the method by which he had obtained his power, this great Republic could well have paused and lost nothing of selfrespect or of honor or prestige among nations of the earth."¹ Nevertheless, after the occupation of Vera Cruz, he decided to vote for the resolution as he felt that that act opened war.

The large majority in both House and Senate felt that the passage of this resolution would mean war and many felt that the failure to salute the flag was not sufficient cause for war. In some cases it was called a mere punctilio, a trifle. If we were to have war, they declared, we had better causes than that: no great nation can tolerate interminable anarchy and disorder on its very frontier.² Senator Lodge referred to the one hundred fifty Americans who had been killed and the American property which had been destroyed in Mexico and introduced an amendment to the resolution making the cause for the use of armed forces the many troubles between the nations and not just the trouble over the salute.³ This was rejected as the majority felt that narrower grounds would allow us to leave Mexico if Huerta either complied with the request or was overthrown.⁴ If we gave, as grounds

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 7001.

² Living Age, v. 281, p. 579.

³ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6936.

⁴ Ibid. p. 6970.

for intervention, all the injuries done to American citizens and insults to the American, it was most probable that we could never leave with our purpose accomplished.

Representative Sisson said that the resolution was in itself a declaration of war. Representative Mann added that it was more than a declaration of war.¹ Representative Flood of Virginia, who had introduced the measure, held that it was not a declaration of war, and that war need not follow.¹ To make sure that war would not ensue, Representative Moore introduced an amendment providing that nothing in the amendment should be construed as a declaration of war.² This was rejected.

On the other hand an amendment by Senator Poindexter, providing that "a state of war exists between the United States of America and the United Mexican States"³ was also rejected as was an amendment which stated that no acquisition of territory should follow this action.⁴

Hermanos, the American consul at Mexico City, said that the flag matter was a most trifling incident since to his knowledge nine American citizens had been court-martialed and shot in the two weeks prior to that time.⁵ However, though an insult to the flag may seem

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6935.

²Ibid. p. 6957.

³Ibid. p. 7005.

⁴Ibid. 63 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 1017.

⁵Ibid. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6976.

a slight thing to go to war about it must be remembered that the flag is the emblem of the nation's honor and insults to it can not be overlooked. A high and formal courtesy is insisted upon by all nations claiming the respect of the world.

In the vote on the resolution there were three hundred and thirty-seven yeas in the House to thirty-seven nays. In the Senate there were seventy-two yeas to thirteen nays. Of the thirty-seven yeas in the House, thirty were Republicans, five Democrats, one Progressive, and one Independent. The thirteen in the Senate were all Republicans. This goes to show that part at least of this adverse vote was given for party reasons and that the large majority of Congress as well as the majority of the people, were behind the President in this measure.

While the Senate was still debating the question, the President notified Rear-Admiral Fletcher to seize the customs house at Vera Cruz. He had heard that Huerta had effected a loan thru the Mexican banks of \$60,000,000 and that a large cargo of arms was on its way to Vera Cruz from Germany.¹ This consignment was due April 21 and the port was seized to prevent its delivery to Huerta.²

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 1017.

² This consignment was on board the German ship Ypiranga -- the ship which had carried Diaz into exile (O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days, p. 251). It had on board 250 cannon and 200,000,000 rounds of ammunition for Huerta (Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6997). It arrived in Vera Cruz the day after the marines had taken over the port. They would not allow the ship to land her cargo but gave her clearance papers. She went to a United States port, stayed there a few days, sailed again and landed her entire cargo of arms

By noon on April 22 Vera Cruz had been occupied with the loss of seventeen American lives and with sixty wounded. Over one hundred Mexicans were killed. General Maas and the Mexican garrison retired some fifteen miles from the city.

Carranza protested against the occupation and sent a note demanding the withdrawal of American troops from Mexican soil. As a result of this attitude the General Staff of the Army headed by Major-General Leonard Wood urged that a general embargo on arms be declared, not only against Huerta but also against the Constitutionalist forces because either faction might use them against the United States. Since the embargo had been raised the previous winter 20,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 18,000 rifles had been shipped into Mexico. Of this amount 8,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 10,000 rifles were shipped after the orders were issued for the dispatch of the fleet to Tampico and Vera Cruz. Still President Wilson refused to restore the embargo, possibly because of the advice of Secretary Bryan who favored the Constitutionalist forces and expected their help against Huerta.¹

at Puerto, Mexico which was in control of Huerta's forces.

The arms were then taken to Mexico City and delivered.

The Ypiranga then returned to Vera Cruz where the Americans in charge of the port fined the owners \$500,000 under the Mexican law making a ship subject to fine if its cargo is landed at a port not specified.

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 7125.

Nevertheless by a departmental order the shipment of arms across the border was stopped by the Secretary of War.¹

At the time of the trouble at Vera Cruz there were three gun boats, the Dolphin, the Chester and the Des Moines in the river a few hundred feet from Tampico. Just after Vera Cruz was occupied a message was received ordering these gunboats withdrawn. The administration felt that all foreigners in Tampico would be safer without the American gunboats near. Admiral Mayo thought that this was a mistake and would not withdraw the boats until the message was repeated. He protested three times but the boats were ordered withdrawn. Before he withdrew, however, he received the assurance of Admiral Craddock of the British Cruiser Hermione that the latter would make provisions for the refugees.² The American Consul at Tampico also protested but to no avail.

As soon as the occupation of Vera Cruz was generally known in Tampico, feeling became intense against Americans. One hundred fifty Americans were guarded in the Southern hotel. Efforts were made to batter down the door. No relief came until the commander of the German boat, Dresden, told the commander of the Federal forces to disperse the mob or he would land marines to do it.³ But within a short time twenty five hundred men

¹Nation, v. 98, p. 483.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 7411.

³Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8966.

women and children were forced to flee from Tampico leaving property worth \$ 250,000,000 behind.

An attempt was made to maltreat and lynch Vice-Consul Bevens on the streets of Tampico, but he was saved by the British Consul. Coaches were stopped and the American occupants were forced to shout "Long live Huerta" and "Death to the Americans."¹ In the American Congress several telegrams were read by Senator Fall on April 28 saying that outrages and insults to Americans in Tampico could not be exaggerated, that millions of dollars of property was being destroyed, and that the present arrangement would result in losses to all Americans and make it impossible for them to continue in business in Mexico.²

Senator Lodge charged that the ships were withdrawn from Tampico so the insurgents could get a port.³ It was known that, since Secretary Garrison's order had been issued prohibiting the shipment of arms across the border, the insurgents had been unable to secure arms since they had no port. As soon as the United States withdrew from Tampico the Carranza forces took the city and began to bring in munitions again to use against Huerta.

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 7408.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. 63 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 1018.

The American occupation of Vera Cruz, according to Governor Colquitt, influenced Mexicans everywhere against Americans. On the North bank of the Rio Grande there were ten Mexicans to one American and there was a strong anti-American spirit shown. When the Federal Government failed to send the number of troops, which the Texas Governor felt was needed, he sent twelve hundred Texas rangers to the border. They were instructed not to cross the river nor to violate the neutrality laws, but at all costs to protect the lives and property of Texas people.¹

On April 22 the President sent a message to the Senate and House of Representatives asking for an appropriation of five hundred thousand dollars for the relief of Americans in Mexico and their transportation from that country.² This appropriation was promptly made. On April 23 Nelson O'Shaughnessy, The United States Charge d'Affaires, received his passports from Huerta and the next day arrived with his family and the personnel of the Embassy at Vera Cruz.³ Many refugees from Mexico City also reached Vera Cruz that day and it seemed that active hostilities were in progress.

On April 26, Argentine, Brazil and Chili, the

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 1060.

² Ibid., 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 7073.

³ Nation v. 98, p. 483.

A. B. C. powers, offered to mediate. The offer was accepted by the administration with the stipulation that any plan must include the elimination of Huerta and the provision that in an event of an act of aggression by Mexico the United States should take what military measures it deemed necessary. Huerta's formal acceptance of the proposal was unconditional. It was thought that pressure was brought to bear on him by England, France and Germany to make him accept the proposal.¹

The Conference with the A. B. C. powers convened at Niagara Falls, Canada in May and the protocol concerning the internal affairs of Mexico, asking for the resignation of Huerta, was signed by the mediators and delegates of Huerta and the United States on June 24. The protocol provided also for a conference to be held between representatives of Huerta and Carranza. Conditions in Mexico however remained uncertain. Carranza was delaying about the appointment of delegates to meet the Huerta representatives, and it seemed that there was no immediate prospect of the conference taking place.²

Huerta, still in control in Mexico City, pushed the preparations for an election July 5 in the parts of Mexico he still controlled. He desired to hold out until someone was elected President, when, it was announced

¹Nation, v. 98, p. 483.

²Ibid., v. 99, p. 1.

he intended to retire.¹ When the election took place only three per cent of the voters went to the polls and Huerta was again overwhelmingly elected President. From his address to Congress July 8, it was understood that he intended to retire shortly from the Presidency² and Dr. Carbajal was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs to succeed him.

In the meantime the Constitutionalist had been gaining ground. Tampico, Tuxpan and Saltillo had fallen into their hands and an attack on San Luis Potosi had been begun. Some difficulties had occurred between the two chiefs, but these had been patched up at Torreon where it was decided that Carranza should remain First Chief but Villa should be supreme chief of the army of the north and second only to Carranza.³ The march on the Capital seemed assured and there was less reason than ever to think that Carranza would appoint delegates to confer with Huerta as the mediators had provided. It seemed that the Constitutionalist would come to terms only in Mexico City.⁴

On July 15 Huerta announced his resignation of the Presidency and Dr. Carbajal, recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, took the oath of office and on July 20, Huerta and Blanquet, the Vice-President, and their families

¹Nation, v. 99, p. 1.

²Ibid. v. 99, p. 59.

³Nation, v. 99, p. 31.

⁴Ibid. v. 99, p. 59.

left for Kingston, Jamaica on the German cruiser Dresden.

Perhaps the most discussed of all Mexican questions during these two years was whether Huerta should have been recognized. There was a strong party in Congress and thruout the country in favor of his recognition. The American Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, urged very strongly unconditional recognition.¹ He did not believe that Huerta had anything to do with the murder of Madero and Suarez. Anyway, he said that after these people were forced back into private life we should think no more about this murder than about the seventy five or eighty Americans who had been killed there in the two preceeding years.² He had made the same recommendation to the Taft administration in February. According to his report Taft delayed only because of delay of the new Mexican administration in adjusting certain differences and also because of the fact that in just two weeks time a new administration was to begin.¹ Foreign governments had already accorded recognition. The Carranzista revolutionary movement was not yet beyond the bounds of control and according to our Ambassador prompt action by our government would have averted all the horrors which followed.¹

The past policy of the government seemed to favor recognition. President Pierce in a message to

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 8873.
²Ibid., p. 8514.

Congress in 1856 said, "It is the established policy of the United States to recognize governments without question of their source of organization or the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there is a government de facto accepted by the people of the country."¹

President Buchanan said in 1848, "We recognize the right of all nations to create and reform their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. --- It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself, and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows."²

In addition it was felt generally that Mexico was not capable of maintaining a constitutional government. James Creelman in the New York Mail for February 24, 1914 called Mexico a "strange political quicksand upon which Wilson expects to erect the solid foundations of a real republic."³ Representative Hulings said in Congress in March 1914 that the form of government in Mexico was necessarily a dictatorship and it would require an iron hand and the wisest statesmanship for a generation before a republic in Mexico could be set up. "Talk about free elections," he said, "is sheer nonsense."⁴

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 3927.

(Pierce: Message to Congress, May 15, 1856.)

² Ibid. p. 5496.

³ Ibid. p. 3928.

⁴ Ibid. p. 5142.

Mondell of Wyoming asserted at the same time that we were getting on dangerous grounds when we declare that we shall refuse to have official relations with any government, no matter how well established nor how long maintained unless it be a constitutional government according to our own interpretation.¹ Theodore Roosevelt stated in the New York Times for December 6, 1914, that, though it was our clear duty to interfere promptly on behalf of American citizens who were wronged, it was not our affair to interfere in the purely internal affairs of Mexico.²

Senator Lodge declared that if Huerta were not recognized it should have been on different grounds. He gave the following which he considered adequate for such a step: That the Huerta Government was unable to maintain international relations since over a large area of Mexico it exercised no authority, It was also proper to say, he said, that the recognition might entail the validation of the loans which the Huerta government was then attempting to make in Europe and which would have pledged certain revenues of Mexico and thus deprived the United States of the opportunity of securing an indemnity for injuries to its citizens.³

Ex-Ambassador Wilson, even after the Vera Cruz

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 351.

² Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 3rd sess. p. 1019.

³ Ibid. p. 1017.

episode, wanted Huerta recognized. This was to be done only on condition that all claims could be turned over to an international claims commission for settlement; that a constitutional presidential election should be held the following October; that the Federal Government be able to restore peace and order to the twenty sixth parallel; and that an arrangement be made by which the American Government, in cooperation with the Mexican Government should be permitted to cross the border and aid the Federal authorities in restoration of order down to the twenty sixth parallel. "Recognition accorded in this manner", he said, "would restore our lost prestige, impress foreign and native opinion in Mexico and undoubtedly restore peace and prevent further bloodshed."¹

Still it was true that Huerta was a dictator. Even though he may not have been responsible for the death of Madero, there were sufficient other charges against him to show that he was not a constitutional ruler in any sense. The recognition of Huerta's predecessors had not stopped anarchy and misrule and there was no reason to think that his recognition would do so.

Senator Norris from Nebraska upheld the President and said that the "precedent of such a recognition, especially among the nations no further advanced would have been one of far reaching consequence, the evils of which,

¹ Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 6979.

had we recognized Huerta would extend down thru generations and perhaps centuries."¹ Representative Linthicum of Maryland stated with reference to this "Recognize every ipso facto president who, by some means or another, manages to get control of the executive office of some South American Republic and how long would any of these republics be free from the danger of revolution?" He further said that Wilson made a wise move in behalf of constitutional government in the western hemisphere when he refused to recognize Huerta as it was our duty to discourage and discountenance every effort to secure changes or reforms in government other than thru those legal constitutional channels established for the purpose. "When the people of South America," he continued, "understand that we will not recognize their claims unless obtained thru lawful means there will be fewer of these sporadic outbreaks of rebellion. As the greatest republican government in the world, it is a shortsighted policy on our part to encourage conditions fostering suspicion and disbelief of that theory of government."²

Those taking this stand on the matter believed that the only way a nation could gain its freedom from an oppressor was thru warfare. As Huerta did not even profess to stand for the people, they did not think any peace with him would be lasting. This being true, they

¹Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 6999.

²Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess. p. 6941.

were sure that it was better that the United States had waited and attempted to settle the matter "in the interest of humanity and permanent peace".

Nevertheless it was the opinion of many other Americans that had Huerta been recognized by the United States government there would have been peace in Mexico sooner than otherwise. At the time he took over the government he controlled more of the country than at any subsequent time; and if he could have gotten outside financial aid, he could have put down the uprisings when they came and much of the awful loss of American life and property might have been averted. It was the duty of the United States government to protect American nationals. Huerta tried to do this and comparatively few complaints came from that section of the country under his control.

They acknowledged while it is probably true that Huerta did have ex-president Madero killed; nevertheless he could not have united the country under himself with Madero alive, and so far as technical legal procedure is concerned there is no question but that he was legally President of the Republic. Furthermore, Madero himself had disappointed the people and it was rumored in Coahuila that Carranza was preparing to revolt against him when Huerta did so.

European countries had recognized the government and it would have been wholly in accord with our past

policy to do so. Mexico herself expected nothing else and the people of Mexico, eighty five per cent illiterate, do not yet understand why we refused. They would doubtless have had more respect for the Washington government had it recognized Huerta. The upper classes of Mexicans generally felt that if Huerta had been given the support of our recognition, he would have been able to quell the revolution and establish peace.¹

President Wilson said that the Mexican people have a right to determine their own form of government and that it is not the business of the United States, how long they take nor what means they use. He added that nobody should interfere with them.² Nevertheless America had never ceased to interfere even from the time of the Madero revolt against Diaz. We have not intervened openly and in consequence the Mexican people have seldom been able to understand our actions. We have intervened, however -- "masked intervention" it has been called.

These factions felt that in solving the Mexican problem the American administration failed to recognize the essentials of Mexican character and the conditions existing there. The people, uneducated and ninety per cent showing traces of Indian blood, were absolutely unable to unite upon any constructive program. This was

¹
²Outlook, v. 110, p. 87.

Pres. speech at New Orleans Jan. 8, 1915, 64 Cong. 1st sess., p. 12611.

true in France after the French Revolution and was true in Russia after the more recent Russian Revolution. Revolution has awakened the Mexican nation and has taught the people many things, but the only way Mexico can unite upon such a program and become capable of self-government is thru a socialized educational system working for perhaps a generation yet. In the meantime Mexico will have to have strong rulers. Huerta showed more strength than any other man in Mexico and perhaps less arrogance toward the United States, even when he realized that his powerful neighbor on the North was driving him from power, than the ruler who followed him and received recognition.

The foregoing are the arguments generally given for and against the Administration's Mexican policy during this period. Since so little time has elapsed the question is still, necessarily, a disputed one. Only the future history of Mexico and American relations with her can decide the wisdom of that policy.

CHAPTER V

The Rule of the Constitutionalists. July 1914--April 1917.

The Constitutionalist movement did not fulfil the bright promises which it had held out for the future of Mexico. Carbajal had become President when Huerta fled. Agreeing to turn the government over to the Constitutionalists, he asked Secretary Bryan to require the following of Carranza: (1) a general amnesty, (2) the protection of the property of all classes and (3) protection of lives. Carranza, however, did not feel disposed to accept these terms and when several Federal officers were captured at Mazatlan they were executed. On August 15 General Obregon took possession of Mexico City in the name of Carranza and on August 20 Carranza entered the city. He adopted a very firm policy from the beginning. Executions continued but a great many did not take place until after the counter-revolutions had developed later.¹

¹One hundred fifty five persons were executed in Mexico City within four days --New York World, Dec. 29, 1914. Reports from Vera Cruz said that many were being executed there without trial and that Carranza had given a general order for the execution of all suspects.-- Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 3rd sess., p. 479.

Within a few days mutinies had occurred in the capital and by September at least three important counter-revolutions were in progress. The most important of these was caused by the split between Carranza and his northern leader Villa. Several reasons were given for this disagreement. Villa's pride had been hurt when Carranza and Obregon entered the city as victors.¹ Some said that it was because Carranza advocated the establishment of constitutional order before the social and political reforms of the country were carried out.² Others thought that the rupture was caused by differences over the basis of representation in the approaching constitutionalist convention. Villa believed that Carranza was trying to pack the meeting with his adherents while Carranza looked with suspicion upon the field commander's desire to apportion seats according to units of one thousand soldiers.³ Another cause given for the split was Villa's imprisonment of General Obregon who had been sent to confer with him and Carranza's retaliatory measure of suspending railway service in Villa's territory.⁴ However, these occurrences were, perhaps, mere excuses. Villa was exceedingly jealous of Carranza's power and this was probably the main cause for their inability to agree.

¹Independent, Vol. 79, p. 204.

²American Journal of International Law, Vol.10, p. 358. At least this was the reason Zapata gave for not being

³willing to recognize Carranza --Nation, Vol.99,p.295.

⁴Nation, Vol. 99, p. 392.

⁴Independent, V. 80, p. 10.

The Convention, which had been planned by Villa and Carranza in the Torreon Conference thus became almost impossible. The loyal generals, twenty six of them, twenty four governors, and a few prominent Constitutionalists met in Mexico City on October 1 for the purpose, as Carranza stated, of deciding what platform the Constitutionalist Government should follow prior to the elections, the reforms to be carried into effect, the date of the elections and other needful matters.¹ According to his promise Carranza submitted his resignation to this convention but, on October 3, it was rejected by an almost unanimous vote.²

A Peace Conference was then convened at Aguascalientes and an armistice declared. Villa's supporters gained control of the Conference and announced that Carranza had resigned and that Francisco Carbajal had succeeded him as president.³ After this announcement a committee of Carranza generals attempted to reconcile the two factions but failed.⁴ The convention remained in session until November and then proclaimed General Gutierrez Provisional President. On November 6 Villa offered to resign his command if that were necessary to eliminate Carranza, and the convention delivered an

¹Amer. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 10, p. 358.

²Independent, Vol. 80, p. 51.

³Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess. p. 9981.

⁴Amer. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 10, p. 358.

ultimatum to Carranza giving him until November 10 to acquiesce in the convention proceedings. Carranza had in the meantime established himself at Puebla and defied the demands of the convention. On November 11, Villa in the name of the convention opened hostilities against him.¹

During this convention an armistice was supposed to be in effect but it was completely disregarded in the North² where General Maytorena, a Villista leader, was pursuing General Hill. Hill retreated to Naco on the Arizona boundary where he was besieged by the Villista forces. These forces paid no attention to the warnings of the United States patrolling soldiers and fired into the adjoining American towns, injuring two residents.³ In addition they looted Catholic churches and submitted the clergy to such harsh treatment that they appealed to Wilson not to recognize any government which would not guarantee religious freedom.⁴

On November 13, Secretary Bryan announced that the American troops at Vera Cruz would be withdrawn on November 23. A statement had been made in September that

¹International Year Book, 1914, p. 447.

²Independent, Vol. 80, p. 51.

³The ninth and tenth U. S. Cavalry were lined up along the international boundary line to prevent the factions from bringing their warfare upon American soil (Cong. Rec. 63 Cong. 2nd sess., p. 16526). The conditions did not improve as by the middle of December bullets were again being shot across the border.--Current Opinion Vol. 58, p. 5.

⁴Ind. Vol. 80, p. 51.

since matters, thruout the country, had become comparatively peaceful the port would be evacuated soon. After the break between the two leaders many thought that the order for the evacuation would have to be revised, but the State Department announced that Washington had received reports which stated that the differences might be adjusted by amicable means. President Wilson then announced that he would not revoke the Vera Cruz order since such an action would excite the suspicion of Mexico.¹ The American forces were consequently withdrawn and a Constitutionalist general took charge of the city on the same day. Carranza had offered to go into voluntary exile before November 25 if Villa would do likewise, but Villa paid no heed to this request and on November 25 Carranza abandoned Mexico City and made Vera Cruz his capital.

The large body of Mexicans had become dissatisfied with Carranza's arbitrary and dictatorial attitude after his entry into Mexico City. On September 7 he had issued a decree setting aside the restrictions on arbitrary arrest and confiscation of property. By the middle of September it was stated that over one thousand persons had been imprisoned in the penitentiary for political reasons, and numerous executions had taken place. This probably had some effect on the attitude of the convention, but it

¹Literary Digest, Vol. 83, p. 619.

did not stop the disorder in the city.

After Carranza's occupation of Vera Cruz he tried to continue as dictator and on December 12, 1914 issued an article declaring that the plan of Guadalupe of March 26, 1913 should continue until peace be restored; that the First Chief of the Revolution, in the meantime could enact and enforce all measures needful to meet the economic, social and political needs of the country. He also took over the power to negotiate loans and issue obligations against the national treasury. He promised to call for an election of Congressmen after peace was established and when such Congress should convene to give it an account of his actions. Congress, in turn, should call for a presidential election and after that was held he, as First Chief of the Revolution, would deliver to the president-elect the executive power of the nation.¹

Fighting in the North which had begun again in 1914 continued thru 1915 and shots were continually being fired into United States' territory. American troops were powerless to stop this, and it seemed that the only solution for the trouble was the neutralization of the border. General Scott, in command of the troops at Naco, attempted to establish a three mile neutral zone for the

¹Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 10, p. 358.

whole frontier.¹ Carranza and Villa agreed to this but the Villista commander in the North, General Maytorena, would not consent. Finally, in January, all concerned agreed to sign; but on February 20 a force under Maytorena occupied Naco in violation of the terms of the agreement. Again in June the pact was violated by a band of Carranzistas who captured Naco and later advanced to Nogales but withdrew when the American Government entered a strong protest with Carranza.²

Much of the fighting in 1915 centered around Mexico City. Gutierrez, who had been appointed Provisional President by the Aguascalientes conference was deposed, on February 16. He then organized a third national party and appealed to Carranza for aid.³ Roqua Gonzales Garza was appointed in his place and martial law was declared in the capital. The Conventionists took over all the powers of the government, legislative, executive and judicial; but reverses in the North caused Villa on January 27 to evacuate the capital. He was followed from the city by the Provisional President and before long the forces of Carranza had again entered the capital.⁴ On February 3 Villa proclaimed himself in charge of the presidency of the republic but also declared that this assumption was

¹Nation, Vol. 100, p. 1.

²International Year Book, 1915, p. 405.

³Ibid.

⁴Nation, Vol. 100, p. 129.

reluctant and of temporary character; but on March 24 he renounced all claims to the presidency and renamed Garza the Provisional President.

The large number of foreigners in Mexico City at this time were in constant danger from some of the contending forces. Shops owned by foreigners were pillaged, and no redress could be obtained. In March Obregon was forced to evacuate the city, and Zapata took charge. He looked with no more favor on the foreigners than others had done, and in the course of some rioting an American, J. B. McManus, was murdered.¹ An especially strong protest thru the Brazilian minister brought an apology and the payment of twenty thousand dollars which was the first adequate claim the United States had been able to obtain. After this the Washington Government endeavored to obtain the neutralization of the city but Carranza refused on the ground that such an action would aid only the opposing army.

Several times during 1915 it seemed that intervention might take place. The Tehuantepec railway tunnel, owned by British capital, was dynamited and bridges were destroyed. The British Ambassador informed the United States Government that Great Britain looked upon the destruction of British property with grave concern. Sometime later Carranza issued a decree

¹International Year Book 1915, p. 405.

annulling all land grants since 1876 and forbidding the further exploitation of such grants. The American and British Governments whose citizens owned large oil interests there protested so strongly that Carranza consented to respect the legitimate interest of foreign capitalists.

Other matters of consequence occurred at about the same time. In February Carranza forced the Spanish minister to leave the country. Spain was displeased but finally agreed to accept Carranza's explanation. On April 29 news reached Washington that an American newspaper correspondent at Vera Cruz had been imprisoned for having sent out uncensored news dispatches and was to be shot by Carranzista forces. Secretary Bryan instructed Consul Silliman to take the matter up with Carranza, and the man was freed.¹

Conditions became so chaotic that President Wilson, on June 2, 1915, issued a public warning to Mexican factions to get together and act for the relief of their prostrate country. He disavowed any desire, on the part of the United States, of meddling in Mexican affairs, but said, that unless they could come to some agreement, the United States "must presently do what it has not hitherto done or felt at liberty to do, lend its

¹Nation, Vol. 100, p. 455.

active moral support to some man or group of men". This would be done for the purpose of "setting up a government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with".¹ Instead of conciliating the parties, this appeal seemed to stimulate the rival factions as each seemed to feel that a decisive victory on its part would bring United States' aid.

Following this, under the date of June 11, 1915, Carranza issued a declaration to the Mexican people stating that the Constitutionalist Government had control of over seven eighths of the national territory; that it was organizing public administration in twenty of the twenty seven states; that it controlled all ports on the Gulf and the Pacific but one, and most of the ports of entry on the northern and southern frontiers. These things being true, Carranza felt that it was time the government was being recognized by foreign governments especially by that of the United States. With a view to this he pledged protection to all foreigners; to reestablish peace; that the laws of reform should be strictly observed; that there should be no confiscation in the settlement of the agrarian question; and that the government would develop public education and comply with the regulations

¹Robinson and West: Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 73.

of the decree of December 12, 1914.¹ In addition to this he promised individual freedom of worship; the payment of just indemnities for damages incurred in the recent trouble and that all treaties with other nations would be carried out.²

However the disorders did not cease and on June 16 instructions were sent to Admiral Howard, Commander of the Pacific fleet at San Diego, to dispatch three cruisers to the west coast of Mexico and, if necessary, to land an expeditionary force for the protection of American colonists threatened by the Yaqui uprising in Yaqui river valley in the southern part of Sonora.³ American citizens were threatened, also, even in Vera Cruz which was under the control of Carranza forces. Two gunboats, the Louisiana and the New Hampshire, were sent there.⁴

When the warning of June 2 did not stop the disorders the six diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Guatemala met with Secretary Lansing for a conference on the course to be pursued with reference to the warring factions. It was decided to send a joint appeal to each faction in order to bring an end to the civil war and establish a provisional government. This was sent under the date of August 13, 1915.

¹Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 10, p. 362.

²Current Opinion, Vol. 59, p. 300.

³National, Vol. 100, p. 695.

⁴Outlook, Vol. 110, p. 883.

The appeal suggested a conference and each representative offered to act as mediary in bringing one about. The note ended by saying that the signatories expected a reply within ten days.¹

This attempt failed. All commanders under Villa accepted the suggestion of a conference; but those under Carranza, having been instructed in February, to refuse to have relations with all representatives of foreign powers as this right was the exclusive privilege of the First Chief², replied that an answer would be left to their leader.¹ Carranza rejected the offer but suggested a border conference in which the international aspect of the Mexican situation should be discussed. The Pan-American Conference, however, did not favor going to Texas to meet the Mexican leaders.³

The Conference met again on September 18 and decided to recognize that faction which could most quickly restore order. On October 9, the delegates again assembled and decided that since there was no central organization of the Villistas and that submission to a central authority was evidenced in the replies of the followers of Carranza, their ultimate triumph seemed evident. This was especially true since he was in

¹Am Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 10, p. 364.

²Nation, Vol. 100, p. 183.

³Int. Year Book, 1915, p. 408.

control of seventy five per cent of the country. After conference, the diplomats decided to recommend to their governments that, in their opinion, the government of which General Carranza was leader should be recognized as the de facto government of Mexico.¹

The note in which the United States Government recognized Carranza was addressed to Carranza's confidential agent at Washington and was as follows:

Department of State,

Washington, Oct. 19, 1915.

My dear Mr. Arredondo: It is my pleasure to inform you that the President of the United States takes this opportunity of extending recognition to the de facto Government of Mexico, of which General Venustiano Carranza is the chief executive.

The Government of the United States will be pleased to receive formally in Washington a diplomatic representative of the de facto Government as soon as it shall please General Carranza to designate and appoint such a representative, and, reciprocally, the Government of the United States will accredit to the de facto Government a diplomatic representative as soon as the President has had opportunity to designate such representative.

I should appreciate it if you could find it

¹Robinson and West: Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p.74.

possible to communicate this information to General Carranza at your earliest convenience.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Robert Lansing

The recognition of Carranza was criticized by the minority party in Congress rather strongly especially by Senators Lodge and Fall but this action came to most Americans as a relief. Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor, recognized in Carranza the friend of the working people and the real leader of the Mexican people generally and had appealed to the President to recognize him.¹ The editor of the El Paso Herald (Republican) accepted the recognition as the most reasonable step the administration had taken up to that time in Mexican affairs. He believed that the only alternative was armed intervention and a long occupation of the country.²

Carranza expressed appreciation of the action of the Conference and agreed to send diplomatic agents to each of the countries. Henry P. Fletcher was appointed Mexican Ambassador from the United States and on October 20 the President ordered an embargo on all shipments of arms from this country to Mexico unless consigned to the Carranza Government.

It seemed that this action would bring an end to

¹Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess. p. 14006.

²Ibid. Appendix, p. 150.

hostilities. The Conventionists in both South and North began to weaken and many laid down their arms. In December Carranza offered the following peace terms to Villa: (1) General amnesty to the partisans of Villa, (2) safe conduct for Villa, himself to the United States where he should have the status of political refugee, (3) cession to the government of Carranza of territory controlled by Villa and (4) incorporation of Villa's troops into the Constitutionalist army and their employment against the Zapatistas.¹ Some of Villa's subordinate leaders accepted these terms but Villa remained in the field.

Matters remained quiet for a short time but by the middle of January talk of armed intervention was again widespread. On January 11 some rebel forces, supposed to be Villistas, had stopped a train at Santa Ysabel, some fifty miles west of Chihuahua City and had taken from it nineteen Americans. These had been stripped of their possessions and clothing, lined up before firing squads and shot. The next day Secretary Lansing sent a dispatch to John R. Silliman, American Consul at Queretaro, directing him to request Carranza to undertake the immediate pursuit and punishment of the murderers.²

¹Nation, Vol. 101, p. 731.

²Nation, Vol. 102, p. 61.

Resolutions were introduced in both houses of Congress calling for armed intervention. Three such were introduced in the Senate, on January 12 by Senator Sherman¹, on January 13 by Senator Lewis², and on January 14 by Senator Works³. Senator Lewis stated that the United States army would have the same power in Mexico as in Nicaragua and in Haiti for the protection of American rights. On January 17 Senator Gore introduced a resolution providing for the establishment of a neutral zone along the boundary line to be jointly policed by United States and Mexican troops until order should be restored.⁴

It was reported at this time that the Latin-American countries were very much opposed to intervention by the United States and that the Administration had made an agreement with the six countries which had united with the Washington Government to send the joint note to Mexico to the effect that any step taken by the United States of a more aggressive character would be taken only at the instigation of the Central and South American countries. Senator Sherman introduced a resolution on January 19 requesting the President to inform the Senate if any such agreement had been made.⁵ Senator Stone answered that

¹Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess., p. 938.

²Ibid., p. 1004.

³Ibid., p. 1060.

⁴Ibid., p. 1137.

⁵Ibid., p. 1239.

the above was a mere newspaper report¹ and Representative McLemore introduced a resolution in the House on January 27 to leave the settlement of the whole Mexican question to those states on the border.² Several speeches were made in Congress denouncing the policy of the government, but Senator Stone upheld the Administration and declared that it would be a mistake for the United States to make war on Mexico immediately after the recognition of Carranza without giving him time to restore stable conditions.

The only resolution which passed Congress at this time was one introduced by Senator Fall asking the President to inform the Senate with regard to certain affairs in Mexico.³ Secretary Lansing refused to furnish this information since it was of too confidential a nature to be made public.

In the meantime a dispatch was received from Carranza promising energetic pursuit of the criminals and on January 16 he gave assurance that such measures had been adopted and the matter was dropped by the Administration.

However, in little more than a month another incident had occurred after which it seemed it would be

¹ Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess., p. 1190.

² Ibid., p. 1660.

³ Ibid. p., 589.

almost impossible to restrain the American nation from war. People everywhere demanded intervention and, had the administration not been so definitely for peace, it is probable that war would have resulted. On March 9 Villa with a force of fifteen hundred men had crossed the frontier and attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico, firing several buildings and killing eleven civilians. On the following day President Wilson decided that the circumstances required immediate action and gave out a statement that an adequate force would be sent in pursuit of Villa.¹ This was to be done in friendly aid of the Constitutionalist authorities of Mexico and with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that republic² and when the American force did enter Mexico six days later it was accompanied by a force of Constitutionalists. Carranza, however, had spent the intervening time arguing over details and later would not acknowledge that the American punitive expedition, which was under the command of Brigadier-General John J. Pershing, had had Mexican sanction at all. This action of the President was upheld by both House³ and Senate³ and a resolution was introduced into the Senate calling for five hundred thousand volunteers for the protection of lives and property in Mexico.⁴ The President

¹Robinson and West: Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 96.

²Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 10, p. 337.

³Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess. p. 4274.

⁴Ibid. p. 3884.

did not call this intervention but resolutions continued to be introduced into both houses providing for the calling of volunteers to restore order in Mexico¹; and Representative Scott of Pennsylvania moved that fifty thousand dollars be appropriated for the capture and delivery of Villa to the proper United States' military authorities.²

Many people in both countries favored war, and it was certain that there were people on and near the border actively aiding Villa. Senator Lewis, in March, introduced a resolution to the effect that those who were furnishing such supplies to Villa for the purpose of opposing the United States were the enemies of the United States, and those within the United States doing so were guilty of indirect treason.³ Senator Stone stated that efforts were being made by numerous people in Mexico and some outside of Mexico to excite the people of that country, to impress them with the idea that the United States contemplated aggression against the government and people of Mexico to their injury.⁴ The President attempted to meet this danger by issuing from the White House, March 25, 1916, a public statement, in which, after reasserting the purpose of the Pershing expedition, he declared that

¹Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess., pp. 4594, 4887.

²Ibid., p. 4732.

³Ibid., p. 4741.

⁴Ibid., p. 4742.

"sinister and unscrupulous influences" were at work; that along the border persons were engaged in spreading sensational and disturbing rumors in order to increase friction between the United States and Mexico "for the purpose of bringing about intervention in the interests of certain American owners of Mexican properties". He assured such persons that a "sane and honorable" policy would be followed by the United States and that so long as this should be done their object could not be attained.¹

Carranza did not work cordially with the American expedition from the first. As the United States forces entered Mexico, they were not allowed to occupy any towns and they were refused the use of railroads. By April their line of communication was three hundred miles long and motor trucks were very inadequate for furnishing supplies. In time Carranza consented to the use of railroads on the ground that goods be shipped from one civilian to another and that the trains not be guarded.² On April 12 there was a serious clash between American troops under Major Tompkins and the forces of Carranza at Parral. The Mexican commander announced later that he was unable to control his troops.² Some thought that this clash was ordered by Carranza; but, though Carranza probably had not ordered it, after it had taken place it

¹Robinson and West: Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 96
²New International Year Book 1916, p. 422.

seems to have had his full approval since he made no apology. On the same day he sent a note to the State Department thru Ambassador-Designate Arredondo challenging the legality of the expedition. He stated that the proposition embodied in the note of March 10 was conditional, and that American troops could enter Mexican territory only providing that the irruption recorded at Columbus was repeated at any other point along the boundary line. He declared further that it was now time to treat with the Government of the United States for the withdrawal of its troops. He said, in addition, that even though the expedition had been carried out in good faith he had not expected it to remain on Mexican soil so long. He particularly objected to the absence of any agreement for the reciprocal passage of the troops of both nations across the border; and, on account of there being no written agreements, he pronounced the expedition as without warrant.¹

On April 14 and 22 resolutions were introduced in Congress against the withdrawal of the troops; and on April 24 it was officially announced that they would not be withdrawn. Secretary Lansing, however, agreed to confer with Mexico on the matter, and on April 25 the Carranza Government accepted the proposal for a conference on the

¹Diplomatic Correspondence. File No. 81200-17867.

border. This conference consisted of Generals Scott and Funston for the United States and Generals Obregon and Trevino representing Mexico. The Mexican representatives demanded the withdrawal of the United States troops; but, since the United States would not agree to this, for a time nothing was accomplished. Then it was decided that the United States should police the border zone north of the boundary line, the Mexicans should police that part south of the line, and the American troops should be withdrawn as soon as Villa's bands seemed to be dispersed.¹

While this conference was in session, Mexican bands, on May 5, raided the American settlements of Boquillas and Glen Springs. At Boquillas they killed a boy and took two American prisoners, and at Glen Springs three troopers were killed. The President immediately called out the militia of Texas, Arizona and New Mexico, and sent two additional regiments of infantry to the border.² Two rescue parties were sent out under Major Langhorne which penetrated one hundred sixty eight miles into Mexican territory, rescued the two Americans and took fourteen prisoners. This was done in spite of the fact that Carranza had given instructions to General Obregon to notify the United States that the Mexican

¹New Int. Year Book, 1916, p. 422.
²Nation, Vol. 102, p. 504.

Government would not permit the further passage of American troops into Mexico on this account. Following this the conference at El Paso adjourned without coming to any definite agreement.

On May 22 Carranza sent a lengthy note to the State Department making an arrogant demand for the withdrawal of the expedition. He questioned the sincerity of the United States Government and demanded a definite statement of its purposes and aims in order to end what he called, "an unsupportable situation". "The explanation given by the American Government for the sending of troops from Columbus", the note continued, "has never been satisfactory to the Mexican Government, but the new invasion of our territory is not now an isolated fact, and leads the Mexican Government to believe that it has to treat with something more than a simple error". It said that the pretexts for detaining the shipments of munitions had always been futile and, as frank reasons were never given, Mexico suspected the United States of insincerity and the Mexican Government wished to know what to expect. It ended by saying that the only way the Mexican Government could be convinced of the sincerity of the American Government would be thru the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Mexican soil.¹ On June 18, following, he

¹Diplomatic Correspondence. File No. 812.00

issued an ultimatum threatening that unless the troops were recalled within seven days a state of war would be recognized.¹

The forces on the Mexican border at this time were about fifty thousand but President Wilson deemed it wise to call out the whole national guard and the forces on the border were soon increased to one hundred thousand. Further raids took place between Laredo and Brownsville and a third and fourth punitive expedition was sent after the marauders in spite of Carranza's protest.

Carranza's note of May 22 was formally answered by Secretary Lansing June 20 in a very lengthy document in which he refused Carranza's demand for the withdrawal of American troops from Mexican soil. He went even further and intimated that, if necessary they would be increased and that, since Carranza had shown that he was unable to bring about the establishment of order, the American forces should remain on the border until this should take place. He denied emphatically any intention of the United States Government to establish authority over Mexican territory and stated that the expeditions made were for the sole purpose of pursuing bandits. He recounted incident after incident where the sovereignty of the United States had been disregarded and charged

¹Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess., p. 1588 (App.).

the Carranza Government with responsibility and even complicity in this. He explained that, if the United States had cared to acquire Mexican territory, there had been better chances than this one and ended by declaring that, when Mexico could fulfil her obligations, the United States would be glad to leave her to do so; but if the Government of Mexico refused to acknowledge its obligations and "believed that 'in case of a refusal to retire these troops, there is no further recourse than to defend its territory by an appeal to arms' the Government of the United States would surely be lacking in sincerity and friendship if it did not frankly impress upon the de facto government that the execution of this threat will lead to the gravest consequences."¹ He thus placed any responsibility for hostilities on the shoulders of the Mexican Government.

On the same day, June 20, a band of American forces moved east and were attacked by Mexicans at Carrizal where seventeen Americans were taken prisoners and several killed. After this war seemed inevitable and on June 21 a circular note was sent to the Latin-American diplomatic agents in Washington explaining the situation between Mexico and the United States and stating that if hostilities resulted, they would constitute

¹Diplomatic Correspondence.

a "state of international war" but without any other purpose than "to end the conditions which menace our national peace and the safety of our citizens."¹

Matters were made worse by the note from Carranza received June 24 in which he confirmed the order given to General Trevino not to allow the American forces to advance any farther south, east or west and he further declared that General Pershing had been informed of this order before the movement of troops had taken place.²

On June 25 Secretary Lansing answered this note. He said that the United States could look at the matter in no way except as "deliberately hostile action against the forces of the United States now in Mexico." He demanded the immediate release of the prisoners taken in the encounter and asked for a statement from the Mexican Government "as to the course of action it wishes the Government of the United States to understand it has determined upon."³ The prisoners were released almost as soon as the note was received thus complying with one of the requests.

Carranza waited to publish this note until June 30. He published it along with a statement of his own charging the United States with mendacity, incompetence,

¹Diplomatic Correspondence. File No. 812.00-18534b.

²Diplomatic Correspondence. File No. 812.00-18574.

³Ibid. File No. 812.00-18574.

false pretense and shameless aggression and reiterated his purpose to expel the "invaders" if they were not speedily withdrawn.¹ He soon backed down from his warlike attitude however and stated in an interview that he did not desire war with the United States.² This attitude was further shown by his note of July 4 in which he asked that the differences between the two nations be left to arbitration or direct negotiation. The Washington Government agreed to direct negotiation and an American-Mexican Joint Commission was provided for. Representing America were Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of Interior, Judge Gray and Dr. John R. Mott. Justice Brandeis had been appointed, but after conferring with Chief Justice White refused to serve. Representing Mexico were Luis Cabrera, Minister of Finance in Carranza's Cabinet, Alberto Pani, President of Mexican National Railways, and Ignacio Bonillas, Sub-secretary of the Mexican Department of Communications.

On October 22 a general election took place in Mexico for a new constitutional assembly. This assembly convened December 1. The proposals outlined by Carranza were as follows: Punishment of wrongdoings on the part of governors and other public officers; various reforms of the Judiciary, including its absolute independence of

¹Cong. Rec. 64 Cong. 1st sess. Appendix p. 1588.

²New International Year Book, 1916, p. 424.

the other departments of the government, and more equitable provisions for the treatment of the accused; the establishment of a minimum wage and a maximum working day; reform of the divorce laws; the abolition of the vice-presidency; consideration of the question of the franchise and direct election of the President.¹

On November 24 the Joint Commission completed its negotiations. It provided for the withdrawal of General Pershing's army from Mexican soil within forty days after the agreement had been ratified. However, if new raids should occur in the meantime, the operation of this measure should be suspended. Each army would patrol its own side of the border, but no special arrangement was made for the establishment of a neutral border zone which the armies of the other nation might use for police purposes. The United States reserved the right to send an army into Mexico to capture bandits who had invaded American territory.² December 26 was the date set as the time limit for Carranza's reply. On December 27 a note arrived from him in which he failed to consent to the demands. The Commission, however, had not failed since it had increased the confidence and good feeling between the two governments and, as a result, Carranza assumed a more friendly attitude.

¹New International Year Book, 1916, p. 425.

²Ibid.

The new constitution was signed January 31 and on March 11, 1917 a presidential and congressional election was held. This election brought out an unusually large vote and resulted in the choice of Carranza as president and gave the Constitutionalist Liberals, his party, a majority in the new Congress. He was inaugurated May 1.

The constitution was very democratic in character and provided for the abolition of many of the old abuses. It provided for equal suffrage, a single term for the President, no Vice-President, free justice, without court costs, minimum wage, eight-hour day, compulsory profit sharing, national public health department, free employment bureau and rigid measures against trusts. In the matter of land reform, it did not go so far as was expected by some but measures were adopted restoring the communal and tribal lands to the villagers and Indians from whom they had been taken; and it brought about the complete separation of church and state and took education completely out of the hands of the church.

The commission had advocated the withdrawal of the American forces. This was begun the first of the year and the last American troops left Mexico in February with nearly four thousand refugees following them across the border.¹

¹New International Year Book, 1917, p. 705.

The commission had also advised that further negotiations with Mexico be carried on thru the regular diplomatic channels and, in consequence, soon after the withdrawal of the troops, Henry P. Fletcher started to Mexico to present his credentials to the new government. Though there had been many interruptions in the peaceful relations between the two countries, it seemed that, by April 1917, the critical period in these relations was passed. Villa's power had apparently become very weak and he was seldom heard from,¹ After the acceptance of the new constitution nothing of a serious nature occurred to disturb the peaceful relations of the two countries and it was hoped that Mexico was on the way to the establishment of peace and order. However, real progress is always gradual, often painfully slow, in its development. No democratic government can be established in a day. Because of its type, it must be an evolution and can not be truly successful until the people of the nation are prepared for it. The Mexican people generally are not ready for the full acceptance of the duties and responsibilities of a democratic state. Since this is true, it can only be expected that there will be

¹Matters have never become completely settled there. Villa is still at large and occasionally creates some disturbance. Within the last month several instances of shots being fired across the border have been recorded.

occasional uprisings in Mexico especially in the North near the border. It is hoped that nothing of a serious nature may occur and that in the course of time, with her new educational system, Mexico will become qualified to take her place along with other firmly established democratic governments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I Public Documents

Congressional Record, 61 Cong. 2 sess.--64 Cong. 1 sess.

United States Treaties, Conventions, International

Acts, Protocols and Agreements. Wash. Gov't.

printing office. 1913.

Senate Documents

62 Cong. 1 sess. no. 25.

62 Cong. 2 sess. no. 404.

63 Cong. 1 sess. no. 148, 153.

63 Cong. 2 sess. no. 549, 561.

63 Cong. 3 sess. no. 714.

Senate Reports

62 Cong. 2 sess. no. 938.

63 Cong. 3 sess. no. 437, 920.

House Documents

62 Cong. 2 sess. no. 910, 916.

62 Cong. 3 sess. no. 1168.

63 Cong. 1 sess. no. 171, 205.

63 Cong. 2 sess. no. 794, 1040.

House Reports

62 Cong. 2 sess. no. 1154.

63 Cong. 3 sess. no. 1421.

Diplomatic Correspondence, Department of State, 1917.

II Secondary Material

Calero, Manuel, The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson.

New York, Smith and Thomson, 1914.

Fish, Carl Russel, American Diplomacy. New York,

Henry Holt and Company, 1915.

Foster, John Watson, Diplomatic Memoirs. New York,

Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1909.

Fyfe, H. Hamilton, The Real Mexico. New York,

McBride, Nast and Company, 1914.

Gonzales Roa, Fernando, The Mexican People and Their

Detractors, New York, Latin-American News

Association, 1916.

Hall, William Edward, Treatise on International Law,

London, H. Fronde, 1895.

Johnson, Willis Fletcher, America's Foreign Relations.

New York, Century Company, 1916.

Moore, John Bassett, Digest of International Law,

Washington Gov't. printing office, 1906.

Moore, John Bassett, Principles of American Diplomacy,

New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1918.

New International Year Book, New York, Dodd, Mead

and Company, 1910-1917.

O'Shaughnessy, (Mrs.) Edith, Diplomatic Days, New

York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1917.

Palmer, Frederick, Central America and its Problems,

New York, Moffat, Yard and Company, 1910.

Pan American Union, Mexico; a General Sketch,
Washington, D. C. 1911.

Robinson, E. E. and West, V. J., Foreign Policy of
Woodrow Wilson, New York, Macmillan and Co., 1917.

Stephens, Frank Fletcher, The Monroe Doctrine,
U. of Mo. bulletin, 1916.

Wharton, Francis, Digest of International Law,
Washington Gov't. printing office, 1887.

III Magazine Material¹

Annals of American Academy, Vol. 54, 66.

American Journal of International Law, Vol. 10.

Current Opinion, Vol. 54-61.

Forum, Vol. 56.

Independent, Vol. 70-88.

Literary Digest, Vol. 45-53.

Living Age, Vol. 277-281, 290.

Nation, Vol. 97-101.

New Republic, Vol. 2-4, 7.

North American, Vol. 198-200.

Outlook, Vol. 104-114.

Review of Reviews, Vol. 48-51, 54.

World's Work, Vol. 27, 28.

¹More specific citations are given in footnotes.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
COLUMBIA

SCHOOL OF
BUSINESS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

August 26, 1919

Dean Walter Miller
University of Missouri

My dear Dean Miller:

Herewith I am returning the dissertation of Miss Marie Launa Smith which I have read in accordance with your request.

In my opinion Miss Smith has done a good piece of work and her dissertation meets the general standard which has been established in this University for the Master's degree. I am enclosing a list of suggestions for the correction of typographical and other errors. With these corrections made, I recommend the acceptance of the dissertation by the Graduate Committee.

Very truly yours,

IL/MM

*I am sending two copies of the suggestions
as you may wish to give Miss Smith one copy*
J. F.

University of Missouri - Columbia

010-100951640

378.7m71
X5m 617

MU Libraries
University of Missouri--Columbia

MU Theses and Dissertations (Pre-1920)

Local identifier SmithL1919

Capture information

Date captured	20171121
Scanner manufacturer	Ricoh
Scanner model	MP C4503
Scanning system software	
Optical resolution	600 dpi
Color settings	grayscale
File types	tiff

Source information

Format	Book
Content type	Text
Source ID	010-100951640
Notes	Pages typed and single-sided. Some pages have handwritten marginalia and corrections.

Derivatives - Access copy

Compression	Tiff compressed with LZW before conversion to pdf
Editing software	Adobe Photoshop CS5
Resolution	600 dpi
Color	Grayscale
File types	pdf
Notes	Grayscale pages cropped, canvassed, and images brightened. Blank pages removed.