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THE THOMAS HART BENTON FACTION
IN MISSOURI POLITICS
1850-1860

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter I. The Struggle for Party Control in Missouri	1
Chapter II. The Benton Die-Hards	48
Chapter III. Social and Economic Influences in the Benton Counties	81
Chapter IV. The Benton Faction After 1856 . . .	134
Appendix	171
Resolutions on the Subject of Slavery	172
Maps	174
Bibliography	195

PREFACE

The central event in the history of political parties in Missouri, between 1850 and 1856, was the fight between the Benton and the Anti-Benton factions for the control of the dominant Democratic party in the state. At the end of that fight, there was a Benton faction steadfast enough in the support of Benton that it is characterized by the expression "Die-Hards." The purpose of this study is to trace the emergence of these "Die-Hards" and define them in terms of their geographic location, their condition of economic development, and their social background in order to discover if there were other common influences, besides Benton's personal leadership, that bound them into one political party.

CHAPTER I

THE STRUGGLE FOR PARTY CONTROL IN MISSOURI

The division of the Democratic party in Missouri into two opposing factions in the state election of 1850 was unique neither in Missouri nor in the Democratic party in that year. Its peculiar significance and interest lay in the fact that in Missouri party conflict centered about a personage of unusual state and national prominence, Thomas Hart Benton. Benton, who had been Missouri's Senator for thirty years, was standing for reelection at that time. Being an individual who held definite convictions on all national problems, he aligned himself on one side of the fight and declared unrelenting war against all who dared oppose him. The bitterness and intensity of these factions in dealing with each other tended to make the difference between them so wide that it was never closed. So another significance of the 1850 election in Missouri was the definite beginning of the disintegration of the Democratic party there.

The acquisition of Oregon and the Mexican Cession by the United States government created problems of national policy that contributed to the general division of

political parties. As soon as it became apparent that the United States was to have an increased public domain, the opponents of slavery--those hostile to the institution or to the extension of slave territory--began to lay plans to keep slavery out of the newly acquired territories. David Wilmot introduced in Congress his proviso which would exclude slavery from any territory acquired from Mexico. This proposal brought forth an avalanche of criticism and protest from the pro-slavery sections and leaders of the country, because they had supported the Westerners in the expansionist agitation. The extension of slavery had been a motivating force in their expansionist program, so naturally they would not readily acquiesce in any exclusion proposal. In 1847 Calhoun, the most ardent pro-slavery leader in the United States Senate, introduced a set of resolutions denying the constitutionality of any congressional exclusion measure. These resolutions never came to a vote owing to the influence of Benton, who was devoted to the principle of the Missouri Compromise for the disposition of slavery in the territories and felt that the interests of the whole country could best be served by non-agitation of the slavery question.¹ However, this discussion had brought forward two issues of national interest that parties were to divide over--free soilism versus the

1. McClure, Clarence Henry, Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Benton, pp. 104-107.

extension of slavery and the question of the power of Congress to determine the status of slavery in any territory.

In Missouri, Benton added a third issue--the right of instruction, or strictly speaking, the seat of authority in instruction. When Benton kept the Calhoun resolutions from coming to a vote in the Senate, the Missouri legislature approved of Benton's course. It passed resolutions favoring the Missouri Compromise principle and instructed Missouri's Senators and requested her Representatives in Congress to vote according to it on all questions of slavery in the territories.¹ But in the period from 1847-1850, when Congress was engrossed in the dispute over applying the Wilmot Proviso to Oregon, New Mexico and California, Benton took little part in defending the interests of the slave states. Although he voted against the proviso in regard to New Mexico, he voted for its principle in application to Oregon. Because his activities and record on this question seemed to be inconsistent for a senator from a slave-holding state, the Missouri legislature in 1849 adopted a series of resolutions purporting to set forth the attitude of the people of Missouri on the national issues and to instruct the Missouri delegation in Congress, especially Benton, as to its future course in voting.² These resolutions, named after their sponsor, C. F. Jackson

1. McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Benton, p. 105.

2. Ibid., pp. 158 ff.

denied the constitutionality of the exclusion principle, asserted the complete authority of the people of a territory when forming their constitution for a state government to determine the status of slavery therein, reaffirmed a belief in the fairness of the principle of the Missouri Compromise for dealing with slavery in the territories, pledged Missouri to cooperation with the other slave states in resisting the fanaticism of the North, and finally instructed her delegates in Congress to vote according to¹ these expressed principles.

The Missouri legislature not only adopted these resolutions, but the vote was substantially in favor of them.² The house voted two to one in favor of them, while the senate passed them by a five to one vote.³ But in spite of the definite expression of opinion of the members of the legislature and the general practice of the legislature instructing its Senators through resolutions, Benton chose to challenge both the content and the instruction of the resolutions. He saw in them a threat to the existence of the Union which he did not believe the people of Missouri sanctioned. So instead of following the accepted practice of the party on instruction, which was obey or resign, Benton carried his case directly to the people.

1. Laws of Missouri, 1848-1849, pp. 667 ff.

2. House Journal, 1st Sess., 1848-1849, pp. 480 ff.

3. Senate Journal, 1st Sess., 1848-1849, pp. 175 ff.

When he delivered his "usual report" to the people of Missouri on May 26, 1849, at Jefferson City, he boldly attacked the spirit of the Jackson Resolutions for pledging Missouri to a course that would mean the breaking up of the nation, and appealed to them to sustain his course where it differed from the legislature. Justifying this appeal he said:

I appeal, then, from these instructions, to the people of Missouri--the whole body of the people. ...It is a question above party and goes to the whole people. ... I shall abide the decision of the whole people and nothing less. ... I appeal --because I think it due the people to give them an opportunity to consider the proceedings so gravely affecting them, and on which they have not been consulted.

Later in the same speech, in denouncing his instructors, he laid open the breach in the party by saying, "...I mean the plotters, and between them and me, henceforth and forever, [there is] a high wall and deep ditch, and no communion, no compromise, and no caucus with them." ¹ It is evident from these statements that Benton believed the people of Missouri would sustain him. One of his theories was that he had a direct duty to the people who, he thought, would always vote right when completely informed. It was his duty to give them the facts; and since they had elected him because they had confidence in him more than in anyone else, his duty further was to do what he thought

1. Jefferson Inquirer (Jefferson City, Missouri), May 26 and June 2, 1849.

right regardless of consequences.¹ From this time until after Benton's death, the Democrats in Missouri were divided into Benton and Anti-Benton factions which carried on unrelenting strife in their efforts to win control of the party. Divided at first on the man, they later became divided on principle and ended with numbers of them finding a berth in another political party.

If Benton ever closed one campaign and began another one, it may be said that this speech opened his campaign for reelection to the United States Senate in 1850-1851. At least this appeal from the instruction of the legislature furnished an issue which his opponents would not let rest.

The Jefferson City Metropolitan is a good example of an Anti-Benton paper of the time whose editor was busy with pen and press denouncing Benton, which, it may be assumed, expressed the general opinion of this faction of the party. Its members found much to criticise in the fact that Benton had departed from the accepted party practice to obey or resign, and set forth the contention that he had appealed because he felt himself superior to all party organization or regulation. One editorial said that in the better days when Benton was working with and for Jackson his motto was "Obey or Resign."

1. McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Benton, p. 98.

Now the sum and substance of a Senator's duty... has become the mere 'wolf howl' of a band of 'nullifiers.' Though he then declared that a Senator had no right to question the motives of those who might give him instructions, but that his bounden duty [was] to yield a ready obedience or resign, he now assumes to play the dictator by impugning the intentions and aspersing the character of the members of the General Assembly, and seeks to thwart the solemnly expressed will of the State under the delusion and mockery of an Appeal!¹

At another time the Metropolitan warned the people to remember that the doctrine of the right of instruction had always been held sacred by freemen because it lies at the foundation of all republican government.²

Benton admitted in a speech at Boonville sometime in June, 1849, that the appeal was a new measure but said he was justified in applying a new measure because the instruction was new in that it instructed him to do something that was unconstitutional. His opponents seized upon this as a further cause for criticism of him. They said:

It is new because it shows that Senator Benton was not consulted by members of the Legislature respecting what should be done before they acted. It is new because the Legislature instructed Senator Benton without waiting for Senator Benton to instruct the Legislature. It is new because the Legislature dared to oppose the will of Senator Benton. It is new because it proves that Senator Benton is no longer to dictate to the people of Missouri....³

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1. The Metropolitan, October 23, 1849.
 2. Ibid., November 20, 1849.
 3. Ibid., October 30, 1849.

From such expressions of bitterness toward the man, it would seem that there were people in Missouri who welcomed an issue and occasion to differ vehemently with Benton. The Anties made Benton appear very unfavorable on the instruction question by comparing him with Cass who, as a Representative from Michigan, was instructed to vote for the Wilmot Proviso. Its principles were against his, so he used his influence against the proviso and resigned his¹ seat before the vote.

It was quite natural that the appeal issue of Benton should subject him to the charge of free-soilism since the Jackson Resolutions were expressly for the purpose of permitting the extension of slavery. Before the close of 1849 the Anties had accused him of being a free-soiler. His devotion to the Union had led him to be emphatic in his defense of the North and its attitude toward southern interests throughout his justification tour of 1849. The Hannibal (Missouri) Courier in ridiculing him for his repeated attempts to show that the North was not aggressive toward the South said that Benton had followed Van Buren and other northern Democrats into the free soil camp in 1848. The Metropolitan said it was because of his acceptance of such a policy which was unjust to their rights that the legislature laid down the instructions of the

1. Missouri Republican (St. Louis, Missouri), January 17, 1850.

¹
Jackson Resolutions. A little later, the St. Louis Times in attempting an exposure of Benton's real principles to those who followed his leadership said, "His affiliation with Seward, Chase, and the whole batch of Free Soilers...in the Senate, ought to open the eyes of every man [to the fact that Benton is a Free Soiler] not hermetically sealed against the truth. He stands solitary and alone among all the Senators from the slave States, in his disunion course...."² The opponents of Benton were just as certain that free-soilism was destructive to the Union as he was that nullification or Calhounism was. Benton was never able to convincingly clear himself of this charge of free-soilism.

The tendency to think of Benton in connection with the free soil group was, no doubt, due to his devoted personal and political association with Van Buren. Benton resented the political expediency that sacrificed Van Buren as the party nominee for the presidency in 1844 on the issue of the immediate annexation of Texas. Benton opposed immediate annexation because he thought it would be inviting trouble with Mexico since she had not recognized Texan independence. The policy that President Polk followed in the Texas problem, which resulted in the Mexican War, caused Benton to lose patience with the administration,

1. The Metropolitan, October 23, 1849.

2. Quoted in the Metropolitan, May 14, 1850.

and his disapproval of it increased when the issue of the Wilmot Proviso endangered the existence of the Union. When Van Buren and others of the old Jacksonian "inner circle" embraced the proviso completely as a matter of national policy in 1848, people rather naturally thought that Benton, too, had accepted it, because he had already taken issue with Calhoun in his extreme opposition to the proviso. However, Benton, with apparent honesty, supported Cass as the party nominee in 1848 although that support¹ was not marked by any aggressiveness. The fact that he retained his personal friendship for Van Buren caused people to doubt the sincerity of Benton's opposition to Van Buren's political policy. His lack of harmony with the national administration caused people to doubt his stand on this proviso issue. Also, this lack of harmony, made him a less influential political leader in Missouri because he could not command the party patronage.

However, even though the instruction and the free soil issues played important roles in dividing the party, the issue that was the test of Democratic orthodoxy was the power question. This had been made the test in the national party as soon as Calhoun had questioned the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso. The pro-slavery faction of that party held that Congress had

1. Smith, Wm. Ernest, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics, Vol. I, pp. 162 ff.

no power to exclude slavery from the territories of the United States.¹ Benton believed that Congress had the constitutional power to exclude slavery from the territories, but in case of the Mexican Cession he felt the exercise of such power inexpedient.² This policy, it seems, was prompted by Benton's desire to prevent the agitation of the slavery question, although many people believed that it was his way of gaining the political support from people on both sides of the issue. If this policy was adopted for the purpose of keeping the agitation of slavery as quiet as possible, it failed completely. Benton's opponents attacked him as bitterly for a halfway stand as they possibly could have for a complete and positive acceptance of the power of Congress to control slavery in the territories. The Metropolitan called it a political purgatory, intended to please both the North and the South.³ This paper was equally emphatic in denying the power of Congress to control slavery in the territories. It held that the exercise of such power disposed of slavery without reference to the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory or the consideration of the rights of slaveowners who may have wished to have gone there. It accused the exclusion principle of being "the first in a series of

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1. Missouri Statesman (Columbia), September 13, 1850.
 2. Missouri Republican, February 6, 1850.
 3. The Metropolitan, February 26, 1850.

diabolical measures already concocted for the accomplishment of this wicked and treasonable design (ultimate abolition)."¹

With the crystalization of this division between Benton and a large group of his erstwhile supporters during the later months of 1849 and the early ones of 1850, it did not take a prophet to predict an intensely bitter struggle between these two factions in the election contest of 1850. Each side believed it had righteousness, justice and party tradition on its side. Commenting on the situation in the early part of 1850, the St. Louis Intelligencer said:

It is now pretty evident, that the warfare which has been going on between the two divisions of the Democratic party in this state, has reached a point from which neither can nor will recede... The August elections are to decide the issue between Col. Benton and his opponents. If the Colonel and his friends are successful combatants, then his opponents are politically defunctif he is beaten his political ascendancy in Missouri is gone forever.... The warfare has been conducted with too much of bitterness, of personal hatred...on both sides, to authorize the vanquished to expect any clemency at the hands of the victor.²

The Missouri Republican made a similar prediction in the following short item. "Throughout the State, unless all signs fail, it will be an intensely bitter contest--the Free Soilers being determined on achieving a victory over

1. The Metropolitan, October 23, 1849.

2. Missouri Statesman, February 8, 1850.

their enemies at all hazards; and the Disunionists looking to the destruction of Benton as the only means of saving themselves from political martyrdom.¹"

The speculation which these two Whig papers were making on the difficulties of the Democrats reveals to some extent the widespread interest of the people of Missouri in this controversy. All politically minded people watched this factional development, each of which had the aspiration to get control of the party and government. The Whigs believed that the division in the Democratic party would react favorably upon their candidates. Another interest the Whigs had in this split was the well-grounded fear that the issues that divided the Democrats would divide them also. This actually happened although they had no Benton and as a party they did not apply the power question as a test for party loyalty and orthodoxy.

When the time came to nominate the candidates for Congress and the state legislature, the factions followed the course predicted for them by each putting up its own candidate in the great majority of political districts. With many people it was a question of the man Benton while with others it was definitely a question of principle. A correspondent writing in the Missouri Republican over the signature "One of the Old Guard" said, in advocating that Benton or no Benton was a question of principle, "Men are

1. Missouri Republican, January 16, 1850.

not divided into parties because they have personal differences or ill will; their divisions arise from differences of views, respecting the objects of government, and the proper means of accomplishing them, and the great body of men on either side have no other object than the public

good...."¹ According to the St. Louis Times the Anties felt that a large part of Benton's following was personal and more due to sentiment rather than to reason. They were quite sure that many Bentonites did not realize his² "free soilism."

Personalities always play an important part in elections and this election was not an exception to the rule. Besides Benton other political leaders were looked to for their stand on the issues. Any insight into the course of the campaign and election must depend almost entirely upon the Congressional canvass as reports and records of local elections are too scattered and inadequate. At this time the Democrats ran the politics of the state and the Congressional incumbents were ready to seek reelection. The question about them was where did they stand on the issues. Being primarily interested in their reelection, some of them withheld a statement of their stands until they had an idea of the temper of the controlling faction of their district nominating conventions. Even then some

1. Missouri Republican, March 5, 1850.

2. Quoted in the Metropolitan, May 14, 1850.

of them tried to steer a middle course in the hopes of drawing enough votes from both sides to assure reelection. But their non-committal policy did not prevent the public from speculating about their attitudes on the question.

The first Missouri district, southeast Missouri, was represented by Judge James B. Bowlin who seems to have been about the first Representative about whom there was a speculation. In the early part of January the Missouri Republican commented on the articles and notices appearing in the St. Louis Union about Judge Bowlin. Before a local meeting that was to propose names for submission to the district convention the Union strongly endorsed Bowlin. When the meeting was held the Bentons had control of it and practically ignored Bowlin. Afterwards, the Union, which was a Benton paper, had no more to say in favor of the nomination of Bowlin but began to suggest F. A. Rozier for the first district nominee. Summing up these incidents the Missouri Republican said, "Looks as if the Bentons are about to throw Judge Bowlin over and in that case¹ who is to be so lucky as to receive the nomination."

Later the same sheet expressed the belief that Bowlin² would not be put up by the Anti-Bentons. An editorial on "Judge Bowlin--His Equivocal Position" explained what actually happened in the district. It said that right after

1. Missouri Republican, January 10, 1850.

2. Ibid., April 9, 1850.

the Jackson Resolutions Bowlin wrote a letter to the St. Louis Union explaining and interpreting them and indicating that he was not in sympathy with them because he dubbed them "absurdities and monstrosities." Then he became silent. When Col. Benton instructed the people to select as nominees only men who were avowed for his principles,¹ a convention in the first district nominated Rozier, not Bowlin. Bowlin protested and appealed to the people without waiting to see if the Anties would nominate him. In their convention they wired him for consent to place his name on their ticket and a statement favoring the Jackson Resolutions which he refused to answer. The Anties made no nomination--left the field to him. Such procedure was his method of drawing votes from both fac-

1. When it became plainly evident that there would be two tickets in the Democratic field in the 1850 election many leaders expressed the belief that the factions should forget their differences and unite on nominees who could carry the state for the party. When Benton heard of the tendency toward union of the factions he sent his famous "Scamp Letter" to the people under date of March 8, 1850, from Washington, in which he said, "I would sooner sit in council with the six thousand dead who died of cholera in St. Louis, than go into convention with such a gang of scamps....There is but one principle on which the Democracy and the Calhounites can meet in any election, and that is the one which Calhoun said held any party together, 'the cohesive bond of public plunder.' That may be true of him and his, but it is not true of me and mine; and I will prove it...by standing clear of all connections with them. I will not mix with them, nor give nor take help. Let them have their own ticket, and we ours...." Missouri Statesman, April 12, 1850.

tions.¹ When the Jefferson Inquirer, one of the strongest Benton papers in the state, learned of Bowlin's running as an independent, it read him out of the Benton faction. "The Judge seems to have deserted the banners of his old friends and has taken up with nullifiers and disunionists."²

In the second, third, and fourth districts which included all of the Missouri River counties except St. Louis, Jackson, Lafayette and Saline and which were the large slaveholding counties of the state,³ the Anti-Benton forces were able to control the conventions. The second district refused to nominate W. V. N. Bay of Franklin county, who had "flinched a little with Benton" when the instructions came out, and named John B. Henderson as its candidate.⁴ The Bentons did not place a candidate in the field there for which there may have been one of two reasons. First, the greater number and the more populous of the counties lay north of the river and on the basis of the Presidential election of 1848 were Whig.⁵ The Democratic strength in the district was comparatively so weak that the Bentons could hardly hope for a victory, so they

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1. Missouri Republican, July 22, 1850.
 2. Jefferson Inquirer, June 15, 1850.
 3. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 233 ff.
 4. Missouri Republican, May 22, 1850.
 5. Jefferson Inquirer, October 7, 1848.

did not compete. A second cause, which will be pointed out in an analysis of state election results, was that apparently the two factions traded Congressional for state election support.

James S. Green who was hostile to Benton¹ was nominated for reelection in the third district. Early in the year the Jefferson Inquirer had come out against Green and said that the true Democrats could not vote for him unless the Anties pledged themselves to stand by the Union in case of the passage of the Wilmot Proviso.² The energies of James Lusk, editor of the Jefferson Inquirer, would not let his district go through the campaign without a Benton candidate, so largely through his continued agitation on the question, the Bentons put up John Miller of Cole county for Congress. They had nominated A. M'Kinney at a previous time but he refused to run.³ The Benton nominee here was just someone to oppose the field.

In the fourth district the convention endorsed Willard P. Hall who had a congressional record opposed to Benton's policies. The Buchanan county convention in recommending his re-nomination to the district adopted a resolution which declared that any principle contrary to the belief that the people of a territory have exclusive

1. Jefferson Inquirer, May 18, 1850.

2. Missouri Statesman, February 22, 1850.

3. Missouri Republican, June 18, 1850.

rights to allow or prohibit slavery among themselves was the offspring of abolitionism to which they were as much opposed as to nullification and that "the stand taken by Hon. T. H. Benton has developed in our midst of so many of the latter (abolitionists)."¹ The standard bearer for the Bentons in that district was James Gardenhire who came to be one of the outstanding members of this faction.

Only in the fifth district did the Democrats hold together on a man which was, no doubt, due to their man, John S. Phelps. The notice of their convention proceedings was unusual for that year when the report stated that the Democrats had a harmonious meeting and nominated John S. Phelps "who had the experience to know and the will to attend to their interests."² At that time Phelps, without making a statement of principle, was considered a member of the Benton faction.

Thus on the basis of congressional nominations the Anti-Benton faction appeared to have had the stronger and more active following in the state in that they had captured three of the five congressional conventions.

From the beginning, this campaign was looked upon as one of tremendous importance, not only in Missouri politics but in relation to the whole secession movement abroad in the country at that time. In Benton's "Scamp

1. Missouri Republican, April 16, 1850.

2. Jefferson Inquirer, May 18, 1850.

Letter," referred to above, he said, "the Missouri elections of this year (1850) are a turning point in the drama¹ of disunion." At the time the district conventions were being organized, the Jefferson Inquirer reminded its readers that the election in Missouri will be important because of its influence upon public opinion throughout the Union. It warned that Calhoun and the nullifiers had set out to defeat their worst foe and the best friend of the Union--Benton.²

The importance of the campaign increased as it progressed because the division on interests and principles began to make inroads upon the Whigs who had thought their position in 1850 very advantageous.³ F. W. Switzler said that the Whigs were to some extent divided into Benton and Anti-Benton Whigs and that the division was more ruinous to the Whig party than the division was to the Democrats.⁴ Both factions of the Democrats played to the Whigs as well as against them. In Cooper county the Whigs and the Bentons held their meetings together,⁵ and the Springfield Advertiser ridiculed Benton for courting the favor of the

1. Missouri Statesman, April 12, 1850.

2. Jefferson Inquirer, May 18, 1850.

3. Missouri Republican, July 8, 1850.

4. Switzler, William F., History of Missouri, p. 273.

5. The Metropolitan, April 16, 1850.

¹
Whigs. The Anti-Bentons drew from the Whigs at least one prominent leader, General John B. Clark of Howard County. At first he announced his sympathies for the Anties because he could not accept the Whig congressional candidate's position on slavery,² which was the same as Benton's.³ Then within a month, Clark openly admitted a transfer of allegiance to the Anti-Benton party which, the Glasgow (Missouri) Times said, was the first step toward forming a states rights party.⁴

In a campaign based so much on an individual it was but natural that the most malicious of political practices were employed. With one group it was anything to defeat Benton in whom they felt all the differences between the factions rested,⁵ and with the other it was anything to elect him to whom they looked as a sole savior of a dying state.⁶ Toward the end of the campaign the Missouri Republican in an editorial on its conduct said, "There are three parties in the contest--two of them embittered against each other by personal denunciation and an intol-

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1. The Metropolitan, July 23, 1850.
 2. Ibid., June 4, 1850.
 3. Ibid., February 19, 1850.
 4. Jefferson Inquirer, July 6, 1850.
 5. The Metropolitan, December 25, 1849.
 6. Jefferson Inquirer, July 27, 1850.

erance which is of the most unforgiving character. Between these parties there is seemingly no desire for reconciliation...."¹

The outcome of the election was most disastrous for the Democracy. The Whigs carried three of the five congressional districts, losing only the fourth, where there was a three-cornered contest, to the Anti-Benton Hall. In the fifth district, where the Democrats had not divided Phelps won an easy victory.² Since each faction claimed to be the "True Democracy"³ it blamed the other for the Whig success although many people felt that Whig success was in a sense a victory for their faction.

The state election went in favor of the Whigs also but the Bentons far outstripped the Anties. With the hold-over senators there were sixty-four Whigs, sixty-two Bentons, and thirty-five Anti-Bentons in the state legislature in 1850-1851.⁴ Many factors entered into the selection of these county representatives, so the victory of one party or another cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of the political temper of the people. In the days before the direct primaries many ambitious candidates disregarded the county conventions, so there possibly were

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1. Missouri Republican, July 8, 1850.
 2. Jefferson Inquirer, September 4, 1850.
 3. Missouri Republican, June 11, 1850.
 4. Jefferson Inquirer, August 24, 1850.

more than three people seeking a single office in many of the counties. Such a situation would have made it possible for a person to have been successful by a small percentage of the total vote and a less than usual margin of plurality. In Cole county, the Benton candidate won the election by thirteen votes¹ but, unfortunately, the recorder of that fact failed to state either the victor's total vote or the number of his opponents. Another element that no doubt entered into the election was the usual practice of trading votes. A close study of the election outcomes in many counties indicates that there were bargains between leaders of opposition groups.

²
This study leads to the conclusion that the Bentons had made a greater effort to control the State legislature than they had to capture the congressional seats. From their success in county elections it appears that their belief that Benton should be returned as senator from Missouri was well-founded. Not one county that went Benton in the congressional election went Anti-Benton for the state election. But in districts where there were both Benton and Anti-Benton congressional candidates, the Bentons captured seven counties in the state election that voted Anti-Benton for Congressmen. These counties were Nodaway, Mercer, Gentry, Putnam and Carroll in the fourth

1. Jefferson Inquirer, August 13, 1850.

2. See Maps No. I and No. III, Appendix, pp. 176 and 178.

district and Oregon and Stoddard in the first district. The Bentons also gained representation in the state legislature from thirteen counties that went Whig for Congress --a total of seventeen votes. These counties with the number of representatives elected were Buchanan (1), Platte (2), Ray (2), Johnson (1), Moniteau (1), Boone (1), Montgomery (1), St. Charles (2), Franklin (2), Osage (1), Jefferson (1), St. Francois (1), Perry (1). The Whigs carried a few counties for the state assembly where the Benton candidates had received the congressional majority. These counties were Atchison, Camden and Ste. Genevieve. They also elected one of the two representatives from Greene county which had voted for Phelps, the Benton candidate, in the fifth district. On the other hand, there was not so much shifting between Whigs and Anti-Bentons. In the first district not one Whig county in the congressional election voted Anti-Benton for state legislature, but the Anti-Bentons, except for one representative in Cape Girardeau county, did not lose ground to the Whigs. In the second district, the Anti-Bentons made no gains on the Whigs while the Whigs gained Crawford county and one representative from Washington county from the Anties. In the third district, Knox county went Anti-Benton for Congress and Whig for state while Chariton county made exactly the reverse exchange. Howard county which voted Anti-Benton for Congress sent one Whig and one Anti-Benton to

the state legislature while Monroe county which voted Whig for Congress made the same split in its state representation. In the fourth district, the Whigs won the state assembly seats in Linn and Sullivan counties, where the Anti-Bentons were successful in the congressional canvass, and also in Caldwell county, where the two parties polled the same number of votes for congressman. In the fifth district, as stated above, there was no Benton and Anti-Benton¹ contest. In the face of these results it appears there was no great amount of trading between the Whigs and Anti-Bentons but that the greatest trading was between Whigs and Bentons.

An analysis of the state senatorial election results of that year makes the political situation in Missouri more confused and complicated. Of the twenty-four senators elected that year, ten were Whigs; eight, Benton; six, Anti-Benton. There was some consistency in the affiliation of these men with those chosen for other offices but to understand the choices clearly we need the vote in each county which is not available. For instance, Platte and Clinton counties gave their votes to the Whigs for Congress; to Whigs, Bentons and Anties in that order of preference for the state assembly; and then as a senatorial district elected an Anti-Benton state senator. Grundy, Putnam, Harrison, Mercer and Sullivan had a similar confu-

1. Jefferson Inquirer, September 14, 1850. (Election statistics.)

sion by electing a Benton senator when they clearly showed a preference for Whigs and Anti-Bentons in their other choices.¹ The only conclusion to assume here is that party affiliation and discipline were both poorly organized or that the man up for consideration was more important than the party to which he professed allegiance.

By referring to Maps No. I and III in the Appendix, it will be observed that the people supporting Benton were concentrated generally in four sections of the state--the northwest border and Missouri river counties; the southwest Ozarks and border counties through the valleys of the Osage and Gasconade rivers; and along the southern side of the lower Missouri river plus St. Charles county and scattered support in the south central and southeast Ozarks and Mississippi river bottoms. They were conspicuously absent from the north central, northeastern, and western Missouri river sections of the state.

The real test of Benton or No-Benton was before the state legislature, chosen by this election of 1850, when Benton's name was presented for his reelection to the United States Senate. The Benton faction expected the Anties to accept the democratic practice of rule of the majority within the party and give their support to Benton. But the Anties, however, from the opening of the

1. Jefferson Inquirer, November 2, 1850. (Senate Membership.)

session, showed no inclination to support the Benton faction. In the election of the speaker of the house, they withdrew their candidate after four days' balloting and joined with the Whigs to elect the candidate of that party¹ the speaker of the house.

However, in spite of this evidence of unwillingness on the part of the Anties to accept the rule of the majority in the party, the Benton faction sponsored the calling of a legislative caucus for the purpose of nominating a party candidate for United States Senator. Evidently, only Benton members of the general assembly attended the caucus because the Jefferson Inquirer reported that Benton was nominated on the first ballot.² At about the same time the Missouri Republican carried an item stating that the Anties had voted down a proposal to meet with the Benton faction.³ Hence, the additional effort to obtain the cooperation of the factions had been fruitless and the members of the assembly entered upon the task of electing a Senator with as deep and wide a ditch between them as there had ever been.

The election of a Senator was a bitter and persistent struggle that carried through forty ballots before any candidate received a majority vote. In the opening ballot James S. Green received the Anti-Benton; Henry S. Geyer,

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1. House Journal, 1st Sess., 1850-1851, pp. 5 ff.
 2. Jefferson Inquirer, January 11, 1851.
 3. Missouri Republican, January 12, 1851.

the Whig; and Col. Benton, the Benton votes as the legislators were classified by the newspapers with the exception of the representatives from Stoddard and Oregon counties and one from Boone county.¹ On this ballot Green polled thirty-seven, Geyer sixty-four, and Benton fifty-five votes. On the last ballot fifteen Anti-Benton and one Benton went to Geyer, giving him eighty votes, a majority. Benton received fifty-five votes on the last ballot, having received at one time or other during the balloting the support of fifty-eight members.²

This combination of Whigs and Anties had prevented the Bentons from deadlocking the assembly without electing a United States Senator, which the Whig press had accused them of trying to do,³ and had given the Anties a United

1. These men, Huett of Stoddard, Howell of Oregon, and Robinson of Boone were all listed by the Jefferson Inquirer, November 2, 1850, as Benton men. But both for speaker of the house and for United States Senator they voted persistently with the Anti-Benton group. Robinson voted for Geyer on the electing ballot. House Journal, 1st Sess., 1850-1851, pp. 5 ff., pp. 88 ff.
2. House Journal, 1st Sess., 1850-1851, p. 88 ff.; Senate Journal, 1st Sess., 1850-1851, pp. 75 ff. Coke of Nodaway was the Benton man who switched to Geyer on the last ballot.
3. Missouri Republican, September 6, 1850. On January 10, 1851, this paper carried this editorial on the same theme. "If all efforts to elect shall fail, and the State is, for this reason, to go unrepresented for the next two years, the fault will not be with them (Whigs).--They will be guiltless of this disregard of the interests of the people, which require that the state should not be unrepresented (con't on next page)

States Senator who was acceptable to them on the question of slavery, power and the right of instruction.

Geyer denied the power of Congress to legislate for slavery in the territories although he also denied that such a test should be one of Whig orthodoxy.¹ He believed that a Senator should not conform to instructions contrary to his convictions on constitutional problems but that he should resign rather than vote against the will of his constituents.² That was basic Anti-Benton doctrine,³ so on these points he truly represented their interests. Their switch to him had secured his election. Definitely, they had defeated Benton and had secured a Senator whose views on the vital issues were theirs: they had won a victory as had the Whigs whose party name Geyer bore. The Anties had reason to feel their power in party control in the state since, even though they were the least group in numbers, they held the balance of power. The division in

3. (continued from preceding page) for so long a period...The other parties may look to the consequences for themselves. They both avow their intention to stand by their candidates. It is clearly the policy of the Bentons to keep up such a state of things as will prevent an election altogether....They desire an opportunity of keeping open the questions which have so long disturbed the repose of the country, and of agitating for two years more, in the hope that some change of fortune will again restore Col. Benton to the majority....No party can stand up under such complete abandonment of the interests of the people, to secure the personal triumph of any man."

1. Missouri Statesman, February 28, 1851.

2. Ibid., January 3, 1851.

3. Jefferson Inquirer, February 1, April 6, 1851.

the Democratic party had made it possible for the Whigs who were never able to win an election on principle in Missouri, normally Democratic by 15,000 votes, to send three Representatives and one Senator to the National Congress.¹

The defeat of Benton did not close the fight in Missouri, although it appears that all those opposed to Benton felt that his immediate repudiation would silence the arguments on all points of difference for which they held him personally responsible.

The Anti papers rejoiced that the day of Benton's dictation and tyranny was over² and that at last principles had triumphed over men so that there was no longer a necessity for division within the ranks of the Democracy.³ But their continued attacks upon Benton and his principles were evidences of their lack of confidence in their own statements. The Benton faction continued to defend him as vigorously as the Anties attacked him since they felt, as the Jefferson Inquirer stated, the Anties kept up their abuse against Benton because they knew he was not dead politically--that he was still the "stumbling block in the way of a southern convention and a southern confederacy."⁴

1. Jefferson Inquirer, August 16, 1851.

2. Missouri Republican, January 27, 1851.

3. The Metropolitan, copied in the St. Louis Missouri Republican, January 27, 1851.

4. Jefferson Inquirer, March 29, 1859.

The Benton members of the general assembly did not accept the defeat of their leader as final at all but rather took it as a challenge to them for greater effort to save the state from the evils for which their enemies stood and to recapture the political control of the state. The first thing they set out to accomplish in the 1850-1851 session was to remove Missouri from the list of nullification states by bringing about a repeal of the Jackson Resolutions. Accordingly, Sims of Cass county introduced a resolution to reaffirm the Jackson Resolutions. The house voted 109-13 to table the resolution¹ which the Bentons interpreted as a virtual repeal of the odious measures, because they were not sustained. This, of course, encouraged the Bentons to defend the principles for which they stood and to insist upon expelling from the Democratic party the ones they called traitors. Speaking in St. Louis in the spring following his defeat, Benton said that the Anti-Bentons were traitors and like all traitors were permanently lost to the Democratic party. He thought the leaders would remain Whig but that the misled membership would return to the true Democracy and help² redeem the state from Whiggery and nullifiers.

This expression of sentiment that the masses of the

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1. House Journal, 1st Sess., 1850-1851, pp. 395 ff.
 2. Union (St. Louis, Missouri), copied in Jefferson Inquirer, April 12, 1851.

Anti forces had been misled by treacherous leaders emphasized the appeal to the people Benton had made in 1849 when he urged them to support him in preference to the local leaders of the Jackson Resolutions clique. After his defeat there was more need for that support in order to bring about the return of the Democrats to political control in the state. The Bentons were the more numerous faction of the Democratic party, measured by the outcome of the state election in 1850; they believed themselves devoted to the true principles of the Democracy of Jefferson, Jackson, and Madison while the Anties had no principles as a party but were bound only by hatred to a man;¹ hence, they believed that the Anties should and would return to party loyalty. They wasted little time in starting the machinery for bringing about a union of the two factions, because by early summer, 1851, the papers were carrying items on "Union of the Factions" and "Burying the Hatchet" in order to capture the 1852 election. The best method for accomplishing their purpose was to promote a state convention of both factions for nominating a single ticket for the party. In this way the rule of the majority on the basis of the 1850 election would give the Benton faction the superior position in the party and the combined factions' support would mean victory for the Democrats over the Whigs.

1. Jefferson Inquirer, April 19, 1851.

The Jefferson Inquirer started its aggressive campaign for a union of the factions in June, 1851, by stating that although there was some difference among the members of the Democratic party--some free soilers and some nullifiers--actually they believed the same in basic principle. Because of these differences which had assumed too great proportions the party had lost ground in Missouri which it needed to regain. It could do this by holding together. "Party nominations, both by our National and State Conventions, must be sustained; ... we must give up our prejudices against men and submit to the decision of our party, as expressed by its majority in convention, for if men selected as our candidates fail by reason of our opposition and prejudice to them, it virtually disbands¹ our party." Clearly, this was a plea in order to reinstate the dominance of the Benton party.

It was natural that the Whigs and Anti-Bentons opposed the suggestion for union of the factions. The Anti-Bentons opposed the idea because they feared that such a convention would make them impotent.² Also, they doubted that the Bentons would keep faith by supporting the Anti candidates who might receive nominations. This distrust was founded on the experience of the canvass of 1850 where

1. Jefferson Inquirer, June 21, 1851.

2. Bloomfield Gazette (Macon county), copied in Missouri Republican, October 10, 1851.

the joint convention of the second congressional district nominated an Anti-Benton. The Bentons refused to support this nominee which resulted in the election of a Whig in this district. Also in the third congressional district, according to the Metropolitan, the Bentons refused to accept the Anties' invitation to join them in the support of Green and, upon the advice of their party leaders, voted for the Whig even though they, themselves, had a candidate in the field.¹ The Grand River Chronicle stated that the extreme states rights Anties opposed the union because of principle. They frankly admitted that they believed that the slavery issue would be the eventual test for settling the question of the preservation of the Constitution and the Union and they preferred states rights Whigs to Benton Democrats.²

Obviously, the Whig interest in preventing this reunion of factions sprang from their desire to capitalize on the Democrat split to control the state politics, because the chief argument for reunion used by Democratic leaders was to break the Whig control. Their papers adopted a tone of ridicule in their comments on the union of the factions. This especially was the policy of the Missouri Republican which reminded the public of Benton's

1. The Metropolitan, copied in the Missouri Republican, August 29, 1851.
2. Grand River Chronicle (Chillicothe, Missouri), copied in Missouri Republican, October 10, 1851.

"Scamp Letter" and "High Wall and Deep Ditch" of 1849.¹ Later it explained that the Bentons were anxious to unite if the Anties would come into the convention on the Benton terms and agree to take whatever crumbs of party patronage² that the Bentons wished to give them. Other Whig papers were not so extreme in their criticisms but they did dwell on the fact that there was much that each side had to swallow if it agreed to a reunion. The reaction of the Missouri Statesman was that it was hard to see how the two factions that had spent two years telling everyone how the other was composed of renegades and traitors could³ come together as one party true to the same principles.⁴ But it believed that the union would take place in order⁵ to gain the spoils of office.

In spite of the opposition to union and the emphasis placed on the meaning of union of the factions, the idea began to gain in popularity. By the late fall of 1851 the counties were holding union conventions and passing resolutions for cooperative support in the election of 1852. All through the winter there were reports of such recon-

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1. Missouri Republican, October 10, 1851.
 2. Ibid., August 26, 1851.
 3. Missouri Statesman, September 12, 1851.
 4. Ibid., September 26, 1851.
 5. Ibid., October 31, 1851.

ciliation meetings.¹ In some places, however, the Anties persisted in their hostility to union. Led by C. F. Jackson the Howard county meeting adopted resolutions opposed to the union.² In Livingston county the convention proposed that a renouncement of Benton be made the test of orthodoxy in the Democratic party.³ In Cole and Polk⁴ counties the conventions ended in wrangles with each faction's choosing delegates to the state convention.⁵ But the unfavorable county resolutions reported were much fewer than the favorable ones.

However, while the party was making this progress toward a union in Missouri, the Washington Telegraph reported that Benton was displeased; that he had protested and declared that the Anties should be driven into the Whig camp before there should be a coalition between them and his party.⁶ This indicates that Benton was not ready to climb the wall or cross the ditch, and that he differed with the people in both factions of the party who thought the division of 1850 had been on a man and not on princi-

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1. Jefferson Inquirer, November 1, 1851-April 3, 1852, inclusive.
 2. Missouri Republican, December 8, 1851.
 3. Jefferson Inquirer, November 1, 1851.
 4. Ibid., January 17, 1852.
 5. Ibid., March 6, 1852.
 6. Telegraph (Washington, D. C.), copied in Missouri Statesman, November 28, 1851.

ple. The same article announced his return to Missouri to take part in the 1852 elections in which his attitude on the union of the factions was to make Benton or No-Benton the issue again. Benton's policies were not in harmony with those of the other faction but it is doubtful if the masses of either faction of the party realized the extent to which principle and not a man divided them.

In spite of the opposition of Benton and others and the ridicule of the Whig press, the party held its union convention and nominated the union state ticket. Apparently, the Bentons controlled the convention although there was much catering to the Anti faction. In the organization of the convention the Bentons had two officers, including the chairman, and the Anties, three. In the nominations the Bentons named four, the Anties, three while one nominee's position on the Benton question was not in the report of the convention. The choice of the governor was a compromise--Sterling Price, a Benton man but a favorite of the Anties. The real choice of the Bentons was Thomas L. Price.¹ The platform adopted pledged the Missouri Democracy to support the National Democracy² and the party platform of 1848.

Even though a union convention had been accomplished, the Bentons had discovered that they were not acknowledged

1. Missouri Statesman, April 9, 1852.

2. Ibid., April 16, 1852.

as the undisputed majority of the party in spite of their superior number of delegates in the convention and their larger membership in the general assembly. Realizing their strength the Anties had determined to exercise some power in the union. They continued to think of themselves as the true party while the Benton faction was the one that needed forgiveness and readmission to the party fold. Referring to their influence in the convention, the Whig Missouri Republican said, "it is the first time within our knowledge, since the organization of parties in this or any other country, that a majority has been forced to yield to the impervious demands of a minority...the first time the 'mountain has come to the mole hill.'" The Bentons were in the majority but they surrendered their vital¹ principle to the Anties.

After the state convention the evidences of friendship between the factions were less and less apparent. It was easier to say that all was forgotten than it was to forget all. The agreement on the state ticket if observed meant success in the election and, therefore, the fruits of the spoils of victory which they would share. But in the local affairs there was too much first-hand bitterness, too much seeking individually after power, too little party discipline for the will for union, if it did exist, to convert itself into a fact of union. Shortly after the

1. Missouri Republican, April 17, 1852.

state convention, the failure of union in St. Louis showed itself when both factions held conventions to ratify the proceedings of the state convention.¹ And it was not very long before the editor of the Jefferson Inquirer, who had worked so hard to bring about union and harmony in the party, was despairing that union and harmony would ever be accomplished. In the congressional and county conventions the friction due to the Anties' trying to exert more influence than their numbers warranted as they had done in the state convention was ending in bolts from the conventions and splits in the party. This, the Jefferson Inquirer² saw, was disastrous to the party.

Consequently the 1852 election practically resolved itself into the same fight that the 1850 election had been. The chief difference was, of course, that there was no Senatorial election that year. The union on the state ticket made no difference because there had been no gubernatorial election in 1850. The old issues of power, the Jackson Resolutions and instruction were brought into the canvass by Benton who was, himself, a congressional nominee. Writing to the Boonville Observer he said, "I consider the expunging of these Jackson resolutions, as due to the honor, and the future safety of the State, and to the Union; and there is no justification for any man now

1. Missouri Republican, April 27, 1852.

2. Jefferson Inquirer, June 19, 1852.

to uphold them."¹ In a letter to the St. Louis committee in charge of the eighth of January meeting he reaffirmed his position on his appeal on the right of instruction and² the power tests.

With the open revival of these issues, it was quite natural that there were both Benton and Anti-Benton men in the canvass for the local and district offices. In the first congressional district convention, the two factions were so nearly equal in strength that each one chose a³ candidate. Benton, himself, was his party's standard bearer and Col. Louis V. Bogy was the nominee of the Anti faction. Their Whig opponent was Sam Caruthers. The only other district where the three parties had candidates in the field was the fourth. The nominees there were A. A. King, Benton; James H. Birch, Anti-Benton; and Mordecai Oliver, Whig. In the second district the Bentons controlled the convention and nominated A. W. Lamb to oppose Gilchrist Porter, the Whig. The Anties did not have out a separate ticket. In the fifth district, Phelps was still the idol of all Democrats even though he was considered a Benton man. He opposed John C. Price, the Whig. In the third district, the Bentons left the race to the Anti-

1. Jefferson Inquirer, June 26, 1852.

2. Missouri Republican, January 14, 1852.

3. Anzeiger (St. Louis, Missouri), copied in the Missouri Republican, May 28, 1852.

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Benton, James S. Green and the Whig, John G. Miller.

Since Benton was not up for reelection to represent the state in the United States Senate and the national issues that alarmed the country in 1850 had been quieted somewhat, this canvass was not nearly as bitter as the earlier three-cornered contest had been. The greatest bitterness centered in the first district where Benton was the successful candidate. He, as usual, took advantage of the campaign to instruct the people in the principles which he held to be the true doctrine of Democracy. In a speech at Jackson on May 15, 1852, he attacked the conventions and caucuses which, he said, set themselves up as dictators to the people which interfered with the free exercise of political privilege. He especially attacked the Jefferson City Union Convention, where, he said, the Bentons were cheated and principles contrary to his were² sanctioned.

This attack on, as well as his previous opposition to, the efforts to bring the factions of the party together was no doubt prompted by the fact that he realized more than he cared to admit that he was the source of division within the party. Apparently, many Democrats in both factions honestly lamented their division that gave

1. Missouri Statesman, September 24, 1852. (Election returns.)

2. Jefferson Inquirer, May 29, 1852.

the Whigs control of the state. But the Bentons as a whole would not accept the Anties one stipulation for re-¹union--the repudiation of Benton. Benton's break with the national administration had lessened his prestige as a political leader both in the nation and the state. For that reason, the Anties felt that the day to follow him was past. It seems that Benton, recognizing that attitude of the Anties, opposed all efforts at union and emphasized the difference in principles in an effort to hold the following he had. As the election results indicate, this rabid attack on the union convention must have driven the wedge between the factions deeper and have caused a number of Benton's followers to desert him for the Anti camp.

Benton's election to Congress was due to the St. Louis vote largely and that was due in great part to the support that the German population of St. Louis gave him.² One of the most outstanding developments of this campaign was the alignment of German support to Benton that the Anzeiger sponsored. His failure to deny the charges of free soilism alienated many of his former supporters but it also gained him this German backing.

The outcome in the other congressional districts was divided between Bentons and Whigs, the Anti-Bentons not

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1. Grand River Chronicle, quoted in the Missouri Republican, October 10, 1851.
 2. Anzeiger, translation in the Missouri Republican, May 28, 1852.

carrying a single district. Not only that, but in districts where there were three congressional candidates, the Anties carried only ten of all the counties of those districts. They, however, showed definite gains in the local election. In the election to the state legislature, they sent one representative from the fifth district in 1850 and thirteen in 1852. From the fourth district, they sent five representatives in 1850 and eleven in 1852. In the third district they gained none although they took two Benton counties from that faction. From the second district they had two members in 1850 and six in 1852. In the first district they gained from nine to thirteen house members by the 1852 election. These gains were practically all at the expense of the Benton faction.

A comparison of Map No. VI with Map No. III in the Appendix will readily show the extent of this shift from Benton to Anti-Benton in the election for the state assembly. It will be noticed that the centers of Benton support remained in the same areas but the counties which his faction carried, besides being less in number, were much more scattered in the areas except in the Gasconade valley, the lower Missouri river counties and the counties along the Missouri river in the northwest part of the state. A study of Maps No. IV and No. VI together reveals the differences in the votes of the counties in the congressional and the state elections. The apparent increase in the

Benton following in the congressional election of 1852 over the one of 1850, shown by comparing Maps No. I and No. IV, was due to the fact that the Democratic nominee in the second district was a Benton in 1852 and an Anti in 1850. Also, Benton, himself, carried more counties in the first district than his party's candidate in 1850.

Since complete figures of these election results are not available, it is impossible to draw accurate conclusions on the meaning of these shifts in voting support. The only point that is clear is that the Bentons had lost local following. The possible explanations for this condition may have been Benton's denunciation of the efforts of local leaders and their organization to reunite the factions; the honest transfer of the opinions of some of the people on the issues that divided the factions in the beginning; or, in the case of the people of the southwest Ozark counties, Benton's refusal to support the interests of that section in promoting a route for the western railroad. In addition to these possible explanations for the change of political allegiance, the answer to the question may lie in local conditions and personalities that decided the outcome of elections by small and inexplicable margins.

The result of the election of 1852 promoted further rivalry between the factions of the Democratic party. According to the reports of the election returns, there were fifty-five Anti-Bentons, thirty-nine Bentons, and thirty-

eight Whigs elected to the state house of representatives.¹ The division in the party affiliations of the members of the house almost deadlocked the general assembly of 1852-1853 at the beginning of the session. No party had strength enough to control the organization of the house of representatives, yet each made a determined effort to elect one of its members to the speakership.

The contest for the speakership showed that the reported membership of each faction in the house was not its actual following there. Eight reported Anti-Bentons--the representatives from Bollinger, Caldwell, Cape Girardeau, Dallas, Greene, Harrison, Henry and Ray counties--voted for the Benton candidate for speaker, and three reported Anties--from Clay, Marion and Dunklin counties--voted for the Whig candidate. Three reported Bentons--from Ozark, St. Louis and Cass counties--voted for the Anti-Benton candidate and two reported Bentons--from Pike and Lafayette counties--voted for the Whig candidate. The Whig representative from Jackson county voted for an Anti-Benton and one reported Whig from Bates county voted for the Benton candidate. On the first ballot, the Benton candidate received forty-three votes; the Whig, thirty-seven; and two Anti-Benton candidates received thirty-three and eleven votes respectively. On forty-eight ballots, the factions were still divided: the Benton candidate

1. Missouri Statesman, September 3, 1852.

received thirty-five votes; the Whig, thirty-one; and the Anti-Benton, forty-six votes. The house then adopted a resolution, presented by William O. Maupin of Saline, a Whig, to make the speaker pro tem,¹ Dr. Reuben Shelby of Perry, the permanent speaker. The Anties, who had expected to win the speakership, were keenly disappointed at their failure and definitely alarmed and displeased at the friendliness between the Whigs and the Bentons. When the Bentons joined with the Whigs to elect officers for the Missouri banks, the Anti-Bentons accused the Bentons of betraying their constituents.² The Bentons defended their actions by saying that all parties had agreed previously³ that the bank positions should not be political. Such a defense did not satisfy the Anties. They had practically exchanged positions with the Bentons from the 1850 session and they resented the alliance of the Bentons with the Whigs as deeply as the Bentons resented the Whig-Anti alliance to defeat Col. Benton.

With the 1852 election legislature in session, working by combination as it did, it was clear that the efforts of union of the Bentons and Anti-Bentons, the method of conducting the canvass, and the outcome of the election had intensified rather than relieved the friction that

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1. House Journal, 1st Sess., 1852-1853, pp. 3-47.
 2. Examiner (Jefferson City, Missouri), February 1, 1853.
 3. Jefferson Inquirer, February 5, 1853.

existed between the factions. The high wall and deep ditch were higher and deeper than they had been and the possibility of reconciliation definitely did not exist. Nor had either side been able to gain control of the party with the result that the Whigs were exercising an influence in state politics incommensurate with their numbers.

CHAPTER II

THE BENTON DIE-HARDS

The fight for the control of the Democratic party between the Bentons and the Anti-Bentons did not end, however, with the election of 1852. Each side interspersed vicious attacks with well-tempered overtures for union in which all differences were to be forgotten. But after this date, more and more people deserted Benton to join the Anti faction. Those who stayed with Benton through the entire fight, and even beyond it after the cause of Benton was hopeless, were called the "Die-Hards." There seem to have been two groups of these "Die-Hards." In one were the people who apparently believed in the principles of "Bentonism" and were not just attached to the faction because of the prestige of Benton's personal leadership. In the other group were the people who, in the beginning of the fight, chose Benton because of his prestige, and then had to stay with his faction because they had lost standing with the Anties. Apparently, the members of the latter group were the political leaders, either local or state, whose activities were in large part responsible for the intensity of this fight. The central interest of this

Chapter is the sifting out and defining of these two groups of "Die-Hards."

Benton's insistence that this division in the party was based on principles raises the question of his principles. Basically, in what ways did they differ from those of the other leaders enough to divide the powerful and dominant Democratic party in Missouri? Benton was a man of definite convictions on questions of public interest which he believed in defending. He had an ardent passion for preserving the Union, and was suspicious of all people and policies that in any way threatened the permanency of its existence. For that reason, he opposed Calhoun and all his ideas of nullification and disunion and distrusted any group that endorsed any Calhounism. His idea on slavery was somewhat out of harmony with the ideas of the usual representative of a slaveholding state: he disapproved of the institution of slavery personally, although he owned slaves, and was personally against the extension of slavery into new territories,--a free soiler according to his enemies. He was not an abolitionist. On the question of power, he believed that Congress had the right to exclude slavery from any territory, but he believed, also, that it was inexpedient for Congress to exercise that power if it agitated the slavery question. He opposed any measure that caused friction over the slavery question because he thought that such friction and agitation were a

menace to the permanency of the Union. For that reason, he opposed the Wilmot Proviso, refused to vote on the Fugitive Slave Law or to support the repeal of the Missouri Compromise or the repeal of its repeal. Benton opposed a national bank and favored specie currency. He believed that the government should promote the development of the West and advocated a three-fold program for that development, namely, the opening of the public lands for sale on the principle of a downward graduation in the price according to the native fertility of the soil; the granting to the squatter the right of preemption to the land that he developed; and the promoting of the construction of a railroad to the West, especially by the central route. Besides these principles in governmental policy, he held positive views on political theory. He believed that the people were the true source of power and instruction and that no official was bound by instructions that appeared not to represent the will of the people. He disliked nominating conventions and preferred to depend upon popular accl¹aim for the offices to which he was called. He was yet, in 1850, a true advocate and interpreter of Jacksonian Democracy, to the promotion of which he devoted so much of his energies in public life.

Theoretically, these principles were the doctrine of

1. Meigs, William Montgomery, Thomas Hart Benton, pp. 165 ff.; pp. 499 ff. Roosevelt, Theodore, Thomas Hart Benton, pp. 114 ff.; pp. 341 ff.

the Benton faction. When his attitude toward the controversial issues of this period, 1850-1856--his non-support of the Fugitive Slave Law, his opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, his suspected sympathy for free soilism--became known, many people who stood with him in the beginning of the contest deserted him for the Anti-Bentons. In addition to those who changed factions because they found Benton's principles unacceptable, there were many others who changed because they resented Benton's placing himself above party in his refusal to cooperate with the apparently honest effort for party reunion in 1852. By their changes, these people not only determined which faction won the control of the party organization, but they also defined the "Die-Hards." By tracing these withdrawals from the Benton faction, it is possible to discover where the "Die-Hards" were in the state. Knowing where they were assists in establishing who they were.

The election of 1850 started defining the Benton "Die-Hards" by locating the centers of Benton strength in the beginning of the struggle for control of the Democratic party. These centers were in the extreme northwest border and Missouri river counties; the southwest Ozark border and the Osage and Gasconade valleys; the counties along the south side of the lower Missouri river plus St. Charles; and scattered centers of support in the south central and southeast Ozark hill and Mississippi river

counties. In this election, the Benton party had enough power in the state to elect one Congressman and sixty-two members of the state legislature.

The apparent success of the Bentons in the union convention and the election of 1852 proved to be a hollow victory. In this convention the Bentons nominally won the nominations for governor, secretary of state, register of lands and attorney general.¹ In the election, they won three of the five seats in Congress, thirty-nine seats in the state house of representatives and nine seats in the state senate. The Anties, in the convention, won the nominations for two state offices--lieutenant governor and treasurer.² In the election, they won no seat in Congress fifty seats in the state house of representatives and eight seats in the state senate. The coalition state ticket³ was successful.

Although they could not direct a legislative program because of their minority in the state assembly, the Bentons expected to gain and keep prestige in the party by the distribution of patronage through the administrative state offices and the Congressmen. They were doomed to disappointment in this expectation because men elected as

1. Missouri Statesman, April 9, 1852.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., August 27, September 3, September 24, 1852.
Weekly Missouri Sentinel (Columbia), October 7, 1852.

Bentons proved themselves Anti-Bentons. Governor Sterling Price, nominated as a Benton, showed his preference for the Anti-Benton faction from the beginning of his administration by giving every appointment in his power to an Anti.¹ Naturally, he was read out of the Benton faction and condemned as a renegade, but Price, no doubt, felt he was justified in the course he followed. He owed his nomination, and therefore his office, to the Anti faction, because he was a compromise candidate in the union convention of 1852.² The fact that the Anties favored him for the nomination marked him as not too staunch a Benton man. Then, Benton's personal repudiation of the convention and its platform in the campaign of 1852 could not have enhanced the fidelity of Price for Benton. The withdrawal of Price from the Benton faction probably did not weaken it appreciably from a numerical standpoint. He came from central Missouri where the "Central Clique," the best organized of Benton's opposition, ruled local affairs, and there is no evidence that he had a great following out of his locality. Through his withdrawal, however, the Bentons lost heavily, in place of gaining, in prestige and power in the control of the party organization.

Besides Governor Price, two of the so-called Benton Congressmen--John S. Phelps of the fifth district and

1. Jefferson Inquirer, March 26, 1853.

2. Missouri Statesman, April 9, 1852.

A. W. Lamb of the second district--came out openly against Benton in the winter of 1853. The cause for their difference with him was his refusal to cooperate with the organization of the national Democratic party and accept the Baltimore Convention and Platform¹ which accepted the popular sovereignty instead of the Missouri Compromise method² of dealing with the slavery question in the territories.

The open withdrawal of Phelps from the support of Benton was capable of impairing the strength as well as the prestige of the Benton party, because Phelps' district in southwest Missouri was a Benton stronghold. Phelps was a very popular man in his district. Since his alignment as a Benton man had been universally assumed in the beginning of the party fight, the break between Benton and Phelps was the first real occasion for the alignment of the southwest Missouri Democrats in the party split. It created a situation where the fight for the local control of the party played an important part in determining factional affiliations. The evidence tends to indicate that Phelps locally refused to endorse the Benton men in 1852 although there is no definite proof. In 1854, an Anti correspondent in the Jefferson Inquirer spoke of Phelps as a "veteran member" of their ranks. Lusk interpreted that statement to mean that Phelps had never been honestly a

1. Missouri Republican, April 16, 1853.

2. Missouri Statesman, June 18, 1852.

Benton man, but had used Benton to further the organization that would keep himself in power, and that, privately, he had supported the local Anti-Benton faction.¹ The number of Anti-Bentons elected to the state legislature from his district in 1852 rather supported Lusk's claim.

The removal of Lamb, like Governor Price, apparently took more prestige than actual following from the Bentons, because in his section of the state, Ralls County, Benton had never had much support. In addition, Lamb was a compromise nominee over the Benton choice, W. V. N. Bay, in the district convention of 1852, and in the canvass was such a mild Benton man that the Missouri Republican listed him as an Anti.²

Between 1852 and 1854, the next opportunity for a test of the strength of the factions, the division in the Democratic party was increased, not alone by the shift of allegiance of prominent party men from the Benton to the Anti factions, but also by a new problem in the slavery issue. This problem was the Kansas-Nebraska Bill which proposed to open that area, once closed to slavery by the Missouri Compromise, to settlement on the principle of popular sovereignty. The preamble to this bill attempted to avoid the power question by stating that the measure legislated slavery neither into or out of the territories.

1. Jefferson Inquirer, January 7, 1854.

2. Missouri Republican, May 14, 1852.

The bill definitely proposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

Although Benton was interested in western development, he opposed this bill not only on the grounds that he was against the opening of any additional territory to slavery but also he doubted the power to repeal and the wisdom of repealing the Missouri Compromise. Referring to the repealability of that compromise in his Examination of the Dred Scott Case, he said, "...to one who was contemporary with the event, and saw the sacrifice of feeling or prejudice which was made, and the loss of popularity incurred, and how great was the danger of the country from which it saved us, it becomes a national compact, founded on consideration higher than money, and which good faith and the harmony and stability of the Union deserved to be cherished next after the Constitution."¹ He questioned its wisdom because it, too, stirred up agitation. His opposition to this Nebraska bill was considered by many as contrary to the interest of Missouri and probably lost him some of his following in the northwest and western parts of the state. Charles Sims of Cass county broke from his support in the legislative session of 1854-1855 and there seems to be no other cause than a difference on this question.

Between 1852 and 1854, it seems that the bitterness

1. Benton, Thomas Hart, Examination of the Dred Scott Case, p. 95.

and rivalry between the factions were intensified through the proposals for party union. In the early part of 1853, James Lusk of the Jefferson Inquirer started a campaign for union and harmony in order to elect Benton to the United States Senate in 1855.¹ The Anti press resented this overture for peace and harmony. The Jefferson Examiner was outspoken in its ridicule of the Bentons for suggesting a union after Benton had denounced the Jefferson City Convention and Platform and his followers had failed to support it. It also accused the Bentons of bidding for Whig support for Benton in the Senatorial election in 1855.² Part of this ridicule probably was due to the disgruntled feelings which grew out of the legislative session of 1853 when the Bentons joined with the Whigs to prevent the Anties from controlling the assembly. Then as the time for the 1854 canvass approached, toward the later part of 1853, the Anties suggested union and harmony. Their suggestions met with as decided disapproval from the Bentons as the Anties had given the Benton suggestions. Lusk again spoke for the Bentons, through the Jefferson Inquirer, and summed up their attitude toward their position and problem thus:

...the enemy is sedulously engaged in attempting to foment disunion in our ranks, in order to divide and thus be enabled to conquer. ... We have

1. Jefferson Inquirer, March 12, 1853.

2. Jefferson Examiner (Jefferson City), March 22, 1853.

the right on our side and victory will be ours if we but stand firm. Let a good man and true be brought forward ... and in every district. This policy if adhered to, will secure a majority in the next legislature in favor of the re-election of the Hon. Thomas Hart Benton to the Senate of the United States. ... The Anties sold you once ... do not trust them again....¹

The importance of the election contest of 1854, as indicated, lay in the fact that again Missouri was to elect a United States Senator. David Atchison, an ardent Anti-Benton, a strong supporter of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a figure in northwest Missouri politics, was seeking re-election. Both because they wanted to vindicate their leader and their cause defeated in 1851, and also to defeat Atchison whose policy was the antithesis of Benton's, the Benton faction entered the canvass with a hope and determination to reclaim Missouri for their principles and faction.

Pursuant to their determination, the Bentons entered the campaign completely. At this time there were seven congressional districts in Missouri, two additional ones having been authorized by the congressional apportionment following the census of 1850 and organized by the state in 1853. The Bentons entered a candidate for Congress in each district, except the second and third which were located in that section of the state (approximately the eastern three-fourths of the region north of the Missouri

1. Jefferson Inquirer, January 14, 1854.

river) where the Benton party had negligible support in the elections of 1850 and 1852. It is doubtful if the Bentons could have found a satisfactory person to make the canvass in these districts. The Anties had candidates in all of the districts, except the seventh, southeast Missouri. The Whigs had nominees in all the districts, except the sixth, Phelps' territory in southwest Missouri. Judged by its outcome, this canvass has the appearance of having been a win or die battle for both factions of the Democratic party, which was accompanied by all the bitterness, color and dealings in personalities that a political campaign can have. The Bentons accused the Anties of duplicity, trading and all the other vicious political practices. They made a special effort to hold the German and Irish vote for the Benton faction by emphasizing Atchison's stand on questions regarding the immigrants. The Bentons reminded these foreigners that a vote for an Anti-Benton meant a vote for Atchison who, they said, opposed giving the foreign born the right to vote or any rights in the territories.¹ The greatest charge the Anties made against the Bentons was that they were out of harmony with the administration because they had broken with the national organization and had renounced the party platform and, consequently, were flying under false colors as Democrats.

1. Jefferson Inquirer, July 29, 1854.

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Their party and their leader both were Benton. These two parties were far apart on the Kansas-Nebraska Act which was seemingly the central issue in the campaign.

The outcome of the congressional election was disastrous for both factions of the Democratic party--the Whigs carried every district in which they competed for the seat. The Anties returned only John S. Phelps. This election left the Benton faction with no representation in Congress, although Benton, himself, ran for reelection to the House in the first district, St. Louis county. He was defeated by Luther M. Kennett, the Whig, who polled a majority of the votes over the combined vote of Benton and Trusten Polk, the Anti. Polk, however, received only 378 votes, which most probably was not indicative of the actual strength of the Anties in St. Louis county. They may have voted for Kennett in order to defeat Benton.

Phelps won his reelection by a majority of only 356 votes over the Benton, Waldo P. Johnson. This close contest showed that Phelps did not carry nearly all of his previous following away from Benton and, it seems, indicates that there was an active fight for party control in this district. In the counties of this district that had been in Phelps' district in 1852, the vote between the two candidates was divided on a less than three to two basis in all but seven counties reporting returns. In those

1. Missouri Republican, May 3, 1854.

seven counties, the Anties received all the votes in one county, McDonald, as much as 71 per cent of the votes in three counties and as much as 61 per cent of the votes in one other county. The Bentons received at least 60 per cent in the other two of these seven counties.¹ Of the counties that voted for Phelps as a Benton in 1852 and were left in his district by the redistricting of the state, eight stayed loyal to Benton in the 1854 election. Besides these eight, Benton carried three other counties in Phelps' district two of which were among the Benton lower Missouri river counties. This result bore out Phelps' statement that Benton was anything but among the dead in his territory.² In the northern part of the Osage valley, Benton held most of the following he had there when that area was a part of Phelps' district and Phelps was considered a Benton man. Thomas L. Price, the Benton candidate in this district, in 1854, carried three of the old Phelps' counties and two additional counties in the district that had been transferred to the new district from the old third. In the new southeast Missouri district, which extended to the Missouri river, the Bentons retained their plurality following in the lower Missouri river and the southeast and south central Ozark hill counties, even though the Benton candidate was defeated. In

1. See Map No. VIII, Appendix, p. 183.

2. Jefferson Inquirer, August 27, 1853.

the northwest part of the state, the Bentons failed to hold the plurality in the counties that had been centers of Benton strength. Benton's attitude to the Kansas-Nebraska Act was probably one of the causes for the shrinking of his support there. Also, this was Atchison's home territory, and it is likely that there was a very active Anti campaign in that section of the state.

A comparison of the results of the election of the state assembly with those of the congressional election of 1854¹ shows that south of the Missouri river the counties that the Benton faction carried in the two elections were practically the same although there were some discrepancies. In most cases, however, where a county was carried by the Bentons in one election and by another party in the other, the margin of victory in the congressional election was so small that a shift of a few votes would have given that victory to the other party. In the light of this fact, it may be assumed that in the election for county representatives, either a greater number of candidates or the shifting of a few votes was responsible for the discrepancies in the party of victory.

North of the Missouri river, in the fourth district, where the Bentons did not carry a single county in the congressional election, they were able to elect state representatives from Andrew and Holt and from St. Charles in

1. See Maps VII and IX, Appendix, pp. 182 and 184.

the second district. These counties had been Benton strongholds. Putnam county, which was not consistent in its support of Benton but showed evidences of a Benton following, elected a Benton representative in 1854.

A comparison of the Whig and Anti-Benton successes in the two elections seems to indicate that there was some conscious trading of votes between the two parties. The Anti-Bentons did not have a candidate in the congressional canvass in the seventh district, southeast Missouri. Here, the Whig candidate won the election by carrying sixteen of the twenty-one counties of the district. In the election for the state assembly, however, the Anties succeeded in electing their candidates from nine of these sixteen counties. In all but one of these nine counties, the Whigs received at least 60 per cent of the votes cast¹ in the congressional election. North of the Missouri river, there were nine counties that voted Whig for the congressmen and Anti for members of the general assembly, while only one county went Anti-Benton for Congress and Whig for the general assembly. Although the victories in these counties in the congressional elections were by small margins (not over three to two ratio), it seems improbable that so many counties would have shifted from Whig to Anti-Benton and so few the other way without an understanding between the two parties. From these condi-

1. See Map No. VIII, Appendix, p. 185.

tions that existed, both in the northern and the southeastern part of the state, it appears that the Anties made every effort to get enough power to control the state legislature in order to return Atchison to the United States Senate.

The election of the state senators did not show the inconsistencies that previous elections showed. The only district where the evidence indicated either a confused condition or an outright deal was the district composed of Livingston, Grundy, Harrison, Mercer and Carroll counties. There the Whigs carried three of the five counties in the congressional election, four of the five for the state house of representatives, and the Anti-candidate for the state senate carried the district.¹

From this analysis of the results of the election of 1854, it is clear that, with the exception of the northwest border and Missouri river counties, the centers of Benton strength, measured by the elections of 1850 and 1852, remained fairly constant to the Bentons support. However, the membership of the party had evidently decreased since it failed not only to elect any Congressman but also to return as many members to the state legislature as it did in 1852. The territorial extent of the congressional districts did not correspond in the two

1. All data on the election of 1854 based on the Official Election Returns in the Missouri Statesman, October 13, 1854.

elections and the party did not have a candidate in every district in either election, so a detailed analysis of the decrease is difficult.

The results of the election for the state legislature in 1854 made it obvious that no party, alone, was in a position to elect a United States Senator. According to the reported party affiliation of the members, there were in the house of representatives forty-eight Whigs, forty-six Anti-Bentons, and thirty-three Bentons; and in the senate¹ twelve Whigs, thirteen Anti-Bentons, and eight Bentons. Owing to this division, it seems that, between the state election and the time for the convening of the general assembly, the Anties made some direct offers to gain the cooperation of the Bentons in the Senatorial election and other legislative business. Because the Bentons had entered this campaign with the determination to return Benton to the United States Senate, the Benton press met all the bids with decidedly negative replies. The general tone of these answers was one of indignation that the Anties, who had joined with the Whigs, in 1850, to defeat Benton, should seek the cooperation of the Bentons that would mean the sacrifice of Benton.² This refusal on the part of the Bentons to act with the Anties met the approval of the Whigs, who hoped to profit again at the expense

1. Missouri Statesman, October 3, 1854.

2. Jefferson Inquirer, September 16 and 30, 1854.

of the divided Democracy, and of some Anties who wanted¹
no assistance from the Bentons.

Since no pre-session coalition was effected, the election of a United States Senator resolved itself into a contest between the three parties, each of which seemed to feel that it had enough members in the legislature to justify an expectation of support from another party. The Benton candidate was, of course, Benton; the Anti, Atchison; and the Whig, A. W. Doniphan. On the first ballot, Benton received forty-one votes; Atchison, fifty-six; and Doniphan, fifty-seven. The agreement between the votes cast and the reported affiliation of the members indicates how definite party lines were. The only members who were misrepresented in the newspaper reports of their party affiliations were the representatives of Dunklin and Stoddard counties, both reported as Anties. Thomas J. Mott of Dunklin supported Benton and Richard Walls of Stoddard supported Doniphan. The vote of Mott took the place of that of George W. King of Madison who was absent on the ballot, to make up Benton's total reported strength of forty-one.

After the first ballot, there were forty others taken in an effort to elect a United States Senator. The balloting lasted over a month, and in spite of efforts, apparent from the number of recesses from voting and the substitute

1. Missouri Statesman, October 13, 1854.

candidates the Anties offered, to agree on a candidate, each faction remained steadfast in the support of the choice of its own party. On the forty-first ballot, the vote was Atchison, fifty-eight; Doniphan, fifty-six; and Benton, thirty-eight. This was practically the same deadlock that existed on the first ballot, so the assembly abandoned the effort to elect a Senator in this session by adopting a motion to adjourn the joint session until further call. The determination of both the Bentons and the Anties to win the 1854 election with the accompanying bitterness and rivalry between the factions resulted in depriving Missouri of her complete representation in the national Senate.

Throughout the balloting the Benton men remained loyal to Benton, except Charles Sims, of Cass, senator from that district who left Benton on the second ballot to support Atchison.¹ Sims had been one of Benton's strongest supporters and it is probable that Benton's Nebraska policy was responsible for his desertion of the Benton faction. By their fidelity to Benton in their voting for him through forty-one ballots when he was the lowest of three candidates, the Benton members of the state legislature of 1854-1855 marked themselves as members of the Benton "Die-Hards."

1. House Journal, Regular Session, 1854-1855, pp. 63 ff.
Senate Journal, Regular Session, 1854-1855, pp. 48 ff.

After the deadlock in the legislative session of 1854-1855, the parties began to lay plans for winning control of the state in the election of 1856. This election of 1856 was of great importance because there were two United States Senators to be chosen as well as the state, district and county officials. In addition it was a Presidential election year. The months intervening between the failure to elect a United States Senator in the general assembly of 1854-1855 and the election of 1856 were especially confusing ones in Missouri politics. The parties were attempting to increase their own followings by accusations and ridicule against other parties or factions. The non-extension of slavery program of the new Republican party caused the Anties and other enemies of the Bentons to label them Black Republicans. The civil war in Kansas as a result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act caused further agitation over the power question for which the Bentons blamed the Anties. Then in an effort to gain the German and Irish support, every party accused the members of every other party of being Know Nothings or Americans. In Missouri, however, the Know Nothing party, judged by its support and leading men, was almost identical with the old Whig party, although it seems that some of the states rights Whigs went directly to the Anti-Bentons when the Whig state and national organization disintegrated. Because of its make up, the Missouri Know Nothing party

emphasized that it was not hostile to the foreign born. But accusations of membership in that order kept up party friction. The nature and intensity of these controversial issues made the tension in party politics very great.

When the time for putting a state ticket in nomination approached in 1856, Thomas L. Price, chairman of the state committee elected by the union convention of 1852, issued a call for the state convention. The friction between the factions was so great that it was unlikely that a union between them could be brought about. Since each faction believed itself to be the true party and the other, the insurgent, two sets of delegates were chosen in a large number of counties and reported to Jefferson City for the convention.

The factions met separately, but before they organized as two separate conventions an effort was made to convene as one body, adopt one platform and select one ticket for the state. But the two factions could not agree on an attitude toward the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The Bentons were willing to give their support to it and disapprove its repeal, but the Anties insisted upon an open approval of both the act and the necessity for the act. As a result of the failure of this effort at union, which, it seems, neither side could have honestly hoped for, the meeting ended with two conventions, two platforms and two tickets.

1. Jefferson Examiner, May 2, 1856.

The Benton program stood for the non-agitation of the slavery question--against the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Republican party, abolitionists and secessionists--and for furthering the program of internal improvements. The Anties platform dealt mostly with the approval of slavery policies, like the Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska Act.¹ The Bentons nominated Benton himself, for governor, and the Anties nominated Trusten Polk. The Anti candidate for Lieutenant-Governor was the renegade Charles Sims.² The Missouri Republican in its report on the meeting said there were about fifty in the Benton convention and two hundred fifty in the National Democratic--the name which the Anties had adopted--convention which was a "fair representation of the talent and intelligence ... of the Democratic party of this state."³

With a state ticket in the field headed by their hero himself, the Bentons entered the congressional canvass in every district south of the Missouri river. The almost complete absence of Benton support in the north part of the state, indicated by the election of 1854, evidently discouraged the Bentons from any attempt at winning a congressional seat in that area. Their candidates were Frank P. Blair, Jr., in the first; Thomas L. Price in the

1. Missouri Statesman, May 2, 1856.

2. Daily Missouri Democrat, April 24, 1856.

3. Missouri Republican, April 25, 1856.

fifth; General B. H. Emerson in the sixth; and John D. Stevenson in the seventh district, all of whom, except Emerson, were active party leaders. In all but the sixth district, three parties were in the congressional campaign --the Bentons, National Democrats and Americans in the first and seventh; and the Bentons, Americans and Whigs in the fifth. Phelps was Emerson's only opponent.

Because of the combination of national issues with the local issues, the campaign of 1856 was a very important one for Missouri. However, it appears not to have been conducted with as much intensity and color as the earlier elections of the Benton fight were. There seems to have been less bitterness on the part of Benton and his followers than in earlier canvasses, which might have been due to their realization that they were actually on the losing side of a fight. But more probably it was due to Benton's first principle, the love of the Union, which prompted him to be less vindictive in dealing with his enemies lest too much division in the Missouri vote give a radical or sectional party power in the national government. Apparently, he honestly wanted to hold Missouri for Buchanan.¹ The Bentons were assailed bitterly as Black Republicans. This charge was due probably to the persistent idea of Benton's "free soilism," the fact that his son-in-law, John C. Fremont, was the Republican nominee for

1. Daily Missouri Democrat, November 4, 1856.

President, and that Blair, the most powerful of Benton's followers, had been given a committee appointment by the national Republican party. Blair, of course, denied the accusation and refused to act on the committee, but the¹ idea of his being a member of that party persisted.

The results of the election were disappointing to the hopes of the Bentons. Their papers had been filled with assurances of success for Benton and all candidates under his banner. But the voting showed that such optimism was better politics than it was indicative of the attitudes of the Missouri people to the parties and candidates in the election contests. Benton ran a poor third in the three-way race, trailing Trusten Polk by about 20,000 votes and² Robert C. Ewing, the American, by about 13,000 votes. Blair was the only Benton elected to Congress while the³ Anties succeeded in four districts. In the election for county representatives, the Bentons elected their men in only sixteen counties with a total representation of twenty-nine, while the Anties won sixty-eight counties and

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1. Missouri Republican, March 4, 1856.
 2. All results of the gubernatorial election based on official returns in Missouri Statesman, September 12, 1856.
 3. All results of the congressional election based on official returns in the Missouri Statesman, September 19, 1856.

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seventy-four representatives.

Since the congressional district boundaries were the same in 1854 and 1856, there is a basis for comparing the voting strength of the Bentons in those two years. In the first district, St. Louis county, Benton polled 45 per cent of the total vote in 1854, while Blair, though successful and having a greater total vote than Benton, polled only 44 per cent of the total vote in 1856. This loss of vote seems to have been to the Anties as their increase over their vote of 1854 was slightly more than the increase of the total vote of the district. Probably the loss of J. R. Barrett in 1856 from the Bentons² was responsible for a part of this decrease in votes. In the fifth district, T. L. Price received about 1,000 votes less in 1856 than he did in 1854 or 26 per cent of the total vote against 35 per cent of the total previously. The total vote in that district was approximately 1,200 more in 1856 than in 1854. The difference in votes apparently went to the Whig candidate, Douglas. There S. H. Woodson, the American candidate, as in most other districts, received about as many votes as the Whig had in 1854. In this fifth district the Whig received a vote about equal to the Anti vote of 1854 plus the loss in Price's vote and

1. Affiliation of members of the house of representatives given in Weekly Missouri State Journal (Columbia), October 2, 1856.

2. Daily Missouri Democrat, July 26, 1856.

the increase in the district. In the sixth district, Phelps' plurality over his opponent in 1856 was 2,907 compared to 356 in 1854. The vote in the district was 1631 more in 1856 than in 1854. In the seventh district, where there were 2,110 more votes cast in 1856 than in 1854, the Benton candidate received 16 per cent of the total vote as compared to 41 per cent in 1854. This was a three-way contest in place of the former two-way one so it is impossible to estimate where the votes went.

Caruthers polled about three hundred votes more as an Anti than he did as a Whig, but it cannot be estimated how many of those votes were former Benton votes and how many former Whig votes. In this area south of the Missouri river the Bentons lost 3,792 votes between the elections of 1854 and 1856.

After this analysis of the loss in numbers in the Benton party, a study of Map No. X, Appendix, page 185, shows that the centers of Benton support in the lower Missouri river, the upper Osage and the southwest Ozark border counties remained faithful to the Benton party. In Phelps' district, General Emerson carried six counties. In the fifth district, northern part of the Osage valley, Price carried four counties. Blair's victory in the first district kept St. Louis loyal. But in the southeast Missouri section, the Benton party was practically deserted. John D. Stevenson carried only two counties, Franklin and

Bollinger, and Franklin belongs to the lower Missouri river group. In all other counties of the district, he received less than 30 per cent of the votes.¹

A comparison of the outcome of the state and congressional elections² reveals that the main centers of Benton strength were those most loyal in the congressional election--the lower Missouri river, the upper Osage and the southwest Ozark border sections. However, the counties that the Bentons carried in the two elections were not identical, which tends to indicate that the fight for party control was still an important factor in Missouri elections. Twelve of the sixteen counties that the Bentons carried for the Missouri house of representatives were in these centers of support. The evidence of the practical disappearance of the Benton party in southeast Missouri is emphasized by the fact that the only reported Benton representative elected from that section was one of the two from Cape Girardeau county. The loyal Bentons in the northwest border and Missouri river counties elected the assemblymen in Andrew, Holt and Gentry.

Benton, himself, in the gubernatorial election showed no greater influence for rallying support than his party did except in the northwest border and Missouri river counties. He carried seventeen counties in the election--

1. See Map No. XI, Appendix, p. 186.

2. See Maps No. X and XII, Appendix, pp. 185 and 187.

four northwest border and Missouri river; five lower Missouri river; six southwest Ozark border; and two south-central and southeast Ozark counties. He ran no more than 5 per cent behind the winning candidate in eleven other counties--one northwest border; two Missouri river; seven southwest Ozark border; and one southeast hill county. The people who supported him in this election when he was so definitely the minority candidate were the ones who earned for themselves the name of "Die-Hards."

The election gave the Anti-Bentons clear control of the state legislature which had the responsibility of choosing two United States Senators. In spite of this undisputed victory, it was reported that some people, especially in St. Louis, started a movement for consolidation of the Benton and American support to elect Benton and Luther M. Kennett¹ for Senator. This met with no approval generally, so when the legislature met, the Anties were able to organize the assembly without difficulty and elect their candidates to the United States Senate as a matter of routine. Benton and Kennett were the choices of their parties while the Anties nominated James S. Green for the unexpired term and Trusten Polk for the full term, both of whom were elected on the first ballot. Benton received thirty-three votes against Green which was the support of every reported Benton man except John Gullett in the Sen-

1. Missouri Republican, December 1, 1856.

ate and the representatives from McDonald, Stone and Gentry counties. Although the representatives from Madison, Pettis, and Stoddard counties, which had given Benton strong support in previous elections, had been elected under some banner besides Benton's, they voted for him. It is difficult to give a probable reason for their vote, especially since the Madison and Stoddard men voted for Polk, not Benton, for the long term. It may have been that these representatives were Benton men whose political affiliations were reported erroneously or who made no open statement on principles but were elected because of their popularity in their communities. Several Benton men--the representatives from Dallas, Webster, Andrew, Holt and Osage counties and Jones of Franklin and Senator D. M. Frost of St. Louis--deserted his following and voted for Polk against whom Benton received only twenty-three votes¹ for the long term. Frost announced that his reason for switching his vote was that he saw that Benton did not have a chance to be elected which may have been the motive behind the other deserters.

This election was so convincing that at last the fight started in 1850 was settled. The Anti-Bentons had won control of the party and deserved the name which they assumed, the National Democrats. In 1850, the Anti-Ben-

1. House Journal, Regular Session, 1856-1857, pp. 82 ff.
Senate Journal, Regular Session, 1856-1857, pp. 69 ff.

tions were a minority faction of the Democratic party in the state legislature. In the election of that year the Bentons returned John S. Phelps to Congress and elected representatives from forty-four counties to the state assembly where they had a total representative of sixty-two. In the same election, the Anties elected Willard P. Hall to Congress and sent representatives from twenty-five counties to the state assembly where their total group was thirty-five. This Anti minority increased its political importance during the legislative session by joining with the Whigs to defeat Benton for reelection to the United States Senate and to divide the offices of the state which the legislature filled.

The effort at uniting the factions in 1852 resulted in the Bentons electing four of the elective state officers, three congressmen and representatives from twenty-nine counties to the state house of representatives; and the Anties electing two elective state officers, no congressmen and representatives from fifty-two counties to the state house of representatives. In this session the Anties expected to exercise the dominant influence in the assembly because they had sixty-five members, the Bentons forty-nine and the Whigs forty-nine, but the Bentons joined with the Whigs to prevent the dominance of the Anties as they had done to defeat the Bentons in 1850-1851.

The union of the minority factions of the Democrats

with the Whigs to prevent the majority faction from exercising the authority and power to which it thought it had a right, separated the factions further, so that by 1854, when there was another senatorial election, the rivalry between the factions was more determined than ever. Benton's personal denunciation of the state union convention and platform contributed greatly to increasing this bitterness, it appears, as well as to increasing the number in the faction opposed to him. The election of 1854 created a state assembly composed of sixty Whigs, fifty-nine Anties and forty-one Bentons, which failed to elect a United States Senator because no party or faction gave support to another to bring about a majority.

Then in the election of 1856, Benton, himself, was defeated for governor and his party succeeded in winning representation in only sixteen counties. The Anties carried sixty-eight counties and won a clear majority in the state legislature. This victory gave them control of the party organization of the state. In the congressional representation, the Anties advanced from none in 1852 to one in 1854, and then to four in 1856. At the same time the Bentons went from three in 1852 to none in 1854 and to one in 1856.

The Bentons then, in 1856, were a minority political faction, composed of the people who were determined and persistent in their loyalty to Benton. They had supported

him on the issue of principles and had remained faithful to his leadership when he was charged with placing self above party. By this fidelity, regardless of whether the motive prompting it was a belief in Benton's principles or the attraction of his personal prestige, these Bentons earned the name of "Die-Hards." Among these "Die-Hards" were men like F. P. Blair, Jr., and B. Gratz Brown who were ambitious for political prestige. The combination of the leadership of such men and the evidence of the solidarity of the "Die-Hards," established by their constant vote for Benton, destined them to a place of continued importance in Missouri politics even though they had failed to gain control of the Democratic party.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCES IN THE BENTON COUNTIES

The election results analyzed in the preceding discussion established the fact that there existed in Missouri in 1856 a Benton faction sufficiently stable to be called a political party. It is reasonable to assume that the members of this group adhered to the principles of Jacksonian Democracy which Benton, to the end of his life, attempted to keep as the basic creed of American Democracy. In spite of the fact that the Benton fight in Missouri, in the beginning, was about as much a fight for control of the party organization as it was over principles, it seems unlikely that stubborn and disgruntled local leaders could have been responsible for the 27,527 votes cast for Benton for governor in 1856 or for the more than 19,000 votes cast for Benton candidates for Congress in four of the seven districts of Missouri that same year. The analysis also showed that the Benton party was not concentrated in one continuous section of the state, but was concentrated rather in four sections--the extreme northwest border counties, the southwest Ozark border and Osage valley counties that fused into the area comprising the counties

on the south side of the lower Missouri River plus St. Charles, and broken areas in the southeast and southcentral Ozark region.

The existence and distribution of Benton's following presented these questions: Were there influences or conditions in the Benton counties to cause people to remain loyal to his principles and ideals of governmental policy? Did all counties that had similar conditions and influences react with the same degree of loyalty to Benton's platform? Did counties that were most unlike Benton counties accord him the least support? The answers to such questions lie largely in the social and economic influences that controlled the people of that period and directed their reactions, but for some there is no answer except politics. Although it is not possible to rebuild completely the social and economic structure of Missouri in 1850-1860, it is possible to gain considerable information through a study of the United States Census Report records. It is the purpose of this discussion to show how such a study reveals similar conditions in economic development in these widely scattered Benton areas that suggested homogeneity and prompted the support of one political party.

In any study of Missouri it must be kept in mind that Missouri is neither a geographic nor an economic unit. Geographically, there are four sections in the state--the

river bottoms that are along all the principal small rivers within the state as well as the Missouri and Mississippi rivers; the entire region north of the Missouri river which is a comparatively level and fertile plain enriched by the deposits left by the glacier era; the southwestern region of the state, a little less than half of the state south of the Missouri river, which is a type of plateau, (called in this study the Southwest Ozarks and Ozark border) that has a considerable number of richer stretches of land; and the southeastern region which is Ozark broken country that extends east of the Ozark border and south of the Missouri river in a broadening belt as it gets farther south until it meets the Mississippi bottoms.¹

These natural conditions influenced the economic development of the state because the settlers in entering the area to take up land naturally followed the navigable streams and settled along their banks. For that reason the section of the state along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers developed well in advance of the sections not so accessible to the early means of transportation. As those river bottoms were acquired by private owners the later settlers moved up the smaller rivers, the Osage, the Gasconade, the Grand and the Salt just as the still later settler had to push out into what was then the back coun-

1. Bratton, Sam T., Missouri, a Geographical Reader, pp. 8 ff.

try. Due in part to these natural conditions, there were in Missouri in 1860, four practically distinct economic sections. The most developed section was the Missouri river belt that stretched across the state, west from Callaway and Cole extending about thirty-five to fifty miles from each bank, following it northward from Kansas City into the bottoms of the Platte Purchase and also extending north and south along the Mississippi. It was into this area that the first American pioneers into Missouri moved when they began to pass by the older settlements around Cape Girardeau and Ste. Genevieve. Many of these settlers who came mostly from Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee, brought their slaves with them. In the half century or more that the area had been developing up to 1860, it had grown into a comparatively thickly populated, wealthy farming section containing the great majority of the slaves in Missouri.

North of this Missouri "black belt" was a section, reaching from about the third or fourth county from the Mississippi to within one county of the Missouri river in the west, where economic development was hardly beyond the pioneer stage in the decade of the fifties. Settlers came into that region, mostly by the northern route, in that period of expansion when the middle border was filled up in the late thirties and forties.

South of the "black belt" was the Ozark country that

had been more recently settled by pioneers from the older states, mostly from Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and by German immigrants. In 1860, the whole Ozark region was for the most part in the pioneer and small farmer stage of economic development.

The southeast Mississippi bottom region was one in which the conditions of the older, wealthier and more developed community met those of the new and shifting frontier life. It was a mixture in economic development.

Besides these sections there was the city of St. Louis with a population of over 160,000, one of the most prominent metropolitan and commercial centers of the United States at that time.¹

There is a definite connection between this sectionalism and party politics. The economic development that a community has, the way the people earn a living, the amount of wealth there is, and the interests and institutions it has are largely responsible for the reactions the people have toward principles and policies. Thinking people make those principles the basis for determining their political affiliations and join with the party whose platform is most in sympathy with their own ideas. Consequently, people in communities of practically the same stage of development tend to support the same political party even

1. Viles, Jonas, "Sectionalism in a Border State," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XXI, June, 1934, pp. 3 ff.

though the natural environment of the various communities make their eventual economic destinies dissimilar rather than similar. In this fact may lie an explanation for the well-worn expression, "Politics make strange bedfellows," with which so many political inconsistencies are dismissed.

Since economic sectionalism did exist in Missouri in 1860, this study of the Benton counties to discover the conditions that could have prompted their faithfulness to Benton was made along two general lines of approach. First, through a series of tests for measuring economic development, based on the records of the United States Census Report of 1860, an effort was made to discover what economic development and influences there were common to the Benton counties. In applying these tests, conditions of economic development in the Benton counties were compared with those of the state as a whole. These comparisons indicated that, in economic development, the Benton counties as a group were slightly below the average of the state, although there were marked variations in economic development among them. Then, because of the existence of these variations, these Benton counties were compared and grouped according to the economic, social and political influences within them that appeared to be the explanations for their loyalty to Benton. These comparisons, divided the Benton counties into four general groups, namely, the city of St. Louis, the counties with a large percentage of

foreign population, the counties where frontier economy prevailed and the counties where the frontier and the older settled areas met.

The tests, based on the census report, applied to measure the economic conditions of the counties of Missouri in 1860, were the percentage of improved land to the total acreage, the per capita wealth, the size of farm holdings, the number and distribution of the slave population, important crops and the percentage of the foreign population. All of these tests, except the percentage of foreign population, should have given a comparatively accurate and definite interpretation of the economic conditions in the counties of the state.

It must be acknowledged, though, that these tests were not entirely conclusive or satisfactory, owing to the fact the records from which they were made apparently lack uniformity. However, these records of the United States Census are the only ones available so that any insight into the economic status of the counties of the state in 1860 must be based on them. As in some cases there was no standard for making the census report, each enumerator was forced to make his own standard. This was particularly true of the improved and unimproved land. Under this circumstance, figures for the various counties in any one table naturally did not represent the true relative conditions. A number of these reports, for example the per

capita wealth, were based on estimates which made the rating of a county dependent upon the optimism or pessimism of the enumerator.

The report in which there was apparently the most inconsistency was the one on the acreage of improved and unimproved lands. There seems to have been no general understanding on what improved or unimproved land was. In some counties, it appears that only the land owned privately was divided into the improved and unimproved classes, while in others the total acreage appeared to have been considered, the public lands being classified as unimproved. The interpretation which the enumerator placed on the meaning of improved and unimproved lands made a great difference in the percentage of improved land to the total reported acreage of the county.

For the records that were based on estimates, like the wealth of the county, it is more reasonable to suppose that the estimates were not made upon a uniform basis than it is to suppose that they were. But, in spite of these recognized inconsistencies in the data upon which these tests were based, the tendencies that all of them seem to indicate must be accepted as the best available interpretation of the general economic development in the counties of the state in 1860.

In applying these tests, in each case an "average" group of counties was set up, defined by a somewhat

arbitrary equal range above and below the average of the state as a whole. Experiments with other ranges, that is, different definitions of the "average" group, were made, but did not result in appreciable different results in the real objective, the comparison of the different counties with the state as a whole.

The first test made was the test on the percentage of the improved land to the total reported acreage of improved and unimproved land of the counties. According to the table on "Improved and Unimproved Acreage" in the census report of 1860, approximately 31 per cent of the reported acreage of the state was listed as improved.¹ For this test, counties having from 20 per cent to 40 per cent of their land listed as improved were considered in the average range or group. On this basis of classification, the counties are listed in Table No. I, page 90, in the below average, average and above average groups.

A more detailed study of the groupings in Table No. I for the comparison by percentages of the Benton counties with the counties of the state on the percentage of improved land to the total reported acreage, produced the results tabulated in Table No. II, p. 91.

1. Computed from report on "Improved and Unimproved Lands," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 88 ff.

TABLE NO. I¹

PERCENTAGE OF IMPROVED LAND TO THE TOTAL REPORTED
ACREAGE IN MISSOURI COUNTIES IN 1860

Under 20%		20%--40%	
1. *Barton	6%	7. *Benton	22%
2. *Bollinger	18%	8. Caldwell	25%
3. Butler	13%	9. Callaway	34%
4. Carter	16%	10. Camden	27%
5. Cedar	17%	11. *Cape Girardeau	29%
6. Crawford	10%	12. Carroll	21%
7. Dent	11%	13. *Cass	28%
8. *Gasconade	18%	14. Chariton	27%
9. Howell	19%	15. Christian	25%
10. Jefferson	19%	16. Clark	39%
11. Maries	19%	17. *Cole	24%
12. Miller	16%	18. Cooper	39%
13. *Oregon	15%	19. Dade	22%
14. *Osage	18%	20. *Dallas	25%
15. Pemiscott	18%	21. Daviess	27%
16. Reynolds	15%	22. DeKalb	31%
17. Ripley	15%	23. Douglas	33%
18. Shannon	15%	24. Dunklin	20%
19. Stoddard	13%	25. *Franklin	27%
20. Texas	14%	26. Gentry	27%
21. Vernon	18%	27. Greene	31%
22. Washington	18%	28. Grundy	26%
23. Wayne	16%	29. *Harrison	30%
		30. Henry	28%
		31. Hickory	21%
		32. *Holt	28%
		33. Iron	22%
		34. *Jasper	25%
		35. *Johnson	28%
		36. Knox	34%
		37. Laclede	25%
		38. *Lawrence	33%
		39. Lincoln	34%

20%--40%

1. Adair	26%
2. *Andrew	40%
3. *Atchison	29%
4. Audrain	34%
5. Barry	31%
6. Bates	22%

State Average 31%
(Benton Counties Marked *)

1. Computed and compiled from report on "Improved and Un-improved Land," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 88 ff.

TABLE NO. I (Continued)

20%--40%			20%--40%		
40.	Linn	27%	68.	Sullivan	20%
41.	Livingston	29%	69.	*Taney	36%
42.	Macon	31%	70.	Warren	35%
43.	Madison	20%	71.	*Webster	28%
44.	Mercer	26%	72.	Wright	24%
45.	Mississippi	28%			
46.	*Moniteau	33%			
47.	*Morgan	20%			
48.	Montgomery	33%		Over 40%	
49.	McDonald	28%			
50.	New Madrid	32%	1.	Boone	54%
51.	Newton	24%	2.	Buchanan	45%
52.	*Nodaway	25%	3.	Clay	50%
53.	Perry	25%	4.	Clinton	42%
54.	*Pettis	37%	5.	Howard	53%
55.	Phelps	22%	6.	Jackson	47%
56.	Pike	38%	7.	Lafayette	45%
57.	Polk	23%	8.	Lewis	49%
58.	Pulaski	36%	9.	Marion	50%
59.	Putnam	30%	10.	Monroe	45%
60.	Ray	36%	11.	Ozark	44%
61.	*St. Clair	20%	12.	Platte	50%
62.	St. Francois	24%	13.	Ralls	45%
63.	Ste. Genevieve	20%	14.	Randolph	43%
64.	Schuyler	33%	15.	*St. Charles	43%
65.	Scotland	37%	16.	*St. Louis	48%
66.	Scott	29%	17.	Saline	41%
67.	Shelby	37%	18.	*Stone	44%

TABLE NO. II

COMPARISON OF THE BENTON COUNTIES WITH THE STATE AS A
WHOLE ON THE BASIS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF
IMPROVED LAND TO THE TOTAL
REPORTED ACREAGE

Acreage Improvement	No. Counties in State	% Total No. Counties in State	No. of Benton Counties	% Total Benton Counties
Under 20%	23	20%	5	18%
20%--40%	72	64%	20	71%
Over 40%	18	16%	3	10%

From this study, it is clear that compared to the state, the Benton counties had a larger percentage of counties that ranked average in the percentage of improved land than the state as a whole had. Also, there was a smaller percentage of Benton counties in both the below and the above average groups than there was in all the counties of the state.

A closer examination of the average group shows that the tendency in the percentage on improved land within the Benton counties was toward the lower limit of the average range rather than the higher. The data in Table No. III, shows that in comparison to the state, the Benton counties had a greater percentage of counties within the lower division of the average range than the state as a whole had.

TABLE NO. III

ANALYSIS OF THE AVERAGE GROUP IN IMPROVED ACREAGE
TO THE TOTAL REPORTED ACREAGE BETWEEN
THE BENTON COUNTIES AND THE
COUNTIES OF THE STATE

Acreage Improvement	No. Counties in State	% Total No. Counties in State	No. Benton Counties	% Total No. Benton Counties
20%--30%	46	41%	15	53%
31%--40%	26	23%	5	18%

This improved and unimproved land test indicates that the counties of the Benton group are similar in the percentage of improved areas within them. It also shows that as a group they were average in this phase of economic de-

TABLE NO. IV¹

PER CAPITA WEALTH IN MISSOURI COUNTIES IN 1860

[illegible]

State Average \$610

(Benton Counties Marked *)

* Only a part of Moniteau's wealth reported.

1. Compiled from report on "Real and Personal Property," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Mortality and Property, pp. 30 ff.

TABLE NO. IV (Continued)

\$400 to \$800			\$400 to \$800		
13.	Daviess	\$468	40.	Sullivan	\$400
14.	DeKalb	546	41.	Vernon	466
15.	*Franklin	459	42.	Warren	520
16.	Gentry	447			
17.	Greene	763			
18.	Henry	770			
19.	*Holt	525		Over \$800	
20.	*Jasper	457			
21.	Jefferson	474	1.	Audrain	\$1070
22.	Lewis	702	2.	Boone	905
23.	Lincoln	786	3.	Callaway	893
24.	Linn	505	4.	Chariton	843
25.	Livingston	546	5.	Clay	1153
26.	Madison	418	6.	Clinton	813
27.	Monroe	580	7.	Cooper	1089
28.	Montgomery	736	8.	Howard	1661
29.	*Morgan	493	9.	Jackson	1072
30.	*Nodaway	460	10.	*Johnson	961
31.	Pemiscott	560	11.	Lafayette	1438
32.	Polk	450	12.	Marion	903
33.	Randolph	785	13.	Mississippi	836
34.	Ray	750	14.	New Madrid	967
35.	*St. Charles	717	15.	*Pettis	1180
36.	*St. Clair	490	16.	Pike	980
37.	St. Francois	528	17.	Platte	848
38.	*St. Louis	754	18.	Ralls	988
39.	Ste. Genevieve	435	19.	Saline	1364

velopment even though there were counties both above and below the average group.

The results of the per capita wealth test adds more evidence for the general conclusion concerning the economic status of the Benton counties. The per capita wealth

of the state in 1860 was \$610.¹ The average range used was from \$400 to \$800, which divided the counties of the state into the divisions or groups listed in Table No. IV, page 93, according to their average, below average or above average rating.

A study of the divisions in Table No. IV for a comparison of the percentage of the counties in the Benton group with the percentage of the counties of the state in each of these divisions of per capita wealth gave the results summarized in Table No. V.

TABLE NO. V

COMPARISON OF PER CAPITA WEALTH BETWEEN THE BENTON COUNTIES AND THE STATE AS A WHOLE

Per Capita Wealth	No. Counties in State	% Total Counties in State	No. Benton ² Counties	% Total Benton Counties
Under \$400	51	45%	11	40%
\$400 to \$800	42	37%	14	51%
Over \$800	19	17%	2	8%

This summary shows that there was a larger percentage of Benton counties that had an average per capita wealth rating, and that there was a smaller percentage of Benton

1. Computed from reports on "Real and Personal Property," and "Population," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Mortality and Property, pp. 307 ff; Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Population, pp. 299 ff.
2. Moniteau's total wealth was not reported. It is not included in this study.

counties both below and above the average rating, than there was in the state as a whole. In both the Benton counties and the state, there was a large percentage of counties that were in the below average per capita wealth group. Dividing the counties in the average group into those below and those above the actual average per capita wealth of the state emphasized the tendency toward a below average rating. The results of this study are tabulated in Table No. VI.

TABLE NO. VI

ANALYSIS OF THE AVERAGE GROUP IN PER CAPITA
WEALTH BETWEEN THE BENTON COUNTIES
AND THE STATE

Per Capita Wealth	No. Counties in State	% Total Counties in State	No. Benton Counties	% Total Benton Counties
\$400-\$600	30	27%	11	40%
\$600-\$800	12	10%	3	11%

The results from this study of per capita wealth support the indication established by the test for improved land, that the Benton counties were in the average group but their tendency was to approach the lower limit of the average group rather than the higher. However, there was a much larger percentage of Benton counties whose wealth per capita fell below the average of the state than there was of those whose percentage of improved land fell below the state average. Since Missouri was primarily an agri-

TABLE NO. VII¹

ACREAGE OF FARMS

Counties Having the Greatest Number of Farms in
Each of the Following Acreage Groups

20 to 50 Acres

1. Adair
2. *Atchison
3. *Barton
4. Barry
5. *Benton
6. *Bollinger
7. Butler
8. Caldwell
9. Camden
10. *Cape Girardeau
11. Carroll
12. Carter
13. Cedar
14. Chariton
15. Christian
16. Clark
17. *Cole
18. Cooper
19. Crawford
20. Dade
21. *Dallas
22. Daviess
23. Dent
24. Douglas
25. *Franklin
26. *Gasconade
27. Gentry
28. Greene
29. Grundy
30. *Harrison
31. Hickory
32. Howell

20 to 50 Acres

33. Iron
34. *Jasper
35. Jefferson
36. Laclede
37. Lincoln
38. Linn
39. Livingston
40. Macon
41. Maries
42. Mercer
43. Miller
44. Mississippi
45. *Moniteau
46. Montgomery
47. *Morgan
48. McDonald
49. Newton
50. *Oregon
51. *Osage
52. Ozark
53. Pemiscott
54. Perry
55. Phelps
56. Platte
57. Polk
58. Pulaski
59. Putnam
60. Ray
61. Reynolds
62. Ripley
63. *St. Charles
64. *St. Clair

(Benton Counties Marked *)

(Jasper in both 20-50 acre and 50-100 acre group)

1. Compiled from "Size of Farms," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 207 ff.

TABLE NO. VII (Continued)

20 to 50 Acres	50 to 100 Acres
65. St. Francois	7. *Johnson
66. *St. Louis	8. Knox
67. Ste. Genevieve	9. *Lawrence
68. Schuyler	10. Madison
69. Shelby	11. *Nodaway
70. Stoddard	12. Scotland
71. Scott	
72. Shannon	
73. *Stone	
74. Sullivan	
75. *Taney	
76. Texas	
77. Vernon	
78. Warren	
79. Washington	
80. Wayne	
81. *Webster	
82. Wright	
83. Dunklin	
50 to 100 Acres	Over 100 Acres
1. *Andrew	1. Audrain
2. Bates	2. Boone
3. Buchanan	3. Callaway
4. *Cass	4. Clay
5. *Holt	5. Clinton
6. *Jasper	6. Henry
	7. Howard
	8. Jackson
	9. Lafayette
	10. Lewis
	11. Lincoln
	12. Marion
	13. New Madrid
	14. *Pettis
	15. Monroe
	16. Pike
	17. Ralls
	18. Randolph
	19. Saline

cultural state, this fact might indicate that the value per acre of the land in the Benton counties was less than elsewhere in the state. The discrepancies in reported wealth may be due to the enumerators, but the fact that a majority of the Benton counties were in the Ozark country seems to furnish practical proof that the indication is a

relatively accurate measure of the condition.

In making a test based on the size of farms, the use of an "average" group of counties was not satisfactory. In the first place, the census tables lists the farms in groups according to size. Also, the prevalence in a given county of small, medium or large farms seemed a more significant index of economic conditions than a comparison of the "average" farm in a county with the state "average" farm. In Table No. VII, page 97, the counties of the state are listed according to the acreage group containing the greatest number of farms in each county in 1860. Table No. VIII is a summary of Table No. VII, and compares, on a percentage basis, the number of Benton counties with the greatest number of farms in each acreage group, with the number of the counties of the state with the greatest number of farms in each acreage group.

TABLE NO. VIII

COMPARISON OF THE SIZE OF FARM HOLDINGS BETWEEN THE
BENTON COUNTIES AND THE STATE BASED ON THE
ACREAGE GROUP OF THE GREATEST NUMBER
OF FARMS IN EACH COUNTY

Acreage of Greatest No. of Farms	No. Counties in State	% Total Counties in State	No. Benton ¹ Counties	% Total ¹ Benton Counties
20-- 50 Acres	83	73%	21	75%
50--100 Acres	12	10%	7	25%
Over 100 Acres	19	17%	1	3%

1. Jasper had the same number of farms from 20-50 acres in size that it had from 50-100 acres in size and is counted twice.

Table No. IX compares the total number of farms in each acreage group in the Benton counties with the total number of farms of the state in each group on a percentage basis.

TABLE NO. IX
COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FARMS IN EACH
ACREAGE GROUP BETWEEN THE BENTON
COUNTIES AND THE STATE

Acreage	No. Farms Whole State	% Total No. Farms	No. Farms Benton Counties	% Total Benton Co. Farms
Under 10 Acres	2428	2.0%	694	3.0%
10 to 20 Acres	9110	12.0%	2874	11.0%
20 to 50 Acres	33620	38.0%	10060	44.0%
50 to 100 Acres	24336	27.0%	6055	26.0%
100 to 500 Acres	18497	20.0%	3597	15.0%
500 to 1000 Acres	467	.5%	64	.3%
Over 1000 Acres	95	.1%	15	.6%
TOTALS	88551	99.6%	23088	99.9%

From a careful study of Tables No. VIII and No. IX, these generalizations seem apparent. A majority of the farms of the state was under fifty acres in size and in practically three-fourths of the counties there were more farms from twenty to fifty acres than any other size. The Benton counties had a greater percentage of counties with more twenty to fifty acre farms than any other size, and a greater percentage of farms under fifty acres, than the state as a whole. They also had a smaller percentage of counties with more 100 acre farms than any other size, and a smaller percentage of farms of 100 acres or over, than

the state as a whole had. The Benton counties had a greater percentage of counties with more 20-50 acre farms than any other size, than the state as a whole had, but they had one per cent less farms in that group compared to the state. These generalizations seem to indicate that a greater number of small farms in proportion to larger ones in a county was a mark of a Benton county. Apparently, the size of farm holdings in the Benton counties was below the average of the state. The small farmer was typical of the Benton county.

However, this study points out also that there were among the Benton group some counties with large farms, but they were few. The fifteen farms of over 1000 acres were located in six counties--Cass 1, Harrison 3, Pettis 6, Johnson 1, St. Charles 1, St. Louis 3. Twenty-two of the sixty-four Benton county farms of from 500 to 1000 acres were in Pettis, thirteen in St. Louis, and eight in St. Charles. These counties did not conform to the standard of development that the tests indicate for the Benton counties. The other 500 to 1000 acre farms were located in eleven counties--Cass 4; Cape Girardeau and Moniteau 3 each; Benton, Johnson, St. Clair 2 each; Atchison, Harrison, Jasper, Lawrence and Morgan 1 each. These large landholdings in counties, that by other tests appear to

1. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 207 ff.

have been poorly developed from an economic standpoint, may indicate land held by land speculators; although a few farmers operating large farms in a poorer county was not an unusual condition.

Perhaps the most generally accepted measure of the distribution of wealth in Missouri before the Civil War was the number and distribution of the slave population. By this test, also, the Benton counties rated low in economic development. The slave population, in 1860, was approximately 10 per cent of the total population of the state.¹ In order to get the distribution of this slave population over the state, the counties of the state are grouped and listed in Table No. X, page 103, according to whether they had an average, 5 per cent to 15 per cent; above average, 16 per cent or more; or below average, less than 5 per cent, percentage of slave population to total population.

The study of this table shows that the institution of slavery existed over practically the entire state. Slaves were, however, unevenly distributed, ranging from 0 per cent in Douglas to 37 per cent of the population in Howard county. Another fact emphasized by this grouping is that the counties of the above average percentage of slaves were the older Missouri and Mississippi river bot-

1. Computed from reports on "Slave and White Population," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 233 ff. Population, pp. 299 ff.

TABLE NO. X¹

PER CENT OF SLAVE POPULATION TO THE TOTAL POPULATION IN MISSOURI COUNTIES IN 1860

Over 15%		5% to 15% inc.	
1. Boone	26%	11. Dade	5%
2. Callaway	26%	12. *Franklin	9%
3. Chariton	23%	13. Greene	12%
4. Clay	27%	14. Henry	13%
5. Cooper	22%	15. *Holt	5%
6. Howard	37%	16. Iron	5%
7. Jackson	16%	17. Jasper	5%
8. Lafayette	31%	18. Jefferson	5%
9. Lincoln	20%	19. *Johnson	13%
10. Marion	16%	20. Laclede	6%
11. Mississippi	26%	21. Lewis	10%
12. Monroe	24%	22. Linn	6%
13. Montgomery	17%	23. Livingston	8%
14. New Madrid	31%	24. Madison	8%
15. *Pettis	20%	25. *Moniteau	7%
16. Pike	22%	26. *Morgan	8%
17. Platte	18%	27. Pemiscott	9%
18. Ralls	21%	28. Perry	7%
19. Randolph	23%	29. Polk	5%
20. Saline	33%	30. Ray	14%
5% to 15% inc.		31. *St. Charles	13%
1. *Andrew	18%	32. *St. Clair	8%
2. Audrain	14%	33. St. Francois	12%
3. Bates	6%	34. Ste. Genevieve	7%
4. *Benton	7%	35. Scott	9%
5. Buchanan	8%	36. Shelby	11%
6. *Cape Girardeau	10%	37. Warren	12%
7. Carroll	11%	38. Washington	10%
8. *Cass	10%	39. Wayne	5%
9. Clinton	15%		
10. *Cole	11%		

State Average 10%
(Benton counties marked *)

1. Computed from Reports on Slave and White Population in Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 233 ff.; Population, pp. 299 ff.

TABLE NO. X (Continued)

Under 5%

1. Adair	1%	28. Macon	4%
2. *Atchison	1%	29. Maries	1%
3. Barry	3%	30. Mercer	.2%
4. *Barton	1%	31. Miller	3%
5. *Bollinger	3%	32. McDonald	2%
6. Butler	2%	33. Newton	4%
7. Caldwell	4%	34. *Nodaway	2%
8. Camden	4%	35. *Osage	3%
9. Carter	1%	36. Ozark	2%
10. Cedar	3%	37. *Oregon	.9%
11. Christian	4%	38. Phelps	1%
12. Clark	4%	39. Pulaski	1%
13. Crawford	3%	40. Putnam	.3%
14. *Dallas	2%	41. Reynolds	1%
15. Daviess	3%	42. Ripley	2%
16. DeKalb	2%	43. *St. Louis	2%
17. Dent	2%	44. Schuyler	.6%
18. Douglas	0%	45. Scotland	1%
19. Dunklin	3%	46. Shannon	.6%
20. *Gasconade	.9%	47. Stoddard	2%
21. Gentry	.9%	48. Stone	.8%
22. Grundy	3%	49. Sullivan	1%
23. *Harrison	.2%	50. *Taney	2%
24. Hickory	4%	51. Texas	.9%
25. Howell	1%	52. Vernon	2%
26. Knox	3%	53. *Webster	3%
27. *Lawrence	3%	54. Wright	1%

toms counties; and that the counties with the below average percentage of slave population were in the pioneer regions of both the northern plains and the southern plateau and hill sections of the state. A check of this table to compare the percentage of the slave population in the Benton counties with the counties of the entire state produced the results listed in Table No. XI.

TABLE NO. XI

COMPARISON OF THE PER CENT OF SLAVE POPULATION
BETWEEN THE BENTON COUNTIES AND
THE STATE AS A WHOLE

% Slave Population	No. Counties in State	% Total No. Counties in State	No. Benton Counties	% Total No. Benton Co.
Below 5%	54	48	14	50
5--15%	39	34	13	46
Above 15%	20	17	1	4

This study reveals that about half of the counties of the state as well as the Benton counties had a below average percentage of slave population. A greater percentage of the Benton counties than of the counties of the state as a whole had an average percentage of slave population. Only one Benton county had more than the state average of slave population. The division of the average group in Table No. XI into the counties below and the ones above the actual average percentage of slave population gave these results:

TABLE NO. XII

ANALYSIS OF THE AVERAGE GROUP IN THE PER CENT OF
SLAVE POPULATION BETWEEN THE BENTON
COUNTIES AND THE STATE AS A WHOLE

% Slave Population	No. Counties in State	% Total No. Counties in State	No. Benton Counties	% Total No. Benton Counties
5%-- 9%	23	20%	8	28%
10%--15%	16	14%	5	18%

There was a greater percentage of the Benton counties whose slave population was less than 10 per cent than there was whose slave population was more than 10 per cent. This test definitely established that the Benton counties were not the great slave-owning counties. By using the number and distribution of the slave population as a measure of wealth in Missouri before the Civil War, the Benton counties ranked below the average of the state.

However, there were variations in slave owning in the Benton counties just as there were variations from the general conclusions indicated by the other tests. There were seven counties of the group where the slave population was more than 10 per cent of the total population. Also, six of the thirty-eight great slaveowners of the state--those who owned fifty or more slaves--lived in Benton¹ counties. These conditions tend to emphasize the great contrasts from an economic standpoint that existed within the Benton counties.

Another possible measure of wealth and more advanced economic development in Missouri before the Civil War was the crops produced. Tobacco and hemp were money crops, and counties producing them were definitely emerging from frontier economy. A check on the report of the production of these crops in 1860 showed that in the Benton counties

1. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 233 ff.

TABLE NO. XIII¹

HEMP PRODUCTION IN MISSOURI COUNTIES IN 1860
By Tons

1. *Andrew	127	24. Livingston	3
2. *Atchison	217	25. Macon	600
3. *Bollinger	170	26. Madison	10
4. Boone	215	27. Maries	25
5. Buchanan	1479	28. Marion	263
6. Callaway	35	29. McDonald	200
7. Carroll	616	30. Mercer	180
8. *Cass	8	31. Mississippi	50
9. Chariton	51	32. Monroe	60
10. Clay	499	33. Montgomery	252
11. Clinton	45	34. *Nodaway	1
12. Cooper	31	35. *Osage	34
13. Dade	5	36. *Pettis	64
14. DeKalb	150	37. Pike	1689
15. Gentry	815	38. Platte	1793
16. Grundy	54	39. Putnam	78
17. *Holt	117	40. Ralls	3
18. Howard	655	41. Ray	167
19. Jackson	162	42. *St. Louis	46
20. Jefferson	5	43. Saline	3920
21. *Johnson	41	44. Scotland	60
22. Laclede	3558	45. Wayne	644
23. Lewis	5		

Average Crop of these Counties 449 tons
(Benton Counties marked *)

these crops were not grown extensively. In Table No. XIII above, there is a list of the hemp producing counties with their reported production in 1860. There were only forty-five counties of the state that reported any production in 1860, and of these, ten were in the Benton group. However, the hemp crop in these Benton counties was comparatively

1. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 88 ff.

insignificant. The average crop for the producing counties was 449 tons. Of the Benton counties, Atchison was the highest producer with 217 tons. Andrew, Bollinger and Holt reported as much as 100 tons; the others raised less than a hundred tons. The biggest crop reported was 3920¹ tons from Saline.

Although tobacco was grown in all counties of the state except Mississippi, it apparently was an important crop in less than one-third of the counties. In Table No. XIV, page 109, the counties are listed according to the quantity of tobacco they produced. By this grouping, it appears that only three or four (Webster county's crop was 96,000 pounds) Benton counties were among those where tobacco was an important crop. Based on the 112 counties that raised tobacco, the average crop was approximately 224,000¹ pounds, in 1860. If a county produced less than 100,000 pounds, tobacco was probably not an important crop. This test for important crops, also, proves that the Benton counties were not in the more wealthy economic class of Missouri counties.

Thus, every one of these tests points to the fact that the Benton counties as a group were counties of comparatively lower economic development. The greatest percentage of them had below the actual average of the state

1. Report of "Agricultural Products," Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture, pp. 88 ff.

TABLE NO. XIV

TOBACCO PRODUCTION IN MISSOURI COUNTIES BY POUNDS
IN 1860

Over 1,000,000
pounds

1. Callaway
2. Chariton
3. Howard
4. Lincoln
5. Macon
6. Monroe
7. Pike
8. Randolph

500,000 to
1,000,000 pounds

1. Carroll
2. *Franklin
3. Montgomery
4. Warren

100,000 to
500,000 pounds

1. Audrain
2. Boone
3. Grundy
4. Knox
5. Lafayette
6. Lewis
7. Linn
8. Livingston
9. Marion
10. *Osage
11. Ray
12. *St. Charles
13. Saline
14. Schuyler
15. Shelby

100,000 to
500,000 pounds

16. Stoddard
17. Sullivan

50,000 to
100,000 pounds

1. Adair
2. Cooper
3. Crawford
4. Jackson
5. Miller
6. Wayne
7. *Webster

10,000 to
50,000 pounds

1. *Andrew
2. Barry
3. *Benton
4. *Bollinger
5. Caldwell
6. *Camden
7. *Cape Girardeau
8. Carter
9. Cedar
10. Christian
11. Clark
12. *Cole
13. Dade
14. *Dallas
15. Daviess
16. Dent
17. Dunklin

(Benton Counties marked *)

TABLE NO. XIV (Continued)

10,000 to 50,000 pounds	Under 10,000 Pounds
18. *Gasconade	4. Buchanan
19. Gentry	5. Butler
20. Greene	6. *Cass
21. *Harrison	7. Clay
22. Hickory	8. Clinton
23. *Holt	9. DeKalb
24. *Johnson	10. Douglas
25. Laclede	11. Henry
26. Maries	12. Howell
27. Mercer	13. Iron
28. *Moniteau	14. *Jasper
29. *Pettis	15. Jefferson
30. Polk	16. *Lawrence
31. Putnam	17. Madison
32. Ralls	18. McDonald
33. *St. Clair	19. *Morgan
34. Ste. Genevieve	20. New Madrid
35. *St. Louis	21. Newton
36. Scotland	22. *Nodaway
37. Scott	23. *Oregon
38. Shannon	24. Ozark
39. *Stone	25. Pemiscott
40. *Taney	26. Perry
41. Wright	27. Phelps
	28. Platte
	29. Pulaski
	30. Reynolds
	31. Ripley
	32. St. Francois
	33. Texas
	34. Vernon
	35. Washington
	No Production
	1. Mississippi

1. Compiled from Report of Agricultural Products in
Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Agriculture,
pp. 88 ff.

in the percentage of improved land and per capita wealth. They had a greater percentage of small farms than the counties of the state as a whole. They were not great slave owning counties and they did not produce tobacco and hemp as important crops. These conditions, together with the fact that most of the counties that supported Benton were located in the newer developed areas of the state, seem to indicate that most Benton counties were frontier counties and most Benton followers, the small farmer of the frontier, independent and self-sufficient. The principles for which Benton stood--the love of the Union, a strong national government, a liberal public land policy and the promotion of internal improvements by the national government--were principles that were acceptable to the frontiersman. It seems reasonable to conclude that the similar economic conditions in the great number of Benton counties was one of the determining factors in the evolution of his party.

But these tests also pointed out that there were Benton counties that did not conform to this general standard of economic development. It cannot be assumed that identical influences were responsible for the preference for Benton in all the counties that supported him. Apparently, there is no reason why a richer and more developed county should have supported the same political party that a new frontier did. Yet, Andrew, Cass, Cole, Holt, Johnson,

Lawrence, Moniteau, Nodaway, Pettis, Stone, St. Charles, St. Louis and Taney, which by one or more of the tests used ranked in the richer and more highly developed group of counties of the state, supported Benton. Admitting that the accuracy of the data that placed some of these counties, such as Taney and Stone, in the richer and more developed group of counties in the state is erroneous or misleading, there still remains the fact that conditions of economic development within the twenty-eight Benton counties were not similar enough to have been responsible for all support given Benton.

This issue over Benton, it must be remembered, was a fight for party control as well as a difference over principles. In that fact lies, it would seem, the explanation for many apparent inconsistencies, both within and without the Benton counties. It must be remembered, also, that in many of these counties classified as Benton, there was a Benton minority in 1856. However, this minority was so nearly equal in voting strength to the party of victory that it seemed illogical to ignore so great a number of partisans in the consideration of the party.

The nativity of the population of the counties was another possible explanation for the inconsistencies, from a standpoint of economic development, in the counties that supported Benton. It has been brought out in Chapter I that the German population and press supported Benton and

TABLE NO. XV

PERCENTAGE OF THE FOREIGN BORN TO THE TOTAL
POPULATION IN MISSOURI COUNTIES IN 1860

10% and Over Foreign Born		5% to 10% Foreign Born	
1. *Benton	12%	6. Lincoln	7%
2. Buchanan	18%	7. Maries	6%
3. *Cape Girardeau	20%	8. Mississippi	5%
4. *Cole	23%	9. Montgomery	8%
5. Cooper	14%	10. St. Francois	6%
6. *Franklin	30%	11. Saline	6%
7. *Gasconade	36%	12. Washington	6%
8. Iron	10%		
9. Jackson	13%		
10. Jefferson	21%		
11. Lafayette	14%		
12. Linn	11%		
13. Marion	14%		
14. *Moniteau	11%		
15. *Morgan	13%		
16. *Osage	26%		
17. Perry	21%		
18. Phelps	14%		
19. Platte	11%		
20. *St. Charles	33%		
21. *St. Louis	51%		
22. Warren	28%		
5% to 10% Foreign Born		1% to 5% Foreign Born	
1. *Andrew	5%	1. Adair	3%
2. *Atchison	5%	2. Audrain	4%
3. Chariton	6%	3. *Barton	1%
4. Clark	6%	4. Bates	1%
5. Lewis	9%	5. *Bollinger	3%
		6. Boone	2%
		7. Butler	1%
		8. Caldwell	3%
		9. Callaway	4%
		10. Camden	1%
		11. Carroll	3%
		12. Carter	1%
		13. *Cass	2%
		14. Clay	4%
		15. Clinton	3%
		16. Crawford	3%
		17. DeKalb	2%
		18. Dunklin	1%
		19. Gentry	1%
		20. *Harrison	14%

State Average 15%
(Benton Counties Marked *)

1. Compiled from table on "Native and Foreign Born,"
Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Population,
p. 299.

TABLE NO. XV (Continued)

1% to 5% Foreign Born		1% to 5% Foreign Born	
21. Henry	2%	53. Sullivan	2%
22. Hickory	1%	54. Vernon	1%
23. *Holt	4%	55. Wayne	1%
24. Howard	3%		
25. Howell	1%	Less than 1% Foreign Born	
26. *Jasper	1%		
27. *Johnson	4%		
28. Knox	4%	1. Barry	.2%
29. Livingston	3%	2. Cedar	.4%
30. Macon	3%	3. Christian	?1
31. Madison	4%	4. Dade	.4%
32. Miller	1%	5. *Dallas	.08%
33. Monroe	1%	6. Daviess	.9%
34. New Madrid	3%	7. Dent	.8%
35. Newton	1%	8. Douglas	0.0
36. *Nodaway	1%	9. Greene	.7%
37. Pemiscott	1%	10. Grundy	.9%
38. *Pettis	4%	11. Laclede	.4%
39. Pike	4%	12. *Lawrence	.4%
40. Pulaski	3%	13. Mercer	.9%
41. Putnam	1%	14. McDonald	.3%
42. Ralls	4%	15. *Oregon	.9%
43. Randolph	1%	16. Ozark	0.0
44. Ray	2%	17. Polk	.4%
45. Reynolds	1%	18. Shannon	.9%
46. Ripley	2%	19. Scotland	.7%
47. *St. Clair	1%	20. *Stone	.1%
48. Ste. Genevieve	1%	21. *Taney	.1%
49. Schuyler	3%	22. Texas	.8%
50. Scotland	2%	23. *Webster	.3%
51. Scott	1%	24. Wright	.1%
52. Shelby	5%		

appealed to all foreign born to support him. The percentage of the foreign born in the population of Missouri, in 1860, is tabulated in Table No. XV, page 113, according to

1. Only three foreign born in county listed.

the amount of this percentage in each county. From this table, it is noted that ten of the twenty-two counties of the state that had as much as 10 per cent foreign born population, in 1860, were Benton strongholds in 1856. The 1860 census does not give the nationality of the foreign born citizens, but in the 1870 census the greatest percentage of the foreign born in the Benton counties was German.¹ It seems plausible that a similar condition existed in 1856, and that the influence of this foreign born vote was contributed to the adherence of these counties to the Benton party.

By this analysis of conditions in the Benton counties, there have been established three possible explanations for their support of the Benton party--namely, a condition of lower economic development, the fight for the control of the party, and the presence of an appreciable percentage of foreign born citizens. In most counties, a combination of these factors was responsible for whatever following Benton had, although, usually, one influence was more important than another. Because there were variations in the economic conditions within the counties that supported Benton, the following comparison and study are made to discover how these three factors combined in these counties to hold people of apparently different interests loyal to the same man and party.

1. Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Population,
pp. 361 ff.

TABLE NO. XVI

COMPARISON OF FACTORS INFLUENCING SUPPORT FOR THE
BENTON PARTY IN THE BENTON COUNTIES

County	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
1. Andrew	S, 2	A, 2	I, 3	W, 2	F, 3			v
2. Atchison	S, 1	A, 1	I, 2	W, 2	F, 3	v		
3. Barton	S, 1	A, 1	I, 1	W, 2	F, 2	v		
4. Bollinger	S, 1	A, 1	I, 1	W, 1	F, 2	v		
5. Benton	S, 2	A, 1	I, 2	W, 1	F, 4	(v)	(v)	
6. Cape Girardeau	S, 3	A, 1	I, 2	W, 2	F, 4	(v)	(v)	
7. Cass	S, 3	A, 2	I, 2	W, 3	F, 2			(v)
8. Cole	S, 3	A, 1	I, 2	W, 2	F, 4	v	v	
9. Dallas	S, 1	A, 1	I, 2	W, 1	F, 1	v		
10. Franklin	S, 2	A, 1	I, 2	W, 2	F, 4	v	v	
11. Gasconade	S, 1	A, 1	I, 1	W, 1	F, 4	v	v	
12. Harrison	S, 1	A, 1	I, 3	W, 1	F, 1	v		
13. Holt	S, 2	A, 2	I, 2	W, 2	F, 2	v		
14. Jasper	S, 2	A, 1, 2 ¹	I, 2	W, 2	F, 2	v		
15. Johnson	S, 3	A, 2	I, 2	W, 4	F, 2			v
16. Lawrence	S, 1	A, 2	I, 3	W, 1	F, 1			(v)
17. Moniteau	S, 2	A, 1	I, 3	W, 1 ²	F, 4	(v)	(v)	
18. Morgan	S, 2	A, 1	I, 2	W, 2	F, 4	v	v	
19. Nodaway	S, 1	A, 2	I, 2	W, 2	F, 2	(v)		
20. Oregon	S, 1	A, 1	I, 1	W, 1	F, 1	v		
21. Osage	S, 1	A, 1	I, 1	W, 1	F, 4	(v)	(v)	
22. Pettis	S, 4	A, 3	I, 3	W, 4	F, 2			(v)
23. St. Charles	S, 3	A, 1	I, 4	W, 3	F, 4		v	v
24. St. Clair	S, 2	A, 1	I, 2	W, 2	F, 2	(v)		
25. St. Louis	S, 1	A, 1	I, 4	W, 3	F, 4		v	v
26. Stone	S, 1	A, 1	I, 4	W, 1	F, 1	v		
27. Taney	S, 1	A, 1	I, 3	W, 1	F, 1	(v)		
28. Webster	S, 1	A, 1	I, 2	W, 1	F, 1	(v)		

1. Jasper had the same number of farms in two groups.
2. Not all of Moniteau's wealth reported.

In Table No. XVI, there is a tabulation of the rating of each Benton county in each of the tests applied, except the important crop test.

Column I represents the percentage of slave to the total population, and the key is: less than 5%, S, 1; 5% - 9%, S, 2; 10% - 15%, S, 3; over 15%, S, 4.

Column II represents the acreage of the greatest number of farms of any one size in each county, and the key is: 20 - 50 acres, A, 1; 50 - 100 acres, A, 2; over 100 acres, A, 3.

Column III represents the percentage of the improved land to the total reported acreage, and the key is: under 20%, I, 1; 20% - 30%, I, 2; 30% - 40%, I, 3; over 40%, I, 4.

Column IV represents the per capita wealth and the key is: under \$400, W, 1; \$400 - \$600, W, 2; \$600 - \$800, W, 3; over \$800, W, 4.

Column V represents the percentage of foreign born population and the key is: less than 1%, F, 1; 1% - 4%, F, 2; 5% - 9%, F, 3; 10% and over F, 4.

A rank of one or two in each test for economic development, except the acreage of the greatest number of farms of one size in a county, is below the actual average of the state. Therefore, a county that ranked one or two in each item, except in the acreage of the greatest number of farms of one size, conforms to the standard accepted as most nearly typical of the Benton counties. Clearly, the adherence of a county of that type of development to the Benton party could have been due to economic conditions. It seems reasonable to assume that the influence of economic conditions was responsible, also, for the support of the Benton party by a county that met the typical standard of a Benton county in all but one item of economic development. A rank of four for the percentage of foreign population indicated a percentage of at least 10, large enough to have strongly influenced the support of the Benton party.

The counties checked in:

Column VI are the counties in which the conditions of economic development explained their preference for Benton.

Column VII are the counties in which the foreign born population explained their preference for Benton.

Column VIII are the counties in which conditions of economic development contradicted their adherence to the Benton party.

The checks marked (v) indicate a Benton minority in 1856.

The previous discussion and study setting up the standards that marked the Benton counties, together with the study of the markings and explanations of Table No. XVI, page 116, makes it clear why the counties checked in Columns VI and VII of this table were justified in supporting a Benton party. Twenty-one of the twenty-eight Benton counties met the low standard of economic development, ten had a large German population and eight had both of these conditions that indicated a Benton stronghold.

The impressive evidence, in this Table No. XVI, is the inconsistency that apparently existed. This inconsistency was of two types--the Bentons were the minority in counties where they should have been the majority; and the Bentons received support, both majority and minority, in counties where there appeared to have been no reason for that support. These inconsistencies are the points that demand attention and some attempt at an explanation for them.

The most obvious explanation of a Benton minority where one might expect a majority, of course, lies in remembering that the Benton fight was a fight for the control of the party as well as over governmental policy or political principles. Many of the apparent inconsistencies disappear with this explanation. This fight for the control of the party seems to have been the only explanation

for the Benton minority in Benton, Moniteau, Osage, Taney and Webster. The influence of this fight for party control overcame the influence of both the economic conditions and the German population in Benton, Moniteau and Osage.

In Cape Girardeau county, a conflict of economic interests seems to have been present which, added to the fight for party control, made a Benton minority. The test for economic conditions which put Cape Girardeau in the poorer and less developed group of counties of the state did not reflect the real situation in that county. The area around Cape Girardeau is one of the oldest settled areas in the state,¹ and although the tests show it was not wealthy, it was not a frontier region. Probably, the majority of Benton's following in this county was from the foreign, German, element that was 20 per cent of the population.

St. Clair and Nodaway may have had the addition of economic conflict to the fight for party control, also, as their rank in the items of economic tests showed a higher rating than most of these twenty-one counties. In St. Clair county, the Osage valley crossing the county offered an opportunity for a variation in economic development in the county. However, the fight for party control appears to have been the greater influence.

1. Violette, E. M., History of Missouri, p. 48.

The party fight must have been responsible for the minority in Lawrence county, also. There is no real evidence from the test rankings that there was greater wealth in Lawrence than in many other Benton counties. There were two items--the acreage of the greatest number of farms of one size in a county and the percentage of improved land--in which it ranked above the average of the state. According to the standard of the table, only one item above average was allowed a county.

The greatest inconsistencies, though, were in those counties where economic conditions apparently contradicted any support of the Benton party. The counties where these conditions existed were Andrew, Cass, Johnson, Pettis, St. Charles and St. Louis. The fight for party control had its influence in these counties, no doubt, but the support of the Benton party, though often a minority, was too consistent to have been due to the party strife alone.

St. Louis county was the real anomaly--a county with a large and prosperous city interested in all the commercial and industrial activities of the age, one of the leading centers of commerce in the United States of that time. An analysis as to why St. Louis was Benton is a complete problem in itself. Its age, its economic interests, its wealth and development would indicate a Whig territory--and election results prove that there was definite Whig strength there. On the surface there are three

reasonable suggestions for the solution of the problem. First, the presence of the large majority of foreign population, about 50 per cent in 1860, which opposed slavery. Benton's party was the only faction in Missouri up to 1856 that definitely stated the belief that the further extension of slavery into the territories was inadvisable. The second reason was the strong party organization under the leadership of Francis P. Blair, Jr. And third, St. Louis naturally supported Benton's program for internal improvement which called for a railroad to the West from St. Louis. Most any population would support a person whose policy was directed at advancing its community to the most advantageous commercial position in the nation. That is what Benton's program, if carried out, would have done for St. Louis.

For St. Charles county, the large percentage of foreign population seems to have been the only influence added to the party fight.

Outside of St. Louis county, Cass, Johnson and Pettis were the counties whose support of the Benton party seemed most inconsistent. Unlike St. Charles and St. Louis, they had no German population for an explanation. However, in Johnson and Pettis, there was a 4 per cent foreign population that no doubt supported Benton and accounted for a part of the consistent strength he showed there. These counties all lay within the Missouri "black belt" and had

the distinguishing marks of the older and wealthier counties of the state. By every measure of economic development, except the percentage of improved land, Pettis was in the group of counties of the state that were most advanced in economic development. Although the economic development in Cass and Johnson was not as advanced as that of Pettis, it was decidedly beyond that of the standard of the Benton county. And they supported Benton faithfully.

The probable explanation for the presence of the Benton following in these counties is that the Missouri river area adapted to large scale farming merges into a small-farm area within that tier of counties. This difference in environmental conditions within the counties made a difference in economic development. Therefore, in the southern part of these counties, there was a small farmer population whose economic conditions bound it to the Benton party; and in the northern part, the richer and more advanced agricultural group where the wealth, that made the higher rating for the county, was concentrated. It appears, then that the Benton support in these counties was not contrary to its economic interest. The contradiction was that the general economic development of the county did not reflect those conditions of the Benton county standard.

With this influence added to a small foreign population and an active party fight, Benton support in these

counties was not out of place.

A similar condition must have existed in Andrew county, which was an older, more developed and richer county. Holt county which had much the same conditions as Andrew, but which did not rate so high by the tests, was probably influenced by the same factors that influenced the support of Andrew for Benton. These factors probably were: a large number of settlers from the northern states; second, a 5 per cent foreign, mostly German, element in the population which could determine the course of an election that was close; and the division between the developed area and the frontier. These in addition to the element of factional strife within the party gave the Bentons a consistent support in these counties with more regularity than he had from the other counties of the northwest border and Missouri river group.

This discussion has shown that the fight for party control was not always the only explanation for apparent political inconsistencies. It has also shown that, within the Benton group, there were four sections, determined by conditions common to each section that apparently influenced its adherence to the Benton party. These conditions were apart from local party organization and leadership which played no small part in keeping the party alive in all the sections. The first section was St. Louis whose support of Benton was due, it seems, to a combination of

conditions which often appear to be contradictions. Second, there was the group of counties with the large German population, located from St. Charles and St. Louis counties up the Missouri beyond the Osage to include Moniteau, and up the Osage as far as Benton county, and in addition, Cape Girardeau. The third group was the one of hardy American settlers, held together, apparently, by the conditions of pioneer life, located in the counties of the northwest border, the Ozark border and the southeast Ozarks. The fourth section was made up of that group of counties that was the meeting ground of the more settled areas and the small farmer frontier region. These counties were Pettis, Johnson, Cass, Andrew, and Holt and their ties to the Benton party seemed to have been a combination of economic conditions and foreign population. In many counties, there was the overlapping of economic conditions and foreign population that influenced the people to follow Benton's leadership.

These conditions which were common among groups of Benton counties were not peculiar to them which raises the question, if the Benton party is explained in terms of a large percentage of foreign population and of certain economic conditions, why were not all counties with these conditions centers of Benton support.

Again the answer is that the inconsistency is largely responsible to the element of the fight for party control.

However, for the other counties with a large percentage of foreign population, there are two possible suggestions, both of which really involve party control. In four of these counties--Buchanan, Jefferson, Perry, and Platte--whose foreign population was predominately German, the elections of 1850-1856 showed a consistent Benton faction that frequently won seats in the state legislature. They cannot be called Benton counties because of the shrinking of the Benton strength in the election of 1856, but it is quite possible that the foreigners in those counties voted for Benton in 1856. The other counties with a large foreign population, except Iron and Phelps which did not exist in 1856, were in the rich Missouri river belt. Most of the people were Whigs, and the Bentons had so little following after the split in the party that they rarely had a candidate in the congressional canvass. If the foreigners had a local Benton party, there is no record of its activity.

There are certain sections of the state where economic conditions indicated that they should have been more Benton than Benton, himself, but he had very little support from them. The only answer at all to that inconsistency, unlike the ones in the richer counties of the Benton group, is party conflict. All of the counties of the southwest Ozark border region should have been Benton, according to their economic development. The evidence that

the reason for the failure of these counties to support Benton was party leadership and the fight for the control of the party is quite clear. As long as John S. Phelps was a Benton man, that entire section was Benton. When Phelps left Benton, a large number of the counties not only refused to give Benton a majority, but he did not have even a strong minority. Since these people were living under economic conditions practically identical with those of the Benton counties, it would seem that party politics outweighed principles.

In the southeast Ozark section conditions were such economically to have made it a stronger Benton center than the Ozark border region. From the tests applied, they proved to be less developed than the Benton group--more truly the frontier type. It seems quite evident that it was local leadership that removed this section's support from Benton. Until after he broke with the state convention and platform in 1852 and the national administration over the Kansas-Nebraska question, this section was loyal to Benton. After that, the Anti faction had the power. It appears, then, that the local leaders went with the party organization and carried the voting population with them. This situation prompts the belief that the leaders "mounted the band wagon" in order to be a party to the division of the spoils. After 1852, it was quite evident that the Benton faction had nothing to offer in the way of

patronage.

In the pioneer region north of the "black belt," there appears no reason why a Benton party of some strength should have been confined to the northwest border counties, but that was the condition. The only explanation seems to be that the section of the state north of the Missouri river was a Whig stronghold, and when the split in the Democratic party came the local leaders were Anti-Benton men. As there was commonly no Benton candidate for Congress, the people had to vote, if at all, for the candidates of the organization leaders. Such a situation made it impossible for the Benton men to express their real preference in an election for which there are records of votes available. There were some Benton people among these settlers. Putnam county elected a Benton man to the state legislature in 1850 and 1854 and Mercer and Linn in 1852. It seems then that the lack of local leadership was the reason for the lack of Benton strength in that section.

The wealthier counties of the state present an interesting study when examined with reference to the Benton section. By all tests of per capita wealth, slave population, size of farms, per cent of land improved, and crops produced Boone, Callaway, Howard, Jackson, Lafayette, Pettis,¹ Pike, Randolph, Audrain, Lincoln, Marion, Monroe,

1. Explained as a Benton county.

New Madrid, Platte, and Ralls were grouped as the wealthiest counties of the state. All of these counties, it will be observed, were in that belt of best developed area along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers except New Madrid in the lower Mississippi bottom lands. All of them had more than 20 per cent slave population; their per capita wealth was far above the \$610 average of the state--all of them more than \$800--; they had larger farms, most of them had more 100 acre and over farms than any other size; and they raised the greatest quantity of tobacco. This resumé of their economic status sets them apart from the Benton counties by about as far as they can be separated. Politically, they were Whig, and when the Democratic party split, its leaders in this area went to the Anti side. Usually, there were not enough Bentons among them to have even a party organization, and in most of the elections between 1850 and 1856 there was not a Benton candidate in the canvass for congressman from the districts where these counties were located. In 1852, when Lamb ran as a Benton he carried only Pike and Lincoln of these counties. Between 1850 and 1856 these counties chose five Benton men in 1850, three in 1852, and none in 1854 and 1856 to the state legislature. These facts prove rather conclusively that in the counties least like the Benton group economically, Benton had the least support. There is however, no ready explanation why Warren county

with a larger foreign and German population and a smaller slave population than St. Charles should have been Whig instead of Benton. It will have to be assumed that there was a local condition of which there is no record back of that difference--if there was a reason for it.

No study of forces influencing the reactions of whole groups of people can be complete without an investigation of the cultural opportunities that they have. The institutions existent at that time through which some insight of the culture of the period may be attained were the school and the church. The records do not contain much of the highly desirable information which makes it impossible to get even a fairly accurate understanding of the cultural attainments. There is no record of the percentage of literacy in the population which is necessary for an honest estimate of any people. The school statistics are detailed but they fail to give the average length of school term which makes some of the figures available almost meaningless.

Since Missouri was a rural state the computations in Table XVII were made without including St. Louis, because the inclusion of the figures on St. Louis seemed to give a distorted picture of the state. From this tabulation it appears that the Benton counties showed somewhat greater interest in educational opportunities than the average of the state. Both the greater percentage of enrollment and

TABLE NO. XVII¹

SCHOOL STATISTICS, MISSOURI, 1860

Enumeration	Missouri	Benton Counties
5-20 years of age	334,722	73,694
School Enrollment	157,561	39,234
% of Enrollment	47%	53%
Number of Teachers	5,428	1,278
Pupils per Teacher	28	30
Total Teachers' Salary	\$570,919	\$132,930
Average Teachers' Salary	\$105	\$104

the greater number of pupils per teacher seem to establish that fact. That does not necessarily mean, however, that there was more education in the Benton counties as the amount of educational achievement had to depend upon how long the pupils attended school. The only point in this analysis that apparently makes any correlation with the other tests of Benton counties is the fact that they paid less money to their teachers. Since other indications are that they were interested in education, they probably paid less money because they had less money to spend, but such a conclusion cannot be taken as a fact.

1. Computed from Report of State Superintendent of Schools, State of Missouri, Senate Journal, 1860-1861, Appendix, p. 260.

TABLE NO. XVIII¹
CHURCH STATISTICS, MISSOURI, 1860

Denomination	Missouri number Churches	% Total Number Churches in State	Benton Counties Number Churches	% Total Number Churches in Ben- ton Co.
Baptist	457	30%	77	21%
Christian	150	10%	32	9%
Episcopal	18	1%	7	2%
Lutheran	55	3%	22	6%
Methodist	526	33%	105	30%
Presbyterian	225	14%	57	16%
Catholic	88	5%	45	12%
Union	54	3%	16	4%
TOTALS	1577		361	
Value of Prop- erty	\$4,509,767		\$3,014,495	

These church statistics emphasize evidences that have been pointed out by other tests. The large number of Catholic and Lutheran churches in the Benton counties reflected the presence of a large foreign born population. The percentage of these churches of the state located in Benton counties pointed to the fact that most foreigners were Benton people. The predominance of Methodists, Baptists and Christians indicated the new and developing condition of the state. The Presbyterians, the church of the richer people, were located mostly in the wealthier counties.

1. Compiled and computed from Table on Churches in Missouri, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Property and Mortality, pp. 421 ff.

Many of the counties below average from an economic standpoint had no Presbyterian congregation.

The average value of church property furnishes further indications of the general conditions of communities. However, from the standpoint of the state average, the concentration of denominations that usually put the most money into church edifices in a comparatively small area makes the figures present an erroneous picture. From the table above the average value of church property for the state was \$2860 and for the Benton counties \$8350. Those figures include, of course, all the churches for St. Louis. There were in St. Louis and St. Charles counties twenty-six of the eighty-eight Catholic churches of the state. Since the buildings and property of this denomination are usually of so much greater value than those of other denominations, it seems that the more accurate general condition is reflected when these counties are omitted from the consideration. Without St. Louis, the average value of church property for the state was \$1255 and for the Benton counties, \$1196. Omitting St. Charles also, the averages were for the state \$1208 and for the Bentons, \$888. This value of church property in the rural sections of the state, like the teachers' salaries, tends to emphasize that outside of the concentrated centers of wealth the Benton counties were less well-off than the state as a whole.

This analysis of the factors back of the Benton faction seems to have established these general indications. The Benton group, as a whole, was not very different from the rest of the state, as in most of the tests those people were in the average group but usually in the lower level of the average division. They were mainly small farmers, living in the newer areas of the state under a condition of frontier economy, from which they were producing a substantial living and wealth. There were comparatively few slaves and slave owners among the Benton party. A great portion of the Benton following was composed of Germans who agreed with Benton in his opposition to the extension of slavery and approved of his belief in a vigorous national government. It may be said that, after all, the Benton people were not distinctive--that any other group may have the same things true of it. Admitting the possibility, that there could be other groups of counties that would work out as the Benton counties did by the tests, does not detract from the distinctiveness of the Benton group. The fact that the Benton counties, scattered over the state as they were, reacted to the conditions within them that were common to the group as a whole or in part, in like manner so as to establish their own average makes the evidence of their homogeneity significant. The indications point in the direction that the small, substantial, frontier-type farmer, "the truest

American," had unconsciously joined with a powerful and articulate foreign element to support the cause of a strong national government, whose unity they wanted preserved at all hazard, and from which they expected a paternal service that would insure to them the opportunities that belong to a free America and secure the wealth they would create. Benton stood for those principles, so they stood for Benton.

CHAPTER IV

THE BENTON FACTION AFTER 1856

The election of 1856 was the last in which the Benton faction participated as a separate political party. In this election the long struggle for control of the Democratic party came to a close with the decisive victory of the Anti-Bentons. However, this victory did not reduce the Benton faction to a position of complete unimportance in Missouri politics. Since 27,000 voters in the election of 1856 could not fail to exercise some influence in party politics, it is the purpose of this chapter to discover the influence this group had after 1856.

When it became apparent that the cause of the Benton faction as a contender for power in the Democratic party was hopeless, the question that naturally arose in public discussion was where would the Bentons give their support. In order to understand why that should have been a question commanding general attention, it is necessary to remember two things--first, that the Bentons always claimed that the division of the Democratic party was on principle, not on a personality; and second, that all political party organization was in a state of great confusion.

The people who made up the main body of Benton's following, according to the evidence presented in Chapter III were the foreign born population, especially the Germans, and the small type farmer living under a condition of frontier economy. These people had an outlook upon life that prompted them to support the principles for which Benton stood--namely, a strong national Union; the promotion of internal improvements at national expense; a liberal public land policy that made land easily available to the settler by enabling him to buy the less fertile land at a reduced price; a distaste for the institution of slavery; and an opposition to all issues that agitated the slavery question because of the threat agitation was to the permanency of the Union. The Bentons maintained that their principles on the slavery issue, internal improvements and the Union separated them from the Anti-Benton faction.

These principles furnished the basis for the continued importance of the Benton faction in Missouri party politics, because it was to these principles of Bentonism that various political groups appealed to get the support of the Benton faction. These appeals were to some extent prompted by the general political confusion of the time. It will be recalled that the Whig party had ceased to exist as a national organization. In its place, opposing the National Democratic party, were the American or Know

Nothing party and the Republican party. In Missouri, as a general thing, the Old Line Whigs, with the exception of the States Rights Whigs who had joined the Anti-Bentons, were, in 1856, members of the American party. In fact, it appears that the American party was practically the Whig party with a new name, because the Whig party leaders were the American leaders and the centers of American strength were the old centers of Whig strength.

In Missouri, the American party was a loosely organized group which apparently did not emphasize the basic principles of Americanism, namely, the curtailment of the political rights of naturalized citizens. Because it had indefinite principles, it attracted temporarily many people, who were, themselves, indefinite in political principles, to its membership. Many of its members adhered to these old Whig principles: a strong national Union, development of internal improvements at national expense, the promotion of industry under the protection of a high tariff, and a sound banking system sponsored by the national government. The principles which they shared with the Bentons were the ground on which the Americans, speaking through Col. Switzler of the Missouri Statesman, urged the Bentons to join with them to drive the National Democrats, the Anties, from power in the state. It seems that the old Whig leaders hoped that by such a union of

1. Missouri Statesman, January 29, 1858.

parties there could have been a revival of the Whig party organization in Missouri, at least.

The new Republican party had neither an organization nor a defined following in Missouri in 1856. Having come into existence as a protest against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise provisions which excluded slavery from Kansas and Nebraska, it continued to have, in 1856, only the one policy--the non-extension of slavery into the territories. Frank P. Blair, Jr., the first ranking leader of the Benton party after Benton, himself, acknowledged his sympathy with this party and announced shortly before the presidential election in 1856 that he could support the Republican ticket. In the discussion that followed this announcement, he intimated that Benton, also, ¹ approved of the principle of the Republican party. At a later time, when Blair became the champion of free labor and started a party organization that became the Republican party in Missouri, he expected the Benton faction to follow his leadership into this new party because of Benton's personal attitude toward slavery and his failure to deny or silence the charges of free soilism made against ² him.

The National Democrats made overtures to the Bentons

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1. Jefferson Examiner, October 4, 1856.
 2. Ulbricht, John Harold, F. P. Blair, Jr., and Missouri Politics., pp. 141 ff.

to return to the National Democracy. Contrary to emphasizing the principles of Bentonism as a basis for the union of the two factions, the members of the National Democracy pointed out, through the columns of the Jefferson Examiner, that the division of the party on principles had never been as marked as it had appeared. Whatever division there had been on minor principles, they said, had ceased to exist so that the Benton people no longer had a cause for staying outside of the Democracy. The Bentons needed to guard against being separated longer from their true party by the efforts of the enemies of the Democracy to prolong the friction over the personal issue of Benton. They insisted that he would never again be a candidate for office so that both the principles and the personality¹ that had divided them were things of the past. This willingness on the part of the Anties to forget past differences that had divided the party was prompted, it seems, not alone by a magnanimous spirit. Although the leaders did not admit its presence, they no doubt realized the definite lack of unity that existed in the National Democratic party in 1856 and wanted to offset any losses in party membership by the addition of new strength.

In a time when old political organizations were disintegrating and new ones were forming, it was highly desirable to gain the support of a faction as large, as

1. Jefferson Examiner, June 24, 1857; June 6, 1857.

active and as loyal as the Benton party had proved itself. To a large extent the destinies of the political organizations that sought to add the Benton faction to themselves depended upon how much Benton support they were able to gain. Within the Benton party there was enough following, if gained, to bolster the waning power of a disintegrating party or to form the nucleus of a rising party.

The argument that the leaders of the political parties used to gain the support of the Bentons was on the basis of principles. But the choice of a new affiliation which the Bentons made probably did not depend entirely upon principles as far as the members of the Benton party, themselves, were concerned. The fight between the Benton and Anti-Benton factions had been most bitter. It is natural to suppose that there were many Bentons who refused to support the Anties under any circumstances because of the intense hatred and jealousies that had accompanied the conflict for party control. On the other hand, there probably were many members of the Benton faction who were born into the Democratic party as much as they were born members of their churches. To them it was rank heresy to vote any besides the Democratic ticket, regardless of principles involved. In the political realignment of the Benton party these personal factors most probably played a significant part.

The first new factor that entered into the determining of the response which the Bentons made to the invitations to join other political parties was the question of emancipation of slaves. The Benton leaders of St. Louis were accused of opening the emancipation question in Missouri when B. Gratz Brown made a speech in the state house of representatives in January, 1857, advocating free soil and free labor.¹ Benton was enraged at these leaders of his party for opening an issue that agitated the slavery question. He openly and vehemently denounced them. In a letter published in the Missouri Republican, he said, "I saw with amazement ... the late abolition movement in the Legislature, and wrote immediately to Price, Lusk and others at Jefferson City to Denounce and Repudiate It. The persons ought to have cut themselves loose from me before they began such an agitation."² Apparently from this time there was a division in the Benton forces over this issue of emancipation. In reporting on the resolution which the general assembly adopted, which declared the emancipation movement was "inexpedient, impolitic, unwise and unjust,"³ the Daily Missouri Democrat said that the only people who opposed the resolution were

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1. Jefferson Examiner, January 24, 1857; April 18, 1857.
 2. Missouri Republican, April 4, 1857.
 3. Missouri Laws, 1856-1857, p. 61.

¹
those from St. Louis. Since at that time all members of the house of representatives from St. Louis county were Benton men, the Benton party apparently was dividing into a St. Louis faction and a rural faction. With this wedge dividing them it was unlikely that the entire Benton faction would support one party or one platform again.

The opportunity for the Benton "Die Hards" to exercise the balance of power in Missouri politics came in 1857. The election of Trusten Polk, the successful candidate for governor in 1856, to the United States Senate in 1857 made necessary a special election for governor that year. The Democrats nominated Robert M. Stewart who did not have much to recommend him for the governorship of Missouri. He was an easterner, openly charged with opposing slavery and having been involved in rather questionable activities in connection with the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad of which he was the president.² His opponent was Major James S. Rollins, a former Whig, a member of the American party, who made the canvass for governor as an independent. His announcement as a candidate stated that he was entering the gubernatorial race in response to requests from members of the general assembly and men who were affiliated with the Whig, the American and the Benton

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1. Daily Missouri Democrat, February 14, 1857.
 2. Missouri Statesman, May 29, 1857; June 5, 1857; July 10, 1857. Jefferson Inquirer, July 18, 1857.

¹
parties. Major Rollins was a slave owner and a prominent leader in central Missouri. He did not favor free soilism, emancipation or any issue that agitated the slavery question. He adhered to the old Whig principles on internal improvements, high tariff and the supremacy of the Union and believed that the interests of Missouri were better served by the promotion of internal improvements and economic development within the state than by agitation over
²
the slavery issue.

The slavery issue played an important part in this campaign, because it was not possible to separate local issues from those that were demanding such great attention nationally. This was the period when Stephen A. Douglas broke with the national administration over the Lecompton Constitution and fraud in Kansas, forcing Democrats to choose between Douglas and the administration. The abolitionists and emancipationists were more active than they had ever been. Chief Justice Taney had handed down his Dred Scott decision which guaranteed the security of slave property in all territories of the United States. In a slave-holding state it was not possible to hold an election and ignore these problems.

The National Democrats in Missouri were accused of being the party of the national administration. As such

1. Missouri Statesman, April 24, 1857.

2. Ibid., May 29, 1857.

they were supposed to favor the extreme southern view of slavery, that is, the obligation of the United States government to protect slavery in all territories of the United States. Their candidate for governor, Stewart, as stated above, was charged with opposing slavery. Some people believed he was an emancipationist because he was in the employ of an eastern company that had lands in Missouri¹ which it wished to sell to free settlers. The presence of slavery tended to keep free settlers out of the state.

According to the charges then, there were in the National Democratic party in Missouri the two extreme positions on the slavery question, both of which were threats to the existence of the Union. On the basis of these charges, leaders of other political factions appealed to all people, who placed the Union above every other issue and who believed that the agitation of the slavery question by either the secessionist or the abolitionist was destructive to the Union, to join in supporting Rollins in order to rescue the state from the treachery of the National Democracy. The members of the Benton faction were advised to join with this conservative middle group. Benton wrote from Washington under date of May 21, 1857, to

1. Copied from the St. Louis Intelligencer in the Missouri Statesman, July 10, 1857.

Col. H. B. Branch to urge the Bentons to support Rollins.¹
Thomas L. Price made a speaking tour of the state in the
interest of Rollins' candidacy,² and Austin A. King, the
ex-governor,³ declared in favor of Rollins.

However, all the Bentons did not follow this advice
and leadership. Early in 1857, B. Gratz Brown, editor of
the Daily Missouri Democrat, the Blair organ, started a
campaign for free labor saying that emancipation would
mean a great industrial, economic and financial advantage
to the state; land prices would go up and the resources of
the state would be developed.⁴ When accused of agitating
the slavery question by such emancipation doctrine, this
paper insisted that it was advocating the cause of free
labor rather than agitating the slavery question.⁵ The
Daily Missouri Democrat did not support Stewart but stated
that it could support him on the slavery issue because of
"his past practices and present connections."⁶ By taking
this open stand on emancipation Blair and Brown violated
one of Benton's basic principles: they definitely con-
tributed to the agitation of the slavery question, thereby

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1. Missouri Statesman, July 3, 1857.
 2. Jefferson Examiner, May 16, 1857.
 3. Missouri Statesman, July 17, 1857.
 4. Daily Missouri Democrat, January 28, 1857.
 5. Ibid., March 27, 1857.
 6. Ibid., April 11, 1857.

adding to the general political confusion that existed within the state.

Rollins, however, did not permit the entire campaign to be waged on the slavery issue. Believing that there should be as little agitation of the slavery question as possible, he emphasized the necessity for completing the state internal improvement program. He openly appealed to the Benton party members to support him because their and his policies were so much the same. According to the reports of his speaking in the various parts of the state, he made both an extensive and an intensive campaign to unite all the mal-contented against the National Democrats into one party. He seems to have made an especially thorough canvass in the Ozark border counties and the Osage valley where Benton had such consistent support. The reports from his meetings there, as well as from those in southeast Missouri and the Missouri river counties, expressed confidence that Rollins would win by the combination of all true Benton men, the Americans, the Old Line Whigs who had never joined the Americans, and the Anties¹ who could not support Stewart.

As mentioned previously, Stewart was not a satisfactory candidate even to his own party. A notice from south-

1. Jefferson Inquirer, July 25, 1857; August 1, 1857.
Missouri Statesman, June 12, 1857; June 19, 1857;
July 3, 1857; July 10, 1857; July 24, 1857; July 31, 1857.

east Missouri, appearing in the Missouri Statesman said that Stewart did not represent the interests of the people of that section at all and that a great many members of the National Democrats there would support Rollins over Stewart.¹ A similar report from the southwest part of the state said that Stewart had always opposed their southwest railroad which made him unacceptable to the people there.² The candidacy of Stewart also reduced the possibility of the National Democrats' drawing support from the Bentons. In 1850, Stewart was one of the leaders of the group in the state legislature who turned the support of fifteen members to Henry S. Geyer, thereby defeating Benton for reelection to the United States Senate.³ In the 1857 campaign, Lusk of the Jefferson Inquirer emphasized the past attitude of Stewart to Benton in order to consolidate the support of the Benton party for Rollins.⁴

The outcome of the election was a disappointment to those who were confident of a Rollins victory. He lost the election by 329 votes, receiving 47,646 votes to Stewart's 47,975 votes. Apparently, there was a considerably less active participation in the election than the reports of the interest in the campaign indicated there would be.

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1. Missouri Statesman, June 5, 1857.
 2. Jefferson Inquirer, August 1, 1857.
 3. Missouri Statesman, July 15, 1857.
 4. Jefferson Inquirer, May 20, 1857; June 3, 1857.

There were 19,373 fewer votes cast in this election than were cast in the gubernatorial election of 1856.¹ Some decrease in the vote cast was to have been expected as there usually are fewer votes cast in an election that comes in a year when there is no national election. Just to what extent the decrease in the vote in 1857 was due to this cause, or to the absence of a Benton ticket in the canvass, or to the unacceptability of Stewart to many members of his party, it is hard to estimate. However, a study of the following Table No. XIX, page 148, which compares the vote in the Benton counties in the gubernatorial election of 1856 with their vote in the special gubernatorial election in 1857, seems to reveal comparatively definite indications of the part the members of the Benton party took in the election of 1857.

1. Missouri Statesman, August 29, 1857.

TABLE NO. XIX¹
COMPARISON OF THE ELECTION RESULTS FOR BENTON COUNTIES ON
THE ELECTIONS OF 1856 AND 1857

	I %	II %	III %	IV %	V %	VI %	VII %	VIII %
<u>Group I</u>								
Stone	73	8	77	862	18	23	28	32
Dallas	51	6.8	56	722	42	44	4	28
Benton	47	5	50	900	47 1/2	49	4	28
Taney	47	4.9	25	410	48	75	56	26
Webster	42	11	55	400	46	45	2	15
							{decrease	
Lawrence	37	23	54	134	39	45	18	13
Pettis	33	36	64	77	31	36	16	13
Nodaway	43	3.8	38	331	48	62	29	7
Jasper	41	19	61	221	38	39	2.6	2
Cole	45	13	36	177	41	64	56	1
								{increase
Barton	59	13	55	323	27	45	66	7
								{increase
<u>Group II</u>								
Cape Girardeau	34	30	54	80	34 1/2	46	35	40
Bollinger	35	32	57	78	32	43	34	35
Johnson	62	21	64	204	16	36	125	13
<u>Group III</u>								
Holt	43	27	47	74	29	53	82	42
St. Charles	42	32	59	69	25	41	64	38
Atchison	49	21	42	100	28	58	107	37
St. Clair	36	33	45	36	40	55	37.5	29
Osage	33	31	50 1/2	61	35	50	42	24
St. Louis	54	34	58	70	26	42	62	16
<u>Group IV</u>								
Gasconade	66	27	68	151	6.9	32	363	46
Oregon	77	2.7	9	233	20	90	350	44
Franklin	56	26	53	104	17	47	176	37
Morgan	44	29	42	45	26	58	123	19
Harrison	50	33	50	52	16	49	209	19
Andrew	65	22	53	140	12	47	291	11
Moniteau	39	37	56	51	23	44	91	9
Cass	32	43	54	25	24	46	91	4
								{increase

1. Computed from official Election Results published in the Missouri Statesman, September 12, 1856, and Jefferson Inquirer, August 29, 1857.

In this table, Column I represents Benton's percentage of the total vote cast for governor in 1856. Column II represents Ewing's (American) percentage of the total vote cast for governor in 1856. Column III represents Rollins' (Opposition) percentage of the total vote cast for governor in 1857. Column IV represents the percentage of increase of Rollins' percentage of the total vote in 1857 over Ewing's percentage of the total vote in 1856. Column V represents Polk's percentage of the total vote cast for governor in 1856. Column VI represents Stewart's percentage of the total vote cast for governor in 1857. Column VII represents the percentage of increase of Stewart's percentage of the total vote in 1857 over Polk's percentage of the total vote in 1856. Column VIII represents the percentage of decrease in the total number of votes cast in each county in 1857 compared to those cast in 1856.

The counties are grouped according to the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote--that is, Rollins' vote over Ewing's--compared to the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote--Stewart's over Polk's.

In Group I are the counties where the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote was very large and the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote was comparatively small. The ratio of these percentages of increase was as much as approximately three to one in all of these counties. This relation existed in eleven of the Benton counties.

In Group II are the counties where the ratio of the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote to the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote was approximately two to one. There were three of these counties.

In Group III are the counties in which the ratio of the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote to the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote was no more than one and one-half to one. There were six counties in this group.

In Group IV are the counties in which the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote was less than the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote. There were eight counties in this group.

The average percentage of decrease in the total number of votes cast from 1856 to 1857 was 16 per cent.

All of these groups are separated into two divisions by the percentage of decrease there was in the total number of votes cast in each county. Over the state there was an average of 16 per cent fewer votes cast in 1857 than in 1856. As suggested above there were three possible explanations for this decrease--namely, the fact that the election was not held in connection with a national campaign; the Bentons did not have a ticket of their own; and the National Democratic candidate was not acceptable to many members of that party.

In attempting to analyze the participation of the Benton faction in this election, one of the factors that must be considered is the group that did not vote because there was no longer a Benton ticket in the field. The failure to vote for that reason might have been due to two causes. It has been established that counties with a large percentage of foreign born population supported Benton as a usual thing.¹ In this election the Bentons were urged to vote for an avowed American whose party principles, if not his personal ones, were hostile to the immigrants. Apparently, the Germans, who composed most of the foreign population in the Benton counties, refused to vote for Rollins.² The Anti-Benton principles were as unacceptable to them as the American principles, so they did

1. See Table XV, p. 113.

2. Missouri Statesman, August 7, 1857.

not vote at all. This attitude of the Germans could have accounted for the more than 100 per cent above the average percentage of decrease in the total vote in Cape Girardeau, Franklin, Gasconade and St. Charles counties and the more than average decrease in the total vote in Morgan and Osage counties.

The other influence among the members of the Benton party that might have kept many of them from voting was their loyalty to party and party names. No doubt, many Bentons would not support Rollins because he was not a Democrat, and they would not vote for Stewart because he was an Anti-Benton. Such an attitude more probably existed in counties with little economic development, because it seems that the more closely people are connected with conditions of pioneer economy, the more blindly devoted they are to political creeds that do not change names. This factor might have been the explanation for the more than 25 per cent decrease in the vote in Bollinger, Taney, Stone, Oregon, Atchison, Dallas and perhaps Benton, and St. Clair. However, it is not assumed that the entire decrease in the vote in the various counties was due to the lack of participation of the Benton faction alone. No doubt all three factors mentioned above worked together in each county to account for the total decrease. It must be remembered that the high percentage of decrease in the votes cast may not indicate a great number of votes.

There was such a small number of voters in many counties that the change of only a few votes made a great difference in percentage.

Those counties that showed a less than average decrease in the percentage of votes cast were the counties in which Rollins made his most active appeal for Benton votes. Although the census reports show that there was a marked increase in population between 1850 and 1860, there is no reason to suppose that an increase in population within one year would have affected the vote in these counties more than it did in others to cause the comparatively small percentage of decrease in the votes cast in the 1857 election. It is more reasonable to suppose that the people in these counties took a greater interest in voting in 1857 than they did in 1856.

This discussion has indicated the probable division between the groups of Benton people who voted and those who did not vote in the election of 1857. A study of the four groups in Table No. XIX page 148 gives some evidence of how the Bentons voted in this election.

Since the actual difference between Groups I and II in Table No. XIX page 148 is in the amount of the percentage of increase of Rollins' percentage of the total vote in 1857 over Ewing's percentage of the total vote in 1856 compared to the percentage of increase of Stewart's percentage of the total vote in 1857 over Polk's percent-

age of the total vote in 1856, the outstanding facts in a careful study of the two groups are practically the same. For this reason, they are considered as one group in this more detailed examination.

In the first place, the percentage of increase in the percentage of votes for the Opposition party over the percentage of increase in the percentage of votes for the Democratic party was large enough in these counties to be reasonably convincing that the Opposition had received reinforcements outside the Whig-American group. Then, these counties, with the exception of Nodaway, Cape Girardeau, and Bollinger, are all in the section of the state where Benton's strength was most consistent--the southwest Ozark border and the Osage valley, merging into the lower Missouri river lands.

In 1856, the American party had a negligible following in all of these counties except in Pettis, which they carried with 36 per cent of the votes, and in Bollinger and Cape Girardeau, where they received about one-third of the votes cast. The Anti-Bentons carried six of these counties and received 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the votes cast in twelve of these fourteen counties in the election of 1856. That same year Benton carried seven of these counties and received as many as 40 per cent of the votes in all of them except Bollinger, Cape Girardeau, Lawrence, and Pettis where he polled between 30 per cent

and 40 per cent of the vote. In 1857, Rollins carried eleven of these fourteen counties. It seems quite obvious that the Benton vote in this group supported Rollins.

The three counties that Stewart carried were Taney, Nodaway, and Cole. In two of these counties, Nodaway and Taney, Benton received only a strong minority vote in 1856. In these counties the big percentage of increase which the Opposition apparently received from the Bentons was not enough to overcome the normally superior Democratic strength. Then, too, in Taney county, there was a large percentage of decrease in the total number of votes cast which may have represented Benton strength. The confused condition in Cole county seems to have no explanation. There was a one per cent increase in the number of votes cast in Cole county in 1857. The percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote was more than three times as much as the percentage of increase in the percentage of Democratic vote. Yet Stewart, the Democratic candidate, carried the county.

The counties in Group I, except Johnson, Lawrence and Pettis, were the ones in which the economic conditions, measured by the tests applied in Chapter III, were such that prompted the support of Benton's policies. The Whig-American principles of Rollins were more like Benton's than were those of the National Democrats. It is not surprising that the Benton vote apparently went to

Rollins. The combination of respect for principles, the active campaign that Rollins made and the old animosities that no doubt existed among the Bentons for the Anties, made this section appear more opposed to the Anties than it had been in previous elections.

In the counties of Group III, the evidence of how the Benton party voted in the election of 1857 is not as obvious as it is in Groups I and II. The nearly equal percentage of increase in the percentage of the total vote of the two parties in the election of 1857 over the election of 1856, together with the large percentage of decrease in the total vote cast in each county, tends to indicate a disintegration of the Benton faction.

In 1856, Benton carried four of these six counties and received from 33 per cent to 54 per cent of the total vote in all these counties. The American party polled about one-third of the votes in Osage, St. Clair, St. Louis and St. Charles counties and approximately one-fourth and one-fifth of the votes in Holt and Atchison counties respectively. The National Democrats received about one-fourth of all the votes cast in all of these counties except St. Clair and Osage which they carried with 40 per cent and 35 per cent respectively of the vote. In 1857, Rollins carried Osage, St. Louis and St. Charles counties and Stewart Holt, Atchison and St. Clair. These results of the election tend to indicate, also, that the

Benton faction was disintegrating and that neither the National Democrats nor the Opposition in these counties made any real gain from the addition of reenforcements from the Benton group.

In all of the counties of this group, except St. Louis, the percentage of decrease in the total vote of each county was at least one and one-half times the average percentage of decrease in the state as a whole. This seems to indicate that the Benton faction was less active in its participation in the election here than in other parts of the state. The greater percentage of decrease in the vote in St. Charles and Osage counties may be credited to the Germans who would vote for neither candidate because of principle. In St. Louis county where the percentage of decrease in the total vote was less (16 per cent, the average of the state), it appears that Blair and his organization with the emphasis on emancipation was able to bring out a greater percentage of voters than voted in the other German counties. It is quite probable that a part of the Germans in St. Louis voted for Stewart because of his personal attitude to the slavery issue. For Atchison, Holt and St. Clair there seems to be no very definite assignable reason for the larger percentage of decrease in the total vote.

The greater percentage of increase in the percentage of the vote for the Democratic party in these six counties

of Group III apparently indicates that a considerable number of Bentons in these counties had decided that it was useless to stay with the Benton faction longer. They returned to party regularity by voting for the party nominee.

The marked percentage of increase in the percentage of the total vote for the Opposition seemed to show that there were in these counties of Group III a number of Bentons who persisted in their disapproval of the Anti faction. No doubt, as in the counties of Groups I and II, there were men whose principles agreed more with those of Rollins than with those of the Democratic party.

In the counties of Group IV, where the percentage of increase in the percentage of the total vote for the Democratic party was greater than the percentage of increase in the percentage of the total vote for the Opposition in the election of 1857, the ratio of those increases ranged from approximately three to two to four to one. But here, as in Group III, in spite of the greater margin between the percentages of increase in the percentages of the total vote of the two parties, there were evidences of a general disintegration of the Benton faction.

In 1856, Benton carried all of these eight counties except Cass. He received a clear majority in five of the six counties and no less than 32 per cent of the votes in any of these eight counties. The American party carried Cass county and received from 2.7 per cent to 37 per cent

of the total vote in all of the counties of this group. In that same election, the Democratic party carried none of the counties and polled no more than about one-fourth of the votes cast in all of these counties. In the 1857 election, Rollins carried all of these counties except Morgan and Oregon. This result shows that apparently a sufficient number of the Benton faction voted with the Opposition to give it the majority of the vote in most of these counties. But a large number of the Bentons, it seems, forgot past differences in the Democratic party and voted for the nominee of the National Democrats. Since the Americans had a much larger following in these counties in 1856 than the Democrats did, evidently more Bentons voted with the Democrats than with the Opposition in order to make this greater percentage of increase in the percentage of the total vote for the Democrats.

The counties in this group that have a large percentage of decrease in the total vote cast, except Oregon and Harrison, had a large percentage of foreign born population which no doubt accounted for that decrease. The cause for the large percentage of decrease in Oregon and Harrison, like in St. Clair, Holt and Atchison in Group III, cannot be assigned with the evidence available. Any of the general reasons for the decrease in the vote in the election of 1857, except the large percentage of foreign population, may have been responsible for this decrease.

The case in Cass county was just the reverse of the case in Cole county in Group I. There was a four per cent increase in the number of votes cast. The percentage of increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote was almost four times the percentage of increase in the percentage of the Opposition vote. Rollins carried the county. There appears to be no explanation for such confusion. Probably the reason for the greater number of votes cast in this county was that Cass is among those counties in which Rollins waged his most active campaign.

The division of the Benton faction appeared much more evident in Groups III and IV than it did in Groups I and II. This may have been due to the fact that in the counties of Groups III and IV, except those with a large percentage of foreign born population, the support for Benton during the long struggle for party control had not been consistent. In Andrew, Cass, Holt and in some respects Atchison and St. Clair, the economic conditions varied from those which seemed to be typical of Benton counties¹ according to the tests applied in Chapter III. It is not surprising, therefore, that in these counties the Benton faction gave its support, as it appears, more to the Democratic party than to the Opposition.

This study apparently established these generalizations about the Benton faction in the election of 1857.

1. See Table XVI, p. 116.

The Bentons did not support one candidate as a unit. The faction divided its support between the two parties, but more Bentons supported Rollins and the Opposition than supported Stewart and the National Democracy. The counties that had been most uniformly Benton throughout the fight between the factions, excepting the German counties, gave Rollins the most consistent support. In many counties, especially those with a large percentage of foreign born population, there was a big decrease in the votes cast, indicating a conscious refusal to vote. In several counties this non-active group of voters had within it the power to determine the final political influence of the Bentons in those counties. The influence that the Benton faction was to exert in the future depended upon whether it disintegrated further or revived its organization to consolidate its support with one party. The evidences in this election tend to justify the contention of the Bentons that they were divided from the Anties more on principle than on personalities.

From 1857 to 1860 there was so much confusion in political party organization and alignments that it is practically impossible to trace any faction through this confused period. Nationally, the chief cause for this confusion was the fight between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic party for control of the party's policies and the government. The question of the power and

responsibility of the national government over slavery in the territories eventually forced these two factions to abandon the efforts to compromise their differences and take their stands definitely. The southern wing, led by Jefferson Davis, insisted that it was the duty and the responsibility of the national government through its courts to maintain and protect slavery in all the territories of the United States. The Douglas or northern wing of the party believed that it was the privilege and responsibility of the people in any territory to decide upon the existence of slavery for themselves. This breach in the party brought about a rather general realignment of party affiliations. Members of the American and some old Whigs who had not identified themselves with another party joined the Democrats in choosing between these factions of the Democracy. Some Democrats, who found the idea of Douglas for the solution of the slavery problem as distasteful as that of Davis, went into the Republican party to advocate absolute non-extension. The extreme anti-slavery radicals increased their agitation for complete emancipation of the slaves. The Buchanan administration favored the southern wing of the Democratic party. Since this was the faction of extreme views and since there was so much agitation in the country, conservatives of all old parties advocated the union of all people, who placed the security of the nation above every other issue, into one

party in order to defeat those who would destroy the Union.

In Missouri, the disintegration of old parties and the new political alignments reflected the national political confusion. Although the effort to consolidate all opposition in the support of Rollins against Stewart had failed to overthrow the National Democrats in 1857, the old party leaders continued to encourage the union of Old Line Whigs, Americans and Benton Democrats to rescue the state from the clutches of the National Democrats.¹ The Democratic party organization in the state was in dispute over which of the two factions of the national party would have its endorsement. The Blair faction of the Benton party advocating free labor at first, eventually endorsed the Republican platform.

In the election of 1860, the Missouri political parties followed the lead of the national organizations also. That year, each of the four organized groups put a candidate in the canvass for the presidency. The Republican party nominated Lincoln; the Union party's choice was John Bell; and the two Democratic factions, being unable to accept a common platform and candidate in the Charleston Convention, adjourned to separate meetings where the northern faction nominated Douglas and the southern fac-

1. Jefferson Inquirer, February 13, 1858; March 13, 1858; June 26, 1858; September 29, 1858. Missouri Statesman, February 26, 1858; June 18, 1858; December 24, 1858; May 13, 1859; October 4, 1859; January 20, 1860; March 9, 1860. Daily Missouri Democrat, July 15, 1859.

tion, John C. Breckenridge. When the National Democratic party convention failed to agree on one ticket, the party nominee for governor in Missouri, Claiborne F. Jackson, although suspected of being a Breckenridge man, endorsed¹ Douglas. The minority Breckenridge or southern faction in Missouri nominated Hancock Jackson, an old Anti, for governor. The Union party ran Sample Orr of southwest Missouri and the Republican nominee was James B. Gardenhire who had been one of the most prominent Benton leaders.

In the Missouri election of 1860, the factions opposed to the National Democracy again attempted to unite their forces in order to defeat the Democratic ticket. Although the division in the national political parties interfered with as complete a union of the opposition forces as there had been in 1857, the main contest in the gubernatorial canvass was between Claiborne F. Jackson, the Douglas Democrat who was considered the representative of the National Democrats, and Sample Orr of the Union party. The Jackson forces waged a vigorous campaign and urged all Democrats to forget the problems in national politics and support the party candidate in the state election. Jackson carried the state for governor with 74,446 votes. Orr received 66,583 votes; Hancock Jackson,² 11,415 votes; and James B. Gardenhire, 6,135 votes.

1. Missouri Statesman, July 6, 1860. Missouri Republican, October 1, 1860; October 3, 1860.

2. Missouri Statesman, September 14, 1860.

As the presidential campaign progressed, the question of the preservation of the Union became more and more an issue in Missouri. Two of the candidates, Lincoln and Breckenridge, represented sectional parties and the possibility of the success of either threatened the stability of the nation. The Missouri Republican used this circumstance as the basis for an intensive campaign for Douglas. It urged all people interested in saving the Union to vote for Douglas as the only national candidate who had a chance to win the election.¹ However, this campaign was not effective enough to secure for Douglas as large a vote as C. F. Jackson had received for governor. The Missouri vote in the presidential election was: Douglas, 58,801; Bell, 58,372; Breckenridge, 31,317; and Lincoln, 17,028.²

A study of the results of this election to discover the influence of the Benton faction upon its outcome reveals that the Benton party, also, had disintegrated. Because of the divisions in the parties and the large number of candidates seeking the presidency and the governorship in 1860, the results of these elections cannot be compared with the results of any previous election. In order to discover trends or shifts in party affiliations in Missouri, the results of the state and the national election in Missouri in 1860 were compared for the basis of this study.

1. Missouri Republican, September 18, September 28, 1860.

2. Missouri Statesman, December 7, 1860.

In Table No. XX, page 165, there is a tabulation of the vote in the Benton counties which gives some insight into the confusion and lack of uniformity there were in these counties. In the table, the percentage of the total vote that the presidential candidate of a party received is placed beside the percentage of the total vote for governor that the candidate for the party received. In a few counties, the candidate for governor and the candidate for president in each party received a comparatively consistent percentage of the votes cast. In other counties, there was a marked difference in the percentage of the vote polled by the candidate for governor and the candidate for president of any one party. An attempt to group these counties by the increase of a party's percentage of the vote in one election over another, and also by the decrease, proved futile because there was no consistency in the party or candidate that benefitted or suffered by this increase or decrease in the other party. There appears to be such complete confusion in the election results that evidently there was equally complete confusion among the voters of the time.

It would be expected that the Benton counties would have supported most consistently the candidates of the Douglas and Union parties. They did in the state election for governor but not in the presidential election. In nine of these counties the percentage of the vote cast for

TABLE NO. XX

ELECTION RESULTS, STATE AND NATIONAL 1860¹

Percentage of Total Vote Received by Each
Candidate in the Benton Counties

	Douglas	C. F. Jackson	Bell	Sample Orr	Breckenridge	Hancock Jackson	Lincoln	James Gardenhire
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Andrew	43	46	35	34	16	16	5	2
Atchison	68	55	18	26	7	14	7	3
Barton	35	65	25	18	31	15	9	0
Benton	54	65	29	31	9	1	7	1
Bollinger	46	83	31	11	18	3	4	1
Cape Girardeau	31	26	38	46	20	14	10	13
Cass	15	30	45	47	38	21	1	8
Cole	34	20	18	51	39	28	9	0
Dallas	32	43	41	55	24	.9	3	.1
Franklin	42	42	28	38	5	2	24	16
Gasconade	22	36	19	43	6	6	52	13
Harrison	58	67	20	8	3	1	18	22
Holt	38	47	29	24	15	9	17	16
Jasper	38	41	40	49	18	7	3	1
Johnson	25	40	51	56	22	2	1-	0
Lawrence	12	36	38	53	44	8	5	1
Moniteau	33	40	37	56	23	2	6	1+
Morgan	50	59	29	34	18	4	1	1
Nodaway	44	75	21	15	22	2	12	6
Oregon	18	47	12	1	69	51	.5	0
Osage	24	42	19	36	31	14	26	7
Pettis	30	39	51	58	17	2	.7	0
St. Charles	41	38	30	36	3	2	25	21
St. Clair	57	53	36	27	26	19	.1	0
St. Louis	37	38	19	48	2	1	40	12
Stone	37	78	13	8	49	13	0	0
Taney	22	54	10	23	67	22	0	0
Webster	19	24	37	57	42	18	.8	0

1. Percentages computed from Official Election Returns published in the issues of the Missouri Statesman, September 14, and December 7, 1860.

Douglas and Bell decreased materially from the percentage of the vote cast for C. F. Jackson and Orr, while the percentage of the vote for Breckenridge increased over the percentage of the vote for Hancock Jackson. In five other counties the percentage of the vote that Douglas received was less than that of C. F. Jackson while Bell received a slightly larger percentage than Orr and Breckenridge, a decidedly larger percentage of the vote than Hancock Jackson. It is impossible to reconcile the principles of "Bentonism" with the fact that strong Benton counties gave an appreciable vote to Breckenridge. In the counties where there was a large German population and those in the northwest part of the state, where the population increase came from the North, the loss in the percentage of the vote of Douglas and Bell from that of Jackson and Orr went to Lincoln. The support of the Republican party by these counties seems natural because that party represented the ideas of the people in those counties better than any other party.

The extent in the division of the Benton party was indicated by the outcome of the elections in the Benton counties. In the state election, the Union party carried twelve and the Douglas Democrats carried sixteen of these counties. In the presidential election, Douglas carried twelve, Bell, eight, Breckenridge, six and Lincoln, two counties. On this evidence it appears that the

conclusion that the Benton party had ceased to act as a unit is justified.

But since all political parties were in such great confusion in 1860, it is not fair to the ideal of "Bentonism" to drop it there without an investigation to see if it reappeared. In the decade of the sixties, there was more chaos in political organization and affiliations than there was in the late fifties, due to the war, the problem of emancipation and the test oath as well as the inheritance of confused political organizations from the fifties. In Missouri, this confusion centered around the fight between the radical Republicans, "Charcoals," and the conservative Republicans, "Claybanks," for determining the policy of the party, especially on emancipation, the test oath, and the reorganization of state government under a new constitution. In addition to this fight, in 1866 there was the fight between the entire Republican party and the Union party, composed of Old Line Whigs, Union Democrats, Benton Democrats, Confederates, and Free Democrats. There were such rapid changes in the meaning of terms and so much shifting of personal affiliation with factions as the meaning of terms changed that the actual situation beggars description. Eventually, there evolved from this chaos a sane Republican faction, called the Liberal Republicans, under the leadership of Carl Schurz. In the gubernatorial election of 1870, the Union party joined

with these Liberal Republicans and elected B. Gratz Brown governor, ending the radical regime in Missouri. In 1872, the Union-Liberal Republican coalition supported Col. S. H. Woodson for governor of Missouri as well as Horace Greeley, the presidential nominee for the national Liberal Republican party.¹ After this period of confusion, the election of 1872 was indicative of political party trends in Missouri for the next generation. In consideration of this fact, it is interesting to note how the Benton counties voted in this election.

Table No. XXI, page 169, which gives the percentage of the total vote that each candidate for both the presidency and the governorship received, shows that in each county the candidate for governor and the one for president received practically the same percentage of the vote. This apparently indicates there was a good party organization with a rather definite membership. Referring to Map No. XIX, Appendix, page 194, it will be observed that the counties that were most consistently and typically Benton--those German counties along the Missouri river and the counties in the southwest Ozark border--supported Grant and the Republican ticket. The counties that gave Benton a minority support frequently and were not typically Benton, measured by economic standards, supported

1. Barclay, Thomas S., "The Liberal Republican Movement in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, Vol. XX, 1925-1926, Parts 1, 2, 3, 4.

TABLE NO. XXI
ELECTION RESULTS, STATE AND NATIONAL 1872¹
Percentage of Total Vote Received by Each
Candidate in the Benton Counties

	Grant %	John B. Henderson %	Greeley %	S. H. Woodson %
Andrew	53	54	47	46
Atchison	52	52	48	48
Barton	51	51	49	49
Benton	51	52	49	48
Bollinger	38	38	61	61
Cape Girardeau	46	46	43	43
Cass	41	41	59	59
Cole	46	46	53	53
Dallas	63	61	37	38
Franklin	52	49	48	50
Gasconade	76	74	24	25
Harrison	61	60	39	39
Holt	62	60	38	39
Jasper	61	58	39	41
Johnson	47	47	53	52
Lawrence	52	50	48	49
Moniteau	43	43	57	56
Morgan	37	39	63	60
Nodaway	52	50	48	49
Oregon	10	10	89	90
Osage	54	49	14	50
Pettis	46	44	54	55
St. Charles	48	47	52	52
St. Clair	46	45	54	54
St. Louis	46	46	54	53
Stone	74	69	26	30
Taney	62	60	38	39
Webster	48	47	52	52

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1. Computed from the official election returns published in the Tri-Weekly Missouri Democrat (St. Louis, Missouri), November 27, 1872.

Greeley and the Fusion (Democratic) ticket. The counties in the northwest part of the state where Benton had a strong minority following voted for Grant also. Their support of him may have been due to the increase in population from the northern states. There had been increases in the population in the counties south of the Missouri river, also, but no greater in the counties that voted for Grant than in those that voted for Greeley¹ so that population increase alone was not responsible for the trend of votes in those counties. Since there was an apparent consistency in the support of the Republican party where there had been the most consistent Benton support, it seems reasonable to assume that the influence of "Bentonism" within those counties could have been the explanation for their adherence to the Republican party.

1. Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Population,
pp. 361 ff.

APPENDIX

Resolutions on the Subject of Slavery¹

1. That the federal constitution was the result of a compromise between the conflicting interests of the States which formed it, and in no part of that instrument is to be found any delegation of power to congress to legislate on the subject of slavery, excepting some special provisions having in view the prospective abolition of the African slave trade, and for securing the recovery of fugitive slaves; any attempt, therefore, on the part of congress to legislate on the subject, so as to affect the institution of slavery in the States, in the District of Columbia, or in the territories is, to say the least, a violation of the principle upon which that instrument was founded.
2. That the territories acquired by the blood and treasure of the whole nation ought to be governed for the common benefit of the people of all the States; and any organization of territorial governments, excluding the citizens of any part of the Union from removing to such territories with their property, would be an exercise of power, by congress, inconsistent with the spirit upon which our federal compact was based, insulting to the sovereignty and dignity of the States thus affected, calculated to alienate one portion of the Union from another, and tending ultimately to disunion.
3. That this General Assembly regard the conduct of the Northern States, on the subject of slavery, as releasing the slave-holding States from all further adherence to the basis of compromise fixed on by the act of congress of the 6th of March, 1820, even if such act ever did impose any obligation upon the slave-holding States, and authorizes them to insist upon their rights under the constitution, but for the sake of harmony, and for the preservation of our federal union, they will still sanction the application of the principles of the "Missouri compromise," to the recent territorial acquisitions, if by such concessions, future aggressions upon the equal rights of the States

1. Laws of Missouri, 1848-1849, pp. 667-68.--These are commonly known as "Jackson Resolutions."

may be arrested, and the spirit of anti-slavery fanaticism be extinguished.

4. The right to prohibit slavery in any territory, belongs exclusively to the people thereof, and can only be exercised by them in forming their constitution for a State government, or in their sovereign capacity as an independent state.
5. That in the event of the passage of any act of congress conflicting with the principles herein expressed, Missouri will be found in hearty co-operation with the slave-holding states, in such measures as may be deemed necessary for our mutual protection against the encroachments of northern fanaticism.
6. That our senators in congress be instructed and our representatives be requested to act in conformity to the foregoing resolutions.

'Approved March 10, 1849.'

MAPS

The boundaries for the counties indicated in the following maps were taken from photostatic copies of maps compiled by Frederick C. Hicks. For convenience in comparing, county by county, the results of the elections to the state assembly and to congress, the congressional district boundaries were indicated on the maps representing the party affiliations of the members of the state house of representatives.

MAP NO. I. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1850
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Jefferson In-
quirer, September 14, 1850.

MAP NO. II. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1850
BENTON VOTE BY PERCENTAGE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Jefferson Inquirer, September 14, 1850.

1. Jefferson Inquirer, November 2, 1850.

2. Counties with divided representation are indicated by combination of colors of the parties of the successful candidates.

MAP NO. III. STATE ELECTION 1850
PARTY AFFILIATION OF MEMBERS OF MISSOURI HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES BASED ON NEWSPA-
PER REPORTS OF THE CAMPAIGN¹

1. Jefferson Inquirer, November 2, 1850.
2. Counties with divided representation are indicated by combination of colors of the parties of the successful candidates.

MAP NO. IV. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1852
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, September 24, 1852.

MAP NO. V. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1852
BENTON VOTE BY PERCENTAGE¹

4th District

3rd District

2nd District

1st Dis-
trict

5th
District

0 10 25 50
Scale of Miles

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri States-
man, September 24, 1852.

1. Missouri Statesman, August 27 and September 3, 1852.
2. Counties with divided representation are indicated by combination of colors of the parties of the successful candidates.

MAP NO. VI. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1854

MAP NO. VI. STATE ELECTION 1852
PARTY AFFILIATION OF MEMBERS OF MISSOURI HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES BASED ON NEWSPAPER
REPORTS OF THE CAMPAIGN¹

- Benton
- Anti-Benton
- Whig
- Divided Representation²
- Numeral
- Number of Representatives
- Congressional District Boundaries

1. Missouri Statesman, August 27 and September 3, 1852.
2. Counties with divided representation are indicated by combination of colors of the parties of the successful candidates.

MAP NO. VII. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1854
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman,
October 13, 1854.

MAP NO. VIII. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1854
BENTON VOTE BY PERCENTAGE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, October 13, 1854.

MAP NO. IX. STATE ELECTION 1854
PARTY AFFILIATION OF MEMBERS OF MISSOURI HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES BASED ON NEWSPAPER
REPORTS OF THE CAMPAIGN¹

1. Missouri Statesman, October 13, 1854.
2. Counties with divided representation are indicated by combination of colors of the parties of the successful candidates.

MAP NO. X. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION, 1856
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, September 19, 1856.

MAP NO. XI. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1856
BENTON VOTE BY PERCENTAGE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, September 19, 1856.

MAP NO. XII. STATE ELECTION 1856
PARTY AFFILIATION OF MEMBERS OF MISSOURI HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES BASED ON NEWSPAPER
REPORTS OF THE CAMPAIGN¹

1. Weekly Missouri State Journal, October 2, 1856.
2. Counties with divided representation are indicated by combination of colors of the parties of the successful candidates.

MAP. NO. XIII. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1856
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, September 12, 1856.

MAP NO. XIV. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1856
BENTON VOTE BY PERCENTAGE¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman,
September 12, 1856.

NO. XV. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1856
BENTON "DIE-HARDS" COUNTIES¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, September 12, 1856.

MAP NO. XVI. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1857
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE IN BENTON
COUNTIES¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman,
September 4, 1857.

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman,
September 14, 1860.

MAP. NO. XVII. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1860
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE IN
BENTON COUNTIES

- Douglas or National Democrat, C. F. Jackson
- Union, Orr
- Breckenridge Democrat, H. Jackson

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, September 14, 1860.

-193-

MAP NO. XVIII. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1860
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE IN
BENTON COUNTIES¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Missouri Statesman, December 7, 1860.

MAP. NO. XIX. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1872
PARTY OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE IN
BENTON COUNTIES¹

1. Based on Official Election Returns in Tri-Weekly Missouri Democrat, November 27, 1872.

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