

**Confucian Values and Economic Performance; Exploring Their Effects on Citizens
Satisfaction with Democracy**

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ABSTRACT

The political climate in East Asia is of emerging importance in the world. Democracy in this region has had mixed levels of success in the past decades leading to a significant debate on how democracy and cultural values interact. This thesis works to provide information to clarify the relationship between Confucian values and citizens' satisfaction with the way democracy works in Confucian societies with a democratic government. The analysis utilizes individual level survey data using probit analysis to explore this relationship. Perceptions of economic performance among other important influences of attitudes towards democracy are also tested. The findings provide evidence that in Confucian democracies cultural values and perceptions of national economic performance can have a positive influence on how individuals' evaluate democracy.

SECTION ONE

Introduction

“In practice, Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy”

- *Samuel Huntington*

East Asia provides a valuable example to explain whether democracy as it is experienced in the west can be transposed to other regions of the world. Several authors have explored how region specific cultural values can influence the performance of democracy (Huntington, 1991; Fukuyama, 1995; Thompson, 2001). Samuel Huntington (1991) argued that Asian values, or Confucian values, hinder democratization due to its emphasis on hierarchy, strong man leadership, and the importance it places on harmony and cooperation over competition. Other researchers, however, have had a less pessimistic view of Confucianism’s relationship with democracy by stating that Confucianism is not anti-democratic (Hu, 1997) and can even aid in the process of democratization (Chaibong, 2004). Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are all currently democracies that share a Confucian heritage. This suggests that Confucianism is either not as inhospitable to democracy as Huntington argued, or that these countries were able to overcome the proposed hindering factors of Confucian values. These countries provide strong evidence that democracy can arise and be sustained in Confucian societies. However, deep seated Confucian values still likely have an influence on how citizens evaluate their government.

This work will look at three democracies¹ with a Confucian heritage in order to determine if certain values are causing people to be dissatisfied with the way their democracies work. Throughout history some countries have transitioned to democracy, but then experienced a regression into authoritarian rule. This work strives to clarify how Confucian values influence the survival and quality of East Asian democratic governments. The impact of these correlations would also have implications in the study of current non-democracies with Confucian cultures and their potential to make a transition to successful democratic governance. If Confucian values are having a negative influence on individuals satisfaction with how their democracy works, it would create a disincentive for a non-democracy in East Asia to make a democratic transition if the population has strong Confucian values. If Confucian values do not have a negative influence on democratization, the prospects for democratization will be good for non-democracies with a Confucian heritage. Therefore, the findings of this work seek to provide an understanding of how Confucian values are going to influence the long term prospects for democratization in East Asia.

Confucianism is a complex multi-dimensional set of values. In looking at South Korea, Park and Shin (2006) utilize seven different dimensions of Confucianism in their work, which I will also use in this analysis. Looking at South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan together can provide understanding of how Confucian values are affecting citizens' attitudes towards democratic government. To my knowledge, there has never been a study looking at all three of these Confucian democracies simultaneously. There has been some empirical work exploring the role of Confucian values and their influence on democracy (Shi 2000, 2001; Park and Shin 2006; Chang, Chu, and Tsai 2005, Fetzer and

¹ South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan

Soper 2007). However, the current quantitative work focuses on specific countries. Looking at three countries together will produce more generalizable results as to the relationship between Confucianism and democracy in democratic states.

In order to get an understanding of what influences peoples' attitude towards their democracy, the theoretical literature will be used to develop measures in an empirical test utilizing probit analysis. This method allows for the use of survey data from the Asian Barometer 2005-2008 to simultaneously test whether different beliefs and attitudes influence how satisfied people are with the way their democracy works. Inevitably, there are other less traditional cultural factors, which likely influence how individuals evaluate their level of democratic support. Economic development may enhance the significance of more current influences, such as perceptions of economic performance. Also, whether a person is interested in politics may have an influence on how satisfied they are with their political system. This analysis will compare each of the theoretical influences of an individual's satisfaction with democracy, which will provide insight into the attitudes of the region and in individual countries. Economic modernization may also play a role in diminishing the influence of traditional Confucian values. This may lead to people evaluating the government based on perceptions of how well the economy is performing, or their level of political interest. Demographic influences also can play a role. Age, income, gender, education and whether a person lives in the city or the country can influence how people evaluate their government.

This work will contribute to the literature by comparing the Confucian influences with perceptions of economic performance to determine which have a more consistent impact. In sum, the key research question of this work is to determine if cultural values of

Confucianism and/or more contemporary influences such as perceptions of economic performance or interest in politics are affecting people's attitudes towards their democracy.

This work will proceed in several sections. The next section evaluates other studies which look at satisfaction with democracy in order to clarify the central concept this work addresses. The third section discusses the importance of studying satisfaction with democracy and justifies using the three countries that will be covered in this analysis. Section four reviews and evaluates the relevant literature providing background for the various hypotheses. Section five develops and explains a series of testable hypothesis which will be evaluated using probit analysis. Section six discusses the methodology and data and describes the dependent and independent variables that are used. Section seven presents the results of the statistical analysis. Finally, section eight concludes with an overview of the findings and implications of this work, and provides suggestions for future research.

SECTION TWO

How Satisfaction with Democracy is Studied

The focus of this work is on individuals' satisfaction with democracy as a political system. Anderson and Guillory (1997) define this type of political support as satisfaction with the way democracy works. Thus "support" represents an emotionally-biased evaluation that individuals place on the performance of the political system (Kuechler 1991, 280). Survey data will be used in order to understand what influences satisfaction with democracy as a political system in terms of how satisfied people are with their democracy.

Studying satisfaction with democracy as a dependent variable is not without its criticism. There has been debate as to whether individuals responding are displaying diffuse or specific support for the political system (Easton 1965, 1975). Diffuse support would indicate that the respondents are evaluating the government from a more general perspective, while specific support deals more with the individuals who are in power as well as short term influences. Research has found that indicators for diffuse and specific support are highly correlated (Kaase 1988). Fuchs (1993) argues the difference between diffuse and specific support is more relevant on a theoretical level and less so in empirical social research. The implications of these findings are that this study can be conducted while assuming that people are evaluating their government both in terms of how the system works more generally and also how individual actors are performing.

Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001) have argued against using survey indicators to measure satisfaction with democracy. They claim that conceptions of democracy vary depending on the individual being questioned, how the survey is given, and the cultural attitudes of the respondents. If the people being surveyed do indeed have varying understandings of democracy then we have to question how valid this type of measure is. This criticism is relevant when studying East Asian democracy where some people believe that Confucian culture has led people to have “Asian Values” which can influence how they conceptualize democracy. However, Christian Welzel (Unpublished Manuscript) tested to see if people in different regions of the world had varying notions of liberal democracy. He found that there are only gradual differences between notions of liberal democracy in the West when compared to Asia. Welzel’s analysis provides evidence that East Asians understand democracy in a liberal manner similar to individuals in other Western democracies. This calls into question the idea whether vast differences in conceptions of democracy exist between East Asia and the West.

Ultimately the literature on democratic support as an individuals’ level of satisfaction with how their democracy works provides a useful tool to explore regime support in democracies. Therefore, having an indicator measuring satisfaction with democracy remains a valuable methodological measure to use in order to understand democratic support and will be utilized in this project.

SECTION THREE

Why Study Satisfaction with Democracy?

Understanding what makes people satisfied with the way their democracy works is important for the survival of democracy for two reasons. First, if people are dissatisfied with their democracy the survival of their democratic government in the event of a crisis is less likely (Seligson and Muller, 1987; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Therefore, low support for democracy can cause democratic failure. Second, to maintain the quality of the democratic system it is important for citizens to be satisfied with their government so they do not become disinterested and apathetic (Bunce, 2008). This section will expand on these two ideas and also describe how they fit with the countries used in this study.

Importance of studying determinants of democratic support

Research has shown that studying citizens' satisfaction with democracy is important for a number of reasons. As stated above there is a theoretical connection between support for a political regime and the survival of the government during a crisis (Seligson and Muller, 1987). Support for the regime is especially important for a democratic government because it depends on participation of the citizens; if the masses do not support the democratic government then long term regime stability would be difficult. This is particularly important for newer democracies which are still working to consolidate their institutions. It has been argued that weak support for democratic institutions in these newer democracies could result in the failure of democracy in these countries (Lipset, 1959; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). These findings suggest that if

Confucian values are having a negative influence on how satisfied people are with their democracy, it would have implications for the survival of democracy in East Asia.

Other researchers have focused less on survival of democracy and more on how low support for democracy can affect the quality of the democratic process within countries. A populace that is dissatisfied with their government is more likely to lose interest in politics and avoid participating in the process (Bunce, 2008). It has also been shown that an interested, active, and informed electorate will lead to greater sustainability of democracy than a less informed and less interested mass public (Ginsberg, 1982). These findings suggest that low support for democracy among the masses could threaten the quality of the democratic system leading to a decline in the ability of democracy to function and to be responsive to the population. These results stress the importance of understanding what influences satisfaction with democracy in order to ensure the survival and stability of democracy.

Confucian values did not prevent transition to democracy in these countries, however, that does not mean that these values have no influence on attitudes toward the current regime. Low satisfaction with the way democracy works can affect stability and the quality of democracy to the point where democratic institutions may be abandoned. It has been shown empirically that support for democracy among the population can be influenced by Confucian values (Fetzer and Soper, 2007; and Park and Shin, 2006). While, these countries may have formed governments consistent with Confucian beliefs it is still unknown whether these values are having an effect on whether citizens' are satisfied with their democracy.

Country Selection

In order to explore the relationships of traditional values on democracy, we must look at democratic states with these values. The three East Asian democracies this paper will look at are South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. This paper is focused more on developing a general theory for the influences of satisfaction with democracy in democratic East Asia as opposed to looking at any of the three countries individually. However, in order to understand reasons why these countries should be grouped together in this analysis I will discuss various similarities and differences that are relevant to understanding the influences of satisfaction with democracy, both generally, and in the individual countries.

There are several similarities between the countries in this study that warrant a regional grouping for the purposes of this study. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan share a Confucian heritage, are democracies, and each have been successful in modernizing their economies. These key similarities make it useful to look at them together to get a more accurate idea of the general relationship between Confucian values and peoples' attitudes towards their democracy in democratic countries.

These countries are among the wealthiest in the world. It has been argued that the process of economic development can lead to values of self-expression among the population (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). These self-expression values occur as a result of individuals seeking to actively participate in society and politics, voicing their opinions, and having a high level of interpersonal trust. Self-expression values help to motivate people to govern their own lives more independently. This notion is contradictory to

Confucian values which place more emphasis on hierarchy and the importance of the group over the individual. This suggests that as these Confucian democracies have developed, or continue to develop economically self-expression values may play a more active role in forming attitudes towards the society, and diminishing the importance of Confucian values. Park and Shin (2006) provide evidence to support the idea that Confucian values are less strong among younger and highly educated cohorts. Ultimately Confucian values may play a less significant role in how individuals view their democracy, leaving other influences such as perceptions of economic performance to shape peoples level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.

While there are several notable similarities between the three countries they are not without their differences. Each of the countries made their transitions to democracy for very different reasons. Japan, for instance, had democracy imposed on it by a foreign power following World War II. South Korea conversely, transitioned to democracy under the pressure of mobilization of mass protest and international factors (Kim, 2000). Finally Taiwan, gained its independence more from the top down when Chiang Ching-Kuo came to power and accelerated the process of political liberalization (Gilley and Diamond, 2008). Even more, the countries made their transitions at different levels of economic development. Taiwan and South Korea experienced very high levels of economic growth prior to their democratic transition, while Japan made the switch when it was in shambles economically following WWII, and then flourished economically afterwards.

It may be argued that these key differences could cause some problems in combining Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in a pooled analysis. However, even with their different experiences in democratic transition and economic development each of the

countries, to date, have been successful at maintaining their democratic institutions. This can lead an observer to believe democracy can arise and be sustained in a Confucian society regardless of differences in how they transition democratically or at how developed economically they are during transition. These countries, however, have all experienced high levels of growth over the last few decades, which may suggest that economic development may be a significant condition for democratic survival in Confucian societies. Ultimately the different experiences provide evidence that Confucianism may not be as strong of a deterrent to democratic emergence and survival, as was predicted by Huntington (1991). A more complete discussion of Confucianism and its theoretical connection to democracy will be forthcoming.

While the implications of understanding the influences of individuals' satisfaction with democracy in the specific democracies looked at in this analysis is important, it is still very valuable for other non-democracies in the region with a Confucian heritage. At the moment there are a number of Confucian non-democracies and semi-democracies including China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Singapore. If a negative relationship between Confucian values and individuals' level of satisfaction with democracy is found then a transition to democratic governance may be destabilizing politically or economically and therefore make democratic transition less desirable.

SECTION FOUR

Review of Relevant Literature

A major focus of this work is whether cultural influences can affect how satisfied people are with their democracy. There are, however, other factors that likely have an effect on an individual's level satisfaction with their democracy. The analysis below will explore the literature regarding the theorized influences of satisfaction with democracy that are relevant to this work. Short term perceptions of how the government is performing are also likely to have a significant influence on individuals' satisfaction with democracy. Anderson and Guillory (1997), make the argument that perceived economic performance, acts as a method people use to evaluate their government. By looking at questions that get at how people perceive the state of the economy, it can be determined how these perceptions affect support for democracy. Perceptions of economic performance and cultural values can be looked at to understand which, or both have an influence on satisfaction with democracy in democratic East Asia.

This section is going to discuss the literature's findings regarding the influences of democratic satisfaction. This section is not intended to be comprehensive summary of the literature. Instead it serves to provide a discussion of theoretically relevant influences of satisfaction with democracy that will then be tested empirically. The following factors could all conceivably have an effect on how individuals view their government. However, sections six and seven will use statistical analysis to determine which of the

influences have a significant relationship with individuals' satisfaction with democracy controlling for the other relevant factors. First, this section will discuss how cultural influences, Confucian in particular, are said to affect citizens' attitudes toward democracy. Second, I will discuss literature that focuses on how people use evaluations of the economy to develop their perceptions of government performance. Next, I will look at how people's interest in politics can influence support for democracy. Lastly, I will discuss how variations of demographics may affect different levels of attachment to cultural influences and therefore support for democracy.

Confucian Influences

The introduction to this work quoted Samuel Huntington arguing that Confucianism hinders the process of democratization. Beyond Huntington there have been several writers arguing about the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Lee Kuan Yew in an interview with Fareed Zakaria argued that Western-style liberal democracy is not the compatible with the societies in Confucian East Asia (Zakaria, 1994). Shaohua Hu's (1997) qualitative work contradicts the statements made by Yew and Huntington by arguing that there are aspects of Confucianism that could have both a negative and positive influence on democracy. Ultimately, Hu argues that Confucianism is a-democratic and therefore has little or no influence on democracy and is therefore not insurmountable to democratization, however, it contributes little to the process. On the other hand it has been argued that Confucianism has created a foundation for democracy by supporting coherent nation-states, aiding in economic development, and showing potential for creating movements against illiberal and undemocratic regimes

(Chaibong, 2004). Thus, researchers have argued that Confucianism may help, hinder or have no effect on democratization.

There has been some empirical work testing the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Chong-Min Park and Dol Chull Shin (2006), focusing on South Korea, use quantitative methods to explore Confucian values and support for democracy in greater depth by looking at individual levels of attachment to these values and how this might affect their satisfaction with democracy focusing on South Korea. Ultimately they do find evidence that attachment to Confucian political values does have a negative influence on democratic support.

Park and Shin provide a useful conceptualization of the various Confucian values which provides testable measures of Confucian values. Fetzer and Soper (2007) build on Park and Shin’s work by testing the relationship in Taiwan. They find evidence that in 2001 Confucian values provided support for liberal democracy.

<u>Table 1. Dimensions of Confucianism</u>
<u>Social value dimensions</u>
*Social hierarchy
*Social harmony
*Group Primacy
*Anti-pluralism
<u>Political value dimensions</u>
*Family-state
*Moral state
*Anti-adversarial politics
<u>Similarities with Democracy</u>
Participation
Socio-economic equality
*Shin and Park (2006)

The different dimensions of Confucianism described below follow from the analysis of Park and Shin (2006). Park and Shin divide Asian values into two categories, social value dimensions and political value dimensions. By exploring several different components of Confucianism it can be determined which and if they have an influence on

how satisfied people are with their democracy. In addition to the seven components listed by Park and Shin (2006) I will include two additional values held as important to both Confucianism and democracy.

The social-value dimensions can be divided into four categories which include social hierarchy, social harmony, group primacy and anti-pluralism. The political-value dimensions will be divided into three categories, Family-state, moral state, anti-adversarial politics. The political value dimension focuses on what people expect from their government, while the social-value dimensions focus on the relationship of the individual to the group and family. The various social and political value dimensions will be discussed in greater detail below.

After discussing the social and political dimensions of Confucianism as conceptualized by Park and Shin, I am going to add a discussion of the literature regarding similarities between democracy and Confucianism. This will take the literature a step further and will also provide a basis to test to see whether values that are held as important to both Confucianism and democracy have an influence on satisfaction with democracy. Hu (1997) noted two similarities between Confucianism and democracy that will be discussed and included in this analysis; political participation and socio-economic equality.

It is important to note that while the ideas described below are values fundamental to Confucian traditions, for these values to actually have an effect on satisfaction with democracy would require individuals to be attached to them and then influence how they evaluate their democratic government. However, Attachment to a Confucian value does not necessarily mean that a person will or will not be satisfied with their democracy.

Discrepancy between preferences of the people and actions of those in power can create distrust towards the government (Citrin, 1974). This distrust can lead people to be less satisfied with the government. Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc T. Ong (2005) look at this in terms of congruence theory, which argues that relations to authority in the family and social life are the basis of political orientations. Thus they argue that attachment to Confucian values does not create a basis for the development of democracy.

Confucian Social Values

Social Hierarchy

Park and Shin (2006) list four sub dimensions of Confucian social values will be discussed below in turn. Each value has been italicized above with the name of the variable that will appear in the quantitative test and a list appears in Table 1. The first sub dimension of Confucianism explored is social hierarchy. In Confucian society human interactions are hierarchical. A lower person in the hierarchy is expected to follow the instruction of the person that is higher regardless of whether the demand is unreasonable. A child therefore is expected to follow his or her parent's demands without question (Park and Shin, 2006). Hu (1997) argues that western democracy places high value on political equality which contrasts this Confucian value. Therefore the social hierarchy with the rejection of the individual contradicts western ideals of liberal democracy (Spina, Shin, and Cha, 2009)

Social Harmony

Social harmony in Confucianism is adverse to self-assertion. Essentially individuals each voicing their ideas on a subject will hinder collective harmony and

welfare and is viewed as disgraceful. Instead individuals should place the goals of the community over their own aspirations in a pursuit of a peaceful and harmonious society (Park and Shin, 2006). This rejection of individualism is a fundamental component of why Confucianism is detrimental towards democracy in the Western sense. Democracy depends on people being free and willing to voice their demands to influence government action. It is suggested that this tension between human ideals is necessary to make progress within a society (Hu, 1997). This rejection of individual self-assertion suggests that social harmony in Confucianism is not compatible with democracy.

Group Primacy

The group primacy dimension focuses on sacrificing individual interest for the good of the collective. This value focuses on the importance of the individuals' responsibility to the group over personal rights and freedoms (Freeman, 1996; Park and Shin, 2006). Again this notion that individuals sacrifice rights and freedoms for the good of the group is an example of a major cultural difference between Western society and Eastern society. Hu (1997) argues that this notion which places a high amount of importance on the collective does not necessarily conflict with Western democracy. This group primacy dimension uses the family as the key example of social unit, which is also an important tool to organize societies in virtually every culture. However, there has been research showing that traditional family structures may be slowing the growth of formal democracy in East Asia (Ames, 2008; Spina, Shin, and Cha 2009).

Anti-Pluralism

In Confucian tradition, *anti-pluralism* places importance on social uniformity to achieve unity and order within the society. People that organize along ethnic or social

differences are seen as causing conflict and harming the collective good. Therefore restraining people from organizing and restraining the expression of their ideas is viewed as necessary to achieve a harmonious society (Park and Shin, 2006). While South Korea and Japan are very homogenous the situation in Taiwan requires special note. While Taiwan is 98% ethnically homogenous there is an important source of conflict between the mainlanders, which came over as a result of the Communist Revolution, and the indigenous population that inhabited the island prior to the late 1940's. This division is a constant source of contention between the two groups. While Park and Shin found that South Koreans are not widely attached to this belief, this work will test to see if this social division has had an influence on satisfaction with democracy in Taiwan compared to South Korea and Japan.

Confucian Political Values

Family-State

Park and Shin (2006) conceptualized three Confucian political values that will be used in this study. Below they are discussed in turn with each dimension italicized. Confucianism places great importance on the family structure. The ideal society and political system should be organized like a family. The *family-state* dimension of Confucianism underlines the importance of this feature. The state government model should be based on the Confucian family and serve as a metaphor to emphasize paternalistic rule. If a person is attached to this notion of Confucianism they would believe that the relationship between the political actors and individuals should be similar to the relationship between parents and children. In this example people should be

expected to support their decisions even if they disagree. Hu (1997) states this as a major difference between Confucianism and Western rulers. Democracy is said to serve most fundamentally as a way to select and control rulers and limit the power of the government and allow the masses to dictate policy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2008). Without mechanisms to control those in power there would be no democracy. The Confucian model described above does not provide an idea to check despotism. Treating the ruler as the head of a family works when you have a wise and benevolent leader. However, if you have a poor leader democracy provides a method to remove this person from power. Confucianism does not.

Moral State

The conception of the moral state focuses on the government being led by benevolent leaders as opposed to rule of law. This notion places importance on leaders ruling with wisdom. In Confucianism the state is understood as an institution for the ruler to teach the people how to behave (Park and Shin, 2006). Hu (1997) phrases this by saying that “Confucianism prefers ethics to law to such an extent that it obviates the need of law in society.” Essentially if we have benevolent and wise leaders that are generally concerned with the wellbeing of the population then we would not need laws. The assumption of the moral character of the state poses a problem in that Confucianism provides no method to be sure that the leaders are moral. Attachment to this value may undermine the rule of law of political leaders, ultimately undermining democracy more generally (Spina, Shin and Cha).

Anti-Adversarial Politics

The final value tested by Park and Shin (2006) is anti-adversarial politics. It is important to note that an important feature of Confucian moral tradition assumes that there is an innate goodness of human nature. If people, and rulers, are generally good then democratic institutions that serve to limit the authority of political actors are unnecessary and prevent the rulers from accomplishing good things for the people. In Confucianism, institutions should work to unify decision makers and allow them to work together as opposed to dividing their authority. People that are attached to this value would likely advocate for the supremacy of the executive branches and place less importance on the judiciary and legislature.

Similarities Between Confucianism and Democracy

Political Participation

In addition to the components conceptualized by Park and Shin, I am going to add two other Confucian dimensions that are argued to be similar to democracy. Both Confucian tradition and Western democracy place importance on active participation in politics (Hu, 1997). Mencius argued that it is the responsibility of individuals to participate in government to ensure that rulers are benevolent and wise. It is not a far jump to think about democratic institutions being used to provide a mechanism for citizens' to use in order to ensure that rulers are wise and benevolent. The idea of active participation in politics is important in both Confucianism and democracy which means that if a person views this value as important then they are likely to support democracy since it provides an avenue to participate in politics.

Socio-Economic Equality

Hu (1997) argues that a similarity between Confucianism and Western democracy is the emphasis on socio-economic equality. Confucius argued that if we have equal distribution there will be no poverty. Hu points out that Western democracy traditionally puts more emphasis on political and civil equality, economic and social equality are still regarded as important (Hu 1997). If people have attachment to this Confucian and democratic value then they are likely to provide support for democracy.

Economic Evaluations

The government is commonly looked at to manage the economy by the population. The success or failure of the economy then would likely have strong implications for whether people support their government. This paper pulls from Anderson and Guillory (1997) which uses economic performance as a measure that influences citizens' satisfaction with the way democracy works. In short, people view economic performance as an output generated by the political system. This is a result of people assuming that the government has the tools and abilities to solve social problems (Weatherford 1984, 189). Economic performance evaluations help to shape the reputation of the political system. Ultimately, prosperous individuals are more likely to be satisfied with the current political climate and have a more positive view of their democracy (Rose, Shin, and Munro, 1999). There have been a lot of work connecting perceptions of economic conditions to support of the political system (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993). It is important to note that we are discussing economic performance in terms of how well people perceive the economy to be performing. The economy could be in a time of boom or bust but if the

individual does not perceive of this taking place then there would be no effect on how the evaluate the system based on this economic performance.

Park and Shin (2006) did not include economic evaluation in their analysis of Asian Values in South Korea. However, Rose, Shin, and Munro (1999, pg. 160) included six economic variables in their study to predict the extent individuals believe democracy is achieved in South Korea. Their findings showed that South Koreans' relied on future economic conditions and current national economic conditions to evaluate their level of democracy. Modern Koreans likely have similar views regarding satisfaction with democracy as they did when this study was conducted. However, the test section will determine whether this relationship to exist across the three countries.

Anderson and Guillory (1997) focused on industrialized countries in Western Europe and found consistent evidence that individuals in the countries tested relied on perceptions of economic performance to determine whether they were satisfied with the way their democracy works. Their work provides evidence that individuals in modern Western societies utilize their perceptions of economic performance to develop their attitudes regarding their democracy. The following sections will see if this connection works in democracies with a Confucian heritage in a similar manner as the industrialized countries of Western Europe that were tested by Anderson and Guillory.

Researchers have focused on the differences between sociotropic and egocentric evaluations (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Citrin and Green 1986; Lockerbie 1993). Sociotropic focuses on how people perceive the economy is functioning as a whole while egocentric evaluations focus on their personal economic situation. These two variations

are important for determining whether people are more self-interested, by looking at their own economic conditions, or are more focused towards the collective good of the society.

The first two components of perceptions of economic performance that will be looked at are how people evaluate their present personal financial situation and the national economic situation. People are likely concerned with both individual and national financial situations at a given time. However, by including both in this study it can be determined which, if any, or both have an influence in whether people are satisfied with the way their democracy works.

Economic performance evaluations can also be looked at in terms of retrospective evaluations and prospective evaluations. Retrospective evaluations focus on past performance of the economy. Retrospective economic evaluations are used to determine how well the individual believes the economy was functioning in the past. This is in contrast to prospective evaluations which focus on how well the individual believes the economy will perform in the future.

Sociotropic and egocentric evaluations and retrospective and prospective evaluations can be combined into four different measures. Retrospective-sociotropic, or past national economic evaluations look at how well individual perceives the economy has functioned as a whole in the past. Prospective-sociotropic, or future national evaluations determine how well people believe the economy will function in the future. Retrospective-egocentric or past personal, economic evaluations look at how individuals' financial situation was in the past. Prospective-egocentric, or future personal economic evaluations look at how well the individual perceives their economic situation will be in the future.

Interest in Politics

There is evidence supported in the literature that interest in politics is related to political support (Almond and Verba 1965, Lambert et al. 1986, Weatherford 1991). Citizens who are interested in politics are more likely to understand how the system works and believe that their participation can influence election outcomes and policy making. If a citizen can make the connection between their behavior and political outcomes then they are more likely to support democracy. This relates to the connection between the participation in politics dimension of which is held as important to both Confucianism and democracy as discussed above. Citizens may believe that participating in politics is important but if they are uninterested and unknowledgeable of how the system works and how they can get involved then the quality of democracy would likely suffer.

Demographics

There are five demographic categories that this paper will focus on. These include: gender, age, education, income, and urban vs. rural. Anderson and Guillory (1997) only found income to have a consistently significant influence on satisfaction with democracy, but did not test for urban vs. rural. Fretzer and Soper (2007) found that more educated people demonstrate higher levels of support for democracy in Taiwan. Income and education are both likely to reduce the levels of attachment of traditional values among citizens, as influences from the west have permeated the society, a finding which was supported by Park and Shin (2006) in South Korea. Interestingly, women were also less likely to demonstrate support for democracy than men in Taiwan (Fretzer and Soper, 2007).

The next sections will seek to determine if these relationships exist both in the individual countries tested and if they are widespread across democratic East Asia. Researchers have argued that Confucianism can hinder, support, or have no effect on democracy. The analysis above demonstrates the Confucian values that will be tested. The inclusion of the economic perceptions, political interest and demographic measures will present a comprehensive picture of what influences satisfaction with democracy in Confucian democracies.

SECTION FIVE

Hypotheses

The previous section laid out the theoretical influences on individuals' satisfaction with democracy that may be specific to the three Confucian democracies. The next section will utilize statistical analysis to determine which of the influences do indeed have an effect on whether individuals are satisfied with the way their democracy works. First, however, this section will outline some testable hypothesis in order to make clear what the statistical models are testing. The hypotheses that are outlined below will test how the various dimensions of Confucianism, perceptions of economic performance, interest in politics, and demographic variables will influence how satisfied people are with the way their democracy works.

The first three hypotheses will deal with one of the central focuses of this work, which is whether traditional values based on Confucianism influence peoples' attitudes towards democracy in Confucian democracies. In order to look at the relationship between Confucian values and satisfaction with democracy nine different values from Confucianism will be tested. These will be divided into three broad categories which include; social-value dimensions, political-value dimensions, and similarities with democracy. It is expected that the various Confucian values would have a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy if Confucian values do hinder democratization as theorized by Samuel Huntington (1991). However, Fetzer and Soper found empirically that Confucian values may have a positive relationship with how people view democracy,

suggesting that a positive relationship is possible. The first three hypotheses will deal with these three categories which are listed below. The first three hypotheses are designed to directly test the relationship between Confucianism and peoples view of democracy in order to determine if certain dimensions of Confucianism can have a positive, negative or no influence on an individuals' satisfaction with democracy the way their democracy works. After the statistical test will provide information that will allow the hypothesis to be rejected or fail to be rejected. The hypotheses are worded in a manner so that it would require strong evidence to not reject them.

Hypothesis 1: An individual's level of attachment to the social-value dimensions of Confucianism will have a statistically significant relationship with how satisfied people are with the way their democracy works

Hypothesis 2: An individual's level of attachment of to the political-value dimensions of Confucianism will have a statistically significant relationship with how satisfied people are with the way their democracy works

Hypothesis 3: An individual's level of attachment to the values held common between democracy and Confucianism will have a statistically significant relationship with the way their democracy works

Perceptions of economic performance will also be tested to determine if they influence an individuals' satisfaction with democracy. If people have favorable view of the economy they are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Anderson and Guillory (1997) found both personal level and national level economic perceptions to be positive and statistically significant. This work will follow Rose, Shin and Munro (1999) by including past, present, and future perceptions of

economic performance combined with the national and personal level has a statistically significant relationship with support for democracy creating six variables. These will be tested to show whether people evaluate the government based on their perceptions of economic performance. Confucianism places more importance on the group over the individual, there for it could be expected that individuals in these countries place more importance on perceptions of national economic conditions rather than personal. The next, two hypotheses will be used to see if individuals place more importance on personal or national economic conditions either past, present, or future.

Hypothesis 4: An individual's perception of national economic performance will have a statistically significant relationship on whether individuals are satisfied with the way their democracy works.

Hypothesis 5: An individual's perception of personal economic performance will have a statistically significant influence on whether individuals are satisfied with the way their democracy works.

For democracy to flourish people have to have an interest in politics that will motivate them to gain information and mobilize resources, becoming involved in the democratic process. It would then be expected that people who have an interest in politics to understand how they can change political outcomes and become invested in the political system. Accordingly, people who are interested in politics likely have a more favorable view of the way democracy works in their country. This leads to the next hypothesis which test to determine if interest in politics has a relationship with satisfaction with democracy.

Hypothesis 6: An individual's interest in politics will have a statistically significant relationship with how satisfied they are with the way their democracy works.

Various demographic variables have been shown to have an influence on democratic support. Income, (Anderson and Guillory, 1997) education, gender and urbanicity (Fretzer and Soper, 2007) have all been shown to have an influence on how individuals evaluate their democracy. Subsequently income, education and urbanicity will be expected to have a positive relationship with democratic support. If urbanicity demonstrates a positive relationship then rural people are more likely to demonstrate satisfaction with democracy. If women are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy as in the findings of Fretzer and Soper (2007) then gender will have a negative influence with satisfaction with democracy. The hypothesis below follow from the results found in previous work with the goal of determining if the same relationships exist across democratic East Asia.

Hypothesis 7: A person's income will have a statistically significant relationship with their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works.

Hypothesis 8: An individual's level of education will have a statistically significant relationship with their level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.

Hypothesis 9: Gender will have a statistically significant relationship with an individual's level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.

Hypothesis 10: Whether a person lives in a rural or urban area will have a statistically significant relationship with the level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.

SECTION SIX

Data & Methodology

Data

The statistical analysis in this work will utilize survey data from the second wave of the Asian Barometer 2005-2008. The Asian Barometer has conducted surveys in 18 Asian countries to analyze public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance. This survey instrument allows a researcher to explore contemporary public opinions in each country and compare these to the other nations that have been sampled. The Asian Barometer samples a large amount of people in each country. The survey for Japan yielded 1,418 valid cases, South Korea included 1,212 valid cases, and Taiwan had 1,587 cases. This large amount of observations allows for a sufficient representative sample of the population and provides a suitable pool of data to conduct statistical tests.

Probit Analysis

This study will utilize probit analysis, using a series of independent variables to predict a binary dependent variable. To be able to conduct probit analysis I recoded the responses to the survey question used as the dependent variable to either “0” or “1”. A probit analysis will provide statistical indicators such as coefficients, standard errors, z-tests, and p-values. The coefficients will either be positive or negative which will signify the relationship of the corresponding independent variable with the dependent variable. The standard errors are then used with the coefficients to determine the p-value which

tells the probability that the coefficient is not equal to zero. If the p-value is lower than .05 we can be 95% certain that the coefficient is not equal to zero meaning that there is a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. In other words, that the independent variable is likely to have an influence, either positive if the coefficient is positive, or negative if the coefficient is negative. Probit will also provide a pseudo R-squared value which shows the estimated percentage of variance that the entire model explains. Essentially the larger the pseudo R-squared value the better the model can explain the variation of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2009).

In order to avoid problems with heteroskedasticity, all of the results of the regression outputs will be shown with robust standard errors. Heteroskedasticity occurs you have residuals that are non-constant given the value of x. When this occurs there are unbiased coefficients, however, this can cause the standard errors to be biased. Therefore to create reliable p-values heteroskedasticity must be accounted for. Using robust standard errors corrects for the problems of heteroskedasticity and thus produces unbiased results (Wooldridge, 2009).

Variables

The Asian Barometer contains a host of survey questions, some of which will be used in this study to help answer the key questions. The main focus of this work is to determine what influences people's satisfaction with democracy in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Table 5 in the appendix has a list of the various questions used for each of the independent variables along with a guide showing how the variables were coded prior to

running the probit analysis. Table 6 in the appendix also includes descriptive statistics for each of the variables used.

In order to test what influences peoples' satisfaction with democracy, the question "On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country," will be used as the dependent variable. Respondents are then asked to give one of four answers which are "Very Satisfied," "Fairly Satisfied" "Not Very Satisfied" and "Not at all Satisfied." I then recoded the answers so that "Very Satisfied" and "Fairly Satisfied" are coded to a 1, and "Not Very Satisfied" and "Not at all Satisfied" are coded to 0. This provides a binary dependent variable that will allow for probit analysis. There are some responses such as "can't choose," or "I don't know." Dropping these values can be problematic due to the lack of information that is lost. However, a review of the data did not find any single variable to lose more than ten percent of their responses, and there was no identifiable pattern regarding missing values among independent variables and the various demographics. This suggest that the missing values are the result of random non-answers and with the large number of observations the missing cases likely does not have a significant impact on the analysis.

An alternative to the dependent variable used in this study is to create an index of liberal democracy as was done by other researchers (Shin and Park, 2006; Fetzer and Soper, 2007). However it has been argued that using such a specific conceptualization of democracy can cause incomplete and narrow results (He, 2010). Instead, using the question focusing how satisfied people are with how their democracy works, can serve to create a measure of how the individual evaluates their democratic government in their own country more specifically as opposed to how they view liberal democracy more

generally. The focus then will be less on how individuals feel towards democracy as a concept and more on how they perceive their democratic government is functioning.

A host of independent variables will then be used to test the influences of satisfaction with democracy. These include the aforementioned nine dimensions of Confucian values which including social-value and political value dimensions, which follow directly from the questions used from Park and Shin (2006), and two values that are held to be important by Confucianism and democracy. The next clusters of independent variables are designed to test respondents' perception of economic performance. Six different economic perceptions variables will be tested using similar questions used by Rose, Shin, and Munro, 1999. These include; current national, current personal, past national, past personal, future national, and future personal. The variables measuring both the Confucian values and the perceptions of economic performance are coded so that the higher value demonstrates a more positive response. Interest in politics will also be tested along with the various demographic control variables. The list of questions, how they are coded, and percentage of responses are available in Table 5 in the Appendix. The Appendix also includes Table 7 which demonstrates the level of attachment to Confucian Values by country; this provides information to understand the strength of the Confucian values in each state.

The Confucian dimensions, perceptions of economic performance, interest in politics, and the five control variables have been used to create a series of independent variables that will be used to determine which of them influence the dependent variable which is individual's satisfaction for democracy. After running the probit analysis with the variables listed above I can test which of the hypotheses can be rejected and which

will fail to be rejected. This will demonstrate which values affect people's attitudes towards democracy in these East Asian democracies and gain perspective towards the general relationship between Confucian values and individuals' satisfaction with the way democracy works.

SECTION SEVEN

Results

The probit² analysis yielded significant results that provide useful information to develop an understanding of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, and more generally what influences citizens' level of satisfaction with democracy in democratic East Asia. The goal of this study was to explore the determinants of individuals' satisfaction with democracy in a way that is generalizable. The pooled analysis, displayed on Table 2, looks at all three countries at the same time in order to move beyond country specific influences and on how individuals within these societies develop their attitudes towards democracy. In order to add depth to the analysis and provide insight into the specific influences of satisfaction with democracy it is necessary to look briefly at the results of the individual countries as well. After a review the results of the pooled analysis there will be a brief description of the results of the individual countries. Results for the pooled analysis are included in Table 2. Table 2 also contains a model run with the Confucian influences and controls, and a model with the perceptions of economic performance with the controls. The same model was run for individual countries with the results from this test available in Table 4, which is available in the appendix. Ultimately the results show that across the East Asian democracies attachment to Confucian values does not hinder citizens' satisfaction with how democracy works.

² Other statistical methods such as Tobit analysis and clustering by countries were also used to explain satisfaction with democracy. The change did not change the results with the exception of the Moral State value, which reached significance of $p=.05$. However, following from Anderson and Guillory (1997) probit analysis will be used in the descriptions of the results.

However the values can have a positive impact whether a person is satisfied with their democracy. Moreover, economic variables are shown to have a significant influence on how individuals evaluate their democracy.

Pooled Analysis

The results of the probit analysis are displayed in Table 2 in the Appendix with coefficients listed and standard errors in the parentheses. The coefficients show the influence of the corresponding independent variable is predicted to have on the dependent variable. The standard errors show how much the coefficient may vary. The asterisks are placed next to the coefficients that are statistically different than zero, showing a high probability that the independent variable has a significant relationship with the dependent variable. If the coefficient has one asterisk then there is a 95% likelihood that the corresponding independent variable has a relationship with the dependent variable. If there are two asterisks then there is a 99% likelihood. A positive coefficient means that there is a positive relationship with the independent variable and the dependent variable, and the opposite is true for a negative coefficient.

Dimensions of Confucianism

The results of the analysis provide information which furthers our understanding of how Confucian values influence democracy. The statistical analysis provides mixed but interesting results. The Confucian social-value dimensions did not yield any statistically significant results. This provides no evidence that attachment to Confucian social values influence whether people are satisfied with their democracy. Huntington (1991) argued specifically that Confucianism's emphasis on hierarchy and harmony over competition hinders democratization. However, the variables measuring peoples'

attitudes did not reach significance. Accordingly, whether people are attached to the Confucian notions of social harmony and social hierarchy has no influence on how they view their democracy, providing evidence against Huntington's argument. Since none of the variables are significant, Hypothesis 1 will be rejected.

The three Confucian political-value dimensions provide contradictory results. The pooled analysis demonstrated that the variable measuring the family-state dimension of Confucianism is positive and statistically significant. This provides evidence that attachment to this Confucian political value can actually have a positive effect on individuals' satisfaction with democracy and therefore contradicts the underlying thesis of that Confucianism hinders democracy. The significance of the family-state variable shows that individuals in these Confucian democracies, who strongly believe the state should function similar to a family, are more likely to be satisfied with the way their democracy works. The significant coefficient of the family-state value leads me fail to reject Hypothesis 2, and provides strong evidence against the idea that Confucian values are hindering people opinion towards their democracy. Conversely this provides evidence that Confucian values can cause people to have a more favorable view of their democracy.

The Confucian similarities with democracy were thought to have a positive effect on individuals' satisfaction with democracy. However, both of these dimensions failed to yield statistically significant results. This means that there is no evidence suggesting that peoples' attachment to these common values held by both Confucianism and democracy influence how satisfied people are with the way democracy works in their country. Again the lack of significant variables causes Hypothesis 3 be rejected.

The relationship between Confucian culture and democratization is a major question addressed in this work. The findings in Table 2 provide no evidence that any of the Confucian values are hindering peoples' opinion of their democracy across democratic East Asia. These findings call into question the central argument from that Confucian values hinder democratization. In fact, there is more evidence to the contrary. Attachment to one of the dimensions of Confucianism is shown to have a positive relationship with an individuals' satisfaction with their democracy. The results indicate that the more strongly a person is attached to the Confucian value of the family-state the more likely they are to be satisfied with the way their democracy works. Overall the results indicate that individuals' attachment to Confucian values does not hinder their opinion of their democracy. Conversely, their attachment can increase their level of satisfaction with their democracy.

Perceptions of Economic Performance

The findings regarding Confucianism and democracy suggest that attachment to only one Confucian value is having an influence on citizens' satisfaction with democracy in democratic East Asia. People in these Confucian democracies likely use other influences to develop their attitudes towards their democracy. The perceptions of economic performance variables yielded two positive and statistically significant variables.

The variable testing individuals' perceptions of the current national economy was positive and statistically significant. This suggests that individuals in East Asian democracies place strong importance on how they view the present economic conditions to develop their attitudes towards their democracy. The second economic variable that

was significant was the perceptions of future national economic performance, suggesting that individuals are concerned with the prospects for future economic performance when developing their attitudes regarding their democracy. The statistically significant variables demonstrate that a relationship between national economic perceptions and individuals' satisfaction with democracy does exist, which leads me to fail to reject Hypothesis 4.

Notably, that individuals in these three countries show more concern for national economic performance than personal economic performance. This is demonstrated by two of the three national performance variables showing statistical significance, while zero of the personal economic conditions showing significance. Confucianism values place importance on the group over the individual (Spina, Shin and Cha, 2009). The findings provide support that individuals still adhere to this belief by placing more value on the national economy as opposed to their personal economic situations. The findings lead me to reject Hypothesis 5 since none of the personal economic variables were significant.

Interest in Politics

The interest in politics variable failed to yield any statistically significant results. This suggests that whether people are interested in politics has little or nothing to do with how satisfied they are with the way democracy works. The lack of a significant relationship leads me to reject Hypothesis 6.

Demographic Variables

The independent variables that were designed to test the influence of education and income on an individuals' level of satisfaction were both found to be not significant,

leading me to reject Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8. The analysis did however yield several demographic variables that have a statistically significant relationship with satisfaction with democracy including, gender and urban-rural.

Gender has a negative and significant relationship with satisfaction with democracy in the pooled analysis. Indicating that across the region women are more likely to have a less favorable view of the way their democracy works than men. This suggests that there is a sentiment across the three countries tested that women are less satisfied with the way their government works than men. This work was not meant to provide a theoretical justification as to why, but it provides interesting fodder for future research. Since evidence is found that women do have a less favorable view of democracy than men I must fail to reject Hypothesis 9.

The positive sign on the urban-rural variable shows that people in rural areas are more satisfied with the way democracy works than people in urban areas. The finding supports the idea that rural people are more likely to be more satisfied with democracy than urban which causes me to fail to reject Hypothesis 10.

Individual Country Analysis

Japan

Japan provided no evidence that any of the aspects of Confucianism influence how individuals' evaluate their democracy. The results of the probit model run for Japan, and the other individual countries separately are available in Table 4 in the appendix. None of the Confucian values were able to reach statistical significance. The results show that the Japanese place more importance on how they perceive the performance of the economy on whether they support their democracy. Economic development in Japan may

have resulted in a decline of traditional values resulting in people being more interested in the performance of the economy when they are developing their opinions towards their democracy. While the results vary from the pooled model they support its findings nonetheless. Attachment to the Confucian values was not shown to have any effect on how satisfied individuals are with how their democracy works. Conversely, the Japanese place more importance on economic performance when evaluating their democracy, similar to the pooled model.

Korea

The results for South Korea demonstrated that Confucian values are having a negative effect on whether individuals are satisfied with the way their democracy works. The variables testing for anti-adversarial politics and socio-economic equality both had a negative and statistically significant relationship with individuals' satisfaction with democracy. The anti-adversarial politics was also found to be negative and statistically significant in the analysis conducted by Park and Shin (2006). This provides evidence that attachment to the anti-adversarial politics dimension of Confucianism has a negative influence on democratic support using two different ways of conceptualizing democratic support. This case does provide evidence, at least in South Korea, that Confucian values are hindering people opinion of their democracy. This relationship is more interesting given that none of the economic variables proved to be statistically significant, meaning that Koreans are less likely to evaluate their democracy based on their perceptions of economic performance.

In addition to the two Confucian values three of the control variables tested for were significant. First, the urban-rural variable was also shown to be positive and

statistically significant meaning that rural people are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than urban citizens. Huntington (1991) suggested that Christianity has led to the erosion of traditional values in South Korea. To test this I included a dummy variable to test whether Christians had a more positive view of democracy than non-Christians. The variable was positive and significant meaning that Christians are more likely to be satisfied with their democracy. This supports the idea that Christianity and the Western values it brings have helped to erode traditional values in South Korea and helped support democracy.

Taiwan

The influences of Confucian values and peoples' satisfaction with democracy, as shown in Table 4, are mixed. The social hierarchy value is shown to have a negative influence on whether people are satisfied with their democracy, meaning that people who are attached to this value are more likely to have a negative opinion on how democracy works in Taiwan. The family-state and anti adversarial politics values demonstrate positive influences with whether individuals are satisfied with their democracy. In the Case of Taiwan, the results show that Confucianism can be both hinder and improve peoples' attitudes towards their democracy. The results also show that Taiwanese place a great deal of importance in how they perceive the economy. Current national, future national, past personal perceptions of economic performance were all shown to have a positive relationship with whether people are satisfied with the way their democracy works.

Summary

The results of the statistical analysis provide a complete picture of the relationship between the influences of Confucian values, perceptions of economic performance, and interest in politics on whether individuals are satisfied with how democracy works in their country. The pooled analysis demonstrated that no general negative relationship between Confucian values and satisfaction with democracy exist, which provides hope for democracy in the region. However, in South Korea there is evidence that Confucian values may be eroding satisfaction with their democracy. Moreover, the economic model in Table 2 explained more of the variance of Satisfaction with Democracy than did the Confucian model. This provides evidence that economic perceptions better explain how satisfied people are with their democracy than Confucian values.

SECTION EIGHT

Conclusions & Implications for Future Research

The introduction to this work cited several scholars who have studied the relationship between Confucian values and democracy. This project works determine the relationship between Confucian values and an individuals' satisfaction with democracy in countries with a Confucian heritage and a democratic government. All three of the countries tested are democratic, which means that understanding what influences satisfaction with democracy has implications for the survival and the quality of their political institutions. The results of the analysis provided a picture as to what influences peoples' attitudes towards their democracy in East Asia.

By looking at the three democracies with a Confucian heritage I was able to test whether Confucian values are causing people to have a negative view of their democracy. This provides a general look at the relationship, instead of focusing on specific countries. The results of the pooled probit analysis for the three countries combined provided no evidence that Confucianism is having a negative influence on democracy across the three Confucian democracies. Alternatively, individuals that are highly attached to one Confucian value, the family-state dimension, are more likely to have a favorable view of their democracy. The broad implications of these findings are that in East Asian democracies, Confucian values do not have a negative influence on individuals' attitudes towards their democracy. This suggests that the quality of democracy will not degenerate,

or a regress to authoritarian rule as a result of Confucian values. On the other hand, perceptions of national economic performance in the present and the future are used by individuals' to decide whether they are satisfied with the way their democracy works.

This study expands the theoretical literature regarding satisfaction with democracy. First, by grouping together three democracies with similar cultural heritage to explore the connection between democracy and Confucianism I was able to gain a perspective of this relationship across the region, instead of individual countries. To my knowledge, no study has looked at the influence of Confucian values on these three Confucian democracies simultaneously to get a more general understanding of a general relationship. This study strove to build on the quantitative analysis used by Park and Shin (2006) by adding to their seven dimensions of Confucianism. In addition to these seven I included two similarities with democracy that Hu (1997) included to determine their influence on citizens attitudes towards their democracy.

An important next step is for further qualitative and empirical analysis to determine a more exact definition of Confucianism. This study looks at nine different components, Park and Shin (2006) used seven, and Fetzer and Soper used three. Expanding the definition of Confucianism is useful to explore and test the theoretical connection between Confucianism and Democracy built in the literature. However, such a large definition of Confucianism may be too expansive and include values that are more endemic to humanity and not specific to Confucianism. Therefore, the literature needs to further develop a definition of Confucianism that is relevant to exploring its relationship with democracy.

This analysis includes measures for perceptions of economic performance as a predictor of satisfaction with democracy. This was not done in the previous empirical studies conducted by Park and Shin (2006) and Fetzer and Soper (2007). The significance of these variables provide strong evidence that individuals in democratic East Asia, Japan and Taiwan in particular, view their government's performance to a large degree in terms of how well they believe the economy is functioning. Future research should explore the role of economic development in diminishing the power of Confucian values, thus leaving people to evaluate their democracy in terms of how well they perceive the successes and failures of the economy.

Several important avenues for future research have been identified while conducting this analysis. Interestingly, the finding that women across the region are more likely to be more dissatisfied with their democracy than men. The relationship also was the strong in the specific case of Japan. This indicates that one half of the voting public has a less favorable view of the way their works government than the other half. The finding suggest that potentially their might be a push for better representation of women in the near future in East Asia and Japan.

It would also be of value to explore the influence of Confucian values on the non-democracies in East Asia. However, It would not be as theoretically relevant to use the question "How satisfied are you with the way democracy works?" in non-democracies. Instead, Park and Shin (2006) create a measure for the rejection of authoritarianism which they use to explore its relationship to Confucian values in South Korea. It would be interesting to test whether Confucian values are having a positive or negative effect on the rejection of authoritarianism in countries like China, Vietnam, and Singapore.

The political climate in East Asia is of emerging importance in the world. Democracy in this region has had mixed levels of success in the past decades leading to a significant debate on how democracy and cultural values interact. This thesis works to provide information to clarify this relationship. Data sources such as the East Asian Barometer provide empirical tests of important questions, and will allow for additional future research in the future. Having this data is valuable because it allows for empirical testing of ideas developed in theoretical literature providing better understanding between the influences of culture and democracy, which is very important in East Asia and other regions throughout the world.

Appendix

Table 2.				
The Determinates of Satisfaction with Democracy				
	<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Pooled Analysis</u>	<u>Confucian Model</u>	<u>Economic Model</u>
	Constant	-2.01** (.411)	-.650 (.383)	-1.63** (.286)
Confucian Social Value Dimensions	Social hierarchy	-.018 (.043)	.001 (.041)	–
	Social harmony	.024 (.049)	.033 (.042)	–
	Group primacy	.060 (.063)	.096 (.062)	–
	Anti-pluralism	-.020 (.055)	-.057 (.054)	–
Confucian Political Value Dimensions	Family-state	.180** (.060)	.200** (.054)	–
	Moral state	.114 (.061)	.118** (.060)	–
	Anti-adversarial politics	-.001 (.061)	.043 (.059)	–
Confucian Similarities with Democracy	Socio-Economic Equality	-.078 (.046)	-.115** (.044)	–
	Participation	-.005 (.037)	.017 (.037)	–
Perceptions of Economic Performance	Current National	.192** (.037)	–	.199** (.034)
	Current Family Conditions	.081 (.043)	–	.131** (.040)
	Past National Conditions	.048 (.032)	–	.037 (.030)
	Future National Conditions	.134** (.033)	–	.119** (.030)
	Past Personal Conditions	.057 (.037)	–	.049 (.040)
	Future Personal Conditions	.041 (.038)	–	.044 (.035)
Political Interest	Interest in Politics	.010 (.037)	.032 (.036)	-.009 (.035)
Demographic Variables	Urban-Rural	.198* (.080)	.197* (.036)	.199** (.073)
	Income	.004 (.024)	.025 (.023)	-.008 (.022)
	Gender	-.211** (.056)	-.222** (.055)	-.179 (.051)
	Age	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	.004 (.002)
	Education	-.008 (.018)	.002 (.018)	-.010 (.016)
	Korea Dummy	.271** (.094)	-.001 (.084)	.371** (.079)
	Taiwan Dummy	.224* (.101)	.182* (.384)	.243** (.080)
N=2283, Pseudo R-squared = .0697			Pseudo R-Squared=.026	Pseudo R-Squared=.0583
Unstandardized coefficient estimates; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests: *p<.05 **p<.01				

Table 3. Results of the Hypothesis Testing		
<u>Hypothesis</u>	Summary	Result
1	An individual's level of attachment to the social-value dimensions of Confucianism will have a statistically significant relationship with how satisfied people are with the way their democracy works	Reject
2	An individual's level of attachment of to the political-value dimensions of Confucianism will have a statistically significant relationship with how satisfied people are with the way their democracy works	Fail to Reject
3	An individual's level of attachment to the values held common between democracy and Confucianism will have a statistically significant relationship with the way their democracy works	Reject
4	An individual's perception of national economic performance will have a statistically significant relationship on whether individuals are satisfied with the way their democracy works.	Fail to Reject
5	An individual's perception of personal economic performance will have a statistically significant influence on whether individuals are satisfied with the way their democracy works.	Reject
6	An individual's interest in politics will have a statistically significant relationship with how satisfied they are with the way their democracy works.	Reject
7	A person's income will have a statistically significant relationship with their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works.	Reject
8	An individual's level of education will have a statistically significant relationship with their level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.	Reject
9	Gender will have a statistically significant relationship with an individual's level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.	Fail to Reject
10	Whether a person lives in a rural or urban area will have a statistically significant relationship with the level of satisfaction with the way their democracy works.	Fail to Reject

Table 4				
The Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy (Individual Countries)				
<u>Independent Variables</u>		<u>Japan</u>	<u>South Korea</u>	<u>Taiwan</u>
	Constant	-2.36** (.843)	-1.06 (.677)	-3.27** (.694)
Confucian Social Value Dimensions	Social hierarchy	-.042 (.078)	.094 (.073)	-.164* (.076)
	Social harmony	.110 (.107)	.016 (.078)	.016 (.086)
	Group Primacy	.134 (.130)	-.005 (.106)	.065 (.110)
	Anti-pluralism	-.106 (.104)	.036 (.097)	.052 (.097)
Confucian Political Value Dimensions	Family-state	.048 (.121)	.150 (.094)	.324** (.111)
	Moral state	.206 (.127)	.129 (.098)	.162 (.112)
	Anti-adversarial politics	.005 (.119)	-.206* (.103)	.239* (.108)
Confucian Similarities with Democracy	Socio-Economic Equality	-.075 (.096)	-.164* (.070)	-.038 (.084)
	Participation	-.026 (.074)	-.040 (.063)	.108 (.067)
Perceptions of Economic Performance	Current National Conditions	0.200* (.084)	.144 (.087)	.209** (.050)
	Current Family Conditions	0.375** (.105)	.158 (.089)	.010 (.060)
	Past National Conditions	-.007 (.080)	.017 (.072)	.058 (.043)
	Future National Conditions	.237** (.075)	.095 (.061)	.130** (.047)
	Past Personal Conditions	-.049 (.089)	-.006 (.079)	.137** (.052)
	Future Personal Conditions	.097 (.086)	-.096 (.067)	.110 (.058)
Political Interest	Interest in Politics	-.167 (.093)	.033 (.063)	.076 (.056)
Demographic Variables	Urban-Rural	.260 (.141)	.387* (.194)	.208 (.125)
	Income	-.061 (.049)	.028 (.044)	-.003 (.039)
	Gender	-.427** (.123)	-.169 (.101)	-.145 (.089)
	Age	.014** (.004)	.001 (.005)	-.008* (.004)
	Education	-.048 (.039)	.013 (.034)	-.002 (.029)
	Christianity	-	.230* (.105)	-
	Pseudo R2	0.1391	.0503	.1157
	N	546	761	976

Unstandardized coefficient estimates; standard errors in parentheses.
Significance tests: *p<.05 **p<.01

<p align="center">Table 5 Questions used From Asian Barometer 2005-2008</p>		
Variables Used	Items Used	Coding
Satisfaction With Democracy ³	On the Whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?	Very Satisfied and Fairly Satisfied (54%)
Socio-Economic Equality	In order to preserve social justice, the government should prevent the gap between rich and poor from growing any larger.	1 Strongly disagree (1%) 2 Somewhat disagree (7%) 3 Somewhat agree (61%) 4 Strongly agree (31%)
Participation	I think I have the ability to participate in politics	1 Strongly disagree (19%) 2 Somewhat disagree (47%) 3 Somewhat agree (30%) 4 Strongly agree (4%)
Social hierarchy ⁴	Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask	1 Strongly disagree (8%) 2 Somewhat disagree (56%) 3 Somewhat agree (32%) 4 Strongly agree (4%)
Social harmony ⁵	When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person	1 Strongly disagree (4%) 2 Somewhat disagree (44%) 3 Somewhat agree (46%) 4 Strongly agree (5%)
Group Primacy ^{6*}	Q1: For the sake of national community/society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice his/her personal interest Q2: For the sake of the family the individual should put his personal interests second.	1 (1%) 1.5 (2%) 2 (12%) 2.5 (35%) 3 (40%) 3.5 (9%) 4 (2%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment- 51%
Anti-pluralism*	Q1: If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic? Q2: Harmony of the community will be	1 (3%) 1.5 (4%) 2 (25%)

³ The responses were combined to create a binary dependent variable in order to perform probit analysis.

⁴ Park and Shin (2005) combined the results of this question with the results of the following question "If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute." This question however was not included in the Asian barometer dataset that was provided.

⁵ When testing for social harmony Park and Shin (2005) also used the question "A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him." However, there were no valid cases for this question for South Korea. Therefore I omitted it from this analysis.

⁶ *Each of these questions were combined through addition and then divided by two to create a scale measure for the variable.

	disrupted if people organize lots of groups.	2.5 (29%) 3 (32%) 3.5 (4%) 4 (2%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 39%
Family-state*	Q1: The relationship between the government and the people should be like that between parents and children Q2: Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.	1 (3%) 1.5 (8%) 2 (24%) 2.5 (38%) 3 (21%) 3.5 (4%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment - 26%
Moral state*	Q1: If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything Q2: The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society	1 (4%) 1.5 (9%) 2 (37%) 2.5 (30%) 3 (16%) 3.5 (2%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 20%
Anti-adversarial politics*	Q1: If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things Q2: When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch	1 (5%) 1.5 (7%) 2 (32%) 2.5 (36%) 3 (17%) 3.5 (2%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 20%
Current National Conditions	How would you rate the overall economic condition of your country today?	1 very bad (20%) 2 bad (46%) 3 so so (21%) 4 good (14%) 5 very good (1%)
Current Family Conditions	As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?	1 very bad (6%) 2 bad (24%) 3 so so (46%) 4 good (23%)

		5 very good (1%)
Past National Conditions	How would you describe the change in the economic condition in our country over the last few years?	1 Much worse (23%) 2 A little worse (37%) 3 About the same (20%) 4 A little better (18%) 5 Much better (2%)
Future National Conditions	What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now?	1 Much worse (9%) 2 A little worse (23%) 3 About the same (39%) 4 A little better (26%) 5 Much better (2%)
Past Personal Conditions	How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago?	1 Much worse (11%) 2 A little worse (33%) 3 About the same (40%) 4 A little better (15%) 5 Much better (1%)
Future Personal Conditions	What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now?	1 Much worse (4%) 2 A little worse (19%) 3 About the same (44%) 4 A little better (29%) 5 Much better (4%)
Interest in Politics	How interested would you say you are in politics?	1 Not at all interested (12%) 2 Not very interested (37%) 3 Somewhat interested (42%) 4 Very interested (10%)
Urban-Rural		1 Urban 2 Rural
Income	Here is a scale of household [fill in "annual" or "monthly"] incomes. We would like to know in what group your household on average is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, dividends and other incomes that come in before taxes and other deduction. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into.	1 Less than 5500 2 5501 to 10000 3 10001 to 20000 4 20001 to 40000 5 40000 and above
Gender	-	1 Male 2 Female
Age	Birth year and actual age	18-99
Education	What is your highest level of education?	1 No Formal Education 2 Incomplete primary/elementary 3 Complete primary/elementary 4 Incomplete secondary/highs school

		technical/vocational 5 Complete secondary/high school technical/vocational 6 Incomplete secondary/high school 7 Complete secondary/high school 8 Some university education 9 University education completed 10 Post-graduate degree
<p>*Percentages next to answers represent the percentage of respondents who selected the answer.</p> <p>* Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment is calculated by adding the percentages of respondents in the pooled model who scored 3, 3.5, and 4. For a person to be in this range they would have had to answer in agreement to both of the survey questions used to build the index.</p>		

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics
From Asian Barometer 2005-2008

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Satisfaction With Democracy	.55	.497	0	1
Socio-Economic Equality	3.22	.60	1	4
Participation	2.16	.78	1	4
Social hierarchy	2.32	.68	1	4
Social harmony	2.52	.67	1	4
Group Primacy	2.73	.49	1	4
Anti-pluralism	2.52	.58	1	4
Family-state	2.41	.55	1	4
Moral state	2.28	.57	1	4
Anti-adversarial politics	2.30	.55	1	4
Current National Conditions	2.33	.95	1	5
Current Family Conditions	2.86	.85	1	5
Past National Conditions	2.37	1.07	1	5
Future National Conditions	2.88	.96	1	5
Past Personal Conditions	2.62	.90	1	5

Future Personal Conditions	3.07	.88	1	5
Interest in Politics	2.46	.84	1	4
Urban-Rural	1.14	.35	1	2
Income	2.89	1.3	1	5
Gender	1.48	.49	1	2
Age	45.11	15.3	19	94
Education	6.89	1.95	1	10

Table 7
Attachment to Confucian Values By Country
Higher answer represent more attachment to the Confucian Value

Confucian Value	Japan	South Korea	Taiwan
Socio-Economic Equality	1 (1%) 2 (5%) 3 (55%) 4 (38%) Percentage showing agreement (93%)*	1 (1%) 2 (11%) 3 (53%) 4 (35%) Percentage showing agreement (88%)*	1 (1%) 2 (6%) 3 (70%) 4 (23%) Percentage showing agreement (93%)*
Participation	(37%) (41%) (17%) (5%) Percentage showing agreement (22%)*	1 (23%) 2 (47%) 3 (26%) 4 (4%) Percentage showing agreement (30%)*	1 (8%) 2 (51%) 3 (39%) 4 (3%) Percentage showing agreement (42%)*
Social hierarchy	(11%) (44%) (38%) (7%) Percentage showing agreement (45%)*	1 (7%) 2 (50%) 3 (38%) 4 (5%) Percentage showing agreement (43%)*	1 (7%) 2 (67%) 3 (24%) 4 (2%) Percentage showing agreement (26%)*
Social harmony	(1%) (20%) (69%) (10%) Percentage showing agreement (79%)*	1 (5%) 2 (32%) 3 (56%) 4 (7%) Percentage showing agreement (63%)*	1 (6.24%) 2 (69%) 3 (23%) 4 (1%) Percentage showing agreement (24%)*
Group Primacy	1 (1%) 1.5 (2%) 2 (11%) 2.5 (37%) 3 (36%) 3.5 (10%) 4 (3%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 49%	1 (1%) 1.5 (3%) 2 (16%) 2.5 (36%) 3 (36%) 3.5 (7%) 4 (3%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 36%	1 (>1%) 1.5 (1%) 2 (9%) 2.5 (35%) 3 (46%) 3.5 (8%) 4 (2%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 56%
Anti-pluralism	1 (5%) 1.5 (7%) 2 (25%) 2.5 (29%) 3 (26%) 3.5 (6%) 4 (3%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 39%	1 (3%) 1.5 (6%) 2 (33%) 2.5 (28%) 3 (25%) 3.5 (3%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 29%	1 (1%) 1.5 (2%) 2 (20%) 2.5 (28%) 3 (41%) 3.5 (5%) 4 (2%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 47%
Family-state	1 (7%) 1.5 (16%) 2 (35%)	1 (2%) 1.5 (8%) 2 (24%)	1 (1%) 1.5 (3.3%) 2 (19%)

	2.5 (28%) 3 (12%) 3.5 (2%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 15%	2.5 (34%) 3 (25%) 3.5 (5%) 4 (2%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 32%	2.5 (49%) 3 (24%) 3.5 (3%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 28%
Moral state	1 (11%) 1.5 (16%) 2 (36%) 2.5 (24%) 3 (10%) 3.5 (1%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 12%	1 (2%) 1.5 (4%) 2 (23%) 2.5 (34%) 3 (29%) 3.5 (6%) 4 (2%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 37%	1 (3%) 1.5 (7%) 2 (49%) 2.5 (29%) 3 (10%) 3.5 (1%) 4 (>1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 11%
Anti-adversarial politics	1 (11%) 1.5 (12%) 2 (35%) 2.5 (25%) 3 (15%) 3.5 (1%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 17%	1 (6%) 1.5 (8%) 2 (39%) 2.5 (33%) 3 (12%) 3.5 (2%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 15%	1 (1%) 1.5 (4%) 2 (24%) 2.5 (45%) 3 (23%) 3.5 (1%) 4 (1%) Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment – 25%
*The percent showing agreement is figured by adding percentages who agreed with the survey questions.			
* Percentage of those displaying a high level of attachment is calculated by adding the percentages of respondents who scored 3, 3.5, and 4. For a person to be in this range they would have had to answer in agreement to both of the survey questions used to build the index.			

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