SECURITY IN PERVASIVE HEALTH CARE USING LOCATION-BASED KEY GENERATION SCHEMES

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by
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SECURITY IN PERSVASIVE HEALTHCARE USING LOCATION-BASED KEY GENERATION SCHEMES

Debargh Acharya, Candidate for the Master of Science Degree
University of Missouri- Kansas City, 2011

ABSTRACT

Remote health monitoring has tremendous potential to improve quality of health care services in modern and ubiquitous medical environments. It helps to cut the cost in modern healthcare by avoiding unnecessary hospital visits for frequent checkups. In this context, security and protection of sensitive medical data such as Electronic Health Records (EHR), data integrity and protection of patient’s privacy to be monitored are important aspects in order to increase user’s acceptance of these new technologies. Secure communication protects data from unauthorized users and usually requires pairwise keys. In all existing schemes these keys are generated and distributed to nodes wishing to communicate. The key generation phase is usually well-secured but the key distribution is not, as a result, they are vulnerable to security threats.

In this work, we investigate the key distribution problem inside a Body Sensor Network (BSN) and present two secure communication schemes which, unlike others, do not store a key chain in the memory from a universal key space and eliminate key
broadcast. We have made the key generation phase relatively more secured with the use of location information.

Authentication of biosensor nodes is also an important issue and has been taken into consideration in our schemes. Simulation of our schemes illustrates that they outperform some existing schemes and comparatively incurs less transmission and storage cost.
The faculty listed below, appointed by the Dean of School of Computing and Engineering, have examined a thesis titled “Security in Pervasive Health Care Using Location-Based Key Generation Schemes” presented by Debargh Acharya, candidate for the Master of Science degree, and hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>WWW</td>
<td>World Wide Web</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSN</td>
<td>Wireless Sensor Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSN</td>
<td>Body Sensor Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAN</td>
<td>Body Area Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHM</td>
<td>Pervasive Health Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPAA</td>
<td>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act</td>
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<td>EHR</td>
<td>Electronic Health Record)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Denial-of-Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>LH</td>
<td>Location-dependent Hash</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNH</td>
<td>Location-dependent Non Hash</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMD</td>
<td>Intelligent Medical Devices</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to my advisor Dr. Vijay Kumar, without whom completion of this work would have been very difficult. I sincerely thank him for his assistance and constant guidance during the duration of my thesis and sparing time for my work whenever required. I thank him for allowing me to explore every possible aspect towards my work and guiding me at each and every step. I would also like to thank Dr. Cory Beard for his support towards my work and providing guidance whenever needed. I would like to thank Dr. Yugyung Lee for sparing some of her valuable time towards my work and ready to help me whenever I needed. It has been a privilege and a very good learning experience to work under all my committee members.

I would like to give a special thanks to my brother Dr. Debopam Acharya, my parents and friends without whose support and encouragement I would not have pursued my Masters, and completed successfully.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks (WSN) [1, 2] have made inroads to virtually every corner of our life and have received significant attention due to their widespread application in civilian and military operations. Recent advances in wireless communication and microelectronics have led to the development of low-cost and low-power sensor nodes. Sensors are inexpensive, low-power devices which have limited resources [2]. They are small in size, and have wireless communication capability within short distances. A sensor node typically contains a power unit, a sensing unit, a processing unit, a storage unit, and a wireless transmitter / receiver. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of large number of sensor nodes with limited power, computation, storage and communication capabilities. Characteristics of a sensor network include flexibility in operation, high sensing fidelity, rapid and easy deployment, fault tolerance, low cost, dynamic changes and low maintenance.

Sensor networks have many applications in many fields, from medicine to military to inventory control. Some of the prominent applications in sensor network include:

- Traffic monitoring system: Traffic monitoring system monitors vehicle traffic on a highway, freeway or in a congested city area and provides information regarding accidents or traffic jams.
- Parking Monitoring System: Parking monitoring system provides identification of unoccupied parking spaces in busy city areas.
• Environment Monitoring System: An environment monitoring system detects and monitors environmental changes such as drought, floods and forest fires. It can also provide security in a shopping mall, parking garage, or other facilities.

• Battlefield Monitoring System: Battlefield monitoring system tracks enemy movements and deployments.

• Patient monitoring system: Inside a patient monitoring system biosensors or IMDs embedded in human body monitors blood pressure, body temperature, sugar level, heart beats etc.

1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks and Pervasive Healthcare

Since early 21st century, security and privacy [3, 4] in wireless sensor network has been an active field of research. Development of a robust security scheme is challenged by the limited capabilities of a sensor in terms of storage, processing power and energy. In today’s modern and ubiquitous computing environments, it is important more than ever the necessity for deployment of pervasive healthcare architectures into which the patient is the central point who is surrounded by different types of small and embedded computing devices. These devices measures sensitive patient’s medical data, physical indications and interacts with hospitals databases and therefore if required allows urgent medical response during emergencies and other critical situations. These environments should be developed incorporating the fundamental security requirements for real-time secure data communication, protection and confidentiality of sensitive medical data and measurements, data integrity and protection of the privacy of the patient being monitored.
1.2 Biomedical sensors or Intelligent Medical Devices (IMD)

Biomedical sensors take signals representing biomedical variables and convert them into an electrical signal. So it acts as an interface between a biologic and electronic signal. Biomedical sensors are classified into physical sensors and chemical sensors. Many different types of sensors are used in biomedical applications and are classified in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Sensors</th>
<th>Chemical Sensors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric</td>
<td>Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td>Electrochemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal</td>
<td>Photometric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>Other physical chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical</td>
<td>methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic</td>
<td>Bioanalytic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Physical sensors measures muscle displacement, body temperature, blood pressure and flow, cerebrospiral fluid pressure, bone growth and density etc. While chemical sensors measures and detects chemical quantities by identifying the presence of compounds and monitors chemical activities in the body.

1.3 Need for Security in Pervasive Health Care

Medical information security of a pervasive health care system is very important as it is in any information system. In recent years EHRs have become more computerized and integrated among various healthcare providers. According to ISO, EHR (Electronic
Health Record) is any repository of patient data in digital form, stored and exchanged securely and accessible by authorized users. EHR is used in primary, secondary and tertiary health care by the staff of a general practice, a specialist facility upon referred by a primary care physician and by a team of specialists in a major hospital respectively.

Security is an important factor in medicine and health care [6] since patient’s medical records must remain private. Inside a typical Body Sensor Network or Body Area Network (BSN-BAN) a biosensor or an IMD (Intelligent Medical Devices) gather sensitive medical information from a patient’s body for transmission to a hospital and also provides medical services such as drug delivery or prosthetics to the patient being monitored. In accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) all hospitals and clinical settings must ensure secrecy and privacy [8] of patients’ medical information. Therefore any BSN-BAN which senses and measures various body parameters needs to ensure that the patient’s medical data is never leaked or provided to unauthorized entities, either during the sensing or communication process.

A possible breach in security inside a BSN-BAN can lead a malicious entity to disguise as the controlling base-station and inject unwanted, false medical instructions such as a drug administration leading to catastrophic results such as patients’ death. It is always a challenge to provide security in BSN-BAN. One reason is the wireless nature of the whole set up. Biosensors communicate between themselves and the base station using wireless communication so an eavesdropper can always listen to this communication, insert bogus messages or jam the communication. Another reason is the limited capability of biosensors such as reduced processing power and battery life. So the traditional
cryptographic algorithms cannot be used to secure the communication between these devices.

There are many security issues [3, 4, 5] regarding WSN-BSN-BAN.

- **Sensor node compromise**: This involves attacking, capturing and reprogramming a sensor node. Once attacker captures a few nodes, a variety of attacks are mounted by the adversary such as distortion of sensor data, exhausting the network by creating false routing loops and extracting secure information.

- **Eavesdropping**: Eavesdropping can be done where an adversary monitors transmissions of communication between nodes and gains important information.

- **Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks**: DoS attacks aim to destroy network functionality rather than subverting it or using the sensed information and are extremely difficult to defend. Potential defenses against DoS attacks are as varied as the attacks themselves.

- **Malicious use of commodity networks**: The use of sensor networks will inevitably extend to criminals who can use them for illegal purposes. With widespread use, the cost and availability barriers that discourage such attacks will drop.

1.4 Thesis Overview

In this thesis the secure communication between biosensors are divided into three phases: initialization or set up phase, secure key generation phase and medical data communication phase. In our two schemes the biosensor nodes communicate with the parent node or head node $H$ inside the BSN-BAN with wireless link. We have followed a centralized approach for our a) Location-dependent Hash (LH) chain based scheme and a
distributed approach (b) Location-dependent Non Hash (LNH) chain scheme. The two schemes proposed are analyzed and the comparisons with other similar schemes are presented along with the result of their implementation.

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the preliminaries for the research. Chapter 3 presents our problem statement, followed by the description of our protocols in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the mathematical analysis of the protocols, implementation results and security analysis. Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and future work.
2.1 Evolution of Pervasive Health Management

Pervasive Health Management (PHM) mainly involves round-the-clock monitoring and collecting vital health information like pulse, temperature, blood pressure, blood glucose level, respiratory function and a variety of other physiological metrics with the help of portable biomedical devices and other Intelligent Medical Devices (IMD). This real time information may then be sent to health agencies and health practitioners for further analysis. This not only helps in self managing various chronic diseases like Heart Diseases, Asthma, Diabetes, etc, but also in preventive healthcare for persons of all ages.

So far PHM has evolved in three stages till now [7]:

- The Stand-alone health monitors [8] are used to take readings manually and then stored manually or electronically.
- Hospital and Home based Tele-health monitors that capture data from wired medical devices that are wired to or around patient’s body and transfer it to backend servers via landline phones.
- Pervasive Healthcare Management where a cell phone or PDA directly gathers or captures data 24/7 from various wireless biomedical sensors attached to human body and transfers them to backend servers wirelessly to be further processed for diagnosis and appropriate action. This is easier to use as the entire system is wireless and mobile.
PHM creates a win-win situation for everybody like patient, doctor, pharmaceutical companies, hospital and insurance agencies. A patient has peace of mind by being silently monitored all the time. Medical units such as doctors, specialists and nurses can be reached anywhere anytime who can diagnose and provide accurate medical advice since they have access to real time medical records. Hospital and pharmaceutical companies can extend their health care management programs effectively and insurance companies will save significant funds with reduced number of hospitalizations.

Today’s social conditions are perfect for pervasive health monitoring because of high growth of chronic diseases and aged population, better penetration of mobile phone industry, and due to high medical expenses in hospitals. The market surveys have already shown that the costs with pervasive monitoring are several times less than the cost of monitoring at hospitals. Here is an example to further illustrate the advantage that involves symptoms common to the world population.

**Example 1:** Emily is a 15 year old who has just been diagnosed with juvenile diabetes. She uses a glucose meter and cell phone to monitor her blood sugar levels. The cell phone reminds Emily to check her blood sugar regularly during the day, and her glucose meter seamlessly transmits the measurements to his cell phone after each use. The data is transferred to a diabetic monitoring service that maintains Emily’s long-term history and looks for abnormal events. If a reading is unusual, or if Emily skips a test, the system automatically contacts her parents/relatives, who can get in touch with her immediately.

**2.2. Features of Pervasive Health Management**

PHM has the following features:

- Pervasive health care is available anytime and anywhere.
• Disease monitoring 24/7 using wireless biomedical sensors.
• Medical data can be transferred for evaluation to a medical call center round-the-clock and feedbacks are given to patients or action is taken immediately in case of emergency.
• Data is stored in patient’s medical history in the form of Electronic Health Record (EHR).
• For further analysis EHR can be sent to doctor / specialist in a hospital by email, fax, or on mobile on real time basis and remote consultations can be provided using e-mail, text, chat and video conferencing.
• Trend analysis and alerts can be provided to patients for overall improved disease management leading to greater life expectancy.

2.3. Socio-economic Reasons for PHM

In 2008, total healthcare spending in the USA reached $2.3 trillion which was 16% of the gross domestic product (GDP) [9]. In 2009, 145 million people or almost half of all Americans lived with a chronic condition [10]. In 2009, United States spent 85 percent of the health care cost on people with chronic conditions. Figure 1 shows information about US population with one or more chronic diseases [11].

By 2015, U.S. healthcare spending is expected to increase to $4.4 trillion, or 20% of GDP. Industry experts agree that the U.S. healthcare system is plagued with excessive administrative expenses, inefficiencies and inappropriate measures. These problems significantly increase the cost of medical care and health insurance for employers and consumers.
Figure 1. US population (in millions) with one or more chronic diseases.

In the year 2009, data from Center for Disease Control [12] show the observation on physician visits as given in Table 2. Based on the table we can infer that approximately 441.98 million visits were made to primary care physicians only for the purpose of performing general medical examination. A pervasive health monitoring system is expected to almost eliminate visits to a physician for general medical examination as the system monitors medical data round-the-clock, issues alerts in case of an emergency and recommends appropriate action. Assuming an average cost of $100 per visit translates to saving of approximately $44.19 billion in hospitals visits only. If we consider all the savings from hospital, pharmaceutical and insurance companies, the total costs savings will be much more significant.
Table 2. Physician visits observation data, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of visits to a physician in USA</td>
<td>902 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of visits to a physician per 100 persons</td>
<td>306.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of visits made to primary care physicians</td>
<td>49 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most frequent reason for visit</td>
<td>general medical examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average cost of hospital visit</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate total savings to US healthcare using PHM</td>
<td>$44.19 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With researches predicting a shortage of 35,000 to 44,000 primary care physicians in the USA by 2025 [13] and approximately 0.8 million shortage of nurses (Figure 2) by 2020 [14], mobile health monitoring is going to get significant attention in healthcare management.
CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM STATEMENT

3.1 Problem Specification

Many applications in BSN-BAN involve secure communication among large numbers of wireless sensor devices. In order to protect sensitive medical data and sensor readings pair-wise keys should be used for encryption. In all existing schemes these keys are generated and distributed to nodes wishing to communicate. The key generation phase is usually well-secured because it is completed at system setup time, but the key distribution is vulnerable to security threats. The idea of key broadcast seems useful; however, in reality it is fairly unreliable [19], especially for devices with IEEE 802.15.4 radio packets, a de facto standard in WSN [2]. While the maximum broadcast packet size is a few kilobytes of payload, an individual 802.15.4 radio packet can carry a maximum of 128 bytes of data and this mode is inherently unreliable because the list of recipients is unknown. Datagrams broken into three or more fragments (over 200 bytes of payload) are almost likely to experience some loss. If that happens then the lost data must be retransmitted, and if required, may have to be fragmented and defragmented again, leading to further data loss and increased power consumption [25]. It is all the more important that the loss of data which is actually medical data in our case remains minimum or zero. Hence, schemes that transfer packets with subset of keys may lose a portion of data as they would be fragmented during broadcast. Important data should generally be transferred in unicast mode via radiograms or radio streams. For these
reasons we took a different approach for generating and using the keys for communication instead of distributing them to nodes wishing to communicate.

3.2 List of Possible Attacks

We have divided the possibility of attacks in a pervasive health care set up into patient’s side and the caregiver side. Here is the list of some of the possible security issues.

Patient’s Side:

- Probing attacks, tampering attacks by malicious users that have explicit interference and physical access to an IMD or a biosensor. A malicious node can prevent a legitimate warning generated by an IMD or a biosensor from reaching the appropriate authorities. Also it can generate a false warning for a patient leading to unwanted actions such as false diagnosis or a wrong drug delivery. This is a form of Active attack.

- Attacks in the form of eavesdropping by a malicious node into the communication link between an IMD and other systems. This is a form of passive attack.

- A malicious node can take advantage of the fact that biosensor devices are resource constrained and therefore can generate bogus messages inside the network leading to wastage of much needed battery life.

- The biosensors are implanted or attached to patient’s body so another side effect of “overworking of biosensor nodes” is the problem of tissue heating. Due to prolonged exposure to abnormal temperatures can cause tissue degeneration leading to severe health problems such as leukemia.

- Attacks can also be made by insiders such as patient reporting false medical data.
Severe security lapses can occur at the Caregiver Side too such as:

- Security breach because of granting system access to improper persons, “who gets access to what”.
- Security breach because of not revoking terminated employee’s access that are fired or retired.
- Security breach due to common errors such as “Mailbox Full” and important medical messages not getting delivered to required persons.
- Security breach due to improper configuration of hardware and software being used, “never trust on defaults”.
- Security breach due to Group Activities using a Group Login. Activities cannot be monitored in situations where a common login is being used to monitor a patient’s medical information by a group of doctors and nurses.
- Security breach due to improper training.
- Security breach due to workstations not getting automatically locked when no one is around.

3.3 Related Work

Several works have discussed the problem of devising a secure mechanism for key generation and distribution [3, 15, 19, 20, 21, 30, 31]. Eschenauer and Gligor [16] proposed a probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme for pairwise key establishment. The main idea of this scheme was to let each sensor node randomly pick a set of keys from a universal key pool before deployment so that any two sensor nodes must have a certain probability of sharing at least one common key. We call this as the basic probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme or EG scheme. Chan et al. [17] further extended this idea and
developed two key pre-distribution techniques (a) *q-composite key pre-distribution* and (b) *random pairwise keys scheme*.

The *q*-composite key pre-distribution uses a key pool but requires two sensors to compute a pair-wise key from at least *q* pre-distributed keys which they share. This approach increases the amount of key overlap required for key-setup. Further, to preserve the probability of two nodes sharing sufficient keys to establish a secure link, it is necessary to reduce the size of the key pool. As a result, a small number of compromised nodes may affect a large fraction of pair-wise keys. The random pair-wise keys scheme randomly picks pairs of sensors and assigns each pair a unique random key. Both schemes although improve the security over the basic probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme, the pair-wise key establishment problem remains unsolved. In the basic probabilistic and the *q*-composite key pre-distribution schemes, as the number of compromised nodes increases, the fraction of affected pair-wise keys increases quickly. Although the random pair-wise keys scheme does not suffer from the above security problem, due to memory constraint nature of sensor nodes, the network size remains small.

Perrig et al. [5] proposed SPINS, a security architecture specifically designed for sensor networks. In this scheme each sensor node shares a common key with the base station. The base station acts as a trusted third party when two nodes establish a new key. Having base station as a mediator for new key generation is costly because of increased communication overhead.

Das et al. [30, 32] proposed a scheme which is an extension of Dong and Liu’s scheme. The main idea is to deploy a small number of High end sensors (*H*-sensors)
together with a large number of Low end sensors (L-sensors). Before deployment the set up server stores id_s, master keys, n key plus id combination K_{Hi, uj; id_{uj}} (key and id combination of H and L sensors respectively) and the polynomial share (Blundo and Santis, 1993) of all H sensor into each H sensor. Also each L sensor are loaded with its own id, master key and l key plus id combination K_{u, vj} = \text{PRF}_{MK_{vj}(id_u)} where u and v are L sensors, MK_{vj} is the master key of any sensor v_j and id_u is the id of sensor u. For common pairwise key generation, H and L sensor will broadcast their ids to check whether the key ring of them contain the id of another node. If the id is found in its memory then the associated key becomes the secret pairwise key.

Du et al. [31] proposed a symmetric pre distribution (AP) key management scheme. Here in this scheme each L sensor is preloaded with l keys and H sensor are loaded with M keys where M >> l. For distributed pairwise key distribution each L sensor broadcasts its key id_s associated with the keys from its key ring to discover if they share a common key. For centralized pairwise key distribution each L sensors broadcasts its key id_s to its cluster heads (H). The key discovery is done by H as it has all the information in its memory so it can determine if two L sensors u and v are neighbors based on their location proximity and then a common key is allocated to each pair of neighboring L sensors. The approach is very similar to other pairwise key distribution schemes. This scheme suffers from cost overhead due to message transmission during pairwise key generation.

Recently location information [27, 33, 34] of sensor nodes has been used for key distributions. Liu and Ning [23, 24] proposed closest pairwise key scheme (CPKS) and closest polynomial key scheme (CPPS) for key generation and distribution. It is an extended version of random pair-wise key scheme. The main idea here is to have prior
deployment knowledge of the deployed sensor nodes. Here each sensor node share pairwise key with its $n$ closest neighbors. The schemes lose their performance as the deployment error between actual and expected locations of the deployed sensor nodes increases. Das [34] extended the idea of Liu and Ning by proposing ECPKS (enhanced closest pairwise keys scheme). ECPKS used both pre deployment as well as post deployment knowledge for key pre distribution mechanisms.

Authentication of sensor node is also a major area of research while developing schemes for key generation and distribution. Perrig et al. developed a protocol named $\mu$TESLA [4] for broadcast authentication in distributed sensor networks. This protocol is a modified form of stream authentication protocol called TESLA [5]. $\mu$TESLA protocol uses a serial chain of authentication keys which are linked to each other by a pseudo random function [22]. This pseudo random function is a one way function. It achieves authentication by delayed key disclosure in the key chain. Liu et al. [23, 24] proposed a modified form of $\mu$TESLA. The main idea was to predetermine and then broadcast the key chain commitments instead of message transmission.

Zhang et al. [26] proposed a node-to-node neighborhood authentication scheme using LBKs (Location-based Keys). In this scheme each node has to broadcast its location to its neighboring nodes for authentication. Broadcasting of confidential entities such as location information possesses a security risk as discussed above.

3.4 Thesis Approach

Here we are proposing a pervasive health care system where our schemes can be implemented inside the BSN-BAN. Pervasive health care systems provide medical units specially doctors and nurses at a hospital with remote access to real-time patient’s health
data. The whole medical system (figure 3) runs a large diversity of applications which consists of setting up communications among various implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as sensors, actuators and smart handheld portable devices (PDAs). Collection of medical data is done inside the BSN and then it is further integrated with patient’s EHR through communication channels such as internet and other asynchronous transfer through cellular network. The messages and medical records are further processed and accessed by authorized doctors and specialized medical personnel on demand to give care and treatment to the patients.

![Figure 3. High level view of a pervasive health care architecture.](image)

Inside the pervasive healthcare environment, resource-constraint BSN-BAN needs data transmission scheme that requires minimal cost in terms of memory and power usage. A typical sensor node when idle consumes less than 100 μwatts of power. A significant portion of power is used in data transmission with devices having data transfer speed of 10-250 kbps consuming about 30-40 mW of power. In several prominent key distribution schemes for BSN, data transmission involves broadcast of a subset of keys from a key pool. While broadcast involving IEEE 802.15.4 devices are unreliable as
indicated above, multiple broadcasts results in significant consumption of power. Also, as the size of program memory of a typical sensor may range from 4-128 kilobytes, storing a large subset of key ring sizes (in order of few hundreds) as discussed above may involve use of a significant portion of overall program memory. We present two schemes that eliminate the key distribution phase in setting up secured communication among sensor nodes. Thus, unlike most other schemes our schemes do not require sensor nodes to store a key chain in memory from a universal key space and broadcast them to other nodes. Instead, the individual and common pair wise keys are generated and undergo unicast in the network. We have exploited the strength of location information (x’ and y’ coordinates) in developing our scheme. An x’/y’ value is unique and cannot be hacked without being identified.

BSN-BAN environment can be indoor or outdoor. For outdoor localization GPS is the most favored and used technology. But for indoor which is actually the environment for pervasive health care networks GPS technology is not feasible. Several indoor localization schemes have been proposed. For our set up we are using RFID tag based indoor localization mechanism [18]. In our schemes the sensor nodes communicate with the parent node or head node \( H \) inside the BSN-BAN with wireless link. We present (a) Location-dependent Hash (LH) chain based scheme and (b) Location-dependent Non Hash (LNH) chain scheme. The first scheme creates several hash chains and involves more computation for the head node. The second scheme does not create hash chains but involves more data storage in the head node.
4.1 The Implementation

In this work, we investigate the key distribution problem in body area networks and present two secure communication schemes which, unlike others, do not store a key chain in the memory from a universal key space and eliminate key broadcast. We have made the key generation phase relatively more secured with the use of location information. Authentication of sensor devices is also an important issue and has been taken into consideration in our schemes. Simulation of our schemes illustrates that they outperform some existing schemes and comparatively incurs less transmission and storage cost. Here is our software architecture in figure 4.

![Software Architecture Diagram]

Figure 4. Software Architecture
4.2 Location-Based Hash (LH) Chain Scheme

This scheme uses location information (x’ and y’ coordinates) of sensor nodes first to generate the individual key sets which are then used to generate the common pairwise key between any two sensor nodes wishing to communicate. This approach makes sure that no two sensor nodes can have any keys in common.

The pairwise key generation scheme is divided into two steps: (a) deployment of sensors and individual key generation by nodes using (x’/y’) and (b) authentication of sensor nodes and generation of pairwise key. Table 3 shows the notations we have used to describe the schemes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A, B$</td>
<td>Communicating Nodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>Head node of a cluster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ID_A, ID_B$</td>
<td>Identifier of node A and B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_{A1}, \ldots, K_{A3}$</td>
<td>Key set for A generated by hash chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_{B1}, \ldots, K_{B3}$</td>
<td>Key set for B generated by hash chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_{AB}$</td>
<td>Common pairwise key for A &amp; B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Lat_H$</td>
<td>Location information of head node, x’ in this case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Lat_A$</td>
<td>Location information of node A, x’ in this case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_A, K_B$</td>
<td>Individual keys of node A and B respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$LOC_A$</td>
<td>Location information of node A, x’/y’ coordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$LOC_B$</td>
<td>Location information of node B, x’/y’ coordinate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.1 Sensors Deployment and Hash Chain Formations

In this step the key is generated after deploying the sensors and forming the clusters. We can safely assume that this initial setup securely saves sensor ID together with location information (X’/Y’) of all nodes in each head node prior to key generation and each sensor devices are capable of determining its location information using RFID tag based indoor localization mechanism [18] so they can uniquely determine their own location. The scheme involves creating one way hash chains by hashing the location information to generate individual keys for each sensor nodes. All hash chains are generated using hash functions starting from the head node of a cluster. Figure 5 shows our scheme of using location information in hash chains to generate individual key rings. For simplicity we have considered x’= LAT (latitude information) and y’=LON (longitude information) or vice versa wherever required.

[Diagram showing hash chain formation]

Figure 5. Hashing of Location Information for individual key generation

Thus, using a hash function h the head node (H) generates a hash value \( K_H = h(Lat_H) \) by hashing its location information (x’ and y’ coordinates). It passes this hash value to the next neighboring node A which in turn generates \( K_A \) (key of A) by computing the hash of sum of \( K_H \) and its location information, \( Lat_A \) which is \( K_A = h(K_H + Lat_A) \). Next, node A
sends $K_A$ to its adjacent node and thus the individual key generation continues until the last node of the cluster has generated its key. In our scheme we require three keys in the key ring set of each sensor node which can be generated using $x'$, $y'$ and both. In the example above we have used the $x'$ coordinate for generating these keys. It can be argued that two or more sensor nodes can have either $x'$ or $y'$ coordinate information same but it is impossible for both $x'$ and $y'$ information of one sensor node matching with another sensor node. So even if one of the individual keys out of three keys is same between two or more sensor node due to the same $x'$ or $y'$ information still the pairwise key will be different as it is generated using all the three keys in the key ring set.

Since key generation is hash chain based, head node has the ability to generate individual keys for any node in its cluster as it knows the location of all the nodes in its cluster. The head node uses this concept later in the pair wise key generation mechanism. No sensor node of the cluster can generate individual keys of any other sensor node because they do not have the location information of any other node. Hash chains are lightweight cryptographic elements and are suitable for applications in WSN and they have the following properties:

- For a given cryptographic hash function $h$ and an input string $S$, it is easy to calculate $h(S)$ but not possible to retrieve $S$ from $h(S)$. Since cryptographic hash functions are one-way, it is also not possible to compute $h^{-1}$ where $h(h^{-1}(S)) = h(S)$.

- The hash function $h$ has collision resistant property which means it is not possible to find two strings $S$ and $S'$ such that $h(S) = h(S')$. 


4.2.2 Authentication of Sensor Nodes and Secure Pairwise Key Generation

We consider two sensor nodes $A$ and $B$ with identities $ID_A$ and $ID_B$ respectively in the same cluster and show how pairwise keys for them are generated (Figure 6).

![Figure 6. LH Scheme](image)

Suppose $A$ has $K_{A1}$, $K_{A2}$ and $K_{A3}$ and $B$ has $K_{B1}$, $K_{B2}$ and $K_{B3}$. These individual keys have been generated by the three hash chains discussed above. If node $A$ wants to communicate with node $B$, it will require a symmetric pairwise key. The pairwise key generation starts by $A$ sending its $ID_A$ and an encrypted message $E_{KA1}$ to $H$. $E_{KA1}$ contains 3 entities: (a) two of the three individual keys of $A$ chosen randomly and (b) the identifier $ID_B$ of $B$. $E_{KA1}$ is a message encrypted using the individual key of $A$ (e.g., $K_{A1}$) and hence this key, $K_{A1}$, is not included in the message. $A$ sends this encrypted message $E_{KA1}$ to $H$ requesting a common pairwise key, $K_{AB}$, for communication.

The head node $H$ checks the authenticity of these two nodes before it generates the pairwise key for $A$ and $B$. $H$ checks the identifier of $A$ and initially assumes that $A$ is a local node of the cluster. Since all the keys of $A$ were earlier generated by using a hash
chain starting from $H$, it can re-hash multiple times and calculate all the three keys of $A$. It decrypts $E_{KA1}$ (by applying the three keys of $A$ using trial and error method) and get two keys of $A$ in the message. The head node authenticates $A$ if two of the three generated keys match with the key pair in the message. $H$ also knows that $A$ wants to communicate with $B$ (the encrypted message sent by $A$ to the head node includes the identifier of the node it wants to communicate with) so it generates the individual keys of $B$ using hash chain and stores it into its memory together with the individual keys of $A$. $H$ authenticates node $B$ next. It sends an encrypted message $E_{KB1}$ to node $B$ requesting its ID information and the other two keys of node $B$. Node $B$ decrypt this message $E_{KB1}$ (by applying its three keys one by one using trial and error method). Node $B$ sends back $E_{KB1}$ (encrypted message containing $ID_B$ and two other keys of $B$, say $K_{B2}$ and $K_{B3}$). After receiving this information from node $B$, $H$ decrypts the message and matches this information with the previously stored information of node $B$ ($ID_B$) and the keys $K_{B2}$ and $K_{B3}$. The authentication of node $B$ ends successfully if the information matches. In the event of information mismatch, $H$ may declare $B$ as malicious and quarantine it from the rest of the cluster.

After a successful authentication of nodes $A$ and $B$ the common pairwise key generation starts. $H$ randomly selects the individual keys of $A$ and $B$ (say $K_{A1}$ $K_{A2}$ $K_{B2}$ $K_{B3}$) and generate $K_{AB} = K_{A1} \oplus K_{A2} \oplus K_{B2} \oplus K_{B3}$ (Common key for $A$ & $B$ generated by XORing). $H$ sends $K_{AB}$ and $ID_B$ to node $A$ by encrypting it with $K_{A1}$ and $K_{AB}$ and $ID_A$ to node $B$ by encrypting it with $K_{B1}$. Nodes $A$ and $B$ will decrypt this common pairwise key and ID information by using their respective keys $K_{A1}$ and $K_{B1}$. Node $A$ understands that this pairwise key is to communicate with a node in its cluster with identifier $ID_B$. 

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Similarly, node $B$ understands that this pairwise key is to communicate with a node in its cluster with identifier $ID_A$. The algorithm for pairwise key generation is summarized below:

a. Node $A$ sends its $ID_A$ and an encrypted message $E_{K_{A1}}$ (containing two randomly chosen keys of $A$ and $ID_B$) to $H$ requesting a pairwise key $K_{AB}$. The message is encrypted using one of the keys of $A$, say $K_{A1}$.

b. $H$ decrypts the message using key $K_{A1}$ (it can generate all the three keys of $A$ using hash chain) and verifies node $A$ is an authenticate node. It also generates the three individual keys of $B$.

c. $H$ sends an encrypted message $E_{K_{B1}}$ to node $B$ requesting its ID information and the other two keys of node $B$.

d. $B$ decrypts this message $E_{K_{B1}}$ using $K_{B1}$ and sends back an encrypted message $E_{K_{B1}}$ (containing $ID_B$ and two other keys of $B$ say $K_{B2}$ and $K_{B3}$). The message is encrypted using one of the keys of $B$, say $K_{B1}$.

e. $H$ decrypts this message using key $K_{B1}$ and authenticates $B$.

f. $H$ generates common pairwise key $K_{AB}$ by XORing the randomly chosen keys of $A$ and $B$. ($K_{AB} = K_{A1} \oplus K_{A2} \oplus K_{B2} \oplus K_{B3}$).

g. $H$ sends the common pairwise key $K_{AB}$ and $ID_B$ to node $A$ by encrypting it with $K_{A1}$.

h. $H$ sends the common pairwise key $K_{AB}$ and $ID_A$ to node $B$ by encrypting it with $K_{B1}$.
Node $A$ and $B$ decrypt the messages sent by $H$ using their keys $K_{A1}$ and $K_{B1}$ respectively to recover $K_{AB}$. Node $A$ and $B$ may now communicate with each other using the common symmetric key.

In our scheme we have considered a scenario where two sensor nodes require common pairwise key from $H$ before they can communicate. $H$ authenticates these nodes before sending the common pairwise keys. In some scenarios a sensor node may try to communicate with many other sensor nodes, as a result, $H$ may end up authenticating the sender node as many number of times as the number of nodes it wants to communicate (multiple authentication) within a very short interval. This will incur significant processing cost which will vary with the size of the network and traffic leading to significant communication delay. We are actively investigating this issue we will report our remedy in our future work.

4.3 Location-Based Non Hash (LNH) Chain Scheme:

In our previous scheme (LH), the key generation and distribution is somewhat centralized. The individual key generation and later distribution of pairwise key is initiated by $H$ inside the cluster. After the pairwise key has been generated $H$ does not play any significant role. In our second scheme (LNH), the common pairwise key is generated by individual sensor nodes with some assistant from $H$. Thus, the pairwise key generation in this scheme is distributed. Unlike LH scheme here $H$ does not generate pairwise key but acts as a third party in key generation. The dependency of $H$ in common pairwise key generation in LNH scheme is less than that of LH scheme. Use of both schemes can vary depending upon the cluster size. Implementing hash chain based LH scheme for huge clusters can be sometimes tedious but it is more secure compared to LNH scheme.
which can work well if the cluster size is bigger as it is simpler to implement. Figure 7 shows the operations of our LNH scheme.

### 4.3.1 Sensor Node Deployment and Secure Key Generation

In this scheme every node inside a cluster has a unique key which is stored in them prior to deployment. During deployment, the location information, sensor Id, and the unique individual keys of every sensor nodes are stored into $H$ in a secure manner.

![Figure 7. LNH Scheme](image)

Similar to the LH scheme, we use location information of two sensor nodes wishing to communicate as a parameter to generate common pairwise keys. Two nodes (say A and B) wishing to communicate will require a common pairwise key, $K_{AB}$. The individual keys of these sensor nodes are $K_A$ and $K_B$. Node A will send its sensor ID and an encrypted message $E_{KA}$ to $H$. This message contains a request for the location information of node $B$. $H$ receives the request and sends an encrypted message $E_{KB}$ (containing $ID_A$) to $B$ requesting its location information.
This message is an indication that Node A intends to communicate with B and hence B needs to send its location information to H. Node B will send its sensor ID and an encrypted message $E_{KB}$ to H requesting node A’s location information. H will identify node A and B by their IDs and can decrypt messages sent by them. As H has all the location information of the sensor nodes in its cluster, it sends the location information of node B to node A and vice versa by encrypting it with their individual keys. On receiving the location information from H, A and B will generate the common pairwise key $K_{AB}$ ($\text{Lat}_A \oplus \text{Lon}_A \oplus \text{Lat}_B \oplus \text{Lon}_B$) by XORing location information. Unlike the previous scheme, the head node does not generate the pairwise key. It only acts as a third party in key generation.

All the communications done in this scheme are in encrypted form and hence cannot be eavesdropped. The scheme also does not require storing huge key sets in a sensor node. The mechanism is although lightweight but quite secured. The algorithm for pairwise key generation is summarized below:

a. Node A sends its $ID_A$ and an encrypted message $E_{KA}$ (requesting the location information of node B) to Head node H. The message is encrypted using the key of A, say $K_A$.

b. H receives the request and sends an encrypted message $E_{KB}$ (containing $ID_A$) to B requesting its location information. This message is an indication that A intends to communicate with B and hence B needs to send its location information to H.

c. Node B sends its $ID_B$ and an encrypted message $E_{KB}$ (requesting the location information of node A) to H. The message is encrypted using the key of B, say $K_B$.

d. Node H decrypts the messages from A and B using key $K_A$ and $K_B$.
e. Node $H$ sends an encrypted message $E_{KA}$ to node $A$ containing node $B$’s location information and an encrypted message $E_{KB}$ to node $B$ containing node $A$’s location information.

f. Node $A$ and $B$ decrypt these messages and generate the common pairwise key $K_{AB}$ by XORing of location information. ($K_{AB} = Lat_A \oplus Lon_A \oplus Lat_B \oplus Lon_B$)

Node $A$ and $B$ may now begin communication using this common pairwise key $K_{AB}$.

### 4.4 Strengths of Our Schemes as Compared to Other Existing Schemes

Unlike some other schemes developed earlier, our LH and LNH schemes are although lightweight but very effective as discussed below:

- Unlike most other schemes, ours do not require broadcasting of a subset of keys.
- Our schemes do not require storing large amount of information (for example, a subset of keys) inside a sensor node (except the head node) to compose a common pair wise key. This saves significant number of transmissions between nodes and storage space.
- No major calculations other than hash chain generation (which are lightweight cryptographic functions) are needed to generate pair wise keys.
- In our schemes we have used location information of sensor nodes for key generation. Location information is a metric unique to each sensor node. No two sensor nodes can have the same location. Also, it is not possible to find the location of a sensor node using the location of another sensor node. This means even if one node is compromised, the other nodes remain safe.
• Our schemes have a mechanism for authenticating sensor nodes before common pair wise keys between two sensor nodes can be generated. In this way, malicious sensor nodes can be identified easily within the cluster and $H$ can take appropriate action.

• Our schemes perform well irrespective of cluster size. This is because there is less communications among nodes which is less susceptible to eavesdropping.

• Our schemes are robust and in the event of an eavesdropping, the encrypted messages cannot be decrypted as the intruder will not have the individual keys of a node. We assume that head nodes in our network are tamper resistant devices and cannot be compromised. Even if the intruder compromises other sensor nodes, it will not be able to generate individual keys of those nodes (since they are created using one way hash chains starting from the head node).

• The proposed schemes always guarantees that no matter how many regular sensor devices are compromised, the other non compromised devices can still communicate with 100% secrecy. The proposed schemes are always unconditionally secure against node capture attacks.
CHAPTER 5
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

We evaluated LH and LNH schemes with the EG scheme, Q-Composite scheme, Random Pairwise scheme, AP scheme, ECPKS scheme, USKS scheme, CPPS and CPKS scheme. As discussed above that key-distribution in broadcast based schemes are vulnerable and it is costly to maintain security. The above mentioned schemes broadcast their key or polynomial sets for pairwise key generation. Broadcasting keys is more costly in terms of processing power and battery life as a large portion of power is used in data transmission.

To avoid an increase in computational, power consumption and storage cost, unlike other schemes our schemes (LH and LNH) avoids key broadcast during common pairwise key generation process and therefore we expect our schemes to be more energy efficient as shown below. In our experiment we compared the total data transmitted in all the above schemes and total storage required in a sensor node during the pairwise key generation process. The schemes are evaluated assuming networks of all sizes. We initially assumed a network of 100 nodes in a cluster and increase the size by 100 nodes. The size of a key is assumed to be 128 bits. Interference is common in 2.4 GHz band. IEEE 802.15.4 applications (sensor nodes) have low quality of service requirements and may need to perform multiple retries for packet transmissions. This is especially true for data broadcast of key rings in a sensor network which may significantly affect the transmission cost between sensor nodes. To avoid complicated scenarios of significant
rebroadcast of keys in a sensor network due to loss of data, we assumed that all schemes are able to broadcast their keys with minimum retransmissions.

5.1 Power Consumption Analysis

![Transmission Cost Graph]

Figure 8. Comparison of Data Transmission in EG, Random pairwise, Q-Composite, AP with LH and LNH

Figure 8 and 9 show the result of our simulation comparing transmission cost between various other schemes. X axis denotes number of nodes. In Figure 8, for the sake of clarity and due to large values of y, we show the transmission cost in kilobytes using logarithm scale. Here Figure 8 shows that transmission cost of EG scheme is significantly higher than Q-composite and Random pairwise scheme. AP scheme works better than the above mentioned scheme even with increased number of nodes. Due to unicast transmissions for pairwise key generation, both of our schemes (LH and LNH) have relatively lower cost as compared to other schemes.
Figure 9. Comparison of Data Transmission in ECPKS, USKS with LH and LNH

Figure 9 shows the comparison of LH and LNH schemes with ECPKS and USKS schemes. ECPKS scheme stores higher number of keys inside sensor memory during key prioritization phase. After key prioritization only highest priority keys are kept and rest is discarded. In comparison to USKS scheme it uses more message communication and therefore is costly as shown in Figure 9. On the other hand LH and LNH scheme use less message transmission to find the common pairwise key and perform slightly better than USKS scheme but much better in comparison to ECPKS scheme.

Both LH and LNH schemes perform similarly during the data transmission experiment.

5.2 Data Storage Analysis

Figure 10 and 11 shows the cost of storage of key ring sets in the memory. Since key ring sets are used to generate pairwise keys, they are kept in the program + data memory of the node. For values of \( N = 4900-5000 \), key ring set storage requirements for EG scheme is more than 128 kilobytes, thus making it completely insignificant in terms of usage for most of the contemporary sensor nodes, including the popular Mica series,
IMotes and Telos sensors (except high end sensors like Sun SPOTS [28, 29], which has 512 kilobytes of RAM). Q-Composite scheme performs better than Random pairwise scheme for large values of N. It still takes more memory as compared to our LH scheme (14 kilobytes in Q-Composite as compared to approximately 2.5 kilobytes in our LH scheme for N=10000). During deployment of sensors in LNH scheme, the location information, sensor id information and the unique individual keys of every sensor nodes are stored into the head node in a secure manner. This causes the scheme to perform worse than the LH and Random pairwise scheme but better than Q-Composite and EG scheme. The LH scheme performs best in terms of data transmission.

![Memory Storage comparison of EG, Random pairwise, Q-Composite, AP with LH and LNH schemes](image)

Figure 10. Memory Storage comparison of EG, Random pairwise, Q-Composite, AP with LH and LNH schemes
In Figure 11 we have shown the memory storage comparison between ECPKS, USKS, LH and LNH schemes. During deployment the set up server selects a set $S_1$ of $n$ sensor nodes whose expected locations are closest to any node $a$. Now if all the nodes want to communicate between themselves they are required to have a common pairwise key between themselves. So for each node $b$ in $S_1$ set up server stores $n$ key-plus-id combination ($k_{ab}, id_a$) into b’s key ring and also $n$ key-plus-id combination ($k_{ab}, id_b$) into a’s key ring. This type of setup leaves very small memory left to be used as application in sensor devices such as smart dust sensor which has only 8 K bytes of program memory and 512 bytes of data memory. Also in USKS scheme before deployment the set up server stores id_s, master keys, n key plus id combination $K_{Hi, uj}, id_{uj}$ (key and id combination of $H$ and $L$ sensors respectively) and the polynomial share of all $H$ sensor to each $H$ sensor. Also each $L$ sensor are loaded with its own id, master key and $l$ key plus id combination $K_{u, vj} = PRF_{MK_{vj}(id_u)}$ where $u$ and $v$ are $L$ sensors, $MK_{vj}$ is the master key of any sensor $vj$ and $id_u$ is the id of sensor u. Though USKS works better than ECPKS but
our schemes LH and LNH performs best in terms of memory storage as shown in Figure 11.

5.3 Security Analysis

In this section we compare security against sensor node capture of our schemes with that for the existing schemes.

We compare our scheme LH and LNH with EG scheme, Q-Composite Scheme, Random Pairwise Scheme, AP scheme, ECPKS scheme, CPPS and CPKS scheme. Here we consider a scenario where 100 regular sensor nodes have been captured in a network and we keep on increasing the size of the network by 100 more captured nodes. The resilience against node capture attack of a key establishment scheme is measured by estimating the fraction of total secure communications that are compromised by a capture of c nodes not including the communication in which the compromised nodes are directly involved. For example, for any two non-compromised sensor nodes a and b, we have to find out what is the probability that the adversary can decrypt the secret communications between a and b when c sensor nodes are already compromised. If Pe(c) denotes the fraction of total secure communications compromised after capturing c sensor nodes by an attacker in a sensor network and if Pe(c) = 0, we call a key establishment scheme as unconditionally secure against node capture or perfectly resilient against node capture. We can see from the figure 12 that even with a small number of c captured nodes, EG scheme reveal a large fraction of total secure communications between non-compromised sensor nodes in the network.

The security of CPPS scheme shows that it performs well as long as number of captured nodes is small but as more number of nodes is captured CPPS scheme works
less better. ECPKS scheme performs better than CPPS scheme in terms of certain fraction of revelation of secure communication links between non-compromised nodes. Only CPKS, LH and LNH provide unconditional security against regular node capture attacks. We have assumed $H$ nodes (cluster head) are equipped with tamper-resistant technology [36]. For a network of 1000 nodes we need only 10 tamper resistant $H$ nodes assuming we have 100 nodes in a cluster. It is reasonable to assume that powerful $H$ nodes are equipped with this technology.

**Figure 12.** Security Analysis of EG, CPKS, CPPS, ECPKS with LH and LNH schemes.

However for $H$ nodes to be not tamper resident the attacker can get valuable sensor node information such as hashing function, location information etc. Therefore it can generate individual sensor keys inside a single cluster and can compromise the communication between two regular sensors by XORing the various possible combinations of individual sensor keys. Our future work will be in this area of providing unconditionally security to $H$ nodes. However we have a better tradeoff between security
vs. transmission and storage cost of our schemes with all other current schemes. We outperform most other schemes in this area.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

In this work we have developed a unicast based pairwise key generation and distribution scheme. A prominent feature in the key generation process includes generation of one way hash key chains and use of location information which adds to the security of our scheme. Broadcast and storage of key ring sets have been avoided (due to the inherent feature of unreliability of data broadcast in sensor nodes) unlike other schemes. This idea has led to significant reduction of cost in terms of transmission and storage.

We have used location information of sensor nodes for key generation which is a metric unique to each sensor node. The scheme performs well irrespective of network size because there is less communications among nodes which is less susceptible to eavesdropping. Our scheme is robust and in the event of an eavesdropping, the encrypted messages cannot be decrypted. Right now we assume that head nodes in our network are tamper resistant devices and cannot be compromised. In future we intend to develop a prototype for health care management that will address secure communication of medical data between medical sensors and handheld device of mobile patient called personal wireless hub (PWH) inside a wireless body sensor network (WBSN) using unicast based LH and LNH schemes.
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VITA

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Publications

