

GO USA...GO WORLD: NATIONALIST AND INTERNATIONALIST
PRIMING EFFECTS THROUGH OLYMPIC TELECASTS

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Dedication

For MY MOM: It was inconceivable when I submitted this dissertation prospectus just a few short months ago that you would not be here to see this dissertation finished, and since then, there have been countless days I never thought I would have the strength to carry on and finish it after you were so unexpectedly called Home. As dad reminded me, you had symbolically gone to school for nearly twenty-two and a half years, which made the last few months unbearable without your support. On the days I wanted to give up, you still gave me the push I needed, just as you would if you were still here on the earth. In the end, I finished this dissertation just for you. I love you and miss you terribly.

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ABSTRACT

Within the Modern Olympics, a tension exists between celebrating national pride and promoting international peace and unity. Research has documented that U.S. network coverage of the Games is dominated by a pro-U.S. frame. Despite millions of Olympic viewers, little research has examined possible Olympic viewing motivations; and perhaps more importantly, no research has explored the effects of pro-U.S. Olympic images, which largely ignores themes of international peace and unity upon which the Olympics are founded. This study first developed the International Sport Viewing Motivations (ISVM) scale, a measure consisting of nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations. Further analyses confirmed that nationalist sport viewing motivations are a stronger predictor of Olympic viewing than internationalist sport viewing motivations. Additionally, through experimental design, the study exposed participants to a nationalist or internationalist Olympic frame to test possible priming effects of frame on viewers' national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes. Results showed main effects of frame on national pride and internationalism. Specifically, the nationalist frame caused a larger degree of change in national pride, and the internationalist frame caused a larger degree of change in internationalism. Findings also suggested indirect effects of the nationalist frame through national pride on certain international political attitudes.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Olympic Games, despite being a symbol of world unity, thrive on conflict and controversy. As Hulme (1990) explains, the ancient Olympic games were far from “innocent sporting contests” (p. 1) but were political affairs. Contrary to the modern Games’ promotion of international understanding, brotherhood, and peace, the ancient Greeks would not have understood the modern concept of international sport, as they had no interest in competing with foreign nations (Crowther, 1999). Instead, the ancient Greeks competed as individual city-states, which were constantly at war. Truces allowed safe passage for athletes and spectators before and after the Games. Later ancient Olympic Games, under Roman rule, observed the Roman Peace during the Games. Still, in its more than 1,000 year history, the ancient Games never stopped a war (Crowther, 1999).

Today, despite the good intentions of modern Olympic founder Baron Pierre de Coubertin (Hulme, 1990), the conflict and controversy of the ancient Games transferred into the modern Games. For example, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games had their fair share of controversy. Most notably, controversy engulfed one of the premier Olympic events, women’s gymnastics. Accusations were brought against China, the host country, for having several female competitors under the age of 16, the Olympic minimum age to compete. Off the mat, the host country China received considerable international scrutiny about their handling of issues such as human rights and pollution.

Nonetheless, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics drew in a total of 214 million viewers over the two weeks of the Games.

When examining the popularity of the Games though, the 2008 controversies did little to seemingly affect the popularity of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games. About 190 million people tuned into NBC and its cable networks for the 2010 Games, placing these Games in second place for all-time viewership behind the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Games with 204 million viewers. In fact, the nightly 24.4 million viewer average of the Vancouver Games was 21% higher than the average nightly viewers of the 2006 Turin Winter Games. While a variety of factors beyond scandal might determine TV viewership for the Olympic Games, such as a record U.S. medal haul in 2008 and 2010, Olympic TV viewership remains strong despite a history of Olympic Games controversy.

Perhaps the controversy and conflict embedded within the Olympics may actually fuel, rather than deter, viewership. Zillmann, Bryant, and Sapolsky (1989) applied their disposition theory to explain the enjoyment that conflict and drama provide in sport, a fulfillment dependent on spectators having feelings towards the games' participants. They argue that viewers love the human drama of sport display, and the enjoyment of watching sport contests is partly a function of the degree to which a contest is perceived as involving human conflict.

Study Goals

Olympic viewing motivations. The first goal of this dissertation is to examine the Olympic television viewing motivations. Certainly, one of the most conflict-driven televised sporting experiences can be found in international contests such as the Olympics. While viewers' desire for human conflict and drama might explain why so

many enjoy watching these events, this fact has not been substantiated through existing research.

The Olympic ideal versus nationalism. The second goal of this dissertation is to examine the tension within the Olympic Games' telecast and determine if there are possible effects of the televised framing of the contrasting images of international peace and conflict. The first image is of the Olympic Games representing a utopian internationalism through sport. This internationalism advocates international camaraderie, global unity, and coming together peacefully, all of which is part of the Olympic ideal. According to the Olympic Charter, the Olympic rings represent the union of the five continents and the meeting of athletes from throughout the world at the Olympic Games. Chehabi (2001) argues that when athletic games are "accompanied by mutual signaling of goodwill and friendly cheering spectators" (p. 90), attitudes can change because of the unity displayed. Sport, however, is about competition and winning. Olympic internationalism supports the chant of "Go World" (VISA's marketing slogan during the 2010 Vancouver Games), which contradicts the win/lose mentality of sport. According to the Olympic ideal, we are one world during the Olympics, but we are competing against each other and someone must lose.

Although the Olympic charter may proclaim a "union," there is political conflict and competition between the nations off the field, which can intersect with the competition on the field. Thus, the second image is of nationalism, or loyalty to a nation. Nationalism places a nation and its interests above all others. In the case of the Olympics, nationalism can supersede internationalism both on and off the field. Even in today's global society, sport often affirms nationalistic pride (e.g. Cronin & Mayall,

1998; Hargreaves, 2002). International political conflicts and nationalistic pride, which is enacted by cheering for one's home nation and against other nations, work against the Olympic Games' internationalism message of peace and unity. Internationalism and nationalism create tension within the Olympic spectacle, and in turn, its television broadcast.

The Contradiction within the Olympic Telecast

In forming the Modern Olympic Games, founder Baron de Coubertin saw sports as a vehicle for furthering international friendship and understanding, thereby bringing about the goal sought by many thinkers of his day - universal world peace" (Strenk, 1979, p. 138), yet the Olympic telecast does not focus solely on the Olympic ideal" of world peace. The Olympics as a televised event represents both nationalism and internationalism, a contradictory storyline that encourages rooting against and for other nations, which past research supports. Riggs, Eastman, and Golobic's (1993) content analysis of CBS and TNT Olympic commentary found that the U.S. received the largest number of nationalistic references, which were often reflexive of U.S. foreign policy. These nationalistic references were either sympathetic towards the U.S. or a U.S. ally, which expressed favoritism towards the country, or hostile, which expressed discontent with or portraying the entity in opposition to the interests of the U.S or an ally. The authors concluded that nationalism is completely woven into the fabric of the greater Olympic discourse, which includes the Olympic television broadcasts and other Olympic media commentary, and places Olympic performances in terms of performances of their nation-states. Similarly, Billings (2008b) content analysis indicated that the NBC Olympic coverage is "unabashedly American" and creates a bifurcated "us versus them"

mentality. This —us ~~vs~~us them” mentality seems to be bolstered by the fact that in the U.S., where fans typically split their sports loyalties among hundreds of professional and college teams, the large majority of Olympic viewers unite behind their national team (Billings, 2008b).

Despite nationalistic undertones of U.S. Olympic television broadcasts, the Olympics also embody an international coming together every two years. Large-scale sporting occasions such as the Olympics are some of the very rare events that can still command a large audience of all classes, ages, and other interests (Beck & Bosshart, 2003b). Supposed universal values such as the —Olympic ideal” are built into the spectacle of the Games over and over again (Tomlinson, 1996). To promote the —Olympic ideal”, television can create memorable visual symbols and sound bites, promoting the IOC’s images of the interlocked Olympics rings, flames, doves of peace, and the equality of participants (Larson & Rivenburgh, 1991).

While the —Olympic ideal” should be important in Olympic media coverage, framing research of Olympic reporting suggests that the media focus has been on nationalistic or conflict-driven frames. Zaharopoulos’ (2007) examination of framing of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games in the *New York Times* found no articles framed predominantly in terms of peace and friendship, with the dominant report of the Games crafted around episodic or conflict-oriented frames. The frequent focus on topics and issues such as concern for U.S. security by the U.S. government suggested ethnocentric coverage by the U.S.

A number of other content analyses have also focused on the media’s coverage of the Olympics, analyzing the political nature of such coverage (e.g. Riggs et al., 1993;

Salwen & Garrison, 1987), and the distorted coverage of gender (e.g. Billings, 2007 & 2008a; Billings & Angelini, 2007; Billings & Eastman, 2003; Bissell & Duke, 2007; Eastman & Billings, 1999; Hardin, Lynn, Walsdorf, & Hardin, 2002; Hardin, Simpson, Whiteside, & Garris, 2007) and ethnicity (Billings, 2008b). Very little research, however, goes beyond content analysis of the Olympic media coverage to examine possible effects of the way the media covers the Olympics.

In one of the only available studies of both the content of NBC's television broadcast of the Olympic Games as well as survey data about that content, Billings (2008b) examined the portrayal of gender, ethnicity, and nationality in the 1996-2006 Olympic telecasts. During the 2006 Torino Games, Billings (2008b) surveyed three different sets of respondents at three different times: the day of the 2006 Torino Games opening ceremony, two weeks later, and a month later. Respondents from the Southeastern United States were surveyed about their Olympic viewing habits (e.g. how much they watch and what were the memorable moments) and their knowledge of the number of total medals won by the U.S., in an attempt to see if there was a difference between the number of actual medals and what respondents thought were won by watching the telecast. He found that respondents "wildly overestimated" (p. 141) the success of their country's athletes. The respondents collectively believed that the U.S. had won approximately 30% of the total medals, nearly three times the actual 11% of total medals won. Billings argued that these findings supported an "Ameri-centric" (p. 142) focus of viewers and the NBC telecast.

Priming Effects of Olympic Telecasts

If NBC's Olympic content is —~~A~~meri-centric" as Billings (2008b) argues, experimental research will allow us to better understand the effects of nationalistic coverage on viewers. McCombs and Reynolds (2009) admit that because journalists do not have the time or the capacity to gather all the information about every single occurrence, they rely on a set of professional norms to guide their sampling of the environment. Journalists who cover international sporting events are no exception. It is unclear from the available research whether the focus of sports media content (agenda setting) or the way sports media content frames its reporting (second-level agenda setting) can possibly affect the way millions of Olympics viewers might think about their own or other nations.

Thus, most people's understanding of the Olympics is through the media coverage. Research has documented the media's ability to prime, or —the effects of the content of the media on people's later behavior or judgments related to the content that was processed" (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2009, p. 75). While much political priming research exists (e.g. Carpentier, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008; Hwang, Gotlieb, Nah, & McLeod, 2007; Sheafer & Weinmann, 2005), there is little to nothing about how sports media coverage might prime viewers. Past research has not examined whether or not there is a priming effects, a connected but separate media effect of agenda setting and framing (Price, Tewskbury, & Powers, 1997), of international sporting event media coverage. Specifically, we do not understand whether Olympic television broadcasts can possibly prime nationalistic attitudes.

While priming has not been studied related to international mediated sporting events, political priming research provides a possible model of similar effects. For example, Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier (2009) in their discussion of political priming explain that most individuals have little to no contact with the President of the U.S. or first hand experiences of the political events about which the media report. To measure priming effects, this research often measures presidential approval as the chief outcome variable, and Roskos-Ewoldsen et al (2009) argue that political priming should focus on the type of information people use to make judgments and how much that information is used in making a judgment.

Just as individuals make judgments of the president based on the information they receive from the media, they have little contact with the nations participating in international sporting events such as the Olympics and World Cup. What information they receive from the media coverage of these events could prime their judgments of those nations, their athletes, and political leaders as well as possibly prime their own nationalistic attitudes.

Study Justification

Understanding whether or not these priming effects exist are important for several reasons: (1) viewers may well be affected by the distortion in Olympic media content; (2) priming effects could impact international political relationships; (3) other parties besides the media have an interest in priming effects on viewers; and (4) the contradiction in the Olympic storyline may be important to the Olympic movement.

First, as mentioned previously, a great deal of research seems fixated on Olympic media content, such as possible distortions related to gender and ethnicity as well as a

nationalistic or conflict-oriented focus, yet we have very little understanding if such reporting matters or, more specifically, not has any effect on the hundreds of millions of viewers who watch the Olympics. Sport television producers make important decisions about what the viewers will and will not see, and while producers “cannot dictate when an athlete makes a play,” they can “react to what the athletes do before, during, and after each play” (Chandler 1998, p. 2). The Olympic “ideal” clearly has great promise for bringing nations together, but the media’s portrayal of this ideal, or the lack thereof, may hinder the Olympic ideal from being realized. If the Olympic telecast provides viewers with a distorted view of Olympic competition, one that gives the Olympic “ideal” of bringing nations together, there could be missed opportunities to advance the peaceful message of the Olympic movement. Again, no effects research exists to substantiate the possible impact of the Olympic telecast viewing.

In addition, viewers could be affected by distorted and prejudiced images within the Olympic telecast, which go against the intended purpose of the modern Olympic movement. Billings and Angelini (2007) argue, “The impact of witnessing differential treatment within mediated sport may impact social interactions that viewers have away from the television, because prejudices that are reinforced within a sportscast may harden notions that people have in organizational, educational, family, or other interpersonal settings,” (p. 108). Still, the Billings and Angelini study, along with other content analyses, cannot substantiate the impact “differential treatment” within televised sport can have. Experimental research is needed to determine if distorted Olympic coverage has specific effects on viewers.

If there are no effects, then it ultimately may not matter whether the Olympics are cast within a nationalism or internationalism frame; but if effects are found, the influence of particular framing may affect not only Olympic viewers, but could also ultimately impact the relationships between nations involved in Olympic competition. With millions of people watching the Olympics, much is at stake for the broadcast companies, journalists, commercial sponsors, the nations represented in the Olympics telecasts, and viewers themselves. Viewers may very well formulate political attitudes by watching something that seems as apolitical as sport competition, without realizing such attitudes have been influenced.

Second, while the framing research is limited, it raises questions as to whether or not the media's focus on national conflict could have an impact on international political attitudes and relationships. Based on their findings, Riggs et al. (1993) argued that U.S. Olympic television discourse, specifically CBS and TNT commentary, reinforced U.S. political ideology and the unfolding U.S. foreign policy. They conclude (p. 237):

The relationship between overt political events, such as Olympic boycotts, and the discourse surrounding them highlights the explicit nationalism in the games. However, the exercise of nationalistic rhetoric by journalists who may even believe they are reporting non-political events is more implicit, and therefore insidious.

Journalists may not be aware that they are further politicizing the already political Olympic Games, and such "nationalistic rhetoric" by journalists could possibly effect how U.S. citizens perceive other nations. Moreover, the national stereotypes used within the global sports broadcasts can essentialize, or promote clichés about, a nation's athletes to international audiences, which can last for decades (Beck & Bosshart, 2003c). For example, Germans are ambitious and hard-working, Brits are tough and fair, and Asians

are quick and nimble, all of which might represent a viewer's only knowledge about a nation.

If Olympic TV viewers are watching for the political undertones within the Olympic storyline, there are perhaps some public diplomacy ramifications. Encouraging viewers to tune in for the nationalistic undertones and reaffirm their nation's superiority on and off the field could negatively impact viewers' perceptions of other nations. In addition, the effects are possibly more powerful if viewers are not watching for the political undertones. If viewers watch the Olympics believing they are just watching sports, they think the Games are apolitical and are therefore not in their political mindset. These viewers are probably not aware of the political messages embedded within the Games' broadcast.

All viewers, whether they realize political undertones exist or not, might have previous stereotypes or attitudes about other nations, and people reaffirmed by watching the Olympic telecast. Maguire and Poulton (1999) suggest that while international sporting events can have unifying effects within a nation, these contests can also stray "far from uniting nations" and can at times be "divisive, myth-forming and potentially dangerous," (p. 18) in part because of the powerful media representations. Yet, we do not understand how Olympic coverage might hurt or help viewers' opinions of other countries. Larson and Rivenburgh's (1991) study confirmed that television constructs the Olympic spectacle into multiple realities with, they argue, profound implications for images of nations, culture, and the Olympic movement, but still their research only speculates about these implications. It is well documented that the media has a tendency to accentuate certain aspects of sporting events such as the athletic and political prowess

of the home nation and the lack of such attributes for other nations, but little is known if such media depiction has an effect on viewers' attitudes.

Third, while it would be easy to assume that the media would be mostly to blame for the framing of the Olympics, there are other parties that influence the media's agenda, and in turn could benefit from priming effects. As Fortunato (2000) argues, there is a critical relationship between the mass media and the organizations that provide the media content. The organizations providing media content have an agenda they want communicated to an audience. With the Olympics, the organizations with possible agendas are numerous. Many different parties -- from broadcast companies, journalists, commercial sponsors, and even political parties -- have an important investment in the media spectacle of the Olympics (Farrell, 1989). These parties compete to frame the media message with a desired priming effect on viewers that will serve their individual needs.

Beck and Bosshart (2003a) claim, —The history of the modern Olympic games has become a history of Olympic commercialism. Big money is at stake! Selling the television property rights was and still is like having the right to print money” (p. 22). Television networks join the extravagant bidding wars for the broadcast rights to the Games. For broadcast companies, they must create a televised Olympics package that will draw in viewers. For sponsors, how the Olympic telecasts are framed and the priming effects that result, impact their decision to sponsor. Without sponsors, there is probably no telecast so the broadcast companies must please the sponsors with a broadcast that will draw in the sponsors' targeted audience.

In addition, nations and cities fight for the rights to hosts the Games, in part to serve their own political purposes. Senn (1999) argues, —Governments have tried to exploit the Games for their own ends, and at times the IOC has itself put pressure on governments. It is no surprise, then, that the Games have served as a focus for national rivalries and ideological rivalries between states,” (p. x). If priming effects are found to further exist, it could justify nations’ many efforts to influence the Olympic media agenda in an attempt to affect political outcomes. Providing nationalistic media content or foreign policy agenda information to the media covering the Olympics could help nations or political groups within a nation further their agendas at home and abroad. Danner (1997) claims that nations frequently stage large-scale international media events hoping that the media coverage will positively affect their national image.

Finally, understanding whether or not there is a priming effect will shed some light as to whether the Olympic storyline should be a contradiction of internationalism and nationalism. While the Olympic movement claims to focus on bringing nations together within friendly sport competition it has become clear that nations joining together in peace is not what attracts Olympic viewers. Perhaps it is healthy for the Olympic telecast to frame this world event as both a coming together of nations and a display of nationalism. While some might argue we should promote the Olympic ideal, the Olympic contradiction could ultimately be important to the Games’ survival and attracting millions of viewers. As Hoberman (1986) claims, —It is the utopian dimension of sport, as much as the political forces which seek to exploit it, which accounts for the survival of the Olympic movement” (p. 5). The Olympics are possibly not just a

–unifying” force between nations, but a force that thrives on the competition and conflict amongst nations.

Study Method

An experimental design will be used to study Olympic viewing motivations and priming effects. An important component of understanding these possible effects is to first examine why viewers are drawn to the Olympics to determine what role nationalism, international conflict, and internationalism play in their Olympic viewing motivations. Combining the past motivation scale with items related specifically to the Olympics based on past literature will provide a broader measure of possible Olympic viewing motivation. With a media focus on conflict, it is easy to assume that either nationalism or internationalism motivates the millions of viewers who watch the Olympics every two years; however, whether viewers watch the Olympics for the same reasons they watch other sports remains unanswered, which this dissertation will compare. There is the possibly false assumption that viewers are not motivated by norms but manipulated by spectacle and ideology (Rothenbuhler, 1989).

To measure the second purpose of this study, priming effects of the televised framing of these contrasting images of peace and conflict, I will examine if different frames affect different audiences by measuring the variables of national pride and identity, viewers’ perceptions of other nations, and fan identification. In addition to measuring viewing motivations, measuring sport fan identification will provide insight into whether or not there are differences in these motivations between fans and non-fans. Determining if differences exist in motivation for watching, or not watching, between sports fans and non-sports fans will also provide some explanation as to what draws the

millions of viewers into the Olympics and the role conflict plays in drawing in viewers. We do not know if international conflict or nationalistic pride factors into why so many people who would consider themselves non-fans of sport watch the Olympics.

In this first chapter, I have provided a justification for this study. Specifically, I have explained the importance of studying Olympic broadcast coverage as well as the nationalism/internationalism contradiction within the Olympics and possible effects. In addition, I have outlined the goals of this study. Chapter two will review literature related to the media coverage of the Olympics and the political undertones within the Olympics. In addition, the pertinent media theories of priming and framing will be explained. Next, chapter three details the study's design and method of analysis. Chapter three provides operational definitions of each of the study's variables, a description of the measurement for each variable, and a description of the experimental design.

Chapter four includes the results of the study's research questions and hypotheses as well as the descriptive statistics and specifics of the data analysis procedures. Finally, Chapter five discusses the study's key findings. In synthesizing the results, this chapter applies the findings of the study and discusses the contributions of these findings to sport communication. The chapter also addresses the limitations, future research, and concluding remarks.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

As noted in Chapter 1, millions of U.S. television viewers watch the Olympics, but little is known about the reasons why these viewers tune into the Games. Perhaps even more alarming, the inherent political undertones within sport carry over into the Olympic Games' coverage, with the competition often framed to highlight or promote between nationalistic pride and internationalism. Danner (1997) explains that our conceptualization of national identity will be influenced through such media images and coverage of large events like the Olympics. In turn, nations clamor to stage events such as the Olympics because they think the attendant media coverage will positively affect national image. Thus, the way the Olympics are covered in the media could also impact viewers' perceptions of their own as well as other nations, yet this claim has not been substantiated by empirical research. The current chapter explores past literature related to the political undertones within sport, including Olympic boycotts and protests, examination of the Olympic nationalism/internationalism tension — and especially how this tension is displayed in Olympic media coverage — a discussion of Olympic television viewing motivations, and finally, a discussion of media framing and priming of the Olympics in order to illustrate the paucity of such research and also to provide a theoretical framework for the current study.

Linking Politics and Sport

Sport is so much more than a game involving athletes, coaches, and spectators. All too often, national, state, or local government officials and/or entities become

involved in athletic competition, thoroughly mixing sport with politics. Guttmann (2003) argues that even though some scholars (and officials) wish to pretend that sport and politics do not mix, with sport not wishing to be sullied by the dirty “taint” by politics, substantial research exposes the political influences on and implications of sport and the political controversies that have occurred within sport, particularly international sport.

The intersection of politics and sport can be both positive and negative. Strenk (1979), for example, argues that on the positive side, the nations of Argentina and Brazil have employed the popular game of soccer to improve the image their nation's of dictatorships. In contrast, South Africa, due to its legal system of racial segregation under apartheid, had a ban placed on its national teams from participating in international sporting competitions (e.g. Booth, 1988; Booth, 2003; Jarvie, 1993; Kidd, 1988; Lapchick, 1979; Steenveld & Strelitz, 1998), including no Olympic Games participation from 1960-1992. South Africa was only reinstated in international sporting events after the nation rejected the political system of racial apartheid.

Franks, Hawes, and Macintosh (1988) claim that participation in international sport fulfills nations' domestic objectives, such as improving citizens' feelings about their country, furthering national unity, encouraging excellence and achievements in all national endeavors, promoting physical fitness among the citizens, and as a means of legitimating government and economic systems including both capitalism or fascism. In addition to promoting domestic objectives, there are several international and diplomatic objectives to be gained from participating in international sporting events, including the creation of national identity and as a means to express political policy.

Sport and National Politics

At times, national sport can be a direct reflection of the political system in which it operates. Lapchick (1979) explored historically how sports policy in South Africa at one time directly reflected its political system, which was based on the systematic exclusion of nonwhites from full membership in all of that society's institutions — including sport. In addition, sport in the Soviet Union once reflected the Communist system (Guttmann, 1988; Riordan, 1988; Sugden & Tomlinson, 2000; Washburn, 1956). Washburn's (1956) historical analysis explained that sport in Soviet Russia after World War II could not be separated from the realm of politics. There was no "sport for sport's sake," but all athletes—from hunters to gymnasts—strived to win as an expression of their obligation to Soviet society. Sport in the U.S.S.R. did not have an independent existence apart from state power, as it was treated as a consolidation of state power through mass training and indoctrination. The Soviet state subsidized athletes of championship caliber, taking potential champions from the farm or factory and placing them on the field.

Following apartheid, sport has had a positive influence within South African national politics. Steenveld and Strelitz (1998) critically examined the media coverage of the 1995 rugby World Cup and its impact on nation building in South Africa. The 1995 rugby World Cup was singled out as the most significant political event of the year in South Africa, in part because the recently elected Mandela government attempted to promote a vision of "South Africanism" beyond the view of ethnic identity promoted by the apartheid ideology. Uniting all of South Africa behind the nation's rugby team

served as a potent symbol and provided the momentum for the creation of a common South African identity, despite continuing ethnic differences within the nation.

Sport and External Political Relations

While sport can play a role in national politics, more frequently sport intersects with a nation's external political relations. Sport has often been used to wage political ideological warfare with other nations, defined by scholars as a "war without weapons" (e.g. Mangan, 2003). During the twenty-first century war on terror, U.S. President George W. Bush attempted to promote his stance regarding the liberation of Iraq and Afghanistan within the context of the Olympics. Butterworth (2004) critically analyzed the Bush campaign's airing of a commercial that valorized the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq by touting the Iraqi soccer team qualifying for 2004 Olympics. In addition, Bush claimed in his campaign rhetoric regarding the ongoing "war on terrorism" responsibility for the freeing Iraq and Afghanistan, which allowed these nations to compete in the Olympics, and in turn, taking credit for the success of the Iraqi soccer team. The Iraqi players rejected the idea that they should be thankful for what the U.S. did for them, but while competing in the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, the Iraqi team was careful not to demonize Americans as evil enemies. Thus, Butterworth concludes that Bush constructed a metaphor of democratic triumph through the Iraqi soccer team, which illustrates the diplomatic potential of sport.

Even earlier than George W. Bush's attempt to use the Iraqi soccer team as a triumph for U.S. spreading of democracy around the world, communistic nations used sport to communicate their political ideology (Arnaud & Riordan, 1998). In Cuba (Slack & Whitson, 1988; Riordan, 1981), China (Hoberman, 1987; Riordian, 1981), and East

Germany (Merkel, 2006), the promotion of communist ideology has been advanced through international and Olympic competition. For example, after the revolution in Cuba, Fidel Castro's quest for military and economic security was clearly expressed through large athletic displays and the use of sport as a surrogate for military supremacy (Slack & Whitson, 1988). During the division of Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) developed its own National Olympic Committee in 1951 and sought to unite with the Federal Republic to make one German Olympic Committee (Carr, 1980). The Federal Republic resisted, and despite thousands of hours of discussion and meetings, in 1968 the GDR received the recognition they had been seeking as the IOC allowed its separate team to participate in subsequent Olympic Games. In sport, unlike the actual divided Germany, both sides had gained "freedom" on the athletic field.

Perhaps the master of using sport in ideological warfare was the Cold War Soviets. The U.S.S.R. depended on external sport relations to further its foreign policy with other nations (Riordan, 1988). Sport held a stable role during the Communist Soviet period by providing a diplomatic and propagandist medium to promote relations with its neighbors. While the U.S.S.R.'s place as the sole Communist nation hindered its bargaining leverage with other world powers, its immediate neighbors were all relatively weak and relied heavily on Soviet support. Another aim of Soviet sporting relations was to win support for the U.S.S.R. and its policies among developing states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To help developing states, the Soviets sent coaches and instructors, built sports facilities, trained foreign sports administrators in the U.S.S.R., arranged tours by Soviet athletes, and held sports "friendship weeks" with political figures from other nations.

In addition to its use as a war without weapons, sport can be used in a more traditional diplomatic manner in further a nation's external communications. Large-scale international sporting events have also provided an avenue for sport diplomacy. Henry, Amara, and Al-Tauqi (2003) examined how the Pan-Arab Games reflected the already existing tensions between Arab nations. Pan-Arabism, a form of macro-nationalism, sought to integrate and encourage cooperation between Arab states, in which sport played an important role. While the Pan-Arab Games projected unity among Arab nations, there actually existed a tense fragmentation between these nations because of hyper-localism and nationalistic feelings.

For South Korea, hosting the Olympics provided a very useful avenue for public diplomacy. Manheim's (1990) qualitative analysis explored the political and economic objectives of Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in his nation's bid for the 1988 Games, and the Olympics' role in Korea's approach to public diplomacy, providing several important conclusions for political communication research. First, the Olympic Games and other similarly magnetic events do have the potential to play a cathartic role in the political life of nations. Second, the Olympic Games is often such a potent political symbol that the host government was unable to maintain control over their impact. South Korea intended for the Olympics to be its "coming out party," demonstrating the nation's political stability and economic growth, yet student protests pushing for a democratic South Korea impeded the South Korean government's attempts to project desired national pride that it sought from hosting the Olympics. Third, the impending Olympics brought unusual outside attention to South Koreans, which only added to the pressures on the Korean government to formulate a response sufficient to defuse its opposition against

further democratization. Lastly, the international news media became a catalyst in both domestic and international exchanges that led to political changes towards democracy in South Korea in advance of the Olympic Games.

While the 1988 Seoul Olympics presents an excellent case study of how sport can be used to further a nation's international relations goals, Carter (1999) warns that a sport team from one nation playing against another nation's team abroad does not necessarily equal diplomacy. He criticized the U.S. media's portrayal of the so-called "baseball diplomacy" cultural exchange when the Cuban national baseball team visited Baltimore in 1999 to play a second exhibition game with the U.S. While diplomacy involves the practice of international politics between states, no U.S. officials were actually involved in the negotiations in Havana that produced the exhibition baseball series, nor did any U.S. officials actually attend the game. Carter (1999) concludes that categorizing this game as "diplomacy" was a false media creation. Although this game was not actually considered "official" diplomacy by the two nations, the possibility of "soft" sport diplomacy sometimes makes way for the hard power of sport in international politics, as in the 1988 South Korea Olympics Games. Still, the hope for diplomacy through sport is often overshadowed by the most frequent "political" use of an international sporting event, the Olympic boycott. The next section narrows the focus from the broad intersection of politics and sports discussed thus far to the frequently studied Olympic boycott.

Olympic Boycotts and Protests

The founder of the Modern Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, asserted that the re-establishment of the Olympics allowed for the rare glorification of the

individual athlete (Shaikin, 1988), attempting to draw the focus away from collective glory for nations and the political undertones that accompanied the Games. Nonetheless, just forty years after the founding of the modern Olympics, the 1936 German Olympic Games, under Hitler's rule, were threatened with widespread boycotts by many nations (e.g. Kruger & Murray, 2003; Mandell, 1987). In the end, the 1936 Olympics were held with most nations attending.

In the history of the modern games, the 1956 Australian games, the 1980 Soviet games, and the 1984 U.S. Games were all plagued by major nations boycotting the Games for political reasons; and the 1952 Soviet games, 1968 Mexican games, 1972 Munich, West German games, and the 1976 Canadian games were all heavily protested. The black Africans and also African-Americans challenged the political status quo through their "Black Power" salutes on the 1968 Mexico City Olympic podium, and 28 African nations boycotted the 1976 Montreal games (Edwards, 1984). While these boycotts made strong political statements, it was the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre that demonstrated extreme political violence. Eight Palestinian terrorists, part of the Black September group, broke into the Olympic Village and took eleven Israeli athletes, coaches, and officials hostage. In the end, all of the Israelis and all but three of the Palestinians were killed in the standoff. From an analytic perspective, the 1980 Soviet Games boycott (Hulme, 1990; Hoberman, 1986) and the 1984 U.S. Games boycott (Redmond, 1984; Shaikin, 1988) have received the greatest scholarly examination.

Political tensions surrounded the 1980 Soviet Olympics as these were the first Games in which a totalitarian country served as host since the 1936 German Games. President Jimmy Carter had initially ruled out a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic

Games, but changed his position when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late 1979 (Kanin, 1980). The Soviets deplored the U.S. decision, attacking Carter, and the decision possibly hindered East-West relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. Not surprisingly, Eastern Europe and Communist nations like Cuba followed the Soviet line, and Great Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher staunchly supported the U.S. stance, but the Brits did not boycott the Soviet Games. Only West Germany, Kenya, Canada, China, and the Philippines joined the U.S. by not participating in the 1980 Olympics. Kanin (1980) concluded that while the 1980 Olympic boycott was the most extensive diplomatic use of sport in modern Olympic history, neither the U.S. nor the Soviets achieved exactly what they wanted. The Games were not moved from Moscow, but the U.S. absence robbed the U.S.S.R. of the athletic pride and political prestige of previous Olympic competition (Hill, 1999).

In addition to the 1980 Games, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, which were boycotted by the Soviet Union as a seeming response to the 1980 U.S. boycott, have also been the subject of scholarly research. Guttmann (1988) argued that the most dramatic aspect of Modern Olympic competition, spanning the 1952 Helsinki Games to the 1988 Seoul Games, was the sports rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In many ways, this battle was seen as a proxy rivalry between Capitalism and Communism. Success for one nation's ideas and very way of life was increasingly measured by official medal counts between the two nations, as opposed to the celebration of performances of the athletes themselves. When 17 nations boycotted the L.A. Games, it only added to the propaganda war raging between the U.S. and the Soviets.

Edwards (1984) claims that the 1980 U.S. boycott of the Moscow Olympics began the course leading up to troubles with the 1984 L.A. games. Challenges facing the L.A. Games included the participation of the People's Republic of China for the first time in 32 years, and possible black-African nation boycotts. In addition, political *faux pas* by the L.A. Olympic Committee, including the California legislature declaring the Soviets "unwelcome" in L.A., plagued the 1984 L.A. Games, which came to be called the "capitalist" Games in opposition to the 1980 communist Games. Edwards (1984) concluded that while many sought to promote the Olympics as an apolitical gathering of nations, the 1980 and 1984 Games demonstrated that sport at no level, especially the international level, "can be isolated from the impact of objective forces shaping the contours of human events" (p. 173).

Clearly, international sport is connected to politics, whether such connection is desired or not. Sport has the power to evoke emotions and feelings, as well as a strong element of conflict which is the essence of politics (Franks, Hawes, & Macintosh, 1988). As Kanin (1980) argued, "Political sport serves to remind us that international relations, no matter how secretly conducted, are bound to the mass publics who, in the final analysis, serve as both audience and judge of those who lead them" (p. 24). When international political tensions arise, and a nation's political leaders address such tensions through boycotting international sporting events, the coming together of nations as found in the Olympics become more than just a game of sport. Boycotts and protests of Olympic Games are a reflection of the inherent tension between nationalism and internationalism, a tension that was part of the Olympic Games beginning in ancient Greece and demonstrated with fervor since the resumption of the Modern Games in 1896.

The Olympic Tension

As mentioned earlier, modern Olympic founder Baron de Coubertin saw sports as a “vehicle for furthering international friendship and understanding” (Strenk, 1979, p. 138). By agreeing to cooperate and participate in the Olympic Games, nations would be taking an important step that could help bring about world peace. The human relationships built through sport would lead to forming national relationships in areas such as education, cultural exchange, and political diplomacy (Strenk, 1979). De Coubertin believed that international sport could contribute to international peace, but he warned of possible problems if athletics and big business started joined, specifically if athletes were used to further the financial success of corporate interests or to further the political interests of nation states (Moretti, 2005).

Despite his warnings, de Coubertin himself was partially responsible for promoting the tension between internationalism, or world peace and unity, and nationalism, loyalty to one’s nation, within the Olympic Games. Dyreson (1999) argued that while de Coubertin developed the modern Games as a vehicle for world peace he also promoted the Games as a way to “toughen up” the national image of his home nation, particularly following the humiliating political defeat handed to the French by the Prussians in 1871. Thus, while De Coubertin publically proclaimed that he sought to leave politics out of the Games, he had clear political motives for developing the Modern Games from the very beginning.

In addition to de Coubertin, the IOC is also partially responsible for promoting the Games’ nationalism/internationalism tension. From its formation, the IOC never adequately acknowledged the importance of amateur athletes to the Olympic movement.

While many believed amateur athletes would not be motivated by financial reasons, the IOC eventually allowed professional athletes to participate in the Games, which was not part of Coubertin's original vision (Moretti, 2005). Also, while the IOC claimed to promote internationalism and the recognition of athletes apart from their home nations (Strenk, 1979), such decisions as the introduction of national flags and anthems as part of victory ceremonies and to only formally recognize individual athletes as a representation of their home nation furthers the promotion of national pride (Roche, 2004).

A seemingly simple decision to introduce national flags paved the way for the growth of nationalism at the Olympics. The waving of national flags at the Games provides a prime illustration of the development of excessive national passion, and further adding to such tensions, each nation's citizens project the sports in which their athletes dominate as the most important part of the Games (Senn, 1999). In turn, athletic achievement at the Olympics suggests the superiority of a nation because "world-class athletes and other sports personnel emerge as little more than political foot soldiers, frontline troops in assorted cultural and ideological struggles camouflaged under the pageantry of international competitions" (Edwards 1984, p. 172). Franks et al. (1988) agree that the Olympics are much more than competitions among individual athletes, but competitions between nations, ideologies, power blocs, and ethnic groups. Many citizens and national leaders, who often attend the Games amid heavy media attention, consider the appearance of their national flag at the Games as magical; however, the expression of national feelings at an international gathering like the Olympics differs among both a nation's citizens and its leaders and also differs greatly from nation to nation (Senn, 1999).

The tension between nationalism and internationalism accompanying the Olympic Games is prominently reflected within the televised broadcast and the ensuing drama seems to be made just for television. The addition of professional athletes to the Olympic competition and the increase of commercialism in Olympic TV have all contributed to the growing nationalistic tone of the Olympic telecast (Roche, 2004). Franks et al. (1988) claim that the emotions of sport drama are often not rational and the reactions that resonate from spectators go far beyond the normal expression of one's desire to see their nation achieve political and economic goals. Yet, international sports are mass spectacles with athletes their heroes, their plots romances or tragedies, and their outcome triumph or defeat (Franks et al., 1988). The drama inherent within any sport is further amplified with the nationalism versus internationalism undertones of the Olympics, a tension which is made even more explicit in U.S. Olympic media telecasts.

The Tension in Olympic Media Coverage

Time-and space-compressed international competitions such as the Olympics are a powerful intersection of media, nation, and sport (Rowe, McKay, & Miller, 1998). Sport media can influence the way people look at other countries as well as their own, both positively and negatively (Beck & Bosshart, 2003c). Because television images etch new pictures in our heads (see Lippmann, 1922), Larson and Rivenburgh (1991) argue that global television can be a "double-edged sword," as it can both promote common goals or international understanding and advance simplistic stereotypes or the narrower interests of individual nations and groups. This dual role of media is epitomized in the Olympic Games, as demonstrated and discussed in the extant research.

Nationalism within Olympic Media Coverage

Maguire, Poulton, and Possamai (1999) suggested that international sporting events amount to nothing more than “patriot games,” with such nationalism reinforced and reflected in powerful media representations. Other scholars have also claimed that the media play a powerful role in forming nationalistic images with Olympics coverage (see Hoberman, 1986). Billings (2008) concludes, —The gargantuan identity issue within the Olympics telecast continues to be overt (and covert) nationalism” (p. 90).

Much research has focused exclusively on the United States’ “patriot games” (e.g. Dyreson, 1999; Hughson, Inglis, & Free, 2005; Pope, 1997), which has been reaffirmed through analyses of Olympic media coverage since the beginning of the Modern Olympic movement. U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt claimed at the turn of the twentieth century that U.S. sport was not only vital to American culture, but it could also transform world culture (Dyreson, 1999). Complimenting Roosevelt’s American century, the American press actually invented the tradition of counting Olympic medals. The media counting not only demonstrated U.S. athletic prowess, but was an actual scorecard of national superiority of one nation over others (Dyreson, 1999).

At the height of the U.S.-Soviet tensions under the Reagan administration, media coverage reaffirmed the nationalistic bias first developed in early Olympic Games reporting. Edwards’ (1984) critical analysis of *Time Magazine* and the *New York Times* prior to the 1984 L.A. Games argued that these media outlets were overwhelmingly supportive of the U.S. led 1980 Olympic boycott. In the weeks leading up to the Games, *Time* stressed the boycott, Soviet security, and Soviet press censorship as well as the negative impact of the boycott on the quality of the Games. *New York Times*’

editorialists and sports writers unflinchingly supported the U.S. led boycott and repeatedly informed readers that the Soviet Union's goal was to use the Olympics for political purposes and that the U.S. should justifiably expose those intentions by boycotting. Similarly, Moretti's (2003) content analysis of the *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* from 1948-1988 found that U.S. athletes were the subjects and sources of sports stories at rates that exceeded the actual number of medals won, while Eastern European and Soviet athletes were discussed far less than their actual medal counts.

Once television became the dominant Olympics medium, TV sports reporting followed the American Olympic newspaper narrative beginning with the earlier Modern Olympics and perfected by the 1908 Games, which were just the fourth Modern Olympics. The dominant press narrative featured nationalistic undertones with American athletes portrayed as patriotic protagonists fighting for our nations' Olympic supremacy (measured by most medals won) against a cast of other nations who sought to defeat the U.S — both on and off the field of sport competition (Dyreson, 1999). As television's romance with the Olympics developed, TV played a large role in what Riggs et al. (1993) pointed to as a conflict between internationalism and national interests built within the structure of the modern Games.

With U.S. television networks making up the largest part of television rights fees sold for each Olympics, the Olympic Games are dependent in large part on U.S. television broadcasters (Danner, 1997). Moretti (2005) explains that TV networks seek to be seen as industry leaders among shareholders and the public by having broadcast rights to as many diverse and meaningful sporting events as possible, such as the Olympics. NBC, which in recent years lost its professional baseball and basketball (but

regained football rights), eagerly sought to become the “network of the Olympic Games” to establish its standing as a network industry leader.

Several content analyses have exposed U.S. televised nationalistic messages and images. Riggs et al.’s (1993) content analysis of Olympic television broadcasts, discussed briefly in the previous chapter, found that the U.S. received the largest number of nationalistic references in CBS and TNT’s Olympic commentary. Riggs et al. (1993) studied commentary made by CBS and TNT’s hosts and commentators, promotional advertisements for upcoming segments, and segments on athletes to see if the events were portrayed as serving any national purpose — in part because the 1992 Games were heralded by many as the return of the “good old days” of the Games, before the rise of Communism, allowing for a celebration of world freedom. In exploring how the media incorporated a nationalist frame, Riggs et al. were guided by several general assumptions for all Olympic telecasts: (1) journalism cannot be separated from ideology, (2) the media advanced clear international enemies such as the Soviet Union after World War II, and (3) the ritual nature of the Olympic spectacle presents both afflictions and cures for the media’s discourse of nationalism. Riggs et al. concluded that while dynamic world shifts continually redefine Olympic media, during the 1992 Games the U.S. media no longer had the Soviets to rally against, but their commentary remained overwhelmingly pro-U.S.

In additional research supporting the notion of nationalistic U.S. Olympic television coverage, Billings and various colleagues have conducted several content analyses examining NBC’s Olympic telecasts. These studies found similar pro-U.S. coverage. In their content analysis of the 1994, 1996, and 1998 U.S. Olympic Games’ telecasts, Eastman and Billings (1999) found that 19 of the 30 athletes on top-ten lists for

amount of media coverage were American. Similarly, in a content analysis of NBC's coverage of the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Billings and Eastman (2002) found that 51% of all the athletes mentioned were American, yet Americans only won 11% of the medals. Also, the top-ten athletes most frequently mentioned were predominantly American, and half of all athletes mentioned were American.

The 2004 Athens Olympic broadcasts were even more overtly nationalistic. Billings and Angelini's (2007) content analysis of NBC's coverage found nationalistic differences in the commentary as varying descriptors were used for American and non-American athletes. For example, American athletes were frequently depicted as either excelling or failing because of their "concentration." Non-American athletes, however, were more likely depicted as failing because they lacked "athletic strength and ability." In addition, 85% of the most frequently mentioned athletes were Americans, and more American athletes than athletes from other all countries combined were mentioned.

Billings and Eastman (2003) also analyzed the 2002 Salt Lake Games, and while non-American athletes were mentioned more frequently than American athletes in this coverage, American athletes were referred to as more "composed" and "courageous," while non-Americans were reported as succeeding due largely to their "experience." In addition, Billings et al.'s (2008) content analysis of the 2006 Torino Winter Olympic prime-time telecasts found that non-American athletes were more frequently depicted as successful because of athletic strength or skill, while American athletes were more frequently categorized as succeeding because of "concentration" and "composure."

Interestingly, while all NBC Olympic broadcasts have a clear U.S. slant, NBC's Winter Olympics' broadcasts are not nearly as nationalistic when compared to the

Summer Olympics broadcasts (Billings et al., 2008). These differences in nationalistic coverage between the Summer and Winter Games do not always make sense. For example, the unabashed Americanization of the 2004 Summer Olympics could have been due to a country at war; but the U.S. would perhaps feel and be depicted as even more patriotic while hosting the 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City just a few months following 9/11 (Billings & Angelini, 2007). Still, the 2002 Games did not have nearly as many references to American athletes as the 2004 Games. Increased national pride post-9/11 was seen as one reason for increased ratings in the U.S. for the 2002 Games, representing an increased national awareness of the Olympics and Americans watching in greater numbers (Billings & Eastman, 2003). In synthesizing the data from various content analyses of Olympic coverage, Billings et al. (2008) conclude (p. 229):

It now appears evident that the anchor (predominantly Bob Costas) is utilized to set a heavily American agenda, as both 2002 and 2006 examinations found the host to overwhelmingly highlight American athletes over non-American athletes, particularly when compared to relative overall mentions, which favored non-American athletes.

Billings and Angelini (2007) claim that NBC, in order to feed the “ratings beast,” gives viewers what they want, the home team winning medals. Although these content analyses expose the nationalistic undertones in U.S. televised Olympic coverage, very little scholarship has supported the assertion that nationalism draws in the millions of U.S. Olympic television viewers. As mentioned earlier, nationalistic coverage goes against the notion of internationalism, which is at the core of the Olympic ideal and can also be found in Olympic media coverage.

Internationalism within Olympic Media Coverage

Despite the obvious U.S. bias in NBC’s Olympic coverage as documented through Billings’ work, other findings suggest that NBC occasionally attempts to appear

unbiased by promoting a theme or frame of internationalism for their Olympic Games coverage. For example, Eastman and Billings (1999) found that 37 percent of the athletes featured by the U.S. media were not Americans. Also, Billings and Eastman (2002), in analyzing the 2000 Sydney Olympics, found that foreign sports in which no Americans competed were mentioned more frequently than American sports that featured U.S. athletes, which they argue was done purposefully by the network to reduce the appearance of nationalist bias. Thus, such coverage could be seen as NBC's attempt to achieve greater fairness in their Olympic broadcasts.

In addition to NBC, other media outlets also promote internationalism in their Olympic coverage. Salwen and Garrison's (1987) content analysis of the *LA Times* Olympics sports supplement for the 1984 L.A. Games actually contradicted Edwards' (1984) non-scientific critical analysis of *Time Magazine* and the *New York Times*. Again, Edwards argued that those outlets were overwhelmingly supportive of the U.S. led 1980 Olympic boycott. Despite similar political undertones because of the Soviet's boycott of the 1984 Olympics, Salwen and Garrison (1987) found that most stories about the L.A. Games contained no political assertions. Danner's (1997) work also confirmed that U.S. Olympic media coverage can be positive towards other nations, supporting the theme of internationalism. In a content analysis of CBS's Olympic television broadcasts and the *Seattle Times* Olympics coverage of the 1994 Lillehammer Games, Danner (1997) found that CBS's coverage was particularly favorable toward the host country, Norway, in featured segments.

While the number of studies illustrating internationalism in U.S. Olympic media coverage are considerably less than those supporting nationalistic U.S. media coverage,

Salwen and Garrison's (1987) interpretation of their findings explains why the U.S. media coverage may well adopt an internationalist frame at times. Salwen and Garrison (1987) argue that the role of the media in promoting national politics varies based on the political system of that nation. For instance, in democratic societies, contrary to communist societies, the news media has press freedoms and is not meant to be a mouthpiece for the government (Salwen & Garrison, 1987).

Interplay between Nationalism/Internationalism in Olympic Media Coverage

Thus, U.S. Olympic media coverage is not either nationalist or internationalist, but often a combination of both, just like the Olympics themselves. Beginning with the 1896 Games, the Olympics were viewed from the U.S. media from two perspectives: 1) the Games were an instrument for promoting peaceful international relationships; and 2) U.S. victories were a matter of national prestige and proof that the U.S. was the world's leading nation in athletics as well as in every other marker of national power (Dyreson, 1999). Larson and Rivenburgh's (1991) content analysis is one of the few studies illustrating both themes within the Olympic narrative.

Larson and Rivenburgh compared audio and visual components of the 1988 Seoul Olympics opening ceremony telecasts as seen in the United States (commercial NBC), the United Kingdom (non-commercial BBC), and Australia (commercial TEN). All three networks selected and edited the available pictures from the international feed differently, and NBC alone was found to portray nationalist (U.S.) bias in their editing choices. NBC took more commercial breaks than TEN, cutting out the entrance of other nation's athletes and the cultural performances which displayed Korean music, dance, and narrative. The authors argue that such coverage limited the overall cultural or

international narrative of the Games for U.S. viewers, while the BBC, in contrast, broadcast the entire ceremony. NBC's visual style also differed from the other two networks as they interviewed the disorderly U.S. team members entering the arena and featured close-ups of U.S. athletes and televised several homemade signs with patriotic expressions carried by U.S. athletes.

NBC's coverage actually contradicted the IOC charter. The IOC allows networks such as NBC to air the opening ceremony by using the IOC's feed, but the IOC charter states that the televised coverage of the Olympic opening ceremony must be neutral and feature all countries equally. In total, NBC displayed only 86 national teams entering the stadium out of 160 teams, compared to 111 on TEN and 134 on the BBC.

Nonetheless, parts of NBC's broadcast supported the idea of Olympic internationalism and heightened the Games' theme introduced in the Seoul opening ceremonies, "Beyond all Barriers." Olympic themes such as the Olympic rings, flag, oath taking, dove release, and Olympic flame were quite consistent across all broadcasts, but TEN carried more Olympic symbols in their telecast. Still, NBC offered more glimpses of modern South Korea, both good and bad. NBC's coverage talked about South Korea's 98% literacy rate and displayed images of the demilitarized zone; but because the U.S. was an ally with South Korea, NBC also focused on South Korea's role as a global political player. Larson and Rivenburgh's (1991) findings illustrate the dual emphasis of opening ceremony telecasts on both nationalism and Olympic-style internationalism and confirm that television constructs the Olympic spectacle into multiple realities with profound implications for images of nation, culture, and the Olympic movement.

Olympic Television Viewing Motivations

The literature reviewed to this point has shown the inherent conflict the Olympic Games naturally provides to viewers, a tension between national pride and the ideal of internationalism. Research that has focused specifically on Olympic media coverage has found that the content of the Olympic mediated experience indeed focuses on certain aspects of the Games, including international political conflict, nationalistic undertones, and international peace and brotherhood. Such focus or framing makes sense because, as Danner (1997) argues, “Media events reflect many current journalistic news values; reporters are trained to report news that is timely, impacts people, has human interest elements, is unusual or different, happens close to home, and shows drama or conflict” (p. 61).

Still, the question remains as to whether or not the fundamental tension within the Olympic Games matters at all to television viewers. A first step in answering this question is determining what motivates Olympic television viewing. The Olympic Games represents perhaps the best example of televised sports’ ability to obtain large numbers of sport spectators. For instance, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games brought NBC a record 200 million plus viewers (Carter, 2008). The 2008 Games netted NBC more than \$100 million in ad sales profit and received perhaps the best word of mouth coverage of any Olympics coverage in decades (Carter, 2008).

While the Olympic television viewing phenomenon is impressive in its expanse, there remains some uncertainty as to what draws all of these viewers into the Games’ broadcast. The motivations of sports fans to watch their favorite sporting event is often very specific to individual fans. Televised sports fans are rather purposive in their

viewing habits compared to fans of other genres; sports fans plan out what they will watch instead of choosing a program only as a “last-ditch” alternative when there is nothing else to do or nothing else to watch (Gantz, Wang, Paul, & Potter, 2006). Gantz et al. (2006) argue that, ultimately, sports fans are more emotionally involved and care about the outcomes of their chosen sport than fans of other televised genres who are not as active or invested even in their favorite programming genre. Non-sport fan groups are essentially the same in their lack of involvement with their fandom because, for example, non-sport fans do not engage in the pregame planning and information search activities and do not check media sources for follow-up information.

While sports fans may be different in their media viewing behaviors, perhaps more intriguing is why they enjoy watching sports so much. Raney (2006), in reviewing past research that discusses the factors that motivate the viewing of mediated sports and drawing upon the uses and gratifications media perspective, broke sports viewing motivations into emotional, cognitive, and behavioral/social factors. The emotional motivations include: (1) entertainment motivation: we tune in to our favorite teams with the expectation of being entertained; (2) eustress motivation: viewers like positive emotions coming from the thrill of victory; (3) self-esteem motivation: viewers may tune into sporting events because they think that viewing will help them feel better about themselves; and (4) escape motivation: we tune in to sports to get away from the stress of our daily lives.

The cognitive motivations include learning motivations, in which viewers learn about players and teams in order to provide conversational fodder, and aesthetic motivations. Aesthetic motivations attract viewers to the beauty or dance of sport,

especially in stylistic sports such as gymnastics, as well as the novelty and high risk of nonstylistic sports such as basketball. Finally, the behavioral and social motivations are fivefold. First, viewers seek release because watching one's favorite team win can produce boundless joy and exuberance. The second and third motivations, companionship and group affiliation, are related. The companionship motivation allows an interpersonal experience between strangers because of their connection through sport, while group motivations occur specifically in international competitions such as the Olympics or World Cup that pits nations against one another generating increased national pride, at least for a short time. A fourth motivation is family bonding as viewers want to spend time with or have something to do with family members. The final behavioral and social motivation is economics, as viewers are motivated because of financial investments through such activity as gambling.

Within these motivations for viewing, fans are perhaps most drawn to the drama of televised sport. Raney (2003) argues that the purpose of added drama in sport is its apparent impact on viewer enjoyment, and cites much of the research that has examined the relationship between the special features used in sport commentary and production to accentuate conflict, viewers' perceived level of drama in the contest, and spectator enjoyment. As Peterson and Raney's (2008) results concluded, the unfolding nature of suspense is a strong predictor for mediated sports enjoyment.

Zillmann, Bryant, and Sapolsky (1989) used their disposition theory years earlier to explain the enjoyment of conflict and drama in sport, which is dependent on spectators having feelings towards the participants. Specifically, the disposition theory of sports spectatorship identifies a fans' relative placement on a continuum of affect toward the

participants (intense liking to intense disliking) as a chief predictor of sports enjoyment. The two major propositions of this theory are (1) enjoyment from witnessing a team or a player succeed increases positive affect dispositions and decreases with negative affective dispositions toward that competitor; and (2) enjoyment increases the more we dislike the losing team, but decreases the more we like the losing team. They argue that viewers love the human drama in sport display, and the enjoyment of watching sport contests is partly a function of the degree to which a contest is perceived as involving human conflict. In addition, viewers enjoy uncommon, risky, and effective play, yet viewers do not like it when the outcome is certain. Perhaps the most conflict-driven televised sporting experiences include international contests such as the Olympics and the World Cup, which might explain why so many enjoy watching these events. Still, in some of these sports, only a few nations excel, which often makes the outcome almost certain.

In one of the few studies examining Olympic television viewing motivations, Danner (1997) conducted a small scale ethnographic study after the 1994 Lillehammer Games, asking participants why they watched the Olympics. Some participants said they watched the Olympics because of an interest in internationalism and not the actual competition of specific Games, while others watched because of the competition and conflicting personalities. Also, there were differing perceptions of the Olympics. Some saw the Olympics as a celebration of achievement and “stick-to-it-iveness,” a “world-get-together,” and as unifying. Despite these internationalist perceptions, others thought the Olympics were changing and becoming more political and “propagandized,” and that the athletes were often exploited. While just one qualitative study, these findings suggests

that Olympic television viewers may also have conflicting motivations along the lines of the Games' underlying tension between nationalism and internationalism.

While available evidence might lead us to assume that what ties the Olympic audience together is the dichotomy between national pride and global unity, there may well be other reasons for why so many viewers are attracted to the Olympics. Perhaps the assumption that viewers are manipulated by the spectacle of the Olympic broadcast is false (Rothenbuhler, 1989). Clearly, we need to understand more fully whether the Olympic audience buys into the "Olympic ideal," is motivated by nationalistic pride, or perhaps both. Viewers are possibly motivated to watch beyond national pride or international camaraderie, but more research is clearly needed to answer these questions. To address this issue, a scale focusing on nationalist and internationalist motivations for watching international televised sporting events such as the Olympics was developed through a factor analysis. To do this, the following research questions addressed these motivations:

RQ1: What are the dominant motivations for international sport viewing?

In examining sport viewing motivations, past research indicates that gender can influence motivations. For example, Raney (2006), in reviewing research examining factors that motivate viewing of mediated sports, found that females were significantly more likely to view televised sports in order to spend time with or have something to do with family members. Moreover, females were less involved in the actual viewing (Raney, 2006). Similarly, Gantz and Wenner (1995) found that females more often reported watching sports "because that's what my friends and family are watching" than males. Still, male and female sports fans reacted and responded in almost identical ways,

but fans were different from non-fans in their viewing motivations; however, because more males are fans, the televised sports viewing experience in many households may not be shared, even when husbands and wives watch the same TV program (Gantz & Wenner, 1995). Thus, as gender could likely impact international televised sport viewing motivations, this question was also addressed:

RQ1a: Are there gender differences in international sport viewing motivations?

Additionally, Gantz and Wenner's (1995) study also examined fanship as a factor in televised sport viewing motivations. In this study, level of fanship made a difference as fans differed from non-fans in their investment in their viewing experience. Clearly, sports television audiences should not be considered a monolithic mass as the fan sport experiences will differ across members of the viewing audience. While Gantz and Wenner (1995) did not use Wann and Branscombe's (1993) Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS), SSIS is often used to compare fans with similar sports viewing motivations by measuring their sport fandom intensity. Sport fandom identification is defined as one's self-perceptions as a sport fan (Wann, 2002). To assess the impact of sport fan intensity on international sport viewing motivations, the following question was posited:

RQ1b: Do international sport viewing motivations differ between high-intensity and low-intensity sports fans?

With a scale in place for international sport viewing motivations, this scale was used to determine whether nationalist and/or internationalist viewing motivations predicted viewing the Olympics specifically as well as international sports in general (e.g. World Cup). As discussed earlier, little research has addressed how Olympic viewers

might differ from fans of other sports such as other international sports. The following research questions were tested.

RQ2a: Which motivations predict viewing the Olympics?

RQ2b: Which motivations predict viewing international televised sports in general?

Media Framing and Priming of the Olympics

In addition to examining Olympic viewing motivations, a second portion of the proposed study seeks to understand how the underlying tension in Olympic media coverage may affect attitudes of particular viewers of the Games. To understand possible viewing effects, the media theories of priming, agenda setting, and framing offer a useful framework. As Allen, O'Loughlin, Jaspersen, and Sullivan (1994) state, media framing and priming can predispose individuals to understand and interpret information selectively. While these theoretical perspectives have been widely adopted in media and political communication research, their use has been limited in research examining Olympic media coverage. First, a description and synthesizing of these theories is needed.

Connecting First and Second Level Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing

While this study is concerned with priming and framing, both constructs grew out of agenda setting research. Price and Tewskbury (1997) provide a detailed explanation of how agenda setting (first and second-level), priming, and framing are all connected, yet operate as separate media effects. News coverage that focuses greater attention on particular issues while excluding other issues, leading news consumers to develop a

selected or unbalanced view of the greater political environment, refers to an agenda setting effect now well documented in the extant literature.

McCombs and Reynolds (2009) define agenda setting (first-level) as the “ability to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda” (p. 1). On the second level, agenda-setting is used to describe the salience of the media’s coverage of characteristics of an issue in the minds of viewers (Scheufele, 1999). In the first level of agenda setting, the unit of analysis of each agenda is an object, e.g. a public issue, and the media selects certain objects for attention. In the second level of agenda setting, the unit of analysis of each agenda is the attributes of the object, e.g. the characteristics and properties that describe each object, and the media selects certain attributes of the objects for attention (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). For example, in the election setting, the first level of agenda setting focuses on certain candidates (objects), and the second level of agenda setting emphasizes certain depictions of the candidates’ images (attributes) (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Thus, the first level of agenda setting deals with cognitive effects while the second level of agenda setting deals with attitudinal effects.

Price and Tewksbury (1997), in reviewing the framing, agenda setting, and priming literature, claim that there are differences between the three concepts, but there is at least one important theoretical dimension that framing shares with the other two effects. They assert (p. 184):

Agenda setting looks on story selection as a determinant of public perceptions of issue importance, and indirectly through priming, evaluations of political leaders. Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented, on the ways public problems are formulated for the media audience.

Priming, which is “attendant to agenda setting” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 180), refers to the notion that those issues that receive prominent news coverage might be used by people as judging criteria for the performance of political leaders or issues. Allen et al. (1994) clarify that priming involves the unobtrusive activation of attitude or knowledge constructs stored in memory. Agenda setting and priming research has focused on news story selection as a source of indirect media effects, while framing research focuses on story presentation, or the ways particular issues are cast by journalists. The way in which choices are presented, or framed, will impact the likelihood a choice will be selected (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

To further explain priming and framing, Price and Tewksbury distinguish between applicability and accessibility effects. According to Price and Tewksbury (1997), applicability effects are primary or first-order effects of stimuli (in this case media messages). Accessibility effects, on the other hand, are secondary or second-order effects of messages as these effects are a product of “temporary residual excitation” (p. 197). In general, priming may be considered a temporary accessibility effect. Framing, on the other hand, is an applicability effect, occurring during initial message processing, and is the effects experienced during the interpretation or reaction to specific stories. This does not mean, though, that the influence of message framing is experienced only immediately. They argue that first-order cognitive effects of mass communication might be “very consequential” (p. 199).

Understanding the differences between these three media theories is necessary to explain what might be occurring with the mediated tension inherent within Olympics coverage. Clearly, the coverage of the Olympics features both a nationalistic and

internationalism frame, and based on priming and framing research, these frames could prime viewers' political judgments. With an explanation of how these three effects are linked, framing and priming will be further explored in the following section to explain how these perspectives will be utilized in determining effects of Olympic media coverage.

Framing Olympic Media Coverage

Chandler (1998) argues that television producers “lift the game out of its cultural setting, the stadium, and set it in a new cultural context, the living room” (p. 2). This process requires making important decisions by the producers such as what the viewer will and will not see, which athletes will get more attention, how graphics and other statistical information will be presented to the viewer, which plays warrant replay, and the language announcers use in analyzing each play. Producers and announcers cannot dictate when an athlete makes a play, but react to what the athletes do before, during, and after each play.

Related to those decisions, both framing and attribute agenda setting (second level agenda setting) call attention to the perspectives used by communicators and their audience to picture topics in the news (McCombs & Roberts, 2009). Attributes have two dimensions, —a cognitive component regarding information about substantive characteristics that describe the object and an affective component regarding the positive, negative, or neutral tone of these characteristics on the media agenda or the public agenda,” (McCombs & Roberts, 2009, p. 6). Different aspects of issues (attributes) are made more salient in the media and in how people think and talk about issues.

According to Price and Tewksbury (1997), issue framing is “the ability of media reports to alter the kinds of considerations people use in forming their opinions” (p. 175). While this explanation provides the link between agenda setting and framing, Scheufele (1999) claims that vague conceptualizations have led to the word “framing” being used to refer to similar but different approaches.

To help clarify the conceptualization of framing, Scheufele (1999) argues that research should address framing from a metatheoretical perspective to determine how framing can be used to broaden our understanding of media effects, and must therefore focus on both macro and microlevels of analysis, media and individual frames, and link these two frames together. A media frame is the story line that holds what might be otherwise meaningless events together. An individual frame is “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

Iyengar (1991) argued that framing was not just a real-time decision making bias, but one implicating both memory and social evaluations. That is, the effects of frames on individuals can be immediate or long-term. Behind issue framing is the idea that when media messages formulate public choices in different terms, these messages “put people in mind of very different considerations when they think about public issues and decide their opinions” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 184). In other words, the framing of media messages can help determine what knowledge is activated and then used once people are called on to make politically relevant judgments.

While none of the previously reviewed studies of Olympic coverage used media framing as a theoretical framework, the existing research clearly supports the notion that U.S. Olympic media coverage is framed in different ways, sometimes nationalistic,

sometimes internationalistic, or sometimes both. Zaharopoulos' (2007) content analysis, discussed in the previous chapter, is one of the few framing studies of Olympic media coverage. Zaharopoulos examined online *New York Times*' coverage of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and coded for frames of conflict and economic consequences, which are generally accepted news framing schemes; or codes (De Vreese, 2004). In addition, Zaharopoulos examined additional frames such as the Olympics returning home – to Athens – as well as another inherent internationalist frame, the Olympics as an act of peace and friendship or world understanding.

In addition to coding for these four frames, Zaharopoulos also coded for two framing approaches, episodic and thematic. Episodic framing personalizes issues by focusing on specific events and cases, and thematic framing places issues within a more general context by providing collective or general evidence (Iyengar, 1991). Zaharopoulos found no articles framed predominantly in terms of peace and friendship, with the dominant reporting of the Games crafted around episodic or conflict-oriented frames. Thus, the coverage followed usual news practices.

As Zaharopoulos (2007) identified in his framing analysis and past research suggests, either a nationalistic (“us” versus “them”) or a peaceful (or internationalism) frame is used in the coverage of the Olympics, which could well affect viewers' political attitudes towards a certain nation. For example, Poulton (2004) examined the relationship between national identity and media sport by examining the construction and representations of national identities in British television coverage of the 1996 European Football Championships (Euro '96). Findings from this study suggested that I/we national identities are strengthened in international sporting tournaments such as Euro

'96, and such events can be seen as mediated "patriot" games where nation is pitted against nation and matches are framed as contests between "us" and "them."

In contrast, the sporting competition frame might be depicted in more positive or even peaceful frames. For instance, South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Olympics provided an avenue for public diplomacy and a possible shift in attitude. Manheim (1990), in analyzing the Seoul Olympics case, concluded that the Olympic Games and other similarly magnetic events do have the potential to play a cathartic role in the political lives of nations. Selected media frames could affect political attitudes of the viewers, yet no research exists to examine this possibility.

The question remains, however, if nationalistic or internationalism media framing has discernable effects on viewers' attitudes towards their own and other nations. Specifically, what little research that has focused on Olympic media coverage is disjointed theoretically, represented by a few "framing" studies through content analysis of Olympic telecasts. Danner (1997) claims that the Olympics and subsequent television coverage can alter international perceptions, and Billings and Angelini (2007) asserted that the disparity in Olympic television coverage may impact social interactions of viewers and reinforce prejudices; however, both of these studies, as content analyses, cannot substantiate such claims. Over twenty years ago, Frank, Hawes, and Macintosh (1988) argued that international sporting events such as the Olympics and World Cup are (p. 280):

Complex rites whose outcomes have an effect on hundreds of millions of people. These effects are intangible and non-economic, but they are nonetheless real... We need analysis that digs deeply into the meaning, function, and significance of these events, and how they can lead to a better understanding of political behavior.

Possibly, viewers are affected when they watch the Olympics due to the way the events are framed, but no research exists to help us understand such possible effects. Priming theory, which has not been used previously in Olympic media research, can guide our analysis of how Olympic media coverage that emphasizes nationalism or internationalism frames may affect nationalistic attitudes and perceptions of other nations.

Media Priming and Nationalism

Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier (2009) assert, “Priming refers to the effects of the content of the media on people’s later behavior or judgments related to the content that was processed” (p. 75). McCombs and Roberts (2009) argue that priming occurs because citizens do not engage in a comprehensive analysis of all of their stored information. Instead, audiences draw upon bits of information that are salient at the time of their judgment.

During priming, one concept is activated, making similar concepts that are stored together (schema) easily accessible to be used in interpreting new information (Carpentier et al., 2008). According to Fiske and Taylor (1991), schema is “a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes,” (p. 98). The framing of the media message will impact which schema are activated as well as impact the spread of the schema activation (Carpentier et al., 2008). When schema are activated, the individual retrieves a previously stored evaluation of the object (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), such as activating a schema related to your nation or global unity

depending on the exposure to different media frames, which was the case in the current study.

In their review of the priming literature, Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. (2009) argue that a great deal of research has focused on priming violence and racial stereotypes in TV, movies, and video games in addition to focusing on how TV and movie viewing can result in political priming effects. People rely on stored stereotypes for making judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Research regarding stereotypes indicates that the media can prime stereotypes, influencing how other people are perceived. Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. (2009) explain that cognitive and psychological research has demonstrated two important characteristics of priming. First, how much the prime affects a target behavior or thought relies on both intensity and recency of the prime; and second, the effects of the prime fade over time.

Related to the phenomenon of priming is the activation of implicit memory (Yoo, 2009). Implicit memory is the nonconscious, non-intentional retrieval of previously stored information (Duke & Carlson, 1994), and the processing of recent exposure to such information is facilitated by priming (Berry & Dienes, 1991). According to Yoo (2009), priming is found to occur through the activation of implicit memory when a primed stimulus (e.g. an Olympic telecast framed as either national pride or internationalism) generates information processing (e.g. a word completion test) that corresponds with the selected prime.

For example, Yoo (2007) explains that a commonly used implicit measure is the word-fragment completion test. In this test, subjects are initially exposed to a set of target words (e.g. NATION) and are later given a set of word fragments or stems (e.g. N

T N or NAT), which they complete without reference to the stimulus (Yang & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007). If the completion rate for the previously seen or, in the Olympic telecast case, previously heard words found in the stimulus significantly exceeds that for new words not in the stimulus, then a priming effect has occurred (Yoo, 2007). Thus, for the current study, a word completion test will be conducted using selected words within the experimental stimulus directly related to the frames of national pride and internationalism. This feature of the study design is explained in greater detail in Chapter 3.

In addition, to test priming effects of Olympic viewing, I will use scales from Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) scale representing the multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. These measures will include items taken from existing scales of nationalism, attitudes of American superiority and dominance, patriotism, and feelings of attachment of America to measure national pride; and items from existing scales of internationalism, world sharing and equality and global welfare to measure internationalist attitudes.

While no research exists supporting the notion that the framing of the Olympic Games telecast can prime nationalistic attitudes, some political science research substantiates that nationalistic attitudes can be primed by media exposure. Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, and Gross (2007) examined whether individual's political attitudes and decisions were shaped by exposure to even subtle national cues of their home nation, Israel. In a series of three experiments in both the laboratory and natural environs, the authors found that passing exposure to the Israeli flag influenced political attitudes, intentions, and decisions. After exposure in the first experiment, the gap between those

who scored high and low on a measure of Israeli identification narrowed. The second experiment found that passing flag exposure affected political opinions of Jewish settlers on the West Bank and Gaza. In the final experiment, exposure to the flag altered voting intentions.

In the U.S. after 9/11, Li and Brewer (2004) examined the distinction between patriotism and nationalism as well as the relationship between national identification and pluralistic values. As part of the questionnaire instructions, participants were provided with one of two different definitions of American identity. The stimuli were intended to determine if different definitions of nationality would prime activation of different conceptualizations of nationality. Their results found that the different definitions did have an affect on the interrelationship among measures of patriotism, nationalism, and tolerance of cultural diversity. While the nationalistic priming research is limited, the few studies available demonstrate that nationalistic attitudes can be primed in ways similar to the Olympic media frames of nationalism and internationalism. To add to this body of research, this study tested the following set of research questions and hypotheses:

RQ3: Does the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) change viewers' level of national pride?

(control for gender differences and sport fan intensity)

RQ4: Does the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) change viewers' level of internationalism?

(control for gender differences and sport fan intensity)

Along with measuring participants' internationalism, or how they feel about world welfare in general, I also asked participants some specific questions regarding their

attitudes about international political issues. I developed these questions based on international political issues that were facing the U.S. at the time of the study. To determine whether the frame affected these attitudes the study tested these research questions, addressing both possible direct and indirect effects:

RQ5a: Does the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) change viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur?

(control for gender differences and sport fan intensity)

RQ5b: Does the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) change viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration?

(control for gender differences and sport fan intensity)

RQ5c: Does the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) change viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran?

(control for gender differences and sport fan intensity)

RQ6a: Does national pride mediate the effect of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur?

RQ6b: Does national pride mediate the effect of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration?

RQ6c: Does national pride mediate the effect of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran?

RQ7a: Does internationalism mediate the effect of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur?

RQ7b: Does internationalism mediate the effect of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration?

RQ7c: Does internationalism mediate the effect of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran?

In considering the effects Olympic media framing could have on national pride and internationalism, there are possible moderating variables to consider. As the previously discussed research by Gantz and Wenner (1995) found, sport fans differed from non-sport fans in their investment in the sport viewing experience. Fan intensity could well impact any effects the Olympic frames have on national pride and internationalism. Since fan intensity influences why viewers watch sport, sport television viewing motivations as well as the international sport viewing motivations developed in this dissertation could also impact the effects of the Olympic frame. Thus, these research questions were posed:

RQ8a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by sports fan intensity?

- RQ8b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated by sports fan intensity?
- RQ8c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, Immigration, and Iran) be moderated by sports fan intensity?
- RQ9a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by sport television viewing motivations?
- RQ9b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated by sport television viewing motivations?
- RQ9c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, Immigration, and Iran) be moderated by sport television viewing motivations?
- RQ10a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by nationalist sport viewing motivations?
- RQ10b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated by nationalist sport viewing motivations?

RQ10c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, immigration, and Iran) be moderated by nationalist sport viewing motivations?

RQ11a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by internationalist sport viewing motivations?

RQ11b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated by internationalist sport viewing motivations?

RQ11c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, immigration, and Iran) be moderated by internationalist sport viewing motivations?

RQ12a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by gender?

RQ12b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated by gender?

RQ12c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, immigration, and Iran) be moderated by gender?

Finally, the amount of international televised sport viewed in total as well as the amount of Olympic viewing specifically could moderate any effects that the frame has on

national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes. This final set of research questions addressed these effects:

RQ13a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by the amount of Olympic viewing?

RQ13b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated the amount of Olympic viewing?

RQ13c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, immigration, and Iran) be moderated by the amount of Olympic viewing?

RQ14a: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride be moderated by the amount of international sport television viewing?

RQ14b: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on internationalism be moderated by the amount of international sport television viewing?

RQ14c: Will the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on international political attitudes (Darfur, immigration, and Iran) be moderated by the amount of international sport viewing?

In this second chapter, I have reviewed literature related to the proposed study. Specifically, I have discussed the political undertones found within the Olympic Games,

how this tension is reflected in media coverage, Olympic viewing motivations, and media framing and priming of the Olympics. With the theoretical foundation for this study established, and explication of the study's specific research questions, the next chapter details the study's design and method of analysis.

CHAPTER THREE: METHOD

This study proceeded in two phases in order to meet its two primary purposes: (1) to investigate Olympic viewing motivations; and (2) to investigate priming effects of nationalist and internationalist Olympic frames on viewers' national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes. The first phase employed a survey design that was conducted one week prior to the experiment with the same participants used for both phases. The survey portion allowed for an investigation of possible gender differences in nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations and differences between low and high intensity sport fans. In addition, the survey portion measured participants' national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes prior to the experimental stimuli exposure. The experimental design, which was conducted one week after the survey, allowed for an investigation of whether a nationalist or internationalist Olympic telecast frame primed viewers' attitudes of national pride and internationalism. In addition, the experimental analysis allowed for an examination of whether sport television viewing motivations, fan intensity, gender, and international sport viewing moderated the impact of nationalism and internationalism framing on participants' national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes.

Pilot Study

Scale and Stimuli Validation

Prior to data collection for both phases, a sample of 255 students from undergraduate communication courses at the University of Missouri completed the

nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations scales. First, participants responded to two sport viewing motivation subscales, measuring nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations. According to an a priori power analysis (Cohen, 1988), at least 200 participants were needed to conduct the exploratory factor analysis to validate these scales. This power analysis assured the development of reliable and valid scales to measure the viewing of televised sporting events based on national pride and internationalist motivators.

To develop measures for watching televised sporting events based along the lines of nationalist and internationalist reasons, the scales were developed according to Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) definitions of patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism. Patriotism refers to feelings of attachment to America, nationalism refers to one's view of U.S. superiority and dominance, and internationalism refers to world sharing, equality, and global welfare. The nationalist viewing motivation scale included such items as "I like watching sporting events that allow me to root for my nation;" and items in the internationalist viewing motivation scale included such items as "I like watching sporting events that bring all nations together, regardless of political affiliation." The full scales are listed in Appendix A.

Second, in addition to completing the viewing motivations scales, each participant viewed and rated several short video clips taken from NBC's 2010 Vancouver Olympics television broadcast, with each clip representing either U.S. nationalist or internationalist themes. The clips best representing the nationalist and internationalist themes were ultimately chosen as the stimuli used in the experiment, which is explained in further detail in the next section. Some examples of nationalist themes included: 1) U.S. athletes

entering during the Opening Ceremony waving U.S. flags with the commentators focusing on how well the U.S. would do during the Games; 2) the U.S. men's bobsled team gold-medal winning race and their post-race victory celebration waving U.S. flags; and 3) U.S. athletes being interviewed during the Closing Ceremony about their gold-medal winning Olympic performances. Some examples of the internationalist themes included: 1) The lighting of the Olympic flame featuring frequent shots of the Olympic flame and rings as well as images of competitors from all nations; 2) A montage of the gold-medal winners and their nations' colors from a variety of nations during a specific day of competition; and 3) All of the athletes entering in their national colors waving their small national flags during the Closing Ceremony with no distinction between nations. Clips used in the pre-test were selected based on Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) definitions of nationalism, the view of American superiority and domination, and internationalism, world sharing and equality. These questions are listed in Appendix A.

In order to make the online clip viewing manageable in length for participants and ensure that they viewed each clip in its entirety, the participants were divided into three groups for the pilot study based on their communication course instructor. Each of the three groups viewed a different set of clips. Additionally, to ensure that participants viewed the online clips, the controls on the Windows Media Player were disabled, not allowing participants to fast forward the clips. Participants were also timed for the total length of time spent on the survey. If participants spent less than 1110 seconds (18 minutes and 30 seconds), they were not included in the pilot study data analysis. This cut-off is based on an average of 12 minutes of clips while allowing participants 6 and a half minutes to answer the pre-test and the survey questions after each clip.

Each group viewed a different set of five to six clips, with two to three clips included from both of the two conditions (nationalist and internationalist). The clips ranged from one to three minutes in length. Each group viewed clips from the opening ceremony, Olympic sporting event competitions, and the closing ceremony (See Table 1).

NBC's 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games DVD had very little coverage of sporting competitions that did not focus on the U.S. and its athletes. This made it more difficult to compile internationalist clips, creating a limitation of the sample used for the stimuli clips. The lack of international coverage coincides with the content analytic findings discussed in Chapter 2. Because of NBC's exclusive rights to the Olympic broadcast and potential copyright issues, the official NBC DVD and also the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) official Olympic website was consulted to find adequate nationalist and internationalist clips. Several of the video montages showed at the beginning of each day's competitions on the NBC DVD did feature a variety of athletes, and as detailed below, some of these clips were used. In addition, one of the clips used in the pilot study was found on the IOC's official Olympic website, the men's sprint skiing competition.

Group 1 ($N = 93$) viewed six different clips including an internationalist day five opening montage competition clip, a nationalist U.S. opening montage from the opening ceremony, an internationalist Olympic torch arrival clip during the opening ceremony, a nationalist U.S. men winning gold in Nordic combined skiing competition clip, a nationalist U.S. men's bobsled team winning gold competition clip, and an internationalist clip of all nations' flags entering the closing ceremony. Group 2 ($N = 82$) viewed six different clips including a nationalist U.S. men's downhill skiing competition

clip, an internationalist day eleven opening montage competition clip, a nationalist clip of U.S. athletes enter during opening ceremony, an internationalist clip featuring the singing of the Olympic Hymn during closing ceremony, a nationalist day nine montage competition clip, and an internationalist performance of “Beat Your Drum” during the opening ceremony. Group 3 ($N = 80$) viewed five different clips including an internationalist clip showing the passing of the Olympic flag from Canada to Russia during the closing ceremony, a nationalist clip of U.S. athletes entering during the closing ceremony, an internationalist clip showing the lighting of the Olympic flame during the opening ceremony, a nationalist clip of U.S. athlete interviews during the closing ceremony, and an internationalist men’s sprint skiing classic competition clip.

After viewing each clip, participants in each group rated the extent to which the clips focused on the U.S. and nationalism by answering these questions: “The U.S. is dominantly featured,” “U.S. athletes were the focus of the clip,” “The U.S. is positively portrayed,” “This clip inspires pride in your nation,” and “The American flag, American colors (red, white, and blue), and other American symbols are featured predominantly” on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Participants rated the extent to which the clips featured the theme of internationalism by responding to these questions: “All nations are featured equally,” “All nations and athletes in the clip were positively portrayed,” “This clip promotes cooperation between nations,” “The focus of the clip was on the sport competition, not one specific nation or athlete” and “Olympic symbols such as the Olympic rings, torch, and other symbols of peace are featured” on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Each condition ultimately used in the experiment featured a montage of three short clips, one from the opening ceremony, one from a sporting event competition, and one from the closing ceremony with each clip roughly the same length. In order to maintain similarity between the conditions and limit the impact of pre-existing participant bias, the sporting event clip selected for the experimental stimuli were from the same sport for all conditions, featured a sport in which all nations have a chance at doing well, and avoided sports featuring “celebrity” athletes such as snow boarder Shawn White and speed skater Apolo Anton Ohno. In addition, for further control of the stimuli, the excitement of the clips was also evaluated. Participants rated each video clip on a 7-point scale as positively or neutrally emotional using three questions from Gunther and Thorson’s (1992) Emotional Content measure. These questions are listed in Appendix A.

Pilot Study Results

The clips selected as stimuli for phase two, the experiment, were based on the results of the pre-test analysis determined by the extent to which the participants distinguished the clips between nationalism and internationalism. To determine which clips were chosen for the two conditions used in the experiment (nationalist and internationalist), paired sample *t* tests were used to test the difference in the five nationalist and four internationalist items between the clips in each category for the same condition (nationalist or internationalist). Cronbach’s Alpha for the nationalism items ($\alpha = .84$) indicated internal consistency, but the internationalism items did not reach the .70 Cronbach’s Alpha minimum threshold. Therefore, each scale item was compared individually for each clip in each category for the same condition. Then, the clips chosen for each condition in each category were used to test for a significant difference between

two conditions for the clips selected. Again, each clip pair (nationalist and internationalist) for each category was compared individually for each scale item.

First, paired sample t tests were conducted between each pair of nationalist opening ceremony clips (one pair), each pair of nationalist competition clips (four pairs), each pair of nationalist closing ceremony clips (one pair), each pair of internationalist opening ceremony clips (three pairs), each pair of internationalist competition clips (three pairs), and each pair of internationalist closing ceremony clips (three pairs). The nationalist clips in each category (opening, competition, and closing) were compared for the highest means on the five nationalist items and the lowest means on the four internationalist items. The internationalist clips in each category (opening, competition, and closing) were compared for the highest means on the four internationalist items and the lowest means on the five nationalist items.

The researcher compared the paired sample t test statistics, and selected the nationalist clip for each category that best represented the nationalist items (larger means) while not representing the internationalist items (smaller means). Based on these criteria, and as shown in Tables 2-10, the nationalist clips were U.S. Montage, U.S. Men's Bobsled, and U.S. Interviews. The researcher also compared the paired sample t test statistics, and selected internationalist clip for each category that best represented the internationalist items (larger mean) while not representing the nationalist items (smaller means). Based on these criteria, and as shown in Tables 2-10, the internationalist clips were Flame Lighting, Day 5 Montage, and Flags Entrance.

Second, paired sample t tests were used to test for a significant difference in the nationalist and internationalist items between the nationalist and internationalist clip

selected from the paired sample *t* tests for each of the three categories, opening, competition, and closing. In addition, a paired sample *t* test found no significant difference between the nationalist and internationalist clip on the three emotional measures. For each scale item, the means and standard deviations for each clip chosen for the experiment as well as the paired sample *t* test results for each pair in each category of clips, including the mean and standard deviation differences of each pair, are listed (See Tables 2-13).

Based on the results (See Tables 2-10), all five nationalist items were significantly different ($p < .05$) between the nationalist and internationalist clip in each of the three categories. Three of the four internationalist items, “focus on sport competition,” “all nations featured equally,” and “Olympic symbols/symbols of peace featured,” were significantly different ($p < .05$) between the nationalist and internationalist clip in each of the three categories. One of the internationalist items, “all nations and athletes positively portrayed,” was significantly different ($p < .05$) between the nationalist clip and internationalist clip only in the closing ceremony category. In conducting the initial *t* tests comparing the means between clips of the same condition, there was little mean difference between any of the clips in the opening ceremony and competition clips across both conditions on the internationalist item “all nations positively portrayed.” This is a possible limitation of that item because the other three internationalist items were all significantly different, and suggests a reason for the possible reliability problems with the internationalist scale. Despite this limitation, the manipulation check using the emotional items found no significant difference ($p > .05$) between the nationalist and internationalist clip in each of the three categories (See Tables 11-13).

The following nationalism clips were chosen for the experiment: U.S. Montage for the opening ceremony clip, U.S. Men's bobsled for the competition clip, and U.S. athletes' interviews for the closing ceremony clip. The following internationalism clips were chosen: the Olympic flame lighting for the opening ceremony clip, day five opening montage for the competition clip, and all nations' flag entrance for the closing ceremony clip.

Phase 1: Experiment Pre-test

Participants

In total, 314 U.S. citizens participated in both phases of the experiment. To conduct a CFA with the phase one data, a minimum sample of 200 participants was needed to achieve a power level of .80 (Cohen, 1988). Participants were recruited through introductory communication courses as part of the Department's convenience sample. College students were used for the sample because they are part of a strong sport culture on a college campus. In addition, variance was likely due to participants' exposure to the global thinking that comes with higher education. Students received extra credit for participation in the study. The participants were more predominantly female, 71% of the sample ($n = 223$), with males making up 29% of the sample ($n = 91$). In total, 97.5% of the participants were between the ages of 18-22 ($n = 306$), whereas 2.5% reported being over 22 years of age ($n = 8$). The mean age was 20.2 ($SD = .25$).

Design and Procedures

As part of the pre-test measures for the experiment, participants completed an online survey on Survey Gizmo one week prior to completing the experimental phase of the study and viewing the stimuli. The pre-test measures assessed participants' overall

NBC Olympic telecast consumption including their amount of viewing of the telecast in general, Opening Ceremonies, the Closing Ceremonies, special athlete features between events, daytime coverage, primetime coverage, early morning/overnight coverage, and total access of NBC's official Olympic website during the Olympics (adapted from Billings, 2008b). These eight items were averaged into an overall Olympic viewing scale ($\alpha = .86$). Also, participants were asked how frequently they watched other televised sporting events involving international participants such as the FIFA World Cup, the FIBA World Basketball Championships, the U.S. Open golf tournament, and the Wimbledon tennis tournament. These four items were combined with the amount of viewing of NBC's Olympic telecast item, and the average of these five items constituted one's international televised sport consumption ($\alpha = .71$). Televised Olympic and international sport consumption represented moderating variables in this study. These items are listed in Appendix B.

Also, to measure participants' sport viewing motivations (moderating variables), the following scales were used: (1) sport television viewing motivations; (2) nationalist sport viewing motivations; and (3) internationalist sport viewing motivations, with the last two scales developed from the study's CFA. A final moderating variable, sports fan intensity, was measured. The dependent variables also measured, as part of the pre-test, were national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes.

Sport television viewing motivations. Gantz's previously validated (Gantz, 1981, 1985; Gantz & Wenner, 1991, 1995; Gantz et al., 1995; Gantz et al., 2006) 15-item televised sport viewing motivation scale, which identifies the reasons viewers watch sports on television, was used to measure participants' televised sport viewing

motivations. Two items were removed at the request of IRB because they referred to drinking and gambling, leaving a 13-item reliable measure of separate sport television viewing motivations ($\alpha = .86$), or different reasons for watching televised sport.

Participants rated their level of agreement to statements on a 7-point scale (1= *just about never*, 7= *just about always*). The full measure is listed in Appendix B.

Nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations. A multidimensional measurement of nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations was developed through a CFA. For the two viewing scales, I developed items supported by the literature, relying on Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) definitions of national pride and internationalism and Gantz's (1981) sport televised sport viewing motivations. I developed 13 items to represent each indicator. The initial index consisted of 26 testable items. Participants rated their level of agreement on a 7-point likert scale (1= *strongly disagree*, 7= *strongly agree*). These items were tested in an EFA with the data from the pilot study, and a CFA with the experiment data, as explained in Chapter 4. The full measure used in the EFA is listed in Appendix A.

Sport fan intensity. Wann and Branscombe's (1993) Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS) was used to measure how intense of a sports fan individuals consider themselves to be. This scale consists of five items: "I consider myself to be a sport fan;" "My friends see me as a sport fan;" "I believe that following sports is the most enjoyable form of entertainment;" "My life would be less enjoyable if I were not allowed to follow sports;" and "Being a sport fan is very important to me." Participants rated their level of agreement on a 7-point scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*). The 5-item scale was reliable ($\alpha = .95$).

National pride. Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) scale representing the multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes has several subscales representing the factors of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. Items from two subscales, patriotism and nationalism, were used to develop a national pride measure. Patriotism measures one's affect for America or "my country" (e.g. "I love my country" and "when I see the American flag flying I feel great"). One of the items from the nationalism scale, which measures the "America-first" or "American-superiority" view relative to other countries, was added to the items from the patriotism scale ("It is important that the U.S. win in international sporting competition like the Olympics"). Participants rated their level of agreement with these statements on a 7-point scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*). The pre-experimental exposure measure of the 11-item scale was reliable ($\alpha = .90$). The full measure is listed in Appendix B.

Internationalism. Another subscale in Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) scale representing the multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes is internationalism. Internationalism measures attitudes towards world sharing and equality or global welfare. Some items on this scale include "If necessary, we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world" and "Children should be educated to be international minded to support any movement which contributes to the welfare of the world as a whole, regardless of special national interests." Participants rated their level of agreement with these statements on a 7-point scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*). The pre-experimental exposure measure of the 5-item scale was reliable ($\alpha = .70$). The full measure is listed in Appendix B.

International Political Attitudes. In addition to the internationalism scale, participants answered questions about their views on international political issues. To measure their international political attitudes, participants were asked their opinion on three different international scenarios involving the U.S.: “Are you willing to help the U.S. effort to stop genocide in Darfur and aid in relief efforts,” “If Iran’s nuclear power increases, should the U.S. go to war with Iran,” and “The U.S. should continue efforts to control illegal immigration into the U.S.” These three issues were chosen because they were prominent U.S. international issues at the time this study began. Participants rated their level of agreement with these on a 7-point scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*).

Phase 2: Experiment

Participants

The same participants completed phase two of the study in a media research lab at least one week after they completed the phase one online with Survey Gizmo. For the experimental portion, according to the previous priming research discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g., Hassin et. al, 2007; Li & Brewer, 2004), a small effects size was anticipated, $d = .15-.20$. To achieve a power level of .80, 175 participants were required per condition for $d = .15$, and 99 participants were required per condition for $d = .20$ (Cohen, 1988). In total, 314 participants completed both phases, with nearly an equal number of participants assigned to the nationalist frame ($n = 156$) and the internationalist frame ($n = 158$). Thus, the necessary power was achieved.

Design and Procedures

The design of this study was a between-subjects experimental design with random assignment of participants to one of two conditions: exposure to video of the Olympic telecast with a nationalist frame, or exposure to video of the Olympic telecast with an internationalist frame. A week before exposure to the stimuli, participants completed the survey of pre-test questions including their Olympic television consumption, televised international sporting event consumption, demographic information, and the three sport viewing motivation scales explained in phase one above. In addition, interspersed throughout the survey were the measures of fan intensity, national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes.

To complete phase two of the study, the condition video viewing and post-test measures, participants signed up in their communication course for a 20-minute session to complete the second phase in a media research lab. Upon entering the lab, each participant was checked to ensure they had completed phase one before they could participate in phase two. The researcher then assigned each participant randomly to one of two conditions: (1) a montage of clips featuring a nationalist (pro-U.S.) frame, or (2) a montage of clips featuring an internationalist frame. Participants were given brief instructions and a participant ID number, which was their student email address and the same ID number they were assigned by Survey Gizmo for phase one.

The experimental conditions were constructed using Survey Gizmo. Each condition contained a montage of three clips (one from the opening ceremony, one from a sporting event, and one from the closing ceremony) representing one of the two frame categories. On the first page (consent form) of the Survey Gizmo survey, participants

were told they would evaluate NBC's Olympic telecast and rate the production quality of the clips to which they were exposed to. For each condition, the three clips were embedded directly into the survey. After watching each clip, to mask the study's purpose, participants were asked to rate the Olympic television clip on a five-point scale (1=*very low*, 5=*very high*) in terms of how well it ranked for visual quality, ability to maintain their attention, and their level of interest after they watched each clip. Immediately following their exposure to the clips, participants completed a word-fragment completion test and dependent measures assessing national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes. Additional distracter questions were included at the end of the survey, asking participants to rate the commentators and their likelihood of watching NBC's Olympic coverage based on the three clips they watched.

Conducting phase two in the media lab allowed for additional experimental control. Four of the eight media research lab computers had a link to the nationalist condition while the other four had a link to the internationalist condition. The researcher alternately assigned participants to one of two conditions as they entered the lab. Each participant had their own set of headphones for their computer. Also, if there were any technical issues, the researcher was present to help solve these matters. Participants were timed for further experimental control. Any participant who spent less than 12 and a half minutes (750 seconds) on the entire experiment, which allowed for seven and a half minutes of clips and five minutes for the questionnaire, was not included in the experimental data analysis.

Stimuli

Each condition featured a collection of three short clips, one from the opening ceremony, one from a sporting event, and one from the closing ceremony with each clip roughly the same length. In order to maintain similarity between the conditions and limit the impact of pre-existing participant bias, the sporting event clips selected were from the same sport for all conditions, featured a sport in which all nations have a chance at doing well, and avoided sports featuring “celebrity” athletes such as snow boarder Shawn White and speed skater Apolo Anton Ohno. After exposure to the stimuli, participants completed the word-fragment completion test – a test of completion and not a timed test – and again completed online survey measures of national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes.

Post-exposure measures

As discussed in Chapter 2, after exposure to the stimulus, participants completed a word-fragment completion test as a further check of priming. Participants were told that the researcher was assessing the verbal abilities of potential Olympic viewers. The words used as part of this test were drawn from specific words found within the stimuli that were chosen for the experiment based on the pilot study’s stimuli validation. The participants assigned to the nationalist stimulus were given fragments of words that represented national pride found within those clips: AME (America), NAT (nation), and PRD (proud or pride). Participants assigned to the internationalist stimulus were given fragments of words that represent internationalism found within those clips: INT (international), WRL (world), and UNI (unity or united). Both of the conditions were given distracter fragments not related to the clips they watched: BCS (because), BRD

(bird), and FTD (featured). When coding the words, the researcher included iterations of each word, e.g. American, national, proudly, internationality, worldly, unified, birdie, or feature. Correctly completed target words were coded “+,” and all incorrect words were coded “-.”

In addition, after the word-fragment completion test, participants filled out the same national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes scales used in phase one after their exposure to the experimental stimuli. For national pride, the post-experimental exposure measure of the 11-item scale was reliable ($\alpha = .91$), and for internationalism, the post-experimental exposure measure of the 5-item scale was reliable ($\alpha = .78$).

Data Analysis Procedures

RQs 1-2 were tested with a significance level threshold of $p < .05$. Due to the exploratory nature of this dissertation, RQs 3-14, addressing the main effects, mediating variables, and moderating variables, were tested with a significance level threshold of $p < .10$.

Confirmatory factor analyses were used to test all parts of RQ1. Hierarchical regressions were used to test all parts of RQ2. For the main effects in RQ 3-5, 2(time) x 2 (frame) repeated measures ANOVAs were used to test the effects on the various DVs (national prided, internationalism, and international political attitudes). To test the moderating variables in RQ 8-14, 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (moderator) repeated measures ANOVA were used to test how each moderating variable moderated the main effect of frame on each of the DVs (national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes).

A regression-based path analysis was used to test the meditational RQs 6a-c and RQs 7a-c. The nationalism framing condition (=1) was dummy-coded against the internationalism framing condition (=0). These steps were followed for establishing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981): (1) significant association between the independent and dependent variables, (2) variation in the independent variable significantly account for variations in the mediator, (3) variation in the mediator significantly account for variations in the dependent variable, and (4) when the mediator is controlled, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable decreases significantly. Then, the bootstrapping technique (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) was used to test the significance of the indirect effect. To generate 95% confidence intervals, 5,000 bootstrap resamples were conducted (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

For descriptive statistics for the items used in phases one and two of the experiment, please see Tables 14-15. As represented in Table 14, the Olympic viewing and international sport viewing both were both roughly at the midpoint; however, these means suggest that viewers consume more Olympics ($M = 2.47$) than international sports ($M = 2.05$). Similarly, participants reported greater nationalist sport viewing motivations ($M = 5.34$) than internationalist sport viewing motivations ($M = 5.15$), and the means for both the nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations were much higher than the midpoint of 3.5.

Participants also reported greater national pride ($M = 5.37$) than internationalism ($M = 4.47$). National pride ($M = 5.37$) was almost identical to nationalist sport viewing motivations ($M = 5.34$), but participants reported much lower internationalism ($M = 4.47$) than internationalist sport viewing motivations ($M = 5.15$). Of the three international political attitudes, the means of helping in Darfur ($M = 5.16$) and controlling illegal immigration ($M = 5.38$), were close, but participants reported much lower ($M = 3.38$) agreement with the U.S. going to war with Iran.

As the results in Table 15 illustrate, there were some differences between phases one and two. In phase two, national pride ($M = 5.37$; 5.47), internationalism ($M = 4.47$; 4.68), and help in Darfur ($M = 5.16$; 5.21) all increased from phase one. Two of the

international political attitudes, controlling illegal immigration ($M = 5.38; 5.23$) and war with Iran ($M = 3.38; 3.32$), slightly decreased from phase one to phase two.

Survey Results

Research Question 1

To test RQ1, exploring the dominant motivations for international sport viewing, the factor structure of international sport viewing motivations was examined. An EFA with the pilot study data was performed using principal components factoring and varimax oblique rotation. Based on the criterion of eigenvalues over 1.0 (and in agreement with the inspection of the scree plot), my initial EFA results produced a 6-factor structure. I sought to reduce the number of items by analyzing the statistical properties, low inter-item correlations, low factor loadings, and substantial cross-loadings. I went through two rounds of item reduction before arriving at a satisfactory two-factor solution, nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations, which exhibited clean factor loadings. My criterion was a .55 primary loading with no secondary loadings higher than .40. A third factor, emotional motivations, met the criterion, but only two items loaded on that factor so those items were also removed. For the factor loadings see Table 16.

The two-factor loading combined for 64.5% of the variance. Of the initial 26 items, 14 items remained for the international sport viewing motivations, with eight items representing nationalist sport viewing motivations and six items representing internationalist sport viewing motivations. My interpretation of the factors followed the two factors that I originally conceptualized: viewers watch international televised sporting events for nationalist and internationalist reasons. The emotional motivations

factor, which only loaded with two items, was unexpected, but need additional items would be needed to be developed into a separate factor.

The final 14-item scale was tested with phase one experiment data for a goodness of fit using the AMOS software package. The model is displayed in Figure 1. For adequate fit to the model, a CFI > .9 (Bentler, 1992) is necessary. RMSEA < .08 indicates a good model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), and RMSEA < .10 indicates an adequate model fit (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). The fit of the two-factor 14-item model was deemed adequate ($\chi^2 (78) = 280.42, p < .001, \text{CMIN/df} = 3.60, \text{CFI} = .92, \text{RMSEA} = .09$). The loadings for each factor were quite high, ranging from .60 to .87. Further, the inter-correlation between the two factors was high at .54 (See Figure 1).

To answer RQ1a, which asked whether there were gender differences in international sport viewing motivations, I investigated whether the CFA varied between male and female participants. I ran multiple-group analyses as outlined by Byrne (2001). First, I split the CFA baseline model into two groups, one for male participants and one for female participants with AMOS estimating all parameters separately for male and female participants. The fit of the model was satisfactory: $\chi^2 (156) = 372.48, p < .001, \text{CMIN/DF} = 2.37, \text{CFI} = .96, \text{RMSEA} = .07$. Next, I compared the fit of that model to a constrained model in which I set all parameters to be invariant between males and females: $\chi^2 (183) = 428.44, p < .001, \text{CMIN/DF} = 2.34, \text{CFI} = .91, \text{RMSEA} = .07$. Byrne (2001) states that if the fit of the unconstrained model is significantly better than the fit of the constrained model, which is measured by a χ^2 difference test, you can conclude that the models were not equivalent across groups. For gender, a χ^2 difference test suggested that the CFA did vary between men and women, χ^2 difference (27) = 55.96, $p < .001$.

Thus, the CFA confirms that there are gender differences. The primary difference was that the internationalist viewing motivations were more tightly clustered and inter-loaded more consistently for women (.74-.81) than men (.65-.77). Also, most of the internationalist factors loaded higher for women than men. For the models, please see Figure 2 and 3.

To answer RQ1b, which asked whether there were differences between high and low-intensity sports fans in international sport viewing motivations, I investigated whether the CFA varied between low and high-intensity sport fan participants by creating a categorical variable of sport fan intensity. I ran multiple-group analyses as outlined by Byrne (2001). First, I split the CFA baseline model into two groups, one for low-intensity sport fan participants and one for high-intensity sport fan participants with AMOS estimating all parameters separately for low and high-intensity sport fans. To determine the two groups of sports fans, sport fan intensity ($M = 4.25$) was used. Low-intensity sports fans were those lower than 4.25, and high-intensity sports fans were 4.25 or higher. The fit of the model was satisfactory: $\chi^2 (156) = 372.73, p < .001$, CMIN/DF = 2.39, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .07. Next, I compared the fit of that model to a constrained model in which I set all parameters to be invariant between low and high-intensity sport fans: $\chi^2 (183) = 466.08, p < .001$, CMIN/DF = 2.55, CFI = .88, RMSEA = .07. For sport fan-intensity, a χ^2 difference test suggested that the CFA did vary between low and high-intensity sport fans, χ^2 difference (27) = 93.32, $p < .001$. Thus, the CFA confirms that there are sport fan-intensity differences. The primary difference found was that low-intensity fans' internationalist sport viewing motivations were more tightly clustered and

inter-loaded more consistently (.73-.84) than high-intensity sport fans (.67-.80). For the models, please see Figures 4 and 5.

Research Question 2

To examine RQ2a, exploring which motivations predict viewing the Olympics, I ran a hierarchical regression model (HRM). The control variables, sport fan intensity and gender, were entered in Block 1 of the model. These variables were chosen because past research suggests that sport fans are motivated to watch sports for different reasons, and gender differences in sport viewing motivations have also been confirmed. This would indicate that there also could be differences for the international sport television viewing motivation scale developed in this study so the two variables were controlled. The two international sport television viewing motivation scales, and internationalist developed from the factors derived from the confirmatory factor analysis explained above, were entered in Block 2 of the model. The criterion variable was Olympic viewing.

The results of the hierarchical regression indicated a significant change ($\Delta F = .17.82, p < .001$) with the addition of the variables in Block 2, nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations, to the amount of variance explained in Olympic viewing. The block of nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations together significantly improved the R^2 of the model ($\Delta R^2 = .10, p < .001$), accounting for 9.7% variance in Olympic viewing beyond sport fan intensity and gender. Both the nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations were statistically significant in predicting Olympic viewing; however, nationalist sport viewing motivation ($\beta = .22, p < .01$) was a stronger predictor of Olympic viewing than internationalist sport viewing motivation ($\beta = .16, p < .05$). For the full results, please see Tables 17-18. While gender

and Olympic viewing were statistically significantly, negatively correlated ($r = -.12$, $p < .05$), gender was not a statistically significant predictor of Olympic viewing ($\beta = .01$, $p > .05$).

To examine RQ2b, exploring which motivations predict viewing of international sport viewing, I ran a hierarchical regression model (HRM). The control variables, sport fan intensity and gender, were entered in Block 1 of the model. The two international televised sport viewing motivation scales, nationalist and internationalist developed from the factors derived from the confirmatory factor analysis explained above, were entered in Block 2 of the model. The criterion variable was international sport viewing. For the full correlation matrix, please see Table 19.

As Table 19 illustrates, gender was negatively correlated with international sport viewing, $r(277) = -.41$, $p < .001$. International sport viewing was positively correlated with the other variables, sport fan intensity, $r(277) = .59$, $p < .001$, nationalist sport viewing motivations, $r(277) = .34$, $p < .001$, and internationalist sport viewing motivations, $r(277) = .21$, $p < .001$. Seemingly, international sport viewing motivations would be more strongly and positively correlated with international sport viewing than national sport viewing motivations; however, the inverse is supported by these data.

The results of the hierarchical regression indicated a significant change ($\Delta F = 5.86$, $p < .01$) with the addition of the variables in Block 2, nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations, to the amount of variance explained in international sport viewing. The block of nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations together significantly improved the R^2 of the model ($\Delta R^2 = .02$, $p < .001$), accounting for 2.4% variance in international sport viewing beyond sport fan intensity and gender; however,

separately, nationalist sport viewing motivations ($\beta = .03, p > .05$) was not a statistically significant predictor of international sport viewing while internationalist sport viewing motivations ($\beta = .15, p < .01$) was a statistically significant predictor of international sport viewing. For full results, please see Table 20.

Experiment Results

Manipulation Check

To determine if a priming effect occurred for the experimental portion of the study, I calculated the completion rates for the target and distracter words from the fragment test as suggested by Yoo (2007, 2009). Each correct word was coded as 1, and each incorrect word was coded as 0. The mean completion rates for the distracter and target words were then calculated. A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference between groups, $F(4,310) = 2.20, p > .05$, indicating no difference between subjects in the two conditions' completion rates for the distracter words. The competition rates for the distracter words were used as subjects' baseline score on the fragment completion test.

A priming effect was estimated by a difference in fragment completion test for target words above word completion for distracter words. For the means for the distracter and target words as well as the difference between the distracter and target words, please see Table 21. To test if the completion rates for the target words was greater than those for distracter words due to a priming effect, a 2(distracter v. target) x 2(condition) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of the within-subjects factor (target v. distracter words) was statistically significant, $F(1,315) = 143.21, p < .001$; however, the interaction effect between groups (condition) was not significant, $F(1,315) = 1.995, p > .05$. This confirms that subjects reported greater fragment completion rates

for the target words than the distracter words with no significant difference between conditions, which supports a priming effect.

Research Question 3

RQ3 determined whether the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) changed viewers' level of national pride, while controlling for gender and sport fan intensity. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride was marginally statistically significant, $F(1,310) = 3.82, p = .05, \eta^2 = .01$. There was a larger degree of positive change from pre-exposure national pride ($M = 5.43; SD = .99$) to post-exposure national pride ($M = 5.58; SD = .88$) in the nationalist frame condition than the change from pre-exposure national pride ($M = 5.31; SD = .87$) to post-exposure national pride ($M = 5.36; SD = .85$) in the internationalist frame condition. For a visual representation of the mean change, please see Figure 6.

Research Question 4

RQ4 determined whether the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) changed viewers' level of internationalism, while controlling for gender and sport fan intensity. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism was statistically significant, $F(1,310) = 3.91, p < .05, \eta^2 = .01$. There was a larger degree of positive change from pre-exposure internationalism ($M = 4.43; SD = .93$) to post-exposure internationalism ($M = 4.73; SD = .98$) in the internationalist frame condition than the change from pre-exposure internationalism ($M = 4.50; SD = 1.01$) to post-exposure internationalism ($M = 4.64; SD$

= .93) in the nationalist frame condition. For a visual representation of the mean change, please see Figure 7.

Research Question 5

The three parts of RQ5 determined whether the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) change viewers' level of agreement with the three international issues, including the U.S.'s handling of Darfur, illegal immigration, and war with Iran, while controlling for gender and sport fan intensity. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on whether or not the U.S. should help in Darfur was not statistically significant, $F(1,310) = .36, p > .10$, observed power = .09. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on whether or not the U.S. should control illegal immigration was not statistically significant, $F(1,310) = .479, p > .10$, observed power = .11. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on whether or not the U.S. should go to war with Iran was not statistically significant, $F(1,310) = .658, p > .10$, observed power = .13.

Research Question 6

RQ6a tested whether national pride would mediate the influence of the nationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur. To examine the effect of being assigned to the nationalism condition, initial regressions established that being assigned to the nationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur ($\beta = .04, t = .71, p > .05$). When controlling for national pride, being assigned to the nationalism condition still did not statistically significantly predict a change in attitudes towards helping Darfur ($\beta = .04, t =$

.72, $p > .05$). The nationalism condition significantly positively predicted national pride ($\beta = .13$, $t = 2.26$, $p < .05$), and national pride did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards Darfur ($\beta = .00$, $t = -.02$, $p > .05$). The steps of mediation outlined by Baron and Kenny were not met, suggesting that national pride did not mediate the influence of the nationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur. For a visual representation of these results, please see Figure 8a.

Further analysis of the indirect effect through the bootstrapping technique found the standardized estimate for the indirect effect was $-.002$ ($SE = .02$; 95% $CI = -.04 - .04$). This finding suggests nationalism does not have a statistically significant indirect effect on the relationship between the nationalism condition and the U.S. helping in Darfur.

RQ6b tested whether national pride would mediate the influence of the nationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration. To examine the effect of being assigned to the nationalism condition, initial regressions established that being assigned to the nationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. controlling immigration ($\beta = .09$, $t = 1.52$, $p > .05$). When controlling for national pride, the regression showed that being assigned to the nationalism condition did not statistically significantly predict an increase in change in attitude towards the U.S. controlling immigration ($\beta = .04$, $t = .73$, $p > .05$). The nationalism condition significantly positively predicted national pride ($\beta = .12$, $t = 2.26$, $p < .05$), and national pride significantly positively predicted attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration ($\beta = .37$, $t = 7.13$, $p < .001$). The steps of mediation outlined by Baron and Kenny were not met, suggesting that national pride did not mediate the influence of the nationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes

towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration. For a visual representation of these results, please see Figure 8b.

Further analysis of the significance of the indirect effect through the bootstrapping technique found the standardized estimate for the indirect effect was .13 (SE = .06; 95% CI = .02 - .26). This finding suggests that assignment to the nationalism condition has a statistically significant indirect effect on participants' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration through national pride.

RQ6c tested whether national pride would mediate the influence of the nationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran. To examine this effect of being assigned to the nationalism condition, initial regressions established that being assigned to the nationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran ($\beta = -.03, t = -.50, p > .05$). When controlling for national pride, the regression showed that being assigned to the nationalism condition did not statistically significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran ($\beta = -.07, t = -1.33, p > .05$). The nationalism condition significantly positively predicted national pride ($\beta = .13, t = 2.26, p < .05$), and national pride significantly positively predicted attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran ($\beta = .33, t = 6.26, p < .001$). The steps of mediation outlined by Baron and Kenny were not met, suggesting that national pride did not mediate the influence of the nationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran. For a visual representation of these results, please see Figure 8c.

Further analysis of the significance of the indirect effect through the bootstrapping technique found the standardized estimate for the indirect effect was .13

(SE = .06; 95% CI = .01 - .25). This finding suggests that assignment to nationalist condition has a statistically significant indirect effect on participants' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran through national pride.

Research Question 7

RQ7a tested whether internationalism would mediate the influence of the internationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur. To examine this effect of being assigned to the internationalism condition, initial regressions established that being assigned to the internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards helping Darfur ($\beta = -.04, t = -.71, p > .05$). When controlling for internationalism, being assigned to the internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards helping Darfur ($\beta = -.06, t = -1.14, p > .05$). The internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change internationalism ($\beta = .05, t = .81, p > .05$), but internationalism did significantly positively predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur ($\beta = .41, t = 7.92, p < .001$). The steps of mediation outlined by Baron and Kenny were not met, suggesting that internationalism did not mediate the influence of the internationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur. For visual representation of these results, please see Figure 9a.

Further analysis of the indirect effect through the bootstrapping technique found the standardized estimate for the indirect effect was -.04 (SE = .06; 95% CI = -.15 - .06). This finding suggests that assignment to the internationalism condition does not have a statistically significant indirect effect on participants' attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur through internationalism.

RQ7b tested whether internationalism would mediate the influence of internationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration. To examine this effect of being assigned to the internationalism condition, initial regressions established that being assigned to the internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. controlling immigration ($\beta = -.09, t = -1.52, p > .05$). When controlling for internationalism, being assigned to the internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. controlling immigration ($\beta = -.07, t = -1.29, p > .05$). The internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change internationalism ($\beta = .05, t = .81, p > .05$), but internationalism significantly negatively predicted attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration ($\beta = -.40, t = -7.80, p < .001$). The steps of mediation outlined by Baron and Kenny were not met, suggesting that internationalism did not mediate the influence of the internationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration. For visual representation of these results, please see Figure 9b.

Further analysis of the significance of the indirect effect through the bootstrapping technique found the standardized estimate for the indirect effect was .02 (SE = .05; 95% CI = -.08 - .19). This finding suggests that assignment to the internationalism condition does not have a statistically significant indirect effect on participants' attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration through internationalism.

RQ7c tested whether internationalism would mediate the influence of internationalism framing condition on viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war

with Iran. To examine this effect of being assigned to the internationalism condition, initial regressions established that being assigned to the internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran ($\beta = .03, t = .50, p > .05$). When controlling for internationalism, being assigned to the internationalism condition did not significantly predict a change in attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran ($\beta = .03, t = .61, p > .05$). The internationalism condition did not significantly predict internationalism ($\beta = .05, t = .81, p > .05$), but internationalism negatively predicted attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran ($\beta = -.14, t = -2.5, p < .05$). The steps of mediation outlined by Baron and Kenny were not met, suggesting that internationalism did not mediate the influence of the internationalism framing condition on the change in viewers' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran. For visual representation of these results, please see Figure 9c.

Further analysis of the significance of indirect effects through the bootstrapping technique found the standardized estimate for the indirect effect was .02 (SE = .03; 95% CI = -.03 - .08). This finding suggests that assignment to the internationalism condition does not have a statistically significant indirect effect on participants' attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran through internationalism.

Research Question 8

The three parts of RQ8 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by sports fan intensity (low versus high). A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport fan intensity) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with sport fan intensity as

a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .082, p > .10$, observed power = .059. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport fan intensity) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism with sport fan intensity as a moderator was also not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .304, p > .10$.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport fan intensity) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of the U.S. helping Darfur with sport fan intensity as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .201, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport fan intensity) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with sport fan intensity as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .400, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport fan intensity) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with sport fan intensity as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .152, p > .10$.

Research Question 9

The three parts of RQ9 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by low versus high sport viewing motivations.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport television viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with low versus high sport television viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = 1.440, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport television viewing

motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism with low versus high sport television viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .011, p > .10$.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport television viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of helping Darfur with low versus high sport television viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .225, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport television viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with low versus high sport television viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = 2.613, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (sport television viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with low versus high sport television viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .303, p > .10$.

Research Question 10

The three parts of RQ10 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by low versus high nationalist sport viewing motivations. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (nationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with low versus high nationalist viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = 2.335, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2

(nationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism with low versus high nationalist viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = .155, p > .10$.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (nationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of helping Darfur with low versus high nationalist viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = 1.127, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (nationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with low versus high nationalist viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = 1.818, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (nationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with low versus high nationalist viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = .025, p > .10$.

Research Question 11

The three parts of RQ11 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by low versus high internationalist sport viewing motivations.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (internationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with low versus high internationalist sport viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically

significant, $F(1,272) = .497, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (internationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism with low versus high internationalist sport viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = .262, p > .10$.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (internationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of helping Darfur with low versus high internationalist sport viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = .363, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (internationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with low versus high internationalist sport viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = .326, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (internationalist sport viewing motivations) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with low versus high internationalist sport viewing motivations as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,272) = .591, p > .10$.

Research Question 12

The three parts of RQ12 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by gender. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with gender as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .003, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA found that

the main effect of frame on internationalism with gender as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .305, p > .10$.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of helping Darfur with gender as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .420, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with gender as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = .059, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with gender as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,309) = 1.068, p > .10$.

Research Question 13

The three parts of RQ13 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by the amount of Olympic viewing (low versus high viewing). A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (Olympic viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with Olympic viewing as a moderator was marginally significant, $F(1,273) = 3.195, p = .068, \eta^2 = .401$. There was a larger positive degree of change from pre-exposure national pride for high Olympic viewers ($M = 5.60; SD = .98$) to post-exposure national pride for high Olympic viewers ($M = 5.84; SD = .75$) in the nationalist frame condition than pre-exposure national pride for low Olympic viewers ($M = 5.32; SD = 1.03$) to post-exposure national pride for low Olympic viewers ($M = 5.30; SD = .94$). There was a

larger positive degree of change from pre-exposure national pride for high Olympic viewers ($M = 5.61$; $SD = .76$) to post-exposure national pride for high Olympic viewers ($M = 5.69$; $SD = .69$) in the internationalist frame condition than pre-exposure national pride for low Olympic viewers ($M = 5.19$; $SD = .83$) to post-exposure national pride for low Olympic viewers ($M = 5.21$; $SD = .81$). For a visual representation of the mean changes, please see Figures 10-11.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (Olympic viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism with Olympic viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .028, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (Olympic viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of the U.S. helping Darfur with Olympic viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .072, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (Olympic viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with Olympic viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .145, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (Olympic viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with Olympic viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .050, p > .10$.

Research Question 14

The three parts of RQ14 determined whether the effects of the type of Olympic media framing (nationalism versus internationalism) on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes would be moderated by the amount of international sport viewing (low versus high viewing). A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2

(international sport viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on national pride with international sport viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .073, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (international sport viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on internationalism with international sport viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .658, p > .10$.

A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (international sport viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of the U.S. helping Darfur with international sport viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .198, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (international sport viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of controlling illegal immigration with international sport viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = 1.052, p > .10$. A 2(time) x 2 (frame) x 2 (international sport viewing) repeated measures ANOVA found that the main effect of frame on the international political attitude of war with Iran with international sport viewing as a moderator was not statistically significant, $F(1,273) = .211, p > .10$.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

The first purpose of this study was to investigate Olympic viewing motivations. The second purpose was to investigate the priming effects of nationalist and internationalist Olympic television on viewers' national pride, internationalism, and international political attitudes. Both purposes of the study yielded several significant findings. This chapter first discusses the findings of the factor analyses related to the Olympic viewing motivations, and then discusses the findings of the experimental portion of the investigation related to the effects of the nationalist and internationalist televised Olympic frames. Third, the chapter addresses the limitations of this study. Finally, future directions for research examining Olympic viewing and its effects on political attitudes are explored.

Findings and Implications

Factor Analyses

Nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations. The first research question addressed dominant motivations for international sport viewing. The CFA revealed a two-factor structure, nationalist and internationalist viewing motivations, which supports past research. In particular, this factor structure supports Danner's (1997) qualitative analysis which found conflicting reasons for watching the Olympics; some reported participants reported in this earlier study watching the Games because of their interest in internationalism rather than interest in the actual competition of specific

Games. The six internationalist items identified in the current study demonstrate the international viewing motivations identified in Danner's investigation.

In contrast, Danner also found that other viewers watched the Olympic Games because of the competition and struggle between the conflicting teams and athletes. In the current factor analysis, almost all of the nationalist motivation items reflect interest in competition and a focus on winning and losing, such as "It is important for me to root for the U.S. when the U.S. team or U.S. athletes compete in a sporting event;" "I like watching the U.S. win sporting events;" and "It saddens me to watch the U.S. lose a sporting event against other nations."

Additionally, the internationalist factor structure reflected that some viewers do not watch international sporting events primarily for the competition between nations and their athletes, unlike those who watch Olympic sport due to nationalist motivations; however, having some understanding of the actual sport still seems to matter to most viewers. For example, two items that did not load were "I like to watch any sporting event in which different nations come together peacefully to participate, regardless of whether I understand the sport or not," and "I like to watch any sporting event in which the U.S. is competing, regardless of whether I understand the sport or not." Clearly, viewers are motivated to watch international sporting events for both internationalist and nationalist interests, but these two primary reasons for viewing international sport do not seem to eliminate viewers' need to actually understand what is going on within a specific sporting arena or field. This finding supports Gantz et al.'s (2006) findings that sport television viewers, unlike viewers of other television genres, care about the outcomes of

their chosen sport, and do not choose to view a sports program only as a “last-ditch” alternative when there is nothing else to do or nothing else to watch.

Gantz and Wenner (1995) argue that sport audiences should not be considered a monolithic mass as the fan sport experience will differ across members of the viewing audience. The two different sport viewing motivation factors identified in the present study demonstrate that international sport audiences are similar to any other sport audience in that they are motivated to watch sport for different reasons. Viewers of international sports are not inclined to watch international sporting events for just one set of motivations or the other.

Along with supporting past findings, the International Sport Viewing Motivations (ISVM) scale developed in this study has implications for future research. The two subscales can be used to represent the different factors for international sport viewing. While Gantz’s (1981, 1985) existing measure of sport television viewing motivations provides a broad set of reasons that capture why individuals watch sports in general, researchers can use the motivations scale developed in this study for a more specific measure of why viewers watch sports featuring the U.S. in competition with other nations.

The ISVM scale also allows for exploration of the intersection between sport, the media, and international politics. For instance, respondents scored much lower ($M = 4.17$) in their general sport television viewing motivations than their nationalist ($M = 5.34$) and internationalist ($M = 5.15$) sport viewing motivations. The ISVM indicates sport viewing motivations fueled by national pride and internationalism resonated more strongly with viewers than their general sport television viewing motivations, which do

not reflect nationalist and internationalist themes. Additionally, respondents' level of internationalism ($M = 4.47$) was not as strong as their internationalist sport television viewing motivations ($M = 5.15$), which also suggests an interesting possibility of international sport competition to attract viewers who may not necessarily attune to international issues or events. These findings suggest that international sport viewing may well act as a vehicle for increased attitudes of internationalism.

Gender and sport fan intensity differences. In addition to confirming the two factors of the ISVM scale, interesting differences also emerged between gender and sport fan-intensity, within the ISVM factor model. First, the CFA confirmed differences between female and male sport viewing motivations, and gender gave a better model fit. This finding supports past research (e.g. Raney, 2006; Gantz & Wenner, 1995) that also found gender differences in motivations for viewing mediated sports in general. Women exhibited higher loadings for internationalist viewing motivations (.74-.81) than men (.65-.77). Also, most of the internationalist viewing items loaded higher for women than men. Specifically, the internationalist motivation items “to learn about other nations” and “like bringing all nations together” loaded much higher for women (.75; .77) than these same motivations did for men (.67; .65). While nationalist and internationalist motivation factors were inter-correlated similarly for men (.58) and women (.57), indicating that men and women are motivated to watch international sport for both factors, women are more related to the latent factor of internationalist motivations than they are for both factors.

In contrast, the nationalist factors loaded similarly between males and females. The “watching allows me to cheer for U.S.” and “makes me proud to be American”

nationalist motivation items loaded almost identically for men (.88; .82) and women (.88; .84). In fact, the lowest loading item for both men (.64) and women (.58) was the nationalist motivation “I’m saddened watching U.S. lose versus other nations.” Nationalist motivations attract men and women similarly in watch international sporting events. While the gap between men and women’s overall sport viewing motivations has begun to close (Gantz & Wenner, 1995), the current study suggests gender differences in international sport viewing motivations persists.

Second, the CFA confirmed that running the models separately by sport fan-intensity provided a better fit to the model. Like RQ1a, this study confirmed past research (e.g. Gantz & Wenner, 1995) which found differences between sport fans and non-fans in their sport viewing motivations. Low-intensity fans’ internationalist sport viewing motivations were more tightly clustered and exhibited higher loadings more consistently (.73-.84) than high-intensity sport fans (.67-.80). Interestingly, the highest loading internationalist item for low-intensity fans, “I like different nations showing gestures of goodwill,” (.84) was the lowest loading internationalist item for high-intensity sports fans (.67). The current study supports Gantz and Wenner’s (1995) finding that non-sport fans watch televised sports without much “interest, concern, involvement, or responsiveness,” (p. 70). Non-sport fans motivated to watch for internationalist reasons tune in more for international education, understanding, and peace and seem to lack interest in the ultimate outcome of the sporting event itself.

In comparing the two models, the most interesting finding was the inter-correlations between the nationalist and internationalist factors for low and high-intensity sports fans. The low-intensity fan model was much higher at .63, while the high-intensity

fan model was lower at .40. This indicates that high intensity sports fans are more likely to watch international sports for either nationalist or internationalist reasons, but not for both. Low-intensity sports fans, however, are likely to watch for both nationalist and internationalist viewing motivations because the nationalist and internationalist factors were highly correlated for low-intensity fans.

Olympic and International Televised Sport Viewing Motivations

RQ2a examined which motivations predicted viewing the Olympic Games. A hierarchical regression found that nationalist and internationalist viewing motivations combined were both significant in predicting Olympic viewing, but nationalist sport viewing motivations were a stronger predictor of Olympic viewing than internationalist sport viewing motivations. This finding provides some support for previous claims by Billings and Angelini (2007) who argued that NBC, in order to feed the “ratings beast,” simply gave viewers what they want: the home team shown winning medals. While content analyses of Olympic television coverage such as Billings and Angelini’s identified the dominant nationalist frame in NBC’s Olympic coverage, the current study provides much needed scholarly evidence that nationalist motivations are a stronger predictor of Olympic TV viewing. Even though some viewers are motivated to watch the Olympics for internationalist reasons, these tendencies are not as strong as viewers’ nationalist viewing motivations. With this finding, NBC is clearly providing Olympic coverage that caters to viewers’ dominant nationalist interests.

Still, viewers’ overall dual motivations for watching the Olympics support Hoberman’s (1986) claim that “it is the utopian dimension of sport, as much as the political forces which seek to exploit it, which accounts for the survival of the Olympic

movement” (p. 5). This study found that both the peaceful international unity and pro-U.S. themes resound with Olympic viewers. For U.S. television viewers at least, the contradiction in the Olympic storyline is a tension that viewers seemingly reconcile in describing why they are motivated to watch the Games.

Non-Olympic international sport viewing does differ somewhat from Olympic viewing in viewing motivations. Similar to the Olympic viewing hierarchical regression model, the nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations combined did significantly improve the non-Olympic international sport viewing model; however, the combined nationalist and internationalist motivations only accounted for 2.4% of the variance in the non-Olympic international sport viewing model. In contrast, the combined motivations accounted for 9.7% of the variance in the Olympic viewing model.

Additionally, when separated, internationalist sport viewing motivations did predict non-Olympic international sport viewing, and nationalist sport viewing motivations did not predict non-Olympic international sport viewing. Unlike Olympic viewers, other international sporting event viewers, such as the FIFA World Cup, FIBA World Basketball Championship, U.S. Open, and Wimbledon, are not motivated to watch these events largely for nationalist reasons. Thus, Olympic viewers do differ from non-Olympic international sport viewers in their viewing motivations. These findings indicate that non-Olympic international sport viewers are not motivated to watch for the nationalist and internationalist motivations developed in the ISVM scale to the same degree as Olympic viewers.

Olympic viewers are also different from non-Olympic international sport viewers in their sport fan intensity as a viewing predictor. While sport fan intensity was a strong

predictor for both Olympic ($\beta = .394, p < .001$) and international sport viewing ($\beta = .514, p < .001$), sport fan intensity was a stronger predictor of international sport viewing than Olympic viewing. Olympic viewers are indeed motivated for different reasons than those who watch other international televised sports because sport fandom is not as strong of a predictor for watching the Olympics. Non-Olympic international sport viewers seem to watch those sports more for the love of sport, while Olympic viewers are motivated to watch in order to see the U.S. win and feel pride in their nation.

One final note about the findings related to Olympic viewing versus other international sports. As the Olympic television viewership numbers indicate, the current study found that viewers consume more Olympics ($M = 2.47$) than international sports ($M = 2.05$). In general, the Olympics were more popular among respondents in this study. Also, participants reported greater nationalist sport viewing motivations ($M = 5.34$) than internationalist sport viewing motivations ($M = 5.15$). Viewers of all international sporting events measured in this study scored slightly higher in watching for nationalist than internationalist reasons.

Main Effects

RQ3 and RQ4 examined the main effects of exposure to Olympic framing (nationalism and internationalism) on viewers' levels of national pride and internationalism. The results found a significant main effect for frame on national pride, with a larger degree of positive change from pre to post-exposure national pride in the nationalist – rather than internationalist – condition. Also, there was a significant main effect for frame on internationalism, with a larger degree of positive change from pre to post-exposure internationalism in the internationalist – rather than nationalist – condition.

Additionally, there was a larger degree of change in internationalism in the internationalism condition than national pride in the nationalism condition. This could be partially due to the fact that, in the internationalism condition, the pre-exposure means in internationalism were much lower ($M = 4.43$) than the pre-exposure means in national pride ($M = 5.43$) in the nationalism frame. With a lower pre-exposure mean, internationalism had more room for possible variation post-exposure. These findings have both theoretical implications and implications for the viewers and producers of the Olympic telecast.

Theoretical implications. In considering attitudes of nationalism and internationalism, one might assume that such constructs may function as a zero-sum game whereas exposure to the nationalist frame might decrease one's internationalism and exposure to the internationalist frame might decrease one's national pride. Yet, such was not the case in this study. Exposure to U.S. nationalism did not significantly impact viewers' level of internationalism, positively or negatively; and exposure to internationalism did not significantly impact viewers' level of national pride, positively or negatively. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) suggest a theoretical explanation for this finding, as they argue (p. 260):

Nationalists may score high on love of country and high on hostility toward foreigners, but one does not necessarily follow from the other. Internationalists, on the other hand, may score low on hostility toward foreigners, but it is not intuitively obvious which direction they would score on love of country.

Just because national pride or internationalism increases, it does not follow that the opposing or other attitude would decrease. Indeed, the findings from this study point to the fact that nationalism and internationalism are not opposing attitudes. While Kosterman and Feshbach's measure of nationalism is not constructed in opposition to

their measure of internationalism, however research by Li and Brewer (2004) found attitudes toward specific nations that suggested a less-pluralistic worldview were positively associated with one's feelings of nationalism. The internationalism measure used in the current study did not address attitudes toward a specific nation, which may explain why exposure to each condition (nationalism or internationalism) did not create opposing attitudes (national pride or internationalism).

Additionally, these findings suggest some theoretical implications for framing and priming research. First, depending on the condition, participants were exposed to a frame that either cast the U.S. in a positive light with images such as the U.S. winning a gold medal or cast all nations in a positive light with images of all the Olympic nations entering together during the closing ceremony. Price and Tewksbury (1997) argue that the way in which choices are presented, or framed, will impact the likelihood a choice will be selected. Participants chose to view either their nation or all nations positively depending on their frame condition, which is supported by the main effects on nationalism and internationalism in the current study, and participants experienced the applicability effect of framing, a first-order cognitive effect. While participants processed the message frame and then interpreted the Olympic media coverage, they cognitively applied the frame they viewed.

On the second level of agenda setting, certain attributes of the Olympics were selected depending on the condition and brought those attributes to participants' attention, including visual symbols such as the U.S. flag or the Olympic rings. Based on what the participants in this study viewed in their experimental condition, the participants considered certain attributes of the Olympics more important because these attributes

were more salient, and in turn, evaluated the U.S. and its role in the world differently (priming effect).

Second, the priming results of this study found that the nationalist condition primed schemata associated with patriotic feelings towards the U.S., and the internationalist condition primed schemata associated with positive international thoughts and feelings. These findings support the framework of media priming effects that argues particular attitudes and beliefs are more readily accessible after related exposure. After seeing pro-U.S. images, participants recalled more pro-U.S. words, and they reported higher levels of nationalism immediately after viewing nationalist clips. Similarly, after viewing pro-international images, participants recalled more pro-international words and reported higher levels of internationalism immediately after viewing internationalist clip.

Specifically, the findings of this study support existing research regarding political priming. Hassin et al. (2007) found that subtle national cues, specifically brief glimpses of the Israeli flag, affected attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, voting intentions, and even actual voting in Israeli elections. The authors suggest that even subtle reminders of one's nationality can significantly influence political thought and overt political behavior. While the current study did not assess political behavior, it did find that even subtle reminders of U.S. nationalism through flag-waving and the viewing of U.S. athletes winning gold medals positively affected viewers' political attitudes about their own nation.

The indirect effects of the nationalist condition through national pride on attitudes towards controlling illegal immigration and going to war with Iran support Li and Brewer's (2004) findings. Their results found that different definitions of American

unity primed participants to be more patriotic while less accepting of cultural diversity, concluding that nationalism is not always compatible with pluralistic values. Hassin et al. (2007) argued that national flags of any country is one of the most “pervasive and ideological images” (p. 19757) and can have significant influence over our attitudes and behavior. The current study confirms Hassin et al.’s claim, as there were indirect effects on international political attitudes supporting the U.S. controlling illegal immigration and the U.S. going to war with Iran after being exposed to pro-U.S. images, such as the constant waving of the U.S. flag and a flood of U.S. red, white, and blue.

While there were direct effects of the internationalist frame on the broad global attitudes suggested through the internationalism scale, attitudes towards the specific international political issues measured were not directly affected by the nationalist or internationalist frame, which has some possible explanations. The indirect effect on the attitude towards going to war with Iran had the most variance of the three international political attitudes from pre to post-test possibly because it started lower than the other two international political attitudes. Also, some limitations within the measures of political attitudes (single-item) suggest why no direct effect of frame on the individual political attitudes occurred; however, the indirect effect of the nationalist frame on controlling illegal immigration and going to war with Iran through national pride suggest that some effect on these attitudes is happening and needs further research. The clips used in the current study activated global schema, but the three specific items measured were not part of that schema.

While this study’s preliminary results support the findings of some existing political priming research, a major difference with the current study is that it was

conducted within the context of sport, not the explicit arena of political affairs. Until now, little to no research has examined the intersection of sport and politics, and specifically how the media coverage of sport competition primes viewers' feelings of national pride and internationalism and affects attitudes regarding political issues. Also, unlike previous priming research related to nationalism, such as Hassin et al.'s study which showed participants a glimpse of the Israeli flag on a blank screen, the current experimental study used actual footage from the Olympic Games. The current study's reliance on visual symbols, and not commentary, to illustrate a specific frame and use of real world stimuli provided the study with more externally valid stimuli.

Implications for Olympic viewers, political groups, and broadcasters. The study's findings also have important implications for Olympic viewers as well as for nations that host the Olympic Games and the parties responsible for the Olympic telecast. First, perhaps the most substantial implication of these findings is that viewers are clearly affected by the distorted, heavily nationalist Olympic Games media coverage described by previous content analytic studies of the Olympic Games. As numerous studies have found (e.g. Billings et al., 2008; Billings & Angelini, 2007; Billings & Eastman, 2002, 2003; Eastman & Billings, 1999; Riggs et al., 1993), Olympic media coverage is predominantly pro-U.S. The disproportionate focus on U.S. athletes in NBC's coverage, such as during the 2000 Sydney Olympics when 51% of all athletes mentioned were American yet only 11% of the medals were won by Americans (Billings & Eastman, 2002), is the very type of pro-U.S. media framing found in this study to positively affect viewers' attitudes towards their own nation and their feelings of national pride.

Also, internationalist themes included within an Olympic telecast can positively affect viewers' internationalist attitudes. Yet, with much less media content focused on pro-world unity and themes of world harmony and peace (e.g. Salwen & Garrison, 1987), themes which actually represent the Olympic ideal, U.S. Olympic media coverage misses opportunities to positively influence what viewers think about the rest of the world. As Larson and Rivenburgh (1991) argued, television constructs the Olympic spectacle into multiple realities with profound implications for images of nation, culture, and the Olympic movement. The tension between nationalism and internationalism, inherent within an Olympic event, creates two distinct realities. With so much more of the NBC Olympic telecast focused on the U.S. winning gold medals, the notion of U.S. world dominance and global superiority is advanced in the minds of viewers while international understanding and appreciation is stifled.

Even viewers that set out to watch the Games for either nationalist or internationalist reasons may be unaware that even though they are just watching a sporting event, their feelings towards their and other nations can be affected. As Kanin (1980) has argued, "Political sport serves to remind us that international relations, no matter how secretly conducted, are bound to the mass publics who, in the final analysis, serve as both audience and judge of those who lead them" (p. 24). Judging by the ratings, NBC Olympic viewers clearly approve of the network's coverage of the Games. Still, while this study found that Olympic viewers watch for both nationalist and internationalist reasons, there are viewers who are not watching the Games for the overt political reasons represented in the ISVM scale developed in this study. Yet, viewers'

political attitudes are clearly affected by viewing Olympic coverage, even though one may not attune to such programming with politics in mind.

Perhaps, more troubling is that the “differential treatment” (Billings & Angelini, 2007, p. 108) given to the U.S. in NBC’s telecast positively impacts viewers’ national pride, possibly reinforcing attitudes of U.S. dominance in world affairs because of the extreme focus on U.S superiority in the field of sport (even when such focus or framing is not warranted due to actual performance of U.S. athletes and teams). NBC’s exaltation of the U.S. reinforces an “us versus them” mentality (Billings, 2008b) within U.S. viewers. In the end, the current study confirms that sport, specifically the Olympics, is anything but apolitical, as some past research has suggested. The political nature of the Olympic telecast matters a great deal because, at the very least, its pro-U.S. coverage does not reflect the fostering of international feelings of goodwill.

Another implication for this study is in the arena of international political affairs. The study found a larger degree of increase in attitudes of internationalism after exposure to the internationalist condition than increase in national pride after exposure to the nationalist condition. While participants reported lower pre-exposure internationalism ($M = 4.47$) than national pride ($M = 5.37$), this finding suggests that the Olympic Games and attendant telecasts have the unique power to positively change viewers’ international mindset – should internationalist framing be more frequently featured in Olympic telecasts. The Olympic Charter professes the building of unity among the nations of the world’s five continents and its athletes, and the findings of this study point to the fact that the Olympic “ideal” could be furthered through telecast of Games, highlighting an internationalist frame. Unfortunately, the U.S. media coverage of the Games is driven by

viewership and commercial profits, not concern for world peace. Still, the effects of the internationalist condition illustrate the potential and the promise of the Games.

Further, sport's ability to positively foster viewers' global worldviews or reinforce national pride may well be of interest to nations who wish to host the Games. While this study's results are preliminary, the findings may further justify nations' attempts to use the Games and influence the Olympic media agenda to positively affect nationalist and influence political agendas at home and abroad. Certainly, nations frequently fight for the rights to host the Games, often with intentions to exploit the Games for their own national purposes (Senn, 1999). The effects found within this study indicate that the Olympic telecast can be an effective media tool within a nations' international relations arsenal as a way to impact attitudes.

Beyond furthering national interests, other parties also have interest in the potential effects of the Olympic telecast. The specific entity that has the most control over the broadcast is the Olympic telecast is the broadcast network and their journalists. Even if NBC's commentators and production team do not realize their broadcasts have the affect to further politicize the already political Olympics, their ~~n~~ationalistic rhetoric" (Riggs et al., 1993) that dominates the Games' telecast clearly affects U.S. viewers' perceptions of their own nation and its role in the world. The commercialism of the Games, as suggested by Beck and Bosshart (2003a), has created extravagant bidding wars among the networks for broadcast rights to the Games. NBC has rights to the Games at least through 2020 for \$4.38 billion, after out-bidding both ESPN and FOX (~~N~~BC retains Olympic," 2011).

As a commercial entity broadcasting the supposedly non-for-profit and apolitical Olympic Games, NBC must balance the needs of its corporate sponsors, yet they should also realize how their framing of the Games impacts viewers. Certainly, corporate sponsors must approve of NBC's final product as it is their advertising revenues that make the telecast possible. The increasingly pro-U.S. coverage since NBC took over the Games in 1988 has proved very lucrative for NBC and has provided this corporate entity with a unique ability to foster national pride through sport and further politicize the Olympic Games.

Moderating Effects

Finally, this study examined several possible moderating variables in order to achieve a clearer picture of the effects of the two Olympic frames. Sport fan intensity, sport television viewing motivations, nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations, and international sport viewing were not found to moderate the effects of the type of Olympic media framing on national pride, internationalism, and the three international political attitudes; however, low versus high Olympic viewing did significantly moderate the effects of the type of Olympic media frame on national pride, but did not moderate the effects of the frame on internationalism and the three international political attitudes. In both the nationalist and internationalist conditions, high Olympic viewers had a larger positive degree of change from pre to post-exposure national pride than did low Olympic viewers.

This finding suggests what past content analytic studies of Olympic coverage (e.g. Billings, 2008b) have found. NBC's Olympic telecast is greatly pro-U.S., thus those who are heavy consumers of Olympic telecasts have been exposed to the largely nationalist

framing of the Olympic broadcast, making those schema more readily accessible. In fact, pre-exposure national pride ($M = 5.60$) was higher for high Olympic viewers in the nationalist condition than all participants ($M = 5.43$) in the nationalist condition. Also, the mean change from pre ($M = 5.60$) to post ($M = 5.84$) exposure for national pride in the nationalist condition among high Olympic viewers was larger than the pre ($M = 5.43$) to post ($M = 5.58$) exposure for national pride in the nationalist condition among all participants. Further, pre-exposure national pride ($M = 5.61$) was even higher for high Olympic viewers in the internationalist condition than all participants' pre-exposure national pride ($M = 5.31$) in the internationalist condition. Those who had not watched as much of NBC's U.S. dominated Olympic broadcasts may not have had the national pride themes as readily available to be activated after exposure to the Olympic telecast.

This moderating effect can be explained theoretically by the chronic accessibility of priming effects. Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. (2009) argue that "the frequent and repeated stories on a particular issue increases the chronic accessibility of the information" (p. 83). Those who watch lots of Olympics were more affected by the nationalist frame because they already have the well-defined, existing nationalist schema readily available. The high Olympic viewers have been exposed to those nationalist themes over and over again during their frequent consumption of NBC's Olympic coverage.

Limitations

As with any research endeavor, particularly an exploratory study like this one, choices must be made in the research design that create limitations for the study. First, in regards to the experimental stimuli, identifying internationalist competition clips from NBC's 2010 Olympic coverage was much more difficult than identifying nationalist

competition clips from NBC's telecast. While this did create some issues in finding potential stimuli for the internationalist condition, the researcher addressed this problem by using competition clips from the IOC's website that featured internationalist themes. Despite this potential limitation, in the end, valid nationalist and internationalist stimuli were created for the experiment.

Second, as with many experimental studies, there were limitations with the population. Because this study focused on NBC's Olympic coverage, nationalism was restricted to one nation as only U.S. citizens were included in the population. Also, the researcher did not differentiate between races within the U.S. citizen population; and, because a convenience sample was used, there were more females than males within the study's population.

A final shortcoming of this study is related to the three international political attitudes measured. Due to the exploratory nature of the investigation, only three broad questions addressing three major international political issues facing the U.S. at the time the study was conducted were used. Only indirect effects emerged through national pride for two of the three political attitudes, suggesting the possibility of effects on certain political attitudes based on the Olympic frame. Perhaps asking participants about other international political attitudes would yield different results. Also, a single question was asked about each issue, and additional questions about each political issue could also yield different results.

Future Research

While this study did uncover important effects of viewing the Olympic Games, this initial investigation only begins to explore what motivates Olympic viewers and how

the Olympic telecast can affect what viewers think about their own nation and the rest of the world. First, future research should examine other Olympic telecasts. As past content analyses suggest (e.g. Billings et al., 2008; Billings & Eastman, 2002), there is variation in the amount of nationalism found within NBC's Olympic telecast from one Olympic Games to another. Researchers should use broadcasts from multiple Games to better understand the possible priming effects. Also, variations of the nationalist and internationalist frames used in the current study need to be explored. For example, because this study found that pro-U.S. clips from the Olympic Games can positively affect nationalist attitudes, there exists the possibility that exposure to Olympic telecasts focusing on the U.S. losing or being portrayed in other negative ways could negatively affect nationalist attitudes. Possible effects from such framing need further scholarly exploration.

Second, more research is needed to develop a possible third factor, an emotional dimension, within the ISVM scale developed in this study. The two items that loaded on the emotional factor, "I feel emotional when I see the U.S. win a sporting event" and "when I see the American flag during a sporting event, I get emotional" both were a nationalist motivation on its second factor loading. Additional emotional items related to internationalist sport viewing motivations need to be developed and then tested to see if a third, separate emotional factor would load as part of the scale.

Next, the scope and population of this study needs to be broadened in future research. Reflecting Larson and Rivenburgh's (1991) content analysis, which compared NBC (U.S.), BBC (UK), and TEN's (Australia) coverage of the 1988 Olympic Games and found differences between the three nations' network coverage, the effects on U.S.

citizens' nationalist and internationalist attitudes based on their exposure to one of these three different national networks' coverage could be explored. Also, the effects of NBC's coverage on U.S. citizens' political attitudes could be compared to the effects of TEN's or BBC's coverage on their citizens.

Finally, future research should expand on the political issues examined in this study in order to further explore the effects of sport telecast framing on specific political issues. As suggested in this study, effects of the supposedly non-political Olympic Games on international political issues can have implications for viewers' political attitudes towards other nations, thus future research on such effects should be pursued. Future research should also control for ideology and political party affiliation to see if these variables moderate the effects of sport viewing on international political attitudes.

Conclusion

Guided by past content analytic work suggesting that framing the Olympic Games as pro-U.S. or pro-world matters, this study has provided a much clearer picture of the effects of the Olympic frame. Frank, Hawes, and Macintosh (1988) argued almost 25 years ago that international sporting events such as the Olympics and World Cup are "complex rites whose outcomes have an effect on hundreds of millions of people. These effects are intangible and non-economic, but they are nonetheless real" (p. 280). The current study heeded their call that more analysis of the Olympics was needed, and this investigation found that there are measurable effects of Olympic telecast viewing. Modern Olympic founder Baron de Coubertin alluded to the tension between world unity and nationalism over 115 years ago. In the 20th century, the IOC further enhanced the nationalist aspects of the Games when they allowed national flags and anthems as part of

victory ceremonies and only formally recognized individual athletes as a representation of their home nation; and now corporate U.S. media such as NBC have almost completely turned the Games into a pro-U.S.A. nationalist spectacle. Ultimately, this study reveals the nationalist and internationalist tension embedded within the Games affects Olympic viewers. The dual chant of “Go USA...Go World” reflects the Olympic Games’ ability to affect viewers’ attitudes about their own nation, the rest of the globe, and their home nations’ role within the international political landscape.

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APPENDIX A

PILOT STUDY MEASURES

Nationalistic Post Viewing Questions

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*, 6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. The U.S. is dominantly featured.
2. The U.S. is positively portrayed.
3. This clip inspires pride in your nation.
4. The American flag, American colors (red, white, and blue), and other American symbols are featured predominantly.
5. U.S. athletes were the focus of the clip.

Internationalist Post Viewing Questions

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*, 6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. The focus of the clip was on the sport competition, not one specific nation or athlete.
2. All nations are featured equally.
3. All nations and athletes in the clip were positively portrayed.
4. Olympic symbols such as the Olympic rings, torch, and other symbols of peace are featured.

Emotional Content Post Viewing Questions (Adapted from Gunther & Thorson, 1992)

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1. The clip was:
7=*Very pleasant*, 6=*pleasant*, 5=*somewhat pleasant*, 4=*neutral*, 3=*somewhat unpleasant*, 2=*unpleasant*, 1=*very unpleasant*
2. The clip was:
7=*Very emotional*, 6=*emotional*, 5=*somewhat emotional*, 4=*neutral*, 3=*somewhat unemotional*, 2=*unemotional*, 1=*very unemotional*
3. The clip was:
5=*Very emotionally touching*, 4=*somewhat emotionally touching*, 3=*neutral*, 2=*somewhat not emotionally touching*, 1=*not emotionally touching*

Nationalistic Sport Television Viewing Motivations

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*, 6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. I like watching sporting events that allow me to cheer for the U.S.
2. I enjoy watching sport events that make me feel proud to be an American.
3. I like to watch any sporting event in which the U.S. is competing, regardless of whether I understand the sport or not.
4. I like watching the U.S. win sporting events.
5. I feel like I am a part of the U.S. team when I watching the U.S. compete in sporting events.
6. I feel emotional when I see the U.S. win a sporting event.
7. It is important for me to root for the U.S. when the U.S. team or U.S. athletes compete in a sporting event.
8. I cannot root for any nation besides the U.S. when watching a sporting event.
9. I like hearing the announcers during a sporting event positively remark about the U.S. team and/or U.S. athletes.
10. I like watching sporting events in which the U.S. competes against other nations.
11. I enjoy watching sporting events in which the U.S. has a realistic chance to win.
12. When I see the American flag during a sporting event, I get emotional.
13. It saddens me to watch the U.S. lose a sporting event against other nations.

Internationalist Sport Television Viewing Motivations

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*, 6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. I like watching sporting events that bring all nations together, regardless of political standing.
2. I enjoy watching sporting events in which I can learn more about other nations besides my own and their athletes.
3. I enjoy watching sporting events in which each nation participating has a realistic chance to win.
4. I like watching sporting events where a less politically powerful nation defeats a more politically powerful nation.
5. I like to watch any sporting event in which different nations come together peacefully to participate, regardless of whether I understand the sport or not.
6. I like hearing the announcers during a sporting event remark about the global unity between the different participating nations and their athletes.
7. I do not like to hear announcers during a sporting event remark about the political relationships between the different nations participating.
8. I like watching sporting events where the athletes representing the different nations participating show gestures of goodwill towards each other such as shaking hands, hug, or exchange flags and/or uniforms.
9. I enjoy watching sporting events that let me focus on the sport itself and forget about international political conflict.
10. I like watching sporting events that focus on the skill of the athletes from the different nations competing.
11. I enjoy watching sporting events that focus on different cultures and customs.
12. I like watching sporting events that feature the peaceful pageantry of a variety of nations' flags, colors, and symbols.

APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENTAL MEASURES

Sport Television Viewing Motivations (Gantz, 1981, 1985)

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*just about never*, 7=*just about always*.

1. It's something to do with friends or family.
2. It gives me something to talk about.
3. It gets me psyched up.
4. It's a good way to let off steam.
5. It lets me relax and unwind.
6. I like the drama and tension involved
7. It's something to do when there's nothing else going on.
8. It's something to watch when there's nothing else on TV.
9. Because I don't want to miss a thing.
10. It gives me a chance to learn more about the players and the sport.
11. I like to listen to announcers.
12. To see how my favorite team does.
13. Because that's what my friends or family are watching.

Olympic Television Viewing Scale (Adapted from Billings, 2008b)

1. On average, how much do you watch NBC's Olympic telecasts?
 - More than three hours each day
 - One to three hours each day
 - Less than one hour a day
 - A few times
 - Not at all

2. On average, how much did you watch NBC's evening (7 p.m.-12 p.m.) Olympic telecast?
 - More than three hours each day
 - One to three hours each day
 - Less than one hour a day
 - A few times
 - Not at all

3. On average, how much did you watch NBC and its affiliates (e.g. MSNBC, CNBC, USA) daytime (9 a.m.-7 p.m.) Olympic telecast?
 - More than three hours each day
 - One to three hours each day
 - Less than one hour a day
 - A few times
 - Not at all

4. On average, how much did you watch NBC and its affiliates (e.g. MSNBC, CNBA, USA) late night/early morning coverage (12 a.m.-3 a.m.) of the Olympic telecast?
 - More than three hours each day
 - One to three hours each day
 - Less than one hour a day
 - A few times
 - Not at all

5. How much of NBC's coverage of the Opening Ceremony of the Olympics do you normally watch?
 - In its entirety
 - One to two hours
 - Less than one hour
 - Not at all

6. How much of NBC's coverage of the Closing Ceremony of the Olympics do you normally watch?
 - In its entirety
 - One to two hours
 - Less than one hour
 - Not at all

7. On average, how much did you watch NBC's and its affiliates (e.g. MSNBC, CNBC, USA) special features (e.g. athlete profiles) between the broadcast of the sporting events of the Olympic telecast?
- Each time a feature was broadcast
 - At least once a day
 - A few times
 - Not at all
8. On average, how often did you access NBC's official Olympics website?
- Several times each day
 - At least once a day
 - A few times
 - Not at all

International Sport Television Viewing Scale

1. How frequently did you watch the 2010 FIFA World Cup?
- Every Match
 - Several Matches Per Day
 - Once Per Day
 - A Few Matches Per Week
 - Less Than Five Matches
 - Not at all
2. How frequently did you watch the 2010 Men's FIBA World Basketball Championship?
- Every Game
 - Several Games Per Day
 - Once Per Day
 - Less Than Five Games
 - Not at all
3. How frequently did you watch the 2010 U.S. Open Golf Tournament?
- Every Tee Time
 - One to two hours from each of the three rounds
 - Less than one hour from each of the three rounds
 - Less than one hour total
 - Not at all
4. How frequently did you watch the 2010 Wimbledon Tennis Tournament?
- Every Match
 - One to two hours from each round
 - Two to four hours total
 - Less than one hour total
 - Not at all

National Pride (Kosterman, & Feshbach, 1989)

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*, 6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. I love my country.
2. I am proud to be an American.
3. In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally affected by its actions.
4. Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to the U.S. always remains strong.
5. I feel a great pride in that land that is our America.
6. It is not that important for me to serve my country.
7. When I see the American flag flying I feel great.
8. The fact that I am an American is an important part of my identity.
9. It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional attachment to his/her country.
10. In general, I have very little respect for the American people.

Internationalism (Kosterman, & Feshbach, 1989)

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*, 6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. If necessary, we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world.
2. America should be more willing to share its wealth with other suffering nations, even if it doesn't necessarily coincide with our political interests.
3. We should teach our children to uphold the welfare of all people everywhere even though it may be against the best interests of our own country.
4. Children should be educated to be international minded-to support any movement which contributes to the welfare of the world as a whole, regardless of special national interests.
5. The position a U.S. citizen takes on an international issue should depend on how much good it does for how many people in the world, regardless of their nation.

Sport Fan Intensity (Wann & Branscombe, 1993)

Directions: Responses to statements will be:

1=*strongly disagree*, 2=*disagree*, 3=*disagree somewhat*, 4=*neutral*, 5=*agree somewhat*,
6=*agree*, 7=*strongly agree*.

1. I consider myself to be a sport fan.
2. My friends see me as a sport fan.
3. I believe that following sports is the most enjoyable form of entertainment.
4. My life would be less enjoyable if I were not allowed to follow sports.
5. Being a sport fan is very important to me.

Table 1

Definition of Pilot Study Clips' Content

	<i>Nationalist Condition</i>	<i>Internationalist Condition</i>
Opening Ceremony	Images of the U.S. flag and U.S. athletes	Images of peaceful Olympic symbols such as the Olympic rings and the Olympic torch/flame
Competition	Winning performances by U.S. athletes	Images focused on all nations' athletes equally or focused on the sport itself
Closing Ceremony	Images of the U.S. flag and U.S. athletes	Images of peaceful Olympic symbols such as the Olympic rings and the Olympic torch/flame

Table 2

Paired Differences: U.S. Dominantly Featured

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	4.58	.89	
	Flame Lighting	2.39	1.10	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	-2.18	1.39	-13.27***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	4.66	.66	
	Day 5 Montage	1.91	1.00	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-2.75	1.25	-19.26***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	4.35	1.01	
	Flags Entrance	1.63	.67	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	-2.72	1.26	-17.86***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 3

Paired Differences: U.S. Positively Portrayed

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	4.42	.85	
	Flame Lighting	3.23	.68	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	-1.20	1.08	-9.36***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	4.59	.64	
	Day 5 Montage	3.22	.74	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-1.37	1.01	-11.88***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	4.37	.80	
	Flags Entrance	3.03	.64	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	-1.34	.94	-11.74***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 4

Paired Differences: Inspires Pride in Your Nation

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	4.03	.96	
	Flame Lighting	3.46	.80	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	-.56	1.19	-3.98***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	4.26	.78	
	Day 5 Montage	3.25	.80	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-1.01	1.16	-7.61***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	4.10	.82	
	Flags Entrance	3.16	.86	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	-.94	1.09	-7.11***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 5

Paired Differences: American Flag, Colors, & Symbols Featured

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	4.41	.82	
	Flame Lighting	2.35	1.07	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	-2.06	1.34	-12.93***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	4.58	.72	
	Day 5 Montage	2.09	1.02	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-2.49	1.35	-16.04***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	3.85	.92	
	Flags Entrance	2.00	.80	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	-1.85	1.27	-12.01***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 6

Paired Differences: U.S. Athletes Focus of Clip

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	4.48	.85	
	Flame Lighting	2.14	1.00	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	-2.34	1.38	-14.25***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	4.62	.54	
	Day 5 Montage	1.76	.98	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-2.86	1.14	-21.84***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	4.34	.98	
	Flags Entrance	1.60	.70	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	-2.74	1.10	-20.48***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 7

Paired Differences: Focus on Sport Competition, Not One Nation

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	1.87	.93	
	Flame Lighting	3.01	1.20	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	1.14	1.57	6.12***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	2.59	1.10	
	Day 5 Montage	3.55	1.03	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	.96	1.41	5.94***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	2.19	1.09	
	Flags Entrance	2.76	1.21	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	.57	1.72	2.75**

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 8

Paired Differences: All Nations Featured Equally

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	1.61	1.00	
	Flame Lighting	2.86	1.04	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	1.25	1.42	7.43***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	1.99	.88	
	Day 5 Montage	3.01	.97	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	1.03	1.36	6.60***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	1.94	.84	
	Flags Entrance	2.97	1.29	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	1.03	1.60	5.30***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 9

Paired Differences: All Nations & Athletes Positively Portrayed

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	3.52	1.37	
	Flame Lighting	3.71	.90	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	.20	1.69	.99
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	3.58	1.12	
	Day 5 Montage	3.76	.96	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	.18	1.34	1.20
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	3.47	1.01	
	Flags Entrance	3.94	.83	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	.47	1.34	2.89*

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 10

Paired Differences: Olympic Symbols & Symbols of Peace Featured

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	3.41	1.03	
	Flame Lighting	4.54	.69	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	1.13	1.33	7.14***
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	3.16	1.07	
	Day 5 Montage	3.76	.90	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	.61	1.29	4.10***
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	3.16	.97	
	Flags Entrance	4.03	.89	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	.87	1.29	5.54***

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 11

Paired Differences: Pleasant Clip

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>T</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	5.63	1.01	
	Flame Lighting	5.71	.91	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	.08	1.42	.50
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	5.80	1.12	
	Day 5 Montage	5.67	.94	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-.13	2.32	-.87
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	5.29	1.16	
	Flags Entrance	5.36	1.07	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	.07	1.56	.39

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 12

Paired Differences: Emotional Clip

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>T</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	4.89	1.09	
	Flame Lighting	4.90	1.03	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	.01	1.58	.08
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	5.34	1.45	
	Day 5 Montage	4.86	1.38	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-.48	1.74	-1.49
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	4.67	1.03	
	Flags Entrance	4.76	1.11	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	.10	1.21	.70

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 13

Paired Differences: Emotionally Touching Clip

Category	Clip	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>
Opening Ceremony	U.S. Montage	3.69	.77	
	Flame Lighting	3.87	.75	
	U.S. Montage - Flame Lighting Pair	.18	1.10	1.40
Competition	U.S. Men's Bobsled	3.56	.92	
	Day 5 Montage	3.32	1.14	
	U.S. Men's Bobsled - Day 5 Montage Pair	-.24	1.30	-.92
Closing Ceremony	U.S. Interviews	3.46	.82	
	Flags Entrance	3.59	.91	
	U.S. Interviews - Flags Entrance Pair	-.13	.95	-1.16

Note: *T* statistic based on a paired sample *t* test.

p*<.05; *p*<.01; ****p*<.001.

Table 14

Descriptive Statistics for Phase 1

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i>N</i>
Olympic Television Viewing	2.47	.70	1.0-4.38	279
International Sport Television Viewing	2.05	.76	1.0-4.23	279
Sport Television Viewing Motivations	4.17	1.38	1.0-6.85	314
Nationalist Sport Television Viewing Motivations	5.34	.96	1.0-7.0	278
Internationalist Sport Television Viewing Motivations	5.15	.97	1.0-7.0	278
National Pride	5.37	.94	1.0-7.0	314
Internationalism	4.47	.97	1.0-7.0	314
International Political Attitude 1: Help in Darfur	5.16	1.22	1.0-7.0	314
International Political Attitude 2: Control Illegal Immigration	5.38	1.39	1.0-7.0	314
International Political Attitude 3: War with Iran	3.38	1.43	1.0-7.0	314
Sport Fan Intensity	4.25	1.79	1.0-7.0	314

Table 15

Descriptive Statistics for Phase 2

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i>N</i>
National Pride	5.47	.87	2.10-7.0	314
Internationalism	4.68	.96	2.20-7.0	314
International Political Attitude 1: Help in Darfur	5.21	1.16	1.0-7.0	314
International Political Attitude 2: Control Illegal Immigration	5.23	1.44	1.0-7.0	314
International Political Attitude 3: War with Iran	3.32	1.44	1.0-7.0	314

Table 16

Factor loadings for two-factor solution of nationalist and internationalist sport television viewing motivations

	Nationalist	Internationalist
It is important for me to root for the U.S. when the U.S. team or U.S. athletes compete in a sporting event.	.862	.025
I like watching the U.S. win sporting events.	.861	.122
I like watching sporting events that allow me to cheer for the U.S.	.859	.192
I enjoy watching sport events that make me feel proud to be an American.	.778	.337
I enjoy watching sporting events in which the U.S. has a realistic chance to win.	.773	.274
It saddens me to watch the U.S. lose a sporting event against other nations.	.705	-.016
I like watching sporting events in which the U.S. competes against other nations.	.695	.375
I like hearing the announcers during a sporting event positively remark about the U.S. team and/or U.S. athletes.	.691	.360
I enjoy watching sporting events that focus on different cultures and customs.	-.008	.791
I enjoy watching sporting events in which I can learn more about other nations besides my own and their athletes.	.066	.785
I like hearing the announcers during a sporting event remark about the global unity between the different participating nations and their athletes.	.201	.756
I like watching sporting events that feature the peaceful pageantry of a variety of nations' flags, colors, and symbols.	.228	.732
I like watching sporting events that bring all nations together, regardless of political standing.	.231	.725
I like watching sporting events where the athletes representing the different nations participating show gestures of goodwill towards each other such as shaking hands, hug, or exchange flags and/or uniforms.	.391	-.697

Table 17

Zero-order correlations between control and predictor variables RQ2a

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Sport fan intensity	1.0				
2. Gender	-.31***	1.0			
3. Nationalist sport television viewing motivations	.42***	-.15**	1.0		
4. Internationalist sport television viewing motivations	.15*	.08	.53***	1.0	
5. Olympic viewing	.39***	-.12*	.42***	.32***	1.0

Notes. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Gender was coded 1 = male, 2 = female.

Table 18

Summary of HRM examining the contribution of nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations on Olympic television viewing.

	Olympic Television viewing
Block 1	
Sport Fan Intensity	.39***
Gender	.01
Adjusted R ²	.15***
Block 2	
Nationalist sport television viewing motivations	.22**
Internationalist sport television viewing motivations	.16*
Adjusted R ²	.97***

Notes. For all models, $N = 279$. Gender was coded as 1=male; 2=female. Sport fan intensity was coded as 1=low-intensity; 2=high-intensity. Coefficients are standardized Betas (β). * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 19

Zero-order correlations between control and predictor variables RQ2b

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Sport fan intensity	1.0				
2. Gender	-.31***	1.0			
3. Nationalist sport television viewing motivations	.42***	-.15**	1.0		
4. Internationalist sport television viewing motivations	.15**	.08	.53***	1.0	
5. International sport TV viewing	.59***	-.41***	.34***	.21***	1.0

Notes. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 20

Summary of HRM examining the contribution of nationalist and internationalist sport viewing motivations on international sport television viewing.

	International sport TV viewing
Block 1	
Sport Fan Intensity	.51***
Gender	-.25***
Adjusted R ²	.41***
Block 2	
Nationalist sport television viewing motivations	.03
Internationalist sport television viewing motivations	.15**
Adjusted R ²	.02**

Notes. For all models, $N = 279$. Gender was coded as 1=male; 2=female. Sport fan intensity was coded as 1=low-intensity; 2=high-intensity Coefficients are standardized Betas (β). + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 21

Fragment Completion Test Means

	Distracter Words	Target Words	Target-Distracter
Nationalist Condition	.29	.45	.25
Internationalist Condition	.23	.54	.32

Figure 1

Confirmatory Factor Analysis International Sport Television Viewing Motivations




Figure 2

Confirmatory Factor Analysis International Sport Television Viewing Motivations Model for Males




Figure 3

Confirmatory Factor Analysis International Sport Television Viewing Motivations Model for Females




Figure 4

Confirmatory Factor Analysis International Sport Television Viewing Motivations Model for Low Sport Fan Intensity




Figure 5

Confirmatory Factor Analysis International Sport Television Viewing Motivations Model for High Sport Fan Intensity




Figure 6

Pre to Post-test Mean Change in National Pride




Figure 7

Pre to Post-test Mean Change in Internationalism





Figure 8a


Mediational model examining national pride mediating the main effect of assignment to the nationalism condition on attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur



Notes: The coefficient after national pride was controlled is in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Figure 8b


Mediation model examining national pride mediating the main effect of assignment to the nationalism condition on attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration



Notes: The coefficient after national pride was controlled is in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Figure 8c


Mediational model examining national pride mediating the main effect of assignment to the nationalism condition on attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran



Notes: The coefficient after national pride was controlled is in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Figure 9a


Mediational model examining internationalism mediating the main effect of assignment to the internationalism condition on attitudes towards the U.S. helping in Darfur



Notes: The coefficient after internationalism was controlled is in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Figure 9b


Mediational model examining internationalism mediating the main effect of assignment to the internationalism condition on attitudes towards the U.S. controlling illegal immigration



Notes: The coefficient after internationalism was controlled is in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Figure 9c

Mediational model examining internationalism mediating the main effect of assignment to the internationalism condition on attitudes towards the U.S. going to war with Iran



Notes: The coefficient after internationalism was controlled is in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Figure 10

Pre to Post-test Mean Change in National Pride in Nationalist Condition with Olympic Television Viewing as a Moderating Variable





Figure 11

Pre to Post-test Mean Change in National Pride in Internationalist Condition with Olympic Television Viewing as a Moderating Variable



VITA

Rebekah G. Watson received a Master of Arts degree in Communication from Purdue University in 2007 and a Bachelor of Science degree in Communication from the University of Indianapolis in 2003. She worked as a Marketing Associate for VIA Computer Services in Whitestown, Indiana, from 2003-2005. Rebekah has served as a graduate teaching assistant in communication at Purdue University and the University of Missouri. While at the University of Missouri, she served as advisor of iCOM (the undergraduate communication organization) from 2008 to 2011 and received the Outstanding Graduate Service Award in 2011 for her service to the Communication Department. She was appointed Assistant Professor of Communication at Grace College and Seminary in Winona Lake, Indiana, in 2011.