THE UTILIZATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS COUPLED WITH AGENDA

SETTING AND INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATION IN THE

PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, MASS ATROCITIES AND OR MASS KILLINGS

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

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In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

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by

JOSEPH R. CRANFIELD, II

Dr. Margaret Duffy & Dr. Esther Thorson, Thesis Supervisors

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The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of Graduate School, have examined the thesis entitled

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Presented by Joseph R. Cranfield, II

A candidate for the degree of Master of Arts

And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

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Professor Margaret Duffy

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Professor Esther Thorson

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Professor Daryl Moen

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Professor Mitchell McKinney

DEDICATIONS

First and foremost, this research is dedicated to the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who continue to engage the enemy in the Global War on Terrorism and other peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations around the world. This study is also dedicated to the families who have lost loved ones to genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings. May the memories of your loved ones and your individual stories continue to inspire society to do everything humanly possible to seek prevention.

I would like to personally thank the "Super 8" Cohort from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) – Chris Dodds, Joe Harrison, Vic Herbin, Andrew "Doc" Kim, Kevin Reneau, J.R. Reynolds, and Stephen Wisniew. You all have been an outstanding group of scholars to work with over the last year during this aggressive Master's degree program. Your input to our professional discussions and various explorations while at CGSC, Mizzou, and in Poland have been immensely beneficial to my personal and academic growth and the most rewarding element of this program. I consider each of you a friend for life.

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has been due to your unconditional love, support, and sacrifice. Your patience and

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BCT – Brigade Combat Team

CA – Civil Affairs

CG – Commanding General

CGSC – Command and General Staff College

CNO – Cyber Network Operations

CNOs – Chief Networking Officers

COAs – Courses of Action

COIN – Counter Insurgency

DoD – Department of Defense

EW – Electronic Warfare

FA – Functional Area

FAO – Foreign Area Officer

GWOT – Global War on Terrorism

IO – Information Operations

IW – Information Warfare

MEL-4 – Military Education Level-4

MOS – Military Occupation Specialty

MISO – Military Information Support Operations

NGOs – Non-governmental Organizations

OPSEC – Operational Security

OH – Out-group Homogeneity

PA – Public Affairs

PCS – Permanent Change of Station

PSYOP – Physiological Operations

RTLM – *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*

SOF – Special Operations Forces

TOC – Tactical Operations Center

TRADOC – Training & Doctrine Command

TTPs – Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

UN – United Nations

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ABSTRACT

Over the last 10-years, the focus of the U.S. Army has been on Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the writing is on the wall that military involvement in both locations will soon come to an end. Historically, when the Army is not involved in combat operations, it transitions to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid roles in various countries around the world. This raises the question as to whether the Army's training and force structure is sufficiently postured to handle such crises. This qualitative research will examine the kinds of arguments that are made by perpetrators and supporters of genocidal acts aimed at specific groups of people. More specifically, this study will analyze pro-genocide messages used by the media during the Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia genocides. Using qualitative content analysis it will identify the types of messages that have been used to cause hate against others and develop a categorized list of those messages and their antithesis. Additionally, it will encourage senior civilian and military leaders as well as the U.S. Army Information Operations (IO) proponent to formulate training and appropriate force structure to ensure the U.S. Army can sufficiently combat such messages post Iraq and Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The concept of the U.S. Army's use of IO as a weapon system is a relatively new phenomenon. Although this concept has experienced some recent success in Iraq, the reluctance to use its approach by many military operators has caused some senior civilian and military leaders to question whether the current training and force structure of the Army's IO branch/specialty is sufficiently postured to handle future conflicts. Similar to the interwar period of 1919-1938, the drawdown in Iraq and the current plan to potentially reduce the number of forces in Afghanistan have caused the military services and many senior military leaders to question how best to assist the U.S. government in achieving its strategic goals for the long term. Historically, when the Army is not involved in combat operations, it assumes peacekeeping roles in such places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor and others. If history repeats itself, the next logical step for the Army will be the execution of some type of peacekeeping operation.

Typically, peacekeeping operations result from a potential for genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings. However, a vast majority of military personnel are not sufficiently trained in the art or science of employing IO concepts and principles in order to prevent such acts. In a Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of 3,000 to 5,000 personnel, only one officer is typically authorized. Because of the shortage of these officers across the Army, most units are forced "to create IO cells out of hide" (Tulak, Broome & Bennett, 2005, p. 18). Tulak, Broome & Bennett (2005) further suggest "units are uncomfortable with and untrained in IO" (p. 18). It can be argued that the Army is gradually approaching a "tactical pause" in order to conduct some much needed

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rearming, refitting and reintegrating after more than a decade of war. If senior civilian and military leaders of the Armed Forces are not attempting to forecast operations where IO could have application, the development of future training and force structuring will truly suffer. Although a small number of Army units and other military contingents have been applied to the recent disaster relief efforts in New Orleans, Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina and Haiti for the earthquakes, the majority of military forces are not sufficiently trained or structured to handle crises where genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings are probable. Additionally, the Army's IO program has only recently been revised to better parallel the emergence of the information and technology age (Lamb, 2004). Therefore, the value of this study will be that it seeks to make some interpretations as to whether or not the Army's training and force structuring efforts are sufficiently preparing personnel for both disaster relief efforts and crises where the potential for genocide is imminent. The goal of this research will help to determine a way ahead for the overall prevention of genocide. If the research shows the military is sufficiently postured, then it can continue to build on its successes and capitalize on the steps already initiated. However, if the research shows the military is not sufficiently postured, then recommendations can be formulated and raised to senior civilian and military leader levels for immediate change. Therefore, the primary research question that this study will explore will be further explained in the following section.

~ Research Questions

The specific research question this study will explore is as follows:

Research Question 1

Were agenda-setting themes and messages used by government/non-government controlled media outlets to target out-groups during the conflicts of Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia? If so, are adequate lessons from these conflicts serving as a baseline for future IO curriculum development in order to protect out-groups?

In addition to the primary research question several sub-questions will also be explored.

These sub-questions are as follows:

Sub-question 1

Are the successes or failures of IO Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) used in Iraq being examined and incorporated into the current IO training curriculum and used as consideration for future IO force structure?

Sub-question 2

Are the successes or failures of IO and the use of traditional and new media during the conflicts in Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia considerations for future IO training and force structure?

Sub-question 3

Is the current training and force structure for the Army's IO branch/specialty sufficiently postured to handle future conflicts of genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings?

Sub-question 4

Is there a convergence of the traditional methods for conducting IO with the development of new media outlets?

To determine if the IO concepts and principles used in Iraq could also be achieved in other conflicts where the potential for genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings exist, it is necessary to examine three case studies – Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia. In each case study, the focus of the research will be to determine 1) which pro-genocide

messages achieve greater success in perpetuating such acts over other messages, 2) which anti-genocide messages achieve greater success in preventing such acts over other messages, and 3) if the convergence of traditional and new media was both present during these conflicts. This study will examine the pro- and anti-genocide messages and attempt to categorize each message. The usefulness of collecting and categorizing these messages will be to provide some insight on how frequently particular messages were used in the various media outlets – specifically, radio, television and print news. A review of the types of pro- and anti-genocide messages will be helpful to future situations as some comparison to the consistency of a particular message and its frequency can be established. From here, it is hoped that senior civilian and military leaders could attempt to predict from what messages they are seeing generated in a conflict stricken area of the world to what stage of genocide might be possible or likely. Additionally, if successful acknowledgment by senior civilian and military leaders can be achieved regarding the lessons learned from Iraq as well as, Rwanda, East Timor, and Bosnia, greater validly could be given to the notion that the Army's use of traditional IO concepts and principles coupled with new media outlet tools could serve as successful weapon systems in the prevention of genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings.

~ Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to examine the kinds of arguments that are made in support of and against genocidal acts aimed at specific groups of people. The messages will be studied in, Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia case studies. It is suggested here that there are several specific types of arguments that will be made on both sides – political, ethnic, religious, gender, socio-economic and others. This study will be guided by

agenda-setting theory and theory about how multiple media can be used to synergize their messages creating a strong persuasive effect – a concept commonly referred by some researchers as integrated marketing communication (Thorson & Moore, 1996). Thorson and Moore (1996), suggest that using multiple forms of media simultaneously such as radio, print news, opinion pieces and even email blasts to disseminate themes and messages are expected to have a greater effect on public opinion than using one medium by itself. The last section of this thesis will be a discussion of the utility of this research for the Army. It will also discuss whether the Army has successfully married traditional methods for conducting IO with the development of technology and new media outlets and subsequently incorporated these combined methods into the current IO training curriculum. Finally, it will suggest a need for further training of the concept and the establishment of appropriate levels of force structuring to enable the Army to better carry out the concept. Additionally, it will stress the need for IO training and force structuring to take into account the advances in new technology and suggest that the Army's approach must focus on emerging technology in order to ensure successful execution of IO for the future.

We turn now to the literature review and research methodology. The literature review will first attempt to link the theories of agenda-setting and integrated marketing communication convergence to the expanded definition of the research question. It will provide background through the use of previous scholarly studies in agenda-setting and convergence theories. The research methodology chapter will reiterate the expanded research question, attempt to highlight why the methodology is the most appropriate method to examine the established research question, identify the various materials that

will be used in conducting the study and thoroughly explain the research methods to be used. Finally, it will specifically lay out the steps this research will take in order to draw some interpretations on the research question and sub-questions.

~ Objectives Defined

The initial review of the relevant literature on the Army's IO branch/specialty has five objectives. First, it will introduce and define the concept of IO as a weapons system versus the more traditional systems of the past. Second, it will introduce and discuss the mass communication theories of agenda-setting and convergence as a means to ground the defined concept. Third, it will apply the theory to the recent conflicts Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia. Fourth, it will identify the types of messages that have been used in efforts to engender hate against others and it will develop a categorized list of those messages and their antithesis.

In later chapters, the case studies of Rwanda, East Timor, and Bosnia will be further explored. Following the case studies, some examination will be necessary to determine if the Army has successfully married traditional methods for conducting IO with the development of technology and new media outlets and subsequently incorporated these concepts into the current IO training curriculum. After reviewing the relevant literature and examining the three case studies, if it is interpreted that the Army has made only minimal adjustments, it may be necessary to suggest further training and appropriate levels of force structuring be established to enable the Army to better carry out the concept. Additionally, it may also be necessary to stress the need for IO training

and force structuring to take into account the advances of emerging technology in order to ensure successful execution of IO for the future.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

~ Information Operations as a Weapon System – Concept Introduced

In 1995, the United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

conducted a study to determine if IO had significant application on the tactical battlefield.

This study was considered successful in that it clarified U.S. Army IO doctrine and other

concepts established in the Army's IO *Field Manual 100-6* (McConville, 1997; US

Department of the Army, 1996). The Army IO *Field Manual 100-6* (1996) states,

> *"IO is defined as —*
>
> *Continuous military operations within the Military Information Environment (MIE) that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations; IO include interacting with the Global Information Environment (GIE) and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities"* (p. 2-3).

McConville (1997) claims, "Army IO is an effort to use the power of emerging

technology to better collect and provide information to commanders, and better allow

them to C2 [Command and Control] their units" (p. 1). McConville (1997) asserts

"information dominance is the goal" (p. 1). The Army IO *Field Manual 100-6* (1996)

defines information dominance as

> *"The degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary"* (p. 1-9).

While it is important to achieve some familiarity with how the Army IO *Field*

Manual 100-6 defines IO and information dominance, it is equally important to provide

some specificity to the term weapon system(s). For this study, weapon system(s) will be

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defined by effects – lethal and non-lethal. Weapon system(s) that produce lethal effects will bring about serious injury or death to an individual. In contrast, weapon system(s) that produce non-lethal effects will not bring about serious injury or death to an individual, but will instead serve to influence and possibly change their attitude and behavior.

The military's use of IO as a weapon system remains in embryonic stages among its conventional forces. Even though the Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been exercising "information dominance" through the use of psychological, civil affairs, and foreign area experts for quite some time, conventional forces have only recently discovered its utility. Since its original doctrinal design in 1996, the Army established an IO Functional Area (FA) for officers between their fifth and sixth year of service. These officers conduct additional training, beyond their basic Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), focusing on tactical level information operations prior to placement in conventional units at brigade level and above. The development of an IO FA for selected officers is a step in the right direction. However, the vast majority of military personnel are not sufficiently trained in the art or science of using mass and targeted communications (e.g. radio, television, newspapers) as weapon systems. All too often, civilian leaders elect to use Non-governmental Organizations or NGOs to assume these roles during a crisis. It can be argued that the use of NGOs is an attempt to maximize the economy of forces by applying one organization to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations and another organization (the military) to combat operations. President Barack Obama claims in the *2010 National Security Strategy* that the U.S. must "spur and harness a new diversity of instruments, alliances, and institutions in which the division of

labor emerges on the basis of effectiveness, competency, and long-term reliability" (p. 46). However, much of the this unity of effort is degraded due in part to an imbalance of comprehension between NGOs and the military regarding IO and its uses. Recent examples of genocide and mass atrocities have prompted government and various scholars to explore alternative approaches to its prevention. Some argue that a military IO expert is best suited to handle such a crisis. However, generating these experts has been a slow process for the military. For decades, the military has been a major action arm for U.S. domestic and foreign policy, but is often spread thin to cover multiple crises around the world. Despite these challenges, the military must remain on the leading edge of U.S. strategy to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

~ Information Operations as a Weapon System – Concept Defined

President George W. Bush's address to the nation on March 19, 2003 regarding the invasion of Iraq called for "decisive force" in order to limit the duration of U.S. action in the country (Gill, 2003). Bush stated, "this will not be a campaign of half measures and we will accept no outcome but victory" (Gill, 2003). President Bush and his closest military advisors assumed Geoffrey Parker's "five principal foundations" of the "Western way of war" as described in *The Cambridge History of Warfare* (Parker, 2005). It was Parker's (2005) premise that if an armed force possessed the "five principal foundations" of superior technology, discipline, aggressive military tradition, emphasis on innovation and ability to fund war, then the advantage over an adversary will be gained. President Bush also claimed in his 2003 address to the nation that the main objective in Iraq was to restore control of the country under its own people. Carl von Clausewitz addressed strategy in *On War* and explained the management of a campaign is of the upmost

importance to ensure objectives are achieved (Clausewitz, 1976). Additionally,

Clausewitz (1976) claimed, "the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of

action as in the ultimate success of a whole" (p. 177). The U.S. strategy in 2003, which

became known as "shock and awe," called for rapid dominance of Baghdad. However, it

did not take into account subsequent phases of the operation or as Clausewitz suggested

"success of a whole" (p. 177). U.S. civilian and military leaders failed to realize the

psychological effects superior lethal technology would have on the people of Iraq and the

challenges the military would later face in convincing the local populace of the U.S. main

objective. U.S. civilian and military leaders failed to fully take into consideration

Clausewitz's ideas on strategy in order to determine if "decisive force" or "shock and

awe" would lead to the main objective of restoring control of Iraq under its own people.

Nine years later, coalition forces remained in Iraq due, in part, to an incorrect assumption

that the "Western way of war" would lead to ultimate victory.

In Vietnam, the concept of "winning the hearts and minds" was first introduced

by U.S. Army Major General Ed Lansdale (Bell, 2008).   Lansdale believed the best way

to convince the South Vietnamese people to resist the Communist aggressors of North

Vietnam and Viet Cong insurgent groups was not with lethal force but with non-lethal

force and more specifically with songs and music. Lansdale rallied support for this

concept from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and set out to promote groups of singers

that would sing and create music for the local populace (Bell, 2008). Lansdale's concept

had measurable success in Vietnam. However, U.S. leaders were slow to apply the

Vietnam War strategy of "winning the hearts and minds" (Bell, 2008) in Iraq. The

miscalculation of hard versus "soft power" and the reluctance to apply the concepts of IO

prolonged U.S. actions in the country unnecessarily and ultimately cost the lives of thousands of American men and women in the process (Nye & Owens, 2004). Nye and Owens' (2004) concept of hard versus soft power are synonymous with this study's idea that weapon systems against an adversary can have lethal and non-lethal effects. In other words, with hard power or lethal effects an enemy's will to fight is being diminished by attrition through overwhelming military force. In contrast, using soft power or non-lethal effects, an enemy's will to fight is being altered by direct and indirect alternative influences.

It has been argued by some researchers, that the power resource of the future is knowledge and the country that can best harness this concept will inevitably be the most powerful (Nye & Owens, 2004). Today's world of emerging technology – space based surveillance, direct broadcasting and high-speed computers intermixed with key information can potentially deter and defeat traditional military threats at a relatively low cost (Nye & Owens, 2004). While the military has already begun combining technology with information in its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, more refinement is required (Nye & Owens, 2004). Views on how the U.S. approaches conflict with an adversary are changing due to technology and further research of technology must continue to ensure the edge over an adversary (Nye and Owens, 2004). Nye and Owen (2004) suggest, "diplomatic and public broadcasting channels through which information resources can be applied must be maintained" (p. 36). The works of Nye and Owen are testaments that alternative methods are necessary in dealing with adversaries and those methods must continue to be pursued. The Army's use of IO attempts to do just as Nye and Owens suggest, but further evidence will show that the

training and force structuring for the Army's IO branch/specialty is due for a major
overhaul.

**~ Agenda-Setting & Convergence Theory as Theoretical Approaches – Theory
Defined**

The theoretical approaches used in this study will be the mass communication
theories of agenda-setting and integrated marketing communication. McQuail (2010)
explains that the term "agenda setting" (p. 512) was coined by mass communication
scholars McCombs (1972) and Shaw (1993). The premise behind agenda setting theory
is that as the news media articulates the "issues of the day" (p. 512) and its explanations
result in the general public perceiving the issues just as they are articulated. McCombs
and Bell (1996) further suggest that agenda setting theory seeks to describe how the news
media have a tendency to create what they describe as a "second-hand reality" (p. 93). In
other words, reality is shaped and or created by someone else. The strength of the theory
attempts to quantify the design of a message and its impacts on society with controlled
variables, for example; prescribed time frame, aggregate populations, and comparisons of
single issues. Several studies suggest that more action is prompted by one variable over
another. Paluck (2007) suggests that adjustments in messaging variables can have a
significant impact on an audience's reaction. Her study tested the impact of a radio soap
opera about two Rwandan communities in conflict compared to a government controlled
radio soap opera where the communities were not in conflict (Paluck, 2007). The results
of this test concluded that specific agenda setting messages can be attributed to sparking a
conflict regardless of the existing environment. Berinsky (2011) suggest that rumors
(e.g. un-factual news) tend to fuel an audiences' reaction and often in negative ways

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depending on who is reporting the rumor. Additionally, he reveals that "debunking" (p. 1) or disputing a rumor is difficult. In other words, once a rumor has reached the audience, motivation to act or not act has already been determined and cannot be undone. Other researchers refer to this phenomenon as the "backfire effect" where inaccurate information is attempted to be corrected only to find that audiences targeted for correction cling even more strongly to the false beliefs. Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) cite several of Chong and Druckman's (2007) studies and suggest that a message with "a weak frame can backfire among certain individuals, leading them to move in a direction that is opposite to the one promoted by the frame" (p. 14). Chong and Druckman (2007) suggest, "public opinion often depends on how elites choose to frame issues" (p. 99). Additionally, they suggest a theory that "the key individual" (p. 99) along with "contextual parameters" (p. 99) will determine motivations and ultimately drive the public's opinion. Yang (2003) uses a media frame analysis technique in his study to compare how the Chinese and U.S. media framed the air strikes in Kosovo in 1999. Yang (2003) explains the Chinese framed the air strikes as an "intervention of Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territory" (p. 231). In contrast, the U.S. framed the air strikes as a "humanitarian effort towards the Albanians while attempting to reduce the ethnical cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbians" (p.231). Additionally, Yang (2003) asserts that national interest of a country is the driving force behind how messages are constructed and media is framed. He also suggests that the international media play a decisive role in national policy and national action (Yang, 2003). Ultimately, Yang's (2003) study provides some insight on the various ways messages can be structured in order to generate a specific outcome. While his research lacks some analysis on the

audience's perception, it does reveal that national interest can be a driving force behind particular messaging. Hoijor (2004) suggests there are few studies regarding an "audiences' reaction to and interpretation of the media exposure on human suffering" (p. 513). Despite limited studies, Pryce (2007) suggests that additional research would help in the planning process to find a "middle ground between the anguished demand that governments 'do something, anything – now' and those within government who respond with the equally emotional 'we can't do anything – ever, because it's just too hard'" (p. 82-83). Pryce's (2007) statement regarding the potential for a government entity to intervene or not intervene implies that, on some level, the often unspoken dilemma of in-groups versus out-groups remains very prevalent today. Rubin and Badea (2007) explains "the out-group homogeneity (OH) effect is the tendency to perceive members of one's own social group (in-group members) as being more variable than members of groups to which one does not belong (out-group members)" (p. 31). Additionally, they suggest that perceptions in the "variability of social groups can cause differences in the extent of stereotyping" (Rubin & Badea, 2007, p. 31). Rubin and Badea (2007) contend that a deeper understanding of social group variables will in turn better explain how "stereotype-based judgments" (p. 31) are made among the various in or out-groups.

Adolf Hitler, 66-years after the Holocaust, remains one of the most hated men in history. However, despite one's revulsion toward the man himself, he was undeniably successful in motivating an entire country and military to kill what he perceived to be an out-group. Niewyk and Nicosia (2000) explain that as Hitler was coming to power in March of 1933, over one-third of German voters supported Hitler and the National Socialist German Worker's Party or Nazi for short. At the time, Germany was

experiencing severe economic hardship and political turmoil. Most Germans believed in Hitler and the Nazi party and "expected bold moves to revive the economy and put the millions of unemployed back to work" (Niewyk & Nicosia, 2000, p.3). Niewyk and Nicosia (2000) suggest that "race stood at the very heart of the Nazi ideology" (p. 4). Those not from the same race were considered by the Nazi party as the out-group. Niewyk and Nicosia (2000) explain that in Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*, Hitler was extremely adamant that in order to restore Germany's economy and resolve the political turmoil that existing in the country, Germany must "conquer Lebensraum (living space)" (p. 4) from their European neighbors and anyone who stood in the way of Germany's prosperity. Hitler mentally linked the Jews as wells as Gypsies and other social undesirables to the growing Communist movement and essentially articulated these individuals to the rest of country as threats to German superiority (Niewyk and Nicosia, 2000). Heer (2000) asserts, "the stigmatization of the Jew as a partisan and wire-puller of resistance signaled the transfiguration of the Jews as political opponents into the declared military enemy" (p. 335). This transformation of the Jews as the enemy resulted in a German mindset that their economic and political demise was due primarily by the Jews. If the Germans did not stop further growth of the Jewish population, their quality of life was destined for extinction.

The philosophical argument regarding the preservation of the one group over another has been debated for years. Waller (2008), who has spent much of his academic life studying the psychology behind perpetrators of genocide, attempts to provide some explanations. Waller (2008) suggests that there are three tiers of perpetrators. The first tier is the leadership at the higher echelons and those who, according to Waller (2008),

"structure the ideology policy and initiatives behind a particular genocide or mass killing" (p. 147). The second tier is the bureaucracy who Waller (2008) claims make the implementation of genocide initiatives possible through funding, material and logistics. The final tier is the "rank-and-file killers" (Waller, 2008, p. 147) and those who reside as the lowest level responsible for the execution of human lives. Waller (2008) asserts that an individual's "cultural, psychological and social construction" (p. 162) tend to be the predominant factors that bring an ordinary human being to commit such acts as genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings. He further suggests that regardless of the socialization that an individual has experienced in their lifetime, a deliberate decision to kill is the failure of the individual to exercise his moral judgment and legal accountability (Waller, 2008). Hatzfeld (2003), in her interviews with multiple killers from the Rwandan genocide suggests that once the killer can mentally overcome the first kill, the rest become easier. In Laqueur's (2001) description of Auschwitz-Birkenau (German translation for Oswiecim, Poland and site of one Nazi death camp) one gains the sense that from the highest echelon of Nazi leadership to the most junior "rank-and file killer" (Waller, 2008, p. 147), killing Jews was just a necessary means to a political end. Despite the arguments for genocide and mass killings, a simple walk on ground that is Auschwitz would allow for some appreciation in just how systematic the Nazis were in achieving their national and strategic ends. The below excerpts are taken from this researcher's personal journal following a tour of the death camp at Auschwitz:

Monday, September 26, 2011 –

After lunch, we were given guided tours of Auschwitz I in small groups. While the reading of "Auschwitz," by Walter Laqueur, provided some background on the history of the camp, the tour guide's interpretation of

the place was the most interesting. His official position here at the museum was the in the management of old records and inputting those records into digital data bases. Again, over 66 years since the Holocaust and we are still managing data. During the tour, many emotions ran through my head – sadness, guilt, remorse as my own heritage is British and German and I am they epitome of the master race that Hitler was attempting to create. I begin to hide my own blue eyes out of embarrassment. I was amazed of the amount of people that were at the museum taking the tours, but it was encouraging to see some many people from around the world taking an interest and educating themselves on what occurred here. As we passed by a group of German high school students, I suspect they too were having many of the same feelings of embarrassment I was having.

When our small group stepped into the room where all the shoes, hair and suitcases with name, birth year and hometown stenciled on them were displayed, it was here when the horrific nature of this place really hit home to me. The displays were large, in and of itself, but they only represented a fraction of the number of people who died here. A sense of realness came over me. How could anyone deny that the Holocaust took place? I once had to recover personal effects from a helicopter crash. The same types of things I collected at that crash site are the same types of things displayed in these cases. A person once wore those shoes. That hair was once on someone's head. I am sick to my stomach!

As we moved throughout the camp, I grew angry. We stepped into the gas chamber and I felt death all around me. I imagined myself standing here naked with hundreds of other prisoners just waiting to suffocate from the poisonous gas that would be released into the room very shortly. As we left the gas chamber and headed into the crematorium, I grew even sicker to my stomach. There stood two ovens large enough to hold three human beings in each and used to burn the bodies of those killed in the adjacent gas chamber. Unbelievable!

Tuesday, September 27, 2011 –

Today we are headed to Auschwitz II or Birkenau. Unlike, Auschwitz I, which was a concentration camp, Auschwitz II was the death camp. When we arrived at Auschwitz II, I could not get over just how big the camp was from the ground level. The 400 plus acres surrounded by an enormous fence seemed to continue for miles. I immediately began to hear the noises and smell the odors that would have resonated from this death camp. I begin to see images of people standing at the fence line begging our small tour group to rescue them.

The first place our tour guide took us to was what he referred to as the "selection point." It was here where prisoners were off-loaded from the

trains and then "selected" for immediate death. Of course, selection was based on an individual's ability to work. If you looked tired or physically incapable for work, you were immediately selected for death. Again, I wondered about my own family and how we would have stacked up to the Nazis' standard for life.

As we walked to the first crematorium, I came upon a picture of young children walking down the same road. The caption on the picture read "Jews selected by the SS for immediate death in the gas chambers of crematoria IV and V were herded along this road." (Photo taken by the SS, 1944). I immediately began to wonder what it would have been like to walk down this road knowing that at the end of the road I would die. Of course, the SS were very good at coercing prisoners into areas without actually letting them know they were getting ready to die, but as I walked down the road I saw images of prisoners on the other side of the fence and their facial expressions back to me indicated that this was the end. I began to think about how nasty this ground most have gotten in the winter, the snow, the cold, and how we give our prisoners a final meal before we execute them. These prisoners were simply rushed from the train, down this nasty road without any last rights. I also began to think what must have been going through their minds as they made the long walk to the crematorium. What would have been going through my mind? How could I have been strong for my family if my family and I were making the long walk to our own death? I begin grow very angry has I made this walk. I was feeling mad that this happened, but thankful that I was able walk in the same path that so many others walked in order gain some perspective.

When I saw the cart used to carry ashes, this was my indication that the Nazis were very systematic in their task of killing. What an extraordinary place designed specifically to kill people. Simply unbelievable! The wall of the pictures that were found in the suitcases of the prisoners really made me stop and think. While the display was quite large, I realized that the pictures only represented a small fraction of the pictures that were collected from prisoner's suitcases – fathers, mothers, children each with their own unique story and experience about this place. Some of these people died here and others lost loved ones. The images of the people in these pictures (the ones that I studied for quite some time) are burned in my memory forever. What a horrible place this camp must have been. Our tour guide told us about how the Nazis would remove the gold from a corpse's teeth and use the gold later to manufacture other items to support their operations. I believe I remember our tour guide telling us about 14,000 tons of gold was collected during the Holocaust. How many mouths does that equate to? When I saw the destroyed crematoriums, I felt vindicated. I realize that the Nazis destroyed the crematoriums as the Soviets were advancing, but I was glad to see that these symbols of death will no longer be used to harm another individual. When I saw the toilets all in a row it reminded me that once inside the camp, human dignity is

diminished. Prisoners having to use the bathroom next to another person with no privacy whatsoever – absolutely no dignity existed here. As I stood on the grounds and took yet another picture – this time of the end of the train line used to bring in the prisoners. I could not help but the think of the symbolism that this picture represented. While it was the end of the line for the train, it was also the end of the line for over a million human beings. The entire city that I lived in growing up would have been completely wiped off the face of the Earth. What a horrible place!

Similar to discussions related to the Holocaust, other arguments regarding the eradication of out-groups have and will continue. However, it is important to establish some level of understanding on exactly how genocide is defined across academia and thus highlight arguments against the annihilation of out-groups. Staub (1989), suggests that genocide is "an attempt to exterminate a racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, or political group, either directly through murder or indirectly by creating conditions that lead to the group's destruction" (p. 8). Chalk & Jonassohn (1990) argues genocide is "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator" (p. 23). Katz (1994) states, "the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means" (p. 131). Rummel (1997) claims that genocide is "the killing of people by a government because of their indelible group membership (race, ethnicity, religion, language)" (p. 31) and further confirms that in-group out-group theory is a sound theoretical approach to how particular messages are constructed. Fein (1993), in her book *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* further codifies the arguments for out-groups and explains that genocide is a "purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, though interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members."

To further review of some of the most relevant studies conducted regarding in- and out-groups, Kellow and Steeves (1998), Steuter and Wills (2009) and Bratic (2008) appear to have encapsulated the essence of how media can be used in order to incite violence and ultimately bring about genocide in a conflict stricken area of the world. Kellow and Steeves (1998) use a textual approach to determine the role of radio during the Rwanda genocide and concludes that "extreme media dependency can set the stage for campaigns to increase ethnic hatred and fear, leading to massacres" (p. 126). Kellow and Steeves (1998) cite McQuail (1994) and suggest that even though the study of mass media of Western societies has produced a "plethora of frameworks" (p. 108) there is "no single theory capable of explaining why the media, at times, seem to have powerful, direct effects, but at other times, weak, indirect effects" (p. 108). They approach the study by attempting to draw some interpretation on radio's "collective reaction effect" (p. 108) and the dependency ("dependency theory," p. 108) of an audience on media to determine if radio can be assessed as a cause for inciting genocide. More specifically, Kellow and Steeves (1998) utilize qualitative textual analysis involving a thorough reading of radio transcripts available during the time period leading up to the Rwanda genocide crisis as well as transcripts from April 6, 1994 – narrative date that allegedly sparked the mass killings. Kellow and Steeves (1998) consider their research approach as "macrotextual" (p. 111) analysis, and explain that this approach views "texts as 'symbolic action,' and assumes the role of words in representing, dramatizing, and shaping society" (p. 111). Despite the macro approach, Kellow and Steeves (1998) reviewed 74 tapes of radio broadcast between October 1993 and July 1994 which included over 16,000 words. In addition to the examination of these transcripts, their research also leaned on the findings

of other researchers as well as an eye witness account of the events (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). Their findings indicate that several narrative forms of agenda-setting messages were used to incite violence in Rwanda (Kellow and Steeves, 1998). Kellow and Steeves (1998) conclude that much "consistency" (p. 124) existed in "radio's role in the genocide, and the dependency and collective reaction frameworks" (p. 124) used throughout the study. Given the dependency of the Rwandan audience on radio to receive their political news and the agenda-setting campaign conducted by the government controlled radio is assessed by Kellow and Steeves (1998) to be a major factor in the events that transpired in April of 1994.

Overall, Kellow and Steeves (1998) provide an insightful look into the role of radio in the Rwandan genocide. Using text found in the various radio transcripts and correlating those statements to the "collective reaction" (p. 108) of its audience is initially a somewhat weak interpretation. However, to strengthen their argument Kellow and Steeves (1998) provide historical and political background on the dependency of the Rwandan citizens on radio as their primary resource for receiving political news. Furthermore, their interpretation coupled several examples of how particular agenda-setting messages resulted in killing sprees beyond those allegedly sponsored by the Rwandan government shows the power of their research. Another advantage to this research is it helps to fill the gap due to limited studies on why the media can sometimes be very powerful in producing effects while other times not as effective.

One major limitation to this study acknowledged by Kellow and Steeves (1998) is that "radio dependency and collective reaction effects alone cannot explain atrocities like the Rwandan genocide" (p. 126). Their study accounted for only one aspect that may

have caused the events and any attempts to apply their findings to similar events would be beyond the scope of this research. However, to Kellow and Steeves (1998) credit, their research does provide useful insights as to the power of the media. Given this power that they so richly articulated led this researcher to a belief that the same media outlets used to ignite genocide (radio) could also be used to prevent such horrific acts. Of course, further research will be necessary to determine if this theory has utility, but due to the interpretation provided by Kellow and Steeves, (1998) it provides a benchmark for future research.

Steuter and Wills (2009) use a rhetorical approach to determine if certain agenda setting messages promote violence and concludes that an "'enemy' is constructed and framed in dominant media discourse" (p.1) and that "repeated use of animal metaphors by monopoly media institutions" (p. 1) can bring about genocide. Steuter and Wills (2009) argue that metaphoric language used by the media results in a "dehumanizing frame that has both political and ideological force" (p. 1). More specifically, Steuter and Wills' (2009) study suggest that Canadian newspaper headlines in their coverage of the War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan use metaphors to describe an enemy and these metaphors establish dehumanizing frames that have the potential to lead to something as horrific as genocide. Steuter and Wills (2009) suggest that by deliberately positioning metaphors in print media, Canadian newspapers are "reinforcing the broader political discourse of essential, hostile difference and, more gravely, laying the groundwork for the language of eradication and annihilation that is the logical corollary to metaphors of the enemy as vermin or virus" (p. 2).

The specific methodology that Steuter and Wills (2009) use in their study was to examine the headlines of Canadian- based newspapers using the *Lexis Nexis* and *Proquest Canadian Newsstand* databases to determine how many times the use of animal and or disease metaphors were used to describe an enemy. In a review of "tens of thousands" (p. 9) of Canadian- based newspapers, which according to Steuter and Wills (2009) is nothing more than a "sample" (p. 9) of what was originally discovered, it was determined that animal and or disease metaphors were consistent in all papers since September 11, 2001. Ultimately, Steuter and Wills (2009) conclude that this study provides a "clear pattern" (p. 10) that Canada's print media routinely uses metaphoric language to describe an enemy. They proclaim that, "suspected terrorists, enemy military and political leaders, and ultimately entire populations are metaphorically linked to animals, particularly to prey" (p. 10). Ultimately, Steuter and Wills (2009) suggest there is danger when the media practices these techniques.

Steuter and Wills (2009) use empirical evidence to support their claim by providing an abundance of newspaper headlines that clearly articulate the various ways in which Canadian-based newspapers have routinely used rhetoric techniques in the form of metaphoric language to persuade its readers. Steuter and Wills' (2009) focus on headlines versus entire articles is based on their argument that for "a large part of the population they represent a primary source of condensed information" (p. 9-10). Steuter and Wills also suggest that, "headlines ultimately influence and direct interpretation as much as summarize content; a headline's compressed narrative is therefore particularly ideologically powerful" (p. 10). Steuter and Wills (2009) urge the media community not to be so quick to "participate in this racially-charged, ideologically-inflected, and

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historically dangerous symbolic language" (p. 18) as these practices continue to perpetuate racism and ultimately genocide. Further, they link the identified headlines with the owners of various media outlets and suggest that they have a responsibility to not perpetuate the type of language that could continue to fuel ethnic hatred. Steuter and Wills (2009) like other qualitative researchers provide an abundance of historical context to their claims reminding their readers of the holocaust as one example to show how entire societies can be dehumanized to a point of near extinction if certain rhetorical practices continue. It is important to note that while the research techniques closely resembled the techniques used in content analysis, Steuter and Wills (2009) were more concerned with how each headline was framed and if that context served to dehumanize individuals, groups or even entire populations. Additionally, they successfully link other issues to their data such as the power of gatekeepers and media ownership.

Bratic (2008) suggests that the "positive use of mass communication channels in the reconciliation of post-conflict societies are virtually unknown" (p. 487). His research sought to resurrect the positive use of media and highlight how it attempts to promote "peace across the world" (p. 487). He suggests that media during times of war can be used to develop propaganda and that this technique links back to the eras of Napoleon, Caesar and Alexander the Great (Bratic, 2008). In contrast, Bratic (2008) also suggests a theory that just as media has historically been used to perpetuate war, a similar use of media can also be used to reduce and possibly prevent war and violent conflict altogether. Bratic (2008) contends that a "peace-oriented media," (p. 488) while only supported by limited literary references, does have value as a new ideology. Bratic (2008) states that even though "social scientists have hypothesized about the positive role of propaganda,

the literature rarely addresses the positive influence of mass communication" (p. 489).

Despite Bratic's (2008) claim that the literature does not routinely focus on the positive

influence of media, he attempts to demonstrate the power of media when oriented

towards peace by applying "cultural violence" (p. 492) as a theoretical framework in his

study. Bratic (2008) explains that while "direct violence" (p. 492) is a visible violence

and designed to bring about physical harm to others, "cultural violence" (p. 492) is

invisible and serves to harm the mind. Bratic (2008) suggest that media are "often a

venue where cultural violence is created" (p. 492). Therefore, in order for this paradigm

to shift, the media must gain a better appreciation for just how powerful it can be.

Bratic's (2008) research methodology first highlights two case studies to support his

theory. These case studies include the peace oriented or "intervention" (p. 494)

campaigns used in Rwanda and Bosnia. In each of these case studies, Bratic (2008)

examines approximately 40 media projects in 18 different countries that were being

monitored by U.S. NGOs. In each of the two cases, NGOs utilize media outlets (radio in

Rwanda and television/radio in Bosnia) to broadcast peace oriented messages to its target

audience – mainly women and children in Rwanda and refugees in Bosnia. While each

of the projects produce mixed reviews, Bratic (2008) contends, "the two case studies

demonstrate how well-organized media programs can impact conflict audiences" (p.

500).

While the theory of peace-oriented media as a form of ideology has merit, media

alone will not completely prevent conflict – genocide or otherwise. Nevertheless, the

study suggests how the collective efforts of a few, in a concerted effort to use media for

good, can have positives impacts on a society in conflict. Additionally, this study

introduces a new form of ideology – peace-oriented media. While the legitimacy of this ideology is still to be determined, further study may eventually cause the orientation to become common among media scholars and practitioners. Also, despite the fact that only television and radio were examined in this study, it led this researcher to wonder if the emergence of new technology (e.g. Internet/social media enabled mobile phones) would complement Bratic's (2008) study if such devices could have been incorporated and examined.

In further examining the case studies of Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia, it will be important to this research to gain some insight as to how certain hate messages incited or perpetuated genocide. A working knowledge of agenda setting theory and familiarity with several of the scholarly studies already conducted will serve this research well in determining the types of agenda setting variables that caused such horrific acts in each case. If some interpretations can be made, counter-messages can be established and broadcasted through various mediums in an effort to prevent such acts.

One shortfall of agenda setting theory is that a preponderance of the research has primarily focused on traditional media types – television news, newspaper, and radio. McQuail (2010) suggests the concept of mass communication is currently in a period of transition. McQuail (2010) also asserts "digitalization has provided the impulse and possibility for many new initiatives to send, exchange, seek and express across the previously restricting social and physical boundaries" (p. 547). He further claims that even the current language of theory is outdated and due for revision in order to better address new technology (McQuail, 2010). The evolution of technology will continue and the possibilities of technology are limited only by the imagination. McQuail (2010)

alludes to this fact and claims that each technological invention offers new challenges for the field of mass communication theory.

Given the development of new technology, and as a secondary consideration to the planned use of agenda-setting theory, this study will also examine the theory of media convergence and how it persuades through integrated marketing communication. Jenkins (2008) identified the late Ithiel de Sola Pool as the "prophet of media convergence" (p. 10) and like McQuail (2010), believes that the media industry is undergoing a transition in the way in which media reaches its audience. Jenkins (2008) defines media convergence as "a situation in which multiple media systems coexist and where media content flows fluidly across them" (p. 322). For this study, the concept of convergence is mostly concerned with how traditional media and new media are combined and through integrated marketing communication persuades an individual or a group of individuals to commit genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings.

Due to the limited amount of qualitative research regarding convergence theory and human suffering, this study will seek to determine, given the timeframes of various case studies already described, if some evidence can be found that would suggest traditional media was coupled with new media (e.g. Internet/social media enabled mobile phones) to promote genocide. This determination will be accomplished by tracking the presence of different instances where pro-genocide messages appeared and reappeared across the media. Lumpkins et al (2010) attempts to show how certain messages or "conflict factors" (p. 73) were placed more in predominantly African American newspapers as oppose to other newspapers in order to suggest that if the target audience are African Americans, message placement in certain newspapers will better prompt

action of the target audience. Brady (2010) uses content analysis to determine the

frequency of discussion by the *Journal Armed Forces & Society* concerning

peacekeeping operations. Costello (2009), in his case study on the Darfur genocide,

attempts to fill some gaps in the relevant literature and to delineate the way in which

genocide is conceptualized in the media. If this research can produce positive results, the

study will further investigate the success or failure of agenda setting messages that were

broadcast through the various forms of media. However, if the research produces

negative results, then further exploration will be necessary to determine if the

convergence of traditional and new media to generate anti-genocide messages has

application in each case.

~ Agenda-Setting & Convergence Theory as Foundations for IO

Some researchers argue that after a review of the 25-year history of agenda setting

theory it can be determined that the use of this theory has become more than the shaping

of public opinion from a particular point of view (Kosicki, 1993). Instead, proper use of

agenda-setting theory can result in something much more powerful – a societal law of

sorts (Kosicki, 1993). Kosicki (1993) defines agenda setting in terms of the public,

policy and media. He claims if one views agenda setting from the public, policy, or

media perspectives separately and does not discuss influences on an audience; the agenda

setting model becomes incomplete (Koscicki, 1993). Koscicki (1993) asserts that one

must combine all three perspectives in order to truly articulate the model. He concludes

that researchers of today may have an obligation to continue to provide proper

explanations for the science in order to increase understanding and also to enhance the

democratic decision-making process in today's society (Kosicki, 1993). Scheufele and

Tewksbury (2007) in their comparison of agenda setting and framing suggest that several factors such as "sociological, economic, critical, and psychological" (p. 12) tend to influence the production of news messages for example. They cite Cobb and Elder (1971) and claim that "research in the agenda-setting tradition has identified how issue agendas are built in news production" (p. 12). Similar research in the framing tradition has also indicated that "social forces" (p. 12) can be contributed in how a particular news message is constructed. Scheufele (1999) refers to this process as "frame building" (p. 12) or how an organization and others seek to consciously build the social and media agendas. Scheufel and Tewksbury (2007) claim that "both frame building and agenda building refer to macroscopic mechanisms that deal with message construction rather than media effects" (p. 12). The events of 9/11 served as an agenda-setting model to prompt American policymakers to adjust policies and change the way they viewed war (Birkland, 2004). While the terrorism agenda has been in existence for quite some time, little action had been taken in terms of enacted policy to appropriately address the terrorism threat until the 9/11 attacks (Birkland, 2004). Birkland (2004) claims 9/11 opened "windows of opportunity" and subsequently served as a catapult to enact policy that would sufficiently combat terrorism (p. 179). Additionally, Birkland (2004) suggests agenda setting and "focusing events" such as 9/11 brings policy makers and the public together on a particular issue and at that point policy turns into action (p. 179). Several agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, were established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in order to better address the terrorism agenda. Other agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, were given additional roles and responsibilities that had not been previously seen prior to 9/11

(Birkland, 2004). While further research is required to truly assess if new policy was enacted due directly to the 9/11 attacks, it is clear that 9/11 was a "focusing event" to promote change in the way the Army trains, equips and views an adversary. Unfortunately, Birkland (2004) provides only anecdotal evidence that agenda setting theory can have significant impacts on the strategic, operational and tactical level IOs of the Army. In contrast, Kosicki (1993) offers a valuable lesson for the Army and shows how the public, policy, and media perspectives can shape public opinion for the good of a society. Given Kosicki (1993) and other's assertions, it appears there are several gaps within the literature and this research should serve to fill some of the gaps.

Other research suggests that a theory-based model in discussing the Army's IO program assumes the military will operate in the information environment just as they do in the kinetic environment with the ultimate goal of reducing the enemy's will to fight (Romanych, 2005). An operating environment, such as Iraq, is made up of three domains – cognitive, informational, and physical (Romanych, 2005). These three domains cannot be viewed separately as all three domains are interconnected and required in order to affect perceptions, attitudes and decision making of an adversary (Romanych, 2005). This dynamic implies that careful and deliberate planning is required to ensure the "information advantages" over an adversary will be gained and these advantages will ultimately lead to information superiority (Romanych, 2005). Romanych (2005) further defines IO in practical terms as "synchronized activities that impact the use, content, and flow of information in the battlespace" (p. 17). This definition implies that these activities are essential in a particular operating environment in order to meet the desired end state. The application of Romanych's (2005) psychological and scientific model to

better understand the Army's IO program has merit and would have been beneficial during the early planning stages of the invasion into Baghdad. Further study of IO within these boundaries will increase the understanding of the operational environment overall regardless of the operation type.

Other research implies that communication of information when applied to technology can become very powerful (Castells, 2007). Castells (2007) asserts that media has become nothing more than a "social space" where ultimate power is decided by the audience (p. 238). Castells (2007) suggests that new media, such as the internet or wireless communication, have allowed insurgents and alternative political and social views to inject themselves in a more decisive manner within the "new communication space" (p. 238). This dynamic implies a shift in societies from an institution to a common space and that media and new forms of communication outlets are converging (Castells, 2007). This further calls into question traditional agenda setting theory's explanatory power in which a private issue receives corporate attention. Berger (2001) in his study of the business association *Business Roundtable* or *BRT* suggests that "*BRT* uses information subsidies to control the scope of issue conflict and that these subsidies influenced the policy agenda" (p. 91). Additionally, Berger (2001) suggests that "corporate influence on private issues may alter the traditional agenda-setting process" (p. 91). Castells (2007) hypothesis further addresses the converging of old media and new media and alludes to the fact that insurgents and or other political and social views now have an outlet to better inject their ideas in a much more decisive manner. Similarly, other researchers claim that the effects of new technology on current military theory may result in the next military revolution (Henry & Peartree, 1998). If this is the case,

adjustments to existing TTPs may be in order to prepare for the changing environment and to ensure a balance in kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Henry and Peartree (1998) suggest that technology has emerged and caused changes to society and its views on war. However, Henry and Peartree (1998) also asserts that even though technology has advanced, the actual devices is not what is important and that military theory should be more concerned with how the technology is used (Henry & Peartree, 1998). Both Castells (2007) and Henry and Peartree (1998) apply convergence theory and claim the world is drastically changing technologically. The challenge for the future will be how to best harness the technology in order to use it on today's modern battlefield (Henry & Peartree, 1998; Nye & Owens, 1996).

As mentioned, IO is a relatively new phenomenon and worth additional study to determine the best way to utilize the concept in a combat environment (Roamanych, 2005). Some researchers and military practitioners have viewed IO as an irrelevant approach to combating an enemy force (Darley, 2006). However, Birkland (2004) similar to Clausewitz (1976), suggest that IO is a political instrument designed to achieve the political end state of a conflict (Darley, 2006). If Clausewitz's (1976) theories are applied to a practical situation, it should become clear that policy makers and military operatives cannot always rely on lethal weapon systems in order to meet a political end state and that IO must be a parallel effort (Darley, 2006). While the works of each researcher in this section offer different perspectives on agenda-setting and convergence theory, it is abundantly clear that IO must be grounded in both theories to ensure successful execution. To reiterate, agenda setting theory will be defined throughout the remainder of this study as any message or messaging technique that, in turn, generates

some agenda whether anti- or pro-genocide. Convergence theory, for the purposes of this study, will be primarily concerned with the merging or combining of traditional media and new media outlet tools to generate anti- or pro-genocide messages.

~ Information Operations for Conflict Resolution in Iraq - Theory Applied

Assuming IO is grounded in agenda-setting and convergence theory, the application of IO to a practical situation can best be examined through the lens of former combat leaders and or commanders in Iraq. Many leader and commanders would assume Birkland's (2004) claim that a "focusing event" prompted them to adjust their tactics in order to successfully accomplish their missions (p. 179). The most notable examples come from Aylwin-Foster, Chiarelli, Michaelis and Bloom (Aylwin-Foster, 2005; Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005; Bloom, 2004; Birkland, 2004). Some commanders argue winning the peace is the key requirement to full-spectrum operations in Iraq (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). These commanders claim that the traditional way of maneuvering combat forces inside a particular battle area in order to penetrate defenses and defeat the enemy is not the effective means by which to achieve the main objective (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). Today's battle area is considered an operational environment and demographics as well as several other cultural and societal factors play a large role in defining that environment (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). Likewise, the operational environment is transitioning from open terrain with significant maneuver space to more urban areas where civilians or non-combatives exist. This dynamic has created new challenges for combat forces more familiar with conventional war. Similar to other researchers and Army doctrine, full-spectrum operations and the application of IO must be applied in order to be successful (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). In order to win a

war using full-spectrum operations a balance between kinetic and non-kinetic approaches

must be incorporated into all military operations (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005).

The use of IO is already prevalent with Special Operations Forces and has had

measurable success in Iraq (Bloom, 2004). However, it still lacks acceptance by many

military planners throughout various organizations (Bloom, 2004; Lamb, 2004). The use

of IO during full-spectrum operations is becoming a common trend to the overall mission

accomplishment of SOF and is a key factor in the planning process (Bloom, 2004).

However, much of the integration of IO has occurred at the theater (strategic) level and

many of the planners at that level do not have the resident expertise to apply IO doctrines

to the tactical level (Bloom, 2004). This shortcoming within the IO force structure

suggests that not only are conventional forces (non-SOF) struggling with the growing

need for IO capabilities, but that SOF may be experiencing similar challenges as well.

Like Lamb (2004), Bloom (2004) asserts core billets must be filled in order to build

consistency in the planning staff during peace time or refit periods. If the Army can

maximize IO personnel into the planning process at the operational level, this would

enhance the overall capabilities and benefits of IO at the tactical level (Bloom, 2004).

Chiarelli & Michaelis (2005), Bloom (2004) and Lamb (2004) suggest that across the

current force, there is a reluctance to employ IO TTPs at the tactical level. Some of this

hesitation stems from the challenges that tactical commanders face when operating in

what U.S. Marine Corps General Charles Chandler Krulak refers to as the "Three Block

War" (Tresch, 2009; Krulak, 1999, p. 1). Krulak's (1999) "Three Block War" (p.1)

concept suggest that, given the current operating environment, tactical commanders are

forced to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations in one area of a city

while simultaneously conducting combat operations in another – often with only a few city blocks of separation. Krulak's (1999) asserts that now "Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks" (p. 4). Additionally, Krulak (1999) contends command and control of a particular operation is pushed down to the most junior ranks requiring young Marines to make snap and tactical level decisions that may have strategic level impact. Krulak (1999) refers to these Marines as "Strategic Corporals" (p. 1) and suggests that their actions "will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation" (p.5). Krulak also contends that "further complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience" (p. 4). There is ambiguity in today's operating environments. While maintaining security and preserving military and non-combatant lives is of the upmost importance, finding a balance between conducting kinetic and non-kinetic operations remains a challenge for both commanders and junior soldiers alike.

There are multiple examples of IO being applied too late in war campaigns or simply overlooked altogether. One British commander suggests that the coalition's efforts during the security sector reform of Operation Iraqi Freedom were inadequate. More specifically, that the U.S. approach to "de-Baathing" senior leaders and the Iraqi Army may have done more to increase the insurgency than to reduce instability in the region (Aylwin-Foster, 2005). Aylwin-Foster (2005) claims the overall effectiveness of the Iraqi reform was ineffective following the initial invasion into Iraq. The coalition's continual use of lethal force following the fall of Saddam Hussein did not appropriately address the needs of the local populace (Aylwin-Foster, 2005). It was not until 2004,

that the Army had to adapt and move from a kinetic to a non-kinetic posture in order to establish the Vietnam War strategy of "winning the hearts and minds" of the local populace (Aylwin-Foster, 2005; Bell, 2008). The Army has had a long history of conventional warfare and the "winning the hearts and minds" approach has not been fully ingrained into the Army's "core competencies" (Aylwin-Foster, 2005; Bell, 2008; Lamb, 2004). Additionally, the Army has struggled with adjusting its organizational culture in order to adapt to the new environment. Aylwin-Foster (2005) states, the Army is "always seeing itself as an instrument of national survival" (p. 14). Aylwin-Foster (2005) further claims that due to this self-perception, "the Army has developed a marked and uncompromising focus on conventional war fighting, leaving it ill-prepared for the unconventional operations" (p. 14). This commander's testimony suggests that had the U.S. adjusted its paradigm from a lethal approach to a non-lethal approach, actions in Iraq would not have lasted for over 10 years.

Another testimonial from a former Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commander in Iraq indicates further skepticism across the force regarding the application of IO concepts. The belief was that only a minimal amount of information or evidence existed to prove that IO could be successfully applied to a practical situation in combat (Baker, 2006). However, Baker (2006) soon realized that IO and human intelligence became the two most vital combat multipliers to a counter-insurgency type of war. He (2006) reveals that he made the necessary adjustments to his staff in order to build a unity of effort between the kinetic and non-kinetic operations (Baker, 2006). Baker (2006) further confirms and describes in detail the value of societal and cultural leaders in his operating environment that would enviably carry the message of his unit to the rest of the

community. It is clear that the Army must learn to deal with the local populace, other

military services, multinational organizations and coalition partners if they are to be

successful on today's modern battlefield (Olsen & Davis, 1999). As Baker (2006)

learned, interpersonal skills will determine success or failure of a particular mission

(Olsen & Davis, 1999). The necessity of this emerging skill set implies that future IO

training must incorporate interpersonal skills development and relationship building

techniques in the Army leaders of the future.

The testimonials of former leaders and commanders in Iraq imply that IO, when

effectively applied, does have value. In retrospect, the fact that it has taken the Army so

long to properly apply IO techniques and methods to a particular situation since its

inception in 1995-1996 is astonishing. The 10-year gap between the IO

branch/specialty's inception and successful application suggest further research is

required to determine if the Army is focusing on the training and force structure for the

next 10 years. Aylwin-Foster (2005) and Baker's (2006) testimonials highlight that

changes in the way the Army approaches war fighting is fast approaching. It further

implies that refinement of existing IO training methodology and force structure is

required in order to meet the demands of future conflicts. Additionally, the application of

agenda-setting and convergence theory will play an enormous role in the training and

force structure refinement process. It is simply discouraging that since Army IO's

inception, leader and commander testimonials of this tone did not begin to surface until

mid-way through the war in Iraq – once the value of non-lethal operations was realized.

However, Baker's (2006) full account of how he deliberately planned and executed a

combat mission with IO as the main effort proves to be the strongest argument for

immediate evaluation of the Army's IO training and force structure. Additionally, some assessment as to the current state of the Army's IO training and force structure could assist this research and provide insight as to whether the Army is prepared to mitigate genocide post Iraq and Afghanistan.

The use of agenda setting and convergence theory will have limitations in this study. As mentioned, this study will review the genocide case studies of Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia in order to gain some insight on the types of agenda-settings messages that were used. If a determination can be made as to whether or not some messaging types were more successful than others, than the Army's IO community can capture this data and subsequently incorporate similar messaging techniques into their current training curriculum. Additionally, if revisions to the current training curriculum require increased manpower resources to execute, further considerations can also be made regarding IO's current force structure. In contrast, this study may experience some disadvantages when attempting to apply convergence theory. The primary reason for such disadvantages will be due to the time period in which these cases occurred and the fact that there are limited historical examples to suggest that traditional and new media outlet tools were used for generating anti- or pro-genocide messages. Additionally, one final and obvious limitation is that this research will not be a study of how other media or information outlets have contributed or taken away from the agendas employed in each case study. Instead it will focus on the messages themselves in order to make some interpretations as to why some messages were more successful than others in an effort to ignite or prevent genocide.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

~ Case Studies

    This research will examine the three case studies of genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings which occurred in Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia. The selection of these three events is deliberate as each case possesses distinct differences in U.S. military involvement.   For the purposes of this study, Rwanda will be considered a genocide event with *no* military involvement, East Timor with *limited* military involvement, and Bosnia with *full* military involvement. Despite the uniqueness of each case, this cross-section should provide sufficient data to complement the primary research question for this study. Similar to previous research, this study will not only attempt to provide some historical and political context to the actual events that occurred in the three case studies examined, but will allow through a careful review of several scholarly works, an even closer examination of the mass communication theories of agenda-setting and convergence – the primary focus of this study.

    This study will also consider the predominant victims in each case as the *out-group*. Therefore, the predominant out-group in Rwanda will be considered the Tutsi ethnic group. The case of East Timor has been argued by many scholars as a gender selective-genocide. However, for the purposes of this study, the predominant out-group will be considered the entire East Timorese population. In contrast, the Muslim Bosnians will be considered the primary out-group in the Bosnia case. This cross-section of out-groups encompassing ethic, gender and religious orientations will offer a unique perspective to this study as a single agenda setting theme and or message will rarely

translate contextually across all orientations in the same manner. This design will further reinforce the notion that themes and messages must be specifically targeted for an out-group in order to ensure the desired effect.

While there are various stages to genocide, it is often challenging to clearly identify when the planning stage begins or at what point events transition from one stage to another. Stanton (1996) suggests genocide has eight stages and those stages are "classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial" (p. 2). He further claims that the "first stages precede later stages, but continue to operate throughout the genocidal process" (Stanton, 1996, p.2). Stanton's (1996) explanation of the eight stages of genocide suggests that the stages are fluid and somewhat subjective with regard to when each stage starts and stops. Given this ambiguity, it is important for this research to clearly articulate a timeframe as its primary focus. It has been determined that this study will focus on the timeframes in which the actual killings took place. Additionally, this study will be concerned with the dehumanization stage of genocide and how dehumanizing themes and messages serve to incite violence. For Rwanda, the focused time period for this study will be the 100-day massacre which occurred between April 1994 and July 1994. As for East Timor, it has been argued that genocide in this country was constant between 1975 and 1999 due to the Indonesian monarchy and occupation of East Timor. However, this study will be primarily concerned with the killing events which occurred between January 1998 and December 1999. This timeframe marks the months leading up to East Timor's independence from Indonesia and the final push by Indonesian-backed militias to eradicate the Timorese population in East Timor. Finally, the Balkan Wars which

occurred between April 1992 and December 1995 will be this study's focus regarding Bosnia.

Now that the countries, out-groups and timeframes have been clearly established, it is important to articulate the message or messaging sources in which this research will consider. Given the time period of each individual case study and through some preliminary analysis, an assumption was made that government/non-government controlled radio, television, and newspaper were the common carriers of themes and messages in all three conflicts. Therefore, this study will focus primarily on traditional forms of media. However, the use of new media (e.g. Internet/social media enable mobile phones), will also be examined within this research, as a secondary consideration. This secondary examination is primarily due to the fact that new media, for the most part, post-dates each of the case studies. However, Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) cite empirical evidence provided by a Washington think tank that suggests by 2020, "a mobile device will be the primary Internet connection tool for most people in the world" (p. 67). If this prediction comes to pass, simple logic would conclude that the same messages targeting out-groups by Rwandan, East Timorian and Bosnian radio, television and newspaper could also be achieved through new forms of media today. This dynamic has significant implications for how the Army's IO proponent may combat these media outlets for the future. Additionally, understanding this dynamic will also allow for some interpretation in how genocidal messages disseminated across the described forms of traditional and new media can result in a viral effect which can often contribute to additional genocidal messages in the form of leaflets, interpersonal measures and even word of mouth. It is also important to note that for this study, that a theme or message that could be suggested

to argue for annihilation of an out-group will be considered throughout this study as a *pro-genocide* theme or message. In contrast, a theme or message that could be suggested to argue against annihilation of an out-group will be considered throughout this study as an *anti-genocide* theme or message. It is the belief of this researcher that if successful pro-genocide messages can be clearly identified, then further drafting of successful anti-genocide messages by the Army's IO proponent could be conducted in an attempt to successfully counter pro-genocide messages for the future and thus reduce the possibilities of genocide altogether. Therefore, this research will also seek to provide some insight to whether or not convergence theory and integrated marketing communication have application in disseminating anti-genocide messages in an effort to protect out-groups.

As mentioned, preliminary analysis suggests that only traditional forms of media were used in each of the three cases. However, it is possible for an isolated example to arise as this research further evolves. Regardless of the outcome, it is the belief of this researcher that the coupling of traditional media with new media and utilization of integrated marketing communication to protect out-groups will have application in the near future. Therefore, a mastery of such emerging technology by a prevention apparatus will be critical for anti-genocide efforts in the years to come.

~ Data Collection

This study utilized the *Communication and Mass Media Complete* and *Academic Search Premier* databases as its primary resource for the collection of themes and messages that could be considered targeted toward one of this study's established out-

groups. As a secondary source for data collection, this study also used books, journal articles, transcripts, archived records and physical artifacts where genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings remained a salient theme. Using qualitative content analysis and an inductive approach, this study identified the types of themes and messages that have been used to cause hate against out-groups. This study then systematically categorize each message in order to provide some insight as to the commonalities and differences of the various theme and messages retrieved from the data collection sources. Once this analysis was completed, some interpretations were made as to whether or not the list of identified messages actually targeted out-groups during the conflicts of Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia. Additionally, this study attempted to make some correlation between the messages and theory and what may motivate people to kill out-groups.

~ Units of Analysis and Research Goals

In summation, the units of analysis used in this study will be the use of radio, television, newspaper, and new media (e.g. Internet/social media enabled mobile phones) in each case study. This study will examine pro-genocide themes and message and attempt to categorize each. This approach to the study will first allow for some comprehensive analysis on the most prevalent themes and messages that have been suggested by scholars to incite genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings. Once these themes and messages have been identified, some comparison will be made as to the consistency of a particular message and its frequency of use. From here, some attempts can then be made to predict if certain messages correlate to the dehumanization stage of genocide. The goal of this study is to provide some early warning indicators that would

ultimately prompt government and military intervention. Next, this study will attempt to present interpretations of successful attempts in using agenda setting themes and messages to promote genocide to the Army and its IO proponent in order to determine if similar techniques are being incorporated into the current training curriculum to prevent.

It is the belief of this researcher that if some determination can be made as to how pro-genocide messages resulted in the successful genocides of Rwanda, East Timor, and Bosnia further steps can be taken to ensure counter-messages are being developed to successfully prevent genocide. If anti-genocide messages can be determined and formulated, further exploration can be conducted to determine who should execute and or carry out these anti-genocide messages. If it is assumed that the Army's IO proponent is best suited for carrying out anti-genocide messages, further exploration will be necessary to determine if the techniques for using anti-genocide messages are currently being trained across the Army as in the proponent IOs. Additionally, some determination will also be required to ensure that the current Army force structure is accounting for possible increases in manpower requirements to accomplish such training. Overall, the three case studies should provide greater interpretation as to whether or not the IO TTPs used in Iraq would have sufficient application in the prevention of genocide, mass atrocity and or mass killing cases for the future and if the Army's IO program is currently prepared to execute.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

Utilizing the established methodology for this study, a general inquiry was made into the *Communication and Mass Media Complete and Academic Search Premier* databases for each case study country. A search for the term "Rwanda" produced 6,567 results. In contrast, a search for the term "East Timor" produced 2,433 results and a search for the term "Bosnia" produced 14,817 results. Although the abundance of data from each of these inquiries suggests an appropriate level of data available, the ultimate goal of this research was to identify the types of agenda-setting themes and messages that may have been used to target out-groups in each of the three cases. Therefore, further filtering was necessary in order to retrieve the desired themes and messages for examination.

Due to the overarching theme of genocide in this study, it was determined that a search using the term "genocide" in conjunction with each country name would narrow the data to a much more manageable level. As a result, a second search, again using *Communication and Mass Media Complete* and *Academic Search Premier*, for "Rwanda genocide" produced 996 results. A search for "East Timor genocide" produced 19 results and a search for "Bosnia genocide" retrieved 179 results. Once the data for each country had been reduced under the general theme of genocide, a third query was conducted using the same databases by adding the phrase "of out-groups" to each case study country. A search for "Rwanda genocide of out-groups" produced 2,553 results. In contrast, a query for "East Timor genocide of out-groups" retrieved 2,448 results while a search for "Bosnia genocide of out-groups" provided 2,188 results. The results of these

inquires was surprising, but implied that a multitude of out-groups exist in each one of

the case study countries. While it is important to acknowledge that more than one group

could be considered the out-group based on their affiliations and orientations, this study

is primarily concerned with the historically agreed upon victims of each genocide case.

As a result, a forth search was necessary in order to ensure that sufficient data was

available to represent this study's identified predominant out-groups for each case.

Again, using the same databases, a search of "Rwanda genocide of Tutsis" was

conducted which retrieved 26 results. In comparison, a search of "East Timor genocide

of Timorese" produce 2,395 results and a search of "Bosnia genocide of Bosniank

Muslims" revealed 16 results.

In order to retrieve data on each country and each out-group, the first four

searches intentionally did not use an associated time period. As mentioned, the transition

between the various stages of genocide is often unclear.   Historically, genocide

invention often occurs after the fact and thus, an assumption during this study was that

little data concerning themes and messages prior to the actual killing phase would have

been prevalent to support the research question. To give this particular topic some frame

of reference as well as to further filter the data, time periods were incorporated in the next

series of searches.

A search of the phrase "Rwanda genocide of Tutsis" with an incorporated time

period of April 1994 – July 1994 provided 28 results from the aforementioned databases.

In comparison, a search of the phrase "East Timor genocide of Timorese" with an

incorporated time period of January 1998 – December 1999 produced 702 results, while a

search of "Bosnia genocide of Bosniank Muslims" with a time period of April 1992 –

December 1995 produced 5 results. These results were somewhat puzzling in that

Rwanda produced a manageable amount of data whereas East Timor produced

overwhelming numbers. In contrast, Bosnia produced very little data that would

adequately address this study's established research question. An assumption was made

that since the time periods for each case study were not exactly the same, some data

distortion would exist. To reiterate, this study is primarily concerned with when the

actually killing events took place. These timeframes encompass an examination of 4

months or the 100-day massacre for Rwanda, 33-months for East Timor and 45-months

for Bosnia. In the case of East Timor, the fact that genocide, mass atrocities and or mass

killings have arguably been constant since 1975, it was the belief of this researcher that

some anomaly articles may exist in the data returns and thus not useful to the scope of

this research. However, following this logic did not explain why the Bosnia case, with a

45-month time frame, only produced 5 results. Given these inconsistencies and the need

to present a more global representation of the data, a *subject thesaurus filter* was used for

both East Timor and Bosnia. In the case of Bosnia, the term "violence" was selected as

the subject thesaurus filter. In the case of East Timor, the term "atrocities" was used as

the filter. While it is acknowledged that the filtering terms are not same, limitations of

the selected database drove these selections.

As a result, the search for "East Timor genocide of Timorese" with the associated

time period of January 1998 – December 1999 and a subject thesaurus filter applied

produced 17 results. The search for "Bosnia genocide of Bosniank Muslims" with an

associated time period of April 1992 – April 1995 and a subject thesaurus filter applied

provided 24 results. In all cases, the results generated U.S.-only news articles, academic

journals, periodicals and government documents. Again, while the ultimate goal of this study is to identify the types of agenda setting themes and messages that may have been used by local radio, television, and newspapers of the various case study countries, the initial series of searches satisfied this researcher and subsequently provided an ample amount of data for which to begin a preliminary examination.

Now that the data were narrowed down to a more manageable level for analysis and provided for a more global representation, a through reading of each academic journal, periodical and government document was conducted. The initial read was intended to establish some familiarity with the data and to ensure that no duplicate data existed. A more thorough reading of the literature was later conducted in order to gain some insight as to the dominant themes and subsequent messages that existed in each case. For convenience and ease of reference, the remainder of this this study will utilize a short version title of the search parameters. Therefore, "Bosnia data" served as the abbreviated title for the search of "Rwanda genocide of Tutsis" with an associated time period of April 1994 – July 1994 and no filters applied. "East Timor Data" served as the abbreviated title for the search of "East Timor genocide of Timorese" with an associated time period of January 1998 – December 1999 and the term "atrocities" filter applied. "Bosnia Data" served as the abbreviated title for the search of "Bosnia genocide of Bosiank Muslims" with an associated time period of April 1992 – December 1999 and the term "violence" filter applied.

~ Rwanda Data Analysis

Figure 1 illustrates the academic journal and periodicals by title and frequency retrieved during the search. As mentioned, the results of the initial query were disappointing to this researcher as each result was a U.S. based news organization's publication or academic journal. However, upon further examination of each article, greater fidelity surfaced as to how the various U.S. based reporters, staff writers and academic scholars perceived the events that were occurring in Rwanda during the prescribed timeframe. Additionally, the review of each article revealed outstanding visualization of the variety of themes and messages that were perpetuated not only by the genocide aggressors but

Rwanda Data Sources	Freq.
Africa Report	1
Christianity Today	1
Chronicle of Higher Education	1
Economist	1
Maclean's	1
National Catholic Reporter	4
New Republic	2
New York Times	6
New York Times Magazine	1
New Yorker	1
Newsweek	4
Time	2
TLS	1
U.S. News & World Reports	2

Figure 1. Rwanda data sources and frequency.

also the victims themselves. Despite the fact that the data returns revealed U.S. reporting, a sufficient amount of insight was gained on the types of themes and messages that Rwandan radio and newspaper used to dehumanize the Tutsi out-groups making it much easier for the Hutu aggressors to kill in the manner in which they did. A preponderance of the articles found in the Rwanda data suggests that two predominant agenda setting themes existed in the country during the time of the 100-day massacre and subsequently drove agenda setting messages and genocidal acts. The first theme was *ethnic conflict*. Hilsum (1994) suggest that ethnic conflict has existed for decades in the country and this

ethnic conflict was one of the major factors of the 100-day massacre. Abzug (1994) compared Rwanda to the events that occurred in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 and the Holocaust of World War II. At the time of the conflict, Hutus made up 85% of the population while the Tutsis made up 15% (Wretched Rwanda, *Economist*, 1994). Abzug (1994) suggests that the Tutsis essentially acknowledge that being killed by the majority Hutus was essentially their destiny in life. In comparison, Hammer (1994) describes the Tutsi ethnic group being slaughtered in the same manner that animals would be slaughtered prior to delivery to market. It is here were the ethnic conflict theme and message types that target an out-group collide. Were the majority Hutus seriously suggesting that the Tutsis were animals? Stanton (1996) claims the during "incitements to genocide, the target groups are called disgusting animal names - Nazi propaganda called Jews 'rats' or 'vermin'; Rwandan Hutu hate radio referred to Tutsis as 'cockroaches'" (p. 1). Additionally, Stanton (1996) suggests the "targeted group is often likened to a 'disease', 'microbes', 'infections' or a 'cancer' in the body politic" (p. 1). Purvis (1994) confirms the ethnic divide in the country and suggest the social conditions in the country during the time of the murders were extremely tense between the two ethnic groups. Michaels & Mutiso (1994), Hammer (1994), and Lubbock (1994) in multiple interviews with eye witnesses of the massacre suggest the conflict was ethnically based and that this theme drove messages in order to dehumanization the victims using animal and insect terminology and metaphors. Lubbock (1994) actually reported how one Rwandan Information Officer was observed making a phone call to the prominent government-controlled radio station - *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)* in order to pass along the states next series of messages in an effort to further dehumanize

the victims during the 100-day event. Hammer (1994) suggests that "fear, suspicion and hatred of 'the other' seem to simmer just below the surface, fueled by ignorance, poverty and the collective memory of earlier killings" (p. 9). Hammer (1994) also concluded that *RTLM* was a "Hutu supremacist station" (p. 10) and was "fomenting anti-Tutsi passions" (p. 10) over the air.

It appeared through a review of the data that the ethnic conflict theme that existed in Rwanda was driving the types of agenda setting messages being generated on *RTLM* as well and in the prominent newspaper *Kangura*. However, other data suggest that a second theme existed during the time of the conflict. The second prominent agenda setting theme was *political conflict*. It appeared throughout the data that education and wealth determined power. While the power-base between the Hutus and Tutsis has fluctuated throughout history and global support for one group over another continues to be a revolving door, the data in this study consistently suggested that the Hutus possessed the majority of educational benefits and wealth in Rwanda during the 100-day massacre. These factors suggest that subsequent political power over the Tutsi minority was understood.

As mentioned, some analysis by this researcher suggests the ethnic tension bled over into political conflict. This factor is dynamic as is the majority ethnic group remained in power for the duration of the conflict. What was equally unique to the Rwanda genocide is that the political powers of Hutu controlled government successfully linked the ethnic conflict theme with the political conflict theme. Pritchard (1994) suggest that "when political conflict begins to flare-up, ethnical divisions begin to appear" (p. 10). Pritchard (1994) also suggests that "while the Tutsis may have been the

main target of violence, members of opposition political parties are also victims" (p. 10).

In Pritchard's (1994) interview with the wife of a *Catholic Relief Services*' staff member

– David Piraino, she stated, "This is not really an ethnic war… this is political" (p. 10).

Edwards (1994) revealed that Rwanda was nothing more than a "political manipulation of

ethical differences" (p. 10).

Overall, the ethnic and political conflict agenda setting themes ran throughout the

analysis of the data. Additionally, these themes propagated multiple messages that

targeted the Tutsi out-group. It was interesting to this researcher, that the data appeared

to suggest that decades of ethnic conflict in Rwanda bled over into political conflict and

based on who was in power at the time of the conflict spawned more ethnical conflict – a

cyclical dynamic. Once the in-group (Hutus) was in power, the ability of the power elite

to influence a nation to commit such horrific acts was rather simple. *RTLM* and *Kangura*

also contributed to the additional ethnic and political conflict and word of mouth agenda

setting themes became apparent which ultimately spilled out into the streets of Rwanda.

~ East Timor Data Analysis

The East Timor data search provided 24 results. More specifically, this search

produced one academic journal, one government document, one newspaper article and 10

periodicals. Figure 2 illustrates the searches academic journals, government documents,

newspaper articles and periodicals by title and frequency retrieved during the search.

Building on the methodology of identifying themes and then messages as used in the

Rwanda study, an examination of the database returns revealed a prominent theme of

political conflict between the Indonesian government and the Timorese of Indonesian

occupied East Timor. For historical context, on September 11, 1999 violence broke out

in the country due to a 78.5% Timorese
vote for independence from Indonesia
(The tragedy of East Timor, *Economist*,
1999). In a response, the Indonesian
Army was initially mobilized to establish
stability in East Timor. However, some
scholars and reporters argue that the
chaos in East Timor was systematically
orchestrated by the Indonesian
government (Who will rescue East Timor,
Economist, 1999). These scholars and
reporters believed that the Indonesian
Army was first attempting to drive out the
journalist and foreign official (primarily

East Timor Data Sources	Freq.
America	1
Asiaweek	4
Canadian Forum	1
Economist	5
Journal of Church and State	1
Maclean's	1
National Catholic Reporter	1
National Review	2
New Internationalist	1
U.S. News & World Reports	1
Wall Street Journal	1
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents	4
TLS	1

Figure 2. East Timor data sources and frequency.

United Nations representatives) and then "to cleanse the territory of its independence

supporters and to destroy anything else remaining" (Who will rescue East Timor,

Economist, 1999, p. 45). One staff writer describes the situation in East Timor as a

systematic killing of the East Timorese by the Indonesian Army (The dangers in East

Timor, *Economist*, 1999). Caragata (1999) states that Indonesian soldiers created an

"orgy of violence against those who opposed a continued link with Jakarta" (p. 44) –

capital city of East Timor. Caragata (1999) also suggests that following the violence

inflicted on the Timorese, the soldiers then pursued peacekeepers in the streets,

categorizing them as outsiders and making every effort to keep the United Nations (UN)

out of the country. Buckley (1999) criticized the U.N. for the events that occurred

following the vote for independence, claiming the U.N. did not adequately protect the

East Timorese out-group. While there was minimal evidence throughout the data that the

genocide in East Timor was propagated by more than a political conflicts agenda setting

theme, some scholars suggest the religious conflict theme was also a factor during the

East Timor genocide.   One staff writer suggested the not only is there political conflict in

the country of East Timor, but there is also a clash between Christian and Muslim was

prevalent and this too resulted in violence (Hendon, 1999).

There was minimal evidence within the data to suggest that radio, television and

newspaper contributed to the violence in East Timor. However, what the evidence did

reveal was that word of mouth agenda setting themes were prevalent and thus contributed

to the chaos. It is also important to note that in the case of East Timor, the majority of the

killing was conducted by the Indonesian Army. While specific agenda setting themes

directed towards the army would have been important to examine, the data returns

produced only minimal indications of these themes. However, the agenda setting themes

did drive specific hate-messages similar to the examples found in the Rwanda case study.

In East Timor, the Timorese out-group was considered by the in-group to be animals

ready for slaughter and as insects waiting to be crushed. Lay (1999) describes how

innocent men, women and child were killed very similarly to how animals are

slaughtered in a typical slaughter house. Horta (1999) explains that the East Timorese

are "frustrated, unemployed, marginalized elements of society who have been prepared

and organized by the Indonesian army" (p. 26). Horta (1999) suggests that the "East Timorese who have joined the Indonesian-backed militias have done so because it was a way for them to save their lives" (p. 26). Horta (1999) also explains that "to prove their loyalty to Indonesia those East Timorese who have joined the militias have often been forced to kill their own families" (p. 26). However, Horta (1999) in his article describes how the psyche of the East Timorese remains strong and that the Indonesia Army will not be able to crush them similar to that of crushing a bug or insect.

In summation of the East Timor data, it has come to the attention of this researcher that a political conflict theme and to a lesser extent a religious theme seemed to drive the pro-genocidal messages during the conflict in East Timor. While there was only minimal evidence that would suggest radio, television, newspaper played an enormous role, word of mouth and possibly international reporting may have incited the genocidal attacks. East Timor has been considered in this study as genocide where Australian-led peacekeeping forces entered the country in order to create a safe and secure environment. The fact that radio, television and or newspaper played such a limited role in proliferating genocide implies that military action to some extent could have been a factor in neutralizing the traditional forms of media. While this cannot be the only contributing factor in how the East Timor genocide differs from the Rwanda genocide in terms of numbers killed, it has led this researcher toward this theory. If further evidence could provide some insight that military invention would minimize the ability of mass media to broadcast genocidal messages, then one must consider if and how to tailor a typical military force not trained in these tactics to combat.

Understanding this dynamic has compelled this study to look at another case for further clarification.

~ Bosnia Data Analysis

The results of the Bosnia data search provided 17 results. More specifically, this search produced one news article and 8 periodicals. Figure 3 illustrates the news article and periodicals by title and frequency retrieved during the search. A preponderance of the sources found in the Bosnia data suggests that the predominant agenda setting theme in the Bosnia genocide of was fueled by religious orientation and to some extent political conflict.

Bosnia Data Sources	Freq.
Christian Science Monitor	8
CQ Researcher	1
Economist	1
Maclean's	2
National Catholic Reporter	1
New Republic	1
Newsweek	1
Scholastic Update	1
U.S. News & World Reports	1

Figure 3. Bosnia data sources and frequency.

This region of the world is historically complex as Bosnia is just one of the splitter countries of the former Yugoslavia. Understanding this dynamic is important particularly once the countries of Serbia and Croatia are introduced along with the ethnic and religious divides among each. However, despite the acknowledged ethnic tension that surrounds the countries of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, it was *religious conflict* that surfaced from the data as the most prominent agenda setting theme in this case study, followed by political conflict and to a lesser extent gender due to the raping of women. Nordland, Post & al (1993) describes how Croatian paramilitary forces raped and killed Bosnian primarily due to their Muslim affiliation in his *Newsweek* magazine article "Let's kill the Muslims!" (p. 48). Barnes (1993) compared Bosnia to the

Holocaust and how the out-group was being force to seek hiding from the aggressors and religious elites. In multiple survivor interviews conducted by Rohde (1995) in *Christian Science Monitor*, he describes how mass executions were occurring all throughout the county at alarming rates. One interviewee, Rohde (1993) said, wanted to be called by his name versus being referred to as a Muslim for fear of retribution. Ball (1995) describes how Bosnian women were being dehumanized and raped at "Serb rape camps" (p. 9). She further explains that women in these camps were rape until they became pregnant which suggest that the Serbs, much like the Nazi experiments with young girls, was attempting to reproduce a religiously "correct" human (Ball, Ethnic cleansing, rape continue in Bosnia, *National Catholic Reporter*, p. 9).

While the agenda-setting theme of religious conflict was evident throughout the data, specific messages targeting the out-group Muslims did not surface in the data. However, the data produced specific examples of radio, television and magazines reporting the events as they took place. Rohde (1995) suggests that Serb magazines were routinely reporting the killings and proclaim that a Serb dominated government was driving the killings of innocent men, women and children. Wallace & Branson (1992) suggests that local radio stations were advertising "house giveaways" (p. 16) of victims who have been forced from their homes and into hiding. Wallace & Branson (1992) also reveal that local television were broadcasting photos from Serb camps highlighting pictures of undernourished prisoners, some with noticeable wounds.

While the media coverage in Bosnia appeared to this researcher to be much more sophisticated than in East Timor, the data did not reveal evidence that these broadcasts were inciting violence as they did in the Rwanda case. Additionally, there was minimal

evidence to suggest that a religious agenda setting theme was, in turn, generating parallel agenda-setting messages across the country. In essence, it appeared through an examination of the data that Serb media was attempting to sensualize the killings not to incite more violence, but to justify their actions. Fenyvesi (1993) in his article in *U.S. News & World Report*, explained that senior Bosnia officials blamed the international community and "Muslim volunteers abroad for inciting violence" (p. 24) and national and international did more to stir up contempt than the local media. Additionally, this researcher also assessed that due to U.S. military involvement in region during the time of the atrocities; military intervention played an enormous role in maintaining a safe and secure environment for all citizens. The sure number of deaths in Bosnia as compared to the numbers in Rwanda supports this assessment.

~ Summary of Findings

In the three case studies, the countries of Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia are undoubtedly unique in their own right. The factors that drove genocide in these countries, in some instances, are similar while in other instances are completely opposite. This study was not aimed at suggesting that intervention of any type can be applied evenly across each case. If anything, this research has suggested that the overarching theme of genocide is quite different in all cases. However, what is important to understand about this study and studies similar is that agenda setting themes are prevalent in all cases whether driven by a government or even by a particular out-group. Because of these themes, specific agenda setting messages are then developed under the umbrella of a specific theme in order to influence behavior of those in opposition. Figure 4

summarizes the predominant and secondary agenda setting themes discovered in each of the case studies.

In the Rwanda case, this study has revealed that the themes of *ethnic conflict* and *political conflict* were two of the factors that contributed to the killing over

Case Study	Predominant Theme	Secondary Theme
Rwanda	Ethnic Conflict	Political Conflict
East Timor	Political Conflict	Religious Conflict
Bosnia	Religious Conflict	Political Conflict

Figure 4. Predominant and secondary agenda setting themes by case study.

800,000 people between April 1994 and July 1994. These two themes have also driven specific agenda setting messages that target out-groups by using animal and insect metaphors to describe the enemy – in Rwanda, the Tutsis ethnic group. This study has also provide some insight that government-owned radio and newspaper were used to disseminate these animal and insect metaphors to locals in an effort to make the agenda-setting messages more viral and thus more dehumanizing to the victims at large.

In the case of East Timor, this study has provided some interpretation to the idea that the themes of *political conflict* and to a lesser extent *religious conflict* are two of the factors that contributed to the violence that occurred on the Indonesian occupied island during January 1998 and December 1999. While these two themes do not support notions that agenda setting-messages were disseminated across radio, television and newspaper, some of the literature supports the belief that word of mouth dissemination played an enormous role in the chaos. This word of mouth dissemination prompted a government-supported army to retaliate against anyone who opposed their political affiliation – in East Timor, 78.5% of the Timorese population. Additionally, the fact that East Timor for the purpose of this case study was a country with limited military

intervention suggests that on some level, this intervention may have reduced the ability of the Indonesian government to propagate genocide with traditional media.

In the case of Bosnia, this study has provided some insight to the notion that the theme of *religious conflict* and to a lesser extent *political conflict* and *gender selection* were factors that drove the atrocities during April 1992 and December 1995. While radio, newspapers and magazines were prevalent in the country, governmental control over them was negligible and therefore agenda-setting messages disseminated via these media was also kept to a minimum. Additionally, the fact that Bosnia was considered in this study as genocide with *full* military involvement suggests that employment of a military force equipped with non-lethal weapon systems and IO TTPs does have some utility in reducing the viral effects that can be cause by genocidal themes and messages. A simple comparison of the numbers killed in Rwanda with *no* military involvement and the numbers killed in East Timor and Bosnia with *limited* and *full* military involvement supports this claim.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

The findings in this study suggest that while every case of genocide has its own unique characteristics, some familiarity with the agenda setting themes and messages could potentially provide early warning indicators that would, in turn, prompt some type of prevention apparatus to intervene. To this point, an exhaustive review of the literature and extensive examination of the data in this study suggests that the utility of IO TTPs under both combat and peacekeeping operations have merit. However, the highlighted testimonials of former BCT Commanders strongly suggest that the current training and force structure of the Army's IO program is not sufficiently postured for the future given the drawdown in Iraq and the potential reduction of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. A limited amount of literature suggests that the successful use of IO TTPs in Iraq will have similar success once applied to peacekeeping operations where genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings are likely. Therefore, this qualitative research approach was selected to add to the existing body of literature and to provide some insight as to whether or not the use of IO TTPs might have similar success in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, this research attempts to provide some interpretation into the types of themes and messages that the military must be aware of as they continue to develop training and force structure to combat the global enemies of the world.

Many advantages can be observed when IO is applied as a weapon system to conflict resolution. However, civilian and military leaders have been slow in executing the approach and thus may have prolonged conflicts similar to the examples provided by Iraq. Additionally, the convergence of new media with traditional media has provided

even more options in how messages are disseminated to an adversary, a partnering nation and the rest of the world. The Army's IO FA must account for these advances in technology and use them in order to strengthen their ability to achieve information dominance in conflict stricken areas. While Bush's (2003) "decisive force" and "shock and awe" mentality may have been in accordance with historical examples, lessons from Iraq suggest the concept of IO is not fully ingrained across the force – specifically in its approach to training and force structure. What is next?

To date, the Department of Defense (DoD) has approved a training and force structure course of action (COA) that includes the training of captains and majors in IO-related fields of Psychological Operations (PSYOP - FA39B), Public Affairs (PA - FA46), Civil Affairs (CA - FA39C), Foreign Area Officer (FAO - FA48), and strategic intelligence (FA34) (Brown, 2004). Only after training and operational experience in the above related fields would officers be allowed to transition to the IO FA reserved for the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels (Brown, 2004). Another COA involves merging all the related branches together under one umbrella and creating an Information Warfare or IW branch (Brown, 2004). While it may be premature to conclude that these adjustments to training and force structure have sufficiently resolved the issue for the Army, it is encouraging to observe concerted efforts to improve the forces overall deficiencies. Other researchers suggest that IO must be core competency and instilled in every Soldier on the battlefield (Lamb, 2004). It is here where the strongest argument for revision of training and force structure seems to lie. If IO training were required for every Soldier, non-commissioned officer, and commissioned-officer, traditional paradigm shifts would greatly improve. In 2003, the DoD established a plan to transform the Army IO program

in order to parallel it better with the emergence of the information and technology age

(Lamb, 2004). The approval of the *IO Roadmap* in October of 2003 by the Secretary of

Defense set in motion training and force structure adjustments. Additionally, it addressed

the importance of information exploration and how overtime this exploration will become

key factors to the military decision making process of our civilian and military leaders.

The approval of the IO Roadmap has served as a common framework and will continue

to the create policy that will guide our military in training and force structure with robust

capabilities such as PSYOP, CNOs, EW and others (Lamb, 2004).

It is unfortunate that little has been done regarding the development of IO training

and force structure until recent years. Nevertheless, it appears through a review of the

pertinent literature that the Army's approach to resolving this deficiency is producing

positive results and it has been the intent of this study to make such a case. However, this

study has also sought to provide some insight on whether the Army's current initiatives

are evolving fast enough given the complexity of world affairs and unstableness that exist

today. Will the current adjustments to training and force structure be enough to prepare

the Army for future conflicts beyond Iraq? Are more aggressive measures required now

versus later?   It appears the emergence of new media will be a means to achieve the

national strategic ends. However, fundamentally, the IO FA may not be where it needs to

be in terms of applying appropriate agenda-setting and convergence techniques to

facilitate mission success. If the military is to remain the action arm for all domestic and

international policy, it must be prepared to handle the challenges of all conflict types –

lethal and non-lethal. This study has provided some interpretation as to whether or not

the Army's IO component is sufficiently postured to handle such crises. However,

further training must be recommended and adjustments to the current doctrine must be developed, tested and incorporated into the existing Army *Field Manual 100-6*.

~Limitations

Of course, this study is not without limitations. First, given the time allowed to conduct this research, the feasibility to gain some insight on the use of agenda setting themes and messages in the three case studies was possible. However, the feasibility to thoroughly explore the secondary consideration of this study or the convergence of traditional media and new media outlet tools to generate agenda setting themes and messages was limited. Therefore, additional research will be required in order to draw some interpretation as to whether or not the convergence of traditional and new media outlet tools for generating anti-/pro-genocide messages has application in future conflicts. Second, the data retrieved in this study was exclusively U.S. based news articles, academic journals, and government documents. While this U.S. based perspective provided evidence to suggest that specific agenda setting themes and messages were targeting out-groups, further research will be required in order to provide some insight as to how non-U.S. based organizations perceived the various themes and messages. Third, though the data returns for this study provided a respectable cross-section of news organizations and academic institutions, additional research will be necessary to determine if one organization perceives the agenda setting themes and messages in the same fashion as this study or in some other manner. Finally, further research will also be necessary to ensure that the data sources found on aggregator websites and in aggregator databases possess a sufficient level of credibility. Ultimately, if successful acknowledgment by senior civilian and military leaders can be achieved regarding the

lessons learned from Iraq as well as, in these Rwanda, East Timor, and Bosnia case studies, greater validly could be given to the notion that the Army's use of traditional IO concepts and principles coupled with new media outlet tools could serve as successful weapon systems in the prevention of genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings.

~ Applied Conclusion

The use of IO as a weapon system within the context of this research is primarily concerned with establishing peace in areas of the world where genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings are likely. However, it is important to acknowledge that not all people will agree that government based agenda setting is necessarily good for all of society. Some members of society, for example, would argue that 9/11 was only used as a political platform to launch an Iraq invasion agenda. Therefore, some delineation between the use of IO and the term propaganda is necessary. For clarification, IO is an umbrella term and proponent of the Army that serves to synchronize the functions of Psychological Operations (PSYOP- FA39B), Public Affairs (PA - FA46), Civil Affairs (CA - FA39C), Foreign Area Officer (FAO - FA48), and Strategic Intelligence (FA34) (Brown, 2004). Additionally, Electronic Warfare (EW), Operational Security (OPSEC), and Cyber Network Operations (CNO) have historically been considered functions of IO. While most of the IO functions have avoided negative political scrutiny, PSYOP has been the exception as the name implies mind altering and is often misconstrued as propaganda. The outputs of PSYOP are indeed lies, half-truths and innuendos. However, the lies, half-truths and innuendos used in PSYOP are targeted specifically at foreign audiences and those that could be considered adversaries of the U.S. Johnson and Dalehow (2003) define PSYOP and propaganda in the following manner:

> *"PSYOP is a subset of information operations that sends selected information to a foreign audience to influence behavior in support of battlefield objectives. One example would be a U.S. Air Force C–130 'Commando Solo' aircraft broadcasting radio messages to war zone residents to warn them against collaborating with enemy soldiers. Because its messages are not intended to be balanced or complete, its mission and bureaucracy traditionally have been kept separate from public affairs and public diplomacy"* (p. 3).

> *"Propaganda is information deliberately propagated to help or harm a person, group, or institution, regardless of whether the information is true or false. To many not aware of its exact meaning, propaganda suggests disinformation. Public diplomacy and public affairs officers have always maintained that any information they convey must be truthful. Propaganda or not, it must deal with known facts"* (p. 3).

While Johnson and Dalehow's (2003) definition provides some clarity on the differences between PSYOP and propaganda, there remains much debate on the ethics behind its use. These debates have recently prompted senior civilian and military leaders to create new policy in an effort to avoid the often negative stigmatism that accompanies the term PSYOP. On January 25, 2011 the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates in his *Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others* ordered that the term PSYOP be changed to Military Information Support Operations (MISO) in order to avoid further scrutiny and ensure that the IO function remained relevant as the current information age evolves. *The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.05E* defines MISO in the following manner:

> *"Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of military information support operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objective."*

Despite the recent changes in terminology, ethical debates regarding the use of PSYOP and or MISO will continue as the very nature of its uses involves lying.

Therefore, the ethical justification that this study lend on was the works of Bok (1978) and her interpretation of the teachings by philosopher St. Augustine. Additionally, this research also adhered to John Stuart Mill's *Principle of Utility* which "seeks the greatest happiness for the aggregate whole" (Christians et al, 2009, p. 18). Bok (1978) defines lying as an explicit statement, which implies that omitting information is not considered a lie. The idea that omitting information from a statement is not considered a lie suggests to this researcher that there is a higher moral purpose for lying. From Bok's (1978) viewpoint, she is primarily concerned with the context in which a lie is told. Her idea that a lie is "any intentionally deceptive message which is stated" (Bok, 1978 p. 13) would indeed support claims that the use PSYOP and or MISO techniques is unethical when applied evenly to a friend or foe as some form of deception may be necessary to influence behavior. However, St. Augustine claims that in some cases lies may be justified (Bok, 1978). His "eightfold distinction" (Bok, 1978 p. 33) for lies suggests that on one end of the spectrum are lies that bring about great harm to others and are ultimately condemned by religious teachings. On the other end of the spectrum, are lies that bring about minimal harm to others. St. Augustine's eight step continuum allowed him to differentiate between a harmful lie and a not so harmful lie (Bok, 1978). St. Augustine, similar to Bok (1978), was mostly concerned with the "intention" (Bok, 1978 p. 34) of a lie. If the intent is not to harm a person, then the statement is not a lie. Bok (1978) would claim that omitting damaging information to avoid harm is telling a lie but with good intentions. St. Augustine would assert that a good intention lie is justifiable and designed for a higher moral purpose. Christians et al (2009) in their explanation of Mill's utilitarian viewpoint suggest that a determination of right or wrong must consider

"what will yield the best consequences for the welfare of human beings" (p. 18). If the use of PYSOP and or MISO tactics could have prevented 9/11 or prevent future genocides, mass atrocities and or mass killings, then to this researcher, these tactics are justifiable.

In conclusion, the purpose of this research was to first define the concept of IO coupled with new media outlet tools (e.g. Internet/social media capable mobile phones) as weapon systems in the prevention of genocide, mass atrocities and or mass killings. Second, it was to discuss the mass communication theories of agenda setting and convergence as a means to ground the defined concept. Third, this study attempts to apply both theories to the recent conflict in Iraq in order to gain some insight as to its strength and weaknesses. Fourth, it examined the case studies of Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia to determine the types of agenda setting and pro-genocide messages that were used during these conflicts. Fifth, it continued examining the Rwanda, East Timor and Bosnia case studies to determine if the convergence of traditional and new media could have had application during these conflicts.

This study has demonstrated, on some level, that it appears senior civilian and military leaders are taking the necessary steps to ensure the Army is postured for the future. However, growing the force structure takes time and finding windows for training is always a challenge. Understanding this dynamic, I suggest that interim steps are necessary to ensure that the present day military has a working knowledge of the doctrinal concepts surrounding the tactics of IO. Although signs and indicators of genocide, mass atrocities, and or mass killings are usually easy to ascertain through some analysis, the actual violent acts can unknowingly ignite and produce significant levels of

casualties in a very short period of time. IO has been combat tested and provided

significant measures of effectiveness in bringing stability to a region. However, this

study suggests that the training and force structure to conduct successful IO still has room

for improvement. Senior military leaders must heed these warnings and take active

measures to ensure that the handful of IO subject matter experts in the Army today are

sufficiently preparing the rest of the force for tomorrow.

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