SILENT VOICES:

THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST

COVERAGE OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

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SILENT VOICES:
THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST

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Presented by C. Victor Herbin III

A candidate for the degree of Master of Arts of Journalism

And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

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ABSTRACT

The genocide in Rwanda was one of the worst human experiences within the 20th century. Throughout the 100 day genocide at least 800,000 people were killed, countless were wounded, and millions were displaced from their homes. Even though details supported the claim that genocide was in progress, the international community failed in its recognition and intervention efforts. This qualitative research study examines the New York Times and the Washington Post coverage of the Rwandan genocide and the American response as part of the media discourse. Through a textual analysis of 36 articles this research revealed six frames existed in depicting murder and American state actor’s response regarding Rwanda: death and murder is an African reality, Rwandan murder is a reality distortion, visual reality of murder, strategic neglect, down-play of events, and recant, remorse, and apologetic. This research provides insight for government leaders, media institutions, academicians, and the international community on the challenges of reporting the Rwanda genocide in Africa and how the limited recognition, lack of knowledge, and negative perception of the region dismissed the reality of genocide which delayed appropriate responses.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Despite the US media’s continuing coverage of 20th century genocides and attempts of shaping the public agenda, the international community in particular the American government, remained consistently non-committal, hesitant, and apprehensive in its approach for preventing or intervening during a genocidal conflict (Power, 2002). Beginning with Turkey in 1915 until Rwanda in 1994, more than a hundred million people were victims to the crime of genocide. Although the US media have been said to possess the power and influence for setting public agenda and policy agenda, somehow this power is severely limited when promoting awareness for the phenomenon of genocide and persuading American officials for suitable responses. In the context of this study, 800,000 Rwandan citizens were murdered within 100 days because their tribal affiliation was either Tutsi or a moderate Hutu desiring a peaceful nation. The Hutu’s extreme level of hatred were so strong that even the United Nations Peacekeeping forces present in the region were unsuccessful at repelling the perpetrators. In fact, they even found themselves the victims of the massacre. Because of the speed, viciousness and chaotic nature of this genocide and lack of American response, how the US media covered this event maintains a subject of debate and criticism.

Unfortunately the threat of genocide still exists. Therefore a mandate is placed upon government leaders, media institutions, academicians, and the international community for developing suitable lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide for implementing adequate steps of prevention for future occurrences that remotely resemble
genocide. Actively researching this topic and facilitating academic debate, dialogue and interest will not only maintain its importance but will identify solutions and techniques that combat the problem.

This study examines how American media covered the 1994 Rwanda genocide and a few terms may require further explanation. An assumption is made that everyone has a common foundation of what genocide is, let alone how to identify media coverage of genocidal acts. For this reason The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide, 1997) defined genocide as, “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious people.” Genocidal coverage is the media coverage of these acts.

American’s receive their news from a variety of sources ranging from internet blogs, social media sites, media-content sites, magazines, radio, and television. This study focuses on two US elite newspapers, the daily New York Times and Washington Post, because of their level of dominance and agenda setting capability they possessed in society prior to the Internet age. Unlike today, newspapers were the major information source that provided the president and elected officials with international events that shaped the public and affected policy decisions. For the purpose of this study, the newspaper coverage under examination is from April 6, 1994, the beginning of the Rwandan genocide, to July 18, 1994, the conclusion of the genocide.

American responses to the genocide is also examined in order to determine how the media covered the opinions, perspectives, intentions, and expectations of American policymakers and public as it related to the Rwandan genocide. Understanding how the
media conveyed the American level of interest and attention that the genocide required for immediate cessation is worth exploring. There are four major forms of American responses. First, American response can be depicted as Presidential statements in the form of recorded transcripts, White House correspondences, or press interviews denouncing the genocidal acts. The second form of American response is State Department diplomatic visits to the region, implementation of humanitarian missions, press interviews, and foreign military assistance training. The third form of response is American military intervention through the use of soft or hard power. Soft power is most often expressed in the show of military force such as a fleet of naval aircraft carriers off the coast of Africa, Army military training Special Forces exercises in the region, Marine Corps highly publicized partnership programs, or Air Force training flights and bombing targets displaying the full arsenal and capability of American military. The intent of this method of power is to deter or cease the aggressive action from the perpetrators. Hard power is the direct intervention of force from the US military. America can respond through aerial and naval strategic bombing in Rwanda, American Marines and Soldiers engaged in direct combat, or a combination of any of the hard target options, where the intent is the stop the genocide through force. The fourth type of response is the American public which is expressed in the form of protests, letters to the editors, articles, or opinion polls.

The American media is a critical component of the American society in educating, informing, and providing relevance towards national and international events. Coupling these facts with the extreme power of the American media in shaping the political or public agenda, accurately covering the phenomenon of genocide is vitally
important. Prompting decisive political action requires an actively engaged media in the analysis and proper classification towards a genocide event that will place the necessary pressure on political actors. Hence, this research is interested in the media coverage of American political action regarding genocide.

**Background**

On July 19, 1994 the world population was a little less than 6 billion (Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2005). Yet, throughout the preceding 100 days, not one of these individuals possessed enough power or influences to prevent the massacre of over 800,000 Rwandan citizens. The failure of the international community to intervene after the assassination of President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira set the conditions for the tragic events that ensued. Rwandan Armed Forces with the aid of the Interahamwe militia methodically sought out and killed Tutsi tribal members and moderate Hutus with the intent of extermination. Even though 17 years has passed since this tragic event, questions continue to arise and are often unanswered. Because of the lessons learned and the significance of this event in world history, exploring and understanding the role of the US media in its coverage of the Rwanda genocide is critical in identifying steps for prevention of future genocides.

Setting the public agenda for promoting awareness, action, and response towards genocide is where media outlets earn their value to mankind. Genocide is a phenomenon that requires immediate action from media outlets, American policy makers, and the international community. The media coverage of genocide varies drastically over the last
90 years from detailed to limited. What media organizations must exercise in covering genocide is maximum and consistent saturation of the event, effectively use multi-media agenda setting for increasing its exposure for the American public, and immediately recognizing and explicit classifying the event as genocide.

Media coverage of various genocides in the last century, from the Turkish genocide leading up to the Rwanda genocide, shows that detailed coverage of the genocides failed at shaping the public agenda and equally failed in prompting swift American response. In the case of the Turkish genocide during World War I that killed over 1 million Armenian citizens in 1915, history conveys that American policy makers and the international community were anything but immediate in their response to genocide (Suny, 1993). *New York Times* published over 100 stories framing the events with varying headlines and content specifying “massacres”, “slaughter”, “atrocities” against the Armenians (Power, 2002). Despite the *New York Times* media coverage highlighting the massacre, their power and influence in setting the public agenda was limited and received little recognition from American and international leaders. Even with these multiple attempts at setting the American public agenda, the American government failed in their response in denouncing the acts. In fact, too often the reports were dismissed as mere propaganda, exaggerated fables, or justified the civilian deaths as collateral damage as the expected unintentional consequences of war.

Sixty years later, Cambodia was faced with genocide where approximately 2 million Cambodians were killed between 1975 and 1979 (Sharp, 2008). How the media framed this event and shaped the public agenda is equally worth examining. Unlike the Armenian genocide in 1915, the power and influence of media would increase with the
advent of broadcast television in addition to print media and radio. With the new presence of multimedia, the agenda setting capabilities and opportunity for international exposure reduces American policy makers ability for questioning the realities of genocide occurring. What remains crucial is how the media understands, interprets, and conveys their coverage of genocide for the American public that assists in setting the agenda for promoting intervention or action.

When the Khmer Rouge overthrew the American sponsored government in Cambodia, major newspapers failed in conceptualizing how this change in government affected the local Cambodian citizens. Many newspapers reported the event with optimism promoting the takeover as the first stage of repairing peace within the region after a civil war. Others newspapers, such as the Washington Post and the New York Times, viewed the events with skepticism that the worst is yet to come for the Cambodian citizens. While covering the evacuation of foreigners, the New York Times and Washington Post ran stories expressing that the conditions of a potential genocide were established (Power, 2002). Yet, this coverage did not spark American action or response. As time progressed the print and television media coverage of Cambodia decreased which directly affected the public agenda. Because of this failure to transfer salience, the American attention and interest in the region was limited. Ultimately, without public pressure on politicians, policy makers remained disconnected, disengaged, and uninvolved in Cambodia which contributed to a prolonged genocide.

Eight years later during the Iraq-Iran War that took place from 1980-1988, the international community witnessed the Iraq government planned genocide of its Kurdish population. Employing various means of execution including the use of poisonous gas,
the Iraq government successfully murdered over 100,000 Kurds, placed millions in concentration camps, and destroyed numerous amounts of Kurdish education, religious, medical institutions between April 1987 and August 1988 (Middle East Human Rights Watch, 1995). This genocide was unique because it marked the first time a nation attacked its own citizens with chemical weapons. Because this genocide occurred in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi government blamed the killings on Iran. Despite these claims, the New York Times and the Washington Post visited Iran and witnessed firsthand the effects of the genocide and found evidence that Iraq was responsible for the atrocities (Power, 2002). As a result, the written content and the photographic images became more specific with the intent of shaping the American public agenda.

Even with these efforts the American policy makers remained noncommittal and nonresponsive. Unlike previous genocides where America maintained a strict stance of neutrality, America equipped Iraq during its war with Iran. Therefore, regardless of the US media coverage attempt at shaping the agenda, US policy makers avoided the issue of responding through classifying the events as an internal affair (Power, 2002). Even though the media coverage remained consistent throughout the event, the American government’s dismissal of the genocide and failure of galvanizing public support demonstrated the media’s limited power and influence for agenda shaping. For an event as serious as genocide, additional efforts are required for adequately shaping the agenda if prevention and awareness is possible.

These three historical examples illustrate America’s reluctance for response despite the US media’s attempt of setting the agenda reference the prevention or occurrence of genocide. Fifteen years after Cambodia and nearly 80 years after the
genocide resolution was ratified and recognized as an international crime, the US media faced another challenge in Rwanda. Leveraging upon the experiences of covering the genocides in Turkey, Cambodia, and Iraq, would allow *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* an added advantage of setting the public agenda and promoting an American response for Rwanda. Yet, history conveys otherwise.

In 100 days spanning from April 6, 1994 to July 18, 1994, Hutu tribesmen massacred 800,000 Rwandan citizens without remorse and direct opposition from the international community. During World War I, American policy officials classified the media coverage of the Armenian genocide as mere propaganda. In Cambodia, the media coverage of their genocide was dismissed as the collateral damage of a civil war. In the Iraq-Iran War the Kurdish genocide was rejected as an internal issue not requiring American involvement. What perception did the media coverage of the Rwandan genocide provide? It is not a coincidence that these historical examples demonstrate that the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were present and actively involved in each case. Considering this level of genocidal experience, what was their role in shaping the public agenda in 1994? Raphael Lemke, pioneer and human rights leader who coined the phrase genocide, and Senator William Promise were instrumental advocates in bringing international awareness for the recognition of genocide for decades (Power, 2002). However, in 1994, genocide was a recognized term and an international crime which required immediate action. News media was the new genocide advocate for informing and persuading the international community of human rights violations.

Serving as the fourth estate, the US media is not accountable to the government and functions as the political, educational, cultural, or informational linkage for the
American people (Elliott, 1986). Shaping the public agenda and promoting awareness is a key responsibility. There is no better cause for passionate and fervent action than the case of genocide. Following the evacuation of the American, Belgium, and French embassies in Rwanda, the United Nations initiated their withdrawal plan reducing troop strength to 270 personnel. Instead of assistance and intervention, the international community responded with silence, departure, and no assistance. This departure of personnel resources prolonged the genocide for another 81 days without any intervention from the international community.

This study is separated into five distinct chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which presents the research question, purpose statement, important definitions and the background. The second chapter is the literature review which includes an extensive amount of literature on the theoretical framework associated with this study, previous studies exploring media coverage of genocide and the media coverage of political action, and the chapter concludes with the specified research question for this study. The third chapter introduces the textual analysis used for conducting this study, why this particular method is chosen, and the necessary steps taken in the methods. The fourth chapter reveals the frames found from the newspaper articles. The last chapter concludes why this topic is worth researching, its contribution to the body of literature, and areas for further research. The references of all cited and reviewed literature is included at the end of this study.
CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

An applicable theory for understanding the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* media coverage of the Rwandan genocide and the American response is framing theory. This literature review will present previous studies relevant for this question and how they relate with framing theory. This chapter is divided into three significant categories. During the first category, framing as the theoretical framework is defined. In particular, this paper will examine how media framing is instrumental to setting the public agenda. Because of this critical role, exploring what genocide content is selected and how it impacts the public’s reaction and importance is worth analyzing. The second category examines the existing scholarship on media coverage of genocide. The third category examines the political action and genocide. This section explores literature addressing American responses and intervention toward conflicts and crises.

**Theoretical Framework**

Framing is the process where the messenger (news media, political leaders and military officials) frequently uses certain segments of images, data, or information from a perceived reality with the intent of influencing audience reaction in a certain manner (Entman, 1993).

A critical component of framing is the choice of words, syntax, tone, and selected content media uses when creating a story. An event viewed from two different
perspectives and selected word choice can influence audience perception of the same event in a variety of ways. Entman (1991) explored how the US media covered two similarly related military tragic events that killed several civilians differently. The first event took place in 1983 when the Soviet Air Force shot down a Korean civilian aircraft. The second event took place in 1988 when a US naval ship shot down an Iranian civilian airline. Researchers found that the coverage was different and the illustrated a level of western bias existed as well as the embedded tensions between the international community. Framing media content in this manner demonstrates the level of media persuasion and effect on audience reception of the story.

Framing is a versatile method that can employ images as a scene setter for developing critical actors in a particular event. Smith and Dionisopoulos (2008) found that the Bush Administration used frames that depicted an antagonist and protagonist in Operation Iraqi Freedom for creating public support and justification for the war. However, research indicated that even though the frames were effective, the photographic images that surfaced from the Abu Ghraib prison controversy degraded the success of the original frames. As a result the Bush Administration implemented additional frames that sought the repair of the Bush Administration. This article demonstrates that using images as frames can serve as critical aids in story creation.

Additionally, framing places significant emphasis on the selection of scenes for developing and presenting a story. Gitlin (1980) determined that the intentional composition of frames and their presentation effectively provides a socially constructed reality of what events are transpiring and its particular importance for the audience. It is for this reason that not all the media coverage of an event is necessarily conveyed for an
audience. External factors ranging from newsroom pressures, time constraints, and the perceived level of importance are significant roles in determining what media content is presented. The level of salience that transpires impacts the audience perception of these events.

Framing is pivotal at setting the political agenda. Therefore, understanding how the New York Times and the Washington Post framed the Rwanda genocide for the American political actors is important for analysis. Genocide is a word that, when used, can evoke certain emotions and memories of a dark past. Equally important are the words, stories, or graphic depictions of genocide to include the number of corpses or mutilated bodies, interviews of demoralized victims, discussion of maimed victims and barbaric weapons, or eyewitness accounts of orphaned children. Under the theoretical assumption of media framing, effective use of these themes with the intent of portraying the genocidal reality in Rwanda can influence or persuade the American policy makers for immediate response.

Often times framing a news story is accomplished with the deliberate intention of drawing upon an emotional appeal from the audience. It is expected that as a result of viewing or reading a news frame that the audience will change their attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, or behaviors toward a particular event. Shen (2004) conducted an experiment on news frames and how the interpretations affected participants’ attitudes. Previous research discounted the presence of individual frames (values, ethics, belief systems, and emotions) assuming that the influence of news frames alone affected attitudinal change. However, Shen’s findings suggest that news frames that emphasize issues that relate to individual frames will generate the most interest.
In certain instances there is a limited power of framing that exists which can potentially degrade the desired effect for audience members. The absence of American political interest, attention, personal experiences, or emotional attachment to the phenomenon of genocide limits the presence of individual frames necessary for effective salience transfer from news frames. Therefore without an individual frame that triggers some level of personal involvement, frequently exposing genocidal coverage to American policy makers will not provide the necessary response required.

Audiences who maintain a significant level of social, political, economic awareness decrease the effectiveness of news frames and increase the power of audience response. An educated audience that dismisses news frames places additional pressures on media institutions and political leaders for more relevant and insightful information. Without question reports, images, and personal accounts of genocide victims will evoke emotions from the audience. From this perspective, it is possible that America’s experience in Somalia and the ongoing conflict in Bosnia might impede or distort the audience’s collective individual frames which prevented acceptance of news frames in Rwanda.

Media Coverage of Genocide

During the course of this literature review an extensive amount of books were found that addressed the Rwandan lessons learned, questioning the lack of response, steps for prevention, or critiquing the Clinton and administrations that oversaw the genocide (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999; Barnett, 2002; Berkeley, 2001; Destexhe, 1995; Feil, 1998).
Even though there was a limited amount of scholarly writing reference the Rwanda genocide, the majority of articles found explored why the lack of intervention, why the limited media coverage, methods of prevention, or recommended policy changes, as opposed to examining how the genocide and American political actors were depicted during the genocide.

This section of the literature review will highlight previous studies and their findings on how the media covered genocides. Identifying what and how media institutions covered this phenomenon will provide policy makers, fellow researchers, and the media community valid lessons learned that will aid in the prevention of another Rwanda.

A popular criticism of the American public is the limited knowledge concerning foreign affairs and international relations. Perhaps this is a result of American isolationism, level of Eurocentric ideas, or lack of interest towards events that do not directly affect them. Because of this fact, much of America’s perceptions, thoughts, and level of importance concerning international affairs relates to the media coverage. Wanta, Golan, & Lee (2004) conducted a study examining the news coverage of foreign nations that identified not only how the American public perceives a particular foreign nation, but if their perception was negative or positive. Despite the seemingly contradictory findings regarding the extent of the media power, the overall scholarship points to the conclusion that the media influenced the public on how important foreign nations are to American interests and how the public should perceive the foreign nation. Ultimately, this study supported the claim that American involvement, perception, and interest in foreign affairs is dependent upon the media coverage.
With empirical data that supports the media’s power of influence in shaping the public agenda, the question remains what and how did the US media cover the Rwandan genocide and the responses from American officials. To successfully prevent easy dismissal or plausible deniability from state actors, media institutions cannot be intimidated from employing the term “genocide” when evidence clearly supports its occurrence.

However, studies suggest that there is reluctance with using the term genocide. Glanville (2009) examined if the word “genocide” still maintains the power of influence for promoting awareness and intervention. Glanville asserts that the Clinton administration avoided classifying the Rwandan events as a genocide because the connotation would increase American and international awareness and pressure for intervention. Glanville found that during the ten years that elapsed from the Rwandan genocide to the genocide in Darfur, the word lost its power of influence. In this case the Bush administration openly used the term and claimed that this mere classification does not require any action from the international community or increase political pressure to respond.

Glanville ultimately argues that even though the use of genocide triggered two different responses between the Clinton and Bush administration that the issue is not the word usage, but instead the American response after the word is used. His findings suggest that not properly recognizing or acknowledging a genocidal event devalues the word and releases the international community from any political and legal responsibility of prevention, intervention or prosecution. Even though Glanville’s study does not examine the role of media coverage in using genocide, this study provides further understanding and insight regarding political administration perspective of the word.
“genocide.” Considering these findings, media institutions can place additional pressures upon presidential administrations for action while educating the American public on genocide and its importance.

As studies evolved in researching media coverage of genocide, varying arguments exist at explaining and understanding the phenomenon. Some argue that the lack of media coverage towards the Rwandan genocide is directly related to the limited American importance towards the event. Eke (2008) examined five years of ABC, NBC, and CBS television news coverage of the Darfur genocide. Applying the agenda-setting theory, the researcher asserts that the limited television coverage did not adequately inform the American policy makers of the genocidal realities facing Darfurians. Eke further posits that ABC, NBC, and CBS limited coverage conveyed that the value of Darfuran lives were not newsworthy. Because of this limited television exposure and commentary, the American policy makers and the international community did not intervene or denounce the events.

Additionally, he argues that in cases of genocide the media is responsible for better exercising its power of influence in shaping the public agenda for the prevention of genocide in Darfur. Even though Eke analyzed the Darfur genocide, his findings are relevant and applicable to Rwanda because they suggest that limited media coverage of genocide directly affects the public agenda. However, what is missing from this study is how the stories were framed. Although his study finds that the coverage was limited, examining how the stories of genocide were framed and depicted is worth consideration. Limited coverage with detailed information regarding the genocide is quite different than limited coverage and no information regarding the genocide.
When one considers the limited US media coverage of international events, the American political agenda regarding Rwanda is inadvertently set. An important factor for exploration is that the limited coverage may be a result of improperly assessing the conditions in Rwanda and ignoring the signs that genocidal acts are in progress. Proper classification of this event would certainly prompt more detailed coverage. This is only successful when foreign observers know what exactly constitutes genocide.

In addition to the limited coverage and lack of importance, the manner and method of reporting the events in Rwanda are equally important. Retrospectively, if the coverage was limited but the framing of the events were emotionally appealing then possibly America would have responded in a responsible manner. Scholarly work exists that focuses on the framing of the Rwandan genocide. Livingston et al. (Schmeidl & Aldeman, 1998) conducted an empirical assessment of the ABC, CBS, NBC and CNN American television news coverage of the Rwandan genocide exploring the framing methods for the presentation of international news.

The researchers found that although the events in Rwanda received extensive coverage on American networks, the frames used conveyed a different story to Americans. The first frame, illustrated the genocide of the Tutsi and Hutu moderates. The second frame highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the genocide concerning refugees, diseases, and the hospitalization of victims which triggered the emotional appeal of the American audience. The study found that the genocide received more coverage when framed with a humanitarian focus. Therefore, the audiences’ understanding and perception of the Rwandan reality was skewed. The researchers ultimately concluded that framing the humanitarian aspect of the genocide to maintain
American interest was less complicated than explaining why the Hutu were killing the Tutsi people.

After review of the literature the findings suggest that media coverage fail in classifying the events as genocide. Instead, frames existed that dismiss Rwanda as a humanitarian issue, an African problem as opposed to a Western problem, and a common historical occurrence prevalent in Africa over the decades. As a result, the media coverage of the genocide did not adequately frame the events for promoting American political interest, attention, and elicit political responses in acknowledging the reality of genocide. Even though the humanitarian frames remained a common theme for understanding how the American public and policy makers may have perceived Rwanda, this research expects to discover that some level of genocidal frames did in fact exist.

**Political Action and Genocide**

Media coverage that is not centered on a humanitarian aspect but on the reality of genocide will attract the attention of the American public, promote the necessary political pressures, solicit the support of lobbyists, provoke the interest of human rights organizations, congressional leaders, and solicit the appropriate political action and response required from American policymakers. Examining how the media covered the political action in response towards genocide is a significant factor for this study as it provides additional insight in how American policy makers viewed the events in Rwanda and if their assessments were in line with the prescribed genocide convention guidelines.
Shaw (2007) conducted a study on how Western news media employed historical frames and its effect on humanitarian interventions in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Shaw found that Western media’s coverage provided a level of Western arrogance dismissing the crisis as an African problem versus a Western elite problem. Shaw further explains that when media coverage is centered on humanitarian intervention in Africa, the conditions are set for either non-intervention or delayed intervention. Therefore, the manner in which Western media covers Africa can impact the level of attention and response from American political actors.

Additionally, Von Hippel & Clarke (1999) examined intervention strategies of nations to understand the factors contributing to global intervention or lack thereof. The authors analyzed the US involvement in Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia as examples. The findings suggested that although there are different reactions for each crisis there were eight significant factors that contribute to the respective situation. The first factor included the span of time the conflict continued prior to US intervention which ranged from 24 months in Somalia to as long as 51 months in Bosnia. The second factor was the justification for US intervention which varied from the denial of democracy or humanitarian crisis of either famine or genocide. The third factor involved the situation prior to intervention which consisted of either a nasty dictatorship or a civil war leading to state collapse. Fourth was the electoral status of the particular nation. Fifth was the international setting which consisted of the US sphere of influence or exacerbated by end of cold war. The sixth factor was if the refugee crisis affected the west. The seventh, was if the event garnered extensive media coverage. The final factor contributing to a US intervention was the increase of sanctions.
Although a useful article that examined possible justifications for intervention, the factors are not generally applicable to explain the lack of American response towards Rwandan’s crisis. According to the eight factors the authors presented, at least four pertained to Rwanda. Rwanda was faced with a humanitarian crisis of genocide, civil war leading to state collapse, electoral status in question after assassination of their president, a severe refugee crisis, and extensive media coverage. Media coverage directed towards genocide and the role of prevention is critical in shaping the agenda and promoting acceptable response from American officials.

As mentioned earlier in this study, after the first two weeks of the genocide the international community evacuated its embassies and withdrew its forces. The UN troop strength reduced significantly where military protection was not feasible. However, some researchers disagree with this method and suggest the appropriate response for genocide is direct and lethal action. Krain (Krain, 2005) analyzed the appropriate military intervention techniques at delaying or stopping an active genocide or politicide in progress. Krain presents six hypotheses regarding the effects of genocide. The findings suggest that there are two effective military intervention techniques to slow or end the threat. The first is the employment of military force that directly engages the hostile force. The second is a military operation that aids the targeted population. Krain further asserts that incomplete intervention is not an effective means of deterrence and does not reduce genocidal affects. Krain ultimately concludes that as a result of direct military engagement with the hostile force, and the findings suggest the targeted population is safer.
Regardless of the method of response, it is evident that a response of action and not inaction is required. When policy makers delay appropriate responses for genocide prolonged delays debating intervention only increases the number of victims from genocide. Perhaps previous experiences in the region contributed to the lack of American response. Brunk (Brunk, 2008) examined how the “Somalia Syndrome” prevented US intervention in Rwanda. Brunk asserts that the humanitarian mission and ultimate US failure in Somalia were completely different than the situation facing Rwanda. However, as a result of the loss of 18 Army Rangers and the ultimate withdrawal of US troops from Somalia, the memories of that crisis contributed to the American response in Rwanda. Brunk further asserts that the failure of policy makers to examine Rwandan’s social, political, and economic circumstances independent of the Somalia experience explains the lack of US intervention. However, covering the events on ground in a comparative nature that promotes full awareness of the difference in Rwanda would assist in shaping a more realistic public agenda. Because of the fear exhibited from US policy makers, the importance of conveying media coverage that would counteract these misperceptions and fears could have been beneficial in averting the Rwandan genocide.

Since genocide is a deliberate, systematic, and methodically planned event, there is a requirement for quick and swift response without delay. Consistent throughout the literature reviewed for this study is the historical justifications of previous interventions, why the lack of American response, or how to mass military force to prevent future genocides. The extensive literature research indicates that the academic community is not only interested in understanding this phenomenon, but providing necessary steps for prevention.
This qualitative research study examines how did the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* frame the Rwandan genocide and include the American response as part of the media discourse. Specifically, this research explores the media depiction of the murders and the coverage of American political actors’ responses captured during the actual 100 day genocide which transpired between April 6, 1994 and July 18, 1994.
CHAPTER 3: Methodology

This research paper asks the primary question, how did the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* frame the Rwandan genocide and include the American response as part of the media discourse? The question of how this could have happened, who is to blame, whether this tragedy been avoided, or most importantly how the international community can hopefully prevent a reoccurrence continues after 17 years. However, this particular research study cannot answer all of these questions, but it can lead the body of knowledge to the next logical step in understanding the genocide. Seeking a complete understanding of the relevant actors and their contributions is worth exploring.

As this study examined the aforementioned primary research question the following sub questions were also examined: 1) How did the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* frame the murders of the Rwandan genocide? 2) How did the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* frame American political actors’ responses?

Research Materials

This study examined the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* coverage of the Rwandan genocide. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were selected for six reasons. First, these newspapers maintain credibility, a long standing prominence, and a prestigious national reputation. Second, each respective newspaper ranks in the top 5 of circulation size which signifies a high volume of distribution within the market.
(Associated Press, 2010). This expanded reach increases the agenda setting opportunity for the American public on a variety of domestic and foreign policy issues, opinions, and concerns. Third, the physical location of the headquarters for the newspapers increases its influence and agenda setting ability for policy makers and worldwide leaders in Washington DC and the United Nations. Fourth, the two newspapers historically demonstrated a level of experience in covering genocides in the 20th century. Finally, the elite status of the newspapers usually sets the agenda for how other media may have covered the genocide (Power, 2002).

The LexisNexis database was used to explore the New York Times and the Washington Post coverage of the Rwanda genocide. The search for newspaper articles were not limited to the daily, weekly, or Sunday only editions because analyzing if the coverage increased in detail and scope as the genocide progressed through the months is equally important. A general inquiry using the search word “Rwanda” without the date range and selected newspapers retrieved over 3,000 results. Although this mass amount of articles was encouraging, the focus of this study was centered on the New York Times and the Washington Post coverage during the timeframe of April 6, 1994 to July 18, 1994.

The database was filtered to only include newspaper articles from the New York Times and the Washington Post with the search term “Rwanda” during the specified timeframe of April 6, 1994 to July 18, 1994. This resulted in 33 New York Times articles and 27 Washington Post articles. The chosen date range was significant because these were the actual dates of the genocide. This study was only interested in the New York Times and the Washington Post media coverage while the genocide was in progress and
not the coverage of the consequences afterwards. Examining the specified date range was critical in fully understanding how and which frames were used for setting the public agenda of either action or inaction.

Considering the popularity and power of influence each paper possessed was surprising that only 60 articles were initially retrieved. Therefore, an assumption was made that expanding the search words would possibly net more results. The second LexisNexis database search included the words “Rwanda genocide” and same date range of April 6, 1994 to July 18, 1994 using the New York Times and Washington Post as the selected newspapers. The database returned 33 New York Times’ articles and 3 Washington Post articles. After a detailed analysis and comparison of the articles with the first search, there were no duplications. Therefore, the second search retrieved original sources.

A conclusion was made that the database had select trigger words for archiving the articles. Surprisingly, a small number of articles were retrieved after adding the term genocide to the search criteria. Possibly this was most likely a result of American policy makers and the international community’s avoidance of classifying the events in Rwanda as genocide. Avoidance such as this translated into the media coverage and headlines during this period. Because of this fact, a modified search criteria was employed increasing the possibilities for additional sources.

An assumption was made that journalists used the term “killings” for a description of the events in Rwanda. Therefore, the third LexisNexis database search incorporated the term “Rwanda Killings” with the same date range of April 6, 1994 to July 18, 1994.
An expectation was made that the term “killing” would provide a greater response because of its general applicability towards an international event that had debatable facts and causes, but would capture readers’ attention by illustrating a dire situation abroad. However, this was not the case as the search returned only 4 *New York Times* articles and 3 *Washington Post* articles.

A fourth LexisNexis database search incorporated the term “Rwandan murders” with the date range April 6, 1994 to July 18, 1994 which retrieved 3 *Washington Post* articles and 0 *New York Times* articles. A fifth LexisNexis database search incorporated the term “Rwandan deaths” which retrieved 3 articles from the *Washington Post* and 0 from the *New York Times*. The sixth and final LexisNexis database search incorporated the word “Rwandan massacre” which retrieved 1 article from the *Washington Post* and 0 articles from the *New York Times*. As a result of the six different searches within the LexisNexis database and screening for potential duplications, a total of 163 articles were retrieved for analysis.

After the six screenings a large sample was yielded. A pilot study was conducted for narrowing the articles into two distinct categories and removing opinion editorials and editorial articles. The first category pertained to the depiction of murders, while the second category pertained to state actor responses. This two part subsample yielded a collection of 36 articles. The *New York Times* returned a total of 21 samples, 10 articles which pertained to the first category and 11 that related to the second category. The *Washington Post* returned a total of 15 samples, 11 that pertained to the first category and 4 that related to the second category. With a focused and manageable sample size, this research conducted a textual analysis of the 36 articles focusing specifically on the
depiction of murder in Rwanda and the American state actors’ response towards the genocide. After reading the 36 articles numerous times the researcher gained clarity of the stories, identified recurring frames, and conducted a critical analysis for a detailed interpretation of the articles.

**Method: Textual Analysis**

The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* articles retrieved were subjected to a textual analysis. A textual analysis is a commonly used tool at analyzing newspaper articles and texts. Dijk (Jensen & Jankowski, 2002) asserts, “Most of our social and political knowledge and beliefs about the world derive from the dozens of news reports we read or see every day. There is probably no other discursive practice, besides everyday conversation, that is engaged in so frequently and by so many people as news in the press and on television.” Truth is found in this assertion because of the popularity of newspapers and the public’s reliance on journalist perceptions and perspectives on an event to create their own opinion. This method not only examines written text as a whole but it analyses the syntax, structure of sentences, and word choices to discover true meaning of an account. Ultimately, a researcher applying this method serves as a microscopic lens to literally read between and behind the lines to decode the meaning.

Feldstein & Acosta-Alzuru (2003) effectively used the textual analysis methodology for discovering the meanings of the newspapers accounts of the tragic bombing of the Israelite Argentinean Mutual Aid Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people as well as the depiction of the local Jewish community. Critical to the
employment of textual analysis is the ability to analyze, decode, and interpret the meaning of written text to identify the social, political, and economic undertones of a journalist.

A significant advantage of a textual analysis is the process of implication, which involves examining the use of certain words, omitting critical information and sentence structures what is a journalist implying, to whom, and how it is implied. A researcher who employs this methodology attempts to discover the overall intent of a journalist and what is often left unsaid. To properly comprehend a journalist’s implication, it is imperative that the researcher understand the bias, opinions, prejudice, socio-economic status, ethnic make-up and intent of the journalist and newspaper which will assist in understanding the implication (Jensen & Jankowski, 2002).

Another advantage of this methodology is the immersion into a topic of study for discovering the meaning of text. In the case of the Feldstein et al. (2003) article, over 400 articles were analyzed for interpreting their meaning, identifying structural usage, placement of headlines, tone, in essence undress the articles and discover the naked truth. Although an exhaustive process, the primary goal is identifying the underlying meaning.

A major disadvantage of this methodology is similar to many qualitative methods which is the researcher findings or interpretation. Regardless of the numerous articles analyzed, and historical context of injustice, and the political affiliation of the newspaper or journalist, an interpretation is subjective and falls victim to one’s own personal or political biases. Although the interpretations may be true, what is often missing in a textual analysis of this nature is illustrating the impact on the audience. Is the audience
decoding the message as intended, is the audience interpreting the data in the same manner as the researcher? These are significant questions to consider during a textual analysis.

Method Procedures

Unlike a quantitative study where a set of predetermined words or phrases are identified before conducting the data analysis, the frames in this qualitative study were not known until after a detailed analysis of the articles. Therefore, while examining the articles, the researcher explored, identified, and segregated two categories for analysis. The first category was content that addressed or depicted murder. Items that fell into this category were language describing the method of killing, disposition of bodies or corpses, intent of killing, or detailed accounts from refugees, survivors, or witnesses. The second category was content that addressed the response from American state actors. Items that pertained to this category were statements or quotes from the presidential Administration, congressmen, senators, State Department officials, or Pentagon officials. Members of humanitarian organizations, United Nations, or non-governmental organizations were not considered American state actors and therefore were not selected for this category. Articles were separated based upon frame and date of occurrence to represent the evolution of events as they transpired in 1994. The newspaper articles were the primary unit of analysis.

A pilot study of 163 articles was conducted for an initial open coding to reveal the frames within the initial two categories, murder and state actors’ responses. While
reading the articles six core categories were identified and used as the basic structure to read the rest of the articles. The initial categories were reclassified and identified the six frames. The articles were segregated and counted to effectively explore the media’s coverage of the Rwanda genocide and American response. A notepad and Microsoft Word document transcribed the textual findings for a detailed analysis.
CHAPTER 4: Data Findings

This chapter presents the findings after conducting the textual analysis of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* coverage of the Rwanda genocide. The first section provides a statistical overview describing average word count, article placement, headline, and use of sources within the articles depicting murder and state actors’ responses. The second section introduces the six frames identified regarding the coverage of the Rwandan genocide. The last part of this chapter provides a summary of the findings.

A total of 36 articles were analyzed for the purpose of this study. Of these, 15, or (41.6%) were from the *Washington Post* and 21, or (58.3%) were from the *New York Times*. The *Washington Post* had a total word count of 9,429 with an average count of 628.6, while the *New York Times* had a total word count of 16,996 with an average word count of 809. Findings suggest that 100% of the *Washington Post* articles were placed in the main section on the “A” page. The majority of the articles in the *New York Times* (86.3%) were placed in Section 1, while 9% were placed in Section 4, and 4% in Section 6. The majority of the coverage was sourced by the papers’ own reporters: 81.9% for the *New York Times* and 93.1% for the *Washington Post*.

Headlines ranged in detail and severity in their attempts at promoting attention towards the reality of murders in Rwanda. For example *New York Times* featured headlines that read, “Rwanda Killers Leave A Village of the Dead,” and, “Thousands of Rwanda Dead Wash Down to Lake Victoria.” The *Washington Post* featured ran

**Depiction of Murder and State Actors Response**

After thorough analysis, 11 Washington Post articles were found that depicted murder which ranged from 7 April 1994-29 May 1994. The smallest article found during this timeframe entitled “Two African Presidents Killed” was written on 7 April 1994. This article was located in the first section, page A1, and was written in 91 words. This limited word account towards signifies a brief story absent of specific details and overlooking the relevance of these key deaths to the region and Rwanda in particular. In contrast, the largest article entitled “Rebel Victory Called Path to Ending Rwandan Slaughter” was on 29 May 1994. This article was located in the first section, page A48 and was written at 1214 words which provided a detailed historical background and more robust coverage quoting various African scholars, UN spokesmen and, human rights activists addressing the phenomenon.

Comparatively, 10 New York Times articles depicted murders which ranged from 10 April 1994-1 July 1994. The smallest article found during this time period was the
Sunday Late Edition on 12 June 1994 entitled “June 5-10 New Atrocities in Africa: Three Bishops and 10 Priests Are Slaughtered in Rwanda as Tribal Killings Go On.”

This article was located in section 4, page 2, column 1, and was written in 198 words. Even though this article was written in less than 200 words, it effectively surmises the chain of events that led to the killing of clergy. The largest article entitled “A Killer in the Eye” written on 5 June 1994. This article was located in section 6, page 40, column 1, and was written in 3,195 words and is the most thorough article between the two papers. This particular article describes conditions in a refugee camp, consists of interviews with perpetrators and victims, provides a political assessment of Rwanda, historical analysis of the ethnic hatred between the Tutsis and Hutus, and graphically depicts the methods of killings, and the societal impact on survivors.

Overall the articles depicting murder that made the front page were fairly equal between the two papers: 30% for the New York Times and 27% for the Washington Post. On April 25th, the New York Times headline read, “Rwandan Refugees Describe Horrors After a Bloody Trek”, the May 21st headline read, “Thousands of Rwanda Dead Wash Down to Lake Victoria”, and the July 1st front page headline read, “Grisly Discovery in Rwanda Leads French to Widen Role.” On April 7th the Washington Post front page headline read, “Two African Presidents Killed”, and the April 30th headline read”250,000 Flee Rwanda for Tanzania; Ethnic Warfare May Have Killed 200,000, U.N. Says”, and the headline on May 23rd read “Rebels Take Key Parts of Rwandan City.” Seventy percent of the New York Times articles were within the “A” Section of the paper ranging between pages 1 through 12, while 100% of the Washington Post articles were within the first section ranging between pages A1-A48. Even though only 28% of the articles made
the front page between the two papers, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* recognized the conflict in Rwanda as somewhat newsworthy where majority of the articles (85%) depicting murder were in the main section of their respective newspapers. These statistical findings suggest that attempts were made at promoting awareness of Rwanda and shaping the public agenda.

While examining newspaper articles that revealed frames depicting American state actor’s response, findings suggested that four *Washington Post* articles were found which ranged from June 11, 1994-July 2, 1994. The smallest article found during this timeframe entitled “Christopher Urges Trial Over Genocide in Rwanda” was written on July 1, 1994. This article was located on the first section, page A29, and was written in 172 words which provided a brief yet detailed explanation recognizing that genocide occurred and punishing perpetrators. In contrast, the largest article entitled “Administration Sidesteps Genocide Label Rwanda” was written on June 11, 1994. This article was located in the first section, page A1 and was written at 718 words which was a thorough article addressing the challenges of classifying Rwanda as a genocide. Findings suggest that in the first few months of the genocide, the *Washington Post* devoted limited coverage regarding state actors’ responses. However, as the debate involving Rwanda became more controversial, the articles effectively depicted state actors’ responses and their challenges associated with Rwanda.

Comparatively, 11 *New York Times* articles depicted state actors response which ranged from 10 April 1994- June 27, 1994. The smallest article found during this time period entitled, “U.S. Aides Avoid Labeling Horror” was written on June 10, 1994. This was article was located in section A, page 1, column 1 and was written in 136 words
which was a brief, yet, provocative article inferring that the Clinton Administration is apprehensive in its approach regarding classifying Rwanda as a genocide. The largest article entitled “Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda” written on May 26, 1994. This article was located in section “A”, page 1, column 3, and was written in 990 words which thoroughly illustrate the international community’s failure to react and level of accountability regarding Rwanda.

Overall the articles depicting state actors responses that made the front page were 20% for the New York Times and 25% for the Washington Post. The front page headlines that were consistent between the two newspapers addressed the two critical failures involving Rwanda; the failure of response and the failure of not classifying the event as genocide. The New York Times front page headlines read, “Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda” and, “U.S. Aides Avoid Labeling Horror.” The Washington Post had only one front page headline depicting state actors response which read, “Administration Sidesteps Genocide Label in Rwanda.” These three detailed, provocative, and thorough articles effectively highlighted the controversy with aggressive headlines prompting reader interest and attention.

Each of the New York Times and Washington Post articles were within the main section of the paper. The New York Times articles ranged between pages 1 through 12, while the Washington Post articles ranged between pages A1 through A29. Collectively, 30% of the articles made the front page between the two papers which suggests that the New York Times and Washington Post recognized the most important aspect of depicting state actors response was illustrating the United States noncommittal stance for assistance and its lack of acknowledgement that genocide occurred.
Based upon the number of newspaper articles published for each particular frame, the findings suggest that not only did the New York Times publish 6 more articles than the Washington Post, but it balanced its coverage between both frames publishing 10 articles depicting murder and 11 articles depicting state actors response. However, the Washington Post reported the event the earliest and longest, beginning with coverage on April 7, 1994 and ceasing coverage on July 2, 1994. Determining word count, section, and page number were critical factors throughout analysis because it can reveal the believed newsworthiness of an event thus affecting salient transfer.

Considering the aforementioned factors, the findings revealed six distinct frames existed and were shared between the two papers. The frames depicting murder were “death and murder is an African reality,” Rwandan murders are an extraordinary reality,” and “visualized reality through graphical depiction.” Meanwhile, three frames revealed depicting American state actor’s responses which were “down-play of events,” and “recant, remorse, and apologetic.” It became apparent that the tone, intensity, detailed historical descriptions of Rwanda increased as the genocide progresses conveying a sense of urgency and specific attention towards Rwanda.

**Death and Murder is an African Reality**

The death and murder frame is evident when the President of Rwanda and the President of Burundi were assassinated upon their return from the Arusha Peace Accords in Tanzania. On April 7, 1994, the Washington Post covered this event with a brief article entitled “Two African Presidents Killed.” Albeit, the newspaper does not realize
that this assassination is the spark which ignites the genocide, thus it fails in its attempt at explaining the significance and how important the two presidents were within the region at creating the conditions for peace. The tone is dismissive, apathetic and the last sentence of the article reinforces that the assassination is a common occurrence where it states, “The two men were returning from a conference in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on ways to end the ethnic violence in Burundi” (1994). The two phrases within this sentence that is worth further examination is, “the two men” and “ways to end the ethnic violence.” The first phrase dismisses the men’s position of authority as presidents and how tragic their deaths are to the cause of peace and stability within the region. Two heads of states are murdered, yet the tone of the article conveys an image of two ordinary men returning from a routine conference. The lack of reverence towards the men as political leaders portrays their murders as routine and customary.

Further analysis of this article illustrates that the second phrase “ways to end the ethnic violence” demonstrates that an ongoing conflict exists within the region. However the article omits information regarding the background regarding the president’s role in peace talks, significance of the peace talks, and how long the discussion of peace has been a subject. Additionally, the article dismisses the importance of depicting what ethnic groups are in conflict. In addition, the article relies upon a report from an unnamed U.N official that states the deaths were “an assassination” which signifies a level of superficiality and disregard regarding the severity of what transpired. Furthermore, because this front page article fails to not include any statements from international or regional leaders expressing sympathy for a country’s loss of their political leaders reinforces this frame.
Since murder and death is depicted as an African reality, reports of high civilian deaths are easily rejected as collateral damage and attributed to a civil war or tribal conflict. During the first two weeks of the genocide, Tutsi refugees sought protection and safety in numerous locations. One place in particular was the local stadium. The Washington Post (1994) article, “Rwandan Army Shells Refugees Huddle in Stadium,” portrays a scene where 20 people were killed inside the stadium as a result of heavy artillery engagements. The article passively addresses the killings using emotionless phrases such as, “20 bodies were counted inside the stadium,” or, “at least eight more people died near the stadium when it was pounded by about 30 shells this morning,” and, “meanwhile, new corpses piled up around city streets.” The article does not address the tribal affiliation of the killed civilians as well as the impact of targeting civilians. The article does not address if these “bodies,” “corpses,” or “people” are suspected militants, aggressors, rebels, accidental civilian kills, or were civilians intentionally targeted. Not providing meaning, context, or background misleads the reader into assuming that all Rwandans are subjected to the killings. Acknowledging that a history of ethnic hatred exists within the country, yet failing to identify the ethnic background of the perpetrators or victim groups does not adequately complete the story. However, in another paragraph, the article adequately describes the events as a conflict between “government troops, drawn mostly from the majority Hutu tribe, and rebels from the Tutsi tribe who have infiltrated the city.” This article communicates a scenario where the righteous government force is defending its country from an infiltrating rebel force, thus, reinforcing an image of civil war where death is highly anticipated, expected and therefore easily dismissed.
After years of war and tribal tensions, the death and murder is an African reality frame is further supported when news reports highlight the government efficiency of collecting and disposing bodies. An article within the *New York Times* states that,

“Teams of Government workers in orange overalls, escorted by soldiers, began collecting the bodies today. They worked quickly, trying to dump the bodies into mass graves before disease could start to spread. Fifteen minutes after they began work in one area, the dead had disappeared, thrown into large trucks and driven out to mass graves on the edge of the city” (Schmidt, 1994).

The articles vivid description of a systematic and well organized clean-up process demonstrates the country’s immunity to death and murder. Therefore, limited attention is warranted to the events because it supports the status quo of African reality regarding death and murder. This paragraph also conveys a cold, unsympathetic tone using words such as “dump the bodies,” “mass graves,” “thrown into large trucks” which signifies a sense of lightly-treated life and lack of reverence for the deceased as their bodies are discarded like weekend garbage.

*New York Times* eventually refers to the events as “one more round of the tribal bloodletting that has plagued this part of Africa for centuries” (Schmidt, 1994). This statement signifies that these murders are nothing out of the ordinary and it is in line with its historical lineage. Even though the death toll rises fairly quickly within the first two weeks and reports identify tribal hatred exists, no connections were made that identified an ethnic group was the target of murders. Therefore, reports at this time did not consider classifying this event as genocide. In fact, articles rarely identified the victim group based upon their tribal distinction, but instead reported the victims in general terms as only Rwandans. The *New York Times* reports that, “The International Committee of the
Red Cross temporarily suspended relief operations today when gunmen stopped one of its trucks carrying six wounded Rwandans, pulled the Rwandans out and killed them. Earlier, Red Cross officials came across 15 bodies hacked to death in front of a religious school” (Lorch, 1994). This also illustrates how the same frames are adopted by both newspapers. The reporter’s failure at recognizing tribal affiliation of the gunmen or the victims infers that the murders were an indiscriminate act and reinforces the frame that murder and death are an African reality prompting easy dismissal.

**Rwandan Murders are an Extraordinary Reality**

The Rwandan murders are an extraordinary reality frame surfaces in articles a few weeks following the assassination of the two presidents. Since death and murder is perceived as an African reality, this frame illustrates how killing is depicted in an environment that has become extremely chaotic, uncontrollable, and dangerous where anyone has the capability of committing murder. Additionally, the writing increases in its intensity and sense of urgency. The murders become more sporadic and unpredictable while the death toll increases exponentially. Large numbers of corpses are found around the countryside in various stages from mutilation, decapitation, or late periods of decomposition. Findings suggest that these killings are different from traditional wars experienced in the past mainly because a specific group is systematically targeted for elimination. Journalistic approaches at explaining the phenomenon is underway but express difficulty in understanding the difference. Citizens, refugees, human rights
groups, and journalists realize there is a distortion to their known reality reference the murders and make frequent attempts at explaining the experiences.

As murders intensify in detail, number, and location, the articles begin referring to the killings as massacres and clearly identify perpetrators and victims. The Washington Post reports that, “it appears that the roving Hutu death squads blamed for most of the estimated 100,000 killings in the capital over the past two weeks were also at work in the countryside, as part of a systematic campaign against Tutsi tribesmen that one relief official here called “genocide” (Richburg, 1994). Of significance, this is the first time the term genocide is used to explain the atrocities. An article from the Washington Post uses a quote from a UN refugee official which describes the evidence of government sponsored genocide when it asserts that, “mainly Hutu police and militias hurled hand grenades and fired with machine guns today on a group of about 5,000 mainly Tutsi civilians who sought protection in a sports stadium in the southern town Cyangugu” (Preston, 1994).

A new line is drawn that the events as something different than the usual murders the region has witnessed in years past. With a new classification of genocide, the articles boldly identify that a known perpetuator group, Hutus, is singling out and murdering victims, Tutsis, based upon their ethnic or tribal affiliations Reports surface from The Washington Post reference “an intellectual ethnic cleansing campaign” where Tutsi social elites were identified and executed nightly (Preston, 1994). Similarly, another article graphically depicts how the new style of Rwanda murder even supersedes the respect for religious institutions. The New York Times reported, “nearly 1,200 Tutsis, more than half of them children, were massacred Wednesday at a church in Musha, 25
miles east of Kigali. It was the largest reported massacre so far in the fighting” (1994). These findings suggest that as the genocide matures and actors are known, the tone of the articles change, information becomes more detailed, and the articles display a strong sense of urgency that contribute to this frame.

In addition, the findings suggest that these Rwandan murders began depicting a level of uncontrolled violence which is perceived as unusual within the region. The Washington Post quotes a relief worker that vividly conveyed the challenges facing relief workers where it describes, “The most dreadful thing for us is the impossibility of evacuating the wounded. Once we have wounded on our ambulances, they kill them” (Richburg, 1994). The use of this quoted statement assists in developing the frame that Rwandan murders are a reality distortion towards normal African murders. Uncontrolled violence that does not even spare the wounded suggests a more serious issue in Rwanda, murder without limits. The New York Times rely on refugee accounts that confirm this reality where it describes, “the villagers and townspeople, most of them members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group, told of being hunted down like animals as they hid in fields and forests, of watching friends and relatives hacked to death and of walking wounded for more than a week without food or water” (Lorch, 1994).

Additionally, the Washington Post ran articles from April 26-29 which depicted how the Rwandan murders were an extraordinary reality because they were uncontrollable. Headlines read, “U.N. Aid Officials Say Mass Killings are Spreading in Rwanda”, “Rwandan Rebels Call Truce but Bloodshed Goes On”, “Mass Killings Continue, Rwandan Official Says”, “250,000 Flee Rwanda for Tanzania Ethnic Warfare may have killed 200,000.” Articles supporting the frame stated, “Some of these have
been the work of uncontrolled military personnel but most of them have been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order” (Preston, 1994). However, as rebels find mass graves, decaying corpses, and other evidence of atrocities, the articles convey that murders will continue to thwart the advances of rebel forces. The Washington Post states that, “members of the majority Hutu tribe feared the advancing rebels of the Tutsi tribe and had launched the widespread massacres as a way of trying to assist the army by rooting out guerrilla infiltrators and sympathizers” (Richburg, 'Mass Killings' Continue, Rwandan Officials Say, 1994). The findings suggests that as the media coverage improves over the course of the genocide, the identification of the Hutus as perpetrators and Tutsis as the victim group become more clear and that the uncontrolled violence is unprecedented shaping the frame that the Rwandan murders were a reality distortion.

Visualized Reality through Graphical Depiction

Throughout this research, the visualized reality through graphical depiction frame was the most evident. Reporters effectively used their choice of words for graphically depicting the killings which prompted the mental visualization of mutilated corpses, mass graves, presence of dead bodies on roadways, refugee accounts, pregnant women singled out and killed, and reports of bloodstained walls in churches and hospitals. It is this visual evidence that supports the idea that something larger than murder has taken place. Considering the amount of information gathered reference the murders and expressed within the reports, only three articles label the murders as genocide. These murders that
were unlike any in the past, were described in the articles in terms of a “tribal war”, “tribal bloodletting”, “slaughter”, “ethnic massacre”, “mass murders”, “ethnic violence”, and “atrocities.” Effective use of this frame highlighted the societal and potential economic impacts the murders presented within the region and world.

The large refugee crisis that ensued placed significant resource restraints on neighboring countries, Tanzania and Uganda. However, these concerns were secondary to the visual imagery the presence of dead bodies posed. The Washington Post graphically described that, “the corpses came every minute or two, sometimes alone but usually in groups of two or three, as many as 30 in an hour. All were badly bloated and disfigured, and they moved gently in the murky water until they hurtled over the falls just beneath the 300-foot-long yellow metal bridge” (Richburg, 1994). The article’s tone and descriptive words in this statement not only exemplify the quantity and frequency of bodies floating down the river, but also communicates a somber, disturbed, saddened, and even peaceful scene that triggers an emotional connection towards the murdered victims headed towards their final resting place.

Other articles highlight how the multitudes of dead bodies in the area pose a public nuisance, eyesore, and inconvenience to daily routines. An article in the New York Times entitled, “Thousands of Rwanda Dead Wash Down to Lake Victoria” describes that, “a clean-up operation by the Ugandan Government and international relief agencies has been hampered by the remoteness of the area, heavy rains and the difficulty of fighting off the wild animals and dogs feeding on the bodies. Worried about epidemics of cholera and other diseases, the Health Ministry of Uganda is telling villagers to boil drinking water and to cook all fish thoroughly” (Lorch, 1994). This article conveys that
the visualized reality of the Rwandan murders have not only directly impacted Rwanda but also has created a new hardship and lifestyle change for neighboring countries.

A New York Times article “Rwanda Killers Leave A Village of the Dead”, introduces the reader to an abandoned city called Karubamba. This article is one of the most disturbing depictions of murder as it describes the presence of bodies with the absence of souls. “Nobody lives in Karubamba anymore, not the expectant mothers whose corpses are huddled outside the maternity clinic, nor the families squeezed into the church, nor the man whose body lies rott ing in the schoolroom beneath a map of Africa” (1994). Coined a “slaughterhouse”, The New York Times effectively describes how Hutus murdered Tutsis within the town. The article reports that “the killers swarmed among the neat rows of buildings and began systematically executing the predominantly Tutsi population with machetes, spears, clubs and guns.” Using the word choice “neat rows of buildings” in the preceding sentence provided a comparative contrast of Karubamba that signifies that a time existed where the city was organized, clean, and detail specific which is not the present reality. The article effectively uses quotes from a town survivor, Agnes Kantengwa, which creates an emotional bond and enhances the visual imagery of hatred and murder. Regardless of age, sex, or medical conditions all Tutsis were considered expendable. Kantengwa is quoted as saying, “they were women waiting to have babies. The killers made them go outside and kneel down, then cut them in the head with machetes and spears” (Rwanda Killers Leave A Village of the Dead, 1994). This article successfully depicts the visual reality of murder which maintains the reader’s attention to effectively illustrate the immediate impact the murders caused on the future of a Rwandan city that has succumbed to the violence.
Strategic Neglect

Other than the three frames applied to the coverage of the murders, this research also identified three frames used to depict the American responses. Within days following the assassination of the Rwandan and Burundi presidents, evidence of large scale violence and death in Rwanda had been reported. The strategic neglect frame illustrates the United States self-imposed limitations in its options regarding Rwanda and that the Rwanda problem is not an issue of priority or national interest for the US. This frame was displayed in an April 10, New York Times (1994) article entitled “Rwanda Update.” The title infers that an update will be provided for all parties involved in Rwanda, in particular the citizens of Rwanda. However, the article pertains to the evacuation of American, French, and Belgian citizens from the country. An example of this frame is displayed when the reporter writes “In Washington, President Clinton said in his weekly radio address that ‘we’re doing all we can’ to assure the safety of Americans.” Even though the preservation of American life is a critical concern, the article omits information regarding the safety, evacuation procedures, or the status of protection for Rwandan citizens whose country is in turmoil. Using the phrase “we’re doing all we can” conveys the message the American government has exhausted all resources in its attempts of providing assistance and can depart the region without reservation and relief of responsibility.

Another example of the strategic neglect frame is portrayed in a later issue of the New York Times. This article described the United Nations Secretary General and the High Commissioner for Human Right’s efforts at investigating methods for stopping the Rwandan murders through the idea of building an “all-African peacekeeping force.” In
response to this attempt, “the Clinton Administration favored involving the new High Commissioner for Human Rights in Rwanda, arguing that the more the international community was seen to be scrutinizing developments in that country, the better the chance of stopping the killings” (Lewis, 1994). However throughout this article, the Clinton Administration, a critical member of the international community, does not make a statement denouncing or criticizing the killings, but instead transfers significant responsibility and accountability to countries within Africa. Ultimately, conveying the message that the administration desires distance from the Rwandan situation and that Rwanda is an African issue requiring African troop involvement, support, and scrutiny. In essence, the strategic neglect frame presents the idea that American involvement is a privilege that Rwanda is not afforded.

This frame is also demonstrated when the United States was slow regarding logistical support for the all-African peacekeeping force deployed which conveyed a low sense of urgency and concern. In support of the Rwandan genocide the United States provided armored personnel carriers, blankets, and humanitarian aid. However, on June 21, six weeks after New York Times reported on the new peacekeeping force, the Washington Post reported that, “The United States, by making the Rwanda crisis the first test of its new, more cautious approach to multilateral peacekeeping, stalled any momentum to raise a UN mandated force…..they negotiated for weeks to make the financially strapped world body pay $10 million for 50 U.S. armored personnel carriers that Washington had pledged to the Rwanda operation” (Preston, 1994). Instead of statements inferring the immediate need for troop intervention that will decrease further killings in Rwanda, a critical undertone within this article highlights the term “stalled”
signifying a lethargic staff process that further delayed troop movement for the protection and safety of the Rwandan civilians.

**Down-play of Events**

The down-play of events frame is evident within the *New York Times* article published on May 26. This frame illustrates the American government’s disinterest in Rwanda, lack of acknowledgment and avoidance of coining the Rwandan events as genocide. The opening paragraph highlights the Secretary General’s acceptance that genocide occurred in Rwanda and his displeasure that the international community will not commit troops for intervention. In response to this scenario, the article reports, “President Clinton listed Rwanda among the world’s many bloody conflicts where the interests at stake did not justify the use of American military power.” The reporter then proceeds to quote President Clinton at the United States Naval Academy commencement ceremony as saying, “We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces” (Lewis, 1994). The article effectively highlighted that this quote was delivered to an audience of newly commissioned Navy Officers, which have a vested interest in military deployments. In addition, acknowledging the Rwandan issue as an “outburst” downplays the severity of genocide and significantly devalues its relevance for American involvement and attention.

As the Rwandan death tolls increased and more detailed refugee accounts were reported, the Clinton administration became more vocal and adamant at down-playing the
existence of genocide. In section “A”, page 1, column 1, an article with the headline “US Aides Avoid Labeling Horror, the New York Times reported in the first sentence,

“Judging that a stark label could inflame calls for United States military action, the Clinton Administration has instructed its spokesmen not to describe the mass killings in Rwanda flatly as genocide. The State Department and National Security Council have told spokesmen to say only that “acts of genocide may have occurred” (1994).”

Clearly, the headline demonstrates that the Administration recognizes the existence of mass atrocities within Rwanda, however conscious attempts are made to avoid classifying the events anything except genocide because it will guarantees immediate action. Towards the end of the article in the last paragraph, two perspectives emerge affecting the American position. One perspective identifies that the Administration is characterized to “lack candor”, while the other perspective illustrates that Rwanda has “no oil or other resources that would make American intervention worth the cost” (1994). Although the article conveys that political tensions exists for proper classification of genocide, for such a controversial and public issue it does not provide adequate detail informing what the difference, if any, between genocide and acts of genocide. Because the article fails in this explanation, the reader is left uninformed that regarding the main relevancy of the issue. Nonetheless, the overall tone of this article suggests that the Administration has failed significantly in its assessment of Rwanda and its attempt at downplaying the reality of genocide has been revealed.

The following day, the Washington Post wrote an article that further illustrated how the Administration’s use of semantics supported the down-play of events frame. The Washington Post quoted the State Department spokeswoman as saying, “Based upon evidence we have seen from observations on the ground, we have every reason to believe
that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda…clearly not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which you might apply that label” (Lippman, 1994). Prior to this quote, the reporter provides information regarding the Hutus massacre of Tutsis and a paragraph defining genocide. Resonating within the definition is “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group” (Lippman, 1994). The reporter effectively presents the spokeswoman’s quote, background of the Tutsi victim group, and definition of genocide which enables the reader to see fallacy in the Administration’s argument that “acts of genocide” is genocide. In a later paragraph, historical background on Bosnia is provided to demonstrate a claim of hypocrisy and perhaps unequal assessment in Rwanda. The report correlates the Rwandan issue with the Bosnia conflict where the Bush Administration was criticized for employing “semantics” to avoid taking difficult or unpopular military action” (Lippman, 1994). This article successfully demonstrates the Administration’s methods and language in its deliberate attempts at down-playing the genocide.

**Recant, Remorse and Apologetic**

While the American government delayed logistical support, refused committing military power, and wasted weeks debating the difference between genocide and acts of genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) effectively secured Kigali, defeated the Rwandan military, and began establishing social order in Rwanda. As combat operations in Rwanda began to cease, more detailed facts revealing the intricacies of the genocide surfaced prompting staunch political responses demanding recognition and a
level of accountability for those responsible. During this transitional period the recant, remorse and apologetic frame was displayed in the news. Although, the capital city fell on July 4 and the genocide did not officially end until July, 18, 1994 only two articles revealed this theme within the selected ample size. Presumably, this frame is more evident in articles following the date of July 18, covering the repatriation of displaced refugees, State Department visits to the region, increase of humanitarian aid and assistance programs, and most importantly the war crimes tribunal.

Nonetheless, evidence that a recant, remorse, and apologetic frame was displayed in the June 16 edition of the New York Times. Facing pressure that the delays in logistical support and equipment hindered UN security efforts in Rwanda, the United States became more vocal, directive, and publicly active with recognizing the reality in Rwanda. The second paragraph of the article states, “The Administration has also decided to describe the deaths there as genocide, after once instructing its spokesmen to say only that “acts of genocide may have occurred” (Gordon, 1994). A week after publicly declaring that Rwanda was not genocide, this sentence highlights that the American state actors have made a pivotal change in their consistent message and acknowledgement of Rwanda. Although the recant and acknowledgement that genocide has taken place is admirable, within a week the Administration demonstrated its inexperience, hesitancy, and foreign policy failures regarding action within Rwanda. Certainly, operating within the shadows of Somalia contributes to the hesitancy, however, downplaying the reality of genocide only to confirm the existence of genocide causes more damage to the credibility and reputation of the Administration. The article quotes Secretary of State Warren Christopher as saying, “I think that is the operative term, from a legal standpoint,” he
said. “If there is any particular magic in calling it genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that” (Gordon, 1994). The reporter effectively employs this quote which demonstrates that the Secretary Christopher still possessed a dismissive attitude and reluctance in accepting the reality that genocide occurred under his watch. Furthermore, referring to the consequential action of genocide as “magic” equally supports a level of disregard.

The final example is demonstrated on July 1, a Washington Post headline read, “Christopher Urges Trial Over Genocide in Rwanda.” The headline is in stark contrast of earlier reports because it mentions a prominent state actors and the trigger word genocide. Warren Christopher is the Secretary of State, whose office was reluctant to classify Rwanda genocide and publicly denounced the word on multiple occasions. This headline signifies the shift of state actors’ perspective on the issue from cautious bystanders to aggressive participants demanding accountability and justice. The Washington Post reports Secretary Christopher as saying, “It’s clearly a tragic situation that could call for the creation of an international war crimes tribunal. It’s clear that there is genocide, acts of genocide in Rwanda, and they ought to be pursued“ (Reuter, 1994). The tone of this article suggests that Secretary Christopher had a significant change of heart and is humbled through this event and the emotional weight of what actually occurred is revealed with empathy and regret. The reporter makes effective use of this quote as it overrides and acknowledges that previous statements from the administration that “acts of genocide” did not require action were incorrect. Furthermore, the phrase “they ought to be pursued“ declares that regardless if an event demonstrates genocide or acts of genocide, semantics delay genocide prevention and intervention which in the case of Rwanda cost 800,000 lives.
Based on a textual analysis of 36 articles, this chapter finds that six frames were revealed that depicted murder and state actor’s responses. Both newspapers consistently displayed majority of their articles in their main section. This ultimately, resulted in 24% of the articles reaching the front page. Findings suggest as the genocide progressed the media coverage depicting murder increased in its tone, intensity, and graphic portrayal. Consequently, as the international debate increased regarding the proper classification of the Rwandan murders, the media coverage became more assertive and direct with bringing the issue of genocide to the front page of their papers.
Chapter 5: Discussion

Unfortunately the world is too familiar with the notion that the African continent is plagued with instability as a result of decade-long wars, tribal tensions, famine, disease, political corruption, unfavorable economic conditions, and an extremely high mortality rate. However, this perception poses a challenge when attempting to understand when these factors are independent of one another or interrelated and thus requiring international assistance. This issue is further compounded with the presence of civilian deaths during wars. How the media, state actors, or human rights organizations properly and timely delineate this difference is critical. Concluding if the deaths are collateral damage suffered through war or the intentional killing of a particular group is what constantly fuels the debate.

As demonstrated within this study, there are multiple aspects that create a long standing scholarly and political debate surrounding the Rwandan genocide. In particular an issue surrounds the immediate recognition, acknowledgement, and classification of the event as genocide. An additional issue involves the intervention techniques required after genocide is declared. Irrespective of these factors, the most challenging aspect is navigating the imaginary line that exists between the usual wartime expectations and the early stages of genocide. However, a dangerous dilemma is presented when combining Africa’s familiarity with war and the American government’s historical record regarding genocide. Certainly the fact that Rwanda occurred 6 months on the heels of Somalia and less than 3 months after the US implemented restrictive peacekeeping guidelines had a
tremendous impact on the American government’s options regarding recognition and assistance.

The New York Times and the Washington Post used six frames in depicting murder and American state actor’s response regarding Rwanda: death and murder is an African reality, Rwandan murder is an extraordinary reality, visualized murder through graphical depiction, strategic neglect, down-play of events, and recant, remorse, and apologetic. The first three frames were present in the newspaper coverage of the murder itself while the last three were applied regarding the American responses to the genocide. Both newspapers used the three frames, but in a chronological order. Initially the coverage depicting the murder was dismissive and negative in nature but improved to a more provocative tone as the genocide progressed. The early coverage indicates a level of the Western media bias, unfamiliarity regarding Africa, and limited knowledge regarding genocide. Earlier articles clearly demonstrated the naivety with the perpetrators, victims, and delicate political situation which originally characterized the rebels as the antagonists. Eventually, the media’s use of the frames depicting murder adequately conveyed that the murders were in fact genocide in attempts of garnering attention and action from political leaders and American public.

Additionally, the frames depicting the American political actor’s response were overall dismissive, inattentive, and apathetic. The New York Times and the Washington Post coverage of the Administration’s responses highlighted a level of contradiction and confusion of actions that needed to occur. It was not until after 10 weeks when the Administration recognized genocide occurred did the media coverage shift favorably. Throughout the genocide, the Administration made more attempts at avoiding Rwanda as
opposed to addressing the issue with more sincerity and compassion reinforcing these frames and the level of political apathy.

For a crisis of such magnitude and catastrophic loss, there was extremely limited coverage devoted to the genocide. However, between these six frames it is evident that the New York Times and the Washington Post made multiple attempts at shaping the public agenda regarding the reality of events in Rwanda. Since the threat of genocide continues threatening countries within Africa, it is evident that conscious efforts are required to eliminate the stereotypes and perceptions that the African continent is an image of hopelessness and despair. Ultimately, this depiction causes negligence and dismissal of serious issues confronting the continent including genocide. This study illustrates how impactful these frames are when communicating genocide in Africa.

Previous studies found that the media coverage of the Rwanda genocide lacked adequate coverage and revealed numerous frames that depicted Rwanda as a humanitarian issue, an African problem as opposed to a Western problem, or another Somalia. However, Shen (2004) suggested that news frames are ineffective if they do not trigger emotional attachments that relate to an individual frame. Additionally, there is a direct correlation between the progression of genocide and the progression of the media frames covering genocide. This study found that frames covering this genocide are episodic in nature. Basically, as more information is discovered concerning genocide, the media coverage leverages statements from bystanders, refugees, and officials, which increases the details of events and lends to a more provocative tone that is direct in nature.
Other studies suggest the limited coverage directly affected the public agenda and eventual political response, which the findings in this study support these claims. This study found that 36 articles depicted murder and state actors’ responses in a 100 day period, which averages 1 article every 3 days between two of the most prominent American newspapers. This limited coverage illustrates the need for more consistent and saturated coverage for promoting awareness and attention towards genocide. However, the findings also suggested that six frames revealed in the study were reported on the front page in both newspapers and were consistently displayed in the main section of the newspapers which are considerable factors.

Limited coverage is a significant issue when combined with inconspicuously placed articles with minimal word counts. In this study, *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* placed this event in the main sections which dictates newsworthiness and ability of shaping the public agenda. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* identified the Rwanda genocide as relevant and important news, instead policy makers consistently ignored the reports and avoided taking necessary action for a timely intervention. However, this state response is consistent with the media coverage of previous genocides that occurred within the 20th century. This signifies a larger and more troubling issue that despite adequate, detailed, and informative media coverage regarding genocide, American political actors’ lack the compassion or appear detached and defiant from the issue of genocide and intervention.

As genocide remains a threat worldwide, this study introduced the visualized reality through graphical depiction frame which illustrates how tone and descriptive phrases effectively leverage a reader’s mental imagery of events. Incorporating this
frame evokes an emotional attachment and sympathetic bond towards the victims and events as they unfold. Of additional significance, this study conveys how media coverage of genocide reveals two sets of frames which depict the murder and state actors’ responses which enhances the communities understanding of media frames in relation to events and social actors.

**Areas for further research**

Genocide is a world-wide problem requiring world-wide intervention to prevent further occurrences. Not to dismiss the responsibilities of other nations to confront this problem, exploring the international newspaper coverage and determining if the six frames were consistent is also a worthwhile topic for future studies. Since this study only focused on the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, future studies would benefit from examining if these frames exist with other prominent US newspapers. Also, examining if the presence of the visualized reality through graphical depiction frame exists within other US or international newspapers would serve an interesting subject for future studies.

Additionally, this study presented new frames depicting state actors responses. Research exploring the written correspondence between the Clinton Administration, state department, UN, and Pentagon officials, could potentially identify if these frames were prevalent throughout the administration. Perhaps exploring how these written sources communicated the genocide and American state actor’s response will add more insight for the community.
This study analyzed print newspaper and did not examine the coverage of broadcast media, or newsmagazines which maintain a greater ability for salience transfer and agenda shaping. Another area for exploration is through a mixed method approach. Conducting a content analysis of the data for empirical data would prove beneficial and a well rounded research study. Based upon the limited amount of scholarly journal articles reference the Rwandan genocide the field of further research is open. Recommend an analysis of the current role of Rwandan radio stations in enhancing the social climate between Hutu and Tutsi people in a post genocidal Rwanda. Study of the Rwandan genocide conveys that the local Rwandan radio station was instrumental in inciting hate and promoting the genocide. Now that the Rwandan society restores itself and promotes an atmosphere of solidarity, examining how the radio is employed for decreasing tribal tension. Another area of particular interest is exploring the difference of international and US broadcast media of the Rwanda genocide as it relates with agenda setting theory. Finally conducting a study which examines the American public opinion and perceptions of genocide intervention and importance of the phenomenon is also worth conducting.
Appendix 1: List of New York Times Articles Under Examination


Appendix 2: List of Washington Post Articles Under Examination


REFERENCES


