

SANCTIONING SMARTER? THE IMPACT OF SMART SANCTIONS ON DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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Professor Sean C. Nicholson-Crotty

I dedicate this work to my family.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
LIST OF TABLES	iv
ABSTRACT	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
WHY SANCTIONS ARE USED	2
THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE	3
THE SMART SANCTION EMPHASIS	4
THE RELEVANT LITTARATURE	5
CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTIONS	7
HOW SANCTIONS ARE INTENDED TO WORK.....	9
HOW SANCTIONS REALLY WORK.....	10
SMART SANCTIONS	12
SMART SANCTION TYPES	14
ARMS EMBARGOES	14
TRAVEL SANCTIONS	16
ASSET FREEZING.....	17
LUXURY GOODS EMBARGOES	19
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SMART SANCTIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS	19
DEPENDENT VARIABLES	20
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	21
CONTROL VARIABLES.....	22
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES.....	30
FINDINGS	30
CONCLUSION	34
APPENDIX	40

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Summary of variables	23
2: The effect of economic sanctions on human rights.....	24
3: The effect of broad and smart sanctions on human rights conditions.....	26
4: The effects of specific sanction types on the Physical Integrity Index.....	27
5: The effects of specific sanction types on the Political Terror Scale, State Department	28
6: The effects of specific sanction types on the Political Terror Scale, Amnesty.....	29
7: The general effects of economic sanctions on democracy.....	30
8: The effects of broad and smart sanctions on democracy.....	31
9: The effects of specific sanction types on the New Empowerment Rights Index	32
10: The effects of specific sanction types on Polity.....	33

ABSTRACT

Do so-called smart economic sanctions, aimed at a target country's political regime, cause less political repression than traditional comprehensive sanctions? That is the main research question of this thesis. By utilizing time-time series cross-sectional regressions with data from 77 sanctioned countries from 1980 to 2007, this thesis confirms the notion that economic sanctions in general, have severe negative consequences for the human rights conditions in the target countries. Smart sanctions are also found to have a negative impact on human rights conditions; however these results are not as consistent. The effects of sanctions and smart sanctions are also tested on two proxies for democracy, but the results are mostly insignificant and suggest that a methodological error has crept in.

INTRODUCTION

For centuries various forms of economic sanctions have been used as coercive policy tools by nations trying to intimidate other nations, without applying military force. However, the last two decades have seen a remarkable increase in the application of economic sanctions as a coercive mean between disputing nations. In the first 15 years after the Cold War, there have nearly been as many sanction episodes as during the first 90 years of the twentieth century (Hufbauer et al 2007). This rapid increase is also evident in the United Nations Security Council. Between 1945 and 1990, the UN employed economic sanctions only twice, but in the 1990s alone the Security Council voted for multilateral sanctions twelve times (Cortright and Lopez 2002a).

The type of sanctions that is preferred has also evolved. In the 1990s it became apparent that comprehensive trade embargo sanctions cause a major amount of suffering in the targeted populations and leads to more violations of human rights and democracy. This is especially troubling because more than 51% of the sanctions since the Cold War have been implemented with the purpose of improving democratization, political and civil liberties, and human rights (Drury ND). To avoid these paradoxical consequences, scholars and policymakers put an increased emphasis on sanctions that moved the costs away from the civilian population and on to the target nation's political elite - the so-called "smart sanctions"¹. However, the effects these specific types of sanctions have on political repression in the target countries have not been empirically tested in the same manner as the effects of economic sanctions in general have. In this paper, I try to remedy this by using cross-sectional time-series regressions to test the effects of smart sanctions on two forms of political repression: violations of human rights and

¹ In this paper I use the terms smart sanctions and targeted sanctions interchangeably.

democracy. The results show that smart sanctions also appear to have some negative effects. However, the findings for smart sanctions, are not as consistent as those for the general sanctions

WHY SANCTIONS ARE USED

Sanctions are used as a coercive policy tool primarily because they are cheaper than militarized warfare measured by material costs and fatalities for the sender (Baldwin 1985), but also because they are perceived as the coercive option with least humanitarian suffering for the target nation. Because of the latter reason, applying economic sanctions do not have the same negative influence on the reputation for a sender nation's leader - either domestically or from the international community - as the use of armed force can have. In fact, applying economic sanctions to improve democracy or stop human rights abuses have a positive influence on the reputation of the sender elites, even if they actually worsen the very conditions they are aimed at improving (Drezner 2011). Furthermore, if the sender country later is to engage in a militarized dispute, it can more credibly claim that it has exhausted all options and thus lower its audience costs.

That the surge in the use of sanctions correlates with the conclusion of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union is no coincidence, as economic sanctions are considerably easier to apply and more effective in a unipolar power environment. This is because the potential for sanction-busting countries are considerably smaller than in a bi- or multipolar power environment, where opposing major powers might see it as an opportunity to expand or open a trade relationship with the sanctioned countries or to simply upset the sender. The increased focus on sanctions from policy makers in the last 20 years has not gone unnoticed by political

scientists. Sizeable amounts of research have been produced about economic sanctions. For example, how and why they are imposed, their effectiveness, and in recent years also how sanctions have a spectrum of unintended consequences to the target nations.

THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE

As the use of comprehensive trade sanctions escalated through the 1990s, severe negative humanitarian consequences for the civilian populations of the target countries became evident. Iraq was the prime example of this, as the civil population was hit exceedingly hard after the country lost between \$175 billion and \$250 billion in oil revenue (Cortright and Lopez 2002a). This had devastating consequences: food prices increased 250-fold, causing a minimum of 100,000 excess deaths among young children². Mueller and Mueller (1999) commented, “Economic sanctions may well have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history.” and General-Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan summarized the negative experiences, “Sanctions are a blunt weapon and sometimes it tends to hurt the innocent people.” Recent research has also provided ample evidence that sanctions increase the levels of political repression by the target countries, and therefore lead to less respect for human rights and democracy.

² Garfield, Richard. 1999. Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 Through 1998. Available at

THE SMART SANCTION EMPHASIS

These severe and unintended effects combined with a general disappointment in the success rate of sanctions, were the driving force in an increased emphasis on the use of targeted economic sanctions to be agitated by several political scientists. These sanctions are designed to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime, while imposing minimal hardship on the mass public (Drezner 2008). Asset freezing aimed at the targeted regime, arms embargoes, import bans of luxury products and travel sanctions, are all examples of targeted sanctions that have been applied. Although none of these sanction types are new policy tools, an emphasis in recent years has been put on using smart sanctions over the more traditional broad sanctions such as reduction of aid, general trade sanctions or financial sanctions. Therefore, smart sanctions have become the sanction type of choice, and the United Nations has not implemented comprehensive sanctions in the past 15 years. Hawkins and Lloyd (2003) declared, “A new norm against comprehensive sanctions has become part of the shared understanding among states.” However comprehensive trade sanctions implemented earlier than the 1990s against North Korea and Cuba among others, remain in place, but with greater exceptions for humanitarian aid, food, and medicine.

With the increased use of sanctions in the last two decades, a larger amount of scholarly work on the subject has followed. However, the impact of smart sanctions on human rights and political repression has only been tested through case studies, and has not been the subject of empirical and comprehensive testing in the same way the impact of general sanctions has. With the widespread use of smart sanctions from policy makers, driven by the hope that they have less severe unintended consequences than broad sanctions, this missing piece in the literature is problematic and it would seem worthwhile and long overdue to test it. This paper does so by operationalizing and categorizing all sanctions imposed on 77 different countries in the years

from 1980 to 2007. The data is applied in time-series cross-sectional regression models on five different measures of democracy and respect for human rights.

In the following section I present a review of the most relevant literature, then a theoretical explanation of why general sanctions have severe unintended consequences, and why and how we should expect sanctions targeted at the political elite to be different. Then I present my data, research design and findings, and conclude with a short discussion of these findings and the implications they have for policy makers and future research.

THE RELEVANT LITTARATURE

A large part of the early work on sanctions has focused on their effectiveness as a coercive policy tool, and the conditions under which sanctions can achieve their intended policy objectives (Galtung 1967; Wallenstein 1968; Knorr 1975 Barber 1979; von Amerongen 1980; Baldwin 1985; Doxey 1987; Lindsay 1986; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Kirshner 1997; Drury 1998). Generally scholars find that sanctions are very limited in their ability to change the behavior of the targeted countries; both when measured in large N studies and when investigating single cases. Pape (1997) found that sanctions only gained concessions 5% of the time. Hufbauer et al (1990) were more conclusive on the impact of sanctions and established a success rate around 34%, but only 24% for sanctions implemented after 1973. However, Drezner (2003) disputes this claim that sanctions are of limited effectiveness. Using a game-theoretic approach, he argues that both large N-studies and case studies of sanctions suffer from an inherent selection bias. Because of strategic interaction, one should observe most of the failures but miss most of the successes he claims. He argues that the true value and effectiveness of economic sanctions lies in the threat

before the application of the sanction, whether this threat is implicit or stated. He maintains that if target countries won't stand firm once the sanctions are in place they might as well give the concession to the sender before they even are applied, to avoid the negative consequences of the sanctions. These cases however, do not usually reach the attention of the public or academics and thus, Drezner claims, there is a significant selection bias in the studies of sanction effectiveness. He claims that the extensive use of sanctions by states, despite a significant cost for the senders, is proof that sanctions are more effective than scholars assert. Rogers (1996) also argues that the most high-profile cases of comprehensive economic sanctioning in Iraq, Haiti and the Former Yugoslavia have been successful in obtaining the desired concessions, at least moderately. However, it should be noted that military statecraft was also used in all three cases. Drezner and Rogers seem to be in the minority with these points of view, as the majority of scholars still maintain that the effectiveness of sanctions is severely limited.

Scholars have also answered the question of under which circumstances economic sanctions are effective. Sanctions that cause severe economic damage to the target country are more likely to succeed in gaining concessions (Tsebelis 1990; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Drezner 1999). Related to this finding is the argument that sanctions are most effective when the target is economically dependent on the sender (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Drury 1998), where there is no expectation of future conflict between the target and sender countries (Drezner 1998, 2000), where the target state is a democracy (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Allen 2005), and when an international institution endorses the sanctions (Drury 1998; Drezner 2000; Bapat and Morgan 2000; Allen 2005).

Scholars have also studied the success rate of targeted sanctions. It has been argued that sanctions aimed at the political elites of the target countries are more likely to succeed. (Morgan

and Schwebach, 1997; Kirshner, 1997; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988; and Shagabuddinova and Berejikian, 2007). Others however are less positive with regards to the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. Tostenson and Bull (2002) find that the optimism regarding the effectiveness of smart sanctions appears to be largely unjustified. And in his literature review of smart sanctions, Drezner (2011) concludes that they are less promising in coercing the target government into making a concession. Similar conclusions are reached by Lopez and Cortright (2002b) after reviewing the United Nations sanctions implemented in the 1990s.

CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTIONS

A wide array of inadvertent consequences of sanctions has been tested by political scientists, and therefore considerable amounts of research have been added to the literature in recent years. Because target regimes transfer a disproportionate amount of the suffering to the citizens, the immediate costs from economic sanctions are damaging to the public health, the development of civil society, and education in target countries (Galtung 1967; Weiss et al, 1997; Weis, 1999; Cortright, Millar and Lopez 2001; Lopez and Cortright 1997; Cortright and Lopez 1995). In a quantitative analysis, using the child mortality rate as a measure of public health, Peksen (2011) finds that when sanctions are costly on the target economy, the public health suffers significantly, regardless of the general economic wealth of the target countries.

There is also significant evidence that sanctions cause increased levels of political repression in the target countries. In a case study of the Iraq sanctions imposed by the United States, Lopez and Cortright (1997) argue that the Iraqi civilians not only endured atrocious humanitarian conditions, but also suffered from increased levels of human rights abuse. Li and

Drury (2004) discover similar results that conclude the threat of economic sanctions were counterproductive in improving human rights conditions in China following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. They argue that this engagement with China would have been a more productive strategy for bettering the human rights conditions. In a quantitative test of the effects of sanctions on human rights, Drury and Park (2004) find that the implementation of economic sanctions increases the risk of militarized interstate disputes, and that such disputes following economic coercion attempts, tend to be more severe as the actors have built up a hostile relationship. Adding to this research, Venteicher (2009) confirms their findings, and establishes that the more the sender values the issue under dispute, the more likely the dispute is to escalate to violence. These two findings are relevant to the study of sanctions and political repression, since Poe and Tate (1994), and Poe et al. (1999) show that militarized interstate disputes are likely to cause significant human rights abuses and violations of democratic principles among the disputing countries. Peksen (2009) finds that economic coercion decreases government respect for physical integrity rights; a measure of freedom from disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment. He also discovers that extensive³ sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial sanctions, even when they are specifically imposed with the goals of improving human rights. Peksen and Drury (2009) find that sanctions worsen the level of the government respect for democratic freedoms and human rights in the target country, even when aimed at promoting political liberalization and respect for human rights. Peksen and Drury (2010, ND) find that sanctions decrease the level of democratic freedoms. Therefore, sanctions applied to promote democracy, cause the target countries to become less democratic.

³ Peksen's definitions of extended and limited refer to the degree of economic impact the sanctions have. Not whether they are aimed broadly at the civilian population or aimed at the political elites.

Allen (2004) discovers that sanctions cause more political violence while Marinov (2005) shows that sanctions destabilize political leaders.

HOW SANCTIONS ARE INTENDED TO WORK

Why do traditional sanctions lead to these unintended consequences? A traditional line of reasoning regarding sanctions is the ‘naive theory of economic sanctions’. In this, the sender state or sender coalition applies economic coercion at the outset of a confrontation against the target country, with the expectation that the sanctions will lead to economic hardship among the civilian population. This economic hardship will harm the legitimacy and the capacity of the political leadership and create pressure from the general public and opposition groups on the government to either give in to the sanction sender’s demands, or step down so a new government with a different policy can take over (Mack and Khan 2000). Allen (2004) also argues that the suffering and frustration caused by the sanctions makes the target state’s population more likely to commit political violence against the regime. Drury and Peksen (2010) point out, that this naïve theory asserts that the economic coercion will encourage opposition groups to be more active in challenging the targeted leadership, knowing they have support from the sender state.

Additionally, the economic effects of the sanctions decrease the target regime’s wealth and therefore shrink the funds the regime can pay to supporters for their loyalty, according to the ‘naïve’ theory. Sanctions also result in fewer resources for the police and military which is crucial when repressing the population. (Galtung 1967; Wintrobe 1990; Kirshner, 1997; Davenport 1995; Blanton 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Peksen and Drury 2010).

Subsequently, once targeted regimes feel the impact of economic pressure from outside states or alliances, they should give in to the foreign demands for political reform. According to this ‘naïve’ theory of economic sanctions, this is done in order to curtail the suffering for the civilian population.

HOW SANCTIONS REALLY WORK

The outline in the previous section of how sanctions are supposed to work, is somewhat removed from reality, and this traditional ‘naïve’ view of sanctions is problematic for a number of reasons. As discussed earlier, economic sanctions are of limited effectiveness in causing concessions by the target state. As a result, the processes described in the ‘naïve’ theory, does not actually happen. If they did, sanctions would be considerably more effective as a coercive policy tool. Traditional broad economic coercion rarely harms the target regime or their coercive capacity. Instead, the sanctions cause severe humanitarian and political consequences for the civilians. The political elite is usually successful in transferring the hardship to the civilian population while mostly remaining insulated from the coercion themselves. Examples of this are seen in the sanctions applied against Cuba, Rhodesia, and Iraq. (Weiss et al. 1997; Gibbons 1999; Weiss 1999; Andreas 2005; Rowe, 2000). In fact, sanctions even increase the target regime’s repressive power and even create incentives for the regime to restrict the democratic freedoms and civil liberties of the citizens so they can stay in power. This is because economic disruptions caused by the sanctions can be used as a strategic tool to manipulate access to and redistribute resources made scarce by the sanctions. If the leadership can control who suffers the hardest from sanctions, they can weaken opposition groups. Moreover, when broad sanctions hit

the civilian population, but have limited or no impact on the regime's economy, the regime becomes relatively more resourceful. Because of this enlarged gap in resources, supporters of the regime, including the military and police, become more dependent of the leadership, which in turn increases their repressive capabilities. Furthermore, a sanctioned country's political opposition groups might be encouraged that causing a regime change is a real possibility following the implementation of sanctions. Therefore, the sanctioned regime has an incentive to send a strong message to the opposition groups through repression, discouraging them from protesting or rising against the political leadership. Allen (2004) also finds that sanctions increase the likelihood of political violence against the leadership, which in turn can provoke the use of repressive means by governments.

Sanctions from other states are also often depicted as an external threat against the sovereignty of the targeted country. Therefore political elites legitimize their use of repression against anti-regime groups, claiming they are just maintaining domestic cohesion. (Galtung 1967, Myagawa, 1992, Peksen 2009). An example of this is the sanctions against Cuba, which Castro portrayed as an imperialistic attack on the integrity and independence of the Cuban people, making it easier for him to justify the oppression of his opponents. Comprehensive sanctions also isolate target countries from global economic and political influences, which otherwise could play a vital part in promoting the respect, protection and advancement of human rights and democracy (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Meyer 1996; Goldstone et al 2000; Apodaca 2001; Richards et al 2001). Finally, the majority of sanctions are aimed at authoritarian regimes, where acquiescing to the sender demands would mean they would have to end their tenure in office. Therefore they will choose to stand firm regardless of the consequences.

On the background of this discussion, I find evidence that economic sanctions in general significantly increase the risk of further political repression in the target countries. I therefore hypothesize:

H₁: Economic sanctions increase the level of human rights violations in the target country.

And

H₂: Economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy in the target country.

SMART SANCTIONS

As previously mentioned, smart sanctions aimed at the sanctioned country's regime, have progressively replaced the traditional sanctions to avoid unintended consequences similar to those described. However, the impact of smart sanctions has not been thoroughly and empirically tested. In their study of the impact of sanctions on democracy in the target countries, Drury and Peksen (2010) find that comprehensive sanctions have a greater negative impact than limited sanctions. Wood (2008) also discovers that comprehensive sanctions were likely to increase repression in authoritarian countries. However, their definitions of limited and comprehensive sanctions account for the severity of the coercion, not whether the sanctions are targeted against the regime or the broad population.

By employing smart sanctions instead of comprehensive sanctions, the sender states eliminate both opportunities and incentives for the target nation to repress the population. Since the smart sanctions are aimed at the regime, and not the population, the regime does not have the

same opportunities of manipulating access to resources to create a further enlarged gap in wealth that would have made supporters more dependent of the leadership. Therefore, their repressive capabilities are not increased in the same manner they could be under comprehensive sanctions.

Unlike traditional comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions are not designed to entice the population, but to put pressure on the elite of the regime. Also, there is no evidence that targeted sanctions leads to increased levels of political violence. Therefore the regime leadership has less incentive to repress their political opposition as a precaution. Finally, targeted sanctions are perceived as a less severe policy tool. Therefore leaders can't pronounce the sanctions as an external threat against the country's independence and that way legitimize repression of the opposition in the same way they can when comprehensive sanctions are applied against nations.

However, anecdotal evidence shows that regime elites that are targeted by sanctions often manage to transfer some of the sanction cost over to the population. Therefore, I still expect smart sanctions to have some effect on the levels of political repression. I hypothesize that

H₃: Targeted sanctions have less severe consequences for human rights in the target countries, than broad sanctions have.

And

H₄: Targeted sanctions have less severe consequences for democracy in the target countries than broad sanctions have.

SMART SANCTION TYPES

Smart sanctions can be operationalized into a number of subcategories: arms embargoes, luxury goods embargoes, asset freezing and travel sanctions. These are some of the most prominent types of smart sanctions. Likewise, comprehensive sanctions can also be divided in a number of categories such as: reduction of aid, financial sanctions and trade sanctions. Financial sanctions include vetoing loans or financial agreements concerning the target country in international organizations and suspension or denial of loans from the World Bank or sender countries. Trade sanctions can furthermore be divided into a series of subcategories: general trade embargoes either from main trading partners or non-main trading partners, embargoes on specific technologies, bans on energy import or export, bans on diamond exports, denial of export credits, increased tariffs, and increased prices or reduced supply of energy delivered from the sender to the target country. In the following section I describe a couple of the most often applied smart sanctions.

ARMS EMBARGOES

Arms embargoes are one of the most employed types of smart sanctions and are often implemented in civil wars or where the target regime is violently repressing the opposing party and civilians with the hope that a ban on the import on arms will weaken the government's repressive power (Cortright and Lopez 2002a). However, there is evidence pointing towards arms embargoes not being as effective as desired and also having unintended consequences. In a study of arms embargoes employed in civil wars, Tierney (2005) finds, "Much of the impact of UN arms embargoes in civil wars can be summarized as irrelevance or malevolence." Fruchart et

al (2007) reached a similar conclusion. On the other hand Brzoska (2008), has a considerably more positive outlook on arms embargoes. Using a series of case studies as examples, with the 1993-2003 arms embargo of Angola being the most prominent, he argues that arms embargoes can actually decrease the level of violence and human rights abuses. He also found that arms embargoes have only been successful in altering the behavior of target countries less than 8% of the time, which should make policy makers question the use of arm embargoes.

The paramount problem of arms embargoes is enforcing them. In almost all instances where arms embargoes have been enforced, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that sanction-busting has taken place (Drezner 2011). Illicit arms pipelines have been created and in many instances it is questionable whether the total import of arms has been reduced by the sanctions (Bondi in Lopez and Cortright, 2002a). Even when embargoes are enforced, there are some inherent problems, which Demrosch and Tierney (2005) point out. Since effective arms embargoes, per definition, put a status quo on the weapon capacities⁴, they reward the actor with the superior weapon capacity before the sanctions – usually the targeted government - and thus increase their repressive capabilities. Sender country satisfaction with arms embargoes has increased over time. This might explain why we have seen an increase in the use of arms embargoes - the political virtues of smart sanctions trump the policy virtues as Drezner (2011) concluded.

H₅: Arms embargoes increase the level of human rights violations in the target country.

And

H₆: Arms embargoes worsen the level of democracy in the target country.

⁴ I'm assuming that no countries that are the target of arms embargoes are producing weapons themselves. If they did, it wouldn't make sense to enforce an embargo as a coercive tool in the first place.

TRAVEL SANCTIONS

Another frequently applied type of sanction is travel sanctions, They have been used as part of the sanctions against Libya, Angola, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Liberia, but the effect of travel sanctions as a coercive tool seems to be limited, so far. Travel sanctions can include restrictions on certain individuals through visa bans, sanctions on designated airlines, or restrictions on an entire country or region from traveling to certain other countries (Cortright and Lopez 2002a). In this study I differentiate between general travel sanctions aimed at a whole region or country, and targeted travel sanctions aimed at the regime elites and their associates. Targeted travel sanctions are perhaps the type of smart sanction that most accurately hits the target regime's elite. It is relatively straight forward to put a travel ban on certain individuals, and it is considerably harder to transfer the cost of targeted travel sanctions to the target country's population. However it is possible for targeted individuals to circumvent the sanctions with false passports and visas. It has been argued that general travel bans can lower state revenues if government owned airlines for example are grounded, which hurts the target country's economy (Cortright and Lopez, 2002a). But this loss of income is relatively insignificant compared to that of comprehensive trade sanctions. General travel sanctions naturally also affect the civilian population if the whole country is restricted from traveling to certain places or countries. However, since the regime elites are expected to travel more, they also suffer a relatively greater amount of the costs of these general travel sanctions. There have also been some concerns expressed about a potential negative humanitarian impact from general travel sanctions, especially for poor nations dependent on help from other countries. In 1997, a humanitarian report warned of potentially harmful social consequences from a proposed travel

ban in Sudan because it would stop aid from getting in to the country⁵. However, this concern is a moot point today, as it is hard to imagine general travel bans being imposed these days without exemptions for humanitarian aid flights. The democratic and human rights consequences from targeted travel sanctions appear to be minimal, and therefore I hypothesize:

H₇: Targeted travel sanctions do not increase the level of human rights violations in the target country.

And

H₈: Targeted travel sanctions do not have a negative effect on democracy in the target country.

ASSET FREEZING

In recent years, one of the most popular forms of smart sanctions has been asset freezing. By freezing assets belonging to the target state's political elites, the sender hopes to put pressure on the target leadership without hurting the civilian population. Asset freezing have been included in most of the major multilateral sanction-efforts implemented by the United Nations in the 1990s, including against Libya, former Yugoslavia and Haiti. The most prominent case of asset freezing from that time might be the asset freezes imposed on Iraq in the 1990s. The UN attempted to freeze assets held by the Baghdad government, but the sanctions were only partly successful. A big reason for this was the freeze only applied to Iraqi government holdings, and

⁵ United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Note from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs Concerning the Possible Humanitarian Impact of the International Flight Ban Decided in Security Council Resolution 1070 (1996), New York, 20 February 1997.

not those controlled by individuals or nonstate actors. The personal assets of Saddam Hussein and his family were therefore not seized. The sanction resulted in the seizure of approximately \$4 to \$5 billion, but Graham-Brown (1997) estimates that \$10 to \$30 billion remained unfrozen, meaning the sanctions did little to coerce Saddam Hussein.

As the Iraq example shows, there are significant challenges to overcome when enforcing asset freezes. First and foremost the sender must locate the assets it wants to freeze, which can be extremely difficult, especially if the target country expects an asset freeze and therefore prepares for it by hiding the most valuable assets. This also makes it challenging for the sender to use asset freezing in multilateral sanctions. If word gets out that an asset freeze might be a possibility or under consideration in negotiations between sender countries, then the target country will quickly try and hide its assets. The most relevant challenge in the context of this paper however, is to freeze the right assets so it only is the target leadership, and not the population that is affected. Correctly executed asset freezing should not affect the target population. However in reality it is almost impossible to enforce an asset freeze that only affects the elite part of a regime without them being able to manipulate some of the costs to the population. I differentiate between targeted asset freezes and general asset freezes, and hypothesize:

H₉: Targeted asset freezes do not increase the level of human rights violations in the target country.

And

H₁₀: Targeted asset freezes do not have a negative effect on democracy in the target country.

LUXURY GOODS EMBARGOES

Luxury goods embargoes specifically target the regime leadership and the wealthiest supporters in the target country. By putting an embargo on certain luxury products for the leaders, the target countries have a coercive tool that won't hurt the civilian population⁶. Luxury goods embargoes also stand out by being a sanction type where the cost cannot be transferred to the target population. The weakness of this sanction type is that it is relatively easy to break this embargo, and even if the senders manage to avoid sanction-busting, the impact on the targeted elite is expected to be so minimal that no concessions can be expected to be given. For these reasons, luxury goods embargoes are rarely used as a policy tool, and I therefore can't test the effects empirically.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SMART SANCTIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

To empirically examine the hypotheses predicting the impact of sanctions and smart sanctions on political repression, time-series cross-sectional regressions delineated by countries and years, respectively, are applied. Included in the data are all countries that had sanctions registered between 1980 and 2007 in the third edition of the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset. However, sanction threats that were never realized have been excluded from the data, as the threats are assumed to have a minimal impact on the targeted countries. Countries that weren't sanctioned in the covered time period have not been included to avoid potential dangers

⁶ If we assume the population wasn't able to buy these products under normal circumstances. And if they were it is only a loss a luxury, not a severe threat to their humanitarian conditions.

of selection bias. Overall, the sample size includes 77 countries from 1980 to 2007. The sanction types are not mutually exclusive and in many of the cases both targeted and broad sanctions were applied.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The impact of sanctions on human rights is tested on three different indexes. The first is the *Physical Integrity Rights Index* from Cingranelli and Richards's (CIRI) (2004) human rights dataset. It is a nine-point scale composed from four variables covering different aspects of human rights abuses. These include: extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment and torture. The index ranges from 0 (most violations of physical integrity rights) to 8 (no violations of physical integrity rights). For robustness, the impact of sanctions on human rights is also tested on two different versions of Gibney and Wood's Political Terror Scale from the Polity IV dataset. The *State Department Political Terror Scale* and the *Amnesty International Political Terror Scale*. Both measures cover the magnitude and severity of integrity rights abuses, including disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, and executions. The two index variables are based on data from the United States State Department and Amnesty International. In the Polity IV dataset, they both range from 1 (no violations) to 5 (most violations), however for an easier comparative interpretation of the regression tables they have been recoded so 1 denotes most violations and 5 denotes no violations.

To test the effect targeted sanctions have on democratic rights and civil liberties this study refers to a *Polity* variable from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2011). The variable is composed by subtracting the country's autocracy score from the democracy score, and

ranges from -10 (lowest levels of democracy and highest level of autocracy) to 10 (highest levels of democracy and lowest level of autocracy). For robustness, I also test the impact of smart sanctions on democracy with the *Empowerment Rights Index* from Cingranelli and Richards's human rights dataset. This index is additive and composed from five sub variables: worker's rights, political participation, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of movement. The index ranges from 0 (most violations of democratic rights and civil liberties) to 15 (no violations of democratic rights and civil liberties).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The main independent variables of the study are coded based on the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset (2008). All sanction variables are binary and takes the value of 1 if the sanction type was implemented for a duration of more than two months that year, and 0 if the sanction or sanction type wasn't in place.⁷

Sanction denotes whether any sanction was applied on the country in that given year. *Targeted travel sanction* represents travel sanctions aimed against the regime elite. *Arms embargoes* denotes whether an arms embargo was implemented on the targeted country, but does not include bans on high tech military equipment solely for the purpose of interstate wars, or bans on nuclear technology. *Targeted asset freeze* denotes whether an asset of the target country's political elite are frozen in a given year. *Smart sanction* is coded as 1 if a targeted travel sanction, targeted asset freeze, or arms embargo is implemented that year, and 0 otherwise.

⁷ A list of how every sanction has been categorized is in the appendix.

Reduction of aid signifies a reduction in either developmental or humanitarian aid. *Comprehensive trade embargo* denotes a broad and comprehensive embargo from one or more of the target nation's main trading partners. *Energy export* represents an export ban on oil, gas, or coal. *Energy import* signifies an import ban on oil, gas, or coal. *Trade sanction* stands for any kind of trade embargoes, including increases of tariffs and denial of export credits. *Financial sanction* denotes denial or suspension of bilateral loans, vetoing of loans or grants to the target country in international organizations by the sender country, and sanctions from the World bank. *Broad sanction* is coded as a 1 if a *trade sanction*, *financial sanction*, or *reduction of aid* is in place that year, otherwise it is a 0.

CONTROL VARIABLES

To control for the effect of developmental differences between the countries, *GDP per capita (log)* denotes the natural log of Gross Domestic Product per capita (in 2000 constant US dollars), and *GDP Growth* denotes the annual change in GDP in percentage. Poor countries are expected to experience more political instability, violence and repression (see Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1991, Poe and Tate 1994, Poe et al 1999, Zanger 2000, Keith 2002). The data for *GDP per capita (log)* and *GDP Growth* is taken from the World Bank. *Civil war* is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a civil war occurred in the country that given year and 0 otherwise. *Interstate war* likewise takes the value of 1 if an interstate war occurred that given year and 0 otherwise. These two war variables are included because research shows that the presence of either has severe negative effects on the respect for democracy and human rights. Governments tend to be more repressive when faced with a threat, either domestically or from other countries (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Davenport 1995b, 1999, Poe and Tate

1994, Zanger, 2000). Both the civil war and interstate war variables are taken from the Polity IV dataset. A *past practice* variable is also included in each model. It is a one-year lag of the dependent variable to control for autocorrelation issues that can arise when working with cross-sectional time-series data (Beck and Katz 1995). Additionally, lagging the dependent variable controls for the assumption that the previous year's practices are a most significant predictor of respect for human rights and democracy. To minimize the simultaneity bias, a one-year lag is applied on all the independent variables.

Table 1: Summary of variables:

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Physical Integrity Index	1801	3.77	2.27	0	8
Political Terror Scale, State Depth.	2157	3.03	1.11	1	5
Political Terror Scale, Amnesty	2066	2.84	1.04	1	5
New Empowerment Rights Index	1809	6.72	4.12	0	14
Polity	2192	-0.51	6.87	-10	10
Sanction (all)	2508	0.35	0.48	0	1
Broad sanction	2508	0.45	0.82	0	3
Smart sanction	2508	0.13	0.34	0	1
Targeted travel sanction	2508	0.04	0.21	0	1
Targeted asset freeze	2508	0.03	0.17	0	1
Arms embargo	2508	0.09	0.29	0	1
Reduction of aid	2508	0.17	0.38	0	1
General embargo	2508	0.07	0.26	0	1
Energy export ban	2508	0.02	0.13	0	1
Energy import ban	2508	0.02	0.13	0	1
Financial Sanction	2508	0.13	0.33	0	1
GDP Growth	2102	3.59	7.62	-51.03	106.28
GDP per capita (log)	2073	6.92	1.21	4.06	10.07
Interstate war	2234	1.04	0.18	1	2
Civil war	2234	1.11	0.31	1	2

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Because all the dependent variables utilized in the analysis are ordinal variables with scales of at least five points, all the regression models are reported using ordinary time-series cross-sectional regressions with fixed effects (Long 1997). Since different sanction types have been applied at the same time in countries. Correlation between the sanction types is also tested for, but no correlation above .65 was found.

FINDINGS

Table 2 reports the effect sanctions in general have on human rights conditions. The main independent variable *Sanction (all)* has a significant negative impact on human rights conditions in all three models. This suggests that economic sanctions in general lead to higher levels of human rights abuses in the target country, if everything else is equal. This supports my first hypothesis and is in line with the previous literature.

Table 2: The effect of economic sanctions on human rights

	<i>Physical Integrity Index</i>	<i>Political Terror Scale, State Depth.</i>	<i>Political Terror Scale, Amnesty</i>
Sanction (all)	-0.221* (0.088)	-0.138*** (0.038)	-0.232*** (0.042)
GDP growth (annual %)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.479** (0.158)	-0.091 (0.057)	-0.137* (0.062)
Civil war	-0.909*** (0.162)	-0.377*** (0.066)	-0.608*** (0.073)
Interstate war	0.062 (0.271)	-0.049 (0.118)	-0.039 (0.128)
Past practice	0.521*** (0.022)	0.623*** (0.019)	0.476*** (0.022)
Observations	1494	1748	1628
R^2	0.360	0.486	0.359

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3 reports the findings from the models testing the effect of all broad and smart sanctions on the three proxies of human rights conditions. The results reveal that *broad sanctions* have a significant negative effect on human rights conditions when measured against the *Physical Integrity Index* and the *Political Terror Scale* based on Amnesty International's data. *Broad sanctions* also have a negative coefficient and are significant at the .10 level for the Political Terror Scale based on the State Department's data. However this negative coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The impact of *smart sanctions*, which denotes all targeted travel sanctions, targeted asset freezes, and arms embargoes, is statistically significant and negative measured in both of the Political Terror Scales. The coefficients are stronger than for *broad sanctions* which is somewhat surprising, however this difference is not statistically significant at the .05 level, so we can't conclude anything about hypothesis 3, which says that targeted sanctions have less severe consequences for human rights conditions than broad sanctions have. *Smart sanctions* is also significant at the .10 level when predicting the Physical Integrity Index, but this coefficient is not statistically different from 0.

Table 3: The effect of broad and smart sanctions on human rights conditions

	<i>Physical Integrity Index</i>	<i>Political Terror Scale, State Depth.</i>	<i>Political Terror Scale, Amnesty</i>
Broad sanctions	-0.112* (0.057)	-0.046^ (0.024)	-0.089*** (0.027)
Smart sanctions	-0.262^ (0.140)	-0.210*** (0.063)	-0.211** (0.068)
GDP growth	-0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.483** (0.156)	-0.103 (0.057)	-0.134* (0.062)
Civil war	-0.922*** (0.162)	-0.390*** (0.066)	-0.620*** (0.074)
Interstate war	0.036 (0.271)	-0.065 (0.118)	-0.060 (0.128)
Past practice	0.514*** (0.023)	0.613*** (0.019)	0.474*** (0.022)
Observations	1494	1748	1628
R^2	0.361	0.488	0.359

Standard errors in parentheses

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4,5 and 6 reports the findings from the models testing the effect of some of the most commonly used specific types of sanctions. *Comprehensive trade embargo* is found to only have a significant negative effect in one of the three models. *Reduction of aid* has a significant negative effect measured on the two Political Terror Scales. The coefficient is also negative when predicting the *Physical Integrity Rights Index*, but only at the .10 level and not significantly different from 0. *Targeted asset freeze*, is only found to be significant at the .10 level in one model, and not significant in the two others. *Targeted travel sanctions*, is not significant predicting the *Physical Integrity Rights Index*, but is significant with a negative coefficient when predicting the two Political Terror Scales, disproving hypothesis 7, which says that targeted travel sanctions doesn't not increase the level of human rights violations in a country. *Arms embargoes* are also significant and negative in the two Political Terror Scales, as

well as being significant at the .10 level when predicting the *Physical Integrity Rights Index*, which provides support for hypothesis 5, that states arms embargoes increase the level of human rights violations in the target country.

In all the models predicting human rights conditions, *GDP per capita (log)* and *past practice* are significant predictors of the dependent variable and with the coefficients having the expected directions. *GDP growth*, does not seem to be a strong predictor of human rights conditions, though.

Table 4: The effects of specific sanction types on the *Physical Integrity Index*

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
Comprehensive trade embargo	-0.574* (0.228)				
Reduction of Aid		-0.202^ (0.103)			
Targeted Asset Freeze			-0.125 (0.260)		
Targeted Travel Sanctions				-0.135 (0.180)	
Arms embargo					-0.321^ (0.174)
GDP growth	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.402** (0.152)	-0.404** (0.153)	-0.382* (0.153)	-0.395* (0.155)	-0.428** (0.155)
Civil war	-0.873*** (0.161)	-0.905*** (0.162)	-0.880*** (0.162)	-0.881*** (0.162)	-0.911*** (0.163)
Interstate war	0.031 (0.272)	0.080 (0.271)	0.098 (0.271)	0.095 (0.271)	0.079 (0.271)
Past practice	0.526*** (0.022)	0.524*** (0.022)	0.532*** (0.022)	0.530*** (0.022)	0.524*** (0.022)
Observations	1494	1494	1494	1494	1494
R ²	0.359	0.358	0.357	0.357	0.358

Standard errors in parentheses
 ^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: The effects of specific sanction types on the Political Terror Scale, State Department

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
Comprehensive trade embargo	(0.096)				
Reduction of Aid		-0.142** (0.044)			
Targeted Asset Freeze			-0.192^ (0.105)		
Targeted Travel Sanctions				-0.227** (0.078)	
Arms embargo					-0.183* (0.077)
GDP growth	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.043 (0.056)	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.054 (0.056)	-0.071 (0.056)	-0.070 (0.057)
Civil war	-0.353*** (0.066)	-0.376*** (0.066)	-0.363*** (0.066)	-0.364*** (0.066)	-0.375*** (0.067)
Interstate war	-0.028 (0.118)	-0.036 (0.118)	-0.027 (0.118)	-0.033 (0.118)	-0.040 (0.118)
Past practice	0.643*** (0.018)	0.628*** (0.019)	0.638*** (0.018)	0.632*** (0.019)	0.631*** (0.019)
Observations	1748	1748	1748	1748	1748
R^2	0.482	0.485	0.483	0.484	0.483

Standard errors in parentheses

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: The effects of specific sanction types on the Political Terror Scale, Amnesty

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
Comprehensive trade embargo	-0.118 (0.105)				
Reduction of Aid		-0.252*** (0.048)			
Targeted Asset Freeze			-0.055 (0.116)		
Targeted Travel Sanctions				-0.184* (0.086)	
Arms embargo					-0.252** (0.084)
GDP growth	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.071 (0.062)	-0.094 (0.061)	-0.066 (0.062)	-0.085 (0.062)	-0.098 (0.062)
Civil war	-0.574*** (0.074)	-0.616*** (0.074)	-0.583*** (0.074)	-0.588*** (0.074)	-0.608*** (0.074)
Interstate war	-0.017 (0.129)	-0.017 (0.128)	-0.012 (0.129)	-0.015 (0.129)	-0.032 (0.129)
Past practice	0.504*** (0.022)	0.480*** (0.022)	0.504*** (0.022)	0.497*** (0.022)	0.493*** (0.022)
Observations	1628	1628	1628	1628	1628
R ²	0.347	0.358	0.347	0.349	0.350

Standard errors in parentheses

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7 reports the findings from the models testing the effect of all economic sanctions of the two proxies of democracy. *Sanction (all)* is not a statistically significant predictor of democracy, when measured against the *New Empowerment Rights Index*. When *Polity* is the dependent variable, respect for democracy actually improves when sanctions are applied. This is somewhat surprising and contradictory to earlier findings, and disproves hypothesis 2. Table 8 reports the findings from the models testing the effect of broad and smart sanctions on democracy. Again no significant results are presented from the model with *New Empowerment Rights Index* as the dependent variable. However, with *Polity* as the dependent variable, *broad sanctions* is significant with a positive coefficient. Again surprising and contradictory to both the

theory and earlier findings, disproving hypothesis 4. Table 9 and 10 reports the findings from the models testing the effect of some of the most commonly used specific types of sanctions on democracy. Most results are not significant, except *reduction of aid* and *arms embargoes*, which have positive coefficients. The insignificant findings in tables 7-10 and the sanctions predicting more respect for democracy is the opposite of what I expected, and does not fit with what is referred to in the literature. From all the models it appears that *past practice* is a very strong predictor of the two democracy scores, and the reason behind the relatively high R-square values reported. Their strong predictive capabilities might explain why many of the independent variables are insignificant. In models where past practice is excluded, the majority of the independent variables get a negative coefficient that is statistically significant.

Table 7: The general effects of economic sanctions on democracy

	<i>New Empowerment Rights Index</i>	<i>Polity</i>
Sanction (all)	0.091 (0.108)	0.328* (0.130)
GDP growth	0.002 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.362 (0.198)	0.077 (0.194)
Civil war	-0.334 (0.192)	-0.097 (0.220)
Interstate war	0.157 (0.332)	(0.438)
Past practice	0.695*** (0.018)	0.885*** (0.011)
Observations	1494	1836
R^2	0.520	0.787

Standard errors in parentheses

[^] $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: The effects of broad and smart sanctions on democracy

	<i>New Empowerment Rights Index</i>	<i>Polity</i>
Broad sanctions	-0.046 (0.072)	0.181* (0.089)
Smart sanctions	-0.078 (0.171)	0.090 (0.219)
GDP growth	0.001 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.451* (0.196)	0.053 (0.195)
Civil war	-0.346 (0.192)	-0.100 (0.221)
Interstate war	0.107 (0.334)	0.222 (0.439)
Past practice	0.687*** (0.019)	0.886*** (0.011)
Observations	1494	1836
R^2	0.520	0.787

Standard errors in parentheses

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: The effects of specific sanction types on the New Empowerment Rights Index

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
Comprehensive trade embargo	-0.353 (0.282)				
Reduction of Aid		-0.131 (0.129)			
Targeted Asset Freeze			-0.167 (0.316)		
Targeted Travel Sanctions				-0.109 (0.222)	
Arms embargo					0.111 (0.214)
GDP growth	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.432* (0.191)	-0.434* (0.192)	-0.423* (0.192)	-0.428* (0.195)	-0.389* (0.194)
Civil war	-0.326 (0.192)	-0.350 (0.192)	-0.343 (0.192)	-0.339 (0.192)	-0.332 (0.192)
Interstate war	0.104 (0.333)	0.121 (0.332)	0.138 (0.332)	0.134 (0.332)	0.147 (0.332)
Past practice	0.688*** (0.018)	0.688*** (0.018)	0.691*** (0.018)	0.691*** (0.018)	0.693*** (0.018)
Observations	1494	1494	1494	1494	1494
R ²	0.521	0.520	0.520	0.520	0.520

Standard errors in parentheses

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: The effects of specific sanction types on *Polity*

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
Comprehensive trade embargo	0.309				
Reduction of Aid		0.323*			
		(0.154)			
Targeted Asset Freeze			0.356		
			(0.375)		
Targeted Travel Sanctions				0.277	
				(0.275)	
Arms embargo					0.607*
					(0.263)
GDP growth	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.008	0.011	-0.007	0.006	0.061
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.194)
Civil war	-0.110	-0.084	-0.086	-0.093	-0.070
	(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Interstate war	0.177	0.201	0.172	0.176	0.215
	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.439)
Past practice	0.884***	0.886***	0.883***	0.884***	0.880***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Observations	1836	1836	1836	1836	1836
R^2	0.786	0.786	0.786	0.786	0.787

Standard errors in parentheses

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

CONCLUSION

In this paper the notion that economic sanctions in general have a severe negative effect on human rights conditions is confirmed: when a sanction is imposed on a country it is likely to cause an increase in human rights violations by the target government. Broad economic sanctions that aren't specifically aimed at the political regime are also confirmed to have a similar substantial negative impact on human rights abuses. Sanctions specifically targeted against the political elite of the target country, also show signs of worsening human rights conditions. When the effects on human rights abuses of specific types of sanctions were tested, comprehensive trade embargoes and reductions of aid were shown to have substantial negative effects on human rights conditions. Targeted asset freezes, targeted travel sanctions and arms embargoes did also show similar tendencies, in some circumstances. The findings does not give any clear answer to whether the increased emphasis on smart sanctions in recent years have been in vain, as there is no clear evidence of smart sanctions causing less human rights violations. When improved data is available, future research is encouraged to more accurately test the effect of each smart sanction type on human rights conditions, to test under which circumstances they have an impact. This would greatly help future political decision makers in minimizing the unintended human rights abuses.

The effect of sanctions and smart sanctions on democracy is also tested on two different parameters in this paper. However, the only significant relationships between democracy and sanctions revealed from this study are positive. Sanctions in general, broad sanctions, reductions in aid, and arms embargoes should cause higher *Policy* scores, which indicate greater amounts of respect for democracy. However, this contradicts ample amounts of earlier literature, empirical

research, and theoretical models. Therefore I assess that either a methodological error has crept in, or the datasets used for this evaluation has been inappropriate under these circumstances.

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APPENDIX

Sanctions coded:

Afghanistan

Targeted asset freeze: 1998-

Targeted travel sanctions: 2002-

General travel sanction: 1999-2002

General asset freeze: 1999-2002

Arms embargo: 2000-2002

Ban of military corporation and training: 2000-2002

Albania

Aid: Aid delayed: 1994

Financial sanctions: Expulsion of illegal immigrant workers: 1994-1995.

Algeria

Loan freeze: 1992-1994

Angola (UNITA)

Freeze of Ex-Im Bank financing: 1985-1991,

Reduction of aid: 1989-1991, 1993-2003

Representatives in international institutions voting against loans to Angola: 1989-1991, 1997-2003

Ban on export of military equipment: 1991-1993

Targeted travel sanctions: 1997-2002

Ban on diamond imports: 1998-2002

Asset freeze: 1998-2002

Export ban on mining services: 1998-2003

Argentina

General import ban (not main trading partner): 1982-1985

No new export credits extended (not main trading partner). 1982-1985

General freezing of assets (not main trading partner): 1982

No new loans extended (not main trading partner): 1982

Armenia

Block of gas exports: 1991-1995

Arms embargo: 1992-2002

Block on export of electricity: 1992-1995

Azerbaijan

Reduction of aid: 1992-2002

Export ban of military equipment: 1992-2002

Belarus

Reduction of aid: 2004-(2008)

Targeted travel sanctions: 2006-(2008)

Targeted asset freeze: 2006-(2008)

Bolivia

Reduction in economic aid: 1980-1982

Suspension of military aid: 1980-1982

Reduction in World Bank Loans: 1980-1982

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Reduction of aid: 1991.

Arms embargo: 1991.

Burma (Myanmar)

Reduction of aid: 1988-(2007)

Ban of export of military equipment: 1988-(2007)

Denial of Ex-Im Bank loans: 1989-(2007)

Representatives in international institutions voting against loans to Burma (Myanmar):-1989 – (2007)

Not renewing bilateral textile agreement: 1991-(2007)

Targeted travel sanctions: 1996-(2007)

Targeted visa bans: 1996-(2007)

Ban on trade imports: 2003-(2007)

Targeted asset freeze: 2003-(2007)

Arms embargo: 2003-(2007)

Burundi

General trade embargo 1996

General trade embargo with exceptions for vital items 1997-1998

General travel sanctions 1996-1999

Cambodia

Arms embargo: 1991-1992

Reduction of aid: 1997-(2006)

Ban on petroleum export: 1992-1997

Ban on log import: 1992-1997

Cameroon

Reduction of aid: 1992-1998

Export ban of military equipment: 1992-1998

China

Ban on export of military equipment: 1990-1996

Ban on nuclear corporation: 1990-1997

Ban on nuclear technology: 1997-(2007)

Ban on export of high technology equipment: 1991-1996

Suspension of US Ex-Im Bank loans: 1996.

Colombia

Reduction of aid: 1996-1998

Ban on EX-IM Bank loans: 1996-1998

US representatives instructed to vote against loans to Colombia from multilateral development banks: 1996

Targeted travel sanctions: 1996-1998

Discontinuation of OPIC programs: 1998.

Targeted asset freeze: 1998-(2007)

Croatia

Reduction of aid: 1991.

Arms embargo: 1991.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Arms embargo 2003-(2007)

Ecuador

Ban on export of military equipment: 1995.

Stop of military corporation/training: 1995.

El Salvador

Reduction of aid: 1990-1992.

Reduction of military aid: 1990-1993

Equatorial Guinea

Reduction of aid: 1992-1999

Ban on all forms of financial corporation: 1993-1999

Asset freeze: 1993-1999

Estonia

General asset freeze: 1992-1999

Ban of oil export: 1993-1999

Fiji

Aid reduction: 1987-1988, 2000-2001, 2006-(2007)

Military aid reduction: 1987-1988, 2006-(2007)

Stop of defense corporation: 1987-1992, 2000-2001, and 2006-(2007)

General travel sanctions (main traveling partners): 1987, 2006-(2007)

General export ban (main trading partners): 1987

General embargo (not main trading partners) 1987-1997.

Export ban on arms 2000-2003

Former Republic of Macedonia

Total trade embargo from Greece: 1994-1995.

France

Export ban on uranium: 1983-1986, 1988-1996

Import ban on military projects: 1995-1996

Stop of defense corporation: 1995-1996

Consumer boycotts: 1995-1996

Ban of access to projects in Australia: 1992-1993.

The Gambia

Reduction of aid: 1994-1997

Reduction of military aid: 1994-2002

Stop of military corporation: 1994-2002

General travel sanctions: 1994-1995

Georgia

Import ban on key agricultural exports: 2006-(2007)

General travel sanctions: 2006-(2007)

Increased gas prizes and reduction of supply: 2006-(2007)

Block on money transfers through Russia: 2006-(2007)

Grenada

General travel sanctions: 1983

General trade embargo: 1983

Guatemala

Reduction of aid: 1993.

Revokes preferential trade status: 1993.

Veto against future loans in World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Bank: 1993.

Haiti

Reduction of aid: 1987-1990, 1993-1994, 2001-2005

General trade embargo (main trading partner): 1991-

Targeted asset freezing: 1993-2001

UN Targeted asset freezing: 1993-1994

UN Oil embargo: 1993-1994

UN Arms embargo: 1993-1994

UN Targeted travel sanctions: 1993-2001

General travel sanctions: 1994.

India

Ban on financial assistance: 1998.

Ban on Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Ex-Im Bank financing: 1998-1999.

Export ban of high technology products: 1998.

Opposition to loans from international financial institutions: 1998.

Ban on US bank loans to the government of India: 1998.

Reduction of aid: 1998.

The World Bank postpones consideration of almost \$1 billion in loans to India: 1998.

Indonesia

Reduction of aid: 1991-1998, 1999-2002

Ban of military corporation: 1992-1996, 1999-2005

Veto of trade and economic corporation pact between Association of Southeast Asian Nations and EC: 1992.

Ban on export of military equipment: 1993-1996, 1999-2005

Arms embargo: 1994-1996, 1999-(2005)

Iran

Oil import ban: 1979-1981, 1987-1990, 2000-

Reduction of aid: 1979-1981, 1987-

Reduction of military aid: 1979-1981

General freeze of assets: 1979-1981, (1984-

General export embargo (excluding food and medicine): 1980-1981,

Export embargo of military equipment: 1984-

General travel sanctions: 1980-1981

General import ban: 1987-1990,

Denial of Export-Import Bank Credits 1990-

Denial of World Bank Loans: 1993-1999

General trade embargo: 1995-1998

General trade embargo with exemptions for food and medicine: 1999-2000

The oil boycott by large US companies with US government support beginning in 1979 has been coded as a de facto oil embargo. At the end of 1979 President Carter imposed a “real” ban on oil imports from Iran.

Export embargo of military equipment does not only cover a broad general ban on the export of all military equipment, but also more specific bans of certain weapons, machines or chemicals.

Iraq

Export embargo of some military equipment: 1979-1982, 1984-

Export embargo of all arms supplies: 1990-2003

General trade embargo with exemptions for donations of food and medicine: 1990-2003

Arms embargo: 1990-2003

General financial sanctions: 1990-2003

General asset freeze: 1990-2003

General travel sanction: 1990-2003

Ivory Coast

Reduction of aid: 1999-2002

Arms embargo: 1999-(2002)

Stop of IMF assistance: 1999-2001

Arms embargo: 2004-(2007)

Ban on diamond imports: 2005-(2007)

Targeted asset freeze: 2006-(2007)

Targeted travel ban: 2006-(2007)

Jordan

Oil export ban: 1990-1992

Reduction of aid: 1991, 1993-1997.

Kazakhstan

Reduction of fuel export: 1994-1995

Stop of payments for coal imports: 1994.

Kenya

Reduction of military aid: 1990-1993

Reduction of aid: 1991-1993

Latvia

Increased prices of oil exports: 1992-1998.

Denial of MFN status: 1993-1994

Increased tariffs for agricultural products: 1994-1998.

Reduction of amount of oil exported: 1998.

Lebanon

Ban on export of military equipment: 1984-1995

Suspension of military aid: 1984-1992

General travel sanctions: 1985-1997

General trade embargo: 1985-1992

Lesotho

General trade embargo (with exemptions for vital goods): 1983, 1986

Arms embargo: 1983

General travel sanctions: 1986

In May 1983 and January 1986 South Africa slows traffic into and out of Lesotho for “security checks.” “The resulting long lines caused shortages of essential supplies in Lesotho...” (Washington Post, 12 August 1983, A1). Since this caused an effect similar to that of a trade embargo I have coded it as a General trade embargo.

Liberia

Arms embargo: 1992-

Ban on imports of Liberian sources: 1992-1997
Ban on financial transactions: 1992-1997
Targeted travel sanctions: 1996-1997, 2001-(2006)
Targeted asset freeze: 1996-1997, 2004-(2006)
Reduction of aid: 2000-(2006)
Diamond embargo: 2001-(2006)

Libya

Ban of export of military equipment: 1979-2004
Ban on import of crude oil: 1982-2004
Ban on export of oil, gas equipment, technology: 1982-2004
Ban on import of refined petroleum products: 1985-2004
General trade embargo (not main trading partner): 1985-2004
General travel sanctions: 1985-2004
General asset freeze: 1986-2004
Ban on investments in Libya: 1996-2004

Lithuania

Oil embargo: 1990.
Gas embargo: 1990.
Food, metal, tire and cable export ban: 1990.
Coal export ban: 1990.

Malawi

Reduction of aid: 1992-1993

Macedonia

Reduction of aid: 1991.

Arms embargo: 1991.

Montenegro

Reduction of aid: 1991-1995

Arms embargo: 1991-1995

Ban on financial sanctions: 1992-1995

Trade embargo: 1992-1995

General asset freeze: 1992-1999

General travel ban: 1992-1993

Oil embargo: 1992-1995

Nepal

General trade sanctions: 1989-1990

General travel sanctions: 1989-1990

New Zealand

General import ban (not main trading partner): 1986.

Nicaragua

Reduction of aid: 1981-1984, 1992

Ban on export of military equipment: 1982-

Ban on import of sugar: 1983-1990

Veto of World Bank loans: 1983

General trade embargo: 1985-1990

General travel restrictions: 1985-1990

In 1983 the Reagan administration redistributes most of Nicaragua's sugar export quota among “Central American nations friendly to US. This is coded as ban on import of sugar.

Niger

Reduction of aid: 1996-1997, 1999-2000

Opposing loans from international financial institutions: 1996.

Nigeria

Reduction of aid: 1993-1998

Reduction of military aid: 1993-(2007)

Suspension of military corporation: 1993-(2007)

Ban on export of military equipment: 1993- 1999

Targeted travel sanctions: 1993-1998

General travel sanctions (between Nigeria and US): 1993-1999

Termination of OPIC and Ex-Im Bank programs: 1994-1998

Arms embargo: 1995-(2007)

Denial of export licenses: 1995-1998

Panama

Reduction of aid: 1987-189

Reduction of military aid: 1987-1989

Representatives in international institutions voting against loans to Panama: 1987-1989

Suspension of sugar quota import: 1987-1989

Asset freeze: 1988-1989

General trade embargo: 1989.

General travel sanctions: 1989.

Prohibits EX-Im Bank loans: 1987-1989

Pakistan

Reduction of aid: 1979-, 1999-2001

Ban on export of military equipment: 1990-1995

Stop of OPIC, TDA assistance: 1979

Ban on Trade and Development Agency, OPIC and Export-Import financing: 1998-1999

Restrictions on US exports of high-technology products: 1998.

Opposition to loans from international financial institutions: 1998.

Ban on US bank loans to the government of Pakistan: 1998.

Peru

Reduction in aid: 1992-1994

Reduction in military aid: 1992-1994, 1995.

Ban on export of military equipment: 1995.

Stop of military corporation/training: 1995.

Poland

Cancellation of US Export-Import Bank credit insurances: 1981-1986

General travel restrictions: 1981-1984

Ban on export of high technology goods: 1981-1986

Suspension of fishing rights: 1981-1983

Block of application to IMF: 1982-1984

Denial of Most Favored Nation status: 1983-1986

Romania

Suspension of MFN status: 1988-1993

Decline of export credits: 1988-1992
Decline of EX-Im Bank loans: 1988-1992
Reduction of aid: 1990
Block of trade and corporation deal: 1990

Rwanda

Arms embargo: 1994-1995, 1996-1997
Reduction of aid: 1995-1995

Serbia

Reduction of aid: 1991-1995
Arms embargo: 1991-1995
Ban on financial sanctions: 1992-1995
Trade embargo: 1992-1995
General asset freeze: 1992-1999
General travel ban: 1992-1993
Oil embargo: 1992-1995

Sierra Leone

Reduction of aid: 1997-1999
General trade embargo: 1997-1999
Targeted travel sanction: 1997-(2004)
Targeted asset freeze: 1997-(2004)
Arms embargo: 1997-1998
Ban on export of oil: 1997-1998
Ban on diamond import: 2000-2003

Slovenia

Reduction of aid: 1991.

Arms embargo: 1991.

Somalia

Arms embargo: 1992-(2007)

Reduction of aid: 1988-(2007)

Targeted asset freeze: 2001-(2007)

South Africa

US arms embargo: 1963-1998

Reduction of aid: 1977-1993

UN arms embargo: 1977-1994

Prohibits EX-Im Bank loans: 1964-1991

Oil export embargo: 1973-1992

Ban of new investments: 1984-1990

Ban of new bank loans: 1985-1991

Export ban of high tech: 1985-1991

General ban on imports: 1986-1991

Sudan

See also Case 89-3: US v. Sudan (1989: Human rights; civil war)

Reduction of aid: 1988-(2007)

Stop of military corporation/ training: 1990-(2007)

US general asset freeze: 1997-(2007)

UN general asset freeze: 2005-(2007)

UN targeted asset freeze: 2006-(2007)

UN targeted travel ban: 2006-(2007)

UN general travel ban: 1996-2001

Block on financial transactions: 1996-(2007)

General trade embargo (with exceptions for areas considered key for US national interest; the president mentions the import of gum Arabic: 1997-1999

General trade embargo with exceptions for agricultural goods, medicine and medical equipment: 1999-(2007)

Suriname

Reduction of aid: 1982-1988, 1990-1991

Syria

Ban on military equipment: 1980-1994, 2004-(2007)

Arms embargo: 1986-1994

Targeted visa bans: 1986-1987

Denial of EX-Im bank loans: 1986-1990, 2004-(2007)

General travel sanctions: 1987-1994, 2004-(2007)

Suspension of aid: 1986-1990, 2004-(2007)

Prohibits financial transactions: 1996, (2006-2007)

Oil embargo: 2003-(2007)

Export ban with exemptions for food and medicine: 2004-(2007)

Thailand

Reduction of aid: 1991.

Reduction of military aid: 1991.

Togo

Suspension of military corporation: 1990-(2006)

Reduction of aid: 1992-(2006)

Targeted travel sanctions: 1992-(2006)

Turkey

Reduction of aid: 1981-1986, 1986-1996

Veto of EU custom union (financial sanction):1990-1995

Turkmenistan

Import ban of gas deliveries: 1993-1995

Asset freeze: 1993-1995

Ukraine

Reduction of oil export: 1993-1997

Increased tariffs: 1995-1997

USSR

Ban on export of high technology goods: 1980-1987

Ban on export of military technology: 1980-1990

Reduction of grain import (trade sanction): 1980-1981

Curtailing of fishing rights: (coded as trade sanction) 1980-1984

General travel ban: 1980-1987

Ban on export of oil and gas technology: 1980-1987

Regarding 1991 coup against President Gorbachev: it ended before sanctions were implemented, so any sanctions as a reaction to the coup has not been coded.

Yemen

Reduction of aid: 1990-1997.

Expelling immigrant workers and sending them back to Yemen (coded as financial sanction): 1990.

Zambia

Reduction of aid: 1996-1999

Zaire (Congo)

Reduction of aid: 1990-1997

Reduction of military aid: 1990-1997

Targeted asset freeze: 1992-(1997)

Arms embargo: 1993-(1997)

Targeted travel sanctions: 1993-(1997)

Zimbabwe

Reduction of aid: 1984-1988

Targeted travel ban: 2002-(2007)

Targeted asset freeze: 2002-(2007)