

A STARTING POINT FOR IDENTIFYING PERPETRATOR GENOCIDAL  
MESSAGING

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A Thesis presented to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School  
at the University of Missouri- Columbia

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In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

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by

G. JOSEPH HARRISON JR.

Dr. Esther Thorson, Thesis Supervisor

MAY 2012

The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of Graduate School, have examined the thesis entitled

A STARTING POINT FOR IDENTIFYING PERPETRATOR GENOCIDAL  
MESSAGING

Presented by G. Joseph Harrison Jr.

A candidate for the degree of Master of Arts of Journalism

And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

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Professor Esther Thorson, PhD

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Professor Margret Duffy, PhD

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Professor Charles Davis, PhD

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Professor Brian Houston, PhD

My dear wife Josette - thank you for being the love of my life. You're never ending love and support has been a miracle over the past 19 years. You continue to be my angel, my refuge, and my city on a hill. My relationship with you and our relationship together with God is by far the greatest thing that has ever happened to me. Thank you. Special thanks to my dad Gary J. Harrison Sr.; you have always lived your life as a noble and honorable man, never seeking glory or fame for yourself but always seeking God's will for your life and teaching me that life is not about awards and accolades but about our relationship with God and the value in making a difference in the lives of those around us. Special recognition to the Super 8: Doc, Steve, Kevin, Joe, J.R, Vic, and Chris. Whether it was Fort Leavenworth, Mizzou, or Poland, it has been a great atmosphere of mutual respect, support, and cooperation during our academic endeavors this year.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Esther Thorson for your candid guidance, personal sincerity and committed dedication throughout this experience. I appreciate your flexibility and accessibility especially during the final weeks of this project. Your level of involvement clearly demonstrates your commitment to academic excellence you have on behalf of all your students. I am altogether appreciative of the quality input and advice I received from the other academic professionals serving on my committee. Dr. Margret Duffy your guidance related to organizational structure of the project was superb. Dr. Charles Davis your ability to assist in focusing my efforts enabled the research to take on even greater meaning in both my personal and professional life. Dr. Brian Houston, your suggestions in the area of agenda building and inductive analysis were instrumental in providing continuity in the research material. Last but certainly not least, I would like to acknowledge my student advisor Sarah Smith-Frigerio. Your efforts and patience throughout the last year reflect great credit upon yourself, the University and your profession. Thank you for the solid input and detailed direction required for this research study, it has been honor and pleasure learning from you. Thank you all.

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# A STARTING POINT FOR IDENTIFYING PERPETRATOR GENOCIDAL MESSAGING

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research was to determine whether a consistent messaging strategy could be identified in three recent outbreaks of violence or if genocidal messaging will show tremendous variances that are unique to each circumstance. This was done by conducting a comparative textual analysis of three separate case studies (Rwanda, Darfur, and Bosnia) that looked at perpetrator messaging to their own supporters through the theoretical framework of social identity and agenda building. Through this theoretical and pragmatic approach of determining how and by what means genocidal leaders use a consistent set of messages about the victim group in the areas of religion, ethnicity, nationality, and race, a natural assessment can be made from which to understand its effectiveness. The results of the study will be useful for considering ways to counteract the messages that in these three case studies were associated with such terrible, extensive and deadly attacks by perpetrators on victims.

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW**

A starting point for identifying perpetrator genocidal messaging has been clearly laid out by the United Nations Resolution 260, ratified in 1948. This act claimed that every act of past genocide has been predicated upon religion, ethnicity, nationality, race or a combination thereof (Schabas, 1948). Unfortunately, there is significant ambiguity in how these categorical terms are defined: “what is called “race” in one country might be labeled “ethnicity” in another, while “nationality” means ancestry in some contexts and citizenship in others” (Morning, 2005, p. 1). The United Nations Office of Statistics offers what is perhaps the clearest and most up to date definition of some of these terms in its census guidance. We look next at the four critical concepts identified by the U.N.

### **Religion**

In the 2000 global census conducted by the department of sociology at New York University, the U.N. categorizes religion in two ways. First, the census guidance describes it as an individual “spiritual belief or preference, regardless of whether or not this belief is represented by an organized group” (United Nations Office of Statistics, 2011). As an alternative, based on a broader context, The U.N. offers a second definition of religion as an “affiliation with an organized group having specific religious or spiritual tenets” (United Nations Office of Statistics, 2011). The U.N. encourages its census takers to choose the definition most appropriate to the needs of the individual county or group of people.

## **Ethnicity**

Ethnicity is defined in an even broader way as individuals or groupings of individuals based on “race, color, language, customs of dress or eating, tribe or various combinations of these characteristics.” In addition, some of the terms used, such as “race”, “origin” or “tribe”, have a number of different connotations. The definitions and criteria applied by each country investigating ethnic characteristics of the population must, therefore, be determined carefully and with the involvement of or consultation with representatives of the groups which it desires to categorize. By the nature of this topic, these categories and their definitions will vary widely from country to country; therefore, no internationally accepted criteria are possible (United Nations Office of Statistics, 2011).

## **Nationality**

Nationality is defined by the U.N. as citizenship or legal nationality within a specified country or area of origin (United Nations Office of Statistics, 2011). This infers that nationality is based on a legal recognition of citizenship by those in out-groups that have already been accepted by others.

Nationality may also include political definitions identified by the U.N. that seem to infer that political categories may be part of a larger social construct that is both linked to governmental regimes as well as a governing ideology that changes based on perception of the individual as “political, economic, and historical contexts change” (Spalter-Roth, 2002).

## Race

Since 1993 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been given the responsibility to represent the world's commitment to the protection of human rights under international law. As a part of that mandate, the OHCHR maintains the responsibility of defining racial discrimination in accordance with resolution 2106 ratified on 21 December 1965. Article 1.1 of resolution 2106 defines racial discrimination as:

“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”  
(International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965).

While the four categorical definitions have been clarified over time what is not as clear is whether there is a consistent set of message types within those categories that can be identified in each of the three cases or whether the messages show significant differences across the three cases.

This research analyzes what has been written about mass media messages implicated in outbreaks of genocide in three of the most recent and virulent instances: Rwanda, Darfur, and Bosnia. For each of the cases, the analysis will identify the following:

1. What was the cultural, national, political background for each of the countries?  
How were these background characteristics related to development of the messages used by the perpetrators of genocide?

2. What were the predominant messages that the in-group, i.e., perpetrators, used?
3. What types of media were used to carry these messages?

This analysis will serve to answer a single primary research question: Is there a consistent set of message types that can be identified in each of the three cases or will the messages show significant differences across the three cases?

## **Literature Review**

**Introduction.** There are many contributing ideas and case studies that are both directly and indirectly related to the in-group framing of violent messages and the determination of how the media can be used as a tool for stimulating mass murders, such as those found in the book *Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (Thompson A. , 2007). Thompson clearly draws a connection using the medium of radio as a channel of control when he identified that Rwandan “authorities supporting the genocide urged citizens to listen to the radio. One official even told the residents of his area that they should regard what the radio told them as having the same importance as direct orders from him” (Thompson A. , 2007, p. 50) . Thus, when the radio began framing reports of secret stashes of Tutsi rebel force Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) weaponry found near churches and other religious facilities it could then immediately focus the ire of the local populace towards religious institutions that opposed some of the tactics that the local authorities were using against the Tutsi population. This resulted in a mentality of kill or be killed and formerly peaceful Hutus into murderers by causing them to believe that their lives and the lives of their families were in danger and that the Tutsi were the source of the danger.

In the article *Framing Comparative Risk: A Preliminary Analysis*, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. and Zhan Li (2005) invite the reader to consider how the contextual framing of perpetrator

messages in the media affects the outcome of the response by its intended audience. Their findings indicate that in an attempt to help an audience receive a message the way it was intended by the media outlet, particular attention had to be paid to whether the framing of the story would be a singular event (episodic) or would be an ongoing story requiring longer term engagement by the audience over a period of time (thematic). They point out that in an attempt to connect with an audience, an influence leader may leverage the framing of episodic messages to focus the audience's attention on events in the lives of the individual, to whom it may more easily relate (Gandy & Li, 2005, p. 72).

**Operational Concepts.** The following discussion expands the examination of the causes of genocide and suggests a role that strategic communication might play in its mitigation if it is possible to understand the hallmarks of genocidal messaging. As noted above, the commonly accepted causes of genocide are rooted in religion, race, nationality, ethnicity (Schabas, 1948).

**Religion & Conflict.** A detailed timeline search of genocidal acts provided by Prevent Genocide International showed that nearly all recorded acts of genocide between 1915 and 2011 have had some component of religious messaging associated with it (Prevent Genocide International, 2011). Religion has the ability to root itself deep within people's hearts and minds while creating common frames that are generally understood and accepted on a mass scale. In the recent past we have seen its effects when left unquestioned or unchecked. In today's era of social media, new groupings of individuals connected through modern communication venues have created communities of belief without the limitations of geography or borders. Moizes (1998) offered valuable insights into what it may be like when these religious communities no longer are limited to geographic boundaries (p. 117). The impact of a genocidal war cry that can

be heard and responded to by fanatical followers, no longer limited by borders, can make putting out the fire that much more difficult once it begins.

Mojzes and his contributors take an in-depth look at war and religion (Religion and the War in Bosnia, 1998). His contributors include representation ranging from Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and secular traditions. They offer a unique view that spans the spectrum of religion as a primary contributor to genocide and a key ingredient for its effectiveness. He points out that it becomes easier for genocidal leaders to mobilize others when there is the assurance that this is an in-group message of what God or Allah wants them to do. This allows those that may have moral hesitancy to completely divest themselves of any feelings of guilt while carrying out acts of violence no matter how repugnant they may have viewed them in the past. When religion is used to transform people's lives in a positive way it can be a powerful tool for good but when religion is used as a key component in facilitating genocidal messages, it can become dangerous and unconstrained.

The concepts of in-group message framing are of particular importance when it comes to religion. Religion, from a conceptual perspective, lays a foundation for the collection of commonly understood ideas or practices within an in-group that can later be referenced by an influence leader within the group to create a link between individuals within a society. This is what framing does as well. Framing attempts to identify specific concepts within the mind of individuals so they can be used at a later time to help mass communicators ensure that a message reaches its audience with the greatest likelihood of being innovated or acted upon in the way that it was originally intended.

Words have meaning, though the same words used by one individual can mean something very different when filtered through the consciousness and beliefs of another. It is the primer used by the individual to interpret meaning within a religious context that may be of most value in identifying, classifying and understanding in-group genocidal messages. Entman (1993) in his article “Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm” calls these internal boundary frames “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Similarly, Gamson et al. (1992) define an in-group boundary as “a central organizing principle that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols” (p. 384). From a religious perspective, these commonly stored frames can be seen in such concepts as the Ten Commandments found in the Bible or the Five Pillars of Islam found in the Qur'an. The identification of these types of pre-existing frames can be used as building blocks in developing an effective overall framing strategy.

Avnita Lakhani in his article, “Finding a Peaceful Path for Kosovo: A Track Two Approach”, examines the relationship between government and religion as it relates to the theory of using faith-based diplomacy as a means of communicating what would be seen today as unconventional or even somewhat unorthodox. He suggests that faith-based diplomats would focus their messaging strategy on the predominate religion involved with the conflict and then orient international and geo-political goals with the transcendent tenets of that particular religion (Lakhani, 2006, p. 28).

In the article “Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent”, Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott point out that when attempting to address critical issues related to religion and genocide, it is imperative that faith-based diplomacy address “the active role of the divine in human affairs” (2003, p. 32) in its messaging. Simply attempting to cleanse the divine from

religiously driven genocide is probably not only ineffective but will likely result in creating an even greater struggle in ensuring a message is received by the target audience in the way it was intended.

**Ethnicity & Conflict.** Newbery (2008) argues that many see the ethnic aspects of genocide in Rwanda framed as an anomaly in a way that is too complex and abstract to understand. His exegesis is derived from the many attempts by researchers and analysts to describe genocide itself rather than attempt to explain it. In order to keep this idea of over complexity from growing into a self-fulfilling prophecy, Newbery argues, “genocide needs to be addressed directly and understood, not neglected”. He likewise calls for additional analysis of “the conjunction of factors widely present elsewhere that produce catastrophes” (2008, p. 77). This could help political leaders and decision makers conceptualize potential messaging strategies that may be effective in overcoming perpetrator genocidal messaging.

Cobb and Elder (1971) make two significant observations that are widely accepted among agenda theorists but, according to them, rarely developed. First, they point out that processes of hierarchal influence distribution within any system or group are inherently biased by nature. They quote Dahl’s observations (1956) that “all human organizations there are significant variations in the participation in political decisions-variations which in the United States appear to be functionally related to such variables as concern or involvement, skill, access, socio-economic status, education, residence, age, ethnic and religious identifications, and some little understood personality characteristics”

The second observation Cobb and Elder make follows from the first in that “the range of issues and alternative decisions that will be considered by a given in-group will always be

restricted” (1971, p. 901). This implies that looking for commonalities such as these may allow us to measure the effectiveness of perpetrator messaging within an in-group.

**Nationalism, Politics & Conflict.** The International Security Council at the U.N. has mandated requirements to aggressively address the issue of mass atrocities and genocide once they have been identified and verified. However, it does not specifically identify what entities have the responsibility to address it, what mediums they will use and what is or is not an acceptable strategy.

In *Genocide, War Crimes & the West: History and Complicity* (2004), Jones researches and eventually addresses the more difficult aspects of being a leader in the free world by asking a very simple question: “Is the complicity of the free world the reason why genocide even exists today” (p. 49)? He points out that while the Western world may not be the source of genocide, its inaction may allow it to flourish and grow out of control. Jones uses general references to the Western world but assumptions will likely have to be made by the reader as to whether or not the U.S. has a larger and more specific role to play due to its position as a global leader and its access to available resources that it has. Messaging strategies must both begin and finish by determining the national and international objectives, the desired end state, and whether or not citizens of the at-risk country will support anti-genocidal activities.

### **The role of imagery and branding in framing pro- or anti-genocidal messages**

As part of strategic planning, in-group message framing is crucial. In this age of 24-hour news cycles, the powerful imagery and basic principles of modality have become a key aspect in tapping into in-group message framing. When it comes to mass atrocities and genocide, information is better remembered when accompanied by a visual image. In-group message

framing that leverages the use of imagery can be emotionally overwhelming at times and evoke a significant amount of passion within the group.

Military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz identifies how the passion of the citizenry becomes the driving force behind a national political end state. He calls it the “paradoxical trinity” saying that the military, politicians and the citizenry all form a magnet pulling with equal strength during times of conflict. When one pulls harder than the other it forces the other two to match its attraction (Clausewitz, 2009, p. 25). If Clausewitz’ theory of the paradoxical trinity is accurate then it is plausible to believe that an image that evokes passion in the people could persuade geopolitical action relatively quickly.

A strategy to evoke passion within a group through imagery could take many forms. For instance Roushanzamir (2004) identifies a key differentiator that in many ways only an image can provide—instant recognition. She points out that after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, there was a need for instantly recognizable images and for broad and deep circulation of images of the Middle East (Roushanzamir, 2004, p. 10). In the same way that a shoe or soft drink company attempts to get you to associate their product with a given celebrity or symbol, the media also uses branding and imagery in an attempt to allow their audience an opportunity for instant association. Roushanzamir identifies how the benefits of this can be powerful by creating a narrative that can quickly and easily be shown with little or no explanation (Roushanzamir, 2004, p. 16).

In the article “The Primes of Our Times” (Domke, Perlmutter, & Spratt, 2002, p. 131), the authors take a differing approach by starting from a premise that images most often interact with an in-groups existing understanding of the world around them. They point to intrinsic links

between images and the feelings that they evoke within the group. They use many key examples from the past to include images from Tiananmen Square, the Gulf War and the physical abuse of Rodney King by local law enforcement that eventually led to the LA riots in 1992 (Domke, Perlmutter, & Spratt, 2002, p. 132). They were all indelible images that took little to no explanation yet inspired entire nations to action. They bring up a very interesting point that most scholarly studies of news photography have focused either on assessing the content of images or the contexts of their production while the role of the images go relatively without analysis. They go on to analyze “image impact” examples on societal perceptions of trust in government. They used control groups with both text only and then image based as they related to the Kent State shooting and were clearly able to determine that, vivid, striking images had a particularly strong impact on the groups’ opinions.

Both of these articles identify the potential impact that images can have on the passion of an in-group in a relatively short period of time. By using images that create an instant connection with intended audiences, and resonate with their preconceptions about the world around them, policy actors may evoke the kind of passion needed to influence the group into action.

Among the goals of this research is a better understanding of how the U. S. Military might detect and respond to pro-genocidal messaging. Mills and Bruner (2002) offer their insights in their case studies surrounding an award-winning group of reporters and scholars such as David Rieff, Peter Maass, Philip Gourevitch, William Shawcross, George Packer, Bill Berkeley and Samantha Power. They review four of the most dramatic acts of state-sponsored genocide in recent history: Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and East Timor in an attempt to assess the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the US military in combating its effects and providing humanitarian intervention (Mills & Bruner, 2002, p. 254). They include many original essays

from first hand reporters while attempting to ascertain answers to the questions that seem to haunt most modern day scholars: how do we maintain peace and what is the future of human rights in today's digital age?

Mills and Brunner (2002) suggest that analysis of genocide and mass atrocities by journalists in this modern media era is critical to understanding what may become the future battleground for the hearts and minds of humanity itself. Their analysis seems to imply that today's journalists could become tomorrow's information warriors and heroes, responsible in a single night for saving thousands of lives threatened by manipulation and hate (Mills & Brunner, 2002, p. 66). Traditionally, journalists' relationship with the activities going on around them has been to assume a position of "passionate non-involvement" (Mills & Brunner, 2002, p. 64). Yet where resources are limited, or where pressures are placed on societies because of political or economic instability, journalists may be able to use social media in the digital world to help create connection with people, resulting in a positive passion for peace in the physical world. Traditional media outlets did not offer the real-time advantages of today's almost instantaneous transmission of messages. Potentially, journalists' ability to detect and report genocidal messages could be part of an enhanced early warning system using digital media and other media outlets.

Framing, as it relates to genocide, is a means by which a communication source can construct and define a religious, cultural, political or ethnical issue for its audience. While many researchers of genocidal communication and the mass media have discussed framing, few have clearly identified how framing affects those that perpetrate genocide in relation to those that seek to stop it.

## **CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH CONTEXT**

### **Summary**

This chapter provides an overview of the historical, political, ethnic and cultural histories of each of the countries examined in the present research. This is important since each incidence of genocide emerges in its own context. Thus messaging, whether it is used to encourage or prevent genocide, will only be effective if it has cultural meaning and resonance for citizens.

### **Rwanda**

**Historical.** Originally colonized by Germany in the late 1800's, Rwanda quickly became a country that was annexed by military conquest like many other African nations during the period of European colonization. The following briefly summarizes some of the important historical and contextual issues that surround the Rwandan genocide.

**Cultural.** During this period of time the Germans believed the pre-established minority Tutsi ruling class was better positioned and in many ways more able to carry out what the Germans wanted. Because of their apparent "Hamitic" (Speke, 1863, p. 247) origins in other parts of Africa, the Tutsi were also thought of by the Germans as being more "European" (Saha, 2007, p. 130) than the Hutu. It was these commonalities that allowed the Tutsi to be accepted into a new form of in-group established by the Germans in order to exert the type of influence needed while at the same time ensuring a pliant ruling class. It was at this point this point that a preexisting divide between the Tutsi and the Hutu was taken to the next level.

**Political.** Shortly after the end of World War I, the League of Nations urged the Belgian people to accept governance responsibility over Rwanda, which they did. The Hutu allowed

themselves to hope that this might be an opportunity for unity and renewal. This was soon followed by disappointment only to find out that the Belgians would continue to rely heavily on the Tutsi ruling class (Kammerud, 1998, p. 11).

Finally, the Hutu population, which had grown in both size and influence, revolted in 1959 (Uvin, 1997, p. 105). This led to a completely independent Hutu government by 1962. Rather than finding common ground, the differences between the two groups continued to grow by the focus shifting from commonalities within their own individual in-groups to what made the out-groups different.

In the space of a hundred days between April and June of 1994 nearly 800,000 people became victims of a murderous genocide. It was ignited by the murder of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana when his plane was shot down over the Kigali airport on 6 April 1994 when it was trying to land. It is still unclear if this was part of a larger strategy to frame genocidal messages that would mute political opposition and control the masses. In Kigali, the presidential guard immediately sought revenge. While it was unknown at the time who bore responsibility for the assassination, political leaders of the opposition party were immediately sought out and were systematically murdered. Within hours, recruits were dispatched all over the country to carry out a wave of slaughter resulting in the death of even the most moderate opposition.

As the intensity grew between the two groups, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) began to threaten a civil war in 1990 if things did not change. Refugees began to pour across the boards spilling ethnic out-group tension into the surrounding countries. This was

followed by the 1994 Genocide, in which Hutu extremists eventually killed an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu (Kent, 2004, p. 855).

Like a forest fire that eventually burns itself out, the genocide finally ended but not until the devastation could be felt by every citizen within Rwanda as well as many of the surrounding countries. The loss of life and the lack of response by anyone to help left an indelible image on the hearts and minds of a lost generation.

From the very beginning, the United States and the international community resisted intervention. International governments initially refused to recognize it as genocide. After nearly two months of ethnic slaughter and a perceived credibility gap by the public at large, the international community settled for the carefully framed phrase “acts of genocide” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994, p. 1) when condemning the activities through the United Nations which carried with it no legal ramifications for the United States (Powers, 2001, p. 6).

## **Darfur**

**Historical.** Darfur has been mired in civil war and conflict for nearly a half century. However in February 2003, the breadth and width of the identifiable atrocities took a horrific turn. In a period of only 29 months nearly 400,000 people were murdered through direct violence, intentional malnutrition, and the disease that followed (Lacey, 2005). Another 2,000,000 were displaced and/or left for dead creating a tipping point that caused the near total breakdown of all acceptable societal norms (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008, p. 270).

Nearly nine years after the devastating change in the nature of this violence, this western Sudanese region is still remains a state of total disarray and destruction as the two primary rebel

groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) continue the decade old conflict against the Sudan government (Radio Dabanga, 2011).

**Cultural.** The vast majority of Sudan's tribes live peacefully with each other. However, struggles for social identity and in-group dominance between tribes in the north and the tribes in the south have a historically been at odds since Sudanese independence. The north, being largely of Arab descent, and the south largely of African, resented the northern tribes push towards "Arabization" (Hassan & Ray, 2009, pp. 18-19) within the country. Feeling a sense of forced loss of identity and helplessness within the southern associated tribes by this perceived attempt to replace local languages and culture with a one that is more nationalistic in nature, conflict and bloodshed began to ensue taking the form of an ongoing civil war.

Many Sudanese identify with individual tribes as the preferred in-group association rather than a larger nationalistic identity (Kimenyi, 1998, p. 50). The country's borders are less centered on national geographical boundaries and more centered around cultural and tribal boundaries creating confusion during times of conflict, which may at times spill over into contiguous countries. Since its independence from the British Commonwealth in on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1956 (Fadlalla, 2004, p. 38), Muslims aligned more closely with Egyptian culture in the north attempted to coalesce around a national Sudanese social identity in-group based on Middle Eastern culture, language and religion (Ali, 2008). This was done at the expense of many other tribal cultures throughout the country. This had an opposite effect in the end creating anger within the out-groups and proving to create an even large chasm between the divided cultures. One side effect however was the solidification of in-group identification and loyalties of a number of different tribes in the south. This culminated in the creation of the nation of South Sudan on July 9<sup>th</sup> 2011 (Beber, Roessler, & Scacco, 2011, p. 2).

**Political.** With a mixed form of black African tribes and a Middle Eastern Arab national government, Darfur is located in a remote region of western Sudan separated from the consolidated national power base established in the capital city of Khartoum. For years after the creation of a Sudanese state in 1916, Darfur remained on the outskirts of both African and Middle Eastern culture (Prunier, 2007, pp. 42-47). The country's lack of resources and general absence of any coherent nationalistic economic strategy created several marginalized regions within the country such as Darfur. This marginalization caused both internal grievance and tension between Darfur's "Arab" and "African" tribes, eventually culminating in the rebel conflict of February 2003, where armed groups of "African" heritage began to rebel against the government of Sudan.

## **Bosnia**

**Historical.** By 3 March 1992, the state government of Bosnia-Herzegovina had already decided through a poorly represented vote through referendum to declare its independence from the federal governing authority of its nation state, Yugoslavia (Campbell, 1998, p. 266). Over the next several years, Bosnian Serb forces would systematically target both Bosnian Muslims and Croatian political opposition for gross crimes of genocide and mass atrocities eventually resulting in the deaths of nearly 100,000 people by 1995, 80 percent of which were identified as Bosnian Muslims after it had all ended (History Channel, 2011).

**Cultural.** "The killing of a person destroys an individual memory. The destruction of cultural heritage erases the memory of a people. It is as if they were never there" (Bevan, 2001). As was mentioned above the 6 individual states of Yugoslavia each formed sub-cultures within the overall nationalistic culture being separated from the centralized leadership. As the numbers

of each state changed over the years, so did the levels of in-group influence amongst the states (see figure 1-A).




Figure 1-A (Dahlman, 2011, p. 327)

While the above data put out by the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo does not specifically identify the role of religious culture, the genocide campaign that would follow the declaration of independence within Bosnia Herzegovina clearly targeted Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats (History Channel, 2011). The genocidal campaign targeted nearly every violent act included in the U.N. declared definitions for genocide and mass atrocities from the targeting of intellectual leaders to the destruction of places of worship within a given religious ethnicity group.

**Political.** Following World War II, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia all became individual states as part of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Shortly after the death of longtime Yugoslav revolutionary leader Josip Broz Tito in

1980, a growing divide among the six Yugoslav states threatened to split the country apart. Taking advantage of in-group dissatisfaction throughout the country, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic rallied a sense of in-group unity by fomenting even greater discontent between Serbians, Croats and religious Muslims within Bosnia. In 1991 (History Channel, 2011), the individual Yugoslav states of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia all claimed their new status as free and sovereign independent nation states. During the ensuing war that followed, the bulk of the Yugoslav army, now located in Serbia, supported Serbian rebels in their brutal clashes with Croatian forces.

The declaration of Bosnian sovereignty on 15 October 1991 was quickly followed by a referendum for independence 5 months later (Campbell, 1998, p. 265). The referendum was boycotted by a great majority of Bosnian Serbs who not only disagreed with the process but also refused to even show up for a vote. This resulted in the creation of the new Bosnian independent state on 3 March 1992 (Campbell, 1998, p. 266). This became the foundation of discontent in which genocide would be perpetrated within the months that followed.

## **CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework**

### **Social Identity Theory**

The concept of social identity will be used in an attempt to ascertain certain intergroup genocidal messaging within the three case studies discussed above based on the perceived status, legitimacy and permeability of the intergroup environment. This will help identify how people develop attachments to groups in order to define their own personas, and how this process generates out-groups through perpetrator messages.

For purposes of this research, a key assumption have been made that influential leaders associated with an in-group will choose to identify where people sit on a continuum of influence between self and group in order to determine the level of influence that can be levied on the individual. This commonly identified in-group trait is called “interpersonal-intergroup continuum” (Tajfel, 1979, p. 35).

A second key assumption can then be made that regardless of where the individual sits within the intergroup continuum, those within the in-group will eventually “strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity” (Tajfel, 1979, p. 43). In the end the individual goal is to achieve a level of acceptable uniqueness within perceived permeability of group boundaries. Constantly looking for this unique balance is often times facilitated through a series of stages which at times can be superseded through associated acceptance by high status group members. This leads to our last assumption that having high status group’s members as sources for messages is likely to increase the impact of those messages.

Social identity theory, initially introduced by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (Reynolds, 2010, p. 32) suggests that people depend on groups they consider as “belonging” to in order to create and understand their own identities. Those they identify with, e.g., “Muslim”, “Tutsi” or “Black African” are called “in-groups.” To distinguish themselves from others, the concept of “out-groups” is developed. In genocide, perpetrators can be thought of as doing the same thing—defining who they are as an in-group and what it means to belong. The victims can be thought of as an “out-group” thus social identity theory is described and many of its tenets are brought to bear on the question of how messages about the out-group by the in-group develop and are used (Castano, 2008, p. 161).

Social identity does not simply refer to categorizing group members as having certain attributes. Rather, it is a psychological state that relates to human beings’ needs for belongingness and through which they create, at least in part, their own identities (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1443).

In-groups reinforce the cohesiveness of their own groups and reinforce each other’s beliefs and values. When in-group boundaries are perceived as impermeable and mobility between in-groups unacceptable, social competition can arise and may even be expected between in-groups and out-groups in order to solidify positive distinctiveness of the group’s social identity. It is at this point where hierarchal opinion leaders from within the group begin to test their boundaries of influence.

When social identification begins to shift from the identification of similarities to the identification of what makes others different, friction can begin to form between in-groups and out-groups. It is within this type of social group environment that derogation of out-groups

occurs through a range of strategies intended to exaggerate differences and perpetuate a goal of demonization in order to solidify in-group positioning of both individuals within the group and the stature of the group. It is this process that in the end can become most dangerous and creates an environment more susceptible to genocide and mass atrocities (Laitin, 2000, p. 854).

### **Agenda building**

For purposes of this research, the theory of agenda building will be looked at as tool to identify intentional perpetrator messaging that reinforces in-group cohesion and may denigrate out-groups. These messages will be examined to identify factors such as the level of in-group participation involvement used to create a sense of community by the perpetrator in order to increase his or her hierarchical influence and position within the group. Other aspects are also examined such as the medium type, the messaging category, and the identification of any metaphors and similes objectification used in order to achieve a desired end state.

Scholars and mass communication theorists such as Dahl (1956), Schattschneider (1960), and Gamson (1968), first applied the term agenda building to the processes by which “groups attempt to move issues from their own agendas to those of policymakers” (Denham, 2010, p. 308) within the political process. Dahl was so confident of the potential effectiveness and thus the explanatory theories of agenda building that he actually went as far as to say that Time Magazine founder Henry Luce may have had “a thousand or ten thousand times greater control over the alternatives scheduled for debate and tentative decision during a national election” (Dahl, 1956, pp. 72-73) than the average citizen or even the politician themselves due to the systematic ability that print media of that era had over influencing the general populace through messaging.

Agenda building theory focuses primarily on the pre-established intent and desired end state of the editorial review process of those who disseminate information in relation to how ideas and messages are selected as they are diffused throughout a larger population. In effect, agenda building theory is the means by which the editorial review process of information is governed. While agenda-setting theories attempt to identify the relationship between the stories that are being reported/published and the priorities of its intended audience, most of the research surrounding agenda building examines the targeted intent of the communicator in developing thematic messaging that helps achieve a specific goal or end state. Agenda building is often used in public relations research to explain how interest groups, corporate entities, and others who seek influence or approval from publics attempt to mold news and entertainment reporting.

Chaffee (1975) writes that “important questions about communication, the ones that are likely to yield theoretically generalizable answers, may not be those that inquire into specific agents of change in individual behavior, but instead those that identify structural behaviors that are properties of the socio-political system” (p. 87). That will be the goal in how this theory is applied to the overall research data.

### **Inter-theory research relationship**

To understand the different ways that social identity theory and agenda building theory are related to the issue of message framing and genocide, one can begin with the concepts of in-group inertia. The system of inertia established through agenda building can make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to change the prevailing biases created within the population for whom it is intended to reach once it has taken root. This begs the question as to whether the

profession of journalism or the media itself could be instrumental in identifying a consistent set of messaging strategies in each of the three cases that we will be looking at.

In the case of Rwanda, Hutu influence leaders had already made the decision by March 1994 that the Tutsi and those Hutus who sympathized with Tutsis needed to be removed. These influence leaders immediately began to build on pre-existing thematic messaging that reinforced social identification needs for belongingness and in-group defense as in any other threatened in-group. Once the idea of self-preservation was generally accepted within the in-group, a new boundary was then established allowing the in-group's opinion leader to expand his or her influence. This general acceptance within the Hutu population could then take the form of a prejudicial bias that led to greater acceptance of individual hierarchical positions within the in-group. This can then begin to influence and shape other areas of social life and action such as the re-defining of what is or is not acceptable behavior when it comes to more specific acts of genocide such as the taking of what out-group members would perceive as innocent lives. From this point a new platform can be established that is more vulnerable to even greater types of in-group influence. An in-group like this is governed by both a reinforcing hierarchical influence and social acceptance. This may create powerful reinforcement of biases and what the in-group perceives as morally acceptable or even desirable behaviors which then creates a potential impermeable boundary where it is difficult to change the prevailing bias that determines what is or is not considered morally acceptable behavior while a part of the in-group.

Social identity theory and agenda building both show promising contributions to what we understand about the message impacts in genocide. Agenda-building could become a valued tool in answering many of the unanswered questions that social identity theories create in regards to

genocidal in-groups. As part of explication of the two theories the following questions may need to be answered:

1. Can social identity be manufactured artificially in order to expand, manipulate and mobilize the in-group?
2. How does perpetrator messaging influence loyalties within the group?
3. Can social identity be centered on common activities or ideas through perpetrator messaging?

### **Relevance of the research**

Theories of social identity and agenda building can help explain how and by what means genocidal leaders use perpetrator messaging in the areas of religion, race, culture and politics. The present research may assist in developing strategy for dealing with the possibilities and early development of genocide.

As the U.S. Army copes with the development of violence in other countries, it is important to acknowledge that the current media and messaging environment is nothing short of a “new battleground” (Schleifer, 2009 , p. 4). This may be seen in the example of the 2005 Ayman al- Zawahiri correspondence to the head of al Qaeda in Iraq, Musab al-Zarqawi, saying “we are in a battle and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media; we are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of ummah” (Janbek, 2011, p. 31).

The exploration of messages used in genocidal cases is a means by which researchers can understand how in-groups can construct and define a religious, cultural, political or ethnical issue for its audience. I will discuss important conceptual differences between social identity, agenda

building and other more traditional theories of persuasion that focus on inter-group belief change. The findings suggest that perpetrator messages are rooted in creating or exaggerating differences of out-groups from in-groups that may then be an aspect of agenda building. This agenda building involves deliberate and systematic framing of ideas with goals to legitimate violence against out-groups through a variety of strategies. I will close by reflecting on the various routes by which genocidal messages can influence in-group attitudes and understanding of the issues.

### **Research Methodology**

The qualitative approach used to obtain the information needed to answer the primary research question will take the form of a textual analysis centered on three separate case studies (Rwanda, Darfur, and Bosnia) that look at the perpetrator messaging of genocidal influence leaders through the theoretical framework of social identity and agenda building. This approach will link both the conceptual and logistical frameworks required to serve as the support structure for this research project. This qualitative method uses inductive approaches to understand what messages were used and became prevalent in each case. By attempting to examine the perpetrator messaging, it should allow for the identification of patterns and/or variances within the messages and any links they may have to genocidal opinion leader influence.

### **Methodology/Textual Analysis**

**Research Question.** Is there a consistent set of message types that can be identified in each of the three cases or will the messages show significant differences across the three cases?

**Explanation.** This research will be a textual analysis of media perpetrator messages implicated in outbreaks of genocide in three of the most recent and virulent instances: Rwanda,

Darfur, and Bosnia. They were selected because they extensively discussed messages and the media that carried them. The study will examine what the predominant messages were within the in-groups, how they related to those messages, and the conditions within the country that may have been contributing factors. The theoretical foundation for this study will be social identity theory, which explains how people develop attachments to groups to help define their own personas, and how this process generates out-groups, that is, those who are seen as not belonging to the same defining group as “self”. In-groups reinforce the cohesiveness of their own groups and reinforce each other’s beliefs and values. In addition, in-groups tend to derogate out-groups through a range of strategies and tend to exaggerate differences and potentially demonize them.

After the analysis of the three case studies from this theoretical perspective, there will be a comparison of the messages in the three. This approach will enhance the validity of the research by doing two things:

- Revealing descriptions surrounding the correlating message frames with categorical identification
- Identifying recurring patterns of message framing and communication behavior that the use of more ethnographic approaches may be unable to recognize.

**Population of Interest.** The in-group populations of Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur during the times of the genocidal activities will be the primary populations of interest for this study. This textual analysis will have two primary boundaries as it relates to the case studies: the Agenda Building and Social Identification of violent messages as they relate to four categorical focus areas: religion, culture, race and politics (Schabas, 1948).

**Categories.** The method will start with coding of any reference to a perpetrator message referred to in any of the three case studies. If possible, that message will be categorized into one of the four areas identified by the U.N. as falling under the definition of genocidal causes. Particular attention will be paid to perpetrator messaging related to the variant treatment or demonization of a certain out-group or in-group based on ethnicity (racial), national and international decision making (political). If a message does not fit into one of these categories, other categories may be developed.

## **CHAPTER 4: Results**

The following reveals the results of textual analysis of the case studies. The messages are then compared with each other in an attempt to determine if a consistent set of message types can be identified or if the messages show significant differences across the three cases. Whenever possible, original perpetrator messaging transcripts will also be used to verify individual case study findings and to ensure that they are authoritative representations of the situation that is being discussed.

### **The Use of Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide: Study of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTL) By: Hege Løvdal Gulseth**

**Introduction.** The case study *Use of Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide* was conducted in the context of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This international criminal court was established in the fall of 1994 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 in an attempt to provide a reconciliation process through which transitional justice could be executed (United Nations, 1994). The goal of the court was to judge those most responsible for the Rwandan Genocide that had taken place from April to June of 1994. What was relatively unique to this particular time period shortly before this case study had been completed was the emphasis that the 2003 trial of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTL) put on media and the use of perpetrator messaging. This became a direct recognition of the destructive role perpetrator messaging plays in cases of genocide and mass atrocities.

On 3 December 2003, the ICTR found RTL leaders Ferdinand Nahimana, and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza guilty on all counts and handed down prison sentences ranging from 30

years to life (2003, p. 20). On 14 December 2009, five years after the completion of this case study, RTLM announcer Valerie Bemeriki was also found guilty through the Rwandan justice system and sentenced to life imprisonment for her role in inciting actual genocidal acts (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2010, p. 4).

While the guilty verdict provided a foundation for the validity in the research conducted for this case study, it was the research question studied that makes it relevant to this research. The case study attempts to determine how the radio station RTLM was used as a political tool for the Hutu extremists (Gulseth, 2004, p. 4). The researcher attempts to answer this question through a textual analysis of RLTM transcripts, the bulk of which are still available and can be verified through the online site Genocide Archive Rwanda (Genocide Archive Rwanda, 2011) as well as the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human rights (2011).

**Summary.** Gulseth draws on the tradition of content analysis as it is presented by Holsti (1969) in the book *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Holsti, 1969). The author begins by examining the four pillars that were suspected to have laid the foundation required to facilitate the perpetrator messaging:

1. What kind of institutional framework did RTLM work in?
2. How did the context influence the propaganda message?
3. What kind of propaganda techniques did the RTLM make use of?
4. How did RTLM interpret major political events?

**Context.** Gulseth points out that while RTLM had only received its transmitting license a year earlier, during the first few days of the genocidal activities it was broadcasting nearly 24

hours a day (Metzl, 1997, p. 632). Accessibility to radios and batteries was increased when the Rwandan government obtained foreign aid to purchase them under the auspices that they would be needed to promote modernization within the farming and agricultural communities (Gulseth, 2004, p. 6). By the early 1980's it was believed that 1 out of every 13 citizens in Rwanda had his/her own radio and it was presumed that by 1994 that number had increased dramatically (Mpambara, 2003, p. 10).

Rwanda was densely populated at the time and the majority of the citizenry was engaged in an agrarian lifestyle. The ruling Hutu represented nearly 84% of the population with the Tutsi representation at only 14% by 1994 and in a progressive decline (CIA, 2004). With the institutional framework in place needed to provide the Rwandan government's informative reach into most of the countryside, the scene was now set for an enhanced level of perpetrator influence that would eventually end in mass murder and the elimination nearly 75% of the Tutsi population.

“Genocide does not start with the murder of masses of people, it starts in peoples' minds; before the weapons comes the image, before you can eliminate your enemy, you must define it” (Gulseth, 2004, p. 9). Through the use of radio broadcasts, the Hutu-led Rwanda government would go on to create the “cognitive and normative framework” (Fujii, 2003, p. 8) required to mobilize the killing masses.

The case study attempts to identify biased use of oral sourcing by the RLTM. The researcher points out the correlation in the use of biased sourcing as a vital part of perpetrator messaging. The use of biased sources became necessary to ensure the proper environment could be set for the transmission of the “Hutu power” ideology. For instance, RTLTM journalist

Valérie Bemeriki stated: "...I consulted other intellectuals, our country has got many scholars, professors of University, people who completed universities...I had a discussion with them. Their views and our editor's confirm each other, which means that what Gaspard Gahigi said was true" (RTLTM, 2011).

In addition to biased sourcing that facilitates an ideology, Gulseth points out that a deliberate strategy had to be put in place (Gulseth, 2004, p. 61) to ensure that all opposition to the "Hutu power" ideology would be dealt with swiftly and thoroughly. In late 1991, a commission of ten Hutu government officials prepared a targeted strategic communications plan for defeating the Tutsi enemy "in the military, media and political domains" (Forges, 199, p. 62). This communications strategy provides the first indications of genocidal agenda building and perpetrator messaging with the end state in mind.

I was able to further reinforce the theory in the necessity of agenda building through the direct analysis of the following broadcast transcript on RTLTM on April 15 and June 21, 1994: "However, our war does not use bullets. It uses papers and words" (MIGS, 2011) "However, your weapon RTLTM is there, it will fight against them..." (MIGS, 2011).

As with any perpetrator messaging, when building an agenda it requires the classification and eventual separation of the target audience. In addition to the general populace, the RTLTM seems to have focused much of its messaging on security forces and local militias who were primarily of Hutu descent (Kirschke, 1996, p. 86). In this way, radio became the primary tool of in-group messaging and would eventually be the medium by which death orders would be given.

While this case study was predominantly focused on the perpetrator messaging transmitted via the RTLTM, a broader set of media utilization techniques were likely in use. Bias

in print media became evident in that the Hutu power base within the government also enjoyed the support of the national newspaper Kangura. The paper's slogan was "the voice which seeks to awaken and defend the majority people" (Kirschke, 1996, p. 62). The textual analysis showed that this was most likely a counter messaging technique intended to limit the impact of minority influence within the general populace (Kirschke, 1996, p. 62).

The case points out that perpetrator messaging can be made more powerful by "incorporating opposing arguments in a way that tends to discredit the message, while at the same time leading the audience to believe that they have heard both sides of a dispute" (Gulseth, 2004, p. 83). Examples of this could be found textually in RTLM transcripts on January 6 and March 16 1994: "That Tutsi woman with a gap between the front teeth asked me: 'Kantano, why did you tell lies?'" (RTLM, 2011) "The same Inyenzi have declared this morning that our President, His Excellency Theodore Sindikubwabo is becoming fusty with old age, because of his encouragement to Kibuye population, he lastly visited. The Inyenzi said that 'in his old age, he should follow Mandela's example'" (RTLM, 2011).

**Interpretation.** The agenda of dehumanization through the lack of sourcing identity in opposition sourcing was an attempt not only to draw clear lines of separation but also to solidify positive in-group distinctiveness. Gulseth's analyses of the of the content leading up to the 1994 genocide shows that "journalists and the external sources created a positive image of the radio station in 19 of the 25 broadcasts, and altogether 56 thematic parts of these broadcasts belonged to this category. This high number indicates the level of importance that the RTLM placed on creating a positive self-image" (Gulseth, 2004, p. 85).

From this point of positive self-image the RTLM could then elicit great trust while exerting greater influence with their intended audience. I was able to independently confirm this through the following textual transcripts on 24 November 1993 and 15 April 1994: “They [the Inkotanyi] will hide the truth from you and RTLM will reveal it, even if it were to be in trouble because of that. That is our unique assignment” (RTLM, 2011). “We will tell you the truth on our radio” (MIGS, 2011).

The combination of solidifying positive distinctiveness within a group while accusing the “other as lying” (Gulseth, 2004, p. 87) can become a powerful combination of perpetrator messaging designed to enhance hierarchical influence within an identity group.

When cognitive dissonance within the larger population overrides opinion leader influence, additional perpetrator messaging must be explored. The case study researcher points out that a message of “positive intention” (Gulseth, 2004, p. 87) could be identified in 17 different broadcasts leading up to the genocidal activity. I was able to verify this in the following textual transcripts on 22 April 1994: “So RTLM will go on broadcasting in its armored vehicle, wherever it will go, it will keep speaking for the majority of Rwandans, it will give you its opinions, it will never be discouraged, it will never close” (MIGS, 2011). “Dear fighting friends, we [RTLM] are here for you, during war we don’t give you up, we go on fighting at your side. [RTLM] ...represent the popular will” (MIGS, 2011).

Focused blame is another perpetrator tool targeting the out-groups as a scapegoat through symbolic identification. Gulseth was able to identify the use of this technique in 12 of 25 RTLM transcripts. I was able to independently verify this through very direct accusatory language regarding opposition leaders in the 12 April 1994 transcript:

“The sad events we are living are brought about by people like Twagiramungu Faustin alias Rukokoma, Kanyarengwe, Bizimungu Pasteur, the latter who spoilt all the Arusha Accords believing that Rwandans would accept the declarations he made in Arusha.

These people and all other accomplices in the country have ruined this country, plunging it in such misfortunes” (RTL, 2011).

This attempt to focus ire is at the very least an oversimplification, and at the very worst a targeted attempt to misplace blame. The theory being used here is that by using the out-group as a scapegoat it highlights the positive strength of the in-group.

This perpetrator message of scapegoating the out-group was likely an attempt to justify the initial acts of genocide. The genocide was ignited by the murder of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana when his plane was shot down over the Kigali airport on 6 April 1994 when it was trying to land. As soon as the President’s plane crashed, the Presidential Guards began killing. “Prunier sees these events as a support for the view that the assassination and the ensuing killings were connected. An unknown RTL journalist agreed:” (Gulseth, 2004, p. 90) “Rwanda is facing many problems and many misfortunes because of the death of the Chief of State His Excellency Major General Habyarimana Juvenal... After that, many other bad things happened, we lost many people...” (RTL, 2011).

**Conclusions.** The case study *Use of Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide* goes on to identify nine additional techniques, many of which are variations under similar perpetrator messaging already discussed. These include techniques such as Band-Wagon, Highlighting Its Own Strength, Alleged Intentions, Use of Stereotypes, Use of Threats, Name-Calling, Call for Action, Description of Activities and Use of Euphemisms, Repetition. While it is clear that

perpetrator messaging was both over-powering and pervasive, only a single page was dedicated to counter messaging strategy. There was a clear attempt to identify what happened and why it happened without answering the question as to what end. This was likely an intentional effort to allow the readers to apply it as they saw fit.

The perpetrator messaging represented in this case study was in line with many of the coexisting themes that had been around since the late 19th and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The potency of this type of perpetrator messaging was most likely to be effective because of its familiarity with “existing presuppositions” (Gulseth, 2004, p. 77). This played an intricate part in the opinion leaders’ ability to exert influence on the in-group.

This case study seems to indicate that strong perpetrator messaging campaigns tend to form around a consolidated centralized decision making process. It was clear through the use of agenda building and social identity that the use of RTLTM offered the greatest likelihood of success in attempting to provide in-group influence from a centralized location while still being able to achieve the desired end state.

These textual analyses of RTLTM transcripts provide a unique perspective on perpetrator messaging. Through the identification of propaganda techniques and thematic imagery, a single primary messaging characteristic can be identified; perpetrator messaging in the Rwanda genocide was primarily focused on the in-group (the Hutu) but did include messaging focused on the out-group (the Tutsi) as a contributor.

## **Mass-Atrocity Crimes in Darfur and the Response of Government of Sudan Media to International Pressure: by Frank Chalk and Danielle Kelton**

**Introduction.** The case study *Mass-Atrocity Crimes in Darfur and the Response of Government of Sudan Media to International Pressure* offers a unique overview that characterizes the struggles between those of Muslim faith living in the north and holding positions of influence in the government and the black Africans who made up much of the tribal west and southwest. What makes this particular event different is the unique mixture of religion against race and vice versa. The two categories of genocidal condition bring in both the complexities of spiritual life and the physical.

When looking at historical perpetrator messaging techniques, Chalk and Kelton point out that the first and greatest indicator of perpetrator messaging is can be found in the “carefully crafted information it fed to its people in their own language” (Chalk, 2009, p. 151). Political scientist and RAND corporation researcher Alexander George reinforces the same theory through studies of the broadcasts of German radio during World War II. George clearly illustrates how “Joseph Goebbels and his aides had prepared the German public for important changes in policy through anticipatory news releases and commentaries” (Chalk, 2009, p. 151). By diagramming the relationships we will be able to show the correlation between the messaging intent and the medium it would require. German guidance and directives were issued using the process depicted in Figure 1-B on a weekly and sometimes even daily basis during times of high operational activities. The Goebbels model is as follows:




Figure 1-B (Chalk, 2009, p. 113)

**Summary.** This study “examines Government of Sudan (GOS) domestic radio and television news broadcasts as indicators of the Sudanese government’s intentions in Darfur and Southern Sudan” (Chalk, 2009, p. 151). The case study does this by addressing a series of relevant questions that could lead to greater upheaval or peace.

1. Does the GOS genuinely intend to share authority over Darfur’s and Southern Sudan’s oil and other natural resources and grant their citizen’s fair portions of the revenues accruing from their sale?
2. Will the government in Khartoum call off and disarm the Janjaweed militia, ending its harassment, rape, and murder of civilians in Darfur?
3. Is the GOS serious about implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for the south?

This case study, based on extensive content and textual analysis, attempts to assess “translations of transcripts from Arabic to English covering the major government-owned broadcasters and websites in Sudan accessed through a subscription to the BBC Monitoring Service. Those broadcasters monitored by the BBC include Republic of Sudan Radio (Arabic/Omdurman), Sudan TV (Arabic and, rarely, English/Omdurman), the Sudanese Media Centre website (Arabic/Khartoum), and the Sudan News Agency (SUNA) website (Arabic and English/Khartoum)” (Chalk, 2009, p. 153).

**Context.** The population of Sudan prior to the recent establishment of South Sudan had reached more than 41 million people, with a literacy rate nearing 61% (Chalk, 2009, p. 152). Of the 41 million people approximately 250,000 households had television sets (Division, 2004). While access to the internet is growing in Sudan, in 2005 it was limited to approximately 1.14 million users (CIA, 2006).

In 2005 Freedom House named Sudan one of the most oppressive governments in in all of Africa when it comes to allowing independent media and freedom of the press (Freedom House , 2005). “The Government [of Sudan] directly controlled radio and television and required that they reflect government policies, and television has a permanent military censor to ensure that the news reflected official views, reported the US Department of State in 2005” (Bureau of Democracy, 2006).

Foreign media and outside international aid organizations faced stiff governmental restrictions, office raids by local law enforcement (Reuters, 2003) and confiscation of broadcasting equipment when they were deemed to be “transmitting programs with false information and poor biased analyses” (International, 2004). Article 25 of the Press Law of Sudan does not allow for the “publication of any news about the armed forces without their prior authorization” (International, 2004).

**Interpretation.** Distorted revisions of news broadcasts are not uncommon features in Sudan’s domestic media. On 9 September 2004, former Secretary of State Colin Powell used the word “genocide” to describe the government in Sudan’s actions regarding its oppressive practices (Lynch, 2004). The statements were met with immediate counter-messaging in a press release by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry that attempted to first belittle the remark as

“regrettable” and “political” in nature (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2004). The Sudanese minister goes on to say that the: “Description of the situation in Darfur as genocide does not correspond with the findings of other officials who visited the area, and that it will only worsen the situation and give the wrong signal to rebels at the Abuja talks.” Despite the "unfounded remark", the statement continued, “the government will continue its efforts and good intentions to find a peaceful solution at Abuja” (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2004).

Shortly after Secretary Powell’s return to the United States the United Nations adopted Resolutions 1556 & 1564 which called for the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militia (United Nations, 2004), an unofficial arm of the GOS and strong supporter of the current administrations principle ideology, or face international trade sanctions (United Nations, 2004). Domestic media re-broadcasts stripped the news segments of the genocidal language and refused to inform the general populace of the division between the GOS and the international community.

Similar to the redefining and devaluation tactics, domestic media omissions were also demonstrated with The U.N. General Secretary’s criticisms during his visit to Sudan in May 2005 (Service, 2005). Kofy Annan’s visit came shortly after the U.N. Security Council referral of atrocity crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague. While Annan noted that there had been improvement in recent days he also pointed out that the violence had mounted in early May (Service, 2005). The GOS in turn omitted all Sudanese government criticism and commented only on Annan’s concerns over rebel violence (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2005).

The Sudanese messaging was immediate. “In its version, in his meeting with Foreign Minister Isma‘il, Annan had focused on rebel atrocities in Darfur, emphasized his “appreciation of Sudan’s cooperation with the UN, and underscored the government’s positive role in accomplishing the Southern Sudan peace agreement” (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2005).

Sudan’s ministry of communication left nothing to chance. General criticism of Sudanese policies within the international community became commonplace and could be identified as a regular trigger for the Sudanese government to initiate a counter-misinformation campaign within their domestic media. As an example of this, shortly after the stinging release of the U.N. Human Rights Office Report on Sudan in the spring of 2004 discussing the genocide in Darfur, Republic of Sudan Radio adamantly denied that any such activity had taken place and began publishing quoted statements from “officials of the African Union (AU) and the World Health Organization who said they saw no evidence of genocide in Darfur” (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2004).

As a final example of messaging distortions and strategic communications triggering by the Darfur Situation in Sudan’s Domestic Media, shortly after U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew into Khartoum on 21 July 2005 and declared to Sudanese President al-Bashir that Sudan had “a credibility problem and that she wanted to see actions not words by his government to quell the violence in Western Darfur” (Chalk, 2009, p. 9), the GOS put out that Secretary Rice had: “Lauded the efforts made by the government to resolve the crisis and held out the possibility of upgrading relations between Sudan and the United States” (Chalk, 2009, p. 9).

This was nothing less than a complete fabrication. This may indicate that there is a correlation between the level of offense taken and the level of liberal justification taken in perpetrator counter messaging. In this case it would mean that everything must be responded to and the more offense that is taken, the greater the likelihood of an inaccurate response. While the Sudanese government knows that the international media traveling along with the distinguished visitors likely have access to the truth, the perpetrator realizes that the international media is not the target audience, the population of Sudan is. This may also indicate forethought and once again brings perpetrator messaging back to agenda building and desired end states.

This case study lists a series of pre-determined triggers through textual analysis of the word “genocide.” Throughout the summer and fall of 2004 the mere mention of the word “genocide” in the international media would be sure to elicit a response. Radio Sudan declared: “any suggestion of genocide was simply Western propaganda reflecting Zionist influence and Western jealousy of Sudan’s great wealth and rich culture” (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire , 2004).

Sheik al-Karuri alleged on Sudan TV after Friday night prayers that: “US government sympathy for the Darfur rebels arose from American lust to gain control of Sudan’s oil reserves in the region” (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2004). This frame was further built upon by creating a perpetrator message of the west as an out-group only interested in: “Advancing the interests of the Zionist entity” (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2004).

This demonstrates an agenda to build on commonly accepted thematic messaging within the in-group. It is an indicator of the use of agenda building as a means to promote belonging,

while establishing a clear distinction between “us” and “other.” This approach to perpetrator messaging serves two goals in this instance:

1. Intentional solidification of in-group loyalty and positive position within the group
2. Promotion of out-group competition to promote the in-group’s overall position within the social identity hierarchical constructs.

Portraying the out-group as a self-concerned Zionist entity became a common theme within the government of Sudan. It was a useful tool that drew a clear line of distinction based on religious messaging. These themes demonstrated the Sudanese government’s tendencies to re-enforce the minority Islamic positions of “Arabization” as pointed out earlier by the writings of Salah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (2009).

This approach to building in-group loyalty through religious messaging had several progressive steps that could be taken depending on the agenda that is being built. Defense of faith and defense of sovereignty messaging would be used in later phases.

The government of Sudan consistently rejected U.N. peacekeeping solutions being offered. Under a theme of a “Sovereign Sudan” “President al-Bashir totally rejected U.N. forces and declared that:” “He would prefer to be a leader for the resistance in Darfur rather than being a President of an occupied country” (Sudanese News Agency, 2006)

The “Sovereignty of Sudan” message had a naturally progressive stage as well in the theme that Sudan “has the Darfur crisis under control.” This could then build upon the theme that the Sudanese government is “dedicated to the peace process” and to the “Economic and Social Development in Darfur” (Chalk, 2009, p. 16). All of these themes that were used

demonstrate a perpetrator messaging approach that was both intentional and stated with the end state in mind. It is these characteristics that provide the greatest indications of a perpetrator messaging strategy built upon the theory of agenda building.

**Conclusion.** This case study draws correlating progressive themes most likely to be found in the Darfur genocide such as:

1. “Intimidation of Editors and Reporters in Sudan” (Chalk, 2009, p. 4).
2. “The Distorted Versions of the Darfur Situation in Sudan’s Domestic Media” (Chalk, 2009, p. 6).
3. “Triggers Prompting the Government of Sudan to Broadcast Misinformation at Home, May 2004–August 2006, and the Emerging Narrative of President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir” (Chalk, 2009, p. 10).
4. “Key Themes in Government of Sudan Domestic Broadcasts and Web Media” (Chalk, 2009, p. 14).
5. “How the Media Prepares the Population for Changes in Policy: The Southern Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan’s Media and the Darfur Peace Agreement” (Chalk, 2009, p. 29).

Identifying messaging techniques and analyzing text only serves to measure intent.

Determining the nature as is discussed at the beginning of this case study in regards to the approach taken by Germany’s Joseph Goebbels during World War II is far more challenging.

These are activities that take place behind closed doors where a measure of effectiveness is felt after the fact. The advantage that we have today is that of 20/20 hindsight. While it may be

difficult to pin down while it is happening, the process becomes significantly more identifiable with the addition of online transcription and the publishing of legal case testimony.

What this case study does demonstrate through its analysis of both text and medium is that each medium was linked to a specific type of message and each message served a greater purpose linking back to the overall agenda of the perpetrator. There are clearly identifiable patterns for the use of radio, TV and internet. The Sudanese government leveraged TV and internet to prepare the educated, wealthy and elite for upcoming policy changes in terms of the eventual shift in major message phasing as it related to the government's position. When government support of the Janjaweed become more painful because of growing pressure in the international community as it related to the expansion of U.N. resolutions and eventual sanctions, the TV and internet were used to prepare the educated elite for the government's potential support for the stand-up of the south Sudan and rebel peace accord. Radio stations on the other hand were used to address the operational factors related to the poor and aggregate class located further away from the capitol power base.

What is made most apparent throughout this case study is that the struggle in Darfur is not yet over and the nation of Sudan has been woefully unprepared by the perpetrator messaging agenda that was so effective during the first decade of the new millennium. Neither Sudan nor South Sudan shows any indication that they are prepared "for the loss of revenue that would accompany any seriously implemented sharing of oil revenues with the south and the west, and schooled by the government media to regard southerners and Darfurians as fractious, disorganized, and backward interlopers in the serious work of governing Sudan, Arab northerners are unready for accommodation with the southern and western regions of the country

which contribute the bulk of its revenues” (Chalk, 2009, p. 35). This in and of itself presents the single most significant risk to peace since the signing of the accord in July of 2011.

### **War-Time Propaganda: Media As An Instrument of Manipulation By: Hanna Blank**

**Introduction.** The case study *War-Time Propaganda: Media as an Instrument of Manipulation* is an analysis of the “methods and principles of war propaganda in the media” (Blank, 2005, p. 72) during the Bosnian genocide. Blank points out that while war-time propaganda bent on genocide in the Bosnian war could not create war in and of itself tolerance of it “could not have been assured unless the public accepted that armed conflict would not be an excessive price for the pursuit of nationalistic objectives...the media were essential to procure such acceptance.” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 291). This case study more specifically examines “the methods and principals of war propaganda in the media used during the 90s in the Balkan region” (Blank, 2005, p. 72).

**Summary.** In the absence of outside motivating information, people generally do not prefer conflict. History has shown that while this is a general rule, it can be affected through a series of coordinated mechanisms. Through a series of linked concepts such as:

“Conflict or war wasn’t ‘our’ choice, but ‘we’ have to defend ourselves from ‘them’, to confront ‘our’ not self-serving goals and good cause to ‘their’ selfish and bad causes, like this one, can describe the situation in Serbia during the 1990s” (Blank, 2005, p. 72).

Slobodan Milošević, the popularly elected President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia attempted to perpetrate the false message to his citizens that “the Serbian side never attacks; it responds to enemy provocations, assaults, crimes or genocide (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 90).” This messaging was intentionally designed less to ensure the citizenry why Serbia would not be

involved in conflict but why they must engage in conflict. In the end this simple perpetrator messaging is the first stage in preparing the general populace for war.

As an example the Serbian media represented Serbian forces as: “Unarmed defenders of centuries-old hearths, defenders and liberators of towns and territories” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 90).

**Context.** Milošević began attempting to gain direct control over the media outlets as early as 1986-1987 (Bennett, 1998). This five-year process was completed by the summer of 1991. The very next year “Radio Television Belgrade, together with Radio Television Novi Sad (RTNS) and Radio Television Pristina (RTP)” (Bennett, 1998) was brought in underneath the umbrella of Radio Television of Serbia (RTS). It was from this point that the pieces were all put in place to perpetrate one of the worst acts of European genocide since the end of World War II.”

**Interpretations.** For several months the perpetrator messaging refused to acknowledge that Sarajevo had been bombarded by Serbian forces. In fact the exact opposite had occurred; according to the reporter Rada Djokic: “Muslim authorities were holding Sarajevo under siege from within, so that the Serbs were in the position to defend their century-old hills around Sarajevo” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 90).

Blank identifies the second critical moment of perpetrator messaging required to mobilize the public.....”Fear” (Blank, 2005, p. 72). It is the fear stage that is required for public acceptance of the morally repugnant. This type of perpetrator messaging addresses commonly accepted fears that are found to be acceptable to the vast majority of citizens such as loss of “independence, honor, liberty, even life and that the war forces the implementation of undisputable values” (Blank, 2005, p. 72).

Blank points out that this stage was emphasized in the Bosnian genocide through enhanced clarification of additional framing aspects, e.g., the idea that the object of fear was omnipresent. This was further enhanced by reputation and clearly defining “Us as good” and “Other as bad”. This was done by several carefully constructed frames: “Muslim forces, mujahidin, Muslim-Croat forces, Muslim extremists, Muslim paramilitary organizations, etc” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 26).

This leads to the beginning of the third readily identifiable stage of perpetrator messaging used in the Bosnian genocide: demonization and dehumanizing. “Typical for Serbian and Croatian propaganda was, for example, to call Serbian forces on the one side ‘Serb terrorists’ or ‘Serbo Communist army of occupation’; on the other side Croatian forces were called ‘Ustasha’, equalizing them with the army of Hitler’s wartime puppet state” (Zimmermann, 1999, p. 328). As an example of this, the word “vampirical” was a preferred derogatory slang used in the Serbian war propaganda. “Radovan Karadzic, war leader of Bosnian Serbs, described the war in Croatia as war against a ‘vampirized fascist consciousnesses’” (Malcolm, 1994, p. 228)

Another critical aspect identified during the Bosnia propaganda campaign was the ability to exert control, influence and censorship over the adaptation of out-group messaging. This could include the falsifying of casualty reports, reducing the level of detail if necessary, “prejudicial commentaries, sheer hate speech and glossing over of controversial events” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 200).

When dealing with foreign media that were less easily controlled or manipulated, different tactics were used. Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) was often deployed as a counter messaging tool. “Denial of the foreign report, spoiling the effect of the story by careful

preparation and presentation, moving it to the end of the news program or sending parallel reports to detract from the authentic news have been used as methods to keep negative information out of the news” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 92).

Eliciting the use of the RTS required direct guidance and coordinated efforts to ensure that counter messaging activities would line up with the pre-determined perpetrator messaging strategies. “For example in 1999 the Serbian Ministry of Information gave concrete instructions to refer for example to actions of police or army as ‘defensive activities’, or NATO forces had to be referred to as ‘the aggressor’” (Thompson M. , 1999, p. 117).

**Conclusion.** The case study concludes by recapping the role that state-run media played during a critical period of genocide towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. State-run media as a tool of suppression legitimated and falsely justified terrible atrocities as a means of categorically exercising what was determined to be the national goals of Slobodan Milošević. The Bosnian genocide of the 1990’s represented a systematic approach aimed at “evoking fear and manipulation of ordinary people, public tolerance for peace, and security-threatening policies” (Blank, 2005, p. 74).

In the end, Slobodan Milošević was tried and found guilty by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in part through eleven separate indictments related to the intentional use of state run media for perpetrator messaging to commit acts of genocide and mass atrocities (United Nations, 2011). The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights reported that the state controlled media: “Persistent propaganda played a major role in shaping the stances of listeners. Hence, the Serbian radio was doing precisely what it was tasked with: it turned Serbs in

the RS against cooperation with the FB&H and discouraged them from returning to their homes in the other entity” (Rights, 1997, p. 1).

## **Chapter 5: Discussion**

### **Messages**

There is much to be said about perpetrator messaging when addressing genocide over the last 30 years. A textual analysis of each case study identified themes that were both common and unique to each circumstance that was identified. Twenty-nine unique textual messages with 660 words were identified through original transcripts. Many of the messages had characteristics of multiple commonality types associated with them. While they are not all-inclusive, the messages collected for this research represent a targeted sample based on available transcripts within each case study.

**Commonalities.** The single largest commonality could be seen in 25 of the 29 messages demonstrating some form of polarization. Perpetrator messages are often crafted in an attempt to drive groups apart. “Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating and silencing the center” (Stanton, 2011).

The analysis identified 14 instances of attempts of perpetrator messaging intended to demonize that out-group. Demonization would be considered a lesser form of dehumanization, which will be talked about in the next paragraph. Under this paradigm, genocidal messages attempt to relate a cognitive view point that lessens value of an out-group member in an attempt to transition the in-group viewpoint to one of hostility, rage and dehumanization.

Nearly 13 messages attempted some form of classification. All cultures, religions, nationalities and races have subsets of categories to uniquely identify “us” and “them”: Hutu and

Tutsi; Arabic and black African; Croat and Serb. “Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide” (Stanton, 2011)

The research found only four of 29 messages carried commonalities in the area of dehumanization of the out-groups. This was a bit surprising considering the level of moral assuredness that has to be overcome within the individual in order to elicit activity that would result in the death of another based on race, ethnicity, nationality or religion.

When it comes to the nature and intent of the messaging, nearly all perpetrators’ messaging attempted to raise the influence and stature of the in-group as well as their position within the group. The solidification of positive identity is the single greatest commonality.

Commonalities were also identified in four unique areas of process:

1. Six messages within two of the case studies demonstrated an intimidation of editors and reporters with potential in-group influence (Chalk, 2009, p. 4)
2. Eleven messages within two of the case studies were identifiable triggers prompting the perpetrator to broadcast misinformation (Chalk, 2009, p. 10)
3. Eleven messages within two of the case studies attempted to represent key agenda building themes designed to foster a sense of belongingness that could be identified both in the messaging and the medium (Chalk, 2009, p. 14)
4. Fourteen attempts within all three case studies recorded text that used perpetrator messaging to prepare the in-group populations for changes in strategy and in-group policy (Chalk, 2009, p. 29)

**Variations.** Points of unique variance could be identified in all three case studies.

Demonization as defined by an intentional portrayal of an out-group as wicked and/or

threatening was present in a Rwandan and Darfur case studies but to a much lesser extent than in the Bosnia case study. A similar finding was identified with the intentionally distorted perpetrator messaging. While trigger messaging could be seen in two of the case studies, the level of message triggered by outside stimuli was significantly greater within the Darfur case study.

### **Categorization**

It was verified that all three case studies fell into at least one categorical definition for genocide as identified by United Nations Resolution 260. Nationality and ethnicity in particular could be identified within all three case studies.

### **Medium**

All three case studies demonstrate through their analyses that the media of radio, television, and print were used as primary channels for carrying perpetrator messaging within the three case studies. While no messages collected for this thesis were transmitted via the internet, the Darfur study in particular referenced the internet as a medium that was successfully used in the later years when linked to specific types of targeted messaging. Regardless of medium, each message served a greater purpose linking back to the overall agenda of the perpetrator. There are clearly identifiable patterns for the use of radio, TV and print in particular.

### **Limitations**

Each theory discussed for this review in and of itself will carry limitations in scope, predictive nature and generalized concepts. When it comes to in-group message framing there can be difficulty in objectively identifying the relationship between a predetermined proposed

frame such as those found in agenda-building theories and a larger belief system like those created within an in-group as identified through social identity theories when dealing with mass communications. This means that the research will not be a conclusive determination of an all-encompassing universal theory of agenda-building as it relates to modern genocide. This will only be a snapshot in time. Moreover, reliance on secondary sources and cases is not ideal and future research would benefit from locating and interpreting primary sources.

### **Areas for further research**

There are many questions that the present research will not answer. Questions concerning the contribution of social media, radio and television in the perpetuation of genocide and mass atrocities are still not answered. What role did such messaging play in the uprisings of the Arab Spring and Darfur? Have the media expanded their ability to affect U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy as they relate to acts of genocide and mass atrocities in this era of social media?

### **Conclusions**

Many of the case studies that we discussed in both the thesis and literature review carry with them an underlying theme for understanding mass communication as the foundation upon which a strategy for combating genocide and mass atrocities can be built. This study revealed indications that any starting point for combating genocide must address medium mechanisms of genocidal messaging. Discussions surrounding framing, agenda building, social identity, and imagery have addressed how potential messages may be formed and possibly mitigated. A powerful strategic approach to combating genocide would likely involve aspects of all three transport mechanisms. An example of such a strategy could be to use a thematic approach over multiple channels that evoke passion against genocidal ideas. A means of preventing those same

techniques from being used by others could be centered on episodic messaging that breaks genocidal themes while disrupting key channels. A counter imagery strategy could then be implemented that minimizes the source and impacts of the original images that were intended to promote genocidal themes.

Finally, the U.N.'s Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides a clear definition and, in effect, a direction for developing an operational strategy to combat genocide. Any operational approach must be able to frame social media messaging in the areas of religion, culture and politics. A delicate balance must be achieved between non-geographic, national, international and faith-based diplomacy. This balance could include an approach that addresses how to orient international and geo-political goals with the transcendent tenants of the religion in question and through addressing "the active role of the divine in human affairs." It must be flexible enough to engage and, at times, counter the extreme passions of culturally based digital nationalism not linked to any specific country. Rather, it should be governed by a new, more ambiguous, cultural trifecta between media audiences, producers and content providers in a new, much larger, digital realm. Lastly, it must address the geopolitical influences related to the acknowledgement of genocide by national and international leaders who struggle to recognize what they feel helpless to affect. Given this premise, any operational strategy must include practical steps that can be taken in order to stop the victimization that comes from this feeling of helplessness and focus on providing a sense of hope that there is a means of combating genocide, as long as we are willing to recognize it. By convincing political leaders of the value of identifying specific cross-geographical shifts in a social media culture, an operational strategy can be formed to stop, reroute or insert counter messages. These counter messages have the potential to drastically influence the passion of not

only the people committing these heinous acts of genocide but also those that are trying to combat them.

Determining the right focus areas in combating genocide and mass atrocities in an era of social media can be daunting, depressing and even at times overwhelming, but it does not have to be insurmountable. Though a pragmatic approach of determining how and by what means society views religion, culture and politics, a strategy can begin to take shape and lead the global community to a sense of moral assuredness once again.

## APPENDIX A

**Table 1-A.** Yugoslavian Population Demographics From 1948-1991

Republic	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991
<u>Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>	788,403 (30.7 %)	891,800 (31.3 %)	842,248 (25.7 %)	1,482,430 (39.6 %)	1,630,033 (39.5 %)	1,905,829 (43.7 %)
<u>Montenegro</u>	387 (0.0%)	8,396 (2%)	30,655 (6.5%)	70,236 (13.3%)	78,080 (13.4%)	89,614 (14.6%)
<u>Croatia</u>	1,077 (0.1%)	16,185 (0.4%)	3,113 (0.1%)	18,457 (0.4%)	23,740 (0.5%)	43,469 (0.9%)
<u>Macedonia</u>	1,560 (0.1%)	1,591 (0.1%)	3,002 (0.3%)	1,248 (0.1%)	39,512 (2.1%)	35,256 (1.7%)
<u>Slovenia</u>	179 (0.0%)	1,617 (0.1%)	465 (0.0%)	3,197 (0.2%)	13,425 (0.7%)	26,867 (1.4%)
<u>Serbia</u>	17,315 (0.3%)	79,109 (1.1%)	93,457 (1.2%)	154,364 (1.8%)	215,166 (2.3%)	246,411 (2.5%)
<b><u>Yugoslavia</u></b>	<b>808,921 (5.1%)</b>	<b>998,698 (5.9%)</b>	<b>972,940 (5.2%)</b>	<b>1,729,932 (8.4%)</b>	<b>1,999,957 (8.9%)</b>	<b>2,347,446 (10.0%)</b>

Table 1-A. Yugoslavian Population Demographics From 1948-1991 (Dahlman, 2011, p. 327)

**Table 1-B.** Message Demographic Analysis

Message:	Rwanda	Darfur	Bosnia
<u>Messages</u>	12	9	8
<u>Words</u>	338	256	66
<u>Thematic Phrases</u>	6	3	3

Table 1-B Messaging Demographic Analysis

**Table 1-C.** Message Analysis

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Type:	Rwanda Messages	Darfur Messages	Bosnia Messages
<u>Polarization/Separation:</u>	11	6	8
<u>Classification</u>	5	3	5
<u>Demonization</u>	4	3	7
<u>Dehumanization</u>	1	0	3

Table 1-C. Message Analysis

**Table 1-D.** Medium Analysis

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Medium:	Rwanda Messages	Darfur Messages	Bosnia Messages
<u>Radio</u>	11	5	8
<u>TV</u>	0	2	1
<u>Print</u>	1	1	0
<u>Internet</u>	0	0	0

Table 1-D. Medium Analysis

**Table 1-E.** Categorical Analysis

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Category:	Rwanda Messages	Darfur Messages	Bosnia Messages
<u>Religion</u>	0	2	2
<u>Ethnicity</u>	3	3	4
<u>Nationality</u>	5	4	5
<u>Race</u>	4	1	0

Table 1-E. Categorical Analysis

**Table 1-F.** Thematic Analysis

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Type:	Rwanda Messages	Darfur Messages	Bosnia Messages
<u>Positive Identification</u>	7	8	1
<u>Censorship</u>	3	3	0
<u>Trigger</u>	2	9	0
<u>Belongingness</u>	5	5	1
<u>Preparatory</u>	5	5	4

Table 1-E. Thematic Analysis

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## APPENDIX B

### Message Transcripts

#### Rwanda

1. “I consulted other intellectuals, our country has got many scholars, professors of University, people who completed universities...I had a discussion with them. Their views and our editor’s confirm each other, which means that what Gaspard Gahigi said was true”
2. “However, our war does not use bullets. It uses papers and words”
3. “However, your weapon RTLM is there, it will fight against them...”
4. “the voice which seeks to awaken and defend the majority people
5. “That Tutsi woman with a gap between the front teeth asked me: “Kantano, why did you tell lies?”
6. “The same Inyenzi have declared this morning that our President, His Excellency Theodore SINDIKUBWABO is becoming fusty with old age, because of his encouragement to Kibuye population, he lastly visited. The Inyenzi said that, ‘in his old age, he should follow Mandela's example’”
7. “They [the Inkotanyi] will hide the truth from you and RTLM will reveal it, even if it were to be in trouble because of that. That is our unique assignment”
8. “We will tell you the truth on our radio”

9. “So RTLTM will go on broadcasting in its armored vehicle, wherever it will go, it will keep speaking for the majority of Rwandans, it will give you its opinions, it will never be discouraged, it will never close”
10. “Dear fighting friends, we are here for you, during war we don’t give you up, we go on fighting at your side....represent the popular will”
11. “The sad events we are living are brought about by people like Twagiramungu Faustin alias Rukokoma, Kanyarengwe, Bizimungu Pasteur, the latter who spoilt all the Arusha Accords believing that Rwandans would accept the declarations he made in Arusha. These people and all other accomplices in the country have ruined this country, plunging it in such misfortunes”
12. “Rwanda is facing many problems and many misfortunes because of the death of the Chief of State His Excellency Major General Habyarimana Juvenal... After that, many other bad things happened, we lost many people...”

## **Darfur**

13. “Description of the situation in Darfur as genocide does not correspond with the findings of other officials who visited the area, and that it will only worsen the situation and give the wrong signal to rebels at Abuja talks. Despite the ‘unfounded remark’, the statement continued, the government will continue its efforts and good intentions to find a peaceful solution at Abuja”
14. “officials of the African Union (AU) and the World Health Organization who said they saw no evidence of genocide in Darfur”
15. “appreciation of Sudan’s cooperation with the UN, and underscored the government’s positive role in accomplishing the Southern Sudan peace agreement”

16. "Lauded the efforts made by the government to resolve the crisis and held out the possibility of upgrading relations between Sudan and the United States"
17. "any suggestion of genocide was simply Western propaganda reflecting Zionist influence and Western jealousy of Sudan's great wealth and rich culture"
18. "US government sympathy for the Darfur rebels arose from American lust to gain control of Sudan's oil reserves in the region"
19. "Advancing the interests of the Zionist entity"
20. "He would prefer to be a leader for the resistance in Darfur rather than being a President of an occupied country"
21. The "Sovereignty of Sudan" message had a naturally progressive stage as well in the theme that Sudan "has the Darfur crisis under control". This could then build upon the theme that the Sudanese government is "dedicated to the peace process" and to the "Economic and Social Development in Darfur"

## **Bosnia**

22. "Unarmed defenders of centuries-old hearths, defenders and liberators of towns and territories"
23. "Muslim authorities were holding Sarajevo under siege from within, so that the Serbs were in the position to defend their century-old hills around Sarajevo"
24. "Muslim forces, mujahidin, Muslim-Croat forces, Muslim extremists, Muslim paramilitary organizations, etc"
25. "Serb terrorists"
26. Serbo Communist army of occupation"
27. "Ustasha",

28. 'vampirized'

29. "fascist consciousnesses"

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