HUMANITARIAN FRAMES AND HUMANITARIAN SOFT POWER IN DARFUR:
ADVOCACY FRAMES IN A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

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ADVOCACY FRAMES IN A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Rosalie and Jerome, my first teachers and the first to show me love. To my children, Francesca Marie-Stephen and Victor Constantine for their inspiration and love. To my brother Gregory for continued assistance during my most troubling times. The Kim family, Dr. Andrew Kim, Stacy, Rachel, and Luke for putting their arms around me in prayer and compassion. To my family members, Gregory, Andrea, Sarah, Kathryn, Jeannine, Carolyn, and Anthony for standing by me at all times. To the Command and General Staff College for the opportunity to broaden my mind in the STRATCOM program and the Super 8 dedicated to the cause: Doc Kim, Vic Herbin, Kevin Renau, JR Reynolds, Chris Dodd, Joe Cranfield, and Joe Harrison. To Matthew Yandura for his insight into the research questions and sharing his family. To Alex Zucker for assistance with reading materials and the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation for opening my eyes to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocity. To Dr. Heller for his passion and support to the Poland trip to visit Auschwitz and Krakow. To the dedicated a staff of the University of Missouri School of Journalism for the education and advancement into Strategic Communication. To the NGOs that work tirelessly for values through charity, their gift of love in action—thank you and may this paper help you to help those who cannot protect themselves, the oppressed, and bring justice, aid, and relief to all people in need.

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Conflict in Darfur has raged since 2003, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups have been supporting efforts to quell the violence and bring stability and humanitarian relief to Darfur. Both operational NGOs working from Darfur and advocacy groups, not directly working within Darfur, have specific messages and soft power (versus military or hard power) strategies, they employ.

Operational NGOs limit the frames they employ because negatively framing the Sudanese government would cause governmental retaliation and could end humanitarian efforts in Darfur. This was the case in 2009, when 13 NGOs were thrown out of Sudan, after the International Criminal Courts (ICC) indicted then leader, al-Bashir. The Sudanese government accused NGOs of offering evidence to the ICC leading to that indictment.

Conversely, advocacy NGOs have the full range of framing, whereas operational NGOs seem to only be able to provide information about victims of conflict. The frames used allow NGOs to gain advocacy and donor support by persuading their audiences. For U.S. advocacy groups, messages ask for citizen action and donation; however, operational groups ask for donations on the grounds of humanitarian relief and aid.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian organizations’ role in attempting to quell the conflict within Darfur showed “the persistence and resilience of external actors in transcending the limits of those international strictures and norms” (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 79). The messages and correspondence that humanitarian organizations had with their donors became important as a means of telling a story and conveying a humanitarian solution in a complex environment of rules, international law, negotiations, and humanitarian relief. The discourse of those messages and the “soft power” frames formulated may help policy actors and humanitarian organizations understand the strategic communications that may be necessary to allow humanitarian organizations to provide relief and aid services within the confines of International law, but also within the greater context of humanitarian motives to provide assistance and help to bring stability. Soft power means the ability to affect the attitudes of others through collaborative means to “[frame] the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye, 2011, p. 21).

Soft power forms the narrative and persuasive setting for humanitarian action with regard to donors and stakeholders. Framing theory informs the notion of soft power and together, framing and soft power work together as structure and architecture. Put another way, framing messages enable soft power strategies.

The goals of this study are to understand the humanitarian and soft power frames and their effectiveness in gaining support for humanitarian relief, and in this instance, humanitarian relief in Darfur. Two types of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) were explored. Operational NGOs, those that currently providing direct relief and aid in Darfur, and advocacy NGOs, operating mostly from the U.S.; however, with no technical support in Darfur advocating for policy action to change the conflict within Darfur. Advocacy NGOs messages use a diversity
of framing techniques; while Operational NGOs have limitations with framing because their messages must not oppose the Sudanese government, who could end humanitarian aid and relief efforts. Operational NGOs shape their news and frames to donors carefully to inform about the situation in Darfur and omit or choose not to report certain information that would lead the Sudanese government to cease their humanitarian work. An efficient, salient, and persuasive message allows humanitarian organizations to get to action by gaining needed resources from their donors. Understanding humanitarian and soft power frames may allow humanitarian organizations to deploy strategic communication messages of words, deeds, and images that are persuasive and reflect the goals of the humanitarian organization and their donors. The study aims to show the relationship of framing theory, soft power, and humanitarian frames to enhance strategic communications and improve awareness and appreciation for their convergence and application.

The concept of international humanitarian law, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), provides a state-to-state relationship that “[limits] the effects of armed conflicts for humanitarian reasons” (ICRC, 2010). Primarily, the law protects non-combatants, those no longer involved in hostilities, “the sick and wounded, prisoners and civilians, and to define the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the conduct of hostilities.” (ICRC, 2010). Furthermore, states are required by international law to allow for humanitarian aid by both the following:

- Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, and customary international law as reflected in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 2005 study on the rules of customary international law, [and] require that states consent to humanitarian assistance where failure to do so would risk causing starvation or otherwise threaten the survival of a civilian population.

(Barber, 2009, p.372).
Not all humanitarian organizations have the same function or find support from the same donors. Humanitarian organizations constitute governmental or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), or Nonstate Actors (or in other cases called Not-For Profit Agencies (NPA)). The difference between the two is based on state sponsored humanitarian aid, or donor non-state sponsored aid. Regardless of the organization as either governmental, NGO, or Nonstate actors, each follows the guidelines indicated for humanitarian aid established by the aforementioned Geneva Conventions and its protocols.

Humanitarian organizations inform their activity through International law governing the rules on how they operate. These organizations are some of the first to witness humanitarian crises and indicators of genocide and other acts against humanity, as were witnessed and reported in Darfur in 2003-2004. Humanitarian organizations are expected to report and remain vigilant to developing situations in violation of International law. Developing humanitarian objectives that may thwart and/or assuage mass atrocities and crimes against humanity serves to define humanitarian activity in Darfur as legitimate and consistent with applicable international laws. Humanitarian soft power may be used in connecting with potential donors and promoting humanitarian actions. The message of the humanitarian organizations frames ideally will work to encourage potential donors to support the need for humanitarian activity. The medium and the message together convey support using already established soft power presence of the humanitarian organization.

Humanitarian organizations espouse their soft power agendas through differing media and messages and specific frames. As Manzo (2008), in *Imaging Humanitarianism: NGO Identity and Iconography of Childhood*, suggests “images of children and shared codes of conduct are two sides of the same coin; they are both means through which NGOs produce themselves as humanitarian” (p. 634). Additionally she contends that these images are important to “a larger discursive apparatus through which humanitarian identity in general is constituted, revised, and reaffirmed” (p. 634). Moreover, this suggests a frame of reference of concepts with the
overarching “schema” relying upon “rights” (Manzo, 2008, p.634). An example Manzo highlights involves Oxfam UK, a humanitarian organization, which used a story and picture of a Darfur refugee in a website to demonstrate Oxfam’s successful campaign against disease by showing a refugee’s hygiene lessons learned and application. (Manzo, 2008, p. 640).

Further, as Ryfman (2007) argues, an NGOs’ applications of soft power to stakeholders should “make both beneficiaries and members, staff and volunteers but also private donors, public sponsors, partner associations, suppliers and so on – feel that they are directly involved themselves.” (p. 33). The partnership and involvement of the NGO with stakeholders necessitates “compliance with a principle of coherence” that communicates:

- Improved internal procedures, for strategic planning and for the establishment of risk and quality identification and control processes, designed both to improve programme [sic] content, performance and credibility and to develop a culture of internal quality at all levels of the NGO. (p.33)

Thus Ryfman adds stakeholder interest and quality of services as an important component of framing and articulating humanitarian soft power.

A major assumption of this study is that message framing is a means for humanitarian organizations to garner soft power and use it as a means of gaining and maintaining donor support, so it is both a tactic and an outcome. In order to explore these assumptions the following research questions emerge:

RQ 1: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur frame their messages to their intended audience, donors and potential donors?

RQ 2: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur perceive their own efforts to frame messages?

RQ3: Do these framing strategies result in strengthening soft power on the part of humanitarian organizations?
CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

The following literature review explores three major areas: definitions of humanitarian organizations, soft power, and framing theory; soft power concepts and theory; and finally framing theory, research methods, and practices.

A. Definitions

As described above, humanitarian organizations may be governmental or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), or Nonstate Actors. The primary differences between the two (governmental and non-governmental) are the support mechanisms. Regardless of how the organization is structured as governmental, NGO, or Nonstate actors, each follows the guidelines indicated for humanitarian aid established by the Geneva Conventions and its protocols.

The complete definition of soft power, according to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye, 2011, p. 21). Nye is a well known political theorist who has taught at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In addition, he has served as undersecretary of state for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs. Nye is considered the preeminent expert on soft power and developed the concept in his 1990 book Bound to Lead. Nye suggests that “soft power is attractive power” (p. 243) and “the ability to get others to want what you want” (p. 243.) In contrast, he defines hard power as “the use of force, payment, and some agenda setting based on them” (p.20). He contrasts hard and soft power saying that “hard power is push; soft power is pull” (p. 20). Nye suggests that the ultimate indicator of hard or soft power depends on how message receivers interpret whether actions or messages produce “hard or soft behavior” (Nye, 2011, p. 21).
According to Nye, some observers have used the term “soft power” too broadly to describe any influence that doesn’t involve military actions. He points out that soft power is a tool that may be applied in pursuit of worthy or malicious outcomes. Describing soft power is difficult because often times it is “reduced to measurable, tangible resources” (p. 82) when it should be viewed as a “way of getting desired outcomes” (p.82).

Soft power is crucially dependent on context because what is effective in what situation may not be in another. Humanitarians acting according to accepted societal context and narratives can produce effects or reactions from the target audience with little or no hard power. Context and human relationships are the basis of soft power and the measurement is difficult to measure (Nye, 2011, p. 5).

Nye says that the definition of power rests in the “people’s choice”(p. 5), that is the individual, and “reflects their interests and values” (p. 5). He suggests that “[we] must specify who is involved in the power relationship (the scope of power) as well as what topics are involved (the domain of power)” (p.6). The “who” can be termed, stakeholders; whereas the “what” can be known as the operating environment, landscape, or areas of operations. Power involves all the actors or stakeholders within context: humanitarians, audience (victim or beneficiary), outside resources (financers, donors, contributors), and antagonists. Soft power has underlying motives but can also have unintended consequences outside of those intentions.

Framing can have two meanings, according to McQuail (2010). First, it can refer to journalists’ shaping information into familiar news forms and narrative structures. Second, it may examine how publics may react or respond to the frames and whether they correspond to the journalistic framing. Waters (2004) indicates that “news frames are the window in which the news is presented, and the framing includes the packaging and display of the information (headlines, photos, and video footage), as well as the text” (Waters, 2004,p. 699). Story framing involves the “cultural and social norms that are imbedded and communicated within a specific
news item” (p. 699). Waters argues that journalists work in a social process that involves his or her individual beliefs, journalistic values and constraints, and organizational demands. A key factor is how audiences receive and interpret a story, how it relates to their values and mindset, and whether the story is compelling enough to induce action on the parts of audiences. (Waters, 2004, p. 699). The future framing of any issue relies on its first frame because the original framing will be archived and referenced by journalists in the future. Whether a frame is significant involves how broadly it is disseminated and how successful it is in engaging publics (Waters, 2004).

The next section offers a more detailed definition of soft power, theory, and the extension of that theory. In addition, I will further discuss as it relates to humanitarian organizations. I also explain how framing relates to mass media theories outside the scope of the research

**B. Expanding the Definition of Soft Power**

To extend the above discussion of soft power, an example from Dechaine (2002) describes how Doctors Without Borders (*French translation: Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF)) concluded operations in 1998 in North Korea, because MSF’s activities had unintended consequences. The organization issued this statement: “our assistance could not be given freely and independent of political influence from the state authorities”(Dechaine, 2002, p. 358).

Dechaine suggests that the concepts of “humanitarian morality” and “political influence” are not neutral” (Dechaine, 2002, p.358) and that in general MSF has difficulty in “humanitarian and political action” (Dechaine, 2002, p.359). MSF’s dignified exit strategy hinged on the idea that they could exit based upon principles and soft power, and explaining their rationale in detail was unnecessary because these principles were intrinsically associated with MSF.

Framing applies some of Nye’s fundamental “aspects of relational power: commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preference” (Nye, 2011, p.10-11). Another way of looking at and comparing soft power and persuasion Nye draws from an older concept by Yale political scientist Robert Dahl, who offers the first face of power (see Figure 1.). Nye argues that
proper framing of actions and ideas may be used to characterize other approaches as inappropriate or ineffective, which is the second face of power as discussed by political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz’s commentary and missing from the first face of power (Nye, 2011, p. 12). Finally Nye argues a third face of relational power, derived from the 1970s sociologist Steven Lukes, that says that “I can shape your basic or initial preferences, not merely change the situation in a way that makes you change your strategy for achieving your preferences”(Nye, 2011, p. 13). The second and third face of power of power seems to be the boundaries outlining soft power strategy; whereas, only the non-coercive points of the first face of power fit into the concept.

Nye illustrates three faces of power theory in a diagram:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Face</th>
<th>A uses threats or rewards to change B’s behavior against B’s initial preference and strategies. B knows this and feels the effect of A’s power.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Second Face</td>
<td>A controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B’s choices of strategy. B may or may not know this and be aware of A’s power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Face</td>
<td>A helps to create and shape B’s basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. B is unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effect of A’s power</td>
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Nye argues that an actor can produce the idea of:

Monopoly (a single seller) or monopsony (a single buyer), [to] gain some power over price. [Actors] can do this by differentiating [their] product through advertising, creating brand loyalty, picking a special location, and so forth. Or in the case of oil-producing countries, agents can try to form a cartel like the organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). (2011, p.15)

Humanitarian organizations could produce the same idea of producing a single choice of persuasion by being the only game in town with a certain service; however, this seems to be a form of expediency or necessity and does not seem to carry the weight of a persuasive message or a soft power theme.
Humanitarian organizations prefer to work in two areas of soft power, in what Arnold Wolfers calls “possession goals” and “milieu goals”. Possession goals have measurable or observable objectives; whereas milieu goals are values representative of organizations. (as cited in Nye, 2011, p.16). For a humanitarian, possession goals could mean offering aid to a specific number of people in a region and lowering disease related illnesses because of that aid. Milieu goals would engender social justice issues and human rights, or the value that humanitarian organization brings to health and well-being of those in need of assistance. (Nye, 2011, p.16).

The means of demonstrating possession and milieu goals can be accomplished in communication networks because the power of a salient message through social networking are considered critical in this information age where “positioning in social networks can be an important power resource” (Nye, 2011, p.17). Communications can viewed as an entity of power by creating a value to connect and control communications between humans, where it may have a gap in services or limited physical access or in person-to-person communications (Nye, 2011, p.17). Shaping preference can result from the communications networks in both the hardware, devices, and global means of communications. (Nye, 2011, p.18), but it is assumed that the content, the message, and frame must transfer attractively to maintain soft power.

Legitimacy is a key aspect of soft power because it supposes in a common belief that an action, the person or the group is right and allows an entity to coordinate support. Legitimacy, often becomes the perception of causes and the procedures and the proper authority to carry those out (Nye, 2011, p. 42-44). It often plays upon “enhancing or depriving actors of soft power” (Nye, 2011, p.82) because a negative perception can alter one’s credibility. Maintaining soft power credibility (a measure of soft power success) means to be perceived as legitimate without appearing to manipulate or propagandize. According to Nye, lack of credibility will destroy soft power (Nye, 2011, p. 83).

Soft power is limited at times as a resource to use in confronting certain situations where other influences of power may be more appropriate or available. (Nye, 2011, p.83-84. Using ideas
and soft power strategies against an imminent threat may not feasible in every situation.

However, it may useful in the future depending on the situation faced. Nye (2011) suggests that the conflict over North Korea’s nuclear proliferation program does not readily offer a soft power solution (p.84); however, it is hoped that that as the exploration of soft power concepts and frames are more understood, that more apparent solutions will become available. If we seek soft power strategies and solutions, or discuss them, we may be able to problem solve using them instead of reaching for hard power resources.

Hard power and soft power can be confused, especially when speaking about economic relationships (Nye, 2011, p.85). However, it—what is “it” may be more appropriate to call it an indirect approach of compelling others by rules of economic alliances. Relationships may be seen like this in order to gain the benefits of economic unions, such as that of the European Union and the Brussels framework, that require certain country standards as prerequisites to gain acceptance. For example, “Turkey has made changes in its human rights policies and laws on similar grounds” (Nye, 2011, p.85). This may be considered soft power only if, given the facts, economics were used as the catalyst to gain a positive human rights response; otherwise, these are merely prerequisites for possible and likely economic enhancements. Economic pressures are considered soft power, if using economics gets a preferred behavior outcomes (Nye, 2011, p.9-10). Additionally, Nye suggests that NGOs using tactics to shame other countries reputation to get other nations to action is soft power because it creates competing state narratives and gets powers to struggle over their legitimacy (Nye, 2011, p. 75

Nye aptly states that, “journalists and historians must trace particular processes in detail to disentangle causation” (Nye, 2011, p.86). Humanitarian organizations require an awareness of the current situations and administer a response appropriate with a soft power response. The response often uses the communication means available, which is global and can spread ideas rapidly. Diffusion of power seems to derive from currently available mass media platforms and provides leverage to “nonstate actors, [and] soft power [to] become an increasingly important part
of smart power strategies” (Nye, 2011, p.84). The internet, cell phones, and social networking demonstrate a few of the currently available communications tools that can support soft power strategies.

State soft power emerges through its behaviors according to Nye and includes the state’s culture, politics, and policies toward other states. (Nye, 2011, p.84). Nye believes that culture, seen as social patterns of behavior, and interacting with power behavior may form a connection that makes them a power resource, or a soft power resource of attraction leading to intended behaviors (Nye, 2011, p.84). States are not the only active entities in the concept of soft power: Nonstate, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and terrorists may also apply soft power strategies.

For purposes of the present research, soft power refers to efforts to attract or influence target audiences. A societal attitude of quick-fixes can run against the effects of soft power because generally soft power takes time, or cannot meet immediate demands, or are not readily available for crisis action. Soft power has risks and rewards like any other decision that makes its implementation difficult. Soft power can easily be lost, and can be just as significant of an endeavor to regain and recover the trust lost in fouling it up in the first place. (Nye, 2011, p.83)

C. Theorizing Soft Power

Theory of attraction means drawing positive or negative attention or “creating alluring” results (Nye, 2011, p.92). As mentioned above, context and situational variables determine whether actions and messages bring welcome or unwelcome attention and soft power relies on “positive attraction” (Nye, 2011, p.92). Sometimes powerful parties apply hard power tactics in ways to smaller or weaker parties that may have unintended effects of making the powerful party more vulnerable (p.92). In addition, if powerful agents falsely present themselves as benign, and then are revealed or perceived to be covertly engaging in power behavior, there may be audience backlash (Nye, 2011). Soft power by attraction means that the agent must exhibit the qualities and that the target believes them to exist within the agent.
Nye has been used extensively for defining soft power. However, there are other outlooks and expansions upon the idea and theory. For example, Ozkan & Akgun (2010) help to define soft power as the relationship that Turkey’s government has with Sudan pertaining to the humanitarian crisis and conflict starting in 2003. Ozkan & Akgun (2010) offer that:

Quiet diplomacy uses soft power engagement as part of its constructive engagement. It pursues economic and social programs to develop the country in question. Ankara has utilized economic imperatives toward Darfur and this has facilitated Ankara’s work behind doors in urging al Bashier to end the conflict [in Darfur]. (p.161)

This suggests that soft power successes depend upon engagements without hard force or hard power and involve a dialogue based on common terms and interests. The study suggests that soft power is likely enhanced by parties having common ground. In this case, the common ground-was a Muslim nation-to-nation exchange of values. In order to leverage the potential for soft power rooted in common ground, partnerships between nations such as the U.S. and Turkey, for the same objectives in Darfur, could be established with Turkey as the lead soft power agency. This would enable policy actors to draw upon soft power resources (tangible and monetary) from the U.S. using the established and accepted soft power between Turkey with Sudan.

Thieren (2007) elucidates the theory of soft power by comparing humanitarian action and foreign policy as a mixture of both hard and soft power interests. His soft power definition emphasizes altruistic values: “the precedence of the humanitarian altruistic imperative over self-serving politics keeps humanitarian action within the framework of soft-power foreign policy” (Thieren, 2007, p. 219-220). Moreover, Thieren concludes that soft power is or should be a moral duty, not just an exercise in pursuing national interests.

**Soft Power and Persuasion**

Persuasion is seen by many as manipulative. It can downplay or enhance certain points. Persuasion based on fraud is perhaps the most negative example as well as hiding information that would otherwise not support one’s persuasiveness. When persuasion works well, it is similar
to Nye’s concept of soft power as attraction, “It is the use of argument to influence the beliefs and actions of others without the threat of force or promise of payment” (Nye, 2011, p.93). He cites persuasion as involving rational appeals, normative appeals, and emotions in message framing and suggests that “attraction, trust, and persuasion are closely related” (Nye, 2011, p.93). Clearly, persuasion depends on developing the appropriate frames for target audiences.

D. Framing Theory

Entman defines framing as pulling “elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2007, p. 164). Entman (2007) believes completely developed frames contain four functions: “problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion (Entman, 1993, 2004)” (Entman, 2007, p. 164). Additionally, Entman (2007) relates that framing’s goal acts to form and change audiences’ understanding, using priming as a technique creating audience preferences (Entman, 2007, p.164). Priming, consists of the way the media presents stories that later allow a judgment to the “values and standards” (McQuail, 2010, p. 567) and “promoting certain evaluative criteria”(McQuail, 2010, p. 514) related to those media objects. Priming serves to present frames initially, if they have not already been introduced, create salience, or generate significance to specific ideas; which seek the target audiences’ interaction “to think, feel, and decide in a particular way” (Entman, 2007, p. 164). The audiences define events, based on the facts, and the interpretation by journalists with intended or unintended consequences of bias (McQuail, 2010, p. 380).

According to McQuail (2010) framing theory applied through textual analysis seeks to uncover definite results about the frames applied even if the measurement of those frames is not precise. Framing will involve using narrative structures, language selection, tropes, and other linguistic strategies. (McQuail, 2010, p. 381). Similar to Nye’s concept of context, frames’ effectiveness and power are highly connected to events and situations and will necessarily change over time. (McQuail, 2010, p. 382).
Framing analysis allows researchers to tease out impressions, meanings, and assumptions from the frame(s) (McQuail, 2010, p. 382). However, as McQuail (2010) reminds us citing Kitzinger (2007), hidden frames may be convincingly powerful. Conversely, other common frames may be so obvious and transparent that the audience takes their meaning for granted (McQuail, p. 381). Borah (2011) believes that frames are a means for people to organize and make sense of events and must always emphasize some aspects of reality while downplaying or ignoring others, thus affecting people’s perceptions of events and reality (p. 248).

Chong & Druckman (2007) suggest that framing emerges from the fact that individuals may perceive any event or activity from many perspectives. Framing then comes to mean a “process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). The expectancy model helps Chong & Druckman (2007) explain attitude as formed from ideal concepts from a number of known established beliefs about something (p.105). Those attitudes are valued over others by having degrees of emphasis upon the differing concepts attending to ideal concepts, and those ideals used to evaluate are known as “frame in thought”(p. 105). Tuchman (1991) also points out that audiences may reject a particular frame if it does not conform to their own experience or their values (p. 90).

In the present study, I argue that a humanitarian organization operating in Darfur may use frames and soft power to accomplish their goals. Creating a soft power frame means developing a continuing narrative resonating in time, space, culture, attitudes, words, deeds, images, and motivations that appeal and attract others to support humanitarian efforts.

According to Borah’s (2011) research involving 93 peer reviewed communication journals, framing research has primary aspects, sociological and psychological. The sociological aspect relates to the construction of news stories and involves the words, messages, images, and the processes of story construction (p.247). In contrast, the psychological aspects refer to how people’s frames and how they organize and make sense of the world they inhabit (Borah, 2011, p.
Additionally, framing research may explore both unique frames and consistent frames. Borah also suggests that relatively few studies on framing examined the “frame production process” (p. 250). With the preponderance of framing research tending towards an affiliated role with priming and agenda-setting, where larger portion of literature focused on agenda-setting (p. 251). Borah (2011) thinks that “value conflict” (p. 251) composes of “issue framing and political judgment” (p. 251), which may provide a relationship to humanitarian organizations’ understanding of their message frames to donors. Finally, Borah (2011) argues that “examining moderators, the mediational processes involved in framing are important in understanding framing effects” (p. 252), and give a roadmap on how humanitarian organizations organize and transmit their messages to their intended audiences.

Borah’s 2011 research concludes with her observation of the tendency for communications literature towards the “sociological aspects by examining message design” (p. 255); with most research focused on unique frames (p. 255) concluding that unique framing may not be able to interpret sufficiently with framing concepts and theory (p. 256). Borah’s recommendation for research links “issue-specific frames” with framing theory to answer the following questions: “Does the examination of the issue-specific frames help in methodological development of frame analysis? How does the unique set of frame associate with already developed generic frames in literature?” (Borah, 2011, p. 256). Furthermore, her views on diversity of frames call for studies to define “conceptualizations and operationalizations of that particular study” (Borah, 2011, p. 256). Because of the lack of multiple frames found within the study, Borah recommends their examination in future research (Borah, 2011, p. 257). Her study also highlights that factors or actions forming frames have had little research attention regarding the multitude of influences on framing. She suggests that to gain a better understanding of framing, researchers should investigate how frames emerge (Borah, 2011, p. 256). Moreover, Borah’s (2011) research posits moderators and mediators associated with the media effect to be the predominant method of study (p. 257).
Scheufele’s (1999) research critiques much framing research arguing that many studies do not offer clear “conceptual definitions” (p. 103). Scheufele (1999) attempts to resolve some of the deficiencies he finds by proposing a model framing process. His process model of framing research (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115) demonstrates a four-process continuous method of borrowing outcomes and inputs from previous programs of “frame building; frame setting; individual-level effects of framing; and a link between individual frames and media frames” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 114-115). The diagram suggests that as frame building develops to media frames there has been little research uncovering how that result was determined or what process was followed (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). Frame setting, on the other hand seems to have more influence with the audiences’ “perceived importance” of an issue than upon the “salience or accessibility” of it (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117). Regarding the individual-level effects of framing, Scheufele (1999) realizes that descriptions of framing effects have been uncovered; however, the causal relationship to “behavior, attitudinal, or cognitive outcomes” (p.117) has not been properly linked or associated. The model also tries to explain the journalist-as audience to say that journalists are affected by the frames they are presented and the frames that they have and use in their work, as well as, their interpretation of those frames (Scheufele, 1999, p.117-118). Scheufele (1999) admits that the model remains an initial step reaching towards an acceptable model and with limitations; however, his efforts to apply a stronger effects orientation to framing are very useful.

In the same article, he borrows from agenda-building research and asks, “what kinds of organizational or structural factors of the media systems, or which individual characteristics of journalists, can impact the framing of new content?” (p. 115). He also suggests that “frame setting” is similar to agenda setting and is related to what is known as second-level agenda-setting. Second level agenda setting is concerned with the salience of different attributes of a frame in a media message (p. 116). Scheufele also discusses the potential individual-level effects of framing, and identifies “behavioral, attitudinal, and cognitive” variables arguing that the process relationship between these variables has been largely unobserved in research (p. 117).
Much previous research appears to link media frames and individual level outcomes apparently overlooking audience adoption of the frames or the extent to which the audience uses the frames for their own understanding (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117). Finally, Scheufele describes the journalist as audience and suggests that journalists are influenced by their own frames (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117). Additionally, it is important to journalists to recognize common frames describing equal content or subjects in other media, and the frames of other media actors affecting a journalist’s ideas about those interpretations (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117).

E. Framing Research Related to Humanitarian Organizations

Chang & Lee (2010) researched charity advertising to understand how humanitarian frames carried a clear message of transparency and consistency, but also how they represented statistical values (playing with the numbers by displaying them differently) to draw attention and change attitudes that would promote charitable donations (p. 195). Chang & Lee (2010) view framing as “one of two different but equivalent value outcomes to decision makers, where one outcome is presented in positive or gain terms, and the other in negative or loss terms” (p. 197); where this creates in the decision maker as either benefiting or about to make an error in judgment by not reacting to the charitable promotion. They define framing as a “practice of influencing how individuals think and feel about issues by encouraging them to think about the issues in particular ways” (Chang & Lee, 2010, p. 197).

Chang & Lee (2010) suggest that “prospect theory” works to engender positive or negative “consequences” to influence a stronger frame, and enhances the position and persuasiveness of the issues (p. 198). Prospect theory tries to encapsulate a projection of likely outcomes so that the decision maker feels appraised and empowered to make a valid decision. Adding to the framing effect, “vividness congruency” tries to persuade through “concrete information [to attract] more attention than pallid and abstract propositions, and hence increase message scrutiny and persuasion” (Chang & Lee, 2010, p. 199). To gain the effect, one has to show perceivably real information, such as pictures or valid statistics that go beyond broad ethical
principles. For charitable organizations to enhance the salience of the issues, the public must be convinced “that the cause is valid, urgent and serious enough to compete with other social problems” (Chang & Lee, 2010, p. 201).

Chang & Lee (2010) concluded that “negative framing is more effective than positive framing” (p. 212), and “presentation is found to increase the effectiveness of charity advertising, but it is not a sufficient factor in facilitation donation intentions”(p. 212). They believe there are important insights into framing for charitable advertising that include selecting the goal to be framed in the message, understanding whether to spin the story as positive or negative, and calibrating any statistics or numbers that supports the framing effects (p. 212). Negative persuasion frames of charitable promotion is more persuasive (p. 212). Additionally, a message aligned with a “vivid presentation” seems to increase advertising effectiveness. Negative frames appear to have more impact when combined with “vivid information that portrays negative outcomes in a concrete personal story” (p. 213). Lastly, Change & Lee’s (2010) study indicates that toying with the ratio of numbers by representing those numbers as large numerators and denominators can influence the persuasion of the message and instigate the intended behaviors from the audience. (Chang & Lee, 2010, p. 213-214)

Clearly there are substantial controversies about framing research. However, researchers agree that framing theory provides a useful lens through which to examine media messages and potentially their effects on audiences. Moreover, the concept of soft power and its deployment depends heavily on policy actors’ messages, message framing, and persuasiveness as well as the self-perceptions of policy actors.

The following section outlines how advocates used soft power and various media sources, to frame the crisis in Darfur and thus formed the basis for interviews and analysis in the findings section.

Rebecca Hamilton, in Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide writes about the campaign in the U.S. to bring attention to Darfur. Hamilton (2011)
contends that from past genocides, U.S. involvement failed to protect victims because little public support existed; however today the situation in Darfur is one where U.S. citizens “create an outcry”, that assist to solve a solution for the problem of prevention (p. xx). Humanitarian organizations can create a salient message that frames crisis to donors and supporters to their causes.

Hamilton (2011) argues that U. S. responses to foreign massacres generally involve the consequences and not the causes of the disaster. These are different situations than natural disasters where such responses make more sense. Again, the Darfur situation is instructive because the situation is complex, and the research assumes the messages must be simple.

The narrative from Rwanda plays a significant role in Darfur’s frame. One such position was to never view Darfur violence in context of a civil war because it would “[draw] moral equivalence between the parties.”(Hamilton, 2011, p. 106) and for Save Darfur, a U.S. advocacy group, it was important not to highlight rebel crimes, but important to the Darfur narrative to use the word genocide (Hamilton, 2011, p. 106).

Hamilton (2011) suggests that any statements made by President Bush on Darfur were ineffective because they were clouded by the Iraq issues of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. “U.S. ‘soft power’ (the ability to influence others through noncoercive measures) was at an all-time low, and Bush simply talking about Darfur would not convince other countries to spend their resources on the crisis” (Hamilton, 2011, p. 123). Bush’s effectiveness would be better served not in speaking about Darfur, but using economic and diplomatic means to pressure countries to influence Khartoum (Hamilton, 2011, p. 123). This suggests that U.S. soft power was in the hands of humanitarian organizations in Darfur.

Humanitarian organizations are assumed to use soft power strategies. Human Rights First successful campaign against China’s arms funding to Sudan, in which through the advocacy of op-eds to newspapers in 2007 called “The Genocide Olympics”, and Mia Farrow’s work,
helped to influence Steven Spielberg to pull out of his commitment to China’s hosting of the Olympics. (Hamilton, 2011, 138-149). This example illustrates a way in which soft power strategy and framing coincide to create behavior outcomes.

Framing a situation or an impending crisis as a slow diffusing problem does not carry an effective message better than making the problem require immediate action. By concentrating on genocide in Darfur, the advocacy and struggle overlooked the whole of Sudan as a complete set of issues and Hamilton (2011) sees that the movement needed context. Perhaps, if Darfur had been placed in proper context in the beginning of the struggle then perhaps Darfur would not have been in “isolation generated solutions weighted heavily towards external actors intervening on behalf of Darfuris who were not in a position to protect themselves”(p. 191). Soft power solutions require situations to be understood in their proper context, and humanitarian solutions alone may not provide the answers.

The Darfur advocacy advanced thinking about stopping genocide and mass atrocity and demonstrated an effective political frame “to demand that the U.S. Government act to protect the lives of those beyond their borders.”(Hamilton, 2011, p. 195)

Advocacy for Darfur was successful in collaborating with citizens and the media for humanitarian interest. Prior to Darfur there was a sense that the media would lose interest after the initial crisis reporting; however, advocates were able to sustain public interest that kept the issue newsworthy, and kept it in the media. Because public opinion focused on the Darfur crisis, editors could use that as evidence of newsworthiness and keep writing and expressing it. (Hamilton, 2011, p. 196)
CHAPTER 3: Methodology

A. Research Approach

This qualitative research was based on interviews, e-mail correspondence, and NGO website analysis of artifacts related to messages about Darfur, an approach that used the materials from the websites and the responses from NGOs to interpret and report (Creswell, 2009, p. xxiv). This related closely to Creswell’s (2009) method for a qualitative research as “purposeful sampling, collection of open-ended data, analysis of text or pictures, representation of information in figures and tables, and personal interpretation of the finding all inform qualitative procedures” (p. xxiv).

This study involved a structured interview posed as a questionnaire, to interview public relations representatives for data to assist with answering the three research questions; and intended initially to generalize a sample population of five NGOs. Additionally, the interview process included a plan for time to follow-up the interview for further understanding of the answers offered, and then to allow for other interviews from possible subject matter experts in the area of humanitarian work (Babbie, 1990 cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 12).

When the initial five NGOs declined involvement or were unable to provide information, an NGO expert with experience in Darfur was interviewed to assist with an understanding and interpretations to those five NGOs’ declining to respond. The expert NGO provided insight from an operational and NGO advocacy perspective to the questions posed by the structured interview. The expert recommended that the approach to gather information about messages needed to come from what the five NGOs were saying publicly through their websites. Therefore, this research took the approach to search the five NGO websites and other NGOs who were not operationally involved within Darfur to understand the research questions and the differing perspectives.
The data was gathered from the five NGOs initially asked for an interview to discover their messages on Darfur. Additionally, five other NGOs were researched for their messages about Darfur; however, the additional five were not considered operational NGO, but were deemed advocacy NGOs because they did not have the technical support on the ground in Darfur. The data was then interpreted based upon framing and soft power theory from the literature review and compared the messages from an operational NGO and advocacy NGOs concerned about the crisis in Darfur.

B. Characteristics of Research Approach

The characteristics of qualitative research embody the following (derived from Creswell, 2009, p. 175-176): multiple sources of data; theoretical lens; and participant meaning. First, multiple sources of data included: observation of NGO artifacts, case studies related to humanitarian organizations, documentation from humanitarian organization’s messages in websites to donors, and other mass media and social media available on NGO websites. Additionally, the study used framing theory as its guiding approach and how it related to humanitarian frames and soft power theory to understand how humanitarian organizations developed their messages about Darfur. Finally, to gather participant meaning a review of the responses of NGOs toward the research questions, an interview with an NGO expert source, and website data were used together to view “the meaning that the participants hold about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the research or writers express in the literature”(Creswell, 2009, p. 176).

C. Research Strategy

This research offered an appropriate strategy for three primary reasons. First, it developed the landscape of understanding for theoretical frames related media framing theory and soft power. Secondly, it collected interview data responses of a representative group of NGOs operating in Darfur that gave an understanding of operational NGO use of messages used with
their donors and potential donors, and their understanding of their soft power. Although the five NGOs did not answer the interview questions, they were able to explain through their correspondence why they could not share their messages and the particular circumstances and approach they took towards messages to donors. Thirdly, researching NGOs, observing e-mail correspondence, one interview with an NGO expert source, and research on humanitarianism brought an understanding of the frames, soft power, and messages used by NGOs providing relief and aid within Darfur and those advocacy groups outside of Darfur advocating for solutions to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Finally, taking the three elements as a whole and in parts, and relating them to the research questions allowed for explication and expansion on humanitarian soft power and framing.

The strategy of this research aimed to interview five NGOs with a questionnaire specifically generated to answer each of the three research questions to narrow the focus on how NGOs framed their messages with their donors and potential donors. It also sought to understand how those frames related to the definition of soft power, giving NGOs their appeal and attractiveness to their donor audience. Although, the interviews with the five NGOs was unsuccessful, the responses from NGOs and their reasoning for not answering the interview increased the body of knowledge on humanitarian frames and soft power in Darfur and caused the research to shift efforts to examine NGO artifacts indirectly from NGO websites to understand the messages that donors received about Darfur and the frames and soft power messages associated with them.

D. The Researcher’s Role

My experience has encompassed 13 years of U.S. federal military service in the U.S. Army in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, multi-national exercises in the Asia, Middle East, Europe and Northern Africa, and humanitarian relief to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Louisiana. I have worked in the above stated venues with various humanitarian organizations, both non-governmental and governmental humanitarian organizations. Based on my experience
and personal contact with humanitarian organizations, I believe that humanitarian organizations continuously retain soft power and are able to use framed messages as the vehicle to gain and maintain soft power with the U.S. government, supporters, and a donor audience.

The connection between my research and the humanitarian organizations studied was one of mutual cooperation for information. I used public affairs or public relations officials of humanitarian organizations for information and messages or to gain their experience as experts in humanitarian organizations. Additionally, I contacted and explained the research to NGO communication representatives to gain relevant information into the research questions and to gain further insight into their responses, or for gaining missing and needed information. I was trained and registered with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the IRB approved the interview instrument and methodology for this research.

The following highlights the steps taken to secure permission with the humanitarian organizations. Initial research entailed obtaining a point of contact and general information about the public affairs and public relations personnel for contact. An initial e-mail with the research purpose, scope, questions, and my personal information was disclosed and sent via e-mail to gain permission for the research. Additionally, questions were asked of NGOs as to when they would be able to take and turn-in the interview and to clarify reasons for declining. The study was not intended to be intrusive to the humanitarian organizations.

Some sensitive materials or subjects were discussed with an NGO expert source about Darfur and that information was protected and the source was not disclosed. No information was disclosed that will cause harm. The identity of NGO representatives providing information through e-mail were kept anonymous.

**E. Data Collection Procedures**

The initial interview participants consisted of public affairs officers or public relations representatives of five representative operational NGOs in Darfur. Section F explains the specific screening criteria used for a representative operational NGO population providing relief and aid
in Darfur. The interview asked about humanitarian organizations’ message frames to their donors and potential donors for support for humanitarian relief and services in Darfur. The data from one interview of an NGO source was used to help explain why the initial five NGOs declined participation and assist with a method for obtaining answers to the research questions posed in the interview instrument. All other NGOs contacted for their response as advocacy NGOs concerned about Darfur also declined or did not interview (see Chapter 4, Findings for a detailed discussion). The research examined relevant materials from the internet web pages of the NGOs studied and relied upon documentation from open sources (i.e. internet, library books, journals, and documents) and from volunteered information specific to messages from humanitarian organizations to potential donors through the interview instrument.

An interview by telephone and e-mail was conducted with one NGO source that was not connected to any of the NGOs considered in this research. The interview with an NGO subject matter expert helped to explore and search for missing data and explain why NGOs were unwilling to participate in the research. Documents, both public and private enabled me to examine messages for language, narratives, and images combining into frames and humanitarian soft power. I was able to unobtrusively gain materials from outside sources, such as websites, and the messages to donors through NGO websites. Some audio and visual materials from NGO websites, as mediums of messages, assisted with understanding the connection between frames and soft power.

The type of information collection that was useful, involved the following from the existing humanitarian organizations providing humanitarian relief and aid in Darfur:

- Humanitarian organization mission statement
- Activity or type of humanitarian relief in Darfur
- “About Us” information (content from internet)
- Supporters or donors (content material from internet)
- Support materials to the humanitarian support mission in Darfur-general
- Support materials to the humanitarian support mission in Darfur-specific to donors
g. General information or fact sheets: number of years in Darfur, number of years as a humanitarian organization, website, channels of media representation, spokesperson, etc.

In essence, I searched the internet, library, and other sources for information on NGOs providing relief in Darfur and also requested information from the humanitarian organizations about the messages they use with donors through the interview instrument. The data used in this research consisted of open source information, one interview with an NGO source expert in Darfur, and e-mail correspondence and materials from NGOs.

F. Analysis and Interpretation

The interview questions were aimed at specifically addressing the research questions. Understanding the humanitarian activity within Darfur and humanitarian organization’s relationship to their donors requires narrowing the field of information and questions to specifics:

RQ 1: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur frame their messages to their intended audience, donors and potential donors? RQ 2: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur perceive their own efforts to frame messages? RQ3: Do these framing strategies result in strengthening soft power on the part of humanitarian organizations?

Furthermore, analyzing the specific themes within the messages presented to donors and the general public from NGOs for frames referent to humanitarian frames and soft power and whether those frames fell within the theoretical definitions, enabled analysis in context.

Screening Criteria for Research

To limit the number of credible NGOs for this research, screening criteria were established to indicate factors defining credibility (Appendix 2, Screening Criteria for Operational NGOs). The first criterion was to generate a list of competent NGOs. The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Fact Sheet #7 for Fiscal Year 2011 was used as a listing of implementing partners (NGOs) that provide relief to Darfur, Sudan. The list contains 30 separate organizations supported by the U.S. government. This list was used because it
assumed that the list contains credible NGOs who were vetted by the U.S. government and had proven past efforts that merited them the potential to provide specific relief services in Darfur. It was also assumed that they were implementing partners and had a direct operational humanitarian mission in Darfur. To further refine the study, United Nations (U.N.) programs were eliminated from the USAID FY 2011 list, so as to review private non-governmental organizations outside of the United Nations. Next a refined list of NGOs was used and screened according to the most dollars allocated to each NGO from USAID; assuming that more dollars allocated from USAID means the more credible the NGO to handle fiscal and relief responsibilities.

Next, each of the NGOs were screened for highest donations from public donors from 2010; which assumes that higher public donations the more the public values the credibility of an NGO to handle fiscal and relief responsibility. Further screening, was used to show the highest number of years operating in Sudan and the highest number of years operating as a public NGO. These criteria are used to show credibility through longevity; where the longer the organization served in Sudan and the longer the organization has existed as being significant to credibility. Lastly, administrative and funding expenses (AFR%) as a percentage of total revenue as calculated by the annual IRS filing form 990 by the charity was used to show that those organizations that maximized their donor monies by limiting their administrative activity were efficient and responsible stewards of funds. Each of the criteria measured the top five, then added the number of occurrences that each NGO had in each of the screening criteria. Those NGOs with the highest number screened in, were retained.

The five NGOs researched as Darfur based, or operational NGOs are the following based upon these screening criteria: Catholic Relief Services (CRS) because of the highest number screened in (five occurrences), then CARE and World Vision with four occurrences. ACTED, HelpAge, IMC, and UMCOR tied with two occurrences. To resolve only a top five of NGOs for research, precedence was defined to the NGO for the highest number of years operating within Sudan and highest number of years operating as a public relief entity; which lends to UMCOR
and HelpAge, respectively. ACTED and IMC were considered for this study if NGOs declined to assist with the survey. They were considered and sent materials; however, did not respond.

Therefore, the five NGOs considered for answering the research questions were the following:

1. Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
2. Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc (CARE)
3. World Vision (WVis)
4. United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)
5. HelpAge International (HelpAge)

Because NGOs declined to assist with the survey, more NGOs were asked to provide information, to include looking at NGOs that are not supported by USAID, in particular, Save Darfur. This allowed another perspective on the message frames because it was intuited that there were two types of NGOs concerned with Darfur: advocacy and operational NGOs. Alternate interviews were sent to ACTED, IMC, ARC, Oxfam America, International Rescue Committee, and Save Darfur to identify their perspectives on Darfur; however, did not provide assistance with the interview.

**Sensing Materials**

Secondly, I read through all the materials from each of the NGOs considered for a general sense of their missions, and to understand their materials collected from websites. Some questions asked about the materials gathered were the following: (Creswell, 2009, 185-186):

a. What general ideas are the materials suggesting?
b. What are the tones of the ideas?
c. What impression does the depth, credibility, and the use of the information offer?
d. Does this material seem relevant to the research question? Why?

**Coding Process**

The materials were separated into two groups, those that were considered for interview, also the top five NGO for the initial interview instrument, and then separated as advocacy NGOs because they did not have their main NGO efforts on the ground in Darfur. In this manner, I was
able to distinguish operational NGOs, those operating in Darfur; and those advocacy groups, not specifically operating in Darfur but advocating humanitarian issues about Darfur.

**Coding to Describe**

Fourthly, I analyzed the structured interview instrument to answer the three research questions. There were no interview responses received from NGOs asked for a response. Therefore, to answer the research questions, I used NGO internet site search engines to look for frames on Darfur. The research questions can be compared using coding to describe the setting and themes through the theoretical definition of framing and soft power definitions. The following assisted broadly in qualitatively evaluating the tendencies and sense of the information gathered from websites to answer the research questions and determine framing and soft power themes:

a) specific message frames or familiar frame (McQuail, 2010, p. 557) or “particular conceptualization of an issue” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104)
b) “problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, remedy promotion” (Entman, 2007, p.164)
c) story framing (Waters, 2004, p. 699)
d) hidden frames (Kitzinger, 2007)

Code messages as they compare to soft power theory:

a) positive attraction (Nye, 2011, p.92)
b) “three clusters of qualities of agent and action that are central to attraction…: benignity, competence, and beauty” (Vuving, cited in Nye, 2011)
c) exhibit the qualities of soft power and the target believes them to exist within the agent. (Nye, 2011, p.92)
d) “to influence the beliefs and actions of others without the threat of force or promise of payment”(Nye, 2011, p.93).
e) “attraction, trust, and persuasion are closely related”(Nye, 2011, p.93).
f) legitimacy (Nye, 2010, p.93)
g) “quiet diplomacy” Ozkan & Akgun (2010)
i) moralistic or ethical component of persuasion (derived from Thieren, 2007)

General themes related to the type of frames offered and soft power persuasion emerged, at the same time; a description of the types of frame appeared. Themes and descriptions integrated and combined to assist with a general description of the NGO message frames that
allowed a conceptualization and description of the representation of frames. A comparison of models for the types of soft power and framing was devised to uncover the types of frames used by NGOs.

**Advance Themes Represented**

Fifth, I engaged with a narrative to further the explanation of the analysis. I use charts and words to convey a total picture that assisted with understanding of NGO soft power strategy and framing in Darfur and expanded on the research questions.

**Interpretation of Data**

Lastly, I compared framing theory with soft power frames relating their interconnectedness and from positions where divergent ideas, themes, and descriptions occurred; and assimilated the understanding of those comparisons. Additionally, I offered more questions that were not originally considered and generated ideas for future research to expand upon NGO soft power framing and included them in the discussion and conclusion to the research.

**G. Reliability, Validity, and Generalizability**

Qualitative reliability depended upon proper documentation during the research and procedures to gain information by using the same methods for obtaining content from NGOs. Transcripts and documentation were validated for errors and mistakes that may have been present.

Validity accounted for checking NGO websites and humanitarian organization literature against credible information independent of those sources for historical reference and credibility. I checked with the humanitarian organizations in e-mails by asking questions to clarify meaning when it was determined that meaning and descriptions were unclear, or to clarify my own interpretations. I validated my assumptions with an NGO expert source to ensure that qualitative interpretations were consistent in proper context.

I identified my biases relating to NGOs and to the research. I offered explanations as to how generalizations, inferences, and understanding were reached. I put forward my background,
gender, culture, history, career, and other demographics to ensure disclosure and openness about any biases that may or may not be expressly informed.

I discussed accounts or instances when the results or research diverged or other alternate perspectives running counter to the research appeared. I conferred the various controversies in technique and theory about framing and those suggested about soft power to add to the discussion and help establish a holistic approach.

I reviewed my findings and analysis with those credible in mass media research, outside researchers in other disciplines, and humanitarian organizations and their practitioners.

I used generalizability to indicate meaning only to concepts in their proper context.

**H. Reporting Findings**

The report uses a narrative and descriptive format to offer answers to the research questions, observations, and conclusions. The findings shall be furnished to the participating humanitarian organizations, and the University of Missouri for review and approval.
CHAPTER 4: Findings

As the research progressed it was apparent that asking the research questions of NGOs with boots on the ground in Darfur (operational NGOs) was causing some resistance or controversy on exposing information about the situation in Darfur that was not being communicated through other channels. Although the interview was submitted to the communication desk of the NGOs, they were sending the request out to the field for response, which was an unexpected activity. The research questions were uncomfortable for the respondents because the issues in Darfur were complex and so too were the means of communication for the humanitarians on the ground to their headquarters. It was assumed that because the research questions were coming from a student who was an officer in the U.S. Army that the interview may have been interpreted as having ulterior motives or have raised some suspicion—perhaps of infiltrating NGOs for the government’s interest, which was not the case, but was excusable from an NGO’s perspective. The five operational NGOs on the ground or operational were either willing to participate or unwilling to do so, or wanted to change the issue or topic to another “humanitarian crisis”. It is assumed because the issues were so difficult to talk about with an outsider to the organization, that the media savvy responses were to not say, “no comment” but to offer some communication tactics: delay long enough until the research expired, decline on some principles of the organization, security issues, or changing the subject

Some NGOs offered the reasons that they were unable to offer information that served this research to understand the frames and the questions more completely, while those who did not respond suggested to me that other explanations might be possible and encouraged me to dig deeper into the reasons. To gain some understanding into the nature of the responses of the five NGOs first approached for participation in the survey/interview instrument, an NGO source with experience in Darfur was sought, found, and interviewed to shed light upon the various
responses and repulsion of the research questions. One interview was conducted; however, e-mail correspondence with the same individual enabled an interview of questions and answers about the research questions.

The research needed to determine: If the request to fill out a survey was reasonable, why would NGOs find a way to avoid doing it or deny the request because they did not have the “liberty” to comment? Having no data directly from the NGO sources, made answering the research questions difficult. Thus, having an NGO source explain the issue with the questions, helped significantly to answer the questions, that for some unknown reason, should not be asked of operational NGOs.

A. NGO Source Perspective.

(anonymous, all quotes are personal communications on November 21-22, 2011)

Information regarding the research questions and information about the situation in Darfur was required and needed from a perspective close to both NGO advocacy from the U.S. and operational NGOs in Darfur. When the source was asked to review the survey, there was no surprise that there was pushback from the operational NGOs in Darfur (those NGOs with operations in Darfur and headquarters in the U.S.). Particularly because of the following response interviewed:

NGO’s and international staff in Darfur have been incredibly vulnerable to attack, to deportations and persona non-grata, and their programs have been under constant scrutiny by the government.” Many still recall the expulsion of the 13 large NGOs who were expelled in 2009, “– the government accused them of providing information to the ICC leading to the charges against Bashir. Some groups have been able to go back in, but the expulsion put a huge dent in the assistance being delivered, so they are VERY careful; that is they are more cautious about their actions and messages for fear of being expelled again. (Personal communication, November 21, 2011)
Additionally, the government has made it difficult for new NGOs, who are not operating currently in the region, by requiring that they register through the government or by having another organization (NGO) that is already present and registered, vouch for them. This tends to make the already operational NGOs cautious of the groups they endorse because if they feel that they cannot associate with those NGOs then they are unlikely to endorse them:

Those groups who are consistently providing relief may have to deal with being asked to leave Darfur for messages or advocacy that others groups or person’s they endorsed have said. This becomes difficult for the operational NGOs in Darfur because they have to deal with the outcomes of possible information being associated with them and jeopardizing their relief efforts indefinitely. (Personal communication, November 21, 2011)

Information sharing becomes an overall issue for NGOs and they need to have trusted agents that they can share, and asking for basic data would have been easily answered:

…operational organizations in Darfur don’t share information (particularly with regards to situational information and advocacy messages) unless they really know who you are, trust you, and trust what you are going to DO with it. They are very quiet and behind-the-scenes about this because their safety and their programs depend on it. If you had asked for basic data about their programs (territory covered, number of beneficiaries etc.) they probably would have answered. (Personal communication, November 21, 2011)

Another apparent issue with the research questions, particularly question three, was related to soft power as a term used by NGOs, as indicated by the source:

Another issue you may be having is the language you have used. “Soft-power” isn’t something NGOs perceive themselves as projecting (Governments project hard and soft power, and NGOs might support the USE of soft power, but don’t see their messages as CONSTITUTING soft-power…) (Personal communication, November 22, 2011)
And the following, which seems to show that there understanding of the term as used by government, but using it as a term of identify does not seem to fit with NGOs:

Advocates would see their role as ENCOURAGING the use of soft-power over hard power. E.g. they may advocate with the USG to strengthen its diplomatic and development capacity rather than always looking to military power) but they THEMSELVES (the NGOs) are independent entities and explicitly do not seek to contribute to political/government objectives. As such, they do not consider themselves to be an INSTRUMENT of soft power. (Personal communication, November 22, 2011)

According to the source, a lot of reporting about finances occurs between the NGOs and their donors and these reports are often exhaustive and sensitive in their details. Having a student, or stranger for that matter, ask for it, was to disclose too much information for someone on the outside. Also, the advocacy messages can be found on the websites and those who manage the message are not the same as a technical staff on the ground in Darfur. The technical staff does not engage with the U.S. government or the U.N. but those who do, are at the headquarters of the NGOs in the U.S.

Recommendations were given by the source as to how to proceed with little information from the NGOs asked to answer the survey. The source suggested looking at websites for the Big 5: World Vision, Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, and MSF. A way to get information was to look at the messages that are offered by the NGOs through their website:

The messages are in there and some are saying something about Darfur that they can say. Hard to separate the advocacy message from that of the donors’ message. Messages are usually coming from media, the stuff from reports. Ask yourself these questions to try and understand the message being conveyed: What is happening and why is it important?
Then go to the operational NGOs and then the advocacy NGOs and take a look at their messages for comparison. (Personal communication, November 22, 2011)

Finally, it was recommended to look at the U.S.—based advocacy groups in comparison with the operational NGOs because the U.S. based NGOs sent messages without consulting the operational. In essences NGOs could be out of context to the ground actions in Darfur and not account that their message was affecting those dealing with the situation on the ground in Darfur; which is to say that advocacy messages from the U.S. “did not reflect the realities on the ground.”, and that the two could be out synchronization.

After the interview, the research needed to take a look at what messages were being issued about Darfur from both the U.S. advocates and the operational advocates for frames and messages and discover what differenced in frames might explain hidden frames or limitations to communication. A search of websites was administered by using the search engine of each of the NGOs and typing the word Darfur. If Darfur rendered no response, then Sudan was entered for information. Various artifacts from the website were viewed and the frames annotated and commented.

B. Soft Power and Framing in Darfur

The below figure outlines the observed frames and soft power concepts contained within the researched NGO websites. Media frames assist humanitarian organizations with their messages and lead to humanitarian soft power. Textual analysis, used for this research, assisted to uncover definitive results even though the frame measurement may not be exacting (McQuail, 2010, p. 381). The list is by no means exhaustive; however, it aids in the understanding of common humanitarian frames and soft power strategies that were uncovered in the analysis.
FIGURE 2. Common Framing and Soft Power Strategies of Researched NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Framing Techniques</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shape information into familiar news (McQuail, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping information into familiar narratives (McQuail, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window for news presentation (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging and display of information (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How audience received/interprets story (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How audience relates to values and their mindset (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compelling to induce audience action (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on first frame of issue (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referenced by journalists in the future (Waters, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of perceived reality and narrative connected to form a narrative (Entman, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion (Entman, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience defines events from facts and interpretation from journalists’ bias (McQuail, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative structures, language selection, tropes, and linguistic strategies (McQuail, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidden frames (Kitzinger, 2007)(McQuail, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualization of issue (Chong &amp; Druckman, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorient thinking about issues (Chong &amp; Druckman, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known established beliefs about something (Chong &amp; Druckman, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconvincing frame from experience or values (Tuchman, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value conflict with respect to issue and political framing (Borah, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue specific frames (Borah, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent statistical values to promote charitable donations (Chang &amp; Lee, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalent value outcomes presented in positive or gain and negative and loss (Chang &amp; Lee, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vivid congruency, persuade with concrete information and abstract propositions to persuade (Chang &amp; Lee, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause is valid, urgent, and serious; and competes with other social problems (Chang &amp; Lee, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative framing over positive framing (Chang &amp; Lee, 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Soft Power</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framing the agenda through co-optive means for a preferred outcome (Nye, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persuading through co-optive means for a preferred outcome (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliciting positive attraction through co-optive means for a preferred outcome (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive power (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to get others to want what you want (Nye, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Way of getting desired outcomes (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian morals (Dechaine, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence (Dechaine, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principled values (Dechaine, 2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commanding Change (Nye, 2011) for preferred outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling agendas (Nye, 2011) for preferred outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing preference (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control boundaries, or omit certain ideas (Nye, 2011) for a preferred outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single choice of persuasion (Nye, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific tangible objectives (Wolfers, cited in Nye, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milieu goals (Wolfers, cited in Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depriving or enhancing others’ soft power (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social pattern of behavior leading to intended behaviors (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiet diplomacy for economic or social programs (Ozkan &amp; Akgun, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement without hard force in dialogue based on common terms and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument to influence beliefs and actions, no threat of force or promise of payment (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational appeals, normative appeals, and emotional to get act, gain trust, and persuade (Nye, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from Literature Review using the following authors represented.
C. Observing Messages from Other NGO’s Not Considered for Interview

In the following section four NGOs are explored because they represent the largest humanitarian organizations. CARE is the fifth, but will be discussed in the section containing operational NGO frames in Darfur. Oxfam, MSF, and Save the Children were expelled, but each has been able through some means to have been reinstated or have another NGO providing relief and aid on their behalf. They were not considered as participants in the research interview because of the methodology to obtain participants, but they were considered later for understanding humanitarian frames after interviewing an NGO subject matter expert who recommended their websites. Save Dafur is considered an advocacy NGO operating from the U.S. and their frames were considered to contrast operational NGOs.

Each of the NGOs researched have websites that were observed. Using individual NGO websites search engine, the word Darfur was entered to explore artifacts that would uncover frames related to Darfur. In cases where the word Darfur received no entries, the word Sudan was entered for a response. When artifacts were found, then the word Darfur was searched to understand the frames associated with the term or to read through the text to gain a general understanding of the frames offered. The following sections will summarize the frames observed.

Oxfam

The results of this search brought up a list of papers and on-line resources. Choosing the *Oxfam Fact Sheet: Crisis in Darfur, September 2010* offered a glimpse of relief work in Darfur, and briefly discussed a history of the Darfur conflict with frames calling the government forceful and using militias and Janjaweed to “systematically attacking and destroying villages considered sympathetic to the rebels” (Oxfam, 2010)(See Appendix 1 A). The ICC, after issuing an arrest warrant for al-Bashir, “revoked the licenses of 16 aid agencies” (Oxfam, 2010); however, Oxfam states that they are still present in the region through Oxfam America. The crisis is further framed in numbers of villages destroyed, villagers killed, and the thousands of displaced civilians.
The fact sheet gives a website for Darfur information, but it takes the user to a “Donate to the Sudan Crisis Relief and Rehabilitation Fund”, which seems to imply that the Darfur campaign is now a save Sudan frame. The soft power frame indicates framing the agenda using persuasion toward a preferred outcome: donating to the crisis. Also, Oxfam has principled values as a leader in humanitarian efforts in the world, an attractive power with legitimacy, that helps to establish preference for support to this cause. The framing concepts common throughout the artifacts review reveal shaping news and information that is familiar by including Darfur as a window of news presentation making it an issue specific frame, using negative framing, displaying the cause as urgent and serious, and reorients the issues of Darfur for a broader humanitarian mission to all of the Sudan.

Next, the Oxfam journal called, Oxfam Impact, “In war-torn Darfur, a stove with a mission”. The following were the frames and language discovered: “war-torn”; Darfur women live in displaced camps; in the “heart of Darfur”, thus trying to capture that the Darfur world is an austere environment with difficult living conditions, and women gathering wood are vulnerable to rape, helps to conceptualize the problem that these stoves are solving. Those who were displaced by terror and violence require less exposure to harm, and the stove mission offers a solution to going back out into a still conflicted area. The stoves seem to frame a safe humanitarian solution and one by the name of the project: “Darfur Stove’s Project” (Stevens, 2011) resonates with a partnership of the Darfuris and the “Lawrence-Berkeley National Labs and to the Darfur-based Sustainable Action Group to produce and distribute a portable, inexpensive, fuel-efficient wood stove. The Berkeley-Darfur StoveTM…” (Stevens, 2011); to show a collaborative project of Darfuris and outsiders. Possibly this frame is used to conceptualize the issue of security in a different manner by equating a stove to enhanced security to the beneficiaries and has a frame of remedy promotion to the problem defined.
Part of the message at the bottom of the article is to “Make sure that Darfur is not forgotten” (Stevens, 2011). Additionally, “the Darfur-Stoves project, can have a significant impact on the lives of people in Darfur” (Stevens, 2011), suggesting that the NGO is impacting the situation in a positive manner. Soft power plays a role in this narrative as a rational appeal to persuade and also as an argument to influence beliefs about the project and perhaps to gain more action from donors to continue this humanitarian model of relief.

Exploring Oxfam’s January 2011 online article, *Beyond Sudan’s Big Day: What next for one of the least developed places on earth?* the article shifts from Darfur to the whole of Sudan, what is today Sudan and South Sudan. The article mentions Darfur in this manner initially: “The world must not forget Darfur and northern Sudan” (Oxfam International, 2011) suggesting that the frame of only focusing on Darfur has extended to the rest of Sudan as well, and uses a reliance of our first frame of Darfur, which was when it erupted in violence in 2003.

Furthermore, we see the same language of crisis and violence and danger in the Darfur frame: “ongoing crisis in Darfur is in danger of being neglected” (Oxfam International, 2011) as a means of presenting a frame for how the audience will interpret the story when South Sudan breaks from Sudan. Also, this highlights the danger that aid workers are having with abductions and forcing staff into main towns for refuge away from the violence (See Appendix 1) and that Oxfam has a presence in the area. Like the article before it, there is an emerging frame that serves to reorient us to new issues for this NGO and helps us shift from only thinking about Darfur to thinking about relief in Sudan and South Sudan.

Taking a look at *OxfamExchange*, Fall 2011 which is a type of journal publication on the webpage, the front page is about “Africa’s Last Famine?”, but also there is an article about “Why you should still care about Darfur” (Stevens, 2011). The president opens the journal suggesting that Oxfam stands with the people of Darfur in resilience to the conflict for a long time after
violence (Stevens, 2011), which seems to be a frame of perceived reality linking the narratives of this issue. The article on the four reasons uses the language of conflict in Darfur as the following: “ignited a fierce conflict” (Stevens, 2011); “crisis in Darfur” (Stevens, 2011); gathering wood in Darfur is dangerous to women (quoted by an Oxfam partner) (Stevens, 2011); “assisting 300,000 people in and around the camps of Darfur” (Stevens, 2011); “Oxfam is standing by the people of Darfur and we rely on you. Even though Darfur may not appear in the headlines, the needs remain great. Donate at oxfamamerica.org/donatesudan” (Stevens, 2011). Together this frame has statistical values to help orient the magnitude of activity, but to promote a charitable donation from potential or current donors and has an elements of soft power by using persuasion to gain a desired outcome of support.

**Save the Children**

A search for Sudan was used because Darfur did not return any data. The Sudan webpage explains that initially Save the Children was invited in by the Sudan government and then later asked to leave (see Appendix 5). Another webpage, offers the details of expulsion. The NGO describes their expulsion as a suspension rather than an expulsion. This NGO highlights their history in Sudan before being asked to leave by Khartoum and goes through some length to list the aid and activities they were performing prior to being told to leave. The approach that this NGO takes is to provide assistance in the region “through a variety of programs” (Save the Children, 2011). There seems to be a hidden frame present because the NGO may not have its own Save the Children employees on the ground and they may have other humanitarian advocates working as a proxy for humanitarian assistance. Also, the frame is packaging the expulsion as a suspension perhaps to help the audience define the action in Save the Children’s terms and help the audience interpret that situation from their point of view.

Further along on the Sudan webpage the NGO describes a success story of a three child centers by stating, “Dorti camp near Geneina in West Darfur, where 8,000 people settled, having
fled the violence that drove them from their villages.” (Save the Children, 2011) Some of the language associated with Darfur include framing it as an “urgent need” for children, families, and displaced persons (Save the Children, 2011). The frame conjures up urgency and presents information negatively perhaps to validate this issue as a social problem to attend to the needs of children.

When observing the “read more” link of the website, which explains Save the Children’s expulsion from Sudan, the language used was that the NGO had their “registration cancelled” (Save the Children, 2009) and that there were other NGOs who were told the same. The Sudanese government is framed as ceasing their operations and Save the Children “closed down operations” (Save the Children, 2009) and was trying to transfer their aid activity to others. This seems to show that they were acting responsibly, before the expulsion, while leaving, and even now with regard to Darfur. This information serves as a lens to news presentation and allows Save the Children to tell their side and inform their donors. This has not been updated since 2009, perhaps because the frame it offers remains consistent to Save the Children. There is a statement of hope for U.N. assistance so the NGO can be back in business in Darfur, while Save the Children Sweden picks up their relief mission. This demonstrates an advocacy for the U.N. to help solve the issues of aid in Darfur, a policy solution (Save the Children, 2009). The soft power aspect forms in an engagement based upon dialogue for the common interest, which in this case are policy solutions and political influence and using Save the Children Sweden as a way of getting the desired outcomes of humanitarian relief and support to Darfur.

MSF

The online article International Activity Report 2010 – Sudan, written on 2 Aug 2011 covers mainly the Sudan; however, it makes allusions to Darfur: “Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) responded to several medical emergencies in 2010, including the biggest kala azar outbreak in the country in eight years, as well as treating victims of violence in Darfur.” (MSF,
MSF speaks about the Sudan’s medical emergency, but also includes their work with Darfuris, as victims of violence, thus a frame of Darfuris as victims in the violence. The frame represents a problem definition, some causal understanding, a hidden moral judgment, and a remedy that MSF can provide. MSF wants to show their struggle to do their aid job, but of meeting opposition along the way, so they frame in a negative manner, and shape the audiences perceptions of their struggles:

Emergency response and restricted access reaching people who are in dire need of healthcare in Darfur remains a struggle and MSF faces many challenges in delivering timely and lifesaving medical care. In May, MSF staff conducted a medical assessment in eastern Jebel Marra, a mountainous region in Darfur. However, lacking the proper authorisation, teams have not been able to return to provide medical care to the people who need it. (MSF, 2010)

A frame of restriction and difficult access to the people of Darfur, also helps with showing that MSF is on the ground, prepared to do their job, but there is difficulty in doing that job, adding a compelling frame for their remedy of aid to the issues in Darfur. Moreover, framing as personally being on the ground helps the NGO’s legitimacy for an appreciation for the humanitarian needs in the conflicted area and helps the audience interpret MSF’s actions or inability to provide aid all of the time.

The next frame uses concrete information to persuade:

In Shangil Tobaya, in North Darfur, staff held more than 30,000 outpatient consultations over the course of the year. In Kaguro, an MSF clinic offered emergency surgery, a nutrition programme, immunisation and general healthcare, and staff conducted almost 65,300 consultations. In coordination with the Ministry of Health, nutrition programmes were established in Abushok and El Salam displaced persons camps. (MSF, 2010)
The frame shows legitimacy for the right actions by the right NGO, and shows tangible humanitarian returns on the work performed. The reader infers that the Ministry of Health and MSF are working together; therefore, MSF has a legitimate presence by association to a government agency in Darfur which is a narrative structure of framing. This assists with MSF’s soft power by establishing themselves as the preferred NGO and their political influence in working co-optively with the government, and forming a social pattern of behavior leading to the intended behavior of aid and cooperation with the government.

MSF describes and frames their aid in their activity report, as responsive to crisis to allow their donors to define the event from facts and MSF’s specific interpretation of events in Darfur when they used the following “Nevertheless, MSF responded to several emergencies, including treating over 40 wounded people and distributing essential household items, like cooking and hygiene kits, after fighting between different groups in Tabarar, North Darfur, in September.” (MSF, 2010)

Another article searched led to MSF’s, 12 JUL 2011, As South Sudan enters independence, the long-standing humanitarian emergency continues, again the frame of Darfur as a “violent” and added as the language to situations where it can frame the conflict as still present (See Appendix 4). Perhaps using, more Darfur-centric language recognizes a buzzword for this resemblance of the violent past as happening in the same manner now and evokes a familiar narrative about Darfur. MSF seems to have a more comprehensive message about perpetrators and victims and does not hold back from identifying whether the actors are governmental, rebel, environmental, or resource causes and is understood as negative framing and interprets a value conflict. Also, MSF frames by shaping news when they mention that although media is not reporting the conflict, MSF is on the ground and have an appreciation for the situation.
An interesting aspect of MSF’s messaging was shown in their article in an attempt to prove they were not expelled from Darfur in 16 FEB 2011 as seen in the headline “MSF has not been expelled from Darfur.” The alarm that this article reveals may indicate that NGOs need to have a face in Darfur, but attempt to shape the news and give journalists in the future a reference to work. The fact was that the Dutch section of MSF was expelled and that MSF France had its license revoked, according to The Guardian’s writer Xan Rice on March 12, 2009. Regardless, the frame of having a presence in Darfur is an important insight of providing humanitarian aid to crisis areas. MSF supplies the language of “independent medical and humanitarian assistance in both North and South Darfur” (MSF, 2011) to show that they are still involved, but also to demonstrate their values as a provider of objective humanitarian aid and emphasize their belief about neutrality. They seem to frame themselves as a third party providing aid to whomever becomes a casualty of conflict. It seems important for this NGO to frame direct and substantial aid involvement in Darfur for clearing the record which could be taken as an issue specific frame, or as clearing their record.

MSF, unlike the other advocacy groups, is from France, and is able to frame their messages with no limitation and still operate in Darfur. This research is unable to evaluate how they are able to both have a message that would seem to anger the Sudanese government by identifying both perpetrators and victims and continue operations in Darfur. The groups may have a proxy aid element on the ground that they directly associate themselves with; however, the situation is unclear. This may be their soft power of persuasion engaging the issues and controlling the agenda without losing their soft power or their ability to influence aid in Darfur.

**Save Darfur**

Save Darfur aligned with Intervention Network to become known now as, United to End Genocide. This advocacy group has changed names; but retains the same website. It seems it has done this so that it can use a past frame and its prior advocacy network to transition their message.
from a concentration of Darfur to a more global view of genocide, this is a frame of reorienting thinking about the issues and values that the new organization espouses. The new title, United to End Genocide, integrates with the old website and their new name to get those interested in the transition of their mission from a Darfur-centric model to a prevention and stopping of genocide frame drawing upon familiar news and narratives.

The communication plan for those visiting the website shows a three-fold development of “take action now”, “learn about the movement”, and then “get action alerts” (Save Darfur, n.d.) a devised package and display the information easily. The method allows a potential supporter to quickly to take action by getting information immediately from this link which gives a small message, 1-800-GENOCIDE phone number, and a link to call your representative and get the White House involved. The common frame seems to be to stop genocide, war crimes, and to protect civilians and is framed as an urgent cause that competes well with other social problems. The first site, rapidly gives information on the conflict in “Attacks on Abyei” (United to End Genocide, n.d.). A quick read of the situation allows for participant action to respond with a form letter that goes to the White House and frames the conflict for the user, but also the message they should carry—a message with concrete information meant to persuade policy makers. The frame is simple, identifies the perpetrator as the Sudanese government, is an outcry for following internationally approved laws, and calls the victims targeting civilians. The other frame used is to demand specific policy solutions that will end the conflict and violations of international law(See Appendix 6) which presents a value conflict with respect to the issue and political framing.

The frame functions to try and get policy for protecting civilians by demanding more security, holding accountable those who are implicated by the ICC, but also those who have been already implicated, beefing up the U.N. mission with security and providing access so that aid and relief can benefit civilians. The frame begins with an incident in Darfur and then seeks a policy solution for Sudan, seemingly to address the heart of the problem, instead of just the incident that occurred. These are compelling arguments to induce audience actions.
The second step for participants is to watch a video that explains the United to End Genocide movement with appeals to emotion, rallies from 2006, and Obama (before becoming president) and celebrities who speak at a Washington rally, again to package the news presentation, interpret the information for the audience, and draws upon familiar news events. The video shows a 5 year progression of United to End Genocide’s activities and the campaigns are quickly explained: divestment campaign, normal people are reading facts about Darfur, and there is an interview with leader of the organization. Speakers talk about the movements advertising of Darfur before anyone else and of the commitments from candidates that were gained before the last election U.S. presidential election. The message transitions so that “Sudan becomes a priority” (United to End Genocide, n.d.) and the Save Darfur message does not end, but progresses with the new movement—reorienting the audience.

The final piece of the Save Darfur program is to get action alerts. A simple form that puts the citizen advocate in touch with alerts, and actions they can take from now forward, which will assist United to End Genocide with how the audience define facts and interpretations of genocide and induces audience action.

Save Darfur, now United to End Genocide, seems to have a different message than those groups operating in Darfur and different from humanitarian organizations. Their main goals seem to be to get action related to government policy mainly from the U.S. to stop the regime in Sudan that allows and has allowed genocide. Their soft power strategy is to control the agenda on genocide, command change for preferred outcomes, persuade through co-optive means, and deprive others of their soft power—mainly perpetrators of genocide. This contrasts with advocacy by humanitarian organizations that seek to be allowed to provide aid in Sudan to displaced people and provide the basic needs that this country in conflict has and is suffering. The two messages may not resonate together; however, that is mainly because their approaches are different. United to End Genocide can call into question the actions of Khartoum openly shame the government, but the operational NGOs cannot hold that frame because they may be
expelled. United to End Genocide uses soft power to deprive it from Sudan, attract political influence to their issues and principle values.

United to End Genocide has a message of genocide because of the implications that the word genocide carries with it; the right to protect, the holocaust, and “never again”. These cannot be used by NGOs on the ground because it is assumed it will endanger their humanitarian efforts. Also, United to End Genocide (UEG) is also in a transition message from focusing mainly on Darfur to the greater Sudan and Southern Sudan, and also a more global approach to stop all genocides, and to prevent them. Their message for Sudan requires that the U.S. do something to limit or to cut off the manner in which al-Bashir has been able to deflect facing chargers at the Hague. UEG uses soft power to get specific tangible objectives met at political and policy levels.

The ICC wants to bring al-Bashir to trial and in the interest of UEG, as well as, sanctions or divestment campaigns that limit other nations supporting Sudan that are thought to equip their military to oppress people, and to bring any leaders breaking the peace agreements to justice, and is an issue specific frame. UEG also sees President Obama as a beacon of hope because he spoke at their first rally and is gradually implementing measures that fit into their message. U.S. envoys to Sudan were integral components of the Save Darfur advocacy and in a sense proved they could get policy action; even though they may not have been able to change the actions of al-Bashir, or allow more NGOs to provide aid. Assuming that while both the advocates in the U.S. and the operational NGOs in Sudan may think al-Bashir is at the root of the issue in Sudan, only the advocates in the U.S. can voice it directly or use the frame without fear of ruining their policy efforts. NGOs with a mission in Darfur do not have that latitude.

D. Operational NGOs in Darfur

Catholic Relief Services

Looking into the website for CRS showed a country summary of Sudan that looked into not only the years of conflict but the involvement of the organization to be there as one of the first; therefore, shaping the news into familiar and positive information. Darfur is understood as
an “unresolved conflict” (CRS, n.d.) that threatens peace for the whole of Sudan. This message is benign because it does not point a finger at the government or Darfuris, just adjusts the conflict to a place; however, it draws upon the audiences first frame of Darfur in 2003 when it erupted in violence. Additionally, “Darfur region” seems to be used as a frame of conflict still requiring much needed relief and using the number “2.7 million people who remain internally displaced” (CRS, n.d.) helps to bring the context of support into view and shaping a familiar narrative.

CRS is on the ground providing relief and has to temper their language so that it can provide relief. They understand that 13 NGOs were expelled in 2009 because al-Bashir believed the 13 provided information to the ICC leading to his indictment. A statement by CRS, to diminish CRS’s supposed complicity and address an issue specific frame to information was made in an online statement in a blog, Catholic Relief Services Statement on Allegations in West Darfur, Sudan, FEB 28, 2011 (see Appendix 7). The allegations were that CRS distributed Bibles in West Darfur, and CRS needed to diffuse that allegation because it would seem to oppose the government’s interest. CRS reiterated their assistance policies are “without regard to race, religion or nationality” (CRS, 2011) using positive framing and assisting with future framing of their services in Darfur. As an issue specific frame, CRS reiterates with concrete information and uses value conflict frame to resolve the issue in their statement that, “CRS has worked without complaint for decades in numerous countries where the majority of the population is Muslim” (CRS, 2011). The audience of this appeal seems to be the government of Sudan, and the frame is a strong denial and a reinforcement of the “strong” relationship between the government and the NGO and addresses the problem with a reliance on the first frame—decades of humanitarian work with the government, to shape and display the information. CRS used their soft power to frame the agenda for a preferred outcome; to remain operating in Darfur. They also used their humanitarian morals, controlled the boundaries by omitting their Christian values and making attractive their common values with the Sudanese government.
CRS ensured that they stated they were in compliance with the Sudanese government and the U.N. in West Darfur. The allegations had such an impact, that CRS was forced to shut down operations and move their staff to safety for some time in Darfur, and until the perceptions were cleared up so they could offer relief (CRS, 2011); thereby confirming that their soft power strategy worked maintained their preferred outcome of humanitarian relief. CRS strengthened their frame of neutrality, non-engagement with military or political entities, and compliance with the Sudan government and U.N. by defining the events from facts and interpretation to their audiences.

CRS refused to answer questions in the research interview and I assume that the reason behind it was for fear of reprisals by the Sudanese government for offering information that they could not shape that might damage their efforts from an unknown outsider. It is understood now why the CRS refused. I assume that CRS believes their efforts supporting Darfur relief are more important than offering what messages their donors receive because the perceptions may be that CRS is against the government. Also, CRS would not be able to control the message and the readership of the research, the risk seems to be too high and create a misinterpretation.

CRS uses elements of perceived reality to present a positive frame in Darfur related to a school project. This is evidenced in *Darfuri Students Return to School*, by Debbie DeVoe. In this article the life in a camp is called “oppressive” (DeVoe, n.d.) and because there are “few opportunities to grow food or have a job”, the Darfuris “rely heavily on outside aid” (DeVoe, n.d.) to assist with conceptualizing of the issues in the camps. This aims to show the first-hand experience on the ground in Darfur, a frame of proximity and an appreciation of the humanitarian needs and draws a window for interpretation about the news in this specific arena. CRS explains the situation from a more refined understanding and gives a reason for the conflict, and the different sides to the issue, and perhaps offers an interpretation to those in the community in Darfur who may not like having CRS offering assistance. The following example demonstrates:
Tensions can also run high with permanent residents who may resent services being provided to displaced Darfuris living in camps and not to all people living in the surrounding community. At times, the crowded, transient conditions lead to crime and violence, with displaced families having little protection. (DeVoe, n.d.)

By contrasting those who never were able to go to school in their former residences, it shed a good light on the aid given to those who are in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) locations. Although the students are happy to attend, CRS calls attention the need for better facilities and conditions for education-perhaps as an appeal for donor support to IDP initiatives, where schools are one of them. Further in the article, CRS substantiates their claim that “helping more than 32,400 students receive an education” (DeVoe, n.d.) has had some measurable outcomes framed to persuade with tangible positive activity with the following:

Key activities have included:
• building more than 385 classrooms
• training volunteer teachers
• organizing and supporting PTAs
• building kitchens and storage rooms so schools can participate in World Food Program's school feeding initiative
• providing water tanks and simple hand-washing stands
• training students and cooks in good hygiene
• teaching cooks to build industrial-sized fuel-efficient stoves

Finally, the ending to this article assumes an image that is not only benign, but hopeful and positive about the efforts of CRS, “For now, displaced children in Darfur will attend school in the open air, shielding their eyes from the sun and sand. But at least they will learn. And they'll continue to dream of better futures” (DeVoe, n.d.). I assume that the DeVoe, as the regional information officer of eastern and southern Africa has the authority to write this article because it does not judge the Sudanese government, mention them, or demonstrate a message against them perhaps a hidden frame omitting information, or keeping it positive. It also is a call to action to donors, to provide support to this demonstrable activity by representing numerical values to
promote charitable contribution, but also to show the Sudanese government and donors, that aid works and makes Sudan better—making this a known and established belief frame.

The last point about messages from CRS researched come from an article in an online blog called, *Darfur Driver Takes Up Education Causes*, by Rachel Hermes. The frame of a good news story seems to have some hidden frames carried over from the earlier story about Bible distribution. CRS states that, “CRS uses hired vehicles and drivers in West Darfur. But while the drivers are not CRS employees, most of them become attached to the staff and loyal to the program work” (Hermes, n.d.). This seems to try and diffuse a suspicion that perhaps the NGO is recruiting, or espousing their Christian values (remember the earlier article), and that those involved may be doing other business, perhaps reporting to the NGO on military activity. This frame is as much a statement of neutrality as it is a good news story and is a frame assisting the audience about the facts and the interpretation of those facts. The education’s program driver is given a false name (stated in the article) to protect his identity, for fear, it is assumed, that this person could have trouble with the government, or implicate the NGO. He seems to be shielded from being an informant to the organization:

When he returns, he often reports to me on how many students and teachers were present at the school – as well as if the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) members seem to be active or not in supporting the construction work. Although [false name] speaks no English, after spending nearly 18 months together, he has adopted an ear for my amateur attempts at Arabic. (Hermes, n.d.)

CRS has an audience with their donors framing a first-hand, on the ground relief effort providing relevant aid. Also, the message seems to resonate at another level, the government—to reiterate neutrality to providing aid highlighting the future about CRS’s activity with the education program. CRS’s soft power seems to be in their diplomacy of engagement that works to draw a common interest with the government and keep CRS’s license as a humanitarian in good standing.
The trend among observed internet NGOs, is their emphasis on how many years they have operated in Darfur or in Sudan for the purpose of credibility but also, it seems to show that they understood a need in relief before the area became a crisis—a positive frame that influences the audiences’ mindset about the value NGO represent. This would give them credibility in their understanding about indicators throughout the world, not just Darfur or Sudan, as to where they believe relief is needed. History helps them to prove a consistent existence and that their efforts may foreshadow impending conflicts or humanitarian needs well before anyone else takes an interest. Therefore, NGO frames add to their soft power of legitimacy, humanitarian morals, and attractiveness for donor support.

**UMCOR**

UMCOR was searched for Darfur and because no return on the keyword returned Sudan was entered. UMCOR’s website on Sudan offers their experience in Sudan since February 2005 and became operational after an assessment to the region to “alleviate suffering in South Darfur” (UMCOR, n.d.)—a positive frame found throughout their website. UMCOR frames their experience in Darfur as expanding alongside their success in providing aid to displaced people living in camps and even calls themselves UMCOR Sudan, used as a frame to reorient. Darfur is the starting point of their message, then it expands to Sudan, and finally with new offices in South Sudan: “UMCOR Sudan has since expanded its programs to include education, agriculture, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) projects. A second office was opened in South Sudan, a region with low levels of infrastructure and high levels of need” (UMCOR, n.d.). This frame shapes information into the already familiar news and narratives about Darfur and works on a first frame of Darfur.

The message about Darfur appear program oriented, which means they talk about the programs they offer in Darfur and do not use Darfur to bring up “conflict”. The frame offers equivalent value outcomes, which means that a donor viewing information will choose a positive gain by supporting or feel a loss if they do not. For instance, the focus from the website relies on
agricultural programs to IDPs and Host Communities (HC) to recuperate “livelihood” and help to train and form communities that can promulgate, or become self sufficient on their own: “The South Darfur agriculture program focuses on assisting IDPs and HCs to regain livelihood security by providing agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools, establishing farmers’ committees, and providing training” (UMCOR, n.d.). The frame of aid and assistance serves to demonstrate measureable gains in their programs to Darfur: “It is providing general food distribution (GFD) to over 100,000 IDP beneficiaries each month in South Darfur to supplement crop production, as well” (UMCOR, n.d.). UMCOR stresses their soft power by co-opting donors through attractive aid and relief solutions and gaining a desired outcome of support and possible charitable contribution.

When UMCOR speaks of education and child protection (see Appendix 8) they offer information about what has been accomplished, and provide a measurable outcome (“11,400 students in Darfur”). Additionally, the frame constructs the image of a comprehensive, specific, relevant, and sustainable programs by clearly indicating the other special needs of a school: “teacher training”; “classroom blocks”; “gender-specific latrines”; “school kits”; “school feeding program”; and “targeting 4,598 pupils in 12 primary schools in Al Daein and Adilla localities with food” (UMCOR, n.d.). This forms a narrative to relate a positive remedy to the identified education problems.

The message has no political rhetoric and shows believable figures and outcomes. The target audience seems to be potential and current donors and reveal in a short and concise report of what UMCOR’s efforts are and how they are measuring success. The frame is benign and avoids blame to the government or conflicting groups for not providing those schools or causing the displacement of civilians. The soft power strategy gains specific tangible outcomes, establishes UMCOR as a preference for education assistance, and gains trust.
Further exploration of the Sudan website speaks about UMCOR’s efforts in Darfur for peace-building efforts and again follows a consistent model of program purpose or focus, actions, and results, a frame of actual information that persuades for audience or donor support:

UMCOR’s peace building project in Sudan focuses on workshops and training in peaceful coexistence, conflict resolution, as well as organizing peace building activities through songs, dramas and dances. The project targets youth, women, teachers and community leaders in IDP camps in South Darfur. Peace building pamphlets are circulated within the communities to disseminate messages about the importance of peace and how it can be achieved. (UMCOR, n.d.)

The message embodies the concept of Darfur as a place of conflict, drawing on familiar Darfur frames, and the programs as a resolution to the conflict—remedy/solution frame. Another point of interest, is that the targeted population does not mention men, but does identify “youth, women, teachers, and community leaders” (UMCOR, n.d.); allowing the possibility that UMCOR is careful in their display of beneficiaries packaging a more salient message.

UMCOR offers donors resources to share with their church communities and asks that donors help others understand UMCOR’s mission. This tends to show advocacy sharing and offers a person-to-person exchange of ideas and messages packaged for presentation and appeal. The website offers ongoing crisis information and information about Sudan in Africa to shape information into familiar news frames. A link provides access to a website called Sudan Crisis that frames values on how the audience should view UMCOR. UMCOR describes their efforts since 2005 to provide relief in Sudan and Darfur in Sudan Emergency, UMCOR Advance #184385 (See Appendix 8) where there is an image of a woman smiling with seeds in her hand and a tilled field. The text speaks about Darfur as an “embattled” area with one field office from UMCOR that is in “direct relieve and rehabilitation” to illustrate that UMCOR remains in contact with the conflict and familiarizes with the first frame of Darfur dating back to 2003. Supplementing this short paragraph we learn of the program expansion and that it is
“concentrated in South Darfur” and UMCOR with other humanitarians have formed a “coalition” for refugees fleeing Darfur into Chad (UMCOR, n.d.). The frame shows that UMCOR builds upon success and forms direct connections with the people and other humanitarian organizations to efficiently and effectively enhance livelihoods and takes elements of this perceived reality to form a narrative. The depiction of UMCOR’s soft power establishes them as a preferred NGO that co-opts others to support refugee relief.

In concluding remarks to this appeal to donate, UMCOR states they are “100% efficient” and that every dollar donated will go to this particular emergency. In addition, references are made to a donation campaign called the “One Great Hour of Sharing” for which donations to this will cover administration costs, and “acting now is important because crisis are not considered long time events.” (UMCOR, n.d.). UMCOR frames a concise and specific message of the Darfur conflict, while at the same time guaranteeing their efforts to their donors, and encouraging their donors to act quickly. The campaign name “One Great Hour of Sharing” assists in conveying doing the right action, in a timely manner, and seems to show that a decision to share will provide large rewards to the beneficiaries, which frames for the donors a positive gain

Finally, the research observed UMCOR’s Setting a Vision by Linda Unger, staff editor and senior writer for UMCOR, an online article about UMCOR’s semiannual board of directors meeting in April 12, 2011. UMCOR presents a business-like report depicting the decision making process openly to donors, how those decisions were made, and the possible risks to an unknown Sudanese operating environment. Included also were the future steps in humanitarian action that might be taken and how to assess situations of opportunity when they arises. The meeting notes assume that readers trust the organization and shows NGO transparency as an organization (See Appendix 8). This demonstrates UMCOR’s soft power through connections with their humanitarian morals and influences and enhances donors belief and actions to support.

Preparation for the South Sudanese independence brought a vote to commit funding for continuing operations already underway, and would allow for a national office in the South
Sudan’s capitol. Also, South Darfur programs and those working from Sudan’s capitol will continue, while new efforts in South Sudan will begin to form (Unger, 2011). The work in Darfur gives the impression that continuing efforts in Darfur have been prudently calculated, but also to show that while transitioning elsewhere in South Sudan, those on the ground are assessing and have the foresight and knowledge to expand operations into new territory—again, using a frame to reorient thinking about humanitarian issues and relief. Therefore, the Darfur frame substantiates a successful model or story to expanding operations in South Sudan and continuing in Sudan and Darfur and reminds us that efforts in Darfur will not be abandoned.

**World Vision**

The keyword Sudan was entered into World Vision’s website because Darfur returned no data. World Vision offers a country fact sheet overview of Sudan from 2009. They first mention Darfur, “just as Sudan’s civil war seemed to be ending, violence intensified in the northwestern Darfur region” (World Vision, 2009), alluding to the common familiar Darfur conflict frame. Furthermore, World Vision describes more, relating why the violence continues to shape information to donors:

The work of 7,000 peacekeepers from the African Union have proven to be ineffectual, and killings continued in Darfur. Shortly thereafter, another peace deal was composed and signed by the government and some of the Darfur rebel groups. By July 2006, violence had reportedly intensified. (World Vision, 2009)

Darfur continues to be a place of violence and “killings” even while peacekeeping efforts were used (World Vision, 2009). The frame informs the reader that even though some actions, such as peacekeeping have been tried, they still have not resolved that Darfur remains in a conflict. The website does not implicate sides of the conflict, nor assign blame for the conflict, which may attribute to World Vision’s soft power in their silent diplomacy or controlling the agenda to make peacekeeping the preferred outcome.
Mentioning Darfur on the webpage offers World Vision a way to highlight successful projects today in Sudan (see Appendix 9). Named projects such as the “Darfur Clean Water Initiative” with its 50 wells, the “Quality Basic Education for War-Affected Children”, and “Community-Based Health Care” (World Vision, 2009) advances the notion that World Vision co-exists with violence and relief to make a difference and interprets their humanitarian efforts as positive. World vision states the program and what it does to improve the lives of those in Darfur, that is understood as saying that they are getting positive results to Darfur-specific programs.

Another website, the Sudan Food and Emergency Relief page, *Make a Donation, Bring urgent help to children in need. Sudan Food and Emergency Relief* (see Appendix 9) renders a three paragraph message for donors with a message of the conflict in Darfur, followed by statements of credibility as a humanitarian operating in Darfur; and finally, a pitch to potential donors and may be interpreted as a frame to define the problem, understand some causation, assign a moral judgment, and offer promotion for a remedy. The first images gives the figures of “300,000” killed in an “ongoing conflict” to and then offers that “2.7 million” of displaced civilians and children are in need. This helps set a frame for demonstrating the programs that World Vision offers to 500,000 people. Finally, the call to donors mentions that, “Thanks to government grants, your gift will multiply to provide life-saving food, water, medical care, and other urgent needs.” (World Vision, n.d.). The frame shows that World Vision was awarded government grants (credibility) and also, that when a donor gives their giving “multiplies” or carries impact to the crisis under current relief efforts (World Vision, n.d.). This frame persuades with actual examples and offers an abstract scheme of humanitarian relief as beneficial.

**CARE**

CARE returned information from their website search engine for the word Darfur. *Darfur Crisis* webpage contained an update to CARE’s expulsion from Sudan, press releases, and media coverage with the following statement, “On March 4, 2009, CARE, along with several other
international organizations, received a letter from the government of Sudan canceling our operations in the country” (CARE, n.d.). CARE seems obligated to give their side of the expulsion to donors and supporters offering news, and reference for donors for the situation. The language groups them with the other 13 NGOs and gives an impression that their services are postponed and that they could be reinstated. In fact, they currently operate in Darfur and Sudan, so the statement although given in 2009 retains significance now. Their frame worked to position their cause as valid and urgent and made the case to reinstate the organization. CARE’s soft power reveals their ability to appeal to the Sudanese government to want them back, which is what CARE wanted. There is a sense of transparency for not only keeping this website active, but in offering an explanation to their supporters who may want to know what are CARE’s next steps.

Additionally in this website, CARE gives a background statement with the facts as they see them in Darfur to bring the reader into the Darfur conflict that “erupted” between various “factions”. CARE describes that hundreds of thousands were killed, 2 million were displaced to camps and Chad, resources are strained, and civilian attacks were “brutal” and included home burning, rape, and killing. CARE mentions the extremes of the conflict to assist them with explaining their place in Sudan for three decades, and in Darfur since 2004, thus they were there during all of this and to be asked to leave was somewhat of a surprise. They end their message highlighting the humanitarian work they provide: water; sanitation; community services; food distribution; and other relief (CARE, n.d.). The frame seeks to engender hope that they will return to be able to provide the much needed relief that they have consistently provided, but today the frame exhibits a quality of credibility because they were allowed to return and continue the work they have provided for so long.

On CARE’s webpage, *Families Flee Deadly Fighting in Sudan* GENEVA (June 17, 2011), CARE relates the situation that has occurred in Sudan and South Sudan (See Appendix 10). This situation does not mention Darfur, and could be interpreted as a shift in CARE’s
strategy regarding the Darfur frame, since it may have negative connotations, and may not function well because of their expulsion. This is a reorienting frame. The language in the text; however, although not mentioning Darfur, does have Darfur-like images, particularly, “gun battles”, “air strikes”, and fleeing in “terror”. There is no implication of taking sides; however, CARE mentions the two sides that are in battle, the government forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Two frames emerge: one of an issue specific frame, and the other of interpreting the story for the audience.

The frame used are that innocent civilians are caught in the “crisis” of a cross fire and CARE requires “prepositioning” of aid supplies for the refuges and civilians caught in the battle (CARE, 2011). CARE shows a sense of forecasting events where they will be useful in the current conflict and further down the road by preposition aid for the end of conflict and for next crisis on the horizon, which they foresee will be a hunger crisis. CARE uses their attractive power to influence donor trust and action to support this future event. There is a negative frame used as a desperate call to do something now, otherwise, the future such as the harvest will not be sufficient enough to feed those who have had to flee. The frame could be seen as a call to donors to help. Also, CARE wants to show that they are the ground and that they understand the situation and the right type of aid and support to this crisis and the next one they see on horizon.

HELPAGE

HelpAge’s webpage search engine for the search word Darfur returned HelpAge’s PDF, *Working with the media*, which provides guidelines to their NGO to bring attention the issues on the NGO’s behalf. This page shows tips, gives advice, and finally has the material for self study to ensure press releases and interviews conform to a salient message about HelpAge’s issues. In this research, this was the first time that an operational NGO openly showed their hand at communication strategy, but no mention of Darfur or Sudan was within the document. However, this was search engine’s result. HelpAge instructs its representatives on how to frame by
packaging the information and how to use their soft power to establish a preference with the mass media for stories relevant to their relief issues.

The webpage, Sudan, offered a concise message about Sudan, but makes mention of Darfur. HelpAge places their work in contrast to Darfur, “We now work in West Darfur and Khartoum and in 12 camps with people forced to flee their homes by the West Darfur conflict.” (HelpAge, n.d.) The frame uses the common Darfur conflict images of “fleeing” people. HelpAge mentions the Darfur “conflict” in an eye clinic in West and North Darfur as an accomplishment for this year. Darfur is framed as a conflicted areas and the work of HelpAge addresses the issues for older persons, and a frame that competes on the same level of humanitarian priority as the other social issues in Darfur.

HelpAge’s has a link to their “Other Emergencies” homepage for Darfur Conflict, and speaks about, “What's happening in Darfur?” (HelpAge, n.d.; See Appendix 11):

The conflict in Darfur has been going on for over seven years and some 2.7 million people are thought to have been displaced and a further estimated two million, such as host communities flooded with refugees, have been affected. Those displaced lack shelter, food, and jobs and have sought security in temporary camps. Approximately 8% of these are older people. (HelpAge, n.d.)

HelpAge then offers its services below this quote, their aid and relief efforts, and the impacts. This seems to follow a common frame and message for all NGOs in the region. Conflict, followed by NGO services, then the positive impacts of those efforts. After a short summary, there are links to donate and for a quick read, HelpAge uses bold text to scan the key points to draw attention. Darfur as a frame, shows that HelpAge continues to provide direct services specially helping the older population of Darfur.
CHAPTER 5: Discussion

This research sought to examine the crisis and humanitarian situation in Darfur through the lens of soft power and message frames aimed at journalists, donors and potential donors. Three research questions were developed to investigate this. Five NGOs were asked to answer an interview and return them. Two NGOs, UMCOR and World Vision, returned positive response for consent to take the survey; however, did not result in doing so. CRS and CARE declined participation with reasons that will be explicated. HelpAge made no attempts to respond to the interview.

CRS’s reasons for declining the survey requested revealed that organizational members perceived that answering such questions could threaten CRS’s mission or the beneficiaries of CRS’s relief. CRS responded to the survey by stating in an e-mail:

Due to the current operating environment in Sudan our work in Darfur is too sensitive in nature to share much of what we do publicly. This is the case in which the needs of our beneficiaries and providing them with assistance supersedes most forms of outreach.

(Personal correspondence, November 16, 2011)

The statement helps show also that there are indeed other forms of outreach amenable to communication, but in this case, these questions were considered “sensitive” or jeopardizing CRS’s operational situation in both Darfur and the greater Sudan.

Moreover, CRS, offered their opinion that other NGOs currently operating in Darfur would not want to share answers to the research questions either, for fear of government reprisals, alluding to the situation in 2009 when 13 NGOs were expelled from Sudan. CRS states, “There are probably very few NGOs currently working in Darfur that would feel at liberty to speak. It was only a few years ago that numerous NGOs were kicked out of Darfur” (personal correspondence, November 16, 2011). This seems to convey that NGOs have been threatened,
silenced, or in some way censored. If the messages do not conform to the Sudanese government’s liking, then NGOs will be asked to leave. Recall that NGOs were asked to leave in 2009 because when the ICC indicted al-Bashir, NGOs were thought to have provided information against al-Bashir leading to that indictment. It is assumed, then that the questions being asked, at least from an operational NGO’s view, might lead to answers that further will incite negative information about the Sudanese regime, and in a sense reports possible crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide that may compromise an NGO’s mission in Darfur.

Finally, CRS suggested that I ask another organization, an advocacy NGO in the U.S. called the Enough Project as a possible NGO that could give information about Darfur from their point of view, as an NGO not working in Darfur. CRS states:

The team at the Enough Project might be able to orient you as to other organizations that would have less restriction. Since they are an advocacy organization they might also be able to assist you on how they message things and raise funds if that is something that is of interest to you. (Personal correspondence, November 16, 2011)

This seems to say that advocacy organizations can say whatever they want to say about the situation because they are not on the ground doing the field work. CRS deflected the interview to another NGO and changed the subject at the same time.

An additional e-mail was sent to CRS for clarification for declining the interview and to get further information into their point of view. The following is the clarification on the CRS’s views:

When it comes to Darfur and other sensitive areas like Somalia we have to really remain under the radar. I know it sounds a bit severe but agencies get kicked out all the time. This severely limits what can be said. If you were to check our website you would see that there really is not much content on Darfur or Sudan in general. This is not the case with South Sudan which has received extensive coverage because the same restrictions do not apply.
If you were asking about countries like Kenya or South Sudan it would be another story, but with Sudan and Darfur in particular we really are not at a liberty to comment. (Personal correspondence, November 17, 2011)

The language seems to show issue avoidance because offering information could get the NGO into trouble and consequently expel them and cease their relief. Not having the liberty to comment on Darfur or Sudan may indicate that the NGO is being observed for what they say and have to remain cautious and vigilant to a message design that are neutral and benign. When brought into the light of the 2009 expulsion of NGOs, it may indicate that the Sudanese government has control over the message by means of negative consequences and retaliation. NGOs want to deliver what they believe is much needed aid, but they have to temper their language and message to meet the government constraints, or suffer the consequences. This is a frame influenced by choosing the lesser of two evils in messages. Choose to report negatively about the situation and possibly showing the Sudanese government as the root cause of conflict, or providing relief because choosing to turn a blind eye, does more good in relief than harm to the humanitarian efforts.

The NGO and the government relationship seems strained, and resonates with perhaps unspoken rules: do not implicate the government in anything that might further prove the ICC allegations. The NGO message seems to be carefully crafted for the benefit of continued relief while not further implicating the regime. Operational NGOs on the ground do have access to the realities that are present and could tarnish the image of a government by reporting incidents of inhumanity or war crimes; especially since the conflict continues within Sudan.

Additionally, CRS made statements alluding positive communication between the governments of Kenya and South Sudan; messages not requiring caution and perhaps that the NGO and government relationship remain sound. Security of relief workers remains an issue, as further correspondence with CRS gave the following from one of their U.S. communication officers in an e-mail:
Unfortunately, we have to follow the lead of our field offices, and they have severely restricted any communication about Darfur for security reasons. If you were doing your research on South Sudan, we might be able to help you, but even that would be dicey. We’re one of the few American NGOs still operating in Darfur and we want to keep it that way. You might have better luck with one of the organizations that were ejected from Sudan, as they would have nothing to lose at this point. Those would include Britain’s Oxfam and Save the Children; US-based CARE, CHF and the International Rescue Committee; the French Solidarités and Action Contre la Faim; and Mercy Corps, MSF’s Dutch section (Doctors without Borders) and the Norwegian Refugee Council. (Personal correspondence, November 18, 2011)

The statement offers that expelled NGOs have a different message about the situation in Darfur than CRS can explain openly. There seems a tone of credibility, that CRS remains intact while others were thrown out, because the other NGOs did something wrong. Being “American” and the scarcity of those types of “NGOs” seems to add prestige to the message as an honor of relief in Darfur; where only a few chosen selected remain to provide relief and aid.

World Vision initially indicated they would be unable to return data in the short amount of time and that they are a complicated organization and the information would need to come from several departments in two different time zones. They also indicated that they did not have the bandwidth to respond, which seems a little odd except for the notion that they are most likely communicating the material to their operational workers on the ground in Sudan. Time and communication means were the major obstacles in completing the interview. Later, World Vision offered to respond if given more time and wanted an explanation about “soft power”. World Vision wanted to know, “Regarding soft power, would that be ‘soft power’ of the USG (vs. military action), or our own kind of ‘soft power’, which is not a term we use much of?” (personal communication, November 17, 2011). Both more time and the definitions of “soft
power” were provided to World Vision and a positive response for consent for participation was granted; however, nothing was received.

The response from World Vision showed several indications about the grass roots level communication between the operational relief side and media relations in the U.S. They seemed to be communicating regularly, if only at a slow rate because of bandwidth issues. This was the first time “soft power” was asked to be explained, seeming to show that the term was unrecognized with the media relations department of this NGO, and perhaps missing within the lexicon of others NGOs as well.

CARE’s response to the survey was that they were unable to assist because of the “crisis in the Horn of Africa” and that they had “limited resources” (personal correspondence, November 18, 2011). CARE, however, did supply a progress report on their work “in the Horn famine crisis in case it is helpful” (personal correspondence, November 18, 2011). CARE’s response may have been a thoughtful way to say, they did not want to talk about Darfur and to distract with focus on the “crisis” in the Horn of Africa. The message conveyed expediency; CARE is too busy dealing with the current “crisis” to interview about Darfur. It reflects a frame similar to the situation of the first line of the e-mail attached progress report: “The worst humanitarian crisis the world has seen this century continues to escalate in the Horn of Africa, where over 13 million people are currently in urgent need of life-saving humanitarian assistance.” (personal correspondence, November 18, 2011). This was to frame the context of what they were dealing with and shape my thoughts, or this could be the frame that intended audiences need to receive; that Darfur is over, and Horn of Africa is the new “urgent” crisis requiring “life-saving humanitarian assistance” and that CARE is over-worked saving lives to pause to report on Darfur. Moreover, without CARE being in the Horn, this crisis would “escalate” to maddening proportions. NGOs are proud of being first responders when crisis occur or of forecasting conflict well before they boiled over. CARE positioning in the Horn of Africa early will assist their framing of being there first providing the first of the important relief efforts. The conclusion
of the Horn of Africa report communicates to donors the sense of urgency and “apocalyptic” text appealing to emotions of donors:

The crisis in the Horn of Africa is likely to peak in early October 2011. It will take years for surviving families to recover. CARE’s donors make our ongoing emergency response possible, and enable us to scale up to reach more people. We appreciate your consideration of support for people in dire need of assistance in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. (Personal correspondence, November 18, 2011)

When responses to the survey were low, other NGOs were added to the request for participation. The following were asked for participation: Save Darfur, American Refugee Committee (ARC); International Medical Corps (IMC); ACTED; Oxfam America and International Rescue committee (IRC). IRC responded that they were no longer operating within Darfur and that they were, “among the expelled, after the ICC indicted Bashir on war crimes.”; thus indicating, as aforementioned that those expelled were believed by the Sudanese government as assisting in the ICC charges. IRC volunteered to have someone interview by phone, however, the interview never occurred.

USAID was also asked to provide feedback to the survey and a representative was reached. An opportunity to meet with someone who could contribute to the academic literature was offered but did not occur. USAID offered websites for understanding the process of gaining government grants for NGOs seeking financial support from the State Department. This information was useful in understanding that NGOs seeking finances from the State Department must apply and frame a salient message to the government when they gain that support request. This may also support the notion that NGOs receiving government financial assistance support the context of support to beneficiary nations receiving the relief and aid.

Humanitarian organizations meet the soft power frame of the U.S. to volunteer to be selected to provide a non-military solution to the conflict in Darfur, so they create the salient meaning that answers the job offering and application required to receive government funding
for humanitarian support to Darfur. This keeps the hard power option off the table for the U.S., something from the literature review that assumes it is not currently a U.S. policy option; but can at the same time communicate U.S. involvement and interest into the conflict. It is a soft power solution of win-win for the humanitarian organization who receives the grant and the U.S. to exercise another option aside from hard power. The NGOs are applying for a job with the U.S. government to be an implementing partner and they are meeting a requirement to offer a soft power solution because the context of the grants are not requiring hard power solutions or offerings. Therefore, NGOs are meeting a soft power requirement of the U.S.’s national interest.

**RQ 1: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur frame their messages to their intended audience, donors and potential donors?**

When evaluating the concept of frames to research question one, the main points were to use the existing literature to expose the frames observed from an interview, e-mail correspondence, and from website searches of operational and advocacy NGOs working specifically in Darfur. To accomplish the task, frames were compared using the models and theories contained in FIGURE 2, Common Framing and Soft Power Strategies of Researched NGOs.

When an NGO references or uses messages about Darfur, they seem to picture all events related to Darfur as a crisis and violent event. They emphasized a sense of urgency that makes a donor want and need to react now so that the situation can be resolved before it gets worse. There is a tendency to elicit sympathy to the struggle for the both the people receiving aid and the operational NGOs on the ground providing the aid. This allows NGOs to bring the reader to the level of conflict witnessed by NGOs and perhaps to move donors emotionally and morally to donate or support the NGO’s efforts. Messages carry salience by being simple and at times vague language must be used; however, it does seem to give the reader situational awareness of the complexity of issues, while not detailing the events in timeline fashion since the initial interest in
Darfur from 2003. Basically humanitarian organizations communicate news and a window to the Darfur situation in a humanitarian context.

NGOs are seen to show compassion toward people a frame consistent with offering aid and relief in a purposeful manner to suffering people. The Darfur conflict creates a humanitarian crisis frame that relates a narrative of millions of displaced persons, and not enough aid or relief for all the people the crisis affects. Humanitarian relief and aid frames tend to demonstrate that humanitarian action will solve the relative problems of the crisis or emergency people are facing now in Darfur. Frames carry a news message imaging and contextualizing current relief efforts, while also asking for donor support to the ongoing conflict.

The efforts of humanitarian organizations to frame messages helps demonstrate that they are making measurable gains with their Darfur related relief. NGOs consistently were reorienting their efforts in Darfur, by framing their messages to include humanitarian relief to Sudan and South Sudan. Darfur was a gateway frame to the type of ongoing conflict which now had extended boundaries into other parts of Sudan and even the newly formed South Sudan. Against, that backdrop, were messages to prepare donors for anticipated conflict to the separation of South Sudan and Sudan and other areas of crisis nearby like Chad.

NGOs tended to offer their longevity as credibility and their time in Darfur as a badge of tenacity and courage in the face of an ongoing conflict. They seem to see themselves as front liners in an ongoing battle to save people from suffering, and that aid and relief worker lives are always in danger.

Relief efforts are framed to portray the specific needs of Darfur, usually enumerated in terms of how many people they supported, and they most often were seen as positively accomplishing their intended humanitarian effects of relieving suffering, bringing a better peace, or aiding the circumstance to make them better in Darfur or Sudan.

Scarcity of relief efforts and aid is in parallel to the scarcity that the people suffer; there is never enough aid and relief effort available to support a large number of people requiring it, nor
are there enough resources for everyone in Darfur. Working with the Darfuris on the ground was an important frame to convey an idea that the solutions on the ground had support and commitment from the beneficiaries of relief and aid, but also to shape a familiar narrative of hands-on support and relevant aid solutions strategies were in place.

Not every NGO was found to use the “innocent victim” presentation; however, each mentioned innocent children, women, families, and communities to give the necessary impression of innocence, or rather that victims had no choice about their situation. Each NGO offers good news stories and hope for a better future in Darfur through their particular relief efforts and try to unite their donors as narrative partners of that positive effects their donations will bring to Darfur.

Frames commonly avoided by all NGOs are those that would call into question whether humanitarian aid and relief was exacerbating the issue of suffering it was supposed to eliminate. “Men”, “rebels”, or the government’s military were not observed as being mentioned as recipients of aid or relief. Only one mention of receiving government funding was mentioned but it was mentioned by a non-American NGO. Addressing the root causes of the conflict, or the conditions that still remain that continue to exacerbate the conflict for carrying on for so long, are avoided by operational NGOs because it could implicate the governments of the U.S. or Sudan.

The term “soft power” was not used by NGOs because the use of the term seemed to have a government overtone and may seem to align NGOs with governments or their interests. NGOs probably steer away from the term because they do not understand the definition. The research was able to interview an NGO source who explained soft power as something governments do, something NGOs would encourage, but not something that NGOs would see their messages as “constituting” or as “instruments of soft power (personal communication, November, 22, 2011).

Neutrality was more consistent with operational NGO and with MSF, considered both an operational and neutral NGO, who was able to frame a message that could speak about both perpetrators of the Darfur conflict and the victims. Operational NGOs studied were not going to
offer a frame of being human rights observers or portray or implicate rebels, the government, communities, or groups in the any conflict. Genocide, mass atrocity, human rights violations, and crimes against humanity was avoided by operational NGOs; however, for UEG framing of these terms to incite policy actions for the U.S. government and other governments was important and a common frame used.

The research had difficulty understanding at times which of the NGOs were operational and which were advocacy or not on the ground in Darfur. All wanted to be in the game but not all of them were players on the field of Darfur. UEG was easily identified as an advocacy NGO, with the basis of its support to Darfur from a distance. Other NGOs, such as Save the Children or Oxfam, were thought to be advocacy NGOs because they were expelled from Darfur; however, their websites make them seem as if they have workers on the ground. Therefore, the assumption is that NGOs frame a perceived reality and connect it to the narrative in place and perhaps remain involved through a coalition or partnership with other operational NGOs, and see their efforts as just as good, informed, and relevant through that support to the team on the ground. MSF confounds this issue, and it is assumed that even though they may have been expelled, they have always remained connected and able to frame their messages to support their aid efforts in Darfur and also to have a political message that opposes the Sudanese leadership.

**RQ 2: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur perceive their own efforts to frame messages?**

The perception of success is a measured account of the effects of aid or relief, or in the case of policy based Darfur frames, the action of government to the demands for specific action. Common to all NGOs are their actions, the intended effect, and a measurable and perceivable outcome they can point at as a success to their campaigns. The frame identifies the problem as a humanitarian crisis, the causation as conflict, the moral judgment as something charitable or action to assuage suffering, and the remedy as donor support to contribute to direct humanitarian relief and services to Darfur beneficiaries.
Operational NGOs perceive their efforts to frame message as positively contributing to mitigating the Darfur crisis on the ground. Their message frames show their actions in relief and aid work by demonstrating in word, deeds, and images the people they have positively influenced, and the results they have achieved in alleviating suffering and help people move on with their lives after a crisis or violent conflict in Darfur. The limited frame that operational NGOs have been assumed to work within was deemed successful because those NGOs in Darfur have not been expelled. Success can be perceived as having a license and sanction to continue to provide aid and relief. For example, CARE was an NGO that was dealing with damage control of being expelled in 2009 and maintained a frame that they were providing critical aid and relief. They framed their relationship with the Sudan government, after the expulsion, in noncontroversial terms and continued to explain that their expulsion was a miscommunication or misunderstanding between the government and their technical staff. Their efforts were successful because they were granted a USAID grant as an implementing partner in Darfur, and so were able to shape an issue specific frame that has since allowed them humanitarian access back in Darfur.

U.S.—based NGOs perceive their efforts at communicating a frame as effective by weighing their political action campaigns for action to influence the behaviors of governments and policies they believe will address Sudan’s involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. According to Entman (2007) this would mean, “problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, remedy promotion” (p.164) and uses another frame making NGO’s cause urgent and valid and able to compete with other U.S. social problems of national interest (Chang & Lee, 2010).

It becomes difficult to judge a message or a frame when contact is limited to the events on the ground. A tendency to believe what NGOs offer in frames because they have that limited access to Darfur, whereas, a general population from the U.S. does not; plays a part in believability of their message but NGOs the upper hand to shape information into familiar news, narratives, and an access into the context of the conflict in Darfur. Donors seem to believe NGOs
because together they share the same values and trust—so by association, where shared values combined with messages, credibility and believability become intertwined, as well. I assume that messages with donors, and support gained from grants from the U.S. and donor money, contribute to the same support to relief efforts and the frames that are offered by NGOs. Because NGOs must have donor financial support to continue humanitarian work, it also assumes that there is a contract between paying for a service and getting measureable or believable results. Not-for-profits do not have to make money, they have to spend all their money wisely on their programs of interest, and if their services were not wanted or required, we would see them disappear for lack of funding, public interest, or unconvincing frames from either experience or values.

**RQ3: Do these framing strategies result in strengthening soft power on the part of humanitarian organizations?**

The research found that NGOs generally do not use the term “soft power” to describe themselves nor do they admit that they use it to form or evaluate their image, soft power strategy, or use the notion in forming messages. At least three NGO sources wanted clarity to the definition of soft power. NGOs seem to attribute soft power to governments and not something they have, use, or project. However, it was discovered that NGOs might support the use of soft power by governments because they enables NGOs to provide aid and relief through application of relief, relief, or humanitarian services, but they do not define themselves in soft power terms, nor do their messages seem to have been formulated with soft power as a strategy in message salience. However, the frames that humanitarian organizations use to promote their work and gain donor support, in fact bear their soft power.

NGOs might encourage soft power application over the hard power options and that means when governments use the forms of national power associated with DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic), NGOs may effectively add their humanitarian goals within that framework, excluding the military option or hard power portion of that framework. NGOs seem to avoid the term soft power because they want to remain “third party” and independent, not
wanting to seem to collaborate in the political or governmental objectives. NGOs may not like to think that they are considered an apparatus or instrument of soft power of governments; however, when it assists a government soft power objectives, they do in fact become accomplices in governmental soft power. In the case of USAID implementing partners (CRS, CARE, World Vision, UMCOR, and HelpAge), they answered an application for grant money to perform a humanitarian service for the U.S. government specifically in Darfur. Because USAID is a U.S. government proponent of the State Department, humanitarians as implementing partners are carrying the U.S. soft power strategy because they are not exercising humanitarian requirements and not hard power requirements, on behalf of the State Department.

If the framing strategies found in research question one and two are effective for the humanitarian organizations, then it can be deduced that humanitarian soft power frames are strengthened if they support in some manner the U.S. government, or as in the case of a U.S. based advocacy, espouse the same policy objectives of the government. If humanitarian aid and relief is believed to be a solution outside of hard power resources to address conflict resolution or aid civilians in conflict, then it assumes that the efforts of NGOs have strengthened their soft power by their usefulness in addressing governmental objectives to apply soft power techniques in lieu of hard power resources.

When we uncover the definition of soft power, it is not considered anything other than military force, so this could be the point of departure with the NGOs’ understanding to research question three. Perhaps the definition was misunderstood by the NGOs. Therefore, to elaborate upon soft power we should define what it means: “is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes”(Nye, 2011, p. 21) From this point of view we can look at the frame of questions one and two and begin to expand upon them and give soft power meaning to NGOs.

Soft power strengthens NGOs when they frame the agenda, persuade, or attract through a co-optive or collaborative way to gain a preferred outcome. Some of the preferred outcomes may
be political influence, establishing specific preferences, or diplomacy for economic or political gain. NGOs do frame their activities and efforts in a positive manner and attract their donors through the images of humanitarian relief providing release from suffering, resolving crisis and conflict situations. Even when NGOs persuade using negative frames, that framing effectively carries their intended outcomes—donor support. Moreover, the messages are benign in that they “refer to positive attitudes that you express when you treat people, especially the client” (Vuving, 2009, p. 8). NGOs exhibit “brilliance” as it relates to their relief work as something of “high performance” or exercised with quality (Vuving, 2009, p. 8) and also, with “beauty” because NGOs’ ideals resonate with their “ideals, values, causes, or visions” (Vuving, 2009, p. 9). An NGO’s ability to perform the actions as their values in action, demonstrates a soft power quality from their stakeholders (Nye, 2011, p. 92). Because NGOs are considered and framed as credible, they have the soft power quality of “legitimacy” (Nye, 2011, p.93) and NGOs are non-threatening and make no promises of payment, while closely aligning themselves with their messages of “attraction, trust, and persuasion” (Nye, 2011, p. 93); their messages ultimately reinforce their soft power. And finally, because NGOs are able in their messages to have a “quiet diplomacy” (Ozkan & Akgun, 2010), generate a uniting agenda with both humanitarian and political actions, and use moral and ethical convincing messages (Thieren, 2007, p. 220), they generate a soft power frame or are reinforced by it.

Although NGOs in this study were reluctant to use soft power as a term, the research suggests that NGOs evaluate how to communicate soft power more effectively for “the ability to get others to want what you want” (Nye, 2011, p. 243), whether from donors, potential donors, government or non-government entities. By acknowledging the importance of soft power regardless of the terms used, NGOs may frame their messages to obtain the preferred outcomes of donor support necessary for the various humanitarian relief and aid missions.

From experience, NGOs shy away from governments to maintain perceived independence consonant with their missions. However, if NGO objectives are to provide much
needed aid, why would using government hard power or security, detract from humanitarian objectives? It may be that people could perceive NGOs as hypocritical tools of disliked governments; however, it is suggested that humanitarian organizations consider what larger benefit to humanitarian aid and relief would come if government assisted security and humanitarian soft power worked together. Hard power would seem to facilitate a necessary component of a relief process to stop the fighting and conflict and make possible relief and aid humanitarian activity to occur. NGO soft power frames and images are offered as a different strategy for NGOs, for solutions in the foreseeable future of complexity. Is there a compromise to be made that still fits within the humanitarian ideals? Could smart power, the use of both soft and hard power, offer a solution for a new way forward in areas of conflict, mass atrocity, and genocide and initiatives taking hold for the right to protect? Governments looking for partners to collaborate in the whole of government solutions on the right to protect will invariably look for NGOs. NGOs provide the necessary relief for IDP when violence has ended and civilians are protected. NGOs may no longer be able to frame themselves as “independent” or “neutral” and shy away from political efforts to intervene. NGOs should consider how to frame their independence and objectivity in their application of aid and relief to victims, and that complicity with governments protecting people strengthens not only soft power, but also the humanitarian frames. This is something interesting to consider.

Finally, soft power relies upon framing. Without humanitarian efforts to shape familiar news, narratives, and in Darfur a window into the conflict and humanitarian needs, then the deprivation of soft power would occur for humanitarian organizations and they would not be strengthened by their frames.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The literature review identified common media frames, defined soft power theory, and examined humanitarian frames about Darfur. Within those common frames and the range of possibilities exposed, there seemed to be omissions to common frames, such as directly identifying the perpetrators of conflict in the case of operational NGOs. Also, it was discovered that frames from different viewpoints needed to communicate to more than one specific audience, and had to communicate inoffensive messages or omit frames that had the potential of damaging NGOs’ current aid efforts within Darfur. Therefore, it was assumed that two differing advocacy frames existed and that they communicated differently: U.S. based advocacy, with no operational or technical support on the ground in Darfur; and operational NGOs, with boots on the ground and technical support on the ground. Their viewpoints were moderated by their limitations. U.S. based NGOs had a full range of frames, while the operational NGOs in Darfur were more limited on their message frames, even if their headquarters reported for them from the U.S. The following is an outline of the comparison of observed frames:

FIGURE 3: DIFFERING NGO FRAMES ABOUT DARFUR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differing NGO Advocacy Frames about Darfur</th>
<th>Operational NGOs, operating in Darfur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. based NGO Advocates for Darfur</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operational NGOs, operating in Darfur</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire and ask for citizen’s involvement as part of donor support</td>
<td>Desires donors to support NGOs to do the job the way they are trained or experienced—not asking for U.S. citizen advocacy to change U.S. policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifies victims and perpetrators</td>
<td>Identifies victims only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offers Humanitarian ideals to define the conflict: requires aid and relief; to report war crimes, acts against humanity, genocide</td>
<td>Define the conflict in only aid and relief narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political approach to advocacy</td>
<td>Apolitical approach as a neutral third party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses citizen outrage and citizen outcry</td>
<td>Uses a Silent message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages that Sudan denies humanitarian aid, not enough resources and aid workers for the amount of people requiring aid</td>
<td>Messages that victims need humanitarian aid, not enough resources and aid workers for the amount of people requiring aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At some point the operational NGOs needed to decide what to report back to their media
communication representatives, and ultimately their donor constituents. It is unlikely that they
would say nothing to them, or give no indication about NGO relief in Darfur. It is assumed
NGOs opted for a message supporting the victims over exposing, or reporting the perpetrators
and highlights the relief and aid efforts to beneficiaries. This decision would seem to bring more
good to many, than reporting on perpetrators; whereby they would subsequently be asked to leave
Sudan, and leaving victims without “lifesaving” aid and relief.

NGOs in Darfur framed their messages to their intended audiences by eliciting sympathy
to the beneficiaries and the aid workers and using frames as a means to communicate news and
the humanitarian context of relief in Darfur and enumerating the results of relief efforts, or in the
case of advocacy group, government action that occurred on account of their outcries. The frame
often created a humanitarian crisis as having millions of IDPs requiring assistance with
significant shortfalls in humanitarian resources to ask for donor support to resolve the differences.
Operation Darfur NGOs consistently used frames to reorient donors to a larger problem of Sudan
and South Sudan, and focus donor support to not only Darfur but the humanitarian crisis in other
parts of both countries. Longevity of operational activity and advocacy to the efforts in Darfur
was framed to shape credibility of the organizations and it was seen as important for humanitarian
organizations to frame a hands-on relief and aid narrative in Darfur to add appeal to their
credibility for humanitarian solutions in Darfur.

Advocates in America, especially those who were formerly operational NGOs in Darfur
and Sudan recognized that they were expelled on suspicion of the Sudanese government of
reporting al-Bashir’s abuses. Therefore the operational NGO, those still remaining in Sudan and
Darfur are assumed to have been put on-notice—if they did what the expelled NGOs were
suspected of doing, then they would be expelled also. These messages and activities had to be
framed with caution, and were limited on what could be said to donors.
After viewing the frames as limited, controlled, and cautious it was important to seek an NGO source, to at least explain why NGOs were skirting the research questions and try to explain the frames in the messages that were being sent to the U.S. and other parts of the world, and understand what was purposefully not being said. Why were some messages being left out? The research was able to find an anonymous NGO source to help to explain why NGOs were unable and unwilling to participate and to explain the observed messages from e-mail and NGO websites.

Using the experience and intuition that I have gained from 13 years of serving in the U.S. Army with two theaters of war, and multiple deployments to the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa, it was obvious that NGOs on the ground in Darfur and Sudan were being watched by operatives of the Sudanese government and reporting back NGO actions and information back to the government. When a country is in conflict, such as Sudan, it is assumed that the government and military view the battlefield in total—that is all of Sudan and its neighboring countries. NGOs are actors on the battlefield, and their actions can play into operations and can be used; essentially NGOs have to be controlled, which I suggest extends to other aspects of relief that are probably also controlled, so as to support the national interest of Sudan and benefit the government. In war plans, knowing who the government and non-government actors, the enemy, and population specifics are essential; having the opportunity to control them helps to create operational success. It is not hard to imagine that Darfur and Sudan based NGOs are being watched and to a large extent controlled, not only in their deeds, but their words and images that they can portray of the Sudanese government negatively or positively. Although these assumptions resonate with my experience as a military professional, working Army plans for 13 years, this would not be obvious to the average American or donor receiving a message about Darfur relief efforts. In conflict and warfare, spies die or are killed, so security about messages coming out of Darfur must have some regulation at the government level and the NGO level—it is a balancing effort of continued NGO relief and Sudanese national interest.
NGOs perceive their efforts to frame messages as effective because of their reliance and consistent use of successful humanitarian campaigns. In the campaign model, the humanitarian organizations were observed demonstrating their intended humanitarian effort with measured and perceivable successful outcomes to their beneficiaries and to their program. The frame positively contributed to mitigating the Darfur crisis on the ground. Additionally, NGOs believe their success in framing comes from continued humanitarian support in Darfur; whereas, a failure of their messages would be their expulsion by the Sudan government. Darfur advocacy NGOs perceived success in their ability to affect behaviors of the U.S. government as a result of their messages and campaigns carried out by citizens to the U.S. government.

The framed messages from NGOs about Darfur give the perception of helping victims. It does not address the perpetrators or their role as perpetrators. U.S. based advocates have taken that role by seeking policy solutions and getting at the heart of the issues of conflict in Darfur, and why relief has become a requirement there: since 2003’s genocide and mass atrocity; and today with acts against humanity from both the Sudanese government and rebels forces. The conditions that caused aid to be a necessity for victims' survival remains at the government’s level and a persistent issue.

Operational NGOs are not saying that they do not stand against injustice in Darfur, but they cannot report abuses of the government at the expense of denying relief to a cause they believe; that the benefits (relief) outweigh the cost (reporting abuses). This assumes that they have deferred the message to those NGOs stateside who can point a finger at the Sudanese government without the hope of retaliation; whereas, the operational NGOs do not have the freedom of expressing abuse reporting from their offices in Darfur, nor from the messages their home offices in the U.S. offer. If their home offices in the U.S. communicate messages against the Sudanese government or offer frames that are frowned upon by that government, then the operational workers in Darfur will be targeted because of their guilt by association.
Although there are an inexhaustible number of frames operational NGOs in Darfur can use to entice or persuade donors, they are unlikely to use anything identifying perpetrators. They may use the terms “rebel activity” or “conflict from rebel groups” because it is not in opposition to the powers that can have the NGOs removed from Sudan—the government. It is a neutral message with respect to the Sudanese government; however, it could be observed as taking sides about the situation in order to simplify the message and give a “crisis” and “conflict” tone, a common frame for humanitarian organizations. The neutral tone suggests that a different frame would implicate the government further during the conflict and consequently expel operational NGOs, or cause retaliation and possible death to aid workers.

It was interesting to see terms describing the current conflict with “air strikes” because it was thought that the image would implicate the Sudanese government; however, it was inferred that the image made the conflict look like a civil war between the government and rebels, a frame benefitting the Sudanese government to side step the ICC charges and continue to pronounce their sovereignty as a nation. Civil war is the classic rebuttal for a nation accused of genocide or mass atrocity intervention because it complicates whether state have the right to enter another state and interfere. The civil war frame gives al-Bashir a way out if ever he is to face the ICC charges as a means of explaining that he was putting down a rebellion challenging his sovereign rule.

U.S. based NGO advocates would not frame these genocidal activities as a civil war but would frame the perpetrators on both sides, but mainly al-Bashir, as facilitating and continuing oppression, suffering, war crimes, mass atrocity, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This is an indirect method of Sudanese image control of the frame through operational NGO. NGOs, if they must talk about conflict or “crisis” must frame the conflict as a civil war to operate in Sudan, or decide to refrain from stating exactly who the two sides of the conflict have fighting. Operational NGOs seem to be able to use the term “rebels” so long as the rebels’ image does not represent them as causing a conflict or creating the crisis, it keeps their message neutral also because they too can retaliate against aid workers.
The research found that NGOs generally do not use the term “soft power” to describe themselves nor do they admit that they use it to form or evaluate their image, soft power strategy, or use the notion in forming messages. NGOs seem to attribute soft power to governments and not something they have, use, or project. However, it was discovered that NGOs might support soft power use by governments because it enables NGOs to provide aid and relief through humanitarian services. NGOs do not seem to form messages with soft power as a strategy. However, the frames that humanitarian organizations use to promote their work and gain donor support, in fact bear their soft power.

NGOs might encourage soft power application over the hard power options and effectively add their humanitarian goals within that framework, excluding the military option or hard power portion of that framework. NGOs seem to avoid the term soft power because they want to remain “third party” and independent, not wanting to seem to collaborate in the political or governmental objectives. NGOs may not like to think that they are considered an apparatus or instrument of soft power of governments; however, when it assists a government soft power objectives, they do in fact become accomplices in governmental soft power. USAID implementing partners (CRS, CARE, World Vision, UMCOR, and HelpAge), received grants to perform humanitarian service for the U.S. government specifically in Darfur. Because USAID, part of the U.S. State Department, gives money in grants to humanitarians as implementing partners in Darfur, humanitarian organizations carry U.S. soft power strategy and humanitarian frames were assumed to strengthen their soft power.

Humanitarian soft power frames are strengthened if they support in some manner the U.S. government, or as in the case of a U.S. based advocacy, espouse the same policy objectives of the government. If humanitarian aid and relief is believed to be a solution outside of hard power resources to address conflict resolution or aid civilians in conflict in Darfur, then this research assumed that the efforts of NGOs at framing their messages strengthened their soft
power by their usefulness in addressing governmental objectives to apply soft power techniques in lieu of hard power resources.

Soft power strengthens NGOs when they frame the agenda, persuade, or attract through a co-optive or collaborative way to gain a preferred outcomes for political influence, establishing specific preferences, or diplomacy for economic or political gain. NGOs do frame their activities and efforts in a positive manner and attract their donors through the images of humanitarian relief providing release from suffering, resolving crisis and conflict situations. Even negative framing effectively carries their intended outcomes—donor support.

An NGO’s ability to perform the actions as their values in action, demonstrates a soft power quality from their stakeholders (Nye, 2011, p. 92). Because NGOs are considered and framed as credible, they have the soft power quality of “legitimacy” (Nye, 2011, p.93), do not coerce donors, and align themselves with their messages of “attraction, trust, and persuasion” (Nye, 2011, p. 93); their messages ultimately reinforce their soft power. Because NGOs are able in their messages to have a “quiet diplomacy” (Ozkan & Akgun, 2010), generate a uniting agenda with both humanitarian and political actions, and use moral and ethical convincing messages (Thieren, 2007, p. 220), they create soft power.

Soft power relies upon framing. Without humanitarian organizational efforts to shape familiar news, narratives, and offer information about Darfur as lens into the conflict and humanitarian needs, then the deprivation of soft power would occur for humanitarian organizations and they would not be strengthened by their frames.

The research aimed to expose the humanitarian and soft power frames emanating from Darfur and hoped to demonstrate that a simple, salient, and persuasive message must exclude information. The situation on the ground in Darfur and Sudan remains a complex environment where the balance of humanitarian relief and aid, Sudanese national interest, and victims and perpetrators seek to strike a complicated balance. Sudan remains at war, and the operating environment for NGOs is a battlefield. Operational NGOs studied seem to have made a choice
not to report war crimes in order to gain what is perceived to be a greater good in continuing to
provide aid and relief. It could be assumed that they do not need to do so because the evidence
already collected is so compelling that the ICC was able to prefer charges against al-Bashir and
indict him. The outcry from the advocacy NGOs outside the conflict have sought policy
resolutions and frame and deploy the messages that the operational NGOs cannot. The two may
not always be working in tandem, but each has expressed their soft power and their values in the
best way possible for their current situation. Efficient, salient, and persuasive messages allow
humanitarian organizations to get results from both operational and advocacy stated or implied
goals.

As I write this, Kenya is facing a challenge to honor its commitment to the ICC and voted
to arrest al-Bashir. Sarah McGregor, on November 30, 2011 from Bloomberg reports “Kenya
plans to “immediately” appeal the decision that threatens to destabilize regional security and
damage relations with a trading partner and ally”. Operational NGOs will need to remain vigilant
as the conflict issues flare up and be the first responders to relief and aid to the consequences of
the possible conflict. Politically advocating NGOs must continue their message to keep the
pressure, because “Kenya, as a member of the Hague-based war crimes court, is obliged to
cooperate with the ICC arrest warrant if al-Bashir enters Kenyan territory” (McGregor, 2011).
Al-Bashir has already expelled the Kenyan ambassador and denied charges (McGregor, 2011).

Humanitarian organizations’ role in attempting to quell the conflict within Darfur showed
“the persistence and resilience of external actors in transcending the limits of those international
strictures and norms” (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 79). The messages and correspondence that
humanitarian organizations had with their donors became important as a means of telling a story
and conveying a humanitarian solution to a complex environment of rules, international law,
negotiations, and humanitarian relief. The discourse of those messages and the “soft power”
frames formulated help donors, supporters, and advocates to understand the strategic
communications that were necessary to continue to allow humanitarian organizations to provide
relief and aid services within the confines of International law, but also within the greater context of motives to provide assistance and help to bring peace and relief to victims of conflict.

Humanitarian organizations and their donors see themselves and the action in the frame and define themselves simultaneously as reflections of each other through the lens of humanitarian frames and soft power. The study demonstrated the relationship of framing theory, soft power, and humanitarian frames to enhance strategic communications and improve awareness and appreciation for their convergence and application.

Humanitarian organizations inform their activity through International law governing the rules on how they operate. These organizations are some of the first to witness indicators of genocide and other acts against humanity, as were witnessed and reported in Darfur. Humanitarian organizations are required to report and remain vigilant to developing situations in violation of International law. Developing humanitarian objectives that may thwart and/or assuage mass atrocities and crimes against humanity serves to define humanitarian activity in Darfur as legitimate and consistent with applicable international laws. Humanitarian soft power engages with potential donors promoting humanitarian actions by arousing contextualized salient and framed messages, defining the capability of the organizations to efficiently create stability, prevent future genocide or acts against humanity in Darfur, and help with Darfur resilience after conflict. The message of the humanitarian organizations frame encourage potential donors to support the need for humanitarian activity and become active donors or supporters.
## Appendix 1:
Screening Criteria for Operational NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nongovernmental Organization</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>US AID $</th>
<th>Donor $ 2010</th>
<th>Donor $ 2009</th>
<th>Year Operating in Darfur</th>
<th>Years Operating in Darfur</th>
<th>Founding Year</th>
<th>Num Yrs in Operation</th>
<th>AFR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>$1,700,606.00</td>
<td>$122,593,580.56</td>
<td>$76,804,681.49</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Refugee Committee</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>$5,639,738.00</td>
<td>$7,629,582.00</td>
<td>$3,559,253.00</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>$3,198,044.00</td>
<td>$62,344,000.00</td>
<td>$60,097,000.00</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Concern Division of Crista Ministries</td>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>$233,506.00</td>
<td>$4,768,000.00</td>
<td>$4,986,000.00</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>$5,401,044.00</td>
<td>$212,179,000.00</td>
<td>$92,177,000.00</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>$1,275,896.00</td>
<td>$104,741.43</td>
<td>$135,460.65</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HelpAge International</td>
<td>HelpAge</td>
<td>$702,166.00</td>
<td>$415,020.66</td>
<td>$344,515.22</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>$4,892,538.00</td>
<td>$88,701,214.00</td>
<td>$63,808,392.00</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medair, SWI, Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation</td>
<td>Medair</td>
<td>$2,296,301.00</td>
<td>$39,598,819.00</td>
<td>$28,785,981.00</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Experts on the Front Line</td>
<td>MERLIN</td>
<td>$1,980,053.00</td>
<td>$8,453,123.15</td>
<td>$5,845,599.63</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Mercy</td>
<td>$2,130,492.00</td>
<td>$285,491,501.00</td>
<td>$64,517,337.00</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner Aid</td>
<td>PAI</td>
<td>$1,059,698.00</td>
<td>$3,198,375.37</td>
<td>$1,894,296.91</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief International</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>$1,478,915.00</td>
<td>$25,878,833.00</td>
<td>$25,257,170.00</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terres Des Hommes</td>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>$1,266,076.00</td>
<td>$389,905.30</td>
<td>$610,935.69</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Methodist Committee on Relief</td>
<td>UMCOR</td>
<td>$4,396,475.00</td>
<td>$82,171,258.00</td>
<td>$35,534,047.00</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Relief International</td>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>$1,400,000.00</td>
<td>$67,909,651.00</td>
<td>$61,380,148.00</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Wvis</td>
<td>$2,499,999.00</td>
<td>$800,000,000.00</td>
<td>$769,000,000.00</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOA Netherlands</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>$597,020.00</td>
<td>$11,712,967.05</td>
<td>$9,088,122.76</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2: 
OXFAM


**Background on the Darfur crisis**

In early 2003, armed groups from Sudan’s western region of Darfur launched a rebellion, claiming that Darfur had suffered decades of political marginalization and economic neglect at the hands of successive national governments in Khartoum. The government responded with force, and the fighting quickly escalated. Arab militias—commonly known as Janjaweed—began systematically attacking and destroying villages considered sympathetic to the rebels. The conflict reached its height in 2003 and 2004, but in 2010, fighting continues to trigger wide-scale displacement of civilians.

In March of 2009—shortly after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sudan’s president Omar Bashir—the Sudanese government revoked the licenses of 16 aid agencies (3 Sudanese and 13 international). Oxfam Great Britain was one of the organizations asked to leave; however, Oxfam America continued and expanded its humanitarian operations in Darfur and is now assisting more than 300,000 people in and around the camps for displaced people.

**The facts**

- Between February 2003 and December 2009, nearly 3,000 villages in Darfur were destroyed.
- An estimated 300,000 people have so far been killed in the conflict.
- More than 2.5 million people who have fled their homes are now living in camps in Darfur.
- More than 260,000 Darfuris have taken refuge in neighboring Chad.
- More than 4.7 million people have been directly affected by the conflict.
- The crisis continues: in early 2010, armed conflict displaced tens of thousands of villagers from their homes.


“Outside the thatched walls that surround the workshop is the world of Darfur, where since 2003, more than two million people have been displaced by violence and terror. Unable to safely return home to their farms and villages, they have tried to build a life in the camps—settlements that continue to grow: in a single month in early 2011, more than 50,000 new arrivals took refuge in a camp of North Darfur.” (Stevens, 2011)
“Millions of people in Darfur rely on aid agencies for vital assistance – yet over the past 18 months it has become increasingly difficult and dangerous to reach people in need. Abductions of aid workers have spiraled out of control, forcing many agencies to restrict staff to the main towns. Some of the worst affected areas, such as the mountainous Jebel Marra region which has seen heavy fighting, have been inaccessible to aid workers.” (Oxfam International, 2011)

“The Darfur conflict is still far from resolution and the peace process remains distant from the communities most affected. This is symptomatic of a wider challenge across northern Sudan, where too many communities have faced years of neglect and marginalisation. Development has often failed to extend from the centre to the peripheries of the north, and there is a growing divide between rich and poor. In the post referendum period it will be more important than ever to address the needs of communities in remote and impoverished areas.” (Oxfam International, 2011)
APPENDIX 3:
MSF


“The heightened hostility between both sides and violent attacks by the North in contested border areas [Abyei, South Kordofan, and similar patterns of violence on the border between South Darfur and Western Bahr El Ghazal] is making media headlines. In the lead-up to the South’s independence from the North. However, other violence has also claimed lives and displaced people this year, but has rarely made it into the news. This includes intertribal/communal related violence, cattle raiding and the rise of new southern militias.” (MSF, 2011)

Save the Children began working in Sudan in 1984, conducting programs for children and families affected by conflict, displacement, extreme poverty, hunger and a lack of basic services. Many of the children and families we served were among the most vulnerable and hardest to reach.

In March 2004, with permission of the government of Sudan, Save the Children entered Darfur to address the urgent needs of children and families displaced by several years of conflict. Within a month of our arrival, we had launched a large-scale response that became a sustained relief operation to provide hundreds of thousands of children and adult members of their families — especially women — with access to lifesaving food and water, basic health care and emergency obstetrical care for women, protection programs, and educational and income-generating activities.

As Save the Children was completing its fifth year in West Darfur, we received a letter from the Sudanese authorities asking us to suspend operations in northern Sudan. We were among 13 international aid organizations — including our sister agency, Save the Children UK — to have their registrations revoked. Read more.


Sudan Update

Save the Children USA, based in Westport, Conn., issued the following statement regarding its operations in Sudan.

In March of 2009, the government of Sudan cancelled the registrations of Save the Children USA — as well as a number of other international nongovernmental humanitarian organizations — and ordered these agencies to cease humanitarian operations. As a result of this order, Save the Children USA has closed down its programs in northern Sudan and terminated contracts with its staff.

Save the Children USA has been working to reach an agreement with the government of Sudan to transfer programs and assets to our colleague organization, Save the Children Sweden. While details concerning these arrangements are still being worked out, the agency's objective is to maximize support for Save the Children Sweden to scale up its programs to assist vulnerable children and families in Sudan.

Save the Children also looks forward to the outcome of United Nations discussions with the government of Sudan to strengthen the humanitarian framework and operational environment to...
enable all humanitarian NGOs in Sudan to effectively carry out their lifesaving work aimed at improving the lives of the Sudanese people. Last Updated June 12, 2009
APPENDIX 5:
SAVE DARFUR OR UNITED TO END GENOCIDE


“This weekend, in violation of peace agreements, the Sudanese government invaded Abyei and escalated bombing and aid cut-offs in Darfur. The Government of Sudan believes that the United States and other international actors will respond with rhetoric instead of action to its flagrant disregard for international humanitarian law… I urge you to impose serious consequences on all parties that target civilians and violate international law.” (United to End Genocide, n.d.)

“Immediately suspend progress toward normalization with Sudan, including the review of its status as a state sponsor of terror,…review of debt relief or the lifting of sanctions;…. impose targeted U.S. sanctions on officials and militia leaders implicated in orchestrating violence; support expanding and strengthening the existing U.N. sanctions regime to hold accountable individuals responsible for instigating violence in Abyei; and press the U.N. Security Council to authorize emergency planning for the protection of civilians from violence in Sudan and the strengthening of the United Nations Mission in Sudan with a future mandate that prioritizes civilian protection and provides access to sensitive areas on both sides of the north-south border.” (United to End Genocide, n.d.)

**Catholic Relief Services Statement on Allegations in West Darfur, Sudan**

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has worked in West Darfur, Sudan since 2004 and has established strong partnerships with the community and local government in the area. CRS remains committed to meeting the immediate and long-term development needs of more than 500,000 people of Darfur regardless of race, religion or nationality.

Recently allegations have been made that CRS has distributed Bibles in West Darfur. CRS strongly denies these allegations. CRS does not distribute Bibles. The distribution of Bibles would be a violation of our policy. CRS provides assistance to people in need, without regard to race, religion or nationality. CRS has worked without complaint for decades in numerous countries where the majority of the population is Muslim. CRS designs all its programs to ensure that our assistance is given in accordance to international humanitarian standards and appropriate cultural sensitivities.

CRS also does not engage in military or partisan political activities. We have consistently worked in compliance with the Sudanese government and the United Nations in our humanitarian efforts in West Darfur. This is the first time accusations have been made regarding the neutrality of our work or the manner of our conduct.

The allegations have resulted in perceived safety threats to our staff and CRS was forced to temporarily close our Darfur offices and relocate staff. We hope to resume our critical aid and development work in West Darfur as soon as possible.
APPENDIX 7:
UMCOR


“UMCOR Sudan’s Education and Child Projection program centers on teacher training, school construction and reconstruction, establishing Parent Teacher Associations and providing essential school supplies for students. For example, UMCOR partners with UNICEF to distribute girls' uniforms and school materials for 11,400 students in Darfur. UMCOR has also constructed new classroom blocks and rehabilitated permanent classrooms in addition to building gender-specific latrines at the schools. School kits from UMCOR Sager Brown, the UMCOR’s Relief Supply Center, are also distributed to support students in Darfur and South Sudan. Through a WFP school feeding program in Darfur, UMCOR is targeting 4,598 pupils in 12 primary schools in Al Daein and Adilla localities with food.” (UMCOR, n.d.)


“UMCOR opened a field office for direct relief and rehabilitation in the embattled Darfur region of Sudan in February 2005. Later that year the program expanded to include agriculture extension, emergency supply distribution, and small-scale livelihoods. The initial work is concentrated in South Darfur. UMCOR is also working with a coalition of other humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to Sudanese refugees fleeing from Darfur into the neighboring nation of Chad.” (UMCOR, n.d.)

“We're 100% efficient. Every dollar you give to this emergency will provide humanitarian relief and recovery only for this emergency. That's because gifts to the One Great Hour of Sharing offering covers UMCOR's costs to administer your gifts.”, which seems to assure their donors that their monies will be well spent on this crisis, and that acting now is important because crisis are not considered long time events. (UMCOR, n.d.)


“In Africa, UMCOR has been preparing for South Sudan independence, which will take effect July 9. Directors voted to provide $250,000 to continue programs the organization has run for about five years in two locales in what will be South Sudan. The funds also will allow the organization to open a national office in the new country’s capital, Juba, where other relief, donor, and United Nations organizations will also be headquartered. Programming will continue in the South Darfur region of Sudan, as will the related Sudan HQ field office in Khartoum. But the South will face many challenges, including the ongoing return to the new nation of Southern Sudanese from Sudan. South Sudan is severely lacking in infrastructure and has abysmally low social-economic indicators: only 15 percent of adults are literate and only 2 percent have completed

94
primary school. About 73 percent of Southern Sudanese live on less than $22 US per month.

Thomas Dwyer, director of UMCOR’s field offices in eight countries, indicated that UMCOR would participate in a South Sudan roundtable discussion with other partners in August to discern needs and ongoing and coordinated responses to them in the world’s newest nation.” (Unger, 2011)

- “The Darfur Clean Water Initiative improves access to water in South Darfur communities by drilling 50 deep wells.
- Quality Basic Education for War-Affected Children in South Darfur will improve quality basic education targeting all school-age children, especially girls, in South Darfur by providing appropriate teaching and learning materials, including girls’ uniforms, latrines, water supply, and essential furniture for classrooms.
- Community-Based Health Care in South Darfur will improve the health status and productive capacity of the Ed Al Fursan community by providing health-care training programs that focus on reproductive health and nutrition, reducing the morbidity among women of reproductive age.” (World Vision, 2009)


“300,000 people have been killed during the ongoing conflict in Darfur where, tragically, a child dies every 18 minutes. This conflict has forced 2.7 million hungry and frightened children and families from their homes, leaving more than a million without food or medical care. They desperately need your help.

As the largest relief organization on the ground in South Darfur, World Vision is working hard to help these innocent victims by providing food, water, medical care, and other humanitarian assistance to 500,000 affected people in the region. More than 300,000 internally displaced people in Darfur rely on World Vision for monthly food rations. But we need your help to continue this important work in Sudan.

Can you help us save as many lives as possible? Thanks to government grants, your gift will multiply to provide life-saving food, water, medical care, and other urgent needs. Thank you for doing anything you can to keep these struggling children and families alive.” (World Vision, n.d.)
APPENDIX 9: CARE


“Background

The Darfur conflict erupted in early 2003. Fighting among various factions has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced more than 2 million, most escaping to larger towns where they stay in camps for "internally displaced people," and some crossing the border into Chad, where they live in refugee camps, straining local resources. Attacks on civilians during the conflict have been brutal and include burning homes, killing and rape.

CARE's Work

CARE has worked in Sudan for almost three decades. We been active in Darfur since April 2004 and currently provide direct humanitarian assistance to more than 1.5 million people there and in neighboring Chad. We operate throughout South and West Darfur, including the cities of Nyala, Kass, Zalingi and surrounding camps. CARE's work includes water and sanitation, community services and distribution of food and other relief items.” (CARE, n.d.)


“Tens of thousands of families have fled in terror as air strikes, gun battles and burning of homes and buildings have intensified in the past week in the states of Abyei and South Kordofan in northern Sudan. The United Nations is reporting that more than 174,000 people have been displaced by the fighting between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, with many people crossing into southern Sudan.

CARE is providing emergency assistance to families who have crossed into Southern Sudan desperately trying to escape the violence and we are calling for the protection of civilians. Women and girls are at particular risk, with new mothers and pregnant women walking for days to reach safety, without access to clean water, food, or health care. Separated from their home communities and families, women and girls are at increased risk of sexual or physical attack. We are prepositioning health supplies such as safe birthing kits and newborn kits at our primary health care facility in Panyang, near the border with South Kordofan, to help meet the needs of pregnant women and new mothers in particular, and providing emergency health care for families.

To help prevent the outbreak of waterborne disease, CARE is working with partners to distribute soap and jerry cans for the storage of clean water to families who have crossed into Unity State in
southern Sudan. CARE is coordinating with UNICEF to preposition additional supplies, and we are planning to scale up our response to meet the growing need.

In South Kordofan, many roads are blocked, and ongoing fighting is slowing the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance. Reports indicate that many families are taking shelter in host families in neighboring areas to the north or hiding in the Nuba Mountains, without access to food or clean water. Making the situation worse, the region is entering what is known as the "hunger gap" between now and harvest time in October-November, and our staff warn that if families are not able to return home to plant crops now, then this could become a very serious long-term hunger crisis.

Tensions are on the rise in Sudan in the lead-up to July 9, when southern Sudan will become the world's newest country. There are fears that the fighting could spread, adding to an already serious humanitarian situation across many parts of Sudan.” (CARE, 2011)
HelpAge. (n.d.). *Darfur Conflict*. Retrieved from:
http://www.helpage.org/what-we-do/emergencies/other-emergencies/darfur-conflict/

What's happening in Darfur?

Some 2.7 million people are thought to have been displaced and a further estimated two million, such as host communities flooded with refugees, have been affected.

Those displaced lack shelter, food and jobs and have sought security in temporary camps. Approximately 8% of these are older people.

Older people's needs

Older people in camps are rarely included in humanitarian relief programmes.

Those who are less mobile cannot reach food distributions.

The camps do not provide any treatment for age-related ailments such as eye problems.

What is HelpAge doing?

HelpAge is working in 12 camps for internally displaced people in North and West Darfur. We help to provide *age-friendly healthcare* and have set up *mobile eye care clinics*.

We also provide *shelter*, help older people to get *work*, offer *literacy* programmes and organise *cultural activities*.

These activities *promote dialogue* between young and older people and *strengthen bonds* between different age and gender groups.

Our impact so far

In 2009-2010, HelpAge helped more than *32,000 older people*, children in their care and their families.

As well as continuing to help host communities and internally displaced people retuning to their homes, we have:

- built *927 individual shelters and 241 family shelters* for extremely vulnerable older people. Up to *670 young people* who were involved in building the shelters benefited from the *food for work scheme*.
- trained 54 tutors (30 older people and 24 young people) to conduct *literacy and numeracy sessions*, which up to 1,868 students have attended (908 were older people).
• involved 1,275 older people in **income generating activities**, which took place at 17 older people's social centres. We also encouraged a total of 500 young people and 240 older people to participate in **sports activities**.

• run five **life skills sessions** for older and younger generations. These dealt with topics such as hygiene and nutrition promotion, children's rights, HIV and AIDS prevention and assistance to people living with HIV and AIDS, animal care and agricultural best practices. An estimated **7,115 people took part** in these sessions.
Consent Form

Humanitarian Soft Power Frames Consent Form

You are being asked to take part in a research study on how humanitarian organizations providing relief in Darfur frame their soft power messages to their donors and potential donor. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.

What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to understand the soft power message frames that humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur use with their donors and potential donors.

What we will ask you to do: If you agree to be in this study, we ask you to fill out a survey and provide artifacts from your humanitarian organization. The interview will include questions related to answering the three research questions. The survey is estimated to take about 30 minutes to complete. If we decide to interview, with your permission, I would like to tape record the answers for the survey.

Risks and benefits: I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in day-to-day life. There are no benefits to you. Humanitarian relief is a very demanding place, and we hope to learn more about the soft power message frames used for support to relief efforts in Darfur.

Compensation: There is no compensation for this survey.

Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report we make public we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have access to the records. I will destroy the tape recording within two weeks of taking the recording and after transcribing the information.

Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions that you do not want to answer. If you decide not to take part or to skip some of the questions, it will not affect your current or future relationship with the University of Missouri. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time.

If you have questions: The researchers conducting this study is Stephen Wisniew. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Stephen Wisniew at sm.stephenmatthew@gmail.com or at (561) 866-9468. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant in this research and/or concerns about the study, or if you feel under any pressure to enroll or to continue to participate in this study, you may contact the University of Missouri Campus IRB (which is a group of people who review the research studies to protect participants’ rights) at 573-882-9585, umcresearchcirb@missouri.edu
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.
Dear NGO,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey.

Foremost, I respectfully request any materials being sent to your donors from your organization in order to substantiate the data for this questionnaire and the research questions and analysis. It can be e-mailed to me at sm.stephenmatthew@gmail.com, or arrangements can be made over the phone (561) 866-9468 with Stephen Wisniew, the researcher.

Research Question 1 asks the question: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur frame their messages to their intended audience, donors and potential donors? It can also be understood as saying, How does your NGO providing relief in Darfur tailor messages to your intended audience of donors and potential donors?

Please answer the following questions as precisely and completely as possible by typing below the questions. Please indicate any areas with a star (*) where you can provide documents or materials that will help to explain, and identify those materials. Thank you for your assistance.

1. Describe your understanding of your donor market for humanitarian aid to Darfur.

2. Describe the demographic of the donors you solicit.

3. Explain the media and the methods you use to communicate with potential donors.

What are the elements that compose the frame (words, deeds, images) and how do those elements combine to form a specific or multi-purpose message?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Donor</th>
<th>Media(*)</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Message Summary or Specific message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex. Donor</td>
<td>Ex. Website,</td>
<td>Ex. Combining images and words to show…</td>
<td>Ex. Donation of $25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Donor</td>
<td>Facebook,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Twitter,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*please make specific reference to media websites, or documents that may be obtained.

** add more rows, as required.
4. Explain the media and methods you use to communicate with previous donors.

What are the elements that compose the frame (words, deeds, images) and how do those elements combine to form a specific or multi-purpose message?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Donor</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Message Summary or Specific Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex. Previous Donor</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. In your experience, which methods yield the most donations?

6. Within your organization, to what degree do personal relationships play in getting potential donors to commit and previous donors to give again or continue to donate?

7. Describe your organizations main planning considerations when developing donor outreach/donor engagement plans.

8. Explain your organizations donor fulfillment plan.

9. Explain the unique or novel ways in which your organization connects the donors with the humanitarian aid recipient(s) whose interests you represent.

10. Describe any constraints you have in communicating your message to the donor community.

11. What are the common images used to frame your messages?

12. What common language is used to frame your messages?

13. What humanitarian service or aid is highlighted specifically or the most in your messages, and why?

14. What other events or special circumstances (i.e. benefit concert, fundraising event) convey the framed messages to your intended audience of donors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events/Special Circumstance</th>
<th>Donor/Intended Audience</th>
<th>Framed Message</th>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Measured Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Research Question 2 asks the question: How do humanitarian organizations in Darfur perceive their own efforts to frame messages? It can also be understood as saying, How does your organization providing relief in Darfur rate your ability to reach your target donor audiences?
1. 
   a. Describe how familiar your employees are with the organization’s donor objectives and purpose.

   b. How does your organization check employees understanding of the donor objectives and purpose?

2. Describe the measures your organization uses to determine the effectiveness of your outreach efforts.

3. What are your intended outcomes of your framed messages sent to donors or potential donors?

4. Explain the range of corporate and host Nation consequences, when donor target objectives are not met.

5. List the top three organizations with whom you mainly compete for donor support.
   a. 1.
   b. 2.
   c. 3.

6. 
   a. How does your organization perceive your potential donors?

   b. How do those perception inform your messages and framing to donors and potential donors?

7. How do you frame the situation requiring humanitarian relief from your organization, and how do you view the reaction of your intended audience to this frame?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian relief frame (words, deeds, images)</th>
<th>Explain in short narrative what the frame illustrates to the intended audience.</th>
<th>Intended audience reaction to frame (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

8. What common narrative(s) do you use to convey your relief efforts in Darfur?

9. How do you formulate a salient message that attracts support for donors to your efforts within Darfur? Or, what group of employees or workers are charged with formulating the donor campaigns and efforts and what process do they use to formulate a salient message that attracts support for donors to your relief efforts in Darfur?

10. What is the most important behavioral outcome desired from the messages sent to donors or potential donors?
Research Question 3 asks the question: **Do these framing strategies result in strengthening soft power on the part of humanitarian organizations?** It can also be understood as saying, **Do your message personalization strategies result in a perceived increase in your organizational prestige among targeted donors?**

1. Describe your organization’s brand and image in comparison to your closest competitors within Darfur.

2. List the words your closest competitors would use to describe your organization.

3. Demonstrate or show any evidence of outside interests or documentation that describes your organization in the light that you find positive and reinforcing to your mission. Describe also, those outside interests or third parties that describe your organization in a negative manner different from your espoused mission and vision.

4. Provide roughly what percentage of donations in a given year comes from previous donors versus new or first-time donors to your organization.

5. Provide your opinion on the factors of your organizational appeal that you feel are most likely to get a donor to make a commitment.

6. Explain some of the reasons why a donor would be more likely to make a pledge with your organization than another organization.

7. Are there any measures or results from messages sent to donors or potential donors that have increased support to your humanitarian mission to Darfur?

8. Are there any measures or results of messages to donors or potential donors that have decreased support to your humanitarian mission to Darfur?

9. Have any framing techniques (specific words, deeds, images, media) specifically increased support to your humanitarian mission in Darfur?

10. How has framing the agenda proven to persuade, and elicit positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes of your humanitarian aid in Darfur?

11. How do you define your humanitarian organization’s soft power?

*(The complete definition of soft power, according to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye, 2011, p. 21). “Soft power is attractive power,” and “Soft power is the ability to get others to want what you want” (Nye, 2011, p. 243). )*

12. How do you think your donors view your organization’s soft power?

13. Is there a method to understand what your donors think about your soft power or any specific feedback received that shows agreement? If so, what is that feedback mechanism?
14. Do you and your donors have the same definition of soft power for your humanitarian organization? Why or why not and how can you tell?
REFERENCES


http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/learn/world-vision-sudan

http://donate.worldvision.org/OA_HTML/xxwv2ibeCCtpItmDspRte.jsp?item=1745244&go=item&