THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE

Professor of the History of Philosophy at Harvard

as set forth in his

"World and the Individual."

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Master of Arts

by

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INTRODUCTION.

My first purpose when I undertook the subject of Professor Royce's philosophy, was to make a thorough comparative study of his various works. The difficult character of his conceptions, and the somewhat formidable volume of his writings made this a greater labor than I could at this time undertake. Moreover, it was less necessary than I had at first supposed. In the "World and the Individual" are to be found his conclusions, matured and systematized. His own account of the relations of his various works is to be found in the prefaces of the two volumes of the book under discussion.

(pp. vii, viii.)

In Volume I he says: "As to the most essential argument regarding the true relations between our finite ideas and the ultimate nature of things, I have never varied in spirit from the view maintained in... my first book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy... The argument.... has since been restated, and set into relations with other matters, without fundamental alteration of its character, and in several forms; once in my Spirit of Modern Philosophy (in a shape intended for a popular audience.... ) again in the book called The Conception of God.... and still again, in the paper called The Implications of Self-Consciousness, published in the
So also in Volume II he says: "As to the Idealistic Theory of knowledge, what I have to say is founded upon studies which I began as a student in the Johns Hopkins University in 1876-1878. The first formulation of these theories I made in my thesis for the Doctorate at that university. A further stage in my inquiry was published in 1881, in a paper on Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophical Progress.... The interpretation of our knowledge of finite facts, as largely due to an active 'acknowledgement', whose significance is ethical, rather than to a mere passive acceptance of given contents of present experience, was insisted upon in the concluding section of that paper. When in preparing my Religious Aspect of Philosophy (published in 1885), I had definitely passed over from my earlier sceptical position to the constructive Idealism that I have ever since endeavored to work out, I attempted at once to take up this former view of our finite knowledge into what was then, in my personal growth, a new doctrine as to the nature of the Absolute. In 1892, in my Spirit of Modern Philosophy, I essayed a still further development of this theory regarding human knowledge, in the lecture entitled The World of Description and the World of Appreci-
ation. Since then, in the paper called Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature, published in my Studies of Good and Evil (1898), as well as in other essays, I have attempted to apply the same essential view to the explanation of the bases and characteristics of our human knowledge of the physical world." "In my discussion with Professor Howison, published in the book called The Conception of God, and in my recent Ingersoll Lectures, on the Conception of Immortality (published in Boston in 1900), and finally, in the present volumes, I have simply reported the results to which meditation on the nature of the ethical self, and on the place of Individuality in the Theory of Being have led me."

A more or less cursory examination of the volumes that promised most additional light, convinced me that while an extended study of them would be interesting and desirable, it would not be absolutely necessary to an understanding of Professor Royce's philosophy.
PART I. SYNOPSIS OF "THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL."

VOL. I. PREFACE.

The first series of lectures deals with the first principles to the problems of Natural Religion; the second gives a detailed application of these. The first series defines God, the world, finite individuals, and the fundamental relations linking them together. The principal distinguishing features of this discussion are: 1) the definition and comparison of the four historic concepts of Being; 2) the form given to the criticism of realism; 3) the use of the parallelism between the mystical and realistic concepts of Being; 4) the transition from the concept of the real as the valid to the concrete conception of Being which constitutes idealism; 5) the statement of the finite contrast and the final unity of the external and internal meaning of ideas; 6) the concept of individuality; 7) the reconciliation of the One and the Many.

LECTURE I. THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF BEING.

There are three different conceptions of Natural Religion: 1st, as the way through Nature to God, 2nd, as a kind of consciousness not to be proved or disproved but to be estimated through the inner consciousness, 3rd, as an object of inquiry, as a strict examination into the nature of things.
All three are proper and, dealing with different fields, have, but the third view that which forms basis of these a distinct office. Philosophy does not depend upon natural science, it is not a mere compendium of the results of the special sciences, but has a field of its own.

II. The first question that must be asked is, what is meant by Being in general? and by the special sorts of reality which we attribute to God, to the world, and to the human individual? The first series of lectures deals with this general problem.

III. In asking the question, "what is an idea, and how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality?" we take the best method of solving the world-problem. From Plato down there have been many ways of asserting the primacy of the world as idea over the world as fact, but all agree in dealing with the problem of reality from the side of the means through which we are supposed to be able to attain reality, i.e., from the side of the ideas.

IV. One method in asking our question is to lay stress on the externally representative value of the idea. Then "Ideas are states of mind that image facts external to them selves." But this would presuppose the very possibility of a cognition of a cognition of Being.

"By the word "Idea" I mean in the end any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex."
consciousness, whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose." "It appears in consciousness as having the significance of an act of will." "An idea is any state of mind that has a conscious meaning." Purpose in the definition, when viewed as fulfilled through the state called the idea, is the internal meaning of the idea.

V. But there is apparently an external meaning to ideas, transcending the internal meaning, but an idea is not true or false except as it has assigned first selected its object. The whole problem of Being will in the end reduce to the question: How is the internal meaning of ideas consistent with their apparently external meaning? We shall reach the essentially idealistic thesis that no being has power to give an idea any purpose unless the idea, as a fragment of life, first learns so to develop its internal meaning as to assign itself just that specific purpose; and that to be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas.

VI. Two features of this form of idealism are: 1st. The theory of account of the nature of Being is to be founded upon the way in which ideas possess their own meaning. 2nd. The
theory of the nature of meaning is to be founded upon a
definition in terms of will and purpose. We do not say,
our will causes our ideas, but, our ideas now imperfect-
ly embody our will, and the real world is just our whole
will embodied.

Rem.1. Our conception of Being is of a limit, viz. of
that limit to which the internal meaning of an idea tends
as it grows consciously determinate.

Rem.2 The theory identifies finite \textit{vagueness} ignorance
of reality with finite vagueness of meaning. The Abso-
lute is even now the object that you really mean by your
fragmentary passing ideas. The universe is always with
you as your true internal meaning, implied in this very
moment's vagueness. Hence we shall not be looking for
mere abstract principles in our search for Being, but
for the most concrete objects in the world, for individ-
ual beings, and for the system that links them in one
individual whole.

We have defined \textit{idea} in terms of purpose or of
will. In the end the conception of absolute thought is
in explicit unity with the conception of absolute pur-
pose. The defect of our momentary internal im-
pulses is that they imply an individuality, both in our-
selves and in our experience, which we do not wholly get
presented to ourselves at any one instant. The whole meaning, therefore, which is the reality, will prove to be, not a barren Absolute, which devours individuals, but a whole which is just to every form of finite selfhood—a whole that
while that is an individual system of rationally linked and determinate, but for that very reason not externally determined, ethically free individuals who are nevertheless one with God. It is just because all meanings in the end will prove to be internal meanings, that this which the internal meaning most loves, the presence of concrete fulfillment, of freedom and originality, will prove, for our view, to be the very essence of the absolute meaning of the world. This is our thesis, and the point of contrast between this and other idealistic systems.

LECTURE II.

By our difference of language expressing what things are, and that they are we indicate the distinction between the internal and external meaning, between essence and existence. Many of the words used to express existence are drawn from essence: 1st, those indicating immediacy; 2nd, meaning well-founded; 3rd, meaning true, genuine. All the more philosophical conceptions of Being are due to the attempt to take note of these same aspects
of human experience, recognized by the three classes of
popular ontological predicates.

The problem about Being is the problem of experience. Experience comes
to us in part as brute fact, data of sense, etc. In
addition we find a more or less idealized experience, Ideas. There is a conflict between brute fact and ideas.

Sometimes the facts fuse with the ideas, but again they
remain obstinate, and then we are uneasy and conscious of
our finitude. We call this conflict the effort of thought
to comprehend Being. Being is real in so far as we
call it other than our merely transient and finite thought-
thinking of the moment. When Being is found, thought and
fact are no more at war. We can therefore define the true
as that which would end our conflict. On the other hand
we may regard being as that in terms of which our ideas
are to be controlled. Any way of defining Being must
contain fact and ideas as factors. There are four
fundamental conceptions of Reality:

1st. The technically realistic. That is real which is in-
dependent of mere ideas; is not only external to our ideas
but decides the validity of them.

2nd. The mystical. What is real is absolutely immediate.

When found it ends every effort at definition, satisfies
ideas as well as constitutes the fact.
3rd. The critically rationalistic. The real is that which 
experience in verifying ideas shows to be valid. It is 
valid possibility of experience.

4th. That is real which finally presents in a completed 
experience the whole meaning of a system of ideas.

Of these four conceptions realism is the best known. 
According to this to be real means to be independent of 
an idea or experience through which the idea is from with- 
out thought, felt, or known. Reality of this sort has 
historically been attributed to many objects— the Eleat-
ic One, the Many of Empedocles, Epicurean atoms, the sub-
stance of Spinoza, the Unknowable of Spencer, etc. In 
relation to the conflict of thought and immediacy realism 
says that the real is that which you would know if you 
should wholly escape the limits of the merely inner life 
of your consciousness. Independence means that whether a 
thing is perceived or ceases to be perceived makes no 
difference to it. The real in this sense is the immediate, 
because mediated by no one’s thinking; underlying change- 
able appearance; making ideas true or false 
since they try to express what is independent of them-
selves. Almost any content might belong to a real object. 
Even a state of consciousness, capable of being known by 
other states, is real in respect of them. Nevertheless,
any realistic world must contain some objects that are outside of any knowing process whatever, since the relations between the various knowing processes and their objects, even in a world of conscious minds, would have to be external relations, in order to save the realistic type of independence. The relation between the real object, and the knowing consciousness, itself real, makes no difference to the object, but all the difference in the world to the truth or falsity of the knowing consciousness.

The realist actually believes his doctrine because he finds it simple or rational, though he is influenced by essentially social motives as well. It is convenient to consider other individuals as wholly independent. But realism is as false as it is convenient. It gives abstractions necessary for vigorous thinking, but viewed as a complete metaphysical system, it destroys itself by its own contradictions. Its central technical difficulty is that of the nature of individuality, and the meaning of universals. The realistic world must have at least two individuals independent of each other. But such cannot be for they are noumena, defined by the thinking process even for the realist.

The ancient foe of realism is not idealism but mysticism. The historical significance of this conception is
great, both from its influence upon literature, and from its part in the development of the great religions. The common criticism is that the mystic substitutes his own feelings for the facts. But this comes from an external view of the theory. Mysticism is a significant view of the ontological predicate. To be means to be immediate, pure of all mediate ideas and thinking. The mystic does not say that his Absolute is real as the ordinary man uses real, but that the idea of reality must be altered. He tries to get experience quite pure, and then makes it a means of defining the real. He tries very skillfully to be a pure empiricist. He discovers the contradictions of realism. Realism asserts that reality is what makes ideas true or false. But from the essential effects of the process of ideation explicit ideas are always false. Ordinary thinking always looks beyond the truly complete immediate, to false ideas and fleeting states. We must, then, look deeper than ordinary and partial immediacy, deeper than colors and sounds, and find an ineffable and immediate fact. The essence of this view is that to be real means to be felt as an absolute goal, and consequently the quietus of all thinking, and so of all striving. The mystic's predicate is the absolute and immediate inner finality of
and simplicity of the object.

LECTURE III. THE INDEPENDENT BEINGS, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REALISM.

Realism asserts that to be real means to be independent of ideas, which, while other than a given object, still relate to that object being. The essential point is that the realistic world is a world of independent beings. If the material objects are independently real, the souls that know them are real also. This is a world of chasms. The independence of the objects from the knowers makes possible their community for all the independent knowers.

The problem is to discover whether any realistic definition can be self-consistent or adequate to what we seek when we look for true Being. The realistic definition is at once familiar and baffling: familiar because it accepts the view of common sense, baffling because when we attempt to define independence we are at a loss for a definition that will hold. Independence is applied to things that at bottom are not so, but turn out to be closely linked. Hence realism has given rise to doctrines that are startling to common sense. Realism vibrates between two extremes: the world as containing one real being, and as containing many. If many, then it is difficult to
account for their intrusions. If one, then we are confronted by the many ideas in the mind, themselves as real as the one being which exists independent of them. Is this dilemma of realism accidental or is it founded in the very nature of the realistic definition?

We must examine the first principles of realism. In what sense is reality independent of the knowing process? When we say that two happenings like different throws of the dice are independent, we simply do not happen to know the causal linkage. Realism seems, indeed, to admit some causal connection between object and knowledge, but the independence here in question seems to mean something much more nearly like absolute than independence of any merely physical facts. If we consider that knowledge makes no difference to its real outer object, what follows? 1st, The existent causal or other linkage between the knower and what he knows is no part of the definition of the object known, or of its being. 2nd, The logical independence of the object in its own realm is absolute. It follows that any linkage between object and idea will have to be added as a third fact, involved neither in the essence of the object, nor in that of the idea. Moreover, the idea will have to be independent of the object. Otherwise by examining the idea itself you could prove
something about the existence of the object. Then the independent existence of the thing would follow from the idea of the thing, which is contrary to the spirit of realism. That any given idea is true is itself a further fact in a realistic world.

In the realistic world as we have defined it are there many real beings or one sole being? If there are many can the realist show how they can become linked by causation, or in space and time? Independence, seemingly an obvious fact among physical objects, in reality does not exist. There is in fact nothing that may not influence everything else. If there were many real beings they (1) could never acquire any real connections, and (2) could have no common characters. For if two beings were real in the sense that they were perfectly independent of each other, any linkage that came in to connect them must be a new fact and independent of them as a real being, hence a link only in name. As regards the possibility of a common character, if any quality exists in two objects and one is destroyed, by hypothesis there is no change in the other. The quality, then, is not the same in each. Real beings if many, then, can never get either ties or community of nature.

But the realist might say, "My world is one being,
single yet infinitely wealthy. But he has already
blocked the way to this theory; he has already at least
two independent real beings, in the idea and its object.
Nor can they ever be brought together. So that one's idea
can never have any relation to a real being, nor can the
realist, according to his own definition, ever have an
idea of one. Thus the entire realistic fabric vanishes
leaving not even an unknowable behind. We begin now to see
that nothing is absolutely independent of the knowledge
that relates to it. It does, in the long run, make a dif-
ference to all objects, whether they are known or not.

LECTURE IV. THE UNITY OF BEING AND THE MYSTICAL IN-
TERPRETATION.

If the dualism implied in realism is to be abandoned,
must we instead define Being as an absolute and simple
unity? must we say that to be real means something that
cannot be asserted so long as the ideas themselves, by
their search for their Other, keep us from our true goal?
must we say if only of such an object as quenches thought
through the presence of the immediate truth that it is?
The object that fulfills the mystical definition of what
is real is of necessity in itself only one, since variety
when consciously faced calls forth thought. The reali-
ties of the realist, just because many are illusory. And as the One can never be independent of the insight that knows it, the place to look for it is not without but within. If asked how the finite thinker can find himself God, the mystic replies that as far as we reach our goal we forget self as an error. If the Protagorean sceptic asserts that the mystic's feeling of immediacy is but one of many such, and that he is putting his individuality above that of other men, the mystic asks how the sceptic knows of other men. If his ideas give him the sense of unsatisfactoriness evidenced by his supposing others than himself, his supposed immediate knowledge is not pure. If we have to struggle through these finite reasonings up to reality we have not yet attained it. "Believe not those prattlers who boast that they know God. Who knows Him-- is silent".

Now what for us is real is viewed as an Other which, if completely present, would end as much of our finite search as could possibly be ended. Primarily in seeking Being we are seeking to end our disquietude, but secondarily we learn by experience that, since all finite desires cannot be satisfied, more is won by making the desire to know what we call facts a primal motive in the life of common sense. We need not wonder then to find mysticism, then, breaking with commonsense. For the mystic the com-
mon sense antithesis between the immediate and the ideal is deliberately rejected as something to be overcome, through a quenching of reason in the presence of the absolute goal of all thought.

The mystic's first inquiry is, what is the self? It is assumed to be the universe, but it appears in a twofold way. First it is one's life-principle and seems finite. On the other hand the Self is the knower, i.e., as the act of thinking, in so far as the mediating presence of some Other, which is known, is removed, with the diversity of the acts of knowing. To win oneness with the Self means to attain a state of perfect finality, simplicity.

The Self is some wholly immediate fact within the circle of consciousness, but apart from the restlessness from which consciousness suffers. We come nearest to immediacy on the borderlands of unconsciousness. This does not reduce the Absolute to nothingness, for the Absolute seems empty merely by contrast with our finite diversity, while any other conclusion leads to a reductio ad absurdum. Our conscious finitude means at once dissatisfaction and the admission that the truth is not present to us.

Both mysticism and realism seek an absolute finality, a limit which is conceived solely by contrast with the process whereby our ideas tend toward that limit. Each thus
culminates in a passive abandonment of all our actual finite ideas about being. Each in the end defines nothing whatever. But mysticism seems to glory in this, because he is in fact defining a contrast effect, one that far from being itself unknown or absolute, is a constantly present character of our human type of character consciousness. Our goal is first conceived by contrast with the process of pursuit, but the meaning of this very negative lies in the positive contrast effect. Being means something for us because of the presence of a "homing instinct" as the purpose of even our poorest ideas. We seek a city out of sight; in the contrast with this goal, we live. But if this is so, then already we actually possess something of Being in our finite seeking. If the mystic points out that the apparent zero is still our goal, then one rightly replies to him that what makes his Absolute appear so glorious, is precisely its presented contrast with our imperfection. If the Absolute of the mystic is really different from nothing, it is so by virtue of its contrast with our own real but imperfect Being.

LECTURE V. THE OUTCOME OF MYSTICISM.

To the mystic we now say; Your Absolute is defined merely as the goal of the finite search. To save the unity
of Being you have deprived it of all other characters than this. Therefore, since your Absolute is only a goal, its sole meaning is due to your process of search. Pure immediacy has a content only so long as it fulfills ideas. If your conscious ideas are naught, your absolute is naught.

As we dealt with the realist by pointing out that his ideas are at least as real as their supposed independent objects, so now we bring the mystic's case to its close by pointing out that his Absolute is precisely as much a Nothing as, by his hypothesis, his own consciousness is.

What we have learned from the abstractions of realism and mysticism is that our finite consciousness sees a meaning. And if this meaning, then, is neither a merely independent being nor a merely immediate datum, what else can it be? Our answer depends upon our effort to amend the extreme statement of realism. The average realist will admit that the real is only relatively independent, that it is such that, under conditions, it would become knowable and known. The perceivable object is always prepared for future perception. Thus Being and idea are related. This is in the end a giving up of realism. The realist says that knowledge is relatively speaking, an accident in the world. Its business is to conform to the facts, not to create them. But can we di-
vide the being of things into parts, as primary and secondary? Further the former argument holds good against any independence as well as against total. If no reality can have entirely independent being, no part of reality can win such being. The real must be through and through, to its very last quality, such as is fitted to be known. Realism must be transformed, then, if Being is to keep its practical independence of any particular knowledge. But how? The real is to be "outside" of any particular knowledge. On the other hand it is to be such that under conditions, ideas may correspond to it. This involves a new conception. To be real now means, to be valid, to be in essence the standard for ideas. By this theory Being is other than the ideas that relate to it, and may sometimes be real when knowledge is not. But in essence it is always related to the purposes of knowledge.

Apart from my private and momentary point of view, Being in general is what renders my ideas valid or invalid. This is the Third Conception, which we will now examine in detail.

This is Critical Rationalism, the characteristic philosophy of our time. From Plato down, the real has been the truth. By this theory truth is the only mark of the
real. Examples may be given where things are real simply because they are first called true—ideas, not of any one person, yet not independent of all thinking. E.g., prices, credit, perhaps even justice, and the moral law. In mathematics, also, things exist purely in the realm of mind, yet once brought into being are as stubborn as any objective realities.

LECTURE VI. VALIDITY AND EXPERIENCE.

Kant adds to his realism the definition of another sort of reality. Besides his independent reals, which he now regards as wholly unknowable, he asserts the objective character of beings that are of a wholly different type, the objects of Possible Experience. These are independent of our private individuality, but they are dependent upon the constitution of our experience. This conception of Kant's has dominated the most influential treatments of the philosophy ever since.

It has been shown that realism needs no external refutation, but the 3rd conception furnishes such. The reason why independent beings proved to be nothing whatever now appears. For realism, in defining Being, was actually defining Kant's realm of Mögliche Erfahrung or nothing at all. How shall you maintain that reality is
independent of ideas, while at the same time the least reflection shows you that whatever you assert of reality, you can give warrant to your assertion only by first showing reason for regarding your ideas as valid. In asserting independent cause for ideas, you are asserting that a well known empirical relation has validity beyond your present range of experience. And this is but saying that if your senses were improved, you would directly observe how the external facts, which would then be part of your enlarged experience, would appear as empirical causes of what you formerly called your ideas. Thus restated your realism turns at once into a judgment about the "Mögliche Erfahrung."

But validity may be an essential aspect of true being without furnishing the final definition of the whole being of things. The objection to the 3rd Conception is that it by no means always rests validity upon an empirical foundation. It seems at times to deal with eternal truth, while experience does not know eternity. It fails to explain to us the difference that is to be attributed to the valid truths that we do not get concretely confirmed in our own experience, and the reality observed when we do verify ideas. What is valid experience at the moment when it is supposed to be only possible? Validity as applied to the things that we test means that they are expressed in experience whenever we test them. As applied to the
whole realm of truth in general it means that this realm has somehow a character which we do not test, and never gets exhaustively expressed in our human experience. But what is this character? Can these two sorts of Being both be valid, the one concrete life, the other pure form?

LECTURE VII. THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL MEANING OF IDEAS.

We have found that every step toward truth is a step away from vague possibilities and toward determinateness of idea and experience. Being, viewed as truth, excludes as well as includes. As to the vastly important relation between thought and external experience, our thought looks to this experience to see if our hypotheses about fact can be confirmed. Still the service of external experience in revealing what is real has its limitations. It can confirm our hypotheses only inadequately, for it shows us only particular instances. It can never by itself prove a determinate negative by excluding from reality the whole of what our hypothesis has defined. And finally, our experience, external or internal, never shows us what we above all regard as real, namely, the individual fact. In consulting experience we are seeking to give our ideas a certain positive determination, which never in the process of human experience do we
reach. The real is, from this point of view, that which is immediately beyond the whole of our series of possible efforts to bring our own internal meaning to a complete determination. This shows us what the 3rd conception lacks, namely a view of the real as the finally determinate that permits no other.

But we have not taken into account the most important of our relations to the real, the relation of correspondence. The real may not be wholly independent of our thinking, but it is authoritative in demanding correspondence with itself. Whatever our ideas are, it is certain that they are ideas, not because they are masses of images, but because they embody conscious purposes. Now, how can an internal meaning be linked to an external meaning? How can a volition also possess truth? When has an idea an object at all? Some objects from their nature (e.g., a plan of action,) cannot be causes of ideas at all; others can be so regarded only by negative selecting the part played by attention. But if an idea selects its object how can it be true or false? The solution lies in the fact that, whenever an idea aims at truth it regards its object as other than itself, and that the object shall be thus other than itself is even a part of what the idea consciously intends. The object
is nothing but the idea's own conscious purpose or will, embodied in some more determinate form than the idea by itself at this moment consciously possesses. The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object of which the idea can take note. This alone is the other that is sought. If I will to watch for stars, it is an experience that I first am to accept as the determination of my purpose. The idea in seeking for the determination of its own will cannot alter the rules of the game while it is being played. My private will does not create the rest of nature, but my conscious will as expressed in my ideas, does determine what objects are my objects. As for failure, the object that we have not yet won remains for us a beyond, precisely as long as we still seek it; and no merely external buffeting of so-called hard facts ever proves to the resolute will that the objects are unattainable, until we see an inner reason why just these objects are excluded by a fuller understanding of our own ideal purposes themselves. I do not will just now to fly, because my purpose in conceiving nature is just now relatively fulfilled in a system of ideas which excludes flying.

The finally determinate form of the object of any
finite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume whenever it became a completely determined idea, fulfilled by an adequate empirical content, for which no other could be substituted. What is real is, as such, the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas.

Being, then, is something other than themselves, which finite ideas seek. They seek Being as that which, if at present known, would end their doubts. This final form of the idea is: 1st, a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea with which we start our quest; 2nd, the complete fulfilment of the purpose partially embodied in this idea; 3rd, an individual life for which no other can be substituted. We have thus far used terms of validity, but if there is validity there is an object more than merely valid, which gives the very conception of validity its meaning. This object is an individual life, presented as a whole, totem simul. This whole is the completed will as well as the completed experience, corresponding to the will and experience of any one finite idea. In its wholeness, the world of Being is an individual life, consisting of the individual embodiments of the wills represented by finite ideas.
LECTURE VIII. THE FOURTH CONCEPTION OF BEING.

Being itself we should directly face in our own experience only in case we experienced finality. This would be given us in the form of a life that permitted no other to take its place as the expression of its own purpose. Then alone should we stand in the presence of the real. Conversely, whoever thinks only of the general concept (thinks, for example, only of gravitation or man,) has not in his experience the full expression of his meaning. An entire instance of being must be precisely that which permits your ideas to seek no other than what is present. Such a being is an individual. The essence of the real is to permit no other of its own kind, and this character it possesses only as the unique fulfillment of purpose. This 4th conception of Being accomplishes the end which all the four definitions actually sought. 1st, With the realist, the object is not only other than the finite idea, but is authoritative over against it. 2nd, With the mystic we agree in identifying being with fulfillment of purpose. The mystical identification of the world with the self is meant to be true of the final or absolute self, not the partial. So with us, the object is simply the complete embodiment of the idea. We differ from the mystic when he takes refuge in mere negations. 3rd, The fourth conception agrees
with the critical rationalist when he asserts that being essentially involves that which gives validity to ideas. But you will have discovered what conditions are necessary to constitute validity. The three conceptions, then, are brought into synthesis in the fourth. What is, is authoritative over against finite ideas, as realism asserted; as well, is one with the true meaning of the idea, as mysticism insisted; and is valid, as critical rationalism demanded. A will concretely embodied in a life is the reality,—This complete life of divine fulfilment of whatever finite ideas seek.

It may be objected that we in vain try to escape the common sense conclusion that experience alone determines what is and what is not. But we admit this. The idea is already experience, nor can the fulfilment take any form not also empirical. Further whoever asserts that a body of human experience exists, asserts what no human observer has at any moment experienced. Nor has any observer at any moment verified his own past experiences. The realistic empiricist, like every other, transcends individual experience. As to finality, if the empiricist says, All that is, is in one aspect, experienced fact, we so far agree; but if he rejects the 4th conception he must add, This experience, which is, is often
when taken in its totality, a fragmentary experience, a mere collection of whatever happens to be, possessing no finality. It is true that no man experiences that final constitution of experience, which we, on our part, hold to be the true reality. But this is because it is not yet revealed to us what we shall be.

2nd Objection: "Your view is still too abstruse. Nobody can assert with real or positive assurance any being that transcends his own experience. Perhaps there is no final Being." But what other hypothesis is there? We cannot, on the basis of experience, assert that beyond our individual experience there is nothing at all. This, however, cannot be a part of experience. In asserting that anything is all experience—the sceptic's hypothesis, if consistent with itself, asserts that this itself consciously contains and fulfils the whole meaning involved in the idea of being.

3rd Objection: The hard facts of the world, pain, failure, etc. But there are two aspects of any unwelcome facts. Each has its own character, but also appears as involving the temporal defeat of a purpose. "Every evil thing," it is said, "has its own positive perfections." So death has an interest as a fact about which we seek information. On the other hand it appears
as robbing us of our friends. By the definition of Being, you have not empirically found your whole final object. In your search for the eternal, lies for you the very meaning of death and of finite despair. But is

"But is not death as an object real?" Yes, but not by itself a whole object. The fulfilment of the whole of a purpose may involve the defeat of a part of that very purpose. In the victorious warfare with finitude consists the perfection of the spirit.

LECTURE IX. UNIVERSALITY AND UNITY.

My idea as really one with its object, in seeking its other, seeks the expression of its own will in an empirical and conscious life. But this life is. For that any idea has an object at all implies such fulfilment. For despite the relative failures and errors of our finitude, the real world cannot fail to express the whole genuine intent of our ideas. For if they remained unexpressed their final meaning could only take the form of hypotheses. But what is merely valid is not even valid. Suppose the meaning of our finite ideas is to remain unexpressed. The fact of this non-expression has of being then its own real being. What form shall this non-expression actually possess? Independent of all ideas? As we know, this is an impossibility. Moreover, what my
idea seeks, and what therefore could conceivably be refused to it, is just the reality which it means. The reality, therefore, which shall positively refuse it expression, is ipso facto the reality to which the idea appeals, and is not independent of that appeal. For you are not put in the wrong by a reality to which you have made no reference, and error is possible only concerning objects which we actually mean as our own objects. The object that is to defeat my partial and fragmentary will is, then, ipso facto my whole will.

With our definition, of what it is to be, in mind, we shall devote ourselves to an attempt to describe the precise mutual relations of the world and the individual. What is is the world, and it is also the individual. It is the world that any idea views as its own wholly expressed meaning and object. But are not ideas many and various? So the individual is that whole life that expresses and represents the meaning of any single idea. But are not individuals as various as all our various ideas?

The supremacy of God, and the deathless meaning of the life of each person, these are the interests of every form of ethical religion. There are two opposing solutions. The one would lay stress upon the unity of the whole world, the other would insist upon the
variety and relative independence of the individual lives.

We shall proceed to develop and reconcile these two views.

The 4th conception involves the absolute unity of the knowing process. The object that the thinker means can have no form of being independent of his meaning, nor can he be said to have any meaning not now fulfilled in his present experience, unless that very meaning is present to an insight includes and completes his own insight, according to his own real intent. It follows that the whole world of being must exist only as present to the unity of a single consciousness, which includes all conscious meanings in one final eternally present insight, not merely timeless, but possessed of an inclusive view of all time. Proof: The world contains many knowers. They are related or they are not. One or the other is a fact, and as such known. But since this fact includes the being of the knowers, there must be one final knower, who knows all knowing processes in one inclusive act. Finally the knower of the universe can possess, by our definition, no being that is unknown to himself. The final knower is thus defined in terms of absolute self-knowledge. Our reason for asserting this as the reality lies in the now thoroughly expounded doctrine,
that no other definition of being than this can be expressed without absolute self-contradiction.

We may illustrate the results of our definition by an approach to the unity of being from the empirical side also. The subjects of which we assert being belong to certain well contrasted types. We ascribe reality:

(1) to the present physical world, (2) to our fellow men, (3) to past events, (4) to the future, (5) to realities of the 3rd conception type, moral and mathematical truth, (6) to ideas whereby we define, etc.

Looking closely we see that all are but variations of one idea. For attempt to abstract from any reference to past being, and what becomes of any concrete notion of present being? Just so with the future. "What is it?" is inseparably bound up with, "What was it?" and, "Whither is it tending?" So it is impossible to separate possible or valid being from present experience, in terms if which you define it.

Hence we deal with one complex whole, so far, whose being, though differentiated, is of one inclusive type. The being of my fellow is for me inseparable from my idea of my own being. As an essentially social creature, I have no rational and self-conscious life for myself, except by virtue of contrasts with my fellows. It follows
that their being is inseparably bound up for me with my notion not only of my present self, but of the past, present and possible world that I regard as real. We now find, therefore, that the various types of being, which we first distinguished, demands, even upon purely empirical grounds, their reunion in one whole conception of what it is to be real.

There is a sense in which all the world may be viewed as centered about the fully expressed inner meaning of any rational idea. But human ideas are not the only ideas of which this can be asserted. It is not until man views himself as a member of an universal society, whose temporal estrangements are merely incidental to final unity of meaning, that he appreciates the actual sense of the conscious ideas that express his longing for oneness with an absolute life. On the one hand we have no right to define the unity of the world merely in human categories; on the other, in so far as you have become conscious of the unity of your experience, you have a clue to the divine plan. In particular, our human experience of the space relation is obviously so special in its type that the space world is of decidedly limited truth. So also with time. The present instant
is not truly instantaneous, a mere now. Not every form of consciousness must have the precise human limitation of time-span, and a change of time-span would give a vastly different ethical meaning.

Our idea of what it is to be conscious, then, is extremely variable, but the 4th conception has all the more freedom, in undertaking the task of viewing, as fragmentary aspects of one whole meaning, the varieties of nature and of finite individuality. When we consider experience we find manifold interrelationships binding together facts that at first sight appear sundered.

In addition to these glimpses of unity, there are countless signs of fragmentariness and chaotic variety. But these are precisely the facts whose fragmentariness sends us to Another for explanation. And wherever we have a plan relatively fulfilled we have that which cannot be ignored in the final unity of the whole of experience.

Our general and relatively a priori proof of the unity of being has itself been brought into unity with the empirical view of our real world. We see then how the world of our 4th conception must be one, we catch also a glimpse of how it is one.

As to the most general form of the absolute unity,
our guide is the type of our empirical unity present in our own passing consciousness. "How should the many be one?" Look within. Grasp many facts at once, your one purpose embodied in a series of facts. In experience you find present, past and future unified in your own passing moment of consciousness. An eternal consciousness is one for which all facts have the same type of unity as your present momentary consciousness. The case of temporal unity is typical of every application of our 4th conception. In so far as your ideas possess internal meaning, you grasp many in one. You no more lose the many in the one than the notes in the melody.

The 4th conception asserts that God's life sees one plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives. You are for the divine view all that you know yourself to be but infinitely more. Despite the complexity of life, the ultimate unity is not far from each one of us.

LECTURE X. INDIVIDUALITY AND FREEDOM.

In the foregoing lecture we have dwelt upon the unity of the idealistic world; in this we shall dwell upon the individuality, the variety of finite beings, and the relative freedom of finite acts. It is a common charge that idealism has sacrificed to unity, finite
individuality, or freedom of ethical action. Now from the beginning we have defined ideas in terms of experience and will. Whoever rationally knows, has before consciousness that which possesses the unity of a knowing process, and that which fulfills a purpose. We will to know, we know what we will. The world influences man only to awaken him to such functions as interest him in the world. At times we have relatively pure thought, again consciousness is filled with what we call will. But facts always have reference to activities, and activities have reference to facts to which we attribute intellectually significant being. "Meaning" implies both knowing and will. Common opinion makes will a cause of states of consciousness and of external facts. Present day psychology opposes this view, merely making psychic facts an accompaniment of the adjustment to environment. This controversy gives rise to misunderstandings, since cause is a word of various meanings. We will merely state here the sense in which we regard the being of facts as due to the will, human or divine. What can at present be asked is in what sense that which exists expresses on the one the will of God, and on the other that individual will which you find expressed at any moment in your finite
consciousness. We shall maintain that both get consciously expressed and that no contradiction results.

At any moment your ideas, in so far as they are rational, embody a purpose. In saying that the at first disembodied purpose gets expressed we are merely stating a fact, not speaking as yet of an effective force. Whether the facts could have taken place without a given psychic entity or nervous organization, consciousness does not tell. On the other hand, no realistic metaphysics can rob me of the significance of my own act.

Cause and effect, fate and freedom, are subject to the prior conditions of the concept of being itself. The slavery of the metaphysics of the past to the conception of causality is responsible for some of the most fatal misfortunes of religion and humanity. The genuine significance of my voluntary process is always an affair of my own consciousness regarding the present meaning of my life. The distinctly lower category of causation always implies a comment which somebody else, viewing my act in a relatively external way, may pass upon me from without. We cannot insist that the significance of the world and of the individual life lies in the conscious fulfilment of meaning. We do not explain meaning by looking beyond it for cause, for cause, to have being, must
have meaning. Causation is but a special form of being and therefore cannot be that to which being is due. In consequence our primary question as to finite human individual, in his relation to the divine life, is. In what sense does the finite being retain, in spite of the unity of the divine life, any individual significance of his own. An imperfect idea is vague, not only from lack of adequate contents, but with regard to its own momentary consciousness purposes. The presumption is that the final expression of purpose is not merely complete as to its contents, but absolutely determinate as to the meaning these contents fulfil. The finite process from indetermination to determination is known psychologically as selective attention. A satisfied will would involve a twofold consciousness: 1st, I have all that I seek and need no other; 2nd, I need precisely these contents, and so select them as to permit no other to take their place. It is this selective character that is responsible above all for the individuality that belongs to all being. This view, that what is, is a selection from possibilities, is as characteristic of realism, and even of mysticism, as it is of our conception. To know facts is to destroy possibilities. Spinoza indeed asserted that all that is possible is real. This
can be maintained only on the basis of the third conception, our rejection of which was due to a recognition of the fact that as long as you define mere universals, you define neither the being of objects nor the truth of ideas. The elimination of possibilities does not impoverish but enrich. The life in which anything whatever can happen, has no character. The realization of the whole present meaning is known by virtue of the consciousness that one is excluding from complete expression facts whose general nature one still experiences. The very perfection of experience involves the exclusion of another, whose general nature is part of the experience in question.

We next pass toward more special comparisons between finite and absolute individuality. Independent of metaphysical doctrine, "individual" means a unique being. What makes the belief in individuals appear early in human thought is that the real world, wherein will seeks fulfilment, shall be altogether determinate. But owing to our finitude, our will far anticipates its own fulfilment. How should a finite being, whose experience constantly passes from one partial fulfilment to another, come to be so sure that he has actually stood in the presence of individuals? What we find are always
types, instances of imperfectly fulfilled meanings.

So the idea of individuality comes to us rather on the selective side than on the side of present fulfilment. It is not a question so much what I know of individuals as what my affections determine to regard as unique.

Now this tendency to the selection of our objects as unique is the character which the 4th conception gives to the absolute will. The world is individual fact not merely from completeness of content, but from the definiteness of the selection of that object which shall be permitted to fulfil the final meaning. No finite element of meaning can be ignored from an absolute point of view. But the very perfection of the fulfilment would require of the divine will the sort of determination of purpose of which we are conscious when we deal with the objects of exclusive affection. We have now gradually prepared ourselves to define the difference between finite and absolute and absolute will. The world expresses the absolute knowledge by virtue of the unity of consciousness and by universality of meaning. The world expresses will so far as the uniqueness of the world is the result of ideal selection. Now this might seem to deprive any portion of the universe of private significance, but precisely the opposite is true. If
the world is complete and unique, every distinguishable
fact is also unique. One of your own acts expresses one of your own purposes. It is united also in the single
unity of the absolute consciousness. But this absolute
consciousness is not something that merely absorbs your
individuality. Every finite purpose is a partial ex-
pression and attainment of the divine will. The indi-
viduality of the whole dwells in the parts, while the
whole would not be what it is were not finite purpose left
to speak its own word. You are in God but are not lost in God. The many must, despite their variety, win har-
mony through cooperation. But this principle gives no
limit either to the empirical variety of the will, or
to the relative independence which the uniqueness of the
individual elements makes possible.

Two expressions here receive their only possible
justification: that when my will gets expressed I am ac-
tive, and when expressed in my choice I am free. Whatev-
er is unique is not causally explicable. The individual
is never the mere result of law. Hence cause never de-
fines its individual character, but only its general.
Hence acts of will expressing unique character consti-
tute what common sense means by free acts. When I thus
consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here
am God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole. I thus am so far free. As for "activity" common sense means that our present will, as individual, is unique. To later lectures is left the discussion of causation in its real but subordinate place. We do not say, "Your individuality causes your act, or free will creates your life." Being is deeper than causation. Nothing besides yourself determines what constitutes your individuality. Here and now your individuality in your act is your freedom. This is true, not in spite of the unity of the divine consciousness, but just because of the very uniqueness of the divine life. Therefore you are in action free and individual.

VOLUME II, INTRODUCTION.

The former lectures emphasized the world, these the human individual. The former dealt with the theory of being, these with doctrine about life, the practical interests of religion.

All knowledge is of matters of experience. But whose experience? A man's private experience is merely his present consciousness. The very existence of a body of facts called "man's experience" has never been verified.
by any man. When and how then is a fact known to be a fact of human experience? What now concerns us is a closer consideration of a very obvious distinction between the two conceptions: 1st, of what any man at one time experiences as present, and 2nd, of the totality of the several facts that have been experienced by various men. If we say that no fact can be an accredited fact until some man has verified it for himself through its presence in his experience, this doctrine can be interpreted in two ways. The usual way is to say that there exists a body of accredited facts, verified individually by the experience of the various individual observers. But this is contradictory, for by hypothesis, facts of one observer cannot be experience for another, nor can the existence of all the observers be. The 2nd way is to say, that no fact is accredited except in so far as it is verified by the present momentary experience of myself, here and now. The metaphysical result would be to pass through practically our own train of reasoning to idealism. I do not know what constitutes the whole that I can and do verify in my present experience. The difficulty of every introspective problem reminds me that by what is now actually present to my
consciousness, I mean much more than I can be said now consciously to verify. I am conscious, but not wholly conscious of my consciousness, (which would require an infinite series.) I can always verify some fact of consciousness, but the whole always has more being than I am able now to observe. Whoever then asserts that no fact is accredited unless I now verify it, asserts a fact (the fact of my verification of facts,) which must, in the end, be not so accredited.

Hence human experience is bound up with elements which, for us men, are metempirical. The empiristic thesis has yet a meaning, as seen in the 3rd conception. Experience is our only guide to concrete results. But it always guides us by pointing beyond itself to that without which it becomes self contradictory. What is given is our guide. What is not given— the whole of true being— is our goal. It is the characteristic limitation of human experience that it grasps fragments of a meaning which can only be conceived of with consistency, as embodied in an experience of wider scope.

Knowledge involves deeds, but we are acting at present under a twofold limitation. I neither know what I mean to do, nor do I know more than a fragment of the facts that express my will. When I know I am acting, but also reacting, upon a given something. I can create only on
the basis of something that I am not seeking now to create—my environment. Fact, then, is other than I find myself attaining. We are prone, therefore, to insist that the essence of facts is to be "stubborn". But we must remember that it is of the essence of the will to demand its own other, and to set its fulfilment beyond the present, and so to define its very life as now in some sense not its own. We are pilgrims, not only because the facts are stubbornly foreign, but also because we insist that ours shall be the wanderers' portion. My will cooperates in its own compulsion. What we experience is always, in one aspect, our own will to be compelled by the facts.

In psychology we can begin with the world as an existent fact. In philosophy we must begin from within. The world is known by us to exist, because we know it to be acknowledged as existing.

The limitations under which my particular action is willed give me a sense of dissatisfaction. If such and such acts would more fully express my will, I feel that I ought to do them. My ought is my own will more rationally expressed. The fuller expression of my will has its own correlative embodiment in the real. This constitutes my world of recognized facts. The facts, as real, are
embodiments of my purpose, not as it seems but as it ought to be viewed. But facts do seem to possess an overwhelmingly foreign aspect. Whoever, however, not only suffers but asserts, "These are the objective facts," lays himself open to the question, How do you know? You only experience that you are not now succeeding. But if he says that it would be simple folly to think otherwise, his position is substantially the same as ours. He recognizes that he ought to view certain facts as in particular ways external to the internal meanings of his own ideas.

We do not assert that the will acknowledges facts in any capricious way. We do not call the will a cause, still less a free cause. What is said is that its recognition of concrete things is not a mere acceptance, but includes an intention, and fulfills a purpose. The only warrant for believing in causation at all is the ought, whose basis lies in the assurance that all reality embodies purpose. The category of the ought has two aspects, and implies their unity: the external and the internal meaning of ideas. The ought requires that we should acknowledge at each moment as real, certain facts, which even while they are conceived as limiting our acts, are also conceived as enabling us even now to accomplish our will better than we could if we did not acknowledge these
facts. The category of the ought implies these subordinate categories: 1st, the objectivity of particular facts; 2nd, the subjectivity of the grounds for our acknowledgement of every particular fact; 3rd universal teleology, which from our point of view, constitutes the essence of all the facts.

LECTURE II. LINKAGE OF FACTS.

That the acknowledgement of facts is a submission to the ought leaves many aspects of experience ill defined; Likeness and difference: these are inseparable aspects of the world. There recognition and their very existence are correlated with the interests which they fulfil. We express our own interests in them by means of our classifications, whose objective truth depends upon the will that makes them.

The most subjective of our classifications is the distinction between what "is just now observed," and the rest of the universe. The realist asserts that the objects not now thought of by us are not present to our knowledge at all. This theory is simple, but collapses with the realistic theory of being. "For if nothing exists independently of anything else.... then knowledge in facing reality at all, faces in some wise the whole of it at
once, and the only question is how this at any instant takes place." "Other acts of knowledge cannot, in their own being, be wholly other than this one. For if wholly other... they would not be acts of knowledge at all.

As acts of knowledge they have a share in one being. In knowing one thing I, in some sense, know the others. "They are not wholly absent objects. Even now, I, in some sense, mean them all." In what sense is one ignorant, then, of any object? Reply: the objects now concretely acknowledged, are related to those not now concretely known, as the objects which our attention focuses are related to what, though present, is lost in the background of consciousness. "Ignorance always means inattention to details." But as our attention and inattention, though an expression of the will, are not always alterable, just then, at will, so our inattention to countless real facts is due to conditions which we can not at small present alter except by the infinitely numerous steps which make up the process of experience. Further, the very narrowness of our attention is a condition fixed by the very will of which our every act of attention is the passing expression, namely by the will whose embodiment is the whole world of facts. This inner conflict of the world-will with itself is a character of the universal
But the infinitely numerous details of the universe are in no wise wholly absent from our knowledge even now. We know them all at once as the rest of the world... Were the facts that we do not know in detail other than they are, our present attentive attitude would be other than it is.

Real facts, in one aspect, are objects of possible attention. Here, however we meet that abstract way of viewing the world which expresses itself in the categories of the world of description. We have to presuppose our facts in order to make concrete our purposes, while we can define our facts, if at all only in terms of our purposes. This is the fatal circle of our finitude, from which we can escape by acting more or less blindly, seeking in the process of experience both our own purpose and the means of executing it. The object here is to point out the conceptions to which this way of taking the world leads us when we abstract from the creative way of viewing things. The process of discrimination leads necessarily to further discrimination, hence tends to become a recurrent process. The result may give us an idea of an infinitely complex objective structure, which we are disposed to ascribe to a system of facts... By studying the process of discrimination we shall be led to
see what enables us to view acknowledged facts as linked in a single ordered system, in which countless series of real facts are interwoven; and hereby we shall be led to a more definite idea of what is meant by the acknowledge-
ment of law in the material, social, and moral order of the world. Our logical genesis of the concept of real law will free us from the superstition that whatever is, is subject to an absolutely rigid necessity. We shall see that necessity is only one aspect of the fact-world, and is valid only in so far as it serves to make possi-
bile individuality and freedom.

To compare two objects implies, in certain cases, that there is something between the two. That is "be-
tween" which may be discriminated from either, but which, when inattention blends the two, must also be blended. Discrimination involves at least three objects, a pair, and that which helps us to discriminate them. While the problem of the one and the many is baffling when we have only two terms, we get light as soon as we get one of our objects between two others. The unity of the resultant series as the expression of a single volitional process will be due to the fact that I can everywhere see how one distinction depends for its existence upon another and previous one.
Our main thesis here is that, in the world of description, all understanding of facts in terms of general laws depends upon the conception and verification of such a serial order of facts as that characterized. Attention begins to succeed when we begin to discriminate. The whole system of the world may be viewed as made up of various systems which may be discriminated like single facts. The process may be viewed as leading from one series of facts to another through the intermediary stage. Wherever I observe in the process that all stages have certain "invariant" characters, I have discovered a law.

So much for a mere list of concepts, but has the world of fact no other aspect? The world of attention is not the final world that the will seeks: It is a world of validity, not explicitly a world of individuals; it is defined in terms of a fundamental postulate that always has an alternative, that of a well-ordered system; and finally, it meets constantly its empirical limitations, fails to find the intermediate terms. The world of description is also a world of abstraction; it is a world where truth is never discovered in its final individual form.

The facts of the world are there and can be discriminated, but the world is also there to express a deter-
minate purpose. Its facts are incidents in a rationally connected social system of beings that embody purposes in deeds. The facts are therefore linked in a teleological unity. The true series is that of the self, the true variety that of the individual selves, constituting in their unity the individual of individuals. While in our discrimination we find certain facts, our discrimination itself is a fact which we create.

The world is the background in which we are to discover all the facts which we shall come to acknowledge, but it is this as the embodiment of life. From our point of view, the world of a self is embodied in a series of discrete acts, a series in which one stage or act of life is followed by the next. There is no interpolation of deeds between my deeds. My order is discrete like a numberseries. Hence the limitation which experience often seems to set to my postulates about the discrimination about the facts, may be founded in the deepest nature of things. The true world is not the world of description, but a world of socially interrelated selves. The true series of facts in the world must be a well-ordered series.

LECTURE III. THE TEMPORAL AND THE ETERNAL.

An obvious objection to the thesis that finitude
means inattention is found in the nature of time. But we make mistakes by taking time too abstractly, and overlooking the elements of our original percept. The first element is that of change. The second is that of succession. Now not only is succession experienced, but while one member of a series passes and another comes, the whole is present in consciousness as a sequence. If this were not the case we could have no consciousness of succession, again, the present event, if all that was present, could not be made short enough to contain in itself no succession at all. We have what James has called a "specious present," within which there is the relation of former and latter. But every serial succession has for us some sort of meaning. What is earlier in a given series is related to what is later as that from which we pass to a desired fulfilment. Our temporal form of experience is thus peculiarly the form of the will as such. Ideas, when conscious, assume the consciously temporal form of inner existence, and appear to us as constructive processes. The temporal aspect of a series of experiences always involves some element of expectancy, and some sense of something that no longer is.

Our relatively direct experience of time lies at the basis of every deeper comprehension of time and eternity.
The term present never means in any significant application the indivisible present of an ideal mathematical time. The world's time is, in all respects, a generalized and extended image of the observed time of our inner experience, the specious present. Whether we speak of the present minute or the present geological epoch there is always in it a no longer and a not yet. Even the time of physical science gets its essential character through considerations that can only be interpreted in terms of will. For the conceived time series differs from a line in space, since a line can be traversed in either direction, while the direction of the flow of time is a character essential to the very conception of time, and can only be expressed by saying that we conceive the past as leading towards, as aiming in the direction of the future, in such wise that the future depends for its meaning upon the past. Only in terms of will, and only by virtue of the significant relations of the stages of a teleological process has time any meaning.

We are now prepared for a theory of the sense in which the world is a temporal order, and that in which it is eternal. For in defining time we have already defined eternity. First the real world must be viewed as temporal, for it is a world where purposes are fulfilled.
Every real being, in so far as it has not won union with its ideal, is pursuing that ideal, and is accordingly living in time. But the complement which our finite being seeks is not merely something beyond the present, but is inclusive of this very process of striving. The self in its entirety is the whole of the self-representative process, and not a mere last moment in it.

But secondly, this same temporal world is, in its wholeness, an eternal order, i.e., the temporal order is at once known as a whole by the absolute, in the sense in which a musical phrase is at once known, despite the fact that each element when taken as the temporarily present one excludes from its own temporal instant the other members of the sequence. Temporal sequences must be viewed as having for the real world and for the absolute the same twofold character. "Present" in an inclusive sense, means any portion of time with included events as known as a single experience. "Present" in an exclusive sense is applied to any event in so far as contrasted with antecedent and subsequent events. All temporal successions are present at once to the Absolute. This constitutes the eternal order. It is eternal, 1st because inclusive of all temporal distinctions; 2nd, because not inclusive of all sequences; 3rd, because not partial, to pass away and give place to other partial glimpses.
Objection may be made that time is infinite and therefore not capable of completion. But a well-ordered infinite series, if it embodies a single plan, may be viewed as forming a totality. If you view the temporal order as such an endless whole, it will contain a single expression of the divine will, and therefore, despite its endlessness, will be present as a single whole to the Absolute whose will it is. While the past is no longer and the future not yet, all the manifold facts that are yours are present to the Absolute, eternally finished, but by virtue of the temporal sequence of your deeds. Just in so far as I am the eternal or true individual, I stand in the presence of God with my life-meaning revealed to him and to me. Now in time I seek that complete expression of my will, which in and for God my whole life at once possesses. Yet the finding does not occur as an event in time merely, but as an external experience of this my whole striving.

LECTURE IV. PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL REALITY.

The fundamental motives in the interpretation of the world are twofold, 1st, leading to concepts of law and of the world of description; and 2nd, leading to the concept of reality as a well-ordered series, as the realm
of appreciation, i.e. of values, of selfhood, etc.
Our reaction in the presence of the world can become

definite and rational only when we acknowledge lives

other than our own finite selfhood. The world of
description needs to be interpreted in terms of the

world of appreciation. We find motives that lead us to
interpret the physical world as a world of description.

On the other hand the social world is primarily a

world of appreciation, i.e. a world where other wills

than our own present consciousness will seem to be expressing themselves. Our criticism of the categories has
prepared us to understand both the contrast and the

unity of these two realms.

No precise definition of nature can be given in

advance. In a vague way it may be defined as a realm

human

between the Absolute and the finite subject. Now the

senses never show us by themselves the true being of

anything, but they give us data which we interpret

as signs of the existence of matter. In what way do

we come by this experience. Our idealism knows nothing

about a collection of innate principles.

It is a view of wide acceptance that we come by our

belief in the physical world upon the ground of re-
sistance. But it is the fulfilment, even relative and

imperfect, of our internal meanings, and not the opaque
resistance, that gives us our warrant for finding that the universe has being. What is, is the completion of
our incompleteness, and not the fate that merely over-
comes us. Again, belief in causation is either taken
from a physical world already assumed, or observed in
the mind, and transferred to an external world. In
either case it is a begging of the question. In the
latter case we have begun by defining the physical
realm, not as one that primarily resists our will, but
as one that embodies one of our deepest purposes. But
if we are to understand what we mean by material na-
ture, we must ask what internal meaning of ours seeks
and demands an embodiment such as only outer nature can
cushion.

Our belief in the existence of the
physical world is bound up with our belief in the ex-
istence of our fellow men. Nature is known to us as a
realm which we conceive as known or knowable to va-
rious men precisely as it is known to us. A theory of
nature must explain how all men come to possess conne-
ctedness and interrelated unity of their common experi-
ence. The source of our belief in our fellowmen is
said to be the fact that we detect in their behavior a
likeness to our own. This is more in harmony with our
own than the resistance theory. A vague belief in our
fellow seems, however, to antedate the consciousness of ourselves. Our assurance about them arises, not from analogy, but from those very interests whereby we gradually come to our self-consciousness. Our and to have their inner life, fellows are known to be real because they are to us an endless treasury of new ideas. Since reality is what completes our incompleteness our companions are real.

Our fellow man, when he is genuinely alive to us, is a storehouse of meanings. The only question that arises about a particular finite meaning is, where is it embodied. To this my social experience answers, Wherever my fellow speaks to me or acts expressively. True my fellow is more than this--an individual. But this is secondary to our empirical ground for believing that whatever as self he may be, he is in any case real, and something other than any conscious life of our own.

Now with the life of this my fellow, there is bound up the fact that we can treat certain facts which each of us for himself experiences, as if they were facts common to both of us. So we are led to the conception of nature. As experience advances we come to a false sundering. We learn under the influence of the tendency to discriminate, to conceive of our fellows as independent beings, forgetting that we and others are
fragmentary hints of the true unity of the Absolute.
But however remote we may be from each other there is
always a realm between us. So we learn that nature ex-
ists independently of any particular observer. Our
assurance that nature exists apart from any man's pri-
vate experience, is thus inseparably bound up with our
social consciousness. Our idea of separation be-
tween the significant inner life of our fellows and
material nature comes, first from the fact that to
the civilized man the material world becomes more and
more contrasted with our practical relations with our
fellow men, the more our power to mould the material
phenomena to our human purposes becomes prominent. To
the animistic savage all things are vaguely alive. Civi-
lized man is too critical to tolerate vagueness. In
consequence our civilized view of nature has tended
in many ways toward dualism. Nature is no longer con-
ceived as between conscious beings, but as foreign to
them. The processes by which men undertake
to describe the material world are kept under control
by a conception whose origin is social, that of human
experience as an organized totality. Not to accept
the verdict of experience would be to cut ourselves off
from definite social relations.
The law of causation is of only relative validity. Why do we, then, conceive of nature as subject to invariable laws, when we can only show particular instances? If we generalize and say that whatever is must have a cause which determines what it is, we are ambiguous or merely trivial. There is a unity between the one and the many, but it may be very different from the link of rigid necessity. Whenever there is an exactly described series, there is a law of that series. The uniformity of nature is the independence of the invariants of place and time. In the world of appreciation or in any well-ordered series of events, this principle is not true. Because our social life belongs to the world of appreciation, its endless novelties in life and activity can only be organized in definite ways in case many people agree to cooperate by adopting the same plans. Definite social habits depend upon discovering such uniformities of natural law as enable men to conceive, and to describe to one another, definite plans of action. Hence that aspect of nature which suggests such unvarying laws has come to be looked upon as most characteristic. Irregularities are either of no interest, or, if they force themselves upon us, become a field for the endeavor to find law. The so-
called axiom of the unvarying character of the laws of nature is no self-evident truth, but possesses its present authority because of the emphasis which our social interests give to the discovery of uniformity. The value of the dogma of the unvarying character of nature is relative. Our experience of the objects of nature does prove to us that there exists a vast realm of fact other than what human minds consciously find present within their own private apprehension. But when we ask what reality nature possesses, we must distinguish between what our common experience permits us to verify, and what our experience warrants us in asserting as the truth regarding a realm external to man's consciousness. We do not discover anything but this, that our human internal meanings do possess some reference to a vast finite realm beyond ourselves. This realm has doubtless its own meaning, which is as to enable us to develop our arts, and to work out relatively successful, but also distinctly human and social, descriptions and predictions of our science.

Through the success of certain of our conceptions we have been led to a mechanical view of nature, and a sharp contrast between mind and matter. Therefore this very contrast lies in our human way of looking at things. It is justified by our viewpoint, but cannot stand a-
against any deeper reason for interpreting our experiences of nature as a hint of a vaster realm of life and meaning, of which we men form a part, and of which the final unity is in God's life.

LECTURE V. THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

We have reached the conclusion that perhaps a deeper view will annul the contrast of mind and matter. At one extreme we find a world which is conceived as of inwardly changeless substances; at the other, a world where the stream of fact flows, nothing abiding but meanings. Evolution is the largest generalization of our human view of nature. It shows the inorganic world, and organic life with mind as the two extremes from one of which passage has apparently been made to the other, and is often made the other way, (in death.) We may explain this by saying either that the passage is a mistake or that the separation is. The first is practically excluded. In accepting the second alternative, some make matter the basis, since it is permanent while mind is fleeting. But do we know matter, after all? Is it not the more mysterious of the two?

Conscious nature shares with unconscious four characteristic types of processes: 1st, both are subject
to a condition that demands the irreversibility of great numbers of their processes. 2nd, Both are subject to processes which involve a tendency of one part of nature to communicate with another. 3rd, Both show a tendency under favorable conditions to the appearance of approximate rhythms. 4th, Both are subject to the process of evolution.

Now the contrast which we make between material and unconscious processes depends merely upon the accidents of the human point of view.

We have no right to speak of really unconscious nature, but only of uncommunicative nature, or of nature whose mental processes go on at such a different time rate than ours that we cannot adjust ourselves to a live appreciation of their inward fluency. My own hypothesis is, (says Professor Royce,) that, in case of nature in general, as in the case of those portions of nature known as our fellow men, we are dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious process, whose relation to time varies vastly, but whose general characters throughout are the same. The vast slowness of the time-span in nature does not necessarily mean a lower type of consciousness. The actually fluent inner experience, which our hypothesis attributes to inorganic nature, would be a finite experience of an exceedingly august temporal
span. How this world was individuated our hypothesis would leave for deeper consideration elsewhere. Evolution is due to the constant communication of a vast number of relatively separate regions of this world of conscious life. The evolutionary processes would first be fluent processes, more or less governed by the pursuit of ideal goals. 2ndly, They would be processes determined by intercommunication. 3rdly, They would tend to the acquisition of definite habits. The hypothesis supposes that in the case of animals we may well be dealing, not with beings that are conscious in our own time-span, but with a rational being represented by the race as a whole. The animal would then be a temporally brief section of a person whose time-span is far longer than ours. Finally as to the origin and end of human individuals, our theory suggests that we are differentiated from a finite conscious experience of presumably a much longer time-span than our present one. The birth and death of the individual man mean changes of time-span.

Contrast with related hypotheses:

1st, Berkeley. With regard to the material world he is an idealist. The relation of individual minds is, however, realistic. Matter has no basis except the experiences and ideas of men, and the direct influence of God
upon these. From our point of view however nature is real precisely as are our fellow men, though we agree with Berkeley in asserting that there is no substance independent of all mind.

2nd, Leibniz. While he has many genuinely idealistic motives, the conception of being in his monads is essentially realistic. The monads are independent, while, by our theory, in both nature and man individuals are closely linked.

3rd, Clifford's "Mind-Stuff" theory. Inorganic nature is a vast collection of elements of the type of our own sensations. Evolution is a gradual organization of such originally atomic elements of feeling into complex unities, which come to take on the character of conscious, and in the end of rational lives. Our hypothesis rejects any such separate elements, nor admits that such could come to be interrelated. For the same reason we reject every form of doctrine that regards nature as genuinely unconscious, or that supposes the Absolute to come to self-consciousness first in man. All life has conscious meaning. This is the necessary consequence of our idealism. The details of this hypothesis of nature are only tentative.
LECTURE VI. THE HUMAN SELF.

The term "self" is ambiguous. One view places the root of all evil without the self. The assertion of the true independent self is the greatest good. The other view is that the denial of self is the true good. Virtue lies in altruism. Man's original nature is evil. Good comes from without. Again these two are combined, there are two selves, a nobler and a baser. The fleshly self is evil, the spiritual self good. But the former ambiguity persists. The deeper spiritual nature, to whom does it belong? Both common sense and religion give this a very practical significance. Our models, and the mysterious grace that saves us come from without. Yet they in such wise determine what is best in us that we are accustomed to nourish the higher selfhood, by means of what we find as no creation of the original self, but as the free gift of the world. In Christianity the higher self is originally not myself at all, but the Spirit warring against the flesh. This ambiguity is not the result of theological and philosophical speculation, but is seen in the advice given to the young, to forget themselves, and again not to forget themselves.

Such considerations ought to give pause to those who
regard the problem of the true nature of the self as a matter of direct inner knowledge. The concept of the human self comes to us first as an empirical one. But there is a question of just how much is to be included in the self. Some ideas are seen to be mine, some those of others. The boundaries of the ego and non-ego are constantly seen to fluctuate. By what marks is the self distinguished, then, from the rest of the world? Our empirical self-consciousness depends upon a series of contrast effects whose psychological origin lies in our social life. The self of the child grows through imitation. He is conscious of others before he is of himself. A mass of ideas and interests of others is perceived, and a similar mass of our own. These constitute the alter and the ego. The ego is connected with certain warm bodily sensations, but receives its type of unity through social contrast effects. It is secondary, therefore to our social experience. I never do observe my Self as a single and unambiguous fact of consciousness.

A second type of the conception of the self is that it is in some metaphysical sense a real being, with its being defined in strictly idealistic terms. This must fall with the realistic conception of being. The
self, like every other real thing, is a meaning embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within the absolute life. Its individuality is the essential uniqueness of the life. Human experience always implies that the will now present is genuinely expressed through other conscious life that, from an absolute point of view, is at once in conscious unity with this instant's purpose, and also in conscious contrast. Primarily, the contrast the contrast between the self and the not-self comes to us as a contrast between the internal and external meaning of this present instant's purpose. Any finite idea is so far a self. I can contrast my present self with my past or future self. There is no rational principle to the usual identification of the past and future with the self. There remains only the persuasion that one ought to possess or create for himself some one principle whereby he should be able, with a united and permanent meaning, to identify that part of the world's life which is to be his own. This consideration, that one ought to select from all the universe a certain portion of remembered and intended life as that of his own individual self, and to contrast with this, one's larger individuality, the life of all other individual selves and the life of the Absolute in its
wholeness, shows us at once the sense in which the self is an ethical category. To identify the self with the instant's internal meaning merely, is to leave it a mere thrill of transient life. Your true justification for the larger self is that you regard the present's life and striving as part of a larger task now assigned to you. By the meaning of my life plan, by the intent always to remain another than my fellows, despite my unity with them, by this, and not by the possession of any soul-substance, I am defined and created a self.

LECTURE VII. THE PLACE OF THE SELF IN BEING.

Other theories of the self compared with ours:

1st, Realism. The principle problem here is how this self whose interests are essentially its own, can come to recognize any responsibility to other selves or to God. It tends to become solipsistic. 2nd, Mysticism simply condemns all finite individuality as an evil dream. 3rd, For Critical Rationalism the self is no independent entity, but a being whose reality involves the validity of a system of laws. The truth of every such doctrine lies in its recognition of the valid relations of the self as conditions without which the self cannot exist. Its defect is its impersonal view of
being; the self by it is a law, not a life.

We cannot too strongly insist that the self is not a datum but an ideal. I am assured of myself only in so far as I am assured of the nature of being in general. There is no instant when I can say, Here I observe that I finally am. For every one of us, indeed, the absolute self is God. Yet we retain our individuality just in so far as our life plans, by the very necessity of their social basis, are mutually contrasting life plans, each of which can reach its fulfilment only by recognizing other life plans as different from its own. Therefore never in the present life do we find the self as a realized fact. In God alone do we fully come to ourselves.

In view of your dependence upon the world how shall you win conscious meaning and freedom? Your life depends upon nature and society for its general character, for everything, in fact, except its individual fashion of acknowledging and taking interest in this very dependence. The spirit of God compels you in the sense that it compels you to be an individual and be free. Our theory of the self assigns to it its character of the free individual, but maintains that this char-
acter belongs to it in its true relation to God, and cannot be observed at any one instant, as an obvious and independent fact. The absolute life includes an infinity of longings, each by itself a consciousness of imperfection seeking its relative fulfilment in some other finite state. Only through such consciousness is perfection attainable. We are not obliged to assume some principle of blind self-differentiation as a ground for the separation of the finite beings from the divine source. Longing, as a fact other than fulfilment, is indeed blind. But in order to be possessed of the eternal knowledge of the attainment of the goal, the absolute insight will actually include all that we experience when today we seek the goal in vain. It is possible for us now to comprise in one moment, expectation and fulfilment, ignorance and discovery. So all finite consciousness, just as it is in us, from the absolute point of view, but is also seen in unity with the wholeness of temporal processes. Finitude means the sense of sundering, and must find its place in the Absolute, in order that the absolute life may be complete. From the point of view of the absolute, finite beings never fall away. What we have said applies equally to the relation of the larger individual self to the lives of the individuals included within it. So every new
self that arises finds its place in the larger self that permits it to become an individual. The explanation of any particular existence can be given only in one of two forms: 1st, in terms of universal principles, in so far as just this finitude is needed to complete the absolute; 2nd, in terms of the particular relations of each finite being, in so far as it is what it is in consequence of the presence in the world of other finite beings that require some aspect of its own life as their resultant. We have seen how a new sort of selfhood can arise, as in the case of the empirical ego in human experience. We have only to generalize in order to see how a similar process can occur universally.

A tentative hypothesis would be: "the process of the evolution of new forms of consciousness in nature is throughout of the same general type as that we observe when we follow the evolution of new sorts of plans, of ideas and of selfhood in our own life." A new individual life is a new way of behavior appearing amongst natural phenomena. As a result of the union of sexual elements, the cell from which the new organism develops, has characters between those represented by the parent cells. Sexual generation is thus analogous to the process of conscious imitation. But in another
class of cases the new living individuals result asexually, e.g., by the process of call-multiplication. But this process is analogous to the recurrent processes of the conscious will that has found what it has to do.

Further, the new living largely illustrate the process of gradual adaptation to environment, by novel forms of structure and function, analogous to our conscious process of learning new arts through trial and error.

"The evolution of new selfhood is rendered possible by the fact that a finite form of conscious life may have a twofold relation to the universe, and so may seek the truth, and its own self-expression, in a twofold way--a more active and definite course of self-expression, or a more tentative one of discovery." The new expressions of purpose are tentative. When they are successful they so mass themselves as to form definite centers of new experience. But when they suggest nothing that accords with the established habits of the self within which they arise, they are unadapted to their environment and pass away. "But now these new creations if they survive, are not the mere contents of another and larger consciousness. They are also processes occupying time and embodying will; they are themselves finite conscious purposes, having an inner unity. If
they become aware of their relation to the Absolute, then they no longer survive or pass away merely as they serve the larger purpose that originally invented them. They then define their own lives as individually significant, conceive their goal as the absolute, and their relations to their natural sources as relations that mean something to themselves also. "When once I become aware that my little form of willing also is a hint of an absolute truth, I know myself as in intent this individual in the world...... And now I have a character that may well survive, that in fact will survive, all the organic processes that were originally expressed in my life, as this variation of the parent stock. For in God I am a seeker after God as soon as I know myself as a self at all...... I no longer depend upon the finite self within which I came into being, just as my organism even in physical functions, no longer depends upon the parent organisms." This allows for origination, but also is perfectly consistent with immortal destiny.

The self, like any other phenomenon, is a proper object for investigation, in order to reduce it terms of causation. We do not thereby endanger our own doctrine of the freedom of the individual self, for this way of viewing man is necessarily limited by the limits of the
world of description. 1st, Thus to view a man is not to view him as he views himself, i.e. as possessing internal meaning. Hence, what you never causally explain about a man is precisely his primary character as a self.

2nd, All causal explanation has to do with types and never with whatever is individual about events. Whatever about me is expressible in general terms you can and must undertake to explain causally, as due to my dependence upon nature in general. But what remains causally inexplicable is precisely my being as this individual, who am nobody else in God's world.

Nor is the self teleologically determined, as might be urged by its place in the unity of the divine plan. The divine act whereby God wills your individuality to be what in purpose and meaning it is, is identical with your own individual will, and exists not except as thus identical. But if there are no independent beings can there be free beings? We reply that in the very reciprocity of our relations lies the assurance of our true freedom. A change in the world produces a change in the individual, but so does a change in the individual produce a change in the world. It may be objected that according to the theory, God's will creates
us all alike. But the very essence of the theory is that the categories, whether of causation or of teleological dependence, are secondary to the fact that the world exists as the embodiment of conscious purpose. I depend for my life and meaning upon life not my own. But my will as the will of an individual is not wholly the expression of other purposes than my private purpose. The divine will gets expressed in the existence of me, the individual, only in so far as this divine will first not merely recognizes from without, but includes within itself my will as one of its own purposes. If I am I and nobody else, then I am in so far free. That is precisely how my existence results from God's will. God cannot be one except by being many.

LECTURE VIII. THE MORAL ORDER.

In what sense, and for what reason, do we assert that the world is a moral order? But first let us ask, What is a moral order? And has our idealism a place for such? "A moral order," an objector may maintain, "depends upon recognizing that selves can do good or evil by means of their own free will. There is an essential opposition between what ought to be and what is. The best world for the moral agent is one that needs him to make it better. In the idealistic world everything is
viewed by the Absolute as static, changeless. There can be no real progress. The world is certain to have one of its finite perfections embodied in whatever the individual does. Thus He cannot, therefore, sin." Now the moral *ought* in its primary sense is a category of temporal application, having reference to acts which follow one another in time sequence. Accepting the statement that any moral agent can choose right or wrong, the act must possess an aspect in which it is not deducible from any external conditions, but is the agent's own present deed. Either what ought or what ought not can occur at any one temporal instant, just because of the eternal perfection of the whole. By the reality of the individual moral agent we mean that there is a finite internal meaning, which seeks as its own other, with whatever degree of blindness, the Absolute itself. To seek any thing but the Absolute is impossible. By the Ought you mean a rule that would guide you nearer to the expression of your own will, and hence the Absolute, than if you ran counter to it. The Ought commands, "Harmonize thy will with the world's will, express thyself through obedience." But the self is known through contrast effect. Hence it is possible for it to conceive its search for self-expression as simply an undertaking, not
to obey, but to subdue. Hence it may seek its self-expression in rebellion. "Nor is such a rebellious attitude by any means wholly evil. Conscious choice of a total evil is, indeed, wholly impossible, for the self at its worst seeks finality of self-expression. I can only assert myself by transforming myself, so that I actually obey, in some measure, even while I rebel. Nor can any being wander so far as to escape the indwelling of the Absolute. The obedient self, however, acts willingly in accordance with a truth that is final, and is conscious of its own meaning in a form that is far more significant than the one in which the life of the rebellious spirit is embodied.

The objector may say, "What you call freedom of the finite self cannot be moral freedom. For the self always wills its own fulfilment through oneness with the Absolute. The conflict between the ought and the rebellious attitude of the self can depend upon nothing but ignorance. Hence your moral acts are mere expressions of knowledge and ignorance, and not of freedom." We reply that knowledge and will are inseparably bound together. By holding a thought before the mind by means of attention we come to act upon it. The only field of choice then, is the field of attention. The attention is the will of the instant. To sin is consciously to
choose to forget an ought which one already recognizes. All sin then, is sin against light by a free choice to be inattentive to the light already seen.

But the objector may continue, "In God the whole intent of good and evil alike is brought to light in a unique whole. This whole is absolutely perfect. Sinners cannot make it less perfect, nor the good make it better." We reply that we reach here a place where the distinction between the temporal and the eternal order becomes of the greatest importance. Moral acts occur in time. We say to the moral agent, "You act as you will in so far as you are free. If you do ill, the world-order will, indeed, in the end make good the ill you have done, and in that sense make naught of your deed--yet not because you are unable to do any ill at all, but because elsewhere in the temporal order, other agents, seeking to overcome the disquieting ill, which your will has chosen as its expression, will somewhere, and somehow succeed. The moral order of the idealist's world means, then, not that no moral ill can be done, but that in the temporal order, every evil deed must somewhere, and at sometime be atoned for, by some other than the agent, if not by the agent himself, and that this atonement, will in the end make possible the perfection of the
The objector has said that no other world than this is, or can be; hence it is changeless, according to the theory. We reply that from the eternal point of view it is not subject to further change; because the eternal point of view includes at a single glance the whole of time, and therefore includes a knowledge of changes that finite agents, acting in time, really work in their own world.

A further objection may be made, "The individual knows at any moment that what he really means is identical with the divine will." My meaning when interpreted in the light of all other life, of all the atoning deeds, is identical with God's will. But taken by myself as I now am, I am remote enough from conscious union with the Absolute.

The objector may say, "But the agent's deed is but one of the incidents by which the Absolute wins perfection, hence he cannot go wrong." On the contrary, he may say, but if so, the divine perfection includes his condemnation, and the overcoming of his evil will. The objector may continue, "Were the agent other than he is, the whole world would be other than it is; but the world as known to the Absolute, is known as a world that fulfills the absolute purpose, and hence cannot be other than it is." But if evil appears it demands its other
which so supplements it that it is overruled for good. Only by virtue of this, other does the evil-doer enter into the perfect whole. If the objector continues, "You are losing sight of the contrast between what is and what ought to be;" we reply, that they can and do fall asunder at any one instant in the temporal order. "But your doctrine has still to face the difficulty concerning foreknowledge and free will." On the one hand God does not temporally foreknow anything, except in so far as He is expressed in us finite beings. On the other hand, the Absolute possesses a perfect knowledge at one glance, of the whole of the temporal order, past present and future.

Our idealistic realm then is a moral order. The acts of a moral agent are his own even because God's will is in him in the heart of his freedom. And his deeds are not indifferent to the whole universe, which wins, through his free aid when he cooperates, and through the overruling of his caprice when he withstands, yet wins by regarding and including his freedom.

LECTURE IX. THE STRUGGLE WITH EVIL.

An evil, in general, is a fact that sends us to
some Other for its justification, and for the satisfac-
tion of our will. This obviously applies to every finite
fact qua finite. Any temporal fact is essentially more
or less dissatisfying, and so evil. Were the will sat-
ished with the present expression of experience, the
whole of being would now be present. It follows that
dissatisfaction is the universal experience of every
temporal being. We can see that many ills that beset
our fortune are due in large measure to the very magni-
tude and ideality of our undertakings. The abstract
formula does not, however, enable us to explain or pre-
dict the fluctuations of our fortunes. Man is bound by
manifold ties to nature, 1st, as a social being, and 2nd,
as connected with the conscious life of nature as a
whole. Yet apart from these endless complications, the
abstract formula does hold good. But the very pres-
ence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of
perfection in the eternal order. The attainment of a
goal means the consciousness that a certain process wins
its own completion. But this process is essentially a
struggle towards a goal. Were there no longing in time
there would be no peace in eternity. Every
ill of human fortune is presumably due to the magnitude
of our plans, or is the expression of the morally defective intent of some agent. As to whence comes this ill-fortune, we have seldom any right to venture detailed speculations. On the other hand it becomes plain that the moral ill of any agent becomes a source of ill-fortune to other finite moral agents. If nothing human is foreign to me, then this my free will is in no sense absolutely independent of the common human nature that I share with the sinner. All human sin is therefore in some sense my own. The finite will responsible for my misfortune is in general unknown to me. Yet every such defect of a finite will has a genuinely moral significance. I shall therefore undertake to atone for the ill that the unknown agent has done. Where I am obliged to know whose sin it is whereof I endure the consequences, I shall remember that all men are brothers, and I shall even rejoice, when I have the strength, that I can join consciously in the task of atoning for this sin. This intimate relation between ill-fortune and sin renders especially serious my view of my own moral task. No sin of mine is wholly indifferent to my fellows, for what is deed to me, is in some sense fortune to all other selves.

The older forms of theodicy are mainly either mys-
tical or realistic. The mystical doctrine is that evil has no being at all. For us evil is certainly not an unreality. What we have asserted is that no evil is a complete instance of being. In other words evil is for us a thing explicitly finite. The mystic first denies that evil is real. Asked then why evil seems to exist, he replies that this is our finite error. This error becomes thereupon the source of our woes, an evil. But no evil is real. Hence we do not really err, etc. On the other hand the denial of the reality of evil makes rational an end of every possibility of moral effort. For us on the contrary, while in the eternal order the will of God is triumphantly expressed, in the temporal order there is freedom and the possibility of resistance. Real evils result, justified only by the eternal worth of the life that endures and overcomes them.

According to the realist, evil is due to the free will of moral agents, who are essentially independent beings. If they choose evil, evil enters into the world, but is not in any sense in God. Divine justice then demands that the moral order should be vindicated by requiring the sinner to reap the consequences of his deed. Sufferers have, therefore, only their own sins to blame for their sufferings. The realist lays great stress
upon the sundering of moral agents in the world, 1st, to make the responsibility of each moral agent quite unmistakable; and 2ndly, to clear the divine will entirely from the deeds of any finite agents; and 3rdly to assure us that no real harm can come to the righteous.

This theory is seldom carried out with rigid consistency, but in any case it breaks down. For our ethical interest in the world is inseparable from our belief in the solidarity of the human race. The moral agent must indeed possess a measure of freedom. But independent beings of the realistic type are impossible for ethical significance. What gives moral life its significance is the fact that individuals can and do suffer undeservedly from the wrong-doing of others; and again that moral agents can do good in and for the life of other moral agents. For otherwise no moral agent could have any genuinely significant task to perform, since he could not affect others. Again if the ills of the creatures are external to the life of the creator, the ancient dilemma as to the limitation of his power, or his benevolence, retains all its hopelessness.

According to the idealistic view I suffer, in general, because I am an agent whose will is not now completely expressed in a present conscious life. The
higher my ideals, the more there is in me of one kind of sorrow, i.e., that my present temporal life is not yet what I mean it to be. I can improve this my state of temporal ill, by every effort to live in better accord with my ideal. But my comfort can never lie in the temporal attainment of my goal, but must be in the consciousness, 1st, that the sorrows of our finitude are identical with God's own sorrows; 2nd in the assurance that God's fulfilment in the eternal order is to be won through the very bitterness of tribulation, and thro' overcoming the world. That our sorrows are God's own sorrows, contains the only ground for a genuine theodicy. Through my tribulation the absolute triumph is won, but this triumph is also eternally mine. If some sorrows seem not thus to make for the nobler gifts of the spirit, we must remember that man echoes, in his passing experience the sorrows of the world. His comfort here lies in knowing that in all this life, ideals are sought, with incompleteness at every instant, but with the assurance of the divine triumph in eternity, lighting up the whole.

LECTURE X. THE UNION OF GOD AND MAN.

We have seen that in God you possess your individ-
uality, that your very dependence is the condition of your freedom and your unique significance. The task of this lecture is to bring together the threads of our argument as they bear upon the doctrine of the individual self, and the more practical aspects of its union with God. Personality is an essentially ethical category. A person is a conscious being, whose life, temporally viewed, seeks its completion through deeds, and eternally viewed, attains its perfection by means of the present knowledge of the whole of its temporal strivings. So God is a person. His perfection is not the result of any process of evolution. God in his totality as absolute being, is conscious, not in time, but of time. Every temporal instant contains a seeking after God's perfection. Yet never at any instant of time is this perfection contained. There is always progress in the universe, in so far as at any instant some finite end is nearing its temporal attainment. But we do not necessarily assert that there is a law of universal progress. If the temporal world contains progress, it also contains decay. But progress is always present in the sense that at every moment of time some new and significant goal is approached by finite agents. On the other hand progress is not universal. We can always say
that in some respects the finite universe of any one temporal moment is worse than it ever was before. But all things work together for good from the divine point of view, and whoever can make this divine point of view in any sense his own, sees that they do in spite of the inevitable losses and sorrows of the temporal order.

Now man too, is a person. His life, temporally viewed, seeks its completion through deeds. Eternally viewed, it attains its perfection by means of the knowledge of the whole of its conscious strivings. The human self is not a thing or a substance, but a life with a meaning.

The first impression would be that our theory gave no decision as to how long a time is needed for the expression of a whole life. The self as found in a passing thrill of internal meaning in its relation to God is an individual. Temporally it has a unique contrast with every other event in the universe. Eternally it finds the complete expression of its whole meaning in God's entire life. The temporal brevity of the instant is no barrier to its eternal significance. But this is far from being the whole human self, which is the self of the unique life-plan. This needs temporally extended expression. It is to be remembered that any task, however transient, has a twofold aspect.
It is temporally contrasted with all other events in the universe, and stands likewise in eternal relations as bearing a place in the absolute meaning. Yet not thus do we discover the adequate view of the relation of the human self to time. For when I aim to do my duty I aim not merely to accomplish the unique, but such a service that I could never say, at any one instant, "My work is done. There is nothing more to accomplish."

For it is of the essence of the ethical self to press on to new tasks, to demand new opportunities of service.

The sense in which the human individual is to be viewed as immortal is more precisely defined by three distinct considerations:

1st, We know being from three sides: a, Whatever is is something that in one aspect is content of experience; b, is an object conforming to a type; c, is also a unique embodiment of a type. Individuality is a category of the satisfied will. For us creatures of fragmentary consciousness and dissatisfied will, the individuality of all things remains a postulate, and is rather the object that our ethical consciousness demands than any object that we in our finitude attain. Just here, however, lies the first of the three considerations. The self possesses individuality in and for God. It can
say, "As human self, here and now, I know not consciously what my own individuality is. But God knows, and He knows this not as another than myself, but in so far as in the eternal world I know myself as real. Hence in the eternal world, my own self, whose consciousness is here so flickering, attains an insight into my own reality and uniqueness."

And death occurs we know, but how from our idealistic point of view is this possible as a real event? Something with a meaning comes to an end, before that meaning is worked out to its completion; something individual is attempted, but to our ken never finished. For us, if death is real, it can be real only in so far as it fulfils a purpose, necessarily one that, in the eternal world, is consciously known and seen as continuous with, yes, as inclusive of, the very purpose whose fulfilment it seems to cut short. The defeated purpose must be known by some conscious being who can say, "This was my purpose, but temporally I no longer seek it, but this ceasing of my former purpose has its meaning which is continuous with my larger meaning." Thus I can temporally die, but I myself, in the eternal world, see why I die."

I shall finally die, only when I come to say of myself, "My work is consciously and absolutely ac-
complished." But this brings us to the third consideration.

3rd. An ethical task is one of which I can never say, "My work is finished." Every deed of an ethical life emphasizes the contrast between itself and other lives, and so gives opportunity for new deeds. To serve God is to create new opportunities for service. There can be no last moral deed.

Is the completed self still to be called finite? As the complete expression of a self-representative system it is in the eternal world no longer finite, but infinite. Yet it differs from the absolute self in being partial, requiring other selves as its own supplement. It is infinite "in its own kind." We need not conceive the eternal ethical individual as in any sense less in the grade of complication of his activity, or in the multitude of his acts of will than is the Absolute.

Our result is this: Despite God's absolute unity, we preserve and attain our unique lives, and are not lost in the very life that sustains us, and needs us as its own expression. This life is real through us all, and we are real through our union with that life.
PART II. CRITICISM.

INTRODUCTION.

The general plan of this work is admirable. It aims at a thorough and consistent system, based upon fundamental concepts, and while examining rival systems with the greatest keenness, endeavors to do justice to the truths involved in them, and to incorporate these within its own theory. If Professor Royce had succeeded in carrying out this program with consistency and conclusiveness, his work would mark a great stage in the history of philosophy. No one could be more desirous than I of finding something that offered or promised finality in the conclusions of philosophy. But while there is much of suggestive value in the "World and the Individual," and much that sheds light upon the intricacies of previous philosophers, yet the final solution seems to remain as far off as ever. I do not find that Professor Royce's criticisms are conclusive, (except in the case of mysticism,) or that he has established his own theory upon the firm a priori ground that he desires.

I shall take up the points to be considered, much in the order in which they occur in the book.
THE EXAMINATION OF REALISM AND CRITICAL RATIONALISM.

The definition of realism that Professor Royce gives is such as would be accepted by a realist, not quite conscious that the wooden horse was filled with armed men. The unsuspecting philosopher finds that he has admitted that the mere knowledge of one being by another, "makes no difference" to the first, though they may be in the most intimate relationships; "that the existent causal or other linkage between any knower and what he knows is no part of the definition of the object known". I am holding a pencil, and think that I have asserted that the pencil will not cease to exist if I cease to think of it. I find that I have asserted that it is no part of the definition of a pencil to be something that can be seen and held. Ideas, again, must be independent of things, else you could prove something about the things from the ideas, and "the that would follow from the what." I shall try to show that it is possible to hold to the reality of the external world, as essentially independent of our ideas, and to the independent reality of the ideas themselves, without being involved in these consequences.

As for the ideas, they are (as they must be by the realistic definition) independent of any other ideas
about them, and this quite consistently with any argument that Professor Royce has advanced. Further they may in many instances be caused by external objects, or be attributed to them, and yet have an existence that is independent of them thereafter, an existence that is not affected, though the external object be proven not to exist. The idea having once occurred, is a real idea. Prove to me that after all an idea of mine was erroneous and I shall say, "Still, I certainly had the idea." It was not true, but it was real. True to its object and real in itself are different things. When we assert that an idea is true, we ascribe to it a quality that is entirely dependent upon its object. When we say that it is real, we mean that, true or false, it possesses an existence not to be taken away. When this distinction is kept clearly before the mind that part of Professor Royce's argument that has to do with the dependence of ideas upon their objects, loses its force.

Independence is made to carry with it the impossibility of a link between the independent beings. Independence may, of course be defined in such terms. But I very much doubt whether any realist ever took it to mean that. Certainly it is possible to take it in another sense. Put a piece of matter into existence, with
this character, that it shall attract every other piece of matter in the universe. Just what it is, what it will do, how much it will attract, depends upon the amount of matter in the universe to which it is added. That it is, that it possesses the power of attracting, does not depend upon the power of any other one piece of matter.

As for the relation of object and idea, the object may have an existence which is independent of the idea of it, and yet sustain a close and intimate relationship with it. The being of a business correspondent whom I never saw, is independent of my being, a fact which the existence of postal communication does not remove, but that independence of existence does not prevent our establishing a correspondence, and profoundly influencing each other's conduct. Professor Royce confuses, I think, "independent" with "not dependent", or in other words turns his definition around and shows that since independent objects cannot exist, therefore the object is dependent upon the idea, a use of "dependent" in two different senses. The idea is independent of the thing, he says, because it can be conceived of as persisting if the object were destroyed. But what the realist really says is that there is real being outside of the mind, that would persist if the mind ceased to think of it; a
baseless assumption perhaps, but not inconsistent with, (1) the dependence of the idea upon the object, (2) with the modification of the object through the individual will, as the result of the idea, and (3) with the existence of a real mind which is capable of responding to the object, but whose existence is independent of that or of any particular object. Of course the object, qua object, is not independent, but the real being which furnishes the basis of the subjective object to the mind may be.

It may, "make a difference in the long run," as Professor Royce asserts, to all objects, whether they are known or not, but the question is rather a teleological than an ontological one. A thing may exist because it was created for the sole purpose of my knowing it, and yet it does not follow that its being is dependent, ontologically, upon my thinking. It seems to me that the weak point in Professor Royce's whole attack upon realism is that he does not discriminate between unshakable existence, and unchangeable quality. A drop of ink has an existence independent of me. I can not absolutely destroy (let us say,) one atom of it. But I can spread it out into whatever words I please. I can change its relations, but the fact of its existence is
quite independent of me. Nor again does Professor Royce seem to discriminate sufficiently between the relation of the real to the finite mind, and to the infinite mind. The real as presented to me, for the purpose of testing my thought, may be quite independent of that thought. I have a headache. I notice it, not because of any purpose of mine, conscious or unconscious, and I locate it in my head quite as involuntarily. My thought in so locating it, is true, not from any purpose of mine, but because, as a matter of fact, the nerves in that part of my body are producing the phenomenon known as headache. Its reality depends upon no connection between thought and will in my case, but upon the fact that my mind involuntarily recognizes a real disturbance in a real structure, whose that, and in part whose what, are independent of me. That is what the average realist would mean, I think, and all that he would mean. What marks a thing as real? Roughly, the impossibility of its being done away merely by my thought. It is the persistent, the stubborn. But that it is independent of all thought, that it came into being of itself, and owes its continued existence to itself alone, viz not, I think, a common position even among realists. The immanent Deity gives the external world its character,
a realist might aver, and part of its character is to be
independent of human thought for its that.

The reduction of the first conception to the third,
to the merely valid, that is to say, as the real, in not
truly necessary. A real thing is, has an existence in-
dependent of the idea of it. As a result, not as a con-
dition of its being, it can be known under proper circum-
stances. A thing might be conceived which would have
what we call reality, which would not be so known to any
finite mind, yet we should still call it real if the
possibility of it occurred to us. But the third con-
ception, though we are not driven to it by any breakdown
on the part of realistic ontology, yet has its proper
function. This is one of several places where Professor
Royce fails to discriminate between the problems proper
to epistemology, and those which belong to ontology. To
The question of the former is, What is the general
character of our knowledge? of the latter, What is the
ultimate nature of reality? Now the third conception
is essentially an epistemological one. It is true that
the men who hold it may not have any ontological theory.
But this need not mean that they claim that their theory
gives the ultimate nature of reality, but simply that
they hold that that nature cannot be known. It is un-
fair, therefore, to put to this conception questions that it does not pretend to answer. The question with which our author triumphantly confronts the third conception, "What is a valid experience, at the moment when it is supposed to be only possible?" is, therefore, unwarranted. The conception does not attempt to say. But it does give a very good account of what the ordinary use of the term real is. Every use that is made of that word by anybody but the metaphysician, is justified by the definition given by the third conception. Nor has this all but universal use of the term anything to do with ultimate being. A real object of any sort is one that will answer to my expectations. When you ask, "How do you know that it is real?" I say, "I do not know, but I believe that if I put it to the test, I shall get certain phenomena which I demand from that class of object." The ordinary use does not go into the question of substance, nor concern itself with the being of things, when not subject to test. The plain man's expectations, of course, go beyond his experience. He proceeds upon working hypotheses, and will continue to do so, so long as successful. In the meantime, real for him means verifiable. Of this epistemological state of things the 3rd conception gives a very proper account.
Now, this validity theory is perfectly consistent with any ontological conception. It conflicts neither with realism, nor with idealism. The world where validity marks reality for our minds, may, and not at all unnaturally, a world where things are unchanged by whether they are perceived or not, where they may be wholly independent of any creator, and may depend upon other reals, conscious or unconscious, partly for their what, but not at all for their that. On the other hand the 3rd conception expresses exactly what Professor Royce means by real when he is not thinking ontologically.

THE AUTHOR'S OWN CONCEPTION.

One of the first things to strike one in this part of the work is that Professor Royce is relying too much upon his refutation of realism. He is going to found a theory of the ultimate constitution of the universe, upon the necessity of the case, and he has shown, as he thinks, that it cannot be of the realistic type. While little inclined to accept realism as the last word, I must confess that a repeated study of that part of the argument has failed to convince me that realism is untenable. One approaches the author's own theory, then,
with the feeling that he still has an alternative behind him, and is not at all disposed to accept a reduction to realism as a reductio ad absurdum. But even if realism were disproved, even if there were no ground for, or possibility of, an independent universe which makes our ideas true or false, still is there ground for postulating an ultimate reality of the kind laid down by our author? We have seen, I think, that all that is meant in ordinary speech, is reality of the 3rd conception type, which is not ultimate reality. What assurance have we that there an ultimate fixed and stable something at all? If realism and every other type of ultimate reality, except the 4th conception type, were a hundred times disproved, could we argue from the nature of things that there must be ultimate reality of that type, that if nothing else can be found, then things must have their reality in their embodiment of meaning? But who has a right to declare that any such meaning must exist. If it be admitted that Professor Royce has disproved his other types, and if it be admitted that these are the only alternatives, and if it be admitted that he has a right to assert an ultimate reality at all, then and not till then can it be said that he has reached his proof by the process of exclusion.

Turning now to his positive proof, we are confron-
ted at once by the identification of thinking and willing, upon which it is based. To identify the \textit{weal} with the fulfilment of purpose, is to make that satisfy the idea which satisfies the will. It is with much hesita-
tion that one attempts to criticize a skilled psycholo-
gist upon a point like this. Yet I am here, as I have been before, impressed by the fact, that "out of the mouths of babes and sucklings" theories that smack too much of the study may be corrected. Has not that very rage for simplifying, of which Professor Joyce accuses the realist, here gotten the better of himself? Does the mere fact that thought and will habitually accompany one another, that thought leads to will, and will to thought, make them one? Does not the very possibility of speaking of them so, prove and emphasize their differ-
ence? \textit{There} can be no thought without attention, and attention is an act of will, but even this does not identify the content of my thought with its purpose. I will to think of my pen. I could not think of it, it may be said, unless I willed to give it my attention. Be that as it may, the resulting mental state is in no sense identical with that act of willing. There is in my mind an idea of my pen, including various sensory elements that are not in any true sense willed by me. That I
perceive its hardness and blackness may be the result of my deliberate choice, but is in no sense identical with it. Again, attention is not always the result of will in the ordinary sense of the term. Does one will to attend to a toothache? Is his purpose to perceive it, and his consciousness of excruciating pain the result of a desire to make that fact "his fact"? The experience of most sufferers will be of a frantic struggle of the will to divert the attention which cannot be diverted. Every thought may have in it the elements of will, as every act of willing requires thought, but is not the identification of the two one of those instances of a rage for simplicity carried to extreme lengths?

But even if every element of thought were deliberately admitted to consciousness by the definite act of the will, still the will is limited to a choice. If the will could, by a mandate, rigorously exclude the toothaches and other things of like nature of which it did not approve, still, even by our author's confession, it would choose, rather than create, its content. And it would be hard to say how it could choose, except from an unwilled background. Selective attention, be it never so absolute, must always have something to select from.

It is plain, then, that the real either in not what
I now seem to intend, or else that there are a great many things in the world which pose as real, but which are not so. The mystical solution, that these things are illusory, Professor Royce rejects; he admits that at any instant my thought contains many things, which I do not regard as desirable, but which have at least a partial reality. He takes, however, a course not unlike that of the mystic. He says, not that the undesirable things are unreal, but that their undesirability is unreal.

The conflicts of your will with reality result from the fact that your present will is but partial, finite.

Reality, the ultimate reality, is your whole meaning, completely embodied in a life. This your idea really means now, though you do not know it. This you really will now, though you struggle against it. The plain man must be pardoned if he confesses his inability to comprehend how he can have ideas without being conscious of them, and doubts willing anything which he does not yet will. In so far as my desire to win righteousness is partial, it is unconscious, and dependent not upon itself, but upon that which it seeks. I desire to meet that which will complete what I feel to be incomplete, but that complement depends, for everything but its bare outlines, upon a will not my own.
acquiesce in the whole order of things, that it will ac-
-cord with my final will, and hence in the end the actual
will be harmonized with the ideal, may be true; but to
Professor Royce's position there are these objections:
that in no ordinary sense of the words can this be said
to be my will now, nor does any ever think of using the
word real in the sense, not of the present and actual,
but of the future and ideal, of saying that what really
is, is that which is not, but will be. Philosophy, in
explaining ultimate conceptions, must explain those
which run through all science, and all language, and all
life, and not give an explanation of a special vocabula-
ry which applies only to a special sphere of its own.
Men look to philosophy to explain to them terms of their
own using. Professor Royce's explanation of the onto-
logical predicate is useful only in reading his own book,
But even so he has made a tremendous assumption in his
definition in any case. He seems to prove his point,
perhaps, but after all he reasons in the end in a circle.
That being, and therefore ultimate and eternal being,
is that which embodies purpose, he proves from temporal
instances. My ideas are true only as they embody my
purpose. My count of ships is true, to use an illus-
tion of our author's own, if I carry out my purpose to
count the ships. No object is my object except as I will that it shall be my object. From this, by analogy, we arrive at the conclusion, that the ultimate reality is an embodied purpose. But we find facts that contradict the definition of reality in finite instances. Many things that come into my life are not as I will them. The world of reality, for me, is far from according with what I consider now to be my will. Ah, Professor Royce would say, but your completely embodied purpose will be found to include this very thing which now seems to overthrow it. Yet we have constructed our eternal on the basis of our temporal, and if it can be shown, as Professor Royce admits, that our temporal purpose is often thwarted, every reason for thinking that our eternal purpose will meet with a happier fate, dependent thereupon, falls to the ground. The objections which he answers at the close of the lecture on the 4th conception, he answers by means of the very conclusions that those objections go to overthrow. For example, in answer to the objection that the "hard facts" such as pain and death are against the theory, he urges that "in your search for the eternal lies for you the very meaning of death and of finite despair.... the fulfillment of the whole of a purpose may involve the defeat of a part of that very purpose." But this is the very thing
that he wishes to prove. Overlooking such objections as this, he supposes eternal fulfilment of purpose from temporal fulfilment, and then answers objections to his assuming a temporal fulfilment, contrary to the facts, by appealing to eternal fulfilment to complete the facts. He may show that his system, once admitted, is consistent with itself, but he can not prove it by this method.

One summing up which he makes is as follows: "You are not put in the wrong by a reality to which you have made no reference, and error is possible only concerning objects which we actually mean as our objects. The object that is to defeat my partial and fragmentary will is ipso facto my whole will." Now I am not at all sure that I follow this correctly, but the two or three different ways in which it has seemed possible to me to understand it are alike in begging the question. The meaning which seems most probable is this: Nothing can prove my idea to be in error but that which I have chosen as its object. If I am counting stars, nothing can put me in the wrong, and nothing can oppose my will in the matter but those very stars which I have chosen as my object. Hence the result of my counting, though it may be opposed to my will to prove a certain theory, is after all in accord with my whole will,
to ascertain the number of the stars, and not to "violate the rules of the game." But this supposes a willingness to submit to the rules of the game, a willingness which, with most men, merely comes as a result of their appreciation of the hopelessness of trying to do anything else— as a result, that is to say, of their appreciation of the very obstinacy and foreignness of the facts, which Professor Royce denies.

But to my mind the whole method employed in the proof of this theory is radically wrong. In the chapter on Universality and Unity, the author gives an empirical proof, but rather by way of confirmation than as being in itself conclusive. The distinguishing feature of the work is its attempt to construct the universe from an examination of the concept of being. In Professor Royce we have a bolder, subtler Anselm. But the attempt is after all the attempt to get something out of nothing, to pull oneself up by the straps of his boots. The ontological predicate becomes like the conjurer's hat.

We look at it and see that it is empty. Three taps of our philosophers' wand, and behold! from that which before was empty he produces the whole system of free individuals, unified in the Absolute. The novice may not follow the process, but he strongly suspects that the master magician slipped them all in.
DETAILS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE AUTHOR'S THEORY.

INDIVIDUALITY AND FREEDOM. As a libertarian I should naturally look with favor upon Professor Royce's argument, but I confess that while I welcome him as a witness, I do not think that he adds much as an advocate. He declares that Being is deeper than causation, that here and now your individuality in your act is your freedom. But one is inclined to doubt the possibility of anyone's so dismissing the category of causation from his mind. Many men examine it and show that it is due to natural causes, thus explaining it by itself, acknowledging its validity in the very act of denying it. Professor Royce is not so absurd as this, yet he does not I think, extricate himself from the category of causality. "It is this selective character that is responsible above all for the individuality that belongs to all being." Is not this to say that individuality is caused by this fact of selection? Again to speak of meaning and significance is to speak of final, if not of efficient causes. If cause has being and is secondary to being, so too has meaning, and cannot therefore by the same reasoning, afford a basis for being. And in so far as Professor Royce has avoided the causal category he has apparently deprived himself of all possi-
bility of argument. He declares that whatever is unique is not causally explicable, that the individual is never the mere result of law. This the libertarian is delighted to hear, but he looks for proof and he does not find it.

THE CATEGORY OF THE OUGHT. "It is of the essence of the will", says Professor Royce, "to demand its own other... and to define its very life as now in some sense not its own." "My will co-operates in its own compulsion. What we experience is always, in one aspect, our own will to be compelled by the facts." But his is true only in case the will, demanding its own other, meets what it then demands at each successive moment. If I play a game of tennis, I will, indeed, that the ball shall not move from me without my striking. I would not have the striking done without my act. I will that which is not, an other which is not now. But I do not wish the ball to go awry as it often does, I do not wish to miss the stroke as I often do. In those instances it is no part of my will to be controlled by the facts, but an unwilling submission. Our whole attitude toward external fact is often but making the best of a bad matter. That we do so does not make the fact one whit less stubborn and foreign. Our author carries this acquiescence in t
things as they are, still farther. "If such and such acts would more fully express my will, I feel that I ought to do them. My ought is my own will more rationally expressed." This is true only if we will remember that this is not the ought of the moral law, and further that this idea of rational expression implies an external compulsion. In a course of dissipation I ought to be careful of my health, because my will in that course is to obtain pleasure, which I cannot obtain if I am not careful and moderate. "My will more rationally expressed" means, then, my will reduced to consistency with the "stubborn"and"foreign" facts of the world. The moral Ought may say that I should not choose a course of pleasure as my object at all. Still I have done so, and it would then be a great stretching of the meaning of the terms to say that after all the moral ought is but that same will more rationally expressed. It is true that Professor Royce endeavors, in a later lecture, to explain this, by showing that wrong-doing is but the result of inattention; but this, as I shall endeavor to prove in that place, in no way alters the case.

LINKAGE OF FACTS. It is to be noted that in this connection, the forced nature of some of the statements which the theory requires, is plainly seen. The world
if real for me, is part of my life necessarily. The
realist may be allowed to say that that which is not now
thought of is not present to my knowledge; but we have
rejected realism. We are compelled to say, "If nothing
exists independently of anything else... then knowledge
in facing reality at all, faces in some wise the whole
of it at once." But this is simply playing with words.
Doubtless, in the physical world, all things are bound
together, and the buzzing of a fly upon the earth shakes
the uttermost star. But it does not follow that it af-
fects my consciousness in any way. It only does so if it
is very close to me. The vast mass of facts in the
world are only in the most indirect way factors in my
consciousness, and only by the most violent wrestling of
the word can I be said to know them. "Other acts of
knowledge cannot, in their own being, be wholly other
than this one. For if wholly other, they would not be
acts of knowledge at all." "They are not wholly absent
objects. Even now, I, in some sense, mean them all." I
have a watch. If other watches were wholly other, they
would not be watches, so I in some sense own all watch-
es. Still I am no richer on that account.

Our ignorance, we are told, is merely the result of
our inattention. But this is again a mere wrestling of
the terms. Inattention has been said before to be a mere matter of choice. But it is no mere choice that keeps us from knowing the location of hid treasure, or the events of tomorrow. It is here as it was in the beginning; his theory compels our author to stretch knowing and willing until they have a meaning all their own. We are told that we have to presuppose our facts in order to make concrete our purposes, while we can define our facts, if at all, only in terms of our purposes; that this is the fatal circle of our finitude, from which we can escape only by acting more or less blindly, seeking in the process of experience our own purpose, and the means of executing it. Rather this is the fatal circle of Professor Royce's reasoning. We can define our facts only in terms of our purposes, which we do not know until we find our facts. In other words, we purpose what we do not yet purpose, and know what we do not yet know.

THE TEMPORAL AND THE ETERNAL. The answer to such an objection as I have made above is to be found, we are told, in the nature of time. We must take eternity into account. The complement which our finite being seeks, is not merely something beyond the present, but is inclusive of the very process of striving. The self in
its entirety is the whole of the self-representative process, and not the mere last moment of it. Just so far as I am the eternal, or true, individual, I stand in the presence of God, with my life-meaning revealed to him and to me. The finding of the complete expression of my will does not occur as an event in time merely, but as an eternal experience of this my whole striving. Now if it could be proved that at some time I should grasp the whole significance and unity of my life, we might be willing to overlook for the sake of the promise that we shall know, the fact that Professor Royce has assured us that we know our life-meaning in some sense even now. However, until this time, until we shall have our life-meaning fully revealed, we have not yet our "eternal or true" individuality. But we have no promise that this shall ever be. In fact we may gather that it can never be. As a temporal individual I go on forever struggling in my finitude. That process never ends, it has no last moment. As an eternal individual, I should grasp the whole of that temporal life, with its successions, as a unit. But when is that eternal consciousness of mine? If it were the perpetual accompaniment of my temporal consciousness, there might be a place for it—but we know by bitter experience that it is not.
Why, and how can it come in at any particular point of time? Professor Royce nowhere gives us any answer, nor have we any reason to hope that we shall ever be self-conscious, eternal individuals, but rather always temporal Sisyphus, rolling forever the stone of our finitude, while the Absolute sits in calm enjoyment of the eternal and perfect whole our temporal sufferings make up.

THE THEORY OF NATURE. The problem is twofold: (1) How can mind and matter be connected at all? and (2) How can the rational conscious nature of man be evolved from forms which, if they have mentality, have it differently? The theory in question does not meet the first difficulty, and meets the second only to introduce new difficulties. Matter, Professor Royce admits as the common factor in individual experiences. He admits in some sort, then, the living human brain, thrown open to the inspection of two or more persons in an operation. Now here is matter admittedly connected with mind, as much so as is the whole universe in his theory. It has certain sensory qualities, affects the minds of the onlookers in certain ways entirely dissociated from its own peculiar connection with conscious life. Qua sense object, it presents an aspect and fulfils an office quite other than what it does in its capacity as seat of the
mental functions. Here is a fact that Professor Royce's theory does nothing with. Granted all the mind he wants in and under and behind the finite universe, is the mind more intimately connected with the universe than my mind is with my brain? If not, how can it explain the manifold qualities of nature, any more than my mind can explain the effect that the gray matter of my brain, if laid bare, would have upon the eye of an observer?

Again, he removes the difficulties of evolution by supposing other types of finite conscious life, which pass into our own type. He makes great use of the difference of time-span supposedly possible. Now of many changes we are unconscious—some are too swift, some are too slow in happening. But if all these are to be included in minds, there must be a whole succession of such, from a mind to which the vibrations of light-waves are separately perceptible, to those which include aeons as elements of consciousness. And where has he any indication of such consciousnesses? The only finite consciousnesses of which we have any evidence, are human or animal. These are all associated with a brain-structure somewhat like our own. We have no evidence that mentality is associated with matter in any other way. Evolution is not evolution from race mind to individual mind,
mind associated with no brain or with many brains, to
mind associated with a single brain, but from less de-
veloped mind in less developed single brain to greater
development in single mind and brain.

When one takes our author's theory as a whole, it
is seen to be one of magnificent assumptions. If it
follows logically from the 4th conception, it is calcul-
ated to send one back to examine that conception with
doubly critical eye. But I do not see that it does so
follow. Granted that every real being is dependent upon
mind, why need the mind be finite? Cannot the Absolute
include the finite, cannot the reality of the material
world be a reality which it owes to the Absolute, so
that we need not imagine, without a shadow of evidence,
an infinite number of finite minds to do the work? If
we must make inanimate nature conscious in some sense
in order that consciousness may evolve, I confess I
should prefer a theory of the type of Clifford's, which
does not shock common sense quite so much. But why
so limit the power of evolution? Does any scientist as-
cribe to the lower forms of life all the elements of
consciousness that we have? Unless all the lower forms
of life are endowed with the power of sight, light as we
know it did not develop or unfold; but came into being
in the course of "evolution." But if this is true of this and other forms of sensation, one must at least hesitate before declaring that it is impossible that consciousness itself should so come into being. The fact is that evolution consists not of a gradual development, so much, as of a series of steps—chance steps if you will, but still steps—each the introduction of some new thing.

At any rate the problem and the data are too little understood for us to be prepared to adopt so monstrous a tissue of the imagination as this animated nature theory of Professor Royce, a return to the myths of the savages, who missed, like him, the significant point, that nature as a whole does not exhibit the structure with which our alone experience associates consciousness.

THE HUMAN SELF AND ITS PLACE IN BEING.

The ambiguities which Professor Royce discovers in our ordinary speech with regard to the self in no way dispose of the possibility of direct consciousness of the self. The mere fact that its boundaries are uncertain, or that we speak of it in ambiguous terms, does not make the fact of the self ambiguous. I may not have a piece of land accurately surveyed, and yet own it, and know that I own it. Professor Royce declares that a child is conscious of others before he is of himself, that he perceives a mass of ideas and intersets as those
of others, and then a similar mass as his own. But how
does Professor Royce know that the child is conscious of
others as others, before he is of himself? Does not the
alter presuppose the ego, as much as the ego the alter?
That the child is not at once conscious of the ego one
will readily grant, but the moment that he begins to
divide up the world of consciousness, his putting the
not-self on one side implies the self on the other.

But the self when our author finds it at last, is
a very indeterminate thing, including only, with cer-
tainty, this present instant, and the self of that in-
stant having but shadowy outlines. We are told that
there is no rational principle to the usual identifica-
tion of the past and the future with the self, and that
there remains only the persuasion that one ought to pos-
sess or create for himself whereby he should be able,
with a united and permanent meaning, to identify that
part of the world's life which is to be his own. Yet
the fact remains that we do identify past and future
with our present self, and it is the more necessary to
be accounted for. Nor can it be contended that we unify
this larger self by its unity of purpose. I see no such
unity of purpose in myself. There may be such, but it
is not my consciousness of it that makes me associate
myself with my own past. The "intert always to remain another than my fellow, despite my unity with them" already presupposes the self. Again Professor Royce's statement, that I can at no instant say finally that I am, is perhaps necessary for his theory, but is not justified by experience. There is something as the center of my life, which I call "myself". I do not feel that it is incomplete, however varied an experience may still stretch before it. It is true, in a sense, that "in God alone do we fully come to ourselves", but self, in the ordinary sense of a center of consciousness, has a unity and uniqueness that we cannot imagine more complete. The distinction between this and all other centers of consciousness is radically different from the distinction between its present and its past.

The looseness of his boundaries of self, the missing of the very distinguishing feature of it, as an absolutely unique, inviolable theater of consciousness, severed irrevocably from every other, leads Professor Royce into further error. We are told that, "when new expressions of purpose are successful, they so mass themselves as to form new centers of experience." When, how, and why? What endows these successful expressions of purpose with self-determining power? How do they become "conscious purposes, having an inner unity"? But more
is behind. "If they become aware of their own relation to the Absolute..... they then.. define their own lives as individually significant, and conceive their goal as the Absolute." But after all this explains nothing. You have a mass of ideas in the mind, which you call your ideas, but let a certain part of them become conscious of their own unity, and of their relation to the Absolute, and behold, you have a self, whose "I" and "my" mean something other than your "I" and "my". Such a process never takes place in any man's brain as far as I have ever heard, and that it can take place within any finite individuality of a different type is a gratuitous assumption. As an illustration from the individual case, our author says that when once I become aware that my little form of willing is also a hint of an absolute truth, I know myself as in intent this individual in the world. But how did that form of willing become my form of willing? If this is really an illustration of the formation of the self, it amounts to saying that I know myself as an individual, and therefore make myself an individual--another instance of lifting oneself up by the straps of his boots. That which is not, knows itself and immediately is. One cannot help feeling that the conjurer has again slipped something into the hat.
The discussion of the relation of the absolute to the finite will is as little satisfactory as any part of the treatment of this topic. "The divine act whereby God wills your individuality to be what in purpose and meaning it is, is identical with your individual will, and exists not except as thus identical." This reduces God to helplessness, and makes the Absolute a mere congeries of the wills of all individuals. There ceases to be a God in the universe. He is no longer a God of nature, since nature too is made up of conscious individuals, whose wills determine themselves. Any transcendent will relating to these individuals, is expressly denied. All that is left to the Absolute is a number of wills which the Absolute eternal consciousness of an infinite possesses merely as the wills of finite individuals. Better a thousand times our temporal freedom, than this eternal impotence of the Absolute.

THE MORAL ORDER AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. Our author has told us that to seek anything but the Absolute is impossible. He sees that he thereby at once gives ground for the objection that there can then be no true moral order. Sin would be only ignorance, the self seeking the Absolute with imperfect light. "Nay," replies Professor Royce, in effect, "ignorance is sin after all, since to sin is consciously to forget an ought which one
already recognizes. All sin then is sin against the light, by a free choice to be inattentive to the light already seen." But this does not remove the difficulty in the least--only pushes it back one step. It makes the soul which can seek nothing but the Absolute, still able deliberately to reject the knowledge which it possesses of the way to seek the Absolute. To Professor Royce evil is a real, though partial, constituent in a perfect whole. The obvious objection to the whole being perfect when the parts are evil, he answers by telling us that in this whole every evil must be atoned for, if not by the agent responsible for it, then by some other. But can finite beings atone for the evil wrought by finite beings? If I fall short of what I might be, can I ever make up this deficiency, which must always be present in the eternal whole of my life? If another by his own good deeds makes up for my evil ones, would not the world have been better if it had not had those same good deeds with no evil ones to counterbalance them? But if so, the supposedly perfect world might have been better, hence is not perfect. Full atonement by the finite, then, is not possible. Of atonement by the Infinite nothing is said. But to my mind, our author's definition of evil is radically de-
fate. He tells us that an evil, in general, is some
fact that sends us to some other for its justification,
and that this obviously applies to every finite fact,
qua finite. But this is to make evil a matter of degree
only. To me the difference between a good and a bad one,
between a deliberate choice of the right, and a deliberate
choice of the wrong, in so far as they have their
moral character unmixed, is absolute and radical. But
according to Professor Royce our only chance to escape
from evil is to escape from finitude. I have shown that
while he speaks of our eternal consciousness, he leaves
no room for it. It seems to follow that we are hopelessly
and eternally evil. The universe made up of finite
things, must be evil in every part. Ah, but the whole
is good. But what of that if we never have to do with
the whole? We are finite individuals, having to do with
finite individuals, in finite portions of time. God is
good, and can be nothing else, while we are, and can be,
so far as Professor Royce shows, conscious of nothing
but evil. Incidentally, this is a dangerous
dogma. Our best deeds differ from our worst deeds
only in degree. Temporally we are doomed to eternal fin-
itude. Eternally, if we are somehow to get eternal con-
sciousness, we are equally certain of perfection. How
one shall conduct himself
one shall conduct himself at any one moment is of no lasting importance. If on the other hand, as I maintain, the difference between right and wrong is fundamental, Professor Royce's theodicy would be saved, but at the expense of making the Absolute the container of infinite evil.

Professor Royce's theory requires no improvement in the world. The goal is no temporal state, but the sum of the whole, the elements of which in any case, being finite, are evil. We are not moving even toward an infinitely distant perfect state. All that the theory requires is an infinite number of finite elements to make up the perfect whole. Good, bad, and indifferent—first bad and then good, or first good and then bad, all add up together into a perfect whole. Granted progress in the sense that finite goals are always being reached, though there is retrogression as well, that is enough. This is progress by pure addition. Make it infinite, and you get an infinite total. An endless succession of thieves, adulterers and murderers, will in the end give you as perfect a whole as a succession of saints. A sufficient number of burglaries summed up will answer as well as a noble act of self-sacrifice. Our author would doubtless repudiate such a conclusion with great vigor, but to my mind it is to this conclusion that we
are forced, if once we confuse the morally evil with
the purely finite.

CONCLUSION.

While I have devoted my attention, in great measure,
to those things about Professor Royce's theories from
which I dissent, it must be added that in many instan-
ces my objections are rather to his methods than to his
conclusions. Many of the latter I heartily accept, many
more seem unobjectionable, and at least probable, still
others are things which I at least hope. But generally
Professor Royce has not proved these things, not alto-
from his own fault-- for most of them are unprovable.
The great fundamental verities are not matters for
that is to say, proof. The more fundamental they are, the more they af-
flect the very ground upon which we stand, the more im-
possible is it to subject them to logical demonstration.
The history of over two thousand years of philosophy
proves conclusively reason cannot lead to an absolute
conclusion in regard to the concepts upon which it must
base its operations. What philosophy has done is to de-
fine its problems and to suggest possible answers. The
radically opposite conclusions to which philosophers are
still coming show that their solutions depend, and must
always depend upon faith. They belong to that class of things of the truth of which, as we are told, we may be ourselves convinced, but cannot hope to convince others.
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