THE IDEALISM OF KANT

by

CHRIS NICHOLS NATCHEV

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the GRADUATE SCHOOL of the UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

1912.
1. The philosophy of Kant is undoubtedly one of the most stubborn and daring attempts of the human mind to furnish a true account of its own knowledge. This philosophy, both on account of its teachings and through its historical development, has been closely allied to idealism. Fichte, for example, who was Kant's own pupil, in spite of the protests of his master, was the first to turn it into a form of idealism, while men like Paulsen, Royce, and Perry, have classed Kant amongst idealists. And when we add to this Kant's own classification of his philosophy as critical idealism, it would seem that transcendentalism is idealism; were it not, on the one hand, that Herbart and his followers have quite as well given to it a realistic interpretation, while, on the other hand, Kant himself classifies transcendental idealism as coequal with empirical realism or dualism. At the present time, when so many writings, both books and magazine articles, appear which defend or oppose the position that Kant's philosophy is idealistic, it would seem that an attempt on the part of a student of philosophy to investigate for himself this point should be highly profitable. It is with this in mind that we have undertaken the present paper, using Kant's "Critique of Pure
"There ought not to be a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at least has not been furnished."

2. But in dealing with Kant talk of this kind is rather hazardous: for, on the one hand, the limitations of a Master's thesis do not permit of a full treatment, not even of a comprehensive outline of a subject which undertakes to show the points of agreement or disagreement between Kantianism and idealism, even were the mental equipment of the writer adequate to the task; and on the other hand, no one would expect to discover that somebody else had been able to "set Kant right" when so many voluminous works, and his own efforts, have brought forth, and are bringing forth, newer and newer complications inherent in Kant's own thought, thereby adding to the numberless difficulties to be found in the mere study of it. And when we add to the above difficulties also the not less important difficulty arising from the inevitable historic development of human thought, namely, the rather delicate work of interpreting eighteenth century thought and translating it into twentieth

(1) References to the first original edition are designated by the letter A; to the second - B; M stands for the second edition of Müller's translation, which has been the only one used in connection with the present paper, no other being available in this as yet bookless century.
century language, I have no doubt that we must admit that any one fairly started upon a quest like ours needs a great deal of courage and a bit of audacity to get through with the work and then present it for investigation. I have discovered that the peculiarly hopeless bewilderment of the Kantian student, and the painful worry of the devotee are necessary results when attempting to get clear from the maze winding through the pages of the Critique, abounding with frequent unexpected obstructions and closed exits. The present paper, therefore, will not exhaust the subject by a wide margin, and the writer is far from flattering himself that he has arrived at a definite solution of the relation existing between Kant's philosophy and idealism. The writer does, however, insist that what follows is an earnest and careful attempt to present a tentative outline, which according to his insight and investigation, may show the way in which, if followed out in detail, the problem may be solved.

3. We should add here an early remark in regard to the aims and limits of our task. First, this paper is not polemical, that is, we do not propose to take up any single doctrine held by Kant and by proving that it is incompatible with idealism, to disprove Kant's otherwise probable idea-
listic tendency, nor the reverse. Such procedure would
not be fair even with the author of a strictly consistent
and unified system, much less with Kant, who, by any such
method may be proved to be an adherent of many philosophic
systems. Our aim therefore is to go beyond such a mis-
leading method as this, and by presenting the whole of
Kant's philosophy as contained in the _Critique_, to estimate
its various teachings in their relation to his philosophy
as a system, and consequently to arrive at their true value
in deciding the relation of his philosophy to idealism, - a
rather comprehensive task, it is true, but nevertheless a
task which should be performed if we are to arrive at the
best judgment in regard to Kant's views. But, second, we
do not propose to take up all the material which might be
properly treated under the heading of this thesis. We do not,
for example, aim to take up idealism as a doctrine, even in
enumerating its salient points, which when thus outlined,
may serve as reference to our inquiry. As said above, we
shall be concerned with the expansion of the general teach-
ings contained in the _Critique_ as representative of Kant's
philosophy; but even there we do not intend to consider
their historic parentage. Such an inquiry would be undoubt-
edly quite valuable and suggestive, and might help us greatly
in estimating the different threads of Kant's thought, by showing us that many of the contradictions, in fact, that the general confusion of his whole philosophy, arises from his attempt to evolve a philosophy out of English scepticism and German dogmatism - a compound of final empiricism and of complete rationalism, which are two inherently divergent, and most probably incompatible, lines of thought, - a confusion which forces one to agree with E.B. Bax, that Kant's philosophy "refuses to crystalize". But more restrictive than the above are two other limitations of the scope and aim of our task: First is the fact that this paper will not deal even with the mutual incompatibilities of the various doctrines taken up beyond what is necessary to represent them as harmonious or inharmonious with each other in showing their relation to idealism. Neither shall we deal with the validity or invalidity of the arguments concerned, except for an occasional remark, since our aim is not to criticise Kant's views, but only to estimate their bearing upon his classification as an idealist. To be inquiring into his proofs with the purpose of testing their validity would be to judge of Kant as a philosopher, and thereby to pronounce judgment upon the philosophic school to which he, or the particular view examined, may inherently belong. This however is excluded by the nature of our task, which is merely an attempt at classi-
fication, and consequently excludes, save for the mention of them, any efforts towards criticism and the investigation of minute incompatibilities lurking in particular view or arguments, even when these incompatibilities are decidedly apparent and have long since been so proved.

4. One last remark is needful in regard to what undoubtedly is a strong point against the heading of the thesis, namely, the fact that we have limited the investigation of Kant's philosophy to the "Critique of Pure Reason" only. It may be said that the Critique does not contain Kant's whole philosophy, or that it does not represent all the stages of his philosophic metamorphosis, which ought surely to be considered as an important aid toward the solution of our problem. No doubt, both these objections have some weight, and a full treatment should include what we now exclude; but I only care to mention that by omitting them our task is not made impossible and that the heading of the thesis does not become a misnomer. This is proved from the above quoted words of Kant himself, who says of the First Critique that it contains the solution of every metaphysical problem or the road to it, and also from the general consent and practice of philosophic writers to consider the Critique as sufficient for the purposes of estimating Kant's philosophy.
5. A much more pertinent problem which we meet in our work, and which is so closely allied with the First Critique that we cannot avoid it, and according to which we are rather forced to arrange the order of our topics, is the so often mentioned difference between the point of view of the first edition of the Critique as being idealistic, and the second edition as realistic. The divergence of opinion upon the subject is too well known to require any comment here; suffice it to say that even this important controversy will not be in any way independently dealt with, but that it will be taken up only in conjunction with the specific topic where it may exist, and even then we shall consider it only because the said difference between the two editions seems to have made two books of them, rather than one book in two editions.

6. Now it appears to me that we can have no better order of presentation as well as treatment of our subject, then the order which may be given to us by beginning first with an explicit examination of the chief places of the Critique in which Kant himself deals with idealism and the relation of his philosophy to it. Such procedure is also economical, for it affords a ground of limitation by denoting the chief lines of thought running through Kant's own mind when thinking on the subject.
and to which we may conveniently limit our discussion. Furthermore, with Kant this will not be a faulty convenience on account of his very full treatment of any and all topics found in all places of the Critique, even though it may be necessary for him to repeat a great deal of what has been already gone over in former pages.

7. Upon examination of the Critique we find three places in which Kant directly speaks of idealism and in which he discusses the relation of his philosophy to it. One of them, namely, the Sixth Section of the Antinomy is found in both the first (1781) and second (1787) editions of the Critique. A second place is found only in the first edition, namely, the Fourth Paralogism; and the third place, the much debated "Refutation of Idealism", is found only in the second edition. As we said, a separate examination of these places will reveal to us: first, the true contents of our discussion, and second, it will set us right upon the question of a fundamental difference of the two editions relative to our thesis, if first of all there actually exists a real contradiction between the contents of the places changed or left out from the first edition and the substitutes and editions of the second. It should be noticed that in case of a difference, the question as to which edition contains the true view of Kant, shall be an additional topic for our investigation. We shall, therefore, take up now the three places as men-
tioned, making the sixth section of the Antimony, which is found in both first and second editions, as the middle term which should be compared with the other two places, to arrive at a definite solution of their mutual relation.

8. In the sixth section of the Antimony entitled "Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Cosmological Dialectic" Kant sets forth a division of philosophic schools in what he evidently considers to be the only two world theories, namely, transcendental realism, and transcendental idealism, and then classifies empirical idealism as a world view which gets its start from transcendental realism. Transcendental idealism he defines as the doctrine which holds that "all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena" and not things in themselves, and that space and time, like the objects of our experience, "have no independent existence outside our thoughts". Opposed to this is transcendental realism, which holds that space and time and our representations of all the things of our experience are real; while the "long decried empirical idealism" is the doctrine "which while it admits the independent reality of space, denies the existence of extended beings in it, or at all events considers it as doubtful..."(2) "Our own transcendental idealism on

(1) A 491, M 400.
(2) A 491, M 401.
the contrary, allows that the objects of the external intuition may be real, as they are perceived in space and likewise all changes in time, as they are represented by the internal sense." In other words, Kant says that transcendental is the doctrine which holds that the objects of our senses, and the space and time in which they are always to be found, are no more than appearances to us "having no independent existence outside our thoughts" while, nevertheless, they are real for us "as they are perceived." Transcendental realism on the contrary, is the doctrine which teaches that all the objects of our senses, as well as the space and the time in which they appear, are real things independent of our sensibility. Empirical idealism is the doctrine which holds that the things in time are absolutely real only, while, though space itself is real, to things in space it denies reality, or at least doubts that they really exist. Then follows the refutation of the last two theories, which we shall now take up in detail.

9. In regard to the first of Kant's contentions, namely, that what we know is appearance only and not things-in-themselves, he says that "it has been sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic". (1) The Aesthetic forms the first of two parts of Kant's doctrine of the

(1) A 490. M 400.
elements of his system, (1) and consequently its study will have not only a significance as a refutation of transcendental realism, but it will also be an inquiry into one of his most fundamental positions. He says of the aesthetic that it is "the science of all the principles of sensibility a priori". (2) These principles Kant finds by first isolating "sensibility by separating everything which the understanding adds by means of its concepts, so that nothing remains but empirical intuition". Secondly, we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains but pure intuition or the mere form of the phenomena, which is the only thing that sensibility a priori can supply". (3) When all this is done, he says, it is evident that the aesthetic can have no other elements than space and time. (4) It is within space that we represent to ourselves the form, size, and other qualities of external objects, and in which we fix their relative positions, while it is in time that the soul (we ourselves) represents its internal states as related amongst themselves. "Time cannot be perceived externally as little as space can be perceived as something within us."

"What then are space and time? Are they real beings? Or, if not that, are they determinations or relations of

(1) A 15, M 12.
(2) A 21, M 17.
(3) A 22, M 17.
(4) A 41, M 33.
things, but such as would belong to them even if they were not perceived? or lastly, are they determinations and relations which are inherent in the form of intuition only, and therefore in the subjective nature of our mind, without which such predicates as space and time would never be ascribed to anything?"(1)

10. Kant's treatment of space is found in the first section of *Transcendental Aesthetics*. According to him, space evidently has the following characteristics: first: "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience". To know external things space is needed as a concept of the mind under which external things may be subsumed, consequently space precedes our knowledge of them as external, or as Kant says: to have external experience "the representation of space ought already to be here . . ." "This external experience becomes possible only by means of the representations of space." Secondly, "Space is a necessary representation a priori forming the very foundation of all external intuition." For we may well imagine empty space, but it is impossible to imagine objects without their spatial characteristic, consequently, "it is a representation a priori which precedes all external phenomena". Thirdly, which is an explanation of and also an argument for the above two points, (1) A 23; M 18.
and which is left out in the second edition, is the observation that were it not for the priority of space, "the apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles, and the possibility of their construction a priori" would vanish, for then, space being a concept derived from experience will not possess universality and necessity, since "whatever is derived from experience possesses a relative generality only, based on induction," and under such conditions we cannot be sure that the proposition that between two points there can be but one straight line, can be predicted with necessity of every case that may be experienced.

Fourthly, "Space is not a discursive or so called general concept of the relation of things in general, but a pure intuition", for, "space is essentially one", its parts are not antecedent to it, but can be thought as existing within it only. And fifthly, which is differently worded in the second edition, but in both cases serving only as an explanation to the preceding paragraph, - "space is represented as an infinite quantity". For the infinite number of spaces we represent not as making up a concept of infinite space, but as being themselves possible as separate representations of a concept of space already containing the characteristic of infinity, and thus making the separate representations possible as infinite in number.
11. The conclusions from the foregoing observations, says Kant, can be but two, namely, first, "space does not represent any quality of objects by themselves" since, if it were so, it would not be possible for us to separate space from the objects thought of by us as spatial. "For no determination of objects, whether belonging to them absolutely or in relation to others, can enter into our intuition before the actual existence of the objects themselves, that is to say, they can never be intuitions a priori," And secondly, "Space is nothing but the form of all phenomena of the external sense", since the very fact that it is found in the mind previous to our knowledge of things which themselves are thought of as spatial, shows that space has already entered into our knowledge of them.

12. A brief résumé of the above will now be necessary to show us the application of this reasoning to the case of transcendental realism and consequently to empirical idealism. It may be easily perceived that the five points as given by Kant, are really two aspects of one point, namely the subjectivity of space. The whole section aims to prove that space is a (concept) of the mind, and not a property of the objects thought of by us as spatial, neither is it an independently real thing in itself, from which it follows, first, that space is an a priori concept, a pure
intuition, and second, that the objects thought of by us as spatial, are not things in themselves; that is, they are not absolutely real things, but are real as phenomena only. That space is a concept of the mind Kant maintains thus: first, we can not think of objects without thinking of them as being in space; and second, we can think of empty space, while we can not think of non-spatial things. The consequence of this is, according to Kant, that space is a universal condition preceding our experience of things and, if space is not a property of things, because it is a condition preceding their appearance, then space must be a property of the subject which precedes those things as being in space. The latter part of Kant's conclusion is not by him so explicitly stated, neither is it proved by him, but such is the view he has adopted. He nowhere argues that qualities and relations are either objective or subjective and that no third alternative is possible, as for example that a quality or a relation may neither belong to the subject or the object as an inherent quality of either, but that it may be merely a relation between entities, which do not themselves contain it as parts of themselves. It is not our purpose to question here the historic division of all knowledge into subject and object be it in the transcendent
or Kantian view of them, - he has adopted his division not even unaware of a possible third alternative, namely, that space may be considered as a property of ultimate reality either as mind or matter, and not as the property of the humanly known subject or object, as may be seen from his statement, to be quoted later on that "intellectually" subject and object may be one, which however is impossible for human beings either to prove or disprove. So we see that Kant accepts space to be a concept of the mind, as is clearly expressed in the second point of his conclusion(1). And then he maintains that space is not a general concept of the mind derived from experience, because, first, experience itself presupposes it, since the experience itself is made possible by the use of the concept of space which therefore exists prior to the experience, and, secondly, that only so may we understand and explain the universality and necessity of the propositions of geometry, which "have always been in possession of perfect trustworthiness. (2) And this characterization of space is equal to saying that space is a concept a priori. But space being a concept a priori a concept expressing the universal and necessary condition of the mind under which we may know external objects, - it is evident, says Kant, that the objects of our external intuition cannot be things in themselves.(3).

(1) A 26, M 21.
(2) A 4, 149; M. 3, 122.
(3) A 30, M 24.
For, "if we drop the subjective condition under which alone we can gain external intuition, that is, so far as we may be affected by objects, the representation of space means nothing. For this predicate is applied to objects only in so far as they appear to us, and are objects of our senses". (1) Therefore, how can we know things as they are, independently of our senses, when our knowledge of them is made possible by the external sense, the concept of which, space, is itself contained in the mind, while the things of which we think as spatial are contained in that space only? Both transcendental realism, therefore, which holds space and all things to which it belongs as an inseparable condition to be real independently of our subjective conditions, and empirical idealism, which holds that space only is real independently of our minds, are false.

13. As space is the fundamental mark of external objects, so is time, says Kant, the fundamental mark of internal experience - in fact of all knowledge. This he propounds in the second section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Time, just like space, has, according to Kant, certain characteristics, which he sets forth in five observations, as in the case of space, differing however in this that instead of two

(1) A 26; M 21.
conclusions, he now gives us three. He says, first, "Time is not an empirical concept derived from experience, for neither coexistence, nor succession would enter into our perception, if the representation of time was not given a priori". Secondly, "Time is a necessary representation on which all intuition depends". We can have no experience of anything which is not a temporal experience to us, while time may be present in our mind apart from any of those experiences which always follow upon it. Thirdly, it is on account of the a priori of time that experience possesses orderliness and regularity such as is expressed by its necessary and universal laws. Fourthly. "Time is not a discursive, or what is called acquired concept, but a pure form of sensuous intuition." An intuition is that which can be produced by a single object only. Now, time is just such an object, the different times being parts of one and the same time, the single dimension of which is its successiveness, which cannot be known in any other way except by the evidence of experience. And fifthly. Time is conceived of as infinite since we can conceive of any and all definite quantities of time merely as parts of one time, which forms the foundation of them all. Such in brief are the five observations which Kant makes in regard to time, and it may be noticed that they, too, can be divided into two groups, the first three resting upon the a priori of time, and the last two upon the sensuous relation.
14. Then follow the three conclusions, namely, (a) time is not, first, something existing by itself, it would then be something real without itself being a real object, and, second, it is not inherent in things as an objective quality of them, for in that case it could not be antecedent to them as their condition. Time is nothing but a subjective condition existing in the mind a priori. (b) "Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense, that is of our intuition of ourselves, and of our internal state." It can refer neither to the shape, nor position, nor any other property of external phenomena, because its parts are successive, while the parts of external phenomena are simultaneous. (c) "Time is the formal condition, a priori, of external phenomena whatsoever." It is true that space is the particular condition, a priori, of external phenomena, but since external objects themselves are representations belonging to our inner state as determinations of the mind, it follows that they are also conditioned by the form of our internal intuition, or time. And this cannot be said of space which is the condition of external objects only. Or as Kant otherwise states his conclusions in regard to time: "Time is therefore simply a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), but by itself, apart from the subject, nothing. Nevertheless, with respect
to all phenomena, that is, all things which can come within our experience, time is necessarily objective. (1) And the application of this view of time in regard to transcendental realism is, just as in the case of space, that all which is presented to us in time, is itself nothing apart from our consciousness of it, because time itself is simply the form of our internal sense, which from without the mind would be nothing. Our experiences, therefore, are no more than phenomena which can not exist independently of our experience of them, since how could the temporal experiences be known as they are absolutely by themselves, except by the fact that they are parts of our particular way of experiencing everything as determined in time? But time itself is nothing more than a property of our sensibility, possessing reality only under the condition that we are using it, then how can it be possible that the objects to which it is a condition be absolutely real beings? Thus we see that Kant's answer to his three questions in regard to space and time is in favor of the last one of them, namely, that they are merely subjective forms, serving as determinations of objects, but possessing no further objective reality than as conditions under which objects are given to us, the objects themselves being phenomena only, and not things in themselves. (2)

(1) A 35, M 28.
(2) A 149, 267, 509. M 122, 218, 413.
And this was what Kant was expected to prove to sustain his distinction of philosophic doctrines into absolutistic and temporalistic, and also to refute transcendental realism.

15. The second of Kant's conclusions made in the chapter dealing with the solution of cosmological dialectic is that the objects in space and time, though transcendentally not real, are nevertheless real in perception - a contention the first part of which, namely, that which refers to external objects, contains also the refutation of empirical idealism, which "denies or doubts" their real existence although it admits the existence of space as real. Such a view, Kant says, is false, first, on account of the fact that space is not a real thing, which we saw from the first section of the aesthetic, and second, because the objects of external intuition are real "as they are perceived in space, and likewise all changes in time, as they are represented by the internal sense. For as space itself is a form of that intuition which we call external, and as there would be no empirical representation at all, unless there were objects in space, we can and must admit the extended beings in it as real; and the same applies to time". (1) Objects, therefore, according to Kant's

(1) A 492, M 401.
teaching in this place, are real "if they are empirically connected with any real consciousness, although they are not therefore real by themselves, that is, apart from the progress of experience." (1) This contention however, we shall not consider now, nor shall we take up other important teachings contained in it, because, first, they are contained in the Fourth Paralogism, which we shall presently consider, and second, because they need further explanation from the body of the Critique. For the present, all important points of this section, with one exception, may be summarised in the following quotation: "Nothing is really given to us but perception, and the empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions. For by themselves phenomena, as mere representations, are real in perception only, which by itself is nothing but the reality of an empirical representation, that is, phenomenal appearance. To call a phenomena a real being before it is perceived, means either that in the progress of experience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing. For that it existed by itself without any reference to our senses and possible experience might, no doubt, be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We here are speaking, however, of a phenomenon only in space. 

(1) A 493, N 403.
and time, which are not determinations of things by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence, that which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by itself, but consists in representations only, which, unless they are given in us (in perception), exist nowhere." (1) The exception mentioned above is Kant's teaching concerning the transcendental object to "which we may ascribe... the whole extent and connection of all our possible perceptions, and we may say that it is given by itself antecedently to all experience". (2) but this "non-sensuous cause of representation is entirely unknown to us", because it is not an object to us either as a representation in space, or in time. And the same applies to the transcendental subject, because "even the internal sensuous intuition of our mind (as an object of consciousness), which is represented as determined by the succession of different states in time, is not a real self as it exists by itself, or what is called the transcendental subject, but a phenomenon only, given to the sensibility of this to us unknown being". (3) An important point to notice from this sixth section of the Antinomy is that Kant neither upholds nor disavows the existence of ultimate, non-temporal and non-spatial reality.

(1) A 493, M 402.
(2) A 494, M 403.
(3) A 492, M 401.
16. The second place of reference is the Fourth Paralogism of Ideality. (1) Kant says in the criticism of it: "Before I expose the deceptive illusion of our paralogism, let me remark that we must necessarily distinguish two kinds of idealism, the transcendental, and the empirical. Transcendental idealism teaches that all phenomena are representations only, not things by themselves, and that space and time, therefore, are only sensuous forms of our intuition, not determinations given independently by themselves or conditions of objects, as things by themselves. Opposed to this transcendental idealism is a transcendental realism, which considers space and time as something in itself, (independent of our sensibility). Thus the transcendental realist represents all external phenomena (admitting their reality) as things by themselves, existing independently of us and our sensibility, and therefore, existing outside us also, if regarded according to pure concepts of the understanding. It is this transcendental realist who afterwards acts the empirical idealis, and who, after wrongly supposing that the objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and without our senses, yet from this point of view considers

(1) A 366, M 298.
all our sensuous representations insufficient to render certain the reality of their objects.

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, may well be an empirical realist, or, as he is called, a dualist, that is, he may admit the existence of matter, without taking a step beyond mere selfconsciousness, or admitting more than the certainty of representations within me, that is, the cogito, ergo sum. For as he considers matter, and even its internal possibility, as a phenomenon only, which, if separated from our sensibility, is nothing, matter with him is only a class of representations (intuition) which are called external, not as if they referred to objects external by themselves, but because they refer perceptions to space, in which everything is outside everything else, while space itself is inside us. We have declared ourselves from the very beginning in favor of this transcendental idealism."

17. This long quotation contains apparently at least two general statements, first, that there are two kinds of idealism, and second, that one of them is wrong. That such is the general result of its contents is also supported by the fact that Kant started out with the denial of idealism, and less than a page later, we find him offering to the world a new idealistic theory. This necessarily means
also that the refutation it contains does not include the idealism of which Kant is "in favor". The uncertainty of external objects is held to by empirical and not by transcendental idealism, and this is undoubtedly the import of the preparatory remark, i.e. Kant in it aims to show that it is not transcendental but empirical idealism which he refutes. Furthermore, while making this distinction Kant has given us a general outline of transcendental idealism, which we shall here briefly restate that we may compare it with the other two places we are to examine.

18. According to Kant's statements in the Fourth Paralogism, the following is the classification of philosophy in general and the types of idealism in particular. There are two main World-views, transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, the former denies, while the latter accepts, first, "that all phenomena are representations, not things in themselves", and second, "that space and time, therefore, are sensuous forms of our intuition, not determinations given independently by themselves..." Consequently when the transcendental idealist looks upon the world around him he thinks of it as real phenomenally only - this we shall call Kant's doctrine of phenomenalism, while the transcendental realist looks upon it as an aggregation of independent "intellectual" beings as they are by themselves - this we shall call the doctrine things in themselves. We may here
mention a difficulty found in the system of Kant, which will later on become clear, namely, that the greatest, and perhaps the one great obstacle which transcendental idealism has to meet is its helpless inability to explain in any way the mutual relation of these two inherently exclusive yet logically interdependent classes of phenomena and noumena - as they are defined by the very premises upon which transcendental idealism rests. But besides these mutually exclusive world-views, Kant also says that there is an idealism which by accepting the tenets of transcendental realism, and by finding them untenable at least in regard to our external objects, refuses to accept even the empirical reality of the latter, by saying that they are not immediately known as our mental states are. This is the wrong empirical idealism. Expressed in other words, in the criticism of the Fourth Paralogism, Kant is combatting on the one side materialism and naïve realism, and on the other, illusionism, as found in the eighteenth century-neoplatonic speculation.

19. There is, however, a second way in which Kant (though not with evident intention, yet quite definitely,) distinguishes in the Fourth Paralogism, instead of two, three types of idealism. Since this subdivision marks a
transition to the refutation to be later examined, we shall here briefly explicate it. He says later on in the Fourth Paralogism: "there are two kinds of idealists, the dogmatic, who denies the existence of matter, and the sceptical, who doubts it, because he thinks it impossible to prove it." (1) In this case, just as in the former, it will be noticed, Kant does not mention transcendental idealism as one of its types, though not many lines below, he again ends with his own critical idealism. Apparently owing to his own sense of the superiority and distinctiveness of his doctrine over the others he could not consider them as branches of one stem. But in this triple division of idealism, as well as in the general classification and definition of doctrines, it is evident that the Fourth Paralogism has nothing contradictory to the Sixth Section of the Antinomy, but it does closely follow it in all respects. The triple division of idealism given here is a distinction which already lurks in the words "denies or doubts" used in reference to empirical idealism in the Antinomy and the beginning of the Paralogism. It should however be noticed that while the Sixth Section of the Antinomy refutes the idealist who "denies" the existence of external objects, the Fourth

(1) A 377, B 306.
Paralogism refutes only the idealist who "doubts" their existence, which is evident from the express words of Kant to that effect, (1) and also from the use of the word "doubtful" in the conclusion of the thesis of the Fourth Paralogism, a word which in no way expresses denial.

20. In the Fourth Paralogism of Ideality, Kant states the reasoning of the sceptical idealists in the following syllogism:

"That the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a doubtful existence only:--

"All external phenomena are such that their existence cannot be perceived immediately, but that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions:--

"Therefore the existence of all objects of the external senses is doubtful. (2)

It is true, says Kant, that we are immediately certain of that only which is within us, "taking the word in its intellectual meaning", cannot be known with certainty; for being thus separated from myself, and having no other bond of union with me than the fact that it appears to me on the evidence of my thinking self makes me take the effect as an argument for the cause. "An inference, however, from a

(1) A 377, M 306.

(2) A 366, M 298.
given effect to a definite cause is always uncertain because the effect may be due to more than one cause, therefore, in referring a perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful whether the cause be internal or external." Therefore, in that sense sceptical idealism is correct. "It must not be supposed, therefore, that an idealist is he who denies the existence of external objects of the senses; all he does is to deny that it is known by immediate perception, and to infer that we can never become perfectly certain of their reality by an experience whatever." (1) But, Kant argues, this manner of reasoning is incorrect. "For indeed, if we consider external phenomena as representations produced inside us by their objects, as existing as things by themselves outside us, it is difficult to see how their existence could be known otherwise than through a syllogism from effect to cause, where it must always remain doubtful, whether the cause be within or without us." (2) This, however, is not the case here, for even if we admitted the existence of things in themselves, yet they can have no bearing upon the certainty or uncertainty of the objects of our senses, they can only serve as probable explanations of the source of phenomena, remaining themselves utterly unknown to us in so far as their nature as things in themselves is concerned. "Of this, however, we are not speaking at present.

(1) A 368, M 299.
(2) A 372, M 302.
but only of the empirical object, which is called external, if represented in space, and internal, when represented in temporal relation only, both space and time to be met with nowhere except in ourselves." (1) That is to say, in the refutation of sceptical idealism Kant leaves out of consideration the question whether things in themselves be assumed to exist or not - this has been dealt with in the Aesthetic, and the result was that they cannot be objects of our experience, so that any argument based upon the consideration of them, is invalid. What we deal with, says Kant, is not things existing in themselves "apart from us", but phenomena belonging to "outward appearance only". These latter are "empirically external objects", they are "things occurring in space". (2) It becomes apparent, therefore, that the thesis of the Fourth Paralogism rests upon the wrong view of the objects of our experience. Kant then continues the further development of his argument, which is plainly a continuation and an enlargement of the conclusions derived from the Aesthetic. He here seeks to prove, not the phenomenal character of the objects of our senses, but their empirical reality, an argument which was contained in the Sixth Section of the Antimony, but which we left then, and shall consider now.

21. To prove that the objects of the external sense are bits of real everyday life, Kant says "it is sufficient

(1) A 373, M 303.
(2) A 373, M 303.
to consider (1) that external perception proves immediately a reality in space, which space, though itself a mere form of representations, possesses nevertheless objective reality with respect to all external phenomena (which themselves are mere representations only); (2) that without perception, even the creation of fancy and dreams would not be possible, so that our external senses with reference to the data from which experience can spring, must have real objects corresponding to them in space." (1) Kant's main argument to prove his thesis is as follows: "Space itself, it is true," says, he, "with all its phenomena as representations, exists within us only. . . ." Consequently "it is impossible that in that space anything outside us (in a transcendental sense) could be given, because space itself is nothing outside our sensibility... but the real or the material of all objects of intuition is nevertheless given in that space, independent of all fancy and imagination" by perception. (3) For whatever is seen in space, though preceded by space, is not space itself, but something real, the knowledge of which we acquire by our sensibility, of which space is only the form. "It is sensation, therefore, that indicates reality in space...."(4) "For, first, per-

(1) A 377, M 305.
(2) A 375, M 304.
(4) A 373, M 303.
ception is the representation of a reality, while space is the representation of a mere possibility of coexistence. Secondly, this reality is represented before the external sense, that is, in space. Thirdly, space itself is nothing but mere representation, so that nothing in it; or vice versa, whatever is given in it, that is, whatever is represented in it by perception, is also real in it, because if it were not real in it, that is, given immediately by empirical intuition, it could not be created by fancy, the real of intuition being unimaginable a priori." (1) That is to say, the above proof of the empirical reality of phenomena rests upon the following fact, namely, that space is a representation a priori, consequently space represents no ground either for proving or disproving the reality of the objects it contains, because "the real of intuition is unimaginable a priori", but is given "in perception only. (2) And this view, we saw, is the view of the Antimony also.

22. Kant's view of reality is set forth in the second Postulate or the second principle of modality, which states that "what is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real." (3) This special place in regard to reality contains, however, nothing more.

(1) A 375, M 304.
(2) A 376, M 305.
(3) A 218, M 178.
nor different from what is said in the Fourth Paralogism and Antinomy. "A concept, says Kant, is to be considered as empty, and as referring to no object, if the synthesis which it contains does not belong to experience." (1) With regard to reality, it stands to reason that we cannot conceive it in the concrete without the aid of experience; for reality concerns sensation only, as the material of experience. (2) Consequently "the postulate concerning our knowledge of the reality of things, requires perception, therefore sensation and consciousness of it." (3) Wherever, therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to empirical laws, there our knowledge also of the existence of things can reach." (4) That is to say, the reality of all phenomena is immediately proved by the very fact that we experience them. Our a priori concepts, rules and principles, which render experience possible as orderly and interdependent, would themselves be invalid if they were void of their contents which perception gives as the reality displayed by each phenomenon - a real experience. The reality of phenomena, therefore, consists just in this experienced evidence through the sense - impression that they exist, and perception is the only attestation of reality, nay, is reality.

(1) A 225, M 179.
(2) A 223, M 181.
(3) A 225, M 183.
(4) A 226, M 184.
itself, forming the substance of each phenomenon." (1)

23. But it should be also observed that Kant brings forth another argument in the Fourth Paralogism to refute sceptical idealism, an argument which though not explicitly stated, is quite plainly implied. The peculiar importance of this argument, like the additional subdivision of empirical idealism in the latter part of the Paralogism, is that it marks a transition to the refutation of idealism of the second edition. This argument is based upon the admission which idealism makes in regard to our internal experience as being real. Kant says that our external experience is no less real, since in both cases we have an immediate experience of objects as internal or external, which are real not as things in themselves but in perception only, i.e. they are "phenomenally real". "Now we may well admit that something which, taken transcendentally, is outside us, may be the cause of our external intuition, but this can never be the object which we mean by the representations of matter and material things; for these are phenomena only, that is, certain kinds of representations existing always within us, and the reality of which depends on our immediate consciousness, quite as much as the consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcendental..."
object is unknown equally in regard to internal and external intuition." (1)

24. This argument is no more than a restatement and a logical outcome of what Kant has taught in the Aesthetic, in connection with which we shall further elaborate it. We saw there that space and time were the only two forms a priori of sensibility, the former of extended things, and the latter of our mental states. But, says Kant, "all representations, whether they have for their objects external things or not, belong by themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state, and as this inner state falls under the formal conditions of internal intuition, and therefore time, time is a condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever, and is so directly as a condition of internal phenomena (of our mind) and thereby indirectly of external phenomena also." (2) But, continues Kant, this does not exhaust the relation of space and time between themselves, for though all experience is produced in the consciousness of our existence as a temporal experience, and though even the shape, size and all other qualities of objects the parts of which bear the relation of coexistence between each

(1) A 373, M 302.
(2) A 34, M 27.
other, are given to us in a fundamental temporal i.e. successive order, yet the coexistence of the parts of external objects requires something more than time that they may exist as such. What is more, says Kant, even time as an intuition is successive. "because all its relations can be expressed by means of external intuition." (1) As regards the Fourth Paralogism, however, we should only notice that its proof mainly rests upon the identity of space and time as intuitions, within which everything that is given is immediately given in perception in which it is real, while the latter part of the argument, namely that even time itself is dependent upon space in a certain sense, we shall see explicitly treated by Kant in the Refutation again as an argument against sceptical idealism differing in the method of proof only.

25. With this we have arrived at the end of our short examination of the two places of reference which are found in the first edition of the Critique. Before entering upon the examination of the third place, namely, the Refutation of the second edition, it is well to summarize briefly the results obtained thus far, in order that we may compare them with the views of the Refutation. (1) A 34, M 27.
We have defined and distinguished the following themes:
Transcendental realism, which holds that the objects of our knowledge are things by themselves, and transcendental idealism, which holds that they are mere phenomena, existing within consciousness only, in which they are empirically real. From both of these differs empirical idealism, which does not admit the existence of extended beings, either as transcendentally or as empirically real. Empirical idealism is furthermore subdivided into sceptical, which only doubts the existence of external objects, and dogmatic, which denies them. We also saw that all three, namely, transcendental realism and sceptical and dogmatic idealism, Kant refutes. Transcendental realism is refuted in the Aesthetic as being an utterly mistaken view of the world as far as human cognitive faculties are concerned. Dogmatical and sceptical idealism are refuted by showing that the objects of our external sense are real in perception, by which they are immediately given. His whole argument is as follows: Space and time are the sensuous forms, under which, as conditions of our sensibility, all objects are given to us. But space and time being within the mind itself, it is evident that what they contain cannot be outside that mind which contains them, consequently, what we are thinking about when speaking of the objects of our
senses is not something independent of our consciousness as things in themselves, (1) but is phenomenal only as representations of the external sense, in space, and the internal, in time. Space and time, however, being mere concepts, do not give us the objects contained in them, nor are they themselves these objects. They are only representations in which other representations, those of what is real, are given, both kinds of representations depending for their existence as bits of possible experience, upon that peculiar faculty of the soul, called sensibility. (2) It is sense-perception, therefore, which attests the reality of anything and not its forms, space and time, which are themselves real in sense-perception only. The functioning of the soul through sense-perception, therefore, gives us real things in space and time, while it also makes space and time objectively valid by referring them to real things. To this view, however, says Kant, empirical idealism is opposed; for it tells us that as regards external objects, we cannot be even certain of their existence, since they are mediately known through internal intuition. This however is incorrect, says Kant, when we consider that all we know is "all my representations" existing as real in the mind only, and not as things in themselves, and consequently, both ex-

(1) A 27, 28, 45, M 22, 36.
(2) A 19, M 15.
ternal and internal intuition proves the existence of real things in space as it does in time, immediately. Not only are space-representations independent of our internal states, but our internal states themselves depend upon external things for their own existence. This latter thought we saw promulgated in the Aesthetic, and shall now investigate in a place where it is best developed, namely the refutation of idealism of the second edition.

26. The third place of reference where Kant specifically deals with idealism and the relation of his philosophy to it, is the important addition of the second edition, entitled "Refutation of Idealism". This place is most often adduced to show Kant's realistic faith, and even according to some, the utter incompatibility of the two editions. In the classification and definition of philosophic theories, however, there is no divergence in any respect from those previously given; even as to the peculiarities found in the former two places, especially in the Fourth Paralogism, we find Kant unwilling to classify his own idealism with the other idealistic doctrines as one of the types of idealism, just as they are; in fact, here he makes no mention of his own idealism at all. He says: "Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space, without
us, as either doubtful only and not demonstrable, or false and impossible. The former is the problematical idealism of Descartes, who declares one empirical assertion only to be undoubted, namely, that of I am; the latter is the dogmatical idealism of Berkley, who declares space and all things to which it belongs as an inseparable condition, as something impossible in itself, and, therefore, the things in space as mere imaginations

But in all this we may plainly discover that the term material stands for empirical, and that the problematical idealism of Descartes is the sceptical idealism; and the dogmatical idealism of Berkley is the merely dogmatical idealism of the former places. Kant's doctrine of the phenomenality of our world is plainly worked through in the Refutation, while as for the doctrine of the unknowability of things in themselves, we may easily explain its absence, not from the context of the Proof of the Refutation, but because next after the Explanation of the Postulates to which the Refutation is added, follows the chapter containing their special treatment, namely, the chapter on phenomena and noumena. That this is the true explanation will be proved in the sequel.

27. But the identity of the classification and definition of doctrines between the first and second editions is expressly affirmed by Kant himself, who, in a
note to the preface of the second edition very plainly
says: "the only thing which might be called an addition,
though in the method of proof only, is the new refutation
of psychological idealism." (1) Let us notice here that
the problematical idealism of Descartes is here called also
psychological idealism, while in the Fourth Paralogism it
was called sceptical idealism. Bearing in mind that it
is with the soul that the Paralogisms deal, and that
Descartes is there much referred to, the explanation of this
is not hard to find. The Refutation itself expressly states
that it deals with Descartes' 

\[ \text{idealism, and not with Berkeley's,} \]

the foundations of which were removed in the \text{Aesthetic. And}
no doubt Kant's statements as regards the Refutation are
correct, because it is apparent that even the argument of
the Refutation seems to have been developed out of the cri-
ticism of the First Paralogism, while Note II, is a para-
phrase of the Second Paralogism, and Note I of the Fourth.
And here in the Refutation, as elsewhere, Kant still retains
his dislike of Dogmatism, even though it be Berkeleyan idea-

\[ \text{idealism, and retains his good will and patience with the "Scep-
tical" idealism of Descartes, though it seems strange to us to think of Berkeley's idealism as "dogmatic" and the} \]

\[ \text{optimistic philosophy of Descartes as "sceptical", still} \]

more as mere idealistic. (2)

(1) B XXXIX, M 705.
28. We see, therefore, that the Fourth Paralogism, omitted from the second edition, and the Refutation added to it, are identical in their classification and definition of theory, and that they both deal with problematical idealism. There is, however, Kant says, a distinction between the two places as regards the particular points to be proved. This no doubt is so. In the Fourth Paralogism Kant reduces the problem to the statement "that external perception proves immediately something real in space", while in the Refutation he aims "to demonstrate that we may have not only an imagination, but also an experience of external things, and this it seems can hardly be affected in any other way except by proving that even our internal experience, which Descartes considers as doubtful, is possible only under the supposition of external experience". And to this effect he establishes the following theorem to be demonstrated: "The simple, but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence, proves the existence of objects in space outside myself." That such an argument, however, was possible with Kant upon ground contained in the first edition, we made plain by quotations from the Aesthetic as a notion contained even in the Fourth Paralogism. Whether the results of the two methods are congruous, we shall now see.

29. Fearing that the proof of the above theorem may be much curtailed by a paraphrase, I give it here in the
Proof.

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time, and all determination in time presupposes something permanent in the perception. That permanent, however, cannot be an intuition within me, because all the causes which determine my existence, so far as they can be found within me, are representations, and as such require themselves something permanent, different from them in reference to which their change, and therefore my existence in time in which they change, may be determined. The perception of this permanent, therefore is possible only through a thing outside me, and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me, and the determination of my existence in time is, consequently, possible only by the existence of real things, which I perceive outside me. Now, as the consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of that determination of time, it is also necessarily connected with the existence of things outside me, as the condition of the determination of time. In other words, the consciousness of my own existence is, at the same time, an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things." And, Kant adds, "it will have been perceived that in the foregoing proof the trick played by idealism has been
turned against it, and with greater justice." The trick here referred to is the reasoning of sceptics that we cannot have an immediate experience of external objects, since we only know them through our internal states. Kant, has therefore, turned the trick against idealism, by proving that we have an immediate experience of external objects, through which alone our internal states are made possible. That Kant has turned the trick against problematical idealism, there is no doubt. The trick appears to have been turned even against transcendental idealism, if in philosophy words mean what they say in plain talk, unless there be a mistake somewhere. Let us look into this proof.

30. First of all we must notice that this proof is a highly complex syllogism. We need not here however enter upon its analysis. Suffice it to mention that the whole argument is based upon two premises, namely, 1st, that "all determination of time presupposes something permanent", and 2nd, that this permanent is not "a mere representation of a thing outside me." To investigate the agreement or disagreement of the first and second editions, therefore, and to ascertain the true meaning of Kant's conclusion in the Refutation, no doubt we must begin with the specific examination of these two premises, namely, Kant's view in regard to Time and the Permanent. To do this, we shall here set forth his teaching concerning them as found in the
Proof of the Refutation, and then we shall compare it with his view of them as found in the body of the book. Concerning time Kant says in the Proof that, first, man is conscious of his existence as a temporal existence, and second, that such a temporal existence as the human, presupposes something permanent by means of which the various events of his life may be mutually related. Of the permanence, subsisting in this time-duration of one's own consciousness, Kant says, first, that it cannot be a mere representation in the mind of man when he thinks, like any other representations conditioned by time and space as its forms, for then such a permanence would, like any representation, itself require something permanent in regard to which its change, as seen to change in sense-perception, may be determined in time, which time itself determines the existence of the man who perceives the change. And second, as a consequence of the first point, it follows that the perception of the permanent is possible only through the existence of real things "outside" the man, and not through the existence of the representations of real things outside him. What, therefore, is the teaching of the Critique in regard to time and the permanent and how does it relate to the above view of them?

31. The central clue to Kant's notion of the permanent is undoubtedly found in a right understanding of
time as a factor in his philosophy. This is evident not only from what is said concerning it in the Refutation, but also, we shall presently see, and have already seen in part, from the very important role indeed which time plays in Kant's system, serving as a deus ex machina, helping Kant to bridge over the wide, and for the critical philosophy, impassable chasm between the (by origin,) extra-temporal subjective forms a priori, and the empirical appearances, which even by themselves are no less dependent upon some non-empirical manifold of experience, being "given" manifestly from a non-spatial "outside". The study of the concept of time, therefore, presents a very important, fruitful, and far reaching horizon for human thought in general, and particularly for that which is our concern here, namely, the Kantian system. And this importance of time to the critical philosophy, rests no doubt upon the third conclusion found in the Aesthetic in regard to it, namely, that time is "the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever," a notion which underlies the Schematism and the Deduction, and makes the latter possible. It should be remembered, however, that in the investigation of these places to discover Kant's teaching in regard to time our special purpose still continues to be the inquiry into the relation of time to the permanent,
and not time by itself, much less the doctrine of Schematism or that of the Categories with whatever they imply.

32. Before we enter upon the investigation of the chapter of Schematism, where logically next to the Aesthetic Kant develops his doctrine by the aid of time, it is necessary for its better understanding to take into account some of the psychology of Kant, for time and Kant's psychology are very closely related. This latter fact can easily be perceived by a study of the Deduction, where psychology is extensively applied to philosophic ends. To this, however, we shall frequently refer later on; at present, as far as the doctrine of Schematism is concerned, we need only to understand the important distinction of human cognitive faculties into, first, the sensibility, for which space and time are pure sensuous forms a priori, and in which all objects are given to us; and second, the understanding, to which belong those pure concepts with the aid of which we think of the objects of our sensuous intuitions as interrelated in one experience, and without which, therefore, experience is impossible. Otherwise expressed, the sensibility is that function of the mind which deals with direct perceptual experience, while the understanding is the function of the mind which conceptualises these perceptions.
Of the specific denotations of the empirical and a priori elements of experience we shall later on extensively treat. Here it should be merely noticed that the pure forms of the understanding; or the categories, are, according to Kant, of a nonsensuous origin altogether, while the objects which serve as the particular field of their application, are sensuous in origin. They are, therefore of an entirely heterogeneous character among themselves, and, asks Kant, "How then can the latter be comprehended under the former, or how can the categories be applied to phenomena, as no one is likely to say that causality, for instance, could be seen through the senses, and was contained in the phenomena?" And the answer is easy. "In our case there must be some third thing homogeneous on the one side with the category, and on the other with the phenomenon, to render the application of the former to the latter possible...for this is the only meaning of the expression that an object is comprehended under a concept." And this third thing, homogeneous with both object and category, is, according to Kant, time. "We shall call this formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the concept of the understanding is restricted in its application, its schema; and the function of the understanding under those schemata, the schematism of pure understanding." This therefore is Kant's doctrine of Schematism,
which we shall now briefly investigate, - a doctrine which, in spite of its great importance, has received but scant attention at the hands of Kant; it occupies only eight of the many pages of the Critique, and we find no emphasis laid upon it anywhere; but most significant of all is the fact that Kant dismisses much of the explanations necessarily needed for its full treatment, as a "dry and tedious determination", which however, is to be explained rather by the fact that Kant himself recognizes the Schematism to be "an art hidden in the depth of the human soul, the true secrets of which we shall hardly ever be able to guess and reveal." (1)

33. If we look deeper into the antique language of Kant in the meaning he attaches to the word schema, we shall find that the schema is not what we now call a composite image. Kant distinguishes between an image and a schema by bringing forth an example of five dots, which through sense-impression are an image to us, and of number in general, which cannot be sensed. The concrete difference which he makes between them consists in this, that the image cannot be universally applied, say the image of a spotted dog, while the schema can be so applied, as the term dog in general. The schema, according to Kant, is "rather the representation of a method of representing in one image" anything

(1) A 141, 278; M 116, 226.
"according to a concept, than the image itself." It is "a rule according to which my imagination can always draw a general outline" say "of a four-footed animal, without being restricted to any particular figure supplied by experience, or to any possible image which I may draw in the concrete." Now all this is quite analogous to our notion of a composite image, but when we think that the schema is time in general as filled, as empty, as related, - when we think of how it bears a relation to objects, it at once becomes clear that while a composite image is a thing derived from a repeated experience of identical objects, Kant's schemata are rules a priori, i.e. concepts underived from experience, according to which the objects themselves are being produced. The former presupposes sense-impressions; the latter are presupposed by them. How, therefore, can time, as being at the bottom of the schematism, point to something permanent in the perception upon which our temporal experience, i.e. the experience of concrete images, depends."

34. To answer this, we should understand that besides the notion of time, as underlying all perceptual experience, Kant also joins another notion with it, namely, that the comprehension of all objects, and in fact, the production of all experience and knowledge is a continuous flow of indefinite sensuous parts, inevitably measured by lesser or greater quantities of time, such as may be necessary for
their production as perception to us. Now this latter notion underlies all Kant's thinking and is most clearly expressed in three important places of the *Critique*. First in the Deduction, which according to Kant has explained "that the only way in which objects can be given to us, consists in a modification of our sensibility", (1) which modification is stated in the first preliminary note as an observable fact of introspection that "our representations...as modifications of the mind, they must always belong to the internal sense, and all our knowledge must therefore finally be subject to the formal condition of that internal sense, namely, time, in which they are all arranged, joined, and brought into certain relations to each other." And "the formal condition of that internal sense" is declared to consist in this that "every representation contains something manifold, which could not be represented as such, unless the mind distinguished the time in the succession of one impression after another; for as contained in one moment, each representation can never be anything but absolute unity...it is necessary first, to run through the manifold and then to hold it together. It is this act which I call the synthesis of apprehension." (2) This same notion is expressed in the second place, in the Axioms of

(1) A 189, M 114.
(2) A 99, M 82.
Intuition, where the very definition of quantity contains it as the ground upon which the definition obtains its validity; Kant says "I call extensive quantity that, in which the representation of the whole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts, and therefore necessarily preceding it". And the third place where this same notion is expressed, is the Anticipation of Perception, where the change of the internal constitution of things as regards their "intensity", is declared to be observable again as a "continuous connection" in time, as perceived by their parts following one upon another. "All phenomena are, therefore, are continuous quantities, whether according to their intuition as extensive, or according to mere perception (sensation and therefore reality) as intensive quantities." He then goes on to state that even when aggregates are perceived, as thirteen silver coins, for example, "they, too, being based on the numbering of them, are as unity, a quantum, and as such, a continuum", since "every number must be founded on some unity." (1) And now, since, first, the schema is "nothing but the pure synthesis determined by a rule of unity, according to concepts, a synthesis as expressed by the category, and represents a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense in general, under the condition of its form (time), with reference to all representations, so far as they are meant to be joined a priori in one concept, according
to the unity of apperception" - a thing to be dealt with in detail later on; and, since second, "Time is only the form of intuition, that is of objects as phenomena", which was the task of the *Aesthetic* to prove, it follows that "that which in the phenomenon corresponds to sensation, constitutes the transcendental matter of all objects, as things in themselves (reality, sach heit)". And no doubt this was just what the proof of the *Refutation* is based upon, when it says "I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time, and all my determination in time presupposes something permanent in the perception." But what may this permanent, which is presupposed by time, be, when we have seen that according to Kant's own elements of transcendentalism, of things in themselves we can know nothing, and that the reality of the objects of our senses is a reality in perception only, i.e. in space and time as the conditions under which objects may be given to us?

35. The answer to this question may be traced in the chapter on Schematism, in embryo, so to say. Kant says: "The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of it as a substratum for the empirical determination of time in general, which therefore remains while everything else changes. (It is not time that passes, but the existence of the changeable passes in
time. What corresponds therefore in the phenomena to time, which in itself is unchangeable and permanent, is the unchangeable in existence, that is, substance; and it is only in it that the succession and the coexistence of phenomena can be determined according to time." (1) The proof of the Refutation is clearly outlined here: time presupposes something permanent in reference to which the change of things may be determined in time, and this permanent is substance. What may that substance be however? Is the nature of the mind to serve as that permanent, or is it something different from it, existing independently, "outside of us"? It is evident from the schematism, as it was evident from Kant's notion of the real in perception, that the permanent, like the real, cannot be discovered by our concepts a priori. He says "And in truth we must allow to these pure concepts of the understanding, apart from all sensuous conditions, a certain significance, though a logical one only, with regard to the mere unity of representations produced by them, although these representations have no object and therefore no meaning that could give us a concept of an object. Thus substance; if we leave out the sensuous condition of permanence, would mean nothing but a something that may be conceived as a subject, without being the predicate.

(1) A 144, M 117.
of anything else." (1) But permanence being a sensuous condition" of substance, is it like reality "in the pure concept of the understanding, that which corresponds to a sensation in general," (2) or is it the permanent reality itself as all indications seem to show? But then also, the question is, what are the predicates of that reality or permanence which is evidently given in time, - predicates in sensibility of which Kant says that it "realizes the understanding by at the same time limiting it;" (3) and which without it would be nothing but merely concepts of something without "being the predicate of anything else?"

36. The answer to the question as to what the permanent may be is variously given by Kant in different places of the Critique of which we shall here examine the most important, namely, first, the permanent as self-consciousness, especially developed in the deduction of the first critique; second, the permanent as indefinite substance, of which we just now had an inkling, and which is further developed in the three analogies; and, third, the contrast which Kant makes between the stability of space-perception and flux of time. Now, are all these various independent permanents with Kant, or are they explainable by some single principle?

37. There are many places in the Critique where it is more than evident that Kant intends to derive the possibility

(1) A 147, M 120.
(2) A 143, M 117.
(3) A 147, M 120.
of experience through the "permanent unity of self-consciousness."

(1) He says: "It is clear also that, as we can also deal with the manifold in our representations, and as the corresponding to them (the object), since it is to be something different from all our representations, is really nothing to us, it is clear, I say, that the unity necessitated by the object, can not be anything but the formal unity of our consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in our representations." (2)

To get a proper view of the contents of this quite inclusive statement, we should notice that it is the conclusion of a series of reasonings which may be stated as follows: All our knowledge consists of representations, in which we can deal with what is manifold in them; the object which we think of as standing behind the representations and as different from them, is nothing to us, because it can not be comprehended under the sensuous conditions of our intuition so as to be known by us; therefore the unity obtaining in almost all the representations of our knowledge, is due to the peculiar power of self-consciousness to collect and connect all these representations in one inclusive representation. Looking now upon this analysis of the quotation, we are no doubt struck by the close likeness between the "something different from all our representations" which "is really nothing to us", and the statement concerning substance (and all the categories) that they become empty subjects without any -


(2) A 105, M 87.
icates except the predicate that they are, when all sensuous conditions are taken from them. This is a notion quite similar to the notion of the permanent in the Refutation. But the permanent there is declared to be "outside" us, while we here find Kant establishing a permanent unity through self-consciousness, which is a notion decidedly contrary to the indications of the Refutation. To settle this contradiction we shall now look into Kant's teaching concerning the manifold, the object (in parenthesis) and of self-consciousness, or better, merely consciousness.

38. Undoubtedly our great concern here in regard to the Manifold. Its importance will become clear as we now proceed to investigate its meaning and function. On the first hand, we could state that with Kant it is a vain task to try to find any specific treatment of the manifold, as of many of his important notions. By all indications the manifold seems to be a term used to designate a certain element of knowledge which appears to be psychologically necessary to explain the possibility of knowledge itself. That this is so the first pages of the Transcendental Aesthetic (1) show. Kant says there "whatever the process and the means may be by which knowledge reaches its objects", it is perception that reaches them directly and that only "through a certain affection of mind." This is called sensation, and the faculty of

(1) A 19, 20; M 15, 16.
receiving objects through affection is the sensibility, which produces phenomena only. Now each phenomenon, according to Kant, possesses, first, matter, which corresponds to sensation, and, second, form "which causes the manifold matter to be perceived as arranged." As we said, Kant's distinction of all knowledge into a posteriori and a priori will be fully treated later on in connection with his idealism; at present we need to notice from the above that the manifold is on the side of the sensibility, and therefore should be classed with the real and apparently with the permanent, as "inimaginable a priori". Keeping this distinction in view, namely that the manifold is that which corresponds to sensation, as the real does, it should also be noticed that it is not any of the sensuous forms, i.e. space and time, which are also real in sense-perception but are on the subject-side, and not on the object-side, though every object given in intuition is necessarily contained within them.

39. This view of the manifold is further elucidated from passages found in the Deduction. He says when considering the distinction between general and transcendental logic, that the latter has just this quality not possessed by the former, namely, that it "has before it the manifold contents of sensibility a priori, supplied by transcendental Aesthetic as the material for the concepts of the pure understanding,
without which those concepts would be without any contents, therefore entirely empty." (1) He then tells us that these "manifold contents of sensibility a priori" are neither space nor time, since "they belong also to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind under which alone it can receive representations of objects" though he first states that they "contain what is manifold in the pure intuition a priori". This notion of the manifold however, receives its full significance only when it is joined with the formerly mentioned teaching of Kant, that the sensation as well as the apprehension of things is a sort of a flow in time, where the mind goes over piece by piece what is given to it in sensibility and thus collects and arranges the flowing sensations into representations. "The spontaneity of our thought requires that what is manifold in the pure intuition, should first be in a certain way examined, received, and connected, in order to produce a knowledge of it. This act I call synthesis". (2) But it becomes apparent that thus far in our investigation of the manifold, we discover no other quality as belonging to it, except that it is evidently a psychological necessity to explain the possibility of our experience and of our knowledge of objects, by first postulating a something as manifold, which is then dealt

(1) A 77, M 64.
(2) A 77, M 64.
manent unity of self-consciousness.

40. The second thing we were to consider in connection with the permanent unity of self-consciousness, was Kant's statement that such a permanent unity, except on account of the inability of the manifold to explain the possibility of the permanent and unitary knowledge which we possess without consciousness, is due also to the fact that permanence and unity of knowledge cannot be explained by the notion of an object which is "something different from all our representation", for it then is really nothing to us. The statement concerning this "object" is much like what was said of the "permanent" of the Refutation, except that here Kant also adds that it is really nothing to us. Now, is there a contradiction between the two notions, or can this "object" elucidate "the permanent" of the Refutation? Kant says: "And here we must needs arrive at a clear understanding of what we mean by an object of representations. We said before that phenomena are nothing but sensuous representations, which therefore by themselves must not be taken outside our faculty of representations. What then do we mean if we speak of an object corresponding to, and therefore also different from our knowledge? It is easy to see that such an object can only be conceived as something in general- X: because, besides our knowledge, we have absolutely nothing which we could put down as corresponding to that knowledge." 

(1) \(A\) 104, \(M\) 86.
And this is a necessary result of the elements of transcendentalism as given in the *Aesthetic*: we deal only with the manifold in phenomena, and what the object as a distinct reality behind these phenomena as the cause of them may be, is "really nothing to us" for we cannot know it except as, perhaps, a postulate, an hypothesis, by which the production of knowledge may be explained, but which evidently is devoid of any empirical reality for us. The unity of knowledge, therefore, being an empirically observable fact, needs some empirical function to explain it, and this is the function of the Ego, or self-consciousness, which Kant calls its synthetic activity.

41. It should be noticed, however, that the object behind the phenomena is not the same as the object of our senses, or phenomena in themselves, and in this respect it undoubtedly is the thing which the permanent purports to be, namely, a thing which itself is not a representation. Phenomena or representations, are mental facts, produced in space and time as their sensuous conditions, and of them Kant says that they are real in perception. They are not postulates or hypotheses, but real perceptual data, as we shall later see in greater detail. Here Kant speaks of an object of a non-sensuous nature, which nevertheless refers to the sensibility only like manifold matter *a priori*, and
which does not contradict "the permanent" of the Refutation, except that the latter appears to be also "real in perception" like the objects of our sensuous conditions. The object in the first sense therefore agrees with the "permanent" of the Refutation as being the thing behind appearances, while the objects of our knowledge agree with the "real things, which I perceive outside me", of the Refutation. Are therefore these two notions in any way explainable, when apparently as they now stand, they are incongruous between themselves in relation to Kant's philosophy? It is evident, however, that it is in respect to the non-sensuous "something" behind phenomena, which is "nothing" to us, that Kant bases his argument for the permanent unity of self-consciousness. Let us, therefore, look into this notion for further elucidation.

42. The cognitive aspect of our consciousness Kant holds to be a continuous process of unification, in which three distinct types are present, namely, apprehension, as sense-perception in time; reproduction as association in imagination; and recognition of past and present experiences as belonging to one experience through apperception. Apprehension (1) is the synthesis of the manifold in space and time, a notion with which we are now familiar. It is a process which presupposes the succession (2) of parts in

(1) A 97, 99, 167; M 81, 82, 137.
(2) A 182, 189, 198, 201; M 143, 155, 161, 164.
time as different sensations coming into existence through the "affection" of our senses. But, says Kant, evidently, since the manifold which affects the senses is itself nothing more to us than a postulate to explain the possibility of the things which appear in the sensibility, and since of the objects we know nothing more than what we think of as our knowledge of them (notions which we have just investigated) "it is clear", says he, "that it cannot be sensation again the rough, which sensations are arranged and placed in certain forms." (1) This he says, can be done only through that active principle, upon which sensation itself depends, namely, through consciousness and its synthetic activity, (2) which is always successive. (3) And this is the figurative synthesis of the second edition. To cognize objects, therefore, says Kant, two things are necessary, first, matter, corresponding to the sensation which is given in intuition only, and second, form, which is given a priori. Both when connected through synthesis produce knowledge of objects.

43. But were objects left to themselves by merely being produced, they would exist in a disjointed, separate and absolutely independent agglomeration, which no doubt,

(1) A 20, M 16.
(2) A 77, M 64.
(3) A 198, 201; M 161, 164.
cannot make a unitary process such as is recognized in our
experience of them. A second step is therefore necessary,
namely, reproduction, which unifies them under one experi-
ence according to a single principle, (1) by its empirical
laws of sequence and concomitancy. But even "the series
of representations" thus produced, says Kant, would make
no experience possible, were they left to themselves, for
objects, and events are not sufficient by themselves to
account for the unity existing between the experiences we
have of them, except by postulating that there also exists
a third and last subjective process, i.e. a certain conscious
effort to unite them together under one experience and one
principle; this is the principle of the recognition of these
various experiences as mine through the concepts of the pure
apperception, or self-consciousness, - "that original apper-
ception in which everything must be necessarily subject to
the conditions of the permanent unity of self-consciousness,
that is, must submit to the general functions of that syn-
thesis according to concepts, by which alone our perception
can prove its permanent and necessary identity a priori."

44. Now, it is not our purpose here to inquire into
Kant's notion of self-consciousness beyond what is necessary
for our inquiry into his notion of the permanent. But this
inquiry forces us here to make hurriedly a broad distinction
(1) A 97, 100; M 81, 83, etc.
within the Ego, or self-consciousness, as conceived by Kant, in order that we may clearly understand the nature of its permanence. And to do this we shall endeavor to obtain Kant's answer to the following two questions in regard to the Ego, namely, (a) is the Ego an empirical representation, a reality in perception, as all objects are, or (b) is it a metaphysical reality such as "the permanent" of the Refutation purport to be?

45. Kant's view of self-consciousness (1) is no doubt due to his attempt to solve the incongruity between temporality and predeterminism which, we shall later see, are so closely allied with transcendentalism. For according as we think of the function of the mind either in the act of experience itself, or as an independent synthetic activity without the aid of experience, he distinguishes two aspects of it, the empirical and the transcendental. To the first corresponds empirical, to the latter transcendental consciousness. Empirical consciousness consists entirely of discrete perceptual experiences, from sensations and feelings. This consciousness, or Ego, is passive, incoherent, the parts of which have no necessary relation to past and present, and much less of a necessary prediction in the future; its whole function consists merely in actualising the flowing stream of sensation into representations, by taking care of the reality that affects it from without, and then in moulding it through the

(1) Deduction of A.
the pure form of sensibility, namely, space and time, and this
we saw the mind does by going over the manifold part by part,
item by item in temporal succession. This consciousness can
be conscious of no more than its immediate existence through
sense-perception only, and cannot be a thinking consciousness,
nor a remembering and a controlling center; for it lacks the
necessary and universal rules and laws of the transcendental
Ego, which turns the unity of the material given and contained
by the empirical Ego, into an experience of constant relations.
This latter is the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception,—
undoubtedly Kant's favorite child.

The transcendental ego has two aspects; first comes the
active, a priori, original, etc. Ego, the fundamental intuition
of which is the "I think"; and the other is that unknown entity,
or whatever it may be which is conceived as existing by itself,
called the highest or noumenal Ego, which has no predicates,
but consists in the bare notion that "I am." In this division,
the former aspect corresponds to what we shall latter see to
be the a priori factor in our experience, found by the postulating
of it as being necessary for the possibility of experience
under necessary and universal conditions, such as empirical
consciousness cannot supply; and the latter aspect corresponds
to what we shall later see, and have thus far designated by
the notion of the thing in itself, as actually existing apart
from our consciousness of it. We have seen that the question how the empirical and the first aspect of the transcendental Ego can get into relation with each other, Kant answered by his doctrine of Schematism, where time, as sensuous and also as a priori, served as the connection between them, and where consequently only such items of knowledge can be valid as are really connected by an empirical consciousness; the concepts a priori had only an empirical use with us, and the objects produced according to those concepts, to be real, should be empirically given. But how does Kant explain the connection between the two aspects of the transcendental Ego? We shall later see that Kant's explanation amounts to a positive ignorance on the part of human beings concerning it. Our present aim shall be to show that the transcendental Ego for human beings has a relation in its first aspect, not as a reality, but as a concept a priori, under which aspect permanence may be predicated of it only as one of its sensuous conditions.

When we considered the fourth Paralogism, we saw that Kant teaches there that our internal states, as well as our external perceptions, are all, as representations, immediately known and real on the evidence of their presence in our consciousness. This is what he called his doctrine of transcendental idealism, which we saw was likewise based upon his Aesthetic, and developed in the Antinomy. Following that conception we should admit that the permanent unity of self-consciousness is
not one of those things immediately present in consciousness, it is not therefore empirical consciousness; and if we prove that it is not a reality in the sense of a noumenon, then since it is not the first aspect of the transcendental Ego, evidently the only thing which remains for it to be is concept a priori, a necessary postulate adapted to explain all concrete cases of experience, where a permanent is needed to explain the possibility of experience. The answer to these queries is best found by a brief investigation of the first three Paralogisms, dealing with the substantiality, simplicity and identity of the soul.

In the First Paralogism the soul, according to Kant, may be called a substance logically only, for the category of substance, like all categories, possesses in itself "no objective meaning unless they rest on some intuition, and are applied to the manifold of such intuitions as functions of the synthetical unity. Without this they are merely functions without contents." And this is the same thought which we met at the end of the Schematism, and which we have just seen to be contained in the Deduction. It is true, Kant says, that all our thoughts are determinations of the I looked upon by us as the subject of thinking, but this is no evidence for its being absolute substance, because it is merely a relation between our thoughts and the I which the concept of substance
designates; and we have not the slightest sense impression by which the I may be distinguished from the objects of our sense-impressions. "Hence it follows that--- reason imposes upon us an apparent knowledge only by representing the constant logical subject of thought as the knowledge of the real subject in which that knowledge inheres. Of that subject, however, we have not, and cannot have the slightest knowledge, because, consciousness is alone that which changes representations into thought." That is, concepts are not sufficient signs of their reality outside their sensuous predicates and determinations. We may well think of substance as the permanent in relation to which the changeable comes and goes, but that makes it no nearer to prove, since we have not experienced it." It therefore signifies a substance in the idea only and not in reality." The permanent, taken as being self-consciousness, therefore, is not an absolutely real thing, and not a real thing in perception, but is here declared to be merely the logical subject of a certain function or necessity which exists when we attempt to explain the possibility of experience, -a thought which is likewise attested by the two distinct arguments of the Second Paralogism, the consideration of which we shall here omit as of comparatively little importance to us.

It undoubtedly is the third Paralogism which throws most light upon the kind of permanent the soul is. Kant says
that just as we observe in time the change of the determinations of external objects, in reference to the whole object, as the subject of change, so do we, being ourselves objects of the internal sense, refer the change of our own states to ourselves as the subject of the changes. But as in the object, so also here, this is done only in so far as we are conditioned by our sense-impressions of ourselves as changing in time. "And from this point of view the personality of the soul should not even be considered as inferred, but as an entirely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time--", the unity of time being in both external and internal objects the ground for the admission of the permanent unity of the whole object, For "if I consider myself from the point of view of another person (as an object of his external intuition)" "though he admits the I which at all times accompanies all representations in my consciousness, and with entire identity, he will not yet infer the objective permanence of myself," because the time of his sensibility in which he observes me is not the same time as that of my sensibility through which I think of myself as objectively permanent. "The identity of my consciousness at different times is therefore a formal condition only of my thoughts and their coherence, and proves in no way the numerical identity of my subject, in which in spite of the logical identity of the I such a change may have
passed as to make it impossible to retain its identity." The proposition therefore that everything is in a flux cannot be refuted by the permanent unity of self-consciousness; "for we ourselves cannot judge from our own consciousness whether, as souls, we are permanent or not---" It remains, therefore, after these explanations of Kant, to accept the only alternative left, namely, that the permanent, if it is to be self-consciousness, is only a concept a priori, a postulate used to explain the possibility of experience as a constant whole, and possessing a logical significance only.

The second of Kant's permanents met in the Schematism, together with the permanent Ego, or pure apperception, is substance. We quoted there Kant as saying "The Schema of Substance is the permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of it as a substratum for the empirical determination of time in general, which therefore remains while everything else changes---". We saw likewise that time itself was not that permanent, or substance, but that it presupposes it as the subject in relation to which the change, the flow in time, may be determined. This notion may best be understood by an examination of the three Analogies, especially the first of them entitled the Principle of Permanence or, as amended in the second edition, Principle of the Permanence of Substance. Kant's aim here is to show that in all phenomena, there is always a sub-
stratum, i.e., substance, in regard to which their change may be determined, and that what changes is only the mode i.e., the determinations of substance in time, and not substance itself, the quantum of which is neither increased nor diminished in nature. There is no doubt a great similarity in the aim as well as proof of the Refutation, and the thesis and argument of the First Analogy. As Kant does in the Refutation prove, first, that time presupposes something permanent, so does he here begin first with the same notion. He says: "Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive, and therefore always changing. By it alone, therefore, we can never determine whether the manifold, as an object of experience, is coexistent or successive, unless there is something in it which exists always, that is something constant and permanent, while change and succession are nothing but so many kinds (modi) of time in which the permanent exists... So that the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself, and in it alone all determination of time is possible." Time itself cannot be their permanent, because "in it no parts can be coexistent but successive only", and because "if we were to ascribe a succession to time itself, it would be necessary to admit another time in which such succession should be possible." Time is a concept a priori devoid of any perceptual reality save for its use in perception itself as one
of its functions. Neither "does existence in different parts of a series of time assume a quantity which we call duration, for in mere succession existence always comes and goes", but does not abide. All this is possible only through the "permanent in phenomena that forms the substratum for all determination of time, and at the same time the condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is of experience...". And this proposition, says Kant, is valid only in reference to possible experience, and could therefore be proved only by a deduction of the possibility of experience", and not dogmatically, by mere assertion, or by concepts analytically, for then it will be a tautological proposition, as it had been until Kant had discovered the principle of the Possibility of Experience, to which we shall later refer. It is of importance for us now to notice, that this proposition, according to Kant, "refers to a synthetical proposition a priori", which means that this principle of permanence, which is based upon the assumption of the existence of something permanent behind what for us really exist, i.e. phenomena, applies only to real existences of the latter kind, and not to things as they are independently of our consciousness. This principle designates merely "the manner in which we represent the existence of things (as phenomenal)" and not
as related among themselves as things by themselves. Were it a principle applied to things of the latter kind, it would admit that things new in substance may arise and perish, which will annihilate the very identity of the substratum of all phenomena that exist in the unity of time. "Substances therefore (as phenomena) are the true substrate of all determinations of time" while permanence "is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things or objects, can be determined in a possible experience. What the empirical criterion of this necessary permanence, or the substantiality of phenomena, may be, we shall have to explain in the sequel". (1) 

This explanation is found in the latter part of the Second Analogy, which deals with the Principle of Causality and which aims to establish that "It is of course in phenomena only that we can know empirically this continuity in the coherence of times": the continuity involving, namely, that as time is one and continuous in which "a preceding necessarily determines a succeeding time, it is also an indispensable law of empirical representation of the series of time that the phenomena of past time determine every existence in succeeding times... The succession in time is therefore the only empirical criterion of an effect with regard to the... "

(1) A 199, M 163.
cause which precedes it." (1) The reference of the First Analogy, however, was to the empirical criterion of a substance; this, Kant says, he cannot pass unconsidered here, (2) however this he does "not so much through the permanence of phenomena as through action." But of action as the empirical criterion of substance he says: "Action itself implies relation of the subject of the causality to the effect. As all effects consist in that which happens, that is, in the changeable indicating time in succession, the last subject of it is the permanent as the substratum of all that changes, that is substance." Substance, however, cannot change, for were it also possible to change, then another time and another subject would be necessary, according to the principle of causality, with reference to which it may change. This substance, however, is not a thing in itself, but only points "in the end to empirical necessity and permanence in existence, that is, the concept of a substance as phenomenon." (3)

The Third Analogy speaks of the permanent as substance in the same terms as the first and second, of which it is only a logical outcome. Kant says: "If we suppose it possible that in a number of substances, as phenomena, each were perfectly isolated, so that none influenced another or received influences from another, then the coexistence of them would —

(1) A 203, M 156.
(2) A 204, B 24. M 167, 753.
(3) A 212, M 173.
never become an object of possible perception, nor could the existence of the ones through any process of empirical synthesis lead us on to the existence of another." Therefore it becomes necessary from the point of view of coexistence also to admit that all phenomena should stand in reciprocal determination one to another, according to the law of causality, which is itself made possible on account of the necessary principle of the permanence of substance as the substratum of all phenomena. But while dealing with the soul we found that the notion of substance, as also expressed in the Schematism, has a logical necessity only, and therefore here, as in the former case, we have to admit that the permanent is conceived not as a real thing, either as a phenomenon or a thing by itself, but as a necessary postulate to explain the possibility of experience.

Is there, however, any contradiction between permanence thus conceived in the Deduction and the Analogies? The answer is easy, for it is found both in the preface and conclusion of the Analogies. In the conclusion Kant says: "Our analogies therefore represent the unity of nature in the coherence of all phenomena, under certain exponents, which express the relation of time (as comprehending all existence) to the unity of apperception, which apperception can only take place in the synthesis according to rules." Which, (1) A 216 M, 176.
when turning to the preface, means that, first, the analogies being regulative principles of the possibility of experience, can be no more than rules according to which a certain unity of experience may arise from perceptions, but not on account of how perception itself, as an empirical intuition, may arise.

(1) And second, that these analogies, like all synthetical principles, "have their meaning and validity, not as principles of the transcendent, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding." (2) It follows, therefore, that "those principles will therefore authorize us only to connect phenomena, according to analogy, with the logical and universal unity of concepts, so that, though in using the principle we use the category, yet in practice (in the application to phenomena) we put the schema of the category, as a practical key, in its place, or rather put it by the side of the category as a restrictive condition, or as what may be called, a formula of the category." (3) That is to say, the principle of the permanence of substance as well as the principle of the permanent unity of self-consciousness is only a synthetical proposition a priori which resides in the mind, and has no more than logical significance; and they are therefore not only not contradictory, but are one and the same.

(1) A 180, M 147.
(2) A 180, M 147.
thing, namely, the principle of permanence behind phenomena, itself not being a representation (a sensuous product), which is found in the mind only.

But we said Kant has another way of explaining the need of a permanent, which seems to approach to the permanent of the Refutation, - namely, the flux of time and the stability of space-relations. In the consideration on the whole of Pure Psychology, he says: "If we compare the science of the soul, as the physiology of the internal sense, with the science of the body, as a physiology of the objects of external sense, we find, besides many things which in both must be known empirically, this important difference, that in the latter many things can be known a priori from the mere concept of an extended and impermeable being, while in the former nothing can be known a priori and synthetically from the concept of a thinking being. The cause is this: - Though both are phenomena, yet the phenomena of the external senses have something permanent, which suggests a substratum of varying determinations, and consequently a synthetical concept, namely, that of space, and a phenomenon in space; while time, the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent, and makes us to know the change of determinations only, but not the determinable object. For
For in what we call soul, there is a continuous flux and nothing permanent, except it may be (if people so have it) the simple I,—so simple because this representation has no content...this I is neither an intuition nor a concept of any object, but the mere form of consciousness, which can accompany both classes of representations and impart to them the character of knowledge, provided something else be given in intuition which supplies matter for a representation of an object." (1) And to this effect, and no less clearly, are the passages of the second edition, namely, the general note on the System of Principles,(2) and the conclusion in regard to Time. (3) It may be noticed, that in those places, as in the ones also here quoted, the permanent Ego as an object independent of our consciousness, is declared to be void of contents, as we formerly saw Kant also thought in regard to the soul; that permanence, therefore, assumes significance only in connection with our experience of external objects, i.e., of objects really given in perception, which is also a thought formerly outlined by us; and lastly, that it is on account of external objects that we can think of the concept of permanence, because only space relations represent to us things as permanent, while in time everything is in a flux.

(1) A 381, M 308.
(2) M 784.
(3) A 33 M 26.
The important question, therefore, as far as we now are concerned, is in regard to the last point, namely, what constitutes the permanence of external things. Is it, or is it not the same as the permanence of the two previous subjects: the Ego, and the substance of the Analogies?

This question Kant has clearly and fully answered in the second Paralogism (1) as well as in the consideration on the whole of pure psychology as affected by the paralogisms,(2) and we shall do no more than quote from the last mentioned place almost the entire passage, both as significant for our purpose and as a masterpiece of philosophic discussion. Kant asks "What purpose can be served by pure psychology founded on pure principles of reason? Its chief purpose is meant to be to guard our thinking self against the danger of materialism. This purpose, however, is answered, as we have shown, by the concept which reason gives of our thinking self. For, so far from there being any fear lest if matter be taken away, all thought, and even the existence of thinking beings might vanish, it has been on the contrary clearly shown that, if we take away the thinking subject, the whole material world would vanish, because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our own subject, and a certain class of its representations." (3)

(1) a356-361 m 290-293 A 383-386.
(2) M 310-314.
(3) A 382 M 310.
Then follow the important place which explains both the nature of the permanence of space relations, and the noncontradictory character it has as regards the permanence of the Ego and of substance. This long quotation is as follows:

"What I maintain is, that all the difficulties which we imagine to exist in these questions and with which, as dogmatical objections, people wish to give themselves an air of deeper insight into the nature of things than the common understanding can ever claim, rest on a mere illusion, which leads us to hypostasize what exists in thought only, and to accept it in the same quality in which it is thought as a real object, outside the thinking subject, taking in fact extension, which is phenomenal only, for a quality of external things, existing without our sensibility also, and movement as their effect, taking place by itself also, and independently of our senses. For matter, the association of which with the soul causes so much misgiving, is nothing but a mere form, or a certain mode of representing an unknown object by that intuition which we call the external sense. There may, therefore, well be something outside us to which the phenomenon which we call matter corresponds; though in its quality of phenomenon it cannot be outside us, but merely as a thought within us, although that
thought represents it through the external sense as existing outside us. Matter, therefore, does not signify a class of substances totally heterogeneous and different from the object of the internal sense (the soul) but only the different nature of the phenomenal appearance of objects (in themselves unknown to us), the representations of which we call external, as compared with those which we assign to the internal sense, although, like other thought, those external representations also belong to the thinking subject only. They possess, however, this illusion that, as they represent objects in space, they seem to separate themselves from the soul and to move outside it, although, even the space, in which they are seen, is nothing but a representation of which no homogeneous original can ever be found outside the soul. The question therefore is no longer as to the possibility of an association of the soul with other known and foreign substances outside us, but only as to the connection of the representations of the internal sense with the modifications of our external sensibility, and how these can be connected with each other according to constant laws, and acquire cohesion in experience.

So long as we connect internal and external phenomena with each other as mere representations in our experience, there is nothing irrational, nor anything
to make the association of both senses to appear strange. As soon however as we hypostatise the external phenomena, looking upon them no longer as representations, but as things existing by themselves and outside us, with the same quality in which they exist inside us, and referring to our own thinking subject their acts which they, as phenomena, show in their mutual relation, the effective causes outside us assume a character which will not harmonise with their effects within us, because that character refers to the external senses only, but the effects to the internal sense, both being entirely unhomogeneous, though united in the same subject. We then have no other external effects but changes of place, and no forces but tendencies, which have for their effects relations in space only. Within us, in the contrary, these effects are mere thought, without any relations of space, movement, shape, or local determination between them; and we entirely lose the thread of the causes in the effects which ought to show themselves in the internal sense. We ought to consider therefore that bodies are not objects by themselves which are present to us, but a mere appearance of we do not know what unknown object, and that movement likewise is not the effect of that unknown cause, but only the appearance of its influence on our sense.
Both are not something outside us, but only representations within us - and consequently it is not the movement of matter which produces representations within us, but that motion itself (and matter also which makes itself known though it) is representation only. Our whole self-created difficulty turns on this, how and why the representations of our sensibility are so connected with each other that those which we call external intuitions can, according to empirical laws, be represented as objects outside us; a question which is entirely free from the imagined difficulty of explaining the origin of our representations from totally heterogeneous efficient causes, existing outside us, the confusion arising from our mistaking the phenomenal appearance of an unknown cause for the very cause outside us. The "notorious problem, therefore, as to a possible association between the thinking and the extended, would, when all that is purely imaginative is deducted, come to this, how external intuition, namely that of space (or what fills space, namely form and movement), is possible in any thinking subject? To this question, however, no human being can return an answer, and instead of attempting to fill this gap in our knowledge, all we can do is to indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a transcendental object as the cause of this class of representations, which
however we shall never know, nor be able to form any concept of. In all practical questions we treat phenomena as objects by themselves, without troubling ourselves about the first cause of their possibility (as phenomena). But as soon as we go beyond, the concept of a transcendental object becomes inevitable."

Plainly, then, Kant teaches that the permanence of space relations is a permanence found in the mind when representing external things; that these things depend upon their presence in consciousness in order to be possible and perceived as real, only because that consciousness possesses a certain synthetic activity which through the pure forms of the mind exerts a unifying and ordering power over the manifold matter which is given to it from elsewhere, but which has no other sign for existence than its presence in consciousness. Consequently the permanence of matter, as of mind and of substance, consists in the notion of something permanent behind all our representations be it of internal or of external representations, which serves as the logical correlate upon which the existence of these representations may be explained; it is merely a concept as any other concept a priori, from which certain rules may be derived which have no other except an empirical use, and
the notion of which is merely the thought of a logical subject devoid of any tangible and demonstrable predicates. Of this trio of permanents, no doubt, substance is the central one, standing as that concept which comprehends both mind and matter which are the other two permanents, and which though themselves logically distinguishable, are in no way actually different, for both mind and matter are alike concepts of the mind, designating that which the mind within itself distinguishes as two phenomenally different things. But can such conception of the permanent agree with what is said of it in the Refutation?

If we recollect the argument of the Refutation, and our investigations concerning it, we shall no doubt here discuss the idea of a possible contradiction as far as the proposition that time presupposes something permanent goes. In both cases the teachings concerning time are identical; there may however be a possible contradiction only between Kant's view in regarding to the nature of the permanent, which we have now investigated, and the notion embodied in the Refutation. But even with the notion of the permanent, certain statements should be also dismissed as uncontradictory, namely, the statement of the Refutation that the permanent "is
not a mere representation", but that it is something which is not an "intuition within me". This was true we saw of all the permanents thus far. The contradiction of the Refutation and the permanent of the first (as well as second) edition has to do, therefore, only with the nature of its non-intuitional character. In the former case, the permanent has been interpreted to be a real thing in itself, a substantially different thing from all our representations, which at the same time is not consciousness; at least this can be the only advantageous interpretation for any real use. While the permanent in the latter case is expressly stated to be a thing which is not a representation, and which serves as the correlative of them, but only as a principle residing in the mind, possessing no other marks of substantiality than its mental force to be assumed as an a priori principle for the explanation of the possibility of experience. As such Kant allows its reality, while as a transcendentally real thing it can be only ideal, i.e., subjective with us. Now, in view of all the evidence of the Critique against the former interpretation, are we to consider the latter view as the view really intended by Kant to be expressed in the Refutation?
Against that interpretation we have some specific passages where Kant himself expressly denies it. In the second note of the Refutation itself, Kant says concerning the view promulgated in it, that "this view is fully confirmed by the empirical use of our faculty of knowledge, as applied to the determination of time. Not only are we unable to perceive any determination of time, except through a change in external relation (motion) with reference to what is permanent in space (for instance, the movement of the sun with respect to terrestrial objects), but we really have nothing permanent to which we could refer the concept of a substance, as an intuition, except matter only," etc. Now, it is evident that Kant speaks here of the permanent in terms of matter, as extended, impermeable, etc., a substance, in intuition, which is as any empirical object apprehended through the sensibility and which, as formerly quoted, is no less mental for being external.

A second place with the same import, and much more important, is the note to the preface of the second edition, which specifically refers to the Refutation. Kant says there: "It will probably be urged against this proof, that, after all, I am immediately
conscious of that only which is within me, that is, of my representation of external things; and that consequently I must still remain uncertain whether there be outside me anything corresponding to it or not. But by internal experience I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently also of determinability in time); and this is no more than to be conscious of my representation only, any yet identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which can be itself determined only by something connected with my existence, yet outside me." And later on again: "In order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects outside me really correspond (these intuitions belonging to the external sense and not to the faculty of imagination), we must in each single case apply the rules according to which experience in general (even internal) is distinguished from imaginations, the proposition that there really is an external experience being always taken for granted." But this also means that Kant when speaking in the Refutation of external objects, and things real in space, only means phenomena, objects gotten through "intuition" or perception, and not things which are not conditioned
by the rules of possible experience.

A third place which also bears against the realistic interpretation of the refutation is the general note on the System of the Principles, which in the Critique closely follows upon the Refutation as an addition to the second edition and which so closely resembles the second Paralogism that it appears to be a restatement of it. Kant there says:

"It is still more remarkable, however, that, in order to understand the possibility of things according to the categories, and thus to establish the objective reality of the latter, we require not only intuitions, but always external intuitions. Thus, if I take, for instance, the pure concepts of relation we find that:-

"First, in order to give something permanent in intuition...we require an intuition in space (of matter*..." We need not, therefore, multiply quotations to point out that the Permanent of the Refutation is not meant by Kant in any sense as different from his general notion of it, and that the "real things" he speaks of there are not in any way different from his teaching concerning spatial objects. If we were to take the realistic interpretation, namely, that Kant admits in the Refutation the existence of absolutely real things in space, it would vitiate not only the entire
logical coherence of Kant's philosophy, but it would also give rise to contradictions within the Refutation itself. As regards Kant's whole system, such interpretation according to Kant's own view of things would admit that first space is either a property of things by themselves, or that it is itself such a thing-in-itself; which will, second, admit that Kant's doctrine concerning the unknowability of things in themselves would become invalid, for then what we see in space would be the representation of a thing-by-itself, as it is inherent in it as its quality; and this will, therefore, also annihilate, in the third place, the need for the subjective forms and their adaptability in an ideal world, for then the mind would not be the "synthetic activity" which is to produce representation with qualities which it puts in them, but will be merely a receptive function which registers what it finds there; while within the refutation itself such an interpretation contradicts the very statement of the theorem, namely Kant's aim to prove that "the simple, but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence, proves the existence of objects in space outside myself, but in the empirical sense only. How can, therefore, the rise of such an interpretation be explained? We answer that it is due to the use in the Refutation of the word "outside me", and to Kant's
peculiar doctrine of things-in-themselves, - which on the one hand, are represented as necessary to be postulated as the logical subjects of our mental concepts when explaining the possibility of experience, while, on the other hand, Kant has nowhere expressly and emphatically denied their objective reality in an absolute sense.

In the whole Refutation there is no word which equals the suggestiveness of the work "outside" me. It contains, presumably, the realistic flash of Kantianism. In the fourth Paralogism where we saw Kant refuting this same problematical idealism which he refutes in the Refutation, speaking of this word, he says: "The expression 'outside us' involves, however, an inevitable ambiguity, because it may signify either something which, as a thing in itself, exists apart from us, or what belongs to outward appearance only. In order, therefore, to remove all uncertainty from that concept, taken in the latter meaning (which alone affects the psychological question as to the reality of our external objects from those that may be called so in a transcendental sense, by calling the former simply things occurring in space." There is no doubt then, in view of the many passages of the first, and the more numerous ones of the second edition, that Kant himself fell into that "inevitable ambiguity", by allowing his ideas to become obfuscated through the equivocality of this
expression. It will be noticed, however, that Kant does not speak of the permanent as "outside me", i.e. as an intuition as any other intuition, but that this expression is used only in connection with the word 'objects' - in the plural,-- through which the permanent, as different from them, is yet to be known; that "all determination in time presupposes something permanent" which cannot be an intuition within me, but the perception of which is possible only through things which really exist outside us. Therefore the permanent of the Refutation must also be classed together and in harmony with, the notion of the permanents previously enumerated.

After we have thus ended the examination of the three important places of the first and second editions of the Critique, and have found them harmonious as regards the definition and classification of Idealism, as well as regards the congruity of the views propounded in them, we may now, before entering into the investigation of the third type of idealism, which is Kant's own, profit by the following observations. First, in the definition of Idealism, Kant limits himself to statements regarding the objects of the external sense merely, and that only in as far as idealism doubts or denies their real existence.
consequently in the refutation of its types, he only aims to show that our internal experience, which idealism holds as absolutely real, is either in no wise any more real than our external experience, since both are immediately given as real in perception; or that our internal experience even proves the existence of our external, since the phenomena of our internal sense are impossible to conceive as externally correlated without the assumption that external things really exist. And a second observation to consider is that Kant always speaks of absolute reality as something unknown; while of a type of objects, such as are the manifold the permanent, and the transcendental subject and object, he speaks as devoid of content and as serving a logical reference only. These two observations, we shall presently see, are of direct importance to the investigation of Kant's philosophy in its relation to idealism.

As regards the definition and refutation Kant gives of idealism, it is plain that he does not really touch upon the main issue; for what idealism maintains and aims to prove is not the objective unreality of things perceived as spatial, but only that this objective reality is not independent of the mind, but is due to the fact that they are perceived by a mind, be it of God or man. And Kant has in no way refuted this; the indications thus far are that he maintains this view. How little Kant understood idealism and its implications, is, furthermore, evident from his misunderstanding
of Berkeley, whose philosophy is not only not such as Kant says it is, but it goes quite parallel with his own teaching concerning the phenomenal reality of external things, expressed so explicitly in his famous "to be perceived is not to be real". Therefore the very misunderstanding on the part of Kant of the contentions of idealism, leaves open as a possible case that his Transcendental Idealism is really Idealism correctly understood, though, as we shall see, not finally formulated. There is no doubt that Kant was having the "famous Locke", he loved to real even in his old age, in mind, when thinking of then arising English psychological idealism, and whose aim, just like the aim of Berkeley and Kant, was to raise a barrier against atheism and scepticism. How close Kant followed in the steps of Locke, just like Berkeley, and Kant after them, taught that the mind is cognizant of its own ideas only; knowledge being, according to him, "nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of our ideas," the word idea comprehending "whatsoever is in the object of the understanding when a man thinks"; though Locke, unlike Berkeley, derived the origin of our ideas from sources other than mind. What Kant's view in this respect is we shall later see. For this interesting relation see A. W. Moore, Existence, Meaning and Reality, etc. in the Decennial Pub. of the U. of Ch.
Our second observation, namely, the peculiarity of Kant's doctrine of things-in-themselves, is undoubtedly much more important, and unquestionably requires an exhaustive delineation; there is nothing in the philosophy of Kant which has stirred up more interest throughout the whole history of criticism. One might as well say that Kant hold out to his readers no such doctrine as that which we call the doctrine of things-in-themselves, because all he affirms concerning those things is their unknowableness, and yet this indefiniteness of statement concerning it adds not a little to its interest, and its ambiguity, especially the latter. It is a doctrine, however, which has always, in the discussions of Kant, deserved consideration, and we cannot here omit it. No doubt this doctrine derives by far its largest share of interestingness and significance in the philosophy of Kant from the fact that it stands out as the representative of the ontological implications of transcendentism. It is, therefore, in it that men have tried to discover those tenets of Kant which will be of most importance for the classification of his philosophy, for there is no doubt that according to the present day formulation of platforms, it is in the ontological faith of any philosopher or philosophy that he or it stands out in definite relation to some world view. If, therefore, it is proved that the unknowability of things-in-themselves does not betray in any
definite manner allegiance to any world theory, Kant's philosophy will contain an inherent cause for misapprehension, by necessitating its students to classify it as best they can, not according to its own expressed language to that effect, but according to their best judgment, taste, or any other favorable circumstance.

That the Critique firmly holds the unknowability of ultimate reality needs no quotations to affirm. Those are scattered all over the book, and we have already investigated the philosophic bases upon which Kant holds its unknowability, when considering the elements of transcendentalism as found in the Aesthetic. This however does not yet mean that Kant denies or accepts their existence. In fact there are places in which he seems both to affirm and to deny it. The places in which Kant seems to be most directly affirming the existence of things-in-themselves are few indeed. But so are the places of their complete negation. In views of the overwhelming evidence that he holds them to be unknowable, it is best to consider provisionally now, that both the affirmation and the negation of them as really existent is an anomaly, or, say, contradiction to the very premises from which Kant starts. Such "dogmatic" statements either for or against the existence of things-in-themselves are contrary to the very nature of the critical method which always
aims to "examine" the proofs of its statements, before it states its conclusions, for as Kant says of the method: "the supply of material would suffice...on the level plane of experience" only by that method to satisfy all the legitimate cravings of the human mind; and Kant has, therefore, quite consistently avoided affirming or rejecting "dogmatically" the existence of things-in-themselves. In fact the following may be considered as the only places where such may be the case. In the chapter on Schematism he appears to hold that, since time is only the form of intuition, it is necessary to presume that what corresponds to the sensation is a thing-in-itself, or reality. But that was what he said of the Permanent, and in no wishe has a convincing power; he does the same in regard to the transcendental subject in a note to the fourth section of the Antimony there also however affirming only its non-phenomenality. While he elsewhere says that "if by purely intelligible objects we understand things which, without all Schemata of sensibility, are thought by mere categories, such objects are simply impossible." How can therefore these contradictions be explained.

1 A 143  
M 117

2 A479  
M391

3 A286  
M232

4 A297, 302, 360, 367, 478, 494, 572, 576, 616,  
M 241, 245, 293, 298, 390, 402, 462, 465, 496.
To answer this question we shall here provisionally give the definition of the term transcendental which Kant uses to designate his own philosophy, and then we shall follow out its explication. There are two specified places in which Kant has more fully dealt with the denotation of the term transcendental. One is found in the Dialectic and one is in the Method; but there are none in the Aesthetic and the Analytic, or in the elements of Kantianism. In the last named place Kant defines however transcendental knowledge as "that which is occupied not so much with objects, as without <a priori> concepts of objects"; or as the passage is amended in the second edition, it is knowledge occupied not so much with the objects "as with our manner of knowing objects, so far as this is meant to be possible <a priori>". In the specific places mentioned, however, the meaning of this is elucidated by a joint presentation of the meaning of the terms 'immanent' and 'transcendental' with the meanings of the terms 'immanent' and 'transcendent'. Kant says, "all principles the application of which is entirely confined within the limits of possible experience, we shall call immanent; those, on the contrary, which tend to transgress those limits, transcendental"; the transcendental principles therefore, being those which, like the categories which they represent, are immanent in their application while
transcendent in their origin only, but do not admit of a transcendent application. And this is the import of the division of metaphysics into "transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason. The former treats only of understanding and reason themselves, in a system of all concepts and principles which have objects in general, without taking account of objects that may be given (ontologiae)". And thus by holding that we know of no ontological implications further than the evidences our senses may present as mental facts only, and by transferring the origin of the significance of these mental facts from the things-in-themselves to the transcendental Ego, Kant solves all problems of the mind in a thorough-going idealism, as we shall now see.

Undoubtedly, no better, and in fact no understanding at all of Kant's philosophy, may be had, except by first understanding the denotation and the implications of the terms a priori and a posteriori as used by him, in regard to which the Critique of Pure Reason can only be delimited. Time and Space, the categories, and the Permanent, phenomena, the synthetic process, and the noumena that roughly correspond to them, are all dependent upon the con-
ception of these two elements of Kant's philosophy, and consequently they call for a full treatment; a treatment which to a great extent is lengthened on account of the rather insufficient elucidation which Kant gives them, through omitting to devote a special chapter to the subject of the *a priori* and *a posteriori* implications of his philosophy. In the second edition indeed he does more specifically delineate their meaning, but still leaves the reader to discover in their old meaning a peculiarly new use. To the elucidation of these difficulties, therefore, we shall now proceed.

From the Introduction to the Prefaces of the first and second editions (considering that the Prefaces are written last) one meets the terms *a priori* and *a posteriori* everywhere, but especially the former term. It will facilitate matters if in the study of the meaning of these two terms one will always think of the word *a priori* in connection with rationalism, and of the word *a posteriori* in connection with empiricism, which, we said, are undoubtedly the two contradictory philosophies which Kant aims to unite. Our discussion of these terms will consist of two parts, first their denotation, and, second, the proof of the meaning he attaches to them. We shall mainly concern ourselves with the term *a priori*. 
Kant on first sight appears to be quite explicit as to the meaning he attaches to the terms a priori and a posteriori. He says: "general truths which at the same time bear the character of an inward necessity must be independent of experience, - clear and certain by themselves. They are therefore called knowledge a priori, while what simply is taken from experience is said to be, in ordinary parlance, known a posteriori or empirically only." (1) In other words, as is clear from the Introduction of the second edition especially, and elsewhere, according to Kant every truth which at all times and under all conditions obtains universal validity and a force of necessity such that under like concrete circumstances it must be taken as true, is an a priori concept, proposition or principle, on which full reliance must be had for future predictions, because any such knowledge is an a priori knowledge not derived from experience to which it relates, but is independent of experience (sense perception), and serves as the condition under which experience itself is possible to us. Any knowledge which does not so pretend to be taken as absolutely necessary and universal, is knowledge a posteriori. It has been generally the fault of the students of Kant to understand him to mean that a priori knowledge is not known by us in experience, as if we could know anything in any other way. This is due undoubtedly to
Kant'd use of the word experience to designate the a posteriori kind of knowledge only, while according to his own view of the matter, as we shall later more definitely point out, experience itself is possibly only by the conjunction of the a priori and a posteriori, the form and the matter of knowledge, both, consequently, being discovered in this possible experience. (1) Or as Paulsen has expressed it: "Rational truths do not lose their character because they arise some way or another in empirical consciousness. (2)

There is another difficulty added to the understanding of the distinction between the denotations of the terms a priori and a posteriori, namely, that it cannot be explained by saying that the former stands for the "innate ideas" of Kant's English masters, and that the latter stands for the manner of the derivation of our knowledge from experience without any marks of universality and necessity. For no doubt, with Kant, those terms possess not only a designation of functional predicates, but also have an ontological significance. Let us explain: the term a priori has with Kant two quite distinct meanings,—it designates all elements of knowledge that possess a character of necessity and universality, be it a condition, a relation or a reality; and also it designates concepts as functions of the mind only. That is, it stands both for notions expressing the static aspect of experience, and the dynamic. (3)
Let us take the concept of space, with which we are acquainted, for an example, Kant proved the a priori of space by the fact that it was presupposed by our external experience, since its objects always appeared in space. He proved also that space could not be in the object, for we could easily imagine space as independent of objects, that is, as empty, while we could not imagine external objects without implying space. Space, therefore, is a mental fact, a concept a priori. But this does not exhaust the meaning of space, for it is also an object, a thing with qualities distinguishable from other things of which we likewise think as objects. Now, the same applies to all objects which, we saw, are real in perception only, i.e., as mental facts which are experienced. This point has an important significance for our investigation, as will become plain when we arrive at Kant's Copernican Revolution", because in it is this duality of the meaning Kant attaches to our a priori concepts, which makes his philosophy a epistemology peculiarly suited to avoid ontological implications.

But no doubt the term a priori lacks definiteness and sufficient justification in regard to proof; (1) in connection with which we shall bring in the further denotation of its meaning and use. In the pages of the Critique no fuller statement as regards the arguments Kant

1 Paulsen, Im. Kant, p. 206.
or rather would have offered if he were to devote particular attention to them, can be found, than in the Introduction of the second edition. He says: "That there really exists in our knowledge such necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, and therefore pure judgments a priori, is easy to show. If we want a scientific example, we have only to look to any of the propositions of mathematics; if we want one from the sphere of the ordinary understanding, such a proposition as that each change must have a cause, will answer the purpose; nay, in the latter case, even the concept of cause contains so clearly the concept of the necessity of its connection with an effect, and of the strict universality of the rule, that it would be destroyed altogether if we attempted to derive it, as Hume does, from the frequent concomitancy of that which happens with that which precedes, and from a habit arising thence (therefore from a purely subjective necessity), of connecting representations. It is possible even without having recourse to such examples in proof of the reality of pure propositions a priori within our knowledge, to prove their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus proving it a priori. For whence should experience take its certainty, if all the rules which it follows were always again and again empirical, and therefore contingent and hardly fit to serve as first
principles? For the present, however, we may be satisfied for having shown the pure employment of the faculty of our knowledge as a matter of fact with the criteria of it."

Now, from the above quotation the following evidently are Kant's arguments for the existence of knowledge a priori, namely, first, from the case of mathematics, second, from the nature of causality (and the concept of substance), and third, from the indispensability of it for the possibility of experience itself.

The argument from mathematics may be very briefly considered. It is the easiest to understand, though it is hard to establish its conclusiveness, it being itself no more than a coincidence at the time of Kant that mathematics "that pride of human reason... has always been in possession of perfect trust-worthiness"; and that men of all times, not excluding Hume also, have admitted in mathematics the existence of universal and necessary rules, the apriority of which is accepted as needing no demonstration. (1) And this apriority was just the ground which made it possible for the first man to have come upon the thought that what he had to do in geometry for example, "was not to investigate what he saw in the figure, and thus to learn its properties but that he had to produce (by construction) what he himself, according to concepts a priori, placed in that figure". (2) This argument however, is no longer quite so conclusive at
at the present day, for "mathematic" has lost its "pride" if it be judged from the investigations of modern mathematicians. But even independently of this it is not so evident that mathematics is a synthetic science and not an analytic, which in fact is the point Kant mostly aims to prove. As far as the scientist is concerned, it is of little importance to him whether the hypothesis, the rules and laws etc. which he follows, be of a priori or a posteriori origin. What he cares is that they work satisfactorily for him, while their universality and necessity are to him no mark of their universality and necessity are to him no mark of their unearthly birth. No doubt, therefore, as far as this argument goes, the existence of knowledge a priori is no more than a fundamental assumption with Kant, which, though unproved, may nevertheless for all that deserve an unwavering faith.

The argument from causality is the best developed argument of Kant for the existence of knowledge a priori, for it was reflection upon it, aroused by Hume's scepticism, which awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber, as he says, We may also add that the concept of causality is the only one of all his categories which is definitely dealt with by Kant. A comprehensive investigation of it will, therefore, serve also as an explanation of that important part of his philosophy contained in the Deduction and
represented by the categories, with which we are not here concerned, but which indirectly through our investigation of Causality we shall consider.

According to the express language of Kant, causality is directly dealt with in the second Analogy; (1) we shall therefore begin with it. The problem stated there, as given in the first edition is, "Everything that happens (begins to be), presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule." (2) We need not here enter upon the specific meaning of this statement, which would lead us on to the investigation of the correctness of Kant's understanding of Hume's view upon it, an understanding which no doubt, just as in the case of Berkeley, is erroneous.(3)It is evident that so far as our purposes are concerned, Kant has to prove that from a definite cause always necessarily will follow a definite effect; that the cause given, this effect may be predicted, and the reverse; and that this may be done a priori, or independent from experience, in which case the necessity and universality of the "rule" will rest not upon the inner nature of the mind. For only if so taken, can the proposition that "every effect must have a cause", received its real contrast as it exists in the opposition between rationalism and empiricism. And the problem as stated here is correctly limited by Kant to a relation existing only between objects of sense-perception, and not to relations of moral significance (4) and the law of freedom.(5)
Hume, working upon the main principles of empiricism, namely (a) that the mind knows its own ideas only, and (b) that all knowledge springs from experience, had, just before Kant, carried out Locke's "true and advantageous knowledge of things" to the point of scepticism; as Höffding says, he pushed the empirical method to an extent where it amounts to "reductio ad absurdum". Starting with experience as the source of all knowledge, Hume took sense impressions to be all the fundamental elements necessary for the knowledge of things. Ideas are "fainter copies of impressions used in

1) Treatise, thinking and reasoning." (1) Hope and fear and desire, and Selby-Bigge's edition, the like, are "impressions from reflexion" which arise when an idea returns upon the mind. (2) Impressions themselves are inexplicable for the human mind, and are in no way connected by the mind itself in any other way except through the habitual expectation that, since things have happened always in a certain way, they are presumed to happen again that way. Kant's "necessary" connection between phenomena, according to Hume, is reduced to be merely a "belief" engendered in us by the "strongest impression". And against this view Kant arose.

Now, at certain points Hume wavered. Speaking of the action of the mind when searching our the congruous details for a definite purpose, he says of the imagination that it "suggests its ideas...in which they become necessary
and useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other, collecting those ideas which belong to any subject... collected by a kind of magical faculty of the soul which is inexplicable by the utmost effort of the human understanding."

(1) And also when speaking of the connection of our ideas, he says that the imagination does not associate our ideas at random, but does that in "an uniform fashion" by the presence of a "certain universal principles" which supply "a gentle force which generally prevails". And it is this "attraction", magical faculty" and "gentle force", of certain parts of our knowledge which, Kant says, is explainable by the presence in experience of knowledge a priori. And it is the proof of this statement which we will now try to obtain, by picking out the pertinent parts to Kant's proof of causality as found in the highly confounding Second Analogy.

Our apprehension of things, says Kant in the Second Analogy, is by the successive (2) representation of their parts as following one upon another. As we formerly have seen, this means that it is a self-evident observation of our consciousness that in its cognition of objects it is limited by its time - condition, and, therefore, lays hold of the manifold bit by bit. But while in our apprehension such an orderly succession takes place, it is not so evident, says Kant, that the same succession happens in the object which is apprehended. To decide that "point" one must
first decide upon the nature of the objects of external perception, for were they phenomena only, i.e., objects which exist entirely under conditions given to them by the subject, it is evident that they should also conform to the order of their apprehension; but were they to be taken as things existing independently of consciousness and of conscious construction, then we could not predict that the succession of the different states of their changes will conform to any orderly arrangement, for, evidently, only the mind possesses such power of orderliness, while we can with great assurance affirm that the succession of apprehension in the subject in no way determines the succession of states in the object, which is declared to be independent of it for its nature and existence. But we have seen that the objects of our external experience, nay, of all experience, are not things-by-themselves, but are phenomena only; therefore, it is the object that must conform to our subjective conditions, and not the reverse. "The phenomenon, in contradistinction to the representations of our apprehension, can only be represented as the object different from them, if it is subject to a rule distinguishing it from every other apprehension, and necessitating a certain kind of conjunction of the manifold. That which in the phenomenon contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object." (1) A phenomenon being "a representation the
transcendental object of which is unknown", (1) it follows that "that which in the phenomenon contains the necessary rule of apprehension" i.e. the object which distinguishes it from other objects, is unknown.

But all this seems to be mere explanation to Kant, for he straightway says: "Let us now proceed to our task". And true enough, the above is a part of the argument but not the whole argument. For to prove that the object must conform to our manner of cognition, in reference to causality, means only that whatever regularity is contained in objective changes, is a change conditioned by such subjective laws. But it does not yet mean that the changes thus conditioned are yet changes which express the contention of the law of causality, namely that upon a certain cause follows a certain effect universally and necessarily, which Kant has yet to prove. Kant has thus far merely reiterated what we saw in the Aesthetic he teaches concerning our cognition of objects; but this is not the same as saying that such a rule obtains in objective representations as representations; for whether phenomena or not, the objects of space are, nevertheless, empirically distinguishable from our internal states, and it is not enough to assume that they are conditioned by subjective determinations for their apprehension, in order to prove that the purely objective law of causality is universally and necessarily
valid. An object, as an object, is empirically always to be distinguished and separated from our mental states, and its laws are in no wise to be treated as laws obtaining between mental states regardless of their objective environment. That this Kant himself recognized, his antithesis between the standing house and the moving ship well illustrates. (1) This however we shall leave unconsidered as unessential to our purpose. Our aim is to find out Kant's proof that the law of causality, even were it necessary and universal, that is, though it contains the criteria of knowledge a priori, is really a concept not derivable from experience, but is a law imposed on us from within with the above criteria as its distinctive qualities to show that it is a priori derived.

The manner in which Kant has proved this we said is highly confounding, not to say ambiguous, and we shall not here enter upon the systematic explication of the three or more repetitions, or explanations, or, one may say, different proofs given here. Throughout all it will be noticed that the important points upon which Kant's argument is based are two: first, the nature of time as the condition of our empirical existence, i.e., of all experience, and, second, the nature of reality. As before so here, (1) Kant holds in regard to time, first that it is
the fundamental condition of both the cognition of the arising of objects, i.e. of knowing them now, and also of the experience of wants, i.e., of the results following upon the existence of objects in their relation to objects. (1)

With the first part of this we have already dealt, and we saw that the real point at issue concerns itself only with the second point, namely, the relation of cause and effect between objects which already exist as objects. And, second, time presupposes something different from itself which in the perception corresponds to sensation and which Kant calls the real. Now the real is of empirical importance in the consideration of the relation of objects, for it exists in perceptionally, that is, in experience. What it may be independently we know not. And the law of cause and effect therefore should obtain between empirical objects, though it is not empirically derived itself. (2) But since time, by conditioning the real, always places it at certain points of time to which something is antecedent and something is or must be consequent, since we cannot admit the existence of empty time, nor the absolute arising and perishing of substance or reality, it follows, says Kant, that as the parts of time are determined in this, that a preceding determines a succeeding time, so is every reality, as object of our perception, determined by the law that every existing thing presupposes of necessity something upon which it empirically follows. (3) And this
proof is not derived from experience, by the mere observance of sense-perceptual events, but is a law deduced from the nature of time, which is the condition of sense-perception and cannot therefore be perceived.

Thus far, however, it should be plain that what Kant has proved is merely that knowledge a priori is any broad generalization imposed upon us by the fact that to explain experience we must admit its validity. But it tells us nothing more specific as to its origin, nor as regards its ultimate validity. It may be, for example, possible that our perceptual experience is really formed not of a continuous flow of a whole, absolutely connected mass of conscious existence, but that consciousness is itself conditioned by interrelated intervals of non-conscious value, the various parts of which are connected not at all by their existence in time; and this, as an hypothesis, possesses just as much force as Kant's generalization, and can therefore be also called knowledge a priori, since such a conclusion cannot be derived from sense impressions, but from reflection upon them. It should furthermore be noticed, that this is not precisely what Kant should have proved; the law of cause and effect calls not for a statement that all things stand in a necessary relation, but that it is such a relation as may be expressed by saying that whatever exists is a necessary outcome of something which preceded it, and the qualities of which, taken in their minutest analysis,
absolutely limit and determine the qualities of that which follows upon it as its effect. There is no doubt that there exists with Kant a certain ambiguity in his argument, as he intends to prove the latter view of the relation of cause and effect, by simply proving that it is a generalization necessarily holding as far as human knowledge is concerned, in order that experience may be rationally explained. But even a proof to this effect presupposes a little too much dependence upon the notion that the human intellect can really reach to the bottom of things, - a notion which Kant has employed throughout the Critique, and which led him to substitute to a large extent the artificial for the absolutely true, as in the case of his twelve categories, on account of his thinking that the mind does really exhaust all its knowledge of subject and object by looking within itself only. (1)

Further elucidation upon the subject of causality as well as the meaning of the term a priori, is undoubtedly to be found, if anywhere, in the Deduction, which aims to show the right of the categories to "be destined for pure use a priori." Whether one would not "return to the same ignorance from which he started" even after he has been "convinced of the inevitable necessity of such a transcendental deduction." (2) We shall not here consider. we shall only take up the deduction in so far as it goes in connection with the category of causality, which is here
specifically dealt with. It is easy, says Kant, to show the
apriority of space and time as the formal conditions under
which objects are given to us, because they belong to the
sensibility, which is always empirical. But not so with the
categories. (1) "For if we take, for instance, the concept
of cause, which implies a peculiar synthesis, consisting
in placing according to a rule after something called A
something totally different from it, B, we cannot say that
it is a priori clear why phenomena should contain something
of this kind. We cannot appeal for it to experience,
because what had to be proved is the objective validity
of this concept a priori. It would remain therefore
a priori doubtful whether such a concept be not altogether
empty, and without any corresponding object among phenomena."

(2) Now, says Kant, "It might be imagined that we could
escape from the trouble of these investigations by saying
that experience offers continually examples of such
regularity of phenomena as to induce us to abstract from
it the concept of cause, and it might be attempted to prove
thereby the objective validity of such a concept. But
it ought to be seen that in this way the concept of cause
cannot possibly arise, and that such a concept ought
either to be founded a priori in the understanding or be
surrendered altogether as a mere hallucination. For this
concept requires strictly that something, A, should be of
such a nature that something else, B, follows from it
necessarily and according to an absolutely universal rule. Phenomena no doubt supply us with cases from which a rule becomes possible according to which something happens usually, but never so that the result should be necessary. There is a dignity in the synthesis of cause and effect which cannot be expressed empirically, for it implies that the effect is not only an accessory to the cause, but given by it and springing from it. Nor is the absolute universality of the rule a quality inherent in empirical rules, which by means of induction cannot receive any but a relative universality, that is, a more or less extended applicability. If we were to treat the pure concepts of the understanding as merely empirical products, we should completely change their character and their use."

This quotation, however, plainly throws the weight of all proof of the a priori concepts upon Kant's notion of possible experience, which, contrary to common experience, seems to be the thing that proves their existence; and this is Kant's third and last proof of knowledge a priori, to the investigation of which we shall now proceed.

Kant's argument from experience to the existence of knowledge a priori consists in this, that according to him our sense-perceptions, which are the elements of empirical knowledge, cannot indicate to us the existence of
truths which possess the marks of "real generality" and "strict necessity." (1) But the existence of such truths is undeniable, therefore there exists knowledge a priori. The whole argument rests upon the point that experience cannot give us truths of real generality and strict necessity, truths "which perhaps serve only to produce certain connection between our sensuous representations." No doubt, Kant's argument goes, when we look at the objects of our experience, we find that we know more than what we discover in them by the mere evidence of our senses. There must, therefore, be a certain kind of knowledge not discoverable by the senses, certain pure concepts which exist in the soul, and that therefore "it is owing to them that we are able, or imagine we are able, to predicate more of the objects of our senses than can be learned by our more experience."

Kant teaches in the first as well as the second edition, that experience consists of two heterogeneous elements, matter and form. (2) Matter is "that in a phenomenon which corresponds to sensation;" (3) it is the only thing given a posteriori. Form is "that which causes the manifold matter of a phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order." The form is ready in the mind a priori. That is to say, in order to have experience we must have, first, something which may be experienced (substance or qualities), and, second, the organization of that something in a system of relations. (4):
We saw from the Aesthetic that what something is, independently of our consciousness, we do not know, but that we know it only as being that in a phenomenon which corresponds to sensation. "Now it is clear that it cannot be sensation again through which sensations are arranged and placed in certain forms. The matter only, of all phenomena is given a posteriori; but the form must be ready for them in the mind a priori, and must therefore be capable of being considered as separate from all sensation." (1) We should notice however that thus far in the argument from experience, Kant only has proved that there are items of experience which cannot be sensed, and that such are our judgments of relations. This however does not yet mean that such judgments are all of the a priori kind, for not all ideational content between man and his environment, for example, would always obtain and prove not erroneous nor unfailing. We saw, moreover, that Kant himself sought, for his judgments of relation, definite space relations, i.e., relations existing between apparently stable objects of our external senses, to make those judgments objectively valid, by proving that not the existence of external objects as related to each other was doubtful, but that their existence is necessary for the very existence of all judgments of relation, in which only the subjective forms, or that which the mind finds as other than matter in phenomena, may possess a necessary and universal permanence.
The argument from the unperceptibility of the ground upon which certain judgments rest, to their apriority, is not, however, Kant's main argument for the "right" of certain judgments to be entitled to the appellation a priori. This right they possess from the necessity with which they force themselves upon us in "possible experience", a notion upon which we already came in the Deduction. This is a principle of great consequence in the philosophy of Kant, and we shall therefore devote some space to its investigation.

Philosophers before and at the time of Kant, according to him, have used the law of contradiction as a sufficient law to explain the truth of any judgment, Dogmatics as well as sceptics (empiricists), Wolfe and Hume, Leibnitz and Locke, have all asked, when attempting to establish or deny the truth of judgments; Do the predicate and subject correspond to each other? Are they identical or different? They have, however, says Kant, fallen into a great error and difficulty; the error consists in this, that they have taken all judgments to be analytical, and the difficulty is that they have not been able to explain certain kinds of truth which are not analytical but synthetical. And this is Kant's perhaps greatest discovery in his own as well as in the estimate of subsequent philosophers, which leads to the principle of possible experience; and finally to the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, apparently, according to Kant, ushered in for the first time by himself, and leading to undreamed of
possibilities of discovery.

The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is dealt with by Kant in two specific places, and therefore no further references will be given in regard to it. One is in the Aesthetic, (1) in the very beginning, and the other is in the Analytic. (2) According to Kant analytical judgments are those "in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived through identity; which means that "the predicate belongs to the subject as something contained in it," (3) as for example in the judgment "all bodies are extended". Here the predicate 'extension' is necessarily contained in the subject 'body' for we cannot think of bodies without implying that they are extended. Such judgments are only illustrative; they give better order and regularity, but though they form "perhaps, the greatest portion of what our reason does", and though they give us "a great deal of knowledge", yet they cannot give us any new knowledge, for they only refer to those things which are contained in the thing of which we are thinking. Naturally, the test of such knowledge is the law of contradiction, since, being knowledge derived from concepts only, we need but to compare them as they are contained in the judgment to see whether they are in harmony with our observations and knowledge of things, or not. Such a test is therefore, merely a negative
criterion of truth which leave it possible that "a judgment may be false or groundless, though in itself it is free from all contradiction". Knowledge, therefore, which is derived from analytical judgments, is not sufficient by itself "to establish objective reality", though such judgments be made in regard to quantitative propositions, (1) because they rest upon concepts only. Such judgments need synthesis to precede them, to be valid. (2)

Synthetic judgments are those in which "the predicate is not contained within the denotations of the subject." In them predicate and subject are not identical, but are judgments which "possess something else (X) on which the understanding relies in order to know that a predicate not contained in the concept, nevertheless belongs to it." They are therefore expanding judgments, which bring new elements into our knowledge such as are not immediately and inherently possessed by the concepts contained in the judgment, which elements serve as a third something to unite the concepts together, and to serve as the ground upon which the falsehood or the truth of the judgment shall be sought.

In a posteriori knowledge, says Kant, the truth or falsehood of such a judgment is easy to discover, for "there the concept and its connection are parts of the same experience in which they are added together"; the "third something" there works without our being conscious of it. "In synthetical judgments
a priori, however, that help is entirely wanting...take the proposition that all which happens has its cause. In the concept of something that happens I no doubt conceive of something existing preceded by time, and from this certain analytical judgments may be deduced. But the concept of cause is entirely outside that concept and indicates something different from that which happens...What is here the unknown X, on which the understanding may rest in order to find beyond the concept A a foreign predicate B, which nevertheless is believed to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because the proposition that all which happens has its cause represents this second predicate as added to the subject not only with greater generality than experience can ever supply, but also with a character of necessity, and therefore entirely a priori and based on concepts. (1) "What then is that third? What is the medium of all synthetical judgments? It can only be that in which all our concepts are contained, namely, the internal sense and its a priori form, time"? (2) But time is the medium through which the mind makes experience possible by the synthesis of the manifold by transcendental apperceptions(3) It is through time that the pure concepts of the understanding and the objects of sensuous intuition become interrelated, and thus experience is made possible. "The highest principle of all synthetical judgments is therefore this, that every
object is subject to the necessary conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."(1)

Our question now is, in what way does the principle of possible experience prove the right of the categories to be objectively valid, but valid as concepts which cannot be derived from experience, which is the correct and the full meaning of Kant's endeavor in the Deduction? Let us briefly summarize. When considering the concept of cause in order to discover Kant's proof of the existence of knowledge a priori, we found that if finally rested upon the principle of the possibility of experience, the third proof which Kant advances for the existence of knowledge a priori. In our investigation of the meaning of this principle, we found that, first, it is a principle which presupposes the existence of knowledge a priori, because it refers to "connections" between subjects and predicates of judgments which are necessary and universal,(1) and, second, that it is a principle resting upon the synthetic activity of the soul in fashioning experience, which is done in and through time, time itself being a form a priori of the mind, a referring with necessity and universality to the possibility of experience in general as well as its actual existence. But is not in both cases Kant's proof from the principle of the possibility of experience
a circular argument, and a tautological proposition? What Kant was expected to prove is that experience, as we have it in its daily manifestations, can give us no judgments of necessity and universality; and when he has proved that, then he should prove that such judgments exist, therefore, etc.,... This he has not done, except by assuming in all instances both clauses of the above argument. No doubt the whole incongruity and ambiguity between the a priori and a posteriori elements of experience arises out of the sharp, and, perhaps, natural antithesis between rationalism and empiricism, which Kant aims to unite in an ever enduring consummation of philosophic thought, - a thing which, perhaps, is to be much less due to argumentative speculation than to practical insight.

From all this discussion and investigation of the distinction of the a priori and a posteriori elements of our knowledge, we have discovered one important fact for our as well as for any consideration of Kant's philosophy, and that fact is the already once emphasised importance of time in relation to Kant's philosophy. We have thus far plainly noticed that time lies at the bases of our apprehension of all sensuous objects, and that time also is the "connection", the "medium" through which the non-sensuous gets together with the sensuous. Time is the centre of the Aesthetic, and time is the ground whereon
the Analytic rests. It is this importance of the distinction which Kant maintains to exist between the a posteriori and a priori elements in human experience, and the connection of both through time, which makes of the Schematism one of the most important of Kant's doctrines, and which serves for the explanation of the two cardinal objects of Kant's philosophy: first, what do we know, and, second, how do we know it, in connection with the answer to which questions we shall now proceed to state Kant's views and to estimate their relation to idealism. The answer to the first question will set forth the anthropology of Kant, and the answer to the second will set forth his epistemology, if with Kant, such a distinction be really possible. For better coherence, and to keep more closely to Kant, we shall call the investigation of the former Kant's doctrine of phenomena, and the investigation of the latter, doctrine of syntheticism, the first dealing with existence, the second with the way it gets into it.

Thus far we have seen that the transcendental philosophy of Kant starts out with a fundamental assertion that there exist in the mind certain primary concepts which are not derived from experience, because experience itself presupposes them, and is made possible by them. These concepts are handed together in a system of unity, existing in each thinking being, because there must, according to
Kant of necessity exist a unit amongst all terms entering our knowledge in such a way that while they may change, yet their change, in regard to the whole of human knowledge, must always remain possible to be necessarily and universally predicted, because otherwise their relation to the whole would be either of a contingent nature, and not apodictically certain, which is a demerit to the dignity of the world; or the whole would be full of gaps and breaks which would inevitably render men uncertain of their scientific results and investigations, and in that way lead into scepticism. Now this necessary and universal unity is due to the mind's activity in fashioning its experience according to the above investigated knowledge a priori, which is known to us as such by its necessary and universal relation, first, in those concepts without which we cannot conceive of any sensuous experience as giving us objects of sense as really present in perception, and, second, in all the concepts, laws and principles in the formation of our judgments which are actively engaged in the production of the connection and relation of perceptual experience. These are the two elements of transcendentalism; time and space, and the categories. Both are concepts designating acts of pure thought and consequently depend upon the function of the mind, through sensation, as the sure signs of existence, and through synthesis as the sure sign of the order and regularity of experience. Existence and synthesis unite for human
beings only in temporal relations and in no other way. Any other use of human cognitive processes leads to confusion and self-deception, since synthesis without something to work upon is empty, and existence without synthesis to get it together is not existence for us. Rationalism therefore, to be just, should restrict itself to "perception and its train", while empiricism, to be full, should admit the existence of the general and necessary synthesis. *a priori* under which alone the particular facts and observations can be subsumed in a rational whole. The affiliation of transcendental idealism with other philosophic systems is therefore reached by two roads; one is Kant's teaching concerning existence, or his phenomenalism, and the other is his doctrine of syntheticism.

Kant's doctrine of phenomena we need not here fully treat, for certain aspects of it and, in fact, its true foundation we have already investigated when we considered space and time, or the Aesthetic. The results of that investigation are briefly as follows: Because space and time are to be always found as the unseparable conditions of all our sensuous intuition; because we can in thought separate them from the objects through by us as appearing in them, and cannot do the reverse; and because to perceive the existence of any appearance, space and time are to be supposed as being already there, - it
follows that, 1st., space and time are forms a priori of the mind, and not of the object; 2. that whatever is in them can in no way be there as a thing independent of the mind, and 3rd., that everything which in sensation presents qualities that distinguish it as a real thing in our perception from any other thing also perceived, is real

(1) \(A27,38, 41,370, 491.\)

M22, 30, 34, 300, 400.

(2) LaRaison orre et les Autinomies

F. Evalin, a rich field for philosphic thought, especially as a starting point for a discussion of temporalism versus eternalism, we can here only in the briefest way make mention of the argument. Kant says, that men hold contrary views upon the "unconditioned unit of the objective conditions of phenomenal appearance", i.e., the composition and division of the world, which is dealt with in the first two Autinomines, with apparently cogent arguments; and, at the present state of thought, reason has fallen "into a natural antithesis". But this is true not only of problems relating to the composition and division of the world, but also with its origination and dependence, which is dealt with in the latter two Autinomies. Now, says Kant, this dialectical battle
between empiricism and dogmatism can never be ended, except by removing the very ground upon which it rests; namely, we should take refuse in transcendental idealism, and recognize with it that what we are thinking about when disputing upon these points are not things-in-themselves existing independently of our sense perception, but are phenomena only which depend for their existence on the mind's functioning in fashioning the world of sense-perception according to its a priori forms. Of things in themselves we know nothing, nor care we to know. And this is "the key to the solution of the Dialectic", namely "if we remove the ground whereon the battles wage, we shall be free of the turmoil", without taking recourse in illusionism and neo-platonism, but still retaining the immediacy of the reality of both external and internal experience. But if Kant has thus proved by a direct proof in the Aesthetic and by an indirect proof in the Antinomy, as his own words go, (1) that "without its relation to an at least possible consciousness, the phenomenon could never become to us an object of knowledge; it would therefore be nothing to us; and because it has no objective reality in itself, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing altogether", (2) - are we not right to class Kant as a thoroughgoing idealist?
A possibility which we saw was not excluded by the fact that Kant did not state correctly the contention of idealism, and therefore was not refuting it when he thought he was doing so. And here is where we may also show, that even the very important doctrine of the thing-in-itself, which has been so highly estimated in most discussions on Kant, and which we formerly took up and shall now further develop, does not prevent us from considering Kant a full-fledged idealist, though of an imperfect sort, for with Kant, the definition of idealisms as given by Howison remains active, namely that "mind is the measure of all things, and complete ideality (is) the sure sign of reality."(1)

(1) Concept-ion of God, p. 88.

The important place in which Kant has dealt with phenomena and things-in-themselves, is no doubt the third chapter of the Analytic of Principles, headed: On the ground of distinction of all subjects into phenomena and noumena, - a chapter the need of which is felt from the very conclusions of the Aesthetic, but which is scarcely introduced at the end of the Analytic. Kant seems to have been gathering all his powder to blast away all at once all the crooked paths and mistaken realities of philosophic speculation, but only after his system has thoroughly cleared the sky from all its danger giving signs. He says: "We have not only traversed the whole domain of the pure understanding, and carefully examined each part of it, but
we have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its proper place. This domain, however, is an island and enclosed by nature itself within limits that can never be changed. It is the country of truth (a very attractive name), but surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion, where many a fog bank and ice that soon melts away tempt us to believe in new lands, while constantly deceiving the adventurous mariner with vain hopes, and involving him in adventures which he can never leave, and yet can never bring to an end. Before we venture ourselves on this sea, in order to explore it on every side, and to find out whether anything is to be hoped for there, it will be useful to glance once more at the map of that country which we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, first, whether we might not be content with what it contains, nay, whether we must not be content with it, supposing that there is no solid ground anywhere else on which we could settle; secondly, by what title we possess even that domain, and may consider ourselves safe against all hostile claims. Although we have sufficiently answered these questions in the course of the Analytic, a summary recapitulation of their solutions may help to strengthen our conviction by uniting all arguments in one point. "We have seen that the understanding possesses everything which it draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, for no other purpose but for experience. The principles of the pure understanding.
whether constitutive a priori (as the mathematical) or simply relative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but, as it were, the pure schema of possible experience; for that experience derives its unity from that synthetical unity alone which the understanding originally and spontaneously imparts to the synthesis of imagination, with reference to apperception, and to which all phenomena, as data of a possible knowledge, must conform a priori. But although these rules of the understanding are not only true a priori, but the very source of all truth, that is, of the agreement of our knowledge with objects,...nevertheless we do not seem to be content with hearing only what is true, but want to know a great deal more...It is for that purpose that such profound investigations are required as we have just instituted. If the understanding cannot decide whether certain questions lie within its own horizon or not, it can never feel certain with regard to its claims and possessions, but must be prepared for many humiliating corrections, when constantly transgressing, as it certainly will, the limits of its own domain, and losing itself in follies and fancies.

That the understanding cannot make any but an empirical, and never a transcendental, use of all its principles a priori, many of all its concepts, is a proposition which, if thoroughly understood, leads indeed to most important consequences. What we call the transcendental use of a concept in any proposition is its being referred to things in general and to thing-bx-themselves.
while its empirical use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter use alone is admissible will clear from the following considerations. What is required for every concept is, first the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general; and secondly, the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without the latter, it has no sense, and is entirely empty, though it may still contain the logical function by which a concept is in intuition, and though a pure intuition is possible a priori and before the object, yet even that pure intuition can receive its object, and with it its objective validity, by an empirical intuition only, of which it is itself nothing but the form. All concepts, therefore, and with them all principles, though they may be possible a priori, refer nevertheless to empirical intuitions, that is, to date of a possible experience. Without this, they can claim no objective validity... It is for this reason that an abstract concept requires to be made sensuous... because, without this the concept (as people say) is without sense, that is

(1) 4237-240

therefore yielded us this important result, that the understanding a priori can never do more than anticipate the form of possible experience; and as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of
sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are principles for the exhibition of phenomena only; and the proud name of Ontology, which presumes to supply in a systematic way different kinds of synthetical knowledge \textit{a priori} of things-by-themselves (for instance the principle of causality), must be replaced by the more modest name of a mere analytic of the pure understanding." (1)

"What then is the cause why people, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phenomena the noumena, which the understanding only is supposed to be able to realise?" (2) "What right have we then to add to these representations an object, or to ascribe to these modifications, beyond their subjective reality, another objective one?" (3) This says Kant, people do because they think "that something must correspond to it, which is itself not a phenomenon, because a phenomenon now cannot be anything by itself, apart from our mode of representation. Unless therefore we are to move in a constant circle, we must admit that the very word phenomenon \textit{indicates} a relation to something the immediate representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is founded) must be something by itself, "that is, an object independent of our sensibility." (4) This, Kant says,
we do, because "we find that it consists in nothing but the rendering necessary the connection of representations in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule,..."(1)

(1) A197
ML61

But, continues Kant, people do not perceive that whereas in their case we shall have to admit the existence of a faculty of knowledge which may know things without sensuous conditions,(2) which is a kind of cognizing of which we can have no evidence whether for or against it; in our case, we only postulate a something "equal to X" as the transcendental object which serves as the condition a priori for the possibility of experience, but which can have no meaning further than what we attach to it in

(2) A249, 254,
A277, 280, 286,
A297.
A34, 207, 209,
A258, 253, 254,

(3) A104, 109, 247, sense-perception.(3)
A104, 109, 247, sense-perception.(3)
A104, 109, 247, sense-perception.(3)
A104, 109, 247, sense-perception.(3)
A104, 109, 247, sense-perception.(3)

People, says Kant, do not distinguish that the problem of noumena has two aspects, one positive, and one negative. (4) Although concepts may be divided into sensuous and intellectual, this may be done in the negative sense only and not in the positive, for we saw that our concepts, those that are purely intellectual, the categories for example, can have no objective validity except they be united with an intuition in time, and, as far as we are concerned, can admit of no other use except to serve us in the apprehension of objects and to relate them in experience. "Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it does not become itself limited by sensibility, but, on the contrary, limits it,
by calling things by themselves (not considered as phenomena) noumena, in doing this it immediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself, by admitting that it cannot know these noumena by means of the categories, but can only think of them under the name of something unknown." (1) As such however the noumenon is only a problematic concept, devoid of any objective reality such as may be known by us; (2) and if taken in a positive sense, is to be considered as contradictory to the very nature of the rule so very often expressed: "Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind," (3) which is at the base of Kant's "nothings", of which the noumenon is one. (4) In conclusion, therefore, it becomes apparent that Kant's philosophy is in no way restricted or bound to any view of ultimate reality, and that its idealistic teachings are in no way hampered by the absence of such views, for, as Kant has shown, we have nothing to do with ultimate reality. "Now we may well admit that something which, taken transcendentally, is outside us, may be the cause of our external intuition, but this can never be the object which we mean by the representations of matter and material things; for these are phenomena only, i.e. certain kinds of representations existing always within us, and the reality of which depends on our immediate consciousness quite as much as the consciousness of my own thoughts.
The transcendental object is unknown equally in regard

(1) A 372, 379, to internal and external intuition."(1) And with this 357.

M 302, 308, 290, view of the first edition, the second edition also occurs. But an investigation directed specifically to the nature and meaning of phenomena themselves, as given by Kant, will as clearly show us that his transcendental idealism is really idealistic. Without quotations to justify it, we shall here state that the terms 'representation', 'phenomenon' and 'object', the latter not in its transcendental and logical meaning, are synonymous. To this equivocality are due some circular definitions given by Kant, but in the main they are not for our purpose of much significance, and we shall not do more than mention them, - as when Kant says, a phenomenon is "the undefined object of an empirical intuition".(3)

(2) A 20, 108, 34, 720
M 6, 90, 403, 578

As is evident from this, Kant teaches that a phenomenon is directly dependent upon the sensibility for its existence, since an empirical intuition is that which arises through sensation.(4) Intuition in general is "representation which can be produced by a single object only."(5) Sensations form its matter, and concepts furnish its form. Empirical intuition is that which is given by the sensibility to the understanding as

(3) A 29, 108, 34, 720
M 6, 90, 403, 578

perception, and is in fact the phenomenon.(6) Other definitions of phenomena are as follows: a phenomenon is the "play of representations, all of which are at the end determinations only of the internal sense", (1) or
time, as is further developed in the Schematism. Phenomena

(1) A190, 279, 375, 535, M156, 229, 304, 435

are the only things given to us to know; (1) they are the

schema, the sensuous object in agreement with the category

etc. (2) And in all these definitions it is apparent that

phenomena are dependent upon the mind for their existence,

because they originate in the sensibility, with no other
qualities than those put in them by our sense. In a

phenomenon there are two necessary elements upon which its
existence or rather its being known follows: matter, which

(2) A146 M180 etc.

(3) A20, 50 makes affection possible; (3) and form, "which causes the

phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order."

But matter and form are at the foundation of all our
reflection in which matter "denotes the determinable in
general", and the form "its determination". The form

belongs to the subject side, while matter is substantia

phenomenon, of which what "should be absolutely internal--
is a mere phantom, for matter is never an object of the
pure understanding, while the transcendental object which
may be the ground of the phenomenon which we call matter,
is a mere something of which we could not even understand
what it is, though somebody should tell us", (4) which, just
like our previous investigations, proves that phenomena,
and all they contain, exist in being known only, i.e., as
a mental fact.
But not only does Kant's teaching concerning existing objects put him in the same class with the idealists; his doctrine of the synthetic activity of the mind in its cognition of the existing objects is a greater cause, and one much freer from contradictions, for classing Kant as a thoroughgoing idealist. And it now devolves upon us to look into this doctrine of temporal becoming to which is limited all the valid contents of any experience possible to us. We need not, however, here take up its investigation at length, for much of what pertains to it has been already dealt with in the consideration of the Permanent; and besides very little expansion is necessary to show its idealistic implications. A few generalizations and the filling up of missing links from previous discussions would have, therefore, ended our task, were it not for a certain misapprehension that the first two editions of the Critique differ greatly as regards Kant answer to the question, How do we know? We shall therefore take up Kant's teaching in regard to synthetic activity at some length to show the general harmony existing between the two editions, and to designate the value and bearing of the difference found in them.

We said before that the synthetic process is best developed in the Deduction, undoubtedly the most important part of the Critique, which is carefully revised in the second edition. With the deduction of the first edition
we dealt when considering the "permanent unity of self-consciousness". In view of the fact that in the second edition Kant has removed the word permanent from the above expression, and that certain other changes are made which appear to be of a realistic import, it is best here to take up Kant's view of the synthetic process as found in the second edition that we may compare the two editions in this respect: "though it (the second edition) changes absolutely nothing with regard to propositions, and even to proofs", but gives a "new and more intelligible representation of the subject", as Kant says, it still "deviates so considerably from the former (i.e. first edition), in the method of the treatment here and there, that mere additions and interpolations would not have been sufficient." (1) It is these deviations of the second edition as far as the deduction is concerned that we shall now take up and follow out to see whether or not they present to us merely "apparent contradictions", as Kant says. For our purpose it is sufficient to begin with the direct investigation of the synthetic process, that we may lay hold of the changes pertinent to our subject only.

Synthesis, as we have formerly quoted from a passage contained in both first and second edition, is that act required by the spontaneity of our mind, through which
"what is manifold in the pure intuition should first be examined, received and connected in order to produce a knowledge of it." (1) Much of the explanation of synthesis can be better comprehended if we recollect that according to Kant, the production of phenomena is a process of addition, to parts that affect the sense, other parts in a successive, i.e., temporal order. And this is the import of the Aesthetic, which we saw led to the ideality of the objects of our knowledge as phenomena existing in the mind only, and to the unknowability of things-in-themselves. "This addition of part to part, however is not an agglomerate, but is an orderly, a unified and meaningful production of objects according to the necessary functions of the understanding in concepts, the highest unity of which is found in the transcendental apperception, (2)--a unity which is not given to us by the senses, i.e., empirically, but is an a priori act of synthesis. "Such a relation takes place, not by my simply accompanying every relation with consciousness, but by my adding one to the other, and by being conscious of that act of adding, that, of that synthesis." (3) The sensibility therefore, does not give us the connection of the manifold along with the representations of it in time through the internal sense, but the understanding produces such connection of the manifold by affecting the
the internal sense. And consequently, synthesis is an act of the understanding, and therefore a condition a priori for the production of experience likewise. But if the understanding is a faculty of the soul corresponding to the a priori elements of knowledge, and if those elements are the condition under which phenomenon, through time and space, and their relations, through the categories, become possible possible, is it not also evident that, if the soul is to exert an influence upon what follows as the result of its action, and if the necessity and universality with which it thus predetermines with an intelligently unchangeable order all its products is to remain at all times and regardless of temporal, i.e., phenomenal changes, - that the soul will have to and does work upon a material of entirely resistless matter, which has no other meaning but the meaning which is given to it when present in consciousness as a meaning attached to it by the same consciousness in which it appears and which can only know what it means. But this is no more realistic than the thoroughgoing idealism of the first edition. And that such is the case a brief survey of paragraph twenty seven of the second edition, (1) which Summa rises the Results of the Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding, will make evident. There Kant plainly states the same view as regards the categories,(2) the conditions under which objects may be known, and his view of possible experience;
then he sets forth his view of the \textit{a priori} intuitions and concepts of the mind, and its synthetic function through the latter over the sensuous datum, or experience through the Schematism alone; and then shows the groundless claims of the "middle course" promoters, who aim to explain our knowledge and its necessary and universal relations, by saying "that the categories are neither self-produced first principles \textit{a priori} of our knowledge, nor derived from experience, but subjective dispositions of thought, implanted in us with our existence and so arranged by our Creator that their employment should accurately agree with the laws of nature, which determine existence." (1)

But neither such a theistic idealism would Kant admit. The human mind is still an independent sort of an entity, though unknown by itself, which knows nothing more than what its constructions internally and externally are. And this can be further shown by Kant's specific answer to questions put by himself as regards nature and its relation to the thinking mind, which no doubt has given much cause for misgiving to some.

Kant says in the Deduction of the first edition: "You call the ground for the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as it is contained in the objects themselves, the affinity of the manifold. I ask, therefore, how do you make that permanent affinity by which phenomena stand, nay, must stand, under permanent laws, conceivable to your-
"According to my principles it is easily conceivable. A.. possible phenomena belong, as representations, to the whole of our possible self-consciousness. From this, as a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable and a priori certain, because nothing can become knowledge except by means of that original apperception...

It sounds no doubt very strange and absurd that nature should have to conform to our subjective ground of apperception, nay, be dependent on it, with respect to her laws. But if we consider that what we call nature is nothing but a whole of phenomena, not a thing-by-itself, but a number of representations in our soul, we shall no longer be surprised that we only see her through the fundamental faculty of our knowledge, namely, the transcendental apperception, and in that unity without which it could not be called an object (or the whole) of all possible experience, that is, nature". (1) Now the same is the import of the latter part of paragraph twenty six found in the Deduction of the second edition. Kant says: "Categories are concepts which a priori prescribe laws to all phenomena, and therefore to nature as the sum total of all phenomena, and (natura materialitater spectata). The questions therefore arises, as these laws are not derived from nature, nor conform to it as their model (in which case, they would be empirical
only), how we can understand that nature should conform to them, that is, how they can determine a priori the connection of the manifold in nature without taking that connection from nature. The solution of that riddle is this."

If phenomena were things-by-themselves, then they would not have had to be dependent upon the laws of the understanding and the conditions of the sensibility. But they are only existences having a relation to a subject, in which relation they exist merely as known. What they may be behind that we do not know. Consequently phenomena "as mere representations are subject to no law of connection, except that which is prescribed by the connecting faculty. Now that which connects the manifold of sensuous intuition is the faculty of imagination, which receives from the understanding the unity of its intellectual synthesis, and from sensibility the manifoldness of apprehension." But perception depends on empirical synthesis, which in its turn depends on the transcendental synthesis through apprehension which works with the categories, therefore "all phenomena of nature, must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the categories. ...as the original ground of its conformity to law (as natura formaliter spectata)". (1) Phenomena,
therefore, which exist in nature singly by virtue of the existence of beings which have senses, do also conform in the whole, i.e., as nature, to the laws which those beings impose, upon them. And here is the place to notice that though Kant leaves out from the second edition the word permanent to stand as one of the predicates of self-consciousness, this in no way indicates that he has changed his view in regard to it, for at the bottom of all it is again the soul as the subject, though a logical one only, which supplies nature with permanent connections.

But if Kant's view of the synthetic process remains unchanged in the second edition, it may seem that he has changed his attitude somewhat in regard to the two main terms of it, namely, self-consciousness which acts, and the manifold, which is acted upon. But even this we fail to corroborate. As regards Self-consciousness he has made no changes, and the Deduction of the second edition agrees in full not only with the Deduction of the first, but it also contains a great deal of what the Paralogism contained, which is left out in the second edition; thus we find in it the empirical, the transcendental and the noumenal Egos. So also the temporally active aspect and the nontemporal

(1) B18, 24, a priori aspect of the transcendental Ego. (1) And the deduction as a piece of exegesis, has received a by far better treatment, at least as regards coherence, by beginning with the highest condition of knowledge, namely, the
original synthetical unity of apperception, (1) and by omitting the preliminary remarks and preparatory paragraphs, and inserting at the end a very brief account of the psychological place of the subject, not as observations, but as results logically following from the transcendental apperception. It should be clear therefore that, if anything, the case of idealism in Kant is much strengthened in the second edition, if for nothing else, then for the greater emphasis laid upon the mind as an acting power, (2) and a thing which is not quite as abstract as the Subject of the first edition, -- a point which in the second edition led Kant to compare, and name his doctrine of syntheticism, his most original and ingenious contribution to philosophy, according to him, the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, whereby metaphysics shall "enter upon the secure path of a science, just as mathematics and physics have done a long time ago." And this "veritable" revolution is nothing more or less than just this synthetic process which forces us to assume "that the objects must conform to our mode of cognition," and not the reverse, as has been done before, and the results of which have "come to nothing", (3) a notion which, though not so named in the first edition, is yet clearly indicated, (4) because it is the logical outcome of Kant's premises, and is the best evidence of Kant's idealism.
As regards Kant's view of the manifold, it should be noticed that there also he has made no material changes, except a clear statement of that which was only implied in the first Deduction. Kant, namely, there though that the manifold was on the side of the sensibility as unknown in its own nature; here, i.e., in the Deduction of the second edition, paragraph twenty one, (1) he plainly states that the manifold "is represented through the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness" through the categories, and that the manifold is a postulate necessary to assume as given, because our manner of cognition can be explained to work only upon the supposition that "the manifold for an intuition must be given antecedently to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it; - how, remains uncertain." And this means that the apparently two unknowables of the first edition, i.e., the subject of matter and the subject of mental facts, i.e., of function, are only more clearly affirmed. The idealistic tendency of the first edition is not, however, so easily turned into a realistic one by the occurrence in the second edition of clearer restatements of certain problems. It only means that Kant has begun to approach certain difficulties inherent to his system, especially so in regard to the unknown things-in-themselves in their relation to the possibility of
phenomena, which later on, that is, in the Preface to the second edition, and especially in the Prologomena, by reason of his pondering over his ethical system, led him to affirm the existence of things-in-themselves even as unknown, in spite of his Aesthetic and Analytic. But this does not mean that Kant has turned back on idealism; it only shows that an epistemological theory, as Kant's system is, cannot since it avoids ontological implications, give a satisfactory answer to the problem of being. Logic (which Kant took as the basis of his system) is not metaphysics (which Kant so stubbornly denied). By omitting the latter from the Critique, Kant has remained an idealist who always has his back leaning on realism, though he was not able to see it.

-End-
The following are the more important books used in connection with this dissertation:

1. E. Caird - The Critical Philosophy of Kant.
2. R. Watson - Kant and his English Critics.
4. Paul Carus - Introduction to Kant's Prolegomena.
5. Paulsen - Emmanuel Kant.
6. Charles Renouvier - Critique de la Doctrine de Kant.
7. Buchner - Kant's Psychology with Ref. to the Crit.Phil.
8. Miss Calkins - The Persistent Problems of Phil. (Outline of Critique there).