THE PHILOSOPHY OF HORACE

by

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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In a treatise on the philosophy of Horace it is necessary to discuss the following problems: 1) What did Horace know of the different philosophical systems? 2) To what extent do the works of Horace contain references to philosophy? 3) To what philosophy does he refer? 4) To which school did he claim to be an adherent? 5) What is his system of ethics? In order to solve these problems, it is necessary to take first a survey of the development of Greek philosophy.¹

What is meant by the term philosophy? "Philosophy is a search for a comprehensive view of nature, an attempt at the universal explanation of things."² Thus we see that it is closely related to Science. Both are trying to discern the causes of things "Rerum causas cognoscere". Science seeks to discover the causes of phenomena: philosophy seeks to discover the ultimate cause of all things. Science is the necessary foundation of philosophy, or, in the phraseology of Aristotle, it is potential philosophy, while philosophy itself is the actuality. This effort to explain the ultimate causes of the universe has constituted the bulk of mental activity of all civilized races, varying of course in range. But of all early nations none went so far as did the Greeks.

¹ In this treatise I have followed Weber: History of Philosophy; and Turner: History of Philosophy. I have not attempted to take up all the problems of philosophy but have confined myself chiefly to ethics since the art of right living "Rene vivere" was of greatest interest to Horace.

Their philosophy arose out of their religion. They believed in many gods who were of the same kind as human beings but exalted above them in degree. Up to the beginning of the sixth century B.C. all phenomena had been explained by referring them to the capricious will of these divine beings. About this time, however, scholars began to think such explanation of the world about them absurd and sought for other causes. Hence philosophy began when scholars, instead of referring everything to the gods, explained nature by principles and causes. The first attempt among the Greeks at such a scientific explanation of the world was made by Thales of Miletus. He said that water was the first principle and that the earth floated upon the water. His disciple, Anaximander, said that everything, water included, owed its existence to the unlimited atmosphere, and that this unlimited substance was indeliverable and imperishable, and its motion was eternal. Anaximenes followed the latter and said that the first principle was air or breath. As to the way that different things arose from first principles they give no explanation. These scholars practically agree as far as they go. But controversies arise when later philosophers come to look into the nature of things, the problem of becoming. This discussion gave rise to a number of different systems — the system of the Eleatics, of Heraclitus, and of the Atomists.

The Eleatics start out with the idea that beings exist, but they neither arose nor will they pass away. Hence, according to this theory, being is eternal. This eternal being is the one God Whom they make identical with the world. Hence the Eleatics are the creators of philosophical monotheism.
Plato deduces his idealism from this system; while others interpret it in a materialistic sense.

Heraclitus, like the Eleatics, starts out with the idea of being, but he emphasizes the fact that things are always changing. He considers that all bodies are formed from one element, fire. Everything springs from this principle and returns to it. Hence everything is in a state of change. Both of these systems went to extremes, and not until the time of the Pythagoreans was there an attempt at an explanation of the seeming contradiction involved in these systems.

Pythagoras, unlike Heraclitus and the members of the Eleatic school, does not regard matter as a continuous mass, but he breaks it up into different elements. These elements are unchangeable, in themselves, but continually changeable in their relative positions. Hence there is both permanence and change; permanence in the beings themselves, but change in their aspects. Concerning the question of origin, Pythagoras does not differ from the earlier schools. Assuming that the world exists, he is interested in explaining the law and order that exist in this world and in finding a rule of life, a way of salvation. This notion never entirely died out in subsequent Greek thought. "Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics constantly refer philosophy to life as well as to knowledge." About the fifth century B.C., the Pythagoreans went to Thebes and their influence counteracted that of the Sophists and brought about the spiritual reaction of Socrates and Plato against materialism.

The Pythagoreans are interested in the order in the

world, the proportion of harmony, and the mathematical relations underlying all things. Hence their most distinctive principle: "Number is the essence and basis of all things."

They consider that everything is formed from five elements, earth, air, fire, water, and ether, different combinations of which form an infinite variety of bodies.

They consider the soul as a fixed number, a portion of the world soul, a thought of God. In this respect it is immortal; at death it enters upon a life inferior, similar, or superior to the present life, according as the soul has lived for the world, for self, or for God. This doctrine is known as Metempsychosis.

True to their mathematical concept of the world, they apply the doctrine of number to physics, psychology, theology, and ethics, working out a religious connotation for many numbers with the result that their ethical system was thoroughly religious. The chief end of man was to become godlike. This was to be accomplished by subordinating what is lower in man's nature to that which is higher. The importance of the Pythagorean philosophy consists in the fact that it deepened religious feeling in Greece. The old time religious feeling of the Homeric times passed away, and the people began to realize that there was need for atonement from their sins.

As an investigation of nature it is much in advance of the theories of the earlier schools. "The Pythagoreans leave the concrete, sense-perceived basis of existence, and substitute for it the abstract notion of number, thus preparing the way for a still higher notion - that of Being."  

1. Turner: History of Philosophy, p.44. This seems to me to state exactly the advancement made by the Pythagoreans.
The Pythagoreans took the first step in the atomistic philosophy. They saw that all matter could not be reduced to one substance; consequently they reduced everything to five primitive elements. The atomists, however, said that the elements were infinite in number. The atomistic theory was considered the work of Leucippus; the application of the theory to natural sciences was attributed to his disciple, Democritus. They declared that the full and the void were the constituents of all things. They considered the full as being divided into an innumerable number of atoms which were separated by the void, but contained no void in themselves. Each atom was the same as the being of the Eleatics. In themselves they were unchangeable, but by different combinations, all the different substances were formed.

It is very difficult to determine how far the atomists were influenced by their predecessors and contemporaries. Each philosopher in some degree depended upon his predecessors, and in turn influenced his contemporaries. However that may be, one thing is certain: atomism prepared the way for Sophism and subsequent contempt of all knowledge. Atomistic philosophy was materialistic, and "Materialism ends when the highest problems of philosophy begin".¹ Atomistic philosophy, making the soul as well as the body corporal, culminates in the scepticism of the Sophists.

The Atomistic, the Heraclitean, and the Eleatic schools had attacked the trustworthiness of sensible perception and disagreed to such an extent in their explanations, that un-

¹. Turner: History of Philosophy, p. 70
til Socrates appeared on the scene to determine the condition of scientific knowledge, no positive development of philosophy was possible. This gave rise to a school called the Sophists who deny the possibility of attaining knowledge. These were the first sceptics of Greece.

Protagoras, the first member of this school, was greatly influenced by Heraclitus. According to his teaching "Nothing is, all is becoming; but even this becoming is relative". As objects present themselves differently to different individuals, there is no objective truth. The relativity of knowledge reduces it to individual opinion. Hence a proposition and its opposite are true, if they appear to different individuals to be true. "Man is the measure of all things."

The teaching of the Sophists destroys the mental foundation of Polytheism and prepares the way for the religion of Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics. Their moral system is not scientific because it failed to realize universal principles. By man as the measure of all things, Protagoras meant the individual and not human nature in general. He meant the particular, changeable individual, not the unchangeable moral element common to all. Goodness, justice, and truth depend upon individual tastes as the final judge. There are, therefore, as many systems of ethics as there are individuals, which amounts to saying that there are none.

The error of the Sophists consists in their interpreting man to mean not man in general but the individual man. They fail to see that human reason is the same in all, that diversity is but apparent, and that we have only to remove by education

l. Turner: History of Philosophy, 72.
the superficial layer in order to discover in all the same ideas and aspirations toward goodness, justice, and truth. It is this cardinal error that is rectified by Socrates.

Like the Sophists, Socrates had a contempt for metaphysics and natural sciences. Like them he placed the study of man and the duties of the citizen as the chief aim of education. Their scepticism forms the starting point of the Philosophy of Socrates. "All that he knows is that he knows nothing." He is convinced that certainty is impossible in physical science, but he believes that there is something in the universe that can be known. This is man. We can never know the nature of the world, its principles and causes; but we can know how we ourselves ought to live, what is the end of life, the highest good of the soul. This is the only thing that can be known with certainty, therefore Socrates' motto "Know thyself". Outside of ethics, of which Aristotle calls Socrates the founder, there can be no serious philosophy.

"Socrates' merit, therefore, consists in having attempted, at least in morals, to separate the general from the particular; in having advanced from the particular to the universal. In having discovered beneath the infinite variety of men, the one unchangeable man".1 In the midst of intellectual anarchy, he teaches how to define and help put an end to confusion of ideas by giving words their exact meaning.2 The cause for a great many errors had been the misuse of words, therefore he introduces conceptual thinking, the source from which all science springs. The intimate relation between

knowledge and will constitutes the fundamental principle of his philosophy. If a person knows the right, he will do it; only ignorance is the cause of wrong doing. "Knowledge is virtue and virtue is knowledge." Therefore educate men to distinguish between right and wrong.

Socrates justifies morality on two grounds, the commercial and the moral. The fundamental principle underlying the first is "Honesty is the best policy"; while the moral basis considers virtue best in and of itself. This is the only basis upon which his actions in life, during his trial, and just before his death can be explained.

Socrates had a great many disciples, and a number of them founded schools of their own, each emphasizing in his school the part of the Socratic doctrine that seemed most important to him. Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaics, emphasizes the commercial side. For him pleasure is the only thing to be desired in and for itself. Pleasure is measured mainly in terms of intensity, the most intense pleasures being those of the body, not of the intellect. Theodorus, one of his disciples, turns to quiet pleasures; this view is a stepping stone to Epicureanism.

The Cynics adopt the moral side of the Socratic doctrine. The independence and hardness of Socrates impress them. They consider that virtue and only virtue leads to happiness. They do not, however, put this doctrine into practice but use virtue as a cloak for vice. The truth of the moral side of all Socratic doctrine is found in the teaching of the Stoics; the commercial side is emphasized by the
Epicureans. The main line of Socratic thought, however, comes down to us through Plato.

Plato, after a study of the systems of the Eleatics and Heraclitus in explaining the problems of becoming, saw the futility of materialism; consequently advances another theory, idealism.

The mission of Socrates was to form ideas; but he regards these ideas as thoughts or concepts in the mind, while Plato regards them as being copies of realities. These ideas, which are copies of the real outside world, must agree with the real world. The things themselves pass away, but the idea remains. Therefore, the ideas are more real than the things of the outside world of which they are the general patterns. Plato separates the idea from the thing itself. In fact he has two worlds, the world of ideas and the world of objects.

The highest concept of Plato is the absolute good. All other ideas become modes of this highest idea which is God. God, therefore, is the greatest reality, but Plato places him beyond the clouds somewhere in his world of ideas. This is what is known as the transcendent idea of God. Plato realizes the fact that there is also evil in the world, which, he believes, cannot be created by the good or absolute being. He calls this matter or non-being. Non-being cannot be created by being, so he makes matter co-eternal with God. In this Plato comes back to dualism.

He rejects the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body, because it has strivings contrary to the senses. This conflict proves it to be of a nature different from that of
the body. How, then, did it come to be united to the body? Plato answers by an allegory, in which he draws the doctrine of pre-existence. Pre-existence gives rise to the doctrine of immortality. The sojourn of the soul in this world is but a period of discipline, which ends with the death of the body, when the soul returns to the country from whence it came. "Indeed, Plato is the first Greek philosopher to formulate in scientific language an answer to the question, Does death end all things?" The answer to which this argument leads is an "everlasting no". The soul lives after the death of the body, and the future life of the good is better than the life in this world.

This doctrine of the immortality of the soul resembles somewhat the doctrine of transmigration propounded by Pythagoras. In his ethics Plato follows the teachings of Socrates. From him he learned that, although it is impossible to understand the nature of the world, yet we can know ourselves and attain to a knowledge of the highest good. Plato, as a consistent idealist, finds the highest good not in pleasure but in man's most perfect likeness to God.

God is the absolute good or absolute justice. It is impossible to get entirely rid of evil on the earth, but it has no place among the gods in Heaven. So it is our duty to fly away, as it were, to Heaven, i.e. to become god-like. Justice is the mother of all the virtues. "Wisdom is the justice of the mind; courage, the justice of the heart; temperance, the justice of the senses. Piety is justice in our relation with deity."¹ Man must be educated in order to reach this higher goal and he cannot attain to it by himself. It is only realized in the collective man or state. In this state there are three classes, each of which must receive an education in accordance with the position which he is to fill.

The philosophers or ruling class must pursue their studies for a much longer period. At the age of thirty they turn their attention particularly to ethics. Wisdom is the virtue of this class, courage of the soldiers, and obedience of the third class. The mission of the state is to realize goodness and justice on the earth.

According to Plato, as we have seen, reality does not belong to the objects of sense but to the ideas or types which these objects represent. The highest idea in this series is that of the good. This may be called "The monoism of the good". "It is the sublimest and purest product of philosophic genius."²

Modern scientists like Plato and Socrates, hold that the phenomenon is changing, the general law is stable and is therefore more real than the particular facts. Plato's mistake was not in exalting the universal over the particular,  

but in his separating them from the objects of sense. This is what Aristotle criticized and undertook to correct.

Aristotle goes back to the old problem of first principles which he called the science of being, that is, the real in this world. His problem is narrowed down to this: What is the nature of being? Is reality general or particular? The Sophists declared all knowledge to be particular. Socrates said it was general, while Plato and Aristotle hold that both the general and the particular are real. Plato had to put the generals in another world in order to avoid contradiction. Aristotle said that unless the generals are in this world they are unreal for us. He holds that the universal and the particular must exist in this world. This is known as the immanent view. He claims that the universal exists in the particular. A desk, for example, is neither particular nor general to the exclusion of the other. It is a particular desk, but it is one of a general class of objects and shares the universal nature of all desks. In the terminology of Aristotle, this desk has both form and matter. The form is common to all desks, but the material in it is peculiar to itself. For Aristotle the real thing is in this world, for Plato it is beyond the clouds. Aristotle next takes issue with Plato for saying that matter is non-being. He claims that matter is the germ of form, being, or idea. There is one exception to the general rule that everybody possesses both form and matter. God is pure form and no matter. Aristotle has a graded series of form and matter. At the top of the standard is pure form, God. If God is the
the highest in the series, what is the lowest or pure matter? His answer is, there is no matter without form.

These stages are also comparative degrees of actuality and potentiality, reality and possibility. A piece of marble, for example, is actually a piece of marble; potentially it is a statue. When it is a statue, it actually is what potentially it was. The world is potentially God. God is actuality, perfect, complete realization. In Aristotle's theory he accounts for evolution in the world instead of the static, unchangeable world of Plato. This developing mental phase started with Heraclitus; was carried farther by Aristotle; and reaches perfection in Hegel.

What is the cause of this development? We are attracted to a higher life by God whose life is pure self-consciousness or intelligence. As the final cause God is both in things (immanent) and above things (transcendent). Everything is organized and controlled by Him. The unity that exists in the world proves the unity of God.

The relation that exists between the body and the soul is the same as that existing between matter and form, between the world and God. The organized body, therefore, lives for the sake of the soul which is its final cause. From this he argues that metempsychosis is impossible. In so far as the soul is the seat of sensation, will, etc., it is mortal; but as the seat of pure reason, it is immortal. Aristotle calls the quality that makes it immortal active intellect. It is this quality that makes the soul an intermediate between the animal and God.
In his ethics he has the same problem as Socrates and Plato, what is the final end of life, or what is the highest good? All agree that happiness is the final end but disagree as to what happiness really is. Aristotle says that happiness results from the exercise of one's rational nature, that is, spiritual nature. This is known as the self-realization or perfection theory. Hedonism, the opposing view, makes quantity of feeling life the highest good. Aristotle does not leave feeling life out of account, but he makes it the result of perfection. Perfection or virtue is the end, and happiness is the result. The Stoics agree with Aristotle, while the Epicureans claim that pleasure is the end and virtue the means.

Aristotle discusses another problem in ethics, What is the nature of virtue? He makes it a matter of the will. It is not only knowing what is right, but in being compelled by the will until a habit of right action is found. According to this theory, about the best definition would be: Virtue is a trained and settled habit of action leading to the highest good. Aristotle says that virtue is not the extreme opposite of vice. It is a mean between two extremes.

Unlike Aristotle, who loves science for science's sake, Epicurus is interested in it only in so far as it bolsters up his theory of ethics. He considered pleasure as the highest good. In seeking for a metaphysics of this kind, he goes to the atomistic materialism of Democritus. After a study of his theory, he was convinced that the fear of the gods and the hereafter is the principal obstacle in the way of man's happiness. He, therefore, believed that it was the duty of
philosophy to free men from this belief in the supernatural.

Matter is not, according to Epicurus, non-being, as Plato states, but it is the very essence of things from which mind, soul, and thought arose. He agrees with Democritus that matter is composed of uncreated and indestructible atoms in continued motion. Therefore, absolute creation and destruction of the universe are out of the question.

In order to convince themselves that the world is not the work of the gods, they consider the nature of the gods and the imperfection of the world. Why should these supremely happy beings create the world? If they are perfectly happy, it is not a condition of divine happiness and they have their own place of abode. If they created it for men, it must have been for the few philosophers and that would not be worth while. If it were created for wicked men, the gods are cruel beings. How can we assume a world full of evil the creation of the gods? "Empty space, atoms, and weight, in short, mechanical causes, suffice to explain the world."¹

All agree, however, that gods exist. They are happy beings, free from care, unmoved by the miseries of mankind, living in their far off home, enjoying absolute repose; nor are they able to exert any influence whatever on the life of man.

We should not fear the punishment of Tartarus because the soul is material. This is proved by the fact that the advance and decline of the soul corresponds to analogous bodily conditions. If the soul retains consciousness at death, or if death is the transition of the soul to a higher life, men should rejoice at it. We fear death because we combine

¹ Weber: History of Philosophy, p. 137.
with it an idea of life. If we should relinquish all thought of immortality, death would have no terror for us.

They claim that if men are not educated along this line, they are prevented from attaining the goal of their existence, happiness. Pleasure is the highest good, not that accompanying a passing sensation, but as a permanent state of peace and happy contentment. Simplicity and naturalness is the key note of their philosophy. If a person is to attain to perfect happiness, desire for power, wealth, and fame, which seem to lead to pleasure, must be abandoned. If a man is to be happy, "Add not to his riches but take away from his desires", that is, change his desires. One should desire simple and natural pleasures, such as conversation, the simple life, and the pleasures of friendship. Happiness or pleasure, according to the Epicureans, is the end and perfection or virtue the means. Virtue impels the wise man to do what is for his best welfare. "Honesty is the best policy."

The early Stoics did not formulate any new system of philosophy but released cynicism from its abuses. In metaphysics their theory is the exact opposite of the Epicurean doctrine. The latter held that the particular is more real than the general; the former held that the world as a whole is the only self sufficient thing. They hold that the world is a rational, organized whole, a living organism. The world is a living being of which God is the soul, or, in other words, God is the world and the world is God. The world is the corporal side and God the rational side.

This theology is a compromise between pantheism and theism. The doctrine that makes God identical with the world
is known as pantheism. This reduces everything to a dead level. Although the Stoics identify God with the universe, they make the universe a real being. Aristotle also spoke of the rational and physical side of nature. The rational is real and superior to the physical, therefore the latter should become subordinate to the former. The Stoics ascribe providential care and love to God which is a contrast to the Epicurean belief.

The pantheism of the Stoics is essentially religious. They consider Jupiter as the supreme God but grant the existence of other gods. They ascribe immortality, however, to Jupiter alone.

Since, according to their view, reality is synonymous with corporeality, the soul is matter. The decay of the body, however, does not necessarily mean the destruction of the soul. If there be no hereafter for all men, the philosopher, at least, exists beyond the grave. The Stoics do not mean by this, immortality in the absolute sense. The soul is not destroyed, but returns to the place from whence it came. God alone is immortal.

The Stoics had no set theory in logic or metaphysics, but the distinguishing characteristic of their philosophy was their system of ethics, the key note of which is "Virtue for virtue's sake". Happiness consists in independence and peace of mind, rather than in the enjoyment which moral conduct brings. "How can he be deficient in happiness", Cicero says, "whom courage preserves from fear and care, and self control guards from passionate pleasures and desires."

1 Cicero: Tusculanarum Disputationum, V, 14, 42.
The Stoics regard the universal element in man who seeks contentment from within, the Epicureans regard the individual side of his nature. The Stoics regard man as a thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of feeling.

Like Aristotle's, the Stoics' theory of ethics is a perfection or self-realization theory. They differ from him in the fact that they claim that there is no mean state. One cannot be virtuous in one respect and not be wholly virtuous person. If a man possess any one of the cardinal virtues, as wisdom, courage, temperance, or justice, he possesses them all. A man is good in all things or bad in all. The later Stoics, however, do not go to such extremes, they do not wholly reject the feeling side of life but make pleasure a secondary good.

With such a background of confused and contradictory philosophical views, Pythagoreanism, Sophism, Pantheism, Theism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism, Horace began his search for a philosophy.
CHAPTER II
HORACE’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY

In this section it will be necessary to answer three questions: 1) Was Horace acquainted with these different systems of philosophy? 2) Was he interested in them? 3) To which school was he an adherent?

1) Horace’s Acquaintance with Philosophical Systems.

Horace tells us in Sat. I, 4, 115, that his father advised him to study philosophy:

Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu
Sit melius, causas reddet tibi;

The culmination of a liberal education at the time of Horace was to spend some years at Athens, the fountain head of philosophy and literature. These advantages, however, were not open to all and it was an exceptional thing for a man in Horace’s circumstances to be able to share in the life of the rich men’s sons. But such good fortune came to Horace. Epist. II, 2, 43.

Adicere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae, Scilicet ut vellem curvo dinoscere rectum Atque inter silvas Academi quasrere verum.

Very little is known, however, of his studies at Athens except that they were interrupted by the civil war. Epist. II, 2, 46.

Dura sed emovere loco me tempora grato, Civilisique rudem belli tutil est atus in arma, Caesaris Augusti non responsura lacertis.

Horace is supposed to have been in the city about the year 46 B. C., a time when the Epicureans, the Stoics, the
Peripatetics, and the Academicians enjoyed a flourishing existence. Are we to infer from this that Horace became acquainted with one or all of these four schools to the exclusion of the other philosophical systems? This would be impossible, for each of these schools owed its existence and development to some previous school. In fact they were founded on different phases of the teaching of Socrates. We have only to glance at Horace's writings to see numerous references to earlier philosophers, which show that he had at least a knowledge of them and the systems that they upheld.

We find no mention of the earliest such as Thales, Anaxagoras or Heraclitus because the problems that they discussed were not of interest to Horace. He mentions Democritus and Empedocles, and makes frequent reference to Chrysippus; Aristippus, Socrates, Pythagoras, Plato, the Epicureans, and the Stoics.

Horace, of course, does not definitely discuss all these different systems, but he had the happy faculty of introducing their teachings into his writings. He would have been unable to do this with any degree of success had he not studied all the different systems.

3) Horace's Interest in Philosophical Systems.

A large majority of the poets are declared enemies of philosophy because different philosophers hold such opposite and contradictory views. They realize too that many philosophers uphold

1. Epist. I, 12, 12.
2. Epist. I, 12, 20.
absurd teachings; so they cast away the true and the reason-
able with the false and the foolish. Horace, however, can-
not be classed with these poets. Epist. I, 1, 10.

Nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono
Quid verum atque decens curae et rogo, et omnis
in hoc sum

Epist. II, 2, 141

Nimirum sapere est abjectis utile nugis,
Et tempestivum pueris concedere ludum,
Ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinis,
Sed verae numeroque modosque ediscere vitae,
Quocirca mecum loquor haec tacitusque recordor.

In fact to all the poets he recommends, besides the knowledge
of life and experience, the study of philosophy Epist. II, 3,
309.

Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons:
Rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,
Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequuntur.

Not only did he recommend these principles to others, but he
himself followed them and in Epist. I, 1, 27 he says that he
was guided and comforted through the teachings of wisdom.

Restat ut his ego me ipse regam solerque
elementis.

3) The Philosophical School to which Horace Belonged.

In order to determine the philosophical school to which Horace
belonged, it will be necessary to find out the attitude which
he took toward all the different schools. At times he takes
his stand with the Epicureans, once he suggests his adherence
to the Stoics, but almost in the same breath he says his phil-
osophy is a composite of the best things that he has gleaned
from the study of all the philosophers. I shall start, then,
with a discussion of his attitude toward the Epicureans and
Stoics and follow with a discussion of his attitude toward
Aristotle, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato.

A) Horace and Epicurus and the Epicureans

To a large class of people, Horace's message to his
generation is nothing more than "enjoy the present and be un-
disturbed about the future". In other words, he is an Epi-
curean. In this treatise I purpose to show that Horace could
not be classed among the followers of Epicurus.

1) Horace's Attitude toward the Epicurean Theory of
Death. Epicurus thought that the fear of death was the chief
cause of discontent; consequently he avoided any mention of
the subject. Horace, on the contrary, keeps reminding his
readers that "the place that now knows them, shall soon know
them no more forever". Ode I, 28, 15.

Sed omnes una manet nox
Et calcanda semel via leti.

Ode I, 4, 13.

Pallida mors aequo pulsat pede pauperiem tabernas
Regumque turris.

Epist. II, 3, 178.

Metit Orcus
Grandia cum parvis, non exorablis auro?

Ode I, 11, 4.

Seu plures hiemes, seu tribuit Iuppiter ultimam,
Quae nunc oppositis debilitat pumicibus mare
Tyrhenenum.

Ode II, 3, 4.

Moriture Delli,

Sat. II, 6, 93.

Terrestria quando
Mortalis animas vivunt aortita, neque ulla est
Aut magno aut parvo leti fuga.
Ode II, 3, 24.
Victima nil miserantis Orci.
Ode I, 28, 20.
Nulla saeva caput Proserpina fugit.
Ode II, 13, 19.
Sed improvisa leti
Vis rapuit et rapietque gentis.
Sat. II, 6, 97.
Vive nemor, quam sis aevi brevis.¹

3) Horace's Attitude toward the Epicurean Theory of
the Hereafter. Epicurus taught that there is no hereafter.
All you have is each day as it comes; therefore enjoy it. Hor-
ace, on the other hand, does believe in a life beyond the grave.
If this were not so, there would be no meaning to Ode I, 4, 17.
Domus exilis Plutonia.
Ode II, 13, 22.
Iudicantem vidimus Aeacum.
Ode II, 13, 31.
Regna Proserpinae.
It is impossible for Horace to rest in the conviction that this
brief and troubled career on earth is the "Be all, end all of
existence". He may have had his doubts at times as all great
thinkers have, but in Ode III, 2, 21 we find his true convic-
tions.
Virtus, recludens immirtis mori
Caelum, negata temptat iter via,
Coetusque volgaria et udam
Spernit humum fugiente pinna.

¹ See also Odes II, 14, 2 and 4. IV, 7, 31. II, 18, 29-32.
Ode III, 2, 26.

Vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum
Volgarit arcanae, sub idem
Sit trabibus fragilémque mecum
Solvat phaselôn.

Ode III, 3, 9.

Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules
Enius arces attigit igneas.

In his teaching in this connection Horace comes nearer to the Christian conception than any other pagan philosopher except Socrates. Ceres, the grain must first die, then spring up again; the type of immortality, "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone".1 But, perhaps wisely, Horace gives little space to the discussion of this subject, for he seems to regard the after life as cold and unsubstantial, as repellant to most people.

3) Why Horace is Mistakenly Considered an Epicurean.

If Horace were not an Epicurean, why was he so considered by such a large number of people? (a) He definitely stated that he was. Epist. I, 4, 15.

Me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,
Cum ridere voles Epicuri de gregis porcum.

(b) At other times Horace implied that he was an Epicurean. He was broad-minded enough to see some good in their system. He realized that pleasure and enjoyment were all right in their place and gave utterance to these views. Consequently some, without sufficient reflection, or without considering both sides of his teaching, have been induced to call him an Epicurean. There is, however, a vast difference between the teachings of Horace and Epicurus on the doctrine of pleasure. Epicurus made pleasure one of the chief ends of life. Let 1. John XII, 24.
us look under what conditions Horace wrote the majority of his poems in the spirit of "Carpe diem". (1) They are written in a mood to which he gives way as a relief from painful memories or anxious forebodings. Out of the thought of the certainty of death he seems to extract a keen interest in the enjoyment of the present. Ode I, 11,1-3,4-5, 7-8.

Tu ne quaesieris......quem mihi, quem tibi
Finem di dederint.

Seu plurès hiemès, seu tribuit Iuppiter ultimam
Quae nunc oppositis debilitat pumicibus mare.
Tyrrenenum.

Dum loquimur, fugerit invida
Aetas: carpe diem, quam minimum crèdula posterò.

The whole of Ode II, 3, is written in the strain
"Live while you live, the Epicure will say.
And give to pleasure every passing day." 1

yet the keynote of the ode is struck in moriture.

Sat. II, 6, 93.

Terrestria quando
Mortalis animas vivunt sortita, neque ullà est
Aut magno aut parvo leti fuga: quo, bone, circa,
Dum licet, in rebus iucundis vivè beatùs.

Ode IV, 7, 17.

Quis scit an adiciant bodiernaè crastina summae
Tempora di superi?
Cuncta manus avidae fugient heredis, amico
Quae dederis animo.

Ode I, 9, 13.

Quid sit futurum oras, fuge quaerers et
Quem Fors dierum cumque dabit, lucro
Appone nec dulcis amores
Sperne puer neque tu choreas.

(2) To men in high positions and those who are constantly employed with weighty matters, he recommends a little gayety.

Ode III, 29 is addressed to Maecenas in this strain "A freshly

1. Doddridge.
opened jar awaits thee at my home, Maecenas; come, tear thyself away from cares of state and taste of country joys. The future we may not guess: but each day’s duty rightly met brings tranquil peace; what once we’ve had, no power can take away; while fortune bides, I bless her; when she takes her flight I trust the gods to bear me safe through every gale”. ¹

Ode I, 7, 17-31.

Sic tu sapiens finire memento
Tristitiam vitaeque labores
Molli, Plance, mero, seu te fulgentia signis
Castra tenent seu densa tenebit.
Tiburis umbra tui.

Epist. I, 11, 22.

Tu quamcumque deus tibi fortunaverit horam
Grata sume manu neu dulcia differ in annum,
Ut quocumque loco fueris, vixisse libenter
Te dicas;

Epod. Xiii, 3.

Rapiamus, amici,
Occasionem de die, dumque virent genua
Et decet, obducta solvatur fronte senectus.

Ode IV, 12, 25.

Verum pone moras et studium luceri
Nigrorumque memor, dum licet, ignium
Misce stultitiam consiliis brevem:
Dulce est desipere in loco.

Epist. I, 4, 12-16.

Inter spem curamque, timores inter et iras
Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum;

Ode III, 8, 17.

Maecenas............
Mitte civilis super urbe curas:

Ode III, 8, 25-28.

Neclegens,ne qua populas laboret,
Parce privatus nimium caveret et
Dona praeuentis cape laetus horae ac
Linques severas.

Even in these teachings about the wisdom of pleasure, Horace does not forget to impress upon the mind of his readers that moderation must be observed at all times. Ode II, 3, 1.

Aequam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
Ab insolentiat temperatam
Laetitia.

In addition he warns those who are too intent upon pleasure, wealth, and worldly position, away from the lower and points them to the higher things. Epist. I, 3, 55.

Sperne voluptates; nocet empta dolore voluptas.

Epist. I, 3, 40.

sapere aude;
Incipe. Qui recte vivendi prorogat horam,
Rusticus exspectat dum defluat amnis; at ille
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.


Quod si
Frigida curarum fomenta relinquere posses,
Quo te saelestis sapientia duceret, ires.

c) He prefers the Epicurean to the Stoic in one case. Sat. I, 3, 96-98.

Quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant
Cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresaque repugnant
Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

Horace ridicules the Stoic doctrine that all faults are equal and appeals to the standard of utility, the practical teaching of the Epicureans. This, however, only proves what I have stated before, that Horace is willing to recognize whatever is good in any system.

d) He suggests that he believes in the Epicurean doctrine of the gods. From Sat. I, 5, 100,

Dum flamma sine tura liqueascere limine sacro
Persuaders cupit. Credat Iudaeus Apella,
Non ego; namque deos didici securum agere aevum,
Nequ quid miri faciat natura, deos id
Tristis ex alto caeli demittere tecto.
people who claim that he was an Epicurean seem to have their strongest point. Let us look closely into this satire. The whole poem is written jokingly and it is not at all like Horace to give utterance to his truest convictions at the close of a poem of this nature. Again, this satire is not in Horace's usual style when he is writing about the gods. Horace, however, is upholding one good point of the Epicureans here, viz., their utter abhorence of superstition. Before we finally determine that he is an Epicurean because of his statement in this satire, let us turn to his other writings and find out if it is his custom to speak thus of the gods.

Ode IV, 13, 1.

Audivere, Lyce, di mea vota, di
Audivere, Lyce:

Ode I, 12, 13.

Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
Lauditus, qui res hominum ac deorum,
Qui mare et terras variisque mundum
Temperat horis?

Ode III, 5, 1.

Caelo tonantem credidimus Iovem
Regnare;

Ode I, 17, 13.

Di me tuentur, dis pietas mea
Et Musa cordi est.

Epist. I, 18, 111-112.

Sed satis est orare Iovem, quae ponit et aufert;
Det vitam, det opes;aequum mi animum ipse parabo.

1. Sat.I, 9 and Ode I, 27 are written jokingly throughout. On the other hand, Epist. I, 1 is written seriously and ends with a joke. There is no other instance in which he comes down to seriousness at the end of a jesting poem, consequently we infer that he was not speaking seriously here.
Ode IV, 15, 25.

Nosque et profestis lucibus et sacris
Inter iocosae munera Liberi
Cum prole matronisque nostris,
Rite deos prius adprecati.

Epod. 13, 7.

deus haec fortasse benigna
Reducet in sedem vice.

Ode. III, 6, 5,

Dis te minorem quod geris, imperas:
Hinc omne principium, hoc refer exitum.
Di multa neclecti dederunt
Hesperiae mala luctuosae. 1

Finally, if we did not have any of these references just mentioned, we should find ample statement of Horace's views on this subject in Ode I, 34, where he devoted the entire ode to refuting the idea that he believed the gods lived a life of repose.

Ode I, 34, 1-12.

Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens,
Insanientis dum sapientiae
Consultus erro, nunc retrorsum
Vela dare atque iterare cursus

Cogor relictos: namque Diespiter,
Igni coruscus nubila dividens
Plorumque, per purum tonantis
Egit equos volucremque currum;

Quo bruta tellus et vaga flumina
Quo Styx et invisì horrida Taenari
Sedes Atlanteusque finis
Concutitur.

This philosophy of the Epicurean attitude toward the gods and their repose had lately been described in almost the grandest effort of Latin Poetry, Lucretius "De Rerum Natura". One of its cardinal points was that either the gods did not exist at all, or that they lived wholly apart, remote from all care.

1. See also Odes I, 11, 1-3; II, 17, 37; I, 31, 13; I, 31, 13; III, 2, 29.
"The Gods who haunt
The lucid interspace of world and world
Where never creeps a cloud or moves a wind
Nor sound of human sorrow mounts
To mar their sacred everlasting calm."

Among many other arguments to prove the remoteness of the gods from human affairs, one of the most popular was: if thunder be the voice of God, why does it never thunder except when clouds are about and it can be explained on natural grounds?

Horace had actually heard thunder "caelo puro". He was alarmed and did not know how to explain it. The thought of the Epicurean philosophy came before his mind and the absurdity of it was thrust home upon him. He was speaking in jest when he declared that he was an Epicurean before this time. If we did not know that Horace was thoroughly religious and that he spoke jokingly of the Epicurean philosophy, "Insanientis Sapientiae" would reveal the secret.

Before leaving the discussion of the Epicurean philosophy there is a point of resemblance to mention, viz., his advocacy of a simple life and the necessity of controlling desires. This point of resemblance is not often cited, for the word Epicurean came to suggest rather sensual indulgence than control of desires. Sensual indulgence, however, was not a part of the teachings of Epicurus himself, but his followers, even his earliest, went beyond their master in commending sensual delights until luxurious living seemed to the Roman Epicureans to be the highest good. The Epicureans made distinctions so fine between the more or less refined pleasures, that they were unintelligible to the Romans, who were willing to sacrifice every kind of enjoyment. Consequently, when pursuing pleasure,

1. Tennyson's Lucretius.
they descended to its coarsest forms and used the word Epicureanism as a cloak for their vice. It is the teaching of Epicurus only that Horace commends; he satirizes those who deviated from the straight path. Satires II, 4, 6 and 8 are directed against those who were living on the principle "Eat, drink, and be merry". Horace holds up the standard of "Mundus Victus" as the proper mean between the luxurious and niggardly style of living. Sat. II, 2, 63.

Quali igitur victu sapiens utetur, et horum
Utrum imitatitur? Hac urget lupus, hac canis, aiunt.
Mundus erit, qua non offendat sordibus, atque
In neutram partem cultus miser.

Sat. II, 2, 70.

Accipe nunc, victus tenuis quae quantaque secum
Adferat.

Sat. II, 4, 1-3.

Unde et quo Catius? Non est mihi tempus aveni
Ponere signa novis praecptis, qualia vincunt
Pythagorae Anytique reum doctumque Platona.

introduces an unknown man by the name of Catius, who proceeds to deliver a speech to Horace on correct dining. There seems to be no doubt that Horace introduces him as a Roman epicure in order to show the absurdity of his doctrine. The sarcastic words at the end of the satire show Horace's true position.

Sat. II, 4, 93-95.

at mihi cura
Non mediocris inest, fontis ut adire remotos
Atque haurire queam vitae praecpta beatae.

Although Horace censures this extravagant type of Epicurean, he praises those who uphold the precepts of a simple life.

Ode III, 16, 43.

bene est, cui deus obtulit
Parca quod satis est manu.
Ode II, 16, 13,

Vivitur parvo bene, cui paternum
Splendet in mensa tenui salinum
Nec levis somnus timor aut cupido
Sordidus aufert.

Epist. I, 10, 10-11,

Utque sacerdotis fugitivus liba recuso;
Pane ego iam mellitus potiore placentis

Ode II, 18, 11,

nihil supra
Deos laccos nec potentem amicum
Largiora flagito,
Satis beatus inicis Sabinis.

Sat. II, 2, 1, 4-6,

Quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo....
Dicite non inter lances mensasque nitentis,
Cum stupet insanis acies fulgoribus et cum
Acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat.

Epist. I, 14, 10,

Rure ego viventem, tu dicis in urbe beatum.

Ode I, 31, 15-20,

Me pascunt olivae,
Me cichorea levesque malvae.

Frui paratis et valido mihi,
Latos, donae et, precor, integra
Cum mente, nec turpem senectam
Degere nec cithara carentem.

Summary: At the risk of repetition I shall summarize the conclusions of our investigation as to why Horace is mistakenly classed as an Epicurean. 1) Horace jokingly said in several cases that he was an Epicurean; 2) Horace was sympathetic with three phases of Epicurean Philosophy: a) he enjoined the people, at times, to pursue pleasure, but unlike the popular Epicureans he enjoined also moderation; b) he upheld the practical against the theoretical; c) he advocated the simple life.
He differed from them in two respects: a) in his conception of life after death; b) in his belief in the gods. If we are to take Horace's words in Epist. I, 1, 14, "Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri" he was not an Epicurean, and finally I cannot conceive of Horace speaking as in Epist. I, 4, 15,

Me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,
Cum ridere voles Epicuri de grege porcum

of a philosopher whose teachings he made the rule of his life.

B) Horace and the Stoics

Horace has not only allied himself with the Epicureans, but he has also allied himself with the Stoics. We found some reason for considering him an Epicurean. Let us see if those who consider him a Stoic have any foundation for their opinion.

1) Horace's Stoic Attitude toward the Crushing of Desires.

There are several passages in Horace that bear on the crushing of desires, one of the cardinal principles of the Stoics.

Ode II, 2, 9-12.

Latius regnes avidum domando
Spiritum, quam si Libyam remotis
Gadibus iungas et uterque Poenus
Serviat unu.

Ode I, 11, 3.

Ut melius, quicquid erit, pati!

2) Horace's Stoic Attitude toward Wealth and Worldly Goods.

The fact that the majority of people were striving after wealth and worldly goods seemed to lead Horace to embody the Stoic doctrine in several odes written on the proper use of wealth. To achieve this wealth nothing was too much to sacrifice, time, health, happiness, even honor itself.
"Get money, money still
And then let virtue follow if she will."

was the attitude taken by so many that Horace undertakes to
show that wealth does not lead to happiness.

Epist. I, 1, 42.

Vides, quae maxima credis
Esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam,
Quanto devites animi capitisque labore.

Epist. I, 1, 58.

Vilius argentum est auro, virtutibus aurum.

Ode II, 16, 9-12.

Non enim gazae neque consularis
Summovet lictor miseris tumultus
Mentis et curas laqueata circum
Tecta volantis.

Ode III, 24, 1.

Intactis opulentior
Thesauris Arabum et divitis Indiae
Caementis licet occupes
Tyrhenum omne tuis et mare Apulicum;

Si figit adamantinos
Summis verticibus dira Necessitas
Clavos, non animum metu,
Non mortis laqueis expedites caput.

Sat. I, 1, 40.

Nil obstet tibi, dum ne sit te ditior alter.

Sat. I, 1, 70-73.

congestis undique saccis
Indormis inhius et tamquam parcere sacris
Cogeris aut pictis tamquam gaudere tabellis.
Nescis quo valeat nummus? quem praebat usum?

3) Horace's Stoic Attitude Toward the Simple Life.

Simple life and self-restraint will lead to happiness, not

Vivitur parvo bene, cui paternum
Splendet in mensa tenui salinum
Nec levis somnos timor aut cupidio
Sordidus aufert.

Epist. I, 2, 55-57

Sperne voluptates; nocet empta dolore voluptas,
Semper avarus eget; certum voto pete finem.

Ode III, 1, 25-28

Desiderantem quod satis est neque
Tumultuosum sollicitat mare
Nec saevos Arctūri cadentis
Impetus aut orientis Haedi.

Ode III, 1, 47.

Cur valle permutem Sabina
Dvitiās operosiores?

4) Horace's Stoic Attitude Toward Virtue. Horace in a great many of his odes speaks in exalted terms of virtue. This is probably the main reason why he is so often considered a Stoic. Ode III, 24, 21.

Dos est magna parentium
Virtus et metuens alterius viri
Certo foedere castitas,
Et peccare nefas aut pretium est mori.

Epist. I, 16, 52.

Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore;

Ode III, 2, 17-20.

Virtus repulsae nescia sordidae,
Intaminatis fulget honoribus,
Nec sumit aut ponit securis
Arbitrio popularis aurae.

In this one stanza Horace has embodied three stoical paradoxes: 1) The virtuous man cannot be disgraced. 2) Not only can he not be disgraced, but he cannot be defeated. These two are explained by 3) The office which he fills is neither assumed nor resigned in accordance with the shifting breeze of popular favor. Horace is also influenced here by the Stoic paradox that the virtuous man, however low his position in life, is nevertheless rich, noble, and kingly among men.
Ode IV, 9, 39,

Consulque non unius anni,
Sed quotiens bonus atque fidus
Iudex honestum praetulit utili

he tells Lollius that his soul is ever consul. Though he no longer wear the insignia of office, his soul proclaims its real dignity and unchanging rank whenever it prompts him to act with true nobility. "Honestum" and "utili" are often used in ethical treatises expressing the two great ends according to which moral conduct is regulated. While in Satire I, 3, 96 he prefers "utili" he follows in Ode IV, 9, 39 the doctrine that the upright judge should prefer "honestum" to "utili".

Following the description of this ideal character, Horace is still influenced by the Stoic doctrine that "Man's life consisteth not in an abundance of the things which he possesseth" but life consists in character. Ode IV, 9, 45.

Non possidentem multa vocaveris
Recte beatum; rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti

Duramque callet pauperiem pati
Peiusque leto flagitium timet,
Non ille pro caris amicis
Aut patria timidus perire.

5) Horace's Departure from Stoic Philosophy. Shall we then, because Horace agreed in some points with Stoic philosophy, decide that he was a rigid Stoic? Certainly not. 1) At times he holds up to ridicule the paradoxes of which he has just spoken in high terms. Sat. II, 3, 94-98.

Omnis enim res,
Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris
Divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit, ille
Clarus erit, fortis, iustus. 'Sapiensne?' Etiam et rex
Et quicquid volet.

Epist. I, 1, 105-108.

Ad summam: sapientia uno minor est Iove, dives,
Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
Praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.

2) In the Satires, the earliest of Horace's works, the teachings of the Stoics are invariably introduced as objects of ridicule. In Sat. I, 3, 96-98

Quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant
Cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant
Atque ipsa utilitates, iusti prope mater et aequi
he ridicules the Stoic paradox that all faults are equal and appeals to the standard of utility, the practical teaching of the Epicureans.

Sat. II, 3, Damasippus, repeating the teaching of Stertinius in the abrupt manner of the Stoics, discourses on the theme that all men are mad except the Stoic philosopher. Horace's style and manner of dealing with the subject reveals his true feeling. Sat.II,3,32-33.

insanis et tu, stultique prope omnes
Si quid Stertinius veri crepat,

Sat.II,3,43-46

Quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri
Casum agit, insanum Chryssippi porticus et grex

3) Horace's theory, moderation in all things, even when pursuing virtue, is the very antithesis of the extreme Stoic doctrine.

Epist. I, 6, 15.

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.

Summary: Again I shall summarize the conclusions that have been formed from a study of Horace and the Stoics. He may be considered a Stoic because 1) he believed in the crushing of desires, 2) he taught that wealth does not lead to happiness, 3) he advocated a simple life, 4) he speaks in ex-
alted terms on virtue. On the other hand he cannot be
classed among the Stoic philosophers because 1) he ridicules
their paradoxes, 2) in his earliest works he invariably intro-
duces the teachings of the Stoics as an object of ridicule,
3) he believes in moderation in all things.

C) Horace and Aristotle

Nowhere in his works has Horace made any reference to
Aristotle. He must, however, have been acquainted with
him and his works. The clearness and precision with which
Aristotle dealt with all subjects under discussion must have
appealed to Horace, although one essential, poetic fancy and
imagination, which would appeal to Horace far more than his
logic, was lacking in Aristotle's works. Horace, it is
ture, never mentions Aristotle by name, yet the principle of
the golden mean first brought forward by Aristotle is one of
the most important lessons to be learned from Horace's teach-
ing.

In Ode II, 10, Horace teaches that the virtue of moder-
tion is the true lesson to be derived from philosophy and ex-
perience. 1–8.

Rectius\(^1\) vives, Licini, neque altum
Semper urgendo neque, dum procellas
Cautus horreascis, nimium premendo
Litus iniquum
Auream quisquis mediocritatem
Diligit, tutus caret obsoleti
Sordibus tegiti, caret invidenda

\(^2\) Sobrius\(^2\) aula.

1. "Rectius" is used by writers of moral philosophy to indicate
that which is in accordance with the moral standards.

2. "Sobrius" is used by Horace to indicate the man who is tem-
perate in all things as opposed to the man who indulges
himself without restraint.
The same thought is brought out in Sat. I, 1, 106-107.

Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.

Sat. II, 2, 65-66

Mundus erit, qua non offendat sordibus, atque
In neutram partem cultu s miser.

Epist. II, 2, 195-196

Distat enim, spargas tua prodigus, an neque sumptum
Invitus facias neque plura parare labores.

Ode II, 10, 13-14.

Sperat infestis, metuit secundis
Alteram sortem bene praeparatum
Pectus.

Horace is inculcating "a virtue equally removed from foolish
over-confidence on the one hand and unreasonable despondency
on the other."

Horace has adopted this one principle from the teach-
ings of Aristotle and always insists upon moderation, but we
cannot say that he was a Peripetetic in every respect.

D) Horace and Pythagoras

The earliest system in which Horace seemed sufficiently
interested to discuss some of its principles is the Pythagorean.
There are three outstanding principles in this philosophy to
which he refers: 1) Their explanation of being and becoming
by dividing all things into five elements. 2) Their principle
that number is the essence of all things. 3) Their doctrine
of the transmigration of souls.

1) His reference to the principle of the division of the
universe into five elements is found in Ode I, 13, 16.

Quae Venus
Quinta parte sui nectaris imbuit.
He got his idea of quintessence from the Pythagoreans. "Quinta pars" with Pythagoras was ether. It is of a higher nature than the other elements, hence its name became synonymous with purity.

3) The whole of Ode I, 28, addressed to Archytas, the greatest philosopher in the Pythagorean school, begins by reference to his skill in mathematics, sciences, etc., 1-3.

Te maris et terrae numeroque carentis harenæ
Mensorem cohibent, Archyta,
Pulveris exigui prope litus parva Watinum
Munera.

"Carentis harenæ" has become proverbial for wasted trouble and some think that Horace is putting the labors of Archytas in a ridiculous light. Quite the contrary; it is simply another reference to his mathematical power without meaning that he actually undertook the task of counting the grains of sand.

The lines, Ode I, 28, 5,

Aerias temptasse domos animoque rotundum
Percurrisse polum

indicate the interest taken by this school in astronomy.

3) In line 4 of Ode I, 28, the discussion of the third theory, the doctrine of transmigration of souls, starts. "Morituro" sounds the keynote of the whole ode. "Thou that hadst still to die". Lines 7-11 give instances of those who at one time seemed to have escaped the natural law, Tantalus when he reclined at the feast of the gods, Tithonus when he was loved by Aurora and snatched by her into heaven, Minos, when Jove himself counselled him in the art of law giving, and, as a climax, Pythagoras and his claim to have proved that he had outlived one death. Though privileged above humanity, they were mortals, however, and died at last.
Ode I, 28, 7,

Occidit et Pelopsis genitor, conviva deorum,
Tithonusque remotus in auras
Et Iovis arcanis Minor admisisus, habentque
Tartara Panthoiden iterum Orco
Demissum.

There is something sarcastic in Horace's style here, and some have been led to think that the whole ode is intended to ridicule the philosophic system of Pythagoras. Although Horace is inclined to speak playfully at times of the Pythagorean philosophy, as in Sat. II, 6, 63-64

O quando faba Pythagorae cognata simulque
Uncta satis pingui ponentur holuscula lardo?

Epist. II, 1, 52.

Quo promissa cadant et somnia Pythagorea
nevertheless he is interested in the doctrine of the transmi-

gation of souls to which he devoted lines 10-15.

habentque
Tartara Panthoiden iterum Orco
Demissum, quamvis clipeo Troiana refixo
Tempora testatus nihil ultra

Nervos atque cutem morti concesserat atrae,
Judice te non sordidus auctor
Naturae verique.

The question now arises, did Horace accept this theory as his own? Ode I, 28, 16-17

Sed omnis una manet nox,
Et calcanda semel via leti

Ode II, 17, 11

supremium
Carpere iter comites parati

Ode IV, 7, 21

Cum semel occideris
Ode II, 3, 25-28

Omnes eodem cogimur, omnium
Versatur urna serius oculus
Sors exitura et nos in aeternum
Exilium impositura cumbas.

He says in these words distinctly that he does not believe in the doctrine of transmigration of souls.

E) Horace and Socrates

Horace mentions Socrates several times with the greatest respect and in Sat. II, 4, 3 ranks him among the great philosophers. But nowhere in all his writings do we find Horace making any comment on the teachings of Socrates. When, in Epist. II, 3, 310 he advises the poets to go to the works of Socrates for their material, he is using Socrates instead of his followers Plato and Xenophon. The same might be said of the reference in Ode III, 21, 9.

Non ille, quamquam Socraticis madet
Sermonibus, te necleget horridus:

In Ode I, 29, 14, when he expresses his surprise that Lollius should exchange the distinguished works of Panaetius and the works of the Socratic school for Iberian armor, he is using the name Socrates for Philosophy in general.

What is the explanation of this? I think it can be explained in no other way than that Horace considered Socrates as being worthy of representing the teachers of philosophy from whom he claimed to have received help and comfort.

F) Horace and Plato

Plato may have been the first to direct Horace's mind in the study of Philosophy.
Atque inter silvas Academi quaerere verum
is to be taken literally, Horace says himself that he started
the study in the Platonic school, and there seems to be no
reason for taking this passage as otherwise than true. Nor did
his interest in Plato's teachings cease, for he is ridiculed by
Damasippus in Sat. II, 3, 11 for taking his Plato, Menander,
Eupolis, and Archilochus with him to his country seat.

Platoni, Menandro?
Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos?

In reading Horace's works there are very few places that can
be definitely quoted as resembling the teachings of Plato, but
there seem to be many places written in the spirit of Plato.
Perhaps the best of these instances is found in Odes I - 6 of
Book III. Horace and Plato both have a passionate desire for
a well organized, well governed, and peaceful state. They both
realize that this is the only way to attain the highest good.
In the Republic, Plato describes his ideal state, in which jus-
tice, the mother of the virtues, reigns supreme. This book is
really an ethical treatise on justice, but the other cardinal
virtues of the Greeks, courage, temperance, wisdom, and piety
are also emphasized.

Horace, in the first six odes of book III, most dis-
tinctly comes forward as the national poet of Rome and the
empire. He emphasizes the cardinal virtues of the Romans, those
virtues that had made Rome great in the past and to which she
must cling, if her greatness is to be ensured for the future.
In Ode III, 1, 41-47 he recommends contentment
Quodsi dolentem nec Phrygius lapis
Nec purpurparum sidere clarior
Delenit usus nec Falerna
Vitis Achaemeniumque costum:

Cur invidendis postibus et novo
Sublime ritu miliar atrium?
Cur valle permutem Sabina
Divitias operosiores?

Manliness is the subject of Ode III, 2, 17-25

Virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae,
Intaminatis fulget honoribus,
Nec sumit aut ponit securis
Arbitrio popularis aurae.

Virtus, recludens immeritis mori
Caelum, negata temptat iter via,
Coetusque volgaris et udam
Spernit humum fugiente pinna.

Justice and strength of character is recommended in III, 13,1-4

Iustum et tenacem propositi virum
Non ovium ardor prava iubentium,
Non voltus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida

Mildness and purity in III, 4, 65-68

Vis consili expers mole ruit sua:
Vim temperatam di quoque provehunt
In maius: idem odere viris
Omne nefas animo moventis.

Courage and patriotism is the key note of III, 5.

Piety and purity is emphasized in III, 5-7

Dis te minorem quod geris, imperas:
Hine omne principium; hoc refer exitum.

33-34

Non his iuventus orta parentibus
Infecit aequor sanguine Punico

16-17

Fecunda culpae saecula nuptias
Primum inquinavere et genus et domos:

Nowhere has the poet shown more skill than in the opening odes of this book. With great taste he has inculcated the loftiest ethical principles in language which constitutes some of
the choicest verse in Latin literature. They were intended to indorse and support the Emperor Augustus in social and religious reforms which he had, in his capacity as perpetual censor, inaugurated for the stability of the Roman state.

In speaking of the Epicurean philosophy we showed that Horace believed in the immortality of the soul. In this respect he also resembles Plato who was the first philosopher to give a definite answer to the question "Does death end all?"

G) Horace's Statement of his Attitude Toward all Philosophy

Let us turn to Horace's words to see if he throws any light on the subject of what philosophy he did accept.

Epist. I, 1, 10-19

Nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono;
Quid verum atque decens cura et rogo, et omnis
in hoc sum;
Condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.
Ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo Lar e tuter,
Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri
Quo me cunque rapit tempestatas, deforos hospes.
Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis,
Virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles;
Nunc in Aristirpi furtim praecepta relabor,
Et mihi res, non rebus, subiungere coron.

In this passage Horace declares that he is engaged in the study of theoretical philosophy and ethics, the quest for the highest good. He borrowed from all the different schools and as a thinker has striven to unify the borrowed material (compono). That would be sufficient in itself to convince us that he was not a follower of any system, but he goes still farther and says that he swears to the words of no particular master (Addictus nulli) but, like a traveller, lands on every coast and gets material of every kind.
He next mentions two different schools from which he had gathered some useful material. The Stoics teach him the active life (agilis) while the Cyrenaics show him the life of pleasure and enjoyment. This is Horace's true opinion that after the labors of the day are over, enjoyment is permissible provided everything is carried on in such a manner "that one would rule circumstances and not be ruled by them".

From this passage a large number of people have been led to believe that Horace was an eclectic who gathered together the different doctrines of all the schools for the purpose of discussion and argument. The words "condo" and "compono", however, show that this was not the case but he took what was good and reasonable from every school.

Summary: The problem of this chapter was to discover to what school of Philosophy Horace was an adherent. By the references quoted it is plain that he was neither an Epicurean nor a Stoic. Aristotle did not seem to interest him sufficiently to mention his name. He mentions Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato as the greatest philosophers. Nowhere do we find the slightest ironical reference to Plato or Socrates, but the others did not escape. Altho he mentions Pythagoras with Socrates and Plato, yet he does not escape his contempt when he speaks of the bean and the Pythagorean dreams. Evidently Horace regarded Plato and Socrates with the greatest respect and his teachings are very much in the same spirit as theirs.
CHAPTER III
HORACE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Horace did not live altogether in imagination in poetry, he lived his own life and enjoyed it as intensely as any human being. At certain times he rejoiced in retirement and seclusion, at others, in social intercourse and the world of pleasure. From the world of pleasure and social enjoyment he learned many lessons, and meditated upon the best way in which they could be represented in his teachings. As a practical man, with definite ethical values, he had little use for any doctrine of philosophy as such. His philosophy is therefore a practical philosophy based upon his observations of human life. I shall discuss his practical philosophy under two heads: 1) Philosophy of the present life; 2) Philosophy of the after life.

1) Philosophy of the Present Life; End of Life is Happiness.

He agrees with all philosophers that happiness is the end of life, but he has his own definite ideas as to the course which should be pursued in order to attain it. Sat. II, 6, 70,

*Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis,
Nec malo nec ne Lepos saltet; sed quod magis ad nos Pertinet et nescire malum est, agitamus: utrumne Divitiis homines an sint virtute beati;
Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos;
Et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius.*

Epist. I, 1, 70-80,

*Quod si me populus Romanus forte roget cur
Non ut porticibus sic iudiciis fruar isdem,
Nec sequar aut fugiam quae diligit ipse vel odit,
Olim quod volpes aegroto cauta leoni*
Respondit, referam: 'Quia me vestiglia terrent, Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.'
Belua multorum es caputum. Nam quid sequar aut quem?
Pars hominum gestit conducere publica; sunt qui
Crustis et pomis vidius venentur avaras,
Excipient que senes, quos in vivaria mittant;
Multis occulto crescit res faenore.

Men are chasing after happiness in a thousand different ways. In Ode I, 1, Horace enumerates some of the chief ambitions of mankind. Some desire wealth, others power, others political distinction. Some are eager for fame, others for success, others for glory of victory. Some are fond of war, others of peace. Let us see, however, what Horace considers the proper road to happiness.

A) Negative statements about the way to this end.
Horace first of all warns people against the pursuit of so many things which to him seem useless and a waste of time. He points to the error here and says these things do not make a man happy.
1) Glory, fame, political distinction, etc. In Epist. I, 6, 28-66, he says that one must cultivate indifference to such pursuits or spend one's life in a constant struggle. Epist. I, 6, 49-55,

Si fortunatum species et gratia praestat,
Mercur servum, qui dictet nomina, laevum
Qui fodicit latus et cogat trans pondera dextram
Porrigere: 'Hic multum in Fabia valet, ille Velina;
Qui libet hic fascis dabit, eripietque curule
Cui volet importunus ebur.' 'Frater' 'pater' addes;
Ut cuique est astas, ita quemque facetus adopta.

The whole of Sat. I, 6, is devoted to the subject of ambition; the great estimate a man not by his high birth and social position, but by his true worth. Sat. I, 6, 23-26,

Sed fulgente trahit constrictos Gloria currur
Non minus ignotos generosis. Quo tibi, Tilli,
Sumere depositum clavum fierique tribuno?
Invidia adcrevit, privato quae minor esset.
2) The sins which we are daily committing keep us from the final goal. Ode III, 6, 45,

Damnosa quid non imminuit dies?
Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiostorem.

Ode I, 3, 25,

Audax omnia perpeti
Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas.

Ode I, 18, 10,

fas atque nefas exiguus fine libidinum
Discernunt avidi.

Epod VII, 1,

Quo, quo scalesti ruitis?

Sat. I, 3, 68,

vitiis nemo sine nascitur; optimus ille est,
Qui minimis urgetur.

Ode I, 3, 37,

Nil mortalibus ardui est;
Caelum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque
Per nostrum patimur scelus
Ilacunda Iovem ponere fulmina.

Epist. I, 1, 65,

rem facias, rem,
Si possis, recte, si non, quocumque modo rem.

Ode I, 35, 34,

Quid nos dura refugimus
Aetas? Quid intactum nefasti
Liquimus? Unde manum iuventus.
Metu deorum continuat?

Sat. II, 7, 74,

Tolle periculum;
Iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis.

Epist. I, 2, 15.

Seditone, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira
Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.
Ode III, 24, 31,

Virtutem incolcumen odimus,
Sublatam ex oculis quaerimus, invidi.

Ode III, 6, 17,

Fecunda culpae saecula nuptias
Primum inquinavere et genus et domos:
Hoc fonte derivata clades
In patriam populumque fluxit.

3) Folly. Men, in their blindness, are daily doing things that prevent them from rather than aid them in obtaining the highest good. Sat. I, 2, 24,

Dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt.

Epist. I, 1, 97,

mea cum pugnat sententia secum,
Quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,
Aestuat et vitæ disconvenit ordine toto,
Diruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis?
Insanire putas sollemnia me neque rides.

Epist. I, 1, 57

Est animus tibi, sunt mores, est lingua fidesque,
Sed quadringentis sex septum milia desunt;
piebs eris.

Sat. II, 3, 43,

Quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri
Caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex
Autumat. Haec populos, haec magnos formula reges,
Excepto sapiente, tenet.

Sat. II, 7, 111,

Adde, quod idem
Non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte
Ponere, teque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro,
Iam vino quaerens, iam somno fallere curam;
Frustra; nam comes atra premit sequiturque fugacem.

1. See also Odes II, 15, 1; III, 1, 31; III, 24, 54; III, 24, 42;
   III, 16, 9; Epod. VII, 15; Epist. I, 16, 5; II, 1, 10.
Sat. I, 1, 15,

Si quis deus 'En ego' dicat
'Iam faciam quod voltis; eris tu, qui modo miles,
Mercator; tu consultus modo, rusticus: hinc vos,
Vos hinc mutatis discedite partibus. Haia!
Quid statis?' — nolint. Atqui licet esse beatiss.

4) Wealth. In Sat. I, 1, Horace asks Maecenas the cause for so
much discontent in the world, and gives his own answer to this
question. "Desire for wealth." Sat. I, 1, 1,

Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem
Seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa
Contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis?

Sat. I, 1, 40,

Nil obstet tibi, dum ne sit te dition alter
Quid iuvat immensum te argenti pondus et auri
Furtim defossa timidum deponere terra?

a) Wealth is desired by the majority. Epist. I, 1, 42,

Vides, quae maxima credis
Esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam,
Quanto devites animi capitisque labores;

Epist. I, 1, 53,

'O cives, cives, quaerenda pecunia primum est;
Virtus post nummos.'

Epist. I, 1, 57,

Est animus tibi, sunt mores, est lingua fidesque,
Sed quadringentis sex septem milia desunt;
Plebs eris.

Ode III, 24, 59

Cum periura patris fides
Consortem socium fallat et hospites

Indignoque pecuniam
Heredi properet.

Epist. I, 2, 44.

Quaesitum argentum

1. See also Epist. I, 1, 80; I, 1, 76, Sat. ii, 7, 92; I, 1, 103.
b) Wealth does not bring happiness.

Ode I, 31, 1, 3-6,

Quid dedicatum poscit Apollinem
Vates? ............. ...........
........................ Non opimae
Sardiniae segetes feraces,
Non aestuosae grata Calabriae
Armenta, non aurum aut ebur Indicum

Ode II, 18, 1.

Non ebur neque aureum
Mea renidet in domo lacunar,
Non trabes Hymettiae
Premunt columnas ultima recisas
Africa, neque Attali
Ignitus heres regiam occupavi,
Nec Lacconicas mihi
Trahunt honestae purpuras clientae.

At fides et ingeni
Benigna vena est

Epist. I, 1, 52,

Vilius argentum est auro, virtutibus aurum.

Epist. I, 2, 46,

Quod satis est cui contingit, nihil amplius optet.
Non domus et fundus, non aeris acervus et auri
Aegroto domini deduxit corpore febris
Non animo curas.

Ode III, 1, 41,

Quodei dolentem nec Phrygius lapis
Nec purpurarum sidere clarior
Delenit usus nec Falerna
Vitis Achaemeniumque costum:

Cur invidendis postibus et novo
Sublime ritu moliar atrium?
Cur vale permutem Sabina
Dvitias operosiores?

Ode II, 3, 1.

Nullus argento color est avaris
Abdito terris, inimice lamnae
Crispe Sallusti, nisi temperato
Splendeat usu.
Ode II, 2, 17,

Reddittum Cyri solio Phraēten
Dissidens plebi numero beatorum
Eximit Virtus populumque falsis
Dedocet uti
Vocibus

Ode III, 16, 17,

Crescentem sequitur cura pecuniam
Maiorumque fames.

Ode III, 16, 42.

Multa petentibus
Desunt multa: bene est, cui deus obtulit
Parca quod satis est manu.

Ode III, 24, 1,

Intactis opulentior
Thesauris Arabum et divitiae Indiae
Caementis licet occupes
Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare Apulicum;

Si figit adamantinos
Summis verticibus dira Necessitas
Clavos, non animum metu,
Non mortis laqueis expeditas caput.

Epod. IV, 5,

Licet superbus ambules pecuniae,
fortuna non mutat genus.

Epist. II, 2, 180,

Gemmæ, marmor, ebur, Tyrrhena sigilla, tabellas,
Argentum, vestes Gaetulo murice tintas
Sunt qui non habeant, est qui non curat habere.

Epist. I, 10, 47,

Imperat aut servit collecta pecunia cuique,
Tortum digna sequi potius quam ducere funem.

Ode II, 16, 13,

Vivitur parvo bene, cui paternum
Splendet in mensa tenui salinum
Nec levis somnos timor aut cupidus
Sordidus aufert.

Ode III, 24, 45,

Vel nos in Capitolium,
Quo clamor vocat et turba faventium,
Vel nos in mare proximum
Gemmæ et lapides aurum et inutilis,

Summi materiem malis,
Mittamus, scelerum si bene paenitet.
Erundae cupidinis
Pravi sunt elementa et tenerae nimis

Mentes asperioribus
Formandae studiis. Nescit equo rudis
Haerere ingenuus puer
Venarique timet, ludere doctior,

Seu Graeco iubes trocho,
Seu malis vetita legibus alea,
Cum periura patris fides
Consortem socium fallat et hospites

Indignoque pecuniarum
Heredi properet. Scilicet improbae
Crescunt divitiae; tamen
Curtae nescio quid semper abeat res.

B) Positive Statements

Horace is not a destructive but a constructive critic. From his observations of human life he draws the conclusion that men are striving after happiness in a thousand wrong ways. He not only tells them that such pursuits do not make a man happy, but he also enumerates some of the things which he thinks will have the desired effect.

1) Enjoyment of present blessings.

Epist. I, 11, 22,

Tu quamcumque deus tibi fortunaverit horam
Grata sume manu neu dulcia differ in annum,
Ut quocumque loco fueris, vixisse libenter
Te dicas;

Ode II, 16, 25,

Laetus in praesens animus quod ultra est
Oderit curare et amara lento
Temperet risu.

Epist. I, 5, 9,

cras nato Caesare festus
Dat veniam somnumque dies; impune licebit
Astitam sermone benigno tendere noctem.
Quo mihi fortunam, si non conceditur uti?
Epist. I, 14, 36,

Nec lusisse pudet, sed non incidere ludum.

Sat. II, 6, 45,

quo, bone, circa,
Dum licet, in rebus iucundis vive beatus,

Ode II, 11, 9,

Non semper idem floribus est honor
Vernis, neque uno luna rubens nitet
Voltu: quid aesternis minorem
Consiliiis animum fatigas?

Cur non sub alta vel platano vel hac
Pinu iacentes sic temere et rosa
Canos odorati capillos,
Dum licet, Assyriaque nardo

Potamus uncti?

Ode II, 3, 13,

Huc vina et unguenta et nimium brevis
Flores amoenae ferre iube rosae,
Dum res et aetas et sororum
Fila trium patiuntur atra.

2) Self control.

Ode II, 2, 9,

Latius regnes avidum domando
Spiritum, quam si Libyam remotis
Gadibus iungas et uterque Poenus
Serviat uni.

Sat. II, 7, 92,

'Liber, liber sum,' dic age! Non quis;
Urget enim dominus mentem non lenias et-acris
Subiectat lasso stimulos versatque negantem.

Ode I, 24, 19

Durum: sed levis fit patientia,
Quicquid corrigere est nefas.

Epist. I, 6, 1,

Nihil admirari prope res est una, Numici,
Solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum.
Ode II, 3, 1,

Aequam memento rebus in arduis  
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis  
Ab insolenti temperatam  
Laetitia, moriture Delli.

Sat. II, 2, 136,

Vivite fortés  
Fortiaeque adversis opponite pectora rebus.

Epist. I, 1, 19,

mihi res, non me rebus, subiungere conor.

Epod. XIII, 7,

deus haec fortasse benigna  
Reducet in sedem vice.

Epist. I, 2, 62,

Ira furore brevis est; animum regis; qui nisi paret,  
Imperat: hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce catena.

Epist. I, 2, 59,

Qui non moderabitur irae,  
Infectum volet esse, dolor quod suaserit et mens

Ode I, 11, 3,

Ut melius, quicquid erit, pati!

Ode II, 16, 25,

Laetus in praesens animus quod ultra est  
Oderit curare et amara lento  
Temperet risu. Nihil est ab omni  
Parte beatum. ¹

3) The simple life, city vs. country.

Sat. II, 6, 60,

O rue, quando ego te aspiciam, quandoque licebit  
Nunc veterum libris nunc somno et inertibus horis  
Ducere sollicitae iucunda oblivia vitae?

Epist. I, 14, 16,

Me constare mihi scis et descedere tristem,  
Quandocumque trahunt invisa negotia Romam.

¹. See also Ode II, 10, 13-24; I, 16, 17-22; III, 29, 49;  
Epist. I, 16, 65; I, 10, 30; I, 18, 87-88.
Epist. I, 10, 6,  
  ego laudo ruris amoeni  
  Rivos et musco circumlita saxa nemusque

Ode III, 13, 1,  
  O fons Bandusiae, splendidior vitro,  
  Dulci digne mero non sine floribus

Ode I, 1, 30,  
  me gelidum nemus  
  Nympha rumque leves cum Satyris chori  
  Secernunt populo

Sat. II, 6, 1-4,  
  Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus,  
  Hortus uni et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons  
  Et paullum silvae super his foret. Auctius atque  
  Di melius fecere. Rens est. Mil amplius oro

Ode III, 16, 29,  
  Purae rivos aquae silvaeque iugerum  
  Paucorum et segetis certa fides meae  
  Fulgentem imperio fertilis Africae  
  Fallit sorte beatior.

Ode II, 6, 13,  
  Ille terrarum mihi praeter omnis  
  Angulus ridet, ubi non Hymetto  
  Mella decedunt viridique certat  
  Baca Venafia ...........

  Ille te mecum locus et beatae  
  Postulant arces; ibi tu calentem  
  Debita sparges lachrimae favillam  
  Vatis amici.

Epist. I, 7, 44,  
  Parvum parva decent; mihi iam non regia Roma,  
  Sed vacuum Tibur placet aut imbelle Tarentum.

Epist. II, 2, 77,  
  Scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbem

Ode III, 29, 13-16,  
  Plurumque graeae divitibus vices  
  Mundaeque parvo sub lare pauperum  
  Cena sine aulaeis et ostro  
  Sollicitam explicuere frontem.
Epode II, 1,

Beatus ille qui procul negotii,
Ut prisca gens mortalium,
Patera rura bobus exercet suis
Solutus omni faenore

Epist. I, 10, 12,

Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet,
Ponendaque domo quaerenda est area primum,
Novistine locum potiorem rure beato?

Epist. I, 10, 18,

Est ubi divellat somnos minus invida cura?

4) Intercourse and friendship.

Sat. I, 3, 69,

Amicus dulcis, ut aequum est,
Cum mea compenset vitiis bona, pluribus hisce,
Si modo plura mihi bona sunt, inclinet, amari
Si volet. Hac lege in trutina ponetur eadem.

Ode I, 3, 5,

Navis, quae tibi creditum
Debes Vergilium; finibus Atticis
Reddas incolarem, precor,
Et serves animae dimidium meae.

Epist. I, 7, 11,

Ad mare descendet vates tuus et sibi parcat
Contractusque leget; te, dulcis amice, reviset
Cum Zephyris, si concedes, et hirundine prima.

Sat. I, 3, 41,

Vellum in amicitia sic erraremus et isti
Errori nomen virtus posuisse et honestum.

Sat. I, 3, 74,

aequum est
Peccatis veniam poscentem reddere rursus.

Sat. I, 3, 53,

Opinor,
Haec res et iungit, iunctos et servat amicos.
Epist. I, 10, 50,
Excepto quod non simul esses, cetera laetus.

Ode I, 24, 1,
Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus
Tam cari capitis?

Sat. I, 4, 81,
absentem qui rodit amicum,
Qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos
Qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis,
Fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere
Qui nequit; hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.

Epist. I, 10, 8,
Vivo et regno, simul ista reliqui
Quae vos ad caelum effertis rumore secundo.

Ode II, 7, 3,
Quis te redonavit Quiritem
Dis patril Italoque caelo,
Pompei, meorum prime sodalium,
Cum quo morantem saepe diem mero
Fregi, coronatus nitentis
Malobathro Syrio capillos?

Epod. I, 5,
Quid nos, quibus te vita si superstite
Iucunda, si contra, gravis?
Utrumque iussi persequeamur otium
Non dulce ni tecum simul,
An hunc laborem mente laturi, decet
Qua ferre non molles viros?
Feremus, et te vel per Alpium iuga.

Sat. I, 3, 139,
mihi dulces
Ignoscent si quid peccaro stultus, amici,
Inque vicem illorum patiar delicta libenter

Ode II, 17, 31,
Utrumque nostrum incredibili modo
Consentit astrum.

Ode II, 17, 5,
A, te meae si partem animae rapit
Maturior vis, quid moror altera,
Nec carus aequus nec superstes
Integer? Illes dies utramque
Ducet ruinam. Non ego perfidum
Dixi sacramentum: ibimus, ibimus,
Ut cumque praecedas, supremum
Carpere iter comites parati.

5) Contentment.
Ode II, 16, 17,
Qui brevi fortes iaculamur aevo
Multa?
Ode II, 16, 25,
Laetus in praesens animus quod ultra est
Oderit curars.
Ode III, 1, 25,
Desiderantem quod satis est neque
Tumultuosum sollicitat mare
Nec saevos Arcturi cadentis
Impetus aut orientis Haedi.

Epist. I, 2, 46,
Quod satis est cui contingit, nihil amplius optet.

Epist. I, 14, 11,
Cui placet alterius, sua nimirum est odio sors.

Epist. I, 5, 12,
Quo mihi fortunam, si non conseditur uti?

Ode II, 16, 13,
Vivitur parvo bene, cui paternum
Splendet in menea tenui salinum
Nec levis somnoa timor aut cupidu
Sordidus aufert.

Sat. II, 2, 107,
Uterne
Ad causas dubios fidel sibi certius? Hic qui
Pluribus adserit mentem corpusque superbam,
An qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri
In pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello?

Ode II, 18, 9-14,
At fides et ingenii
Penigna vena est, pauperemque dives
Me petit: nihil supra
Deos lacesso nec potentem amicum
Largiora flagito,  
Satis beatus unicus Sabinis.

Ode III, 16, 37,

Importuna tamen pauperiss abest,  
Nec si plura velim tu dare denogenes.  
Contracto melius parva cupidine  
vectigalia porrigam,

Quam si Mygdoniis regnum Alyettei  
Campis continuem.

Epist. I, 18, 106,

Quid credis, amica, precari?  
'Sit mihi, quod nunc est, etiam minus, ut mihi vivam  
Quod superest aevi, si quid superesse volunt di;  
Sit bona librurum et provisa frugia in annum  
Copia, neu fluitem dubiae spa pendulus horas.'

Sed satis est orare iuvem, quae pondit et auferet;  
Det vitam, det opes; asquam mi animum ipse parabo.

6) Fear of God and faith in Him.

Ode III, 6, 1-8,

Delicta maiorum immixtus lucis,  
Romane, donec templ a refeceris  
Aedisque laubentia deorum et  
Foeda nigro simulacra fumo.

Dis te minorem quod geris, imperas:  
Hinc omne principum; huc refer exitum.  
Du multa nec lecti dederunt  
Hesperiae mala luctuosae.

Ode I, 34, 1-5,

Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens,  
Insanientia dum sapientiae  
Consultus erro, nunc retrorsum  
Vela dare atque iterare cursus.  
Cogor relictos:

Ode III, 3, 29,

saespe Diespiter  
Neclectus incesto addidit integrum,  
Raro antecedentem aselestatum  
Deseruit pede Poena clado.

Ode III, 4, 45,

Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat  
Ventosum et urbes regnaque tristia,  
Divosque mortalissque turmas  
Imperio regit unus aequo.
Ode III, 4, 65,
Vis consili expers mole ruit sua:
Vim temperatam di quoque provehunt
In maius:

Ode I, 12, 13,
Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
Laudibus, qui res hominum ac deorum,
Qui mare et terras variisque mundum
Temperat horis?

Unde nil maius generatur ipso,
Nec viget quicumquam simile aut secundum.

Ode III, 23, 17,
Immunis aram si sedit manus,
Non sumptuosa blandior hostia,
Mollivit aversea Penatis
Farre pio et saliente mica.

Ode III, 29, 28,
Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit deus,
Ridetque si mortalis ultra
Fas trepidat.

Ode III, 29, 62,
Tum me biremis praesidio scaphae
Tatum per Aegaeos tumultus
Aura feret geminusque Pollux.

Epist. I, 18, 111,
Sed satis est orare Io vem, quae ponit et afferet
Det vitam, det opes; aequum mi animum ipse parabo.

Ode IV, 6, 39,
Spiritum Phoebus mihi, Phoebus artem
Carminis nomenque dedit poetae.

Epod. XIII, 7,
deus haec fortasse benigna
Reductet in sedem vice.

Epist. I, 11, 22,
Tu quamcumque deus tibi fortunaverit horam
Grata sume manu.

Ode I, 17, 13,
Di me tuentur, dis pietas mea
Et Musa cordi est.
7) A pure heart and an upright life.

Ode III, 3, 1,

Iustem et tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava iubentium,
Non voltus instantia tyranni
Mente quatit solida neque Auster,

Dux inquieti turbidus Hadrias,
Nec fulminantis magna manus Iovis;
Si fractus inlabatur orbis,
Impavidum serient ruinae.

Epist. I, 18, 9,

Virtus est medium vitiorum et utrumque reductum.

Sat. II, 2, 54,

frustravitium vitaveris illud,
Si te alio pravum detorseris.

Sat. I, 1, 106,

Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.

Ode III, 34, 31,

Dos est magna parentium
Virtus.

Sat. I, 3, 96,

Quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant
Cum ventum ad verum est: sensus morsque repugnant
Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

Epist. I, 1, 41,

Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima
Stultitia caruisse.

Ode III, 2, 25,

Est et fidelis tuta silentio
Merces: vetabo, qui Ceres sacrum
Volgarit arcanae, sub isdem
Sit trabitus fragilemque mecum
Solvat phaselon;

Epist. I, 6, 38,

Si latus aut renes morbo temptantur acuto,
Quaere fugam morbi. Via recte vivere; quis non?
Si virtus hoc una potest dare, fortis omissis
Hoc age dieliciis.
Ode III, 5, 29,

Nec vera virtus, cum semel excidit,
Curat reponi deterioribus.

Epist. I, 16, 53,

Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore
Tu nihil admittes in te formidine poenae.

Ode I, 22, 1,

Ineger vitae acelerisque purus
Non eget Mauris iaculis neque arcu
Nec venenatis gravida sagittis,
Fusce, pharetra.

Ode III, 2, 17,

Virtus repulsae nescia sordidae
Intaminatis fulget honoribus
Nec sumit aut ponit secures
Arbitrio popularis aurae.
Virtus recludeus immeritis mori
Caelum negata temptat iter via
Costusque vulgares et udam
Spernit humum fugiente penna.

2) Philosophy of Life After Death.

Horace is not satisfied with discussing this present life, with the problems in it that must be faced and solved, but he also gives us his conception of the life beyond. Horace was a man of practical ideas and as such he gives us the facts as they appear to him.

A) Death is inevitable.

The thought ever present to the mind of Horace is the uncertainty of human affairs, and the limit imposed on all effort and enjoyment by the absolute certainty of death. Even at the risk of repetition, I shall again give quotations from Horace to this effect.
Ode II, 18, 15,

Truditur dies die,
Novaeque pergunt interire lunae.

Ode I, 4, 13,

Pallida Mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas
Regumque turris.

Ode I, 28, 19,

nullum
Saeva caput Proserpina fugit.

Ode II, 18, 29,

Nulla certior tamen
Rapacia Or ci fine destinata
Aula divitem manet
Er um. Quid ultra tendis? Aequa tellus
Pauperi recluditur
Regumque pueris.

B) The theories of the states of life after death.

Horace, like every other thinking man, was compelled to ask himself the question "If a man die, shall he live again?" If Horace were a follower of Epicurus, his answer would necessarily be 'no'. On the other hand were he a follower of Plato, his answer would be in the affirmative. The fact of the matter is that passages may be quoted which appear, on the surface at least, to indicate that Horace believed "Dust thou art, to dust returnest" was also spoken of the soul. Again, there are others that clearly indicate that he had no such view.

1) Annihilation.

Ode IV, 7, 14,

Nos ubi decidimus,
Quo pius Aeneas, quo Tullus dives et Ancus,
Pulvis et umbra sumus.
Ode I, 24, 5,

Ergo Quintilium perpetuos sopor
Urgat?

This last passage is one mostly used, when contending that
Horace believed in annihilation at death. What more can
that mean than our expression "Last long sleep" and Shakes-
peare's words

"We are such stuff as dreams are made on
Our little life is rounded with a sleep."

2) Existence after death.

We have shown already that Horace believed in immor-
tality but it shall be taken up in this connection from a
slightly different standpoint.

a) As shown in stories of Tartarus

Ode II, 3, 24,

Victima nil miserantis Orci.

Ode I, 4, 16,

Iam te premet nox fabulaeque Manes
Et domus exilis Plutonia; quo simul mearis,
Nec regna vini sortiere talis,
Nec tenerum Lycidam mirabere, quo calet iuventus
Nunc omnis et mox virgines tepebunt.

Ode IV, 7, 21,

Cum semel occideris et de te splendida Minos
Fecerit arbitria,
Non, Torquâte, genus, non te facundia, non te
Restituet pietas;

Infernis neque enim tenebris Diana pudicum
Liberat Hippolytum,
Nec Lethaea valet Theseus abrumpere caro
Vincula Pirithoo.

Ode II, 18, 34,

nec sateslea Orci
Callidum Promethea
Revenit auro captus. Hic superbun

Tantalum atque Tantali
Genus coercet, hic levere functum
Pauperem laboribus
Vocatus atque non vocatus audit.

1. Shakespeare: Tempest, Act IV, Scene I, 156.
Ode II, 13, 21-36, gives the most vivid description.

Quam paene furvae regna Proserpinae
Et indicantem vidimus Aeacum
Sedesque discriptas piorum et
Aeolias fidibus querentem

Sappho puellis de popularibus
Et te sonantem plenius aureo,
Alcaea, plectro dura navis,
Dura fugae mala, dura belli.

Utrumque sacro digna silentio
Mirantur umbrae dieris; sed magis
Pugnas et exactos tyrannos
Densum umeris bibit aure volgus.

Quid mirum, ubi illis carminibus stupens
Demittit atras belua centiceps
Auris, et intorti capillis
Eumenidum recreantur angues?

b) As promising rewards and punishment.

Ode II, 13, 37-40,

Quin et Prometheus et Pelopis parens
Dulci laborum decipitus sono,
Nec curat Orion leones
Aut timidos agitare lyncas.

Ode III, 11, 25,

Audiat Lyde acelus atque notas
Virginum poenas et inane lymphae
Dolium fundo pereuntis imo
Seraque fata,

Quae manent culpas etiam sub Orco?

Ode III, 2, 29,

saepè Diespiter
Neclectus incesto addidit integrum,
Raro antecedentem aëlestum
Deseruit pede Poena claudio.

Ode III, 24, 24.

Et peccare nefas aut pretium est mori.

Ode III, 2, 31-34,

Virtus, recludens immeritis mori
Caelum, negata temptat iter via,
Coetusque volgaris et udam
Spernit humum fugiente pinna.1

1. In this treatise I have not mentioned Horace's philosophy of politics and society, as very few references are found bearing upon them, and these references have been discussed in other connections.
Summary: At the risk of repetition I summarize my findings upon:

I. Horace's philosophy of the present life. 1) Menaces to happiness in the present life. a) The desire for self-advancement. b) Indulgence in sin. c) The love of folly. d) the pursuit of wealth. 2) The means of attaining happiness. a) Enjoy present blessings b) Exercise self control. c) Lead the simple life. d) Have intercourse and friendship. e) Be content. f) Fear God and trust Him. g) Keep a pure heart and lead an upright life.

II. Horace's philosophy of the after life. 1) Death is certain. 2) States of life after death. a) Annihilation. b) Existence after death as shown in the stories of Tartarus and in the promises of rewards and punishments.
CONCLUSION

A resume of Horace's philosophy as revealed in his writings may be briefly stated:

1) His theoretical philosophy did not accept the ideal of the Stoic renouncing all the pleasures, nor the Epicurean renouncing the practical duties of life, nor the man who gives himself entirely to pleasure; but the man who can temperately enjoy all the blessings of life, who is ready if called upon to sacrifice his life for his country.

We have about the latest utterances of his philosophy in Ode IV, 9, in which he sketches an ideal wherein the best qualities of the Epicurean and the Stoic are united to those of the patriot and man of honor.

2) His practical philosophy is gained only by synthesizing bits of advice and injunctions to his friends upon various occasions. It concerns chiefly happiness and the means of its attainment. He feels that the condition of happiness is to understand rightly each situation and meet it as it should be met.
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