CAMPAIGN MISSOURI 1992

David A. Leuthold
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David A. Leuthold

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For Carolyn
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Missouri's campaigns in 1992 were the most exciting in years. Missouri citizens contributed the most money ever to their candidates, and the candidates spent almost all of it. Voter interest was high, reflected in voter turnout several percentage points higher than in previous elections. The 1992 campaigns were also the longest, the most negative, and the most professional in many years. Even the results were dramatic: a party turnover in four state executive offices and two congressional seats. Not everyone considered all of these changes in Missouri politics to be positive.

Soon after the election, on November 20, 1992, campaign managers and reporters from throughout Missouri gathered at the University of Missouri–Columbia to discuss and dissect the races. This book offers their analyses and evaluations.

The discussions took place at a one-day symposium sponsored by the university’s Department of Political Science. The participants included:

- Ken Allen, campaign manager for gubernatorial candidate Wendell Bailey
- John Ballard, campaign worker for secretary of state candidate Howard Wagner
- Duane Benton, judge of the supreme court
- Roy Blunt, secretary of state, and gubernatorial candidate
- Steve Boriss, campaign manager for second district congressional candidate Jim Talent
- R. E. Burnett, campaign manager for ninth district congressional candidate Rick Hardy
- Marietta Caiarelli, staffer for senatorial candidate Bill Peacock
- Richard Callow, press secretary for gubernatorial candidate Vince Schoemehl
- Greg Casey, associate professor of political science, University of Missouri–Columbia
Sandy Crews, campaign manager for seventh district congressional candidate Doug Harpool
Karen Czernell, campaign manager for second district congressional candidate Bert Walker
Tom Dueschle, campaign manager for gubernatorial candidate Roy Blunt
David Doak, partner at Doak, Shrum et al., and consultant for senatorial candidate Geri Rothman-Serot
Bob Edwards, political reporter, Springfield News-Leader
Marc Farinella, campaign manager for gubernatorial candidate Mel Carnahan
Tony Feather, campaign manager for gubernatorial candidate Bill Webster
James Fitzpatrick, reporter, Kansas City Star
Terry Ganey, chief of Jefferson City bureau, St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Terri Gleich, state capitol reporter, Springfield News-Leader
Mary Jo Graettinger, public information coordinator, Missourians to Authorize Riverboat Gambling in Excursions
Todd Graves, campaign manager for attorney general candidate David Steelman
Christian Hameiman, campaign manager for secretary of state candidate John Hancock
Charles Hatfield, campaign manager for attorney general candidate Jay Nixon
Reverend Harold Hendrick, Coalition Against Organized Crime
Rich Hood, political columnist, Kansas City Star
David Israelite, director of communications and research for Senator Christopher Bond
Jim Kolb, campaign manager for secretary of state candidate Judi Moriarty
Carolyn Leuthold, board of directors, Missouri League of Women Voters
David Leuthold, professor emeritus of political science, University of Missouri-Columbia
Guylene Litle, campaign manager for sixth district congressional candidate Sandra Reeves
Janis Londe, campaign manager for attorney general candidate Mike Wolff
Sandy McClure, Missouri coordinator for presidential candidate Ross Perot
Jo Mannies, political reporter, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*
Jim Maupin, campaign manager for seventh district congressional candidate Ron Houseman
Tom Mericle, state coordinator for Common Cause
Jack Oliver, finance director for Senator Christopher Bond
Woody Overton, director, Clinton-Gore 1992 coordinated campaign in Missouri
Bob Priddy, director of Missouri Net radio network
John Robinson, campaign manager for lieutenant governor candidate Roger Wilson
Jack Stapleton, Missouri News and Editorial Service
Gayla Thomas, director of campaign reporting, secretary of state’s office
Greg Upchurch, Missourians for Limited Terms
Nancy Vessell, *Jefferson City Post-Tribune*
Dan Wadlington, campaign manager for seventh district congressional candidate Mel Hancock
Ann Wagner, executive director, Bush-Quayle reelection campaign in Missouri
Henry J. Waters III, publisher, *Columbia Daily Tribune*
David Welch, finance director for second district congressional candidate Bert Walker
Lee Wilkins, associate dean, school of journalism, University of Missouri–Columbia
Stacy Woelfel, news director at KOMU-TV, and faculty member, school of journalism, University of Missouri–Columbia
Elizabeth Zelenka, finance director for gubernatorial candidate Mel Carnahan.

In addition, statements were submitted later by Doug Gray, campaign manager for sixth district congressional candidate Pat Danner; Terry Jones, pollster for second district congressional candidate Joan Kelly Horn; and Sloane Simmons of Simmons and Company, which managed the campaign of seventh district congressional candidate Pat Deaton.

The Department of Political Science is indebted to the campaigns and media institutions for their support of this symposium and the book. All participants contributed their time and talent; for many that meant a long drive through a rainstorm. The department is indebted to the participants for their candor in discussing their activities during the
election campaign; we are particularly indebted to the managers of losing campaigns, because the joy of dissecting a campaign is considerably reduced when the campaign is lost. We are also grateful to the large number of students, alumni, and citizens who attended panels of the symposium as well as the luncheon.

Special thanks are due to many people and institutions that helped finance and conduct the symposium, including the Department of Political Science, the College of Arts and Science, the Associated Students of the University of Missouri (which helped finance a luncheon for 175 people), the UMC Lectures Committee, the law school, the Reynolds Alumni Center, Parking and Transportation Services, the Academic Support Center, the Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and Quick Copy Center. Thanks are due also to numerous individuals who contributed in many ways to the success of the symposium, including Richard Dohm, John Ballard, John Hark, Margaret St. Omer, Jeannie Bangs, Steve Roper, John Bellais, S. K. Baek, Martin Romitti, Cassandra Veney, Steve Galatas, Josh Davenport, Wanda Pace, Marianne McCollum, Claudia Schauer, Megan Flakamper, David Wood, and Chris Heigle.

Special thanks are also extended to the many people who contributed to the publication of this book. Thomas Vaeth typed the transcript of the symposium, demonstrating once again the variety of skills possessed by the visually handicapped. Frank Pascoe and the staff of the Missouri State Library created newspaper clipping files on the campaigns and aided immensely in securing access to the files. Similarly the Federal Election Commission, the Office of Campaign Finance in the office of the Secretary of State, and now the Missouri Ethics Commission have received and analyzed financial reports from the candidates and published informative and useful annual or biennial reports. Many of the symposium participants reviewed portions of the manuscript and helped increase the accuracy and clarity of the chapters. Editorial assistance was provided by John Ballard, Sara Fefer, and two anonymous reviewers for the University of Missouri Press. Financial support for the author was provided by the University of Missouri Research Council, and financial and other support was provided by the Department of Political Science.

Most of all, I want to thank my wife, Carolyn Leuthold, who participated in every stage of the symposium and book, even serving as a
substitute in one panel when a scheduled speaker failed to arrive. She shares my high respect and appreciation for those citizens who are willing to be political candidates and to dedicate all of their energies and resources to the campaign, insuring that we as democratic citizens have meaningful choices in our election.
CAMPAIGN MISSOURI 1992
Missouri's Political Climate

The 1992 election in Missouri was unusual in the number of competitive races and the amounts of money spent. The campaigns represented the culmination of trends toward increased aggressiveness, increased professionalism, and increased reliance on television commercials.

Missouri, the geographical center of the nation, is both northern and southern, eastern and western, urban and rural. Politically, Missouri is the most typical state in the nation, having cast majorities for the winning candidate in every presidential election since 1904, save one, 1956, when Missouri voted for Adlai Stevenson and the nation voted for Dwight Eisenhower. Campaign themes that win in Missouri will win in the nation as a whole. The significance of Missouri in 1992 was indicated by the numerous visits by presidential candidates to the state, so many that they exhausted the local campaign workers.

Missouri's Political History

Missouri politics reflect in part the state's political history. When it was admitted to the Union in 1821, Missouri was a frontier state with frontier politics. Voting was restricted to free, white, male citizens, aged 21 or older, and only two public officials, the governor and the lieuten-
ant governor, were elected statewide. Government was distant, had little impact on most citizens, and excited limited interest.

The Civil War changed much of that pattern. Missouri had been admitted to the Union as a slave state, as part of the Missouri Compromise. Thus the state was home to many slaveholders. On the other hand, while still open frontier, Missouri had also attracted many immigrants who were strongly opposed to slavery. The question of whether Missouri would fight with the North or the South was decided largely by force of arms, with victory going, by a narrow margin, to the Union side. Support for the Union was translated into support for the Republican party, while support for the Confederacy was translated into support for the Democratic party. Party preferences were bequeathed to succeeding generations, and the tradition of party loyalty helped establish the patterns for the 1992 election.

For a few years after the Civil War, Radical Republicans ruled the state, restricting the vote to people who had been “loyal” and introducing “Yankee” ideas, such as expansion of the public schools, paid for by higher taxes. In 1870, voting restrictions against former Confederates were lifted, providing voter support to tip the balance and allow Democrats to govern for three decades. The revolt against Democratic party dominance, which came at the turn of the century, was led by Progressives who introduced the initiative and referendum, reflecting their faith in the voters and their reliance upon a more open democracy.

Republican party electoral strength was strong in the first quarter of the twentieth century but began to wane in the 1920s. One portent of the change was the shift of blacks, originally intensely loyal to President Lincoln’s party, to the Democratic party because of the unwillingness of the Republican leadership to oppose the actions of the Ku Klux Klan. The large number of blacks active in the Democratic party in 1992 gave blacks power within the party primary and gave Democratic candidates much of their margin of victory in the general election. The Great Depression sealed the fate of the Republicans. Democratic leaders constructed a new majority made up of blacks, labor unions, urban machines—including the Pendergast machine of Kansas City—and rural traditional Democrats. Part of the success of the Democratic party was based on the quality of its candidates—Senators Harry Truman and
Missouri's Political Climate

Stuart Symington and Governors Phil Donnelly, James T. Blair, Jr., and John Dalton, as examples.

The 1960s brought a disintegration of the organizational strength of both parties and an increase in voter independence. The independence of voters was signaled by their support of Warren Hearnes who, in 1964, challenged and beat the party organization candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor. The independence of voters was further indicated in 1968 by the election of the first Republican to statewide office in twenty-two years. John Danforth, scion of the family that founded Ralston-Purina, one of the state's major corporations, came from behind late in the campaign to win the attorney general's post.

Danforth's victory led to a string of Republican successes. Danforth won reelection in 1972 and a U.S. Senate seat in 1976. He recruited and promoted Christopher Bond, who became successively auditor, governor, and U.S. senator; John Ashcroft, who became auditor, attorney general, and governor; and Clarence Thomas, who became an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Missouri Republicans competed evenly with the Democrats in the 1970s, then more than evenly in the 1980s, winning both Senate seats and all but one statewide office (though they failed to gain a majority in Missouri's congressional delegation or in either house of the state legislature). Republican success was achieved with attractive candidates, large campaign treasuries, a cooperative and effective state party organization, and a national swing to conservatism.

Missouri's Political Regions

Political partisanship in the state is regional, with Democrats and Republicans dominating in different geographical areas. The following areas are the state's principal political regions:

1. The Bootheel in southeast Missouri and Little Dixie in northeast Missouri, two regions originally settled by southerners who became Democrats. As in the real Dixie, conservative orientation began to conflict with Democratic party loyalties, and many voters switched to the Republican party, making these regions competitive between conservative Democrat candidates and Republican candidates.

2. Strongly Republican southwest Missouri, settled originally by the
Scotch-Irish. The Scottish people are noted for their frugality, a characteristic required by the low productivity of the poor soils in Scotland. Many Scotch-Irish who immigrated to America settled first in southern Appalachia and then moved on to the Ozarks of southern Missouri; both areas have soil similar to Scotland's. These fiercely independent farmers strongly opposed slavery and embraced the Republican party, which took a strong stand against slavery. That Republican identification is still dominant in much of southwest Missouri.

3. Mid-Missouri German counties, strongly Republican. Germans immigrated especially to St. Louis and to the river counties south and west of St. Louis. The Germans strongly opposed slavery and were drawn to the Republican party by its strong antislavery stand. That loyalty has persisted to the present.

4. Northwestern Missouri, settled by emigrants from Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and adjoining states. These settlers were successful farmers; they gathered abundant crops produced by the rich soil of the region. They and their descendants shared typical midwestern attitudes, emphasizing community, demanding quality government services, and shifting party support in response to the level of agricultural prices.

5. The major urban areas, diverse and divided. The northern half of the city of St. Louis is African American, and the southern half is ethnic working-class white. The two groups fight over city offices but unite to vote for Democrats for state and national offices. Suburban St. Louis County (which is separate from the city), the most populous and wealthiest county in the state, is the mother lode for votes and campaign contributions for both Republicans and Democrats. Kansas City also includes numerous ethnic and demographic groups but provides less support to Missouri Republicans because many of its well-to-do residents have moved across the state line into suburban Johnson County, Kansas.

Political Climate of 1992

In the 1988 elections, Missouri Republicans solidified their hold on statewide offices, reelecting Senator Danforth and five statewide officeholders. Democrats were unable to find strong opponents to challenge some of the Republican incumbents, and they won only one office—the
lieutenant governor's post. The 1990 elections signaled a change in attitude. Voters began to turn against incumbents. Incumbent congressmen saw their victory margins cut by 5 percentage points, and the Republican congressman from St. Louis County lost his seat. A further indication of voter discontent was the crushing defeat in 1991 of a tax increase for education, which was supported by most of the state's leaders of both parties.

The anti-incumbent climate attracted stronger challengers in 1992 and stimulated incumbents to begin earlier and more extensive campaigns. The constitutional provision limiting the governor to two terms meant that the governor's office would be open and five major candidates stepped forward, four of them already statewide office holders whose open offices attracted other strong candidates. The candidates were strong and well qualified; among them, the candidates for governor previously had run, in total, eight winning and two losing statewide races. The candidates who filed for the statewide offices being vacated by the would-be governors were also outstanding, including people who had previously won six party nominations for statewide offices.

The professional skills of campaigning have become widely known and practiced, so many of these candidates could, and did, employ highly skilled media consultants, pollsters, fund-raisers and campaign managers. The candidates and their professional staffs conducted the most intensive and expensive campaigns in the history of Missouri. Voters were bombarded with information. Although the negative slant to many of the commercials undoubtedly turned off some voters, interest stayed high.

The level of interest was reflected in high voter turnout. On primary election day, August 4, turnout was 37 percent of registered voters, a figure that easily exceeded the 28 to 30 percent turnout of "normal" years like 1988 and 1984, and even the 36 percent turnout in 1980, when four major candidates had contested for the gubernatorial nominations. On general election day, November 3, 1992, turnout was 78 percent of registered voters in the state, up from 74 percent in 1980, and 71 percent in 1984 and 1988. The ballot required each voter to make at least 20 decisions in the primary and at least 30 decisions in the general election. The candidates, the issues, and the results of the general election are indicated in Table 1-1. The candidates contesting in the primaries appear in the chapters discussing each of the offices.
## Table 1-1. General Election Ballot and Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>George Bush and Dan Quayle (R)</td>
<td>811,159</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill Clinton and Al Gore (D)</td>
<td>1,053,873</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andre Marrou and Nancy Lord (Libertarian)</td>
<td>7,497</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ross Perot and James Stockdale (Independent)</td>
<td>518,741</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Senator</td>
<td>Christopher “Kit” Bond (R), incumbent senator</td>
<td>1,221,901</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geri Rothman-Serot (D), St. Louis County Council member</td>
<td>1,057,967</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jeanne F. Bojarski (Lib)</td>
<td>75,048</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>William “Bill” L. Webster (R), attorney general</td>
<td>968,574</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mel Carnahan, (D), lieutenant governor</td>
<td>1,375,425</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>Margaret Kelly (R), state auditor</td>
<td>1,114,305</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roger B. Wilson (D), state senator</td>
<td>1,151,357</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Franklin M. Nugent (Lib)</td>
<td>60,320</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>John Hancock (R), state representative</td>
<td>1,107,701</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judith “Judi” K. Moriarty (D), Pettis County clerk</td>
<td>1,140,424</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eric Harris (Lib)</td>
<td>59,353</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Treasurer</td>
<td>Gary Melton (R), Christian County treasurer</td>
<td>847,235</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bob Holden (D), former state representative</td>
<td>1,285,890</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Janet Lewis (Lib)</td>
<td>140,968</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>David L. Steelman (R), former state representative</td>
<td>1,064,814</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jeremiah “Jay” W. Nixon (D), state senator</td>
<td>1,154,714</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mitchell J. Moore (Lib)</td>
<td>92,576</td>
<td>4%</td>
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Table 1-1. Continued

Supreme Court retention:

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<td>1,115,352</td>
<td>740,774</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,094,658</td>
<td>734,176</td>
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Judges
- Duane Benton
- Elwood Lauren Thomas

Constitutional Amendments:

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<th>No</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>915,082</td>
<td>1,228,518</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>906,887</td>
<td>1,233,662</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,082,086</td>
<td>1,085,336</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,859,878</td>
<td>315,702</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>889,077</td>
<td>1,148,531</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>786,231</td>
<td>1,207,497</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,610,311</td>
<td>535,562</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,590,552</td>
<td>558,299</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,397,750</td>
<td>839,568</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,427,801</td>
<td>693,411</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Con Amend # 1 Only 4/7ths majority needed on some tax votes
- Con Amend # 2 Allows toll roads and bridges
- Con Amend # 3 Off track wagering on horse races
- Con Amend # 4 Puts rights of crime victims in constitution
- Con Amend # 6 Establishes state reserve for years with short revenue
- Con Amend # 10 Only 4/7ths majority on St. Louis bond elections
- Con Amend # 12 Term limits for state legislators
- Con Amend # 13 Term limits for Missouri congressmen, senators
- Proposition A Authorizes riverboat gambling
- Proposition C Assigns additional duties to lieutenant governor

Other offices:

- U.S. Congress
  - On all ballots
- State senators
  - On 1/2 of the ballots
- State representatives
  - On all ballots
- Judges, Courts of Appeals
  - At least four judges on every ballot
- Circuit court judges
  - On two-thirds of ballots
- County offices
  - About half-dozen elected in each county
- Local issues
  - Number of issues varied by city and county
The 1992 election results nationwide were affected by voter perceptions that the economy was sluggish, that too many people were unemployed, and that the purchasing power of the average worker had remained flat or declined. Voter concern about economic problems reinforced a long-term decline of confidence in government and government officials. As always, voters tended to blame the incumbent president and his party. In the end, George Bush paid the heaviest price, trailing the Republican ticket in Missouri, but all Republican candidates probably lost a percentage point or two in their vote totals because of the problems of the economy.

In Missouri, the 1992 elections were also affected by voter perceptions of Republican gubernatorial candidate Attorney General Bill Webster. Two grand juries and the two major newspapers in the state investigated allegations of corruption involving Webster's office, the Second Injury Fund, and campaign contributors. Public opinion began to turn against Webster, giving the Democrats a good chance of winning the governorship. Quickly then, Democratic candidates for lieutenant governor and for attorney general alerted voters to their opponents' ties with Bill Webster, and those appeals aided the Democrats to win those offices.

Plan of the Book

This book offers analyses of the campaigns from the viewpoints of campaign managers, fund-raisers, and reporters—the people who fought the battles or saw them close at hand. Their analyses were first presented at a symposium at the University of Missouri at Columbia on November 20, 1992.

These participants provided the first analysis ever of the major campaigns conducted in a single state in a single year. They also provided a record of a very important year in Missouri’s political history; without the symposium, recollections would have been discussed only in a few private conversations as the campaign principals scattered to other jobs, other campaigns, and other interests.

The campaigns also illustrate the art and science of campaign management in America, particularly because Missouri is a microcosm of American politics. The development of campaign strategies and tech-
niques has been chronicled for presidential campaigns by post-election panels of campaign managers and reporters assembled by researchers at the Institute of Politics, Harvard University. Presidential campaigns have also been analyzed in various works by social scientists and journalists.

In this book, the early chapters present analyses of 1992 statewide campaigns for particular offices—the governorship in chapter 2, the U.S. Senate in chapter 3, the presidency in chapter 4, the attorney general in chapter 5, the lieutenant governor and secretary of state in chapter 6, and the congressional offices in chapter 7.

Chapter 8 presents a discussion of important campaigns for and against issues on the ballot, rather than for candidates. In previous years, issue campaigns have been among the most expensive and professional campaigns conducted in the state. In 1992, the campaign urging approval of riverboat gambling cost $1.9 million. An additional issue discussed in this chapter is the proposal of term limits, placed on the ballot by initiative petition. Anti-incumbent fervor was sufficiently high that the proposal passed easily.

That anti-incumbent fervor concerned judges who were on the ballot for retention in 1992. The proportion of voters supporting retention had been falling steadily for thirty-five years and had taken a sharp tumble in 1990. Bumper stickers urged “Vote no on all of them,” and judges noted that it was only for them that voters had the opportunity to vote no. The story of the judicial campaigns and the analysis of public attitudes in judicial retention decisions are presented in chapter 9.

Campaign fund-raising, an integral part of almost all 1992 campaigns is analyzed in chapter 10. The role of the media and the reporting of the campaign is presented in chapter 11. For some listeners, the record of 1992 was an indication of what needed to be changed, a record that would illustrate the problems we now have in our election campaigns and justify the solutions that are needed. Those listeners had a panel of their own on campaign reforms, reported here in chapter 12. The lack of agreement on the panel reinforced the awareness that any changes in the rules may provide advantages for some people and disadvantages for others.

While the book covers most of the campaigns in Missouri in 1992, some important campaigns are missing, simply because of the lack of
time and resources to included every campaign in the symposium. Most notable is the statewide race for treasurer, in which Democrat Robert Holden, who lost to Wendell Bailey in 1988, defeated two strong opponents in the primary, then easily won the general election over little known Gary Melton, Christian County treasurer. Other significant races included the eleventh senate district (Kansas City) race in which incumbent Henry Panethiere failed to hold his seat despite an expenditure of $158,000, the race for a state senate seat from the Cape Girardeau area with total expenditures of $344,000, more than half of that by eventual winner Peter Kinder, the race for the Democratic nomination for prosecuting attorney of Jackson County, won by Claire McCaskill, despite a $206,000 campaign by her opponent, the assistant prosecuting attorney, and the similarly expensive race for circuit attorney in St. Louis City, won by another woman, Dee Joyce Hayes.

The patterns presented in this volume are likely to be the campaign patterns for Missouri for the next few years. Those patterns are summarized in chapter 13.
The Race for Governor

The key to winning the primary, in my opinion, was the fact that we were able to get on the air early, and build a solid foundation out there. We also had a very good grass-roots organization that worked very hard for us, working the last-minute door-to-door activities.

—Tony Feather, campaign manager for Bill Webster

We were able to generate more money than Bill Webster, to our surprise and to their surprise. This was largely because of Webster’s involvement in the Second Injury Fund.

—Marc Farinella, campaign manager for winner Mel Carnahan

The governorship has long been considered the ultimate office in Missouri, the capstone of an outstanding political career. As a result, the governor’s race has almost always attracted outstanding candidates who have run extensive, expensive campaigns. Even so, the 1992 gubernatorial race was a landmark in Missouri politics in terms of the number of well-qualified candidates and the length and total cost of their campaigns. Never before had five major officeholders contested for the governorship. Because Governor John Ashcroft was prohibited by the constitution from running for a third term, everyone had known for four years that 1992 would be an open race.
In the first half of the twentieth century, many paths led to the governorship. Successful candidates prepared themselves with experience in state executive offices, the legislature, the judiciary, local government; two governors even won the governorship as their first office. After 1950, increasing competition made statewide name recognition vital and restricted the field almost entirely to candidates holding statewide office—attorney general, auditor, secretary of state, treasurer, and lieutenant governor.

Thus, in 1992, circumstances favored the Republicans, who held five of the six statewide offices, and had held the governorship for twelve years. In addition, the Republican party had the advantage of a presidential candidate who was so strong initially that leading Democrats opted out of the presidential race. In seventeen of the past twenty-one elections, Missourians had elected a governor from the same party as that of the winning presidential candidate.

The Republican Primary

Three major statewide officeholders—Attorney General Bill Webster, Secretary of State Roy Blunt, and Treasurer Wendell Bailey—wanted to be the Republican nominee for governor. In hindsight it seems likely that Republicans would have retained at least two, perhaps three offices if two of the three men had been willing to file for other offices. In the end, all three filed for the governorship, as did minor candidates Dwight Watts and Fred Salmons. The three major candidates for the Republican nomination were all from southwestern Missouri, relatively conservative Republicans, statewide office holders for eight years, and friends who had worked together on state issues.

Candidates

When Bill Webster was born in 1953, his father, Richard Webster, had already served in the legislature and run for attorney general. In 1962 his father was elected to the Missouri Senate, where he served for almost twenty-eight years. Although he was always in the minority party, Dick Webster was widely regarded as one of the most
powerful political leaders of the state. He used his power to pave the political path for son Bill.

Bill became a collegiate debate champion at the University of Kansas, then transferred home to graduate from Missouri Southern State College and from the University of Missouri–Kansas City Law School. At age twenty-seven he became the youngest member of the Missouri House of Representatives, and at thirty-one he was elected attorney general, the youngest attorney general in the United States. He easily won reelection in 1988 and became the leading candidate for governor, though he lost one of his important campaign assets when his father died in 1990. Webster once commented, “I inherit my father's friends, and I inherit his enemies. And he had quite a few of both.”

As attorney general Webster was strongly identified with the abortion issue, and he personally argued before the Supreme Court and won the suit carrying his name, *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*. The court ruling allowed Missouri lawmakers to ban abortions in public hospitals.

Roy Blunt. Blunt is the son of a Greene County farmer who became a state legislator. Blunt graduated from Southwest Baptist University and earned a master's degree in history from Southwest Missouri State University. Blunt himself owned and operated a farm. He also taught history and government at Marshfield High School and Drury College. He noted that if elected he would be the first governor in forty years who was not a lawyer and the first governor in fifty years to be raised on a farm.

In 1973, Governor Christopher Bond appointed the twenty-three-year-old Blunt as county clerk of Greene County, and voters returned him to the post in 1974, 1978, and 1982. He ran unsuccessfully for lieutenant governor in 1980 then was elected secretary of state in 1984 and reelected in 1988.

Wendell Bailey. Bailey was named for Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, the year he was born. He grew up in Willow Springs in south central Missouri. After receiving a bachelor's degree from Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, he returned home to manage the family business, an automobile agency. He was elected to the city council and served as acting mayor.
## Table 2-1. Media Polls on the Republican Primary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Webster</th>
<th>Blunt</th>
<th>Bailey</th>
<th>Other and Undecided (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 91</td>
<td>Webster campaign</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 92</td>
<td>Mason-Dixon</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21% (217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extensive advertising by Webster beginning March 17</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28% (237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14–22</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25% (318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28–31</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2% (420,145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28% (237)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mason-Dixon refers to Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research which conducted a poll for several Missouri media, including the Springfield News-Leader. SLPD refers to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and KMOX refers to St. Louis radio station KMOX.

At age thirty, he was elected to the state legislature, where he served for eight years before being elected to Congress in 1980. Reapportionment in 1981 cost Missouri a congressional seat, and Bailey's old district was cut in half. Rather than oppose fellow Republican Bill Emerson, Bailey filed against Democrat Ike Skelton and lost a hard-fought battle in 1982. In 1984, he was narrowly elected state treasurer, and in 1988, he narrowly won reelection.

Throughout his political career, he has been known for his "hail-fellow" approach, his ability to recognize and remember people, and his storehouse of jokes. A wisecracking manner conceals a political shrewdness and keen independence of thought that have helped him achieve outstanding records in office. For example, while treasurer, he reduced state banking fees from $3 million per year to $988,000 by asking for bids from banks.

Bailey's campaign was often surprising and unusual. Hurrying to catch a plane in St. Louis, Wendell Bailey forgot that he was carrying a loaded pistol in his briefcase, and when it was discovered, he was detained by security agents. A federal prosecutor declined to file charges. For his campaign vehicle, Bailey used a 1977 Checker cab with a "Not for Hire" sign on top to show that he would accept only limited cam-
The Race for Governor

Campaign contributions. Bailey also tried to seize an advantage in a debate by noting that Governor John Ashcroft had endorsed Roy Blunt and Bill Webster, but not him. A few days later, Ashcroft moved to strip that "advantage" from Bailey by announcing that he also supported Bailey.

Poll Standings

Although Roy Blunt had slightly higher name identification among voters than did Bill Webster, Webster began 1992 with a lead in the polls, which he maintained throughout the primary. This lead was sustained by his television advertising. Media polls and publicly reported polls, presented in Table 2-1, indicate that Blunt closed most of the gap during July. Apparently Webster was able to widen his lead slightly during the last week before the primary election.

Issues

The Second Injury Fund

Overhanging the party primary (and eventually the general election campaign) was a grand jury investigation of front-runner Bill Webster. The grand jury, meeting in Springfield, began by investigating the sale by Webster and his family of an unfinished condominium to a group that included a developer then under investigation by the attorney general's office. The jury apparently was asking whether the attorney general's investigation was affected by the private sale. Webster testified twice before the jury in 1991, and he publicly denied any wrongdoing, saying that the deal was handled by his father, that he himself had transferred the case to private counsel as soon as he learned of the developer's involvement in the purchasing group, and that, in any case, the family had lost $300,000 on the deal. In July 1992, the developer pleaded guilty to bankruptcy fraud, forfeited nearly $5 million in assets, and testified before the grand jury. Webster was also asked about a real estate transaction in which he and a partner made $53,000 on the sale of land they had purchased three months before.

Later the grand jury's attention switched to the Second Injury Fund, which came to dominate the gubernatorial campaign. In the 1920s,
Missouri established a worker's compensation program to provide medical care and compensation for workers who were injured on the job. Employer costs depended upon the cost of injuries to their workers, so an injury disabling a person for life could be especially costly. Employees who already had one injury were more likely to become permanently disabled, and thus were considered too risky to hire by some employers. Wounded veterans from World War II fit automatically into this once-injured group, and thus were less likely to be hired. To encourage hiring such veterans and other once-injured employees, Missouri government established the Second Injury Fund, which broadened the base for costs of a second injury, and relieved the employer of high liability. The Second Injury Fund was financed by a tax surcharge on all workers' compensation insurance premiums. Employees who suffered a second injury could make claims against this fund rather than against their employers' insurance.

After Bill Webster became attorney general, costs in the second injury program rose dramatically, from $3.5 million in 1984 to $30.7 million in 1991. The grand jury investigation focused on the possibility that some of these funds were used to help finance Webster's campaign for office. The allegation was that some favored lawyers received larger than usual settlements for their clients when they sued the Second Injury Fund (and thus higher lawyer fees since fees were a percentage of the settlement), and that these favored lawyers then gave hefty contributions to Bill Webster's campaign. In addition, many of these favored lawyers were also asked to "help" the state by defending the fund against other claims; the allegation was that the lawyers who were contributing to Webster's campaign were allowing higher than usual settlements against the fund.²

The grand jury interviewed people associated with the attorney general during the campaign, stimulating many headlines but bringing no Second Injury Fund indictments before the election. After the general election, the grand jury also questioned various people associated with the attorney general's office and the campaign for governor, apparently concerned that state resources had been used to pay for printing and telephone calls for the Webster campaign.

After the Springfield grand jury investigation was well under way, the
United States district attorney in St. Louis opened another investigation. A high proportion of Second Injury Fund suits had been filed in the St. Louis area and most of the attorneys who had both sued and defended the fund practiced in the St. Louis area. After the general election, the grand jury brought an indictment against and received a guilty plea from William Roussin, Jr., an attorney who had received more than $1.3 million for his legal services in suing and defending the fund. Roussin, one of Webster's chief fund-raisers, stated that he had been instructed by Webster to give larger settlements to plaintiffs whose attorneys had contributed to the Webster campaign than to those represented by non-contributors. He was supposed to "[give a] hard time" to lawyers who had not contributed. Eventually other St. Louis-area lawyers and an administrative law judge pleaded guilty or were found guilty of various crimes associated with the Second Injury Fund.

Webster maintained throughout the campaign and long after that he was totally innocent. In June 1993, however, he pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court to two federal felony charges of conspiracy and embezzlement. The plea, part of an agreement with prosecutors, included admissions that he had conspired "with others to defraud the state: by using the Second Injury Fund to raise campaign money; by destroying state computer records; by using state printing equipment for campaign purposes; by using state computers for campaign purposes; by having state employees campaign for him at taxpayers' expense; and by using a state employee to baby sit for his children on more than 100 occasions." He also pleaded guilty to "converting to his own use and to the use of others state property—including employees' time and equipment—worth more than $5,000." Webster was sentenced to two years in prison.

Media coverage gradually helped the public understand the complex issue. On May 12, 1992, a story by Rich Hood and John A. Dvorak appeared in the Kansas City Star; it revealed that about 10 percent of Webster's campaign funds had come from attorneys who sued or defended the fund overseen by the attorney general.

On April 12, Terry Ganey of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch began a series of articles about abuses of the Second Injury Fund, following up on a preliminary article he had written in 1988 before taking leave of absence to complete a book. Analyzing over eleven thousand cases, Ganey found
that claimants’ lawyers who gave money to Webster’s gubernatorial campaign won settlements from the fund that averaged 1.5 times larger than those of lawyers who did not contribute. (Usually the attorney received 25 percent of the settlement.) One of the stories reported on a meeting in which a Second Injury Fund attorney had solicited future business from workers who might be injured by asserting that he could get favorable settlements, presumably by claiming that the worker had a preexisting condition so that this was a “second injury,” and then arranging for a high settlement from the Second Injury Fund.

One of the articles focused on Morris B. Kessler, who had received more than $500,000 in attorneys fees from suing the fund, plus $65,000 for injuries he had personally received when he tripped and fell in his law office and again when he closed a file drawer. Kessler justified his first claim under the Second Injury Fund on the basis of a preexisting condition of heart problems. Kessler, 72, also had a claim pending for injury suffered while lifting a briefcase. Kessler was Webster’s biggest individual contributor, having donated $59,000 to his campaign. Webster denied any impropriety in the Second Injury Fund procedures, but he did return Kessler’s contribution and file charges against him for defrauding the fund. Six months after the election, Kessler pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to defraud the Second Injury Fund.

A later story reported that Webster, faced with a rapidly growing caseload of lawsuits against the state in 1988, had asked for and received authority to shift this work from staff lawyers to private law firms. In the next four years, the attorney general had paid $5.69 million from the Legal Defense Fund to nineteen law firms, and lawyers in those firms had contributed $193,983 to Webster’s campaign.

Both Blunt and Webster campaigned on the need for welfare reform. Wendell Bailey accused them of engaging in “some bashing of the welfare system” in an effort to win white votes. Wendell Bailey took a pro-choice position on abortion (shifting his 1988 position, which had won the endorsement of the anti-abortion Missouri Right to Life group), while Bill Webster and Roy Blunt took pro-life positions.
Webster issued a 120-page booklet entitled *Bill Webster's Blueprint for Missouri's Future*. Almost immediately the *Kansas City Star* noted similarities to wording in a book by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*. Quickly Webster issued a covering letter listing important sources for this compilation of “some of the most provocative, reform-oriented ideas in circulation today.” Wendell Bailey criticized the booklet in his usual candid and humorous manner, “It's just out and out tripe and I feel better to know he [Webster] didn't write it.” While the charges were embarrassing, they probably increased circulation of and interest in the booklet considerably. In the first week, Webster received “fewer than 4,000” calls for the booklet. By contrast, only 500 people called for Carnahan's plan for elementary and secondary education.

**Advertising**

Bill Webster began advertising in rural areas of the state on March 17, probably the earliest opening date for television commercials in the forty years they have been used in Missouri. Blunt went on the air in mid-June, immediately deploying attack ads, to which Webster responded. The *Independence Examiner* described the ad campaigns:

In recent weeks, both the Democratic and Republican races have displayed all the intellect and sophistication of a recess playground fight. No one seems interested in discussing the numerous issues crucial to the state; sniping and mudslinging have become the rule.

Secretary of State Roy Blunt set the low tone by hooking up with Roger Ailes, the GOP ad man responsible for the despicable Willie Horton ads that gave George Bush a boost in 1988. Blunt’s campaign gave us the merry-go-round lawyers attack on Attorney General William Webster’s handling of the Second Injury Fund.

Webster soon lowered himself into the fray with his own set of mudslinging ads. The lowest shows an Indiana town praising Blunt for having The State Manual, better known as the “Blue Book,” printed by a firm in the Hoosier State.

Blunt’s late advertising closed the gap between the two candidates, with the merry-go-round ad being one of the principal vehicles. Webster’s staff fought back hard; campaign manager Tony Feather said, “It’s
Merry-Go-Round Ad (Blunt)

As a group of professionally dressed men laugh and joke while riding on a carousel, the ad begins with an announcer stating, "Bill Webster proves that what goes around comes around. As attorney general, Webster has collected over $400,000 in campaign contributions from lawyers—the same lawyers who were suing and defending the injured workers' fund."

While the announcer speaks, actors representing lawyers who have contributed to Webster are portrayed in a party mood as they toss money into a Webster campaign barrel. Later, as the merry-go-round revolves, the same "lawyers" reach in to the "state fund" barrel and haul out armfuls of money.

"As $123 million left the fund supposedly defended by Webster, where did millions of those dollars go?" an announcer asks. "Right back to the very same lawyers who gave money to Webster. Webster's biggest contributor even sued the fund for himself, claiming overexertion with a briefcase."

"Missouri can't afford the ride with Bill Webster."

—Rich Hood, Kansas City Star, June 27, 1992

classic Roger Ailes. They said from the beginning they would be very negative. They hired Roger Ailes so they could. They are risking tearing the party apart with this kind of tactics."

Tom Deuschle, Blunt's campaign manager, said the merry-go-round ad had received positive feedback. "Most people have enjoyed the ad immensely and believed it has made what is a very complicated issue much more simple to understand. The Second Injury Fund scandal is a very complicated issue. There are a lot of lawyers involved, a lot of issues involved. Explaining that in 30 seconds . . . we think we've done it very well."
Indiana Print Contract Ad (Webster)

To begin with, the ad is a simulated newscast. . . . A shaky, hand-held camera pans to an announcer broadcasting “live” from Crawfordsville, Ind., where residents are portrayed celebrating “Roy Blunt Day.” The bogus newscaster relates that Blunt had the Official Manual of the State of Missouri printed in Indiana, thus costing Missourians jobs. The crowd in the background waves Blunt campaign signs and chants, “Thanks, Roy!”

[The ad] gave Blunt an opportunity to explain that state law required him to award the printing contract to the firm that submitted the low bid. The Indiana firm’s bid was more than $100,000 lower. . . . Worse, Blunt’s partisans are claiming Webster’s cadre stole their candidate’s signs . . . to use in the bogus “Roy Blunt Day” rally. A Webster spokesman hotly denied the charge.

—Forrest Rose, Columbia Daily Tribune, July 23, 1992

Wendell Bailey, largely off the air except for ten-second ads that consisted of the word CHOICE displayed in huge letters, sent letters to sixteen thousand of the state’s Republicans, warning that to nominate Webster was to invite Democratic ads the next fall that said, “Don’t Vote for a Crook.”

Endorsements

A critical point in this contest came very early, in February 1989, when Hillard Selck, a top conservative leader and former Republican state chairman, organized a “Draft Webster” movement at the annual Lincoln Days celebration in St. Louis. Selck lined up influential Republican leaders for Webster. Later, Bill Webster was endorsed by Missouri Citizens for Life, the state’s leading pro-life group, and by the Joplin Globe.
Roy Blunt announced that he had received the endorsements of twenty of twenty-two Missouri newspapers making endorsements. Those papers included the *Kansas City Star*, the *Springfield News-Leader*, the *Sikeston Standard Democrat*, the *Rolla Daily News*, the *Lebanon Daily Record*, and the *Warrensburg Daily Star-Journal*.

Wendell Bailey received the endorsement of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the National Abortion Rights Action League, and Ann Stone, national chairman for Republicans for Choice. The *Columbia Daily Tribune* recommended a vote for either Blunt or Bailey.

**Campaign Finance**

In two and one-half years of fund-raising before the primary, Bill Webster raised $4 million, with major contributions coming from many of the state's corporations. For example, Apex Oil and Voorhees International Incorporated of Fenton each gave $10,000, and Schnuck's Market gave $5,000. A political action committee for Central Bancompany (which has a major role in providing banking services to state government) gave $10,000. The Enterprise Leasing Company PAC (a St. Louis automotive leasing firm) gave $5,000, and its owner gave another $5,500. More than $250,000 was raised in and around Joplin, Webster's hometown, over a three-year period. Lane Beauchamp and Rich Hood of the *Kansas City Star* reported that the political action committee Citizens for an Informed Electorate, whose treasurer was a commercial loan officer at Central Bank in Jefferson City, had contributed almost $320,000 to Webster's campaign funds since 1988.7

An indication of Webster's fund-raising prowess was the $435,000 he raised when he announced his candidacy in March 1992. In St. Louis, thirteen hundred people came to a dinner, averaging $250 each, while in Kansas City, eleven hundred paid $100 each to attend a reception. He raised another $300,000 at a St. Louis fund-raiser in September 1992.

Contributions that proved embarrassing were some totaling $34,000 made by William Pagano from 1984 to 1989; Pagano was the former police chief of Festus who later was convicted of murder. Webster gave that amount to women's shelters.

Roy Blunt raised $2.5 million in two and one-half years of fund-raising
before the primary. His biggest contribution came from Midland Bank in Kansas City, presided over by his brother. The bank and its affiliates contributed $105,000 and loaned $200,000 to the campaign. In an apparently unrelated incident, the brother was indicted for using bank money to pay personal expenses. Other major contributors were George K. Baum & Company, a securities brokerage firm, which gave $22,883; American Bank of Branson, $12,800; Modern Business Systems of Jefferson City, $10,900; Donald B. Lichtenstein of St. Louis $10,200; and Concord Bancshares of Shawnee Mission Kansas, $8,167. Blunt owed $130,000 at the end of the campaign.

Wendell Bailey raised almost $700,000 during the two-and-one-half year fund-raising period, and still owed $21,000 at the end. In August 1991, he announced he would no longer accept contributions of more than $100. The *Kansas City Star* reported that one-sixth of Bailey’s early contributions (about $47,000), which were not restricted to $100, had come from individuals or businesses that had benefited from MO BUCKS loans. The MO BUCKS program was set up by the treasurer to stimulate or preserve jobs by using tax money to provide low-interest loans for deserving businesses. Bailey pointed out that companies receiving MO BUCKS loans and banks handling the loans had contributed $52,000 to Webster’s campaign and $35,000 to Blunt’s.

Fund-raising of such magnitude requires substantial lead time; the candidates raised millions of dollars in 1990 and 1991. Blunt’s campaign manager noted that while they had begun intensive fund-raising late, they had raised more than $150,000 per month during the last three months of 1991 (about $7,500 each working day).

On the other hand, early expenditures were also high—in 1991, Bailey spent $240,000, Blunt spent $425,000, and Webster spent $550,000. All that money was spent before any of the candidates ran a single television commercial. Combining the early fund-raising with the early expenditures meant that Bill Webster began 1992 with $2 million in the bank, Roy Blunt with $1 million, and Wendell Bailey with $125,000.

The final results indicated that Bill Webster’s total expenditures from 1990 through the primary were slightly more than $4 million, a little more than $22 for each vote received. Roy Blunt had more than $2.5 million in comparable expenditures, more than $15 for each vote he
received; and Wendell Bailey spent almost $700,000, over $10 for each vote he received.

**Campaign Staffs**

Bill Webster hired as his campaign manager Tony Feather, former executive director of the Republican State Committee, and as his finance director Mark Rhoads, former director of administration in the attorney general's office. Other staff on the campaign included Rich Galen, press secretary, Kelly Gillespie and Al Duffy. The campaign hired the Stuart Stevens Group, of Alexandria, Virginia, for media buys, Cine-Vision Films, of Massachusetts, for filming, and Market Strategies and then Hill Research Consultants, of Texas, for survey research.

Roy Blunt hired as his campaign manager Tom Deuschle, who had managed John Ashcroft's successful reelection bid in 1988. Frank Ybarra, formerly public information officer for the secretary of state, served as campaign press officer. Blunt hired as his media specialist Roger Ailes, widely known for his hard-hitting approach to campaigns. Ailes had been a consultant for George Bush's successful 1988 campaign. Blunt's advertising agency was National Media Team, of Alexandria, Virginia.

Wendell Bailey hired Ken Allen as his campaign manager. Chris Molen-dorp served as finance director for several months, and Randy Wright served as campaign spokesman. Bailey hired his daughter, Jill, to work in the campaign, and ended the campaign owing her $13,000 in salary. Bailey hired The Media Group of Washington D.C. for media consulting.

**Primary Election Results**

In the election, the vote distribution was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William L. (Bill) Webster</td>
<td>183,968</td>
<td>44 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roy Blunt</td>
<td>163,719</td>
<td>39 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendell Bailey</td>
<td>63,481</td>
<td>15 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight Watts</td>
<td>5,019</td>
<td>1 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Salmons</td>
<td>3,958</td>
<td>1 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bill Webster beat Roy Blunt in every county in the Kansas City metropolitan area, and in every county in the St. Louis metropolitan area
except Franklin County. Blunt carried his home base of Greene County (Springfield) by three thousand votes but lost nearby Jasper County, Bill Webster’s home base by six thousand votes. Blunt’s strongest showing was in northwest Missouri, where he carried fourteen of nineteen counties.

The *Springfield News-Leader* focused on Blunt’s shortcomings as a candidate: “Even his supporters in Springfield lamented that Blunt was too often vague and lackluster in campaign appearances. At a time when the former teacher from Stafford needed to talk specifically about issues, Blunt missed the chance time after time. . . . Meanwhile, Webster, a former debater and radio journalist, used his skills before the microphone to advantage.”

After his loss, Roy Blunt accepted the presidency of Southwest Baptist University, his alma mater. Wendell Bailey founded a newspaper in his hometown of Willow Springs, then went to work for an Arkansas insurance company. In May 1994, Bailey was indicted by a federal grand jury, charged with using state employees and equipment in his gubernatorial campaign. He pleaded not guilty.

**Comments in Symposium about the Republican Primary**

*Jack Stapleton, moderator.* Our first speaker is Tony Feather, who resigned his position as executive director of the Missouri Republican Party to become manager of Bill Webster’s campaign.

*Tony Feather, campaign manager for Bill Webster.* I went on board the campaign right after the 1990 election. Our early goals were to build an organization and raise funds.

Once the public campaign began, we needed to build a strong foundation of recognition of Bill Webster, what he stood for, and what he had accomplished. Fortunately, we had enough firepower in terms of funds raised that we could accomplish that. We went on the air very early in mid-March and we started with a sixty-second spot called “Carthage Values” that talked about Bill Webster, his upbringing, and his values. [Editor’s note: Bill Webster attended public schools in Carthage, Missouri.]

We dealt a lot with his accomplishments as attorney general. We used a couple of case studies, talking for example about the price fixing by gas
companies, a case for which Bill Webster got major recognition in western and southwestern Missouri. We did a spot on welfare reform, and one on returning lottery funds to education. These were issues that we knew were significant to voters.

We were targeting Republican primary voters. We spent all of our money in outstate Missouri. We were not on the air in St. Louis or Kansas City because of the cost. We focused on southwest Missouri, central Missouri, and southeast Missouri, areas which have high proportions of Republican voters in the primaries. It has always been our policy that once you get on the air, you stay on the air. You don't go out there and back off. There was a four- or five-day period in late May and early June when we weren't on the air, but other than that, we were on the air full time through the primary campaign. That was critical to our campaign and the reason that we were able to be successful in the primary.

Once Roy [Blunt] went on the air battling us, and the charges and counter-charges started going back and forth, the race started to equalize. Nevertheless, we managed to sustain the base that we had put out there.

I tried to put together some of the polling numbers that we had. We were able to sustain a fairly decent margin throughout that early phase of the primary in a three-way race. We held steady up until about July 26, when the advertising by the Blunt campaign began to move our negatives up to a high enough level that we were in a very precarious situation. Our support hadn't changed much, but our negatives were going up. We had to start fighting back. We came back with a couple of spots that helped settle things in a little bit. [One of these spots was the "State Manual" commercial described above.]

As we closed into the last week of the election, we were holding at 41, 42 percent. We managed to sustain that throughout the last week of tracking but we saw Roy's numbers start to rise and the undecided start to go down. We stopped tracking five days out because you can't change your advertising at that point, but we still felt fairly comfortable. In the last five days, the undecided were moving dramatically towards Blunt and that's why the margin ended as close as it did.

The key to winning the primary, in my opinion, was the fact that we
were able to get on the air early and build a solid foundation out there. We also had a very good grass roots organization that worked very hard for us, working the last minute door to door activities. We managed to get the endorsement of the pro-life organization, and the Sunday before the election the churches got hit with all of the pro-life pieces. We knew that we were in pretty good shape with the pro-life constituency. Those were the kinds of things that helped sustain us out there. The key was being able to get on the air very early and build this foundation so that when the fire came in on us, we were able to sustain it.

Jack Stapleton, moderator. Tom Deuschle who managed Secretary of State Blunt's campaign is our next speaker. A native of Sedalia, Tom began working for John Ashcroft in 1981, when Ashcroft was attorney general. He handled appointments during Ashcroft's first gubernatorial term, and ran his 1988 reelection campaign. He directed the Division of Employment Security until he signed on as Roy Blunt's campaign manager.9

Tom Deuschle, campaign manager for Roy Blunt. The Blunt campaign started later than the Webster campaign and the Bailey campaign. Wendell was the first to announce that he would run for governor, though Bill had been working towards the gubernatorial election for a number of years. Roy Blunt didn't decide to run for governor until late 1990; he began putting together his campaign team in 1991.

We had three major strengths going into the race, the first being the highest name identification among the candidates running for governor. More individuals in the state knew Roy Blunt than anybody else. The second thing is that he had actually run for statewide office three times. He ran unsuccessfully for lieutenant governor in 1980 then successfully for secretary of state in 1984 and 1988. He had held statewide office for eight years in an office that receives some publicity, though not as much publicity as the attorney general's office. The third strength was the vulnerabilities of the attorney general. In the 1988 campaign for attorney general between Bill Webster and Mike Wolff, a number of things were brought out which later played in the 1992 campaign. In September 1988, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch first ran a story about the Second Injury Fund, which made us aware of some vulnerabilities of the attorney general.
We also knew that we had several weaknesses. First, and foremost, we knew that we were going to be terribly outspent. On January 1, 1992, we had $1 million in the bank while the Webster campaign had $2.1 million. We knew that was a significant disadvantage going into this race.

Another important weakness was that Bill Webster, with his earlier start, had secured a large number of commitments. When I came on board in September 1991, I turned first to many of the people who had helped me when I ran Governor Ashcroft's 1988 campaign. I found that individual after individual in St. Louis County had already committed to Bill Webster. Webster had done an excellent job of getting early commitments, leaving us at a disadvantage. That didn't stop Roy Blunt, but it meant that he had a long ways to go to catch up.

One of the most interesting disadvantages was what I call the lack of definition of Roy Blunt. We had the highest name identification of any candidate, but we had the least amount of definition. I personally think that most people do not know what the secretary of state does for a living. They can pretty well figure out what the attorney general, the lieutenant governor, the mayor of St. Louis and the treasurer do. The secretary of state is harder to figure out. I told one voter that the secretary of state regulates securities, and he thought I was talking about a private police agency. Obviously, we had great name identification but little definition as to what Roy Blunt did.

The remaining factor was the three-way race. A three-way race puts you at a terrible disadvantage when you are being outspent two to one. I think that Roy Blunt would have won the primary if it had been a two-way race. Our polling showed that the individuals who supported Wendell Bailey were not basing their preference on his pro-choice stand. In fact, we had just as many pro-choice votes as did Wendell Bailey, and so did Bill Webster. According to our polling, the one thing that Bailey supporters had in common was they didn't like Bill Webster. Bailey supporters were more hostile towards Bill Webster than any other group. Our supporters sort of liked Bill Webster [laughter]. If we had had only one-third of that anti-Webster group, we would have won.

Our strategy was to hold on to our money until the very end, until we absolutely had to go on TV. Then we would need to define Bill Webster and Roy Blunt. We came up rather late compared to the Webster cam-
The Race for Governor

The campaign, which came up on March 17. They moved numbers early, and they moved numbers significantly. Six weeks from the election, we were faced with a forty-one-point spread between ourselves and Bill Webster. Wendell Bailey and Roy Blunt were fighting it out for the basement at that time.

When we went on television, the Webster campaign had already been on TV for eleven weeks, at least two of which were used to define us. We were the negative politician, and he was the prize-fighting conservative attorney general. We came up with the merry-go-round commercial. It didn’t put the game away, but it caused people to think and to ask what was going on.

Three weeks out our poll showed we were down thirty-one points. We had moved ten points, closing the gap some, but not closing it fast enough. Because the issue of the Second Injury Fund was very complicated, we did great among newspaper readers. Among those who got most of their information from television, we weren’t doing so great. Our problem was that 90 percent of the people were getting their information from television. The issue which was winning votes for us was only being understood by a minority of the voters.

We decided to try, once again, to emphasize the Second Injury Fund. We did so, and one week out, we were seven points down. It was closing quickly. Our problem, as I mentioned, was that we not only had to define Bill Webster, which we were clearly doing, but we also had to define ourselves. We had to demonstrate that we were the alternative and that Wendell Bailey was not the alternative. To do that, we ran a commercial called “Welfare Reform,” which was very similar to the commercial that the Webster campaign was running. We were trying to bring the anti-Webster vote to us and that started to happen at the end. The bell rang before we could get enough of those votes, and we lost the fight by five points.

I think we ran a very, very good race and came out of nowhere. Just before the election, I told someone that if we win this thing, it will be the greatest upset of all time as we were 41 points down six weeks out. I’m very proud of the effort that we put forth. I was glad to hear that Tony thought we were closing too. Ultimately, it was very, very close—twenty-two thousand votes.
The coverage of the race by the print media was very good. I think they were very fair and very thorough. Since television is simply a form of entertainment, you do not get news on TV. It's very difficult to explain a Second Injury Fund in thirty seconds. It just cannot be done. In this race, as in many, many races, the three most important things were money to buy TV, money to buy TV, and money to buy TV, because that is where the general public gets their information.

Ken Allen, campaign manager for Wendell Bailey. First, I have to agree with Tom [Deuschle] that, unfortunately, money matters! We tried to run an idealistic campaign, and it didn't work. The way the public sees the campaign is through thirty-second commercials. You cannot get around it any way, shape or form, even when you have a candidate who runs around the state like Wendell did.

Our campaign was based on a tremendous amount of energy. Wendell was willing to go anywhere. He would drive from St. Louis to Kansas City, down to Springfield and up to Kirksville in one day and shake hands and go to events. We tried to utilize that energy and his commitment to the campaign.

I joined the campaign in February 1991. In December 1990 Wendell was the first candidate to formally announce his candidacy for governor. Since it was a three-way race, people asked Wendell why he was in this race. It never occurred to people that the two officeholders who had to leave their office[s] were Governor Ashcroft and Wendell Bailey. Under the state constitution, the treasurer is limited to two terms, and Wendell was completing his second term.

Wendell had many years of experience in the political arena. He had been a United States Congressman, a state representative, had held some local offices and for the last eight years had been the state treasurer. We felt that his experience and his knowledge, especially in budget matters, would convince voters that he should be in the governor's office. He understands budgets, and he was concerned about people and jobs. His programs as state treasurer had created twenty-two thousand jobs.

In the Republican primary, all of these candidates were well known. Republican voters around the state knew and liked all three of the candidates. Therefore, until the Second Injury Fund came out, you couldn't criticize anybody about the job they had done in their office.
They had all done admirably well. They had all entered statewide office at the same time and they had been friends. The three were part of a Republican team which had worked well together.

Bill Webster and Roy Blunt not only had more money, but they also had more political party people. That meant that we attracted and used people who were new to politics, much like Ross Perot did. We had many people in our campaign who had never been involved in campaigns before. They didn’t know what to do, which was a disadvantage because we had to stop what we were doing and try to explain what to do. They were hard-working people and wanted to help, but they simply had never done it before. That was almost a disadvantage.

We decided to put a limit on the size of campaign contributions that we would accept. On August 4, 1991, we said that we would not accept any more than $100 from any person. We felt that would get a little more press, which would be helpful since we were going to be outspent anyway. Our opponents were saying that Wendell can’t raise money. In a way, they were right because the high-dollar Republicans had already given to Bill Webster or Roy Blunt.

We were totally outmanned, outgunned with money and with the lineup of endorsements. As a result, the perception among Republicans was that they liked Wendell Bailey but he couldn’t win. If people don’t think you can win, your chances aren’t very good. That was indicated by the television ads, in which Roy [Blunt] and Bill [Webster] were firing at each other and not at us. They didn’t have to fire at us because we weren’t in the ball game. I’m sure they had ammunition ready to come after us if we started climbing in the polls, but so long as we didn’t climb, there was no reason to worry about us.

Our strategy was to try to get as much earned media as possible. Wendell was traveling around the state meeting new people every day. We had fund-raisers that ranged from $5 on barbecue picnics to $100 per person. What we were trying to do was to encourage more people to become involved in the process. I think we did that. We had a lot of people involved with our campaign who had never been involved in the process before.

The number of people who vote in the Republican primary has always been smaller than the number who vote in the Democratic primary. Out
of a state of five million, only 400,000 will vote in the Republican primary. From the beginning, we targeted areas with lots of Republicans. Obviously, St. Louis County is huge for a Republican primary. Our strategy was geared towards the metropolitan areas and the primary. We would worry later about whatever came after that. Our whole strategy was based on the top sixty counties where Republican votes are. You’ve got to go where the votes are.10

Our message was put out especially by having Wendell speak to people. Also, we targeted groups with our mailing lists. We had doctors, dentists, pro-choice Republicans, Chamber of Commerce, car dealers and many other groups that we targeted, trying to get a piece of mail into their hands. The big problem is that you don’t know if the recipients are going to vote Republican or Democrat. If they don’t walk into the polling place and ask for a Republican ballot, you have wasted your money.

We ran a campaign on issues and we ran a campaign with a one-hundred-dollar limit. When everybody talks about money as being the ruination of politics, we tried to show that it really was. Thus, we feel good about that.

The Democratic Primary

In the 1950s and 1960s, Democrats dominated Missouri politics, winning almost every statewide race. The pattern changed in the 1970s when Republicans, presenting attractive, well-funded candidates, won yet one and then another statewide office. In 1984 and 1988, Democrats were able to win only one statewide office, the lieutenant governor’s post. Prospects for 1992 looked little better; incumbent Republican governor John Ashcroft was leaving office still held in high regard by the voters, and the Republican party had a stable full of well-known, popular candidates, any one of whom could succeed Ashcroft. Furthermore, Republican president George Bush looked like a formidable candidate for reelection, strong enough that most of the strong Democratic candidates of 1988, including Missouri’s Richard Gephardt, announced that they would not be candidates in 1992.

Even so, the potential uncertainties in a two-party state, and the
strong attraction of the governorship drew two potentially strong Dem­ocratic candidates—Mel Carnahan, the one Democrat holding statewide office, and Vince Schoemehl, three-time mayor of St. Louis, at the time of the election the state’s second-largest city.

Candidates

**Mel Carnahan.** Mel Carnahan was born in southeast Missouri, where his father was a school superintendent. The father, A. S. J. Carnahan, was later elected to the United States Congress, where he served for fourteen years. Mel Carnahan graduated from George Washington University, then from the University of Missouri—Columbia Law School with highest academic honors. At age twenty-eight he was elected to the Missouri House of Representatives and selected during his second term for the second most powerful post, majority floor leader. After unsuccessfully running for the state senate, Carnahan practiced law in Rolla until 1980, when he ran for and was elected state treasurer, receiving more votes than any previous nonincumbent statewide candidate in Missouri history. In 1984 he filed for governor but lost the Democratic nomination to Lieutenant Governor Ken Rothman. In 1988 Carnahan was elected lieutenant governor, the only Democrat to win statewide office that year. Carnahan’s supporters wore straight-arrow pins to symbolize Carnahan’s image: to his supporters, he was a solid, cautious, unflappable team player, but his critics considered him dull, plodding, and a reluctant fighter.

**Vince Schoemehl.** One of eleven children, Vince Schoemehl grew up in St. Louis and attended the University of Missouri—Columbia for a year. Encountering financial difficulty, he returned home, and after spending seven and one-half years working his way through college, graduated from the University of Missouri—St. Louis. Schoemehl was elected to the St. Louis city council in 1975; then, at age thirty-four, he challenged and defeated the incumbent mayor. He was reelected twice after that. His terms were marked by vigorous action, successful policies, and noisy fights with opponents. “Compare my record as a change agent—as a person who took a city on the brink of bankruptcy and brought it back, as a person who took a bloated city bureaucracy with
Table 2-2. Media Polls in the Democratic Gubernatorial Primary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Carnahan</th>
<th>Schoemehl</th>
<th>Undecided and Other</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 92</td>
<td>Mason-Dixon</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>(380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14–22</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>(282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25–26</td>
<td>Quitno for Attorney Gen</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>38% (about 400)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27–Aug 1</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>(478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4</td>
<td>Election results</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>(700,988)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mason-Dixon refers to Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research which conducted a poll for several Missouri media, including the Springfield News-Leader. SLPD refers to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and KMOX refers to St. Louis radio station KMOX. The Quitno poll was conducted by the pollster Mike McKeon of Chicago, and released by Quitno’s campaign.

almost 10,300 employees and shrunk it by about 50 percent, to about 4,300 employees,” Schoemehl said during his campaign for governor.

The position of mayor of St. Louis had given Schoemehl political and administrative experience and substantial name identification. On the other hand, it created liabilities: “Missouri voters have gone decades without electing a governor from St. Louis, a city that is frequently viewed in outstate Missouri as a breeding ground for the sleight-of-hand political deal and a place with a high crime rate.” Schoemehl himself proudly quoted a voter in Mexico, Missouri, who said, “I don’t know if the state can take eight years of you, but we sure as hell need four.”

Advertising

Schoemehl began the campaign with only 57 percent name recognition statewide, by far the lowest among the five major candidates. He began airing ads outstate in early May, focusing on his accomplishments in St. Louis and on his leadership style. As shown in Table 2-2, media polls indicated that those ads helped close the gap.
Schoemehl Television Ad

Schoemehl walks down a neighborhood street, then is seen wearing a hard hat at downtown construction. It ends with him sitting on some residential steps. Schoemehl does all of the talking throughout the ad, saying, “A few years ago, this neighborhood was struggling just to survive. Now people are really proud and call it home. Downtown was a ghost town, but today people are back at work—and St. Louis is back in business. It wasn’t always easy and I might have stepped on a few toes along the way. But I’ve learned that if you want change, you’ve got to be willing to fight for it.”

Another so-called “inoculation ad” has been running for weeks outstate. . . . It shows Schoemehl breaking eggs while he says, “I may have broken a few eggs, but I’ve made some nice omelets.”

—Jo Mannies, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 9, 1992

Carnahan, with the luxury of higher name recognition and a statewide network of supporters earned in three previous statewide campaigns, saved his money until late in the campaign. With two weeks to go he began running attack ads; one accused Schoemehl of having backed eighteen tax increases in his eleven years as mayor. The most effective ad cited St. Louis’s high crime and cuts in the police force and featured a retired St. Louis police officer who said, “The St. Louis Police Officers Association wants you to know that Mayor Vince Schoemehl can’t be trusted.”

Another ad alleged that Mayor Schoemehl reaped more than $2 million in campaign contributions from companies doing business with his city government. “His friends get city business, Vince Schoemehl gets campaign money. Dirty politics, dirty money,” the ad said. A third ad, aired in western Missouri, accused Schoemehl of taking “illegal laundered money,” referring to the $25,000 contribution from a company in
England, in apparent violation of a federal law that bans campaign contributions from foreign countries.

Schoemehl largely refrained from attack ads, one exception being an ad featuring a stopwatch and asking, “For 12 long years, Mel Carnahan has been on the public payroll in Jefferson City. In 10 seconds, can you think of one thing Mel has accomplished? Give up. Maybe that explains his vicious negative ads attacking Vince Schoemehl’s character and distorting his record. But if you had Mel’s record, what else could he do?” Another attacked Carnahan’s proposed $200 million education tax plan saying, “Mel Carnahan wants you to pay more taxes. I want government to pay more attention.”

**Issues**

Both candidates emphasized **education** and **economic development.** Carnahan proposed a tax increase for education, while Schoemehl proposed to increase spending for education by $450 million over four years, securing the money by downsizing other areas of state government. In economic development, Schoemehl emphasized development of alternative forms of energy, especially ethanol and soy fuel-oil plants. Schoemehl said he would cut the number of state government employees by 20 percent.

On abortion, Carnahan had been consistently **pro-choice** for many years and won the support of **pro-choice** groups. Schoemehl had been supported by abortion opponents in his earlier races, but announced that if elected governor, he would support the status quo and veto any changes in the state abortion laws.

The campaign was enlivened by Mayor Schoemehl’s reference to Carnahan as a “redneck from Rolla.” Schoemehl apologized to any Missourians who felt offended, but not to Carnahan, saying that Carnahan had been accusing him of being “a city slicker and a big-city mayor.” At the very least, the dust-up gave professors an opportunity to explain the origins of the term *redneck.* Schoemehl’s opponents defined it as “somebody who was prejudiced,” and “a dumb, bigoted, uneducated country person.”
Endorsements

Carnahan won a critical endorsement from Congressman William L. Clay of St. Louis, who is influential with black voters in the St. Louis area. Clay had backed Schoemehl in each of his three mayoral bids, but he had also fought with him on city issues. Carnahan also won the endorsement of Freedom, Inc., a Kansas City black political organization. Carnahan won the active support of the St. Louis Police Officers Association, upset with Schoemehl because of his opposition to pay and pension increases. Carnahan was endorsed by the Kansas City Star, the Moberly Monitor-Index and the Warrensburg Daily Star-Journal. Carnahan also received substantial assistance from Missouri abortion rights groups, which operated phone banks and sent out mailings on his behalf.

Schoemehl won the endorsement of most labor groups, including the AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers, the American Federation of State and County Municipal Employees, and the Missouri National Education Association. Near the end of the campaign, Schoemehl was accompanied almost daily by Bob Kelley, head of the St. Louis Labor Council. Schoemehl won endorsements of more than two hundred elected officials from throughout the state, including many state legislators, and most of the St. Louis area Democratic clubs. He was endorsed by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Springfield News-Leader, the Joplin Globe, the Columbia Daily Tribune, and the Rolla Daily News. Trying to put the best face on losing the endorsement of Carnahan’s hometown newspaper, campaign manager Marc Farinella said, “Endorsements from the Republican papers don’t bother us. They’re dying to run against Schoemehl.”

Campaign Finance

1991 Fund-raising

Jo Mannies of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch analyzed Schoemehl's 1991 contributions, finding that he had raised $1.56 million during the year. About one-quarter of his contributions had come from labor groups or individuals. About two-thirds of his contributions were from the St. Louis metropolitan area. Major contributors included John E. Connelly of Pittsburgh (almost $50,000), owner of entertainment and excursion
boats on the St. Louis riverfront; Jerry Clinton and Fran Murray ($22,600), partners in an effort to bring a professional football franchise to St. Louis; and Tippins Development, Ltd., of London ($25,000), a recycling company interested in the mayor's proposals for trash to energy plants. That last contribution raised questions about the legality of a foreign contribution, and the mayor eventually returned the money. An analysis by Rich Hood of the Kansas City Star revealed that Schoemehl had received $400,000 in out-of-state contributions, largely from labor unions and businesses with investments or interests in St. Louis. This constituted 29 percent of his contributions, a much higher out-of-state percentage than the other major candidates received.

Jo Mannies of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch also analyzed Mel Carnahan's 1991 contributions, noting that highway contractors had given large amounts. For example, William Herzog—past president of a state contractors' association—and his firm, Herzog Contracting Company of St. Joseph, contributed about $43,000 in donations and in-kind airplane flights (later increased to almost $58,000). John Fabick Tractor Company of Fenton (a distributor of construction machinery) and the Fabick family contributed $26,000.

By January 1, 1992, Vince Schoemehl had raised $2.2 million for his campaign and Mel Carnahan had raised $1 million. On the other hand, early expenditures were also high—Schoemehl spent $1.5 million in 1991, and Carnahan spent almost $700,000. Even so, neither candidate had run a single television commercial. Early spending went for consulting firms, staff members (five each for Carnahan and Schoemehl), travel, computers, voter files, and campaign literature, and of course for fund-raising. As a result of the fund-raising and spending, Schoemehl began 1992 with $500,000 on hand and Carnahan had about $350,000 on hand.

1992 Fund-raising

By primary election day, Mel Carnahan raised $1.7 million. Examples of major contributors included Central Bancompany and its PAC, $33,000; Lucianna Ross of St. Louis, a strong proponent of abortion rights, $30,000; St. Louis Police Officers Association $28,000; trial lawyers Gary
The Race for Governor

and Anita Robb of Kansas City, $25,000; and Mercantile Bank PAC, $17,500. Carnahan ended the primary with a debt of $130,000.

In 1992, Mayor Vince Schoemehl collected $2.3 million, and spent slightly more, so that he still owed $153,000. Large in-kind contributions included $23,570 from Jefferson Keeler Printing of St. Louis and $21,150 from Ozark National Life Insurance. Large monetary contributions included $20,000 from Deffenbaugh Industries of Shawnee Kansas, $15,000 or more each from the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Washington, D.C.; IBEW Education Committee of Washington, D.C.; and the Missouri State Council of Machinists.

Campaign Staffs

Carnahan’s first campaign manager was his daughter, Robin Carnahan, who had experience as a political consultant helping Eastern Europeans form political parties and conduct democratic election campaigns. She worked throughout the campaign, but the campaign manager role was shifted first to Celia Fischer, then to Marc Farinella. Other staff people included finance director Liz Zelenka, who had been involved in Senator Harris Wofford’s campaign in Pennsylvania; Deidre Hirner of Jefferson City, who had been the lieutenant governor’s Director of Governmental Affairs; political director Roy Temple of Puxico and Rolla, who had worked in son Rusty Carnahan’s unsuccessful campaign for Congress in 1990; Chris Siford, press spokesman, who had worked as a newspaper and radio journalist in Springfield; Mike Wolff, a St. Louis University law professor who did research for Carnahan after losing the nomination for attorney general; Phil Wright of Jefferson City; and John Beakley of San Antonio, Texas. Media consultants and television producers were Shorr and Associates of Philadelphia; surveys were conducted by Hickman Brown Research of Washington, D.C.

Schoemehl hired E. C. Walker of Jefferson City, director of governmental relations and research for the Missouri National Education Association, as his campaign manager. Much of the actual management however was conducted by Nancy Rice, who served part-time on the mayor’s staff and part-time with the campaign. Another campaign aide was the mayor’s sister, Lucille Green. Rich Callow served as press secre-
tary. Also serving as consultants to the mayor were JoAnne Gladney and Associates of St. Louis County, which organized campaign activities around the state. Schoemehl hired as his campaign press secretary Catherine Behan, who began the campaign as a reporter for the Riverfront Times, writing some hard-hitting news stories about Schoemehl. His media consultants were Glenn Totten and ProMedia of Needham, Massachusetts.

Primary Election Results

In the election, the vote distribution was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mel Carnahan</td>
<td>388,098</td>
<td>55 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vince Schoemehl</td>
<td>235,652</td>
<td>34 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharon Rogers</td>
<td>35,104</td>
<td>5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary J. Johnson</td>
<td>22,273</td>
<td>3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony (Tony) B. Cox</td>
<td>11,514</td>
<td>2 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmer Dapron</td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td>1 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedric Nazee Hawkins</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>1 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carnahan won every county of the state except Ste. Genevieve, a small Catholic county on the Mississippi River. Particularly embarrassing to the mayor was his loss of both St. Louis city and St. Louis County. In the city, Schoemehl won only seven of the twenty-eight wards, carrying his own ward by only twenty-eight votes. Carnahan led Schoemehl three to one among north side wards, which are predominately black. Carnahan won Jackson County with 57 percent of the vote, receiving more than 70 percent of the vote in some wards where Freedom, Inc., a black political group, wields influence. Carnahan’s total expenditures from 1990 through the primary were slightly more than $2 million, a little more than $5 for each vote received, while Schoemehl’s expenditures were $4 million, more than $17 per vote.

After his loss, Schoemehl continued to serve as mayor of St. Louis, decided not to run for a fourth term, and began to ponder business opportunities, especially the alternative-energy production plants he had advocated during the campaign. When Senator Jack Danforth announced that he would not run for reelection in 1994, Schoemehl quickly announced that he would not be a candidate.
Comments in Symposium about the Democratic Primary

Jack Stapleton, moderator. Marc Farinella was campaign manager for Lieutenant Governor Mel Carnahan. Originally from Evanston, Illinois, Marc worked for political candidates in Oklahoma and Nebraska. He was heavily involved in Harris Wofford’s successful campaign for the United States Senate seat from Pennsylvania before becoming campaign manager for Mel Carnahan.

Marc Farinella, campaign manager for Mel Carnahan. The Democratic primary was a very long campaign; Mel hired his first campaign workers about eighteen months prior to the primary. The early expectation among insiders, the five thousand people in the state who follow politics day in and day out, was that Mel Carnahan was going to defeat Mayor Schoemehl. Not because of Mel Carnahan, because Mel Carnahan was not well known, but because the mayor of St. Louis, like the mayor of any large city, carries a lot of baggage, which makes it very tough running for statewide office.

The early expectations were that Mayor Schoemehl might not be able to mount a tough challenge, but he did. During the year prior to the primary, Vince Schoemehl ran a very active campaign and raised phenomenal amounts of money. In contrast, Mel Carnahan has never been known as a great fund-raiser. It became clear that Mayor Schoemehl was going to get a pretty good campaign together. He traveled throughout the state, met a lot of people and raised and spent a lot of money.

I came on board the campaign in April, having been a consultant to the campaign prior to that. By April the perception among insiders was that the mayor of St. Louis might beat us. He had raised considerably more money than had Mel Carnahan. He had run a more aggressive campaign. A lot of people on our side were concerned. Polls around April or May showed that the gap which had existed for twelve months was tightening up. Our salvation, and the big difference here, was that the mayor had also spent a lot of money. By the time ordinary citizens were beginning to care about the campaign, we had about as much money in the bank as Schoemehl, though he had raised much more. He had spent much of his money. We went into the final two or
three months with approximately the same number of dollars in the kitty.

Given Schoemehl's higher negatives by virtue of being mayor of a big city, we thought we would have a pretty good shot if we could get our fund-raising off the ground. At the time I came aboard, we brought a major fund-raiser on the staff. From then on, 85 percent of Mel Carnahan's time, and of our activities and campaign resources were devoted to fund-raising. As a number of people have said, that's all that counts. If you can't afford to be on television, you aren't going to win a statewide race. Nothing else matters. We cranked in the dollars.

During the last three months, Mayor Schoemehl still outraised us and outspent us, but not by much. We were able to be competitive. We had enough resources to drive home his high negatives and at the same time, do a little something to define Mel Carnahan who was still kind of a blank slate. This allowed us to ultimately win the primary.

A couple of things worthy of note about the primary: first, the education plan. Lots of people told us that it was a big mistake for Mel Carnahan to be supporting a tax increase for education while running for governor. There were several factors that led us to do it however. Mel Carnahan believed deeply about education and we have to let candidates do those kinds of things. We try to discourage it but some of these things slip through. [Laughter] He really felt strongly about it, and he was determined to emphasize that issue.

The education plan had considerably more support than most observers thought it had. Our polling indicated that when the people knew how the money was going to be used, a tax increase for education won the support of about 50 percent of the prospective primary voters. Even among general election voters, support was about 50 percent.

I think the biggest factor in the primary was an error on Mayor Schoemehl's part of spending his money early. I think Schoemehl raised about twice as much money as we raised in the primary. I think he raised and spent about $4.2 million; we raised and spent just over $2 million. If Mayor Schoemehl had saved that money and spent it on television late in the game, we would have had a much more difficult time because television is what people pay attention to. That's how you change opinions. Newspapers don't do it. Mail rarely does it. Radio
doesn't do much. Television is the name of the game. Had he spent all of those dollars on television, it would have been a much tighter race.

Richard Callow representing Mayor Schoemehl. The formal campaign manager of the Schoemehl campaign was E. C. Walker, but in reality the campaign was conceived and executed by Nancy Rice. Nancy joined the Great American Smoke Out yesterday, or else she would be sitting here at the table with these four gentlemen. She said that sitting here with them would be an unusually cruel test of her resolve and an unfair danger to their personal safety. [Laughter]

The campaign had a tremendous asset in Vince Schoemehl, an attractive, charismatic leader of accomplishment. He had been elected mayor of the state's largest city while only in his mid-30s and reelected twice. He has a mind like a sponge, a heart the size of the arch, and a mouth like . . . well you-all saw his mouth. [Laughter] To his media consultants in Washington, D. C., Schoemehl was a modern candidate whose citywide mayoral races had been characterized by an understanding of the power of televised images and by an ability to raise, and yes Marc, spend a great deal of money. To his pollster, Bill Hamilton of Washington, D.C., Schoemehl was an intellectual challenge, a candidate who carried very high negatives.

When I joined the city a year and a half ago, Schoemehl's negatives in the St. Louis area were 50 percent. But, he was also a candidate about whom hostile focus group participants would giggle, literally giggle, when they started thinking about what Jefferson City would be like when Vince Schoemehl got there to shake things up. [Laughter] And Vince Schoemehl really did plan to shake things up in Jefferson City, just as he had in St. Louis.

To balance the St. Louis city budget and to maintain services, Schoemehl had laid off, retrained, transferred, or privatized 60 percent of the city's work force. He had sued the entire state legislature. He had drilled the locks off the door of the license collector's office. He had appointed the city's first African American citywide official and had increased the number of women appointees in city government by 910 percent. He had convinced scores of private and public investors to invest billions of dollars in the city, even though half its 1950 population had moved away. He had also managed to alienate both sides of the abortion issue by
vowing to veto every piece of legislation, pro or con, that dealt with the subject of reproductive freedom. Vince Schoemehl was a radical changer; the strategic challenge of the campaign was to show him to voters in a way that did not scare their electoral pants off. Literally, we built the strategy of this campaign on a giggle in a focus group.

The formal campaign plan had four objectives: The first objective was to make Vince Schoemehl the Democratic nominee. Our first project to meet that objective was to discourage Mel Carnahan from remaining in the race. When I was living in Washington, D.C., a year and a half out, all the ongoing discussion there was which of these two candidates was going to drop out and run for the United States Senate. When I got to Missouri, I learned that that was a campaign that Vince Schoemehl had specifically engendered, enlisting the support of organized labor, state legislators, Washington Beltway types, teachers, African-American groups, and women's groups. As part of the same campaign, he secured endorsements from outstate political figures who could not normally be counted on to even recognize the mayor of St. Louis. He fought tooth and nail to try to convince Mel Carnahan to get out of the race. That didn’t work. A related goal was to discourage others from getting into the race; and, until very late, there were no cats and dogs in the race.

The second objective was to present Vince Schoemehl as a competent, knowledgeable, dynamic, and creative statewide, not citywide, but statewide leader. The first goal was to increase Vince Schoemehl’s name recognition, which outside of the St. Louis media market was almost zero. Towards that end, Vince traveled extensively. He bought an airplane, and he traveled through almost every county in the state. He assembled a network of county coordinators. He built a speaker’s network. We were putting up signs in the middle of nowhere. We had a fax list that was several hundred places long. He was the toast of Democratic days. He started early TV on May 11 in Kansas City, Columbia, and Springfield. Eight days after he started his TV, he had closed nineteen points, according to our internal polling.

Beyond growing his name recognition, Vince Schoemehl sought to demonstrate competence in non-urban issues and, at the same time, to demonstrate a commonality of interests among urban and rural voters.
Finally, he attempted to address the St. Louis bias. In St. Louis itself, we were always confident, maybe too confident, that we could make those people giggle once again. If they stayed angry with Vince Schoemehl because of twelve years of fights, they could send him to Jefferson City and get him out of their hair. If we could make them [feel] less angry and focus on the accomplishments, they would reward him with a job promotion.

The third objective of the campaign was to build the strategic, tactical, and logistical capabilities to win the primary and then the general. Schoemehl built a grass-roots organization with regional headquarters. At its high point, he had somewhere between ten and twenty paid staffers, including a fully paid staff in Kansas City. That's where a lot of that money went. Nancy also built a fund-raising organization which was pretty spectacular. There were three fund-raising centers—St. Louis, Kansas City, and Washington, D.C. They raised and spent $4.5 million. Nine hundred thousand dollars came from organized labor. Of the rest, 95 percent came from in-state; $1.8 million came from the greater St. Louis area. In the last six weeks, they raised about what Carnahan did, $100,000 a week. In 1991 alone, they spent $1.4 million, not a minute of television.

The most critical part of the third objective, to give Vince Schoemehl the logistical capabilities to prevail in the general, was a decision not to go negative. Given Vince Schoemehl's own negatives, Vince decided that if he went negative in the primary, Bill Webster, Roy Blunt, or Wendell Bailey would make mincemeat out of him in the general election campaign. So, as tempting as it was for staff to spell out the deficiencies of Mel Carnahan, Vince Schoemehl told us not to do it, and we did not do it. Vince Schoemehl used to ask us at every single meeting to repeat his mission statement like a mantra: “We will elect Vince C. Schoemehl, Jr., governor of Missouri on a program of progressive involvement of the state government and a shaping of the economic and social future of Missouri.” That mission statement says nothing about going negative and we didn't.

Finally, a great deal of effort was spent on the fourth objective, building a plan to govern. Vince Schoemehl had no intention of getting elected governor of Missouri and then trying to figure out what to do.
He had an entire organizational effort figuring out what to do in the first one hundred days, what to do in the first year, the first two years, and in the first four years. That plan is on some shelf somewhere now. In short, the strategy of the Schoemehl campaign from its start to its finish was to present clearly to Missouri voters the sort of governor they would have in Vince Schoemehl. It is my contention that the campaign was successful, not in the sense of winning the primary, but in communicating its message of a discontinuous change agent.

I suggest Vince Schoemehl lost his primary campaign, not because voters didn’t believe him, but because they did believe him. The Carnahan campaign helped fan the flames and shape the feelings about Vince Schoemehl. Vince believes that he lost precisely because voters understood his message. Given the alternative that he would be surprising the voters for four years if he hadn’t told them, I don’t think he cares one bit.

The General Election Campaign

As shown in Table 2-3, Webster had the early lead in match-ups with Carnahan, but he lost that lead sometime during the summer or early fall. Among those who had already decided, Carnahan had 46 percent of the vote in December 1991, and that percentage still held in February 1992. That proportion had increased to about 55 percent by September, and it was over 60 percent in October, settling at 59 percent on election day.

Issues

First newspaper reports after the primary election indicated that both Carnahan and Webster expected abortion and taxes to be key issues. Carnahan had received strong support from pro-choice groups, and Webster had received strong support from pro-life groups. Carnahan had proposed a tax increase for education, and Webster strongly opposed it.

The candidates also divided over the issue of desegregation in Kansas City and St. Louis, with Carnahan arguing that the state should cooper-
Table 2-3. Media Polls in the Gubernatorial General Election Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Carnahan</th>
<th>Webster</th>
<th>Undecided (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 91</td>
<td>Webster campaign</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 92</td>
<td>Mason-Dixon</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12-16</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>KC Star, KMBC</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12-13</td>
<td>Demo Natl Committee</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12-21</td>
<td>KC Star, KMBC</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 20-24</td>
<td>KBIA, KOMU, Missourian</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25-29</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Election results</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>(2.3 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mason-Dixon refers to Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research which conducted a poll for several Missouri media, including the Springfield News-Leader. SLPD refers to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and KMOX refers to St. Louis radio station KMOX. The Democratic National Committee poll, released by the Carnahan campaign, was conducted by Bennett, Petts and Associates of Washington. KC Star refers to the Kansas City Star and KMBC refers to Kansas City television station KMBC. KBIA et al. survey was conducted by the University of Missouri Media Research Bureau for KBIA/91.3 FM radio, KOMU/Channel 8 television, and the Columbia Missourian, all located in Columbia.

ate with the school districts to develop plans which would eliminate the vestiges of segregation and relieve the state of continued financial responsibility. Carnahan noted that Missouri had the highest cost per capita desegregation plan in the nation, evidence that the case had not been well handled. Webster argued that recent court decisions and recent changes in the United States Supreme Court now placed Missouri in the position in which it could win some of the court battles and get judgments relieving the state of financial responsibility. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorialized that the Webster campaign verged "on coded appeals to racism." Webster responded by accusing the newspaper of "race baiting" in an editorial cartoon attacking his views on funding for school desegregation.
The Second Injury Fund and the grand jury investigation dominated much of the campaign. Carnahan challenged Webster to ask for a letter from the federal prosecutor saying he was not a target of the investigation, but Webster said that Carnahan's proposal was "sleazy campaign tactics."

The October poll conducted by the Kansas City Star and KMBC-TV, found that the abortion issue was most influential, affecting 50 percent of the voters, with the Second Injury Fund affecting 37 percent, and Carnahan's tax plan affecting 32 percent. On the issue of abortion, 25 percent of the respondents wanted to ease Missouri restrictions on abortion, 22 percent wanted state law to remain the same, and 42 percent wanted to further restrict abortions. The significance of the abortion issue was also indicated by the distribution of literature, with abortion foes distributing one million pieces of campaign literature, many in church parking lots the Sunday before the election, and with abortion rights supporters mailing many pieces of literature.

**Advertising**

Webster was the first to run television commercials; his aired on or about September 4, but Carnahan was on the air five or six days later. Webster took the offensive with an ad that said, "Bill Webster opposes a tax increase. Mel Carnahan is pushing one of the largest tax increases in Missouri history. Desegregation: Bill Webster will fight to end excessive desegregation payments. Mel Carnahan disagrees. He wants to negotiate a deal that will cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars." Carnahan issued a press release charging Webster with hypocrisy, noting that Webster had proposed a multi-million-dollar settlement plan himself in 1991.

In mid-October, Webster began an ad comparing Carnahan to Senator Joe McCarthy, freezing an image of McCarthy, then dissolving it into an image of Carnahan. Springfield News-Leader columnist Ron Davis publicly urged Webster to pull the ad, calling it "an especially cheap shot."

**Endorsements**

Webster won the support of his two primary election opponents, as well as the endorsement of the Missouri Farm Bureau political action
committee, continuing a pattern of endorsing the Republican candidate in each election since it first started in 1980. The PAC also immediately pledged $10,000 for his campaign. Webster also won support from the National Rifle Association and the political committee of Missouri Right to Life. Webster was endorsed by the St. Joseph News-Press, which said that Webster “wants to win the school desegregation case so outstate Missouri schools will have a fair share of educational funding,” and the Columbia Daily Tribune, which advised voters to “take a deep breath, sort out the negatives, and vote for Webster.”

Carnahan was endorsed immediately by Mayor Schoemehl. Later he was endorsed by the United Auto Workers, the Missouri National Education Association, the Missouri School Boards Association, the Missouri Association of School Administrators, the Missouri Association of Elementary School Principals, the Missouri State AFL-CIO, the Teamsters, and the National Abortion Rights Action League political committee.

**Campaign Finance**

Both candidates entered the general election race hurting for funds. Webster had only $144,000 on hand; Carnahan was in about the same position, having $259,000 on hand, but owing $130,000, including $100,000 to himself.

The shift in fortune for the two candidates was indicated by the shift in fund-raising in mid-summer, with Carnahan, who had long trailed Webster in fund-raising, moving ahead of him in day-to-day income. In 1991, Webster had raised 2.6 times as much money as Carnahan. In the month just before and after the primary campaign, Carnahan raised 1.6 times as much as Webster. This proved to be a harbinger of Webster’s increasing difficulty in raising the funds he would need for the general election campaign. In the general election campaign, Carnahan raised $2.7 million compared with the $2 million raised by Webster, an unusual turnaround in Missouri where the Republican gubernatorial candidates have regularly outspent the Democrats. Indicative of Carnahan’s success was a Kansas City $100-a-plate fund-raiser attended by one thousand people, the largest Democratic gathering in Jackson County since the 1970s.
Terri Gleich of the *Springfield News-Leader* reported that “much of Carnahan’s money came from organized labor, trial lawyers and pro-abortion rights group. He also received $60,000 from Anheuser-Busch brewery in St. Louis.” Abortion rights organizations contributed nearly $60,000 in the last month before the election. In addition, the Missouri Democratic Party donated $130,000 to Missourians for Choice to finance mailings that would encourage abortion-rights supporters to vote.

John Dvorak of the *Kansas City Star* found that large contributions to Carnahan included over $95,000 from James B. Nutter and his family, $50,000 from the Teamsters’ political arm, and $39,000 in targeted mailings from Missourians for Choice. Large contributions to Bill Webster included almost $98,000 in donations and in-kind services from Anheuser-Busch; $52,500 from Frank A. Bowman, head of Von Hoffmann Press, a St. Louis commercial printer; $37,630 in donations and in-kind services from Leggett & Platt, Inc., a Carthage manufacturer of furniture and bedding components, and one of its executives; and $34,000 from Kansas City Life Insurance’s political action committee, and two top company executives.

The additional funds meant that Webster’s race for the governorship cost $5.8 million, and Carnahan’s race cost $4 million. Total spent in the gubernatorial race by all candidates was more than $17 million, about half again as much as the previous record for a gubernatorial campaign set in 1980. The total also eclipsed what had been the most expensive election in Missouri’s history, the 1986 U.S. Senate race in which Kit Bond and Harriett Woods raised and spent more than $13 million (in 1992 dollars).

General Election Results

Final results in the election were:

- Mel Carnahan: 1,375,425 votes (59 percent)
- Bill Webster: 968,574 votes (41 percent)

Carnahan’s margin of more than 400,000 included a margin of more than 225,000 in the St. Louis metropolitan area and of more than
100,000 in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Another 20,000-vote margin came from Boone County (Columbia) and its adjoining counties. Surprisingly, Carnahan even had a slight margin in Greene County (Springfield). Webster chalked up significant victory margins only in his home counties of Jasper and Newton (Joplin), and in Cape Girardeau County.

Comments in Symposium about the General Election

Tony Feather, campaign manager for Republican Bill Webster. Once we got into the general election, we knew that we had issues that could win. Our polling showed that we were strongest on welfare reform, holding down taxes, and fighting excessive desegregation payments. We had to try to control the agenda, to make sure that the campaign was run on those issues. If we could hold it to those issues, then we knew that we would be successful.

But we didn't have the early firepower that we needed. We had no money because we had spent it all on the primary. It became important to raise money quickly. We tried to throw some spots on early to start talking about these issues. Instead of waiting until the end of the campaign to do contrast spots, we ran a contrast spot very early, trying to draw a very clear picture between Bill Webster and Mel Carnahan on those issues. But we didn't have the firepower to sustain that.

When the Carnahan campaign came on, they came on very hard. They directly aimed at us on the negatives that were out there. They beat us to death on the Second Injury Fund. Once they started on that, they were relentless. Their spots were very good and drove home the message very clearly. They just kept pounding that home. They did an outstanding job raising money, which gave them firepower that we were not able to match. They were able to seize control of the agenda, and it became a campaign based on the Second Injury Fund rather than on the issues of taxes, welfare, and desegregation payments. That's why you saw the result that you did.

We worked very hard until the end of the campaign. But, the Carnahan campaign had the most resources. They had a direct mail pro-
gram that was phenomenal, very effective, very good direct mail. That stuff really was deadly. They did a two-stage thing. They were going out there and grabbing some Democratic and independent votes. In addition, they were doing a very good suppression program among Republican voters. A lot of Republican voters got some very, very tough mail about Bill Webster.

We saw in our polling towards the end that one of the problems that we had was that we weren't carrying 85 percent of the Republican vote. We were running only about 71 percent among Republicans. George Bush had the same problem in his campaign. When you can't sustain your own base and have to go after independents and Democratic conservatives, it's very tough for a Republican to win in Missouri. They were able to grab on to Democrats and independents and hold them throughout the campaign.

Marc Farinella for Democrat Mel Carnahan. Throughout the primary campaign and early in the general election campaign, I think it was widely assumed among insiders and ordinary citizens that Bill Webster was going to be the next governor. Bill Webster went into this campaign as the front-runner. Up until primary day, I think he was widely believed to be the front-runner in the upcoming general election.

Perceptions began to change on primary day. It was widely anticipated that the Democratic contest would be the real squeaker and that the Republican contest would be the blowout. That was reversed. On the Democratic side, Carnahan won by a pretty large margin, 22 percent, while the Republican side was a much tighter race, 5 percentage points. That election result changed the perceptions of insiders and ordinary citizens.

The other factor was money. We were able to generate more money than Bill Webster, to our surprise and to their surprise. This was largely because of Webster's involvement in the Second Injury Fund. So, as usual, money played a key factor.

Obviously there is risk if you support a tax increase when you are running for governor. The Webster campaign, quite correctly, tried to hammer that home, because that was an issue on which they could have won. While the final vote showed quite a wide margin, it was a very competitive campaign in the general election. Bill Webster could have
won this, in my view, had he made some adjustments and had some more dollars to drive home the tax message. In any case, we decided to support the tax increase and we did it. It was a risky thing, but maybe not as risky, given our research, as many people thought. We had people in our camp who thought that it was just the end for us and that it would cause us to lose because no one wins when proposing a tax increase during a gubernatorial election. Fortunately, they were mistaken.
The United States Senate Race

We lost the race for two reasons. First, not having the money to go on air immediately after the primary to define her. Second, not having the last $120,000, which would have allowed us to respond to their last negative ad.

—David Doak, campaign consultant for challenger Geri Rothman-Serot

Kit Bond was running for his second term in the United States Senate in 1992. A sixth-generation Missourian from an affluent family, Bond was educated at Princeton and the University of Virginia Law School, where he was first in his class. He worked as a judicial clerk in Georgia and practiced law in Washington, D.C., before returning to Missouri to run a strong but unsuccessful race for Congress in 1968. Attorney General Jack Danforth appointed Bond as an assistant attorney general, and that position provided the springboard for Bond’s successful 1970 campaign for state auditor. Two years later, Bond was elected governor at age thirty-three; he became the youngest governor in the nation and the youngest governor in the history of the state of Missouri. In 1976, however, Bond lost the governorship to Joe Teasdale. Four years later, Bond returned the favor, defeating Teasdale in his attempt for a second term.

In 1986, Bond won the United States Senate seat vacated by the retirement of Tom Eagleton. He won with only 53 percent of the vote,
Bond's Senatorial Record

The man mocked by some Missourians as the "stealth Senator" during his early, relatively dormant years on Capitol Hill has been transformed into a different weapon: a calibrated, programmed cruise missile aimed at getting federal largess for Missouri interests.

"I'd give Bond an A in pork, and a C or C-minus in substance," said a knowledgeable Senate expert, a Democrat.

—Robert L. Koenig, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 18, 1992.

but Bond was the only Republican in the nation that year to pick up a seat formerly held by a Democrat. That background meant that Bond began the 1992 campaign with enormous advantages, including the name recognition and network of supporters he had accumulated in five statewide campaigns.

To these he added successful fund-raising. In 1986, Bond had spent $5.4 million in his Senate race, one of the most expensive campaigns in the history of the state. Between 1987 and 1992 he prepared for his re-election race by raising $2.5 million, leaving him with $1.5 million on hand at the beginning of 1992. During the last six months of 1991, Bond was raising more than $5,000 every working day. Even so, he stepped up the pace, raising $8,500 every working day during the second quarter of 1992, then more than $14,000 per working day during the third quarter.

Bond had also utilized well the advantages of office, spending $1.5 million for office expenses in 1991, including mailing of more than 360,000 newsletters and letters. When asked why Bond was raising so much money and campaigning so hard, his aides said that the senator remembered 1976, when he underestimated his Democratic opponent and lost the governorship.

When asked by the Kansas City Star for his three biggest accomplishments in his first term, Bond listed three Missouri projects—an increase in highway funds, farm bill changes benefiting Missouri agriculture, and
getting Kansas City in the running for a proposed new jetliner to be built by McDonnell Douglas. His voting record in the Senate was characterized as "a turn of the screw more conservative than Jack Danforth." The two Senators differed on such issues as Bond's support for a constitutional amendment to ban desecration of the flag, for continued production of chemical weapons, for continuation of the filibuster against the 1990 Civil Rights Act, and for more military aid to El Salvador. No major Democrat emerged to challenge Bond. Although St. Louis Mayor Vince Schoemehl and Lieutenant Governor Mel Carnahan both urged each other to forsake the gubernatorial race and challenge Bond, neither was willing to do so.

The Republican Primary

Within his own party, Bond was challenged only by unknown Wes Hummel. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch on August 2 editorialized that "Mr. Bond faithfully reflects Republican values on most national policy issues and deserves to be nominated for a second term." In the primary, the results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kit Bond</td>
<td>337,795</td>
<td>83 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wes Hummel</td>
<td>70,626</td>
<td>17 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bond carried every county in the state.

The Democratic Primary

On the Democratic side, the absence of major candidates gradually brought forward a number of little-known and unknown candidates. Who could foretell where lightning might strike? In the end, fourteen candidates filed. Only five of them had ever been elected to any post, and only two were then in office. While Bond had $1.5 million on hand on January 1, 1992, the best-heeled Democrat had less than $50,000.

In June the St. Louis Post-Dispatch found that fewer than 5 percent of the respondents in a statewide poll knew the names of any of the fourteen Democratic candidates. By late July, the proportion had increased to 13 percent, meaning that 87 percent of the prospective Dem-
The United States Senate Race

Table 3-1. Candidates in Democratic U.S. Senate Primary and Votes Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>224,984</td>
<td>Geri Rothman-Serot, St. Louis County Council member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>67,723</td>
<td>Bill Peacock, Washington lobbyist, Assistant Secretary of the Army under Carter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>59,290</td>
<td>Mert Bernstein, Washington University law professor, former counsel to several Senate subcommittees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>57,254</td>
<td>George D. (Boots) Weber, one-term legislator in 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>50,091</td>
<td>Barbara M. Manson, real estate agent and appraiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>48,634</td>
<td>Carol A. Coe, attorney, black Kansas City council member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>38,509</td>
<td>David Westfall, attorney who twice ran unsuccessfully for legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>18,312</td>
<td>Dan Dodson, young Jefferson City attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>16,313</td>
<td>Ned Sutherland, small-town dentist, one-term legislator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,253</td>
<td>Ken Dudley, perennial Republican candidate, advocate of term limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10,334</td>
<td>Jim Krueger, soft drink delivery truck driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>9,588</td>
<td>Earl Carey, irritated with federal judges who dismissed his claims that IBM had no good cause to fire him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8,152</td>
<td>Richard Charles Tolbert, home rehabber who resigned 18 years before from Kansas City Council on a bad check charge which was later dismissed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>7,830</td>
<td>Nicholas Clement, Lyndon LaRouche supporter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democratic primary voters still were not able to name even one of the fourteen candidates.

Geri Rothman-Serot. The leading Democratic candidate was Geri Rothman-Serot, 48, first elected to the St. Louis County Council in 1990, representing about 140,000 constituents. Rothman-Serot had a statewide network of contacts from campaigns with her former husband, Ken Rothman, who had been speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives, lieutenant governor, and Democratic candidate for governor in 1984. After Ken Rothman retired from politics, the Rothmans had divorced, and Geri had married Don Serot, an orthopedic surgeon.

Rothman-Serot had tried to recruit a major candidate for the Senate
race, then decided to make the race herself when county council redistricting gave her a district that would be difficult for her to hold in 1994. She quickly picked up support from women’s groups and was able to win credibility by securing nationally known consultant David Doak, originally from Missouri, as adviser for her campaign. Her success in the primary depended in part on having more money than her opponents, much of it put into last-minute television advertising.

Bill Peacock. The second-strongest Democrat, Bill Peacock, 51, served as assistant secretary of the Army under President Jimmy Carter. He had later served as a Washington, D.C., lobbyist, and his industrial connections scared off at least one competitor who felt that he would never be able to match Peacock’s fund-raising. Peacock planned to raise $3 million, then scaled his goal back to $2 million. In the end, however, the Peacock campaign raised less than $100,000 and never caught fire. One reason was reflected in Rich Hood’s commentary in the Kansas City Star: “Peacock has an impressive résumé. One problem is that he knows it and shows it.”

The problems faced by candidates in the Democratic primary were described in the symposium by Marietta Caiarelli, a staffer in the Bill Peacock campaign:

Our strategy was first to raise as much money as possible so that we could run media, and secondly, to start a grass-roots organization which could win endorsements from the AFL-CIO, traditional Democratic groups and veterans groups because Bill himself was a veteran, a Marine Colonel.

The major focus of the campaign was to stay home and raise money, not to visit counties. Talking to groups of people is a relatively ineffective use of your time because you don’t reach enough people. The emphasis is on mass communication.

The problem with our campaign can be stated in two words: no money. The gubernatorial race, which had been going on for about two years, had absorbed most of the political contributions available in the state. On the national level, the presidential campaigns were soaking up all the available money.

When we did get money, it came in late. Because it came in late, we were not able to do any polling and thereby craft some effective message. That meant that our TV spots were a variety of talking heads,
which are not effective communication. Bill was an unknown with no name recognition, and we didn’t have the money or resources to turn that around. We also had difficulty getting the grass-roots organization, in part because labor split its support in the primary. Not having a background in Missouri politics, Bill had no base of support upon which to build.

**Mert Bernstein.** The third-strongest Democrat, Mert Bernstein, 68, a Washington University law professor, had served in Washington as an aide to then senators Hubert Humphrey, John F. Kennedy, and Wayne Morse. He had also written books on Social Security and pensions. Bernstein was the first to declare, and he campaigned for a year and a half before the primary.

His campaign was briefly described by Jo Mannies, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* political reporter:

Bernstein had a very limited organization. In fact, it was run out of his house. He has a big house in St. Louis and had literally turned his attic into his campaign headquarters. Mert traveled around the state. He had one guy who would drive his car around. He got on lots of rural radio stations; I know, I kept hearing him on small stations. He was everywhere. He used to send me the clippings he got from these little papers and he made a very shrewd use of the free media in the state.

**Funding**

None of the Democratic candidates demonstrated an early skill at raising money. In the first six months of 1992, while Kit Bond was raising $816,000, the leading Democrats, as a group, raised only one-quarter of that amount. Geri Rothman-Serot raised about $80,000, and Mert Bernstein and Bill Peacock each raised about $60,000. Bernstein had imposed a $100 limit on contributions he would accept and declined all PAC contributions. The campaign treasuries of each of the leading Democrats were fattened by personal loans to the campaign, $140,000 from Rothman-Serot, $72,000 from Bernstein, and $113,000 from Peacock. In the end, Rothman-Serot spent about $220,000 in the primary, and Bernstein and Peacock each spent about $160,000.
Endorsements

Rothman-Serot won the endorsements of the Kansas City Star, the Columbia Daily Tribune, the Missouri National Education Association, the Sierra Club, the Committee for County Progress in Kansas City, and various ward and township groups in St. Louis and St. Louis County. Mert Bernstein won the endorsement of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The Missouri AFL-CIO and the St. Louis Labor Council remained neutral.

Primary Election Results

As indicated in Table 3-1, Geri Rothman-Serot easily won the primary, receiving 36 percent of the vote, far above the 11 percent won by Bill Peacock and the 9 percent each won by Professor Mert Bernstein and perennial candidate "Boots" Weber. Rothman-Serot carried 82 of the 114 counties in the state, plus the city of St. Louis. In her home county of St. Louis, easily the largest county in the state, she won more than 50 percent of the vote.

The General Election Campaign

Kit Bond quickly opened the general election campaign by challenging his opponent to get out and meet the people of the state, to campaign in many counties, as he said he had done. Rothman-Serot, possessing a campaign treasury only a fraction the size of Bond's, chose instead to concentrate on fund-raising. Moreover, the perils of statewide campaigning were indicated by one of her early campaign swings, when no crowd appeared at the kick-off rally, leading to a St. Louis PostDispatch headline "Rothman-Serot Tour Draws Faithful Few." By election day, Bond was saying that he had campaigned in 80 counties while he counted only 19 for Rothman-Serot.

Rothman-Serot's contrast of the contest between herself and Bond as "between somebody who's lived a real life and somebody who's lived in the lap of luxury" was countered by Bond's pointing to the $140,000 that she had loaned her primary campaign. He said, "Not many people in the middle class could put $140,000 into [a] campaign."
Geri Rothman-Serot "Senate Perks"
Commercial

Geri Rothman-Serot walks into a dining room where a family of four is seated at table. She says, "The average Missouri family makes less than $32,000 a year. But U.S. Senators make over $129,000, more than the income of four Missouri families. Then they get perks like a health club, subsidized restaurants, free doctors. The list goes on and on.

"I'm Geri Rothman-Serot. I think its time to stop these special privileges. In the Senate, I'll vote to rescind the pay raise and end perks. To me the issue is fundamental. Unless Senators learn to live like the rest of us, they'll never understand our problems."

Issues

Rothman-Serot stated she would have voted in "180-degree contrast" to Kit Bond, noting that he had opposed abortion rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act, a minimum-wage increase, plant-closing notices, and the extension of unemployment benefits. Bond replied that if she were 180 degrees opposed to everything he had done, he wanted to see "how she rationalizes opposing more money for highways for Missouri; before- and after-school day care; housing for families in crisis, keeping families together; the clean-air amendments."

Both candidates emphasized programs designed to create more jobs. Bond proposed tax credits for businesses and first-time home buyers and reduction in the capital gains tax. Rothman-Serot proposed a tax cut for middle-class Americans, an equivalent tax increase for the wealthy, and an acceleration in spending on roads and other infrastructure repairs. They agreed on spending less money for defense of Germany and Japan and on a balanced-budget amendment. Bond proposed cutting defense expenditures by 33 percent over five years, while Rothman-Serot
proposed a cut of 50 percent in that time period (though other quotes indicated support for a reduction of "25 to 50 percent").

Environmental accomplishments divided the two. Rothman-Serot pointed with pride to a bill that she pushed through the St. Louis County Council that tightened county rules on pollutants from incinerators. She also publicized the fact that the League of Conservation Voters gave Bond only a 13 percent approval rating in 1991. Bond called her "an environmental extremist" and repeatedly ran television commercials charging that Rothman-Serot had supported a landfill that had created noxious fumes and bothered nearby residents. He also pointed to his accomplishment in developing the compromise that led to enactment of the federal Clean Air Act.

Rothman-Serot emphasized a health-care plan that she had proposed for St. Louis City and County, to establish a joint health-care authority and to encourage doctors, private hospitals, and clinics to contribute services to those who cannot afford care. Bond noted that she had never introduced the plan, much less passed it, and produced letters from federal and state agencies and professional associations indicating that the plan would probably be illegal if enacted.

Part of the debate revolved around the issue of debates, with each candidate claiming to be eager for debates. The two camps, however, were unable to agree upon a time and place. Bond accepted invitations to debates before October 15, and objected to debates after that date. Rothman-Serot took the opposite stand, objecting to debates before October 15, and accepting debates after that date. One impromptu debate occurred when Rothman-Serot "got a tip" about a Bond press conference and attended the event herself. Bond greeted her and invited her to join him in front of the cameras, where the two discussed Bond's proposals to cut health-care costs.

Eventually the two met for joint questioning by reporters for the *Kansas City Star* on October 10. Rich Hood, one of the questioners, summarized the exchange: "Rothman-Serot has little of substance to say, but she says it with feeling. Bond is not at a loss for facts or specifics, but he indulges too often in government double-speak and bureaucratic jargon." The exchange reflected the comparative advantages and disadvantages of challengers and incumbents. Rothman-Serot entered the
Kit Bond’s Landfill Commercial

The ad accused Rothman-Serot of voting to expand a “dangerous landfill.” Bond’s ad said Rothman-Serot, a County Council member, voted to expand the landfill after taking $2,000 in campaign donations from the owner. The ad says that the landfill was “targeted for prosecution” and that “methane gas from this mountain of trash has killed 10 acres of trees.”

Two Democratic County Council members and the County Executive defended Rothman-Serot, saying the legislation she supported actually had tightened restrictions on the landfill. The facts: Rothman-Serot received $2,000 in campaign contributions from the landfill owner. Six months later the Department of Natural Resources sued the landfill for dumping waste higher than allowed. Three months later, Rothman-Serot and other Democrats voted to allow the twenty excessive feet of height already dumped before Rothman-Serot took office, plus another twenty feet. A year later, Rothman-Serot and other Democrats extended the time limit to meet these new heights. The trees died nine years before Rothman-Serot took office.

Rothman-Serot said she was “horrified” by the commercial: “I believe very strongly that Kit Bond is lying, and it’s very sad because when you have enough money to repeat the lie long enough, people tend to believe it.”

Adapted from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 18, 1992, and the Kansas City Star, October 22, 1992.
race late and needed to focus her efforts on fund-raising if she was to have any chance of winning. That focus precluded spending substantial time learning about the issues. As the incumbent, Bond had been raising money and studying national issues for six years, giving him substantially greater resources in each area.

**Campaign Finance**

About one quarter of Rothman-Serot’s receipts came from Democratic party committees, and another quarter came from political action committees. Rothman-Serot received help from various women’s groups, especially the National Women’s Political Caucus, headed by Harriett Woods, Kit Bond’s 1986 opponent. Bond had long expected that Woods would be his 1992 opponent, and he lost little time in raising the argument that “Rothman-Serot and Harriett Woods are in lockstep on the issues and out of step with most Missourians.”

Bond entered the general election campaign with an ample treasury. He hoped to spend even more than the $5.4 million he spent in first winning his seat in 1986. He lowered his goal however because “money-raising is a lot harder this year. I was always about the sixth tambourine in line in Missouri. Somebody’s always standing at the door. I was there after two or three gubernatorial candidates, and at least one attorney-general candidate.” Even so, Bond raised $5.1 million during the six-year cycle, an amount exceeded in 1992 only by Republican gubernatorial candidate Bill Webster. Bond’s treasury, one of the largest in the history of the state, was seven times that of Rothman-Serot. About one-third of the funding came from political action committees.

Campaign staff. Campaign manager for Bond was David Ayres, a University of Missouri–Columbia graduate who had worked in Bond’s 1986 campaign and Danforth’s 1988 campaign. David Israelite served as director of communications and research. Don Sipple, a Washington consultant originally from Missouri, developed the television commercials. Fred Steeper served as pollster.

Rothman-Serot’s campaign staff was unusual in that women occupied many of the top spots. Campaign manager was Terri New; press secretary was Kate Fiedler; and director of communications was Joe Garcia.
Excerpt from the Kansas City Star Debate Exchange

Bond: And I might ask Geri what kind of agricultural proposals she has because . . . I haven’t heard her say anything about agriculture and what she specifically would propose to do for agriculture.

Rothman-Serot: . . . in Cape [Girardeau] County we were at a county fair and I was talking with a woman who was with her children and she was showing her animals. And it was within minutes that woman was in tears and it was incredible to listen to her story and listen to the pain in her eyes. . . .

And she said, “Geri, I don’t believe I can hold onto [our family farm] long enough to give it to my children.”

And I have watched your votes and I have taken a good look at what you have done for family farmers in this state, and every time there has been a choice to make you have stood up for agribusiness, not for the family farmers. . . .

Bond: Geri, that’s a very nice speech, but I asked you what specifically you would do, and you talked about the woman who is concerned about family farms. What specifically would you propose to help the woman with the family farm problem?

Rothman-Serot: Kit, the question that I would ask you is what have you done for her in the last six years? What I will do for her and all the people of this state is I will turn our economy around. . . . Let’s talk about what you’ve really accomplished as a Senator and what did you do for family farmers.

Bond: I'll be happy to talk about that, but you haven’t given us a single specific. Do you have any answers or any specific proposals for that very, very difficult situation that the woman on the family farm has in Cape Girardeau?

“Conversation with the Candidates,”

Kansas City Star, October 18, 1992.
Rothman-Serot hired the consulting firm of Doak, Shrum, Harris, Sherman and Donilon of Arlington, Virginia, and the political research firm of Mellman & Lazarus of Washington. After the primary, Carrier-Christopherson of Wisconsin was added as a general consultant, handling fund-raising and media.

**Endorsements**

Rothman-Serot won the support of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the *Springfield News-Leader*, and the *Columbia Daily Tribune*. Groups that endorsed her included the National Abortion Rights League, the St. Louis Fraternal Order of Police, League of Conservation Voters, labor unions, and state and national women's groups. Bond won the support of the *St. Joseph News-Press*, which said that “besides ridding St. Joseph of dangerous chemicals, Bond obtained badly needed federal highway money for the state,” and the *Kansas City Star*, which said, “Bond has made a difference in several areas key to the people back home: in highway funding, housing reform, early childhood education, before-and after-school care for latch-key children, family and medical leave, and health care.”

**Election Results**

As indicated in Table 3-2, Bond began the campaign with a sizeable lead, widened it during the campaign, then saw it narrow at the end to the margin with which he had originally begun. Rothman-Serot ran stronger than many had expected, but she still trailed all statewide Democratic candidates except Bill Clinton, who was in a three-way race that had a much stronger third-party candidate. Rothman-Serot carried only 16 of the state's 114 counties and St. Louis city, winning only the traditionally Democratic counties.

In 1993 Rothman-Serot announced her candidacy for the Senate seat being vacated by the retirement of John Danforth, then later in the year announced her withdrawal from the race. She later explained that she had withdrawn because of the problems of fund-raising. “I couldn't put the dollars together. That's the biggest problem with government today.
The United States Senate Race 67

Table 3-2. Media Poll Findings, U.S. Senate General Election Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Rothman-Serot</th>
<th>Bond</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>(N)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 14-16</td>
<td>Rothman-Serot</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>(500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12-16</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>(480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25-29</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>(693)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>(2,354,916)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SLPD refers to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and KMOX refers to St. Louis radio station KMOX. The Rothman-Serot campaign poll was conducted by Mellman & Lazarus and released by the campaign.

You have to spend 95 percent of your time raising money. It shouldn’t be that only the ones who raise enormous sums of money should be the ones in office. But that’s the reality,” Rothman-Serot declared that she was out of politics: “It’s a nasty profession that needs a major overhaul. It eats its young.” She recommended campaign finance reforms, including limits on overall campaign spending and a ban on television advertising until two weeks before an election.8

**Symposium**

*Jo Mannies, political correspondent*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, moderator. We will start with Mr. Israelite since his candidate was the ultimate victor. David Israelite graduated from William Jewell College in 1990 with a degree in political science and communications. He served as legislative assistant for the Senate Judiciary Committee in Washington, D.C., then as director of communications and research in Kit Bond’s campaign. He is currently in his second year of law school at the University of Missouri.

*David Israelite, representing Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond.* About a year ago, when we started seriously looking at our race, we identified four major concerns we would have to address. The first was an impres-
tion by some in the state that Kit Bond hadn’t done a lot during his first four or five years in the Senate.

The second problem was the perception that Kit was going to have a very easy race. As a result, many party people felt that they didn’t need to become involved in our race. Since they thought Kit was going to have an easy race, they could put their money and their effort in other races. We weren’t expecting an easy race, and we were concerned we could have a repeat of the 1976 gubernatorial race, when Kit was also favored heavily. Workers put their energy and money into other races, and Kit lost his reelection.

The third problem we would have, regardless of who won the primary, was that our opponent would be very much unknown in the state—someone who had never run statewide before. Even Ms. Rothman-Serot, the best known, did not have a lot of statewide name recognition, and the name recognition she did have wasn’t really identified with the name of Rothman-Serot. [Her name had been Geri Rothman when she campaigned with her first husband ten years earlier.] Our concern was that an unknown candidate could be swept into office in a Democratic year.

Fourth, we expected that it was going to be a very big Democratic year in the state. Of course, that hurt us very much.

We were able to address all of these concerns. With regard to what Kit has done, we concentrated very early in our campaign on putting out a ninety-eight-page book detailing his accomplishments. We went to a lot of newspaper editorial boards, and traveled around the state a great deal talking with local journalists and citizens. We opened the campaign with a ninety-second commercial that focused upon Senator Bond’s accomplishments, which is rather unusual. We were trying to set up a base so that people could relate issues to Kit Bond.

A lot of people don’t understand that it is difficult being a minority-party junior Senator. When you don’t chair a committee, when Danforth is the high-profile Senator in the state and of the same party, it is very difficult. So, we made a conscious effort to really try to make people aware of the things that Kit had done. Our polling data at the end of the campaign showed that people could associate Kit Bond with achievements, whereas at the beginning of the campaign, a lot of people couldn’t.
With regard to the perception that Kit had an easy race, we just fought that every day, convincing people that it was going to be a close race. The closer we got to election time, the more people realized we were going to have a race. This problem pretty much took care of itself.

Since we had an unknown opponent, our job was to define our opponent before she could define herself. When Geri Rothman-Serot won the primary, she was treated like a giant killer who had just come blowing out of the gates. The Post-Dispatch and other papers ran big profiles on her. She was treated as a celebrity because she had come out of this pack of fourteen with such a strong showing. The win in the primary projected her into almost a dead heat race. Since there was no real character associated with the name, the race was to define the character of Rothman-Serot. The comparison would be with Kit who has been around for a long time. A lot of people know him and have an opinion of him. With respect to Ms. Rothman-Serot, people had no idea what she stood for or who she was, so it was a race to define who she was.

Lastly, with the Democratic year, Kit, who has always been an independent politician but particularly in this year, took great pains to make sure that people knew that he was running his own campaign. We took a lot of heat for separating ourselves from the president and not being involved in statewide pushes, but in the end it was successful. As an example, Kit took the lead on the family medical leave issue, opposing the president. That was highly visible. This allowed us to present an independent image, which is very important in Missouri.

With those four problems addressed, the final question is why we won the race. We ran a textbook campaign and, quite honestly, our opponent was an unqualified candidate who ran a very bad campaign. It was the combination of these two factors that allowed us to beat the odds this year and win the race. We were the only Republican to win statewide.

Jo Mannies, moderator. David Doak is a partner in Doak, Shrum, Harris, Sherman, and Donilon, named the nation's leading Democratic media consulting firm for the 1990 election cycle by Campaigns and Elections magazine. A graduate of the University of Missouri Law School, David served as Boone County assistant prosecuting attorney and public defender. Later, he managed the successful campaigns of Chuck Robb
Campaign Missouri 1992

for governor of Virginia and Mark White for governor of Texas. He was media consultant in the presidential campaigns of Dick Gephardt in 1988 and Bob Kerrey in 1992. He consulted in five U.S. Senate campaigns in 1992, including that of Geri Rothman-Serot.

David Doak representing Geri Rothman-Serot. I think Kit Bond ran a pretty good race. Having five and a half million bucks to her seven or eight hundred thousand didn't hurt him. The race was a referendum on Kit Bond. It was always going to be that way. When we did our first polling in June or July, he had a 34 percent reelect number. Our polling question asked: "Will you definitely vote to reelect this candidate; would you consider somebody else; or would you definitely vote to replace this candidate?" Only 34 percent of the people said that they would definitely vote to reelect him. The rest of the vote was split between considering somebody else and definitely voting to replace him. That number is comparatively weak for an incumbent and indicates a serious problem. This illustrates the problems that Bond has had in the state since the first time he ran.

Bond did what he needed to do, which was to improve his job ratings and give people some rationale for feeling that he had done a good job. He actually got his numbers up pretty high. We didn't have the money to go on television as early as we would have liked, but as soon as we did go on, his numbers came back to earth quickly. I sensed that the Bond campaign staff knew exactly what we knew because we put our first positive spot on the air and they covered with a negative spot right away. That signaled to me that they had the same kind of polling numbers that we did. They knew the vulnerability that their candidate had.

They probably won the race in the last ten days to two weeks, when we were supposed to get another $120,000 from the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee, but they ran out of money. We wanted to make a heavy radio buy because we felt that television was getting too cluttered at that time. We were able to get the money for outstate radio but without the Senate Campaign Committee money, we weren't able to make our radio buy in St. Louis and Kansas City, a buy that would have supplemented our television advertising. In the last week, we were probably being outspent three to one on TV; for the total campaign it was probably seven to one.
I think Geri Rothman-Serot ran a pretty good race. She was a relatively new candidate. She had been a councilwoman. She grew tremendously during the process. She's a good speaker, and I think she acquitted herself very well, given the kind of money we had. Rarely do these long-shot races come this close. And I think it speaks well for her.

I think she will be around in years to come and may even get a rematch one of these days. As David said, they knew they were going to have a tough race. We knew they were going to have a tough race, and everybody in the country knew it except the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee. All along the line, we basically had to pry money out of them. They never wanted to advance money to this race. They never understood the vulnerability of Bond's candidacy. Strategically, what we wanted to do, had we had the money, was to go on the air in August right after the primary while she was fresh. We had a statewide poll showing her pulling within eight points right after the primary.

My feeling was that we lost the race for two reasons. First, not having the money to go on air immediately after the primary to define her. Second, not having the last $120,000, which would have allowed us to respond to their last negative ad.

Questions from the Audience

Question: David Doak, how did you view the year of the woman? Did you make that an issue?

David Doak: The truth of the matter is that I thought that gender issues would help us without introducing them into the campaign advertising. But that was not to be. We had to move the numbers quickly and dramatically in order to keep the money coming in. Abortion was the one issue in our arsenal that would make the race close quickly, so that the Senate Campaign Committee would give us more money. We therefore made abortion an issue in the race, though reluctantly because of the risk of defining her as strictly a female candidacy. It was too much emphasis on a female candidacy early in the race, but we had to do it because the abortion issue would move votes quicker than anything else we had.

The abortion issue crosscuts in outstate Missouri, where many old-
time Democratic voters are also pro-life. In addition, I thought that issue ran the risk of defining her in people’s minds as Harriett Woods the Second. That’s not all bad, but I thought that Geri was entitled to have her own definition apart from that of Harriett. By the time this campaign rolled around, I expect Harriett had a high 40s negative. I wanted to hold that issue off until later so that Geri could develop a persona outside of Harriett. It was a crosscutting issue, but we had to inject it at that time to keep the money coming.

Question: You used the term negative a couple of times. Can you define that term?

David Doak: It’s an ad that talks about the opponent, an ad that raises some issue that makes people want to vote against the opponent. There are several kinds of negative ads. I think that negative ads on issues are fair game. They are just rough-and-tumble politics and really make a spirited debate. I’ve actually defended the Willie Horton ad, because I think the Willie Horton ad was less about race than most people in the Democratic Party like to complain that it was. It was really about somebody who was permissive.

I don’t know the answer to negative ads. I would be content to do solely positive ads because I think my company does better positive ads than negative ads. We spend more time with them. We enjoy them more. They are more pleasant, more artistic, more fun to do, and more fun to show to a group. But the truth of the matter is that people crave that negative information. To a partial degree, the negative information about candidates allows people to make a good voter decision. They are distasteful to people, but they are probably here to stay.

Question: Did you consider Kit Bond’s “landfill” ad a negative ad?

David Doak: Sure, it was a negative ad, but it’s like every negative ad. It was probably half truth. We made some ads that were half-truths also, but that is the nature of politics. You are not required to tell your opponent’s side of the story. You tell your side of the story and expect them to take care of themselves. That’s the nature of a debate. I didn’t think that the landfill ad was out of bounds. I thought it gave us the opportunity to respond and we did, I thought, effectively. Our problem was lack of resources. I don’t think anything they did was particularly unfair, and I don’t think anything we did was particularly unfair.
Question: David Israelite, did you consider the ad on the landfill accurate?

David Israelite: It was very accurate. I did all of the research on that subject, and I would be happy to discuss with anyone at great length and detail about it. It wasn’t a stretch at all. Her amount of blame might have been disproportionate since she was only one of a group that was responsible, but the ad was factually accurate.

Question: Did you think that the Rothman-Serot ad with the cocktail party was beneficial? And secondly, does anything about the Bond campaign stick in your mind as a mistake?

David Doak: I can’t really say that the Bond campaign made many mistakes. I think they ran a pretty good campaign. I think they had a tremendous amount of vulnerability, but I thought they executed pretty well. Had I been them, I might have responded to some of our ads more. But we tried to craft those ads so that they would be hard to respond to, especially the abortion ads, which were almost impossible for them to respond to without losing their right-to-life base.

The cocktail party ad, I don’t know. [The ad featured a cocktail party of well-to-do people supporting Republican candidates. At the end, the butler opened his coat to the camera to show a Rothman-Serot button.] One of the downsides to a race like Geri’s is that you don’t have the money to do the research that you would usually do. Normally, we pre-test this stuff, make the spots, put them in front of focus groups, and see how people react to them. We didn’t show that spot to a focus group, because we didn’t have time. I worried a little bit after I made the ad that it was unclear who the butler was, because that was key to the humorous element of the spot. I think everybody probably got the idea, but our other spots were probably better. I wouldn’t classify it as our best spot.

Question: David Israelite, do you think that you gave Geri Rothman-Serot more exposure than she deserved? I saw more of your advertising about her than I saw of her advertising about her.

David Israelite: That’s what we wanted. Since she was an unknown candidate, many voters based their opinion of her solely on television ads. Our goal was to highlight some of the unpopular views she held and to point out the inconsistencies between her rhetoric and her record.
She had to respond to most of the issues we raised. It wasted a lot of her money. It wasted a lot of her effort.

I knew that by election day her name recognition would be high, regardless of what we did. The question was what were people going to think of her by that time. It's a concern, but I really thought that by election day she would have had the name identification anyway.

**Question:** Given that Barbara Boxer, Democratic senate candidate in California, and others didn't seem to have a problem with resources, why didn't you get more national party assistance?

**David Doak:** I think most people thought that Geri didn't have a very good chance to win. Emily's List, the predominant woman's fund-raising organization, did help. They provided a lot of the money; once each week, $15,000 to $20,000 came in from their fund-raising. They are a good and powerful force in women's candidacies. The Democratic Campaign Committee is probably the place that failed us, although they helped us a lot too. They gave us all but about $120,000 of what they could have given us.

The sad truth of the matter is that the party apparatus—the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee and the Congressional Campaign Committee—doesn't get people who have a tremendous amount of experience in electoral politics. They don't know how to read polls as well as some of us who do it for a living. They tend to look only at the horse race. If you have an unknown candidate, the horse race doesn't mean anything because nobody knows her. Geri started this race with 4 percent name identification.

What you look to much more is the incumbent's job rating, the incumbent's favorability rating, his reelect numbers and some of his underlying characteristics. In this race, when we tested our basic messages, "She fights for the middle-class, wants to change health care, wants a middle-class tax cut, and wants to get rid of the perks and pay raise in the Senate," the race went to her by ten points in the poll.

What the Senate Campaign Committee did in this race was not unusual. They get mesmerized by the high-profile candidacies. Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein in California were much more glamorous. Lynn Yeakel in Pennsylvania caught everybody's attention early. Geri had a late primary. She didn't grab people's attention. She was the step-child in the year of the woman.
Question: Judging from the discussion thus far, one would get the idea the candidates could have spent a day and a half in a TV studio, bought some time, and run the campaign. I would like to hear you address campaign organization and how that was a part of the election.

David Doak: Organization can change a race 1 percent or 2 percent around the edges, but mass communication can change fifteen or twenty points. When you have a candidacy without any money, thirty-five and forty points behind and totally unknown, you don’t have much choice of how to spend your resources. You have to spend them on the big piece of the puzzle and not on the organization.

All through the primary, we had only four people on staff. We expanded that and got some very talented people in the general election campaign, but we came through the primary without a research arm, which is absolutely critical in modern campaigns. You have to know the opponent’s record and your own record thoroughly to be able to have a quick response capacity.

After the primary, we got that in place. We also got a press function in place. The campaign really turned around when we brought in a general consultant from Wisconsin. Given the limited resources with which Terri New, our campaign manager, had to work, she did a fabulous job, running a campaign without any money. She held that campaign together with baling wire and bubble gum. We didn’t have much organization because we couldn’t afford it.

David Israelite: Kit Bond concentrated heavily on traveling throughout the state. He had somewhat more of a luxury to do so because of the money situation. A lot of people never saw his opponent. She was fond of making the comment that concerns were similar across Missouri, so that she didn’t need to travel the state. A lot of rural people were offended by that. They didn’t think that she paid attention to rural concerns. If you look at the numbers, we won big in many rural counties which lean Democratic. One of the big reasons was that she wouldn’t visit them.

I don’t blame Mrs. Rothman-Serot for not traveling much during the primary, but after she won the primary, she was basically dormant for two months. No one saw her. You had a lot of Democrats who were really upset with her because they didn’t think she was making an effort.
Question: David Israelite, you mentioned that Kit Bond campaigned in numerous counties. On the other hand the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* called Bond the invisible candidate. We wanted very much to see Kit Bond during the campaign, but we were never able to. Once or twice there was a story the day after he was in Columbia, but there was never any announcement ahead of time, or any opportunity for the public to see him. Did Kit Bond reduce or minimize his public appearances or rallies because of a concern about opposition or demonstrations?

David Israelite: Yes, the *Post-Dispatch* did call him the invisible candidate, but that’s not surprising, considering the source. With regard to appearances in Columbia, I guess you just didn’t know about them, because Kit was in Boone County six times and all of them were open to the public. He visited over eighty-five counties since July and that’s while also working in Washington with his Senate duties until the recess. Mrs. Rothman-Serot did send a couple of Mariachi bands to our press conferences. It made things interesting, but we certainly didn’t abstain from showing up in public because of the fear of a renegade Mariachi band. It really wasn’t a concern.

Jo Mannies, moderator: We have run out of time. Thank you very much. [Applause]
The Presidential Race in Missouri

A real highlight in Missouri were our many, many, many candidate and surrogate appearances. They almost wore out our statewide campaign staff, I can tell you. President Bush gave high priority to Missouri and this area, making nine campaign stops in the state of Missouri during the organized campaign. The vice president was here six times. We had Barbara Bush, Marilyn Quayle, and about every cabinet secretary and official you could think of in this state at one time or another and many of them numerous times.

—Ann Wagner, Bush-Quayle campaign coordinator in Missouri

Missouri was a critical state in 1992 for all three presidential candidates, reflecting its heritage as the bellwether state of the nation. As was mentioned in chapter 1, Missouri voters have cast their ballots for the winning candidate in every presidential contest since 1904, with the exception of 1956, when Missourians supported Illinois neighbor Adlai Stevenson over Dwight Eisenhower.

Missouri’s position reflects in part its geographical position in the center of the nation. Missouri is northern and southern, eastern and western, urban and rural. As such it has become a microcosm of the nation.
Nomination of Candidates

Missourians used the caucus system to express their preferences among candidates for the presidential nominations for each of the major parties in 1992. Missouri had used the caucus procedures for several elections, but the state changed in 1988 to use a presidential primary. Some public support had always existed for a presidential primary, but it was used only in the year in which Missouri's own Richard Gephardt was seeking the Democratic nomination. The legislature could have provided for another primary in 1992, but support for the change appeared to have weakened.

Three Democrats from neighboring states announced their candidacies early—Senator Tom Harkin from Iowa, Senator Bob Kerrey from Nebraska, and Governor Bill Clinton from Arkansas. Clinton was the most active of the Democratic candidates, holding a fund-raiser in St. Louis and speaking at a gathering of Democrats in Hannibal. Many of the state's party leaders lined up behind Clinton. In early January, Speaker Bob Griffin got signatures of fifty-seven state representatives and eleven state senators to a letter supporting Clinton. Lieutenant Governor Mel Carnahan announced early his support for Clinton, and the wife of St. Louis Mayor Vince Schoemehl attended Clinton's St. Louis fund-raiser. When Clinton's wife, Hillary, spoke in Jefferson City in early March, she was flanked by Carnahan, Griffin, and numerous legislators. When she appeared in Kansas City, she was joined on the platform by the Jackson County executive and the Jackson County prosecutor.

Missouri Democrats held their caucuses on March 10, Super Tuesday, the day on which nine other states were holding primaries and two other states were holding caucuses. Meetings were held at 250 to 300 sites across the state, in wards and townships in the more heavily populated counties, and in countywide meetings elsewhere.

By caucus day, the campaigns of Senators Harkin and Kerrey had folded, and Clinton's principal opponent was former senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts. The Tsongas banner was carried by two state legislators, who held a press conference shortly before the caucuses. One of them, budget committee chairman Chris Kelly, said Tsongas was the
candidate most like Harry Truman: "He's the straightest, and he's the
funniest looking." An undercurrent pervading the campaign was a lack
of excitement about any of the three candidates remaining in the race,
Clinton, Tsongas, or Jerry Brown, former governor of California. Many
party members were only lightly leaning toward one of the candidates or
were still uncommitted.

At the caucuses, Clinton received support of an estimated 45 percent
of the attendees, while 39 percent opted for uncommitted. Clinton did
particularly well in areas near Arkansas and in northeastern Missouri.
In the metropolitan areas of St. Louis city, St. Louis County, and Jackson
County (Kansas City), the uncommitted slate ran well ahead of Clinton,
with Tsongas and Brown even further behind. Some of those supporting
uncommitted were hoping that other candidates might enter the race.
Clinton's Missouri coordinator said she was not dismayed: "The train is
leaving the station, and they'll want to be with us." The process of
climbing on board was slow, however, and at the conclusion of the state
convention in May, Clinton had the commitment of only 48 percent of
the state's ninety-two delegates.

On the Republican side, Pat Buchanan announced early his candidacy
in opposition to George Bush's renomination. There was no indication
of any activity by Buchanan in Missouri, and Bush corralled the support
of all the state's leading Republicans—the governor, the two senators,
and the three congressmen. Even Congressman Mel Hancock, more in
tune with Pat Buchanan's philosophy, joined the Bush campaign, de­
scribing his role as helping to make Bush "more conservative." At the
state convention, Bush received the support of all forty-seven delegates
from Missouri.

The Ross Perot campaign began in Missouri in late March, following
Perot's nationally televised statement on Larry King Live that he would
run if "ordinary people" drafted him in all fifty states. In Missouri, this
required the signatures of 25,000 voters on petitions. About 100,000
signatures were collected in April and May. In late May, however, the
campaign leaders announced that they would need to start over, having
discovered that two of the eleven electors listed on the petition were not
willing to make an ironclad commitment to endorse Perot. The month
of June was the high point of the Perot campaign—volunteers quickly
collected another 100,000 signatures and a statewide poll showed Perot with a four-percentage-point lead over Bush and an eight-point lead over Clinton. On July 16, however, Perot announced his withdrawal from the campaign, but authorized supporters to put his name on state ballots. Missouri supporters promptly did so, submitting petitions with 135,000 signatures nominating Perot.

**General Election Campaign**

Missouri has been a battleground in every recent presidential election, and 1992 was no exception. Each of the major party candidates returned to the state again and again, and vice presidential candidates, candidates’ family members, and other surrogates also made frequent appearances. About thirty visits were made to the state by the two major presidential candidates and their vice presidential candidates. On many of these trips each of the four candidates made three or four appearances in the state. Ross Perot and his vice presidential candidate, making far fewer appearances across the nation, each campaigned once in Missouri.

As indicated in Table 4-1, voter preferences in Missouri matched the national patterns. George Bush began with the early lead, then Ross Perot took the lead in June, with Bill Clinton a weak third. Clinton began to build his support with his preconvention campaigning and especially with the selection of Al Gore as his running mate. The “bounce” from the Democratic convention and the withdrawal of Ross Perot gave Clinton a large lead. Clinton continued to lead throughout the campaign, though Ross Perot’s reentry and George Bush’s strenuous campaign efforts reduced the lead in October.

Missouri took on a special role in the campaign when St. Louis was selected as the site for the first presidential debate. One reason that St. Louis was chosen was that Missouri senator John Danforth asked St. Louis’s August Busch III to put up a half million dollars for the debate. Busch’s company, Anheuser-Busch Corporation, did so, and the Washington University gymnasium became the focus of world attention for a Sunday evening in October. André Marrou, of the Libertarian party, the fourth presidential candidate on the Missouri ballot, made one of his
Table 4-1. Media Polls on the Presidential Contest in Missouri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Perot</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 13-21</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>(519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perot withdrawal and Democratic national convention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-30</td>
<td>American Research Group</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23-25</td>
<td>Mason-Dixon</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28-31</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>(763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4</td>
<td>Ken Warren exit poll</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Others—11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican national convention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12-16</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>(480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21-</td>
<td>KC Star, KMBC</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>Democratic National Committee</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>(500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12-13</td>
<td>Missouri Republican party</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12-21</td>
<td>KC Star, KMBC</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>(800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 20-24</td>
<td>KBIA, KOMU, Mo'n</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>(657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25-29</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>(693)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Election results</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>* (2.4 million)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SLPD refers to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and KMOX refers to St. Louis radio station KMOX. The American Research Group and Mason-Dixon polls were reported in *The Public Perspective* 3 (September/October 1992), p. 83. The Democratic National Committee poll, released by the Carnahan campaign, was conducted by Bennett, Petts and Associates of Washington. The August 4 primary election exit poll was conducted by Ken Warren (reported in *St. Louis Business Journal*, Aug. 10–16, 1992). KC Star refers to the *Kansas City Star* and KMBC refers to Kansas City television station KMBC. KBIA et al. survey was conducted by the University of Missouri Media Research Bureau for KBIA/91.3 FM radio, KOMU/Channel 8 television, and the *Columbia Missourian*, all located in Columbia.

*The Libertarian ticket headed by Andre Marrou received less than .5 of 1 percent of the vote.*
Missouri campaign appearances during the event, asking (unsuccess­fully) to be included in the debate.

On election day, Bill Clinton won 44 percent of the vote in Missouri, slightly better than the 43 percent he won nationwide. Ross Perot also did comparatively well in Missouri, his 22 percent of the vote being 3 percentage points above his national total. These comparatively strong showings came at the expense of George Bush, who won only 34 percent in Missouri, 4 percentage points lower than his national percentage. Turnout was higher than in previous elections, so that Clinton’s total vote was the second-highest ever for a Democratic presidential candidate in Missouri, ranking only behind the total vote for Lyndon Johnson in the one-sided, two-candidate 1964 race. George Bush received only 75 percent of the votes he had gotten in Missouri four years earlier.

**Symposium**

_Jo Mannies, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, moderator._ As executive director for the Bush-Quayle reelection campaign in Missouri, Ann Wagner was responsible for directing all activities of the presidential reelection cam­paign in the state. Previously, she was project director with the Missouri Republican party. She also served as emergency planning coordinator for the Department of Natural Resources. Prior to 1989, Ann was with Ralston-Purina in various positions, and earlier with Hallmark Cards. Ann is half of one of Missouri’s power couples; her husband is director of revenue in the Ashcroft administration, now well known for his quote about patronage that “political plums have lots of worms.”

*Ann Wagner, Bush-Quayle campaign coordinator.* The overall plan of the Bush-Quayle campaign was very simple, one that has been heard over and over again, and has proved successful in many campaigns. We were hoping at the statewide level to put together a person-to-person grass-roots campaign, finding, contacting, and then turning out Bush voters in their communities. The majority of the Bush-Quayle 1992 activities in Missouri revolved around our volunteer network. We had a very strong focus on information and visibility at the local community level.

We got started at the state level for the national campaign relatively
early in April. One of our first tasks was to elect Bush-Quayle delegates to the Congressional district conventions, the Republican state convention, and ultimately the national Republican Convention. Remember back in April we still had Pat Buchanan competing against us. We achieved our goal and were quite successful in getting delegates favorable to both the ticket and our ideologies.

The second task was the early building of our organization and our endorsements. We built a grass-roots organization, multi-tiered at the congressional district coordinator level, the county coordinator level, and in many areas, at the township coordinator level. And, we gave these people very specific tasks to do in their local communities: gathering volunteers, and keeping their ear to the ground for certain information, especially information about activities and events. We worked on endorsements, soliciting them from everyone—county chair people, general assembly members, committee persons, Democrats for Bush, Ross Perot leadership activists, celebrities, and coalition groups. We built quite a few strong key coalitions here in Missouri in such areas as veterans, farmers for Bush, outdoorsmen, and right-to-life groups. These coalitions were very active in dealing with their networks, holding their press conferences and flying around and taking bus tours with various cabinet secretaries.

Thirdly, we focused on the all-encompassing press, communications, and media. Internally, we produced weekly Bush-Quayle information sheets, newsletters, and briefings. By the end of the campaign, these materials were being distributed almost every day. We would redistribute articles from national dailies and information to our coordinators, constituents, and interested citizens. We tried to reinforce our national themes with the Missouri press, using press releases, appearances, and fly-areounds. We tried to give a Missouri twist to some of the national messages and themes by using our statewide candidates, other groups or interested parties.

Toward the end of the campaign, the national Bush-Quayle campaign placed radio advertising specifically targeted to Missouri voters in stations around the state. We had seven or eight very specific regional radio scripts dealing with environment, ethanol, judges, and farm issues, for example. We also presented spot TV advertising on most of the Missouri television stations in addition to the network activities.
Chronology of the Bush-Quayle Campaign in Missouri

January. Bush campaign appointed Governor John Ashcroft as Missouri campaign chairman and Senators John C. Danforth and Christopher S. Bond as co-chairmen. Ashcroft appointed William H. T. "Bucky" Bush of Ladue, the president's brother, as Missouri finance chairman, and Congressmen Mel Hancock, William Emerson, and Thomas Coleman as vice chairmen. Hancock, who was more in tune with Pat Buchanan's philosophy, saw his role as helping to make Bush "more conservative."


January 29. Dan Quayle in St. Louis said Bush's tax proposals will revive the economy.

April 14. Bush received all 47 national convention delegates from Missouri.

April 24. In Orange County, California, Governor Ashcroft criticized Clinton for "lack of effective environmental regulation" in Arkansas.

June 15. John Ashcroft, co-chairman of the Republican Platform committee, began public hearings.

June 25. Senator Danforth agreed to lead Bush fight for school choice in Senate.

June 27. Republican state convention at Springfield supported Bush.

June 29. Dan Quayle addressed cheering crowd at St. Louis fund-raiser, saying he will continue to campaign for family values.

July 23. U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter took aim at Clinton's economic proposals in St. Louis.

July 24. George Bush kicked off Missouri Show-Me Games in Columbia, saying sports strengthened the nation's building block, the American family, which he said is now under siege.

July 31. Marilyn Quayle appeared in St. Louis, telling audiences that her husband shares her views on abortion and that it was a school teacher who gave him an erroneous cue card that caused Quayle to make a student misspell "potato."

August 17. Arriving at the Republican National Convention, George Bush evoked the Truman image, promising supporters "the most stirring political comeback since Harry Truman gave 'em hell in 1948."

August 19. George Bush was nominated by Republican National Convention.
Chronology of the Bush-Quayle Campaign in Missouri continued

Addressing the convention, John Ashcroft promised a “family-friendly” agenda from the next Bush administration, and said that if Clinton is elected, “Chief Justice Cuomo will make sure that the family beach goes topless.”

August 20. Senator John Danforth introduced Dan Quayle for his acceptance speech, accusing Quayle’s critics of trying to destroy him personally because they can’t beat him on ideas. Marilyn Quayle told Missouri delegates that the critics have misinterpreted the convention’s focus on family values.

August 21–22. George and Barbara Bush campaigned in Springfield and Branson, first stops after the Republican convention. 10,000 turned out in Branson to hear Bush, Glen Campbell, Moe Bandy, Loretta Lynn, and others.

August 27. George Bush made a campaign stop in St. Louis, visiting a police siren manufacturing plant as an example of a successful exporter in a free trade economy, and attending a campaign fundraiser.

August 28. Four Perot coordinators announced their switch of support to Bush.

September 2. In Kansas City, Dan Quayle spoke of family values at a luncheon for 700 people.

September 11. George Bush spoke at a rally at Missouri Southern College, Joplin, with hometown boy Bill Webster as master of ceremonies. Later, in St. Louis he announced he will approve the sale to Saudi Arabia of 72 advanced F-15 Eagle Fighters made by McDonnell Douglas. In Kansas City he attended a fund-raising luncheon ($150,000) and visited a Job Corps center in Excelsior Springs.

September 16. Barbara Bush visited Girls Inc of St. Louis and attended a fundraiser in Ladue. She also visited the SEMO District Fair in Cape Girardeau.

September 22. George Bush spoke in Springfield to about 800 guests.


September 25. Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan said in Continued
Campaign Missouri 1992

Chronology of the Bush-Quayle Campaign in Missouri continued

St. Louis that Clinton’s health care proposals would require hefty tax increases and a large bureaucracy.

September 27. George Bush spoke about crime in St. Louis, portraying himself as a law and order leader, and attended a private fundraiser.

September 29. Marilyn Quayle spoke to a St. Louis meeting of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, calling Bill Clinton’s health care plan “a prescription for disaster.”

September 30. Agriculture Secretary Ed Madigan spoke in Kansas City, St. Joseph, Warrensburg, Sedalia, Jefferson City, Lebanon, Springfield, and Joplin. In Kansas City he toured the state’s livestock export facility at KCI, which Auditor Margaret Kelly later found had only been used twice in its years of operation.

October 1. President Bush announced that the federal government is loosening restrictions on the use of ethanol (potentially boosting corn prices).

October 9. Dan Quayle talked about Republican health care proposals to 125 doctors and employees at St. John’s Mercy Medical Center in Creve Coeur. Afterward he spoke to 500 at a $350,000 fundraiser.

October 11. Presidential debate at Washington University, St. Louis. George Bush held a post-debate rally at St. Louis Community College at Forest Park.

October 19. Marilyn Quayle read a story to 4-year-olds at a handicapped center in St. Peters, then campaigned in Springfield.


October 30. George Bush campaigned in St. Louis County, being joined on the platform by Governor Ashcroft and Senators Bond and Danforth, and being endorsed by Democratic Governor William Schaefer of Maryland.

November 1. John Ashcroft and William H. T. Bush, the president’s brother, campaigned in Cape Girardeau.

Fourth, a real highlight in Missouri were our many, many, many candidate and surrogate appearances. They almost wore out our statewide campaign staff, I can tell you. President Bush gave high priority to Missouri and this area, making nine campaign stops in the state of Missouri during the organized campaign. The vice president was here
six times. We had Barbara Bush, Marilyn Quayle, and about every cabinet secretary and official you could think of in this state at one time or another and many of them numerous times. They were here to make news. They were here to remain visible and carry the message, whether it was the message of the day, of the week, or of the overall campaign theme. On many instances, especially with the cabinet secretaries, they were here to bracket an opposing candidate that was here. They would come in as kind of a "truth squad," to gain equal time. When Clinton was appearing, we had [Secretary of Labor] Lynn Martin, [U.S. Trade Representative] Clayton Yeutter, or some official here to be an equalizer.

We also coordinated a statewide calendar for Missouri speakers. We had everyone—coordinators, candidates, activist groups—who would appear at picnics, parades, fairs, conferences, forums, debates, and call-ins.

Lastly, we had an extensive voter contact program here in Missouri. The Missouri Republican party in conjunction with the Republican National Committee developed a tremendous voter contact list. The list is householded and phone matched, carrier-routed, and sorted. We were able to tap into that. Using that list, our surveys identified certain households. The Bush-Quayle campaign in Missouri mailed over one million pieces of mail to undecided voters. These were very targeted pieces of mail.

We also had literature drops. We had volunteers hand-deliver or pass out an estimated 3.7 million pieces of literature on behalf of the president.

Then there was the phoning and the phone banks. We made over 500,000 phone calls to identify and persuade undecided voters in the state. Those phone calls were both paid and volunteer. We also made approximately 200,000 get-out-the-vote phone calls to supporters on election day.

And then, of course, we had the traditional campaign materials. I can't tell you how many bumper stickers and buttons and yard signs we went through. The most highly prized sticker was our infamous "Annoy the press. Re-elect George Bush!" sticker. That went out the door the quickest; I went through 4,000 of those in three days.

To recap here, we are talking about our five key areas. We started in April (1) with the delegate selection, (2) then the building of grass roots
organizations, endorsements, and coalitions, (3) then the press, and communications function, (4) candidate surrogate appearances, and crowd events, and then (5) the voter contact program, including direct mail, literature drops, phone bank and campaign materials. I think we ran a very good statewide campaign. I think the national campaign would echo that and was very pleased with our performance here.

I will say this: when you are dealing with a national campaign, like a presidential race, I don’t care how organized your statewide efforts are, I don’t care how good you are, I don’t care what kind of grass-roots team you have out there, you will probably only make a marginal difference. For example, if you are within two or three points of your opponent, a good statewide organization will make a difference. But, if you are seven points out, ten points out, fourteen points out, you will probably not be able to make enough difference for a real impact on that number.

A lot of the problems were bigger than we were. At the state level, it was difficult for us to impact the economy or the Perot phenomenon. We did what we could in terms of endorsements, appearances, fly-arounds, and media releases. But we were too far back to be able to carry Missouri for George Bush, even though we had an excellent campaign.

Jo Mannies, moderator. Woody Overton was director of the Clinton-Gore 1992 coordinated campaign in Missouri. Mr. Overton’s career includes ten years as a special assistant to former United States Senator Tom Eagleton. He was vice president of public issues at Fleischman-Hillard, the largest independent public relations firm in the United States. Most recently, he was manager of administration of Jackson County, Missouri. His first presidential campaigning was with Robert Kennedy in 1968. He has managed and directed local, state, and federal candidates and issue campaigns since then.

Woody Overton, director, Democratic coordinated campaign. This is the first time in twelve years that it’s felt good to be a Democrat in Missouri. It’s been a long dry spell for us. One of the reasons why it all worked so well, I think, is the excellent ticket. The truth of the matter is that over the years, we’ve had to hold our noses sometimes with the statewide ticket. We haven’t done very well and we haven’t had good statewide candidates. This time, up and down the line, we had excellent candidates. All were outstanding. All were good people. Many of these candi-
The Presidential Race in Missouri

Chronology of the Clinton-Gore Campaign in Missouri

January 12. Jo Mannies reported in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* that no Democratic candidate had broken out in front of the pack.

January 13. Clinton raised $35,000 in St. Louis luncheon.

January 22. Speaker of Missouri House Bob Griffin announced he was supporting Clinton, as were more than half of Democratic legislators. Representative Katie Steele was named coordinator of the Clinton campaign.

February 12. Lieutenant Governor Mel Carnahan endorsed Clinton.


March 7. Bill Clinton spoke at Democrat Days in Hannibal.

March 8. Congressman Joan Kelly Horn endorsed Clinton.

March 10, March 17. Democratic caucuses voted 43% uncommitted, 39% for Clinton. Clinton was strongest in southern Missouri and Little Dixie. "Uncommitted" was strongest in the metropolitan areas.

April 12. Congressman Richard Gephardt endorsed Clinton, indicating beginnings of support from super-delegates.

April 14. Clinton trounced Jerry Brown in Missouri Congressional District conventions.

April 25. William Clay, Jr., and Paula Carter, previously uncommitted, were elected as Clinton delegates, indicating Clinton support among Blacks. Clay had originally supported Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia, who withdrew.

April 25. Bill Clinton campaigned in Kansas City.

May 2. At Democratic state convention in Columbia, Clinton won 44 delegates to 40 for uncommitted and 8 for other candidates. Hillary Clinton was featured speaker.

July 10. Clinton picked Al Gore as vice-presidential nominee.

July 15. Clinton was nominated at Democratic National Convention in New York.

July 22. Clinton and Gore attracted 20,000 people to St. Louis rally, at end of bus caravan after Democratic National Convention.

July 28. Ron Brown, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, spoke at the National Bar Association convention in St. Louis, saying Democrats should expect the race to tighten.

*Continued*
Chronology of the Clinton-Gore Campaign in Missouri continued

July 30. Al Gore spoke in Eureka.
July 31. Bill Clinton spoke in St. Louis.
August 5. Clinton and Gore arrived in St. Louis, began a Midwest bus tour, and spoke in Hannibal.
August 6. Democratic statewide candidates agreed to coordinate their campaigns with Bill Clinton, named Woody Overton as state coordinator.
August 26. Clinton announced support of sale of McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. (The planes were to be made by McDonnell-Douglas of St. Louis.)
September 7. Bill Clinton spoke to 50,000 at Independence. Later Kansas City Mayor Emanuel Cleaver, whose office is nonpartisan, was criticized for making campaign appearances for the Clinton-Gore ticket.
September 13. Al Gore spoke to several thousand in Columbia about jobs, education, and the environment, then attended a town meeting in Springfield.
September 20. St. Louis Post Dispatch endorsed Clinton.
September 27. Jesse Jackson spoke to 500 people at a St. Louis church, urging them to vote in the 1992 presidential election.
October 3. Bill Clinton spoke at a rally at Soulard Market in St. Louis. The St. Louis Election Board banned voter registration at the rally.
October 11. Presidential debate at Washington University, St. Louis. Bill Clinton, accompanied by Hillary, prepared himself in Kansas City. After the debate, Clinton held a rally in Forest Park after being denied the opportunity to rally on campus.
October 13. Hillary Clinton spoke in Columbia, then at a Kansas City fund-raiser at Marsha Murphy’s home ($50,000), then with Tom Harkin before 200 supporters at another fund-raiser ($25,000).
October 24. Clinton campaigned in Springfield, saying the campaign had come down to “a race of hope against fear.”
October 24. Barbara Jordan and Senator Bill Bradley campaigned for Clinton in St. Louis.
Chronology of the Clinton-Gore Campaign in Missouri continued

October 29. Tipper Gore spoke in St. Joseph and St. Louis on politics and motherhood.

October 29. Republicans for Clinton/Gore, including some old friends of President Bush's brother, a St. Louis resident, held a press conference in St. Louis.

October 31. Hillary Clinton spoke in Kansas City and Fulton.

October 31. At a Democratic rally with several thousand supporters in Northwest Plaza, St. Louis, Al Gore accused President Bush of lying about the Iran-Contra scandal.

November 3. Clinton spoke to two thousand at Lambert Field, campaigning through the day and all night in eight states. At Lambert Field, he was joined by Congressman Richard Gephardt and all five Democratic statewide candidates.

We started later than the Bush campaign—two days after the August state primary. All the candidates' representatives got together, and we decided to run a coordinated campaign. A coordinated campaign is unique for the Democratic party. The coordinated campaign structure did all the voter contact and targeting for the candidates so that they could have more money for their television messages. We took care of the basic organizational tasks. The reason it worked so well is because (1) Bill Clinton believed in a coordinated campaign and (2) Governor Mel Carnahan bought into the process as did the other statewide candidates. I think that was probably the first time in history that the Democratic party had the candidates for all of those offices working together for a common goal.

We registered over 150,000 targeted people that we could directly identify. We also did the voter identification. We identified 193,000 voters that we had to go after and win. Remember that Dukakis lost the state in 1988 by 83,000 votes, or only two votes per precinct, in Missouri. We also did a strong get-out-the-vote effort. We identified 250,000 hard-core Democrats, and we tried to go after 400,000 seldom-voting Demo-
crats in high-performance Democratic areas in Kansas City and St. Louis.

Our goal was to be very responsive and to be very available to the media. Media played an important role in this. If you look at the numbers, 42 percent of the statewide vote is in the St. Louis media market, and 22 percent is in the Kansas City media market. We staffed offices in major media markets like Kansas City and St. Louis. We had offices in other major media markets and population centers—St. Joseph, Columbia, Cape Girardeau, and Springfield. We were always available to respond. Many of these statewide campaigns had no grass-roots organizations. We acted like their eyes and ears. If they had problems, we would immediately call them. We checked on the media buys on a daily basis and told candidates when their opponents were making buys. We also shared polling. I must admit that we got one scare towards the end of the campaign when Ross Perot was beating George Bush in St. Louis County. We were just a little bit ahead so that really scared the hell out of me. We doubled our media buy for the Clinton campaign that last week.

Our strategy was to appeal to the Reagan Democrats and to shore up our traditional Democratic core of pro-choice women, African Americans, and labor. For the first time, the Democratic party was viewed not as a special interest group but as a coalition. Many of these groups put aside their own special interests. I remember in 1984 that women were saying that Mondale had to have a woman on the ticket. When he nominated Geraldine Ferraro, it appeared that he had caved in. There was no cave-in on anything by Governor Bill Clinton. I think the turning point of the campaign was the Democratic convention, which was a real success. We had a moderate platform. I think the limited coverage of the convention by the television networks favored us, because they didn’t have time to draw out all the problems within the party. I think that was probably a blessing in disguise for us and it worked very well.

The other major turning point was the Republican convention, which I thought was an abomination. Pat Buchanan talked about the religious right, what was right and who was wrong, frightening a lot of people. We had many people come into our office and volunteer because that speech absolutely scared them.

The other thing that turned the campaign was the early visits by
Clinton and Gore. We had a lot of visits by them. We had a Labor Day rally in Kansas City, with about 50,000 people. I’ve never seen so many young people come out before. Some of the statistics indicated that 11 percent of the voters were casting a ballot for the first time. The under-thirty group really favored the Clinton-Gore ticket.

The Clinton-Gore ticket had a natural appeal in Missouri. We won by 10 points in Missouri while the national margin was 5.5 percentage points. Coming from nearby Arkansas had a natural appeal to it. We had a good statewide ticket that believed in the coordinated campaign and cooperated with it. Governor Carnahan took a leadership role in making this work. Missouri was a targeted state. The number of visits was astronomical. The Bush campaign was the same way. We had people like Kathleen Turner who came in for a visit. She’s a fantastic campaigner as was the “Fonz,” who created a lot of excitement. So, we had all different kinds plus political leaders. We also had John White, who had been on the Perot campaign. He joined our campaign and became an economic advisor to Bill Clinton.

The other thing that worked was the frequent contact from the national campaign headquarters. We received talking points every day, sometimes four times a day. If Bush issued a statement, usually incorrect, we would come back and tell the truth. We were able to respond accurately and quickly to any attacks that came out. In the past, I’ve been involved in presidential campaigns in which we didn’t hear from the presidential campaign for a week at a time.

I first met Bill Clinton four years ago, but when I met him during the campaign, he said: “Woody, I am going to play ‘in your face’ politics. It’s not going to be like Michael Dukakis. We’re going to fight back; we’re going to respond.” And we did that. I think that’s one of the reasons for the success that we had.

Some of the problems we had were minor. As usual, advance people may come in and mess up things so that you have to repair some damage. It happens in every campaign. Also, I never felt comfortable with our Perot strategy. Perot was an interesting phenomenon in this whole race because he did get people excited and he was able to articulate problems. I think having him in the race helped all of us focus on the issues.

In closing, I think that a coordinated campaign worked in this in-
stance. I'm not sure that it would work in every instance. We had strong candidates at the statewide level, and the chemistry between them and Clinton-Gore worked well. That's not necessarily going to occur again. Obviously, the issues were on our side. After twelve years of Reagan-Bush and Bush-Quayle, the economy had really turned sour. Obviously, that worked to our favor a lot. You couldn't get off those issues. You have to remember the first, second, and third issues were jobs, jobs, jobs.

Jo Mannies, moderator. Sandy McClure was the Missouri state coordinator for Ross Perot and his group United We Stand. She is currently Missouri state chairwoman for United We Stand. Like many of the Perot volunteers, this was the first campaign in which she became involved. Sandy resides in Greene County just outside of Springfield, and her professional background is in customer service. She was with Delta Airlines for ten years and was involved in residential real estate sales.

Sandy McClure, Missouri coordinator for Perot. I spent numerous hours with Ross Perot one-on-one in meetings, and in group meetings. I saw him on TV, as everybody else did, endlessly. With Ross Perot, what you see is what you get. To us, he was never an enigma. It was that simple to over nineteen million people who voted for him.

There is no way to dissect the volunteer group and produce a model entitled the “average Perot volunteer.” We came from all age groups and all professions, and no gender was predominant.

By and large, the media balanced their reporting with exceptions being those political commentators on the national TV circuit, pontificating at our expense. Our secret weapon was Rush Limbaugh. As his attacks on the volunteers and Ross Perot became more hysterical and more vitriolic, we gained more support. [Laughter] We suspect the Democrats benefited as well.

For example, I walked into my hotel room in Washington, D.C., at 1:30 one morning during the campaign. The TV announcer was saying that George Bush announced the endorsement of the Missouri Perot organization. I said, “I think not,” and got on the phone. Four guys, one of whom didn’t live in Missouri, who had been involved in the early petition drive had announced for Bush. We called and we called and we called and tried to get that information stopped. We were really incensed. It was deliberate. It was plain.
Unlike any other political movement in history, the problem was not how to inspire and motivate people. The trick was to disseminate information and set up a communications network, supply materials, and enforce compliance with FCC regulations, all this and more while running at breakneck speed.

Remember we were all novices. We had no political experience outside that of the voting booth. We also had the problem of dealing with loose cannons. How in the world do you fire a volunteer? We had to contend with opportunists who used Perot’s name for personal and financial gain. This sad situation occurred in Missouri as well as other states.

The Missouri organization consisted of nine district coordinators plus a state coordinator. The nine district coordinators served as the state steering committee; I did not act autonomously when I removed certain undesirable people. I gathered information, discussed it with the district leaders, and as a body, we voted to remove these people. We composed a document of proof and asked them to resign. We did this as a group of their peers unanimously.

However, they chose notoriety rather than oblivion and went screaming to the press. “Persecution by Dallas” is a phrase they used, talking about the Dallas Perot organization. They claimed that I had engaged in a power play. Now, we thought this was very strange, because I was already the state coordinator. In addition, we didn’t think there was much power in being an unpaid volunteer working seven days a week. Anyway, this was our first experience with bad press; eventually the media saw through their publicity charade. We survived that and came to the next blow.

These people were also on the petition as presidential electors [for the electoral college]. We didn’t have a hundred-year history of dedication to a single party, so we grabbed people out of the air to be presidential electors, because you have to list your electors on the petition you circulate. Later we realized that we could not trust these people to vote for Perot in the electoral college. The state leaders made the decision to start a new petition drive. We set aside petitions with 125,000 signatures. On May 29, we announced the start of a new petition drive, and political observers predicted our self-destruction. We collected over 140,000 signa-
Chronology of the Perot Campaign in Missouri

March 23. Volunteers began to set up organizations in Kansas City area, Jefferson City, and the suburbs of St. Louis.

May 23. Sandy McClure of Springfield became Missouri state coordinator of the Perot campaign, replacing Kevin Laughlin.

May 29. State organizers concluded that Kevin Laughlin and one other presidential elector listed on the Perot petitions did not really support his presidential bid, dumped 125,000 signatures, and began their petition drive anew.

June 13–21. A statewide poll showed Perot with a four percentage point lead over Bush and eight point lead over Clinton.

June 26. Former Democratic state treasurer Jim Spainhower announced his support for Perot.

July 16. Perot announced his withdrawal from the presidential contest, but authorized supporters to put his name on state ballots.

July 20. Fifty Perot supporters submitted to the secretary of state 135,000 signatures nominating Perot.

August 28. Secretary of state announced that Perot would be on the November ballot.

August 28. Four Perot coordinators announced their switch of support to Bush.

October 1. Perot announced his reentry into the race.

October 11. Presidential debate at Washington University, St. Louis. Perot brought in nearby supporters for debate audience, and after debate spoke to 1,000 supporters at Frontenac Grand Hotel.

October 27. Vice-presidential candidate James Stockdale spoke at a rally in Kansas City.

October 29. Kevin Laughlin and Edward Dyck, former Missouri volunteers for Perot, complained about Perot’s secret investigation of their credit records.

October 31. Perot told supporters in Kansas City that Bush was incapable of turning the economy around.
The Presidential Race in Missouri

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tures for the second time, far exceeding the minimum of 25,000 signatures. We were swamped with people who wanted to sign; I believe you-all saw us out there being totally overrun in parking lots and everywhere.

To understand the mentality of a Perot supporter, you need to know that each worker made, on average, at least three long-distance phone calls just to find us. That's how hard they tried to network with us. Our biggest shock was that reasonably intelligent people told us that they had not voted for twenty years, but they were registering so that they could sign our petitions. We heard this every single day. We also noted that the majority of Perot supporters voted a split ticket, though they may lean toward the Democratic or Republican party. Voter confusion with ballot formats and instructions cost us an untold number of votes. We will be better prepared to overcome this next time. We created excitement, stirred up voter awareness and interest in participating in a political process. We did what we set out to do, to make it a three-way race: Bush, Clinton, and the issues.

I hope you-all don't think we have gone away, because we haven't. Our name is United We Stand, America. We want the system to be more representative, but the people in control of parties do not want it to be so.

Questions from the Audience

Jo Mannies, moderator: In the last eight days before the election, Clinton was here on Friday, Quayle on Monday, Tipper [Gore] on Thursday, Bush on Friday, Gore on Saturday, and Clinton on Monday. Was it an effective use of resources when the polls were showing a huge Clinton lead in Missouri? From a financial standpoint, did it make sense for either candidate to go to the extent that they did?

Ann Wagner, Bush-Quayle campaign coordinator: From the Bush viewpoint, Missouri was always regarded not in terms of just the Missouri voters, not just in terms of eleven electoral college votes, but as the heartland. As Missouri goes, so goes the nation. It's a good place to enunciate a good midwestern message. Our numbers were really very good up until that Friday before the election. We had Bush visiting St. Louis, and the momentum was rolling for us so that the gap was in the
lower single digits. The Iran-Contra thing hit that Friday, the day that he visited, causing the rebound to stop.\textsuperscript{3} We stagnated there, but, frankly, I thought it was very important to keep the push on in Missouri for many reasons not only because in the beginning, it was targeted and considered very reachable, but at the end, it represented more than Missouri. It represented a whole culture, a whole population—Midwest, heartland. Frankly, it did become a bidding war.

\textit{Woody Overton, director, Democratic coordinated campaign:} I thought the visits really paid off at the end. Our polling, like the Republican polling, showed that numbers were beginning to narrow. You also have to remember that in St. Louis, the media market there covers the whole southern half of Illinois; so, it was a very good hit for him to come to St. Louis the day before the election. We had Clinton in on election eve. He came in at eleven o’clock and over one thousand people turned out for that. I got up at five o’clock on election day, and I saw Bill Clinton on TV still campaigning in Albuquerque. That tells you something about the kind of campaign he ran and the kind of campaign that he expected his people to run.

These events did disrupt our voter contact program. We had to pull people off the voter contact project to prepare for a visit, but the visits gave us a bump in the media market. Getting that thirty seconds on TV, getting that column in the newspaper was worth the disruption of the voter contact program. My field director came up to me and said, “Dammit, we can’t have any more of these visits. They’re wrecking the whole voter contact program.” I responded, “We’ll take all we can get because we’re going down two tracks, your organizational track and also a media track.” As Ann said, a good organization can make only a 3 to 5 percent difference.

\textit{Sandy McClure, Missouri coordinator for Perot:} Bush and Clinton did use up a lot of resources in Missouri. They were working for the electoral college votes and that’s obviously what their plan was. We didn’t have that kind of plan, and our money did not come from Perot. We raised it all. Everybody else could afford to give buttons, bumper stickers, and things but we could not. We had to sell everything we had. Everybody thinks that Ross Perot just wrote a check or gave us a checking account or charge card. He did not. We did all of the fund-raising and
the work within the state; then, of course, we had a rally in St. Louis after the debate. We had the Kansas City rally and through somebody’s glitch—no bad thoughts here—it did not get on TV, but that’s okay.

Ann Wagner, Bush-Quayle campaign coordinator: There are things out there that are bigger than the campaign organization—broken pledges, the world economy, a third candidate, a convention. The proximity of Arkansas to Missouri was a big concern of ours and rightly so. That media market was such that Clinton would dominate in the whole southern half of the state.

We Republicans also ran a coordinated campaign. In fact, a coordinated campaign is a chapter lifted directly out of Republican campaign plans. We conceived coordinated campaigns and have run them forever. We called it our Victory ’92 component, folding in the Bush-Quayle campaign with statewide office campaigns in St. Louis, Springfield, and Kansas City. We also worked on the voter contact program on the entire statewide ticket.

Question: What influence over money were you able to have in the campaign? Woody mentioned that he doubled the buy in St. Louis County, and Sandy mentioned that they were raising all of their own money. Early on, there were hugely successful fund-raisers, especially in St. Louis, so successful that I was concerned the presidential candidates were taking money away from Missouri candidates. Did you have much influence over Missouri money going in or out of the campaign?

Woody Overton, director, Democratic coordinated campaign: Yes, we did have. We would look at the polling and report back. The campaign would listen to us about what was needed. We started looking at those St. Louis County numbers as we got nearer to the end. You know, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand those numbers. There was certainly a greater willingness at that time to put more money in the campaign. The St. Louis media market was critical.

Ann Wagner, Bush-Quayle campaign coordinator: We had a great deal of control in Missouri. The national campaign had a lot of confidence in our chairman, Governor Ashcroft, our state party chairman, Tom Fowler, and our professional experience. We had a lot of influence on how presidential campaign dollars were spent in our state and also on the Victory ’92 dollars. We are talking about two different coffers here. We
had a good deal of influence also on media buys, including the regional breakdowns. We also got reports on media buys by the opposition and played that game—they bought here, we will double their buy here, and drop this buy there.

*Sandy McClure, Missouri coordinator for Perot:* Obviously, the Perot campaign did only national advertising. Perot was doing the buying, and he didn’t want any local advertising that wasn’t specifically what he wanted to say. He didn’t want anybody’s personal opinion to come up or to color his words. He wanted his words to go straight to the voter. He really set out to prove that he respected the intelligence of the American voter more than any candidate in history and was willing to spend money to have them watch flip charts. When we saw the flip charts the first time, we were grossed out. We didn’t realize how it went until the calls started flooding in the next day.

**Question:** Could Ross Perot or an independent candidate come back in 1996 and be even more successful?

*Woody Overton, director, Democratic coordinated campaign:* I don’t think Perot got the scrutiny that the other candidates got because he was in and then he was out. I’m not sure that he would have withstood full scrutiny. Having said that, you know, people are angry, and they do want change. I think it depends upon what Congress and the president do over the next four years. If we see the gridlock that we have seen for the past four years, you could certainly see another Ross Perot–type candidate or Ross Perot himself, for example.

*Ann Wagner, Bush-Quayle campaign coordinator:* I think Perot was the right man at the right time for that message. Will all of these galaxies mesh again so perfectly like this at another time? If I were guessing, I’d say “no.” This time, he was right for the message. He accentuated this whole need for change. Perot hurt us, not only statewide in terms of our campaign, but also nationally because he accentuated this whole cry for change. In Missouri he hurt us specifically with white males under age forty. You wouldn’t believe the support that Ross Perot had in that group here in Missouri.
Campaigns for Attorney General

The Democratic candidates in Missouri have had two problems. They have had no money, and they have had no guts. We were determined that we were going to have more money than the Republican candidate, . . . and we were determined that we were going to have the courage to go out there and run a comparative race, if necessary.

—Charles Hatfield, campaign manager for winner Jay Nixon

Incumbent Attorney General Bill Webster ran for governor in 1992, leaving the contest for attorney general open. The office had become a stepping stone for higher office, with two of the previous five occupants having been elected governor and another two having been elected U.S. Senator.

Prospective candidates had long been measuring themselves for the 1992 race. At one time, the contest for the Republican nomination was expected to be between Carrie Francke, former candidate for Congress in the Ninth Congressional District, and Jean Paul Bradshaw, son of a state senator from Springfield and grandson of a one-time Republican gubernatorial nominee. In the end, neither ran, Carrie Francke having died in a car accident and Bradshaw preferring to stay in his post of U.S. district attorney for western Missouri. On the Democratic side, many
people had seen Mike Wolff's 1988 campaign for attorney general and Jay Nixon's 1988 campaign for the United States Senate as preparations for 1992 races for attorney general.

The Republican Primary

In the end, candidates for the Republican nomination were David Steelman and John Hall. Steelman, thirty-nine, a summa cum laude graduate in economics from University of Missouri—Columbia and first in his class at University of Missouri Law School, had served three terms in the state house of representatives. He had been elected by his colleagues as minority floor leader, then left the legislature to practice law in Rolla. Steelman's father had also served in the legislature and as state GOP chairman before being selected as a circuit judge. His sister had been a domestic issues adviser in George Bush's 1988 campaign, chairman of a committee advising the Bush administration on health care, and a lobbyist for several major corporations and business associations. She was sufficiently important to be a major figure in a CNN program on the role of "the influence industry" in Washington, D.C.

Hall, thirty-four, a graduate of Harvard College and a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, had served as a speech writer and policy assistant to Governor Christopher Bond, as Senator Danforth's legislative counsel in Washington, D.C., as manager of Danforth's reelection campaign in 1988, and as assistant U.S. district attorney in the St. Louis area.

The Republican primary came to be viewed as a struggle between the moderate and conservative wings of the Republican party, with John Danforth, widely regarded as a leader of the state's moderates, serving as campaign chairman for Hall. Former state GOP chairman John Powell of Rolla, long active as a conservative leader of the party, was a prominent backer of Steelman. The Second Injury Fund became an important issue in the campaign with Hall publicizing the fact that Steelman's law firm had received about $180,000 for both suing the fund on behalf of clients and defending it against other clients.¹ (Steelman had brought four small cases against the fund, then received a contract to defend the fund in numerous cases.) Steelman had also received more than $32,000
Table 5-1. Republican Candidates for Attorney General and Primary Election Results

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<tr>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>241,798</td>
<td>61% David L. Steelman, former state representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155,709</td>
<td>39% John E. Hall, former legislative counsel for Senator Danforth</td>
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in campaign funds from other lawyers who had been on one or both sides of cases before the Second Injury Fund.

The tenor of the campaign was indicated by headlines that read “Steelman, Hall trade charges,” “Candidates trade desegregation barbs,” and “Steelman, Hall clash over TV ad claims.” The Springfield News-Leader editorialized that “Hall and Steelman have targeted one another with scathing commercials so insulting we hesitate to give them credence here.”

Steelman hired as his campaign manager Todd Graves, graduate of the University of Missouri–Columbia, the University of Virginia Law School, and the University of Virginia Woodrow Wilson School of Government and Foreign Affairs. Graves was a former assistant attorney general who had worked in the campaigns of Senators Christopher Bond and John Danforth. For his commercials, Steelman hired the Stuart Stevens Group of Alexandria, Virginia. Filming was done by CineVision Films of Massachusetts.

Both Steelman and Hall raised and spent more than $600,000. About 10 percent of Hall’s funds came from Senator Danforth, Danforth’s relatives, and a political action committee formed by the senator. About 10 percent of Steelman’s funds were a personal loan that he made to the campaign.

Hall received the endorsements of the major newspapers, including the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Kansas City Star, the Springfield News-Leader, and the Columbia Daily Tribune. Steelman’s campaign was helped by pro-life groups.

Steelman won the election with 61 percent of the vote, carrying all but six of the counties in the state. He received over two-thirds of the vote in a broad band of southeastern Missouri counties stretching from Cape Girardeau to Howell County and north to the state capital in Cole County.
Campaign Missouri 1992

Comments in Symposium about the Republican Primary

Todd Graves, campaign manager for David Steelman. Most of the Republican votes are in Springfield and St. Louis, connected by interstate highway I-44. We called our strategy the I-44 marathon, driving up and down I-44 trying to go to all of the events that we could. We set the days that we were going to be in each region of the state. If we missed a day in one region of the state, we went back and made it up later. We had an exact number of days for heavy retail campaigning with a lot of handshaking and meeting party leaders.

Basically, we had a three-pronged approach—"home boy—stature—federalism." Home boy. We started off with the idea that David Steelman is a guy who went to school here, has great Missouri experience, and is very smart. People know and like him.

Stature. He is a guy who has stature. He had been probably the youngest leader in the history of the state legislature. He's a natural leader. People were looking to him as someone who could help carry the party forward.

Federalism. Education in Missouri was being hamstrung by the way that the racial desegregation programs were being run in the metropolitan areas. That became the most important issue of our primary campaign for several reasons. One was that we believed it. Two was that we were working against John Hall, a guy who had worked for a federal candidate [U.S. Senator John Danforth]. We had a federal figure [Danforth] heavily opposing us. In addition, Hall had been a federal prosecutor. It all fit together very well.

We started out with about $100,000 lead over our primary opponent. From the day that Senator Danforth said that he was going to help Hall, we were scared that Danforth would pick up the phone and bury us in money. He would have been very capable of doing that.

To counter that, we did a very heavy direct-mail effort. We put out hundreds of thousands of pieces of direct mail, ending with three thousand contributors. We worked very hard. We did it all in-house. There were no consultants on the fund-raising or mailings. Also, we hit gold in Kansas City—we struck up a good relationship with some Kansas City
corporate leaders who hung with us despite Danforth's pressure, which
made a big difference because Kansas City is not traditionally a fund-
raising center.

We started out with two issues: crime and desegregation. We hit them
hard. We stumbled onto the Missouri experience theme; it tied into our
whole theme but we really didn’t begin the campaign thinking about
that. David had tried thousands of cases in the state courts and that
struck home with people though we didn’t actually set it up as some-
thing that would work. The result was that we got 61 percent of the vote.
We outperformed what we thought we would.

The Democratic Primary

On the Democratic side, the candidates were [Jay Nixon], [Mike Wolff],
[Mike Reardon], and [Neal Quitno], State Representative Doug Harpool
entered the race, campaigned briefly for the office, then switched to
campaign unsuccessfully for the Democratic nomination for Congress
from the seventh district. Michael Shaffer, assistant prosecuting attorney
of Jackson County, considered the race but decided to run (unsuccess-
fully) for Jackson County prosecuting attorney.

[Jay Nixon], thirty-six, a political science graduate of the University of
Missouri—Columbia and of its law school, was elected to the state senate
in 1986 from his home area of Jefferson County, being the first state
senate candidate to spend $100,000 on a campaign. Two years later, he
won the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate when
more experienced candidates decided not to challenge Senator Dan-
forth. In that campaign, Nixon raised and spent $880,000, compared to
the $4 million spent by his opponent, and received 32 percent of the
vote, the lowest percentage received in Missouri by a Democratic Senate
nominee since senators had become popularly elected.

[Mike Wolff], forty-seven, graduate of Dartmouth College and the
University of Minnesota Law School, practiced law for twenty-two years
and served as professor of law at St. Louis University. He served as a law
clerk for a Minnesota federal judge and for two years headed a legal
services program for American Indians in South Dakota. In 1988, he
Table 5-2. Democratic Candidates for Attorney General and Primary Election Results

| 225,093 | 35% Jeremiah W. "Jay" Nixon, state senator from Jefferson County (in St. Louis area) |
| 189,209 | 29% Michael A. Wolff, St. Louis University law professor and 1988 Democratic nominee for attorney general |
| 163,385 | 25% Michael Reardon, prosecuting attorney for Clay County (Kansas City suburb) |
| 69,224  | 11% Neal Quitno, prosecuting attorney for Vernon County (southwest Missouri) |

won the Democratic nomination for attorney general, but he lost in the general election to incumbent Bill Webster.

Mike Reardon, forty-four, graduate of William Jewell College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City Law School, had practiced law for nineteen years and had served as prosecuting attorney of Clay County, in the Kansas City area, since 1986.

Neal Quitno, thirty-five, graduate of the University of Kansas Law School, had been a lawyer for nine years and prosecuting attorney of Vernon County in southwest Missouri since 1986.

A poll released by Mike Wolff in May showed most voters undecided and three of the candidates about even: Wolff had 15 percent of the vote; Nixon had 14 percent; and Reardon had 12 percent; Quitno had only 2 percent.

Nixon won the support of Congressman William Clay and of his son, fellow state senator William L. "Lacy" Clay, Jr., both of whom were political leaders of the black community in St. Louis. Nixon also won the endorsement of the state AFL-CIO, and the Moberly Monitor-Index.

Wolff won the support of Circuit Clerk Freeman Bosley, Jr., another major black political leader in St. Louis, of the United Auto Workers, and of the St. Louis Fraternal Order of Police. Wolff was endorsed by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Kansas City Star, and the Springfield News-Leader. Reardon was endorsed by the Columbia Daily Tribune, which also expressed strong support for Wolff.

Nixon received substantial support from labor unions and attorneys. He easily raised and spent the most money, spending more than $500,000
in the primary contest. Mike Wolff spent $287,000; Reardon spent $100,000; and Quitno spent $362,000.

Nixon hired Charles Hatfield as his campaign manager. Hatfield, a graduate of the University of Missouri–Columbia and a student at the University of Missouri–Columbia Law School, had worked for more than a year in Nixon’s 1988 campaign for the U.S. Senate and had written his senior honors thesis in political science on that campaign. Nixon contracted for media advertising from Campaign Group of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and survey research from Bennett, Petts and Associates of Washington, D.C.

The campaigns also had their human interest side. Nixon made headlines by canoeing the length of the Missouri River to emphasize the state’s water pollution programs and his concern for the environment. He shook up expectations by appearing at the secretary of state’s office earlier than any other prospective candidate in order to be listed first on the ballot. Maintaining the place in line required that a volunteer sit outside the office for forty hours per week for a couple of months. Mike Reardon challenged Nixon’s ballot position, alleging that he had arrived early on filing day and thus was first in line that day and should have been allowed to file first. The court dismissed his suit.

Jay Nixon won the Democratic primary with 35 percent of the vote, as shown in Table 5-2. Nixon demonstrated a statewide appeal, leading his three opponents in 65 of the 114 counties of the state. His largest margins were in his home county of Jefferson, in southeastern Missouri, and in Boone and Cole Counties, where he had attended university and served in the legislature. Mike Wolff led in his home area of St. Louis city and St. Louis County; in most other places he ran second or third to one of the other candidates. Mike Reardon was the leading candidate in 31 counties, most of them in western Missouri, his home area. Quitno won 11 counties in his home area of southwest Missouri and in northern Missouri.

Comments in Symposium about the Democratic Primary

Janice Londe, campaign manager for Mike Wolff. Our greatest strength was, ironically, our greatest weakness: this was the year when the voters
wanted non-politicians and our candidate was not a politician. He was the only candidate in the race who had never held a public office. He was a law professor. While that was our strength with the voters, it was also our greatest weakness because if you do not hold public office, you have no base from which to raise money. Every candidate who won a party nomination for statewide office had held another office. Further weakening our position was the fact that the other candidates were saying that they weren't politicians, even the ones who were.

You really have to spend money in the media to break through the pack when you are in a multi-candidate primary. We put together a strong campaign team but fund-raising was a problem. In the end, we raised $300,000, of which $50,000 was in-kind, such as office space, that we couldn't spend on media. Ten percent of our money went for fund-raising, which was actually lower than the average, but it was still money we couldn't spend for television. In addition, we spent $40,000 for overhead, which was a very small amount considering that we were campaigning for two years. That left us with $180,000 for media, which put us way behind Jay Nixon.

Three hundred thousand dollars in a normal campaign would have been enough money. It wasn't enough in 1992. We thought that we had done pretty well, but we were running against a gentleman who was going to be attorney general if he won and a state senator if he lost. Obviously, he could raise money and he was very good at raising money.

If we had had the kind of money that Jay Nixon had, we would have run a television campaign. Since we couldn't do that, we emphasized the grass roots, hoping to have enough support from party activists and from editorial readers to win. We did very well in getting party support and newspaper endorsements. We had every single ward and township in St. Louis County. We had the endorsements of the major newspapers. We had the endorsements of eighty citizen groups.

Early on, we had done really well with free media, or earned media, as people like to call it now. Later we had difficulty getting coverage. Not only were we competing with three attorney general candidates in the primary, but there were also many candidates for other offices. The candidates who ran for governor held statewide offices and were able to get a lot of coverage, which reduced the attention paid to candidates for lesser office.
Normally, about 25 percent of the voters vote in a primary. However, the turnout was 37 percent in 1992! What that meant was that 200,000 people who don’t usually vote in the primary voted. About 20 percent of the voters are pretty plugged in. They read the newspapers; they belong to some organization; you can go out and find those people and shake their hands. The remainder, I call the TV people. That next 17 percent were people who got their information from television where we weren’t competitive. If turnout had been normal, our strategy might have been more effective.

I’m still proud of the campaign we ran. One reason I’m so proud is what we did after we lost. Within forty-eight hours of the election, all of our key staff members and some of our major volunteers had gone to work in other campaigns. Nobody took a break. I went to work as political director for Congressman Gephardt. Some of our staffers went to work for Mel Carnahan.

Mike Wolff started out in 1988 to keep Bill Webster from being attorney general. Mike continued the mission by going to work for Mel Carnahan as research director. In that role, Mike helped the entire Democratic ticket and improved the chances for Jay Nixon’s election.

Charles Hatfield, campaign manager for Jay Nixon. We were in the primary campaign for eighteen months. The primary was a marathon. Our plan in the primary was to have more stamina than everyone else. We ran a totally positive campaign. We knew that Mike Wolff would be a candidate; he had run statewide before for attorney general and had run a race on limited resources. We felt that he would run a relatively strong race given the amount of money and name recognition that he had.

We felt we had a couple of advantages: one was that we had good name recognition from Jay’s statewide campaign for the United States Senate in 1988. In most statewide races your name recognition drops precipitously after the race, even in a period of six or eight months. Jay’s name recognition had stayed fairly high, because he was in the state senate and was able to get involved in some issues. Secondly, we thought we had a good statewide base in terms of fund-raising and organizational support.

Perception is reality, and it was our goal to establish the perception that Jay Nixon was the front-runner in the race, that he had a better
organization, that he could raise more money, that he had better issue positioning and that he had a better relationship with the press than anyone else in the campaign. If you ask someone to write a check for the campaign, one of the first questions they ask is, “Can you win?” They don’t want to put money into a candidate who has no chance of winning.

Secondly, in the Democratic party you have some important constituency groups. You must address the issues of organized labor, and you must address the minority communities. If one of your opponents in a multi-candidate race gets those two constituency groups on his or her side, you are going to be in big trouble, even if you do have the money. We had a few problems there, but we set about establishing strong ties with those constituency groups.

Our third goal was to make sure that we had a moderate positioning of Jay Nixon in terms of issue positions. We had an opponent, Mike Wolff, who was widely perceived to be a liberal. I don’t know if that perception was really accurate, because he was later endorsed by the National Rifle Association, but that was the perception. We felt that we could position Jay Nixon as a moderate based upon the fact that he takes a populist view towards consumer issues, including regulation of corporate industry but he has a fairly conservative view on fiscal issues. With this positioning, we knew we weren’t going to get hit on “tax and spend” and those sorts of things.

Fourth, our goal was to make sure that we outspent everyone else in the primary. One way we did that was to ensure that Jay Nixon made one hundred fund-raising calls every single day. We were able to spend three times more money than any Democrat has ever spent in the Democratic primary for attorney general. We raised that money by establishing a plan, deciding how much money we were going to need, and where we were going to get the money. Then we went out and started raising it, particularly by telephoning people and asking for $1,000, $10,000, whatever it takes.

We used a lot of that money for extensive mailings. Our experience in the 1988 U.S. Senate campaign showed us that statewide travel is very expensive and not as productive as you would think. The candidate ends up talking again and again to the same groups of people, preaching to a choir that has already decided how to vote. In primaries, a lot of the
Campaigns for Attorney General

hard-core political structure, the committee people, for example, make up their mind at an unbelievably early point, long before any candidate has taken any issue positions. So, we did extensive mailings to Democratic contributors and Democratic groups.

We made very specific appeals to the constituency groups we targeted. We received the endorsement of [the] Missouri State Labor Council, the AFL-CIO, which Mike Wolff anticipated getting but we got. Our plan was to get the sixteen votes we needed from the board of thirty-two people. We went after them, one vote at a time, the way we did our fund-raising. We appealed to the police groups. We wanted to get the police groups on our side so that we could position our candidate as strong on crime. We did have some constituencies, including the prosecutors and the highway patrol, who were unhappy with Jay Nixon because of battles he had in the state senate. We legitimately had to address their concerns because they had the potential to be a serious liability.

We took a lot of heat in the primary campaign for our lack of a traditional field operation. While we thought the field operation was important, we kept putting it off until tomorrow, and we just never got it done. It’s tough to find a good field coordinator to whom you can just say: go deal with this stuff. Also we thought television would be more effective than a field organization in contacting many primary election voters. Lots of people in this state who vote in Democratic primaries aren’t traditional Democrats. These are people who aren’t following issue positioning, who aren’t in tune with the party structure, but are still voting in the Democratic primary.

The General Election Campaign

The general election campaign between Steelman and Nixon was hard-hitting. The barrage of negative ads led some viewers to predict that Steelman and Nixon would guarantee continuous statewide standing for the Libertarian party. Mitchell Moore of Columbia had submitted petitions that qualified him for the ballot as the Libertarian party candidate for attorney general. If he received at least 2 percent of the vote, the Libertarian party would be entitled to ballot position in future elections without circulating petitions. The negative ads threatened to
disenchant voters with both candidates, with the possibility that they would vote for Moore as the equivalent to "none of the above." In the end, Moore received almost 4 percent, easily qualifying the party. However he trailed Janet Lewis, who received over 6 percent of the vote as the Libertarian candidate for treasurer. In addition, every statewide Libertarian candidate except André Marrou, candidate for president, received more than 2 percent of the vote and thus qualified the party for a continued position on the ballot.

Nixon won the endorsements of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the Kansas City Star. Steelman won the endorsement of the St. Joseph News-Press, the Columbia Daily Tribune, and the first endorsement ever made by the Missouri State Troopers Association.

Nixon began the general election campaign with $127,000 on hand, though he also had debts of $60,000. In contrast, Steelman had $16,000 on hand and debts of more than $146,000. Expenditures in the general election campaign included $775,090 for David Steelman and $772,152 for Jay Nixon. Steelman ended the campaign $177,456 in debt, while Nixon ended $145,000 in debt.

Nixon won the election, the vote totals being

Jay Nixon, Democrat 1,154,714 votes 50 percent
David Steelman, Republican 1,064,814 votes 46 percent
Mitch Moore, Libertarian 92,576 votes 4 percent.

Nixon's vote was about average for statewide Democratic candidates in 1992, and Steelman's vote was about average for statewide Republican candidates.

Comments in Symposium
about the General Election

Todd Graves, campaign manager for David Steelman. After the primary, the entire staff just crashed, mentally and physically, for a week and a half. A campaign is a very dynamic process, almost organic; the campaign feeds on itself. So we were just spent. We were also $150,000 in debt, which is no small thing.

Our strategy didn't change in the general election campaign. We used
### Table 5-3. Media Poll Findings for Attorney General, General Election Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Steelman</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Mason-Dixon</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12–16</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>(480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Mason-Dixon</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25–29</td>
<td>SLPD, KMOX</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>(693)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>(2,312,104)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mason-Dixon refers to Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research which conducted a poll for several Missouri media, including the *Springfield News-Leader*. SLPD refers to *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, and KMOX refers to St. Louis radio station KMOX.

The same issues: crime and desegregation. Crime became a much better issue for us because our opponent had some pretty weak crime votes. Some anti-crime constituencies were unhappy with him. The race became much less of a beauty pageant, much less retail work and much more issue-oriented, which was the way we wanted to run it. Sometimes, the metropolitan newspapers editorialize, especially on the desegregation orders, that you say one thing in the metro areas and another thing in the rural areas. That’s not true. We gave our message wherever we went. We weren’t afraid of our stance.

Very quickly we lost control of the dynamic in this race. In the primary, we felt we had controlled the debate from day one, but in the general, the debate spiraled out of control. First of all, the Second Injury Fund entered our lives. David Steelman had supported Bill Webster in the past, and they were friends. That issue started driving the race, maybe even before the press kicked it in gear. That was a losing issue for us because Steelman and Webster were in the same party. If voters are going for reform, they usually switch parties.

Clinton’s success also became a factor in our lives. Our polls showed approximately 70 percent of Clinton voters were Jay Nixon voters and approximately 70 percent of President Bush voters were David Steelman voters. The math didn’t add up for us, because Bush was getting only
one in three voters at that time. Facing a Republican train wreck, our strategy became that of being a passenger who survives. We tried to focus on how to survive forces beyond our control, namely the Second Injury Fund and the presidential race. And also, Jay Nixon was running a very aggressive and good race, but we felt we could deal with that and stay on our agenda. We couldn't deal with things that we could not influence.

Because of the need for money, we got out of the retail, handshaking aspect of politics and became full-time fund-raisers. David Steelman raised money. I raised money. We spent all of our time raising money. Our strategic plan was to stop raising money four weeks out and start running around and shaking hands with people. But four weeks out, it didn't look good, and we continued raising money. The same thing happened three weeks out. On Friday before the election we were still trying to raise money.

One reason we got into trouble was because Jay Nixon was able to carry over about $60,000 in cash from the general, while we carried over a $150,000 deficit. In the primary, we broke our pick on a lot of our contributors that are just good friends or people who have a belief in the system and could only give so much. We had used all of that goodwill. In addition, we were worn out after the primary.

We were doubly behind because the candidate loaned money to the campaign in the primary. He didn't do it in the general election because he had only so much money to loan. Jay Nixon didn't have the fund-raising potential of United States Senator John Danforth, but he was a state senator, and that counted. A lot of the lobbyists and "professional contributors" said, "I'd like to help you, but there's life after November 3 and even if he loses, I will have to face Jay Nixon as a senator."

In the final days, we felt the Carnahan factor became important in fund-raising. Money was moving down the ticket from Carnahan to other Democratic candidates. About five to seven days out, contributors decided that Carnahan was going to win. A lot of the business money is given to both major candidates until they figure out who is going to win and then they bet on the winner. Contributors started betting on Carnahan, and he had more money than he could handle. He was funneling some of it down the ticket. On the final days, we felt overwhelmed by the money factor.
In our television commercials, we went from emphasizing our issues to reacting to the dynamics of the race. We began to emphasize personality more than issues. That's how we became negative, but it became very much a "I'm not as dirty as he is," "Who do you want to clean it up?" or "Anyone but him" race.

A significant factor in our defeat was the decision of the Nixon campaign to buy about $100,000 of television advertising in the St. Louis media market about four weeks before the election. In traditional politics, you don't ever do that. You hold your money to spend at the end when it can make a difference. I think Nixon correctly analyzed that St. Louis television was going to become too crowded, and that it was going to become too much of a negative race for late commercials to be effective. Those commercials defined us on a key issue in the race, the Second Injury Fund. We spent a lot of our money and a lot of time trying to catch up in St. Louis.

Our biggest success was that Steelman was the only Republican candidate who actually rose in the polls. The first polls had us anywhere from 11 to almost 20 points down, but we lost by only 4 percentage points. Most Republicans, even those who lost in close races, started out higher and declined. Another great success was the people we attracted into the process. We ran the campaign mostly with students from the University of Missouri. They took a lot of responsibility and worked very hard and showed a lot of grit. I considered it an honor to have worked with those people.

Our most significant personal success is one of the sadder aspects of politics—both David and I became very effective fund-raisers. We started out without ever having run a statewide race, without knowing who had the money or how to get it. We'd never done fund-raising, but in the end we raised $1.4 million.

A few days before the election, someone asked me if I would be sad if we lost. I said, "Of course, but I'll be sad when it's over, whether we win or lose." You work for one hundred hours a week, and you love it, and it's really a great thing to get involved with. There are things about the system that need to change, but I think basically, it works.

Charles Hatfield, campaign manager for Democrat Jay Nixon. Our goals and procedures in the general election campaign differed from the
primary. The Democratic candidates in Missouri have had two problems. They have had no money, and they have had no guts. We were determined that we were going to have more money than the Republican candidate (which I don’t think we were able to accomplish, but we were close), and we were determined that we were going to have the courage to go out there and run a comparative race, if necessary.

We won the primary on Tuesday night, and we had every staff member at work by noon on Wednesday. I made my first fund-raising call at 12:05 P.M. on Wednesday. We raised $100,000 in the first twenty days after the primary election. When the finance reports were filed, we had about $100,000 more than David Steelman. That was a crucial point, because it established the perception that we were ahead, and perception becomes reality. We were immediately aggressive and did a poll in which we showed that we were up eight points. Shortly thereafter, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch did a poll showing us up eleven points. So we forgot about our poll and went with their poll. We worked harder than ever raising money, telling potential contributors that we had the lead in the polls and in the fund-raising. At that point, we didn’t know if it was going to be a Democratic year or not.

The second goal in the general election was, as Sun-Tzu says in The Art of War, to anticipate your opponent’s moves. Based on the manner in which David Steelman won the primary, we anticipated that the general election campaign was going to be rough, and we were prepared to run a comparative race. We were convinced we were going to have guts on that issue. Because we thought the campaigns would be rough, we thought it important to have the referees on our side. The referees would be the independent analysts and the editorial boards.

Independent groups like the police didn’t go as well for us as we had hoped, but it was important to us from the very beginning of the general election to have the St. Louis Post-Dispatch endorse Jay Nixon, to have the Kansas City Star endorse Jay Nixon, and make sure that those were good endorsements. We went about that just as we went about getting the AFL-CIO endorsement. We sat down and read the editorials in the newspapers and looked at the issues that were important to them. We focused on the issues in which our position was likely to appeal to the editorial boards and David Steelman’s position was not likely to appeal
to them. We made sure that when Jay Nixon met with those people, he emphasized those issues. We got endorsements, and we used them. We brought out a commercial that said: "This is a bloody fight, one of the classic fights of all time with two great counterpunchers, but the referee scores it on points for Nixon." I think that made some difference in the end.

Finally, we wanted to stick to a hard message. I think Todd's analysis is right, that the campaigns rapidly became a series of responses to each other. I found Todd and David Steelman to be some of the best counterpunchers in politics. We'd think we had them nailed with a particular press release or press conference, but in twenty-four hours, we'd be in damage control. We tried to make sure in the primary and the general that we were always on the offensive, but we often had to defend against Steelman's charges.

Our decision to put $100,000 into the St. Louis media market in the early stage of the general election campaign was crucial. There were two reasons for that. First, we anticipated that we would be hit on the issue of crime. All the polling showed that in the attorney general's race, crime is the number-one issue in the voters' minds even though the attorney general handles criminal appeals and has a fairly tenuous relationship to the actual crime in the streets. Because crime is such an important issue in the voters' minds, we knew that we would be hit on crime.

We decided that we were going to hit first on crime. We picked out some votes by David Steelman that we thought showed some insensitivity on crime and we put $100,000 on the air in St. Louis, which is a significant buy, saying we are going to fight crime. David and Todd had started with a desegregation commercial which is not an issue that Democrats want to fight on. They were running that commercial in three or four rural areas of the state, and we anticipated that by going up with $100,000 in St. Louis, by going up on crime, we would make them respond to our ad. After that we immediately switched to the Second Injury Fund.

Perhaps because of commercials like that, the Springfield News-Leader published a scathing editorial in which they ripped David Steelman and Jay Nixon for the dynamics of this campaign. But part of the reason for
the dynamics of the campaign was the selection of materials that the media chose to cover.

Our opponent, David Steelman, put out a very comprehensive crime proposal, and a comprehensive proposal on domestic violence. I spent two months going through their crime plan because it was very detailed. Jay Nixon put out a fifteen-page ethics proposal on how to clean up the attorney general's office, and a crime proposal. Most reporters tended not to cover such proposals, because the proposals are not unique; every candidate has some positive issue proposals. In addition, reporters can't find an angle which makes the story interesting, such as an opposite stand by the opponent, or some evidence that the candidate really does not favor the proposal. If the reporters do decide to cover policy papers, their editors allocate only a few column inches for the story. Furthermore, the editors are probably not going to say anything about the proposals in their editorials.

However, press releases about the negative aspects of an opponent provide information which a reporter can check for accuracy, and information which editors can analyze. They do check and analyze these negative stories, and they do write and publish stories about them. It shouldn't be surprising then that candidates will send out press releases which will get the most coverage for the candidate. In a lot of cases, that is what we call comparative.

I will say, as did Todd, that being involved in the campaigns is one of the greatest things that you can ever do. I'm coming back to law school in the fall, but being involved in a political campaign is the ultimate jury trial. Everyone gets to vote on who is guilty and who is innocent, who has the best plan and who doesn't. The campaigns are, in some ways, intoxicating.

Questions from the Audience

Terri Gleich, Springfield News-Leader, moderator: What role did television advertising play in this campaign? Both general election candidates had more money to spend than candidates normally have in a down-ballot race.

Todd Graves for David Steelman: When your opponent has enough
money to buy television advertising, you are dreaming if you think you are going to win without buying television. TV is king.

We had a great experiment in western Missouri. In the primary in Jackson County, we put up two thousand yard signs, and went door to door. We worked our tails off and won with 54.6 percent. In Clay County, which is right next door, and also includes part of Kansas City, we didn't do anything and we got 49 percent. I think you can interpret that difference as meaning that a substantial grass-roots effort will increase your support by four or five percentage points, which is marginal. Grass-roots activities will help you on the margins especially in the rural areas, where television doesn't reach as well. The results in the primary led me to conclude that TV is king, yet grass-roots work can make a crucial difference.

Television news coverage was nil. There were times when we begged the St. Louis television stations to cover substantive events, but they wouldn't do it. Once, David Steelman was standing on the state capitol steps giving a press conference about his campaign finance reform proposal. A Channel 8 [Columbia] television reporter happened to be there doing a stand-up story. We couldn't even talk him into poking his camera at us and taking a shot for the news. A day later though, when our opponent hit us with a negative ad, a news reporter from that station drove down to Jefferson City just to interview me about the negative ad.

Terri Gleich, moderator: Which of their ads did you find most devastating to your campaign?

Todd Graves for David Steelman: Usually the most devastating ads are the simplest. I think the Second Injury Fund ads hurt us the most. Toward the end, Attorney General Webster had become loaded with baggage, and their ads started associating us with him. I think that it was just too much weight for us to bear.

Terri Gleich, moderator: Toward the end, were you trying to disassociate yourself from Attorney General Webster?

Todd Graves for David Steelman: On policy issues, there's a lot of disagreement between David Steelman and Bill Webster, but David Steelman said Bill Webster has been my friend and I will not turn against him. There was never a time when we refused to appear with him. There
was never a time when we said something against him, not because they always agreed but because they were friends, even before politics came into their lives. David wouldn't go against that.

Terri Gleich, moderator: Chuck, could you talk a little more about TV and which of the Steelman ads did you consider to be the toughest?

Charles Hatfield for Jay Nixon: TV is where it's at, and TV costs money. Thus my primary job every single day was to raise money. We had a goal in the primary of raising $1,500 per day. In the general election campaign our goal was to raise $5,000 per day. If we had only $3,000 in the morning mail, I made it my personal goal to find another two grand before the end of the day. Our primary focus was to give that money to the TV guys, be involved in what they were doing and make sure that all of that money was being used on the air.

About two weeks out our polling indicated that the Carnahan-Webster race was not only over but was going to get really one-sided, that Webster was going to go down really fast. Our goal thereafter was to tie David Steelman to Bill Webster in terms of the Second Injury Fund and in terms of party affiliation. It wasn’t very difficult for us to figure that out.

As to the ad that hurt us worst, it had to be the ad that said that Jay Nixon voted to continue the Second Injury Fund and funneled $19 million in state contracts to a family business. If you say that somebody stole $19 million from the state treasury, voters will have a problem with that candidate. That ad in itself lost us about eight points in seventy-two hours. It closed the gap just like that. That ad created a new race ten days out. That became a crucial point in the campaign; we raised another $100,000 in seventy-two hours, helped by the fact that Carnahan’s people were starting to get involved in other races. They didn’t give us any money directly, but there were a lot of people who could give to us because Carnahan wasn’t tapping them any more. We were able to put the money together and get back on television. We didn’t directly respond to the charge. We didn’t want to put a lot of our money into denying a charge because denying a charge requires that you repeat it. We did try to make sure that from that moment on, we were very competitive, having as much airtime as they did, and driving our issues and charges as strongly as they were doing theirs.
Terri Gleich, moderator: Chuck, one of the ways you responded to that ad was to have Jay call a lot of the reporters who were covering the race. I found that to be a disarmingly honest tactic. I'm not accustomed to candidates calling me and saying, "Look, I'm really worried about this ad; here's what the true story is." How effective was that in combating the ad?

Charles Hatfield for Jay Nixon: I thought it was very effective. At that point in the campaign, ten days out, free press has value only to the extent that it is consistent with your paid media or to the extent that you can reproduce it in your paid media. We did that with an article that Jo Mannies wrote, with the headline saying, "Steelman ad appears to distort facts." I think the use of the article in our ad had a big effect. We were saying, and documenting, that the Steelman ad went over the line. The Steelman campaign responded immediately with a couple of ads like that, trying to show that our ad went over the line too. We were trying to make sure that when we thought we had been fouled, we called the foul.

Question: Chuck and Todd, how much of the money raised in the primary and general elections was personal money?

Charles Hatfield for Jay Nixon: We probably raised $600,000 in the primary and perhaps $800,000 in the general for a $1.4 million race. Of that, family money was about $50,000 in the primary and about $50,000 in the general.

Todd Graves for David Steelman: Our totals are about the same. We don't know the total for the general election because there are still bills to be paid. We spent $600,000 in the primary and probably $700,000 in the general. In the primary, David Steelman personally loaned the campaign $70,000. In the general, we didn't do loans, except for $15,000, which will probably be repaid to him by the campaign.

Charles Hatfield for Jay Nixon: Missouri has no campaign finance laws except for a requirement to tell where the money came from. Campaigns report that a contribution came from this corporation, but that gives the reader no idea who actually pulled the string and said, "Let's give them the money." There are no limits on how much a contributor can give. There are no restrictions on who can give. I think that the campaign finance laws in Missouri need some pretty serious reform.
It's wholly different in a federal race. I was involved in 1988 when Jay Nixon ran for the U.S. Senate. That was a lot harder because you had to go out and meet a lot more people; you can only raise $1,000 at a time. This year, we could ask people for $5,000. A few calls were much easier than having to have a fund-raiser and trying to get 150 people to contribute small amounts.

The federal system involves a lot of five-year-olds getting into politics because of the $1,000 limit per person. We would call potential contributors who would ask, “How much can I give?” We would say that he could give $1,000 in the primary and $1,000 in the general but his children could give the same amount, his wife could also give, the employees of his company could also give. That's perfectly legal. If you don't do that in a federal race, you're an idiot because everybody else is doing it.

Question: The attorney general’s race seemed particularly nasty. Why did that happen?

Todd Graves for David Steelman: Attacks receive more news coverage, and once they start they accelerate. You have two choices if the attacks start. You can either decide that it was a great learning experience and fold up your tent and go home, or you fight. We fought.

One thing that was very, very telling was the way that media covered the campaign. As I said, we did everything we could to talk about issues. The media weren't interested. We never got a TV station to pick up anything we did except a few times when we somehow coaxed them to come out and take a picture of it. But when a press release came out from Jefferson City saying that David Steelman was a bad father, the TV station in Springfield immediately read it on the air. They didn't even take a visual. The press release was clearly a foul, but all of the press carried it, in effect saying, “This is just terrible, but it's a good story.” We got out a story in response. That was carried by some media, but we couldn't get them to write a story about what we had said about domestic violence or anything else.

Charles Hatfield for Jay Nixon: Todd said that it was out of our control, and it does seem to get out of control very quickly. Our philosophy was that you have two choices. The day after the primary Jay Nixon held a press conference and said, “I want to say right now that if
anybody hits me, I’m hitting back.” For us, from day one, everything was analogous to a boxing match. When you get hit, you can go into a defensive crouch and try to avoid the knockout punch, or you can start swinging back. When you swing back, you are going to get counterpunched a couple of times. Pretty soon, everybody loses sense of the strategy and it just becomes a street fight.

That’s another analogy, a street fight. If you are walking down the street and somebody comes up and hits you over the head and takes your wallet, a reporter is going to say that there was a mugging. If they hit you over the head and you turn around and hit them in the face, she’s going to write that there was a street fight yesterday. We didn’t want any stories that said Jay Nixon got mugged yesterday, because that would leave the impression that he got hit hard and it really stuck. We wanted them to say that the two candidates hit each other. We wouldn’t win by complaining that we got mugged, and David Steelman wouldn’t win by complaining that he got mugged. What you get into is a dynamic of counterpunching. We had to make sure that we counterpunched, and soon that gets out of control.
Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State Campaigns

Lieutenant Governor

Eighteen days before the general election, we were twenty-four points behind; ten days out, we were thirteen points behind. Our television, radio, and newspaper advertising began to take effect. Seven days out, we were still eight points behind, and Democratic advisors were saying, "You guys are going to lose." We were helped by a last-minute infusion of money, which gave us the ability to get our message out on a par with the Republican candidate, which is a rarity.

—John Robinson, campaign manager for winner Roger Wilson

In 1992, the incumbent lieutenant governor ran for governor, leaving the office open to all comers. The job carried few duties and little responsibility. The authors of Missouri's constitution gave the lieutenant governor only the responsibility to complete the governor's term if the governor did not do so, to serve as acting governor if the governor were absent or disabled, and to preside over the senate.

This third power was sharply reduced in the 1970s. In 1972, Bill Phelps had won the lieutenant governorship with a campaign in which
he promised to spend full time on the job, thus giving the taxpayers more value for their money. When Republican Phelps showed up day after day to preside over the Democrat-controlled state senate, senators objected, maintaining that they were quite capable of conducting their own business and were entitled to do so without interference or guidance of an official from the executive branch of government. Phelps persisted and the senators had him bodily removed. Eventually the state supreme court decided that the lieutenant governor could preside only when the senate agreed. Ironically, Republican John Ashcroft profited most from this decision, winning the governorship in 1984 in large part because of the effectiveness of a television commercial in which he charged that his opponent, the lieutenant governor, had not carried out his constitutional duties, because he had presided over the senate only one-third of the time.

On the other hand, the limited duties left the lieutenant governor free throughout the four-year term to give numerous speeches and attend various meetings, in essence to conduct a constant campaign. Not surprisingly, then, each of the last nine lieutenant governors had been a strong candidate for governor or United States Senator.

**The Democratic Contest**

State senator Roger Wilson was the first candidate to announce for lieutenant governor, stating frankly that his ultimate goal was the governorship. Wilson probably had a choice between lieutenant governor and secretary of state. (He was ineligible for the attorney general’s post because he was not an attorney, and a race for treasurer would have wasted party resources by pitting Wilson against Bob Holden, the 1988 near-winner who had spent four years preparing for another run for treasurer.) Wilson’s choice of the lieutenant governor’s post, which had a lower salary, fewer duties, smaller staff, and fewer opportunities for statewide exposure than the secretary of state’s position, surprised some observers. On the other hand, those factors also meant that there might be less competition for the post.

Wilson’s early entry, eighteen months before the general election, had the desired effect, virtually anointing him as the Democratic candidate.
Table 6-1. Primary Election Candidates for Lieutenant Governor and Votes Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate Description</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Roger B. Wilson, state senator</td>
<td>297,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mary Ross, black St. Louis city alderman</td>
<td>155,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Larry Rice, television minister and advocate for homeless</td>
<td>127,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prentess E. Clifton, Sr., black parochial school teacher</td>
<td>33,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rich Bullet Train Pisani, advocate for high speed train</td>
<td>27,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Margaret Kelly, state auditor</td>
<td>281,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don Stubblefield, owner of religious radio stations</td>
<td>81,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jerry Malone Peters, former mayor of small town</td>
<td>31,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He brought considerable strength to the race, based upon his success in winning elections in Boone and adjoining counties and his skill in the senate, where he had successfully chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Congressional Apportionment Committee in 1991. On the other hand, senate leaders had had little success in statewide races in earlier years, being plagued by low name identification and limited skill in raising funds.

The candidates to step forward against Wilson tended to be those looking for an opportunity to drum up public support for a project or cause. Rich Pisani, a St. Louis businessman, announced early, using his candidacy to advocate the development of a high-speed train between Kansas City and St. Louis as a prelude to a world’s fair in both cities in 2004. Pisani got his name changed legally so that he could be identified on the ballot as Rich Bullet Train Pisani.

Reverend Larry Rice filed, carrying forward his long campaign for shelters for the homeless. His numerous appearances on religious television, including his own two stations, and his leadership at capital rallies and presentations had given him some name recognition as well as a potential group of campaign volunteers. Rice called for yet another investigation of the escape of James Earl Ray from the Missouri state penitentiary prior to his assassination of Martin Luther King. Rice wanted the investigation partly to let the black community “know there
is hope and that this issue is not dead."¹ Rice was followed by Prentess Clifton, a black parochial school teacher who had run poorly for the nomination for lieutenant governor four years earlier.

Mary Ross, a black sixteen-year city alderman from St. Louis, also filed, saying she was interested in "dealing directly with the legislators on issues like health care." Ross supported tighter controls on the sale of firearms and ammunition. She also advocated affordable health care and state licensing of church-run day-care centers. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch said that she "waged an almost invisible campaign,"² but she did win endorsements from the Jefferson Township Democratic organization and the Black Elected Officials organization, both in St. Louis County, and she did campaign at some out-state functions.

Wilson set the early pace with strong endorsements from Congressmen Richard Gephardt and William Clay of St. Louis, whose own futures had briefly been in Wilson's hands when he chaired the Senate Congressional Apportionment Committee. Wilson had introduced and pushed through a plan similar to one developed earlier by the congressmen. Gephardt and Clay cohosted a St. Louis fund-raiser that raised more than $100,000, a far more successful fund-raiser than any Wilson had ever conducted as a candidate for the state senate. More importantly, Clay's endorsement brought with it the support of his political organization, support which would be very helpful in winning a portion of the black vote against Mary Ross.

Other endorsements for Wilson came from the St. Louis Police Officers Association and the St. Louis Police Fraternal Organization, from three major statewide labor groups, and from many of the Democratic ward groups in St. Louis city and Democratic township organizations in St. Louis County. The party endorsements were reflected also in Wilson's expenditures of about $13,000 to party groups for get-out-the-vote activities in the primary. Wilson was endorsed by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Kansas City Star, the Warrensburg Daily Star-Journal, and the Moberly Monitor-Index.

Wilson moved to make the lieutenant governor's job more meaningful by assigning additional duties concerned with the three e's—education, the elderly, and economic development. A successful court case brought by Governor Ashcroft had eliminated one of the few duties that the
lieutenant governor had, serving as governor in the absence of the governor. Assuming that Ashcroft would veto any proposal to provide the lieutenant governor more rather than fewer duties, Wilson pushed his proposal through as a resolution, which would bypass the governor and go straight to the public for a vote. It was listed on the November ballot as Proposition C.

Wilson spent almost $500,000 in the primary, far more than any of his primary opponents. Major contributors included Anheuser-Busch, Kansas City banker Jim Nutter, the Central Bancompany PAC, the UAW PAC, and a number of companies in his hometown of Columbia.

**Comments in Symposium about the Democratic Nomination**

*John Robinson, Wilson's campaign manager.* Boone Countians were convinced that Roger was the only candidate who had a prayer, not only in the primary, but in the general election. Our polling showed something completely different. Roger was well known in central Missouri, but outside of that area, his name recognition was about 10 percent. Our first goal was to increase Roger's name recognition.

The other important goal in the primary was to sew up as many endorsements as we could, especially in the city of St. Louis and in the county Democratic organizations. We were successful in doing that. By acquiring most of the endorsements in St. Louis City, we shut off the opportunity for the three St. Louis candidates to gain any momentum.

Our polls told us four weeks out that we were trailing Mary Ross. She had 31 percent of the vote in a five-person race, which is easily enough to win. Roger Wilson had between 8 and 10 percent. That was critical, and something that almost sneaked up on us.

At that point, we stuck to our campaign plan, continuing to work on gaining endorsements. A major tenet for a campaign manager is to stick to your plan. You can adjust and make certain changes in the plan, but don't throw it out in a panic four weeks out when you find yourself 20 points down. If it was good when it was formed, it should be good in the heat of battle. In our efforts to get endorsements and raise money, we had an advantage in Roger's service for **thirteen years as a state senator**.
and particularly his service as Senate Appropriations Chair, which gave him contact with many constituent groups.

We did buy television in the primary campaign and that was critical in making up those 20 percentage points. Four weeks out, we were 20 points behind. Ten days out, we were 13 points behind, and we were beginning to sweat. Seven days out, we were 7 to 9 points behind. Polls on the Sunday before the election showed us 2 points behind and still moving.

I think that says something about polling. In this case, the polls didn’t catch our candidate’s networks, the fact that he was well connected to educators because of his support for education, well connected to mental health workers and people concerned about the handicapped, and various other constituencies around the state. I’m a believer in polls, but I don’t think polls reflected those networks the way they showed up in the polling places.

Primary Election Results

Any concern that the Wilson camp might have had evaporated quickly when votes were counted. Wilson won 46 percent of the vote, compared with 24 percent for Ross, 20 percent for Rice, 5 percent for Clifton, and 4 percent for Pisani. The three major candidates split St. Louis city evenly, with the outsider, Roger Wilson, having a slight lead over the two St. Louis residents, Ross and Rice. The very low vote for Pisani indicated a long fall for the candidate who had been regarded as a formidable challenger early in the campaign. By August, interest in the future world’s fair and the high-speed train had evaporated.

The Republican Contest

Democrat Roger Wilson's inside track to the lieutenant governor's office became congested when Republican state auditor Margaret Kelly decided to run for lieutenant governor. Her decision was surprising, because the new office would involve a reduction from a staff of 150 to a staff of 4, an $18,000 cut in pay, and a loss of numerous powers and duties. She explained that she would “like to be more involved in the management of state government.” Later she said she would use the
lieutenant governor's office as a public forum to help make sure that more of the auditor's recommendations were implemented, noting that the auditor's office had no authority to implement its findings.

Because the auditor is elected at midterm elections, Kelly could run for lieutenant governor without losing the auditor's post. The campaign would further increase her name recognition statewide. Her candidacy could also serve her goal of helping the Republican team by putting a woman on the statewide ticket, by giving the ticket some badly needed visibility in a year when four statewide incumbents were not running for reelection, and most of all, by defeating Wilson, who, if he won, threatened to be a strong candidate for governor in four or eight years.

Kelly had served as Cole County auditor, then been appointed state auditor by Governor Bond, becoming the first woman to hold statewide elective office in Missouri. She narrowly won election over Travis Morrison in 1986, then easily beat Connie Hendren in 1990. Her husband, Clark Kelly, worked as an assistant attorney general in Bill Webster's office.

Two southwest Missouri Republicans also filed for lieutenant governor. Don Stubblefield of Joplin, former high school football coach and now owner of two religious radio stations, advocated a state law allowing school districts to use the Bible as a textbook, supported term limits, and proposed that the legislature meet only in alternate years. Jerry Malone Peters, former mayor of Pierce City, campaigned against lawyers, calling for laws to bar them from the legislature and all executive branch offices except attorney general, for more supervision and discipline of lawyers, for shorter judicial appointments, and for appointment of people who were not lawyers to some judgeships. "There are lots of smart people besides lawyers," Peters said.³

Kelly made a fifty-three-county tour of the state, promising to use the lieutenant governor's office to promote economic development by working for a stable economic climate, government efficiency, low taxes, and improved highways. She spent $157,000 on the primary election. Her major contributors included the political action committees of Emerson Electric, Enterprise Leasing Company, Southwestern Bell, and Mercantile Bank.
Primary Election Results

Margaret Kelly was an easy winner, securing 72 percent of the vote, compared with 21 percent for Stubblefield and 8 percent for Peters. Kelly carried every county in the state except two carried by Stubblefield—Clay and Newton. Peters was uniformly third across the state, but he found more support in Jackson (14 percent) and Clay (24 percent) Counties than in his home county of Lawrence (8 percent).

The General Election Contest

Issues

The Second Injury Fund, significant in both the governor’s and attorney general’s races, was also important in the lieutenant governor’s race. Long before the primary election, Wilson was criticizing his prospective general election opponent for withholding a completed audit of the fund, suggesting that Kelly was doing so to help fellow Republican William Webster, her husband’s boss. Wilson noted that Kelly and Webster had raised money for each other’s campaigns. Kelly’s spokeswoman said that the audit was in its final stages, but nothing could be said about an audit until it was signed by Kelly, evoking memories of previous political charges that Kelly’s audits had been delayed for long periods, awaiting her final review.

Two weeks later Kelly released an audit of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, the department in which the Second Injury Fund was located. Apparently little was included about the Second Injury Fund, and Kelly announced that she would undertake a “special review” of the Second Injury Fund, the results of which were to be released before the August primary. Wilson criticized the auditor for failing to discover, in the audit of the department, that almost $1 million in attorneys fees for workers’ compensation cases had been paid from the wrong fund, resulting in an extra charge to businesses rather than taxpayers.

Wilson also attacked Kelly for her limited campaigning in September, dramatizing her absence with an empty chair beside his podium and with an offer to pay reporters $50 for any direct quote of Kelly on a
substantive issue. Although Kelly had campaigned only a limited amount in September, she spent most of October on a sixty-six-county tour of the state. She said that she had “no objection” to debating Wilson but that she was booked through the election. Later she noted that she had been invited to candidate forums but never to a debate.

In her statements, Kelly often spoke of her interest in bringing more women into the governmental and political process. Wilson responded by pointing out that most of her top office and campaign aides were men. He also noted that women in her office were paid $343 per month less than men, on average.

By the end of September, Wilson had campaigned in every county of the state, in an effort to bring his name identification up to the level that Kelly had achieved by her two previous statewide campaigns and her service in statewide office. Wilson became the first statewide candidate to use satellite technology to conduct a fund-raiser. During halftime of the University of Missouri–University of Colorado football game, he broadcast to thirty sites around Missouri, discussing his goals and asking for funds.

A third candidate in the race, Libertarian Franklin Nugent, used the campaign to argue that jurors had the power and duty to acquit suspects if they thought the laws unjust. Nugent charged that judges routinely concealed this power of the jury by giving false instructions to the contrary. Nugent made few appearances, and his name recognition was so low that even opponent Margaret Kelly did not know his name in early October. Nugent responded, “I think it’s a wonderful commentary on how poorly informed she is as a candidate, and also a commentary on how difficult it is for us to get our message out.”

Funding

In 1992, fund-raising proved easier for at least some Democrats than for Republicans, particularly as Bill Clinton and Mel Carnahan began to look like winners. That proved true in the lieutenant governor’s race, indicated by the amounts raised in the first month after the primary—$82,000 for Wilson and $17,000 for Kelly. In the end, Roger Wilson spent $622,000 in the general election campaign, while Margaret Kelly spent
$386,000. Wilson's superior funds included $40,000 raised by Mel Carnahan and transferred to Wilson. Carnahan also asked some potential contributors to contribute directly to Wilson.

Endorsements

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch endorsed Roger Wilson but spoke well of Margaret Kelly, noting that the race had "two of the state's most qualified and promising candidates." The Kansas City Star endorsed Wilson on the basis of his thirteen-year senate record, his energy, and his leadership. Wilson received endorsements also of the Rolla Daily News, the Columbia Daily Tribune, the St. Joseph News-Press, the Warrensburg Daily Star-Journal, and the Joplin Globe. The National Abortion Rights Action League became active for Wilson about two weeks before the election, with polls showing that the pro-life candidate for governor, Bill Webster, would be defeated but that the pro-life candidate for lieutenant governor, Margaret Kelly, had a healthy lead. In contrast, the group Missouri Right to Life featured Margaret Kelly in a mailing to 75,000 Missourians, and in distribution on car windshields in church parking lots on the Sunday before the election.

Wilson's campaign manager, John Robinson, described the general election campaign as follows:

Margaret Kelly was a statewide office holder, well known compared to us. Her name recognition at the start was about 40 percent, rather substantial in a statewide race where not many people are paying attention. After winning the primary, our polling indicated that Roger was still at about 10 percent name recognition. We had grown a little bit but it was damn discouraging. A lot of people who were aware of these figures didn't think we had a chance.

Our campaign plan assumed that Margaret Kelly would not actively campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign, which had been her pattern in previous campaigns. Roger went around to various forums in the state and to meetings with Missouri newspaper editors. Margaret was invited to many of those meetings, but didn't attend so there would be an empty chair beside Roger. We were the underdog, so we asked for debates, but we did not get any. That Roger was the more accessible candidate hit home with newspaper editors.

Margaret's campaign strategy wasn't without merit, because many
voters don’t decide until the last two weeks on an obscure down-ballot race like lieutenant governor. Her strategy had served her well in the past. This time, however, we laid an effective groundwork for those two weeks of decision making, raising money and getting key endorsements from many newspapers.

One of the things that impressed the newspaper editors was Roger’s plan, specifically Proposition C, which would give additional duties to the lieutenant governor. Our hometown newspaper [Columbia Daily Tribune] editor, Hank Waters, God bless him, still doesn’t think Proposition C is worth anything. We are going to try to prove him wrong, but be that as it may, Roger had positive plans for the office. Our polling showed us beginning about thirty points behind Margaret Kelly. Eighteen days before the general election, we were twenty-four points behind; ten days out, we were thirteen points behind. Our television, radio, and newspaper advertising began to take effect. Seven days out, we were still eight points behind, and Democratic advisors were saying, “You guys are going to lose.” We were helped by a last-minute infusion of money, which gave us the ability to get our message out on a par with the Republican candidate, which is a rarity. Some of the last tracking polls showed that we had moved within two points of Margaret.

General Election Results

Election vote totals were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1,151,357 votes</th>
<th>49 percent;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Roger Wilson</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Kelly</td>
<td>1,114,305 votes</td>
<td>48 percent;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Nugent</td>
<td>60,320 votes</td>
<td>3 percent.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Both major candidates ran well in most counties, with Kelly stronger in traditionally Republican areas of the state and Wilson stronger in traditionally Democratic areas. Wilson had an edge of 70,000 votes in the core of the two major metropolitan areas and a margin of 15,000 in the outer suburbs of those areas. In contrast, Margaret Kelly had a lead of about 48,000 in outstate Missouri, with her lead being strongest in southwest Missouri. Wilson did win usually Republican Cole County (Jefferson City), Margaret Kelly’s home for many years, as well as Jefferson County, her birthplace.
Secretary of State

Some people have described Judi's victory as the "Moriarty Miracle." We felt that she actually had a good chance to win the race. The miracle was that she won the primary on a budget of $21,000. That may have been a Missouri record for a nonincumbent running for statewide office.

—Jim Kolb, campaign manager for Judi Moriarty

In 1992, the incumbent secretary of state ran for governor, leaving open an office from which two of the last three incumbents had been strong candidates for governor. The secretary of state has many ministerial responsibilities. One is that of publishing the Official Manual, State of Missouri (commonly called the "Blue Book"), and other publications. In earlier years this responsibility had sometimes given the inside track to newspaper publishers, who campaigned on the basis that they had experience in publishing. When incumbent Roy Blunt was first elected, he had emphasized his experience in conducting elections in Greene County as the appropriate preparation for being the secretary of state, who has responsibility for conducting statewide elections. Obviously, the widely varying responsibilities of the office allowed candidates with a variety of backgrounds to claim that their experience would be helpful.

The Democratic Contest

Three fairly strong Democratic men filed for the race, but in the end, they all lost to a woman who filed at the last moment, Judi Moriarty. James Askew, 51, a truck driver from St. Louis County, made his sixth attempt for secretary of state. While each of his campaigns had been low-key, he had gained enough name familiarity over the years to win the Democratic nomination in 1988, a year in which Republican Roy Blunt appeared almost certain of reelection. In 1992, Askew ran a radio ad that St. Louis Post-Dispatch columnist Bill McClellan characterized as the "Most Honest Radio Ad"; in the ad, Askew touted himself as the common man running against the political establishment. Askew's ap-
Table 6-2. Primary Election Candidates for Secretary of State and Votes Received

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Judith K. “Judi” Moriarty, Pettis county clerk</td>
<td>194,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Howard Wagner, circuit court clerk, Jefferson county</td>
<td>155,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert J. “Bob” Quinn, state representative, St. Louis county</td>
<td>153,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James J. Askew, truck driver and perennial candidate</td>
<td>121,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Hancock, state representative, St. Louis County</td>
<td>211,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard T. Struckhoff, Greene County clerk</td>
<td>88,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Craig Kilby, state representative, St. Charles County</td>
<td>39,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don Parker, Clay County auditor</td>
<td>36,600</td>
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Robert Quinn, 25, St. Louis County state representative, had served one term as chairman of the House Elections Committee. In the legislature he had twice sponsored election reform bills that passed both houses but were vetoed by the governor. He advocated random selection of candidates’ placement on the ballot, a computerized statewide voter list, and allowing non-registered voters to register at the polls on election day, when they get their drivers’ licenses, or by mail. Quinn was endorsed by the Missouri National Education Association, the state AFL-CIO, legislative leaders, the Kansas City Star, which noted that he had sponsored “much of the major election reform legislation in the last few years,” the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which said he brought “a depth of experience to the job,” and the Columbia Daily Tribune.

Howard Wagner, 45, was clerk of the circuit court of Jefferson County, the official who handled much of the administration of the local court. Wagner advocated placing voter registration forms in income tax booklets, noting that Minnesota registered 100,000 new voters the first year it had done so. Wagner was endorsed by former secretary of state James Kirkpatrick, St. Louis city Democratic chair Freeman Bosley, Jr., a number of labor groups, including the Missouri UAW, and Congressmen Richard Gephardt and William Clay. Wagner was easily the most suc-
cessful fund-raiser in the race, raising $142,000, almost twice as much as his three opponents combined. Even so, that amount was insufficient to secure the name recognition needed by a relatively unknown candidate.

Campaign worker John Ballard described the frustrations of the Wagner campaign:

My candidate had top of the ballot placement because volunteers sat in a filing line for weeks to insure that he would be first in line. He had the endorsement of Jim Kirkpatrick, the revered twenty-year holder of the post, who is now retired but still politically potent. For consultants he had a St. Louis firm with a good track record. He had good campaign materials. He had a photogenic family, all willing to campaign hard. He even had a message by Megan, his little four-year-old. Callers to Howard’s home got this recording: “My Daddy and Mommy are out campaigning and can’t answer the phone; if you promise to vote for my Daddy, I promise to give him your message.”

Early on, it seemed that Jim Askew, the perennial candidate, would be the biggest threat. Because of his repeated ballot appearances, he had big name recognition for voters, who are tired by the time they get that far down the ballot. Then Bob Quinn got labor endorsement based on a good pro-labor voting record in the legislature. Non-legislator candidates like Wagner are somewhat handicapped by the lack of a voting record, whatever their attitude towards labor. Until the final hour of filing, that was the race. We had heard rumors that Judi Moriarty was thinking about filing, but my calls to old friends did not find anybody in Pettis County who believed it.

By the time Judi entered the race, Howard had lined up impressive support all around the state. Many county clerks who would have been Judi’s natural allies had already signed on with Howard before she announced. Since they are the local election authorities, and the secretary of state is the state’s election authority, that’s not inconsequential.

One problem that we had was media coverage, especially from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The first time they talked about the secretary of state’s race they completely left out Howard even though he was the top name on the ballot. In their second article, they gave Howard the wrong first name, calling him Harold. In the third article, they had him in the wrong office, county clerk instead of circuit clerk.

Even so, up until election day, things seemed pretty good. Quinn was not picking up support in spite of his endorsements. Askew had support but not much from anyone who knew who he was. Judi was
seldom mentioned by voters that various campaigners contacted. It looked possible. My candidate was early in, strongly supported, adequately financed but the wrong sex. Being of the male persuasion in the year of the woman is tough.

Judith K. Moriarty, 50, serving her third term as county clerk of Pettis County (Sedalia), filed at the last moment and began her campaign months later than her opponents. She emphasized her experience in conducting elections. She advocated registration by mail and election-day registration to increase vote participation.

Judi Moriarty was endorsed by former governor Joe Teasdale. Moriarty had campaigned for Teasdale in 1976, then served as a Department of Revenue license fee agent during his administration. Teasdale’s endorsements of Moriarty and of Jim LePage, a candidate for state treasurer who was revenue director in Teasdale’s administration, marked his first participation in politics since his defeat twelve years before, leading to news stories about what had happened to Joe Teasdale.

Jim Kolb, her campaign manager, described the patterns of the Moriarty campaign:

I met Judi originally back in the Teasdale administration when she was a supporter of Governor Joe Teasdale. I worked for four years as an administrative assistant to Governor Teasdale. In the past twelve years, I have been in the insurance business in Jefferson City, and haven’t really been politically involved. I returned to politics as a volunteer campaign manager for Judi Moriarty in both the primary and the general election.

Judi called me two nights before she filed for the primary election and said: “Jim, I’m thinking about filing for secretary of state. What are your thoughts?” I told her that she should do it, if she had a burning desire. She had three things going for her.

First, the three people who had filed were all from St. Louis, and each had enough strength so that they should split the St. Louis vote. Judi had a reasonable chance to be the only out-state candidate, potentially able to attract a good out-state vote and a good Kansas City vote.

Secondly, she was a female, and 1992 held some promise of being the year of the female. I thought that would be worth 7 to 8 percent of the vote. The way it turned out, I think it was probably more than that in the primary.
A third issue was that Judi could argue that she had the best qualifications for secretary of state. She was the only candidate that had election experience. In addition, she had practical business experience, having been manager of a license fee office for four years, maintaining a budget of $3 million.

I was with Judi the day she filed. She was really scared because [State Treasurer] Wendell Bailey was standing in the secretary of state’s office getting ready to do something. The rumor was that Wendell Bailey was going to withdraw as candidate for governor and file for secretary of state, which would have made things a lot more difficult. As it turned out, Wendell withdrew and refiled as governor to take his name from the middle of the pack to the bottom of the ballot. Supposedly, that has some advantage in obtaining votes; if so, Judi had that “advantage,” because her name was last among the secretary of state candidates.

In reality, the fact that Judi filed late was a negative. It hampered her ability to get key endorsements in the primary, and the lack of endorsements hindered her ability to raise money. Howard Wagner had decided two or three years in advance that he was going to run for secretary of state, and he did an excellent job of cultivating support around Missouri. Bob Quinn was a state representative and had locked up the support of most of the state representatives. Both of them had good support from labor. This meant that labor, the state representatives and the county Democratic central committees were already committed. Because of the lack of money and the lack of party endorsements, Judi found it very difficult to get endorsements from the news media. Judi had to get out and find support on her own. She did win endorsements from former governor Joe Teasdale, Senate President Pro Tem Jim Mathewson [a fellow Sedalia resident], state Senator Norman Merrell, U.S. Representative Ike Skelton, and Freedom Inc., a black group in Kansas City.

I was her campaign manager, but most of the campaign decisions were made by Judi. She made a point early in her campaign that she would have a positive campaign, without any negatives. Her opponents—Howard, Bob, and Jim—pursued a positive road as well, which was refreshing to many voters, especially in comparison with other key races.

Through hard work she was able to win the primary. Judi did a lot better on the eastern side of the state than she had anticipated, winning St. Charles County and running second in St. Louis City and in
St. Louis County. We needed those votes because Judi did not win Jackson County as well as we had hoped, getting only 41 percent of the vote. Some people have described Judi’s victory as the “Moriarty Miracle.” We felt that she actually had a good chance to win the race. The miracle was that she won the primary on a budget of $21,000. That may have been a Missouri record for a nonincumbent running for statewide office.

Primary Election Results

In the primary election, each of the four candidates had substantial strength. Moriarty won with 31 percent of the vote; Wagner and Quinn each had 25 percent, and Askew had 19 percent. Howard Wagner won the city of St. Louis and 21 counties, largely in southeastern Missouri, and Bob Quinn won his home county of St. Louis and 13 other counties, mostly in northern Missouri. James Askew won 28 counties, mostly rural except for suburban Clay County. Judi Moriarty led in 51 counties, doing well in western Missouri. Hank Waters, editor of the Columbia Daily Tribune was one of many who admitted he had underestimated her strength; afterward Waters surmised, “In this contest among unknowns, the woman factor might have helped her.”8

The Republican Contest

Four candidates also stepped forward to be the Republican candidate. The past success of young Republican candidates (when first elected to statewide office Christopher Bond and Bill Webster were both 31, John Danforth was 32, and John Ashcroft and Roy Blunt were both 34) encouraged young people and newcomers to file.

Third-term state representative Craig Kilby, 32, of St. Charles County was obviously interested and secured volunteers to sit in line so that he could be first on the Republican ballot. A real estate appraiser, Kilby emphasized the secretary of state’s business service responsibilities. He suggested a small-business advocacy council to review state government regulations, and an easing of restrictions on investment rules for small business. He also advocated election-day voter registration.

Second to file was Richard T. Struckhoff, 40, who was serving his fifth year in Roy Blunt’s old job as county clerk of Greene County (Spring-
Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State Campaigns

Struckhoff had formerly managed United States Senator Jack Danforth’s southwest Missouri office. Like Blunt, Struckhoff emphasized his experience in conducting elections in a large county, as well as his management experience. Struckhoff called for limits on campaign contributions, and imposed a one thousand–dollar limit for contributions to his own campaign. Struckhoff enlivened some political events by playing guitar and singing country and western tunes.

Third to file was Don Parker, 53, serving his second year as auditor of Clay County (Kansas City, North). Parker emphasized his supervisory experience and advocated more computerization of the secretary of state’s office and a reduction in the size of state government.

Last to file, and youngest was 28-year-old John Hancock, serving his second term in the state legislature. Hancock, a political science baccalaureate and doctoral student from the University of Missouri–St. Louis, had been noted in the legislature for his ability to play ragtime piano and for his imitations of Governor Ashcroft. Hancock emphasized legislation he had sponsored to allow children to vote in a mock election on election day. Hancock opposed election-day registration and registration associated with driver’s license applications.

Richard Struckhoff was endorsed by 42 of the 47 GOP county clerks in the state and also by the Kansas City Star because of his experience as an election officer and his support of a presidential preference primary and voting by mail. The Star also spoke of Kilby as a “strong contender.” Craig Kilby was endorsed by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which said he had “the most progressive ideas on expanding voter registration as well as some innovative ideas for modernizing the office and making it an advocate for small business.” Don Parker was endorsed by the Columbia Daily Tribune because of his administrative experience and “wealth of ideas about how to organize and manage the office.” John Hancock, who was ardently pro-life, received strong support from church groups.

Given the comparatively low visibility of the secretary of state’s office and the intense competition at the gubernatorial level, all four candidates had difficulty raising money. In the end, each spent at least $50,000, with Craig Kilby spending the most, $108,000, a comparatively low total for a statewide race.

Christian Hamelman, a full-time engineer for McDonnell Douglas
and a part-time campaign manager for John Hancock, described the primary campaign:

Our overall campaign strategy for both the primary and the general election campaigns was to emphasize that John had a unique combination of both ability and vision. He did not possess experience directly applicable to the secretary of state’s office, but leadership requires ability and vision, which we emphasized.

The battle for the primary is done in the trenches. John officially announced that he was running for secretary of state on December 2, 1991, and began immediately to establish county organizations in predominantly Republican counties. For eight months, he traveled the state, attending functions and meeting people face to face. John wasn’t able to raise campaign funds for a media campaign because potential contributors were consumed by the governor’s race, and because there were four candidates in the secretary of state race. Contributors found it difficult to choose among the four.

Primary Election Results

On election day, John Hancock, who, as Rich Hood said, was “fortunate to have the name of a famous American revolutionary,” easily swept the field, winning 56 percent of the vote. Struckhoff received 24 percent; Kilby received 11 percent, and Parker received 10 percent of the vote. Hancock won every county in the state except Parker’s home county of Clay and Struckhoff’s home county of Greene, both of which were won by Struckhoff.

General Election Contest

Issues

Judi Moriarty continued her advocacy of election-day registration to aid working men and women and people who move and miss registration deadlines. John Hancock opposed the proposal, saying it would be expensive and open to fraud by “making it possible for someone to vote in several polling places or in several counties on the same day.”

Hancock said he would serve as Missouri’s “business ambassador,” which he saw as an appropriate fit since the secretary of state is the
"chief business officer" for Missouri. He saw Missouri as a low-regulation state, but he argued that regulations should be loosened further to allow small businesses to issue securities.

Terry Ganey of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* checked attendance records and found that Hancock had missed most of the meetings of the House Elections Committee and all the meetings of a house appropriations committee to which he was assigned. Hancock said, "I really do regret missing those meetings, the ones that I did miss. . . . I was away from Jefferson City more than I would have liked to have been just because of the campaign schedule."\(^1\) Hancock later charged that Moriarty had failed for some time to remove from the Pettis County voter registration lists the names of 362 dead people, then had finally purged them in September. "She was county clerk for 10 years and didn't do anything to correct this situation. Now, it looks as though she scurried around and cleaned up the mess after she decided to run for secretary of state."\(^2\) Moriarty replied, "What the situation really is, is that we have a young man from St. Louis who's scared he's going to lose this race, and he's grasping at straws."\(^3\)

Endorsements

Hancock picked up the support of Republican Governor John Ashcroft, who agreed to chair the Hancock campaign. He also won the endorsement of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* as "a bright and capable administrator" who had developed "imaginative proposals to streamline and improve the regulatory and archival functions of the office and to operate it more effectively and flexibly."\(^4\) The *Columbia Daily Tribune* also endorsed Hancock "in a close call" after asking, "Who is the best choice: a 28-year-old state legislator with a so-so record in office who is running a very good campaign for the office, has an appealing demeanor and the world's best political name, or a woman of more maturity who has been successfully performing in a nearby county clerk's office and is not nearly as sophisticated in her campaign?"\(^5\) The *St. Joseph News-Press* endorsed Hancock, and the *Kansas City Star* endorsed Moriarty. Both candidates were pro-life and endorsed by Missouri Right to Life.
Financing

Democrat Moriarty continued with a low-budget campaign, spending only $128,000 in the general election contest. Her opponent, Hancock, spent $188,000, with which he managed to get a surprising number of television commercials on the air.

Jim Kolb, campaign manager for Democrat Judi Moriarty, described the general election campaign this way:

Given her small primary campaign budget, Judi Moriarty entered the general election campaign with much less name recognition than she needed. She was facing an opponent who had good name recognition, since John Hancock is a name famous in American history as well as the name of an insurance company which advertises extensively. That is what she had to fight—not her opponent's qualifications but his well-known name.

She decided she would talk about issues, keep the campaign positive and avoid the negatives. For all practical purposes, it was a positive campaign from both sides. John Hancock did come out with a couple of newspaper negatives against Judi. They hurt. We were worried about them, but he did not use that tactic in his TV commercials. Again, I want to compliment him for the fact that he used positive media.

Judi was her own campaign manager. She did what she wanted to do. We wanted her to concentrate on fourteen key counties, which have 80 percent of the vote, but she wanted to campaign in lots of small communities. She enjoyed going to a place like Keytesville, where there were thirty people, stopping there on the way to St. Louis. She had a certain instinct for what the people wanted, which helped her tremendously. We recommended that she do some negative advertising. She said, "No, I don't want to do it." We had some things we felt we needed to get out—the fact that her opponent was twenty-eight years old and lacked the maturity and qualifications for the job—but she said: "No, I don't want to do that. I want to talk about myself and what I'm about and not what he's about."

Judi was able to get key endorsements from the labor community, which helped her substantially. She got endorsements from two newspapers—the Kansas City Star and the Quincy, Illinois, newspaper, which serves northeast Missouri. The St. Louis, Jefferson City, Columbia, Springfield, and Cape Girardeau papers all endorsed her oppo-
Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State Campaigns

Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State Campaigns

Christian Hamelman, campaign manager for Republican John Hancock, described the Hancock campaign this way:

The battle for the general election is fought on the airwaves. Our campaign had three months to reach a whole new arena of voters, forcing us to launch an aggressive television and radio campaign. Because that requires a lot more money, John spent the first two months of the general election campaign raising money. Another major task was to blend our primary organization with the Republican organization. A third major effort was to get widespread exposure by attending events especially the more popular events like the State Fair in Sedalia.

Our strengths in the campaign were the charisma of both John and his wife, Georgann, their speaking abilities and their public-appearance skills. We utilized those strengths to their maximum potential. Even more important was John's in-depth understanding of the issues related to the secretary of state's office. A third strength was an extremely committed and ambitious volunteer organization. Finally, we had a very creative campaign group, willing to try new ideas, to do whatever we thought it would take to get votes.

Our principal weakness was limited staff resources. The campaign consultant and I had other full-time jobs, which reduced the amount of time we had available for campaign work. After the primary election, we did hire two recent college graduates. A second problem was the difficulty in getting media attention, because the office doesn't attract a whole lot of attention, especially in comparison to the races for governor and attorney general.

The last weakness, which we just weren't able to overcome, was the rising tide of straight party voters for the Democratic ticket. I do have to agree with Mr. Kolb that the organizations of Clinton and Car-
nahan helped very much. We just weren't able to overcome that, though we came closer than any other Republican statewide candidate.

One other point, we also were very pleased that it was a very positive campaign both through the primary and the general.

**General Election Results**

Vote results in the election were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judi Moriarty, Democrat</td>
<td>1,140,424</td>
<td>49 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hancock, Republican</td>
<td>1,107,701</td>
<td>48 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Harris, Libertarian</td>
<td>59,353</td>
<td>3 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moriarty's victory was managed with a 105,000-vote margin in the Kansas City–St. Joseph area and a 60,000-vote lead in St. Louis city. In addition, Moriarty held Hancock to a lead of only 36,000 votes in his home county of St. Louis and the adjoining county of St. Charles.
Congressional Races

Horn did her part, having an outstanding first term, but the campaign fell just short in convincing a majority to return her to office. Ultimately, most Republicans and Republican-leaning independents “stayed home” and supported Jim Talent.

—Terry Jones, pollster for defeated congresswoman Joan Kelly Horn

In 1990 every Missouri congressman had seen his margin of victory fall from 1988. Jack Buechner lost his seat; Tom Coleman and Mel Hancock barely held on to theirs; and even Richard Gephardt received only 57 percent of the vote. In the subsequent two years, the public’s confidence in Congress seemed to decline further. No wonder that incumbents were concerned in 1992 and that challengers were lining up three deep. In the end, two incumbents—Tom Coleman and Joan Kelly Horn—lost their seats in 1992 and Harold Volkmer barely held on to his.

Redistricting had the potential to create further insecurity for incumbents. In 1990, however, the incumbent congressmen had met and outlined districts for themselves that were at least as safe as, if not safer than, their 1990 districts. In 1991 the legislature adopted and the governor signed a redistricting plan fairly similar to that outlined by the con-
gressmen. In the second district however, the 1990 incumbent had been beaten, and the new congresswoman, Democrat Joan Kelly Horn, was given a district much like her predecessor had wanted, a district that was even more Republican than the old district. Otherwise, redistricting provided no problems for incumbents.

Three congressmen—Republican Bill Emerson and Democrats William Clay and Ike Skelton—had little concern in 1992. Each received only token opposition (though every congressman worries that seemingly token opposition might become serious, especially in a year like 1992). Democrats in Emerson's district searched for an opponent, but state senator Danny Staples decided not to run after having breakfast with Emerson, and state representative Joe Driskill opted for an unopposed reelection to the state house of representatives. Later Driskill was appointed director of the Missouri Department of Economic Development.

*Alan Wheat.* Kansas City congressman Alan Wheat, saddled with ninety-six “problem checks” at the House banking facility and primary opposition from Fred Arbanas, former Kansas City Chiefs football player and twenty-year member of the Jackson County Legislature, hired fund-raising consultants and raised a war chest of $240,000. Arbanas started with no funds, but some unwanted opportunities: “I've gotten phone calls from so many special interests you wouldn't believe. They’re all saying, in essence, ‘if you think the way we think, we have PACs that can help you out.’ This has really turned me off.” In the end, Wheat received 58 percent of the primary vote, and Arbanas received 38 percent.

*Richard Gephardt.* A fifth Congressman, Richard Gephardt, was faced with the same opponent as in 1990, Mack Holekamp, who had reduced Gephardt’s vote to 57 percent with only $83,000 in expenditures. Potential problems were indicated early when the House Republican Campaign Committee put $11,000 to $15,000 into St. Louis radio ads about Gephardt’s bounced checks, retaliating for ads the Democrats had run against Republican Whip Newt Gingrich in Georgia. Gephardt took no chances; he walked door to door in the district, and raised and spent $3.3 million, the second most costly congressional campaign in the country. The money, more than seven times the $426,000 that Holekamp spent, had its impact, and his vote went back to a much more comfortable 64 percent. Gephardt also established a state PAC, the Missouri
Table 7-1. Congressional Candidates in General Election and Votes Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158,693</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>William &quot;Bill&quot; Clay, (D)</td>
<td>24-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74,482</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Arthur S. Montgomery, (R)</td>
<td>investment specialist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157,594</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Jim Talent, (R)</td>
<td>Minority floor leader, Missouri House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148,729</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>Joan Kelly Horn, (D)</td>
<td>2-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,119</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Jim Higgins (Libertarian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Richard Gephardt, (D)</td>
<td>16-year incumbent; majority floor leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90,006</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Mack Holekamp, (R)</td>
<td>Republican candidate in 1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,828</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Robert Stockhausen (Libertarian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fourth District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176,977</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Ike Skelton, (D)</td>
<td>16-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74,475</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>John Carley (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fifth District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>151,014</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>Alan Wheat, (D)</td>
<td>10-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93,562</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Edward “Gomer” Moody, (R)</td>
<td>businessman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,107</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Tom Danaher (Greens)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,629</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Grant Stauffer (Libertarian)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sixth District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148,887</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>Pat “Patsy Ann” Danner, (D)</td>
<td>10-year state senator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119,637</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>Tom Coleman, (R)</td>
<td>14-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seventh District</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>160,303</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>Mel Hancock, (R)</td>
<td>4-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99,762</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Pat Deaton, (D)</td>
<td>attorney, 1990 nominee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eighth District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147,398</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Bill Emerson (R), 12 year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86,730</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Thad Bullock, (D)</td>
<td>retired businessman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ninth District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124,694</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>Harold Volkmer, (D)</td>
<td>16-year incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118,811</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>Rick Hardy, (R)</td>
<td>University of Missouri political science professor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,565</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Jeff Barrow (Greens)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,265</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Duane Neil Burghard (Independent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effective Government Committee, which contributed $24,500 to treasurer candidate Bob Holden,$16,000 to lieutenant governor candidate Roger Wilson, and $20,500 to other statewide Democratic candidates. In addition, Gephardt’s federal PAC, which in 1991 received $5,000 from Ross Perot, distributed about $600,000 to congressional candidates across the country.

The remaining four districts—the second in suburban St. Louis, the sixth in northwest Missouri, the seventh in southwest Missouri, and the ninth in northeast Missouri—looked like they would provide very competitive races, given the problems of the incumbents and the strength of the challengers. Campaign managers for the leading candidates in each district were invited to the symposium. Their comments, abstracted in this chapter, were presented in two different panels, one chaired by Jo Mannies, political reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the other chaired by Robert Edwards, political reporter for the Springfield News-Leader.

Second Congressional District

The Second Congressional District is largely the outer suburbs of St. Louis, parts of St. Louis and St. Charles Counties. Its citizens have high levels of wealth and education, and the district normally votes Republican. Averaging 65 percent Republican in recent years, the district is now the most strongly Republican in the state.

Despite Republican dominance of the district, Republican congressman Jack Buechner—beset by problems of overutilization of congressional perks—lost in 1990 to Joan Kelly Horn by fifty-four votes. Horn’s chief weapon was a humorous last-minute television commercial that showed pigs at a trough and discussed Buechner’s abuse of congressional privileges.

The Republican Primary

Obviously Horn’s reelection seemed doubtful, and four Republicans stepped forward to challenge her. At first the most formidable appeared
Table 7-2. Candidates in the Second District Primary and Votes Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Joan Kelly Horn, first-term incumbent</td>
<td>50,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Susan Johnson, Lyndon LaRouche supporter</td>
<td>12,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>James M. Talent, lawyer, minority floor leader, Missouri House</td>
<td>35,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Bert Walker, businessman, cousin of President Bush</td>
<td>19,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Tom McCoy, business instructor at Webster University</td>
<td>4,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Hugh V. Murray, fourth time candidacy</td>
<td>1,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50,882 Joan Kelly Horn, first-term incumbent
12,760 Susan Johnson, Lyndon LaRouche supporter

Republican
35,791 James M. Talent, lawyer, minority floor leader, Missouri House
19,555 Bert Walker, businessman, cousin of President Bush
4,322 Tom McCoy, business instructor at Webster University
1,915 Hugh V. Murray, fourth time candidacy

To be businessman and civic leader George Herbert "Bert" Walker III, cousin to President George Herbert Walker Bush. Although Walker raised and spent $745,000, he lost the primary, his first campaign, by a wide margin. His campaign was described by Karen Czernell, his campaign coordinator:

The basic strategy was first, to garner support from various conservative groups and second, to raise early money to discourage other people from getting into the race. The early assumption was that Bert's campaign would be able to raise enough money to dominate the "ads war" in the primary, if there was a contest. Much of the strategy was directed toward the general election contest against Joan Horn. For example, the consultant who was hired had managed a successful campaign against a congresswoman in Colorado.

The entry of Jim Talent, the house minority leader, into the race forced us to develop a grass-roots structure to counter his popularity in west central St. Louis County, a popularity built up by his four terms in the legislature. We then brought on a field director and built an organization, put up yard signs and all of that.

Bert Walker is a wonderful man who saw himself as citizen legislator, not a politician. That was a strength and a great asset in a year in which the public didn't want politicians. But it was hard to get people to see him as an outsider, a citizen legislator, when he was a cousin of the president, and he had close friends in the cabinet and top levels of government. Bert had all these friends who wanted to come to St. Louis to help. We realized that it was a problem, but Bert found it difficult to turn down old friends, now in top places, who wanted to
help him. Bert talked about citizen issues—term limitations and congressional reform—but his talks weren’t moving the voters.

One of our problems was that Bert was identified with the president, and the president’s popularity began to plummet. Bert never wanted to disassociate himself from the president. It was a very loyal family, and they were all pulling for George Bush. Some people said we should not have used Walker’s voice in the radio ads because he sounded so much like the president. It was difficult to say, “Bert, you can’t speak for yourself because you sound like the president.” His response was, “Well, I don’t care. I want to be me.” And, he was. Another problem was that a lot of St. Louis County voters wanted to take Democratic ballots because of Vince Schoemehl being in the race, frankly.

In the end, we got 32 percent, and Jim Talent got 58 percent. One consolation, when you lose by that kind of margin, you don’t lose sleep about what you might have done, what fine tuning you missed.

Jim Talent Primary Campaign

The primary campaign for Jim Talent, minority leader of the Missouri House of Representatives was described by Steve Boriss, media director for the campaign:

Jim Talent’s congressional race was the first political marketing assignment that I had ever handled. In some ways this was a disadvantage, competing against people who have done it before. In many other ways, though, I think my newness in this game helped. My previous experience was mostly in the marketing and advertising of products sold through grocery and drug stores. I began my career at Proctor & Gamble attempting to get more people to buy things like Crisco, Pringle’s, and Duncan Hines cake mixes.

Selling a candidate didn’t prove to be a whole lot different. Whether you are creating advertising for cooking oil or for a congressman, you begin by determining the handful of things that are most persuasive to people, that make them buy your product, or in this case, vote for your candidate. Then you say these things over and over, up to the point that people stop listening. The most important thing is finding those persuasive words.

Our first race, the Republican primary, was against Bert Walker, a civic leader and a respected businessman. From a marketer’s perspective, this race was a nightmare. The mother’s milk of politics is money,
and Bert Walker owned all the cows. Perhaps it was my imagination, but he appeared to be a golfing buddy with every top business leader and person of extraordinary wealth in St. Louis and in Washington, D.C. He was able to line up people like former chief of staff John Sununu, Labor Secretary Lynn Martin, and the president's oldest son to headline fund-raisers. If the race had gone one week longer, I'm certain we'd have seen Millie the Dog.

Even more frustrating for me was the fact that the views of Jim Talent and Bert Walker were indistinguishable. Both were conservative; both believed that the budget deficit was the nation's biggest problem; and both wanted to spur job creation by ending the government's adversarial relationship with business.

Nevertheless, the job of the marketer is to work with what you've got. Jim Talent had been in the Missouri legislature for eight years, serving four years as house minority leader. He had worked hard to bring tax relief for families and reduce wasteful spending. Despite his party's minority status, he accomplished some impressive things. He was young, only thirty-five years old, articulate, and sincere.

We decided to try to win the primary by finessing Bert Walker. We would not compare ourselves directly to Bert Walker. Instead we would position Jim as someone who fights for the middle class, a relevant message in a district where so many members of the middle class are struggling and believe that the government has let them down. This was a positioning that would put Mr. Walker into a box. He could not credibly present himself as someone who had shown great interest in the middle class through his life. We suspected that he would go with his strengths and highlight his achievements as a civic leader, and in the process, implicitly communicate that he was just another rich guy who did the type of social, community-oriented things that rich people do. That's exactly what he did. In my opinion, that is why he lost.

**The General Election Campaign**

In the general election campaign, both Congresswoman Horn and State Representative Talent raised and spent large sums. Including the primary campaigns, Talent spent $917,000, and Horn spent $833,000, the second and third most expensive congressional campaigns in the state after Gephardt's. Talent won the general election, beating Horn by 3 percentage points.
Terry Jones, pollster for the campaign, and husband of Joan Kelly Horn, was unable to attend the symposium but submitted later the following description of the campaign:

The setting. Preparation for Joan Kelly Horn's 1992 reelection campaign began soon after the final recount in December 1990 declared her the victor. Retaining the seat would be a major challenge. First, Horn won by only fifty-four votes in an off-year election. The 1992 contest would include over one hundred thousand voters who had not cast a ballot in 1990. For them, 1992 would be more like an open seat election.

Second, the district was becoming more Republican. Population was growing in Republican-leaning areas like west St. Louis County and St. Charles County and declining in the more Democratic segments in northwest St. Louis County. Even in 1990, the normal Republican vote was at least 55 percent.

Third, reapportionment would make the district even more Republican. There was no politically realistic way to strengthen the district's Democratic base, and all that could be accomplished was to minimize the damage. The final redrawing made the district about 2 percentage points more Republican.

Fourth, much of Horn's 1990 support was a vote against her opponent's excesses (e.g., pay raise, honoraria) and not a vote for her positives. It was unlikely there would be as much negatively based support in 1992.

Fifth, Republicans knew all of the above. They would have no difficulty recruiting one or more strong challengers and no problem raising more than enough funds for the campaign.

The strategy. The overriding strategy was for Joan Kelly Horn to do an excellent job as congresswoman, both in representative style and as legislative actor, communicate that performance to the electorate, and trust that enough voters would overcome their traditional party leanings to reelect her in 1992.

Horn did her part, having an outstanding first term, but the campaign fell just short in convincing a majority to return her to office. Ultimately, most Republicans and Republican-leaning independents "stayed home" and supported Jim Talent.

Here are the points the Horn campaign stressed:
(1) Joan had the most empathy with the middle class. She had been a single parent, raised six children while finishing her baccalaureate education and completing a master's degree, started three successful businesses, and implemented public programs in energy conservation and housing improvement. Like the typical voter, she too worried about her ten grandchildren's future and was working to ensure a better world for them.

(2) When it came to reforming the legislature, Joan was part of the solution and not part of the problem. She had donated her pay raise to charitable causes, she had returned to the district every weekend, she had held scores of public meetings, she had a 99.8 percent voting attendance record. In short, she was less of an incumbent than her opponent.

(3) Joan had begun to establish an impressive legislative record. She had helped shape and pass programs to find civilian applications for defense-based research and technology, she had fought successfully on behalf of St. Louis infrastructure projects, she had helped protect the rights and jobs of TWA employees, and she had helped retain defense contracts within the region.

(4) Joan was a centrist on economic issues and a progressive on social matters. She had voted to cut federal spending on items ranging from executive travel to foreign aid to the space station and supported a balanced budget amendment that would eliminate the deficit without placing an unfair burden on the elderly. She fought for legislation like the Family and Medical Leave Act that would address the needs of the families of the 1990s. She opposed government intrusion into private decisions like abortion.

To deliver these messages, the campaign determined that it would need to spend at least $300,000 for electronic media and $100,000 for direct mail. By the end, closer to $400,000 was devoted to television and radio and about $150,000 to mail.

What happened and why? By one standard, exceeding the expected two-party share of 42 percent for a Democratic candidate in the second district, the Horn campaign succeeded. Her final share of the two-party vote was almost six points higher. By the most important criterion, of course, the campaign failed. Jim Talent won.

Why? The biggest single reason is that Talent convinced most of the Republicans and independents leaning Republican to stick with him. To win, the Horn campaign assumed it would need to attract about 30 percent support from this segment. Through mid-October, according
to internal polling, enough of this group was staying on the fence to give Horn hope for achieving this goal. But then in the last two weeks of October most fell onto the Talent side and, in the end, only about 20 percent voted for Horn.

Although at least one-third of Republicans were not in agreement with Talent's views on such social issues as freedom of choice and gun control, he adroitly avoided much discussion of his social agenda and worked vigorously and effectively to focus the campaign on which candidate would be the most fiscally conservative. When the question is structured this way, any Democratic candidate faces a tough time with traditionally Republican voters, and Talent capitalized on this fact. The result was a narrow victory for the Republican candidate in what is now a noticeably Republican district.

Jim Talent Campaign

Steve Boriss, media director for the Jim Talent campaign, described the general election efforts:

In the general election, our race was against Joan Kelly Horn. The post-election conventional wisdom would have you believe that defeating Joan Kelly Horn was easy because this was a Republican-leaning district and it had been redistricted to make it even more Republican. That conventional wisdom is wrong. Eight weeks before the election, our poll showed that we were behind by twenty-one points, including a two-to-one deficit in St. Charles County. When we asked people on a generic basis whether they would be more likely to vote for a Democrat or a Republican for Congress, the Democrat won by a substantial margin.

And consider the tide that we were swimming against on election night. Our opponent was a Democrat on a night when virtually every Republican on the ballot in our district lost. We were running against a woman in the year of the woman. We were running against an incumbent, moreover an incumbent who was untouched by scandal.

Our research showed that Joan Kelly Horn was vulnerable. The core of her strength were people who felt she should be given more of a chance to prove her worth. Yet, there were things people didn't know about her record that, when told, they did not like. She opposed term limits. In an incredible act of politics, she reversed herself and voted against a balanced budget amendment that she had cosponsored, causing it to fail by nine votes. Joan also voted against the Persian Gulf
War, which not only ran counter to popular opinion, but also concerned the many workers in defense-related jobs in our area. When we focused on her voting record, we were pointing out to people that she had had her chance. We kept talking about the balanced budget amendment, term limits, the Persian Gulf War. This is the reason that we won.

We did have one scare in our campaign. Joan Horn did run effective advertising against us saying that Jim Talent had missed hundreds of votes as a legislator. The ad included an odometer toting up hundreds of votes. We put together a response designed to both answer that issue and to protect us from future attacks. Our ad reminded viewers that Joan Kelly Horn was the candidate who, two years earlier, had run a nasty ad showing pigs in mud. "Now she's at it again." Jim then explained that the reason for missing votes was that he was house minority leader, and his duties, such as meeting with senate leaders and the governor, took him off the house floor. Even so he still cast 94 percent of the more than six thousand votes. The ad seemed to do the trick within two or three days. Political marketing is amazing to me because one ad can have such an impact so fast.

Sixth Congressional District

In the Sixth Congressional District, seven-term Republican congressman Tom Coleman barely won reelection in 1990 against an unknown farmer who conducted a very limited campaign. That narrow margin obviously raised questions about whether Coleman, ranking member on the House Agriculture Committee and ranking member of the Postsecondary Education Subcommittee could and would mend fences in a hurry. An indication of Coleman's problems came when he sent a districtwide mailing trumpeting the news that he had not bounced any checks at the House bank. Newspaper articles and comment focused on the substantial expense that Coleman had foisted on the public in an obvious campaign ploy. Later stories reported that Coleman spent the most money on his House office of any congressman from either Missouri or Kansas, and the third-highest amount per district household for mailings among all 435 House members. Even given his problems, Coleman escaped without a primary challenger.

State Representative Sandra Reeves indicated immediately after the
Table 7-3. Candidates in the Sixth District Primary and Votes Received

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43,821</td>
<td>Pat &quot;Patsy Ann&quot; Danner, state senator</td>
<td>Tom Coleman, 16-year incumbent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,842</td>
<td>Sandra Lee Reeves, state representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,795</td>
<td>John J. Kauffman, state representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,671</td>
<td>John Gallagher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>Jeff Bailey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>Gene Simmons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>Don Pine</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>Ed O’Herin</td>
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<td><strong>Democratic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
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<td>Ed O’Herin</td>
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1990 election her intention to challenge Coleman in 1992. Her leadership in the statehouse and her excellent record of representation of her district made her a leading candidate and a formidable challenger. Reeves won the endorsement of the *Kansas City Star*.

Late in the filing period, State Senator Pat Danner, who had considered running for secretary of state, filed for Congress. Danner had served as district representative for Congressman Jerry Litton, and she had run for Litton’s congressional post when Litton ran for the Senate in 1976. Danner, however, lost the nomination to a transplanted Texas millionaire who was later unmasked as a fraud. Danner had served in a subcabinet position in Jimmy Carter's administration, then been elected to the state senate in 1982. In the 1992 primary, Danner won with 52 percent of the vote in an eight-person field.

**Sandra Reeves Primary Campaign**

The unsuccessful campaign by Sandra Reeves was described by her campaign manager, Guylene Little:

Sandra Reeves had been elected to the legislature seven times, representing Clay County, a highly populated county in a metropolitan area. She had been known as the representative of the "little people," one of the type of representatives that answered every phone call,
every message that she got. Everyone in Clay County loved Sandra. I left my job as broker-manager in a real estate firm and joined Sandra in this race.

We made a trip to Washington, D.C., in November 1990 to talk with local congressmen and the various PAC groups. All of the groups, including the women's groups, said that money, money, money is the name of the game. Emily's List, a women's group, told us that we needed to have $80,000 in the bank by the time we came back in 1991. We went back to Kansas City hoping to raise that kind of money. As it turned out, when we filed our first reports, Sandra had raised $20,000 and loaned herself $10,000 for a total of $30,000, a long ways from $80,000, and an indication of our potential problem.

By starting early, Sandra hoped to be the only viable Democratic candidate in the primary. She developed a strategy through the general election, focusing on her strengths as compared with Tom Coleman. As soon as filing opened, however, Sandra had competition. The first person to file was John Kauffman, a first-term legislator from a rural area, a candidate who could provide some, but not extensive, competition. Toward the end of February, we began to hear rumblings that one of the Danners was going to file for this office. Pat Danner and her son Steve were both state senators; between them they represented 20 of the 27 counties in the Sixth Congressional District, so that either Danner would have had substantially higher name recognition than Sandra had. In November, Sandra had approached the Danners and asked if they were considering filing for this office. They both assured her that they were not going to file for this race. But in March, Pat Danner did file. Our media consultant from Washington, D.C., told us that we would lose this primary if we did not go on the attack. He said that it wasn't a matter of being negative but a matter of using facts.

When Senator Danner filed, she immediately did a poll, which showed that she had 42 percent support and Sandra Reeves had 7 percent, a huge disparity. She used that poll and her senate position to help her raise money, and to dry up our chances of receiving money. We decided that we would spend the small amount of money we had for a poll. It showed similar results, Pat Danner with 49 percent name recognition and Sandra Reeves with 5 percent. As if the gap weren't big enough, on the first of July, billboards with Pat Danner's name just dropped out of heaven all over the district. Every mile, you would see another billboard with Pat Danner's name.

We tried to gain some ground by pointing out issue differences,
particularly noting that Sandra was the only pro-choice candidate in the race. Pat Danner did not address the issues. Her name was already known, and she didn’t need to say anything. In candidate forums, Senator Danner would always stand up and say, “I’ve always been taught that when I speak, to be brief, to be sincere, and be seated. Now, I’ve been brief, I’ve been sincere, and I’m being seated.” Sandra would get up and talk about her platform, how she believed in changing health care and all this. We did what we thought was the right thing.

We got support from the Missouri National Education Association, which was angry with Danner’s vote against collective bargaining, some labor groups, and the Sierra Club. However Danner got support from NRA, though she had voted against their handgun bill, and Sandra had voted for it. Their mailing and monetary support were very helpful to Danner.

Sandra carried Clay County, her home, two to one, split evenly in adjoining Platte County, and lost every other county. The big disappointment was Buchanan County [St. Joseph], which we lost more than three to one. We ran television ads and put a lot of our effort there, but Danner had too much name recognition. Though Buchanan County was not in Danner’s district, she had used their newspaper and television to reach her own constituents for the past ten years.

Sandra did support Pat Danner for the general election. Sandra upheld the Democratic party and is hopeful that she will be able to run for some other position in the future.

**Pat Danner Primary Campaign**

Doug Gray, campaign manager for Pat Danner, described the primary campaign in a statement submitted after the symposium:

People were urging Pat to run for an office in 1992. She had two years left in her four-year senate term so that she would still have an office if she lost. There were statewide offices that people mentioned and that interested her. Ultimately she decided on the congressional race. She was considering a lot of things—redistricting in the state senate districts, family considerations, and the constant commuting from Washington.

In the primary we ran a very positive campaign. We were always perceived as the front-runner, so we were the target of the other seven candidates. Pat Danner was known in a large part of the area, having
been district assistant to Congressman Jerry Litton, who is still a hero to many northwest Missouri people, having served ten years in the state senate, and having a son in the state senate. We were able to focus on building Danner’s name identification in the areas that she did not represent, especially the Kansas City area. We spent a lot of time on her background, and what she had done in the state senate to make people’s lives better. Labor groups split their endorsements between Reeves and Danner.

The General Election Campaign

In the general election campaign, Coleman urged voters to compare the legislative records of the two candidates, arguing that Danner had been far less effective in the state senate than he had been in Congress. Danner focused on Coleman’s travel expenses, honoraria, and pay raise. She received help from the National Rifle Association’s political action committee, which ran ads denouncing Coleman. The committee had independent expenditures of more than $25,000 against Coleman, who had sponsored and voted for the Brady Bill, which would have imposed a waiting period on buying handguns. She also reported that her position on abortion had evolved to the point that she would now support the Freedom of Choice Act if elected to Congress. “If no one changed their mind, no one would get divorced,” said Danner, who has been divorced twice from the same man.” Coleman received the support of the Farm Bureau, and Danner responded with formation of a Farmers for Pat Danner Steering Committee, pointing out that she and her husband owned farms in three different counties in Missouri. Danner won the endorsement of the St. Joseph News-Press.

Coleman spent $533,000, of which 64 percent came from political action committees. Danner spent $483,000 (of which 38 percent came from political action committees) and had a net debt of about $71,000. Danner won the general election with 55 percent of the vote.

Danner Campaign

Doug Gray, former campaign worker for Richard Gephardt and campaign manager for Pat Danner was unable to attend the symposium but later gave a telephone interview from which this statement is taken.
Congressman Coleman Works for Cash, NOT For You

Thomas Coleman used to take advantage of his "special" status as a congressman by traveling the country and lining his pockets with cash—honoraria for speaking engagements. He made almost an extra $25,000 a year. In fact, from 1987-1990, your congressman pocketed over $100,000 from 84 different speaking appearances.

In 1990, accepting honoraria was banned unless the money was donated to charity. Interestingly, Coleman has only given two speeches since then. It seems he doesn’t have the time to speak unless he can make a quick buck.

Don’t settle for a get-rich congressman. Vote for someone who’ll get to work—for Missouri and you.

Fire Congressman Coleman November 3

VOTE PAT DANNER.

Paid for by NRA-PVF and not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee.

Tom Coleman was in trouble because he lost touch with the people. He became a Washingtonian who wasn’t back in the district enough. People were complaining that they didn’t get responses, didn’t get phone calls returned, didn’t get letters answered. He wasn’t paying attention to the things that people care about.

Our first poll after the primary showed that Danner’s name identification shot up almost 20 points, and we were only 12 points down in the two candidate comparisons. We slowly made progress. About forty days before the election we received the first poll showing us in the lead by 5 percentage points. We held that lead throughout the rest of
the campaign. It was a scary feeling to have gone into the lead that far ahead of the election.

I was the campaign manager, the only paid staff person. Everyone else was a volunteer. We had four full-time volunteers; many of their weeks were seventy or eighty or ninety hours long. We had a lot of other volunteers, and a good grass-roots organization throughout the twenty-seven counties. Our pollster was Cooper and Secrest of Virginia, and our media consultant was Politics Inc. from Washington.

We had a good media campaign, which was so important. Coleman started about two weeks before we did, using some negative ads. Our introductory piece emphasized what Danner had done and discussed her plans for the future. Later we had comparisons on issues, which became more intense. We drew a contrast between the philosophy of Congressman Coleman and what Pat Danner had done in the state senate. There was a lot of comparison to outline the ideas that she had. At the end, everyone was advertising heavily. People were seeing so many commercials, especially negative commercials, that they tuned them out. Early spots had more effect than late ones.

We spent $100,000 in the primary, and $300,000 in the general for a total of about $400,000. We raised about $320,000, leaving us about $80,000 in debt. About 60 percent of our money came from individuals rather than PACs or interest groups. We had a lot of fund-raisers, a lot of networks.

**Seventh Congressional District**

The Seventh Congressional District in southwest Missouri has always elected Republicans, except in the late 1950s, when an intra-party split allowed a Democrat to win two terms. The staunchly conservative district has expected its congressmen not to bring home the bacon but rather to resist and reduce government activity. Thus it was not surprising in 1988 when an open-seat contest produced as the new congressman Mel Hancock, who had gained statewide recognition as the author and sponsor of a tax-limitation amendment.

That Hancock won by only 53 percent in 1988 was not surprising since it was his first term and his opponent was a popular and conservative local judge. But in 1990 Hancock won with only 52 percent of the vote against a relatively unknown candidate, Pat Deaton, reminding
**Table 7-4.** Candidates in the Seventh District Primary and Votes Received

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate Name</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic</strong></td>
<td>Thomas Patrick “Pat” Deaton, lawyer, 1990 candidate</td>
<td>20,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doug Harpool, state representative</td>
<td>15,629</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gary Hamlin</td>
<td>1,764</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William “Bill” Jacobs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill Rosen</td>
<td>1,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodney J. “Rod” Roberson</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
<td>Melton D. “Mel” Hancock, two-term incumbent</td>
<td>66,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ron Houseman, Taney County clerk</td>
<td>13,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stephen Keith Pennington</td>
<td>6,304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

potential opponents that Hancock had previously lost statewide contests for U.S. Senator and lieutenant governor. Deaton had spent $103,000, compared to Hancock’s $182,000. Was the district changing because of the increasing number of recent migrants to the area, people attracted by the scenery, climate, low taxes, retirement communities, and tourist attractions, including Branson, the nation’s new country music center?

**The Democratic Primary**

Pat Deaton was encouraged by his close race and began preparing immediately for a rematch in 1992. In March of 1992 he received strong primary opposition when state legislator Doug Harpool switched from the race for attorney general to the race for Congress. In addition, four other Democrats also filed for Congress. Pat Deaton took 50 percent of the vote in the six-candidate Democratic primary, with Doug Harpool second with 38 percent. A distant third was Gary Hamlin, an osteopathic physician who had said “I believe it’s going to require a doctor to cure what ails America.” His bumper sticker read “Another Lawyer? Not!”

At the very bottom of the Democratic vote list was Rod Roberson, a self-employed illustrator who was ordered to seek psychological counseling after harassing the police department with calls. Roberson, ob-
sessed with what he saw as a conspiracy by his former wife and public officials to keep his young daughter from him, said in a prepared statement after his trial, "It is sadly apparent that on this Good Friday, we again reflect back upon a man who was falsely accused, unfairly tried and maliciously sentenced to death. Today, each of us should think back upon the last request he made, 'Forgive them, Father, for they know not what they do.'" He also said he would continue his campaign for the nomination.\(^6\)

Doug Harpool Primary Campaign

Sandy Crews, campaign manager for Doug Harpool, described the efforts to win the primary election:

It was March before Doug Harpool entered the Seventh Congressional District race. That obviously gave him a late start, since Pat Deaton had run in 1990 and had long since been working on the 1992 campaign. A further indication of the lateness of our campaign was that it was June 1 when I quit a nice job at Southwest Missouri State University to work as Doug Harpool's campaign manager.

Doug was encouraged by a poll indicating he had high name recognition and could defeat Hancock. Our media started with a biographical ad during the Democratic National Convention [July], designed to catch the attention of Democrats who would be watching the convention. Soon after that, we came under a heavy attack with negative advertising so we had to shift immediately to defense ads. We also did some radio advertising.

We had a strong grass-roots campaign. We had about fifteen thousand Democrats identified, using a sophisticated computer database. We mailed about forty thousand pieces of literature, all through volunteer efforts. We did literature drops, distributing another ten thousand pieces door to door. We had county coordinators in every county. We attended all sorts of events, including fairs and parades. We had typical yard signs and larger signs.

Our basic strategy was to avoid dividing Democrats, assuming that no Democrat could win such a heavily Republican district if his own party was divided. Based on that premise, we felt we could not run a negative campaign. We could not afford to alienate any Democratic voters. That's basically what happened to Mr. Deaton. He ran a cam-
campaign that won the primary but divided the Democratic party and guaranteed his loss in November.

Because we were very cautious in our response ads, we lost the primary, which means that we were totally out of it in November. Probably we should have been more aggressive in our responses, using something more like the "big lie" technique because we had mounds and mounds of evidence. One reason we were cautious was because a lot of people had considered the race to be Pat Deaton's since he filed first. We didn't believe that. We thought Doug was a better candidate.

Doug was angry about the lies that Pat Deaton told in the primary campaign and did not endorse him in the general election. About the middle of July, Doug talked with Pat and told him that if he continued on this path, he would ruin any chance that either of them might have of winning in November: "If you do this, my people will not support you." Even so, Pat ran the ads.

Concerning endorsements, we were endorsed by NEA, Voters for Choice, Missouri Medical Association, UAW and the Springfield News Leader.

We needed a real strong turnout in Springfield, where Doug had good name recognition, and lower turnout in the surrounding areas. Another possible group of supporters was independent voters, but many of them took a Republican ballot as opposed to a Democratic ballot so they could vote in the Blunt-Webster race. Both of those individuals were from southwest Missouri so there was a lot of interest in that race.

One disappointment that I had is that KY3-TV, a local television station, did not develop its "Ad Watch" program until after the primary. I wish that that had been in place during the primary, because many of the ads run against us were purely false.

The Republican Primary

Congressman Hancock easily won the Republican primary with 77 percent of the vote, his nearest competitor being Ron Houseman, county clerk of Taney County.

Ron Houseman Primary Campaign

Campaign manager Jim Maupin described the campaign efforts of Houseman:
Mel Hancock had announced that he was only going to run for one more term. Since Ron Houseman, county clerk in Taney County, wanted to position himself for the 1994 race, we decided it would be a good time to run for Congress, knowing that we were going against a strong incumbent who would have ten to twenty times as much money as we had. The idea was to get out and get ourselves some name recognition. We couldn’t go out and say that was what we were doing—that would have shot us out real quick. We tried to approach the Republican party itself as much as possible. Ron argued that Mel Hancock didn’t have much influence in Congress because he was too combative and had too much of a tendency to say no to everything.

The money-raising efforts in the district were real tough with three gubernatorial candidates pulling so much money out of the district. As a result, we had no radio or television ads. We did some newspaper ads and a bio. We felt that we presented ourselves very credibly during the televised debate. We ended up with almost exactly what we had expected—tremendous name recognition, and the endorsement from the *Springfield News-Leader*.

**Mel Hancock Primary Campaign**

Campaign manager Dan Wadlington described the primary election campaign: “We went into the primary expecting to be attacked, but there was no attack. There were no opposing radio or television ads. We ran a modest generic radio and television campaign. I think the entire primary cost us $80,000.”

**The General Election Campaign**

Congressman Hancock was well prepared for the general election, having spent part of 1991 raising money in “down home” style, inviting small groups of PAC officials to breakfasts of eggs and biscuits and gravy prepared by his wife. The result was $230,000 in the bank at the start of 1992, far more than the $8,400 that Deaton had at that time. Hancock hired Brockmire and Associates of Baltimore for political advertising and Public Opinion Strategies of Alexandria, Virginia, for public opinion surveys.

The two candidates met twice in debates, sparring over taxes, government expenditures, and free trade with Mexico. Environmental Action,
a Washington-based lobbying group included Hancock on its "dirty dozen" list of legislators with a poor voting record on environmental issues and, thus, made the environment a campaign topic.

Deaton Campaign

Sloane Simmons of Simmons and Company, the Kansas City consulting firm that managed the Deaton campaign, was unable to attend the symposium but later provided a telephone interview from which this description of the Deaton campaign is taken.

Pat Deaton had been public defender for seven southwestern Missouri counties. Otherwise he has not held public office. In 1990 he was the Democratic candidate for congress in the seventh district. That year, Mel Hancock and everyone else underestimated Pat Deaton. We came out of the blue at the last moment, and attacked very hard. With two more days and two thousand more dollars, I think we would have won. One of the problems of that campaign was that our campaign firm was not contacted until forty-two days before the election.

In the 1992 primary, our strategy was to show that we were the only viable candidate, to show that Pat Deaton had been the leading candidate for two years. In the general, our strategy was to show that Pat Deaton offered change. If voters wanted jobs to stay in this country, if they wanted a pro-choice candidate, if they wanted someone who would look out for the district, Pat Deaton was the candidate.

Team Deaton included a good paid staff and tremendous volunteers. The people of my company, Simmons and Company, were the general consultants, and Cathryn Simmons, Casey Simmons, and I all worked on the campaign. The pollster was Jon Hutchens of Media Strategies and Research, and the media consultant was Joe Trippi of Trippi, McMahon and Squiers. Fund-raising was directed by Pat's wife, Pam Ross Deaton, and the Washington fund-raiser was Tom Erickson of Erickson & Company.

We had $303,000 in funding, about $100,000 in the primary and about $200,000 in the general. In congressional campaigns, fund-raising is very hard. Candidates are very limited in what they can accept and who they can accept it from. As a result, congressional campaigns have a real need for talented people who can raise money under those restrictions. Most of our PAC fund-raising was from labor unions. About half of our money came from individuals, which was quite good
Congressional Races

because individual contributions are limited to $1,000 compared to $5,000 from PACs.

In the general election, we were endorsed by the NEA, the UAW, lots of labor unions, the Sierra Club, women's and pro-choice organizations, and various Democratic officials from around the state. We weren't endorsed by our primary opponent, Doug Harpool, and we were sad to see that. However I don't think it affected our votes or fund-raising. The most it affected was a handful of people who were Harpool supporters through and through.

We did very hard-hitting ads; I'll be frank about that. All of our ads were researched extensively. Our ads were factual, direct, and very hard-hitting. The ads in the general that quoted Mr. Hancock were researched very extensively. For every ad we produced a packet of information and documentation. Before we released an ad on TV, we released that information to the press. We were discouraged that the media didn't do more homework. We had to keep referring them back to the packets we had already sent them.

The health-care ad was factual. I talked with a legal counsel in Washington, D.C., who sent me documentation about what congressmen pay and what they get in health care. We included that documentation in our packet. The ad was factual, hard-hitting and true to itself. Congressmen get a lot of free services. The House physician and the House nurse practitioners are there, they are free to use, and they were available to Congressman Hancock.

We were pleased that we ran well. In the Seventh Congressional District, we had more votes than Bill Clinton, more than Geri Rothman-Serot, in fact more than every statewide Democratic candidate except Mel Carnahan, and we were close to Carnahan. It's hard to imagine running much better in that district in 1992, though we would like to have won.

Mel Hancock Campaign

Campaign manager Dan Wadlington described the Hancock campaign:

In 1990, Mel decided that he would not campaign, but rather spend his time in Washington working on the Budget Summit, where President Bush broke his "no new taxes" pledge. Congressman Hancock and his advisors believed Pat Deaton posed no threat. That allowed Hancock to stay in Washington without mounting a serious campaign. A mid-October poll caught Mel's attention. It showed a close election.
That prompted Hancock to run some poorly produced television spots in the last two weeks of the election. Helped by the heavy turnout in rural counties strongly opposed to the Natural Streams Act, Mel won a second term with 52 percent of the vote.

So, when 1992 came along, Mel decided in January to have a bona fide, all-out campaign, like his 1988 effort. Deaton had twice as much money in 1992. He spent about $300,000. Over 70 percent of his money came from traditional Democrat sources like labor unions and trial attorneys.

We started the campaign year with about $240,000 in cash in the bank, and we put together a paid staff of two people. Our volunteer force was impressive. We turned out 4 mailings, and a mail drop of 120,000 pieces. We put up eight hundred two-foot-by-eight-foot road signs in all fifteen counties, and we staffed two campaign offices with volunteers.

Deaton used some questionable campaign tactics in his TV advertising in 1990, claiming in one ad that Mel got a pay raise of $95,000. Congressman Hancock's total pay in 1990 wasn't even $95,000. The fact was that Mel opposed the pay raise and voted against it, and gave it away to charities.

We were expecting the same kind of ads in this campaign; about October 8, Deaton ran an ad on health care in which he made a statement that "Mel Hancock gets free health care." He followed that a week later with a TV ad that claimed that Hancock's vote for the "fast track" procedure was sending jobs to Mexico.

We were slow to respond to either ad. Mel Hancock does not like to run negative campaigns. He had never run a negative commercial and has never mentioned his opponent's name in his two past campaigns for Congress. Our first two ads were generic and syrupy: "Mel Hancock is a great guy; give him another term because he votes against all kinds of taxes and has never voted for a tax or pay increase"—that kind of stuff.

Our pollster called about October 13 and said we had lost 19 points from Deaton's health care ad, going from a 60-29 lead on September 9 to a 48-37 lead on October 12. He said it was time to "cut this guy's legs out from underneath him." Our media director reminded us: "As TV goes, so goes the campaign."

That prompted the creation of a spot called "Deaton Lies." We used a cut from Harpool's postelection speech which said, "Pat Deaton beat me with a lie; I showed him it was a lie; I proved it was a lie but he used
Missouri's 7th Congressional District
Ballot Trend Data

PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES
the lie to win votes, anyway.” That ad ran a week on radio and TV. We followed it with an ad saying that Pat Deaton is lying again about Mel Hancock having free health care. We followed a week later with an ad that said “Pat Deaton is lying again: Mel Hancock’s vote on the fast-track procedure did not send Springfield jobs to Mexico.”

And the press helped us. The KY3 Ad Watch labeled his claim in the health-care spot as “false.” A week later, the Springfield News-Leader ran a story that quoted Zenith and union officials saying Hancock’s vote in favor of “fast track” had played no part in the movement of Zenith jobs from Springfield to Mexico. We used both articles—from independent sources—in our TV spots to refute Deaton’s claims.

The polls a week before the election showed Deaton’s credibility was badly damaged. Our favorables rose. His reversed. Overall he went from 33 favorable–20 unfavorable to 20 favorable–33 unfavorable. Among Democrats, his favorable rating went from 73 in September to 48 the week before the election. Our successful effort to undercut Deaton’s credibility through an aggressive TV campaign worked with Republican and Democrat voters. He spent about $108,000 on TV while we spent $101,000. It was not a money issue that turned this election, it was the candidate’s message that was flawed. Congressman Hancock gave the conservative voters in this district something to vote for.

General Election Results

In the general election, Hancock won easily with 62 percent of the vote, running ahead of most Republican candidates on the ballot. Hancock told cheering supporters, “I’m going to keep doing what we’ve been doing. We’re going to keep voting no. We’re going to get this thing straightened out.”

Ninth Congressional District

Congressman Harold Volkmer had represented the Ninth Congressional District for sixteen years. His style was aptly described in a congressional almanac: “Though it irks colleagues in the House, Volkmer’s tireless, hard-charging style has brought him consistent political success in Missouri. When told that his 1982 opponent called him ‘abrupt and
Table 7-5. Candidates in the Ninth District Primary and Votes Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harold L. Volkmer, 16 year incumbent</td>
<td>Rick Hardy, political science professor, University of Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45,899</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,785</td>
<td>Justus D. Griffin, Columbia real estate and mortgage banker</td>
<td>Joseph Brajdich, project manager for construction company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,124</td>
<td>Joseph P. Caulfield, insurance adjuster</td>
<td>7,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>Anthony DeFranco, Lyndon LaRouche supporter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>Duane Messick, Air Force retiree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>Rob Shiverdecker, self-employed disc jockey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aborasive,' Volkmer replied, 'Could be,' and went on to take 61 percent of the vote."

Missouri's northeast district historically has been dominated by Little Dixie, a region originally settled by southern Democrats, and still rural and small-town-conservative-Democrat. Harold Volkmer’s opposition to abortion and gun control, two issues on which he exercised leadership in Congress, and his service on the Agriculture Committee fit easily with the views of people in his district. In 1981, however, redistricting added to the district Boone County (Columbia), once part of Little Dixie but now dominated by young, ticket-splitting, style-conscious voters, and also more of the St. Louis suburban area, with its own mix of voters.

Boone County Republicans presented two formidable opponents to Volkmer in the early 1980s, but Volkmer won 61 percent of the vote against State Representative Larry Mead in 1982 and 53 percent against Carrie Francke in 1984. Carrie Francke was beaten in the Republican primary two years later, so Volkmer did not have to face her again. Republicans had no strong candidates available in 1988 or 1990.

Even so, the 1990 election results, in which Volkmer was held to 57 percent by an unknown noncampaigning opponent, stimulated interest among both Republicans and Democrats. Five Democrats, two Republicans, a Green, and an independent filed against Volkmer in 1992. Strongest of the Democrats was Justus Griffin, a Columbia real estate and
mortgage banker making his first political race and a former campaign worker for Volkmer. Griffin won the endorsement of the Columbia Daily Tribune, but he pulled only 21 percent of the vote against Volkmer's 57 percent.

The strongest general election opponent was Republican Rick Hardy, professor of political science at the University of Missouri–Columbia. Hardy was an award-winning teacher who had taught thousands of students, and many of those students or their families lived in the ninth district. Hardy campaigned on his opposition to special interests, using his slogan of "No Strings Attached," his support of term limits, campaign finance reform, and congressional reform. In the end, his underfunded ($140,000 compared with Volkmer's $511,000) campaign came up 2 percentage points short of Volkmer's total.

**Rick Hardy Campaign**

R. E. Burnett, campaign manager, described the Hardy campaign:

First of all, none of us had ever done this before. Mr. Hardy had never run for office before and I had never run a campaign before. We had ten to twelve people on our staff and we were able to take advantage of one important resource—young people. We had literally hundreds of young volunteers in this district.

I was appointed to lead the campaign in June. We thought Mr. Volkmer had serious problems, indicated by the fact that he had five primary opponents. We weren't able to confirm his problems, because we didn't have the money for a poll until late in the campaign. I would say we did pretty well for not being able to take a poll, but it did mean we were really unsure of ourselves at various points.

We decided to build a coalition of counties with high crossover votes. We started to build our base in Boone County and moved east on I-70. We had to get Democratic votes, so our strategy had to be bipartisan. I fit easily into that strategy, because I'm a Democrat who was elected as a Clinton delegate at my local caucus. I am not happy with Mr. Volkmer, and I found that Rick and I lined up very well on many of the issues.

Part of my job as campaign director was to go out there and make it as easy as possible for Democrats to cross over and vote for us. On the
first day that we went out as a team, I wore a button that said “Demo­
crat for Hardy.” We walked into the courthouse in Monroe County, 
the most Democratic county in the state, and people said to me: 
“What the hell kind of Democrat are you, boy?” Obviously, we had a 
ways to go.

Our assets were better-than-average name recognition because of 
Rick’s status as a professor at the university and because of his service 
as political analyst and commentator in the Columbia media market. 
He had been involved in two statewide initiatives—yes for ethics, and 
the term limits movement. He also had a good reception from lots of 
Lincoln Day and other speeches around the district. Rick was the most 
tenacious campaigner I’ve ever seen. He was working from 5 A.M. until 
night until almost every day. Probably our biggest advantage was grass­
roots organization. We had the biggest and the most tenacious and the 
most capable grass-roots network in any congressional race in this 
state. We were at every parade; we were at every festival with dozens, if 
not hundreds of people.

We thought that we had pretty much taken care of any potential 
primary opposition, but a gentleman from Washington, Missouri, did 
jump in at the last minute. We took that person very seriously because 
we had never done this before and we didn’t know not to. It turned out 
to be one of the best things about our campaign because it really 
forced us to get our organization together early on.

In the general election, we were up against a PAC millionaire. Mr. 
Volkmer had taken $1.2 million in PAC money over sixteen years and 
has had some version of a political organization in place for thirty-two 
years. Mr. Volkmer was also recognized as having sizable pork projects 
to his credit—highway projects, farm subsidies, and flood control 
projects on the Mississippi River. Although his Little Dixie Demo­
cratic network is seriously weakened, it still works.

We identified his primary weaknesses and they are where we de­
cided to attack. I took most of my ideas from watching Mr. Carville, 
the brilliant strategist for Clinton. What he taught us was that you hit 
somebody on a few issues, you hit them hard, and you hit them 
relentlessly even if the media and the elites get tired of hearing those 
issues. We hit PACs, we hit term limits, we hit Volkmer’s pay raise, and 
we hit his tax-and-spend policies.

Our funding weakness hurt us. Rick said from the start that he 
wouldn’t take PAC money because he feels that PACs are hurting the 
political parties. We relied on individual contributions. In October,
even though we were low on money, we decided to do the unconventional, to go on television for a couple of days. Once we went on the air, people said now we can see that you are legitimate. And the money poured in. We set up a phone bank and we raised about $85,000, mostly in small donations. As it came in, we poured it right back into media to keep us going.

You can’t win unless you have a grass-roots organization. You’ve got to go out there mingling with the people on a day-to-day basis, to convince people that you are real, that you have a feel for the issues. But you also cannot win unless you have the legitimacy of the media. Media creates legitimacy. Media also penetrates those areas where you cannot meet people. Some people don’t go to parades; they don’t go to town meetings; they don’t go to carnivals. But they do watch television.

Our strategy was to win Boone County big, which we did, giving us a big base. We did better than expected in Little Dixie. We won Audrain County and Callaway County. We lost Shelby County by ten votes and Knox County by forty-five votes. We did it primarily through old-fashioned grass-roots bottom-up politics. Our organizations in the most Democratic counties in this district were phenomenal.

We lost two very important counties, St. Charles and Franklin. In Franklin County, the Republican network has been there for a very long time, and they manage all of the races at once, so we didn’t have an organization of our own, like we had in Little Dixie counties. St. Charles County is an enigma to me. We tried to start up an organization there four times, and we crashed every time. That area is very diverse. Also Volkmer was able to activate a pro-life network in Franklin and St. Charles Counties where there is a high Roman Catholic population.

We could have won those two counties if we had had another three or four days of media, which would have meant another $30,000 or $40,000. Unfortunately, the party money was too little and too late. We got about $40,000 from the National Republican Congressional Committee but not till the last nine days of the campaign. Coming that late kept us from taking advantage of Volkmer’s failure to buy any media time in the St. Louis suburbs. We had an opportunity to go in there and to define him completely according to our terms. Unfortunately, we didn’t have the money to do that.
We were lucky because the quadrennial election in 1992 had lots of competitive races. Every time there was a negative commercial on TV, it was a commercial for term limits. . . . Our campaign would have been more difficult in an off-year election without as many commercials with politicians cutting each other up.

—Greg Upchurch, leader, Missourians for Limited Terms

History of Ballot Issues in Missouri

In the last 160 years, Missouri voters have decided more than 375 statewide issues. They have voted on constitutional amendments and referenda proposed by the legislature, constitutional amendments and statutes proposed by voter petition, and miscellaneous issues, such as calls for a constitutional convention. The number of statewide issues has accelerated to about five per year in the last two decades.

The first statewide vote was in 1835 over a call for a constitutional convention, which was rejected by the voters. The 1865 constitution provided that constitutional amendments passed by the legislature must receive voter approval to be effective. Both subsequent constitutions have included similar provisions, and since 1868, more than 240 constitutional amendments have required voter approval. Missouri adopted
the initiative and referendum in 1908, and since then Missouri voters have cast ballots on 63 initiative proposals and 27 initiated referenda.¹

Some of these statewide issue votes have been particularly hard fought, two of them being among the three most expensive campaigns in Missouri in the last 15 years.² The most expensive issue campaigns (in 1992 dollars) since 1978 have been

- $6.5 million Against Proposition B (nuclear power plant operations), 1984;
- $6.3 million Against Amendment 23 (right to work), 1978;
- $3.2 million Against Proposition 11 (nuclear waste disposal), 1980;
- $2.8 million For Amendment 23 (right to work), 1978;
- $2.2 million For Proposition A, (big truck referendum), April 1982.

These campaigns have involved numerous television commercials as well as extensive use of professional campaign consultants. In some elections, an issue proposal has been the most exciting race on the ballot, drawing the most voters to the polls and potentially affecting some of the candidate races on the ballot.

Ordinarily ballot issues will appear on the November ballot, except that the governor may place some constitutional amendments on the primary ballot in August. (In some circumstances, an issue may also be on a special election ballot.) In 1992, Missouri’s governor put five of the constitutional amendments referred by the legislature on the August ballot. Surprisingly, only two of the five passed, perhaps indicating some voter discontent. The governor put the remaining six constitutional amendments on the November ballot. In addition the legislature put two referenda on the November ballot, and two constitutional amendments were qualified by initiative petition. This meant that Missourians were faced with ten ballot issues in the November 1992 election. Historically, voters have tended to reject most of the issues if thirteen or more issues appear on the ballot, and to pass most of the issues if nine or fewer issues appear on the ballot. The November 1992 ballot fit between these patterns, with voters passing five issues and rejecting five issues. See Table 8-1 for vote results.³

Two of the issues—riverboat gambling and term limits—drew considerable interest and were discussed by the panel on ballot issues. As
### Table 8-1. Issues on the Statewide Ballots and Vote Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 4 primary election ballot</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong> vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 5. Local government earthquake retrofit</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>CA 7. Allow higher tax rate for schools without vote</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 8. More of gas tax increase to cities, counties</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>CA 9. Put a cap on one tax on commercial property</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 11. Earmark lottery money for education</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 3 general election ballot</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong> vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 1. Lower majority needed for school tax increase</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>CA 2. Authorize toll roads and bridges</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 3. Allow off-track betting on horse races</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>CA 4. Put crime victims' rights in constitution</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 6. Budget stabilization fund (Rainy day fund)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>CA 10. Lower St. Louis bond issue approval to 57%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 12. Legislative term limits (initiative)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>CA 13. Congressional term limits (initiative)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. A. Riverboat gambling</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. C. Additional duties for Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CA means constitutional amendment. Prop. means proposition (proposed law).
Table 8-2. Media Poll Findings, November Ballot Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Riverboats Don't</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Know</th>
<th>State Legis term limits Don't</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Know</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 13–21</td>
<td>SLPD/KMOX</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>(519)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12–16</td>
<td>SLPD/KMOX</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>(480)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 20–24</td>
<td>KBIA/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KOMU/Mo'n</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 25–29</td>
<td>SLPD/KMOX</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>(693)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 3</td>
<td>Election results</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>(2,100,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The SLPD/KMOX surveys were conducted by the University of Missouri Media Research Bureau for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and St. Louis radio station KMOX. KBIA et al. survey was conducted by the University of Missouri Media Research Bureau for KBIA/91.3 FM radio, KOMU/Channel 8 television, and the *Columbia Missourian*, all located in Columbia.

indicated in Table 8-2, public opinion polls indicated both issues were strongly favored by the public, and on election day, each passed easily.

**Riverboat Gambling**

Riverboat gambling had been referred to the voters by the legislature and was supported by a campaign whose expenditures exceeded $1.9 million, with more than $1.3 million coming from a Pittsburgh businessman. Opponents of riverboat gambling had only $25,000 and ran no television commercials.

The Pittsburgh businessman was John Connelly, who contributed through a company called I. C. Admiral Partners, which he owned jointly with IGT Corporation, a Reno firm that makes slot machines and other gaming equipment. Connelly was the owner of eighteen riverboats, including gambling boats operating in Davenport, Iowa, and Biloxi, Mississippi. In St. Louis, Connelly owned four cruise boats, a floating restaurant, and the *Admiral*, moored at a St. Louis dock. The
Admiral had once been a successful excursion boat, then had fallen on hard times. The city of St. Louis spent millions rehabilitating the boat as a waterfront attraction, but eventually the city sold it to Connelly.

Connelly had also hired lobbyists to push the gambling bill through the Missouri General Assembly. The Missouri law provided some restrictions in that losses would be limited to $500 per gambler on any single excursion. Connelly commissioned a study by John Qualls, assistant professor of economics at Maryville University, St. Louis, who predicted that riverboat gambling in the St. Louis area would draw 6.25 million admissions a year, with the average passenger losing $45 at the gaming tables and spending an additional $15 on admissions and other items. Total employment would be 5,400 people, and total new taxes would be $20 million for local governments and $68 million for state government.

The state law allowing riverboat gambling also required cities that wished to have a gambling boat dock in their portion of the river to receive public approval in a local vote. On November 3, voters in the cities of St. Louis, St. Charles, Ste. Genevieve, Parkville, and Jefferson City, and the counties of Buchanan and Jefferson approved local authorizations. Only Hannibal, where local ministers had led an anti-gambling drive, voted down the proposal. In February 1993, Kansas City and North Kansas City passed similar proposals despite last-minute opposition from some religious leaders. Voters in Maryland Heights in St. Louis County voted down a plan for riverboat gambling in February 1993, but approved a proposal in April after a $91,000 campaign. Other cities also passed local option elections indicating they would be available if a riverboat chose to dock in them.

The 1992 vote came on the heels of a long series of votes in which Missouri enthusiasm for legalized gambling had gradually declined. The percentage voting "yes" on previous Missouri gambling votes included 73 percent, November 1978 for authorization of sweepstakes in which players did not have to pay to play, such as the Readers Digest sweepstakes; 72 percent, November 1980, legalization of bingo; 70 percent, November 1984, legalization of state lottery; 60 percent, November 1984, legalization of horse race betting; 58 percent, August 1986, liberalization of horse race betting procedures;
57 percent, November 1986, authorization of horse race betting by individual counties;
56 percent, August 1988, liberalization of lottery, reduction of proportion of income for the state; and
47 percent, August 1990, liberalization of bingo regulations.

A measure to allow simulcasting of horse races at a track plus off-track betting lost narrowly in November 1992, receiving 49.9 percent of the vote. With 62 percent approval, riverboat gambling reversed the downward trend, suggesting that the extensive television advertising may have been very effective.

The authorization of bingo had led to the establishment of games that gross more than $200 million a year, generating $5.5 million in revenue for the state. Total amount bet on the lottery is about $220 million a year, with state revenues being about $70 million per year, less than 2 percent of total general revenue. By contrast, few bets were ever cast on horse races, because investors were reluctant to spend the millions of dollars needed for a racetrack, in part fearful of the competition from established tracks just across state lines from St. Louis and Kansas City.

The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch/KMOX* radio poll showed that the riverboat gambling issue received support from a higher proportion of men than of women, and from a higher proportion of younger voters than of older voters, patterns similar to that found in earlier studies of public attitudes toward gambling. Similarly, in the election itself, support was strongest in the metropolitan areas, especially in the St. Louis metropolitan area, and opposition was strongest in the rural areas, especially in the southern half of the state. Riverboat gambling led by a margin of more than two to one in St. Louis city, and the counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, Jefferson, and Boone. It lost in twenty-one counties in the state.

In 1993, Illinois riverboat owners initiated a lawsuit challenging the Missouri law. The supreme court declared that the 1992 *law* authorizing games of chance did, in fact, violate the state constitutional provision prohibiting gambling. The court decreed that the riverboats could offer games of skill—poker, blackjack, and craps—but not games of chance—roulette, and most important, slot machines. The legislature quickly submitted a new *constitutional amendment* to the people authorizing games of chance on the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. Proponents
conducted a $3 million television and direct-mail campaign, but the voters rejected the amendment by a very small margin of 1,412 votes. Local option elections were conducted by a number of local governments, including several repeaters that had doubts about the legality of the previous approval by their voters, doubts occasioned by the intervening adverse court decision.

Proponents succeeded in getting comparatively good turnout in the St. Louis metropolitan area, which regularly provides strong support for gambling measures, and low turnout in southwest Missouri, which regularly provides strong opposition. Turnout was low in Kansas City, which had a surprising April snowstorm on election day, and those who turned out cast only half of their votes in favor of the riverboats. Precinct analysis in Boone County indicated that students and young people, who had provided very strong support for gambling in 1992, reverted to their usual pattern of voting only in presidential elections. The precinct analysis also indicated that some voters had shifted from support to opposition; editorial comments and letters to the editor suggested that these voters switched "as a direct result of what [we] witnessed being initiated by the gambling industry over the past year."4

The legislature passed a law declaring that some machines, such as video poker, constituted games of skill. Soon after, May 27, 1994, the first riverboat casinos—the Admiral in St. Louis and the Casino St. Charles—opened their doors to eager throngs who played craps, blackjack, poker, and video poker. At the same time, gambling interests announced a petition drive to allow slot machines.5

**Symposium Discussion of Riverboat Gambling**

*James Fitzpatrick*, Kansas City Star, moderator. Riverboat gambling easily survived some critical stories in the press. Phil Linsalata of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* wrote several stories critical of riverboat gambling. One of them said that in St. Charles, Missouri, the prospective operator of a gambling boat was connected with organized crime, a very damaging story. On the other side of the state, I wrote a story saying that the law, as written, does not exclude convicted felons from running the riverboats. Because this was run at the top of the front page with a large
headline, I thought this was another damaging story. Yet when the voters went to the polls, riverboat gambling passed 62 percent to 38 percent. The stories had little, if any, effect.

Mary Jo Graettinger is public information coordinator for MO-TARGET; that is, Missourians to Authorize Riverboat Gambling in Excursions, the campaign committee for Proposition A. Before becoming involved in the Proposition A campaign, Ms. Graettinger had helped set up John Connelly's riverboat operation in Davenport, Iowa. Ms. Graettinger worked on the public relations portion of the MO-TARGET campaign, which preceded the $1.9 million advertising campaign.

Mary Jo Graettinger, MO-TARGET. Like Jim, I have a media background. I formerly had a television talk show on an ABC affiliate and produced documentaries with my colleague, Jack McNamara, who is a former newspaper man. We were employed by John Connelly to conduct a public relations campaign for Proposition A. We had previously worked on the riverboat gambling issue in Iowa so that we were familiar with the issue.

Most of the money that Mr. Connelly contributed to the campaign, which indeed was a large sum of money, was used for television advertising and media advertising. Before that advertising began, there was already majority support for the issue. The effect of the advertising may have been to solidify support or to halt a potential slide, but it wasn't needed to establish majority support. Jack and I did not work on the television campaign.

The public relations campaign was conducted by just the two of us with a secretary back at the office. We were no massive machine with a lot of workers. We approached it pretty much as a public relations job. In effect, we acted as if we were candidates, which meant good hard public relations work, a lot of elbow grease and a lot of sleepless nights. After going through my first political campaign, I'm not sure I would ever want to be a candidate.

We would arise every morning between five and six, getting on the road early. I now know the roads of Missouri better than most natives do. Each day we would visit two, three, or four towns and do six to eight interviews, trying to look fresh, enthusiastic, and unruffled. A mobile phone kept us in constant contact with the office. Requests for inter-
views and changes in schedule could be handled immediately. We handled twenty-five to thirty calls a day from the car.

We basically had that campaign won before the big money ever kicked in. We had about 54 percent of the vote at the start of our public relations campaign, and about 60 percent when the media advertising kicked in. Traditionally, referendums go down as you get closer to elections because people become more resistant to change as they consider issues more fully. In contrast, support for riverboat gambling stayed high.

Our premise was very simple. Get there early, talk to the people in all parts of the state of Missouri and find out their concerns. We found that Missourians have the same concerns as do people across the nation. They were concerned about unemployment. They were concerned about education. We did a lot of listening for the first six weeks before we ever began writing our collateral materials.

We found that people were very concerned about the use of lottery money, because it had not gone to fund education as they had been promised. As a result, we were elated in August when Missourians voted overwhelmingly for the passage of Amendment 11, guaranteeing that money from the lottery and any future state sanctioned gambling operations would go for education. That gave us a tremendous tool, allowing us to assure voters that money from riverboat gambling would go for education. We might have had a problem because the Proposition A ballot, prepared before the August vote on Amendment 11, said that the money was going to the general fund. Amendment 11, however, had superseded that language, giving us the extra club in the bag that we needed.

When we went to the press, we would say in our interviews, if you have but one message you could carry to the people, if you have time for only one sound bite or only one inch in your column that will tell them one thing, we want you to tell them that that money is earmarked for education. That proved to be very effective.

Of course, we had problems, especially problems with the economic troubles of the riverboat gambling industry in Iowa. Fortunately, I am a native Iowan, and Jack and I had been involved with the riverboat casinos there for nearly three years. We knew that the stories about the boats leaving were not as they seemed. We knew the behind-the-scenes
stories. We were able to share that with the press, who understood and didn’t play those stories the same way after that.

Reverend Hendrick and his two colleagues were some problem for us but not too great. Their Coalition Against Organized Crime was designed to instill a little fear in the hearts and minds of the electorate, and to raise doubts. We knew and could say very honestly that organized crime has not been an issue in Iowa or Illinois. In years past organized crime has been associated with gambling casinos of the land-based variety. But we talked with many people and found that riverboats are spotlessly clean in those two states.

It was a very rewarding experience, and I really enjoyed it. As a native Iowan, I had done a lot of research on riverboat gambling for a documentary in Iowa, and I felt very strongly that it was going to be a very positive thing for my state. It has been and it continues to be. I felt that it would be equally good for the people in Missouri because Proposition A authorized a limited-stakes gaming situation. That’s what works best and that is what I feel most comfortable with.

Just to alleviate Reverend Hendrick’s fears about Jack McNamara and myself, we are former employees of John Connelly. We did take a leave of absence to do this project for regular salary, and we had decided that when this was over, we were going on to new careers. We sent Mr. Connelly a letter the day before the election stating that we would not be rejoining his organization. So, there was no personal gain for us except the satisfaction of a job well done, of knowing that we had met a challenge and feeling that we had done something very positive for the state of Missouri. We think it was a great partnership, and we’re proud to have been part of it.

I feel that riverboat gambling does need to be watched very, very closely. I think that it needs to be regulated very tightly, and I think that Missouri has watched and learned from what happened in Iowa and Illinois. I think Missouri can avoid pitfalls that those states experienced. I do think that the press must stay ever-vigilant, they must keep their integrity, and they must report everything to the public. Democracy worked because the press in the state of Missouri really did their job and did it very, very well under very difficult conditions.

James Fitzpatrick, moderator. For the information of the audience, the
only other states that have legalized riverboat gambling are Iowa, Illinois, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Louisiana, the most recent state to legalize riverboat gambling, has no boats in the water yet. Iowa has a two-hundred-dollar limit on losses and a five-dollar maximum bet per hand. In Illinois and Mississippi, there are no limits on either amount per bet or total losses. In Missouri, the limit will be a five-hundred-dollar loss per excursion with no limit on each bet. You can bet $500 on the first throw of the dice if you want.

The group which led opposition to Proposition A was the Coalition Against Organized Crime headed by the Reverend Harold Hendrick from St. Louis city.

Reverend Harold Hendrick, Coalition Against Organized Crime. A state legislator, a traditional values lobbyist, and I, three people with a real concern about the proliferation of gambling, jumped into this, particularly when we discovered a vacuum, a complete lack of opposition to this proposal.

We had very little money, especially compared with the $1.3 million that a gentleman living in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, put into the campaign for Proposition A. We used all of the freebies that we could through Missouri Network, through another network of ten stations, and through interviews on KCMO, KMBZ, KMOX, and a Jefferson City station. We had our voices or statements on news stories in about one hundred stations. For that, we were thankful. Still, three to four weeks before the end of the campaign, we didn't know what the final figures would be, but we felt that it would be hard to sell our position in Missouri.

Our concern was the likely increase in compulsive gambling. According to the National Review, October 19, 1992, 8.9 percent of the people in New Jersey, a wide-open gambling state, are problem or pathological gamblers. In Missouri, 8.9 percent would be 450,000 people. We were concerned about the advancement of political corruption. The growing compulsive gambling and the track record of organized crime prompted us to use the title of Coalition Against Organized Crime; we were trying to dramatize what was at stake.

We got about three good stories in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Three weeks before the election, the Post-Dispatch stopped printing negative articles on gambling. Hoping to get more coverage in the print media, I
fed reporter Phil Linsalata several negative stories. One story focused on the fact that the lottery promised to give the state 45 percent of its sales each year, but by 1991 it was paying less than 31 percent. Even though the amount bet on the lottery increased $16 million from 1988 to 1991, less money from lottery sales went into the general fund. We gave stories like that to the *Post-Dispatch* and nothing happened. We had a dozen newsworthy stories that the *Post-Dispatch* did not print. Some focused on the social problems, especially the increase we would have in compulsive gambling.

*James Fitzpatrick.* You keep talking about the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and an inability to get the stories there. Their circulation covers only the eastern part of the state, with their greatest concentration in the St. Louis area. I am not convinced that if they had written one hundred more stories it would have made a difference. On the other hand, Proposition A proponents, MO-TARGET, had an organization that spread over the entire state. They were coming over to Kansas City, doing interviews, and putting out their message every day. What was it like to go up against that? Your message wasn’t getting out.

*Reverend Harold Hendrick.* Well, our message wasn’t getting out because MO-TARGET had approximately $2 million more than we had. So, that was our difficulty, the money situation, the lack of financial gain from the people on our side, whereas tens of millions in gambling money would go to Mr. Connelly and others, if Proposition A passed.

There has been an increase in gambling in Missouri under Bob Griffin’s Speakership in the House of Representatives; twenty-two pieces of gambling legislation have passed since he has been Speaker, and I am not sure that any of them had any grass-roots initiation. The legislators and the lobbyists got together and decided what was best for the rest of us. Through advertising, they created a market and gained approval. We think they have had limited success in producing the jobs that they predicted.

**Term Limits**

Term limits for state legislators and U.S. congressmen were put on the ballot by initiative petition. The issue drew no advertising from either
proponents nor opponents, but it stimulated great interest and extensive discussion. Proponents had major expenses to get on the ballot, so that they spent more than $283,000. The organization had collected only slightly more than half that amount, leaving it $130,000 in debt.

Amendment 12 proposed to limit state lawmakers to eight years in the house and eight years in the senate, for a total of sixteen years. Amendment 13 proposed to limit members of the U.S. House to eight years of service and U.S. Senators to twelve years but would only take effect after half the states approved limits on members of Congress.

The National Council of State Legislatures noted that legislative seats changed hands with considerable regularity, even without term limits. During the 1980s, the ten-year turnover rate in Missouri was 62 percent for Senate seats and 74 percent for House seats. During the same period, Missouri saw a turnover on one of the two U.S. Senate seats, and on four of the nine House seats.

In the election, the term-limit proposals were passed by 75 and 74 percent, respectively. The proposals won handily in every county in the state, sometimes with more than an 80 percent yes vote. Strongest support came from several traditionally Republican southwest Missouri counties. Least supportive, though still providing a 60 percent yes vote, were several traditionally Democratic areas, such as St. Louis city and Shannon and Reynolds Counties. Thirteen other states also passed term-limit proposals.

**Symposium Discussion of Term Limits**

*James Fitzpatrick*, Kansas City Star, moderator. Greg Upchurch, a patent attorney from St. Louis County, headed the campaign for Missourians for Limited Terms.

*Greg Upchurch, leader, Missourians for Limited Terms.* For all of you foolish enough to consider an initiative petition in the future, let me explain what’s involved. I started about two years ago by filing a petition with the Missouri secretary of state. The legislature, which doesn’t like initiative petitions, had a law in effect limiting the collection of signatures to one year prior to the last date for submitting petitions. Having filed too early, I spent the first six months of my campaign challenging
that law and getting it declared unconstitutional. That sounds like a waste of time but it wasn't because I was challenging that law in Jefferson City. Every time I was there to do anything, I went down to talk to the press corps. I went from office to office. The press was very good about covering the story. In Jefferson City, limiting the legislators is a big deal, so I got very good coverage.

I also hired John Thompson, a political consultant who had two years earlier handled the “Yes for Ethics” initiative. Those people secured enough signatures to get on the ballot; I figured that the last person who had been through this would be a good person to bring on board. I also talked with Mel Hancock, father of the Hancock amendment, a successful initiative in 1980.

We decided that I ought to get a statewide board of directors. We got a group of six people, the people who had supported term limits for the city council in Kansas City, to join our board en masse. Then we got Jim Spainhower, former Democratic state treasurer, out of St. Louis and several other people across the state who had been involved in the “Yes for Ethics” initiative.

Actually, it was very helpful for term limits that “Yes for Ethics” never made it to the ballot. The result was that we had a ready-made statewide organization of people who were frustrated, people who thought that the legislature had used its power to keep “Yes for Ethics” from being voted on. I personally don’t believe that. I believe that “Yes for Ethics” did not meet the constitutional requirement of having only one subject and that the Supreme Court should have thrown it off the ballot. But, in any event, all of those people were there ready to help.

Having a statewide organization helped us because a lot of our directors knew their local press people. By this time, I had been in to see the Jefferson City press corps six or seven times and they knew who I was. The night of the election, one reporter told me that they had never thought we would get term limits on the ballot, but even so they were good enough to run the story.

I held eight public meetings around the state, and I handed out questionnaires asking people what they wanted in the way of term limits. I also mailed out ten thousand questionnaires. Originally, I had proposed that officials be limited to twelve years, sit out for four and
then be eligible to come back. I am glad I polled people, because that was the least popular choice on the questionnaire. People wanted shorter limits and lifetime bans. We settled upon limits of eight years in each house of the Missouri legislature, eight years in the U.S. House of Representatives, and twelve years in the U.S. Senate.

As I went around to these public meetings, invariably someone would stand up and say, "Why are you harming our congressional delegation by placing them at a disadvantage compared with other states [since Missouri congressmen would be denied long tenure available to other congressmen]?" I only had to hear that three or four times to realize its impact so we put in a trigger clause, saying that the federal limits don't go into effect until half of the states have term limits.

After we won the lawsuit, we started collecting signatures. We were relying on volunteers, which is fine, but you have to have some supervision of those volunteers. It doesn't work if they do the work at their convenience. You have to call them up every week and check on the number of signatures they got. Even though a year sounds like a long time, it's not. Because we didn't supervise from the beginning, we were falling short, and we had to pay collectors at the end. We collected over 190,000 signatures on each petition, one for state legislators and one for federal officials. If I were going to do it again, I would have supervisors all the way through.

I also got a number of people to sign on as supporters. You have seen solicitation letters that have lists of prominent citizens on the letter. I spent over a month talking to three and four people a day, asking them to agree to add their name to our letterhead. That's what you have to do if you want to build a broad base of support for something.

In its winter 1992 session, the legislature was thinking about putting a competing amendment on the ballot. As a result, I shut down the public aspects of our effort for the last three months of the session. I didn't send out a single press release. I wanted the legislature to think the term-limits effort had died. Fortunately they didn't put anything on the ballot, and as soon as the legislators were gone, I cranked up our campaign again.

As far as money was concerned, we spent over $200,000. We raised about half of our money through direct mail, just finding whatever mailing list we could. Probably another quarter of it I still owe, and another quarter I paid out of my own pocket.
James Fitzpatrick, moderator. You paid at least $50,000 of this?

Greg Upchurch, leader, Missourians for Limited Terms. Oh yes, most definitely. Once you start something like this, you’re either going to see it through or you are not. By that time, I had too many people who had done too much work to let it fail.

The final lesson out of the campaign is that it’s better to be lucky than to be good. First, we had Ross Perot, who was saying things that supported our theme for term limits. He was saying that we didn’t need a professional legislature; we needed people who would serve for a time and then come back home. That was exactly the term-limits message. We thought we could count as sure “yes” voters all of the people voting for Ross Perot.

Secondly, we were lucky because the quadrennial election in 1992 had lots of competitive races. Every time there was a negative commercial on TV, it was a commercial for term limits. Although we had commercials, we didn’t have to run any of them because everybody else was doing it for us unintentionally. Our campaign would have been more difficult in an off-year election without as many commercials with politicians cutting each other up.

One indication of this was that term limits passed in fourteen other states also. The margins ranged from 78 percent down to 52 percent in the state of Washington, where there was a major media campaign against it. Other states had money to spend for term limits, but we didn’t see any reason to do that. The Post-Dispatch ran seven or eight editorials against term limits. The first three or four concerned me, but the polls never changed. It was always 65, 70, 80 percent; after you see that for a little while, you realize the editorial page is not making a difference. The reporters were giving me a fair shake in the articles.

James Fitzpatrick, moderator. We had expected to have on the panel a representative of Missourians for Responsible Government, a group which had opposed term limits. That person has not arrived. However we have in the audience a representative of the League of Women Voters, which also opposed amendments number twelve and thirteen, and I have asked her to comment on this issue. Carolyn Leuthold is a member of the Board of Directors for the League of Women Voters of Missouri. She was active with the league on the term-limit issue.
Carolyn Leuthold, League of Women Voters of Missouri. The National League of Women Voters took a position opposing term limits at their convention in the summer of 1991. In the state of Washington, the Washington state League of Women Voters was heavily involved with a very strong group of people who defeated a term-limits proposal in 1991. In Missouri, the state League of Women Voters of Missouri took a position against term limits of any kind in February 1992. We were concerned about the weakening of voters rights and of the legislative branch of government, in a system in which we already have a strong executive.

Though the League of Women Voters was not involved in it, I can tell you a little about Missourians for Responsible Government, the ad hoc group formed to oppose term limits. The principal thrust for this group came from members of the state legislature. They focused most of their efforts on a legal challenge, hoping to get term limits ruled off the ballot. Several of these opponents had been involved in the successful 1990 suit in which the Supreme Court ruled that the “Yes for Ethics” proposal contained more than one issue, and should not be on the ballot.

In 1992, the court challenge to the term-limits proposal was a challenge that we have seen a number of times before—the lack of sufficient signatures. To get on the ballot, proponents are required to have the minimum number of signatures in two-thirds of the congressional districts of the state, in this case six of the nine. So a common challenge is to pick the congressional district with the smallest margin and try to disqualify enough signatures to invalidate that congressional district and thus the entire petition. The term-limits proponents had only 66 signatures more than the minimum in the Eighth Congressional District, so signatures in that district were challenged. The challengers also wondered whether the solicitors that Mr. Upchurch had to hire at the end met the requirement of being registered voters in Missouri, given the previous experience some of them had in soliciting signatures in California. They had, however, registered to vote in Missouri before they started soliciting signatures. In the end, Judge McHenry ruled that there were sufficient signatures and left the issue on the ballot.

Judge McHenry’s ruling came on October 21, only about two weeks before the election. There was little time and few resources left to organize an opposition campaign. The League of Women Voters found
it difficult to get media coverage about their position. The presence in the opposition of legislative leaders, who are often newsworthy, meant that reporters could get a balanced story by talking with the legislators. They didn't need to hunt out citizen groups. The reporters ignored the League of Women Voters of Missouri, though we did get some letters to the editor published.

We had hoped to get some national speakers similar to speakers who helped in the anti-term-limits campaign in the state of Washington. But term limits were on the ballot in lots of states, and there was no particular reason for opponents to concentrate on Missouri. We also hoped that we would have more Missouri elected officials who would stand up against term limits, but it was so popular that elected officials concentrated on their own elections or other issues.

*Greg Upchurch, leader, Missourians for Limited Terms.* We fully expected to have $100,000 or $200,000 thrown at us in the last ten days in an attempt to defeat this. When you look at the campaign finance report of the group which funded the lawsuit, they raised, as best I can tell, three-quarters of their money from campaign committees. I think most of their funds were raised from politicians. Apparently, they had the money available but, for some reason, and I don't know why, they weren't willing to spend it in an attempt to defeat term limits.

*James Fitzpatrick, moderator.* We are out of time. I thank the panelists for their contributions, and I thank the audience for your attention.
Judicial Retention Elections

Our real concern was that there might be a mass throw-them-out, “vote no” reaction. Early in this campaign I pulled up behind a bumper sticker that said: “Fire them all; vote no on all of them.” Well, we’re the only people on the ballot on whom you can vote “no.”

—Supreme Court Justice Duane Benton

In 1938, Missouri voters were faced with “the nastiest, most bitter intra-party fight in years.” The fight was ostensibly between James Douglas and James Billings, two candidates for a seat on the Supreme Court. In reality it was between Kansas City political boss Tom Pendergast and Governor Lloyd Stark. Pendergast had handpicked Stark for the governorship. Once elected, Stark split with Pendergast, and chose Douglas for a Supreme Court position. Pendergast challenged Stark’s pick with his own choice, Billings. Governor Stark’s candidate won. Many citizens concluded that such a race should never occur again and circulated an initiative petition to establish a merit system for selection of judges.¹

The system, approved by voters in 1940, provided that a nominating commission should screen candidates and recommend three nominees to the governor, who would then appoint one of the three. In actual practice, governors have substantial influence over the nomination. "Judges
are made by governors who want them on the bench. ... All any governor, past or present, has to do is to drop an indirect hint to the commission that he wants so-and-so on the three-person list, and guess what—he or she is on it."²

After a judge is appointed and has served for at least one year, he or she must stand for retention, that is, the judge must win a majority among voters who have been asked the question: "Shall Judge so and so be retained?" Judges must also stand for retention at the end of their four-, six- or twelve-year terms. In the first year of the plan, a Jackson County Circuit Court Judge was ousted by voters.³ Otherwise every judge up for retention through 1990 was retained, so that the appointments were, in effect, lifetime appointments.

Since Missouri was the first state to adopt this procedure, it has become widely known as the Missouri Plan, though it has since been adopted in nine other states. Ironically the plan is used in Missouri for only some courts—the supreme court, the appellate courts, and the circuit courts (trial courts) in metropolitan areas. It does not apply to circuit courts in out-state Missouri, where judges are elected by partisan election.

Chart 9-1 indicates the percent of "yes" votes among all retention votes cast in each biennial election, combining results for all levels of courts. More than 68 percent of all retention votes were "yes" votes in the very first election in 1942. The proportions voting "yes" increased until 1954 and then decreased for thirty-six years. A sharp decline in approval in 1990 served as a wake-up call, indicating that a number of judges might not be retained in 1992 if the decline continued at the accelerated rate. Spurred into action, defenders of the plan commissioned studies by researchers, encouraged judges to meet with more media representatives and constituents, collected funds, and conducted a statewide campaign.

**The Retention Campaign**

Former U.S. Senator Tom Eagleton, former Kansas City mayor Richard Berkley, and newspaper publisher Avis Tucker led Citizens for Missouri's Courts, which raised $440,000, almost entirely from lawyers and
All Merit Plan Votes Combined
businesses. Monsanto and McDonnell-Douglas gave $17,000 each, and Southwestern Bell, Anheuser-Busch, and Ralston Purina each gave $15,000 or more. Major law firms gave $7,000 to $19,000. The group spent $354,000 and announced that the remaining $86,000 would be turned over to the chairmen of the next campaign. The indirect participation by Chief Justice Edward “Chip” Robertson in the fund-raising campaign and the campaign’s similarity to the pre–1940 practice of asking lawyers to contribute to judicial campaigns disturbed critics of the nonpartisan court plan.

In addition, the Missouri Bar spent $75,000 on a related educational effort, conducting a survey in which lawyers rated the judges who were up for retention and distributing the results. Listeners to the radio advertisements were invited to call an 800 number at the Missouri Bar and request a report on the lawyer survey. About 13,000 people did, and 150,000 of the survey reports were distributed.

Radio and Newspaper Ads

The campaign money was spent for newspaper and radio ads. The newspaper ads stated

NOT ALL
CANDIDATES
SPEND THEIR
TIME SHAKING
HANDS AND
KISSING BABIES.
Some actually do their job. Instead of wasting time blaming the other guy for every little thing that’s gone wrong. Who are they? They’re judges. And judges don’t campaign for re-election. Of course, if they don’t campaign, how are you supposed to know if they’ve done a good job or not? Simple. Before you vote call 1-800-829-4128 and get the Missouri Judicial Evaluation Survey. And you be the judge.

The radio ads were described in the St. Louis Post Dispatch as follows:

The ads feature a voice sounding like the comedian Tom Bodett, who stars in radio spots for the Motel 6 chain and who tells prospective guests, “We’ll leave the light on.”
One of the commercials likens Missouri courts to a refrigerator containing "pickled possum brains," warning voters against throwing out everything in the refrigerator—or from the Missouri courts—without checking first.

Another commercial says neither side at a football game would want the other side to bring its own referee, and adds that judges selected under Missouri's nonpartisan court plan are impartial.

Still another radio ad does a takeoff on President George Bush's controversial line "Read My Lips" and Governor Bill Clinton's comment that he never inhaled when he smoked marijuana as a college student.

**Election Results**

In the election, only one judge was rejected, and the proportion of "yes" votes averaged 5 percentage points higher than in 1990. The vote for all judges on retention ballots is indicated in Table 9-1. The second judge in the history of the plan to be rejected was John Hutcherson, Clay County Circuit Judge. In the lawyer's survey, Judge Hutcherson was recommended for retention by only 28 percent of the Clay County lawyers, 30 points lower than the Missouri judge with the second-lowest evaluation. Lawyers criticized the judge's demeanor in court and his stiff sentences, including a twenty-year prison term for a man who stole $27 worth of merchandise and pushed a store security guard. An organized group opposing Hutcherson was led by a woman upset with Hutcherson's decision to award custody of her three children to her ex-husband. Hutcherson's supporters organized a campaign committee of their own, and the judge appeared on radio talk shows and the speaking circuit.

On election day, both supporters and opponents handed literature to voters as they approached the polls, despite a downpour that soaked the poll workers most of the day. Literature from the opponents included a listing of the ratings given to each of the forty-two judges up for retention. Judge Hutcherson was on the bottom of the list, while his colleague on the Clay County Associate Circuit received the third-highest rating in the state. In the end, Judge Hutcherson received only a 49 percent "yes" vote and lost his position.
### Table 9-1. Judges in the 1992 Retention Election and Vote Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judge</th>
<th>Supreme Court</th>
<th>Yes vote</th>
<th>No vote</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duane Benton, appointed 1991</td>
<td>1,115,352</td>
<td>740,774</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elwood Lauren Thomas, appointed 1991</td>
<td>1,094,658</td>
<td>734,176</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court of Appeals, eastern district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James A. Pudlowski, appointed 1979, retained 1980</td>
<td>497,087</td>
<td>336,692</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifford H. Ahrens, appointed 1991</td>
<td>509,453</td>
<td>316,213</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul J. Simon, appointed 1979, retained 1980</td>
<td>533,163</td>
<td>302,979</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathianne Knaup Crane, appointed 1990</td>
<td>491,725</td>
<td>312,058</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert E. Crist, appointed 1979, retained 1980</td>
<td>487,950</td>
<td>313,990</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circuit Court Judges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael J. Maloney, 90</td>
<td>37,568</td>
<td>18,983</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9-1. Continued

**Circuit Court 16 Jackson County (Kansas City)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circuit Court 16 Jackson County (Kansas City)</th>
<th>134,942</th>
<th>87,179</th>
<th>61</th>
<th>William F. Mauer, 79, 80, 86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>146,242</td>
<td>77,302</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Edith L. Messina, 84, 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135,796</td>
<td>82,465</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Jay A. Daugherty, 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137,101</td>
<td>84,905</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Vernon Scoville, 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133,733</td>
<td>87,510</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Robert L. Trout, 87, 88</td>
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</table>

**Circuit Court 21 St. Louis County**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circuit Court 21 St. Louis County</th>
<th>260,275</th>
<th>173,213</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>William M. Corrigan, 72, 74, 80, 86</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>276,951</td>
<td>153,152</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Kenneth Weinstock, 84, 86</td>
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<td>281,766</td>
<td>147,270</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>James R. Hartenbach, 83, 86</td>
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<td>256,179</td>
<td>170,622</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Richard F. Provaznik, 79, 80, 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>265,563</td>
<td>147,197</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Larry L. Kendrick, associate circuit judge, 85, 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258,673</td>
<td>151,918</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Philip Sweeney, 78, 80, 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273,302</td>
<td>155,022</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Melvyn Wiesman, 79, 80, 86</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>255,337</td>
<td>166,285</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Tony L. Eberwein, 78, 80, 84, 88</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>287,720</td>
<td>140,375</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Sandra Farragut-Hemphill, 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259,816</td>
<td>163,336</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Ellis Gregory, Jr., 78, 80, 84, 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Associate circuit judges**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associate circuit judges</th>
<th>70,048</th>
<th>29,020</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>Booker T. Shaw, 83, 84, 88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68,011</td>
<td>30,224</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Henry Edward Autrey, 86, 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** For circuit court judges, the first figure indicates the year appointed and the succeeding figures indicate the year(s) the judge was retained.
Symposium

Stacy Woelfel, moderator. I'm Stacy Woelfel, news director at KOMU-TV in Columbia, a faculty member of the School of Journalism and a graduate student in the Department of Political Science. Our first speaker is Duane Benton of the Missouri Supreme Court, who was retained in the November 1992 election. Judge Benton received his undergraduate degree in political science at Northwestern University, and a law degree from Yale University. He served as campaign manager and administrative assistant for Congressman Wendell Bailey, and as a lawyer in private practice in Jefferson City. Just before his 1991 appointment to the Supreme Court, he was Director of the Department of Revenue for Missouri.

Judge Duane Benton. When you are first appointed to the Supreme Court, everybody is happy, there is a big glow, and you get many congratulatory letters. For me that glow ended quickly. At the first meeting I had in court after my August 1991 appointment, someone presented data from a poll conducted by University of Missouri scholars which was absolutely scary. The report not only indicated the possibility that some judges would not be retained, but also indicated the lack of information held by citizens about judges and the selection process. One-third of the respondents didn't know the difference between state judges and federal judges, a very heavy indictment in rural Missouri where federal judges are not popular. In addition, the poll showed widespread ignorance about what judges and courts do.

The poll confirmed impressions that judges already had. In 1990, we had seen judges like Jack Gant fall below 60 percent “yes” in their retention vote. Gant is very well known in Jackson County, very much of a civic leader. He was a state senator for ten years and still goes to numerous funerals and weddings because he knows so many people. If Jack Gant wasn’t going to get a good retention vote, who would get one?

Those of us who were scheduled to be on the retention ballot in 1992 immediately said, “What do we do about this?” In years past the appellate judges had not conducted any campaigns. We decided, first of all, that anything we did had to conform with judicial ethical standards. We asked the Commission on the Retirement, Removal and Discipline of Judges what we could and could not do. The commission said that if we
Judicial Retention Elections

had active opposition, we could do almost anything. This had happened in California where Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other justices encountered strong opposition campaigns when they were on the ballot for retention in 1986. In response, there was also a tremendous effort in their behalf. Nevertheless all three lost.

Since we didn’t have active opposition, we decided to conduct what we called an educational campaign, thus avoiding the media questions of “Aren’t you campaigning?” We began by meeting with the news media in November 1991. We went to the major media markets of Missouri and had breakfasts with the news media—the major TV, radio, and newspaper outlets. Those breakfasts met with uniformly good response. The media people believed that in the past the supreme court had simply not communicated.

Two of the justices were retiring; the five of us who were continuing met as a court with the Associated Press and the editors of the major newspapers, television, and radio stations when they came to Jefferson City in January or February 1992. Most of the media agreed that judges should be described in the voters’ guides that come out just before the election. Nevertheless, when I got the voters’ guides out of the newspapers that come into the supreme court, we were in only about half of them. The other half never even mentioned the judges on the retention ballot.

We began a conscious effort to reach out to the public. On the ballot in 1992 were not only the two newly appointed supreme court judges, Elwood Thomas and me, but also fourteen of the thirty-two judges who serve on the state court of appeals. Our real concern was that there might be a mass throw-them-out, “vote no” reaction. Early in this campaign I pulled up behind a bumper sticker that said: “Fire them all; vote no on all of them.” Well, we’re the only people on the ballot on whom you can vote “no.”

In addition to the Rotary Clubs, the Lions Clubs, and the Optimist Clubs, Judge Thomas and I decided to take three weeks in August and hold forums in each city in Missouri that had a daily newspaper. If you hit cities with daily newspapers, you get most of the communities with radio stations or television stations. We thought that an August tour would have some impact on the general election, yet be early enough
that it would seem like milquetoast electioneering rather than blatant electioneering. The courts of appeals judges were often with us, at least one or two of them.

Most of our forty-six forums were well attended. In about one of three forums, we would have a gadfly. Usually, these were persons who thought that gold was the only monetary standard and that the money in your pocket was worthless. They would argue that the federal income tax was illegal, ignoring the Sixteenth Amendment passed for that purpose. They were easy to handle, but they embarrassed the local people no end.

Most forums had a good turnout of local people, in some cases school board and city council members. The exception was in the metropolitan areas; the closer we got to center city, the poorer the attendance got and the less representative it was. In rural areas, people were attracted by the novelty of our forums. People would say, We've never had Supreme Court judges in Brookfield or in Poplar Bluff before. After Labor Day, we did almost nothing. If the media requested an interview, of course, we accommodated that.

Citizens for Missouri's Courts, a group headed by Tom Eagleton, Richard Berkley, and Avis Tucker and a lot of big name people, began their efforts about that time. They raised $440,000, most of which was put into a radio campaign the last month of the campaign. We had no knowledge of what they were doing, none whatsoever. In fact, several judges in the big cities, and certainly many big-city lawyers, would call us, upset with that radio campaign. They thought it was too hokey, too rural, too non-judicial, and too nonprofessional. We had nothing to do with that.

**Election Results**

The results were that Judge Thomas and I were retained, each with about 60 percent "yes" vote, which is about a 5 percent bump over 1990, the first increase in a long time. Females running on the court of appeals—Judge Breckenridge in Kansas City and Judge Crane in St. Louis—went as high as 64 percent.

All over Missouri, judges got 59 percent "yes" votes or more, with one exception, John Hutcherson from Clay County, who lost by 1 percent, about one thousand votes. Judge Hutcherson was the only judge in the
state who got less than 50 percent approval in the lawyers poll, and he
got only 28 percent approval. I might add that he was originally ap­
pointed as associate circuit judge and was retained in 1982, 1986, and
1990, though by just one percent in his last election. Ironically he got
promoted to circuit judge, which is one notch higher. By virtue of that
new appointment, he had to go on the ballot again.

All in all, our educational efforts were well received. I think we should
continue such efforts in future elections. Once we have taken this step,
we can't go back.

_Stacy Woelfel, moderator._ Dr. David Leuthold is professor emeritus of
political science at the University of Missouri–Columbia. Dr. Leuthold
received B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Montana and a
Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Leuthold
taught public opinion courses and has published numerous articles on
public opinion in Missouri. He and Professor Casey conducted two
studies of judicial retention elections, financed by grants from the Mis­
souri Bar.

_Professor David Leuthold._ Greg Casey and I conducted the survey in
1991 that Judge Benton referred to, and a second study in 1992 that
included an exit poll on election day, and a telephone survey immedi­
ately after the election. I will report on some of the findings from the
telephone survey and Professor Casey will report on some of the find­
ings from the exit poll.

The decline in the percent voting “yes” on retention of judges has
continued for many years. Other states have a shorter history of judicial
retention voting but similar patterns. Illinois, Nebraska, and Iowa had
retention votes above 80 percent “yes” in the 1960s and 1970s, then only
in the 70 to 79 percent range in the 1980s. The average percent “yes” fell
at least 5 percentage points between 1988 and 1990 in Arizona, Colo­
rado, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas. Missouri had the steepest decline—12
percentage points—among the nine states that had judicial retention
elections in both 1988 and 1990. Missouri also had the lowest average
percent “yes” in 1990 among the nine states with judicial retention
elections that year, 6 percentage points lower than second-lowest Indiana.

Why has there been such a long and continuous decline? At one time
or another, analysts might have suggested the civil rights revolution of
the 1960s, the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, and the Watergate scandals of the 1970s, but the decline began before any of these events and continued beyond each of them. One of my colleagues suggested that the only factor that matches this time period is the increasing significance of television.

A partial or related explanation is provided by the measures of trust in government. In 1958 political scientists devised a public opinion survey measure of trust in government, measuring it that year and then most election years since 1964. Those measures indicated a steady decline in trust in government, a decline parallel to the decline in retention voting for judges. This suggests that the decline in retention voting for judges is part of a larger phenomena of decline in trust in government. That decline appears to be, in turn, part of a larger decline of confidence in most large institutions in society.

In our telephone survey with 676 respondents, we found support for the relationship between attitudes toward government in general and vote on retention of judges, in a strong correlation between voting "yes" on judges and voting for the reelection of incumbents in other offices. Among those who said they voted for reelection of all incumbents, 64 percent voted for retention of the judges. Among those people who voted against all incumbents, 15 percent voted for retention of judges. We also found that the likelihood of voting "yes" on judges correlated with the evaluation by respondents of the judicial branch of government, which is not surprising, but also with the evaluation of the legislative and executive branches of government, indicating that the general attitude toward government was affecting the judicial retention vote.

Generally, respondents cast similar votes for all judges for whom they voted. About 40 percent of the respondents voted "yes" on every judge for whom they cast a ballot. Another 20 percent voted "no" in every case in which they voted on judicial retention. About 10 percent cast "yes" for some judges and "no" votes for others, and about 30 percent said they didn't vote for or against any judges. Some of that last group indicated that they may have voted in the judicial retention election but they could not remember how they had voted, since two or three or four days had now passed.

Stacy Woelfel, moderator. Greg Casey is Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Missouri–Columbia. Professor Casey received his B.A. from the College of St. Thomas and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Georgetown University. Professor Casey teaches public law courses and has published research articles on popular attitudes toward court decisions. He will report on the exit polls.

**Professor Gregory Casey.** On election day, we conducted exit polls with two thousand people at more than twenty precincts in ten locations across the state. The precincts constituted a stratified sample, classified according to the proportion of “yes” votes cast in the precinct in a previous retention election. Both major metropolitan areas and several rural counties were included in our exit polling. The weather was horrible that day with a heavy rain storm across much of the state. That probably affected the representativeness of our sample, but the final statewide results were fairly close to the actual results and to the telephone survey.

We asked about half of the respondents for their reasons for voting “yes” or “no” or for not voting in the judicial retention election. The reason most frequently given was that the respondents had no information. Not surprisingly, this was the reason given by 93 percent of those who did not vote, but it was also the reason given by 15 percent of the people who voted “yes” on retention of judges, and 10 percent of the people who voted “no” on retention of judges. You are probably asking immediately, “Among these people with no information, why did some vote “yes” and others vote no?” We don’t know the answer to that question yet.

I coded the incredibly varied set of reasons for voting for and against judges, finding these patterns:

27 percent of the reasons people gave for voting for judges involved information that put the judges in a positive light, including

8 percent who cited personal experience, such as serving on a jury, and meeting judges personally. One St. Louisan said, “I saw a flyer posted at Teamster Hall which said vote for the judges. A Kansas Citian responded, “Well, I just happened to get a flyer from Freedom Inc. and they recommended voting for retention so that’s why I’m doing it.”

3 percent who referred to the 800 telephone number that was advertised on radio, and

2 percent who mentioned the radio ads.
Twenty-three percent of the reasons involved generalized trust or respect for the judges' performance, talking about the integrity or status of the judge, or how judges represent the effective voice of the community.

Seventeen percent of the explanations were from people who had no adverse information, saying in effect, "If I haven't heard anything bad about them, I will vote for them."

We got some special reasons. Some people explained that they voted for a particular judge because she was a woman, and four people gave a classic defense of the merit plan. "I believe in appointment and review of judges as opposed to a party election system. For this to be tenable, those judges who appear to be qualified and effective must be supported."

What reasons were given by people who voted against retention? Thirty-two percent of the explanations given by "no" voters referred to the need to clean house. Judge Benton referred to the bumper sticker that gave him a sinking feeling. Some people felt that there should be a limit on the number of terms of judges, so they voted "no."

Twenty-six percent of the voters reported that they were motivated by performance problems of the courts. People talked about crime rates, the supreme court decision in the Cruzan case, and the desegregation decisions. One lady said, "Well, I really want to vote against Judge Clark [of the United States District Court] from Kansas City, but I can't vote against him so I'm going to do what I can." She voted against every judge.

And there were miscellaneous comments, including some from a few people who voted against a judge because she was a woman.

When we classified voters according to the amount of information that they had, we found that the most informed voters tended to pick and choose a little bit more, whereas the less informed tended to vote for or against all judges.

**Questions from the Audience**

*Stacy Woelfel, moderator:* How does the information that voters have about judicial retention elections compare with the information they have about other elections?

*Professor Gregory Casey:* One indication of level of information is whether or not people cast ballots in a race. People who don't know
anything about the candidates or an issue are less likely to vote. The number who voted on each of the ten constitutional amendments on the ballot was higher than the number who voted for and against Judges Benton and Thomas. In Boone County, the number who voted for candidates for county treasurer and public administrator was substantially higher than the number who voted on either Judge Benton’s or Judge Thomas’s retention. Some people, however, may be skipping a vote because they assume that the result is foreordained, that all judges always get reelected, so that an individual vote doesn’t really matter. That would suggest that the vote would be higher if people knew that some judges might be defeated.

Stacy Woelfel, moderator: Let me ask about television. Do you have any studies that link television with voting behavior, such as in judicial retention elections?

Professor David Leuthold: Using 1968 data, Michael Robinson found that people who relied solely upon television for their news were more likely to have anti-government feelings than those who relied upon other sources for their news. Robinson also found that people who relied solely upon television for their news in 1968 were more likely to vote for George Wallace than people who relied upon other sources of information. He suggested that television was providing people with an anti-government attitude, which was similar to George Wallace’s theme.8

Question: TV has been a big user of courts and drama; the courts shown on television have scant resemblance to the courts as they actually exist. I think that is the issue. The actual courts get compared with Perry Mason, and the actual courts can’t measure up to that standard.

Judge Duane Benton: The three most recognized judges in America are: third with 9 percent is Chief Justice Rehnquist; second at about 20 percent is Clarence Thomas. Guess what judge is first, with 50-plus percent. Yes, it’s Judge Wapner from television. That proves your point.

Question: Did you find any indication that people were concerned about the governor who appointed the judges? I am not an admirer of Governor Ashcroft, so I gave some thought to voting “no” because he had replaced all of the supreme court justices.

Professor Gregory Casey: There were three or four people out of per-
haps one thousand exit-poll respondents who said they voted against every judge because they were all appointed by Governor Ashcroft.

**Judge Duane Benton:** Some of the media people that we met suggested discontent with the governor as a reason for the decline in “yes” voting on retention. When people saw the pattern over time, they would realize that the decline began before Ashcroft was elected.

**Question:** Are there any studies regarding the retention of judges that come from political backgrounds in contrast to law school backgrounds?

**Professor David Leuthold:** The retention vote for judges almost always clustered in a narrow range. In the judicial evaluation survey, the approval ratings by attorneys ranged from 96 percent down to 58 percent, excluding Judge Hutcherson, but the public retention vote within constituencies ranged only 2 to 7 percentage points. For example, in Jackson County circuit, the lowest judge got 60 percent “yes” vote, and the highest judge got 65 percent, a 5 percentage point difference. Historically, the strongest predictor for any judge on the ballot is the proportion of the vote that another judge on that same ballot got. The next strongest predictor is the proportion of vote that any judge got two years before. The best predictor of any judge’s percentage is not his or her background but the attitude of the public that year.

**Judge Duane Benton:** As we went around the state, people in some towns would tell Judge Thomas, whose background is in teaching and practicing law that he wasn’t nearly well enough known around the state. At another town they would tell me that I had been involved too much in politics. We would laugh as we were heading to the next meeting: Is this town going to tell us that we are too political or not political enough? In the end we had almost exactly the same percentage of the vote.

**Stacy Woelfel, moderator:** We have used up our time. We thank the panelists, and we thank the audience for your attention.
Campaign Fund-raising in Missouri

People are willing to give only so much even if they agree wholeheartedly with your beliefs and even if they support you as a person and a candidate. You can ask someone for money only so many times. The well goes dry. There were a lot of turnips out there that got bled to death this cycle.

—Jack Oliver, Finance Director for Senator Christopher Bond

More money was spent on Missouri election campaigns in 1992 than in any of the previous fourteen years in which full disclosure was required. That expense reflected the high level of competition for many offices, the willingness of candidates to spend more time raising money than ever before, the increased skill in raising funds, and the increased willingness of citizens and groups to give money, a willingness reflecting, in part, the increased wealth in the state.

Record expenditures were made in many races. The amounts spent in the races for governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, congress, and the state house of representatives were not only the highest since full disclosure began in the middle of 1978, but probably in the history of the state. The data are provided in Table 10-1, with the expenditures for earlier years converted to 1992 dollars to remove the impact of inflation.

Even so, none of the campaigns ranked as the most expensive in the
fifteen years that Missouri law has required full disclosure, once the data are converted to 1992 dollars. That distinction, as indicated by Table 10-2, is held by Christopher Bond’s 1986 Senate campaign. In addition, two issue campaigns, the anti-Proposition B campaign (nuclear power plant operations) in 1984 and the anti–Right-to-Work campaign in 1978, also spent more than the most expensive 1992 campaign, William Webster’s campaign for governor.

Christopher “Kit” Bond and Richard Gephardt have been the most successful Missouri fund-raisers in the last fourteen years, and probably in the history of the state. Bond’s campaign expenditures, in 1992 dollars, exceed $16 million during the fourteen-year period, a period that included his successful gubernatorial campaign in 1980 and his two successful Senate races, in 1986 and 1992. Congressman Richard Gephardt raised over $8 million in 1992 dollars for his Missouri congressional campaigns from 1978 through 1992, plus another $7 million to $8 million in individual and committee contributions (plus $2.9 million in public funds) for his 1988 presidential campaign. Bond’s and Gephardt’s totals are well above the $11 million raised by John Ashcroft and the $7 million to $9 million raised by Vince Schoemehl, Bill Webster, Harriett Woods, and John Danforth during that time period. Mel Carnahan raised almost $6 million during that time period.

Bond’s total indicates that, on the average, he raised more than $21,000 per week every week for the fifteen years between 1978 and 1992 (in 1992 dollars). Even Mel Carnahan, the eighth most successful fund-raiser, averaged more than $7,400 per week (in 1992 dollars) over the fifteen-year period.

The data in Table 10-2 also illustrate another sobering conclusion: Heavy expenditures help, but they do not guarantee election victory. Over one-third of these $2 million-plus campaigns were losing campaigns. Admittedly, some of the candidates won a primary before losing the general election, and all of the losing campaigns lost to another campaign on the list, but fund-raisers must find it particularly galling to have so much success that they top the $2 million mark, yet still lose the election.

In 1992, as in previous years, much of the money came from the St. Louis area. St. Louis County has the largest population of any county,
Table 10-1. Expenditures in State and Federal Contests in Missouri, 1980–1992 (All figures are converted to 1992 dollars and presented to nearest thousand.)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>11,046</td>
<td>10,949</td>
<td>7,137</td>
<td>17,906</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>2,151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>843</td>
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<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,141</td>
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<td>Attorney General</td>
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<td>991</td>
<td>2,179</td>
<td>4,253</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
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<td>162</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>630</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal, statewide</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,539</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,503</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,448</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,252</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Senator</td>
<td>4,375</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>13,486</td>
<td>5,781</td>
<td>6,725</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>7,254</td>
<td>4,753</td>
<td>5,769</td>
<td>6,908</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>11,225</td>
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<td>State Senate</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,818</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Represent’ves</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>3,182</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>3,147</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>3,885</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial offices</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>375</td>
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<td>Statewide ballot</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>measures</td>
<td>4,053</td>
<td>6,651</td>
<td>8,144</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>2,277</td>
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<td>Metro counties</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>7,309</td>
<td>1,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, these offices</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,872</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,630</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,719</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,674</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,941</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,645</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,157</strong></td>
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1. Data for statewide contests includes not only the expenditures submitted on reports for primary election and general election expenditures, but also expenditures submitted by incumbent committee reports in the years prior to the election and supplemental committee reports in the years after the election.

2. No Senate elections were held in 1984 or 1990.

3. The 1980 total includes $3.2 million spent against Proposition Number 11, a nuclear waste disposal regulation. The 1982 total includes $3.8 million spent for and against Proposition A, a big truck referendum. The 1984 total includes $6.5 million spent against Proposition B, a nuclear power plant operation issue. The 1988 total includes $2.2 million spent for and against Constitutional Amendment No. 8, a health care issue sometimes called Medassist, and $1.16 million for a 4/7ths bond issue proposal.

4. Metropolitan counties are Clay, Greene, Jackson, Jefferson, St. Louis County and St. Louis city. Boone and St. Charles are not included because they were not required to report during the entire time period. The 1990 total includes $5.2 million spent in St. Louis County, much of it in spirited primary and general election contests for county executive.
### Table 10-2. 25 Most Expensive Campaigns in Missouri, 1978–1992 (in 1992 $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$7.6 million</td>
<td>Kit Bond for U.S. Senate, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6.5 million</td>
<td>Against Proposition B (nuclear power plant operations), 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6.3 million</td>
<td>Against Amendment 23 (right-to-work), 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6.1 million</td>
<td>John Ashcroft for Governor, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.9 million</td>
<td>Bill Webster for Governor, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.9 million</td>
<td>Harriett Woods for U.S. Senate, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.5 million</td>
<td>Joe Teasdale for Governor, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.0 million</td>
<td>Kit Bond for U.S. Senate, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.7 million</td>
<td>John Danforth for U.S. Senate, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.3 million</td>
<td>John Ashcroft for Governor, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.1 million</td>
<td>Vince Schoemehl for Governor, 1992 (primary only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.1 million</td>
<td>Mel Carnahan for Governor, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3.8 million</td>
<td>Kit Bond for Governor, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3.2 million</td>
<td>Against Proposition 11 (nuclear waste disposal), 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3.2 million</td>
<td>Richard Gephardt for Congress, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.8 million</td>
<td>Ken Rothman for Governor, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.8 million</td>
<td>For Amendment 23 (right-to-work), 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.6 million</td>
<td>John Danforth for U.S. Senate, 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.6 million</td>
<td>Gene McNary for Governor, 1984 (primary only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.6 million</td>
<td>Roy Blunt for Governor, 1992 (primary only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.4 million</td>
<td>Tom Eagleton for U.S. Senate, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.2 million</td>
<td>Buzz Westfall for St. Louis County executive, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.2 million</td>
<td>Yes for Proposition A (big truck referendum), April 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.0 million</td>
<td>William Webster for Attorney General, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.0 million</td>
<td>Gene McNary for U.S. Senate, 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Missouri Annual Campaign Finance Reports, 1978–1990 (Secretary of State, Jefferson City, MO), and 1992 Missouri Annual Campaign Finance Report (Missouri Ethics Commission, Jefferson City). Total expenditures for each campaign have been converted to 1992 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index as a deflator. Primary and general election costs have been combined for candidates who were successful in the primary. Expenditures include funds spent by incumbent committees prior to filing for office, and funds reported in supplemental reports in the years after the election.
about one-fifth of the state’s total. In addition, per capita income in St. Louis County is regularly the highest in the state, well above that of whatever county is in second place. Consequently political fund-raisers gravitate toward St. Louis. An analysis by Rich Hood found that, of the funds received by the five major candidates for governor:

- 46 percent came from the St. Louis area (including Illinois suburbs),
- 16 percent came from the Kansas City area (including Kansas suburbs),
- 27 percent came from other sections of Missouri, and
- 11 percent came from other states.

**Symposium**

Gayla Thomas, moderator. I am the director of the campaign reporting division, in the secretary of state’s office. This division receives all of the campaign finance disclosure reports filed by candidates running for statewide, local and federal office. A significant difference between Missouri and federal law is that Missouri has no limits on how much money candidates can raise or spend, or on the sources of funds. Federal law prohibits candidates for federal office from accepting contributions from corporations or labor unions, but Missouri law has no such prohibition. Missouri law emphasizes full disclosure.

Our first presentation today will be by Liz Zelenka, who served as director of finance for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Mel Carnahan. She had previously served as finance director in 1991 for Harris Wofford, who defeated U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburg to become U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania.

Liz Zelenka, finance director for Mel Carnahan. While working in Senator Wofford’s office in Washington, D.C., I got a call from Mel Carnahan and Mark Farinella, the campaign manager, asking me to visit my old home area of St. Louis and talk with them about the gubernatorial race. I had a really good discussion with them and felt that there was tremendous potential here for a change. I left Washington last March and came on board Mel’s campaign. I had the responsibility of raising $1.5 million in the four months before the primary, more than $12,000 every day of the week. We knew that we could never out-raise
mayor Schoemehl, but at least we could raise enough money to give him a run for his money on TV.

To quite an extent, I used the model I had developed in the Wofford race in Pennsylvania. In this day and age, a candidate can raise more money more quickly on the phone than by doing fund-raising events. Sometimes, you have to use fund-raising events as a vehicle, but our preference is to have the candidate make calls, making very specific targeted calls to a priority list of people.

Mel had a young man working with him on a daily basis, making phone calls to solicit people for campaign contributions. I streamlined that process. Because of the time constraints and because there are no campaign limits in the state, we prioritized his calls, focusing on people who can contribute large amounts—$10,000 or $20,000. The question was, Who were the people who could and maybe would contribute x-number of dollars. At all times, we had a list of two hundred to three hundred top people that Mel would be calling, soliciting for funds.

I hired several young people, enthusiastic, assertive, high-energy people just out of college. I put two in Kansas City, one in Jefferson City, and four in St. Louis, all of them ready to follow up after Mel made phone calls. Mel would call a potential contributor, tell him about the campaign and ask him to help in the campaign. The comments were very specific, tied to our needs. Within 24 hours, one of the nearby young people would contact that person and say: “Sir, I know you talked with Mel about raising $10,000 for us. Can I come over to your office? Can we sit down and talk about how we are going to do that?” We were constantly branching out, constantly trying to expand our network of fund-raisers, while keeping Mel very focused on what he needed to do.

Daily schedule. During the campaign, Mel Carnahan’s typical day, Monday through Friday, followed this schedule:

8 to 8:45 A.M.—a fund-raising breakfast;
9 A.M. to noon—telephoning, raising money;
noon to 1 P.M.—luncheon meeting with political leaders, maybe fund-raising;
1 to 5 P.M.—back on the phone.
The evenings were taken up with political meetings. Mel spent his
weekends on field activities and then was back on the phone Sunday from 6 to 9 P.M.

It was really quite intense. It is really tough to be on the phone with people whom you barely know, saying, "I'm running for governor; I need your support; can you help me?" Mel had to be specific, to ask each person to write a check for $1,000 or more and to arrange to send a staff person the next day to pick up that check. Because he was focused and because he was willing to listen to my ideas and suggestions, we were able to raise the money we needed.

I had a full-time person who did nothing but sit with Mel and dial phone numbers. If you are running for office, you don't make phone calls in your campaign office, you get a separate location that's quiet. You have two phones there. The candidate will be talking on one phone. The other person is dialing numbers on the other phone and contacting the person, ready to hand that phone to the candidate when he finishes his call on the first phone.

We kept very, very focused and kept right on track. There were times that Mel wanted to go out into the field, to go to this event or that one, but we made a conscious decision to have a family or field staff surrogate take care of events so that Mel could remain on the phone.

I worked very closely with our press department. Whenever we had a positive press release, positive news, we would send copies to our top two hundred to three hundred contributors overnight, via fax machine. Also, those releases were faxed to the top two or three hundred people that Mel would be telephoning the next week. Everybody in that campaign office knew how much we were raising and was a part of the process.

Our task was complicated by the presence of Mayor Vince Schoemehl in the race. St. Louis has a tremendous capacity for fund-raising, but many people from that area were hesitant about contributing to a campaign against the mayor. They indicated that they might be interested after the primary. Before the primary, our top donors had addresses in Cape Girardeau, St. Joseph, Kansas City, and similar cities. Few had St. Louis addresses. Once we won the primary, a number of people from the St. Louis area came on board, helping us raise funds.
Fund-raising is a professional task. In the general election, the campaign manager told me that I needed to raise $2 million in ninety days, which averages to more than $20,000 per day. We anticipated that if we raised $2 million we could be competitive with Bill Webster, though we would probably still not have as much as he had. You have to keep raising to be competitive since TV time is so expensive. TV time in the St. Louis market can run $140,000 a week.

*David Welch, fundraiser for Republican congressional candidate Bert Walker.* I was involved with Gene McNary's race for the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1984. We raised $1.5 million, much of which was Gene McNary's personal money. Even so, it was much easier to raise money in $20,000 or $25,000 checks in that state-level campaign than it was to raise money for a federal campaign in $1,000 checks. Money for a senatorial or congressional race is much harder to raise because there is a $1,000 limit per person per election.

Bert Walker was a candidate for the Republican nomination for Congress in the Second District, which is mostly in St. Louis County. His candidacy had instant credibility because he was first cousin to President Bush as well as a successful St. Louis businessman.

From day one, the assumption was that we would win the primary and would be running against Congresswoman Joan Kelly Horn in November. Everything was based upon that assumption, which turned out to be a major error. Nevertheless, in making our fund-raising plan, we focused on how much we could raise for the whole campaign.

I presented a budget of $1.5 million, believing that we could raise much more than that in the primary and general election combined. That budget included $400,000 in fund-raising expenses, including a major direct-mail effort to raise substantial money from small donors. However, the budget adopted for the campaign was $1 million.

The decision to have a $1–million budget included a major decision to concentrate a lot of effort on large donors. "If we have $500,000 for the primary, we will be in great shape. I don't care if it's five hundred $1,000 checks." To some degree such statements were made in jest, but there was not a concern about what our average contribution was. From a political standpoint, that was a major mistake, because when you get a person to send you a five-dollar check, that person is going to vote for
you, that person is going to be a contact, that person is going to take part in the campaign.

The second mistake we made was our underestimation of the candidacy of State Representative Jim Talent. We thought that Talent would not be a candidate. If he did become a candidate, we thought we would be able to out-spend him by a four-to-one margin, because we would be able to keep him from raising money. We assumed that our network of contacts would help to shut off his sources of money. That also was a major error. I have not seen the final figures, but I suspect he raised around $300,000. We spent around $650,000, so we were at two to one rather than four to one, mainly because he raised more than we thought he would be able to.

Where was the money going to come from? We knew that much of it would come from large donors in St. Louis.

We planned also a major effort outside Missouri. We looked at four areas outside Missouri: (1) the New York financial community, which we thought would be open to us because Bert was president of a brokerage firm; (2) Chicago, because his brokerage firm, Stifel Nicolaus and Company, was very big there; (3) Washington, D.C., because of Bert Walker’s connection with the president; and (4) major donors to George Bush’s campaigns. The New York and Chicago efforts were very good. The Washington effort was not as successful as we had hoped because of the decline in the president’s popularity. Our attempt to raise money from major Bush donors fell flat. We had a former cabinet secretary, very much a Bush insider, write a letter to two hundred big donors, such as state finance chairmen for Bush. That letter did not raise enough money to pay its own expenses, which weren’t very high.

We were under the impression, and I think, very correctly, that if you have enough money, you can dominate an election. That money has to be spent properly and you have to have the most money in the last thirty days. The largest money problem we had was that we didn’t have a specific budget for various time periods. Jim Talent was able to spend at the same level as us the last thirty days of the election.

Part of the reason that we didn’t raise more money was that it was too easy to raise money early. As a result, the candidate did not become accustomed to making the numerous personal requests that major fund-
raising requires. That meant that later in the campaign, he did not want to go out and make a lot of personal visits. It is hard to ask a person for money. Candidates don't like to do it. They despise doing it, and when you have money flowing in, they ask why. They point to the $500 checks which came in the mail. We respond that we wanted $1,000 checks from those people, and that we can't get the additional $500 now because the contributor will say "I have already given you money." The donor gave, but he didn't give as much as we wanted. [laughter]

Because we didn't have a direct mail base, we did not have a large base of contributors. At the end we needed more money, but many of our contributors had already given us the maximum allowed under federal law, so we couldn't ask them for more. In fact, we sent back lots of checks because they exceeded the maximum. We needed a larger base of smaller donors. I don't want to overstate the case, because we had a good base. We had two thousand donors, which in a congressional race is very good, but we needed more. Gene McNary had over nine thousand donors on his 1984 list.

Another problem we faced is that contributors who contribute early also push you to spend early. They say, "I have given you this money, why don't you spend it?" We answer that we are saving it for the end. The contributor responds, "Candidate A is doing this, and candidate B is doing that. Why aren't you doing these things?" That syndrome helped to push the money out.

Bert is a gentleman who needed money in the last few weeks but hated to ask for it, so he fluctuated back and forth. On the one hand, he would be thinking, "We have to have more money and I'm not going to put any more in," so we need to get more money from these people." On the other hand, he would say, "These contributors are my friends. They have already done more than anybody could expect. I can't ask them for any more money."

Another problem was that Jim Talent began to look more like a winner. This meant that while we got a lot of personal money, we got very little political action committee money. The chairman of a company would give us his personal $1,000 check, but he was not willing to have the PAC director write out a $5,000 check. For that he would have had to answer to the board of directors or to the stockholders. That hurt us.
That's the role money played in our campaign. We did raise a lot of money, but we needed a broader base and more small donors. The role of the small donor in an election process cannot be overestimated. It is an expensive way to raise money but it is a necessary one.

Jack Oliver, finance director for Senator Kit Bond. As David Welch said, it is much different raising money on the federal level than at the state level. A lot of people who had donated to Kit Bond's gubernatorial campaigns in 1980 and 1976 wrote corporate checks, because Missouri law allows corporations to contribute. Federal election laws do not allow any corporate money in political campaigns. Contributors to federal campaigns have to write a personal check rather than a company check. It's a lot harder to get money out of someone if they know that it is their own rather than some big budget that they have in their company.

We raised about $4.6 million during this campaign cycle. That was $1 million less than was raised for him in 1986. We attributed that to the fact that it was a very different political climate this time. Much of that had to do with the assumption that Kit's opponent would come from a pack of thirteen, none of whom had high statewide name recognition. Some potential contributors were assuming that Kit wouldn't have a tough race. In fact, it was a very difficult race. Fortunately, we survived the Democratic tide, but it was difficult to raise money from previous contributors because we didn't have a well-known opponent, someone like Harriett Woods who was campaigning every day and being covered in all the newspapers and major media markets.

Another problem was that candidates in the governor's race raised $17 million or more. People are willing to give only so much even if they agree wholeheartedly with your beliefs and even if they support you as a person and a candidate. You can ask someone for money only so many times. The well goes dry. There were a lot of turnips out there that got bled to death this cycle.

We basically had four areas in which we raised money. First, we had a major donor program—people who wanted to donate significantly to the Senator. It was set up so that you could donate to the maximum but there were different time periods in which you could donate. There are a lot of people who would like to give $2,000 to a campaign, but can do it
only if they can write eight $250 checks over a period of time. We set up a program to coordinate the major donors.

Secondly, we had an extensive direct mail program. There were over 18,000 people who contributed to this campaign! A lot of those were small donors. Direct mail has lost its glamor as the way to raise a lot of money but it is extremely important because of the combination of small amounts of money and votes. As David said, when somebody gives you a check, even if it is only $5, they have committed to your election. Checks like that turn into votes. They are extremely important and cannot be overlooked.

Third, we had a PAC fund-raising program. We raised a significant amount of money from PACs. I don't have the exact number because the final report is not finished yet. About one-third of our funds came from PACs, which is a comparatively small proportion for an incumbent Senator.

Fourth, we raised money through events. Kit was in Washington most of the time because the Senate was in session, so we had to figure out the best way to allocate the limited time available for the campaign. We had fund-raisers in almost every major city in the state. St. Louis is obviously important for fund-raising, having large numbers of people who are financially well off, in addition to lots of companies. One of Kit's biggest strengths is out-state Missouri, the areas outside Kansas City and St. Louis. We had a lot of events in Springfield, Joplin, and Cape Girardeau. We did fund-raising also in places like Kennett and Moberly. You name the place, we were there.

Two other things I wanted to mention: one is the effect of the climate of opinion on fund-raising. Perception is reality when it comes to fund-raising. If you are perceived to have a race, you can raise more money. If potential donors perceive that you are not going to have any problem, the perception makes it tougher to raise money. If a poll shows you up by thirty points and the governor's race is much closer, potential donors are going to be more apt to give money to the governor's race than to yours. We had that problem in the beginning because the polls showed us well ahead of Geri Rothman-Serot, our opponent. As the race became closer, it helped us to raise money, but it also helped her. She was very effective in using the polls to raise money in Washington.
Secondly, she also benefited from something that no one mentioned. On the national level, Emily’s List has become one of the most powerful fund-raising organizations. It is a Democratic fund-raiser for women candidates who support the pro-choice position. They do a mailing nationwide, and checks are written directly to Geri Rothman-Serot rather than to Emily’s List. The check is a direct contribution to Rothman-Serot from someone solicited by Emily’s List. Their ability to raise money was the largest in the whole country, better even than the AFL-CIO. Emily’s List was unbelievable this year. I think Lynn Yeakel in Pennsylvania raised three or four million dollars and she had never run before. We don’t know what our opponent ended up raising. She had about $900,000 before the last report, and she raised some in the last few days before the election. The federal election law requires notice within forty-eight hours for contributions over $1,000. On the other hand, if contributions are $999 or less, no report is required, so we don’t know yet how much she raised at the very end.10

In this environment, we were very pleased with the amount that we were able to raise for Kit. He is an endless campaigner. He doesn’t get tired of making phone calls. He loves to travel and go to different counties and cities throughout the state. He’s very willing to do events. He did an event in Stockton for which we asked only $25 per person. The money that comes in $1,000 donations is extremely important because it’s a large source of your money, but it is also important to go to these places to show them that their vote counts and that what they are doing is appreciated.

Questions from the Audience

Question: For Liz Zelenka, did you attempt to raise money from political action committees and how successful was that?

Liz Zelenka: We did put packets together. I did some targeting of pro-choice people at the national level. There were isolated instances of Washington money, but most of the Washington labor money went to the mayor. We had to wait until the general election campaign to get much labor money.

We were much more effective in-state than out-of-state. There was a
misconception that because I had gotten national money for Wofford, I could get big chunks of national money for Carnahan. However, only Missourians are interested in who is elected governor of Missouri. Some people in Washington and elsewhere were interested in defeating Bill Webster, and I used that appeal. But those people weren’t especially interested in electing Mel Carnahan, because they didn’t know who he was. In New York, folks weren’t interested because they were concerned about Geraldine Ferraro’s race.

I had to be very selective in whom we targeted because of the time constraints. I took a different approach than the Schoemehl campaign. I kept Mel on the phone, kept him raising money, and put that money into a media account which was not to be touched until the last three or four weeks before the primary. We maximized free media and didn’t spend as much on campaign bumper stickers and buttons as the mayor did. Of course, he raised $4 million to our $2 million before the primary. The bottom line is that we had to be very careful how we spent our resources.

Gayla Thomas, moderator: How much contact did the candidates have with the contributors?

Liz Zelenka: At 9:45 at night Mel would be calling and thanking people for hosting an event which was going to occur a couple of days later. That personal touch means a lot to people. Thank-you notes for contributions of $1,000 and below were generated by the staff. Any contributions above $2,500, Mel personally dictated a thank-you note. He personally dictated thank-you notes for people who did events, and often he also made follow-up calls.

Jack Oliver: Kit writes handwritten notes to everyone that hosts an event. That takes extra time, but it means something when you have worked hard and someone remembers that you have worked hard. Unless you do that, there is no way that you can go back and ask for more money. It will not come unless you treat them with gratitude. That personal touch is very important.

David Welch: Sometimes we wanted Bert to be calling people and asking for more money, but he would say that he didn’t have time to call people and ask for more money because he was writing notes to people
who had already given. Anybody who gave $250 or more got a handwritten letter from him. He did use form letters for contributors below $250, but he always added a handwritten postscript.

Gayla Thomas, moderator: Our time is up, and we need to conclude. Thank you very much to the panelists and to the audience.
Media Coverage of the Campaigns

When we followed the money, we got to the scandal of the Second Injury Fund, which wound up being the issue in the November campaign for statewide officials. It was the one thing that basically led to the defeat of all the statewide Republican candidates.

—Rich Hood, columnist, Kansas City Star

Campaign managers are in solid agreement about the value of good television commercials for a quick change in a candidate's poll standing, and the importance of grass-roots organization to establish a base of supporters. Similarly significant is the impact of free media coverage, now often called "earned media" given the money and effort expended by the campaigns to get that coverage. Few voters today see candidates in person, and their impressions of the candidates come largely from television commercials and media coverage.

The impact of free media is assumed more than proven. The history of media impact research includes numerous efforts to prove substantial impact for media, with most efforts falling short, failing to demonstrate that voters' attitudes were different from what they would have been in the absence of media, or with different media reporting. Despite the
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difficulty in proving the significance of media, most analysts consider
the impact of the media to be substantial.¹

Much of the media research today revolves around the role of tele­
vision, which has such large audiences for so many hours that it seems
that it must have a major impact. Television executives have decided that
television news with good pictures are much to be preferred over talking
heads or other news without good pictures. Furthermore, short stories
are preferred over long stories. The problem of getting good pictures
and the limited amount of time available to present them precludes tele­
vision from much that is significant in political reporting.

Television makes significant contributions in presenting, nationally,
political conventions, political debates, and a few other major events. At
the state level, however, few stations can justify the expense of such
coverage. As a result, Missouri's televised debates of 1992 were carried
only on PBS stations or on special satellite hookups. Local television
stations treated state political conventions and rallies like other news
events with camera crews popping in for a few background shots and
brief interviews with prominent speakers (rather than any coverage of
the speeches themselves). Campaign events more than fifty miles from
the television station were not likely to be covered; rarely did a station
take a news feed from some other station in the state. If a political event
elsewhere in the state was carried by a station, it was because the story
was carried by a national news feed.

For example, the campaign manager for attorney general candidate
David Steelman described television news coverage of the race for attor­
ey general as "nil," despite numerous campaign efforts to get coverage.
This pattern of coverage of political events helps explain why few state
and local television reporters establish reputations as political reporters.
As a result, it is not surprising that there was no television reporter to
invite to a panel on media coverage of the 1992 campaign. Coverage of
state politics is more extensive by radio, in part because of the establish­
ment of a statewide radio network, and Bob Priddy, director of that
network, represented broadcast media.

On the other hand, newspaper coverage of politics in Missouri is
extensive and thorough. The two large newspapers, the St. Louis Post­
Dispatch and the Kansas City Star, maintain Jefferson City bureaus and
cover politics thoroughly in their readership areas. A half dozen other newspapers and the Associated Press also have part-time or full-time Jefferson City bureaus covering the state's government and politics. Any reader who can peruse all of the major newspapers of the state will be well informed about state politics and campaigns. That opportunity is available to a fairly large number of people because the state library in Jefferson City clips articles about Missouri government and politics from the state's newspapers and distributes daily reprints (called "Keeping Up") to state legislators and a few other people. The clippings are available for research or reference use in the state library itself.

The 1992 Missouri election campaigns were affected significantly by newspaper stories, especially the stories of the Second Injury Fund scandal. Most of those stories appeared first in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Kansas City Star, and the Springfield News-Leader. The stories began in March and continued throughout the year.

Amplified by the television commercials, the stories were significant in the defeat of Bill Webster and other Republican candidates in November. Those November results raised the interesting question of why Webster was not defeated at the primary in August. Was the story still too difficult for voters to understand fully, or were the television commercials by Webster's opponents in August less effective than those by his opponent in November? If Webster had been defeated in August, additional Republican candidates for statewide office might well have been winners in November.

**Symposium**

Lee Wilkins, associate dean of the School of Journalism, University of Missouri–Columbia, moderator. Terry Ganey has been chief of the Jefferson City bureau for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch since 1977. He has won awards for general excellence in news reporting and for investigative reporting. He is the author of the book *Innocent Blood*, which made the New York Times paperback bestseller list in 1990, and also coauthor of *Under the Influence*, an unauthorized story of the Anheuser-Busch dynasty, which was on the New York Times bestseller list in 1991. This year, Terry's most widely read publications were his articles on the Second
Injury Fund, presenting data on the use of the fund to aid campaign fund raising for Bill Webster.

*Terry Ganey, St. Louis Post-Dispatch.* I will limit my remarks to my impression of the way in which the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* covered the state election in Missouri in 1992. I felt that the resources of the newspaper were overwhelmed by the agenda that was put before it by the people of the state and by the legislature. We didn’t have the manpower or the womanpower to deal sufficiently with all of the issues and candidates in this year’s primary and general elections.

Last fall, we had a meeting in St. Louis about political coverage in which we learned that our budget would be very limited. The newspaper is in a shrinking situation, cutting staff and cutting travel to events like the national political conventions. At the same time, we were going to cover an election campaign with turnover in every state office. In addition, we had issues like term limits, riverboat gambling, and parimutuel wagering on the horizon. On top of that, we had frequent visits by the presidential campaigns. Considering the circumstances, I think the newspaper went overboard in always making sure that we collected quotes from Hillary Clinton, Tipper Gore, and other surrogates. As a result, our state coverage suffered.

I don’t want to belabor you with my own woes, but in the Jefferson City bureau of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* we lost two of our three staffers and they were not replaced. As a result, our staff in Jefferson City was decimated at a time when we needed the most experience in covering state government. I felt like I was all by myself, and to some extent I was. Somehow, we got through it, and people feel good about the coverage.

Looking internally, if I were to grade our own newspaper’s coverage, I would give a C. On the statewide races and on the statewide ballot issues, we weren’t as interpretive as we should have been. We were more willing to quote people saying what they would do as attorney general, saying what they would do as lieutenant governor, but less able to go into what they had done in their previous political lives. We did a good job, as best we could, in “ad checks.” You might have seen them in the newspaper, little square blocks that said here’s where this candidate is coming from, here’s how he’s distorting the facts, here’s how he or she is taking a little piece of truth and not telling you the whole story.
The Second Injury Fund has been mentioned. It's true that it set the agenda for a lot of political candidates' campaign ads. I looked upon it as a tremendous scandal. Mike Wolff had first mentioned this problem in his 1988 campaign for attorney general. I had written a story on it during that campaign. At that time, many of the records were closed, and we didn't have the computer capability to analyze large amounts of data. Both the Second Injury Fund lawyers and the attorney general told us there was no connection between the campaign contributions and the Second Injury Fund settlements. I set the issue aside and, in fact, took a two-year leave of absence to write a book.

When I returned, I asked for, and got, support to research more of this story. By then the number of settlements and the number of contributions had gotten much larger. Our newspaper's attorneys persuaded the state's attorneys to give us access to a tape of 11,600 Second Injury Fund settlements over four years. The tape did not include the names of any individual claimants, but it did include the names of attorneys representing both sides. We also hired a computer analyst and entered into our more powerful computer the Second Injury Fund data and all the campaign contributors for each of the major candidates for governor. The *Kansas City Star* had the first story in March about the connection between the campaign contributions from lawyers who both defended and attacked this fund and how they were connected to Bill Webster.

My stories began in April, going further in reporting how this relationship affected the size of their settlements. Attorneys who gave money to Bill Webster's campaign got much better settlements than attorneys who did not make contributions. It took a computer to tell us that. It was a piece of good journalism done by our computer expert in St. Louis, George Landau.

But really, people didn't understand it. Tony Feather [Bill Webster's campaign manager] told one of our reporters that it's not really going to cause the Webster campaign any problems because it's a complicated story that people don't understand. In this, the twilight of the printed word, candidates worry only when their problems are showing up on television, because then they have problems.

That first story generated information from more attorneys about
other aspects of the cases. On May 24, we came up with a story that people could understand, about a lawyer who said he tripped and fell in his office for which he got a workman’s compensation settlement of $40,000, then he said he injured his shoulder closing a file drawer in his office and got another $25,000 from worker’s compensation. He had yet another claim pending for an injury from lifting a briefcase. Frankly, in more than fifteen years of writing news, it’s one of the most, if not the most interesting story that I have ever worked on. People understood it. KMOX had a call-in show the next day, and they were deluged with calls from people saying how could this be? That, to me, is what newspapers are for. A story like that makes us feel good about the business that we are in. We can make a difference.

More stories followed. For example, we learned that the wife of an administrative law judge received $30,000 from the Second Injury Fund for panic attacks that she received on her job, which, ironically, was processing worker’s compensation claims.

Is there any political agenda for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch? There is not. In fact, from the inside the process does not look sufficiently organized to have a political agenda. This year, we had a political editor who was distracted by writing his own column and going out and making speeches. Midway between the primary election and the general election, he was replaced by a guy who did not want to be the political editor and was difficult to reach. Newspapers are the most disorganized thing. The only agenda that the newspaper had is the statement in the corner of the editorial page; the newspaper will fight corruption and will not tolerate public plunder. That’s what the Second Injury Fund story was all about. We’re very proud of it.

Lee Wilkins, moderator. Bob Priddy is director of Missouri Net, a radio network which covers the entire state. He is also widely known for his books Across Our Wide Missouri, published in 1982, and Only the Rivers Are Peaceful: Thomas Hart Benton’s Mural, published in 1989.

Bob Priddy, Missouri [Radio] Network. Nineteen ninety-two was probably the most fun that the media is going to have in Missouri until the year 2000 when Roger Wilson, Bob Holden, and Jay Nixon will give us a Democratic gubernatorial primary much like the Republicans had this year.
The most enjoyable time that I had was the great unity news conference in the governor’s garden a few days after the primary when the leading Republicans—Governor Ashcroft, Bill Webster, Roy Blunt, and Wendell Bailey all announced they were going to unite behind Bill Webster and urged people to support him in the general election in November. I was laying in the weeds for that. I immediately asked Mr. Blunt how he could possibly urge people now to support someone that he had been saying a few days ago was the center of the biggest political scandal in the history of the state of Missouri. Of course, we got the standard answer: “Well, that was the primary election and that’s past, and we are looking ahead to the future.” Over the next several minutes, the members of the press grabbed Roy by the front of the shirt verbally and didn’t let go. We never did get a satisfactory answer.

That news conference pointed up to me some fairly basic hypocrisies of the campaign. The candidates who did not think that the voters were aware of the hypocrisy sadly underestimated the intelligence of the voters. In fact, I think many candidates underestimated the intelligence of the voters and their interest in finding information. The best information those voters found was in print. I don’t mind saying that as a broadcaster. Personally, I think that Terry Ganey is the best reporter we’ve got in Jeff City. The work he did on the Second Injury Fund was amazing. I admire it a great deal.

The Second Injury Fund was a tremendous story for newspapers. It was a very difficult story for broadcasters. How do you tell the ins and outs of the Second Injury Fund in thirty seconds? It became a matter of Webster said this and Carnahan said this; that’s all a broadcaster can do unless he wants to spend seven or eight minutes on a special segment. Most broadcasters do not have that much time. This was a story that was tailor-made for newspapers, and they did a tremendous job putting that story together and keeping it in the forefront of the campaign.

In our shop, we were very conscious of the issue of manipulation. We have a policy that we do not take any canned tape from anybody. If someone wants to call up and feed us an excerpt from an interview, we simply tell them, “No, we don’t run anything from anybody that we can’t ask a question.” Well, the Bush-Quayle people called us every day, and we told them that every day, until I finally got somebody to give me
a telephone number of the person next highest up. I was on the verge of
telling them that if we got one more telephone call, I was going to file a
harassment charge with the attorney general's office of the state of Mis­
souri. We didn't hear from them anymore after that discussion.

Local radio is a very malleable medium for the statewide or national
politicians nowadays. Local radio, because of its economics, can't afford
to hire the people who have great amounts of insight and talent to deal
with the complicated issues that go with the state or national campaigns.
When a candidate comes into town or calls up on the telephone and
says, "How would you like to interview me because I'm the governor
candidate or the presidential candidate?" the person who sits in the
radio news room, especially in the smaller markets, will allow them to
say basically whatever they want to say. The saving grace is that many of
our major candidates do not have the time to do that as much as they
might like to do it. Local radio is suffering a great deal simply because of
its economics. Radio and television are feeling many of the same eco­
nomic pinches that Terry was talking about with regard to the newspapers.

I once had a consultant tell me that some issues are too complicated,
too inane, or too dull for people to be interested in them. That kind of
advice goes out to a lot of broadcasters, which is why you see more fluff
and less substance in the broadcast newscasts than we should have. I'm
one of those who says that that simply is not true. If you write the story
correctly, if you write it well, if you cover it well, if you understand what
you are writing about, people will find it interesting. I think the people
who read about the Second Injury Fund in the newspapers proved that a
story like that can be interesting.

There has been some whining since the election from losing candi­
dates who blame the media for their loss. I never hear those people say,
"Maybe I wasn't the right person for this job." It seems to me losing
candidates never want to admit that they just weren't good enough to
win. So they start looking for scapegoats. With the media being a large
target, they take a shot at it.

Lee Wilkins, moderator. Rich Hood has been a political columnist and
correspondent for the Kansas City Star for the past ten years. An alumnus of the Missouri School of Journalism, Rich was a member of the
Kansas City Star staff that won the Pulitzer Prize for coverage of the
Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse. This year he jointly received an award for reporting on the Kansas public pension scandal.

Rich Hood, Kansas City Star. If I had to give a grade for the presidential coverage this year, I would give the media overall, both print and electronic, a B, an improvement over the C-minus that I thought we deserved in 1988.

After 1988 I interviewed Roger Ailes, the major media manipulator for President Bush in that campaign. He just chortled and boasted about how it was so simple to dupe the media and how he had managed continually to get free media coverage of campaign events, such as George Bush's visit to a flag factory. Because these campaign events made nice television, everybody went along and wrote them up as if they were actually news. We had a campaign that was not based on issues other than George Bush trying to demonstrate that he was not Michael Dukakis. He did that extremely successfully.

This year, we did have issues covered in the national campaign. We can thank the voters for that because every time either the media or the candidates got off the economy, and jobs, jobs, jobs, the voters yanked us back. In more than twenty-five years in journalism, I have never seen the kind of involvement from the readers that I had this year. My stuff was scrutinized, graded, and spit back at me in ways that I have never seen before.

One of the reasons I would not give the media a better overall grade is the considerable bias in the way the overall campaigns were covered. There was an early ongoing attempt to destroy Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton was like Rasputin; he refused to die. Stab him, poison him, strangle him, whatever, he kept coming back. For a time, the media was very tough on Bill Clinton and probably unjustifiably so.

I made very few friends in the newsroom when I wrote a column complaining about how we had played the Gennifer Flower story on page one with a big picture of Gennifer and her red dress. The editor called me in to chat about it, and we had a nice conversation. The backlash from that overemphasis inoculated Bill Clinton from some critical coverage later.

There was never a conspiracy on the part of the media to favor Bill Clinton. If anybody came to the Kansas City Star and wanted to watch
the conspiracy in process, they would have been absolutely amazed. If we did not have an economic necessity that we had to publish a newspaper every day, we could not get enough people to agree on anything for it to happen.

On the other hand, there is evidence that the majority of reporters and editors tilt toward the Democratic end of the spectrum. A recent poll financed by the media study group Freedom Forum showed that journalists are 5 to 10 percentage points more likely than all Americans to describe themselves as Democrats and 10 to 15 percentage points less likely to call themselves Republicans.

I saw more bias this year than in earlier years. When I was out on the campaign trail with Clinton, I saw over and over again reporters who were genuinely rooting for Clinton to win. When I was on the campaign trail with Bush, I saw very few people who were rooting for George Bush to win. Frankly, I don't think it is right for me to be able to pick up who's rooting for whom when I'm out there, because I think as reporters we have an obligation to be neutral.

If I was giving a grade for the media coverage of statewide campaigns in Missouri, I would probably give it a B-plus. One of the people I would credit for that is Terry Ganey, who did a splendid job on the Second Injury Fund. We heard in some of the earlier panels today that the only thing that matters in these campaigns is money and television commercials. On the state level, the media covered the trail of the money better in this campaign than in the past. I think the Kansas City Star did an excellent job. I think Terry did a very good job with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch as well.

When we followed the money, we got to the scandal of the Second Injury Fund, which wound up being the issue in the November campaign for statewide officials. It was the one thing that basically led to the defeat of all the statewide Republican candidates. Some of them had no involvement in it, but the voters said, "If the Republican governor candidate is involved in this, if the Republican attorney general candidate is involved, if the Republican lieutenant governor candidate could have stopped it and didn't, I don't want any of these people in office." The only way that Kit Bond survived was because he had no involvement with the Second Injury Fund. If there had been any way for the
Democrats to tie Kit Bond to the Second Injury Fund, Kit Bond would probably not be going back to Washington.

We did a better job of covering issues than we did in 1988. We were more creative in the ways that we packaged the issues. We did grids; we did boxes; we did things to make it more reader friendly. We need to figure out ways to make it even more reader friendly. We did a better job of looking at the actual records in office of the candidates. We did a better job of offering profiles that said something and were not just warm, fuzzy portraits. We did a better job of truth watches to find out when candidates were lying or distorting the truth. Those helped boost the grade.

One of the reasons that my grade is not higher is because we misused polls in the worst way that I have ever seen—misleading, distorted, and multitudinous polls. We had fifteen polls every other day, taken in different ways by different organizations. Television, CNN and many others contributed to that proliferation. The polling was hideous, odious, awful. Polls were designed in the first place to provide the media ideas about how they should be covering races, but they have become the news in themselves.

**Questions from the Audience**

*Question:* What is the alternative, if there is one, to negative campaigning and negative advertising?

*Rich Hood,* Kansas City Star: One alternative is what we saw out of Ross Perot—his one-minute commercials were absolutely brilliant. Each one of them was a separate issue. I think his half-hour infomercials were very good even though he had some factual problems with them. Both of those work. If the candidate is willing to present issues, the voters will respond. It’s the lazy man’s way out to do the negative campaigning because it moves numbers faster. It just beats the other guy down, like Bush did to Dukakis. That’s why we see so much of it. We have seen very clear and convincing evidence that issue oriented campaigns do work.

*Bob Priddy,* Missouri Network: Back in 1976, Congressman Jerry Litton [of northwest Missouri] had a program called “Dialogue with Litton” in which he would bring in someone prominent from Washington,
D.C., and talk about issues before a room full of people. His staff videotaped it, edited it, and ran it on television as a public service. In his campaign for the United States Senate nomination, he bought half-hour time slots and ran the programs in other parts of the state. Talking about issues with important people projected an excellent image for Jerry Litton in the voters’ minds.

Ross Perot came up with his half-hour programs which, while some people said they were simplistic, also gave the impression that they were looking in depth at some issues. I think we see with Perot and with Litton value in the extended discussion of issues. I don’t think candidates can afford to do that alone. It takes more than that.

Another alternative to negative campaigns is the analysis of commercials we saw in newspapers and CNN. Many of the negative commercials are based on a very flimsy premise. Some of them are simply incorrect. The only way that the voter is going to get an accurate counter to that kind of information is if the news media cover the commercials. In four more years, we will see even more attention paid to the commercials, analyzing whether the people are being misled or not.

Rich Hood, Kansas City Star: One weakness of the media ad watches is that they will appear only once unless a candidate picks it up and runs it in a TV ad, ad nauseam. Some of the hired guns that I talked with said, “Okay, you got us once, but we’re going to have our ad on for two weeks. You may convince some people, but we are just going to blitz you so much that the ad watch won’t make any difference.” We have to figure out a way to repeat the truth watch. If it is distorted, then we have to continue to get repetitions out there ourselves. That’s an economic problem for us. If you’ve got limited staff and limited space, it’s hard to repeat a story.

Question: What are the ethical standards in the media on carrying an ad that you know is an outright lie, distortion or manipulation?

Bob Priddy, Missouri Network: Broadcasters don’t have a choice. Federal rules, based on freedom of political speech, say that broadcasters cannot reject a political ad because they think it is untrue.

Terry Ganey, St. Louis Post-Dispatch: Not many politicians advertise in print any more. Your local candidate for the city council will use the newspaper. Many weekly newspapers thrive on political advertising, but
I can’t think of many ads that the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* had for political candidates. If candidates do advertise in print, it’s just a picture of the candidate and he’s a good family man or she did this or that. I don’t think that the newspapers have ads in which the question you raise is applicable.

Rich Hood, Kansas City Star: The negative ads generally don’t run in newspapers. If campaigns want to be particularly nasty, they do it in direct mail. That’s the silent killer. Earlier, we heard Tony Feather [Bill Webster’s campaign manager] talking about how awesome Carnahan’s direct mail was—that’s what they were doing.

**Question:** Earlier today, campaign managers said that the media paid no attention to their comments about issues, but gave lots of coverage to their negative attacks. To get media, they had to go negative. Can you address that?

Bob Priddy, Missouri Network: I think they are dead wrong. When Roy Blunt came out with his position papers, the media were there. The media reported on position papers everywhere. When there were debates held, or joint appearances, the media were there to cover the positive as well as the negative things that were said. Yes, they got coverage for the negative things, but to say that that’s the only way they could get media coverage is a bunch of mule fritters.

**Question:** In *USA Today*, a reader can find out where the presidential and vice presidential candidates are scheduled to campaign every day. It’s much more difficult to find out where the candidates for governor, secretary of state, and other state offices are going to campaign. Even when the candidates campaign in an area, the local news media rarely carry any notice of it ahead of time. For us to have a personal experience with the campaigns, it would be helpful if the newspapers would include a record of where the candidates are going to be during the day.

Rich Hood, Kansas City Star: That’s easier said than done. It’s an excellent idea, it would be reader friendly, but if we had tried to do sightings on Geri Rothman-Serot and say where she was going to be, we would have been printing corrections from here until kingdom come. Some of the campaigns were not organized well enough to provide that information in a timely fashion. Some of them were literally in town before we knew they were there. They would call from the airport and
say—"Why aren't you here?" We would say, "A very simple reason, we didn't know you were here." It's an excellent idea, but it's going to take a lot of logistical help to make it happen.

Bob Priddy, Missouri Network: I was told that late in the campaign, when the Missouri School Boards Association was trying to get Bill Webster and Mel Carnahan together for a joint appearance, Webster's people told the school board association that he wasn't committing himself to anything more than twenty-four hours in advance. Many times in a campaign, especially late in the campaign, the plans for the next day are made the night before.
Campaign Reform

Twenty-seven states have campaign contribution limits. There’s no constitutional problem for campaign contribution limits, as there is for expenditure limits. Clearly, the legislature and the governor, if they want to, can limit contributions, and I think it is time we did that, to level the playing field.

—Secretary of State Roy Blunt

The secretary of state regularly publishes a booklet entitled Election Laws of Missouri. The volume is half an inch thick, indicating the detail with which Missourians regulate elections and voting. The existence of the laws also makes clear that election and campaign procedures are public policy issues, reflecting the preferences of the people of the state. On the other hand, many people were dissatisfied with some aspects of the 1992 campaigns, and the panel on campaign reform focused on some possible changes.

The topic most frequently discussed was campaign finance, reflecting the importance of money in campaigns. In 1992, Missouri campaign finance law required disclosure of all contributions and expenditures over $100. There were few restrictions on either contributions or expenditures. Generally, any individual or corporation could give any amount, and a candidate could spend any amount that he or she had. While there
were some large contributions, the average contribution was fairly low, and major campaigns had thousands of contributors. Convincing such large numbers of people to give to a campaign took much of a candidate’s time.

Principal changes proposed by the panelists included
1. Roy Blunt’s call for contribution limits;
2. Common Cause’s call for expenditure limits, which, following the Supreme Court decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*, would require public financing; and
3. David Welch’s call for full disclosure.

Much of the discussion centered on the role of political action committees, with Roy Blunt proposing that they be outlawed, and with David Welch noting that the outlawing of PACs would effectively reduce disclosure because the interest represented by the campaign contributions would no longer be identified.

Other proposals centered on ways and times in which contributions might be limited:
1. prohibiting state lawmakers from raising campaign funds during a legislative session;
2. prohibiting lawmakers and elected state officials from receiving contributions from lobbyists or from vendors doing business with the state;
3. prohibiting candidates from carrying campaign war chests from one campaign to another;
4. prohibiting incumbents from raising campaign money prior to the year of the election; and
5. limiting the proportion of a candidate’s revenue which can come from PACs or from out-of-state contributions.

The panelists also expressed concern about some problems of campaigns for which they had, at best, limited solutions, including the shortening of campaigns, increasing the discussion of issues in campaigns, and reducing the number of negative commercials on television.

Near the end of the panel, Roy Blunt noted that campaign finance reform might have to be secured through an initiative petition rather than through legislation. In June 1993, Blunt took the next step, announcing the formation of a committee to develop a proposal to limit campaign contributions and to circulate petitions to put it on the ballot.
In May 1994, the legislature, perhaps in response to Blunt's petition drive, sent the governor a bill limiting contributions from individuals, PACs, unions, and corporations to $1,000 in statewide races, $500 in state senate races, and $250 in state house races. Since the limit is for each election, contributors may contribute the same amount in both the primary and general election campaigns, if their candidate is involved in both. The bill also puts voluntary limits on campaign spending, limiting governors to $1.5 million in the primary and the same in the general election, other statewide candidates to half that amount, state senate candidates to $100,000 in each election, and state house candidates to $30,000 in each election. Candidates exceeding the limit must pay a surcharge of as much as 100 percent on all excess expenditures. Candidates rejecting the voluntary spending limits can raise contributions only from individuals, and not from corporations, unions, or PACs.  

The generosity of the legislative limits was indicated by the fact that in 1992 only nine candidates—1.2 percent of the 724 candidates—exceeded the limit. The limits on statewide candidates were less generous—in 1992, five of the statewide candidates had exceeded the limits in both the primary and general elections, and seven more candidates exceeded the limit in one election. Opponents promised to challenge the constitutionality of the spending limits in court.

Other key provisions in the bill included a requirement that candidates approve any negative advertising and include a statement of their approval with the advertising; a prohibition against acceptance of contributions during regular legislative sessions by legislators, statewide officeholders, and candidates for those jobs; a prohibition of contributions from children under age fourteen; a limit of contributions by parties to ten times the amount that individuals can give, except that parties can double the contributions to candidates for statewide office and legislature by making in-kind contributions of services; and a limit on the amount that may be retained in after-election war chests of one-quarter the allowed spending limit for the election cycle.

After passage of the bill, Roy Blunt's group dropped their petition campaign, assuming that the court would consider the provisions of the bill separate and distinct, so that the contribution limits would survive a possible court ruling that the expenditure limits were unconstitutional.
Symposium

Hank Waters, Columbia Daily Tribune, moderator. Roy Blunt is both a practiced politician who has had to raise money for campaigns, and as secretary of state, Missouri’s chief election officer. Roy was the chief election official for Greene County for twelve years before becoming secretary of state. This year, Roy ran his fourth statewide campaign, raising and spending more than $2 million in the Republican primary for governor.

Roy Blunt, secretary of state. My final request as secretary of state to the legislature in January will be to take some aggressive action in the area of campaign finance reform.

I favor abolishing political action committees. The concept seemed good at the time of Watergate, but the idea didn’t work. The idea was that individuals with similar philosophical orientations would come together, each write a small check, and make a major impact with their PAC contribution. It just didn’t work! Look at the PACs that give money to incumbents whose voting records are nowhere near where the voting membership of that PAC would like them to be. PAC leaders reason that “we are going to have to deal with this legislator anyway, so let’s make a contribution. Sure, these representatives won’t vote with us, but maybe they will oppose us quietly instead of verbally.” PACs have become the greatest incumbent protection tool in the country, and I think they ought to be eliminated.

I would, at the very least, regulate PACs. As a first step towards that, I propose that we limit the total that candidates can raise from political action committees to some percentage of their funds. I have proposed 10 percent. I’d be willing to talk about 15 or 20 percent, but I personally think one out of ten dollars coming from PACs is the most we should allow.

I will also propose that the legislature set campaign contribution limits. Twenty-seven states have campaign contribution limits. There’s no constitutional problem for campaign contribution limits, as there is for expenditure limits. Clearly, the legislature and the governor, if they want to, can limit contributions, and I think it is time we did that, to level the playing field. Frankly, I don’t think it matters how much money
you spend if you get it from enough people. If you get a million dollars equally from a million people, nobody should be concerned about that. If you have a million dollars, and half of it comes from one person or one special interest group, everybody should be concerned about that.

I will also propose to the general assembly a more complete listing of specific expenditures paid by campaign consultants, the elimination of multiple committees, a prohibition against the raising of campaign funds by state lawmakers during a legislative session, and a prohibition against lawmakers and elected state officials receiving contributions from lobbyists or from vendors doing business with the state.

_Hank Waters, moderator._ Tom Mericle is associated with Common Cause, the all-time good guys in campaign reform. His organization has been working on this issue for years.

_Tom Mericle, Common Cause._ Governor Mel Carnahan's campaign manager said 85 percent of Carnahan's time during the political campaign was devoted to fund-raising. 85 percent! We've got a major problem, folks! We need to reform that system.

The problem is still money. Money drives the whole thing. In Missouri, all you have to do is report where the money comes from and where you spent it. There are no limits and no restrictions on who can give. Unions, corporations, any entity can give as much money as they want.

That creates an incredibly unbalanced playing field. In the Missouri Senate this year, seven of the seventeen incumbents had no general election opponent. Five of those seven had no primary opposition either. In other words, they filed; they were elected. In the Missouri House, 65 of 163 races had no general election opponent, none whatsoever. Fifty of those 65 had no primary opposition either. Why didn't they have opposition? It's the money, the money.

Common Cause has long said that we need public financing of elections. That's not a popular topic, but we are eventually going to get it. Bill Clinton campaigned on campaign finance reform as a major issue. Through the efforts of Common Cause, a large majority of both houses of Congress signed pledges supporting campaign finance reform.

In principle, I think every single dollar should be reported, but in practice, the paperwork might become a major problem. I doubt that
politicians are influenced by contributions under $100; that figure may be higher for statewide candidates who get many contributions of $1,000 or more. Lobbyists may be buying access with their contributions, but they don't get much access with a $100 contribution, so the reporting of small contributions is probably not worth the effort.

_Hank Waters, moderator._ David Welch is a political consultant who has worked for a number of candidates, including Gene McNary, Republican candidate for governor in 1984, and Bert Walker, candidate for the Republican nomination for Congress in 1992.

_David Welch, political consultant._ Some people want campaign finance reform because they think that people who enter politics are dishonest and are in it for their own gain. All the candidates I have known have been willing to run for office because they believed—Democrat or Republican—that they had the best ideas to make this country a better place to live.

I think it is very important to have full disclosure; for that reason, I favor political action committees. Corporations support candidates by giving a PAC check or a corporate check. If we outlaw PACs, the chairman of the board will host a fund-raiser at his house, invite ten executives, collect their checks and give them to the candidate. When the candidate's report is filed, there will be no indication that the company gave a contribution, only the names of eleven contributors. With PACs, you can easily identify which corporations, which labor unions, which interest groups are supporting which candidates.

I also think it important that we have disclosure of every dollar contributed. Right now, you don't have to disclose contributions of $100 or less. You can have a husband, a wife, and each child giving $100, adding up to a substantial contribution without disclosure.

I think candidates should not be allowed to retain campaign funds from election to election. Funds remaining after the completion of a campaign should be returned to the government. Candidates carry over that money to discourage challengers from running against them. Another reason for prohibiting the carry-over of funds is that the funds came from people who supported the candidate in the last race but may not support him in the next race.

I propose that incumbents not be allowed to begin raising money
until the January before the election. Senators begin fund-raising as soon as the election is over. They have fund-raising events in Washington right before major votes, and interest groups concerned about those votes feel they have to go to the fund-raisers.

I think we need to limit how much money can come from PACs and how much can come from out of state. I don’t want to prohibit out-of-state contributions, especially in congressional races and senatorial races. Congressmen and senators do affect policy outside of their state so out-of-state contributions are appropriate, but I think they should be limited to some percentage of the total.

Questions from the Audience

_Hank Waters, moderator:_ The panelists have talked a lot about finance reform, but I haven’t heard anything about election reform. If we had election campaigns that lasted about six weeks, like they do in some countries, we wouldn’t have all of these problems, would we? Is there anything about the conduct of our elections that ought to be changed?

_Roy Blunt, secretary of state:_ It’s not likely that we are going to come up with a mechanism that springs the election on voters as they do in Great Britain. Certainly, that has the impact of shortening that whole contest to six to nine weeks. Part of the problem is that Americans really enjoy politics, and politics is seen by the press as much more fun to cover than government.

_Tom Mericle, Common Cause:_ One needed reform of the election process is TV access for more candidates; I’m not sure how to do it. TV, except for PBS, is in it for the money. How do we get more access and longer access and not just the thirty-second commercial? I don’t know that we want to go to thirty-minute infomercials but we need some period of time longer than thirty seconds, a period where candidates can seriously discuss issues that aren’t getting covered now.

One of the major complaints that candidates have is that it’s like pulling teeth to get media coverage of a serious discussion of issues. The candidates are primarily talking about TV because that’s the medium that gets through to most people. We need reforms, but I’m not sure how to do it.
Roy Blunt, secretary of state: I think it would be possible for the FCC to pass rules and regulations that make five minutes of TV cheaper than thirty seconds. The question would be whether people would watch a five-minute commercial.

Hank Waters, moderator: Don’t they have rules in Great Britain that there is a minimum length of time for a political commercial?

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: In Great Britain, individual candidates for Parliament can’t buy TV time. The government gives TV time to the major political parties. Normally, party leaders use it to talk about why you should vote for Conservatives, Labor or whatever.

Question: The basis of reform has to be voter perceptions. Candidates say that trying to talk to people about the issues doesn’t work. This year, people were much more concerned with the character issue—what the candidate looks like and how he acts. I would say that reform must start with a new attitude of the American people. Is there any way to create a stimulus for change in the American voter?

David Welch, political consultant: Well, I think Ross Perot did some of that through his infomercials, which focused on issues. I think the debates did some of that. The studio audience in the second presidential debate set the focus by saying: we don’t want to hear any more about personalities.

On the other hand, I think that personality is a legitimate issue. The question is how do you discuss that? I think the honesty or integrity of a person running for office is very important. How do you discuss lack of honesty without name calling?

Tom Mericle, Common Cause: Political advisors were discussing with us today how they had manipulated the voters. I’m amazed at the number of people in very bitter and negative campaigns who were able to sit next to each other and be relatively civil today. I would have thought some of that animosity might have held over a few more days. Campaign managers talked about how they threw out half-truths, and it was the job of the other side to respond. Unfortunately, these negative commercials have worked.

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: The way to end the negative commercials would be for people not to respond to them, but I don’t know how you change the mindset of voters. Human nature seems to be more inter-
ested in hearing bad things than good things about people. People respond to negative commercials. I’m hopeful that 1992 was the low point, but we may reach a new lower point.

Question: The media did present “truth watches,” saying what was untrue or incomplete about an ad. I don’t think the media has done that before. I found that very helpful.

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: The average viewer has to see a commercial seven to eleven times to fully grasp it. If a candidate is running fifteen hundred points of a commercial, the average person sees it fifteen times. That same viewer only sees the truth watch one time. Political junkies watch the truth watch, understand it, and talk to each other about it, but I don’t think it has any impact for most people. Candidates believe that “we can say whatever we want to say, no matter how unfounded it may be because we are the ones who are buying the time.”

If you have a truth watch, you better be right because the person on the other side of the commercial may take your headline and say, “The Columbia Daily Tribune says that X is incorrect and is being deceptive.” If you do a truth watch, you have to be sure it’s right because your truth watch will be used by the other campaign to respond.

Hank Waters, moderator: In my newspaper, we did not have a regular truth watch section. If something came up that we regarded as obviously false, then we would have done a story on it. The problem was time. We had a hell of a time covering the candidates this year, let alone second-guessing every commercial. This is the first year that we haven’t had our own staff cover all of the candidates. There were just too many of them.

Question: Is it possible and what would it take to require television stations to set aside free blocks of airtime for candidates in the general election?

David Welch, political consultant: Money! I think it’s legally possible in that television stations are licensed by the FCC. I personally don’t like the idea. A television station has gone into business for the purpose of making money for the stockholders of the television company. I don’t think it’s appropriate for a federal agency to dictate how the station should allocate its time or resources. The less regulation, the better.

Hank Waters, moderator: You really can’t have a practice of govern-
ment telling the media what it can put in its content. That would be oppressive. We have too much regulation as it is.

Tom Mericle, Common Cause: You can get around the free TV aspect with a voucher system in which the public pays some part of the cost of presentations on television.

Question: It seems to me that every donor is a special interest at some level. What's the difference between (1) having a PAC, and (2) having the lobbyist for an organization ask everybody to give $10 and then sending the money to the candidate? Is there a real difference there?

David Welch, political consultant: I believe that PACs are good because it's easier to trace who is contributing. One other reason is that a lot of individuals do not know how particular incumbents voted. It takes a lobbyist to track how a person voted in a committee meeting. A group of voters gets together, forms an organization, and hires a lobbyist to keep track of votes. They are pooling their money, which allows an association—NRA, the teachers' organization, whoever—to participate just like a corporation. The little people can make sure their money is going to people who support their views.

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: I would prefer the lobbyists having to call the people and say, "I want you to write a check to Dorothy Jones for representative." The donors, if they have any familiarity, may say, "Oh, is that the person who I read about who was for X, which I am not for?" I would rather see that system.

Whenever I propose to the Missouri General Assembly that PAC contributions be limited to 10 percent of a candidate's total contributions, the people who are the most opposed to it are the seven unopposed senators that Tom talked about, because who will give them money if PACs don't? Nobody would give them money. Nobody cares about non-opposed incumbents except PACs and maybe a very few of the candidates' friends. Look at the campaign finance reports.

Tom Mericle, Common Cause: If we get rid of PACs, or we limit the contributions that PACs can make, the legal and accounting experts in the campaigns and parties will find a way around it. One of the biggest campaign expenses now outside of TV is legal and accounting experts to find ways around the existing campaign finance laws. Limit PACs, and they'll find something else.
Question: How do we deal with the purchase of an office? Can't we limit what one person can put in of his own money?

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: Well, not legally so far. I'll say this with all deference to the great efforts of the Perot people here in Missouri. I thought the most interesting thing about the Perot movement was not Mr. Perot's willingness to put such large personal resources into the campaign but that nobody complained. My only explanation is that the American people must be totally convinced that real people's money doesn't go into politics, that it's all PACs and special interests. In fact they may have taken some comfort in the idea that, at least with Ross Perot, you knew who was buying this guy. He was doing it himself.

I don't think ten years ago or twenty years ago, you could have had somebody spend $60 million on a campaign and not have a major uproar. I think people must have become convinced that real people don't have much impact in politics any more, so why be concerned if a guy wants to spend all of his own money to be elected.

Hank Waters, moderator: I think it worked for Perot as an outsider. If George Bush had proposed to do that, everybody would have been mad because he would have been one of the inside organization guys.

Sandy McClure, Missouri chairman for Ross Perot: If you were a politician, you couldn't get away with it. Rockefeller tried to put a lot of money into his campaigns. Everybody tried it. People saw that Perot was not a politician, but was trying to straighten out the mess.

David Welch, political consultant: In the early 1970s, many people said nobody can buy Jack Danforth, he's too rich. So, I think there is a certain philosophy out there that a candidate with personal wealth is not available for purchase.

Question: You're still skirting the issue of public funding as a dynamic in campaign reform.

Tom Mericle, Common Cause: My organization is for it.

David Welch, political consultant: I'm diametrically opposed to it. Over the years, the American Medical Association polls found the American people were opposed. The number of people who check off public funding for presidential campaigns is declining. People don't like the idea that nominees of the major parties automatically get support but
third-party candidates who are trying to get started don't get any money. Public financing is a way of continuing the two-party system.

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: I'm not for it. One argument for public funding is that it is needed in order to impose expenditure limits. You can level the playing field, however, with contribution limits. I have proposed some pretty low limits.

Hank Waters, moderator: Let me ask you a mechanical question about that. How would you run a system like that? How would you control contributions?

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: It's similar to a federal race. If a contributor has already given $1,000 in a congressional campaign, he or she can't give any more, and the campaign can't accept any more from him. That happens all the time.

Tom Mericle, Common Cause: Contribution limits favor rich families that have lots of family members, with each of the kids contributing a limit.

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: Every system has a loophole. We would be wrong to do nothing, just because somebody can figure out a loophole in whatever we do. My sense of limits is that the people who give money become the quickest and best informed on those limits; they would enforce the limits. Individual limits are supportable, do-able and it doesn't cause a constitutional crisis of any kind. There's no funding mechanism that has to kick in. You can just do it.

Hank Waters, moderator: We had a surprisingly successful grass-roots campaign for term limits. Will there be a similar effort launched on behalf of contribution limits?

Roy Blunt, secretary of state: That may be what it takes. The difficulty is that people who propose things through the initiative may face legal challenges once they have submitted the signatures. The longer and more complex the proposal, the more potential there is for someone to find a flaw in it. One of the great things about term limits was that they had two different petitions to make sure that there were not ruled off the ballot for having multiple topics. Each was one or two sentences long. I think campaign finance reform may have to happen through an initiative petition rather than through legislation.

Hank Waters, moderator: Thank you very much to the panelists and to the audience.
Missouri Campaigns in Retrospect

Traditionally, an effective campaign builds upon the strengths and resources of the candidate, his or her party, and the issues. The 1992 campaigns showed that, increasingly, effective campaigns also exploited the weaknesses of the opposition. The candidates emphasized the patterns that moved and influenced voters.

The election campaign is one of the defining elements of a democracy. Voters pay more attention to politics during an election campaign than at any other time, preparing themselves for their responsibility of casting a ballot. Because they are paying closer attention, voters learn more about government during election campaigns than they do at other times. The decisions that voters make and the attitudes they develop during a campaign are carried through much of the succeeding term, and in some cases, through much of the political life of the voter.

Election campaigns are also defining elements of democracy because of their impact on public officials. The patterns of an election campaign help determine who will win office and who will be also-rans. In addition, campaigns serve to educate candidates, giving them the opportunity to learn the views of voters, forcing them to learn the intricacies
of issues sufficiently to be able to debate those issues with opponents or discuss them with voters or reporters.

In Missouri, the patterns of election campaigns are structured in part by state law, in part by the social structure of the state—especially the political party structure—in part by the candidates and their campaign workers, and in part by the voters who respond or fail to respond to one or another procedure. Potentially, all of these patterns can be changed if a majority of citizens or voters want a change. They will probably be changed quickly if candidates conclude that some new pattern is more likely to win votes.

What then were the patterns of 1992 in Missouri? What did the voters learn, and what did the candidates learn? How well did these campaigns serve to further implement a democratic system?

**Extensive Participation**

Participation by citizens was high in Missouri in 1992. Extensive volunteer organizations were put into operation. Hundreds of thousands of supporters and undecides were identified and targeted for mailings or get-out-the-vote phone calls. The George Bush campaign made 500,000 phone calls in Missouri to identify and persuade undecided voters, with many of these calls being made by volunteers. Later the undecided voters received, as a group, 1 million pieces of mail from the Bush-Quayle campaign. Another 200,000 calls were made to supporters on election day, in an effort to get out the vote. Volunteers also passed out and delivered by hand 3.7 million pieces of literature on behalf of Bush. Large numbers of Missourians contributed money to the campaigns: U.S. Senator Kit Bond received funds from 18,000 contributors; Bert Walker, unsuccessful Republican primary candidate in the Seventh Congressional District, had 2,000 contributors.

This high level of participation culminated in comparatively high voter turnout on election days. Turnout in both the primary and general election, as a percentage of registered voters, was several percentage points higher than in the three previous primaries and general elections.

Extensive citizen activities did not move voters the way an effective television commercial could, but they could make the difference in a
close election. George Bush's campaign coordinator credited the grassroots team with at best "a marginal difference. For example, if you are within two or three points of your opponent, a good statewide organization will make a difference." Senator Bond had credited his 1986 Senate victory to the campaign organization that slowed the tide of public opinion, which was rapidly turning against him in the last days before the election.

**Negative Commercials and Appeals**

A negative tenor characterized the 1992 campaigns. Candidates were more aggressive and more negative toward their opponents than in previous years. Such negativism was found most frequently in television commercials but also in direct mail, to some extent even in newspaper ads, and finally in the debates themselves. The second, and last, debate between gubernatorial candidates Bill Webster and Mel Carnahan turned quickly into a name-calling, vituperative contest that was exciting but had little substance. The graphic description by Jay Nixon's campaign manager was applicable to many campaigns, "We were determined that we were going to have the courage to go out there and run a comparative race, if necessary."

Several negative television commercials were particularly effective. Roy Blunt's gubernatorial campaign presented an ad with lawyers on a merry-go-round, taking money from a barrel labeled "state fund," and dropping it into a barrel labeled "Webster campaign." The ad was not sufficiently effective to win the primary election for Blunt, but it largely closed the substantial gap between Blunt and Webster. Mel Carnahan's attack ads about Vince Schoemehl's campaign funding and about crime in St. Louis reopened Carnahan's lead, which had been fading.

The impact of negative commercials could be so substantial that media consultants were continually telling candidates that they would lose if they did not go on the attack: "It isn't a matter of being negative but a matter of using facts." As a result, more and more candidates used negative ads. The campaign manager for seventh district Congressman Mel Hancock reported that Hancock had never previously gone negative, never previously mentioned an opponent's name; this time his
“Deaton Lies” ads stopped his slide in the polls. Political consultant David Welch argued the appropriateness of negative commercials: “I think that personality is a legitimate issue. The question is how do you discuss that? I think the honesty or integrity of a person running for office is very important. How do you discuss lack of honesty without name calling?”

Candidates used television commercials to change their standings in the polls, and they continued to find that negative commercials changed patterns more quickly than positive commercials. The campaign manager for attorney general candidate Jay Nixon reported that an opponent’s negative television commercial had dissolved Nixon’s eight-point lead within three days. Similarly, Roy Blunt’s campaign made up, in three weeks, most of a thirty-one–point gap, by relying heavily on negative commercials. They did not close the entire gap, in part because opponent Bill Webster responded with negative commercials.

Negative commercials clearly affected voter attitudes about a candidate for at least a few days. But how lasting was that impact? To what extent was it generalized to an attitude toward all candidates or public officials? Voting data in one race in Ohio indicated that negative commercials broadcast only in one media market reduced voter turnout in that area. But turnout was high in Missouri in 1992. Presumably the attraction of the competitive races was stronger than the offensiveness of the negative commercials.

One logical deduction suggests that voters subjected to many negative commercials will conclude that most candidates, and therefore most public officials, are incompetent or corrupt. If so, such negative commercials could be very damaging to the operation of a democracy. The decline in public faith in elected officials might be cited as evidence supporting this logic, but that decline began in the 1950s or 1960s, before the widespread use of negative commercials.

An alternative logical deduction is that voter attitudes are affected for only a short time, and that voters do not transfer negative attitudes about one candidate to other candidates. Certainly name identification of a candidate falls rapidly after a campaign. Jay Nixon’s campaign manager commented that name recognition “drops precipitously after the race, even in a period of six or eight months.” If a voter cannot
remember the name of a candidate, he probably cannot remember the negative information associated with him or her either. Similarly, voters may have inoculated themselves against a transfer of negative attitudes; for example, a strongly partisan Democratic voter is not likely to conclude that all Democratic candidates are corrupt just because he has viewed a negative commercial about one Democratic candidate. This line of thought suggests that perhaps voters regard a negative commercial as nothing more than a ploy designed to win a short-term advantage, no more worthy of incorporation into a belief system than the puffery designed to sell soft drinks or running shoes.

Not every campaign was negative. Usually the candidate who has a substantial lead will not use a negative campaign, at least until the lead begins to slip. In some cases, even trailing candidates did not use negative campaigns. Campaign managers in the secretary of state’s race generally agreed that they and their opponents pursued “positive campaigns, without any negatives.” The representative for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Vince Schoemehl reported that Schoemehl had prohibited the staff from conducting a negative campaign. The campaign manager for Doug Harpool, the Democratic candidate for the Seventh Congressional District, reported that Harpool did not run a negative campaign in the primary because he felt that such a campaign would divide Democrats so much that the Democratic candidate would not win in November.

To what extent does the prospect of being subjected to a negative campaign discourage would-be candidates from running for office? Logic once again suggests that the possibility of a rough-and-tumble fight will discourage some potential candidates, and thus limit the choice that voters may have in an election. As a result, public offices are increasingly likely to be filled with pugnacious fighters rather than with mediators or conciliators. Perhaps, but a number of the leading 1992 candidates—Democratic gubernatorial candidate Mel Carnahan and Republican lieutenant governor candidate Margaret Kelly, for example—are far more likely to be described as cooperators than combatants. Once again, the danger of negative campaigning seems significant but remains unproven.
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Importance of Television Commercials

The importance of television commercials was noted by several campaign managers. Roy Blunt’s campaign manager reported that television commercials won them 24 percentage points in two weeks, almost 2 points per day. Roger Wilson used television commercials to move 25 points in the last eighteen days of the campaign, just enough to win by 1 percentage point.

The election of 1992 included the earliest commercials ever, with Bill Webster beginning his commercials in mid-March. When Webster started running his commercials, newspaper reporters and analysts asked why he was starting so early, not realizing that he had such a large war chest and such excellent prospects for raising more money that he could expect to run the commercials more or less continuously until the November election. In Webster’s case, the commercials probably were instrumental in gaining an early, lopsided lead over his two opponents, a lead so large that it withstood continued stories about the Second Injury Fund and Roy Blunt’s ads about the scandal surrounding the fund’s operation.

Importance of Campaign Money

The importance of money was another theme that dominated the analysis. The 1992 campaigns were the most expensive ever, even with controls for inflation, in the years in which Missouri has had accurate records of campaign expenditures. While some individual campaigns in earlier years had cost more, never before had so many campaigns cost so much, nor had so many candidates spent so much time raising money.

Because candidates are the most effective fund-raisers, they become heavily involved in fund-raising. Observers of Congress have complained, albeit in an exaggerated manner, that congressmen spend all their time raising money for the next campaign. In Missouri in 1992, such statements involved little exaggeration. Governor Mel Carnahan’s chief fundraiser was the most specific, reporting that Carnahan spent thirty-eight hours each week on the telephone, asking people for money (and in addition spent part of his “free” time attending fund-raising meals or
Jay Nixon fueled his campaign for attorney general with one hundred fund-raising calls every day. His general election opponent, David Steelman, spent almost all of September and October raising money, hoping to but never managing to get enough money to allow him to go back to the handshaking and retail politics that had worked well for him in the primary.

Candidates for Congress looking for PAC support in Washington, D.C., were frequently advised to go home and raise $80,000 or some such amount as an indication of serious candidacy. The candidates were also instructed to use part of that war chest for an expensive survey to prove that they had some chance of winning. The combination of $80,000 and a glowing survey could gain the candidate needed PAC funds. To candidates who have never raised more than $15,000 or $20,000 in a two-year cycle, it is daunting, to say the least, to learn about an $80,000 hurdle to be jumped a year before the election.

The television commercials and money were at times closely related to each other. The campaign manager for congressional candidate Rick Hardy reported that though it was low on money, the campaign took a calculated risk in spending its remaining funds on some October television commercials. Those commercials excited and stimulated supporters, and more money began to flow in. That money was immediately put into more commercials, stimulating more donations. In this case, the commercials indicated that the campaign was viable: the commercials provided legitimacy.

One of the surprises of the 1992 campaign was the fund-raising ability of Democratic gubernatorial candidate Mel Carnahan. Carnahan's previous campaigns had been comparatively low-cost campaigns, with the most expensive being only a half-million-dollar campaign. In 1992, however, Carnahan raised more than $4 million, so much that he was able to funnel contributions to other statewide Democratic candidates and thus help insure their election. The hard work by Carnahan and other candidates for statewide office resulted in a four-to-three lead, in their combined expenditures, over their Republican opponents in the general election. The Democratic group had tied the Republican group in expenditures in 1980 but fallen somewhat behind in 1984 and far behind in 1988. An explanation of the pattern was provided by the campaign
manager for Republican attorney general candidate David Steelman: “A lot of the business money is given to both major candidates until they figure out who is going to win and then they bet on the winner. Contributors started betting on Carnahan and he had more money than he could handle. He was funneling some of it down the ticket.”

The importance of money was graphically illustrated by the comment of Democrat Mel Carnahan’s campaign manager: “[Money] is all that counts. If you can’t afford to be on television, you aren’t going to win a statewide race. Nothing else matters. We cranked in the dollars.” That view was reinforced by the campaign manager for losing Republican gubernatorial candidate Wendell Bailey: “First, I have to agree . . . that, unfortunately, money matters! We tried to run an idealistic campaign, and it didn’t work. The way the public sees the campaign is through thirty-second commercials. You cannot get around it any way, shape, or form.” The campaign consultant for Democratic senatorial candidate Geri Rothman-Serot presented the same conclusion: “In this race, as in many, many races, the three most important things were money to buy TV, money to buy TV, and money to buy TV, because that is where the general public gets their information.”

Professionalization of Campaigns

The professionalization of campaigns was indicated by the hiring of highly skilled campaign consultants. Almost every major Missouri campaign contracted with a media consultant and with a pollster, usually choosing out-of-state firms. These firms conducted polls for the candidates, advised them on campaign strategies, and developed television commercials. Democratic senatorial candidate Rothman-Serot got instant credibility by recruiting David Doak, a Missourian who had become one of the nation’s top campaign consultants. A number of the firms also hired professional fund-raisers to help open doors or to develop procedures that would fill campaign war chests.

In addition, most major candidates hired full-time campaign managers, who were usually, but not always, from Missouri. Major candidates demonstrated their seriousness by recruiting experienced managers—Republican gubernatorial candidate Bill Webster convinced Tony Feather
to give up the executive directorship of the Missouri Republican Party to become his campaign manager. Webster’s opponent, Roy Blunt, recruited Tom Deuschle, who had managed John Ashcroft’s 1988 gubernatorial campaign. Pat Deaton, Democratic candidate for Congress in southwest Missouri, contracted early with a Kansas City professional campaign management firm, Simmons and Company.

In earlier years Republicans had overcome the disadvantage of their smaller pool of supporters by more professional and better financed campaigns. In 1992, Democrats were catching up, raising more money and conducting better organized and more structured campaigns than in the past. One indication of the change was the Democrats’ ability to organize a coordinated campaign for the first time. Republicans had done so for several campaigns. The task was made easier for Democrats by the nation’s economic problems, which soured voters on President Bush and other Republicans, giving Democrats more leverage than usual. Another reason was the campaign skill and party concern of the two party leaders, Bill Clinton and Mel Carnahan.

Given the perception of voters that George Bush was responsible for the economic problems of the country, Republicans were less eager than usual to conduct a coordinated campaign. This was well described by the representative of Senator Christopher Bond, the one Republican to win a statewide race:

> With the Democratic year, Kit . . . took great pains to make sure that people knew that he was running his own campaign. We took a lot of heat for separating ourselves from the president and not being involved in statewide pushes, but in the end it was successful. As an example, Kit took the lead on the family medical leave issue, opposing the president. . . . This allowed us to present an independent image which is very important in Missouri.

Campaign skills once made a big difference, but now most of the major candidates have developed the skills themselves or are able to hire people who can bring those skills to their campaigns. An early clue that a campaign might be in trouble was the hiring of a campaign manager inexperienced in politics.
Year of the Woman

The significance of the "Year of the Woman" was indicated by the primary victories of Democrats Geri Rothman-Serot, Judi Moriarty, Joan Kelly Horn, and Pat Danner. In the Democratic primary for governor, two unknown candidates, both women, received 35,000 and 22,000 votes, respectively, while unknown male candidates received 4,000 to 11,000 votes. Most surprising was the victory of Judi Moriarty in the Democratic primary for secretary of state. Entering the race with low name recognition, perhaps the lowest in the group, Moriarty won with an expenditure of only $21,000, or eleven cents per vote, a figure far below the $1.15 to $3.62 per vote spent by other statewide Democratic primary winners.

In the Republican primary, women candidates were weaker, but Margaret Kelly won the nomination for lieutenant governor. Another indication of support for a woman candidate was the vote for Joyce Lea, 70, running against three men for the Fifth Congressional District Republican nomination. Lea appeared at only two forums, where she spoke about outer space and architecture, yet she pulled 12 percent of the vote.

In the general election, results were mixed. Only one of the three women running statewide won, Democrat Judi Moriarty for secretary of state. Losing women included Republican Margaret Kelly for lieutenant governor and Democrat Geri Rothman-Serot for the U.S. Senate. In congressional races, nonincumbent Democrat Pat Danner won, but incumbent Democrat Joan Kelly Horn lost her seat. On the other hand, women did slightly better than men in the judicial retention elections, where women judges were on the ballot in four different constituencies. In each case, the woman received the highest "yes" vote, averaging 3 to 4 percentage points higher than the male judges on the same ballot. One other straw in the wind was the performance of candidates on the Libertarian party ticket; women averaged 4.5 percent of the vote while men averaged only 2.5 percent.

These totals do not indicate a strong preference for women, but the indication of a small preference for women is a change from previous patterns. Harriett Woods, the first woman elected to statewide office in
Missouri, noted, "Missouri is a tough state for women to run in. This is a state that didn't get around to ratifying women's suffrage until it was already a part of the federal constitution." Woods estimated that her gender cost her as much as 5 percent of the vote when she ran for the U.S. Senate in 1982 and 1986.\(^5\)

The strengths and weaknesses of female candidates were described well by David Doak, campaign consultant for Geri Rothman-Serot, who noted that the Rothman-Serot campaign felt forced to utilize pro-choice abortion commercials early in the campaign in order to stimulate financial contributors. The commercials also invigorated opponents and ran the risk of branding Rothman-Serot as solely a woman's candidate, thereby reducing the breadth of her appeal.

### Anti-incumbent Feeling

Another pattern of 1992 was the anti-incumbent feeling. Given the drop in support for incumbents in the 1990 election, many incumbents feared even greater problems in 1992. In the end, skillful incumbents largely overcame any bias against them. Judges went out and held meetings across the state and brought their declining average percentage back up. Even so, two incumbent U.S. Representatives, Republican Tom Coleman, of the sixth district, and Democrat Joan Kelly Horn, of the second district, lost their seats. Attorney general candidate Mike Wolff's campaign manager described the problem for the challengers:

"This was the year when the voters wanted non-politicians and our candidate was not a politician. He was the only candidate in the race who had never held a public office. While that was our strength with the voters, it was also our greatest weakness because if you do not hold public office, you have no base from which to raise money. Every candidate who won a party nomination for statewide office had held another office. Further weakening our position was the fact that the other candidates were saying that they weren't politicians, even the ones who were."
Corruption and the Impact of Media Coverage

The campaign scandal of the Second Injury Fund also aided Democrats substantially. The issue was sufficiently complicated that many voters did not understand it at first. Eventually, voters came to understand, and the issue and the taint of corruption gradually engulfed the Republican candidates: first to fall, of course, was gubernatorial candidate Bill Webster, then the Republican candidate for attorney general, who had been assigned some of the Second Injury Fund cases, then the candidate for lieutenant governor, who, as auditor, had not included in her audits sufficient recognition of the seriousness of the transgressions.

Public awareness of the scandal came in part from leaks from two grand juries, one in St. Louis and one in Springfield, each investigating Bill Webster and the Second Injury Fund. In addition, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* conducted a computer analysis of more than eleven thousand worker’s compensation cases and an analysis of campaign contributors for each of the major candidates for governor, demonstrating that attorneys who had contributed to Bill Webster’s campaign won larger settlements and, thus, larger fees for themselves. The article on computer analysis was part of an outstanding series on the issue, which was written largely by Terry Ganey. In addition, the *Kansas City Star* had extensive coverage of various ramifications of the issue. Undoubtedly, some public awareness came from the television commercials run by the opposing candidates as well.

The ultimate impact of the scandal surrounding the Second Injury Fund is certainly open to interpretation. On the one hand, the October poll conducted by the *Kansas City Star* and KMBC found that the abortion issue was most influential, the Second Injury Fund was second, and Carnahan’s tax plan was third. On the other hand, the abortion issue provided some help to each candidate, while the Second Injury Fund (and the proposed tax increase) provided substantially more help to one candidate than the other. On the one hand, campaign managers for Carnahan and Webster seemed to agree on the importance of funding disparities, that Bill Webster might have won if he had had more dollars to draw public attention to Carnahan’s proposal for a tax increase. On the other hand, another analyst might suggest that the reason that
Webster did not get more dollars was because contributors were scared off by his involvement with the Second Injury Fund.

"It’s the Economy, Stupid"

One other factor that was undoubtedly important in the campaign was the voter perception of the sluggishness in the economy. ABC found in its surveys that 42 percent of voters listed the economy as the most important issue in their vote; 21 percent listed the deficit; and 20 percent listed health care. Bill Clinton’s campaign manager had above his desk a sign that served as a constant reminder: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Much of George Bush’s campaign was designed to shift voter attention away from the economy, while much of Bill Clinton’s campaign was designed to stimulate voter concern about the economy. As in the past, voters tended to blame the incumbent president for the economic problems. Like most presidents, George Bush began his term with high popularity, then saw that popularity fall steadily. In February 1991, at the time of the Gulf War, Bush’s popularity shot up again, in a phenomenon that has come to be known as the “rally ’round the flag” effect. Most Americans rally to support the president at times of international crisis. This popularity faded quickly however, and Bush’s ratings in November 1991 were similar to his prewar ratings from a year earlier.

Importance of Campaigns

The events of 1992 indicate the importance of the campaigns in the operation of democratic elections. The climate of opinion may present one side with a disadvantage, but effective campaigning can often overcome much of that disadvantage. Similarly, an effective campaign may reinforce an advantage. Bill Webster’s campaign manager noted how Carnahan’s television commercials “directly aimed at us on the negatives that were out there. They beat us to death on the Second Injury Fund.”

An effective campaign is almost always an expensive campaign. Such
was the pattern in Missouri in 1992. Having the most money does not guarantee victory, as gubernatorial candidate Vince Schoemehl can testify, but it certainly helps. In the primary and general election contests for statewide executive officials in 1992, the candidates who spent the most won eight of fifteen races. Of course, strong candidates attract money; campaign managers spoke of late money in the campaign going to the candidate who looked like the winner.

Traditionally, an effective campaign builds upon the strengths and resources of the candidate, his or her party, and the issues. The 1992 campaigns showed that, increasingly, effective campaigns also exploited the weaknesses of the opposition. The candidates emphasized the patterns that moved and influenced voters. In 1992, voters were moved by some issues, such as the state of the economy and the Second Injury Fund, but they were also moved substantially by personal characteristics of the candidates. So long as voters respond most rapidly to commercials focusing on a candidate's "negatives," we shall continue to see numerous negative commercials.
Notes

1. Missouri’s Political Climate


2. Excellent descriptions of Missouri politics during this period are included in Richard S. Kirkendall, *A History of Missouri, 1919 to 1953,* vol. 5, and in John H. Fenton, *Politics in the Border States.*

3. Turnout is judged on the basis of the number of valid ballots cast for president, compared with the total number of registered voters reported by the secretary of state. Each of those figures is subject to some inaccuracy, since some people cast no ballot for president and other ballots are spoiled or not counted, and since some people who have died or moved continue to be counted as registered voters. The inaccuracies should be fairly constant so that the comparisons over time should be reasonably valid.

4. An important reason for the low number of votes for Bush was the presence on the ballot of a strong third-party candidate, Ross Perot. On the other hand, the state of the economy and Bush’s performance provided much of the reason why many voters were searching for some alternative.


6. Helpful syntheses of state election campaigns have been included in Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, *Political Parties and Elections in American States,* in Larry Sabato, *Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie,* a discussion of governors and their elections; and in Malcolm E. Jewell, *Parties and Primaries: Nominating State Governors.*

7. See Ernest R. May and Janet Fraser, eds. *Campaign ’72: The Managers*


For earlier elections, Theodore White presented analyses of the 1960 through 1972 elections under books with the title *The Making of the President, 1960*, changing only the year.

2. **The Race for Governor**


2. Much of this story was first reported in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. See the description of the coverage by reporter Terry Ganey in chapter 11, “Media Coverage of the Campaigns.”


9. As one of his last acts, Governor Ashcroft appointed Deuschle to a six-year term on the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. Newly elected governor Carnahan withdrew seventy-six Ashcroft appointments that had not yet been confirmed, but he did not withdraw the Deuschle appointment.

10. The counties with the largest numbers of votes in the 1992 Republican primary were St. Louis County, 95,000; Jackson County, 33,000; Greene County, 25,000; St. Charles County, 18,000; Jasper County, 15,000; Clay County, 10,000; St. Louis city, 8,500; and Cole, Boone, and Jefferson Counties, each about 8,000—the ten together constituting 54 percent of the statewide Republican primary vote.


16. See chapter 8, "Ballot Issues." Connelly provided most of the money for the campaign supporting Proposition A to allow riverboat gambling.


20. Liz Zelenka's report on her fund-raising activities is included in chapter 10, "Campaign Fund-raising in Missouri."


28. The amounts spent in earlier campaigns have been converted to 1992 dollars in order to eliminate the impact of inflation. See chapter 10, “Campaign Fund-raising in Missouri.”

3. The United States Senate Race


2. Campaign staff for Mert Bernstein were invited to participate in the panel or to submit a statement to be included but did not do so.


4. The Presidential Race in Missouri


3. The indictment of former secretary of defense Casper Weinberger included release of a memo made by Weinberger in January 1986, indicating that then–vice president Bush had favored an arms-for-hostages deal at a White House meeting, undermining Bush’s long-stated claim that he had not known about the deal until it was revealed by a later Senate investigation.

5. Campaigns for Attorney General

1. See chapter 2 for a full discussion of the Second Injury Fund.

3. The campaign manager for John Hall was invited to attend or to submit a statement later, but he did not do so.

4. The Steelman ad charged that Nixon had been influential in getting a $19 million state contract for a Nixon family firm. Nixon denied the charges, pointing out that the firm in question was not a Nixon family firm, though it did share an office with a firm owned by the family. The head of the Department of Natural Resources, a Democrat appointed by Republican John Ashcroft, said that Nixon had had nothing to do with awarding the contract.

5. The Nixon campaign had charged that Steelman had missed some child-support payments. Steelman and his ex-wife refuted the charges.

6. Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State Campaigns


6. The campaign manager for Margaret Kelly was invited to participate in the symposium but did not. Later, he was invited to submit a statement about the campaign, but he did not.


7. Congressional Races


2. Some aspects of the second-district campaign were described also by David Welch, fund-raiser for Bert Walker. These are included in chapter 10.


4. The campaign manager for Congressman Tom Coleman was invited to participate in the symposium and to submit a statement later, but she did not do so.


7. Hancock, a believer in term limits, had committed himself to no more than four terms, which would extend to 1996.


10. The campaign manager for Congressman Harold Volkmer was invited to make a presentation at the symposium, and afterward to submit a statement or provide a telephone interview. He did not do either.

8. Ballot Issues


3. See David A. Leuthold, “Pro-tax and Anti-tax Voting in Missouri Counties,” *Governmental Affairs Newsletter*, 1–7, for a discussion of voting patterns by county on Missouri statewide tax issues. On tax issues, counties with higher per capita income are more likely to vote “yes” than counties with lower per capita income. If income is controlled statistically, traditional Republican counties in southwest Missouri are more likely to vote “no,” and traditional Demo-
ocratic counties in northeast and southeast Missouri are more likely to vote “yes.”


6. While some officials had urged from the beginning that lottery revenues be earmarked for education, the proposal submitted to the voters in 1984 provided that revenue would go into the general fund. Even so, the legislature had in effect allocated all the money to education, having increased the funding for elementary and secondary education even more than the increased revenue from the lottery. Nevertheless, in succeeding years statewide opinion grew stronger and stronger that the “politicians” had broken their promise. (At least some people felt that the lottery was supposed to solve all funding problems for education, and requests for more tax money for education were evidence of the broken promise.) In 1992 the legislature proposed the addition of a clause to the constitution earmarking lottery and gambling proceeds for education, and the proposition passed overwhelmingly.

7. In 1990 a group of Missourians secured signatures to place on the ballot a proposal to require changes in various legislative and government procedures. The proponents called their effort “Yes for Ethics.” Governor John Ashcroft, one of the leaders of the group, provided $135,000 of his campaign funds to aid the group and personally solicited signatures. The petition was challenged in the courts and declared unconstitutional by the supreme court because it violated a constitutional provision limiting initiatives to one topic. The decision surprised some observers, and probably some principals, because all but one of the judges had been appointed by Ashcroft.

8. The group, called Missourians for Responsible Government, submitted a campaign finance report indicating that they had raised and spent slightly more than $11,000. Presumably most of this money was for the court challenge.

9. Judicial Retention Elections


2. Ibid.

3. Judge Marion D. Waltner, originally appointed in 1934, had been, like all sitting judges, continued in office when the plan was adopted in 1940 with the
requirement that he stand for retention at the end of his term, which was 1942. The judge was opposed by the Lawyers Association of Kansas City, the Kansas City Star, and various business interests. He was supported by the Kansas City Bar Association, the Central Labor Union, and the Pendergast organization. His defeat is described in Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing, The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 226–29.

4. This ad appeared in the Columbia Daily Tribune, October 21, 1992.


10. Campaign Fund-raising in Missouri


2. The authority to receive all campaign finance reports and to publish the annual report of campaign finances was transferred to the Missouri Ethics Commission in 1993. The Ethics Commission published the 1992 Missouri Annual Campaign Finance Report.

3. By an overwhelming vote for an initiated law, Missouri voters adopted in 1974 a law limiting campaign expenditures and contributions as well as requiring disclosure of personal finances. The Missouri Supreme Court later declared the entire law unconstitutional. Legislators then adopted a new law, requiring full disclosure, which was still in effect in 1992.

4. The 1994 general assembly passed a campaign finance law that limited contributions to candidates to $1,000 per election.

5. As indicated in chapter 2, Carnahan raised more money than Webster in the general election campaign, which was probably a surprise to both candidates.

6. The campaign financial summary provided by the Federal Election Commission included almost $80,000 in “individual refunds.”

7. The financial summary provided by the Federal Election Commission indicated that Walker contributed $10,000 to the campaign and loaned $75,000
to it, a large figure but still less than the contributions and unrepaid loans from other candidates, including $143,000 from Democratic senatorial candidate Geri Rothman-Serot, $129,000 from Democratic senatorial candidate William Peacock, $111,000 from Democratic senatorial candidate Merton Bernstein, and $88,000 from Third Congressional District Republican candidate Mack Holekamp.


9. The financial summary provided by the Federal Election Commission indicated that in the 1991–1992 cycle, $1,420,459—35 percent of Bond’s total receipts—were from “non-party (e.g. PACs) or other committees.”

10. The financial summary provided by the Federal Election Commission indicated that Rothman-Serot’s total receipts were $1,156,647, including $301,000 in loans and money raised and spent before the contested primary election.

11. **Media Coverage of the Campaigns**

1. Some of the earliest efforts to show the impact of media attempted to measure the impact of editorial endorsements. The earliest studies found it difficult to claim an impact for editorial endorsement when Franklin D. Roosevelt won despite having a majority of newspapers endorse his opponents. Many of the later studies failed to measure the existing attitudes of readers prior to the endorsement. One Missouri study that did measure voter attitudes before and after the endorsement found that newspaper endorsements reinforced attitudes already held, strengthening supporters and opponents. Usually the effect was to add no more than 1 or 2 percentage points to a candidate’s vote total. In two special cases, large numbers of editorial readers were reinforced in the views they held contrary to the editorial, and thus the candidate lost 1 or 2 percentage points. See Roger A. Gafke and David A. Leuthold, “Why Some Editorial Endorsements Are More Persuasive than Others,” 5–9; and Leuthold and Gafke, “The Persuasiveness of Editorial Endorsements in Elections: A Model and Some Tests.”

Later efforts focused upon agenda setting, the possibility that the media may not influence people in their attitudes but they do influence people in their view of what is important. In this research, causality became an important issue. Did people think an issue was important because it was heavily covered by the media, or did the media cover it heavily because the public wanted to hear about the issue? Or more likely, were both the media and the public
interested because political leaders or newsworthy figures were able to create events that drew attention?

Later studies utilized laboratory experiments that experimentally altered the media agenda to see the effects upon television viewers, finding that emphasis upon particular stories increased viewer evaluations of the importance of those stories. See Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That Matters. See also Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey, “What Moves Public Opinion,” American Political Science Review 81 (March 1987): 23–43, for a finding that the content of television news accounts for a high proportion of aggregate changes in U.S. citizens’ policy preferences.

For interesting analyses of the role of media in campaigns, see Thomas E. Patterson, The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose Their President. For an excellent summary of the literature, see Richard Joslyn, Mass Media and Elections.

12. Campaign Reform

1. For political subdivisions, the contribution and voluntary spending limits are $250 and $30,000 for subdivisions with a population under 100,000; $500 and $100,000 for those with a population of 100,000 to 250,000; and $1,000 and $500,000 for those with a population over 250,000. One exception doubles the voluntary spending limits for certain charter cities that conduct only one non-partisan election rather than a primary and general election.


13. Missouri Campaigns in Retrospect

1. Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” This definition focuses attention on the election campaigns that are the most intense form of the “competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 269.

2. That statement is open to the challenge: “Which earlier years do you have in mind?” Historians quote from some of the scathing editorial comments in nineteenth-century newspapers as indications that we have long had negative campaigns. Since scholars have no readily available measures comparing the dirtiness of one campaign with another, we have to fall back on personal observation. My impression is that the proportion of negative appeals was
much higher in 1992 than they were in Missouri campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s.


5. Ibid.

6. The issue is described in detail in chapter 2, “The Race for Governor,” and chapter 11, “Media Coverage of the Campaigns.”


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**About the Author**

David A. Leuthold, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Missouri–Columbia, has been writing and speaking on Missouri political campaigns for more than thirty years. He is coeditor of the forthcoming second edition of *Missouri Government and Politics* and author of *Electioneering in a Democracy: Congressional Election Campaigns*.

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