The Germans in Missouri, 1900–1918
This book is published in memory
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The Germans in Missouri, 1900–1918
Prohibition, Neutrality, and Assimilation

DAVID W. DETJEN

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Dem Gedenken eines
"wahren Amerikaners"
GUSTAV DETJEN
gewidmet
Preface

Although my earlier university training concentrated in history, my profession now is law. In fact, when I first began reading about the National German-American Alliance, my intention was to write on the prosecution of various leaders of the Alliance in 1917 and 1918 under the Espionage Act of 1917 for allegedly disloyal activities.

There does appear in this book a discussion of the Espionage Act and an account of the prosecution of one leader of the Alliance under that act. But as I read further about the Alliance and German-Americans in the Midwest during the First World War, I concluded that a broader review of the history of the Alliance itself in St. Louis and Missouri was more appropriate than a narrowly focused legal history on a piece of wartime legislation. There were several reasons for this change in direction.

First, in the course of my reading I became aware of how inextricably the activities of the Alliance chapters in St. Louis and the other parts of Missouri were tied to the temperance and prohibition campaigns in the state just before and during World War I. Throughout its existence the Alliance was not only an important cultural institution in the German-American community but also one of the principal organized opponents, ethnic or otherwise, to those organizations in the state agitating for the control or prohibition of liquor. It is hard to conceive of any history of the political struggles over prohibition and temperance legislation of the time ignoring the efforts of the Alliance in opposition to such legislation. Yet it is surprising how little has been written on the National German-American Alliance and its state and local affiliates. There have been a number of books and articles on either the national organization or one or the other of its local branches. But few of those studies have analyzed closely the significance of the antiprohibition activism of the Alliance in the minds of its members and supporters and in the minds of its opponents. For many German-Americans the antiprohibition agitation of the Alliance was the principal justification for its existence.

To a large extent the dearth of detailed studies of the Alliance may be due to the ephemeral nature of the Alliance itself. It was organized, rose into national prominence, and dissolved in ignominy inside of two decades. Moreover, it is easy to overestimate the amount of committed support it enjoyed in German-
American communities throughout the nation. After all, it was largely a paper organization, a federation of unrelated groups whose members seldom participated in Alliance activities, with most of the political agitation of the Alliance being carried out by a narrow cadre of committed leaders.

Nevertheless, in many American cities the most prominent, articulate, and committed leaders of the German-American community converted their anti-prohibition sentiments into action through participation in the Alliance. And many leaders of the prohibition movement itself saw the Alliance as their most formidable opponent after the brewing and liquor industry. Clearly, the anti-prohibition activities of the Alliance deserve attention.

Second, my reading suggested that the public statements and actions of the leaders of the Alliance on German culture and German-American life are an important mirror of the mood and sentiments of German-Americans generally in the two decades before World War I—both in Missouri and throughout the United States. By the turn of the century, the German-Americans who wished to maintain a distinctive German identity were a beleaguered group, proud of their cultural heritage and of the rise of their European fatherland into a world power, but aware nevertheless that their social and cultural institutions were being undermined by the increasing assimilation of German-Americans into the native American culture. At the same time, there were simply not enough new immigrants from the German-speaking parts of Europe to revitalize the German culture in America.

Thus, the leaders of the Alliance, in their speeches, publications, and political activities, reflected the pride, arrogance, insecurity, and desperation felt by many German-Americans in America. Accordingly, another purpose of this book is to describe, in a preliminary fashion, the Weltanschauung of the Alliance leadership and its reaction to the pressures of assimilation, as it endeavored to meet the challenge of preserving German culture in an ethnic community rapidly being assimilated. In many ways those attitudes were complex. For instance, despite the desire of German-American leaders to preserve a separate social culture, there was a fairly unrestrained acceptance by the German-American leadership of the American political system. Even during World War I, German-Americans expressed their opposition to the foreign policy of the Wilson administration through traditional American political lobbying.

Third, another impetus for expanding the scope of this work was the realization that German-American efforts to participate in the 1916 presidential campaign, in an effort to depose President Wilson, had a significant impact on the atmosphere and content of the political debate of that year. Moreover, the German-American lobbying efforts for a strict neutrality policy by the United States, which would favor Germany, influenced political rhetoric of native American politicians of both major parties on the local and state levels as well. Thus, another purpose of this work is to show how one native American community reacted to the political agitation of German-Americans on the issues of neutrality and presidential policy.
This book is by no means meant to be the definitive work on German-Americans in Missouri in the first two decades of this century. But it is hoped that this work, by focusing on the activities of German-Americans in the Alliances in St. Louis and Missouri, may encourage further studies of German-Americans in the early years of this century, a time when that ethnic community still had a significant impact not only on the native American social and cultural institutions in many localities throughout the United States but also on national political issues.

* * *

I wish to express my appreciation to the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in St. Louis, which many years ago encouraged my initial interest in this subject through a modest stipend.

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The staffs of the Missouri Historical Society in St. Louis, the State Historical Society of Missouri in Columbia, and the library of Washington University in St. Louis provided significant expertise and assistance in finding valuable source material. Ms. Gisela Canaan, librarian of the German Society of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, went beyond the call of duty in meeting my research inquiries.

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Finally, my thanks to my wife, Barbara, and our two daughters, Andrea and Erika, for their patience in seeing me through this adventure.

D. W. D.
New York
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Note on German Spellings

For the sake of uniformity, the spelling of various German words and names in the text has been standardized by rendering all vowels with umlauts (i.e., ä, ö, ü) with an e (i.e., as ae, oe, and ue). However, variations in the spelling of words employed by the original German-language author have been retained, such as spelling the word for Bulletin as either Mitteilungen or Mittheilungen, or the word for act or deed as Tat or That. To the extent that the plurals of certain German words appear in the text, they are given in their German form, so that, for example, the plural of Verein is given as Vereine and the plural of Stadtverband appears as Stadtverbaende. Generally speaking, at those points where a German noun or title appears in the English-language text, it is shown in the nominative form in order not to confuse English-speaking readers, even if the word or title in the context of the sentence would otherwise be in another case.
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Founded in Pennsylvania at the turn of the century, the Deutsch-Amerikanischer National-Bund, the National German-American Alliance, was an ethnic federation active in St. Louis and in other Missouri communities from 1904 until April 1918. During this time, the St. Louis German-American community was engaged in what many German-Americans perceived as a life or death struggle in the political arena with those forces in the state favoring prohibition. This struggle was of vital importance to many German-Americans at the time because they believed that if prohibition prevailed in Missouri the German cultural and social institutions that they supported and enjoyed would be destroyed. Gradually in the years before 1914 many of Missouri's German-Americans and native Americans alike came to see the German-American Alliance as the political standard-bearer in the German-American community against prohibition and temperance legislation.

Eventually, prohibition did prevail and the German-American community and all its institutions merged into the mainstream of American society. But few German-Americans could have foreseen at the turn of the century the bitter fruits that their political activity against the prohibition movement would bear, for after August 1914, the German-American Alliance in Missouri shifted the focus of its political lobbying efforts from the prohibition question to the much more volatile issue of American neutrality in the World War. That shift in focus was fateful for the future of the German-American Alliance and the German-American community in Missouri.

Never in United States history has an ethnic group so large and so well established suffered such a sudden and complete reversal of fortunes in time of war. In 1914, German-Americans as an ethnic group were widely accepted and tolerated by the native American population, and the German-American cultural and social organizations were seen as legitimate by the English-language press and by American public officials. German-Americans were often stereotyped, but the stereotyping was consistently favorable or at least benign, and many native Americans sympathized with the German-American community's opposition to prohibition.
But by April 1917, when the United States entered World War I, German-Americans generally were widely distrusted and even despised by many spokesmen in the English-language press and by many Americans who favored United States war participation on the side of the Allies. All German-American institutions, including German-language schools, churches, theaters, and newspapers, German-American social and cultural organizations, and even political activity by the German-American community as a bloc, came under attack as overtly "un-American" or "pro-German." As a result, the forcible assimilation into American society of vast numbers of German-born Americans and Americans of German heritage was accomplished literally in a matter of months. By the end of the war in November 1918, the huge number of German ethnic organizations had been drastically reduced throughout the United States.

Certainly St. Louis did not see the worst excesses of the anti-German hysteria in the United States during the last years of the war. Nevertheless, even if the suspicion and distrust that the St. Louis German-Americans experienced was of a milder variety, it was enough to cause the German cultural organizations and the overtly German-American political lobbying to melt away quickly, as even St. Louis German-American leaders were willing to concede after the war.¹

It seems obvious that there would have been distrust toward the German-American community during World War I, no matter what German-Americans might have done to allay any suspicions of disloyalty toward the United States or sympathy toward Germany and Austria. It was a time when many Americans still thought in terms of absolute good and absolute evil. The propaganda of the Allied Powers from 1914 on and of the Wilson administration from 1917 was that the Allies and, later, the United States, were fighting on behalf of democratic good against autocratic evil. Undoubtedly, in such an atmosphere the German-Americans were found guilty in the eyes of many by association through common ancestry with the "Huns" on the European continent.

But the tragic fact is that certain leaders of the German-American community, often through the activities of the German-American Alliance, exacerbated the suspicions and hatred that many U.S. citizens held toward German-Americans as the war progressed. By their public statements and conduct these German-American leaders indicated that they were in sympathy with the Central Powers and hoped that Germany and Austria would prevail in the war. In all frankness, they did harbor such sympathy, although public expressions of their feelings were made only up until the time that the United States entered the war. Nevertheless, in those first years of World War I, from 1914 through late 1916, they lobbied aggressively in the United States for an American foreign trade policy that would benefit the Central Powers by depriving the Allies of war materiel manufactured in the United States, goods that the Allies desperately needed to continue the war against the Central Powers. That lobbying effort created considerable resentment in some circles.

Unfortunately, the same German-American leaders publicly stated that they
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spoke for German-Americans as a whole. The rationale for such statements was to convince American public officials and the Wilson administration that as leaders of the German-American community they carried political clout that could be delivered at the election polls. But the sad consequence was that after the United States joined the Allies, many people were convinced that there were many German-Americans who secretly supported the Central Powers against the Allies, including the United States.

It is important to keep in mind that the lobbying efforts and public statements of the German-American leaders on behalf of the Central Powers were made before the United States entered the war. In fact, strange as it may seem, there appears every indication that the German-Americans actively lobbying for Germany and Austria from 1914 through 1916 considered themselves to be quite loyal American citizens, albeit of German ancestry. They considered their activism on behalf of Germany and Austria to be every bit as much a legitimate part of the American political process as the lobbying and propaganda efforts by those Americans sympathetic to the Allied cause. In the later years of the war, German-Americans were quick to note that their leaders had never agitated for American military intervention or trade intervention for the Central Powers, but rather for absolute neutrality without intervention for either side.2

Yet it soon became obvious that much of the English-language press in the United States and many important American political leaders and opinion makers considered the political involvement of German-American leaders, especially those of the Alliance, to be beyond the limits of traditional American interest-group lobbying, and indeed to be "disloyal." Nevertheless, the leaders of the Alliance and others in the German-American community continued to agitate until nearly the very day that war was declared by the United States against the Central Powers.

In hindsight, we can say that the conduct of the German-American leaders was reckless and irresponsible. It certainly points out the tragic events that can evolve when an ethnic group vehemently and vocally urges a foreign-policy position that is different from and even contradictory to the foreign policy eventually adopted by the administration in office and accepted by the majority of Americans.

But it is important to examine and to understand how it came about that the leaders of the St. Louis German community, principally through the St. Louis and Missouri branches of the German-American Alliance, came to lobby for sympathy toward Germany and Austria.

First, the German-American Alliance in Missouri from its very inception was a political organization, although initially lobbying solely in regard to prohibition. Second, the very size and stability of the St. Louis German-American community prior to the war, as well as the social and political acceptance that German-American institutions had found in the native American press and among political officeholders, led many German-American leaders to believe that they could lobby on the foreign-policy issues of World War I without fear of
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reprisal. Third, the antiprohibition activism of the St. Louis and Missouri branches of the German-American Alliance before World War I provided a ready-made lobbying organization on behalf of an American neutrality that would favor the Central Powers. Consequently, shifting the focus of political activity of the German-American Alliance from prohibition to foreign policy was a small but fateful step, especially since many German-Americans had rationalized that participating in German cultural activities, preserving their German heritage in the United States, and, later, sympathizing with the German war cause did not preclude full devotion and loyalty at the same time to the United States, their adopted country. Finally, it is also important to examine how the political activity of the German-American Alliance and other German-American leaders came to be seen as disloyalty by certain elements in St. Louis, with unfortunate results after 1917 for the president of the state branch of the German-American Alliance and for others as well.

The events in St. Louis and Missouri were similar to those that occurred in many other cities and regions in the United States. In fact, St. Louis is a very good model for examining the reaction of the German-American population to the prohibition movement and to World War I. The city was one of about a half dozen in the United States that by 1910 had over 100,000 citizens of German birth or origin. Similarly, because there was a fairly substantial agitation for prohibition legislation in the state, there is an opportunity to see how a German-American community reacted to what it perceived to be a threat to its institutions. And, finally, the St. Louis and Missouri branches of the German-American Alliance were among the most active in the nation and received considerable press coverage, affording a chance to follow closely the political activity of the principal lobbying organization of the German-American community in the city and in the state.
I

The Germans in St. Louis

Crucial to an understanding of the conduct of German-American leaders in St. Louis between 1914 and 1917 is at least some knowledge of the history and social and political position of St. Louis German-Americans on the eve of World War I. They formed a proud community, proud of their history in the development of the city and proud of the economic and social standing many of them had come to enjoy not only among fellow German-Americans but also among Americans of non-German ancestry.

Today St. Louis is one of the older manufacturing centers of the country, with few differences culturally from the other older cities of the Middle West, aging gracefully or otherwise, while the focus of rapid growth and industrialization in modern industry moves to other parts of the nation. Moreover, with the exception of a few corporations located in St. Louis that do an international business, the city's direct contacts with the world beyond the borders of the United States are slight when compared with coastal trade centers.

But St. Louis in the latter part of the nineteenth century enjoyed a different pace and atmosphere. At that time St. Louis still was one of the preeminent commercial centers of the United States, and its citizens were quite proud of it. To be sure, St. Louisans had already resigned themselves to the fact that Chicago was to be the premier city of the Middle West, and the city was known even at the turn of the century for being "conservative and sedate." But at the turn of the century, St. Louis was still the fourth largest city in the United States, with nearly 600,000 residents. Only forty years before, the city had had only 160,000 citizens, and many St. Louisans expected the city's population to exceed a million within a few decades. The markets for the city's manufactured products extended deep into the South and dominated the Southwest all the way into Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. St. Louis was one of the most important manufacturing centers in the nation for beer, shoes, and tobacco products. Moreover, it was
the leading cultural and educational city of the lower Middle West, with two long-established universities, a symphony orchestra founded in 1880, one of the leading botanical gardens in the nation, and no less than six daily newspapers, including two German-language dailies that carried national influence.

As St. Louis grew into a major manufacturing and mercantile center, so grew the number of wealthy citizens, who resided primarily in large mansions in the West End of the city and the Near South Side, homes widely admired throughout the country. Many an older or former St. Louisan has written fondly of a quiet, peaceful childhood along tree-lined streets and on wide-porched homes in various residential sections of St. Louis around the turn of the century. By 1900, St. Louis was nearly 150 years old, and that had been plenty of time for a social elite to develop, formerly composed principally of families of French ancestry but later of citizens of Anglo-Saxon origin, with leading figures in many of the financial and mercantile and social institutions of the city.2

Even though the location of St. Louis in the very center of the continent made it impossible for the city ever truly to become a Weltstadt—a world city—the waves of immigration into this country during the second half of the nineteenth century had most definitely reached St. Louis. The result was that the city in 1900 still had a distinct international flavor to it, and one had a sense of various national cultures mixing together. In 1910 still more than half the residents in St. Louis were either born abroad or had at least one parent born abroad.

Even as late as 1915 there were still Catholic parishes for Germans, Poles, Italians, Syrians, Bohemians, Croatians, and Irish, and there was a central district of the city populated mostly by Chinese immigrants. Moreover, no less than twenty-nine foreign nations had full or honorary consuls in the city.3 And at the turn of the century St. Louis was already preparing for the great international exposition in 1904, a world’s fair that attracted exhibitions from dozens of nations throughout the world and served as the site for several world congresses of leading intellectuals and scholars in various fields. Also in 1904 St. Louis was the site of the first Olympic games to be held in the United States.

Without question the ethnic community that most contributed to the international flavor of the city at the time was the German population. Indeed, most perceptive contemporaries and intellectuals recognized that St. Louis had owed its nationally renowned cultural vitality in the period between 1865 and 1885 almost exclusively to the domination of the city by Germans.4 The size and influence of this German-speaking community on the banks of the Mississippi was still sufficiently great in 1900 that St. Louis was perceived by many Americans as a sort of German city in the middle of America.

The German-American community in St. Louis was not an isolated and enclosed ethnic ghetto made up of members of the lower economic or social classes in a large tenement district. Instead, the St. Louis German-Americans were an ill-defined and even amorphous group of people of German ancestry who harbored certain attitudes about German culture. In fact, there were some St. Louisans of German ancestry or even German birth that should not be included
in any concept of German-American community, simply because they had been totally assimilated into the American culture and did not harbor any special sense of identity with German culture or with German-American political or social views. But even those who did identify very closely with German culture were hardly isolated in St. Louis: it simply was not possible for German-Americans to avoid the American culture of the city.

German-Americans had a long history in St. Louis, a history that encouraged many of them to believe that they had a right to full acceptance by non-German citizens of German-American efforts to preserve their German culture as they saw fit. Significant German immigration into Missouri and St. Louis began in the 1830s. In the first years of German immigration, these newcomers, called Dreissigers from the German word for thirty, were often lured to Missouri by glowing reports from various travelers to the state and the Middle West. In addition, various religious groups and settlement and immigration societies led German immigrants into the state in the early years, seeking to establish, often in a rural or small-town setting, some type of utopian or new German community. But in that early wave of immigrants were also quite a few townspeople, such as craftsmen and artisans, who were attracted to the burgeoning city on the Mississippi.

In the early 1850s, the ranks of the German immigrants were swelled by those liberals fleeing Germany and Europe after the collapse of the revolutions of 1848. These immigrants, called “Forty-eighters,” were generally better educated, more liberal, and more active politically than the earlier immigrants. They added considerable diversity to the German-American community in St. Louis and included many of the most prominent German-Americans in the United States, men who participated extensively in the creation of German cultural and educational institutions in the American cities with larger German populations. Although in St. Louis there was already a liberal and intellectual element in the city’s German-American community from the German immigration of the 1830s, the Forty-eighters upon their arrival took the lead in developing many of the cultural amenities for German-Americans and were also foremost in attempting to politicize the German-American community.

The magnitude of the German immigration into St. Louis during the early years of the city’s rapid growth is evidenced by the census figures. From 1830 to 1850, the population of St. Louis grew from a mere 7,000 to 77,860, of whom only 36,529 had been born in the United States. Of the approximately 40,000 foreign born, 22,340 were born in Germany. Thus, in 1850 more than a quarter of the total population of the city had been born in Germany. By 1860 the number of German-born in the city had more than doubled, to 50,510.

German influence in the city grew accordingly, as one contemporary account in 1853 commented:

St. Louis has a large number of academically educated Germans in whose midst one may believe oneself transposed to the beneficent rocks of the Rhine or the banks of the blond Elbe. The Germans of St. Louis are progressive and have obtained to po-
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The arrival of great numbers of German immigrants into the city during the 1840s and 1850s was not without its tensions between the new immigrants and the native Americans, however. As early as 1836, the offices of the first German-language newspaper in the city, Anzeiger des Westens, were threatened by a mob after the editor of the paper, Wilhelm Weber, vehemently denounced the murder of a black by the name of Francis McIntosh. Consistently during the 1840s and 1850s, German-language newspapers in the city and in the state attacked slavery, a position that hardly endeared them to a significant number in the native American community: Missouri was a slave state, and a sizable number of Missourians defended slavery.

Some native Americans retaliated against the flood of immigrants through the nativist and Know-Nothing movements. When the Whig party faltered in St. Louis in 1845, the nativists captured every city office except mayor and in 1846 also won the mayoral seat. In that year, the St. Louis Common Council, dominated by recently elected members of the Native American party, passed an ordinance restricting Sunday activities by banning public transportation after 2:00 p.m. on that day. This was a direct slap at the German immigrant community, for the Germans, as most newly arrived Europeans, used Sunday as a day of recreation, while many native Americans, influenced by Puritan religious doctrines, believed that the day should be one of restrained and somber worship and reflection.

Although the nativists faded in influence after 1846, they experienced a brief resurgence in 1855. The tensions in the 1850s between the Know-Nothings and the German-Americans were great, and sometimes there was violence. In the early 1850s there were disturbances over elections for mayor of the city of St. Louis. In one instance, in 1852, German immigrants seized a polling place in Soulard Market, and native Americans marched south from the center of the city to recapture it: the tavern of one German was burned down in the uproar. The skirmishing between native Americans and German-Americans continued right up until the Civil War. In 1859, there was an effort in St. Louis to forbid the sale of beer on Sunday, but the move was beaten back in the city's Common Council. In 1861, the newly elected police commissioners unearthed an old ordinance prohibiting theatrical performances on Sunday, which was the day the German theater in St. Louis enjoyed its heaviest patronage, especially at the St. Louis Opernhaus, which had been founded by Heinrich Boernstein two years previously. After taking office on 8 April, the commissioners had Boernstein advised that he should not open his theater on Sunday, 14 April, since he would be in violation of the ordinance. Boernstein, a defiant soul, nevertheless opened the theater, but shortly before curtain time the chief of police and forty policemen arrived to stop the production. The German patrons in the theater nearly rioted, until Boernstein cancelled the production and urged his customers to leave peacefully. The theater closed permanently by the end of the next week.
In later years, however, many St. Louis German-Americans perceived a turning point in their relations with the native American population: the Civil War. Invariably in later decades German-American speakers and editors harked back to the role of German-Americans in the Union effort during the Civil War as a positive contribution to the United States and as proof that they were indeed loyal Americans. Such a view of the German-American role for the Union during the Civil War in many states like Missouri was even endorsed by prominent native Americans such as Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁶

The role of the German-Americans in saving St. Louis and Missouri for the Union can be described briefly. In December 1860, Gen. Francis P. Blair, Jr., a confidant of Lincoln, began organizing Union sympathizers in the city into military troops. The recruits were mostly German immigrants from South St. Louis. Many of the men were first drawn from the membership of the Wide Awake clubs, predominantly German organizations formed to protect speakers of the newly organized Republican party at political rallies in Missouri. Later the troops were reorganized to include more than just Republican activists, but the military units were still mostly German. After Claiborne F. Jackson, the Missouri governor and a sympathizer of the Southern cause, called a special state convention in February 1861 in the hope of causing the secession of the state from the Union, tensions in Missouri, a border state with sympathizers for both sides, ran high. Two pro-Southern St. Louisans began organizing secessionists into military units called Minute Men. But the threat that Missouri would fall into Southern hands was effectively eliminated when federal forces captured the pro-Southern state militia at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis, in May 1861. Taking part in the capture were various volunteer units composed of not only the Wide Awakers but also the members of German Turner societies in the city, commanded by German-Americans such as Heinrich Boernstein, Franz Sigel, and Nicholas Schuettner.¹⁷ German-Americans also participated in other minor military skirmishes throughout the state during the war.¹⁸

After the Civil War, the German-American population in St. Louis continued to grow, and even before the turn of the century the community reached its zenith of cultural, social, and political development and influence. The peak of German immigration into the United States was 1882, when over 200,000 Germans immigrated. After that year, German immigration dropped off markedly, but there was still a considerable vitality in the St. Louis German-American community in the early 1900s. Moreover, ethnic cultural and social activity continued to be practiced by various other national groups, and was tolerated by the native American population, if for no other reason than that the foreign influence was still so large. Indeed, even in 1910, of the 687,029 inhabitants of St. Louis, 372,652, or 54.24 percent, were either born abroad or had at least one parent born abroad. Of that number, 186,404 were either born in Germany or had at least one parent born in Germany.¹⁹

Manifestations of the German-American cultural heritage were many, and to a great extent the very size of the German-American community enabled its mem-
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bers to keep alive many of their social and ethnic customs. The following account from Richard O’Connor’s informal and sometimes critical history of German-Americans is based upon the recollections of one St. Louis German-American, Lucille Kohler, about the bock beer season in St. Louis:

“We knew that while bock beer lasted the Eltern would be gayer, kinder. . . We knew that while bock beer lasted pretzels would be free at all beer saloon counters, and patrons, moved to song, would grow hoarse in Sangerfests [sic]. We knew that while bock beer lasted, there would be many who would marry, some even for a second time; and second weddings were twice as much fun. We knew that with bock beer and pinochle the grown-ups would let the evening stretch and give us our fill of games and peanuts.”

In the German sections of St. Louis, towheaded children raced for the nearest beer saloons Easter Sunday morning for the first of the Bock, which “hailed the Risen Lord and the end of the Lenten season.” Each child carried a bucket and a chip, which cost four cents. At Hermann Klein’s the proprietor was so exhilarated by the bock season that he would order his pet rooster, named Hindenburg, to march on command for the children “just like I used to march in the guard back in Baden.” The German beer saloon was as respectable a place, as family oriented, as the corner grocery.

During the several weeks during which the bock flowed . . . a carnival atmosphere prevailed for children as well as adults. “From after supper until dark we might follow a Little German Band from beer saloon to beer saloon in our neighborhood, listen to the singing, and reap pretzels and soda water. . . We attended Charivaris, pinochle and klatsch fests, a concert at Liederkranz Hall, and never did see our beds before 9:00, even 10:00 o’clock.”

The vitality of the St. Louis German community also influenced non-Germans in the city in the two decades after the Civil War. Denton Snider, a resident of St. Louis then, noted that there were four cultural elements in the city after the war: Roman Catholics, Southerners, New Englanders, and Germans. But the dominant element was German, “ascendent in amount of its members, its aggressiveness, its general intelligence, and its unity of spirit”: This was the time, then [1860s and 1870s], in which the Teuton held sway in St. Louis, not by external conquest, but by honest superiority of voting strength at least here in the city, even if disenfranchisement was more fully resorted to elsewhere in the state. The whole community was borne along in the flood-tide of German spirit. The majority of the inhabitants was composed of Germans, German-Americans and Germanizers, of which last class I was a right specimen. Many native flowers of German life could be seen and plucked in the suburban beer-gardens which enwreathed the whole city round about in a blooming circle. As to public manners and amusements the public turned German; I joined a German club in which English was tabooed and in some cases unknown. The beer-house was then in its glory and was a popular resort, especially Tony Niederwieser’s Valhalla, and George Wolbrecth’s Tivoli. In the latter gambrinus effervesced with the highest overflow of his divine frothiness, melodiously attuned to the notes of the largest and best orchestra in town. What a music-loving folk, one had to exclaim, for the rather bitter liquid would not go down unless mingled with sweet sounds. Here I saw the real Teutonic people in its heart’s attunement to life’s ills and joys. There was a triumphant swing in the crowd, a consciousness that it was on the time’s top just here in St. Louis as well as on the other side of the globe.”
As Snider noted, St. Louis for some years in the 1860s and 1870s was a veritable “German city,” with close ties indeed to Germany itself. For instance, at the end of the Civil War there were three large German bookstores in St. Louis and many lesser German stores with ties to publishing houses in Berlin and Leipzig. Moreover, many St. Louis Germans nurtured ties with Germany, which in the 1860s was in a process of unification that would make it the greatest power on the continent:

Was there some deep undercurrent of connection between German St. Louis and the old or rather new Fatherland in Europe? I now believe that there was a spiritual transportation going on during those years, an inner change common to both during and through its massive display of victorious energy, the German spirit all over the world began to deem its blood kin the superior race, which was destined to rule other peoples, to possess the wealth and even to mold the mind of the rest of mankind after its pattern. . . . It was natural that we here in St. Louis should get some echo of the mighty world-historical upburst of our racial congeners across the ocean. Every year hundreds, yea thousands of the more educated and wealthy class of Germans went over to the re-born Fatherland, and drank of the new spirit at the head-waters. 22

Indicative of the impact of this German influence upon non-Germans in St. Louis was that the St. Louis Movement, a school of Hegelian philosophy that flourished in St. Louis between 1865 and 1885, of which Snider himself was a member, was composed principally of non-German members of the intelligentsia in the city. 23 William Marion Reedy satirized the pretentious intellectuality of the members of the St. Louis Movement, which included lawyers, doctors, and educators, in his Mirror, 24 but there is little question that the German culture and ideas had an impact on many St. Louisans, especially in the area of education. Among those influenced by the St. Louis Movement were John Torrey Harris, superintendent of public schools in the city, and Susan Blow, the instructor of the school system’s first kindergarten, the first public school kindergarten in the United States. Both Harris and Blow applied German educational theories to practice in the public schools.

The St. Louis public school system had a number of other German-born or German-trained superintendents, and the system employed the head of a local Turnverein to organize the system’s physical education system. The German influence continued to as late as 1905, with the superintendency of Louis Soldan, German born and a disciple of Harris. In addition, Otto Heller, who occupied a professorial chair in German at Washington University in St. Louis endowed by Adolphus Busch, the brewing magnate, reported in 1900 that, although the university was not generally oriented to the German-American community in the city, nearly half the students at the university, both German-American and otherwise, were enrolled in courses to learn the German language or German literature and culture. 25 Even after the turn of the century, native Americans in St. Louis conceded their intellectual and cultural debt to the German culture of the city. 26

The last years of the nineteenth century saw the final phase of the Bluetzeit, or
flowering, of German culture in St. Louis. A review of the extensive German-American commercial, social, and cultural institutions and achievements in St. Louis does much to explain the feelings of power and influence German-American leaders felt in later years.

As late as 1897 there were still five daily German-language newspapers in the city.21 And in 1914 two of those German dailies were still publishing: the Westliche Post, the paper for which Carl Schurz and Joseph Pulitzer had once worked, one of the leading German-language newspapers in the United States, with readers throughout the Midwest and a tremendous influence on other German weeklies and dailies in the nation; and the Amerika, the leading German Catholic newspaper in the nation and headed for many years by Carl Daenzer, a leading Forty-eighter. In 1910, the Westliche Post, which was oriented toward the Republican party, had a daily circulation of thirty thousand in the city, while the Sunday edition of the paper, called the Mississippi Blaetter, had a circulation of sixty thousand. The Amerika, which was more liberal and oriented toward the Democratic party, had a daily circulation of twenty-six thousand.22

Another sign of the cultural vitality of the St. Louis German-American community was the existence of German theater companies in the city. There were many companies of varying quality and duration of existence during the twenty-five years from the end of the Civil War until 1890, as well as guest performances by various actors and actresses and companies from Germany. Many of the productions were for the so-called popular taste, although some classical works, by Goethe, Schiller, and the like, were performed, as well as a few German operatic works. At least two productions by German-American authors residing in St. Louis were staged: Sibyl by Charles Gildehaus, and Die Sclavin, or The Slave Girl, by J. G. Woerner. Other St. Louis playwrights included Boernstein, Dr. John Hartmann, Ernest Anton Zuendt, and Louis Gottschalk.29

Johann Gabriel Woerner deserves special attention, not only because his life was typical of German-American writers, but also because his political and literary careers suggest how extensively German-Americans in St. Louis were a part of both the German and native communities in the city. Woerner was born in Moehringen, in Wuerttemberg, on 28 April 1826, and came with his family to St. Louis in 1837. When the revolutions in 1848 broke out in Europe, Woerner returned to his homeland, but he found his political thinking had been so influenced by his experiences in America that he felt totally out of place in Europe. Upon returning to St. Louis in 1850, he became the editor of a local newspaper, was then appointed clerk of the municipal judge’s court, and studied law, gaining admission to the bar in 1855.

Between 1857 and 1870, Woerner served in a series of governmental posts, including clerk of the Board of Aldermen, city attorney, member and president of the City Council, and state senator. Although he remained a Democrat after the organization of the Republican party, he voted for Lincoln in 1860 and 1864 in order to oppose slavery. In 1870, he was elected probate judge of the city and
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county of St. Louis, running on the Democratic ticket, and served for twenty-four years in that position, winning reelection several times until he was defeated by a fellow German-American, Republican Leo Rassieur.30

Woerner’s literary efforts reflected his attitudes on the political condition of the United States generally. Significantly, Woerner’s writings had nothing to do with the culture or life in Germany. His first well-known effort, the play Die Sclavin, carried the subtitle Ein Amerikanisches Schauspiel in funf Aufzugen, an American play in five acts. The play dealt with the inherent contradiction of the United States, a nation founded upon the principle of personal liberty, recognizing as lawful in part of its territory an institution inherently inimical to such personal liberty, slavery. Die Sclavin was first produced in St. Louis on 23 January 1874 and was enthusiastically received. Over the next twenty-five years it was also performed in such cities as Pittsburgh, Chicago, Cincinnati, and Buffalo.31

Woerner’s other principal literary effort was Die Rebellen (literally translated, the woman rebel), produced in 1874 by the St. Louis German stock theater company at the Apollo, the German-language theater house in St. Louis at the time.32 Over the next twenty-five years Woerner reworked the play into a novel in English, published in 1899 by Little, Brown & Company. Woerner was opposed to slavery and strongly favored the Union, but he was deeply concerned after the Civil War that Reconstruction was being carried out too vindictively against the former rebels in the Confederacy. Thus Woerner opposed the Fifteenth Amendment—not because he opposed emancipation and the abolition of slavery, but because he feared that the amendment would be used by the Radical Republicans to oppress Southern whites.33 The novel, The Rebel’s Daughter, a highly autobiographical work, reflected these concerns, and in the end, after the Civil War, the hero, Victor Waldhort, a character representing the North, marries the heroine, Nellie May, representing the South.

Theatrical works by German-American authors such as Woerner were only a minor aspect of the St. Louis German-American stage, and there were a sufficient number of Germans in the city to support a fairly steady diet of theatrical productions by German, as opposed to German-American, playwrights. In the decades after the Civil War, a whole series of German theatrical companies successively flourished and died, but relatively permanent and stable productions of German theater arrived finally in the 1890s, when a number of resident companies were established with sufficient funding to last more than a season. In July 1891, certain German-American business and community leaders founded a German theatrical association to finance the conversion of a former Presbyterian church at Fourteenth and Lucas into the Germania Theater, for German theatrical productions.34 The productions were fairly sophisticated, including not only German classics but also modern realistic works, such as Hermann Sudermann’s Die Ehre (Honor) and Ibsen’s Die Gespenster (Ghosts).35

In 1903 German theater productions were transferred to the Odeon Theatre at Grand and Finney, where many German assemblies and festivals were held.
More significantly, however, in April 1907 the Deutsche Theaterbau Gesellschaft, which had been organized by St. Louis German-American leaders to finance the construction of a permanent German theater house, bought land on Delmar west of Grand for a theater site. In the spring of 1912 the total capitalization of the company was increased to $150,000, raised from the between five hundred and six hundred stockholders, to finance construction of the theater itself. The building was completed in March 1913 and named the Victoria. Even after World War I started, productions at the Victoria were given once weekly—ironically on Sundays—from October to May.

There was also an appreciation for German literature and poetry in the city, with most of the St. Louis German-language newspapers regularly printing poetry, short stories, novellas, and serializations of novels by authors of various schools of German literature. Although certainly of no national or international literary significance, there was also a German literary movement of sorts in the city. In addition to the several German-language playwrights who lived in St. Louis, there were also writers of German-language fiction and poetry, including Heinrich Lange, whose poetry dealt with Missouri landscapes, novelists Otto Ruppius and Heinrich Boernstein, and even the poet Albert Sigel, brother of the Union army general Franz Sigel. The St. Louis Freidenker, or Free Thinkers ethical movement, had a German-language library of over three thousand volumes.

Much of the support for the establishment of the St. Louis Symphony Orchestra in 1880 came from the German-American community in the city. The orchestra in its early years often was used for musical accompaniment in concerts by various local choral groups, including many German choral societies. Most of the musicians in the orchestra were of German origin. As for the choral groups themselves, the first German choral society had been the St. Louis Saengerbund, founded in 1846 by men from a brewery in St. Louis. The National Saengerfest of choral groups throughout the United States was held in St. Louis in 1872, 1888, and 1903. The 1903 National Saengerfest included soloists from the Hamburg city theater and the New York Metropolitan Opera, singing works of Wagner, Meyerbeer, and Mendelssohn.

Even at the turn of the century there was still a distinct German-American aspect to the economic and business community in St. Louis. The brewing industry, a major source of jobs and income, was dominated by German-Americans, and nearly every major line of business, including shipping, hardware, chemical manufacture, milling, furniture manufacture, and clothing manufacture, had at least one significant German-American company represented. An indication of the aggregate economic wealth of the German-Americans—and that they were not totally assimilated into the St. Louis economic community—is the fact that in 1902 there were at least a half dozen small and middle-sized banks controlled by German-Americans. The Southside Bank of St. Louis, established in 1891, included among its directors such prominent German-Americans as Adolphus Busch and Charles Nagel.
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But the primary way in which many German-Americans in St. Louis identified with German culture was through personal contact with other German-Americans in various ethnic social organizations. In the years just before World War I, there were over two hundred German ethnic organizations in the city, with thousands of members. These groups generally were classifiable into one of four categories: \textit{Unterstuetzungsvereine}, or benevolent aid societies, to which German immigrants paid assessments and received financial benefits upon illness or unemployment; \textit{Landsmannschaften}, or societies for immigrants from the same province or region of Germany, often with benevolent aid programs, but also with many social activities; \textit{Gesangvereine}, or choral groups for men and women, although often these groups were also social in nature; and \textit{Turnvereine}, gymnastic organizations founded upon the principles of Friedrich Jahn, the founder of the Turner movement in Germany, although these \textit{Vereine} had as much a social as an athletic purpose. In addition, there were numerous church sodalities, circles, men's clubs, and similar organizations composed of the members of a particular Protestant or Catholic church.

The facilities for some of the organizations were quite elaborate. In an advertisement soliciting members in 1915, the St. Louis Turn Verein hailed among its features a hall and gymnasium: competent teachers and leaders for classes for men, women, and children; well-equipped dressing rooms and baths; a library with over three thousand volumes in German and English; a lecture program; and free medical care at the facilities of the Turn Verein.

Just how well established were these social and recreational clubs in St. Louis is suggested by the Liederkranz, the premier social institution in the German-American community. In 1907 the Liederkranz built a $175,000 structure of black marble and brick, with a banquet hall, card and billiard rooms, a reading room, a concert hall and ballroom, a bowling alley, a barroom, kitchen, cafe, ladies' powder room, and a garden. The club had eight hundred members by 1907, generally the elite of the German-American community. Its social functions were some of the leading events of the city and were even reported in the society pages of English-language newspapers. Over sixteen hundred tickets were sold and one thousand dinner reservations were made for the Liederkranz masquerade ball in 1914.

Even greater numbers participated in the \textit{Turnvereine}, or Turner organizations. On Turners' Day at the World's Fair fifteen thousand Turners participated in precision calisthenics, and in 1912 there were six thousand Turners in the city. The various \textit{Turnvereine} regularly held banquets and dances for their members and guests, and frequently the attendance at such functions exceeded five hundred or even one thousand.

Festive days promoted by these social and cultural organizations served as a significant impetus for feelings of German solidarity. For instance, in May 1905, the Schillerverein, a St. Louis German social and cultural organization, commemorated the centenary of Schiller's death with ten days of functions, including a parade in which eight thousand German-Americans marched through streets.
decorated with German and American flags and pictures of the poet. At the statue of Schiller in a St. Louis park, thirty thousand people listened to music, choral presentations, poems, and speeches in German and English.48

German Days, often sponsored in late summer or early fall by the German-American Alliance, were heavily attended. The August 1907 celebration was attended by five thousand German-Americans at Forest Park Highlands, who heard singing societies and watched Turner exhibitions and German theater. The 1908 German Day, in October, featured a parade of thousands of marchers, twenty-five bands, and six floats that formed a procession eight miles long. Similar German Days were held in 1909, 1910, and 1911, and a mammoth celebration was held in 1913, in conjunction with the national convention of the National German-American Alliance, held in St. Louis that year.49

The proliferation of these ethnic clubs and organizations and their activities in St. Louis encouraged an identification with German culture. To the extent that they encouraged such a common identification with the German language and German social institutions, they were a factor of cohesiveness in the German-American community in St. Louis, as well as a defense against the assimilative forces of the native American society. But at the same time, these organizations, to the extent that they appealed to the parochial regional, social, or religious differences of their members vis-à-vis other German-Americans, were a factor of disunity within the German community.50

Yet another indication of the early strength of the German-American community in St. Louis was its effort to establish and maintain a German-language schooling system in the city. The first public school in St. Louis was opened in 1838, but a German-language school had been established in 1836. By 1860 there were thirty-five public schools with 6,253 pupils, but there were also thirty-eight German-language schools with a total enrollment of 5,524 pupils. Of the thirty-eight German schools, twenty were Protestant, six were Catholic, ten were nonsectarian, and one each was Free Thinker and Jewish.51 Obviously, the German-language school network was stiff competition for the public schools. Both native Americans and German-Americans saw the German-language schools as important devices for passing on German language and culture to the younger generation.

In 1864 the Public School Board allowed German classes to be taught in the public schools in order to attract pupils from the German-language schools. The move successfully undercut the appeal of the private German schools; by 1881 fifty-four public schools had German classes, and by 1887 and 1888 there were ninety-eight German teachers and seventy-four bilingual German-English teachers in the public school system teaching German courses.52 Such deference to a particular ethnic community aroused resentment among native Americans in the city, and eventually the public school system terminated instruction in German, supposedly because the cost of hiring German-speaking teachers became too great, although actually because of nativist political pressures. But the German
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Schulverein, a private association funded by members of the German-American community in St. Louis, was still paying dozens of teachers in 1915 to instruct 1,042 pupils in the German language in four schools on Saturday mornings.53 Despite the strength of the German cultural and social organizations and institutions, and despite the large number of German-Americans in the city, at the turn of the century the German-American community was hardly an ethnic monolith. In this respect, the community reflected the diversity of the population of Germany itself.

No country in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century was as fragmented socially and culturally as Germany, in part because German political unity was not achieved until 1870. But the political unity of Germany achieved by Bismarck did not accomplish social and cultural amalgamation at the same time: the regional and religious differences in Germany continued. The German population was nearly evenly divided between Protestant and Catholic believers, a result of the religious troubles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries after the Reformation. In addition to these religious differences, citizens of various principalities and kingdoms within the German Empire still felt greater cultural and even political loyalty to their own state of, say, Bavaria or Wuerttemberg or Baden than to Germany. Superimposed on this political and religious diversity were the social class differences in a German society that by the 1870s was industrializing at a faster rate than any other nation in Europe. Thus, the Protestant urban tradesman from the north German city of Hamburg who immigrated to St. Louis had little in common with the Catholic farm worker from Bavaria who was also newly arrived in the city.

All of these socioeconomic and cultural differences were brought to the United States by the German immigrants as so much social and class baggage. Of course, once here there was a tendency among many immigrants to feel closer to the other German-speaking immigrants as fellow adventurers in a strange, new world. But the differences were there. As one study has noted, the various choral societies in St. Louis appealed to various segments of the German community. The Liederkranz, Apollo, and Avion societies were for the social elite, the Sozialistische Liedertafel was for those with socialist tendencies, and Vorwaerts for those of liberal bent, while other choral organizations attracted members who had emigrated from particular regions of Europe or Germany.54 Nor was the German-American community politically homogeneous once the immigrants were settled in the United States. Although many Forty-eighers remained liberal to varying degrees after their arrival in this country, many other German immigrants were less politically active and often to the right of the Forty-eighers. In any event, most immigrants translated what political interests they had into participation in the two-party system that they found in the United States. There was, however, a small group of German socialists in St. Louis. In fact, the leaders of the General Strike of 1877 in St. Louis, some of whom were German, appealed through flyers in the German language to German socialists
and workers in the city to support the strike. Moreover, since the German socialists felt that the existing German newspapers in the city had not adequately reflected the views of the working class during the strike, the socialists founded a German-language socialist newspaper in 1878, Die Volksstimme des Westens. The paper ceased publication after three years, but it was followed by a series of chronically undercapitalized German-language socialist newspapers in the city, the longest lived of which was the St. Louis Arbeiterzeitung, founded in 1898. For the most part, however, German-Americans in St. Louis were in one of the two major parties, and the two major German daily newspapers reflected this split.

There were also very sharp religious differences among the German population in St. Louis. Protestant German-Americans were divided into German Evangelicals, German Evangelical Lutherans, and German branches of the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Baptist churches. Moreover, there were numerous conservative Lutheran congregations, especially in the Missouri Synod, that were deeply suspicious of the German Catholics in the city.

The German Catholics themselves were represented in St. Louis by an organization called the Central Verein, which was one of the largest and best organized German ethnic interest groups in the United States. Headquartered in St. Louis, the Central Verein, relatively liberal, came out with a strong policy of social reform in 1901, spearheaded by Frederick P. Kenkel, editor of the Central Blatt and Social Justice, published in St. Louis. Nevertheless, the Central Verein considered itself as much a German as a Catholic organization. Thus one of its publications noted, “The principal consideration [of the Central Verein] is that we preserve and foster German Ideals, German Uprightness and Sincerity, German Loyalty, Faith and Thoroughness.” Not surprisingly, there later developed considerable rivalry between the Central Verein and the newer and more secular German-American Alliance over which organization would better represent the interests of all German-Americans generally and German-American Catholics specifically.

But there were even instances of division among St. Louis German Catholics themselves, such as when a Catholic priest from one part of Germany was assigned to a parish composed mostly of Catholics from another part of Germany. Of course, there was also a German Jewish community to add yet more diversity, and a Free Thinker society, organized by Forty-eighers. The vehement anticlericalism of these Forty-eighers had even resulted in some uneasy alliances between them and the Know-Nothings in the city elections of 1855 in order to reduce the influence of members of the organized German churches in the city.

There were other factors that hindered the ethnic unity of the German-American community in St. Louis. Any sense of community identity, for example, was greatly hampered by the fact that German-Americans resided all over the city: there was no part of St. Louis that was exclusively German. Although in 1910 there were over 15,500 native Germans and Austrians centered in four South St.
Louis wards, at least 900 German-born or Austrian-born residents lived in each of all but two of the twenty-four other wards in the city. This led to some rivalries earlier in the nineteenth century between German-Americans who lived in the far northern sections of the city and those who lived in the South St. Louis area, probably as a result of poor communications and a lack of good public transportation between the two parts of the city.

In summary, at the turn of the century there were still large numbers of German-Americans in St. Louis who participated in and identified with various German ethnic institutions and organizations. To be sure, the number of St. Louisans born in Germany was steadily dropping, and various assimilation processes were working on the German-American immigrants and especially their children. These assimilative forces were able to work all the more effectively upon many German-Americans because there were really few barriers between the German-American community and the native American community, and the cultural, social, and religious differences among the Germans themselves discouraged putting up a united front against assimilation. Most German-Americans had English-speaking neighbors, many lived in predominantly English-speaking parts of the city, and many had employment in firms where English was spoken. And, of course, their children were attending public schools in which English was the language of instruction.

But there was still a strong sense of identification on the part of many German-Americans with other German-Americans, a willingness on the part of many to be at least to some degree part of a German culture in the United States. This sense of cultural identity with other German-Americans, this tendency to be different from other Americans, did not necessarily lead to any sense of social, political, or religious solidarity, but there was a sense of identity or common interest, especially when, as later developed, German-Americans saw some of their cultural institutions threatened by prohibitionist forces arising out of the native American society.
There was considerable debate among German-Americans at the turn of the century about how and to what lengths efforts should be undertaken to preserve a German identity and culture in the United States. But prior to a discussion of the effort to preserve German culture in America, it is important to emphasize one phenomenon recognized by even the most ardent of those urging preservation: the fact was undeniable that the vast majority of German immigrants and first-generation Americans of German heritage were rapidly assimilating into American society. Not only were these people assuming political allegiance to the United States, but they were adopting the social and cultural values of this country as well—while at the same time rapidly discarding many of the vestiges of their ethnicity.

That this was so was hardly surprising. As one scholar has noted, the Germans were probably better attuned to the environment they were entering in America than any other group of immigrants. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the German immigrants found themselves able to adapt to the prevailing political order here. The absence of an established national political order in Germany until very late enabled many Germans to come to the United States without any prejudice toward one political system or the other. Moreover, the Forty-eigh ters, who had great influence among German-Americans in the latter half of the nineteenth century, fostered an enthusiasm for the democratic process found in the United States. Thus, most German immigrants came willing to accept the basic principles of American politics. Furthermore, German-Americans were coming to an industrialized, urban United States from a nation in Europe that was no less industrialized and no less urbanized. Accordingly, many of them were already equipped with labor skills and an understanding of urban life in general that enabled them to move quickly into the marketplace and to adapt to the social routine, which surely encouraged rapid economic and social assimilation into American society.
The result was that there were few political or economic or even social barriers to prevent German immigrants from rapid assimilation. To be sure, the inability to speak English and a lack of knowledge of local customs forced many German immigrants to stay within the secure perimeter of the ethnic community for at least some period of time after arrival in the United States. But once they mastered basic English and became familiar with local customs, most were clearly willing to strike out on their own in the American society: any tendency of the German immigrants after that point to identify with German culture was a matter of volition rather than necessity. Of course, many German-Americans did maintain ties with social and cultural institutions that were German in character, but they did so out of a desire for familiarity, comfort, and security, not because they had to in order to survive.

Indeed, many German immigrants and most first-generation Americans of German origin were willing and indeed eager to become Americanized. Moreover, by the turn of the century probably no large number of German-Americans would have been able to avoid Americanization for any period of time, even if they wanted to, for the German-American community in St. Louis, as in most other cities, was simply not large enough and not cohesive enough to isolate itself from the dominant American culture. Although German-American leaders in St. Louis and in other American cities might not have conceded the point in 1900, it is now clear that the assimilation of German-Americans was inevitable. By 1900 the great wave of German immigration was over: while in the 1880s a total of 400,000 Germans came to the United States, in the 1890s there were only 105,000, and between 1901 and 1910 a mere 36,500 Germans entered the United States. The lack of any new cultural impetus from the homeland, due to the dearth of immigrants from Germany, coupled with the tendency of most first-generation Americans of German origin to become fully Americanized, assured the eventual dying out of German culture in America.

In 1900 the response of various German immigrants and other German-Americans to the native culture around them was quite diverse. The important thing to remember, however, is that often the fervent call of the idealistic German-American leaders to preserve the full panoply of their cultural institutions did not find an echo among the broad mass of German-Americans. The average German-American was undoubtedly more concerned about preserving his Verein and his local tavern’s right to sell beer on Sunday than in the performance of Schiller in the local theater and the publication of local German-American histories. In short, the views on just how much of German culture should be preserved, and how, were varied.

The most extreme position, of trying to establish a “New Germany,” totally based upon German culture and isolated from the native American culture, had lost all vitality by the 1850s. An example of such German communities in Missouri is the one founded at Hermann: German-born residents of the town were assimilated into American culture only slightly more slowly than German-
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Americans in urban areas. Although some isolated farm families may have retained the ability to speak German, by now only a handful of residents in the town have even the slightest familiarity with the German language.  

As one study has pointed out, many German-Americans in St. Louis were willing to become part of the native American society. They became members of only American social and business organizations and were married to native American spouses. Speaking only English, many of this group even moved to parts of the city that were widely recognized as being primarily for Anglo-Americans.

Others in the German-American population, however, did not submit completely to the native American culture, but rather, to varying degrees, harbored a certain emotional or intellectual attachment to aspects of German culture. That attachment manifested itself in various ways, such as a loyalty to the German language and German art and literature, or to certain aspects of the German life, including participation in ethnic social organizations and activities. Scholars have debated the degree to which this mental or intellectual attachment to German culture existed among German-Americans. Frederick Luebke has expressed doubt that there was any widespread psychological acceptance by German-Americans of a sense of Deutschtum, or “Germanness,” in the United States. But others, including John Hawgood, have concluded that there was a certain “mental reservation,” as Hawgood phrased it, maintained by a significant number of German-Americans about accepting totally the American way of life.

Just what percentage of foreign-born and native-born German-Americans accepted the idea of belonging to a separate culture is only indirectly important in this study. The focus here is the German-American Alliance, a hierarchical federation in which only a handful of St. Louisans, basically certain members of the upper social and economic strata of the German-American community, participated actively. It was this core of German-American leaders that maintained the Alliance and guided its propaganda campaigns, and their identification with German culture was great, undoubtedly greater than that of most other members of the Alliance. As for the reported seventy-five thousand or so other so-called members of the German-American Alliance in Missouri at the start of World War I, only a small fraction of them participated to any significant degree in Alliance activities.

There appears to be little question that many German-American elite of not only St. Louis but also other large cities in the United States had to some degree this sense of Germanness, a sense of cultural separateness from the mainstream of native American culture. But some German-American leaders were able to participate actively in both native American and German-American social, professional, and cultural institutions, moving back and forth between the two cultures with relative ease. Both Frederick Lehmann and Judge Hugo Muench, for example, prominent lawyers who identified with aspects of the German-American cultural and social community in St. Louis, served as president of the
Bar Association of St. Louis. Lehmann and Charles Nagel, another prominent St. Louis German-American lawyer, both served in the Taft administration in Washington. J. G. Woerner served as a city official and as an elected judge while writing German-language literary works. Emil Preetorius served as president of the Missouri Historical Society, a private organization in St. Louis closely tied to the native American social elite. And Enno Sander, the Forty-eighter who helped organize the St. Louis College of Pharmacy and authored the law creating the State Board of Pharmacy in Missouri, was a member of the Liederkranz and a German Turnverein, but at various times in his life he was also a member of the St. Louis, Missouri Athletic, Noonday, University, and Union clubs, all pillars of the native American social and business community.9

Other German-American leaders remained more isolated intellectually in the ethnic milieu, marrying a German-origin spouse, participating only in German-American institutions and organizations, and residing in heavily German areas of the city.10 Yet even these individuals who felt a great sense of loyalty to German culture were confronted daily by native American institutions, to say nothing of the public school system in which their children were taught. The German-American leaders did not try to repudiate these institutions. Instead, they simply insisted that there was more to their life than the native American culture and society.

There thus developed a sort of cultural schizophrenia in the German-American leaders in St. Louis: they considered themselves to be loyal to the American political and economic system, but at the same time they were loyal to American cultural values only to the extent that such loyalty did not impinge upon their sympathy for and attachment to the German cultural values they continued to embrace. This German cultural schizophrenia is well reflected in the comments of Carl Ruemelin, a prominent Cincinnati German-American:

We did not wish to establish here a mere New Germany [ein blosses Neu-Deutschland], nor on the other hand did we wish simply to disappear into America [einfach in Amerika untergehen].

... It is necessary for us to declare, with a bold consciousness of fact, that we have succeeded in remaining honorably German without at the same time being untrue to our new Fatherland.11

As the Omaha Bee put it, "Germania our Mother; Columbia our Bride," in reference to the adage that it was not necessary for a man to forsake his mother in order to be loyal to his wife.12 Maybe so, but only if the mother and bride were not feuding.

As Hawgood noted, it is difficult to perceive how this dual loyalty was to be accomplished. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the American aspect of the German-American dual loyalty, for German-American leaders and German-Americans generally considered themselves to be deeply loyal and committed to the political and economic institutions of the United States. Conversely, there was little interest in or sympathy for the political system of the German Empire.
German-Americans believed that they had earned their American political spurs in the Civil War. Regardless of how significant that role in fact was, it was an event of perceived great historical significance not only for St. Louis German-Americans but also for German-Americans throughout the United States. They believed that their participation in the Civil War on behalf of the Union was conclusive proof that they could retain their German culture and yet be unswervingly loyal to the United States.

The German-Americans' assimilation into the American political system was enhanced by the fact that German-American voters at the time of the Civil War were wooed by the young Republican party. That original attraction developed into a long-standing predilection of many German-Americans to support the Republican party, reciprocated by the effort of Republican leaders to protect the interests of German-Americans in such areas as immigration policy and, on a local basis, retention of German language instruction in the St. Louis public schools.

The result was that by the start of World War I the Republican party in St. Louis included many leaders who were of German origin. Indeed, one wag commented that the list of aldermen in the city of St. Louis read like the roll of the German Reichstag. In 1908, for example, E. V. P. Schneiderhahn, the first president of the Missouri German-American Alliance elected at a state convention, was elected a member of the St. Louis City Council on the Republican ticket.

The political assimilation obviously redounded to the benefit of more than just the elite. For instance, 236 of 970 patronage jobs for the city of St. Louis for street repair and sewer and street cleaning went to Germans, with the Irish and the Italians getting 154 and 93 positions, respectively, a distant second and third among foreign-born workers. The Republican message was spread to the German-American populace by the Westliche Post. At election time, whole pages of the Westliche Post were taken up with dozens of ads for Republican candidates for office. But even those German-Americans who were not Republicans were also politically assimilated and were generally to be found within the folds of the Democratic party.

Accordingly, German-Americans considered themselves to be an integral part of American history and the American political system. Indeed, German immigrants had the highest rate of naturalization of any immigrant group entering the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. Yet political assimilation did not result in total cultural identity with the native American community. There were a number of reasons for this.

One was historical. Certainly German-Americans of the early twentieth century did not forget the tensions that constantly had cropped up in St. Louis during the nineteenth century between German-Americans and various segments of the native American society. Numerous times in the period around World War I German-American speeches compared the activities of those opposing German-Americans on prohibition or American neutrality policy to the conduct of the nativists and Know-Nothings before the Civil War. These nativist tensions had
The Sense of Deutschtum

continued after the Civil War, even if acceptance of German-Americans by the native American population and especially the English-language press was much greater. For instance, in early 1866 the Missouri General Assembly passed legislation forbidding the sale of alcoholic beverages on Sunday. St. Louis Germans promptly organized a Reformverein and held mass meetings in February and March 1866 to protest the law. The Westliche Post that winter constantly agitated against the law and strove to unite St. Louis Germans to vote in the 3 April city elections for officials who would oppose the legislation. The newspaper's efforts were unsuccessful: in the city election the reformer slate was soundly trounced.

In fact, German-Americans often attracted native American resentment by their very participation in American politics and their challenge of native American political leaders, especially after German political leaders in Missouri began efforts to moderate the harsher policies of the Radical Republican party. After his election as U.S. senator by the Missouri legislature in January 1867, Radical Charles D. Drake vented his resentment of German-American political leaders opposed to his election by gloating that his victory was a heavy blow at the domination of the Radical party by the little knot of Germans in St. Louis.

And in the bitter political campaign of 1870 in Missouri, after the Liberal Republicans, led by Carl Schurz, had divorced themselves from the Radical Republicans, led by Senator Drake, Drake implied that Schurz, who at the time was the other U.S. senator from Missouri, was evincing more sympathy for German industry than for American industry in his stand on a revenue tariff question.

The teaching of German in the public schools also gradually led to a confrontation in the school board elections of 1887. In fact, ever since the introduction of German instruction into the public schools in 1864 there had been resentment among native Americans, even though it was intended to induce the assimilation of German-American youths into American society. The 1887 election turned into a contest between a "citizens slate" urging that German be eliminated and a "Turner slate" urging that it be retained, into which was interwoven the efforts of Democrats, who favored elimination, to break the control over the school board by the Republican party, which favored retention. In the end, the citizens slate prevailed and German instruction was abolished. Although there was not the political solidarity among German-Americans at the polls that one might have expected, the fact that native Americans coalesced to eliminate German instruction did not escape the attention of German-American leaders.

Moreover, tensions between the German-American community and native Americans were heightened by the increased rivalry between the United States and Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as both nations participated in the age of colonial imperialism. Increasingly the United States and Germany became naval and trade competitors, and there were incidents of tension and suspicion between the two countries during the two decades around the turn of the century over Samoa, China, and Venezuela.

One serious incident during the Spanish-American War roused German-
Americans in Missouri to action. In April 1899, one Captain Joseph B. Coghlan of the United States Navy made remarks before a gathering in New York City over a confrontation between Admiral Dewey’s fleet and the ships of a German admiral while both navies had ships in the Manila harbor. The Coghlan incident raised tremendous concern among German-Americans throughout the country, including in St. Louis, that war between Germany and the United States might develop. Emil Preetorius, the old Forty-eighter and publisher of the Westliche Post, declared Coghlan to be a “reckless ignorant ass” and called a meeting of editors of German-language newspapers throughout the state to discuss the situation.

The editors met in late April in St. Louis, and included representatives from German-language newspapers in a half dozen cities and towns, and other editors corresponded by letter with the participants of the meeting. The positions taken by those in the meeting were a fascinating preview of the German-American rhetoric that was to prevail during World War I, when the threat of war between Germany and the United States again existed.

In conjunction with the resolutions passed by the newspaper editors, Emil Preetorius issued a statement:

In a conservative manner we want to protest against the agitation that has been going on of late, which tends to disrupt the friendly feelings between the United States and Germany. We want to protest against imperialistic militarism. We want to silence the Anglo-American press which would bring about entangling alliances. . . .

The basis on which these fellows operate is that England is our friend and Germany our arch enemy. It is a wormworn basis. We maintain that we are adhering strictly to the principles on which our government was founded. We are, and mean to stay, American. If war were to be declared against Germany, we would take up our guns, though it would be with bleeding hearts.

Preetorius maintained that the German-Americans would surely fight to defend the United States, but it is interesting that the whole thrust of the action of the editors was to try to prevent such a war situation from ever arising, by condemning the imperialism and militarism that made Germany and the United States rivals. It was precisely this desire to avoid conflict between the United States and Germany that was later to lead to the insistent efforts of German-American leaders during World War I to have the United States adopt a neutrality policy that would keep the United States totally isolated from all belligerent nations. Likewise, in 1899, if the United States and Germany were not colonial and naval rivals, the threat of conflict would also be reduced. Implicit in the statement by Preetorius is a recognition that the cultural juggling act that so many German-Americans were performing with their sympathies for both nations would collapse if the United States and Germany went to war.

In any event, these tensions between Germany and the United States at the very least set off many German-Americans from their fellow citizens of Anglo-American origin. Indeed, German-Americans often came to see the English-language press, to the extent that it criticized aspects of German life or society, as
mouthpieces for the propaganda of Great Britain, which German-Americans rec-

But undoubtedly the most significant source of tension and sense of sepa-
rateness from the mainstream of American life for German-Americans was the
matter of the liquor laws and the related rise of Sabbatarianism. This was a
fundamental cultural issue in the eyes of the German-Americans, a cultural is-

The temperance issue did not fade away after the Civil War, as the German

Consistently prohibitionists contended that they were defending Sunday from

As the prohibition movement grew in influence around the turn of the century,

In any event, the prohibition movement gave German-Americans a common

fue, which created a solidarity within the German-American community that had
never existed before. German-Americans of diverse socioeconomic, regional,
and religious origins felt equally threatened by the prohibition movement. But even in resisting the prohibitionists in the political arena, many German-American leaders considered themselves to be thoroughly American. They sincerely believed that they had an American right to preserve their German culture. Typical were the remarks of Congressman Bartholdt in a speech given in Nashville, Tennessee, on German-American Day in that city on 6 October 1897:

It is true that German-Americans, irrespective of party and religion, have common and very definite views on quite a number of public questions, but their attitude is not dictated by any foreign instincts or by special interests of a racial nature, but solely by their interest as American citizens. They advocate personal liberty, for instance, not because they are of German birth or origin, but because they regard their personal liberty as an inalienable right of our American institutions, and of their rights as citizens of the Republic. To understand all, means to forgive all, and as soon as our Anglo-American friends have once satisfied themselves that the German-Americans do not even dream of organizing a party of their own, or of prejudicing the language of the land or of—what a folly!—establishing a new Teutonic Empire on American soil, they will concede them the right to cherish their mother tongue and their old national traits and customs. The United States will neither become Germanized nor "Puritanized," and the sooner both elements reconcile their sentiments with this unalterable fact, the better it will be for them and their common country.32

But there were factors other than the periodic attacks on their way of life by the prohibitionists and other native American groups that made some German-Americans feel apart from the mainstream of American life. Indeed, some German-Americans, especially the leaders of the community and the editors of the German-language newspapers, had a very high opinion of themselves as protectors of German cultural values in the United States. As the guardians, they often remained aloof and acted superior to their fellow citizens who embraced only Anglo-American customs and values.

This attitude became especially obvious after the unification of Germany was finally achieved following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when the German Empire clearly entered the ranks of world powers. However, the pride of German-Americans over the establishment of the German Empire was not necessarily a matter of political loyalty to Germany. Instead, their enthusiasm over the unification of Germany appears more to have arisen from a conviction that the rise of Germany as a world power was proof of the superiority of German culture, the very same culture that St. Louis German-Americans were endeavoring to preserve in the Middle West of the United States.33 In one speech on the Franco-Prussian War, Emil Preetorius asserted that out of the conflict not only Germans in Europe but also Germans in the United States would gain respect and admiration.34 Thus the German-Americans saw the glory of the German Empire as further evidence of the greatness of the German language and the culture of Schiller, Goethe, and Beethoven.

Consequently, St. Louis German-Americans celebrated the victories of the German forces over the French army with parades, rallies, meetings, and even
telegrams to the Diet of the North German Confederation to express support for the German people. One mass rally, held 18 July 1870 at the courthouse in downtown St. Louis, attracted five thousand people, mostly Germans, but also some native Americans. Moreover, a committee was organized to collect funds for war widows and orphans—activities to be repeated years later when World War I began in August 1914.

Significantly, some American politicians supported the enthusiasm of the German-Americans over the German victories of 1870 and reinforced the idea that the German-Americans had some special characteristics that were somehow indirectly confirmed by the events in Europe. Mayor Nathan Cole of St. Louis, for instance, speaking at a rally on 20 July 1870, praised German-Americans for their spirit of "indomitable liberty . . . your yearning for the welfare of the Fatherland." And B. Gratz Brown, former U.S. senator and future governor of Missouri, sent a letter to Preetorius, to be read at the 18 July rally, in which he expressed support for Germany and noted that the German states had supported the Union during the recent Civil War, while France had sided with the South. But even more significantly, Brown noted that Americans, living in a republic as they were, could not sympathize with the dynastic impulses of a France ruled by a Napoleon, while Americans could support the cause of German unification, since, as Brown believed, that unification would lead to a German republic.

Fatefully, in 1914 the roles were reversed: in the eyes of many native Americans, France was worthy of sympathy as a republic, while Germany was to be condemned as an autocracy.

Further evidence of German-Americans' sense of special attributes is suggested by the same speech of Congressman Bartholdt in Nashville in 1897, quoted above. Bartholdt contended in the speech that four special qualities of German-Americans made them especially well suited to be American citizens: Freiheitsliebe, or a "love of liberty which has induced most of our German-Americans to choose this glorious country as their new home"; deutsche Treue, or "that fidelity and loyalty of which Heine said, if it were not as old as the world, a German would surely have invented it"; personliche Freiheit, or a "jewel" in the "shadow of prohibition and intolerance trying to obscure it," although personal freedom would prevail because "the genius of our institutions is on the side of Germans who believe in music, and song and dance, and life's innocent pleasures"; and finally Ehrlichkeit, or "the old Germanic virtue" of honesty in private and public life.

However, this pride and sense of special worth of German-Americans as the bearers of German culture in the United States also encouraged a sense of aloofness from and disdain for those aspects of American society and culture that German-Americans found vulgar, shameful, or embarrassing. This sense of superiority existed from the very beginning of the German presence in the United States. Gustav Koerner, an early German immigrant and later lieutenant governor of Illinois, noted in 1834, for example: "To speak quite frankly, the Ameri-
The Germans in Missouri

cans are in their regard for art half barbarian, and their taste is not better than that of Indian Aborigines, who stick metal rings through their noses." Leaders of the DANB were also guilty of this sense of aloofness. For instance, Rudolf Cronau, a prominent member of the Alliance in New York, in a book in English on the conservation of America's natural resources, repeatedly compared the wastefulness of Americans to the careful conservation of German loggers, farmers, and miners.

And the sense of superiority continued after the turn of the century. Indeed, some leading German-Americans saw their community as the savior of political liberty in the United States. In a remarkable bit of arrogance, Congressman Bartholdt opined at a German Day in 1909 celebrating in St. Louis the victory of the Germanic forces at the Teutoburger Wald:

The Germanic spirit of liberty and independence to which the human race owes whatever free government there is on earth, is as alive to-day as it ever was. We have brought it with us from the fatherland, and inspired by it, the Germans of the United States have fought under the banners of Washington for independence and under the banners of Lincoln for freedom and a united country. It is this spirit which has united all American Germans in a common defense of the right of self-determination against fanatical attempts to abridge it and has culminated in the mighty organization [the German-American Alliance] under whose auspices this festival is celebrated. It is this spirit to which the American people will owe the preservation of their individual liberty and in whose name we are pledged to oppose with all lawful means the assaults of those whose mischievous hands are about to rob this free nation of the very essence of its liberty.

The contempt by German-Americans for certain aspects of American life was often coupled with a certain defensiveness about their own Germanness. This is reflected in a favorite editorial device in the Westliche Post, which was to remark on some newsworthy event reflecting poorly on American society and then add a caustic or sarcastic commentary of only a few words at the end, suggesting German-American disdain for the event. This disdain for American social values did not necessarily end with the entry of the United States into the World War. Naturally, the inclination by German-Americans to count themselves out when it came to sharing responsibility for the shortcomings of American society, especially as reflected in the German-language newspapers, aroused the expected resentment among native Americans. That resentment of the native American population only reinforced the feeling of estrangement of the German-Americans.

By 1900 the pride in German culture and the sense that their way of life was being threatened by prohibition and native American antagonists had coalesced sufficiently in the minds of German-American leaders to lay the groundwork for a national organization to represent the interests of German-Americans. This organization, the National German-American Alliance, was headed by leaders of the German-American community, both in St. Louis and elsewhere, who embraced the values and attitudes described above.
The Origins of the German-American Alliance in Missouri

Although at one time it was claimed that there were seventy-five thousand members of the German-American Alliance in the state of Missouri, the Alliance really was no more than a loose federation of organizations, with no historical tradition and no established central organization of any permanency. Moreover, the organization had no central overriding programs in which any large number of its so-called members participated. In fact, the St. Louis Alliance, which claimed to have twenty-two thousand members on the eve of World War I, had a central leadership core of maybe two dozen men, and probably no more than several hundred ever participated regularly in its activities.

Nevertheless, the leaders of the Alliance contended that they were speaking for thousands of German-Americans in the city and in the state and that they could sway the votes of a huge bloc of voters who belonged to the Alliance. In fact, there is little evidence that the members of the German-American Alliance, who frequently had little or no contact with the organization itself, were ever moved in any significant numbers by the appeals of the Alliance leaders to vote other than in the way they would have been predisposed to vote in any event. Indeed, it is certainly possible that large numbers of members of the German-American Alliance in Missouri did not even realize that they were considered members.

Yet the Alliance did eventually attain a certain effectiveness in its lobbying efforts against prohibition. And by 1917 it had managed to stir up enough of a fuss in the public eye on the neutrality issue and in the 1916 presidential campaign that it was widely known—and its potential feared—outside the German-American community.

To understand the structure, function, and role of the St. Louis and Missouri Alliances, it is necessary to consider very briefly the history and organization of
the national organization called the National German-American Alliance, or *Deutsch-Amerikanischer National-Bund* as it was officially named in German, with which the St. Louis and Missouri Alliances were affiliated.

The DANB, as the national organization was often called, had its origins in the Pennsylvania German community, which historically had a very high percentage of its German-American citizens participating in well-organized ethnic clubs and societies. In 1888 a loose federation of German social and cultural groups was organized in the state, but it was not until 1899 that a full-fledged statewide organization was created in Pennsylvania, called the *Deutsch-Amerikanischer Zentralbund von Pennsylvania*.¹

It was only a matter of time before the attempt was made to organize nationally, and in October 1901 a convention of German societies from a dozen or so states met in Philadelphia to organize a national German-American organization.² Dr. Charles Hexamer, an American-born civil engineer who was the son of a Forty-eighter, was elected president of the newly formed organization, the DANB, and served in that office for all but the last year of its existence. Considerably lacking in tact, Hexamer personified the German-American attitudes discussed in the previous chapter: an American citizen who considered himself to be politically loyal to the United States, Hexamer nevertheless forcefully urged the preservation of German culture in America, called for opposition to prohibition and Sabbatarianism as antithetical to American values of personal liberty, and openly displayed sympathy for Germany after World War I began.

The DANB was little more than a federation of similar state and city federations throughout the United States, with the national officers carrying out most of its cultural, organizational, and political activities. There were some individual members of the DANB, but generally there was little contact between the individual members of the DANB or its affiliated state and city alliances and the national officers of the DANB. Instead, various local clubs and social organizations affiliated with a state or city alliance, which in turn was affiliated with the DANB. Often the only contact would be between the officers of the local club or social organization, such as a *Turnverein* or *Gesangverein*, and the officers of the city or state alliance with which the *Verein* was affiliated. Nevertheless, each member of a local club or *Verein* would be considered a member of the local city or state alliance and also of the DANB. It is apparent that the members of these clubs were members of the DANB only in the broadest sense of the term. Nevertheless, the DANB received a per capita tax from the city or state alliance for each club member affiliated with the city or state alliance. By counting the members of local organizations as members of the DANB, by 1914 the DANB was able to contend that it had chapters in forty-five states and a membership of 2.5 million.³

Ostensibly the DANB was a cultural organization, founded to further the preservation of German cultural heritage in the United States. But a summary of the purposes of the DANB, first adopted at the 1901 convention of the DANB and
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set out in the 1905 revised Statement of Principles and Constitution of the organization, suggests that the leaders of the DANB saw it as something more:

The National German-American Alliance aims to awaken and strengthen the sense of unity among the people of German origin in America with a view to promote the useful and healthy development of the power inherent in them as a united body for the mutual energetic protection of such legitimate desires and interests not inconsistent with the common good of the country, and the rights and duties of good citizens; to check nativistic encroachments; to maintain and safeguard the good friendly relations existing between America and the old German Fatherland.

In this statement there is once again evident the desire to encourage good international relations, which during the Spanish-American War were so much the concern of Emil Preetorius, who realized that the German-American system of values would be torn apart if the two objects of loyalty and sympathy of the German-American community went to war against each other. And the statement obviously implies political activism by the DANB in the interest of German-Americans, activism that would be in the context of confronting certain "nativistic encroachments," a euphemism for the prohibition and Sabbatarian movements. The intent of the DANB's founders to lobby politically is all the more evident in a later passage in the 1905 statement of principles: "The Alliance, as such, refrains from all interference in party politics, reserving however the right and duty to defend its principles, also in the political field, in case these should be attacked or endangered by political measures." The prohibition movement was always perceived by the leaders of the DANB as an attack on German principles by political measures, so that in reality the leaders of the DANB always intended to be politically active.

In fact, if the DANB and its state and city alliances had forsaken political activity, they would have deprived themselves of their raison d'être. After all, the German-American community was quite diverse, with its members coming from so many socioeconomic, religious, and regional backgrounds. About the only issue on which a substantial number of German-Americans could agree at the turn of the century was the need to fight prohibition and Sabbatarianism as threats to their German way of life, and the DANB with its antinativist platform provided that cohesion.

It is impossible to underestimate how important German-Americans perceived the battle against prohibition to be. Prohibition became the political symbol of a general clash of cultures that confronted many immigrants as they adjusted to American society. The important thing for German-Americans was that prohibition was a significant example of legislation that threatened German traditions and values. The issue even permeated German-American literature. For instance, in J. G. Woerner's novel The Rebel's Daughter, set in Civil War St. Louis, the narrator laments in an ironic tone:

Ah, those beer gardens! That desecration of the Holy Sabbath Day by music from brass and stringed instruments! What a flagrant violation of the law of the land! For
was there not an ordinance of the city prohibiting the keeping open of any place for
the sale of intoxicating drinks on the first day of the week, commonly called Sun-
day? Did not the statute of the State declare such to be a misdemeanor, indictable by
the grand jury and punishable by fine not exceeding fifty dollars? Surely, this was a
signal instance of the lawlessness of the foreign population, and of the rottenness of
the old parties that had winked at and connived with the evil doers, thus encouraging
open defiance of law and order.

Here, then, was a task worthy of the municipal broom. The law must be vindicated.
The American party must weed out these heathenish customs and protect the
country against dangerous foreign influence. And the American party shrank not
from its self-imposed task: it was equal to the emergency,—the fiat went forth: The
beer garden must go!

The rapid growth of the DANB and its state and city alliances was directly
attributable to the perception of local German-American leaders in their commu-
nities that this organization was the best political vehicle for fighting the ad-
vances of prohibition. Again and again throughout the United States the DANB
began to gain support in the German-American community when the threat of
local prohibition legislation became real. In short, the German-American Al-
liance was a defensive reaction to the gains of the prohibitionists. As one student
of the DANB has observed, if the prohibition movement had not been as suc-
cessful as it was, the DANB probably would never have been known outside of a
few German-speaking groups of an academic nature.

But the prohibition movement was successful, and it made significant gains in
Missouri in the 1880s and 1890s. Thus the rise of local alliances in Missouri
affiliated with the DANB is no exception to the common situation as it developed
throughout the country: by the time the first stirrings of support for a local
German-American Alliance organization in Missouri were evident, the forces of
prohibition had made considerable progress in the state. Indeed, it was the suc-
cesses of the prohibitionists that inspired support for the Alliance among many
German-Americans in Missouri, a fact even the leaders of the Alliance in St.
Louis were willing to admit.

Temperance agitation in the state had a long history, dating back to the early
1830s. Most of these efforts had been outstate and often had religious overtones.
Moreover, the early activity was concentrated on pressuring local officials to act
against particularly offensive dramshops. Nevertheless, the agitation continued
all during the 1830s and 1840s, and after Maine enacted statewide prohibition in
1851, there were efforts in Missouri to convince the state legislature in Jefferson
City to do the same. But there were protests against such a law, and the bill
was never passed. The temperance agitation continued after the Civil War, as did
German-American protests. In 1866 Emil Preetorius of the Westliche Post led the
fight among German-Americans in St. Louis to oppose yet another campaign to
impose liquor control. In 1872 German-Americans in St. Louis met to protest
proposed legislation to increase the vicarious liability of dramshop owners for
the wrongdoing of patrons. The prohibition issue at the end of the nineteenth
century and in the beginning of the twentieth century was much more complex,
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however, than either the sparring between nativists and immigrants or simple religious enthusiasm.

Although Missouri never had statewide prohibition during the nineteenth century, there had been legislation for many years proscribing the sale of liquor on Sundays. But by the 1880s this law, although more or less observed in the rural areas of the state, was widely ignored in the cities. On Sundays in the big cities it was common to see the front doors of saloons shuttered, as a token of respect to the state law, yet a side or back door would be open and the adjacent beer garden would be doing a flourishing business. Accordingly, the closed front door and the open side door “were ordinary and accepted features of the Sunday scene” in the cities of the state, including Kansas City as well as St. Louis.

More importantly for St. Louis, however, in 1857 the state legislature had enacted a law that permitted the voters in the cities in St. Louis County, which then included the city of St. Louis, to vote to allow the sale of all but distilled liquor on Sunday. The voters of St. Louis so voted in April 1858, and for the next decades residents in St. Louis enjoyed their beer on Sunday under the protection of state law and city ordinance.

During the 1870s, however, there had been increasing activity by temperance leaders. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was organized on a statewide basis in 1872, and Catholic, Methodist, and Presbyterian organizations, both outstate and in St. Louis, had begun to campaign during the 1870s for liquor control by both local officials and the General Assembly.

Serious trouble began to loom for beer and liquor drinkers in the state as the 1880s began. Even as early as 1875 the General Assembly, dominated by legislators from rural areas who were not sympathetic to the desires of the less-inhibited dwellers in the state’s urban areas, began to adopt a string of bills that more strictly regulated dramshops and the sale of liquor in the state. Thus began a series of intense political battles in Jefferson City, the state capital, over liquor-control legislation, pitting not only prohibitionists and antiprohibitionists but also leaders in both the major political parties, who jockeyed about endeavoring to obtain the greatest political gain out of the controversy. The political struggle between the wets and the drys seemed never ending. In fact, at least one bill regulating dramshops and liquor traffic, or fine tuning such legislation previously enacted, was passed in every regular session of the Missouri General Assembly between 1881 and the entry of the United States into World War I.

The rise of the prohibition movement in the 1880s and its continuing success during the next twenty years is a fascinating episode in United States history. It also resulted in a large-scale struggle of opposing political and social forces: more than a narrow political issue, it was rather a sweeping war of competing political, cultural, social, and even religious values. In the end, the prohibitionists prevailed, in no small part because one of the major sources of opposition to them, the German-American community, was totally discredited by developments in World War I.

To some extent, the prohibition movement can be seen as the work of rural
elements of native American Protestants rebelling against the foreign populations and the modern institutions found in the big cities.\textsuperscript{21} The movement also may have been a product of the aggressive reformism that swept the nation at the turn of the century, partly in an attempt to achieve a political and social regeneration of the nation, and especially of the cities, through political reform.\textsuperscript{22} And some observers have seen the prohibition movement as the manifestation of an increasingly powerful middle class reacting to the ills and stresses of society in the new industrial age, endeavoring to establish harmony and social welfare in the nation by imposing its own value system, which was essentially based upon Protestantism, as the norm of the American society.\textsuperscript{23} In Missouri, all three elements appear to have been at work in support of the prohibition movement: rural reaction, progressive political reform, and urban middle-class evangelism. The result was a powerful coalition of forces that eventually prevailed in the state.

Prohibition certainly had its rural support in Missouri. In 1887 the Wood Local Option Law was passed, permitting the voters in a single county, or a single city of 2,500 persons or more, to vote whether the county or city should be wet or dry.\textsuperscript{24} In the first six months after the law was enacted 30 of 47 counties having local-option elections voted dry; in the first nineteen months after enactment of the law 83 of the 114 counties in Missouri had voted in local-option referenda, and 61 had voted to be dry.\textsuperscript{25} Most of these counties were outstate, away from the concentration of Germans and Austrians in St. Louis and its surrounding counties. The march of local option continued unabated, and by 1917 all but 18 of the 114 counties had voted to be dry. Thus nearly all of outstate Missouri was dry, while the cities, and especially St. Louis, remained the centers of opposition to prohibition. In the 96 dry counties in 1917, for instance, there were 16 wet cities that had voted by local option to continue to allow alcoholic beverages to be sold. Significantly, the German-Americans were mostly urban dwellers, and they contributed, of course, to the vote in opposition to prohibition in the wet cities. Moreover, the rural German population of the state was concentrated in the counties near the city of St. Louis and along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers—and it was in this rural area near St. Louis that many of the 18 still-wet counties in 1917 were to be found. Of these 18, a majority had contingents of first- and second-generation Germans and Austrians ranging from 30 percent to 50 percent of their total population.\textsuperscript{26}

The significance of urban opposition to prohibition, especially in St. Louis, is reflected in the four statewide referenda on prohibition in Missouri in 1910, \textit{1914, 1916, and 1918}. St. Louis was consistently the area that carried the day for the antiprohibition forces. In the 1918 referendum, for example, 57 percent of the total statewide vote was against prohibition, but the result in the state were the St. Louis vote removed from consideration would be a 53 percent vote for prohibition.\textsuperscript{27} St. Louis came to be seen as the one voting area that was thwarting attempts of prohibitionists to gain statewide prohibition. Naturally, this only exacerbated the tensions between the rural and urban elements in the state. In the
end, the prohibitionists circumvented the wet vote in St. Louis and gained statewide prohibition by persuading the rural-dominated General Assembly to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In any event, it is easy to understand why even by the turn of the century German-Americans in St. Louis felt besieged by the prohibition movement, as more and more counties in the outstate areas voted to be dry.

The prohibition movement in Missouri, however, was not simply a matter of the rural farmers and town dwellers voting against the city residents. There were also religious overtones. While it may be a fact that the religious forces lined up against liquor consumption were more powerful and dominant in the rural areas than in the big cities, there is no question that there was religious support for prohibition in the larger cities as well. The Anti-Saloon League in Missouri, which relied on local ministers to coordinate agitation in various communities, was active in the 1910, 1916, and 1918 referenda on prohibition. Moreover, the WCTU was also active in the same campaigns.

A study of the national leaders of the Anti-Saloon League and the Prohibition party indicates that 45 percent of them were Methodists, 15 percent were Presbyterian, 11 percent were Congregationalists, and an additional 8 percent were Baptists. None of these denominations had a substantial following in the German-American community. One scholar has noted that the Protestants saw it as their duty "to use the secular power of the state to transform culture so that the community of the faithful might be kept pure and the work of saving the unregenerate might be made easier." Another student of the prohibition movement in Missouri has observed that evangelical Protestants saw intemperance as a threat to political liberty: democracy demanded an enlightened and virtuous electorate, and to such Protestants this required a Christian electorate of their own values and ethics. Moreover, they believed they had a Christian duty to be their brothers' keepers and to impose social rules to regulate individual standards of morality. Indeed, some zealous middle-class evangelical Protestants felt that the only way to solve society's ills was through a new wave of Christian revivalism and that temperance was a necessary prerequisite of this revivalism. Typical of such an attitude were the opinions of Charles Hay, counsel to the Anti-Saloon League in Missouri. Hay, a Protestant raised in the small town of Fayette, Missouri, who attended Central College, a Methodist school there, observed that the abolition of the saloon would end "the undermining of the influences of the Christian home and the teachings of the Church." Not surprisingly, Hay coupled his antipathy toward the saloon with a dislike for the city.

The religious element in the prohibition movement was a significant force in Missouri from the very beginning of the prohibition agitation. Religious leaders united in the YMCA and the Evangelical Alliance had worked in 1887 for the adoption of the Wood Local Option Law, which in addition to establishing local-option election procedures also repealed the 1857 state legislation allowing St. Louisans to vote to allow the sale of beer on Sunday. In 1888 alone ninety-one
new unions of the WCTU were organized in Missouri, and the WCTU held sixty conventions in the state that year. In addition, after efforts at the establishment of a local Anti-Liquor League in Kansas City in 1890 and an Anti-Saloon Agency in Clinton in 1893, the Anti-Saloon League got its true start in Missouri after a meeting of the Ministers' Alliance in January 1894 and a subsequent convention of two hundred temperance leaders in April 1894, which involved a large number of ministers from smaller Missouri towns and leaders in the WCTU.

Furthermore, even in St. Louis by the turn of the century religious leaders were consistently in the forefront in urging governmental officials to enforce the Sunday closing laws, the dramshop license laws, and the other liquor control legislation already on the books. For instance, in 1899 the WCTU and an organization of Christian men began a campaign to have the Sunday closing law vigorously enforced. At the same time, leading ministers and priests were urging that the liquor laws be used to stamp out what they considered to be dives and bawdy houses. They exhorted the local police commissioners and the excise commissioners (the latter being responsible for issuing dramshop licenses) to do their duty. In 1903, the Anti-Saloon League, which had been permanently organized in May 1901 with several ministers among its officers, announced a similar campaign to fight vice in the city. And in March 1904, just before the first efforts to organize the German-American Alliance in St. Louis were undertaken, a group of Presbyterian ministers formed a committee to meet with city officials to urge enforcement of the Sunday closing law during the World's Fair. 38

Yet another religious figure in St. Louis who was active in the movement against liquor and corruption was Father James Coffey, who gained considerable public attention by publicly branding a number of business establishments—by name—as dens of vice and then calling upon city officials to enforce the laws to close them. Coffey, among other activities, headed the Knights of Father Mathew, a temperance movement that at various times between 1898 and 1909 had between twelve hundred and six thousand members, a majority in St. Louis and many Irish-Americans. Father Coffey vigorously supported the election of gubernatorial candidate Joseph W. Folk in 1904. 39

In fact, the election of Folk was another disturbing development for German-Americans in Missouri. As a true Progressive, Folk displayed a distrust of urban life, that dark den of foreign influence and political corruption. Thus Folk and his administration enforced the Sunday closing laws against taverns, brought about the ban of horse race gambling in the state, and opposed home rule legislation, which would allow cities to have a form of government more independent from the rural-dominated state legislature. Significantly, Charles Hay, the counsel for the Anti-Saloon League, supported Folk, suggesting the coalition of prohibition forces at work in the state.

Folk was not a teetotaler, and he declined to preside over the National Anti-Saloon League convention in 1906 held at the First Presbyterian Church in St. Louis. Nor did he ever come out in favor of statewide prohibition. Neverthe-
The Origins of the Alliance

less, he constantly called for enforcement of the Sunday closing laws, despite the lack of enthusiasm by officials in St. Louis County and St. Louis City to enforce them, because he firmly believed that a law should be enforced or repealed, but never ignored. Governor Folk's view that the liquor control laws should be enforced had many supporters, and not just in the ranks of the prohibitionists. Many reform-minded citizens, even though not dry, saw the vigorous enforcement of the liquor laws as the only way to clean up the corruption that permeated the saloon business: the corruption in enforcing the liquor laws was beginning to affect the integrity of city government.

Such was the case with the liquor-control law enforcement in St. Louis City and St. Louis County at the turn of the century. Many disreputable saloon establishments were able to thrive because of the climate in the city: the police were not eager to arrest saloon keepers for violating the laws, in no small part because jurors in the city and county were unwilling to convict and judges were unwilling to impose what they considered to be harsh fines and sentences in the face of strong public sentiment that the laws not be enforced. Moreover, city and county officials fell victim to the temptation of corruption, as saloon keepers sought protection from the threat that the laws regarding dramshops and liquor control might arbitrarily be enforced against them.

Unfortunately for German-Americans and others, this unsavory aspect of the liquor business boosted the cause of the prohibitionists. Perhaps inevitably, in the minds of many people the causes of introducing prohibition and fighting corruption merged in a fuzzy manner into one issue; this proved to be especially true among those religiously oriented voters and those reformers who perceived liquor itself, rather than the unpopular and erratically enforced liquor-control laws, as the source of the corruption.

Yet another aspect of Progressivism was the desire to have a greater direct citizen participation in deciding the political issues of the day. It is hardly coincidental that between 1910 and 1918 there were four statewide referenda on the prohibition issue. In 1910 there was a successful petition drive to place the issue of statewide prohibition on the ballot that year. The referendum was defeated at the polls. In 1913 the Missouri General Assembly passed a law eliminating the local-option opportunity for cities over 2,500. This move, of course, denied such cities the opportunity to elect by local option to remain wet while the surrounding county was dry. A petition referendum placed a proposal on the 1914 general election ballot to repeal the General Assembly's 1913 law. The referendum was successful, and the local option for cities was restored. In 1916, yet another original petition campaign to have a referendum on statewide prohibition put the issue on the ballot again—and it was once again defeated. Finally, in 1918 the General Assembly itself submitted the issue to the voters, and this was the time that 57 percent of the Missouri voters opposed statewide prohibition.

All these referenda served as a battleground for the struggle between those in favor of prohibition and those opposed. The German-Americans throughout the
United States saw their culture under significant attack by prohibition, and they were alarmed by the progress of the prohibition movement. In 1900 already 18 million of the nation’s 76 million inhabitants were living in dry regions, and 17 percent of those were living in the five states that had statewide prohibition. By 1906, 35 million Americans, nearly double the number of only six years earlier, were living in dry territories.\(^4^4\)

Moreover, the German-Americans found themselves confronted by an elaborate and well-organized lobbying organization in the Anti-Saloon League. What is ironic is how similar the operations of the League were to the activities of the DANB and its local alliances: here were two lobbying and political activist organizations on opposite sides of an issue struggling for the voters’ and legislators’ sympathies on equal terms and with similar tactics. The League was organized into state branches, much like the DANB, with power concentrated in a few leaders who could act quickly to set up an agitation campaign. Like the DANB, the Anti-Saloon League received indirect payments from its members, although there were some large contributors, such as the John D. Rockefellers, both father and son, contributing to the League, while the DANB and the local Alliances received monies from brewers. Like the DANB, the Anti-Saloon League had its own official national organ, *The American Issue*, and printed its own books and tracts against liquor. The DANB and the League had similar internal committee organizations. The League had agitation, legislation, and law enforcement committees, and the DANB had committees providing lobbying and agitation functions. Just as the DANB supported German Day in many cities, the League held an Anti-Saloon Field Day, on which League speakers were allowed in the pulpits of thousands of churches throughout the United States on the same Sunday urging prohibition.

Moreover, even the political pressure tactics of the two organizations were similar. Both sought to persuade voters to vote for candidates that the organization had endorsed. Both sent out questionnaires to candidates asking for their position on issues of interest to the League or the Alliance, a not-so-subtle form of pressure to conform. And, finally, both tried to bring pressure on legislators by organizing letter campaigns.\(^4^5\)

Just how calculating and carefully thought out were the tactics of the League is indicated by one scholar’s analysis of League support for local-option laws.\(^4^6\)

Thus, one advantage of the local-option procedure was that it kept attention on the saloon problem, since the election was always in terms of excluding saloons from a particular county or municipality. Moreover, since one could still bring in liquor supplies from an adjacent wet area, it helped the League to win the support of people who drank privately but were willing to vote dry in order to exclude public bars near their homes or places of business. The local-option campaigns allowed League workers to develop experience in training and political action on a local scale to build up their organization before campaigning on larger issues. Finally, local-option campaigns allowed the League to attack the
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liquor industry first at its points of least resistance—the rural towns and villages. Thus the League was able to drive the saloons out of the country and into the urban communities, where the wets could be defeated by the combined votes of the drys within and without the town. It was for precisely that reason that the prohibition forces, after successfully driving the saloons out of most rural areas in the state through the local-option procedure, sought in 1913 to eliminate the possibility of towns and small cities in a county from having a separate local-option election; if the smaller urban areas had to vote in the same local-option election as the rest of the county, the wet voters in the town could be overwhelmed by the combined dry vote from both in the town and in the rural portions of the county. In this way the stage was set by the Anti-Saloon League and its allies for the national prohibition campaign later in Missouri and throughout the rest of the nation.

The first significant legislative product in Missouri of the wave of prohibition sentiment in the 1880s was the Downing High License Law of 1883.47 The law was a device encouraged by the prohibitionists to discourage liquor trade. The idea, which had originated in Nebraska in 1881, was to place high license fees on taverns in order to discourage traffic and to make it economically necessary for tavern operators to obey Sunday closing laws and other liquor-control laws—or else risk the loss of the license and its high fee as well as a further bond that the tavern operator had to post upon obtaining his license.

The High License Law, along with the Wood Local Option Law, had the effect in Missouri desired by the prohibitionists. By 1889, only six years after the High License Law had been enacted, over two-thirds of the saloons outside the large cities had been forced to close. Indeed, by that time there were only three hundred taverns in the whole state outside urban areas like Kansas City and St. Louis, and many of those were in areas with high concentrations of German-Americans or where the Republican party, which cast itself as sympathetic to the wet cause, was dominant.48

Moreover, section 5 of the High License Law prohibited the opening of dramshops on Sunday or upon general election day, on the penalty of up to a $200 fine and the forfeiture of the license. But this provision was not vigorously enforced in the larger cities in the first years after its enactment. For instance, the first attempt at serious enforcement in Kansas City took place in March 1888, after the Wood Local Option Law was passed. The campaign in that city was short-lived because a police judge, in blatant disregard of the plain wording of the law, ruled that a saloon with only a side door open was not keeping an open saloon on Sunday so as to violate the law.49

Many in St. Louis contended that the Sunday closing provision of the High License Law did not have an impact on that city; they asserted that the law in 1883 did not repeal the 1857 state legislation allowing St. Louisans to vote to permit the sale of beer on Sundays, even though section 8 of the 1883 law expressly stated that all state laws inconsistent with its provisions, including the
Sunday closing provision in section 5, were repealed.50 In any event, no one was that eager to litigate the issue, given the public sentiment for allowing the Sunday sale of beer.

But the watershed in the struggle between the prohibitionists and the anti-prohibitionists was the passage of the Wood Local Option Law by the state legislature in 1887,51 the most significant result of the prohibition sentiment that had been growing all through the 1880s.52 The law permitted citizens in each county in the state to vote separately on whether the county should be wet or dry. Thus the prohibitionists were not forced into the position of having to win a statewide election on the prohibition: they could instead attack the issue on a county-by-county basis. In addition, however, the law permitted cities of at least 2,500 citizens to vote separately on whether to be wet or dry, regardless of how the rest of their county had voted. It was not long before there were a number of wet Missouri cities in the midst of dry counties.

Of vital significance to St. Louisans was that the General Assembly in 1887, after a fierce lobbying struggle between the temperance-oriented YMCA and the Evangelical Alliance on the one side and the Brewers' Association on the other, unequivocally repealed the 1857 state law permitting Sunday sales in St. Louis. Mayor David R. Francis of St. Louis, a Democrat eyeing statewide support for his upcoming gubernatorial race, rigorously enforced the provisions of the new law voiding the old state statute and city ordinance permitting the sale of fermented liquors on Sunday. Thus, on the first Sunday that the new law was in effect, 26 June 1887, Francis had thirty-eight saloon keepers arrested for having their taverns open on Sunday.53 However, Judge Edward A. Noonan became a hero among wets in the city a few days later when he ruled that the Local Option Law did not affect the 1857 statute. In the spring of 1888, however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed Noonan's ruling, on the startling ground that the vote of St. Louis residents in 1858 had been void.54 Nevertheless, by the end of 1888 Francis had been elected governor and no one was eager to enforce the law in the heavily German city, where it was exceedingly difficult to find a judge, much less a jury, who would convict an offender for violation of the law.

In fact, for much of the 1890s and early 1900s the impact of the High License Law and the Local Option Law, as well as other liquor-control legislation, was greatly ameliorated in St. Louis by the antagonism of the local officials toward the legislation. This was to some extent a result of Republican control of the city administration between 1893 and 1901, even though the General Assembly in Jefferson City was controlled by the Democrats. The dramshop licenses were to be collected by the collector of the city of St. Louis and were to be paid before the licenses were issued. But Henry Ziegenhein, the Republican collector, softened the impact of the law by allowing saloon keepers to pay the fee over the term of the license.55 In addition, little effort was made to enforce state laws prohibiting sales to minors without permission (children regularly purchased beer for the family at the local tavern), forbidding musical instruments in taverns, and
condemning games in saloons, to say nothing of the enforcement of the Sunday closing provision. And there was widespread flouting of other liquor-control provisions. For example, saloon keepers circumvented the licensing statutes that required them to obtain the consent of a certain number of property owners within a certain distance of the proposed saloon. They did so by deeding one-foot strips of nearby property to straw parties to boost the number of signatories over the statutory minimum. Moreover, public officials in St. Louis were rewarded for helping to flout the state liquor-control laws in the city. Judge Noonan, for instance, the Democrat who had tried to stop the enforcement of the repealer provision of the Wood Local Option Law in St. Louis, was elected mayor of the city in 1889. And in 1897 Ziegenhein, the collector, was elected mayor.

Yet the fact remains that by the turn of the century prohibitionists had made great strides in Missouri. Many of the outstate counties had very quickly voted dry under the local option. Consistently during the 1880s and 1890s the General Assembly in Jefferson City passed increasingly stringent liquor-control laws. Moreover, various religious and prohibitionist groups in St. Louis were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands that the liquor control laws be strictly enforced to remove corruption and vice in the city. And in the fall of 1900 the Progressive political forces of the state began to coalesce with the election of Joseph Folk, the future governor, to the office of St. Louis circuit attorney, the city's prosecuting attorney.

It was in this context that the leaders in the German-American community in St. Louis took preliminary steps shortly after the turn of the century to organize a German-American Alliance for St. Louis and Missouri. From the very start, the Alliance was intended to serve as a vehicle to combat the advances of prohibition in the state.
The First Organizational Efforts in Missouri

German-Americans from Missouri participated in the founding of the DANB in October 1901, and the Schillerverein in St. Louis was represented by official delegates to the second national convention of the Alliance in Baltimore in 1903. In addition, there were several people in St. Louis who were individual members of the DANB by 1903, including Otto Heller, chairman of the German Department at Washington University.

But there was no activity to establish a State Alliance in Missouri until May 1904, about the time of the opening of the World's Fair in St. Louis. At that time the Schillerverein, which had considerable standing and reputation in the German-American community in St. Louis, began preliminary efforts to organize a Zweigverband, or branch alliance, of the DANB. The territory of the new alliance differed from the other state alliances of the DANB in crossing state lines to include southern Illinois. An interstate chapter in this instance was logical, for there were large numbers of German-Americans across the Mississippi River, in communities like Alton and Belleville, which were oriented more toward St. Louis than to any larger Illinois cities. Belleville in particular was predominantly German and had been the home of several famous Forty-eighers.

The Schillerverein had been organized in 1895 by Dr. Georg Richter, with the stated purpose of "keeping alive the memory of Schiller, preserving the German language and literature in America, and giving deserving German-American poets and authors financial support." For all its idealistic desire to preserve German culture in America, however, the Schillerverein from its very beginnings was one of the most prestigious social organizations in the St. Louis German-American community. Its membership included the finest of the German-American intelligentsia and social elite in the city, including Emil Preetorius, the publisher of the Westliche Post; Louis Soldan, superintendent of the St. Louis public schools; Professor Heller of Washington University; Judge Finkelnburg of the United States District Court; and Dr. Hugo Starkloff, a noted St. Louis physician.
Organizational Efforts

The leadership of the Schillerverein, once again principally under the aegis of Dr. Richter, moved to establish the DANB affiliate as a separate organization in the city and state, to serve as a more active agitator for German-American values than the Schillerverein could ever be. But the ties between the Schillerverein and its DANB offspring remained close. The Vorstand, or board of directors, of the Schillerverein ended up providing three presidents of the State Alliance, Carl Barck, Emil Tolkacz, and Charles Weinsberg, as well as numerous other officers and functionaries, including Philip Morlang, the printer of the official bulletin of the State Alliance, and August Hoffmann, the treasurer of the State Alliance for nearly its entire existence. In addition, there were numerous joint activities of the Schillerverein and the Zweigverband, especially in the early years of the Alliance.

Like the founders of the DANB in Philadelphia in 1901, the organizers of the Missouri State Alliance were well-educated and idealistic Americans of German origin, well situated in both the German and American business and social communities, and freighted with a heavy sense of mission to preserve German culture. Moreover, they considered their culture and way of life to be under attack. Thus when leaders of the German community in St. Louis met in May 1904 to plan the organization of the local branch, their effort to establish an affiliate of the DANB had a defensive air about it. The published announcement of the organizational meeting of the new State Alliance, scheduled for 17 June 1904, observed that in the DANB the German element had found “the means to make good the many defeats it has suffered as a result of its disunity so far.”

The constituting convention of the State Alliance was held in St. Louis on 17 June at the St. Louis Turnhalle. At the convention, the delegates from nineteen Vereine, all from the St. Louis area, announced that their organizations were ready to affiliate with the DANB. Accordingly, a constitution was adopted and slates of officers and directors were elected. The first president was Dr. Carl Barck, a professor of ophthalmology at St. Louis University and a native of Karlsruhe who had taken his medical degree from the University of Freiburg. Barck’s vice-president was Dr. Richter, a native of Leipzig who had received his medical training at the university there.

The Schillerverein had been prodded by President Hexamer of the DANB to organize a local chapter in time for a Germanistic Congress in St. Louis in September 1904, an event promoted by the DANB in conjunction with the World’s Fair. The State Alliance subsequently participated in the congress, which included addresses on various aspects of German culture in America. In addition, the new Alliance helped stage a three-day commemoration of the centenary of Schiller’s death, and representatives of the State Alliance met with the St. Louis Board of Education in an effort to arrange for German classes in the evening. Despite these cultural activities, however, there can be little question that one of the principal motives of the delegates at the organizing convention of the Alliance in Missouri was to create a vehicle to fight prohibition.

In the year after the State Alliance was founded, the political situation for
those favoring the right to consume liquor was not good. Upon his inauguration as governor of Missouri in January 1905, Joseph Folk, the reformist Progressive, called for strict enforcement of the Sunday closing laws and liquor license laws. In addition, he appointed a young, vigorous reformer, Thomas Mulvihill, to serve as excise commissioner in St. Louis to enforce the liquor licensing laws. The governor’s pronouncements and Mulvihill’s activity had the result of making saloon owners nervous, and some establishments began closing on Sunday. Moreover, Mulvihill set out to close the “lid clubs,” the sham private clubs designed solely to circumvent the liquor laws on licenses and Sunday closing.

Folk’s call for strict enforcement quickly became the hottest topic of conversation in the state. Because the Sunday closing law was not being observed only in the urban areas, where Germans were concentrated, Folk’s call seemed to Missouri German-Americans to be very much directed against them. On the other hand, as soon as the Kansas City Times reported that St. Louis brewers were ready to spend vast sums to lobby for repeal of the Sunday closing law, “Every pulpit in the state [was] thundering against the Sunday saloon and commending Governor Folk. Most of the county newspapers, irrespective of politics [were] urging the Governor to stand firm.” Governor Folk was astute enough to exploit the issue for his political gain.9

The new State Alliance responded promptly to the vigorous governmental enforcement urged by Governor Folk. In late May 1905, Dr. Barck and Dr. Richter met to propose a common action. The result was a plan to submit a protest to Governor Folk against his calls for stricter enforcement of the “lid laws,” as the liquor control legislation was called, and to urge him to call a special session of the General Assembly to repeal the laws—a highly naive request on the part of the young Alliance.10

The pamphlet that was circulated by the Alliance containing the protest to Folk set out a number of the objections that the Alliance was to assert regularly against the dramshop and Sunday closing laws. For one, the Alliance contended that the “half-forgotten” and “odious” law failed to reflect the pluralistic values of modern American culture. Second, the Alliance suggested that the facts of city life dictated different standards of recreation from those in the country, since Sunday was often the only free day for the factory worker. Third, the Alliance argued that the blue laws caused economic hardship, since the manufacture and sale of beer were major industries in Missouri and made the state attractive to businesses. And, finally, the Alliance contended that the law was unconstitutional as a deprivation of individual liberties.11

Nothing came of the appeal to Folk, but the reaction of the Anti-Saloon League was swift and sharp. The day after the published reports of the Alliance protest, Samuel Lindsay, superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League, retorted that “the German-American Alliance, in working for the repeal of the Sunday Closing Law, is acting as the exponent of the organized liquor interests in the city.” This was a natural and common charge of the Anti-Saloon League and the other
temperance proponents, who saw the Alliance members, or at least wanted the population to see them, not so much as sympathetic activists for political liberty but as sinister agents for the mercenary interests in the liquor industry.

It would hardly have been surprising if the St. Louis brewing industry had been paying monies to the Alliance. By 1900, St. Louis was the third largest brewing center in the Middle West, after Chicago and Milwaukee, and the brewing industry had become an integral part of the state’s economy. Obviously, it was in the interest of the brewing industry to defeat prohibition, and in 1909 Anheuser-Busch was to set aside $300,000 for advertising and propaganda favorable to the consumption of beer. And on the national level, there was quite close cooperation between the DANB and the United States Brewers’ Association (USBA), which was essentially an association of German-American brewers who freely acknowledged their cooperation with the DANB. The USBA, through its annual Year Book, was more or less obsessive in its opposition to the Anti-Saloon League, perceptively noting early on that the League’s ultimate goal was purely and simply total prohibition.

But there is really no evidence that any significant amount of brewery money went directly to the German-American Alliance in Missouri, although at one point the State Alliance benefited indirectly from organizational efforts carried on by the DANB in Missouri and financed with funds from the USBA. Of course, it is possible that St. Louis brewers advanced money to the State Alliance secretly, but the periodic financial statements of the State Alliance and the subsequently organized St. Louis City Alliance, as reported publicly, were regularly only a few thousand dollars, and there do not appear to have been any enormously expensive propaganda campaigns or activities carried on by the State Alliance or the various city alliances in Missouri that would suggest the need for a large secret subsidy. Nevertheless, for many years the St. Louis Liquor Dealers Association was an official affiliated member of the State Alliance and paid dues to the organization.

The leaders of the German-American community and the German-American Alliance in Missouri did not need subsidies by the brewing industry to prod them to campaign against prohibition. Every indication is that the German-American leaders sincerely saw prohibition as a threat to personal liberty and to their culture, and if brewers wanted to assist them in their efforts by providing funds, that was all the better: but the German-American leaders were motivated to fight prohibition and puritanism in any event.

The Alliance protest struck a responsive chord among German-Americans of the state. At the quarterly meeting of the Alliance in July, it was reported that more than twenty thousand Germans in St. Louis had already signed a protest petition to Governor Folk. In addition, Alliance officials had sent signature cards on the protest to German societies throughout the state and had sent one of its members to various cities in the state to drum up support. The response supposedly had been so great that the Alliance had been forced to open an of-
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Office in downtown St. Louis in July 1905 to handle the great volume of mail. Georg Richter set out the personal impact that the lid laws had on the German-American community in a newspaper interview: "It is not a matter of 'drink and be merry' with us, but the closing of gardens and other places, where we usually gather on Sunday, deprives us of each other's company, the associations of our friends, and takes away from us a place where we might go, sit around, converse and enjoy the Sabbath." 15

In September 1905 the State Alliance began yet another campaign against the Sunday closing laws, which affected not only the sale of beer but also other items. After sixty merchants were arrested in southeastern Missouri for selling food supplies to farmers on Sunday during the harvest season, several thousand letters were prepared by the Alliance to mail to merchants throughout Missouri in an effort to gain their support in the fight against Sunday closing laws.16 This was a clever attempt to appeal to another class of the population affected adversely by Governor Folk's call for following the letter of all laws, but it was no more successful than the protest earlier in the year.

In publicizing this September letter campaign in an interview with the St. Louis Republic, Alliance official William C. F. Lenz contended that the local Alliance had "25,000 intelligent, conscientious and determined voters" as members.17 Lenz's contention that the membership was at 25,000 was probably exaggerated.18 And of course it was an open question whether most "members" of the Alliance even realized that they belonged to the organization. But Lenz's interview with the Republic was nevertheless interesting, for he felt compelled to deny once again that the State Alliance was subsidized by the local brewing industry and he took pains to insist that the campaign was a nonpartisan one, designed simply to urge "personal liberty."

Lenz's remarks are consistent with a conscious effort by the leaders of the DANB and the local alliances affiliated with it to be as broadly based an organization as possible in the German-American community. The Alliance was never that concerned about Republican or Democratic politics per se, even though many of its leaders were members of the Republican party. Rather, the Alliance in Missouri generally was interested in endorsing candidates, of whatever party, who took positions in sympathy with the policies of the DANB and the local alliances. Obviously, to be too closely allied with one or the other political party would hinder the efforts of the DANB to become the broad-based, representative organization for all German-Americans, and neither major political party could be counted on to pursue consistently and vigorously an antiprohibition policy. After all, the strength of both parties had been their ability to remain non-ideological and flexible on many issues and on setting priorities among various issues. Neither party was interested in being shackled to a clear-cut ideological position on prohibition. It was no accident, then, that the Anti-Saloon League, equally dogmatic on the other side of the same issue, was also nonpartisan.19

But even if the political actions of the Alliance were intended to be nonpar-
tisan, the organization was nevertheless combative. By the national convention of the DANB in October 1905, held only a little more than a year after the Missouri State Alliance was established, the Missouri Zweigverband was already "in einem regen Kampf"—in a sharp battle—against the recently revived Sunday closing laws, as the report of Fernande Richter, wife of Dr. Georg Richter and recording secretary of the State Alliance, stated to the national convention. Mrs. Richter's further comments to the national convention suggest that the backers of the Missouri Alliance considered their efforts to be more than a matter of politics, nearly a crusade, in fact: "a battle of liberal Weltanschauung against narrow bigotry and holier-than-thou hypocrisy, and against the favoring of certain classes of people." Nor were the Alliance leaders inhibited about converting some of their less enthusiastic German-American peers to the cause, with Mrs. Richter telling the national convention, "There is the need to fight a trait of our fellow citizen of German origin, which actually is in contradiction with the rest of his character: cowardice—not wanting to be 'German' in the eyes of other nationalities."

Mrs. Richter also noted that the State Alliance's political activities against prohibition had won the forceful support of some English-language newspapers. Such endorsement by native American politicians and the press convinced the German-Americans that their lobbying efforts were accepted as being every bit as American as the efforts of any other interest group, including those promoting prohibition and, later, those agitating for an American neutrality policy favorable to the Allies. The English-language press in St. Louis in the years after the turn of the century broadly tolerated or even encouraged manifestations of ethnic identity in the city. Indeed, it was only after World War I began that the English-language press in St. Louis began to see something sinister in the lobbying efforts of the various state alliances and of the DANB.

The State Alliance firmly believed that its political activities had value, and it believed that they were an effective counter to the prohibitionists' political pressure. Typical is this observation of the leaders of the State Alliance: "Only at the ballot box, through unremitting agitation and through practical action can we achieve something. We need in this respect only to take note of the Anti-Saloon League... as an example of what can be done."

The State Alliance grew steadily during its first several years of existence. By the time of the 1905 national convention of the DANB at Indianapolis, the Missouri Alliance had forty-seven Vereine affiliated with it, as well as forty-three individual members who belonged to the State Alliance directly. By the next national convention of the DANB, in October 1907, the membership of the State Alliance had swelled to include ninety-four affiliated Vereine and almost three hundred individual members in Missouri and southern Illinois.

Moreover, the State Alliance had started to expand beyond the limits of St. Louis and its environs. By 1907, as a result of the publicity given the Alliance and through its political and organizational efforts, there were German-American or-
ganizations from a number of Missouri and Southern Illinois communities affiliated with the Missouri State Alliance, although the center of activity remained in St. Louis. Among the Missouri cities represented in the Alliance by 1907 were Kansas City, St. Joseph, Joplin, Sedalia, De Soto, Higginsville, Concordia, Lexington, California, and Clayton, the St. Louis County seat. Among the communities from Illinois represented in the Alliance were East St. Louis, Belleville, Upper Alton, Freeburg, and Highland. This growth in the outstate areas of Missouri and Illinois was not an accident. Indeed, the separate report of Emil W. F. Leonhardt, then the recording secretary of the Missouri State Alliance, to the 1907 national convention of the DANB indicated that the leaders of the State Alliance realized that a considerable source of strength for the prohibition forces was the rural and town population in outstate Missouri.

As noted before, it would be incorrect to see the German-American Alliance in Missouri as solely a political group. The Alliance leaders saw political agitation as an important means to an end—the preservation of German culture—but it was not the only method. Thus the German-American Alliance also participated in or sponsored cultural and ethnic festivities and events throughout its existence. The Alliance took part in the German Day festivities at the 1904 World’s Fair. The Alliance was active in the Schiller centenary festivities in 1905, and in September 1906 the Alliance sponsored a German Day, at which Dr. Hexamer, president of the DANB, and Adolph Timm, the national secretary of the DANB, were present. In 1907, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Goethe’s death, the Alliance staged appropriate festivities. The Alliance also purchased twenty shares, at ten dollars per share, of the Deutsche Theaterbau Gesellschaft, the corporation that eventually built the German Victoria Theater in St. Louis.

In spite of its many cultural and political activities, however, the Alliance found itself fighting a rearguard action to preserve German culture. Significantly, it saw much to criticize in the German community itself, as it decried the Americanization that was continuing. In 1907 the Missouri Alliance lamented, “Unfortunately it appears that our first German Vereine are becoming ever more Americanized, and the German-Americans and their offspring apparently are becoming the gravediggers of the Germân language in America.” The Alliance complained that one of the oldest Gesangvereine in the city was sending out invitations and conducting its meetings in English, despite a provision in the organization’s constitution that its business be conducted in German. The Missouri Alliance also called for political awareness by its members: “To thresh phrases at the beer table and then on election day not to fulfill one’s duty as a citizen at the ballot box is comfortable, but successes are not won that way. . . . There will not be created at the beer table any organization which will successfully confront the bigots [Muckerelement].”

The constant harping by leaders of the Alliance for greater devotion to the cause of German culture suggests that the great mass of German-Americans
were not as motivated as the Alliance leadership. To be sure, many, if not most, German-Americans resented the advances of the prohibition forces and many of them sympathized with the avowed purpose of the Alliance to fight prohibition, but there simply was not the willingness to engage in constant confrontation and open political warfare to save German culture, as the Alliance leaders seemed willing to do. Ironically, even the Alliance itself did not present a united front in the crusade of its leaders. The reports of the activities of the various Alliance branches in Missouri in the monthly newsletter of the Alliance reveal that, while the large urban branches of the Alliance in Missouri were striving to carry on the good fight against prohibition, members in the smaller communities looked upon the Alliance primarily as another German social organization to be used to organize picnics, balls, and festivals with fellow German-Americans.

Rather than unifying German-Americans, the hen-clucking directed at those less eager to fight the assimilative forces of the native American society produced enemies for the Alliance among German-Americans. Even in St. Louis the aggressive leaders of the German-American Alliance stood apart from the mainstream of the German-American community when it came to political and cultural agitation for preserving the German cultural identification. It did not take long for the less fanatical to give them the deprecating title of “professional Germans,” since they took upon themselves the role of shepherding the cultural growth and political direction of the German-American community with the kind of zeal that one would devote to one’s career.

Despite all the noble calls for action, the cultural programs of the Alliance were remarkably ineffectual and shortsighted. The leaders of the DANB and its branch alliances seemed more concerned about preserving for themselves their ethnic culture—but their efforts to insure that German culture and language passed on to the next generation were remarkably inefficacious. For instance, the cries of the Alliance in St. Louis for German instruction in the city’s public schools were perfunctory. Moreover, it was unrealistic to believe that instruction in German for an hour or so a day in the public high schools was going to create a new generation of Americans fluent in German. And the DANB never did endeavor to establish German-language institutions of higher education, a necessary prerequisite to replenishing the dwindling number of intellectuals who knew their German heritage.

Possibly this failure of the Alliance leadership to establish a meaningful program to preserve German culture for the next generation was simply a factor of their lack of sophistication. But the inaction of the Alliance leaders probably also reflected a realization on their part that German language and culture in America were already doomed, no matter what the Alliance did.

Even in the 1870s Gert Goebel, a German-American who had lived many years in Missouri, commented on how the German language was often inadequate for the experience in the New World. And Goebel frankly conceded that German-American children would learn English from playing with their Anglo-
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Saxon playmates and would use it among themselves in the home unless their parents insisted that the children speak German in their presence. But of course such an artificial and coercive attempt to induce the use of German was bound to be self-defeating.

By the start of this century, German-American leaders were constantly expressing, sometimes almost subconsciously, an awareness that the end of German-American culture was impending. Anyone could see the ease with which younger German-Americans were assimilating into the American culture, and ever fewer German immigrants were arriving in St. Louis to bring new blood to the German-American community there. Thus one German-American scholar published the view in 1907 that "the outlook for the lasting existence of a separate German element in the United States is extremely poor." That awareness may have created a sense of defeatism about trying to create cultural institutions for a German-American culture whose future was illusory.

Yet, at the same time, the political skirmishes over prohibition and liquor control became ever sharper, as if engaging in the present-day struggle against immediate threats enabled German-Americans to displace contemplation of the inevitable events of the future. The German-Americans saw the forces of prohibition and Sabbatarianism making continual progress during the early years of the Folk administration from 1905 to 1907, in no small part because Governor Folk was creating an atmosphere favorable to the prohibitionists by his public remarks.

In April 1905 Governor Folk had again called for strict enforcement of the liquor laws. Within a few days, A. C. Stewart, president of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners and a gubernatorial appointee, gave orders for the chief of police to see that the saloons remained closed on Sunday. And Sheriff Herfel of St. Louis County announced that he was going to enforce the liquor laws, even if the county grand jury declined to indict anyone arrested. The Anti-Saloon League, encouraged by the governor's attitude, announced plans to resist the renewal of more than two hundred dramshop licenses pending before St. Louis Excise Commissioner Mulvihill. Later, the League helped to enforce the Sunday closing law by patrolling the city on Sunday and reporting violations to the city authorities. All this activity intimidated St. Louis saloon owners, who began to close their businesses on Sunday. The consequence was a massive exodus of thousands of St. Louisans to East St. Louis, Illinois, where no Sunday closing law was in effect, and to St. Louis County, where the Sunday law was not as strictly enforced as in the city, despite Sheriff Herfel's public statements.

The fear created among saloon owners is reflected by this humorous account from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch about the sale of liquor on Sunday at a refreshment area along Creve Coeur Lake, a popular recreation spot in St. Louis County:

At 5:00 p.m. there was a remarkable transformation at Wipke's [a dancehall in the park].
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At the score of tables surrounding the dance pavilion were some 50 persons drinking beer. At the bar were several others, a few drinking whiskey.

The launch “Favorite” was approaching. A dancehall attendant was watching it closely. Suddenly the flag dipped.

Instantly the waiters rushed to the various tables, grabbed the beer bottles, empty and otherwise, and rushed into the barroom. Others swept the metal beer [caps] from the floor into the lake. The whiskey bottles and glasses disappeared from the bar as if by magic.

“Lids on,” the waiter remarked. Clarence Campbell, Deputy Sheriff, had arrived.

While Campbell remained at Wipke’s no liquor was sold.

When Campbell left Wipke’s the lid went with him.40

Governor Folk continued the atmosphere of strict enforcement with his message to the General Assembly on 2 January 1907. Significantly he also urged legislation to provide for the licensing of not only individuals and corporations dispensing liquor but also clubs. That proposal directly hit home at the private societies and Vereine of the German-American community and it caused the expected reactions.41 Petitions poured into the capitol from all across the state, calling for more temperance laws.42 And representatives of various German-American societies met at the Turnhalle a few weeks later to protest the proposed legislation to require private clubs and societies to pay a dramshop license fee, contending that such a tax would destroy the smaller singing, Turner, and social societies in the German-American community.43

In this context, the Alliance continued its efforts to agitate, with a zeal born of true antipathy toward the drys. In his report to the 1907 national convention of the DANB, Secretary Leonhardt of the Missouri Alliance cited the efforts of the local organization to fight prohibition through lectures, pamphlets, and lobbying.44 Leonhardt was willing to concede, however, that these efforts had so far been without success. The sentiment grew among leaders of the State Alliance that there needed to be a reorganization of the Alliance in Missouri in order for it to be effective.
Reorganizing the Alliance in Missouri

Until its reorganization in 1907, the growth of the Missouri State Alliance was a fairly haphazard affair. Because the various affiliated organizations came to be so far-flung within the state, there was no general coordination between the executive officers of the State Alliance and the officers of each local Verein. Nor outside St. Louis was there any coordination between affiliated organizations even in the same city or region of the state. The consequence was that most of the activity of the State Alliance was centered in St. Louis, the home of nearly all the original founders and early officers. Nevertheless, by the time of the State Alliance’s annual meeting in February 1906, there was enough Alliance activity outside St. Louis to justify the election of directors from St. Joseph, Sedalia, Cape Girardeau, and California, Missouri, and East St. Louis, Illinois.

By 1907, the State Alliance had increased in size sufficiently to warrant a reorganization that was more hierarchical. Accordingly, a convention of the State Alliance was held in St. Louis on 6 September 1907, the day before a giant German Day festival in the city sponsored by the State Alliance. The convention was held at the St. Louis Turnhalle, at Fifteenth and Chouteau, where many of the Alliance functions were held over the years. In attendance were fifty-four delegates, from nearly every town and city in which there were organizations affiliated with the State Alliance, representing a total of 126 organizations. The convention passed the usual resolutions with the familiar themes of favoring personal liberty and opposing liquor-control laws. But the principal business of the convention was to reorganize the State Alliance.

As a part of the reorganization, several different organizations were established. First of all, the Staatsverband, or State Alliance, was maintained. The affairs of the State Alliance were to be coordinated by an executive committee, composed of the elected officers of the State Alliance, plus certain committee chairmen. The concept of a Vorstand, or board of directors, was eliminated. The membership of the first executive committee was indeed statewide, with mem-
bers from St. Louis, Kansas City, Sedalia, St. Joseph, and elsewhere. An annual state convention was to be held each September, although the president of the State Alliance could call a special convention at any time. At the state conventions, policy decisions were to be made by the delegates to the convention, and officers were to be elected. In addition to the president, vice-presidents, corresponding and recording secretaries, and the treasurer, there was also to be chosen a national delegate (Beisitzer) to the DANB, who would serve on committees of the DANB to represent Alliance members from Missouri. Delegates to the state convention were to be representatives from the different organizations in the cities and towns of Missouri and Southern Illinois affiliated directly with the State Alliance. Since these delegates met together only once each year, the State Alliance was effectively run by the executive committee from one convention to the next.

Just as the DANB was supported in part by a per capita assessment charged to organizations affiliated with it, each Verein or organization affiliated with the State Alliance paid 1.5 cents to the State Alliance for each of its members. Of that money a penny went from the State Alliance to the DANB as the tax upon the State Alliance. Within the year, the tax was raised to 2 cents per head, and then to 3 cents at the 1908 state convention, in order to generate more revenues for the State Alliance’s activities. Individual members of the State Alliance paid one dollar per year in dues.

In addition to the State Alliance, each city was now to have its own Stadtverband, or city branch or alliance. Each of the Stadtverbaende was independent of other city alliances, although the city alliances were to send delegates to the conventions of the State Alliance. A city alliance had affiliated with it the Vereine and organizations in its community that would otherwise be affiliated directly with the State Alliance. The city alliance had its own officers and could engage in its own political and cultural activities, independent of the State Alliance, although frequently the State Alliance sent advisory correspondence to the officers of the city alliances suggesting to them the appropriate policy positions to take.

By far the most active and largest of the city alliances was in St. Louis, referred to in this work as the City Alliance. (Either of two terms, German-American Alliance or Alliance, will be used to refer to the State Alliance and the city alliances in Missouri as a group.) Indeed, in later years the activities of the St. Louis City Alliance generated much more publicity in the English-language press than those of the State Alliance, since leaders of the former were more active and given to more controversial statements.

The St. Louis Alliance held two meetings each month: one was a meeting of the executive board of the City Alliance; the other was a meeting of the delegates of its affiliated organizations. Moreover, the internal organization in the St. Louis Alliance was every bit as elaborate as that of the State Alliance. Both had a number of committees, including those for entertainment, festivals, and the like, and also a propaganda committee, which was charged with political and cultural
agitation, and a legislative committee, which often made recommendations on which political candidates should be endorsed as having opinions sympathetic to the German-American community.

Despite all this organization, there was a certain degree of haphazard whimsy in the operations of the German-American Alliance in Missouri in its first years. Typical is the manner in which the first state convention at the Turnhalle in St. Louis elected its president for 1907 and 1908, Edward V. P. Schneiderhahn. Well-known among Germans in the state as a former president of the state branch in Missouri of the German Catholic Central Verein, Schneiderhahn had been urged to attend the meeting so that he could serve as temporary presiding officer of the convention, since he had experience as a parliamentarian. But when he arrived at the Turnhalle, he found that a chairman had already been elected. Although he stayed to serve on the Committee on Resolutions, he had to leave the convention in the afternoon for several hours to attend to other business. When he returned a little later, he saw three names on a blackboard, including his own. Inquiring, he learned that the three were nominees for the office of president, and ballots were being collected at that very moment. The next thing Schneiderhahn knew, he was president. 1

Schneiderhahn had an interesting background, especially in light of the long-standing tension between the Catholic Central Verein and the more secular German-American Alliance. He was born in St. Louis on 23 September 1874, the son of a German-born sculptor. He attended parochial schools in St. Louis, studied at St. Louis University and Washington University, and was admitted to the bar in 1896. 8 Although he was a native-born American, Schneiderhahn could speak German. He was a devout Catholic who attended mass nearly daily, and he remained active in German Catholic affairs even while president of the State Alliance. He seemed able to serve the two leading German ethnic organizations well, although he did take the position that the Central Verein should not affiliate with the German-American Alliance. 9 Nevertheless, he urged his colleagues in the Central Verein that they cooperate with the DANB on issues of mutual concern, although seldom was there to be much close official contact between the Alliance and the Central Verein in Missouri after Schneiderhahn left office. 10

After the officers of the State Alliance had been elected by the first state convention, the delegates adopted a statement of principles that reflected the aggressiveness and ethnic schizophrenia of the leaders of the German-American Alliance not only in Missouri but also throughout the United States:

We are Americans through and through. We have and recognize only one Fatherland, to which we are loyal: the United States.

But as Americans and enthusiastic citizens of the land we are still nevertheless proud of the German blood which pulses in our veins: proud of the accomplishments of the German people and proud that we have the wonderful opportunity to use and preserve the German language.

We therefore admonish all ancestral brothers to stand by this beautiful part of the world, the Mother Tongue, and lovingly to preserve and nurture it in the family
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circle, to pass it on to your children and children's children in addition to the na­tional language. . . .

The German is by character a true and peace loving citizen, and in every danger will rush to the aid of the State against its enemies. But we also intervene for per­sonal liberty, that is, we want to know that the libertarian and equalitarian principles of law of a republic are fully protected. We view it as the duty of the State not to curtail unnecessarily the natural rights of its citizens, and if such a thing does hap­pen, we allow ourselves, in the interest of all citizens, to become vocal against such curtailment and to fight against the curtailment with all lawful means that are avail­able to us.11

But the comments of the Westliche Post on the foregoing resolutions were more warlike. The paper enthusiastically declared:

The German shows almost endless patience; but if it comes to an end, so is he all the more radical, and he loves to make a total end of the unpleasant matter, in order never to have to meet up with it again. Who would dispute that now once again the time has come for the German element to show its power. . . . The State Alliance of Missouri and Southern Illinois has through its resolutions given notice that the Ger­mans of the state are not willing to let a single particle of their personal freedom be stolen away, and that they will make every effort to win back at the very next oppor­tunity what has been lost.12

But in his year in office Schneiderhahn tried not to be as dogmatic or comb­ATIVE. Indeed, Schneiderhahn was one Alliance leader who wanted to emphasize the cultural aspects of the Alliance. At a mass meeting at the Odeon Theatre in St. Louis, he presented the Alliance position on prohibition, but then went on to insist that the principle of personal liberty was not the original nor the main ob­jective of the organization.13 In a sense, Schneiderhahn's view was correct, for many in the DANB and the State Alliance and the local alliances believed that political agitation was only one aspect of preserving German culture in America, not an end in itself. Such a subtle distinction was probably lost on many of the members of the Alliance, however, and it certainly was lost on those in the native American community who were opposing the antiprohibitionist and anti­Sabbatarian campaigns of the Alliance. In any event, Schneiderhahn revealed in his diary that he declined to serve again as president when offered the position a second time at the 1908 state convention because he was unhappy that the con­vention endorsed candidates for public offices, including Republican Herbert S. Hadley for governor.14 Moreover, at a German theatrical performance held at the Odeon Theatre the day after the 1908 convention, Schneiderhahn was irritated that Rep. Richard Bartholdt, a leading spokesman for German-Americans in St. Louis and throughout the United States, disturbed the cultural setting of the evening by raising the matter of opposition to prohibition in his speech.15 Schneiderhahn was objective enough to perceive that the conduct of certain lead­ers of the German-American Alliance contributed to the misconception that the Alliance was interested only in preserving the right to consume beer.16

Nevertheless, Schneiderhahn had some very definite ideas on the German-
Americans and their role in the United States. Some of these ideas were attempts at philosophical rationalization for the activities of the German-American Alliance, but they reveal an attitude, so common to German-American leaders, to consider German-Americans to have a unique role in American life. Thus in a speech to the 1909 convention of the State Alliance, Schneiderhahn noted, “The teutonic race has been one of the chief, if not the chief, contributor to the population and civilization of America, and therefore the sour-minded pilgrims should not attempt to sour the whole population by certain extravagant notions proved to be untenable by the history of the whole world.” 17 In a resolution he composed and presented to the 1908 state convention, Schneiderhahn attempted to come up with a philosophical basis for the opposition of the German-American Alliance to prohibition, contending that under the “germanic idea of government” it was the duty of the state to protect the individual in his natural rights, as opposed to the “roman idea” in which the citizen exists for the state. The implication was that under the “germanic” theory the state would not be used to undermine the citizen’s natural right to “personal liberty.” 18

Although Edward Schneiderhahn’s devout Catholic background was unusual for a leader of the State Alliance, in most other respects his high standing in the German-American community was typical. The leaders of the Alliance tended to be among the social and professional elite of the community, basically practical men, responsible and respected, although most of them tended to be afflicted with a very considerable case of German idealism about their cultural aspirations. 19 These were not obviously embittered or frustrated men in their personal or professional lives, nor were they isolated from power and influence in the German-American community, although to a certain extent German-Americans with such a heightened sense of Germanness were estranged from the inner circle of the social and professional elite in the native American community. Yet the leaders of the German-American Alliance were not totally isolated from native American community leaders. Indeed the State Alliance by 1907 had established cooperative ties with various St. Louis business, labor, and boosterism organizations. 20 And the Alliance took part with the native American leadership of the city in organizing the events in 1909 celebrating the centennial of the incorporation of St. Louis.

A review of the leaders of the German-American Alliance in St. Louis over the years gives an idea of their social and economic position.

Dr. Carl Barck, president of the State Alliance; professor of ophthalmology at St. Louis University.

John Gewinner, holder of several offices in the City Alliance; owner of Gewinner Sausage Company.

August Hoffmann, treasurer of the State and City Alliances for over a decade; president of Northwestern Bank.

Frederick W. Keck, president of the City Alliance; an officer in Schwartung & Keck Clothing Company.
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Henry Kersting, president of the City Alliance; attorney and associate city counsel.

William C. F. Lenz, delegate to the DANB; advertising agent for the Westliche Post and the St. Louis Times.

Hugo Muench, holder of several offices in the Alliance; attorney and circuit judge.

William Prufrock, president of the State Alliance; president of Prufrock Furniture Manufacturing Company.

Leo Rassieur, long-standing member of the City Alliance; school board attorney and probate judge.

Dr. Georg Richter, vice-president of the State Alliance; physician.

Edward V. P. Schneiderhahn, president of the State Alliance; lawyer and member of the St. Louis City Council.

Dr. H. M. Starkloff, president of the State Alliance; physician.

Emil Tolkacz, president of the City Alliance; president of Missouri Boiler and Steel Metal Works.

Dr. Charles H. Weinsberg, president of the City and State Alliances; physician and surgeon.

George Withum, secretary of the City Alliance; owner of Withum Tavern and Buffet.

These men were hardly carbon copies of each other. Although all could be said to be safely within the confines of the German-American Buergertum, the bankers, lawyers, and physicians among the German-American leaders were clearly higher up the social, educational, and economic ladder than the advertising agent or tavern owner. Moreover, there were differences in attitudes about what should be the principal thrust of the Alliance’s activities: men like Schneiderhahn and Weinsberg wished to emphasize cultural aspects of the Alliance’s activities, while officers like Kersting were eager to confront the political opponents of the Alliance direct and openly. And the more mature and level-headed of the leaders often were busy trying to corral those officers who gloried in their official positions and became self-important and overbearing toward others in the German-American community. Nor by any means were the personalities of the leaders uniform: Weinsberg was quiet, aloof, and reserved; Kersting talkative and impetuous; Gewinner at times tactless; Keck retiring. Despite the leaders’ different personalities and philosophies, what held them together was a common belief in the need to preserve, in one way or another, aspects of their German heritage. It is no accident that many of these men made regular trips back to Germany to renew and preserve their sense of German culture.22

Not only did these men repeatedly rotate their offices within the German-American Alliance with themselves and others, but they also met each other in a number of other German-American organizations in the city, so that there were constantly close ties between the leaders of the State Alliance and the City Al-
liance and other German social and cultural organizations in St. Louis. This was especially true during World War I, when agitation on behalf of Germany sprang up in the form of many different relief organizations throughout St. Louis: repeatedly the various war-relief committees in the city had interlocking executive boards.

The secular aspect of the leadership of the German-American Alliance in Missouri is suggested by the fact that Barck, Muench, August Hoffmann, and Starckloff, among others, were all active in the Free Thinkers society, the German ethical society in the city. This irreligious side of the Alliance leadership was a principal cause for the reluctance of the Catholic Central Verein to identify closely with the Alliance. In addition, the Alliance leadership more often than not was oriented to Republicanism, although no attempt was ever made overtly to promote the Alliance as a Republican organization. Indeed, the Alliance leadership regularly and publicly insisted on its nonpartisan role in fighting prohibition.

The real growth of the City Alliance and the State Alliance began about 1907, when the Alliance was reorganized. To some extent this growth was due to the support expressed for the Alliance by two influential leaders in the St. Louis German-American community.

One was Emil Preetorius, the Forty-eighter who had guided the Westliche Post for many decades. Preetorius was one of the most influential men among German-Americans in Missouri, and for decades in the nineteenth century Preetorius had been vocal in St. Louis in urging the unity of the city's Germans. The favorable attitude of Preetorius toward the German-American Alliance led to his paper's extensively publicizing the events and programs of the Alliance. Such support continued even after his death in 1907, when his son, Edward Preetorius, took over the newspaper.

The other influential supporter was Richard Bartholdt, a German-born lawyer who came to the United States as a youth and eventually became the United States Congressman for the Tenth District in Missouri, which included many of the German areas in St. Louis. Bartholdt, who served in the House for nearly twenty-five years, was a spokesman for the DANB specifically and German-Americans generally in Congress. It was Bartholdt who obtained a federal charter for the DANB from Congress in 1907, and it was Bartholdt who was to be among the most vocal defenders of the DANB after it came under attack in 1917 and 1918. Bartholdt participated regularly and actively in functions of the German-American Alliance in Missouri, often as a speaker for one or another German-American cause.

Another major factor in the growth of the Alliance was a bill proposed in the Missouri General Assembly in 1907 requiring all private clubs and societies with taverns dispensing liquors to buy a dramshop license and to conform with rules regulating taverns open to the public. The principal reason for the proposed law was that many so-called private clubs, in order to circumvent the dramship laws,
were springing up throughout the state and charging a nominal membership fee to any patron who showed up at the door. Yet the proposed legislative remedy, if too broadly worded, could directly affect not only the lid clubs (as the private clubs were called) but also all the German Vereine and clubs in St. Louis, and possibly even threaten their very existence, as some German-Americans claimed.25

It was not just the threat of proposed legislation, however, that induced many German-Americans to believe that finally something had to be done about fighting the advances of the prohibitionists: the general atmosphere had become intolerable for those who desired to drink beer on Sundays. The interest in enforcing the state and local liquor-control laws on the books, revived with Governor Folk's election in 1904, began to have a significant impact upon the ability of St. Louis German-Americans and other St. Louisans to obtain beer on Sunday. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat reported that on a single Sunday in June 1907 so many thousands of St. Louisans traveled to East St. Louis to drink there that extra cars had to be put on the trolley lines. Not that there were not any people still trying to flout the closing law in the city: the Globe-Democrat on the same date reported numerous raids within the city of St. Louis to arrest those who were dispensing liquors on Sunday.26 And on 22 November 1908 the St. Louis police made 832 arrests of owners and patrons at sixty-one different lid clubs, in some instances raiding the same club four or five times on the same day.27

Without question this impressive work by the police was a product of the public statements by Governor Folk and the diligent efforts of Thomas Mulvihill, the excise commissioner for St. Louis, whose efforts were indeed effective: in a speech in late November 1908 Mulvihill reported that of the twenty-eight hundred saloons in the city at the time he took office eight hundred had been put out of business.28 Folk further added to the atmosphere of strict enforcement in the summer of 1908 by having the Missouri National Guard do exercises in St. Louis County, in an effort to intimidate county officials into enforcing the Sunday closing law more vigorously—or else have the National Guard do the job.29 The 1908 election of Herbert S. Hadley as governor brought little relief for those desiring a more relaxed attitude about the Sunday closing law: following the election Hadley, a Progressive Republican, announced that he also intended to force adherence to the dramshop laws.30

In the midst of this turmoil, the German-American Alliance appeared to many German-Americans to be the one umbrella organization capable of representing their interests in fighting the liquor-control laws and the general advance of the prohibitionists. Thus the State Alliance began to assist in political agitation in other cities of Missouri. The State Alliance and the Kansas City Alliance helped candidates sympathetic to "personal liberty" to win city offices in St. Joseph in 1908. Moreover, the Sedalia city alliance supposedly helped stop prohibition in a local-option vote in that city, even though the drys won in Pettis County, where Sedalia is located.31 Schneiderhahn himself spoke at an antiprohibition rally in
East St. Louis in August 1908, and he also took part in an antiprohibition rally at the Odeon in St. Louis in May 1908, although he complained to his diary that the meeting was poorly attended because of confusion among various subcommittees of the Alliance that were supposed to organize the affair.

The City Alliance was even more active politically than the State Alliance, in no small part because the City Alliance focused its agitation right in the city, where the greatest number of members of the German-American Alliance was located. Early in 1908, the City Alliance with the State Alliance distributed four broadsides against prohibition, with press runs of one hundred thousand copies, which were distributed not only in Missouri but also in other states. The City Alliance took part as well in the unfortunate rally at the Odeon in May. In June 1908 the City Alliance resolved to take an active role in supporting candidates whose views were known to correspond to those of German-Americans in the city. And in July, the City Alliance heard a report by its Legislative Committee on the positions of the candidates. In addition, the City Alliance held a mass protest against prohibition at the Coliseum in St. Louis on 22 June 1909, although ostensibly the rally was put on by the "Missouri Model License League." The principal speaker was Mayor David S. Rose of Milwaukee, who addressed several thousand at the Coliseum on the "fallacy of prohibition." Furthermore, the chairman of the Legislative Committee of the City Alliance, J. A. V. Schmidt, engaged in a lively public correspondence with P. A. Bake, general superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League. The German-Americans felt that they scored a major coup in the debate between the two gentlemen when they showed that President Lincoln had operated a tavern for a brief time in New Salem, Illinois, in 1833. That anyone could believe that such a historical tidbit had anything significant to do with the debate on the prohibition issues suggests the low level on which the debate was sometimes carried out. The City Alliance also sent emissaries as activists in other cities and communities of the state, and with some success. For instance, the City Alliance helped to defeat the local-option forces for prohibition in Sedalia, De Soto, and Monett.

The political agitation seemed to be the impetus for the growth of the City Alliance. By the time of the national convention of the DANB in October 1909, two years after the reorganization of the State Alliance and the creation of the City Alliance, the City Alliance had eighty-three Vereine affiliated with it, along with an additional six hundred individual members. Similarly, the State Alliance continued to grow and by the end of 1908 had well over one hundred affiliated organizations.

When the second convention of the State Alliance was held on 3 October 1908, the two organizations were well established. The convention went smoothly, and it was indicative of the growing statewide outreach of the State Alliance that someone other than a St. Louisan was elected president, John Nusser of St. Joseph. Moreover, it was decided that the State Alliance would
Reorganizing the Alliance

hold its annual convention in a city other than St. Louis in 1909: in St. Joseph, the home of the newly elected president.

Thus, by the time of the second state convention, a little more than four years after the State Alliance was organized, it had already matured significantly: steadily the Alliance was becoming an effective lobbying force. Gone were the tactics of ineffectual petition campaigns, replaced by direct voter education in the form of lectures, rallies, and broadsides, as well as fledgling grass-roots campaign activity in other parts of the state. Its growth prodded by the advances of temperance forces, the Alliance in Missouri by 1908 was on the way to becoming a recognized opponent of the Anti-Saloon League and the WCTU.

On 4 October 1908, a massive German Day parade was held. German and American flags hung from buildings along the route of the parade, which was eight miles long and included between fifteen thousand and twenty-five thousand participants and six floats. Later that day, there was a series of four one-act plays at the Odeon to conclude the German Day celebration, along with a number of speeches, including the prohibition speech by Congressman Bartholdt that Schneiderhahn thought was inappropriate. In the audience at the Odeon that evening was Dr. Charles H. Weinsberg, the man who became increasingly the key figure in the development of the German-American Alliance in Missouri—and in its downfall.
The Alliance Consolidates Its Influence

Significantly, the growth of the German-American Alliance in Missouri after the reorganization of the State Alliance and the creation of the city alliances in 1907 continued without any real opposition from influential segments of the native American society. The English-language press to a great extent was neutral or even positive in reporting the activities of the Alliance. Indeed, the first convention of the State Alliance in 1907 was extensively recorded in both the Post-Dispatch and the Globe-Democrat in St. Louis. In fact, the Globe-Democrat, which despite its name was a Republican-oriented paper and had a large number of German-American readers, carried a cartoon in its 7 September 1907 issue that showed a chair tipped against a desk with the label "Mr. Missouri." In a nearby wastebasket were papers marked "Business" and tacked to the desk was a sign reading "Be Back Monday." On the wall was a picture of the Kaiser (not yet the target of attacks as he would be ten years later) and strewn on the floor were books on German history and various papers with German phrases, such as "Prosit, Willkommen," "Wie Befuehlen Sie Sich," and even "Hoch dem Kaiser." The whole message of the cartoon was that Missourians were going out to participate in the German festivities and that such festivities, despite the ethnic overtones, were innocent and enjoyable.

The following year, the Globe-Democrat reported at great length on the second convention of the State Alliance and carried front-page photographs of the German Day parade. Nor were the Globe-Democrat and the Post-Dispatch the only English-language papers to report on the activities of the German-American Alliance. In its 22 August 1910 issue, the St. Louis Republic offered heavy coverage of that year’s German Day at Lemp Park. The St. Louis Times, an English-language newspaper owned by the German-American Press Association, the same company that published the Westliche Post, also reported on Alliance activities in a sympathetic light, as might be expected.

All these positive, or at least neutral, reports by the English-language news-
papers may well have convinced the leaders of the German-American Alliance that their political and cultural activities were widely tolerated and accepted as legitimate, if not enthusiastically endorsed, by native Americans and their press. Thus even the Republic, which strongly supported enforcement of the state liquor laws, in its account of the 1910 German Day festivities reported in neutral fashion that there had been a bitter but enthusiastically received speech against prohibition by Reverend Jacob Meeker, who was introduced to the crowd by the president of the City Alliance, Emil Tolkacz.

The political activism of the German-American Alliance in Missouri continued unabated in the years from 1907 to 1910. The Alliance endorsed political candidates in the 1908 election. In 1909 the German-American Alliance sponsored the speech by Mayor Rose of Milwaukee, and the State Alliance sent out a purported 172,000 letters to voters in opposition to prohibition. On 3 November 1910, just before election day, the City Alliance held a rally in opposition to prohibition. The first speaker was Emil Tolkacz, who addressed the audience in English. But after Tolkacz completed his remarks, someone in the audience suggested a poll of the crowd on which language it preferred be used by the speakers. As a result of the poll, the remaining speakers, including Henry Kersting, a St. Louis attorney and member of the Alliance, and Congressman Bartholdt, gave their remarks in German.

There began to be a certain militancy in the public statements of the German-American Alliance, which suggested how deeply the leaders of the Alliance were becoming emotionally involved in the fray between the wets and the drys. For instance, the official report of the State Alliance to the 1911 national convention of the DANB proclaimed: "The Germanic element of the nation has awakened. More and more there is developing the conviction that it is not just the offspring of the Anglo-Saxons who made this land great, as they contend, but on the contrary that the Germans and the Celts have contributed. It was these [the Germans and Celts] who fought the battle against the medieval ideas of Puritanism, and they are doing it again today." This new attitude, however, was not evolving in a vacuum. Indeed, to a great extent it was matched by the increasing militancy of opposing groups like the WCTU and the Anti-Saloon League after 1906. As one writer has observed, "The opponents of Prohibition were no longer sufferers to be helped but enemies to be conquered."

But it would be incorrect to leave the impression that it was only the German-American Alliance that was fighting prohibition. On 22 October 1910, former U.S. Solicitor General Frederick W. Lehmann, a widely respected German-American, spoke against prohibition in an address at the Odeon Theatre in St. Louis. In 1908, the Concordia Turnverein gave the Alliance money to help distribute antiprohibition literature, and in 1910 the Bayernverein, along with the Tower Grove and West St. Louis Turnvereine, joined in passing resolutions opposing prohibition. Moreover, the Central Verein, albeit a rival of the German-American Alliance as a representative of the German-American Catholic com-
munity, nevertheless also gradually became outspoken in its opposition to prohibition. At its 1909 state convention, the Catholic Union of Missouri, the state branch of the Central Verein, for the first time adopted a resolution explicitly condemning the prohibitionists as "subscribers of the theory of state absolutism, the mortal enemy of personal freedom." And at the 1910 state convention, the delegates of the Catholic Union resolved that, although they recommended and encouraged total abstinence from all alcoholic drinks, "We see in the concepts of coerced temperance and prohibition an encroachment on personal freedom and a misguided effort to encourage true temperance which uses improper means." And Lutheran leaders sometimes instructed members of the Missouri Synod on the excesses of the prohibition movement. In addition, Congressman Bartholdt could always be counted upon to give rousing speeches against prohibition at any appropriate—or inappropriate—function. Bartholdt perceived prohibition to be caused by the ethnic and political prejudice of certain elements of the native American society, and he was quite willing to say so in numerous speeches.

Nevertheless, it was the German-American Alliance that was the most effective and the most visible German-American organization fighting the prohibition movement in the city and in the state. To a certain extent, the visibility of the German-American Alliance was the result of the competent leadership of Dr. Charles H. Weinsberg, a mild-mannered physician who carried out the cultural and political agitation programs of the German-American Alliance in Missouri with a certain Teutonic thoroughness. Weinsberg had served on the first board of directors of the State Alliance in 1904, but he had not served on the subsequent board elected in 1906. Nevertheless, his abilities were quickly recognized by his fellow German-Americans once he again became involved in the Alliance: after first becoming significantly active in Alliance affairs in 1908, he was elected president of the City Alliance within three years and was elected president of the State Alliance in 1912, serving for a short period of time thereafter as president of both. Eventually he stepped down from his post in the City Alliance, but he continued to be reelected president of the State Alliance every year from 1913 through 1917, and was serving in that office when the State Alliance was dissolved in April 1918.

Weinsberg's social position was similar to that of many of the leaders of the German-American Alliance. He was very firmly entrenched in the middle class, a professional man with an advanced education. He was a Republican, and although a Protestant by birth, he was not a churchgoer and was not affiliated with any denomination. He had some social and professional standing in the native American community, including membership in the St. Louis Medical Society, but he was much more involved in the social and cultural life of the German-American community.

His early years were typical of many German immigrants to this country. He was born on 30 April 1866, as the last of thirteen children of a school teacher in Hofgeismar, a small town near Kassel in north-central Germany. Young
Charles attended the public schools in Hofgeismar from 1872 to 1881, when, with his brother Julius, he immigrated to St. Louis, leaving their parents behind in Hofgeismar. Charles and Julius were not the first offspring of the Weinsberg family to leave for America: once in St. Louis they lived with another brother, George, who was twenty-one years older than Charles and whom Charles had never seen before their meeting in St. Louis. George operated an apothecary in St. Louis, and Charles worked in the store in his first years in America.

George's livelihood obviously influenced his youngest brother, for Charles attended the St. Louis College of Pharmacy, founded by the German-American Forty-eighter, Enno Sander, some decades before. In 1885, Charles passed the examination of the State Board of Pharmacy and became a licensed pharmacist. But Charles did not practice pharmacy for long. Instead, he went on to attend the St. Louis College of Physicians and Surgeons. After receiving his medical degree in 1889, Weinsberg returned to Germany, where he studied with two prominent physicians in Berlin for a year before going back to St. Louis to set up his medical and surgical practice.

After his return to the city, he married Alma Riese, a native-born American whose parents had immigrated to the United States from the area around Kassel. Because her parents were both German, Alma spoke fluent German. In fact, she spoke the language even more fluently than her husband, who had used English principally for many years after his arrival in the United States.

Charles set up practice as a general practitioner, but specialized to some extent in surgery, for which he became rather well known in the city. His patients were not exclusively Germans, as he treated not only immigrants from other nations but also native Americans who resided in the neighborhood around his office. As was common in the day, Dr. Weinsberg practiced out of an office in his home, the first of which was in the 1500 block of South Eleventh Street, a not very fashionable part of the city. But in 1909 he moved his family to a mansion at 2805 Lafayette, which was nearer to the center of the heavily German area of the city. As before, he practiced from an office in the home, and retained the same mix of German, other immigrant, and native American patients.

Doctor Weinsberg had not been particularly active in community affairs before he began participating in the activities of the German-American Alliance. However, he was a member of the Schillerverein and of the Liederkranz, the two elite social organizations of the St. Louis German-American community. He also belonged to one of the seemingly innumerable Turnvereine in the city, basically for social rather than athletic reasons.

Nevertheless, despite his fairly low visibility in community affairs, he had sufficient social and professional stature in the German-American and native American communities of St. Louis to be included in the 1906 and 1912 editions of the Book of St. Louisans, which provided biographies of prominent business, social, and professional leaders. In 1907, he was elected to the Vorstand of the Schillerverein, evidence of his standing in the German-American community.
Dr. Weinsberg was a soft-spoken man and rather reticent. He was of a fairly slight stature, with short-cut grayish-white hair, a full moustache, and a thin face atop a rather slender neck.

Weinsberg participated in the organization of the Alliance in St. Louis. But it appears that he began to take an active part in Alliance affairs only later, serving as chairman of the Sanitary Committee for the 1908 German Day sponsored by the German-American Alliance, although he was not a delegate to the 1908 convention of the State Alliance, which was held in conjunction with the German Day. After Weinsberg became president of the City Alliance in January 1911, he immediately started in to continue the vigorous political agitation of the Alliance against the prohibitionists.

The need for antiprohibition agitation was great, for the drys, led principally by the Anti-Saloon League, were making great strides. By 1909, the voters in two-thirds of the state's area, over 45,000 square miles, had voted dry in local-option elections, and about 1,550,000 of Missouri's 3,300,000 citizens were living in dry territories. By 1912, sixty-one Missouri counties were wholly dry, and about twenty others were dry except for some wet cities. More significantly, the drys were winning more and more of the local-option elections, as people resolved that they did not want saloons near their homes, even if they were not necessarily in favor of barring all saloons everywhere. In 1909 there were seven local-option elections, four in previously dry counties and three in previously wet areas: the drys won again all four dry counties and one of the previously wet counties. In the twelve local-option elections in 1910, drys won three of the four previously dry counties and, more significantly, five of the eight previously wet counties.

To be sure, a statewide prohibition referendum was defeated on 8 November 1910 by a majority of 200,000, but half of that majority came from St. Louis, the leading wet area in the state. Nevertheless, the advance of the drys in the rural areas continued despite the defeat of the 1910 referendum. In 1911, for instance, ten county elections were held in Missouri on the local-option question, and the drys won eight of them. Symptomatic of the trend is that in those ten elections the net dry majority in 1911 was 6,256, as opposed to a net dry majority of 2,478 in the same ten counties when local-option elections had been held previously.

As early as 1909, the Anti-Saloon League began working toward an amendment of the Wood Local Option Law to provide solely for countywide voting. That is, cities would not be allowed to vote themselves wet while the rest of the county voted dry: if the total county vote was for no saloon licenses, then the entire county would be dry, including incorporated communities. Obviously, this would have no impact on large cities like St. Louis or Kansas City, but in other counties the dry vote in the rural parts of a county could overwhelm the wet vote in smaller towns. In fact, such a county-unit bill passed the House by a large majority during the 1911 session of the General Assembly but was sidetracked in the Senate.

The strategy of the Anti-Saloon League in Missouri in seeking the county-unit
The amendment was stated as follows: "The county unit will drive the liquor traffic into the last eight or ten counties, and the liquor interests will fight the final adoption of this measure as they will not be able to fight in any subsequent battle, for if the temperance forces win they will drive the liquor interests from the open field and the final siege by way of state and national prohibition will speedily follow."  

Thus in 1911 Weinsberg and the German-American Alliance had their work cut out for them. Weinsberg wasted little time. In March 1911, only months after taking office, Weinsberg (and the City Alliance) sent a letter of protest to the members of the General Assembly complaining about another piece of proposed legislation to regulate lid clubs in St. Louis. The German-American Alliance was not opposed to regulating lid clubs, because the membership scheme was merely a subterfuge for disguising a public saloon. But the proposed law did not differentiate between lid clubs and legitimate social clubs, of which there were so many patronized by German-Americans. In addition, the Alliance was uneasy about the fact that the excise commissioner of St. Louis under color of the law might try to exert control over more than the tavern operations of the German-American Vereine. Once again, the German-American leaders perceived a liquor-control bill as another device to abridge the personal liberty of the German-Americans to participate in German cultural activities.

Nor was Weinsberg bashful about the City Alliance intervening in the election of public officials. In June 1912, the Legislative Committee of the City Alliance called a special meeting to discuss plans for a mass rally in July to allow candidates to make presentations to the members of the Alliance and other interested voters. Moreover, the Legislative Committee revealed plans to ask all candidates for governor to declare themselves on the issues, especially the questions of the Sunday closing of saloons and home rule.

Home rule was an important issue for German-Americans and others opposed to temperance legislation. Included under the rubric of home rule was proposed legislation of the General Assembly granting cities of a certain size the power to legislate their own ordinances regulating their affairs, independent of state laws on the same subject. The specific version of home rule that was controversial in 1912 was a series of bills to allow the city of St. Louis control over its own Board of Police Commissioners, its election commissioners, and its excise commissioner, all of which at the time were officials appointed by the governor rather than by the mayor. (Moreover, the salaries of policemen were set by the General Assembly, not by the city government.) Of course, all this limited the opportunity of city officials, who were more susceptible to German-American political pressure than state officials, to regulate the enforcement of the liquor laws by the police and the excise commissioner in St. Louis. Naturally, the drys perceived home rule as a device whereby urban areas in the state, which were wet by inclination, could escape the lawmaking of the rural-dominated state legislature, which tended to be sympathetic to temperance legislation.

The City Alliance followed up on the initiative of its Legislative Committee
when Weinsberg sent a letter to each gubernatorial candidate, asking each to respond to five specific questions regarding home rule and prohibition. The letter did garner a response from no less than six gubernatorial hopefuls, four of whom showed up for the rally on 12 July. But even more significantly, the letter campaign and rally publicized that the Alliance was serious about influencing the voting preferences of its members. Indeed, at about the same time, the Executive Committee of the State Alliance adopted a resolution to the effect that the Alliance should recommend to its members the election of candidates who would favor home rule. In the fall of 1912, the Executive Committee of the State Alliance initially endorsed the home-rule bills prepared by the Business Men’s League of St. Louis, which called for the election commissioners, the police commissioners, and the excise commissioner all to be appointed by the mayor of the municipality in question. But when the endorsement brought forth a protest from the Kansas City Alliance, which wanted the officials to be elected by the local voters, the Executive Committee appointed a special committee to draft the Alliance’s own version of a home-rule bill.

During this time the State Alliance was also active, and the leaders of the German-American Alliance were generally becoming more combative. It was hardly surprising that the State Alliance would be feeling its oats. By 1912, it was apparent that the German-American Alliance was becoming the leading organ of German-Americans in the state in opposing prohibition. By May 1912, moreover, the State Alliance was reporting that it had seventy-six thousand members and twenty-five different Stadtverbaende affiliated with it.

Thus as the German-American Alliance entered the last two years before World War I, it appeared to be very well established in the state. Its acceptance in the German-American community was growing, and there were signs that others outside the German-American community were beginning to take the Alliance seriously in the political arena. For instance, in September 1912, Gov. Elliot W. Major sent a letter to Professor A. P. Scheurmann of Kansas City, then president of the State Alliance, to assure the Alliance that he supported home rule legislation. He added, moreover, “I am not a prohibitionist.”

But behind the facade of growth and success there lay a basic structural weakness. Although the number of organizations allied with the Alliance and the total membership had grown, it was the same old core of leaders who were carrying out the political campaigns of the Alliance. In fact, the growth in membership simply reflected a growth in the number of German-Americans who sympathized with the principles of the Alliance and wanted to identify with them, but the level of active participation in the political campaign to fight prohibition did not increase significantly. In fact, the leaders of the Alliance often did not even involve their own family members in the cultural and political activities of the Alliance.

The result was that the tactics of the Alliance did not change significantly over the years, despite the increase in membership: although the Alliance eventually discarded aimless petition campaigns, its activism reflected the reality that it did
The Alliance Consolidates Its Influence

not have a large number of people passionately involved in furthering its cause. Thus it resorted to sending intimidating questionnaires to candidates, holding private conferences and carrying on correspondence with officeholders, lobbying in Jefferson City, and counseling German-American leaders in smaller outstate communities, all of which could be carried out by the small core of dedicated Alliance leaders and all of which could be glossed over with a vague threat that large numbers of German-Americans—the passive members of the Alliance—were willing to vote as the leadership recommended.

There simply was not the grass-roots support and activism that made the Anti-Saloon League so effective in the local-option referenda throughout the state, for it was in those countywide and communitywide elections that the prohibition struggle was to a great extent won and lost during the twenty-five years or so before prohibition came to Missouri. The German-American Alliance, with its active leadership cadre and passive membership, was never in a position to match the accomplishment of the Anti-Saloon League of putting at least one of its sympathizers at every polling place during elections involving temperance issues. The German-American Alliance was the best antiprohibition organization the German-American community had, but the organization looked considerably more effective and formidable than it really was.
In 1911, during his first term as president of the City Alliance, Charles Weinsberg had successfully continued the organizational efforts of the City Alliance as a political unit and had worked well in planning Alliance cultural functions. As a consequence, he was reelected in February 1912. In September of that year, Weinsberg was also elected president of the State Alliance at its convention in Springfield, succeeding Professor August P. Scheurmann of Kansas City.

Weinsberg’s election as president of the State Alliance reflected the extent to which the Alliance was centered in St. Louis. Fully a third of the members of the Alliance in Missouri resided in the city. Moreover, most of the leading officers of the State Alliance were located in the city, although its Executive Committee included members from other parts of the state.

Under Weinsberg’s leadership the State Alliance became more institutionalized. Indeed, the Alliance began to take on the trappings of a permanent organization, not just an ad hoc protest movement. Three events were indicative of the institutionalization.

At the Springfield convention of the State Alliance in September 1912, the delegates had authorized the publication of a German-language historical quarterly, called Deutsche Geschichtsforschung fuer Missouri, or German Historical Research for Missouri. The purpose behind the magazine was to create through historical example a sense of ethnic unity and identity by evoking pride and a sense of worth in being German. But the publication was intended by its editors also to combat purportedly biased reports in books and newspapers slighting the German-Americans’ role in United States history. Thus, the journal reflected the mix of positive attitudes about preserving German culture and defensive attitudes about resisting the assimilative forces of the native American society. The quarterly magazine, which first appeared in October 1913 in an issue of 1000, included poetry and columns in German urging loyalty to German culture.
The Last Two Years before the War

were also articles recounting the founding of various German settlements in cities and towns in Missouri.

The magazine reflected the beleaguered mood of the German-American leaders of the time, who saw organizations like the Alliance and magazines like Deutsche Geschichtsforschung fuer Missouri as desperate efforts to fight creeping assimilation and what German-Americans characterized as Anglo-Saxonism. And frequently the sense of defensiveness gave way to a certain aggressiveness to counterattack against the forces of assimilation. An editorial entitled “The Significance of German Historical Research” (Bedeutung der deutschen Geschichtsforschung), in the final issue of the magazine’s first year of publication, reflected these attitudes. The editors asserted that the magazine was needed to bring to the fore the efforts of the German element in settling and developing Missouri. They also complained that the press, historical books, and textbooks did not give German accomplishments due credit, since the “Anglo-Saxon community” had demanded for itself all recognition in regard to the development of the country, while the German element “in its modesty had allowed the monopolization of historical credit to happen.” The editors, quoting from another German-American publication, insisted that German-Americans had a “duty” to insure that information on the accomplishments of Germans in the United States was collected and made available for use by future historians.4

Despite these noble sentiments, the magazine ceased publication in July 1914, about the time World War I began, after incurring a deficit in the first year of over four hundred dollars. Subscriptions had covered only 10 percent of the magazine’s costs.5 The content of the magazine was written mostly by amateur writers, and the quarterly never was able in that short span of time to achieve its goal of high quality documentation and analysis of the role of German-Americans in Missouri history. Moreover, it is doubtful that all that many German-Americans outside the leadership of the Alliance were much interested in the project: the average German-American simply did not have the idea of social mission to preserve German culture that the Alliance leadership had. Nor were most German-Americans inspired to engage in holy war against Anglo-Saxonism, which, after all, meant attacking the native American culture in which the vast majority of German-Americans had to live and, more importantly, work. German-Americans generally were assimilating into the native American culture in any event, and their interest in the Alliance was limited to a concern that the Alliance preserve those vestiges of German culture in which most German-Americans retained an interest: the ability to enjoy certain German social institutions, including the clubs and Vereine, and the other social pleasures of their ethnic community. In short, the magazine was a product of the hothouse of cultural idealism in which the Alliance leadership existed, and it was unable to flourish without the support of the German-American community as a whole.

More successful was the other publication of the State Alliance, which was first issued in May 1912. Entitled Monatliche Mittheilungen, or Monthly Bul-
The Germans in Missouri

letin, the generally four-page monthly newsletter was edited by William C. F. Lenz of St. Louis and frequently contained reports of the officers and meetings of the Missouri State Alliance and alliances in the cities and towns throughout the state. Later it contained articles and broadsides, in both English and German, urging support of positions taken by the State Alliance on various political issues. The Missouri Mittheilungen was patterned after the official monthly of the DANB, the Mitteilungen. The national publication had a circulation of approximately three thousand, and it was distributed only to the officers of the state and city alliances affiliated with the DANB, rather than to each person considered to be a member of the National Alliance. The Missouri Mittheilungen was distributed in a similar manner.

There were efforts to spread the message beyond the circle of leaders, however. In December 1912 the Executive Committee ordered an extra 500 copies of each issue printed, to be sent to German-Americans in parts of the state where there were no affiliated organizations of the Alliance. In addition, 2 free copies were sent to the secretary of each affiliated organization and to all State Alliance officers, so that they could be passed on to others. And members of the Alliance could subscribe individually to the newsletter for twenty-five cents per year. To support the newsletter, the City Alliance bought 500 copies to send to each of the delegates of the various Vereine to the City Alliance and to other interested German-Americans, and the St. Joseph Alliance also bought copies to send to its delegates. For one particular month, the State Alliance arranged for a press run of 25,000 copies of the Missouri newsletter because that issue had articles in both English and German in opposition to prohibition: it was felt that that particular issue should be given a wider distribution for propaganda purposes in light of an upcoming statewide referendum.

The monthly newsletter was one of the principal ways by which the leaders of the State Alliance informed the membership, in hierarchical fashion through the leaders of the local Vereine and city alliances, of the official position of the State Alliance on various issues. Indeed, at times the newsletter extensively stated just before election day the position of the Executive Committee of the State Alliance on state referenda and election issues. In December 1913, for instance, the newsletter first printed in English the text of the county-unit bill that had been finally passed by the General Assembly and then printed an English-language broadside against it. The newsletter urged the members of the Alliance to oppose the legislation in a forthcoming statewide referendum on the grounds that it was the first step to statewide prohibition. In October 1914 the newsletter urged the Alliance’s members to vote for home rule for St. Louis, to vote against the county-unit referendum on the same ballot, and to vote their own conscience on the matter of woman suffrage on 4 November 1914.

It was Weinsberg who suggested that the propaganda presentations in the Missouri Mittheilungen be printed in English as well as German, even though the rest of the newsletter was in German: he and the other leaders of the Alliance
hoped that the English articles would be passed on to those who did not read German but would nevertheless be sympathetic to the antiprohibition position of the Alliance. The tactic was at least in part successful; some of the antiprohibition articles in the newsletter were reprinted in newspapers in the state.\textsuperscript{10}

Of course, a continued theme of the newsletter was opposition to prohibition. Articles against prohibition and temperance legislation appeared in the January, April, June, July, and October issues of 1914. The propaganda against prohibition thus continued even after World War I had begun, in no small part because of the important temperance legislation that was on the referendum ballot in November 1914.\textsuperscript{11} The newsletter also served as a conduit for statements from the DANB. The April 1914 issue, for example, contained an appeal in English from Dr. Hexamer, president of the DANB, to “liberal minded citizens throughout the United States” to combat the “nationwide Prohibition idea.”

Yet another indication of the institutionalization of the Alliance was its formal incorporation by pro forma decree under the laws of Missouri in April 1914. Incorporated as the German-American Alliance of Missouri, the association’s charter provided that it was to have a fifty-year duration and that the seat of the Alliance was to be in whatever city the president of the Alliance resided at the time. The purpose of the Alliance was set out in the charter and was based on the Statement of Principles of the DANB.\textsuperscript{12} Thus the charter of the State Alliance made the same type of proviso about political action that the DANB had made in its charter: no party politics, but political activism for “personal liberty.”

The years 1912 and 1913 reflected the highest degree of political activity by the Alliance in its history. But most of the agitation was by the State Alliance, the City Alliance in St. Louis, and, to a much lesser degree, the Kansas City Alliance. The local alliances in other communities generally were basically social organizations, involved very little in the political questions that disturbed Alliance officers in urban areas. Yet the political agitation of the urban alliances was indeed extensive. There were the letters sent by the Alliance to each of the gubernatorial candidates in the 1912 campaign asking for their positions on the issues.\textsuperscript{13} In February 1912 a protest against prohibition propaganda was sent to all representatives and senators in Congress from Missouri, urging them to oppose all prohibition and interstate commerce laws pending in Congress to limit the sale of liquor. The protest letter, which went out over the signatures of Weinsberg as president and William C. F. Lenz as secretary of the City Alliance, was part of a national campaign by all alliances affiliated with the DANB to exert political pressure on Congress.\textsuperscript{14} The Kansas City Alliance also sent a protest letter to Washington over the proposed federal legislation.\textsuperscript{15} And in January 1913 the Alliance sent yet another letter to United States senators, protesting federal legislation that would prohibit the interstate shipment of liquor into states where the sale of liquor had been forbidden by state law. This was the first time a significant piece of prohibitionist-inspired legislation not only had passed Congress but had been affirmed over presidential veto.\textsuperscript{16}
The Executive Committee of the State Alliance in December 1912 assessed a number of city alliances an added sum to fund lobbying activities in Jefferson City on behalf of home-rule legislation. An even $1,000 was to be raised, with $600 coming from the St. Louis chapter, $210 from Kansas City, $65 from St. Joseph, $35 from Springfield, $25 from Joplin, and lesser amounts from other local Alliance chapters. And there was the political agitation carried out through the State Alliance’s official newsletter, such as the attacks in both German and English against the county-unit bill in December 1913. A similar bilingual attack on both prohibition and the county-unit proposition was printed in the newsletter in June 1914. The appeals in the *Monatliche Mitteilungen* at least contemplated action by the members of the Alliance. For instance, the issue in April 1914 included a list of representatives and senators, as well as a form letter protesting prohibition for the members to send to the legislators.

The Kansas City Alliance also bestirred itself on local political matters. In September 1913 the Kansas City organization appointed a committee to consult with the local police commissioners in an attempt to achieve reconciliation on the saloon question, and the Alliance established a defense fund to aid private clubs that had been raided for violating the liquor laws. The following March the Kansas City Alliance intervened in the city elections after hearing an address by the embattled mayoral incumbent, Henry Jost, whom the Alliance called “a friend of personal liberty.” The Kansas City Alliance’s political committee ended up calling for the election of the entire Democratic party ticket because in Kansas City the Democrats were “not controlled by narrow-minded fanatics.” Jost won the election, and he thanked the members of the Kansas City Alliance for their efforts on his behalf.

Moreover, the Alliance in Missouri finally began to have success in its intervention in state politics. In 1913 the Anti-Saloon League managed to achieve in the General Assembly passage of the county-unit bill as an amendment of the local-option law, eliminating the opportunity for cities of at least 2,500 population to vote to remain wet even if the county in which the cities were located had voted. After the General Assembly passed the county-unit bill, the Alliance collected over sixty thousand signatures on petitions for submission to the Missouri secretary of state, forcing the state to submit the county-unit legislation to a referendum vote at the general election in 1914. The voters in November 1914 voided the county-unit bill, although at the same time the limited home-rule referendum was defeated.

Yet it would appear that the fiscal resources of the German-American Alliance for its efforts had not grown significantly from earlier years. The treasurer’s reports for December 1912 and April 1914 showed that the State Alliance had $702.29 and $612.13 on hand, respectively, and other treasurer’s reports never did show an announced balance of more than about $3,000. Of course, since there was always only a limited number of members acting on behalf of the Alliance at any one time, expenses were not great. Nevertheless, in a report to the
Alliance published in its newsletter, Weinsberg complained that there was not enough money coming into the organization, especially when one considered how much money was being spent by Alliance members at the Stammtisch in their local taverns.26 Weinsberg’s complaint suggests the lack of grass-roots support that plagued the Alliance’s political efforts during its entire existence.

Still, Weinsberg began to organize the political activities of the State Alliance in a systematic manner that suggested he could use more money. For instance, Weinsberg and the Executive Committee of the State Alliance resolved in March 1914 to set up a fifteen thousand dollar fund to fight prohibition and the county-unit legislation.27 At the same time, the Executive Committee was meeting with German-language newspaper editors in Missouri to set up an organized campaign against prohibition sentiment.28

In addition, in accordance with a December 1912 Executive Committee decision, the Alliance arranged for two of its leading members, Henry Kersting and William C. F. Lenz, to lobby for the passage of the statewide home-rule bill in Jefferson City. They did not succeed, but once it became clear that the bill supported by the Alliance had no chance of passage, the Alliance pragmatically decided to support home-rule legislation proposed by the Businessmen’s League, which seemed to have better prospects.29 The alternative legislation did pass in the General Assembly, but it was rejected by the voters in the statewide referendum in November 1914.

Nevertheless, the idea of a campaign war chest, the use of lobbyists, and the coordination with newspaper editors in Missouri together demonstrated the kind of sophisticated organizational system that the Alliance needed if it was to counter the equally sophisticated organizational efforts of the proponents of prohibition, especially the Anti-Saloon League. And the prohibition forces were extremely well organized. The goal of the Anti-Saloon League was to have a political organization that reached all the way down to the precinct level throughout the state.30 Indeed, consistently in local-option elections the Anti-Saloon League would have workers at every poll, from opening time at 7:00 a.m. to closing at 6:00 p.m., to distribute literature and to insure the integrity of the election.31 And in 1913, the prohibitionists even invaded the den of the lions, so to speak, by winning a local-option election in Webster Groves, an affluent suburb in St. Louis County, whose residents, although not necessarily oriented to temperance, did not want saloons in their community.32

Although the prohibition struggle, which had become increasingly sharp, had resulted in some considerable successes of the Alliance, the crowning event of the prewar years for the State Alliance was not the strengthened organization but rather the national convention of the DANB in St. Louis in October 1913. Through the convention the German-American Alliance in St. Louis won for itself widespread recognition, and the St. Louis Times in its enthusiasm reported that delegates to the convention and related festivities were calling the proceedings “the greatest German event of its kind ever held in the United States.”33
The DANB national convention was in fact only one aspect of a week-long celebration by German-Americans in the city. The underlying theme was the centennial celebration of the wars of liberation in Germany in 1813 against Napoleon’s armies. The resistance to Napoleon was seen by many as the first stirrings of a true nationalistic spirit among German-speaking people in what became the German Empire. Naturally, the idea of celebrating the awakening of German political and cultural identity was popular among German-Americans active in the Alliance.

The week of festivities began on Saturday, 4 October 1913, with the opening of the annual convention of the Missouri State Alliance at the St. Louis Turnhalle. In attendance were 210 delegates from all over the state. Indeed, there were now twenty-five Stadtverbaende, or city alliances. When the convention got down to business, there was, interestingly enough, a contest for the office of president: Professor Scheurmann, from Kansas City, contested the reelection of Dr. Weinsberg, who was still president of not only the State Alliance but also the St. Louis City Alliance. In the end, Weinsberg won by eleven votes, and the convention thereafter resolved to elect him unanimously. But there were other signs of less than total harmony at the convention. For instance, there were some indirect complaints from rural delegates that the agitation for home rule only benefited the big cities. And when some Kansas City delegates, including Scheurmann, urged that newspapers be asked to accept no more liquor advertisements, there was a vigorous debate before the proposal was ruled out of order by national delegate William C. F. Lenz. There were, nevertheless, attempts to coordinate and unify Alliance efforts statewide. Thus a resolution was passed by the convention that local alliances, Vereine, and organizations affiliated with them be instructed on how to induce more of their members to vote for candidates who agreed with the principles of the Alliance—a sign that the membership had not been theretofore heeding the urgings of the Alliance leadership.

On Monday, 6 October 1913, the national convention of the DANB opened at the Planter’s Hotel. The delegates were greeted by Henry Kiel, mayor of St. Louis, a Republican who enjoyed the support of many German-American voters. Kiel made extensive reference to his German heritage but apologized that he was unable to speak German. He went on to congratulate the delegates for their activity in preserving German culture and even went so far as to declare that the Germans were “the best people of the world.” In any event, it is obvious that the DANB delegates did not believe that everyone in the United States as heartily endorsed the goodness of Germans as Kiel did, for a day later the delegates passed a resolution protesting distorted reporting of news from Germany by the English-language press in the United States.

Frederick Lehmann, Congressman Bartholdt, and the German consul to St. Louis, Max von Loehr, made addresses to the national convention. When a great torchlight parade with fifteen thousand marchers made its way through the streets
of the city on Thursday evening, 9 October, among those on the reviewing stand were Mayor Kiel and other city officials, Congressmen Bartholdt and Dyer, Archbishop Glennon, and the German and Austrian consuls. Adding to the sense of accomplishment was the praise that Weinsberg and other members of the Alliance in Missouri received for organizing the convention.

The sense of pride as German-Americans and the sense of accomplishment as members of the German-American Alliance in Missouri are reflected in the official remarks of President Weinsberg to the state convention of the Alliance.

It is a special honor for me to be able to greet here today the representatives of the German Vereine in Missouri: people for whom the preservation of German customs and usages in the new homeland is a solemn goal, men who with all their strength stood up for personal freedom and the rights granted us by the Constitution.

What German power, energy, knowledge and sacrifice has accomplished for this land, our current Fatherland, is engraved with the iron stylus of history for eternity. Even though often nativism seeks to minimize and cover up the deeds of our fellow immigrants (Landsleute), the German pioneers of past times and the present, we are not only proud of their deeds and service, we know that we must assure recognition for those deeds.

This last point was the cause and purpose of the founding of the DANB. Through the closing of ranks of all citizens of German origin in this land, regardless of where one’s cradle stood, it will be possible, and it is already possible, for us to earn respect and recognition in the widest circles of the land. Even if the National Alliance has accomplished much in the short time since its creation, there is still much, very much, to accomplish, and therefore we should not slacken in our efforts, but on the contrary, true to the principles of the National Alliance, we should work further, with the exclusion of all party politics and respecting the religious tendencies of every person.

Despite Weinsberg’s upbeat statement, there were problems with the Alliance’s public image in the German-American community. There were some German-Americans who resented the domination of the Alliance. Indeed, there were even protests that the German-American Alliance had usurped control in St. Louis over the celebration in 1913 of the wars of liberation, and a citizens committee had to be formed to plan the celebration so that some German-Americans who were not members of the Alliance could have a hand in planning the events. Similar complaints over shabby treatment of other German groups by the St. Louis Alliance in regard to planning the local German Day had arisen before. There were also rumblings that the German-American Alliance was too closely allied to brewing interests, and, in fact, during the festival week in 1913 both the Anheuser-Busch and Lemp breweries held functions at their respective plants, at which delegates of the State Alliance and the DANB were treated to meals and to the product of the respective breweries.

Moreover, the leaders of the Alliance curiously failed to broaden their appeal among German-speaking Americans. Thus, despite their loud proclamations of a need for unity to preserve German language and culture, they did not actively solicit German-speaking people who were not Reichsdeutsche, that is, those who
were not from the area commonly considered to be within the German Empire. And consistently the Alliance leaders in their pronouncements reflected the values of the German-American upper-middle class: too liberal or secular for many German Catholics and too conservative for certain German-American socialists and radicals.

And despite Weinsberg’s proud statement, the Alliance and other antiprohibitionist groups were not by any means driving the prohibition movement from the field in Missouri. Between 1906 and 1912, the number of taverns in Missouri registered with the state auditor as licensed declined almost 25 percent, from over 5,000 dramshops to 3,853, a sign that the antidramshop legislation of the General Assembly and the local-option agitation were having a slow but steadily deleterious effect on the tavern industry in Missouri. In fact, the prohibitionists were making phenomenal progress in driving the sale of liquor into the last few urban areas in the state. Between 1910 and 1913, the drys won forty-seven of fifty-two local-option elections and lost only one of the last twenty-nine of those fifty-two elections. Thus by 1914, 75 of the 114 counties in Missouri were totally dry, and 16 more were partially dry, leaving only 23 counties wholly wet.

Of course, there was no doubt that the German-American Alliance in Missouri had made great strides in uniting the German-American population under one umbrella organization, partly to preserve and cultivate German culture but more fundamentally to oppose prohibition as a threat to that German life-style and culture. Indeed, many people perceived prohibition as the overriding obsession of German-Americans in general and the Alliance in particular. As one prominent German-American intellectual bemoaned, “The battle against temperance, which could be important to all classes of society, has become almost exclusively a concern of Germans, and what is much more lamentable, the concern of the Germans became almost exclusively the battle against the temperance movement.”

Despite the attacks on the Alliance from within the German-American community, and despite the gains of the prohibition movement, the Alliance was fairly strong in 1913. Membership had increased significantly, politicians were paying attention to its activities, and the organization was becoming increasingly institutionalized. Moreover, the Alliance was beginning to have some success in its political intervention. Yet within a year, the entire prohibition struggle of the German-American Alliance was to be overshadowed in the German-American community by the events in Europe as World War I began.
When the First World War began in 1914, the leaders of the German-American community in St. Louis considered themselves in their own way to be an integral part of American society. They were totally involved in the domestic political struggle over prohibition and temperance legislation. Moreover, despite their affinity for the German language and culture, the careers, families, and aspirations of these German-Americans were enmeshed in life in St. Louis. By 1914 even those who most fervently identified with the label of German-American probably had lived in the United States for decades and had no intention of ever returning to Europe to live.

Yet there had never before been such an outburst of enthusiasm for Germany among German-Americans as occurred in the summer and fall of 1914. The war in Europe and Germany's initial successes were the primary topic of conversation among German-Americans not only in St. Louis but also in outstate Missouri: German-Americans in Hermann, for example, would rush down to the train station early in the morning to buy copies of the latest newspaper from St. Louis for the most recent news on the war. The circulation of German-language newspapers reporting extensively on Germany's efforts in the war rose significantly. German-Americans were swept up in cheering the war effort of Germany and Austria with an enthusiasm not seen in America since the entry of the United States into the Spanish-American War. Moreover, German-Americans of many diverse socioeconomic and political backgrounds suddenly found common ground in their mutual support of Germany and Austria in the war against the Entente nations.

This sudden enthusiasm was all the more remarkable because German-Americans had been equivocal in their earlier opinions about the German government. In fact, earlier German-American attitudes had ranged from total indifference to disquietude. One is struck in reading German-American newspapers in the years...
before 1914 how little attention was paid to political events in Europe generally and Germany and Austria specifically.¹ German-Americans were more interested in German culture than German politics. In fact, the DANB in the years before the war had declined to become involved with other organizations that were too overtly pan-Germanic or too supportive of German military ambitions.²

Those German-Americans who did watch political developments in Germany did not seem overly enthused by what they saw. As early as 1873, one leading German-American who visited Germany complained of too many uniforms and the existence of military conscription.³ One author, in describing the attitudes of the German-American patriarch of his family in St. Louis at the turn of the century, noted that the patriarch was “fiercely proud of being American but intolerant of any slurs upon the German people. The German government was something else.”⁴ An essay published in 1910 in the New York Staats-Zeitung by Dr. Julius Goebel of the University of Illinois, a prominent spokesman for German-American culture and the DANB, reflects these mixed feelings of German-Americans toward Germany. Thus Goebel emphasized, “The American German element is not a political appendage of the German empire, for we identify with an ideal Germanness which exists above a mere sense of national allegiance.” Goebel went on to observe that German-Americans did not protest the imperialist cries during the Spanish-American War in order to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the “foolish” (albernen) policies of the German government at the time, but rather because German-Americans recognized that a war between Germany and the United States would mean the destruction of that cultural heritage which tied German-Americans to their cultural fatherland.⁵

Especially revealing about the prewar attitude of German-Americans toward the German state was a resolution adopted by the Kansas City Alliance in March 1914 in support of the proposition that, with the exception of American ships, a toll should be imposed on the passage through the Panama Canal of the ships of all countries, including Germany:

We are now American Citizens and must work for the best interest of the United States and its commerce. We are always prompt in making demonstrations against any laws that would hurt us German-Americans and this is the first opportunity to show the American People that we are true Americans and that our old Fatherland is only our second choice.

Germany, of course, will kick, and so will other foreign countries, but the American Government built the Panama Canal with American Money and for the Benefit of the American People, and it looks unreasonable that foreign countries shall reap the benefits from it for nothing and shall be on equal footing with the American Ships.⁶

Nevertheless, the willingness of German-Americans to identify with the German cause in the summer and fall of 1914 was overwhelming. The reaction of the St. Louis German-American population to the war must have been humbling to the leaders of the Alliance. For ten years the Alliance leaders had struggled to unite the German-American community under one broad organization to fight for
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its cultural identity. Their success at such unification, however, had been only gradual and was still incomplete by August 1914. Yet the events in Europe upon the outbreak of World War I brought about in a matter of days the sense of unity among many St. Louis German-Americans that the Alliance had been unable to achieve in a decade.

There were a number of reasons for this. First of all, most German-Americans, regardless of the extent of their assimilation into American society, still harbored some degree of interest and sympathy for their cultural homeland. German-Americans naturally felt a sympathy for Germany when it was threatened by its principal European rivals: in the west, Great Britain and France; in the east, Russia. With the old homeland thus threatened, the impulse of the German-Americans in this country was to defend Germany publicly before a supposedly neutral native American community.

At the start of the war, many German-Americans, like the Germans of Europe, believed Germany was the victim of an aggressive campaign by the Allied powers to weaken that country as a trade and military rival. This belief caused the ranks of the Germans and German-Americans to close, as they perceived the existence of their Fatherland threatened. Of course, there was already a foundation of widespread anti-English sentiment among German-Americans. For many years already, Germany and England had seen each other as the principal competitor in the imperialistic world order, vying for trade and naval power, and certainly by the first years in this century English leaders considered warfare between Germany and Great Britain to be likely at the least. This Anglo-German hostility did not escape the attention of German-Americans. Rudolf Cronau, a leading member of the DANB in New York, contended that as early as the world fairs in Chicago and St. Louis in 1893 and 1904 he had seen Englishmen resentful of the industrial power of Germany. Moreover, in February 1913 Roland Usher, an associate professor at Washington University in St. Louis, had published a book on Pan-Germanism that excited considerable comment. In the book, Usher contended that Great Britain and France had secretly albeit informally reached an understanding with the United States as early as 1897 that the expansionist efforts of Germany should be curbed. As the remarks of Emil Pretorius during the Coghlan incident in the Spanish-American War suggest, German-Americans had long believed that Great Britain was making designs to weaken or destroy Germany’s newly emerged power. Accordingly, it was almost a reflex action for German-Americans to spring to the defense of Germany in the face of a contest with Great Britain.

Another source of anti-English sentiment among German-Americans was their widespread belief that much of the impetus for the prohibition movement in the United States was the puritanical religious background of that portion of the native American community of Anglo-Saxon national origin, a puritanism seen as having its origins in Great Britain. Moreover, there was a general feeling of resentment among German-American leaders toward the Anglo-Saxon element in
the United States, arising from the belief that American historians, educators, and public officials of Anglo-Saxon origin had over the years belittled the contributions of German-Americans to American culture, society, and history, in order to enhance unfairly the contributions of Anglo-Saxon Americans. This sense of Anglo-Saxon cultural domination reflected a generalized attitude harbored by many German-Americans that the preservation of German culture in the United States involved a constant and increasingly sharp struggle by German-Americans against the assimilative attacks of the English-speaking Anglo-Americans.10

Obviously, then, there were many German-Americans in St. Louis and throughout the United States who were predisposed to defend Germany, to the extent possible from thousands of miles away, both in support of their old Fatherland and in opposition to the despised Anglo-Saxon foe. Nor did the fact that the German-Americans were living in the midst of an ostensibly neutral country deter them in their enthusiasm to identify with the German war effort. Indeed, the neutrality of the United States encouraged German-Americans to believe that they could be unrestrained in their support of Germany. No one of influence in the Middle West in the summer and fall of 1914, whether German-American or Anglo-American, seriously proposed that the United States intervene militarily on behalf of either side. As a result, the possibility that Germany and the United States might go to war seemed remote to most German-Americans in St. Louis. They saw little possibility of conflict arising between their dual loyalties: cultural affinity for Germany and Austria and political loyalty to the United States.

The public manifestation of that German-American support was not long in coming in St. Louis. Starting on 5 August 1914, there appeared in the two German-language dailies a notice of a meeting to be held on 8 August at the St. Louis Turnhalle to protest the "unfair" reports on the war appearing in the English-language press in St. Louis.11

There is some indication that the English-language press in the United States may indeed have been predisposed to support the Allies. An admittedly unscientific survey of newspaper editors taken by the Literary Digest shortly after the war began showed 242 editors of 367 responding asserting no preference between the Central Powers and the Allies. But of those who did have a preference, 105 favored the Allies and only 20 supported the Central Powers. Moreover, when the same editors were asked to assess the sentiment, as the editors perceived it, of their respective communities, 180 stated that their community favored the Allies, while 140 saw their community as divided, and only 38 reported that their community was pro-German.12 Needless to say, many an editor's perception of readers' allegiance might well have influenced, however subconsciously, the content of his paper.13 Significantly, the survey found that the greatest number of pro-German or neutral editors and apparently pro-German and neutral communities were in the Midwest, while the pro-Ally editors and communities were concentrated in the East.14

In St. Louis, the two leading English-language newspapers were the Globe-Democrat and the Post-Dispatch. The former was conservative, Republican, and
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widely read by German-Americans. Its editor at the start of the war was Capt. Henry King, who perceived the European conflict as a relatively value-free military test of imperialistic powers. The Post-Dispatch, on the other hand, was a liberal and crusading paper owned by the Pulitzer estate, which also owned the fervently pro-Ally New York World, although the Post-Dispatch was relatively independent of its New York counterpart. The editorial page editor of the Post-Dispatch, however, was one George S. Johns, who was a friend of Woodrow Wilson, both having attended Princeton at the same time. A third English-language newspaper was the totally Democratic St. Louis Republic, which during the Civil War had been sympathetic to the secessionists and against German immigrants who supported the Union. Moreover, during the Folk administration the paper had urged the governor to enforce the liquor laws strictly.15 There was naturally considerable suspicion among German-Americans in St. Louis toward the Republic.

Both the Post-Dispatch and the Republic tended to see the conflict from its earliest days as a moral conflict: the democratic Allies against the autocratic Central Powers. Thus on 28 July 1914 the Post-Dispatch commented editorially on a report that 490 officers in the German military had been convicted in the previous year of mistreating enlisted men: "This is one of the reasons why the German military system will never commend itself to this country. Other reasons also exist."16 On 1 August 1914 the Republic in an editorial contended that Germany was at war with itself, contrasting the peace-loving German citizen with the power-hungry and war-mad bureaucracy and military.17 There were other anti-German, or more precisely anti-autocratic, sentiments expressed in the two papers, suggesting that the war had moral overtones. On 5 August 1914, the Post-Dispatch asserted, "Autocracy is in a death struggle with Democracy in Europe and Democracy must win."18 And the Republic on 3 August and 7 August editorialized that the cause of the war was the peculiarly militaristic constitution of Germany, giving the Kaiser power to declare war.19

What the German-Americans in their indignation at such comments failed to recognize was that the attacks were on the political order of Germany—not against its people or customs. Moreover, German-Americans failed to grasp that their support for the German war effort was more than mere cultural affinity to Germany and that many native Americans rightly perceived the German-Americans' support and sympathy for the Central Powers as a political act. The danger of such support of Germany is as obvious to us now as it was unseen by German-Americans then: before the war their cultural affinity for Germany and political loyalty to the United States were like two trains rushing at each other on parallel but different tracks; after August 1914 their growing political support for the Central Powers while they were supposedly loyal to the United States put the two trains rushing at each other on the same track. A collision became inevitable as the political and economic interests of the United States and Germany began to come into conflict.

In fact, the German-Americans in their enthusiastic support of the German and
the Austro-Hungarian empires in the war were defending two autocratic regimes that were markedly different from the democratic system under which they lived in the United States and to which they claimed to be committed. Newspapers like the *Republic* and the *Post-Dispatch* were hardly inconsistent with their domestic editorial support of democracy in the United States when they condemned German and Austrian autocracy.

On the other hand, the sympathizers for the Allies over the next years seemed unable to realize that the support of Germany and Austria by German-Americans was not intended to undermine the American political system. Rather, the support of German-Americans for the Central Powers was born of a cultural affinity even if it became political in expression: German-Americans sprang to the defense of the Central Powers because they identified with the language, culture, and history of Germany and Austria—not with the language, culture, and history of Great Britain, France, or Russia. Because in their own minds their support of Germany and Austria was not directly political but rather humanitarian and indirect, German-Americans had no problem supporting their former homeland, despite its form of government, while feeling loyal to the political system in the United States.

In no small part the German-Americans rationalized their support of Germany and Austria by believing that the governments of those two empires were less autocratic than the enemies of the Central Powers contended. For instance, at the rally in St. Louis on 8 August, German-Americans went so far as to insist that Germany was simply a constitutional monarchy. Thus, it was the old German-American schizophrenia: in the eyes of German-Americans, support for Germany and Austria against the Allies in 1914 did not even raise a conflict with the German-Americans' belief in and loyalty to American democracy. Besides, German-Americans found the proclamations of English-language newspapers in the United States that the European war was a battle of democracy against autocracy to be hollow and hypocritical, especially in light of the fact that democratic Great Britain and France had allied themselves with Czarist Russia, a nation whose form of government was easily as autocratic as that found in the German and Austro-Hungarian empires.

It is indicative of the spontaneous enthusiasm of the German-American community that the August protest rally was not an affair orchestrated by the Alliance. In fact, the rally had numerous sponsors, of which the German-American Alliance was only one, including the Catholic Union, various *Turnvereine*, and the singing societies. Thus the supporters of the rally formed a coalition that embraced nearly every milieu in the German-American community. Unlike the antiprohibition movement, this was one instance in which the sentiment and enthusiasm of a large part of the German-American community outpaced the organizational activities of even the Alliance.

The rally on 8 August was an exciting affair, involving over five thousand participants, who filled the St. Louis Turnhalle to capacity, with the overflow remaining on the street outside to hear reports of the proceedings shouted from
inside. Those participating in the rally went beyond merely adopting resolutions complaining of the anti-German press reports: in a spontaneous reaction to the public reading at the rally of a call by Dr. Hexamer of the DANB for a campaign to raise money for the German and Austrian war victims, a committee to operate a relief fund was organized. From thousands of miles away, the most concrete support the German-Americans in St. Louis could give was financial assistance. Significantly, however, this financial aid even in the very earliest days of the war was not directed to the German government for its war effort, but was intended for the German and Austrian Red Cross.

As enthusiastic as the German-American community was for the German cause in the first months of the war, the German-language newspapers in the city were even more committed. Under the headline "For Germany’s Honor," the *Westliche Post* began its account of the protest rally as follows:

Aroused by the premeditated [geflissentlichen] misstatements of the facts which the present European War has created, and in arms over the hateful, anti-German commentary which is being presented in the editorial columns of a part of the Anglo-American press on the basis of the unreliable reports from the theater of war, the St. Louis German element saw itself moved to a giant protest rally, which took place yesterday evening at the hall of the St. Louis Turnverein. All differences of social standing, religion, politics, and any other nature, which under the normal conditions would have created innumerable factions and splinter groups, disappeared. He who still felt himself to be German and felt something for his German origins, as well as a national German character generally, appeared, in order to prove through his presence that also he felt attacked by the unjust, hateful attacks by the Anglo-American jingoistic press on Germany, its military and naval forces, and also the German people generally, and that he is not inclined to let these libels go by without decisively rejecting them and protesting energetically against any renewal of them.

On the editorial page, the *Westliche Post* commented further on the rally, which the newspaper saw as a momentous event for the German-American community in St. Louis:

Who will ever forget that moment, when thousands—as if moved by a single will—as one rose to join in singing that powerful battle song, *Die Wacht am Rhein!* It was no trained choir—it was untrained voices which were heard over the sound of the music—but never has *Die Wacht am Rhein* so deeply touched every heart as in that sacred moment. And then when out of thousands of throats the vow *Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles* rose to the heavens—there were only a few eyes left dry. . . . It can be rightly doubted if among our Anglo-American fellow citizens there is a true understanding of the deep meaning of the German protest rally. . . . However, that does not trouble us. At least we have again proved ourselves; in the common anger over the injustice to the old Fatherland we have swept away all artificial differences and are for the first time in a long time German, not Swabian, Prussian, Austrian, Bavarian, or Siebenburger. That is a tremendous accomplishment; but we must hold to it firmly, so that the old disunity does not quickly return again and destroy the work of the holy hour. Let the Anglo-Americans not understand us—we have long given up trying to educate them. But we must impress them, and we succeeded in that on Saturday; of that there can not be the slightest doubt.
The *Amerika* was equally involved in the German war effort, editorializing on 5 August 1914 that the start of the war resulted from France’s desire for revenge, fed by the Pan-Slavism of Czarist Russia, and strengthened in its tendencies by England’s perfidy. And as early as 5 August the St. Louis-based German Catholic weekly, *Der Herold des Glaubens*, was reporting on protests against anti-German bias in the English-language press. The weekly reported favorably on the Turnhalle rally, remarking that “no one had any doubts about the justice of the German and Austrian cause” after one particular speaker at the rally finished his address. In addition, the editorial cartoons of the *Herold* commented regularly on the war in the summer and fall of 1914.

It is important to recognize that this editorial sympathy of the German-language newspaper editors for the Central Powers was the natural and spontaneous reaction of editors living and working in the midst of a German-American community and having for decades struggled to encourage and nurture an enthusiasm or interest in German culture and the German language. As one historian has written, “There is little evidence that any German language paper in the United States sold its favors for German gold.” Indeed, the editors’ affinity for German culture, coupled with their Anglophobia, resulted in a natural emotional response when the old Fatherland called for aid upon being beset by enemies.

What is remarkable about these editorial comments and the enthusiasm of the St. Louis German-American community in general was the absolute recklessness and defiance in the face of growing anti-German, or at least pro-Allied, sentiment among influential elements of the native American community. It would appear that the German-Americans did not truly realize that there was a real risk that their German sympathies might some day clash with United States foreign policy.

It is not difficult to understand why the German-Americans felt that they could be sympathetic to Germany with impunity. First of all, in the United States, and especially in the Middle West, there was an almost universal sentiment, among both immigrants and native Americans, that the United States should stay out of the war. Even newspapers sympathetic to the Allies, including the *Post-Dispatch* and the *Republic*, had no intention of urging military intervention by the United States on behalf of the Allies. Second, German-Americans were convinced that they had a right to voice their sympathies for their former homeland, a right to which they believed they as loyal Americans were entitled and which they perceived to be widely recognized by native American leaders and institutions. While many native Americans in the metropolitan areas on the East Coast became overtly sympathetic to the Allies very early in the war, in the Middle West there was initially a considerable indifference concerning the causes of the war and the question of who ought to prevail. Many Midwesterners simply did not see the European conflict as having a bearing on their lives. Of course, as is always sure to happen in the face of such a vacuum of public opinion, there soon developed a struggle between those sympathizers in America of the two warring
sides in Europe to convince the American public that the United States should conduct a foreign policy favorable to one side or the other. In that struggle, the German sympathizers were at a distinct disadvantage.

Without question, it was an important advantage for the Allies that Britons and native Americans had the same mother tongue, and after the war began the English enhanced this advantage by cutting at once all sea cables that the German government could have used to transmit its account of the war to the United States. The Germans were reduced to transmitting accounts to two shortwave radio stations on the East Coast of the United States.

In addition to the Allied sympathies of some English-language newspapers, yet another ominous sign that eventually native Americans would be led to sympathize with the Allied war effort was the huge amount of trade that the United States carried on with the Entente nations, especially after the war began. In fact, within a matter of months it was obvious that the Allies could not survive without the massive shipments of foodstuffs, supplies, and war materiel from the United States.

Significantly, St. Louis benefited from this war trade. For instance, a combined venture of two St. Louis firms, Wagner-Electric Manufacturing Company and Curtis and Company, and two out-of-state firms had war orders from Great Britain for eight-inch shells. Half of the $9.6 million order was filled in St. Louis. Curtis and Company also had an order of its own for $4,650,250 in shell forgings, which it subcontracted to Scullin Steel in St. Louis. A $258,000 contract for bayonets for the Allies was awarded to a St. Louis firm, and Benoist Aircraft Company in St. Louis built twelve airplanes for Great Britain. Moreover, from 1 September 1914 to 20 December 1916, the Allied governments bought an incredible 262,542 horses and 24,750 mules at the National Stock Yards in East St. Louis. In fact, as early as October 1914 the French were buying 350 horses each day at the National Stock Yards.

Despite these unfavorable circumstances, the German-American community in St. Louis displayed more unrestrained enthusiasm for Germany in the first months of the World War than ever before. What is remarkable is that the enthusiasm spread through the entire German-American community. Whereas the German-American Alliance's efforts at evoking enthusiasm for German culture and German affairs had often involved a narrow circle of leaders in the German-American community in St. Louis, the war evoked a response and interest from broad segments of the community. In the wake of all this enthusiasm, the Alliance was simply overwhelmed. Indeed, at the 8 August 1914 protest rally at the Turnhalle, Weinsberg, president of the State Alliance, was present, but he did not preside. The meeting was in fact chaired by the Alliance's treasurer, August Hoffmann, but the rally was by no means solely an Alliance event. When those in attendance at the rally voted to establish a fund for German orphans and widows, the Alliance did not dominate the organizing committee, although Weinsberg was a member and Hoffmann was chairman.

Moreover, other fund-raising committees were formed in the next weeks, sug-
gesting how broad based was the support for such war relief in the German-American community. A second group of fund-raising leaders, composed of a majority of those on the committee formed at the August rally plus some especially prominent German-Americans in the city (including Congressman Bartholdt, former U.S. Solicitor General Frederick Lehmann, and former Secretary of Commerce Charles Nagel) and some company executives, met on 18 August at the Liederkranz Club to organize the Citizens War Relief Committee. On 1 September 1914, a third organizational meeting was held, this time including some from the original Turnhalle committee formed at the August rally, five or so from the Liederkranz group, plus four business executives, five saloon owners, five professional men, and two craftsmen. This group held a two-day fund-raising event at the Delmar Gardens in October 1914. Moreover, a committee was organized for a giant German-relief bazaar in St. Louis in the fall of 1915, which included both the Turnhalle and Liederkranz groups. Finally, yet another group of community leaders organized a doctors’ relief fund, which raised nearly thirty thousand dollars in late 1916 to send to Europe four doctors and a number of nurses to treat German and Austrian war victims.33

Other German-American organizations associated with St. Louis also came out in support of the Central Powers. The Central Verein at its national convention in Pittsburgh passed a resolution setting up a collection fund for German victims of the war. In addition, the Missouri branch of the Central Verein organized its own fund-raising campaign.34 And the German Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Missouri Synod, contained many members who identified closely with the German war effort. As a result, Die Abendschule, a weekly magazine with circulation of nearly sixty thousand published in St. Louis and oriented to Lutheran readers, gave extensive reports of the German war campaigns from 1914 into 1916.35

The enthusiasm of German-Americans in St. Louis for Germany and Austria was not limited to the elite of the community. In fact there was a high degree of participation by German-Americans in the fund-raising drives to finance the war-relief for Germany and Austria. In August, for instance, the German-American leaders in St. Louis had set a goal of one hundred thousand dollars for the city’s German-American community to raise for war relief. By 2 September 1914, three weeks after the campaign began, nearly eight thousand dollars had already been raised.36 Another rally was held on 3 and 4 October 1914, this time not so much as a protest rally but as a fund-raising event for the war-relief fund. The rally was held at the Delmar Gardens, a large assembly hall in St. Louis, and the attendance for the two days of the rally was between twenty-five thousand and thirty thousand, with each person paying ten cents admission. In the hall were various booths featuring games and items for sale. By the end of the two-day affair, nearly thirty thousand dollars had been raised.37

One significant aspect of the two-day rally was the speechmaking to the crowds by political and community leaders. The one belligerent address was by
Henry Kersting, Weinsberg’s successor as president of the City Alliance, who suggested that self-preservation was the only war aim of Germany and contended that the French and British were guilty of “barbarous atrocities” in putting Indian and African troops against “men of their own color” on the western front in France. 38 But even more significant was that some native American public officeholders were willing to identify with the effort—a sure sign that opposition to German-American agitation among other segments of the St. Louis community had not yet coalesced enough to make it imprudent politically to identify with German-Americans. The governor of Missouri, Elliot W. Major, allowed his name to be used in conjunction with the rally. In addition, Mayor Kiel of St. Louis spoke to the crowd, congratulating them for what they were doing and stating: “I am not going to inflict a long speech upon you, because you know my heart is in the right place.” 39

Nor was the German-American community in St. Louis alone in its fundraising efforts for Germany and Austria: all over the United States, German-Americans began raising money to send to Europe. Chicago German-Americans raised nearly $200,000 in 1914 alone, $260,000 in 1915, and $300,000 in 1916. By January 1915, a German-American relief organization in Cincinnati, similar to the ones in St. Louis, had raised $30,000. German-Americans in Davenport, Iowa, raised $10,000 for German war relief in a matter of weeks after the war began. Even in New York City, where the pro-Allied sentiment was especially sharp and overt, German-Americans raised $200,000 on the sale of 56,000 tickets to a bazaar before the doors even opened. 40 Often the German-American Alliance in these cities participated in the fund-raising efforts, but by no means was the Alliance the sole or prime mover: the reaction of the German-American population in aiding Germany and Austria was indeed spontaneous and broad based. In New York City, for example, a shopkeeper of German birth named Wilhelm Busch enthusiastically kept track of the war reports in the local newspapers and wrote indignant letters to the editors whenever he detected anti-German bias. 41

In the midst of all this enthusiasm in the fall of 1914, the German-American Alliance in St. Louis continued its antiprohibition work. After all, the prohibition struggle was still going on, and German-Americans generally still were harassed by prohibitionists. For instance, in the fall of 1913, law enforcement raids were staged on the Germania Verein in Rolla, Missouri. This newly organized Verein, which was affiliated with the Alliance, was closed for selling liquor among its members, even though as a private club it was supposedly exempt from the liquor laws under an 1894 Missouri Supreme Court decision. Various officers of the Verein were fined a total of $1,800. They appealed their convictions, and Alliance chapters throughout the state set up defense funds for the men. 42 In 1914, however, the state Supreme Court reversed its decision in the 1894 case and ruled that private clubs were indeed subject to the liquor laws. 43 And on the ballot at the general election in November 1914 were the referenda to
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reject the County Unit Law passed by the General Assembly in 1913 and to adopt a home-rule provision for St. Louis. In July, a mass rally against prohibition was held at the Concordia Turnhalle, at which several Alliance members, including E. V. P. Schneiderhahn and Henry Kersting, spoke. In October 1914, President Weinsberg of the State Alliance met with U.S. Sen. William Stone from Missouri to quiz Stone on whether he opposed prohibition. Weinsberg requested the interview after reports circulated that Stone had sent a letter to the Anti-Saloon League stating that he favored prohibition. Stone assured Weinsberg that he was still adamantly opposed to statewide prohibition.

The antiprohibition agitation of the Alliance continued after the November election. At its December 1914 monthly meeting, the St. Louis City Alliance passed a resolution protesting the Sunday closing law. The City Alliance organized a meeting on 8 December 1914 at the Mercantile Club in St. Louis to organize the leaders of the various private organizations and Vereine that had been hard hit by the recent decision of the Missouri Supreme Court ruling that private clubs were subject to the state's liquor laws. The meeting, headed by Albert von Hoffmann, attracted participants from as far away as Kansas City. A committee was appointed to draft legislation to submit to the General Assembly to undo the court's decision.

Nevertheless, the German-American Alliance slowly but surely insinuated itself into the question of German-American support for the Central Powers in the World War. In the August 1914 issue of the monthly newsletter of the State Alliance there was a report on the 8 August protest rally at the Turnhalle. The report, by Pastor Hermann Walz, concluded with the assertions that the war was caused by others in Europe who were jealous of the trade successes of Germany and that German-Americans were justified in supporting Germany because that country had always been the best supporter of the United States in times of peace and war—a reference to the fact that during the Civil War several German states had been more sympathetic than Great Britain or France to the Union, the latter nations having tried to preserve cotton trade with the Southern states.

In the same issue, Weinsberg published a letter in English, urging all organizations in the State Alliance in Missouri to pass resolutions calling on English-language newspapers to print information on the war in an unbiased manner.

Thus, almost reflexively the Alliance drifted from being a political agitator against prohibition to becoming also an activist group for the German-Austrian cause. The institutions that had already been established by the Alliance for the purpose of working against prohibition could now be used to agitate for sympathy for the German war effort. As one scholar has noted:

A study of the German-American Alliance in the three years of American neutrality thus begins with the question of prohibition rather than with the foreign politics of the German Empire. . . . The German-American leaders obtained their training in public affairs not from Berlin but from American politics. Their organization, the Alliance, however persistently it might profess, and even pursue, a German cul-
tural purpose, was essentially the product of American social and political conditions, and its violently pro-German attitudes after 1914 should not be allowed to delude us into reading its history backwards, and make us lose sight of its truly American origin.  

The agitation of the Alliance in Missouri to support Germany began literally within a matter of days after the war began. The Alliance sent protests to President Wilson complaining of the conduct of Great Britain, which was seizing ships bound for neutral ports on the high seas, apparently in violation of international law, and also complaining of the conduct of Japan, which had seized a number of German colonies in the Far East. On 20 August 1914, Weinsberg also wrote to Wilson, requesting that in fairness to both sides there should be no censorship of the two shortwave radio stations on the East Coast receiving accounts of the war from Germany. On 14 October 1914, the City Alliance organized a seven-man committee to oversee anti-German bias in the press and cinema in St. Louis. The cinemas were to be warned not to choose anti-German films or else face the possibility of a boycott from the German element in the city. In January 1915, the newsletter of the Alliance printed an account by John Gewinner, Jr., an officer of the City Alliance, of his eleven weeks in Germany after the war began. And during 1915, the newsletter published a Kriegschronik, chronicling the day-to-day events of the war in a pro-German tone. Moreover, Weinsberg used the Alliance’s monthly newsletter to agitate against allegedly biased English-language newspaper accounts.

The concern over European events took on a more concrete form as well. For instance, in the fall of 1914 the State Alliance provided financial assistance to German and Austrian nationals who had reported to their respective consulates in St. Louis for military duty but were unable to return to Europe and had no employment or financial resources. Moreover, the Alliance in Missouri was carrying on a relief-fund campaign of its own, independent of the other spontaneous community efforts in the St. Louis area. As part of the DANB’s national war relief drive, local chapters of the DANB were to raise money, and eventually the DANB raised a total of about $900,000 nationwide before the United States entered the war. The campaign was not very successful in Missouri, however: by the end of 1914 the DANB had raised over $279,000 nationally, but only $3,230 of that amount came from Missouri, even though the local war-relief committee in St. Louis had raised nearly $50,000. Of course, that was due to a great extent to the participation of some of the leaders of the Alliance in the other relief campaigns in St. Louis. The local Alliance chapters in other cities did participate in the DANB effort. The Joplin Alliance raised $800 by November 1914 and contributed another $200 a month later. The Kansas City Alliance contributed $750 to the DANB fund in November, and by February 1915 the St. Joseph Alliance had contributed $1,500.

When in September 1914 the State Alliance held its annual convention in Sedalia, it appeared to be business as usual. Although Weinsberg wished to step
down as president of the State Alliance, he was persuaded by both the St. Louis and Kansas City delegates to remain in office. The delegates passed resolutions opposing prohibition and calling for the defeat of the county-unit referendum and passage of the home-rule referendum in the general election scheduled for that November. In addition, the per capita tax on each affiliated Verein or other organization was raised in order to create a larger fund for propaganda against prohibition.57

But the convention also passed a resolution urging that the United States remain neutral in the European conflict, and the Alliance leadership on its own had already started the Alliance on the road to leadership of the pro-German lobby in St. Louis. This shift in the focus of the political intent and activity of the Alliance was by no means sudden, nor did it result in a total neglect of the prohibition question. Nevertheless, foreign affairs were to play an increasingly important role in the political program and concerns of the German-American Alliance in Missouri.
While the German-American community was sympathetic to the cause of the Central Powers, the reaction of other Americans to the war in Europe was quite ambivalent. Among Americans of other than German origin, with the possible exception of Irish-Americans, there was little sympathy for the Central Powers. Germany and Austria were, after all, autocratic governments, and even German officials in the United States recognized that a considerable antipathy for Germany was created when German troops invaded Belgium. Moreover, many Americans feared that a victorious Germany, already the strongest industrial power in Europe, would soon thereafter threaten the interests of the United States throughout the world.

Yet the lack of sympathy for the German cause did not translate into a nationwide desire to leap into the war on the side of the Allies. To be sure, there were many supporters of the Allied governments, especially in the eastern United States, supporters who were eager to see the United States come to the direct aid of Great Britain and France as quickly as possible. But in that age before national radio and television, their opinions were not disseminated effectively that far inland, and in the Middle West there was a distinct reluctance on the part of many native Americans, whichever side they favored in the war, to have the United States become directly involved on either side. But even if the United States remained neutral, there remained the question of what were to be the trade relations of the United States with the two warring sides. American public opinion was by no means clear on this issue, and German-American groups joined in the fray to sway public opinion.

The Alliance was not in the forefront of German-American agitation in early 1915 over United States neutrality. In no small part this was because the leaders of the Alliance did not try to push the organization in the first year of the war as the principal lobbying entity of the German-American community. Instead,
many of the leading members of the Alliance took part in the activities of the St. Louis branch of the American Neutrality League, which declared that it was totally American in its views on the war and neutrality. In St. Louis, nevertheless, the League was dominated by German-American leaders, who hoped that by playing down the ties of the League to the German-American community the League's message would be perceived by the general public as being more oriented to American interests than explicitly pro-German.

The November 1914 prohibition referendum had also kept Alliance leaders occupied, but the European war, which had seemed distant from America in the summer of 1914, began to encroach upon the consciousness of those in the Middle West. Slowly but surely, the war became a domestic political issue in this country.

The essential questions were these: What should be the trade relations of the United States to the two warring factions, and what rights of protection should the United States, as a neutral, demand from the belligerents for the merchant ships of the United States? Eventually, the crucial issue came down to which neutrality policy should be adhered to: Should trade be allowed with the belligerents? Or should the United States adopt a neutrality policy that prohibited trade with any of the countries participating in the war?

A neutrality policy that allowed trade with the belligerents was favored by those sympathetic to the Allies, quite simply because the Allies desperately needed supplies and war materiel manufactured in the United States in order to carry on the war against the Central Powers. Moreover, Great Britain's navy was capable of imposing a general blockade upon any United States trade with Germany, so that, in effect, a policy of allowing trade with the belligerent powers resulted in trade with the Allies alone.

On the other hand, those in the United States sympathetic to the Central Powers favored an American neutrality policy that imposed a strict embargo on all trade with the belligerents, since Germany was able to carry on the war without supplies and war materiel from the United States. In addition, many German-Americans sincerely believed that, in light of Germany's submarine warfare tactics, only a strict embargo could adequately insure that the interests of the United States and Germany would not collide and result in confrontation between the two countries.

In addition to urging a neutrality policy favorable to the Central Powers, many German-Americans attacked the Allies for violating international law by the general blockade against the Central Powers, claiming that the blockade was designed to starve the civilian population of Germany. At the same time, those sympathetic to the Allies attacked Germany for its use of the submarine in an attempt to disrupt maritime trade between the United States and Great Britain, contending that the sinking of ships without warning to their crews was an atrocity of war. The debate between the pro-Allied and pro-German factions in the United States at first had all the trappings of a typical American political lobby-
ing contest, with each faction having its representatives in the political arena of Washington and in the news and public opinion arena of New York attempt to sway governmental and public sentiment. But eventually the public debate took a sinister turn and the German-American lobbying in the end was branded as disloyalty.

As might be expected, German-Americans did not see their lobbying efforts in the first years of World War I as an act of disloyalty to the United States. Rather, they considered their political activism to be quite within the American tradition of seeking to influence policy, legislation, and public opinion. The typical attitude of German-American leaders in 1914 and 1915 in regard to their lobbying efforts—and the attacks of Allied sympathizers upon them—is reflected in the following justification by Richard Bartholdt in his autobiography, published some years after the war:

If in the annals of the country there is one pregnant example of the pot calling the kettle black, it is the denunciation by the pro-British of the German-American element for alleged German sympathies. . . . Both elements, of course, sympathized favorably with their mother countries. This they had a perfect right to do as long as America was not involved and such sympathies did not run to unneutral acts. But while the pro-British left no stone unturned to plunge this country into war in order to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for England, the pro-Germans clung to the time-honored American policy of neutrality and justly criticized American support of the Allies by money and ammunition as a flagrant violation of that policy because similar aid could not simultaneously be extended to the Central Powers.

It is true that strict neutrality on our part would incidentally have redounded to the benefit of Germany, but was it even proper for us, from the standpoint of honest impartiality, to inquire which side would be benefited and which injured by our faithful adherence to American traditions and our government’s solemn pledges? Should we not determine our policies with an eye to America rather than to Europe?*

In keeping with this logic, on 7 December 1914, Congressman Bartholdt and Henry Vollmer, a Democratic congressman from Iowa who was an officer of a German-American organization in Davenport, introduced resolutions in Congress to give power to President Wilson to declare an absolute embargo on munitions shipments by United States firms to any of the belligerents in the war. Gilbert Hitchcock introduced a similar resolution in the Senate that would have prohibited firms from selling munitions to be used in the war. The DANB quite promptly came out in support of the embargo proposal, and Dr. Hexamer and other officers of the DANB even went to Washington in late December 1914 to testify before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in favor of such an absolute embargo. Moreover, the DANB organized campaigns all over the nation to send petitions in support of the embargo proposal to congressmen in Washington.

In St. Louis, agitation for a strict embargo in the name of absolute neutrality began almost at once after the embargo resolutions were introduced. At the instigation of Congressman Bartholdt, on 16 December 1914 Irish nationals and members of the German-American Alliance met at the Wainwright Building in
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St. Louis. Their purpose was to organize the motley assortment of German-Americans sympathetic to Germany, Irish-Americans hostile to Great Britain, and immigrant and native Americans interested in isolating the United States from entanglement in European affairs.

At the suggestion of Dr. Friedrich Bente, a professor at Concordia Seminary, the organization was called the American Neutrality League. Nevertheless, the organization was perceived as being essentially German-American, and the *Globe-Democrat* headlined the report of the League’s first meeting with the statement “Germans Organize to Urge Fair Play.” The president of the St. Louis branch was Carl Barck, a former president of the State Alliance, which suggests the close ties between the Alliance and the Neutrality League in St. Louis. In addition, others active in the leadership of the Neutrality League included Henry Kersting, president of the City Alliance; Weinsberg; Dr. Georg Richter, the Alliance’s first vice-president; August Hoffmann, treasurer of the Alliance; and Emil Tolkacz, another former president of the State Alliance. Weinsberg, as president of the State Alliance, also released a statement supporting the Bartholdt resolution, and on 11 January 1915 Weinsberg testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in favor of the embargo resolutions.

The resolution remained bottled up in committee in Congress; President Wilson had passed the word to congressional leaders that it was not his desire to be embarrassed by having such authority to impose a strict embargo forced upon him. But the introduction of the legislation was enough to set the stage for agitation for the embargo in St. Louis and throughout the United States, agitation that lasted for nearly a year.

Basically, the activities of the League in St. Louis took the form of massive rallies, the first of which was held on 10 January 1915 at the Coliseum, a large assembly hall in St. Louis. It was an impressive event in terms of turnout: the one hundred members of the Neutrality League were able to draw a crowd of twelve thousand for the rally, and supposedly another three thousand were turned away.

Although the rally was ostensibly to call for American neutrality, it soon degenerated into a blatantly pro-German and anti-English event. The hall was festooned with not only American but also Irish and German flags, which were being sold by busy hawkers. Moreover, the partisan crowd roundly cheered every mention of Germany and loudly booted any mention of President Wilson or Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, who were perceived by German-Americans and Irish-Americans as conducting a neutrality policy that was sympathetic to the Allied powers. The pro-German enthusiasm of the crowd was further evidenced by the spontaneous outburst into song in the midst of the rally by a large portion of those assembled: without warning they launched into singing “Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles” and other German patriotic songs.

Despite the raucous and enthusiastic audience, the scheduled speakers were able to deliver their addresses, all but one of which were given in English. The
principal speaker was Friedrich Bente from Concordia Seminary, an institution in St. Louis affiliated with the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church. That denomination even in 1915 still harbored a strong affinity for its German heritage, and a number of its congregations still held their services solely in German. In fact, the Missouri Synod was still called the German Evangelical Lutheran Church in 1915 and 1916, and large-scale work in the English language within the church had not begun until after 1911, when the English-language Evangelical Lutheran Church was absorbed into the German church. Not surprisingly, Missouri Synod members often felt a deep sympathy for the Central Powers. As one historian has noted, “A survey of official Missouri Synod literature from 1914 to 1917 reveals one major theme: a continuous demand for rigid United States neutrality.”

In his speech at the rally, Bente insisted that the League was not for either side in the war, but rather “pro-American.” Nonetheless, he went on to complain of British seizure of American ships on the high seas, as the British tried to interrupt shipments from the United States to the Central Powers. The other speakers were no more neutral in their sentiments. Those addressing the rally included Father J. P. Lubeley and Charles Kersting, newly reelected president of the City Alliance, who both attacked England for violations of the international law of the seas in establishing a general blockade against Germany. Not surprisingly, such attacks garnered enthusiastic applause from the crowd. After telegrams of support from various public officials, including Congressman Bartholdt, were read, the assembly passed several resolutions, including one calling for the absolute trade embargo. Copies of the resolutions were sent to Wilson, as well as to the speaker of the House, the president pro tem of the Senate, the secretary of state, and the representatives and senators from Missouri.

Nor was St. Louis the only city in the country in which there was German-American and Alliance agitation for an arms embargo. In early 1915, similar rallies were held in Omaha, Philadelphia, Washington, New Orleans, Los Angeles, St. Paul, and San Diego. Over fifteen thousand attended the rally in Chicago, and twenty-two hundred were present at Milwaukee’s rally—all of which was extensively reported in the regular newsletter of the DANB. As in St. Louis, the rallies typically were vehemently pro-German, pro-Irish, or anti-British in tone, rather than focusing on American neutrality.

Yet the transparently pro-German nature of the 10 January “neutrality rally” and other activities of the Neutrality League in St. Louis provoked the first significant criticism in the English-language press of the city of the St. Louis German-American community. The Post-Dispatch on 11 January 1915 noted that “Deutschland ueber Alles” was an extraordinary way to open a meeting called in the name of American neutrality. Moreover, it was one thing to wax enthusiastic over the German cause; it was another to attack the president of the United States. The Globe-Democrat published a letter to the editor that said: “I heard President Wilson and Secretary Bryan hissed and laughed at, and while I
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am not an admirer of either, being a life-long Republican, I protest as one whose ancestry goes back before the Revolutionary War, that any set of men being able to fool the people under the guise of American patriotism in such a crude and disreputable manner by advertising that which they do not stand for. 19 And the *Globe-Democrat* reported the remarks of the Reverend Richard Kretschar, a member of the Neutrality League, to the effect that "evidence of patriotism not strictly American" was displayed in the rally.20 Furthermore, in December 1914 Congressmen Bartholdt and Vollmer had been attacked by the *New York Sun* as agents of Bemstorff, the German ambassador to the United States, in authoring the embargo resolution. The charges against Bartholdt were reported in the St. Louis press.21

Despite these rumblings of criticism, the St. Louis German-American activism for neutrality continued. Professor Bente in February 1915 testified on behalf of the American Neutrality League before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favor of strict neutrality, making much the same speech that he did before the 10 January rally in St. Louis. And on the next day, Bente met privately with President Wilson in what Bente described as a "dispassionate, cordial, and polite" session to voice his views on neutrality to the president.22 The Neutrality League in St. Louis organized yet another rally for April 1915, at the Coliseum, to urge the arms embargo. Not surprisingly, the German-American Alliance provided advance publicity for this rally in the monthly bulletin of the State Alliance.23

Ominously for the League, however, the crowd for the second rally was not as large, only seven thousand or so. Moreover, the setting was considerably toned down, with only American flags being allowed in the hall and only American music being played. Nevertheless, one of the principal speakers this time was Charles Dolan, a former member of Parliament from Ireland, who asserted in his address that when he was in Parliament nine years before, Great Britain had already been plotting war against Germany. But the heartiest applause was reserved for Bartholdt, the author of the embargo resolution.

Bartholdt was characteristically partisan, proclaiming, "This war will not be decided by mass meetings, but on the battlefield, and if signs do not fail from a military standpoint, it has already been decided." 24 The congressman went on to assert a common charge made by German-Americans in the early years of the war against certain American bankers and businessmen: these financial leaders, especially in the East, were selling the interests of the United States to England in order to protect their own investments in Great Britain. Bartholdt also complained that British censorship had now extended all the way to St. Louis, thereby alluding to a report that the British consul in St. Louis had complained to Archbishop Glennon in order to have the Reverend Lubeley, the Catholic priest who had spoken at the first Neutrality League rally, barred from speaking at the second rally. Indeed, Reverend Lubeley did not speak. Other men who did speak at the rally included Professor Bente and the ever present Henry Kersting. As
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before, the usual resolutions calling for an absolute arms embargo were passed by the crowd, which had already begun to dwindle by the time the speakers finished.

The Neutrality League held a final rally in July 1915. It was a disaster. First of all, the leaders of the League became embroiled in an internal squabble that became public. The dispute arose when John C. Meyers, an insurance broker labeled by the Post-Dispatch a year later as “one of the most active leaders in the German propaganda movement in St. Louis,” served as the organizer of the July rally, to be held at the Delmar Gardens in St. Louis. Meyers arranged to have Eugen Kuehnemann, a faculty member from the University of Breslau, speak at the rally. Kuehnemann traveled throughout the United States during the first year of the war, unabashedly stating the German position on the causes of the war and the current status of the military conflict. His stay in the United States was arranged to a great extent by the German government, and he obviously was an unofficial spokesman for Germany. Placing such a biased speaker on the program for a rally that was supposed to be for American neutrality was too much for John Calhoun, one of the other leaders in the Neutrality League, who insisted that the rally be a truly nonpartisan affair. Calhoun declared, “I will take a hand in getting the speakers myself, and can assure you there will be no un-neutral expressions.”

As it was, only a paltry 350 people showed up, a sorry contrast to the more than 12,000 who had appeared for the Neutrality League’s first rally only six and a half months before. The Westliche Post blamed the poor attendance on the weather and on attacks against the Neutrality League in the English-language press. But the fact was that German-American support for the rallies of the League had almost vanished. There undoubtedly were many reasons why German-Americans were unwilling to attend any further Neutrality League functions, not the least of which may have been boredom at hearing speeches rendering the same theme over and over again and the passage of ineffectual resolutions. But one major reason was the notoriety that the League had achieved in the St. Louis community: the League was now seen as more of a pro-German propaganda front than an organization for neutrality. That was the gist of an editorial attacking the League in the Globe-Democrat shortly after the 31 July rally. The editorial suggested that the “boat rocking” by the League was not appropriate because the situation in the United States in regard to the war had become so “delicate.” Many German-Americans apparently concurred.

What had made the situation so acutely “delicate” was the sinking of the Lusitania, the British passenger liner with several hundred American citizens aboard, off the Irish coast by a German submarine on 7 May 1915. To a great extent, the sinking of that ship was the turning point in the partisan efforts of the German-Americans for the German cause. That from the very start of the war there had been many native Americans sympathetic to the cause of the Allies had been obvious to the German-American community all along. But many German-
Americans came to realize in the course of the Lusitania affair, which included the exchange of several diplomatic notes between the United States and German governments, that there was certainly the potential for conflict between the United States and Germany over the matter of submarine warfare. No longer was it possible to agitate recklessly for the old Fatherland without considering the impact that certain of its war policies might have upon the interests of the new Fatherland. No longer was the United States far away from the conflict in Europe. American lives were being lost because of the German efforts in the Atlantic to make the seas unsafe for Allied shipping.

From our vantage point well beyond World War II, we may find it difficult to conceptualize that when World War I began the idea of sinking ships without warning was a startling innovation and was perceived by many as uncivilized—an atrocity of war. Prior to the twentieth century, war had been carried on in a very limited way: the armies of the belligerents were fair game, but the civilians on both sides were to be protected as much as possible from direct military involvement. Many Germans and German-Americans believed that the British had first violated this rule, of protecting civilians from the ravages of war, by imposing the general blockade upon Germany, which prevented not only the shipment of war materiel to Germany but also food and other supplies that might well have been destined for the civilian population. Nevertheless, there were many in the United States who considered it to be barbaric to implement a form of naval warfare that resulted in the sinking without warning of both passenger and merchant ships, leaving passengers and civilian crew members no opportunity to save themselves.

Characteristically, the reaction to the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 was much greater in the eastern part of the United States than in the Midwest. Many in the East believed that the sinking of the passenger ship, with the loss of several hundred American lives, was in itself casus belli unless the United States received satisfaction from the German government. In the Midwest and in the Far West, the reaction was not as warlike, with many believing that the American passengers on the ship had been fairly warned that they would be sailing on a ship flying the British flag and that the ship itself was fair game because it was reportedly carrying munitions to Great Britain. Significantly, Secretary of State Bryan concurred in the more moderate reaction, and in St. Louis both the Post-Dispatch and Globe-Democrat opined that the sinking of the Lusitania was insufficient cause for war. 29

Nevertheless, the reaction of the general public was severe enough that German-Americans found themselves very much on the defensive in their support of the Central Powers. Die Abendschule, in an unusually lengthy analysis and commentary, stated that Wilson’s harsh reaction to the sinking was understandable and appropriate, given the heavy loss of American life, but the magazine contended that Great Britain’s own conduct had led to the tragedy and that the best way for the United States to avoid such future incidents was, of course,
to enforce a total embargo and travel ban. The *Westliche Post* was so caught up in the partisan cause of the German war effort that its first reaction to the sinking of the *Lusitania* was exultation over the indication that the English mastery of the sea was declining. But prominent St. Louis German-Americans felt a need to espouse American patriotism. Thus, former Secretary of Commerce Nagel, Edward Preetorius, editor of the *Westliche Post*, and Henry Kersting, president of the City Alliance, insisted to the *New York Times* that they were entirely for the United States and supported the first, fairly harsh, diplomatic note of the United States to Germany over the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The Neutrality League expressed its sympathy for the loss of civilian lives aboard the *Lusitania*, but the pro-German bias of the League was evident from its public statement, released by Dr. Barck, which included many of the same arguments as those made in Die Abend schule.

Yet the League felt compelled to call a special meeting a few days later to reaffirm that the members of the Neutrality League were loyal Americans and would stand by the flag. Upon reflection, the *Westliche Post* modified its tone as well, as it contemplated the possibility of war between America and Germany: “That we Americans of German descent with a bleeding heart contemplate the possibility of an armed conflict between the United States and the land of our parents and forefathers, no fair-minded person will condemn us for. On the contrary, everybody except people void of all sentiment and sympathy will feel with us the tragic conflict which rends our hearts.”

But the *Lusitania* incident had not been a bolt out of the blue; for some time it had been obvious to German-Americans that the foreign policy of their adopted country was less benevolent to the interest of Germany than to its enemies. Thus, Allied interests were clearly benefited when the Wilson administration recognized the right of American citizens to trade with anyone they wished. And the Allies were again the beneficiaries when the Wilson administration announced in the fall of 1914 that Great Britain and France would be allowed to buy goods in the United States on credit, thereby reversing an earlier no-loan policy established by Secretary of State Bryan. Finally, whereas the United States had expressed concern to the German government over its establishment of a submarine warfare zone in the North Atlantic in February 1915, the United States did not object to the Allied establishment of a general blockade, curtailing the right of some American traders to ship their noncontraband goods freely on the high seas to neutral ports, until the fall of 1915, a half-year after the blockade was imposed. To be sure, the American foreign policy was motivated as much by the desire to protect American businessmen as by sympathy for the Allies. But German-Americans could see that the interests of the United States and Germany were gradually drifting into conflict. Moreover, it was obvious to many German-Americans that their fellow American citizens of non-German origin sympathized to varying degrees with the Allied cause, even if most native Americans were not yet clamoring for a declaration of war.
Thus, the dilemma that Emil Preetorius had feared in 1899 in the Spanish-American War had nearly become fact. Accordingly, by the time of the third and last Neutrality League rally, the chance of war between Germany and the United States seemed very real. It is little wonder that German-Americans felt the need to pull back from such publicly pro-German organizations as the Neutrality League and to assume the customary low profile of most German-Americans on foreign political matters. For instance, Ernestine Schumann-Heinck, the German-born opera singer, in correspondence during April and May 1915 to Professor Hermann Almstedt of the University of Missouri in Columbia, confessed her sympathy for the old homeland and observed that she felt Germany had been in the right in the Lusitania affair because it had given warnings, but she saw the need to keep still and not to speak out too often or too loudly. Yet most important for her, her “heart trembled” out of fear that war would break out between the United States and Germany, for that could result in the five of her sons in the United States fighting the one son who was still in Germany. And in a letter to George Sylvester Viereck on 21 May 1915, Charles Nagel recognized that it was becoming a liability to be seen as a German-American. Similarly, Kuno Francke, a leading German-American on the Harvard faculty, concluded after the Lusitania that he should stop making public statements and should devote himself to his academic work. The poor attendance at the last Neutrality League rally in St. Louis suggests that not just prominent German-Americans realized that discretion was appropriate.

The situation in the United States for German-Americans also became “delicate” during 1915 because of a subtle shift in the reporting by the English-language press of the German-American agitation for the Central Powers. Gradually, a number of English-language newspapers in the United States began to perceive the lobbying efforts of German-American organizations, including the Alliance, as in some way disloyal to the United States. This attitude of Anglo-Americans was hardly surprising. To be pro-German when the interests of the United States were not involved obviously reflected no anti-American animus. But when certain German-Americans remained fervently pro-German after that nation’s war policies began to result in the loss of American life, they were perceived by many native Americans as acting contrary to the interests of the United States and were thus considered anti-American or disloyal. Moreover, an absolute trade embargo, although of benefit to Germany, clearly would be harmful to American business interests. German-American leaders, however, were less cautious than the rank and file. The leaders still considered themselves to be in the midst of convincing their fellow Americans to adopt a foreign policy favorable to the Central Powers. At the same time, they perceived the tension between Germany and the United States to be all the more reason for the United States to adopt a strict trade embargo in order to avoid entanglement in the sea war. Thus many German-American leaders were baffled by the attacks on their lobbying activities on behalf of Germany.

This shift in attitude of the English-language press was evident in St. Louis.
One example is the series of critical newspaper accounts and editorials after the first rally of the Neutrality League, although the criticism was more in terms of complaining about the attacks on Wilson and the intellectual bias of the Neutrality League members. Gradually, however, the press began to insinuate that partiality for the German cause was disloyalty to the interests of the United States. For instance, the *Globe-Democrat*, after the last rally of the Neutrality League in July 1915, observed, “The great number of American citizens are in favor of strict neutrality, according to established principles, and they believe that the government has made an earnest endeavor to maintain such neutrality. They have no sympathy with a propaganda which would, in the name of neutrality, force this country into an unneutral position.” 39 What is significant here, of course, is that the newspaper felt that the status quo, which allows shipment of supplies to Great Britain, all to the great benefit of the Allies, was a neutral position. Similar views were voiced in the *St. Louis Republic* at about the same time: “The barring from our markets of nations with whom we are at peace would in itself be a markedly unneutral act.” 40 The editorial reflected a perspective on the neutrality question that was in close sympathy with the Allied cause. The editorial did not, however, address the fact that the continued shipment of arms and supplies to the Allies could be perceived, and was perceived by German-Americans, as an unneutral act toward other nations with which the United States was at peace at the time, the Central Powers.

One of the most ominous of the early attacks on the pro-German stance of the German-American Alliance and the German-American community generally appeared in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* shortly after the final Neutrality League rally. During his speech at the rally, Henry Kersting had complained that free speech was to all intents and purposes being denied in the city because pro-German speakers were being attacked by the press for disloyalty for the positions that they were taking. The *Post-Dispatch* responded:

> Who is denying free speech? Certainly there is no check of either law or reason on Mr. Kersting’s loose-hinged tongue. Not even his silly attack on the *Post-Dispatch* for giving free public expression to the follies of himself and his associates will bring him any punishment except the contempt of the judicious and the scorn of loyal Americans. . . .

> Speech is free in this country. But freedom carries responsibility. . . . When *professed* Americans impinge [Wilson’s] motives and accuse him of hypocrisy and dishonesty, when they accuse the government of being secretly hostile to the government with which it is dealing; when they misrepresent the sentiment of the people for the purpose of injuring the country in its foreign relations, they are disloyal. They earn the condemnation of loyal Americans.

> It is not the denial of free speech, but the exposure and condemnation of their disloyalty and folly that is hurting Kersting and all those who stand with him for a foreign nation against America.41

By the end of the editorial, the *Post-Dispatch* had managed to imply not only that Kersting was being disloyal but also that the position of the Neutrality League and, by implication, the German-American Alliance in urging an arms embargo
was also disloyal. In short, the editorial went a long way toward substantiating Kersting's accusation that free speech was being stifled by overblown charges of disloyalty. What is disturbing about the editorial is the ready willingness to brand any position contrary to that of the Wilson administration as a badge of disloyalty: somehow the very act of urging a different foreign policy became instead a demonstration of false allegiance.

To be sure, the whole effort of the St. Louis German-American leaders was an attempt to have the foreign policy of the United States, their adopted country, coincide with the interests of Germany, their ancestral home. But the basic premise of the German-American embargo lobby was that the embargo, which would help prevent confrontations between the two countries, was not detrimental to the interests of the United States. Indeed, at a City Alliance meeting in June 1915, Charles F. Krone, a former state senator, argued that a German victory would be beneficial to the United States, since it would leave Germany as a buffer state between the world power Great Britain and the coming world power Russia, while a victorious England would supposedly turn its imperialistic eyes next to the territories and possessions of the United States, including Alaska.

Of course, the belief of the German-American leaders that the interests of the United States would not be adversely affected by a German victory (and that it was in the best interest of the United States to stay entirely out of the European conflict) was colored by subjectivity, and it did not comport with the economic realities of American foreign trade and foreign policy at the time. Nevertheless, the German-American leaders were not endeavoring to act as agents for the German government. Indeed, in the course of 1915 it became increasingly obvious that the German-Americans wanted a strict embargo just as much in order to avoid any chance of conflict between the United States and Germany as to aid the Central Powers. Increasingly, the paramount concern became the need to avoid a confrontation that might lead to a war between the United States and Germany.

It is not to President Wilson's credit that he encouraged by his own public statements the bandying about of disloyalty charges against German-Americans. To be sure, he may have been reacting to passionate attacks by certain German-Americans. Henry Kersting charged that Wilson was hypocritical and dishonest in that his administration supposedly overlooked violations of U.S. neutrality by Great Britain in enforcing its naval blockade while reacting harshly to neutrality violations by Germany in the course of its submarine warfare. In any event, during an address in October 1915, Wilson contended that he was in a "hurry for an opportunity to have a line-up" between loyal and disloyal citizens of the United States. A few weeks later in New York, Wilson suggested that there were "small groups whom it is high time the nation called to a reckoning" and that "voices have been raised in America professing to be the voices of Americans, which were not indeed and in truth American, but which spoke alien sympathies." And in an address to Congress on 7 December 1915, Wilson spoke of those citizens "born under other flags . . . who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life."
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There was also plenty of unofficial criticism of German-American political activity by those sympathetic to the Allied cause. Thus in a speech in Indianapolis in October 1915, Lucius B. Swift, a prominent member of the Indianapolis bar, saw the war as one between Anglo-Saxonism, with its history of support for freedom, and Germanism, with its tradition of submission to authority and monar­chism. Ironically, this concept of Anglo-Saxonism against Germanism was much the same language of cultural struggle that the leaders of the DANB had used before the war in regard to cultural and social issues in the United States. Swift argued that German-Americans had forsaken the democratic ideals of the Forty­eighters to support the Kaiser, an autocrat. Forty thousand copies of the speech were printed and distributed, and Swift made similar speeches elsewhere in the Midwest.

In the light of such pres idential pronouncements and public and press hostility, it is not surprising that a number of German-Americans began to distance them­selves from institutions that were under attack as “pro-German.” Yet while German-Americans generally began to pull back from vehemently pro-German positions, the DANB began to hit its stride as the vocal champion of the German cause in the United States. Accordingly, the City Alliance adopted a resolution on 28 May 1915, a full three weeks after the adverse reaction of the American public to the sinking of the Lusitania had begun, militantly calling for the total embargo of shipments to either side in the war. The resolution went on to call for members of Congress to make their attitudes on the embargo known, which, of course, constituted an implied threat to retaliate at the polls if the politicians did not express their support for the embargo. In addition, the State Alliance in its monthly bulletin for May took the same position as the Neutrality League on Great Britain’s responsibility for the sinking of the Lusitania. The leaders of the Alliance gradually became the most vehement and prominent spokesmen in St. Louis for German-American sympathy for the Central Powers and for urging a foreign policy that would avoid war with Germany.

At least during 1915 and for most of 1916, the Alliance was not alone in back­ing an American foreign trade policy that was favorable to Germany. During the summer of 1915, both St. Louis German-language dailies railed against the pro­Allied bias of the local English-language press and complained about British propaganda. And in August 1915, the Central Verein at its national convention in St. Paul, Minnesota, adopted a resolution calling for a general embargo and asserting that the Central Verein believed that the Wilson administration had not acted in accordance with its own proclamation of neutrality. In addition, a number of prominent St. Louis German-Americans, including Professor Bente, Congressman Bartholdt, and Charles Nagel, gave speeches not only in St. Louis but also throughout the United States urging the embargo proposal and defending the German cause in the face of the anti-German attacks.

It was the German-American Alliance in Missouri, however, that was increas­ingly to carry the heavy load in political agitation over the issue of neutrality. In the first part of 1915, the leaders of the Alliance acted mostly through the Neu­
trality League itself, but the Alliance had been active in St. Louis in its own name as well from the start of the war. Significantly, the leaders of the German-American Alliance felt that public events like the Turnhalle protest rally in August 1914 and the Neutrality League rally in January 1915 had had a positive effect: they believed that after the rallies the English-language press in St. Louis had become more cautious in portraying the events in Europe and in attacking Germany. Naturally, this success perceived by the German-Americans only encouraged the Alliance leaders to press further in such efforts.

Nevertheless, the neutrality issue allowed little in the way of concrete activism by the members of the Alliance. Reprisal by German-Americans at the ballot box, for example, was not nearly as immediate a threat to the Wilson administration as it was to a local politician who might otherwise be inclined to favor prohibition. And certainly there was little that German-Americans could do to have an impact on English propaganda and press releases: they were disseminated from London and New York. Thus the Alliance was often forced to resort to passing resolutions protesting anti-German propaganda or calling for the Wilson administration to take a stance on the embargo resolution. An example is Weinsberg’s protest to Wilson in August 1914 calling for the two East Coast shortwave radio stations to be allowed to remain open to receive war reports from Germany.

Some more direct methods of pressure could be undertaken locally, such as the threat of boycott and personal contact. For instance, the City Alliance had organized the seven-man committee in October 1914 to investigate not only the press but also the local cinemas to see to it that not only anti-German propaganda but also themes and information in favor of prohibition were not being printed or shown. At the October 1914 meeting of the City Alliance, the delegates thanked U.S. Senator William Stone for remarks he had made in the Senate in defense of the German people; at the November 1914 meeting of the City Alliance, the delegates resolved to thank Judge O’Neil Ryan of St. Louis for printing an article favorable to Germany. Thus, forms of both negative and positive reenforcement were used by the Alliance. In keeping with the oversight of the press, the City Alliance protested to the Post-Dispatch in May 1915 against certain editorial cartoons that the Alliance believed to be “außerst gemein,” or “extremely base.”

An oversight committee was also created by the Alliance to try to pressure St. Louis bankers into not participating in a loan syndication in late 1915 on behalf of the Allies (as discussed in Chapter 10). The committee and the Alliance openly threatened the banks with a boycott by German-American depositors if they participated in the syndication.

To be sure, the Neutrality League and the spontaneous rallies of the German-American community received more publicity than the Alliance did in 1914 and early 1915, but the Alliance kept at its activities, long after the spontaneous demonstrations of the Neutrality League and the German-American community had disappeared. And once the war had begun, there were efforts by City Alliance
officials to recruit the remaining German and Austrian organizations in the city that were not yet members of the Alliance. The efforts were successful: in his March 1915 annual report to the City Alliance, Kersting stated that the membership in the Alliance was still increasing.

Nevertheless, the same disconcerting pattern of political involvement showed itself in the Alliance’s activities on the neutrality issue as in the antiprohibition campaign; the participation of the rank and file Alliance members simply was not there. Instead, it was the leadership alone that was conferring with politicians, overseeing newspapers and cinemas, and threatening (although not carrying out) boycotts. Ironically, the Alliance leadership, which had earlier seen itself overwhelmed by the spontaneous enthusiasm of the broad mass of German-Americans in St. Louis in the first six months after the war began, once again found itself in the same familiar plight as before the war: leading a crusade that had many sympathizers but few active and committed supporters other than the leaders themselves.

By the fall of 1915, many of the leaders of the Alliance in their idealism were too far involved emotionally in the political agitation for strict American neutrality to disengage from the confrontation with those who sought to maintain a foreign policy favorable to the Allies. Thus, even as many more pragmatic German-Americans began to lose their ardor for supporting overtly the German cause, the temptation to continue loudly and openly on political issues related to the war was too great for some Alliance leaders to resist. The result was a significant flare-up of the tensions that had always been extant, even if more or less latent, in the leadership cadre of the Alliance.
Despite the sense of unity that the onset of the World War had brought to the St. Louis German-American community, internal pressures began to build up within the community. Differing opinions were forming among German-Americans over the appropriate response to the increasingly hostile press commentary on their agitation for an arms embargo. Many German-Americans in St. Louis, both without and within the Alliance, were for pulling in their wings and lowering their profile in the face of such criticism.

That is hardly surprising. After all, the German-American community, despite some radical elements, was overwhelmingly conservative and buergerlich. Despite the enthusiasm and interest that German-Americans had in the German war effort, there were definite limits beyond which most German-Americans would not go in championing the interests of Germany in the United States. Thus fundraising campaigns within the German-American community in regard to the war were invariably for humanitarian purposes—usually for contributions to the German or Austrian Red Cross—not to the German government directly. Moreover, no responsible German-American leader ever called for direct intervention, financial, military, or otherwise, by the United States on behalf of Germany. Even in their sympathy for Germany during the war, for most German-Americans moderation was the word.

But the DANB over the years had attracted those German-Americans most passionately devoted to their Germanness, and in the Alliance, more than in the German-American community as a whole, there were those who were extreme in their devotion to the German cause. To be sure, there were DANB members in the country who saw the need for restraint; some delegates to the national convention of the DANB in San Francisco in August 1915 expressed the hope that the DANB would take no official stand on the war in Europe. They were in the minority, however, and after President Hexamer gave a speech to the convention sharply critical of United States policy, a majority of the delegates were ready to
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adopt similarly critical resolutions. The episode was symptomatic of the division in the organization.

And the disagreement over tactics also developed among German-Americans outside the DANB. Kuno Francke, for example, published a thin book in 1915 entitled A German-American's Confession of Faith, in which Francke insisted, "My German sympathies cannot make me forget what seems to me my duties as an American citizen." Moreover, he argued against "political organizations which would set Germans in this country apart as a class by themselves." In September 1915, after a summer of increasingly sharp attacks on German-Americans and the Alliance by the English-language press in St. Louis, dissension between moderates and extremists finally surfaced into public view within the City Alliance, and the Post-Dispatch was gleefully willing to publish all the details. The dispute began during a meeting of the City Alliance on Friday evening, 24 September 1915, when Kurt von Reppert, a St. Louis attorney and an Alliance member, launched a bitter attack from the floor against President Wilson and his neutrality policy. In the course of his remarks von Reppert used some harsh epithets, according to one report calling Wilson a "jackass" and an "ape," and insisting that Wilson was either "ignorant or a crook."

The outburst enraged moderates in the Alliance, especially when the other Alliance members in attendance failed to censure von Reppert. In fact, other speakers joined in with their own attacks on various public officials in the state for their position on the World War, and all were greeted with considerable applause from the delegates in attendance. The result was that Albert von Hoffmann, the owner of a local printing firm, and Paul O. Sommer, financial secretary of the Alliance, tendered their resignations from the Alliance in protest. Even more significantly, August Hoffmann, no relation to Albert, publicly observed that the Alliance should not tolerate intemperate remarks like those of von Reppert and announced that, although he had decided not to resign because of his many friendships in the Alliance, his initial impulse nevertheless had been to follow von Hoffmann out of the organization. Moreover, he had concluded not to run for reelection as an officer of the Alliance. August Hoffmann's disaffection was a serious matter, since not only had he been the longtime treasurer of the Alliance but, as president of Northwestern Bank, he was one of the leading figures in the St. Louis German-American community. Nevertheless, the resignation of Albert von Hoffmann became the focus of the controversy.

Von Hoffmann was certainly independent and outspoken, capable of inducing an uproar. Born in Vienna, he left school at an early age to learn the electrical trade before departing for America at the age of twenty. He traveled from New York to Philadelphia and then on to Milwaukee, where he heard that one could get a job without having to know English. There he worked for the Milwaukee Electric Railway Company for $4.50 a week—until he invented a device for welding streetcar rails. The patent brought him prosperity, and he received royalties for the rest of his life, although later he invested in a plantation in Vera
Cruz and lost much of his wealth. He then moved to St. Louis and began working for the Missouri Telephone Company, until he founded his own publishing company to print telephone books. He was a balloon enthusiast and later established a sales agency and flying school for airplanes. An independent spirit, he had set up his own free soup kitchens in St. Louis in the winter of 1914 to aid German and Austrian draftees stranded while awaiting call-up in the German and Austrian armies.

Von Hoffmann announced that while some "radical members" were disposed to criticize him, many other Alliance members were warmly congratulating him for resisting the slurs against President Wilson by von Reppert. Von Hoffmann asserted that some in the Alliance were predicting that the Alliance officers would not accept his resignation. Von Reppert, on the other hand, contended that he had received several threats on his life—not from native Americans but from German-Americans who felt that his remarks would arouse anger against German-Americans and injure the "German cause." In short, a lively debate was precipitated over whether aggressive agitation was the proper tactic for the Alliance.

In an editorial on the Monday following the controversial Alliance meeting, the Post-Dispatch reported that the federal prosecutor in St. Louis, A. L. Oliver, was researching the federal statutes to determine if von Reppert's attack on Wilson was a punishable offense. The Post-Dispatch observed that Oliver's research for such a statute would be fruitless, and that was "as it should be." The paper added that although the country had never had a president who was a crook, a jackass, or an ape, "some day, however, we may have a President who is all three and when we do we want to call him what he is without going to jail."

In any event, the incident served as a test of the Alliance, to determine just how responsible its leaders would be in disciplining its members and exercising restraint. The Alliance did not do well in the test. After a special meeting of the executive committee of the City Alliance to discuss the incident, Henry Kersting, president of the City Alliance, announced that while "emphatically repudiating and regretting" the remarks made about Wilson at the meeting, the Alliance had decided to accept von Hoffmann's resignation. The result was significant to the Post-Dispatch, which noted in an editorial on 28 September that the man who slurred the president retained his membership in the Alliance, while the man who resisted the slurs was outside the fold: the public image of the Alliance in the eyes of native Americans was seriously damaged by the incident. Moreover, there is no question that the Alliance had damaged its image with German-American moderates.

Despite the adverse publicity the Alliance received from von Reppert's intemperate statements, the organization pressed on with an attack on some of the leading banking institutions in the native American community. The impetus for the agitation against the bankers was the announcement in early September of a plan to float a large loan in the United States for the Allied governments, who
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had by then exhausted all of their credit in buying supplies in the United States for their war effort.

It is not hard to see why the German-Americans were upset by the Allied effort to obtain loans in the United States, or why German-Americans felt that the Wilson administration was again favoring the Allies. On 15 August 1914, only a few days after the war had begun, Secretary of State Bryan had announced that “loans by American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war are inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.” Unfortunately, it soon became apparent that the Allies could not survive without American credit and that a denial of such credit would result in the loss of tremendous markets to United States companies. The consequence was that the Wilson administration in October 1914 vitiated Bryan’s statement of policy by making the questionable distinction between bank and seller credit and public loan issues, with supposedly only public issues being condemned by Bryan’s statement. But by September 1915, even the bank credit had been exhausted, so that the only recourse for the Allies was to float loans in the United States through public sale. Once again, the Wilson administration reversed itself and announced that it would not resist such a loan effort. It was in this context that an Anglo-French financial mission arrived in the United States on 10 September 1915 to promote the loan.

Not surprisingly, the Post-Dispatch and the Republic came out in favor of the loan, making a number of cogent and practical arguments. The papers urged that floating a loan was not a breach of neutrality in any military sense and that although the loan was necessary to avoid stoppage of the extensive export trade of the United States with the Allies, such a stoppage would create severe economic repercussions in the United States. Moreover, the German government itself had already sold $10 million of its own treasury notes in the United States in April 1915, even though that sum paled before the $500 million the Allies eventually were seeking. (Originally, the Allied goal was to float $1 billion in loans in the United States.)

To be sure, the German-American community was upset. The Westliche Post contended with some exaggeration that the news of the plan to seek $1 billion in loans without even offering any securities as collateral for the loan “had unleashed in the whole country a feeling of rising indignation.” The DANB issued a letter for national distribution urging every “true American” to write to his bank to protest against the investment of his bank’s funds in the Allied loan, and protests materialized in St. Louis. The Turnvereine protested against the loan, observing realistically, “This stupendous sum, dependent entirely on the continued stability of the credit of these governments, would tie us irrevocably to their interests and ultimately force the United States into a ruinous war.” In addition, quite a few German-Americans responded to the call to write letters: a St. Louis banker, in New York in late September for a meeting of those participating in the loan, admitted that St. Louis banks had been “flooded” with letters threatening withdrawal of accounts if the banks participated in the Allied
loan issue. The banker observed that most letters bore names of German origin and showed “remarkable similarity in wording”—a sign of an organized protest effort.\textsuperscript{16}

The City Alliance in St. Louis was outspoken in its agitation against the loan program, announcing on 24 September 1915, at the very meeting at which Kurt von Reppert made his intemperate remarks about Wilson, that a special committee of three Alliance members was being appointed to investigate how local bankers were going to stand on the Allied loan. One of the three members was von Reppert.\textsuperscript{17}

The actions of the Alliance and German-Americans generally in St. Louis against the loan program had some impact. For one, the directors of the National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis decided to submit the question of whether to buy Allied loans to the shareholders of the bank after there were protests from some of its customers over the bank’s intended loan participation.\textsuperscript{18} And a number of banks felt compelled to place advertisements in both English-language and German-language newspapers in the city to suggest that they were being impartial in selling bonds. The Mississippi Valley Trust Company, for example, advertised that it was selling bonds not only of the United Kingdom and France but also of Germany, and Mercantile Trust Company announced that it was selling British and French gold bonds, Imperial German government bonds, Argentine gold bonds, and, for a dash of total neutrality, Swiss gold bonds.\textsuperscript{19}

In the end, the Alliance agitation was unsuccessful, for the loan was successfully floated, with St. Louis institutions buying $2.7 million in Allied bonds. There were few further protests and few withdrawals.\textsuperscript{20} Yet many in the native American community were resentful of the attempt by German-Americans and the Alliance to thwart the efforts to aid the Allied governments. The effort to sabotage the bond issue came across as a flagrantly pro-German act rather than one of neutrality. After all, the German-Americans had not complained when the German government had sold notes in the United States: it was only when the Allies tried to tap further United States capital sources that German-Americans complained about either the danger of American involvement in the war being caused by credit to the belligerents or the evil of American credit being used to prolong the war in Europe. The upshot was that by the fall of 1915, as the second year of the war in Europe began, the German-American Alliance and certain leaders of the German-American community were under attack as being blatantly pro-German and disloyal to the United States.

Moreover, relations between the United States and Germany had worsened. Although many Americans did not want their country to become involved in the war, they had a strong sense of national pride and resented incursions by Germany upon the national interest of the United States. Reports in the fall of 1915 in English-language newspapers and journals about German espionage in the United States, and even some acts of sabotage against American firms supplying goods to the Allies, thus caused considerable resentment. In addition, when two
American lives were lost upon the sinking of a White Star liner, the Arabic, by a German submarine in August 1915, the new secretary of state, Robert Lansing, was ready to break off relations with Germany. And the German government hardly enhanced its image in October 1915 when it executed the British nurse Edith Cavell for espionage, an execution that fit neatly into the English propaganda that the German military forces were barbaric.

The charges of disloyalty against German-Americans and the tension between Germany and the United States dampened the eagerness of many German-Americans to engage in political activity involving neutrality: from this point on the Alliance was more or less on its own in the German-American community in its continued efforts to influence foreign policy. While the leaders of the Alliance became increasingly vocal and visible, the mass of German-Americans became more reserved in their public actions and statements. But this did not mean that there was not still a vast reservoir of sympathy for Germany and for the German language and culture among St. Louis German-Americans. Just how much sympathy remained became evident when the German-American leaders organized a charity bazaar in St. Louis for the German and Austrian Red Cross in October 1915. Here was an opportunity for German-Americans to evince support and concern for the old Fatherland in a neutral and humanitarian fashion, without having to become embroiled in controversial domestic politics. Thus, the theme of the bazaar was “For Humanity’s Sake.”

Nevertheless, there was an undercurrent of overt sympathy for the Central Powers and antagonism toward the Allies even in this charity event. For instance, Richard Bartholdt, writing in German in the program for the bazaar, expressed those sentiments while at the same time seeking to justify the bazaar as an exercise in Americanism:

[The bazaar] is for the purpose of opening heart and hand to peoples who are isolated from the world and whom an enemy without equal in viciousness is seeking to starve to death. For we do not forget: the dear “neutral” America in fact has powder and lead for the enemies of Germany and Austro-Hungary, but not a crumb of bread for the land of our fathers. And precisely this aspect affords us the insight into the historical mission of our charity work. For where our country’s policies have opened wounds and created bitterness on the other side of the ocean [in Germany and Austria], precisely there after the war we will be called upon to build golden bridges and rebind the loose ties of friendship on the basis of our better self and the many proofs of love of mankind which America through us gave to the peoples to which we are related in their time of greatest need. Thus while we now help the old Fatherland we are at the same time serving the best interests of the new. Can we, so we ask, devote our efforts to a better, or more holy, cause?

The bazaar, which was called the greatest charity effort in the history of the St. Louis German community, was organized by leading figures in the community, including a number of officers of the German-American Alliance. The five-man board of managers for the bazaar included three officers of the Alliance, and the women’s organizing committee included the wives of three Alliance officers.
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among its six officers. In fact, every officer of the Alliance residing in St. Louis had some role or another in the bazaar. But the bazaar was very much an event put on by every segment of the German-American community. Both Catholic and Lutheran organizations had a part in the project, and literally hundreds of German-American women served on various organizing committees affiliated with numerous German-American organizations in the city.

The bazaar was an ambitious affair, with a fund-raising goal of $100,000, and was to run for nearly a week at the Coliseum in St. Louis. The event was ballyhooed in both the English-language and the German-language press for some time in advance of its opening, and the Westliche Post reported that even Governor Major took part in the publicity for the bazaar in the week before the event by riding in a balloon owned by Albert von Hoffmann, the St. Louis businessman who only the month before had resigned from the Alliance over Kurt von Reppert's remarks.

The bazaar ran from 25 to 30 October 1915. Admission was twenty-five cents for adults and ten cents for children. Inside, there were various charity booths, featuring games, food, and items for sale. The very first night the bazaar was open, over twenty thousand people packed the hall so tightly that it was nearly impossible to move from one booth to another, and over $16,000 was raised the first night alone. Among the funds raised was a $5,000 gift from Mrs. Adolphus Busch, widow of the brewer, who telegraphed best wishes from her home on the Rhine and authorized her agents to make the donation on her behalf. In fact, the Busch family had reserved the entire southwestern corner of the hall and was operating several charity booths there.

Significantly, the Post-Dispatch was willing to give the bazaar, essentially a nonpolitical event, extensive and positive coverage, and in the end the bazaar grossed $113,759.79, and netted $96,710.53. Subscriptions from wealthy German-Americans raised the net proceeds to $100,000, of which $60,000 was given to the German Red Cross and $40,000 to the Austro-Hungarian Red Cross through the consulates of the respective countries.

The bazaar was the last great unified social event of the St. Louis German-American community: never again would there be such widespread public support and participation by a large number of German-Americans in a social or political event in the city of St. Louis. It is significant that the bazaar was essentially apolitical.

Yet the German-American Alliance remained militant on the question of neutrality, as suggested by the proceedings of the State Alliance at its annual convention in St. Joseph on 12 and 13 September 1915. In light of the attacks on the purposes and motives of the Alliance in the English-language press, the convention delegates took the occasion to restate the goals of the Alliance, quoting extensively, in a resolution, from the statement of purposes of the DANB adopted at its 1901 organizing convention. The statement of the Alliance made the usual
appeal to its members to use the German language whenever possible but then went on to affirm that Alliance members were loyal Americans, despite their position on United States neutrality:

During the present situation we sharply differentiate between the duties to our American Fatherland, which we want to fulfill as enthusiastically as our ethnic forefathers have done since the creation of the Union, and the natural feelings which we justifiably harbor for the lands of our own birth or of the birth of our parents.

We view ourselves as a part of the American nation and therefore cannot support or undertake any policy or course of action which in its consequences would harm the whole [of the nation], because we would also thereby suffer.

Therefore we demand from the administration and our representatives in Congress that they strictly and without partisanship maintain the neutrality against all belligerent powers which was declared by presidential proclamation at the start of the European War, and that they refrain from all unjustified intervention in the matters of foreign powers.27

The convention was by no means bashful about taking positions on the socio-political issues of the day: home rule for the cities, appropriate representation of urban areas in the state’s General Assembly; state laws providing for sickness, disability, and old-age insurance for all citizens, and workmen’s compensation laws.28 In any event, the political positions that the convention did take naturally enough were often favorable to the preservation of German-American interests. But many were unquestionably liberal in outlook, even if not as controversial as the position of the Alliance on the neutrality question.

As was his practice, Dr. Weinsberg reported to the convention on the activities of the State Alliance in the past year and made recommendations for the coming year. Weinsberg began his remarks by declaring that the past year had shown how necessary it was for German-Americans to unite to protect the personal freedoms granted them by the Constitution and to defend themselves and Germany against the hateful attacks of a large part of the American press and the Puritan element in the United States. Thus Weinsberg took note of the various mass protests in the past year in St. Louis against trade with the Allied powers. Nevertheless, Weinsberg conceded that the efforts to influence the United States neutrality policy had not been successful, even though he urged the Alliance not to give up its efforts. Moreover, Weinsberg tried to project a tone of moderation and circumspection in the matter of political agitation and even chastised indirectly the Alliance and German-Americans for being too tactless and aggressive in their activism.29

Referring to domestic issues, Weinsberg noted that the Alliance’s legislative committee had worked effectively to defeat the county-unit legislation by referendum. Ironically, the chairman of that committee had been Albert von Hoffmann, who left the Alliance only a few weeks after this 1915 convention.30 But Weinsberg conceded that there were intelligent and conscientious citizens voting for prohibitionist measures. Indeed, Weinsberg observed that the liquor
industry itself was to blame in part for people who were not prohibitionists voting for prohibition measures, since the liquor industry had corrupt aspects in it.

The prohibitionists in fact had made further progress in 1915, and by 1916 the Anti-Saloon League was proclaiming that its forces had control of Missouri’s House of Representatives and needed only to win four or five additional seats to gain control of the state Senate for the drys. In addition, by 1916 the Anti-Saloon League had begun to concentrate on electing U.S. congressmen from Missouri who would vote for national prohibition, and the League noted that eleven of the state’s sixteen congressmen had voted for national prohibition the year before. This did not escape Weinsberg’s attention, and in his report to the 1915 convention he urged the Alliance in the coming year to seek to put up “liberal-minded candidates” for Congress and the state legislature, warning that the national prohibition measure was sure to be proposed again in the next Congress. Weinsberg concluded with the observation, “Only if we form a nonpartisan political power and elect liberal representatives to Congress and the state legislature can we protect our personal freedom in the future.”

Thus, as the second year of the war began the Alliance in Missouri was still prepared to agitate on political issues, including measures for a strict United States neutrality policy and against prohibition. It was willing to do so despite the negative rumblings from certain native American circles and despite the reservations of an increasing number of German-Americans. The Alliance got its opportunity for active involvement in the presidential and state elections of 1916, and by every standard it was a fateful time for the Alliance and German-Americans.
The Election of 1916

The Alliance leaders viewed their involvement in the presidential campaign as a logical continuation of their political efforts earlier against prohibition legislation and for anti-prohibition candidates. But never before had the DANB and its affiliated chapters tried to intervene so directly and openly in national politics against a particular candidate as they did in 1916 against President Wilson.

Ironically, at that time relations between the United States and Germany were improving, as a result of Germany's pledge after the sinking of the Sussex in March 1916 that no more unarmed merchant and passenger ships would be sunk without warning. And at the same time, Anglo-American relations were strained by the Allied seizure of mail on ships in the Atlantic, the English blacklist of various American companies for trade with the Central Powers, and the unwillingness of the Allies to enter peace negotiations proposed by President
Wilson until the Allies had achieved the unconditional surrender of the Central Powers.

The improvement in American relations with Germany, however, did not translate into a similar improvement between the English-language press and the DANB. To be sure, the situation between the Alliance and the English-language press (and the members of the native American community who sympathized with the Allies) had been worsening before 1916. But during 1916, the highly visible political agitation of the DANB and other German-American leaders escalated this skirmishing between the press and the Alliance into outright warfare.

The opening salvo came from New York, in the form of a series of exposés in March 1916 in the *New York World* to the effect that the DANB was attempting to influence United States foreign policy. The reports in the *World* did not carry any significant new evidence of foreign influence upon the DANB. What was significant was the tone of the report and the attendant implication: that the political agitation of the DANB and its affiliated alliances, which after all had been carried out more or less in the open, was part of a broad conspiracy, with foreign ties, to influence in some sinister way American foreign policy for the benefit of Germany. The *New York Times* picked up this story on 8 March 1916, calling the first of the reports by the *World* "an astounding chapter of the continued story of the German conspiracy against the United States."

There is no question that the German government did finance propaganda activity in the United States. For instance, George Sylvester Viereck's *Fatherland*, a pro-German English-language journal issued from New York, was heavily subsidized by the German government. Yet German propaganda efforts in the United States were more extensive and certainly not as polished as Allied propaganda campaigns in the country during the same period. Nevertheless, exposés in the *World* and other newspapers of German propaganda campaigns in the United States, real or imagined, had been stirring up comment since the summer of 1915.

On 19 March 1916, the *World* called for the dissolution of the DANB, declaring that the Alliance was carrying on "bitter warfare" against the president because he refused to make the United States "an ally of the Teutonic Powers" and that the Alliance was plotting to gain control of the Republican national convention in order to "Prussianize" American foreign policy. Of course, Alliance leaders quarreled with the idea that they were resisting Wilson because he refused to make the United States an ally of Germany. Rather, they were upset because he had refused to keep the United States from being a trade ally of the Entente powers. German-Americans perceived their agitation against Wilson to be nothing more than criticism of a political leader who they believed was not following his own policy of neutrality.

Nevertheless while newspaper editors were casting the political activity of the Alliance as a sinister effort by foreign, not American, forces, the same editors viewed efforts to gain financial and trade support for the Allies in the United States as nothing more than normal domestic political ac-
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Activity. If this German-American activism was disloyalty, it was a disloyalty of the most manufactured sort.3

There is no evidence that the activity of the State Alliance and the City Alliance in Missouri and in St. Louis had any foreign source. Indeed, the Alliance did not undertake many political campaigns, in public at least, that would have required much in funds: there simply was no need for money when the Alliance agitation was being carried out by only the narrow leadership cadre. In any case, the political involvement of the German-American Alliance leaders in Missouri appears to have been founded on a basic emotional sympathy for Germany, a sympathy upon which these men felt entitled to act because the United States was supposedly neutral. And while the sympathy for Germany provided the initial impetus for the Alliance leaders' political activity, they were spurred on by a sense of rage over the unfair way in which they believed their lobbying was being depicted by the leading American newspapers.

For instance, shortly after the New York World exposés, the Post-Dispatch promoted in St. Louis the alien influence charge against the local Alliance. In an editorial entitled "Shall Alien Votes Win?" the paper reiterated the charges against the Alliance of conspiring to "control the Government in the interest of Germany" and trying to control official power "to the end of the power, interest and sovereignty of the United States may be summated to the interest of a foreign power." Alliance leaders were bitter over such editorials, for they did not see themselves as trying to subordinate the interests of the United States to a foreign power, but rather as American citizens trying to influence American policy in a way that would conform to their wishes, as American citizens who did not want war between the United States and Germany and who did not want the United States aiding Germany's enemies. Equally maddening to them were the ideas that Germany was in the wrong in the war or that Germany alone was guilty of violating international law, and indeed there is little question that the British general blockade of Germany took considerable liberty with international law.

Despite the seriousness of the charges of the English-language press and the ideological biases those charges reflected, many German-American leaders continued their political agitation as 1916 wore on, and the self-righteous attitudes of many German-Americans only contributed to the matter. After all, the German-Americans reasoned, they knew that they were not agents of the German government and that their motivation was as much to avoid war with Germany as to aid Germany. Likewise, they knew that the attacks of certain American newspapers against them as agents and spies were fabrications, and they believed that such fabrications, whether or not sincerely believed by the English-language newspaper editors, would not be believed by a large segment of the American public if exposed for what they were.

Consequently, the wartime political activities of German-American leaders continued. In late May 1916 a number of German-American leaders met at the
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Hotel Kaiserhof in Chicago to discuss strategy in the upcoming presidential election, since they hoped to obtain concessions favorable to the German-American community from one or the other party's candidate in exchange for the endorsement of the various German-American leaders and the organizations they represented. The convention was to a great extent perceived to be the brainchild of the DANB and drew participants from twenty-eight states. Among the delegates was Friedrich Bente, the Concordia Seminary professor who had been active in the rallies of the Neutrality League in St. Louis. The participants adopted a platform that, among other things, attacked those trying to isolate German-Americans and indicated that German-Americans would only support a presidential candidate who favored strict neutrality and a trade embargo and who opposed the attacks on German-Americans.

Naturally, the response of many English-language newspapers to the Chicago conference was hostile. On June 1, the New York Times called the participants "hopeless aliens, wearing the cloak of American citizenship to stab America." The St. Louis Post-Dispatch on the previous day contained an editorial on the Chicago conference:

What is the most effective method of creating and maintaining racial division in America? Is it not marshaling different races and nationalities, who come to America to enjoy the blessings of American citizenship under republican institutions, on racial and national lines? Is it not by creating in America of each race or nation a racial or national solidarity in keeping alive racial or national distinctions, sentiments and ambitions?...

To be specific, what could be worse than the effort of these German-American leaders to unite all the voters of German origin on a political program to control our foreign policy and to punish those whose action as American officials are displeasing to pro-Germans in this country? The mere union of German-Americans on a German-American platform creates a racial division and sows the seed of racial and national antagonisms which have been the chief cause of disturbance in Europe and have drenched European soil in blood.

Americans of every origin who unite on other than American lines for American policies in the sole interest of the United States and the American people are not true Americans, they are aliens in the mask of Americans.

Of course, the fact was that many voters in large urban areas did vote for their public officials out of a sense of ethnic solidarity, without rending the national fabric. But there was a great deal of truth in the perceptions expressed in the editorial, and there is no question that the agitation of the German-American leaders was designed to coalesce German-American voters into an ethnic voting bloc and to make American politicians responsive to their desires on a volatile domestic issue. In doing so, German-American leaders were increasing the visibility of German-Americans and German-American institutions, simultaneously making them an identifiable target for anti-German sentiment.

It was not just the leaders of the State Alliance and the City Alliance who continued to agitate against the foreign policy of the United States in 1916, however: other leading figures in the German-American community also continued to
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speak out. Charles Nagel made speeches urging a defense of Germany’s conduct in the war and questioning American foreign policy in a number of cities in March and April 1916; Richard Bartholdt remained vocal; leaders in the Missouri Synod and in the Catholic Verein spoke out; and both German-language dailies and the German-language weeklies in St. Louis, like Die Abendschule and Der Herold des Glaubens, continued to complain about the trade policy of the Wilson administration during 1916.11

Nevertheless, such activity began to stir up charges against these men, and especially against the German-American Alliance. One leader in the attacks on the Alliance was a former president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, who was vehemently opposed to German-American lobbying. Moreover, Roosevelt and other influential Americans had come to the conclusion after the Lusitania incident that it was only a matter of time before the United States would have to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Accordingly, they urged preparedness, so that the United States would be economically and militarily ready for involvement in the war when the appropriate time came. Of course, German-American leaders were hardly enthusiastic about the idea of preparedness because they realized that the United States would never intervene militarily on behalf of Germany, and they indeed had never urged such military intervention by the United States. Thus, preparedness could only redound to the benefit of the Allies.

Coincidentally, at the same time that German-American leaders were meeting in Chicago to plot a German-American lobbying effort in the upcoming presidential campaign, Roosevelt arrived in St. Louis to give an address at the Planter's Hotel before the City Club on 31 May and to participate the next day in a parade designed to demonstrate support for preparedness for war. In his speech, faithfully reproduced in the Post-Dispatch, Roosevelt attacked the German-American Alliance directly and vigorously, bluntly stating that an effort to organize an ethnic group to vote to influence foreign policy was "off-limits," and in fact amounted to "moral treason." 12

The Post-Dispatch also took care to include in a bordered box Roosevelt's specific attacks against the local Alliance:

When the German-American Alliance of St. Louis voted down the proposal to take part in the preparedness parade, at the time when it was insisting that our politicians should champion Germany, the greatest possible example of military preparedness, it showed that, though it calls itself the German-American Alliance, it is really anti-American.

I would like to remind these gentlemen [the German-American Alliance leaders] that next fall our business is to select an American President, not a Viceroy of the German Emperor in America.13

The very same day the newspaper published its editorial attacking the German convention in Chicago and on the next day, 1 June 1916, published an editorial praising Roosevelt's remarks, citing the service that he had performed by awaken-
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ing the people "to the danger of the hyphen in America—the danger of American divisions and antagonism on racial lines and racial issues." 14

The Globe-Democrat also reported on Roosevelt’s speech, but that paper also printed an editorial defending the "Americanism" of St. Louis German-Americans in the face of Roosevelt’s attack. 15 The response of St. Louis German-American leaders to Roosevelt’s words was prompt and sharp, and the Globe-Democrat took pains to report the unhappiness of those leaders with Roosevelt. The Globe-Democrat reported that the Westliche Post, referring to Roosevelt’s observation that the American people were not electing "a Viceroy of the German Empire," had sarcastically retorted, "And neither will the people elect a Viceroy of Morgan," referring to the Morgan banking house, which had made extensive loans to the Allies and which many German-Americans believed to be seeking to influence the Wilson administration to aid the Allies so that the Morgan investment would be protected. 16 And the St. Louis Amerika observed about Roosevelt:

In St. Louis, before all else, he made a target of the German-Americans. He spoke as a demagogue who realizes he has a portion of the people against him and who is seeking to do everything to offset this opposition.

His rage against the hyphen is due to his realization that these conservative people hold him in contempt as a self-seeking striver. Once he called anyone who dared to question him a liar; now he stamps all who are not of his mind over the attitude of our country in the present war and the preparedness question as traitors. 17

Richard Bartholdt noted that Roosevelt had not objected to the support of the German-American Alliance in earlier campaigns when he ran for president, and Charles Weinsberg, the president of the State Alliance, argued that Roosevelt was a partisan of the Allies and that the Alliance stood for "complete perfect neutrality." Henry Kersting, president of the City Alliance and never temperate in his remarks if he could avoid it, chimed in with the allegation that Roosevelt was a "hoodlum and a traitor." 18

Interviewed again by the Post-Dispatch, Kersting insisted rather lamely that the City Alliance had not in fact voted against participating in the preparedness parade but had decided simply to let each affiliated organization decide for itself whether to participate. For good measure he threw in the allegation that many of the organizers of the parade were interested in the munitions business. 19 Nevertheless, the failure of the City Alliance to take a position on the parade was significant, for it suggested that the Alliance was finally being put on the defensive. Its leaders realized that adverse publicity on this issue was counterproductive, and for the first time the City Alliance publicly shied away from controversy. Kersting still tried to go on the offensive, observing, "I do not see where Colonel Roosevelt, or anyone else, gets the right to say that those who join in a certain demonstration are loyal and those who do not join are disloyal." 20 But the fact remained that the local Alliance had been badly hurt by an attack upon it by a former president of the United States.
The Election of 1916

The attacks on the Alliance continued even after Roosevelt left the city. They emanated from the Democratic party, whose leaders feared that there might be a massive shift of the German-American voters to the Republican party in reaction to the supposedly pro-Allied and anti-German neutrality policy of the Wilson administration. On 14 June 1916, for example, President Wilson, in a Flag Day address, contended, "There is a disloyalty active in the United States, and it must be absolutely crushed. It proceeds from a minority, a very small minority but a very active and subtle minority." The president was no more specific about the identity of the "disloyal minority," and in St. Louis, where the Democratic National convention opened on the same day as Wilson's speech, a number of German-American leaders protested vigorously against the vague aspersions they perceived as addressed at their ethnic group.21

On 16 June 1916, the Post-Dispatch, which had long been oriented in its editorial positions to the Democratic party, acclaimed the platform of the Democrats, just adopted at the national convention, under the headline "Platform Denounces Anti-American Alliances." The relevant portion of the platform condemned all "Alliances and combinations of individuals" who conspired to the purpose of "embarrassing or weakening our Government" or "improperly influencing or coercing our public representatives in dealing or negotiating with any foreign power."22 Obviously, the German-American Alliance was among the principal targets of the platform.

The Post-Dispatch continued the barrage against the German-American Alliance two days later by running an editorial under the headline "The Alien Conspiracy," calling the loyalty plank "the most important plank in the Democratic platform" and attacking not only the German-American leaders but also the Republican party and its nominee, Charles Evans Hughes, by guilt through association. The editorial urged, "Before all other issues of the campaign, let us have a referendum on the question of whether the Government of the United States is hereafter to be subjected to alien blackmail and whether a President of the United States can be driven out of office because his foreign policies are not made in Europe. Until that is settled nothing is settled."23

All the attacks by Roosevelt, Wilson, and various newspapers had their impact on native Americans who heard them, especially in the East. Thus, the New York theatrical producer Louis Nethersole wrote to Homer Bassford, an editor for the St. Louis Times, "I pity you having to live in that hot bed of Germanism," and noted that he probably would not visit St. Louis until after the war, since he was so offended by it being so pro-German.24

Incredibly, the leaders of the Alliance in St. Louis continued their political agitation during the summer of 1916. On 30 June 1916, Paul O. Sommer, chairman of the Legislative Committee of the City Alliance, issued a letter to be sent to the candidates in the state primary election on 1 August, asking for their stand on various issues. This was a device used previously by the Alliance.25

Significantly, this letter addressed itself only to the "personal liberty" and pro-
hibition questions. In fact, Sommer insisted that the endorsements for the primary would not be based on “Germanism” but solely on the question of opposition to prohibition. It is indicative of the perceived influence of the City Alliance that all but about a dozen candidates in the area responded to Sommer’s letter. The Legislative Committee met on 7 July and on the basis of the responses received endorsed a complete slate of candidates for all judicial, legislative, congressional, and city offices. Interestingly, the committee declined at the time to decide whether to endorse Henry Kersting, the former president of the City Alliance who had resigned that office only a few weeks before in order to run for the congressional seat previously held by Richard Bartholdt.

On 21 July 1916, the City Alliance met to take up the question of the primary endorsements recommended by its Legislative Committee, and on that occasion the Alliance publicly announced the latest version of the committee’s endorsements, which by now included an endorsement of Kersting for Congress. In making public the endorsements, the Alliance announced that the organization had over twenty thousand members, supposedly ready to vote in a bloc, and that it was going to open an office to work for the election of the candidates that the Legislative Committee and the Alliance itself endorsed.

This endorsement process was a rather traditional and formerly noncontroversial activity of the Alliance in which it had engaged for years before the World War without any adverse press comment. But this time the reaction of the Post-Dispatch was immediate and harsh. The day after the Alliance meeting, the paper announced that two of the candidates endorsed “have been leaders in the pro-German propaganda in St. Louis,” citing Henry Kersting for his intemperate remarks while president of the City Alliance and Hans Wulff for his activity in the American Neutrality League. The Post-Dispatch had already attacked Wulff’s candidacy for judge of the Court of Criminal Correction some weeks earlier, when it alleged that Wulff “has been active in all the St. Louis movements undertaken to aid Germany in the war,” and labeled Wulff’s campaign manager, John C. Meyers, “one of the most active leaders in the German propaganda movement in St. Louis.” Of course, the allegations of the Post-Dispatch certainly made the endorsements sound like mutual back-scratching within the German-American community among self-professed agents of the German government and seemed to substantiate the existence of the pro-German conspiracy so widely alleged.

Two days after the City Alliance made public the endorsements of the Legislative Committee, the Post-Dispatch attacked the action editorially, asking, “On what basis were the selections of candidates by the German-American Alliance made—merit or supposed pro-German sympathies?” and insisting that the endorsements were “vehemently unAmerican.” The editorial ignored the fact that the endorsements for most offices had been made on the expressed basis of opposition to prohibition laws, rather than on the candidates’ position on the neutrality question or any other ethnic issue. Weinsberg, as president of the State
Alliance, thus insisted that the selection of candidates for state office had been solely on the "personal liberty" question, even if candidates for the Senate and House seats had been on the basis of those who were for "Americanism and justice for all countries and who will treat all countries at war alike." 32 Weinsberg went on to note that the City Alliance was simply reacting to an endorsement slate already published by the Anti-Saloon League and the Ministerial Alliance in St. Louis, urging support of dry candidates.

But, of course, the English-language press was by this time sensitive to any political agitation by German-Americans, and it was clear that ethnic bloc voting for antiprohibition candidates and proposals could easily be converted into ethnic bloc voting for candidates and proposals affecting the United States neutrality policy. Indeed, that had already been the evolution of Alliance political activity between early 1914 and 1916. Accordingly, the English-language press remained hostile to political action of all types by the Alliance.

Unfortunately for the Alliance, added to the controversy of these attacks by the Post-Dispatch was an internal dispute within the Alliance that arose out of the endorsement process. During the week of 21 July, Weinsberg and Sommer had met to discuss the proposed slate of endorsed candidates, and it is indicative of the close ties of the City Alliance and the State Alliance—and the influence of Weinsberg—that at his suggestion Sommer agreed that William Dee Becker would be endorsed for the St. Louis Court of Appeals; and Sommer accordingly withdrew the proposed endorsement for Lambert E. Walther. Nevertheless, Sommer tendered his resignation as chairman of the Legislative Committee of the City Alliance and from the Executive Committee of both the City and State Alliances, stating that Becker's endorsement was desired by "powerful brewing interests." 33 Naturally, the tiff received extensive play in the Post-Dispatch, which noted that there were some members of the Alliance who felt that it was inappropriate for the Alliance to be making political endorsements at all. 34

When the City Alliance met on 28 July to give its final and formal approval of the Legislative Committee's endorsements, Weinsberg and Sommer publicly insisted that there had simply been a misunderstanding: Weinsberg had not sought to have Walther's endorsement removed; he had simply wanted to suggest that Becker be endorsed as equally acceptable. 35 The whole performance by Weinsberg and Sommer was obviously a face-saving gesture, but it was apparent that at least some at the City Alliance meeting believed that the disagreement between Weinsberg and Sommer had been exaggerated by the Post-Dispatch. Thus the Reverend Hermann Walz, pastor of the Salem German Evangelical Church, and I. J. Bauer, Secretary of the Retail Liquor Dealers Association, both complained that the Post-Dispatch was trying to break up the German-American Alliance. 36

Interestingly, the State Alliance made no endorsements for the August primary election. Nevertheless, it was politically visible. Weinsberg, for example, although not as vocal as some of the City Alliance officials and members, went so far as to state to the press in July 1916 that he was for a trade embargo against
England, France, and Russia unless Germany could be in a position to get an equal quantity of munitions. He asserted, furthermore, that Wilson was being partial to England and unfair to Germany. 27

But the State Alliance was also engaged in organizational activity, and in doing so it became involved indirectly in the expenditure of monies received by the DANB from the United States Brewers’ Association, a fact that was later to be used extensively by prohibitionist forces to discredit the brewing industry as disloyal. In 1916 there was yet another statewide prohibition referendum on the ballot in Missouri for the November election, and the State Alliance perceived the need to organize the German-Americans throughout Missouri, where anti-prohibition sentiment was weakest. Accordingly, the State Alliance cooperated with Joseph Keller, a German-born vice-president of the DANB who operated a dry goods business in Indianapolis and was the chairman of the DANB Committee on Organization. Keller and his aides visited between forty and fifty smaller communities along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers in Missouri between September and December 1916, seeking to organize Alliance chapters to be affiliated with the State Alliance in Missouri. Money for the efforts by Keller and his associates came from Percy Andreae of the USBA. 28 By founding alliances outside the cities, the DANB and the State Alliance leaders hoped to organize opposition against the prohibition referendum where the antiprohibition forces were at the time on the defensive.

The organizational effort was successful: by December the State Alliance could announce the establishment of new local alliances in a number of outstate communities, including Augusta, Marthasville, New Haven, Altenburg, Festus, Crystal City, Holstein, and Union. 29 And at a meeting of the DANB Executive Committee and various state alliance presidents in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 26 November 1916, Weinsberg publicly thanked Keller for his work in Missouri and announced that the 1916 prohibition referendum effort had been defeated in the November election. 30

The 1916 presidential election, however, was hardly a triumph for the German-American Alliance and the German-American voting bloc. In fact, the bloc simply did not materialize. The Republicans had nominated Charles Evans Hughes for president, and the former Supreme Court justice vacillated all summer over whether to accept or reject unequivocally the support of ethnic voters. Nevertheless, the dislike of Wilson was sufficiently great that Hughes might have won significant German-American support on an ethnic basis if he had more explicitly courted it. But he did not, and enthusiasm for Hughes was dampened even further by the rumors that Roosevelt, the vigorous opponent of the Alliance and of “hyphenated Americans” generally, would be named Secretary of State if Hughes was elected president. The discomfort of German-Americans over the common party affiliation of Hughes and Roosevelt was exacerbated by the apparent endorsement by Hughes of some particularly hawkish remarks of Roosevelt about German-Americans. 31
Roosevelt's speech, given on 31 August at Lewiston, Maine, suggests to what extent the German-American Alliance had a hand in compromising all German-Americans during the 1916 Presidential campaign with the taint of disloyalty. Roosevelt's remarks at Lewiston were very similar to those he had given earlier in the summer in St. Louis, when he had attacked the German-American Alliance by name. But this time some of Roosevelt's advisers induced him to direct the attack not at "members of the German-American Alliance," as he originally intended to do in the text of his speech, but rather at "professional German-Americans," a much vaguer and more all-encompassing term.42

Despite the ambiguity of Hughes's position on German-America, Charles Hexamer, president of the DANB, issued a letter over his own signature in late October urging member organizations to vote for Hughes. In accordance with Hexamer's views, the Executive Committee of the Missouri State Alliance met on 29 October 1916 and voted to endorse the Republican ticket for president and vice-president. In doing so, the Executive Committee set out a list of Hughes's positions that it found made him an acceptable candidate and a list of grievances against Wilson that made his defeat appropriate in the eyes of the Alliance.43 The decision of the Executive Board was one of consensus and included not only Weinsberg and F. W. Keck, president of the City Alliance, but also fourteen other men from towns and cities throughout Missouri, including Washington, Sedalia, Union, Joplin, Kansas City, St. Joseph, and Springfield.44

Hexamer's letter calling upon the member organizations of the DANB to support Hughes had been issued personally rather than through the DANB; the charter of the DANB issued by Congress at the instigation of Richard Bartholdt in 1907 forbade political activity. The device of ostensibly acting personally rather than as president of the DANB was to no avail, for within two years after the 1916 election the charter of the DANB was repealed by Congress, in large part for engaging in political activity in violation of its federal charter. As for the Missouri State Alliance, no one in attendance at the Executive Committee meeting that endorsed Hughes appears to have considered that the active endorsement of the Republican ticket for president was probably beyond the purposes of the State Alliance set out in the pro forma decree charter issued by the St. Louis Circuit Court to the State Alliance in April 1914.

In any event, the Alliance was by no means alone in the St. Louis German-American community in endorsing Hughes for president. The Lutheran weekly, Die Abendschule, and the Catholic weekly, Der Herold des Glaubens, both endorsed Hughes, as did the Westliche Post.45 In addition, the Central Verein urged its members in October 1916 to vote against Wilson as "the man who is striving to bring about racial cleavage among the people of our beloved country."46 None of these actions, however, received nearly as much individual publicity and notoriety as the activities of the Alliance.

All these efforts in 1916 were equally ineffective. In fact, Wilson carried the city of St. Louis against Hughes by a small margin, after Wilson had managed to
carry the city in 1912 with only 45 percent of the total votes cast in the three-way presidential race, in which nearly 20 percent of the vote had gone to Roosevelt as a third-party candidate. However, there does appear to have been some shift in the voting in heavily German wards toward the Republican party. But the shift was not so overwhelming as to suggest that the agitation of the Alliance had had a significant impact on the voting tendencies of German-Americans. Nor did the agitation of the Alliance and other German-Americans appear to have had any significant impact on the outcome elsewhere in the nation, except maybe in Cincinnati and in Minnesota, with Hughes winning by only a few hundred votes in the latter. Even though there may have been a somewhat greater tendency of German-Americans to vote for Hughes, that tendency obviously did not affect the outcome, and large numbers of German-Americans had continued to vote Democratic.

Alliance leaders were terribly naive in believing that their endorsement would be heeded by any significant number of German-Americans or would have any significant impact on the American political scene. Indeed, in Missouri there is little evidence that the endorsements of the State Alliance or City Alliance had ever had any significant impact on voting patterns in previous years on the prohibition question. Moreover, German-American leaders were in the difficult position of urging in conjunction with their endorsement of Hughes a new foreign-trade policy for the United States, one that would require altering the status quo that had developed over 1914 and 1915. During those two years, United States policy had evolved into allowing trade by United States companies with any government that was able to get ships successfully from American harbors to its own or neutral ports. The German-American leadership was put in the position of urging that the policy be changed—to the economic detriment of many American companies and their workers. Moreover, the very act of changing the status quo smacked of doing something actively unneutral. Those sympathetic to the Allies, on the other hand, were in the enviable position of simply urging that the status quo be maintained, which permitted a lower profile for such sympathizers and did not have an adverse economic impact on any economic interest group in the United States.

Yet despite the lack of success of the DANB and its affiliated alliances to elect Hughes in 1916, the organizations were completely compromised by the hostile criticism generated by their political tactics. Quite possibly the very makeup of the Alliance and the way in which it was operated contributed to its willingness to continue agitating in the face of criticism and, in some instances, to its aggressiveness. Led by a small circle of men, often the most committed in the community to German culture and values, the Alliance suffered from a shortage of the kind of moderation and restraint more prevalent in the German-American community as a whole. As it was, the endorsement of the Republican national ticket by the State Alliance was made by a committee of fourteen men, and the endorsements of the City Alliance for the August 1916 primary were carried out
by a small group of officers and delegates. Not surprisingly, the leaders of the Alliance were operating in a narrow circle of acquaintances, often reinforcing their common attitudes on the war and politics, and they were thus to a certain degree isolated from the mainstream of American society and committed intellectually to a sympathy for Germany at a point when public sentiment was beginning to drift toward sympathy for the Allies.49

It is little wonder that Hermann Hagedorn, an American intellectual of German origin who nevertheless was totally assimilated into American society, accused the leaders of the Alliance of "pompous drivel."50 To a great extent the rhetoric of the leaders of the Alliance was just that, but it was not drivel motivated by a conspiratorial malice to sabotage the United States or the nation's foreign policy. Rather, it was motivated by an emotional attachment, not necessarily rational, to Germany and by a desire to have the United States and Germany, the respective political and cultural homelands of these men, remain at peace with each other.

Meanwhile, however, most German-Americans whose perception was not clouded by any obsessive sense of Deutschtum were able to see that the attacks on German-American political activity threatened the standing of all German-Americans. Thus, a number of the community's leaders in 1916 warned that German-American political activity could have serious repercussions for all German-Americans. For instance, a number of Catholic church leaders and members of the Central Verein urged other Catholics and fellow members of the organization not to become politically active.51 After 1916 the reputation of the Alliance, and whatever influence that it indeed had in the German-American community and upon German-American voters, began to crumble. Moreover, the Alliance had also forfeited whatever credibility it might have had in the native American community as a political force. By the end of 1916, the Alliance was very much under a cloud.
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The attacks during 1916 against German-American political activity had been fierce. Yet despite the numerous allegations of foreign influence in the United States among German-Americans and despite the editorial indignation of many English-language newspapers over such influence, the American public in 1916 was not agreed that the United States should go to war with Germany. In fact, during early 1916 over a million signatures were collected and delivered to the steps of the Capitol in Washington, petitioning Congress to impose an arms embargo on deliveries to the belligerents in order to avoid involvement in the war. Moreover, in February 1915 the Gore-McLemore resolutions were introduced in Congress, warning United States citizens against traveling on armed ships of the belligerents. And the leaders of the Democratic convention in St. Louis in June 1916 had been astounded at the popularity of the slogan “He kept us out of war”—revealing the still widely prevailing sentiment that the United States ought to stay out of the European conflict.

Nevertheless, it was perceived early enough in 1916 by most German-Americans that sympathy for Germany among most elements of the native American society, to the extent that there had ever been any significant amount of sympathy for the autocratic regimes in Berlin and Vienna, had vanished under the weight of the events of the preceding two years: ship sinkings by German submarines, the invasion of Belgium by German troops, real or imagined conspiracies by German agents in the United States, and even the press attacks against the Alliance. Most German-Americans perceived the risk of conflict between Germany and the United States, and realized it was appropriate to cease all political activity that could be seen as sympathetic to Germany. By late 1916, the German-American Alliance had then become rather an embarrassment to many in the German-American community, since the attacks on the German-American Alliance for being disloyal in trying to influence German-American voters indirectly re-
flected adversely upon the German-American voters themselves. After all, the implication was present that these voters were receptive to disloyal influences.

At the same time, however, the sympathy for the Central Powers among German-Americans remained real enough, even in the last days before the entry of the United States into the war. And when the issue was humanitarian aid for German and Austrian victims of the war, many leaders of the St. Louis German-American community, not just those in the Alliance, were still willing to participate actively, just as they had participated in the charity bazaar in October 1915. Accordingly, considerable support developed in late 1916 and early 1917 for a campaign to raise $34,000 to send a team of doctors and nurses to Germany and Austria.

As had often been the case in German-American regarding the war, the impetus for this pro-German activity was a widespread resentment among German-Americans over the native American community. Specifically, they were upset that many medical expeditions had been financed by American charitable organizations to be sent to Great Britain or France—the "enemies of Germany," as reported in the announcement of the organizational meeting for this latest German-American charity drive—but none had been sent to Germany or Austria. As a result, Dr. George Gellhorn and Dr. Carl Barck, the former president of the State Alliance, called a meeting to rectify the matter. What resulted was a St. Louis branch of the American Physicians' Expedition Committee, which proposed an expedition of four doctors and six nurses to be sent to Germany or Austria to aid war victims.

The first meeting of the group resulted in $5,000 in pledges for the expedition, including pledges of $1,000 by August A. Busch, $100 by Edward Devoy, a friend of Dr. Weinsberg and a frequent participant in Alliance activities, and $100 each by Theo Lange, Peter Herzog, and Fred Widmann, who had all been active in Alliance affairs at one time or another in the past. In addition, over $700 raised from various members of the City Alliance was contributed to the fund.

The contribution by the Alliance members was not the only donation to the doctors' expedition fund from those outside the leadership circles of the German-American community. The Westliche Post publicized a Frauen-Dollar-Spende, or Women's Dollar Fund, among German-American women: the Spende eventually exceeded $600, with small contributions of a dollar or so apiece from as far away as Keokuk, Iowa, and Preston, Kansas. And Dr. Gustav Moser, on behalf of the Deutscher Theater Verein in St. Louis, gave money to the Spende. Within two weeks the general fund had increased to $16,000, including a $2,500 contribution by Mrs. Adolphus Busch. The participation of German-American leaders was extensive. The chairman of the fund-raising committee was Richard Bartholdt, the former congressman, and the treasurer was Otto L. Teichmann, president of the German-American Bank.

That the participants in the fund-raising campaign were less than nonpartisan and moved by more than simple humanitarian impulses is suggested by the fact
that when the fund-raising committee held its weekly meeting on 23 December 
1916 at the Liederkranz Hall, O'Neil Ryan, a St. Louis judge, gave a “flaming 
speech” in which he predicted that the Central Powers would win and that there 
would be peace soon, since England was nearly exhausted. On 1 February 1917, 
only a matter of weeks before the United States entered the war, the West-
lische Post announced that the expedition of four doctors and (now) four nurses 
was scheduled to leave for New York on 3 February to board a ship of the 
Scandanavian-American Line for Europe. Unlike earlier humanitarian drives by 
St. Louis German-Americans, this doctors’ expedition drew little attention from 
the St. Louis English-language newspapers.

Just as the fund-raising campaign for the doctors’ expedition was concluding, 
however, relations between Germany and the United States took a serious turn 
for the worse. During much of 1916, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the ci-
vilian chancellor of the German government, had been fighting a rearguard ac-
tion within official circles in Berlin to prevent German naval officials from con-
vincing the German kaiser that Germany should abrogate the Sussex pledge and 
reinstate unrestricted warfare. Bethmann-Hollweg recognized that such a sub-
marine war would bring the United States into the conflict, and he remained un-
convinced that the German military was correct in its claims that the unrestricted 
submarine campaign would sink so much Allied shipping that the Allies would 
collapse before American military support could become meaningful. But in Oc-
tober 1916 Bethmann-Hollweg began to lose his influence over the kaiser, and on 
9 January the kaiser decided, with the urging of the German military leadership, 
to reinstate unrestricted submarine warfare. On 31 January 1917, Germany ad-
vised the United States that unrestricted submarine warfare would be resumed 
the next day. The reaction of President Wilson was prompt: on 3 February he 
announced that the United States was breaking off diplomatic relations with 
Germany. War between the United States and Germany became an immediate 
possibility.

On the day before Wilson’s announcement of the break in diplomatic rela-
tions, the City Alliance held its annual elections. F. W. Keck, who had become 
president of the City Alliance when the vocal Henry Kersting resigned in order to 
run for Congress, was reelected. Hans Wulff, the judicial candidate who had 
been bitterly attacked by the Post-Dispatch the previous year as a propagandist 
for Germany, was elected first vice-president to replace Keck in that position. 
August Hoffmann was again elected treasurer, for the fourteenth time, despite his 
protest during the von Hoffmann affair that he would not run for the office again. 

The implications of the announcement by the German government a few days 
before were obvious to the Alliance leadership. Thus at this election meeting 
there were no ringing pronouncements of defiance of President Wilson, for 
it was clear that the loyalty of the Alliance leaders would be under even closer 
scrutiny by the English-language press. Indeed, the resentment of German-
Americans over the perceived bias of the English-language press was still great,
but one member, Emil Frei, simply noted mildly during the course of the meeting that the *St. Louis Times* was still the one newspaper in St. Louis that was being fair in reporting the situation in Europe and was best representing the interests of the United States; there were no blasts against the other newspapers.\(^1\)

As February progressed, it became clear that the United States was slowly but surely sliding toward entry into the war on the side of the Allies. The severance of diplomatic relations by Wilson had unleashed nationalistic and interventionist sentiments in many Americans who only weeks before had been disinclined to have America become involved in Europe. Many Americans considered war with Germany inevitable, even if as late as March 1917 Wilson had not reconciled himself to that fact. In a desperate effort to stop that slide, Dr. Hexamer, the president of the DANB, and others urged a national referendum on the issue of United States participation in the war.\(^1\) The *Westliche Post* endorsed the idea, but it was never seriously considered.\(^1\) *Die Abendschule*, the Lutheran German-language periodical, announced its new motto, *Das Volk will keinen Krieg!* (the people do not want war), and urged its readers to write their respective officials in Washington to emphasize three points:

The people of America do not want war.

Let the President or Congress warn all Americans off ships bound for the war zone.

If ever war seems unavoidable against any nation, let the people determine in a referendum vote.\(^1\)

And on 14 March 1917, the *St. Louis Amerika* urged, “Our land should at every price stay away from the horror of the war, not for the detriment of England, not for the benefit of Germany, but on the contrary, solely and simply for the love and welfare of our country, America.”\(^1\)

With the publication of the Zimmermann telegram, however, a message sent by a German foreign office official to Germany’s Ambassador in the United States and intercepted by the British, all efforts to avoid war were finally and irrevocably rendered naught. As a result of the telegram, which became public toward the end of February, much of the reluctance in the Midwest to the United States entering the war on the side of the Allies was swept away. The telegram, which suggested a secret alliance between Germany and Mexico to enlist the aid of the latter against the United States if the United States and Germany went to war, further proposed that in reward for its efforts on the side of Germany, Mexico would receive back former territories lost to the United States, including Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.\(^1\) Within days after the publication of the telegram, isolationists in the Midwest, who until then had urged that the United States should not become involved in the European war, found their position becoming increasingly unsupportable: it was difficult to urge that the United States refrain from preparation for war with Germany when there was now undeniable evidence that Germany itself was contemplating war with the United States.
At first the Westliche Post contended that the telegram was a fake, concocted by pro-Allied propagandists. More realistically, the Amerika called the telegram an “inexcusable blunder” by the German government, and eventually the Westliche Post joined suit in criticizing the German officials. 

Now the nation’s march toward war was inexorable, the criticism of those who opposed the march became ever sharper. Sen. William I. Stone of Missouri was bitterly attacked by the Post-Dispatch and the Republic for opposing legislation that would permit President Wilson to authorize the arming of American merchant vessels. And on 3 April 1917, the day before the mayoral election in which Republican Mayor Henry Kiel was running for reelection, the Post-Dispatch ran a banner on its front page declaring, “Repudiate the Republican platform’s silent appeal to disloyalty—Scratch Kiel—Vote for Connett.” Taking a lesson from the Democratic presidential campaign of the previous year, the city Democratic organization in the mayoral race blatantly exploited the issue of German-American disloyalty. And the Democratic organization ran an advertisement attacking John Schmoll, chairman of the Republican city committee, for allegedly catering to disloyal tendencies among German-American Republicans in the city.

The St. Louis German-American press was bitter. On both 4 and 7 April 1917, a matter of days before and after the American declaration of war, the Amerika complained that a small group of those interested in the munitions industry were forcing their will upon the people. The Herold des Glaubens complained in its 4 April 1917 issue, “The American people will, if it comes to war with Germany, not be fighting for their honor or rights, but on the contrary they will be putting their life and property on the line for the gold chest of Morgan and the munitions manufacturers.”

Obviously, there were those in the German-American community who were not emotionally reconciled to Germany and America being at war, and they harbored those feelings even as the United States entered the war. Nor were all those in St. Louis who were emotionally opposed to the war German-Americans. Thus in February 1917 one Jason Wakefield, “an American, born and bred,” wrote a letter to Reedy’s Mirror, urging that the United States was being misled by Allied propaganda and that there was no justification for the involvement of the United States in the war. Moreover, a number of Missouri congressmen, in voting on the resolution of war in Congress on 6 April 1917, noted that they had received considerable mail from their constituents opposed to participation in the war. In fact, while many in the nation clamored for expeditious passage of the war resolution in Congress, there was significant opposition to the resolution from congressmen and senators, most of whom represented districts and states in the Midwest or Far West, legislators who still believed that it was inappropriate for the United States to enter the war and that there were still many Americans of the same opinion. Democratic Rep. William Igoe of St. Louis, for example, noted that the people in his district were loyal to the United States but opposed the war,
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and he felt obligated to vote their views on the resolution rather than his own. 22
Democrat Walter Hensley of Farmington also reported that he had received many
 telegrams urging him to keep the United States out of the war. 23 Rep. L. C. Dyer
of St. Louis reported that the telegrams to him were nine to one in opposition to
war. With such opposition being reported by the Missouri congressional delega-
tion on the very eve of the obviously impending entry of America into the war, it
is easy to see why some German-American leaders were moved to agitate against
war until the last minute. In the end, fifty congressmen and six senators voted
against the declaration of war. 24

The resolution of war was adopted in the Senate on 4 April and in the House
on 6 April. The United States thereby declared war on Germany, the other hom-
eland of many German-Americans: thus the dilemma had become reality and the
dual German-American loyalties had become mutually incompatible. In its first
issue after these events, the HeroLd des Glaubens observed sadly:

When the readers receive this journal this week, the incomprehensible, the un-
fathomable, the fearful, will have happened—a rip has appeared in the century-long
friendship; the state of war has arisen between our new and our old homelands.

The entry of the United States into the World War is a catastrophe which our na-
tion has not experienced since the Civil War, a catastrophe . . . which will have
fateful consequences on the social, political and economic development of our land.
For us German-Americans the catastrophic effects are doubly hard. The wound
which it inflicts on us will not heal easily. For thousands of us America will never be
that which it once was. 25

Indeed, things would never be the same: the first several months after the dec-
laration of war proved to be a period when many German-Americans had to
come to grips with the reality that the traditional German-American accommoda-
tion of cultural and ethnic loyalty to the old world and political allegiance to the
new was now insupportable. During those months, German-Americans gradu-
ally began to cut the emotional ties with Europe—and as they did, the German-
American Alliance suddenly became an obsolete institution of an archaic era.
When the United States declared war on Germany in early April 1917, the ground rules for German-Americans in the United States changed. Up to the first day of April many German-Americans overtly sympathized with the German cause, and a significant number of them believed that they had the right to act upon their sympathies by engaging in political agitation. And even more German-Americans believed it appropriate to render humanitarian aid for Germans and Austrians, despite the mood of the country as it drifted toward favoring active American involvement on the side of the Allies.

With the American declaration of war, such lobbying efforts, even the humanitarian efforts, for the Central Powers were obviously inappropriate. But that does not mean that German-Americans stopped harboring sympathy for the old Fatherland and resentment toward those in the United States who had agitated for American military and trade support for the Allies. For instance, Wilhelm Busch, the New York German-American shopkeeper, was no longer writing letters to the editor in favor of Germany, but he carefully noted in his diary the fate of German ships and seamen in American ports when war was declared and any signs of pro-German or antiwar sentiment in the populace.1 And the diaries of the novelist Theodore Dreiser, born in the United States but of German ancestry, evinced pro-American and anti-English sentiments, both on his part and on the part of certain of his acquaintances, all during 1917 and into 1918.2

Aware of the German-Americans' latent sympathies, the Herold des Glaubens in its 11 April 1917 issue reminded its readers of their oath of allegiance to the United States upon becoming citizens, warned them that there were many who would be watching every move of the German-American community, and urged that, despite the sense of injustice German-Americans felt, it was important to be circumspect in public statements.3 Die Abendschule, which had published accounts on the German army's activities, stopped such reports with its 12 April
Charles Nagel, a prominent St. Louis German-American, stated in April 1917, after the United States had entered the war, that in his judgment, "Germany's case has never been fully stated or impartially considered in our country." Many German-Americans shared his view, but they also agreed with Nagel's pragmatic assessment of the situation once the United States had declared war: "When my country has spoken in a controversy with a foreign country, the decision has been made, and for the time being there is nothing more for me to say or do. It is unthinkable that after our country has decided to settle a foreign controversy by the test of the sword, any citizen should still be permitted to stand upon his individual opinion." 5

Other German-American institutions also began to lower their public profile in the weeks after war was declared by the United States, toning down their affinity with German culture and society and proclaiming their loyalty to the American war effort. For instance, the Executive Committee of the Illinois German-American Alliance warned German-Americans to remove all German flags and pictures of German military leaders from their lodge rooms, and the Anheuser-Busch Brewery in St. Louis removed portraits of heroes from German history from its facilities. 6

But some German-Americans were unable to resist expressing their feelings of sympathy and resentment. Those German-Americans who had to perform the greatest transformation of public attitudes were the German-language newspaper editors, who were not in a position simply to keep quiet after the United States entered the war but had to make known the editorial position of their newspapers. These editors felt compelled to state publicly their loyalty to the United States and opposition to Germany—which clashed significantly with their earlier public expressions of sympathy for Germany—and for some editors the change in attitude was not accomplished overnight.

For several months after the war began for America, the Westliche Post continued to publish small one-paragraph comments on its editorial page that evinced cynicism about the motives for the U.S. declaration of war and hardly reflected wholehearted sympathy for the allies. On 17 July, the paper attacked American financiers: "In Wall Street the rate of the Liberty Loan is being artificially kept down. The patriotism of capitalism." In the same issue there was the observation that "New York bankers are determined to gain a higher rate of interest for the next loan. For which the people must pay." 7 The resentment of the Westliche Post toward Great Britain continued unabated throughout the summer of 1917. On 1 August, the paper published an editorial protesting certain alleged demands Great Britain was making upon the United States for specific contributions to the Allied war effort. 8 And even as late as 30 August 1917, many months after the United States had entered the war, the Westliche Post had still not reconciled itself to Great Britain: "The Neue Freie Presse in Vienna warns England of the United States: its glasses are on backwards!" 9
These "unpatriotic" attitudes of the Westliche Post did not escape the attention of the Post-Dispatch, which on 8 July noted that the tone of the full-length editorials in the Westliche Post had moderated but that the one-paragraph commentaries were still as vitriolic as ever. An editorial cartoon in the Post-Dispatch on the same day showed a menacing man with a knife and labeled "German Spy System" lying in wait in a dark alley for an Uncle Sam innocently sauntering along the street. The caption of the cartoon was simply, "Somewhere in America." The article on the Westliche Post in the same issue seemed to confirm that there were sentiments among German-Americans that might encourage and foster such a German spy system.

Unfortunately for the German-American Alliance in Missouri, there were also those in the City Alliance who could not restrain themselves from expressing their feelings. Thus, at a meeting of the City Alliance in the Turnhalle in late April 1917, none other than Kurt von Reppert, the man who had induced the embarrassing affair with Albert von Hoffmann in 1915, gave a fiery speech chastising President Wilson.

The speech was seized upon by Henry Kersting, the former president of the City Alliance, who recently had been appointed an associate city counselor. Although Kersting had been vehement in his pro-German remarks in 1914 and 1915, he used von Reppert's attack on Wilson as the basis to resign from the Alliance in an ostentatious manner designed to highlight his own "loyalty" and to emphasize von Reppert's (and indirectly the Alliance's) "disloyalty." Kersting's account of the episode leading to his resignation suggested that other active members of the Alliance were also ambivalent in their enthusiasm for the American war effort.

Von Reppert got up and made a speech criticizing and denouncing the Administration's policy in making a war loan of $200,000,000 to Great Britain. I don't remember just what he said, except that he was opposed to the loan and ridiculed it. His manner was so sarcastic and contemptuous that it made my blood boil. Von Reppert while speaking breathed the very spirit of disloyalty. It was so bad that President Keck warned him to drop that phase of the subject. He did not heed the order, but went right ahead.

When I could stand it no longer, I got up to present a resolution pledging the loyalty of the German-American Alliance to President Wilson. My purpose in doing this was to take away the bad effect of von Reppert's speech. Von Reppert refused to yield the floor to me. I demanded the right to present my resolution and I said to von Reppert, "You always have your mouth open."

In the controversy with von Reppert I had managed to put my resolution before the House. Von Reppert then asserted that I was out of order because I had become personal in addressing him. President Keck sustained von Reppert.

I then sat down, saying, "I see my motion has no second." There was no protest from the other members when President Keck sustained von Reppert. When questioned about his sudden about-face from pro-Germanism to fervent pro-Americanism, Kersting argued that he had a right to free expression of his opinions in sympathy with Germany so long as the United States was neutral, but
now that war had been declared, he felt an obligation to back President Wilson in everything that Wilson saw fit to ask Americans to do.

Although there is room to doubt the sincerity of Kersting’s sudden and complete conversion, there apparently were other German-Americans who were able to discard all sympathy for Germany. Charles Nagel comes to mind, and Helen Traubel, the Metropolitan Opera star who was raised in a German-speaking family in St. Louis. She recounted that her grandmother, who often had parties in her home in which German was the predominant language used, announced at each such function in her home after the American entry into the war that no derogatory remarks about the United States would be permitted, insisting, “We are not Germans here, we are Americans.” The grandmother reportedly evicted from one party a young man who did not heed her announcement.

But the City Alliance exacerbated the damage to its public image by its own miserable waffling on the Kersting affair. Thus in early May the chief naturalization officer for the United States in St. Louis, M. H. Bevington, announced that his office would urge the federal court to reject the testimony of von Reppert on behalf of any alien seeking naturalization. Bevington, who was also active in loyalty matters for the quasi-governmental Missouri Council of Defense, explained that von Reppert would not be allowed to vouch for the character of anyone since it was “not the policy of the Government to permit the loyalty of an applicant for naturalization to be vouched for by a person who is not loyal.”

The City Alliance was stung by this attack, and on 9 May a committee of three officers of the Alliance went to visit Arthur L. Oliver, the federal prosecutor in St. Louis. The three men, President Keck, Vice-President Hugo Wulff, and John Gewinner, Jr., admitted to Oliver that the publicity attending the remarks of von Reppert had caused the organization to suffer. They revealed that they had requested von Reppert’s resignation from the Alliance, and that the resignation would be acted upon at the 18 May meeting of the City Alliance. Having made these revelations to Oliver, they asked him to issue a statement to the public that the German-American Alliance was composed of citizens loyal to the United States.

By the time the Alliance met on 18 May, however, the leadership had reversed itself. Instead of announcing von Reppert’s resignation, Keck issued a denial that von Reppert had ever been asked to resign, and the Alliance voted to refuse to accept Kersting’s resignation from the Alliance, and instead to expel Kersting from membership as an “inimical influence threatening the welfare of the organization.” Personal loyalty to a fellow German-American still within the fold of the Alliance and under attack by an openly opportunistic maverick took precedence over the exigencies of public relations.

Nor was the image of the Alliance enhanced by the revelation on 19 May that several members of the Alliance, including August Hoffmann, its long-time treasurer, and Edward Devoy, Weinsberg’s acquaintance, had joined other St. Louis German-Americans in sending a letter to Jacob Meeker, the United
States Congressman from Missouri who had succeeded Bartholdt from the Tenth District, urging him to oppose any harsh peace terms demanded by the Entente against the German people once the war was over. That was a noble and humanitarian sentiment, but it was hardly a propitious time to urge such a position.17

Although there were some hotheads like von Reppert, the Alliance leadership resolved to keep a low profile during 1917. No public statements were issued by the State Alliance or the City Alliance, nor was any political agitation undertaken. In addition, when the Executive Committee of the State Alliance in July announced plans for the state convention in September, it issued an admonition to Alliance members: “Watch with special care [your] actions and speech in this critical time, so that no one will have the opportunity to accuse us.” The Alliance declared that all delegates to the convention should consider it their duty to avoid resolutions that “might cause offense.”18 Nevertheless, the Germanophilia of the active Alliance members made them incapable of accepting emotionally the idea that their efforts of decades to preserve a German cultural identity should be abandoned. The Propaganda Committee of the State Alliance, in urging every Verein in the state to send members to the convention, thus declared: “Precisely now, in this period of stress, we Americans of German birth must stand together united, to confront with pride the base and low enmity, not to be fainthearted, but on the contrary to work together to further steadfastly the cultural development of our land.”19

At the state convention, the delegates took the cautionary words of the Executive Committee to heart. The official report of the convention recorded that the delegates limited their business only to matters affecting the Alliance itself, said nothing about national issues except to announce their fealty to the United States Constitution, and avoided any extended or embarrassing debates, as evidenced by the fact that the delegates finished their business in only two hours and promptly adjourned.20 Among the resolutions passed were those favoring election of state officials on nonpartisan ballots, home rule for the cities, reapportionment of the state legislature to represent urban areas more fairly, introduction of old-age pensions, employee disability insurance, workmen’s compensation insurance, a civil service system, and a law regulating child labor, as well as legislation for the construction of good highways.21

Significantly, Weinsberg opened the convention with a speech in which he urged the delegates to take into account the gravity of the times and to avoid debates that might be misconstrued. Weinsberg’s further remarks, however, reflected the total confusion of values of many Americans devoted to their German-ness, a mixture of resentment, American patriotism, and sympathy for Germany:

It is necessary to maintain calm and dignity in the face of the hostile slander and witch-hunts. It is to be regretted that there are still German-Americans who do not possess sufficient sense to hold their tongues, and thus they only feed further witch-hunts. Such members should be expelled in the interest of the Alliance. Those
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German-Americans who have no sympathy for the Old Homeland must be without character, and it is impossible that their love for their new Fatherland can be that deep. Our duty as American citizens is to obey the law of the land without reservation in any case. So long as we do that, no one can begrudge us our rights as citizens.22

In addition to urging restraint by its members, the Alliance made affirmative efforts to improve public relations and to demonstrate the loyalty of the Alliance. Thus, the Alliance in organizing an automobile caravan from St. Louis to Washington, Missouri, for the state convention urged that the cars in the caravan be decorated with American flags.23 And the convention delegates went out of their way to proclaim their loyalty to the United States.24 Nevertheless, the attacks against the organization continued all during 1917 and early 1918. One of the most serious attacks came in the form of subcommittee hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee on proposed congressional action to revoke the federal charter of the DANB, granted in 1907. The public hearings, at which various witnesses were able to make a wide variety of allegations against the Alliance and about its purported ties with Germany, were widely publicized throughout the United States, since the purpose of the hearings was in part at least to determine if the Alliance was disloyal. The hearings started off with the testimony of Gustavus Ohlinger, a Toledo lawyer, who asserted boldly that the goal of the DANB had been to make America into a fief of the German Empire, in “the same position as Austria-Hungary.”25

Other evidence supposedly suggesting the disloyalty of the DANB included excerpts quoted out of context from the official publication of the DANB, urging unity among German-Americans and condemning Anglo-Saxonism and “Puritanism.” What was ignored was the fact that the quoted excerpts regularly dealt with German-American unity to lobby against prohibition legislation and for the preservation of German cultural institutions in the United States—not for the political interests of the German Empire or even for a German ethnic political party in the United States. In the absence of the prohibition and cultural context, however, the remarks indeed seemed sinister.

Also quoted in the subcommittee hearings were statements from Alliance officials in 1914 and 1915 condemning Great Britain and France for various alleged misdeeds. Again, what was ignored in that instance was that at the time of the remarks the United States was neither an ally of those two nations nor an enemy of Germany. Not surprisingly, some of the statements of Alliance members quoted as showing disloyalty were remarks by officials of the Missouri State Alliance and the St. Louis City Alliance. Thus, the prediction by Henry Kersting in April 1915 that Germany and Austria would win the war was cited in the subcommittee hearings, as were the anti-English sentiments of the former State Alliance president, Carl Barck, at the April 1915 neutrality rally of the St. Louis Neutrality League.26

Ironically, at the same time the Alliance was under investigation for remarks
by Kersting early in the war, Kersting himself was again attacking the Alliance. In September 1917, he gave a speech on behalf of the Americanization Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, and denounced the loyalty resolutions passed at the 1917 state convention of the State Alliance as "half-baked measures." 27

But while Kersting and others disavowed their former association with the Alliance, Congressman Bartholdt defended the DANB before the subcommittee and sent a letter in March 1917 to Sen. William H. King, the chairman of the subcommittee. Bartholdt sought to combat the allegations that the DANB and its affiliated alliances were part of an international Pan-German conspiracy, pointing out that the impetus for the development of the Alliance had not been some Pan-German offensive steered from Berlin, but rather a defensive reaction to the "revival . . . of the old Know-Nothing spirit." 28

Another source of attacks upon the DANB and its affiliated alliances was the arch-opponent of the Alliance in the prohibition struggle, the Anti-Saloon League. Leaders in the Anti-Saloon League saw the suspicions of disloyalty focused upon the Alliance as an important device for discrediting the Alliance, one of the League's more organized opponents. The Anti-Saloon League also made much of the funding of DANB activities by the United States Brewers' Association, in order to suggest that the brewing industry itself, which after all was dominated by German-Americans, was disloyal. Therefore, in November 1917 Wayne B. Wheeler, counsel for the Anti-Saloon League of America, noted that the liquor industry was a strong supporter of the DANB and asserted, "The liquor traffic aids those forces in our country whose loyalty is called into question at this hour." 29 The Anti-Saloon League Yearbook for 1918 quoted from the transcript of the Senate subcommittee hearings on the German-American Alliance charter in an attempt to publicize the purported disloyal nature of the DANB. 30 The portions of the transcript quoted in the Yearbook were designed to suggest that the Alliance was attempting to promote German culture and German politics at the expense of American culture and American foreign policy and that the Alliance was closely allied to the German government.

The earlier positions of the Alliance thus came back to haunt it. The vehement agitation against the Allied bond issue in 1915 was seen in 1917 as a sign of insufficient loyalty to the Allied cause. The complaints of the Alliance in 1914 and 1915 that Wilson was being sophistic in his neutrality policy were seen in 1917 as evidence of a lack of a commitment to the American effort in the war. And the various fund-raising efforts from 1914 through 1916 on behalf of the German and Austrian Red Cross were seen in 1917 as proof of an overt support for the German war effort.

But there were also pressures closer to the home of the Alliance in Missouri. For instance, in July 1917 the St. Louis police raided the St. Louis Turnhalle, often the meeting site of the Alliance, for violation of the Sunday closing law. Three members of the Executive Committee of the State Alliance, John Gewinner, Jr., of St. Louis, W. A. Tripp of Holstein, and George Baer of Kansas City,
were arrested as well, even though they were upstairs in a meeting room, away from the tavern operations being raided, waiting for an Executive Committee meeting to begin. And in November 1917, the Kansas City police barred the annual celebration of the Alliance in that city. In the same month, moreover, the loyalty of Hans Wulff, the St. Louis lawyer who had been active in the Neutrality League and who was an officer of the City Alliance, was under investigation. Once again it was a matter of the chief naturalization officer, Bevington, refusing to accept a German-American's testimony in a naturalization proceeding. In this instance, Bevington accused Wulff of heading pro-German propaganda in St. Louis earlier in the war and receiving money from Graf von Bernstorff, the German ambassador, to finance such propaganda.

Under these conditions the cohesion of the Alliance in Missouri began to disintegrate. By the fall of 1917 the leaders of the Alliance had learned their lesson. No longer did the Alliance try to intervene in the war question or even in local prohibition politics. Instead, the City Alliance and its women's auxiliary limited themselves to holding regular meetings and sponsoring social functions designed to raise money for the Alliance and for the noncontroversial St. Louis German Schulverein, which operated classes in the German language in the city on Saturdays. In contrast to previous years, the big event for the City Alliance in the fall of 1917 was a raffle and dance held at the Concordia Turnhalle in South St. Louis on 2 December. The function was well attended and helped replenish the treasury of the City Alliance, which had been severely depleted by the decline in participation in the Alliance. Significantly, the officers of the State Alliance did not assist in the planning of the raffle and dance, and the State Alliance engaged in no significant activity after its convention in September 1917 in Washington, Missouri. In fact, by the spring of 1918 the Alliance leaders had already decided that the organization should remain dormant for the duration of the war, with the intent that the Alliance would become active again after the war, when anti-German and anti-Alliance sentiment had subsided.

The situation was no better in Kansas City. Indeed, at the September 1917 convention of the State Alliance, Carl Gleeser, secretary of the Kansas City Alliance, reported that his organization had limited itself to routine business in light of the "prevailing circumstances." Gleeser also noted that up to that time the Kansas City Alliance had not suffered at the hands of the municipal authorities.

The Kansas City Alliance was the second largest local alliance in the state and, except for the St. Louis City Alliance and the State Alliance, was more politically active in the prewar years than all other chapters in the state. Kansas City German-American organizations had first affiliated with the DANB in 1905, and although the Kansas City Alliance never had the influence among Kansas City German-Americans that the City Alliance had among St. Louis Germans, by late 1914 the Kansas City Alliance included thirty-three affiliated organizations and was strong enough to expend $25,000 to acquire an old church at 14th and Cherry streets for conversion into a Deutsches Haus, a meeting place for various
German organizations and functions. The Alliance had sufficient respectability that when the building was formally dedicated on 3 March 1915, Kansas City's mayor, Henry Jost, was in attendance and praised the Germans for their contributions to the development of Kansas City and Missouri.36

But on 7 December 1917, Gleeser and Jacob Frohwerk, president of the Kansas State Alliance, were arrested on charges of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 for statements that appeared in the Missouri Staatszeitung.37 In light of that adverse publicity, on 24 January 1918 the Kansas City Alliance went so far as to petition the circuit court to change its name to the American Citizenship Association of Kansas City.38

Moreover, signs of disintegration within the DANB on a national level were also evident by late 1917. In December, the leadership of the DANB, which by that time included Charles Weinsberg in the largely honorary position of sixth vice-president, met and received the resignation of Charles Hexamer, until then the only president the DANB had ever had. Hexamer resigned, ostensibly for health reasons, and Pastor Sigmund von Bosse of Delaware was chosen to succeed him. Ominously, the DANB had failed to hold a national convention in the fall of 1917, the first time since the organization's founding in 1901 that a regularly scheduled convention had been cancelled. A number of the DANB leaders in attendance from the Midwest urged that a national convention be held as soon as possible, even in January 1918, principally to provide assurances that the organization was still functioning. But the proposition was voted down, for fear that attendance at the convention would be disastrously poor, thereby further undermining the image of the DANB as a vital organization. Significantly, no delegates from the Far West made an appearance at the December meeting. Thus the decision was made to delay any convention activity until after the war was over, when, the leaders of the DANB believed, even as late as December 1917, they would be able to regroup and revitalize the organization.39

But that was not to be: by April 1918, only five months later, the DANB leadership voted to dissolve; the disintegration that had begun in 1917 could not be checked. Having been tainted through its political activity during the earlier war years, the DANB discovered in 1917 and 1918, as did its local affiliates, that it could not retreat into respectability after the United States entered the war by thereafter limiting its activity strictly to cultural matters. The native American community and the English-language newspaper editors would not forget the past activities of the Alliance.
By March 1918, Congress was ready to revoke the federal charter of the DANB, but the DANB decided to end its own life, more or less honorably. In April 1918, the Executive Committee of the DANB met in Philadelphia and announced that it had elected to dissolve the organization and to contribute the approximately thirty thousand dollars in the Alliance treasury to a local chapter of the American Red Cross.

Because the state and local alliances affiliated with the DANB were independent organizations, however, the dissolution of the DANB did not necessarily foreordain the dissolution of the Alliance branches around the country. The editors at the Post-Dispatch were understandably curious to know what was the reaction of the Missouri State Alliance to the dissolution of the DANB. Accordingly, they sent a reporter out to interview Dr. Weinsberg, president of the State Alliance, on the subject. As it turned out, the interview resulted in the collapse of the German-American Alliance in Missouri and St. Louis.

John T. Rogers, a veteran reporter who had joined the Post-Dispatch staff only in 1916 and who was to develop a considerable reputation for inducing interviewees to talk freely, was assigned the task of reporting on the plans of the State Alliance and the City Alliance, now that the DANB was in the process of dissolving. At the time Rogers arranged to speak with Weinsberg, Weinsberg's wife urged him to decline any interviews with the press, especially with a newspaper that had consistently been so hostile to the German-American Alliance in recent years. Weinsberg, who had already delivered several pointed messages to the members of the Alliance over the last year warning them to be circumspect in their conduct and speech, surprisingly agreed to the interview, which took place at his residence in South St. Louis on 3 April. The dispute over precisely what
was said by Dr. Weinsberg in the interview and a subsequent interview about ten
days later was never fully resolved, but, in any event, it is clear that Weinsberg
was talkative. In a free-flowing interview, Weinsberg discussed his youth in Ger-
many, noted that his son was in the U.S. Army Medical Corps, and discussed the
war in Europe, debating with Rogers whether the sinking of the Lusitania was an
atrocity.

Eventually the conversation turned to the future of the Alliance in Missouri.
After all, the State Alliance and the City Alliance had been more or less inactive
in recent months, with the only newsworthy event in the eyes of the English-
language press being a ten dollar contribution by the City Alliance to the Ameri-
can Red Cross, which had been voted by the delegates at a meeting of the City
Alliance in December 1917.

The later versions of Dr. Weinsberg and the Post-Dispatch differed greatly
over what was Weinsberg’s response to the question of whether the Alliance
would disband. Rogers testified that the question led to a discussion of when the
war and the concomitant criticism of the Alliance would cease, allowing things
to return to normal for the Alliance. Rogers apparently told Dr. Weinsberg that
he hoped everything would come out all right and that the criticism would cease.
However, as Rogers got up to leave, Dr. Weinsberg remarked, “Well, it will
come out quick enough.” Rogers in his version of the interview continued:

I asked him what he meant. . . . He said, “Well, the war will be over in six
months.” I asked him, “Why?” He then told me Germany had started her great
offensive, had already taken Amiens, and when the snow melted in Italy, Austria
would send her army in there, defeat the Italians, and Germany would have a back
door into France.

I asked him what would happen when these things came to pass. He told me a
naval conflict would follow, and that England and America would not be able to
keep up the war.4

Weinsberg’s version of the interview, however, was quite different: he contended
that he had asserted that the war would be over in six months; if the Central
Powers did not win the conflict in that time, they would be totally exhausted and
would have to sue for peace.5

In any case, Rogers returned to the offices of the Post-Dispatch to report his
version of the interview, which caused a sensation among the staff, and he was
instructed to write it out in detail. There followed conferences with Benjamin
Reese and O.K. Bovard, city editor and managing editor, respectively, of the
paper.6 Nothing was done about Rogers’ report on the interview for over a week,
until finally Bovard suggested to Rogers that he return to interview Weinsberg a
second time, but this time taking along with him Carlos Hurd, one of the leading
reporters on the Post-Dispatch staff.7

The two reporters took precautions to see to it that they did not arrive at the
Weinsberg residence at the same time. The idea was to avoid making Weinsberg
suspicious that he was being closely interrogated and to induce him to remain
The interview completed, Hurd and Rogers returned to the Post-Dispatch offices, where this time Hurd wrote out his account of the interview. No notes had been taken during the interview, probably so that Weinsberg would be put at ease. The next day, Saturday the thirteenth, the front page of the Post-Dispatch carried Hurd's account beneath mocking headlines:

DR. WEINSBERG SAYING GERMANS WILL WIN WAR
PRESIDENT OF ST. LOUIS BRANCH, GERMAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE
HAS IT ALL WORKED OUT WITH END IN SIX MONTHS
FRANCE TO GET DEATH BLOW THROUGH ITALY

ENGLAND MAY BE INVADED, BUT THE DOCTOR REASSURES
US AGAINST A LIKE FATE—ALLIANCE TO STOP MEETINGS

A photograph of Weinsberg appeared on the page next to the article and was captioned, "German-American Alliance Head Who Is Predicting Quick German Victory." The front-page article read in part:

Dr. Charles H. Weinsberg of 2805 Lafayette avenue, president of the Missouri State branch of the German-American Alliance, in talking last evening with Post-Dispatch reporters about the State alliance's affairs, made the prediction that the war would end in six months, with Germany as the victor. . . .

With Germany victorious over France, he said, the war would become a naval and commercial contest between Germany and America and England—a conflict which, he held, it would not be to the interest of any of the parties to prolong, in view of the British food shortage and American unpreparedness for the war.

Speaking of the State German-American Alliance, which was the original subject of the interview, Dr. Weinsberg said he would recommend, at a meeting tonight, that meetings be discontinued throughout the remainder of the war. He said the suspension of activities would be voluntary, and that the charter of the State Alliance was not affected by the disbandment of the national German-American Alliance at a meeting in Philadelphia Thursday.

The plan to discontinue meetings through the remainder of the war led to the question how long this was likely to be, and Dr. Weinsberg then made his prophecy as to the defeat of France. . . .

"I don't know whether the Germans would demand an indemnity from France. I rather think they would be satisfied to claim no indemnity and keep Alsace-Lorraine. They might invade England, but I do not believe the United States would be invaded. It is not likely that they could destroy the British fleet, with its great superiority and size, but they could keep the British and American fleets from destroying the German navy or inflicting heavy damage on the German coast. The Kiel Canal and Heligoland would be found of great value in such a situation."
When it was suggested that a peace which left Germany the master of Europe would not meet American requirements, Dr. Weinsberg remarked, "Well, when you don't get what you want, you have to take what you can get."

It was suggested that such a termination of the war would have an unfavorable effect on public feeling in this country. "It would be pretty bad," he assented. "There will be a business panic here when peace comes, owing to the return of soldiers to their former employments and the business changes that will come suddenly."

"Germany will also have a large army to disband," the reporter remarked. "Ah," Dr. Weinsberg replied, "That is where we are at a disadvantage. They have planned everything out in advance in Germany, and there will not be any panic when the German army goes home. They will release the army gradually, so that industry can absorb them as they come. They have made all the plans for doing these things. They do not wait until the situation is upon them."

He contrasted food conditions unfavorably with those in Germany, where, he said, "Large food supplies have been made available from Ukraine and other Russian territory."

Dr. Weinsberg is 52 years old, and a native of Germany, and left that country before he was 18 years old.

The article at once became a sensation in St. Louis, and the public reaction to the article was immediate—and overwhelmingly hostile to Dr. Weinsberg. The newspaper report seemed to bring to the fore at once the hostile suspicions of native Americans over the loyalty of the German-Americans and especially the German-American Alliance, as well as the fears of German-Americans over being compromised by irresponsible leaders in the German-American community. Within hours, Weinsberg's remarks were a cause célèbre.

To understand the intensity of the reaction to the Weinsberg affair one has to realize the emotional state up to which many Americans had worked themselves by April 1918 over the matter of German-American disloyalty and German spy activity in the United States. The press and the public had managed to convince themselves that there were a large number of German sympathizers and, even worse, German spies, lurking in the United States. Moreover, there was often a passionate hatred of anything German, and German-Americans who had the misfortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time were targets of that hatred.

Sometimes this hysteria reached tragic proportions. Thus only a week before the Weinsberg affair began, Robert Prager, a native of Dresden, Germany, was lynched by a mob at Collinsville, Illinois, just across the Mississippi River from St. Louis, because the mob believed him to be a German spy. And within days after Prager was murdered, Morris Gotler, a merchant of German origin in East Alton, Illinois, also near St. Louis, was forced to kiss the flag and was threatened with lynching, supposedly because he ignored a merchants' agreement to close their doors during a rally promoting the sale of Liberty Bonds.

But there was other evidence of intolerance, albeit less violent, in St. Louis itself. In late November 1917 the chief of police, at the urging of several St. Louisans "prominent in the Liberty Bond and food conservation campaigns," re-
fused to permit Fritz Kreisler, the eminent Austrian musician, to perform in St. Louis on 4 December. The Post-Dispatch decried the action, contending “Intolerance in art is a relic of barbarism,” and the St. Louis publisher William Marion Reedy complained that the incident gave St. Louis a “bad black eye.” But Mayor Henry Kiel, who had earlier identified closely with the German-American community, refused to intercede. In early April 1918, the St. Louis Republic began a campaign to end the publication of the public proceedings of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen in German as well as English by headlining a report, “City Spends $25,000.00 a Year to Please Germans Who Should Learn English.” The Monday after the Weinsberg interview appeared in the Post-Dispatch, the Republic began a campaign to exclude German instruction from the public schools, and a few weeks later, on 4 May 1918, the Republic called for a campaign to change the names of certain St. Louis streets in order “to abolish German street names to assist in making St. Louis 100% American.”

There were some American voices urging calm in St. Louis. For instance, Reedy condemned efforts to remove German books from libraries and to ban German language study in St. Louis schools and colleges. And some prominent German-Americans in St. Louis tried to defuse the loyalty issue. Charles Nagel, Professor Leo Loeb of the Washington University School of Medicine, and Professor Otto Heller of the Washington University Department of German made public statements in support of President Wilson and the United States war effort. And the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, launched a publicity campaign of its own to emphasize the church’s loyalty to the United States and its lack of ties with the Lutheran Church of Germany, a step deemed necessary after various patriotic groups launched attacks against the church as disloyal.

Nevertheless, the anti-German campaigns had a serious impact upon the St. Louis German-American community. On 14 April 1918, the St. Louis German Theater announced that the performance by the touring Pabst Theater from Milwaukee had been cancelled because advance sales were too weak. And on 17 April 1918, only days after the Weinsberg affair began, it was announced that the use of German in Lutheran churches in St. Louis was being ended, and the name of a Lutheran church, Dreieinigkeitskirche, was being changed to its English equivalent, Trinity Church.

But most distressing of all to the German-American community were the countless wild rumors of German spy and sabotage activity throughout the United States—most of which were regularly reported in the St. Louis newspapers. On 1 March 1918 the Globe-Democrat headlined a story on some of the more sensationalist testimony in the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearings on the DANB with “German-Alliance Called ‘Greatest Internal Menace.’” And on 13 April, the Amerika felt compelled to publish, in English, a report of the United States Food Administration discounting rumors that German agents were putting ground glass into food.

Most of the spy reports were fanciful, but their dissemination contributed to
the atmosphere of hysterical suspicion. Some of the more outlandish rumors included reports that German agents planned to liberate German sailors interned in eastern port towns; that German agents, posing as Bible salesmen, were trying to stir up blacks in the South and were urging them to migrate to Mexico; that attacks were planned against the waterworks of Dayton, Ohio; that Denver German-American Red Cross workers were putting glass into bandages; and that German Mennonite flour-mill operators in South Dakota were putting glass in the flour that they ground.

A contributing factor to the hysteria was the American Protective League, an organization of two hundred thousand untrained volunteers set up in coordination with U.S. Attorney General Thomas Gregory and with the tacit approval of Wilson to feed information on allegedly disloyal citizens and aliens to the Justice Department. The League had three thousand volunteer operatives in St. Louis, as well as fifty who worked full time investigating suspicious persons. The activities of the organization in St. Louis included causing the dismissal of a German-American from his job at a St. Louis bank for predicting that the Allies would lose the war and arresting a German in a St. Louis movie house who loudly protested from the audience when an actor in a film was given a line to the effect that the Germans had marched through Belgium and France like barbarians. Among the “cases” investigated by the League in St. Louis from 3 April 1917 through the end of the war were 1,142 alleged violations of the Espionage Act; 1,741 instances of alleged pro-German propaganda; 48 IWW or pacifist cases; 7,075 draft cases; 589 character and loyalty investigations; and 225 cases of alleged alien enemy activities. In addition, the League supplied Liberty Loan canvassers in St. Louis with report forms to fill out and return to the Protective League if the canvassers came upon supposedly disloyal persons while soliciting the public.

In addition, the Committee on Public Information, established by Congress with the idea of propagandizing the war effort to the public, flooded the country with information on the war and organized seventy-five thousand “Four Minute Men,” who would speak anywhere on request about the American war effort. Quite naturally, many Four Minute Men soon came to see themselves as super-patriots. In its propaganda endeavors, the Committee was not above labeling Germans and German culture as barbarian and hinting at the existence of a German spy and sabotage system in the United States. In the midst of the hysteria, nearly six thousand naturalized Americans and aliens were arrested throughout the United States, as well as over sixteen hundred arrests under the Espionage Act of 1917. Nearly all the innuendos and accusations were groundless, but there was no way for the individual American citizen or even newspaperman to realize that in April 1918.

A number of other quasi-governmental bodies in the state contributed to the atmosphere of intolerance. The Liberty Bell, a newsletter distributed under Treasury Department franking by the Liberty Loan organization for the Federal Re-
serve District headquartered in St. Louis, contained reports on the progress of the bond sales campaigns and to boost sales added accounts of the evil of the enemy. One newsletter declared, “The battle for world freedom is a holy cause. The fate of Christianity depends on the defeat of the Hun.” Another newsletter predicted that the alleged German atrocities in Belgium would be repeated in America by the “Hun.”

The most significant of the patriotic organizations, however, was the Missouri Council of Defense, created by executive decree by Gov. Frederick D. Gardner on 24 April 1917 without any enabling legislation whatever having been enacted by Congress or the Missouri General Assembly. The Council was headed by F. B. Mumford, dean of the College of Agriculture at the University of Missouri in Columbia, and devoted itself to organizing agriculture and industry in the state for the war effort. But the Council, which received guidance from various federal agencies in Washington, also policed the state, looking for “disloyal” citizens. Local councils of defense were organized in numerous counties under the aegis of the State Council of Defense, and officials of the county councils saw it as their duty to keep an eye on disloyal elements in their midst. The leaders of the county councils were local citizens wholly unsophisticated and inexperienced in undertaking investigations of any kind, although their lack of skill or experience certainly did not curb their enthusiasm and zeal.

Thus, the State Council each week received letters from county councils all over the state, as local officials reported on some suspicious German-American or suspected IWW member or socialist, sometimes asking for the State Council to take action or to allow the local council to take action against the allegedly disloyal citizens. In fact, the zeal of the local officials was so great that often one Council of Defense officer would allege to the State Council that another local official was disloyal. For a while, the State Council routinely sent such letters on to the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, but finally the volume of reports became so large that an official of the Bureau wrote to the State Council, “Our experience has taught us that a vast majority of the complaints are written through a spirit of patriotic resentment and do not represent what is in fact a serious condition.” The federal official urged the State Council to stop serving simply as a clearinghouse for disloyalty complaints and to screen out meretricious cases on its own. Significantly, however, the State Council leaders, who tended to be a good deal more moderate in their attitudes and more sophisticated in their outlook on the powers and authorities of the council and the degree of “disloyalty” in the populace, recognized that the local councils were incapable of undertaking efficient investigations to aid in the screening of such complaints. In fact, F. B. Mumford acknowledged that it was “certain that a local Council of Defense would be the worst possible organization to investigate a local case of disloyalty.” As a consequence, the State Council often sent its own investigator to examine suspicious events.

One of the major loyalty campaigns of the State Council of Defense was the
abolition of the German language from the state, including the elimination of the
language from all schools, churches, lodges, and public meetings. Many other
Missourians agreed with that proposition and needed little prompting from the
State Council to follow suit. Thus the Board of Directors of the St. Joseph School
district passed a resolution barring the study of German in St. Joseph schools,
contending, "The German language of Goethe and Schiller has become a dead
language . . . supplemented by the language of the Prussian, with its degrading
immoral influence and brutality . . . until the [German] nation as a whole has
degenerated into a race of savage beasts." 34 Nor was the enthusiasm for barring
German limited to Missouri's secondary schools. The president of the Board of
Managers of William Woods College in Fulton, Missouri, wrote to the State
Council that German had been eliminated as a subject at the college, and he of­
fered the opinion that the language should be barred from every school in the
United States. And the president of the Missouri State Normal School at Cape
Girardeau, although not calling for the abolition of the study of German at the
college, nevertheless urged the Council to agitate for eliminating all German
newspapers as well as all German language study in elementary and parochial
schools. 35 Several county councils of defense convinced local telephone com­
panies to ban the use of German over the telephone. 36 And the community of
Tipton, in Moniteau County, passed an ordinance forbidding the use of German
on the streets of the town, a measure that even the Missouri attorney general,
Frank McAllister, found to be "a little drastic." 37

But the part of the State Council's campaign against the German language that
met the most resistance was the effort to bar German from the churches of Mis­
souri. A number of pastors and local council officials wrote to the State Council,
asking permission to continue to allow the use of German among local church
congregations, citing the fact that many church members were used to worship­
ning in German and that there were some rural pastors who could not conduct
services in English. 38 Ironically, one of the most outspoken and yet pathetic letters
from a German-language pastor to the State Council on the subject of German­
language church services came from the Reverend Hermann Walz, formerly an
active member of the St. Louis City Alliance who by 1917 and 1918 was pastor
of a rural Lutheran Church in Osage County, Missouri. 39

Sometimes the efforts to abolish the trappings of German culture evoked
resentment that boiled over into open defiance. When the predominantly Ger­
man community of Potsdam, in Gasconade County, was confronted with such
de-Germanization efforts, acrimony broke out. The local postmaster refused to
recognize the new name given to Potsdam, "Pershing," and the pastor of the lo­
cal German church ignored various requests and continued to give funeral ser­
VICES in German. In the end, a county council official practically begged the
State Council not to encourage the local native American minority in its efforts
to taunt the other residents of Potsdam about their German ancestry, especially
since in the local official's view the German-Americans of Potsdam were unques­
tionably loyal Americans. 40
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Yet despite all the activity of the State Council and the various county councils, state officials and some local officials freely acknowledged that in fact the Council had no authority to forbid use of German anywhere or for that matter to exercise any governmental powers. But the atmosphere of the state was so charged over the matter of loyalty that many Missourians were willing to follow the lead of the Council, and few German-Americans dared question its authority. Thus, among other things, the State Council was able to petition successfully to the state superintendent of schools for the revocation of the teaching certificate of one J. W. Lint for alleged disloyalty, and the State Council was also able to agitate successfully for the resignation of G. M. Grossman of St. Louis, state chairman of the Four Minute Men, also for alleged disloyalty.

Meanwhile, Governor Gardner served as a quasi-official sponsor of such anti-German campaigns. Gardner congratulated the state superintendent of schools for calling for the dropping of German instruction from Missouri elementary schools. Gardner proclaimed, "Never again in Missouri shall the language which has been used to propagate the doctrine of murder, rapine, and dishonor, and of might over right, be taught in our public schools." And Gardner maintained that the State Council of Defense had greater power to promote loyalty and suppress "disloyalty" than even the officials of the State Council were prepared to claim.

But not just governmental institutions contributed to intolerance. The St. Louis English-language newspapers regularly printed reports of vigilante activity and questionable acts of patriotism. Thus, for instance, the Post-Dispatch reported the acquittal by a Hawaii jury of a man accused of shooting another who had supposedly made disloyal remarks, and the Globe-Democrat reprinted an accusation that a strike at a plant in East St. Louis was caused by pro-German agitators, all of which contributed to the sense of justification for acts of patriotic intolerance.

The hatred of things German in Missouri was certainly not centered in St. Louis, nor were its most virulent forms necessarily evident in that city, as suggested by the events in Tipton and Potsdam mentioned above. And intolerance was evident in other areas in the nation's interior. The Lutheran Witness in May 1918 reported that the state of Idaho had prohibited all foreign languages in schools and churches; that the Montana Council of Defense had sought to ban German in the pulpit; that the Minneapolis Tribune had urged the ban of foreign languages in the schools; that the local council of defense in Wakefield, Nebraska, had called for the abolition of the use of German in the streets, in public places, in churches, and over the telephone; and that the Brookfield, Illinois, village trustees had made it a misdemeanor to use German in any public place, punishable by a fine of up to one hundred dollars.

It was in this context that the article about Weinsberg's reported prediction of a German victory appeared on the streets of St. Louis on the front page of the Post-Dispatch. The reaction of the public was prompt. Within hours after the article appeared, the United States attorney's office in St. Louis began to receive tele-
phone calls, asking what action would be taken against Weinsberg. A group of Four Minute Men showed up at the office of the U.S. attorney and asked to be named special deputies in order to make the arrest of Weinsberg if the prosecutor’s office issued an arrest warrant. And the very same evening, Dr. R. Emmet Kane, a former president of the St. Louis Medical Society, speaking as a Four Minute Man at the West End Lyric Theater, stated that all persons who held Weinsberg’s views should be imprisoned for six months, and as much longer as the war might last.

The U.S. attorney’s office in St. Louis did not waste any time. By nightfall of Saturday, the day the article appeared, a warrant for Weinsberg’s arrest had been issued, charging him with violating Section 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917.

Two U.S. deputy marshals were sent to arrest Weinsberg in his home about 8:30 p.m., and he was taken to the central police station and then on to the St. Louis city jail. There Weinsberg was forced to suffer the indignity of the standard jail admission procedures: undergoing a medical examination, being vaccinated, being required to bathe, having his civilian clothes fumigated, and having to dress in jail clothes—a pajamalike suit of striped ticking cloth. Such treatment evoked further protests from Weinsberg over being treated like the most common of criminals. Finally, at 6:30 on Sunday evening Weinsberg was released on three thousand dollars bail, posted by Edward Devoy, owner of a coal business in the city.

Dr. Weinsberg promptly denied the charges against him and denied that he had made the statements attributed to him by the article in the Post-Dispatch. In doing so, Weinsberg questioned the motives of the Post-Dispatch: “This is the result of a trick. Two years ago I sent out a notice to members of the Alliance to read the St. Louis Times, and not to read the Post-Dispatch, because of the unfairness of the Post-Dispatch to the Alliance. Yesterday when the Post-Dispatch reporters came to see me, I discussed my views with them, but they misused my statement, carefully leaving out parts which would have changed the meaning.” But to the Globe-Democrat, Weinsberg implicitly admitted he had made at least some damaging remarks, even if quoted out of context: “Men who are not of German descent can say much worse things than I did and they are not molested and nothing is made of their statements.”

It is unclear why Weinsberg was so expansive. Possibly it was out of a feeling of resentment or frustration over having to suppress his sympathy, or possibly simply out of naivete. In any event, he acted out of character. And the remarks of Weinsberg to the Post-Dispatch reporters were much more reckless and compromising than anything he had ever before stated publicly. Nevertheless, there appears to be little question that in the interview there very clearly could be perceived a substantial remnant of sympathy on Weinsberg’s part for Germany.

The editorial reaction of the St. Louis newspapers toward Weinsberg was overwhelmingly harsh. The Post-Dispatch, the originator of the story, concluded that “there is not a spark of American in the man,” asserting, “Dr. Weinsberg is giv-
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ing all the aid and comfort of which he is capable to the enemy and is throwing whatever influence he possesses against America’s putting another man or another dollar into the war.” The *St. Louis Star*, another daily, added a few days after Weinsberg’s arrest that Weinsberg had not learned that “Americanism must be active and not passive, to receive the stamp of approval in these times.” Referring to the Alliance, the *Star* observed, “Mere temporary discontinuance of an organization whose existence tends to perpetuate exactly that sort of second-choice Americanism which is revealed in Dr. Weinsberg’s case is not sufficient.” The *Republic* was even blunter about the future of the Alliance: “Nor will the Missouri German-American Alliance resume its ‘activities’ after the war. Whatever those activities have been heretofore, we know they have had nothing to do with making better American citizens, and the German-American Alliance is one of the things we are going to get along without, after the war, both in Missouri and the nation at large.”

Significantly, the *St. Louis Times* and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, both with large German-American readerships, did not comment editorially on Weinsberg’s arrest. On the other hand, the *St. Louis German*-language newspapers did not come to the defense of Weinsberg, an indication that the reorientation of the German-language newspaper editors had finally been accomplished. In fact, the *Westliche Post*, which only months before had been complaining about the arrogance of Great Britain and the machinations of Wall Street bankers, on the very day that the article on Weinsberg’s prediction appeared in the *Post-Dispatch* published an editorial applauding the dissolution of the DANB, an organization that the *Westliche Post* had earlier fervently supported. On the day following Weinsberg’s arrest, the *Westliche Post* published an editorial on its front page—in both English and German—condemning Weinsberg for his purported remarks. Headlined “Unwarrantable and Inexcusable,” the editorial read in part:

Thanks to an alleged statement of [the Alliance’s] President, Dr. Charles Weinsberg, the distrust entertained for years as to its real aims and objects has been fanned into a flame of open and unmeasured condemnation. A St. Louis paper attributes to Dr. Weinsberg observations concerning the war that are almost treasonable. Actually they are without a parallel coming from a man who until now occupied a respected position in public life and enjoyed the reputation of being a patriotic citizen. What harm his alleged remarks may yet cause cannot be foretold, for public opinion will not hold him accountable as an individual. He will be looked upon as one of the foremost representatives of an organization already under strong suspicion. The indignation caused by his alleged utterances will be directed not against him alone. Thousands of loyal citizens of German descent will have to suffer for it as every word that is said to have been spoken in the interview offers a welcome means to those professional agitators who would like to make it appear that the German origin of an American is inseparable from disloyalty and treason.

And the *Amerika*, which at one time had vigorously supported the submarine warfare policy of the German government, also published articles and editorials critical of the Alliance and Dr. Weinsberg.
The impact of Dr. Weinsberg's arrest on the Alliance in Missouri was devastating. Ironically, Weinsberg had called a meeting of the Executive Committee of the State Alliance for the very evening on which he was arrested, with the idea in mind of formally voting to suspend all meetings and activities of the State Alliance for the duration of the war. It is indicative of the advanced disintegration of the State Alliance by April 1918 that only four of the dozen or so members of the Executive Committee showed up for the meeting: F.W. Keck, president of the City Alliance, George Withum and John Gewinner, both also of St. Louis, and Fred Lorenz of St. Joseph.60 When the men learned that Weinsberg had been arrested, Withum promptly moved the dissolution of the State Alliance, and the other three men unanimously agreed. Thus the State Alliance, an organization of supposedly seventy-five thousand members, vanished inside of fifteen minutes upon the action of four men.61 At the same time, Keck, as president of the City Alliance, called a meeting of the City Alliance for the following Friday, 19 April, to consider a similar motion to dissolve.

But by that time the urge to disassociate from the German-American Alliance had become so great that Keck did not even wait until the following Friday. Instead, in order to avoid the glare of publicity, Keck and the Executive Committee of the City Alliance met secretly on the evening of Wednesday the seventeenth and voted to dissolve the City Alliance.62 When a reporter for the Post-Dispatch approached Keck for details of the Executive Committee meeting dissolving the City Alliance, he found a gun-shy Keck unwilling to be drawn out by any questions. Clearly, Keck had learned the lesson of Weinsberg's interview with the Post-Dispatch. The following dialogue occurred between the reporter and Keck:

"Did the St. Louis German-American Alliance disband last night?"
"Yes."
"Who were present?"
"The Executive Committee."
"Were you there?"
"Yes."
"Who composed the Executive Committee?"
"I don't want to tell. Just say that the St. Louis German-American Alliance is disbanded."
"Where was the meeting held?"
"Just say that the Alliance is no more."
"Did the Committee meet at your home?"
"Just say that the Alliance is disbanded."
"Won't you please tell what members of the Committee were there besides yourself?"
"What's the use. The German-American Alliance of St. Louis is no more."
"Well, very likely the 13,000 members in St. Louis would be interested to know what occurred."
"They are not members any more. There isn't any more Alliance."
"You refuse to give any information about what took place except that it was just decided to disband?"
"Yes. What is the use of discussing what is no more? Let's forget all about it."63
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Thus within five days after Weinsberg’s arrest the German-American Alliance in Missouri vanished.

Weinsberg’s arrest even became a national story. In its Sunday edition, the New York Times reported the arrest of Weinsberg on the preceding day with the headline “Alliance Leader Held as Disloyal.” Moreover, Weinsberg’s statements, and the reporting of them by the Post-Dispatch, provoked comment three weeks later on the floor of the United States Senate.

At the time, the Senate was debating whether to amend the Espionage Act, under which Weinsberg was being prosecuted, to define even more broadly the conduct to be proscribed as disloyal and to sharpen the penalties. During the debate on 4 May, a befuddled Sen. William Sherman of Illinois referred to the Post-Dispatch article on Weinsberg and insisted that the article itself, and not just Weinsberg’s statements, were seditious, and that the paper should have been banned from the mail. Pointing to the picture of Weinsberg on the front page of the paper, Sherman insisted that the face was “almost seditious,” and a colleague agreed, perhaps with tongue in cheek, that it had a “Pan-Germanic look.”

Senator Sherman apparently believed that the Post-Dispatch subscribed to the six-month prediction it contended that Weinsberg had made, and the paper felt compelled to defend itself from the senatorial attacks upon it for publishing the article. Joseph Pulitzer, Jr., publisher of the Post-Dispatch, sent a long telegram to Sherman, and in an editorial on 6 May 1918 the paper counterattacked, calling Sherman’s statement on the Senate floor “ridiculous.”

But a portion of a Post-Dispatch editorial in defense of itself, published on 5 May 1918, was revealing:

The Post-Dispatch sent two reporters to obtain the interview, which was published in order to expose the disloyalty of Dr. Weinsberg and to give further convincing reasons for the abolition of the German-American Alliance, which was then on trial in the Senate. Two reporters were sent to obtain two witnesses to the accuracy of the interview, with a definite expectation that Dr. Weinsberg would be arrested for his utterances. Further statements had been made previously to one Post-Dispatch reporter.

A warrant for Dr. Weinsberg’s arrest was issued within an hour of the appearance of the publication, and the testimony upon which he was subsequently indicted was supplied by the Post-Dispatch reporters who interviewed him.

Thus the newspaper implicitly admitted that it had come dangerously close to making news rather than reporting it. It is likely that if Weinsberg had made the prediction attributed to him by the Post-Dispatch reporters and there had been no publication, no prosecution of Weinsberg would have resulted, even if the Post-Dispatch reporters had disclosed the prediction to the United States attorney. But by its very act of publishing the interview, the Post-Dispatch had indirectly but literally made a federal case out of the matter. Moreover, the Post-Dispatch editors had apparently decided for themselves that the Espionage Act of 1917 made punishable such “disloyal” sentiments.
That the Post-Dispatch had come perilously close to or had gone over the line between making and reporting news did not escape the attention of the St. Louis Times, which condemned the atmosphere of distrust that it perceived being stirred up by the Post-Dispatch:

We're out to whip the German, not to bring about disunity among ourselves.

When the Post-Dispatch deliberately set a trap for Weinsberg, it took the first step toward creating sympathy where none existed or should have existed. The frank declaration of the paper that it expected his arrest shows the desire for excitement rather than for justice. His statement repeated privately to the Grand Jury would have accomplished the needed effect.69

Because the affair had become a national event, Weinsberg felt compelled to issue a public statement, in which he continued to maintain that he had been trapped. And he understandably attacked the presumption of his guilt by public officials and editors, complaining of being tried on the floor of the Senate and in the columns of the press rather than in a court of law.69 Although Senator Sherman eventually retracted his accusation of sedition against the Post-Dispatch, he blithely went on to note that he believed Weinsberg would be convicted of the charges against him.70 Dr. Weinsberg, meanwhile, had remained the subject of judicial proceedings. On 22 April 1918, a week after his arrest, he was bound over to the grand jury on the Espionage Act charges.71 On 4 May 1918, the day that Senator Sherman was discussing Dr. Weinsberg’s guilt on the floor of the Senate, Weinsberg was indicted by the grand jury for violation of Section 3 of the Espionage Act.72 His trial was set for the latter part of June 1918.
When the United States entered World War I, there was not nearly as widespread a fundamental consensus as today among Americans about what was the appropriate social, political and economic order for the United States, democratic, capitalistic, socialistic, or otherwise, so that in 1917 there were many substantially large disaffected elements, not yet amalgamated within the prevailing economic and political system. For instance, there was an active socialist leadership in the United States, antagonistic to the political and economic order in America. The socialists drew support from significant segments of the American working population, which was not yet fully assimilated into the capitalist order by the modern American labor movement. After the German-American leaders became quieter in late 1916 and early 1917, it was these socialist leaders who picked up the cry that the world war was being conducted for the benefit of the Wall Street bankers and the munitions manufacturers. When Kate Richards O'Hare, a St. Louis socialist, was ready to depart to serve her five-year prison term upon conviction for violating the Espionage Act by such "disloyal" remarks, she was given a defiant send-off by several hundred sympathizers at the Odeon Theatre in St. Louis. Of course there were also still many ethnic Americans, especially those of German and Irish descent, who resented the entry of the United States into the war on behalf of Great Britain and France and against Germany.

In 1917 the disaffected elements of American society were large enough and vocal enough to lead many citizens and political leaders to fear that a national consensus of support for the war effort, believed by many to be essential if the campaign was to be successful, would be threatened. Moreover, many of those citizens concerned about the war effort were sufficiently estranged from the attitudes and philosophies of those ethnic Americans or political or religious dissenters who protested the war that many citizens suspected such dissenters of lack-
ing loyalty to the United States. The result was a charged atmosphere in which even the most innocent criticism might be seen as part of a presumed larger ethnic or political campaign to sabotage the war effort.

As a backdrop to these diverse elements within the American society, there was the in-fighting between the Democratic Wilson administration on one side and the conservative Republican members of Congress and the Progressives on the other side. Every effort by Wilson's government to establish a war administration centralized in the federal government was met with outcries by the Republicans, Progressives, and socialists, who suspected that the true motive behind those proposals was to aggrandize the power and influence of the Wilson administration or to suppress civil liberties.

Members of the Wilson government were sensitive to these charges, and, as some scholars have noted, there was a tendency on the part of many cabinet-level officers in the federal government to allow volunteer citizens' organizations to spring up in lieu of governmental administration, so that the charges of aggrandizement and the resentment over centralized prosecution of the war effort could be deflected. Thus organizations like the Committee on Public Information, headed by former Missourian George Creel, and the American Protective League were created. Unfortunately, the operations of these citizens' groups allowed the worst and most highly emotional subjective suspicions of some Americans about the political loyalties and motives of war dissenters or fringe political or religious movements to find quasi-official expression.

Into the midst of this setting of suspicion and mistrust was inserted the espionage bill, proposed by the Wilson administration, passed by Congress, and signed into law on 15 June 1917. The Espionage Act was to become one of the principal symbols of the hysteria of the war period in the United States. Not since the Sedition Act of 1798, which had been used by the Federalists to mute the political opposition of Jeffersonian Republicans, had federal law been used to make such a frontal assault on free speech and political agitation. As with the Sedition Act of 1798, the Espionage Act (and the 1918 sedition amendment to the Espionage Act) ended up being used more against unpopular domestic critics of the government than against true enemy agents and sympathizers.

The crucial provision of the 1917 Act was Section 3 of Title I:

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

It is important to consider what the above section does not say. On its face it does not specifically ban seditious remarks. For instance, there is not one word about...
prohibiting disloyalty, whatever that term might have meant to patriotic speakers and newspaper editors during the war years. Thus, a lack of total commitment to the war effort, an incomplete sense of loyalty or indifference toward the United States, or even defamatory remarks about the institutions or officials of the United States were not made crimes by the plain language of the 1917 statute. Moreover, its language requires that the defendant harbor a specific intent to commit the prohibited acts or to cause the proscribed result: on the face of the act one could not violate the law inadvertently or innocently.

The legislative history suggests that the legislators intended the statute to be narrowly construed. The espionage bill, as originally introduced, had a section allowing the president broad powers to censor the dissemination of information and statements about the American war effort. But that part generated a storm of protest both within Congress and among newspaper editors. The New York Times, for instance, took great pains to report the opposition to the section in the congressional debates and warned that the provision would grant sweeping powers to President Wilson to suppress dissent to and honest criticism of the war policy and efforts of the Wilson administration and the military. Eventually, the Espionage Act was passed without the censorship provision. Significantly, one congressman urged that the censorship provision was not needed: “I think anyone who does it [publishes attacks on the government] with a guilty purpose can be caught under the other sections of the Bill, and anybody who does it in the discharging of a duty by way of criticism ought not to be caught by any portion of the Bill.” Nevertheless, the act resulted in widespread violations of civil liberties. What the senators and congressmen opposed to the censorship provision of the bill had not anticipated was that federal prosecutors and federal judges would enforce Section 3 of Title I, one of the “other sections” referred to by the congressman quoted above, in a sweeping and draconian manner to suppress dissent and criticism.

A significant aspect of the injustice of the enforcement of the Espionage Act was its disparate application throughout the United States. Enforcement was left to local federal prosecutors in each federal district of the nation, and the willingness of these U.S. attorneys to construe the law narrowly or broadly varied widely. Similarity, some federal prosecutors were more willing to succumb to the pressures of local citizens to enforce the law oppressively than were their counterparts in other districts. In the first year after the Espionage Act was in force, for example, there were 988 cases commenced under the act in the eighty-four federal districts in the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico: yet 404 of those 988 prosecutions, over 40 percent, were commenced in a total of only eight districts.

It would appear that Arthur Oliver, the federal prosecutor in St. Louis, may have attempted to deflect the public pressure for vigorous enforcement of the Espionage Act by obtaining indictments—and then letting the cases die quietly. Of the seventy Espionage Act prosecutions commenced in the Eastern District of
Missouri between the passage of the act and 30 June 1918, only eight resulted in convictions, and a full fifty-two were "nolle prossed" by the U.S. attorney's office, meaning that the federal prosecutor advised the court some time after the indictments were returned by the grand jury that the prosecutor did not desire to continue the case. On the other hand, Francis Wilson, the U.S. attorney in Kansas City, often explicitly refused to prosecute cases brought to his attention by loyal citizens, including officers of the Missouri Council of Defense, and frankly lectured the Council on the fact that the Espionage Act was not as broadly worded as those lawyers and laymen not acquainted with its provisions thought. The result was that W. F. Saunders, secretary of the State Council, perceived a disparity in the two federal prosecutors' enforcement of the act, contending that Wilson in Kansas City was "more pacific" in his actions under the act than Oliver in St. Louis.

It is not to the credit of the administration of President Wilson that it moved so slowly to curtail abuses in the enforcement of the act. It was only in late October 1918 that Attorney General Thomas Gregory issued an order to U.S. attorneys instructing them first to consult with the Department of Justice in Washington before submitting an Espionage Act case to the local grand jury for possible indictment. If this had been done earlier, the intense local pressure placed on some federal prosecutors could have been deflected to the less vulnerable officials in the Department of Justice in Washington.

In any event, it was obvious within weeks after the Espionage Act became law that various prosecutors saw the act not only as a device to prosecute spies and saboteurs but also as a means to punish dissident elements in American society for "disloyalty," which often was little more than an unwillingness to evince the expected enthusiasm about the American war effort. The prosecutions frequently arose out of statements and actions that are today commonly accepted as within the parameters of free speech, but in 1917 and 1918 such dissent, even if not coupled with any effort to interfere with the military, was subject to prosecution under Section 3 of the Espionage Act.

The prosecutors were not alone in their enthusiasm for broadly reading the act to permit prosecution for "disloyalty." Never before had the United States judiciary been called upon to such a great extent to construe the limits of free speech in a wartime context, and the sad fact is that in the passions of the time, the courts, on the trial level at least, were not up to the task of bringing dispassionate and judicious objectivity to bear upon the question. Rather, the opinions of certain federal district court judges often reflected the same exaggerated fear of dissent that prevailed in the popular press and among the populace. In at least one case in Kansas City, the conviction of a defendant, a socialist, was reversed by the federal appellate court on the grounds that the conduct of the trial judge had been so influenced by his political antipathy toward socialists that the trial had been unfair. Citizens, moreover, often participated in the abuse of the act, as happened in St. Louis when severe pressure was applied to the federal prosecutor there to
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file charges against Charles Weinsberg on the strength of the article in the Post-Dispatch alone. Many prosecutors were unwilling to resist such citizen pressure. But the passions of the citizenry were not manifested solely in calls for prosecution. As one federal judge noted:

For the first six months after June 15, 1917, I tried war cases before jurymen who were candid, sober, intelligent business men, whom I had known for thirty years, and who under ordinary circumstances would have had the highest respect for my declarations of law, but during that period they looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild animals, saying by their manner, "Away with this twiddling, let us get at him." Men believed during that period that the only verdict in a war case, which could show loyalty, was a verdict of guilty.

The consequence of all this was that frequently in the federal district courts an unholy trinity of prosecutor, trial judge, and jury led to indiscriminate indictments and convictions under the Espionage Act. Often the prosecution that resulted seemed wholly arbitrary and whimsically capricious—and so far divorced from the original purpose of the act, to punish spies and saboteurs of the enemy who attempted to curtail the American war effort, as to seem part of some theater of the absurd. Thus, one man was convicted for a casual remark made to his next-door neighbor in the course of a backyard conversation. Another defendant was prosecuted for saying that the YMCA, YWCA, and Red Cross were full of grafters and that only a small portion of the money contributed reached the soldiers. And in another case, a man who was intoxicated argued with some forest rangers over timber rights: unknown to him, the rangers were recruiting men for the army and his behavior was seen as hindering their effort, thereby subjecting him to prosecution. Generally, however, the defendants in these prosecutions fell into three broad categories, each of which included those whose views were unpopular among "patriotic" Americans during the war.

Socialists were regularly prosecuted because they believed the war was being fought for the sake of monied interests and at the expense of the working class, and they said so. That meant that many socialist speakers debunked as mere propaganda the idea that the war was being fought for some higher moral cause. Thus, Rose Pastor Stokes was convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment after she wrote the Kansas City Star to the effect that she was not only against the war but also against the government, since, "No government which is for the profiteers can also be for the people, and I am for the people, while the government is for the profiteers." St. Louisan Kate Richards O'Hare was sentenced to prison under the act for an antiwar speech before a few hundred people in North Dakota.

Pacifists, of whatever moral or religious persuasion, were also regularly prosecuted when they preached their antiwar views. In one case, the defendants were convicted in the trial court for distributing a publication that opposed war and called soldiers "low brutes."

And, of course, German-Americans who were unable to keep within them-
selves their sentiments about the war and their sympathy for Germany were the third general group of persons regularly prosecuted under the Espionage Act. Incidents of German-Americans continuing to reveal pro-German sentiments were especially prevalent in the Middle West, which had been the center of pro-German sentiment before the United States entered the war. For instance, a German-American minister in Pomeroy, Iowa, was unable to contain himself, and in a sermon delivered in November 1917 he stated that the Liberty Bond drive was humbug, that the United States had no right to enter the war, and that the United States was really at war to help England. He was tried and convicted, and his conviction was upheld on appeal.\textsuperscript{19} Former leaders of the German-American Alliance throughout the Middle West were popular subjects of prosecution: Charles H. Kammann, former president of the Peoria Alliance; Dr. Weinsberg, president of the Missouri State Alliance; Carl C. Gleeser, secretary of the Kansas City Alliance; Jacob Frohwerk, president of the Kansas Alliance; and Conrad Kormann, president of the South Dakota State Alliance.\textsuperscript{20} The prosecution of Frohwerk and Gleeser was by far the most notorious of those involving German-Americans, for it was one of a trio of cases in which the United States Supreme Court, in a questionable decision, upheld the constitutionality of such prosecutions under the Espionage Act.\textsuperscript{21}

One pernicious aspect of the prosecution of German-Americans was the common practice of introducing as testimony pro-German remarks and actions made by a German-American defendant \textit{before} the United States entered the war, supposedly to show that allegedly disloyal statements of the defendant \textit{after} the United States entered the war had been made with the requisite criminal intent to interfere with the United States military forces. In one case, for instance, the fact that the defendant had bought German war bonds in 1916, a perfectly legal act in that year, was admitted into evidence purportedly to show his criminal intent under the Espionage Act for remarks made in June and October 1918 to the effect that the United States had no right to go to war, that the German people were the best on earth, and that he hoped Germany would win the war.\textsuperscript{22} Eventually, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the case of \textit{United States v. Kammann}, put an end to the use of pre-1917 statements and actions to justify convictions for allegedly unlawful actions or statements committed after the act was made law. The appellate court noted, “While we were neutral, Kammann’s ‘mental attitude,’ as the trial court characterized the effect of this evidence, was no more an offense than was the ‘mental attitude’ of other American citizens who expressed their belief in the cause of the Allies.”\textsuperscript{23} In fact, the appellate courts often acted as a calming element in the construction of the espionage law, and many of the grossest abuses of justice in the federal district courts were rectified when the cases were appealed. But the appellate decision in \textit{Kammann}, as in most of the cases, came after the war was over. By that time, passions were beginning to cool and the perceived need for scrutiny of supposedly suspicious elements in the society had abated. Yet the fact remains that
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while the war was being waged nearly two thousand defendants were charged under the Espionage Act, many of whom were tried and convicted, and during that time there were few appellate decisions and no Supreme Court opinions admonishing restraint. Thus, when Dr. Weinsberg came to trial in June 1918, there were still many people in the nation clamoring for vigorous enforcement of the Espionage Act, and there were numerous prosecutors and federal district judges willing to heed that clamor.

Weinsberg had been indicted in May 1918, and his trial was scheduled for late in June. It was anticipated that the case would be tried by Judge David P. Dyer, a federal district judge in St. Louis. Dyer, a native of Pike County, Missouri, who had gone to Congress as a Republican in 1868 and had served as U.S. attorney in the 1870s and again in the early 1900s, was eighty years old and in poor health. He was not terribly eager to become mired in the Espionage Act prosecutions, and he obviously felt that the enthusiasm for disloyalty prosecutions was becoming overheated. Judge Dyer in April had warned the grand jury that eventually indicted Weinsberg, “You will find that there are many busybodies in this world who seek to involve their neighbors. It is your duty to consider all such circumstances carefully.” As for the Espionage Act itself, Judge Dyer noted, “This law was made with a view to its enforcement, and, where you find that the evidence warrants it, your duty is to return indictments, however, in times of excitement people are too apt to go further in their talk than they should. If there is any place where a citizen of this country should expect justice, it is in the United States courts.” Nevertheless, the grand jury had indicted Weinsberg.

By the time of his indictment, Weinsberg was being defended by Chester Krum, a venerable figure in the St. Louis legal community. Born in 1840 in Alton, Illinois, Krum had been a United States attorney, a judge of the circuit court, and a member of the faculty of Washington University’s School of Law on a part-time basis, as well as a private practitioner. In 1918, Krum was in his late seventies and had been practicing in the federal courts for fifty-four years. He was well known as a criminal defense lawyer, but in his old age Krum had been given to certain eccentricities in the courtroom. Only a few weeks before, he had been reprimanded by a federal judge for taking liberties with courtroom procedures. At the arraignment of Weinsberg on the indictment, Krum had his client plead not guilty, and a few days later Krum filed a demurrer, or motion for dismissal, against the indictment on Weinsberg’s behalf.

Krum’s motion for demurrer was a long, rambling affair, which was not altogether successful in precisely and clearly setting forth the reasons Krum believed that the indictment should be dismissed. But at least it was apparent that Krum was contending in his demurrer that the Espionage Act, under which Dr. Weinsberg had been indicted, was unconstitutional as violating the First Amendment right of free speech. Krum also contended that the indictment failed to allege that the defendant had acted with any intent to cause disloyalty and refusal of service in the military or to interfere with the success of the military, a neces-
sary element of a violation of Section 3 of Title I of the Espionage Act. In addition, Krum argued in the demurrer that the *Post-Dispatch* and the government had worked together to entrap Weinsberg into making the remarks that allegedly violated the Espionage Act.\(^\text{28}\)

But Judge Dyer did not rule on Chester Krum’s motion. Having been taken ill, Dyer traveled to Michigan for the summer to recuperate for an extended period. Dr. Weinsberg’s trial was left to the various substitutes for Judge Dyer in St. Louis during the summer of 1918.

The first of the substitutes to have to contend with the Weinsberg case was Jacob Trieber, a federal district judge from Little Rock, Arkansas. In oral arguments on his demurrer before Judge Trieber, Krum asserted that Weinsberg had been merely expressing his personal opinions about the war to the two reporters, opinions based in part on the analyses of supposed expert military correspondents whose columns appeared in the *Post-Dispatch*, such as one Colonel Repington of Great Britain. But Trieber interrupted Krum to note that several federal courts had already ruled that the Espionage Act was constitutional, that it did not violate the First Amendment. Krum sarcastically retorted that, if that were so, it was unjust for Weinsberg to be arrested for expressing his opinions while the military correspondents were not.

With that remark Krum touched on a sensitive point in the case. For it was fairly obvious that Weinsberg’s predictions would never have generated the publicity that they did and Weinsberg would never have been arrested and indicted if he was not a German-American, and the president of the German-American Alliance in Missouri as well. At that point Judge Trieber abruptly told Krum to stop his oral argument, and Trieber announced that he was deferring the decision on the motion for demurrer until a later date.\(^\text{29}\)

But Judge Trieber soon went back to Arkansas, without ruling on the demurrer, and the U.S. Court of Appeals in St. Louis appointed Page Morris, a district judge from Duluth, Minnesota, to take Dyer’s place on the federal bench in St. Louis while Dyer continued his convalescence in Michigan.\(^\text{30}\) Morris had been a federal judge for fifteen years. Born and raised in Lynchburg, Virginia, he was a professor of mathematics when he decided to become a lawyer. He was admitted to the bar in St. Louis in February 1880, but he ended up in Duluth, where he was elected a municipal judge in 1889, city attorney in 1894, and then congressman in 1896. He was appointed to the federal bench in 1903.\(^\text{31}\) A handsome man, with bushy eyebrows and square face and white, wavy hair, Judge Morris was dashing enough even to impress Dr. Weinsberg’s teenage daughters. Ominously for Weinsberg, however, there was one report that Morris had recently overruled all demurrers in five Espionage Act prosecutions and that in all five cases the prosecution had gained convictions. Judge Morris reportedly had meted out to the convicted defendants sentences ranging from eighteen months to five years in prison.\(^\text{32}\)

At about the same time that Judge Morris was coming to St. Louis, Dr.
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Weinsberg made a show of surrendering to the St. Louis circuit attorney the charter granted by the St. Louis circuit court in 1914 to the Missouri Alliance. Weinsberg did so after he heard that the circuit attorney was ready to commence quo warranto proceedings to revoke the charter officially. The official accepted the charter, but he did nothing further about revoking the circuit court decree that had granted it.

A few days after Dr. Weinsberg's visit to the circuit attorney's office, U.S. Attorney General Thomas Gregory appointed Charles P. Williams, a St. Louis attorney and a former member of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, to serve as special assistant prosecutor assigned to the office of the U.S. attorney in St. Louis. Williams's principal responsibility was to be the prosecution of the numerous Espionage Act cases pending in St. Louis. Experienced in the area, Williams earlier in the year had served as a special assistant prosecutor in both Kansas City and St. Louis.

On 27 June, Judge Morris was ready to try the case against Dr. Weinsberg, now based on an amended indictment obtained on 18 June. The first matter for Judge Morris was to hear the arguments of Chester Krum urging that the new indictment against his client, in four counts, should be dismissed. Two counts alleged that Weinsberg had made false statements with the intent to interfere with the operations and success of the military or naval forces, while the other two counts alleged the making of statements with the intent to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces. Arguing in support of his motion for demurrer, Krum set a low-key and easy-going tone. He also sought to defuse the explosive aspect of Weinsberg's presidency and membership in the German-American Alliance. Krum observed that he himself had once been a member of the Alliance and had not thought it such a grave error. "All they had to do," Krum observed of the members of the Alliance, "was to pay in $1.00 for a year's dues and a little extra for Sunday beer and promise to vote the Republican ticket." Krum went on to suggest that the case had achieved an "exaggerated importance" because of the newspaper publicity.

Krum also emphasized that the government did not allege that any military man had been demoralized by the Weinsberg remarks, and he cited a federal court opinion for the proposition that Weinsberg's comments did not violate the Espionage Act because there was no real possibility that they could have any impact upon the military. Krum further emphasized that Weinsberg's remarks had been simply opinion, and he suggested that Weinsberg's opinions had not been that inaccurate: "Did not Amiens fall, as he predicted? I saw in the Post-Dispatch that it did. The only true thing I ever read in that paper." Finally, Krum tellingly noted that Weinsberg had spoken to two reporters in his own home, not to a crowd out in public, and that the purported violation of the Espionage Act was made more by the newspaper's publication of the interview than by the accused himself.

Judge Morris took several days to consider the arguments that Krum had
raised in regard to the indictment against his client. Significantly, Morris had made the observation during oral argument that he had heard much wilder outbursts than Weinsberg’s statements in St. Paul, a city that did not have nearly as large a German population as St. Louis, and that in comparison with them, Weinsberg’s remarks were mild. When the judge eventually did rule on the motion for demurrer on 1 July, he issued a Solomonic decision. The two counts of Weinsberg’s indictment charging him with “false statements” with the intent to interfere with the success of the military would be dismissed because the “false statements” were simply Weinsberg’s personal opinion and such “opinions” could not, in Morris’s mind, be considered “false statements.” But the two counts charging Weinsberg with attempting to cause insubordination and refusal of service in the military were retained, Morris ruling that even if the statements by Weinsberg were merely opinion, if they were opinions uttered with the intent to create disloyalty in the military then Weinsberg could be guilty of violating the Espionage Act: “Whether or not there was such intent is a matter for the jury to decide.”

The Post-Dispatch applauded Judge Morris for retaining certain of the counts against Weinsberg:

Broad as the Judge’s interpretation is, it does not strike at constitutional guarantees or right of free speech and liberty of opinion. The vital question in a given case is the intent, and that is, of course, a question of fact for the jury to determine. No loyal, patriotic citizen is expected to utter disloyal and unpatriotic remarks and no wise man will utter them. This is a bad time for loose talking. The welfare of the whole people is at stake. It is a maxim of law that one is presumed to intend the ordinary and reasonable consequences of his own acts. It is not always easy to presume one did not intend them when they lead to disasters that the merest prudence should have foreseen.

The very tone of the editorial did not augur well, either for civil liberties in St. Louis in general or for Dr. Weinsberg’s trial by jury in particular. Indeed, the editorial seemed to lose sight of the fact that the Espionage Act did not make unlawful “loose talk” or even “unpatriotic remarks,” but rather only certain overt acts with the unlawful intent to hinder the armed forces or their recruiting efforts. The problem with the presumption of intent derived from foreseeable consequences, of which the editorial speaks, is that such a presumption allows the judge or jury to make wild conjecture about what an allegedly disloyal person should have “foreseen” as the supposedly natural consequences of his remarks.

The day after Judge Morris’s ruling on the motions for demurrer, Krum filed with the court a bill of particulars on behalf of Dr. Weinsberg, requesting the prosecutor to state with more particularity the nature of the offense with which Weinsberg was being charged. This action was little more than a blatant attempt to stall for time, inspired by Morris’s earlier announcement that he would have to return to St. Paul on 6 July and would not be back in St. Louis until the fall. Krum obviously hoped that he could delay Weinsberg’s trial until the fall. Defense attorneys with clients charged under the Espionage Act were eager to delay
going to trial as long as possible in the hope that passions would cool, especially since it was becoming obvious that the presence of the United States was being felt in Europe and that an Allied victory soon was becoming likely.

When Krum presented his request, an exasperated Judge Morris exclaimed that this was only the third bill of particulars filed before him in his fifteen years on the federal bench. Krum replied innocently that he had filed the bill simply because a judge on the circuit court of appeals had told him he should have asked for such a bill. But Morris did not take the bait: the bill was denied and the trial of Dr. Weinsberg began at once.

The first step at the trial was selection of the jury, which began on Tuesday, 2 July 1918, and was completed the same day. In questioning the prospective jurors, Assistant U.S. Attorney Benjamin L. White, who was assisting Williams, asked each if he was a member of the German-American Alliance or of any organization that had conducted propaganda against war in general or against this particular war—thereby neatly inserting a pejorative about the DANB into the trial. White also asked each person if he had any doubt about the justice of the position of the country in the war. It did not escape the attention of the Westliche Post that of the twelve men on the jury, not one had been born in Germany, despite the large German population in the city.

The two lawyers spent the rest of the afternoon making their opening arguments to the jury. Krum began by stating his client’s defense succinctly: “Dr. Weinsberg did not solicit [the reporters’] visit, he did not invite their presence, and he did not intend or attempt to say anything that would affect the military forces of the country. He had no such purpose in view. He did not know that he was talking to one who was in the aviation service and was told that the interview was not for publication.” And Krum added, “No attention will be paid to the German-American Alliance. It will not enter into the case.” White, however, was hardly willing to give up the Alliance as an opening wedge for the sympathy of the jury for the prosecution. He insisted that the government expected to prove that Weinsberg had helped to organize the German-American Alliance and was a charter member of it and that the charter stated that the purpose of the Alliance was to unite those of German birth and blood and to teach the German language and ideals. Of course, by 1918 the very idea that any institution had as its purpose the teaching of the German language and ideals, as innocent as that might have sounded before 1914, evoked suspicion and distrust in the minds of many Americans. The federal prosecutor obviously wanted the Alliance as much as Dr. Weinsberg to be the focus of testimony and scrutiny in the trial: Weinsberg was about to be tried not only for his own indiscreet remarks, but also for the indiscreet actions of the entire German-American Alliance, both in Missouri and across the nation.

The next day, 3 July 1918, the taking of testimony began. Dr. Weinsberg was seated beside his attorney, and immediately behind him sat a number of prominent German-Americans in the St. Louis community who had come to the trial to show their support for Dr. Weinsberg. Among those in attendance were Fred
Widmann, the chairman of the Red Cross Bazaar in October 1915; Albert von Hoffmann, the German-American publisher who had resigned in disagreement over Kurt von Reppert’s remarks some years before; August H. Hoffmann, the bank president and longtime treasurer of the Alliance; and George Withum, former corresponding secretary of the Alliance.48

Because the government was prosecuting the defendant and charging him with a violation of the criminal statutes, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to put on its case first and to show that there was evidence of a crime before the defendant would be called upon to defend himself. Incredibly enough, considering all the publicity that the case had generated, the government took only a half-day to present its case.

The first witness was the newspaper reporter who had first interviewed Weinsberg, John T. Rogers. Assistant United States Attorney White took care to have Rogers note that he had enlisted in the Army Aviation Corps by the time of the first interview and that Rogers had told Weinsberg of his enlistment: thus the government hoped to show that Weinsberg had been guilty of violating the Espionage Act by attempting to induce at least one member of the military, Rogers himself, to insubordination or disloyalty.

When White finished his examination of Rogers, Krum began a very aggressive cross-examination of the reporter:

Krum: Why was not the interview of April 3 printed?
Rogers: I do not know.
Krum: Was it not a fact that on the second occasion when you went there with Hurd, it was to get Weinsberg to say something that would cause his arrest?
Rogers: No.
Krum: Weren’t you serving in the capacity of a Post-Dispatch sleuth?
Rogers: No.
Krum: Why did you take another man with you?
Rogers: I do not know.
Krum: Why did you and Hurd go in to see him separately? Was that not solely for the purpose of trapping him?
Rogers: That was not the purpose.49

Krum continued his cross-examination:

Krum: As a member of the military forces, did you go to Dr. Weinsberg to have your mind debauched?
Rogers: No.
Krum: As a matter of fact, didn’t you know that nothing which might be said could have debauched your mind?
Rogers: I could not be sure of that. I have an open mind at all times.50

It was obvious that Krum was putting Rogers on the defensive. At that point Williams, the assistant prosecutor, jumped up to object vigorously to Krum’s “bombardment of the witness with improper questions.” Krum replied, “I am not in the military service and hence am not conducting a bombardment.” Williams retorted, “I don’t mean to convey that you are conducting any sort of
bombardment in the interests of your country." 51 Williams thereby managed an effort to impugn the patriotism of Krum himself.

The witnesses who followed were rather anticlimactic. Carlos Hurd was called to give testimony confirming Rogers’s version of the second interview. In addition, the prosecution felt compelled to call the city editor of the Post-Dispatch to deny that there was any agreement between the paper and the government in regard to arranging for the interview of Dr. Weinsberg and the publication of his remarks. 52 The circulation manager of the paper was called to testify that the Post-Dispatch was distributed throughout the United States, thereby raising the possibility that the publication of Weinsberg’s remarks could have had an impact on military personnel throughout the nation. 53 The last witness for the prosecution was O. K. Bovard, managing editor of the Post-Dispatch, who also testified that there were no connections between the government and the newspaper in obtaining the interview.

Promptly after the government finished its case, Krum moved for the acquittal of Dr. Weinsberg. Krum contended that, even assuming that all the testimony of the various government witnesses was truthful and accurate, the prosecution had not proved its case. In other words, Krum contended that the government’s testimony and evidence had failed to show that the comments and predictions that it alleged Dr. Weinsberg had made were in fact made with the intent to cause disloyalty and insubordination in the military. Krum urged that the reporters had induced Weinsberg to make his statements; he had not sought them out. Moreover, it was not Weinsberg who had published the statements. 54

After Krum’s arguments in favor of his motion, the court recessed until after the Fourth of July. When the court reconvened on Friday morning, 5 July 1918, prosecutor Williams urged that the court deny the motion for acquittal:

If the Espionage Act has not accomplished its purpose in giving the Government and its agents the power to protect its soldiers and citizens against men like Weinsberg, to spread as he did and to raise sedition, it has accomplished nothing.

As a leader of the German-American Alliance in this part of the United States, the offense Weinsberg is charged with is far greater than it would have been, committed by a more obscure man. At the time he made the statements contained in the Post-Dispatch interview, just eleven days after Hindenberg had started his drive, when the hearts of America and her Allies were heaviest, and when the cloud seemed darkest—this alone should be enough for a conviction of this man.

White added that the language allegedly used by Weinsberg was especially objectionable because it showed at a critical time all the weaknesses of the Allied lines and internal troubles. Thus, White seemed to be suggesting that no one had the right to speak the truth about the condition of the Allied forces—precisely the suppression of open discussion and criticism of the war effort that House and Senate members had feared when the Espionage Act was being considered in Congress during the spring of 1917. White further complained, "There was not one word of encouragement in the interview, to give the least encouragement and to buoy up the hopes of the military forces, or citizens, or men under Weinsberg's
direct influence." Significantly, at this point Judge Morris interrupted White and observed, "If newspapermen had come to me for an interview on the seriousness then of the German offensive, and if I had been foolish enough to say something, I could not have said a word of encouragement." Then, after the arguments were completed, Judge Morris rather stunned the patriots in the courtroom and in the city: he acquitted Weinsberg of violating the Espionage Act, on the ground that he did not believe that the government had proved any intent on Weinsberg’s part to cause insubordination or disloyalty in the military. In rendering his opinion from the bench, Judge Morris stated:

We must remember that this man is not being tried for being a member of the German-American Alliance. For my part I don’t believe in hyphenated Americanism, Scandinavian-Americans, which infest my part of the country, Swedish-Americans, French-Americans, English-Americans, Dutch-Americans and all other forms of hyphenated Americans.

I believe in Americans, and I hope this war will wipe away all signs of hyphenated Americanism.

Considering the way this interview was obtained, the way it was given, in my judgment when we think how the statements were made, when we consider the reporters went on plying him with questions to get out of him these expressions of opinion, I do not think the defendant can justly be charged under this Act.

My own impressions at that time would not have been encouraging. This defendant is not being tried for imprudent utterances. Prudent men then and now could not make such statements. He is not, however, being tried on that charge.

Accordingly, Judge Morris ordered the jury to sign a verdict of acquittal. At once, Dr. Weinsberg’s friends rushed up to congratulate him, and he left the courtroom a free man with his son and two daughters. But Dr. Weinsberg had not been so much vindicated in his Americanism as he was merely freed of any charge of violating the Espionage Act.

The response of the St. Louis English-language newspapers to the outcome of the trial was both sheepish and awkward. The Republic warned that people who believed that Germany might win the war should not be misled by the Weinsberg acquittal into thinking they, too, could speak their opinion freely in the community. The Republic continued lamely:

As to the acquittal of Dr. Weinsberg, there is this to say: As a former officer of the German-American Alliance, and as a man who was accused of having said that the Germans would win, he was open to the danger that prejudice might convict him, whether he had committed an offense or not. The result shows that as persons of German origin and suspected of German sympathy, they will find protection in the courts and that should be a matter of pride with every American.

To be sure, it was a source of admiration and inspiration that Judge Morris intrepidly ruled that there was an insufficiency of evidence, even without first waiting to see if the jury might remove the onus of a decision from his shoulders by acquitting Dr. Weinsberg. But it is hardly a source of pride that Dr. Weinsberg was arrested and indicted in the first place, and the Weinsberg prosecution was part of a national tendency by prosecutors and some judges to enforce confor-
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mity of thought, or at least conformity of public expression, by overzealous use of the Espionage Act.

The *St. Louis Times*, in its editorial comment on the acquittal, agreed that Dr. Weinsberg had been indiscreet but noted that his prominence in German-American circles had given “undue importance” to his statement and made his indiscretion all the more pronounced. Nevertheless, the *Times* praised Judge Morris’s decision because it was “of importance in showing that our judges maintain a dispassionate view in hours of turmoil.” The *Times* added, “We are inclined to have thought also that the admitted method of securing an expression from Dr. Weinsberg developed for him a sympathy which he might not otherwise have enjoyed.”

Like the *Republic*, the *Globe-Democrat* warned that the acquittal in the Weinsberg case “should not be construed as licensing any kind of imprudent talk.” Nevertheless, the paper insisted that the direction of a verdict of not guilty could not be criticized in the Weinsberg case, given the clear and definite language of the Espionage Act itself.

As for the editorial comment of the *Post-Dispatch*, it had a rather defensive tone to it:

The part the *Post-Dispatch* played in this affair was clearly set forth in the testimony. It caused Dr. Weinsberg to be interviewed as a matter of public service in publishing what the President of the German-American Alliance had to say about the pending dissolution of that society and about the war in general. It had no arrangement with United States District Attorney’s office about the matter. Its employees were subsequently summoned before the grand jury at the District Attorney’s own instance and indictment was returned.

The Weinsberg case has served to clarify the public mind as to possible offenses against the Espionage Act. It has called popular attention to the danger of loose talking about the war, and the effect has been salutary. On the charge of violating the law, Dr. Weinsberg is vindicated.

Of the two German-language daily newspapers in the city, the *Amerika* had been the more restrained in its coverage of the Weinsberg trial. Indeed, in reporting on the acquittal of Dr. Weinsberg, it carried one and one-half columns setting out the decision of Judge Morris but placed the story on its back page. The paper made no editorial comment. The *Westliche Post* had reported extensively on Weinsberg’s trial and reported extensively on the acquittal as well. Moreover, now that Weinsberg had been acquitted the *Westliche Post* was more willing to defend him editorially:

Dr. Charles Weinsberg’s acquittal of the grave charge of having violated the Espionage Law means a victory of justice over wilful sensationalism. The testimony of the reporters who were the key witnesses of the state left no doubt about the manner in which this famous “interview” which led to the charges against Dr. Weinsberg was obtained, and many, who until then were solemnly convinced of the guilt of the accused were just as much convinced of the opposite by the testimony at the trial. To be sure, Dr. Weinsberg was not cautious in his remarks; he must have known that the two interviewers had not looked him up in order to have a harmless chat, but he, and
with him his family, had to suffer bitterly for his trusting nature. However, now this man, who in his thirty years of public activity had gained a wide reputation as a true citizen, once again stands justified. The attempt to cast suspicion in the eyes of the populace upon not only him but also all his friends and colleagues has failed, as it should have. 65

The Missouri Council of Defense had been keeping track of the Weinsberg prosecution, and a day after the acquittal, W. F. Saunders, secretary of the State Council, wrote to a council activist in St. Louis, E. J. Brennan: "I am very sorry that Weinzberg [sic] escaped so easily. He is bad and will do harm, of course, and he will roost lower, but he should be watched and no doubt will be, by you." 66

Just about the last commentary on the Weinsberg trial appeared a week after the acquittal in Reedy's Mirror. In his own style, William Marion Reedy recounted a visit with a number of socialists who were opposed to the war and who supposedly were discussing the arrest and impending criminal prosecution of Eugene Debs under the Espionage Act for antiwar statements:

I think he'll get what Rose Pastor Stokes got at Kansas City, to-wit, ten years, unless he sends to St. Louis and employs Chester H. Krum who got Dr. Weinsberg off on an indictment under the espionage act by arguing that an expression of an opinion about the war is not obstructing the war and is not giving aid and comfort to the enemy. If I ever get into trouble in the federal courts I'll have no lawyer but Judge Krum, who has specialized in federal practice for more than fifty years. I hope the friends of 'Gene Debs will take notice. 67

With that last reference to Dr. Weinsberg, he and the German-American Alliance faded from public view. The German-American Alliance had disappeared forever from Missouri.
Epilogue

With the acquittal of Dr. Weinsberg, the German-American Alliance disappeared from the newspaper columns and from the consciousness of St. Louisans. Nor did the Alliance remain in the lives of the leaders of the former organization. Instead, the men simply went back to living their quiet and often respectable lives in the St. Louis community.

Weinsberg maintained his medical practice and continued to treat patients well into the 1940s; after his acquittal, Weinsberg never again said another word about the Alliance to his children. Dr. Barck, who had once been president of the State Alliance and had been active in the Neutrality League, continued as a professor of ophthalmology at St. Louis University until he retired in 1922, and he continued in his medical practice until 1938. F. W. Keck, the president of the City Alliance at the time of its dissolution, remained in the clothing business well into the 1920s, and the only German-oriented activities in which he participated after the war were the Apollo Men’s Chorus and the North St. Louis Turnverein. Emil Tolkacz, another former president of the State Alliance and a native of Berlin, had been appointed City Director of Public Welfare in 1914, and he continued his public service after the war, serving as president of the St. Louis Altenheim. Kurt von Reppert, the controversial member who had brought so much notoriety to the Alliance in St. Louis by his inflammatory remarks practiced law in the city for several more decades, finally retiring in 1942.

Only a very few of the Alliance leaders made any effort to remain in public life and in the public eye after 1918. The volatile Henry Kersting ran for Congress again in the 1920s and was again defeated. He was once more appointed an assistant city counsellor in 1930. He also served as an officer in various brewing organizations and in a group urging repeal of prohibition. Hans Wulff stayed in the limelight somewhat during the 1930s as deputy finance commissioner in charge of the liquidation of Fidelity Bank & Trust Company. Wulff eventually became an expert in bankruptcy matters, acting as trustee in the bankruptcy of a number of large corporations in the Depression years.

In fact, during the years when the German-American Alliance was loudly proclaiming the need in the United States to preserve German culture and the
German way of life, the economic and social assimilation of German-Americans on all social and income levels had quietly continued. Even if many German-Americans spent their leisure time on Sunday in a German tavern or restaurant and each summer or fall celebrated German Day, the fact remained that nearly all of them also spoke English, participated in the American political process as Republicans or Democrats, in most instances sent their children to public schools, and usually found employment in a sector of the economy reliant upon native American consumption. In short, German-Americanism, as trumpeted by the Alliance after the turn of the century, was a contrived concept: a self-sufficient German-American community, with its own cultural, social, economic, and political institutions, simply was not needed by most German-Americans. Indeed, most German-Americans at the turn of the century had already opted to participate in the political and economic institutions of the dominant native culture. Thus, when the remaining German-American cultural and social institutions collapsed in 1917 and 1918, most German-Americans did not suffer any significant political, economic, or even emotional displacement, although they certainly may have suffered such displacement when accused of disloyalty.

The former leaders of the Alliance were no exception. Even more so than some other German-Americans, the leaders of the Alliance always had been economically and often even socially well assimilated into the native American society, despite the leaders’ call for the pursuit of German culture. When the end of the Alliance came in 1918, its former leaders were able simply to abandon public expression of the German ethnic identity that they had previously nurtured, and they were fully able to do so without any significant economic or social hardship.

Thus, even though the men resumed or maintained their respected positions within the St. Louis social and professional communities, the Alliance was never heard from again. The name German-American Alliance cropped up again in the late 1930s and early 1940s as the title of a small organization sympathetic to Nazi Germany, and a rally for the organization was held in St. Louis in May 1940. This group was, however, an entirely separate entity from the old German-American Alliance, and none of the men in the old Alliance were in any way involved in the new. In fact, Henry Kersting participated in an effort to form an active anti-Nazi movement in St. Louis in 1938.

The DANB and its local alliances, after serving as a lightning rod for Democratic and preparedness attacks during the 1916 election and as a target of charges of disloyalty in 1917 and 1918, simply vanished. To some extent that can be explained by the fact that the Alliance was always very much a paper organization, with most of its members having only the most nominal of ties with the group and the Alliance leadership consisting of a small elite. In fact, in its early solicitations of local German-American organizations to affiliate with the DANB, the national organization made a point of noting that it had no intention of interfering with the local affairs of the affiliated organization. But it is also explained in part by the fact that the loud calls of the Alliance leadership to pre-
serve German cultural heritage concealed a simple truth: by 1917 German-American cultural institutions and a sense of German ethnic identity were fast becoming expendable in the lives of most Americans of German origin or ancestry. Nevertheless, it is fruitful to seek to understand why the Alliance evolved and why its leaders were willing to incur such public disapproval in the period from 1915 to 1918. After all, this organization, which probably had less than a thousand fully active members in Missouri, generated a tremendous amount of notoriety for the entire German-American community in the state.

The German-American Alliance in no small part was born out of desperation. German-American leaders at the turn of the century, not only in St. Louis but also in other cities in the United States, realized that the end of German culture in the United States was nearing. By 1900 it was obvious that the crest of the wave of German immigration into the United States had passed. In fact, the peak year of German immigration had been 1882, and the numbers of Germans entering the United States annually had dropped precipitously since that highpoint, a trend borne out by the drop in the percentage of the German population in large cities like St. Louis. For instance, 14.6 percent of the population of St. Louis was German-born in 1890, but by 1910 only 6.9 percent of St. Louisans had been born in Germany. So even as German-American leaders saw that the economic, social, and political assimilation of fellow German-Americans of their own generation was undermining the willingness of those fellow Germans to identify with German culture in America, they realized that the impact of those assimilative forces on second-generation Americans of German parentage was devastating. Children often evinced an increasing lack of interest or even disdain for the foreign culture and at times the foreign tongue of their parents.

Moreover, German-American leaders were on the defensive because of the growing success of the prohibition movement. Indeed, just as the German immigration began to decline, the prohibitionists began to gain success in the state legislatures. Even more than the assimilative forces at work in the public schools, most German-Americans saw the temperance movement as a fundamental and, more important, an immediate threat to those elements of the German culture still embraced by the greatest number of German-Americans.

In addition, after the Spanish-American War there was an increasing sense of uneasiness among certain German-Americans, who saw in the imperialistic tensions of that war the seeds of future disaster, as Germany, the United States, and Great Britain jockeyed for world influence and power. The natural reaction of German-American leaders was to oppose imperialism by the United States, in the hope that this would avoid tension between the United States and Germany. But this sentiment aroused suspicion among native Americans, who often resented the imperialism of the German government and who suspected that the insistence of German-Americans that the United States not engage in imperialistic competition was really a secret attempt to further Germany’s ambitions.

These varied and antagonistic forces, working against those identifying with
German-American culture in the United States, created a defensive reaction within the German-American community in not only St. Louis but also other cities with a high concentration of German-Americans. Frequently the defensiveness expressed itself in a mixture of belligerence toward the perceived groups and forces hostile to German-American culture and in a vague and ill-defined sense of idealistic mission, of historical dimension, to preserve German culture in America. In the 1890s and early 1900s, German-Americanism took on an increased stridency, militant sentiments that eventually found expression in the creation of the German-American Alliance.

For over forty years during the nineteenth century, German-American leaders in St. Louis had tried to unite German-Americans in the city without any notable success. To be sure, there had been brief moments of German-American unity, such as when nativist legislators proposed or passed a piece of legislation especially obnoxious to German-Americans and also for a brief time during the German successes in the Franco-Prussian War. But for the most part there had been a remarkable lack of unity and sense of common purpose in the German-American community in St. Louis, in large part because of the diverse religious, regional, social, and economic differences that existed among the German-American immigrants.

In fact, most German-Americans did not overly concern themselves with the lofty and noble ideas of preserving the German language and the German arts in the United States: they were willing to allow German and American cultural forces to operate however they might. Of course, this attitude of indifference had its limits, primarily when temperance laws threatened the daily or at least Sunday routine of the average German-American.

Yet there was that certain limited circle of men and women, mostly of the professional middle class and fairly conversant with the salient points of German music, literature, and art, who were susceptible to the most romantic and idealistic impulses of German culture. It was this circle, often educated enough and wealthy enough to be fully capable of assimilating into the middle echelon of native American society but instead desiring to remain somewhat ethnically separate, that became deeply concerned about the likely disappearance of German culture in the United States and felt the need to form an organization like the Alliance to combat that historical trend. To be sure, large numbers of German-Americans participated in the German Days and in the various celebrations of German literary and historical figures and events, but one suspects that many of the German-Americans participating in those events were doing so more for the entertainment value than for the cultural significance of the proceedings. It was the leadership of the Alliance that provided nearly all the impetus for the cultural and political activities of the organization.

In any event, the Alliance leaders, with the belief that they were engaged in an almost holy mission to preserve German culture in the United States, put themselves into a combative frame of mind as they set out to fight the forces of assimilation and prohibition antagonistic to German-American society. They thought
that their activities would generate resentment and even further suspicion among native Americans, and eventually they were right.

This combativeness was reflected not only in the official pronouncements of the Alliance and in the remarks of Alliance leaders but also in the statements of other political and cultural leaders in the German-American community. And it prevented the members of the German-American elite from realizing during World War I that there was a certain point beyond which the adversary attitude toward “Anglo-Saxonism” ought not to be carried. After all, many German-American leaders believed that only by adamantly preserving the German-American element within the United States, as a counterpoint to Anglo-American political and cultural influences, could there be an assurance that there would never be war or at least serious rivalry between the United States and Germany. As early as 1901, one German-American leader in Cincinnati observed: “Use of the German language and familiarity with German customs and habits are the firmest bastion against the war-mongering conscienceless spoils politicians who would not hesitate to organize a party of fanatics to familiarize certain circles among the American people with the thought of an eventual war with Germany. However, so long as thinking and speaking in German is practiced in this country, there exists no threat to peace with Germany.”

As is so often the case in such idealistic ventures, the worthiness of the cause seemed to be substantiated by the fervor with which it was pursued. Quite naturally, the fanaticism with which some German-Americans, especially those within the Alliance, strove to preserve German-American culture tended to isolate them from the mainstream of American life. Thus, the political agitation in which the Alliance so vigorously engaged in Missouri during nearly its entire existence was justified as legitimate because it was done in the name of preserving German-American culture with all its supposed democratic values against the undemocratic forces of prohibition and Sabbatarianism. Time and again the leaders of the Alliance insisted that, unlike most other lobbying groups within the political landscape, they were engaged in much more than just mundane American politics, that through political activism they were engaged in the far nobler task of attempting to preserve their cultural heritage in order to better American democracy.

The politicking of the Alliance was hardly sophisticated, however. Very few of the leaders in the Alliance were professional politicians or ever held public office. Seldom did the Alliance have close ties with public officials who might have been in a position to influence the outcome of the political struggle between the Alliance and the prohibitionists. Instead, the Alliance for much of its history engaged in the kind of political agitation undertaken by many organizations that find themselves outside the center of political influence: public rallies, petition drives, and fairly crude threats of retaliation at the polling place made to recalcitrant politicians. The idea of engaging in quiet but effective lobbying was a phenomenon that developed only late in the history of the Alliance.

To be sure, similarly unsophisticated political activism was taking place on the
other side of the issue in the form of the Anti-Saloon League. Eventually, however, because the principals of the Anti-Saloon League were much nearer to the traditions of the native American culture and were adaptable enough to use skillfully the device of the local option to isolate increasingly the antiproliferationist and liquor movement, the League frequently outmaneuvered the Alliance in political contests. That left the Alliance with only a legacy of resentment for close ties with the liquor industry and its disreputable elements.

But even given the political agitation of the Alliance in the prohibition question, as unskillful as it may have been, one wonders why the Alliance leaders felt compelled to engage in the political contest over the neutrality policy the United States would follow after World War I began. In fact, there were several factors.

One was the ease with which the Alliance was able to slip into the activist role on a foreign-policy issue. After all, the tradition and institutions for political agitation were already in place from the prohibition struggle. There were newsletters and other publications available for politicking, and the leaders and members of the Alliance were accustomed to getting the Alliance involved in political questions. Accordingly, it was easy to shift the political focus of the Alliance from prohibition to neutrality.

Second, the Alliance leaders did not feel inhibited from agitating for neutrality by any sense that their activities were un-American. After all, by the turn of the century, German-American leaders had convinced themselves that the preservation of German culture was in itself a contribution to Americanism. Repeatedly German-American speakers would dwell on the supposed sense of love of liberty among German-Americans that had inclined them to support the Union during the Civil War. And recall the comment of the Cincinnati German-American leader along the lines that preservation of German culture in the United States would permit America to avoid war with Germany. During 1915 and 1916, German-American leaders frequently quoted from George Washington’s farewell address: the United States ought to avoid entanglements in European affairs. Consistently these leaders viewed their efforts on behalf of neutrality as being very much in the American tradition. Indeed, many of them perceived their activism—as opposed to simply withdrawing entirely from the political landscape—as itself evidence of their Americanism.

Moreover, German-Americans may have been lulled into believing that they could agitate on such a controversial issue as neutrality with impunity, despite the rumblings of resentment among those who were sympathetic to the Allies. That German-Americans were considered valuable members of the American community and were indeed widely accepted by the English-language press may have led them to believe that the resentment of their activities was not as dangerous as it really was. After all, German-Americans had been well received in the professional and economic sectors of St. Louis, and German-Americans had managed over the decades before 1914 to win considerable political influence in the city, including power over public office and patronage jobs within the city.
government. It may have been hard for German-Americans to believe that there could ever be any serious attacks against an ethnic community in the city that had created such business and social leaders as the Busches, such politicians as Carl Schurz, and such newspapermen as Joseph Pulitzer. The very size and stability of the German-American community suggested that it was an integral part of American society in St. Louis and that the conduct of German-Americans would be commonly embraced as American. It is hardly surprising that Helen Traubel, whose family in St. Louis spoke German in the home, was convinced in the years before 1917 that nothing could ever change the St. Louis German-American community and its apparently stable institutions.¹⁵

German-American leaders also may have been lulled into believing that there was a fundamental public acceptance of their political activities because so many public officials, including native Americans, were willing to associate themselves with the Alliance. The German-American Alliance had been engaged in political agitation against prohibition as early as 1905, but from the early days of the Alliance in St. Louis most public officials were willing to allow themselves to be mentioned with the activities of the Alliance. Mayor Kiel attempted to identify with the delegates and guests at the convention of the DANB in St. Louis in 1913. And the numerous activities of Richard Bartholdt, who, after all, was a longtime congressman, on behalf of the German-American Alliance in Missouri further suggested respectability and widespread acceptance. Indeed, even in September 1914, after the World War had begun, Mayor Babcock of Sedalia attended the sessions of the state convention of the German-American Alliance in Sedalia.¹⁶ And earlier in the year, Mayor Jost of Kansas City had thanked the German-American Alliance for its political support in the local mayoral race. As late as 25 June 1915, well after the neutrality debate had begun to heat up and after the sinking of the Lusitania, former state senator Charles Krone addressed the City Alliance on the point that a victorious Germany supposedly would not be a danger for the United States, because it would act as a buffer state between the world power England and the coming world power Russia.¹⁷

The elemental reason why German-American leaders were willing to agitate on the neutrality issue in the face of widespread native American criticism must be laid to their own self-righteousness and to their utter inability to understand that American public opinion could be biased. German-Americans saw Allied sympathizers agitating relentlessly for Great Britain and France, without any public condemnation or attack upon the loyalty of these Allied sympathizers. German-Americans could not understand why native Americans should not perceive that their efforts on behalf of Germany were of the same nature. To be sure, there was some German propaganda and espionage activity in the United States that was directly controlled by the German government. Yet Berlin had nothing to do with the natural sentiments and sympathy for the Central Powers that German-Americans in St. Louis and other American cities felt after the war broke out in August 1914. German-Americans knew that, and they knew that the ac-
cusations to the contrary, to the effect that they were willing agents of the German government, were false. German-American leaders were already in a combative attitude over the exasperating prohibition issue. Accordingly, when these officials of the Alliance witnessed the growing resentment and charges of disloyalty featured in the English-language press, they simply endeavored all the more fervently to educate native Americans on the virtues of German-Americans and Germany itself.

Of course, the German-Americans' effort to educate the native American public was doomed, basically because the cultural and historical ties between the United States and Great Britain could not be overcome by any amount of political and cultural agitation by German-Americans or the German agents. Still, there were German-Americans who struggled to the very last minute to keep America neutral, or at the least to induce the United States to refrain from entering the war against Germany.

Once the United States declared war on Germany, most German-American leaders were willing to concede immediately that their fundamental right to agitate for a particular American foreign policy had ceased and that it was their obligation to become loyal supporters of the American war effort against Germany. But the damage had been done: the actions of the German-American Alliance and others in the German-American community on behalf of a pro-German neutrality policy in 1915 and the efforts of German-Americans to defeat President Wilson in 1916 had compromised the German-American community in the eyes of many native Americans. The suspicion and distrust toward German-Americans harbored by many native Americans could not be wiped out by any number of protestations of loyalty after the United States entered the war.

The result was that the very German-American community and culture that the Alliance had been created to preserve was destroyed. Vast numbers of Americans of German origin were able to forsake—and did forsake—their German-Americanism forever. Thus, *Die Abendschule*, which had been outspokenly pro-German between 1914 and 1917 and had maintained a circulation of almost 60,000 before the war began, had only 23,000 subscribers by the end of 1918. *Amerika*, which had seen its circulation rise from 13,000 in 1895 to 26,000 in 1910, suffered a circulation drop to 21,000 by 1920. And the circulation of the *Westliche Post* fell from almost 29,000 in 1917 to 21,500 in just two years.18

Typical of the rush to leave behind German culture was the situation in the Cincinnati high schools, in which German had been taught as a foreign language for seventy-five years at the behest of the large German-American community in that city. In 1916, the number of students studying German in the Cincinnati schools was about 13,800, but by 1917 that number had fallen to 7,000. By the fall of 1918 fewer than 30 students entering the Cincinnati high schools elected to learn German.19

The impact of the widespread anti-German animus was equally great on German culture in St. Louis. German instruction disappeared entirely from the pub-
lic schools, and many German-language churches in the city dropped that language in the course of the war. In April 1918, about the time that Dr. Weinsberg was arrested under the Espionage Act, the German theater in St. Louis cancelled the remainder of its season, and never again was there a German theater in the city on the scale that it existed before the United States became involved in the war. In addition, social institutions like the Liederkranz and the Schillerverein, even if they survived the World War, never again attained the membership or social prestige that they had achieved before the war: participation in such social institutions frequently was limited to the older generation of German-Americans.

Of course, the anti-German sentiments did not evaporate with the dissolution of the Alliance. Indeed, Xenophon P. Wilfey, appointed U.S. senator from Missouri in 1917, lost all chance of winning the Democratic primary for election to a full six-year term in August 1918 when the report leaked out that he, along with some prominent St. Louis German-Americans, had sent a telegram to Wilson, in March 1917, urging the president to act fairly with Germany.20

Meanwhile, the incarnation of ethnic intolerance as perceived by the Alliance and German-Americans, prohibition, loomed ever larger even as the Alliance disintegrated. Thus, while the influence of the German-American Alliance waned, that of its rival, the Anti-Saloon League, waxed. By 1918 the state’s Anti-Saloon League leaders saw little chance to impose statewide prohibition by popular referendum, in large part because the proposals kept being defeated by the huge antiproscription majorities in the St. Louis area. In the last statewide prohibition referendum in Missouri, held in November 1918, the prohibitionists were able to garner a slim 53 percent majority for prohibition in outstate Missouri, but when the votes of St. Louis were added, a vote that was nearly 88 percent wet, the prohibition proposal was defeated statewide by a 57 percent to 43 percent margin. Moreover, the wet vote in St. Louis represented only a slight decline from the 94 percent wet majority in St. Louis in the first Missouri prohibition referendum in 1910.

Accordingly, the state’s prohibition forces turned to the goal of electing members to Congress and the General Assembly to achieve national prohibition without having to go through a public referendum. The Anti-Saloon League in 1916 had supported the election of Gov. F. D. Gardner and of various candidates to the U.S. Congress who would vote to submit the prohibition amendment to the states for ratification. By 1918 the WCTU in Missouri was contending that it had the votes in both the Missouri House and Senate to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment.

They were correct: on 15 January 1919, the Missouri General Assembly ratified the prohibition amendment to the U.S. Constitution, only fourteen months after voters had rejected prohibition in a statewide referendum. After Governor Gardner signed the ratification resolution the next day, he presented the pen to Dr. W. C. Schapp—president of the Missouri Anti-Saloon League.21

Thus, within less than a year after the dissolution of the Alliance in Missouri, prohibition, the specter that had served as the impetus for the initial organization
of the German-American Alliance in Missouri, came to the state. It was not wholly a coincidence in timing; the taint of disloyalty that had fallen upon the Alliance also fell upon the brewing and liquor industry. As a result, the two centers of vocal opposition to prohibition, the liquor industry itself and the German-American community, were effectively silenced by the end of 1918.

The advent of prohibition signaled the end of German-American culture in Missouri and elsewhere. Indeed, prohibition eliminated important parts of German social life, including the German taverns and the social aspect of the Vereine, and thereby contributed to the destruction of German culture in America. The German-American community in St. Louis was doomed in any event, even if it had not had to endure the trauma of the ethnic intolerance incurred during World War I, simply because large-scale German immigration had ceased, the size of the German-American community was steadily shrinking, and assimilation was continuing. Nevertheless, the demise of the German-American community was certainly hastened by the events of World War I, and in those events the German-American Alliance had played a sad and significant part.
Notes

In the notes that follow, references to *Westliche Post*, *Amerika*, *Globe-Democrat*, *Post-Dispatch*, and *Star* refer to daily newspapers published in St. Louis. A reference to *Protocol*, preceded by a specified year, indicates a reference to the minutes (*Protokoll*) in connection with the national convention of the DANB held in the year indicated. A citation to *Anti-Saloon League Yearbook* or *USBA Yearbook*, followed by a specified year, indicates a reference to the annual publication by that name of the Anti-Saloon League or the United States Brewers’ Association, respectively, for the year specified. A reference to *Attorney General Report*, preceded by a specified year, indicates the Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the year designated. In addition, the following shorthand descriptions and abbreviations are used in the notes.

Alliance Hearings  •  U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings before the Subcommittee on S. 3529, Repeal of the Charter of the National German-American Alliance, 65 Cong. 2d Sess. 1918.

Bazaar Program  •  St. Louis War Relief Bazaar, Coliseum, 25-30 October 1915.

Bradley Thesis  •  Claire Lucile Bradley, “The Prohibition Movement and Dram-shop Law Enforcement in Missouri, 1887-1910.”

Busch Diaries  •  Wilhelm Busch Diaries, New York Public Library Manuscript Collection.

DANB  •  Deutsch-Amerikanischer National-Bund (National German-American Alliance)

DGfMo.  •  Deutsche Geschichtsforschung fuer Missouri.

European War Scrapbook  •  *Missouri in the European War, 3 March 1917–22 February 1919*, Press Clipping Scrapbook of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.


Mitteilungen des DANB  •  *Mitteilungen des Deutsch-Amerikanischen National-Bundes.*
The Germans in Missouri

Mittheilungen Missouri • Monatliche Mittheilungen des Deutsch-Amerikanischen National-Bundes, Staatsverband Missouri.


Oster Thesis • Donald Bright Oster, “Community Image in the History of Saint Louis and Kansas City.”

Schneiderhahn Diaries • Edward V. P. Schneiderhahn Diaries, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.

State Council of Defense Papers • Missouri Council of Defense Papers, Western Historical Manuscript Collection of the University of Missouri and the State Historical Society of Missouri Manuscript Collection, Columbia.

Sullivan Thesis • Margaret LoPiccolo Sullivan, “Hyphenism in 1900–1921: The View from the Outside.”

Notes to Prologue


Notes to 1: The Germans in St. Louis


3. Albert von Hoffmann, All About St. Louis: Dedicated to St. Louisians and Visitors to St. Louis (pamphlet).


5. For a discussion of two German utopian leaders in Missouri, see H. Roger Grant, “Missouri’s Utopian Communities.” In addition, see H. Roger Grant, “The Society of Bethel: A Visitor’s Account.” For a short history of various German immigration societies and movements in Missouri in the 1830s and 1840s, see Charles van Ravenswaay, The Arts and Architecture of German Settlements in Missouri: A Survey of a Vanishing Culture, 21–80. An interesting account by one German immigrant into Missouri in 1835 and 1836 appears in Fred Gustorf and Gisela Gustorf, eds., The Uncorrupted Heart: Journal and Letters of Frederick Julius Gustorf, 1800–1845.

6. For a book-length discussion of the Forty-eighers, see A. E. Zucker, ed., The Forty-eighers: Political Refugees of the German Revolution, which includes biographies of slightly over three hundred prominent Forty-eighers. Of that group, more than fifty resided in St. Louis or environs for varying lengths of time.


8. Ibid.


The vehement dislike with which native Americans could view some German-Americans is suggested by the bitter language of a draft of remarks prepared by Hamilton R. Gamble in the earlier 1860s, in which Gamble, later provisional governor of Missouri from 1861 to 1864 appointed by the pro-Union forces in the state, called two German newspapers, the Westliche Post and Neue Zeit, "revolutionary" and their publishers "traitors," and argued that the radical Germans were seeking to incite to violence and bloodshed. He warned, "If the Germans must have a bloody contest, the sooner it begins the better. Americans are ready to gratify them if such is their wish." Hamilton R. Gamble, Papers, Draft of Remarks Circa 1860, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.


12. Interestingly, Heinrich Boernstein, editor of the Anzeiger des Westens, was as anti-Catholic as some Know-Nothings, but Boernstein firmly denounced the Know-Nothing movement, which made him and his paper anathema among nativists: during one riot in the 1850s a group of Know Nothings were marching on Boernstein's newspaper office when intercepted by the militia. George Joseph McHugh, "Political Nativism in Saint Louis, 1840–1857," 56–99, 105.

13. N. M. Porter, "A History of Battery A of St. Louis," 18. For brief discussions of the nativist rioting against Irish and German immigrants, see Primm, Lion of the Valley, 173–80; John C. Schneider, "Riot and Reaction in St. Louis, 1854–1856."


15. A. H. Nolle, The German Drama on the St. Louis Stage, 22. E. D. Kargau in his St. Louis in frueheren Jahren, 246, suggested that the police action against the theater occurred because the police officials, who sympathized with the Southern cause, wanted to make a display of force to the Germans, who were loyal to the Union.

16. La Vern J. Rippley, The German-Americans, 60.


18. See, e.g., Earl J. Hess, "Osterhaus in Missouri: A Study of German-American Loyalty," for an account of the military leadership of Peter J. Osterhaus, a Union officer in Missouri.

19. Crighton, Missouri and the World War, 12.


23. Of the eighteen persons who signed the constitution of the St. Louis Philosophical and Literary Society, the core of the St. Louis Movement, five were German born and thirteen were American born. For a discussion of the St. Louis Movement, see Henry A. Pochmann, German Culture in America, 1600–1900, 256ff.


25. Louis Viereck, Zwei Jahrhunderte deutschen Unterrichts in den Vereinigten Staaten, 145–47. And nearly a quarter of the students in the German classes in the public schools of St. Louis between 1867 and 1880 were non-Germans. Selwyn K. Troen, The Public and the Schools: Shaping the St. Louis System, 1838–1920, 65.


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31. Eventually the play was published in St. Louis by Woerner in 1891.
32. A typewritten manuscript copy of the play is in the collection of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
33. The Democrat Woerner’s adverse attitudes about the policies of the Radical Republicans also found an echo among other German-Americans within the Republican party. Thus, Carl Schurz led a bolt of moderate German-American and native American Republicans out of the Radical Republican circle in 1879 in Missouri, primarily over the undemocratic tendencies of the Radicals. See generally William E. Parrish, Missouri under Radical Rule, 1865–1870, 268–99 and passim.
34. Nolle, The German Drama, 63.
35. Ibid., 61. See also Max Heinrici, ed., Das Buch der Deutschen, 459ff.
36. Nolle, The German Drama, 71–74. Nevertheless, the deficit at the end of the 1915 season was sufficiently great that a group of supporters were forced to solicit St. Louis businessmen and others to buy tickets to a complimentary benefit performance on 25 April 1915 to try to defray costs so that the Victoria Theater would not have to close for the season prematurely. Interestingly, the solicitation letter suggested that a larger number of German immigrants could be expected after the end of the war and that a German theater in St. Louis would attract “desirable” immigrants to the city—to the benefit of all businessmen. Edward Goltra Papers, Letter dated 5 April 1915 to Goltra from Leo Rassieur, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
37. Erich P. Hofacker, German Literature as Reflected in the German-Language Press of St. Louis Prior to 1898, is a catalog of the literally thousands of prose and poetry works that appeared in St. Louis German-language newspapers during the nineteenth century.
38. Paul F. Guenther, “Albert Sigel—The St. Louis German Poet,” 156. The literature and poetry authored by German-Americans often had as its theme a kind of defensive preservation of the German culture and language in the United States, thus reflecting the awareness of German-American authors and poets that their native language was threatened by the surrounding English-language society. In addition, the works were often retrospective, reflecting on German life in the native country. For instance, in 1893 the St. Louis German-American poet Heinrich Lange published a collection of poems called Feld- und Wiesenblumen (Field and meadow flowers). Although the collection included poems dealing with nature, Lange’s forte, other poems carried titles like Unsere Muttersprache (Our mother tongue), Der deutschen Mutter (To the German mother), Die deutsche Sprache (The German language), Heimweh (Homesickness), and even Erinnerungen aus dem deutschen Kriege 1866 (Reminiscences of the German War 1866).
42. See generally E. D. Kargau, Mercantile, Industrial and Professional St. Louis, for an overview of the local business community at the turn of the century.
45. St. Louis War Relief Bazaar, Coliseum, Oct. 25–30, 1915 (pamphlet), 120, in the collection of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis (hereinafter referred to as Bazaar Program).
47. Ibid., 30–33.
48. Ibid., 40.
49. Ibid., 44–46.
50. This concept is elaborated in Olson Thesis, 134. Even the German-Americans could joke about their propensity for joining a multitude of organizations. As one German-American playwright observed: Ja, wo zehn Deutsche sich zusammenfinden, da werden gleich sie elf Vereine gruenden. “Yes, wherever ten Germans find themselves together, there they will at once found eleven Vereine.” Konrad Nies, Deutsche Gaben, Ein Festspiel zum “Deutschen Tag,” scene 2, p. 10.
Notes

52. Ibid., 94–95. The following table shows the growth of German instruction in the St. Louis Public School System:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Schools</th>
<th>No. of German Teachers</th>
<th>Total Enrolled</th>
<th>Total Studying German</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864–65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13,926</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873–74</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34,273</td>
<td>15,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877–78</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>49,578</td>
<td>20,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885–86</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>54,753</td>
<td>21,910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of President and Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools for the Year Ending July 31, 1886.

56. See G. A. Hoehn, Die Arbeiterpresse in St. Louis, Geschichtlicher Ueberblick, a manuscript written for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Westliche Post in 1932, in the G. A. Hoehn Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
58. Clifton J. Child, The German-American Alliance in Politics, 176. Thus in 1915 the Central Verein sharply rejected the idea that it should become associated on a general basis with the Alliance in representing the German-American community. The Central Verein noted that it had its own views on what were appropriate efforts to preserve German culture—deutsche Kulturarbeit—views quite different from those of the German-American Alliance. Amerika, 8 August 1915, part 3, p. 1:6. And in 1918, upon the dissolution of the German-American Alliance in Missouri, the Amerika noted with smug satisfaction that the Central Verein had consistently refused to affiliate with the Alliance. Ibid., 15 April 1918, p. 4:2.
60. Audrey Olson, "The Nature of an Immigrant Community: St. Louis Germans, 1850–1920," 348n15. As another example, Geheimnisse von St. Louis, the novel set in St. Louis by Heinrich Boernstein, a Forty-eighter, had a strong anti-Catholic bent to it.
62. Kargau, St. Louis in frueheren Jahren, 50. Thus Kargau notes that there was a tendency for immigrants from one area of Germany to congregate in a certain section of the city. For instance, an area in the north part of the city was called Neu Bremen because so many immigrants from northern Germany lived there. Moreover, this area had much of the small industry of a German-American community, including furniture factories, glassworks, and the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. Naturally, all this led sometimes to German-Americans in various sections of the city having quite different interests and aspirations. Ibid., 45–50.

Notes to 2: The Sense of Deutschtum

2. Ibid., 72–74.
6. For an account of present-day life in Hermann and the remaining vestiges of its German tradition, see Berton Roueche, Special Places: In Search of Small Town America, 59–86.
7. The varying degrees of assimilation by the St. Louis German-American elite is discussed extensively in Audrey Olson, "The Nature of an Immigrant Community: St. Louis Germans, 1850–
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1920,” 342ff., which is a condensation of Sister Olson’s findings in her doctoral dissertation at the University of Kansas in 1970.


13. See, e.g., Hugo Muench, “The Early German Immigrations to St. Louis and Vicinity,” address before the Missouri Historical Society and in connection with the German Historical Loan Exhibit, 10 June 1915, from the Muench Papers of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, in which Judge Muench contended that if the German-Americans had not saved St. Louis, the outcome of the war might have been different.

14. Ruth Crawford, The Immigrant in St. Louis, 38. According to Crawford, native whites held 181 positions and native blacks held 70.

15. E.g., Westliche Post, 20 March 1916, p. 13. And on 4 April 1915, page 10 of Mississippi Blaetter, the Sunday edition of the Westliche Post, carried a full page ad listing the Republican candidates in the upcoming 6 April election for the Stadtrat, or City Council, in each of the twenty-eight wards of the city. The ad was paid for by the Republican party, which scored a complete sweep in that election.

16. E.g., Letter of Richard Bartholdt to Honorable William H. King, 9 March 1917, printed in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings before Subcommittee on S. 3529, Repeal of the Charter of the National German-American Alliance, 65th Cong., 2d sess., 1918, 549 (hereinafter referred to as Alliance Hearings); Personal Liberty, speech by Richard Bartholdt at Entertainment Hall, Wednesday, 7 March [no year] (pamphlet issued by the League for the Protection of Personal Liberty), in the Richard Bartholdt Collection, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. In the latter Bartholdt noted, “The sails of the prohibition movement are swelled by ‘know-nothing’ air and by the wind of prejudice against foreigners.”

17. Westliche Post, 24 February 1866, p. 3:1; ibid., 13 March 1866, p. 3:1.

18. Ibid., 4 April 1866, p. 3:1.


20. William E. Parrish, Missouri under Radical Rule, 1865–1870, 301.

21. Olson Thesis, 99–106. Thus, a German-language flier issued by “Freunde der Oeffentlichen Schulen” under the date of 18 November 1887 asserted in German, “The opponents of our free schools and the enemies of liberal education have in combination with the prejudiced English press undertaken to attack the public schools, in order to rob us almost totally of the benefits which the public schools give to general public education.” The flier went on to urge German-Americans to fulfill their “holy duty” to unite and agitate to defend German instruction in the schools. The tone of the broadside clearly suggests an “us against them” mentality. From the Collection of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri. A good account of the history of German instruction in the St. Louis schools and the campaign to eliminate such instruction appears in Selwyn K. Troen, The Public and the Schools: Shaping the St. Louis System, 1838–1920, 55–78.


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27. Carl Schurz, one of the leading German-American political figures, also voiced opposition to imperialism out of fear of a possible war between Germany and the U.S., and it was the issue of imperialism that led to the split between Schurz and another leading Republican, Theodore Roosevelt, during the Spanish-American war. See Hans L. Trefousse, *Carl Schurz: A Biography*, 280–83.


29. Ibid.

30. Richard Bartholdt, “From Steerage to Congress” (manuscript version), 58, from the Richard Bartholdt Collection, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri.

31. Ibid., 59.

32. *Our American Germans*, Speech of The Honorable Richard Bartholdt of St. Louis, Missouri, Delivered in Celebration of German-American Day at the Centennial Exposition at Nashville, Tennessee, 6 October 1897 (pamphlet, printed in St. Louis, 1897), 6–7, from the Collection of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.


35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 21 July 1870, p. 2:6. The fund-raising goal for St. Louis in 1870 was $50,000.


38. Ibid., 19 July 1870, p. 2:5–6. In St. Louis, two principal daily newspapers, the Republican and the Democrat, sympathized with Prussia, while the *St. Louis Times* supported France. The reasons Americans supported Prussia were varied, including an honest belief that France was the aggressor, a hope that a Prussian victory and German unification would lead to liberty and democracy in Germany, and a recollection among Americans who had been Unionists that Prussia had supported the Union in the Civil War. In all likelihood, the large German population in St. Louis did influence the editors of local newspapers. See generally Mary Jane Welsch, “Treatment of the Franco-Prussian War by the St. Louis English-Speaking Newspapers.” See also Schieber, *The Transformation of American Sentiment*, 14ff.


40. Quoted in Hawgood, *The Tragedy of German-America*, 41.

41. See, e.g., Rudolf Cronau, *Our Wasteful Nation*, 16, 36–37, 43–44.

42. Press release in Richard Bartholdt Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, (1933–n.d. & misc.). The speech was given on 9 August 1909, and the press release publicizes Bartholdt’s remarks.

43. For instance, shortly after World War I had begun, when the English-language newspapers in the United States were already beginning to condemn Germany for invading Belgium, the *Westliche Post* noted sarcastically, “In Kentucky the ‘Nightriders’ are again fully active, and are whipping men, women and children in the most disgusting manner. *But the Germans are barbarians*” (13 November 1914, p. 4:1). See also Ibid., 4 July 1917, p. 4:1.

44. See, e.g., comments of Friedrich Bente, a prominent St. Louis Lutheran German-American, on racist lynching episodes in the South in *Lehre und Wehre*, February 1918: 79.


Notes to 3: The Origins of the German-American Alliance in Missouri


2. Cronau, *Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in America*, 628. The Schillerverein of St. Louis elected Fernande Richter a delegate to the DANB organizing convention, but she was unable to attend. Instead, she reported to the convention by letter. *Der Schillerverein von St. Louis* (pamphlet), 11.

3. Cronau, *Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in America*, 145. Of course, these figures were highly unreliable. For instance if the same person belonged to both a local Turnverein and a Gesang-
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verein, and both organizations were federated to an Alliance branch, the full membership of each Verein would be deemed members of the DANB, so that the same person would be counted twice as a member of the DANB.

4. DANB, Grundsaetze und Verfassung des Deutsch-Amerikanischen National-Bundes der Ver. Staaten von Amerika, Revidirte Verfassung am 7. Oktober 1905, 3–4 (hereinafter referred to as Grundsaetze). The summary of principles was printed in both German and English. The quoted paragraph was first adopted at the organizational convention of the DANB in Philadelphia in 1901. Cronau, Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in Amerika, 628–29. The DANB Grundsaetze were based substantially on the constitution of the predecessor Zentralbund in Pennsylvania.

5. Grundsaetze, 4.

6. For example, within a month after its founding the DANB had issued four thousand petitions in thirty-three cities for signature and submission to Congress promoting U.S. efforts to intervene to try to bring peace in the war in South Africa. Public letter of the DANB, November, 1901, Collection of Uncataloged German-American Material, New York Public Library.


8. J. G. Woerner, The Rebel’s Daughter, 253. In the same chapter Woerner included a cynical assessment of the rise to power of the Know-Nothings, who led the Sunday closing campaign.

9. As in Missouri, the Nebraska German-American Alliance sprang to life when the threat of prohibition legislation by the Nebraska legislature was imminent. There the Alliance organized to campaign for the defeat of Ashton C. Shallenberger, who had come out in favor of prohibition in the race for governor. Luebke, “The German Alliance in Nebraska,” 172.


11. Ibid., 14. Cf. Guido A. Dobbert, The Disintegration of an Immigrant Community: The Cincinnati Germans, 1870–1920, 124–32, suggesting that a Stadtverband affiliated with the DANB was organized in Cincinnati because the Ohio legislature had enacted temperance legislation and the existing German-American institutions in the city had not been sufficiently vigorous in their political opposition.

12. For a brief description of the early temperance agitation, see Laura Louise Martin, “The Temperance Movement in Missouri 1846–1869.”


15. Missouri Republican, 18 January 1872, p. 2:6. Emil Prechterius spoke at the rally and called the proposed legislation a “declaration of war against the Germans.”


17. Louis G. Geiger, Joseph W. Folk of Missouri, 102.


24. Laws of Missouri Passed at the Session of the Thirty-fourth General Assembly, 1887, p. 79 et seq.


27. Ibid., 389.

28. Ibid., 393. The Missouri General Assembly voted overwhelmingly for ratification of national prohibition only fourteen months after the citizens of Missouri had voted in a referendum against statewide prohibition.


37. Ibid., 89, 70.
38. Ibid., 80, 84, 92.
39. Ibid., 85. For an account of the Knights of Father Mathew, see Mark G. Towey and Margaret LoPiccolo Sullivan, "The Knights of Father Mathew: Parallel Ethnic Reform," 168ff.
41. Republican, 29 November 1906, p. 3:5.
42. Ibid., 23 June 1905, p. 3:1–2.
44. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 149.
45. Ibid., 135–42.
46. Ibid., 146.
47. Laws of Missouri Passed at the Session of the Thirty-second General Assembly, 1883, p. 86.
49. Ibid., 62–63.
50. Eventually a Missouri Supreme Court justice concurred in the opinion of the court in 1888, overturning the 1857 law, on the grounds that the 1883 Downing High License Law did indeed repeal the 1857 statute. State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 94 Mo. 44, 59 (1888).
51. Laws of Missouri Passed at the Session of the Thirty-fourth General Assembly, 1887, p. 179 et seq.
52. Myra Himelhoch, "St. Louis Opposition to David R. Francis in the Gubernatorial Election of 1888," 333. The Democrats in the General Assembly passed the bill in an effort to achieve local prohibition, as well as to foil a Republican drive to submit the issue to the voters, who in a statewide vote would probably have defeated the proposition. Bradley Thesis, 24.
54. State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 94 Mo. 44, 53 (1888).
55. Bradley Thesis, 52. The General Assembly retaliated in 1893 by creating the office of excise commissioner for the city of St. Louis, appointed by the governor, to collect the dramshop license fees and to issue the licenses. Ziegenhein thus was deprived of his opportunity to thwart the will of the General Assembly.
56. Ibid., 53–54.

Notes to 4: The First Organizational Efforts in Missouri

1. Clifton J. Child, The German-American Alliance in Politics, 3; La Vern J. Rippley, The German Americans, 180. Both state that Missouri was represented at the founding meeting, but see Chap. 3, note 2, above. See also the official organ of the Missouri Alliance, Monatliche Mittheilungen des Deutsch-Amerikanischen National-Bundes Staatsverband Missouri, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1912): 3 (hereinafter referred to as Mittheilungen Missouri).
2. Der Schillerverein von St. Louis (pamphlet), 18.
3. Ibid., 7.
4. Ibid., 16.
7. Thus, the report of the State Alliance to the 1911 National Convention of the DANB notes that
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the first organizational efforts in Missouri, in May 1904, were auf Anregung des Bundespräsidenten, i.e., at the instance of the president of the DANB, Dr. Hexamer. DANB, Protokoll des 6. Konvent des DANB der Ver. Staaten von Amerika, Abgehalten vom 6. bis 10. Oktober 1911 im Hotel New Willard zu Washington, District of Columbia, 79 (hereinafter referred to as 1911 Protocol). See, e.g., Heinrici, ed., Das Buch der Deutschen, 835. The Congress was covered extensively in St. Louis in several multi-page supplements to the Westliche Post of 7 October 1904.


10. Republic, 28 May 1905, section 5, p. 1:3–4. As Oldham noted in Reedy’s Mirror, 27 April 1905, p. 5:1–3, it was unrealistic to believe that the rural-dominated legislature, already hostile to liquor interests and urban centers, would ever give relief from the Sunday closing law or grant home rule to St. Louis.


13. United States Brewers’ Association, 1909 Year Book, 22. St. Louis brewers Otto Stifel and William Lemp were active in the USBA.

14. In responding to the attack by the Anti-Saloon League, President Barck of the State Alliance contended, “The German-American Alliance has nothing to do with the sale of liquor of any kind. It has, however, strong considerations in favor of personal liberty.” Republic, 30 May 1905, p. 14:2.

15. Ibid., 12 July 1905, p. 1:3.


17. Ibid.

18. A newspaper report of the July 1905 quarterly meeting of the Alliance reported that a total of fifty “delegates” were present, representing various German organizations with a total membership of supposedly eighteen thousand. Ibid., 12 July 1905, p. 1:3. The newspaper report stated that many women were present. And reportedly fifteen hundred German-American women in Missouri protested against the Sunday laws in conjunction with the Alliance’s petition during 1905. Heinrici, ed., Das Buch der Deutschen, 836. Fernande Richter, who was a poet, author, and drama critic under the name of Edna Fern, was an early officer of the Alliance, but in later years the activities were led almost exclusively by males, even though the organization always was open to women. In 1907 Hexamer organized a women’s committee to help bring women into the membership of the DANB and to involve them in the DANB activities. See Undated [January 1910?] Letter of Emma Doernhoefer, Chairman of Women’s Committee of DANB, Collection of Uncatalogued German-American Material, New York Public Library. During the fall of 1914 the St. Louis women’s auxiliary, headed by Magda Schmidt, raised over thirty-five hundred dollars for war relief in Germany and Austria, and the women arranged to transfer funds to the State Alliance to fight prohibition. In her report to the state convention of the Alliance in 1914, Mrs. Schmidt urged that the way to avoid misery through alcoholism was not through prohibition, but rather through women rearing their children well and not driving their husbands out of the home and into the tavern. Mittheilungen Missouri, vol. 3, no. 30 (October 1914): 5.

19. Larry Engelmann, Intemperance: The Lost War Against Liquor, 10, 17.

20. 1905 Protocol, 22.

21. Ibid., 23.

22. That is not to say that the Alliance did not solicit such support from public officials. See the letter of Theo Lange to David R. Francis, 27 August 1905, in the David Rowland Francis Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, inviting Francis, a prominent St. Louisan, to ride in a carriage in the St. Louis German Day parade on 7 September 1907. Nevertheless, there were native American leaders and editors who were allied with the opponents of the liquor laws and who realized the importance of the prohibition issue in the minds of German-Americans in the city. One example is William Marion Reedy, publisher of Reedy’s Mirror, which frequently commented on the political struggle over prohibition and temperance legislation. See, e.g., Reedy’s Mirror, 13 April 1905, p. 1:2–3.


24. 1907 Protocol, 61.
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25. 1905 Protocol, 22.
27. Ibid., 62.
28. Ibid., 59–62.
29. Ibid., 60–61.
30. Ibid.
31. The 1907 report of the Missouri State Alliance to the national convention implicitly recognized this criticism when it called for German-Americans not to feud among themselves and to present an appearance of a unified whole, at least to those outside the German-American community. Ibid., 61.
One of the presidents of the State Alliance, E. V. P. Schneiderhahn, also recognized that some Alliance officials who were "officious intermeddlers" created ill will for the organization. Diaries of Edward V. P. Schneiderhahn, vol. 6, 12 September and 8 October 1909, in the Collection of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis (hereinafter referred to as Schneiderhahn Diaries). Schneiderhahn kept his diaries in English.
33. In fact, in 1908 the DANB had organized a junior order to promote German culture among German-American youth who could not join the DANB itself because they did not speak German. Undated [late 1908] Public Letter of O. Bismark Kiesewetter, President of the Junior Order of the DANB, Collection of Uncatalogued German-American Material, New York Public Library. There is no evidence that the youth organization had any significant impact on young people.
34. Thus Goebel, in his Laenger als ein Menschenleben in Missouri, 165–69, noted that it was impossible to keep German as used in America from adopting English words and idioms, for there were tools and apparatuses, plants and animals, and phenomena unknown to Europe that were commonplace in America.
35. One often encounters in the German-American literature of the time a sense of the mortality of the German culture in America, bound with a wistful hope that some aspect of it would survive, so as to bestow some meaning to the writer's contemporary German-American existence and efforts to preserve their German identity. Consider the following soliloquy by the allegorical "Genius of the German Language" in the fourteenth scene of Konrad Nies's Deutsche Gaben, first performed in Indianapolis in 1898 and published in St. Louis in 1900:

Und wenn die Stunde kommt in kuenft gen Tagen,
Wo still mein Reich im Meer der Zeit versinkt,
Und nur im Tone halbverschollnen Sagen
Die deutsche Sprache noch dies Land durchklingt:
Klagt mir nicht nach—Die Form nur wird begraben,
Der Inhalt bleibt und bleue. Die Seele lebt.
Der deutsche Geist, der deutschen Heimath Gaben,
Columbias's Wesen werden sie verwebt.

(And if the hour comes in future days,
When my kingdom sinks silently into the sea of time,
And the German language echoes through this land
Only in the tones of half-lost tales:
Do not lament after me—only the form is buried,
The content remains and flourishes. The soul lives.
The German spirit, the gift of the German homeland,
Will be woven into Columbia's being.)

36. Ernest Bruncken, "Die Amerikanisierung der Deutschen in den Vereinigten Staaten," 187. Bruncken, of the California State Library in Sacramento, noted that, although the German-born Americans still identified with German culture, their offspring were assimilating rapidly into the American social and cultural order, even if they spoke German at home in deference to the wishes of their parents. The reason, quite simply, was that the young Americans of German ancestry realized that if they appeared to be too German to their peers, they would be treated as strangers and would suffer significant social and economic disadvantages as a result. For a fictional account of the social tensions created for young German-Americans imbued with too great a sense of Germanness during World War I, see Lida Schem, The Hyphen.
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39. Ibid.
40. Post-Dispatch, 10 August 1908, p. 3:1.
42. Globe-Democrat, 10 February 1907, p. 2:1. The reporter noted that the number of petitions might also be due more to the organizational zeal of the WCTU than to the general sentiment of Missourians as a whole.
43. Ibid., 3 March 1907, p. 11:1. The proposed legislation was never enacted.
44. 1907 Protocol, 67.

Notes to 5: Reorganizing the Alliance in Missouri

2. Globe-Democrat, 7 September 1907, p. 3:5; Post-Dispatch, 6 September 1907, p. 2:5.
7. Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 5, 6 September 1907.
9. Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 5, 23 September 1908. Schneiderhahn at the fifty-third annual convention of the Central Verein, held in Cleveland, urged that it was necessary for the Central Verein to join forces with other organizations where interest and ideals were common. But he observed that direct affiliation of the Central Verein with the DANB was "out of the question," since the per capita membership tax of the DANB would be too much for the Central Verein to bear.
10. Nevertheless, the State Alliance and the DANB regularly lobbied among Kirchen-Deutschen (Church Germans), to urge them to join with the Alliance in presenting a unified front in German-American cultural matters. Thus a resolution of Rudolf Cronau at the first national convention of the DANB calling for the freeing of schools from religious influence was rejected because, according to the minutes of the convention, if the resolution were passed "the church element of the German community would thereby be estranged from the Alliance." DANB, Protokoll der Konstituierenden Konvention des DANB der Ver. Staaten von Amerika, Abgehalten am Sonntag, den 6. Oktober 1901, in der Halle der Deutschen Gesellschaft von Pennsylvania, zu Philadelphia, Pa., 2. And see, e.g., Mitteilungen Missouri, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1912): 2, in which the Alliance applauded the efforts of Pastor Johannes Schubert of Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, to reconcile church officials to the goals and programs of the DANB. See also Mitteilungen des DANB, December 1916, p. 7, in which a DANB official emphasized the need for the DANB to win the sympathy of the German-American clergy and priests before the DANB could win significant support among German-American church parishioners. And the General Synod of the Evangelical Synod of North America, a German Lutheran denomination, in September 1913 endorsed the efforts of the DANB, and urged its pastors and local congregationists to cooperate with and affiliate with local alliances of the DANB. Mitteilungen Missouri, vol. 2, no. 18 (October 1913): 2.
11. 1907 Protocol, 63–64. The manifesto was also printed in the Westliche Post, 7 September 1907, p. 10:2.
13. Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 6, 2 May 1908.
15. Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 6, 4 October 1908.
16. Ibid., 12 September 1909 and 8 October 1909.
17. Ibid., 12 September 1909.
18. Ibid., 3 October 1908. Schneiderhahn insisted on using the word *German* without a capitalized first letter to differentiate between *german* as a matter of ethnic origin and as something relating to the political institution, the *German* Empire, since as he noted in a diary entry, "the word *German* simply denotes descent." Ibid., 12 May 1908. The distinction is significant, for most German-American leaders, despite their enthusiasm for German culture, were distinctly ambivalent in their attitudes about Germany as a political state.
19. On the other hand, Gottfried Kim, president of the Kansas City Alliance, complained in early 1913 that the anti-prohibition movement in that city was hampered by the fact that the *bessere Klasse* of Germans there were not getting involved. *Mitteilungen Missouri*, vol. 1, no. 11 (March 1913): 2.
20. 1907 *Protocol*, 63. In early 1913 Charles Weinsberg, in his annual report as president of the State Alliance, urged creation of a standing committee to work with "influential Americans" in a propaganda effort to reintroduce German language instruction in the upper classes of the elementary schools in the St. Louis public school system. *Mitteilungen Missouri*, vol. 1, no. 11 (March 1913): 3. Nothing ever came of the proposal, but it shows a recognition by Weinsberg that the German-American community had to coalesce with other elements in St. Louis to achieve its goals.
21. For biographical information on other leaders of the Alliance in Missouri, see Heinrici, ed., *Das Buch der Deutschen*, 841-43.
22. In the spring of 1914, only months before the World War began, for instance, both John Gewinner, an officer of the City Alliance, and Philip Morlang, a former officer and also publisher of the monthly newsletter of the Alliance, visited Germany on separate trips. *Mitteilungen Missouri*, vol. 2, no. 2 (May 1914): 2–3.
28. Ibid., 20 November 1908, p. 9:2.
29. Ibid., 8 August 1908, p. 9:1. Despite all his public threats, Folk enforced the liquor laws only half-heartedly, possibly because he realized that the lid laws were nearly impossible to enforce in the face of widespread sentiment against such legislation. Folk made little effort to invoke the 1907 law enlarging his powers to bring removal proceedings against delinquent county officials and fell back eventually upon simply exhorting the citizens to do their duty. Thus Folk was able to reap the political dividends among those voters who favored temperance, but without risking failure in the face of such enforcement. Louis G. Geiger, *Joseph W. Folk of Missouri*, 118–19.
32. 1909 *Protocol*, 48; Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 6, 2 August 1908.
33. Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 6, 2 May 1908.
35. *St. Louis Times*, 26 June 1908, p. 8:3.
39. At its monthly meeting in June of 1908 the City Alliance thanked two of its members for their activity in local-option election campaigns outstate. *St. Louis Times*, 26 June 1908, p. 8:3.
41. Schneiderhahn's account of the 1908 convention is set out at Scheiderhahn Diaries, vol. 6, 4 October 1908.
42. Globe-Democrat, 5 October 1908, p. 4:5. Schneiderhahn described the parade as "an unqualified success." Schneiderhahn Diaries, vol. 6, 4 October 1908.
43. Globe-Democrat, 5 October 1908, p. 4:5, lists Weinsberg as in attendance at the Odeon.

Notes to 6: The Alliance Consolidates Its Influence

1. Globe-Democrat, 6 September 1907, p. 16:2; ibid., 7 September 1907, p. 3:5; Post-Dispatch, 6 September 1907, p. 2:5.
4. 1911 Protocol, 79.
6. 1911 Protocol, 79.
8. Frederick W. Lehmann, Speech at the Odeon Theatre, St. Louis, Missouri, on 22 October 1910 (pamphlet), in the archives of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
16. At birth Charles was, of course, named Karl, but he changed his name after his arrival in the United States. Interview with Flora Weinsberg, St. Louis, 4 June 1980.
19. Anti-Saloon League Yearbook 1909, 42.
21. Ibid. The Missouri Local Option Law prohibited a local-option election in any jurisdiction less than four years after the immediately preceding local-option election in that jurisdiction.
25. Anti-Saloon League Yearbook 1914, 159.
27. The bill was not enacted in the 1911 session of the General Assembly. In fact, no lid-club legislation was enacted at any time, although the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex inf. Harvey v. Missouri Athletic Club, 261 Mo. 576 (1914), eventually ruled that the dramshop legislation already on the books included within its parameters private clubs. In so ruling, the Court in Harvey overruled State ex rel. Bell v. St. Louis Club, 125 Mo. 308 (1894).
29. Ibid., 1 July 1912, p. 5:2.
31. St. Louis Times, 1 July 1912, p. 5:2.
32. Mittheilungen Missouri, vol. 1, no. 8 (December 1912): 1. On the committee were A. P.
Scheurmann of Kansas City, Alfred Meier of St. Joseph, and William C. F. Lenz and August Hoffmann, both of St. Louis.

34. Ibid., vol. 1, no. 7 (November 1912): 1.
35. Interview with Flora Weinsberg, 16 May 1983.

Notes to 7: The Last Two Years Before the War

1. In 1913 the officers of the State Alliance and their home towns were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Town</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Charles H. Weinsberg</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Delegate</td>
<td>William C. F. Lenz</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding Sec'y</td>
<td>George Withum</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>August H. Hoffmann</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recording Sec’y</td>
<td>Remy Joucken</td>
<td>St. Joseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Vice-Pres.</td>
<td>John Gewinner, Jr.</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Vice-Pres.</td>
<td>A. P. Scheurmann</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Vice-Pres.</td>
<td>Alfred Meier</td>
<td>St. Joseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Vice-Pres.</td>
<td>J. H. Lohmeyer</td>
<td>Springfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Vice-Pres.</td>
<td>Chris. Guengerich</td>
<td>Joplin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Vice-Pres.</td>
<td>Charles Botz</td>
<td>Sedalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Festschrift fuer den Missouri Staats-Konvent und den National Konvent, St. Louis, Missouri herausgegeben vom Staatsverband Missouri (hereinafter referred to as *Festschrift*).

2. *DGfMo.* 1 (1914): 1. The editors of the quarterly were A. P. Scheurmann of Kansas City, William C. F. Lenz of St. Louis, and Charles Botz of Sedalia. Botz, who was a vice-president of the State Alliance and publisher of a German-language newspaper in Sedalia, printed the magazine on his presses.

3. The committee publishing the quarterly reported to the state convention in October 1913 about the technical details of publishing the journal. *Mittheilungen Missouri*, vol. 2, no. 18 (October 1913): 3.


6. Alliance Hearings, 484. The difference in spelling of the German word for bulletin in the title of the Missouri and the national publications is that the Missouri State Alliance spelled *Mittheilungen* in the archaic fashion.


9. *Mittheilungen Missouri*, vol. 3, vol. 30 (October 1914). The willingness of the State Alliance to forgo taking a stand on woman suffrage is interesting, for many German-Americans considered woman suffrage to be a forerunner of prohibition, in the belief that once women obtained the right to vote, a majority of them would vote for temperance legislation. See, e.g., Clifford I. Nelson, in German American Political Behavior in Nebraska and Wisconsin, 1860–1920, 11. On the other hand, the Missouri State Alliance did pass a resolution at its 1909 state convention in St. Joseph urging that women in the prohibition movement turn their attention to curing other, more important social ills. *St. Louis Times*, 14 September 1908, p. 8:2. And the Stadtverband in Cincinnati, Ohio, urged that city’s board of education not to hire married female teachers, since that would disrupt the family life of those teachers. G. A. Dobbert, *The Disintegration of an Immigrant Community: The Cincinnati Germans, 1870–1920*, 143–44.


11. In its November 1914 issue the newsletter proudly carried the report that the county-unit proposal had been defeated. *Mittheilungen Missouri*, vol. 3, no. 31 (November 1914).

17. Ibid., vol. 1, no. 8 (December 1912): 3.
18. Ibid., vol. 2, no. 20 (December 1913): 2.
20. Ibid., vol. 2, no. 17 (September 1913): 3.
25. Mittheilungen Missouri, vol. 1, no. 8 (December 1912): 1; vol. 2, no. 24 (April 1914): 3. As a further example of its meager finances, between 5 October 1913 and 10 January 1914 the State Alliance had income of $979.94 and expenditures of $840.48, with a resulting balance of $139.46.
26. Ibid., vol. 1, no. 11 (March 1913): 2.
27. Ibid., vol. 2, no. 30 (October 1914): 4. In his annual report to the state convention Weinsberg explained that the idea of a war chest had to be abandoned because the financial aspect did not work out. Interestingly, Weinsberg declined to publish the reasons that the financing of the war chest had failed, but he promised in his report to tell the convention orally. Ibid.
30. Anti-Saloon League Yearbook 1914, 159.
31. E.g., ibid., 161, in regard to a local-option election in Macon, Missouri.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid. The five major Stadtverbaende were in St. Louis, Kansas City, St. Joseph, Springfield, and Joplin. The twenty other communities with separate Stadtverbaende were Augusta, California, Hermann, Higginsville, Washington, Sedalia, St. Charles, Manchester, De Soto, Moberly, Cape Girardeau, Jackson, Morrison, Jefferson City, Potsdam, Hickman ville, Pilot Grove, Cole Camp, Lee Summit, and Rolla.
35. Scheurmann had been born in Baden in 1844 and was brought to the United States by his parents in 1849. He spent his first years in America in Dayton, Ohio, but he returned to Germany in 1861 to study at the musical conservatory in Leipzig for three years. Upon his return to the United States, he headed the music department of the McLean Institute in Indianapolis, but he moved on to Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1870 in order to teach music and to head the German choral society there. Scheurmann moved to nearby Kansas City in 1882, continuing to teach and perform as both a conductor and a piano soloist. German-American Biographical Pub. Co., ed., Kansas City und sein Deutschtum im 19. Jahrhundert, 231–33.
37. Ibid., 2–3.
38. Ibid.
40. Post-Dispatch, 8 October 1913, p. 5:3.
41. Ibid., 9 October 1913, p. 3:1. Supposedly the downtown streets were "crowded about as on veiled prophet's night." St. Louis Times, 10 October 1913, p. 13:1. The Veiled Prophet parade was one of the leading social events of the St. Louis native American community.
42. St. Louis Times, 10 October 1913, p. 13:1.
44. Amerika, 15 April 1918, p. 4:5–6.
45. See Philip Gleason, *The Conservative Reformers: German-American Catholics and the Social Order*, 157, regarding complaints about the Alliance by Kenkel, the editor of the *Amerika* and a member of the Central Verein.

46. *St. Louis Times*, 10 October 1913, p. 13; ibid., 11 October 1913, p. 6:3.


48. Although the disagreements between the Alliance and other German-American organizations were somewhat muted in St. Louis, in some parts of the country the DANB had sharp clashes with other German-Americans. Thus, certain politically progressive Turner circles condemned as "reactionary" the Alliance's opposition in Ohio and Wisconsin to woman suffrage. And in New York the Central Verein became upset when the DANB supported free textbooks in public schools, because free books in those schools would reduce the attractiveness of the Catholic parochial schools. Even as late as 1916, the Bishop of North Dakota warned Catholics against joining the Alliance in that state because certain elements in the DANB were purported to be enemies of the Catholic Church. See generally Gleason, *The Conservative Reformers*, 154ff., and Heinz Kloss, *Um die Einigung des Deutschamerikanertums: Die Geschichte einer unvollendeten Volksgruppe*, 258–67.


51. Hugo Muensterberg, *Aus Deutsch-Amerikil*, 46. See also the comment of George Sylvester Viereck about the DANB in his *Spreading Germs of Hate*, 236: "They appealed exclusively to Deutschtum, but the Golden Grail of their idealism was filled to the brim with lager beer!"

### Notes to 8: World War I Begins


2. See Ralph F. Bischoff, *Nazi Conquest through German Culture*, 162.


8. Rudolf Cronau, *Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in Amerikil*, 635–37. Cronau, a native of Solingen, Germany, who first came to the United States in 1880 and settled in New York in 1896, was known to the officials in the German-American Alliance in St. Louis and at their behest spoke in St. Louis several times in the prewar years.


10. Thus, Hugo Muensterberg, a German-born Harvard professor and one of the leading voices of German-Americanism among intellectuals in the United States, contended in 1913 that "an aristocratic minority" of Anglo-Saxons nurtured an ignorance of the rest of the world by the vast majority of average Americans in order to preserve the dominant influence of Great Britain in the United States. See Phyllis Keller, *States of Belonging: German-American Intellectuals and the First World War*, 54.


13. For instance, when World War I began, the editors of the *Globe-Democrat* were concerned that
The Germans in Missouri


17. *Republic*, 1 August 1914, p. 4:2.


21. Olson Thesis, 178. Nor was St. Louis the only site of spontaneous outbursts of German-American support for the Central Powers at the start of the war. For a somewhat critical review of the German-American activities in Chicago in August 1914, see Melvin G. Holli and Peter d’A. Jones, eds., *Ethnic Chicago*, 462—72.


24. Ibid., p. 4:2—3.


27. Ibid., 12 August 1914, p. 8:5—7.

28. For example, one anti-English cartoon on 26 August suggested that Great Britain had induced Japan to seize German territories in Asia, and another cartoon on 9 September showed bags of dollars flying across the Atlantic to Europe while German widows and orphans on the continent are shown shouting, "Hurrah! Die braven Deutsch-Amerikaner senden Hilfe!" In the same cartoon, a tiny figure of John Bull stands on the American shore saying weakly, "Oh, say, Stop!" Ibid., 26 August 1914, p. 5:1—2; ibid., September 1914, p. 1:1—2. See also cartoon in ibid., 16 December 1914, p. 1:1—2.


33. Ibid., 262—265.

34. *Herold des Glaubens*, 9 September 1914, p. 2:2—3. The editor of the Herold added, "The United States is being neutral in this war, and thus we can not take part in the conflict. But certainly we can pray for the victory of the German and Austrian arms, and we can, pursuant to the second resolution of the Z-V [Central Verein], help to ease the suffering. The German Catholics of our land can lend a helping hand to the unfortunate victims of the war in Germany and Austria."

35. See generally Frederick Nohl, "The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod Reacts to United States Anti-Germanism During World War I," 52—55.


41. Wilhelm Busch Diaries, in the Manuscript Collection of the New York Public Library, 1 August—15 August 1914 (hereinafter referred to as Busch Diaries).

42. *Mittheilungen Missouri*, vol. 2, no. 21 (January 1914): 3—4. Eventually at the 1914 convention of the State Alliance the delegates urged all affiliated alliances to assess two cents per member to help the Rolla organization pay the legal costs and fines that had resulted from the raids. Ibid., vol. 3, no. 30 (October 1914): 6.


44. *Mittheilungen Missouri*, vol. 3, no. 27 (July 1914): 2.


46. Ibid., vol. 3, no. 32 (December 1914): 2—3. The committee came up with a bill that would
exempt from the liquor laws any special functions of a club that had paid a hundred-dollar fee. An Alliance officer in Sedalia noted sourly that such a law had little chance of passage and would hardly benefit small clubs in outstate Missouri, which did not have one hundred dollars for such a fee and could not afford special functions of that magnitude. Ibid.

47. Ibid., vol. 3, no. 28 (August 1914): 3.
48. Ibid., 2. The resolution read in part as follows:

Be it resolved that we as American citizens insist that the American press shall present its information in an unbiased and impartial manner and that the editorials shall as far as possible be without prejudice or hatred toward any class of American citizens; for, this, though an English speaking country, is not an English nation, and it is but fair in these trying times that the American spirit of fair play shall be exercised to further good feeling among American citizens of every extraction and creed.

And, be it further resolved, that a copy of these resolutions be mailed to the managing editors, the editor, and the news editor of every paper in this city.

The foregoing was in response to a call issued by Hexamer shortly after the war began urging German-Americans who spoke fluent English to monitor the English-language press and to write letters to the editor and articles for the Anglo-American press in favor of the German cause. Hexamer noted ominously, "As I have learned from reliable sources, in case England is beaten the attempt presumably will be made to draw the United States into an alliance with England. Therefore it is important to show at once what colossal power the citizens of German origin truly possess." Georg von Bosse, Dr. C. J. Hexamer: Sein Leben und Wirken, 59.


On the committee were Weinsberg, Barck, Kersting, Withum, Keck, Sommer, and Pastor C. F. Richter.

55. Alliance Hearings, 265. The cumulative amounts raised nationally and in Missouri for the DANB War Relief Fund over the two and one-half years of American neutrality were $886,670.18 and $10,090.35, respectively.

57. Westliche Post, 15 September 1914, p. 5:1–3. On 16 September 1914 the same paper published an editorial, on p. 4:2–3, commenting favorably on the state convention of the Alliance.
the League, eight were officers or active members of the Alliance and eleven more were active in German-American affairs.


11. For a brief history of Concordia Seminary and its Saxon Lutheran origins, see Carl S. Meyer, “Concordia Seminary,” 210ff. The degree to which German Protestant pastors sometimes identified with the German language and culture is evident in the autobiography of Emilie Schaefer, Erinnerungen einer deutschen Pfarrfrau.


13. Ibid., p. 53.


15. Ibid., 11. Other speakers included P. H. O’Donnell, an attorney from Chicago; Rabbi Samuel Sale of Shaare Emeth Congregation in St. Louis; Thekla Bernays; and Eugene A. Vogt.


17. For instance, the League announced that it was sponsoring a slide and moving picture show called “Germany’s Side of the War,” complete with pictures of the Kaiser and his family. Star, 11 January 1915, p. 3:4. And in July the League appointed a special investigatory committee to find out which Missouri corporations were doing business with the belligerents and to learn if the corporate charters of these companies permitted such activity. If not, the League planned to report that fact to Missouri’s attorney general. Globe-Democrat, 27 July 1915, p. 4:3. But the attorney general apparently paid no attention to Neutrality League complaints on corporate charters. Crighton, Missouri and the World War, p. 96.


20. Ibid., 4 February 1915, p. 4:3.

21. Ibid., 17 December 1914, p. 5:3. Bartholdt responded to the attack by the Sun with characteristic remarks that reflected the dual aspect of German-American loyalties, insisting, “As the United States is not an English dependency, I can reconcile it with my Americanism to give my sympathy to the Fatherland just as well as so many newspaper editors evidently reconciled their Americanism with the open espousal of the cause of the Allies. But this sympathy has no more to do with the government of Germany than with the government of Siam.” Speech by Richard Bartholdt under Question of Privilege in the House of Representatives, 16 December 1914 (pamphlet), p. 3.

22. Mitteilungen des DANB, March 1915, p. 7; Bente, Biography of Dr. Friedrich Bente, pp. 42–44. Bente’s remarks to the Senate committee are set out in ibid., 30–40. Senator Stone of Missouri introduced the professor to the committee as a "personal friend." Ibid., 41.


27. What had also vanished was any significant support by Anglo-Americans for the Neutrality League. There are indications from the newspaper reports that there were indeed some Anglo-Americans in the earlier crowds. See Crighton, Missouri and the World War, p. 91n130.


31. Westliche Post, 8 May 1915, p. 4:2.


33. St. Louis Times, 10 May 1915, pp. 9:1.

34. Ibid., 14 May 1915, p. 3:1.

35. See Post-Dispatch, 16 May 1915, p. 2:2, quoting in translation the Westliche Post, 14 May 1915, p. 4:2.
36. Letters of Ernestine Schumann-Heink to Professor Hermann Almstedt, 29 April 1915 and 13 May 1915, in the Hermann Almstedt Papers, Joint Collection of the Western Historical Manuscript Collection of the University of Missouri and the State Historical Society of Missouri Manuscript Collection, Columbia.


38. Francke, Deutsche Arbeit in Amerika, 72–73.


41. Post-Dispatch, 2 August 1915, p. 12:2 (emphasis has been added).


43. Child, The German-American Alliance in Politics, 89–93. In the meantime, various books, with titles like The German-American Plot and German Conspiracies in America, began appearing in the summer and fall of 1915, with a basic thesis that certain German-Americans were in fact deliberately acting as agents of the German government. Ibid., 98–102. German-Americans retaliated in the propaganda campaign: Alexander Fuehr in The Neutrality of Belgium (New York, 1915), defended the German invasion of Belgium, and Rudolf Cronau, in The British Black Book (New York, 1915), urged that England was trying to oppress its great commercial rival, Germany. Cronau also published German Achievements in America (New York, 1916) to highlight the positive contributions of German-Americans to American politics, culture, and history.

44. Lucius B. Swift, Germans in America: Read before the Indianapolis Literary Club (pamphlet), 2, 5–7, 12.


47. For instance, on 10 August 1915 the Amerika included the following in an editorial: “The pro-British have the obvious intention of continuing the war against Germany after it is over, specifically by intending to lead a battle against the German element in the United States in the way of the Know-Nothing movement. Bursting with hate over the fact that the German forces are advancing victoriously and with the fact that the defeat of the Allies most certainly is in their future, they want to give vent to their venom through a German persecution in this land.” (p. 4:2). See also ibid., 21 August 1915, p. 4:2, translated and quoted in Crighton, Missouri and the World War, 86: “England wanted this war, she wages it ruthlessly wherever she has the power. It is Germany’s right to return thrust for thrust. The duty of self-preservation forces her to fight back and make thorough use of the one weapon most feared by Madam Britannia.”


49. For instance, in early 1915 Nagel spoke in St. Louis; in March 1916, he addressed the Germanistische Society in Indianapolis; and in April 1916, he spoke at the German and English Academy in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, before the German Literary Society. See The Speeches of Charles Nagel, Collection of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. In June 1915 Professor Bente spoke on neutrality in Detroit. Die Abendschule, 24 June 1915, p. 384.

50. Westliche Post, 15 October 1914, p. 8:4.

51. Mittheilungen Missouri, vol. 3, no. 30 (October 1914): 7; Westliche Post, 12 November 1914, p. 8:3.

52. Mittheilungen Missouri, vol. 4, no. 37 (May 1915): 2. One cartoon appeared on 11 May 1915 in the Post-Dispatch. It depicted a Bismarck-looking German army officer, with hand extended, approaching a female figure in Greek costume labeled “Civilization,” but the female figure is drawing back in fear of the officer. The caption of the cartoon read “Stand Back.” The cartoon obviously was in reaction to the sinking of the Lusitania.

53. Westliche Post, 12 November 1914, p. 8:3. The letter sent by the City Alliance soliciting membership is reprinted at Mittheilungen Missouri, vol. 3, no. 31 (November 1914): 4.

Notes to 10: Late 1915: Stress Signs Appear

4. Nor was Weinsberg a champion of von Reppert. Thus in April 1917 Weinsberg complained to a reporter that von Reppert was trouble for the Alliance: “No one can control him. When I am not there in person, he always gets up and spouts off, and says embarrassing things. I cannot be there all the time.” Star, 3 July 1918, p. 3:6.
5. Post-Dispatch, 27 September 1915, p. 1:3. In the end August Hoffmann did run for reelection as treasurer, and Paul O. Sommer did not resign.
8. Ibid., 28 September 1915, p. 3:1.
10. Ibid., 28 September 1915, p. 3:1.
11. Ibid., p. 10:3.
13. Post-Dispatch, 16 September 1915, p. 4:2; Republic, 15 September 1915, p. 6:1.
19. Globe-Democrat, 4 October 1915, p. 15. See also ibid., 3 October 1915, p. 4:3. Mercantile Trust also advertised the sale of 5 percent Imperial German Treasury Notes in the Mississippi Blätterter, the Sunday edition of the Westliche Post, on 3 October 1915, p. A-5.
21. For instance, p. A-11 of the Westliche Post on 26 September 1915 carried the banner heading, Hier wird deutsch gesprochen, beneath which were advertisements for eighty-three enterprises and businesses where German was spoken.
22. Richard Bartholdt, Der Zweck des Bazars, in Bazaar Program, 35.
23. Amerika, 8 August 1915, p. 3:4; Bazaar Program.
24. Post-Dispatch, 26 October 1915, p. 5:5; St. Louis Times, 26 October 1915, p. 1:3.
25. See, e.g., Post-Dispatch, 26 October 1915, p. 5:5; ibid., 27 October 1915, p. 5:6-7; ibid.,
27. Mitteilungen des DANB, October 1915, p. 27.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 28: “We will however achieve nothing and will not earn the support of the intelligent American element in this matter unless we proceed in a more cautious and more intelligent manner, always keeping in sight that we are American citizens and working from an American standpoint in this matter.”
30. Ibid.
31. Anti-Saloon League Yearbook 1916, 231. A resolution to submit a constitutional amendment on prohibition to the states was offered by Richmond Hobson of Alabama, but the measure failed to
obtain the two-thirds majority in December 1914, although the vote was 197 for the resolution and 189 against. Ibid., 32.

32. Mitteilungen des DANB, October 1915, p. 28.

Notes to 11: The Election of 1916


3. See Literary Digest, 28 August 1915, p. 388, for a survey of earlier press comment on the World articles on German propaganda. At that time the Globe-Democrat and the St. Louis Times were seen as perceiving of the World reports as "mere hysteria" induced by New York editors looking "under the bed every night for German spies." Ibid.

4. Consider, for instance, the orientation of this editorial comment against Wilson: "It has been absolutely clear all along what President Wilson's intentions were: to render to the Allies all possible service, in order to gain for himself the favor of having America under his leadership help decide the World War in favor of those nations who fought for culture, civilization, democracy, and 'lasting peace,' which naturally must come when the Allies have divided the world among themselves." Amerika, 4 March 1916, p. 4:1.

5. See Child, The German-American Alliance in Politics, 85–86: "Loyalty is always a difficult matter to assess. At times in American history . . . it has been a really fundamental issue. In the form, however, in which it was dressed up by the press and the public speakers in 1915 and 1916, it is hard to treat it with any such seriousness. An ingenious product of anti-German propaganda, it became a convenient political shibboleth for those who feared the German-American vote in the election of 1916."


8. Ibid., 125.


11. For a discussion of the activities of the Central Verein leaders in the neutrality and presidential campaigns, see Philip Gleason, The Conservative Reformers: German-American Catholics and the Social Order, 166ff.


13. Ibid., p. 3:5–6.


15. Globe-Democrat, 1 June 1916, p. 12:2. This was one of the few in the English-language press in St. Louis indicating at the time that sympathy for Germany did not automatically imply disloyalty to the United States.

16. Ibid., p. 11:1.

17. Quoted as translated in ibid.


20. Ibid.


23. Ibid., 18 June 1916, p. 2:3.


25. Post-Dispatch, 7 July 1916, p. 3:3.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 19 June 1916, p. 13:6. The paper noted that Wulff only some weeks before had headed a campaign to flood members of Congress with letters protesting any move to break relations with Germany.
32. Ibid., 27 July 1916, p. 9:2. The article contended that this was the first time the Alliance had ever endorsed candidates for office. That was incorrect: the Alliance had specifically endorsed candidates in an election as early as 1908.
34. Alliance Hearings, 291.
36. Ibid., January 1917, p. 3. Nevertheless, the wets prevailed on the proposition only because they rolled up a hundred-thousand-vote majority in St. Louis, thereby prevailing by about ninety-six thousand votes statewide. That statewide margin was significantly lower than the two hundred thousand wet majority of the 1910 referendum. Anti-Saloon League Yearbook 1918, 231; Official Manual of the State of Missouri, 1917–1918, 484–85.
37. Thus, the Westliche Post noted: "The public reconciliation between the Republican candidate and Theodore Roosevelt, the former traitor of the party and the arch-chauvinist, served as a great shock to the German voters." 26 September 1916, p. 2:2.
40. After the war J. Otto Pfeiffer, assistant editor of the Amerika, noted his opinion that German-Americans did not necessarily follow the views of their newspapers, since Hughes was as vague as Wilson on issues important to the German-Americans, and Hughes never explicitly embraced German-American support. Pfeiffer himself took the view in 1916 that German-Americans should vote only for congressmen. Child, The German-American Alliance in Politics, 151.
42. The following table shows the votes received by the Republican and Democratic presidential nominees for the 1912 and 1916 elections in the ten St. Louis wards with the highest total number of German-born and Austrian-born residents according to the 1910 census.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
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<td>R'sv'lt (P)</td>
<td>Wilson (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>1453</td>
</tr>
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<td>14</td>
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State of Missouri, 1913-1914, 803; *Post-Dispatch*, 6 November 1912, p. 4:2 (Roosevelt’s figures based on 464 of 474 precincts).


49. Interestingly, in late 1914 Hugo Muensterberg proposed to Hexamer that the DANB be revamped to make it more effective in its political agitation by doing away with or deemphasizing the general membership of thousands of nominally interested members, and instead concentrating on attracting to the DANB a narrow upper-class circle of German-American community leaders to participate financially and actively in the DANB’s lobbying efforts. See Phyllis Keller, *States of Belonging: German-American Intellectuals and the First World War*, 82.

50. Ibid., 234. And Kuno Francke complained after the war that the Alliance through its unrestrained self-aggrandizement and through its adversarial attitude on prohibition and other public questions “had more hurt than helped the German cause in the eyes of Anglo-Americans.” Francke, *Deutsche Arbeit in Amerika*, 611.


Notes to 12: Early 1917

3. Ibid., 2 December 1916, p. 2:5. Dr. Gellhorn himself pledged $100.00.
8. Ibid., 1 February 1917, p. 7:5. The group was to travel under the auspices of the American Red Cross. Ibid., 1 February 1917, p. 7:5; 4 January 1917, p. 2:6.
10. Ibid.
15. The popular account of the Zimmermann telegram affair is Barbara W. Tuchman’s *The Zimmermann Telegram* (New York, 1958).
18. Ibid., 3 April 1917, p. 1. See also ibid., 2 April 1917, p. 14:2, suggesting that the local Republican platform impugned the loyalty of St. Louis.
19. *Reedy's Mirror*, 30 March 1917, p. 234:3. Yet Kiel won the next day, carrying twenty-five of twenty-eight wards, and the Republicans swept all fourteen aldermanic seats up for election. Kiel’s reelection suggests that such innuendos of disloyalty had little impact on the public’s assessment of well-known public officials: no one could seriously contend that Kiel, a native-born American who spoke no German and who did not readily identify with the German-American community in St. Louis except when making speeches before crowds of German-Americans, was somehow disloyal. Yet such charges would have a greater impact on the reputations of lesser-known citizens, especially those who did not have many years in public office to attest to their Americanism.
20. *Herold des Glaubens*, 4 April 1917, p. 4:4. Nor was it just the German-American community that perceived economics to be the principal reason for the American entry into the war: prominent
The Germans in Missouri

pacifist senators, including Norris and La Follette, were of the same opinion. For a brief description of the antwar sentiment of April 1917, see David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 20–30.

21. Reedy’s Mirror, 9 February 1917, p. 85:1–4, p. 86:1. A week later the magazine published a letter from Louis Lammann, a “German workingman,” endorsing Wakefield’s views, citing Wilson’s lack of true neutrality, and complaining that the Mirror had labeled Wakefield’s letter “From an Admire of the Kaiser,” noting that Wakefield’s letter had not expressed one word of admiration or support for the Kaiser, but had rather spoken on behalf of “Teutonic peoples.” Ibid., 16 February 1917, p. 102:1–3.


23. Ibid., pt. 8, Appendix, pp. 20–21.

24. In addition, Rep. Perl Decker of Joplin, a Democrat, and Sen. William Stone of Jefferson City were personally opposed to the war. Of the Missouri congressmen, Igoe, Decker, Hensley, and Dorsey Shackleford, a Democrat from Jefferson City, voted against the war resolution. Ibid., p. 102:1–3.


Notes to 13: The War Begins for America

1. Busch Diaries, 1–10 April 1917.


3. Herold des Glaubens, 11 April 1917, p. 4:6–7. The author of the column was chillingly accurate in predicting, “One can assume that the Government, aware of the disinclination of possibly a majority of the American people toward the chosen course [of war], intends to nip in the bud with merciless harshness any real or presumed tendency to resist. We fear that many a harmless critic, who hasn’t the slightest thought of treason or provocation, will bring much unhappiness on himself and his family.”

4. Die Abendschule, 26 April 1917, p. 714. The conversion of that periodical was complete. In May 1918 Die Abendschule came out in favor of the new sedition bill. Ibid., 9 May 1918, p. 710. And later the publisher of the magazine, Theo Lange, headed the Liberty Bond campaign in his church. Lange’s pastor noted with a modicum of cautious defensiveness that Lange “has ever since the declaration of war done his full patriotic duty as a citizen.” Lutheran Witness, 16 April 1918, p. 127.


6. Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, 130; Globe-Democrat, 18 April 1917, p. 9:7. August A. Busch explained that the portraits were taken down “to avoid any show of pro-German sentiment among the workmen of the plant.”


8. Ibid., 1 August 1917, p. 4:2.

9. Ibid., 30 August 1917, p. 4:1. See also ibid., 7 September 1917, p. 4:1.

10. Post-Dispatch, 8 July 1917, p. 5:3–4. Nor was the Westliche Post the only St. Louis German-language publication unhappy with the state of affairs. Citing a Wilson statement that the United States had no grievances, would accept no spoils of war, and was merely acting as a “servant of mankind,” Die Abendschule in June 1917 called the statement “perplexing” and peevishly noted: “Had the President said to the Congress on 2 April, ‘We have no complaints,’ would we have war today? But ‘we are the servants of mankind,’ he explains now. Since when does one serve mankind through war?” Die Abendschule, 7 June 1917, p. 818. At the same time, the publication recklessly began a campaign to raise money for interred German citizens at Camp Oglethorpe, Georgia, an action sure to be misinterpreted by patriotic Americans.

Notes

12. Ibid., 1 May 1917, p. 3:5.
13. Helen Traubel, St. Louis Woman, 44.
14. Missouri in the European War, Press Clipping Scrapbook of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, vol. 1, 6 May 1917 (hereinafter referred to as European War Scrapbook).
19. St. Louis Westliche Post, 1 August, 1917, p. 6:5.
20. Mitteilungen des DANB, October, 1917, p. 7. The convention was originally scheduled for Kansas City, but then shifted to Washington, which is about fifty miles west of St. Louis, possibly in order to promote better attendance. As it turned out, 75 percent of the delegates were from St. Louis or towns near St. Louis or Washington, although a dozen or so delegates were from other parts of the state, including Sedalia, Joplin, St. Joseph, and Kansas City. Westliche Post, 8 September 1917, p. 5:5.
22. Ibid. The quotation is a report of Weinsberg’s remarks rather than a direct quote of his statements.
23. E.g., Westliche Post, 8 September 1917, p. 3:3.
24. E.g., Post-Dispatch, 10 September 1917, p. 8:3.
25. Alliance Hearings, 11.
26. Ibid., 683–84. Also cited as evidencing the conspiratorial political activity of the DANB and its affiliated alliances was a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Missouri State Alliance at which endorsements for certain political candidates and agitation against prohibition were discussed. Ibid., 529–30.
28. Alliance Hearings, 549.
34. Westliche Post, 3 December 1917, p. 5:1–2.
35. Ibid., 10 September 1917, p. 5:3.
37. Alliance Hearings, 637.

Notes to 14: The Weinsberg Affair Begins: The Alliance is Disbanded

1. In a pathetic gesture, the Executive Committee at the same time adopted a resolution insisting that its members were “without reservation” loyal to the United States. Westliche Post, 13 April 1918, p. 1:5.
5. *Amerika*, 14 April 1918, p. 5:3. See also *Republic*, 14 April 1918, pt. 2, p. 1:2, for a similar version of Weinsberg’s denial.
6. For a discussion of Bovard’s career at the *Post-Dispatch*, see Markham, *Bovard of the Post-Dispatch*.
11. The Prager lynching is discussed extensively in Frederick C. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I*, 5ff. No one was convicted of murdering Prager, although a number of Collinsville citizens were tried for the crime.
12. Ibid., 14. Luebke’s book recounts other incidents of violence and intolerance against German-Americans in the St. Louis area in the first days of April 1918; see pp. 14–15.
14. *Republic*, 9 April 1918, p. 1:1. The German-language proceedings were published in the *Westliche Post* and were a consequence of Republican patronage. Other attacks on the printing of the aldermanic proceedings in German appeared in the *Republic* on 10, 12, 20, and 26 April. *Reedy’s Mirror* endorsed the campaign, “not because of German-hating, but because of inutility and expensiveness” of publishing the German version. *Reedy’s Mirror*, 26 April 1918, p. 249:1. The campaign was successful.
15. The school campaign began in the *Republic* on 15 April 1918, and the street name campaign began with the issue of the *Republic* on 4 May 1918. Thus the paper successfully urged that Berlin Avenue be changed to Pershing Avenue: to this day the street is called Pershing. The street name campaign of the *Republic* prompted the following tongue-in-cheek letter to the editor of the *St. Louis Times*, 6 May 1918, p. 6:3, which suggests that not everyone had lost his sense of humor in those times:

Sir:

There is much discussion about the necessity for eliminating German names of our streets, avenues and boulevards. This may be a good plan since we all wish to be classed among the 100% Americans, and want no doubt to exist as to where our city stands on the question. Many names having been suggested as substitutes for those streets which now bear names which have a German tang, I have a suggestion to make.

There are 15 or 20 streets that need to be renamed. Why not, after exhausting our national and state officials in the naming of streets, use our city officials’ names? These men deserve such recognition. It would work out like this: change

- Hapsburgher to Kiel Avenue
- Cologne to Koeln Street
- Dresden Street to Schnoll Avenue
- Austria Street to Menne Boulevard
- Bismarck to Weeke Avenue
- Heidelberg to Haller Boulevard
- Mecklenburg to Alt Avenue
- Kaiser Street to Nolte Boulevard

and so on. When they run out of city officials we could turn to the Board of Aldermen and get a lot more names there.

In place of the objectionable Allemania, Berlin, Carlsbad, Germany, Hamburg, Hanover, Hertling and Unter den Linden, we could have Niedeluecke, Otto, Tamme, Fette, Baur, Stockhausen, Rice, Bergman, Schwartz, Kralemann, Udell, Eilers and Schrantz. In this way we would avoid hysteria!

Notes

17. See, e.g., ibid., 31 August 1917, p. 556:1-2; and ibid., 7 September 1917, p. 572:1-2. Interestingly, Heller, who had participated in the founding of the Alliance in St. Louis, had also harbored the common German-American belief that the German cause was not adequately publicized early in the war. See Letter of Dr. Dernburg to Otto Heller, 17 February 1915, Otto Heller Papers, Washington University, St. Louis. But Heller kept a sense of proportion because he was very much a part of the English-language literary community despite his ties to the German-American community. For instance, during the war years Heller made no less than a half dozen contributions to *Reedy's Mirror*, and Reedy regularly solicited articles and reviews from Heller for publication. See generally Otto Heller Papers, Washington University, St. Louis.


26. Ibid., 162. The figures were compiled by George Creel, chairman of the Committee of Public Information, in 1919. See also Walter Nelles, *The Espionage Act of 1917*, 81.

27. In his memoirs after the war, Wilson’s secretary of state, Robert Lansing, commented upon the feverish activity to find out German spies: “It was an extraordinary mania which seemed to be epidemic all over the country and to affect all classes, just as did the witch-hunting mania of the seventeenth century.” Lansing estimated that “certainly nine out of ten, and probably ninety-nine out of a hundred, of these suspects were guiltless of any wrongful act or intention, but much time had to be wasted by our Secret Service in proving their innocence and satisfying their accusers that they were mistaken.” Robert Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing*, 83–84.


35. Letter of W. E. Jameson, president of the Board of Managers of Williams Woods College, to W. F. Saunders, 18 May 1918; Letter of W. S. Dearmont, President, Missouri State Normal School, to W. F. Saunders, 26 July 1918, both in the State Council of Defense Papers. Secretary Saunders of the State Council sent a moderating letter back to Dearmont, noting that it was not the national policy of the National Council of Defense to bar German newspapers. Letter of W. F. Saunders to W. S. Dearmont, Cape Girardeau Council of Defense, 30 July 1918.
36. Missouri Council of Defense, Final Report of the Missouri Council of Defense (1919), 61–62 (hereinafter referred to as Final Report of Council); Missouri on Guard, a publication of the Missouri Council of Defense, vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1918): 2. The newsletter was published monthly, with ten thousand copies going to the members of the Council System and another two thousand copies being distributed to members of the legislature, other state officials, libraries, and private individuals.

37. Letter of F. W. McAllister, Missouri attorney general, to W. F. Saunders, 28 June 1918, State Council of Defense Papers. The background in regard to the passage of the Tipton ordinance is set out in the letter of S. C. Gill, Moniteau County prosecuting attorney to W. F. Saunders, 22 June 1918, State Council of Defense Papers. And in a letter to J. F. Mermoud of the Barry County Council of Defense, State Council Chairman Mumford suggested that he would hesitate to support a petition requiring businessmen in Monett, Missouri, to approve a plan forbidding use of German on the streets of Monett, since there were many American citizens in Missouri who spoke only German. F. B. Mumford, chairman of the State Council of Defense to J. F. Mermoud, 11 June 1918, State Council of Defense Papers.


42. Lutheran Witness, 28 May 1918, p. 164.


44. European War Scrapbook, vols. 1–6; Globe-Democrat, 20 April 1917, p. 9:1. One must keep in mind that the motives for such allegations of disloyalty or vigilante activity were varied, and not always based upon the most patriotic of sentiments. For instance, allegations of disloyalty became a weapon in labor-management relations, with company officials often seeking to intimidate workers and garner public support for management’s position by implying that a particular strike or other labor unrest was a product of disloyalty or agitation by German agents.

45. Indeed, often the worst outbursts of intolerance were in rural Missouri, in part because the reaction of outstate Missourians to the anti-German propaganda tended to be fairly unsophisticated and also in part because in some rural communities the native Americans felt threatened by being outnumbered by German-Americans. In addition to the situation in Potsdam, where German-Americans allegedly outnumbered English-speaking Americans six to one, see the letter of J. R. Gerstang, Chamois, Missouri, to W. F. Saunders, 8 July 1918, State Council of Defense Papers, in which the writer contends that the local mayor and the local council of defense were being intimidated from acting more forcefully on the loyalty issue because of a large German element in the area.


47. Fortunately for Weinsberg, the offer of assistance was declined. Post-Dispatch, 14 April 1918, p. 3:5.


50. Westliche Post, 15 April 1918, p. 1:3.

51. Post-Dispatch, 14 April 1918, p. 1:3; ibid., 15 April 1918, p. 3:3.

52. Post-Dispatch, 14 April 1918, p. 1:3.


54. Post-Dispatch, 14 April 1918, p. 2:3.

55. Star, 16 April 1918, p. 12:2.

Notes

59. E.g., *Amerika*, 15 April 1918, p. 4:1-2; ibid., 14 April 1918, p. 5:3: “To the many unbelievable acts of the representatives of the German-American National Alliance one can now add the presumably thoroughly foolish and unpatriotic expressions of Dr. Charles H. Weinsberg, President of the Missouri State Alliance, which yesterday evening led to his arrest on the order of the federal District Attorney.” And in another editorial on 18 April 1918, p. 4:1-2, the *Amerika* suggested that the downfall of the DANB resulted from its failure to stay true to its principles of preserving German culture and its engaging in politics instead.
60. *Post-Dispatch*, 14 April 1918, p. 1:3.
65. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 2d sess., 1918, vol. 56, pt. 6, pp. 6046. Sherman went on to label the German-American Alliance as “a treasonable body in the United States.” Ibid., 6047. See also *St. Louis Times*, 6 May 1918, p. 2:3.
66. *Post-Dispatch*, 6 May 1918, p. 1:2. The editorial language of the *Post-Dispatch* was rough on Sherman and the Senate, noting, “The incident is an exhibit of the ignorant, senseless and reckless chatter which passes for debate in some Senatorial quarters.”
67. Ibid., 5 May 1918, p. 2:2.
69. Ibid., p. 2:5.
72. Nor was he alone in his indictment: also indicted by the same grand jury were twenty-six men arrested in a raid on the St. Louis headquarters of the IWW; they were charged with violating the Espionage Act by circulating a parody of “Onward Christian Soldiers” that was allegedly disloyal. Ibid., 4 May 1918, p. 1:6. See also *Post-Dispatch*, 4 May 1918, p. 4:4.

Notes to 15: The Trial of Dr. Weinsberg

1. Ernest Kirschten, *Catfish and Crystal*, 301-2. For the appellate opinion affirming O’Hare’s conviction, see *O’Hare v. United States*, 253 Fed. 538 (CCA 8 1918).
4. The *New York Times* reported on the congressional debate on 13, 16, 19, 20, 22, and 23 April, and 3, 4, and 5 May. The uproar was also reported in the *St. Louis newspapers*.
6. See Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 1918, 156–243. Hereafter these reports of the Attorney General for the year in question will be referred to by the year and Attorney General Report. The eight districts, and the number of prosecutions in each in the first year, were the District of Arizona (47), the Southern District of Illinois (33), the Eastern District of Missouri (70), the District of Nebraska (29), the District of North Dakota (86), the Eastern District of Oklahoma (29), the Southern District of Texas (64), and the Western District of Texas (46).
7. Moreover, two other cases resulted in acquittals and an additional eight cases were dismissed by the district court. 1919 Attorney General Report, 162.
8. Letter of F. Wilson, U.S. attorney, to W. F. Saunders, 12 April 1918, State Council of Defense Papers. See also Letter of F. Wilson to W. F. Saunders, 13 April 1918, State Council of Defense Papers, refusing to prosecute one Fritz Schloman of Hoburg, Missouri, under the Espionage Act, because his allegedly disloyal statements were not in public.
10. 1919 Attorney General Report, 631. The instruction recognized that the language of the act “has given rise to differing and conflicting interpretations . . . resulting in serious confusion.”

11. Stokes v. United States, 264 Fed. 538 (CCA 8 1918). It must be emphasized that there were some federal district judges who did indeed evidence restraint and dispassion. Thus in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (SDNY 1917), Judge Learned Hand sought to distinguish between speech that generally opposed the war and was not unlawful and speech that urged the commission of unlawful acts, which could be prosecuted under the act. In United States v. Hall, 248 Fed. 150 (D. Mont 1918), the district court judge acquitted a defendant on the grounds that a defendant, who made an antiwar statement in a village of sixty people in remote Montana a full sixty miles from the nearest railroad, could not reasonably be considered to have had the requisite intent to interfere with the military, a necessary element of Espionage Act violation. And in United States v. Baker, 247 Fed. 124, 125 (D. Md. 1917), Judge John C. Rose of the U.S. District Court in Maryland dismissed the prosecution against a socialist who had printed a circular pointing out the horrors of war and urging that if everyone would vote Socialist there would be no wars, stating: “Every man has a perfect right to any opinion he may see fit to form about any proposed law, or about any law that is on the statute books . . . You may have your own opinions about that circular . . . But so far as I can see it is a circular principally intended to induce people to subscribe to a Socialist newspaper and to get recruits for the Socialist Party. I do not think that we ought to attempt to prosecute people for that kind of thing.”


15. Fortunately, the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed the conviction. Doll v. United States, 253 Fed. 646 (CCA 8 1918).

16. Her conviction was reversed in 1919 by the 8th Circuit in St. Louis for prejudicial instructions and statements by the trial judge that reflected the bias of the judge against socialists. Stokes v. United States, 264 Fed. 538 (CCA 8 1918).

17. O’Hare v. United States, 253 Fed. 538 (CCA 8 1918) (conviction upheld for speech to one hundred people in Brown, North Dakota, in which O’Hare urged that any person who enlisted in the army for France would be used for fertilizer and that the women of the United States were nothing more nor less than brood sows to raise children to go into the army). See also Trelease v. United States, 266 Fed. 86 (CCA 8 1920) (conviction of defendant upheld for speech to 150–200 people at Stawberry Lake, North Dakota, in which speaker contended that the conflict was a rich man’s war, that the United States was sending soldiers to fight for the monied interests, and that the draft was unconstitutional and ought to be put to a vote of the people).


23. Kamman v. United States, 259 Fed. 192, 194–95 (CCA 7 1919). Ironically, after the war Kammann and his family left Peoria and moved to St. Louis, setting up residence in the same neighborhood where Dr. Weinsberg resided. The two victims of Espionage Act prosecutions developed a friendship. Interview with Flora Weinsberg, St. Louis, Missouri, 9 December 1979.


25. Post-Dispatch, 23 April 1918, p. 8:5.


28. Ibid., 11 May 1918, p. 3:1.


32. Ibid., 26 June 1918, p. 1:5.
35. Star, 1 July 1918, p. 1:3.
37. Westliche Post, 28 June 1918, p. 5:5.
40. Post-Dispatch, 1 July 1918, p. 2:2; Westliche Post, 2 July 1918, p. 1:7.
41. Post-Dispatch, 2 July 1918, p. 20:3.
42. Thus the Westliche Post, 3 July 1918, p. 2:1, noted, Krum schien jeden Versuch zu machen, die Verhandlungen zu verzergeren. See also Star, 2 July 1918, p. 1:1: "Attorneys for Weinsberg took advantage of every legal step to delay or prevent a trial."
44. Post-Dispatch, 2 July 1918, p. 1:1.
45. Westliche Post, 3 July 1918, p. 1:7. The Westliche Post noted that Krum had not objected to two men among the potential jurors, one of whom had been born in France and the other in Great Britain. The jurors chosen for the trial are listed in the Globe-Democrat, 3 July 1918, p. 5:6.
48. Star, 2 July 1918.
49. Ibid., 3 July 1918, p. 3:6.
53. Ibid., p. 9:5.
57. Post-Dispatch, 6 July 1918, p. 8:1–2.
59. Indeed, the action of Judge Morris may have influenced the result in another Espionage Act case. In United States v. Pope, the defendant, a resident in a southern Illinois community, had not subscribed to a Liberty Loan drive. As a result, in April 1918 a number of patriotic citizens appointed a committee to go to the defendant's home to confront him with the question why he had not yet subscribed. When so asked, the defendant forthrightly gave his views for not contributing: he did not want the war to continue and felt that the government was wrong in its position. Accordingly, the defendant reasoned, if enough people who did not like the war did not buy war bonds, the government would have to make peace and the war would end in a draw. For his forthrightness the defendant was subjected to the public ignominy of indictment. But in this instance the district court granted a motion to dismiss, on the grounds, fairly obvious in retrospect, that a man who only made his views known in his own home when confronted did not have the requisite intent to violate the act. 253 Fed. 270 (SD Ill. 1918). The indictment was dismissed on 17 August 1918, shortly after the Weinsberg trial had concluded. It is possible that the judge and prosecutor in the Pope case were influenced by the decision of the trial judge in Weinsberg, for, although the Weinsberg decision was not officially reported in the court reporters, it received extensive publicity in the newspapers distributed in Missouri and southern Illinois.
60. St. Louis Times, 6 July 1918, p. 10:1–2.
62. Post-Dispatch, 6 July 1918, p. 10:3.
63. Amerika, 6 July 1918, p. 8:3.
64. Westliche Post, 6 July 1918, p. 2:1–2.
65. Ibid., p. 4:2–3.
Notes to Epilogue

1. Post-Dispatch, 3 October 1943, p. 4B:1.
2. Ibid., 18 July 1936, p. 5A:7.
3. Ibid., 15 August 1946, p. 3C:3.
5. Ibid., 23 July 1930, p. 5A:8; ibid., 15 June 1930, p. 1A:1; ibid., 10 April 1935, p. 8A:1; ibid., 7 December 1934, p. 18D:4. Nor was Kersting bashful about writing letters to the editor on various public issues, including prohibition. See ibid., 6 December 1933, p. 2B:1.
7. Articles about the planned rally of the pro-Nazi German-American Alliance appear in the Globe-Democrat issues for 17, 18, and 19 May 1940.
9. Of course, German-American ethnic organizations were established or revived after the war, and some, like the Steuben Society, aspired to a national breadth. But none of these organizations tried to act as a successor to the DANB as a political lobbying organization for German-Americans on controversial political issues.
11. Consider the remarks of Ernest L. Wolf, who served as corresponding secretary of the State Alliance, in a speech at the dedication of a statue of Friedrich Schiller in St. Louis on 12 May 1907: "If at some time in the distant future the unhappy day shall appear when the tones of German have disappeared from the residences of the inhabitants of this city and resound only in the lecture halls of our educational institutions, then there will nevertheless still be some landmarks, poured in metal and mounted on stone, which will serve as evidence that once in this city there lived a race of German men and women who felt the need to honor the memory of great German men through the erection of immutable monuments." Der Schillerverein von St. Louis (pamphlet). Ironically, a few years ago the statue was moved to a location opposite the St. Louis City Hall and rededicated in conjunction with the Strassenfest, a typical, Americanized annual street fair visited by hundreds of thousands of St. Louisans, many of whom are not of German origin and almost none of whom, other than the small core of organizers, speak any German whatever or have any familiarity with German culture. What German cultural programs are presented during the fair are usually imported by bringing performers from Germany itself for the occasion. Professor Wolf's "unhappy day" has appeared in St. Louis.
12. For discussion of similar defensive reactions within the Cincinnati German-American community, see Guido A. Dobbert, "German-Americans Between New and Old Fatherland, 1870–1914," 673 ff.
13. Professor Primm in his Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri, 435, notes that, although the leadership of the Alliance in St. Louis, which was mostly upper-middle-class and civic oriented, endorsed in the name of the Alliance an affirmative vote for certain revisions of the St. Louis city charter in an election in 1914, large numbers of less well-off Germans in the city, many of whom surely were at least nominally members of the Alliance, saw little benefit in the revisions and voted against them. And see Guido A. Dobbert, The Disintegration of an Immigrant Community: The Cincinnati Germans, 1870–1920, 59–63, where Dobbert notes the incongruity of German-American leadership striving through the DANB to preserve a high Schriftdeutsch, probably only poorly mastered by the great number of German immigrants, who were from the lower classes.
15. Helen Traubel, St. Louis Woman, 43.
20. Barry Robert Wood, "Holy Joe' Folk's Last Crusade: The 1918 Election in Missouri," 288–91. The article contains a review of the 1918 senatorial election, in which Republican Selden Spencer won the Senate seat over Joseph Folk, despite efforts by some Democrats to question Spen-
cer’s loyalty by linking him to the German Republican machine in St. Louis. Ibid., 295. Wood sug-
gests that there was a high correlation between antiprohibition sentiment and votes for Folk’s oppo-
nent, Spencer. Ibid., 310–13. Thus, many German-Americans and other wets may have recalled
with displeasure Folk’s vigorous efforts to enforce liquor laws while governor, a recollection evoked
by the presence of the statewide prohibition referendum on the same ballot as the Folk-Spencer
contest.
Sources

One of the difficulties in researching the material for this book was the paucity of primary sources relating to the German-American Alliance in Missouri. The lack of primary source material is understandable, however; when the Alliance disbanded in St. Louis in 1918, both the organization and its officers were under a considerable cloud of suspicion. All who were formally affiliated with the Alliance moved quickly to disassociate themselves from that aspect of their past. Thus, the daughter of Charles Weinsberg reported that some years after the war her father destroyed all his correspondence and other papers relating to the Alliance. No former officer or member of the Alliance seems to have been interested in drawing attention to himself by contributing the minutes or other papers of the Alliance to any university or public or private library.

There are, however, some materials relating to the Alliance in Missouri that have survived. The diaries of E. V. P. Schneiderhahn, one of the early presidents of the Alliance, are preserved in the collection of the Missouri Historical Society in St. Louis. In addition, the publications of the State Alliance in Missouri, its historical quarterly, Geschichtsforschung fuer Missouri, and a number of issues of its monthly newsletter, Monatliche Mittheilungen—have been preserved in the collection of the St. Louis Public Library. A report in the Westliche Post on 26 January 1918 suggests that the Mittheilungen was published at least as late as the winter of 1917–1918, but the St. Louis Public Library has no issues after 1916, nor have I found any other library with issues of the newsletters in its collection.

There are, of course, many newspaper sources relating to the Alliance that can still be found in St. Louis. The St. Louis Public Library has a relatively complete collection of most English-language daily newspapers of the period, including the Post-Dispatch, the Globe-Democrat, the Star, the Times, and the Republic. Unfortunately, inquiries to the research libraries at the St. Louis Post-Dispatch revealed that internal memoranda and notes of Post-Dispatch personnel in regard to the Weinsberg controversy, if any were ever prepared, were destroyed during a general housecleaning in the 1930s.

One must approach the English-language newspapers with caution when
studying accounts of the activities of the German-American Alliance and other German-American organizations in the city. First of all, the reporters for the newspapers were not necessarily well acquainted with the Alliance or the German-American community in general, and a certain lack of understanding of the operations, procedures, and social pressures operating within the Alliance and the German-American community often was evident in the newspaper reports. Thus, for instance, some reporters never did comprehend that the State Alliance and the City Alliance were separate organizations. And, of course, one must view newspaper accounts of Alliance and German-American activities after 1914 with care, keeping in mind that some English-language newspapers went out of their way to attack or to defend German-American groups. At the very least, however, these newspaper accounts allow us a view of how certain segments of the native American population perceived and judged the activities of the Alliance during the war.

As for the German-language newspaper sources, the Missouri Historical Society has a complete microfilm collection for the period of the Westliche Post, the leading German-language daily in St. Louis at the time. The St. Louis Public Library also has an unbound collection of the Westliche Post, but the copies are in disastrously poor condition, literally crumbling into dust. However, the St. Louis Public Library also contains a full set of Der Herold des Glaubens, a Catholic weekly newspaper published in St. Louis, and the set is in considerably better condition than the library’s copies of the Westliche Post, in no small part because the copies of the Herold have been bound. A full microfilm set of the St. Louis Amerika, the Catholic German-language daily in the city, can be found in St. Louis at the headquarters of the Central Bureau of the Central Verein. The headquarters also has extensive document collections regarding the history of the Central Verein, which was one of the leading German Catholic organizations in the nation at the time. The library of Concordia Seminary in Clayton, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis, contains a nearly complete collection of Die Abendschule, the German-language family magazine published in St. Louis principally for Lutherans. The library also contains complete editions of the German-language and English-language official publications of the Missouri Synod, Der Lutheraner and Lutheran Witness, as well as other books and papers relating to the activities of members of the Missouri Synod in German-American activities.

The collection of the Missouri Historical Society in Forest Park in St. Louis, which despite its name is heavily oriented toward materials regarding the history of St. Louis, has a wealth of books and documents on German-Americans in the city. The library and archives of the society contain the papers of a number of prominent St. Louis German-Americans, including Richard Bartholdt, Dr. Hugo Starkloff, and Schneiderhahn. The manuscript collection of Washington University contains the papers of Dr. Otto Heller, another prominent St. Louis German-American. Much more so than any other university library in the state, the Pius XII Library of St. Louis University contains a large number of unpublished aca-
ademic theses and dissertations on various aspects of German-American culture and history in St. Louis and Missouri.

The records of the Missouri Council of Defense, including correspondence to and from the Council, are located in the joint collection of the Western Historical Manuscript Collection of the University of Missouri and the State Historical Society of Missouri, in Ellis Library on the University of Missouri campus in Columbia. The correspondence is especially valuable in providing an overview of the attitudes of native Americans toward the German-Americans in their midst during the American involvement in World War I.

The library of the German Society of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia, has a large collection of German language books, including many that are not usually found in other libraries throughout the country. In addition, the library of the Society has some records of the DANB, including correspondence on several specific projects and a collection of pamphlets published by the Alliance.

Finally, it must be mentioned that a remarkably large amount of material concerning the St. Louis German-American community remains in the collection of the New York Public Library, in New York City. This unusual situation is one of the few remaining legacies of the German-American Alliance, more than 60 years after the Alliance dissolved: shortly after the beginning of this century, Richard E. Helbig, an assistant librarian of the New York Public Library and a member of the DANB, responded to the Alliance’s call for the preservation of German-Americana by soliciting books, pamphlets, and other literature about German-American communities throughout the nation for inclusion in the library’s collection. A number of St. Louis German-Americans heeded Helbig’s call and delivered several hundred items to him for the New York Library’s collection. Many of those items are not to be found in St. Louis.

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