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OPERATION RESCUE, VOCABULARIES OF MOTIVE, AND TACTICAL ACTION:

A STUDY OF MOVEMENT FRAMING IN THE PRACTICE OF QUASI-NONVIOLENCE

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of World War II, an increasing number of social movements have claimed that they are practicing nonviolent civil disobedience tactics. Too often these claims are uncritically accepted even when proposed by movements whose rhetoric may be harsh and punitive. This paper explores the relationship between collective action frames and the practice of nonviolent and violent tactics. To demonstrate this relationship, I present a comparative analysis of the mobilizing vocabularies and tactics employed in three civil disobedience types: (1) the classic nonviolence of Gandhi and King, (2) practical nonviolence espoused by Gene Sharp, and (3) quasi-

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nonviolence practiced by the anti-abortion rights organization Operation Rescue. I argue that the latter form, which I have named quasi-nonviolence, has not been identified within the movement literature. It combines both the rhetoric and tactics of classic nonviolence with rhetoric and tactics considered violent in this tradition. I conclude that three elements within mobilizing vocabularies predispose movements toward the use of violent tactics: dehumanization of the opposition, punitiveness, and the threat that disaster will occur if action is not taken to stop the opponents.

INTRODUCTION

Meaning is an integral part of social action. This proposition, elaborated upon by Weber (1956), Mead (1934, 1964), and Mills (1963) among others, has gained increased attention in recent years. Criticism of the resource mobilization approach has generated a new social psychology of social movements distinct from earlier collective behavior and mass society theories (Morris and Mueller 1992). Much of this research has focused on the impact of ideation through the construction of collective identities (Melucci 1989), consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1988), and "collective action frames" (Snow et al. 1986, 1988, 1992; Tarrow 1992; Gamson 1992; Marullo et al. 1996).

The analysis of "collective action frames" has been very useful for identifying the relationship between mobilization appeals and activist participation. They point out perceived injustice, identify the causes, and propose some form of ameliorative action (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). Their respective logic presupposes a "vocabulary of motives" (Mills 1940; Snow and Benford 1988) for collective action. Recent work by Snow and Benford (1992) explores the macrolevel construction of "master frames" and their relation to "cycles of protest" (Tarrow 1983, 1989). A master frame is a successful collective action frame that has been adopted by other social movements. Its adoption is predicated upon the degree to which it can be elaborated upon by other movements and its potential resonance with target audiences. One example is the civil rights master frame which began as a collective action frame articulated by African-American activists in the late 1950s and 1960s. Key characteristics of this frame were the demand for equal rights and the use of nonviolent methods to

achieve integration. This collective action frame became a master frame as a result of its adoption by numerous other social movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

Snow and Benford further propose that master frames both "spawn" tactical innovation and constrain the selection of tactics. The latter occurs because values and goals espoused by the master frame must be congruent with tactical selection and enactment[1] or the movement risks criticism. This relationship illustrates how tactical decisions are constrained not only by access to resources but also by the way in which meaning is constructed by social movements, the media and the state.

While social movement analysts have exhibited an increased interest in how meaning construction facilitates mobilization, little research has been done that answers questions concerning the relationship between values and beliefs and tactical action. As mentioned above, values and beliefs embedded within collective action frames constrain the selection of tactics (Turner 1970; Freeman 1983; Staggenborg 1989; Snow and Benford 1992). But do the motives provided by these frames also effect tactical practice—the enactment of tactics—or are they of minimal importance? What would happen if a movement adopted a master frame to increase public support but the motives used to mobilize the core activists contradicted those within the master frame? How might this dual framing of incongruent motives effect tactical enactment?

In this paper, I explore such an occurrence—the Religious Right's adoption of the civil rights master frame through the creation of the anti-abortion organization Operation Rescue. In their attempt to mobilize support from the secular public, the direct action wing engaged in "frame extension" (Snow et al. 1986) which portrays objectives as more congruent with the concerns of target audiences. As a consequence, Operation Rescue employed dual collective action frames—the civil rights master frame combined with what can be described as the "God's Law" frame. The mobilizing vocabulary of the latter is based upon obedience to God, and opposition to abortion is part of that obedience. It draws upon a discourse that is both dualistic (proponents embody good versus opponents who embody evil) and punitive. Disobeying God's Law will result in severe punishment, including the probable destruction of America.[2] The God's Law frame is commonly used among Religious Right "televangelists" such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson.[3]

This study compares the vocabulary of motives embedded within the collective action frames of the civil rights movements of Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King with the God's Law collective action frame of the Religious Right organization Operation Rescue. The purpose is to identify motives which facilitate or undermine the potential for the enactment of violent tactics. I argue that the God's Law collective action frame provides a greater frequency of motives for violent action than did the civil rights collective actions frames of Gandhi and King.

I further argue that the civil disobedience type practiced by OR has not been identified within the movement literature. I call this tactic quasi-nonviolence. Quasi-nonviolent civil disobedience is characterized by: (1) a public relations campaign that claims that the movement is practicing classic nonviolence in the tradition of Mohandas K. Gandhi and/or Martin Luther King, thereby appropriating the moral legitimacy of these leaders and their movements; (2) the use of motives that are derived from classic nonviolent vocabularies combined with motives that are derived from vocabularies that are punitive, dualistic, and violent in the classic tradition; and (3) participation in classic nonviolent tactics combined with tactics considered violent in this tradition.

The study of the integral relationship of movement framing to the practice of quasi-nonviolence is relevant for two reasons. First, it is important due to the adoption of civil disobedience tactics by numerous post-World War II social movements. Too often, different approaches are conflated or the mere claim to be engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience is taken at face value. In order to adequately assess the success or failure of such tactics, it is necessary to clearly identify various types of civil disobedience practices.

Second, this analysis explores the ways in which language—mobilizing vocabularies—constrain or increase the potential for enacting violent tactics. More research is needed that explores the conditions under which conflict and violence emerge in social movements (Mueller 1992). Consequently, the point of this paper is not to discredit Operation Rescue or to characterize them as the sole proponents of quasi-nonviolence. Other movements claiming to be nonviolent have likely practiced it. Certain factions of the anti-Vietnam War and student movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s merit investigation in this respect.

Before proceeding, I must clarify the limitations of this paper. The relationship between motives and tactical action are the focus of this analysis, not factors external to the movement. Yet, the response of the state and movement opponents are central to making tactical decisions. Although motives for violence may be present among activists, potential repression on the part of the state or opposition groups and the assessibility and vulnerability of targets are crucial to determining whether or not these motives will be acted upon.[4] Other relevant factors include an activist's past experiences with aggression and violence which varies according to social locations such as gender, class, and even geographical region, urban as opposed to suburban or rural experiences. These factors are, without question, relevant to our understanding of tactical enactment. But this paper is limited in scope in order to effectively analyze the relationship between collective action frames and tactical practice. It sheds light on this relationship but more research is needed.

I begin by presenting a brief description of the organization Operation Rescue. After this, I elaborate upon the assertion that motives embedded within collective action frames constrain tactical practice. The differing religious traditions that informed the construction the civil rights master frame and the God's Law collective action frame are then discussed. Next, the data and methods used to construct a comparative analysis of tactics are presented, along with a comparative analysis of three types of civil disobedience—classic nonviolence, practical nonviolence, and quasi-nonviolence. Finally, the comparisons are analyzed. I conclude that three elements embedded within collective action frames create a predisposition for violence—dualism, punitiveness, and threat of disaster if action is not taken.

OPERATION RESCUE

In the late 1970s, a number of Protestant political organizations were forming to promote conservative religious and political goals. The Moral Majority and Christian Voice, to name only two, shared beliefs that included opposition to abortion, gay rights, busing, "secular humanist" school books, the Supreme Court ruling against prayers in school, pornography, reductions in military spending, welfare spending, and even domestic violence legislation.

Perhaps the most emotionally charged goal was the recriminalization of abortion. Its value as a catalyst for mobilization was recognized early on by conservative Protestant organizers, especially Richard Vigurie. He "was the political technician who turned abortion into an issue that made the Christian Right a mass movement" (Diamond 1989, p. 57). Presented as a single issue of moral concern, it politically mobilized participants from both Catholic and Protestant denominations.

By 1984 the more militant, direct action wing of the Religious Right organized its first "Action for Life" conference in Florida. A workshop was presented by Joseph Scheidler on "Effective Confrontation." As part of the training, 200 participants went to the Women's Awareness Clinic in Fort Lauderdale and blocked all entrances. In 1985, the "Action for Life II" conference was held in Wisconsin. Participating organizations, including the Pro Life Action League and the Pro Life Direct Action League, named their nationally coordinated organization the Pro Life Action Network (PLAN). Its goal was to close down abortion clinics nationwide.

During PLAN's third annual conference in Missouri in 1986, participants adopted goals for increased blockading of women's clinics. Over time, a plan to blockade clinics under the name of Operation Rescue (OR) was devised. OR was formed by a five-man national advisory committee elected at the 1987 PLAN conference. The team included Randall Terry, who became OR's leader; Joseph Scheidler, called the "godfather" of OR due to his earlier use of direct action tactics (see Scheidler 1985); and less instrumental players John Ryan, Peter Lennox, and Andrew Burnett.[5]

OR's first experimental blockade or "rescue" at an abortion clinic was in November 1987 in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. But it gained national media attention during its "siege on Atlanta" in the summer of 1988 (also the location of the Democratic National Convention). During this time, 1,200 participants were arrested where abortions were performed. According to OR and other sources, over 11,000 participants were arrested blockading women's health clinics in 1988 (*Nuclear Resister Newsletter* 1989).[6]

OR activists are predominantly from conservative Fundamentalist and Evangelical denominations and are "Bible believers"—those who believe in the literal interpretation of the Bible. Catholics are involved to a lesser degree and there is a sprinkling of participants from other denominations and religions, including Orthodox Jews. Gary Wills

of *Time* magazine writes that most estimates of religious affiliation are roughly two-thirds Evangelical and one-third Catholic (Wills 1989).[7] The vast majority of participants are white and appear to be from upper-working-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds.

OR had a national office in Binghamton, New York. Terry publicly announced that it was closing in 1990 due to financial difficulties. Both Terry and Operation Rescue National leader, Keith Tucci, sent direct mail solicitation through a South Carolina "Operation Rescue National" address in the early 1990s. Currently, Operation Rescue National is based in Dallas, Texas, and has had a leadership change. OR chapters exist throughout the United States, but the number of participants has decreased since the late 1980. A cadre of national leaders travel throughout the country to mobilize for rallies and participate in blockades.

MOTIVES, CONSTRAINTS, AND ACTION

In order to discuss the role of motives in collective action, it is first necessary to explore the more generic topic of the relationship of language to social action. Much of the current work in linguistic analysis has broken with older traditions that conceived of language as description. Many theorists now subscribe to the premise that language is a form of action, be it Austin's "speech acts" (1962), Garfinkel's talking as doing (1967), or Saussure's semiotic deconstruction (1960).[8] But to develop an understanding of how language serves not only to construct reality but also to provide a basis for collective action, we must look to theories that focus on organized social conduct and its relation to language. To this end, Mead (1934, 1964) and Mills (1963) provide the most fruitful foundation.

Similar to the above-stated theorists, Mead did not conceive of language as mere description but as "the medium for social organization in human society" (Mead 1964, p. 287). Language is the mechanism by which the internalization of social roles of significant others takes place, culminating in the subjective development of the "generalized other" or the fully socialized human being. As part of this process, appropriate and inappropriate motives for action among the group are internalized through language. Thus, for Mead, "The process of social control can therefore be defined as the process of presenting an individual with symbolic contents which enclose, implicitly of explicitly, recommendations for action" (Melossi 1990, p. 145).

Building on Mead's premises, Mills has argued that articulation of motive is not to be dismissed as mere epiphenomenon, but rather "verbalization is a new act ... there is not a discrepancy between an act and "its" verbalization, but a difference between two disparate acts, motor social and verbal" (Mills 1963, p. 444). In this context, the role of language is to "coordinate social conduct." Justifications, by use of appropriate motives, are vocalized when actions are incongruent with the expectations of significant others. Motives thereby serve as a license for conduct within the social group. Similarly, Weber (1956) described motives as terms in a vocabulary which appear to the actor or observers as adequate grounds for conduct, an insight incorporated by Mills.

Vocabularies of motive vary with different social groups and change over time. If mobilization appeals are to be effective, they will present motives that resonate with the beliefs and values that constitute the "collective identities" (Melucci 1989) or "social mentalities" (Tarrow 1992) of target groups. If mobilizing appeals recruit participants on this basis, the vocabularies of motives provided by organizers are more likely to be deemed legitimate and adopted by movement participants. The actions of participants are thereby constrained through orienting their behavior to the repertoire of motives available in their vocabularies (Mills 1963). In this context, language can be understood not as merely descriptive but rather as "doing, a doing that is a constitutive and inextricable feature of social organization" (Melossi 1990, p. 143). Consequently, differences in mobilizing vocabularies used by movements cannot be dismissed as merely "rhetorical" and therefore inconsequential. Motive is an integral part of action and thereby legitimates or constrains activist participation in a range of actions and tactics.

Religious Traditions and Mobilization

Moving from the abstract to the concrete, we can understand the Religious Right's construction of dual frames through their attempt to increase mobilization by appealing to the values of a wider audience. This process has been termed "frame alignment" or, more specifically, "frame expansion" (Snow and Benford 1986). When adopting the civil rights master frame, they provided motives for action that had a greater resonance with secular human rights groups and the general public. While the claim to be the "civil rights

movement of the eighties" was emphasized to the mass media, the God's Law frame remained integral to OR's mobilization appeals. It was essential to the bloc mobilization of conservative Christians who were recruited through rallies at churches representative of the Religious Right. The God's Law frame was the link that provided a cultural resonance by which OR could transform Bible-believing Christians into "activist" Christians through mobilization appeals that claimed that God demanded participation in blockades.

To understand how religious traditions have shaped distinctive collective action frames and practices, it is important to recognize the centrality of the belief in biblical inerrancy to Fundamentalists and new Evangelicals.[9] This belief characterizes the world in terms of absolute truth in battle with absolute evil. Biblical scripture is privileged which emphasizes the vengeance of God and the justification of punishment toward "evil" doers. This orientation is evidenced in the Religious Right's promotion of severe punishment of criminals, including capital punishment, and of militarism.

In the case of the civil rights movement, King was a Southern Baptist. Although African-American Southern Baptist and Pentecostal churches *tend* to be Evangelical, it has been argued that many of these churches are more moderate and do not "fit the Fundamentalist mold" (Garrett et al. 1983, p. 23). The orientation of the churches that King affiliated with was distinct due to the social location of African-Americans within a segregated and white supremacist South. Kapur explains that:

> Faith in the redemptive power of suffering and the love ethic of Jesus constituted for African Americans vital elements of their worldview. I will argue here that the Gandhian notion of *satyagraha* based on the principles of *ahimsa* (non-injury and non-killing) and *satya* (truth), struck a favorable cord because it affirmed a very important aspect of popular African American spirituality (1993, p. 8).

In other words, the values of reconciliation with offenders and self-sacrifice intrinsic to Gandhian philosophy where resonant within the African-American religious community, providing a cultural resonance by which King and others could build a movement employing nonviolent civil disobedience.

King had been deeply influenced by Mohandas Gandhi's teachings while in seminary school. It has been argued that the African-

American community had become acquainted with Gandhian philosophy and tactics beginning with his campaigns early in the twentieth century. Sudarshan Kapur (1993) has traced the historical connections of Gandhian campaigns through the African-American press (including the writings of W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey), visits of Indian satyagrahis to African-American communities in the United States, and travels to India by representatives of African-American organizations and colleges. Kapur maintains that this prior knowledge of and identification with Gandhian nonviolence created a resonance within the African-American community that, in part, facilitated the successful mobilization of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s (Kapur 1993).

Gandi, who had a Western education, was a *sanatani* or "universalist Hindu," who adopted what he considered of value from various religions and philosophies. Merton has noted that Gandhi's thought was shaped by the "Vedantic spiritual disciplines" and New Testament Christianity as well as the writings of Thoreau and Tolstoy. The central concepts of Gandhian beliefs referred to above—*satyagraha* and *ahimsa*—are discussed below. For now, it is salient to note that Gandhi's nonviolent direct action "bore witness to the chief truth of Hinduism: 'The belief that ALL life (not only human beings but all sentient beings) is one'" (Merton 1964, p. 8). Such beliefs provided an ideational foundation from which the Indian National Congress could mobilize a vast number of participants throughout India to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience.

Yet unquestionably, there are some collective action participants who share the goals but not the motives provided in collective action frames. In this case, one of two things may happen. If they challenge the beliefs of the group, the activists might invite confrontation by proposing alternative motives which could result in change within the SM.[10] What is more likely is that they will use mobilizing vocabularies as "auxiliary motives" (Mills 1963) considered to be more acceptable to the group, while remaining silent about the real ones. If activists are committed to the cause, they will likely be constrained by the appeals of organizers and other participants even if they do not entirely agree with the range of motives provided. This is due to concern over the movement's public image and the need for favorable media coverage. Most activists understand that the motives presented within a movement's mobilization appeals must be congruent with its tactics if the movement is to maintain

credibility. If an individual does not understand this, organizers and other participants will call his or her attention to this point.

Ultimately, vocabularies of motives embedded within collective action frames constrain tactics in two ways. First, successful mobilization appeals imply some degree of resonance with the culture of participants. This increases the probability of acceptance and adoption of motives provided by movement organizers. Two, even if the motives provided are not adopted by participants, concern over the movement's public image may constrain action, as well as leading to the sanctioning of inappropriate behavior by organizers and other activists.

FRAMES, MOTIVES, AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

There are certainly many leaders, organizers, and organizations in what can be defined as a social movement. The leaders selected here are the most celebrated and their rhetoric most emulated by other movement leaders and participants. The selection of Gandhi and King's mobilizing appeals as constitutive of the civil rights master frame is also due to Terry's claim that OR was enacting classic nonviolence as practiced by these two leaders.[11] The civil rights master frame is signified with the values of equal rights and nonviolence. Only OR's claim to have appropriated the values of nonviolent civil disobedience is relevant to this analysis. Consequently, I discuss the construction of the civil rights master frame by its originators and the vocabularies of motive for nonviolent action derived from it. Then, I analyze the construction of OR's collective action frame and compare the direct action pledges of the civil rights movement and Operation Rescue.

Mohandas Gandhi

Although Gandhi's philosophy evolved over the years, the mobilizing vocabularies he employed remained fairly consistent during his nonviolent campaigns in India from 1920 through 1944. In his work to liberate India from British colonialism and to expand the rights of the untouchable caste, he diagnosed the problem as political oppression that was a manifestation of a deeper problem—"moral confusion" and "social disorganization" which had produced

a violent and unjust social order. The problem was the responsibility of not only the aggressors but also those who accepted injustice.

His prognosis involved taking constructive action in the economic, political, and civil spheres of society through embracing the moral principle of *satyagraha*, which means "truth force."[12] This approach was more than a technique to gain political power. It was a way of life that adhered to the principles of *ahimsa* or nonviolence. For Gandhi, *satyagraha* was the pursuit of truth, which was the same as the pursuit of God. "In fact it is more correct to say that truth is God, than to say that God is truth" (Gandhi 1951, p. 38). Truth and *ahimsa* were "two sides of a coin ... *ahimsa* is the means; Truth is the end" (Gandhi 1951, p. 42).

The moral imperative of the satyagrahi was "noncooperation with everything humiliating" (Gandhi 1964, p. 29). Rather than the threat of violence, Gandhi maintained that nonviolent withdrawal of consent was the key to liberation, as "no government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced, and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the government will come to a standstill" (Gandhi 1951, p. 157).

But noncooperation had to be nonviolent. "In the dictionary of the nonviolent there is no such thing as an external enemy. But even for the supposed enemy [the satyagrahi] will have nothing but compassion in his heart. He will believe that no man[13] is intentionally wicked" (Gandhi 1951, p. 38). An institution or practice might be considered evil, but not the individual engaging in it. Consequently, a satyagrahi sought to convert the opposition, not to harm them. "Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter hatred only increases the surface as well as the depth of hatred" (Gandhi 1964, p. 32).

Through the practice of nonviolence, Gandhi claimed, both the oppressed and the oppressor could be transformed. Although it was a difficult path, liberation could only come through *satyagraha*. "We may never be strong enough to be entirely nonviolent in thought, word and deed. But we must keep nonviolence as our goal and make steady progress toward it. The attainment of freedom, whether for a man, a nation, or the world, must be in exact proportion to the attainment of nonviolence by each" (Gandhi 1964, p. 24). In this attempt, there will be failures, but "*Ahimsa* is one of the world's great principles that no force on earth can wipe out.... Nonviolence will prevail—whatever man may or may not do (Gandhi 1964, pp. 30-31).

To discern the repertoire of motives derived from these mobilization appeals, we must ask the question "Why engage in nonviolent civil disobedience?" The motives derived from the Gandhian collective action frame include taking action to eradicate "moral confusion," "social disorganization," and injustice, to create a nonviolent transformation of the social order, to practice *satyagraha* to end violence, to find truth/God, to live according to *ahimsa*, to withdraw consent from all things humiliating, to not perceive the "supposed enemy" as wicked, to awaken the moral conscience and convert the opponent, to attain freedom in the exact proportion that one attains nonviolence, and although there will be failures, to remain committed because "nonviolence will prevail."

Martin Luther King, Jr.

King's mobilization appeals were also fairly consistent throughout his involvement in nonviolent campaigns to end racial discrimination, from the Montgomery bus boycott in the mid-1950s through his support of a striking African-American union in Memphis, Tennessee, in 1968 (the location where he was assassinated). He diagnosed the problem as racism, segregation, and other forms of institutionalized discrimination. Segregation constituted a system of injustice that took a vast toll on the humanity of the oppressed and demanded immediate action. "When you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will ... [and] hate filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an air tight cage of poverty ... then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait" (King 1964, p. 81).

But the actions of those who were motivated by hate also hurt themselves:

> Hate is just as injurious to the person who hates. Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes the personality and eats away its vital unity.... We recognize that ... [the segregationist's] hate grows out of fear, pride, ignorance, prejudice and misunderstanding, but in spite of this, we know God's image is ineffably etched in his being (King, Speech, Montgomery, Alabama, 1957).

His prognosis called for direct action that could "create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has

constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue" (King 1964, p. 79). This could be accomplished through the use of civil disobedience. But the civil disobedience had to be nonviolent. "There will be no permanent solution to the race problem until oppressed men learn to love their enemies (King, Speech, Montgomery, Alabama, 1957). He elaborated on this point by stating that "With every ounce of our energy we must continue to rid this nation of the incubus of segregation. But we shall not in the process relinquish our privilege and our obligation to love. While abhorring segregation, we shall love the segregationist.... This is the only way to create the beloved community" (King, Speech, Montgomery, Alabama, 1957). The idea that all persons are "made from the same basic stuff ... molded in the same divine image," was integral to King's vision of the "beloved community" (Smith and Zepp 1974, p. 132). His goal was not merely integration but the creation of a society of cooperation and social justice among all people. Nonviolence was the only means that could acheive this end.

King acknowledged Gandhi's influence on his use of nonviolent civil disobedience. He claimed that the civil rights movement would not have been successful if there had not been "a philosophy and method worthy of its goals. Nonviolent direct action did not originate in America, but it found its natural home in this land.... It is a weapon unique in history, which cuts without wounding and ennobles the man who wields it.... Both a practical and a moral answer to the Negro's cry for justice" (King 1964, pp. 25-26). Although the use of this method resulted in violent attack from the opposition, King maintained that "We will reach our goal ... win our freedom because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in our echoing demands" (King 1964, pp. 92-93).

The motives for nonviolent action derived from King's collective action frame include acting to eliminate institutionalized segregation and racism, to stop abuse and to create freedom, to eliminate hatred that injures both the oppressed and the oppressor, to establish "creative tension" such that a community has to confront the issue, to create a permanent solution to hate through the practice of nonviolence, to love the segregationist in order to create the "beloved community," to "ennoble" the activist, to employ a "practical and moral answer" to ensure justice, and to remain committed through adversity as success will come due to the "sacred heritage" of the nation and the "will of God."

Randall Terry

As mentioned earlier, Randall Terry was one of the founders of Operation Rescue and was most prominent spokesperson during OR's "surge" (Lofland and Johnson 1992) in 1988-1990. He has written books and some short articles. Much of what was in Terry's writings was paraphrased in flyers distributed to direct action participants throughout the country. OR's publicized goal has been to stop abortion. In newspaper quotes and televised media bites, abortion has been defined as "murder" and the violation of a group's "civil rights." But in pre-blockade flyers and Terry's books (1988, 1990), he explains this opposition as part of a larger problem—disobedience to God. Other social problems associated with this disobedience are "pornography," "homosexuality," and "humanism."

Representative of the God's Law frame of the Religious Right, Terry states that "God commands his people to 'rescue those unjustly sentenced to death' (Proverbs 24:110) and 'Rescue the weak and needy; Deliver them out of the hand of the wicked' (Psalms 82:4)" (National Day of Rescue flyer, October 29, 1988). The "wicked" consist of physicians who perform abortions, Planned Parenthood, NOW (National Organization for Women), and others who, if Terry is successful, "will no longer be permitted to harvest their blood money from women in crisis pregnancies" (Easter pre-blockade flyer, 1989).

But guilt for this "holocaust" does not rest with physicians and abortion rights organizations alone, as those who do not take action to stop abortion are also guilty. "Judah was severely judged because some Jews killed their children, while others stood passively by without trying to stop them" (National Day of Rescue flyer, 1988). He implores others to sacrifice "a little comfort to rescue defenseless children from demonic child-killers" (National Days of Rescue 3, March 25-30, 1991). Due to inaction, "time is running out for America. The blood of 25 million children is crying out to God in a haunting chorus against this nation" (National Day of Rescue flyer, October 29, 1988). He warns potential activists that "God has committed Himself to avenge innocent blood. If we don't ... end this holocaust—and thereby give God a reason to show mercy in the midst of judgment—America will perish" (National Days of Rescue 3 flyer, March 25-30, 1991).[14]

Terry's diagnosis for preventing the destruction of America consists of "Rescue missions [which] are heroic attempts by God fearing people to save babies and mothers from abortion on a *particular day, by peacefully but physically* blockading abortion mills with their bodies, to intervene between abortionists and their innocent victims" (National Day of Rescue flyer, October 29, 1988). Direct action will "help produce the social tension necessary for political change. 'Politicians see the light after they feel the heat!'" (National Day of Rescue flyer, October 29, 1988).

Activists are cautioned, however, to be prepared for the "spiritual battle" of their lives. "Satan will not give up this stronghold without a fight to the very end" (Terry 1988, p. 212). Despite adversity, however, activists must remain committed as failure to take action will result in "the righteous judgments of God" that will "descend on us like the dew, and then like a storm, until every drop of the children's blood is avenged" (National Day of Rescue 3 flyer, March 25-30, 1991).

Terry makes few references to nonviolence in his mobilization appeals (the most are in the direct action pledge discussed below). But in his book, he does state that "If our spirit is loving and not hateful, repentant and not arrogant, forgiving and not condemning, we will win the sympathy in our nation for the cause of the children (1988, p. 215). He also elaborates on the importance of Christians' "loving their neighbors," but the reference is to taking action on behalf of "unborn children." In response to the police, Terry advises activists to respect their position.

The repertoire of motives for civil disobedience in the OR collective action frame include defense of the "civil rights" of "unborn children," to prevent "murder," obedience to God, to rescue "unborn children" from the "wicked," to stop the "harvest of blood money" and "demonic child-killers," to avenge "innocent blood," to assure that God does not punish America, to "produce the social tension necessary for political change," to battle "Satan," to act in a "loving" and "repentant" and "forgiving" manner to win sympathy for "the cause of the children," to show that one loves thy neighbor by taking action on behalf of the "children," and to act with respect for the police.

As noted above, a greater frequency of motives for nonviolence are present in OR's direct action pledge, which activists must sign prior to blockades. For this reason, I compare the direct action pledges used during King's organized civil disobedience in Birmingham, Alabama, to the OR direct action pledge signed by activists prior to blockades:

CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT PLEDGE

I HEREBY PLEDGE MYSELF—MY PERSON AND BODY—TO THE NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENT. THEREFORE I WILL KEEP THE FOLLOWING TEN COMMANDMENTS

1. MEDITATE daily on the teachings and life of Jesus.
2. Remember always that the nonviolent movement in Birmingham seeks justice and reconciliation—not victory.
3. WALK and TALK in the manner of love, for God is love.
4. PRAY daily to be used by God in order that all men might be free.
5. SACRIFICE personal wishes in order that all men might be free.
6. OBSERVE with both friend and foe the ordinary rules of courtesy.
7. SEEK to perform regular service for others and for the world.
8. REFRAIN from the violence of fist, tongue, or heart.
9. STRIVE to be in good spiritual and bodily health.
10. FOLLOW the directions of the movement and of the captain of the demonstration.

I sign this pledge, having seriously considered what I do and with the determination and the will to persevere.

Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, Birmingham Affiliate of the S.C.L.C.
(King 1964, pp. 63-64)

OPERATION RESCUE PLEDGE

I UNDERSTAND THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE of Operation Rescue being unified, peaceful, and free of any actions that would appear violent or hateful to those watching the event on T.V. or reading about it in the paper.

I realize that some pro-abortion elements of the media would love to discredit this event (and the entire pro-life movement) and focus on a side issue, in order to avoid the central issue at hand—murdered children and exploited women.

Hence, I understand that for the children's sake, this gathering must be orderly and above reproach.

THEREFORE

1) As an invited guest, I will cooperate with the spirit and goals of Operation Rescue, as explained in this pamphlet.
2) I commit to be peaceful and non-violent in both word and deed.
3) Should I be arrested, I will not struggle with the police in any way (whether word or deed) but remain polite and passively limp, remembering that mercy triumphs over judgment.
4) I will listen and follow the instructions of the Operation Rescue crowd marshals.
5) I understand that certain individuals will be appointed to speak to the media, the police, and women seeking abortion, I will not take it upon myself to yell out to anyone, but will continue singing and praying with the main group, as directed.

I SIGN THIS PLEDGE, HAVING SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED WHAT I DO, WITH THE DETERMINATION AND WILL TO PERSEVERE BY THE GRACE OF GOD.

SF Bay Area Operation Rescue, National Day of Rescue flyer, October 29, 1988

In the civil rights pledge, the repertoire of motives for acting nonviolently are: to be a part of a "nonviolent movement," to seek the goal of "reconciliation," to act in the manner of God, which is to act "in a manner of love," to observe rules of courtesy, and to refrain from violence of "fist, tongue, or heart." In the OR pledge, the motives for acting nonviolently are to be "unified, peaceful" and free of any actions or words that would appear hateful to those watching on T.V. or reading about it in the paper, to not allow "pro-abortion elements" in the media to "discredit this event" due to the use of violence, to "commit to be peaceful and nonviolent in both word and deed" for the children's sake, and if arrested, not to struggle with the police in word or deed, and to remain "polite and passively limp, remembering that mercy triumphs over judgment."

Frame/Motive Incongruity

In the diagnosis of both Gandhi and King, the problem was defined as oppression within the institutions of society, coupled with hatred within both the oppressors and oppressed that perpetuated a violent and unjust social order. Terry diagnosed the problem as the practice of abortion due to disobedience to God. This problem was exacerbated by the inactivity of people to stop the "holocaust." Such behavior increased the likelihood that God would destroy America. They all agree that passivity in the face of perceived injustice is part of the problem. But in contrast to Gandhi and King, Terry did not characterize violence as a problem in itself aside from the violence implicit in his construction of abortion.

The prognosis of direct action conjoined with the adoption of a nonviolent life philosophy was proposed by both Gandhi and King. Their nonviolent philosophies promoted self-sacrifice of oneself rather than harm to opponents. Nonviolent direct action could potentially create the desired changes in social institutions through a moral transformation of both the oppressor and oppressed. Similar to Terry, their prognosis had religious implications. For Gandhi, the practice of *satyagraha* was a path to truth which is God, while *ahimsa* or nonviolence was the means for seeking the truth/God. For King, God was love. To act in a loving manner toward one's opponent was to act in the manner of God.

The prognosis for Terry was obeying God by taking direct action to stop abortion. But, distinct from both Gandhi and King, acting

in the manner of God did not necessitate adopting a nonviolent life philosophy. To obey God implied taking action to eliminate "bloodguiltiness." Activists accomplish this when they "avenge" the "murders" of "innocent children." Terry called for retribution rather than forgiveness. He emphasized this point by drawing analogies between abortion and the judgment of Judah for child sacrifice. He reminded his audience that God would "avenge innocent blood" through punishing both those who participated in abortions and those who did not take action to stop them.

Whereas women seeking abortions were characterized as exploited or misinformed, the characterization of OR's opponents—physicians and those who supported abortion rights—was quite different. They were characterized as "demonic," exploiting people for "blood money," equivalent to Nazis who were responsible for a "holocaust," and influenced by "Satan." Rather than attributing the problem to a *system or institutions* which were considered evil by Gandhi and King, the problem for Terry was *within individuals* who were "wicked" in their refusal to obey God. Gandhi and King eschewed such characterizations of their opposition and instead believed that "God's image" was also "etched" in their being and that no one "is intentionally wicked."

When Terry did discuss nonviolence, its use was justified in order to avoid bad media coverage, not as an end in itself. It is notable that in the direct action pledges, the civil rights pledge encouraged activists to internalize motives which refrain from violence of the "fist, tongue or heart" whereas the OR pledge asked only that participants *act* in a nonviolent manner in "word and deed." Yet, Terry also emphasized that activists should be "loving and not hateful," rhetoric drawn from classic nonviolent vocabularies. The presence of such contradictory motives in mobilizing vocabularies is a characteristic of quasi-nonviolence. This is due to its integration of motives derived from the classic nonviolence of Gandhi and King with motives that dehumanize the opposition.

Ultimately, when comparing collective action frames, Terry's characterization of OR opponents was: (1) dualistic—whereas Gandhi and King saw the potential for both good and evil in all people including themselves, Terry proposed that by obeying God's Law, he and OR represented absolute truth (good) as opposed to their opponents, who were characterized as "demonic" (evil); (2) punitive—OR's "enemies" were intentionally wicked and their acts

merited punishment; and (3) threatening—if Christians did not take action to stop abortion, then God would destroy America.

These differences are significant. The punitive and dualistic motives characteristic of the God's Law frame contradict three integral characteristics of the classic nonviolent approach—self-sacrifice rather than harm to opponents, refraining from the use of violence against opponents, and the goal of reconciliation. The threat of God's punishment also contradicts the classic nonviolent belief that love, harmony, and progress, however slow in coming, are essential features of the universe (these points are elaborated upon below).

Yet, Terry publicized the claim that OR was practicing nonviolent civil disobedience in the tradition of Gandhi and King. If motives are a part of action, we must ask whether or not a collective action frame which is dualistic, punitive, and threatening is incongruent with the enactment of nonviolence as practiced by Gandhi and King? Will the frequency of such motives in OR's collective action frame increase the probability of a tactic characterized by violence toward the "enemy?" We can answer this question through a tactical comparison of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, King and the civil rights movement, and Terry and Operation Rescue.

METHODS

In Sharp's (1973) illustration of nonviolent resistance techniques, there are three primary categories of nonviolent resistance. "Protest and persuasion" are exemplified by marches, demonstrations, and mock awards, among other actions. "Nonviolent intervention" involves techniques such as the hunger strike, the creation of alternative economic institutions, sit-ins, and nonviolent occupation. His third category, "economic and political noncooperation", includes boycotts, and civil disobedience, which was described as "a deliberate, open and peaceful violation of particular laws ... believed to be illegitimate for some reason" (1973, p. 315). The type of nonviolent resistance tactic analyzed in this study is civil disobedience.

The nonviolent resistance tradition has been typologized into differing approaches (Bondurant 1965; Stiehm 1972; Sharp 1973, 1979). The most common categorization proposes one technique based on moral principle and another that emphasizes practical

effects. Therefore, to engage in an analysis of the nonviolent tradition, three types of civil disobedience must be compared. They are: (1) the moral principle approach, (2) the practical effects approach, and (3) quasi-nonviolent civil disobedience.

Civil Disobedience Types

The moral principle (MP) tradition is associated with the nonviolent civil disobedience practiced by Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. Gandhi's work with the Indian National Congress involved many forms of nonviolent resistance, the most famous being the use of *satyagraha* for civil disobedience. In the 1950s, King went to India to study Gandhi's work. The *satyagraha* approach was translated to Southern sensibilities and conditions by King. It was made famous through his work with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and affiliated organizations during the civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s.[15]

Satyagraha was a technique that integrated nonviolent moral principles with direct action. Attempts to emulate it were central to the successful resistance campaigns of both Gandhi and King. Consequently, the analysis of civil disobedience types that follows consists of a comparison of the eight characteristics of the *satyagraha* technique with the practical effects and quasi-nonviolence approaches. Table 1 summarizes the results of the comparisons. The characteristics are derived from the abundance of material by and about the nonviolent methods of Gandhi and King. Data sources include movement biographies, autobiographies, speeches, newsletters, and newspaper and video coverage.

The practical effects (PE) tradition has been promoted by author and nonviolent "actionist" Gene Sharp (1973, 1979). He maintained that "the popular idea that only pacifists can effectively practice nonviolent action ... is simply untrue" (1973, p. 68). In *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, an impressive work of some 900 pages, he analyzes nonviolent action as a practical and superior method of economic and political struggle. His goal was not to demean pacifism but to persuade non-pacifists of the practical utility of nonviolent methods.

Essentially, practical nonviolence emphasizes the logic and dynamics of nonviolent action. It is not *satyagraha* in the strictest sense of the term, but its characteristics are similar enough to classify

it within the nonviolent tradition. Although a participant does not have to be a pacifist, she or he does have to adhere to nonviolent strategy and tactics, which are necessary for the method's effectiveness. Sharp supports his claim by providing numerous illustrations of successful nonviolent struggles throughout history. Information on this approach is derived primarily from his books.

The quasi-nonviolent (QN) method has been promoted by Randall Terry. OR's leaders do not promote nonviolence as a way of life nor have they argued that nonviolent tactics are always preferable. They have claimed that they were practicing classic nonviolence only during blockades at women's health facilities. The use of violence in this context was eschewed because it would detract attention from abortion and benefit their opposition. Some of their rhetoric and actions were derived from the classic approach. Yet, they also used rhetoric and participated in actions considered to be violent in this tradition. For this reason, their method is classified as quasi-nonviolence, a form of civil disobedience which resembles but is not nonviolent.

Information on this approach is derived from numerous sources, including books written by movement leaders, OR newsletters, magazine and newspaper coverage, videos, court documents and police records from the files of the California state office of the National Organization for Women (NOW), direct observation of clinic blockades and OR picketing, interviews with OR members and with clinic escorts, attendance of speeches given by Joe Scheidler and OR attorney Cyrus Zal, and interviews with people who have interacted with OR leaders, including NOW president Patricia Ireland and journalist Susan Faludi. My research applies to the time period of the fall of 1987 through the summer of 1991.

TACTICAL COMPARISONS: CLASSIC NONVIOLENCE, PRACTICAL NONVIOLENCE, AND QUASI-NONVIOLENCE

Before proceeding, I must mention one difficulty involved in the construction of this comparative analysis. Methodological requirements made it necessary to treat complex behavior in terms of relevant generalizations. It was necessary to construct civil disobedience categories as "ideal types" (Weber 1947). This resulted

in categories that reflect the normative values, motives, and actions of the originators of each civil disobedience type, complemented by material on the practice of the majority of participants. For this reason, atypical beliefs held by small numbers of participants were not emphasized.

1. Reconciliation/Self-Sacrifice

The Moral Principle Tradition

The willingness of activists to sacrifice themselves as a substitute for violence against their opponents was a quintessential characteristic of *satyagraha*. "He who practices it must be willing to sacrifice everything except his honor" (Gandhi 1965, p. 64). Suffering without retaliation was necessary to awaken the moral conscience in the opponent and elicit his/her conversion. In *satyagraha*, self-sacrifice was a function of love for the opponents. Its practice could ennoble and transform the activists who suffered for their moral principles.

Gandhi taught that a commitment to nonviolence or *ahimsa* was crucial to the success of *satyagraha*. But he emphasized that this principle went far beyond noninjury to others. It implied a positive attitude of nurturing and love toward all. King, who had been deeply influenced by Gandhi, referred to a related concept, agape, from the Greek New Testament. King spoke of love in this context as a form of "understanding, creative redemptive good will toward all (1967, p. 73). Gandhi disapproved of punishment and would not allow the authorities to punish opponents who assaulted him. He believed that people were "not capable of knowing the absolute truth and therefore not competent to punish" (Bondurant 1965, p. 16). Ultimately, the goal of *satyagraha* was reconciliation between opposing groups and the creation of a beloved community. Gandhi did participate in *satyagraha* campaigns that did not result in the desired conversion of the opposition, but he taught that it was the ideal one should strive for.

In fact, *Satyagrahis* in Gandhian campaigns were subjected to verbal harassment, beatings, shootings, prison, loss of property, and loss of life without retaliation in the vast majority of cases. But, in contrast to King and Terry, Gandhi's campaigns for Indian independence involved participants from all over the country. In the

satyagraha against the Rowlatt Bill (1919), literally millions of people participated. This made it difficult for organizers to maintain control. When violence broke out after Gandhi was arrested during the Rowlatt campaign, he suspended the *Satyagraha*, fasted for three days, and urged others to fast to confess their guilt.

Like Gandhi, King's version of nonviolent civil disobedience was predicated on the activists' willingness to suffer rather than to inflict harm on their opponents. He, too, believed that such action could lead to their conversion. "To our most bitter opponents we say, "We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering.... But be ye assured that we will wear you down by our capacity to suffer. One day we will win freedom, but not only for ourselves. We shall so appeal to your heart and conscience that we will win *you* in the process" (King, Speech, Montgomery, Alabama, 1957).

While King was committed to nonviolence as a way of life, he realized that he could not expect most movement participants to be similarity committed. But he did require "the spiritual determination of the people to be true to the principle as it works *in this specific action*" (Smith and Zepp 1974, p. 133). Most movement actions did not succeed in the desired conversion of their opposition. But King emphasized conversion as an ideal to strive for in mobilization appeals. Leaders and activists in the civil rights movement suffered verbal harassment, beatings, bombings, various forms of terrorism, imprisonment, and death—without retaliation.

Participants in nonviolent action were expected to treat opponents with respect. King believed that "there is some good in the worst of us and some evil in the best of us" (Speech, Montgomery, Alabama, 1957). Emphasizing this helped those who had been assaulted to "see within our enemy-neighbor a measure of goodness" (King 1963, p. 43). The goal was "justice" and "reconciliation" with the opponent, not "victory" over them.

The Practical Effects Tradition

Actionists subscribing to the practical effects approach understood the need for sacrifice without retaliation as a part of the dynamics of nonviolent action. As a result, the actionists were able to engage in a form of "*jiu-jitsu*" (Sharp 1973, p. 110) whereby the opponent's repression was used against them. Those employing the practical effects approach have attempted to convert their opponents or certain individual or subgroups among them. They have also surmised that conversion was not likely and attempted to achieve one of two other goals. The first was "accommodation," whereby the opponent grants concessions without having been converted. The second was "nonviolent coercion," whereby the opponent neither was converted nor decided to make concessions but rather found that it was no longer possible to wield power.

The effectiveness of nonretaliatory suffering, however, was dependent on how the tactic was enacted, "suffering by people who have shown their bravery, openness, honesty, goodwill, and nonviolent determination, is far more likely to produce a sympathetic response in the opponent then suffering by people who behave like cowards, cringe, flee, lie and hate" (Sharp 1973, p. 710). Other tactical advantages of self-sacrifice included demonstrating to opponents that repression would not be an effective deterrent, enhancement of morale and solidarity due to shared suffering, and the potential to "frustrate" and "immobilize" the opponents.

In the practical effects approach, the actionists need not love their opponents but Sharp maintains that refraining from hostility and demonstrating good will toward them will increase the effectiveness of the technique. Even if the actionists think conversion unlikely, they will seek "no personal hostility toward members of the opponent group.... Replacement of hostile personal attitudes by positive attitudes will reduce the pressure on the opponent groups to be defensively aggressive" (Sharp 1973, pp. 707-708). A just solution to the problem should be the goal.

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Terry encouraged his followers to sacrifice for "the sake of the children, "as your *community and the nation* sees good, decent citizens sitting, kneeling, and praying around a death camp, risking arrest for these children, they will take seriously our claims that abortion is murder. Credibility follows in the wake of sacrifice" (National Day of Rescue flyer, 1988, italics added). He further prepared activists to expect "the enemy to malign them, ridicule them, fight against them and lie about them" (Terry 1988, p. 216).

To assess whether or not OR sought reconciliation with opponents, it is important to differentiate between their response to women

seeking abortions as opposed to physicians and clinic escorts who were defined as the "enemy." By characterizing women as either misinformed or exploited, activists were motivated to provide what they considered to be accurate information about abortion. They also tempted the women with offers of support during the pregnancy. Such actions can be construed as an attempt at reconciliation. If the woman changed her mind before the abortion, she would receive acceptance. If she converted to the anti-abortion position after the abortion, she would be forgiven.

It was not Terry's desire, however, to achieve reconciliation with physicians and Pro Abortion Rights (PAR) activists. He proposed that it was God's will that they be punished because they were "wicked." In fact, he saw no basis for compromise, as evidenced in his description of the characteristics that a "good warrior" needs to be victorious—"Warriors know that if they don't defeat the enemy, the enemy will defeat them. There is no stalemate, no middle ground" (Terry 1988, p. 216). But some OR participants have attempted conversations with opponents during initial interactions. When it became obvious that the opponent was not changing her or his mind, the response was generally one of dismissal or condescension. But, in contrast to Gandhi and King, Terry encouraged sacrifice to *convert the public not their opponents.*

As a result of blockades, OR activists have been subjected to verbal harassment and jailed, leaders have received anonymous threats, and there have been reports of police brutality. In many cases activists did not retaliate, but in others they did. Terry has spearheaded campaigns to harass judges who sentenced OR activists to what he considered to be unfair fines or jail time. Other acts of verbal and physical violence against opponents have been taken place (discussed below).

Terry is not a pacifist and has espoused the merits of nonviolent tactics exclusively in relation to direct action at abortion clinics. He has reminded activists of the importance of being "loving and not hateful." And OR flyers have committed participants to nonviolence in "word and deed." Yet, in other statements, he has indicated an acceptance of various forms of violence. In a *Washington Post* article, Terry stated that he believed in the use of force but felt that it was counterproductive as the American public has an adverse reaction to what it sees as violence (Kurtz 1989).

2. Negotiation/Intensive Nonviolent Preparation

The Moral Principle Tradition

Gandhi and King valued openness and honesty as principles of nonviolent resistance. For Gandhi, nonviolence was a means to discover truth, and honesty was essential to this quest. "*Ahimsa* ... functions in the open and in the face of odds, the heaviest conceivable" (Gandhi 1951, p. 380). Gandhi informed members of the British colonial government of planned *satyagrahas* beforehand, as a preliminary attempt to negotiate with them. Similarly, King attempted negotiations with the bus company in Montgomery, Alabama, prior to a massive boycott, and with merchants prior to protests against segregation in Birmingham, Alabama. Negotiations were carried out with the hope of avoiding direct action. They were a preliminary step prior to the education of the public regarding the dispute.

Both Gandhi and King felt that intensive nonviolence preparation prior to actions was extremely important. Gandhi required that *satyagraha* participants engage in various actions for purification, including a day of prayer and fasting, participation in public meetings for education, training sessions, signing a *satyagraha* pledge, as well as obligations to become self-reliant (i.e., learning to weave cloth rather than relying on British imports). When the violence mentioned above broke out after Gandhi's arrest, he revised his prerequisites for national campaigns by creating a core of dedicated and well-trained *satyagrahis* to more thoroughly educate the people about the principles of nonviolence. Only these devoted *satyagrahis* were allowed to commit the first acts of civil disobedience against the Salt Acts (1930-1931).

Nonviolence training was an ongoing part of the civil rights movement. Such training was needed to ensure that activists would not act violently but also to make sure that they knew how to protect themselves when violently attacked. King was instrumental in setting up nonviolence training schools in Montgomery, Alabama, shortly after the Freedom Rides, when activists were seriously beaten by white segregationists. Volunteers for direct action were screened, trained, and required to sign a pledge to be nonviolent. King and other leaders would not send anyone to engage in civil disobedience "who had not convinced himself and us that he could accept and

endure violence without retaliating" (King 1964, p. 62). Those who could not commit to nonviolence were allowed to assist by preparing food or providing lodging.

The Practical Effects Tradition

Negotiations with opponents demonstrated honesty and openness that increased the effectiveness of nonviolent action. Sharp argued that secretive behavior can be detrimental. His strongest objection was that it produced fear, which can breed distrust and demoralization, thereby undermining the dynamics of the technique. Secretiveness also tends to increase authoritarianism as participants cannot be told future plans. And it makes the civil disobedience group appear less trusting to the opposition and third parties.

Sharp also insisted that careful planning and preparation were essential to nonviolent action. Preparation for effective nonviolence included investigation of the opponent's views, attempting negotiations as a first step, creating "cause consciousness," casting off fear, overcoming submission, and maintaining a disciplined commitment to prohibiting violence. Sharp maintained that such preparation enhances the probability of success.

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

It is OR policy to negotiate with the police prior to blockades. They do not, however, give the exact date or location of a blockade. The meeting is arranged to negotiate: (1) for mild treatment and (2) to have the police take as long as possible while making arrests. In exchange, OR leaders guarantee that they will be nonviolent. No attempt has been made to negotiate with their opponents, owners of women's clinics, physicians, or Pro Abortion Rights (PAR) escorts prior to an action. In fact, it is the goal of quasi-nonviolent leaders to intentionally deceive the clinics in order to keep them from countering their tactics.[16] This created the need for secretiveness and deception. Quasi-nonviolent rallies were open only to those who gave their names, addresses, and the name of a local pastor. Tactical decisions were privately decided by OR leaders, and the location of the clinic to be blockaded was announced the morning of the action.[17]

Similar to classic nonviolence, activists were taught not to resist the authorities and instead to "go limp" when arrested. Preparation consisted of a pre-blockade rally, prayer, and signing a pledge to be nonviolent. In his book, Terry states that participants may be asked to "role play" being at a "rescue" site during the rally. The degree of training provided appears to vary throughout the country. In California, very little training was provided for confrontations with the police and OR opponents. One OR participant told me that his pre-blockade training consisted of watching a regional leader passively drop to the ground. The audience did not attempt to practice this. Several rally programs in California listed 10 to 12 speakers, only one of whom addressed blockade training. New activists generally had no other preparation than the three-hour pre-blockade rally, most of which consisted of speeches not related to nonviolent principles or resistance.

3. Blockade as Civil Disobedience Tactic

The Moral Principle Tradition

Quasi-nonviolent spokespersons claimed that they were enacting civil disobedience in the tradition of Gandhi and King by "sitting in" at abortion clinics. This is an inaccurate description. A "sit-in" is a form of occupation whereby activists demand the right to be present in a location in which they are not wanted or by law not permitted to be. They do not restrict access to anyone else wishing to be there. OR primarily engaged in "blockades" which restricted others from entering a location. More relevant than the labeling problem is the fact that Gandhi never blockaded anyone. He felt that the "formation of a living wall of pickets" was "naked violence." He further asked "what is the difference between force used against a man wanting to do a particular thing, and force exercised by interposing yourself between him and the deed?" (1951, pp. 338-339). Gandhi felt that only voluntary actions could be moral. This ethic was implicit in the *satyagraha* technique whereby opponents were confronted with a moral choice. It was the choice whether or not to harm protesters, combined with willingness to suffer for the cause, that created the potential for moral transformation.

King participated in nonviolent sit-ins where African-Americans occupied segregated locations, but I can find no record of his having been involved in actions that restricted the access of others through physical intervention. In fact, when a proposal was suggested to the

SCLC to blockade the capitol building in Alabama, King rejected the idea (Garrow 1986, p. 294). Apparently some civil rights activists did engage in blockades but this tactic was never employed by the majority of participants in the civil rights movement.

The Practical Effects Tradition

The practical effects lineage differs most radically from the moral principle approach in its acceptance of blockading. Sharp does include "nonviolent interjection" (creating a small obstacle which can easily be surmounted) and "nonviolent obstruction" (creating physical obstruction which cannot be overcome) as acceptable tactics.[18]

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Terry has participated in "sit-ins" where he entered abortion clinics and refused to leave but did not deny others access. However, the standard OR form of civil disobedience has been "blockading," an action that has been mislabeled by OR leaders and the media as "sit-ins." This tactic could also be described as "obstruction" in Sharp's classification. Whether or not it can be classified as "nonviolent obstruction" is the subject of the next two sections.

4. No Verbal/Symbolic Violence

The Moral Principle Tradition

The goal of nonviolent resistance as practiced by Gandhi and King was to convert their opponents; therefore, verbal or symbolic insults were unacceptable. Dialogue had to be open, attempting to see the point of view of the opponent in hopes of achieving a just reconciliation. From the Gandhian perspective, symbolic violence is "violence once removed." Equally destructive is the attempt to induce guilt, which is "closely related to fear and hatred and violence." Gandhi emphasized that "we must refrain from crying shame, shame to anybody ... if others are wicked, are we the less so?" (Bondurant 1965). Consequently, appeals and slogans used in *satyagraha* campaigns were directed at the injustice of British colonialism rather than vilifying the British people. This is also true of the civil rights movement, where the institution of segregation was attacked rather than individuals.

The Practical Effects Tradition

Slogans and symbols communicate the beliefs of the movement. They are used to influence the viewpoint of opponents and/or the public. As noted earlier, in order to gain sympathy it is necessary to express as much good will toward the opponent as possible. Protest slogans and symbols can be critical, but if they are perceived as hateful they will undermine the effectiveness of nonviolent action. Sharp did include "taunting officials" and "rude gestures" as tactics. Such actions are unacceptable in the moral principle tradition—although the types of examples given, such as Chinese soldiers mooning Soviet soldiers on the other side of their border, are more mischievous than malicious (Sharp 1973, p. 148).

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Some OR leaders and participants have been polite and used rhetoric derived from classic nonviolent vocabularies, such as "I have no bad feelings toward you" or "we don't mean harm to anyone." Yet, a notable characteristic of quasi-nonviolence has been the use of verbal harm and negative symbols to intimidate and induce guilt. The most common examples were signs and pictures of dead fetuses. Many of the pictures of fetuses were from the second and third trimesters, well past the period of development when most abortions take place. These photos were aggressively pushed in front of the faces of women seeking abortions and OR opponents. Equally prominent were signs that vilified OR's opponents as murderers and Nazis, such as "Abortion is Murder," "Abortion—Hitler would have loved it," and "Stop the Holocaust." One Sacramento protester attached to the outside of his van photographs of Jews who had been murdered in concentration camps next to photographs of aborted fetuses.

Although many OR participants did not talk to Pro Abortion Rights activists (as requested by their leaders), some did. On occasion, clinic escorts have been called names such as "whore" or "lesbian." In the East, OR activists have used the term "kike." Some Pro Abortion Rights Activists have been accused of being taken over by the devil. Women seeking abortions have been told "you don't know

what you're doing" or "don't let them do this to you." But they were also told not to "murder your innocent baby." Women have also been aggressively pursued over distances (followed to their car, etc.) by OR "sidewalk counselors" trying to talk them out of having the abortion. This has resulted, at times, in causing women to cry or scream for the "sidewalk counselors" to leave them alone.[19]

5. No Physical Violence Toward Opponents

The Moral Principle Tradition

To Gandhi and King, violence consisted of any type of harm to the individual, be it symbolic, verbal, physical restraint (whereby even blockading was seen as violence by Gandhi), or harm to one's person. In the vast majority of Gandhian campaigns, there was no violence. This was notable especially in his small-scale actions in specific regions. The only incidence of violence occurred in national actions with millions of participants, many of whom shared the cause of national liberation but not the philosophy of Gandhi.

Direct action carried out by the civil rights movement was organized by several closely affiliated organizations, all of which were dedicated to nonviolent action. During civil disobedience, the incidents of violence by civil rights activists was so negligible as to not have been recorded in news coverage of movement actions.[20]

The Practical Effects Tradition

Sharp defines violence as such minor acts as shoving and manhandling (presumed to be carried out as acts of repression against nonviolent actionists) as well as more severe forms of physical harm. Like Gandhi and King, violence of any kind was prohibited during protests. Sharp's reasoning for this, as noted earlier, was that it undermined the efficacy of the technique. Violent action alienates existing support, shifts the media focus to the violence, and justifies state repression, among other negative effects.

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Nonviolence as defined by Terry was refraining from physical and verbal abuse in front of the media and public during OR blockades. Although OR participants signed a pledge to be nonviolent in word and deed, violence as defined in the classic tradition did occur. The type of violence OR engaged in can be described in two categories.

The first was "common" violence, which consisted of pushing, shoving, and physically restraining clients by grabbing them or anyone attempting to enter the clinic and by trapping people inside the clinic. Another common act was pinning PAR activists against walls through the force of the crowd. This violence occurred when clinic escorts and other PAR supporters were present. When opponents and women seeking abortions were not present, OR's tactics appeared more similar to classic nonviolence, especially in relation to the police.

The second category was "occasional" violence. For example, Bay area news coverage showed the CA regional director of OR grabbing and painfully twisting a clinic escort's arm. Other news coverage described how an OR male jumped on a woman in the crowd trying to use her as a pivot. In Sacramento, a scuffle broke out between an OR leader and a news reporter who was trying to photograph injunctions that had been thrown into a trash can. During blockades in Atlanta, OR members threw themselves in the paths of clients and escorts, which tripped and knocked them over.

Also included in the category of occasional violence were abusive actions reported by clinic escorts. When OR members could not find a clinic that was unprotected by PAR activists (mostly women who have previously surrounded the door to save space for clients to enter), they positioned their largest men in a front line to break through the escort's lines. This was done with aggressive pushing and shoving, direct hands-on contact, kicking at the back of knees, and throwing themselves backwards at clinic defenders. Such actions have been difficult to observe as they have occurred prior to media coverage (as early as 4 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.). One instance was reported by several witnesses and documented.[21] There have been other reports from clinic defenders that some OR activists have engaged in pinching and kicking at the backs of their knees where the public could not see.[22]

6. No Damage to Opponent's Property

The Moral Principle Tradition

Damage to an opponent's property was seen as violence by both Gandhi and King. This was true of overt damage, or covert damage such as sabotage. During the one King-affiliated event where damage to property occurred, he left due to his vow not to be involved in any action that became violent. Damage to one's own property was viewed as acceptable. During the Salt Acts *satyagraha*, an effigy of the Salt Acts and imported cloth were burned.

The Practical Effects Tradition

Violence in the practical effects approach is defined exclusively as harm to human beings. But Sharp cautioned that any type of damage to the opponent's property that could result in harm to people would undermine the effectiveness of nonviolent action. He added that even nonharmful property damage may have detrimental effects such as encouraging secrecy and deception, undermining confidence in the efficacy of nonviolent action, and provoking greater repression.

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Terry has stated that he disapproves of damage to the opponent's property. But police records maintain that during OR's "siege on Atlanta," clinic windows were broken and vehicles damaged, and there was phone, mail and personal property damage of police and community personnel who took part in demonstrations. Utilities at clinics have been turned off. In California, locks were jammed at clinics during OR blockades.

Other forms of property damage have also occurred. PAR activist's signs have been ripped by OR participants. After blockades, flower beds and shrubbery in the surrounding area have been ruined. In Sunnyvale, a redwood fence was knocked down by the force of the crowd. In another California blockade, a clinic window was broken from the pressure of the crowd. It may appear that this damage was unintentional but it is important to remember that it occurred frequently and no steps were taken to avoid it. Presumably, this type of property damage was an acceptable part of quasi-nonviolent practice.

7. Universalism, Harmony Will Prevail

The Moral Principle Tradition

The nonviolent life philosophy of both Gandhi and King was a reflection of their religious convictions, which involved principles of universalism and optimism. Gandhi was a ***sanatani,*** meaning "universalist Hindu," who adopted what was of value in all religions. He felt that each religion had it own truth "like the branches on a tree," although different, having the same source. Universal processes to Gandhi were positive and harmonious and he felt that human history had been moving toward this end.

King was a Christian Baptist who also proposed universalist themes and respect for differing beliefs. He reminded his followers that although we are on different paths, we are "all God's children." Like Gandhi, King perceived universal processes as harmonious and maintained that "there is a creative force in the universe which works to bring the disconnected aspects of reality into an harmonious whole" (1958). In King's universe, justice and love would inevitably prevail.

The Practical Effects Tradition

As noted earlier, one does not have to be religious or a pacifist to employ the practical effects approach to nonviolence. One need only accept that nonviolent conflict is a preferable method to violent conflict, and this belief can be found across the ideological spectrum. The presumption that nonviolent actions will inevitably succeed, either at present or in the future, varies with the different value systems adopted by actionists. Some participants may believe that justice will prevail while others are not so sure. At the very least, activists presume that nonviolent action stands a better chance of success than does the use of violence.

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Similar to the MP tradition, quasi-nonviolent activists participated in civil disobedience due to their religious convictions. But the content of their religious beliefs differed dramatically from those of Gandhi and King. Terry is an Evangelical Christian. He believes in Biblical

inerrancy, or the literal interpretation of the Bible. "Bible believers" claim to possess the absolute truth while arguing that those of differing Christian denominations and other religions do not. In contrast to Gandhi and King's tolerance and universalism, quasi-nonviolent beliefs were dogmatic and exclusive.

Quasi-nonviolent beliefs also lack the optimism of the moral principle tradition. In accordance with the God's Law collective action frame, if action is not taken to stop abortion, God may punish the nation by destroying it. One OR flyer asks whether or not God will "completely destroy us, perhaps reducing this nation to a nuclear ash heap?"

8. Accept Consequences of Action

The Moral Principle Tradition

The *satyagraha* technique requires willing sacrifice from activists, be it submitting to violence from the opponent or penalties for breaking the law. For this reason, participants must not seek to escape the legal consequences of their civil disobedience. Public acknowledgment of breaking the law and open acceptance of the penalty expresses the activist's respect for the law. To this end, King quoted Gandhi when emphasizing that the nonviolent resister enters jail "as a bridegroom enters the bride's chamber" (1958) and emphasized the importance of "jail not bail" to civil rights activists. Both Gandhi and King were imprisoned more than once, as were numerous members of their movements.

The Practical Effects Tradition

In the practical effects approach, importance is also placed on accepting the legal consequences of nonviolent civil disobedience, yet a number of options are open to activists. They may accept the consequences of their law breaking or deny their guilt in an attempt to use the court as a platform to publicize their cause. In rare instances, a leader may seek to evade the law due to the importance of his or her skills to the survival of the movement.

Table 1. Three Types of Civil Disobedience

Satyagraha	*Principled Nonviolence*	*Practical Nonviolence*	*Quasi-Nonviolence*
1. Reconciliation/self sacrifice	Yes	Yes	No
2. Negotiations/intensive nonviolence training	Yes	Yes	No
3. Blockade as a civil disobedience tactic	No	Yes	Yes
4. No verbal or symbolic violence	Yes	Maybe	No
5. No physical violence toward opponents	Yes	Yes	No
6. No destruction of opponent's property	Yes	Maybe	No
7. Justice/harmony will prevail	Yes	Maybe	No
8. Accept consequences of action	Yes	Maybe	No

The Quasi-Nonviolent Tradition

Terry also emphasized the importance of being arrested. Many OR activists have paid fines, gone to jail, and refused to give their names to publicize their cause, all actions congruent with the classic tradition. But court dockets in Atlanta and other cities show that more than half of those arrested at blockades fail to appear in court and the law does not expend resources looking for them. Contrary to the classic and practical approaches, OR has also claimed in court, that their organization did not exist, in order to evade prosecution.[23]

The previous eight characteristics of the *satyagraha* approach were presented to illustrate similarities and differences between the three civil disobedience types. A review of Table 1 clearly shows that OR was not using the moral principle approach, the technique emulated by Gandhi and King. Quasi-nonviolence shares more features with the practical effects approach but still deviates in enough crucial areas, especially the use of violence, to differentiate it.

MOBILIZING VOCABULARIES AND TACTICAL ENACTMENT

So far, I have argued that collective action frames provide a repertoire of motives for action. These motives constrain not only the selection

of tactics but also the enactment or character of the tactic. In the collective action frames of Gandhi and King, there were numerous motives for acting in a loving and forgiving manner toward opponents. Such actions were part of a philosophy that sought the elimination of violence and reconciliation with opponents. Such motives were also present in the practical effects approach although with less frequency and they were justified for reasons of effectiveness. But in the mobilizing vocabulary of quasi-nonviolence, we see a different repertoire of motives. Although some motives for nonviolence were provided, especially in relation to direct action, there was a much greater frequency of motives that were dualistic, punitive, and threatening.

These motives contradicted the moral principle tradition. This is evidenced by the incongruent actions of OR's civil disobedience in comparison to the practice of Gandhi and King. Terry's presumption that OR acted according to God's truth conjoined with the characterization of their opposition as "demonic" precluded motives for reconciliation and negotiations with opponents. The frequency of such dehumanizing characterizations, coupled with the threat of punishment due to inaction, provided a greater legitimacy for the destruction of their opponent's property and the occurrence of verbal, symbolic, and "common" as well as "occasional" violence.

The purpose of this study, as mentioned earlier, is not to single out Operation Rescue as exclusive practitioners of quasi-nonviolence, although they present a clear example of its practice. I do not claim that quasi-nonviolence is new, only that it has not been identified. It has likely been practiced in the past by movements claiming to be nonviolent. During the post-Gandhi era in India, there were a number of groups claiming to be enacting *satyagraha*. Bondurant (1965) disputes this and has argued that they were practicing *duragraha*, a term used to describe direct action that did not adhere to nonviolent principles. But it is important to remember that nonviolence is defined differently by different SMOs. Not all movements engage in public relations campaigns in which they claim to be practicing nonviolence *in the manner of Gandhi and King*—a characteristic of quasi-nonviolence.

The difference between the civil rights movement and Operation Rescue was that the civil rights movement had a core of *leaders* who were sincerely committed to classic nonviolent principles. They provided the mobilizing vocabularies for the movement. These

vocabularies were reiterated at meetings and in literature and communicated to the public. Consequently, the vast majority of motives for action deemed acceptable by participants promoted nonviolence and eschewed punitiveness. Reports indicate that a large number of *participants* in the civil rights movement were motivated more by practical considerations than philosophical ones (Farmer 1968, p. 134; Smith and Zepp 1974, p. 133). The point is that the abundance of nonviolent motives provided by the leaders fostered the *practice* of a nonviolent approach for those who did not share the principles of Gandhi and King.

This does not mean, however, that no one in the civil rights movement practiced quasi-nonviolence. Individuals or splinter groups with differing values, beliefs, and motives than those articulated by movement leaders may have engaged in punitive tactics and dualistic characterizations of the opposition. My argument pertains to the majority of participants, the "ideal type" and the overall character of the tactic. Arguably, there were some OR participants who were practicing classic nonviolence.

So what does this study tell us about the relationship between mobilizing vocabularies and the practice of violent and nonviolent tactics? The answer to this question can be illuminated with reference to other research done on this topic. Blain (1988) looked at how the rhetoric of political movements can create a predisposition for violence through an analysis of how motives are constructed to incite followers to fight enemies. Based on an analysis of Hitler's discourse, he concluded that "hyperbole is the idiom of political violence." It is employed in the construction of "the victimage ritual" described as follows:

> There are two moments of identification in this narrative. First the leader gains the audience's identification with the violator's murder of some appropriate victim. In the second moment the leader goads his audience into action through gaining their identification with the triumph over the enemy. The function of these identifications is to constitute dramatic characters or maximal types—patriotic heroes, who symbolize the great goods, fighting and sacrificing, in mortal combat with villainous "enemies" who represent the great bads (Blain 1988, p. 264).

War rhetoric also involved the construction of a sense of imminent danger.

Blain noted that Hitler's style represented a political perversion of the religious notion of the struggle against good and evil. In the mobilizing vocabularies of OR we see this struggle constructed in terms of a victimage ritual in which OR embodies absolute truth/godliness while their "enemies" are constructed as evil/demonic. The excessive use of hyperbole is present. But, contrary to Blain's assessment, this alone does not produce a predisposition for violence. Hyperbole was also used by Gandhi and King. The distinction that provides the motives for violence can be found in their content. Notably, Gandhi and King's rhetoric "vilified" institutions, systems, and ideas, *not individuals*. It tended to characterize the opposition as victims of "ignorance, prejudice, and misunderstanding" while refusing to sanction the use of violence in any form.

Rather, it is the dualistic and punitive characterizations of individuals in hyperbolic rhetoric that provide the motives for violence. These characterizations are embedded within Hitler's construction of the victimage ritual—good versus evil, Aryan versus Jew. But such characterizations go beyond merely constituting the opposition as villainous; they explicitly *dehumanize* opponents as evil incarnate, in which the only just solution is to *eliminate them* in order to save the world from destruction. It is important to recognize the distinctions in the content of motives in order to identify when motives for violent action are being constructed. To criticize one's opposition is not the same as vilifying them, and to vilify them is not the same as dehumanizing them. The further mobilization appeals move along this continuum toward dehumanization and elimination, the greater the potential for violent tactics.

Consequently, when we see a movement engaging in rhetoric that excessively: (1) dehumanizes the opposition through dualistic categorization; (2) characterizes them as intentionally evil such that punishment is justified; and (3) threatens that if action is not taken to stop opponents disaster will result, then the motives for violence have been provided. Inversely, when movement framing: (1) proposes that good and evil exists in all people and/or that the opposition are victims themselves; (2) targets institutions, systems, and ideas for criticism while seeking reconciliation with opponents; and (3) provides a belief in the inevitable success of the movement in the face of short term failures, then motives which constrain violence against the opposition have been provided.

UPDATE

At the time of my initial research from 1987-1991, there had been a decrease in the number of bombings of abortion facilities from the mid-1980s. However, the rate of arsons increased from roughly four per year during 1987-1990 to 10 arson attacks in 1991 and 16 in 1992. In 1993, after the election of a pro-choice president, the first murder of a physician who performed abortions, Dr. David Gunn, took place. There was also a shooting of a physician who performed late trimester abortions, Dr. George Tiller. In 1994, Dr. John Bayard Britton, clinic escort James Barrett, and two clinic staff members, Shannon Lowney and Leanne Nichols, were murdered

The persons who committed these acts had regularly protested outside of women's clinics and were familiar with anti-abortion rights literature. Michael Griffin, Dr. Gunn's assassin, had been involved in Rescue American, a sister group to OR that draws upon the same mobilizing vocabularies. Rescue America's national director is Donald Treshman, a coordinator of the PLAN conferences, the same conferences that produced OR. It is notable that in OR's mobilizing appeals, it is physicians who are the prime targets. Such acts of violence can be understood in their relation to the mobilizing vocabularies that provide motives that justify them.[24]

It is also important to recognize that this movement did not change their appeals after experiencing frustration in 1992. They mobilized from the beginning through use of the dualistic and punitive God's Law frame. Violence had been carried out by a small faction of activists from the inception of the anti-abortion rights movement. OR was temporarily successful in diverting attention to quasi-nonviolent tactics in which abusive actions "seeped through the cracks" so to speak, and sporadic acts of violence still occurred. The setbacks due to policies of the Clinton Administration would have proved difficult for any movement to withstand. But for a movement that constructs its opponents as "demonic" and believes that God will punish activists for not avenging "innocent blood," the escalation of such violent attacks are rendered all too comprehensible.

CONCLUSION

This paper has analyzed the relationship between collective action frames and tactical enactment. Specifically, I have looked at how

mobilizing vocabularies constrain or reinforce the use of violent and nonviolent tactics. In reference to the theories of Mead and Mills, I have argued that motives are integral to the enactment of collective action. While motives derived from mobilizing vocabularies significantly influence tactical enactment, they are not a sole determinant. Other factors such as auxiliary motives, the potential for repression, and access to skills and resources, also play a role.

The majority of motives derived from Operation Rescue's God's Law collective action frame were dualistic, punitive, and threatening. Such motives were incongruent with the ones adopted by the civil rights master frame, which emphasized nonviolence and reconciliation with opponents. This incongruity was, in part, responsible for the enactment of a civil disobedience tactic that has not been identified in the movement literature, one I call quasi-nonviolence. I have presented a tactical comparison of three types of civil disobedience to demonstrate the distinctions—the moral principle approach (practiced by Gandhi and King), the practical effects approach (a variant of the moral principle approach articulated by Gene Sharp), and quasi-nonviolence (practiced by Operation Rescue). Classic nonviolence and quasi-nonviolence are clearly different approaches. Although there is a greater overlap between the practical and quasi-nonviolent types, there are enough differences, especially in regard to the use of violence, to differentiate them.

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NOTES

1. The goal of social movements is not just to get people to participate in actions (mobilization) but also to have them participate in a manner that successfully fulfills organizer's goals (tactical enactment).

2. It can be argued that King also employed a God's Law rhetoric in support of civil rights. But the religious traditions drawn upon to construct the mobilization appeals of the civil rights movement and Operation Rescue were quite different. The term God's Law is used here to capture the absolutist and punitive character of Religious Right mobilization appeals. This term presumes the belief in biblical inerrancy or the possession of one absolute truth. Transgressors of this truth deserve to be and will be subject to severe punishment. Such beliefs were distinct from the references to God used by both Gandhi and King. Perhaps King's rhetorical approach would be better described as an appeal to God's principles rather than God's Law.

3. Abundant examples of God's Law framing can be found in Jerry Falwell's *Listen America* (1980).

4. This may in part explain why some movements that construct openly violent collective action frames fail to act upon them. New Left Maoist groups who justified violence against "capitalist pigs" or "imperialist" politicians had targets who were less accessible and vulnerable than women and physicians entering clinics targeted by anti-abortion rights activists.

5. Excerpts from the First Amended Class Action Complaint filed January 17, 1989 in *NOW v. Scheidler*, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; civil action no. 86 c 7888, p. 7.

6. *Nuclear Resister*, February 15, 1989, No. 60, p. 2. This information was also confirmed in a phone conversation with Tim Duffy, the Operation Rescue source cited.

7. Other newspaper and magazine estimates of religious affiliation are similar. Terry's book and OR flyers also describe participants as belonging to Evangelical and Catholic denominations, with brief mention of a small number of Rabbis. Based on my observations of northern California blockades, the ratio of Bible-Believers to Catholics appeared to be high. Sociological research is needed on the religious affiliation of blockade participants.

8. For a compact introduction to these theorists, see Potter and Wetherell (1987).

9. In the late 1930s to early 1940s, the moderate Fundamentalists broke off into a separate group calling themselves Evangelicals. They promoted greater unity than did Fundamentalists although they shared much common theological ground including the belief in Biblical inerrancy. The term "new Evangelicals" is used by Garret, Jr., to differentiate the moderate Evangelicals from those whose beliefs more closely resemble Fundamentalism. For more information on this topic, see Garrett and colleagues (1983).

10. For example, this happened in the mid-1960s when SNCC members, Stokley Carmichael among them, rejected the traditional civil rights frame and adopted the liberationist black power frame.

11. The "methodological shorthand" of referring to King as the sole articulator of nonviolent philosophy and organizer of civil rights events is in no way meant to demean the sacrifice and work done by members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Congress for Racial Equality, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, among others.

12. The term *satyagraha* was coined by Gandhi in South Africa to distinguish it from early-twentieth-century passive resistance movements.

13. At the time that Gandhi and King lived, the use of generic male pronouns was the norm. They were addressing both male and female activists.

14. Terry elaborates on this theme in his book: "Besides the guilt borne by those who shed blood, a bloodguiltiness is imputed to entire nations where innocent blood

is shed and unavenged.... Under Mosaic law, in order for the nation to be free from bloodguiltiness, the murderers had to be killed" (Terry 1988, pp. 142-143). He continues: "can you see the similarities between child sacrifice in Israel and abortion in America?" (p. 143).

15. It is notable that the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) was formed in 1942 as an outgrowth of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist organization. During actions for racial equality in the 1940s, CORE practiced nonviolent tactics and, like King, believed in appealing to the moral sensibilities of their opponents (Blumberg 1984, pp. 45-46).

16. Prior to blockades, activists met at the pre-blockade rally site (usually a church) to find out where the blockade was going to take place. PAR activists sent out scouts to follow OR activists in order to determine the location and warn the clinic. In response, OR sent out decoy cars to throw them off track.

17. Secretiveness between leaders and participants manifested itself in other ways as well. At one pre-blockade rally in Sacramento, statewide injunctions against trespass were passed out to those attending. When surprised participants asked what they were, the OR leaders at the door said that they were "pro-abortion material" and to throw them away. Participants either gave them to the leader at the door as they went in or threw them in the trash can. Later, a scuffle broke out between an OR leader and a news cameraman trying to photograph the injunctions in the trash. I observed this event at Trinity Church (Sacramento, CA) in March 1989.

18. The largest incident of nonviolent obstruction in the South during the civil rights movement, noted by Sharp, involved segregationists. When Mississippi Governor Ross Barnet refused to desegregate the University in 1963 and was threatened with arrest by federal marshals for contempt of a court order, thousands of white segregationists blocked the doorways so the governor could not be reached (Sharp 1973, p. 388).

19. Other types of abusive comments also occurred. At one blockade in Chico, I observed a male OR activist being shown a picture of a woman who had died from an illegal abortion. Upon seeing it, he joked to his male friend that "this woman needs a lesson in how to use a coat hanger."

20. The only King-affiliated action that became violent did not involve civil disobedience. It occurred in Memphis, Tennessee, in 1968. This march included members of the general public who shared the civil rights cause but not its nonviolent philosophy. Some marchers began to destroy storefront property. King left due to his vow that he would not participate in any violent action.

21. One instance occurred in Sunnyvale, CA, in October 1988. OR violence was described in a news interview with Kass McMahon of the Bay Area Coalition for Our Reproductive Rights (BACORR) who was one of the clinic defenders. This incident was also reported by an PAR infiltrator who observed it in *Coming Up!* (December 1989).

22. This action was described by BACORR spokesperson Kass McMahon. She also stated that it was not unusual for clinic defenders to get bumps and bruises during blockades.

23. Lawyer Cyrus Zal used this defense in Los Angeles when OR was on trial for violating court injunctions against trespass in the spring of 1989. To evade prosecution, he claimed that OR did not exist. He argued that blockaders were not

OR members because they wore T-shirts with the words "Operation Rescue" written on them. Other people wore T-shirts that had the names of ball teams on them. This did not mean that they were members of those teams anymore than blockaders were members of OR. This court proceeding was witnessed by Linda Joplin, California state coordinator of the National Organization for Women.

24. I do not mean to imply that the author's of anti-abortion rights literature intended that it produce this outcome. Such a claim is beyond the scope of this research.

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DEFINING FORMS OF SUCCESSFUL STATE REPRESSION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS:

A CASE STUDY OF THE FBI'S COINTELPRO AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT

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ABSTRACT

State repression of social movement organizations is an important determinant of movement success or failure, yet the focus of current research all but ignores this factor. A paradigm of successful state repression is presented, utilizing a case study of the series of confrontations between the American Indian Movement and the FBI's COINTELPRO operation in the early 1970s. A brief history of the confrontation is provided. It is asserted that repression takes on three distinct forms: direct assault, internal infiltration, and opinion control. The effects of these techniques are discussed as well as the implications of these findings for future research.

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