WRITING TO FEEL / FEELING TO WRITE: UTILIZING EMOTION

THEORY AND PERFORMANCE STUDIES IN CREATIVE WRITING PEDAGOGY

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By

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The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School,

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WRITING TO FEEL / FEELING TO WRITE: UTILIZING EMOTION THEORY AND

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Presented by Kevin Henderson

A candidate for the degree of

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And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

Professor Donna Strickland

Professor Martha Townsend

Professor Samuel Cohen

Professor Heather Carver

This dissertation, like this degree and most things in my life, would not be possible without the bountiful love and support of my family. I want to dedicate this work to my wife and best friend, Annette, and to our inspiring children, Michael and Matthew. I also want to dedicate this work to my mother, who fostered my interest in writing at an early age, and to my father, who passed away during the drafting of this manuscript.

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ABSTRACT

Although undergraduate creative writing courses routinely ask students to create "emotionally complex" characters, engage peers in the emotionally charged experience of workshopping, and scrutinize their personal investments in a story during its evaluation, very little attention has been paid to emotional schooling in creative writing instruction. When the role of emotion in creative writing is broached, it is typically presented in dualistic terms that preserve a binary opposition of feeling and thinking, even though the need to theorize emotions as a "tight braid of affect and judgment" has already been well-argued in feminist epistemology by Arlie Hochschild (1983) and Alison Jagger (1989), and in rhetoric and composition by Alice Brand (1989, 1994), Lynn Worsham (1998), and Megan Boler (1999). My dissertation argues that the core questions for emotion studies can be read as answers for the problems found in the scholarship of creative writing pedagogy, which currently seeks the "perfect combination of praxis and theory" and continues to argue for emotional investment in the writing process and emotional distancing in the workshop process (Blythe and Sweet 307).

Specifically, I demonstrate how concepts from the scholarship on emotions problematize a Gardnerian tradition of pedagogy as well as how Boler's "testimonial readings" offer a chance to engage both craft criticism and emotion theory in workshop. I also demonstrate, through pedagogical trials in my own classrooms, how aspects of performance studies pedagogies and recent translations of Stanislavski's "emotion memory" can be used to help creative writing students recognize emotions as both personally felt and socially constructed *and* as bodily sites of oppression and resistance.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Despite the exponential growth of creative writing courses and degree programs over the last forty years, scholarship in creative writing pedagogy has been slow-starting, especially when compared to the boom of research in rhetoric and composition during this same era. Twenty years after Wendy Bishop (1991) called for collaboration between compositionists and creative writing faculty and ten years after Judith Harris (2001) proposed collaboration between psychoanalytic theorists and creative writers, the lack of any significant interdisciplinary creative writing pedagogies suggests that Bishop's call for "cross-raiding" was alternately met with territorialism and disinterest. Even within the discipline, the majority of creative writing scholarship has either lamented the absence or resented the presence of pedagogical research, which has led to open-ended calls for such studies and little theory to put into practice. In their introduction to "The Writing Community: A New Model for the Creative Writing Classroom" (2008), Hal Blythe and Charlie Sweet confess that even though they have taught creative writing for "a combined seventy years," neither has a well-defined pedagogy and neither had "even thought about the question of how [they] teach creative writing or [. . .] a single instance of the word pedagogy in grad school" (305).

The lack of scholarship on creative writing pedagogy reflects a common lack of definition in creative writing's tenuous relationship to English departments' and humanities' curricula in spite of the massive proliferation of creative writing courses and degrees in the postwar era. Graeme Harper and Jeri Kroll (2008), who along with Bishop, D.G. Myers, Stephanie Vanderslice, Kelly Ritter, Mark McGurl, and Paul Dawson have initiated recent research into creative writing's histories, contingencies, and

pedagogies, have also observed that "creative writing has gone on without change" in almost every institution in spite of the "amazing" and transfiguring impact it has had "upon the life of academe" (6-7). Louis Menand and others have echoed Harper and Kroll's "relative invisibility, yet considerable impact" thesis in recent pieces for *The New Yorker* (2009) and in response to Mark McGurl's *The Program Era: Postwar Fiction and the Rise of Creative Writing* (2010), which posits that the rise of the creative writing workshop is the "most important event in postwar American literary history" (ix). With the AWP currently reporting the existence of over 115 MFA programs and nearly 50 PhD programs in creative writing in the United States (a statistic, according to Vanderslice's demographic work, that does not nearly represent the "hundreds of undergraduate majors and concentrations as well as MA concentrations" nor the ubiquity of creative writing electives on undergraduate menu distributions), it is staggering to consider both the revenue creative writing has provided universities and the comparative autonomy--or marginalization, depending on who you read—that creative writing faculty have been afforded in areas of pedagogy, scholarship, and contributions to the broader aims of liberal arts education (Vanderslice, "Sleeping With Proust" 66; *AWP* 2010).

I should note that these observations aren't leading to another condemnation of what Eve Shelnutt deemed Creative Writing's *de facto* "anti-intellectualism" (4). In addition to literature, theory, and composition courses, I have taught creative writing at the university-level for sixteen years and while, like Blythe and Sweet, I am routinely amazed at the lack of pedagogical scholarship, I am glad to see an emergent dialogue on a range of issues related to the many unchallenged, or "sacred," assumptions of a discipline I learned through observation, intuition, and apprenticeships within the "firmly

entrenched star system in American Creative Writing programs" that Vanderslice derides ("Sleeping with Proust" 70). Although I know creative writing faculty who express little interest in pedagogical scholarship and view academic institutions as "purely incidental to what and who they are" (to borrow Tim Mayers' assessment), I currently work and conference with a network of creative writers who also want to learn more about what it is we *think* we are doing for students (*(Re)Writing Craft* 60). This dissertation is not intended to be another monograph on creative writing's resistance to pedagogical reform; instead, I argue for the acceptance of a new pedagogy that incorporates theory, recognizes what can be learned from rhetoric and composition, and aids the reflective discipline creative writing is becoming.

To be sure, scholars have shown a more sustained interest in creative writing in the last decade. Major publications and an active dialogue from creative writers and composition faculty have flagged a number of key issues for the discipline, including a need to define its own research agenda, develop its own theories, and articulate its own history within the English department. Prior to D.G. Myers' *The Elephants Teach*: *Creative Writing Since 1880* (2005), creative writing scholarship lacked a historical narrative and, consequently, few articles attempted to historicize teaching methods that were only vaguely credited to the Iowa Writer's Workshop model circa 1936. Myers, and even his recent detractor Paul Dawson, whose research I discuss in my second chapter, unearthed an academic history that was never really lost so much as unsearched for. His work, as well as Graeme Harper's history of Creative Writing programs in the U.K. and Australia, re-energized a dialogue that had begun in the late nineties (Kalamaras, 1999; Ritter, 2001; Bizarro, 2004) and has continued to highlight exigencies

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for Creative Writing programs and pedagogy over the last seven years (Mayers, 2005; Dawson, 2005; Wandor, 2008; Harper, 2008; Kaufman and Kaufman, 2009). I detail this dialogue and the concerns creative writing faces as part of my literature review, but, collectively, the last decade of scholarship has called attention to the need for creative writing to 1) scrutinize the unchallenged assumptions of its pedagogy, 2) find a successful marriage of theory and practice, often with calls to arrange such a marriage between existing literary theory and creative writing practice, and, 3) at the programmatic level, integrate and elevate its disciplinary status within the liberal arts curriculum. I should clarify that while I reference and highlight programmatic scholarship in my opening chapters (the research and arguments of Dawson, Mayers, and Vanderslice), I am mainly interested in emergent pedagogical research in creative writing, particularly as it applies to teaching prose fiction.

Myers' history of the American model of creative writing, the model that is the focus of this dissertation, establishes how creative writing as a pedagogy "emerged as an experiment" that gradually "took shape over the six decades from 1880 to the Second World War" (4). The educational goal of this experiment was not to produce a new generation of writers but to move beyond exclusively historical and linguistic studies of literature. By teaching a creative knowledge of literature's composition, early practitioners such as George Krapp and Paul Engle hoped to have students study literature "as if it were a living thing, as if people intended to write more of it" (4). Myers's research charts the ways in which creative writing both abandoned this original purpose and "retained a memory" of this pedagogy in its formalist practices (5). Myers also foregrounds the eras when creative writing pedagogy seemed cutting edge (i.e. the

pragmatic approach of George Pierce Baker's 1906 "workshop" in dramatic technique at Harvard and the Iowa Writer's Workshop under Paul Engle's directorship [1942-1966], which attempted to teach great writing as "expressions of agony and delight" rather than a set of "historical instances") (8-9, 68-70). Myers also examines how creative writing attempted to help English students learn great writing from the inside by recruiting a faculty of practitioners and artists, which Roman Jakobson later likened to "appoint[ing] elephants to teach zoology" (iv). Ultimately, Myers helps us recognize how quickly romantic pedagogical intentions gave way to hidebound practice, endless subjectivism, and an institutionalization of methods that were virtually assessment proof.

What did evolve from the original workshop models, in mass market guides and college textbooks, typically avoided pedagogical research in favor of what Ted Lardner calls "recipe swapping," a dispersal of aesthetic knowledge through tips and inherited rules of thumb ("Locating the Boundaries" 73). This mainstream approach often involves having an established author compile a how-to-guide full of famous prose samples and related exercises ("ones that really work!") that reify without challenging the aesthetics they purportedly teach (Vanderslice, "Sleeping with Proust" 68). In short, what often passes as pedagogical research, in the few volumes that offer more than tips and exercises prior to the last decade, still tends to highlight the New Critical origins of the creative writing classroom while promoting a rhetoric of emotion management and taste distribution.

John Gardner's *The Art of Fiction* (1983, 2007), an enduring text in creative writing classes, provides one famous example of blending craft talk with pedagogical dictates, particularly in Gardner's call to correct students' emotional aptitude. "Whereas

the frigid writer lacks strong feeling, and the sentimental writer applies feeling indiscriminately," Gardner explains, both frigidity and sentimentality "arise out of flawed character" that creative writing teachers should feel a "duty to critique" at the level of personal flaw (121). While this assertion may seem dated, Gardner's pedagogical imperative is still an innovative (if invasive and likely traumatic) treatment of emotions in the creative writing classroom compared to much more recent publications. In separate chapters from *New Writing Viewpoints: Creative Writing Studies* (2008), the first and only anthology dedicated to "practice, research, and pedagogy" in the discipline, Nat Hardy and Kevin Brophy call for more pedagogical reform with the caveat that emotions must be kept a safe distance from the workshop process at all times.

Using Hunter S. Thompson's advice about the "necessary brutality" of the artistic process as the inspiration for a "Gonzo-Formalist" pedagogy, Nat Hardy admits that while "writers sometimes take workshop critiques personally" and the "wounds of truth" in workshop "can indeed be painful for the more thin-skinned writer" it is essential to keep one's own emotions out of the experience and to let a "critical callus [. . .] form a protective barrier" to buffer the student author's "fragile ego" (106). Hardy admits that his "gonzo-formalist" workshop "can hover around abasement and humiliation" (he briefly abandons Hunter Thompson for W.H. Auden to suggest that "art is born of humiliation") but believes this is remedied by the professor "constantly remind[ing] workshop critics to direct constructive criticism toward the art and not the artist" (111). Paradoxically, Hardy argues that since we are "often sharing in the writer's suffering," workshop participants, including the faculty member moderating, must agree that "maintaining emotional distance in the workshop is [. . .] essential for a non-violent and

relatively tear-free environment." (111). I return to Hardy's revealing rhetoric in my concluding discussion of creative writing's role in the new humanities in chapter five (we share a scholarly interest, though not a point of view, in the humanities dialogue), but here I should note his belief that "some soul trampling unavoidably occurs in workshop, never out of spite but in pursuit of improvement" since this is an enduring mantra of the creative writing workshop (111).

Likewise, in his appeal to "workshop the workshop" in order foster a "teaching of the unteachable," Kevin Brophy initially enthuses that the workshop should provide a "*contest* [his italics] between excitement and ideas, between intellect and emotion" since he feels this is the "only way art can be produced" (77). Although Brophy worries over the workshop's potential "dismemberment of excitement" (he privileges the original spark of inspiration in a Shelleyian tradition), he ultimately expresses a familiar lament: "Why is it that workshops so often fall into discussion of writing as illustration of experience or feeling?" (79). To be fair, Brophy at least addresses what I hope to examine in depth when he makes statements like "we are generally clumsy at talking emotions in a public forum" and "there is no escaping feelings once writing becomes creative, but if we remain with feelings then practice is dissipated through a delta of ultimately isolated individual consciousnesses"; however, his argument finally boils down to preserving "the workshop [. . .] as a strange and difficult process if it is to work" (79).

Perhaps because most mainstream and scholarly texts in creative writing either concur with Brophy and Hardy's advice, or ignore real discussion of emotions in favor of quick appeals to writing characters who share your feelings, my students tend to gravitate

toward any reflections on emotion in supplemental readers, interviews with writers, or personal connections that inevitably arise in the workshop process. They point out to me how often guest speakers, visiting writers, and authors chosen for year-end anthologies acknowledge the "emotion that gave birth to a work" or the emotional complex that "unlocked the character's decisions in the final pages" or even how he or she felt during the workshop process (the author Rick Moody once told my class he felt emotionally scarred from the workshops he endured). A rhetorical analysis of the last several decades' worth of *Best American Short Stories*, now occupying a shelf in my office, could make a larger and more nuanced case for what student's notice within craft talk, and the 2011 edition alone offers numerous emotional testimonies: Joyce Carol Oates claims her latest story was "written in a burst of emotion;" Jennifer Egan chose second person because "people tend to slip into the second person when discussing emotional things [. . .] to distance themselves from those emotions;" Elizabeth McCracken confesses that as a student writer she didn't lack material or craft so much as "the ability to work [herself] into a tizzy about everyday things" and admits she "reserved her passion" for what she thought were "things deserving of passion, most of which were enormous and abstract and therefore hard to make into interesting fiction") (Oates 341; Egan 333; McCracken 339-40). Reading these testimonies often results in students' recognizing creative writing's mixed message: to be successful in this class, you must invest yourself emotionally in the creative process, craft characters who are emotionally complex, and then divest yourself from any emotions that result from peers discussing their own emotional reactions to your work. As Blythe and Sweet observe, "students are

basically to reach into themselves to produce works, but once the workshop begins, the writer of the work is to stay out of the conversation" (314).

Although undergraduate creative writing courses routinely ask students to create "emotionally complex" characters, engage peers in the emotionally charged experience of workshopping, and scrutinize their personal investments in a story during its evaluation, almost no attention has been paid to emotional schooling in creative writing instruction. When the role of emotion in creative writing is broached, it is typically presented in dualistic terms that preserve a binary opposition of feeling and thinking, even though the need to theorize emotions as a "tight braid of affect and judgment" has already been well-argued in feminist epistemology by Arlie Hochschild (1983) and Alison Jagger (1989), and in rhetoric and composition by Alice Brand (1989, 1994), Lynn Worsham (1998), and Megan Boler (1999). In addition to providing a rhetoric of emotions that moves past a "naturalized conception of emotions" (a framework that "views emotion as individualized, internally located, and privately experienced") in favor of emotions as "socially and historically constructed and bodily lived," these theorists have argued for the need to address emotional management—at times emotional tyranny—in a range of personal and public settings (Stenberg 349-50; Worsham 216). Though their theories have not yet been applied to the demands of the creative writing classroom, the rhetoric and composition scholars among them (Brand, 1994; Worsham, 1998; Boler, 1999; Micchiche, 2003, 2007) have already demonstrated applications for emotion theory in first-year composition and gender studies.

Questions of how and where internal, biological concepts of affect are mediated—perhaps entirely rewritten—by socio-cultural contexts have certainly informed

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contemporary rhetorical studies of emotion, affect, and motivation. Alice Glarden Brand

argues that the "high brow" term *affect* is often used as a "superordinate or umbrella

construct, under which are included concepts imbued with emotion such as moods,

interests, sentiments, passions," whereas the comparatively "blue collar" term *feeling* is a

vernacular phrase that gets conflated with emotion (*Presence of Mind* 160-161). Her

distinctions are myriad, but essentially emotion may mean "excessive arousal at one time,

motivation at another, or a specific feeling at still another" and falls into categories of

trait emotions, or long-standing affective characteristics outside "a locus in time," and

state emotions, which are "characteristic of our affective life at any given moment" and

which are predisposed "trait emotions" that are in turn regulated by social and cultural

contexts (161-162).

If there is a normative "social and cultural" regulation of our emotions, one that

may be a felt bodily incipience or something more cognitively governed, then there are,

of course, "outlaw emotions" that run counter to the mainstream of approved emotions.

The best source for this discussion is Alison Jagger, who contends that emotions are

"wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntary responses to the world" as opposed

to being the "ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world" (152-153).

Emotions are comprised of "both mental and physical aspects, each of which conditions

the other" and can be both "chosen" and "involuntary" (153). Jagger also believes that

emotions, which are too often dismissed as "mere passions" that sweep over the

otherwise autonomous individual, also "presuppose language and a social order" and

"presuppose values" (153). Her thesis, then, is that conventionally unacceptable or

"outlaw" emotions are most often experienced by "subordinated individuals who pay a

disproportionately high price" for attempting to "maintain the status quo" (160). Most outlaw emotions, which may be "potentially or actually feminist emotions," are of keen interest to rhetoricians and discourse theorists due to their "dialectical relation to critical social theory" (160).

In the last decade, pedagogical applications of emotion theories have also appeared in Dale Jacobs and Laura Micchiche's *A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion in Composition Studies* (2003) and Micchiche's *Doing Emotion* (2007), which includes two chapters that inform my own work with emotion schooling and the embodied concept of "doing emotions." Alison Roberts and Keri Smith (2002), following the lead of Hochschild and Worsham, also highlight the classroom climate's mediation "by the degree to which [students] follow feeling rules—social norms that prescribe what emotional responses are appropriate given a specific situation" and the degree to which students (and, presumably, teachers) engage in "emotional management, a process of making self-indications as to what they should be feeling, and [how they should] work to display and/or experience that emotion" (293). In a Spring 2011 *Pedagogy* article, Shari Stenberg renewed this call to question the "shaping of student subjectivity" by challenging the "self-regulation" demanded by "removing or controlling irrationality / emotion" in pedagogies across the curriculum (350).

Just as Alice Brand intervened in cognitivist and process pedagogies by modestly suggesting that research into the "impact of the emotions on writing may help us understand why some problems occur during writing and how we can solve them," my dissertation intervenes in the emergent field of creative writing pedagogy by examining the emotional labors of the creative process and workshop environment (Brand 441). I

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argue that the core questions for emotion studies can be read as answers for the problems found in the scholarship of creative writing pedagogy, which currently seeks the "perfect combination of praxis and theory" and continues to argue for emotional investment in the writing process and emotional distancing in the workshop process (Blythe and Sweet 307). Specifically, I am interested in exploring how concepts from the rhetorical scholarship on emotions problematize a Gardnerian tradition of pedagogy as well as how Boler's "testimonial readings" offer a chance to engage both craft criticism and emotion theory in workshop. I also argue that aspects of performance studies pedagogies and recent translations of Stanislavski's "emotion memory" can be used to help creative writing students recognize emotions as both personally felt and socially constructed *and* as bodily sites of oppression and resistance.

Clearly, appropriating the emotion scholarship of feminist rhetoricians for creative writing pedagogy will meet with resistance from a great number of creative writing faculty. Although I have actually had very positive feedback on the potential of this dissertation from colleagues and visiting writers, particularly Jamaica Kincaid and Tobias Wolff, I am aware that the increasingly active scholarship on creative writing pedagogy has not resulted in any sweeping reforms in everyday classroom practice. Vanderslice relates that when she discussed her scholarship with a celebrated author and creative writing program director, the author admitted that he "had never heard of any alternatives to the workshop" and was almost wholly unaware that pedagogical research was well underway in his field ("He wondered if I might share some with him," she reports) ("Sleeping with Proust" 71). I am also aware of the number of creative writing faculty I've known as a student, colleague, or host, who share the opinion of another

visiting author I interviewed, who spoke of theory being better "dealt with" in composition or lit classes in order to protect the "purity of workshop."

Since this rhetoric of purity is commonly heard, it would seem that the workshop has evolved from being a "living expression of agony and delight" in Paul Engle's original model to a sanctuary that must be defended against intrusions of theory, assessment, interdisciplinarity, and, as Brophy and Hardy's articles stress, any signs of emotional involvement (Myers 69). I counter that the workshop experience has always been fraught: the introduction of emotion theories to this sacred space only calls attention to the affective attachments, conflicts of feeling, burdens of emotional comportment, and pedagogic violence that already exist in this classroom activity. If anything, the workshop—creative writing's most time-honored and unchallenged pedagogical practice—is the ideal academic testing ground for discussions of outlaw emotions, the signal functions of emotions, and the social construction of emotion. Simply put, the successes and failures of a semester-long workshop environment provide opportunities to view what Micchiche terms of the "stickiness" of emotions: the binding tether to core ideas—moral, aesthetic, or otherwise—that are difficult to acknowledge, much less leverage. I argue for a pedagogy that can fuse Boler's concept of testimonial writings with Phillip Zarrilli's work in performance studies as a way of reflecting on not just the creative process but other students' immediate and emotioned reactions to the creative process. In doing so, I use my own workshops as running examples of the ways in which emotion schooling occurs, whether we formally address it or not, in the sustained emotional comportment of sitting in workshop, silently listening to others who are engaged or discomforted by one's fiction, and in discovering one's own strong emotional

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attachments to aesthetic categories that other workshop participants may encourage or attack.

These pedagogical directions do presuppose that emotions can be explored at one remove—that we can, in fact, learn of ourselves in the alchemy of transmuting feelings to fiction. We might also suppose this process is inevitable. I have participated in many workshops in which writers sought new ways to examine the constructs of their own emotions and I have observed more than a few freshman studies courses in which students were grateful for an opportunity to explore values fictively as opposed to "critically"—that lingering opposition—in an academic essay. As Patrick Bizzaro suggests:

> Perhaps we cannot teach students how to understand people better [. . .] or how to overhear others to great effect. What we can do is demonstrate for them, by describing our own efforts as writers, and by pointing out the efforts historically and even recently of others, [. . . how] writers often find their subjects in what others can tell them and even find in those interviewees traits they as writers note in themselves. Kelly Cherry calls the use of this skill 'positive capability': 'the willingness and ability to use one's own experiences in the formation of one's characters'. (302)

Using emotion theory in dialogue with Gardner's theories can enable such a "positive capability." Learning to understand the social construct and dynamic of our emotions provides a first step for writers struggling with their "own experiences in the formation of characters." Looking forward, then, we need to sustain the current dialogue on creative writing pedagogy that has pushed craft criticism beyond the level of checklists and tips. We need to consider how and where we can find space, in workshops traditionally rife with dissonance and discomfort, to let emotion theory inform the process of creative writing and to let students' testimonies about process inform our understanding of emotion theory.

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At the conclusion of this dissertation, I also use my argument for the conscious schooling of emotions (and the values, judgments, and identification that result from emotional investments) as a way to address the larger need to recognize—or resituate— creative writing's place within the English department and the humanities. This latter argument is of particular interest to me due to my involvement in a "restructuring" of the humanities and fine arts divisions at my university. Since creative writing is housed within the English department, a new divisional structure has separated it from its Fine Arts allies in Music, Theater, and Art: as a result, taking a creative writing course will no longer satisfy a "creativity explored" requirement in general education. Although creative writing is still appreciated as a fine art, a new need has arisen to defend its contributions to humanities education. As part of an ad hoc committee, I have been examining the "role of the humanities in the 21st century university" and, by extension, the role of literature and writing courses within a humanities mission. Committee discussions of works such as Martha Nussbaum's *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (2010), which includes a chapter titled "Educating Citizens: The Moral (and anti-Moral) Emotions", have helped me recognize a broader motive for integrating emotion theories, creative writing pedagogies, and performance studies. Simply put, emotional education is an essential (if still invisible) component of how we teach students to think about western civilization and how we may help them engage, at a level of deeply felt belief, with current global issues. Crowley, Berlin, Jagger, Hochschild, Micciche and others have already addressed the possibility of leveraging fixed understandings of the world through social epistemic rhetoric and scholarship on the body, feeling, and movement. Building on their foundations, my dissertation identifies

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similar points of leverage and emotional awareness within the emergent field of creative writing pedagogy.

To provide an agenda for how I examine what I have just broadly proposed, I am concluding this introductory chapter with a descriptive overview of the remaining chapters in this dissertation.

My second chapter provides a review of literature related to the theoretical argument and ethnography I provide in the third through fifth chapters. This review is divided into three sections as I focus on scholarship of creative writing pedagogy, rhetorical and feminist scholarship in emotion theory, and the ways in which scholarship of the "affective turn" in composition studies provides a context for the argument I am making for creative writing. My analysis of creative writing scholarship begins by showing that a dialogue on pedagogy has only recently developed in earnest and has been energized by the contemporary research of Joseph Moxley, Wendy Bishop, D.G. Myers, Graeme Harper, Stephanie Vanderslice, Kelly Ritter, Ted Lardner, Tim Mayers, Paul Dawson, Patrick Bizarro, and Eve Shelnutt, all of whose work I review in order to highlight exigencies, contexts, and useful terms for my own argument for a creative writing pedagogy grounded in aspects of emotion theory. Also as I've alluded to already in this introduction, I am examining the scholarship on creative writing pedagogy to highlight the need for theory, pedagogical innovation, and the repeated calls, in the U.S and U.K., for scholarship that aids what Vanderslice terms the "long struggling" discipline of creative writing to move past "patronization and marginalization" and find its "place at the table in Higher Education" ("Sleeping With Proust" 66). The other side

of this debate, as I show, can be found in the criticisms of composition faculty who have been recruited to teach creative writing and who have dismayed at the "anti-intellectualism" and determined resistance to pedagogical advice from outside the perhaps self-isolating world of traditional creative writing faculty (Shelnutt 4).

Next, I discuss the need to gather and explore, in theory and practice, specific emotion theories that have developed in rhetorical studies and in feminist epistemology over the last three decades. This section also reviews scholarship that distinguishes definitions of affect, emotion, feeling, and "felt sense" (Damasio, 1999, 2003; Brennan, 2004; Mattley, 2002; Ngai, 2007; Perl, 2004; Whiting, 2009). The multi-disciplinary attention to research in emotions, affect, and feeling over the last two decades eludes any brief summary. However, I find it useful to think of a continuum for what I broadly term emotion theory in this essay. On one end of the continuum there continues to be a Romantic belief in emotions arising within individuals in response to external events—these emotions have interplay with cognition and hail from a unique perspective or sense of self. At the other end of the continuum, following research in the biological and social sciences and the splintering of romantic notions of individual identity in poststructuralist theory, emotions are perceived to be socially experienced and constructed and no longer understood in terms of "internal, idiosyncratic events, but as patterns that can be characterized and understood" only in terms of socio-cultural contexts (Hariman and Lucaites 20-21). Ultimately, I'm interested in the narrower band of this discussion: the appropriation of new understandings of emotion, and the corresponding elevation of emotion / pathos / affect, in composition theory and practice.

After discussing examples such as how Dana Anderson appropriates Bourdieu's concept of habitus to question the motives of habituated action and to expand on Kenneth Burke's conception of disposition, and how this ties back into the research of Damasio and Neidenthal, I transition to the works of Alice Garden Bland, Alison Jagger, Arlie Hochschild, Lynn Worhsam, and Laura Micchiche, who each play a foundational role in the affective turn in composition studies and in the critical methodology I'm arguing for in this dissertation.

The third chapter of my dissertation establishes my theoretical argument for integrating core concepts from emotion theories in the creative writing classroom. After exploring the models that rhetoric and composition have already provided for such an integration, I examine how Gardner's belief in critiquing his students' emotional range actually makes him a precursor of integrating emotion in workshop and not asking writers to feign an objectivity or distance that cannot exist within this environment. I also explore how previous, unsuccessful efforts to incorporate "theory" into creative writing pedagogies have often been an attempt to distance creative writing from its reputation as a "fun and enriching" choice among electives or majors (Blythe and Sweet 306).

I will also argue for an interdisciplinary theory that Roberts and Smith, Laura Micchiche, and Alison Jagger, working independently, suggest but do not develop, a theory of creative writing pedagogy that asks students to engage and challenge the emotions that inevitably shades their writing and workshop experiences. Essentially, Roberts and Smith appropriate Hochschild's definition of emotion management ("a process of making self-indications as to what they should be feeling and work to display and/or experience that emotion") to discuss the "degree to which [the classroom] climate

is mediated" by such "feeling rules" that students use to "evaluate their emotional

responses and those of others" (293-94). Roberts and Smith suggest that professors,

when attempting to meet "cultural expectations of emotion response," can create a "safe

atmosphere" for facilitating "the productive inclusion of emotional responses in the

classroom by articulating their own emotions when applicable" (297). Relatedly, I

describe how Roberts and Smith's reading of Hochschild's work intersects with Alison

Jagger's call for emotional epistemologies that

> would show how our emotional responses to the world change as we
> conceptualize it differently and how our changing emotional responses then
> stimulate us to new insights. They would demonstrate the need for theory to be
> self-reflexive, to focus not only on the outer world but also on ourselves and our
> relation to the world, to examine critically our social location, our actions, our
> values, our perceptions, and our emotions. (164)

In this chapter and in the pedagogical ethnography of my dissertation, I examine ways

that Jagger's epistemological focus could be "witnessed" in a creative writing class as an

answer to Lardner's concern (discussed in chapter two) about the "lack of social

perspective on composing" that has led to the "typical creative writing class" being

"more conservative than the composition classroom, where the subtext of composing (as

a social process mediated through power relations) runs near the surface of classroom

discourse" (73). I also analyze what I've termed the "Gardnerian" version of the Iowa

Workshop model in terms of its talk of "emotional frigidity" and its high degree of

emotional management.

The third chapter also argues that performance studies and Jean Benedetti's recent

translations of Stanislavski's "emotion memory" offer excellent models for raising

creative writing students' awareness of embodied emotions. In her reading of emotions

as performative and produced in the dynamic of our social interactions, Micchiche

focuses on emotions as action—as something that individuals *do* and not as something they merely possess. Readings in performance studies have also offered a basis for integrating a discussion of emotions as a performed action into the writing classroom. Similar to emotion studies and rhetoric, performance studies are inclusive, "enthusiastically borrow from other disciplines" and have remained "fundamentally relational, dynamic, and processual" since performance happens at "always changing intersections of particulars" (Schechner, Foreward, *Teaching Performance Studies* x-xii).[1] That said, a common concern of the diverse writings now anthologized as performance studies is often phrased in the form of a challenge: "to become as aware as possible of one's own positions in relation to the positions of others—and then take steps to maintain or change positions" (xi).

In *Teaching Performance Studies* (2002), Nathan Stucky and Cynthia Wimmer write of the tight connection between performance and pedagogy being formed by an attention to embodiment. Some common points in their scholarship, along with that of Judith Hamera, Michael Bowman and Ruth Bowman, and Phillip Zarrilli, provide potential application for both emotion theory and creative writing, particularly in the ways that constructed identities and culturally inscribed bodies are used to explore more complicated understandings of emotions. Here I argue that rhetorics of emotion and performance studies share a common bond in the attainment of knowledge through *askesis*, or an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought and feeling. Such a focus,

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[1] Beyond its origins in and departures from traditional theater studies, the "discipline" of performance studies, in Schechner's view, is really the intersection of theories from the "social sciences, feminist studies, gender studies, history, psychoanalysis, queer theory, semiotics, ethology, cybernetics, area studies, media and popular culture theory, and cultural studies" (x).

especially in combination with the pre-performance studies teachings of Konstantin Stanislavki, proves ideal for contributing to current dialogues on both emotion studies and creative writing pedagogy.

After exploring intersections of emotion theory, composition studies, creative writing pedagogy, and performance techniques in chapter three, I spend chapter four discussing the trial application and assessment of these theories in my own writing classes. An anticipated objection to incorporating emotion theories is that there simply isn't time in a typical creative writing class, often because of the disproportionate amount of time workshopping takes and the need to represent every student's work equally across a sixteen week semester. It seems essential, then, for me to provide not only a sample syllabus but a qualitative sampling of students' responses and my own reflections on this approach. The fourth chapter of my dissertation provides an ethnography of an intermediate creative writing classroom in which I've put the core ideas of my theoretical argument into pedagogical practice. I detail examples of how reading selected emotion theory (short selections from Damasio, Niedenthal, Micciche, and Jagger) alongside selections from performance studies (Hamera and Zarelli) and Stanislavski ("Emotion Memory" and other selections from *An Actor's Work)* can establish a theoretical basis for writing fiction as well as a language and occasion for reflecting on the emotional labors of workshop. I also demonstrate ways in which theory readings can supplement, not supplant, the usual reading list of creative works.

Finally, I frame the workshop experience--creative writing's dominant pedagogical practice and greatest source of emotional demands--with pre- and post-workshop reflections on emotional labor and the undergraduate tendency to access

"individual" emotions by recapitulating familiar socialized emotions. As a supplement to workshop, I ask students to write about their attempts to craft nuanced emotions and the affective labors inherent in workshop. We use their in-class writings to 1) debate pros and cons of revising "outlaw emotions," 2) question Gardner's advice about narrative frigidity, and 3) consider how a student's emotional management of a character's decisions is also collectively managed by the creative writing classroom, and 4) consider how students either privilege the appeal to emotion memory in the Stanislavski tradition or incorporate embodied descriptions of characters after considering performance studies' perspectives.

A combination of reading *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College English Studies* (1996, 2003), in which Berlin spends his last two chapters presenting "sample approaches" to the integration of rhetoric and postmodern literary theory in writing classrooms, and Nicole Cooley's "Literary Legacies and Critical Transformations: Teaching Creative Writing in the Public Urban University" has provided a basis for my ethnography, which highlights students' written feedback on the assigned emotion theory readings and presents a few samples of students' creative writing, both before and after my feedback, the workshop, and their follow-up questions, to qualitatively assess the ways in which conscious attention to the social and transactional nature of emotions is valuable for the process and review of fiction writing. I have approved this research through the university's Institutional Review Board, which views the oral histories (spoken and written responses to pedagogical trials) as exempt from requiring additional approvals. All participants have also signed an informed consent document.

The fifth and final chapter of my dissertation provides a conclusion that is both summative and forward-looking. I re-examine my theoretical argument in light of outcomes from my pedagogical trials in both seated and online classes. After reviewing successes, pitfalls, and considerations for revision, I suggest future directions for the collaboration between emotion theory, creative writing pedagogy, and performance studies. I also clarify that I'm not trying to distill the complicated questions of emotion scholarship into a collection of "new exercises for short story writers." Even though I am demonstrating exercise-oriented applications, I am more interested in creative writing as a means of understanding the complexities of precognitive affects (bodily incipience, felt senses, emotion memory), socially constructed and regulated emotions, and emotion's determining influence on belief structures that seem rigid and inadaptable. I also return to the larger concern of how the incorporation of these theories helps creative writing contribute to the humanities in general.

CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF CURRENT DIALOGUES IN CREATIVE WRITING PEDAGOGY, EMOTION THEORY, AND THE AFFECTIVE TURN IN RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION

"Maintaining emotional distance in the workshop is, therefore, essential for a non-violent and relatively tear-free environment."

--Nat Hardy, *Creative Writing Studies: Practice, Research and Pedagogy* (2008)

"Emotions, then, are wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntary responses to the world. Rather, they are ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world. They have both mental and physical aspects, each of which conditions the other."

--Alison Jagger, *Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology* (1989)

This chapter provides an extensive review of scholarship in three categories: 1) the evolving dialogue on creative writing scholarship, with some attention paid to larger programmatic concerns and the main focus on research into creative writing pedagogy, 2) the continuum of definitions and rhetorical analysis of theories of affect and emotion, 3) and representative scholarship of the "affective turn" in composition studies. The highlights, contexts, and inter-connectedness of scholarship in all three categories help frame two guiding questions for this chapter:

- What are current problems within the scholarship of creative writing pedagogy that intersect with, or may be aided by, scholarship of the "affective turn" in rhetoric and composition?

- Why is there a critical need for attention to emotion work in creative writing pedagogy?

Inevitably, as this review unfolds, I spend more time on the intricacies of particular theories of affect, creative writing pedagogy, and composition theory, even if some theorists (like Teresa Brennan or Dana Anderson in my second section) offer more complicated arguments about affect than I later apply to the creative writing classroom. My hope is to establish a vocabulary that is grounded in its critical context before appropriating ideas of "habitus," "signal function of emotions," or "transmission of affect" in chapters three and four. I am saving my narrower review of performance studies pedagogies and recent scholarship on Stanislavski's "emotion memory" for chapter three when I argue for their inclusion in the creative writing classroom—an argument that is based on the research contexts I summarize in the following pages.

Review of Evolving Scholarship on Creative Writing Pedagogy

We can discern at least two dominant themes in the recently evolving (if not yet bountiful) scholarship on creative writing pedagogy. First, how does creative writing fit in with the curriculum or "mission" of the English department? Or, how does it balance its curious mix of formalist and subjectivist practices to incorporate theory that may aid its students? Second, how might the process of writing, and the role of workshopping within this process, more productively confront the emotion work involved in crafting fiction? A broader study could make the case that these questions have been raised in practice since the development of the Associated Writing Programs in the 1970s, and arguably since the proliferation of creative writing programs in America that began with the Iowa Writer's Workshop's rise in prominence-- thanks to swiftly canonized participants like Flannery O'Connor--in the 1940's and 1950's.

As I mentioned in my introduction, Blythe and Sweet take time in "The Writing Community: A New Model for the Creative Writing Classroom" to confess that neither has a well-defined pedagogy and neither had "even thought about the question of how [they] teach creative writing" until very recently (305). "We can't remember a single instance of the word pedagogy in grad school," Blythe and Sweet muse before confessing that when they were in graduate writing programs, "even composition and rhetoric studies had yet to appear" (305-306). Blythe and Sweet's lament notwithstanding, it is fair to say that an increasingly active dialogue on creative writing pedagogy has developed since the publication of Joseph Moxley's *Creative Writing in America* (1989) and Wendy Bishop and Hans Ostrom's *Colors of a Different Horse: Rethinking Creative Writing Theory and Pedagogy* (1994). Moxley's landmark collection of essays continues to frame debates, especially in terms of Eve Shelnutt's accusations of creative writing programs having impeded their own scholarly progress through "isolation" within English departments. Wendy Bishop, who would heed the call for pedagogical inquiry over the following decade, cites Moxley's desire to "foster a continuing dialogue" about creative writing pedagogy in her 1990 review of *Creative Writing in America*, and re-asserts his call for "a journal which publishes not only poems, stories, and reviews but also pedagogical and theoretical articles" (Review, par. 11).

Although such a journal never materialized, save for reflections on individual practice that appear in the *AWP Chronicle,* a comprehensive account of the rise of creative writing in the university, D.G. Myers' *The Elephants Teach: Creative Writing Since 1880*, was published seven years later. In it, Myers examines how New Criticism had an early and still often unchallenged influence on what became the "givens" of

creative writing pedagogy: "creative writing enlisted on the side of idealism," assesses Myers, "its origins lie in the complaint that an austere and uninspiring literary scholarship, obsessed with the ideal of scientific knowledge, had treated literature as mere material for analysis, instead of what it was—the most spiritual of subjects" (16).

Paul Dawson, in *Creative Writing and the New Humanities* (2005), takes exception to aspects of Myers' historicizing of the term "creative writing," which Myers traces to Emerson's *The American Scholar*, as well as Myers' belief that creative writing pedagogy cannot be removed from its innate "subjectivist / expressionism." Dawson argues for "root-and-branch reform" of creative writing as a "discipline of knowledge" that helps students transition from expressing "deeply personal experience" to crafting a "sociological poetics" that can dramatize the clash between "living discourses in society" (Dawson 209). But Myers, in a rebuttal in his 2006 edition of *The Elephants Teach*, counters that "having poured a subjectivist/expressivist ethos as its foundation, creative writing can offer no objective criteria for the production and evaluation of new work" and will instead always fall prey to the subjectivism of its individual participants—including the subjective nature of "the creative writing teacher's own criteria" (177). Myers believes creative writing faculty ironically engage in the practice of imposing their own subjective aesthetics while promoting expressivist pedagogies that allows for any critique to carry equal weight in workshop. After further defending his primary sources and scholarship, Myers argues that creative writing pedagogy *does* need innovation (if not perhaps the "deep-seated" reform Dawson calls for), but, he stresses, any pedagogy will have to take into account the problem of "innate subjectivism" of the workshop method

to which "creative writing has been almost exclusively reduced" (Dawson 207-209;

Myers 116-18; 176-77).

Miriam Sved, in turn, uses Myers' study as a springboard for arguing that the

"very entrenchment that creative writing has achieved in the U.S. can also be seen as a

threat to its legitimacy as a discipline among other disciplines in the modern university"

(2). Relatedly, Graeme Harper uses both *The Elephants Teach* (for his discussions of the

American model) and his own historical research into the U.K. and Australian models of

creative writing to accuse

> partly the impact of a Modernist educational ethos, which filtered away the layers
> of personal and fortuitous pedagogy in search of a holistic 'systemic' education,
> and partly . . . a naïve willingness to downgrade the nature of artistic knowledge
> against those institutionalized and even positivist ideals which have found their
> way into some poverty-stricken theory / observation distinctions. (16)

Questioning the "personal and fortuitous" ways in which creative writing continues to be

taught and workshopped (e.g. style-over-substance objections) informs most of what

constitutes pedagogical debate through the late nineties. In more recent scholarship,

Harper has reframed his questions to ask if creative writing, "like its cognate cousins in

the Arts and Humanities, is a subject that provides knowledge of a kind that can be used

in a variety of fields?" and, if so, should creative writing "as a university discipline [. . .]

resist 'departmentalization' as it moves into new territory in an effort to define itself in

the 21st century" (Harper, "Creative Writing in the University" 8)? Though a consistent

answer to these concerns has not arrived, the last decade has witnessed a number of

responses to Harper's work—as well as the research questions raised by Moxley,

Shelnutt, and Myers who have provided impetus for a steady flow of scholarship,

including Pat Bizzaro's "Research and Reflection in English Studies: The Special Case of

Creative Writing" (2004), Tim Mayers' *(Re)Writing Craft: Composition, Creative*

Writing, and the Future of English Studies (2005), Michelene Wandor's *The Author is Not Dead, Merely Somewhere Else: Creative Writing Reconceived* (2009), and Donald Pardlow's *Flight to Flatland: A Descriptive Study of Using Creative Writing Pedagogy to Improve the Teaching of First-Year English Composition* (2009). From this and related scholarship we may discern questions that provide exigency for the appropriation / application of emotion theory in creative writing pedagogy.

Bizzaro's recent investigations into the "special case of creative writing," asking why creative writing has attempted to "achieve disciplinary status and what such status means in English departments," confront what Shelnutt characterized as "anti-intellectualism" among the "powerful and conservative throng of poets, novelists, and dramatists" who are the corpus of creative writing faculty in American universities and for whom "the mere mention of *theory* and *praxis* sets off alarms" (Bizarro 294-296). George Kalamaras also highlights a "misrepresentation" of "'creative' writing as a special process distinct from serious academic work" that is "problematic and perhaps best exemplified by the way the university (administrators and teachers) perceives the business of creative writing" (79). Kalamaras goes on to suggest that the general assumption, across the campus and from within the English department, is that creative writing courses

> should be 'fun' and 'enriching'—descriptions with which education in general would indeed probably be better off, yet designations reserved for course work which are seen as less academically rigorous. In the most generous view, creative writing, cast as implicitly 'expressive,' is expected to enact a pedagogy that conforms to its nature. However, in romanticizing the role of creative expression, the university simultaneously marginalizes the teaching of creative writing and limits its possibilities. (79)

Elisabeth Anne Leonard, in an article that calls for examining the social construction of identity of a text's author, asks a litany of questions related to Kalamaras's concerns,

including: "Why do we require students to produce secondary texts (in the form of the research paper) without demanding primary texts (short stories, poems)? Of what use is academic discourse outside the academy, which is where most of my students are headed? How can I stimulate creative writing and critical thinking simultaneously?" (217). Leonard's queries hearken back to Paul Engle's intentions for creative writing: to give students a way to appreciate literature from an insider's view, from the complicated process of trying to create it.

Tim Mayers hopes that such questions will continue to enter into "craft criticism," or discourse that challenges pedagogical assumptions in journals that chiefly publish creative works. He notes that there are some writers who now "challenge and unsettle some deeply embedded, implicit ideas about creative writing which so often permeate classrooms based on the Iowa workshop model: a model in which student texts are closely scrutinized, but usually only at the level of 'style' or surface features" (*(Re)Writing Craft* 83). Mayers also describes a "Romantic concept of creative writing" that draws its pedagogy from an "aesthetics of inspiration" and a Craftman model predicated on an "aesthetics of work" (66). Stephanie Vanderslice agrees with the dueling models Mayers' describes, and, in response to his article, insists that "room exists at the table for both" ("Sleeping with Proust" 72). "Surely," Vanderslice concludes, "a 'declared' pedagogy invoking—and understanding—both aesthetics rather than dismissing one or the other will provide the strongest fabric for teaching and learning and for ensuring the sustainability of the discipline" (72). Mayers and Vanderslice also believe creative writers and compositionists must continue to explore "common ground" and agree with Bishop's position of "'cross-raiding' the research and practice of

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composition" in terms of taking on "social responsibility" issues and cultural criticism as a way to "open the creative writing class to even greater possibilities besides the writing of poems and stories" (82-83).

Ted Lardner echoes this concern and Bishop's advice as he laments that the few existing "pedagogical texts in creative writing seem to lag behind scholarship in composition by portraying the writing process in either expressivist or cognitivist and linear terms" and then regrets the lack of cultural and sociological perspective on the formation of texts—the "social process mediated through power relations"—that he feels creative writing workshops should find room to include in order to get at the "subtext of composing" ("Locating the Boundaries" 73). Lardner also follows in Moxley's footsteps as he questions what passes for pedagogical scholarship in the *AWP Chronicle,* noting creative writing teachers' tendency to "rarely cite each other's work" and to count as "pedagogical talk" a kind of "lore" or "recipe swapping ('I tried this once and it works') (74). Finally, Nancy Welch, in "Challenging the 'Uselessness' of Creative Writing" states that while she "applauds" some recent attention to the intersection of rhetoric and creative writing theory (citing a CCCC panel in 1997), the continued practice of placing "storytelling outside the realm of rhetoric" is "dangerous" for the continued growth and integration of creative writing within the academy (131).

However, for all of the hand-wringing over weak or absent scholarship in the nineties, scholars like Bizzaro and Kelly Ritter[2] have sustained a forward moving

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[2]Though I am not representing Ritter's work in this field for reasons of focus and not wanting to drift too far afield of Gardner, workshop experience, and emotion theory, her work is especially valuable for those seeking insight into how teacher training occurs—or doesn't—in Ph.D. programs. She admits to being "puzzled by the lack of attention of [her] university to the pedagogy of [her] field" (205). See Ritter, Kelly. "Professional

dialogue on rethinking the traditional workshop model. Kalamaras has also stayed active

on this front: by heeding both Bishop's call for "pedagogical raiding" and Mayers'

suggestion of opening the creative writing classroom to opportunities for "social

responsibility," Kalamaras, much like Dawson, is interested in theorizing a creative

writing experience "grounded in social-epistemic rhetoric [that] would work against the

grain of the dominant creative writing philosophy (individual expression) and romantic

model of instruction (as still depicted in the field's 'primary journals,' the *AWP*

Chronicle and *Poets & Writers*)" (80). To operationalize this social-epistemic approach,

he calls on creative writing faculty to assign "a range of response that includes critical,

affective, and expressive readings, as well as social critiques of professional and peer

work" (80). In his own rhetoric, though, Kalamaras assures us that his students, while

encouraged to catalog how they were affected by pieces in their journals, are still writing

"analytically and not just 'intuitively'"—a distinction Kalamaras privileges as he pursues

a move away from the workshop's "New Critical roots" and towards some future

pedagogy that will "facilitate the growth of the writers' consciousness and [. . .] help

prepare an informed citizenry" (81).

Noting that "undergraduate interest in creative writing is on the rise," Nicole

Cooley explores two inter-related observations in "Literary Legacies and Critical

Transformations: Teaching Creative Writing in the Public Urban University" (2003).

Akin to Myers' summary, Cooley claims that "American New Criticism, installed as a

pedagogy by the first graduate writing workshops, still holds enormous power" in the

Writers / Writing Professionals: Revamping Teacher Training." *College English* 64.2
(Nov. 2001): 205-277.

workshop classroom, which she finds severely limiting (99). More pertinent to my

investigation is her second observation, which she narrates from personal experience.

When Cooley began teaching at a small liberal arts college, she tried to avoid the "hostile

interactions during workshop" that she experienced as a student at Iowa (100). She

demanded complete anonymity with workshop pieces and over-emphasized to her

students that they were "discussing the text and not the writer" (100). After Cooley

moved to Queens College at CUNY, she began feeling "unsettled" by the prospect that

she was, in effect, "silencing their voices":

> If writing is about becoming a speaking subject, then my method undermined that adoption of voice. . .Beyond the aesthetic implications. . .lay something more dangerous: I was helping my students erase their difference, which favored the creation of a 'universal' narrative. (100)

Essentially, Cooley observes that creative writing pedagogy "claims to foster in students

a distinctive voice" even though limited scholarship on such pedagogy has "not fully

examined the network of assumptions surrounding voice as a category" (99).

Though its assumptions may not yet be "fully examined," one obstacle to

fostering "distinctive voice" is the dynamic of workshop itself, particularly the master-

apprentice paradigm of its pedagogy. "Clearly, the lore of creative-writing instruction has

it that writers should teach what they do when they write, employing the 'workshop'

approach to teaching—based on a longstanding notion that the teacher is a 'master' who

teaches 'apprentices',” Bizzaro observes before arguing that this method "survives not

because rigorous inquiry offers testimony to its excellence,[3] but because only recently

have some teachers of creative writing [he references the scholarship of Myers and

Ritter] questioned its underlying assumptions" (296). Even more to the point, Kristen

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[3]Bizzaro also notes that "once this research is done, such inquiry might support exactly
that premise" (296).

Young, in a preface to Amato and Fleisher's self-professed "polemic" on creative writing, asks a tough question: "Is the creative writing workshop, like that of Grady Tripp from the film *Wonder Boys,* little more than a safe haven for taste distribution and reinforcement, harsh or supportive as the case may be, turning on the particular constituency of a given workshop?" (Preface, par. 12).

In response to such concerns, Blythe and Sweet provide an overview of existing approaches to teaching creative writing that they feel filled the gap left by an absence of theory or pedagogical research. They divide conventional approaches into seven categories: the Atellier Approach, in which the student learns from an expert craftsman; the Great Works Approach, in which students study and copy the techniques, forms, style, and content of great masters—often as selected by the Atellier of the first approach; the Inspiration Approach, which privileges a Wordsworthian construct of individual inspiration and the inner process perhaps too often ignored in craft-driven pedagogies; the Techniques approach, in which the Atellier utilizes passages from Great Works to model technical concepts and craft talk; the Workshop approach, the most enduring if not the most enduringly popular, and the comparatively recent Feminist approaches, in which students question prior approaches that originated in male-dominated eras and that suffer from exclusively masculine language and thought processes. The downside of their categorization is that attention to any differences in workshop models and the concerns of what Blythe and Sweet establish as "feminist dialogue" on the field's masculine-traditional rhetoric are too briefly covered. That said, Blythe and Sweet's inclusion of the "possibilities" of feminist dialogue on the male narrative of creative writing pedagogy

provide one basis for the incorporation of emotion studies in creative writing theory and practice.

In both the Atellier and Greats Works approach to creative writing, which are commonly blended--with the Great Works arriving in a Norton anthology for the first three weeks and the Atellier-directed workshop dominating class time for the remainder of the semester--Blythe and Sweet note that "instructors tend to see themselves as facilitators and editors, not the creative writing versions of Solon the lawgiver; they try to provide guidance, their main job being to create a nonhostile environment that encourages students to take risks" (314). The problem is that, in most workshops, the creative work is "judged on the 'it is what it is' theory, not the intent of a writer, who is forbidden to offer Prufrockian interjection such as 'That is not what I meant at all'" (314-15). Blythe and Sweet also address the disconnect between the practice of asking peers to "provide constructive criticism" and detail "subjective impressions of the work and editorial problems" and the reality that, in practice, "such goals do not always occur." (315). Over-subscribed workshops, the reticence of introverted students (creative writing's dominant population?) and "alpha apprentices" who too "often dominate the conversation" result in students' works not being "given equal shrift" and an excess of "negative comments" that "rip apart works and souls" (315). However, just as Blythe and Sweet seem to be on the cusp of critiquing the Garderian tradition (as well as the "art is humiliation" necessity Nat Hardy defends), they use their analysis to repeat the commonplace that the "real reason some writers enter the workshop becomes apparent. They are there for personal therapy, all desirous of a Sally Field Oscar moment: 'You like

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me. Right now, you like me.' And when they receive something less than full acceptance, their sense of rejection poisons the atmosphere" (315).

Relatedly, Anne Leahy, in *Power and Identity in the Creative Writing Classroom: The Authority Project* (2005), addresses dynamics of "power" among the workshop classroom's participants and similar assumptions about how complicated this classroom project is for teaching and learning. While Leahy and other contributors recognize the creative writing classroom as a site of identity construction--as opposed to a site where the construction of character identity is taught--few of her chapters offer alternatives to the "poisoned" atmosphere Blythe and Sweet lament. Instead, Leahy mostly calls for more attention to be paid to identity construction—and potential identity damage—under the central dynamic of "authority" in the creative writing classroom.

Mimi Schwartz, in "Wearing the Shoe on the Other Foot," also voices a concern for any study of identity construction in the writing workshop, and thus provides additional exigency for exploring emotional labor. After a few years of teaching and academic writing, Schwartz enrolled to study with Russell Banks and Carolyn Kizer in undergraduate workshops at Princeton. Her return to this environment made her rediscover her "vulnerabilities [. . .] fears, concerns, and needs" (196). She feels her pedagogy has now been altered by the experience of sharing "emotionally riskier" work with Kizer—Schwartz reports on her stomach rumbling as well—which, as a positive experience, led her to "realize the potency and [. . .] potential danger" of workshop, "especially when the writer feels insecure, which is the way most student writers feel [when their respondents], even skilled ones, react only to what's on the page" (197). Mary Pope expresses a similar lament from her creative nonfiction experience as a Ph.D.

candidate and recounts how "the professor never stated explicitly her subject matter expectations" (105). She then observes how the work produced for class gravitated steadily toward common denominators of "sex, cancer, and depression" (105).

I don't need to reiterate the problems of power, identity, authority and voice inherent in Brophy and Hardy's approaches to workshop, but it is worth noting that two key questions for creative writing pedagogy are how to alter the centrality of workshop or how to get more out of workshop. In recent scholarship, as I discussed in the first chapter, even scholars who defend the necessity of a traditional workshop format draw attention to the accompanying necessities of "personal abasement" and "emotional distancing" that some feel this practice demands. Two key exigencies emerge from the problem of workshop and the need to rethink the disciplinary status of creative writing in the university: 1) the impasse of needing a theoretical basis *and* resisting the merger of theory for theory's sake, and 2) the desire to help student's contextualize and understand the aesthetic categories that underpin their judgments. Both of these exigencies can be shown to intersect with the rhetorical theories of emotion I review in the next section.

Review of Rhetorical Scholarship in Theories of Emotion and Affect

In this section, I focus on the scholarship of emotion, particularly the definitions and theories that stem from feminist epistemology and rhetorical studies over the last thirty years. Although the multi-disciplinary attention to research in emotions, affect, and feeling eludes any brief summary, I begin this section with a continuum for what I categorize as emotion theory. On one end of the continuum there continues to be a more Romantic/Modernist belief in emotions arising within individuals in response to external events; these emotions have interplay with cognition and hail from a unique perspective

or sense of self. At the other end of the continuum, following research in the biological and social sciences and the splintering of romantic notions of individual identity in poststructuralist theory, emotions are perceived to be socially experienced and constructed and no longer understood in terms of "internal, idiosyncratic events, but as patterns that can be characterized and understood" only in terms of socio-cultural contexts (Hariman and Lucaites 20-21).

Antonio Damasio makes a compelling case for emotions as "bioregulatory devices" that are both the "result of a long history of evolutionary fine-tuning" and the result of external stimuli that can be predicted, induced, and "fine-tuned" over time as we gradually recognize more nuanced emotional experiences and the "infinite" range of stimuli that can induce them (*The Feeling of What Happens* 54-58). Emotion and feeling, in Damasio's research, are distinguished as successive levels of life regulation, with emotions being "complex stereotyped patterns of response," which he subdivides into primary, secondary and background emotions, and feelings being "sensory patterns signaling pain, pleasure, and emotions becoming images" (55). Damasio also diagrams feelings as the next level up or, more transactionally, the mediator between "High Reason" at the top of his life regulation chart and emotions on the third level down. These aspects of Damasio's work have certainly influenced Paula Niedenthal's research on embodied emotions. Her theories suggest that "perceiving and thinking about emotion" cannot help but involve the biological embodiment of emotions, which she explains in terms of the interplay between "perceptual, somatovisceral, and motoric re-experiencing" (1002).

The more accessible relevance of Niedenthal's work is that while emotions are embodied (e.g. internal bioregulatory functions), they are negotiated and mediated through social interaction. Counter to fairly recent claims that argue "bodily feedback is too undifferentiated and too slow to represent emotional experience," Niedenthal's research reveals how the embodiment of emotion when "induced by manipulations of facial expression and posture in the laboratory" causally "affects how emotional information is processed," a causality that helps demonstrate the close relationship between emotion, language, comprehension of communication, and, perhaps most importantly, the development of our empathic range. Here, I should also address Teresa Brennan's combination of Foucauldian archaeologies of science and contemporary affect research in *The Transmission of Affect* (2004). Brennan argues that humans used to have a felt sense of other people's feelings, but this empathic response has been hampered by the quest for "self-containment" since the dawn of humanism. Her concluding thesis, that affect is transmitted physically rather than imaginatively and that shared affect gives rise to societal regulation of behavior (and not vice versa), borders on Niedenthal's and Damasio's research at many turns, but Brennan's untimely death during the editing process may have contributed to a lack of direct quotation and full awareness of affect and emotion research since the beginning of the 21st century.

Although Brennan's book does not actively engage, or at times even acknowledge, rival scholarship on the subject of feelings and motivation, her general argument has bearing on key issues for rhetorical studies of emotion. Brennan argues that we are capable of feeling other people's feelings, or at least that we have a capacity for sensory recognition that has become damaged or obscured by civil, religious, moral,

political and gender codes and our own need to establish what Brennan terms our self-containment. In essence, social forces not only regulate emotions but also aid in our forgotten or unconscious disavowal of how feelings can be read and interpreted in the moment and not just later as signs or words. Brennan quickly skims through seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy, avoiding any mention of the passions in Descartes, Spinoza (another opportunity to intersect with Damasio's work) and Hume, but she does reflect on Freudian metapsychology, Le Bon's 1895 work with crowd behavior, and, perhaps most inspired, the ways in which conceptions of demons and hauntings may represent a need to personify the ineffable qualities of "communally shared affects." In terms of the latter, Brennan approaches the strength of religious convictions in a manner contrary to the later emotion and social epistemic work of Sharon Crowley: Brennan suggests that various religions are actually onto what Hochschild terms the "signal function of emotions," but the totalizing narratives of religious organizations will not allow their practitioners a language to witness the suppressed possibilities of our emotional range, only the language to explain it away and re-imagine such bonds in the reifying rhetoric of supernatural forces.

Questions of how and where internal, biological concepts of affect are mediated—perhaps entirely rewritten—by socio-cultural contexts have certainly informed contemporary rhetorical studies of emotion, affect, and motivation. For example, Dana Anderson appropriates Bourdieu's concept of habitus to question the motives of habituated action and to argue with and expand on Kenneth Burke's conception of disposition. That is, Anderson suggests that the habitus, or aconscious body of dispositions that generate "practices which tend to reproduce the regularities of external

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structures" and "dispose agents toward certain types of cognition and action," could be used to expand Burke's concept of "attitude" (traditionally viewed as an incipient act or disposition situated in the mind) to include a "*bodily incipience* [. . .] an embodied potential for future action" (263-64; 270). What seems immediately pertinent to distinctions between affect, feeling, and emotion is that Anderson utilizes Bourdieu's concepts of generative structuralism, of habitus as a method that "aims to bypass the reductive poles of both objectivist and subjectivist theories of action and purpose," in order to extend Burke's concept of attitude beyond "circumscription within the consciousness of agents—[toward] possibilities that might accommodate the aconscious and dispositional character of practical action" (261-62). Anderson also highlights Burke's distinctions between action and motion ("things move, people act") as a segue into her thesis that "inasmuch as purposes may also arise out of the bodily 'instincts' and 'drives' that also comprise the 'motivational properties' of an agent, consciousness need not be involved for an act to be purposeful" (260).[4]

What would such an expansion of the Dramatistic method—one certainly predicated on latitude, insinuations, and ambiguity in Burke's definitions—enable for the study of affect and motives? Potentially, we could begin accounting for ways in which social structures are inscribed "not upon the minds but into the bodies of the agents who participate in society's practices," perhaps in ways that still demand a close reading of comportments if not of literary acts. We might also connect this line of thinking to

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[4] A full consciousness of habitus seems as unattainable as a full recognition of mystification; however, a realization of the habituated coupled with a *consciously* habituated set of practices seems to produce real effect, within and without, and the ability to effect social structures suggests a potential for agency and action, for being containers and not merely contained, which fits with Burke's agenda.

another of Damasio's works, *Looking For Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (2003), in which he discusses "background emotions" as being "composite expression of those regulatory actions as they unfold and intersect moment by moment in our lives" (44). Anderson's work seems to intersect with Damasio's categorization of drives and motivations by looking at the precognitive immediacy of practice and what practice generates, or by looking at habituated actions as a crucial part of what gives rise to the language-driven purposes in more traditional Burkean analyses. Along these lines, Anderson has me intrigued as to how Bourdieu's "aconscious, pre-intentional structure of dispositions" might have us rethink "conscious" self-assessments, such as the one implied by Damasio's example: "When asked 'how we feel,' we consult this 'state of being" and answer accordingly" (Anderson 264; Damasio 44). Anderson's argument also raises necessary questions when accounting for motives, including how deliberate or complicit are we in purpose? How conscious are our actions as agents vs. how much bodily disposition should be analyzed when examining an act or defining an attitude?

Anderson's work with habitus also creates an opportunity to turn from the sociology of affect theory to the research and applications for rhetorical scholarship that have developed over the last two decades. If there is a normative "social and cultural" regulation of our emotions, one that may be a felt bodily incipience or something more cognitively governed, then there are, of course, "outlaw emotions" that run counter to the mainstream of approved emotions. The best source for this discussion is Alison Jagger, who contends that emotions are "wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntary responses to the world" as opposed to being the "ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world" (152-153). Emotions are comprised of "both mental and

physical aspects, each of which conditions the other" and can be both "chosen" and "involuntary" (153). Jagger also believes that emotions, which are too often dismissed as "mere passions" that sweep over the otherwise autonomous individual, also "presuppose language and a social order" and "presuppose values" (153). Her thesis, then, is that conventionally unacceptable or "outlaw" emotions are most often experienced by "subordinated individuals who pay a disproportionately high price" for attempting to "maintain the status quo" (160). Most outlaw emotions, which may be "potentially or actually feminist emotions," are also of interest to rhetoricians and discourse theorists due to their "dialectical relation to critical social theory" (160).

In *Ugly Feelings*, Sianne Ngai utilizes affect studies as a way of reading outlaw emotions in American literature. She suggests that the division of affect and emotion "originated in psychoanalysis for the practical purpose of distinguishing third-person from first-person representations of feeling, with 'affect' designating feeling described from an observer's (analyst's) perspective, and 'emotion' designating feelings that 'belong' to the speaker or analysand's 'I'" (25). Yet, as Ngai points out, Brian Massumi and Lawrence Grossberg have made claims for a stronger distinction, arguing not just that emotion requires a subject while affect does not, but that the former designates feeling that has been given 'function and meaning' while the latter remains 'unformed and unstructured' (Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual* 260, note 3). As Grossberg argues, "'unlike emotions, affective states are neither structured narratively nor organized in response to our interpretations of situations'" (qtd. in Ngai 25). That said, Ngai introduces Massumi and Grossberg's distinctions more as an acknowledgement; she ultimately believes that "while the distinction between affect and emotion is [. . .]

helpful [. . .], [she] will not be theoretically leaning on it to the extent that others have" and will be using the terms "more or less interchangeably" with the distinction being understood "as a modal difference of intensity or degree, rather than a formal difference of quality of kind" (27).

To Ngai, affects are "less formed and structured than emotions, but not lacking form or structure altogether; less 'sociolinguistically fixed,' but by no means code-free or meaningless; less 'organized in response to our interpretations of situations,' but by no means entirely devoid of organization or diagnostic powers" (27). Further, any semantic distinction between affect and emotions still serves Ngai's argument the way it once served a "descriptive problem" in psychoanalytic practice: "that of distinguishing first-person from third-person feeling, and, by extension, feeling that is contained by an identity from feeling that is not" (27).   Ngai's discussion of the overlap between emotion and feeling also serves as a point of connection to Christine Mattley's research. Mattley, who works at the intersection of symbolic interaction and social theory, argues that "meaning can be reconstructed through emotional or cognitive memory, in which case the thought, feeling, or emotion is thought and felt anew [. . .] An individual's feelings, then, are both experiences and thought; emotions are feelings and reflections about feelings," which she believes are "analytically distinguishable but functionally indistinguishable" (369).

Teresa Brennan's work also adds differentiation to this nomenclature. "By an affect," she writes, "I mean the physiological shift accompanying a judgment"; by extension, Brennan argues that the "evaluative and judgmental" are synonyms for the collective regulatory pressures we put on each other through shared affect (5). However,

in a later chapter, her use of "judgment" becomes synonymous with the *blockage* of

shared affect (i.e. "When I judge the other, I simultaneously direct toward her that stream

of negative affect that cuts off my feeling of kinship from her as a fellow living,

suffering, joyful creature") (119). She also rejects any mimetic theories, such as the ones

I discuss in conjunction with performance studies, in favor of an argument that affect is

transmitted chemically, mainly by smell (pheromones). Even though this points out the

overly complicated and contradictory nature of a term like affect, Brennan, like the

rhetoricians she did not seem to read, attaches the concept of affect, or a precognitive

state of feeling not unlike the bodily incipience Anderson describes, to the cognitive and

conscious act of placing judgment, holding opinions, or, I would add, workshopping

someone else's fiction.

Arlie Hochschild provides another useful starting point for articulating the

interplay between the bodily felt yet socially-prescribed constructs of emotions when she

expands on Freud's theory that anxiety serves a crucial function in signaling danger

(*Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (1926)). Hochschild posits that "actually, every

emotion has a 'signal function'" which may not always signal danger so much as "signal

the 'me' I put into seeing 'you' [. . .]. [Emotion] signals the often unconscious

perspective we apply when we go about seeing" (29-30). In other chapters and later

scholarship, Hochschild warns of the gradual numbing and permanent damage to the

"signal function of emotion" that occurs under the sustained duress of most emotional

labors. She also warns of the emotion management that can be found in most strata of the

private sector, and, I later add, in the writing workshop. The need to "entertain" the

particular tastes or dominant conventions of a socio-cultural context, particularly

involving one's work, creates

> a separation of display and feeling [which] is hard to keep up over long periods.
> A principle of emotional dissonance, analogous to the principle of cognitive
> dissonance, is at work. . . .We try to reduce this strain by pulling the two closer
> together either by changing what we feel or by changing what we feign. (*The
> Managed Heart* 90)

In "Going Postal", Lynn Worsham expands on the "strain" and "permanent damage" to

emotion's signal functions in her analysis of the ways in which violence addresses and

educates our emotion responses. Specifically, Worsham, who defines emotion as a "tight

braid of affect and judgment" that is socially constructed and "bodily lived," explains

how "dominant pedagogy" forces "individuals and groups" to internalize a "legitimate

point of view" (216). Dominant pedagogies accomplish this by developing "philosophies

and practices that claim to be non-violent and non-repressive [yet] are particularly useful

in promoting misrecognition, such as pedagogies [. . .] that exert power through a subtle

instrument of coercion, the implied threat of the withdrawal of affection" (221-222).

Worsham also provides a useful summary of Spelman's "positivist approach to

emotion," which "restricts emotion to the realm of the body [. . .] where it remains a

purely private and internal event. Positivism makes emotion independent of any object or

meaning or intention, and it directs attention to the way in which emotion disrupts

rational judgment, thoughts, and perceptions (224). Worsham uses Spelman's concept to

suggest that "keeping your emotions out of it," counter to traditional workshop advice,

may indirectly foster the "dominant pedagogy of emotion [that] refuses the expression of

anger by subordinates" and school "anger to turn inward so as to become silent rage or

passive bitterness, where the energy for political action can be derailed in the pathos of

the personal" (225). Relatedly, Ellen Quandahl puts Worsham's observation into practice

by suggesting that educators should counter pedagogies of violence by providing "information about and opportunities to analyze the linking of social scenes, feelings, and the moral sense" as well as "opportunities to observe repertoires of feeling represented in language" (21).

Until Worsham's work with rhetorics of emotion in the early 1990s, it was difficult to find precedents for connecting Hochschild's theories to writing pedagogy. Following Worsham's example, Elspeth Probyn explores aspects of connecting pedagogies of emotion to pedagogies for composition as she articulates theories of the self as a "double entity" that becomes continuously "reworked in its enunciation" (qtd. in Lu 241) and, in turn, Min-Zhan Lu appropriates Probyn's work in efforts to confront the "gendered experience of the academic researcher or reader (white, straight, middle-class) function[ing] as a universalizing term to overwrite the experiences of others under study" (Lu 242-243).   In the broader university, Alison Roberts and Keri Smith provide a source for adapting and including Hochschild's work—and a supplemental reading list and pedagogy derived from emotion theory—with their sociological reading of the cultural diversity classroom. Essentially, Roberts and Smith appropriate Hochschild's definition of emotion management ("a process of making self-indications as to what they should be feeling and work to display and/or experience that emotion") to discuss the "degree to which [the classroom] climate is mediated" by such "feeling rules" that students use to "evaluate their emotional responses and those of others" (293-94). Roberts and Smith suggest that professors, when attempting to meet "cultural expectations of emotion response," can create a "safe atmosphere" for facilitating "the productive inclusion of

emotional responses in the classroom by articulating their own emotions when applicable" (297).

Roberts and Smith's reading of Hochschild can also be shown to intersect with Alison Jagger's call for emotional epistemologies that

> would show how our emotional responses to the world change as we conceptualize it differently and how our changing emotional responses then stimulate us to new insights. They would demonstrate the need for theory to be self-reflexive, to focus not only on the outer world but also on ourselves and our relation to the world, to examine critically our social location, our actions, our values, our perceptions, and our emotions. (Jagger 164)

In the next chapter I argue that Jagger's epistemological focus could then be "witnessed" in a writing class as a possible answer to Paul Dawson and Ted Lardner's concern over the "lack of social perspective on composing" that has led to the "typical creative writing class" being, in Lardner's estimate, "more conservative than the composition classroom, where the subtext of composing (as a social process mediated through power relations) runs near the surface of classroom discourse" (73).

In *Feeling Power: Emotions in Education* (1999), Megan Boler addresses the need to "develop emotional epistemologies" by seizing classroom opportunities to foster a "public recognition of the ways in which the 'social' clearly defines the 'interior' realm of experience, and vice versa" (142). On the subject of the social construction of emotion, Boler claims to be "less interested in whether or not there are in fact universally similar emotional experiences or expressions and more interested in how the dominant discourses within a given local site determine what can and cannot be felt and/or expressed" (142). Early in her analysis, Boler highlights common assumptions of emotional discourse in our culture, primarily that emotions are located in the individual

and are seen as both naturally occurring and universal in their expression (8-12). This

belief structure leads to the scholarship of emotional quotients, in which students can

supposedly improve upon their natural emotional abilities through the "explicit curricula

of emotional literacy" (81). Boler attempts to help postmodern culture emotionally map

its way back out of the present by performing a close reading of the male discourse on

EQ. She is very interested in revealing the social agenda and eventual hegemony

underlying the supposedly neutral—and thus unquestioned—nature of the new

cognitivism. As Boler explains:

> emotional literacy skills are in no way neutral. Contemporary popular discourses
> in science . . . increasingly encourage an understanding of human behavior as a
> combination of "hard-wired" impulses and an educable set of neutral skills for
> self-control. But this conception of the self reflects historically and culturally
> specific values which carry particular social and political agendas. (80)

One irony is that following acceptance of the socially constructed nature of "objective"

scientific claims—the social construction of intelligence, how it is measured, and what

these measurements refuse to take into account—science decided to privilege emotion,

which once made the female brain inferior, by focusing on male capacities for emotional

growth, development, and "educability."

Boler promotes emotional epistemologies that typically involve "teaching

students how to combine passionate response with critical analysis, to define and identify

how and when particular emotions inform and define knowledge" (142-143). Expanding

on the work of Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, who analyze the "role of testimony in

relation to pedagogy to illustrate the crises of meaning and histories that mark education,"

Boler calls for "testimonial readings" that transcend any "simple process of

identification" and demand that

the reader must attend to herself as much as to the other—not in terms of 'fears for one's own vulnerabilities,' but rather in terms of the affective obstacles that prevent the reader's acute attention to the power relations guiding her responses and judgments. For example, to experience a surge of irritation at the text allows the reader to examine potential analyses: Does she dismiss the text or protagonist on some count, or examine her own safeguarded investment that desires to dismiss the text out of irritation? Might irritation, for example, indicate the reader's desire to avoid confronting the articulated pain? (167-169)

Granted, Boler's argument, like that of Felman, Laub and most I'm highlighting, is first interested in using emotional testimony to "challenge the legal and historical claims to truth" and to confront the "traumas of contemporary history," and, in so doing, is "situated within a greater need for new conceptions of the relation of emotions and power" in feminist theory (166). One insight for my own work, then, is that any early entrance into this dialogue on emotion in composition pedagogy, any exposure to the shared tenets of these feminist pedagogies, at least provides opportunity for change in the present.

Boler highlights two key areas as a means of characterizing testimonial readings:

Our political climate of crisis, which requires new representations of "truth" which are not static and fixed, but allow us to communicate trauma's "excess." Second, in response to crisis the reader accepts responsibility as a co-producer of "truth." This responsibility requires a committed interrogation of the reader's response as she faces the other's experience. To turn away, to refuse to engage, to deny complicity—each of these responses correlates with a passive empathy and risks annihilating the other. (166)

Testimonial reading asks for an engagement with the text that goes well beyond guilt or discomfort; testimonial reading asks us, individually then collectively, to "question the genealogy of [our] particular emotional response" (170). If students feel uncomfortable reading a work, watching a film, approaching the other through the rhetoric or semiotics of some presentation, then they are encouraged to use that lack of comfort and emotional reaction (anger, disgust, outrage, sadness, pity) to examine their/our complicity in the

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"truth" a narrative produces. In this sense, and in ways that I theorize in chapter three,

Boler offers a critical framework for approaching a semester's reading list, even in a

creative writing class: a framework that is purposefully awkward and anger-inducing but

potentially transformational. Why, we might ask a student respondent, are *you* so

invested in saying this? Why are *you* so immediately under attack when you read

anything that touches on this subject? Does this imply that the subject is a "crisis of

truth" or a conflict of competing truth claims? What sort of interrogation could that

initial hostility and denial lead to? This last question arose in my discussion with

Jamaica Kincaid over the concern of what do we *do* with anger that a text or writing

assignment has aroused in our students? While there is no easy answer—Boler asks us to

trade ease for pedagogies of discomfort—Boler, like Worsham, Hochschild, and Jagger,

would ask students to recognize that engaging with a text means engaging with a conflict

of social, historical, political, and economic forces that produced the events of the text,

produced the author and text itself, and, importantly, produced our emotional reactions to

it. All of which means emotional engagement can not only lead to the "critical thinking

skills" every mission statement promotes, but may be the best path.

Review of Scholarship of the "Affective Turn" in Rhetoric and
Composition:

Although I cannot point to any current dialogue between the researchers I've

summarized in the first two sections of this literature review, I can highlight an active

dialogue between the scholarship of emotion rhetoric and the scholarship of composition

theory. Before moving on to works that acknowledge and engage this interdisciplinary

dialogue, I want to detail a few of the ways in which pedagogies of emotion have hovered

around the classic schools of thought in composition studies. What follows is not a comprehensive overview of composition's contemporary history; instead, I am highlighting works that form a good context for composition's "affective turn" in the early 1990s and a basis for my own argument for an affective turn in creative writing pedagogy. I begin with the rise of expressivism since the emphasis on finding an authentic voice "from within" mirrors the autopoetic process of asking students to display their "authentic emotions" in creative writing.

The first true challenge to current-traditionalist practice, during what Richard Young calls composition's "fifteen years of conflicted identities," was the rise of expressivist pedagogies in the early 1970s, due largely to the influential writings of Peter Elbow, Ken Macrorie, and Donald Murray. Expressivism, a title Elbow and others later regretted as reductive and misleading, seems to have at least highlighted the role of emotional attachments in the invention of ideas and the construction of essays. In "Telling Writing", Macrorie eschews the "Engfish" methodologies of "bloody correction marks" and theme-based writing in favor of "writing freely," telling "interior truths," discovering "a voice that rings true to you [once] you learn to record the surprises of the world faithfully," and recognizing that all "good writers" have turned inward to learn "to speak in an authentic voice" (297-313). But this is still an untroubled privileging of an "authentic voice" that arises from an interior "sense" that writing teachers must help students divine through broadly defined pedagogies. Externally, this is more of a hearkening to Plato and to the truth-seeking of New England Transcendentalism than to the social turn or the social construction of emotions that I discuss below.

In the opinions of Henry Giroux and, later, Lester Faigley, expressivist views of composition ignore "how writing works in the world, the social nature of language" and offer "a false notion of a 'private self'" (Faigley 654). In *Expressive Discourse*, Jeanette Harris argues that the term expressive discourse had become, as of the 1990s, "poorly defined" and "virtually meaningless," which prompted a response from Elbow that reads like a precursor of Micchiche's work with emotion theory (Harris 49). The short version is that all discourse is expressive in origin, regardless of the aesthetic or pragmatic direction it takes in style, tone, audience or purpose and that those who oppose this notion of discourse are only revealing their own "personal stake" in, or emotioned-attachment to, denying that quality writing is "full of affect, persona, self, or alleged self of the writer" ("Some Thoughts on *Expressive Discourse*" 939).

Of course, the era of conflicted identity in composition studies is also defined by the emergence of cognitivism, or research into the supposedly universal dimensions of writing that were deeply influenced by cognitive psychology. Although expressivists were not shunned from publishing, the research of Linda Flower, John R. Hayes, Nancy Summers, and Patricia Bizell certainly played a role in the marginalization of individual student emotions and the ways in which emotion might play a *pre*cognitive role in the writing process. Brand argues that the problem of nomenclature in cognitive process models (i.e. the research of Flowers, Hayes, Freedman, and Gregg and Streinberg offers no vocabulary to deal with emotion in the writing process) resulted from a privileging of psychoanalytic rhetoric that gave the movement the "respectability of high science" with little "new explanatory power" (Brand 440; Petrovsky 233). Even Mike Rose, famously sympathetic to the emotions and class-defined boundaries of students in primary,

secondary, and higher education, focuses on the "cognitive dimension" in the subtitle of

his 1984 text *Writer's Block*.   Though Flowers eventually looked for ways to adapt

stricter accounts of cognitivism to acknowledge the social dimensions of writing, it is

telling that as late as 1990's "Writer-Based Prose" she is still dismissive of "feeling

issues," which she believes to be beyond the domain of what can be addressed in the

composition classroom (126).

　　　None of this is meant to suggest that the competing (or "conflicting") process

pedagogies of the mid-1980s through early 1990s were entirely void of "emotion talk" or

an awareness of the affective beyond employing the auxiliary *pisteis* of pathos to

reinforce the primary *pisteis* of logos. Nathaniel Teich, as part of his contribution to

Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive (1994) reflects on the

partial attention to emotional engagement in works by James Moffett, Ann Berthoff and

Toby Fulwiler as each introduced "applications of the dialogue process" that highlighted

the importance of composition theories that fostered empathy in student writers (147).

"Although called by different names," Teich observes, "these methods range from the

strictly personal activities of individual monologues and internal dialogues with ourselves

and others, to the classroom settings of pairs and groups involved in individual,

cooperative, and adversarial public activities" (147). Relatedly, Jensen and DiTiberio's

Personality and the Teaching of Composition (1984) employed Jungian personality

types—via applications of the Myers-Briggs Type indicator in the writing classroom—to

contrast a strictly "cognitive bias" with an awareness of the inter-related roles of

intuition, judgment, and feeling as personality preferences and unacknowledged catalysts

in every act of writing.

In "The Why of Cognition: Emotion and the Writing Process" (1987), Alice Brand observes that while rhetoric and composition theorists "may concede that emotions motivate, " in practice they also appear to "believe that emotions have little to do with actual composing and less to do with revising" (436). Brand, along with Jacobs and Micciche, is instrumental in connecting emotion studies to questions of memory and motivation. Although most theorists would agree that "the construct of memory" is "central to cognition," the entirety of the visual field that memory could, at any moment, present us is too vast to be of aid in cognitive retrieval. Brand and other emotion theorists argue that cognitivists "come up short when they try to explain why we choose what we choose and how" and, further, contemporary writing theory "also suffers a blind spot when it explains how long-term memory and language interact" (437).

The interconnectness of emotion memory and motivation—an interconnectedness that Micciche feels binds us to certain ideas, concepts, and linguistic invention—is also foundational in the process of inclusion and exclusion, of picking and choosing, in the writing process. Micciche and others have appropriated Sara Ahmed's phrase "stickiness" to describe the ways that "accumulation of affective value" serves to "bind emotions with objects and surfaces" (Micciche 8). The larger stakes for interrogating the stickiness of emotioned discourse in the composition classroom is the long-deferred need to highlight emotion's role in the construction of knowledge. Micciche's approach to integrating emotioned discourse (and a rhetoric of emotion) into the composition classroom involves pedagogical exercises for "teaching emotion as an embodied performance," which also help reveal the transactional nature of emotions or the ways in which emotions are produced between people.

Kia Richmond is also concerned with how little attention has been paid to the emotional complexities of the teacher-student relationship and focuses on "felt sense" in her argument for "repositioning emotions" in composition theory and practice (68). Felt sense is Eugene Gendlin's phrase for something akin to Bourdieu's habitus, or that which is "neither a cognition nor an affect but a bodily awareness that had meaning" (qtd. in Brand, *The Psychology of Writing* 55) *and* something that is "preverbal and preconceptual--body and mind before they split apart" (Richmond 3). Sondra Perl also champions the appropriation of "felt sense" in composition studies, insisting that writers "draw on sense experience" that goes deeper than the expressivist dictate to write from within. In a summer 1999 workshop and in articles that followed, Perl's take on felt sense has been that it is the "soft underbelly of thought" that includes "everything you feel and know about a given subject at a given time" (Perl 151).

Although this line of research seems to approach what Flowers and Hayes might have deemed the unrecoverable, perhaps the ineffable, the deep interiority that Richmond and Perl value was partly fostered by the "social turn" in rhetoric and composition from the late 1980s to the present. Certainly the redefinition and new understanding of emotions as socially constructed, learned attitudes (discussed in response to my first question) owes no small debt to a post-cognitive, post-process shift in examining the social and culturally contingent nature of writing. Leading voices of the social turn include James Berlin, Sharon Crowley, James Berlin, and Karen Lefevre. Lefevre helps locate invention in the collaborative, transactional processes of writing as a social act, one that is never performed in a void or through exclusively individual imagination. Berlin, meanwhile, integrates social epistemic rhetoric into the composition classroom—

a rhetoric and a classroom that would now help students develop an "explicit critique of economic, political, and social arrangements" ("Rhetoric and Ideology" 490). In this same era, Bartholomae famously suggests that university-level writing is so difficult (and, to emotion theorists, such a frustrating labor) because students aren't equipped with the academic language privileged by that community. As Lester Faigley surmises, "a social view of writing moves beyond the expressivist contention that the individual discovers the self through language and beyond the cognitivist position that an individual constructs reality through languages" and, importantly, "any effort to write about the self or reality always comes in relation to previous texts" (534).

A more specific example of the integration of social and affective" turns" can be found in Sharon Crowley's *Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism* (2006). At times Crowley's over-reliance on Chantel Mouffe for any discussion of "an identity such as 'an American' depend[ing] upon a rigorous exclusion of [. . .] competing national identities" seems to over-credit Mouffe, LaClau et al. for ideas of "difference" and "the Other" easily found in Derrida, Foucault, and Said's *Orientalism* (1978, 2002) (72). However, Crowley does cite these benchmark poststructuralists when she focuses on how hegemonic fixing of identities takes on the social (and bodily) incipience of *habitus,* and how a "densely articulated ideologic" enters the *habitus*, "explains everything," and produces "intense emotional responses" that can rarely be countered (79). At this point Crowley suggests that beliefs new to, or less densely clustered with, commonplace ideologies are at least "relatively open to reception" (79).

Emotion theorists are also aware of how the social epistemic rhetoricians and composition theorists raised awareness of the marginalization and misunderstanding of

emotions, particularly in a poststructuralist age of theory.   Laura Micciche blames the

marginalization of emotion on the tendency within intellectual discourse and popular

culture to "collapse emotion with all things feminine, a marker that, in the history of

academic discourse, has signaled a tendency to be weak, shallow, petty, vain, and

narcissistic" (3). Micciche asks that we consider the ways in which the processes of

"rational" deliberation are inextricably bound and shaped by our emotional attachments

to a particular world view or sense of self within the social. Gretchen Moon, in "The

Pathos of Pathos", also presents the familiar argument that because "emotions have, at

least since Romanticism, been located in the individual—even identified as individual,"

they have been decentered and dismissed in academic texts as "trivial and Bourgeois"

(39). Finally, Sienne Ngai believes the marginalization of feeling "stemmed from its

perceived incompatability with 'concrete' social experiences [. . . and] from its perceived

incompatibility with poststructuralism's skeptical interrogation of the category of

experience itself." Ngai believes that feelings are as "fundamentally social" as the

"institutions and collective practices that have been the more traditional objects of

historicist criticism (as Raymond Williams was perhaps, the earliest to argue, in his

analyses of 'structures of feeling'), and as 'material' as the linguistic signs and

significations that have been the more traditional objects of literary formalism" (25).

Ngai can also be added in with the post-social-turn camp, or those who recognize why

poststructuralist theories of literary language that prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s, much

like the "dryly technical kinds of semiotic analysis that dominated literary studies in the

1970s and 1980s" were incapable of observing—or valuing—the "structures of feeling"

that elude materialist analysis (25-27).

In the next chapter I draw from the three fields of scholarship I have just highlighted. My intention is to connect some of the key exigencies and debates within creative writing pedagogy and emotion theory, two areas of scholarship that began to generate research interest and sustained dialogue in the late 1980s and early 1990s and continue to expand in range and definition today. To return to the pedagogical implications of these three sections, Roberts and Smith (2002) highlight the management of emotions in the writing classroom. In the vein of Hochschild's work, to which they owe a clear debt, Roberts and Smith call for more recognition of the classroom climate's mediation "by the degree to which [students] follow feeling rules—social norms that prescribe what emotional responses are appropriate given a specific situation," which leads to students (and, presumably, teachers) engaging in "emotional management, a process of making self-indications as to what they should be feeling, and work to display and/or experience that emotion" (293).

This discussion of emotional management echoes Anderson's earlier appropriation of Bourdieu's habitus (as social norms perform a regulatory function that seems to be "felt first" at the level of bodily incipience) and also Berlin's arguments for a recognition of social contingencies and power struggle within the composition classroom. Consequently, I would like to return to the need to foreground emotional management in my discussion of a "Gardnerian tradition" in creative writing pedagogy in chapter three. Just as Brand intervened in cognitivist and process pedagogies by (modestly) suggesting that research into the "impact of the emotions on writing may help us understand why some problems occur during writing and how we can solve them," I also see a need to intervene in the emergent field of creative writing pedagogy by examining the emotional

labor of the creative process, identity formation, and workshop theory (Brand "Social

Cognition, Affect" 441).

CHAPTER THREE: EMOTION MEMORY AND EMBODIMENT IN THE CREATIVE WRITING CLASSROOM

"Once you can blanch or blush simply by recalling something that happened to you, once you are afraid to think about a past misfortune, you have a memory for feelings, or Emotion Memory. Only it is not sufficiently developed for you to fight, all on your own, against the problems inherent in public performance."

--Konstantin Stanislavski, *An Actor's Work* (1938, trans. 2008)

"What is different, then, about the current moment is that the focus on the materiality of the body and its performative potential has begun to usher in a theory of writing, as yet unformulated but most certainly 'in the air,' that explores what embodiment in writing means and why it could or should matter to writing teachers and scholars."

--Laura R. Micciche, *Doing Emotion: Rhetoric, Writing, Teaching* (2002)

Although pedagogical possibilities of what "embodiment in writing means" are still largely "unformulated," Laura Micciche's scholarship has been a great help in thinking through ways to respond to the emotion-centered needs in creative writing pedagogy (CWP). Micciche defines emotions as performative and produced in the dynamic of our social interactions, a definition that focuses on emotions as action—as something that individuals *do* and not as something they merely possess. In this chapter I establish my theoretical argument for integrating core concepts from emotion theory and performance studies in the creative writing classroom. Creative writing faculty—often led by compositionists who teach creative writing courses--have professed a desire for the integration of theory into creative writing pedagogy, but no one has yet articulated a theory that addresses multiple exigencies in the scholarship and the continued dominance of the workshop model. Before I argue for an emotion-focused approach that would

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engage the Gardnerian tradition in workshop, I should summarize the key problems I've examined in the previous chapter, including:

- Ted Lardner's concern about the "lack of social perspective on composing" that has led to the "typical creative writing class" being "more conservative than the composition classroom, where the subtext of composing [. . .] runs nearer the surface of classroom discourse" (73). Likewise, Kalamaras is interested in theorizing a creative writing experience "grounded in social-epistemic rhetoric [that] would work against the grain of the dominant creative writing philosophy (individual expression) and romantic model of instruction (as still depicted in the field's "primary journals," the *AWP Chronicle* and *Poets & Writers*)" (80). In hopes of putting a social-epistemic approach into practice, he has called on creative writing faculty to assign "a range of response that includes critical, affective, and expressive readings" (80).

- Dawson and Myers's debates, framed in two of CWP's most comprehensive monographs,[5] can be summarized as Dawson's call for "root-and-branch reform" of creative writing as a "discipline of knowledge" that helps students transition from expressing "deeply personal experience" to crafting a "sociological poetics" that dramatizes the clash between "living discourses in society" versus Myers' belief that any innovative pedagogy will have to take into account the "innate subjectivism" of the workshop method to which "creative writing has been almost exclusively reduced" (Dawson 207-209; Myers 116-18; 176-77).

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[5]*Creative Writing and the New Humanities* and *The Elephants Teach: Creative Writing Since 1880.*

- Stephanie Vanderslice and Graeme Harper's concern that any CWP theory must not only make sense for creative writing but its place within the academy and in relation to the New Humanities, which echoes Eve Shelnutt's call for theory-driven pedagogies that will remove creative writing from its "self-imposed isolation within the English department" (163).

- Blythe and Sweet's request that any innovations on the seven traditional models of CWP must represent or be unified by "the perfect combination of Praxis and theory," or a theory that would not reduce the time needed for "talking craft" and workshopping nor simply become a theory-for-theory's sake counter to the "fun and engaging" stigma of undergraduate creative writing courses (Blythe and Sweet 307).

- The need to address the tremendous amount of affective labor that already occurs, without being directly addressed or questioned, in the creative writing workshop process. By extension, any CWP theory will need to help students understand affectively the aesthetic categories that underpin their judgments.

This last exigency is broadly stated and will perhaps be dismissed as true for extreme approaches like Nat Hardy's but not for workshops in general. For these reasons, I am beginning this chapter with a close reading of one of creative writing's most canonical texts, John Gardner's *The Art of Fiction: Notes on Craft for Young Writers*.

I am first analyzing what I've termed the "Gardnerian" version of the Iowa Workshop model in terms of its talk of "emotional frigidity" and its high degree of emotional management. In this chapter and in the pedagogical ethnography of chapter four, I examine ways that the epistemological focus of Jagger, Micchiche, and Boler

could be "witnessed" in a creative writing class as both a response to the Gardnerian tradition of workshop and an answer to Lardner's concern about the need to examine the mediated power relations that run "near the surface of classroom discourse" (73). After discussing aspects of emotion studies in response to Gardner's demands for "emotional accuracy" and Roberts and Smith's request for a theory of creative writing that explains what already occurs in the context of the workshop model, I argue that Jean Benedetti's recent translations of Stanislavski's "emotion memory" and selected performance studies pedagogies offer excellent models for raising creative writing students' awareness of embodied emotions.

As I've considered intersections between these areas of scholarship, I've had to work past a mechanical causality in my line of questioning: am I writing about an absence of emotion theory in creative writing pedagogy that could be remedied by the presence of performance studies? Am I responding to needed research in emotion work in composition in order to make a case for similar research in the creative writing classroom? Or, am I trying to problematize creative writing pedagogy and current applications of emotion theory in composition via dialogues in theater and performance studies, dialogues that have also been heavily influenced by post-structural theorists (Baudrillard, Foucault, Derrida) since the 1980s? In writing this chapter, I realized I was interested in each of these interdisciplinary concerns, mainly because the potential interstices between emotion theory, composition studies, creative writing pedagogy, and aspects of theater and performance studies seem numerous, productive, and as yet underdeveloped. Further, the core questions for emotion studies, as of 2012, are not entirely removed from the exigencies found in creative writing pedagogy (as it seeks the

"perfect combination of praxis and theory") *and* in studies that already link composition, rhetoric, and theories of emotion (e.g. the research of Brand, Chandler, Micchiche, Jacobs, Richmond, and Estrem that I described in the previous chapter) (Blythe and Sweet 307).

One origin point for my interest in creative writing pedagogy--beyond having taught undergraduate creative writing courses since 1995--was a dialogue between an early Modern literature professor and a rhet/comp instructor during a panel session at the 2004 M/MLA in St. Louis. The latter made a dismissive statement about creative writing's contributions to the English department as a whole and the former argued that creative writing should warm to the idea of analyzing the literature it purports to create (e.g. "They can't write short stories when they haven't even read Melville"). The rhet/comp instructor, trying to take a higher road, reminded the panel how fully composition was "revitalized" by the integration of cultural studies over the last two decades. He suggested that creative writing would do well to find its own theories, not just for the sake of integrating more of the English curriculum but for transforming its current practice.

I happened to be sitting with a few creative writing professors from other universities. Though none seemed galvanized or particularly engaged by the panel session, one walked with me to lunch and we ended up talking about a range of issues, including his distaste for "recycled theory-speak" at conferences. "What they never get," he said, and I paraphrase, "is that creative writing doesn't need its own special criticism: it's about language, craft, a kind of honesty," he lowered his voice, "that *we* tend to avoid." He gestured at academics holding salads in the foyer of Union Station and

suggested that we are all the English department, but we don't all have to let theory

substitute for the aesthetic truths we can offer students. It was a familiar lament and one I

didn't consider again until I began my Ph.D program the following year and studied

affect theories in rhetoric and composition. Although the conference professor dismissed

the need for a canon in creative writing, I remember that we also discussed how we had

both been schooled in, and still utilized, Gardner's *The Art of Fiction* in our classes. I

appreciated Gardner's syntactical advice but struggled with the tenor of his rhetoric for

"young writers"; the creative writing professor liked Gardner's moral aesthetics and

direct statements of craft, which, of course, were both predicated on unacknowledged

theoretical assumptions.

Like many who teach creative writing, I still use *The Art of Fiction* as a

supplement to the usual anthologies and piles of photocopied fiction. Gardner's legacy

seems to represent a hard-nosed formalism—Charles Johnson likened his mentor to "a

surgeon, quietly perform[ing] scansion on my prose, revealing metrical situations so I

could see for myself where the music of my writing failed"--though I have started asking

students to consider Gardner for other purposes, to strike up a dialogue that seems

otherwise muted in workshop ("John Gardner as Mentor" 620). I have become interested

in how emotional demands in creative writing are often accentuated by what I call the

Gardner tradition in its pedagogy: a rhetoric that suggests what is lacking in a fiction

corresponds to a lack (or "emotional frigidity") in its author. As Gardner writes:

> Art depends heavily on feeling, intuition, taste. . . .On reflection we see that the
> great writer's authority consists of . . .what we may call, loosely, his sane
> humanness; that is, his trustworthiness as a judge of things, a stability rooted in
> the sum of those complex qualities of his character and personality (wisdom,
> generosity, compassion, strength of will) to which we respond, as we respond to

what is best in our friends, with instant recognition and admiration, saying, "Yes, you're right, that's how it is!". (8-9)

The search for "how it is," however, is often fraught with challenges to a student's intuitive trust in his or her "emotional accuracy."

I used to worry over the inevitable student backlash to Gardner's moralizing and to his connections between a story's flaws and those of its creator. "So is that what we're really doing?" a student once asked, "critiquing how 'frigid' we are?" Even when workshops run smoothly, and students feel they have benefited from comments received, there is the lingering concern (and *suspicion* if we imagine the point-of-view of the rest of the English department, much less the rest of campus) that "what we're really doing" is either merely formalist and stylistic or missing opportunities to explore identity production and, in the case of Gardner's work, explore how the creative writing classroom is uniquely suited for exploring emotions in texts and their authors. What my students and I often find problematic in Gardner intersects with at least two dominant themes in the recently evolving scholarship on creative writing pedagogy. First, how does creative writing fit in with the curriculum or mission of the English department? Or, how does it transcend its New Critical origins to incorporate theory that may aid the insights of its students? Second, how might the process of writing, and particularly the role of workshopping within this process, more productively confront the inevitable emotion work involved in crafting fiction? In many ways these questions have been raised since the development of the Associated Writing Programs in the 1970s, and arguably since the proliferation of creative writing programs in America that began with the Iowa Writer's Workshop's rise in prominence, via swiftly canonized participants like Flannery O'Connor, in the 1940's and 1950's.

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To address the second question first, we should examine Gardner's belief that "whereas the frigid writer lacks strong feeling, and the sentimental writer applies feeling indiscriminately, the mannered writer feels more strongly about his own personality and ideas—his ego, which he therefore keeps before us by means of style—than he feels about his characters—in effect all the rest of humanity" (120-121). Gardner also feels that "mannered writing, then—like sentimentality and frigidity—arises out of flawed character. In critical circles it is considered bad form to make connections between literary faults and bad character, but for the writing teacher such connections are impossible to miss, hence impossible to ignore" (121). He goes on to argue that it is the creative writing teacher's *duty* to critique at this level of personal flaw and emotional frigidity (and not merely "limit criticism" to "comments on . . . the sentimentalizing tendency of [the student writer's] speech rhythms") (121). As Gardner explains:

> the best such timorous criticism can achieve is a revised piece of fiction that is free of all technical faults but no less embarrassing. To help the writer, since that is his job, the teacher must enable the writer to see—partly by showing him how the fiction betrays his distorted vision (as fiction, closely scrutinized, always will)—that his personal character is wanting. (121)

All of this, of course, has proven challenging to put into pedagogical practice.

The case could be made that Gardner defaults to formalist pedagogy throughout his discussion, and that his famous "Common Mistakes" section and appendix examples, many of which are still widely used as exercises a quarter-century later, serve to teach style more than offer clarity as to how teachers may facilitate a workshop that is not merely the pedagogy of discomfort for discomfort's sake—or a public shaming of one's emotional frigidity or myopic moral character. Near the end of chapter five, Gardner brings emotion back into his advice, but only to suggest a falling away from some initial emotional impulse that will be best recollected in tranquility:

> The writer might read and re-read what he's written, then put it away awhile, allowing it to cool, then again read and reread, carefully analyzing his emotions as he reads, trying to make out whether the new device works because it gives new interest and life to the material or whether, on the other hand, it begins to wear thin, feel slightly creepy. (124)

Nonetheless, Gardner at least provides a framework for directly engaging and questioning the role of emotion in workshop; he even positions emotion as foundational to the process. Though it may at first seem unlikely, Gardner's advice also offers a framework for discourse when partnered with Boler, Micchiche, or a range of theorists currently exploring the affective dimensions of writing and reading.

Admittedly, Gardner seems like an unlikely bedfellow for emotion theory. His "pantheon of writers who express true moral values" is, as Edelstein notes, pretty "dead, white, [and] male," and, politically, Johnson relates that his mentor may have been a Republican (Edelstein 44; "John Gardner as Mentor" 619). Johnson's rhetoric often casts Gardner's tough-mindedness (the "boot camp" ethic for creative writing workshops) against what Johnson eschews as "intellectually questionable workshops [he's] seen from a distance or heard about," workshops that were "dominated by the instructor's personality" (apparently *unlike* the presence of Gardner, with his "long-stemmed, churchwarden pipes and. . .striking silver mane") and which "took an approach that was highly subjective, a 'touchy-feely' urging of twentysomethings to 'write about what they know'" ("A Boot Camp" B7; "John Gardner as Mentor" 619). Although Gardner, like many creative writing professors, would reject any hint of workshop colonization by theorists, much less the poststructuralists he bristled about in later essays, any collaboration between *The Art of Fiction* and *Feeling Power* is not intended for the sake of sneaking theory into workshop. My aims in engaging these sources are to initiate a dialogue on what is problematic in Gardner and the relatively unquestioned assumptions

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of the workshop method *and* to consider a new workshop model in which testimonials help reveal the emotions of criticism and aid in questioning the authority of experience.

Just as Marilyn Edelstein, while "revisiting the controversy" over Gardner's "widely decried" *On Moral Fiction* (1978), reminds us that "there are more ways for a novel or story to [. . .] have moral effects than Gardner considers," there is certainly a wider range of possibilities for exploring emotion than Gardner suggests (48-49). Students who have at least encountered selections from Hochschild, Jagger, and Boler can approach Gardner's texts with a working concept of socially constructed emotions. In this context, they will be prepared to question key assumptions within Gardner's famously authoritative rhetoric, namely that emotions (and accompanying values) could never be as stable as what he idealizes, and that when emotions are viewed dynamically any discussion of emotional accuracy becomes slippery. Students may begin to question the extent to which Gardner *fosters* emotional dissonance by eschewing a "frigidity" in fiction that must reveal its author's "cold-heartedness. . .the given writer's inability to recognize the seriousness of things in the first place, the writer who turns away from real feeling" (118). Students should be encouraged to reflect on ways that they have repressed what may be assumed to be sentimentality ("the faking of emotions the writer does not honestly feel") for fear of such personal scrutiny (118-119).

I should note that I am not anti-Gardner on all fronts. The idea of asking student writers to avoid "tinker[ing], more and more obsessively, with form" in efforts to mask an emotional "void" in their fiction, which Gardner and his protégées would insist is the bigger picture for this famous advice, is not inherently flawed or even a bad idea. The problem is context, or a lack of it, and the pedagogical discomfort that arises in

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workshops as a result of saying, in effect: we're here to judge your story's emotional depth as a litmus test for your own. To me, this tacit assumption results in Hochschild's "separation of display and effect" (and Cooley's denial of "distinctive voice") in favor of the proven extremes of traumatic telling or ironic detachment—those hallmarks of rounded characterization and tone that tend to be rewarded as the more accurate depictions of our post-postmodern lives.

I agree with Nicole Cooley's assessment that the "creative writing class is a site of individual identity production" and would add another dimension to her call for critical thinking about how "certain strategies for teaching creative writing may enforce a normative identity" (101). Specifically, I offer the workshop environment, even with its flawed process of making "students produce texts that deny their voice," as a viable site for not only discussing the construction of identity, but testing feminist pedagogies of emotion (102). Typically, emotion in the creative writing classroom is presented in dualistic terms that represent much of what emotion theorists are arguing to move past: the binary opposition of feeling and thinking, of emotion as a "tight braid of affect and judgment" vs. a temperament that may impede the "objective" function of reason in critical analysis (Worsham 216). For example, Tim Lensmire and Lisa Satanovsky fall into this latter category as they critique the return of the lost "Romantic" tradition of "celebrating emotion" in the writing workshop. Though they favor the "authenticity" generated in discussions of emotion and emotional identification in creative writing, they ultimately find this direction for pedagogy as limiting as the "postmodern notions of dead authors and pure text and language" (287). What seems most limiting, though, is their

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dualistic opposition of emotion to reason, even as they assert a somewhat Coleridgean preference for "the organic and physicality over reason and intellect [since] authentic understanding is not limited to paradigms, book learning, and exercises in reason but also encompasses emotion, intuition, and the body" (282).

As emotion theorists seek to move beyond oppositions of emotion vs. reason, they also suggest that opportunities to engage with "social responsibility," as Kalamaras recommends, are possible within and not "besides" the process of writing fiction. As previously discussed, Leonard focuses on assigning texts that "engage the socially constructed identity of [their] writers" (i.e. *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*). Such assignments establish a dialogue that enables her to do likewise with her students' papers. That is, in terms of personal narrative or other forms of biographical writing, Leonard is chiefly interested in commenting on "the rough spots, the ruptures, the discontinuities" in order to show students, via their own texts, the "places where a paper can open up and become something greater than the sum of its parts" (225). Leonard also asserts that she is "not advocating. . .a pedagogy based on conflict or exclusion of difference; [but rather one in which] the rifts in writing can be used in bringing forth something new, that writing that is fragmented or ruptured is full of possibility for both imaginative and critical work" (225). In this way, and to advocate a range of ways in which emotion theory may be included in workshops, I suggest Megan Boler's testimonial readings might provide an intriguing—if initially daunting—compliment to Leonard's focus.

In *Feeling Power: Emotions in Education* (1999), Boler addresses the need to "develop emotional epistemologies" by seizing classroom opportunities to foster a "public recognition of the ways in which the 'social' clearly defines the 'interior' realm

of experience, and vice versa" (142). On the subject of the social construction of emotion, Boler claims to be "less interested in whether or not there are in fact universally similar emotional experiences or expressions and more interested in how the dominant discourses within a given local site determine what can and cannot be felt and/or expressed" (142). This is a crucial distinction to discuss in the type of course I am proposing. The creative writing workshop, in what I'm portraying as the Gardner tradition, *does* function as a "given local site" for determining which experiences register as valuable enough to be "felt and/or expressed." Granted, Boler's argument, like that of Felman's, Laub's and most I've highlighted, is first interested in using testimony to "challenge the legal and historical claims to truth" and to confront the "traumas of contemporary history," and, in so doing, is "situated within a greater need for new conceptions of the relation of emotions and power" in feminist theory (141-43). At first, then, it seems like appropriating aspects of Boler's work for the creative writing classroom may make her theories a bit anemic or watered-down--a pedagogical equivalent of the music industry appropriating the rhythms of reggae sans its radical politics; however, any early entrance into this dialogue on emotion, any exposure to the shared tenets of these radical feminist pedagogies, strikes me as an opportunity for change in the present. By clarifying this, I'm not suggesting that the "greater need for new conceptions" of power, gender, identity, and our fictive engagement with the "traumas of contemporary history" be sanitized away in the process—to be honest, I'm probably more interested in English classes that do not have to think in terms of Bishop's "cross-raiding," courses that have not been compartmentalized *a priori* as "creativity explored" vs. "theory-based" vs. "interdisciplinary explorations of emotion theory"—but

I do feel that regardless of how far into the discourse of emotion theory an instructor

chooses to foray, the basic concepts of emotion theory offer opportunities to expand

workshops beyond craft talk and into discussions that unpack what Gardner's rules

insinuate.

It is fair to speculate that Boler's testimonial readings, which may initially take

the form of testimonial writings, could expose what Hochschild has termed the

transmutation of emotions. As I discussed in the second chapter, writing testimonies to

the transactional experience of crafting fiction while engaging in the criticism of others

should highlight, directly or indirectly, the negotiation of emotions involved in drafting a

piece for a specific class and professor. Students should be invited to reveal ways in

which they have already internalized an assumed preference for feeling--or depth of

compassion, or lack of frigidity--that was either established explicitly by a Gardnerian

pedagogy or implicitly by what has been well-received in workshop (what degree of

dreaded "sentimentality" tolerated, what surface of postmodern detachment preferred).

A first exercise could have students consider the dogma in Gardner's rhetoric, not

just for its condescension (i.e. referring to the clumsiness of amateurs, to academic

"blockheads," to examples in which you either possess a cultivated taste or you'll never

cultivate one), but for its tendency to remake apprentices in his own image. Such

testimonies can tease out emotional reactions to being judged by the authority, as well as

workshop "peers," feelings that Charles Johnson admits to having in Gardner's presence

when he recalls, "I feared I had disappointed and failed [him]" ("John Gardner as

Mentor" 624). Even while eulogizing what Gardner's "giving spirit" did for his writing

career, Johnson still testifies to the emotions and discomfort of his apprenticeship,

particularly when Gardner read and critiqued his work in his presence:

> His face was wall-like. In his eyes I could see him dismissing me as
> unimaginative and untalented; in his voice I could hear a vast distance between
> his own passions and the pages I'd given him. I felt embarrassed. We both knew I
> was wasting his time. ("John Gardner as Mentor" 620)

Johnson demonstrates the dismissal, lack of passion, and distance in Gardner's pedagogy

(related in a sort of reflective free indirect discourse on Johnson's part) and the

accompanying feelings of embarrassment that result from Gardner's withheld approval.

Interestingly, Johnson is conveying these embodied states of emotion after having the

validation of a National Book Award (1991) for *Middle Passage*. Though Johnson's

eulogizing essay is intended as a public defense of Gardner's maligned legacy, it

becomes a sort of delayed student testimony to the emotional demands of writing to a

mentor's tastes.

Student testimonies, which may take the form of blogs, journal entries, or

responsive writings in class, should also address the recurrent suspicion of homogeneity

in writing *workshops*, the ways in which characters' identities are, if not entirely

constructed to satisfy the group, at least mediated by inherited conventions. In response

to a study that proposed writing workshops did not churn out a "sameness" in creative

works—in style, tone, and range of emotional register—Bizzaro argues that instead of

looking "horizontally from writer to writer to determine whether a sameness exists from

work to work," we should be looking "vertically" to where "sameness is passed from

teacher to student who, in turn, becomes a teacher who passes certain literary biases to

yet another generation of students" (305). Perhaps it seems misguided to read Charles

Johnson's fiction to detect a stamp of the mentor he defends, but it seems worthwhile to

ask students to examine their *own* fiction after a semester of reading Gardner—or any guru, or any instructor—to perform an archeology of "creative" conventions.

Testimonial writings and selected readings in emotion theory can also help students understand how to question the authority of experience ("I lived it; I know what it felt like; that's how I wrote it") in workshop. My own experiences teaching and participating in creative writing classrooms over the last fifteen years have let me observe, as I imagine many have, the ways in which student writers appeal to their lived experience, and the accompanying perception of emotions accurately recalled, as a way to dismiss any objections to their fiction's emotional pitch. "That's how it happened! I was there!" becomes the default counter to "I didn't believe your characters' reactions; they seemed forced." The privileging of lived experience trumps any criticism of its fictional representation and often shuts down workshop discussion. This also leads to the common problem of students worrying over how to respond objectively to a story's affective dimensions or how to avoid hurting an author's feelings in workshop, worries that Gardner's rhetoric of emotional accuracy only exacerbates. As I discussed in chapter two, Probyn believes experience can be used to both "reveal the connections. . .that it conceals" and "impel an analysis of one's differentiated relation to levels of the social formation" (as cited in Lu 243). Perhaps it is also fair to say that creating characters whose inner conflicts (psychological anxieties, family dysfunctions) are too readily resolved can elicit groans of "too easy" or "lacking in moral ambiguity" in workshop. The desire to see characters wallow in emotional complexity—without succumbing, Gardner would add, to a paralytic discontent—can supersede whatever the student author may remember as the emotional truth of how her family "got back on track" or how, in

fact, she did not turn to drugs, random sex, or decisive violence as a means of negotiating her emotions *or* the fictional outcomes of the narrative she has not-so-loosely based on her "experience."

To help students consider how fictional emotional truths always-already are, Eve Shelnutt requires a concluding self-assessment in her graduate writing workshop. As an experiment, Shelnutt asks students to "consider writing essays about the sources in memory and experience of their fiction" and did likewise for one of her own recent fictions (165). She reports:

> We talked about the difficulties a writer faces when trying to describe one's methods of transforming personal experience into fiction, especially about the tension between wanting to reveal while also protecting one's privacy. We discovered, too, that our essays began to feel *like* fictions, even though we sought to convey what we apprehended as the truths about our writing processes. (166)

Getting students to recognize, if not necessarily isolate, the point at which experience begins to "feel like fiction" (and vice versa) is another step in recognizing the instability in, and mere convention of, emotional verisimilitude. It also offers a chance to question how mediating past experience through present creative impulse can lead us to challenge the autonomy of "lived experience" and "fixed" emotions.

Shelnutt's self-assessment of experience, ideally developed into short testimonial responses throughout a semester's workshop, can offer students insight into why they have such passionate responses, such embodied reactions, to challenging the emotions of certain works; why they may have such strong attachments to conventions or such a "deep-down" rejection of the sentimental. Students should have some dialectic with, some alternative to, silently tolerating the workshop criticism. A testimonial writing that draws on outlaw emotions such as anger, either in reaction to a peer's writing or in response to such a reaction, helps open a dialogue about a student's evolving aesthetics

and sense of identity as a writer as well as how and where this sense of self seems

"incompatible with the dominant perceptions and values" of a workshop's constituency.

Along these lines, Nicole Cooley has used bell hooks to help composition students make

distinctions in classroom concepts of experience and authority:

> In *Teaching to Transgress* bell hooks (1994:90) speaks not simply of the "authority of experience," but of the "passion of experience." Such passion about reading, writing, and the world is crucial to our teaching of creative writing and literature, and the more we blur the boundaries between the disciplines, the more passionate our learning and teaching will be. (103)

This shift from examining the authority of experience to the "passion of experience" can

prove controversial in class discussion, typically because of the unstable connotations of

passion. However, in seeking to move beyond the "timorous" to find the "gusto" in

writing, as Gardner urges, teachers and students should find some place to confront what

Jagger describes as "conventionally unexpected or inappropriate emotions [which] may

precede our conscious recognition that accepted descriptions and justifications often

conceal as much as reveal the prevailing state of affairs" (161). In the process of

confronting outlaw emotions in a writing workshop, we can begin to seek out

discrepancies between "presentation and the thing presented" as opposed to always

seeking the artistic "harmony and invisibility" that Gardner promotes (124).

In the creative writing pedagogy I'm outlining, it will be essential to read

selections from Arlie Hochschild, who expands on Freud's theory that anxiety serves a

crucial function in signaling danger (*Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (1926)).

Hochschild posits that "actually, every emotion has a 'signal function'" which may not

always signal danger so much as "signal the 'me' I put into seeing 'you' [. . . Emotion]

signals the often unconscious perspective we apply when we go about seeing" (29-30).

In other chapters and later scholarship, Hochschild warns of the gradual numbing and

permanent damage to the "signal function of emotion" that occurs under the sustained

duress of most emotional labors. She also warns of the emotion management that can be

found in most strata of the private sector, and, I would add, in the writing workshop.

While I am concerned with the damage done to the "signal functions" of student

writers' feelings, I am principally interested in how a discussion of Hochschild's core

concepts early in a semester invites a more rewarding workshop dialogue on the motives

of character than merely another aesthetic tussle over the symptoms of such concerns (i.e.

the choice of point-of-view or the consistency in "psychic distance"; the formalist

concerns that should open a discussion and not represent the sum total of it) (Gardner

110-112). The need to "entertain" the particular tastes or dominant conventions of a

particular workshop aesthetic would seem to involve what Hochschild terms a

> separation of display and feeling [which] is hard to keep up over long periods. A
> principle of emotional dissonance, analogous to the principle of cognitive
> dissonance, is at work. . . .We try to reduce this strain by pulling the two closer
> together either by changing what we feel or by changing what we feign. (*The
> Managed Heart* 90)

Here we might draw a connection between sustained emotional dissonance, which I

believe happens frequently in workshops, and Lynn Worsham's discussion of the

"pedagogic violence" that needs to be contrasted by a more integrated "schooling of

emotion." Worsham explains that "dominant pedagogy" forces "individuals and groups"

to internalize "the legitimate point of view" and that it accomplishes this by developing

"philosophies and practices that claim to be non-violent and non-repressive [yet] are

particularly useful in promoting misrecognition, such as pedagogies [. . .] that exert

power through a subtle instrument of coercion, the implied threat of the withdrawal of

affection" (221-222). The process of workshopping, then, especially for those well

within their major or in M.F.A. programs, could be re-examined as a social microcosm of

how power is exerted through "coercion" and the fairly immediate "withdrawal of emotion."

Of course, it is difficult to find any precedents for connecting Hochschild's theories with creative writing pedagogy and, admittedly, this can all sound idealized in the abstract, or reduced to a pedagogy of share and share alike. However, asking a class to read selections from emotion theory both undergirds the abstract with concrete possibilities *and* helps guard against easy consensus as to how students might "evaluate their emotional responses and those of others" (Roberts and Smith 294). For instance, Roberts and Smith's reading of Hochschild can be shown to intersect with Alison Jagger's call for emotional epistemologies that

> would show how our emotional responses to the world change as we conceptualize it differently and how our changing emotional responses then stimulate us to new insights. They would demonstrate the need for theory to be self-reflexive, to focus not only on the outer world but also on ourselves and our relation to the world, to examine critically our social location, our actions, our values, our perceptions, and our emotions. (164)

Jagger's epistemological focus could then be "witnessed" in class as a possible answer to Lardner's concern about the "lack of social perspective on composing" in the "typical creative writing class" (73). The fixed nature of all that seems conservative in the "typical creative writing class" can also be leveraged by Laura Micchiche's concept of "doing emotions" and how we don't just individually feel and then find adjectives for these states of being, yet we also shouldn't surrender individual feelings to a socially determined concept of emotional responses. Rather, we can consider the transactional ways that we "do emotions" as a way of avoiding the imprisonment of Romantic individuality or of conditioned habitus.

Micciche clarifies that so much of what is taught as unidirectional in Aristotle's *pisteis* of pathos is not what a closer reading of *On Rhetoric* reveals. In her assessment, "Aristotle defines the emotions as 'those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments" (Aristotle trans. 1991, 121; Micchiche 11). As opposed to teaching emotions in the tradition of "appealing to" or manipulating the emotions of others as a rhetorical strategy, Micchiche is interested in the ways we can describe the *movement* of emotion. In this line of thinking she acknowledges a debt to Sara Ahmed, who also counters a traditional view of emotions as moving from outside to inside, from the broader realm of the social to interior states of being. Micciche's goal with *Doing Emotions* is to make a much-needed case for the transactional nature of emotions, or viewing emotions as "emerging relationally, in encounters between people, so that emotion takes form *between* bodies rather than residing *in* them" (13). Her relocation of emotions is somewhat akin to Iser, Rosenblatt, and Fish relocating "the literary experience" from residing within the text to emanating from the encounter between text and reader--to the liminal space that becomes charged in the active engagement of emotional text and emotioned response.

On one hand, the Romantic lore of creative writing has *not* demoted emotional insights or emotioned texts as having a "mere" quality, as Micchiche argues has happened in the history of academic discourse and as Brand observes in the construction of arguments in the composition classroom. On the other, pedagogies like Gardner's send a mixed signal of this Romantic tradition in classroom practice: students should privilege their emotional faculties *yet* present emotion indirectly through understatement and implication in their work; students must feel deeply, aspire to move their readers

through aesthetic appeals to the emotions, and strike the right balance between the frigid and the sentimental, *yet* be able to detach themselves from these emotional investments during workshop critiques, traditionally with a code of physical comportment and stoic silence. In contrast to the Gardner tradition, I am arguing for an interdisciplinary theory that Roberts and Smith, Laura Micchiche, and Alison Jagger suggest but do not develop, a theory of creative writing pedagogy that asks students to engage and challenge the emotions that inevitably shade their writing and workshop experiences. Micchiche initiates this general direction by calling on others to envision how emotion might be taught as a category of analysis in academic writing, but her "speculative" and "propositional" focus on the "productive, creative, and meaningful effects of teaching emotion as performative and embodied" stops short of "narrat[ing] already worked-through ways of teaching emotion" (49).

So how might we begin to teach or discuss this idea of emotions as something we perform and socially negotiate? How do we approach Jagger's outlaw emotions or Hochschild's signal function of emotions in the service of characterization or workshop critique? In addition to appropriating Boler's testimonial readings as testimonial writings, I have tried to find pedagogical examples of teaching emotions as embodied yet transactional. I was interested in seeing how other creative disciplines dealt with affective performance as well as emotional comportment and drawing on the "authority" of emotional experience in forming characters, narrative arcs, and aesthetic judgments. My first impulse was to turn toward theater studies and the psycho-physical "emotion memory" work of Konstantin Stanislavski.

Emotion Memory and Embodiment

"In the theatre, knowing is feeling."

--Konstantin Stanislavski, original draft preface to An Actor Prepares (circa 1930)

In *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, Damasio defines our consciousness of a "self" in terms of our gradual "awareness of the continuity of the body's integrity, of the brain's constant monitoring of the body's limits in its interface with the 'not-self' around us," which he argues is bolstered by "memories of recurring values and emotions that have been associated with the body's life in its shifting contexts" (223-44). Jon Emigh, working at the crossroads of psychology and neuroscience, adapts this aspect of Damasio's work to observe that memory remains "grounded in the body's performed experience. Indeed, the systems that control memory, emotion, and decision making within the brain are all linked up to and informed by the somatosensory system of the brain, which monitors touch, temperature, pain, and the internal movements of our musculature" (270). Emigh also believes that memory functions "more like a piece of improvised theater [. . .] than like a computer, or even a film or a scripted or well-rehearsed play" (270). He bases this in part on Edelman's scholarship into repeated performances, or the ways in which we cannot call up exactly the same memory, or the same emotional response to an always shifting or increasingly generalized memory since there are "always differences in the associations brought into play, and encountering or engaging the same stimulus twice will result in different constellations of images and phrases being recalled" (Edelman 101-102). These readings in neuroscience and psychology can help students understand that memories, like the emotions they carry, are not fixed and stable entities. Conscious appeals to "familiar

memories" lead us not to the authority of experience but to an array of Edelman's

"constellations": different affective states, non-recurring associations, and identifications.

The challenge is to illuminate how we form attachments to ideas through a

complex of feelings that result from the performance of past emotions through memory.

In her influential "The Temporality of Emotion: Constructing Past Emotions", Christine

Mattley argues that "the experience of being emotional and reflective is clearly the

category in which felt action occurs; that is, taking our emotions as a clue to

understanding a situation or encounter" (369). Mattley's work suggests that we

"symbolically reconstruct past emotion" in ways that help shape "meaning for the present

emotion," to the extent that we are also gifted at creating a "mythical past emotion to

explain the present one" (370). It is hard to avoid comparisons of Mattley's

"reconstruction" of past emotions and Konstantin Stanislavki's appeal to "emotion

memory" in creative performance," a concept famously translated as the "affective

memory" of Method acting under Lee Strasburg's direction of the Group Theater and,

later, the Actor's Studio. Jean Benedetti's recent and more faithful translations of *An

Actor's Work* (1938, 1953, 2008)[6] and Bella Merlin's scholarship help locate

Stanislavski's "emotion memory" as that repository of affective past-tense memory

action recalled through sensory experience to render nuanced emotional responses to

present-actions or stimuli. It is this process of accessing emotions that Stanislavski, as

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[6]Benedetti's "landmark achievement" in Stanislavski translations recombines the previously separated Book One (1938) and Book Two (1953) of *An Actor Prepares*, which came to be known as *An Actor Prepares* and *Building a Character* for most of the development of American Method acting under Lee Strasburg, Stella Adler, Elia Kazan and The Actor's Studio. In the following section, I discuss some of the problems that arose from dividing what Stanislavski, in his notebooks and later lectures, intended as a whole.

influenced by turn-of-the-century French psychology,[7] privileges as the most "reliable" way of intuiting "imaginative truths" on stage and in textual creations and recreations of character. I am intrigued by how this new understanding of Stanislavski's work with embodied emotions might assist in current dialogues on both emotion and creative writing pedagogy.

Stanislavski was deeply interested in late nineteenth and early twentieth century debates—in emergent theater studies and modern psychology—over defining emotions as "physiological responses to situations" or as "cognitive interpretations of situations." In fact, one problem of separating Books One and Two of *An Actor Prepares,* done partly to appease the "pseudo-Marxist Soviet psychologists" who demanded he promote the behaviorist and psychoanalytic aspects of his teachings, was that separating the "psycho" from the "physical" in Stanislavski's "psycho-physical" approach led to the misconception that the psychological aspects of performing emotions were the entirety of his system. Stanislasvki "feared" such an "ultranaturalism" and, certainly, American appropriations of his techniques remained "unaware of the enormous emphasis Stanislavski placed on the physical" for at least two decades after his original translation appeared in the 1930s (Benedetti, "Translator's Forward", xvi-xvii). Certainly, a lack of nomenclature for nonverbal communication or body language that communication studies would later provide also undermined Stanislavski's "pioneering efforts" to

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[7] Namely, Theodule Ribot's *Les Maladies de la Memoire* and *Les Maladies de la Volonte*, first published in Russian in 1900. Ribot, in attempting something like the power of positive thinking with patients suffering from physical ailments, discovered that "memories of past experiences might not be instantly accessible to the conscious mind" without the addition of specific sensory stimulation that provoked patient's memories in visceral and "unexpected ways" (Merlin 143). Interestingly, Ribot employed the term "affective memory" in both of these volumes; Stanislavski, as revealed by Benedetti's 2008 translations, opted for "emotion memory" for some of the same semantic distinctions I highlighted in my second chapter.

"define the actor's processes" as a union of the emotional, physical, and logical (xvii).[8]

Merlin writes that, even in the muddled English translations that have fed Method acting

in America since the 1930s, "whether an emotion is considered physiological or

cognitive, the most important question for us as actors is arguably, what causes it?"

(156). Merlin believes the common denominator for emotion theory across Stanislavski's

trilogy is, simply, "emotion arises when something or someone stops us from getting

what we want. Or when something or someone makes it easier for us to get what we

want" (156). When crafting a dramatic scene, the writer focuses on obstacles and a set of

Given Circumstances that an actor must assess and draw upon past-emotions to engage

with on a sensory level. The physical details and concrete objects of a fictional scene, or

"real life scene" from our "uninterrupted interactions" between the external world and the

internal world of feelings, as Stanislavski decides in his *Notebooks* dating from 1936-37,

are what can grant us present awareness of felt sense, or emotions as bodily felt.

Embodied emotions may be precognitive, but they aid inextricably in the cognition of the

world around us.

Interestingly, after years of struggling against the constraints of the academic

essay, Stanislavski chose to write his most enduring work in the form of a dramatic

narrative, or what reads as a pedagogical ethnography of his early experiences with

bringing his theories into the classroom. The prose narrative of *An Actor's Work* focuses

on Torstov, a prickly and demanding acting teacher, who offers psycho-physical advice

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[8] Although it goes beyond the needs of my argument, Benedetti's full account of the translating and editing decisions—and political contexts of these decisions—provides many examples of separating the emotions from the realm of the physical, or embodied, and toward the realm of the irrational that must be consciously brought under an actor's control through selective recall. Benedetti also discusses the differences between the American and Russian editions of Book One of *An Actor Prepares* in *Stanislavski: His Life and Art*, 3rd ed. 1999.

to a group of fictional acting students, whose names appear as dramatis personae on the

opening page. Near the beginning of his famous chapter on "Experiencing" (in Year One

of an actor's preparation), Stanislavski's fictional surrogate Tortsov admonishes his

students when they default to an external display of emotion—"declaiming" not

"behaving"—that was originally produced in an improvisational exercise that asked them

to react to the Given Circumstances of a scene (e.g. the Given Circumstances begin with

the familiar activity of stoking a fireplace, then Tortsov adds the unanticipated

circumstance of a "madman" lurking outside their cottage door).   In the repetitive style

that Stanislavski adopted for fear of being misunderstood or quoted out of context,

Tortsov complains:

> The whole external, factual side was repeated with quite astonishing precision,
> clear evidence that you possess a keen memory for the stage picture, grouping
> physical action, movements, moves [. . .]. But is it really so important where
> you were standing and how you were grouped? I, as audience, am much more
> interested in knowing how you were responding internally, what you were
> feeling. It is your own individual experiences, which you bring to the role from
> the real world that give it life. But you didn't give me these feelings. If the
> external action, the *mises-en-scene*, the grouping are not substantiated from
> within, they are mere form, dry, and unnecessary for us onstage. And that is what
> makes the difference between today's performance and the one you did earlier.
> (*An Actor's Work* 196)

In this passage Stanislavski gives his earliest indications of emotion memory and Given

Circumstances, which he soon names, and suggests the primacy of drawing on individual

emotions during the improvisation creative play requires. He also suggests the depth of

feeling layered characterization demands. Although Stanislavski is still problematic for

contemporary emotion theory, both in his privileging of individual experiences giving

rise to feeling (vs. a social construction of emotion) *and* in the near pedagogical violence

of Torstsov's unchallenged demands, Stanislavski does suggest a definition of feeling

that privileges interplay between the logical and the emotional. "You must never forget

that many aspects of our [human] nature are complex and will not submit to being consciously directed," Tortsov instructs his acting students, further advising that "nature," defined transactionally as a complex of our emotion memories, immediate feelings, and assessment of the Given Circumstances of a scene, can aid us in "partially, not fully" mastering the "highly complex, creative apparatus we need for experiencing and physically embodying a role" ("Year One: Experiencing – Emotion Memory", *An Actor's Work*, 202).

Stanislavski eschews any performance that is calculated for formal effect and only trusts that "logic" in performance is emotionally guided and never fully a product of conscious direction. He also equates an actor's ability to work creatively in the service of character or text with the actor's ability to access embodied emotional states and not merely mimic such states. In this way, his teachings can be read as an early ancestor of not only Mattley's work but Alice Brand's "Defining our Emotional Life" (one of her two chapters in *Presence of Mind*). Brand's larger thesis is that "emotional arousal affects our intellectual processes (like priming our memories) even without recruiting intellectual thought [. . .] which may explain why we often react to things emotionally first. And why once we learn something, it is hard to let it go" (158). I should also note that Brand invokes pre-Damasio studies in psychology and neuroscience (Luria 1973; Pugh 1977; Clark 1982; LeDoux 1989) to make a case that our rudimentary brain, "in the oldest part of the brain," houses the "old cortex" that allows access to the memories that provide the "experiential context for current emotions" (158). The upshot of Stanislavski's "Year One" for actors is to emphasize a similar "experiential context" that

not only allows actors a way to draw on past feelings in the service of performing "current emotions" but also a way to recognize the *contingencies* of emotional truths.

Without trying to cast Stanislavski as a proleptic poststructuralist, I want to highlight that his Modern impulses to "make acting new" led him to advocate for a plurality of truths. These impulses also led him to postulate the "Magic If" as a link between accessing emotion memory and avoiding familiar, stylized reactions to Given Circumstances. Bella Merlin defines the Magic If as a sort of imaginative-affective dimension to any performance, one that combines "the outer sphere of action with the inner sphere of psychology," and Stanislavski explains that the "circumstances which are predicated on 'if' are taken from sources near to your own feelings, and they have a powerful influence on [your] inner life," so much so that actors—and writers—can use their emotion memory in the service of imagining other possibilities to Given Circumstances in a scene instead of defaulting to stock reactions (Merlin 126-27; *An Actor's Work* 49). In addition to asking students to interrogate their emotioned reactions to other characters, ideas, or sensory details of a place, and in addition to asking them to recognize how past emotions translate into present actions, the Magic If asks students to respond speculatively to the Given Circumstances of a scripted or improvisational exercise. On the stage, in prose, or in daily life, Tortsov asks his students to resist "limits," or tacit assumptions, through empathetic hypotheticals such as how would I respond in this character's situation? How do I know these are the only options for feeling or acting within these circumstances? Why do I initially resist or become so inclined to accept the dictates of this scene or the context of this character's dilemma?

Stanislavski would argue that we only arrive at "make-believe truths" in our stage

characterizations (or, I would say, our fictions) when we don't engage our own emotion

memory in relation to Given Circumstances. He defines "make-believe truths" as those

that appeal to convention, cliché, and the trappings of stylization and familiarity. In his

discussion of the three truths that can be presented to an audience, Stanislavski

distinguishes between "actual fact," or "life which is as we know it," and "scenic truth,"

which is "actual fact distilled into a creative form" through the interrogation and

appropriation of our emotion memories by the "Magic If." Scenic truths become the

pinnacle of Stanislavski's triad and are, in some ways, the synthesis of the dialectic

struggle between Given Circumstances and the imagination, where imagination is

understood as its own dialectic between the propositions of the "Magic If" and the

affective register that a ready access to emotion memory provides (*Notebooks 1936-37*

78-83; Merlin 114-129). Stanislavski's exercises, as I discuss in the next chapter, can

serve as a heuristic for raising awareness of this struggle between the given and the

propositional, and the crucial role emotion plays in determining the complex of truths a

creative work presents.

Additional questions of how to adapt the contingencies of Stanislavski's truths

into a workable pedagogy, particularly how actors or creative writers may possess

cognitive agency of precognitive feelings, may be answered in part by Dana Anderson's

reconceptualization of Kenneth Burke's definitions of emotional disposition and

motivation. In "Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action: Burke and Bourdieu on

Practice", Anderson attempts to recast the father of modern rhetorical theory, with his

purpose-driven subjects and utopian vision of "mining motives" to lead us "toward a

better life," into a sort of postmodern Burke, one whose legacy is flexible enough to include a more dialectical relationship between agents and structures, between the conscious and aconscious, and, importantly for affect theory, between language-fostered attitudes and the "bodily incipience" of felt actions (271). A full consciousness of bodily incipience, what Pierre Bourdieu terms habitus, seems as unattainable as a full recognition of mystification; however, a realization of the habituated coupled with a *consciously* habituated set of practices seems to produce real effect, within and without, and the ability to affect social structures suggests a potential for agency and action, for being containers and not merely contained, which fits Burke's agenda. I'm also interested in how an actor (as agent) attempts to affect a bodily incipience of actions that may become self-generating (or increasingly aconscious) and what this may imply for human practice as a composite of external social structures ("as a kind of scene-act ratio") *and* "aspects of agents themselves, their specific [. . .] commingled 'motivational properties,' as the origins of practical action" (271). Anderson not only provides a dialogue for investigating such an intersection of internal-external, conscious-aconscious agency but also its dialectic as she juxtaposes the possibilities of Bourdieu's habitus assisting and resisting Burkean attitude.

Similarly, aspects of Stanislavki's theories, such as the techniques he pioneered for stimulating emotion memory, could inform contemporary research into how embodied emotions—and the agency of emotional recall—create shifts within the cognition of selves that are at once socially constructed and imbued with agency. The creative writing processes involved in crafting a character with layered and nuanced emotions can be greatly aided by Stanislavksi-based discussions of, say, the differences

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between acting within a scene and behaving within a scene. Whereas acting suggests a cognitive, deliberate control of performativity, behaving demands a more fully embodied transformation into "being" in a scene and affectively "becoming" a character. On this point, it is helpful to distinguish between Strasberg's Method, which "involves an actor personally" and demands the "deep-rooted [. . .] reliving" of past emotions on stage, and Stanislavki's system, which is "fully aware of the risks and pitfalls" involved in trying to surrender completely to one's own emotional traumas in the service of character (Merlin 158). Much like Hochschild's concern for numbing the "signal function of emotion," Stanislavski warns that the more an emotion is "violated, the more it resists and throws out its invisible buffers before it" and this, he feels, is what leads actors (and writers) to over-rely on "old stencils and stagy craftsmanship" (*My Life in Art* 124). In *Songs My Mother Taught Me*, Marlon Brando, perhaps the most famous American practitioner of Stanislavski's techniques, claims to prefer Stella Adler's interpretation of Stanislavski over Strasberg's. Like Strasberg, Adler demanded that her students never "try to act out an emotion" that they "didn't personally experience during a performance," but she also helped Brando expand on Stanislavski by having him watch how people use the "interplay of 155 muscles in the face" in the act of "always concealing emotions" (81-85). Made aware of the continual strains of facial concealment, Brando trains himself to "read body posture, the increase in the blink rate of [. . .] eyes, [. . .] aimless yawning or a failure to complete a yawn—anything that denotes emotions [people] don't want to display" (84).

Brando's need to expand on Stanislavski's views of emotions in terms of how to act the on-going strain of emotional comportment, or visceral emotional "concealment,"

also hints at the limits of over-relying on Stanislavski for what can be rich and provocative classroom discussions of performance and the embodiment of emotions. I am also reminded of interviews where Kate Winslet has dismissed a more traditional Stanislavski approach in favor of immediate, bodily identification with a character's complex of emotions in a scene. Crying, for instance, is not achieved via the Method actor's reliance on "emotion memory," with its implication of detaching from the character's lived experience in search of a personal "equivalent," or channeling a prior emotion to create the affect of one in a scene. Instead, Winslet claims she feels the sorrow her character's feel, inhabits the horror, enmity, desire, or, as Stanislavski might offer, whatever the Given Circumstances of a scene produce. While fielding questions about filming *Titanic*, Winslet expressed that flailing around in a mile wide, open-air tank of water (shooting day-for-night scenes with a 9/10 scale sinking monolith and non-CGI extras drowning alongside her) certainly narrowed the gap between feigned emotions and a real complex of terror, sorrow, empathy, fatigue, etc.—to the extent that her body was "behaving" in the scene independent of conscious, camera-aware manipulations.

Perhaps more pertinent to the question of gaining a consciousness of embodiment and some control over habituated action in acting, fellow *Titanic* alum Leonardo DiCaprio has claimed that he consciously wills himself into an increasingly aconscious disposition for a role. For example, while preparing for and filming *The Aviator* (2004), DiCaprio consciously affected the tics and physical manifestations of Howard Hughes's obsessive-compulsive behaviors to the extent that he felt these bodily tics and motions began to generate themselves (Murray 3). Director Martin Scorsese and Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz, a leading researcher on non-medicinal approaches to OCD at UCLA, attest that

DiCaprio went beyond the usual Method practice of not breaking out of character

between takes—a la Brando and De Niro—and actually took on obsessive behaviors in

his "real" life (Gray, par. 4). This conscious effort to predispose, or *re*-predispose,

habituated actions (in this case obsessively recurrent actions and motions) provides a

subjective example for Anderson's call for a theory that "more fully captur[es] the jointly

physiological [. . .] and symbolic [. . .] nature of practice" and a potential classroom

example for suggesting that habituated actions can both predispose cognition and be

redirected by a cognitive awareness of feeling. (271).

Ultimately, Stanislavski's Tortsov offers his students portable concepts of feeling

and memory a half century before affect theorists, feminist epistemologists, and

neuroscientists called attention to the primacy of embodied emotions in cognition and

performance. Unfortunately, Tortsov's pedagogy also prefigures much of Gardner's

workshop approach a half century later: Stanislavski's surrogate is demanding,

condescending, quick to correct a student's emotional register or the "truth" of a student's

presentation of "personally experienced feelings" to the class. He is also prescriptive in a

way that Stanislavski seems to have labored to push past (he was still drafting what

became Book Two on his deathbed and was worried that his techniques were being

misread as a "system").[9] Though we shouldn't blame Stanislavski for the ways in which

his theories have been "communized and capitalized to taste," his inability to fully

articulate the social-transactional nature of emotions—in acting and in life—made it

easier for Method instructors to ignore Stanislavski's "essentially ensemble context" for

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[9] Stanislavski preferred his theories be referenced as "techniques," since he never felt his
advice should be gathered into one cohesive system. "Unlike Freud," Declan Donnellan
observes, Stanislavski "never wanted to invent a science" (xii).

exploring emotions and "force him to testify for the individual star who prepares the great

role well away from the prying eyes of colleagues" (Donnellan xii). This shift from an

"ensemble" dynamic in the present to an "individual" drawing from her own past in

solitude seems analogous to the problems of the creative writing workshop dynamic and

the Romantic lore of the lone writer toiling in isolation.

Though it may be an oversimplification to suggest that Stanislavski's legacy

focuses on the past-individual whereas performance studies focuses on the present-social,

I want to turn now to what performance studies pedagogies can offer--either as a

postmodern contrast to the Modernist limits of Stanislavski's work with emotion, or as

an extension of these theories that creative writing students can read in dialogue with

selections from *An Actor's Work*.

Performance Studies, Emotions, and Writing Workshop Testimonials

Brando's concern about Stanislavski's lack of explicit direction on emotional

comportment has been answered in aspects of current performance studies scholarship.

Over the last three decades, an attention to embodied emotions and observing / reading

bodies as autoperformance texts has led to ethnographic reporting like Emigh's, who

observes that we are:

> drawn to observing human bodies, or (in the case of films, animations, and puppet
> shows) simulacra and abstractions of human bodies, because of the ceaseless and
> essential monitoring of our own physical selves as they move and push up against
> the world outside [. . .]. Our memories of bodily experience—our own life
> experience—may be essential in allowing us to identify with the performed
> activities of another, providing the basis for empathy as well as self-
> identification" (270-71).

Having established that emotion theory would aid creative writing pedagogy for many of

the reasons Jagger, Boler, and Micciche have outlined in composition studies *and* that

Stanislavski's concept of emotion memory offers one pathway into understanding how past feelings can be summoned in the service of present characterization, I want to propose that performance studies offers an even more expansive basis for discussing emotions as both embodied and transactional. Similar to emotion studies in rhetoric, performance studies are inclusive, "enthusiastically borrow from other disciplines," and often phrase a common concern in the form of a challenge, which is "to become as aware as possible of one's own positions in relation to the positions of others—and then take steps to maintain or change positions" (Schechner, Foreward, xi). Beyond its origins in and departures from traditional theater studies, the "discipline" of performance studies, in Schechner's view, is really the intersection of theories from the "social sciences, feminist studies, gender studies, history, psychoanalysis, queer theory, semiotics, ethology, cybernetics, area studies, media and popular culture theory, and cultural studies" (x). In the forward to Schechner's *Between Theater and Anthropology* (1985), Victor Turner discusses the ways in which Erving Goffman's work also led to this crossroad of anthropological research, ethnographic writing, and theater studies by turning attention to the ways in which intelligence was situated within the body and that any study of human interaction shouldn't be limited to traditional sites of performance (namely the proscenium stage). Rather, as Joni Jones later clarifies, "performance is not merely a metaphor for everyday life [. . .]; everyday life is a series of performances" (339-340). Jon McKenzie (2001) also adds that performance studies are also always liminal—at minimum between theater and ritual, and more broadly as a margin between disciplines that creates space to move "from transgression to resistance" (43).

In spite of my transition from Stanislavski, I am not as interested in appropriating

the "theater studies" side of performance studies for creative writing pedagogy so much

as what developed from an attention to all forms of communication as sites of

performance, which stems less from Schechner's focus on theatrical performance and

more from the Department of Interpretation at Northwestern from roughly the early

1980s to the present.[10] I should note that Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's discussions of

the "Broad Spectrum Approach" of Schechner and NYU vs. the "Aesthetic

Communication Approach" developed at Northwestern has been very helpful in

delineating which performance studies connected back to my own interests in emotion

theory and creative writing pedagogy. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett defines performance as a

"more welcoming and productive concept for a truly intercultural field of study than

concepts that are more tightly bound up with culturally specific divisions of the arts by

medium and genre, as is the case with theater" (47). So, while Performance Studies is, by

its nature, inclusive and fluid, it seems necessary to narrow which approaches within

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[10] Bowman and Bowman offer firsthand testimony to how the Department of
Interpretation shifted pedagogical attention to the performative through a wildly
inclusive, interdisciplinary approach: "Others who have told pieces of this story, what
Northwestern's interpretation department was like "back in the day" (e.g., Edwards,
1999; Hamera, 1998; Henderson, 1998)—have let the cat out of the bag already: how we
learned about double-voiced discourse and the carnivalesque pleasures of "awryness" not
so much from Bakhtin—although he helped us articulate it—but from watching and
listening to the professoriate in that department work. The Department of Interpretation
did not teach us to do what we do now. We learned to do other things there that we no
longer do very often. Yet, the experience of moving through that difficult, eccentric,
"interdisciplinary" program—the manner in which we did things there—has played an
enduring role in whatever it is that we have become. As Hamera (1998) suggested, the
performance studies of today is heir to the conversations and improvisations we learned
in those classrooms, which on the surface were about something else. To forget that is a
form of amnesia" (Hamera, "Debts: In Memory of Lilla Heston" qtd. in Bowman and
Bowman 274). Here, Bowman, Bowman and Hamera do not pay tribute to a series of
texts or the late eighties emergence of a *canon* of performance studies, so much as a
pedagogical approach that interrupted all others and opened pathways to something new.

performance studies I see as most compatible with emotion theories and, specifically,

with how students might come to recognize the ways in which emotion schooling is

learned and performed in the creative writing classroom. Initially, I was interested in

those who helped establish that writing itself is a performance and not merely something

to be performed. Although David Morley seems to be on the cusp of this definition in

"Performing Writing" (2010), he vacillates between an opening claim that "all writing is

performance" and then merely listing performance opportunities (reading poetry aloud in

found spaces; tagging and graffiti, arranging readings for local cable access). Morley's

examples indicate that performative writing still connotes performed writing in a public

setting and not the act of writing *as* its own performance or the performance of

objectivity or emotional comportment within the writing workshop (Morely, "Performing

Writing" 229-232).[11] Whereas creative writing texts still focus on how much writers can

gain from opportunities to read their work aloud, the communications end of performance

studies—particularly the scholarship of Nathan Stucky, Judith Hamera, and Phillip

Zarelli—can help creative writing students recognize that the mental and physical process

of writing is already a series of performances informed by a social-transactional complex

of emotions.

In their introduction to *Teaching Performance Studies* (2002), a collection of

essays that explores the "dynamics of performance as a subject, as a culture and social

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[11] I will return to Morley's call for "performing writing" in my fourth chapter, especially
since his concept of the performative is nearer my own when he briefly describes
"Distance Learning." Here, in relation to online learning, Morely observes that students
are allowed to "set their own pace, and to log in when convenient. In these situations, the
writing process *itself* is performative, an open space into which you step before an
audience of your fellow students, but one in which you find them stepping up beside you"
(Morely, "Performing Writing" 231).

artifact, and as a way of knowing," Stucky and Cynthia Wimmer help lead a pedagogical

charge by observing that "teachers have increasingly come to understand the special

characteristics of classrooms as environments where performance holds particular power"

(2-3). In related scholarship Stucky also contends that "the elemental function of the

classroom involves behavioral change, whether from an era of regulated bodies or from a

more recent one informed by critical pedagogy in which 'the body is conceived as the

interface of the individual and society'" ("Fieldwork in the Performance Studies

Classroom" 261). In this later essay, Stucky provides a "Performance Studies Toolbox,"

or a list of definitions he has compiled for the characteristics of theoretical inquiry into,

and the "preliminary practices" of, performance studies. Among the many tools he

describes, Stucky provides three that could aid an emotion-based pedagogy of creative

writing:

- *Performance Epistemology*: Performance studies is interested in what we know

  through performance and how we come to know it.

- *Performance as a Way of Knowing*: Performance itself is both the subject of

  knowledge and a core method of discovery.

- *Written Communication*: Writing and reading are both utilized as modes of

  performance. (Stucky 273)

Stucky and Wimmer (2002) have also argued that the "most crucial skill set" students

should discover, in classrooms grounded in performance studies pedagogy, is "a way of

embodied thinking that encourages self-reflection and critical distance as well as

empathy, concern with cultural contexts, values, and issues, and confidence in their own

opinions" (*The Power of Transformation* 9-10). To help students accomplish the "deep

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embodiment" of emotion that leads to understanding the body as a site of knowledge and way of understanding, Stucky asks students to "totally immerse" themselves in written transcriptions of "everyday live performance" (ELP) in his classrooms. Tasks for this immersion include conversation analysis, which involves recording and then transcribing the pauses, tics, breaths of everyday conversation, of "ordinary individuals engaged in everyday activities" ("Deep Embodiment" 131-135). Stucky uses these written transcripts of casual conversations to point students toward 1) the ways we omit the physical in performing or recreating a conversation, and 2) how we have to recover the embodied way that emotions present themselves since this "felt knowledge" helps us approach the "ineffable" in understanding how we perform ourselves in everyday social contexts, and, I would add, in using this understanding in the service of crafting fictional characters (137-38).

Laura Micchiche invokes Stucky's work on deep embodiment in her argument for highlighting emotion's performativity in the composition classroom. Specifically, she calls for an attention to pedagogies that will help students understand emotion's ability to "reiterate norms (following Judith Butler) and to subvert them" (50). In some ways Stucky's performance pedagogies are similar to mixing up a work-out routine after hitting a plateau: just as the body can be shocked into a new way to burn calories, it can be shocked into an awareness of how we routinely embody emotions, identities, and social customs in our performances of daily life. I should acknowledge a debt to Micchiche for initiating this dialogue on the performativity of emotion in rhetoric and composition, where such dialogue could "signal both emotion's conservative capacity to produce and reiterate feelings that fix the status quo" and "the cultural narratives of

emotion and how they 'overtake' the forms that one's feelings, and, in turn, one's body take" (51). Relatedly, I believe that aspects of performance studies pedagogies can be used to explore the epistemic values of re-defining, accessing, or performing emotions in the writing of fiction.

To date, though, there are very few examples of the integration of creative writing and performance studies or at least very few published histories of such a pedagogy. Among these few, Kristin Valentine's "Unlocking the Doors for Incarcerated Women Through Performance and Creative Writing" provides an insightful ethnographic account of how Valentine and students in her undergraduate Performance in Social Contexts class, as well as graduate students from nearby Arizona State, established an inmate creative writing and performance class at Arizona's largest state prison for women about forty-five minutes west of Phoenix. They adapted performance and writing prompts from Julia Cameron's *The Artist's Way* (1992) that involved having inmates write and perform responses to prompts about Imaginary Lives ("If you had five other lives to lead, what would you do in each of them?"), Color Schemes (write yourself in relation to a color), and writing a letter to their inner artist. Valentine's students progressed from these basic brainstorming prompts to more improvised performances such as chanting "sudden mantras" (i.e. "I am superwoman. I am faster than a speeding train! I can do anything!"), performing nonverbal actions to suggest environmental scenarios (i.e. standing in the snow, sitting in a small boat that begins to rock, the moment that mail arrives; feet beginning to hurt). Across a semester, with students free to engage or leave without reprisal from armed security, Valentine's embodiment exercises

> magnified the complex relationship between human thought and social action,
> between intention and reaction, between the ways in which individual desire is

made manifest in social systems with varying levels of impact and effect. Each simple act directed the participants to see and understand that their agency is an act of being, an act of knowing, and an act of doing—each of which undergirds all of our responsibilities as social creatures living in the company of others. Through performance-based improvisational work and [the inmates'] writing we believe that we helped to empower these women. (314-315)

Interestingly, Valentine describes, but does not challenge, a quid pro quo of the experience for inmates and the prison:

Creative play can be liberating for the inmates while, ironically, also serving the prison system by allowing 'an emotional outlet and a societally accepted manner of expressing whatever is on the inside' as Steiner explained in her maximum security prison theater project (1974, pp. 22-23). In a poem an inmate can write, "fuck the guards," but if these same words were uttered in a guard's hearing, she'd get a fast trip to the isolation unit. In class, she can be free to laugh and to be "outta here" in her mind." (315)

In making this distinction, Valentine at least implies (without directly referencing) an application of Alison Jagger's work: any pedagogy of creative writing should recognize where and how a writing workshop can serve as a site of outlaw emotions, not as a site of emotional comportment or cultivating emotional accuracy in the Gardner tradition. Importantly, Valentine's ethnography provides a touchstone for discussing the performance of emotions in the service of both creative writing pedagogy and social justice.

Relatedly, Bowman and Bowman's "Performing the MyStory" contends that the "textshop for autoperformance" (much like the writer's workshop) can help us explore the "possibility that the creative imagination is as educable as critical thinking and that the former facility may be as important as the latter in helping students locate themselves in the story of their community, family, region, or nation" and, as previously noted, Stucky's research in performance studies pedagogy examines ways in which "deep embodiment" of a character can result in recognition of habituated action of the Other

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(Bowman and Bowman 173; Stucky, "Deep Embodiment" 138-140). Another self-reflective challenge would involve testimonial writings (informed by selected readings in Boler's *Feeling Power*) that ask students to identify bodily reactions to a workshop piece or to passages in their own writing. Testimonial writings or MyStory reflections can also ask students to articulate their performance as "bodies in the classroom" within the creative writing workshop. In doing so, students can respond to the "conventional" or "outlaw" emotions in their own or other students' writing; they can also identify or describe any opportunities for what Shady Cosgrove celebrates as "improvisational performance," which he believes is key to any successful creative writing workshop. Cosgrove, whose scholarship is in creative writing pedagogy and not performance studies, utilizes "Sawyer's tenets of improvisational performance" to argue that pedagogy should not be predicated on knowing possible outcomes and that teaching practice is always best "informed by the immediate environment and context of the classroom" (473). Although we may cynically read Cosgrove's call for improvisation and lack of predetermined outcomes as another dodge of instructional design and assessment in creative writing, his thesis foregrounds the need to see improvisation as social, dynamic, and performed in any classroom. I would also suggest that testimonial writings could shift the focus from the improvisational performances of writing *teachers* to the improvisations of *students* in relation to the demands of emotional comportment and presentation of self in the workshop environment.

As an extension of the need for testimonial writings or MyStory-inspired student reflections, Judith Hamera asks students to interrogate the absence of performance and bodily affect in the first drafts of her dance students' autobiographies, a revision process

rife with "wry, almost bitterly wistful recollection and recuperation" that she finds to be "extremely emotional" ("Performance Studies, Pedagogy, and Bodies" 123). The value in this integration of reflective writing and performance is the emotion work needed to counter the "pedagogical mystification of affect" that Hamera first recognized after reading Worsham's "Going Postal." Hamera quotes and utilizes in class Worsham's contention that "those in subordinate positions can and must be taught, especially in school and in workplace, that emotional responses such as anger, rage, or bitterness are always inappropriate and unjustified personal responses—forms of emotional stupidity if not psychopathology," a contention that also provides reason to foreground emotional subordination in writing classrooms (123). Hamera also uses performance biographies as a process of reflection and interrogating the emotional, a process that hinges on the instructor making revision suggestions that often highlight the absence of descriptions of embodied emotions in early drafts.

By weighing in on emotional "absences" in her student's performance biographies, Hamera performs a more process-oriented pedagogy than what Bowman and Bowman suggest with their MyStory exercise. Hamera is also asking her students to reclaim their emotioned reactions to past "pedagogic violence" by making them recognize where absences in their narratives mark a resistance to remember such emotions in their training. Unlike, Gardner, who insists that teachers make students recognize their sentimentality in relation to their subject matter, Hamera asks teachers to reflect on where and how they have willfully eliminated the emotional and physical dimensions of workshop instruction. She laments that "rather than anchoring our responses to students' work in our own physical disciplines, we turn instead to the

disembodied, ubiquitous evaluation form or to a discussion that remains steadfastly above the neck" (124). Hamera's approaches could translate to the creative writing classroom in ways that would bridge the common exercise of having students write about their characters' emotions and the uncommon practice of having students testify to their own complicated, embodied reactions to the workshop process. Hamera's performance pedagogies compliment my earlier suggestions for Boler-influenced testimonial writing in that Hamera is asking students *and* teachers to concentrate on the embodied ways we learn to interact with the creative writing classroom or perpetuate degrees of emotional comportment within this space.

Another common point in the scholarship of performance studies, one that can be applied to creative writing pedagogy, is that students should learn to read the texts of constructed identities and culturally inscribed bodies in order to ask more complicated questions about emotions (e.g. How do we perceive emotions as individual? How may we understand emotions as "collective" or socially constructed? How do we develop empathic responses to the Other as in Paula Niedenthal's research?). I would argue that rhetorics of emotion and performance studies share a common bond in the attainment of knowledge through *askesis*, or an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought and feeling. Perhaps the best examples of how *askesis* might be integrated into the often theory-resistant tradition of the creative writing classroom are provided by Phillip Zarrilli and his call for metatheoretical research into "embodied practices" of understanding and "crafting" emotions in performance. In "Action, Structure, Task, and Emotion" Zarrilli synthesizes a range of performance studies perspectives regarding the "commonplace tendency" among young actors and contemporary Western actor training to "assume an

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emotion is a spontaneous eruption of feeling" and to "confuse" their own

"personal/emotional life experiences" with "those of the characters they are asked to

play" (145). In addition to asking his students to question where a character's emotional

responses become confused with those of the actor's, he also asks students to question

what becomes "equivalent to experiencing" in acting. Once we agree that emotion is

both bodily situated yet socially constructed, discussions of how we experience an

emotion become very complicated. We still feel at a bodily level, but, given the self-

aware nature of performance, we can start second-guessing the extent to which we are

"feeling in the moment" vs. "feeling in a manner that is socially prescribed and

determined." In chapter four, I explore related connections between Zarrilli's work in

performance studies and the performative techniques Stanislavski pioneered for

stimulating emotion memory, especially since both suggest that emotional recall creates a

cognition of self that is socially constructed yet imbued with agency. Naturally, I cannot

pretend to resolve the split between the essentialism of neuroscientific research into

emotions and the inherently anti-biological traditions of, say, Judith Butler and emotional

performativity. That said, I am very interested in how readings in Stanislavski *and*

performance studies foreground the tension between the interiority of feelings and the

social construction of emotion as well as how we may learn to leverage both--just as we

once learned how both were supposedly "fixed"--through discussions of emotional

performance in the creative writing classroom.

In this chapter I've attempted to explore theoretically the intersections of emotion

theory, composition studies, creative writing pedagogy, and performance techniques, in

part to examine what each adds to the other discipline's dialogue and in part to suggest a hybrid pedagogy that answers what is problematic about discussions of emotion in Gardner's largely unchallenged workshop model. In my next chapter I offer additional substantiation and "testimonial reading' by providing an ethnography of how I applied aspects of these theories (how I moved from the broadly theoretical to the narrowly specific task of course construction and pedagogical practice) in my own creative writing classroom. I usually dislike theory-driven texts that take abrupt pedagogical turns in their conclusions; I become suspicious when a theorist wants to demonstrate the immediate applicability of what may be better served by further argumentation. However, a combination of reading Berlin's *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College English Studies* (1996, 2003), in which Berlin spends his last two chapters presenting "sample approaches" to the integration of rhetoric and postmodern literary theory in writing classrooms,[12] and reading through numerous ethnographies in composition studies and performance studies, not to mention the first person narration of techniques in Stanislavski's works, has made me think my argument would be well-served by a discussion of how I put these theories into practice (Berlin 159-188). I also realize that the range of concerns expressed in this or any discussion of emotion theory and performance studies may seem daunting to creative writing faculty who worry that theory will crowd out craft in class discussion. A more detailed discussion of my instructional design and an ethnography of which aspects of theory I have incorporated into my own classes, including student responses to these pedagogical innovations, will help alleviate such worries and make a case for the integration of emotion theory in the creative writing

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[12] In his most comprehensive and final work, Berlin even dedicates five pages to Carolyn Forche's approach to theory in the creative writing classroom.

classroom. Specifically, I report on how reading emotion theory alongside selections from Stanislavski and selected readings in performance studies can establish a theoretical basis for writing exercises as well as a rhetoric for reflecting on the emotional labors of workshop. I also explore ways in which theory readings would supplement, not supplant, the anticipated reading list of creative works.

I'll conclude by clarifying that I'm not just trying to distill the complicated questions of emotion and affect studies, performance studies, and Stanislavki's techniques into a collection of "new exercises for short story writers." Though there seem to be direct applications of aspects of these theories in creative writing pedagogy, I am equally interested in creative writing as a means of better understanding the complexities of precognitive affects (bodily incipience, felt senses, emotion memory), socially constructed and regulated emotions, and their determining influence on belief structures that may otherwise seem rigid and inadaptable. Jagger, Hochschild, Worsham, Boler, Micciche and others have already addressed the possibility of leveraging fixed understandings of the world in social-epistemic rhetorics and in calls to engage theories of the postmodern crisis with scholarship on the body, feeling, and movement. I see the potential for similar points of leverage and active awareness within the emergent field of creative writing pedagogy. At a broader level, one I return to in my fifth and concluding chapter, I am interested in how an attention to the primacy and performance of emotions, transcends the local or immediate aims of the creative writing classroom, since, as Stenberg recently argued, "emotion serves as a key site of investigation for those of us interested in connections between pedagogy and social change" (349). Emigh's scholarship also reminds us that

> performances serve to project the mind's sketching and paradigm-making abilities out beyond the confines of the individual being, where other minds can assess the persuasiveness and power of our fleeting, embodied visions—affirming and denying, remembering and forgetting, assimilating them into old categories, forging new ones. (Stenberg 349; Emigh 274)

In sorting through exigencies for this direction in creative writing pedagogy, I realize that I am as engaged in how emotions inform our writing processes as I am in how our writing processes may inform our awareness of emotions—of feeling to write as well as writing to feel.

CHAPTER FOUR: OUTLAW EMOTIONS AND THE PERFORMANCE
OF COMPORTMENT: REFLECTIONS ON PUTTING EMOTION
THEORIES INTO PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE

> "We will need to become ethnographers of experience: I do not mean armchair readers of the 'social text,' but scholar/teachers who find out how people actually feel. And far from bringing English studies to a dismal close, the search for basic grammars of emotional life may give us the future that we never had, a future beyond the university."
>
> –Kurt Spellmeyer, *After Theory: From Textuality to Attunement with the World*.

In a moment of YouTube pedagogy, I showed my creative writing students a clip of Marlon Brando and Dick Cavett arguing about the "constant performance" of emotional comportment as an "act of survival." The interview takes place on June 12, 1973 and even though Brando has just collaborated with Bernardo Bertolucci on *Last Tango in Paris* and has just received (and declined) an Oscar for *The Godfather,* he never seems to be enjoying his mid-career revival. Instead, Brando demonstrates great reluctance to discuss anything, much less Method acting, which makes the interview an amazing study in body language, painful silences, studio audience gasps, and truly outlaw emotions as Brando eventually rages against Hollywood's portrayal (and the United States' "systematic and wholesale slaughter") of Native Americans. Prior to the exchange transcribed below, an anxious, off-kilter Cavett has allowed Brando to decline his questions. After Brando also refuses flattery, Cavett goads him into at least clarifying why he believes "everyone is skilled at acting."

> Brando: Acting is a survival mechanism and it's a social . . . lubricant. We act to actually save our lives every day. People lie constantly, every day, by not saying something that they think or saying something that they don't think or showing something that they don't feel or trying to give the appearance of something they don't feel. I just said that, didn't I?

Cavett: Yeah, but that's not acting.

Brando: That is acting.

Cavett: No it isn't.

Brado: Yes it is.

Cavett: You know what I mean. What you do on the screen—

Brando: When you're frightened or nervous in this chair, when you are distressed or uncomfortable, or you're very angry…

Cavett: Yeah?

Brando: And you know that is not what is necessary to, to, well what cannot be shown here (he gestures to the studio audience, stares into both cameras). You control your face. You're a highly controlled person, and uh…

Cavett: Really? (The audience laughs and applauds) Wow.

Brando: And you have to do that.

Cavett: I see. But you know what I mean is, and we got into this on the phone, *you* say that's acting. That's not. I'm motivated at that moment to do that, and I can do it. Suppose there is a guy here that I think is a schmuck--that is a bore (audience gasps, then laughs). You invite frankness. And uh, I can act like he is interesting for a time. I am motivated by that. But if you wake me up at eight the following morning and say do that same performance before a camera, and then do it again and again, I can't. Some people can. Some people do that wonderfully. And you seem to do it better than almost anybody. (Audience applauds.)

Brando: Thank you.

Cavett: I, I, I won't hear of the fact that what I do is--that what you do is no more than what I do.

Brando: Well, that isn't true. If you were working for an ad agency, some product, and you hate the guy, the idea man, the boss, and you know every time he comes in with some . . . impossible notion, something that really makes you gag when you drive home on the freeway. You know damn well that you're not going to get a raise or you're not going to get shifted out of the position you're in if you don't say, "Leonard, I think that's terrific. It's just beautiful." (Audience laughs.) And you even lean forward, put your elbows on [your knees] to show enthusiasm (mimics active engagement by hunkering forward in his chair. He continues to adjust his body language into the opposite of his previously

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disconnected posture). And you get a face for it and you do it day after day after day in order to survive in your job.

Cavett: What if you had to do the line, "Leonard, I think that is terrific" six times and get something deeper and better from it time after time? That takes an actor.

Brando: What did you say?

Cavett: I, I said those [examples of workplace performance] are one time things where you have an immediate motivation.

Brando: But they are not one time things, because it's a daily procedure.

Cavett: Yeah, but the dialogue changes all the time, but you are able to take—

Brando: The dialogue changes but the motivation doesn't.

Cavett: Are you saying that I could play any role that you can play as well as you can? (Brando pauses; the audience giggles.)

Brando: Well, that might not be true, but I don't think that, that I could play some roles as well as you can play them. I don't think that I could play the role that you are playing now.

Cavett: But this is me. I'm letting it all hang out.

Brando: No.

Cavett: (Laughing) This ain't me?

Brando: I mean that I think that you are thinking of sixty things at once. How is it going? Is it getting dull? Is he upset and distressed and inarticulate? Is he uh, uh, is he bored? Is he offended? Uh, here's a good time for a joke. We haven't got much time. You're thinking of nine million things and reacting to what I say and *how is that going to be*? *Is that going to be offensive? No that's good*, etc. So you're doing this, this editing at an insane rate, and I mean you have to do that and that's your job. You have this demeanor of levity and lightness and amusement and zest and, uh, it's easy to ascertain that finally that isn't what goes on in your mind or your feelings at all.

Cavett: I just feel like all my clothes have been taken off.

As they watched, my students alternated between silence, nervous laughter, and shifting in their seats—much like Cavett's original audience. To me, this five minute debate evokes Kundera's "Words Misunderstood" and I return to it in the context of

teaching performance studies in ENGL 366, the "intermediate" fiction workshop that is the real focus of this chapter. First, though, I should begin with my earliest decisions for this qualitative study.

Having explored the individual exigencies and current dialogue on emotion theory, creative writing pedagogy, rhetoric and composition, and performance studies in chapter two, and having argued for the profitable combination of these theories in chapter three, I spend chapter four discussing the trial application and assessment of these theories in one of my own creative writing classes. This chapter also samples numerous student writings to provide primary evidence from my attempts to put a theoretical argument into pedagogical practice. Specifically, chapter four provides descriptive examples of how reading selected emotion theory (essays by Damasio, Micchiche, Niedenthal, Boler, and Jagger, with referenced excerpts from Worsham and Hochschild) alongside selections from Stanislavski (Chapter Nine, "Emotion Memory" from *An Actor's Work* and selections from his *Notebooks 1936-1937* as translated into the recent critical edition of *An Actor's Work on a Role*) and two key readings in performance studies (Judith Hamera's "Performance Studies, Pedagogy, and Bodies in/as the Classroom" and Phillip Zarrilli's "Action, Structure, Task, Emotion") can offer creative writing students a language and space for exploring both the emotion work of writing fiction and the emotion management of workshopping fiction. I also hope to demonstrate how these brief theory readings can supplement, not supplant, the usual reading list of creative works. Even brief selections can provide a foundation for in-class writings that ask students to challenge the "generalized emotions" that Stanislavski criticizes in his

chapter on "Given Circumstances" or ask why so-called outlaw emotions are commonly avoided or undercut by a need for traditional closure in student fiction.

Finally, I frame the workshop experience--creative writing's dominant pedagogical practice and greatest source of emotional demands--with pre- and post-workshop reflections on emotional labor and the undergraduate tendency to access "individual" emotions by recapitulating familiar socialized emotions. As a supplement to workshop, I had students (in multiple semesters) write about their attempts to craft nuanced emotions and their attempts to understand, and not completely detach from, the workshop criticism their attempts received. With students' permission, I have compiled highlights from in-class writings and discussion, out-of-class posts on a Blackboard forum, and concluding reflections to 1) question Gardner's advice about narrative frigidity, 2) consider how emotions are viewed as both individually occurring and socially constructed, 3) take steps toward considering emotion as a category of analysis and adjunct to inquiry, attachment, and orientation, and 4) understand how a student's emotional management of a character's decisions is also collectively managed by the creative writing classroom. I also show how discussions of Stanislavski's emotion memory and reflective writings inspired by Hamera and Zarrilli's work can aid in crafting a more "embodied" fiction and a greater awareness of the performance of writing. My final reflections, based on a concluding "structural analysis and revision" project, address the ways that emotions have been revised, embodied, and "performed" in student narratives and prefigure the conclusions I categorize in chapter five.

Methodology

Many sources influenced the qualitative, observational approach of this study in

applied pedagogy. Early in the process, as I realized I wanted to test out the combination

of theories I was promoting, David Russell's argument for qualitative studies in Writing-

Across-the-Curriculum made sense for the aims of my argument. As Russell explains:

> researchers have turned to qualitative studies to tease out of the immensely varied
> and complex human relationships that writing facilitates, those factors that
> students and teachers and program builders might attend to when deciding where
> and how to use writing. [. . .] [Q]ualitative studies point [. . .] beyond the search
> for universal or autonomous approaches toward much more messy—and
> human—factors. (261)

The guiding idea for capturing a test run of my approach to teaching creative writing was

to develop a syllabus that would provide excerpts of key works, which I've discussed in

chapter three and re-introduce in a classroom context in the narrative that follows. I have

also taken ample notes on class discussions and have collected in-class writings as well as

reflective pieces from ENGL 366's Blackboard discussion forum. What follows is my

attempt to highlight important conversations from this trial. I tried to sort and gather with

as few preconceived notions as possible in order to let trends in discussion, workshop,

and written feedback "tease out" the influence of emotion theory, Stanislavski, and

performance studies on the creative writing classroom.

En route to determining a prose style for presenting research summaries in this

chapter, I read through many oral histories, case studies, and strategies of qualitative

inquiry. Readings in performance studies, particularly Norman Denzin's "Performance

and Ethnography" (*The Sage Handbook of Performance Studies* 325-333), led me to

Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (2007), Denzin's lengthier collaboration with Yvonne

Lincoln. In this monograph, Denzin and Lincoln assert that qualitative research, or

"thick," reflective descriptions of actual classroom performance, should entail not only the moments in which individual students seem enlightened but a careful attention to when and how individual enlightenment may shed light on social reform or performances that can work in service of progressive ideals. In this aspect, Denzin and Lincoln's approach reminded me of Wendy Bishop's urging, in "Ethnographic Writing Research: Writing it Down, Writing It Up, and Reading It", for naturalistic descriptions of creative writing classroom practice that transcend what may "merely enhance" the individual classroom and may point, instead, to social orientations creative writing may provide students. I also benefitted from reading Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater's "Turning in Upon Ourselves: Positionality, Subjectivity, and Reflexivity in Case Study and Ethnographic Research" as it made me think through the first person "positioning" of my own emotioned connections to, and classroom performance of, the pedagogical innovations I was championing. Recognizing our emotions in relation to our position in a case study seems very much in line with what emotion and performance studies scholars hope to reveal about the intense subjectivity of any classroom experience. As Strater notes, even though "not every researcher may want to disclose the messiness of making meaning in her data," the inclusion of personal notes, digressions, moments of improvisation in the classroom, and the researcher's own journal entries can collectively work to "establish the intersubjectivity between [the student] informants' lives" and the author of the ethnography (127).

Ultimately, a combination of reading *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College English Studies* (1996, 2003), in which Berlin spends his last two chapters presenting "sample approaches" to the integration of rhetoric and postmodern literary

theory in writing classrooms, and Nicole Cooley's "Literary Legacies and Critical Transformations: Teaching Creative Writing in the Public Urban University" provided the best model for this study. Shari Stenberg's Teaching and (Re)Learning the Rhetoric of Emotion" (2009) also helped me think through a method and style that traced individual students' contributions, risks, and emotioned reactions to discussions of emotions across semesters of trial and error. Like Berlin, Cooley, and Stenberg, I highlight the emotion theory readings, in-class exercises, responsive writings, and concluding reflection that I assigned in both classes. Specifically, I analyze samples of student writing and discussion as well as my feedback and follow-up questions for future enhancements of this emotion-centered pedagogy.

I secured all approvals through the Human Subjects Research Council at Drury University in the fall of 2011 and through the University of Missouri-Columbia's Institutional Research Board in the 2011-2012 academic year. The process was helpful in that it forced me to draw together the specific topics and questions I would be asking during in-class writings that were focused on the emotion theory and performance studies readings. In addition to oral history exemptions that I secured due to the nature of my "research trial in pedagogical innovation," I gained approval for specific writing topics from both Drury University's Human Subjects Research Council and University of Missouri's Internal Review Board in fall and spring 2012.

The observations and quotations included in this study have been gleaned with the written consent of students in each of the classes. In compliance with Drury's Human Subjects Research Council, all students were informed of their option to not be included in my pedagogical reflections without consequence, though all students in ENGL 366

were required to participate in the activities of the course regardless of whether or not samples of their work might be used in this dissertation or a future article or monograph. In accordance with confidentiality protocols at both institutions, all student names have been changed to protect anonymity. Both the chair of Drury's Human Subjects Research Council and MU's I.R.B. approved this research into pedagogical innovation and granted an exemption that allowed me to reflect on and quote students' responses in my ENGL 366 courses.

In efforts to contextualize ENGL 366, I am providing a very brief overview of Drury's mission, curriculum, and populations served. Founded by New England Congregationalists in Springfield, Missouri in 1873, Drury University is dedicated to helping students "cultivate [. . .] imaginative faculties as well as ethical insight and critical thought" (Drury Mission Statement). The university is comprised of two colleges: Drury College, a traditional "day" program with approximately 1600 students, and the College of Continuing Professional Studies (CCPS), an "evening" program that serves an additional 3000+ "non-traditional age learners." Drury's CCPS is the oldest continuous provider of adult education in southwest Missouri and has been accredited by the Higher Learning Commission since 1948. Its mission and purposes, as a New American College, have long combined a commitment to "excellence in both liberal arts and professional education," which has been mirrored by the breadth of its offerings. Drury's English department, where I also serve as Faculty Coordinator between the day and evening programs, currently has eight full-time faculty, including my own position,

and nearly forty adjunct faculty who primarily teach at Drury's eleven branch campuses, which are located within a seventy mile radius of the main campus in Springfield.

Over the last two years, Drury's administration and faculty have undertaken the enormous task of academic restructuring. After many self-study drafts, faculty forums, and meetings of faculty and academic affairs committees, early agreements have been reached to realign academic units into a divisional model. This proposed realignment is creating quite a few shifts, including the separation of creative writing from the fine arts, which were previously tethered by a menu distribution that required six hours of "creativity explored" in the general education curriculum. As of this writing, the restructuring has yielded different blueprints, but the most enduring has Theater in a Fine Arts division alongside art, art history, music, and dance and English in the Humanities division alongside history, philosophy and religion, communications, and languages. Whether or not this blueprint will be ratified by academic affairs, upper administration, and the Board of Trustees remains to be seen, but the proposal has already raised questions about creative writing's contributions to a liberal arts preparation. By virtue of being housed within English, creative writing has always been loosely affiliated with the humanities; however, the dividing of departments into schools with attendant deans responsible for separate budgets, academic workloads, proportional contributions to the core curriculum, and fund-raising has required those of us who teach literature and creative writing to articulate specific ways that creative writing can serve a humanities preparation. This exigency hovers around a number of curricular decisions I detail in the following narrative, and I return to my recommendations for the future role of humanities-centered creative writing program in chapter five. First, though, I need to

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describe the current role of ENGL 366 within our writing major and why it became the best testing ground for an emotion-centered pedagogy.

Our department's writing major requires thirty-three hours of coursework, including nine hours in Foundations (Expository Writing, Grammar and Style, and Senior Seminar), nine hours in Literature Electives (American, British, and World), six hours in Professional Writing (Editing and Publishing, Media Writing, Business Communication and Technical Writing), and nine hours in Imaginative Writing, which is typically a sequence of workshops in poetry, fiction, and creative nonfiction. In fiction, writing majors ideally complete three courses: ENGL 266: Creative Writing I, ENGL 366: Creative Writing II, and ENGL 466: Advanced Writing Workshop, the latter of which provides both a senior workshop and opportunities for portfolio development, publication, and departmental readings. As I mentioned, both ENGL 266 and ENGL 366 have previously counted toward a six-hour "creativity explored" distribution within the core requirements in Drury's curriculum. Divisional thinking and a protracted effort to streamline the number of general education hours from sixty (60) to forty-two (42) has recently resulted in "creativity explored" being dropped as a core requirement. I mention this because ENGL 366 enrollments have previously benefitted from students seeking upper-division coursework to satisfy three hours within this menu distribution. From 2005-2010, general education students—or non-English and writing majors—comprised roughly twenty-five percent of the population in any section of ENGL 366. The shrinking enrollments in ENGL 366 that have already resulted from a static number of writing majors (we average thirty in total) and a declining need for this course outside the

writing major have also led me to consider the emotional and social insights ENGL 366 could provide for a wider range of undergraduates than just our majors.

All of this added exigency to testing out pedagogies of emotion in sections of ENGL 266 and ENGL 366 in multiple semesters in 2011 and 2012. I secured approvals from Drury's Human Subjects Research Council in case I wanted to quote directly or utilize student responses and feedback, and, ultimately, these semesters became trials of which course was best suited, or had the most responsive population, for discussions of the social construction of emotions, outlaw emotions, embodiment, performativity, and emotion as a category of creative analysis. The "intermediate level" creative course is typically 75% English and writing majors (a popular double-major because of the literature-heavy focus of our writing major) with the other 25% needing both a creativity explored elective and a 300-level (peer-division) general education course. This mix proved beneficial for assessing the responses of writing majors (very motivated sophomores and mostly juniors) as well as those needing a humanities requirement (mostly juniors and seniors). The workshop-centered course is capped at twenty, but also draws fewer students than the more popular and accessible introductory course.

Traditionally, the purpose of ENGL 366 is to acquaint students with additional techniques for crafting fiction as well as give students ample practice in writing fiction. ENGL 366 asks students to re-examine the fundamentals of craft (gaining additional skill in point-of-view, characterization, descriptions, setting and conflict), explore topics such as subtext, theme, narrative control, structure, internal/external "drivers," and locating the "now," and practice revision and structural analysis. Additional considerations concerning marketing and researching literary journals are stressed in this second

semester. The analysis and criticism of student fiction in a workshop setting is also the foundation of most class periods. Students are typically asked to read a mix of classic and contemporary fiction, examples of experimental and flash fiction, and selections from the *Norton Anthology of Short Fiction* (shorter seventh edition) and/or *The Best American Short Stories*.   To establish a tradition in dealing with emotions in the creative writing classroom, I also asked students to read advice on fiction writing from John Gardner's *The Art of Fiction: Notes on Craft for Young Writers*.

In terms of required assessments in ENGL 366, students are expected to **c**omplete at least two short stories including one experimental narrative. Students must also participate in writing exercises and peer editing in a workshop environment. Unlike the introductory and concluding assignments in ENGL 266, students in ENGL 366 are required to research and review one literary journal and write a structural analysis of their own fiction. I also ask students to provide weekly feedback on selections from the reading list, which can include the selections from emotion theory, Stanislavski, and performance studies in my version of the course. The general "flow" of most class periods involves 1) lecture and discussion of craft and technique, 2) in-class responsive writing with accompanying discussion of assigned readings, a break, and 3) at least the final third of the meeting dedicated to workshopping student fiction. My addition to these standard purposes and requirements for ENGL 366 included a syllabus statement that let students know we would "also be exploring the connections between 'theories of emotion and affect' and the process and craft of creative writing." I also clarified that I would utilize photocopied hand-outs for the supplemental essays that I've listed in the Appendix syllabus and in this next section on syllabus construction.

Narrowing the foundational works I have discussed in chapters two and three down to a workable syllabus proved difficult. Essentially, trial and error across the fall and spring semesters of 2011-12 helped me strike a balance between traditional discussions of writing craft and a theoretical framework for integrating emotion and performance studies into a curriculum that was still workshop-focused. Since the policy statements and course purposes I added to ENGL 366 are boldfaced in the Appendix, I am only reprinting the weekly readings and assignments here to indicate where I integrated theory and responsive writings to address the application of emotion and performance studies scholarship. Like any tentative readings schedule, this syllabus was subject to many variables, including the need to linger on topics such as embodiment, outlaw emotion, the partnership of emotion and cognition in viewpoint, attitude, and orientation, and the performance of self in characterization and workshop. I also left room to improvise—to heed Shady Cosgrove's admonition for creative writing professors to stay constantly "informed by the immediate environment and context of the classroom"—and did so with supplemental readings that I would photocopy during break or bring back from my office to read during a particularly engaging discussion (Cosgrove 473). In some ways, the following syllabus came from various classroom experiments with cuttings, samples, and even passages I read aloud from texts and articles in my office. What I am about to present is the result of three semesters of distillation; the progress *toward* this current syllabus, which I still continue to tweak and rearrange as I discuss in my conclusion, is part of what I detail in my pedagogical narrative. What follows is a weekly outline of readings, discussion topics, and assignments:

WEEK 1:   Welcome, roster, semester overview, and syllabus discussion

Subject matter: intellectual and emotional territory

Affect and emotion theories in the process of writing fiction

Literary Journal Review assignment

WEEK 2:   Point-of-view, Profluence, and Sentimentality

Writing intros: POV, characterization, and establishing omniscience

"Cathedral" Raymond Carver

"Housewifely Arts" Megan Mayhew Bergerman

Gardner, "Sentimentality and Frigidity" sections from *Art of Fiction*

Literary Journal Reviews due

WEEK 3:   Establishing Omniscience, Crafting Emotions, and the First Story

Deadline

"Out of Body" Jennifer Egan

"To The Measures Fall" Richard Powers

Damasio, selections from *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and*

***Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* .**

Micchiche, Ch. 1 "On Texts and Contexts" (emotion as action) pp. 11-

25 and Ch. 2 "Sticky Emotions and Identity Metaphors" pp. 26-29

from *Doing Emotion*.

First short story deadline

WEEK 4:   Experimental Writing and Humor, Embodying Emotions, and Workshop

"Escape from Spider Land" George Saunders

Niedenthal, "Embodying Emotions"

Damasio, selections from *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*.

Workshop (written comments on all critiques must be made prior to class)

WEEK 5: Discuss plot, narrative structure, and endings: muted vs. epiphany

"Dungeon Master" Sam Lipsyte

In-Class Writing: Reflections on the Emotion work of Workshopping

WEEK 6: Discuss experimental fiction assignment and flash fiction:

"Gorilla, My Love" Toni Cade Bambera

"Boys" (hand-out) Rick Moody

"Bullet in the Brain" (hand-out) Tobias Wolff

"La Vita Nuova" Allegra Goodman

WEEK 7: Workshop

"Nadine at 35: A Synopsis" Jo Sapp

"Wedding Night" Tom Hawkins

"The Story of an Hour" Kate Chopin

"Girl" Jamaica Kincaid

Boler, "Testimonial Readings" pp. 142-144 from *Feeling Power*.

Jagger, "Outlaw Emotions" passage from "Love and Epistemology"

WEEK 8: Break Week – No Class

WEEK 9: Workshop

"A Continuity of Parks" Julio Cortazar

"Hills Like White Elephants" Ernest Hemingway

Rough draft exchange

WEEK 10:	**Stanislavski, Ch. 9 "Emotion Memory" pp. 195-204 from *An Actor's Work***
	Stanislavski, Selections from "Notebooks 1936-1937" pp. 79-83 in *An Actor's Work on a Role*.
	"The Hare's Mask" Mark Slouka
	In-class writing exercise: opening lines
	Experimental fiction deadline
WEEK 11:	Workshop
	Assign opening line exercise
	"Gurov in Manhattan" Ehud Havazelet
	Structural Analysis and Significant Revision assignment sheet
WEEK 12:	Workshop
	"We Didn't" Stuart Dybek
	Brando Interview clip from *The Dick Cavett Show*, June 12, 1973 (YouTube)
	Hamera, "Performance Studies, Pedagogy, and Bodies in/as the Classroom"
	Zarrilli, "Action, Structure, Task, Emotion"
WEEK 13:	More experimental fiction:
	"Me and Miss Mandible" Donald Barthelme
	"The Handsomest Drowned Man in the World" Gabriel Garcia Marquez
	"How I Contemplated My Life from the Detroit House of Correction and Began My Life Over Again" Joyce Carol Oates

WEEK 14:   The Road to Publication, pt. 1: writing queries, researching markets

            Structural Analysis and Revision assignment

            Last possible day to turn in any "late" stories for credit

WEEK 15:   The Road to Publication, pt. 2

            Read selections from "Writers on Writing" in *Norton*

            Responsive Writing: Reflections on Emotion Studies and Revision

WEEK 16:   Finals Week – Return Graded Fiction and Portfolios

It was not easy to leave critics like Hariman and Lucraites, Eve Kosovsky

Sedgwick, and Arlie Hochschild off this list, but I did so partly to streamline the theory

readings (and not let them "overtake the course" as Blythe and Sweet warn) and partly

because colleagues and I have used cuttings from Sedgwick and Hochschild in Women

and Gender Studies courses, ENGL 301: Theory and Practice, and ENGL 303: Women

Writers. Inevitably, though, I represented summaries or highlights of other emotion

scholars, including Hochschild and Worsham, as discussion opportunities arose. I have

detailed these and other key moments in trying out this pedagogy in the naturalistic

reflections that dominate the rest of this chapter.

ENGL 366: Qualitative Observations and Responsive Writing Samples

Once I realized how many notes I was taking on a single class period, I knew I

would have to limit my case study to those junctures when the right combination of

readings, in-class writings, and time for extended discussion yielded the most insight.

For this reason, I have divided my observations and selected student responses into six

sections that "drop in" on the semester's progress in Weeks One, Three, Five, Seven,

Twelve, and Fifteen. In each section I describe which aspects of emotion or performance

theory galvanized our discussion or helped me recognize future applicability as I worked toward refining the reading list I have described above.

Week One focused on early talk of emotions and attachments in beginning a draft. The first meeting for ENGL 366 is always a mix of anxiety, acclimation, and, as one student wrote, "sizing up the competition" to see what a higher percentage of writing majors might mean for the "intermediate" fiction workshop. Since the class only met once a week for two hours and fifty minutes and featured a blend of traditional "day" students and non-traditional age learners, both of whom had already spent the better part of the day taking classes, working jobs, and raising families, I was hyper-aware of time management. I have found Blackboard to be a useful adjunct for once a week classes. In addition to being a repository for course documents, assignments, readings, and announcements, Blackboard provides an electronic forum for continuing discussion between Wednesday meetings and this has also been helpful in capturing some conversation verbatim.

On the first night I delayed distributing the syllabus until we had learned names, shared common interests (mainly music, film, and novels), and written an introductory response. I asked students to provide contact info, their current or desired majors, and a brief description of their process and inspiration for, or common struggles with, writing short fiction. I wanted to see how many referenced the role of emotions in creative writing before the syllabus announced that "discussion of emotion theories and performance studies" would be central to our purpose this semester. I wanted to avoid fishing for "emotion talk" and to establish, in the conversation that followed, a tendency to describe "drawing from my emotions" as a wellspring for inspiration.

So, with little advance prodding, most students wrote about emotions as the primary catalyst, source of frustration, and "most consuming" part of why they "couldn't avoid" writing fiction. Becky, a twenty-year-old student who recently added a writing major to her degree plan, was arguably the most exuberant about the role of emotions in her work:

> For me, emotion is the biggest, best and favorite thing in the process of writing. I want *my* feelings to be injected like venom in my fiction, causing an emotional epidemic from anything I write. If I feel confused, sad, happy, that's what I want the readers to feel. It's not an easy thing to do--and I certainly haven't honed this craft, YET. But that's the kind of stuff I like to read: works that are emotionally drenched.

At the other end of the spectrum, Jackie, a non-traditional age student who had returned to school with an interest in writing and secondary education, discussed her struggles to get readers to "attach" emotionally to her characters and to get to where she no longer felt like "holding back" her own attachments in the writing process:

> After re-reading my stories from last semester [Creative Writing I], I found them to be a bit (okay, very) shy of emotions. I know I need to find a way to channel my emotional energy into what I am writing instead of holding back. I know it is important to draw the reader into the story, making them become attached to the character, but when I try to do this I feel like my "character" is still just a collection of traits or states of being. My drafts just seem to be logs of what, when, and where things happened. I need to work on my "interiority" problem this semester.

In this response and in contributions over the next few weeks, Jackie referenced her insecurities with "interiority" in her narratives and her perceived failure at representing interior emotional states in past fictions.

Jackie also professed a comfort in remaining emotionally detached from her characters and believed she had developed skills in exposition of setting and rendering "the micro-details of external conflict" as a result of trying to avoid writing more internal reactions to conflict.   I mentioned that there was a rich tradition of authors who used

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external details to mirror inner turmoil or, in the Hemingway tradition, specialized in

characters who sought to lose themselves in process-oriented actions. As we discussed

her work, Jackie came to realize that she was not avoiding emotion simply by avoiding

narrative interiority. One of the oldest devices in writing fiction—having one character

describe another to reveal the second character's external qualities and the first

character's disposition—partners well with discussions of how emotions may be revealed

without direct telling or confessional monologuing. At the end of our first meeting,

Jackie wanted me to know that reflecting on her previous fiction had already been

revealing: she now believed that her characters' emotional detachment came from her

own resistance to "open up for the whole class" during workshop and writing exercises in

previous classes. I told her that these sorts of questions and connections were what we

would be considering throughout the semester.

Another early insight into our semester focus came from Kirk, a military student

who had returned from active duty in the fall. He volunteered a passage from his in-class

writing that discussed the pros and cons of being "captured" by the initial emotions of his

rough drafts:

> I find that I can get caught up quite easily in the emotions of my characters and
> find myself feeling exactly the way they do. I think of a setting, listen to music or
> search the internet for inspiration and wait to see what emotions (if any) seem to
> attach themselves. This is normally how I try to begin a story. Inspiration rarely
> comes easily and I find it very difficult to *switch* between emotions sometimes,
> but they give me a starting point. I find that most often if I begin a story as
> something intended to be funny it tends to stay that way, and if it starts out dark, it
> can often end up staying that way as well even though I try to mix many emotions
> together.

Many agreed that the early tone of a draft can too quickly determine (or "over-solidify"

in one student's estimate) the ensuing emotional choices and tenor of a narrative. Kirk

said that "over-attachment" to the original emotional inspiration for his fiction was what

he wanted to "push past" in his drafting process. Interestingly, both Jackie and Kirk's responses speak to attachments (Jackie's to "mak[ing] readers attach themselves to characters" and Kirk's to the initial emotional tone of his writing) and others agreed that the earliest emotional attachments were the hardest to go back and revise. Kirk's response initiated a discussion we would revisit in workshop regarding consistency of tone, which one student wrote "plagued [him] the way consistent tense once plagued [his] verb conjugation." I recommended stories with a pronounced tonal shift—something I have decided to do in future incarnations of this pedagogy—and Kirk later reported that Flannery O'Connor, Tony Earley, and Amy Bloom provided "great models" for shifting or blending tones without "losing narrative control."

Our brief discussion of the (assumed) rule of tonal consistency led me to ask students where and how they felt they lost the initial feeling of a story in the process of trying to sustain it. Sheri, a highly self-critical yet prolific writer, expressed a common lament:

> One emotion I struggle with is hard to name but is connected to the feeling of uncertainty with what I am writing. I often question my motives, my abilities, and wonder if I have any talent at all. I have felt in some of my stories that I lose my character's initial motivation or get lost in the storyline and end up abruptly concluding a piece when I feel I could have taken more time to resolve or understand that original motivation.

Other introductory writings proved helpful in getting a sense of how frustrating emotions can be to capture ("I end up settling for lines like 'anger overwhelmed her' and then feel like that's such a cop-out") as well as how the fear of becoming "emotionally drenched," in Becky's phrase, led some to prefer the minimalist traditions of Raymond Carver, Ann Beattie, and Joy Williams. One student admitted he preferred a high degree of "postmodern detachment" because he felt it was "more literary" and worried that he

would never be a "student of literature" until he worked past what Gardner soon assured him was the immaturity of sentimentality.

Week Three focused chiefly on Gardner, frigidity, and the "stickiness of emotions." I decided to begin our third meeting with reactions to Gardner's warnings against sentimentality and frigidity in fiction writing, mainly because so many were anxious to respond. Patricia, a non-traditional-age student, objected to the phrase, "frigidity is, in short, one of the worst faults possible in literature," and Christy quickly chimed in with the preceding sentence in Gardner's "Common Errors": "it may even be that frigidity steers the writer toward sentimentality, the faking of emotions the writer does not honestly feel" (118). A few others agreed this seemed wrongheaded, and one student wanted to know how anyone could anyone assess the honesty or fakery of feeling in fiction?

Surprisingly, I found myself taking up for Gardner and asking for a closer reading of his earlier clarifications. Gardner does eschew "sentimentality, in all its forms" but also insists that "without sentiment, fiction is worthless" (115). This proved fruitful for our conversation as it made more impassioned students call out examples of Gardner's rhetoric that they still found under-defined or condescending. For example, in this same passage, Gardner parenthetically states that he takes "it for granted that the reader understands the difference between *sentiment* in fiction, that is emotion and feeling, and *sentimentality*, emotion or feeling that rings false, usually because achieved by some form of cheating or exaggeration" (115). Rachel suggested Gardner was promoting something like "perfect pitch when it comes to feeling," which led another student to quote two more passages regarding the "common errors" of "amateur writers" who don't

realize that readers are only "moved by characters and events, not by the emotion of the person who happens to be telling the story" *and* the corresponding error of "frigidity" when an author "reveals [. . .] that he is less concerned about his characters than he ought to be—less concerned, that is, than any decent human being observing the situation would naturally be" (116-117).

I asked if they felt Gardner was at least making an effort to discuss emotions in fiction writing and was just limited, like we all are, by a lack of emotion vocabulary. Wouldn't we agree that "without sentiment, a fiction is doomed to fail," or, to return to Jackie's concerns, that without sentiment, a fiction will not "attach readers" to it? One student observed that in moving from "sentiment" to "sentimentality" Gardner seemed to place aesthetic thresholds on feeling, with frigidity marking the lower limits and sentimentality indicating a maximum has been surpassed. Rachel believed the bigger problem was that Gardner's emotion advice was watery, like "touchy-feely advice always is." I suggested that the adjective "touchy-feely" might be another example of the limits of our vocabulary on emotion. She added that Gardner advocates a degree of emotional concern that a mature author should convey without clarifying how we "young writers" can achieve this proper degree of sentiment. She and other students complained that Gardner suggests authors possess an "appropriate rhetoric" for every emotional situation but only "took it for granted" that good authors would recognize a false note of sentiment when they heard one. "And if we can't," Will added, "we should just change our majors now."

Rachel, Christy, and others preferred Micchiche's unpacking of emotions in selections from *Doing Emotion*, though it was hardly a contest. "Tendencies to think of

emotions as only personally experienced and felt are simply not adequate," Micciche explains, "to describe how emotions take form and are coded as appropriate or inappropriate within communities" and this turn toward a transactional definition can mark an important turn in a semester's discussion of the social mediation of emotion (7). This also helps transition from Gardner decrying sentimentality to being able to explore the origins of anti-sentimental thinking in student's social, education, religious, and political affiliations—not to mention being able to discuss sentimentality as an aesthetic that is heralded or deplored within the "transactional" preferences of a literary community over time. As one student from my Studies in 16ᵗʰ-18ᵗʰ Century Literature class observed, sentimentality was "not on fiction's forbidden list" in the Age of Johnson.

After my first pass at highlighting emotion as a category of analysis (I quoted Micchiche's warning that "neglecting to analyze emotion effects leads to neglecting emotion's role as that which binds the social body together as well as tears it apart"), another student raised the question of sentimentality and personal tastes in fiction, particularly the non-canonical kind (14). As we started turning away from Micchiche and the transactional nature of "doing emotion" that I had hoped to address, I worried that we were only headed into another discussion of "why *isn't* the *Twilight* series worth reading?" (to foreground my own bias against a recurrent argument). Soon, though, I was struck by how many students wanted to share their "sentimental attachments" to works that first moved them to write fiction and how these attachments had frequently been dismissed in academic discussions of literature ("I learned early on not to say how deeply I loved and connected with Holden Caulfield," one student laughed). A student mentioned *A Tale of Two Cities*, which a visiting Dickens scholar had recently

championed while other her professors, including two from other universities, had dismissed as "sentimental excess from a known sentimentalist" (This is probably not a fair quote of her "other professors," but I want to capture how the student heard the dismissal of a fiction she felt strongly about). After establishing that almost everyone in the room had been required to read Dickens' novel around their sophomore year in high school, and that the three who hadn't were okay with spoilers, we discussed reactions to Sydney Carton's self-sacrifice and Dickens' tendency to use the fevered emotions of a watershed historical event to heighten the lower stakes romance of his leading characters.

As testament to the spontaneity and fortuity a new pedagogy can create, I went to my office on break to find a copy of *A Tale of Two Cities* that I had held on to (for sentimental reasons) since high school, and this search led me to a worn copy of the now out-of-print *Writing Fiction* by R.V. Cassill (1963, 1975, 1986). I had reviewed it when I was scanning many creative writing texts, particularly those like Cassill's that had survived into multiple editions and were contemporaries of Gardner's manifesto. Not surprisingly, Cassill did not have a chapter on "Emotions" alongside craft, technique, and "finger exercises" chapters on "Narrative Passages," "Plot as Unity," "Character" and "Tone." However, he did offer compressed, tutorial introductions to six short stories in the middle section of his text. These stories were meant to illustrate the many "mechanics" and "techniques" *Writing Fiction* espouses and to serve as running examples of Cassill's advice. In his intro to Joy Williams' "Taking Care," Cassill briefly discusses sentimentality and creative writing as he analyzes his former student's "risky" choices within the third person present tense:

> The short, declarative sentences [. . .] give a tone of almost clinical
> detachment—until we note the very highly emotional nature of the subject matter.

Perhaps the detachment of the style is a precaution against sentimentality or stock responses to a tale of love, danger, and overwhelming tenderness. (65)

I brought *Writing Fiction* back to class with me and found that Cassill's definition of sentimentality proved helpful to our conversation. Many agreed that if sentimentality meant the reliance on predictable emotional reactions—or emotional appeals *to* the reader, against the grain of Micchiche's more transactional definition of emotions "emerging relationally" in encounters *between* texts and readers--then sentimentality was to be avoided (*Doing Emotions* 12-13). So, I asked, did that mean we were just being manipulated by Charles Dickens? Or were our feelings sentimental to the extent that they were uninterrogated or anticipated? *Was* there an inverse relationship between clinical detachment in prose and subject matter that we, as writers or readers, felt was already of a "highly emotional nature"? Christy responded that, yes, even Gardner would agree that if an event is emotionally charged we should "attach readers to it" through understatement, but, she added, Micchiche might suggest this is all predicated on how we're "conditioned to form attachments to what we read, how we 'do it' with literature, I guess."

I should note that the only other direct reference to emotions, either in writing or "reading as a writer," in Cassill's text appears in the last two pages in his concluding discussion of how the "theme of a story cannot ever be satisfactorily abstracted from the story itself" and should not be either the goal of workshop deduction nor the driving impulse of the creative writer (172). "Nevertheless," Cassill concedes, he would "risk tentative statements of theme" for each of the six stories he had used "purely for the purposes of analysis—to pry open the imaginative structure of the stories so [creative writing students] can peer inside" (172). Here, Cassill abandons his more rational-empirical rhetoric to suggest that even though theme is "always coarsened or flawed

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when it is abstracted," the only way to arrive at theme is to distill it from the text through

an emotional process: "properly speaking, the theme is what is left, like a resonance, in

the reader's mind after he recovers from the emotions and sympathies he felt while

reading" (172). Granted, "recovering from the emotions" in order to apprehend theme is

far from relying on emotion to inform cognition, but it does suggest that we have to

foreground our emotions in the processes of reading and analyzing what we can abstract

from subtext. As I made this point, alongside points about shifts in psychic distance in

third person omniscience for those who fear craft talk had been abandoned in the pursuit

of sharing sentimental attachments, I invited responses from a student who had begun to

conflate Cassill's advice with Wordsworth's definition of poetry as the "spontaneous

overflow of emotions *recollected in tranquility*." "We shouldn't ever just write in the

moment of overflowing emotions, then?" the student asked. "We shouldn't write our own

stuff when we're too close to feeling it, but we shouldn't write *about other works* if we

haven't 'recovered' from our initial 'emotional' or 'sympathetic' readings?"

I suggested the following in-class writing, which I had originally planned as a

way to initiate a discussion of Gardner and Micchiche at the beginning of the period:

> I'd like each of you to reflect on the emotional energy, toll, or outlet you
> experienced while drafting your first story of the semester. Try to push past
> merely saying "I enjoyed writing this" or "I didn't like having a deadline" and
> think what some of the emotions were (or tend to be anytime you write
> creatively). If writing this last story was a fairly detached, emotionless process,
> discuss that for a bit too.

After ten minutes or so, I asked if anyone would share what he or she had just written.

Anna, a motivated student who often talked of an editing and publishing career she had

put on hold, led off with the following:

> Drafting this story was anything but detached for me! I chose to write about a trip
> that my family took to Disney World (well, to Orlando – we never actually made

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it to Disney). My daughter ended up in the hospital for most of our stay, and the circumstances of her illness and just the trip in general were extremely traumatic for the whole family. It has been over two years since this trip, and I was just now able to think about the events without getting totally panicked. In writing this story, I was able to put myself back in that situation, relive the events, per se, and finally not feel so emotional about the whole thing. In that way, I think writing about the trip was very therapeutic.

Next, Larry mentioned that working with different points of view had become a personal challenge (he felt he had too often "defaulted to the barely disguised first person monologue" in Creative Writing I) and was amazed how exhausting speaking, thinking, and "feeling" in a different voice was. He had also discussed this in his responsive writing, where he moved from generalizations about creative writing being "very therapeutic" and allowing him "to escape into a different world" to a more specific reflection on the toll of crafting a second person voice.

Will offered the following from his lengthy response to Gardner, sentimentality, and the roller-coaster of feelings associated with drafting his story:

> Usually whenever I begin to write I have the feeling that I am supposed to; it feels like an obligation. This can be especially frustrating whenever I have difficulty getting started. Not long after my first paragraph however I begin to get excited. The words start coming easier than I'd feared, I'm beginning to enjoy the act of writing, I'm becoming seduced by my story, people are going to enjoy reading this--then…brick wall. When I hit a snag I get discouraged immediately. I begin to doubt my story. I may even start losing interest in it or think of another idea that sounds so much better.

I told Will he should try rereading to see if he could tell where his energy began to ebb and flow and how this seemed reflected in his narrative: where his writing seemed less enthusiastic and distant or where it may have been trying too hard to charm readers. Will went on to report:

> Eventually I force myself back on track and catch another wave. I ride that one as far as it will take me before I hit another wall and have to sit patiently for the next wave. Finally, when the work is completed I read it in its entirety and to my amazement it's good. It's not just good in fact, it's great. Almost perfect, so I

think, everyone will love it. Then I take the work to my wife who I'm sure will shower me with praises for my masterpiece but she doesn't. My wife/editor is a prolific reader with excellent grammar and spelling which is why I ask her to help me edit. She is kind to me when she makes her suggestions, but when she tells me to chop out an unnecessary paragraph it feels like a barbeque fork was just jammed in my ego. When she suggests altering a word or sentence, the fork is being twisted. At some point she asks, "if it's perfect, why'd you ask me for help?"

Will felt the "stickiness of emotions" might explain the discord between he and his "wife/editor" in that his attraction to different parts of the text was grounded in an attachment to certain concepts of writing she didn't share. He also saw her attachment to mechanics, form, and organization in opposition to the more holistic sort of validation he had hoped to receive and to the affect he had hoped to achieve: connecting his wife's emotions to the same elation he had felt while writing the story.

Likewise, Michelle felt that the whole craft of writing was about finding ways to "catch readers' emotions" and being able, in her words, to "pull your readers from emotion to emotion":

The greatest skill to learn is being able to pull your readers from emotion to emotion. I often find that if I focus on a particular situation and hone in on the details of the moment that made me feel the way I did, adding that into the scene is where you will catch readers [. . .] Emotion is our only way of connecting to the dead words on a page. Those words aren't alive unless there's emotion. We need surprise, grief, anger, to help us read. We don't want to simply read a story we want to *feel* it.

Many students agreed that we needed emotion to feel our way into understanding a story. One said that there was immediate, "memorizable summary knowledge" and then there was what we "slowly learned" through "feelings that linger." Another student offered that emotional ways of understanding or "intuiting" might be the way that "truth dazzles gradually."

Reading Gardner's aesthetics, discussing the "stickiness of emotions," and sharing several in-class writings also yielded the first honest responses regarding workshop anxiety and student critiques. In one student's opinion, both were just means of taste distribution in creative writing classes, since students were often sharing their own emotional attachments to an idea of writing, a political viewpoint, a stylistic preference, etc. Hailey had echoed this critique in her responsive writing when she reflected on previous workshop experiences at her former school:

> The most difficult part (at least for me) was weighing which critiques were ones to really consider and use as tools to improve my work, and which were more a matter of taste. Yeah, there's always going to be that sting when someone critiques a piece of writing—creative writing especially--but that sting has the potential to significantly improve your writing. Almost all of the comments I would receive were useful and thoughtfully made, but there were a couple that felt more like they just wanted me to duplicate their own writing. For at least one of the critiques, I had to really step back and look at my writing from a distance because it feels so natural to get defensive. But I guess it's worth it to consider *why* someone thought my writing would be more effective if written in a different way.

This led to a discussion of the ways we learn to react to, or suppress, immediate emotioned responses to other students' attachments to taste and style during workshop critiques. This process of first recognizing and then having a vocabulary to understand emotional comportment prefigured the workshop discussion that would develop in Week Five.

Week Five focused on workshop comportment and Worsham's "pedagogies of violence." By the fifth week, we had begun workshopping and had discussed short selections from Damasio's *The Feeling of Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* and Paula Niedenthal's "Embodying Emotion" (2007), which I had learned was more excerptable than the similar territory Niedenthal covers in "Embodiment in the Acquisition and Use of Emotion Knowledge" (2005). Before I

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describe the main focus of our Week Five discussion--the emotional comportment demanded by the traditional creative writing workshop--I should summarize a few of the immediate effects of incorporating Niedenthal's work. First, her research into how the embodiment of emotion "causally affects how emotional information is processed" afforded the more scientifically-oriented students a biological definition of embodiment, which is "the perceptual, somatovisceral, and motoric re-experiencing of [past or present] feeling" that collectively leads to "perceiving and thinking about [. . .] the relevant emotion in one's self" ("Embodying Emotion" 1002). Second, Niedenthal describes her research with a Damasio-like clarity and allows for a discussion of reciprocity between the bodily ways emotion is carried and the amazing rapidity with which we perceive and interpret emotional information from facial and physical expressions. Even before we discussed Stanislavki, this aspect of Niedenthal's work reminded fiction writers of the many ways we embody emotions and that this embodiment can accentuate or bely spoken iterations of our emotional states. Third, the research focus of Niedenthal's article examines the ways that mirroring "emotion-specific postures" can result in experiencing the associated emotions, a transference of emotion that speaks to readers and writers of fiction as well as to emotion's larger function of creating empathy, attachments, and precognitive orientations to the world (1002-1003).

Gary, a Biology student whose pre-med advisor recommended taking an upper-division writing course to round his *summa cum laude* transcript, got to be the class interpreter of Niedenthal's somatovisceral concepts and provided an efficient summary of her protocols and outcomes. He also told the class that Niedenthal's article and Damasio's precognitive feeling-based discussion of consciousness inspired him to begin

a story with a "microscopic focus" on the "mechanistic neural events" that occur when

his main character notices the disconnect between what his chemistry major girlfriend is

telling him and a "curious flexing of her corrugator supercilii" that his own eyebrow

mirrors in hopes of translating her emotions. While this is a much more literal

appropriation of Damasio and Niedenthal's research than I had in mind, I complimented

his story idea and recommended that he read Tobias Wolff's "Bullet in the Brain", in

which a weary book critic is shot during a bank robbery. The narrative that follows the

eponymous event is brought "under the mediation of brain time" as Wolff details the last

nanoseconds of memory and stifled emotion in his main character's life (Wolff 266). I

also recommend David Foster Wallace's "The Depressed Person", which models a

psychoanalytic, hyper-attentive, and exhausting prose style in its exploration of the title

character and her analyst.

Two other students connected Neidenthal's conclusion that modality-specific

circuits in the brain are "fast, refined, and able to flexibly process a large number of

[emotional] states" to Damasio's analysis of how emotion plays an immediate, precursory

role in the development of cognition (1005). Specifically, a student who had borrowed

my copy of *The Feeling of What Happens* highlighted a passage on "The Substrate for

the Representation of Emotions and Feelings" in which Damasio carefully details how

the "neural patterns which constitute the substrate of a feeling arise in two classes of

biological changes: changes related to body state and changes related to cognitive state"

(79). Ever the moderator and time-keeper, I kept an eye on other students'

somatovisceral expressions and soon decided we should transition to talking about the

ways we learn to conceal emotions instead of automatically expressing them.

We began this talk with a responsive writing that asked students to return to feelings they associated with the workshop process. I have found that the best responses, or the most introspective ones, come from writing topics that do not double as reading quizzes or ask the student to agree or disagree with that week's theorists. For Week Five, then, I asked them to "describe your feelings about any aspect of the workshop process. For example, you might describe your initial reaction to finding out your story would be workshopped, or you might describe any of the emotions you felt during the actual workshop period for your story." Patricia was the first to volunteer her reflection that "before the actual critiquing, I was nervous to have others read my work. I haven't put that type of work out there before [she had shared a story that examined the psychological nuances of a very codependent elderly couple]. *Anxious* seems appropriate. During the workshop, I did get a little annoyed by one student, but for the most part, I found it useful." In a later discussion forum, four shared a succession of "workshop feelings" that included nausea, upset stomachs, and knotted muscles:

> Diane
>
> Learning that my story was going to be workshopped did not fill me with joy, excitement, happiness, validation; it made me want to throw up. I cannot stand critiques, especially face to face, when my work is fiction. I can't really defend the characters like I can when I write creative nonfiction or anything more nakedly biographical. Not to mention I just have to sit there and take it.
>
> Becky
>
> I know PRECISELY what you mean. Critiques also make me nauseous. But it's all for the best. At least we are being critiqued by peers WHILE we are in school, right? Each of us having so many different lifestyles and backgrounds will give us just a taste of the real, diverse world of professional writing one day.

Michelle

Glad to know I am not alone with my seasickness. Thanks for the encouragement, and you make a valid point about being in school--feels more like a chopping block, though!

Rachel

My emotions on the workshopping process are pretty neutral—well, at least when I'm not doubled-over with anxiety awaiting classmate responses.

Raymond

I suffer from social anxiety disorder to begin with, so the sweating, dizziness, and inner meltdown ("Just say what you want and get on with the next one!") is not foreign to me but greatly heightened in this environment. This may be the worst scenario for me, really.

Then, in defense of the workshop process, Peter offered the following reflection:

My personal feelings about the workshop are mostly positive. I think I am harder on myself than the rest of the class is though. For the most part they do find my faults, but they are constructive about how I can approach changing them. They are also very good about highlighting the things I am good at [. . .] but at the same time I don't want to get complacent with the aspects of writing that I do well.

For most of the semester Peter seemed to exhibit a Nat Hardy-like belief that displays of

any emotion—on the page, in person, in workshop—were, like compliments, something

that might only impede his growth as a writer.

In a follow-up to Peter posted on our Blackboard forum, Becky explained that she

learned the "importance [. . .] of remaining silent until the end" after letting her "aunt

critique [her] first big piece of writing." Evidently, her aunt was "so brutally honest,

without offering any compliments" that Becky "cried for quite awhile." Since that first

scathing critique, she claims she hasn't "let any constructive criticism bother [her]" and

believes that even allowing authors to defend their work after a critique is "detrimental to

ourselves." In the conclusion of her lengthy post, she advised me that "since I was so

invested in the emotional process of writing" I should ask students to find their most

"painfully honest and hurtful relative and have them offer the first critique [. . .] then

come to workshop." Although I was not out to establish that writers shouldn't prepare

themselves emotionally for the "sting" of workshop criticism, I was becoming interested

in how attached students were to the idea that detachment was both necessary and a sign

of maturity in a writer's development. I also tried to balance the commonplaces Becky

espoused, the fact that students couldn't follow their submitted work and try to "defend

their babies against the cruel world outside," with a response from another student who

wrote about having to "thank everyone for their comments" after digging fingernails into

her thighs and doodling "I fucking hate this" during workshop.

Beth, who professed a desire to be a writer but worried over the need to take a

traditional M.F.A. approach, admitted that

> prior to being workshopped, I was very physically nervous. I found myself
> selecting my clothing based on what I thought would create more positive
> feedback of me as an author. I was very concerned with people liking my work. I
> had shared my work with family and a select group of friends, who had all been
> very supportive and "got it." I was hoping my classmates would respond the
> same way. I generally go into the workshop experience feeling fairly confident
> that people will at least appreciate my work. I think that sometimes not only the
> format of the workshop dictates the emotions, but the content of your work does
> as well. A story including child abuse had a much higher emotional investment
> than, say, a light-hearted story of self-realization in middle age. But at the heart
> of both workshops, before and during, is a sense of anxiety for approval.

Rachel responded in a similar way, with an emphasis on constantly reminding

herself of her autonomy over final editorial decisions as a hedge against defensiveness

and a means of maintaining comportment:

> As for other emotional considerations, I always wonder if others will understand
> or "get" my story the way I do [. . .] and I tend to probably feel a little defensive
> of my "baby". I want them to like the story, and to feel as emotionally connected
> to it as I do. I have to remind myself that critique is meant to further my work,
> and that opinions are just that; they are there for consideration, and in some cases,

the suggestions are accepted and incorporated, and in others, they are considered and rejected. Learning to manage my emotions in this part of the writing process has been incredibly helpful.

Rachel seemed even more direct than Beth in articulating a learned need to "manage [her] emotions in this part of the writing process." Though she testified to how "incredibly helpful" this emotional management was, I asked, in my feedback on this response, if she saw any trade-offs to sustaining emotional comportment or detachment. Were there opportunities to consider why certain kinds of characterizations or ending choices elicited such strong feelings, pro and con, in workshop? I tried not to dissuade anyone from their own coping mechanisms (I had chosen the second semester of creative writing because students had at least one prior workshop experience for recognizing their own degrees of emotional management), but I did try to use the heightened emotions and ensuing detachment of the workshop experience to tease out this discussion.

Linda agreed that these were "interesting questions" and admitted that prior to submitting her story she was "worried that it would not be good enough." She also observed that "there is the question of what that even means…good enough for what? Even though I don't have experience with fiction, I think all of my writing has a certain tone that is 'me' and I suppose the worry was that someone wouldn't like me." Linda also believed that emotional detachment from workshop was for the best. However, in promoting this detachment and defending the requirement of authorial silence, she revealed many of the "defense mechanisms" she used to maintain comportment during *and after* workshop:

> I appreciated the fact that we were asked to remain silent because it prevented the knee jerk reaction of firing back if someone said something I disagreed with. The (forced) waiting moved me beyond that point so I either didn't feel the reply was necessary or I had come to terms with what was said. I understood many of the suggestions and with others I recognized the fact that the person has not had

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anything good to say or even understood any of the short stories we have read in this class. In that respect, I felt I was in very good company with the published authors [selections from our anthology that she felt were also misread by this student]. I also understood when I submitted my first story that my target audience was probably not [the southwest Missouri area] where I have found I do not have a lot in common with people. It was only after I was looking back on the workshop experience that I realized that it really made no difference to my life what my classmates thought of the story or my style of writing and wondered why I had ever thought it did. In a nutshell, I think I was able to find a place where I had some emotional distance and the story became just a story that would resonate with some and not with others. Que sera sera.

Rachel also agreed that an author must comply with mandatory silence in a workshop environment, even though I had modified this common requirement and allowed authors a chance to share their own thoughts, feelings, and revision ideas after all comments had been made. "It is hard for me to workshop my writings," Rachel admitted, "because I pour so much of myself into them—my emotions, thoughts, desires, dreams. When someone examines a story, they are examining a part of my psyche. During the workshop process, I must emotionally detach myself for this reason. This is a hard thing to do, but it must be done in order to intelligently process feedback." I was glad that Rachel read aloud her phrase about what "must be done in order to intelligently process" the criticism that she received. It allowed an opportunity to invoke Arlie Hochschild's "emotion work" thesis that "the individual often works on inducing or inhibiting feelings so as to render them 'appropriate' to a situation" and that the attempt to "manage" an emotion is essentially the "act of trying to change in degree or quality" this emotion (551, 561). I will return to this teaching moment in my concluding chapter, mainly because I would recommend assigning this selection from Hochschild in a future version of the course and using her discussion, perhaps alongside Alice Brand's observation that "emotional neutrality is considered morally the most advanced," to draw us closer to considering emotion as a

category of analyzing both fiction and authorial response in a workshop environment ("The Why of Cognition" 337).

Later, during our discussion of the second workshop piece, a fiction whose main character felt "paralyzed" by the unavoidable math of global warming, a student asked if the metaphor of earth warming and love life cooling might be less directly stated. The student then invoked our previous conversation and suggested that the main character become more active by learning a lesson from his own detachment: if the character could detach himself emotionally from a failing relationship, he could detach himself protectively from eminent climate change. This, he said, would at least add personal growth and a sense of moving forward to the story's conclusion. Some students had taken a "Global Futures" class as part of our university's signature Global Perspectives (GP 21) minor, and a common complaint was that a semester of interdisciplinary learning about the future of the planet was simply overwhelming and resulted in emotional shutdown or disconnect. One of the students who had shared this reaction to Global Futures now defended the previous student's equating of emotional disconnect to maturity and progress. I used this occasion to ask: is emotional comportment a sign of growth or can it be a way of resisting a different kind of understanding? I didn't get many takers for this question, but later saw that a student had at least written it in her margin.

After the workshop I brought in a copy of Lynn Worsham's "Going Postal" and read aloud a few passages regarding how positivism "silences emotion" and "restricts it to the realm of the body" and how, relatedly, dominant pedagogies are "violent" in their subordination of emotion in logical debate and historically determined to hold emotions

"in a relation of opposition to reason" (224). When I had used a similar cutting from "Going Postal" in an expository writing class, Worsham's essay had initiated a semester-long discussion of logic being the fixed center that marginalizes or subordinates emotion in academia (or denies emotion its foundational role in the construction of self, language, and, well, logic itself). In her summary of Spelman, Worsham highlights the "positivist approach to emotion" that "restricts emotion to the realm of the body [. . .] where it remains a purely private and internal event" and, ultimately, "makes emotion independent of any object or meaning or intention, and [. . .] directs attention to the way in which emotion disrupts rational judgment, thoughts, and perceptions (224). To provide illustration for Worsham's analysis, and to practice Roberts and Smith's belief that teachers can only "facilitate the productive inclusion of emotional responses in the classroom" by articulating their own, I offered up my lingering emotions about a debate between senior colleagues on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 (Roberts and Smith 297).

In the spring of 2003, I had taken students in my Alpha seminar, the freshman gateway to GP21, outside to watch as senior faculty, who would not be fighting in Iraq, modeled a civil "academic debate" on invasion as a next step in the War on Terror. Following the debate, the Alpha students commented much more on form than content, and many mentioned "fearing" where it would lead. When I asked if they meant fearing the inevitability of protracted military engagement, many responded that, no, they had already been dealing with that due to family in the military and friends back home who had enlisted out of high school. They feared the debate itself would turn ugly, that the anti-war professor was getting "truly pissed" at his colleague and—forget *ad hominen*

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attacks—the debate over invading Iraq might end in a brawl. At the time, I attempted to

divorce the logos of academic debate from the pathos they were perceiving. I didn't say,

"academia is where you learn to rationally defend an argument without allowing your

real emotions or personal enmities to take over," but I'm sure this is the message most

freshman took from my comments. One student asked if the compartmentalization of

emotions in academic discourse is like football, where you need to kill your opponent on

the field but are a bad sport if you carry homicidal rage past the locker room.

I told the ENGL 366 students that even though I still saw the advantages of

keeping emotional extremes in check during academic debates, I worried about over-

promoting this "detached ideal" in opposition to "letting emotions overtake reason" or

"allowing your feelings to make it personal." I also explained that the theorists we had

been reading would say this perpetuates a false dichotomy between emotion and reason.

This clarification helped students understand (or at least nod along with) Worsham's

belief that the separation of emotion from academic discourse fosters the "dominant

pedagogy of emotion [that] refuses the expression of anger by subordinates" but many

resisted her contention that "sometimes and in some contexts active bitterness might be a

move away from self-deception" for reasons (or *emotions*) they could not articulate (224-

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article after class. I also ended up loaning him a copy of Hariman and Lucaites's

"Dissent and Emotional Management: in a Liberal Democratic Society: The Kent State

Iconic Photograph." He dropped by my office before our next class and talked about

their following contention:

> In bourgeois societies, emotional life is organized in part by a distinction between
> private experience and public restraint. The emotions themselves are understood

to originate deep within the individual, their expression is one of the characteristics of private life, and sharing them is one of the surest marks of intimacy. When public life appears emotional, it is assumed to be imperiled: either the political official is exhibiting a loss of self-control essential for responsible administration of the state, or the public audience is succumbing to those irrational impulses that are amplified by massing bodies and can lead to demonstrations, riots, and the breakdown of social order. (Hariman and Lucaites 6)

He asked if I felt that emotional management was actually a sign of social control and what might be the alternative? I told him I did subscribe to Hariman and Lucaites's conception of emotions and that, to me, the difficulty in articulating the alternative is part of what seemed to prove their point. He said this had already been a very different class than he had expected but wanted me to know that he did not mean that in a bad way.

Week Seven focused on Jagger's outlaw emotions and testimonial readings. Early in the Week Seven workshop, Gary mentioned that the emotions in another student's story seemed too crafted, "like in a CBS drama." I asked Gary if he doubted the *kinds* of emotions the characters were expressing or that they were expressing them so *directly* in dialogue. "I guess both," he said. When the author had a chance to talk, she didn't respond to any other criticisms but defended the phrasing of her main characters' public arguments as the way "the whole scene played out" in real life: "We *did* express our emotions directly," she said; "we did 'summarize' our feelings in dialogue." Of course, this clarification only added tension to the workshop—the "body language of discomfort" as another student later observed in her journal. "You said, 'I'm furious at you for your constant betrayals,'" Gary quoted from a line of dialogue in the fiction. She responded that she had said "exactly that and most of the other things in here too" and that, trust her, she had had this argument.

My own experiences teaching and participating in creative writing workshops over the last fifteen years have let me observe, as I imagine many have, the use of personal experience to dismiss objections to a story's directness or emotional pitch. "That's how it happened, though. I lived this!" becomes the default counter to "I didn't believe your characters' reactions—they seemed forced." The privileged "objectivity" of experience trumps any criticism of its fictional representation. Like many who teach creative writing, I've had this encounter after thinly disguised accounts of life on a military base and young marriages in a downward spiral. Such concerns often lead to the related problem of students who worry over how to respond to a story's affective dimensions without "hurting an author's feelings" in workshop, uncertainties that Gardner's advice only provokes as he claims that problems in the fiction reflect problems with its author.

In Week Seven, we turned to a discussion of "outlaw emotions," which Alison Jagger claims are "distinguished by their incompatibility with the dominant perceptions and values" and which "stand in a dialectical relation to critical social theory: at least some are necessary to develop a critical perspective on the world, but they also presuppose at least the beginnings of such a perspective" (160). I first asked students to respond to the following topic and quote from Jagger's "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology" (1989):

> Please write a 1-2 paragraph reflection on your writing process as you completed your latest assignment. Consider the following quote from Alison Jagger in terms of your main character's active engagement of the world: "Emotions, then, are wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntary responses to the world. Rather, they are ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world. They have both mental and physical aspects, each of which conditions the other."

In her response, Linda spoke to her negotiation with "outlaw emotions" as she completed what had become her "most cathartic writing":

> My primary problem with this story was trying to keep it short. There were other characters (husband) that I wrote out because I didn't have the room to "flesh" him out. I tend to feel guilty if someone isn't represented well and I even feel guilty if I change a name because it is like I am minimizing the person's importance to the event. Written from [a male perspective], this was the most cathartic writing I have done. When writing from my own pov there is the additional dimension of the survivor's life. The anger and guilt, really a whole range of emotions that seemed (at least for us) to be split down gender lines.

In an online discussion post Sheri wondered, "why is it that we 'water down' our thoughts? Are we taking the cautious road in fear of rejection or trying to conform to societal expectations of us? Are we trying to keep our thoughts appropriate? Or are there simply no words to describe the visualizations and experiences we wish to divulge?"

Many ended up sharing emotions that they had tried to write about in the past and had worried would be too taboo or too tricky to resolve in the short form. One student wrote—but did not share aloud—his struggles with writing about a flash anger that often teetered on violence. He could not figure out a way to resolve it in a fiction that others would "probably want to read" and, instead, softened the main character to only having "more 'lawful' anger" that the "cliché love of a decent woman helped tame." Two students wrote of shame as an emotion, one in relation to her father's struggles with addiction and the other in terms of growing up "hungry poor" in an otherwise affluent school district. I later offered both students a photocopied passage from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's *Touching Feeling* (2003) that addresses the cultural construction of the emotion of shame and the "durable, structural changes in one's relational and interpretive strategies toward both self and others" that shame engenders:

> It seems very likely that the structuring of associations and attachments around the affect shame is among the most telling differentials among cultures and times:

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not that the entire world can be divided between (supposedly primitive) "shame cultures" and (supposedly evolved) "guilt cultures," but rather that, as an affect, shame is a component (and differently a component) of all. [. . .] Thus, one of the things that anyone's character or personality is a record of the highly individual histories by which the fleeting emotion of shame has instituted far more durable, structural changes in one's relational and interpretive strategies toward both self and others. (62)

I originally used aspects of Megan Boler's work on "testimonial readings" in literature classes to create more space for students to respond emotionally to a work. In those classes I encouraged students to try to articulate emotioned reactions without thinking of how feelings were supposed to translate into a specific discourse community. In its basic form, testimonial reading asks us to "question the genealogy of [our] particular emotional response" (170). In my narrower appropriation for literature and now writing classes, concepts from *Feeling Power* have enabled emotional reactions without dismissive prefaces, such as when a student says, "I felt a lingering disgust for the choices Gurov makes in 'The Lady with the Dog'" only to apologize with "I know that's not what you're looking for or not really analytical." Testimonial readings can serve as a gateway for analyzing how the "language in which we see particular situations and their demands" makes us either dismiss, deny, or socially *re*-construct our first "felt response" to a poem, fiction, or drama. Such readings, which I always recast as "testimonial writings," can help us unpack, in responsive writings or online discussion posts, how we begin to "develop and trust an orientation" as our emotional investments inform and shape our political and social reactions to a text (Boler 168-70).

I have been tempted to begin ENGL 366 with Boler in order to make "testimonial readings" the framework for all future journal writings, in-class responses, workshop forum posts, but I have also learned that most excerpts from *Feeling Power* (1999) are

difficult to read without prior discussion of emotion theory. I have decided that the

following best serves my purposes in Creative Writing II:

> I draw on two key areas to characterize testimonial reading: our political climate
> of crisis, which requires new representations of "truth" which are not static and
> fixed, but allow us to communicate trauma's "excess." Second, in response to
> crisis the reader accepts responsibility as a co-producer of "truth." This
> responsibility requires a committed interrogation of the reader's response as she
> faces the other's experience. To turn away, to refuse to engage, to deny
> complicity—each of these responses correlates with a passive empathy and risks
> annihilating the other. (166)

Although I have not yet fully employed Boler in ENGL 366, I see the value in shaping a

reading list of short fiction that is purposefully awkward and anger-inducing but

potentially transformational. If students feel uncomfortable reading a work, then they

need to use their emotional reactions (anger, disgust, outrage, sadness, pity) to examine

their complicity in the "truth" the fiction produces. Boler may also produce anger and

defensiveness in her discussion of "defensive anger" that students use self-protectively to

defend their often unconscious "investments in the values of the dominant culture" (191).

A student and I initiated a talk of testimonial readings by discussing how Virginia

Woolf claimed to have revised the two lectures that comprise the bulk of *A Room of*

One's Own to avoid sounding shrill in her delivery—to avoid giving an audience of male

academics the angry woman they anticipated. Instead, Woolf was hoping to provide

"incandescence" in her text that would draw readers' own emotions into the work (to

invoke Micchice) and also create a crisis of truth that readers might have to resolve in

relation to the work (to invoke Boler). A slight majority of students seemed taken by the

idea of testifying, even if our watered down approach fell short of Boler's larger

intentions. Our weekly discussion then focused on *how* we might testify to our emotions

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as a productive category of inquiry in workshop responses. Along these lines, Larry

chose to reflect on an earlier workshop contribution:

> Good stories evoke emotions, and I was raging mad by the end of [another
> student's work]. Child abuse is such an evil that it makes a person want to protect
> the abused and punish the abuser. You did a great job taking me back in
> time. [The main character's] short lived joy was met with her harsh reality, and I
> felt her fear. The honesty of her words as she talks to God, knowing that He
> hears, even in the noise of an unsettled house served almost as a comfort and a
> small break from the turmoil. Although you wrote this as 'fiction,' this type of
> story is all too real. As I sit, still suffering from the words on your page, I am
> burdened and unsettled by what I just read. I guess that is what good writing can
> do for a reader.

I asked Larry to consider writing in the "testimonial" vein we had discussed for the

following week's journal response. I explained again that interrogating why a story

"burdened and unsettled" him would be good for both his workshop critique and his own

understanding of these lingering emotions about a work of fiction. I assured him I wasn't

trying to psychoanalyze his responses or cast any additional judgments about them. He

wrote at length about the horrors of child abuse creating one kind of anger—one he

"imagined everyone must feel just reading about what you realize goes on daily for so

many kids"—but that his "burden" was in the resolution of the short story, which left him

"unsettled" because it seemed "too settled" in this draft. He had not written this in his

previous critique, but he arrived at it through a kind of testimonial process that made him

ask how the supposed "truth" of a narrative resolving its interior and exterior motivations

through traditional closure was at odds with the emotional truths he felt about the

unresolved or "haunting" nature of childhood abuse on later relationships, sense of self,

addictions, guilt, and a range of aftermath emotions he didn't want the story to

"foreclose" for readers.

In a blog I posted shortly after reading Boler for the first time, I began questioning how I might integrate testimonials into my literature and writing classroom, and this is a question I still return to. In the blog post, I said that Boler reminds me of attempts to discuss race in a Southern Literature course I occasionally offer. Inevitably, a frustrated white student will sigh, "Well, hey, *I* didn't own slaves, and I don't think my ancestors did either." Why, Boler might ask the non-slave-holding student, are you so invested in saying this? Why are *you* so immediately under attack when you read anything that touches on this subject? Does this imply that race, for you, is a "crisis of truth," (or the unanswered, often denied conflicts of competing truth claims)? What sort of interrogation could that initial hostility and denial lead to? In testimonial writing, engaging with a text means engaging with those social, historical, political, and economic forces that produce the events of the text, produce the author and text itself, and, importantly, produce our emotional reactions to it. In the broadest sense, Boler wants readers to ask, "what crisis of truth does this text speak to, and what mass of struggles and contradictions do I become as a result?" (170-71).

Week Twelve focused on discussions of Hamera, Zarrilli, performance studies, and the embodiment of the writing and workshop process. In yet another note to self, I should have built a writing assignment around the clip of Dick Cavett and Marlon Brando arguing that acting is not limited to the stage or screen but rather a continuous "act of survival" predicated on the demand for emotional comportment and the need to "edit at an insane rate" feelings that are not socially acceptable. In future versions of ENGL 366, this clip will become an assigned viewing—or "reading" given the performance of comportment that breaks down between host and guest. Since students seemed

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mesmerized by the embodiment of tension (the hulking stillness of Brando's unease, the fidgety tightness of Cavett's anxiety), I plan to show portions of the interview without sound, much like teaching scenes from *Citizen Kane*, to highlight the narrative dynamic of bodies on screen.

Relatedly, in "Action, Structure, Task, and Emotion," Zarrilli synthesizes a range of performance studies perspectives regarding the "commonplace tendency" among young actors and contemporary Western actor training to "assume an emotion is a spontaneous eruption of feeling" and to "confuse" their own "personal/emotional life experiences" with "those of the characters they are asked to play" (145). In addition to asking his students to question where a character's emotional responses become confused with those of the actor's, he also asks students to question what becomes "equivalent to experiencing" in acting. For instance, once we agree that emotion is both bodily situated *and* socially constructed, it gets tricky to talk about how we experience an emotion. We still feel at a bodily level, but, given the self-aware nature of performance, it seems like we will eventually second-guess the extent to which we are "feeling in the moment" vs. "feeling in a socially mediated way"–a way that Hochschild believes is managed and made appropriate for and by a larger community of performers. This is why I like Zarrilli's question of what becomes "equivalent to experiencing" in a performance of self or performance of character. Our discussion in Week Twelve gravitated toward the latter, with students mainly referencing "behaving" and "feeling" as characters in pre-writing and, only occasionally, as bodies in the act of composition.

Following the Brando clip and a hit-and miss discussion of Zarrilli, students were asked to write a reflection on the role of "performing emotions"–their own in the process

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of writing, their characters' within the narrative—as they finished their stories for that week's deadline. I also asked them to engage our previous week's discussion of Stanislavski and emotion memory (I pointed them to his quote about "once you can blanch or blush simply by recalling something that happened to you, once you are afraid of a past misfortune, you have a memory for feelings, or Emotion Memory. Only it is not sufficiently developed for you to fight, all on your own, the problems inherent in public performance") and to consider Judith Hamera's observation about her dance students "neglecting to write their bodies" into their ethnographic reflections (*An Actor's Work;* Hamera 121-123).

Kirk's response returned our discussion to Stanislavski's Given Circumstances and the inspiration of emotional attachments in short fiction. He admitted that he "can get caught up quite easily in the emotions of [his] characters and find myself feeling the way I do. I think of a setting, listen to music or search the internet for inspiration and wait to see what emotions (if any) seem to attach themselves. This is normally how I try to begin a story." Similarly, Beth responded with a reflection on a story she had recently workshopped:

> For me, time periods are important, and a huge part of my own emotional response. I chose to put my story in the early 1970's, because as a child, these were some of my earliest known memories, not stories that were told to me, and I find a huge attachment there. Sometimes I can hear a song from my childhood and get a very vivid image of where I was the first time I heard it, or just an overall memory of the season when I first heard the song (think Paul Simon's "50 Ways to Leave Your Lover", summertime, 1976; as an eight year old, I thought it was scandalous). These attachments give me an emotional investment in my writing.

Larry spoke to the need to "get lost" in his characters, their circumstances, and, in some ways, the performance of writing as becoming the Other:

I found myself drawing from different experiences and stories from students and adults I have worked with, and I combined my emotions with fictional thoughts, actions, and emotions to make the reader have some sort of connection as they read. I felt, almost, as if I were experiencing the story as I wrote it, and 'lost' myself in that world for the time it took me to pen my thoughts. The emotional connection that I felt as I read [a previous fiction] was part of my goal as I wrote, desiring to draw in anyone who read it, while leaving the end somewhat abstract and unclear.

Later, in a discussion forum, I read posts that addressed the problem of role

playing leading to a writer's uneasy identification with her fiction. Michelle posted the

following:

This [pedagogical approach] has posed a good challenge for me already. I love writing and getting into my characters. Every character we write about is some part of ourselves. I once started writing a thriller that centered around a serial killer. I won't go into details, but I didn't finish writing it. As I wrote the part of the killer, I tried to think like he would and would often have a terrible attitude, a "funk," for a couple of days.

I replied that I thought it was hard to say that "we begin entirely with 'The Other' when

crafting fictional characters" and suggested while we may begin building a character out

of aspects of our own lives, we also write "other lives" through the filter of social

orientation, conventions, and feelings about characters who are not so much us but our

interests. I said that we develop characters that we connect to emotionally, even if those

emotions are negative, such as when we revile a character's behavior but want to

understand the motivations of it.

In a similar vein, Becky reflected on writing a story about suicide:

Anything I write I pull from reality, then fix it up with fake stuff. I know someone who recently committed suicide out of rage (or at least, that's the general consensus). From this I felt confusion, loss, and then I wanted to put myself in his shoes, make myself understand what maybe he was thinking, what maybe he thought afterwards. It's a weird thing to do, I know, but it's how I write. In general, when writing creatively, I find that writing is like acting. Not only do we invent the character, we become a character. Or, in some cases, like this week, character creation is like a recipe: use a real person and add and take away ingredients of the person until you've crafted what you want.

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Students were still very attached to Stanislavski's chapters on emotion memory from the previous week. All of the following, for example, wrote testimony to the "storehouse" of emotions they felt they were starting to access, as well as to their newly stored range of empathetic responses to challenging subject matter (i.e. students had recently contributed stories about survivors of rape, incest, suicide, cancer, and characters who were themselves the victimizers through infidelity, vehicular manslaughter, sexual obsession, and, in the case already mentioned, serial killing):

Becky:

There are so many moments, experiences, and fictions that we've encountered that end up in the Not Important trash bin, lost forever. What is the deciding factor in what gets to stay? Emotion. Will we remember a mundane lunch break, eating bland food in a quiet park, or the day there was a giant fly in our pudding cup as tornado warning sirens blared? The latter, due to fear and disappointment. The same is true for writing: words that don't engage us emotionally unremembered, but words that "attached" us to a character, or shared, personal event in our lives, or made us so overwhelmed with guilt, empathy, or even disgust, stick with us in those special storage corners of the brain.

Christy:

Everything I have ever written has involved a piece of myself. It seems as though the best pieces of writing I've ever completed have come from this…*storehouse*. They come from a place inside me where, evidently, I house emotions—not until it's manifested on paper do I realize I've experienced it. I feel the most connected to my work when I'm recollecting something from memory. When I'm describing a country scene, I pull it from my youth where we lived on the middle of nowhere with 200 acres and a plethora of farm animals. When I'm writing about a fight, I recall one of the billions from childhood; I remember what people said, their posture, things broken, people crying.

Becky:

Our childhoods give us this fantastic pool to pull material from; the more I write, the more I seem to remember. It is precisely what Stanislavski speaks about: the Emotion Memory. The emotions of the characters I create are generally my own emotions drawn from a real-life event. Sometimes, though, they come from people-watching, I guess you could say. Writing has everything to do with having material to create from. This material comes from the emotional storehouse, research, and through the observation of the world and people around us.

Beth:

Being an emotional person by nature, I was expecting to feel quite a bit of emotion in writing my rough draft, but I thought I could write the story with *some* emotional distance from my characters. However, that proved very difficult for me, and I didn't even realize it until I re-read my story out loud, and found myself barely making it through some parts, and not making it at all through others without falling apart. I hadn't realized, as I was typing the story, how much I was putting myself into the position of each character. The most difficult was to feel what an alcoholic father would feel, and to write how that manifest itself toward Ruby, without feeling like I was condoning his behavior in some way, like I was guilty of slapping her myself.

Sarah, a prolific writer, discussed the manic-depressive toll of crafting fiction (the "writer's high" of seeing her words as she types them across the screen, the anhedonia of seeing a narrative reach its conclusion) as well as the emotional connections she feels to knowing and creating her characters' circumstances:

Creative writing exhausts me. It is a far greater emotional drain than any other classes I take. [I am drafting a new story this week] and in the first two paragraphs my character is going to find out that her husband has died. I don't know the man yet--we haven't really sat down and had a long talk--but my character is so young that when I wrote about her finding out her husband died I felt genuine remorse for her loss. She has a daughter and now they will have to figure out a way to live and move on, and I hope someday she will figure out how to love again, yet the story is new. I know pretty much how it's going to go, and of course I know its fiction, but I still feel sad telling it.

Since most students discussed their emotional connections in terms of a figurative storehouse or in other disembodied abstractions, Judith Hamera's "Performance Studies, Pedagogy, and Bodies in/as the Classroom" provided an opportunity to ask why we do "not include [. . .] the physical as well as the 'textual'" when we describe the feelings of being a student, or, in a creative writing class, the embodied feelings of our characters? Students will be familiar with commonplace assertions that "absences in [narrative] texts also speak," but Hamera points us to the specific absence of bodies in the state of feeling in her students' narratives. After reading Hamera's article, then, we might ask writing

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students if they physically perform, with faces or full bodies, the emotions of their characters as they write them? If so, how do they perform writing differently—or by pedagogical custom—when they are writing as "bodies in a classroom"?

Beth's response addressed the first of these questions by describing the denial of her body's need for movement, basic functions, and food when she writes. She also implied that her fiction is really working to the extent that she forestalls attending to bodily needs: "once I begin writing, I really enjoy it, but I'm almost maniacal about it; I will sit for hours, curled in weird positions with the laptop on my legs, typing like a crazy person. I won't get up to go to the bathroom, or eat, or get a drink... I'm always thinking, "just one more sentence, then I'll go." In the discussion forum, Linda responded that she found it "so interesting" that Beth wrote while seated "at the computer," since Linda "first composed" scenes in her head while performing other activities. "I only begin to put it 'on paper' when I am 'done,'" she explained. "I then move away from the computer and work on the details and then go back and add things."

Hamera asked her students to rewrite their dance ethnographies and describe more concretely their "disciplined bodies" in the classroom process of training. I translated this into asking, how do we perform or embody writing in the mediated space of the classroom? I also asked how we perform writing differently—or by pedagogical custom—when we are writing as "bodies in a classroom"? After bodies turned to glance at each other, a list emerged: students decided that we perform writing by curling legs up into a cramped desk, rolling shoulders, eyes, heads, flattening back hair, gnawing on pens and fingers, looking around to check out other bodies writing, popping ankles, scribbling in fits, lowering our heads, wincing, breathing louder, shrugging, doodling profanity, and

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fidgeting like Dick Cavett while struggling to give or receive constructive advice. Not

surprisingly, most related to Beth's example of suspending the body for long periods

while they mentally performed writing on the page. Some, however, described missing

"the acting out and pacing about" of their process at home. I suggested we improvise a

"movement-oriented" writing exercise, but, even this late in the semester, I had no takers

("It's childish," Gary claimed, emphatically. "Adults who don't have ADD can sit,

concentrate, and respond to a writing prompt without having to act it out or go get

costumes.").

Later in the week, a student who had not contributed to many class discussions

brought an unauthorized biography of Patti Smith by my office. The book relied heavily

on interviews from *Cream* and *Rolling Stone*, and the student had noticed how often

Smith talked of how her "whole body" was "involved," "electrified," and "always

performing" when she wrote poetry on her old typewriter. The passages were raw—

Smith claims to have "wet herself" and acted upon her own self-arousal during the

process of writing creatively—but they added dramatic performative examples to our

previous week's discussion. I may reference Smith's embodied process in a future

semester of ENGL 366, but I have definitely vowed to create a multi-part writing

exercise that first asks students to perform an emotion (or mirror one, to connect

Niedenthal's research to our later work with Hamera), then write about it, then reflect on

what this in-class performance of both feeling and writing led them to consider about

embodiment.

Week Fifteen was mainly dedicated to final reflections and assessing emotion

work in creative writing. In the week that structural analysis and revision projects were

due, I asked students to reflect on where and how our discussions of emotion theory and performance may have influenced their revisions. I will conclude this pedagogical narrative with three examples from this responsive writing.

First, Beth wrote of how an emergent understanding of emotional labor and aesthetic attachments had helped her negotiate her reactions to criticism:

> After the workshop process and our discussions of emotion, was able to step back from the critiques my fiction received and see them more clearly, read them differently. Even though I am under no obligation to change anything to which I have a strong attachment, I still need to ask why I have such an attachment. I find that if I don't do this as I'm reading the critique, I have too much emotional investment to see it clearly, and each negative comment stings. I have to allow myself the "grieving" process of anger, denial, defensiveness, then see how I feel about each suggestion.

Second, Hailey offered a fusion of Jagger's theories, Stanislavski, and exposition of embodied emotions that may run counter to what a character can or cannot say:

> When I wrote my first story, I was actually worried about making my main character too similar to me. It was my first attempt at writing an actual story, and I just wasn't ready to go there yet. So instead, I created Jan. Since she was female, I wanted to make her much older than myself. But yeah, that didn't work. At the time, I was feeling sort of numb towards my day-to-day routine. That was the direction I was going for with Jan, but it didn't come out that way. I felt most connected to my work when Jan released the dog, since [the character] had emoted inwardly for most of the story and, in the few instances where she did emote outwardly, she did so when others weren't present. I considered Jagger's quote about emotions being "the ways we actively engage and construct the world" when I was deciding on the ending because in terms of emotions, I felt like it was an engagement. [. . .] I chose to complicate Jan's emotions by having her struggle with quitting her job. She built it up to some sort of life-altering experience, and we see the physical decisions to leave within her make-or-break moment, even though she is unable to say the words.

When I wrote feedback on Hailey's story, I complimented her attempts to balance the mental and physical aspects of her character's choices in the end of the story, a balance that Hailey also ascribed to a blend of reading Jagger and engaging in later semester discussions.

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Third, in her structural analysis and revision assignment, Christy claimed to revise her story with an eye toward the bodily location of a character's emotions. In my comments to Christy I suggested that when writing a story "so focused on a character's shifting complex of emotions or when creating a character viewpoint that is still awash in conflicting emotions," she should include "every last bit of emotion in the first draft" and then keep rereading until she had determined "which lines were the most exacting or impressionistic." I wrote that rereading helps us notice the "repetitions, abstractions, and direct statements of emotions (or what I call "place-holder feelings," the tendency to default to abstraction) that always arise in our early drafts." I highlighted that in her first draft, the main character simply tells readers that "When I saw him I felt horrible, like a panic coming on and I almost ran to him. Instead, I fought through all the ways he had made me feel and tried to keep walking, tried to forget all the pain as I kept on toward the park." In her revised version of this passage, she exemplified our discussion of "physically locating emotions in fiction" and made this scene feel much more immediate:

> A flush reddened behind my eyes as I watched him press her against his truck. My legs stiffened, relaxed. I considered walking by and showing him I didn't remember how displayed she must be feeling. I bent my knees, indecisively, then turned and let the shame of him leave me with each passing block. I was halfway to the city park before my hands stopped shaking and I knew I couldn't stop walking.

Although still a work in progress, this revision was already much more "embodied" and I suggested using it as a model when she revisited other scenes that needed affective detailing. I also encouraged her to consider, for the sake of understanding and not for direct statement in the text, how her main character's emotions toward this ex-boyfriend had been shaped and managed by peers, family life, and childhood attachments. "Not every scene needs to become a microscopic examination of a character's feelings," I

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clarified, "but every scene is worth analyzing for the author's awareness of feelings that precipitate decisions in a narrative."

Reflecting on my attempts to translate theory into pedagogy in creative writing courses, I realize that even when our discussions fell short of recognizing our theorists' larger aims, they still resulted in students thinking about how to craft emotions in fiction in more complicated ways. As I summarize in the next chapter, many students *did* make connections between individually experienced feelings and socially prescribed emotions. Importantly, many began to realize how generalized or directly stated emotions had been in their early drafts, which mainly reflected the meager vocabulary we possess for describing the nuances and embodiment of our feelings.

To be sure, talk of the social construction of emotions and the dissent inherent in publicly "outlawed" emotions drew dividing lines in our discussions. However, I still believe that writing versions of Boler's testimonials can help students who resist the more "radical" threads of this discussion give voice to their own dissenting emotions. Testimonial writing can also help students recognize how intractable positions—the "convictions they were born with"—are grounded in attachments to learned ideologies that connect back to family, church, early socialization, and ineffable yet deeply felt connections to place.

In my concluding chapter, I categorize my attempted integration of emotion theories and performance studies across multiple semesters and make four recommendations for future incarnations of this course. I also provide another (much shorter) naturalistic analysis of teaching ENGL 366 online in the summer of 2012, and

what this experience with students who were not immediately or synchronously performing as "bodies in the classroom" helped me understand. Finally, I discuss additional research considerations for these areas of study and return to the larger contributions that an emotion-centered approach to creative writing could make to the aims of a humanities education.

CHAPTER FIVE: "NO ESCAPING FEELINGS": PEDAGOGICAL REFLECTIONS, BODILESS CLASSROOMS AND CREATIVE WRITING'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO A HUMANITIES EDUCATION

"Emotion is the chief source of all becoming-conscious. There can be no transforming of darkness into light and of apathy into movement without emotion."

--Carl Jung, *The Meaning of Psychology for Modern Man*, 1934

"The whole process is mentally exhausting, and I get to the point where I don't know why I began writing in the first place. But I think it's the challenge of writing to feel what I think I am feeling that keeps me going."

--Online student in ENGL 366, Summer 2012

In my first chapter, I discussed Kevin Brophy's recent lament that the "strange and difficult process" of the creative writing workshop had, among its problems, the tendency to "fall into discussion of writing as illustration of experience or feeling" (79). In questioning why, Brophy admits that there is "no escaping feelings once writing becomes creative" and that the problem with this inevitability is that "we are generally clumsy at talking emotions in a public forum" and, when we try to in creative writing classes, the practice of workshopping becomes "dissipated through a delta of ultimately isolated individual consciousnesses" (79). Though these laments are peripheral to Brophy's larger argument for a steadier diet of literary examples in creative writing classes, they illuminate a common resistance to the discussion of emotions. I believe that the inevitability of this discussion in creative writing, combined with the opportunity to address how "generally clumsy" we are at having it, can not only enhance the workshop but open a dialogue that transcends it. I remain convinced that "talking emotions in a public forum" is a necessary adjunct to creativity (and cognitive judgment) and not the

obstacle to craft that Brophy and others suggest. Further, my trial semesters with

emotion-centered pedagogies have reaffirmed that creative writing classes are ideal for

introducing ways of "talking feelings" in a forum that has always needed an interrogation

of what students perceive as "isolated individual consciousnesses."

In my fifth and final chapter, I reflect on how emotion scholarship can and should

be incorporated into creative writing classes, where students commonly refer to "writing

from an emotional place" without much vocabulary or background for articulating that

"emotional place" or questioning its origins. In addition to summarizing the pros and

cons of the pedagogical trials I narrated in chapter four, I spend the second half of this

chapter looking ahead to possibilities for this scholarship: specifically, I provide insights

I gained from testing out this pedagogy in an online section of ENGL 366 and, in my

conclusion, I suggest benefits of this approach to creative writing for a humanities

curriculum.

Although it is limiting to reduce the offshoots of class discussions, random office

visits, marginalia, and in-class writings to "four takeaways of a pedagogical trial," my

notes *can* be organized into these categories when I consider my original question: what

does creative writing gain from the incorporation of readings in emotion and performance

studies? My answer is that writing students benefit from 1) the inclusion of a critical

framework for intermediate and advanced course work, especially one that introduces

them to 2) writing with an understanding of emotion memory and embodiment in the

traditions of Stanislavski and selected theorists in performance studies, 3) the effects of

emotion management in crafting tone and maintaining workshop comportment, and 4) the

possibilities of emotion as a category of analysis that can aid in workshops and, more

broadly, our understanding of culture. I discuss this last observation at the end of the chapter when I articulate creative writing's contributions to the humanities. In each of these reflections I summarize early successes as well as subsequent decisions to alter the reading list, develop additional exercises, and nuance assessments that I have only begun to explore.

Reflections on Incorporating Theory into the Craft of Creative Writing

Shortly after a class discussion of Niedenthal's research into embodiment, I felt my first doubts about committing to a critical focus for creative writing. I had not changed my mind about talking to undergraduates about the crucial role of emotions in our understanding of the world, but I was struck by how alien a theoretical focus seemed in the kind of class I had taught for sixteen years (and had taken for twenty-five). Later, as I reflected on this class, I kept circling back to Ted Lardner's observation that "few teachers in creative writing have the occasion to speak their philosophy of teaching creative writing" (74). Technically, Lardner was lamenting the lack of journals dedicated to creative writing pedagogy, but he made me consider how natural it is to discuss a philosophy of teaching in a composition course or to introduce a theoretical focus in literature, as I do with gender and identity when I teach Studies in 16th-18th Century Literature. I decided to continue *acting* as though it were common to have a running dialogue on emotion in the intermediate creative writing course, even though I knew this resolve was a blend of my own emotional attachment to making this work and an act of comportment given how unusual a theory-based pedagogy felt.

I also took comfort in George Kalamaras's reflections, after his semester of trying to appropriate social-epistemic rhetoric for creative writing pedagogy, that even though

"on the surface, one might say [his actual pedagogy was] not necessarily grounded in social-epistemic discourse," he recognized that conversations about social critique "would otherwise be omitted" and that his courses were at least "introducing this element" as part of a larger social turn across the curriculum (80). Likewise, though I felt like we would fall short of Boler's aims, I recognized that talk of testifying to discomfort would be "otherwise omitted" in, say, the seven traditional models of creative writing pedagogy that Blythe and Sweet outlined. When my creative writing students weren't fully comprehending emotion as a category of analysis, I took solace in Kalamaras admitting his students hadn't fully understood the theories he incorporated, but they also hadn't "mastered writing poetry by midterm" either (79).

Currently, I see my work as helping answer a decades-old call, due to exigencies I identified in the first three chapters, for the integration of theory in creative writing classes. Kelly Ritter and Stephanie Vanderslice have argued that "reassessing" and countering the "avoidance of critical and cultural theory in creative writing classrooms" should be one of the highest priorities in creative writing pedagogy if we are to "galvanize the field" (xvii) and Blythe and Sweet have famously requested "the perfect combination of praxis and theory" that would not reduce time needed for "talking craft" nor represent mere lip service to literary theory to "toughen" the academic image of creative writing (307).   One of my guiding ideas was to balance the potential rigidity of a theory-driven course with a flexible, improvisational approach to our readings. I did not demand that we cover each of the passages I had planned to address each meeting, and I would quickly decide where some arguments, notably Boler's and Stanislavski's, became unwieldy or esoteric in the compartmentalized amount of class time I had allotted. I was

willing to forego a few in-class writings if our prefatory discussion was going well. I also realized that the proximity of our classroom to my office, where a range of books are housed for "whatever comes up in class," enabled follow-up readings and supplemental passages, such as Worsham's assessment of pedagogic violence, following our mid-meeting break. Arguably, brief selections from Hochschild and Sedgwick were the most successful of these impromptu readings, and my plan is to include these passages in future versions of the syllabus. I also want to dedicate one meeting, likely the sixth in a traditional sixteen week semester, to having students bring in their own samples of sentimental or outlaw prose to help exemplify these concepts before we transition to performance studies. Locating such examples in published works would help students develop a better eye for locating these as tones and traits in their own fiction during workshop.

Not unexpectedly, a dividing line in our semester's discourse was the turn toward the "social construction of emotions" during our discussion of Jagger, Boler, and one impromptu reading from Ellen Quandahl's "A Feeling for Aristotle: Emotion in the Sphere of Ethics". Quandahl asserts that "scholars in fields as different as political science, history, and anthropology have shown that the primary other of reason—emotion—is not entirely an individual or natural phenomenon, but is rather culturally and historically shaped, and closely linked with discourse" and this was quite an affront to students who had written at length about the wellspring of inspiration their personal emotions provided (11). However, the evolution on this thinking across a semester of discussions led me to believe that most students made connections between individually experienced feelings and socially prescribed emotions. By Weeks Ten through Twelve,

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for instance, students seemed much more open to referencing the ways we learn to perform emotions for a variety of social settings and how this, in turn, gives rise to the dissent inherent in the performance of outlaw emotions. Writing a version of Boler's testimonials also helped students who were resisting "social mediation" voice their own dissenting emotions, which only created more examples of the "stickiness of emotions" that I was careful to highlight in my feedback on in-class writings or related discussion posts (Micchiche 8-9). The dialectic between biological and sociological conceptions of emotions can allow students to witness the ways in which staunch, intractable positions— the "convictions they were born with"—are grounded in emotional attachments to learned ideologies that connect back to family, church, early socialization, and the ineffable yet deeply felt connections to place ("In my hometown we learned a sense of respect for . . ."). Such awareness can become a portable skill in the humanities, and in life in general, beyond the immediate applications of theory for creative writing.

I found that even brief readings in performance studies can complicate the older, individualized conceptions of emotion memory in Stanislavski's teachings. It helps that Stanislavski's name and legacy resonate with a majority of students, who were already "attached" to the more Romantic ideals of drawing from one's own emotions in the service of art. Stanislavski helped us tie together earlier discussion threads with his urge to use "our own nature, our subconscious, instinct and intuition" to experience "a series of interlinked physical actions" that not only reveal a narrative arc of "logic and sequence and feelings, in the given circumstances" but a knowledge of a character's motivations, decisions, and outcomes that is "not intellectual but emotional in origin" (*Notebooks*

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1936-37 78). These concepts, organized around Stanislavski's construct of "emotion memory," aided our craft discussions of not just character but plot. In previous versions of ENGL 366, I would contrast Aristotelian definitions of mimetic activity with Modern ones in works like E.M. Forster's *Aspects of the Novel* (1927), where Forster famously distinguishes between story and plot by defining story as a "narrative of events in their time-sequence" and plot as "also a narrative of events in their time-sequence, the emphasis falling on causality" (86). Stanislavski's "given circumstances" and confluence of "logic and sequence and feeling" enhanced our discussions of "causality as it develops from character" because it made students question whether or not they believed they could locate their character's "motivation" by accessing their own affective understandings of the character's circumstances: affective understandings that also asked if they believed emotion memories to be individually created and stored. After our readings in performance studies complicated Stanislavski's advice with more transactional, socially mediated concepts of emotion, I had some students testify that character and plot were "frankly, impossible to determine without some questioning of emotional complexes."[13]

Certainly, Stanislavski and performance studies scholars such as Stucky, Zarrilli, and Hamera offer students contrasting views of the performance of emotions. Stanislasvki asks his actors to look into their lives to find emotional equivalencies for what may be brought into established theatrical spaces, whereas performance studies, particularly studies derived from the field of communication, enable us to view all spaces and acts in our lives as performative (we could always and everywhere be viewed as

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[13]I have excerpted this quote from one of the in-class writings on Stanislavski.

bodies in the act of performing). Thus, my students came to equate Stanislavski's

teachings with "actors" drawing from the past to nuance performances on the stage, and

performance studies with our never-ending series of performances and transactions that

extend well beyond a theatrical setting or purpose. This discussion proved useful for

students who commonly claim they "write from an emotional place" or "draw from their

own emotions when crafting character," since it asked them to take a more complicated

look at emotions they believe originate wholly from "within." Moreover, this pedagogy

asks students to consider the psychological / inward / past-mining orientation of

Stanislavski's appeal to emotion memory in contrast with the sociological / outward /

present-observing orientation of performance studies that have emerged from

communications. I also found this pathway, within the potentially infinite geography of

performance studies, to be well-suited to discussions of embodied emotions. Zarrilli's

essay, in particular, helped students focus on how affect is transmitted from one character

to another and not, as I mentioned in chapter three, on the anthropologies or social

dramas of the performance studies Schechner made famous in the late 1970s and early

1980s.

Readings in Hamera and Zarrilli also enabled discussions of narrating characters'

bodies and not just the speech tics, hedges, and pauses of direct dialogue. Students

reported that the revision Hamera assigned her students made them consider how and

where they "feel" memories that do not immediately present themselves in a cognitive,

linguistic way. This helped reinforce our earlier, less sustained discussions of

embodiment, or the ways in which the body not only feels but continually performs

emotions. Like Hamera, I tied these discussions to revision advice, usually in marginalia

that urged students to substitute embodied states of feeling for direct statements of abstracted emotions in exposition and dialogue.[14] As I revise and expand on the performance readings within our semester-long focus on emotion, I hope to guide students to much larger ideas of how emotions are in a constant dynamic with ideologies and cultural contexts that mediate what we may feel at a bodily level.

In future incarnations of this course, I will also dedicate more time to Micchiche's work, which, as I explained in the first chapter, comes nearest to my own. In some ways, this entire dissertation represents one response to Micchiche's observation that pedagogies that help students conceptualize what "embodiment in writing means" are still largely "unformulated" (*Doing Emotion* 18). I plan to highlight her performative definitions of emotions as actions that arise in the dynamic of social activity as an additional means of questioning appeals to personally stored emotions. For example, the assigned passage from Micchiche, while initially daunting to students, is useful for articulating an awareness of both how we feel at a precognitive level *and* the ways in which Hochfield's "signal function of emotions" are what the body experiences and "understands" at a "felt level" of cognition. I want to work on connecting these ideas in Micchiche to issues of emotion management--or the disavowal of bodily feelings in favor of socially mitigated comportment—and to early discussions of performance studies. I also recognize a need to integrate creative in-class writings like the "deep embodiment" exercises Stucky developed, which asked his students to write a faithful, breath-by-breath transcription of another student's body and voice in the act of communicating. Finally, I have decided to assign John Emigh's "Performance Studies, Neuroscience, and the

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[14]I provide an extended example of this in my previous chapter.

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Limits of Culture" as an additional reading in Week Nine (following the fall or spring breaks in Week Eight) to help bridge a perceived gap between the neuroscientific exploration of emotions in Weeks Three and Four and the performances of emotions as bodies within a specific cultural context in Weeks Ten through Twelve. Emigh's essay can also help writers recognize that they do not have to choose sides in a larger essentialist / anti-essentialist debate about the construction of emotions but are only being asked to consider emotions as naturally arising *and* socially mediated.

I also need to foreground my own performance as a teacher, as another body in the classroom, as well as my emotional investments in this pedagogy, in the success of our discussions, and in the incorporation of emotion vocabulary in our workshop process. I should relate how I am still attached to aspects of traditional creative writing pedagogies that I'm seeking to reform and enhance, not overhaul or abandon. I began considering this after re-reading Erving Goffman, who stressed the necessity of "begin[ning] a conversation of performances by turning the question around and looking at the individual's own belief in the impression of reality that attempts to engender in those among whom he finds himself" (18). I also considered this when students referenced my own "performance" during our late semester readings about bodies in the classroom. "You look around a lot and gnaw your bottom lip when we start disagreeing about 'social construction,'" one student wrote. "You got really still when someone asked if writers ever actually used emotion memory."

Our most recurrent theme involved recognizing and questioning the continual emotion management in pedagogical practice and in our lives outside the fiction workshop. Early on, most students accepted that some degree of comportment could be observed in the process of composing (of sifting through the "outlaw emotions" of less socially acceptable character or storylines) and in the characterizations and narrative voices found in first drafts. Eventually, our discussions became more impassioned as some resisted the idea that they were speaking anything but unfiltered truth in workshop and others confessed to the heavy toll—one invoked Worsham's "pedagogic violence" following my reading a sample from "Going Postal"—of emotional management in every workshop, even when their own works were not up for public criticism. In some ways we are still combating what seemed like a commonplace a quarter-century ago when Alice Brand articulated the "bias" toward "emotional neutrality [being] considered morally the most advanced" in any form of university-level writing ("The Why of Cognition: Emotion and The Writing Process" 438). Closely tied to discussions of emotion management were students' frequent references to outlaw emotions (many of the quotes in chapter four originated in responses to Jagger's challenging work). Students were engaged by questions such as, "How do we privilege norms that run counter to the outlaw emotion we feel?" or "How might we confront our emotions instead of 'managing' them into a performance of detachment and appreciative objectivity?" Eventually, we came to ask how can both be felt, and thus accomplished, as part of the workshop model?

In future versions of this discussion, I want to introduce a passage from Patrick Bizarro and Michael Clanahan's "Putting Wings on the Invisible: Voice, Authorship, and

the Authentic Self" that historicizes the workshop process to observe how "creative writing was seen as an opportunity for teachers to create 'good citizens,'a non-surprising outcome of the post-WW I eras" (86). Bizarro and Clanahan reveal that creative writing "educators [. . .] viewed language as the representation of a student's inner self. And if, in the judgment of the teacher, that inner self failed to reveal conformity, the student would be advised to seek counseling" (86). I have also decided to include a cutting from Nat Hardy's conceptualization of the "necessities" in creative writing workshops, which I discussed at length in chapter two. Since students enter ENGL 366 with workshop experience, it doesn't seem too heavy-handed or "leading" to introduce Hardy's admonitions early in our process. Specifically, I am interested in students' emotional reactions to Hardy's belief that it is essential to 1) keep one's emotions out of the workshop experience, and to 2) invoke Auden's belief that "art is born of humiliation" when students either forget that 3) that "some soul trampling unavoidably occurs in workshop, never out of spite but in pursuit of improvement" or that 4) "maintaining emotional distance in the workshop is [. . .] essential for a non-violent and relatively tear-free environment" (106, 111).

Ultimately, I decided to revisit the issues of emotional management and workshop comportment in a class that does not directly feature bodies performing the tasks of emotional neutrality or self-denial. I decided that the best companion, or potential contrast, to my previous research would be online sections of the same course, so last summer I tested this pedagogy in an eight week Blackboard version of ENGL 366. In this next section, I compile some of my reflections from that experience as another way

of addressing next steps for utilizing and refining this pedagogy in what one online student termed a "bodiless classroom."

Testing It Out Online: Embodied Emotions in a Disembodied Classroom

I wanted to move from having taught a one-off experiment to creating a portable pedagogy, one that has been refined in different semesters via different modes of delivery. The online section of ENGL 366 provided this opportunity since summer courses are delivered in eight week blocks and are "zero residency," with writing students never occupying the same physical space. I was curious about the ways that emotions—and bodies—translate into a digital classroom. I also knew I would have to truncate some of the readings to fit the compressed timeline. Ordinarily, the reading load is expected to be consistent between eight week and sixteen week modes of delivery, but keeping the critical framework light and having it enhance, not overshadow, the existing features of Creative Writing II was part of what I wanted to demonstrate—for my research and for colleagues who might fear students would spend their summer reading Niedenthal and Stanislavski to the exclusion of Cheever and Chopin.

In 1998 meetings were held with the Dean of the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies (CGCS) to investigate a perceived need for distance education options for those "underserved populations" who reside beyond the convenience of satellite locations within a roughly seventy mile radius of Drury's main campus in Springfield, Missouri. Essentially, online degree completion became the technological and pedagogical hub around which CGCS configured its future growth in terms of adult students. As has been typical for institutions entering the online education "market," the registration rate for online courses increased exponentially: since the initial spring 1999

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semester when three online courses (seventy-three registrations) were offered, the program has grown to 130 courses with over two thousand registrations in spring 2012. This increase has also given rise to near-degree completion opportunities in English, History, Communications, and the Behavioral Sciences.

I was hesitant when first approached to teach online in 1999. The feeling of an imminent future to which resistance was futile--aided, no doubt, by a colleague with (what was then) North Central who assured me that University of Phoenix would soon have accreditation across North America--led to my reluctant agreement to "beta test" an electronic version of a Faulkner course I taught in the traditional, "seated" classroom. The pilot experience was not disastrous, even though the delivery method was limited to listservs and maximal use of our library's ERES platform. I was particularly impressed with the reflective, detailed dialogue that developed by mid-semester (a point at which I was less daunted by technology and students were less daunted by *Absalom! Absalom!*). By the late nineties, which seems longer ago when discussing national security or electronic communication, my younger students had already practiced an online identity: a lower-case, slightly abbreviated, emoticon-peppered voice for what was now our "virtual classroom." I was amazed at how much substance could be brought to an online discussion, especially when it was kept as informal as what I tried to foster in a decentered, "seated" classroom.

As I've mentioned, I wanted to observe the degree to which online creative writing students still worried about having to "suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others" and, early on, students were quick to highlight differences (Hochschild 7). As Beth observed:

I have been involved in the workshop experience in two different formats; one as a seated student in a live setting with my peers, and one online, with written comments and suggestions. I found the two formats to be very different from one another, with both being beneficial in different ways. In the online community workshop, I was more mentally nervous. It was more a concern that my classmates, who I couldn't see or "read" during their posted critiques, didn't misunderstand the purpose or intent of my work.

Another student, Peter, discussed frustrations with emotional comportment that mirrored those in the seated section. He admitted that "during the workshop process I find myself the most defensive" and clarified that he not only meant "among our ENGL 366 activities" but "out of all of his classes." In line with responses I sampled in chapter four, he clarified that he "attributed this to the fact that I am restricted from speaking and defending my work, and this causes me to feel even more defensive." In terms of the online workshop experience, he wrote that at least in the privacy of his apartment he could

read (online) critiques and immediately discount the feedback as the reader not getting what I am so clearly saying. In the case of seated workshops, I have less time to internalize the critique so the feelings come sharp and sudden, like arrows, which for the most part glance off my shoulders and do not hurt as badly. There is also an underlying sense of frustration that my work isn't as good as I thought it was, which is most acute during the face to face workshop. I seem to have less emotional investment in the critique that is not in person, as if I can create an image of the reviewer in my mind that is more favorable and less biased in their constructive criticism. This may seem as though I'm saying completely opposite things; online critique makes me defensive, but I don't doubt the value of my work. Face to face critique doesn't allow me the time to become defensive, but does cause me to question the value of my work.

In "Performing Writing", David Morley describes a "distance learning" creative writing experience that will only be enhanced by

a continual responsive workshop with common objectives for all its writers, and the performance of the process of writing is open to all its participants regardless of country or time zone. [. . .] In these situations, the writing process *itself* is performative, an open space into which you step before an audience of your fellow students, but one in which you find them stepping up beside you. (231)

The question for some of my online students was whether or not the feeling of fellow writers "stepping up beside [them]" really occurred in an environment where physical steps—and the presence of other bodies in a performative space—were not observable. Linda articulated one of the disadvantages of electronic workshop criticism that Morley's article does not anticipate:

> During the process was the most difficult because you have to just sit and wait for classmates to judge you. I found myself checking the message board several times a day. The whole process is interesting because I don't really know these people and so don't really care what they think but yet…I wanted them to like the story. Weird, I know. I didn't count how many people responded, but I suspect not everyone did. Perhaps, they couldn't find anything nice to say so decided to not say anything at all.

Linda's post underscores both the requisite comportment of "find[ing] anything nice to say" and the patience that asynchronous workshop feedback demands. Jenny also addressed this by admitting that "during the workshop process, my main problem was patience. I was very tempted to answer before the end of the week (Patience has never been one of my strong points). But I did not. I also found it hard not to defend my work. I really worked at seeing the story from an outside point of view." Her response, and several others, revealed that the mandatory silence demanded in workshop was only worsened by the length of time each workshop took ("seven days as opposed to seven minutes," as one noted). To be sure, emotional comportment is being performed in the delay of responses, especially when it is so easy to click "reply" in a threaded workshop discussion.

Other students spoke to the absence of "an audience of classmates in a circle" and trying to adjust to their own lack of embodiment of a physical space. Some even chose to narrate their performance of writing and revision in actual offline spaces; for example, one student invoked art studios and "performing the task of creation" in the same room

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with other students. In a seated class, students observed, you can hear other writers shifting their weight in small desks and moving their pencils in fits and stops; you can peripherally see the production of other fictions. Such observations were similar to ones I catalogued in the "seated" Week Twelve in chapter four. Relatedly, Leslie complained that in the online workshop she found it

> hard to read critiques with emoticons because they are so cutesy and reductive and it may be harder to stomach them and take them in enough when they don't have something like emoticons to deliver the criticism. I'm not asking for smiles, winks, frowny mouths to soften the criticism—that's just condescending—but I do want to read things about the person when they're saying they don't believe my ending or disagree with why my character does what she does.

Another student said that while she knew we were "kind of modeling the 'real world' of sending writing off" to an unknown, unseen "body" who would "decide to publish or scrap it," we were also supposed to be in a "different kind of community (I was about to say relationship, but that may sound too touchy-feely) in a class of peers struggling to get it out on paper." Her parenthetical aside about worrying over the "touchy-feely" foreshadowed a later message to me describing how she feared her responses were "weak" when she reacted to the emotions of a workshop piece and not its "textual problems." I responded that textual problems could *result* from an inability to see past certain emotional attachments, such as the need for satisfying narrative closure or the wish to soften the divisive feelings a character might evoke in readers.

Without being given this direction as a prompt, a few students also brought a bodily awareness of their writing processes into the online environment. As Leslie reflected:

> I have to move around, act out characters, kind of block out where they might be standing in relation to each other. I saw a really good movie, *The Whole Wide World* (1996) about the relationship between pulp fiction writer and Conan the Barbarian creator Robert E. Howard (Vincent D'Onofrio) and Novalyne Price

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(Renee Zillweger) that was based on Price's 1988 memoir of the same name. Robert Howard acts out his characters—many of them over-the-top, fantasy characters—in front of his typewriter, which freaks out his mom and others in his small Texas hometown. The humor is sort of a 'it's bad enough he writes of such things, he has to perform them too?' I'm not as dramatic as Robert Howard, but I do that. There! My secret is out.

Later in the semester, two students addressed the social pressure to moderate or censor feelings and emotions for the sake of group conventions. After our discussion of emotional comportment and readings in Jagger and Boler, Sheri and Beth had the following exchange:

Sheri:

Occasionally, I become embarrassed about the stories that materialize in my mind and cut creativity off at the knees in order to write more socially acceptable literature. I never want to come off like soft-core porn, but I believe some of the most tangible writing can often include quite vulgar or erotic accounts. This is not to say that those pieces which do not include such description are inferior, but just that I finally feel it is okay to embrace this type of writing. Another thought about emotion and writing: where an author is in his or her life can influence the quality of writing he or she produces. When I am emotionally drained or have too much on my plate already, I feel that my writing lacks luster. I have to learn to separate personal emotion and pour those feelings into a story… possibly even use the creative writing process to heal and restore emotional stability.

Beth:

I like that you said "finally feel it is okay to embrace this type of writing." In your case you were talking about "vulgar or erotic" accounts; for me, it was language; some profanity in particular. I don't speak this way in my "real life", and using them in my stories felt in some way like I was cheapening my writing. But I think it's kind of like the F-word in movies; sometimes, language conveys emotion, and feels natural and important. Other times, it just feels gratuitous, and I suppose that's ok if that's the kind of writing you enjoy, but for me, learning to use language as a tool to convey emotion/frustration/elation has been a bit freeing, and has allowed me to realize that I prefer to use it sparingly.

Sheri:

It is definitely difficult to put on paper what is going through our heads and to find the right words to illustrate our ideas. Why is it that we "water down" our thoughts? Are we taking the cautious road in fear of rejection or trying to conform to societal expectations of us? Are we trying to keep our thoughts

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appropriate? Or are there simply no words to describe the visualizations and experiences we wish to divulge? Perhaps we just need more time to edit, develop, and re-develop our stories. Maybe with time and constant revisiting we can find the perfect words, varied description, and sentence structure to get our point across. Lamott writes, "Writing a first draft is very much like watching a Polaroid develop. You can't-- and, in fact, you're not supposed to-- know exactly what the picture is going to look like until is has finished developing" (39). Why do we keep trying, in these drafts, to muddy some of the images that we *feel* but don't wish to see?

Beth:

Sheri, I very much appreciate your thoughts here! I think you definitely hit a nerve; although I don't want to admit it, sometimes my own sense of appropriateness is indeed what keeps me from expressing the story—or what I first feel the story is like.

The sense of appropriateness that Beth mentions led me to discuss comportment in relation to our Norton readings and not just examples of emotional risk-taking in students' fictions.

To help introduce a flash fiction writing assignment, I again assigned Norton staples like Jo Sapp's "Nadine at 35: A Synopsis," "Jamaica Kincaid's "Girl," and Kate Chopin's "The Story of an Hour." Online students did an even better job of discussing these stories in terms of Jagger's outlaw emotions and, to some extent, Boler's pedagogy of discomfort. For example, students claimed they wanted to respond on behalf of Kincaid's mostly silent "girl," who has internalized a litany of her mother's advice for how to avoid being branded a "slut."[15] In the discussion forum for "Nadine at 35: A Synopsis," I asked students how they felt about Sapp's use of a synoptic style to catalog the events of a woman's thirty-fifth year. Jenny decided that Sapp's format allowed

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[15]I had the good fortune of being able to visit with Jamaica Kincaid during the early writing process for this dissertation. She was visiting our department and I got to present some of the concepts of my scholarship in relation to her treatment of anger and hatred in works like *A Small Place* (1988). It was helpful to share my conception of Jagger, Hochschild, and others who deal with the "socially inappropriate" or smothered emotions with one of the great contemporary writers of oppositional emotions.

readers to "maintain a distance from the narrative." She observed that although "the reader forms a connection with the character, the audience is not overwhelmed by the darker emotions implied by the prose. The detachment proposed by the format also reflects the detachment from life experienced by Sapp's character."

In the discussion forum for Chopin's "The Story of an Hour" some students were revolted by Mrs. Mallard's exclamations of freedom ("Free! Free! Body and soul, free!") upon finding out her husband had been killed in a "railroad disaster" (228). Others applauded this emotional honesty, particularly from a story that is 110 years old, and were quick to highlight examples of comportment and management. The omniscience of Chopin's narrative does not immediately attach itself to a mourning young widow; instead, we follow the socially conditioned sympathies of her fellow mourners and then head upstairs, behind closed doors, to find Mrs. Mallard "beginning to recognize this thing that was starting to possess her" as she strives "to beat it back with her will" (229). Chopin's most divisive passage features an epiphany that runs counter to the conditioned emotions of grieving:

> When she abandoned herself, a little whispered word escaped her slightly parted lips. She said it over and over under her breath: "free, free, free!" The vacant stare and the look of terror that had followed it went from her eyes. They stayed keen and bright. Her pulses beat fast, and the coursing blood warmed and relaxed every inch of her body. (229)

Suffice it to say, our discussion of Chopin's work represented a closer tethering of key emotion concepts (embodiment, outlaw emotions, the performance of grief, and, obviously, comportment) to prose fiction than occurred in other weeks of the semester.

The final insight I gained from testing this pedagogy online was how many students wanted to discuss their sources of inspiration in relation to Stanislavski's emotion memory. In the seated section, I rushed past this dialogue in my haste to address

concepts of given circumstances and, ultimately, to contrast Stanislavski's teachings with

the orientations of performance studies scholarship. Online, I gave students more

freedom to share their own motivations for writing and this provided both individual

insight and later examples for us to discuss. For example, one student shared his need to

stimulate "emotion memory" by other "modes of art" in order to be "in the emotional

state I'm writing about," which he felt was "sort of like a Method actor but also like how

we live our lives: art allows us the occasion to feel apart from what may not be public and

permissible." Likewise, Leslie posted that she "find[s] that art always gets [her] in the

mood for more art" and another student added that "music gets me feeling creative and,

well, 'feeling' in general, especially when I write. I listen to music all the time when I do

homework and it never fails to get me temporarily excited, depressed, angry, or any of a

thousand other moods necessary for inspiration."

Following our Stanislavski discussion, more online students than "seated"

students expressed a need to divorce themselves from the characters they created. I

gleaned that students who did not get to represent themselves in other ways (being

physically present in the classroom each week, joking around on breaks, sharing pictures,

walking to parking lots together, hanging out in our student lounge, etc.) worried about

the over-representation of their characters' identities and the under-representation of how

they differed from what they wrote, even though everyone had signed on to write and

share fiction. Jenny described one instance of identity-blurring:

> From the beginning, I was emotionally attached to this story, and it flowed onto
> the page like water. Some of the character's emotions mirror my own—her
> insistence on her right as a woman and her desire to hold her negative aspects at
> bay. Her empowerment at the end of the tale is a reflection of my own personal
> hopes (Having recently ended a bad relationship, I purged some negative emotion
> with the ending.) There was only one instance in which I had trouble during the

writing process. When the rapist grabs the young woman, she reacts by drawing him closer. Her reaction is opposite from mine. I would have automatically become violent, so this part of the text took some thought and a tad bit more imagination.

After other students related to thinning distinctions between creative fiction and creative nonfiction, Leslie stressed that making these clear demarcations, or clarifying these boundaries post-workshop, had always been the main reason she wanted to "be allowed to speak during the process." Mark's post led to another student agreeing that he always wanted to follow workshops with "a list of ways in which I am not the main character or even the emotions behind the narrative voice." Likewise, Nikki posted the following:

> I have the same problem as Leslie with "coming back to real life," but all fiction has truth in it, so maybe it's not such a bad thing? I find it hard to write out separate characters and allow them to be just that: separate. My characters always end up being some warped facet of me. I like the idea of writing on a given topic, and think it could be fun. That said, frustration is the number one feeling/emotion I get when writing too. The whole process is mentally exhausting, and I get to the point where I don't know why I began writing in the first place. But I think it's the challenge of writing to feel what I think I am feeling that keeps me going.

This last line, of course, unintentionally echoed what I had already decided would be the title of this dissertation. Overall, the online experience helped me understand the need for additional forums for students to discuss their process and emotional attachments to a range of genres and modes, and, in doing so, develop their own identities apart from forums that showcased the identities of their fictions.

Creative Writing, Emotion Work, and the New Humanities

Tim Mayers "final plea" in "Figuring the Future" is directed at those "engaged in redesigning college [creative] writing programs, both in theory and practice," whom he asks to "please consider how creative writing might fit into a larger university curriculum" (12). As I discussed in chapter two, many in creative writing pedagogy have

echoed this sentiment, including Graeme Harper and Paul Dawson, who have each questioned how creative writing might move past its decades of "relative invisibility" and consider its "considerable impact" on the university, especially in terms of how it could serve the "new" humanities (Harper and Kroll, Introduction, *Creative Writing Studies: Practice, Research, and Pedagogy* 7). Stephanie Vanderslice has also stressed that any pedagogical innovation must make sense for creative writing as well as its place within the academy, which echoes Eve Shelnutt's call for theory-driven pedagogies that will remove creative writing from its "self-imposed isolation within the English department" (163). With these earlier arguments in mind, I will conclude by suggesting how my pedagogy helps creative writing make an essential contribution to the skill set a humanities education demands.

As I described in chapter four, the proposed restructuring of the Humanities and Fine Arts divisions at Drury provided additional exigency for this dissertation. Since creative writing is housed within the English department, a new divisional structure has separated it from Music, Theater, and Art in the Fine Arts: as a result, taking a creative writing course will no longer satisfy a "creativity explored" requirement in general education. As part of an ad hoc committee, I have been examining the "role of the humanities in the 21st century university" and, by extension, the role of literature and writing courses within a humanities mission. Committee discussions of works such as Martha Nussbaum's *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (2010), which includes a chapter titled "Educating Citizens: The Moral (and anti-Moral) Emotions" have helped me recognize a broader motive for integrating emotion theories, creative writing pedagogies, and performance studies. Simply put, emotional education is an

essential (if still invisible) component of how we teach students to think about western civilization and how we may help them engage, at a level of deeply felt belief, with current global issues.

Jagger, Hochschild, Micciche,Worsham and many others have already addressed the possibility of leveraging fixed understandings of the world through social epistemic rhetoric and scholarship on the body, feeling, and movement. Building on their foundations, I can see how aspects of creative writing pedagogy can help us identify similar points of leverage and emotional awareness within otherwise "fixed" belief systems that have proven humanities- resistant. A common summary of the "humanities crisis" is that the humanities do not provide professional skill sets so much as broad orientations for addressing questions of ethics, critical judgment, and what the "good life" may mean for our culture in dialogue with others; an even older question asks what sort of skills the humanities actually provide students in aid of these orientations. In one recent article, Paul Jay and Gerald Graff take exception to Nussbaum's drawing of a "stark line between the worlds of the humanities and the 21st century workplace," and argue instead that the humanities offer students very "useful professional competencies" ("Fear of Being Useful" insidehighered.com). Specifically, Jay and Graff argue that the humanities

> equip 21st century students" with the abilities to "read carefully [. . .] write concisely,   [. . .] and receive training in fields like rhetoric and composition, literary criticism and critical theory, philosophy, history, and theology [in order] to analyze and make arguments in imaginative ways, to confront ambiguity, and to reflect skeptically about received truths" ("Fear of Being Useful").

It is not hard to imagine how rhetoric and composition contribute to these critical abilities, but creative writing has also helped students argue in "imaginative ways" and "confront ambiguity" as writers are continually in the process of imagining characters

who dwell in moral ambiguity. Clearly, I would also argue that creative writing classes

can help students understand emotion as a category of critical inquiry and as a necessary

adjunct to reason when learning to "reflect skeptically about received truths."

Beyond offering new insights into crafting emotionally complex

characterizations, writing outlaw impulses, and appreciating the affective labors of

workshop, extended discussions of emotion can introduce students to the complexities of

precognitive affects (bodily incipience, felt senses, emotion memory), socially

constructed and regulated emotions, and emotion's determining influence on belief

structures that seem rigid and inadaptable. As Stenberg notes:

> This inquiry into and out of emotion cannot occur, however, unless emotion is
> understood as one feature of meaning making, equal to other features, and thereby
> deserving of a legitimate role in pedagogical settings [. . .] we might also work
> with students to develop a vocabulary for a rhetoric of emotion. This would
> involve helping students to rethink normative conceptions of emotion, in and
> outside of the academy, so as to establish that emotional responses are part and
> parcel of our intellectual work; grappling with new ideas will necessarily both
> employ and evoke emotion. Indeed, emotion can serve both as a powerful
> reinforcement of one's current beliefs, or it can become, as [Audre] Lorde
> suggests, a signal that should reflect and investigate the sources of one's
> emotions. (360)

The investigation into "the sources of one's emotion" that Stenberg and I advocate is an

important first step in finding ways to debate humanistic ideals and fundamentalist faith.

To this end, I want to share two instances that occurred during my office hours, one

involving a student who felt our discussions made him rethink emotions in St. Paul's

Letter to the Ephesians, and the other from a retired veteran who rewrote his story from

the perspective of a Pakistani man suspected of ties to terrorist organizations.

In the first instance, a student dropped by to talk quickly of his recent story and at

length about the following passage from Ephesians 4:30-5:2:

> Brothers and sisters: do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God with which you were sealed for the day of redemption. All bitterness, fury, anger, shouting, and reviling must be removed from you, along with all malice. And be kind to one another, compassionate, forgiving one another as God has forgiven you in Christ.

I worried that he had come to present a scriptural challenge to another student's work; instead, the student and I had an engaging conversation about the inability to "remove emotions" from *within* the body and the mores being promoted through the negation of "outlaw emotions" in the body. Sitting in my office, listening to the student talk through a dialectic of New Testament teaching and one aspect of Alison Jagger's work, I realized two things: 1) this dialogue would have never arisen in one of my previous creative writing classes, and 2) this dialogue ultimately led to the "leverage" that Sharon Crowley (and others) have suggested is crucial to discussing the humanities in an age of "post-9/11, American fundamentalist thinking." The student was open to questioning possibilities and ambiguities—and not merely reciting the unchallenged authority—of a quote from Ephesians.

In the second instance, a retired veteran wrote from the perspective of a Pakistani man who decides to abandon a dream of moving his family to America after repeated interrogations from a group of soldiers. The story was based on the author's own experiences in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan over the last twenty years. The Pakistani character, who became the first-person narrator following our semester's discussion, is continually suspected of ties to local insurgents and larger terrorist organizations, mirroring a "younger perspective" the author recognized he was "socialized into" and which still underpins many of his political attachments. Although this student asked me not to share his revised fiction in workshop, he was fine with me including his example in summary. His travels to foreign countries, both as a member of the military and on

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mission trips, also brought him in close contact with emotions that ran counter to his understandings of the manifestation of anger, laughter, and profound sorrow.

In trying to write of his experiences, he kept running into a problem that our discussion of Micchiche helped him past. Namely, Micchiche troubles a traditional "naturally occurring, biological" conception of all emotional states by arguing that "because people feel emotions and can identify categories of emotion and their familiar manifestations within a particular culture, emotions regularly escape critical thought" (14). Micchiche believes that this common oversight inevitably leads to "neglecting emotion's role as that which binds the social body together as well as tears it apart" (14). This student first chose to write about the Other based on authenticating details he had collected in his travels; he then chose to write *as* the Other following our discussions of empathetic understandings that develop from recognizing socially mediated differences in emotional expression. In this sense, he went from writing the commonplace of "white warrior recognizes his own better nature while living among indigenous peoples in a foreign land" to writing from the viewpoint of a culture where he had felt "outside" rules for emotion that could only be observed bodily and never fully articulated to him.

Conversations like these, which extended beyond revising an okay first draft into an improved second copy, made me value the creative writing classroom as a testing ground for emotion as a category of analysis and judgment. If creative writing students are encouraged to practice emotional or testimonial readings as they workshop each other's fictions, then they can begin to practice a similar means of reconsidering their attachments to ideology and the "way the world works" through the fictions they create

or the ways they can see themselves performing comportment or disavowing the signal

functions of their emotions. As Stenberg suggests:

> we must develop a pedagogy that allows room for "self-reflexive inquiry into how
> our emotional investments determine what we choose to see and not see, listen
> and not listen to, accept or reject. This work requires, then, deliberate attention to
> how we have developed particular emotional investments over our life histories
> and how these investments subsequently color the lenses through which we view
> the world. (361)

Quandahl also speaks to the role of emotions in the formation of ethical judgments and

adds to Worsham's belief that we are still a culture of "emotional miseducation" by

arguing that any emotion-centered pedagogy must "develop [. . .] opportunities to

observe repertoires of feeling represented in language, and [. . .] discursive tasks that

teach and require an understanding of the ethical role of feeling in judgment" (21).

"There are so many creative writing pedagogies that need to be written," David

Starkey enthuses in a recent dialogue on teaching creative writing. In this dissertation I

have argued for one that provides a needed contrast to the Gardnerian tradition of *ad*

hominem criticism, in which frigidity and sentimentality "arise out of flawed character,"

and the pedagogical continuum of emotional resistance and brutality evidenced in Brophy

and Hardy's recent manifestos. My approach also provides an answer to Paul Dawson's

call for a pedagogy of creative writing that will move past, without entirely abandoning,

the formalist and "purely aesthetic" concerns of "studying plot, dialogue, structure, point

of view [. . .] as more than a means of abstracting formal properties from an exemplary

text as examples of craft, or a method of determining whether a student's 'voice' has

been adequately expressed" and will contribute to the oppositional pedagogies that a 21st

century humanities education should provide. Demonstrating that emotion can be used as

a means of inquiry and values analysis, which can lead students to ask why they feel

deep-seated attachments to their beliefs or how they might resist limiting ideological

filters, may not be the sociological poetics Dawson hopes creative writing will innovate,

but it does allow students "to see themselves as inescapable participants in a social

dialogue," which is one of the humanities-centered goals of Dawson's call to arms

("Towards a New Poetics in Creative Writing Pedagogy"). By utilizing emotion theories

and aspects of performance studies in the creative writing classroom, I feel we can offer

students opportunities to create more emotionally nuanced characters, resist the academic

"emotional neutrality" Brand decries and aesthetic "emotional accuracy" Gardner

prescribes, and better understand their attachments to fictional modes and to culture at

large.

APPENDIX

Appendix Item (A)   English 366: Creative Writing II: Fiction - Syllabus

Required Texts: *The Norton Anthology of Short Fiction (shorter 7th ed.)*

The Best American Short Stories 2011

*In-class copies of published and unpublished fiction

**I will provide all emotion theory and performance studies

selections as photocopies and/or .pdf files on our Blackboard

course site.

Course Purpose and Requirements: The purpose of this course is to acquaint students

with techniques for writing fiction as well as give students practice in writing fiction. We

will re-examine the fundamentals of craft (gaining additional skill in point-of-view,

characterization, descriptions, setting and conflict) and explore topics such as subtext,

theme, narrative control, structure, internal/external "drivers," locating the "now" through

revision, etc. Additional considerations concerning marketing and literary journals will

also be discussed in this second semester. We will read a mix of "classic" short stories

and experimental fiction as well as selections from this year's *Best American Short*

Stories.

Students will be required to write at least thirty pages of original prose fiction.

The first assignment will be a review of a literary journal. Students are also expected to

complete one "regular" length fiction (to be discussed), one "experimental" narrative, and

one structural analysis and revision of their own work following the semester workshops

and my individual evaluations. Student analysis and criticism of class papers is also

stressed, as is student participation in class discussion. Finally, students will also be

required to complete many in-and-out-of-class writing exercises. Some of these writings will be creative exercises, **others will be reflections on craft or on the readings in emotion and performance studies that serve as a theoretical framework for this course.**

This semester we will also have a semester-long focus on the role of emotions in creative writing. Our objective will be to analyze where and how "outlaw emotions" can be crafted and "felt" in fiction (in the composition process and then for readers) and where emotional schooling inevitably occurs in the workshop process. I will introduce these concepts, and short related readings from emotion theorists and performance studies scholars, as early as Week Three following our discussion of other fundamentals in the first two weeks.

Grading: The breakdown of each student's semester grade will be:

Literary Journal Review (50 pts.)

Short Story #1 (100 pts.)

Short Story #2: Experimental fiction (100 pts.)

Writing Exercises (100 pts.)

Structural Analysis / Significant revision (100 pts.)

Class participation, in-class readings, quizzes, workshop, etc. (100 pts.)

Course Overview:

The general "flow" of most class periods will involve some lecture and discussion of writing considerations or technique, discussion and writing in response to any assigned readings, and then at least a third of the period dedicated to workshopping your stories.

This semester we will also be exploring the connections between "theories of emotion and affect" and the process and craft of creative writing. I will discuss this in much more depth in upcoming class periods. I will also hand out photocopies of essays to help support this organizing theme of the semester.

Tentative Semester Readings, Discussion Topics, and Assignments List:

WEEK 1:   Welcome, roster, semester overview, and syllabus discussion

Subject matter: intellectual and emotional territory

Affect and emotion theories in the process of writing fiction

Literary Journal Review assignment

WEEK 2:   Point-of-view, Profluence, and Sentimentality

Writing intros: POV, characterization, and establishing omniscience

"Cathedral" Raymond Carver

"Housewifely Arts" Megan Mayhew Bergerman

Gardner, "Sentimentality and Frigidity" sections from *Art of Fiction*

Literary Journal Reviews due

WEEK 3:   Establishing Omniscience, Crafting Emotions, and the First Story

Deadline

"Out of Body" Jennifer Egan

"To The Measures Fall" Richard Powers

Damasio, selections from *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* .

Micchiche, Ch. 1 "On Texts and Contexts" (emotion as action) pp. 11-25 and Ch. 2 "Sticky Emotions and Identity Metaphors" pp. 26-29 from *Doing Emotion*.

First short story deadline

WEEK 4:   Experimental Writing and Humor, Embodying Emotions, and Workshop

"Escape from Spider Land" George Saunders

Niedenthal, "Embodying Emotions"

Damasio, selections from *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*.

Workshop (written comments on all critiques must be made prior to class)

WEEK 5:   Discuss plot, narrative structure, and endings: muted vs. epiphany

"Dungeon Master" Sam Lipsyte

In-Class Writing: Reflections on the Emotion work of Workshopping

WEEK 6:   Discuss experimental fiction assignment and flash fiction:

"Gorilla, My Love" Toni Cade Bambera

"Boys" (hand-out) Rick Moody

"Bullet in the Brain" (hand-out) Tobias Wolff

"La Vita Nuova" Allegra Goodman

WEEK 7:   Workshop

"Nadine at 35: A Synopsis" Jo Sapp

"Wedding Night" Tom Hawkins

"The Story of an Hour" Kate Chopin

"Girl" Jamaica Kincaid

Boler, "Testimonial Readings" pp. 142-144 from *Feeling Power*.

Jagger, "Outlaw Emotions" passage from "Love and Epistemology"

WEEK 8:   Break Week – No Class

WEEK 9:   Workshop

"A Continuity of Parks" Julio Cortazar

"Hills Like White Elephants" Ernest Hemingway

Rough draft exchange

WEEK 10:   **Stanislavski, Ch. 9 "Emotion Memory" pp. 195-204 from *An Actor's***

Work

Stanislavski, Selections from "Notebooks 1936-1937" pp. 79-83 in *An*

Actor's Work on a Role.

"The Hare's Mask" Mark Slouka

In-class writing exercise: opening lines

Experimental fiction deadline

WEEK 11:   Workshop

Assign opening line exercise

"Gurov in Manhattan" Ehud Havazelet

Structural Analysis and Significant Revision assignment sheet

WEEK 12:   Workshop

"We Didn't" Stuart Dybek

Brando Interview clip from *The Dick Cavett Show*, June 12, 1973

(YouTube)

Hamera, "Performance Studies, Pedagogy, and Bodies in/as the

Classroom"

Zarrilli, "Action, Structure, Task, Emotion"

WEEK 13:   More experimental fiction:

"Me and Miss Mandible" Donald Barthelme

"The Handsomest Drowned Man in the World" Gabriel Garcia Marquez

"How I Contemplated My Life from the Detroit House of

Correction and Began My Life Over Again" Joyce Carol Oates

WEEK 14:   The Road to Publication, pt. 1: writing queries, researching markets

Structural Analysis and Revision assignment

Last possible day to turn in any "late" stories for credit

WEEK 15:   The Road to Publication, pt. 2

Read selections from "Writers on Writing" in *Norton*

Responsive Writing: Reflections on Emotion Studies and Revision

WEEK 16:   Finals Week – Return Graded Fiction and Portfolios

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