THE DILEMMA OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES:
AN AGGREGATE ANALYSIS OF COUNTERTERRORIST EFFORTS

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CHAPTER I
COORDINATION, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND RATIONAL TERRORISTS
Shortly after the attacks on 9/11, President George W. Bush, in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS 2002, 1), outlined three crucial tasks to protecting the US from further violence, stating, “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.” These goals stand in stark contrast to those outlined under the Clinton administration in 1998, which argued that the main objectives of the US were to bolster economic prosperity by promoting democracy and human rights abroad (NSS 1999). President Clinton’s statement was broad in comparison to the pointed and focused goals of President Bush. What is more important to note is that Clinton’s statement implied peace, an attitude not present in the declaration of the Bush administration. Given the course of events that just transpired, its absence should come as no surprise. The attacks on 9/11 were an unparalleled international event that singlehandedly shifted US security strategy and the global system seemingly overnight. No single international terrorist attack can rival the scope and depth of global consequences that the hijackings of four commercial airliners harkened in that day. Events that come close, such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the concomitant commencement of WWI, were as much a product of the complicated web of international alliances and diplomatic blunders as it was an act of terrorism (Lewis 2004). Indeed, 9/11 truly stands alone in terms of its tactical success and strategic implications.

These new strategic implications led to a drastic change with regard to US global policy, entailing a shift in its primary concern with European and NATO states to a preoccupation with Latin America, Southeast Asia, and South African countries. The US
argued that these weak states are vulnerable to terrorism and must be secured in order to preclude Al-Qaeda influence in the region. This strategy also delineates a divide between the “Old Europe” of Soviet preoccupation with the “New Europe” of post-Soviet states eager to aid the US in its battle against international terrorism, informally known as the “War on Terror.”

Such a broad and far-reaching strategy is not without its detractors. The concept of a global War on Terror needs clarification if international cooperation is to succeed and its effects are to be analyzed. Walter Mead (2004) argues that the “War on Terror” is a misleading phrase. The US is not concerned with all acts of terrorism so much as it is interested in a specific brand of terrorism. Rather than being preoccupied with terrorism in general, Mead argues that the US is focused on “grand terror.” Under this rubric, acts of grand terror create devastation and economic disruption on a scale that is similar to warfare. To this end, only radical groups in the Islamic world are capable of such deeds. Though various organizations fighting under the banner of Islamic terrorism differ over the peculiarities of their goals, overall, the movement can be conceived of as a coordinated, global insurgency. This insurgency consists of diffuse organizations of Islamic insurgents, who seek to remake Islam’s role in the international system (Kilcullen 2005).

A global insurgency of this scale warrants global action, and global action has been taken. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in trillions of dollars in expenditures, thousands of casualties, and a countless amount of international protest. How has a single incident triggered such a severe response? What is it about international terror that makes it different from other acts of war? More importantly, why do some
states cooperate with the US in its quest to eliminate terrorism while others do not? The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the phenomenon of this recent brand of terrorism and the state actions to and reactions against this global, Islamist insurgency.

Research on terrorism is growing in terms of quality and quantity as a result the attacks on 9/11, though it has been an area of study in political science long before that. Scholars analyzing terrorism have examined the causes, targets, and types of attack; however, they have not examined counterterrorist measures on an aggregate scale. Instead, many scholars rely on case studies and attribute counterterrorist behavior to the institutional characteristics of the state, cultural demographics, and aspects of the terrorist organizations in question (Ginges 1997; Rees and Aldrich 2005; Miller 2007). What has been overlooked, however, is that these outcomes are often the result of strategic interactions between the terrorist organization and the target government as well as interactions among governments. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that states anticipate the actions of other actors when formulating a counterterrorist strategy. Efforts to model these behaviors provide a fertile area for empirical testing. The problem with such an approach thus far has been a lack of systematic data collection on counterterrorist efforts. Indeed, due to want of data, scholars know more about terrorist action than about government action (Enders and Sandler 2006). This dissertation is an attempt to fill the lacuna of research in the area of counterterrorism by testing strategic models of counterterrorist efforts utilizing a framework for data collection. What follows is a brief examination of the root causes of terrorism, followed by a discussion of the literature on state actions to combat terrorism. The running thread that links this research is a heavy reliance on case studies and qualitative efforts examining counterterrorism. There are but
a few that represent attempts at aggregate, quantitative analysis.

The next section considers the obstacles that states must overcome when coordinating a global effort against terrorism, featuring a brief look at a theoretical model of the strategies states choose in the face of a terrorist threat. Overall, when threatened by international terror, states must decide either to engage in offensive action against terrorist organizations or go on the defensive by shoring up domestic security. Empirical evidence suggests that international terrorist attacks asymmetrically target liberal democracies (Li 2005). Consequently, democratic states feel the threat of terrorism more acutely and are theorized to participate in a global prisoners’ dilemma when deciding counterterrorist strategy. Strategies of deterring through security upgrades and preempting by a military offensive rely on the assumption that terrorists are rational actors capable of being deterred. Critics contend that terrorist organizations are fundamentally different from traditional political actors and thus abide by outside motivations. In order to warrant the methods conducted in this dissertation, a discussion of why terrorists are rational actors must be established to show that terrorists think strategically and employ specific attacks based on state action. The last section of this chapter provides an outline of the dissertation and what is expected to be found.

**Root Causes of Terrorism and Counterterrorist Research**

Crenshaw (1981) was one of the first to clearly delineate the root causes of terrorism. Utilizing Most and Starr’s (1989) framework of opportunity and willingness, she argues that terrorism is the result of an opportunistic setting and a catalytic shock that spurs groups into action. Key to the opportunity is a modernized society. Scholars of
terrorism have long argued that globalization is a phenomenon that increasingly facilitates the terrorist and debilitates the state. Modernization allows for the transparency of state borders as well as the acceleration of information across the globe on terrorist grievances, which work to expand the potential recruit base for terrorist causes and elicit sympathy from abroad (Sebastian 2003). Additionally, a lax government is needed. A state must be modern enough to propagate disenfranchisement and simultaneously lack the ability to either crack down on terrorist organizations or address their grievances. With regard to the willingness to mobilize, terrorists have revolutionary and sub-revolutionary motives. While their long-run goals are diverse, terrorist organizations all share potential short-run goals of disrupting government and calling attention to their problems. What is needed is a catalyst for such action (Crenshaw 1981).

However, demographic factors, while facilitating, are a weak predictor of terrorist actions. Focusing more on the willingness aspect, Newman (2006) looks at the root causes and finds that demographic factors are necessary but not sufficient for explaining terrorist attacks. Indirect conflicts are more likely the causes for terrorist mobilization. In general, he concludes that scholars are vague in their identification of root causes and that one of the problems with terrorist research is honing in on an exact definition of terrorism. Unlike states, which have marked borders and clearly delineated targets, terrorist organizations are much more difficult to elucidate.

Presently, the literature on counterterrorist efforts is dominated by case studies. This abundance can be attributed to a lack of systematic data on the subject of counterterrorism. We know more about terrorist behavior than we do about state behavior. Furthermore, most of these studies focus on cultural and demographic factors,
with little attention given to institutions or state structure. Despite this lack of aggregate analysis, case studies provide evidence for the theories to be tested in this dissertation. Meyer (2009) employs a constructivist approach that is somewhat similar to the cost-benefit analysis Enders and Sandler (2006) use in predicting state response. His case study of the “threat perception” in Western European countries in the wake of 9/11 argues that states that feel threatened by international terror are more likely to favor stronger counterterrorist action. These arguments are supported by game theory analysis in which certain states perceive a terrorist threat greater than others and favor more assertive action. States that feel the threat of terrorism the strongest derive the most benefit from taking preemptive action to liquidate the terrorist organization (Arce and Sandler 2005a). Meyer’s (2009) analysis of the dissipation of threat perceptions in Western European states after 9/11 can be linked to this idea of asymmetric targeting. Specifically, states with stronger ties to the US as well as a history of terrorist attacks possess higher threat perceptions.

However, the benefit from the elimination of a terrorist threat may not be the only motivating factor in deciding which states participate in counterterrorist measures. Omelicheva (2009), in her examination of the motivations behind Estonian participation in the War on Terror, notes that the country has not suffered one terrorist attack in its post-Soviet history. This model argues that Estonia is bandwagoning with US interests in fighting counterterrorism for political motives. Utilizing what is called a “reference group perspective,” she argues that states emulate the policies of a group of states it aspires to join. This logic moves beyond rationalist notions of attacks generating preemption and parallels constructivist work from Kuus (2002), Aalto (2003), and Noreen and Sjöstedt.
(2004) who use collective identity as an explanatory variable of its policies with European and NATO security institutions. Her theory extends past the systemic structure of constructivism to explicitly determine what motives drive cooperation from Estonia. This argument does prove convincing, as states, like individuals, compare themselves to other states (Cronin 1999; Wendt 1999). This reference group is defined as “…a state or group of states that guides and orients other states’ responses to terrorism by providing information about the legitimacy and effectiveness of counterterrorism measures.” (Omelicheva 2009, 486).

States seek out reference groups for a variety of reasons, be it material benefits, military assistance, or to avoid punishments. They also seek out reference groups to maintain a positive image (Herek 1986).

Omelicheva’s (2009) case study regarding Estonia’s decision to participate in preemptive action illustrates the prevailing trend in counterterrorist literature stemming from the lack of aggregate data. Ginges (1997) looks at the counterterrorist options of coercion and conciliation in his study by comparing two cases: Italy’s counterterrorist efforts against the Red Brigade and Israel’s ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. He finds that conciliation, in certain respects, works toward alleviating the threat of violence. By refusing to comply with terrorist demands, the government reaffirms the feeling of being ostracized, which is the same grievance that united the terrorist group in the first place. Miller (2007) also looks at terrorist characteristics as well as state responses as a basis for counterterrorist success. He argues that aggregate data are unreliable and instead uses a comparative case method, arguing that enough cases have been examined to warrant generalizations. His study concludes that states facing multiple terrorist groups have the toughest time when deterring attacks.
Moving from analyses across all genres of terrorist attacks to an overall examination of state strategy, Bleich (2009) looks at more recent cases of terrorism, particularly those in response to the growing association of Muslims with violence since the 1980s. He finds that the leading European democracies of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain have responded with an overlapping, three-pronged strategy to extremist attacks. This strategy is achieved by first passing generic, anti-violence laws that eschew reference to religion, followed by enacting policies to repress religiously motivated violence. Finally, the last element involves the construction of integration policies to assimilate religious actors into the state. Though the research method looks at multiple states, the tactics remain qualitative and are difficult to extend beyond the European region. Rees and Aldrich (2005) examine the comparison between European and US responses to post-9/11 terror, emphasizing the difference between US and European strategic cultures as the main variable in explaining state reaction. Whereas the US responded with a strategy of “global unilateralism,” European countries have responded with a more nuanced style of counterterrorism, stressing containment and peacekeeping exercises. These activities are tailored to the decades of terrorist attacks that the Europeans nations have endured. By contrast, US experiences have been relatively few. This argument seems to differ from motives of asymmetric preemption, which asserts that states bearing the brunt of terrorist attacks are more likely to go on the offense. Rees and Aldrich (2005) go on to argue that the large presence of Muslims in Europe likely tempered the EU response, suggesting that the target audience plays a role in state action. Concern for the target audience is what compels a state to modify its counterterrorist actions, for attacks that are too severe could result in a swell of terrorist
recruitment and a fear of reprisal attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004).

The classic problem with case studies is that generalizations are unable to be gleaned from any single method. The maximum amount of cases analyzed in this brief review was five in Miller’s (2007) comparative case technique. Furthermore, these examples only look at a specific terrorist organization or a single time period, further hampering the efforts to come to a general consensus. Some studies even come to contrary conclusions on the same case. Prunckun and Mohr (1997) examine the effectiveness of US retaliatory attacks on Libya in the wake of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. They reach the tentative consensus that the attacks were effective in staving off future terrorist attacks, though they stressed that their findings were inconclusive. In contrast, Enders and Sandler (1993) find that retaliatory attacks against Libya resulted in a substitution of terrorist tactics, not an overall drop in the probability of further violence. What is needed is a systematic data-collection process in order to find generalizable patterns in counterterrorist efforts. Such a process is the research goal of this dissertation. As with any research design, analysis of the counterterrorist actions of states on an aggregate level must be guided by theory. This topic will be the next point of discussion.

Toward an Aggregate Theory of Counterterrorism and the Dilemma of Liberal Democracies

As previously stated, the global threat of terrorism warrants a global reaction. Attacks from Al-Qaeda extend beyond those carried out on 9/11, with regions such as Great Britain, Spain, Africa, and the Middle East seeing violence as well. Thus, the task of eliminating global terrorism would be best achieved by a coordinated, collective,
preemptive strike. In an increasingly globalized network of states, terrorism represents a threat to all states. However, the motivations spurred by globalization may also be the state’s main hindrance. In such a world system, the interconnectedness and ease of communication allows terrorist organizations to network more efficiently across state borders. By contrast, the execution of security and intelligence operations is often hindered by state sovereignty, as states are unwilling to share secrets that could be detrimental to their overall national security. Additionally, states have influences other than international concerns. Domestic institutions as well as a civilian population, whose motivations can run counter to those of their political leaders, can hamstring state behavior. In this respect, globalization aids the terrorist rather than the state (Enders and Sandler 2006).

The global effort to combat terrorism and the hindrance that sovereignty has on cooperation can best be illustrated through a simple game. Enders and Sandler (2006, 102) model the basic cooperative issues behind two states as approximating a prisoners’ dilemma situation due to the fact that offensive measures entail costs. Their modification of this prisoners’ dilemma game is presented in Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1. Counterterrorist Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Preempt</th>
<th>Do Nothing</th>
<th>Deter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preempt</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>-2, 4</td>
<td>-6, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing</td>
<td>4, -2</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
<td>-4, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deter</td>
<td>6, -6</td>
<td>2, -4</td>
<td>-2, -2*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This situation depicts a game played between two nations under the external threat of global terrorism. It is assumed here that maintaining the status quo by choosing to *Do
Nothing results in a payoff of 0, with both states choosing to maintain the status quo by generating no costs or benefits. Another strategy includes a state’s choice to Deter by increasing domestic security in an effort to dissuade terrorists from carrying out attacks on their soil. Examples of deterrent behavior include stricter border controls or the installation of metal detectors at airports. A state choosing to deter in this situation generates public costs abroad by deflecting the possibility of terrorism to a weaker state. Consequently, Deter generates public costs of 4 to the both players and a private benefit of 6 to the deterring state.

The third choice is for a state to Preempt by mounting a military offensive to physically eliminate the threat. The most prevalent example of preemption is the 2002 invasion of Afghanistan to eradicate Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Operation Enduring Freedom. In this situation, a preempting state is expected to generate private costs by choosing to attack. The costs could represent the loss of life in battle, the military resources spent in the process, or the political consequences a leader may suffer from her constituents by choosing this strategy. However, the elimination of the threat is seen as a benefit to all. Therefore, preemptive action generates a public benefit of 4 to both players and a private cost of 6 to the preempting state. Examining the outcomes illustrates how the equilibrium takes on the characteristics of a prisoners’ dilemma. If one state deters while the other preempts, the deterring state will net a total of 6 (= 6 + 4 – 4) while the preempting state gets -6 (= 4 – 6 – 4). The dominant strategy for both states is to deter. The ironic feature of this situation is that when both states deter it puts them in a worse situation than if they both chose Do Nothing. In effect, deterrence is the worst possible social outcome of the game.
A generalized form of this game is presented in Chapter Three to determine the factors that lead to cooperation in response to the global threat of terrorism, allowing for the costs and benefits to fluctuate depending on the players. After all, it is quite feasible to hypothesize that eliminating a threat of terrorism benefits some states more than others and can generate a disproportionate amount of costs as well. Additionally, institutional characteristics can affect the choice in strategy. Democratic governments are asymmetrically targeted by terrorism, yet they are often reluctant to contribute to preemptive action. There are a number of possible factors that temper their desire to go on the offensive. Democratic leaders often have term limits. Thus, leaders are reluctant to risk the gamble of generating long-term benefits from combating terrorism at the expense of the short-term loss of election returns. Terrorist organizations do not feature defined borders and defining the concept of terrorism is a tricky task. Democratic publics are apt to be apprehensive when voting for a leader who would subject human lives and military resources to fight such a nebulous and undefined enemy.

Democratic governments are particularly sensitive to casualties inflicted by terrorism and generally feel that refraining from action in international affairs is the best way to avoid an attack in many circumstances (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). This places democracies in a particular dilemma. Terrorists target liberal democracies because their attacks have a higher chance of tactical success. The greater civil liberties enjoyed by citizens of democracies afford terrorists a greater choice in targets. However, the same institutional characteristics that attract international terror are the same ones that hinder the ability to combat terrorism. Such an adherence to civil liberties prohibits a harsh response in efforts to punish terrorism. This reluctance is also reflected in its ability to
launch attacks abroad, as the public is unwilling to risk resources chasing such an amorphous enemy. Since the citizens of democracies shoulder the burden of preemptive costs in the form of retaliation from a terrorist attack, they can use these costs as punitive leverage against their leaders. Aside from political pressures, legally apprehending terrorists presents its own set of problems. The rule of law hinders democracies in their ability to engage in harsh crackdowns on potential offenders (Byman 2007). These characteristics work to obstruct cooperation between states when combating terrorism.

The arguments outlined thus far make an assumption about terrorists that some may find controversial. Namely, this is the assumption that terrorists and terrorist organizations are strategic, rational actors. Conventional logic asserts that radical Islamic terrorists are motivated by factors that are beyond comprehension and predictability. States can be reasoned with through military force and diplomacy. The US can dissuade or defeat any traditional enemy because it can direct its efforts at an identifiable state with clearly delineated borders and militaries. This is not so with terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Because they are not identifiable on a map and do not consist of standing armies, they are more difficult to combat.

This proclivity to label terrorists as irrational is partially fueled by their reliance on suicide tactics. To many Western nations, the notion that killing oneself is the best way to achieve a political end is unthinkable; death is the worst possible outcome. Since suicide attacks are supposed to end in death, their occurrence cannot be deterred (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006). Accordingly, it is useless to take preventative action toward events like 9/11, for the terrorists would not have been dissuaded from carrying out their act (Lewis 2004). According to this rationale, the War on Terror cannot be won, because
terrorists are crazed, irrational actors that cannot be deterred. As will be shown in Chapter Four, these arguments rely heavily on procedural rationality. From the prospective of instrumental rationality, however, an actor’s preferences could be any outcome, as long as they can be ordered (Quackenbush 2004). Under instrumental rationality, death can be a preference that is not the worst possible outcome.

If the enemies of international terror fail to achieve their goals, it will not be due to the irrationality of the terrorist, for attacking liberal democracies also has a strategic element. Suicide attacks are also shown to have a pattern to their occurrence, following specific time periods. Such trends imply that there is a strategic motive to terrorist attacks, for irrational actions should be random (Pape 2003). If terrorists are rational, the possibility exists that they can be deterred as a consequence. As will be shown in Chapter Five, terrorists choose targets based on the probability of success. Target nations that are more heavily fortified are less likely to see attempted terrorist attacks, which lends evidence to the external costs that deterrent action produces. Terrorist organizations have been successful in gaining territory from liberal democracies by engaging in suicide attacks (Pape 2003), and have strategically targeted citizens of liberal democracies based upon the pressures that liberal democratic leaders face from their populace (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). The seeming randomness of terrorist behavior is deliberately employed to strike fear into their targets. As will be shown in the following chapters, the fear of attacks drive state behavior more so than actual attacks. The evidence presented here pulls away the veil of a crazed, extremist enemy to reveal a strategic, rational actor.

Consequently, terrorists are not passive players of the game. In addition to the interaction between states, combatants of international terror also must interact with the
terrorist organizations themselves. Terrorists act and react to combat situations and choose their type of attack in response to the severity of strikes that a state can level. Indeed, terrorists have multiple ways of carrying out attacks. They can choose to hijack airplanes, set off explosives, kidnap victims, or detonate roadside bombs, to name a few. When one attack fails to succeed, they employ another (Enders and Sandler 1993). However, as will be examined in Chapter Five, the true difference lies in the choice of using a suicide attack. Suicide attacks serve a purpose aside from inflicting maximum damage and can act as a recruitment tool in an effort to garner support from the civilian population. Suicide attacks are generally more devastating on their targets and result in more casualties (Pape 2003). This makes them more newsworthy. Suicide attacks are viewed as the act of martyrs and are often documented for propaganda purposes (Rosendorff and Sandler 2010). Due to the perceived benefits from employing such tactics, suicide attacks are utilized strategically when recruitment is low. They can also be used as a particularly devastating retaliatory attack in the face of exceedingly harsh preemptive action from counterinsurgents. This represents a second dilemma that states face when battling a global insurgency. Too strong of a preemptive attack generates harsh retaliatory strikes, while too soft of an attack does not effectively defeat the enemy.

This dissertation represents an examination of the factors that engender cooperation between states in order to find a solution to the dilemma of liberal democracies as well as empirically examine the dynamics that result from the interactions between terrorist organizations and states. This analysis represents a cursory study of these factors on an aggregate level and utilizes a completely unique data set to categorize the variety and frequency of counterterrorist actions employed by states in their war with radical Muslim
terrorists, otherwise known as the War on Terror, between the years 2001-2010. The rest of the dissertation will be organized as follows. Chapter Two details the methods used to assemble the data set on state counterterrorist action, outlining the case selection process identifying those states that are included as existing under the threat of global terrorism, and provides a list of which terrorist organizations are included as this threat. Terrorist attacks are used as a variable across all three empirical chapters, and it is important to identify which attacks specifically affect state action. This chapter also details the categorization process in constructing the various counterterrorist actions. The goal is to give a valid representation of the states that are affected by global terror while at the same time lending sufficient variability from which to formulate conclusions.

Chapter Three examines the state characteristics that promote cooperation when combating international terrorism. To test this, a generalized form of the game from Figure 1.1 is extended to allow for variance across the costs and benefits that each state faces. The game in Figure 1.1 has the characteristics of a prisoners’ dilemma and will be examined as a prisoners’ dilemma squared game in this chapter. Examining the strategies of Deter and Do Nothing alone is a prisoners’ dilemma game, as is the subgame between Do Nothing and Preempt. In effect, Figure 1.1 consists of two embedded prisoners’ dilemma games. Consequently, Arce and Sandler (2005a) call it a Prisoners’ Dilemma Squared game. What will be shown in this chapter is that varying costs and benefits greatly influence the levels of cooperation between threatened states. Essentially, capable states are the main leaders in coordinating preemptive strikes. What is surprising, however, is the mitigating effect that democracy exerts on this decision. This is particularly striking, since the coalition of preempting states largely consists of advanced
democracies. What the results will show is that, controlling for capabilities, democracy hinders the motivation to engage in preemptive strikes due to its citizens having a strong aversion to combat. This supports the theory of the dilemma of liberal democracies.

Chapter Four extends the analysis of an offensive attack to account for the factors that determine the level and degree of preemptive action. It is theorized that democracy should interfere with the initial decision to engage in preemptive action, however, once the decision is made, democracy strengthens the resolve and actually promotes higher levels of preemption. In this chapter, the level of preemption is operationalized as the number of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops deployed to Afghanistan. The results provide some support for the theory. The decision to engage in preemption consists of alliance commitments, which is inhibited by the effects of democracy. Thus, the dilemma of democracies is once again upheld, with democratic states reluctant to engage in preemptive action. However, once the choice to preempt has been made, capabilities largely take over in explaining the level of preemptive action. Several measures of capabilities are employed and show that not only are capable states committing higher numbers of troops, but that they pass the buck of responsibility largely onto the US. Indeed, when using the ratio of military expenditures as a variable, the results clearly show that states are more willing to let the US shoulder the burden of military responsibility. This should come as no surprise, for the US suffered the most devastating international terrorist attack in history while simultaneously possessing the most powerful military in the world. Despite the mission being spearheaded by the most advanced democracies, the level of democracy actually reduces the likelihood of preemptive action and plays no effect on the level of preemption, suggesting that liberal
democracies are actually reluctant warriors when combating international terrorism despite being the intended target.

The last empirical chapter examines the interplay between states and terrorist organizations to determine if the level of preemptive action has any effect on the type of terrorist attack employed. Rosendorff and Sandler (2010) argue that suicide attacks are utilized as propaganda purposes for terrorists to recruit new members to the organization. As a result of this, it should be expected that suicide attacks be employed at a higher rate relative to all other types of attacks when their recruitment is flagging. Here it is assumed that terrorist organizations react to the severity of violence suffered from coalition forces. Hence, a large and particularly destructive amount of preemptive force should generate an increase in the levels of suicide attacks in an effort to bolster support for the terrorists. The results wind up inconclusive as to how preemption affects levels of suicide attacks, suggesting that other factors are at work. However, suicide attacks are not path dependent like regular attacks, suggesting that terrorists employ suicide attacks in a more deliberate manner. Furthermore, the evidence lends support to the public costs of deterrence, suggesting that terrorists are rational actors capable of being deterred. Increased defenses prompt terrorists to target weaker links. The chapter supports the idea that, even though they are individuals driven by radical religious motivations and employ suicide as an effective means of combat, terrorists are rational actors that utilize the same cost benefit analysis as their more traditional counterparts.

Finally, the concluding chapter ends with a summary of the evidence and closes with an argument for the dilemma of liberal democracies. Case studies of the individual contributing nations belie the true complexity that democracy has on the willingness to
engage in preemptive action. A cursory glance shows that the tip of the spear in counterterrorism consists of liberal democracies. Constructing a new data set that properly includes the universe of threatened states at the aggregate level shows that democracy actually hinders the cooperation needed to combat global terrorism. Furthermore, this coordination problem represents a serious dilemma, as terrorists are rational actors that exploit these weaknesses and use them to their advantage.
CHAPTER II
CATEGORIZING COUNTERTERRORISM
As noted in the previous chapter, the exact behavior of states in reaction to the threat of terrorism is relatively unknown due to the dearth of data on the actions that states take relative to the large amount of data available on the behavior of terrorists. The field of counterterrorism mostly consists of case studies, with many of the results conflicting with one another as to the effectiveness of a particular campaign or strategy. Focusing on the effectiveness of a single event, while rich in descriptive and explanatory detail, lends itself to the problem of external validity, as it is difficult to determine whether the results are applicable to the universe of counterterrorism. This chapter represents but a small effort to alleviate this problem, namely by looking at a much larger set of cases that represent state counterterrorist actions against Muslim extremist terrorist organizations between the years 2001-2010, otherwise known as the War on Terror.

What follows is a description of the processes involved in testing this difficult area of study. The first section deals with the task of explaining the nebulous concept of terrorism and providing a proper, inclusive definition necessary to classify attacks. The second step details the method of case selection, due to the fact that obtaining counterterrorist data on all states during this time period is neither practical nor theoretically appropriate. Many states do not involve themselves in counterterrorism for the explicit reason that they do not associate with the US nor do they feel the threat of terrorism as acutely as other nations. These factors must be accounted for to build a set of cases that includes states with an approximate sense of threat similarity in facing a particular terrorist group as well as consist of enough variability suitable to draw substantive conclusions. The last section details the coding procedures used by relying on the framework established in UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1373.
(2001) to classify states into proper categories and provides a brief discussion of the detailed categorization provided in the appendix at the end of this chapter. The chapter then concludes with a brief discussion of what the results uncover in the following empirical analyses.

**Defining Terrorism**

The framework for this dataset is developed from Chapter VII of UN Resolution 1373 (2001), which outlines the actions that states should take in the effort to halt terrorism. Despite the thoroughness with which the UN approaches the proper methods of combating terrorism, it does not provide an explicit definition of what constitutes terrorism, terrorist organizations, or terrorist acts. This is not an uncommon oversight. There have been numerous efforts to pin a precise definition on the concept of terrorism; however, the notion of who is a “terrorist” is highly subjective. “Terrorism” is known as a pejorative term; much like how those in organized crime do not refer to themselves as the “mafia,” neither do individuals in terrorist organizations nor their supporters refer to themselves as “terrorists.” Additionally, states sympathetic to their cause do not think of the groups as terrorists either. Below is presented a brief review of the different conceptualizations of terrorism, followed by a description of the definition to be used for the rest of this dissertation.

Great Britain states in its Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974 that terrorism is the use of violence for political ends. If such a statement were taken at face value, however, any act of war could be regarded as terrorism (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2005). This same logic applies to the US Department of Defense’s (2002, 8) attempt to label the concept as, “the
calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” Under this rubric, any act of war could be seen as an act of terrorism. Curiously, US attempts to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan would also fall under the purview of terrorism. Scholarly attempts to mediate this problem also have issues. Bruce Hoffman (1998) supplements existing definitions with psychological intentions. According to his definition, terrorism utilizes violence for psychological effects that extend beyond the attack. However, his definition only includes political motivations as an act of terrorism. This disqualifies Al-Qaeda as well as the multitude of terrorist organizations operating under the banner of Muslim faith as terrorist organizations because of their religious motivation of an Islamic jihad.

Perhaps the largest problem with defining terrorism is its effort to be all-inclusive. Additionally, cultural, political, and moral values bias an individual’s understanding of the definition of terrorism. One society’s patriot is another’s terrorist. Studies analyzing terrorism must recognize the historical context of an organization and construct a definition accordingly. Grob-Fitzgibbon (2005) identifies terrorism as consisting of four general motivations. The first group of terrorism is concerned with conflict over national boundaries, and is aptly named national terrorism. An example of this is the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland between the Irish Republicans and the English Loyalists over the unification of Ireland. The second category is revolutionary terrorism. These groups are looking to change the philosophy of a nation and often come from leftist organizations. An example of this is the American Weather Underground, a leftist organization that formed in opposition to the operations in Vietnam, as well as the Civil
Rights Movement, which culminated in a series of bombings in the US over the course of
the 1960s and 70s in an effort to end US imperialism. The third group is reactionary
terrorism. These groups are looking to maintain the “old way” of a certain state, with
philosophies stemming from the right end of the political spectrum. An example of this
would be the actions of Timothy McVeigh during the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995.
McVeigh viewed himself as a patriot revolting against perceived US defamation of
traditional American liberties, particularly gun control. The last is the most prominent
terrorist threat to date and is called religious terrorism. The goal of these groups is
religious cleansing or reformation. The most prevalent example of this today is Al-Qaeda,
whose goals include the removal of US troops from traditional Muslim holy grounds as
well as the establishment of a universal Caliphate.

Miller (2007) also agrees with critics on the overreaching definition of terrorism,
arguing that many authors regard terrorism as a monolithic threat. However, once broken
down into specific categories of terrorism, scholars can come to more definite
conclusions on their behavior based on the type of organization and their motives. These
definitions are mostly employed in case study analysis, enabling them to incorporate the
nuances that separate individual terrorist organizations for a more detailed analysis. This
dissertation is an analysis of a state’s reaction to multiple sources of terrorism. The data
are aggregated over numerous attacks in order to glean general observations.
Consequently, the definition that will be used is broader in scope.

Enders and Sandler (2006, 3) define terrorism as “... the premeditated use or threat
to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social
objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate
victims.” Their definition condenses terrorism into two essential elements: the threat or presence of violence and a political or social motive. Without violence, terrorist groups cannot make a government respond to their demands. Without a political or social motive, a violent act becomes a crime rather than a terrorist act. Terrorists broaden their audience by making their acts appear random, when in fact they are carefully planned and account for potential losses and gains (Enders and Sandler 2006).

There are several additional key components that make up a terrorist attack. The most controversial of these is the identification of the victim. Recent attacks by terrorist organizations in Iraq target military personnel and are often defined as terrorist attacks, yet traditional definitions conceive of terrorism as directed solely at civilians and noncombatants. The second actor is the perpetrator. States, as well as subnational groups, use terror tactics. Examples of state terrorism include Stalin’s reign of terror and the Nazi war crimes against the Jews. Though states can assist subnational terrorists in their actions by supplying funds and harboring groups within their borders, for the purpose of this dissertation, the perpetrator will be confined to subnational groups. The last element is the audience. As indicated in the definition provided by Enders and Sandler (2006) terrorist attacks are aimed at a larger audience than the immediate target. The audience of 9/11 extended beyond the hijacking victims and the occupants of the Twin Towers. They were intended to strike fear in the entire US population, including anyone affiliated with the US.

The Global Terrorism Database (2012) largely follows the definition provided by Enders and Sandler (2006), defining terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social
goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” It contains the two essential elements provided by Enders and Sandler (2006), including the threat or presence of violence as well as a social or political motive. Because data from the *Global Terrorism Database* will be the source for data on terrorist activities, the definitions provided by both the *Global Terrorism Database* and Enders and Sandler (2006) will be adopted in this study. Furthermore, it fits with other definitions employed by scholars and government agencies that focus on a non-governmental actor using violence to instill fear and intimidation among a larger target audience (Department of State 1983-2001; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Reich 1990; Pape 2003).

**Method of Dissertation**

As previously stated, there are no databases exclusively focused on counterterrorist efforts. Many studies examining the subject of counterterrorist behavior have been descriptive and exploratory in nature. In order to gain insight into the influence of state counterterrorist policies, state data that extends across time and space is necessary (Omelicheva 2007). While the Correlates of War (COW) data can be utilized in determining a definite preemptive action by a state, such as the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan in reaction to the events of 9/11, it is insufficient to cover the various deterrent actions of states. A similar problem exists with the *Uppsala Conflict Database Program*. These data offer information on conflicts between states and terrorist organizations, yet they are focused exclusively on conflict and fail to capture the wide range of counterterrorist tactics that states employ.
Data

As previously stated, the thrust of this dissertation is based around the work of Arce and Sandler (2005a) and Enders and Sandler’s (2005) game theoretic analyses of counterterrorist efforts. The prisoners’ dilemma game and its variations to be tested portray two players representing states facing a common terrorist threat. Hence, the key to properly testing these games relies on selecting cases that face a common terrorist threat. Compiling a collection of all states for modeling purposes would not render a valid representation of threatened actors, for certain states face a very limited possibility of an attack by a particular group. With regards to the type of terrorist attack, there are many different variations of terrorist attacks and groups to choose from. The largest number of terrorist attacks stem from groups within a target state’s own borders. Indeed, despite common perceptions within the last decade, transnational terrorist attacks have declined since the early 1990s (Bird et al. 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). Differentiating between domestic and international terrorist organizations is a difficult task. Past reliance on targets attacked or the motivations behind the groups have not been theory driven; most of the information on the motivations of terrorism comes from the more complete data sets on international attacks, biasing our information about terrorism (Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). Thus, it would be imprudent to include groups based solely on whether their attacks are national or international. What is needed is a collection of organizations that share a common goal as well as direct their attacks upon particular targets.
The events of 9/11 serve as a catalyst for establishing a global terrorist threat. The attacks on that single day in 2001 have led to an increase in average deaths per year of about fivefold from the second most lethal year, 1998 (Bird et al. 2008). Critics contend that the phrase “Global War on Terror” is something of a misnomer, with the capabilities and specific motives of international terrorist groups sometimes overstated (Cassidy 2008). However, the present situation can still be thought of as a unified, global insurgency. Though not formally aligned, the movement at hand consists of a diffuse group of Islamic insurgents seeking to remake Islam’s role in the global hierarchy (Kilcullen 2005).

Al-Qaeda has seen a decline in power. With Osama bin Laden’s assassination and the recent assassinations of other key Al-Qaeda operatives, the structure and focus of the group seems to be in disarray. Despite these recent developments, there is still evidence that Al-Qaeda is alive and active. Former CIA Director David Petraeus reiterated that, although weakened, Al-Qaeda remains a global threat (Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Just last year authorities uncovered improved explosive devices designed to bypass airport security and took down a large terrorist cell based in Yemen (Shane and Schmitt 2012). The potential devastation this cell could have unleashed is tremendous. The conclusions reached by intelligence officials and the evidence of a network of underground international cells with improved technological capabilities present the most valid representation of a global terrorist threat against the developed, Western world. Additionally, while the observed capabilities of global extremist organizations are up for debate, the fear of the perceived threat of terrorism and the international reaction in response to this threat is very real. Thus, counterterrorist activities to thwart the ambitions
of Al-Qaeda and their affiliates, otherwise labeled as radical Islamic terrorism, will serve as the arena within which to test the theorized “dilemma of liberal democracies.”

Case selection on which states are threatened by Al-Qaeda and their affiliates still presents its difficulties. Islamic terrorism makes clear from their rhetoric that Western states are the primary source of their angst, due in part to the US and its strong ties to Israel and the stationing of Western troops on Muslim soil. However, the term “Western” is highly ambiguous. Additionally, these attacks have been dispersed unevenly. The United Kingdom is arguably the strongest partner of the US in the War on Terror, yet in 2001 it did not suffer a single terrorist attack on its soil from a radical, Islamist group (GTD 2012). Simply being a liberal democracy does not explain state counterterrorist action. Mexico is also a democracy in the Western Hemisphere, yet it has contributed no troops to either theater in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, both Mexico and the United Kingdom experienced citizen casualties as a result of 9/11. Selecting cases based on those contributing the most to the War on Terror would bias the results. What is needed is a method of selecting states included under the umbrella of enemies to Al-Qaeda or states that are somehow tied to the US through terrorism.

One method of narrowing the field of choices is through utilizing the Patterns of Global Terrorism, yearly reports issued by the US State Department that focus on recent developments in counterterrorism and provide assessments of international progress in countering global terrorist threats. What these documents make most relevant to this study are their presentation of an overview of particular countries and their actions regarding both counterterrorist and cooperative activities with the US. The report is

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1 Renamed Country Reports on Terrorism after 2004.
submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(a), requiring the Department of State to provide an annual report on terrorism for countries and groups that meet the requirements of Section (a)(1-4) of the code (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002). Countries and groups included in the report consist of those where significant terrorist acts occurred and countries where the US has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the prosecution or investigation of acts of international terrorism against the US.

The cases for this particular chapter comprise all countries that assisted or interacted with the US with regards to the War on Terror from the years 2001-2010. These cases satisfy a key element of the models to be tested. Primarily, they all share the common threat of international terror from specific groups, particularly organizations that are deemed combatants in the War on Terror. The groups deemed a threat in this study are Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), a list of terrorist organizations compiled by the Secretary of State, per Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In order to be designated as an FTO, the group must be a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity, terrorism, or retains the capability or intent to engage in terrorism or terrorist activity, in accordance with section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 USC §1182(a)(3)(B)). Additionally, the group must threaten the security of US nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, economic interests) of the US (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003).

The list of FTOs is tailored to eliminate groups that are either dated threats or those which pose a threat to a specific state. This additional trimming serves two purposes. The first is to identify those groups that are currently active and that have a reasonable
amount of consistency between their goals and actions. The purpose is to construct a universe of cases that have a likelihood to feel threatened from a specific group of terrorist organizations, while at the same time maintaining significant variance across institutional, economic, and demographic characteristics. This also controls for the possibility that states are cooperating in taking counterterrorist maneuvers for separate motivating factors than the one examined here. For example, the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo is a Japanese cult based out of Japan. Consisting of an amalgamation of Hindu and Buddhist tenets of belief, the organization is most notoriously responsible for the deadly sarin attacks onto five cars in three separate subway lines at their convergence at Kasumigaseki station, located near several government ministries. This attack was an act of terrorism against the government, subsequently achieving the designation as a foreign terrorist organization from the US and Europe (Country Reports on Terrorism 2005). The terrorist organization, while most notorious for its attacks nearly two decades ago, is not included as a threat in this data set. Consequently, its action will not be considered in this analysis. Its inclusion would confuse the separate motivations and goals that individual terrorist organizations have and could lead to biased results. Theoretically, Japan’s contribution of military supplies to aid in the War on Terror should not be influenced by the presence of terrorist organizations such as Aum Shinrikyo. Their movement is concerned with the end of the world via World War III, precipitated by an attack on Japan from the US. This group has no ties to the transnational advocacy network of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, nor does it share its philosophy of a global, Islamist state, and is thus dealt with separately from such organizations. By contrast, the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group is a terrorist organization whose goals include establishing an Islamic
state in Morocco; overall they support Al-Qaeda’s war against the West. The similarity in goals and actions, while not identical, are sufficient enough to warrant categorization as part of the perceived Islamic threat against Western nations. Thus, attacks from this group are included.

An additional qualifying factor is that the organizations have to be part of a broader international movement. In keeping with the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group, the Department of State also notes that those affiliated with the organization are part of a broader international terrorist movement. The attacks carried out by the group qualify this statement, as their reach has extended their cells to Belgium. Beyond supplying cells in Belgium, France, and Spain, the Spanish government also suspects that this group had ties to the March 2004 Madrid train bombings (Country Reports on Terrorism 2005).

Consequently, to be included, the organizations have to share a general motivation as well as have connections to global attacks, though they do not have to claim exclusive responsibility. As such, prominent, anti-Western, Islamic groups such as HAMAS and the Palestinian Liberation Front are not included. This is due to the fact that, while very notorious and prolific in their attacks, the organization primarily only focuses its attacks in the localized region of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Curiously enough, though Al-Qaida and its affiliates have attacked Israeli targets, it can be argued that a partial reason for the lack of a military contribution from Israel could be attributed to the large amount of domestic terrorist attacks that take place within its borders from the more regional groups. This is precisely the theoretical reason that Israel and groups hostile specifically to Israel are excluded, for the US requested that Israel remain on the sidelines of the main counterterrorist action (Zakheim 2011). As such, including the large number
of terrorist attacks suffered by Israel from these locally concerned groups could lead to bias. A complete list of the terrorist organizations included is located in the appendix.

Since this last requirement highlights the US-centric nature of the terrorist threat, each state can be theorized to exist as a dyad-year with the US. However, since the characteristics of the US remain constant across all states within a year, the units will be empirically operationalized as a country year for Chapters Three and Four. With the case selection and unit of analysis established, the next section will discuss the categorization of counterterrorist actions.

**Data Classification**

The framework for the categorization of state action to combat terrorism is based on international and national counterterrorist measures compiled by UN Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999) and Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The actions taken under Chapter VII indicate that the resolutions passed here take on the standing of international law. Article 39 of Chapter VII asserts that the Security Council determines any threat or breach of peace and reserves the right to declare what action, if any, military or non-military, will be taken. It is here where the UN ceases to act as a multilateral organization and converts into a global executive (Schott 2007). The topics cover the areas of public and foreign policies on which to observe states’ counterterrorist actions. It is appropriate to use the framework established in Resolution 1373, for it is expected that all states abide by its orders. Furthermore, the actions covered under its purview largely constitute the basis for evaluation that the State Department utilizes when examining international cooperation with the US in its country
reports.

Section 1(a) of the resolution commands that states will prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts as well as “criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly, or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts.” Additionally, states are instructed to take a series of financial actions against known terrorist organizations and are instructed to freeze the funds or financial assets of terrorists as well as individuals that act on behalf of terrorist organizations. Section 2(a) commands that states should refrain from providing support, both direct and indirect, to individuals and organizations involved in terrorist acts. The nations are also instructed to utilize all means necessary to prevent a safe haven for terrorists and prevent the operation of those individuals acting within their borders from committing terrorist acts. This includes arresting said individuals and bringing them to justice. Section 2 also makes it imperative that states take action to hinder the mobility of terrorists and terrorist groups by placing effective border controls, which consists of actions such as the issuance of passports and identity papers in an effort to cut down on counterfeiting documents and preventing forgery.

Sections 1 and 2 from UN Security Council Resolution 1373 share the theme of concrete, actual actions to be taken in the effort to combat terrorism, calling on states to expel terrorists, to not grant them safe harbor within their borders, and to seize and block all assets related to the promulgation of a terrorist act. As such, this language will set the standard for investigating deterrent attributes of state counterterrorist action. The activities labeled in the appendix — controlling borders and people, seizing assets, target
hardening, and facilitating the preparation of human and technological resources — will all be classified under *deterrent* actions on the part of the state. The primary reason behind this is that these actions represent a tangible demonstration of counterterrorist effort and represent actions that physically commit states to deterring terrorism. For example, the resolution on actions regarding the treatment of terrorist assets calls for the immediate seizure and blocking of the transfer of terrorist financial resources. By this logic, a state that carries through with these measures will prevent terrorists from using resources for an attack, which effectively hinders the ability for it to be carried out. This same rationale applies to the resolutions instructing states to not provide safe harbor to known terrorists; these are constructive actions that inherently limit the safe environments that terrorists can venture to and narrows the selection of targets available for an attack. In the same vein, stricter border controls, as well as technological advances that make it increasingly difficult to move between borders with the help of forged or counterfeit documents, curtail the target menu at a particular terrorist organization’s disposal. Thus, physical demonstrations of counterterrorist actions are credited as legitimate deterrent behavior.

Additional actions beyond Sections 1 and 2 call for greater cooperation across international borders in response to the threat of global terrorism and will not be included as deterrent behavior due to the inability to distinguish concerted, diplomatic efforts from mere platitudes in response to these orders. For example, Section 3 of Resolution 1373 calls for states to find ways to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding the location, action, and movement of terrorist networks, additionally requesting the notification of counterfeit documents used in travel, and the
threat of terrorist organizations found in possession of weapons of mass destruction. Such
instructions, while possibly fostering effective counterterrorist cooperation between
states, are nonetheless difficult to infer from US State Department information. An
example of this difficulty is exemplified through the counterterrorist actions of Italy
during 2005. During this time, the US State Department noted that Italy “cooperated
internationally.” Such a vague statement could imply a multitude of actions; cooperation
in this sense could mean anything from providing verbal support to providing military
resources to Coalition forces. By contrast, the report further states that Italy continued to
provide a strong military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The country also arrested 18
members associated with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group and Ansar al-Islam. This
illustration serves to show the disparity between reports on international cooperation and
actual, counterterrorist actions. The report unequivocally states that Italy contributed
military forces and made 18 arrests; such qualifying reports are necessary to supplement
the term “cooperation.” However, without these assertions, cooperation remains an
indefinite expression. As a result, efforts of states on the behalf of international
cooperation are not counted as deterrent activity without physical action.

Section 3 further calls for the exchange of information regarding international and
domestic law in judicial matters of prosecuting terrorists and requires states to enter into
cooperative treaties and agreements with one another along these themes. These actions
also must be executed with the intention of preserving international standards of human
rights. Interpreting the degree of cooperation along these lines is also a taxing endeavor,
for adherence to human rights is highly subjective. Greece made numerous arrests of both
domestic and international terrorists in 2005, however, the imprisonment of Pavlos
Serifis, a left-wing radical of the People’s Revolutionary Struggle (ELA) led to the acceptance of a petition by the European Court of Human Rights arguing that Serifis’ imprisonment represented a violation of human rights. A similar issue arose in Kenya, where its “Suppression of Terrorism” bill was revoked due to pressure from human rights organizations and Kenyan Muslims (Country Reports on Terrorism 2005). Such legislation regarding arrests, while ostensibly serving counterterrorist purposes, could also be seen as a method a state settling scores with political dissenters within its borders. It is also worth noting that passing criminal legislation is a relatively unsubstantial act. Terrorists by definition are already operating outside of the bounds of standard warfare and are consequently eschewing legal resources to bring about change from within their government. In this respect, actions outlawing terrorism are superfluous.

All variables listed are dummy variables, with a 1 representing language within the country reports that indicates a state took action that met the credentials outlined in Resolution 1373 and a 0 indicating the absence of such action. The only variable that is not a dummy is the count of terrorism-related arrests in each state. The variables are categorized in Table 2.1 under their respective headings, with a full description of coding characteristics provided in the appendix:
Table 2.1. Classification of Variables for Operationalization

Identifying Characteristics
- Year
- Country
- Region
  - State Sponsor of Terrorism
  - Border of a State Sponsor

Institutional
- Creating Legislation
- Creating Departments
- Criminalization

Deterrent
- Controlling Borders and the Movement of People
- Seizing Assets
- Target Hardening
- Facilitate preparation of human and technological resources
- Arrests

Preemptive
- Contribute forces to either Afghanistan or Iraq
- Open borders to bases

Other
- Contribute Monetary Aid
- Sharing Intelligence
- Engage in Diplomacy
- Introduce Proposal

As will be discussed in Chapter Three, preemptive action is counted as stationing troops and allowing basing rights. This is largely due to evidence arguing that such actions draw retaliatory attacks from terrorist organizations (Byman 2005). These two actions, contributing forces and allotting sovereign territory for the purpose of facilitating a foreign military, represent the scope of preemptive action due to the internal costs in the form of retaliatory attacks such actions garner. It is possible to consider arrests as a form of preemptive action because it is a physical example of a country detaining individuals related to terrorism for punishment rather than directing said individuals to a weaker-

\[2\] An updated list of US-designated state sponsors of terrorism is provided annually by the US State Department.
defended state. However, many European countries view terrorism as a criminal act, as evidenced by the resolution calling for the criminalization of terrorism, rather than a military one (Bleich 2009). Preemption is considered here as an act of the military. Deploying troops is an international act and represents a concerted effort to remove a terrorist threat, in its entirety, for all states. By contrast, arresting individuals is largely of national concern and fits more appropriately within domestic acts of deterring terrorism. It is for these reasons that *arrests* are included as deterrent actions and not preemption.

With the definitions, case selection, and classification in place, the next three chapters will turn to the examination of the interaction between states when combating a terrorist threat, as well as the interaction between states and terrorist organizations, representing one of the first attempts at analyzing strategic counterterrorist behavior on an aggregate level. It is anticipated that many states will opt to choose deterrent actions, if capable, entering into an ongoing competition with one another to bolster security in the hopes of deflecting an anticipated attack to a much weaker target. Furthermore, the following chapters will look at the institutional characteristics of states and their influence on counterterrorist measures. The frequent target of international terrorist attacks are liberal democracies (Li 2005), thus it is expected that a majority of counterterrorist effort will stem from democratic states. Conversely, democracies are theoretically less likely to have an offensive response, due to its population having an aversion to military combat and the curtailment of its civil liberties. This dynamic represents the “dilemma of liberal democracies” and will be the focus for the rest of the dissertation.
CHAPTER III
TESTING THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA OF COUNTERTERRORISM
The threat of suffering transnational terrorist attacks at the hands of Muslim extremists has caused the developed world a great deal of grief disproportionate to the amount of damage actually inflicted. The events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting political and military backlash it generated set in motion a chain of events that placed international terrorists at the top of the enemies list in the international community. The nebulous nature of Al-Qaeda and its seemingly unpredictable selection of targets resulted in a frenetic race of counterterrorist activity, with each state rushing to shore up its defenses. The frequent targets of international terrorist attacks are liberal democracies and their citizens abroad (Weinberg and Eubank 1998; Eubank and Weinberg 2001; Li and Schaub 2004; Li 2005). Consequently, they feel this threat more acutely.

As a result, the task of eliminating this global insurgency is a burden mostly shouldered by liberal democracies. However, only a handful of states are conducting military operations to counter this threat. What results is a lack of action, with many states opting to increase their defenses in the hopes of lowering the chances of suffering a terrorist attack. This often results in a change of venue, with terrorists searching for weaker states to attack. Hence, the counterterrorist actions of many states do not eliminate the threat of global terrorism; they merely deflect its consequences. What is preventing states from shouldering the burden equally? What elements compel them to cooperate? These questions are the focus of this analysis.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I will outline the theoretical basis for the counterterrorist activities that states engage in, with a particular focus on the threat faced by liberal democracies. Next will be a discussion regarding the method of case selection and appropriate research design that gives the most valid representation of an
empirical test of the theories covered below, followed by an analysis of the results. Finally, a concluding discussion of the results will be given, suggesting the possible linkages between strategies of counterterrorism and general and immediate deterrence.

**Counterterrorism, Cooperation, and Liberal Democracies**

The thrust of this analysis is based around the work of Arce and Sandler (2005a) and Enders and Sandler’s (2006) game theoretic analyses of counterterrorist efforts. Essentially, democratic governments are faced with a dilemma in combating terrorism, because they are often prime targets for transnational terrorist attacks based on their institutional characteristics. Thus, terrorists strategically target democracies because of their large breadth of potential targets as well as their many institutional constraints that prohibit them from leveling their full force in deterring further attacks. When faced with an attack, democracies, unlike autocracies, must make a trade-off between exerting resources to deter further attacks and reducing their populations’ civil liberties. Because democracies have greater civil liberties and are less restrictive of the actions of their populations, terrorist organizations have greater ease of mobility and a lesser chance of being punished. Additionally, democratic leaders are accountable to a larger population. As a result, there are more potential targets to attack and a larger chance to strike fear into the general population whom the leader answers to. The dilemma democratic leaders face is how to alleviate the fears of their population without substantially infringing on their civil liberties (Enders and Sandler 2006).

The empirical evidence largely supports these claims. Plümper and Neumayer (2010) examine international alliances and show how democracy conditions the decisions
of terrorists when deciding which state in an alliance to target. An important strategic function of terrorists is to weaken their enemy’s government in order to achieve their political goals. International alliances are often a way for a government to support its own political stability through the help of foreign powers. Their study highlights three main actors: the terrorist group, the government of the terrorists’ home country, which the terrorists want to overthrow, and the home government’s foreign ally. A terrorist group looking to overthrow their home government has the option of either attacking that government directly or targeting foreign nationals of a state that is allied with the home government. Certain home governments derive a great deal of political stability from alliances, particularly when their ally is significantly more powerful. The authors find that foreign nationals of the ally are more likely to be targeted when the power asymmetry between the home government and the foreign ally is large. Democracy conditions this relationship due to the fact that civil rights and liberal homeland security policies lower the cost of the attack and make democracies more vulnerable to influence (Li 2005; Enders and Sandler 2006). Because democracies answer to a broader public, attacks on foreign nationals abroad raise the public outcry for the ally to either defeat the terrorists or reduce their support of the alliance, which serves to weaken the home government.

Perhaps the most significant study put forth is that of Li (2005), who gives a more nuanced look into the appeal of a democratic target. He breaks the attributes of democracies down into their subparts to determine what specific traits make democratic states attractive targets, finding that institutional constraints are the most alluring characteristic. By disaggregating the elements of a democracy, one is able to examine
what factors specifically attract terrorist attacks and what attributes quell them (Brooks 2009). Li also finds that other democratic attributes work to reduce terrorist attacks, specifically the ability of democracies to facilitate participation from opposition groups.

Another factor that aids terrorism is globalization. With the transparency of borders and the speed of information, globalization works increasingly in the terrorist’s best interest by facilitating networking and propaganda capabilities. These efforts lead to an increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks (Asal and Reuthemeyer 2008). State sovereignty, on the other hand, hinders the counterterrorist efforts of states to collaborate as quickly and as thoroughly as terrorist organizations (Sandler 2003). Hence, globalization works by assisting international cooperation, but it works for the terrorists (Enders and Sandler 2006).

Arce and Sandler (2005a) argue that state coordination against terrorism represents a prisoners’ dilemma. Their generalized form of the game is presented in Figure 3.1 and consists of two prisoners’ dilemma games embedded within a 3x3 game, a “prisoners’ dilemma squared game” (Arce and Sandler 2005b).

**Figure 3.1. Prisoners’ Dilemma Squared (PD²), 2B>c>B and 2C>b>C**

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<th></th>
<th>Preempt</th>
<th>Do Nothing</th>
<th>Deter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preempt</td>
<td>2B-c, 2B-c</td>
<td>B-c, B</td>
<td>B-c-C, B+b-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing</td>
<td>B, B-c</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
<td>-C, b-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deter</td>
<td>B+b-C, B-c-C</td>
<td>b-C, -C</td>
<td>b-2C, b-2C*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The game is played between two states facing a common terrorist threat. The key that makes the two embedded games prisoners’ dilemmas is the assumption that
preemptive action against a terrorist organization results in a purely public good: elimination of the threat benefits not only the state that conducted the operation but all other potential target states. The robustness of this assumption will be discussed later. In contrast, deterrence will bestow private benefits to the deterring state by providing a safer environment to its immediate population, but it will project external costs to other states that have not taken proper deterrent actions. What results is a deterrence spiral, where states seek to outdo one another in deterrence efforts and deflect the possibility of an attack abroad. As best described by Arce and Sandler (2005a, 185):

> The deterrer must not only expend resources to make its territory a less attractive venue but also suffers costs from having its people or property targeted abroad. Deterrence spending is analogous to an insurance policy that is paid regardless of the outcome, but in bad states (when an attack ensues) deterrence curbs the expected damage at home, which is the deterrer’s private benefit.

When analyzing the PD\(^2\) game in Figure 3.1, \(B\) denotes the public benefit of preemption, \(c\) stands for the private cost of preemption, \(C\) is the public cost of deterrence, and \(b\) is the private benefit of deterrence. Examining the northwest corner of the game only, if Player 1 preempts while Player 2 free rides, the payoff will equal \(B - c\) to the preemptor and Player 2 receives the public benefit of \(B\). If both players preempt, both receive the combined efforts of the public benefits minus their respective private costs \(2B - c\). Here a PD game is ensured when \(B > 2B - c\), which is the same as \(c > B\). The Nash equilibrium in this case is for both players to do nothing and receive a payoff of 0, 0.

The southeast corner of the game contains payoffs when both states are faced with the option of either deterring or doing nothing. If Player 1 deters and Player 2 does nothing, Player 1 receives the private benefits of deterring minus the public costs \(b - C\), while Player 2 only receives the public costs of being the weakest link for an attack, \(-C\).
If we assume $2C > b > C$, the dominant strategy is for both states to deter to avoid being the weakest link for an attack.

Combining the games in which both states have three strategies illustrates the prevalence of deterrent behavior. If Player 1 preempts while Player 2 deters, Player 1 receives the public benefits of preemption minus the private costs of exerting military force and the public costs of Player 2’s deterring action, $B-c-C$, while Player 2 receives the public benefits of preemption plus the private benefits of deterrence minus the private costs of deterrence $B+b-c$. The two sets of inequalities in Figure 3.1 ensure that each state’s dominant strategy of the 3x3 game is to deter. Arce and Sandler (2005a) extend this baseline game by modifying the payoff structures to further demonstrate the prevalence of deterrence. They first do this by extending the game to repeated iterations by assuming a grim-trigger strategy with a discount factor, $\delta$, which they assume to be the probability of reelection within a liberal democracy. If the value of the discount factor is substantially low, which is likely given electoral term limits in liberal democracies, states are unable to achieve cooperation over an extended period of time, due to the fact that new leadership will be unwilling to fulfill the policies of the past administration. Although this is persuasive, when examining alliance commitments, Leeds (2003) shows that democracies pacify the destabilizing effects of changing supporting coalitions when honoring alliance commitments. Additionally, it can by argued that democracies forge more stable cooperation because commitments generate audience costs that constrain leaders in their foreign policy choices (Fearon 1994).

What is particularly interesting is the fact that Enders and Sandler (2006) note that democracies are targeted because democracies have a wider audience to affect.
Selectorate theory states that a regime’s win set is smaller in autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). Consequently, a terrorist organization looking to attack an autocracy has a narrower and more difficult target to strike. Therefore, it seems likely that competing support coalitions within liberal democracies have some overlap in terms of threat vulnerability from terrorist attacks. Additionally, the level of democratic participation can work to facilitate cooperation. As Brooks (2009) and Li (2005) argue, democracy is not a binary variable. Specifically, Li (2005, 294) finds that democracies with higher levels of political participation (particularly proportional regimes) increase satisfaction and political efficacy of citizens, reduce grievances, and lower terrorist recruitment. Furthermore, this heightened sense of satisfaction raises public tolerance of counterterrorism efforts, working to ease the dilemma of liberal democracies. This particular chapter is an examination of the cooperative obstacles states face when confronting terrorist threats. In order to determine if democracy facilitates cooperation between states, since they are the most at risk of an attack, Li’s (2005) measures of democracy will be used to determine if there really is a dilemma faced by liberal democracies.

Arce and Sandler (2005a) next extend the game to a threshold preemption game in which the payoffs from preemption only outweigh the costs when both players engage in a preemptive strategy. They do this by altering the payoff structure of their original baseline game, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.

This threshold game resembles an assurance or stag hunt game where preemption by only one player does not result in a public benefit, because the threshold has not been reached.
Here, if Player 1 preempts and Player 2 deters, Player 1’s payoff is the private costs of preemption minus the public costs of deterring. There are no public benefits of preemption, because the threshold payoff from two preempts has not been attained. Here (Deter, Deter) is still an equilibrium strategy, however (Preempt, Preempt) is also attainable if the payoffs are at least as good as those from deterring alone, or $2B-c \geq b-C$.

If this is attainable then a second Nash equilibrium of (Preempt, Preempt) exists; however, it is important to point out that (Deter, Deter) still exists as an equilibrium also. As Arce and Sandler (2005a) point out, mutual preemption is only possible if the payoff significantly favor preemption over deterring.

Lastly, they examine the effect of asymmetric preemption, where one player attacks and the other deters. The logic behind this outcome is simple: targets that bear the brunt of terrorist attacks are more likely to preempt. This is because the public benefits of preemption are greater for the preemptor than they are to the defector. The payoff structure is modified by giving the lone preemptor a payoff of $2B$, with the defector only receiving a payoff of $B$.

There is strong evidence from past literature linking terrorist attacks to levels of democracy. Additionally, there is compelling theoretical evidence to support the notion that democracies face an elevated sense of urgency in countering terrorist attacks. What
follows in this chapter represents one of the first attempts at empirically analyzing the effects of various state characteristics on counterterrorism and cooperation in response to a terrorist threat.

**Research Design**

As stated in Chapter Two, the universe of cases consists of states hypothetically more likely to feel the threat of Muslim extremists stronger than others. Additionally, they must have some sort of ties to the US regarding counterterrorism because of its strategic importance in the initial operations in the War on Terror. For these reasons, country reports from the US Department of State are used as a method of case selection. The countries examined consist of cases where they either cooperated with the US on counterterrorist operations or were the victims of a terrorist attack within the last five years.

The game to be modeled consists of players in a simultaneous move environment. Thus, the cases will be looking at state strategies within a single year. The year chosen for this first look at counterterrorist action is 2002, which best captures the initial actions of states in response to the increased terrorist threat of 9/11. There are several arguments to support this choice.

First, the attacks of September 11 occurred late in the year, giving little time for states to enact deterrent or preemptive measures before the year was up. Examining 2002 gives a better representation of state action due to the argument that many defenses could not properly be put in place until after sufficient planning and organization were conducted. Second, the full preemptive invasion against Afghanistan did not occur until
2002. The US conducted preemptive bombings late in 2001, but the full-fledged invasion did not take place until next year to allow for the various diplomatic planning and military preparations to take place (*Patterns of Global Terrorism* 2002). Though additional states joined in preemptive strikes after the initial invasion began, this occurred after the initial move, when new information was made available to guide their choices. For example, Austria joined in the offensive after the initial invasion, yet was clearly wary of the private costs that it could provoke, as evidenced in Defense Minister Platter’s efforts to allay public fears of a reprisal attack for its troop commitments to secure Afghan elections (*Worldstream* 2005).

This last point is an extension of the previous. The year 2002 represents the largest and most immediate palate of counterterrorist actions for testing a simultaneous move. Actions examined at later cross sections are argued to be influenced by the initial moves of players immediately after 9/11. Many states failed to act either because they lacked the resources or institutional ability, or they were waiting for additional information to update their decision calculus. Deterrent actions entail costs in resources used. A quick fight could eliminate the threat and preclude the need for a resource-starved state to resort to deterrent action. More importantly, preemptive actions such as deploying troops or opening their borders to coalition forces entail the costs of potential retributive punishment against the preemptive state. Thus, an inactive state could be waiting for additional information regarding the number of players joining in to preempt the terrorist threat. Examining a cross section of a later year would be unable to differentiate between such decisions. Thus, utilizing 2002 will gain the most validation from the variables to be used.
**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is state counterterrorist action from 2001-2010. Although there is a wide range of possible actions that a state could use in response to a global terrorist threat, a select amount of actions will be utilized for the analysis in this chapter and can be categorized as either a preemptive, deterrent, or status quo strategy.

For deterrent actions, a state can choose to issue legislation, criminalize terrorism, create new departments within the government, make arrests, control people and borders, train troops, or harden targets. Since the costs of deterrent action influence the strategy choice of a player, for this study, making arrests, controlling people and borders, training troops, and hardening targets will be used. These actions are selected because they best generate the costs that cause potential terrorists to change their options regarding target selection. Legislation that criminalizes terrorism can look effective on paper. However, punishment can only be given if a terrorist is caught. Furthermore, many terrorists are more concerned with the success of the mission rather than the consequences faced if caught (Pape 2003). As a result, actions that increase the probability of an unsuccessful attack, such as installing metal detectors and tightening border security, prompt terrorists to consider a target more lax in its security.

Regarding preemptive action, states could either deploy troops or provide basing rights and supplies for another state’s preemptive action. States engaging in this latter strategy often do not send any of their own soldiers to conduct the preemptive strike, but they can still generate costs in the form of retaliatory attacks from terrorist organizations, particularly when states choose to base coalition forces. Saudi Arabia is a prime example of this. Though it contributed no troops to support preemptive action in either
Afghanistan or Iraq, it still suffered several high-profile attacks in 2003 as a result of al Saud ties with the US and allowing for the stationing of US troops (Byman 2005).

The coding scheme for these data is discussed extensively in Chapter Two, with a full description of the coding provided in the appendix, and can be referenced for further clarification. In order to get a full idea of the nature of state action over time, a simple outline of state deterrent action is provided in Figure 3.3.

**Figure 3.3. Proportion of Deterrent Actions: 2001-2010**

As can be seen from this simple bar chart, states have a select number of deterrent actions to choose from, and some are employed more than others. Controlling people and borders is the most chosen method of deterrence, with more than half of the states in the sample choosing this method each year. Thus, it appears that controlling is a relatively
cheap way for a state to secure itself. The methods of controlling include improving border security, strengthening of identity papers and other travel documents, as well as more stringent monitoring of financial transactions, such as seizing terrorist assets. A possible reason for this greater occurrence of controlling could stem from US involvement in facilitating financial stringency, as well as the Financial Action Task Force assisting member and non-member states in updating their financial security in the years immediately following 9/11 (*Country Reports on Terrorism* 2005).

The rest of the actions show variations in the frequency, but all are visibly lower in occurrence than controlling. However, these data show evidence of a stronger time trend, especially regarding the category of seizing assets. Seizing is shown to decrease over time and suggests the success of the other tactics. Terrorists possess a finite source of assets in terms of expenses and recruitment (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004). Increased financial scrutiny coupled with a systematic shutdown of the various avenues of funding work to limit the methods of obtaining funds as well as dry up potential recruitment pools. In this respect, the absence of deterrent activity reflects the success of increased deterrent activity in a previous time period.

Target hardening also appears to show a trend, however, this trend illustrates an increase in activity. As states are able to increase the amount of security in primary venues such as weapons caches and vital government facilities, increased amounts of funding and materials are able to help additional states lacking in resources to shore up their ability to deter terrorism. The increase in the target hardening of weaker states works in conjunction with training. States that engage in training operations are cooperative endeavors that strive to equip states lacking in resources with the technology
and techniques to combat terrorism. Thus, as more and more polities acquire the ability to defend themselves, terrorist organizations are pushed away from once-held strongholds as the net draws tighter. The trending increase in target hardening, coupled with training and equipping troops, leads to an initial increase in the amount of assets seized, which gradually dwindles as terrorist funds are depleted.

Another surprising finding is that the results are similar across regime types. The same deterrent action chart is compiled for both democracies and non-democracies. The results are presented in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4. Comparison of Deterrent Activity

3 Non-democracies identified by a POLITY IV score of 5 or lower.
The results show little preliminary support for a dilemma of liberal democracies. There is little difference between the actions of democracies and non-democracies, which provides indirect support to the argument that global terrorism is truly global in its scope. Though radical Islamic rhetoric, particularly that of Al-Qaeda, aims its threats at Western democracies, non-democracies apparently feel the threat as well. What the data do not allow us to see, however, is whether these deterrent activities within non-democracies are focused on protecting foreigners within their borders or whether they are primarily directed at protecting their own citizens.

Perhaps the similarities in counterterrorist responses between democracies and non-democracies could have ties to the theories of general and immediate deterrence. Arce and Sandler (2005a) imply that their game is based on a situation of immediate deterrence faced by liberal democracies; both states are faced with an imminent and credible threat of attack from a terrorist organization. Faced with this dilemma, states have the option of doing nothing, strengthening their security in the hopes of deflecting their probability of an attack to a weaker state, or engaging in preemptive action to remove the terrorist threat completely. However, international terrorism is rare (Bird et al. 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). Terrorists have a heavily reliance on the fear of an attack, and many terrorists lack credibility to either follow through or cease attacks (Lapan and Sandler 1993; Bapat 2006). As a result, it might be inaccurate to portray the coordination problem between states as taking place within the shadow of an immediate threat.

The counterterrorist actions outlined here can be best categorized as a general deterrent designed to dismay terrorist attacks from any group, rather than a threat leveled at a specific terrorist organization. General deterrence is much more extensive than the
crisis of immediate deterrence and has “less to do with ‘crisis decision making’ than with everyday decision-making in relationships involving conflicts of interest” (Quackenbush 2011a, 752). The installation of metal detectors at a particular airport is designed to repel any type of terrorist with the intention of carrying out an attack. Strengthening airport security or monitoring illegal financial activity is not an action intended to address the immediate threat of a terrorist attack by a specific group. In this regard counterterrorism is an activity taken up by all states as a general deterrent and not an activity designed to protect itself from any specific organization. Counterterrorism activity of this level is a general, rather than an immediate, deterrent.

From this preliminary view, it seems that democracies are not the only states taking action to combat terrorism. However, to further supplement these crude findings, additional analysis is needed. As illustrated in the previous games of Arce and Sandler (2005a), the deterrence game is a simultaneous move game. To test this, the various deterrent and preemptive actions are categorized as a single move for the year 2002. Instances of target hardening, arrests, seizing assets, and training troops are defined as acts of deterrence under the codebook provided in the appendix and are coded as 1. For preemptive actions, states contributing troops to Afghanistan in the year 2002 are labeled as preempt. Additionally, states that contribute to basing troops for the purpose of conducting counterterrorism operations are also included as preempt. This is due to the argument that voluntarily stationing foreign troops for has entailed costs on the state that often result in retaliatory attacks from terrorist organizations (Byman 2005). Preemptive action is coded as 2. States that contribute no troops and take no action in the above mentioned deterrent activities do nothing and are coded as 0. Other counterterrorist
measures coded in the data such as creating laws or constructing counterterrorist
departments entail little costs to the state. Laws are not necessarily followed and
departments can be viewed as mere window dressing to placate concerns. The deterrent
actions outlined here consume significant resources and are more concrete
demonstrations of state resilience. More importantly, these actions are argued to decrease
the chances of a successful attack, generating costs that are the burden of less-secure
targets.

**Independent Variables**

The independent variables used are efforts to provide a valid representation of the
various costs and benefits generated by each strategy. Beginning with the generalized
form of the PD$^2$ game presented in Figure 3.1, measures for the costs and benefits will be
listed. Beginning with the public benefits of a preemptive strike ($B$), Arce and Sandler
(2005a) note that if the public benefits of preemptive action are larger for one player, it is
more appealing to engage in a military strike. The most explicit example is if a target
bears the brunt of terrorist attacks. In this case the target state will preempt while the ally
deters, because the private benefits of preemption are greater for the target. Public
benefits will be measured as the *amount of terrorist attacks* a state suffered in the
previous year. Additionally, since international terrorist attacks are rare relative to the
amount of domestic terrorist attacks, a casualty count will also be included. The
involvement of the US directly extends from the attacks of 9/11, an especially
catastrophic event. Casualty and attack data are taken from the *Global Terrorism
Database*. The attacks selected come from international Islamic extremist groups, as
identified in the *Country Reports on Terrorism*. A terrorist group is defined as international if their attacks involve citizens or the territory of more than one country (*Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 2002). The US War on Terror can be seen not as a result of the frequency of the attacks, but rather the amount of casualties inflicted. It is expected as both these variables increase counterterrorist action should increase as well.

Private cost of deterrence ($c$) can be measured by a state’s military expenditures as a proportion of its GDP. Greater military spending lowers the costs of preemptive measures due to the fact that states with large defense budgets are more capable of bearing the costs of conducting a military operation, which is intrinsically more complicated than deterrent efforts at home. This variable is constructed as a ratio between a state’s military expenditures and that of the US. Because the initial operations in the global War on Terror are spearheaded by the US, many states may want to “pass the buck” if their military capabilities pale in comparison to the US. Thus, states with less military resources relative to the US will be less willing to engage in counterterrorist measures.

Public costs of deterrence ($C$) can be measured as a state’s logged GDP in US dollars. States with low levels of GDP will possess the capacity to neither preempt nor deter, for they lack the resources to protect themselves. In the wake of 9/11, industrialized states were quick to engage in target hardening, resulting in an increase of attacks to less developed countries such as Kenya, Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey (Enders and Sandler 2005). Thus, all else being equal, this variable should lead to an increase in deterrent and preemptive behavior.

The private benefit of preemptive action is the most difficult to validly represent.
Several measures are utilized that attempt to measure public satisfaction with preemptive action. Public opinion data is lacking for many states, and multiple surveys covering the same topic often vary in their questioning, so demographic characteristics are used instead. Since the terrorism under study is a form of Muslim extremism, it can be argued that Muslims might show greater sympathy for the terrorists. Engaging in preemptive measures could disrupt the local populace and lead to political turmoil; little benefit can be gleaned from preemptive action. Thus, a state with a large Muslim population can be expected to lack support in preemptive endeavors. To capture this effect, a state’s Muslim population as a percentage of the total population is included, along with dummy variables on whether a state is located in the Middle East and whether it is a US-designated state sponsor of terrorism. An additional control variable is included indicating whether a state borders a sponsor of terrorism. All of these variables intend to capture the costs that preemptive action can garner. As such, these variables are expected to have a negative influence.

To test the effect of a dilemma of liberal democracies, Li’s (2005) measures of democracy will be used. By treating democracy as a multifaceted concept, rather than a binary one, a more complete picture of the relationship between politics and state behavior regarding terrorism can be achieved. The first component is government constraints, a measure of the institutional constraints a chief executive faces, taken from the POLITY IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). This measure is based on a 7-point scale, with 1 indicating complete executive authority, and 7 indicating executive parity or subordination. Li (2005, 283) argues that government constraints prevent a state from effectively combating terrorism, due to the fact that democracies serve a wider range of
societal interests. Thus, repressive measures often entail political costs. It is hypothesized from here that an increase in government constraints decreases the probability of a preemptive strike.

The second component is *democratic participation*, and is a combination of a binary indicator of a democracy (6 or higher difference between POLITY IV DEMOC and AUTOC score) and a measure of electoral participation. If the state has scores a 6 or higher, political participation measuring the percentage of the population that voted in the general election will be used from the International IDEA Voter Turnout database (International IDEA 2010). Otherwise, a score of 0 will be assigned. Scores of 0 are assigned to non-democracies, because electoral participation might be involuntary in those states (Li 2005). Democratic participation is argued to reduce grievances by allowing more participation in the policy process. Higher levels of democratic participation also have an effect on a state’s ability to enact counterterrorist policies, due to the fact that states with higher participation rates are more tolerant of counterterrorism efforts (Li 2005). It can be hypothesized from these arguments that democratic participation increases the probability of a preemptive strike. Lastly, a control variable for membership in NATO is included to determine the impact of alliance commitments.

**Testing the PD² and the Dilemma of Liberal Democracies**

The cases outlined comprise 138 states. A simple frequency count shows that the majority of states took some sort of action, with 55.4% engaging in either deterring or preemption, and 26.7% engaging in only deterrent action. As previously mentioned,

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4 Li (2005) originally uses Vanhanen’s (2000a, 2000b) political participation measures. However, the latest year available is 2000.
allowing sovereign soil for basing rights is a category of preemption, and some states allow for basing but do not contribute troops. For example, Egypt not only allows for the stationing of US troops, but also offers protection for their transport through the Suez Canal. Djibouti is another strategic location, harboring coalition forces from five states in addition to being the only US military base in Sub-Saharan Africa (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002). The results of both models are presented in Table 3.1. The first model represents a baseline test of the prisoners’ dilemma squared game, and shows several of the measures capturing the effects of costs and benefits nicely. GDP is shown to lead to an increase in the probability of counterterrorist measures, which is consistent with hypothesized relationship. The measures of private benefits show significant effects as well, with the designation as a state sponsor showing a decrease. At first glance, it should come as no surprise to include sponsorship and expect a negative relationship, however, sponsorship designation is much more complex than it seems. States included in the data, such as Cuba and North Korea, are often designated as state sponsors more for political reasons than their actual commitment (or lack thereof) to supporting international terrorism. Less attention is given to states that outsource their support for terrorism to other countries, allowing them to avoid the stigma of being labeled a sponsor. Pakistan, for example, had close ties with the Taliban due to the Afghan movement’s willingness to shelter various Kashmiri groups in an effort to absolve Islamabad of any accusations regarding Kashmiri sponsorship (Byman 2005, 267). Additionally, some states have taken steps to cooperate with the US in order to be removed from the list. In 2006 Libya was removed as a sponsor, after years of designation, due to its cooperative efforts with the US regarding counterterrorism (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007).
Table 3.1. Ordered Logit Results for Counterterrorist Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Dilemma Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attacks</strong></td>
<td>0.081 (0.131)</td>
<td>0.086 (0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualty</strong></td>
<td>-0.021 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ln(GDP)</strong></td>
<td>0.578*** (0.123)</td>
<td>0.615*** (0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td>-0.460 (0.794)</td>
<td>-0.160 (0.876)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>-2.892** (1.316)</td>
<td>-3.126** (1.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border</strong></td>
<td>-0.286 (0.597)</td>
<td>-0.862 (0.694)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim Population</strong></td>
<td>0.023*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio of Military Expenditures</strong></td>
<td>0.188 (0.188)</td>
<td>0.197 (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
<td>-0.165** (0.080)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Constraints</strong></td>
<td>0.029 (0.099)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Participation</strong></td>
<td>0.011 (0.013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
<td>1.372*** (0.447)</td>
<td>1.583*** (0.489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log-likelihood</strong></td>
<td>-93.407</td>
<td>-83.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>114</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

The ratio of military expenditures also behaves in the predicted direction. States appear to measure their capabilities relative to those of the US. The decision to participation depends on the size of this ratio. As the disparity between the military might of the two states grows, the chance of preemptive action decreases.

What is particularly interesting, however, is the effect of Muslim population on deterrence. What appears is a positive influence, which is perhaps due to the fact that
many terrorist acts targeted at foreigners occur within Muslim populated states. Recall that Plümper and Neumayer (2010) find that terrorist organizations often target international targets within the group’s own home borders if their home state is supported by a stronger ally. Additionally, there are a large number of US forces, both civilian and military, that are stationed in Muslim-populated states. This could explain why states with large Muslim populations, such as Saudi Arabia, are more likely to deter; increased US troop presence leads to an increase in the probability of a terrorist attack happening on their soil.

A second model is run testing for the effects of democracy on state counterterrorist behavior. Contrary to the preliminary results, democracy has an influence on state behavior. Indeed, even after controlling for the positive effects of NATO membership, democracy negatively affects the behavior of states. This finding is largely due to the effects of preemptive action. The results in Figure 3.4 only show the difference in institutional characteristics regarding deterrent options. The results here model preemptive action as a value of the dependent variable. Leeds et al. (2009) note the pacifying effects of democracy on alliance commitments; however, these conclusions do not find support when applied to counterterrorism. Terrorism is difficult to define and even more difficult to combat due to the lack of a definitive enemy and the nature of its subversive tactics. Given that terrorism’s success is driven by fear, it appears that a democratic public would be more likely to punish a leader for engaging in preemptive action and subjecting its population to potential retaliatory attacks.

An additional explanation for an aversion to preemptive action can also be defined by a state’s motive. The threat leveled by Al-Qaeda against liberal democratic
Western societies was made credible through the attacks of 9/11. The long-term strategic goal of their actions is the establishment of a global Islamic regime and the decline of Western civilization, and the organization did follow through with additional attacks to this end. However intent they are on achieving this goal, it is highly implausible that it will succeed. Democracies are shown to bear the costs of long-term commitments if their state sovereignty and survival are at stake (Horowitz et al. 2011). It seems here that well-established democracies do not buy the argument that their survival is at risk, despite the arguments made by the Bush administration in the events leading up to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, many democracies are not willing to bear the casualty costs of fighting an enemy like Al-Qaeda, for it is unclear what is at stake. Though they are threatened, the costs of conducting preemptive action against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates outweigh the benefits of its eradication. For this reason, democratic leaders forgo the punishment of the next election by passing the buck to more capable states, illustrating the prisoners’ dilemma of counterterrorism.

Deterrence appears to be largely the work of state capabilities, institutional factors, and demographic characteristics. Additionally, the amount of international terrorist attacks that a state suffers from Muslim extremists is a poor predictor of counterterrorist action. It is important to remember, however, that the invasion of Afghanistan and the wave of preemptive action that followed were in many regards a result of the attacks of 9/11, which was an unprecedented and particularly catastrophic terrorist event. This single observation of a terrorist incident is not sufficient to sway statistical inference to mean that terrorist attacks in general are the precursor for preemptive action. These findings support the argument that terrorism fuels fear. As the
models show, states are not motivated into action based on the amount of terrorist attacks or the amount of casualties suffered at the hands of terrorism. Rather, it is the existence of the probability of such an attack that drives counterterrorism. States that possess the capabilities to combat terrorism do not require the catalyst of suffering terrorist attacks. The mere fear of a state suffering their own 9/11, however remote the possibility, within its own borders, is enough to motivate deterrent behavior and preemptive strikes.

**Conclusion**

This study is one of the first of its kind to examine the behavior and cooperative obstacles states face when combating a common terrorist threat. What is shown is that the level of action is determined mostly by the amount of resources a state has to fight terrorism. The desire to act appears to mostly depend on one’s ability to act. The baseline model of the prisoners’ dilemma found support in both the public and private costs of deterrence and preemptive action, respectively. States are able to deter more effectively if they have the resources on hand to do so. Additionally, states are more likely to engage in preemptive behavior if they have the explicit military capabilities to do so. As the prisoners’ dilemma illustrates, preemptive action is very costly, both in the amount of resources contributed and possible casualties suffered. Both work to decrease support for the endeavor at home and possibly abroad. As such, states prefer instead to pass the buck on to someone else more able to eliminate the threat. This effect is captured by viewing the ratio of capabilities each state has relative to the US. States unable to match the prodigious military power of the US instead prefer to let it lead the thrust of preemptive
action, with the hopes that the threat will be eliminated without the preemptive effort of the defecting state.

It is also worth noting the negative influence that democracy has in deciding whether to eliminate the common terrorist threat. Scholarly literature supports the argument that democracies are asymmetrically targeted by international terrorist attacks. Despite the asymmetric number of attacks that democracies bear from international terrorism, many are still unwilling to cooperate to bring about its end. Being attacked by terrorists and choosing to retaliate are two separate processes. Preemption brings about the possibility of retaliatory attacks, which a democratic population is unwilling to tolerate. Furthermore, international terrorist attacks are a rare event that certain democracies may be willing to endure, for they do not believe that Al-Qaeda’s presence is an actual threat to their sovereignty. The tradeoff between resources and the decrease in the already rare probability of a terrorist attack could lead many democracies to direct their efforts at more pressing concerns in the hopes that a more capable state will step up to eradicate the threat.

What these results definitively show, however, is that a majority of states do choose some sort of counterterrorist action, with many choosing to deter. The ability of states to preempt is only taken up by the few, supporting the argument that, given the presence of an international terrorist threat, most states choose the dominant strategy of deterrence, leaving the elimination of the threat to much more powerful nations. It is also important to stress that this action is driven by the threat of a terrorist attack, not in response to past attacks. The insignificance of the number of attacks and the casualty
counts suffered by international terrorism illustrates that the primary goal of terrorism is to instill fear in a population.

The negative effect of democracy shown here does not represent the final verdict of its effects on counterterrorism. Many of the states that chose preemptive action are democracies themselves. Additionally, the preemptive actors are all more developmentally advanced. The threat of terrorism is the result of a global insurgency; all states are better shoring up general defenses in anticipation of a random attack. Preemptive action, however, is a form of deterrence that is intended to eliminate the threats of specific groups of terrorists. Due to the acuity of its focus, preemptive strikes bear a stronger resemblance to immediate deterrence. General and immediate deterrence are two separate phenomena, entailing the possibility that different characteristics motivate a state at each level (Zagare and Kilgour 2000; Quackenbush 2011b).

Since Islamic terrorists direct their threats specifically at Western democracies and those who support Western democracies, it can be argued that these states are faced with the threat of immediate deterrence. And since preemptive strikes can be thought of as a more focused form of deterrence designed to eliminate a specific threat, an exclusive examination of the preemptive levels would gain greater insight into the true nature of the dilemma that liberal democracies face. It could be that democracy has a negative influence on the decision to preempt, but, once committed, democracy can strengthen the resolve of the preempting state. This question will be examined more closely in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, CAPABILITIES, AND THE LEVEL OF PREEMPTIVE ACTION
As illustrated in Chapter Three, counterterrorist actions are largely a product of state capabilities; states in possession of greater resources are more likely to engage in deterrent and preemptive action. Additionally, the threat of international terror is truly global in scale. The results support the theory that all states with the capability to defend against terrorism take action to do so. The end result is a deterrence spiral, with states engaging in a race to shore up their military defenses, lest they become the weak link that draws an attack. The theoretical conclusions reached by Arce and Sandler (2005a, 2005b) and Enders and Sandler (2006) state that deterrence is a problem of liberal democracies. What the evidence shows, however, is that global terrorism is a problem of all states due to the fact that attacks could happen anywhere in the world. Democracies do feel the brunt of this threat, however, with a disproportionate amount of international attacks being leveled at liberal democracies (Li 2005). So how does democracy affect counterterrorist behavior? The theoretical differentiation between general and immediate deterrence (Zagare and Kilgour 2000; Quackenbush 2011a) could serve as the explanation for the difference between deterrent and preemptive action.

The attacks of 9/11 heightened the presence of global terrorism across all states. The fact that an attack of such an unprecedented level was successfully carried out against the most powerful military in the world by an enemy with relatively minimal resources seemingly out of nowhere served as a shock to the international system that terrorism is truly a global threat. These attacks, though seemingly unpredictable and irrational, follow a consistent logic that masquerades under the guise of unpredictability (Pape 2003). The ability of an enemy to appear irrational feeds into the fear of another attack. Since terrorists rely on fear to accomplish their political ends, this is all part of the
strategy. These attacks increased fear across the globe and prompted states with sufficient capabilities to build up their defenses in anticipation of a potential terrorist attack. The fact that this threat was felt more strongly in certain states than others did not prevent non-democracies from deterring. Their actions indicate that they too were pressured to take action.

However, liberal democracies felt this threat more intensely. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, carried out against the most prominent symbol of free market capitalism and liberal democratic values in the most powerful liberal democratic state, unequivocally sent a signal that the prime targets were the US and similar Western democracies. The purpose of this attack also served as a credible signal that additional attacks were imminent. And this is indeed what happened. Devastating strikes by Al-Qaeda operatives were carried out against liberal democracies across the globe, the most prevalent occurring on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, in 2004, and simultaneous attacks on London’s Underground trains and a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square in 2005.

The different levels of threat signal that liberal democracies have been specifically targeted by Al-Qaeda. The difference between liberal democracies and the rest of the deterring states is that the threat is more immediate for the liberal democratic states. Thus, it can be argued that, in general, advanced, liberal democracies are in a situation of immediate deterrence and the other states are in a situation of general deterrence.

This chapter represents an attempt to explain the dilemma faced by liberal democracies when combating terrorism by tying it into more traditional conflict theories of deterrence. What follows is a discussion of the literature on multilateral and unilateral
combat and peacekeeping operations concerning the US. The purpose is to explain why traditional balancing theories do not account for the coordinated, multilateral operations seen today in modern conflict. The reason behind this is that the most of the world feels the threat of global terrorism and does not balance against the US because they share its overarching goal of eradicating Al-Qaeda. What follows next is a discussion of the theories of general and immediate deterrence, with an effort put forth explaining how it is possible for states to deter terrorism and a discussion of why liberal democracies are in a state of immediate deterrence.

Third, an analysis of the dilemma of liberal democracies is outlined, giving a more nuanced test of the preemptive levels of states across all general deterrent cases. Breaking preemptive levels down in this fashion shows how capacity is the main explanatory factor in the decision to preempt but that the level of preemption is also determined by democratic institutional measures. This is due to the argument that liberal democracies feel the threat of terrorism the most. What the results show, however, is that alliance commitments are the main explanatory factor in the decision to preempt, but that this decision is also determined by democratic institutional measures, which serve as a hindrance to participation. This is due to the argument that citizens are wary of enduring casualties in combat and protest overseas action unless the threat is imminent. This conflict between the alliance obligations of state leaders and the reluctance of the population to commit plays out in the decision to act. However, once the decision has been made, state capabilities are the driving force in determining the level of preemptive action. The last section ends with a discussion of the results followed by a cursory examination of the possibility that heightened levels of preemption could generate costs
that manifest in the form of retaliatory attacks by international terrorists, a subject that will be more thoroughly analyzed in the next chapter.

**Multilateralism in the Global System**

Traditional power balancing theories argue that the US should be experiencing international backlash due to its rank as the top military power and its heavy overthrow and subsequent peacekeeping operations directed at states in the Middle East (Leiber and Alexander 2005). This lack of expected action could hinge on the nature of conflict in the contemporary global system as consisting of smaller, peacekeeping and counterinsurgent operations in place of the more traditional great power wars. Bures (2007) notes that there are two types peacekeeping operations (PKOs) that are premised on different outlooks regarding global politics and the best route to peace. The first is the Westphalian theory of peacekeeping and is concerned with the traditional, state-centric view of undifferentiated actors working toward peace through international forums. The internal politics of these states should have no influence on the actions of the peacekeepers unless the host nation makes them relevant. The second is post-Westphalian in nature and recognizes that the seeds of war can be planted within states, with characteristics such as injustice, human rights abuses, and poverty all serving as separate motivating factors to conflict. The approach outlined in this chapter more closely resembles that of post-Westphalian PKOs, in that the rebuilding and peacekeeping goal of the US after its invasions of Afghanistan was to model the governments to resemble liberal-democratic states. It was not enough for the US to wait for the Afghanistan government to eliminate
Al-Qaeda; it needed direct assistance to do that. Additionally, state involvement in Afghanistan in the form of ISAF forces was ostensibly under peacekeeping operations.

Diehl (1993) examines peacekeeping operations to determine what elements engender success. Additionally, he looks at the motivations for state involvement. At that time there were no empirical or theoretical investigations into the decision for a state to partake in PKOs. According to his analysis there are four criteria for examining the success of peacekeeping operations. The first is the determination of whether the purpose of the mission as stated in the mandate was fulfilled (Brown 1993; Durch 1995; Ratner 1995; Bratt 1996). Put more simply, did the peacekeeping operation accomplish what it set out to do? The second concerns the impact on the local population. Even if a peacekeeping operation is successful in terms of fulfilling the goals outlined in the mandate, it is not successful unless there is openness and acceptance on the part of the local population (Durch 1995; Ratner 1995). The third reason is the manner in which the accomplishment of the mission has been achieved. It is possible that the goals may favor the interests of particular constituencies or organizations over the broader goals as defined. By examining the motivations and the manner in which the PKO was conducted it is often possible to detect whether its action was Westphalian or post-Westphalian in nature. Lastly, it is important that a state’s motivation behind the peacekeeping operation is to serve a broad range of goals and to not become self-serving (Pushkina 2006).

Viewing this theoretical reasoning in light of the preemptive measures of the US and its coalition partners, the goal of the operations in Afghanistan attracted participants because the motive of the US was not entirely self-serving. Indeed, per reasoning of Enders and Sandler (2006), the efforts were the result of the immediate threat of a
terrorist organization. International terrorism threatens a host of target states that would all be better off if the source of the threat was eliminated. The broader goal of global security brought together a united coalition.

However, sharing common motivations is not a sufficient condition to motivate a state into action. Perhaps even more relevant, consensus and resources are necessary, though there is no theory for how certain operations attract them (Stedman 2002). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) attempt to outline a theory of multilateral commitment in peacekeeping operations and find that the probability of successful PKOs are a function of a state’s capacities, the availability of international assistance, and the depth of war-related hostility.

Traditional IR theories in the line of realism and neorealism argue that there should be some form of balancing against the US in the wake of its victory after the Cold War. Since the US was the lone superpower after the fall of the Soviet Union, it should find an alliance of states acting in concert to disrupt its hegemonic goals, for the global system would not be stable if there were no balancing against a lone superpower. However, there is no overt action on the part of states to combat US intervention in the affairs of other states; quite the contrary, there is a large coalition of forces aiding the US in achieving its goals. Arguments for the absence of balancing are attributed to evidence that the US has a high reputation for non-aggressive intentions. Furthermore, instead of the traditional form of balancing that states engage in line with realist theories, there is soft balancing, which serves as a form of passive resistance to US power-related goals (Walt 2002; Pape 2004). Through these actions, traditional IR theories still find support, for this explains the lack of explicit military action against the US. An example of soft
balancing is a state’s refusal to participate in the War on Terror. This is plausible evidence of the existence of balancing, as many states do protest US actions in the Middle East. Yet it is empirically difficult to distinguish the concept of soft balancing from hard balancing. Theories of soft balancing can be seen as ad hoc solutions to the contention that states do not engage in balancing actions (Lieber and Alexander 2005).

A more accurate appraisal would be that states do not balance because they lack the motivation. As argued previously, the attacks of 9/11 can be seen as an unprecedented and devastating attack on the international community, with liberal-democratic states serving as the specific target. The empirical results of the previous chapter show how most capable states engaged in deterrent behavior after 9/11, which implies that the international community is preparing for a potential attack and that most states approve of US preemptive action against Al-Qaeda on at least a normative basis. This line of reasoning is supported by Lieber and Alexander (2005), who find no change in the Cold War alliance patterns following the US’s aggressive shift regarding missile defense in the late 1990s. They also note that 9/11 was not a pivotal point that changed the global focus of the international community, and that there was little need to change the alliance patterns in the post-Cold War environment. Russia and China did give vague opposition to the US involvement of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, but that was the extent of their actions. The opposition to the US invasions was not even cleanly delineated along cultural lines; states with large Muslim populations were also active participants in the global War on Terror, with countries such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia lending cooperative efforts. The main point stressed here is that all states, even
predominantly Muslim ones, view international terror as a threat. States fail to balance because they lack the motivation, not because they lack power.

Empirical examinations of state dissatisfaction come to conflicting conclusions on the international consensus regarding US foreign policy. Quackenbush and Drury (2011) examine data on UN voting from 1985-2008 and events data from 1984-2004 in a test of perfect deterrence theory to determine whether US missile defense programs upset state evaluations of the status quo and thus upset the stability of deterrence in the international arena. Their results find that states are not upset at the changing status quo, a point that finds further support in the consistent levels of voting agreement between the US and Russia, China, and India. These results suggest that states are not balancing against the US and are more so in agreement with one another. Theoretically, missile defense policies represent the most threatening of policy choices and should be the most upsetting to the balance of power. The fact that there is little evidence supporting the argument that states view US actions on missile defense as upsetting the status quo provides a stringent test of the lack of balancing against US interests. These conclusions could be a reflection of the international community’s opinions on international terrorism. The results in Chapter Three support the hypothesis that states pass the buck regarding preemptive actions. Indeed, the ratio of military expenditures finds that states are unwilling to engage in preemptive actions when the ratio is high, suggesting a compliance with US actions and a reluctance to act when the US is more capable.

Conversely, Voeten (2004) investigates the global consensus regarding US policies and find a growing divide between the interests of the US and the rest of the world. Looking at UN voting activity from 1990-2001, he finds a precipitous increase in
the distance between the US and the international community after 1996. The divide is not found to be in response to the specific policies regarding defense policies such as the ABM Treaty, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, or Land Mine Convention. Rather, the divide between the interests of the global community and the US has been growing at a constant, linear rate. This gap is felt across all states and is not a reflection of the clash of civilizations between Western and Islamic cultures. However, states vary in their degree of separation; liberal democracies experience a smaller divide between their policies and the US, with Great Britain and Israel having the closest ties.

Coletta (2007) agrees that state balancing is not occurring because the rest of the world is content with US action concerning global terrorism, however, these actions are the product of the global shift in 9/11 and the turning focus of states away from the traditional IR theories of balancing. Instead, in the wake of 9/11 and the dramatic resurgence of global terror, state building and security is the key. This supports the post-Westphalian notion of eschewing classic state and global politics in favor of securing the rights of failing states. This suggests that the industrialized world can no longer ignore the suffering of developed nations, for the collective frustrations bleed beyond their respective borders and focuses on the developed world as the source of their misery.

There are a multitude of factors that account for the failure of state-centric theories explanation of global politics after the Cold War, ranging from the aforementioned lack of a balancing coalition to the exogenous effects of globalization on the internal characteristics of states. The internal reactions to globalization changed the motivation of PKOs; they were undertaken to restore order, not maintain the balance of power (Barnett 2004). Proponents of comparative defense argue that the system needs to
be preserved and that the focus has transitioned from state interactions to nation building. Comparative defense is a departure from traditionalist IR theories and looks beyond the state to domestic level characteristics that define security. As Coletta (2007, 395) notes, “One cannot separate the contributions to regional security forces or peacebuilding coalitions, say, of Spain or Poland’s varying troop levels in operations to remake Iraq, without studying national identity and democratic development in those countries.”

Comparative defense shows some similarities to the global system and the problems that states face when engaging in counterterrorist activities against global terrorism, for it is less focused on how states remain at the top of the power ladder and more focused on how they deter internal and external threats. Defense is more about balancing the principles of preserving security without jeopardizing the characteristics of the state, which parallels the dilemma that liberal democracies face when countering a terrorist attack without sacrificing the liberties that characterize their makeup (Enders and Sandler 2006). However, comparative defense also argues that states delegate their core functions of defense to NATO and other organizations, which is a dubious claim. The initial thrust of the US invasions in both Iraq and Afghanistan was conducted largely without the help of international assistance (Kreps 2008).

While liberal institutionalism has a place in global security, states are still willing to forgo working through institutions, as has been shown in the past and present concerning the initial military engagements against Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically regarding the case of the US invasion of Afghanistan, Kreps (2008) argues that the operation had two phases – the invasion phase and the post-invasion, peacekeeping phase. The two stages are differentiated by the specific nature of the mission. The initial
phalanx of the US assault consisted of their Special Operation Forces (SOF) with minimal assistance by British, Australian, and Canadian SOF. This operation was carried out due to necessity, for it was assumed that a follow up terrorist attack from Al-Qaeda was imminent; there was a limited time horizon to conduct the mission. Engaging in multilateral operations per constructivist notions of the appropriateness of IGOs like NATO or the UN would take months of planning and compromise before the initial phase could begin. Regardless of scholarly claims for an explanatory motivation, for states, multilateralism was eschewed in favor of an efficient, preemptive strike to eliminate the immediate terrorist threat. The operation was not a preventive effort to eliminate an enemy that would eventually amass enough power to begin an attack. Rather, the US felt that an attack was on the immediate horizon and was thus a truly preemptive strike. Preemption is motivated by fear rather than greed (Reiter 1995).

Once the threat was eliminated, the motivation of necessity gave way to the motivation of appropriateness, a behavior in line with the constructivist notion that multilateralism is the correct way to engage in conflict in the post-Cold War arena (Finnemore 2003). This is because many peacekeeping operations have a longer time horizon and are less reliant on military surprise and might. Under the philosophy of appropriateness, only then did the US allow multilateral forces to participate in the peacekeeping operation. The longer time horizon and complexity of peacekeeping operations necessitated the employment of a multinational coalition, a behavior that echoes the constructivist argument of scholars regarding the norm of multilateralism in contemporary international politics.
It is here that the difference between a preventive and preemptive war are examined briefly, for scholars often confound these two concepts (Levy 2008). For example, in his study on the motivations behind the US invasion of Afghanistan, Freedman (2002) argues that there was no imminent threat of WMDs being used on Americans and that the war was a preemptive effort based solely on fear. However, this confuses the two concepts of preventive and preemptive war. Levy (2008) notes that motivations for preemption and preventive wars are different: both are forms of better-now-than later logic but are responses to different threats. Preventive wars are undertaken in anticipation of a power shift and are based on greed and the desire to amass and keep as much power as possible. Preemptive wars, on the other hand are not started by an aggressor country as an attempt to keep power but rather an attempt to thwart an attack that is seen as inevitable. Thus, preventive conflicts are started out of greed, and preemptive conflicts are a reaction from fear.

Bensahel (2006) agrees that the initial invasion was largely the work of the US. However, the operations undertaken in Afghanistan do not consist of one coalition, but instead of multiple coalitions. It is in fact a coalition of coalitions, composed of military, financial, law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and reconstructive efforts, noting that intelligence coalitions are the most difficult to coordinate, due to sensitivities in state security, and that financial coalitions are the ones most exploited by terrorist organizations. Reconstruction operations necessitate the long-term commitments and did not have the short time horizon present in the initial military invasion, which parallels the assertions by Kreps (2008) that alliances were not used in the initial operations but were rather used during the reconstruction phases.
If the conflict in Afghanistan were to be categorized as preemptive, it joins an exceedingly small list of wars, including World War I, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Preemptive wars are exceedingly rare, as there are often grave political consequences of a state attacking first. Additionally, the prospects of a preemptive conflict actually facilitate compromise, as the stakes are so unsure and unpredictable in the wake of immediate preemptive conflict that states are willing to seek out compromises to alleviate the tension (Reiter 1995).

Thus, the conventional literature would assert that the War on Terror is not preemptive in nature. However, state action and multilateral efforts can also be tied to the theories of general and immediate deterrence. As argued in the previous chapter, the decision to engage in either status quo, deterrent, or preemptive action is partly a function of capabilities. States who are capable engage in deterrent actions if they have the resources to do so. Additionally, the more capable the state, the more likely they are to engage in preemptive action. Most states engage in these actions because the international threat of terrorism is truly global in nature. Preliminary results do indeed show that states are more likely to engage in deterrent action rather than entail the costs of preemption, because some states feel the threat more acutely. Thus, the global threat of international terrorism puts all states on alert, regardless of political affiliation. It can be said that they are in a state of general deterrence. When states are directly challenged, as the US was after 9/11, the threat of an international terrorist attack is greater. In this instance, the US realized that Al-Qaeda possessed a credible threat. Since terrorists do not claim a particular state and rely on fear, threats of an attack are often not credible (Bapat 2006). The attacks of 9/11 indicated to the US and other liberal democracies that
Al-Qaeda possessed a credible threat, and thus selected liberal democracies into an instance of immediate deterrence. This chapter represents a closer examination into the institutional characteristics that motivate preemptive action. As seen in the previous chapter, capabilities have a large role in determining the counterterrorist actions that a state takes. However, once selected into the crisis, institutional characteristics take on a more important role, since democracies are said to be in a state of immediate deterrence. In order to examine this more detail, a closer look at the specifics of general and immediate deterrence is warranted.

**Terrorism and Deterrence**

In order for deterrence to work, two conditions must be present. The first is that the defender must be aware that there is a threat that has been leveled. The second is that the decision making process on behalf of the adversary must be influenced by costs and benefits. It can be argued that, since terrorists are irrational, they do not perceive costs and benefits in their actions and thus cannot be deterred (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006). This is because costs are not measured in the traditional sense. Terrorists do not fear attacks in retribution. Since the global terrorist threat consists largely of radical Muslims who view themselves as martyrs, the threat of a costly punishment would only confirm their goal of a glorious death. Framed in this logic, terrorists do not fear punishment. Extending beyond the philosophical differences between states and terrorist organizations regarding costs and punishment, terrorist organizations cannot be deterred simply for the practical reason that they are not states. Because they have no home base and are not part of the sovereign, it is exceedingly difficult to deal out retribution. For these reasons, Van
de Velde (2010) argues that terrorist organizations are incapable of being affected by deterrence.

Trager and Zagorcheva (2006) state that terrorists are irrational because they do not perceive actions in terms of costs and benefits; they are suicidal. This statement implies that the authors are referencing procedural rationality. Terrorists in this regard do not weigh all possible information and carry out their goals in a specified way. Their judgment is clouded by their fanaticism, and thus are not acting in accordance with rationality. However, the assumption used in rational deterrence theory, and rational choice theory in general, is instrumental rationality. Broadly stated, an instrumentally rational actor is one who, when confronted with two choices, chooses the one that yields the highest outcome. Preferences are subjective in nature and are shaped by beliefs, cognitive limitations, and emotions, but this does not mean that an actor is irrational (Quackenbush 2004, 2011a). Rather, actors are rational if they choose strategies in an effort to obtain their highest possible preference.

Additionally, there is evidence that terrorist attacks are carried out in a strategic manner. Analysis of attacks over time shows crests and peaks, suggesting that they are coordinated during specific periods and are not random in nature (Pape 2003). Additionally, these attacks work. Instances of the success of suicide attacks include their role in forcing US and French forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983 and Israeli forces to leave in 1985. They also forced Israel to leave the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994. They can also be thwarted. Enacting deterrent measures on a particular target result in a substitution effect, as terrorists adapt to new defenses and look for weaker targets (Enders and Sandler 1993). Additionally, there are multiple stages to the attack process that allow
an array of strategies to deter terrorists; an attack is only the end result of years of preparation and planning, each stage highly susceptible to sabotage by a defending state (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006). Thus, terrorist actors are strategic and capable of being deterred, for deterrence constitutes a fundamental human relationship and transcends time and enemies (Zagare 2006).

Part of the reason that coalition forces are engaged in such a prolonged war with international terror at this time is that the opposing sides cannot come to a common bargaining area to forge an agreement. This is not due to the deficiencies in deterrence theory to explain the conflict. Rather, it is a product of the failure of both sides to meet on a common ground. Al-Qaeda has many short-term goals, but the long-term goal is the establishment of a global Islamic state. The attacks on 9/11 represented efforts to remove US troops from Muslim soil and cut off ties to Israel in addition to the establishment of a global Muslim state. The US complied with these demands by removing troops from Saudi Arabia but was unwilling to compromise on more drastic demands. To rescind state sovereignty over to a Muslim caliphate and to cut off ties to Israel are concessions that the US and other liberal democracies are not willing to make and demonstrate the limits of terrorism (Pape 2003). This lack of a bargaining range has been tied to deterrence theory for a more complete explanation (Langlois and Langlois 2006).

Fleshing out the interplay between Al-Qaeda, international terrorism, and targeted states necessitates a discussion on general and immediate deterrence. It is assumed here that both sides possess instrumental rationality. For deterrence to occur, a defending state must convince an attacking state that it possesses an effective military capability that could impose unacceptable costs on an attacker, and the attacker must believe that this
retribution would be carried out if it attacked the defender (Quackenbush 2011a). Eschewing the lack of overlap on bargaining terms, it is possible here to explain why deterrence failed. Perfect deterrence theory states that, in situations between two states, there are categories of mutual and unilateral deterrence, with unilateral deterrence being the most stable (Zagare and Kilgour 2000; Senese and Quackenbush 2003). Viewed in this light, the situation between the US and Al-Qaeda is one of unilateral deterrence, with the US as the defender that prefers the status quo and the challenger being Al-Qaeda, which is looking to upset the status quo. Terrorists often lack the credibility to appear sincere in their goals. Therefore, they rely on attacks to signal their intentions. The attacks on 9/11 served as a credible signal that they were sincere in their intent of driving the US out of Muslim territory and establishing an Islamic state. It is unlikely that the US would have removed their troops from Saudi Arabia by the mere threat of an attack on the WTC towers (Kydd and Walter 2006). However, their intentions lacked capability in the sense that it would not deter a US retaliatory attack. Conversely, when examining the US, it can be argued that Al-Qaeda leaders knew that the US possessed a credible retaliatory threat, however, it lacked capability. It should be noted that, in perfect deterrence theory, capability does not mean the ability to project force or the possession of a vast array of sophisticated weaponry. Rather, capability means that, all things equal, a potential attacker would sustain sufficient damage if the threat were carried out to make the outcome worse off than if there was not an attack (Quackenbush 2010). When viewed in this light, the US had a credible but incapable threat.
Research Design

The events of 9/11 signaled to the US that additional attacks were imminent, placing them into a situation of immediate deterrence. Here, the US had the option of backing down or attacking. Since the threat of attack was implied to target all liberal democracies that shared the same views as the US, theoretically, these states should be selected into immediate deterrence as well. However, as shown in Chapter Three, the decision to commit to deterrent and preemptive action in these situations is also partly a matter of capabilities, with states possessing greater resources and having military capabilities on par with those of the US being the committed coalition. Once states commit to preemptive action and immediate deterrence fails, the level of democracy is hypothesized to come into play. Most citizens of democracies have a positive outlook on their system of government. Democracies are a mechanism of airing grievances, and increasing a sense of political efficacy. These characteristics are shown to reduce terrorist recruitment abilities as well as raise public tolerance of counterterrorist actions on behalf of the state (Li 2005). Thus, once capabilities are taken into account and a state engages in preemptive action, liberal democracies should be seen to shoulder the brunt of preemption.

To measure these effects, the first dependent variable is constructed to explicitly determine which states selected to commit to preemptive action and which states did not. It is coded as 1 for those states that either committed troops or allowed for the stationing of coalition forces on their soil and a 0 for any other action. As argued in Chapter Three, allowing bases is included as preemptive actions due to the evidence indicating that states that allow basing are the targets of attack. The method used to estimate the first model
will be a simple logit. This is the most effective method of determining the characteristics that foster preemptive cooperation with the US, for the data set constructed is set up to represent the universe of cases in general deterrence that could be selected into immediate deterrence. Simply examining the characteristics of the coalition forces does not account for the factors that led to their decision to preempt and thus induces selection effects (Fearon 2007). Hence, a binary logistic regression is conducted to determine if there is a distinct difference between deterrent and preemptive action.

Conceptually, preemption could be viewed as an extension of deterrent action, for both moves are directed at a common enemy. The only difference is that preemption entails more costs, however, they are both conducted to achieve the same end result, namely the prevention of a future terrorist threat. Such logic was behind the employment of an ordered logit in Chapter Three. However, framed differently, deterrent and preemptive strategies could be conceptually distinct. Whereas deterrent actions regarding the War on Terror are in response to a specific threat, namely Al-Qaeda, their effects are broad and do not serve as a pointed effort to specifically eliminate a threat. Generally speaking, deterrent actions could be undertaken to prevent any attack and do not impose as much costs on the international community. National defense is a hallmark of state sovereignty; efforts to uphold it are only met with negative reaction when they significantly intrude on individual rights (Enders and Sandler 2006). Preemptive action in the form of armed combat, while directed at the same end, is a different form of means altogether. Public outlook on foreign affairs is fairly minimal, supporting a general aversion to a state involving itself beyond its borders. Additionally, preemptive action almost certainly guarantees the loss of life, a fact that many states are unwilling to
tolerate. Crossing the threshold into the sacrifice of human life is a heavier concept than
the decision to install more metal detectors at an airport. In light of these arguments, the
two concepts of deterrent and preemptive action may be theoretically distinct and linked
only indirectly through their focus on a common threat.

A second dependent variable measures the level of preemptive action and is
simply a measure of the number of troops an individual state committed to Afghanistan.
It is possible to picture the invasion in Operation Iraqi Freedom as a preventive attack to
prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Levy 2008). This logic implies
that the US did not see Iraq as an immediate threat but an eventual one, emboldened by
the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 to acquire WMDs and use them against the US. Many in the
international community view the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a threshold that
warrants a different treatment toward an opposing enemy. Indeed, such an acquisition by
Iraq would certainly improve its capability to do irrevocable harm against powerful
countries as well as the US. By contrast, the invasion of Afghanistan more closely
resembles a preemptive attack, for these operations were seen as a direct response to
9/11. This could also explain the timing of the events, as the invasion of Iraq began a full
year after the invasion of Afghanistan. Hence, the dependent variable modeled here is the
number of troops deployed to Afghanistan in 2002, as it is a more appropriate test of the
factors that foster state coordination in the face of a terrorist threat.

The independent variables for these models are carried over from the previous
chapter and include the number of international terrorist attacks a state suffered the
previous year, the civilian casualty count, the log of a state’s GDP, a logged ratio of a
state’s military capabilities to the US, and the percentage of Muslims within a state’s
population. Additionally, the democratic measures used in Li (2005) are included to determine if different characteristics of democracy affect preemptive levels differently. Finally, controls are included and consist of a dummy variable for the Middle East and a dummy variable indicating whether a state is a NATO member to account for alliance commitments.

**Results**

The results of the first model are presented in the first column of Table 4.1. The findings refute the argument that state capability is the deciding factor that motivates a nation to engage into preemptive action. Quite the contrary, the simple logit results demonstrate that the decision to commit is largely a function of alliance commitments. The coefficient on NATO membership is of a large magnitude and a high significance, suggesting that alliance commitments are the driving force behind the initial invasion of Afghanistan. This finding should come as no surprise, given the fact that the ISAF forces are NATO-led. What is surprising, however, are the insignificance of the logged variables GDP and the ratio of *Military Expenditures*, which capture the effect of state capabilities. When viewed in comparison to the results in Chapter Three, this finding suggests that capabilities drive deterrent action, but the initial decision to commit is motivated by alliance commitments.

When looking to the impact of democracy, however, the dilemma argument finds support. It has a significance of .10, which is likely an artifact of the small sample size. Nonetheless, democratic nations are less likely to support preemptive action, a reflection of the resident population’s aversion to casualties from conflict. This result compounds
the dilemma argued by Enders and Sandler (2006). Not only are the citizens of liberal democracies against curtailing civil liberties to fight terrorism, they also oppose the mobilization of troops to eliminate the threat. This result parallels the findings of Chapter Three that show the reluctance of liberal democracies to act against global terrorism despite the fact that they are the frequent targets.

Muslim Population shows a positive effect on the decision to engage in preemptive action, a finding that was also positive in the baseline model of Chapter Three. It remains unclear as to the relationship between a state’s Muslim population and its decision to preempt. This could be a reflection of the alliance links between the US and Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or it could be a reflection of the Muslim population within the liberal democracies themselves. Looking at the Muslim populations within liberal democracies suggests that they are different from their Middle Eastern counterparts. It could be the case that immigration standards on Muslims entering democracies result in a higher acceptance rate of immigrants with higher levels of education and socioeconomic standards. These factors facilitate assimilation into a democracy more readily and suggest that Muslims, more than other religions and races, condemn the actions of their extremist brethren.

However sound the logic, empirically this is difficult to support. Public opinion polls on Muslims in the US regarding thoughts on Al-Qaeda and the War on Terror find that there is no statistical difference of opinions between the US and European countries as well as between the US and the Middle Eastern countries of Morocco, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt (McCauley and Scheckter 2008). Larger numbers of Muslims in contributing nations do not imply that their public opinion is the reason. It could be a
defensive action at the state level that states with larger Muslim populations contribute for fear of a recruitment factor within their borders, though this seems counterintuitive. Terrorist actions are targeted at Muslim populations to aid recruitment efforts. This concern for the target audience is what compels a state to temper its counterterrorist actions, for attacks that are too severe could result in a swell of terrorist recruitment and a fear of reprisal attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004). That is why Muslim population was used as an instrument in measuring the private benefits of preemptive action in Chapter Three. The hypothesized negative effect was seen as an artifact of highly Muslim states shoring up defenses to deter potential terrorist attacks occurring against foreigners on their own soil. However, it appears that Muslim population serves an additional function regarding preemptive commitment. These findings warrant further examination and are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Table 4.1 Results for Preemptive Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binomial Logit</td>
<td>Tobit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>0.162 (0.413)</td>
<td>-28.518 (39.372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.121)</td>
<td>-1.534 (10.587)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.250 (0.220)</td>
<td>75.887*** (14.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-0.435 (1.148)</td>
<td>-131.498 (215.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>3.462*** (0.988)</td>
<td>92.846** (41.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Population</td>
<td>0.030** (0.125)</td>
<td>2.479 (2.515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of</td>
<td>-0.318 (0.565)</td>
<td>-163.406*** (47.791)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.200* (0.116)</td>
<td>34.678 (31.846)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.090)</td>
<td>-3.444 (10.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.032 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.930 (1.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>9.266* (5.267)</td>
<td>2212.50*** (423.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-33.90 (5.67)</td>
<td>-123.20 (10.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses

Turning now to the next model, the distribution of the second variable measuring the number of troops committed to ISAF is highly skewed to the right, indicating that many states contributed no troops, while others contributed a significant number. A tobit model is used for the second set of results. The theory states that a two-step process is at work regarding the number of troops to send. Additionally, though preemptive action includes troop contributions, it is merely the most visible form of action available. Allowing basing rights and military supplies can be thought of as another form of preemption, though it is difficult to compare a measure of basing rights against the
number of troops committed to battle. Consequently, they are not included here. Preemptive action can also include the use of SOF to complete covert military actions ahead of standard troop invasions. It is known that the US employed SOF in its preliminary actions against Afghanistan and Iraq (Woodward 2002; 2004). However, due to the secrecy of these missions, they are often classified and difficult to quantify. These factors indicate that there could be a number of censored observations within the data. To account for this, as well as the two-step decision process behind troop contributions, a tobit model is used.\(^5\)

The results are presented in the second column of Table 4.1 and show strong support for the effects of capabilities on the number of troop commitments. Indeed, taking into account NATO membership, which also a large, driving force behind the results, the amount of preemptive action taken is a measure of state capabilities as captured by the logged variables of \(GDP\) and \(Military\ Expenditures\) ratio. These results indicate the opposite of what the preceding theory states; instead, the decision to engage in preemptive action is hindered by the level of democracy a state possesses. However, once states decide to engage in preemptive action, which is largely through alliance commitments, the amount of force used is due to state capabilities. This is made all the more convincing by the complete lack of significance on all other variables within the model. The logic behind this relationship is straightforward; the amount of force used is a product of the amount of force a state is capable of using.

The results presented here paint a different picture than what the theoretical argument asserts. Instead of democracy acting as the prime motivating aspect of states to

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\(^5\) A negative binomial was also employed, though convergence was difficult to achieve, largely due to the small sample size.
commit forces once the decision has been made to preempt, it acts as a screening procedure that dismays leaders of democratic nations from taking preemptive action. This argument is made stronger when controlling for the alliance commitments through NATO membership, which largely consists of liberal democracies. Indeed, alliances exhibit a strong pull in persuading states to engage in preemptive action and also account for the large number of troops that a state commits. It appears that democracy captures the residual effects of the decision to commit and temper a state’s willingness to get involved. When viewed in this light, it should be no surprise that capabilities explain troop contributions, due to the fact that the invasion of Afghanistan was largely led by liberal democracies. Consequently, it seems likely that the populace of a liberal democracy cares more about the initial decision to get involved rather than the level of preemption. Indeed, the absence of democratic factors on troop contributions could be a reflection of the population’s initial and short-lived willingness to support military action once the decision was made to commit (Mueller 1970; Parker 1995).

Lastly, once again, the number of terrorist attacks a state receives as well as casualties suffered remained insignificant. Although the WTC bombings were the most catastrophic international terrorist attack ever conducted, they were not enough to generate significant effects on state action. This contributes to the argument that terrorism best works through psychological rather than physical damage. Unfortunately, the psychological costs imposed on a state are much more difficult to measure and are not explicitly modeled here.
Conclusion

The interplay between state characteristics, democratic characteristics, and threat levels regarding decisions to engage in preemptive combat are difficult to elucidate. The preliminary findings here suggest that the decision to engage is largely a function of alliance commitments tempered by the effects of democracy. This is straightforward enough. There is no doubt that the targets of Muslim extremists are specifically aimed at Western-liberal democratic values, however, the fact that these variables lead to a decline in the probability in preemptive actions confirms the dilemma of liberal democracies argued in Chapter Three. International terrorism targets democracies tactically because of their financial and institutional characteristics brought on by globalization. Increased international commerce, as well as the expansion of financial centers, leaves industrialized democracies in a vulnerable position, as their increased dependence and breadth of targets reduces the costs of terrorists traveling abroad and smuggling weapons. Indeed, globalization does work, but it works for the terrorists (Enders and Sandler 2005). Additionally, the citizenry of liberal democracies are relatively intolerable of violent acts and are prone to pressure their military leaders to eschew action for fear of violent retribution, resulting in a relatively low response in terms of punishment. Thus, international terrorism is a strategic asset that can produce policy changes (Pape 2003). Nonetheless, alliance commitments coupled with the psychological fear of further attacks is enough to overcome democratic reluctance and lead to a preemptive attack.

It is here that military capabilities take over. As shown in Chapter Three, capabilities play a large role in state action, and could explain the lack of significance found between democracies and autocracies concerning the amount of deterrent activity.
that a state engages in, which confirms the deterrence spiral hypothesis. All capable states take part in bolstering defenses, for the global threat of terrorism is truly global. This chapter gives a more detailed picture into the mechanisms driving counterterrorism and suggests separate levels of counterterrorism that draw upon separate influences. All capable states take deterrent action, but democracies are pressured to stop at defense when deciding whether to cooperate with the US in taking the offensive. Alliance obligations are enough to overcome this and lead to multilateral, global action. The amount of force then applied in the preemption stage is largely a product of the resources at hand.

The evidence also does not support to the arguments of general and immediate deterrence as stated here. The data represent the universe of cases susceptible to international terrorist attacks from Muslim extremists, as they are all states that have either coordinated counterterrorist actions or involved in a terrorist attack with the US in the last five years. Though terrorist organizations often lack the ability to project credibility like a state, the attacks of 9/11 sent a credible signal to the US that additional attacks were imminent if they did not back down. Though not directly observable, it can be argued that those states selected into immediate deterrence were mostly liberal democracies. Instead, those states selected were NATO members, with democracy actually limiting the probability of engaging in immediate deterrence. Thus, even in the face of an imminent threat, democracies rely on the external constraint of alliance commitments to engage the enemy, with capabilities driving the level of preemptive force applied.
The results so far represent an examination of the factors that prompt state action. But war and conflict are not one-shot games. The War on Terror can be thought of as a series of repeated interactions between coalition forces and terrorist organizations. Preemptive action also draws a reaction from terrorists. It is reasonable to assume that those contributing to preemptive action the heaviest are the most susceptible to backlash in the form of an international terrorist attacks. Does preemptive action generate negative effects on a state? Additionally, does the level of force used in preemption have any effect on the type of attack employed by terrorists? Such questions will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
SUICIDE TERRORISM: THE COSTS OF EXCESSIVE PREEMPTION
Thus far, the previous analyses have assumed that preemption is a purely public benefit that only serves to better those threatened by global terrorist organizations. However, once a target state chooses preemptive measures, it is highly plausible that the degree of action could also have a negative effect for groups combating terrorism. While it is important to recognize the strategic interaction between states when combating an international terrorism, the picture remains incomplete if the actions of terrorist organization are left out. This chapter represents an examination of the strategic interaction between states and terrorist organizations by focusing on the relationship between coalition forces and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The relationship between coalition forces and terrorist organizations has surprisingly been understudied relative to the vast amount of literature covering the root causes of terrorism. Aside from a handful of case studies (Nagl 2005), empirical analyses covering the aggregate strategies insurgents and counterinsurgents employ are relatively sparse. Part of the issue lay in the dearth of data on state action in contrast to the multiple datasets on terrorist behavior. There are studies on the formal relationship between asymmetric actors in insurgencies (Enders, Sandler, and Cauley 1990; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2010), as well as some empirical results examining the relationship between counterterrorist actions and how they affect terrorists’ strategic behavior (Enders and Sandler 1993). However, many of the theoretical relationships remain unclear. Additionally, the concepts are relatively undefined. Thus, empirical results attempting to support theoretical models fall short of completing the picture. For example, a significant body of work exists testing the effect of civilian casualties on the success rate of counterinsurgency. It is well known that
civilian casualties play a factor in counterinsurgent warfare, in that they are higher in number as compared to traditional instances of war (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). What remains to be seen, however, is the effect of civilian casualties on suicide attacks. The literature suggests that suicide attacks are a distinct method of terrorism that is possibly motivated by different factors than normal, non-suicide attacks, yet their causes remained undiscovered (Piazza 2008). The fact that suicide attacks are used far less frequently than normal (i.e. non-suicide) attacks implies a non-random trend that warrants further examination.

Recent research hints at a recruitment motivation factor more relevant behind suicide attacks than in normal attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004). It is suggested here that suicide attacks are a form of motivation to bolster a terrorist organization’s strength. To date, this link between suicide terrorism and recruitment remains relatively understudied (Enders and Sandler 2006). The martyrdom aspect behind suicide terrorism argues that usage of suicide attacks is designed to attract potential supporters to the side of the insurgency.

The previous chapters have treated preemption as a purely public good. However, it is entirely possible that terrorists retaliate for particularly violent preemptive attacks, which calls for approaching the implications of preemption from a different angle. The relationship between the recruitment aspects of suicide terrorism and the preemptive measures of coalition forces is the focus of this chapter. The variable to be used as a measure of preemptive action on the part of coalition forces is civilian casualties. Recent scholars have shown that collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties has a significant impact on the opinion and action of the local population, though the
conclusive results differ across conflicts (Condra and Shapiro 2010; Condra et al. 2010). It is argued here that high numbers of civilian deaths at the hands of counterterrorist violence motivates recruitment to the insurgency. Since suicide attacks are also used as a form of recruitment, this environmental constraint precludes their usage. It is expected that in regions with high numbers of civilian casualties the number of suicide attacks, as a proportion of all terrorist attacks, should decrease. It is also expected that the level of all attacks overall will increase as a reflection of the surge in recruitment generated by civilian casualties and the external costs in the form of retaliation that states garner when conducting especially brutal counterterrorist activities.

What follows is a brief review of the literature covering the range of external costs that states can accumulate in their preemptive actions, with a particular focus on the effects of civilian casualties when viewed in this manner. This discussion will also focus on the reactions of democracies, due to the fact that they are the most constrained in their actions (Wilkinson 2001; Enders and Sandler 2004), and are the frequent target of international terrorism (Li 2005). Next is a brief review of the motivating factors behind suicide terrorism, establishing the argument that suicide terrorism is a strategic and rational behavior on the part of terrorist organizations that is capable of scientific study, with a presentation of the four hypotheses to be tested. Following the theoretical arguments, a discussion of the research method is presented to outline the data used and the motivating factors behind the cases chosen. Finally, there will be a presentation of the results, showing support for some of the hypotheses, followed by concluding comments. The results point to a set of factors that make suicide terrorism fundamentally different
from normal attacks and simultaneously demonstrate that civilian casualties have an insignificant impact on recruitment from the local population.

**External Costs and Civilian Casualties**

The impact of preemptive action cannot exclusively be thought of as a solely positive good for coalition forces; more might does not always make right. Too strong of an impact can have costly consequences. Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) examine a game in which the terrorist organization and the target government choose the severity of their attacks in response to one another. Until now, the theories have only modeled preemptive strikes as external benefits. Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) argue that, in certain instances, preemptive strikes can export costs to other states. When attacked, a democratic government faces the decision of a preemptive strike that serves to weaken the terrorist organization. If the attack is too severe, it could lead to inducing a positive effect on terrorist recruitment, raising the group’s legitimacy and raising the chances of a retaliatory attack on either itself or a softer target associated with the preempting state. If the attack is too soft, the public reaction can damage the leader’s reputation as having a lack of empathy with her population. This is the trade-off dilemma faced by democracies — too soft of a response fosters an image of a state unable to protect its population, while too strong of a response engenders an image of tyranny (Wilkinson 2001).

Analyzing the impact of preemptive measures by looking at civilian casualties is important, because while international norms state that civilians should not be targeted in warfare, commanders have wide latitude in deciding how much they should abide by it (Gray 2000). Liberal democracies particularly have a lot of pressure to obey this norm.
(Crawford 2003). Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010), in their analysis of the Israeli demolition of homes in the Gaza strip as a counterinsurgent strategy, find that if the target population of state violence feels the action is justified they will not retaliate. They point out that indiscriminate violence must be directed solely at the guilty party. Thus, commanders, especially those of liberal democracies, face a dilemma concerning how much risk soldiers should take in weeding out the “guilty,” and whether this effort has positive effects. It is plausible that the local population could blame coalition forces for civilian casualties regardless of who is really at fault. After all, they are the foreign invader in this case. It is also just as plausible that the local population can differentiate between insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies and withhold information accordingly (Condra and Shapiro 2010).

Hence, it is highly reasonable to assume that there are negative external costs faced by states in regards to retaliatory attacks on behalf of the insurgents. However plausible and convincing this logic is, for the most part, it is mostly anecdotal (Kayvlas 2006; Bittle 2008; Nadery and Humayoon 2008). Despite the division over the role of civilian casualties in counterterrorism, it is widely accepted that they are higher in insurgencies than in conventional warfare (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Insurgent strategies rely on the mobilization of popular support, which leads to military strategies that occur in populated areas by necessity. An insurgency is a strategy of rebellion that features the role of civilians more prominently in the process of warfare than conventional forms of conflict (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The defining feature of insurgent warfare is asymmetry. On one side is a relatively militarily deficient rebel faction squared off against a numerically superior and more technologically advanced
counterterrorist state. Under these circumstances it is highly unreasonable for insurgents
to meet such a powerful foe directly on a traditional battlefield. Front lines are not
formed. Instead, insurgents operate among the people, mobilizing support to foil
cooperation between the local population and counterinsurgent forces (Kocher, Pepinsky,
and Kalyvas 2011). This strategy has proven highly effective throughout history. As put
by one US soldier battling the insurgency in Vietnam, “The hardest part is picking out the
bad guys” (Cockburn 2007, 138-139). However, to hinge success on the outcome of a
“popularity contest” belies the true complexity of counterinsurgent strategies, as the
process is more alchemic in nature rather than it is scientific (Birtle 2008).

Despite the inherent negativity in targeting innocent civilians, there is dispute
among scholars in assessing its contribution to a successful counterinsurgency. Those
who have analyzed its effects have either refuted conventional wisdom or introduced
important caveats (Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011). Downes (2008) finds that the
targeting of civilians by counterinsurgents is a successful tactic overall, while Kalyvlas
(2006) argues that selective targeting of civilians known to show support for the
insurgency produces more favorable results over indiscriminant targeting, noting,
however, that indiscriminant targeting is also sometimes capable of success. This
research supports the idea that the target population must see itself as a guilty party
(Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2010). Additional testaments to the success of targeting
civilians include Stoll’s (1993) scrutiny of Guatemalan military punishments toward
peasants sympathizing with communist EGP forces and Lyall’s (2009) examination of
quasi-random shelling by Russian forces in Chechnya to suppress rebel attacks. These
last examples highlight the argument that innocent deaths, while brutal and morally questionable, can prevent further violence in the long run.

Despite evidence to the contrary, the conventional wisdom remains that, overall, civilian casualties are counterproductive to defeating an insurgency, though there are disputes over the precise mechanisms that cause it to hinder counterterrorist efforts (Kocher et al. 2011). Pape (1996) finds that killing civilians toughens the resistance of the society as a whole. Psychologically, targeting can be seen as an attempt to eradicate an entire group of people rather than to extract specific concessions (Abrahms 2006). This stance serves to provoke retaliation rather than force complicity (Carr 2002). An additional theory suggests that civilian deaths strengthen the solidarity and nationalism of the afflicted population, which spurs resistance and retaliation (Arreguín-Toft 2001).

These results turn the previous arguments supporting the benefits of civilian deaths on their head by insisting that targeting civilians works in the short term but is offset by the reactive process that triggers resistance and retaliation in the long run (Kocher 2011). Compounding the complexity of this relationship are the variety of motivating factors that drive the relationship between insurgent attacks and civilian casualties, each operating under different conditions and time constraints. The local population of an insurgent state can either reward or punish insurgents. Their decision is based on the nature of the violence, as well as its intent, and the accuracy to which it is applied (Kalyvas 2006; Downes 2007). These conditions can spawn four possible motivating factors on the local population, which could affect insurgent attacks in response to civilian casualties (Condra et al. 2010). Additionally, these motivations operate on different time frames. The first is the revenge factor. This is a visceral reaction
on the part of the population to see direct retaliation driven against coalition forces in response to witnessing the killing of their neighbors. Condra et al. (2010) note that the retaliatory attacks should be seen at the district level, but Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) argue that retaliatory attacks are also felt abroad. The second is a *propaganda* effect. Here, civilian casualties serve as a recruitment factor, persuading indecisive locals to take up arms with the insurgency against the coalition. The third factor is the *information* effect. This is action on the part of the local population to withhold information from coalition forces, resulting in fewer arrests and destruction of terrorist cells, and increasing the likelihood of an attack. Finally, the authors add what is called a *capacity* effect, which takes into account that ISAF forces make a trade off between the value of the target and the level of collateral damage inflicted to assure its destruction. The capacity effect hypothesizes a short-term, negative correlation between retaliatory attacks and civilian violence if the target was sufficiently valuable. However, in the long run, the destruction of the target has no effect on insurgent groups, as their resources are transferred between administrative districts.

These motivation elements are examined by Condra et al. (2010), who look at the different factors that impel insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. They find that casualties lead to an increase in Afghanistan in the long run due to the revenge effect of direct retaliation as opposed to the short-term information effects. Thus, motivating factors condition the time frame and the frequency of the attacks. An additional empirical study by Condra and Shapiro (2010) examined the effects conditioning the insurgent response regarding civilian casualties in Iraq. They found that short-term information effects were the driving factor in prompting retaliatory attacks against coalition forces. As informative
as these studies were regarding the motivation behind the frequency of attacks, research into the retaliatory response remains incomplete regarding the environmental constraints that condition the type of attack.

The literature thus far has examined the effects of civilian casualties on insurgent strikes, with some evidence pointing to a link between recruitment efforts and casualties. What has been left out, however, is the link between suicide attacks and recruitment in response to the external costs that states impose via harsh preemptive measures. As previously stated, it is possible that suicide attacks could be motivated by entirely different factors that differentiate them from standard, non-suicide attacks. The fact that they are utilized far less than normal attacks implies a rational, strategic element. However, the idea of killing oneself for a cause strikes Western contemporary thought as precisely irrational, with some scholars arguing that there is no logic to suicide terrorism (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006; Van de Velde 2010). As argued in Chapter Four, however, suicide terrorism, in addition to terrorism in general, is a rational act. These scholars confuse the concepts of instrumental and procedural rationality, implicitly assuming that death is objectively the worst possible outcome, and conclude that preferences vary neither from individual to individual nor from culture to culture. However, once one abandons procedural rationality in favor of instrumental rationality, one can allow for cognitive constraints as well as accept death as a reasonable preference.

Additionally, as Pape (2003) finds, suicide attacks often accomplish their goals, noting its success in forcing US and French forces out of Lebanon in 1983 and its success in forcing Israel out again in 1985. Suicide terrorism can also be thwarted at many stages of its operation; the attack is often the end result of many months of preparation and
planning. It is also argued that failed suicide attacks do not garner the notoriety that the groups seek relative to the success of an attack (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004). An especially persuasive example illustrating the impact of a successful attack on both international attention and terrorist recruitment is the comparison between the failed Christmas Day suicide bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and the successful attacks of 9/11. The nature of the attacks is relatively similar; both represented attempts to destroy commercial passenger airplanes on US soil. The explanatory factor that differentiated their impact was that one was successful in completing its catastrophic mission while the other failed. The failure of the Christmas Day attack is arguably due to the awareness of the passengers and crew of the possibility of additional airline attacks in the wake of 9/11, triggering an immediate and collective response once the passengers and crew were aware of what was unfolding. Hardened targets present a greater threat to success, which is why terrorists strategically modify their methods when certain targets strengthen their defenses (Enders and Sandler 1993).

Rosendorff and Sandler (2004), using a sequential game theoretic analysis, provide an examination of the effects of preemption on the type of attacks that terrorists level in retaliation against state action. In their game the state is the first mover, determining the degree of preemptive action to level against a terrorist organization. The degree of preemptive action has consequences for the type of attack that a terrorist organization will choose, with the group having the choice between a normal attack and a spectacular attack. There is an inherent difference between normal and spectacular attacks, with the former having a greater probability of being successful and the latter garnering greater national attention and having a greater impact in gathering a
recruitment base. Thus, terrorist groups weigh the probability of success with the benefits of recruitment when deciding which strategy to choose. Preemptive actions that are viewed as excessively brutal in the eyes of the local population will spur a recruitment factor that benefits the terrorist organization. The resulting attacks are more likely to be normal, due to the fact that spectacular attacks are primarily used to spur recruitment among the terrorist organization’s ranks and are more difficult to successfully carry out.

What separates the definition of a normal and a spectacular attack is somewhat vague. A spectacular attack is denoted as a major newsworthy attack that results in either high casualty rates or possesses watershed character. Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) cite the 1972 Munich Olympic attack on the Israeli athletes as an example of a spectacular. A normal event is any other attack. Since there are different motivating factors behind the terrorists’ decision to utilize a spectacular attack, there are several apparent parallels between a suicide attack and a spectacular attack. Suicide attacks garner more attention and are seen as a martyr mission. Videos often document their preparation for propaganda purposes, which serve to attract recruits to their cause (Rosendorff and Sandler 2010). Additionally, on average, suicide attacks result in 13 casualties compared to the average single casualty of a non-suicide attack (Pape 2003). Due to these similarities, a suicide attack will carry the same meaning here as a spectacular attack. As argued in Rosendorff and Sandler (2004), two components influence terrorist recruits: the proactive response of the government and the presence of a spectacular (suicide) attack. They state that strategic terrorists utilize suicide bombings in an effort to raise recruitment; consequently, they are employed when recruitment is low. A harsh, proactive response from the government serves to facilitate recruitment, sparking an
increase in greater reprisal attacks from the terrorists. However, the reprisal attacks feature a lower proportion of suicides, because the proactive response of the government has already raised recruitment. Governments more restricted in their proactive responses, due to the costs involved, do not incite terrorist recruits to the cause. This constrains the resources of the terrorist organization, which leads to a decline in overall attacks, which in turn results in an increase in the proportion of suicide attacks by terrorist organizations in an effort to raise recruits. This demonstrates the mixed blessing of a proactive response — too little action leads to a decrease in attacks but an increase in the proportion of suicides, while too much of a response leads to a decrease in devastating suicide attacks while simultaneously increasing the frequency of standard attacks.

As previously noted, research by Condra and Shapiro (2010) and Condra et al. (2010) looks at the impact of collateral damage from combat between insurgents and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. More specifically, these two pieces model the strategic decisions of a local population as a function of the number of civilian casualties within a particular region. Focusing exclusively on Iraq, Condra and Shapiro (2010) note the importance of intelligence gathering as a fundamental task in a counterinsurgency (Galula 1964; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971). Reliable intelligence has value, for the ability of coalition forces to neutralize insurgents does not primarily rest with their military might, of which they have a significant advantage, but on their ability to identify and locate terrorist cells. Their analysis indicates that, when coalition forces kill a significant number of civilians, locals are less likely to supply information to help them locate and liquidate enemy bases. This means that more terrorists escape detection and are consequently able to carry out attacks in the ensuing time periods. By contrast, if the
insurgents contribute to a large amount of collateral damage via civilian casualties, the local population is more motivated to relinquish information to coalition forces. This results in the liquidation of more terrorist cells and consequently leads to fewer attacks in the ensuing time periods.

Condra et al. (2010) continue this line of research in their examination of the effects of civilian casualties and the motivations for retaliatory attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. In effect, they find that conflicts in each respective country possess unique qualifiers that motivate retaliatory violence for different reasons. They frame the terrorist’s production of violence at any point in time as a product of the group’s labor and capital, with the counterinsurgency’s ability to stem the production of insurgent violence consisting of its ability to project force through controlling the population and garnering information. Additionally, it is theoretically argued that each of these factors accumulates over divergent time periods. Specifically, the authors expect that gathering information for the purposes of counterterrorism generates retaliatory attacks quicker than recruitment factors, which take more time as a local population mobilizes to a critical mass able to generate statistically significant retaliatory attacks (Condra et al. 2010).

Their results state that retaliatory violence is a product of information constraints in Iraq and labor constraints in Afghanistan. This is because of the unique characteristics of each country, which condition counterterrorist actions. Iraq has a more urban population. Thus, acts of violence against civilians are more likely to be felt and seen by a larger sector of the population. Additionally, the coalition presence in Iraq was higher, which also likely contributed to the higher numbers of civilian casualties. Because of this large population, as well as the tendency of locals to attribute most of the deaths to coalition
forces, recruitment was plentiful and therefore not a constraint. Instead, civilians were
tapped for their information by coalition forces on insurgent locations, which constrained
the capacity for insurgent violence in the short run. By contrast, Afghanistan is a largely
rural country with a dispersed population. Locals in this environment have a much lower
capacity for information due to the lower concentration of locals able to observe activity.
Concomitantly, this also leads to a recruitment constraint on behalf of the terrorist
organization, as the population is highly dispersed and therefore difficult to mobilize.
Due to this, civilian casualties have a long run effect on insurgent violence, as the
mobilization of recruits is more time consuming in this region.

Hypotheses

The effect between recruitment, coalition brutality levels, and recurrent violence
has been modeled (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004) and empirically tested (Condra and
Shapiro 2010; Condra et al. 2010). This research found empirical evidence of a strategic
interaction between coalition forces and counterinsurgents, indicating clearly that there is
a relationship between civilian deaths and retaliatory attacks, which is affected by various
motivators. However, there has been little evidence of analysis on the type of attack that
terrorist organizations employ in response to differing levels of violence. This chapter
represents an examination of the contributing factors that lead to the strategic utilization
of suicide attacks by insurgents in response to civilian casualties during the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq.

Condra et al. (2010) find that a higher level of civilian casualties by ISAF forces
leads to increased attacks in the long run. This is due to the fact that recruitment
constraints are more of a problem in Afghanistan rather than Iraq, leading to a longer length of time to employ and train recruits. Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) argue that, in order to spur recruitment when it is flagging, terrorist organizations resort to spectacular attacks to represent a watershed and particularly destructive event in an effort to mobilize a waffling population and swell their ranks. This implies a discrete difference between a spectacular event and all other terrorist attacks. As previously argued, suicide attacks serve as a valid proxy for spectacular attacks due to the higher average casualty rate and the amount of coverage they receive, both by international media and the insurgents themselves, who document the preparation of the attacks in an effort to spread propaganda. The recruitment-contributing properties provided on the supply side by civilian casualties at the hands of coalition troops and the employment of suicide attacks by insurgents as a demand-driven component to generate recruits begs the question: what is the relationship between the two? The answer to this question proves to be an empirically testable topic.

Recruitment factors are concluded as being the impetus behind insurgent attacks against ISAF forces in Afghanistan, while information constraints motivated attacks in Iraq. Since the two are inherently different conflicts, with insurgent violence being driven by different motives, it is plausible to assume that terrorist organizations would be more likely to employ suicide attacks in Afghanistan due to the unique labor constraints of that country. This leads to the first hypothesis:

*H1: Iraq should experience a lower proportion of suicide attacks compared to Afghanistan.*
Rosendorff and Sandler (2004), Condra et al. (2010), and Condra and Shapiro (2010) state that insurgent violence is a product of civilian casualties, with coalition forces bearing the brunt of violence, regardless if they were actually responsible for the attacks. Hence, in their strategic game, Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) place the preemptive state as the first mover, deciding which level of violence to inflict. Since collateral damage via civilian casualties is seen as an environmental factor that engenders terrorist recruitment, a strategic terrorist would eschew using a suicide attack due to the greater costs of its implementation as well as the fact that its end goal, generating recruitment, has been accomplished by civilian casualties. This leads to the second hypothesis.

\[H2: \text{Ceteris paribus, civilian casualties should lead to a lower proportion of suicide attacks.}\]

Finally, the effects of democracy and state capabilities will be examined to determine the strategic interaction between terrorist organizations and counterinsurgent states. A recurring theme throughout this dissertation is that terrorist organizations are rational, strategic actors that plan individual attacks based on the costs and benefits of achieving their objective goals. Thus, terrorist organizations plan their attacks based on whether they are successful and the utility the attacks serve in accomplishing the organization’s strategic goal. It is reasonable to assume that military power has a significant impact on the ability of state to defend itself. Since terrorist organizations gain greater attention and recruitment from successful attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004)
it is reasonable to assume that terrorist organizations will direct their attacks at weaker targets that increase the probability of their success, leading to the third hypothesis.

\[H3: \text{Ceteris paribus, terrorist organizations will direct their attacks} \text{ at weaker defended targets.}\]

Additionally, democracy is shown to be a characteristic that motivates terrorist attacks due to the accessibility to a target rich environment (Li 2005) as well as the tendency for the population to be relatively more intolerant of violence and death than in less democratic states (Mueller 2005). As shown in Chapter Three, this high level of intolerance for violence and death leads to a reluctance of democracies to cooperate to eliminate terrorism, despite the fact that they are asymmetrically targeted by terrorist organizations. The coalition force is largely led by powerful democracies, which presents a tactical as well as strategic element to their attractiveness as a terrorist target. Aside from the tactical advantage of the abundance of targets when being attacked on their own soil, democratic nations should also be targeted specifically when overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan in the hopes that the casualties inflicted would lead to the democratic populations at home to pressure their leaders for a withdrawal of troops. This strategic importance of targeting democracies to achieve the organization’s overall goal, namely the withdrawal of coalition forces from Islamic lands, leads to the last hypothesis.

\[H4: \text{Ceteris paribus, terrorist organizations will direct their attacks at coalition forces from liberal democracies.}\]
Research Design

This research is an examination of the relationship between preemptive attacks by coalition forces and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan between the years 2008 and 2010. During this time, each country was divided into multiple military districts. Though there were a variety of states with troops participating in counterterrorist actions during this time period, each military district was administered under an individual nation. Though these cases are limited to only two states, analysis within each country as a military district gives spatial variation and eliminates the problems of selection bias and external validity that individual fieldwork is susceptible to (Kilcullen 2009). Utilizing military districts as opposed to the state governorates or provinces in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, serves as a valid representation of the deterrent effects of military defense. It can be argued that the head of a military district administers the forces in conjunction with general counterinsurgency philosophy that they see fit as well as oversee to the defenses and military power utilized within their district. Therefore, nations serving under a foreign district will be a reflection of that district’s ruling power, which means that the head of the district holds ultimate responsibility over the security and insurgent violence that occurs within its boundaries. Iraq is composed of four military districts, while Afghanistan is organized into six. The districts and their ruling states are listed in Table 5.1.

---

6 Each military district consists of subsectors run by a variety of international forces. However, analysis was not conducted by subsector due to data limitations.
Table 5.1. List of Military Occupation Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Southwest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>South Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Poland³⁸</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variables

Data on the frequency and type of insurgent violence are taken from the *Global Terrorism Database*, a source that also categorizes whether the attack was a suicide or a normal act. The attacks are aggregated into a monthly time period, resulting in a unit of analysis of a district-month within a specific year. To control for the variation between districts regarding suicide attacks occurring as a byproduct of the frequency of overall violence, suicide attacks will be operationalized as a ratio between suicide attacks and normal attacks with a value between 0 and 1.

Independent Variables

Data on civilian casualties in Iraq are gathered from the Iraq Body Count, a group founded by independent citizens that operates the only continuously running tally of civilian casualties in Iraq. It is the most widely cited source and is assisted in the distribution and publication of its studies by the Oxford Research Group (2005) with

³⁷ Regional Command Southwest appeared in June of 2010 as a splinter of the Southern Sector. Since both sectors are US-led, it should not affect the results.

³⁸ Poland withdrew its forces after 2008.
which it maintains close institutional ties (Lauterbach 2007). Despite the fact that it is
indicated that coalition forces shoulder the blame of all civilian casualties, the only
casualties to be included are those at the hands of coalition forces. Accordingly, any
relationship between civilian casualties and insurgent violence will likely be understated.
Data on civilian casualties in Afghanistan are taken from the CIVCAS database, a
collection of civilian casualties created by the NATO-led military coalition, the
International Security Assistance Force. Civilian casualties are also aggregated, providing
a count of casualties within a military district on a monthly basis.

The literature argues that conflicts are region specific for a variety of reasons. With
regard to the effects of civilian characteristics on counterinsurgency tactics, it is argued that
insurgent violence in Iraq in reference to civilian casualties was motivated by
informational purposes while violence in Afghanistan was motivated by recruitment
purposes. Because suicide attacks function as recruitment tools, it is expected that
suicides should be higher in Afghanistan. To test for this effect, a dummy variable is
constructed to indicate whether the affected district was in Afghanistan. It is expected to
have a positive and significant coefficient.

Data for measuring the strategic aspect of terrorist actions is largely an examination
of institutional characteristics and would traditionally be operationalized using the
POLITY IV measure of democracy. However, because the majority of districts are run by
liberal democracies, there is little variation on this variable across all institutional
measures. In order to properly capture the relationship concerning democracy in this
study, a dummy variable is created for Turkey, which is the only state not classified as a
democracy, to determine whether its presence has any influence on the frequency and
type of insurgent violence. To further capture the effects of strategic factors, a measure of the ruling state’s home Muslim population is included. It is further shown that concern for the target audience is a factor that compels a state to temper its counterterrorist actions, for attacks that are too severe could result in a swell of terrorist recruitment and a fear of reprisal attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004, 2010). More specifically, Rees and Aldrich (2005) argue that the large presence of Muslims in Europe likely mitigated the EU response in relation to the actions of the US, suggesting that the target audience plays a role in state response. This variable is only included in the model of overall attacks, as it remains theoretically unclear as to how a state’s Muslim population specifically applies to suicide attacks. Lastly, to test for the tactical aspect of insurgent violence, a measure of a state’s military expenditures is used. It is expected that this variable will have a decreasing effect across all types of attacks as a target hardens.

Control variables include the number of arrests a district-leading nation had in a year. This variable was collected and coded from the Country Reports on Terrorism. It is expected that there is a sort of recursive effect between arrests and terrorist attacks, especially regarding Iraq. Civilians are apt to have more information in the more populated state of Iraq and are less likely to withhold it from coalition forces if collateral damages are minimal. This should theoretically lead to more arrests. Therefore, arrests should serve as a control on the amount of information relinquished, due to the fact that sharing information leads to more arrests, which reduces the capacity of terrorists to carry out attacks.

An additional dummy variable is also included indicating whether the district is US-led. The US is the most powerful participating nation, contributing the largest amount
of troops. Consequently, its presence could skew results, showing that an increase in military expenditures actually leads to more attacks. Furthermore, Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) claim that a country with lower marginal proactive costs (i.e. a coalition state that can escalate its preemptive levels easier than others) can destroy forces and cause collateral damage more frequently. This damages a terrorist organization’s recruitment base, leading them to commit more suicide attacks in an effort to increase recruitment.

Standard OLS will be used to examine the count of overall attacks, but to test for the effects of civilian casualties on the proportion of suicide attacks a tobit censored at 0 is more appropriate. The mean for the ratio of suicide attacks is .10 with a standard deviation of .20, indicating a skew to the right as a result of the large amount of zeros present in the data. Despite the fact that the variable is a ratio, OLS is inappropriate because of the zeros present in the data, which leads to inconsistent estimators as the sample size increases (Long 1997). Suicide attacks are viewed as a method of drawing recruitment. Martyrdom is an act of desperation that rallies wavering supporters. An increase in civilian casualties also increases recruitment, which decreases the necessity for suicide attacks. The dependent variable represents the universe of all attacks, however, only suicide attacks within a district-month are counted in its value. Of the 324 months, only 22 of them represent periods in which there were no attacks at all. However, when looking at the proportion of suicide attacks, there are 204 cases in which there were no attacks. This censors the amount of violence in a district, with a value only appearing if it registers at a suicide. Hence, a tobit model will be used to capture this relationship.
Results

Preliminary statistics run on the proportion of suicides between Afghanistan and Iraq show initial support for \( H1 \). The results are presented in Table 5.2. The average proportion of suicide attacks experienced in Afghanistan is .13, more than twice the magnitude of the average proportion of attacks in Iraq, at .06. These results fit with the statistics on civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, which show the average number of deaths during this time period at 2.94 and 13.56, respectively. These numbers indicate that civilian casualties are offsetting the recruitment factor that suicides provide, precluding their necessity in Iraq.

Table 5.2. Summary Statistics for Suicide Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, in order to truly account for the differences between the countries, a fully specified model must be run. The first model examined looks at the effects of civilian casualties and various district characteristics on the proportion of suicide attacks. The results are presented in first column of Table 5.3. As seen here, the fully specified model does not support the first two hypotheses. Both civilian casualty and country variables are insignificant, indicating that they are not the driving factors behind the strategic decision to use suicide attacks. The civilian casualties variable does show a weakly negative coefficient supporting the argument that excessive preemptive action affects suicide negatively, however, the p-value of .74 indicates that it is a highly insignificant result.
Table 5.3. Tobit and OLS Results for Suicide and Normal Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Tobit Proportion of Suicide</th>
<th>OLS All Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.178*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Casualties</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-22.629**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(2.280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>-0.038**</td>
<td>-18.943**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(4.968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.194**</td>
<td>78.066**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(13.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.600**</td>
<td>-694.761**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(212.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.388**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.441*</td>
<td>29.412**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(9.626)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-128.911</td>
<td>-88.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $\chi^2$</td>
<td>51.84**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

It appears here that the driving influence in the decision to employ a suicide attack is the presence of US forces and the level of deterrent ability within the district. Indeed, the largest coefficient is on the US dummy variable, suggesting that there is something about the coalition leader that draws the attention of suicide attacks. The US is by far the most powerful military conducting operations in the Middle East. Consequently, the spurious relationship between power and the US is controlled by the inclusion of military expenditures. Furthermore, this power variable leads to a decline in suicide attacks, suggesting that hardened targets deflect attacks to weaker districts, providing indirect support to the weak link hypothesis in the international-level game discussed in Chapter
Three. Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) note that the lowered marginal costs of a military power as large as the US allows it to impose preemptive measures much easier than weaker powers, which prompts a retaliatory spectacular attack in response from terrorist organizations. This line of logic suggests that civilian casualties are not a valid measure of preemption, as they fail to capture the actions of the US coalition forces. Condra and Shapiro (2010) and Condra et al. (2010) compare detailed micro data, utilizing a series of lagged variables and categorizing the type of insurgent and coalition violence to reach their conclusions. However, they fail to include district-level characteristics, particularly the nationality of troops committed to each. It could be that, by failing to capture the strategic value of US targets, they come to biased conclusions regarding the nature of the interaction between civilian casualties and insurgent violence.

Additionally, there is significance on the dummy variable for Turkey, which was included as a measure of democracy for the districts. Surprisingly, Turkey attracts a significantly larger proportion of suicide attacks, which makes the case even more curious due to the fact that Turkey controls the small, densely populated Kabul Province. It is also worth noting that this province contains Kabul, Afghanistan, the capital of the nation; thus, it is highly urban. These characteristics conflict with the logic of the hypothesis, which states that areas with high concentrations of people have a lower chance of experiencing suicide attacks due to the decreased difficulty in recruiting for the insurgency. It is possible that the characteristic driving the results is the district’s status as a capital district. Including a capital dummy variable identifying the capital districts of Kabul and Baghdad results in collinearity issues, therefore it is difficult to verify whether the main influence is institutional or regional. These results warrant further investigation,
and are beyond the scope of this analysis. The control variable measuring the number of arrests also shows negative significance, suggesting that the information given by locals in the region leads to more arrests in the short term, which decreases the capacity for insurgents to carry out suicide attacks.

The next set of results examines the effects of civilian casualties on terrorist attacks and is presented in the second column of Table 5.3. The results here confirm hypotheses $H3$ and $H4$. The dummy variable, Turkey, shows that attacks in the Kabul district would be around 695 lower than if it were any other district. Admittedly, this is a weak test of the effects of democracy on retaliatory attacks, but it is worth noting that there is a larger presence of suicide attacks in this district. These findings suggest that there is something inherently different between the choice to use a suicide attack and any other type of attack within the decision calculus of the insurgency. This is also supported by the fact that the lagged dependent variables are positively significant for all attacks and insignificant for suicide attacks, indicating that the choice to employ a normal attack is partially path dependent, while insurgents deliberately make a decision to carry out suicide attacks on a case-by-case basis. There is also evidence that target hardening is effective in deterring attacks; both models show negative coefficients on the military expenditures variable, indicating that organizations value the utility of a successful attack and strategically choose targets that increase the probability of success. This latter hypothesis is further validated by the presence of the US dummy, which shows that the number of attacks jumps by around 78 more incidents if the district is US-led. The values of the US coefficient between the two models confirms research indicating that democracies are targeted by terrorist attacks more frequently and implies the strategic
motivation behind terrorists that affecting the leading power of the coalition forces is the best method of removing troops from Muslim soil (Li 2005; Plümper and Neumayer 2010).

Finally, the variable measuring the Muslim population of coalition states is shown to lead to an increase in terrorist attacks, which supports the theory that terrorists target countries with high Muslim populations in an effort to mobilize them either to be recruited or to generate overall outrage at their resident nation. A large Muslim population is considered as a strategic aspect of the insurgency, as they are expected to pressure their democratic leaders to withdraw their troops.

Surprisingly, the civilian casualties are insignificant across both models. Though the possibility exists that this measure is not a valid representation of excessive preemption, there could also be problems with the reliability of the data itself. A unique feature of organizations collecting data on the number of civilian casualties in Iraq is that they are not cooperating with one another to facilitate the task. This is puzzling because ostensibly they have a common, humanitarian goal. Though it is possible that the groups compete with one another for the finite amount of funding available to collect data, another reason could be their differing political motives. The methodology used by the Iraq Body Count compares widely available and reliable news sources with independently archived news pieces (Lawless 2005). Their goal, however, seeks to force warring countries to report on the casualties inflicted by their own troops. Another political goal behind the group is the eventual withdrawal of coalition forces from the area. These motives are radically different from other organizations. The CIVIC, for example, seeks military retributions for civilians killed in battle and has a neutral stance
toward the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. There is also the matter of the “target” of these studies. Organizations with a political motive often direct their studies to a certain target state capable of making political changes. Due to the differing underlying motives that exist between groups, differing datasets are tailored to specific influential states. These actions lead to bias and reliability issues among the data (Lauterbach 2007).

Conclusion

The results presented here show support for two out of the four hypotheses. The first point to note is that there is indeed something discretely different between the choice of a suicide attack and a normal attack. The lagged dependent variables show that insurgent violence is partially path dependent, but the lack of significance on the proportion of suicide attacks lends evidence to the argument that insurgents deliberately choose suicide takes on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the significance on Turkey in both models show that they draw more suicide attacks while simultaneously repelling attacks overall. This finding, combined with the lack of significance on the country variable and the strong effect of the US dummy suggests that there is more to terrorist motivations than information and recruitment. A higher proportion of suicides in a densely populated state capital refute the hypothesis that suicide attacks are employed in sparsely populated rural regions. This effect could perhaps be explained by the strategic value of US-led targets by insurgents as well as the lowered marginal costs the great power has when carrying out preemptive action.

The strategic nature of terrorism is further supported by the significance of target hardening on the choice of which district to attack. Despite the apparent strategic value of
US targets, terrorists also take account of the probability of success in their decision calculus. There is a considerable amount of time and resources employed when carrying out an attack; a foiled attempt does not garner as much attention as a particularly destructive, catastrophic event. This also supports the logic of the deterrence spiral; weaker defended targets attract more violence. The additional value of a target with a high Muslim population also lends evidence to the strategic nature of terrorist attacks besides the tactical considerations of target necessity. Immediate success aside, the long-term strategic goal is to motivate democratic populations to pressure their leaders into withdrawing troops, an objective that is facilitated in target countries with a high Muslim population.

The findings here indicate that civilian casualties have little bearing on all types of attacks, both suicide and normal. Essentially, this study models the terrorism as a response to environmental characteristics that present the demand for a specific type of attack. However, there is evidence that there is a supply side of the equation driving terrorism, noting that group characteristics such as nationality and motivations are stronger predictors of suicide terrorism rather than the more traditional motives of foreign occupation, religious diversity, and tactical advantages (Hafez 2006; Piazza 2008). In light of this, the analysis here precludes the employment of variables such as foreign occupation and religious diversity, as the present cases are limited to groups fighting coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have relatively similar cultures and motivations. There are also inherent problems in establishing a motive behind individual terrorist organizations, chief among them being that collecting data on the perpetrators of terrorist attacks is a difficult endeavor at best. Often times, multiple organizations claim
responsibility for a single incident as a form of credit claiming. Conversely, terrorist organizations refuse to claim responsibility for the strategic motive of spreading panic or for fear of getting caught (Hafez 2006). These problems increase the difficulty in pinning an attack on a specific organization and make quantitative analysis of such theories a particularly thorny issue.

Regardless of these difficulties, there is evidence that suicide attacks and normal attacks are discrete events that are likely driven by separate characteristics. Despite the fact that a large number of scholars have devoted research to the root causes of terrorism (Smith 2004), many fail to differentiate the root causes of suicide attacks separately (Piazza 2008). This study is but a small contribution to point out the inherent differences between suicide and normal attacks and serves to supplement the call for more research into the factors that separate the choice between the two.
CHAPTER VI
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Though the threat of a major power war no longer looms on the near horizon as it did decades ago, the road to international security is still a rough one for liberal democracies. The fall of the Soviet Union and the ramifications of the Cold War left a large number of failed states in their wake. These failed states nurture contempt and dissatisfaction within their populace and prove to be a fertile breeding ground for terrorist organizations. International norms such as sovereignty do not apply to these non-state actors. As globalization draws the web of international interactions tighter and tighter, advanced Western nations face the prospect of terror extending beyond its domestic realm and becoming an international problem (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011). Once domestic terror spills over its borders, it becomes a global issue that requires coordinated effort between states in order to effectively be handled. Fighting international terror is a particularly thorny task as opposed to domestic terror, where the costs and benefits of dealing with the offending groups are primarily born by the host country.

The question of why some organizations resort to terror is a result of several interrelated factors. The first is that a group must possess an extremist ideology. Second, possessing an extremist ideology means that support for the ideology is shared by a small subset of the population, which means, by definition, that the views will be in direct conflict with their home government. Lastly, this conflict with the government, coupled with the low amount of support that an extremist ideology garners, means that political and social recourse will not be achieved peacefully (Neumayer and Plümper 2011). Hence, as long as extremist ideologies exist, the potential for terrorism will remain.

However resilient terrorist groups prove to be, the conclusion here is that they are rational actors capable of being thwarted. International terror is a phenomenon
differentiated from domestic terror because of the coordination efforts required to prevent it. The costs and benefits to combating domestic terror are mostly shouldered by the host state. By contrast, the costs and benefits to fighting international terror are spread over a multitude of players. The problem of international terror presents something of a coordination problem that is mainly born by Western, liberal democracies. Indeed, they are the favored targets of the Muslim extremist organizations examined here. As argued in this dissertation, coordination is particularly difficult for liberal democracies, because the characteristics that make them attractive targets are the same ones that inhibit swift action. Terrorists direct their violence toward liberal democracies not only because they view them as the source of their grievances (Mousseau 2011) but because of their abundance of targets (Li 2005) and the international attention that attacks on them draw (Neumayer and Plümper 2011), particularly regarding suicide attacks (Arce and Sandler 2010). The recent trends show that terrorist attacks have increasingly focused on private parties and non-combatants due to the relative ease and high probability of success with which they can attack such targets (Santifort, Sandler, and Brandt 2011). This suggests a cost benefit motivation behind terrorist action and, along with the evidence here, paints them as rational, calculated actors. Democratic leaders are responsive to their citizens, for they draw their power from the people. As the research here indicates, the illusion of randomness strikes fear into the hearts of citizens, making them highly intolerant of terrorist violence despite the extremely low probability of any one individual enduring an attack. The choice of engaging in preemptive action against a terrorist organization entails private costs for the preempting country in terms of resources spent and lives lost. The preemptor’s citizens shoulder these costs. As a result, citizens are wary of
committing to conflict abroad. Hence, democracies are more unwilling to engage in preemptive behavior.

The results of Chapter Three indeed show that the coordination effort is inhibited by democracies, but the external constraints of alliance commitments and the capabilities of other states are able to overcome these obstacles. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter Four, once the initial decision to preempt is taken, these military capabilities determine the levels of preemptive action from committed states. Thus, once the preemption is decided, institutions lose influence in favor of capabilities. Chapter Five then examined the factors that influence the choice and frequency of terrorist attacks, finding that collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan influenced neither the type nor frequency of terrorist attacks. Instead, support for the external costs of deterrence was shown in the choice of attack location, with terrorists favoring relatively weaker targets. The evidence also pointed to an alternative decision calculus behind suicide attacks, as they do not rely on the path-dependent mechanisms that normal attacks do.

The following discussion looks at methods of improving and verifying the conclusions established here in the form of new variables and new techniques. Analyzing counterterrorism from an aggregated empirical standpoint is in its nascent stages. The research endeavor carried out here is, from the perspective of this author, one of the first of its kind to collect data from such a large number of countries to analyze offensive and defensive counterterrorist strategies. In light of this, the following section will look at new datasets used to measure counterterrorism as well as novel research ideas to get around the issue of data-shortage in order to help bridge the gap between theory and
empirical reality. The US occupies a unique position in the international system. Boasting the largest military in the world by far, it is the dominant global power and a prominent liberal democratic nation and has been the victim of contemporary international terror far more frequently than its liberal democratic counterparts. Hence, any efforts to combat international terror will involve a heavy US presence. In order to address this issue, the last section details the policy implications gleaned from this study and others regarding the future of US counterterrorism.

**New Variables**

Many of the same variables were used throughout this dissertation. Measures of state capacities in the form of military expenditures and GDP show that states with greater means to project force have the highest probability of engaging in deterrent and preemptive actions. These resources were also used in Chapter Five to examine whether terrorists are more likely to attack weaker defended targets. The results in Chapter Five support the idea of a weak link to counterterrorism (Enders and Sandler 2006), with terrorists choosing to attack targets in districts that were less fortified. Regarding the impact of democracy, the running theme throughout this study was that liberal democracies were targeted for the tactical advantage of the wealth of targets as well as the strategic advantages of the institutional characteristics that prevent swift retribution.

In order to capture these democratic traits, Chapters Three and Four relied on three measures — POLITY, the percentage citizens allowed to vote, and executive constraints — used in Li’s (2005) analysis of the effects of democracy on terrorist attacks. The results show that, among these measures of democracy, only the POLITY score showed
an effect, indicating that more open and electorally competitive institutions serve as a brake on preemptive strategies for counterterrorism. However, these measures do not capture the freedoms of the civilian population. The theory outlined here mainly focused on the institutional characteristics of counterterrorism and found support only in one out of the three measures. Further research into the dilemma of liberal democracies could develop theoretical arguments that would support the inclusion of civilian rights in an effort to more fully develop the mechanisms that affect liberal democracies and counterterrorist strategies.

Another interesting conclusion was the insignificant impact that terrorist attacks had on the counterterrorist strategies. The attacks of 9/11 were the most devastating international terror event in history, sparking a complete overhaul of US policy goals and changing the face of global politics. The attacks immediately grabbed worldwide attention, but the truth is that terrorist attacks are relatively rare, with domestic terror taking up the majority of cases over international terror. While 9/11 was particularly severe, analysis shows that it did not affect the overall trend regarding the frequency of terrorist attacks, suggesting that the probability of suffering a terrorist attack after 9/11 has not significantly changed (Enders and Sandler 2006; Lee, Enders, and Sandler 2009). The conspicuous absence of influence from international terrorist attacks suggests that actual violence may not be a valid measure of public benefits as modeled in the prisoners’ dilemma squared game. Indeed, contradictory examples of states such as Estonia, which participated in preemptive action even though it has never suffered from an international terrorist attack, and Israel, which has seen an exceedingly large number of terror attacks from Muslim extremists and yet did not engage in preemptive action,
illustrate the complex factors that motivate participation. This suggests that external political motivations drive the dependent variables measured in Chapters Three and Four. For example, Estonia chose to participate in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in order to ingratiate itself with its aspired peer group, namely, the EU and NATO (Omelicheva 2009). By contrast, Israel was encouraged by the US to refrain from preemptive action in order to prevent inflaming the already volatile relationship it had with various Muslim groups (Zakheim 2011). The theoretical models examined here were mostly preoccupied with security concerns. Future models utilizing variables that capture the political motivations of states would help form a more complete picture of the incentives behind counterterrorist cooperation.

What the results in this dissertation reveal is that terrorism relies much more heavily on the threat of violence and the attention that it draws rather than the actual occurrence of violence. Extending this conclusion, it is logical to assume that it is the threat that inspires fear and the fear that influences the reaction. Research from Epifanio (2011) utilizes risk perception as a variable and finds that it significantly affects the pieces of counterterrorist legislation passed in a sample of 20 liberal democracies. Since terrorists harness fear for strategic purposes, modeling risk perception rather than the frequency of attacks could perhaps lend better insight into the preemptive and deterrent actions of states.

The percentage of Muslims within a state was a significant variable in Chapters Three and Five. In Chapter Three, states with significant Muslim populations were more likely to engage in deterrent and preemptive action, while in Chapter Five, states with significant Muslim populations suffered more attacks within their military districts. The
fact that a higher Muslim population leads to a greater frequency of terrorist attacks as well as more aggressive counterterrorist action hints at the idea that both terrorists and states are trying to influence and perhaps defend themselves from the same target audience. In assessing explanations of Islamist terror, Mousseau (2011) notes that the concept of “Salafism” advocates the purification of Islam from Western influences and calls for an international Muslim brotherhood devoid of constructed boundaries. From this standpoint, the attacks against soldiers stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as a distant call to arms to Muslims across the globe. By contrast, states with a high percentage of Muslims are more fearful of a homegrown, terrorist attack and are more likely to engage in both deterrent and preemptive action to quell this threat. This possibility is supported by Epifano’s (2011) examination of the frequency of counterterrorist legislation passed in 20 liberal democracies, showing that these countries are more likely to curtail civil liberties in the presence of a significant Muslim population. Additionally, counterterrorist legislation is dependent on domestic political factors, suggesting the possible effect of the political climate as an influence on the choice of preemption.

**Research Techniques**

The genesis of this research project was the realization that data on counterterrorism from states are underrepresented when compared to that of terrorist actions. Counterterrorism is an aspect of national security, which gives states discretion on what information they choose reveal to the public. Additionally, finding valid measures of parameters from formal models is a difficult task (Arce, Croson, and Eckel
As stated previously, Epifanio (2011) addresses the issue of data availability by compiling information on legislative action dealing with counterterrorism from 20 advanced, liberal democracies. Legislative data on liberal democracies are much easier to come by than data on the national security measures of a state and provide a more nuanced glimpse of state action, which seems to be a more appropriate method for examining a democracy’s status on civil liberties. Other scholarly attempts at studying civil liberties in the face of a terrorist threat examine kidnappings, extrajudicial executions, and disappearances and find that democracies largely do not limit the rights of citizens for the sake of national security (Piazza and Walsh 2009). However, when looking at milder forms of control, such as counterterrorist legislation, it becomes clear that democracies limit the rights of their citizens (Epifanio 2011). This legislative data set could prove to be a compatible asset to the data collected here, giving more scope and depth to counterterrorist behavior.

There are also other approaches to studying counterterrorism that eschew the issue of data availability. For example, experimental research can serve as the middle ground between theory and empirical reality (Arce, Croson, and Eckel 2011). Research has been conducted examining the psychological theories regarding risk perception and the threat of terrorism (Lerner et al. 2003; Fischhoff et al. 2003; Fischhoff et al. 2005; Small, Lerner and Fischhoff 2006), as well as global security, and the evidence points to some consistency between the theoretical models and empirical results presented here, particularly regarding the free rider problem of international counterterrorism. Chapter Three shows that states look to pass the buck of preemption and that alliance commitments work to overcome this collective action problem. Experimental research
shows how cooperation is overcome by introducing reward and punishment. Inclusion of the NATO alliance variable served as the punishment variable in Chapter Three, with member states facing international pressure to heed by the policy of collective security present in international institutions such as NATO. By contrast, the case of Estonia illustrates the reward aspect of overcoming collective action, for, although it has not suffered a terrorist attack, it still joined in preemptive action in order to please its reference group (Omelicheva 2009).

When looking at the interactions between terrorist organizations and target states, experimental research with the Colonel Blotto game gives promising insights. Here, both terrorists and states have a finite amount of resources to allocate to different targets. Chowhury, Kovenok, and Sheremeta (2009) distribute the resources asymmetrically to represent the stronger target and the weaker attacker and find evidence consistent with the equilibrium outcome that stronger targets spread resources more evenly, while the weaker attacker pools theirs on a specific target. What is curious to note is that the equilibrium outcomes are generally supported when analyzed cross-sectionally, while the results show a trending pattern when looked at longitudinally. The disparity between these outcomes points to the benefit of experimentation as a middle ground. The results uncover an anomaly that was not predicted theoretically and calls for further theory refinement before being examined with data on states and terrorist organizations.

**Theory Modification**

Theories are a simplified method of explaining empirical phenomenon and are only as powerful as the accuracy of their predictions. While the results here generally
support the theory behind the dilemma of liberal democracies, further refinement can be undertaken to more accurately represent the interplay among states and their interactions with terrorist organizations. Upon reviewing the prisoners’ dilemma squared game, modifications can possibly give it a more valid representation of the empirical world. The theory outlined here modeled the choices between states as consisting of three pure strategies: Deter, Preempt, and Do Nothing. For the sake of simplicity, the results were tested in this fashion and found a relative degree of agreement with the equilibrium outcome: states prefer deterring to all other strategies. What is observed in reality, however, is that many states have the option of mixing their strategies, with the preeminent states also employing deterrent strategies. Efforts can be taken to more accurately model these parameters, however, theoretical analysis allowing for the mixing of strategies finds that deterrence is still the equilibrium outcome (Arce and Sandler 2005a). Thus, much of the explanatory power is not lost by the simpler model.

Regarding the interactions between terrorist organizations and the target state, the theory in Chapter Five could also be modified to allow for signaling between players. Lapan and Sandler (1993) produce a model in which states infer the strength of terrorist organizations through their behavior and use this information to formulate whether they should resist or accede to terrorist demands. This work is not inconsequential, for while many states have an official policy of non-negotiation, in reality they can and do submit to terrorist ultimatums (Pape 2003). The bargaining models differentiate between moderate and hardline members of terrorist organizations and theorize that “spectacular” attacks are a pooling outcome when the government is unsure whether terrorist organizations are attacking for concessions or for recruitment. The results of Chapter
Five were unable to reveal the specific driving forces behind suicide attacks and conclude that collateral damage was not a factor in a terrorist’s decision process. What can be inferred, however, is that suicide attacks abide by a different process and do not exhibit the path-dependent processes that normal attacks do. The workings behind this choice are not apparent in the results presented here, and further testing can be carried out to determine what drives suicide attacks and how their utilization updates state information and risk assessment. Hoffman and McCormick (2004) note that suicide attacks are not driven by the traditional demographic measures of desperation such as unemployment or education. Rather, the attacks serve as a signaling tactic by terrorists to display their motivations and goals to a target audience. These qualitative results are supplemented by quantitative analysis by Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2012), who examine suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorists against Israeli targets. They find that unemployment allows terrorist organizations to recruit better-educated and more experienced suicide attackers. Thus, demographic factors do play a role in suicide attacks by indirectly influencing more experienced and educated terrorists to join the cause. What is important to note is that these two studies do not equate suicide attacks with irrationality on behalf of the terrorist.

Indeed, there is a strategic logic to suicide terror. Chapter Five shows that both suicide and normal attacks are used more frequently against weaker targets, illustrating that even suicide attacks are at least partially driven by the probability of success. Perhaps more significant findings could be gleaned from Chapter Five if population characteristics were included in the model. Extreme Islamists think of globalization and its consequences as resulting from US-led, Western encroachment (Mousseau 2011). It is
no surprise that the results from Chapter Five show that US troops suffered the highest number of attacks. Due to the position of the US in global affairs and its role in the eyes of radical Islamist terrorists, any effort to quell international terrorism calls for US involvement, the implications of which are to be discussed in this last section.

**Policy Implications**

It is easy to attribute the responsibility of global counterterrorism to the US, especially in the wake of 9/11, but in truth it has been the victim of international terrorism long before then. Before 9/11, the US suffered 500 terror attacks from non-US perpetrators from 37 different countries, a significant departure from the figures of other similarly advanced, liberal democracies (Neumayer and Plümper 2011). Any effective counterterrorist action will have to involve the US. This is attributed to the asymmetry in attack frequency as well as its hegemonic status and unparalleled military superiority. US counterterrorist policy during the time of 9/11 consisted of multilateral action that resulted from intense diplomatic negotiation, resulting in preemptive action abroad in the form of military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to deterrent action at home, which consisted of counterterrorist legislation, stricter airline and border security, and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Though the military presence overseas has drastically reduced from the levels immediately following 9/11, residual forces will remain stationed across the globe for some time.

Though the empirical analysis in these chapters only briefly addressed the effectiveness of counterterrorist measures, what little is shown supports the logic of deterrence. Terrorist organizations are enemies that engage in strategic behavior, and no
matter how extremist the ideology, all terrorists aspire to successfully carry out their
mission. Engaging in deterrent behavior such as target hardening and investing more
resources into security deflects the costs to other less secure targets, resulting in a weak
link effect to deterrence. In order to ensure global security all states must cooperate on
counterterrorism. To this end, countries that do not have the capacity to secure
themselves must seek aid from stronger states such as the US to protect their citizens
from the violence of international terror.

However, this aid could have adverse effects on weak states that rely heavily on
US security, resulting in an increase in international terror. Neumayer and Plümper
(2011) find that domestic terrorists are more likely to engage in international terror when
their home country relies on the outside support of US military aid. This type of terrorism
is a form of spoiling, where the organization is trying to drive a wedge between the home
government and its foreign supporter (Frieden, Lake, and Scultz 2010). In instances
where the US lends a large amount of military aid to a country, terrorist organizations are
more likely to target US citizens within that home nation in an effort to push the costs of
support beyond the gains that the US derives. If the source of foreign support is
eliminated, so therefore is the home government. These efforts become more pronounced
the more reliant a country is on foreign military aid. Additionally, there is a moral hazard
aspect on the part of the aided nation, for international support ceases when the terrorist
threat is eliminated. As a result, many nations receiving military aid take up a defensive
position instead of proactively seeking out the enemy, extending the duration of terrorist
organizations within these countries (Bapat 2011).
This illustrates the connection between domestic and international terrorism; unattended domestic terrorism is often likely to spill over its borders and become an international affair. This intertwined relationship is empirically displayed as a correlation between domestic and international terrorism. Domestic terrorists engaging in international attacks may seek greater media attention, which could serve as a method to remove foreign intervention (Blomberg, Gailbulloev, and Sandler 2011). Both the retaliatory and protest events of domestic and international terrorist attacks arise in response to political and military events, such as the Iraqi elections of 2005 and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Indeed, the survival of terrorist groups is often reliant on their mix of domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. Evidence shows that international terrorist organizations with a higher ratio of domestic to international terrorist attacks last longer (Enders, Sandler, and Gailbulloev 2011).

Thus it seems that an effective way of managing international terror is by nipping it in the bud by eliminating it in its domestic stages, before it crosses the international threshold. But how is this to be done? While this dissertation did not examine the effects of preemptive action, it did lend support to the idea that hardened targets deter terrorists. By this logic, providing military aid to shore up defenses could prevent an attack. However, military aid does not engender preemptive action on behalf of the receiving state, for the receiving nation fears that its source will dry up after the terrorist threat subsides (Bapat 2011). This points to the collective action problem of preemption for a different set of motivations and illustrates the pervasive nature of the coordination problem when offensive action is required.
To be sure, the events of 9/11 sparked a coordinated, multilateral strategy of preemption in an effort to eliminate Al-Qaeda and the threat of international terror for all affected nations. The rush of military action did a significant amount of damage on the ranks of terrorists and took countless lives in the process. The international support was strong for preemption in Afghanistan and much less so for Iraq. Today, twelve years removed from the incident that started it all, the flow of preemption has diminished, yet the enemy is not extinguished. The last of the US troops left Iraq in 2011, and President Obama proposed cutting military forces in Afghanistan in half by February 2014 (Chandrasekaran 2013). International support largely calls for a withdrawal. The norms of a Westphalian system make infinite occupation an unwinnable strategy. What differentiates a terrorist organization from a state is the conception of boundaries. A state is finite; it ceases to exist at the water’s edge. Its value can be measured by its GDP, natural resources, population, and military strength, to name a few. By contrast, a terrorist organization is measured not so much in terms of finite resources as it is in abstract ideas. Thus, winning a War on Terror is not a matter of material damage as much as it is a war against the mindset and support of the people (Nagl 2002; Mousseau 2011), for the people “may be likened to water to the fish who inhabit it” (Tse-Tung 2000: 92-93). A terrorist organization can perpetually exist as long as the people provide resources, recruits, and support. From this perspective, a sustained strategy of preemption will never completely eliminate international terrorism inasmuch as it cannot completely eliminate the “water.” The US is experiencing diminishing returns, as the benefits of preemption are dwindling to a point of being outweighed by the costs.
Perhaps, then, the best foreign policy advice is to continue to engage in deterrence. After all, the threat of any one individual suffering an attack is extremely miniscule. The amount of resources the US spends on preemption stands in stark contrast to the mathematical threat of experiencing an actual attack, with the likelihood of an individual dying from international terrorism approximating one in 80,000, which is the same probability as dying from a comet or meteor (Mueller 2006). These odds suggest that the resources spent on deterrence are overkill as well. It is the threat that drives action, not the action itself. However, when viewed from this perspective, the threat is almost nonexistent.

Statistics aside, the reality is that inaction in the face of 9/11 would be political suicide. It is highly unlikely that airline security will be significantly relaxed anytime soon. Given the miniscule threat of terrorism and the political necessity of action, what should leaders do? Terrorist attacks have reduced in terms of diversity but still remain hard to predict. Perhaps the US and other nations should target their efforts at the types of attacks that have the highest incidence and provide the greatest devastation to society in terms of resources and lives lost (Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson 2007; Zhuang and Bier 2007). Terrorists are increasingly targeting private parties over government employees due to the low costs associated with such attacks (Santiford, Sandler, and Brandt 2011). Shoring up defense around civilian targets such as public arenas and prominent buildings could reduce the probability of violence as well. However, given the fact that terrorism thrives on fear, the most effective strategy could be for the government to remain resolute and not arouse panic by overreacting.
Though the initial risks of international terror and the global preoccupation with counterterrorism have dissipated over the years since 9/11, the US-led War on Terror soldiers on. The most convincing evidence of this was recently illustrated by the decade-long quest for Osama bin Laden that culminated in his assassination in May of 2011. Despite losing its embodiment of the radical Islamist movement, Al-Qaeda remains. While this dissertation did not explicitly test for the effects of counterterrorism, the results demonstrate the dynamics between international cooperation when combating a terrorist threat. Democracies are the main target, yet are often unwilling participants in the collective security game. However, a solution to the prisoners’ dilemma game of counterterrorism lies in the external constraint of alliances, which emphasizes their merit as successful security institutions. The results also show that terrorists are capable of being deterred, indicating that failure is not always worth dying for. Therefore, it is the inherent structure of terrorism and mindset of the people that makes terrorism difficult to defeat rather than the perceived irrationality of its members. That terrorists are strategic in nature lends encouragement to states seeking protection, for progress can and has been made. However, the high costs of this progress may not be worth the benefits achieved. Even at its peak levels, the chances of suffering a terrorist attack are low. Terrorism is fear-based. Citizens still demand action. At the risk of overextending the analysis, perhaps the goal to winning the War on Terror for liberal democracies is not so much winning over the mindset of the enemy as it is winning over the mindset of its own citizens.
APPENDIX

Coding for State Action

The framework for the analysis of events is based on the international and national counterterrorism measures compiled by the UN Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999) and Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The topics cover the areas of public and foreign policies on which to observe states’ counterterrorism actions:

- Institutional
  - Legislation
  - Create Department
  - Criminalization
- Deterrent
  - Controlling borders and people
  - Seizing assets
  - Target-hardening
  - Facilitate preparation of human and technological resources
  - Arrests
- Punitive
  - Use military and security forces against terrorists
  - Allowing military bases on sovereign soil
- Other
  - Humanitarian aid
  - Engage in Diplomacy
  - Introduce Proposal
  - Share Intelligence

From this framework actions that fall under “Deterrent” will be counted as choosing Deter in Figure 1, and actions that fall under “Punitive” will be counted as choosing Preempt. If a state chooses a deterrent and punitive action during the same year, the outcome will be coded as Preempt. These two choices of Deter and Preempt are chosen because they require a greater amount of effort to execute relative to cooperative or institutional measures. Additionally, these actions entail greater consequences in terms of political backlash and a potential retaliatory attack. For example, it can be argued that
promising humanitarian aid does little to influence the risk of terrorist attacks. By contrast, freezing the assets of a terrorist organization can be seen to carry significant consequences by limiting their amount of available resources, influencing their ability to act. The coding criteria for the different areas of counterterrorist action represent a modified schema taken from Omelicheva’s (2007) coding manual, “States’ Responses to Terrorism: Manual for Data Collection,” for collecting data on state responses to terrorism.

**Institutional**

*Legislation*

Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) requires states to criminalize the provision or collection of funds, by nationals within their borders or territories, for the purposes, whether direct or indirect, of funding terrorist acts. Additionally, Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999) condemns unequivocally any acts of terrorism as criminal, irrespective of the methods or motives of the organization in question. Thus, any acts of legislation passed to meet these ends, including amending acts to combat different aspects of terrorism, changing legislation in the interest of combating terrorism, or extending authority to existing state agencies, are coded as such.

*Create Department*

This code applies to instances in which a state creates a new agency for the purposes of counterterrorism.

*Criminalization*

This category represents any efforts of states to pass laws that either establish
terrorism as a serious criminal offence, criminalize terrorist acts (e.g. hijacking, hostage-taking, bombings, etc.), or any explicit actions regarded as terrorist acts per UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1373 (2001).

**Deterrent**

*Controlling Borders and People*

Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) requires states to take measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and financial flows to entities and persons related to terrorism, and to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts. These measures include controls on the issuance of identity papers and travel documents, intensified border controls, and regulations of financial transactions. Any of the following actions listed below are coded as “Control.”

**Control of the movement of people:** when a state establishes, improves, or expands databanks containing information on any of the individual metrics, identity documents, or visas, and any other measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identify papers and travel documents (e.g., increasing the security level of passports). This event type also includes compiling lists of the persons responsible for perpetration of terrorist acts.

**Border controls:** is used to record a state’s actions aimed at intensification of border controls by supplying border posts with necessary border control equipment, or increasing the presence of border troops at the most dangerous parts of the state border.

**Control of financial flows:** is used to record a state’s measures to protect its financial system. These measures include defining suspicious operations, listing
individuals and groups associated with terrorism for the purpose of freezing their financial assets, instructing banks and other institutions on measures to be taken to prevent the utilization of finances and other assets for commission of terrorist acts. This event code also covers monitoring activities of national banks and financial intelligence units.

**Ban**: is assigned when a state establishes a ban on functioning of terrorist groups on its territory, or prohibits activities of banned organizations. This event type also includes courts’ decision declaring certain groups and organizations illegal.

**Seize**

*Seize*: is used to record various forms of sanctions imposed on the assets of individuals and groups related to terrorism. It includes freezes of accounts, bans on the flow of funds, and sequestration of assets.

**Target hardening**

Target hardening entails an increase or upgrade in security surrounding potential targets under threat of terrorist attack. The purpose of this action is to sufficiently dissuade terrorists from engaging in terrorist attacks against the protected target. Any of the following actions listed below will be coded as “Target-hardening.”

**Target hardening of high-risk activities**: to record measures that a state implements to ensure protection of people during high-risk mass activities, such as sporting events, shows, and public appearances of celebrities or high-profile politicians.

**Target hardening of embassies and internationally protected persons**: to record additional measures of protection of embassies and diplomatic representations of states and international organizations. This event code includes measures of protection of
diplomats and other internationally protected persons.

**Target hardening of transport and communication systems:** to record measures of protection of the systems of transportation – railway, air and naval transport, as well as the systems of communication, including mailing and internet services.

**Target hardening of weapons and explosives storage areas:** to record any additional safety measures in the storage areas of weapons and explosives.

**Prepare Human and Technical Resources**

This category represents efforts on the behalf of states to improve technological deterrent and monitoring activities as well as the preparation or training of units or groups of people for the express purpose of counterterrorism. Any of the following actions listed below will be coded as “Prepare Human and Technical Resources.”

**Train personnel:** is used to record any of the following measures aimed at improving human resources for combating terrorism: recruiting and training human resources for high alert counter-terrorist special reaction force teams (including hostage rescue units); training bomb disposal teams or other special units to deal with terrorist threat or offensive; carrying out simulation exercises; or enhancing the capacity of law enforcement officials to handle terrorist threats.

**Upgrade technical resources:** is assigned when a state develops, applies, or modifies its technological reserves used to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. This includes surveillance devices, means for eavesdropping/interception, satellites, and detectors.

**Arrests**

Non-military punitive reactions to terrorist attacks. This includes arrests made on foreign
nationals or domestic citizens within a state’s sovereign territory as well as non-military raids on the headquarters of terrorists within the occupied territories in Iraq and Afghanistan (for the purposes of arrest and/or neutralization).

**Preempt**

*Strike*

Strike is used to record an instance in which a state contributes armed forces for participation in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is measured as two separate count variables, with each state consisting of a value for the number of troops contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and a value for the number of troops contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.

**Basing**

Base is used to record instances of a nation sanctioning their land for the usage of troop movement or supplies for the purposes of combat or defense against a terrorist organization.

**Other**

*Humanitarian Aid*

This variable is coded when a state provides humanitarian aid for the purposes of emergency relief to other international actors.

*Engage in Diplomacy*

This variable represents instances of international discussion or negotiation of events related to the purpose of combating terrorism and includes engaging in joint
counterterrorist exercises, hosting diplomatic events regarding terrorism, traveling to meet foreign dignitaries for the purpose of discussing counterterrorism, and articulating positions to the international community with regards to counterterrorism.

*Offer Proposal*

This variable represents a state’s attempt to suggest or propose counterterrorism policies or strategies of any kind. This action includes proposing treaties, amendments, and initiatives regarding any reference to fighting terrorism.

*Sharing Intelligence*

This variable is coded to represent the exchange of information between states regarding instances of terrorism, early warning, or assisting in criminal investigations.
Table A.1. List of FTOs Labeled as International Radical Islamist Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Country(s) of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abu Nidal Organization</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
<td>Philippine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ‘Asbat al-Ansar</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Islamic Group (IG)</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) (Movement of Holy Warriors)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Al-Jihad</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Laskar-e-Taiba (Tayyiba) (LT)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Al-Qaida</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Jemaah Islaymiya (JI)</td>
<td>Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Al-Jihad (AJ)</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) (Army of Jhangvi)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ansar al-Islam (AI)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Armed Islamic Group</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) (Army of Jhangvi)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<td>20. Tanzim Qa’idat al’Jihad fi Bilad al-Rifidayn (QJBR)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Islamic Jihad Group (IJU)</td>
<td>Central and South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)</td>
<td>Morocco, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
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<td>24. Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>28. Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (Huji-B)</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
<td>Yemen, Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Kata’ib Hizbollah</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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VITA

Kyle Kattelman was raised in Bethalto, IL, a St. Louis metro-area community. He attended Eastern Illinois University as an undergraduate, where he met and eventually married Kristie Reeter in Bloomington, Illinois, in the summer of 2010.

Kyle is a fan of all St. Louis sports teams, particularly the St. Louis Cardinals, and attends home games whenever the opportunity arises. He enjoys playing the guitar and drawing sketches, as well as spending time with family and friends. His wife recently bought him a keyboard, which he is struggling to learn how to play. He also considers himself and amateur Abraham Lincoln expert and owns a large collection of books and paraphernalia on his life and legacy.