Indigenous Political Representation in Bolivia

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Graduate School
At the University of Missouri

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctorate in Political Science

By
TARA PARSONS
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, Dissertation Supervisor

May 2013
The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the Dissertation entitled
INDIGENOUS POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN BOLIVIA

Presented by Tara Parsons
A candidate for the degree of
Doctorate in Political Science
And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

______________________________
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer

______________________________
Jay Dow

______________________________
Jonathon Krieckhaus

______________________________
Joan Hermson
DEDICATION PAGE

To my parents for their unwavering confidence in my abilities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express great gratitude to Dr. Leslie Schwindt-Bayer for her guidance, assistance, and patience during this entire process. Additional gratitude is directed to Dr. Jay Dow, Dr. Jonathon Krieckhaus, and Dr. Joan Hermson for serving on my committee and providing support and constructive feedback along the way. The staff of the University of Missouri Political Science Department was instrumental in keeping me on track and sane during my time there.

Field work was partially funded by the John D. Bies International Travel Scholarship facilitated through the University of Missouri Graduate School. I am thankful to Dr. Bies for his support of this project. I am particularly grateful for the assistance of David Stephenson, Executive Director of Engineers in Action, Mara Mamani, and Juanqui Pane. I am thankful to Bishop Eugenio Poma and Dr. German Crespo for their valuable time. I owe special gratitude to the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu and the Bartolina Sisa Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women for opening their doors during my visit.

Many personal thanks to my colleagues at the University of Missouri and James Madison University for their support, encouragement, and assistance. Even greater thanks to those who served as my rock throughout this entire process: my many family members as well as Nick Spina, Nathan Madden, Atreyee Sims, Christopher Raymond, Tucker Staley, Nicole Foster-Shoaf, Nisha Bellinger, and Melissa Connolly. Lars J. Kristiansen, this never would have come to fruition without your love and support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. ii
List of Illustrations .................................................................................................................... vi
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... vii
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
  Indigenous Peoples in Latin America ......................................................................................... 2
  Social Movements and Indigenous Parties .............................................................................. 5
  A Case Study of Bolivia ............................................................................................................ 10
Organization ................................................................................................................................. 15
Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations .......................................................................................... 19
  Parties and Party Systems ......................................................................................................... 19
  Functions of Political Parties .................................................................................................... 22
  Origins of Parties ...................................................................................................................... 23
    Social Cleavages .................................................................................................................... 23
    Social Explanations for Indigenous Political Party Emergence ........................................ 26
    Institutional Explanations ...................................................................................................... 29
    Institutional Explanations for Indigenous Political Party Emergence ................................ 33
Recognition of Interactive Relationship ...................................................................................... 35
Weaknesses of These Explanations .............................................................................................. 36
Incomplete Picture: Role of Context .......................................................................................... 40
  Indigenous Mobilization .......................................................................................................... 41
  Economic Pressures .................................................................................................................. 47
  Electoral Changes .................................................................................................................... 48
<p>| Conclusion ........................................................................................................ | 50 |
| Chapter 3: Indigenous Party Emergence in Bolivia ....................................... | 52 |
| Bolivia in Context ............................................................................................. | 52 |
| Indigenous Social Mobilization ....................................................................... | 53 |
| Institutional Context ....................................................................................... | 60 |
| Volatile Political Climate ............................................................................. | 60 |
| Democratization ............................................................................................... | 63 |
| Decentralization .............................................................................................. | 64 |
| Economic Pressures .......................................................................................... | 66 |
| Indigenous Political Parties ............................................................................ | 70 |
| CONDEPA ......................................................................................................... | 72 |
| Eje Pachakutik .................................................................................................. | 73 |
| MAS .................................................................................................................. | 74 |
| Conclusion ....................................................................................................... | 78 |
| Chapter 4: Identifying Sources of Support ..................................................... | 80 |
| Theoretical Explanations ................................................................................... | 81 |
| Social Cleavages ............................................................................................... | 81 |
| Electoral Rules ................................................................................................. | 82 |
| Linkage ............................................................................................................. | 85 |
| Electoral Climate ............................................................................................. | 87 |
| Bolivian Party System ....................................................................................... | 89 |
| Political Parties in 2002 Election .................................................................. | 90 |
| Data and Method ............................................................................................... | 93 |
| Dependent Variable ......................................................................................... | 94 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables: Origins of MAS Support</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Level</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Level</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral District Level</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Indigenous Party Representative Efforts</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Outsider to the Executive Branch</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive Representation</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Issue Areas</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Term Analysis</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development and Vocational Training</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care and Basic Services</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources and Environment</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy and Native Justice</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Constitution</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Contribution</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Research</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Map of Bolivia ................................................................. 11
Figure 2: Presidential Vote Share by Traditional Parties ................. 64
Figure 3: Annual Percent GDP Growth 1980-1989 ............................ 67
Figure 4: Total General Strikes 1970-1999 ..................................... 69
Figure 5: Coca Cultivation and Reported Eradication 1995-2009 ....... 88
Figure 6: Department Level Figures – Social Characteristics ............. 101
Figure 7: Department Level Figures - Inequality ............................. 104

Table 1: Seat Distribution by Department ..................................... 83
Table 2: Chamber of Deputies Seat Distribution 2002 ......................... 84
Table 3: Departmental Analysis .................................................... 100
Table 4: Indigenous Ethnic Groups and MAS Support ....................... 102
Table 5: Province Level Model ...................................................... 106
Table 6: District Level Analysis ..................................................... 108
Table 7: Party Vote Share by Department ....................................... 110
Table 8: MAS Support Compared to Other Parties ......................... 111
Table 9: Indigenous Issue Areas ................................................... 120
Table 10: Indigenous Legislation during MAS First Term .................. 123
ABSTRACT

The 1990s witnessed the widespread formation of political parties organized around indigenous identity throughout the Latin American region. This project examines that phenomenon within the case of Bolivia. Bolivia was home to the region’s first and most successful indigenous political parties. Three primary areas of interest are examined: emergence, support, and representative efforts. Traditional explanations for political party emergence and support fall into social and institutional explanations. Concerning emergence, these theories are incomplete when applied to indigenous political parties because of inattention to the environment in which changes occur. This project argues that economic recession, increased coca eradication efforts, and decentralization policies provided the stimulus for indigenous groups to form political parties. This theory is applied to Bolivia and its indigenous political parties. Concerning political party support, social and institutional explanations are compared using the region’s most successful indigenous party, Movimiento al Socialismo. Social explanations carry the most explanatory weight while institutional factor pale in comparison. Finally, the representation efforts of Movimiento al Socialismo are examined in the first review of representation provided by indigenous political parties. The review finds legislative efforts directed at natural resources and cultural preservation, but little attention given to autonomy and native justice issues.
INTRODUCTION

Following the 1952 Bolivian Revolution, Eugenio Poma became the first Aymara Indian from his Bolivian village to attend school.¹ His trajectory from illiterate child-worker on a hacienda to becoming the Bolivian Ambassador of Denmark parallels the massive strides made by the indigenous peoples of Bolivia during the same time period. Extensive agrarian and educational reforms presented the indigenous population with expanded opportunity and a corollary sense of self-determination. Over the next 50 years, social, political, and economic changes created incentives for the indigenous population to organize into a social movement for equality and eventually into a political party that now holds the presidential office in Bolivia.

The goal of this project is to relay the story surrounding Bolivia’s indigenous population’s transition from second class, non-citizens to the primary constituency of the region’s most successful indigenous political party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). The project seeks to address three distinct issues concerning indigenous politics: the factors contributing to party emergence, the sources of MAS electoral support, and the quality and range of representation efforts provided by indigenous political parties. It begins with an introduction to traditional theorizations concerning new political party emergence and suggests that those theories provide an incomplete picture regarding the emergence of indigenous political parties. It further argues that specific developments in the Bolivian context coalesced together in the 1990s to present a favorable environment for previously unprecedented indigenous political parties to enter the party system. The

¹ Reported in personal interview with Poma on May 19th, 2012 in Tulsa, OK.
project then compares the institutional, economic, and demographic sources of MAS support in an effort to identify how the region’s most successful indigenous political party consolidated support. It concludes with a content analysis of policies passed by MAS during its first term in control of the legislature as well as the 2009 Constitution to gain insight into of representative efforts provided by indigenous political parties.

**Indigenous Peoples in Latin America**

The indigenous populations of Latin America are direct descendants of the ancient Incan and Mayan civilizations. Following in the tradition of colonial conquests, the Spanish conquistadors decimated these impressive empires and regulated their descendants into the bottom tier of a rigid, oppressive, and lasting social hierarchy. Mamdani (1996), for example, has demonstrated how colonial social structures can have substantial effects on resistance and reform long into the future. Even in 2012, indigenous tribes across Latin America are struggling to carve out their own place in systems that were originally built upon their backs.

Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Mexico are home to 90 percent of Latin America’s indigenous population and have the highest proportion of indigenous peoples within their borders (Yashar 1998). Within these countries, indigenous identity has the potential to be a significant and powerful social and political bloc. However, despite a common ancestry, there are many sub-cleavages among indigenous groups within any given country. For example, according to the 2001 National Bolivian Census, 62 percent of the population is of indigenous origin but, within that category, there are thirty-six recognized indigenous identity groups. The great diversity within indigenous identity
groups creates additional difficulties in the demand for indigenous equality from governments whose borders cut across traditional group boundaries (Yashar 2005). One common thread that has managed to unify indigenous peoples throughout Latin America is their status as the region’s most disadvantaged and most disenfranchised population. Although rooted in the colonial structure, disadvantages today fall into two primary areas of concern: socioeconomic discrimination and political exclusion.

Socioeconomic discrimination towards indigenous peoples continues to be a very real problem in Latin America. Although several Latin American countries have made strides in poverty reduction in recent years, these accomplishments fail to close the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous persons. In their study examining the conditions of indigenous peoples, Hall and Patrinos (2006) report that being indigenous is a reliable predictor of socioeconomic position and further explain that an indigenous background increases the probability of being poor by up to 30 percent in some countries. For example, Mexico, Guatemala and Bolivia have reduced their national-level poverty rates in recent years but the poverty gap between indigenous peoples and the rest of the population has remained unchanged or even increased (Hall and Patrinos 2006). The situation is worse in some countries than others. According to 2010 UNDG Human Development Report on Guatemala, 26 percent of the country’s indigenous population lives in extreme poverty compared to only 8 percent of the country’s non-indigenous population. The same picture also emerges in educational settings. In the five Latin American countries with the largest indigenous populations, indigenous students complete an average of three less years of schooling than non-indigenous students (Hall and Patrinos 2006). Moreover, in regards to economic involvement, indigenous people
have typically filled labor-intensive positions such as farm hands or miners—jobs which are dangerous, low in pay, and also socially undesirable. In some places, these positions were—and still are—filled without choice. Until the 1952 Revolution, Bolivia’s indigenous peoples were legally tied to the hacienda system as forced laborers. Hall and Patrinos (2006) report that “across Latin America, indigenous people earn less than non-indigenous people and the proportion of earnings inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous people attributable to labor market discrimination is high” (3).

Political discrimination has also stratified indigenous peoples from their non-indigenous counterparts. First of all, restrictions were in place to limit indigenous suffrage until the early 1980s throughout the Latin American region (Van Cott 2005). A historical lack of access to schools and educational institutions further compounded the problem. Yashar explains that literacy requirements in Latin America “effectively excluded many indigenous men and most indigenous women from taking part in elections and exercising their political voice” (2005, 37). These limits to suffrage effectively isolated indigenous peoples from the governments that ruled over them. Once democratization and indigenous mobilization began, indigenous groups often sought extra-legal methods of communicating their demands to governments. In most countries, indigenous trust in legal procedures was severed long before democracy even took hold. However, despite these challenges, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an unexpected, region-wide organization of indigenous populations into powerful social movements and viable political parties in several Latin American countries.
Social Movements and Indigenous Parties

Despite their stratification into the lower tiers of an institutionalized social hierarchy, indigenous peoples throughout Latin America began to organize into viable social movements in the 1970s and 1980s. This mobilization occurred in unison with the region’s most recent democratization period. Indigenous organizations utilized protests and boycotts to communicate their grievances to governments. Demands generally included bilingual education, respect for customary law, land autonomy and redistribution, as well as the reorganization of the social and economic hierarchy. Significant indigenous movements developed in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico. Yashar states, “In these countries, indigenous peoples have mobilized beyond the local level to forge moderate to strong regional/subnational and national organizations (where strength is defined is defined in terms of mobilizational capacity and organizational endurance) that have assumed a significant place in the national policy debates” (1998, 25).

From country to country, these groups have utilized different tactics for state recognition. The indigenous people of Mexico chose militaristic tactics to gain government attention and respect. On January 1, 1994, the Zapatistas declared war on the Mexican government and occupied several communities in the Mexican state of Chiapas. The group issued a statement on January 6 stating “Since the 1st of January our Zapatista troops began a series of political military actions whose primordial objective is to alert the Mexican people and the rest of the world to the miserable conditions in which millions of Mexicans live and die, especially we indigenous people” (Jung 2003, 24). Today, although relying less frequently on militaristic tactics, the Zapatistas are still
organized and continue to present their demands to the Mexican government. In 2006, they launched “La Otra Campaña” (The Other Campaign) that traveled the country in an effort to unify multiple organizations and rally people behind the indigenous cause (Mora 2007). The Zapatistas have been applauded for their use of technology to bring their grievances to the attention of the international community and its celebrities (Meikle 2004).

The Ecuadorian indigenous populations have taken a decidedly less militaristic approach in terms of presenting their demands to government, but have nonetheless relied on and utilized alliances with the military in order to cultivate and gain political influence. Traditionally, Ecuador’s indigenous peoples, including the national-level indigenous organization Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), refused any and all direct participation in elections (Beck and Mijeski 2001). CONAIE also refused to endorse any political candidate and even forbade its own leaders to run for political office (Becker 2008). However, in 1995, the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País unexpectedly emerged from the fringes and subsequently decided to run indigenous candidates in the 1996 and 1998 congressional elections. This was the first attempt of Ecuadorian indigenous peoples to engage in legal political activity rather than relying on traditionally prevailing extra-legal methods. However, limited political success resulted in deep frustrations with the democratic process within the country’s indigenous communities (Beck and Mijeski 2001). In 2000, thousands of indigenous people joined forces with unions and parts of the military to take control of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Presidential palace. Together, they ousted a sitting president and formed a three-person coalition executive between a
military general, a Supreme Court justice, and the leader of the CONAIE. The coalition only lasted a few hours but signified a change in tide by identifying the shared interests of the indigenous community and other social actors. The move from localized interests to more inclusive platform has proven vital to Bolivia’s indigenous movement success as well.

The year 1990 provided the Ecuadorian Indigenous Uprising and the Bolivian March for Territory and Dignity. Taken together, these events displayed the potential political power wielded by indigenous populations and also facilitated a renewed scholarly interest in their struggle for representation (Albó 1994, Van Cott 2010). Scholars argued that these social movements emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy and a great sense of discomfort arising from economic liberalization (Brysk 1994; Brysk and Wise 1997; Van Cott 1994; Yashar 2005).

Indigenous movements served as a first step towards formal political organization, but only some movements sought political influence through indigenous political parties. During the 1990s, indigenous political parties—such as Movimiento Alianza Social Indígena, Movimiento Unido Pluricultural Pachakutik- Nuevo País, and Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanh Aslatakan—formed in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Perú and Venezuela. While these parties commandeered varying lengths of relevancy, and enjoyed various degrees of electoral success, together they formed an unexpected, region-wide wave of direct indigenous political participation. Political parties often organize around social cleavages, but the politicization of ethnicity in Latin America was noticeably absent until the recent surge of indigenous political parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Dix 1989; 1992). These political parties differ from the
traditional parties in the region because they present a platform focused on the improvement of the indigenous situation through policy building. They also recruit their leaders from the indigenous community. They differ from indigenous movements in that they put forth candidates for electoral office and campaign on behalf of those people. Historically, the cultural traditions of communal decision making and the wish for autonomy kept indigenous peoples from engaging the developing democracies in their countries. However, the 1990s witnessed an unprecedented surge in direct indigenous political participation through indigenous political parties.

Scholars have attempted to explain this surge through reliance upon theories that focus on social cleavages, institutional design, or a combination of the two. Social cleavage explanations typically point to the organization of party systems around social groups and include social conditions like indigenous population size or regional concentration of indigenous populations as reasons for indigenous politicization. They argue that larger and more mobilized indigenous populations like those of Ecuador and Bolivia organized into political parties earlier and more successfully than other indigenous populations (Madrid 2005; 2008, Yashar 2005). Other scholars have elaborated on those theories and specify that the regional concentration of indigenous populations affects their likelihood to form into political parties (Van Cott 2005). The social conditions literature also pulls from the work on grievances and explains the emergence of these parties as a result of the changing social conditions that lead to a gap between the actual socioeconomic conditions of indigenous populations and the conditions they expect relative to other segments of the population (Davies 1962; Madrid 2012).
The institutional design explanations rest in the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral rules on the characteristics of party systems including new party entrance. The democratization process this region experienced during the 1980s included changes to political institutions that opened the system and made electoral ballots more accessible. District magnitude has long been identified as a factor affecting the likelihood of new parties entering a party system and scholars examining indigenous party emergence have also used that theory (Rice and Van Cott 2006; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Another institutional factor scholars have identified as contributing to indigenous party emergence is the decentralization of government power. Van Cott (2005) found that indigenous parties often start at the district electoral level and work their way up through the political system. They gain political experience necessary for electoral success at higher levels of the political ladder. Rice and Van Cott (2006) also credit the creation of new electoral districts for stimulating the formation of indigenous parties.

This project argues that both sets of explanations provide an incomplete picture of the emergence of indigenous political parties. Parties have emerged in systems with very similar social and institutional conditions suggesting that there is a contributing factor to explaining why some indigenous groups formed political parties. This project argues that economic recession, coca eradication, and decentralization policies explain the variation.

While scholarly attention to the emergence of these parties has grown tremendously, few scholars have examined the consequences of their introduction to party systems. In a review of the region’s ethnic political parties, Madrid (2012) notes the populist tendencies of these parties lead them to pursue the consolidation of power or overthrow presidents. The increased legitimacy of working outside democratic
institutions rather than through them has tremendous potential consequences for the future legitimacy of democracy in the region. However, Madrid (2012) also presents evidence that these parties have improved democracy by engaging the previously excluded indigenous populations, which has resulted not only in an increase in political activity but also a marked improvement in this population’s trust and belief in democracy.

This project takes an additional step and reviews the policy output of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies during the first term MAS held a majority of seats. This is the first examination of legislation passed by indigenous political parties. It seeks to gain exploratory information on which issue areas indigenous political parties devote their attention once in office. Data from interviews with indigenous leaders are included to gain insight into how MAS’s efforts at increased indigenous representation are received by indigenous organizations.

A Case Study of Bolivia

Following the advice of George and Bennett (2005), this project is a case study that examines a small subset of a greater phenomenon. At the highest level of abstraction, this project is an examination of the emergence, support, and representative efforts of political parties. More specifically, it is an attempt to identify why indigenous political parties emerged in Latin America and how well they represent the indigenous population. However, these questions must be exhaustively developed and then tested in a specific case before they can be generalized to other cases. This project develops its explanations and applies its theories to Bolivia.
Although indigenous political parties emerged in various countries during the same time frame, Bolivia provides a necessary first test of this project’s theories. Bolivia
shares important similarities with other Latin American countries in terms of history, culture, and political experience. The indigenous peoples of Bolivia share in the plight of the rest of the region’s indigenous populations in reference to their historical maltreatment from the government. As previously discussed, the region’s indigenous populations have fought a long hard fight for equality and that fight will continue long into the future. Bolivia’s indigenous population started from a similar place as others when they began to make demands of the government.

The first indigenous party in Latin America formed in 1978 in Bolivia. The Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari political party’s foundations will be explored in the following sections, but their emergence is significant in that it was the first of its kind. There is validity in arguments that once indigenous organizations and movements saw their counterparts in other countries have success as political parties, they too decided to register and run candidates for office. This snowball effect is witnessed in numerous events studied by political scientists in international relations and comparative politics. However, Bolivia’s Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari was not following an example set by others. They forged a new path to electoral participation. They borrowed the name of an early indigenous revolutionary and participated in three legislative elections from 1978 to 1980.

In addition to the region’s first indigenous political party, Bolivia is also home to the region’s most successful. In December 2005, the Movimiento Al Socialismo, an indigenous political party formed in 1995, won the presidential seat of Bolivia. Evo Morales became the first Aymara Indian to hold the country’s highest office and won reelection in 2009. The MAS political party won 21 percent of the legislative vote in
2002 and secured a majority of the legislature in the 2005 election. No other indigenous political party has been able to consolidate their influence and remain electorally competitive through multiple elections. The emergence of MAS is important to examine because it has secured roots in society and established itself firmly into the party system. It has also been successful in increasing representative quality for the indigenous populations it serves. In 2007, Bolivia became the first country in the world to sign the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 2009, Bolivia also adopted one of the world’s most inclusive constitutions. The new constitution declares Bolivia a plurinational state and recognizes the multiple indigenous nations that reside within Bolivia’s borders.

While Bolivia’s early successes make it an important first step, the similarities it shares with other countries ensure the relevance of findings in Bolivia can be generalized to other countries and ethnic parties in future projects. Although they number around 6 million, Bolivia’s indigenous population comprises around 62 percent of the total population. This sets Bolivia atop a list of the region’s largest indigenous populations proportionate to the total population, but Guatemala and Peru are not far behind. Bolivia’s indigenous population is very diverse with 36 distinct lingual groups officially identified by the government and up to 50 groups recognized by Bolivian indigenous organizations including the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu (CONAMAQ). This means that despite its size, Bolivia’s indigenous population is not easily unified behind a common cause. It faces the same organizational difficulties experienced in other countries like Colombia with 85 distinct indigenous cultures (2005
Census). As mentioned earlier, Bolivia’s indigenous population shares a disadvantaged socioeconomic status with other indigenous populations in the region.

The lessons that can be learned by close examination of Bolivia’s success trump concerns over its differences with other populations. The historical economic disadvantages and political exclusion are shared by all of Latin and North America’s indigenous populations. Although there are an estimated 600 different tribal affiliations on the American continent, they each struggle with the task of asserting their place in the existing system and securing a degree of self-determination for themselves (The Indigenous World 2012). Bolivia’s indigenous community continues this struggle daily as they fight to secure respect for their culture in a developing economy. Identification of the factors that contributed to their relative success is important for other indigenous populations still fighting for a seat at the table. For these reasons, Bolivia is an important case study and should provide valuable insights into the path that takes a disadvantaged population to the executive branch.

The qualitative case study method has received substantial criticism from the political science community. In the field’s efforts to replicate the scientific method of the hard sciences, we often abandon our roots in historical analysis. The last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of the historical method in political science and most of that renewed popularity can be credited to the adoption of the economic method of process tracing in case studies (Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000; Thelen 2000). Hall states, “In short, process-tracing is a methodology well-suited to testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables – precisely the work that more and more social scientists
believe we confront” (2003, 405). The current methods dominating the field are incapable of capturing the complex convergence of long-term conditions and short-term shocks that produce certain political phenomenon. The emergence of indigenous political parties is an event that’s existence can only be explained by the sequencing of developments that occurred before its time.

While statistical analysis is excellent at identifying the value of independent variables in producing causal effects, George and Bennett argue that “Case studies are superior at process-tracing, which relates to the causal mechanism component of causal explanation (2005, 224). Case studies can identify the mechanisms that connect independent variables to their effect on dependent variables. Pierson goes as far as to state that in variable-centered analysis, “The significance of such variables is frequently distorted when they are ripped from their temporal context” (2000, 72). In statistical analysis, theories are used to make the connection between variable and outcome, but case studies provide an examination and, in some cases, a test of how that theory actually operates on the ground, in the unit of interest.

**Organization**

The next chapter details the traditional explanations offered for new political party emergence. The explanations typically fall into two theoretical bodies: one based on social cleavages and the other on institutional design. The chapter first presents each set of theories in terms of general party system characteristics and new party emergence. It then reviews the existing explanations of indigenous political party formation within each theoretical body. The weaknesses of these theories in Latin American party systems are
reviewed as well as the difficulty of applying these theories to indigenous political party emergence. It is argued that these explanations are important, but incomplete in explaining indigenous political party formation.

This project posits that previous theories provide an incomplete picture because of the lack of attention to the context in which indigenous political parties emerged. This project theorizes that long-term developments in the social structure were met with economic recession, increased coca eradication, and decentralization policies during the democratization period that raised incentives for indigenous groups to directly engage the political system as their own parties. The timing of the economic crisis and institutional reforms relative to the mobilization capacity of indigenous groups and democratization of Bolivian politics was fundamentally important. The mobilization capacity was higher in countries where indigenous peoples gained access to education, economic opportunity, and the vote earlier than their counterparts in other countries. This facilitated the building of indigenous networks that lowered organizational costs when economic threats and coca eradication efforts stimulated groups to seize the new political space created by institutional volatility and reforms. Together, these changes created a contextual environment that raised incentives and lowered costs for indigenous groups to form political parties.

The third chapter traces the specific developments in the Bolivia context that created an environment favorable to indigenous political party emergence. In particular, the results of economic recession raised tensions between indigenous peoples and their non-indigenous counterparts. As part of the recession, traditional employment sectors collapsed and indigenous Bolivians found more lucrative opportunities in the growing
cocaine trade. In efforts to gain United States assistance, the Bolivian government increased coca eradication efforts that were viewed as attacks on indigenous culture. Traditional parties, in an effort to combat growing unpopularity, instituted decentralization policies that provided legal recognition to local indigenous communities and created new local governments. Indigenous organizations seized these local opportunities and organized to fill many of the positions with indigenous persons. Four indigenous political parties officially registered in the two years following these reforms.

One of those indigenous political parties became the region’s most successful; Movimiento al Socialismo made a rapid ascent from their formation in 1995 to capturing the country’s executive office in the 2005 election. The forth chapter uses a subnational analysis of electoral data to identify how MAS transitioned from regional, issue-specific political party to a nationally competitive party. Traditional explanations for party support also fall into social cleavage and institutional explanations. This chapter tests those explanations in an effort to identify the sources of support for indigenous political parties. The explanations are operationalized using measures of indigenous identity, inequality, affiliation with the agricultural and mining sectors, and district magnitude. They are tested using an original dataset that combines electoral results at different governmental levels with census data. Across the department, province, and electoral district levels of analysis, the main explanatory factor for indigenous political party support is the proportion of the population indigenous. Measures of inequality and employment in agriculture also contribute to indigenous party support, but institutional factors fail in comparison.
Previous studies on indigenous political parties focus on their emergence and give very little attention to the consequences of their entrance to party systems. Chapter 5 conducts the first review of the legislative representation provided by indigenous political parties. It seeks to answer the question of which indigenous rights issues receive attention from indigenous political parties. Theories on descriptive representation suggest that increasing the presence of certain groups in a legislature can positively impact the legislative output for issues important to that group. The literature has assumed that these parties are acting in the best interest of indigenous populations, but other demands may take precedence once in office. The less controversial issue areas may receive more legislative attention, but fail to meet indigenous peoples’ expectations. This chapter uses interviews with indigenous representatives and a content analysis of legislation passed by the first congress under MAS control, including the new 2009 Constitution, to formulate a critical review of MAS representation. Legislation from the 2005–2009 Congress is coded according to whether it is indigenous related and the issue area of focus. This chapter is exploratory in nature, but provides a necessary first step in determining one area of impact indigenous political parties have on the democracy in which they participate.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

“...I say that I would like the brother Evo to keep working because he is moving forward and he is our blood. I feel he is my brother because before the situation was different. What peasant could you find with the president? Nobody.”

This chapter provides the theoretical parameters of this project. It begins by defining political parties and explaining their importance to democracy. The existing explanations of political party formation and entrance are presented and critiqued concerning their application to indigenous political party emergence. A new contextual theory is developed that completes the gaps left by traditional explanations. This project theorizes that long-term developments in the social structure were met with economic recession, increased coca eradication, and decentralization policies during the democratization period that raised incentives for indigenous groups to directly engage the political system as their own parties.

**Parties and Party Systems**

Democracy requires the organization of society into opposing ideological groups that compete for control and influence over the government. This project is an examination of the formation, emergence, and performance of indigenous political parties with an emphasis on the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia. A brief discussion of definitions is necessary before launching into an examination of this political phenomenon. This section will identify the terms used in this project to delineate social movements, political parties, and party systems.

---

2 Juana Llaria Laruta, Representative of Bartalinas Interview 7/25/11 in La Paz, Bolivia
Social movements are defined as a sustained, organized public effort that makes collective claims through the use of a variety of forms of political action including public meetings, processions, rallies, demonstrations, pamphlet distribution, and press releases (Tilly 2004). According to Tilly (2004), social movements aim to build awareness of the group’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment to the cause. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that social movements emphasizing indigenous identity or ethnicity surfaced in Latin America. Previously, the indigenous community was co-opted into other social movements promoting collective identities based on class, religion, partisanship, or revolutionary ambitions (Yashar 1998). Indigenous movements organized in several countries during the democratization period and experienced various levels of success at promoting their messages. Other scholars have devoted attention to the development of these social movements (Yashar 1998; 2005). This project is interested in the transition from indigenous social movement to indigenous political party.

Early political scientist Anson Morse defined a political party as a lasting organization that consists of a group of citizens united by common values, interests or principles that “has for its immediate end the advancement of the interests and the realization of the ideals, not of the people as a whole, but of the particular group or groups which it represents” (1896, 1). This definition does not differ greatly from the previous definition of social movements. However, political parties advance the interests of members of their group through gaining control and influence in government. Later scholars have added the sponsorship of candidates in elections as a necessary condition for the term political party. Schlesinger states that “whatever else they may be, parties are certainly efforts to capture the offices of the state by the rules laid down by the state”
(1985, 1153). Epstein (1980) agrees that a political party is any group competing for
election under a common label. Sartori (1976) defines a political party as any political
group that presents and is capable of placing candidates to public office through
elections. This condition delineates a social movement or organization devoted to the
promotion of indigenous rights from a political party organized around indigenous
identity.

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) expand their definition of political party to include
groups that would present candidates in an election but are unable to do so. This project
adopts that amendment to the definition and marks the year of party formation as the year
the group decides to begin the process of running candidates rather than the year of the
election that they first compete. The formation of MAS will be presented in detail later in
this project, but an example will clarify this demarcation. MAS arose out of a union that
had long existed and worked for the promotion of indigenous coca grower rights. The
union and the political party share a common membership but the political party was not
formed until 1995 when party registration was sought in order to run candidates in the
1997 municipal elections.

Democracies require at least two opposing political parties competing in elections
to ensure the public exercises choice in selecting leaders. A party system reflects the
interactions among different political actors and the factors that set the parameters of
those interactions (Sartori 1976). The factors shaping the interactions include the number
of political parties, coalition patterns, degree of polarization and nationalization, stability
of competition, and traits shared by parties such as age, personalistic tendencies, and
other characteristics. Party systems vary greatly on the degree of institutionalization.
According to Mainwaring and Scully, “An institutionalized party system implies stability in interparty competition, the existence of parties that have somewhat stable roots in society, acceptance of parties and elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who governs, and party organizations with reasonably stable rules and structures (1995, 1). At the time of their publication, they classified Bolivia as having an inchoate or weakly institutionalized party system, but noted it was showing signs of greater institutionalization.

**Functions of Political Parties**

Political parties organize citizen preferences into shared interest groups and facilitate the communication of those preferences to government decision makers. In most cases, parties assume positions on a variety of issues along an ideological continuum. Voters and parties place different weight on issues and party systems typically settle around one or more of these divides. Ideologies serve as shortcuts for voters allowing them to adopt positions rather than formulate their own stance, identify a candidate’s position on issues, and determine the distance between their position and a candidate or party (Downs 1957; Ordeshook 1976). A party system organized around ideology is necessary to build party labels and identification.

When voters are able to identify and differentiate parties and their positions, parties can serve to increase representation, responsiveness, and accountability in democracies. Key identifies obtaining “popular consent to the course of public policy” as a primary function of political parties (1958, 12). Political parties serve as the channel through which constituents can influence the policy agenda and provide a governing
mandate to those who commit to that agenda. They also offer a representative target for accountability where voters can compare the pre-electoral promises of a party to the post-electoral performance when contemplating their vote in the next election (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). A high quality of democratic representation can be achieved when political parties build a reputation for pursuing programs and platforms that are recognizable by voters. Political parties are the primary facilitator in a democracy for “integrating diverse social forces within democratic institutions, channeling and processing societal demands, regulating sociopolitical conflict, defining public policy alternatives, and holding government officials accountable to the citizenry” (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 575).

**Origins of Parties**

While democracy is dependent upon the existence of political parties, explanations for their existence are varied. Theories fall into two primary sets of explanations: social cleavages and institutional characteristics. This section identifies the primary explanations provided by researchers for the existence of political parties and the emergence of new parties into a party system.

**Social Cleavages**

The first group of theories focuses on the social characteristics of society. Social cleavages are groups within society that are conscious of a collective identity that is based on socially defined differences (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Gallaher, Laver, and Mair 1992). As the springboard for the social cleavage explanations, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that variations in party systems are a result of underlying social cleavages
in society. In their argument, they identify four sets of social cleavages from which political parties in Western societies can trace their roots. The first cleavage pits the center or dominant culture against a periphery or subject culture. Another social cleavage structure revolves around the role of the church in the state. The third social cleavage identified by Lipset and Rokkan is that of the primary and secondary economies that traditionally sort into those in industry versus those in agriculture. The final social structure is the class based cleavage of worker versus employer. These cleavages can be cross-cutting in that not one cleavage exclusively demarks a single group, but that members of that group can also identify with other cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that Western political parties are rooted in the social cleavages that existed during the party system development. They argue that the party system became “frozen” around these cleavages and continued to be structured this way into the future. These arguments led to a long line of theoretical research explaining characteristics of party systems as a result of social cleavage structure (Beyme 1985; Nohlen and Cotarelo 1981; Rokkan 1970).

The transition from social cleavage to political party requires that social cleavages overcome the collective action problem facing their group given that many political gains are collective goods (Olson 1965; Rose and Urwin 1970). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are clear that not all social cleavages provide the foundations of political parties. They present “thresholds” that explain variations across party systems concerning the politicization of cleavages. These thresholds are identified as legitimacy, majority power, incorporation, and representation. Legitimacy covers whether opposition movements are viewed as legitimate by the government while majority power serves as a measure of
whether there are checks on the powers of the majority. Incorporation covers the citizenship rights of differing cleavages and representation measures whether a cleavage can access power on its own or must join an existing political cleavage. According to Lipset and Rokkan, these thresholds work together in varying combinations to result in differing party systems structures around the world. Gallagher et al. (1992) continue this reasoning by providing a set of coding criteria to identify politically relevant cleavages within society. A social cleavage is politically relevant when there are social bases identifiable by distinct social characteristics and members of a certain cleavage have a collective identity that separates them from members of other cleavages. The cleavages provide an organizational structure that unifies differing sides of the cleavage.

This project is particularly interested in the social cleavage of ethnicity. Scholars argue that party systems will utilize group-based social hierarchies, including ethnicity, in the formation of political parties (Horowitz 1985; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sidanius 1999). According to Horowitz (1985), ethnic affiliations can permeate all realms of social, political, and economic organization in some countries. This potential is conditioned by the severity of the division, the hierarchical nature of social groups, the centralization of groups, and the presence of descriptive differences among groups. Across these measures, ethnicity in Latin America is not as divisive as in some other parts of the world, but indigenous groups have been made distinct since the colonization period. As noted in the introduction, indigenous identity still conditions the opportunities available to a person. In most countries, the indigenous population retains its native languages, works predominantly in the agricultural sector, dresses in distinct apparel, and
resides in rural communities. The degree of distinction varies among countries in the region, but there is baseline recognition of difference.

By Horowitz’s theory, ethnic conflict “arises from the common evaluative significance accorded by the groups to the acknowledged group differences and then played out in rituals of affirmation and contradiction” (227). Groups compare their relative worth and legitimacy to other ethnic groups and the gap between their experience and what they feel entitled to serves as a source of ethnic conflict. In certain situations, this conflict can be channeled into ethnic political parties. Horowitz (1985) argues that these parties surface in situations where there is a community aspect to ethnicity that links members, when external pressures make group identity even more important, and when politicians have incentives to cultivate ethnic support. Previous to the emergence of indigenous political parties, politicians would emphasize cross-cutting cleavages like class in order to persuade the indigenous vote to their party. This made the need for indigenous political parties obsolete. However, something changed in some countries during the 1990s that activated the ethnic cleavage and resulted in indigenous political parties. Explanations for indigenous political parties that rest on the existence of social cleavages seek to identify the social conditions that reactivated this cleavage and upped to the incentives for the formation of indigenous political parties.

**Social Explanations for Indigenous Political Party Emergence**

Indigenous political party scholars have identified the size of indigenous population, regional concentration of that population, and relative depravation as
explanations for indigenous party emergence in some countries and not others. They have also acknowledged that these factors work together to politicize the ethnic cleavage.

The social conditions literature hypothesizes that the number of indigenous persons should have a significant impact on their ability to mobilize into political parties (Madrid 2005, 2008; Yashar 2005). Larger populations provide a larger potential constituency base that should encourage the development of political parties around that constituency. Essentially, the larger the indigenous population, the harder it is to ignore. However, other scholars have argued that the relative size of the indigenous population is irrelevant (Van Cott 2005). Most arguments concerning the size of the indigenous population as a factor in the emergence and success of indigenous parties is founded in the comparative survey conclusion that countries with the largest indigenous populations had the earliest indigenous parties and the most successful. Bolivia and Ecuador both have large indigenous populations who became very active during the 1990s. Questions have been lobbied against this assumption concerning the lack of viable indigenous parties in Peru with its large indigenous population and the relative success of indigenous parties in small indigenous population countries like Colombia.

An additional social factor that seems to alleviate some of this disparity is the degree of regional concentration of an indigenous group. If the indigenous population is dispersed throughout a country, it should be more difficult for them to notice their common grievances and organize. This references the strengthening of a community identity that was vital in Horowitz’s explanations for ethnic parties. In Latin America, Van Cott (2005) says that “although there are hundreds of distinct groups within the indigenous category, since the 1970s they have increasingly worked together and share a
common identity by virtue of their common ethnic oppression and socioeconomic exploitation” (12). Yashar (1998; 2005) asserts that connections among the indigenous population, both within country and region-wide, were first built at the local level and then spread into other areas. If an indigenous population is regionally concentrated, there are fewer barriers to organization and mobilization around shared grievances.

In addition to a large, concentrated indigenous population, the literature rooted in social cleavages expects that more inequality between the indigenous peoples and other population groups will translate into greater likelihood of indigenous party emergence. As Van Cott (2005) argues, “An ethnic party’s emergence requires the existence of an ethnic cleavage and the politicization of that cleavage, which most often occurs where access to public and private goods is determined by ethnicity” (7). Throughout Latin America, indigenous identity has historically proven detrimental to one’s chances for economic prosperity. Relative deprivation theory argues that economic and political grievances can stimulate group organization and mobilization (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970). Discrimination against the indigenous population is theorized to serve as a common thread capable of uniting different indigenous groups. It is possible that localized discrimination stimulated mobilization in specific districts which then spread to other parts of the country experiencing similar problems. The recognition of mutual problems and potential for political voice could encourage the development of indigenous political parties. When economic grievances cross ethnic cleavages, they can serve to unite different sectors of the population behind an indigenous party and contribute to their electoral success (Madrid 2012). For example, Madrid (2008) contributes the emergence and subsequent success of MAS in Bolivia to six social criteria including a large
indigenous population, strong ties to other indigenous organizations, symbolic rhetoric and appeals to indigenous, and a platform attractive to a wide indigenous population.

One line of criticism directed towards social cleavage explanations of ethnic party formation centers on the explanatory power beyond Western party systems. These theories were formulated using observations on a limited number of cases in one geographic location. Chhibber and Petrocik (1989) reconcile the weak link between India’s numerous social cleavages and the small number of parties by changing the unit of analysis to lower political levels rather than the federal government. They find that support for the Congress party is strong and homogenous among social cleavages at the community or regional level. Despite the seemingly weakness of social cleavages to explain national party level formation and support, the theory remains strong at lower levels of analysis. Chapter 4 of this project examines the support of MAS at the district level to assess the role played by social cleavages in garnering voter support.

**Institutional Explanations**

The second line of theoretical explanations for party system characteristics centers on institutional explanations. According to Stokes (1999), institutional explanations arose, at least partially, in response to the inability of the social cleavage literature to provide a definitive answer concerning why some cleavages politicized while others did not. For example, Lijphart (1979) compares religion, language, and social class cleavages in four countries. He concludes that religion is the most important and lasting factor in political party choice with language as the second most influential and class a distant third. However, other studies provide conflicting reports on the most important
contributing factor to party system structure (Alford 1963; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976; Rose and Urwin 1969). Institutional scholars responded to this confusion by providing explanations for new political party formation and party system structure based on the institutional framework within a country.

Electoral rules regulate access to political competition, define the conditions in which candidates compete for office, and establish the method of converting votes into offices or seats (Carey and Shugart 1995). Institutional differences in electoral rules include ballot structure, ballot control, electoral threshold, vote pooling, electoral formula, district magnitude, and multiple tiers. These variations structure the incentives of both political actors and voters and affect the number of political parties and the entry of new parties into a party system.

The propositions made by Maurice Duverger in his 1951 work *Political Parties* (2nd English Edition 1959) spurred the examination of electoral rules effects on party systems. Duverger posited that single-member districts with plurality electoral systems lead to party systems with two political parties. This is known as Duverger’s Law. He also hypothesized that proportional representation rules and dual ballot systems were the main force behind systems with multiple parties. These outcomes are a result of mechanical and psychological factors working together to influence the strategy of political actors and voters.

The mechanical effects arise from the method used to covert votes into seats. The “formulaic structure” of the electoral system affects the strategy of parties (Cox 1997; 60). In single-member districts, two parties emerge as dominant through coordination assumptions that affect the strategic entry of parties (Cox 1999). Larger parties are often
over-represented during the translation of votes to seats under plurality or majoritarian electoral rules, which leaves smaller parties underrepresented. For this reason, majoritarian and plurality electoral rules are considered strong and less permissive than proportional representation systems (Cox 1997; Sartori 1976).

The psychological factor structures incentives for voters and party elites in anticipation of the mechanical effect (Blais and Carty 1991; Duverger 1951). If political elites agree that only two parties have a chance to win because of a strong electoral system, then parties and candidates on the same side of the ideological spectrum will have incentives to coordinate before the election in order to meet short-term election goals (Cox 1999). This pre-electoral coordination results in fewer parties as those willing to sacrifice long-term political goals will join with others to achieve short-term gains. Even when smaller parties decide to compete, the anticipation of the mechanical effect causes voters to view a vote for a third party as wasted. If voters can identify the two parties that have a chance of winning, their incentive to vote for other parties decreases. The mechanical and psychological factors work together to result in a two-party system under single-member district majoritarian rules.

The most consistent and important mechanical effect on the number of parties has been identified as district magnitude (Benoit 2001; Lijphart 1994, 1999; Rae 1971; Taagerpera and Shugart 1989, 1993). Duverger’s single-member districts have the lowest possible district magnitude of one seat per district. More proportional electoral systems will have more seats distributed per district. Mechanical and psychological effects work together to make it harder for smaller parties to gather votes and win seats in situations with lower district magnitudes because there is only one winner. Cox (1997) contributed
a formula for calculating the number of viable number of parties as district magnitude plus one. One side effect of this relationship is that lower district magnitudes should encourage large political parties to prevent splintering and encourage small parties to merge together and pool their constituents for greater electoral strength resulting in a smaller number of political parties (Coppedge 1997). Cox (1997) interpreted Duverger’s law to suggest that district magnitude provides an upper-bound on the number of electoral parties, but without social cleavages, the number of parties will remain small.

Other institutional characteristics noted for influencing the odds of new political party entrance include the internal party organization and nomination structure. The more accessible the nomination system of established parties, the more likely groups and factions will join existing parties rather than form their own (Cox 1997; Epstein 1986). If a group can secure a position within an existing party, it is in their best interest to do so because of the high costs of forming a new political party and the advantages that come with name recognition.

Political organization occurs at many levels of government and some institutional theories focus on linking local coordination with the national party structure. Cox (1997) argues that any analysis of national party system structure should include an understanding and analysis of the characteristics of local party systems. One way scholars assess local party structure is by looking at the district magnitude of individual districts rather than the average district magnitude used when predicting national party system structure. Another consideration at the district or regional level that should affect the number of national level parties is the effective electoral threshold within a district. The
higher the local electoral threshold, the more likely it is for a group to merge into an
existing party rather than form their own (Epstein 1986; Cox 1997).

Following the district focus, the level of decentralization in a country is also
hypothesized to shape the characteristics of the party system. Chhibber and Kollman
(1998) find that increased political and economic centralization reduces the number of
national political parties when a single-member district electoral structure is used.
Inversely, Samuels and Abrucio (2000) argues that Brazil has more national parties than
parties competitive in any given local level party system because of high fiscal
decentralization increases the incentives for a group to form a political party to gain
control of local resources. The party may have no intention of linking into a national
party, but the local incentives created because of decentralization are great enough to
stimulate political party formation.

**Institutional Explanations for Indigenous Political Party Emergence**

Scholars identify characteristics of the institutional environment as a reason for
indigenous political party emergence. Changes to electoral systems that result in higher
district magnitude are credited with being favorable to indigenous political party
emergence (Rice and Van Cott 2006). Bolivia has undergone several changes to its
electoral system during its democratic period. Most notably, in 1994 it began to utilize a
personalized proportional representation system where half the legislature is elected via
proportional representation and half is elected by plurality vote in single-member
districts. This raised the average district magnitude of the national legislature but as
discussed shortly the incentive structure may perform differently in mixed-member systems.

Another institutional explanation for indigenous political parties provided by the literature is that regional level elections will increase their probability of emergence. Van Cott (2005) found that indigenous parties often start at the district level and work their way up through the political system. Rice and Van Cott (2006) accredit both a regional diffusion effect and the creation of new electoral districts as reasons for indigenous party emergence. The expectation is that people notice when their neighbors experience similar problems that relate to their own problems. They talk and organize with one another and then submit a candidate to a lower level election. Indigenous organizations gain institutional knowledge of the democratic system and gain confidence in their ability to pursue higher offices in an effect similar to Putnam’s theory of social capital (1994; 2000).

Rice and Van Cott (2006) argue that in the time before the emergence of indigenous parties, the relationship between the indigenous and political parties took three forms. The first from was a patron-client relationship with traditional parties. The next relationship involved populist parties who “attracted indigenous voters by offering economic changes that appeal to their class interests, and by attacking—at least rhetorically—the dominance of traditional elites” (713). The final and dominant form was between the indigenous and leftist parties that saw the indigenous as potential voting blocs in rural areas. They argue that none of these relationships were particularly fulfilling for indigenous voters and the traditional parties lost support throughout the region for various reasons. Van Cott (2003) theorizes that loss of left party support
worked with other institutional characteristics like increased decentralization and unpopular government policies to explain the entrance and success of indigenous political parties in the 2002 elections. Rice and Van Cott (2006) argue “that a higher vote share for political parties of the Left, which reflects the salience of class-based identities in society, would decrease the likelihood of indigenous party emergence and success” (721). They argue that as the left lost popularity, indigenous had to look elsewhere for a political party to represent them. Rice and Van Cott (2006) measure both indigenous party emergence and success and they find evidence that leftist dominance significantly and negatively impacts success, but their findings on emergence, while in the same direction, were insignificant.

**Recognition of Interactive Relationship**

The emphasis on institutional explanations for party system characteristics was stimulated at its foundations by the theories of Duverger. However, Clark and Golder (2006) argue that contributions made by Duverger have been misinterpreted by institutional scholars. They argue that Duverger viewed electoral institutions as a mediating force between social cleavages and party systems. Social dimensions in Western Europe were activated through the expansion of franchise and industrialization and contributed to the number of political parties. More recent scholars have tried to capture the effect of both sets of explanations on party system characteristics. According to Cox (1997), multiple parties are the product of both many exploitable social cleavages and a permissive electoral system. The electoral system places an upper limit on the number of parties but the number will remain small without social cleavages.
Powell (1982) created an additive model of ethnic heterogeneity and electoral permissiveness to explain the number of parties in a mostly European sample. He concluded that higher numbers of political parties are related to both non-majoritarian electoral laws and social heterogeneity, but discouraged by presidential systems. This was a big step in including both sets of explanations but received critique because the additive nature of the model positioned the two sets of explanations as an either/or situation. Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) theorize that the effective number of national parties is a result of the interaction between social heterogeneity and the permissiveness of electoral system. The use of an interaction between social conditions and institutional characteristics attempts to reconcile the divergent theoretical paths but still faces weaknesses in its application to specific cases.

**Weaknesses of These Explanations**

The social conditions and institutional characteristics of a country provide significant explanatory value to the question of why and how many political parties exist in the party system. However, there are certain weaknesses in both sets of explanations when imposing them onto Latin American party systems.

The social cleavage set of explanations has difficulty in explaining indigenous political parties in Latin America because most party systems were established before ethnicity become politicized in the region. In fact, in Dix (1989) noted the absence of ethnicity as a traditional social cleavage in Latin America. According to Dix (1989), only Chile and Argentina developed party systems in a process similar to the Western countries that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) used to support their theory. The same three
political parties controlled the Bolivian party system from the revolution in 1952 until the
democratization period of the 1980s. The party system in Bolivia was ‘frozen’ long
before indigenous identity became a politicized cleavage.

The institutional set of explanations also has weaknesses in application to the
region. Specifically, the traditional institutional variables fail to hold the explanatory
value found in other regions of the world (Morgenstern and Vázquez-D’Elia 2007). For
example, Coppedge (1997) finds that the psychological and mechanical effects of district
magnitude are significant in the region, but pale in comparison to the effects of
underlying social patterns and cleavages. In their study, Mainwaring and Shugart note the
“surprising insignificance” of district magnitude in explaining the number of parties
(1997, 417). One reason for this is the relative lack of pure single-member districts in the
region. Additional electoral tiers were added to many electoral systems during the
democratization period to increase proportionality.

Given the weakness of traditional variables in the region, other institutional
explanations have been added to explain party system characteristics. The concurrence of
executive and legislative elections has been found to reduce the number of competing
parties in an election (Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Shugart and Carey
1992; Shugart 1995). Party adaptability has also been offered as an explanation. Party
adaptability is a political party’s capacity to adapt to opportunities and challenges posed
by the institutional environment (Morgenstern and Vázquez-D’Elia 2007). Lower levels
of party system institutionalization have been found to enhance a party’s ability to adapt
during a crisis and survive shifting party loyalties (Levitsky 2003). A party’s ability to
adapt is also a result of the internal party organizational structure (Coppedge 2001;
Levitsky 2001, 2003). Party organizations change slowly and it is likely that a “party will be sidelined in volatile electoral climate” with the primary mechanism of change being new parties rather than reform (Coppedge 2001, 199).

As mentioned earlier, mixed member electoral systems became popular during the democratization period. In these systems, some proportion of the legislature is elected through single-member plurality elections while another part is elected through proportional representation rules. These institutional design differences structure incentives and party behavior in different ways than hypothesized by the traditional institutional explanations. Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) classify mixed-member systems into mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. In an MMP design, the two electoral tiers are linked during seat distribution. Consideration is given to the proportionality of the entire legislature whereas in a MMM system, the two tiers are independent of one another.

There are two views on how mixed-member systems structure incentives and the behavior of political actors (Ferrara and Herron 2005). One school of thought argues that incentive structures are independent of one another in each tier (Moser 1999; Reed 1999). Therefore, incentives are structured in the predicted way given the electoral rules that govern each tier. The other school thought argues that mixed-member systems have a contamination effect that creates a unique environment (Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron 2002). Studies across a diverse set of case have shown that having candidates on the SMD ballot in a district boosts the performance of the party PR list in that district (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara 2004; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Parties have an incentive to compete in as many single member districts as possible thus contaminating
the reduction effect on the number of parties typically ascribed to single-member plurality districts.

Ferrara and Herron (2005) present several institutional incentives that might counteract this process and discourage parties from running in every SMD. They argue that “pre-electoral coordination is believed to be relatively more beneficial to parties in dual-ballot mixed systems, in systems where the majoritarian component dominates the election, in systems where the presence of a PR threshold threatens the viability of small parties, and in districts where the corresponding PR district magnitude is low” (2005, 19). In single-ballot systems, the vote cast for a political party in the SMD election is also a vote for the party’s list and thus it is in a party’s best interest not to coordinate with other parties and run on as many ballots as possible. MMP systems provide minimal incentives for pre-electoral alliances among parties because the outcome in the SMD tier does not determine the maximum number of seats acquired (Moser 2001). Benoit (2001) argues that electoral systems with majority-runoff or majority-plurality rules discourage pre-electoral coordination among parties until after the first round of election and thus the number of parties remains larger than under a majority system with plurality rules.

The share of seats distributed through the majoritarian districts also affects the likelihood of pre-electoral coordination. A larger percentage of legislative seats distributed by these rules compared to the proportional rules will increase the incentives of parties to coordinate (Ferrara and Herron 2005). Similarly, as the vote threshold needed to receive seats through the PR districts increases, incentives to coordinate also increase. Bolivia has undergone several institutional changes in the life-span of indigenous movements, but for illustration purposes, it should be noted that in the 2002
election, Bolivia operated under a MMP system with dual ballots where 52 percent of the seats in the legislature were distributed through single-member plurality elections and there was a 3 percent vote threshold in the SMDs to be eligible to receive PR seats with a district magnitude ranging from 2 to 15. A discussion of how these institutional variations structured incentives in the 2002 election is a central part of Chapter 4 and will be discussed in more detail there.

**Incomplete Picture: Role of Context**

The two theoretical lines provided to explain party system characteristics, including the number of parties and the strategic entry of new parties, suffer weaknesses. Their explanatory power loses some value when applied to Latin American party systems. The social and institutional sets of explanations offer an incomplete picture when used explain the emergence of indigenous political parties. Indigenous political parties emerged in some countries and not others despite similar social cleavage structures and institutional designs. I argue that these sets of explanations factor into the translation of indigenous movements to political parties, but the contextual factors of economic recession and decentralization policies during the 1980s and 1990s were instrumental in raising incentives for indigenous groups to make the leap to political parties. Long-term changes in the social conditions of indigenous peoples raised the mobilization capacity of indigenous groups. The mobilization capacity was higher in countries where indigenous peoples gained access to education, economic opportunity, and the vote earlier than their counterparts in other countries. These socio-economic gains facilitated the building of indigenous networks that united people behind an
indigenous identity and lowered organizational costs when economic threats caused by the recession stimulated groups to seize political space. Traditional institutional factors such as political volatility and democratization helped to create a favorable environment, but the key explanation is that these changes occurred simultaneously with the economic recession, coca eradication efforts, and decentralization policies.

**Indigenous Mobilization**

There are three primary ways to view ethnic identity and its role in shaping politics. For primordialists, ethnic identity is inherent in all actors and is the lens through which their actions and affiliations are filtered. Different political contexts can suppress the importance of ethnic identity, but it will always be there and its importance can resurface. On the other hand, instrumentalists argue that while ethnic differences may exist in a society, ethnicity becomes important when political leaders view the mobilization of ethnic identity as a way to gain political or economic benefits. Ethnicity is one of many instruments actors can use to mobilize. Poststructuralists or constructivists view the importance of ethnic identity as socially constructed. Actors have multiple identities that may be activated at any time. Their primary identity may be renegotiated in response to social, political, and economic conditions.

The traditional social cleavage explanations for party system characteristics operate primarily from a primordial view that if ethnicity is an important social cleavage during the development of the party system, it will remain a divisor among political parties. However, the party systems of Latin America did not form around indigenous identity as an organizer. Indigenous political parties emerged following the
democratization period of the 1980s. This period was characterized by political liberalization and the expansion of citizenship, but in varying degrees (O’Donnell 1994). The entrance of indigenous movements and parties during or following this period lends the explanations to a more instrumentalist or poststructuralist view of the politicization of ethnicity. Following this line of thought, indigenous groups were present in the region since before colonialism, but the varying role of indigenous identity in the political system is explained by the differing experiences and degrees of indigenous mobilization within countries.

Tarrow (1998) argues that contentious politics with social movements emerge in response to changes in political opportunities and structures. He states that “contention is more closely related to opportunities for and limited by constraints upon collective action than by persistent social or economic factors that people experience” (71). Changes in political opportunity are sparked by shocks to the system. These shocks can eventually become persistent factors that shape future parameters or they can be short-term events whose effects fundamentally change the system. Tarrow identifies changes in political opportunity as including increased political access, changing partisan alignments, divisions among elites, and state repression. In response to these changes in political opening, contention can emerge and translate into sustained action and a social movement when based on dense social networks and connections.

McAdam identifies the source of changing political opportunities as “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (1982, 41). McAdam et al. (1996) subsequently refine political opportunity to four dimensions that include the relative openness of the
political system, the stability of the established political elite structure, the presence of allies among the political elites, and the state’s capacity for repression. One of the primary sources of changing political opportunities relevant to indigenous social movements and political parties rests on their incorporation into the political system through citizenship. Suffrage was expanded to indigenous groups in the region at differing times and in varying degrees. Indigenous peoples in Bolivia were given the right to vote following the 1952 Revolution whereas indigenous peoples in several other countries were not granted this right until much later. Access to universal suffrage was even delayed even further for some indigenous populations because of literacy requirements. Guatemala removed literacy requirements in 1945, but Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil kept them in places until the 1970s and 1980s (Yashar 2005). The expansion of suffrage brings critical changes to both the state and the newly incorporated population.

The introduction of universal suffrage changes the structure of partisan competition. The constituency for which political parties compete is fundamentally altered through expansion. Rokkan (1970) credits the introduction of proportional representation systems in Europe to the expansion of the vote and the incentive for established groups to protect their positions while incorporating new voters. This changes the incentive structure that shapes strategic coordination and new party entrance. The magnitude of change from the expansion of the voting population is dependent upon the proportion of the total population that is newly incorporated. In Latin American countries where the indigenous population constitutes at least a plurality of the population, traditional political parties had to respond to incorporate this new constituency.
Yashar (2005) credits changing citizenship regimes with the mobilization of indigenous groups in Latin America. Corporatist citizenship regimes where the government structures the representation between social groups and the state were common in Latin American countries from the 1950s through the democratization period. These regimes incorporated the new indigenous constituency by creating incentives for them to register as peasant organizations to gain access to land. Yashar (2005) argues that these corporatist citizenship regimes had the unintended consequence of prepared indigenous groups for political mobilization because reforms “recognized Indians’ freedom from elite control, recatalogued Indians as peasants, and as such, granted them rights and access previously denied to them” (61). In the 1980s, Latin American countries shifted to a neo-liberal citizenship regime where political and civil rights were protected but social rights were cut in exchange for an emphasis on the individual (Yashar 2005, 49). According to Yashar (2005), the shift served to activate the social networks within the indigenous population that had been created and supported during the corporatist regimes. Indigenous movements mobilized in attempts to redefine the content of citizenship to include group rights in addition to individual rights. These social movements served as the foundations of the region’s indigenous political parties.

Public education systems also became popular in the region during the early 20th century as a way to “establish the foundations of the nation and citizenship” under the supervision and control of the landed elite (Torres and Puiggros 1995, 5). The main purpose of education was indoctrination into the social order, and access to education was limited to those already in favorable standings in the social order. The educational systems were systematically designed to exclude indigenous children (Lopez 2009).
Assimilation of the indigenous population eventually became popular in some countries and education was expanded to include indigenous children. However, the goals of rural schools were assimilation so instruction was typically in Spanish and centered on socializing the children into “civilized” culture (Lopez 2009). Despite the ulterior motives, educational reforms were able to advance indigenous literacy rates. Gaps between the literacy rates of indigenous and non-indigenous still exist but are much smaller than before the introduction of public education. Education expanded the opportunities available to indigenous peoples. Mono-lingual instruction in the country’s official language is frowned upon from a cultural preservation perspective and bilingual education is still a demand made by the region’s indigenous populations. However, the ability to speak in a shared language facilitated the expansion of indigenous social networks beyond the family and community level.

The indigenous population has original claims to the region’s territory, but the colonial period took the land and placed it into the hands of a few. Most countries established a hacienda style system where arable land was owned by a few families and the native populations served as the labor force, often from no choice of their own. Land reform and redistribution policies became popular in some countries around the 1960s. During that time, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil all enacted some degree of land redistribution in response to the pressures from below (Janvry and Sadoulet 1989). These policies distributed property owned by the powerful landlords to family or communal groups with the intention stimulating the modernization process. The policies were conducted in different ways by governments and lasted for various lengths of time. In some situations, governments created an organizational
structure to facilitate communication between the new land owners and the government. In countries where these peasant farmer’s organizations were formed and encouraged by the government, the newly landed indigenous peoples built community networks through their membership in these organizations that provided resources necessary for mobilization.

Following resource mobilization theory, social cleavages with grievances against the state will form a social movement when they gain access to sufficient resources. Resources include knowledge and experience, solidarity, legitimacy, and internal or external support from elites (McCarthy and Zald 1977). By Yashar’s account, the state through corporatist citizenship regimes supplied some indigenous populations with resources necessary to stimulate action when those resources were threatened by the state. Reforms expanding the education and economic opportunities of indigenous peoples were introduced in varying degrees at different times from country to country. The established political elite responded to changes in the incentive structure by expanding or restricting indigenous access to these resources. This follows the expectation gap in relative deprivation theory where groups compare their political, social, or economic resources to what previously belonged to the group, to what other groups have, and what is realistic for the group to expect to have (Gurr 1970). When neo-liberal reforms where included in the democratization period of the 1980s, organizational resources previously awarded to indigenous groups were restricted. However, the restriction of resources served to mobilize indigenous population rather than quell their mobilization ability. The mobilization capacity of an indigenous population factors into their ability to form indigenous political parties. Those groups who already had access to
resources and were mobilized around shared grievances were more prepared to form political parties when the economic and political context became favorable.

**Economic Pressures**

Fluctuations in economic factors such as unemployment, inflation, growth, and recession are theorized to affect the shape of the political system. Citizens’ satisfaction with economic performance directly affects their support of the government (Lewis-Beck 1988). Voters are known to vote retrospectively in democracies by using the election as report card on the ruling party’s economic performance. Strom and Lipset (1984) find a relationship between inflation and incumbent vote share while Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1990) also provide support for inflation and add unemployment. The “lost decade” of the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s created an unfavorable political environment for the ruling political parties in Latin America. Governments turned to the International Monetary Fund for loans to help recovery, but the loans were conditional upon unpopular neo-liberal reforms. These austerity reforms cut many social programs some of which provided protections to the structurally disadvantaged indigenous populations. If these programs were cut in states where the indigenous population was already mobilizing, this struggling economic period served to further exacerbate their grievances.

The economic struggles also strengthened the relationship between the United States and countries in the region. The US offered economic advice and financial assistance to countries that was often conditional on their pursuance of policies in the United States’ interests. This became particularly important in the Andean countries of South America where unemployment and economic recession coupled with growing
international cocaine demand to create a lucrative drug industry. The coca leaf holds a traditional place of honor in many of South America’s indigenous cultures. The crop has been cultivated for decades without incidence, but when cocaine gained international popularity during the 1970s and 1980s, coca leaf cultivation became one of the few healthy and profitable economic sectors in the Andean countries. However, in light of the growing crack cocaine problem in the US, the United States government launched an international drug eradication program that conditioned their assistance on the domestic eradication efforts of the recipient country. Indigenous peoples seeking profitable employment had already turned to the cultivation of their traditional crop, thus efforts to eradicate the cultivation of the coca leaf was not viewed as an attack on their culture as well as their livelihood.

**Electoral Changes**

In addition to economic difficulties, the 1980s were characterized by the return of democracy to much of the region. Following decades of authoritarian and military rule, Latin American governments began to politically liberalize. The quality of democracy that returned to the region is debated (O’Donnell 1994), but the process was characterized by significant institutional changes including increased electoral volatility and decentralization. These institutional variations created political space for indigenous political parties where the social and economic context had mobilized the indigenous population.

In many countries, the political parties that were active before democracy returned remained competitive. However, the region’s elections were characterized by significant
electoral volatility. Electoral volatility, defined as the change in vote shares of individual political parties from election to election, was very high in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Roberts and Wibbels (1999), the mean electoral volatility in the congressional elections of 16 countries was 19.6 in the 1980s and 23.2 in the 1990s. This degree of shifting party loyalties represents a loosening of the party system and an opportunity for new parties to become competitive. Remmer (1991) credits the poor economic performance during the ‘lost decade’ for electoral volatility and anti-incumbent voting in the region.

Roberts and Wibbels (1999) agree that electoral volatility was a function of short-term economic fluctuations, but add institutional fragility and fluid cleavage structures. In their study, they find that institutions have a strong effect on electoral volatility, but note that the class cleavage structure is not as strong a predictor as expected. They credit this to the fact that most of the region’s historic labor parties collapsed, weakened, or became to sponsors of neo-liberal market reforms. Rice and Van Cott (2006) argue that this loss in left party support was vital to the emergence of indigenous political parties. The traditional left voters were left without a party to vote for and they turned their loyalty to new parties.

Several countries in the region also began decentralizing government power in response to social pressures. O’Neill (2003) argues that in the face of diminishing national level popularity, Latin American political parties instituted decentralization reforms with the hope that they could retain popularity and relevance at the sub-national level. Between 1980 and 1995, the number of countries in the region with direct election of mayors increased from 3 to 17 (Montero and Samuels 2004). Countries vary on the
amount of power and resources directed to the newly elected levels of government, but most countries in the region instituted decentralization policies during this period.

The increased opportunity for government involvement is important to the emergence of indigenous political parties in countries where indigenous groups are geographically concentrated. The geographic location of party supporters is important in explaining party success in districts (Sartori 1968). According to the Minorities at Risk dataset, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela had highly geographically concentrated indigenous populations during this time period while Chile, Guatemala, and Peru had relatively less group concentration (Gurr 1995). If decentralization policies awarded actual political power to regional governments in areas with a mobilized indigenous population, indigenous organizations would have an incentive to compete in the elections. The process of nominating a candidate, building support, designing a platform, running a campaign, and accepting the results provides important democratic experience and knowledge useful in future democratic encounters (Finkel and Smith 2011; Lindberg 2006; Mattes and Bratton 2007). This democratic knowledge coupled with strengthening indigenous networks and increasing indigenous grievances contributed to creating a situation where incentives lured indigenous groups into the political party system.

**Conclusion**

The field has contributed two primary sets of explanations for the structure of party systems and the entrance of new political parties. One set of explanations rests on party systems reflecting activated social cleavages within a society following the theories
of Lipset and Rokkan (1970). The other set of explanations focus on the institutional designs that set the rules of the democratic game. Variations in electoral rules are argued to shape the incentive structure of political actors and account for party system characteristics (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997). Both sets of explanations carry significant weight in tests throughout world, but have weaknesses when applied to Latin American party systems and questions on indigenous political party emergence. Ethnicity was absent as an organizing social cleavage during the formation of the region’s party systems thus theories for indigenous political party emergence have to explain ethnicity’s entrance as a factor rather than start with its importance. While significant institutional variations have occurred within countries, indigenous political parties emerged and did not emerge in countries with very similar institutional designs.

These weaknesses coupled with the region-wide wave of indigenous political parties suggest that traditional explanations provide an incomplete picture of indigenous party formation. This project theorizes that the context within countries conditions the effect of traditional factors on incentive structures. In some countries, unfavorable policies passed in response to economic difficulties were met by a mobilized and networked indigenous population prepared to protest in defense of their interests. Governments responded to growing public pressures with institutional reforms that decentralized power and increased proportionality. This raised the incentives and lowered obstacles for new party entrance. Mobilized indigenous populations responded accordingly. The next chapter demonstrates the role of the changing context in explaining the emergence of indigenous political parties through a case study of Bolivia.
CHAPTER 3: INDIGENOUS PARTY EMERGENCE IN BOLIVIA

“We the native indigenous are happy because finally we can say that we have grabbed the baton from the central government and demanded our legitimate rights and we have that now.”

Explanations for the characteristics of political party systems have generally followed two theoretical lines: characteristics of social cleavages and variations in institutional design. These explanations have most success in explaining Western and institutionalized party systems. Latin American party systems offer multiple versions of mixed member electoral rules as well as varying degrees of institutionalization. These differences have forced scholars to expand their theories concerning party system characteristics. One specific area where traditional theoretical lines provide an incomplete explanation is in the emergence of indigenous political parties. This is because the traditional explanations simplify, or ignore, the contextual environment in which party systems exist. Indigenous political parties emerged and failed to emerge in countries with similar social cleavage structures and institutional variations. Contextual factors including economic recession, coca eradication, and decentralization policies fill in the explanation gaps and provide a more complete picture of the entrance of indigenous political parties.

Bolivia in Context

This chapter demonstrates the importance of context in a case study of Bolivia. Bolivia experienced a wave of indigenous political parties in the 1990s that culminated in the emergence of Movimiento al Socialismo, Latin America’s most electorally successful

---

3 Aquilino Jujra, Representativa of CONAMAQ Interview 8/4/11 in La Paz, Bolivia
political party organized around indigenous identity. The social, economic, and political context in Bolivia went through significant changes to create an environment where indigenous political parties flourished. Within the social context, the indigenous population was liberated following revolutionary reforms and co-opted government organizations as their own. The Bolivian economy experienced significant recession during the 1980s that pushed people to the illegal but lucrative cash crop of coca leaves. The government response to economic pressures further mobilized the indigenous population and policies of decentralization and increased proportionality provided the opportunity for the indigenous population to participate directly as a political party.

Indigenous Social Mobilization

The 1952 Bolivian Revolution was a failed one by most standards. Lasting democracy did not come to Bolivia until the 1980’s. The social structure remained intact with indigenous populations in a disadvantaged position. It had none of the immediate transformative outcomes of the great revolutions as identified by Skocpol (1979). The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) regime that assumed control following the revolution was a strange coupling of social radicals, in the form of miners and peasants, conservative nationalists, and career politicians from Bolivia’s past (Whitehead 2003). MNR enacted three major reforms that stimulated massive changes to the Bolivian social structure and set the foundation for Bolivia’s indigenous population mobilization. These changes included the expansion of suffrage, agrarian and mining reforms, and the introduction of the first public education system. According to Dr. German Crespo, Planning Director in the Bolivian Ministry of Health and Sports, these reforms “began the
modernization of Bolivia” and stimulated the political mobilization of the indigenous cleavage.4

The MNR government almost immediately enacted reforms to Bolivia’s public education system. In 1950, Bolivia educated only 25% of its children in primary schools (Klein 2011). These were the children of the elite and almost completely excluded the rural indigenous population. The establishment of a public education system takes time, but the MNR education reform was not abandoned by its predecessors. In the decades since the revolution, education and literacy have made impressive strides within Bolivia’s indigenous population. The gap between indigenous and non-indigenous children in primary education attendance has nearly closed. By 2010, 93 percent of both indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivian children attend primary school although a gap remains in higher levels of education with 85 percent of non-indigenous students completing secondary school and only 75 percent of indigenous students reaching completion (Klein 2011). The MNR reforms stimulated a rapid transformation of Bolivia where “only 31 percent of the population aged over 15 was considered literate in 1950, but by 1976 the figure had climbed to 67 percent, and by 2003 grew to 87 percent” (Klein 2011, 38). Education leads to opportunity and an educated populace is not easily ignored.

MNR also passed the Act of Bolivia’s Economic Independence in 1952 and the Agrarian Reform Decree of 1953, both of which had a significant impact on increasing the social mobility of Bolivia’s indigenous population. The Act of Bolivia’s Economic Independence nationalized most of the mining industry. Miners were a key group supporting the MNR during the revolution and they demanded compensation during the

---

4 Personal Interview, August 2011. La Paz, Bolivia
first years following the revolution. Through this act, “85 percent of the country’s tin production, 95 percent of its foreign exchange receipts, and about 50 percent of the central government’s fiscal receipts” moved from the private economy to the public (Thorn 1971, 168-169). Previously, the mining industry was concentrated in the hands of three families. Important to indigenous mobilization, the Act created the state Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) to manage the mines. The miners created a union, the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB), and demanded representation in government and consultation during changes to the mining industry. The MNR government granted three cabinet positions to COB leaders and gave the miners veto power in COMIBOL. The COB gave indigenous miners experience in effectively using group solidarity to communicate grievances to a government.

Not only did the mining class experience a shock, but the Agrarian Reform Decree of 1953 also destroyed the hacienda rural ruling class and “freed all indigenous peasants from the personal servitude (pongueaje and colonato) which had tied them to the land” (Klein 2011, 31). The Decree confiscated all highland hacienda lands and granted them to the indigenous workers through the sindicatos and comunidades they belonged to with the stipulation that they could not be individually sold. Land that had originally belonged to the indigenous population was returned to them in the form of community farm organizations. By the mid-1990s, 40 percent of Bolivia’s total land area had been redistributed to 627,000 people (Klein 2011). Klein says that in most of Bolivia, “The hacienda was abolished, the hacendado class destroyed, and land now shifted predominately into the hands of the Indian peasants” (2011, 30). These land syndicates and organizations were originally designed as a way for the government to maintain a
high level of control over the agricultural industry, but they eventually served to provide the network needed among indigenous peasant to facilitate mobilization and organization building (Yashar 2005).

Perhaps most important of the post-revolutionary reforms was the introduction of universal suffrage to Bolivia. Before 1952, it is estimated that only 2 to 5 percent of the Bolivian population could vote (Morales 1992). The electoral law reform passed by MNR guaranteed universal suffrage, abolished literacy exams, and promised citizens at least 21 years old, and of both sexes, the right to vote (18 years old if married). Some estimates suggest that 60 percent of Bolivia’s population were illiterate Indians at the time of the reform (Morales 1992). “In one stroke, the Indian peasant masses were enfranchised, and the voting population jumped from 126,000 in 1951 to 955,000 in 1956 and reached 1.3 million voters in the 1964 election” (Klein 2011, 30).

The expansion of the vote gave the indigenous majority in the Bolivian population legal access to the government. They rapidly moved from a politically excluded segment of the population to a large, potentially dominant, constituency. The introduction of public education helped prepare the indigenous peoples to fulfill their new role as citizen. The release from forced servitude on haciendas allowed indigenous peoples to move freely throughout Bolivia in search of increased opportunities. Many found employment in the newly nationalized mining industry where unions negotiated directly with the government and often had their demands met. These changes to the traditional social order allowed Bolivia’s indigenous population to build organizational networks.

Education opened opportunities for the new generation of indigenous peoples to gain skills and knowledge important to mobilization. Land redistribution provided previously
unattainable economic resources to indigenous farmers. Involvement in unions and farmers organizations provided experiences where the government listened to their demands and considered their collective opinions. It also strengthened collective trust and organization among indigenous peoples as they realized their shared experiences and collective potential.

An individual example of this social change process is the life of Eugenio Poma, the current Bolivian Ambassador to Denmark. He was the first child from his Aymara indigenous community to attend a mission school following the education reforms. He was raised on a hacienda and his family gained property from land redistribution policies. He was a strong student and the missionary financially sponsored him so he could attend the American Institute in La Paz for high school. He applied for university but was denied along with all other indigenous applicants at the time. He worked at a hospital mission where he came into contact with US Peace Corps volunteers. He was eventually hired by the Peace Corps to teach Aymara to volunteers at a university in Ohio. He says that his experiences with the church and the Peace Corps exposed him to liberation theology and politically motivated him to organize Bolivian communities upon his return. He was eventually identified by the Bolivian government as an enemy of the state during a particularly repressive period. He and his family fled to the United States using their connections with American missionaries. He studied at a seminary while there and eventually became the director of the Program on Indigenous Peoples at the World Council of Churches in Switzerland. He returned to serve in Bolivia at the request of Evo Morales when he was elected president. Although his story is unique, he was not alone in experiencing significantly expanded opportunities following the revolutionary reforms.
He reports that his career goal prior to the reforms was to be a farmer, like his parents. The reforms opened Poma and his generation to their previously untapped potential.

Although the necessary stimulants for indigenous mobilization were triggered by reforms following the 1952 Revolution, it took decades for an indigenous movement to form and assert its power. The time between the revolution and the emergence of indigenous political parties was politically chaotic with periods of pseudo-democracy, military rule, and authoritarian leaders. Democracy slowly returned to the region, but the reintroduction of elections was not the watershed moment for democracy as Bolivians and the international community had hoped. The 1978 elections were declared fraudulent by the international community. However, the restart of Bolivian democratic institutions provided political space for the entrance of new political actors.

It was in this election that the indigenous movement, Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA), competed in elections for the first time alongside 20 other political parties. Institutional barriers to political party entrance in the election were minimal in this first election. Yashar (2005) credits the beginning of the movement in the 1970s to the first generation of students following the revolutionary social reforms who migrated from rural areas to the cities for increased educational opportunities. She says,

“Youth came into contact with one another, gained a common political language that enabled them to communicate among themselves and to their communities. Inspired by the writings of Fausto Reinaga, they began to discuss the ways in which they had been discriminated against as Indians and the rights that they should have as Indians” (Yashar 2005, 168).

The Tupak Katari movement focused on spreading its influence by taking over government sponsored peasant unions throughout the Andean highland region (Yashar
They promoted a greater indigenous voice in the labor movement, recognition of traditional authority, and support of the Aymara culture and language. The movement eventually formed its own peasant union, the Unified Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB became Bolivia’s largest umbrella peasant organization by seizing control of smaller peasant unions. In 1979, the CSUTCB organized a national demonstration that obstructed thirty roads in each department and was reported to be the largest peasant mobilization since the 1952 revolution (Yashar 2005, 178). By 1981, the CSUTCB had gained representation in the COB labor group. That year, the COB appointed one of the CSUTCB leaders as its leader, Genaro Flores, an Aymara Indian. Indigenous peasants exerted their influence in the COB and a unified peasantry and labor force was becoming a reality. Under the leadership of Luciano Tapia Quisbert, MITKA competed in the 1978, 1979, and 1980 congressional elections but never pulled more than two percent of the vote.

MITKA’s weakness lay in its localized support. Bolivia’s indigenous population constitutes a majority of Bolivia’s total population but the peoples within the indigenous population are varied. Indigenous movements were regional in nature and failed to unite the total indigenous population until the 1990s. In 1990, indigenous highland and lowland groups displayed the first significant action of a unified Bolivian indigenous population for The March for Territory and Dignity into La Paz where they demanded protection of their lands from logging and Bolivia’s ratification of the International Labor Organization’s Agreement 169 demanding the protection of the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. In response to the pressure, the government ratified the ILO agreement and created a commission to design a new law that formally recognized protected indigenous
territories (Roper 2003). This successful unified mobilization displayed the potential strength of the indigenous population and subsequent protests and marches focused on building a national network of indigenous movements.

**Institutional Context**

The institutional context in Bolivia also experienced changes during the same time period as the mobilization of indigenous identity. Changes in the institutional context shaped the political environment into one favorable to indigenous political party formation when met by an activated indigenous cleavage.

**Volatile Political Climate**

The time period between the 1952 Revolution and the return of democracy was characterized by a volatile electoral climate. The revolutionary reforms that provided for the rapid transition to citizenship for the indigenous population were met by continued high poverty and inequality for all Bolivians. There was a gap between society’s growing expectations and the government’s ability to meet them. The nationalization of the mines and the breakdown of the hacienda system left both the industry and agricultural sectors of the economy in need of massive rebuilding. The economy suffered as a result of these reforms. This created an unstable political environment as the population became more aware of their potential through education, and more frustrated with their inability to reach it. On the political front, the years following the revolution were characterized by high military involvement and brief brushes with democracy. For Bolivia’s indigenous population, the governments during this time looked for opportunities to co-opt the new group of citizens.
In 1970, the Torres regime established a Popular Assembly that was charged with designing a new, more democratic government structure. The assembly included representatives from multiple worker and indigenous peasant organizations. Unfortunately, Bolivia’s competing public sectors proved detrimental for this attempt at democracy. Although they failed to agree on a new path, the exercise itself provided these organizations with an example that their voice could, and should, be heard in the government. The process also built networks between indigenous workers and peasants.

The Torres regime was met with widespread discontentment as it tried to please all social sectors, but failed to ensure the support of any. His term came to an end through a coup in 1971 led by Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez. Banzer Suárez was supported by the Nationalist Popular Front (FPN), an alliance of parts of the MNR and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB). During the first half of his six year term, the economy grew rapidly as production in all sectors increased. However, Banzer Suárez also implemented policies of social repression that included outlawing labor unions and closing universities in attempts to silence miners and students. The military was used to violently suppress strikes and protests by all sectors of society. During his regime, the military killed hundreds of indigenous peasants participating in a roadblock in the Cochabamba Valley, which helped build support for MITKA.

During the long period of military conflict and authoritarian rule, demands for popular elections grew throughout society. Despite attempts to keep the revolutionary alliance of student, laborer, and peasant from redeveloping, rapid pendulum swings from left to right policy reforms had managed to alienate each of these sectors. Although their preferred solutions to Bolivia’s problems differed, each group had tired of authoritarian
rule. When the economic recovery experienced during the first years of Banzer Suárez’s regime proved temporary, the government announced plans for elections in 1980. However, public unrest and distrust was high and Banzer Suárez was forced to resign. A hunger strike by indigenous women and children convinced the government to grant amnesty to political dissidents imprisoned during Banzer Suárez’s repressive regime and elections were scheduled for July 1978.

Following Banzer Suárez, between 1978 and 1982, Bolivia had nine presidents. When Hernan Siles Zuazo took office in 1982, he was the first legally elected civilian president in years. It was a period of political chaos that ended in 1982 when 50,000 people participated in a demonstration for civilian rule that forced General Vildoso to hand power to the 1980 Congress after less than 3 months in office. In 1982, the Congress revalidated the 1980 elections and declared Hernan Siles Zuazo president, a representative of the Democratic Popular Unity (UDP) coalition made up of four political parties including the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left (the leftist faction of MNR), the Bolivian Communist Party, and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Hudson and Hanratty 1991). Bolivia had found democracy but its problems would continue. Three political parties survived the democratic transition and dominated the party system once democracy returned: the MNR (in multiple variants), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and the Nationalist Democratic Action party (ADN).
Democratization

Bolivia’s political elite had instituted democratic elections and reforms in an attempt to pacify growing discontentment. However, they still faced the very alliance that they had feared since the revolution; miner, peasant, and coca grower united by a common indigenous identity held by a majority of the population and mobilized by a common enemy in the form of a government that was attacking their culture. Even with democratic concessions, the three traditional parties were rapidly losing support as the social groups that they had previously relied on for legitimacy became united against their historical disrespect for democracy and indigenous culture.

The elections of 1989 were the first elections where the presidential candidates of all three major political parties were men who gained their political influence solely after the 1952 revolution. According to Klein, “The election of 1989 marked the passage of an entire generation of political leaders who had dominated national life since the 1940s” (2011, 55). Only the ADN candidate, Hugo Banzer Suárez, had held the executive post before. Despite leadership changes, voter confidence in the parties’ ability to govern democratically and stabilize the Bolivian economy was beyond repair. Figure 2 shows the declining vote share won by the three dominant parties (MNR, ADN, and MIR) in presidential elections from 1979 to 2002. The loss in traditional party support created political space that lowered the entrance costs for smaller parties that could attract the displaced voters and grow their political influence. Among these parties were several that seized on the growing discontent in the indigenous population.
Decentralization

The traditional parties alternated control of the government, and each sought ways to pacify discontent and attract the mobilized population. These attempts went as far as President Sánchez de Lozada, elected in 1993, naming an indigenous movement leader as his vice-president. At the presidential inauguration, Vice President Cárdenas spoke in three indigenous languages and dressed in traditional clothing along with his wife (Gurr 1995). His nomination was primarily a symbolic attempt at attracting indigenous voters, but Cárdenas was able to use his position to negotiate several government policies favorable to indigenous rights.

The government enacted constitutional reforms that recognized Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and pluricultural society for the first time (Albó 2002). The reforms also legitimized the local legal authority of indigenous communities and peasant associations. The constitution formally recognized indigenous “communal lands of origin” as well as
culture, languages, and customary law (Albó 2002, 79). According to Minorities at Risk reports, 528 indigenous communities were given legal recognition which “allows the indigenous communities to apply for credits and lobby municipal governments for access to resources” (Gurr 1995). Lanzar (2007) argues that these local organizations were, and continue to be, fundamentally important to the mobilization capacities of Bolivia’s indigenous population. The formal legal recognition of these organizations by the government promoted their leaders to pseudo-lobbyists with the task of communicating community grievances to governmental bodies. This provided democratic experience that became political currency for Bolivia’s growing class of indigenous politicians.

The 1994 Law of Popular Participation and the 1995 Law of Decentralization increased the access of these newly recognized indigenous organizations by creating 311 new municipalities throughout Bolivia. Before these reforms, there were only a few dozen local governments in urban areas. According to the new laws, local governments were to be elected by the citizens of the municipality and “receive 20 percent of central government remittances to manage local development needs” (Morales 2010, 224). It is estimated that 85 percent of Bolivia’s municipalities have an indigenous majority population (Morales 2010). According to Klein, “So significant was this administrative change it was estimated that almost two-thirds of the 1,624 municipal mayors and councilmen, elected to office after the enactment of the Popular Participation law, were peasants and indigenous peoples” (2011, 58).

Albó (2002) identifies three strategies used by different actors to fill these new local offices. The three dominant political parties often sought to place party members from outside the locality and the indigenous community in the offices. The smaller
parties saw the decentralization as an opportunity to expand their sphere of influence and control financial resources in their communities. They sought existing local leaders to represent their party in the elections. And finally, indigenous organizations and unions decided to put forth their own candidates. By 1995, the Peasant Coca Growers’ Union had solidified an alliance with the CSUTCB and the COB and together they seized the opportunity to place their members in these new local governments. Bolivia now had thousands of indigenous politicians networked together through their common grievances and gaining valuable experience in the legal, political realm.

**Economic Pressures**

The economies of Latin American countries crashed during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. Bolivia’s economy was no different. As displayed in Figure 3, the Bolivian economy suffered significant losses in its gross domestic product during the decade. The newly elected democratic presidents had to navigate the new institutional system, an already mobilized population, and tough economic times. Elected in 1982, President Siles Zuazo campaigned on the promise to implement a populist democracy, but multiple economic crises forced him to choose capitalist austerity over socialist populism. In his first three years, Siles Zuazo confronted a foreign debt of $5 billion dollars, a drought, and massive floods. An International Monetary Fund austerity program was implemented to attempt to right the economy, but it is estimated that, by 1984, 1.7 million Bolivians faced starvation (Morales 1991). The labor left had supported Siles Zuazo but austerity programs hit this group especially hard and their support was diverted. During that year, the international tin market collapsed and mines throughout Bolivia closed. Under the
supervision of the US and International Monetary Fund, the Siles Zuazo government implemented a stabilization plan that included freezing wages and ending mining subsidies from the government. By 1987, the mining sector accounted for only 2 percent of the labor force compared with 6 percent in 1977 (Hudson and Hanratty 1991). In response, the COB called for strikes throughout the country. Siles Zuazo voluntarily resigned from the presidency and elections were held in July 1985.

**Figure 3: Annual Percent GDP Growth 1980-1989**

The displaced labor force found a healthier market in the rapidly growing drug industry. Coca leaves hold a place of honor in Aymara Indian traditions and have been cultivated by South America’s indigenous populations for thousands of years. Chewing on coca leaves produces a mild stimulant effect and was used by indigenous peasants and miners to sustain themselves through the long work hours pre-revolution. However, coca leaves also serve as an important ingredient in the manufacture of cocaine, which began to gain popularity worldwide as a recreational drug during the 1970s. According to The World Drug Report (UNODC), country seizure reports suggest that the cocaine world market grew most dramatically during the 1980s. While other sectors of the Bolivian
economy crashed, the international price and demand for cocaine grew and Bolivia was one of three primary suppliers of coca leaves.

Indigenous peoples turned to their traditional crop as the new source of their livelihood. The Bolivian government estimated that from 1977 to 1987 coca production grew from less than 2 million kilograms to at least 45 million kilograms and the number of growers rose by 30,000 people (Hudson and Hanratty 1991). Whereas increased mobility and education often lessen one’s ties with the traditional community, the reforms that freed Bolivia’s indigenous populations from forced servitude in haciendas and mines allowed them to capitalize on the cocaine boom (Sanabria 1993). The areas of Chapare and the Yungas region of La Paz are most favorable for coca cultivation and the growing class of indigenous coca growers became concentrated in these regions (Bolivia Coca Survey). This new sector of the economy adopted the same organizational structure used by miners and peasants following the revolution. They joined together into syndicates and organizations responsible for the logistic coordination of turning thousands of small independent farmers into a reliable source for the international market.

Given Bolivia’s financial dependence on United States and international aid, external pressures were exerted on the government to combat the growing drug economy. In 1987, Bolivia entered into an agreement with the United States that created the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances and set Bolivia on a 3 year eradication plan (Hudson and Hanratty 1991). In 1988, coca growing was declared illegal in most of Bolivia. Pressures from the United States forced successive Bolivian governments to continue to direct efforts at stopping the drug trade.
Legal alternatives for the labor force were not nearly as lucrative as coca production and the coca syndicates and organizations fought back viscously. By the 1980s, there were 160 local organizations which made up 30 sub-federations and eventually coalesced into 5 large federations (Yashar 2005, 185). The organizational capacity of the coca growers was impressive and general strikes were launched often in the decade (Figure 4). One of the federations was the Federation de Cocaleros del Tropico (FCT), which appointed future Bolivian president Evo Morales as executive secretary in 1988. In response to the increased eradication efforts, the regional peasant syndicates organized into the national Peasant Coca Growers’ Union and they began a strategy of gaining influence within the CSUTCB and thus the COB. A national publicity campaign spun the coca eradication efforts as a direct attack on Bolivian culture and identity. According to the coca growers, the government was trading Bolivia’s culture for US economic support. Roadblocks, hunger strikes, marches, and occupations were used during this period to try and force the government to compromise.

**Figure 4: Total General Strikes 1970-1999**
Indigenous Political Parties

It was within this social, institutional, and economic climate that the Bolivian government instituted two waves electoral rule changes: the first to raise party entrance costs and the second to increase proportionality.

Political parties must register and be approved by the National Electoral Court before they can place candidates on the ballot. Coming into the 1989 elections, the National Electoral Court chose to enact part of a 1980 Electoral Law that states “that parties, alliances, or coalitions that do not achieve 50,000 votes must repay to the national treasury the costs of printing the ballot. Repayment must be made three days after the final ballot has been counted; a jail term awaits party chiefs who fail to pay” (Hudson and Hanratty 1991). This threat was in addition to 1986 MNR-Paz Estenssoro government reform that replaced the D’Hondt formula used since 1956 with a double quotient system that required parties to meet a quota before being eligible to receive any remaining seats after initial seat allocation. Together they served to prevent “the electoral slate from becoming clogged with dozens of taxi parties and their nominees” (Morales 2010, 217).

Nine parties participated in the 1989 election, but only the three major parties (MNR, AND, and MIR) had a real chance of winning the executive seat. The 1989 reforms served to discourage the smaller parties that has seized on the political space created during the return of democracy.

However, in 1994 reforms to the congressional electoral system were introduced that shifted it to a mixed-member proportional representation system. The new system required that 68 out of 130 members were elected through plurality elections in single member districts and the remaining were chosen by party list voting according to a
D’Hondt formula of proportional representation in nine departmental multi-member districts (Mayorga 1997). It also instituted a three percent threshold for seats in the Chamber of Deputies. According to Nohlen, the “aims were to strengthen the representatives versus their parties, to link them to their constituencies and to improve the voter’s choice” (2005, 128).

In the literature, a larger district magnitude is associated with increased access for smaller parties and this move actually shifted the average district magnitude from 14.44 to 1 (Golder 2007). However, in mixed systems the multi-member PR seats are distributed to make up for the non-proportional qualities of the SMD distribution. Thus when Bolivia moved the number of electoral districts from 9 total to 68 single-member districts (uninominal; SMD) plus 9 multi-member districts (plurinominal; MMD) electoral districts, the overall district magnitude would be accurately reflected in the MMD magnitude. By this formula, these reforms reduced the overall district magnitude from 14.4 to 6.89. Votes in the MMDs are also votes for the president and senate. In mixed-member systems, a party’s presence on the SMD ballot has been found to increase their performance in the MMD tier (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara 2004; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). This means that under these new rules, political parties have less incentive for pre-election strategic coordination and have greater incentives to place candidates in as many single member districts as possible. This incentive when coupled with decentralization policies, majority-indigenous districts, and newly recognized indigenous organizations created an optimal environment for indigenous party entrance to the party system.
CONDEPA

Despite the 1989 reforms to consolidate the party system by quelling smaller parties, a surprise indigenous-based party was able to participate and pull 11 percent of the popular vote in the election (Morales 2010). Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) was formed right before the 1989 elections by Carlos Palenque, a popular radio and television host and owner in the department of La Paz. His radio and television show, La Tribuna Libre del Pueblo, was designed to serve as an open microphone for the people of El Alto to express complaints, ask for help, or publicize upcoming community events (Lazar 2007, 93). By the 2001 Census, El Alto was Bolivia’s third largest city with a growing population of over 695,000 people, 86% of whom identify as indigenous (Klein 2011, 45).

In 1988, the government shut down Palenque’s television and radio stations in response to a broadcast interview featuring one of the government’s most wanted drug lords accusing current President Paz Estenssoro of drug trafficking. Palenque and employees went on a highly publicized hunger strike and the stations were eventually restored. However, the action motivated Palenque to form CONDEPA and use his popularity and influence to attract marginalized voters who were frustrated with the major parties and their policies. In the 1989 elections, CONDEPA won the La Paz department and its 11 percent of the vote translated into 11 seats in Bolivia’s congress, one of which was given to Remedios Loza, the first traditionally dressed indigenous woman to serve in Bolivia’s Congress (Morales 2010). CONDEPA was also able to secure the La Paz city government in 1991.
The party united around a dynamic personality who shared the ethnic identity of the marginalized and mobilized indigenous population. Because of this, the party was unable to gain influence outside the La Paz department and never recovered from Palenque’s death in 1997. It never utilized the indigenous networks and movements that had been building since the revolution. It never formed the inclusive platform necessary to incorporate enough marginalized voters to break through the institutional roadblocks supported by the three major parties. After Palenque’s death, leadership struggles occurred between different factions of the party and, by 1999, the traditional leftist party MIR had capitalized on the discord and claimed the city of El Alto as their own (Lanzar 2007, 92).

Eje Pachakutik

The electoral performance of CONDEPA and the mobilization capabilities of the indigenous populations forced the traditional parties to find ways to co-opt the indigenous vote in order to secure elected office. Indigenous organizations were courted by personalities from the traditional parties for potential alliances. These often fizzled out before they got off the ground for a variety reasons, but left the indigenous organization with unfilled promises and distrust for alliances with the whites and mestizos. One example of this was the Eje de Convergencia Patriótica party that was conceived as an alliance between the indigenous organization Coordinadora de Pueblos Ethnicas de Santa Cruz (CPESC) and white and mestizo voters for the 1993 election (Van Cott 2005). In diverse groups, communication and compromise is always a source of conflict and this was no different. Some indigenous members eventually left because they felt unheard by
the other half and other members left for more lucrative opportunities with established leftist parties like the MIR (Van Cott 2005, 66). The remaining members committed to more an indigenous-focused platform and formed the Eje Pachakutik political party that won 1.1 percent of the vote in the 1993 election and 0.8 percent of the vote in 1997 (Nohlen 2005). The party was small and concentrated in the Santa Cruz department, which is where it pulled its vote share.

Eje Pachakutik and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (MRTKL) indigenous movement were planning a coalition coming into the 1993 election but MRTKL’s leaders also allied with MNR (Van Cott 2005, 67). The MNR-MRTKL alliance pulled 35.6 percent of the vote and, with the help of smaller parties, was able to secure the congressional support needed to secure the executive branch (Nohlen 2005). Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR became president and Víctor Hugo Cárdenas of MRTKL vice-president. This betrayal confirmed indigenous distrust of traditional parties, but Cárdenas’ position with MNR was a big factor in the institutional reforms that formally recognized indigenous communities and expanded indigenous access to the government.

MAS

As they watched the success and failure of other peasant and indigenous based political parties, the coca growers unions began discussions of forming one of their own (Harten 2011). Internal debate over the goals and purpose of a party delayed its formation until 1995. Evo Morales was instrumental in convincing the movement to enter the political realm (Harten 2011). In March 1995, CSUTCB, CIDOB, and other coca grower
organizations met at the Congress of the Political Instrument, Land and Territory and agreed to form an indigenous political party, the Asamblea para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP), to compete in the 1995 municipal elections (Van Cott 2005). Traditional parties used raised entrance costs using electoral registration rules to keep ASP off the ballot, but ASP still participated in the elections using the party registration of the Izquierda Unida (IU) party (Harten 2011). In that election, ASP placed members as 10 mayors, 54 municipal council members, and 6 department advisors in Cochabamba (Van Cott 2005, 86). In the 1997 national elections, ASP retained the IU-ASP party designation and won 3.7 percent of the national vote and 17.46 percent within the Cochabamba department (Harten 2011, 67). This secured four of the single-member district seats in Congress.

Before the 1999 municipal elections, the ASP split into two factions because of personal rivalry between the 1997 ASP presidential candidate Alejo Veliz and Evo Morales, chosen as the new leader by the party base (Harten 2011, 67). It was decided Evo Morales and his supporters would form a new party, the Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP). In an act that showed the political establishment’s fear of an organized indigenous party, the Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE) denied the IPSP registration and annulled the IU party registration, which almost left the coca growers without a slot on the ballot in the 1999 elections. However, the leadership of the Movimiento al Socialismo political party offered the IPSP their name and position on the ballot. The original MAS formed in 1985 as a result of a split in the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB). The party never really took off and by 1999 had a non-existent membership (Harten 2011, 68). IPSP voted and approved the take-over and the CNE
agreed to recognize the party if it retained the original MAS name, symbols, and platform. In the 1999 municipal elections, MAS won only 3.27 percent of the national vote, but secured 79 city councilmen and 10 mayors, primarily in the Cochabamba region (Harten 2011, 69).

Economic distress and increased indigenous political capacity coalesced in January 2000 with the Cochabamba Water Wars. In late 1999, the Cochabamba government pursued a policy to privatize the water system by selling it to Aguas del Turnari. At the same time, the national government considered privatizing the entire country’s water system. When the first bills arrived in Cochabamba in January, the cost of water had increased up to 150 percent (Assies 2003, 24). The community organizations that were legitimized through earlier constitutional reforms set up roadblocks in protest and effectively shut-down Cochabamba, Bolivia’s second largest city. A compromise was reached that delayed the price hike, but tensions rose again in February when the revisions set the water price hike at 20 percent (Assies 2003, 26). Street protests began immediately, but were met with state force this time. The protests only lasted a day but 70 civilians and 51 policemen were wounded and 172 peasant protesters were arrested (Assies 2003, 27). The government agreed to freeze the water rates at the 1999 prices until a compromise was reached.

Prior to the Water Wars, MAS pulled its electoral support predominantly from the Cochabamba region. In April, feeling ignored and frustrated by the government and negotiators, a general strike was called by organizers in Cochabamba. Thousands of peasants arrived in La Paz from Cochabamba and marched to the offices of Aguas del Turnari where they tore down signs and spray painted buildings with the phrase "Aguas
The CSUTCB, previously uninvolved but with its own list of demands, set up roadblocks throughout Bolivia (Assies 2003). Peasants blocked the highway from La Paz to Oruro and when the military was sent in to remove the blockade, a teacher was shot and killed (MAR 2009). President Banzer declared a state of emergency, but the following day police in La Paz and Santa Cruz took over the prisons and demanded a 50 percent pay increase (MAR 2009). Tens of thousands of Bolivians occupied city squares throughout Bolivia expressing a shared frustration of over a decade of painful economic policies and false promises by the government.

Without an expansion of their platform and reach, MAS was likely to go the way of previous indigenous political parties and fall into oblivion. However, MAS and the cocaleros identified with the struggles against privatization and joined the protest. They capitalized on the shared frustration with neo-liberal policies and developed a platform that “had a common denominator that appealed to a wide range of disparate interests, urban as well as rural and in the eastern lowlands as well in the western highlands” (Crabtree 2011, 133). It was during the Cochabamba Water Wars that MAS and Morales were able to expand their electoral appeal beyond the coca regions to include most of Bolivia’s marginalized, frustrated, and mobilized populations. By the time MAS competed in the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, they had solidified the support of indigenous coca growers, peasants, and miners in an electoral bloc that won 27 seats in congress and 20.9 percent of the presidential popular vote for their candidate Evo Morales, which tied him for 2nd place (Nohlen 2005). In the 2005 presidential election, MAS and Morales won 54 percent of the popular vote and he became not only the first
indigenous president but the first Bolivian president to win by absolute majority in the first round of voting (Morales 2010).

Conclusion

Traditional explanations for party system characteristics and new party entrance are important to the story of indigenous political parties, but they fail to provide a complete picture concerning emergence. The role of contextual variations must be included in theories on the emergence of indigenous political parties. In particular, the results of economic recession, increased coca eradication efforts, and decentralization policies raised incentives for indigenous party emergence. This chapter presented the historical development of Bolivia’s indigenous political parties with an emphasis on the importance of these three factors within the context of long-term social changes and democratization.

Reforms following the 1952 Revolution set Bolivia’s indigenous population on the path to social mobilization by expanding franchise, freeing them from forced hacienda service, and establishing a public education system that welcomed indigenous children. The economic recession, neo-liberal economic policies, and the war on coca served as the unifying contextual factors that moved regional indigenous movements to link with other movements and politically organize. Traditionally, Bolivia’s political context was characterized by extreme volatility. This volatility continued through the democratization period and is reflected by the loss of traditional political party support. This created political space for indigenous political parties to seize upon when the introduction of institutional reforms that increased decentralization and proportionality
were introduced. Traditional institutional reforms known to encourage new party
entrance were effective in encouraging indigenous political party formation because they
were introduced in a context where indigenous were already organized by shared
grievances against continued economic inequalities and coca eradication and after
policies that decentralized political power and recognized local indigenous communities
as legitimate.
CHAPTER 4: IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF SUPPORT

“From around 500 years ago, we were fighting, first slavery, then called Indian, then discrimination. Today we can say that we are totally true Bolivian, recognized in the Constitution and we have all rights.”

The previous chapter provided a picture of the context in which Bolivia’s indigenous political parties emerged. The social, political, and economic climate in Bolivia developed and coalesced to create a favorable environment for the formation of indigenous political parties. Several indigenous political parties formed in the 1980s and 1990s, but only one was able to carve a place for themselves in the national party system. By the 2005 election, indigenous political party Movimiento al Socialismo was able to secure the Bolivian presidential office with 53.7 percent of the vote. This chapter isolates the national election of 2002 when MAS surprisingly won 27 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and presented a presidential candidate who won 20.9 percent of the vote, which tied him for second place. The isolation of the 2002 election allows an examination of how MAS transitioned from a regional, issue-specific political party to a national competitor. It pairs departmental, provincial and electoral district results with 2001 census data to identify the source of MAS support in the 2002 election. It compares social and institutional explanations for party support at the sub-national level to identify the factors important to MAS’s ability to link into a national party. Results indicate that social factors were the primary explanation for MAS support and that the impact of institutional factors fails in comparison.

---

5 Aquilino Jujra, Representative of CONAMAQ Interview 8/4/11 in La Paz, Bolivia
Theoretical Explanations

Following Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), there is a three stage process through which social cleavages transition into political cleavages and parties. The previous chapters have focused primarily on the translation of social cleavages into partisan preferences or the formation of political parties. A complete explanation of indigenous political party entrance to Latin American party systems must include discussion of how politicized cleavages transition into the party system and gain political support. This chapter examines the translation of partisan preferences into votes and seats. Party support arises from the social cleavage structure and the mechanical and psychological effects resulting from variations in electoral rules, electoral volatility, and incentives to link. The sub-national level of examination allows for the control of the contextual factors important in the first stage and the stabilization of political changes during democratization. This level of analysis also allows for an examination of the power of appeals made by political parties to social cleavages.

Social Cleavages

As presented in the Chapter 2, scholars argue that social cleavages provide the basis of support for political parties and party competition can become institutionalized around social cleavage-based political parties (Dalton 1988; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, Latin American party systems formed before ethnicity became politicized so they were not structured around this particular social cleavage (Dix 1989). Once indigenous identity was transformed into partisan preferences, MAS and other indigenous parties campaigned on appeals to this identity. Indigenous political parties have at the
core of their platform the promotion of indigenous rights. This is a direct appeal to the ethnic cleavage of indigenous identity. Expectations are that indigenous identity is a primary factor in a voter’s decision to vote for an indigenous political party. However, MAS eventually won the presidency which suggests there were incentives to broaden support beyond the Cochabamba department and the social cleavage of ethnicity. These incentives may have been structured by institutional variations.

Electoral Rules

Cox (1999) identifies two lines of reasoning that may explain why some local or regional parties become nationally relevant. These are variations in institutional design structure incentives for small parties to ally with others into a larger party organization. The first line of reasoning is that cross-district alliances are advantageous in systems that have upper-tier legislative elections where appeals must stretch further than an individual district. The second reason to form cross-district alliances is to improve the chances of gaining control of the federal or central government. Both of these factors may have been involved in MAS’s transition from political representative of the coca-growers union to representative of Bolivia’s indigenous and discontent population.

Bolivia’s electoral rules were completely overhauled with the new 2009 Constitution, but the 2002 election operated according to the constitutional reforms made during the 1990s. This chapter examines the electoral results for seats in the Chamber of Deputies. There were 130 seats in the Chamber; legislators served a 5 year term and were eligible for reelection. Bolivia has a mixed-member proportional electoral system with 2 tiers, each with their own ballot. Voters have two votes when they went to the polls for
national elections. In 2002, the first vote equated to a vote for a party which provided the basis for the presidential, senatorial, and multi-member PR district vote distribution. The second vote was for a political party candidate in a single member electoral district.

Bolivia is divided into 9 departments that set the boundaries for the multi-member electoral districts and preliminary boundaries for the SMDs. The number of seats distributed to each department is decided by the population of that department relative to other departments. Table 1 displays the seat distribution by department for the 2002 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>MMD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Corte Nacional Electoral*

Of the 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2002 election, 68 (52 percent) were elected through first-past-the-post elections in single member districts. The sixty-two multi-member seats were distributed using the D’Hondt vote distribution system.

There was a 3 percent threshold to be eligible for seats in the proportional representation distribution. The total number of votes won by each party in each department was divided by natural divisors to determine the proportion of seats each party should get in the
Chamber. La Paz had 31 total seats in the Chamber, so the number of votes received by each party was divided by 1 through 15 and the 31 cells with the highest resulting numbers award a seat to the corresponding party (Corte Nacional Electoral 2002, Asignacion). The numbers and their corresponding parties were then placed in descending order and the seats were awarded according to position on the party list. This process was conducted using the total number of seats allotted to the department, in this example 31 for La Paz, so the number of seats won by the party in the SMD elections was subtracted from the number determined by the MMD distribution. If a party won 14 seats according to the above vote distribution, the total number of SMD seats won by that party was subtracted from the 14 and the remaining seats were awarded according to the MMD party list. Following this formula, the 2002 election resulted in the Chamber of Deputies distribution in Table 2.

**Table 2: Chamber of Deputies Seat Distribution 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>MMD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONDEPA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LJ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Corte Nacional Electoral

Bawn and Thies (2003) argue that linking the SMD and MMD tiers in a mixed member system makes the system more closely resemble a proportional representation
system in behavior and incentives. The mixed-member system design should not have a psychological effect on voters that discourages them from supporting smaller or new political parties in a manner similar to traditional less permissive design options. The mixed system with linked tiers creates a more proportional system with political space for voters to select most parties without fear of wasting their vote.

**Linkage**

Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola (2006) present two views of party system nationalization: static and dynamic. In a static system, a nationalized political party pulls its vote share consistently across regions. In a dynamic system, there are regional differences in support for a nationalized political party, but the changes in popularity move in a similar manner across regions. According to Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola (2006), Bolivian political parties ranked low on both types of party nationalization between 1985 and 1997. This suggests that even the traditional political parties had difficulty building a loyal party base and is also reflected in the high levels of electoral volatility. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) note that during Western Europe’s industrialization period, new interests formed that were not absorbed by existing parties and new single-issue political parties formed and gained support. These were small parties focused on one particular interest like women’s rights, the environment, and other issues. Single-issue parties have difficulty carving a lasting position in a party system. Similarly, CONDEPA and Eje Pachakutik entered the national party system, but pulled their support from certain indigenous groups in certain regions of Bolivia without
garnering support in other regions. MAS also began regionally concentrated, but needed to link with other groups in order to carve a lasting place in the Bolivian party system.

The relationship between local party systems and the national party system can vary from independence to a mirror reflection. In some party systems, linkage will be minimal and the national party system will be completely independent of local party systems. Cox (1999) argues that more religious, ethnic, and linguistic heterogeneity in a society, the more malcoordination and entrants in the local party system. In systems with minimal linkage, there may be a significant difference in the number of parties in the local system compared to the national system. At the other end, in some systems the local party system will be a microcosm of the larger party system with the same parties competing at both levels. Cox (1997) explains the variations in linkage among party systems as being the result of a group with a goal that would require large legislative support. The need for a legislative majority gives small groups an incentive to link into a larger party organization in order to accomplish their goal. According to Cox (1997), groups or parties might cross-district ally if the upper-tier of seats in a system considers unused votes in its formula or if there are vote-distribution requirements for the executive office. Groups seeking to control the government in order to accomplish their goals have greater incentives to link in more centralized states and in unicameral legislative settings. Cox (1999) suggests that local parties will ally with one another in more unitary states and will remain distinct in more federal states simply because the incentive is lessened. The more concentrated the power is in a system, the more incentive to build a party organization that can compete for central government control. Cox (1999) also argues
that with more permissive electoral rules and more homogenous distribution of social cleavages, the more local party systems will look like national party systems.

In the 1990s, the Bolivian government enacted policies of decentralization that rerouted some fiscal responsibilities to local governments. However, power in Bolivia is still highly centralized relative to other federal states. The goals of Bolivian indigenous political parties include the re-legalization of coca growing, bilingual education, and the recognition of native justice and autonomy among other issues. These goals require action by the central government and legislature so regional indigenous political parties have incentives to link into a larger party organization. MAS began in Cochabamba out of a coca-growers union but used the nationwide protests during the Water Wars to spread a more inclusive, anti-establishment message that appealed to indigenous peoples in other regions. The sub-national units of analysis in this chapter provide an opportunity to compare the responsiveness of the population to MAS appeals made based on indigenous identity, employment, and inequalities during their attempt at national linkage.

**Electoral Climate**

Economic voting theories argue that voters retrospectively hold incumbent parties accountable for the management of the economy (Lewis-Beck 1988). The 2002 elections were conducted in a tense economic climate. The Bolivian economy had stabilized following the ‘lost decade’ and was experiencing steady growth in the national gross domestic product (World Bank). However, efforts at coca eradication continued into this decade. Figure 5 displays the dramatic effects of eradication efforts by the government on
the cultivation of coca leading up to the 2002 election. The amount land used for coca cultivated in Bolivia fell from 48,600 hectares in 1995 to 11,853 hectares in 2002. Simultaneously, the amount land eradicated of coca grew substantially from 1995 to 1999, fell in 2000, but continued to rise into 2002. The indigenous relationship to the coca leaf was explained in previous chapters. The coca grower’s union successfully framed government efforts at eradication as attacks on indigenous culture.

**Figure 5: Coca Cultivation and Reported Eradication 1995-2009**

The Cochabamba Water Wars took place in the two years prior to the election. Government efforts at the privatization of water were met by massive protests, road blocks, and strikes throughout Bolivia. It began with Cochabamba peasants but by the end included multiple sectors of Bolivian society. MAS and other parties campaigned on anti-establishment messages trying to attract Bolivian voters frustrated by government policies.
Bolivian Party System

A high level of party system institutionalization is necessary for parties to serve their intended role in democracies. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) offer four dimensions of party system institutionalization that include the stability of interparty competition, parties with stable roots in society, acceptance of parties as legitimate representatives of public, and stable electoral rules. At the time of their study, they classify the Bolivian party system as weakly institutionalized or inchoate but note that it was showing increasing signs of institutionalization. According to Roberts and Wibbels (1999), the level of party institutionalization is significant predictor of electoral volatility in Latin America. Electoral volatility the voter difference of individual parties from election to election. They note that Bolivia had relatively high levels of electoral volatility. Levitsky (2004) credits lower levels of institutionalization for enhancing the ability of parties to adapt during crises. Parties with the ability to adapt leave less political space for new parties to emerge. If existing parties have the potential to be changed from the inside, groups will choose that route rather than pay the higher costs to join the system as a new political party. In her study, Domingo (2001) argues that Bolivian political parties were non-programic, weakly institutionalized, and personalistic.

In a survey of 1997 Latin American legislatures, Rosas (2005) found that Bolivian political parties organize around a deep state-market divide. Legislative parties align along a traditional left-right economic-distributive dimension. Bolivia is unique in that leftist parties favor price controls while opposing private security and unemployment insurance and right parties oppose price controls while favoring the other two. The secular-religious divide in Bolivia was significant but overlapped with other political and
economic dimensions. Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) similarly note that the issue positions of parties and presidents in Latin America can be reduced down to the traditional left–right ideological continuum. Bartolini and Mair (1990) argue that the greater the ideological distance between parties; the less likely voters will transfer their vote to another party. However, higher levels of party fragmentation suggest less polarization among parties and more voter flexibility with their vote.

In the 2002 election, Bolivians encountered an institutionalizing party system with eleven parties competing at the national level. Parties typically sorted themselves around an economic ideological continuum but the economic troubles of the previous two decades created some confusion with traditional leftist parties responsible for neo-liberal reforms. High levels of electoral volatility, especially the declining vote share of traditional leftist parties, suggest that party loyalty among Bolivian voters was not yet institutionalized. This created political opportunity for smaller parties to persuade voters with their platform and message. However, low levels of institutionalization create difficulty for voters in holding political parties accountable for their behavior. Rather than holding individual parties accountable for the recent unpopular reforms, discontent was converted into anti-establishment feelings and capitalized on by smaller parties with a populist message (Madrid 2012).

**Political Parties in 2002 Election**

Eleven political parties participated in the 2002 election. The incumbent right-leaning party, Accion Democratica y Nacionalista (ADN), entered the election in an unfavorable position because of their repressive response to the Cochabamba Water
Wars. Hugo Banzer held the presidency, but in 2001 Banzer announced his resignation for health reasons and his vice-president, Jorge Quiroga, finished out his term. Given restrictions to one presidential term, ADN ran Ronald MacLean as their presidential candidate in 2002. They were only able to win 3.4 percent of the national vote and 5 SMD Chamber seats.

Despite the growing discontent with the political establishment, the two other traditional parties fared much better in the election. Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) was able to distance themselves from the unpopular neoliberal reforms they enacted in the 1980s and win 22.5 percent of the presidential vote in addition to 36 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. MNR’s presidential candidate was former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and he won the highest vote share of any of the presidential candidates. The traditional leftist party, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), also ran a former president, Jaime Paz Zamora, as their candidate. MIR won 16.3 percent of the presidential vote, fourth place, but secured 26 seats in the Chamber. These traditional parties alternated control of Bolivia since the 1952 Revolution. Despite their numerical success in this election, growing portions of the population were discontent and looking change.

Two parties competed in the 2002 election that capitalized on that discontent and turned it into political power. As explained in the previous chapter, MAS originated from a split of the Asamblea para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) because of differences between Evo Morales and another leader, Alejo Véliz. In the 2002 election, this divide became politically relevant again because the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR) recruited the ASP members that did not join Morales and MAS. Véliz was offered a high level
position in NFR and his presence increased the appeal of NFR to peasants formally supportive of ASP. The leader and presidential candidate of NFR was Manfred Reyes Villa, a former ADN politician and mayor of Cochabamba. NFR was ideologically center-right and their support was firmly rooted in Cochabamba. However, their primary message in the 2002 campaign was one against the traditional parties, which appealed to the discontent portions of the population, and put them in direct competition with MAS. According to Singer and Morrison (2004), Reyes Villa was the favorite to win the race in polls three months before the election. However, this made NFR the primary target of other parties’ campaign efforts and eroded support in the months prior to the election.

Another indigenous political party, Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP), competed in this election. The party was formed in 2000 by Felipe Quispe, an Aymara indigenous leader from the Unified Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB). The party was limited in that the party was Quispe’s creation and his alone. The party platform was one of Aymara pride with Quispe stating its main goal was to “reclaim the Aymara nation, oppressed for 500 years by white people” (Van Cott 2005, 77). The Aymara message prevented the movement from linking with other indigenous ethnic groups. Quispe announced in March 2002 that MIP was seeking an alliance with MAS for the 2002 election, but the coalition never formalized and both Quispe and Morales were listed as presidential candidates in the election (Van Cott 2005). MIP was primarily competitive in the La Paz department and they secured 5 SMD seats and 1 MMD seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Quispe surprisingly placed fifth in the presidential race, but with only six percent of the vote.
Several other small parties competed in the election, although their electoral impact was limited. CONDEPA and Unidad Civica Solidaridad (UCS) were part of the ADN coalition in 1997 to elect Banzer as president. In 2002, CONDEPA competed again, but the death of leader Carlos Palenque prior to the election and the ensuing internal fight for control cost CONDEPA its previous electoral support. Its candidate for president only won 0.4 percent of the vote and they were unable to secure any seats in the Chamber. Unidad Civica Solidaridad (UCS) also suffered the death of its leader before the election and suffered similar a similar loss of electoral support. The UCS presidential candidate won 5.5 percent of the presidential vote and 5 MMD seats from 5 different departments.

The Partido Socialista (PS), Bolivia’s socialist party, secured one SMD seat in Santa Cruz and won 0.7 percent of the presidential vote. Movimiento Ciudadano para el Cambio (MCC) and Libertad y Justicia (LJ) failed to win any seats in the Chamber and only 0.6 and 2.7 percent of the presidential vote respectively. These three parties, in addition to CONDEPA, lost their party registration as a result of failing to win at least 3 percent of the vote in this election.

Data and Method

The electoral data come from the official election results published on the website of Bolivia’s Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Voting results are available down to the 19,957 electoral polling centers. This data was collected and aggregated up to Bolivia’s 112 provinces, 68 single member and 9 multi-member electoral districts, and its 9 departments. The census data was collected from reports by the Instituto Nacional de
The census reports are available at municipal city district, province, and department. The province and department demographics were matched with electoral results at the province and department level. For the electoral district level, the average of the multiple provinces within each electoral district was taken. There is some crossover in provinces that contribute to multiple electoral districts, but not enough to cause statistical problems.

**Dependent Variable**

The primary variable of interest in this study is voter support of the political party Movimiento al Socialismo. Percentage of vote share is used at each level of analysis for clarity. Percentages were calculated by dividing the number of votes for a party by the total number of valid votes cast. In any given unit of analysis there were more votes cast than ruled valid, but for these purposes the percentage of valid votes serves as a better indicator of party support. Percentages of vote share were also calculated for CONDEPA, MIP, MIR, and NFR. In some of the following analyses, their vote share is included as an independent variable.

**Independent Variables: Origins of MAS Support**

The social characteristics that facilitate the emergence of indigenous political parties are the same that are credited with their electoral support: a large indigenous population that is regionally concentrated and relatively disadvantaged. Departments,

---

6 The 2001 Census is limited on the variables available for analysis. Wealth, college education, and other interesting variables are not available. However, given the multiple levels of analysis in this chapter, new variables may easily be added and tested as they become available.
provinces, and electoral districts with larger indigenous populations are by their very nature regionally concentrated.

The first variable is the percentage of the population that is indigenous. While Bolivia’s indigenous population made up 61 percent of the country’s total population in the 2001 Census, it is very diverse. The census asks for self-identification into the five main Bolivian indigenous lingual groups and also offers “otro-nativo” or none as options. Quechua and Aymara are the largest of the groups and reside in the altiplano region of Bolivia. Guarani, Chiquitano, and Mojeño are much smaller and reside primarily in the Cordillera Oriental. The question asks respondents 15 years or older if they self-identify as indigenous and, if so, with which group. For most of the following tests, the different groups (including the other group) were tallied together into a large indigenous self-identification variable. Some critique should be lodged against this because of the homogenization of very different groups (Van Cott 2010). However, given that the three smaller groups collectively make-up about four percent of the Bolivian population, the summation was necessary to include their voices in this analysis. At the province level, the indigenous percentage stretches from the Mendez province in the Tarija department with only 3.56 percent of its population self-identifying as indigenous to the province of San Pedro de Totora in the Oruro department with 97.15 percent of its population self-identifying as indigenous.

The census data used in this chapter allows the comparison of MAS support and specific ethnic group identification at the department level. This particular data is unable to directly match one’s indigenous ethnic group with their vote choice, but we can look into the differing relationship MAS has with locations where the different ethnic groups
make up the majority of the population. MAS promotes an inclusive platform attractive to all indigenous and non-indigenous persons alike. However, given that Evo Morales is an Aymara Indian, it is hypothesized that MAS support was the strongest in areas where Aymaras were the largest ethnic group. The percentage of the population Aymara, Quechua, and Guarani is paired with MAS vote share at the department level to identify any differences in support.

The last chapter presented an explanation for indigenous party emergence that rested in a large part on the economic shocks of the collapse of the tin mining industry and the subsequent growth of the coca leaf industry. Efforts by the government to solicit aid from the United States rested on their effort to stop coca cultivation. MAS originated in the coca growers unions, so it is expected that most of their support, especially in the 2002 election, came from workers in the agriculture industry. It is hypothesized that higher percentages of the population employed in the agricultural field will increase the percentage of electoral support received by MAS. It is also hypothesized that a larger percentage of the population employed in the mining industry will increase MAS support in a district given the growing frustrations of miners at the government’s inability to save their industry.

These hypotheses were operationalized using census data on occupation. The census asked the question “During the past week, what was your principal occupation?” Respondents 10 years and older chose from 11 categories: armed forces; managers in public administration and enterprises; professional, scientific, and intellectual; technicians and associate professionals; clerks; service workers; workers in agriculture, livestock, and fishing; workers in mining and quarrying, construction and manufacturing;
plant and machinery; unskilled workers; and not applicable. Of primary interest are the percentage of the population in agriculture, livestock and fishing industry and the percentage in mining and quarrying, construction and manufacturing industry. Neither measure is precise for tapping into the relationship between MAS and coca growers and miners, but captures the appeal of MAS to these sectors of the population. For the agricultural variable, the smallest percentage of workers was found in Cercado in the Cochabamba department with only 3.43 percent of the population and the largest percentage was in Mejillones in the Oruro department with 82.26 percent of the population working in the agricultural sector. Predictably, Mejillones has the lowest percentage in the mining sector with only 2.42 percent while Pantaleon Dalence in the Oruro department represents the highest proportion of the population in the mining sector with 40.19 percent.

In the department level analysis, additional variables are included to examine the relationship between inequality and MAS support. These variables were collected and created by the Political and Economic Analysis Unit (UDAPE) at Bolivia’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística. They were built using the 2001 census but are not available at the province level of analysis. These variables include the percentage of the population in each department that reports having inadequate water and sanitation services, failure in education, inadequate healthcare, and live below the poverty line. According to UDAPE, 81.99 percent of the population in rural areas and 53.94 percent in urban areas live below the poverty line. These variables are included in the department level analysis to determine if MAS was able to solicit support from those suffering the most leading up to the election.
Literacy is included in all the analyses as a measure of inequality. Regionally, Bolivia performs similar to its neighbors concerning literacy rates, but there are disparities between the departments and provinces within Bolivia. Although reforms following the 1952 Revolution permitted the education of indigenous people, the small time frame of 50 years means that indigenous identity and literacy rate are related to one another but not as strongly as one might expect. The census reports on the literacy of the population that is 15 years and older. This variable ranges from a low literacy rate of only 37.04 percent of the population over 15 with the ability to read in General Federico Roman in the Pando department to the province of German Busch in Santa Cruz with 95.63 percent of the population literate.

Results

Department Level

The first level of analysis is the departmental level. Although this level of analysis does not allow for statistical tests controlling for other variable influence, it does allow the identification of trends that can be examined more closely at the province and electoral district level of analyses. The department level also allows the inclusion of variables not available at the province and electoral district level. Table 3 provides the percentages of multiple variables across the nine departments of Bolivia. The data is sorted according to the percentage vote share MAS received in the MMD election. The variable MAS Party Rank is the rank that MAS placed in the department relative to the other parties competing. The averages for Bolivia are included across the variables for a

---

7 Statistical tests in appendix confirm this assumption.
comparison point. Figure 6 and Figure 7 graphically display the relationship between the variables and MAS vote share in the MMDs through scatterplots.

The primary explanation for MAS electoral success is that indigenous peoples account for a majority of the Bolivian population. MAS uses indigenous symbols and messages to draw in this primary constituency so it is expected that departments with larger indigenous populations resulted in a higher vote share for MAS. In Figure 6, the hypothesis on the relationship between the size of indigenous population and MAS vote share is supported. There is a clear, positive relationship between the two variables. According to Table 3, MAS was least successful in Pando and Tarija where the indigenous population is the smallest. MAS was most successful in the departments of Chuquisaca, Potosi, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Oruro where the indigenous population constituted a majority of the population, which lends credence to the argument that regional concentration is an important factor in indigenous political party support.
Table 3: Departmental Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>MAS Support MMD</th>
<th>MAS Support SMD</th>
<th>MAS Party Rank</th>
<th>Indigenous Population</th>
<th>Percent Occupation Agriculture</th>
<th>Percent Occupation Mining</th>
<th>Literacy Rate</th>
<th>Inadequate Water and Sanitation</th>
<th>Failure in Education</th>
<th>Inadequate Healthcare</th>
<th>Below Poverty Line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>20.94</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58.25</td>
<td>49.78</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>78.50</td>
<td>63.92</td>
<td>56.89</td>
<td>38.23</td>
<td>64.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.58</td>
<td>39.58</td>
<td>13.57</td>
<td>75.13</td>
<td>83.60</td>
<td>61.30</td>
<td>39.30</td>
<td>72.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38.36</td>
<td>40.77</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>88.87</td>
<td>82.40</td>
<td>54.60</td>
<td>31.70</td>
<td>76.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.36</td>
<td>40.33</td>
<td>14.31</td>
<td>79.61</td>
<td>45.60</td>
<td>60.50</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>50.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>40.01</td>
<td>13.66</td>
<td>88.27</td>
<td>55.80</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>38.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>62.15</td>
<td>51.09</td>
<td>18.79</td>
<td>64.21</td>
<td>62.20</td>
<td>70.70</td>
<td>40.40</td>
<td>70.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>22.49</td>
<td>14.61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>88.42</td>
<td>63.17</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>79.37</td>
<td>53.20</td>
<td>49.10</td>
<td>64.90</td>
<td>66.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>27.02</td>
<td>20.39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>86.53</td>
<td>55.49</td>
<td>15.91</td>
<td>73.44</td>
<td>71.50</td>
<td>72.40</td>
<td>59.60</td>
<td>79.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>29.23</td>
<td>19.51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>89.97</td>
<td>63.29</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>84.67</td>
<td>65.90</td>
<td>47.20</td>
<td>58.80</td>
<td>67.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>37.62</td>
<td>29.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>86.90</td>
<td>54.29</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>72.92</td>
<td>55.10</td>
<td>52.60</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>54.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While MAS was successful in turning indigenous appeals into votes, there are different levels of success concerning Bolivia’s different indigenous ethnic groups. Morales claims Aymara identity and it is clear in Table 4 that the departments with the highest percentage of Aymara Indians also reported some of the highest vote shares for MAS. For example, La Paz has the highest percentage of Aymaras with 73 percent of indigenous peoples identifying with the group. MAS won 22 percent of the MMD votes cast despite that fact that MIP and its Aymara-only message competed strongly there. MAS won 5 of its MMD seats in the La Paz department. MAS was also successful at appealing to the Quechua community. The Quechua and Aymara groups are historically not comfortable allies, but the inclusive platform of MAS was able to capitalize and promote their shared grievances. The department where MAS was the successful in terms of...
of percentage of the vote share was Cochabamba where over 80 percent of the indigenous community identifies with the Quechua ethnic group. It is also clear that MAS was unable to attract the third largest indigenous ethnic group in Bolivia, the Guarani. MAS was least successful in the Pando department where Guarani makeup 17.74 percent of the indigenous population.

Table 4: Indigenous Ethnic Groups and MAS Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>MAS Percent</th>
<th>Percent Quechua</th>
<th>Percent Aymara</th>
<th>Percent Guarani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>17.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>56.26</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>4.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>22.49</td>
<td>12.76</td>
<td>73.27</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>27.02</td>
<td>74.56</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>29.23</td>
<td>19.28</td>
<td>69.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>37.62</td>
<td>81.48</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAS’s foundations in the coca growers unions suggest that their appeals would be the most successful in departments that specialize in agricultural production. This hypothesis is confirmed by the clear relationship between percentage of MAS vote share and the percentage of the population employed in the agriculture industry (Figure 6). In Table 3, Pando has the lowest percentage of the population employed in the agricultural industry and also reports the lowest percentage of votes for MAS. The relationship moves in a relatively linear fashion with Oruro employing the highest percentage in agriculture and MAS securing 29.3 percent of the MMD vote in that department.

While the relationship between MAS and the agricultural community is a strong one, MAS was less successful in its appeals to the mining industry. As noted in the
previous chapter, the tin industry collapse drove many miners to the thriving coca
cultivation industry. Those who remained employed in the mining industry were among
the most frustrated at the neo-liberal economic policies of traditional parties. The
differences between departments on the mining variable are not as varied as the
percentages at the province and electoral districts levels. This makes identifying patterns
 hazier. MAS attempts to persuade with populist appeals appear to have not been as
successful on the miners as other segments of the population. In Table 3, Chuquisaca
reports the largest portion of the population employed in the mining industry in 2001 and
MAS only placed fourth in that department.

The four measures of inequality provide an interesting look into the relationship
MAS cultivated between the party and those suffering the most in Bolivia. With an
average of nearly 64 percent, the majority of Bolivians report having inadequate water
and sanitation services (Table 3). Despite reporting the highest levels of inadequate water
and sanitation, MAS was unable to cultivate support in Pando and Beni. MNR performed
very strongly in both these departments (Table 3). The MNR presidential candidate
Sanchez de Lozada’s term as president is remembered as a period of economic growth
and this may have influenced MNR support in Pando and Beni (Singer and Morrison
2004). Nationally, there does appear to be a slight relationship between reports of
inadequate water and sanitation and MAS support (Figure 7). Dissatisfaction with health
services also has a relationship with MAS support (Figure 7). In the three departments
where a majority of the population lacked adequate healthcare, MAS performed very well
(Table 3). This may reflect the exclusion of indigenous medicinal options from healthcare
provided and supported by the governments of the traditional parties. Since gaining
office, MAS has pursued an overhaul of Bolivia’s healthcare system perhaps in acknowledgement of this constituency. There does not appear to be a clear relationship between MAS support and educational quality at the departmental level. In the four departments with the highest percentage of the population reporting a failure in education, MAS performed strongly in one (Potosi), had a mediocre performance in another (Chuquisaca), and significantly lost the other two (Pando and Tarija) (Table 3). A similar lack of relationship exists between MAS support and percentage of the population below the poverty line. Pando and Beni report some of the highest poverty rates, 72.5 and 76.1 respectively, and MAS was least successful in these departments.

Figure 7: Department Level Figures - Inequality

The department level of analysis allows the identification of patterns and potential trends in identifying where MAS cultivated its support in its first national election. The
next two analyses statistically test the relationship between some of these variables and MAS vote share at more refined levels of analysis with the addition of institutional variations.

**Province Level**

Bolivia is divided into 112 diverse provinces. The vote count and census data is available at the province level, so it provides an important level of analysis for isolating the vast differences within departments while also setting stricter regional parameters than the electoral district. The analysis conducted uses an ordinary least squared regression on the variables MAS percentage support in the province, percentage of population identifying as indigenous, percentage of the population employed in agricultural and mining industries, and literacy rate. Assumption tests confirmed normality and homoscedasticity, rejected multicollinearity, and identified one problematic outlier. The province General Federico Roman was reported across various outlier tests. Upon verifying the data collected, General Federico Roman was dropped from the sample. There were only 346 votes cast in the province and MAS won 0.29 percent of those votes. Only five percent of the population identifies as indigenous and 88 percent of them claim Guarani ethnicity. The removal of this province makes very little difference in the regression analysis.

---

8Test results available in Appendix.
Table 5: Province Level Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Population Indigenous</td>
<td>0.303***</td>
<td>(5.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Agriculture</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Mining</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td>(-0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>-0.382*</td>
<td>(-2.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. The percentage of the population that identifies as indigenous has a strong, significant impact on the percentage of the vote MAS won in a province. For every percentage point increase in the size of the indigenous population, MAS received a third percentage increase in vote share. This confirms the long held assumption in the field that large, regionally bonded indigenous populations increase support for indigenous political parties.

Surprisingly, the percentage of the population employed in the agriculture industry was not a significant predictor of MAS support despite a strong relationship presented at the department level. MAS arose out of a coca growers union and solicited much of its support from coca growers. The reason that this variable shows no impact at this level of analysis is probably because of the inclusion of indigenous identity in the analysis. The primary coca growers are also indigenous, so when indigenous identity is held constant, the impact of agricultural employment disappears.
Mining also had a non-existent impact on MAS vote share, but the control variable of literacy did in fact have a significant effect on MAS support. With each percentage point increase in the portion of the population over the age of 15 that can read and write, the MAS vote share goes down over a third of a percentage point. This result is not unexpected given that less than 50 years ago it was illegal in Bolivia to teach indigenous peoples to read or write Spanish. Table 3 also reports that almost 60 percent of the Bolivian population is dissatisfied with the quality of education provided in their department. It appears that MAS was able to appeal to the less educated portions of the population and turn it into electoral support.

**Electoral District Level**

Earlier the electoral system used to fill the Chamber of Deputies was explained. In this section, ordinary least squared regression analysis is conducted at the electoral district level. In Table 6, the 68 single member electoral districts are included as units of analysis as well as 9 units representing the multi-member electoral districts. These are labeled ALL in Table 6. The same variables are examined as in the province level analysis with the addition of district magnitude. In the other two models, only the 68 SMDs are included to ensure that results are not biased with the inclusion of the large MMDs. These models are labeled SMD in Table 6. In both sets of models, assumption tests confirmed homoscedasticity and identified one problematic outlier, SMD electoral district 27. Tests showed that district 27 had small leverage but a large impact on the residuals in both sets of models. Once confirmed that this was not a coding error, district 27 was dropped from the analysis. District 27 comes from the Cochabamba department
and reported one of the highest vote shares for MAS (83 percent) and one of the highest percentages of indigenous peoples in a district (83 percent). Given that this relationship is proving to be the strongest, the removal of district 27 will only make the tests more stringent.

Tests reported a multicollinearity problem with the employment in agriculture variable at this level of analysis. It is strongly and negatively correlated with both the mining and literacy variables (-.81 and -.74 respectively). The removal of the agricultural variable is problematic given its importance to explanations of MAS support so results are provided with agriculture included and excluded in both sets of data in Table 6. The differences between the two models make it clear that the inclusion of the agricultural variable in this level of analysis was causing serious issues.

Table 6: District Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>ALL no Agri</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>SMD no Agri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>District Magnitude</strong></td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Population</strong></td>
<td>0.282***</td>
<td>0.298***</td>
<td>0.276***</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>(6.24)</td>
<td>(7.10)</td>
<td>(5.47)</td>
<td>(5.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage Agriculture</strong></td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage Mining</strong></td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(-0.58)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(-0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literacy Rate</strong></td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>-0.358***</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>-0.372***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.11)</td>
<td>(-3.36)</td>
<td>(-0.98)</td>
<td>(-2.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R Squared</strong></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*t-statistic in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Results from the electoral district level of analysis are very similar to the province level. In all four of the models, the percentage of the population that is indigenous in the electoral district has a strong, positive relationship to MAS vote share. Each percentage point increase in the indigenous population results in nearly a third of a percentage point increase in MAS support. This is consistent with the pattern identified in the departmental level of analysis and the results in the province level of analysis.

Surprisingly, district magnitude had no effect on the on MAS support. This may be a reflection of the mixed-member electoral system. In a two-tier mixed member system, parties have incentives to place candidates in as many SMDs as possible. Of the 27 seats in the Chamber won by MAS, 14 were secured through single member electoral districts and 13 through the multi-member districts (Table 2). In Table 3, the departmental level analysis, it is evident that MAS won a higher percentage of the vote in the MMDs than in the SMDs, but not by a significant amount. The largest discrepancy was in Oruro where there was a 10 percent difference between MAS vote share in the SMDs and MMDs. Since the electoral formula used for seat distribution in this election took into account the number of SMD seats won by a party before distributing the MMD seats, MAS’s success in single member districts may have tempered the advantage larger district magnitude typically provides to smaller parties. NFR on the other hand only won 5 SMD seats compared to 20 MMD seats and may have benefited from the larger district magnitude (Table 2).

Without the addition of the agriculture variable, the literacy rate of the districts in both models gains significance. For each unit increase in the literacy rate of a district, there is a third of a point decrease in MAS vote share. This suggests that the MAS
platform was persuasive not just to those who self-identify as indigenous, but also to those who were socioeconomically disadvantaged during past regimes.

One additional set of models is tested to compare the performance of MAS’s main competitors with MAS across the same variables. CONDEPA and MIP are the two other indigenous political parties in this election and thus competed directly with MAS for the indigenous vote. MIR is the traditional leftist party and NFR is the other new party that campaigned with a populist message. Table 7 displays the vote share received by each of these main competitors in the nine departments. It is sorted according to MAS vote share in the single member districts.

Table 7: Party Vote Share by Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>MAS SMD</th>
<th>MAS MMD</th>
<th>MIP SMD</th>
<th>MIP MMD</th>
<th>CONDEPA SMD</th>
<th>CONDEPA MMD</th>
<th>MIR SMD</th>
<th>MIR MMD</th>
<th>NFR SMD</th>
<th>NFR MMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>11.79</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>18.34</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>12.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>46.36</td>
<td>39.31</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>10.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>21.72</td>
<td>24.86</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>22.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>15.42</td>
<td>17.27</td>
<td>9.02</td>
<td>15.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>14.61</td>
<td>22.49</td>
<td>15.79</td>
<td>17.74</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>20.51</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>15.62</td>
<td>20.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>19.51</td>
<td>29.23</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>19.11</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>13.65</td>
<td>18.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>20.39</td>
<td>27.02</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>17.85</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>14.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>29.58</td>
<td>37.62</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>29.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 8, the dependent variable in each model is the identified party’s percentage of the vote share in the 68 SMDs. The proportion of the population indigenous is a significant positive factor in explaining all three indigenous political parties’ support. However, it carries the most explanatory weight in the MAS and then MIP vote shares. Interestingly, MAS and MIP may have split the vote in districts they were both competing in. Increases in MAS vote share result in statistically significant
decrease in MIP vote share. MIP campaigned on an exclusive message of Aymara pride whereas MAS campaigned with an inclusive all-indigenous platform despite Morales’ Aymara identity. The indigenous rights platform may have benefited from these two parties coordinating prior to the election. While the proportion of a district’s population was not significant in explaining MAS vote share in earlier models, it is clear in Table 8 that this variable significantly and greatly decreased MIP performance in a district. Each unit increase in the percentage of miners has an almost 2 point decrease in the percentage of votes carried by MIP.

Table 8: MAS Support Compared to Other Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAS</th>
<th>MIP</th>
<th>CONDEPA</th>
<th>MIR</th>
<th>NFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAS Percent</td>
<td>-0.303***</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.32)</td>
<td>(-0.58)</td>
<td>(-1.76)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Population Indigenous</td>
<td>0.315***</td>
<td>0.295***</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.089*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.94)</td>
<td>(5.43)</td>
<td>(2.83)</td>
<td>(-1.68)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Agriculture</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(-1.23)</td>
<td>(-1.32)</td>
<td>(-0.74)</td>
<td>(-1.69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Mining</td>
<td>0.0155</td>
<td>-1.196**</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(-2.41)</td>
<td>(-0.69)</td>
<td>(-0.53)</td>
<td>(-0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>-0.161</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.70)</td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
<td>(-0.68)</td>
<td>(-1.07)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Squared</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-statistic in parentheses</td>
<td>*p &lt; 0.05, **p &lt; 0.01, ***p &lt; 0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

This chapter assessed explanations for indigenous political party support. Earlier chapters of the project focused on the transition of indigenous identity into a politicized cleavage and partisan preference. This chapter rounds out explanations for indigenous political party entrance to the Bolivian party system by examining the weight of social
and institutional explanations on MAS vote share. MAS was the first of the indigenous political parties to become nationally competitive and the 2002 election is where they made the transition. Surprisingly, institutional explanations for party support had minimal effect on MAS vote share. The addition of proportional districts with multiple seats made no statistical difference in MAS vote share. MAS pulled its support from the social cleavages in Bolivian society. In particular, indigenous identity, employment, and inequality were important factors in MAS support.

The primary predictor of MAS vote share was the proportion of the population indigenous. MAS arose out of the coca growers union, but it was able to build mass appeal within Bolivia’s indigenous population. The impact of the proportion of the population indigenous held across all three levels of analysis and across multiple indigenous political parties. Although statistically insignificant at the province and electoral district levels of analysis, the department level of analysis also revealed a positive relationship between MAS vote share and the percentage of the population employed in agriculture. This suggests that once social cleavages are politicized, whether at the founding of the party system or much later, they form a reliable base for political parties to court.

CONDEPA was already on the decline in the 2002 election, but MAS and MIP actually competed directly against one another for the indigenous vote. Under less permissive electoral rules, these two groups would have had incentives to coordinate prior to the election. Studies have shown that placing candidates on the SMD ballot increases a party’s performance in the MMD tier. Under the Bolivian mixed member system, the two parties had incentives to run candidates on as many ballots as they could.
MAS won a similar number of seats in both tiers, but MIP won 5 out of its 6 total seats in single member districts. Pre-electoral coordination with MAS for the greater indigenous cause may have cost the more exclusive, Aymara-based MIP seats.

In conclusion, this chapter adds to the indigenous political party story by focusing on the second question of how newly politicized cleavages transition into votes and seats in the legislature. The emergence of these political parties throughout the region was an unexpected phenomenon. However, most of the parties have remained single-issue or regionally focused which limits their lifespan, effectiveness, and potential power. This chapter looked at the first indigenous political party to carve itself a relevant place in the national party system. MAS placed 2nd in the 2002 elections and, in the 2005 elections, MAS won the executive office with the first candidate to claim a majority of votes since democracy returned to Bolivia. This analysis compared social and institutional explanations for indigenous party support and revealed that social cleavages remain vitally important to indigenous political parties, even as they link to the national party system. Institutional design options still set parameters for the structuring of party and voter behavior, but voter support lies in appeals to the politicized social cleavages that made the group relevant in the first place.
CHAPTER 5: INDIGENOUS PARTY REPRESENTATIVE EFFORTS

“They have come to power with an indigenous representative who is the brother Evo Morales. More has been expected from this government but more time passed and Evo Morales has seemed more the Trojan horse of the transnational neoliberal model.”

The final question this project addresses concerns the type and quality of representation provided by MAS once formed and elected to office. This chapter highlights legislation passed by the 2005–2010 Bolivian Congress, which was the first term MAS held a majority of seats in the lower congressional chamber. It codes legislation according to issues areas of focus to identify where MAS directed its efforts concerning the demands and needs of indigenous constituents. It also examines the incorporation of indigenous rights into the content of the new constitution, pushed forward by MAS, which went into effect in 2009. This policy review uses reports by indigenous leaders to gain insight into how these policies were received by indigenous organizations. To carve a place in the party system, MAS capitalized on discontent in Bolivia’s indigenous population and was able to co-opt that discontent into electoral support. In order to solidify their position in the party system, MAS needed to offer policies in line with their campaign promises. This chapter examines legislation from the first term and the new constitution to highlight areas where MAS successfully pursued indigenous representation and uses interviews with indigenous representatives to gain insight into areas where more efforts may be needed.

---

9 Adrian Villegas, Representative of CONAMAQ Interview 8/4/11 in La Paz, Bolivia
From Outsider to the Executive Branch

As outlined in the previous chapter, the 2002 General Election pivoted MAS from being another special interest political party with a limited shelf life to the second most popular political party in Bolivia. However, Bolivia’s electoral laws require a majority of votes be won by a presidential candidate in order to assume the office. In the 2002 elections, no candidate won a majority of votes and the presidency was determined through negotiations in Congress. Earlier in the campaign, as part of his populist message, Morales had announced that MAS would not negotiate with other parties to form the government (Singer and Morrison 2004). This meant that despite its second place standing, MAS was not courted during negotiations. MNR eventually negotiated support from MIR and UCS to support Sanchez de Lozada as executive. Protests by key citizen organizations occurred on the day he was sworn into office.

MAS participated in the protests and continued to channel its time and resources into building alliances with other frustrated sectors of the population. In September 2003, Sanchez de Lozada unveiled a plan to export natural gas to the United States and Mexico through Chile. The plan was viewed as a betrayal by many Bolivians because animosity towards the US and Chile. Massive protests, led by indigenous peasant organizations, broke out upon the plan’s announcement in September (Jeter 2003). Tensions culminated in violence between protesters and the military and seventy-four people were killed (Williams 2003). Following the deaths, protestors demanded Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation and marched around La Paz for five days. Upon his resignation, his vice-president, Carlos Mesa, assumed the office. He negotiated with the opposition parties by promising a transitional government of non-political cabinet members with early
elections and constitutional reform (Jeter 2003). Protests over continued negotiations concerning the gas pipeline forced Mesa to resign, and MAS and protestors rejected the next two men in the line of succession. The Supreme Court president eventually assumed control for the transition to the December 2005 elections (Forero 2005).

It was in these elections that MAS capitalized on its position as voice of the people and successfully took control of the government. It secured 12 seats in the Chamber of Senators and 72 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Evo Morales won 54 percent of the vote and became the first Bolivian president since the return of democracy to win with a majority thus nullifying the need for congressional negotiations. Morales and MAS were presented with the clearest electoral mandate Bolivia’s democracy had experienced. MAS promised massive institutional reforms, including a new constitution designed to increase the representation and participation of Bolivia’s indigenous majority in government.

**Descriptive Representation**

Theories on political representation distinguish between descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation (Pitkin 1967). Descriptive representation is the theory that when a representative and their constituents share similar politically relevant demographic characteristics, the representative pursues more legislation concerning that group relative to other representatives. Descriptive representation is best exemplified by the example of a legislature that is composed similarly to the population they represent in terms of demography. Thus a descriptively representative legislature in most countries would be composed of half women and half men like the population they represent. In
South American countries, a descriptively representative legislature would be around 50 percent women and have a percentage of indigenous members similar to the percentage of the population that is indigenous. This concept is important because it is argued that descriptive representation should result in substantive representation for members of the shared demographic characteristic. Substantive representation is when an elected representative pursues legislation in support of a particular group. This can occur without descriptive representation but it is argued that descriptive representation encourages it.

Scholars have found significant support for descriptive representation leading to substantive policy representation. Tate (2000) found that African American legislators pursued substantive and symbolic legislation concerning African American issues at a higher rate than their counterparts. In studies on women’s representation, female legislators have been found to concentrate on issue areas of importance to women voters (Bratton and Ray 2002; Carroll 2001; Mateo-Diaz 2005; Norris 1996, Swers 1998, Thomas 1994). In Latin America, Schwindt-Bayer (2006) finds support for the hypothesis that female legislators initiate more legislation on women’s and family issues than their male counterparts.

The evidence of a relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation encourages the expectation that indigenous legislators pursue substantive legislation on indigenous issues at a higher rate than their non-indigenous counterparts. In the case of MAS, this effect should be compounded by the fact that indigenous representatives are members of political parties that used the message of increased indigenous representation as a campaign promise. Indigenous political parties have extra incentives to produce policy results given that their electoral future rests on meeting
expectations. This chapter is an exploratory examination of legislation passed in MAS’s first term to gain insight into how descriptive representation affects substantive representation on indigenous rights. Future studies will compare the policy output of indigenous legislators to non-indigenous legislators and compare legislatures according to their indigenous composition, but this chapter highlights the parameters of indigenous representation and provides insight into the first actions of indigenous legislators concerning indigenous representation.

**Indigenous Issue Areas**

Prior to the election of MAS, indigenous issues were not a priority for Bolivian politicians unless the mobilized populace threatened their continued rule. Socioeconomic inequalities between the indigenous and non-indigenous population continued to be a persistent problem. According to the UNDP Human Development Report on Bolivia in 2002, 63 percent of Bolivian lived below the poverty line and 37 percent of Bolivians could not afford to meet their needs for food. In terms of education, indigenous students completed an average of 3 less years of schooling than non-indigenous students (Hall and Patrinos 2006). Public expenditures on health and education measured as a percentage of GDP changed had changed very little in the decades leading up to MAS rule. In fact, the Bolivian government spent less on health in the early 2000s than they did in the 1980s (UNESCO). The Bolivian government passed land reform in 1996 as an attempt to pacify protests by indigenous groups. However, this reform focused on the regularization of land where properties owned by indigenous peoples were evaluated according to their economic productivity (IWGIA 2002). If the land was deemed unproductive, it could be
taken back and redistributed to a more successful land owner. Over 103 million hectares of land were to be regularized through this process. The reform also included an application process for territories to be marked as indigenous, but these were done through Supreme Decrees that failed to grant actual titles and provide demarcation lines for the territories (IWGIA 2002). Indigenous issues were only relevant to Bolivian politicians if indigenous peoples forced them to pay attention and, even then, the policies were logistically weak and designed as short-term pacification tactics rather than long-term solutions to indigenous problems and demands.

Through the election of MAS, Bolivia’s indigenous population was more descriptively represented in government than it had ever been. As Juana Llaria Laruta of the Bartolina Sisa federation explains, “Before we had been robbed by the governments of Banzer Suárez and Goni [Sanchez de Lozada] and we knew nothing. What they were doing, they did not care for our peasant brothers, nothing. Now, currently we have an indigenous president, Evo Morales, and we know everything.” The policy output of MAS’s first term should reflect its commitment to improving the condition of issues important to the indigenous population in Bolivia through substantive representation.

Research on indigenous politics has provided insight into what issues are important to South American indigenous voters in particular. These issues have historically dealt with citizenship (Eisenstadt 2006; Lucero 2007; Trejo 2004; Yashar 1999) and political and legal autonomy (Yashar 2005). South American indigenous peoples have prioritized multi-cultural constitutionalism, which formally recognizes the multi-cultural nature of states, customary law, indigenous languages, and provides for a bilingual, intercultural education (Van Cott 2000, 2010). Sieder (1999; 2007) has also
noted that the recognition and respect for indigenous customary law is a very important issue for many South American indigenous peoples. In Bolivia, the legality of coca leaf cultivation is also of primary concern.

The United Nations released its *Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues* report in 2009 with the objective of assisting UN member-states and non-governmental organizations in implementing policies and programs sensitive to indigenous peoples’ needs and desires. The report surveys the situation of the world’s indigenous population and identifies several shared critical issues areas where indigenous peoples’ rights are threatened. These areas cover a broad spectrum and require government action in order to provide or protect indigenous rights in these areas. Table 9 lists the issue areas identified. In the following analysis, policy is sorted into these areas for insight into which issues indigenous political parties can effect change and in which areas pressures beyond the indigenous community force concessions.

Table 9: Indigenous Issue Areas

| Self-determination and autonomy |
| Lands and Territories |
| Natural Resources |
| Environmental Issues |
| Traditional knowledge and intellectual property |
| Administration of justice, indigenous customary laws |
| Health and social security |
| Education |
| Capacity development and vocational training |
| Private Sector |
| Indigenous Women |
| Children and Youth |
| Urban indigenous peoples/migration |
| Data collection and disaggregation |

*UNDG Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples' Issues 2009*
First Term Analysis

This is a review of legislation passed during MAS’s first term in control of Congress. Bills passed by Congress between February 10, 2006 and December 2, 2009 were coded through a two-step process. First, bills were coded as indigenous related or not. Only legislation specifically including the indigenous community was coded as indigenous related. For example, a law ordering the construction of a new school in a community would only be coded as indigenous related if it included instructions on teaching indigenous culture or multilingual education. The school may be built in a majority indigenous town, but the bill was only coded as indigenous related if it was explicitly directed towards the indigenous population. The second phase of coding coded the indigenous related laws into the critical issue areas identified in Table 9 to gain insight into where indigenous political parties direct their representative efforts.

It is expected that legislation concerning increased self-determination, recognition of traditional land boundaries, and the respect of indigenous justice mechanisms would have more difficulty becoming law because they require the state to give up a degree of sovereignty. Can indigenous political parties overcome the state’s need and desire to be the supreme power within its borders? The right to control not only the surface of the land but the resources within it is also an area that brings indigenous people’s rights into direct conflict with the persuasive powers of multinational corporations. As the gas wars demonstrated, politicians are pulled on one side by international agreements with states and corporations and on the other by indigenous peoples. They often have to sacrifice indigenous demands in order to pacify other international actors.
Social issue areas should have less institutional and international opposition and thus more opportunity for successful substantive representation. The biggest opponent to education, healthcare, issues concerning women and children, and policy focusing on cultural preservation is limited state resources. In the case of Bolivia, indigenous peoples made the leap from non-citizens to controlling the government in only fifty years. This means that while much progress was made, inequality and poverty are still rampant among Bolivia’s indigenous population. MAS and the state have to make decisions about where to direct limited resources and that forces them to rank priority issue areas.

Table 10 displays the result of the coding process. Only 21 out of 793 bills passed by Congress were explicitly directed at issues concerning the indigenous population. This is only 4 percent of the laws passed. The last explicitly indigenous related law passed was Law 3897 passed on June 26, 2008. This law “rises into law” the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. By June, a draft of the new constitution was already being negotiated in Congress before going to voters through referendum in January. Given the constitution’s significant expansion of indigenous rights, bills directly related to indigenous issues may have been discouraged so as to not come into conflict and create confusion if the new constitution passed with voters.
Table 10: Indigenous Legislation during MAS First Term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Issue Area</th>
<th>Laws 3337 – 4130</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>3545</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>3523 3525 3546 3545 3680 3741 3754</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Issues</td>
<td>3358 3523 3525 3545 3681 3680 3754</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Intellectual Property</td>
<td>3358 3372 3463 3424 3603 3710 3874 3875</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3390 3875</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training</td>
<td>3508</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>3404 3508 3681</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>3681</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>3760 3897</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21 out of 793</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of issue areas, laws were coded according to each issue area they applied to. Therefore, some laws are coded into multiple issue areas. Congress surprisingly directed much of its efforts to laws relating to natural resources and environmental issues. Policies concerning cultural preservation and intellectual property also received significant attention. Highlights of the laws passed in each issue are provided in the following sections. To gain insight into the reception of these laws by indigenous organizations, interviews were conducted with representatives of two important indigenous organizations: the Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa (the Bartolina Sisa Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women; Bartolinas) and El
Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (The National Council of Markas and Ayllus of Qollasuyo; CONAMAQ).\textsuperscript{10}

The Bartolina Sisa federation formed in the 1970s within the peasant workers union CSUTCB and is Bolivia’s only indigenous women’s organization (Monasterios P. 2007). According to Monasterios P. (2007), the Bartolinas have “a membership that reaches over 100,000 women and a trade-union structure that reaches from the national executive directors to community-level producer’s associations.” It is a national organization with representatives in all nine departments in Bolivia. Juana Llaria Laruta, a Bartolina representative in the La Paz region, was interviewed in August 2011.

CONAMAQ is an organization whose primary objective is to achieve self-determination for Bolivia’s indigenous. It directs its efforts to the recognition of the pre-Columbian authority structures within the indigenous community. Before colonization, Allyus were the basic social unit of indigenous communities and Markas were communal groups of multiple Allyus. According to Lucero (2006), many Allyus and Markas remained intact and often negotiated with the republican governments. Across time, the leaders of the Allyus were natural representatives for Bolivia’s indigenous population and several leaders formed CONAMAQ in 1997. CONAMAQ participated in the protests that forced Sanchez de Lozada from office and played a key role in organizing support for a Constituent Assembly to revise the constitution. CONAMAQ also competed in the 2004

\textsuperscript{10} The author recognizes that this small number of interviews is not representative of all Indigenous Bolivians. A survey assessing the quality of representation would be much more effective at revealing assessment trends. However, at the onset of this project, none of the major surveys conducted in the region over-sampled the indigenous population and thus the number of indigenous people interviewed was very small relative to the size of the indigenous population. The author hope to provide insight through interviews with indigenous representatives and organizations that may be paired and compared to survey data in the future.
local elections and won 34 seats (Lucero 2006, 51). In August 2011, several representatives from CONAMAQ were interviewed by the author. Information used in the following sections is primarily provided by Aquilino Jujra, a former mayor and the coordinator for basic services, and Adrian Villegas, an engineer and technical coordinator.

**Education**

The indigenous bill of rights in the new Bolivian Constitution recognizes the importance of intracultural, intercultural, and plurilingual education in all of the educational system. During its first term in control of Congress, MAS passed many infrastructure development policies, but very few explicitly directed at improving indigenous education in Bolivia. According to Aquilino Yuga, despite the Constitution declaring plurilingual education a civil right, “We have some problems in education, because we are continuing to educate our children in the countryside, in the borrowed language which is colonial Spanish. We are Aymaras, Quechuas, and Guaranies, we are from different languages, and it would be good for our children to learn our first language, the mother tongue, in my case it would be Quechua. We want a chance to educate ourselves according to our customs and according to our language more than anything.” Law 3875 passed by Congress in 2008 directs resources to the restoration, preservation, and maintenance of the “Indian School Juku Marka” founded by an indigenous leader and located in the La Paz department.

Law 3875 also places the prefecture of La Paz in charge of adding a superior technical industrial complex to the school. This relates to the concerns of Juana Llaria
Laruta of the Bartolinas about MAS’s progress in the field of education. She says, “We had improvement for education. We asked for libraries; we asked for computers that are very useful for students and so on. We also asked for some help for us. We asked for libraries for the students so they can use internet. Also, we ask for internet in the school. And that was the things we asked for our people, for the natives. We asked schools to be built in twenty provinces. But there are some villages that have been forgotten and are not civilized.” Congress passed Law 3390 in 2006 that creates a “Great Peasant Internship Center” in the Tarija department to benefit adolescents and youth in rural areas “to ensure their right to education with humanistic knowledge and technical promotion and incorporation into local and national development.” It gives the local government a land grant for the area needed to build the school.

**Capacity Development and Vocational Training**

Like most of Latin America’s indigenous populations, Bolivia’s has struggled with severe poverty and inequality relative to their non-indigenous counterparts. Legislation was needed that combated the hurdles to overcoming this stratification. The Bartolinas are a trade-union group and thus many their efforts focus on developing a healthy market for indigenous women to participate in. Juana Llaria Laruta credits MAS for helping this mission: “However, thanks to the brothers [MAS] we have handicrafts. We make wool from Alpaca, from sheep, we make ponchos, we make sweaters, pants, in synthesis; we make handcrafts from everything. From the new laws, we are getting projects to make handicrafts in order to create more jobs around Bolivia.”
In 2006, Congress passed Law 3508 that transferred the ownership and property of a farmer’s market in Sucre to the indigenous organization Federación Única de Trabajadores de Pueblos Originarios de Chuquisaca (FUTPOCH). The law draws on the ideals of fair trade by specifying that the market is intended for the direct sale of agricultural products from producers to consumers. Similarly, Law 3404 orders the department of Tarija to transfer 40,000 Bolivianos to La Federación Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Tarija to host an annual Department Peasant Fair to “promote the productive potential of communities and peasant organizations in the country.” The law says that profits from the fair should be directed towards improving the social infrastructure of the organization and its regular farmer’s market.

The need to develop the internal organization of indigenous groups is one that the Bartolinas have also encountered. According to Juana Llaria Laruta, there are difficulties communicating between the different organization levels and it sometimes creates conflict and unmet needs. She says, “That is the reason we ask to our brother Evo and sister Felipa [Felipa Banca, executive director of Bartolinas] for a course that teaches us what we have to do when we have authority.” They have requested classes to develop executive skills necessary to run a nationwide organization successfully. She hopes that through training they will be able to spread their message of preserving native cultures. She says, “We need more, but we have the capacity. From 100% [of indigenous people], we have 50% and the other 50% are people that do not have interest, but we will fight to the end as a Bartolina Sisa, as Tupak Katari, as a native. We are raising the customs and coming as before.”
Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property

As expressed by Juana Llaria Laruta, cultural preservation is important to Bolivia’s indigenous peoples. There is a fear that they are losing their culture as more and more Bolivians identify as Mestizo instead of indigenous. The United Nations recognizes the need for states to commit to the preservation of indigenous knowledge, culture, and language. Part of these efforts should include a legal right for indigenous populations to control the use of their cultural symbols. In the past, political parties, organizations, and companies have used indigenous symbols to try and capture legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Laws should give indigenous groups proprietary rights to their symbols as intellectual property. Bolivia’s first Congress under MAS control passed several measures focused at these efforts. Law 3874 recognizes several items of clothing as “representing the original culture of the Andean and Amazonia regions of Bolivia.” It says that the Bolivian government in coordination with indigenous authorities has the power to regulate the use of these symbols. Law 3710 declares San Pedro de Totora province in the Oruro department the Capital of Tarqueada Folklore and deems November 10th the beginning of a festival honoring the potato harvest. The tarqa is a wind instrument native to the Andean indigenous tribes. These laws are designed to both highlight the indigenous contribution to Bolivia’s culture and ensure that it continues in a form endorsed by Bolivia’s indigenous population.

Health Care and Basic Services

The socio-economic disadvantages of Bolivia’s indigenous population have created a situation where many people do not have access to basic services and
healthcare. As noted in the previous chapter, in 2001, 64 percent of Bolivians lived below the poverty line. According to the Political and Economic Analysis Unit (UDAPE) at Bolivia’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 64 percent of Bolivians report having inadequate water and sanitation services and 38 percent report inadequate access to healthcare. Many of these issues are located in the rural areas inhabited primarily by indigenous peoples. Juana Llaria Laruta elaborates that “In terms of health, we are very behind my sister, we are behind. At least here in the city we have it, but in the provinces there is just one auxiliary and we have nurses without degrees and they know just the way to inject, prepare some medicine, and just that, nothing more. Because of that, we asked for an ambulance; we have asked to build a health center with a specialized doctor and nurse, but we do not have anything yet.” She reports that in some provinces, people have to walk up to five hours for specialized treatment including pre-natal care. Aquilino Jujrab explains the problems with basic services when he states, “They are still a necessity; because of the incompetence of the ministry the resources still have not arrived. This is what we are missing nationwide.”

MAS passed several laws aimed at improving infrastructure development during its first term in control of Congress, but none that explicitly designed plans to improve access to drinking water, clean sanitation, and healthcare for Bolivia’s rural indigenous populations. However, the Ministry of Development under Evo Morales launched a country-wide development plan in 2006 that defined health as a human right. According to the plan, the state is responsible for ensuring the right to life and health and health is determined by social and political designs, is more than the absence of disease, and
includes promotion, prevention, and protection. This signifies a commitment by MAS to improvement access to health and basic services for Bolivians.

While in Bolivia, interviews were conducted with Dr. German Crespo, the Director General de Planificación (Planning Director) at the Bolivian Ministry of Health and Sports. Dr. Crespo is responsible for designing a comprehensive healthcare plan that will bring free healthcare services to all Bolivians by 2015. According to Dr. Crespo, the plan includes recognition of traditional native medicinal practices and attempts to incorporate those rituals and treatment methods into state provided healthcare. In designing the plan, he has met with over 5,000 people across Bolivia in order to identify their needs and incorporate them into the new plan. His interviews identified several areas that need more attention from the government.

One of these areas is assistance for the disabled. The Ministry launched the Moto Mendez Program that systematically registered all disabled persons in Bolivia to determine exactly how there were in the country, what kind of disability they had, and what needed to be done to help them. From the registry, they identified two areas to direct resources. In order to enhance the quality of life of the disabled, Bolivia is building two factories to manufacture wheelchairs and crutches so that the disabled have improved access to them. In response to the collected information, the Ministry is also distributing folic acid to pregnant women in order to help reduce the number of birth defects in the country. The Ministry has also designed a program that pays Bolivia’s women living in the poorest areas of the country 200 dollars for going to the doctor during their pregnancy.
The healthcare reform plan introduces a Social Protection Plan in the 168 poorest municipalities in Bolivia that provides state-sponsored assistance to people between the ages of 5 and 59 that are too young or too old to qualify for Bolivia’s existing social security programs. It also includes a commitment to combating Malaria, Tuberculosis, AIDS, and Chagas disease in Bolivia’s rural communities. The actions taken by the Bolivian government under Morales and MAS show a commitment to improving the health and quality of life of Bolivians, but progress is not happening as fast as indigenous groups would like.

**Natural Resources and Environment**

During its first term in control of Congress, MAS passed several pieces of legislation concerning the rights of indigenous peoples to natural resources and environmental sustainability. Adrian Villegas of CONAMAQ explains this obligation: “The Spaniards came with the colonies to rob and plunder, to exploit natural resources, our wealth in gold, wildlife and biodiversity, to exploit us and monopolize our lands. They imposed municipalities on us; they imposed provinces, things that do not exist for us as territory.” Once in office, MAS made efforts to help the indigenous communities reclaim some access to the land and its resources. For example, Law 3741 transfers departmental resources from oil revenues in Tarija to rural and indigenous communities in the department. The funds are “for implementing productive community initiatives prioritized by peasant communities and indigenous people in the framework of Community Outreach Development.” A more direct piece of legislation aimed at including indigenous peoples in discussion on future land use in Bolivia is Law 3545
passed in 2006. This law reforms the Agrarian Law of 1996 and establishes a new National Land Commission with sixteen representatives from different governmental departments and organization in Bolivia. Four of these seats are reserved for indigenous representatives from CSUTCB, the Bartolinas, CONAMAQ, and CIDOB. The law also declares properties owned by indigenous communities as exempt from property taxes.

MAS also tackled this issue by including indigenous communities in infrastructure development bills. For example, Law 3680 focuses on developing the tourism industry in a city in Tarija department and covers a broad range of activities from road improvement to festival promotion. This piece of legislation is important to indigenous rights in that it requires the Department of Tourism to “develop regulations and standards necessary for the developments to impact in a lesser extent the indigenous communities to preserve their culture.” Similarly, Law 3523 orders the construction of dams to provide a more economical alternative for the water access needed for agricultural production. There is no mention of prior consultation in this piece of legislation, but the law does include in its objectives the goal “to generate positive impacts on the surrounding environment and improve the living conditions of rural families and indigenous communities.”

**Autonomy and Native Justice**

Related to demands concerning access to natural resources is the desire for autonomy over the land occupied by indigenous communities. While the Bartolinas focus many of their efforts on vocational training and trade improvement, CONAMAQ attempts to improve the level of autonomy given to Bolivia’s indigenous communities.
As Adrian Villegas of CONAMAQ argues, “If we have a territory then we have the natural resources of that territory that are renewable or not, but if we do exercise the true self-government, we should manage our territory. And not just the territory because according to us the territory is Mancapacha, Acapacha, Kainpacha, Alpacha. I mean within the earth, on earth, and what is in the earth. I mean that is for us the territory.”

During its first term in control of Congress, MAS did not pass any legislation explicitly related to indigenous autonomy beyond the approval of the new Constitution and Law 3790 that “rises into law the forty-six articles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Declaration directly recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination. As Aquilino Jujra states, “And we have been given as well, what they call original indigenous autonomy in order for us to have our self-determination, self-governance of all our native indigenous peasants.” However, Law 3790 provides no further instructions on how to ensure that the self-determination rights contained in the Declaration are protected in future legislation. There are no national consequences established for violations of indigenous rights so this piece of legislation can be viewed as more symbolic more than revolutionary, especially given that Bolivia was the first country to approve the Declaration and received significant media attention because of it.

The New Constitution

The protestors that ousted the two presidents prior to the 2005 elections included in their demands a Constituent Assembly for a new constitution. MAS absorbed this
demand into their campaign and began the process of reforming the constitution soon after taking office. The new constitution eventually became MAS’s landmark legislation for the expansion of indigenous rights, but the process to the new constitution was controversial.

One of the first pieces of legislation passed by Congress called for elections of a Constituent Assembly on July 2, 2006. Political parties, indigenous groups, and worker organizations were all allowed to nominate candidates to the assembly. MAS supporters won 56 percent of the seats, but failed to secure the two thirds majority needed to enact change (Hammond 2011). According to Crabtree (2007), opposition parties demanded that each article in the constitution had to pass in the Assembly with a two thirds vote, which essentially provided the opposition with a line-item veto. This slowed the process and the Assembly debated from August 2006 until December 2007. In November 2007, Morales moved the Assembly to a military academy and surrounded it with troops and MAS supporters. The move angered opposition parties and they boycotted the Assembly but with them absent, MAS supporters were able to draft a new constitution.

The Assembly reconvened on December 8, 2007 to vote on each item in the constitution. The main opposition party, PODEMOS, abstained in protest and the new constitution was approved. However, Congress was given the authority to amend the draft before it went to a voter referendum. MAS shared control of the Chamber of Senators with PODEMOS and made concessions on much of the constitution for Senate approval (Hammond 2011). Debates lasted a year and included a failed referendum to recall Morales. In October 2008, thousands of protestors, joined by Morales, marched into La Paz and demanded that the Senate schedule a constitutional referendum
On January 25, 2009, voters went to the polls and 61 percent of them approved the new Bolivian Constitution. It went into effect in February 2009.

The 100 page document significantly overhauls many aspects of the Bolivian government, including the location of Bolivia’s capital, the composition of Congress, electoral rules, and presidential term limits. The Constitution formally declares that access to basic services is a human right that the government is responsible for protecting. However, the changes most relevant to this project concern the expansion if indigenous rights.

From the first article of the Constitution, it is clear that it signals an overhaul of social, political, and economic structure of Bolivia. It declares that Bolivia is founded in plurality and in political, economic, legal, cultural and linguistic pluralism, within the integrating process of the country\(^{11}\). The choice of plurinational over multicultural is important because of it formally acknowledges the multiple indigenous nations living within the Bolivian state. The second article of the Constitution specifically addresses the pre-colonial existence of the indigenous originary farmer nations and people and guarantees their free determination in reference to their right to autonomy, to self-government, to their culture, to the recognition of their institutions and to the consolidation of their territorial entities within the framework of the Bolivian state.

Article 5 of the Constitution also declares the official languages of Bolivia as Spanish and all the languages of the indigenous originary farmer nations and people and specifically identifies thirty-six indigenous languages. It requires that the federal and departmental

\(^{11}\) For the purpose of this section, the English translation of the Bolivian constitution completed by Luis Francisco Valle Velasco, a Bolivian attorney and legal translator, was used for reference. Excerpts from the Constitution are in italics and are from Velasco’s translation.
government levels use at least two of the official languages and all other levels of
government should use Spanish and the own languages of their territories.

Article 30(I) delimits the indigenous peoples as those that share a common
national identity that existed prior to the Spanish colonization. If a group meets the
criteria, Article 30(II) specifies an indigenous bill of rights that declares eighteen specific
rights granted to Bolivia’s indigenous peoples in addition to the rights given to all
Bolivians. These rights include the right to exist freely, the right to free determination, the
right to communal land ownership and the protection of sacred places, and the right to create and manage their own systems, mediums and networks of communication. The
new constitution also highlights the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples to
their culture, languages, medicine and symbols. Indigenous peoples are guaranteed the
right to an intracultural, intercultural, and plurilingual education in all of the
educational system. The constitution grants them access to universal and free healthcare
that respects its cosmovision and traditional practices.

The specifications concerning indigenous autonomy are of particular importance
for the potential they hold. Article 30(II:15) states that the indigenous groups have the
right to be consulted by means of the appropriate procedures, and in particular through
their institutions, every time legislative or administrative measures susceptible of
affecting them are anticipated. Within this framework, the right to an obligatory prior
consultation will be respected and guaranteed, conducted by the State, in good faith and
in an agreed manner, regarding the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources
within the territory where they are located. The promise of prior consultation provides
legal ground for Bolivia’s indigenous groups to stand on in future conflicts with the state.
over natural resources and development projects. The Constitution also promises
indigenous groups a part of the benefits of natural resource collection and development in
their territories.

In other parts of the Constitution, it adds an indigenous level of governmental
jurisdiction to the existing departmental, provincial, and regional governments. The
indigenous levels of government have independent elections and decision making powers
concerning their territory. Article 290 of the Constitution states the formation of the
indigenous originary farmer autonomy is based on the ancestral territories, currently
inhabited by those nations and people, expressed in consultation, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law. This article does not redistribute property once inhabited by
indigenous groups back to those groups, but does allow for an additional legal
recognition and demarcation. Existing municipalities may convert into indigenous
autonomous regions if it is the will of the people verified through referendum and
approved by the national legislature.

With the territorial demarcation as an autonomous indigenous area, the
Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous groups to perform native justice
proceedings. Article 190 states the indigenous originary farmer nations and people will
exercise their jurisdictional functions and competency through their authorities, and will
apply their own cultural values, norms and own procedures. The organization
CONAMAQ devotes much of its efforts to the expansion of indigenous autonomy and
native justice and the next section of this chapter will report on their frustrations with the
logistical workings of this part of the Constitution. The territorial recognition of
indigenous areas also factors into the composition of the Plurinational Legislative
Assembly. The Electoral Organ can use these areas to formulate special indigenous originary farmer electoral districts that elect representatives to the Chamber of Deputies. The indigenous electoral districts are not allowed to cross departmental borders and are only created in departments where the indigenous population is a minority. This essentially creates minority-majority districts to ensure that even small indigenous tribes have the opportunity for descriptive representation in Congress. In the 2009 legislative election, seven indigenous electoral districts were created.

Article 179 of the Constitution also recognizes three levels of jurisdiction in the Bolivian judiciary: ordinary justice exercised by the Supreme Court, departmental courts, and sentencing courts, an agro-environmental level of justice with its own courts, and an indigenous originary farmer jurisdiction that is exercised by their own authorities. It states the ordinary jurisdiction and the indigenous originary farmer jurisdiction enjoy the same hierarchy. However, this promise has not been kept to the satisfaction of many of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples. Adrian Villegas expresses the dissatisfaction concerning their rights to exercise native justice mechanisms when he states, “Now we have a justice of the republic, the ordinary courts, which is nothing executive, and even this justice favors the people who have more money and right now with the new law they place the ordinary justice over the native justice. Therefore, there are big mistakes. Now they will not recognize the autonomy; they do not want to give us that freedom.” Finding a middle ground between the traditional and communitarian approach of native justice with the punishment centered approach of ordinary justice mechanisms has proven difficult and contentious.
MAS arose out of the coca growers associations and the new Constitution also reflects a commitment to that constituency and its interests. Article 384 states that the State protects the original and ancestral coca leaf as a cultural patrimony, a renewable natural resource of Bolivia’s biodiversity, and a factor of social unity. In its natural state it is not a narcotic. Its production, marketing and processing will be controlled by law. This addition to the Constitution has not completely stopped eradication efforts, but it does establish legal grounds for indigenous peoples to defend their right to grow the crop for traditional uses.

The 2009 Constitution created a state where the indigenous nations of Bolivia were recognized, celebrated, and protected; however, this was only on paper. The logistical transition has not been as smooth or as rapid as many of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples would like. Discontentment has built in the gap between the expectations and promises of MAS and the reality experienced by Bolivia’s indigenous majority.

Conclusion

MAS made significant strides at improving political representation for Bolivia’s indigenous populations during their first years in control. They successfully pushed through a new Constitution that revolutionized the parameters of debate in Bolivia. Indigenous peoples were recognized for their important, yet unique, role in Bolivian society. They were given a seat at multiple tables from which they were previously excluded. Mechanisms were established in the Constitution to ensure that the indigenous peoples were descriptively represented in multiple levels of government. However, constitutions are simply documents that organize and structure government. In practice,
there can be gaps between the promises in the document and their application. Indigenous representatives expressed concerns with the commitment to and application of the constitutional articles concerning indigenous autonomy and native justice structures.

In Congress, MAS pursued policies that supplemented the constitutional expansion of indigenous rights and helped define their practical application. MAS was able to pass several pieces of legislation in the area of capacity development and vocational training. This is a relatively non-contentious issue area given that all of Bolivia benefits from the introduction of more participants in the economic marketplace. They were also successful at passing legislation on the preservation and protection of traditional knowledge and intellectual property. Although many have co-opted indigenous symbols throughout time, few would argue that they do not belong to the indigenous nations. Surprisingly, MAS was able to push through several pieces of legislation concerning indigenous rights to natural resources and environmental sustainability. This issue area was expected to be one difficulty given the strong, often foreign, business responsible for the extraction of natural resources. However, the dismissal of these companies’ interests was key campaign point for MAS and one that they pursued during their first term.

Legislation on the issue areas of autonomy and native justice were expected to be sparse given the difficulty between balancing the state’s need to be the supreme authority and the indigenous recognition of a different authority. The progress MAS made in this area was primarily through the Constitution and the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as law. Both of these items are symbolically important, but CONAMAQ reports their actual application is lacking. During their first term in
Control, MAS legislatures did not pass laws that defined exactly how the relationship between state and indigenous nation would actually work.

Interestingly, several of the laws passed by MAS in Congress that were explicitly related to indigenous rights were directed at the department Tarija. Only 16 percent of the population in Tarija identify as indigenous. This may reflect a commitment by MAS to protecting indigenous rights in areas where they actually numerically need the protection. In several of Bolivia’s departments, a significant majority of the population is indigenous. MAS may expect that because of the expansion of indigenous opportunities in the Constitution, indigenous peoples in these departments have the ability to protect their own rights; whereas in departments where indigenous peoples represent a much smaller portion of the population, Congress is still needed to ensure the protection of the minority.
CONCLUSION

This project began with the goal of relaying the story of Bolivia’s indigenous population’s transition from non-citizens to party base of the country’s most successful political party in decades. Three critical areas concerning indigenous politics were addressed: why these political parties emerged, the source of political support for indigenous parties, and the type of representation provided by these parties. In addressing all three research questions, special emphasis was given to Movimiento al Socialismo as the most electorally successful of Latin America’s indigenous political parties.

Indigenous organizations formed during the 1970s throughout the region making demands for increased autonomy from governments. The first few chapters of this project sought to explain the giant leap made by some indigenous groups from demanding independence to directly engaging the political system as a political party. The second chapter presented the traditional theoretical explanations for party system structure including the number of parties and new party entrance. These theories sort into two foundational sets: one based on social cleavages and the other on institutional design. The chapter reviewed the traditional theories and presented the explanations for indigenous political parties that follow each theoretical body. It identified the weaknesses of these theories in their application to Latin American party systems and indigenous political party formation. It was argued that the traditional explanations are important, but fail to explain the emergence of indigenous political parties. The context in which changes occur is necessary to complete the picture of why some indigenous groups form political parties while others do not.
Political actors make decisions within a changing political, economic, and social context that alters the choices available to them and raises incentives for some choices over others. Three main changes in the context shifted small, localized indigenous movements into national political parties. The economic recession of the 1980s raised inequalities and many governments responded by enacting harsh neo-liberal reforms. Traditional employment sectors crashed during this time and in the Andean region, the growing of coca leaves became the most lucrative employment opportunity. However, the international war against drugs forced governments to raise eradication efforts and declare war on growers. Most growers were also indigenous and these efforts were viewed as attacks against indigenous culture. Finally, decentralization policies became popular in the early 1990s. In countries with large or concentrated indigenous populations, increased local government power and opportunity encouraged indigenous peoples and organizations to seize the opportunity for influence.

The third chapter applied this contextual theory to the case of Bolivia. Bolivia had the earliest indigenous political parties as well as the most successful and is an important first test of theories on indigenous political parties. Traditional explanations for new party entrance existed in Bolivia, but became important when might by the three contextual changes outlined above. Long-term social changes occurred where Bolivian indigenous peoples gained education, mobility, economic freedom, and citizenship needed for social mobilization. The institutional context also varied greatly in the 1980s as democracy returned to the country and political volatility rose. However, neither the social changes nor the institutional changes were sufficient to encourage indigenous political parties to form without changes in the context. Indigenous grievances directed towards the
government were aggravated during the ‘lost decade’ of economic recession and the US encouraged drug war against coca cultivation. The number of coca growers grew dramatically following the collapse of the tin and mining industries during the 1980s. When the Bolivian government traded US aid and loans in exchange for upping efforts on coca eradication, coca growers unions presented the move as a direct attack on indigenous culture. This coupled with increased inequalities between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples raised grievances against the traditional parties to a very high level. The traditional parties passed decentralization policies in an effort to alleviate discontent, but actually enfranchised indigenous organizations. Laws gave legal recognition to indigenous communities that allowed them to appeal to local governments for resources and also created hundreds of new local governments. A significant number of local political offices were occupied by indigenous persons. This built a network of politicized indigenous groups that linked together through their shared grievances to form political parties.

Chapter four addressed another part of the story of Bolivian indigenous political parties by examining the sources of support for MAS as it transitioned from localized political party to national competitor. Social and institutional explanations for party support were compared to identify where in the population MAS was able to win electoral votes. It used a subnational dataset of 2002 electoral results and census data to identify trends in indigenous political party support at the department, province, and electoral district levels of analysis. MAS formed in 1995 to compete in the 1997 local elections in Cochabamba. The 2002 election was its first as a national competitor for control of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the executive. It unexpectedly placed
2nd in the presidential race and won more legislative seats than any indigenous political party before it. Surprisingly, institutional explanations had very little impact compared to the explanatory weight of the social explanations of indigenous identity and inequality. MAS was helped by the regional concentration of the indigenous population and performed very well in the large number of electoral districts and provinces that have at least a plurality indigenous population. For example, MAS was most successful in the five of Bolivia’s nine departments that have an indigenous population over 60 percent. Trends identified at the department level suggest that MAS also garnered support from populations suffering inequalities in terms of education, healthcare, and access to clean water. MAS emerged from the coca-growers union, but the percentage of the population engaged in the agricultural economy was only important at the department level and failed to reach statistical significance at the province and electoral district levels. District magnitude had no statistically discernible effect on MAS vote share.

The final question addressed by this project concerned the quality and type of representation provided by indigenous political parties. This question has not been assessed by scholars that study indigenous political parties. This project provided one of the first reviews of the legislative representation provided by MAS to their indigenous constituents. This was done with a content analysis of laws passed during MAS’s first term in control of Congress. MAS passed several pieces of legislation in the area of capacity development and vocational training as well as the preservation and protection of traditional knowledge and intellectual property. Surprisingly, MAS pushed through several pieces of legislation concerning indigenous rights to natural resources and environmental sustainability. This issue area was expected to receive less legislative
attention given the strong, often foreign, businesses responsible for the extraction of
natural resources. MAS was less successful at passing laws on indigenous education and
healthcare. Legislation concerning the issue areas of autonomy and native justice were
expected to be sparse given the difficulty between balancing the state’s need to be the
supreme authority and the indigenous recognition of a different authority. As expected,
MAS passed no laws directly addressing these issues, but it did sponsor the 2009
Constitution that prioritized indigenous rights, recognized indigenous autonomy, and
carved a permanent place for the indigenous population in the new Plurinational State of
Bolivia.

Summary of Contribution

At the most general level, this project contributed to the study of political parties.
In particular, this study examined the forces behind new party emergence, the sources of
political party support, and the representative efforts of political parties. Traditional
explanations for new party emergence have primarily focused on Western European party
systems. The theories lose a significant amount of their explanatory value when applied
to Latin America where democracies are new, party systems are less institutionalized, and
institutional designs use a mixed-system approach to electoral rules. Scholarly attention
on ethnic political parties in other regions of the world disproportionately focuses on the
consequences of their presence to democracy rather than explanations for their formation.

This project attempted to fill the research gap by developing a theory for the
emergence of indigenous political parties in Latin America. Previous explanations
provided for indigenous political party emergence fall into the traditional theoretical
bodies resting on social cleavages or institutional design. However, these theories are unable to explain the differences in emergence across countries with very similar social and institutional conditions. Two countries may enact similar increases in district magnitude or have similar sized indigenous populations, but indigenous political parties formed in one and not the other.

This project posited that previous theories provide an incomplete picture because of the lack of attention to the context in which the political parties emerged. This project adopts a historical perspective and theorizes that long-term developments in the social structure were met with economic stressors and institutional changes that created an environment in the early 1990s that raised incentives for indigenous groups to directly engage the political system as their own parties. The timing of economic crises, coca eradication, and moves towards decentralization and proportionality relative to the longer term changes in social mobilization capacity of indigenous groups and the democratization of the political system was fundamentally important. The mobilization capacity was higher in countries where indigenous peoples gained access to education, economic opportunity, and the vote earlier than their counterparts in other countries. These socio-economic gains facilitated the building of indigenous networks that united people behind an indigenous identity and lowered organizational costs when economic threats stimulated groups to seize the new political space created by institutional reforms. This new theory was applied and supported through a historical case study of the emergence of Bolivian indigenous political parties.

Only one of Bolivia’s indigenous political parties was able to consolidate support into continued, political success in elections: Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). This
project continued the examination of political party emergence by isolating the first national election with MAS on the ballot. This was the first study to examine the sources of political support for MAS. The 2002 electoral results at the departmental, provincial, and electoral district levels were paired with census data to identify the factors contributing to MAS electoral success. During the election, MAS attempted to channel the mass societal discontent that stimulated its formation into votes and seats in the national legislature. MAS used an inclusive, anti-establishment message appealing to frustrations with the traditional parties, economic failures, and perceived attacks on indigenous culture to link from a regional, single-issue party to a national competitor. This examination of the sources of MAS support may provide other indigenous political parties a guide on where to direct their resources and message for the greatest electoral impact.

The analysis revealed that MAS was most successful at appealing to the indigenous population and indigenous identity was the strongest predictor of MAS vote share. Each unit increase in the indigenous population within a province or electoral district raised MAS’s vote share by a third of a percentage point. The departmental level of analysis also revealed positive relationships between MAS support and the agricultural community as well as multiple measures of inequality. The 2002 election included nine multi-member electoral districts designed to increase the proportionality of the election. In theory, these districts are argued to be favorable to smaller, new party entrance and competition. MAS actually performed equally well in the single member districts and district magnitude had no statistical impact on its vote share. Increased proportionality in institutions does not explain MAS electoral support. This suggests that political parties
organized around the promotion of indigenous rights are dependent on the indigenous community for their emergence and continued existence. Institutional designs that stymie the potentially reductive psychological effects on voters will not ensure an indigenous political party votes. The party must continue to make appeals to the social cleavage from which it emerged.

Continued electoral support is ensured by a political party through its legislative and representative efforts once in office. This project provided the first exploratory review of legislation passed by indigenous political parties. Research on the region’s indigenous parties has noticeably ignored the effects of indigenous political parties on the governments they engage. There is an underlying assumption that these parties increase the quality of life for the indigenous peoples they represent, but it has never been tested. The content analysis of legislation and review of the new constitution provide insight into the type of representation provided by indigenous political parties. In personal interviews, Bolivian indigenous leaders expressed discontent with the representative efforts by MAS. Their assessment is supported by this summer’s countrywide protests where indigenous peoples, police, and doctors joined together in making demands for more equality within Bolivia. This chapter was the first step in the process of critically assessing the quality of representation provided by indigenous political parties. Using insights from this review, future projects can continue the examination and fill this research void.

**Future Research**

The study of indigenous political parties is ripe with untested theoretical questions. However, scholars studying these parties face the additional difficulties that
follow from studying an isolated political phenomenon in a developing region of the world. Data is limited in both its existence and accessibility. Important traditional variables have little variation between countries and only slightly more variation through time. Under these conditions, statistical models are difficult to build. This has pushed the field to utilizing primarily qualitative methods. The qualitative method is vitally important to developing new theories, but lacks the ability to dismiss existing explanations. This has provided the field with an abundance of theories, but limited direction to which of the theories carry the most explanatory value and which should be dismissed. The primary task of all scholars interested in Latin America’s indigenous political parties should be the continued collection and dissemination of data.

This project exposed several additional research questions for future project on the subject. The contextual theory developed here and applied to the Bolivian case should be examined in other countries. The most damning critique of a case study of Bolivia on this subject is that the majority indigenous population is the primary reason for indigenous political party emergence and success. The contextual theory should next be applied to countries that vary across indigenous population size and indigenous party emergence. Several indigenous political parties formed in Colombia despite its much smaller indigenous population, but in Peru, where indigenous peoples constitute a majority of the population, very few indigenous parties have formed. Do the contextual factors identified in this project explain these variations?

The subnational dataset created during this project has electoral results data down to municipal district and census data to the provincial level of analysis. Given the multiple levels of analysis, variables can easily be added to this dataset as they become
available. Each additional variable will provide more insight into how indigenous political parties consolidate voter support and create a lasting position in a party system. The dataset can be expanded to include multiple Bolivian elections. Comparing the electoral results of the 2002 election with results from more recent elections would identify trends and defections in the sources of MAS support. Similar subnational data from other countries would allow a cross-national comparison of indigenous political party support as well as a test of contextual factors using hierarchical statistical analysis.

Another area of future research stems from the exploratory review of laws passed by the Bolivian legislature. Additional studies should develop these findings by increasing the level of comparative assessment. With additional coding, the legislative output of the 2005 legislative term could be compared to the terms before and after MAS gained control. This would provide answers on whether MAS increased the quality of representation provided to the indigenous community. It would also provide insight into whether MAS has remained committed to its original platform concerning the promotion of indigenous rights. Bill sponsorship patterns could be assessed to compare the legislative efforts of indigenous legislators to those of non-indigenous legislators. This assessment of representation could be taken to the cross-national level with a comparison of indigenous related legislation passed by countries with varying percentages of the legislature held by indigenous political party representatives. These are all important avenues for future research that scholars interested in indigenous political parties should continue to pursue. Despite all the research conducted on the subject, including this project, we still have limited understanding of the formation, success, and performance of indigenous political parties.
REFERENCES


161


162


168


VITA

Tara Parsons was born in Searcy, Arkansas. She earned Bachelor of Arts degrees in Political Science and Public Relations in May 2007 from the University of Central Arkansas. She immediately enrolled in graduate work at the University of Missouri to begin a doctoral degree in Political Science. She studies comparative politics and is particularly interested in the politics of Latin American’s indigenous populations. She also has research interests on the scholarship of teaching. She currently serves as an Assistant Professor of Justice Studies at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia. She teaches courses in human rights, democratization, and other global justice issues.