HAWKS AND DOVES RECONSIDERED: THE CASE OF US FOREIGN POLICY

A Thesis

presented to

the Faculty of the Graduate School

at the University of Missouri Columbia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

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MAY 2013
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Hawks and Doves Reconsidered: The Case of US Foreign Policy

presented by Colton Heffington

a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professors Cooper Drury, Laron Williams, and Vitor Trindade. Their guidance and advice throughout this process has been invaluable.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................ii

List of Tables and Figures...............................................................................................iv

Abstract............................................................................................................................v

Section

1. Introduction.....................................................................................................................1

2. Previous Research on Domestic Determinants of Conflict........................................2

3. Accounting for Parties and Policy Positions...............................................................6

4. Applying Issue Emphasis to Foreign Policy.................................................................10

5. A Worthwhile Distinction............................................................................................14

6. Case Selection...............................................................................................................16

7. A Set of Testable Hypotheses.......................................................................................18

8. Research Design...........................................................................................................20

9. The Monadic Approach...............................................................................................21

10. Monadic Results..........................................................................................................28

11. Dyadic Research Design............................................................................................30

12. Dyadic Results............................................................................................................33

13. Conclusions and Implications.....................................................................................34

14. References..................................................................................................................38

15. Appendix....................................................................................................................42

16. Tables and Figures......................................................................................................43

iii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figures

1. Foreign Policy Positions of Major Parties since World War 2…………………...43
2. Foreign Policy Position of the Presidential Party since World War 2………………44
3. Probability of Major Force Across Values of Foreign Policy……………………45
4. Probability of Major Force Across Values of Foreign Policy cont………………46
5. Probability of MID Initiation Across Values of Foreign Policy Position…………47

Tables

1. US Uses of Force 1949-2000………………………………………………...48
2. US Dyadic MIDs 1946-2000………………………………………………...49
What are the domestic determinants of international conflict? A number of political scientists have proposed that leaders in democracies initiate interstate disputes or use force abroad to divert the electorate’s attention away from a flagging economy. Some scholars have integrated measurements of partisanship into their theoretical explanations, but extant scholarship has not effectively introduced the foreign policy position of the executive into the equation. Here I employ elements of salience theory to build the issue emphasis approach to foreign policy. I hypothesize that presidential candidates in the United States credibly signal their foreign policy positions prior to their election and that this foreign policy position has an effect on US behavior in the international arena. The approach I take here is an important one because it more accurately models elite preferences. From this viewpoint, we can connect competing foreign policy platforms to behavior in a new way and link voters’ preferences to foreign policy outcomes more clearly. I estimate the frequency of major uses of force and initiation of militarized interstate disputes from 1946-2000 in my empirical test. The results of these tests suggest my theoretical approach is a valid one. Presidents who maintain a hawkish foreign policy stance prior to being elected use force more often and initiate militarized interstate disputes more frequently. These results suggest that citizens can directly influence foreign policy in the voting booth.
Introduction

What are the domestic determinants of the use of international force by the United States? Many scholars have investigated this question. The most popular school of thought, diversionary theory, argues that leaders will initiate conflict to distract the domestic audience from a poor economic situation or to boost shoddy approval ratings.\(^1\) Others, such as Fordham (1998, 2002) have specified theories that include both the partisanship of the president and macroeconomic factors in the decision to use force. More recently, scholars have added measures of Congressional support and party fractionalization to the debate. To date, few scholars have considered the foreign policy stance of the president in the initiation of conflict. By ignoring the party position, or more specifically the foreign policy position, of presidents, these authors have made compelling yet incomplete arguments.

Here, I propose to consider the role of party positions and ideology via issue emphasis in understanding the decision to use force by US presidents. Ideology can be thought of in a number of different ways, but Budge and Farlie (1983) and Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) offer that we can best understand ideology by measuring how parties emphasize issues relative to their opponents. My basic argument is that candidates and parties convey messages about how they will handle foreign policy by selectively emphasizing peace, militarism, or some mix of the two. As I argue below, these messages are credible because, while the president is constrained by Congress, foreign policy still remains in the domain of the executive.

\(^1\) See Ostrom and Job 1986 for the seminal example.
To fully contextualize my theory, I consider the extant literature below. A look at the previous literature allows me to accurately place my approach in the broader constellation of the previous scholarship. Following this, I provide a brief overview of salience theory. From here a full explanation of the issue emphasis approach is provided. Next, an empirical test of the theory is outlined and the substantive results are explained. The final section concludes and offers several thoughts on future research.

**Previous Research on Domestic Determinants of Conflict**

Since Ostrom and Job (1986) first published their pathbreaking work that suggested presidents use force internationally to divert attention from poor domestic conditions and low public approval ratings, the so-called diversionary theory has been a hotly debated topic. Gowa’s (1998) claim that politics actually do end at the water’s edge has intensified the debate over the course of the last decade or so. Moving to challenge this assertion, a number of scholars have examined the domestic causes of international conflict in the US.

Gowa originally found that unified government, that being a situation in which the president enjoys a majority of copartisans in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, has no effect on the initiation of conflict. Gowa also notes that the domestic economy and the election cycle also served as poor predictors of the use of force. Along with Gowa, other skeptics (Meernik and Waterman 1996) suggest that international conflict is merely a function of actual international relations. That is, we can best understand the use of force by the US by accounting for international conditions and accounting for the United States’ relative power.
However, the literature concerning the domestic determinants of the use of force has developed quite extensively. James and Hristoulas (1994) offer that it may be a mixture of both international tensions and domestic politics that cause the US to play a part in international crises. DeRouen (1995) shows that direct linkages between presidential approval ratings and the state of the economy and indirect linkages between approval, the economy, and the use of force can explain diversionary uses of force in the US. Others have tested claims of diversionary theory in democracies other than the US. Morgan and Anderson (1999) find support for a modified version of diversionary theory, which hypothesizes that leaders in Britain will engage in international conflict to bolster support in their winning coalition. In a somewhat more intricate test, Sprecher and DeRouen (2002) discover that Israel responds with international violence to domestic protest, but that the use of force often breeds further domestic protest.

Following Hibbs’ (1977) logic concerning the economic preferences of Democratic and Republican presidents, Fordham (1998) finds that Democratic presidents are more likely to use force when facing inflation, while Republican presidents have used force more often in the face of high unemployment. Fordham argues that the economy and public opinion do not incentivize the president to divert, but that they change how the president perceives his domestic political environment. Fordham (2002) further challenges Gowa and extends the period of analysis, reaching back to 1870. These findings show that macroeconomic conditions and partisanship have a substantive effect on the presidential use of force. DeRouen (2000) also finds that rising levels of unemployment lead to an increase in the use of force, regardless of whether the president is a Democrat or a Republican.
Taking a cross-national approach, Schultz (2001) suggests that opposition parties and signaling play a vital role in coercive diplomacy. Schultz argues that resolve during an international dispute can be signaled if an opposition party in a democracy communicates that they are willing to back the party in control of government. Bipartisan support matters in the stage prior to conflict, though according to this author, hawkish and dovish party preferences do not play a role in the process.

A newer research tradition centers on the role of domestic institutions in accounting for international conflict. Auerswald (1999) argues that because leaders in democracies are vulnerable to elections, votes of no confidence, or both, we can expect institutional context to matter in international crises. Brulé and Williams (2009) have investigated government characteristics (e.g. minority versus coalition governments, weak versus strong party discipline), economic downturns, and dispute initiation cross-nationally, finding that the level of government accountability influences the likelihood of diversionary conflict. Clare (2010) studies the role of ideology as mediated by political institutions, arguing that when extremist parties become junior members of a coalition they can exercise disproportionate influence on foreign policy, with leftist outliers having a more pacific effect and rightist outliers leading to more aggressive behavior. Other research on extreme coalition governments in parliamentary systems has produced similar results (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008).

Those interested in the US case have recently turned toward the effects of Congress on the use of force and the likelihood of diverting. Clark (2000) theorizes that as the preferences of the president and Congress converge, conflicts become more likely and tend to last longer. Howell and Pevehouse (2005, 2007) show that interbranch
politics are a key component of the equation. The frequency with which the president uses force depends on his level of partisan support in Congress. In the same realm of study, Brulé (2006) examines the interactive effect of the economy and Congress, showing that presidents are more likely to divert from a flagging economy when they face an opposition Congress. Building on this notion that interbranch politics matter, Brulé and Hwang (2010) have argued that diversionary uses of force are a way of setting the domestic political agenda. To clarify, the president will divert when facing an opposition Congress that is primed and ready to pass legislation that may harm the president’s constituent copartisans in the electorate.

Another well articulated challenge to diversionary theory has come from the strategic conflict avoidance (SCA) literature. SCA scholarship suggests that states that may be the target of a diversionary attack will moderate their foreign policy. The idea is that potential targets will essentially minimize the opportunity for diversionary tactics. Cross-national results have provided some empirical support for this position (Leeds and Davis 1997, Miller 1999). In the case of the United States, Fordham (2005) has shown that long-term US rivals are more likely to cooperate when the US is experiencing high levels of unemployment, while Foster (2006) has suggested that overt challenges from Congress to the president on matters of foreign policy invite external provocation from other states.

Some authors have considered policy positions and ideology in the aggregate when it comes to interstate conflicts. Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) have considered government position, showing that governments of the left in parliamentary democracies are less likely to engage in international disputes than governments of the right, but more
likely to escalate disputes once engaged as they are more sensitive to removal from office in the face of international conflict. Recent cross-national research has also shown that right-tiling governments are willing to prosecute interstate disputes longer on average than left-tiling governments (Koch 2009). Arena and Palmer (2009) have directly included the ideological position of governments in their study of how domestic politics affect foreign policy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the authors find that governments that lean to the right on their one-dimensional scale are more likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute, while left-tiling governments are more peaceful. Through a theory of economic constraints, the authors show that this effect is conditional on the state of the domestic economy.

**Accounting for Parties and Policy Positions**

How we account for ideology and policy positions depends on how we define and measure these concepts. I begin with a basic discussion of parties and policy positions in democracies, and then relate this discussion to actual behavior in the international arena. Budge and Farlie (1983) introduced the issue emphasis approach, suggesting that parties will attempt to emphasize salient issues that favor their strengths relative to their opponents. By this conception of ideology, it is easy to see what issues lay in the basket of policies that candidates and parties offer. By opening up ideology and allowing it to vary across a number of issue dimensions, we can see clearer, more detailed images of parties and their candidates.

Klingemann, Hobberbert, and Budge (1994) build on this approach by introducing the salience theory of party competition. My theoretical approach here is strongly influenced by this seminal work. Contrasting their work with Anthony Downs (1957),
these authors suggest a move away from the pure abstraction offered by Downs’ spatial model. Downs’ famous spatial model suggests that political parties race to the median voter (in a two-party system) along a one-dimensional scale. Though Downs’ stated goal is some measure of abstraction, to study a single policy dimension, we need to move beyond the one-dimensional space. To fill the gaps left open by Downs, Klingemann et al introduce salience theory.

Salience theory as envisioned by these authors is not entirely distinct from Budge and Farlie’s (1983) approach. Their interest lies specifically with political parties and the issues they choose to emphasize. To quote Klingemann et al, “By stressing certain items and excluding others—without overtly denouncing the latter—parties are, to be sure, implicitly taking pro and anti positions” (pg. 25). Through this process, parties put together the package of policies that they intend to offer the voters by emphasizing a set of issues. The question then becomes, how do we tap such emphases? Most often the answer to this question is via party manifestos.

The manifesto approach espoused by these authors and many other political scientists directly measures which issues are being emphasized and deemphasized by political parties. These manifestos have a long history in party politics, particularly in the United States. Moreover, these manifestos represent a set of general policy positions. By adopting salience theory, we necessarily examine broad issue areas. For example, scholars invoking salience theory are less concerned about specific policy promises and more concerned with the big picture in a number of policy areas. Taking the dimension of foreign policy, we would need to focus on emphasis of militarism and pacifism. This approach is intuitive, as George W. Bush did not campaign on initiating a military
conflict with Iraq, but he certainly promised to maintain a hawkish posture if elected to office. In effect, candidates and parties take up general positions and we assume the electorate gets the message. While some skeptics might offer that voters are unaware of party manifestos or party stances, many proponents of the manifesto approach have shown that manifestos are often the subject of publicity and that these documents make their impact on the electorate via the media.

The connection between relative emphasis in these manifestos and policy is most often studied from the perspective of government expenditures. By examining how the budgetary pie is sliced, we can see how parties and politicians are living up to these pre-election emphases. In the case of the United States, Budge and Hofferbert (1990) show that emphasis on foreign special relations is correlated with increasing defense expenditures. McDonald and Budge (2005) provide similar results using cross-national data, suggesting that the median peace vs. militarist position within legislatures has a long-term effect on defense spending. More recently, Whitten and Williams (2011) have used disaggregated left-right policy positions from manifesto data to show that pro-welfare parties will often agree to increase military spending as a sort of welfare in disguise. In sum, it should be well noted that the disaggregation of left-right party positions into specific policy stances is not a new or novel idea. Other scholars have provided significant empirical evidence to suggest that there is a connection between specific defense policy positions and defense expenditures. My suggestion here is to look outside the annual budget. Foreign policy positions should affect not only budgetary preferences, but also behavior in the international arena.
Along somewhat similar lines as the above noted authors, Petrocik (1996) argues that political parties in the US own certain issues and that the ownership of issues is relatively static over time. Indeed, this ownership may translate into divergent policy outcomes as well given recent empirical results (Koch 2009, Palmer, London, and Regan 2004). McDonald and Budge (2005) agree that parties can be expected to emphasize the same set of issues over time (e.g. we would expect Republicans to consistently emphasize the need for a strong national defense relative to Democrats). The authors measure issue emphasis for a sample of parties in democracies over time, finding that parties rarely position themselves on the “wrong” or unexpected side of the issue. So while parties typically do not leapfrog one another on issues, the extent to which they emphasize different issues varies over time. This variation over time is critical to my understanding of how leaders and governments make foreign policy. It may be perfectly reasonable to theorize that Democratic presidents in the US or even Socialist presidents in France behave as doves relative to their rightist competition, but it is also vital to account for the variation between different Democrat and Socialist presidents.

Here I would like to apply salience theory to foreign policy behavior. I can further explain my reasoning by use of a hypothetical. Say a candidate is elected president in the US and had strongly emphasized the need for defense and external security. In his first year in office, the president might negotiate with Congress to increase expenditures on naval forces in order to commission the building of a new aircraft carrier. By contributing to the external security capabilities of the nation, this president has lived up to his campaign promise communicated via emphasis of national defense. The media will pick up this event and the electorate will see that their president has indeed done what he said
he would. However, there are possibilities beyond this one, and presidents make foreign policy with an eye towards the future. After the hypothetical aircraft carrier is built, the president has some incentive to use it because incentives to carry out policy exist beyond budget negotiations with the legislature, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Executives who have emphasized national security have an incentive not only to increase security through defense expenditures but also to send an even clearer signal to the electorate that defense is a priority. This signal might take form via the use of force or conflict initiation with another state. This is not to suggest that leaders will start a war because they maintain a hawkish foreign policy position. Instead, leaders have an incentive to initiate lower level disputes to capture the electorate’s attention. In sum, there are electoral reasons that a leader might use international force abroad beyond diversionary theory.

My goal throughout this section has been to outline salience theory and work toward bridging the gap between policy positions and observable behavior. As mentioned above, party positions have been relatively underemphasized in previous literature that sought to identify the key domestic determinants of international conflict. It is clear that some form of partisanship has been accounted for in the works discussed above, but simply accounting for a binary measure of the executive’s party identification reveals an incomplete picture. This technique paints all partisans with the same brush. Expectations about what foreign policy issues Republicans and Democrats should own may be stable over time, but parties do vary their stances. I offer here that a closer examination of this variation may help explain foreign policy behavior.

Applying Issue Emphasis to Foreign Policy
Here I more concretely apply salience theory to foreign policy behavior. I conceive of policy positions and their role in policymaking in a manner consistent with the above-described approach. Parties and candidates broadly emphasize some set of policies to voters, implicitly taking policy positions. Once in office, politicians will make some effort to follow up on these policy positions, though countervailing forces may demand compromise. Furthermore, the types of issues that are emphasized are based on the office the candidate is running for. Though some members of Congress in the US campaign on foreign policy issues, we typically expect the executive and his cabinet to handle foreign policy issues.\(^2\)\(^3\) This is not to say that the executive and his cabinet are solely responsible for managing the international relations of the country, but that we generally expect foreign policy to fall under the purview of the executive and his cabinet.

Leaders want to shape foreign policy to match the content of their campaign, but institutional constraints may limit their ability to do so. To understand how constrained the executive in any democracy is in making foreign policy we must first specify what kind of foreign policy we are interested in. As noted above, my particular interest here is the behavior of states abroad. Foreign aid generosity and defense spending can be tied to foreign policy positions, but these correlations have already been well mapped by Budge and Hofferbert (1990) in the American case. I approach foreign policy issue emphasis by examining conflict behavior. By studying the use of force and the initiation of international disputes I am analyzing a set of outcomes that have not previously been

\(^2\) Carter and Scott (2009) shows that members of Congress often take a very active role in shaping US foreign policy, often to the displeasure of the president.

\(^3\) Trumbore and Duflo (2011) provide evidence that some Congressional candidates campaign on foreign policy issues, though it is not typically the major emphasis of the campaign.
studied in terms of disaggregated policy positions. Moreover, I am studying a realm of policy that the executive has significant control over.

The translation between foreign policy issue emphasis and the use of force should be clear. The candidate or party who wins control of the executive position in a democracy has clear incentives to follow up on the issues that they have chosen to emphasize. They would like to keep their promises and be reelected. Even in cases where the executive cannot stand for reelection, presidential behavior should not deviate much from stated policy positions so long as presidents seek to maintain the credibility of their party and the signals it sends. So while parties emphasize issues that they believe they enjoy a comparative advantage in, they also follow through by shaping policy to match their rhetoric to appear responsive. The notion that politicians will attempt to deliver what they have promised once in office if they are relatively unconstrained is certainly not a radical notion. Any candidate, regardless of partisanship, who emphasizes the need for international security should be more likely to initiate military uses of force if they are elected.

A concrete example should be helpful in outlining the simple logic of the theory. Sensing a weakness in incumbent president Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, challenger Ronald Reagan pounced during the 1980 election, outlining a more aggressive foreign policy. As Petrocik (1996) shows, Reagan recognized that the public perceived Republicans as owning national defense, and he sought to take advantage of the issue by offering a militaristic policy alternative to Carter. Interestingly, Reagan actually implemented his foreign policy as advertised. In his first term in office, Reagan initiated 22 major international uses of force, contrasted by 6 uses of major force under the Carter
administration. At first blush, the wisdom of hawks and doves as Republicans and Democrats holds, but when we note that Dwight Eisenhower opted to use force only 27 times during his entire two terms as president, thing become less clear. Reagan and Eisenhower were both Republicans, but Eisenhower and Republicans of his day offered a different and more pacific foreign policy stance than did Reagan and the Republicans of the 1980s. This distinction is an important one.

Finally, the realm of foreign policy provides an ideal opportunity to test this assumption that candidates will live up to their policy positions if elected. In no other area of policy is the executive in a democracy more accountable to the electorate and less constrained than in the making of foreign policy. An executive can promise lower taxes, and then blame an obsolescent legislature when taxes are not lowered, but a leader cannot similarly pass the buck if they fail to live up to their foreign policy position. As I have noted above, leaders may still face constraints. As Howell and Pevehouse (2005, 2007) and Carter and Scott (2009) have shown, Congress can still constrain the president to some extent. Brulé and Williams (2009) have shown that other institutional characteristics condition the likelihood of diversion. My argument is not that institutions are irrelevant to the equation. In fact, we should obviously control for the compilation of Congress in testing the issue emphasis approach in the US. My point here is simply that the effect of policy positions should be relatively strong in the area of foreign policy. It is ultimately beyond the scope of this paper to prove executive dominance in the realm of

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4 These data on use of force come from Fordham, who updates the original Blechman and Kaplan data for use in his 1998 piece, “Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994”. These data include only major uses of force, as is standard practice in this literature.
foreign policy, though Peterson (1994) has made a particularly compelling argument to this effect in the US case.

**A Worthwhile Distinction**

It is necessary to consider how the foreign policy issue emphasis approach differs from other arguments about the domestic determinants of international conflict, especially those arguments centered on diversionary tactics. My point here is not that diversionary theory is wrong, but that by focusing on the signals that parties and candidates send before they are elected, we can view a more holistic picture of their foreign policy preferences. A volatile economy may change a leaders’ foreign policy calculus, but my suspicion is that leaders develop stances on foreign policy that are relatively stable.

Using force and initiating conflict with another state is generally risky in terms of both economic and human cost, though it obviously depends on the degree of violence employed. Proponents of diversionary theory argue that leaders in democracies will divert public attention from domestic problems by stirring up conflict abroad. This approach suggests elected officials change their foreign policy positions based on domestic conditions. My argument here differs from diversionary theory mainly in its assumption that foreign policy preferences are relatively stable. There is certainly some reason to believe short-term economic downturns can lead to conflict abroad given the wealth of empirical evidence that diversionary scholars have provided. The point I would like to make is that we need also to think long-term about the foreign policy position of executives.
Related to this is another point of distinction that pertains to the level of conflict under analysis here. The issue emphasis approach is theoretically suited to deal with major uses of force short of war. My goal is not to explain wars by themselves. My interest is in patterns of force, not exceedingly rare events, such as international wars. I further elucidate on these varying levels of conflict below, but it is worth noting that the foreign policy issue emphasis approach is not designed to explain either small or massive disputes in a vacuum.

It is also worthwhile to consider how my approach differs from regular left-right politics. As many scholars have argued, rightly I think, left-right positional politics matters for how democratic leaders behave in the international arena. Leaders on the left tend to offer more peaceful proscriptions, while politicians of the right offer aggressive alternatives. Invoking Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999), Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) argue convincingly that because governments are accountable to their winning coalition, they should follow up on their policy promises. Generally, I agree. Above I have argued that if we want to examine one specific policy dimension, foreign policy here, we should be most interested in the actual foreign policy positions of leaders. Continuous measures of a party or leader’s ideological position and simple binary measures of US presidents’ party affiliation may be helpful in explaining patterns of conflict, but more direct measures of the leader’s foreign policy position should have some effect on conflict behavior.

Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between my approach and those works that have emphasized the role of psychology in foreign policy-making. Alexander George (1969) first persuasively argued that operational code analysis could help political
scientists understand why leaders make decisions based on measurements of their philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Most recently this analysis has been updated by Walker, Malici, and Schafer (2011), who show that these factors hold great explanatory power when it comes to behavior in IR. Though both the manifesto approach and operational code analysis rely on content analysis, they are clearly tapping different things. The major difference is that my approach, the manifesto approach, captures an element that can be willfully changed or manipulated by a leader. A presidential candidate can help mold or alter his party’s manifesto message in order to attract voters or distance themselves from an opponent. A leader can less easily alter their philosophical beliefs about the world of international relations. There is some evidence that beliefs can change over time (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998), but the extent to which this would constitute a willful change is questionable.

Another point of distinction regards the sort of stickiness that I assume using the manifesto approach. Gerald Ford may have possessed a set of psychological traits that were entirely different from Nixon’s. This difference in psychological disposition might well explain some of the differences between the foreign policy decisions of both leaders. The issue emphasis approach to foreign policy suggests that Ford was essentially stuck with Nixon’s foreign policy position because he had to maintain the credibility of his party’s signal. A number of scholars have examined the domestic determinants of conflict, but I believe it worthwhile to note the unique flavor of my approach to the puzzle.

Case Selection
Though I have built the issue emphasis approach to foreign policy as a general theory that could apply to any democracy, I have framed my argument in the American context. The United States makes an ideal test for the foreign policy issue emphasis theory, not only because of data availability, but because the US has played the role of a major international superpower since World War II. Parties and candidates in the US are expected to produce foreign policy platforms that provide voters with a meaningful choice. This choice should have serious consequences because the US is so internationally active.

The US makes an intriguing case for other reasons as well. The unique role of Congress in the making of foreign policy complicates things. As Brulé (2006) and Pevehouse and Howell (2005, 2007) have pointed out, Congressional support may condition the president’s decision to use force. Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems face no such problems, unless they stray so far from the status quo that their actions induce a vote of no confidence. Parsing out the role of the president’s party and ideology in this already complex institutional equation is a worthwhile endeavor.

Finally, the US makes an attractive case because diversionary theory originated from scholarship that considered the US exclusively. Though the literature has clearly diversified over time and examined different democracies and authoritarian leaders, the puzzle of the United States remains salient and unsolved. Studying the US allows my results to address the extant literature on the domestic determinants of international conflict in the US, a subfield of research that has developed its own tradition as detailed above. By using the United States in my empirical test of the foreign policy issue
emphasis theory, I further diversify this rich tradition of scholarship that analyzes US foreign policy.

A Set of Testable Hypotheses

From the theory articulated above it is possible to derive a set of empirically testable hypotheses. First and foremost we would like to know if it is possible to make absolute comparisons over time. The issue emphasis approach to foreign policy very basically suggests that we can compare presidential terms over time. I ask whether we can compare Eisenhower’s first term to Eisenhower’s second term, and Eisenhower’s second term to Clinton’s first term. The simplest application of salience theory to foreign policy behavior is intuitive. Presidents who have taken hawkish foreign policy positions should behave more aggressively compared to those presidents who have advocated for a more dovish posture.

This hypothesis is tied closely to the above argument that aggregate measures of ideological position and binary measures of partisanship are less than ideal for predicting how governments will behave abroad. To be sure, scholars have found empirical evidence to suggest continuous measures of ideology matter cross-nationally (Arena and Palmer 2009) and that partisanship matters conditionally in the US (Fordham 1998). The main contribution of this hypothesis is to offer a viable alternative that should have a substantial impact in terms of understanding foreign policy behavior. This alternative is the foundation of my theory and my empirical test. It can be stated formally:

**H1: Presidential candidates who present a hawkish foreign policy position will use force more frequently should they be elected to office.**
There are other ways to test the issue emphasis to foreign policy that are logically consistent with the theory. As has been suggested by Budge and Farlie (1983), parties emphasize certain issues to the detriment of their competition. Once in office, I have argued that there real incentives for politicians to follow up on these emphases. While I have made the case that we can compare different administrations over time, there is an aspect of my theoretical argument that speaks directly to contemporary competition. Recall the Carter-Reagan example used above. Reagan had an incentive to behave as a hawk once he took the White House because he had taken a hawkish foreign policy stance prior to his election. This view fits with the first hypothesis. Reagan also had incentives to behave as a hawk given his electoral competition in 1980 and 1984, Jimmy Carter and Michael Dukakis respectively. Carter and Dukakis advocated substantially more dovish foreign policy stances in both elections than Reagan did. It was in Reagan’s best interest to remind the electorate of the clear, distinct policy differences between himself and his competition.

This competition-based argument flows directly from the logic of the issue emphasis approach. If we believe parties and candidates take positions to the detriment of their opponents and that politicians will attempt to follow up on these positions should they be elected, it makes sense to suggest that incentives to behave a certain way increase as the policy distance between winners and losers increases. This is not a totally novel way of thinking or modeling elite behavior. For example, Hellwig (2012) shows that parties move spatially to shift blame and take credit for the state of the economy. Also, it is beyond the scope of this theory and paper to integrate a concept of electoral mandates, though Potter (forthcoming) has shown that political capital and electoral margins can
influence executive behavior in the US. Instead, I argue that politicians in office need to signal to voters that they will behave as they indicated they would prior to the election. Beyond that, politicians will prefer to emphasize the differences between themselves (the winner) and their opponents (the losers) by exaggerating their behavior in office. It is not simply that Reagan was hawk, but that he was a hawk who defeated dovish opponents in both 1980 and 1984. By behaving as a hawk, Reagan reminded voters of the distinction between himself and his opponents. As with the first hypothesis, this line of thinking suggests that leaders are forward thinking and incentivized to behave in a manner that sends a clear signal to the electorate.

**H2: The greater the positive distance between the president’s foreign policy position and that of his major party opposition, the more frequently the president will use force.**

**Research Design**

Here I develop a research design to test my hypotheses using regression. I outline a monadic test both of my hypotheses and a dyadic approach to further test my logic. This dual approach has become relatively standard in this literature, especially when scholars are interested in studying the United States by itself. The monadic approach is built on the major uses of force data, first introduced by Blechman and Kaplan (1978). The second approach utilizes militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as a dependent variable and includes a number of standard opportunity controls. There are benefits to such a dual approach. The monadic research design allows me to perform a fine-grained analysis with a dependent variable tailored to my specific research question, while the

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5 For example see Brulé and Hwang (2010) who test their theory first using major uses of force and provide robustness checks using dyadic MIDs.
The dyadic approach allows me to specify a model that includes controls for interstate relations. That is, I can model the regime type, alliance status, capabilities, and contiguity of potential targets. Given this, the unit of analysis in the dyadic approach is dyad year, and the unit of analysis in the monadic approach is US quarter year. To maintain an orderly flow, I first outline the monadic approach, specify the model, and provide substantive results. Following this, I explain the dyadic approach in detail and provide results from this robustness check.

**The Monadic Approach**

**Dependent Variable**

I test the foreign policy issue emphasis approach in the United States over a time period that spans from 1949 through 2000 in the monadic approach. The main dependent variable of interest is a count of the uses of major force short of war. These data come originally from Blechman and Kaplan (1976), though they have been updated by Zelikow (1987), Fordham (1998), and Howell and Pevehouse (2005, 2007). Fordham has subsequently used this data in a number of papers that only investigate major uses of force. Following Fordham and others, I consider only major uses of force here. These uses of force are incidents in which the US mobilizes multiple aircraft carrier task groups, battalions, or combat wings or deploys nuclear capabilities. These are observations that score a 1, 2, or 3 by Blechman and Kaplan’s original coding rules. Observations coded as only a 4 or 5 are considered minor uses of force and thus not included.

There are reasonable justifications for the use of this cut point. Blechman and Kaplan, Zelikow, and Fordham have all provided short qualitative descriptions of the events they coded. Level three uses of force often include the deployment of
peacekeeping forces. The 1983 invasion of Grenada also ranks as a level 3 use of force. An example of a level 2 use of force is the deployment of air, ground, and naval forces in response to Iraqi threats toward Kuwait in 1994. The Berlin Airlift of 1948 is representative of a level 1 use of force. These sorts of events are highly visible to the public and media, thus representing the action I am interested in capturing. Level 4 and 5 uses of force often include simply flyovers or a show of limited US military forces. These low intensity events may not constitute a strong political use of force and their exclusion has become commonplace in the use of force literature. Finally, some readers may disagree with the coding scheme used to differentiate between levels of force at the high end of the scale, which is why I employ a count of all quarterly uses of major force as the dependent variable.

Independent Variables

To test the foreign policy issue emphasis approach in the United States, I introduce a measure of parties’ foreign policy stances that comes from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al 2008). As noted above, party manifestos are released during election years and provide a general overview of parties’ issue positions. The CMP codes party manifestos via content analysis, assigning values to a wide range of different policy categories that correspond to the percentage of the manifesto document that is dedicated to these policy issues. The policy dimensions I examine here are positive and negative militaristic statements and positive statements about peace. Positive militaristic statements are those that emphasize self-defense, the need to improve the state’s military strength, and the importance of external security among other similar

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6 For example, the deployment of 8,000 troops into Bosnia in December 1995. 7 In the CMP dataset, these variables are labeled per104, per105, and per106.
topics. The negative military variable is coded the same as the pro military variable, but counts statements that oppose pro-military topics. The peace variable measures statements that mention peace as a general goal and declarations that peaceful means should be used in solving crises. Full codebook entries are available for these variables in the appendix.

To create a measure of party foreign policy position I subtract the sum of positive peace and negative military values from the value of the positive military variable. This measure captures how heavily parties emphasized these issues in their manifestos in a given election year. Because presidential candidates are the major actors in campaigning on foreign policy and the actual execution of foreign policy, it is reasonable to expect that this technique captures their stances as well as the general position of the presidential administration. The more parties and candidates emphasize the need for things like self-defense and external security relative to the need for peaceful negotiations, the more forceful I expect them to be if elected to the White House. Because this data displays what may be considered outliers (see Figure 2), I offer an alternative transformation of the variable. I transform it such that the lowest value observed is equal to 1, and then take the natural log of this value. I provide results using the unadjusted measure of foreign policy position and this adjusted measure.

As noted above, other scholars have included disaggregated measures of issue emphasis in their statistical models, indicating that the practice I have adopted here is not unorthodox. For example, Whitten and Williams (2011) include what they call government international position in their study of military spending in democracies, which is calculated in a fashion similar to my own. Though I re-term the measurement
foreign policy position, these variables are essentially measuring the same thing. Though Whitten and Williams are investigating an entirely different dependent variable, it is at least partly comforting to know that this understanding of foreign policy position or a government’s international position has been successfully utilized in the recent past. If anything, this would suggest that this measure of foreign policy stance might have broad applicability to a number of different dimensions within the realm of security.

Figure 1 displays the general patterns of foreign policy issue emphasis of the Republican and Democratic parties since World War II. The story this graph tells has face validity. The parties provide divergent policy choices for the most part, and Republicans appear more aggressive than Democrats in most years. Of specific interest is the 1992 election, in which Bill Clinton and the Democrats actually leapfrogged incumbent George H.W. Bush and the Republicans. This switch may actually be in line with standard thinking about the ’92 election. H.W. Bush is widely perceived as having moderated his tone in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, while Clinton pushed the Democrats further to the right on a number of issues, including foreign policy. In Clinton’s first two years in office, he used force on 6 occasions, while Bush used force short of war only 11 times during his four-year tenure, indicating that their similar scores on this scale should not be too surprising. Figure 2 displays the foreign policy position of the presidential party since World War II.

The independent variable used to test hypothesis 2 is constructed using data on the both the winning and losing party in each election. I take the distance between the winner and the loser’s foreign policy positions to create this measure. For example, the difference between Reagan’s Republicans and Dukakis’ Democrats in 1984 was a
positive 16.8, while the difference between Johnson’s Democrats and Goldwater’s Republicans in 1964 was a negative 13.5. In practice, I am simply subtracting the value of the opposition party’s score from the presidential party’s score. I label this variable as competitive foreign policy in my empirical tests. Because of potential distributional concerns, I also provide results using the logistic transformation of this variable.

It may be disconcerting to some readers that my measures of foreign policy issue emphasis remains static over four years at a time and does not account for the midterm changes in the presidency that occurred after the Kennedy assassination and the Nixon resignation. As I have argued above, this measure is less about individual personality and more about issues emphasized prior to an election. I further argue that this measure of foreign policy position is a broad one that captures the general position of the president and his cabinet, which obviously includes the vice-president in all cases. There were obviously differences in personality between Kennedy and Johnson and Nixon and Ford respectively, but the test here is not one of personality.

Control Variables

A number of international and domestic elements may also shape the president’s decision to use force. A series of control variables are necessary to provide a correctly specified statistical model. I include a dummy variable for years that the US is coded as being involved in an interstate war according to the Correlates of War Interstate War data (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). These include the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf Wars. It may be that ongoing war captures the president’s attention with regard to foreign policy and makes other uses of force less affordable because military resources are concentrated on the war. It may also be that wars alter how parties and candidates present
their foreign policy stances to the electorate, causing them to offer a more pacific or tough position during an ongoing war. I also include a dichotomous measure to capture the Cold War, as it may be that Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet bloc inspired more frequent uses of force by US presidents. This variable is coded 1 prior to 1990 and 0 after.

According to the previous literature, a number of domestic factors can determine foreign policy outcomes. Specifically, macroeconomic indicators may shape the decision to use force abroad. Some authors have hypothesized that economic downturns may limit the president’s ability to engage internationally, while others following the diversionary line of thinking have offered that presidents use force to distract the public from a weak economy. Following this literature on diversionary theory and Fordham’s macroeconomic perception approach, I include quarterly measures the consumer price index and the absolute value of the unemployment rate. The data on unemployment come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the inflation data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

I also include measures of legislative potential for policy change (LPPC). The inclusion of the LPPC scores is consistent with recent scholarship on the role of Congress in supporting or constraining the president in using force. Brulé and Hwang (2010) utilize these LPPC scores, which come from Cooper and Young (2002) and measure the size and cohesiveness of the president’s party in each chamber of Congress. I include the

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8 Brulé and Hwang use the same measure of presidential party support in Congress as Howell and Pevehouse (2005). This measure for each chamber is calculated as \(((\text{president’s party size in percent}) \times \text{cohesion of president’s party}) - (\text{opposition’s party size in percent}) \times \text{cohesion of opposition party})\). Party cohesion data comes from Cooper and Young (2002).
lower of each two scores as it should have the largest substantive constraining impact on presidential decision-making.

Presidential popularity amongst the public may matter as well. I include quarterly measure of presidential approval ratings as a proxy of public support. It may be that presidents are more inclined to use force abroad or feel less constrained by the public when approval ratings are high. Conversely, presidents with low approval ratings may behave more cautiously. Again, diversionary theory might suggest that low approval ratings cause presidents to initiate international crises abroad. This may be in order to reap the benefits of a rally effect, which have been well documented elsewhere. These data are quarterly observations and come from Gallup.

Finally, I include a measure of the presidential party’s ideological position with the foreign policy variables used to create my independent variables removed from the indicator. This transformed version of the aggregate variable represents issues that should lie orthogonal to the use of force abroad. It is comprised of the issue emphasis on mostly social and economic issues. Generally, I have no expectation about the effect this variable should have. I include it only to control for ideological position of the presidential party on issues beyond foreign policy.

Estimation Technique

Because the dependent variable in the monadic approach is a count of the uses of force, a negative binomial regression is the appropriate estimation technique. This practice is in line with the argument of McLaughlin Mitchell and Moore (2002). As King (1988) has noted, event count models can be used to model the underlying processes that cause the events. Because I hypothesize that the variation between administrations is of
the most theoretical interest, all models include random effects. It is true that a set of fixed presidential effect variables would not vary perfectly with my independent variables, but on the whole, using fixed effects simply asks too much of the data. Instead, I cluster robust standard errors on a grouping variable that increases by one unit for each presidential administration. For comparison’s sake I provide results using the log-transformed version of my foreign policy position variables

**Monadic Results**

Table 1 displays the results of the monadic empirical tests. Model 1 in Table 1 displays the results of the fully specified model including control variables and robust standard errors. The statistical significance of my main independent variable provides support for my first hypothesis. Because my untransformed independent variable may be subject to concern about outliers, model 2 includes the logistic transformation of my main independent variable and the logistic form of the transformed right-left variable. The measure of foreign policy position is positive and statistically significant.

The substantive effects are of my main independent variable are best calculated using results from model 1. To interpret the coefficients of a negative binomial regression, we must simply take the exponent of the coefficient. By this method, a one-unit increase in my untransformed independent variable would result in roughly 1.07 more uses of major force per quarter. For reference’s sake, the difference in this independent variable between Reagan’s second term and George H.W. Bush’s only term is 4.1 units. These results are strongly supportive of my first hypothesis. The effect of the presidential party’s foreign policy position is both statistically and substantively

28
significant. Figures 3 and 4 graph the odds of major force across different values of the foreign policy variable.

Moving to models 3 and 4, I can assess hypothesis 2, which suggests that recent electoral competition matters. Model 3 provides results using the fully specified model. Model 4 includes the logistic transformation of the competition foreign policy position variable. In model 3 the value of the independent variable is statistically significant. A one-unit increase in this independent variable would result in a 1.03 increase in the use of major force per quarter. In model 4 however, the logistic transformation of the independent variable of interest does not approach statistical significance by any standards. Upon closer inspection of the correlation between all variables included in the regression, it seems that multicollinearity may be a problem. That is, the logistic transformation of the competitive foreign police variable covaries substantially with unemployment (r=.46), war (r=−.43), and the measure of Congressional LPPC (r=.67). It is difficult to say with any confidence that I find support for hypothesis 2 in these tests. Obviously, utilizing the logistic transformation greatly deflates the variance of this competitive foreign policy variable. In a sample with only 208 observations and an independent variable that does not vary over 16 observations at a time, it is not necessarily surprising to find null results.

Turning to the control variables, we can see that the Cold War has a positive impact on the frequency with which major force is used in models 2 and 3, but not in the fully specified model. Neither measure of the economy nor the binary measure of war is significant in the fully specified model, though unemployment is significant in models 3 and 4. This result with regard to the effect of ongoing war may be due to the fact that
unemployment and war are significantly negatively correlated (r=−.5). Congressional support appears significant in both models 2 and 3, but not in the fully specified model. Quarterly inflation and the transformed left-right variable both fail to reach statistical significance in any model. Approval ratings also seem to have no effect, and this finding is consistent with many other pieces that study the domestic determinants of conflict. I hesitate to interpret much with regard to the control variables in this set of models due to the fact that many of them covary.

In this monadic empirical test I find strong support for hypothesis one and little if any support for hypothesis 2. Given the support for hypothesis one I can say that these findings suggest that the divergent policy alternatives offered between parties and within parties over time have an actual effect on foreign policy outcomes. To put it another way, it seems that presidential administrations do make some effort to live up to the foreign policy positions that they advertise. Moreover, disaggregating party behavior and policy outputs seems to be a worthwhile endeavor. Not all Democrats and Republicans should be seen in the same light as their copartisan predecessors in the White House.

**Dyadic Research Design**

*Dependent Variable*

I offer another test of my hypotheses using an alternative dependent variable. Putnam (1988) argues that behavior between states is often the result of a two-level game. Leaders must balance domestic concerns with international relations. By including this dyadic test I am able to measure both domestic factors and factors that have been shown to affect conflict behavior between states. This empirical design tests the issue emphasis approach from 1946 through 2000. The dependent variable in the dyadic
approach is simply a dichotomous measure of MID initiation by the US. The variable is coded 1 if the US is coded on side A of a militarized interstate dispute in each dyad year and zero otherwise. The data on MIDs come from Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer (2004). Sarver and Fordham (2001) have warned that MID data fail to capture the exact same sorts of incidents as Blechman and Kaplan’s (1978) data, though my theory here speaks generally to the conflict behavior of the US. It stands to reason that my hypotheses can be tested using both Blechman and Kaplan’s data and the MID data. Furthermore, there is a clear advantage in checking my analysis using MID initiations. Skeptics of the uses of force dataset might suggest the US is bound to respond to provocation from other states. It is, of course, reasonable to expect the US to respond with force to the Berlin Blockade of 1948. By testing my hypotheses with an alternative dependent variable that captures only conflicts initiated by the United States, I can assuage these concerns.

Control Variables

As the independent variables are the same in both the monadic and dyadic approaches, I move directly to a discussion of the supplemental control variables included in the dyadic test. As noted above, the advantage of modeling dyadic relations comes in measuring potential target state characteristics. The first of these new controls is the ratio of capabilities, where the value of the United States’ capabilities always appears in the numerator and its dyadic partner’s value always appears in the denominator. These data on power and capabilities come from Singer (1987), and the aggregate indicator is an adjusted index of a state’s total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, iron and steel production, and energy consumption. Theoretically, it may be that the United States
takes into account the power status of its targets or even targets weaker or less capable states, so it is a necessary addition to the equation.

The second addition is a measure of the potential target’s regime type. In this case I include a measure drawn from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Polity IV data are cross-national measures of democratic institutions that run from -10 to 10, with a 10 indicating full democracy and -10 indicating a total autocracy. My measure of regime type simply the Polity IV score of the target state. An expansive strand of literature has studied how regime type and democracy might matter in terms of conflict and dispute initiation. Given the wealth of literature on the democratic peace, we would expect the democracy of the target to have a negative effect on dispute initiation.

I also include the tau-b measure of alliance portfolio similarity between the US and the target. As the alliance portfolios between the US and its potential target become more similar, we expect the odds of dispute to decrease. I account for geographic proximity by including a dichotomous measure of contiguity that is equal to one if the target state shares a land border with the United States or is separated from the US by 150 miles of water or less. All data for these control variables was generated using Bennett and Stam’s (2000) EUGene software. Finally, I include several of the key domestic determinants of conflict from the monadic approach, including annualized measures of inflation and unemployment, a dummy variable for the Cold War, and the same measure of Congress as used above.  

Estimation Technique

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9 Annualized data for both inflation and unemployment come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
As the dependent variable is dichotomous, I employ logistic regression to estimate the model. I also include robust standard errors clustered on the dyad in the fully specified model. To deal with problems of temporal dependence, I follow Carter and Signorino's (2010) advice and add measures of peace years, peace years squared, and peace years cubed to the regression equation.

**Dyadic Results**

Model 5 in Table 1 shows the results of the fully specified model with the untransformed value of the foreign policy position as the independent variable of interest. This variable is statistically significant and correctly signed. Model 6 shows the same model with the logistic transformation of the same independent variable, and it is again correctly signed and statistically significant. Though it is impossible to interpret the coefficients reported from a logistic regression in terms of substantive effects, we can see from these preliminary findings that hypothesis one continues to find empirical support. The implications of these results can be better explained in terms of changes in probability. Holding all continuous variables at their mean, all binary variables at their modes, and the value of the untransformed foreign policy variable at its minimum, -4.3 (the value of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy position), the predicted probability of the US initiating a militarized interstate dispute is .0004. Holding all factors constant and increasing the value of the foreign policy variable to its maximum, 13.3 (the value of Ronald Reagan’s first term), the predicted probability increases to .0012, indicating that there is a substantive effect to go along with the statistical significance of this independent variable in this dyadic research design. Figure 5 graphs the expected
probability of dispute initiation given different values of the foreign policy position variable.

Finally, model 7 includes the competitive foreign policy variable into the fully specified model in place of the regular foreign policy position variable. It does not approach statistical significance. Given this result along with the findings in the monadic test, I must admit that I fail to reject the null with regard to hypothesis 2. There is simply no strong empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, though I am confident that it is possible to derive other intriguing hypotheses from my theoretical approach.

Conclusions and Implications

Though I did not find empirical support for my second hypothesis, the evidence in favor of my first hypothesis suggests that my theoretical approach is promising. The results of this study have implications for several different research programs. First, these findings indicate that the disaggregation of party and executive policy position can have a meaningful impact on the study of US foreign policy, specifically in the area of interstate conflict. Scholars who have previously adopted aspects of salience theory have reason to consider behavior outside of budgets expenditures.

Moreover, these findings reveal more about the complex relationship that exists at the nexus of voters, elites, and international relations. I have shown that voters play a role in electing a certain type of foreign policy. In the run up to elections, US presidents have tended to indicate how they will handle the international affairs of the country if elected. With this information, attentive voters can play a direct role in shaping the international relations of the United States in the voting booth. This result is potentially surprising, but also intellectually appealing. White House hopefuls do seem to live up to the foreign
policy positions that they present during election season, and voters can select foreign policy positions that appeal to them most.

However, the power of the electorate to choose a foreign policy is only as meaningful as the choices they are given. As shown in Figure 1, the Democrats and Republicans offered near identical hawkish foreign policy positions in the 2008 presidential election. This convergence may be the result of the heightened demand for security brought on by the September 11th terrorist attacks, but its consequences in terms of voters’ choices are not yet entirely clear. Future research might be able to examine whether or not voters concerned with security issues can make distinctions between candidates and parties that have failed to distinguish themselves from one another.

As with any ongoing research project, there are potential problems that I cannot address due to data availability. Skeptics may suggest that my findings are simply an artifact of Cold War politics. Given the above noted partisan convergence, curious minds might also wonder how my theory applies in a post-September 11th world. Unfortunately, the temporal availability of my data precludes a solid answer to this question. There have only been five full presidential terms since the end of the Cold War and only 2 full presidential terms since the September 11th terrorist attacks. There is too little variation on my independent variable to provide a true test of my theory using only recent data. There is also a dearth of data on uses of force and interstate conflicts outside of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. To be sure, political scientists have dissected both interstate wars, but there is no contemporary update for the uses of force or militarized interstate dispute data. I cannot provide concrete evidence that my theory should apply to US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. I can simply note that there is also no
obvious evidence to suggest that candidate and party signaling have fundamentally changed in the last twenty years.

In any case, future research on this topic should yield interesting results. There may well be other topics worth examination in the US. Outside of the US, a broader look at all democracies since World War II may lead to similar conclusions, but the analysis has yet to be run. It may also be intriguing to examine other dimensions of international relations. For example, it may be that democratic leaders who emphasize international cooperation are more likely to engage actively in a network of intergovernmental organizations. Leaders who discuss foreign special relations may attempt to increase levels of foreign aid or negotiate new treaties.

However, more research on the United States is certainly possible. As Potter (forthcoming) has already shown, there exists a substitution effect between uses of force and diplomatic visits. Though he has argued that electoral margins alter the policy instruments that presidents use, it may also be that presidents signal which policy instruments they intend to use most frequently prior to their election.

More generally my approach marries theoretical concepts traditionally associated with comparative politics with a set of outcomes in the field of international relations. Recently scholars from both fields of study have begun to understand how much they can contribute to one another’s research. Domestic politics matters for interstate outcomes. As the comprehensive literature on war voting has shown, international conflict matters for domestic political outcomes as well. Future scholarship should keep in mind the link between these fields, because there is substantial evidence to suggest that it is a meaningful one. Comparativists cannot fully understand domestic politics without
considering the role of interstate relations and IR scholars cannot fully explain the behavior of states without a strong consideration of domestic politics.

The study of political parties and foreign policy positions is also relatively underdeveloped. A comprehensive look at foreign policy outcomes and parties’ reactions is worthwhile. We know from salience theory that parties deemphasize issues at their convenience, but scholars have not yet systematically investigated this process with regard to the outcomes of international crises disputes. Do leaders that back down decrease their party’s discussion of foreign policy issue in the following election? In sum, I offer that several intriguing research questions flow directly from the issue emphasis approach to foreign policy. There are a number of promising research projects that can and should be carried out in light of my results here.
References


King, Gary, 1988. “Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in


Appendix

Definitions of variables from the Comparative Manifesto Project.

Military: Positive

Need to maintain or increase military expenditure; modernising armed forces and improvement in military strength; rearmament and self-defence; need to keep military treaty obligations; need to secure adequate manpower in the military; importance of external security.

Military: Negative

Favourable mentions of decreasing military expenditures; disarmament; “evils of war”; promises to reduce conscription, otherwise as 104, but negative.

Peace: Positive

Peace as a general goal; declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises; desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries.
Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Foreign Policy Positions of Major Parties since World War 2
Figure 2. Foreign Policy Position of the Presidential Party since World War 2
Figure 3. Probability of Major Force Across Values of Foreign Policy
Figure 4. Probability of Major Force Across Values of Foreign Policy cont.

- Probability Major Force=4
- Probability Major Force=5
Figure 5. Probability of MID Initiation Across Values of Foreign Policy Position
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2  
US Dyadic MIDs 1946-2000

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<td></td>
<td>(.0336)</td>
<td>(.0337)</td>
<td>(.0340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.509</td>
<td>1.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.940)</td>
<td>(.947)</td>
<td>(.983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Similarity</td>
<td>-.1248</td>
<td>-.1278</td>
<td>-.1275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.134)</td>
<td>(1.147)</td>
<td>(1.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>-.208***</td>
<td>.207***</td>
<td>-.206***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0294)</td>
<td>(.0292)</td>
<td>(.0288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years Squared</td>
<td>.0029***</td>
<td>.00297***</td>
<td>.00294***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0007)</td>
<td>(.0007)</td>
<td>(0007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years Cubed</td>
<td>1.09e-05</td>
<td>-1.09e-05</td>
<td>-1.07e-05e-05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>6,327</td>
<td>6,327</td>
<td>6,327</td>
</tr>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1