TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES, AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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by
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The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate school, have examined the dissertation entitled.

TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AUTHORTARIAN LEGACIES, AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Presented by Jason M. Wells

A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

And hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

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TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES, AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates citizens' support for democracy in southern Africa and the factors that explain variations in that support. Borrowing insights from the historical institutionalism literature, I argue that perceptions of the alternative institutional contexts will influence citizens' support for democracy. More specifically, I argue that support for traditional institutions and/or past authoritarian regimes will influence citizens' support for democracy.

To test this argument, I use a mixed research design, comprised of both a statistical analysis of cross-national survey data and a case-study of South Africa based interviews with members of the South African Parliament. The results indicate that support for alternative institutions do influence citizens' support for democracy, but that all institutions do not have the same effect. More specifically, I found that support for past authoritarian regimes had both a strong negative relationship with democratic support, while support for traditional institutions had a weaker, though still negative effect.

Chapter 1: Introduction

While western observers have often denounced political systems in Africa as "primitive, backward, and inferior," the diversity of Africa's political arrangements defy such simplistic generalizations (Schraeder 2000: 65). In reality, citizens have experienced political arrangements that have ranged from harsh authoritarian regimes dominated by a single leader to fully democratic systems. While European colonization and indigenous exploitation disrupted this rich mosaic of political systems, and military and patrimonial rule have dominated the post-colonial experience, democracy recently returned to Africa and citizens living across Africa have rejected authoritarianism, instituted democratic rules, and are adapting to life under these rules.

To what extent do citizens in southern Africa support their democracies, and will this support enable democracies to avoid a return to the authoritarianism that was once so common across the African continent? Just as the initial post-colonial African democracies gave way to patrimonial autocratic states, many argue that African democracies are likely to experience a resurgence of authoritarian rule (Callaghy 1994; Ihonvbere 1996; Kaplan 1992; Kaplan 1994; van de Walle 1995). This conventional wisdom suggests that the lingering influence of authoritarian institutions, primarily traditional leaders and authoritarian regimes, will likely undermine support for democracy and increase the likelihood of an authoritarian resurgence.

Unlike authoritarian regimes, a democracy's survival is dependent upon the support of the mass public (Diamond 1999; Inglehart 1997). In southern Africa, just as in the rest of the world, citizens' perceptions and evaluations of democracy influence the

prospects of that democracy's survival. The context in which citizens live has also had a strong influence on citizens' support for democracy.

As the historical institutional literature highlights, the perceptions, actions, and goals, of individuals are influenced by the institutional context in which they live (Thelen 1992). This literature argues that the legacy of institutions does not simply disappear with the introduction of a different set of institutions (Rose 1998: 63). This means that former institutions, though replaced by democratic institutions, may continue to influence the perceptions of citizens for some time. Citizens in southern Africa have had very recent experiences with other institutional arrangements, giving these institutions substantially more influence than they might have in other geographic regions. Specifically, the perceptions and evaluations of citizens in southern Africa are influenced by traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) and/or an authoritarian past (ranging from colonialism to the racist Apartheid regime in South Africa). By examining the influence of these institutions, I seek to offer two important contributions to the democratic support literature.

In general, political science recognizes that institutions matter, but the impact that alternative institutions have on citizens' support for democracy has not been sufficiently tested. While scholars have begun to study the lingering effect that institutions in post-Communist Europe have on democratic support, they have yet to ask how institutions influence citizens' evaluations of democracy in Africa. We do not yet know whether individuals continue to think of past institutions or whether these thoughts continue to influence support for democracy. The first contribution of this study, then, is a general

examination of how alternative institutions influence citizens' support for democracy with particular attention paid to traditional and past authoritarian institutions.

Second, while the democratization literature has highlighted the importance of past institutions for understanding citizens' support for democracy in many contexts, scholars have only begun to systematically measure support for democracy in southern Africa and have yet to examine the specific impact that traditional institutions or a country's authoritarian legacy have on individual Africans' support for democracy. For example, in even the most recent examination of mass opinion in southern Africa, Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) note that traditional institutions and nostalgia for the authoritarian past continue to represent viable institutional alternatives, but do not estimate the impact that these have on democratic support. To resolve this gap in the existing consolidation literature, I consider the nature and extent of democracy and democratic support in southern Africa and analyze the factors that influence this support with a particular focus on the influence that traditional institutions and past authoritarian regimes have on variations in democratic support.

1.1 Research Design and Methodology

While some would argue that elites, and not the mass public, really determine the survival of a democracy (Przeworski 1986; Skocpol 1979), I begin from the common assumption that the persistence of democratic governmental institutions is conditional on the mass publics' acceptance of these institutions (Diamond 1999; Linz 1996; Rose 1998). Throughout this project, African citizens are viewed as individuals capable of choosing from alternative institutional arrangements just as citizens in any other region of

the world might. In other words, Africans are seen as viewing their governments with the same critical eye as are citizens in other parts of the world and use their expectations and experiences to evaluate the extent to which the government suits them and their society. The effects of alternative political institutions, however, often linger past formal regime changes. This lingering effect leads citizens to evaluate the democracies of southern Africa based on their perceptions and evaluations of the institutions that govern daily life *and* their expectations of how viable alternatives (traditional leaders and/or an authoritarian regime) might govern daily life.

Estimating the effect that alternative institutions have on citizens' support for democracy is, under the best circumstances, a difficult enterprise. The very nature of the academic study of African politics makes this estimation more difficult. Though there are many notable exceptions, Africanists often draw "general conclusions on the [political] system as a whole from uncertain anecdote about individual cases" (Monga 1996: 7). Researchers in other fields, Monga notes, recognize the problems associated with such tendencies and attempt to correct for them, but many Africanists often ignore these problems (7). Instead of relying upon anecdotes or empirical evidence that is "limited to some administrative data or a few patterns of behavior they noticed during their short trips to the field," Africanists should base their conclusions (such as the effect that alternative institutions have on democratic support) on systematic empirical evidence. While such systematic data has previously been "scarce, spotty, or non-existent," I rely on survey data from six southern African democracies recently collected by the ground-breaking Afrobarometer project (Bratton 2005).

It is important to note, however, that even evidence such as this has limitations. These issues range from, but are not limited to, selecting respondents to the wording of individual questions and the translation of these questions into various local languages. All of these issues combine to limit the accuracy and effectiveness of the survey data. While I believe the benefits of using cross-national data collected in a systematic fashion outweigh these limitations, it is important to consider these limitations and attempt to address them.

In light of these concerns, I employ a two-part research design to determine whether these institutional alternatives actually influence citizens' support for democracy. The first portion uses survey data from the previously mentioned Afrobarometer survey project, to analyze the perceptions and evaluations of democracy of individuals living in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia. Based on a single survey instrument, this data is well suited to asking about individuals' perceptions of democracy, and the factors that influence these perceptions, and allow me to determine the extent to which individuals understand democracy and the extent to which they support democracy. After determining the extent to which individuals support democracy, I evaluate which factors increase or decrease this support, with a special focus on the influence of traditional leaders and the authoritarian past.

The second portion of this project examines the relationship between institutional alternatives and democratic support through a case-study based on in-depth interviews with elected officials in South Africa. This portion provides a way to evaluate the validity of the survey results. I interview Members of Parliament because re-election pressures give them a unique incentive to understand how the average citizens view the

regime and what factors shape these views. More specifically, since institutional memberships overlap (an individual who is committed to a traditional institution is also represented by a member of parliament just as is any other citizen), it seems reasonable to expect that Members of Parliament interact with citizens from a variety of backgrounds and should gain insight into how these alternative institutions influence individuals' views of government. In essence, I am using representatives' evaluations of their constituents as a way of checking the validity of the survey results. Even more, however, this portion of the project should offer a more nuanced, contextually sensitive, analysis of the interaction between traditional institutions, authoritarian legacy, and support for new democratic institutions.

While the South African case is significantly different from the other countries included in the survey portion of this study, both the diversity of the population and the newness of the democratic institutions suggest it for deeper consideration. In addition, since the countries included in the survey portion are located in southern Africa, and South Africa is the most important country in this region, not examining South Africa seems to present more difficulties than does examining it (for example, how can one control for the significant informal influence that South Africa has on the representatives of the surrounding countries).

While each of these approaches introduces unique difficulties and biases, combining these approaches will produce results that are more reliable and compelling than those that could be achieved through either approach individually.

1.2 Map of the Project

The next chapter will consider the existing conceptualizations of democratic consolidation, outline the conceptualization of democratic consolidation used in this study and explain why I believe democratic support is the key to consolidation. It will also offer an explanation of why the historically important institutional alternatives considered in this project are generally believed to undermine support for democracy. Chapter 3 will explore how citizens in southern Africa understand democracy, determine the extent to which democracy is supported by the mass public and compare support across southern Africa with support in other parts of the developing world. Chapter 4 will then offer a baseline explanation of democratic support by testing in the African context the existing hypotheses of the democratic support literature. In essence, the purpose of this chapter is to both show that the factors that influence democratic support in other parts of the world have the same impact in southern Africa and to show that these factors leave a lot of the variation in democratic support unexplained.

In Chapter 5, I explore the extent to which individuals support traditional leaders, determine what sorts of individuals support traditional leaders, and estimate the relative impact of supporting a traditional leader on democratic support after controlling for other factors. In Chapter 6, I turn to memories of the authoritarian past and ask how many people continue to have a sense of nostalgia for the past, who these individuals are, and how much influence these feelings have on democratic support. In Chapter 7, I use data from the interviews I conducted to delve deeper into the South African case. In particular, I use this data to determine whether elected officials see these alternative

institutions as having the same sort, and amount, of influence on democratic support that the statistical analyses revealed. In the final chapter, I draw together the conclusions from each of the preceding chapters and offer some thoughts about the future of democratic consolidation in southern Africa.

1.3 Summary

Around the world, democracy has become the most widely accepted form of government, and with this acceptance comes a decrease in the chances of a reversal to non-democratic rule. In southern Africa, however, the extent to which citizens support democracy remains unclear and democracy remains vulnerable to authoritarian resurgences. Indeed, as noted above, these countries will remain vulnerable until a majority of their citizens accept democracy as the "only game in town" (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Surprisingly, while scholars have started to examine how southern Africans actually perceive democracy as both an idea and as a form of government, we still know very little about democratic consolidation in this region. In acknowledgment of this lack of knowledge, and in an effort to address the problem, this study offers two contributions to the literature on democracy and democratic consolidation. First, I offer insight into the general interaction between individuals and political institutions (to foreshadow, the findings suggest that although institutions do influence individuals, the relationship is less general, and more context-specific, than the existing literature suggests). Second, more specifically, this study highlights the fact that scholars have not yet estimated the influence that adherence to traditional institutions and/or the legacy of authoritarian

institutions might have on individuals' support for democracy and asks just how these historically important institutional alternatives influence citizens' support for democracy.

By analyzing southern Africans' perceptions and evaluations of democracy, this study contributes to political science's understanding of democratic consolidation by incorporating lessons from an understudied region of the world, a region where the prospects of democracy remain in question.

These contributions, based on both a statistical analysis of survey data and a qualitative analysis of interview data, suggest that democratic support, and perhaps democratic consolidation, is the product of citizens' perceptions and evaluations of the current world, rather than experiences with past institutions. Even more, by examining democratic support through both methods, the findings of this study represent a contextually contingent, rigorous expansion of the impact of two historically important institutions on citizens in new African democracies, the general interaction between individuals and institutions, and our understanding of democratization in an understudied context.

Chapter 2: Theory: Democracy, Democratic Consolidation, and Popular Support

In the last 15 years, democracy has spread across much of sub-Saharan Africa. But will it last? More specifically, will citizens attachment to traditional leaders, or the authoritarian past, undermine their support for democracy and contribute to the collapse of these new regimes? The emergence of democracy in this region, combined with the continued presence of traditional leaders and the temporal proximity of authoritarian rule provides a rare opportunity to analyze democratic support and the influence that alternative institutions have on this support.

To this end, this study engages, evaluates, and ultimately integrates two literatures that have gained prominence in the study of comparative politics to explain democratic support in southern Africa. First, this study is rooted in the voluminous literature on democracy and democratic consolidation, particularly literature that examines citizens' support for democracy. Second, this study is informed by the neo-institutionalism literature, and specifically responds to the historical-institutionalism literature. While each of these literatures uses divergent methods to offer distinct views of the world, the concepts, arguments, and findings presented by both seem surprisingly complementary and ripe for integration into a single model that would offer a compelling understanding of the democracies that have emerged in southern Africa.

Recently, scholars have begun to examine the influence that institutions have on politics in sub-Saharan Africa (Boone 2003; Bratton 1997; Monga 1996). Surprisingly, no one has attempted to assess how the factors on which a historical-institutional study would focus actually fit into the democratic support literature, which primarily examines

the influence individual characteristics and short-term evaluations have on popular support for democracy in southern Africa. In this study, I offer just such an analysis by examining the possibility that support for a traditional leader or past authoritarian institutions influence individuals' support for democracy.

In more specific terms, I ask two questions regarding the presence of people who prefer traditional leaders and the authoritarian past and the influence that these preferences have on democratic support. First, I ask whether a substantial portion of citizens in the six countries included in this study continue to prefer traditional leader or the authoritarian past. Second, I ask whether, and how, these preferences influence citizens' support for democracy in southern Africa.

2.1 Conceptualizing Democracy

Before discussing the factors that influence democratic support, the primary focus of this project, it is important to consider the divergent meanings scholars employ when they use the terms like democracy and democratic consolidation.

Both the general comparative politics literature and the particular literature on democratization recognize that democracy is a broad concept that exists on multiple levels and in multiple dimensions.[1] This multi-faceted reality has prevented scholars from reaching a consensus on its meaning. Within the vast array of conceptualizations that scholars have produced to capture this complex reality, however, Joseph Schumpeter's description of democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at

[1] Though Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that democracy is an either or proposition, and model it as such, most scholars employ a multi-faceted view of democracy and incorporate several dimensions into the measures they use to analyze democracy.

political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" has become preeminent (Schumpeter 1976).

While Schumpeter's delineation of democracy is rooted in the procedures associated with democratic governance, such procedures only represent one dimension of democracy; the dimension that is, perhaps, the most superficial and easily secured. As Terry Lynn Karl noted, elections do not make a democracy (Karl 1986).

Given the difficulties of using elections as a principle indicator of democracy, and the tenuous nature of electoral procedures in new democracies, it is more useful to think of democracy in broader terms, perhaps even as Abraham Lincoln described it: "government made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the people." This means both that the people must be ultimately responsible for public decisions and that government should act in the interests of the people. In other words, democracy is about more than free and fair elections. It is also about legitimacy, empowerment, competition, the protection of civil and political liberties and substantive representation.

Table 2-1 Here.

Southern Africa, as illustrated in Table 2-1, highlights the diversity associated with democratic regimes. The existing regime types range from the liberal democracies of Botswana and South Africa to the liberalizing autocracy of Lesotho. While not all of the countries included in this study are fully democratic, all have taken steps away from complete authoritarian rule. However, countries that move away from authoritarianism do not necessarily move directly towards liberal democracy and those that do move towards liberal democracy will not necessarily stay headed in that direction (Diamond 1999; Huntington 1991; Linz 1996). For example, though often invoked as a prime

example of how democracy can work in Africa, the government of Botswana has recently come under fire for deporting a University of Botswana professor for criticizing the presidential succession process.

2.2 Understanding Democratization

In line with this vision of democracy as a complex phenomenon, the process of changing from an authoritarian regime to democratic regime is also complex and requires more than the implementation of elections. For democracy to have meaning, the participants must first have reached a consensus on the general rules of the entire political game. While the nature of a country's electoral rules do not ensure the successful introduction or consolidation of democracy (Katz 1997; Powell 2001), consensus on the rules of the political game, among both the masses and elites, does. If governing elites do not reach an understanding on both the meaning and procedures of elections and the rights and liberties of citizens, a transition to democracy cannot be successful (Karl, 1986: 10).

As many scholars have noted, democratization is a complex process comprised of multiple steps, including the decay of an authoritarian regime, a transition to a democratic regime, and the consolidation, and eventual maturation, of this new democratic regime (Shin 1994). The first two steps capture the fundamental institutional changes that must occur during democratization. The last steps, however, represent the deepening of support for these new institutions and are rooted in the attitudes and perceptions of those living in these new regimes.

Fundamentally, democratic consolidation is the "process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine" (Diamond 1999). More importantly, consolidation is an ongoing, developmental, process that regimes never truly complete (Dahl 1971; Sklar 1996). Even after consolidation, this process continues in the maturation phase, a continued deepening of democratic values, attitudes, and practices which is only possible after the bulk of a country's citizenry supports the regime. This study is based on the premise that the democratic regimes found in southern Africa have begun, but not yet completed, the consolidation step.

Although scholars have yet to reach a consensus on benchmarks to indicate a society's movement through the democratization process (either toward democracy or away from it), there are several widely recognized proxy measures for consolidation. These proxy measures range from the number of years a democratic regime has lasted, to the number of times power has peacefully changed hands, to using individual-level measures of democratic support. Since cross-national survey data has only just become available, previous evaluations of consolidation have been primarily based on institutional and structural measures (Gasiorowski 1998; Huntington 1991; Power 1997). According to these measures, the assumption that no southern African democracy has reached consolidation is accurate – none of these democracies have lasted more than the 50 years generally recognized, none have experienced a peaceful transfer of power. In addition, those few regimes that appear near to consolidation may actually be striving for what Achille Mbembe characterized as a search for 'presentatibility,' rather than the

deeper reforms required for democratization (Joseph 1999). Although Schedler (2001) argues that democratic actions trump both structural and attitudinal measures, it seems that such behaviors are difficult to distinguish from those motivated by a desire to look presentable without instituting real changes. Examining the attitudes of individuals, as offered by both the average citizen and elected representatives, however, offers a way to evaluate the prospects of democratization.

Why Popular Support Matters

As Linz and Stepan (1996) argued, the interpretations and evaluations of individual citizens are the basic components of regime legitimacy, which, in turn, is the foundation of democratic consolidation. Although some scholars argue that the survival of a democracy is the result of elite bargaining and negotiations (Bermeo 1992; Przeworski 1986; Skocpol 1979), such bargaining and negotiations are the key part of regime transitions not regime consolidation. As Bermeo argued, "mass actions such as strikes, riots, and armed insurrections can bring down a dictatorial regime, but they do not in themselves produce an alternative" (Bermeo 1992: 276). Regime construction, or reconstruction, is the job of elites.

After the elites of a society settle on a democratic regime, the masses once again pass judgment on the regime. If citizens are satisfied with the institutions elites have constructed, the regime move towards consolidation. Just as the masses can bring down a dictatorial regime that they do not like, however, the masses can also bring down a democratic regime by withdrawing their support. In those countries where a majority of the citizenry does not favor democratic governance, or are not deeply committed to it, the

regime loses its legitimacy and democracy becomes susceptible to aspiring authoritarian leaders (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1999).

Authoritarian reversions that correspond to the withdrawal of popular support have occurred in numerous countries. In Nigeria, for example, pervasive corruption and a dramatic fall in oil revenues led a large portion of Nigerians to lose faith in democracy and, however reluctantly, see military rule as the only viable alternative (Diamond 1995). As Larry Diamond's pre-election survey noted, "in Kano state, the largest and most volatile in the country, a majority of the state's electorate and two-thirds of the voters in Kano city favored a military government" (Diamond 1995: 438). In the hopes that change could be accomplished through constitutional processes, Nigerians waited for the elections to unfold. Unsurprisingly, given the pervasiveness of corruption in the regime, the elections were deeply flawed with the final voter registry showing 65 million voters, nearly twice the legitimate total (Diamond 1995: 438). On December 31, 1983, "to the delight of most Nigerians," the military retook control of Nigeria (Ihonvbere 1998: 100) (Maier 2000).

In Peru, the Shining Path insurgency and miserable economic conditions led citizens to become disillusioned with democracy and withdraw their support (by 1989, only 43.5% of those in the lower class sections of the capital city of Lima said Peru was a democracy and by 1992 over 87% claimed that Congress and the judiciary had failed to fulfill their constitutional role) (Roberts 1995). Even more, Alberto Fujimori actually "received popular acclaim when he suspended the constitution, dissolved congress and regional governments, and purged most of the judiciary" (Roberts, 1995: 98).

In essence, popular support is "a core component of democratic consolidation" and "mass-level survey data on popular support for democracy provide an indispensable measure of progress towards consolidation" (Diamond, 1999: 174). Even more, beyond measuring progress towards consolidation, mass-level survey data provide the information required to explain individual-level variations in democratic support.

2.3 Explaining democratic support

The democratization literature has primarily focused on three sets of factors to explain variations in individuals' support for democracy. The first examines the effects that personal characteristics, in the form of both demographic attributes and personal experiences, have on an individuals' support for democracy. Although many of these personal characteristics are not terribly strong predictors of democratic support, an individual's level of education is among the most important determinants of democratic support. In fact, countless scholars, beginning with Lipset (1959), have tied higher levels of education to the success of democracy.

In addition to these personal characteristics, scholars examine the influence that short-term perceptions and evaluations of economic status and political experiences. Of the explanatory factors generally considered in the democratic support literature, it is these factors that are the more powerful predictors of democratic support. Scholars, however, disagree over which of these factors is most important. Some argue that individual evaluations of both national economic conditions and individual personal financial situations influence democratic support, with those who believe the situation has gotten better having more support for democracy (Przeworski 1991). Others, such as

Huntington (1991), have looked at cross-national comparisons and noted that there is a strong positive correlation between wealth and democracy. On the other hand, some argue that political experiences have the most profound impact on democratic support (Bratton 1997; Evans 1995). In particular, evaluations of the political system and measures of satisfaction with how the current government works offer the most powerful explanations of support for democracy (Lagos 2001; Morlino 1995; Shin 1999).

While a small number of scholars have recently begun to investigate individual Africans' support for democracy, few have specifically considered individual-level measures of democratic support as determinants of democratic consolidation in southern Africa (Bratton 2001b; Bratton 2003; Ottemoeller 1998). None have considered the interaction between institutions and individuals or specific influence that support for traditional institutions and/or past institutional arrangements (such as the patrimonial dictators that have dominated African politics) might have on individuals' support for democracy.

The New Institutionalism in Comparative Politics

For much of the latter half of the 20th century, political scientists narrowly focused on individual-level, behavioral explanations of political phenomenon. However, the core behavioral studies failed to recognize the critical role that institutions play in shaping the behavior of individuals.

In a classic response to the behavioral approach that dominated much of political science, March and Olsen argued that throughout the 1960s and 1970s, "political institutions, such as the legislature, the legal system, and the state, as well as traditional

economic institutions, such as the firm, … receded in importance from the position they held in the earlier theories …" (March 1984). In the place of institutions, scholars examined the factors that motivated individual action. After years of research into the individual-level determinants of political phenomenon, however, scholars reassessed the role political institutions play in shaping political outcomes. In essence, the new institutionalism approach emerged as a direct response to behavioral explanations of politics that highlighted the "role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes" (Hall 1996: 936). More specifically, scholars (first Americanists and later comparativists) began to realize that the institutional arena in which individuals operated influenced their actions by narrowing the set of available alternatives (Shepsle 1981; Skowronek 1982; Steinmo 1993).

This new institutionalism, however, does not represent a unified approach to studying politics, there are at least three variations: 1) historical institutionalism, 2) rational choice institutionalism, and 3) sociological institutionalism (see Hall and Taylor (1996)and Thelen(1999)for reviews of these). Especially important to this project is the historical institutionalism variant.

This historical institutional approach focuses both on the fact that politics are structured by conflicts between groups and the idea of the "polity as an overall system of interacting parts" (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 937). In essence, this literature argues that "history matters" (North 1990 viii). In particular, history matters not only because we can learn from it, but also because "the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society's institutions. Today's and tomorrow's choices are shaped by the past" (vii).

A key piece of this approach is path-dependence, interpreted as political development though critical junctures and developmental pathways (Ikenberry, 1994). As Thelen noted, critical junctures "involve arguments about crucial founding moments of institutional formation that send countries along broadly different developmental paths," while developmental pathways "suggest that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions" (Thelen 1999: 387). In other words, regimes are able to change beyond the dramatic moments of history, but these changes are conditioned by both the broad path that the country is on and the past choices of those living in the country. Or, as Karl argued (1990:7), "structural and institutional constraints determine the range of options available to decision makers and may even predispose them to choose a specific option." Past events and institutions, then, shape politics in ways that emphasize the important interaction that exists between institutions and individuals.

In southern Africa, this means that the 'triple heritage' of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences continue to shape the perceptions, and choices, of citizens in these new democracies. To understand contemporary democratic governance in southern Africa, then, we need to understand not only the procedures of democracy, but also the influence that support for alternative institutions has on evaluations of these democracy. Although it seems that traditional institutions and the legacy of an old authoritarian regime should play only a small role in the operation of a modern democratic state, as Shin and McDonough (2002) note, such institutions and legacies are the most basic conceptual framework through which many individuals interpret politics in their society.

To develop a better understanding of the process by which countries become complete democracies, then, this study integrates the lessons of historical institutionalism into an explanation of the factors that explain both an individuals' perceptions and evaluations of democracy and how elected leaders reconcile the contradictory demands that history leads citizens to place upon them.

The democratization literature, with its primary focus on the immediate, individual-level causes, has generally failed to consider the independent impact that experiences with alternative institutions might have on individuals. This is surprising since there are studies where scholars have found institutions to have an important impact on individual actions (ie., Bratton's (1999) finding that institutional affiliations had more influence over individuals' political participation than did socioeconomic factors or attitudinal preferences).

The closest that literature has come to considering the impact of institutions on democratic support is a small literature that has begun to examine the influence of national-level institutional variations on citizens' support for democracy (Ames 2001; Anderson 1997). This literature, while reinforcing the findings of the general democratization literature, has presented evidence that a country's institutional environment also has a strong impact on citizens' evaluations of democracy. Scholars working in this area, however, have yet to examine democratic support in southern Africa.

In essence, the historical-institutional approach suggests that the political institutions that shaped the political arena before the democratic transition continue to influence citizens' perceptions and evaluations now that democracy has been introduced.

The lingering influence of these non-democratic institutions has left Africa's leaders unable to easily change the political and economic arrangements that characterize politics in their countries. While I accept the historical institutional perspective that institutions might have a lingering influence on the individuals that have lived within them, this perspective must be carefully evaluated. Specifically, while the logic presented by scholars of historical institutionalism would suggest that traditional leadership and past authoritarian institutions will influence citizens' views of democracy in southern Africa, we must determine the accuracy of this statement through empirical evidence.

In particular, alternative institutions such as these are going to have the largest effect when 1) citizens have difficulties adapting themselves to the political game of the new regime and 2) when the old regime presents a viable alternative to the existing institutional structures. First, for example, the communist past continues to influence Central and Eastern Europeans' views of democracy because it is difficult for citizens to "reorient themselves toward the values of competitive individualism that figure significantly in the democratic political order" (Shin 2002: 2). In southern Africa, while citizens' political experiences are dramatically different from those of citizens in communist and post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, citizens are also adapting to life under new rules, rules that are not arbitrary or corrupt. Alternative institutional arrangements might undermine the democratic support of those who find it difficult to adapt to democracy and new political processes.

Second, institutional alternatives might influence views of democracy, not because citizens are uncomfortable with the new regime, but because these alternatives actually represent the citizens' preferred form of government. Again, as in the case of the

post-Communist world, citizens' dissatisfaction with the living conditions of the post-transition era may lead them prefer government institutions met, or claimed to meet, everyone's basic needs.

In addition to these general reasons why institutional alternatives might influence democratic support, there are reasons tied to the specific alternatives.

Adherence to Traditional Institutions

While chieftaincy systems are generally thought of as being characteristic of pre-colonial Africa, they remain an important institution in the politics of contemporary southern Africa. In Botswana, citizens continue to define themselves according to which of the eight Tswana groupings to which he or she belongs and traditional leaders continue to exert "significant influence over critical institutions of local governance" (Vaughan 2003: 132). In South Africa, the wealthiest and most western country in southern Africa, about 40% of the people continue to live under the rule of traditional leaders (van Kessel 1997).

In practical terms, tradition indicates something "which has been handed down from the past" (Gyekye 1997 219). In this study, this something is the system of chiefs and headmen that lead communities and whose influence shapes society over the course of several generations. Ultimately, traditional institutions are those arrangements that were "created or pursued by past generations and that, having been accepted and preserved, in whole or in part, by successive generations, has been maintained to the present" (221). A traditional leaders, then, is "any person who by virtue of his ancestry occupies a clearly defined leadership position in an area; and/or who has been appointed

to such position in accordance with the customs and tradition of the area, real or invented, and this has ‘traditional authority’ over the people of that area; or any person appointed by an instrument or order of government or elected by the community to exercise ‘traditional authority’ over an area or a tribe, or to perform traditional functions for them” (Keulder 1998: 24).

Across Africa, some form of traditional institution provided many communities with political leadership through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. Although, as Christian Potholm highlights, the nature of these pre-colonial communities was diverse, in all but the most segmented political systems (such as hunter-gatherer communities), authority was often invested in a single figure or a small group of elders (Potholm 1979). This authority elevated leaders to the “agent of social control at the local level” (Dusing 2002). Traditional leaders, whether hereditary, selected, or appointed, held the political, judicial, spiritual, military, and economic authority in the community. This authority, however, was not always dictatorial and retaining a leadership position in southern Africa was often conditional on the community’s approval (Dusing 2002: 74; Holm 1974: 14; Wylie 1990).

Traditional institutions, having survived both the colonial and initial post colonial forms of authoritarianism, show few signs of disappearing and are, in fact, adapting themselves to democratic rules. Even more, citizens continue to acknowledge chiefs and recognize their authority. However, the conventional wisdom suggests that traditional leaders are incompatible with democracy and that those who acknowledge or follow a traditional leader should have lower levels of support for democracy. This argument is based on three points.

First, for a long period, scholars viewed traditional institutions as being fundamentally undemocratic, or as being incompatible with democracy. As George Ayittey noted, a substantial portion of the anthropology literature routinely depicted African chiefs and kings as "despots" and that "Africans 'yearned' to be freed from their own 'autocratic' rulers"(Ayittey 1991).

In political science, the modernization literature that dominated comparative studies for a period also considered traditional leaders as incompatible with democracy. For example, in a classic statement of modernization Apter argued that one of the key characteristics of 'modern' societies was the differentiation of sacred and secular systems of authority (Apter 1965: 84). In traditional societies, modernization became possible only when the people challenged the status of traditional leaders and demanded a redistribution of power away from inheritance and towards meritocracy (generally in the form of democratic governance).

These literatures, however, largely misrepresented the nature of traditional rule in Africa. Throughout Africa and in southern Africa in particular, traditional leaders were not as authoritarian as first imagined. In many societies, chiefs who appeared to have absolute power and the freedom to follow their whim actually held office thanks to popular acceptance of their authority (Ayittey 1991: xxv; Holm 1974; Wylie 1990: 216). As traditional leaders are not the authoritarians that scholars initially assumed, and are often rooted in at least nominally democratic practices, there is nothing inherent in the composition of traditional institutions that should undermine an individual's support for democracy.

Second, traditional political institutions are incompatible with democracy because they were co-opted "by the introduction of the colonial state and its aftermath of African nationalism" (Helle-Velle 2002; Jackson 1982; van Kessel 1997). As Crawford Young (1994) noted, the imposition of colonial state fundamentally changed politics across Africa. Although the colonial experience varied widely from colony to colony and region to region, the entire continent suffered from occupation, subjugation, and the "machinery of permanent domination" (Young 1994: 95). Both the indirect and direct forms of colonial rule undercut the legitimate authority of traditional leaders and created a European-led government with arbitrary power under the guise of indigenous leadership (Young 1994: Chapter 5). Both forms of colonialism undermined the legitimacy of traditional institutions by appointing chiefs based on their willingness to serve the colonial regime (Mamdani 1996: 55).

Following the main point of Young's work, independence did not eliminate the effects of colonialism or restore chiefs to their pre-colonial status. Instead, decolonization simply changed who controlled the state apparatus. In essence, traditional institutions remained co-opted institutions that were used as the mouthpiece of government. Once democracy was introduced, or re-introduced, one could argue that the chieftaincy was so tainted by its cooperation with, or co-option by, authoritarianism that those who continue to recognize its authority could not possibly support a democratic regime.

Alternatively, one could argue that this logic is flawed and that there is nothing about traditional institutions that makes them inherently incompatible with democracy. First, across Africa, there are few institutions that survived the colonial, or post-colonial,

experience without finding a way to co-exist with authoritarianism (even organizations such as the African National Congress in South Africa initially sought to preserve its existence by avoiding direct confrontation with the Apartheid government (Mandela 1995: 98).

In other words, it is important to remember the pervasive nature of the colonial/authoritarian experience in Africa. Unlike colonialism in other regions of the world, Africa experienced a domination of unmatched efficiency and reach. Every aspect of life was touched by the colonial experience and the largely arbitrary nature of colonial administration (Chabal 1999; Mamdani 1996; Young 1994). To say that these experiences necessarily leave the *followers* of traditional institutions with an authoritarian mindset misses the complexity of the colonial and independence experience and the adaptations required for surviving these experiences.

At the risk of overstating the case, viewing followers of traditional institutions as being incapable of supporting democracy would be akin to arguing that German citizens who collaborated with Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime (which Goldhagen (1996) argued happened with surprising frequency) were incapable of supporting democracy after the regime fell. Public opinion polls, however, indicate that Germans, in both the western portion that has experienced democracy since shortly after World War II and in the eastern portion that came to know democracy only since the end of the Cold War, have embraced democracy (Conradt 1996: Chapter 2). In essence, there is nothing inherent in traditional institutions' adaptations to adverse circumstances that automatically prevent followers from supporting democracy today.

Finally, followers of traditional institutions might have lower levels of democratic support because these institutions remain largely excluded from the political systems of contemporary southern Africa. As Dusing noted, chiefs have been excluded from the formal political arena because their presence would "seriously impede the process of modernization, in the sense of being a national symbol of traditionalism and 'backwardness'" (Dusing 2002: 214-15). Indeed, governments across southern Africa have yet to incorporate traditional leaders into the political process. In some countries, chiefs must abdicate their traditional position before standing for elected office, in others chiefs hold seats in the upper house of Parliament for chiefs (Botswana), or on a traditional leaders advisory council (Namibia). In South Africa, the authority of chiefs is recognized in the constitution, but only in the most vague and general ways (Williams 2004). In its most recent official statement on the role of chiefs in South Africa, the government acknowledges the "critical role" of traditional leaders in society, but also states traditional institutions must be "transformed and aligned with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights" (Republic of South Africa 2002). The South African Constitution, however, simply notes that traditional authority exists and that it is subject to the laws of South Africa (Republic of South Africa 1996: Chapter 12).

Extending the historical institutional argument, this exclusion of traditional leaders from government should undermine support for democracy among those citizens who continue to have strong attachments to traditional leaders. After all, if citizens believe that traditional leaders hold legitimate political authority, but the government chooses to exclude them from the political process, there is little reason for citizens to support the government.

Alternatively, this exclusion might not matter if citizens' view governmental and traditional authority as parallel, not contradictory, political constructs. Instead of representing an institutional alternative challenges the government in power, traditional institutions could actually serve a set of purposes that the government is not designed to address. For example, traditional leaders could fulfill ritual/spiritual functions that are outside the scope of government (such as initiation rites, etc.). This set of parallel functions would eliminate the perceived conflict between traditional leaders and democratic governments and leave followers free to judge democracy as they see fit.

In sum, the historical institutionalism approach suggests that the nature and experiences of traditional institutions will undermine support for democracy among those who follow these institutions. Alternatively, one could argue that traditional institutions will not undermine an individual's level of support for democracy. Through this project, I will determine which of these arguments best captures the reality of democratic support on the ground in southern Africa.

Chieftaincy systems, however, represent only one part of southern Africa's historical legacy that might influence individuals' evaluations of democracy. An historical institutional approach might also suggest that an individual's perceptions of the authoritarianism should continue to influence evaluations of contemporary politics.

The Legacy of Authoritarianism

As noted above, a small literature has begun to look at the effect institutional variations and perceptions of past regimes have on regime support. For example, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) and Shin and McDonough (2002) found that perceptions of

the communist past continue to influence perceptions of politics under new regimes, but limited their analysis to the post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe. While suggesting that there could be a link between authoritarian regimes and democratic support, the limited geographic focus of this literature leaves the influence that past authoritarian systems (such as Apartheid or colonialism) might continue to have on democratic support in southern Africa unexplored.

Scholars have, however, studied the effect that the authoritarian past has on the institutional structure of newly formed democratic systems. In particular, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) highlighted the impact that a state's prior authoritarian regime has on new democratic institutions. They argued that "the nature of the preexisting regime shapes the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions" (454). Just as the authoritarian past influences democratic institutions, then, the authoritarian past should influence citizens' views of democracy.

As the neo-institutional literature suggests, individuals act within the context of institutions that constrain the options available at a certain point in time (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Riker, 1980; North 1990). Citizens in southern Africa have experienced divergent institutional arrangements in a very short period of time. These experiences widen the set of viable options and presents citizens with institutional choices that are unlike those available to citizens in established democratic or authoritarian regimes. These competing experiences might very well lead to different perceptions and evaluations of democracy, depending on the particular experiences of individuals. In sum, an historical institutional study would suggest that perceptions of Africa's recent past should influence contemporary politics.

In the five years prior to 1989, only 9 of 47 sub-Saharan African countries held competitive elections (meaning elections in which opposition parties gained representation in the national legislature) (Bratton 1997). The other 38 countries experienced some form of authoritarian rule. Since the recent history of many sub-Saharan African countries has been dominated by authoritarian rulers that exploited their positions of national leadership for personal gain, it is very possible that perceptions of these old regimes will influence perceptions and evaluations of democracy. That is, negative evaluations of the recent past could result in higher levels of democratic support and, conversely, positive views of the past could result in lower levels of democratic support.

For two reasons, on the other hand, one could argue that the authoritarian past will not have a discernable, significant, effect on citizens' support for democracy. First, the authoritarian regimes that southern Africa experienced have been thoroughly discredited. Unlike Central and Eastern Europe, where previous authoritarian regimes provided rudimentary social services such as providing health care and education, the authoritarian regimes of southern Africa performed so poorly that their legacy necessarily puts the present in a positive light for almost the entire population of southern Africa. The remarkably poor economic, social, and political record of these regimes, I argue, fundamentally eliminates any influence that these past regimes might have on evaluations of contemporary politics. In essence, since evaluations of these past regimes are overwhelmingly negative for nearly all segments of society, it can be taken as given that the present regime is better than the past regime. In fact, the primary forms of authoritarian rule that these countries once experienced (colonialism and Apartheid) have

been so discredited they no longer exist in the forms known to southern Africa leaving the influence of the past with only a negligible influence on the present.

This is not to say, however, that southern Africa is not plagued by wide-spread corruption and elements of patrimonial/personal rule, but only that acceptance of the primary forms of authoritarianism experienced by those in southern Africa, colonialism and Apartheid has evaporated (Young 1994). The racist roots that these two forms of authoritarianism share differentiate them from other forms and elements of authoritarianism that remain present. In particular, the authoritarian elements range from corruption (the "unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends" (Lodge 1998; Scott 1969) to personal rule (politics and policy-making on the basis of personal authority and power rather than formal institutions (Jackson 1984; Le Vine 1980)) are particularly problematic. On one hand, corruption is wide-spread throughout southern Africa and is particularly problematic in South Africa (Lodge 1998; Theobald 1994; van de Walle 1999). On the other hand, elements of personal rule can be seen in Hastings Banda's governing of Malawi (Posner 1995) and Kenneth Kaunda's presidency in Zambia (van de Walle 1999: 126).

Second, the influence of the authoritarian past might be minimized by the salience of the struggles citizens currently face in their everyday lives. As is commonly known, the economic and social challenges that citizens in southern Africa currently face are staggering. For example, in South Africa and Lesotho, recent annual unemployment rates were 26.2% and 45% respectively (Republic of South Africa 2004; United States 2005). Nearly every country in southern Africa is ravished by the impact of HIV-AIDS. According to the United Nations, in 2003, the HIV prevalence rates in the 6 countries

included in this study range from 14.2% in Malawi to 37.3% in Botswana (United Nations 2004). Under such conditions, the average citizen has little time, or energy, to think back to times past.

2.4 Summary

As briefly suggested above, the democratization literature has generally assumed that, for a western-style democracy to become legitimate, citizens must fully accept and support this regime as the 'only game in town' (Diamond 1999; Linz 1996; Morlino 1995). In addition, the historical-institutionalism literature has argued that institutions have an effect that lingers beyond an institutions actual existence. This suggests that preferring traditional institutions and/or an authoritarian institution may undermine democratic consolidation, after all few traditional institutions are based on democratic principles and authoritarian regimes explicitly reject such principles. However, it could also be the case that alternative institutions actually have little influence on democratic support in southern African democracies. By determining which of these relationships between these alternative institutions and support for democracy is most accurate, this study will evaluate the extent to which traditional and modern institutions continue to influence both citizens' evaluations of democracy and the prospects of democratic consolidation in southern Africa.

Table 2-1: Political Regimes in southern Africa, 2001

Liberal Democracy	Electoral Democracy	Ambiguous	Liberalized Autocracy
Botswana (2,2)	Namibia (2,3)	Zambia (5,4)	Lesotho (4,4)
South Africa (1,2)	Malawi (4,3)		

Figures in parentheses are Freedom House political and civil rights scores for 2001.

Source: Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa :
Adapted from Larry Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, Journal of Democracy, 13,2 (2002), Table 2.

Chapter 3: Measuring Democratic Support in southern Africa

To what extent do citizens in southern Africa support democracy? How does this support compare to the level of citizen support in other parts of the world? To answer these questions, I analyze data on democratic support among southern Africans through three distinct steps. First, I analyze a number of individual survey items that capture support for democracy, and that allow me to compare these perceptions across countries outside of southern Africa. Second, I construct three index measures of democratic support and use these indices to examine a more nuanced conceptualization of democratic support across the democracies of southern Africa. Finally, I consider the overall level of democratic support among citizens in southern Africa.

3.1 Sources of Data

In the statistical analyses discussed throughout this project, I analyze data from the recently released Afrobarometer surveys.[2] The first round of this long-term project includes data from Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Obviously, since this study includes only 6 of these countries (it will exclude Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe since they are not located in southern Africa or are not democratic), it is based on a sample that is not representative of democracies around the world, or even across the entire African continent. This grouping of countries, however, does cover an important region in Africa and represents an interesting set of new democracies. In addition, this

[2] For a discussion of the sampling procedures used by the Afrobarometer Project, see Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

data comes from a state-of-the-art data-gathering project, a type of project that has never before been attempted in this region of the world. Examining this new data from an interesting set of countries provides an exciting opportunity to answer questions about democratic support in southern Africa that were previously unanswerable.

Table 3-1 here.

3.2 The Nature of Democratic Support

Democratic support is a complex, multidimensional and multilevel phenomena. At minimum, democratic support exists at two levels: normative and empirical. The normative dimension of democratic support focuses on the *idea* of democracy. Or, as Dalton described it, a set of affective orientations that represent adherence to certain values (Dalton 1999: 58). These citizens with high levels of support embrace the rules of democracy. Essentially, citizens can "compare and evaluate alternative types of regimes, beyond merely assessing the immediate attractiveness of the particular regime under which they are currently living" (Klingemann 1999: 35). Citizens who support democracy at the normative level appreciate democracy for the "political freedoms and equally rights that democracy embodies" (Bratton 2001b: 448).

Even those citizens who live under regimes that are not completely democratic are able to assess divergent types of governments and determine under which they would prefer to live. These citizens are assumed to have the cognitive abilities and sophistication to distinguish between the system they have and the system they would like to have. While scholars have long questioned whether citizens are actually able to make such assessments, and while gaining enough information to make a completely

informed assessment may be beyond the abilities of many citizens, scholars seem to finally agree that citizens can make such assessments (Dalton 2000).

At another level, democratic support is influenced by citizens' satisfaction with the system's performance. Instead of comparing the relative merits of abstract governmental forms, citizens can also make empirical evaluations of the government under which they live. These empirical evaluations are based on individuals' satisfaction with the regime's performance and their confidence in the institutions of government. Unlike normative, affective support for democracy, instrumental support can change quite quickly. As Bratton and Mattes note, this type of support can be easily withdrawn if citizens are dissatisfied with a government's "capacity to deliver consumable benefits or to rectify material inequalities" (Bratton 2001b: 448).

Mass support for democracy is also a multidimensional phenomenon that involves both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian evaluations. In addition to evaluating both the idea of democracy and the practice of democracy, citizens evaluate government in terms of both democratic and authoritarian orientations. As Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer noted, low support for democracy, or dissatisfaction with the current regime, "is not proof of endorsement of an undemocratic alternative" (Rose 1998). For example, while only "half the citizens of European Union countries are satisfied with democracy, a big majority want a reformed or 'better' democracy," they do not want a return to authoritarian rule (Rose 1998: 108).

In essence, for a country to move through the consolidation phase of democratization, citizens must embrace democracy 'as the only game in town' (Linz 1996). This requires citizens to support democracy at both the normative and empirical

levels. Even more, consolidation requires support for democracy in both dimensions (a positive attachment to democracy and a rejection of authoritarianism). In other words, for a country to be consolidated the bulk of the population must support democracy as an idea, support democracy in practice, and reject non-democratic alternatives.

3.3 Measuring Democratic Support

As Larry Diamond argues, "if popular legitimation is a core component of democratic consolidation, then mass-level survey data on popular support for democracy provides an indispensable measure of progress toward democratic consolidation." (Diamond 1999: 174). Beginning from this assertion, a number of cross-national survey projects have collected just this sort of data. These data collections provide numerous ways to measure citizen support for democracy and a growing number of analyses examine these measures to determine the extent of mass support for democracy in a wide variety of contexts.

Many existing studies, however, ignore the multi-level and multidimensional nature of democratic support and examine democratic support through a single survey item (Canache 2001; Linde 2003). This popular item, the so-called 'satisfaction with democracy' question, asks individuals: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?"

While questions such as this allow for seemingly straightforward comparisons across countries and regions, there are numerous problems associated using a single item of this sort to measure citizens' support for democracy. For example, as Canache,

Mondak and Seligson (2001) find, scholars actually use such individual items in at least five different ways (1. as an indicator of support for incumbent authorities; 2. as an indicator of system support; 3. as a summary indicator; 4. as an admittedly ambiguous question, but one that is often used and so is easy include in comparative analyses; and 5. as an ambiguous question that should not be used). In a similar fashion, Linde and Ekman (2003) note that this question 1) is “sensitive to different contexts;” 2) does not capture possible differences between peoples’ preference for democracy and their recognition that their country is not yet ready for democracy; or because 3) there could be a strong interaction between regime preference and performance that this question ignores.

Instead of using a single measure of democratic support such as this, scholars have recently begun examining a set of measures that ask about individuals’ system preferences, evaluations of regime performance and support for incumbents. For example, Chu, Diamond and Shin (2001), using East Asia Barometer data, begin with a question that “asks respondents whether democracy is always the best form of government or whether sometimes an authoritarian regime is better.” They then examine an item that asks about the suitability of democracy for a particular country, an item that asks about how satisfied citizens are with the way that democracy works, and finally examined individuals’ confidence in the institutions of democracy.

Such a way of measuring democratic support is also employed by Bratton and Mattes (2001a) in their analysis of Afrobarometer data. In this study, they examined citizens’ knowledge of democracy, their preference for democracy, their rejection of non-democratic alternatives, the perceived extent of democracy, and citizens’ satisfaction with

democracy. Likewise, Marta Lagos (2001) included multiple items in the Latinobarometer project and used these items to examine Latin Americans' preference for democracy, their satisfaction for democracy, and their trust in institutions.   Each of these studies, by using additional measures of mass attitudes, provides a more insightful look into the citizenry's level of support for democracy.

Having discussed the nature of democratic support, the rest of this chapter considers the extent to which citizens in southern Africa support democracy and how this support compares to the rest of the world. First, I examine a number of individual survey items (preference for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and rejection of various non-democratic alternatives) to take a first glance at democratic support in southern Africa and to compare these levels of support to those in other countries included in the Africa and other parts of the world. Second, I discuss four indices of democratic support that I create using the Afrobarometer data. Each of these measures is comprised of three different questions tapping the different dimensions of democratic support (preference for democracy as an idea, satisfaction with democracy in practice, and the rejection of authoritarianism). Finally, I examine citizens' overall support for democracy by constructing a composite index based on these dimensions.

Individual-Item Measures of Democratic Support

While I have noted that the six countries included in this study have al moved towards democracy, the extent to which citizens support these new democracies remains uncertain. While there is not an absolute level of support that distinguishes consolidated from non-consolidated democracies (though Larry Diamond (1999: 68) suggests that

anywhere from 70 to 75% is generally necessary), scholars agree that higher levels of support are better than lower levels of support and that consolidation becomes a possibility only after a majority of a country's population supports democracy. To what extent, then, do the citizens of southern Africa support democracy?

As indicated in Table 3-2, slightly less than three-fourths (70%) of the citizens in southern Africa reported that democracy was always preferable to other forms of government (the remaining 30% were either indifferent or thought that a non-democratic form of government could be preferable). Surprisingly, the number of individuals in southern Africa who reported a preference for democracy is substantially higher than in other regions of the developing world, with just over one-half to citizens in Latin America (55%) prefer democracy while just under two-thirds in Asia (59%) and Eastern and Central Europe (61%) preferred democracy.

Table 3-2 Here.

As Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes (2001) noted, however, "democracy looks better in theory than in practice," meaning that individuals often like the idea of democracy but not the way it works in practice. If this is true, substantially more individuals should claim a preference for democracy than claim to be satisfied with democracy. As Table 3-2 indicates, this is clearly the case. Only a slight majority of the citizens in this region (58%) state that they are fairly or very satisfied with democracy. In a pessimistic light, this means that a large minority of the population is not satisfied with democracy. While there is not a way to determine what these individuals have in mind when they are asked about their satisfaction with democracy (were they thinking about their satisfaction with democracy as an idea, their satisfaction with democracy in practice,

or their satisfaction with the outcomes of democracy as they have experiences them?), these results provide an interesting first glance into the level of support for democracy and superficially suggest that support is fairly widespread.

When compared to the level of satisfaction in other African countries, citizens' in southern Africa appear to be just as supportive of democracy. For example, just over three-fourths of those living in the remaining five countries (Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) prefer democracy (compared to just under three-fourths in southern Africa). In addition, citizens in these other countries also seem more satisfied with democracy (74% satisfied compared to 58% in southern Africa). These two groups of African countries, however, appear to reject non-democratic alternatives at about the same rate.

Finally, when compared with democratic support in regions of the world, citizens in southern Africa are more satisfied with their democracies than are citizens in Latin America (with 32% satisfied) or Eastern and Central Europe (with 33% satisfied). Only Asia seems to have a higher level of satisfaction with democracy, but only by three percentage points. This suggests that citizens in southern Africa are as satisfied, or more satisfied, than are citizens in any other region of the developing world outside of Africa.

In addition to a large majority preferring democracy and a small majority being satisfied with democracy, more than two-thirds of all southern Africans reject non-democratic alternatives. Strikingly, on a continent known for military coups and long-lasting authoritarian regimes, eight out of ten respondents rejected dictatorship and military rule as viable alternatives to democracy. In addition, a slightly smaller majority of just over two-thirds even rejected the viability of a one-party system. Overall, in

addition to being as satisfied with democracy and preferring democracy as much as citizens in other countries, southern Africans reject non-democratic alternatives as much as, or even more than, citizens in other regions of the developing world for which comparable data are available.

Though interesting and informative, these regional numbers might mask interesting cross-national differences in democratic support. As the rest of the data in Table 3-2 indicates, there is variation across the countries, but not overwhelming variation. For example, a majority of the citizens in all 6 southern African countries are satisfied with democracy, but the size of these majorities varies. In Botswana, a large majority (78%) is satisfied with the way democracy works (a level of satisfaction that is higher than levels in all but one of the other countries surveyed, with the exception being Thailand). In contrast, only small majorities of those is South Africa (54%) and Lesotho (56%) reported satisfaction with democracy.

As one might expect, support for democracy in southern Africa, when interpreted as a preference for democracy as a system of government, looks slightly different. Most importantly, in most cases it seems that more southern Africans prefer democracy than are satisfied with it in practice. For example, in Botswana, 78% were satisfied, but nearly 9 out of 10 respondents (87%) reported a preference for democracy. This pattern of a higher level of preference than satisfaction holds true in Malawi (60% vs. 67%), South Africa (54% vs. 64%), and Zambia (62% vs. 78%). In addition, the country-by-country data reveal that at least the same percentage of citizens in southern African countries prefer democracy as do citizens in countries in other regions of the world. In fact, the preference level in Botswana is actually higher than that of any other country and all of

the countries in this region have preference levels that are at least 25 percentage points higher than the country with the lowest levels (Russia with only 29% reporting a preference for democracy).

For the final indicator of democratic support, rejection of non-democratic alternatives (with the exception of the rejection of one-party states, for which data from other regions was not available), the countries of southern Africa again look much like countries in the rest of the world. For both rejection of a dictator and military rule, Zambia has the highest rejection rates among these countries (with rejection rates of 93% and 95% respectively) with Botswana following a close second (with 89% rejection rates for each measure). Even among those with the lowest rejection rates, Namibia for example, a majority of the respondents still reject dictators and military rule.

Overall, these preliminary analyses suggest that 1) democracy means much the same thing to citizens in southern Africa as it means to citizens in other parts of the world and 2) that democratic support is as widespread in southern Africa, whether measured as satisfaction with democracy, preference for democracy, or the rejection of non-democratic alternatives, as it is in other parts of the developing world.

Index Measures of Democratic Support

Since single survey item indicators rarely provide a satisfactory depiction of democratic support, I construct index measures and use these measures through out the remainder of this project. These index measures minimize the biases and inconsistencies often associated with individual survey items and better reflect the concepts in which I am interested. The first of these indices captures support for democracy as a form of

government. To create this measure, I use three questions that asked about support for democracy as a form of government. The first question asks individual about their preference for democracy:

> With which of these statements are you most in agreement?
> Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
> In some circumstance, a non-democratic government can be preferable to a democratic government.
> For someone like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference.

The second question asks individuals about their commitment to democracy or acceptance of a strong leader:

> Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. Others say that even when things don't work, democracy is always best. What do you think?

The third question asks individuals about the suitability of democracy by asking if the constitution reflects the values of the people:

> Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly disagree, disagree neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree.
> Constitution expresses the values and aspirations of all the people in ___.

After identifying these questions, I dichotomized the responses into positive and negative evaluations of democracy, and added them together to form a four point scale (ranging from 0 to 3) of democratic support (higher values indicate stronger support for democracy).

As the first section of Table 3-3 indicates, more southern Africans seem to support democracy as a system of government than reject it (with nearly 35% scoring a 2 and 37% scoring a 3 on the 4-point scale). Surprisingly, the regional mean on this scale was 1.99, highlighting the fact that support might not be as high as the distribution first

suggested. The country-by-country distributions support this by showing that democratic support is not distributed identically in each southern African country. In some countries, such as Botswana, complete support for democracy as a system is very high (47%). In others, such as Lesotho, not many citizens are supportive of democracy (only 26.81% completely supported democracy as the preferable form of government). In addition, Lesotho has the lowest average score and the most even distribution of citizens across this democratic support scale, indicating only mixed support for democracy as a system of government.

Table 3-3 Here.

Overall, the distribution of individuals on this index measure suggests that citizens' support for democracy as the most preferred form of government is mixed.

In addition, Table 3-3 indicates that citizens' satisfaction with democracy in practice is as mixed as their preference for democracy as a system. As above, to better measure citizens' support for democracy, I constructed a 4-point scale of satisfaction with democracy in practice. This scale is constructed from responses to three individual questions that I first dichotomized into positive and negative evaluations of democracy and then added together. The first question asks individuals about their overall satisfaction with democracy:

> Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in …
> Very Satisfied, Fairly Satisfied, Not Very Satisfied, or Not At All Satisfied

The second question asks about individuals' satisfaction with the way the government the exercises its power:

> Our government exercises power in an acceptable way.
> Strongly disagree
> Disagree

Neither disagree nor agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The final question used to construct this scale asks individuals to evaluate how well the government manages the economy:

> How well would you say the government is handling the following matters? Would you say: Very well, Fairly well, Not Very Well, or Not at all well?
> Managing the economy.

While many southern Africans are satisfied with democracy in practice, as the second section of Table 3-3 indicates, perceptions of democracy as practice are evenly distributed across the entire 4-point scale. Even more, while a plurality of the respondents (31.5%) scored a 2 on this 0-3 scale, indicating that they are partially satisfied with democracy as a practice, one-fifth (20.37%) are not at all satisfied with democracy. Clearly, fewer citizens support democracy as practice than preferred democracy as a system of government. This initial finding is reinforced by a regional average of 1.62, a score which indicates that much of the sample is remarkably close to the center of the scale.

As above, however, there are country by country differences that suggest democracy is doing better in some countries than in others. More specifically, citizens in both Botswana and Namibia are much more satisfied with democracy than are citizens in other countries, with nearly one-half in Botswana (49.12%) and more than one-third in Namibia (34.14%) being completely satisfied with the way that democracy is working. The mean score in these two countries is also well above the regional average (2.19 in Botswana and 1.93 in Namibia) and higher than any of the other countries in the region. Alternatively, one-fifth or fewer of the citizens in Malawi (17.9%), South Africa

(16.66%), and Zambia (21.21%) are completely satisfied with the way that democracy is working. While this does not mean that people do not support democracy, after all one-third of the respondents in Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia are partially satisfied with democracy, it does suggest that democratic support is not as strong as in other parts of the developing world.

Overall, then, these findings suggest that citizens in southern Africa like democracy as a system of government, but are not overwhelmingly satisfied with the way that it works in their country.

The final section of Table 3-3 reports the distribution of the rejection of non-democratic alternatives scale constructed for this project. As discussed above, citizens can evaluate democracy and authoritarian alternatives independently. This means that, although an individual may like democracy, he or she may also like an authoritarian regime as well. Democratic consolidation, however, rests on the premise that citizens both support democracy and reject non-democratic forms of government. To determine the extent to which this is true among southern Africans, I again constructed a 4-point scale, this time based on three related survey items that share a common root question:

> Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one ____ has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove or approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?

The first of these three items asked individuals if they prefer a civilian dictator (in the form of a president that can decide everything) to democracy:

If Parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the president could decide everything?

Strongly Disapprove, disapprove, neither approve or disapprove, approve, strongly approve

Given the prominence of the military as an alternative to democracy in Africa, the second item asked individuals about their preference for military rule:

If the Army came in to govern the country?

Strongly Disapprove, disapprove, neither approve or disapprove, approve, strongly approve

In light of the prevalence of single-party states across the African continent, the final item asked individuals about their support for such single-party systems:

If only one political party, or candidates from only one party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office?

Strongly Disapprove, disapprove, neither approve or disapprove, approve, strongly approve

As with the support for democracy as a system and as a practice scales, I dichotomized each of these items into pro and anti democratic responses and added them together to form a composite measure of citizens' rejection of non-democratic alternatives.

Based on Table 3-3, it seems that southern Africans do not support non-democratic alternatives. Region-wide, over half of the respondents (52.35%) completely rejected authoritarian alternatives and only 10% completely accepted authoritarian alternatives. In addition, a mean score of 2.18, higher than the score for either of the other 2 scales, offers another indication that respondents may reject authoritarianism more than they actually support democracy.

Even more, more than two-thirds of the respondents in Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia completely rejected authoritarianism. These four countries also had average

scores of 2 or greater, again highlighting the fact that citizens in these countries reject authoritarian alternatives.

In the other three countries (Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa), however, citizens seem much more willing to accept non-democratic alternatives. Only about three-eighths of the respondents in these countries completely reject authoritarianism. At the same time, only about one-fifth completely accepts authoritarian alternatives. This suggests that, although the bulk of citizens in these countries are not completely committed to democracy, they are also not completely committed to authoritarian rule.

In sum, it seems that citizens in southern Africa seem to like democracy as a system and as a practice, and generally reject the alternative systems prevalent throughout Africa's post-colonial era. Citizens in this region, however, are not completely satisfied with the way that democracy is actually working in practice. Overall, however, support for democracy in southern Africa does not seem threatened by mass support for authoritarian alternatives.

Patterns of Support Across southern Africa

While the analyses presented up to this point have identified the percentage of individuals that support in each of the various dimensions of democracy, these analyses say little about the individuals' overall level of support for democracy. To determine this, I constructed an overall index of democratic support by recoding the system support, practice support, and rejection indices into pro-democratic and anti-democratic responses and then summing these dichotomous variables. This transformation created a 4-point

scale that reveals the percentage of individuals that do not support democracy, have mixed support, and the percentage that completely supports democracy.

Table 3-4 Here.

The most striking finding that emerges from this calculation of democratic support, reported in Table 3-4, is that a majority in every country has mixed support for democracy. Even in Botswana, the longest lasting, most stable democracy in the region, slightly less than one-half (45.58%) completely support democracy and slightly more than one-half (51.75) has mixed support. In the other countries, majorities ranging from 54.64% in Malawi to 64.4% in Lesotho had only mixed support for democracy.

Just as importantly, however, Table 3-4 reveals that only small minorities in each country did not support for democracy. More specifically, the rejection rates range from less than one-fifth of Botswana's population (2.67%) to one-fifth of the population in Lesotho (19.37).

This examination of overall level of democratic support suggest that, while most citizens in southern Africa do not yet completely support democracy, most also do not completely reject democracy. If we consider the mixed and complete categories together, levels of support for democracy are vastly higher in every country than are rejection rates. In other words, citizens may not yet completely support democracy, but they also do not completely reject democracy.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, I set out to determine the extent to which citizens in southern Africa support democracy and to compare the support for democracy in these countries

with other regions of the world. Based on the findings presented above, I can posit several interesting conclusions. First, support for democracy is generally widespread in each of the six countries included in this study. Second, however, only a relatively small percentage of these citizens completely support democracy. Finally, based on both individual survey items and index measures, the distribution of support for democracy in southern Africa is similar to the distribution of support found in other regions of the developing world. In the end, I can conclude that democracy is widely recognized and respected form of government among those that live in southern Africa.

Table 3-1: Sample size and date of survey
Afrobarometer Round 1 Data

Country	Date	Sample Size
Botswana	1999	1,200
Lesotho	2000	1,177
Malawi	1999	1,208
Namibia	1999	1,183
South Africa	2000	2,200
Zambia	1999	1,198
Zimbabwe	1999	1,200

Table 3-2: Measures of Democratic Support in Comparative Perspective

	Preference	Satisfaction	Rejection of Auth. Alternatives		
			Dictator	Army	One-party
Southern Afr.*	**70**	**58**	**79**	**80**	**67**
Botswana	87	78	89	89	78
Lesotho	54	56	75	75	51
Malawi	67	60	88	83	76
Namibia	71	73	61	62	63
South Africa	64	54	69	77	57
Zambia	78	62	93	95	80
Other Afr.*	**78**	**74**	**73**	**87**	**84**
Ghana	77	55	86	88	79
Mali	61	64	73	71	74
Nigeria	81	85	83	90	88
Tanzania	84	76	92	96	62
Uganda	83	81	83	87	53
Latin America**	**55**	**32**	--	--	--
Argentina	65	8	--	--	--
Bolivia	52	62	--	--	--
Brazil	37	17	--	--	--
Colombia	39	44	--	--	--
Chile	50	59	--	--	--
Ecuador	47	17	--	--	--
Mexico	63	21	--	--	--
Paraguay	41	75	--	--	--
Peru	55	16	--	--	--
Uruguay	77	38	--	--	--
Venezuela	73	35	--	--	--
Costa Rica	77	6	--	--	--
Asia**	**59**	**61**	**74**	**81**	--
South Korea	49	61	85	90	--
Thailand	84	89	77	81	--
Japan	68	45	80	94	--
Philippines	64	53	69	63	--
Mongolia	57	70	61	88	--
Taiwan	40	48	68	81	--
Eastern Europe**	**61**	**33**	**63**	**84**	--
Hungary	74	45	76	93	--
Czech	72	55	82	96	--
Poland	69	39	61	88	--
Russia	29	31	68	84	--
Estonia	--	34	55	95	--
Romania	--	32	65	81	--
Bulgaria	--	28	70	85	--
Slovakia	--	21	67	93	--
Moldova	--	17	33	80	--
Ukraine	--	19	45	86	--

* Data comes from my calculations using Afrobarometer data

** Data comes from www.globalbarometer.org

Table 3-3: Cross-National Distribution of Democratic Support Indices

	0	1	2	3	Mean Score
System	**8.95%**	**19.24%**	**34.95%**	**36.85%**	**1.99**
Botswana	3.09	16.05	33.8	47.06	2.25
Lesotho	13.48	23.86	35.96	26.81	1.76
Malawi	11.98	18.35	31.65	38.02	1.96
Namibia	5.74	22.39	40.45	31.42	1.97
South Africa	12.82	19	32.4	35.78	1.91
Zambia	3.94	18.3	39.96	38.4	2.12
Practice	**20.37%**	**22.70%**	**31.50%**	**25.43%**	**1.62**
Botswana	7.8	14.13	28.95	49.12	2.19
Lesotho	24.55	24.67	27.31	23.47	1.49
Malawi	26.11	19.21	36.77	17.9	1.46
Namibia	8.63	23.59	33.63	34.14	1.93
South Africa	29.3	24.8	29.25	16.66	1.33
Zambia	16.41	28.31	34.07	21.21	1.6
Rejection	**10.34%**	**13.67%**	**23.65%**	**52.35%**	**2.18**
Botswana	6.92	6.25	18.25	68.58	2.48
Lesotho	15.21	16.57	31.95	36.28	1.82
Malawi	4.3	8.36	24.5	62.83	2.46
Namibia	21.13	19.78	20.63	38.46	1.76
South Africa	10.95	20.73	26.64	41.68	1.99
Zambia	3.26	4.59	17.53	74.62	2.63

Table 3-4: Patterns of Overall Support for Democracy

Support Level	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	South Africa	Zambia
			Countries			
None	2.67%	19.37%	6.87%	15.38%	13.41%	4.26%
Mixed	51.75	64.4	54.64	60.36	59.45	60.35
Complete	45.58	16.23	38.49	24.26	27.14	35.39

Chapter 4: A Baseline Explanation of Democratic Support in southern Africa

In the preceding chapter, I demonstrated that, overall, citizens in southern Africa support democracy. This data also revealed substantial variation in the level of democratic support. The purpose of this chapter is to determine what explains this variation. More specifically, I ask what categories of individuals are more, or less, supportive of democracy and empirically test the explanatory power of these differences in a statistical model of democratic support. Drawing on explanations of democratic support in other regions of the world, I will demonstrate that those who support democracy in southern Africa are not substantially different than those who support democracy in other parts of the world.

4.1 Individuals and Democratic Support

More specifically, this chapter will show that the personal characteristics, economic evaluations, and political positions that influence individuals' support for democracy in other parts of the world also influence citizens' support in southern Africa in similar ways. I will also illustrate that a substantial amount of variation in democratic support remains unexplained in this chapter, suggesting that perhaps these models should incorporate measures of citizens' experiences with contextually specific, historically important institutions (such as support for traditional leaders and prior authoritarian regimes).

Personal Characteristics and Democratic Support

Having presented evidence on the level of democratic support among southern Africans, I can now ask who supports democracy. In other words, is individuals' support for democracy influenced by particular demographic characteristics, economic evaluations or political stances?

To answer this, I look at the distribution of individuals who support democracy across a number of factors often associated with democratic support. Instead of examining the raw distribution of those who support democracy, however, I construct a representation ratio that indicates whether a particular characteristic (old age or economic satisfaction for example) are over- or underrepresented among those who support democracy (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

Unfortunately, though the literature on democratic support is vast, scholars have not settled on a universally accepted set of characteristics that are associated with higher levels of democratic support. As a result, I identified questions in the Afrobarometer data that capture a set of commonly employed variables that capture the different perspectives current in research on democracy. As suggested above, these variables are based around 3 general types of survey items that are critical to democratic support: personal characteristics, economic evaluations and political stances/beliefs.

The first factors examined are personal characteristics. These items tap into the core elements of the individuals' identity, elements that shape the ways in which individuals respond to particular experiences or social groups and networks. Rooted largely in the modernization approach developed in the 1950s and 1960s, these variables

include both personal identity characteristics (such as age, race, gender, educational attainment, and occupation type) and measures of interpersonal relations (such as interpersonal trust and participation in social organizations).

The importance of identity categories, such as age, gender and race, residential location are highlighted by scholars ranging from Almond (1963) and Easton (1965) to Rose and Carnahan (1995) and Miller and Shanks (1996), who, in divergent contexts, all argued that the values, beliefs, and needs that shape perceptions of politics develop and change over long periods and are shaped by one's place in society. Both Miller and Shanks (1996) and Waldron-Moore (1999) argue that the dramatic changes in the American and Eastern European electorates have been the result of generational change, with younger generations slowly taking the place of older generations. Previous survey research has indicated that males, younger respondents, and those from minority groups will be more supportive of democracy (Finifter 1992; Gibson 1993; Reisinger 1995).

Racial, gender, and residential location differences reflect individuals' position in society and influence their perceptions of democracy. Black Africans, given their experiences with non-democratic regimes, should be more supportive of democracy than other individuals. Democracy also gives women a formal voice in government, a voice that authoritarian regimes have often silenced. This voice should leave women more supportive of democracy than men. Finally, as Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi noted, urban areas are often the most politically active areas in African countries and the areas that benefited most from governmental development programs (2005: 167). The differential experiences that separate urban dwellers from rural-dwellers should have a profound impact on perceptions and evaluations of democracy (with those living in urban

areas more likely to support democracy and the opportunity to participate in policy making that it provides).

Other identity variables, such as education and occupation type, are directly linked to Lipset's (1960) work that identified the primary factors that increase the likelihood of a society achieving a stable democracy. Based on previous survey research, respondents who attained higher levels of education should be more supportive of democracy (Gibson 1992; Reisinger 1994; Rose 1996).

The literature on class, represented here by a measure of occupation type, is rather more muddled. As early scholars, such as Lipset (1960) Moore(1966) and more recent scholars, such as di Palma(1990) and numerous others, have noted, democratic transitions are often the work of a bourgeois class, suggesting that those in the upper classes (those in professional or white collar occupations) should be more supportive of democracy. Alternatively, as Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens(1992) and Collier(1999) noted, democracy has been tied, at least in part, to the mobilization of working classes. In Africa, in particular, democracy seems tied to the mobilization of lower classes and their efforts to remove corrupt elites from power (Bratton 1997). These competing arguments present strikingly different interpretations of the impact of class differences on support for democracy, with one arguing that upper-middle classes should be most supportive and the other arguing that the working classes should be just as, if not more, supportive of democracy.

From these many pieces of the democratization literature suggest a number of formal, if preliminary, hypotheses that can be tested against the survey data:

H1a. More older respondents will support democracy than will younger respondents.

H1b. More black Africans will support democracy than will other racial groups.

H1c. More women will support democracy than will men.

H1d. Those who live in urban areas will support democracy more than those in rural areas.

H1e. Those with more education will support democracy more than those with less.

H1fi. Those in professional/white collar professions will support democracy more than will those in the working classes.
Or:
H1fii. Those in working class professions will support more democracy than will those in professional/white collar professions.

The relational variables that are included as personal characteristics, interpersonal trust and social capital, are also linked to both classic works and more recent additions to the literature on the interaction between individuals and social groups. Some of the earliest traces of this argument that relations to social groups matter can be found in Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) work on parties and party systems in which they argue that social connections, meaning ties to collective identities, are important influences on views of politics. More recently, scholars such as Young (1976), Inglehart (1977), Putnam (1993, 2000), and Waldron-Moore (1999) have continued to emphasize the impact that an individuals' relationship to social groups and settings has on shaping his or her views of politics. These literatures also suggest several preliminary hypotheses:

H1g. Those with higher levels of interpersonal trust will support democracy more than those with lower levels of trust

H1h. Those with higher levels of social capital will support democracy more than those with lower levels

Since looking at the raw percentage of individuals that falls within a particular category without looking at the percentage of the overall sample that falls within this

category reveals little about the presence or absence of these individuals among those who support democracy, the first way I test these hypotheses is to examine a representation ratio. To determine whether particular personal characteristics are overrepresented, or underrepresented, among democratic supporters, I use the following calculation:

$$\text{Log}\left(\%\ C_{support} / \%C_{sample}\right)$$

In this formula, $C_{support}$ is the percentage of respondents who support democracy in each category and C_{sample} is the percentage of respondents in each category in the overall sample.

As Verba, Schlozman and Brady noted, while the ratio alone is a useful indicator of representation, two useful properties emerge from taking the log of this measure. First, this transformation changes the ratio into "a dimensionless number like a correlation coefficient or a beta weight." Second, this transformation produces "symmetry," meaning that the log of the representation ratio ranges from plus infinity to minus infinity. In this range, a score of zero indicates no distortion in representation and positive and negative scores indicating over- or under- representation (the magnitude of the score indicates the extent to which a particular group is over- or under-represented).

The meaning of the representation ratios reported throughout this study is most easily conveyed visually. In Figure 4-1, I present an example of the data underlying these representation ratios. The light columns in Figure 4-1 show the distribution of individuals across the institutional confidence scale (which will be discussed in more detail below) in the entire sample. The dark columns in Figure 4-1 show the distribution of individuals across this same institutional confidence scale, but only for those

individuals that support democracy. Rather than simply reporting the percentage of individuals who support democracy at each level of this scale (the dark column), the representation ratios indicate both the nature and magnitude of the *difference* between these two columns and offer a context in which the percentage of individuals that support democracy can be evaluated. In other words, as this figure shows, about 12% of those in southern Africa scored a 1 on the institutional confidence scale while only about 4% of the sub-sample comprised of those who support democracy scored a one on this scale (corresponding to a representation ratio of -1.01). Alternatively, about 17-18% of those in southern Africa scored a 7 on this scale, while approximately 26% of those who support democracy scored a 7 (corresponding to a representation ratio of 0.39). This means that individuals who support democracy are under-represented among those that scored a one on the scale and over-represented among those that scored a seven.

Turning to the first set of actual results, presented in Table 4-1, the most striking finding is that older respondents are overwhelmingly under-represented among those that support democracy as a system of government, are satisfied with democracy in practice, and reject authoritarian alternatives. In all three cases, only about half as many respondents in the oldest ranges supported democracy as their presence in the overall sample would have suggested (as indicated by representation ratios of -0.21 -0.38). The only exception to this is that the oldest respondents are over-represented among those that reject non-democratic alternatives.

Table 4-1 Here.

Looking at the representation ratios reported in table 4-1, we see that all of the variables are disproportionately distributed across all three measures of democratic

support. The most striking disproportionalities, however, are found among those that are non-black Africans (-0.15 for support for democracy as a system to -0.38 for satisfaction with democracy in practice) and the education variable and support for democracy as a system (-0.17 for those with the least education and 0.16 for those with the highest levels).

For all of the other personal characteristic categories, the distribution of those who support democracy generally matches the overall distribution of the population in these categories in the complete sample. For example, although urban-dwellers are over-represented among those that support democracy as a system and reject non-democratic alternatives and are slightly under-represented among those that are satisfied with democracy in practice, the small representation ratios suggest that this over- or under-representation is not very large. This indicates that democratic support is by and large evenly distributed across personal characteristics, with no particular group being more or less supportive of democracy than another.

At first glance then, those citizens who are more supportive of democracy are generally younger, black, male, educated (at either the secondary or university levels), living in an urban area, working in a non-professional job, fairly trusting, and not terribly engaged in community activities or groups. It is important to note, however, that the relationships between nearly all of these personal characteristics and democratic support are generally weak.

Economic Evaluations and Democratic Support

In addition to these personal characteristics, perceptions and evaluations of the economy have an important impact on democratic support. The existing literature on the influence of economics on public opinion indicates that economic perceptions and evaluations occur at two levels and two dimensions. First, economic satisfaction can be measured at two distinct levels: 1) at the overall, national level and 2) at the personal pocketbook level (Kinder 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; MacKuen 1992). Because each of these levels might have an impact independent of the other, measures of both are included in this project. More specifically, the respondents' satisfaction with the overall economic situation is represented by a question asking individuals to classify their satisfaction with economic conditions in the country at the moment of the interview and satisfaction with the individuals' economic situation is represented by a question asking individuals to compare their economic condition to that of other citizens of the country. Positive evaluations of both individual economic conditions and overall national economic conditions have been found to have a positive relationship with democratic support (Mishler and Rose, 1996).

Second, as highlighted by Fiorina (1981), economic satisfaction can be judged in two dimensions: retrospectively or prospectively. In other words, individuals can evaluate their satisfaction with the economy as it was in times past, in the case of this project one year before, or as it will be in the future, one year from now. As with the different levels of satisfaction, retrospective and prospective evaluations can exist at the same time and have independent effects, therefore both are included. Those who think the economy is better than it was before, and those who think the economy is getting

better, should be more satisfied with the current regime and will be more likely to support democracy.

As above, this literature suggests a few hypotheses about the relationship between perceptions of economics and democratic support:

> H2a. Those who have optimistic or favorable evaluations of the national economic situation will support democracy more than those who have negative evaluations.
>
> H2b. Those who have optimistic or favorable evaluations of their personal economic situation will support democracy more than those who do not.
>
> H2c. Those who think the economy is better now than it was a year ago will support democracy more than those who do not.
>
> H2d. Those who think the economy will be better one year from now than it is today will support democracy more than those who do not.

In general, it seems that the hypothesized relationships between economic satisfaction and democratic support accurately capture the distribution of support among southern Africans. More specifically, the representation ratios reported in Table 4-2 indicate that citizens who are more satisfied with the economic situation are almost always over-represented among those who support democracy. For example, the overall economic satisfaction representation ratios of 0.18 for satisfaction with democracy as a system and 0.36 for satisfaction with democracy in practice indicate that those who are satisfied with the overall economic situation in the country make up a larger percentage of those who support democracy than they do in the overall sample. The representation ratio of 0.00 for the rejection of non-democratic alternatives measure indicates that those who are satisfied with the overall economic situation really make up about the same percentage of those who support democracy as in the overall sample. On the other hand, a representation ratio -0.14 indicates that the percentage of individuals who support

democracy as a practice but are dissatisfied with the economic situation is smaller than the percentage of all individuals who are dissatisfied with the economic situation. In other words, individuals who are dissatisfied with the economic situation comprise only a small portion of those who support democracy as a practice.

Table 4-2 Here.

Across all of the economic measures and democratic support measures, the results show that those who are satisfied with the economy represent a larger portion of those who support democracy as a system and as a practice than they represent in the overall sample. While the rejection of non-democratic alternatives appears, at first glance, to contradict this finding, the representation ratios reported in Table 4-2 are small enough to suggest that the over- or under-representation is not substantial.

Economically, then individual Africans who are generally satisfied with both the overall economic situation and their personal economic situation and think that the economy is better than it was in the past are more supportive of democracy.

Democratic Support and Political Differences

The democratization literature has also argued that political perceptions/evaluations and beliefs influence democratic support. In fact, political factors have been recognized as having a stronger influence on democratic support than either of the other two sets of variables (Diamond 1999). More specifically, this literature has found that satisfaction with the political situation is the strongest determinant of democratic support. Because democratic support and political satisfaction seem inseparably interrelated, this project does not include a direct measure of political

satisfaction as an explanatory variable. Instead, the political factors used in this study include measures of ideology, interest in politics, institutional trust, and perceptions of corruption.

It seems reasonable to expect an individual's ideology, defined as an individual's beliefs about the scope of the government's role in the economy, to influence support for democracy. The nature of this influence, however, is unclear and the existing literature leads to contradictory expectations. On one hand, individuals who prefer a smaller government, classical liberals, might be more supportive of democracy because democratic practices provide a check on governmental action that is absent in other forms of government (Lindblom 1977). On the other hand, those who prefer a more interventionist government may be more supportive of democracy because they can use democratic procedures to implement various programs and even redistribute wealth (Knack 1997). Though the impact of ideology in southern Africa remains ambiguous, both arguments are compelling enough to justify including this variable as a control. To do this, I constructed an index measure of ideology by summing three Afrobarometer questions. The first asked respondents whether individuals or government should be most responsible for "ensuring the success and well-being of the people." The second asked respondents who (government, private businesses, or individuals) should be most responsible for schools and clinics. The final question in this ideology index asked respondents whether the government should retain ownership of factories, businesses, and farms or if these should be privatized.

A second important political variable is the individual's interest in politics. As Downs (1957) argued, collecting accurate, useful information about politics is a costly

enterprise. While those who are interested in politics may pay these costs without giving them much thought, it seems reasonable for such a person to desire a say in the political process. Obviously, this opportunity is not readily available in non-democratic systems, suggesting that those members of the mass public who are more interested in politics should be more supportive of democracy than those who are disinterested (for whom the type of government may not matter). To measure interest in politics, I created an index scale based on two survey items. The first asked respondents how often they discussed politics with their friends, family, etc. The second item asked respondents how closely they followed government and politics.

A third important political variable is institutional trust. Although this measure has sometimes been used as a measure of democratic consolidation, it seems reasonable to expect confidence in institutions to have an independent effect on support for democracy, and the checks and balances associated therewith (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1977; Norris 1999). If individuals have confidence in the institutions of democratic governance, they are likely to continuing supporting democracy. On the other hand, if they lose this confidence, people may want a strong leader that can bypass political institutions and the prospects for continued support should diminish. To measure institutional confidence, I again created an index measure, this time using items asking individual respondents about their confidence in the president, the parliament, the army, the police, the courts, and the election authorities.

The final political influence I include is an index measure of the respondents' perceptions of corruption in the government. This index uses items that tap individuals' perceptions of corruption in the national government, the parliament, and the civil

service. Those who believe that there is widespread corruption are less likely to support democracy. Even more than leading to a decrease in support for democracy, perceptions of widespread corruption have been found to be a primary determinant of military coups in sub-Saharan Africa (O'Kane 1993). Alternatively, as with institutional confidence, those who believe that corruption is not a widespread problem seem more likely to embrace democratic governance.

Overall, this discussion of the relationship between political factors and democratic support suggests a number of testable hypotheses:

> H3a. Those who have a more classical liberal ideology will support democracy more than those who have a classical conservative ideology.
>
> H3b. Those who are more interested in politics will be more supportive of democracy than those who are uninterested.
>
> H3c. Those with higher levels of institutional trust will be more supportive of democracy than those with lower levels of trust.
>
> H3d. Those who think there is widespread corruption in the government will be less supportive of democracy than those who believe there to be little corruption in government.

Unlike the economic satisfaction variables, the representation ratios presented in Table 4-3 seem generally consistent across all three measures of democratic support. Most notably, there appear to be distributional distortions in all four measures. First, as the representation ratios for the ideology measure indicate, those who are more conservative are under-represented among those that support democracy. Second, individuals with the least interest in politics are also the most under-represented among those that are satisfied with democracy (as indicated by representation ratios ranging of -0.19, -0.16 and -0.08). Third, individuals with no institutional trust are substantially underrepresented in the system and practice measures, with ratios of –0.53 and -1.01

meaning that those with no institutional trust comprise a dramatically smaller percentage of those who support democracy than they comprise in the overall sample. Fourth, those with very high levels of institutional support are over-represented, making up a larger percentage of those who support democracy than in the overall sample, though not to the same degree. Finally, as the ratio of 0.14 for the system measure and 0.27 for the practice measure indicate, those with the lowest perceptions of corruption make up a larger percentage of those who are satisfied with democracy than they make up in the overall sample.

Table 4-3 Here.

In general, then, democratic supporters tend to be people who prefer a higher level of government intervention, have higher levels of interest in politics, higher levels of trust in institutions, think the government is not very corrupt, are moderately apathetic, and either strongly identify with a political party or do not identify at all.

Overall, this initial look at the individuals who support democracy highlights the importance of certain characteristics and the unimportance of others. It is important to note, however, that these analyses do not speak to the strength of the relationship between these various characteristics and democratic support after controlling for the other factors. Moreover, these analyses are completely unable to indicate which of these factors is the most important, a key step in explaining variation in democratic support across southern Africa. To accomplish these goals, I now turn to multivariate statistical methods that are designed for just such purposes.

4.2 Multivariate Analyses: Which factors best explain democratic support?

As discussed above, one of the core assumptions of this project is that democratic support in southern Africa can be studied in the same ways as it is studied in other regions of the world. Even more, I suggest that many of the factors that influence democratic support in other parts of the world also influence democratic support in southern Africa. While I have provided evidence that 1) that a substantial portion of those in southern Africa support democracy, and 2) some discussion about who the individuals that support democracy are, I have yet to carefully test the extent to which these various personal characteristics, economic evaluations and political views explain variation in individuals' support for democracy. This requires methods that can assess both the nature and strength of the relationships in question while controlling for the other factors that might also influence democratic support. To this end, I use regression analyses to statistically model support for democracy.

Due to the ordered, but not continuous nature of the measures of democratic support discussed above, traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method produces misleading results and, therefore, is an inappropriate statistical method for this study (McKelvey 1975).[3] Instead, I utilize ordered logit, a statistical model that has been specifically designed to estimate the probability that an individual will fall into one of the categories in indices such as those I have constructed (Long 1997; McKelvey 1975).

---

[3] For the regression analyses presented throughout this project, I use data that has had missing values replaced by a multiple imputation procedure. To replace missing data, I used the AMELIA software package described in King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation. *American Political Science Review* 95 (1):49-69. For a discussion of using multiple imputation with the Afrobarometer data, see Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

While this is the statistically appropriate method, it is important to note that there are several difficulties associated with such models. First, the results of these analyses cannot be interpreted in the same fashion as OLS regression results. Whereas OLS regression reports the impact that a one-unit change in each independent variable has on the dependent variable, the ordered logit method reports changes in the logged odds ratio (a calculation of the odds of falling into one of the categories of the dependent variable). Second, measuring the extent to which ordered logit models adequately fit the data is also problematic. While statisticians have developed several measures of fit, none completely match the R^2 measures associated with OLS regression. Of the various measures that are commonly used, McKelvey and Zavoina's (1975) measure for ordinal models effectively conveys the same idea and "most closely approximates the R^2" (Long 2001). Even so, it is important to remember that the measures of fit reported in this study must be thought of only in terms of comparing the models within this study to each other and that they may not be comparable to measures reported in other studies (Long 1997). Having discussed some of the distinctive properties of these models, I can now turn to a discussion the results.

Table 4-4 Here.

The results for support for democracy as a system of government, support for democracy in practice, and the rejection of non-democratic alternatives are reported in Table 4-4. The first notable result is the extent to which these models accurately predict variations in democratic support. As the McKelvey and Zavoina R^2 indicates, this set of independent variables accounts for 16% (for the support for democracy as a system measure) to 31% (for support for democracy as a practice measure) of the variation in

democratic support. Although this indicates that a large portion of the variation in democratic support remains unexplained, it suggests that these variables do have a collective impact on democratic support and that these variables are useful in predicting who is most likely to support democracy.

Of more theoretical interest is the extent to which each these variables has a statistically significant, independent, impact on the measures of democratic support. As the results in Table 4-4 indicate, many of these variables are statistically related to democratic support. More specifically, anywhere from nine (in the rejection on non-democratic alternatives model) to thirteen (in the support for democracy as a practice models) of the fifteen variables included in these analyses are statistically significant. Moreover, all but five of these significant variables are significant at the 0.01 level (indicating that this relationship happens by random chance just 1 out of 100 times).

Even more important, however, are the nature of these relationships. In the system model, as expected, respondents who are black, male, have higher levels of education, are satisfied with how he or she compares to others economically, think the economy is better now and will be better in the future, are more liberal, are interested in politics and have high levels of institutional trust are more supportive of democracy. Those citizens who think the political system is corrupt are less supportive of democracy. Only the social capital index had a relationship with democratic support that ran contrary to the expectations discussed above. The remaining variables did not have a significant relationship with support for democracy as a system of government.

In the practice measure of democratic support, things change markedly. First, while the social capital index was significant in the system model, this variable is not

significant in the practice model. On the other hand, occupation type and urban/rural residence are significantly related to this measure of democratic support. More interestingly, both those who have a professional occupation and those who live in urban areas are less satisfied with democracy in practice.

Of the nine variables that are statistically significant in the rejection model, five were significant in all three models and two were significant in two of the three models. Only the interpersonal trust variable became significant in the rejection model, while six other variables that were significant in the previous models are not significant in the rejection model. Of these significant variables two (race, interpersonal trust,) had relationships that differed from what was expected. Specifically, each of these variables has a negative relationship with the rejection of non-democratic alternatives (meaning that an increase in interpersonal trust is associated with a lower probability of rejecting non-democratic alternatives).

In addition to revealing the relationships between these commonly employed factors, the models in Table 4-4 also include dichotomous, country-specific, indicators to account for any systematic country differences not accounted for by the theoretically justified variables. Of the eighteen coefficients reported for these country dummies, all but three are statistically significant, suggesting that there are, in fact, additional unspecified factors that influence whether an individual supports democracy and that these factors vary systematically across different countries.

More interesting than this discussion of the statistical significance of the independent variables is the substantive impact that changes in these variables have on the probability of supporting democracy. To determine the effects that these variables

have, I calculate the impact that a moderate change has on the probabilities of falling into a particular category in these democratic support indices.[4] The results of these manipulations are reported in tables 4-5 (for the system model), 4-6 (for the practice model), and 4-7 (for the rejection model).

Table 4-5 Here.

The most striking aspect of Table 4-5 is that the changes in the probability of falling into a particular category of democratic support associated with manipulations of the independent variables are remarkably small. The most notable exceptions to this are changes in race, institutional trust and perceptions of corruption. In the case of race, if we compare a non-black southern African to a black southern African, the probability of completely not supporting democracy as a system (scoring a 0 on this index) of government falls by 0.08, while the probability of completely support democracy as a system of government (scoring a 3 on this index) increases by 0.11. When institutional trust is increased from one-half standard deviation below the mean to one-half standard deviation above the mean, the probability of rejecting democracy as a system falls by 0.04 while the probability of completely supporting democracy increases by 0.08. Alternatively, when perceptions of corruption increase by one standard deviation, the probability of not support democracy increases by 0.03 and the probability of support democracy falls by 0.05. All of the other manipulations produce changes that are very small (with a change in probabilities of less than 0.05).

Table 4-6 Here.

[4] For a continuous variable, a moderate change is defined as moving from one-half standard deviation below each variable's mean to one-half standard deviation above the variables mean, while holding all other variables at their mean values. For indicator variables, a moderate change is defined as moving from 0 to 1, while holding all of the remaining variables at their mean values.

If we turn to support for democracy as practice, reported in Table 4-6, we see similarly small effects. The only exceptions to this are again the race, institutional trust and perceptions of corruption variables. As above, these manipulations show that black Africans are substantially more likely to support democracy than are others as are those with higher levels of institutional trust. Also as above, those who see more corruption in government are less likely to support of democracy.

Table 4-7 Here.

For the rejection model, however, the substantive effects are all weaker. In particular, only race and interest in politics have a reasonable substantive impact on the rejection of non-democratic alternatives. Being a black African decreases the probability of completely rejecting non-democratic alternatives by 0.05 (a score of 3 on this index). On the other hand, shifting from being a non-black African to being a black- African increases the probability of falling into one of the other categories (which indicate lower levels of support for democracy) by 0.02 or less. This suggests that, while black Africans are substantially less likely to reject non-democratic alternatives, they are not substantially more likely to accept authoritarian alternatives. Alternatively, increases in an individuals interest in politics increases the probability of completely rejecting non-democratic alternatives by 0.05.

Overall, the substantive effects for all three models suggest that most of these independent variables, even those that are statistically significant, have only small independent impacts on democratic support. Race is the only variable that has a substantive impact in all three models (though its impact is different across these models). Institutional trust and perceptions of corruption substantially influence support

for democracy as a system and in practice but do not have a large substantive impact on the rejection of non-democratic alternatives. Finally, interest in politics has an impact on the rejection of authoritarianism, but not on the other two measures of support for democracy. All in all, these findings suggest that many of the variables highlighted in previous studies of democratic support influence these different measures of democratic support. These findings, however, are unable to offer any insight into individuals' overall support for democracy. To examine this in greater detail, I now consider analyses of the overall measure of democratic support discussed at the end of the previous chapter.

Table 4-8 Here.

As above, the first notable part of Table 4-8 is the extent to which this model predicts variation in the overall level of support for democracy. The McKelvey and Zavoina R-square statistic indicates that this model explains about one-quarter (0.23) of the variation in democratic support. While this suggests that the model does not perform very well, as noted above the nature of both this model and this measure of fit cannot be easily compared to other studies. When compared to the previous three models, however, this particular model performs adequately (not as well as the practice model, but better than the system and rejection models).

Of the sixteen theoretically interesting independent variables included in this model, thirteen are statistically significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 levels. All but one of the relationships between each of these significant variables and democratic support are as predicted (with all but perceptions of corruption having a positive relationship with democratic support). Contrary to expectations, the interpersonal trust variable has a statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) negative relationship with democratic support.

Unfortunately, as above, the effects that changes in these variables have on democratic support cannot be directly interpreted by the coefficients reported in Table 8. Instead, I again turn to a calculation of the substantive effects associated with moderate changes in the values of these variables.

Table 4-9 Here.

The results of this operation are reported in Table 4-9. As the results in this table indicate, changes in five of the variables (either those that are statistically significant or those that are not) have a large substantive impact on democratic support. In particular, the differences between not being a black African and being a black African, being female or male, increasing interest in politics, and institutional trust increase the probability of supporting democracy. Increasing perceptions of corruption substantially decreases the probability of supporting democracy. Even more, manipulating the race variable from not being a black African to being a black African decreases the probability of falling into the 0 category by 0.03 and of falling into the 1 category by 0.07 and increases the probability of completely supporting democracy by 0.08. These changes are nearly matched by the result of manipulating the institutional trust variable. These two variables have the largest substantive impact on democratic support. Manupulating an individuals' interest in politics also has a substantive impact on the probability of supporting democracy (with an increase resulting in a 0.05 increase in the probability of scoring a 3 on the democratic support scale).

Alternatively, changes in perceptions of corruption have a substantive negative effect on democratic support. As Table 4-9 indicates, a one standard deviation change

decreases the probability of completely supporting democracy by 0.05 and increases the probability of scoring a 2 by 0.04.

4.3 Summary

In the end, this baseline explanation of democratic support that I have developed has generally served the purposes outlined at the beginning of this chapter. First, this set of widely recognized explanatory variables perform much as the existing literature suggested. Although many of the variables were not statistically significant, and their substantive effects were generally small, they related to democratic support in the predicted ways. On the other hand, the statistically and substantively significant country dummy variables, strongly suggest that there a number of possible factors that influence democratic support in southern Africa remain unspecified. In particular, based on the theoretical arguments presented in previous chapters, I argue that these results suggests that support for traditional political institutions and/or past authoritarian regimes are critical factors for which this general model cannot account.


Figure 4-1: Illustrating Representation Ratios
(Comparing Percent in Overall Sample and in
Subsample that Supports Democracy)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Percentage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Institutional Confidence Scale
Sample
Subsample

Table 4-1: Distribution of Democratic Support in Southern Africa

Personal Characteristics		System	Practice	Reject Non-Democratic Alternatives
Age	15-19	0.08	0.16	0.05
	20-29	0.03	0.09	0.02
	30-39	0.02	-0.04	0.01
	40-49	0.00	-0.09	0.00
	50-59	-0.07	-0.02	-0.05
	60-69	-0.16	-0.15	-0.08
	70-79	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03
	80-89	-0.29	-0.25	-0.37
	90-99	-0.21	-0.38	0.18
Race				
	Not Black	-0.15	-0.38	-0.01
	Black	0.02	0.04	0.00
Gender				
	Female	-0.07	-0.06	-0.03
	Male	0.06	0.06	0.03
Urban Area				
	No	-0.03	0.03	-0.03
	Yes	0.05	-0.05	0.04
Education				
	None	-0.17	-0.07	-0.08
	Primary	-0.10	-0.06	-0.04
	Secondary	0.08	0.05	0.03
	University	0.16	0.09	0.11
Occupation Type				
	Non-Professional	-0.03	0.01	-0.03
	Professional	0.09	-0.02	0.08
Interpersonal Trust				
	No	-0.02	-0.05	0.01
	Yes	0.08	0.15	-0.04
Social Capital				
	0	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04
	1	0.01	-0.05	0.05
	2	0.02	0.05	0.00
	3	0.04	0.11	-0.02
	4	0.07	0.02	0.00
	5	0.06	-0.05	0.05
	6	0.07	0.21	0.08

Values are logged representation ratios

Table 4-2: Distrbiution of Democratic Support in Southern Africa			
Economic Influences	System	Practice	Reject Non-Democratic Alternatives
Overall Econ. Satisfaction			
Not Satisfied	-0.06	-0.14	0.00
Satisfied	0.18	0.36	0.00
Individ. Econ. Comparison			
Worse Off	-0.10	-0.20	0.00
Same	0.06	0.09	-0.01
Better Off	0.14	0.28	0.01
Retrospective Economic Eval.			
Much Worse	-0.27	-0.44	-0.01
Worse	0.00	-0.15	0.04
Same	0.05	0.09	-0.03
Better	0.14	0.30	0.00
Much Better	0.20	0.39	-0.01
Prospective Economic Eval.			
Much Worse	-0.20	-0.39	0.03
Worse	-0.07	-0.22	0.04
Same	-0.01	0.01	-0.03
Better	0.16	0.26	-0.04
Much Better	0.18	0.41	0.00

Values are logged representation ratios

Table 4-3: Distribution of Democratic Support in Southern Africa

Political Influences	System	Practice	Reject Non-Democratic Alternatives
Ideology			
Classical Conservative	-0.05	-0.16	-0.10
Moderate Conservative	-0.04	-0.01	-0.05
Moderate	0.00	0.02	0.04
Moderate Liberal	0.13	0.09	0.09
Classical Liberal	0.05	0.05	0.12
Interest			
0	-0.19	-0.16	-0.08
1	0.01	-0.01	0.00
2	0.12	0.11	0.05
Institutional Trust			
None	-0.53	-1.01	0.02
1	-0.17	-0.59	0.02
2	-0.05	-0.12	0.01
3	0.03	0.02	0.01
4	0.10	0.10	0.02
5	0.10	0.28	0.00
Complete	0.20	0.39	-0.07
Perception of Corruption			
0	0.14	0.27	-0.01
1	0.05	0.13	0.01
2	-0.03	-0.14	0.01
3	-0.19	-0.41	0.00

Values are logged representation ratios

Table 4-4: Ordered Logit Analyses of Democratic Support

		System	Practice	Reject Authoritarianism
Age in years		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(1.595)	(1.727)	(0.188)
Black		0.58**	0.61**	-0.19*
		(6.71)	(7.006)	(2.269)
Gender: Male		0.16**	0.16**	0.17**
		(3.275)	(3.2)	(3.89)
Educational Attainment		0.08**	0.05*	0.11**
		(4.169)	(2.305)	(5.975)
Occupation Type: Professional		0.07	-0.14**	0.20**
		(1.259)	(2.539)	(3.44)
Urban/Rural		0.08	-0.12*	0.14**
		(1.676)	(2.363)	(2.748)
Interpersonal Trust		0.00	0.00	-0.32**
		(0.047)	(0.013)	(5.715)
Social Capital Index		-0.05**	-0.01	-0.01
		(3.46)	(0.442)	(0.452)
Economic Satisfaction		0.02	0.13**	-0.02
		(0.713)	(4.7)	(0.964)
Individual Economic Comparison		0.05*	0.13**	0.02
		(2.063)	(5.574)	(0.939)
Retrospective Economic Eval.		0.06**	0.06*	0.02
		(2.611)	(2.413)	(0.901)
Prospective Economic Eval.		0.10**	0.15**	0.00
		(4.514)	(6.722)	(0.076)
Ideology: Right to Left		0.12**	0.12**	0.17**
		(4.079)	(4.168)	(6.087)
Interest in Politics		0.18**	0.16**	0.26**
		(5.491)	(5.136)	(8.899)
Institutional Trust		0.20**	0.33**	-0.03
		(14.236)	(17.523)	(1.748)
Perceptions of Corruption		-0.19**	-0.25**	-0.04
		(7.324)	(12.149)	(1.526)
Botswana		0.87**	0.91**	1.17**
		(9.837)	(10.443)	(13.602)
Malawi		0.76**	0.00	1.10**
		(8.703)	(0.005)	(12.526)
Namibia		0.03	0.01	-0.33**
		(0.378)	(0.102)	(3.844)
South Africa		0.75**	0.17*	-0.18*
		(8.408)	(2.172)	(2.365)
Zambia		0.90**	0.37**	1.48**
		(9.74)	(4.171)	(16.132)
Ancillary Parameters	Cut 1	0.95	1.55	-1.15
	Cut 2	2.26	2.92	-0.06
	Cut 3	3.77	4.61	1.15
Observations		8166	8166	8166
McKelvey and Zavoina R-Square		0.16	0.31	0.17

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4-5: Substantive Effects; Support for Democracy as a System					
Variable	**Unit Change**	0	1	2	3
Age in Years	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Race	0->1	-0.08	-0.06	0.03	0.11
Gender	0->1	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.03
Education	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02
Occupation Type: Professional	0->1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Urban Area	0->1	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02
Interpersonal Trust	0->1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Social Capital Index	-+sd/2	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02
Economic Satisfaction	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Individual Economic Comparison	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Retrospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02
Prospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03
Ideology:Right to Left	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02
Interest in Politics	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.03
Institutional Trust	-+sd/2	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	0.08
Perceptions of Corruption	-+sd/2	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.05
Botswana	0->1	-0.08	-0.10	-0.02	0.20
Malawi	0->1	-0.07	-0.09	-0.01	0.17
Namibia	0->1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
South Africa	0->1	-0.07	-0.09	0.00	0.16
Zambia	0->1	-0.08	-0.10	-0.02	0.20

-+sd/2 indicates a change from one-half standard deviation below the variable mean to one-half standard deviation above the variable mean

Table 4-6: Substantive Effects; Support for Democracy as a Practice

Variable	Unit Change	0	1	2	3
Age in Years	-+sd/2	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Race	0->1	-0.10	-0.05	0.08	0.08
Gender	0->1	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02
Education	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
Occupation Type: Professional	0->1	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Urban Area	0->1	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
Interpersonal Trust	0->1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Social Capital Index	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Economic Satisfaction	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02
Individual Economic Comparison	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Retrospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
Prospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.03
Ideology:Right to Left	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Interest in Politics	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Institutional Trust	-+sd/2	-0.09	-0.06	0.06	0.09
Perceptions of Corruption	-+sd/2	0.05	0.03	-0.03	-0.05
Botswana	0->1	-0.11	-0.10	0.05	0.16
Malawi	0->1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Namibia	0->1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
South Africa	0->1	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.03
Zambia	0->1	-0.05	-0.04	0.03	0.06

-+sd/2 indicates a change from one-half standard deviation below the variable mean to one-half standard deviation above the variable mean

Table 4-7: Substantive Effects; Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives

Variable	Unit Change	0	1	2	3
Age in Years	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Race	0->1	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.05
Gender	0->1	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.04
Education	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.04
Occupation Type: Professional	0->1	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
Urban Area	0->1	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04
Interpersonal Trust	0->1	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03
Social Capital Index	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Economic Satisfaction	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
Individual Economic Comparison	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Retrospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Prospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ideology:Right to Left	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04
Interest in Politics	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.05
Institutional Trust	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
Perceptions of Corruption	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
Botswana	0->1	-0.06	-0.09	-0.12	0.27
Malawi	0->1	-0.06	-0.08	-0.11	0.25
Namibia	0->1	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.08
South Africa	0->1	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.05
Zambia	0->1	-0.08	-0.10	-0.14	0.32

-+sd/2 indicates a change from one-half standard deviation below the variable mean to one-half standard deviation above the variable mean

Table 4-8: Ordered Logit Analysis of Overall Support for Democracy

		(1)
Dependent Variable:		Index of Overall Support for Democracy
Age in years		-0.00343*
		(2.152)
Black		0.41646**
		(4.989)
Gender: Male		0.24869**
		(5.722)
Educational Attainment		0.10806**
		(6.107)
Occupation Type: Professional		0.07549
		(1.337)
Urban/Rural		0.03562
		(0.736)
Interpersonal Trust		-0.10385*
		(1.965)
Social Capital Index		-0.01405
		(0.927)
Economic Satisfaction		0.05467*
		(2.42)
Individual Economic Comparison		0.10114**
		(4.596)
Retrospective Economic Eval.		0.0577*
		(2.268)
Prospective Economic Eval.		0.11825**
		(5.066)
Ideology: Right to Left		0.19339**
		(6.706)
Interest in Politics		0.30129**
		(9.747)
Institutional Trust		0.20884**
		(16.161)
Perceptions of Corruption		-0.20421**
		(7.626)
botswana		1.1999**
		(14.693)
malawi		1.0958**
		(12.338)
namibia		-0.13916
		(1.609)
southafrica		0.5859**
		(7.328)
zambia		1.1655**
		(13.915)
Ancillary Parameters	Cut1	0.74007
	Cut2	2.6593
	Cut3	4.2185
Observations		8166
McKelvey and Zavoina R-Square		0.23

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4-9: Substantive Effects; Overall Support for Democracy

Variable	Unit Change	0	1	2	3
Age in Years	-+sd/2	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01
Race	0->1	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	0.08
Gender	0->1	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.05
Education	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.03
Occupation Type: Professional	0->1	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Urban Area	0->1	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Interpersonal Trust	0->1	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01
Social Capital Index	-+sd/2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Economic Satisfaction	-+sd/2	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Individual Economic Comparison	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.02
Retrospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Prospective Economic Eval.	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.03
Ideology:Right to Left	-+sd/2	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.03
Interest in Politics	-+sd/2	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.05
Institutional Trust	-+sd/2	-0.03	-0.07	0.01	0.08
Perceptions of Corruption	-+sd/2	0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.05
Botswana	0->1	-0.06	-0.17	-0.04	0.27
Malawi	0->1	-0.06	-0.16	-0.03	0.25
Namibia	0->1	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.03
South Africa	0->1	-0.04	-0.09	0.01	0.12
Zambia	0->1	-0.06	-0.17	-0.04	0.26

-+sd/2 indicates a change from one-half standard deviation below the variable mean to one-half standard deviation above the variable mean

Chapter 5: Chiefs and Democratic Support

In this chapter, I explore the influence that citizens' support for traditional institutions has on their support for democracy in southern Africa. As discussed in previous chapters, a large percentage of citizens in southern Africa support democracy (though to different extents in different countries and across the different dimensions of democracy) and many of the factors that influence perceptions of democracy in other parts of the developing world also influence perceptions of democracy in this region. On the surface, then, democratic support in southern Africa is largely similar to democratic support in other regions. Conventional wisdom and the models in the previous chapter, however, suggest that these findings do not fully capture all of the factors that influence democratic support in southern Africa. While the level of democratic support in southern Africa appears similar to the level in other regions, the explanatory factors examined in chapter 4 fail to capture the effects of primary contextual features that influence political life in southern Africa.

As argued in chapter 2, individuals' support for democracy may be influenced by both commonly recognized, and often analyzed, factors and contextually specific, rarely analyzed, factors. These context-specific factors, though largely unexplored in the democratization literature, are critical to understanding politics in southern Africa. This chapter focuses on the impact that perceptions of traditional leadership institutions, a topic that has been "virtually absent in most discussions of democratic consolidation," have on individuals' perceptions and evaluations of democracy (Williams 2004).

5.1 The Nature of Traditional Institutions in Southern Africa

Traditional political leaders, chiefs, represent a fundamental element in the political landscape of southern Africa. For example, according to van Kessel and Oomen (1997), about 40% of South Africans, and nearly 17% of South Africa's territory, are under the power of approximately 800 traditional leaders. While these numbers are rough approximations, approximations that are widely disputed, the point that traditional leaders remain a visible part of southern Africa's political arena is important.

There is, however, a tension between traditional political institutions and democracy. In each of the size counties I examine, these traditional institutions and democratic institutions are divided into separate realms; each type of institution having its own function and followers. In general, however, democratic institutions have been the more dominant of the two, while traditional institutions have been relegated to a generally inferior status.

For example, at one extreme Malawi has given traditional leaders no official role in government, even though the government acknowledges that there are as many as 18,000 traditional leaders in Malawi (Mwalwanda 2005). Even more, although Malawi's constitution specifies that the legislature should be a bicameral body and that the upper house (the Senate) should include chiefs, the government decided against constructing this body for cost reasons (Economist 2003). In contrast, the governments of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia have all incorporated traditional leaders into their governmental systems. Although the role of traditional leaders play in these systems is

largely ‘advisory,’ their place in society has been recognized and the governments have begun to address their roles (Dusing 2002; Republic of South Africa 2002).

Chieftaincies, though not static institutions, existed before, during, and after the colonial experience and continue to exist in many different forms. Some are the direct descendents of pre-colonial political arrangements while others were created, in a rather arbitrary fashion, by colonial powers (Ayittey 1991; Dusing 2002; van Dijk 1999; Young 1994). These arrangements vary from segmented communities (such as the San peoples in Botswana) to hierarchically organized communities (such as the Zulu in South Africa). In addition, in each of these six democracies, traditional leaders hold very different places in society, some having hereditary claims to their positions, others having been appointed by the government. The survey data analyzed in this study, however, does not distinguish between different types of chieftaincy systems or the different status traditional leaders hold. Instead, this study investigates the general effect that having a traditional leader, and ones’ evaluations of such leaders, has on democratic support.

5.2 Individuals and Traditional Institutions

Before determining the influence that having a chief has on democratic support, this chapter first examines the extent to which traditional leaders remain an important part of citizens’ everyday lives. To do this I ask several questions: 1) to what extent do citizens acknowledge having a chief; 2) are these citizens distinguished by some certain personal characteristics, economic evaluations, or political views; 3) how do citizens who claim to have a chief perceive that chief; 4) how strongly attached to chiefs are these individuals? Only after asking these questions, questions that clarify citizens’ views of

the chieftaincy in contemporary southern Africa, can an analysis of the chieftaincy's impact on democratic support make sense.

The first step in this process is determining the extent to which citizens in southern Africa acknowledge having a traditional leader. To do this, I employ a simple yes-no Afrobarometer survey item that specifically asks individual respondents if they have a traditional leader:

> I would like to speak about traditional leadership. Do you have a traditional leader, chief, or headman?

Table 5-1 Here.

As Table 5-1 indicates, about two-thirds of those in southern Africa (62.03%) acknowledge having a traditional leader. This result, however, masks important cross-national differences. In 4 of the 7 countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia), more than two-thirds of the respondents acknowledged having a chief. In one other, Zambia, a slightly smaller majority (about 57%) responded similarly. In contrast, only a minority of South Africans (18.55%) reported having a chief.

Clearly, although there is substantial variation across these countries, a large percentage of citizens in southern Africa do, in fact, acknowledge having a traditional leader.

Which Individuals Acknowledge Having a Chief?

Although the results discussed above suggest that citizens, across southern Africa have traditional leaders, these results do not reveal whether these are particular types of citizens or groups of citizens. Before examining the influence that having a traditional leader has on an individuals' perception of democracy, this study must determine the

extent to which traditional leaders are an integral part of everyday life in southern Africa. In other words, are the people that acknowledge having a chief from a unique portion of the population or are these individuals found in all segments of the population.

Instead of examining the raw percentages of individuals in each category that acknowledges a traditional leader, which is influenced by the presences of each category in the overall sample, I again constructed representation ratios that indicate whether certain groups are over- or under- represented among those who have a chief. To review, I constructed these ratios by taking the natural log of the percentage of respondents in each category that acknowledged having a chief divided by the percentage of respondents in each category in the overall sample. This operation gives a ratio that is centered on zero and has maximum and minimum values that extend to infinity (for a further discussion of this operation see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).

Personal Characteristics and Traditional Institutions

As with democratic support, two types of personal characteristics might distinguish those that have a chief from those that do not: 1) personal identification items and 2) measures of interpersonal relations. For identify factors I examine age, gender, education, occupation, and location of residence. For interpersonal relational items, I examine interpersonal trust, and social capital. Since the existing literature does not specify which individuals are more likely to acknowledge a chief, I am forced to rely on commonsensical predictions for each characteristic. Based on growth of a truly global economy, and the associated need for young people to fit a ‘western’ stereotype to secure employment, I expect more of the older respondents to identify with chiefs and traditional

institutions than younger. In addition, given the generally patrimonial nature of traditional institutions in southern Africa, I expect more men to acknowledge having chief than women. In contrast, educational attainment and occupation type should be negatively related to having a chief. I expect fewer individuals who have higher education levels or who work in a professional occupation to identify with traditional leaders because both of these items generally lead individuals away from traditional institutions. Finally, since rural areas remain the core support bases for traditional leaders, I expect many more of those who live in rural areas to have a traditional leader. In sum, these personal identification factors suggest the following hypotheses:

> $H_{5\text{-}1}$: More older respondents acknowledge having a chiefs than younger respondents.
>
> $H_{5\text{-}2}$: More male respondents acknowledge having a chief than female respondents.
>
> $H_{5\text{-}3}$: Fewer respondents with high levels of education acknowledge having a chief than individuals with low levels of education.
>
> $H_{5\text{-}4}$: Fewer respondents in professional occupations acknowledge having a chief than respondents in non-professional occupations.
>
> $H_{5\text{-}5}$: More respondents in rural areas acknowledge having a chief than respondents in urban areas.

I also expect each of the relational items described in chapter 4 to have a positive relationship with having a chief. Specifically, I expect those who have higher levels of interpersonal trust to be more willing to rely on others and to accept political institutions that have structured their communities for long periods. For social capital, those who are more connected to the community should identify with a traditional leader because traditional leaders are often important symbols of the community. These expectations also suggest testable hypotheses:

$H_{5\text{-}5}$: More respondents with higher levels of interpersonal trust identify with a chief than respondents with lower levels of interpersonal trust.

$H_{5\text{-}6}$: More respondents with high levels of social capital identify with a chief than respondents with lower levels of social capital.

As indicated above, I test these hypotheses using a number of methods, including an analysis of representation ratios.

As Table 5-2 indicates, while three of the personal characteristics have positive relationships with having a chief, only two groupings of respondents are substantially over-represented. First, as indicated by representation ratios ranging from 0.20 to 0.26 to 0.27, many more older respondents acknowledge having a chief than their presence in the overall sample would suggest. More specifically, individuals in the 70-79, 80-89, and 90-99 age ranges are just under twice as likely to acknowledge having a chief than are members of the overall sample (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Table 5-2 Here.

Second, as predicted, those who score high on the social capital index are also over-represented, though not as over-represented as are older respondents. Again, the representation ratios of those with the highest levels of social capital, 0.20 and 0.13 respectively, suggest that individuals with extensive ties to their community are much more likely to have a chief than their presence in the overall sample would lead one to expect.

Interpersonal trust does have a positive relationship with having a chief, but the small representation ratios indicate that those with high levels of interpersonal trust are not substantively over-represented.

Also as expected, the education level, occupation type, and area of residence all have negative relationships with having a chief. In other words, those with more education, who have a professional occupation, or who live in an urban are under-represented among those who acknowledge having a chief.

Interestingly, as representation ratios of 0.00 suggest, men and women seem to acknowledge having a chief at the same rate. This indicates that gender differences do not divide those that identify with traditional institutions in southern Africa.

In summary, older individuals who are more trusting and more connected to the community are most likely to acknowledge having a chief. Those who are more educated or who have a professional occupation are substantially less likely to have a chief. While these results are not surprising, they do begin to tell us that there are certain portions of the population that identify with chiefs more than others.

Economic Evaluations and Traditional Institutions

In addition to being distinguished by these personal identification and relational factors, individuals may also be differentiated according to their evaluations of the economic situation. Although these evaluations may seem divorced from the effects of traditional leaders, a substantial body of literature has highlighted the important impact traditional leaders have on economic development (Ray 1996a; Ray 1996b). Some, such as Ribot (2002), have argued that chiefs often undermine development efforts. If this is correct, citizens who acknowledge having a chief may be joined by certain views of the economic situation, such as the belief that the economy is worse than it was in the past, or that it will be in the future. To test this relationship, since individuals evaluate both their

personal economic situation and that of the country and make both retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy, I examine 4 different ways of evaluating economic conditions.

First, interviewers asked respondents about their overall satisfaction with the economic situation in the country. Since the official role of traditional leaders remains ambiguous across southern Africa, with few chiefs having an official place in the economic policy making process, I expect fewer of those who are satisfied with the economic situation to acknowledge a chief. In essence, I expect those who are dissatisfied with the economic conditions in their country to look to chiefs as alternatives to the government whose policies have produced the economic situation.

Second, interviewers asked respondents about their personal economic situation in comparison to others in their country. Again, since chiefs do not have an official place in making economic policy, and may be viewed as an alternative, I expect fewer of those who think they are in a better situation than others to have a chief. This admittedly loose logic about individuals' perceptions of the economic situation suggests two hypotheses:

> $H_{5\text{-}6}$: Individuals' overall economic evaluations is negatively related to having a chief

> $H_{5\text{-}7}$: Individuals' individual economic comparisons is negatively related to having a chief

In addition to these macro and micro economic evaluations, individuals also look into the past and to the future to evaluate their economic situation. Since governments in southern Africa have not given chiefs a formal place in the policy making process, I expect those who look into the past and think things are better, or much better, today are less likely to have a chief than those who think conditions were better 10 years ago.

Likewise I expect those who look into the future and think the economy is going to get better over the next 10 years are less likely to have a chief than are those who think the economy is going to get worse. In more formal terms:

> $H_{5\text{-}8}$: Individuals' retrospective evaluations of the economy is negatively related to having a chief

> $H_{5\text{-}9}$: Individuals' prospective evaluations of the economy is negatively related to having a chief

As above, I test these hypotheses through an analysis of representation ratios.

Table 5-3 Here.

As the results in Table 5-3 indicate, those who are satisfied with the overall economic situation of their country make up a slightly larger portion of those who have a chief than one would expect. Though the representation ratio is small (0.06), it suggests my expectation was incorrect and that those who are satisfied with the national economy are more likely to have a chief than are those who are dissatisfied. As expected, however, those who think they are worse off than their fellow citizens are more likely to have a chief. Interestingly, those who think they are in the same economic situation as their neighbors make up a smaller portion of those who have a chief than those who think they are worse off or who think they are better off.

Table 5-3 also indicates that there is a clearly positive relationship between both retrospective and prospective economic evaluations, evidence that leads us to reject hypotheses 5-8 and 5-9. Interestingly, those who think the economic situation is better than it was 10 years ago, and those who think the economic situation is going to be better 10 years from now, are make up a larger portion of those who acknowledge having a chief than their presence in the overall sample would suggest.

While there are clear patterns in the results presented in Table 5-3, the general conclusion that can be derived from these results is that economic evaluations do not offer a strong way of distinguishing those who have a chief from those who do not. While individuals who are satisfied with the national economy, or who think it is better than it was and is getting better, are more likely to have a chief than those who are dissatisfied with the national economy, the representation ratios are generally small (smaller than those in table 5-2) and do not offer evidence of an overwhelming relationship between economic evaluations and having a chief.

Political Characteristics and Traditional Institutions

The final set of factors that could group together individuals who acknowledge having a chief that I examine in this study are political characteristics. As noted in Chapter 4, these political factors are often the strongest determinants of support for democracy. Unsurprisingly, given the general lack of attention given to the interaction between traditional leaders and democracy, the relationship between these political factors and having a chief remains unaddressed in the existing literature. To test whether individuals who have a chief are tied together by certain political characteristics I examine four distinct political differences: ideology, interest in politics, institutional trust, and perceptions of corruption.

Only one of the four political measures included in this chapter is expected to have a positive relationship with acknowledging a chief. The higher an individual's level of institutional trust, the extent to which an individual believes in the institutions of government, the more likely it is that the individual will acknowledge having a chief.

After all, he or she trusts governmental institutions and the chieftaincy is often an institution with close ties to the local community.

The three remaining political factors should have a negative relationship with having a chief. As described above, the ideology measure is an index scale that ranges from classical conservative, those who support an extensive government, to classical liberal, those who support limited government. Although chiefs in southern Africa do not espouse a particular ideology, it seems reasonable to expect those who acknowledge having a chief to be generally supportive of government involvement in individuals' lives. Therefore, I argue that there will be a negative relationship between this ideology measure and having a chief (meaning that more citizens with classical conservative views will acknowledge having a chief than those with classical liberal ideology). Likewise, the interest should also have a negative relationship with having a chief. Those who are most interested in politics should want to play a direct role in decision-making, a role not readily available in most chieftaincy systems. The perceptions of corruption measure should also have a negative relationship with having a chief. Those who see government as being corrupt should want to see less of it, meaning he or she should not want to see another layer of government (in the form of the chieftaincy) that is susceptible to corruption.

This reasoning, then, suggests a third set of testable hypotheses that can be expressed in more formal terms:

> $H_{5\text{-}10}$: More individuals with classical conservative ideology acknowledge having a chief than individuals with a classical liberal ideology.
>
> $H_{5\text{-}11}$: More individuals with low levels of interest in politics acknowledge having a chief than individuals with high levels of interest.

$H_{5\text{-}12}$: More individuals with high levels of institutional trust identify with a chief than individuals with low levels of institutional trust.

$H_{5\text{-}13}$: More individuals who think there are low levels of corruption in government identify with a chief than individuals who think there are high levels of corruption.

As expected, the representation ratios reported in Table 5-4 indicate that the ideology, interest and corruption variables are all negatively related to having a chief. In particular, representation ratios of -0.21 for moderate liberals and -0.12 for full classical liberals indicate that substantially fewer liberals acknowledge having a chief than their presence in the overall sample would suggest. Alternatively, classical conservatives are slightly over-represented among those that have a chief (as ratios of 0.04 and 0.07 indicate). While these ratios do not suggest a substantial over-representation, they do reinforce the presence of a negative relationship.

Table 5-4 Here.

These results also show that the interest and corruption variables do have a negative relationship with having a chief, but only a weak relationship. Only one of the interest or corruption categories is substantially over or under represented (those who perceive there to be a substantial amount of corruption are under-represented among those that acknowledge having a chief). In essence, however, these results suggest clear conclusions only for the ideology hypothesis.

Alternatively, the institutional trust index has a clear, positive relationship with having a chief. Those who have the highest levels of institutional trust are substantially over-represented among those who say they have a chief (as indicated by representation ratios of 0.12 and 0.14). On the other hand, those with the lowest levels of institutional trust are under-represented (with a representation ratio of -0.14 for those with no

institutional trust). This suggests that they hypothesis expressed above accurately captures the relationship between institutional trust and having a chief.

In summary, individuals who have a chief are distinguished from those that do not by ideology, institutional trust, and perceptions of corruption. Those who have a chief tend to have a conservative ideology, high levels of institutional trust, and think that government is not very corrupt. On the other hand, individuals who do not acknowledge having a chief are more liberal, have lower levels of institutional trust and tend to think that government is corrupt. In addition, interest in politics does not seem to distinguish those who have a chief from those who do not.

Predicting Which Individuals Have a Chief

Having examined relatively straightforward tabular data that indicated who acknowledged a having a chief, I now turn to a more sophisticated methods of determining who is most likely to have a chief. In particular, I examine a logit model. This model uses the independent variables discussed above to estimate the probability that an individual has a chief or not. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, these methods allow me to determine the influence that a particular measure has while controlling of the effects of other variables.

Table 5-5 Here.

The model presented in Table 5-5 indicates that five of the variables (race, area of residence, social capital, individual economic comparisons and interest in politics) are statistically significant. Moreover, all but one of these significant relationships is in the expected direction. Specifically, the relationship between interest in politics and having a

chief is contrary to expectations (with Table 5-5 indicating that an increase interest in politics being associated with an increased probability of having a chief). In essence, those who are black African, live in rural areas, who are more involved in their community, see themselves as being economically worse off than others, and who are not interested in politics are most likely to have a chief.[5]

While these results indicate which individuals tend to have a chief, they say little about the strength of individuals' association with traditional institutions. While clarifying that traditional leaders continue to retain a large following in southern Africa, and that this following is a rather diverse group, is important, understanding these individuals' perceptions of chiefs is even more critical to determining the influence traditional leaders have on democratic support. To do this, I look at four distinct ways of evaluating traditional leaders.

Individuals' Perceptions of Traditional Institutions

First, I consider a survey item that asks individual about what role they think chiefs should have in the decision making process of their country:

> Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one ____ has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove or approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?
>
> If all decisions were made by a council of Elders, Traditional Leaders, or Chiefs.

[5]Of the variables in this model, area of residence has the strongest substantive effect on the probability of having a chief (decreasing the probability of having a chief by 0.49) and being a black African has the second strongest effect (increasing the probability of having a chief by 0.29).

Responses to this question were recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disapprove to strongly approve.

Second is an item that asked individuals to evaluate whether they thought chiefs were interested in the average people:

> How interested do you think your local chief is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think?
> Are they not at all interested?
> Not very interested?
> Interested?
> Very Interested?

Respondents who indicated that their chiefs were interested or very interested in what happens to them or to hearing their thoughts are considered to have a stronger attachment to traditional leaders.

Third, I consider a survey item that asks those who have a chief to evaluate the extent to which chiefs are involved in corruption:

> What about corruption, that is where leaders take money intended for the community and use it for themselves? How many chiefs or traditional leaders are involved in corruption?
> All, Almost All
> Most
> A Few, some
> Almost none

Individuals who indicated that only a few, or even none, of the chiefs are involved in corruption are considered to have a stronger attachment to traditional leaders.

Finally, I examined an item that asked individuals to evaluate how much of the time a chief can be trusted to do what is right. As the literature on representation has emphasized, believing that a political leader has done what is 'right' is a fundamental part of individuals' evaluations of that leader's ability to represent and protect the community (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Pitkin 1967). In effect, effective representation hinges

on doing what is right for the community. Those who believe chiefs can be trusted to do what is right are, obviously, more strongly attached to chiefs than those who believe chiefs cannot be trusted to do what is right. To examine the extent to which individuals who acknowledge having a chief believe that chiefs can be trusted to do what is right, I examine a survey item that asks these respondents to evaluate their chief along precisely these lines:

> How much of the time can you trust your local chief to do what is right?
> Is it:
> Never
> Only some of the time
> Most of the time
> Just about always?

For each of these subjective evaluations of chiefs, I use both the original coding (for cross-national comparisons) and a dichotomous re-coding that grouped together those who supported the chieftaincy into one category (coded as 1) and grouped together those that did not support the chieftaincy into another (coded as 0). Obviously, those who scored a 1 on this measure are considered supporters of the chieftaincy. In addition, to determine the overall extent to which individuals who acknowledge having a chief accept traditional leaders I constructed an index measure of attachment to traditional leaders that combines the dichotomous version of these individual perceptions of chiefs.

Table 5-6 Here.

The regional and cross-national distribution of responses to these items is reported in Table 5-6. Beginning with the regional distributions, this data suggests that people do believe in their chiefs. Fully 7 out of 10 (70%) believe that their chiefs are interested in what happens to them and hearing from them, while only slightly under one-third thought their chiefs were not interested. Even more, more than two-thirds of those that

acknowledge having a chief (71%) believe that most chiefs do not participate in corruption and less than one-third thought that all or almost all chiefs were involved in corruption. Finally, 6 out of 10 believed that chiefs could be trusted to do what is right, but the remaining 40% thought chiefs could not always be trusted to do what is right.

Strikingly, however, three-fourths of all southern Africans who had a chief (76%) did not think chiefs should be involved in making decisions. At first glance, then, it appears that citizens across southern Africa are strongly attached to their chiefs, but are not so attached as to put them in a position of real power. In essence, though citizens in southern Africa do not appear to want chiefs to have a role in decisions, a large number support their chiefs. In every dimension examined, then, about two-thirds of those in southern Africa expressed support for their chief.

The cross-national results in Table 5-6 also indicated that citizens have generally positive evaluations of traditional leaders. In particular, large majorities of about two-thirds of the population in every country, with the exception of South Africa, believe that chiefs are interested in the ordinary people. In contrast, only a slim majority of 52% of those in South Africa who acknowledge having a chief believe chiefs are interested. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the population in each country believes that chiefs are not involved in corruption.

A similar pattern of generally positive evaluations is again present in distribution of support across the trustworthiness measure. In this case, however, a minority in two countries rated chiefs positively: South Africa, where only 39% thought chiefs were trustworthy, and Zambia, where only 44% supported chiefs.

If we look at citizens' reaction to the idea of chiefs making decisions, however, we again see a general rejection of chiefs. In every country, a substantial majority of the population thought chiefs should not make decisions. Even more, only about one-quarter of the respondents in any of the countries actually acknowledged a desire for chiefs to make decisions (ranging from 19% in Botswana to 30% in Lesotho). As suggested above, these results clearly suggest that citizens across southern Africa think their chiefs are generally interested, honest, and trustworthy individuals, but not individuals that should be involved in making public policy.

Individuals' Support for Traditional Institutions

As mentioned above, more than simply examining who has a chief, I also constructed an index measure of individuals' attachment to chiefs. I constructed this index by combining the have a chief (yes or no) question with positive rankings on the four evaluative items reported in Table 5-6. For example, an individual who does not have a chief scores a zero on the scale, an individual that has a chief and responds positively to one of the four items (how interested are chiefs, how corrupt are chiefs, how trustworthy chiefs, and should chiefs make decisions) scores a one, an individual who has a chief and responds positively to two of the four items scores a two, etc. The results presented in Table 5-7 indicate that attachment to chiefs across southern Africa is strong, but not overwhelmingly so. A plurality of respondents across the region (37.31%) scored a zero on this scale, indicating they did not have chiefs. Alternatively, just over one-third of the respondents (31.09%) scored a 4 or 5 on this scale, indicating strong or complete attachment to chiefs. Even more the average score of 2.03, being below the mid-point of

the scale, indicates that the average citizen in southern Africa is not very attached to chiefs.

Table 5-7 Here.

Cross-nationally, the average score on this scale is above or at the mid-point of 2.5 in 4 of the countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, and Namibia) and below the mid-point in the remaining two (South Africa and Zambia). This suggests that, in many of the countries, the citizenry is actually more attached to chiefs than not.

More specifically, the cross-national results indicate that individuals who support traditional institutions are very supportive. In particular, about four out of those in Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia and one-half of those in Malawi scored either a 4 or a 5 on this scale. Only in South Africa and Zambia do citizens seem to reject traditional institutions (with 8 out of 10 South Africans and 4 out of 10 Zambians not even acknowledging a chief).

5.3 Traditional Institutions and Democratic Support

So far, this chapter has demonstrated that a substantial portion of the population in each southern African country acknowledges having a chief and identified the types of individuals that have a chief (and which of these individuals are likely to have the strongest attachment to traditional leaders). This chapter went on to show that most of those who have a chief believe that chief to be interested, honest, and trustworthy. In a slightly different light however, the analyses discussed above also show that many of these same individuals do not think that chiefs should make policy decisions and that the strength of attachment to chiefs varies widely both within and across countries. Having

developed this basic understanding of perceptions of the chieftaincy in southern Africa, this chapter can now examine the influence that the chieftaincy has on support for democracy.

As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the existing literature suggests that the chieftaincy is antithetical to democracy (Mamdani 1996). To determine whether this is, in fact, the case, this chapter employs two distinct methods. The first is a simple contingency table that illustrates how many of those who support the chieftaincy also support democracy (or do not) and how many of those who do not support the chieftaincy support democracy (or do not). To facilitate this comparison, I dichotomized the attachment to chiefs index (scores of 0, 1, 2 and 3were coded as not supporting chiefs and scores of 4 and 5 were coded as supporting) and dichotomous versions of the support for democracy indices presented in chapter 3.

Table 5-8 Here.

The first cross-tabulation in Table 5-8 indicates that, of those who do not support a chief, just over one-half supports democracy as a system of government (55.21%) and just under one-half does not (44.79%). Alternatively, among those that do support a chief, over 58.41% again supports democracy as a system of government while 41.59% does not. Contrary to expectations, there does not appear to be a wide difference in democratic support between those that support a chief compared to those who do not (the difference is only 3.2 percentage points).

The second cross-tabulation indicates that, among those that do not support a chief, just over one-half (52.15%) do not support democracy in practice and just under one-half (47.85%) does. Among those that do support traditional institutions, more than

one-half (55.70%) does support democracy and less than one-half does not (44.30%). In contrast to the previous cross-tabulation, and contrary to expectations, more individuals who are attached to traditional institutions support democracy than those who are not attached to traditional institutions (by a difference of 7.85 percentage points).

Finally, the third cross-tabulation in Table 5.8 indicates that more of those who are attached to a chief are more likely to reject other non-democratic alternatives than among those who do are not attached to a chief. Specifically, three-quarters of those who are **not** attached to a chief (74.40%) support democracy by rejecting non-democratic alternatives. In comparison, a nearly percentage (81.07%) are attached to traditional institutions also reject non-democratic alternatives.

In sum, the results reported in Table 5-8 indicate that having an attachment to traditional institutions appears to be associated with democratic support, but only weakly. While this analysis provides a good first glimpse into the relationship between these two factors, it is unable to control for other factors that might influence support for democracy. To determine if perceptions of the chieftaincy have a direct relationship with individuals' support for democracy, or if any seeming relationship is actually spurious, I examine a statistical model that estimates the effect that an individuals' attachment to traditional institutions has on democratic support.

Multivariate Estimates: Chiefs and Democratic Support

The most striking results in the first set of regression models, reported in Table 5-9, is their similarity to the democratic support analyses that did not consider the influence of chiefs. In particular, these models fit the variation in democratic support to much the

same extent as did the models in the previous chapter (as indicated by McKelvey and Zavoina R^2s of 0.21, 0.38, 0.16, and 0.23). Even more, again comparing the 4 models in Table 5-9 to those in Chapter 4, there are only two notable differences among the independent variables. First, the direction of the relationship between the urban-rural measure and support for democracy as a system changes from positive to negative, in neither case, however, was the relationship statistically significant. Second, a comparison of the overall support for democracy models shows that educational attainment loses its statistical significance when the chief indicator is included. Again, however, the direction and magnitude of the estimated relationship remain unchanged. That these small changes are the most noticeable differences highlight the extent to which support for traditional institutions does not appear to change the impact that other variables have on individuals' support for democracy.

Table 5-9 Here.

More interesting, however, is the actual relationship the attachment to traditional institutions index has with democratic support, after including the relevant control variables. First, the attachment to traditional institutions index is significant in all four models of democratic support (at the 0.01 level in the system and rejection models and at the 0.05 level in the practice and overall models). Contrary to the results presented in Table 5-8, however, the estimated relationship is negative. In essence, these results indicate that the stronger an individual's attachment to traditional institutions, the less supportive that individual is of democracy.

In particular, statistically significant regression coefficients of -0.06 in the system model, -0.04 in the practice model, -0.07 in the rejection model, and -0.04 in the overall

model indicate a clear decline in democratic support as attachment to traditional institutions increases

Overall, then, having a chief appears to have a significant, negative impact on support for democracy. Unfortunately, due to the non-linear nature of the democratic support indices, the results in Table 5-9 are not as easy to interpret as standard regression analyses. In particular, the coefficients for the chief indicator cannot be directly interpreted. Instead, the substantive impact that manipulations in the value of this variable have on the probability of falling into a particular value of the democratic support measures reveals how magnitude of the relationship between support for traditional institutions and democratic support. The results of these manipulations are reported in Table 5-10.

Table 5-10 Here.

Table 5-10 presents the baseline probability of falling into each of category of the democratic support scale and the resulting change in these probabilities that results from a change in the attachment to traditional institutions index. In the case of an index measure like this, I changed the value of the support for traditional institutions index from one-half standard deviation below the mean score to one-half standard deviation above the mean score, while holding all of the other variables constant at their mean values. As these results indicate, a manipulation of this sort results in only very small changes in the probabilities for each of the democratic support indices (with the increases or decreases never greater than 3 points).

For the support for democracy as a system index, increasing the value of this index by one standard deviation decreases the probability of scoring a 3 by 0.02 points

(from 0.29 to 0.27). At the same time, increasing this index decreases the probability of falling into one of the other categories either not at all or by 0.01.

For the support for democracy in practice index, increasing the value of the attachment index by one standard deviation decrease the probability of supporting democracy (either scoring a 2 or a 3 on this index), but only by 0.01. Alternatively, a corresponding increase in attachment to a chief increase the probability of scoring low on this democratic support measure, but again only by one point.

In both the rejection of non-democratic alternatives index and the overall democratic support index, increasing the value of the attachment index results in a very small increase in the probability of scoring a 0, 1 or 2 (never more than 0.01) and a decrease in scoring a 3 (of 0.03 in the rejection model and 0.02 in the overall model).

Overall, though there is a *statistical* relationship between the strength of attachment index and each of the democratic support measures, these results indicate that the strength of ones' attachment to a chief does not have a discernable *substantive* impact on democratic support.

5.4 Summary

The empirical analyses presented in this chapter suggest two interesting findings about chiefs and democratic support in southern Africa. First, to a large extent chiefs remain an integral part of everyday political life in this region and having a chief appears, at least at first glance, to influence whether he or she supports democracy. In the end, while an individuals' attachment to traditional institutions does influence democratic support, the substantive impact of this attachment is very small.

The first set of empirical analyses discussed above highlighted the fact that large portions of the populations in each of the seven southern African countries considered acknowledge having a chief. Furthermore, the results indicate that individuals who acknowledged having a chief did not represent a small or idiosyncratic portion of the population. Acknowledgement of a chief, in other words, is not restricted to a particular subset of citizens in southern Africa. Individuals with a wide variety of personal characteristics, economic evaluations and political perceptions acknowledged having a chief.

In addition to the simple acknowledgment of a chief being widely distributed across these countries, the strength of attachment (as measured through perceptions of chiefs' interest, honesty and trustworthiness) to chiefs is also widely distributed across these countries. Although slightly more citizens in some countries were more attached than citizens in other countries, strong attachment to chiefs is not overwhelmingly concentrated in any particular country.

Second, having found that many individuals continue to recognize traditional leaders, the multivariate results clearly indicated that attachment to traditional institutions had a statistically significant, negative effect on democratic support. As the ordered logit estimates illustrated, a measure of an individuals attachment to a chief is related to democratic support (in all 4 models), and the direction of the relationship is negative across each measure of democratic support.

Finally, however, examining the substantive impact of changes in this measure of how strongly an individual is attached to a chief has only a weak influence on democratic support. In essence, this chapter has found that chiefs continue to play an integral role in

the political life of citizens in southern Africa. However, having an attachment to a chief only seems to have limited influence on an individuals' support for democracy.

Table 5-1: Percent of Southern Africans that Acknowledge Having a Chief

Southern Africa	62.03%
Botswana	79.5
Lesotho	98.47
Malawi	94.85
Namibia	68.09
South Africa	18.55
Zambia	56.02

Table 5-2: Which Individuals Acknowledge Having a Chief

	Has a chief
Age	
15-19	0.04
20-29	-0.02
30-39	-0.07
40-49	-0.03
50-59	0.08
60-69	0.11
70-79	0.20
80-89	0.26
90-99	0.27
Gender	
Female	0.00
Male	0.00
Education	
No Formal	0.24
Primary	0.22
Secondary	-0.24
University	-0.34
Urban Area	
No	0.29
Yes	-0.75
Occupation type	
Non-Professional	0.06
Professional	-0.25
Interpersonal trust	
No	-0.01
Yes	0.04
Social capital	
0	-0.02
1	-0.05
2	0.01
3	0.04
4	0.10
5	0.20
6	0.13

Table 5-3: Which Individuals Acknowledge Having a Chief
Economic Factors

		Has a chief
Overal Economic Satisfaction		
	Dissatisfied	-0.02
	Satisfied	0.06
Individual Economic Comparison		
	0	0.06
	1	-0.13
	2	-0.01
Retrospective Economic Eval.		
	1	0.03
	2	-0.11
	3	0.03
	4	0.06
	5	0.09
Prospective Economic Eval.		
	1	0.06
	2	-0.14
	3	0.00
	4	0.02
	5	0.08

Table 5-4: Which Individuals Acknowledge Having a Chief
Political Factors

		Has a chief
Ideology		
	Classical Conservative	0.04
	Moderate Conservative	0.07
	Moderate	0.00
	Moderate Liberal	-0.21
	Classical Liberal	-0.12
Interest		
	0	-0.01
	1	0.04
	2	-0.03
Institutional Trust		
	0	-0.14
	1	-0.10
	2	-0.08
	3	-0.02
	4	-0.01
	5	0.12
	6	0.14
Perceptions of Corruption		
	0	0.09
	1	0.03
	2	0.00
	3	-0.13

Table 5-5: Predicting Who Will Have a Chief

Dependent Variable:	Having a Chief
Age in years	0.00
	(0.21)
Black	1.26**
	(7.16)
Gender: Male	-0.02
	(0.28)
Educational Attainment	-0.03
	(1.01)
Occupation Type: Professional	0.00
	(0.05)
Urban/Rural	-2.50**
	(30.68)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.12
	(1.34)
Social Capital Index	0.22**
	(8.42)
Economic Satisfaction	0.05
	(1.32)
Individual Economic Comparison	-0.08**
	(2.19)
Retrospective Economic Eval.	-0.10
	(1.95)
Prospective Economic Eval.	0.04
	(0.96)
Ideology: Right to Left	-0.05
	(1.11)
Interest in Politics	0.18**
	(3.70)
Institutional Trust	0.00
	(0.13)
Perceptions of Corruption	-0.02**
	(0.44)
Botswana	-2.67**
	(10.05)
Malawi	-1.31**
	(4.60)
Namibia	-3.68**
	(13.77)
South Africa	-5.57**
	(21.42)
Zambia	-3.89**
	(14.89)
Constant	4.13**
	(11.59)
Observations	8166
Pseudo R-Square	0.50

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 5-6: Perceptions of Chiefs By Those Who Have a Chief

	Southern Africa	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	South Afric	Zambia
How Interested in the People Are Chiefs?							
Not Interested	**30%**	30	40	25	17	48	28
Interested	**70%**	70	60	75	83	52	72
How many chiefs are involved in corruption?							
All/ Most	**29%**	28	39	25	17	34	31
Few/None	**71%**	72	61	75	83	66	69
How much of the time can you trust you chief to do what is right?							
Never/Sometimes	**40%**	36	48	36	25	62	46
Most of the Time/ Alwa	**60%**	64	52	64	75	39	44
Believe Chiefs Should Make Decisions							
Disapprove	**76%**	81	70	76	73	76	80
Approve	**24%**	19	30	24	27	24	20

Table 5-7: Strength of Attachment to Chiefs

	Southern Afr.	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	South Africa	Zambia
Strength of Attachment Index							
0	**37%**	22	2	6	32	81	44
1	**7%**	9	16	9	4	4	7
2	**11%**	13	20	15	9	4	10
3	**13%**	19	22	19	11	4	13
4	**21%**	25	26	37	30	5	19
5	**10%**	12	15	14	15	2	8
Average Score	**2.03**	2.53	3.01	3.15	2.47	0.53	1.79

Table 5-8: Interaction between Support For Chief and Support for Democracy

		Support Chief: No	Support Chief: Yes
System Support	No	2782 (44.79%)	813 (41.59%)
	Yes	3429 (55.21%)	1142 (58.41%)
	n=8166	6211 (100%)	1955 (100%)

		Support Chief: No	Support Chief: Yes
Practice Support	No	3239 (52.15%)	866 (44.30%)
	Yes	2972 (47.85%)	1089 (55.70%)
	n=8166	6211 (100%)	1955 (100%)

		Support Chief: No	Support Chief: Yes
Reject Non-Democratic Alt.	No	1590 (25.60%)	370 (18.93%)
	Yes	4621 (74.40%)	1585 (81.07%)
	n=8166	6211 (100%)	1955 (100%)

Table 5-9: Ordered Logit Estimates

		System	Practice	Reject Authoritarian	Complete
Age in years		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*
		(1.64)	(1.73)	(0.26)	(2.14)
Black		0.6**	0.63**	-0.16	0.43**
		(6.89)	(7.30)	(1.91)	(5.18)
Gender: Male		0.16**	0.16**	0.17**	0.25**
		(3.32)	(3.24)	(3.88)	(5.75)
Educational Attainment		0.07**	0.05*	0.11**	0.11**
		(4.04)	(2.21)	(5.86)	(6.01)
Occupation Type: Professional		0.07	-0.14**	0.21**	0.08
		(1.27)	(2.51)	(3.48)	(1.37)
Urban/Rural		0.01	-0.17**	0.06	-0.02
		(0.21)	(3.29)	(1.15)	(0.29)
Interpersonal Trust		0.01	0.00	-0.31**	-0.10
		(0.17)	(0.09)	(5.60)	(1.87)
Social Capital Index		-0.05**	0.00	0.00	-0.01
		(3.08)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.63)
Economic Satisfaction		0.02	0.13**	-0.02	0.06*
		(0.84)	(4.72)	(0.81)	(2.51)
Individual Economic Comparison		0.05*	0.13**	0.02	0.01**
		(2.06)	(5.53)	(0.92)	(4.60)
Retrospective Economic Eval.		0.06**	0.07*	0.02	0.06*
		(2.49)	(2.33)	(0.78)	(2.17)
Prospective Economic Eval.		0.10**	0.15**	0.00	0.12**
		(4.60)	(6.77)	(0.06)	(5.10)
Ideology: Right to Left		0.12**	0.12**	0.17**	0.19**
		(4.09)	(4.14)	(6.13)	(6.70)
Interest in Politics		0.19**	0.17**	0.26**	0.30**
		(5.56)	(5.15)	(8.91)	(9.80)
Institutional Trust		0.20**	0.33**	-0.02	0.21**
		(14.68)	(17.79)	(1.51)	(16.29)
Perceptions of Corruption		-0.02**	-0.26**	-0.05	-0.21**
		(7.40)	(12.29)	(1.83)	(7.91)
Traditional Index		-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.07**	-0.04*
		(3.52)	(2.38)	(4.17)	(2.58)
Botswana		0.85**	0.90**	1.15**	1.19**
		(9.42)	(10.34)	(13.32)	(14.49)
Malawi		0.77**	0.01	1.12**	1.10**
		(8.86)	(0.07)	(12.63)	(12.45)
Namibia		0.00	-0.02	-0.37**	-0.16
		(0.01)	(0.17)	(4.30)	(1.87)
South Africa		0.63**	0.09	-0.31**	0.51**
		(6.64)	(1.11)	(3.82)	(5.83)
Zambia		0.85**	0.33**	1.42**	1.13**
		(8.97)	(3.68)	(15.38)	(13.15)
Ancillary Parameters	Cut 1	0.77	1.43	-1.35	0.62
	Cut 2	2.08	2.80	-0.26	2.53
	Cut 3	3.60	4.50	0.95	4.10
Observations		8166	8166	8166	8166
McKelvey and Zavoina R-Square		0.16	0.31	0.18	0.23

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 5-10: Substantive Change in Probabilities
Traditional Index

Support for Democracy as a System				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Probabilities	0.13	0.22	0.36	0.29
Traditional Index	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02

Support for Democracy as a Practice				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Prob.	0.18	0.28	0.36	0.18
Traditional Index	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01

Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Probabilities	0.08	0.13	0.26	0.53
Traditional Index	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03

Overall Support for Democracy				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Probabilities	0.08	0.28	0.37	0.27
Traditional Index	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02

Change in probabilities are based changing value of chief indicator
from 0 to 1.

Chapter 6: The Authoritarian Past and Democratic Support

In this chapter, I ask how support for the past influences evaluations of the present. More specifically, I ask how much influence support for past authoritarian regimes has on perceptions, and evaluations, of democratic regimes in southern Africa. Although the six countries examined in this study have experienced dramatic institutional changes in recent years and decades, the historical institutionalism literature suggests that past institutions will continue to influence citizens' perceptions and evaluations and that this influence is not easily overcome. This suggests that perceptions of the old regime may continue to influence evaluations of the present regime for some time.

As the neo-institutional literature suggests, individuals' perceptions and evaluations are influenced by the institutional context in which they live (North 1990; Riker 1980; Shepsle 1981). Political institutions, the rules of the game that constrain individuals' behavior, shape how a regime functions and determine the regime's effectiveness. Citizens who have lived under different institutional arrangements compare these institutions and judge for themselves which is 'better'.

Recently a small literature has begun to look at the effect that perceptions of past regimes have on citizens in the present (Mishler 2001; Rose 1998; Shin 2002). In central and eastern Europe, Richard Rose and his colleagues (1998) and Shin and McDonough (2002) found that perceptions of the communist past continue to influence perceptions of politics under new regimes.

In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, a number of recent studies have highlighted the importance of the past, especially the authoritarian past, on present political

conditions. Monga (1996) suggested that perceptions of the past hinder the development of democracy across Africa. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argued that the nature of the past authoritarian regime shaped the institutions adopted during transitions to democracy. Boone (1992) suggested that the colonial past fundamentally undermined Senegal's political and economic development because it shaped the power relations among the elites and prevented the adoption of reforms that would have stimulated growth. As these examples indicate, scholars have begun to examine the impact of the authoritarian past, but they have yet to examine how the authoritarian past influences citizens' evaluations of democracy.

In most sub-Saharan African countries, the recent past has been dominated by authoritarian rulers that exploited their positions of national leadership for personal gain (Jackson 1982). In the five years prior to 1989, only 9 of 47 sub-Saharan African countries held competitive elections; elections in which opposition parties gained representation in the national legislature (Bratton 1997). The other 38 countries experienced authoritarian rule, often in the form of patrimonial rule. The legacies of these authoritarian governments do not simply disappear with the introduction of democratic rule. Indeed, I ask whether citizens' experiences under these non-democratic regimes continue to influence citizens' perceptions and evaluations of the new democratic systems.

To test this argument, I consider results from a number of empirical analyses using data from the first round of the Afrobarometer survey project. I begin by briefly discussing the nature of these authoritarian regimes. I then move on to evaluate southern Africans' views of these old regimes, determine the strength of these views, and explore

which sorts of citizens are most strongly attached to the old regime. This chapter culminates in a statistical model that estimates the influence perceptions of the past have on individuals' support for democracy.

6.1 The Nature of the Authoritarian Past in southern Africa

As Table 6-1 indicates, the most striking aspect of the past authoritarian regimes in these southern African countries is the diversity of regimes. The last completely authoritarian regime that Botswana and Lesotho experienced was British colonialism. Malawi and Zambia both experienced one-party rule (governments led by Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda respectively). Alternatively, South Africa and Namibia endured a period of settler domination for several decades after the end of formal colonization. Although these experiences are not substantially different then those experienced by other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to remember that each of these countries experienced a slightly different form of authoritarianism and a different transition from authoritarian rule.

Table 6-1 Here.

Of the six countries in this study, only one country has not experienced authoritarian rule since the end of colonialism. Specifically, Botswana, the oldest democracy in this sample of countries, is the only country to have retained the democratic regime established after British colonialism ended (Holm 1989; Picard 1985; Stedman 1993). Of the remaining countries, all but 2 removed the authoritarian regime without resorting to open violence. Democracy came to Lesotho only after a power struggle between the members of the ruling Military Council and the Monarchy and a struggle

within the Military Council itself (Matlosa 1998; Southall 1999). In Malawi and Zambia, citizens used protests and strikes, which were reinforced by international political and economic pressure, to force the one-party governments of Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda to conduct negotiations that led to democracy (Baylies 1992; Ihonvbere 1997) . In contrast, Namibia and South Africa experienced a generally consensual transition to democracy only after experiencing protracted periods of unrest and violence (Bauer 1999; Forrest 1994; Lodge 2003; Mandela 1995; Trust 2004).

Unlike many countries where democracy has been the only regime type citizens have experienced, citizens in southern Africa experienced authoritarianism first hand and are likely to have vivid memories of life under these non-democratic institutions. With the exception of those in Botswana, all of the survey respondents from these countries are old enough to have experienced the past non-democratic regime. Even in Botswana, however, one of the oldest democracies in Africa, nearly half of the respondents experienced authoritarian rule. This makes it substantially more likely that individuals' feelings for the past will influence perceptions and evaluations of the present regime.

6.2 Perceptions of Past Authoritarian Regimes

The first step in determining the influence that these diverse authoritarian experiences have had on evaluations of the present is to uncover citizens' perceptions of these old regimes. Fortunately, the Afrobarometer survey instrument asked respondents to compare the present government to the past form of government along four dimensions: effectiveness, interest, corruption, and trustworthiness. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether citizens are conflating a genuine preference for the past

with a preference for the stability, and even the economic benefits, associated with authoritarianism. A set of questions that distinguished between support for the old regime and support for specific outcomes of that regime would be better able disentangle these issues. However, such questions are not available and I limit this analysis to these four ways of evaluating the old regime.

For each of the four dimensions, interviewers asked respondents to compare the present government and the past government in response to the following root question:

> You have told us how you feel about the effectiveness of the way government performs its job, its interest in what you think, corruption, and your trust in government. But how does this compare to the government that this country had before?

To capture individuals' evaluations of the present and past along each of these four dimensions, the interviewer added a line that focused on each dimension and probed for the strength of the respondents feelings.

The first dimension of comparison is governmental effectiveness. Specifically, interviewers read the common root question and then asked:

> Is government of today more, about the same, or less effective as the old government?

If respondents thought the present government is less effective than the past government, he or she is categorized as preferring the past.

Table 6-2 Here.

As the results in Table 6-2 indicate, there is an eleven percentage point split between those that prefer the past (37%) and those that prefer the present (48%) and only a small percentage (15%) indicated that these regimes were equally effective. The cross-

national results, however, undermine the image of populations that are evenly distributed between preferring the past or the present.

In three of the six countries, a clear majority (69% in Botswana, 54% in Malawi, and 53% in Namibia) thinks the present government is more effective than the past government. In addition, just under half of those in Zambia (48%) think the present government is more effective than the past. Only in Lesotho and South Africa are the citizens equally divided between preferring the effectiveness of the present or past (41% to 45% in Lesotho and 40% to 41% in South Africa).

Next, interviewers asked citizens to compare the extent to which the present and past governments were interested in hearing what the citizens thought. Citizens were asked the following:

> Is government of today more, about the same, or less interested as under the old government?

Across the entire region, one-half of the respondents thought the present government is more interested than the past (51%). In addition, one-third of the respondents (33%) actually thought the past was more interested than the present. Alternatively, slightly less than one-fifth of the respondents (16%) thought the past and present regimes were equally interested in what the citizens had to say.

Again, in one-half of the countries, an absolute majority feel that the present government was more interested in hearing what they had to say than was the past government. Specifically, two-thirds of those in Botswana thought the present government more interested and slightly fewer than six out of 10 Malawians (59%) and Namibians (57%) thought the present more interested than the past. In the other three

countries, Lesotho, South Africa, and Zambia, a plurality of the respondents (45% in each country) thought the present was better than the past.

The third dimension along which citizens compared the past and present is the extent to which the government is corrupt. In particular, citizens were asked if the current government is more or less corrupt that the previous government. Across these six southern African democracies, just over one-third of the respondents (35%) thought their old regimes were more corrupt than the present regimes. More than four out of ten (43%) actually thought the present regimes were more corrupt than the old regimes. The remainder of the respondents (22%) thought the regimes were equally corrupt.

The cross-national results, however, show that a majority of the citizens in three of the six countries thought the past regime was more corrupt than the present regime. Specifically, 54% of those in Malawi, 50% of those in Zambia, and 46% in South Africa thought the past was more corrupt. In both Lesotho and Namibia, a plurality (46% and 47% respectively) actually thinks the present is more corrupt than the past. An equal percentage of those in Botswana (38%) believe the present was more corrupt than the past as think the past was more corrupt than the present.

The final dimension along which citizens evaluated their current and past governments is trustworthiness. Citizens were asked to what extent they thought the present government was more, or less, trustworthy than the old regime. In essence, interviewers were asking citizens to evaluate how often they thought the current, or past, government could be trusted to do what is right. Across southern Africa, four in ten respondents (43%) thought the present could be trusted more than the past and another

four in ten (37%) thought the old regime was more trustworthy than the current government. An additional 21% thought both regimes were equally trustworthy.

In only Namibia did a majority, a slim majority of 52%, think the present regime was more trustworthy then the old regime. Pluralities in Botswana (48%), Lesotho (44%), and Malawi (48%), however, also thought the present government is more trustworthy than the past. In South Africa and Zambia, on the other hand, pluralities thought that the past was more trustworthy than the present (39% and 46% respectively).

In sum, Table 6-2 indicates that there are substantial portions of the population in every southern African country that prefer the authoritarian past to the democratic present along these four critical dimensions. In 11 of 28 opportunities (six countries across four dimensions) more citizens preferred the past to the present then preferred the present to the past. While many citizens do prefer the present, the authoritarian past are clearly lingers in the minds of the respondents. How strongly these respondents feel towards the past, however, remains unclear.

Strength of Attachment to the Past

To estimate the strength of citizens' attachment to the past, I used these four dimensions to create an index measure of how much citizens like the past. To do this, I dichotomized these four items into pro-past responses (coded 1) and pro-present responses (coded 0). I then added these items together to form a 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 index scale. Those who score a 0 on this scale completely reject the past, while those who score a 4 on the past are strongly attached to the past. Score of 1, 2, and 3 indicate mixed emotions

for the past. In Table 6-3, I report both the regional and cross-national distribution of this index and the mean score for the region and each country.

As Table 6-3 indicates, only slightly more than one-third of those across all of southern Africa (32%) completely reject the past and only one-tenth (12%) are completely attached to the past. In essence, across the region citizens are not ready to completely dismiss the past and are not ready to completely embrace the past, they seem to have very mixed emotions about their past regimes. Further, the region's mean score is 1.50. While this is under the index mid-point of 2, it is still evidence that many citizens do not completely reject the past and that a substantial number are at least partially attached to the past.

Table 6-3 Here.

If we look at the cross-national distribution, however, the picture changes dramatically. In every country but one, a larger percentage of citizens scored a 0 than any other score on this index. In Botswana (40%), Lesotho (46%), Malawi (31%), South Africa (29%), and Zambia (24%), pluralities completely rejected the past. In Namibia, a plurality (36%) scored a 1 on this index scale. Moreover, in every country but Zambia, a majority scored a 0 or a 1 on this index, indicating only weak support for the past.

The national means reinforce this interpretation of Table 6-3 by highlighting that the average score was not over the mid-point in any of the countries. Only in Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia, where the average scores were about 1.6, does there seem to be a moderate-weak attachment to the past. In the other countries, however, the average score was well below the mid-point suggesting only a weak attachment to the past.

In sum, while it seems that there are substantial portions of the population in each country that actually like the past, or at least some part of the past, the overall attachment to these past authoritarian regimes appears to be relatively weak in every country. Even where the distribution indicates that a large percentage likes the past regime, and the average score is above the mid-point of the index, substantial portions reject the past or like only one aspect of the old regime. Now that it is clear that some people do like the past, though they are not strongly attached to the past, I ask if those individuals who prefer the past from those who do not are distinguished by particular characteristics.

6.3 Individuals' Support for the Authoritarian Past

It is possible that positive feelings for the past are limited to a specific sub-set of individuals. If this is the case, I could conclude that any influence the authoritarian past has on democratic support is limited to particular types of people and might not undermine today's democratic regimes. To determine if positive perceptions of past are limited to specific groups, I calculate and report representation ratios for a variety of personal characteristics, economic evaluations, and political beliefs.

I use these representation ratios, as discussed in previous chapters, because they control for the size of each sub-grouping's presence in the overall sample. These ratios indicate the extent to which a particular group is over-represented, or under-represented among those that prefer the past. For example, a representation ratio of 0.30 indicates that the presence of a particular category among those that prefer the past is about twice as large as is its presence in the overall sample, while a ratio of -0.30 indicates that the

presence of a particular group among those that prefer the past is about half the size of that groups presence in the overall sample.

Personal Characteristics

First, I ask if a preference for the past is linked to a particular personal characteristic. I have divided the personal characteristics that I look at into two types: identity factors and relational factors. The identity factors are: age, race (black, white, Indian, colored), gender, education, and occupation type. The relational items are measures of individuals' interpersonal trust and social capital.

Table 6-4 Here.

As Table 6-4 indicates, older respondents are slightly more likely to favor the past than are younger respondents. Representation ratios that range from -0.03 to -0.45 indicate that individuals under 29 are under-represented in each of the four dimensions. Those over 80 years of age, however, are over-represented in only one of the dimensions (the interest dimension) and are under-represented in each of the other three dimensions, with ratios ranging from -0.07 to -0.38 indicating that the presence of the oldest respondents among those who prefer the past is again nearly half the size of the presence of these respondents in the overall sample.

Another important exception is that all of the age groups are under-represented among those that think the past government is more trustworthy than the present government. This reinforces the earlier finding that people do view the past in different dimensions and that they may like certain aspects of the past while not liking others.

Table 6-4 also indicates that race clearly distinguishes perceptions of the past. Blacks in southern Africa are the only group that rejects the past (with representation ratios ranging from -0.04 to -0.07). The representation ratios for each of other races clearly indicate a generally favorable view of the past. Specifically, whites are over-represented among those that prefer the past across each of these dimensions (as indicated by positive ratios). These results show that coloreds and Indians are also over-represented among those that think the past was better than the present (though, admittedly, these racial identities are primarily present only in South Africa).

Interestingly, there does not seem to be a strong difference between men's and women's feelings for the past. The representation ratios for males and females are so small as to indicate that there is not substantial over- or under-representation among those that prefer the past.

Similarly, Table 6-4 also shows that there is not a clear difference between education levels and occupation types. One would expect those who are the most educated, or who have a professional occupation, would prefer a democratic regime to an authoritarian one. The results, however, are mixed. Those with the most education, or who are considered professionals, are slightly over-represented among those that prefer the past and those with little or no education, or a non-professional job, are slightly under-represented. I suspect, however, that this is more related to nature of the educational system and the racial division of labor than to actual differences between the educated and the uneducated. More specifically, those who have the most education, or who work in professional occupations, are white and those with the least education, or who have non-professional jobs, are black.

Finally, the results in Table 6-4 also report the relationship between the two relational items and preference for the old regime. First, Table 6-4 indicates that individuals who trust others make up a smaller portion of those that prefer the past than do those who do not trust others. Specifically, those who trust others have a slightly smaller presence among those who think the past was more effective, more interested, or more trustworthy than they have in the overall sample. In contrast, the results for social capital are mixed. Those with the highest level of social capital are over-represented among those that think the past was more corrupt or more trustworthy, but are under-represented among those that think the past was more effective and more interested.

In sum, while the relationships highlighted by Table 6-4 are generally weak, we can begin to put together a composite of which individuals prefer the past. In general, those who are the most likely to prefer the past are older respondents who are not black Africans, not very trusting, and who are moderately involved in their communities. This description does not eliminate many individuals, and eliminates fewer when I acknowledge that these representation ratios rarely show clear, direct relationships between any of these factors and a preference of the past. Perhaps, however, looking at evaluations of the economy will provide a clearer picture of who tends to like the past.

Economic Evaluations

As discussed in chapter 4, individuals can evaluate the economic conditions in their country in a number of ways. The most important of these are represented in two general dimensions. First, individuals can look at the overall economic situation, and evaluate the success or failure of the economy, or respondents can compare their

individual situation with that of others. Second individuals can either evaluate the economy retrospectively, where has the economy been, or prospectively, where is it going. Each of these types of economic evaluations picks up on a slightly different way of looking at the economic world and, while people do not generally evaluate the economy in each of these ways, each presents a potentially important way of distinguishing those who like the past more than the present from those that prefer the present. Representation ratios for each of these ways of evaluating the economy and each way of comparing the present and past are presented in Table 6-5.

Table 6-5 Here.

As Table 6-5 clearly indicates, those who are satisfied with the overall, national economic situation are overwhelmingly under-represented among those that prefer the old regime. More specifically, representation ratios ranging from -0.29 to -0.69 suggest that the presence of those who are satisfied with the economy is substantially less than half the size of the presence of these individuals in the overall sample.

A similar pattern is present among the comparisons of individual economic conditions. Those who think they are better off than others comprise a dramatically smaller portion of those who like the past than they comprise in the overall sample. Across all four dimensions, in fact, the presence of those who think they are better off than others is about half the size of their presence in the overall sample (as indicated by representation ratios of -0.20, -0.27, -0.09, -0.26, respectively). Likewise those who think they are worse off than others are substantially over-represented among those that prefer the past (with representation ratios ranging from 0.06 to 0.16).

The third way of evaluating the economic situation, retrospective economic evaluations is slightly, though not substantially, different from the first two. As one would expect, individuals who think today's economy is better than it was in the past are substantially under-represented among those that prefer the past. In fact, these individuals' presence among those that prefer the past is about half the size of their presence in the overall sample (as indicated by ratios greater than -0.30). The only exceptions to this finding is in the corruption dimension where a ratio of -0.24 indicates a smaller under-representation than in the other dimensions, though this is still a substantially larger under-representation than found across the personal characteristics reviewed above. At the same time, those who think the economy is worse today than it was in the past are much more likely to prefer the past.

Finally, those who think the economy is going to be the same or better in the future than it is today are again substantially under-represented among those that prefer the past. Representation ratios ranging from -0.07 to -0.80 clearly indicate that those who think the economy is going to stay the same or get better is very small compared to the presence in this subset in the overall sample. At the same time, ratios ranging from 0.12 to 0.39 clearly indicate that those who think the economy is going to get worse in the future are substantially over-represented among those that like the past.

In sum, the results in Table 6-5 clearly indicate that those who are dissatisfied with the overall economic situation, or with their individual economic situation, are likely to prefer the past. Likewise, an individual who thinks the economy is worse today than it was ten years ago, or who thinks the economy is likely to be worse ten years from now than it is today, are likely to have a preference for the past. These patterns are present in

each of the four dimensions of the past that respondents were asked to consider and clearly demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between economic evaluations and perceptions of the past.

Political Factors

Finally, in addition to personal characteristics and economic evaluations, individuals who like the past might be differentiated by particular political perceptions or beliefs. Although there are innumerable political differences that could separate individuals, the political factors examined in this chapter, as in the other chapters in this project, are limited to: ideology, interest, institutional trust, and perceptions of governmental corruption.

Ideology, as captured by an index measure of individuals' feelings towards the role of government, ranges from classically conservative individuals – those who prefer a substantial amount of government intervention in society and the economy - to classically liberal – those who prefer little government intervention. As demonstrated in Table 6-6, individuals at both ends of the ideological spectrum are over-represented among those that prefer the past. In all four dimensions, classical conservatives and classical liberals are over-represented in the subset that prefers the past regime to the present (as indicated by ratios ranging from 0.06 to 0.24 for classical conservatives and 0.222 to 0.45 for classical liberals. Likewise, true moderates are over-represented in three of the four dimensions (though ratios of 0.01 and 0.07 indicate that this over-representation is slight).

Table 6-6 Here.

In contrast, those who are classified as moderate conservatives are generally under-represented among those that prefer that past (with ratios ranging from a negligible -0.01 to a stronger -0.16). Moderate liberals are under-represented among those that think the present is more corrupt than the past and among those that think the past regime was more interested. In each of these cases, however, the under-representation is slight and does not suggest a strong preference for the present over the past.

Table 6-6 also shows that an individual's level of interest in politics is only weakly related to a preference for the past. In none of the dimensions measured is there substantial over- or under-representation. Even more, there does not appear to be a clear pattern between interest in politics and perceptions of the past.

More interesting, is the clear relationship between institutional trust and preference for the past. Table 6-6 clearly shows that those individuals who have moderate to high levels of institutional trust are substantially under-represented among those that prefer the past to the present. In addition, those who have no trust in the current institutions are substantially over-represented. While this pattern is not surprising, it highlights the important role that institutional trust has on perceptions of the past regime.

Finally, Table 6-6 also shows the distribution of preferences for the past across perceptions of corruption in the current government. As one would expect, those who think the current government is corrupt are over-represented among those that prefer the old regime. Across all four dimensions of the past, the presence of those who think the current government is very corrupt is about twice the size of that groups presence in the overall sample. Likewise, the presence of those who think the government is not corrupt

among those that prefer the past is about half the size of this groups' presence in the overall sample. In sum, those who think the government is corrupt are very likely to prefer the old form of government.

Although there is not a single characteristic that separates those that like the past from those that do not, such individuals are different from one another. In particular, those who prefer the past tend to be older, not black Africans, educated, untrusting (both personal and institutional), active in the community, dissatisfied with the current economic situation, and of a moderate ideological bent. Although it could be possible that these characteristics tie together diverse groups, these results do not suggest that these patterns describe a single, coherent group of citizens. For example, those with the highest levels of education (who tend to be over-represented among those that like the past) are not necessarily those with the lowest levels of institutional trust (another group that is over-represented among those that like the past).

Predicting Who Likes the Past

Clearly, these results indicate that there is a small portion of the population that likes the past and that this portion of the population is not confined to a specific sub-set of citizens in southern Africa. These analyses, however, are not able to isolate the effects of particular factors from the effects of other explanatory factors. To do this, I analyze an ordered logit model that uses these independent variables to predict the likelihood that an individual will like the past.

Table 6-7 Here.

The first column in Table 6-7 reports the relationship between these various factors and liking the past. First, using the McKelvey and Zavoina goodness of fit measure, this model explains about one-quarter of the variance in citizens' preference of the past (with a McKelvey and Zavoina R^2 of 0.23).

More interestingly, twelve of the eighteen substantive variables have a statistically significant relationship with liking the past. Of these, only age, interpersonal trust, social capital, and perceptions of corruption have a positive relationship with liking the past (e.g., an increase in an individual's age corresponds to a greater affinity for the past). Satisfaction with the overall economic situation, with one's personal economic satisfaction, thinking the present is economic situation is better than the past, and that the future will be better than the present, and having higher levels of trust in governmental institutions all decrease an individual's affinity for the past. In other words, those who think the economy is bad and getting worse, and who do not have much confidence in the institutions of government are more likely to acknowledge an affinity for the past. Each of the ethnicity measures has a negative relationship with liking the past, indicating that each of these groups is less likely to have an affinity for the past than is the comparison category (Indian).

Having clarified that some citizens do prefer the past, and identified that factors that influence this preference, I can now ask how support for democracy is distributed across perceptions of the past.

6.4 The Authoritarian Past and Democratic Support

To compare perceptions of the past and support for democracy, I use

dichotomized versions of the preference for the past index and the measures of democratic support introduced in Chapter 3. To directly compare these measures, I constructed cross-tabulations that show the percentage of respondents that, for example, like the past and support democracy as a system of government.

Table 6-8 Here.

These cross-tabulations are reported in Table 6-8. In general, those who like the past do not support democracy. As seen in the first cross-tab, nearly six out of ten southern Africans who like the past do not support democracy as a system of government (59.55%) and more than three-fourths of those who like the past (78.87%) do not support democracy in practice. Correspondingly, about four in ten of those who like the past do support democracy as a system and one-fifth support democracy in practice.

In contrast, as seen in the rejection of non-democratic alternatives dimension, approximately one-fifth of the respondents who like the past (23.11%) do not reject non-democratic alternatives while more than three-fourths (76.89%) does reject such alternatives.

Among Africans who do not like the old authoritarian regime, more than sixty percent did support democracy as a system of government (64.97%), democracy in practice (61.55%), or by rejecting non-democratic alternatives (77.09%). Alternatively, only four out of ten or fewer of those that do not like the past also do not support democracy (35% for the system measure, 38% for the practice measure, and 22.91% for the rejection measure. These findings suggest that Africans who do not like the past generally do support democracy and that those who do like the past do not generally support democracy.

In essence, these results show that citizens view the past and the present independently and that some citizens like *both* the present and the past, *neither* the past nor the present, or some combination of the two.

To better capture the relationship between perceptions of the past authoritarian regime and support for democracy, I analyze the effect that liking the past has on democratic support through a multivariate model.

Multivariate Analysis

Although it is clear that some individuals in southern Africa continue to have positive perceptions of the past, and that some of these individuals even support the newly formed of democracies of this region, I have yet to determine whether these perceptions of the past actually have an *independent* impact on support for democracy. To do this, I turn to multivariate analyses that estimate the effect that liking the past, while controlling for the influence of alternative explanatory factors, has on democratic support. In particular, due to the ordered, but not continuous, nature of the democratic support measures used throughout this project, I examine an ordered logit analysis. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 6-9.

The results presented in Table 6-9 model democratic support based on the personal characteristics, economic evaluations, and political factors discussed in Chapter 4 above. In Table 6-9, however, I have included the index measure of the respondents' preference for the past regime. Before looking at the relationship between this variable and democratic support, however, it may be useful to look at the model as a whole.

Table 6-9 Here.

First, these models are very similar to the baseline models discussed in chapter 4. In particular, across all four models none of the statistically significant variables changed signs, though 13 variables changed significance levels. Of the variables that changed significance levels, four became more significant: age in the system model, educational attainment and urban/rural in the practice model and institutional trust in the rejection of non-democratic alternatives model. The remaining variables either moved to a lower significance level or lost statistical significance all together. Since there is only one difference between these models and those reported in Chapter 4, these changes can only be the result of including the preference for the past variable in the model.

Second, including the preference for the past index also improves the McKelvey and Zavoina R^2 measure of fit in all of the models (0.16 to 0.18 in the system model, 0.31 to 0.35 in the practice model, 0.17 in to 0.18 in the rejection model and 0.23 to 0.25 in the complete support model). This suggests that the inclusion of this variable improves, if only slightly, the extent to which these models fit the relationship in the underlying data.

Having determined that the models in Table 6-9 model democratic support as effectively as do the baseline models discussed chapter 4, I can now turn to the relationship between individuals' preference for the past and democratic support. As all fours of the columns in Table 6-9 indicates, this variable has a negative relationship with democratic support, regardless of how democratic support is measured. In other words, as an individual's preference for the past increases, his or her support for democracy decreases, even after controlling for the other factors that influence democratic support. In addition, in all four of these models the preference for the past measure is statistically

significant at the 0.01 level. This significance level means that only one time in one hundred does this relationship happen by chance.

Unfortunately, given the non-linear nature of the democratic support indices, the magnitude of the coefficient reported in Table 6-9 cannot be directly interpreted. Instead, I calculate the change in the probability of falling into one of the categories of the democratic support scales that corresponds to a one-standard deviation increase in the preference for the past measure. The results of these manipulations are reported in Table 6-10.

Table 6-10 Here.

As the results indicate, increasing an individual's preference for the past from one-half standard deviation below the mean score to one-half standard deviation above the mean score increases the probability that an individual will fall into the lower levels of the democratic support indices and decreases the probability that an individual will be in the highest levels. For example, with all of the variables held at their mean values, an individual has a 0.29 probability of completely supporting democracy as a system (scoring a 3 on this measure). Increasing an individual's preference for the past, while holding all of the other factors constant at their mean, decreases this probability to 0.23. This same pattern holds for each of the other three measures of democratic support, though the resulting changes are slightly different.

More importantly, however, in seven of sixteen cases, the resulting change in probabilities is substantial (defined as a change of 0.05 or more). This indicates that, in addition to being statistically significant, the preference for the past index has a substantively significant, independent effect on democratic support.

6.5 Summary

Democracy has had a tenuous history across the African continent. Of the many countries that experimented with democracy after gaining their independence, only a very few managed to maintain that democracy for a long period (including Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, and Senegal) (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Schraeder, 2000). Because the present is a product of the past, and regime transitions cannot erase this past, the neo-institutional literature would suggest the prospects for democracy's survival are very poor. In this chapter, I have suggested that any connection between these two, the authoritarian past and the survival of democracy, is rooted in popular support for democracy. In essence, if past authoritarian experiences undermine democracy, it is citizens' perceptions of the pat and the influence that these perceptions have on democratic support that link together these concepts.

To uncover the nature of the relationship between the preferences for the authoritarian past and democratic support, I asked three questions: 1) do citizens in southern Africa prefer the past; 2) who are these citizens; and 3) what is the relationship between these preferences and democratic support.

First, when asked if they like the past authoritarian regime when compared to the present democratic regime, a substantial minority of citizens across southern Africa say yes. Overwhelmingly, the responses discussed above indicated that citizens in southern Africa have not left the past completely behind them. In all of the countries, many prefer

at least some aspect of the past regime to the present regime and in three of the countries (Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia) more than one-third of the respondents had a complete preference for the past.

Second, I asked whether these preferences for the past were restricted to particular groups. For example, one might expect white South Africans presence among those who like the past to be disproportionate to the whites' presence in the overall South African population. By analyzing representation ratios, I have demonstrated that those who like the past do not come from a single distinctive, idiosyncratic portion of the population. Though the strength of citizens' views of the past are mixed, southern Africans from diverse personal backgrounds, economic evaluations, and political stances comprise the sub-set of the population that likes the past.

Finally, after determining that citizens in southern Africa do like the past, and that such feelings are not limited to a specific portion of the population, I ask whether these perceptions of the past influence citizens' support for democracy. Based on analyses ranging from cross-tabulations to ordered logit regression models, I conclude that the past clearly has a negative effect on evaluations of the newly formed democratic regimes in southern Africa. Although the bivariate cross-tabulation results indicated that relatively few citizens both preferred the past and supported democracy, a minority did express such preferences. In addition, the multivariate analyses clearly indicated that perceptions of the past had a statistically and substantively significant negative relationship with democratic support.

Clearly, based on the numerous, and varied, analyses of this empirical data discussed throughout this chapter, the authoritarian past does have a negative effect on

democratic support. Moreover, in addition to having a statistical effect, the extent to which an individual likes that past has a strong substantive effect on democratic support.

What, then, are the implications of this relationship for the survival of democracy? Because a substantial number of individuals continue to like the past, that these individuals are not limited to a particular group, and that there is a strong negative relationship between perceptions of the past and democratic support, it is reasonable to conclude that the authoritarian past has the potential to undermine democracy across southern Africa. In particular, if citizens' institutional trust decreases or perceptions of corruption increases (the two strongest predictors of whether a person likes the past or not), an affinity for the past could spread and lead to a dramatic decline in support for democracy. As discussed in chapter 2, once citizens have withdrawn their support for democracy, the likelihood of a democratic reversal increase substantially.

In conclusion, although the countries in this region have all experienced regime transitions and constructed democratic regimes, substantial portions of the population in each country continue to express a preference for the past regime and these preferences influence evaluations of democracy.

Table 6-1: Nature of Political Regimes

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	South Africa	Zambia
Past Regime	British Colony	Military Rule	One-Party State	South African Domination	Apartheid	One-Party State
How Regime Ended	Negotiated	Negotiated	Negotiated	Conflict	Conflict	Negotiated
When Regime Ended	1966	1993	1994	1990	1994	1991
Percentage of Respondents Alive During Past Regime	48	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6-2: Comparisons of the Present Regimes to Past Regimes

	Southern Africa	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	South Afric	Zambia
Effectiveness							
Present More Effective	**48%**	69	41	54	53	40	48
Same	**15%**	14	14	8	15	19	14
Past More Effective	**37%**	17	45	39	32	41	38
Interest in Citizens							
Present More Interest	**51%**	66	45	59	57	45	45
Same	**16%**	17	16	7	20	20	13
Past More Interested	**33%**	17	39	35	24	34	42
Levels of Corruption							
Present More Corrupt	**43%**	38	46	32	47	28	31
Same	**22%**	23	22	14	24	26	19
Past More Corrupt	**35%**	38	32	54	30	46	50
Trustworthiness							
Present More Trustworth	**43%**	48	44	48	52	37	36
Same	**21%**	23	19	15	22	24	18
Past More Trustworthy	**37%**	29	37	37	25	39	46

Table 6-3: Strength of Attachment to Past Regimes

	Southern Africa	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	South Africa	Zambia
Index Measure of Comparisons							
0	**32%**	40	46	31	34	29	24
1	**25%**	35	13	24	36	23	23
2	**15%**	13	7	10	19	19	16
3	**16%**	10	13	17	9	17	23
4	**12%**	3	22	18	2	12	14
Average	**1.50**	1.02	1.52	1.68	1.10	1.61	1.79

Table 6-4: Which Individuals Think the Past was Better Than the Present

Personal Factors		Effectiveness	Interest	Corruption	Trustworthiness
Age	15-19	-0.32	-0.29	0.02	-0.45
	20-29	-0.14	-0.13	-0.03	-0.30
	30-39	0.08	0.10	0.06	-0.17
	40-49	0.13	0.10	0.02	-0.12
	50-59	0.05	0.01	-0.03	-0.28
	60-69	0.12	0.12	-0.06	-0.11
	70-79	0.03	-0.01	-0.11	-0.24
	80-89	0.24	0.23	-0.40	-0.03
	90-99	-0.38	0.43	-0.07	-0.16
Black	No	0.32	0.39	0.23	0.38
	Yes	-0.06	-0.07	-0.04	-0.07
White	No	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05
	Yes	0.53	0.61	0.41	0.59
Colored	No	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00
	Yes	0.15	0.29	0.00	0.12
Indian	No	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	Yes	0.74	0.79	0.74	0.88
Gender	Female	0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.01
	Male	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	-0.01
Education	No Formal	-0.05	0.00	-0.22	-0.03
	Primary	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.05
	Secondary	0.00	-0.03	0.07	0.01
	University	-0.02	0.03	0.07	0.18
Occupation type					
	Non-Professional	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.06
	Professional	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.17
Area of Residence					
	Rural	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.06
	Urban	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.09
Interpersonal trust					
	No	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.03
	Yes	-0.08	-0.01	0.07	-0.12
Social capital					
	0	-0.06	-0.02	-0.06	-0.11
	1	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.08
	2	0.03	-0.06	0.04	0.01
	3	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	0.01
	4	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.10
	5	0.10	0.19	0.11	0.22
	6	-0.38	-0.07	0.04	0.11

Table 6-5: Which Individuals Think the Past was Better than the Present
Economic Factors

	Effectiveness	Interest	Corruption	Trustworthiness
Overal Economic Satisfaction				
Not Satisfied	0.12	0.14	0.07	0.12
Satisfied	-0.54	-0.69	-0.29	-0.52
Individual Economic Comparison				
Worse	0.12	0.16	0.06	0.15
Same	-0.13	-0.18	-0.06	-0.15
Better	-0.20	-0.27	-0.09	-0.26
Retrospective Economic Eval.				
Much Worse	0.39	0.42	0.21	0.35
Worse	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.13
Same	-0.18	-0.25	-0.15	-0.21
Better	-0.46	-0.49	-0.24	-0.38
Much Better	-0.57	-0.64	-0.33	-0.61
Prospective Economic Eval.				
Much Worse	0.37	0.39	0.21	0.35
Worse	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.12
Same	-0.07	-0.10	-0.12	-0.08
Better	-0.41	-0.43	-0.19	-0.35
Much Better	-0.55	-0.80	-0.32	-0.60

Table 6-6: Which Individuals Think the Past was Better than the Present
Political Factors

	Effectiveness	Interest	Corrupt	Trustworthiness
Ideology				
Classical Conservative	0.19	0.24	0.06	0.09
Moderate Conservative	-0.01	-0.08	-0.06	-0.16
Moderate	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.07
Moderate Liberal	-0.06	-0.06	0.06	0.09
Classical Liberal	0.40	0.22	0.45	0.44
Interest				
0	0.03	0.05	-0.09	0.00
1	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03
2	-0.06	-0.08	0.03	-0.03
Institutional Trust				
0	0.63	0.63	0.37	0.57
1	0.43	0.44	0.15	0.41
2	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.11
3	-0.07	0.03	0.11	-0.03
4	-0.15	-0.10	-0.04	-0.13
5	-0.57	-0.68	-0.26	-0.44
6	-0.86	-1.02	-0.51	-0.85
Perceptions of Corruption				
0	-0.40	-0.43	-0.31	-0.37
1	-0.18	-0.08	-0.10	-0.13
2	0.15	0.09	0.10	0.13
3	0.31	0.32	0.25	0.29

Table 6-7: Ordered Logit Analysis Predicting Perceptions of the Past

	Like the Past
Age in years	0.01**
	(3.53)
Black	-1.44**
	(7.24)
White	-0.59**
	(2.82)
Colored	-1.22**
	(5.57)
Gender: Male	-0.06
	(1.33)
Educational Attainment	0.01
	(0.38)
Occupation Type: Professional	0.07
	(1.17)
Urban/Rural	-0.09
	(1.93)
Interpersonal Trust	0.14*
	(2.51)
Social Capital Index	0.04**
	(2.87)
Economic Satisfaction	-0.1**
	(4.05)
Individual Economic Comparison	-0.05*
	(2.26)
Retrospective Economic Eval.	-0.08**
	(3.41)
Prospective Economic Eval.	-0.08**
	(3.57)

Table 6-7: Ordered Logit Analysis Predicting Perceptions of the Past, Cont.

		Like the Past
Ideology: Right to Left		-0.03
		(1.31)
Interest in Politics		-0.01
		(0.38)
Institutional Trust		-0.24**
		(17.39)
Perceptions of Corruption		0.22**
		(11.64)
Botswana		-0.44**
		(5.00)
Malawi		0.72**
		(8.02)
Namibia		0.52**
		(5.71)
South Africa		0.39**
		(4.75)
Zambia		0.68**
		(7.77)
Ancillary Parameters	Cut 1	-2.60
	Cut 2	-1.50
	Cut 3	-0.72
	Cut 4	0.49
Observations		8166
McKelvey and Zavoina R-Square		0.23

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 6-8: Support for Democracy and Preference for the Past

		Preference for the Past: No	Preference for the Past: Yes
System Support	No	1690 (35.03%)	1113 (59.55%)
	Yes	3134 (64.97%)	756 (40.45%)
	n=6693	4824 (100%)	1869 (100%)

		Preference for the Past: No	Preference for the Past: Yes
Practice Support	No	1855 (38.45%)	1474 (78.87%)
	Yes	2969 (61.55%)	395 (21.13%)
	n=6693	4824 (100%)	1869 (100%)

		Preference for the Past: No	Preference for the Past: Yes
Reject Non-Democratic Alt.	No	1105 (22.91%)	432 (23.11%)
	Yes	3719 (77.09%)	1437 (76.89%)
	n=6693	4824 (100%)	1869 (100%)

Table 6-9: Ordered Logit of Democratic Support and Perceptions of the Past

	System	Practice	Reject Authortiarian	Complete
Age in years	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(2.35)	(0.97)	(0.32)	(1.48)
Black	0.84**	0.53**	-0.56**	0.33
	(3.76)	(2.47)	(2.81)	(1.90)
White	0.23	-0.09	-0.26	-0.04
	(1.01)	(0.39)	(1.21)	(0.21)
Colored	0.72**	0.32	-0.5*	0.18
	(3.09)	(1.32)	(2.26)	(0.88)
Gender: Male	0.15**	0.15**	0.17**	0.24**
	(3.14)	(2.97)	(3.84)	(5.60)
Educational Attainment	0.08**	0.06**	0.11**	0.11**
	(4.40)	(2.58)	(5.90)	(6.26)
Occupation Type: Professional	0.09	-0.13*	0.20**	0.09
	(1.52)	(2.38)	(3.42)	(1.55)
Urban/Rural	0.08	-0.14**	0.13**	0.03
	(1.60)	(2.73)	(2.51)	(0.52)
Interpersonal Trust	0.02	0.02	-0.31**	-0.09
	(0.33)	(0.42)	(5.52)	(1.66)
Social Capital Index	-0.05**	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(3.27)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.50)
Economic Satisfaction	0.00	0.11**	-0.03	0.04
	(0.11)	(4.23)	(1.15)	(1.79)
Individual Economic Comparison	0.04	0.12**	0.02	0.09**
	(1.75)	(5.09)	(0.83)	(4.20)
Retrospective Economic Eval.	0.05*	0.06	0.02	0.04
	(1.99)	(1.80)	(0.78)	(1.65)
Prospective Economic Eval.	0.08**	0.13**	-0.01	0.10**
	(3.67)	(6.12)	(0.21)	(4.40)

Table 6-9: Ordered Logit of Democratic Support and Perceptions of the Past, cont,

		System	Practice	Reject Authortiarian	Complete
Ideology: Right to Left		0.12**	0.12**	0.16**	0.19**
		(3.99)	(4.07)	(6.05)	(6.67)
Interest in Politics		0.18**	0.16**	0.26**	0.30**
		(5.55)	(5.00)	(8.83)	(9.79)
Institutional Trust		0.17**	0.28**	-0.04*	0.17**
		(12.09)	(13.96)	(2.47)	(12.91)
Percept. of Corrupt.		-0.16**	-0.21**	-0.03	-0.17**
		(6.01)	(9.82)	(1.18)	(6.11)
Preference for the Past Index		-0.23**	-0.35**	-0.08**	-0.24**
		(12.25)	(16.35)	(4.44)	(13.24)
Botswana		0.8**	0.82**	1.14**	1.14**
		(8.87)	(9.29)	(13.22)	(13.85)
Malawi		0.87**	0.13	1.13**	1.21**
		(9.72)	(1.44)	(12.82)	(13.85)
Namibia		0.06	0.07	-0.32**	-0.10
		(0.68)	(0.76)	(3.72)	(1.18)
South Africa		0.78**	0.22**	-0.17**	0.62**
		(8.90)	(2.73)	(2.24)	(7.82)
Zambia		0.99**	0.52**	1.51**	1.27**
		(10.56)	(5.99)	(16.42)	(15.16)
Ancillary Parameters	_cut1	0.79	0.83	-1.68	0.21
	_cut2	2.12	2.27	-0.58	2.16
	_cut3	3.67	4.01	0.63	3.75
Observations		8166	8166	8166	8166
McKelvey and Zavoina R^2		0.18	0.35	0.18	0.25

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 6-10: Substantive Change in Probabilities

Support for Democracy as a System				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Probabilities	0.12	0.23	0.37	0.28
Preference for the Past Index	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.06
Support for Democracy as a Practice				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Prob.	0.17	0.29	0.36	0.17
Preference for the Past Index	0.06	0.04	-0.04	-0.06
Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Probabilities	0.08	0.13	0.26	0.53
Preference for the Past Index	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.06
Overall Support for Democracy				
	0	1	2	3
Baseline Probabilities	0.07	0.29	0.38	0.27
Preference for the Past Index	0.02	0.06	-0.01	-0.07

Change in probabilities are based changing value of attachment to past index from one-half standard deviation below the mean to one-half standard deviation above the mean

Chapter 7: Democratic Support in South Africa: A Case Study

The preceding chapters examined democratic support, and the influence that support for alternative institutions have on this support, through a quantitative analysis of survey data. In this chapter, I analyze the effect that institutional alternatives have on democratic support in South Africa through a qualitative analysis based on interviews with members of the South African Parliament. Ultimately, this analysis arrives at results that closely match those derived from the statistical analyses presented in the preceding chapters. This verification lends greater weight to the finding that perceptions of institutional alternatives influence citizens' support for democracy, but that all institutions do not have the same influence.

Because there are often many limitations associated with survey research in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter examines the relationship between institutional alternatives and democratic support through a qualitative analysis. As Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi noted, "cross-national survey research on public opinion has been attempted only rarely in sub-Saharan Africa" (Bratton 2005: 55). In particular, scholars have avoided survey projects for reasons ranging from their high cost, technical complexity, logistical difficulty, and, most importantly, questions about the validity of survey methodology in the region (questions based on issues ranging from language differences to the instability associated with public opinion and Africans' general lack of familiarity with being surveyed). While Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi discuss their efforts to ensure the validity of the Afrobarometer's data, using an alternative method provides an opportunity

to 'triangulate' the relationship between citizens' perceptions of alternative institutions and their support for democracy (Bowman 2002; Lieberman 2005).

Whereas previous chapters in this project analyze direct information on citizens' attitudes, this chapter analyzes *indirect* information on citizens' views of democracy and the influence that traditional and authoritarian institutions have on these views. For two related reasons, this data provides an effective alternative analysis of democratic support in southern Africa. First, many of the issues that undermine confidence in survey results (basic language difficulties, the complexity of key concepts, and respondents' lack of familiarity with survey procedures) do not apply to the interview data. The parliamentarians I interviewed were all fluent English speakers, familiar with complex concepts (such as democracy and democratic support), and routinely interact with interviewers. Second, and more fundamentally, the data presented in this chapter provide valid information on citizens' views of democracy and democratic support because parliamentarians have a unique incentive to understand the views of the mass public (Crisp 2004; Mayhew 1974). In essence, for parliamentarians and their parties to be successful, they must understand citizens' attitudes, including their attitudes towards democracy, and the factors that influence these attitudes.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly discuss the reasons for using South Africa as a case and introduce the interview data. Second, I discuss South Africa's road to democracy. Next, I compare and contrast the levels of democratic support as estimated by the statistical results and interviews. Fourth, I discuss the role of traditional leaders in contemporary South Africa and estimate the influence that traditional institutions have on citizens' support for democracy. Finally, I discuss the

legacy of the Apartheid state and that this particular form of authoritarianism has on democratic support.

7.1 Why South Africa?

Of the six countries included in this study, South Africa is the largest, wealthiest, most diverse, and, as such, the most influential country in southern Africa. Its land area, 1,221,038 square kilometers, is nearly 400,000 square kilometers larger than the next largest (Namibia). Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), approximately 456 billion, is over 400 billion more than that of the next wealthiest country in the region (Botswana with a GDP of 13 billion). In terms of diversity, South Africa recognizes eleven official languages and counts members of every major ethnic group in southern Africa among its citizens. Its population of just over 45 million people is four times that of the next largest countries (with Malawi and Zambia each being made up of just over 10 million people).

In essence, South Africa dominates southern Africa on nearly every dimension on which these countries can be compared. This dominant position suggests that the success or failure of South Africa's democracy will influence the success and failure of democracy throughout southern Africa. More specifically, there are two mechanisms through which democracy in South Africa influences democracy in other countries. First, a democratic South Africa could adopt policies that endorse, and even actively support, democracy in other countries (Huntington 1991). The importance of South African policies for the rest of the region can be traced to the pre-Apartheid era and the emergence of a regional economy that is rooted in South Africa. Moreover, while nearly all of the countries in this region are members of Southern African Development

Community, most are secondary to South Africa and largely act as a labor reserve for South African industry (Adedeji 1996; Dale 1995). More recently, South Africa has taken a leading role in settling disputes across the African continent and in securing economic development in southern Africa (such as Nelson Mandela's work to educate people around the world about the HIV/AIDS pandemic and Thabo Mbeki's efforts to mediate a resolution to the conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo)(Khapoya 1998; Lodge 2003; Onishi 2002).

Second, South Africa could influence other countries through a demonstration effect (Huntington 1991). Given the important implications of South Africa's experiment with democracy on the other countries in region, it is important to note that South Africa's path to democracy has not been easy. To place the interview data discussed below into the proper context, I trace this path to democracy. As the purpose of this project is to determine the influence that individuals' perceptions of institutional alternatives have on democratic support, it is important to understand the role traditional leaders play in South Africa and the specific form of authoritarianism that South Africa experienced. This can be best accomplished by examining how these institutions, and their place in South African society, have changed over time.

7.2 South Africa: The Road to Democracy

As did many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa experienced a democratic transition in the mid to late 1990s (with the formal end of Apartheid in 1991 and the first fully democratic elections in 1994). South Africa's passage to democracy,

however, has been longer than that of nearly any other country on the African continent. From arrival of the first Europeans in the late 1400s and early 1500s, a small minority of the South African population has controlled the country (first the Portuguese, then Dutch and British, and finally the Afrikaners who assembled the Apartheid regime). At first only a small Portuguese outpost that serviced passing ships, by the mid-1600s Cape Town had become an important re-fuelling station controlled by the Dutch East-India Company (VOC). Around this time, the Company released several of its employees from their contracts, gave them farmland, and established them as a small population of *freeburghers* – free citizens – in the Cape Colony (Beck 2000: 27). Slowly, this small population grew, as "Company employees – Dutch, Germans, Scandinavians, and other Europeans – took their retirement at the Cape" and others sought refuge (such as a group of French Huguenot who fled to the Cape to avoid religious persecution) (27). These early settlers began to see themselves as distinct from the VOC and, by 1707, began calling themselves Afrikaners, forming the foundation for modern white South Africa (Moodie 1975).

As war raged between the British and the French in Europe, control over the Cape colony passed from the Dutch to the British. Although the French overthrew the Dutch Republic and gained formal control of the Cape colony, the British seized the Cape colony after realizing that French control would "threaten trade with India and East Asia" (42). The influx of English speaking settlers following British control of the Cape settlement led to economic and social clashes between the European populations; clashes caused by struggles for control over the limited territory in the Cape colony, arguments over slavery, and disagreements on the rights of black workers.

As the settler populations increased, clashes between various groups of Europeans grew in frequency. Finally, in 1836, a large portion of the Afrikaner population left British controlled colonies and pushed to the interior of the country. This move, known as 'The Great Trek,' led nearly 15,000 Afrikaner men, women, and children from the Cape Colony (64). The *voortrekkers*, as those participating in this move were known, mainly moved towards the northeast to Natal, Transorangia and the Transvaal and led to the settlement of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State (Bauer 2005: 241).

One of the 'great foundation myths' of the Afrikaners is that the areas of the country that they moved into were empty (Bauer 2005: 241). The Africa that these settlers arrived in, however, was not an empty place. Inevitably, throughout the initial founding of the Cape colony and the later expansion to the interior, settlers confronted the peoples indigenous to the region. First, Europeans met the San and the Khoi in and around the territory of the Cape colony. Later, the Europeans met other indigenous groups, including the Xhosa, Sotho, and Zulu peoples. Sadly, the interaction between these groups was largely limited to confrontation and violence.

Prior to the arrival of Europeans, all of these groups had well-developed social and political structures. These political systems were based around political authorities ranging from family units to "autonomous chiefdoms" (Thompson 1995: 24). These chiefdoms ranged in size (from fewer than one thousand people to fifty thousand or more) and style of rule (from direct, centralized control among the Zulu to decentralized control among the Xhosa to segmented bands among the San). Leaders in these political systems spent much of their time "time in the open-air meeting place near his personal

hut" regulating the "affairs of his people, listening to complaints, and receiving visitors" (25).

The governing power of these leaders was, by necessity and custom, limited. In the most practical terms, there was not an enforcement mechanism in these communities, so the chief relied upon the cooperation of the community (26). In some of South Africa's indigenous groups, including the Basotho and Tswana, a chief's power was limited by the community; if the community did not agree with a decision or did not like a chief's ruling, they would 'vote with their feet'(move to another community) or remove the chief from power (Holm 1974; Vaughan 2003; Wylie 1990) . In other groups, including the Zulu, Xhosa, and Sotho, chiefs held uncontested control of the community (Ayittey 1991). The Zulu kingdom, for example, formed a militarized state, made and maintained by a conscript army of about forty thousand warriors (Ayittey 1991; Jung 2000; Thompson 1995).

By 1870, these many groups of black South Africans had been largely conquered, or subdued, and white South Africa was essentially divided into two British colonies, Cape and Natal, and two Afrikaner led republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. This arrangement, however, did nothing to ease tensions between the European populations, and the discovery of diamonds and gold heightened tensions to the level of outright war (the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1903). The British defeated the Boers (who lost an estimated 25,000 women and children in concentration camps) and took control of both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Bauer 2005: 241; Packenham 1991: 581). This defeat led directly to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. This union, which joined the British territories of the Cape colony and Natal with the former

Afrikaner territories of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, gave English and Afrikaans speaking white South Africans equal legal status and formed the foundation of the Apartheid state.

Even before the creation of the Union of South Africa, the individual British and Afrikaner governments had begun enacting laws that restricted the rights and freedoms of black Africans. After the union, the British government gave South Africa autonomy as a self-governing, democratic entity (Bauer 2005). This entity held elections and even saw governmental power shift between various political parties (though all of the winning parties were dominated by the English-speaking population). This move, however, did nothing to undo the racist policies of the previous governments and, as shown in Table 7-1, the new government enacted its own set of racist laws just after the formation of the union.

Table 7-1 here.

In 1948, the Afrikaner dominated National Party (NP) won the election and gave non-English speaking South Africans control for the first time. The NP won this election on a platform of racial segregation and, soon after coming into power, dramatically expanded the laws that separated citizens according to race. Apartheid, the official policy of social and territorial separation of the races, dominated every facet of life in South Africa and persisted for nearly 40 years. During this time, the government harshly repressed non-white persons (eg., blacks, Indians, and those of mixed race) and established a political order based on a "triad of language, religion, and race" (Trust 2004: 12).

This trio of characteristics converged to form a brutally repressive set of policies

that were designed to "advance the interests of Afrikaners" (Bauer 2005: 243). This government is most notable for its exclusion of all non-white South Africans from the political system. The traditional leaders institutions of black Africans, ranging from the decentralized systems such as the San and Khoi to highly centralized structures such as the Zulu and Xhosa, were effectively marginalized by the Afrikaner government (du Toit 1995: 152). From the first meetings to writing the constitution, to which these indigenous Africans were not invited, to the parliamentary system "within which only the white electorate would compete for power," the Apartheid system segregated black Africans from the formal public sphere. This separation, however, extended far beyond access to the formal political processes and reached into every facet of life in South Africa.

As the Apartheid-era laws listed in Table 7-1 suggest, the government regulated the activities of all non-white racial groupings even to the extent of defining who could marry and who could not, regulating where individuals could live and where they could not, and deciding where an individual could be educated, and where they could not. By 1976, one study described 331 different Apartheid laws and another reported "that by 1978 there were 4,000 laws and 6,000 regulations affecting the private sector" (du Toit 1995: 160). This extensive, complex system of legal segregation was enforced by a large security apparatus that, by all accounts was overwhelmingly effective. According to Savage, from 1916 to 1982 the Apartheid state arrested and/or prosecuted at least 26 million Africans under the influx, trespass, tax, and pass laws (Savage 1986).

Struggles against this Apartheid system began even as the Union of South Africa was itself formed. In particular, the African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912. Although just one of many organizations that fought against Apartheid, the ANC

has been the most recognized, and continues to be the most powerful, advocate for eliminating racial discrimination from the South African state. South Africans, led by the ANC, fought Apartheid in two primary ways: a fairly conservative, non-violent strategy of civil disobedience and a more radical use of armed resistance. Until 1948, protests were primarily non-violent. But with the rise of the NP, and the formation of the more radical ANC Youth League in 1944, South Africans began to challenge the Apartheid regime more directly. Finally, after it became clear that non-violent methods would be met by brutal reprisals by the government's enormous security apparatus; an apparatus "designed to crush dissent in the form of black 'subversive' activity," the ANC formally adopted a policy of armed struggle (Bauer 2005: 244).

The radicalization of the anti-Apartheid campaign, and the government's relentless determination to end the campaign, led directly to the imprisonment of the ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu and the banning of the ANC and other nationalist organizations. Such actions, however, did little to quiet the resistance movement and may actually have inspired the creation of more effective multi-racial organizations such as the United Democratic Front and increased the involvement of trade unions in the form of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

The actions of these organizations, combined with "armed incursions from outside the country from the military wings of the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), regional instability, and global sanctions against South Africa" put the government into a position that was impossible to maintain (Bauer 2005: 245). By the late-1980s, the anti-Apartheid movement had made portions of the country completely ungovernable, rallied international public opinion to its cause, and left key elements of

the government searching for a way to out of Apartheid. In essence, as Bauer and Taylor note, increases in the "human and material costs of repression, economic crisis, international condemnation, and domestic stalemate contributed to the negotiated end of Apartheid" (Bauer 2005: 245).

During Apartheid, traditional leaders were either co-opted into the system or forced into a marginalized place in society. As van Kessel and Oomen noted, after the 1951 Black Authorities Act, traditional authority "rested with a hierarchy of compliant chiefs, who were made utterly dependent on the patronage of the Department of Native Affairs" (van Kessel 1997: 157). In essence, chiefs were no longer the legitimate leaders of their communities, but representatives of the Department. These co-opted chiefs lost their legitimacy and many became unpopular among their own people (157). By the Soweto uprising of 1976, the ANC even stopped working through chiefs to expand its support base in the rural areas, as chiefs were generally seen as having become "civil servants, to be hired and fired and paid by the government" (158).

There were, however, chiefs who refused to be incorporated into the Apartheid system. In fact, a substantial number played important roles in the ANC – including Albert Luthuli who was elected president of the ANC in 1952. The ANC, however, developed no official position on traditional leaders and generally expected them to disappear as people 'developed' (Mbeki 1964).

Finally, with the election of 1994 and the Constitution of 1996, South Africa began to experience a transition to a truly democratic regime. As with most democratic transitions, however, South Africa's transition was product of a negotiated settlement worked out through a series of elite pacts (di Palma 1990; Gibson 2003: 17).

It is in this background of repression, armed resistance, and negotiated settlement that the citizens of South Africa came to democracy. As this brief history indicates, South Africans have lived with both traditional institutions, though co-opted or constrained, and the harshly authoritarian rules of the Apartheid regime. More than a decade has now passed since South Africa held its first non-racial democratic elections. In this time, citizens have become familiar with democracy and have faced, and continue to face, the question of continued support for this democracy, this so-called 'Rainbow Nation'. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, the effects of these divergent institutions may not disappear with the introduction of democracy and citizens will likely judge the new democracy based on their experiences with these institutions. I turn now to a consideration of democratic support in South Africa as seen through both the survey data discussed above and the perspectives of elected officials.

7.3 Interview Data

I use information from interviews with members of the South African Parliament to examine the relationship between democratic support and alternative institutions. In these interviews, I asked participants a number of open-ended questions about their constituents' support for democracy and the influence that they believe traditional and past authoritarian institutions have on these perceptions. I conducted interviews with 13 individual members from 9 of the 12 parties that currently hold seats. Of the remaining three parties, one, the New National Party, has entered into a strategic alliance with the ruling party and declined to participate. The remaining two parties, the Azanian People's

Organization (Azapo) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), did not respond to repeated requests to participate.

Table 7-2 Here.

The parliamentarians who participated in these interviews represent a diverse sampling of members from across South Africa's political and socio-economic spectrum. In terms of South Africa's racial divide, which continues to be one of the most salient cleavages in South African society, 5 of the 13 respondents were black Africans, 4 were white, 2 colored and 2 Indian.[6] One of these black Africans was from the ANC, one from the UDM, two from the UCDP, and one from the PAC. Of the colored participants, one was from the ANC, the other from the DA. Of the whites, one was from the DA, one from the ID, one from the ACDP, and one from the FF. Both of the Indian respondents were from the Minority Front. Economically, although all of the parties claimed support from all economic sectors, participants came from parties that represented very different portions of the population. For example, the Democratic Alliance (DA) members represented voters from largely wealthy, white constituencies while the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) represented voters from among the poorest black communities in South Africa.

More interestingly, although differentiating the policy positions of the parties is very difficult, the participants come from political parties that can be divided into three groups according to their overall ideological and issue stances (Ferree 2002; IDASA; Lodge 1999).

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[6] The Apartheid-era government established four racial classifications: white (those with a European background), black (indigenous Africans), colored (those of mixed race), and Indian (those of Indian descent). Although this classification has been officially discarded, it remains a key term of reference when discussing an individual's social, economic, and political status.

First, as indicated visually in Table 7-3, the African National Congress (ANC), the Independent Democrats (ID) and the Minority Front (MF) take a primarily moderate stance towards government. Among all of the parties in South Africa, the ANC dominates – having won two-thirds of the vote in the 2004 election. The ANC is a tripartite alliance of the original ANC (made up the original ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Organization, and the Congress of Democrats), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). While the latter two of these three organizations prefer a substantial amount of government intervention in the economy, the ruling party has adopted a number of neo-liberal economic policies that seeks to secure economic growth through investment and limited government (IDASA 2004). The Minority Front primarily represents the Indian population, but works closely with the ANC and endorses generally the same policies. While the Independent Democrats, a party formed prior to the 1999 elections, however, have yet to fully express its platform, they make claims at being a true alternative to the ANC.

Table 7-3 Here.

In contrast, the Democratic Alliance and the Freedom Front can be located at one end of the ideological spectrum, endorsing limited government and neoliberal economic policies. As the official parliamentary opposition, the DA (a combination of the Democratic Party and elements of the New National Party) endorses a platform that favors substantially lower taxes, fewer social welfare programs (Lanegran 2001). The Freedom Front (FF) is an Afrikaner party that endorses limited government for one reason: to protect 'Afrikaner interests' (Manifesto). Though it has a very different

purpose, it seeks to represent the interests of the Zulu people, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) also favors limited government.

Three additional parties, the African Christian Democratic Party, the United Christian Democratic Party, the United Democratic Movement, are all smaller parties that "offer only limited appeal since they represent particular segments of voters"(IDASA 2004). These parties, however, all lean towards the limited government end of the ideological spectrum (Lodge, 1999).

At the other end of the ideological spectrum are the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC endorses a platform that calls for substantially more government involvement in the economy. Moreover, the PAC claims to be a radical alternative to the ANC based on the ideas of the Black Consciousness Movement.

Although the interview data discussed below comes from only a small number of participants, these participants represent distinctly different portions of the population and therefore provide a snapshot of democratic support in South Africa that is not unduly influenced by racial, class, or partisan perspectives.

7.4 Support for Democracy in South Africa

South Africa has now held three democratic elections, but simply having democratic institutions does not ensure the survival of democracy. Democratic consolidation, as Linz and Stepan (1996) and many others argue, requires broad acceptance of democracy on the part of the masses. As indicated by the survey evidence presented in Chapter 3, in which I presented data showing that nearly two-thirds of South

Africans (64%) stated a preference for democracy, this broad based support for democracy as an idea seems to be largely present. Moreover, the survey data indicates that South Africans prefer democracy about as much as do citizens in other southern African democracies and in democracies around the world. For instance, although slightly more Hungarians (74%) prefer democracy, about the same percentage of Argentineans (65%) preferred democracy, and slightly fewer South Koreans (49%) stated a preference for democracy.

Interestingly, the 4-point support for democracy as a system index indicates that South Africans actually support democracy as a system of government to a slightly lesser degree than do others in southern Africa. With a mean score of 1.91, South Africa has the second lowest level of support in the region (which has a mean score of 1.99, with the country by country mean scores ranging from 2.25 for Botswana to 1.76 for Lesotho). These differences, however, are not large enough to suggest that citizens in South Africa support democracy substantially less than citizens in other countries. For example, the one-third of South Africans that scored a three on this index (36%) is generally in line with the percentages in the other countries (which ranged from 47% in Botswana to 27% in Lesotho).

In contrast to this slightly mixed view of support for democracy as an idea, the interview data indicate that South Africans do favor democracy as a form of government. It is important to note, however, that there could be a bias in this data. Politicians, as democratically elected officials, may very well be more supportive of democracy than the average citizen and may overstate the extent to which their supporters favor democracy. Even considering the fact that democratic support may be higher among those I

interviewed than in the population as a whole, this data supports the survey analysis finding that most South Africans do support democracy as a form of government.

More specifically, as one member of the ANC noted, democracy has had a "tremendous impact in terms of people's lives, the human dignity that people enjoy…" and it is only a very small group of "diehards," a group this member claims has very little support, that wish to move away from a democratic system (Interviewee #1). In a slightly more self-serving tone, another member noted that the electorate has voted overwhelmingly for the ANC – largely, accordingly to this member, because of the ANC's history of advocating democracy – and that this should be viewed as an effective indicator of individuals' support for democracy (Interviewee #2).

More interestingly, even parties from the opposing sides of the political spectrum acknowledge that democracy is the proper form of government for South Africa. On the interventionist end of the spectrum, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) argues that the people it interacts with accept the regime, even though they have little influence over it, and are "not hostile to the current government because we understand that it is legitimate" (Interviewee #10). Even more, this spokesperson for the PAC noted that the people "have a right to decide how we will run the country. If they decide that it is not the PAC who must run the country, we will accept and respect that view and that decision..." (Interviewee #10). In other words, the supporters of the PAC might not like the policies of the ruling party – a point I will return to shortly – but they support democracy as an idea and are not willing to work outside the rules of the democratic game.

On the limited government end of the political spectrum, a member of the Freedom Front (FF) argued that even supporters of this party completely support democracy. According to this member, those represented by the FF are "republicans"… "everwhere we went we founded republics, numerous republics everywhere" (Interviewee #11). While this comment is defensive in tone, and that these Afrikaner republics were obviously not really democratic, this member argues that Afrikaners still prefer a democracy as a form of government.

Based on these interviews, citizens from across South Africa's political spectrum accept democracy as the 'proper' form of government. In fact, of the 9 parties I spoke with, none suggested that there might be a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government. As suggested in previous chapters, however, there can be a difference between supporting democracy as an idea and supporting democracy in action. To see if support for democracy extends beyond the level of an abstract idea, I examine citizens' satisfaction with democracy in practice.

Support for Democracy as a Practice in South Africa

The survey analyses indicated that slightly more than one-half (54%) of South Africans were satisfied with democracy in practice. This is fewer than any other country in the region (the remaining 5 countries had anywhere from 78% in Botswana to 56% in Lesotho stating satisfaction with democracy). More importantly, the level of support for democracy in practice is 10 percentage points lower than support for democracy as a system. Clearly, citizens distinguish between democracy as an idea and democracy in practice (and, at this point in time, appear to like the idea more than the reality).

The drop-off between support for democracy as a system and support for democracy in practice is also evident in the 4-point support for democracy in practice index. South Africa's mean score on this index was 1.33 compared to 1.99 for the support for democracy as a system of government index. Moreover, less than one-fifth of South Africans (16.66%) reported being fully satisfied with democracy in practice, while more than one-third reported being fully support of democracy as a system.

This pattern of substantially lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in practice compared to support for democracy as a system is also evident in the interview data. In fact, eight of the nine political parties I spoke with expressed at least some level of dissatisfaction with the way in which democracy is actually working (while none expressed a dissatisfaction with democracy as a system of government).

To begin, members of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official opposition in parliament, pointed to a number of problems that undermine democracy. First, members of the DA suggested that the bureaucratic partisan impartiality that is required for democracy to function is not yet in place. Within Parliament, this dissatisfaction is manifested through the non-responsiveness of government departments. As one MP noted, all of the parties referred to various offices and agencies as the "departments of no-reply" due to their unresponsiveness (Interviewee # 4). Outside of Parliament, another member of the DA explained that to "the ordinary person, the poor persons that I represent, democracy really doesn't mean anything" because the promises for housing, utilities, and education that were made before the transition to democracy remain unfulfilled (Interviewee #3). In essence, the government's inability to deliver key public

services such as education, sanitation, electricity, and clean water to all citizens has undermined support for democracy as a functioning form of government.

This second point was also made by a member of the United Democratic Movement (UDM). Specifically, this member suggested that "when democracy started, people were excited. They were expecting a lot of profit when so many things were promised to them. A lot of things were promised, free education, etc., etc. But, people are now a little bit disillusioned because those things are not forthcoming" (Interviewee # 7). In addition, according to this member, corruption "is one of the greatest problems which is depriving the taxpayer of the fruits of democracy." As this member explained, "the national government will vote money to go to the provincial government, the money will get to the provinces to build houses. Instead, the houses will not be built and the money will be used to buy certain things for individuals there. Or, if the houses are built, they will be for certain friends and relatives" (Interviewee #7).

This partisan bias in government is also visible through images of employment. As this UDM member also suggested, "employment is terrible because you must be a card-carrier of a certain party to get a job."

South Africa's general dissatisfaction with democracy is effectively expressed by a member of the Independent Democrats (ID). When asked about his supporters' support for democracy, he recalled a quote from an elderly gentleman shortly after the initial democratic election. This gentleman said "you know, in 1994 I voted for freedom and all I got was democracy." As this member noted, prior to 1994, South Africans thought "democracy was going to deliver houses, employment and wealth" (Interviewee #6). Now however, this member went on to explain, there is "a growing realization, in

general, that that is not happening." Across the country, though there has been some improvement, people continue to live without permanent homes, access to clean water, effective sanitation, or even education. In essence, this member says he has found South Africans to be "relieved for their freedom, but they are concerned that delivery is still not taking place at a quick enough level."

The ANC was the only party that did not acknowledge widespread dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democratic system. Though members of the ANC did note that South Africa still faces substantial challenges (housing, unemployment, etc.) that must be addressed for support for the democratic system to increase, they claim that their supporters "understand that we are moving in that direction and trying our best" to deliver on the promises people associate with democracy and that all of the opposition parties have "come with a similar line" (Interviewee #1).

Essentially, these interviews indicate that South Africans support democracy as a form of government, but a substantial number do not yet support the actual governing practices they have experienced. Even more, the difference between these two types of support is directly tied to citizens' frustrations with the processes of governing.

7.5 Influence of Traditional Institutions in South Africa

Across South Africa, traditional institutions are a common feature of government at the local level (Williams 2004). Surprisingly, given their important place in governance, traditional leaders remain "virtually absent in discussions of democratic consolidation (Williams 2004).

As the brief history presented above indicated, the role of South Africa's traditional leaders has changed dramatically. Where they once had sole control of their territory, they now have to share authority with local councilors and recognize the legitimacy of the provincial and national governments. Moreover, as Migdal suggested, in many African countries "chiefs were state officials but sometimes – indeed many times – simply used their offices to strengthen their roles as chiefs" (Migdal 1994). In South Africa during Apartheid, traditional leaders "had autocratic powers and did more or less as they pleased within their own administrative areas" (Peires 2000: 97). In essence, traditional rule became a system of "decentralized despotism" (Mamdani 1996).

Since the introduction of democracy, traditional leaders now play a complex role that mixes ceremonial functions (such as overseeing initiation schools, marriages) with real administrative and political functions (such as lobbying the government on behalf of their residents, enforcing administrative rules and allocating land) (Lodge 2003; Peires 2000; Williams 2004: 122).

While their status has changed, their presence in South Africa has not. By one recent count, there are approximately 14 million people in South Africa who are rule by some 800 traditional leaders (Republic of South Africa 2002). Moreover, although their role changed during the colonial and post-colonial regimes, these leaders remain "influential actors in contemporary southern African states" (Dusing 2002). The nature of this influence, and what effect this influence has on citizens' support for democracy is unclear.

The general political science literature argues that, while informal political institutions play a crucial role in societies, it is the nature of these institutions that

determine whether they support or undermine democracy (Bratton 1989; Chazan 1988; Tripp 1997). In other words, the nature of a particular traditional institution is what determines whether it helps or hinders democratic support among its followers. As Dusing suggested, "generalist conclusions" tell us that traditional institutions leave African countries unsuited for democracy (Dusing 2002: 1). Specifically, as traditional institutions are often authoritarian in nature, and therefore incompatible with democracy, traditional leaders will be unwilling to build support for democracy among their followers. Support for traditional institutions should undermine followers' support for democracy, as is indicated by the survey analysis discussed above.

To review, the statistical data indicated that only about one-fifth of South Africans (18.55%) acknowledged having a traditional leader (compared to nearly two-thirds of the population across southern Africa). According to the South African government, however, nearly one-third of the population "live in areas falling under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders" (Republic of South Africa 2002: 24). The government also notes that the vast majority of these people "live in abject poverty and conditions of underdevelopment, and where there is a lack of access to economic opportunities, poor infrastructure, and lack of access to basic services" (Republic of South Africa 2002: 24). The persistence of these conditions, even in the face of governmental promises of assistance, might very well lead those who follow traditional leaders to reject democracy as a form of government as alien as the colonial system foisted upon them by Europeans. This, relationship, however does not appear to be as clear as this might suggest.

The statistical results indicated that the strength of individuals' attachment to his or her chief had a statistically significant negative relationship with support for

democracy. This suggests that those individuals who had stronger attachments to traditional institutions had lower levels of democratic support than those with weaker attachments. However, changes in an individual' support for traditional leaders (from one-half standard deviation below the mean to one-half standard deviation above the mean) do not result in substantive changes in an individual's support for democracy. This suggests that, although there is a statistical relationship, support for traditional institutions has only a negligible impact on citizens' support for democracy. I find a similar result using the interview data.

Of the nine political parties that I interviewed, members of only two suggested that their constituents found support for democracy and support for traditional institutions to be incompatible. Five additional members claimed that, although their constituents saw traditional institutions as not quite fitting into a democracy they believed that traditional institutions do not represent a fundamental threat to democratic support and should be incorporated into the system, if not at the national level, at least in provinces where traditional institutions are strongest. Finally, six other members suggested that their constituents saw no contradiction between these two institutions.   Overall, however, there does not seem to be compelling evidence of a strong, overarching relationship between support for traditional institutions and support for democracy; they matter, but only among those that are strongly attached to traditional leaders.

Specifically, in the first, only a member of the Democratic Alliance and a member of the Freedom Front argued that their constituents found support for traditional leaders to be completely incompatible with support for democracy. As the member of the DA noted, his constituents believed that "traditionalism goes totally against the grain of

democracy" (Interviewee #3). Although this member acknowledged that traditional leaders are an integral part of South Africa's past, he argued that his constituents see people's acceptance of the absolute power of traditional leaders as undermining the key aspects of democracy.

As one might expect, given the Afrikaner constituency of the Freedom Front, this parliamentarian's constituents did not believe it to be possible that a person could "commit yourself to democratic structures on the one hand and traditional leadership on the other" (Interviewee # 11). As this member noted, the Afrikaner community does not have traditional leaders as does the Xhosa or Zulu communities, and therefore members of this community may not completely understand the relationship between traditional leaders and their subjects. In fact, this member also noted that his constituents recognized the importance of traditional leaders to other communities and acknowledged that it might be possible to have in the Constitution "some arrangement that recognizes that reality."

In both of these cases, the parliamentarians represented a group of South Africans that does not have a strong connection to traditional institutions and only had second hand knowledge of how traditional institutions function. Perhaps more importantly, neither member saw traditional institutions as a critical issue that represented a major problem for South Africa.

The second group of parliamentarians' (coming from the ANC, the ACDP, the ID, the UDM, and the PAC) constituents acknowledged that traditional institutions and democracy are distinctly different types of institutions, but also that there is no reason the two cannot exist within a democratic system, provided the roles of elected and traditional

leaders are clearly delineated. As one member of the ANC noted, “we are not antagonistic towards it, but where the conflict comes in is where we had to put in place of democratic structures of governance which the chiefs viewed as threatening their domain and their influence” (Interviewee #1). In essence, the ANC does not reject traditional institutions (in fact, several ANC Members of Parliament are traditional leaders), but view democratic institutions as being more important.

Another parliamentarian, a member of the ACDP, noted that “in some provinces, the Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal, there is a lot of respect for traditional leadership” (Interviewee #5). He went on to argue, however, that “a lot of traditional leaders are seen not as political leaders, but more in a spiritual sense” (Interviewee #5). If viewed in this way, his constituents see no contradiction between support for democracy and support for traditional leadership and that traditional leaders should be given at least ceremonial powers in provinces where traditional institutions are strongest.

A member of the ID – although this member noted that the party hadn’t developed an official position on the issue of traditional institutions – felt that their constituents might initially “say that democracy and traditional leaders cannot mix,” but would also note that these institutions are “such a part of the culture in this country, particularly the rural component…, that you cannot dismiss it” (Interviewee #6). He went on to suggest that there “must be some sort of way to integrate traditional leaders into our governance system… whether it is as a cultural aspect” or some other function. The supporters of this party do not appear to think that those who support traditional leaders are any less supportive of democracy than are those who do not support traditional leaders, these institutions simply fulfill divergent functions.

These three examples capture the views of this second group of parliamentarians. As suggested above, they represent communities that are somewhat unsure about how traditional institutions fit into democracy, but acknowledge that they should have a role in the system, at least in some provinces. Again, these members were not overly concerned with the issue of traditional institutions and did not indicate that support for traditional institutions would automatically decrease an individuals' support for democracy.

The final group of parliamentarians (including members of the ANC, the DA, the UCDP, and the MF) suggested that their constituents found there to be no contradiction between support for traditional leaders and support for democracy. South Africans, according to these representatives, understand the difference between traditional institutions and democracy and do not confuse them or their functions.

More specifically, as a member of the ANC noted, South Africans "can draw a distinction between what is the competency of traditional leadership and what is the competency of the government. They know that they need the government to do some things and that they need traditional leaders to do certain things" (Interviewee #2). For example, traditional leaders play a essential role in setting up cultural events such as Initiation Schools, while the government's sole responsibility in such events "is limited to providing the necessary enabling environment." Alternatively, when an issue such as theft arises, people understand that the government is generally the key actor and that traditional leaders have little or no formal role in criminal proceedings.

A member of the primary opposition party, the DA, acknowledges that there initially appears to be tension between traditional institutions and democratic institutions, but that traditional leaders can "play roles in the administration and even the judicial

administration of South Africa for those people that wish to fall within those parameters" (Interviewee #4). While this member did not think his supporters would accept traditional leaders making laws, this member did think it would be acceptable for traditional leaders to fulfill functions such as acting as judges in small claims courts, marriages officers, etc.

In this same vein, a member of the UCDP explained that his constituents felt that there is not a contradiction between traditional and democratic institutions. In fact, this member believed that "they can run parallel with local government" and help local government achieve its goals through its close connection with the community (Interviewee #9). As a member of the MF noted, traditional leaders are often geographically closer to the people in certain neighborhoods and have better relations with people in particular communities and, therefore, may have more success ensuring that the members of these communities comply with governmental regulations.

As above, this final group of parliamentarians did not think their supporters saw traditional institutions as a significant threat to citizens' support for democracy. Each of these forms of government perform specific functions and, as long as traditional institutions only have jurisdiction over those that desire to live within them, these functions are not contradictory.

7.6 The Influence of Authoritarian Institutions in South Africa

In 1991, South Africa formally emerged from its decades long experience with racist government. This end, brought about by efforts ranging from the ANC's campaign to make South Africa ungovernable to the Black Consciousness Movement embodied by

Steve Biko, eliminated the legal structures of Apartheid. These movements, however, could not remove the psychological effects or memories of Apartheid (Gibson 2003; Gobodo-Madikizela 2003; Krog 2000). Apartheid, and the memory of Apartheid, continues to influence both black and white Africans. On one hand, black Africans experienced the realization that they were no longer forced to live as social inferiors. On the other hand white Africans realized that they were no longer in control of the country. Both of these adjustments continue to affect citizens' views of the new government and no matter what institutional changes are adopted, the memories of Apartheid could not be easily erased (Gibson 2003).

In a unique move, a move taken by only a handful of countries around the world, South Africa formed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address Apartheid era crimes, facilitate communication among all citizens, and grant amnesty for political crimes. While the work of the TRC garnered much domestic and international attention, even this extraordinary body could not erase the memory of having lived under a brutal, intolerant, racist regime. The effect that perceptions and evaluations of Apartheid have on support for the new democracy, however, is unclear. On the one hand, those who suffered under this regime should prefer democracy and, the more they disliked the past, the more they should support democracy. On the other hand, those who benefited from the regime should dislike democracy. Whether this negative relationship actually reflects reality, however, remains unclear.

To briefly review, the survey results discussed in Chapter 6 suggest that South Africans are surprisingly supportive of the Apartheid government. More specifically, as many, or more, South Africans found the past government to be better than the present

(41% thought the past government was more effective than the present government, while 40% thought the present was more effective than the past). Four out of ten South Africans (39%) believe the Apartheid government to be more trustworthy, while nearly the same number (37%) believe the present government to be more trustworthy. For the remaining two items, interest in citizens and corruption, more South Africans believe the present to be better than the past. For example, 45% feel the present government to be more interested in citizens than the past (compared to 34% who thought the Apartheid government was more interested) and 46% felt that the past government was more corrupt (compared to 28% that felt the present government was more corrupt). With the exception of Botswana, this pattern holds across all of the countries included in this study.

More over, the index measure of support for the past also indicates that South Africans are surprisingly supportive of the past. Specifically, South Africans are more attached to the past than is the region as a whole (1.61 for South African and 1.50 for southern Africa). Cross-nationally, however, there are two countries that are actually more attached to the past than is South Africa (Malawi with an average of 1.68 and Zambia with an average of 1.79). This suggests that, while South Africans are surprisingly supportive of the past authoritarian regime, this support is not completely unique among southern African democracies.

It seems, then, that a substantial portion of the South African population remains attached to the past. More importantly, when included in a multivariate model, this measure has a statistically significant, and substantively significant, negative relationship with democratic support (regardless of the measure of democratic support that is used).

The interview data indicate that this negative relationship between support for Apartheid and support for democracy is accurately captured by the survey analysis. Tthe interview data also indicates, however, that the relationship is not as clear as the survey data suggested. In particular, there are two clear views on the influence of the past: those that say Apartheid has no effect on people's evaluations of democracy and those that say Apartheid does undermine support for democracy.

The first group of parliamentarians, those who say Apartheid no longer affects their supporters, is comprised of only the ANC members I interviewed. This party, which won two-thirds of the seats in Parliament in the 2004 election, claims to represent the bulk of the South African population. Both of the members that I interviewed argued that South Africa's Apartheid past no longer has a substantial influence over their supporters. For example, the first member argued that voices calling for the disintegration of South Africa into different racial states "diminished very rapidly" and that today "society is integrated" (Interviewee #1). This member went on to argue that there is still informal segregation on the part of white South Africans, who are choosing to withdraw from the system, but even these groups are limited to a very small portion of the population.

The second member of the ANC with whom I spoke argued that Apartheid is "not at all undermining democracy." This member did, however, acknowledge that "there are those small individuals who will still be harboring" bad feelings, individuals from all races (Interviewee #2). These individuals, the member asserted, are "just a small minority, a very small minority." In contrast to the previous member, this member suggested that people are interacting much more than before and that today you can go

into a township and “find white people addressing and black people applauding and even drinking together.”

Clearly, these members of the ANC think Apartheid has only a minimal impact on people. In light of the remaining interviews, however, this is probably an overly optimistic view; a view that may be the product of the ANC’s position of being responsible for transforming South Africa’s society. It could also be a reflection of a substantive definition of democracy, a definition that focuses on the outcomes of the process rather than the process itself and the fact that conditions are improving for citizens around the country.

The second set of parliamentarians, comprised of the remaining members, provide a different view of the influence Apartheid continues to wield over South Africans. All of these members suggested that Apartheid does continue to influence citizens’ evaluations of democracy, but disagreed about the strength of this influence.

For example, a member of the DA noted that, although South Africa is now a better place to live, Apartheid continues to undermine democratic support “to a certain extent” (Interviewee #3). This member went on to argue that Apartheid’s influence is evident in the continued grouping of individuals according to the racial stereotypes of the Apartheid regime. For example, this member’s primary language is Afrikaans and whenever this member stands as an opposition speaker others accuse this member of being “racist… anti-revolutionary, anti-reformist.”

A second member of the DA argued that Apartheid’s influence is most apparent in functioning of the civil service. For example, this member recounted a story in which an individual within the civil service openly refuse a legitimate opposition party request

for information. When this member asked why this individual, whose responsibility was to respond to such requests refused, the minister in charge of the department responded by saying "we have a big problem with Mr. X. Mr X. was a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe [the military wing of the ANC] and he does not believe in your right to exist" (Interviewee #4). In turn, this member argued that it is impossible for his constituents to support democracy when the system is simply reversing the discrimination of the past regime. If they cannot get satisfactory answers from governmental departments, how can they support the system?

While such a refusal to communicate, cooperate, could merely be a reflection of partisan differences, the importance of relative positions in the previous regime is self-evident and presents a substantial problem for democratic governance.

The member of the ID also indicated that Apartheid continues to have a negative influence on democratic support. In particular, constituents argued that "in Apartheid I had a job and in Apartheid I had a house, now I have neither" (Interviewee #6). However, this member went on to note that only a small number of primarily older constituents actually expressed such feelings. More commonly, supporters complained about the post-Apartheid government's inability to deliver basic social services and the poor state of the public education system that controls the schools that most children attend.

Similarly, the member of the PAC that I interviewed indicated that his supporters strongly felt that the effects of Apartheid had not been adequately addressed by the ruling party and that this led to lower levels of support for democracy. As this member argued, "stratification at the psychological level still remains, still remains to a large extent"

(Interviewee #10). Although the relations between South Africans have become less antagonistic, this member argues that the socio-economic reality in South Africa has not changed since the introduction of democracy. Those who did not have water, electricity, or passable roads during Apartheid, continue to lack these things today. This lingering effect of the Apartheid system, this member argued, seriously undermines citizens' support for democracy.

In essence, Apartheid continues to influence the citizens and the way in which citizens interact, and this influence appears to undermine citizens' support for democracy. It must be remembered, however, that this second group of parliamentarians all come from opposition groups who disagree with the policies of the ruling party. In other words, just as the image presented by members of the ANC may be overly optimistic, the image presented by these parliamentarians may be overly pessimistic.

7.7 Summary

The data presented in this chapter, alone and when considered in conjunction with the survey data, presents an interesting picture of democratic support in South Africa. First, South Africans overwhelmingly support democracy as a form of government. Second, South Africans are not satisfied with the way in which democracy is actually functioning in the post-Apartheid era. Third, support for traditional institutions does have a negative effect on democratic support, but only among those that are strongly attached to chiefs. Finally, support for the authoritarian past has a strong negative effect on democratic support (and support for the past is more widespread than one might expect).

In more general terms, with only one exception, the results of this qualitative analysis closely match the findings derived from the quantitative analyses presented in the preceding chapters. First, the Members of Parliament I interviewed indicated that their supporters overwhelmingly support democracy as an idea. This differs slightly from the more mixed the results discussed in Chapter 3, but this may simply reflect a pro-democratic bias on the part of these democratically elected politicians.

Second, the interview data reinforces the prior finding that substantially fewer South Africans support democracy in practice than supported democracy as an idea. According to Members of Parliament, South Africans are frustrated by on-going economic problems, such as high unemployment and a lack of adequate housing, and social problems, such as racial discrimination.

In terms of traditional institutions and democratic support, members of Parliament indicated that traditional institutions did not have a strong negative effect on democratic support within the general population, but that it might among those that were strongly attached to traditional leaders. This mixed finding roughly corresponds to the statistically significant, but not substantively significant, relationship that I discussed in chapter 5.

In contrast to traditional institutions, past authoritarian institutions do have a strong, general influence on citizens' support for democracy. In particular, the data presented in this chapter and in Chapter 6 indicates that support for Apartheid has a lingering presence among South Africans and this support undermines support for democracy.

In essence, the interview data analyzed in this chapter indicates that institutional alternatives do influence democratic support and that, in the case of traditional

institutions and past authoritarian institutions this relationship is negative. These results, based on a distinctly different type of data, serve as a verification of the relationships highlighted by the survey data. Based on these findings, I can be confident that the relationships I have reported throughout this project are not simply an artifact of either the data or the method of analysis.

Table 7-1: Key Pieces of Pre-Apartheid and Early Apartheid-Era Legislation

	Year	Function
Pre-Apartheid Laws		
Glen Grey Act	1894	Restricted black landholdings
Mines and Works Act	1911	Barred Africans from skilled positions
Native Lands Act	1913	Limited African landownership to 7 percen of land (all in "native reserves")
Natives Trust and Land Act	1936	Limited African landownership to 13 percent of land
Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act	1945	Mandated carrying of passes in urban areas
Aparthied Laws		
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act	1949	Outlawed interracial marriages
Population Registration Act	1950	Classified South Africans by "race"
Group Areas Act	1950	Outlawed interracial communities and created racially defined residential areas
Suppression of Communism Act	1950	Granted state broad police powers to prevent "communist" activities
Bantu Education Act	1953	Consigned Africans to menial education
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act	1953	Outlawed integration of public facilities
Native Labor (Settlement and Disputes) Act	1953	Made African strikes illegal

Table 7-2: Parties in National Assembly, 2004 Election Results, and Interviewees

Party	Percent Vote	Seats	Interviewees
African National Congress (ANC)	69.7	279	2
Democratic Alliance (DA)	12.4	50	2
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	7	28	0
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	2.3	9	1
Independent Democrats (ID)	1.7	7	1
New National Party (NNP)	1.7	7	0
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1.6	6	1
Freedom Front Plus (FF)	0.9	4	1
United Christian Democatic Party (UCDP)	0.8	3	2
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	0.7	3	1
Minority Front (MF)	0.4	2	2
Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO)	0.3	2	0

Table 7-3: Political Parties Arrayed by Ideology

Interventionist Government[a]		Centrist[b]			Limited Government[c]		
AZAPO	PAC	ANC	ID	MF	DA	NNP	FF
					UCDP	ACDP	
					IFP	UDM	

[a]Interventionist government indicates parties whose platforms call for a larger government and more

government involvement in the economy including the provision of social benefits.
[b]Centrist indicates parties whose platforms take a moderate economic stance.
[c]Limited government indicates parties whose platforms call for smaller government and less

intervention in the economy.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

In the last decade, southern Africa has experienced a virtual sea-change in governance. Where once, not so very long ago, there were only authoritarian regimes of various forms, citizens have embraced democracy as the favored form of government. These democracies, however, are young, fragile things whose futures are uncertain. In fact, arguing that these countries' political experiences are simply not conducive to the survival of democracy, many observers expect these democracies to fail as have democracies across the African continent (Kaplan 1992; Kaplan 1994; van de Walle 1995). More specifically, the continued influence of alternative institutions, in the form of traditional leaders and a recent authoritarian past, has a substantial negative effect on democracy. Until now, however, this conventional wisdom has not been empirically tested.

In general, the democratization literature has focused on three primary sets of factors to explain variations in citizens' support for democracy: individual characteristics, economic status, and political views and evaluations. While these factors do help us to understand democratic support, they do not completely explain the variation in support observed among citizens in southern Africa. In particular, thee factors do not capture the influence that citizens' experiences with alternative institutions may have on their perceptions and evaluations of democracy.

As the historical institutionalism literature indicates, previous institutional arrangements do not simply disappear when a new set of institutions are introduced. In southern Africa, this means that traditional and past authoritarian institutions continue to

influence citizens' views of democracy even though they are not the institutions that govern the country. However, scholars have not examined either the general influence that support for alternative institutions has on individuals' support for democracy in southern Africa, or the particular influence that support for traditional institutions or past authoritarian institutions has on this support. Using a mixed research design that features both cross-national analyses based on survey data and a case study of South Africa based on elite interviews, I inquire into the nature and strength of the influence these institutional alternatives have on citizens' perceptions and evaluations of democracy.

8.1 Summary of Findings

Sub-Saharan Africa is often seen as 'different' from the rest of the world, a place where people do not like democracy, where things simply work differently. In this study, however, I have illustrated that such assumptions are incorrect. First, by comparing data from a number of survey projects, I found that citizens support democracy to much the same extent as do citizens in other regions of the world. Matching Klingemann's (1999) work on Europe, citizens in southern Africa are best described as dissatisfied democrats – they overwhelmingly prefer democracy, but are dissatisfied with the way in which democracy is actually functioning in their country.

More specifically, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, the masses in each of these six countries clearly prefer democracy as a form of government and reject non-democratic alternatives. Even more, citizens overwhelming rejection of the major alternative, non-democratic forms of government (ranging from military rule to systems dominated by a single political party) reinforces this support for democracy. The

quantitative and qualitative analyses also indicated, however, that citizens are not satisfied with the functioning of democracy (in each of these six countries, citizens' satisfaction with democracy in practice was substantially lower than was their support for democracy as an idea).

Second, I found that the factors that influence citizens' support for democracy in other parts of the world have the same effect on the perceptions and evaluations of democracy of those who live in southern Africa. In essence, these findings suggest that democratic support in southern Africa is, at least roughly, similar to democratic support in other parts of the world.

However, both the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that there are other factors that influence democratic support, factors that are not a part of the existing literature's 'standard' explanation of democratic support. Borrowing from the historical institutionalism literature, I argue that support for alternative institutions might also influence citizens' perceptions and evaluations of democracy. More specifically, I suggest that expanding this existing explanation to include measures of support for traditional leaders or past authoritarian regimes will improve our understanding of democratic support.

The analyses presented in this project indicate that, in general, perceptions and evaluations of alternative institutions do influence individuals' support for democracy and that, in particular, traditional and past authoritarian regimes each have an independent, negative impact on citizens' support.

Long before Europeans arrived in sub-Saharan Africa, communities formed distinct systems of governance that included loosely organized bands (such as the San in

Botswana) and highly structured kingdoms (such as the Zulu in South Africa). Each of these communities structured politics in its own distinct ways, dealt with adversity in its own ways, and ultimately, found its own way to survive both the colonial and post-colonial eras. For the Xhosa in South Africa, this meant fighting the Apartheid regime until it fell. For the Tswana in Botswana, it meant cooperating iwht the British colonial authorities until the end of colonialism. Throughout southern Africa, these traditional institutions have not only survived, they continue to play an important part in the lives of many people.

As the analyses presented in Chapter 5 indicate, a substantial number of citizens across southern Africa acknowledge having a traditional leader, though fewer have an overwhelmingly strong attachment to these leaders. These individuals appear to be those who are older, more trusting (of other people and of governmental institutions), more connected to the community, more conservative, and believe that the government is corrupt.

In addition, support for traditional institutions has a statistically significant negative relationship with democratic support. Those who have the strongest attachment to traditional institutions have the lowest levels of democratic support, after controlling for the other factors that might influence that support. The quantitative and qualitative analyses, however, suggest that the substance of this relationship is not strong. More specifically, the quantitative analysis revealed that manipulations of an individual's support for traditional institutions results in only small changes in the probability of supporting democracy (regardless of how democratic support is measured). Moreover, the qualitative analysis indicated that traditional leaders' influence is limited to specific

portions of the population: those who have the strongest attachment to traditional leaders. While most people in South Africa have connections to a traditional institution, their actual relationship with that institution is generally weak, leaving support for traditional leaders with a strong effect on only a smaller portion of those living in South Africa.

In sum, support for a traditional leader does influence citizens' support for democracy, but does not have the unqualified negative impact on democratic support that one might expect.

The second important historical/contextual factor that might influence citizens' views of government is past authoritarian regimes, or, more specifically, citizens' support for these regimes. In southern Africa, past authoritarian institutions ranged from British colonialism in Botswana, to the racist Apartheid regimes in South Africa and Namibia, to nearly patrimonial regimes in Zambia and Malawi. While these specific forms of authoritarianism are unique to southern Africa, countries around the world have experienced authoritarian regimes, and scholars have found that nostalgia for these regimes has a strong negative impact on democratic support. Building on these findings, I expected those who continue to favor past authoritarian regimes to be substantially less supportive of democracy.

The results presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 indicate that a small, though substantial, percentage of those living in southern Africa do continue to like the authoritarian past. Although nearly all of those included in the survey experienced life under these regimes (only in Botswana did less than 100% of those surveyed experience the authoritarian regime), a surprising portion continues to view the past in a positive light. More over, while those who support the past tend to be older, white, and more

educated, there are individuals with very different characteristics who also favor the past (such as some black South Africans who believed their lives were better under the Apartheid regime). While we cannot know whether this support is due to a particular benefit citizens received (such as increased educational opportunities or access to inexpensive food) or an inherent preference for authoritarianism, it is clear that a substantial portion of those living in southern Africa continue to support the past.

More importantly, the quantitative analysis reveals that the index measure of support for the past has a statistically significant, negative effect on democratic support (those who did not like the past are much more supportive of democracy and those having lingering feelings of nostalgia for the past are less supportive). In addition to have a statistically significant effect (which support for traditional institutions also had), support for the authoritarian past also has a substantively significant effecto n democratic support (which support for traditional institutions did not have).

This substantive effect is also revealed by the qualitative analysis of South Africa. In particular, those Members of Parliament who expressed dissatisfaction with democracy often suggested that the past regime would have been better able to handle the problems facing the country.

8.2 Contributions and Implications

These findings based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative analyses, offer two important contributions to our understanding of democratic support in general, and of democratic support in southern Africa in particular.

First, beginning with the historical institutionalism literature insight that institutions do not disappear, or lose influence, simply because a formal transition occurs, I have shown that alternative institutions continue to influence democratic support (and that in some cases, such as in Botswana, this influence has lingered for decades after a formal change). Moreover, I have shown that including perceptions of alternative institutions improves upon the standard explanation of democratic support offered by in the existing democratization literature. In the most general terms, then, this study contributes to political science's understanding of democratic support by highlighting the importance of the impact that perceptions and evaluations of alternative institutions has on citizens' support.

Second, this study has highlighted the impact that citizens' perceptions and evaluations of traditional institutions and past authoritarian regimes have on democratic support in southern Africa. While both of these institutional alternatives represent key parts of the historical development of each country included in this study, and each alternative has a negative relationship with democratic support, only support for past authoritarian regimes has a substantive relationship with democratic support, suggesting that the relationship between support for alternative institutions and support for democracy is complex and that all institutional alternatives do not have the same influence on democratic support.

While this project has improved our understanding for the general interplay between citizens' perceptions of different institutions, and the specific impact that traditional and past authoritarian institutions have on democratic support in southern Africa, there are several possibilities for further research.

8.3 Directions for further study

The conclusions, and findings, discussed above suggest two trajectories for furthering our understanding of democratic support in Africa. First, it is important to note that these results are really a snap-shot of a particular point in time. To get a better grasp of the dynamic relationship between these institutions and individuals' support for democracy, it would be useful to examine a number of additional points in time. These additional time points would reveal whether the results reported throughout this study are the reflection of an unusual point in time, or whether they effectively capture the reality of politics on the ground.

Unfortunately, the survey data for such an analysis is not yet available. In the near future, however, data from subsequent rounds of the Afrobarometer project will become available. In addition, it would be useful to expand the case-study chapter to a series of interviews at different points in time to see if the parliamentarians' understandings of the factors that influence their constituents change.

Second, the findings and conclusions presented in this project could be improved by including other countries in both parts of this mixed research design. Such an expansion would provide a more comprehensive understanding of both the state of democratic support in Africa and the influence that alternative institutions have on this support.

In conclusion, I have found that perceptions of alternative institutions have a significant, negative, impact on citizens' support for democracy in southern Africa. This suggests that, until these new democracies address the influence of these alternatives, we

cannot disregard the possibility that these democracies might return to a non-democratic form of government. However, I have also found that citizens' in southern Africa view democracy as a preferable form of government and that support for democracy is high, about as high as anywhere else in the developing world, suggesting that such a return would not be widely welcomed.

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