UNDERSTANDING ETHNORELIGIOUS CONFLICT:
THE STATE, DISCRIMINATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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To Olcay Akbaba, Medet Akbaba, Yaprak Seçil and Idil Seçil

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Chapter One
Introduction: Opening Pandora's Box

The period from the 1979 Iranian revolution to the tragic fall of twin towers of the

World Trade Center in September 11, 2001 is only a blink of the eye in world history.

Yet, a series of events since 1979 have opened the eyes of academics and decision

makers about religion's role in understanding conflict. The Islamic rebellion in

Afghanistan against communism; the civil war in Lebanon; the conflict in former

Yugoslavia between Bosnians, Serbs and Croats; the rise of radical Hinduism in India;

and the current tension in Iraq between Shi'is and Sunnis are not random events, but

pieces of the same puzzle: religion and conflict.

In line with decades of neglect toward religion, research on this issue has taken

'baby steps' in the social sciences. International relations, as a field of political science, is

not an exception. The academic literature on religion is not well developed.

Achievements can be traced to a handful of devoted scholars rather than a critical mass

throughout the social sciences. This study takes an incremental step in moving toward

the literature on religious conflict. Like every baby step, it is small, yet spirited.

This project seeks to answer the following specific question: What are the factors

that facilitate protest or rebellion of ethnoreligious groups? Ethnoreligious conflict is just

one of many forms of religious conflict that refers to strife among ethnic groups that

"belong to different religions or denominations than the majority group in their state"

(Fox 2004b: 59). So, what are the causes of ethnoreligious conflict? The answer to this

question, as it turns out, will not be fully in accordance with intuition from the major

schools of thought. Both annual multiple regressions and time series cross-sectional data

analysis has revealed that unlike what is expected, there is a negative relationship between religious marginalization and conflict. Religious discrimination and religious legislation in majority religion discourage mobilization of ethnoreligious groups. This finding contradicts with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) model that simply predicts discrimination as a major determinant of grievances that at the end trigger mobilization. It is against the common sense as well since democratization and religious freedom are considered as a quick recipe to harmony for multiethnic states.

This study intends to contribute the ethnoreligious conflict literature in three different ways. The first contribution is developing a theoretical link that will connect ethnicity and religion based on a trilogy of ideas from the ethnic conflict literature, i.e. primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Religion is not actually different from any other attribute of ethnic identity (Gurr 1993). However, it is mostly treated as an invisible factor in ethnic studies. With a common theoretical background, we can incorporate religion into the rest of the ethnic conflict literature. The search to understand motivations for ethnic conflict is not new, but stimulated by a 'tsunami' of conflicts that marked the early 1990s.[1] Asia, Europe and Africa had suffered from nationalist and ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Creating links with ethnic conflict literature and religion can be quite helpful for the development of the literature on religious conflict.

The second contribution is providing an inclusive data collection on religious discrimination that will enable empirical testing of the model. For this project, a religious discrimination index that includes 24 variables for the period 1990-2004 is coded for 62

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[1] Gurr (2000) was inspired from waves of ethnic conflict in 1990s. The Minorities at Risk (2002) dataset includes many aspects of contemporary ethnic mobilization that are used in large-N studies.

ethnoreligious groups. To the best knowledge of the author, this is the most comprehensive data collected on religious discrimination at the minority level.

The third contribution is testing the model, using the data collected on religious discrimination, in a large-N cross sectional format employing diverse methods. In addition to conventional methods such as multiple regression, we used statistical techniques that had not been used in ethnoreligious conflict literature before, such as spline temporal effect models and mixed models of repeated measurement. Using multiple techniques enables testing the robustness of the newly introduced theoretical model.

These contributions aim to address different aspects of research ranging from theory development to data collection, from employing sophisticated statistical analysis to descriptive analysis of data. Since religion has been a relatively neglected factor in conflict literature, there are many unanswered questions with regard to individual, cultural, structural and international causes of ethnoreligious violence. Therefore, the avenues of contribution are wide open.

This study proceeds in five additional parts. Chapter 2 describes theoretical relevance of religion to conflict. Chapter 3 explains the model developed. Chapter 4 is about the research design of the analysis. The findings of the analysis are in Chapter 5. Finally, conclusions and directions for future research are offered in Chapter 6.

The failure of the literature to provide well-developed theories on religion and conflict can be explained with strong trends, such as theories of modernization, secularization and functionalism, which consider religion irrelevant to politics. Westphalia's secular ties have also contributed to the limited number of studies in this

field. When this is combined with challenges posed by attempting to quantify religion-oriented variables we more or less get the equation of ignorance. All of these matters, as well as the impact of religion on ethnic strife with specific emphasis on religious discrimination, is discussed in Chapter 2. In this sense it is argued that religion is relevant to conflict and politics.

The purpose of this study is not only to provide a theoretical framework for ethnoreligious conflict, but also to empirically test that framework. A model of ethnoreligious conflict is developed in Chapter 3 for that purpose. Moving forward from the debate among primordialists, instrumentalists and constructivists, a constructivist approach is used to build up a model on the impact of faith on ethnic conflict. The main argument is that, from a constructivist point of view, the religious marginalization of an ethnoreligious group, the socioeconomic situation, and the interaction between the main determinants of ethnic conflict (like separatism, regime type and repression) with religion can trigger protest and rebellion.

Chapter 4 explains the research design and completes five tasks. First, it provides information regarding the datasets used. Second, the criteria for case selection are developed. Third, coding issues, including major problems faced during the coding process, are explained. Fourth, other variables included in the analysis are described. Finally, questions relating to missing data, data reliability and methodology used to test the model are addressed.

Chapter 5 tests the model introduced in Chapter 3 in a large-N, cross-sectional format using data collected by the author along with the Religion and State (RAS) and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) datasets. This is a comprehensive analysis that employs

four different methods to explore the data. The first part displays descriptive statistics on religious discrimination in order to identify regional distribution of the variable. The second part offers multiple regressions that test the model annually from 1990 to 2003. In the third part, the available data for the period from 1990 to 2003 is pooled for time series cross-sectional analysis. Fourth and finally, the results are applied to ethnoreligious minorities in Iraq to provide ideas regarding the future of the country.

Chapter 6 wraps up the project. In this chapter, three items are highlighted: the accomplishments of the study, the summary of findings and possibilities for future research. One of the significant findings of this research is that statistically significant religious discrimination and religious legislation variables keep appearing even when the statistical technique used is changed. At this point, it is possible to argue that religion is an important factor in understanding ethnoreligious conflict. However, the form of the relationship is much more complicated than we might believe. This opens many further research avenues. The closest target is understanding the religious aspect of ethnic identity. However, that is not the final destination. Eventually, we need to see if the theory developed here that emphasizes religious discrimination and religious legislation is applicable to any from of religious conflict. In other words, is religious marginalization influential in the non-ethnic context of conflict?

Chapter Two
Theoretical Relevance of Religion to International Relations and Ethnic Conflict

Despite several real world events in the real world of politics, religion failed to take a prominent role in political science in the modern era. Recent research suggests that this might be changing. Some well known studies such as *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 2001) and *Clash of Civilizations* (Huntington 1996a) have recognized the importance of religion. Putnam underlines the role of religious institutions as providers of social engagement in American society and Huntington's definition of civilization mostly overlaps with religion (Fox 2004a). Whether about religious institutions or the role of religion in social life, recent works focus attention on the importance of religion (Fox 2004a; Jelen and Wilcox 2002; Hart 2001; Rudolph and Piscatori 1996; Barkun 1994; Casanova 1994; Marty and Appleby 1992; Hadden 1987).

This chapter aims to review the (lack of) literature on religion and proceeds in three parts. In the first part, ignorance of religion and reasons behind this ignorance are explained. Second, the role religion plays in conflict is discussed. Third, the specific impact of religion on ethnic strife is the focus with emphasis on religious discrimination.

I. Religion and International Relations

The absence of religion in social science is attracting more and more attention. "Bringing religion back" from the black holes or forgotten lands of research is on the agenda of social science branches and even entire fields, such as comparative politics (CP), sociology and international relations (IR).

Anthony Gill (2001), in his article "Religion and Comparative Politics", addresses the absence of religion in CP despite its presence in the realm of politics. Gill (2001: 118) argues that spiritual traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism functioned as a "locus for political mobilization" in the past and the religious economy school provides valuable insight about this. It is observed that religious movements can create collective action such as political protest in different parts of the world (Smith 1996; Stark and Bainbridge 1985):

> Observers of the 1979 Iranian Revolution were taken by surprise by the mobilizing potential of Islam in a nation seemingly moving through rapid modernization... The electoral mobilization of Protestant minorities in Peru allowed Fujimori to win a surprise victory in the first round of balloting in 1992 and eventually become president. And in countries such as Algeria, India, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia, religious motivations overlay political conflicts with violent ramifications. Without doubt, religion continues to make its presence felt in the realm of politics across the globe (Gill 2001: 118).

These diverse examples reinforce the relevance of a study on aspects of religion that still are neglected, such as discrimination.

Inglehart emphasizes the importance of religion in CP with not only the belief oriented questions he included in the World Value Survey, but also the results of analysis that utilizes these questions. The survey includes many faith-based questions such as: Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or contemplation or something like that? How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following? Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office. Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections. It would be better for [this country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public

office. Religious leaders should not influence government decisions (World Value Survey 2000: 17-18).[1] The presence of these questions confirms the presumed importance of religion in the broader picture of "word values" and CP. According to the World Value Survey results, more than three quarters of the respondents assert "a belief in some supernatural deity" and 63 % of the respondents consider themselves religious (Inglehart et al 1998, Table V151; Gill 2001: 117).

Billings and Scott (1994) observe that theories of secularization and modernization expected a declining significance of religion despite its historical role in legitimation. However, as for other branches of social science, the gap between paradigms and reality was disturbing for sociology:

> Unexpected events in the late 1970s, however- the rise of the "New Christian Right" in the United States and the international resurgence of religious activism symbolized by the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua- have encouraged a paradigm shift in the sociology of religion and legitimation (Billings and Scott 1994: 174).

Actually sociologists have highlighted the "double function" of religion "as apology and legitimating of the status quo and its culture of injustice on the one hand, and as a means of protest, change, and liberation on the other hand" (Solle 1984: 21). Berger (1967), for instance, considers religion both as "world-maintaining" and "world-shaking" force that can confirm or conflict with power and privilege (Billings and Scott 1994: 173). However, functionalist conceptions of religious legitimation, which will be discussed in this chapter, have marginalized the role of religion in sociology. Post-

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[1] More information about the survey questions can be found at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/index.html (04/19/2006).

functionalist studies give more attention to the role of religion in political processes (Billings and Scott 1994). In other words, sociology is bringing religion back, too.

Likewise, International Relations, as a social science discipline, suffers from the same problem, i.e. relative ignorance of religion. Discomfort with the situation has been expressed by a handful of scholars (Fox 2004a; Fox and Sandler 2004; Hatzopoulos and Petit 2003; Lausten and Waever 2003; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003; Fox 2001a; Reychler 1997).

> [T]he discipline of international relations is a microcosm of the Western social sciences, which for most of the twentieth century ignored religion. The founders of the social sciences and their heirs, including most major Western social thinkers, rejected religion as an explanation for the world (Fox and Sandler 2004: 2).

A follow up question is "why?" First of all, theories of modernization, secularism, as well as functionalism have excluded religion from the explanations of world events. That partially explains the similar ignorance of different branches of social science. Second, specifically for international relations, it is possible to argue that treaty of Westphalia and its secular character, with emphasis on sovereignty, contributed to our memory loss on the impact of religion on IR. Third, the influence of behaviorism and the utilization of quantitative methods in line with that ignorance of religion as a factor difficult to measure contributed to lack of interest (Fox and Sandler 2004). Each reason for the high level of ignorance will be explained in the following section.

The Reasons for Ignorance

A. Theories: Modernization, Secularization and Functionalism

Modernization and secularization theories contributed to the general ignorance of religion. In the 1950s and 1960s, modernization theory was quite influential (Fox 1997; Kautsky 1972; Smith 1970; Apter 1965; Almond 1960, Rostow 1959; Deutsch 1953). It was argued that modernization would reduce the political significance of factors such as religion and ethnicity with urbanization, education and economic development:

> students of social development hypothesized that exposure to education, urbanization, the presence of modern opportunities for employment, technology, scientific advancement, as well as new and more complex social organizations, would inevitably lead to the spread of secularization, pluralism and political differentiation throughout the world. These changes were also expected to lead to the adoption of new values and modern life styles that would sharply clash with religious traditions. .... Rather than being a force for collective action, social control and political mobilization, religion would simply become a private affair for the individual (Sahliyeh 1990:3).

Modernization theory made a false prediction regarding role of religion. Unlike what was expected, modernization has contributed to the resurgence of religion. Fox (2001a) summarizes the reasons for that outcome. First, in the places where modernization was not very successful, like most Third World countries, individuals started to "feel alienated, disoriented, and dislocated, leaving them more open to the overtures of religious movement (Fox 2001a: 56)."[2] This feeling of alienation and disorientation at the end encouraged fundamentalist movements in the developing world (Williams 1994; Mendelsohn 1993; Marty and Appleby 1991). Second, with modernity, spheres of religious movements expanded through modern communications technology.

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[2] See, for example, Haynes (1993) and Thomas (2000).

Thus availability of modern organizational and propaganda techniques facilitated

fundamentalist movements. Third, the "religiosity" of individuals increased with

modernity due to freedom of choice given to them. Fox explains the basic argument of an

economic theory of religion:[3]

> ...when religious monopolies are broken down, as they have
> been in much of the modern world, people engage in a cost-
> benefit analysis in selecting their religion. At the same
> time, religious "producers" have an incentive to make their
> religions as attractive as possible to the body of
> "consumers" in the religious "market place" (Fox 2001a:
> 57).

Functionalism is another school of thought that denies the connection between

religion and politics. Religion is not considered as a source by itself, but one of the

expressions of 'fundamental' sources. So, what is important is not religion, but those

fundamental forces that use religion to manifest themselves (Fox 1997; Billings and Scott

1994).

Functionalists see religious legitimation as "the process by which one aspect of a

social system confers sanctions on society as a whole and on particular institutions within

it" (Fenn 1974: 144). From this point of view, even though in real world we experience

resurgence of religion, religion is not actually the cause of significant change. Therefore,

from a functionalist standpoint, any study that sees religion as a source by itself to

explain social events, such as conflict or social mobilization, is not explaining anything

since another, more fundamental force behind religion is the real reason (Fox 1997).

Functionalism is bitterly contested in sociology and international relations (Fox

1997; Billings and Scott 1994; Robertson 1985; Beckford 1983). It is stated that "other

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[3] For a comprehensive discussion of the economic theory of religion see Iannaccone 1995; Billings and
Scott 1994; Warner 1993.

societal and political forces do have an influence on religion", but religion also is more than an accumulation of these forces (Fox 1997: 4). Controversy continues to this day.

In sum, modernization/secularization theories as well as functionalism had contributed to ignorance of religion. When these theories were influential, they created and even entrenched patterns of social science research that excluded "religion" as a significant factor.

B. Westphalia and the Abandonment of Religion in IR

Fox and Sandler (2004: 15) write that "the study of international relations simply ignores religion... That is, it is simply assumed that religion is not important to international relations and that no explanation or discussion of this assumption is necessary." When we look at the history of IR, we can trace it back to the Treaty of Westphalia.

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is considered as the starting point of the modern international system (Goldstein and Pavehouse 2006). The treaty not only established principles of sovereignty and independent states, it also ended the Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648, which was a product of rivalry between Protestants and Catholics. The idea was that religious conflict needs to be stopped. In line with that, the Treaty of Westphalia initiated secular authorities. In other words "the study of international relations was founded, at least in part, on the belief that the era of religion causing wars was over" (Fox and Sandler 2004: 15; Laustsen and Waever 2000).

The impact of the Treaty of Westphalia is reinforced by the dominant IR theory of the post- World War II period, i.e. realism. Realism, after defeating idealism as a by-

product of the results surrounding World War II, became the dominant approach. Its most prominent scholars included Carr (1939), Wight (1946), Niebuhr (1932; 1947), Spykman (1942), Morgenthau (1948), Kennan (1951; 1954); Thompson (1960). Kissinger stands out as a scholar and policy-maker, with the vast majority of the latter implicitly adopting realism for a very long time, with a focus on power politics.

Emphasizing the structure of the international system, (neo) realism excludes what is going on inside the states. States are like "billiard balls, obeying the same laws of political geometry and physics" (Harries 1995: 13; Brooks 1997; Jervis 1998; Wattz 2000; Mearsheimer 2001; Kegley and Wittkopf 2004). Religion is also considered as a domestic issue that does not have an impact on international relations.

C. Quantitative Methods and Measurement of Religion

Scholars of IR intensely utilize quantitative methodology, i.e. "many of those who study international relations distill the various factors involved in various research questions into standardized measures and use statistical techniques in order to assess the dynamics of a phenomena that they are examining" (Fox and Sandler 2004: 30). However, quantifying religion is not an easy task.

First of all, religion is sometimes context oriented. Being a Christian in Burma is quite different from being a Christian in the United States. Similarly, being a Muslim in Germany is not the same as being a Muslim in China. Although theoretically religious practices are the same, place of religion in the broader identity of a person or group is different. In other words, how belief interacts with linguistic, racial and customary differences changes from one place to another and it makes religion context oriented. For

instance, in many European countries, due to racial contrast and immigrant background, being a Muslim has a broader connotation than religion. For Hui Muslims in China, it is more about the combination of belief, language, clothing and diet (MAR Reports). This diversity makes it hard to come up with comparable labels or categories.

Second, religion ultimately is intangible in some way, and measurement criteria are open to debate. The subjective nature of religion complicates the data collection process. For instance, a survey might include a question like "Do you consider yourself a religious person?" What does being "religious" mean? How can we measure it? Even though the study identifies a certain meaning for being religious, the respondent might have a different definition, which might at the end create inconsistencies in the data. Thus the personal and subjective aspect of religion is an important challenge to quantitative research on this subject matter.

In line with the difficulty just noted, available data on religion is very limited. To the best knowledge of the author, the most comprehensive dataset on religion is the Religion and State (RAS) dataset of Jonathan Fox. Quantitative analysis of religion is underway, but still rare.[4] Lack of data is a key reason behind ignorance of religion in IR.

So far, reasons behind the relative neglect of and ignorance about religion in IR are clear. The main argument of this study is that religion is relevant, present and important in IR. It is essential to note also that the main argument of this study is not that religion is *the* factor to explain international relations. On the contrary, we are aware of the fact that there are many other political, economic and structural factors. However,

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[4] Fox (Unpublished Manuscript), argues that religion is measured generally with one or more of the following methods in the literature: identity-based variables (Midlarsky 1998; Miller 1996), religious diversity variables (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002), survey based variables (Inglehart 1998) and government / institutional behavior variables (Fox 2004).

especially in the post- Cold War period, religion has a place among the influential factors in accounting for IR.

There are many reasons for this assertion. First, believers of a particular religion carry core values that define what is good and what is bad which are sometimes perceived as universal truths (Thomas 2000). Strong attachment to one's religious values brings the natural tendency to regard one's own religion as superior to others (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997). This has an impact on anything that includes interaction of two religions.

Second, religion has an impact on people's perception of life. In other words, religion influences the way we think and behave (Fox and Sandler 2004). It is an important aspect of individual and group identity:

> the world's religions answer the individual's need for a sense of locatedness- socially, sometimes geographically, cosmologically, temporally, and metaphysically. Religious meaning systems define the contours of the broadest possible range of relationships- to self; to others near and distant, friendly and unfriendly; to the non-human world; to the universe and to God, or that which one considers ultimately real or true. No other repositories of cultural meaning have historically offered so much in response the human need to develop a secure identity. Consequently, religion often is at the core of individual and group identity (Seul 1999: 558).

People use religion to understand the world around them, to keep the moral framework, to provide psychological stability and to recognize their role and place in the world (Fox 2004; Seul 1999). Policy makers are influenced by their belief systems as well:

> [F]or many people it is impossible to separate religion from their motivations. It colors their understanding of political and social events as well as the decisions they make. This encompasses political decisions and the decisions to go to war (Fox 2004: 19)

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Third, religion can change the intensity and nature of conflict. Reychler (1997:1) writes "value conflicts have a tendency to become mutually conclusive or zero-sum issues" and adds "[t]hey entail strong judgments of what is right and wrong, and parties believe that there cannot be a common ground to resolve their differences." Due to the place it has in personal and group identities, the power of giving or taking away legitimacy from people or institutions, "any threat to one's beliefs is a threat to one's very being" (Brahm 2005: 1).[5]

In the next section, the relationship between religion and conflict will be discussed.

II. Religion and Conflict

What is the role of religion in conflict? Is religion an important aspect of conflict in general and ethnic conflict in particular? The protracted Arab-Israeli conflict, increasing tension in the Kashmir province of India, conflict in Northern Ireland, and civil war in former Yugoslavia are conflicts among groups with different religions. Yet, due to reasons stated above, religious conflict is an overlooked issue in International Relations.

One of the suggestions to address critical questions about religiously engaged political movements is social mobilization theory. Social mobilization theory is initially employed to account for civil rights, student, feminist and environmental protests (Wald et al. 2005; Meyer and Tarrow 1997; Morris et al. 1992). From this perspective, interaction of motive, means and opportunity influences political action based on

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[5] Eric Brahm's e-article "Religion and Conflict" can be found at:
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/religion_and_conflict/?nid=6725 (04/06/2006)

religious grievances (Wald et al. 2005). Motive is an important determinant of religious

movements because of religion's power on shaping individual's preferences:

> If religion shapes culture, or is shaped by culture, as Weber
> and Durkheim respectively suggest, then cultural theory
> offers an important insight into how religion shapes
> individual preferences. These preferences combine to form
> the *motive*[6] for the political mobilization of religious
> organizations (Wald et al. 2005: 125).

So, motives for political mobilization are influential in understanding religious

movements. But what are these motivations? Without question motives are diverse, yet in

this study our main focus is impact of religious marginalization on development of

motives. The argument is if a religious minority within a state is marginalized through

activities of state, this might contribute to social mobilization of this group.

Means, i.e. resources, are important as well. So, frustrations that most of the time

form motivations are not enough for mobilization. A group needs resources. This can

mean different things, such as leadership, material resources, geographical concentration,

and group cohesion. Our position here is religion with its leadership, places of worship,

and rules/regulations that are respected by the religious community facilitates

organization of the group and this increases the likelihood of social mobilization.

Opportunity is an important determinant of social mobilization as well (Tarrow

1994; McAdam 1982). Likelihood of collective mobilization increases with the opening

of institutional participation, or during the formation of new alignments when old ones

are decaying, or when there is lack of consensus between political elites (Steigenga and

Coleman 1995). So, in a way political system of the country might invite religious groups

to mobilize:

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[6] Emphasis added.

> Social movements do not exist in a political vacuum where range of motion is unobstructed and all choices are equally sound. Instead, they arise and act in a political environment full of formal and informal structures that provide both incentives and disincentives for political mobilization (Wald et al. 2005: 136).

Religious groups will have fewer problems compared to many others in terms of utilizing available opportunities, because religion can form foundation of a religious rhetoric easily. That is why religion is expressed at political party level in many countries such as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of India or Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey.

In a nutshell, the theoretical framework of social mobilization theory offers ways to understand religious mobilization. What makes this an important issue is actually that religious conflict can be explained through secular lenses. Wald et al. (2005:121) state "scholars should approach religiously engaged social movements with the same theoretical frameworks used to understand secular political forces and that focusing these interpretive lenses on religion will illuminate issues of general interest of the discipline." Although social mobilization theory does not form the main framework of this study, it is significant to highlight that this framework puts light on religion based mobilization.

This study argues that religion can be an important source of conflict. First of all, religious identity, by itself, can trigger conflict. This does not mean that any kind of religious identity unavoidably leads to religious conflict. Contrarily, the literature focusing on peaceful content of religious identities is well developed.[7] It is stated that religion can be source of peace when it stays as a mystical or spiritual aspect of life and

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[7] See Smock 2006; Haas 2005; Brackney 2005; Coward 2005; Florida 2005; Coward and Smith 2004; Johnston 2003; Appleby 2000; Gopin 2000; Sampson and Lederach 2000; Smith-Christopher 1998; Groff and Smoker 1996; Little 1996.

does not reach the point of extremism (Groff and Smoker 1996). However, Huntington

argues that in the modern world, identity, including a religious one, will be the main force

that mobilizes people:

> What ultimately counts for people is not political ideology
> or economic interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are
> what people identify with and what they will fight and die
> for (Huntington 1993: 194).

Why and how does religion form an important part of individual and group identity, and

then become a source of conflict? In some cases, religious values can be more influential

than other sources of identity because they carry a world-view or a value system that can

shape our perceptions on anything. Abu-Nimer (2001: 687-688) writes:

> When religious values, norms and behaviors are an integral
> part of the interactions between individuals and among
> groups, then religion helps to construct both the
> individual's and the group's value system and world-view.
> If an individual or a group has internalized a set of religious
> values, these beliefs can motivate changes of attitude and
> action.

When these values collide with each other, religious identity becomes source of

conflict because, when defending these values, people consider themselves in a zero-sum

game where their whole moral framework is in danger. Moreover, religious views are

non-relativistic, i.e. they claim to be true and do not accept alternative answers. This

nature of religious identity facilitates political mobilization and conflict (Shupe 1990).

Also, when a religious group faces a difficult situation, it will have a tendency emphasize

its religious tradition to promote group cohesion and to improve the group's living

condition (Seul 1999).

Second, religions, with their institutions, leadership and power to grant legitimacy to people, can facilitate conflict (Fox 2004). Legitimacy is "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd 1999: 381). Sometimes, religious groups try to form a social order compatible with their religious world-view, like in Sudan and Afghanistan. Or in times of social crises, religious rules and institutions provide a justification and framework for social mobilization (Seul 1999). For instance, in former Yugoslavia, religion had an important impact in the escalation of conflict (Seul 1999; Dunn 1996; Mojzes 1995).

It is important to note that religion has "double function", i.e. on the one hand it can justify the status quo, and on the other hand it can be used as means of protest and rebellion (Fox and Sandler 2004; Billings and Scott 1994; Solle 1984). Religious institutions can explain this dichotomy. Mobilization literature gives support to the idea that religious institutions facilitate mobilization, because they provide meeting places, leadership with organization skills, and a natural hierarchy that smoothes the progress of organization (Fox 2004; Tarrow 1989, McAdam 1982, McCarthy and Zald 1977). However, at the same time, religious institutions can use all these attributes to support the status quo. So, religion can be one of the pillars of government that provides justification to state policies instead of those who oppose it (Fox 2004). Gill's (1994) study on religious competition and Catholic political strategy in Latin America examines the 1962-1979 period to see the impact of competition of Catholic Church with Protestantism on the relationship of Catholic Church with dictatorships in Latin America. He argues growing presence of Protestantism changes the trend of support from Catholic Church to governments.

Fox (2004) recognizes the double-edged sword attribute of religion, religious leaders and institutions in terms of legitimacy. He states "religious institutions will support governments as long as they benefit from this support, but when such support undermines their support within the community they will oppose the government in order to remain relevant" (Fox 2004a: 23). Reychler (1997) provides a similar approach that considers religion a major source of soft power and this power can be (mis)used by organizations to pursue their interests. This dual influence is reflected by findings as well. When religion is a significant element of conflict, religious institutions increase the likelihood of conflict (Fox 1999). From this point of view, religious institutions might facilitate conflict only when their community has the power to demand that. This study argues that demand of institutional support from the groups will become visible through religious discrimination against the group.

This section displayed the theoretical background of religion- conflict relationship. In the next section, specifically, the role of religion in ethnic conflicts will be discussed.

III. Religion and Ethnic Conflict

Many ethnic minorities are within the borders of religiously heterogeneous countries and yet do not engage in violent conflict. However, some others protest or even rebel. These types of conflicts are called ethnoreligious conflict, i.e. "conflicts between ethnic groups who belong to different religions" (Fox 2004a: 2). So, what is the theoretical link between religion and ethnic conflict?

First of all, religion is perceived as a significant factor and source of 'shared perception' in the ethnic (communal) group definition of Gurr (1993:3) and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) literature urges us to explore more on that aspect of ethnic conflicts:

> in essence, communal [ethnic] groups are psychological communities: groups whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they interact. People have many possible bases for communal identity: shared historical experiences or myths, **religious beliefs,**[8] language, ethnicity, region of residence, and, in castelike systems, customary occupations. Communal groups- which are also referred as ethnic groups, minorities and peoples- usually are distinguished by several reinforcing traits. The key to identifying communal groups is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather in the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart.

As a source of shared perception, religion is actually part of the ethnic identity. Like any aspect of it, such as historical experiences or language it might facilitate conflict. This study is not the first one, which highlights the importance of religion in ethnic conflict. Previously, quantitative studies by Jonathan Fox addressed mobilization of ethnoreligious minorities using different methods such as multiple regression and binary correlation. These studies are built on the MAR model. The MAR model is the product of research initiated by Gurr that dates back to his classic work, *Why Men Rebel* (1970). The model explains ethnic conflict through intervening factors that include deprivation and political mobilization (Akbaba, James, Taydas forthcoming). In the model, the road to rebellion starts with discrimination against ethnic groups, which

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[8] Emphasis added.

eventually leads to grievances, mobilization and protest. Studies of Fox, like the original

MAR model, aim to figure out the way to protest and rebellion for ethnoreligious groups.

Like the MAR literature, his work also includes a broad range of variables from

repression to cultural differences, from regime type to discrimination, from number of

military organizations to (political, economic, cultural) grievance. A sample of this

inclusive literature's variable selection can be found in table 2-1.

[Table 2-1 here]

Earlier studies on the issue concluded that the dynamics of conflict are altered

dramatically when an ethnoreligious minority is involved (Fox 2004b). Ethnoreligious

conflicts most of the time feature higher levels of discrimination and grievances over

political issues (Fox 1997); they have a higher likelihood of involving self-determination

issues (Fox 1997); they are more violent and attract third-party support more often (Fox

2004a; Fox 2001b; Khosla 1999). Moreover, the presence of religious minorities in a

state, increases the extent of ethnic violence (Rummel 1997). Similarly, Reynal-Querol

(2002) reports a positive relationship between religious fragmentation and intensity of

ethnic conflict. Richardson (2001) examines the relationship between minority religion

and violence. Therefore, to be able to understand the 'big picture' regarding ethnic

conflicts, specific consideration of sub-groups, i.e., ethnoreligious ones, should be

explored due to different and maybe even unique characteristics.[9]

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[9] Some of the variables and methods frequently employed in large-N studies on ethnoreligious conflict are displayed in Table 2-1.

Second, the salience of ethnic identity appears as an important catalyzing factor in models from Gurr's MAR Project. Gurr (2000) argues that greater salience of ethnocultural identity facilitates mobilization for collective action. Even though he accepts that communal identities are multidimensional, he distinguishes some traits such as race and religion from others, since they are intrinsically more important. Religion is perceived as a strong source of group cohesion for many societies except the explicitly secular ones. In the developing world this appears among Shi'i and Sunni Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims. In Europe, a similar distinction appears between Catholics and Protestants. What makes religion specifically a salient attribute in heterogeneous societies is that, theoretically, the co-existence of two religions is not possible. You can speak two languages but you cannot be both Hindu and Muslim (Gurr 2000). When the incompatibility of the two religions is underlined due to any reason, the salience of ethnic identity increases suddenly for ethnic groups.

As stated above, religion can be an important piece of the ethnic conflict puzzle. However, without placing the role of religion with a theoretical approach, it is on a slippery ground which can slide to anywhere. For that purpose, this study argues that religion is neither a primordial, nor instrumental factor. In this study a constructivist approach to the role of religion in ethnic conflicts is adopted.

Hasenclever and Rittberger (2003) distinguish three theoretical perspectives in analyzing the impact of faith on political conflict: primordialist, instrumentalist and moderate constructivist. The primordialist perspective sees basic conflict as "cultural" conflict where religion appears as an independent variable (Seul 1999; Kepel 1994; Huntington 1993a, 1996a, b). Even though different terminology is used to address

religion, the role of religion in the conflict is similar, i.e. primordial. While Seul (1999)

emphasizes the influence of religion on identity and conflict, Huntington (1993a, 1996a,

b) sees conflict from a "civilizational" dimension that being in the post-Cold War period,

most conflicts will be among civilizations. It is important to note that Huntington's

understanding of civilization is mainly defined by religion (Fox and Sandler 2004). The

common denominator of this perspective is the primordial tension between "cultures."

Expectations of primordialists are "culturally based" and it is inferred that

"realignments and wars of religions" will dominate domestic and international politics

(Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 110). It is argued that states will form alliances based

on their religious traditions against those with dissimilar religious beliefs, which at the

end will lead to violence. For multireligious societies such as Sudan, Bosnia, India or

Nigeria, the picture is even darker:

> In multireligious societies ... primordialists expect a fierce
> struggle for power between communities with
> irreconcilable understandings of the sacred. In the end,
> either these societies will fall apart or one community will
> gain dominance and suppress the others. Internationally,
> civil unrest in multireligious societies might tempt third
> parties to intervene on behalf of their brethren. This, in
> turn, may lead to a horizontal escalation of the conflict and
> provoke war between states of different civilizations
> (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 110).

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, see the issue as a socioeconomic one, and they

consider any kind of relationship between religion and conflict as a spurious correlation.

Their approach strongly contrasts with primordialist view, because they argue that

cultural differences cannot be the real causes of conflict (Gurr 1996[10]; Nye 1995;

Juergensmeyer 1993). According to instrumentalists, the reasons behind religious

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[10] It is important to note that Gurr's recent studies are closer to a constructivist than instrumental approach.

movements are economic and political inequalities. As long as there is an uneven distribution of income and political power, conflicts are inevitable (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). Periods of economic decay or social tension can radicalize religious groups and cause religious conflict (Faksh 1994). This situation is most of the time used by political leaders (Brown and Oudraat 1997).

> Desperate people subject to poverty, marginalization, or physical threats turn to their religious traditions in search of an alternative political order that satisfies their need for welfare, recognition, and security. In this context, religious communities operate primarily as refuges of solidarity, sources of cultural reaffirmation, and safe havens (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 111).

This study adopts a constructivist approach. The constructivist position is in between primordial and instrumental ones. It merges cultural and socioeconomic approaches. The causal status of religion is intervening variable, according to constructivists. The constructivist view, which considers ethnic identities as enduring social constructions, is highlighted by the Minorities at Risk project as well (Gurr 2000).

> The content and significance of group identity can and do change but usually in response to changes in the group's social and political environment. The criteria by which people are judged to be group members also can change but usually around the margins (Gurr 2000: 4).

Constructivists argue that, to be able to understand conflicts, we need to comprehend cognitive structures like ideology, ethnicity and religion (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 113). Wendt (1994) underlines the importance of these cognitive structures due to shared understandings and expectations they carry along that at the end determine friends and enemies. However, the constructivist approach is not very far away from instrumentalist one due to two 'zones of agreement' (Hasenclever and Rittberger

2003: 113-114). First, both constructivists and instrumentalists accept that self-interest and power are very influential factors in politics. However, for constructivists "power and interests are embedded in cognitive structures that give meaning to them" (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 113). Second, both schools of thought agree that political leaders and their interest perception have a huge impact on conflict (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003; Appleby 2000; Snyder 1995). The major difference is about the manipulation power of leaders. Instrumentalists argue that leaders can manipulate groups easily and for them, justification of violence is not a hard task. Constructivists disagree on the idea of unlimited rhetorical power of the leaders.

> [Leaders] have to convince the rank and file of their interpretation of a given situation, and these interpretations are in principle always vulnerable to countervailing arguments that may undermine the validity of these interpretations but the authority of those who advance them. (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 114)

Unlike instrumentalists, constructivists give a causal status to religion. They see religion as an intervening variable that has an impact on political conflict. Religion or faith has a dual function: it can either encourage violence among groups, or it can inhibit conflict, depending on the reading of holy texts and religious tradition (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 110).

This study adopts constructivist approach due to three reasons.

First of all, the middle ground between the primordialist and instrumentalist approach passes the reality check successfully. For instance, when Sri Lanka received independence in 1948, governments dominated by the Sinhalese constructed a system that did not offer many rights to Tamils. In this discriminatory system, Sinhala was the official language and Buddhism was the state religion (MAR Assessment Reports). The

discriminatory policies triggered violent conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils. The tension had some primordial ingredients. Sinhalese had always considered themselves protectors of Buddhism. The specific mission they hold regarding their religious identity gives a primordial taste to the conflict. However, discrimination against Tamils had an instrumental aspect as well. The main concern of Sinhalese-dominated governments was to be able to protect the interest of a group at the other's expense. As in this example, in many others, it is possible to see both primordial and instrumental aspects of the conflict. In line with that, this study claims that constructivism is better at explaining real world examples of ethnoreligious conflicts.

Second, previous studies support the argument that religion is not the reason for conflict but an important catalyzing factor. Findings show that factors such as grievances, separatism, contagion and many others have important impact on the levels of protest and rebellion of these groups. It is noted, the conflict is not primarily about religion but religion plays an important role. Self-determination and nationalism cause ethnoreligious conflict, but religion intensifies that (Fox 2002c). Out of 105 ethno-religious conflicts in just twelve of them religion was the primary issue (Fox 1997). However, interaction of religion with self-determination or nationalism catalyzes conflict. It is reported that the rebellion level of groups expressing religious grievances and self-determination, is much higher than the groups that just desire self-determination (Fox 2000b; Fox and Squires 2001).

Third, and finally, the constructivist approach embraces the diversity of religious practices and religion-state relationship in different parts of the world. In other words, its

explanatory power stems from the ability to combine important factors such as leadership, self-interest, cognitive structures and holy texts in a flexible fashion.

As stated at the beginning, there is little systematic research on the impact of religion on conflict. This project focuses on the protest and rebellion of ethnoreligious groups. The impact of religion in general, religious discrimination in particular is analyzed. The important question is 'Why discrimination?'

First of all, religious discrimination is prohibited and religious freedom is considered an important part of human rights documents such as the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief Article 1 and Article 2[11] state the importance of religious freedom:

> **Article 1**
>
> 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
> 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.
> 3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

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[11] Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981. The full document can be found at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_intole.htm (04/26/2006).

Article 2

> 1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person on the grounds of religion or other belief.
> 2. For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression "intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief" means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.

Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18 states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."[12]

Second, dissatisfaction due to inequality is perceived to be one of the core sources of political violence, including ethnic conflict. For instance, Aristotle claimed a disturbed sense of justice is the reason behind political revolutions (Ellina and Moore 1990). Similarly, Feierabend and Feierabend (1966), Morrison (1987)[13] and Gurr (1968; 1970) argue that frustration among people who perceived others as being treated better, labeled "relative deprivation", is an important cause of violent behavior.

Relative deprivation (RD) is defined as "actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those

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[12] A copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 can be found at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (04/26/2006).
[13] Morrison's (1987) book on three rural Mississippi towns focuses on the other side of the coin, i.e. the improvement in African American electoral participation after the Voting Rights Act

goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep)" (Gurr 1968: 1104).

Subsequent research built on this idea and employed many variables to measure RD, including discrimination and grievance measures from the MAR Project. Studies produced evidence or argued that RD, discrimination and grievance were important determinants of political violence (Ellina and Moore 1990; Moore and Jaggers 1990). Since RD is argued to be a reflection of the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought to be" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, discrimination among ethnoreligious groups can signal its presence. In other words, the gap between expected and actual need satisfaction frustrates groups and creates tension. One of the sources of that process is deliberate discrimination.

Group discrimination is defined by MAR as "political, economic and cultural [e.g., religious, linguistic] restrictions that are individually imposed on members of ethnic, religious and other communal minorities as a matter of public policy or social practice" (Gurr 2000: 106). In other words, discrimination means a deliberate act of maintaining inequalities for members of an ethnic group in terms of material well-being, political access or cultural status in comparison to others. Politically active ethnic groups targeted for discrimination are of "greatest concern in international politics" (Gurr and Harff 1994: 5). In 1990, around 80% of the politicized ethnic groups suffered from either contemporary or historical economic and/or political discrimination (Gurr and Harff 1994). Also Caprioli and Trumbore (2003: 5) confirm that "states characterized by domestic inequality with regard to ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility and to use force when involved in an interstate conflict."

While discrimination might be manifested along many dimensions of public policy, religious discrimination is the focus of this study. Historically, religion has been used as an important source of validation for both ethnic and interstate conflict and violence (Henderson 1997). Moreover, religion has been used as a tool of discrimination by governments that trigger religious grievances (Little 1996). Religious discrimination is addressed as a dependent or independent variable in empirical research (Fox and Sandler 2003; Fox 2001c; Fox 2000; Fox 2000b).

Third, real world events highlight the importance of religious discrimination. Tension between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Balkans, Hindus and Muslims in India, Bahais and Shiite Muslims in Iran, Hindus and Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Christians and Muslims in Sudan are major examples of that. Depending of the religious demography, many states, such post colonial Sri Lanka and Sudan, used religious discrimination as a political tool that enhanced the legitimacy of the state.

> In the Sinhala language, the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous, and a multiethnic or multicommunal nation or state is incomprehensive to the popular mind. The emphasis on Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhala Buddhists carried an emotional popular appeal, compared with which the concept of a multiethnic polity was a meaningless abstraction. (Silva 1986: 31)

> Islam has long played a key role in forming the northern Sudanese identity and in providing political legitimacy to opposition parties and governments alike... The withdrawal of British colonial rule after 1956 provided an opportunity for the Muslim majority in the north to establish some form of Islamic rule. Fearing domination by the northerners, the southern Sudanese opposed Islamic rule. (Little 1995: 294)

Persecution of around 300,000 adherents of Bahai faith in Iran is an obvious example as well. Starting from Khomeni period in 1980's, all religions other than Shiite,

but especially the Bahais were repressed in Iran. Members of Bahai religion are constitutionally considered as "non-persons" which prevents them to have any kind of protection from discrimination in Iranian courts.[14]

Religious discrimination in different parts of the world encourages us to learn more about the nature of discrimination as well as role of it in conflicts. This way, it might be possible to decode the impact of intolerance and discrimination on contemporary international relations.

In this project, religious discrimination is seen as a sign of a thick line drawn between "self" and the "other" among ethnoreligious groups. The deliberate and selective exclusion of certain ethnoreligious groups strengthens the ethnoreligious identity of the discriminated groups. It might be perceived as a manifestation of irreconcilable differences between parties that may at the end open the way to protest and rebellion of the minority. Recent literature detected the importance of religious discrimination previously (Fox 1997, 2003a). However, these studies relied on either just correlation analysis or limited discrimination- grievance data ran for a short time period (two to five years) with a small number of categories for each. For this project, an inclusive religious discrimination index (not coded at the minority level before) appears in a multivariate analysis for the period 1990-2003.

Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism theoretically confirm the connection between religious discrimination and protest/ rebellion, but due to different reasons. Primordial approach sees religious discrimination as a major source of cultural tension that will at the end lead to conflict. Instrumentalists' emphasis on socioeconomic

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[14] There is full access to the Center for Reductions of Religious- Based Conflict reports at http://www.center2000.org/ (04/26/2006),

aspect and would say this can turn into a conflict if it is manipulated by leaders. From constructivist point of view, religious discrimination has an importance as well. As mentioned above, although constructivism accepts the socioeconomic aspect of conflict, interests are embedded in cognitive structures that give meaning to them. Therefore, constructivists would see religious discrimination as a source of conflict not only when leaders decide to manipulate but when the religious reading of the society leads to that. It can be argued that religious discrimination is an important source of conflict since it can easily communicate cognitive structures of people.

In line with this theoretical foundation, the model developed in the next chapter gives a central place to religious discrimination.

Table 2-1- Sample Variables and Methods Frequently Employed in Large N Studies on Ethnoreligious Groups

Variables	Method
Dependent Variables: Rebellion Protest # of Military Org. Mil. Org. Support Discrimination Repression	Regression (Fox 2003, 2004c, 2004a)
Independent Variables: Separatism Cultural Grievance Economic Grievance Political Grievance Cultural Differences Polity Score Repression Regime Type Religious Contagion Per Capita GNP Official Religion (For two years) Region (Control Variable)	Regression (Fox 2003, 2004c, 2004a)
Rebellion Separatism Cultural Discrimination Economic Discrimination Political Discrimination Repression Religious Grievance Religious Demands Religious Legitimacy	Correlation (Fox 1997, 2000b, 2004a)
Religious ID Region Rebellion Protest	Cross Tabulation (Fox 2002a,c, 2003)

Chapter Three
A Constructivist Model of Ethnoreligious Conflict: The Role of Religious Discrimination and Religious Legislation

In the previous chapter, it is argued that ignorance of religion in social science is a central problem. This is due to the important role religion plays in conflict; much more research is needed. Although the number of studies emphasizing religion is increasing, there is still need for comprehensive conflict models that incorporate faith. One of the major problems regarding ethnoreligious conflict is the limited theoretical discussion on how to approach the role of faith (Hasenclever and Rittberger. 2003; Fox 2002b). This study seeks to fill that gap in the literature. In this chapter, a model of ethnoreligious conflict is developed based on the famous trilogy of ethnic conflict: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Moving from this debate, a constructivist approach is used to analyze the impact of faith on ethnic conflict. The main argument is that, from a constructivist point of view, religious marginalization of ethnoreligious group, the socioeconomic situation and interaction of the main determinants of ethnic conflict --like separatism, regime type and repression-- with religion can trigger protest and rebellion.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, a summary of the main quantitative study findings on religion is provided. In this way, the specific contribution of the newly introduced model is clarified. Second, a model of religion and conflict that can be tested in a large-N, cross sectional format is introduced. This section also includes basic propositions from the model. Third, based on these propositions, specific hypotheses are derived.

I. Previous Findings of the Religion and Conflict Literature

This study aims to provide a model of ethnic conflict that includes religion as a central factor. Before introducing the model, there is need to report major findings of the literature to place contributions of this model in context. The majority of the studies that will be mentioned here are inspired by the MAR project and they are mostly conducted by Jonathan Fox. Jonathan Fox is the first person to collect data on ethnoreligious groups.

Previous findings show that religion is an important factor in understanding conflict.

First, a key concern is with the importance of religion in conflict: is it a determining factor? Fox's (1997) analysis on 105 ethnoreligious cases show that only in twelve of them religion is the primary issue. However, in 65 of cases it is a secondary issue. So, even though it is not usually the primary issue, at different levels, religion is very frequently on the agenda of ethnoreligious conflicts.

Second, it is found that ethnoreligious conflicts are different from conflicts among groups with the same religion. In most ethnoreligious conflicts, groups suffer from high political and cultural discrimination and these conflicts usually involve ideas of self-determination (Fox 1997). The number of ethnoreligious groups within a state changes structure of the conflict as well. Rummel (1997) found that a high number of religious groups increases the level of ethnic violence. Similarly Reynal-Querol (2002) reports a positive relationship between religious fragmentation and extent of ethnic conflict. This attracts our attention to a specific type of ethnic conflict, i.e. ethnoreligious conflict.

Third, the relationship between religious discrimination and religious grievances has been analyzed. Findings show that religious discrimination triggers religious

grievances, which in turn increases violence for separatist groups (Fox 2004a). So, religious discrimination and religious grievance, and interaction of these two factors with separatism, stand out as significant aspects in understanding ethnoreligious conflict.

Fourth, religious institutions have an uncertain role in conflict. If religion is an important aspect of conflict, religious institutions support protest. They also facilitate rebellion when self-determination is an element of conflict (Fox 1999). There is evidence around the globe, religious institutions have mobilized political action (Wald et al. 2005; Jelen and Wilcox 2002; Hart 2001; Rudolph and Piscatori 1996; Barkun 1994; Marty and Appleby 1992). Therefore, religious institutions form an interesting area of further research on religion.

Fifth, and finally, religion is an important factor in understanding third-party intervention to ethnic conflicts. It is found that conflicts between two different religions attract more third party support (Fox 2001b; Khosla 1999). So, religion seems like a significant factor in understanding third-party intervention to ethnic conflicts.

These findings reinforce the idea that religion is an important part of conflict processes. However, two elements of religion are not emphasized enough. Both of these elements are related to the motivation of ethnoreligious groups. Since the focus of many studies has been behavior of minority groups, the behavior of majority and its impact on minority behavior are ignored most of the time (Fox 2004a). Religious marginalization of groups through state policies is a major example of that and it is operationalized with religious discrimination and religious legislation in this study. How do actions of the majority or the state itself influence motivations of the minority? Specifically, for ethnoreligious groups what is the role of religious discrimination and religious legislation

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on the part of the majority religion in understanding protest and rebellion of these groups?

Religious discrimination is mostly analyzed with religious grievances. Yet, the direct impact of religious discrimination on protest and rebellion takes a back seat in these studies. The literature fails to provide findings of a strong relationship between religious discrimination and ethnic conflict. This study gives religious discrimination a central place and explains the lack of strong relationship with absence of inclusive data on the subject matter. As explained in Chapter 4, available data on religious discrimination is very limited and this is one of the major reasons behind the low number of studies focusing on impact of religious discrimination on conflict. However, from a theoretical point of view, the impact of discrimination and inequality is hardly disputed. Discrimination can be an important source of motivation for ethnic groups.

Religious discrimination increases the salience of ethnic identity. When group rights are not protected by the state, when the state loses its neutrality against its citizens, members of the ethnoreligious groups start considering their religious identity as a major common denominator. This defensive reaction can lead to offensive acts against the state such as protest or rebellion.

Similarly, religious legislation is a neglected element in the conflict literature. Religious legislation by those from the majority religion sends strong messages to religious minorities. The state, as the sole provider of security, indirectly emphasizes rights of one group at other's expense. From a theoretical point of view it is not hard to argue that there is relationship between high religious legislation by the majority religion and marginalization of religious minority. Religiously marginalized groups feel insecure

within their own state. This increases the salience of ethnic identity since members of the group might need to provide their own security. This tension can facilitate protest and rebellion of the group. Limited data on religious legislation prevented inclusion of this factor to religious conflict research. Thanks to the Religion and State (RAS) database which provides inclusive coding on religious legislation of 152 states for the period 1990-2002, the number of studies incorporating religious legislation might increase in the near future (Fox 2006).

Similarly, socioeconomic inequality stemming from political and economic discrimination can be a significant source of protest and tension as will be explained in the next section.

There are three figures displayed at the end of this chapter to illustrate the textual explanations provided. Figure 3-1 conveys the abstract connections that are stated in the previous paragraphs. This figure does not display the model. It includes the theoretical connections developed during the model formation process and because of that, directions of the arrows are much more complicated than the model itself. We know that the relationship between religious discrimination and protest/rebellion is not as direct as it is shown in figure 3-3. Religious discrimination and religious legislation are influential factors because they lead to religious marginalization of the group. This increases the insecurity as well as salience of ethnic identity of the group. Figure 3-2 and 3-3 fail to show these connections. Similarly socioeconomic inequality creates feeling of insecurity that at the increases salience of ethnic identity. Salience of ethnic identity is always considered as one of the determinants of protest and rebellion in the MAR literature (Gurr 2000). In other words, there is a dynamic relationship between these factors.

[Figure 3-1 here]

The model provided here aims to fit in these two neglected factors to ethnic conflict literature.

II. A Model on Ethnoreligious Conflict: Basic Propositions

In Chapter 2 the relationship between religion and conflict in general, and religion and ethnic conflict in particular, is discussed. It is stated that constructivist approach to the role of faith will be utilized, with specific emphasis on the religious discrimination to build a model of ethnoreligious conflict. Since Chapter 2 provides a broad discussion of alternative approaches such as primordialism and instrumentalism, in this chapter I discuss briefly primordialism, instrumentalism and only the basic propositions derived from constructivist approach that will appear within the model.

Although, each scholar may not fit well to a single category, there is consensus on importance of three approaches to the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict-primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. In the primordialist view, ethnic divisions and conflict among these groups are "natural" because ethnic identity is considered as a fixed attribute of groups. It might be because of genetic pool or historical experiences, but if you are a Copt, Kurd or Turkmen this characteristic will not alter (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Connor 1994; Kaplan 1993; Smith 1986; van den Berghe 1981; Issacs 1975). Thus the answer of the question "why do we have ethnic conflicts?" is ethnic differences:

> After all, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, even the most cursory historical inspection will reveal the resilience of ethnic nationalism in every part of the globe, as well as its ability to serve as the mainspring and banner of social discontent and cultural alienation. Even when its proponents fail to deliver on their promises, ethnic nationalism offers a vision that appears at once more vibrant and sharply focused for those whom it elevates into "the chosen" than any of the other ideologies on offer. One reason for this enhanced power of the ethnic vision is the nationalist ability to harness popular ties, myths, and sentiments of ethnic choosenness, which are much older, deeper, and denser, and more closely attuned to popular perceptions and needs, than are other ideologies (Smith 1993: 39-40).

In line with the "power" and "uniqueness" of ethnic identity there is high likelihood of conflict and whatever we do, it is hard to escape from that.

> [W]herever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of populations, there one may expect to find powerful assertions of national self-determination that, if long opposed, will embroil whole regions in bitter and protracted ethnic conflict. Whether the peace and stability of such regions will be better served in the short term by measures of containment, federation, mediation, or even partition, in the long run there can be little escape from the many conflagrations that the unsatisfied yearnings of ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle (Smith 1993: 40).

Primordialism received frequent criticism from instrumentalists. According to instrumentalists reason of ethnic conflict was not due to power of ethnic identity but because it is something that can be used by groups or elites to enhance their own interest (Rothchild 1986; Brass 1985; Steinberg 1981; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). Thus, ethnic ties are not natural. Contrary they are symbolic and used for political advantage. Instrumentalist approach associates ethnic identity with labels such as interest group membership or political party affiliation (Lake and Rothchild 1998).

Critiques of instrumentalism insist that ethnic identities are different from other political associations, because it not controlled by individuals but by society. Constructivism takes a middle ground between primordialism and instrumentalism.

> Ethnic identities, according to constructivists, are not social givens but are produced through processes of socialization and acculturation. Neither primordial ties nor common interest hold ethnic groups together. Rather, ethnic groups are social constructs generated and maintained by specific historical processes ... Overtime, ethnic identities gain widespread social acceptance. Individuals come to perceive ethnic identities as immutable social facts and have difficulty separating their personal identities from those of groups to which they belong. (Green and Seher 2003: 521).

Constructivism provides an important space for understanding ethnic conflict that we do not see in other approaches (Brubaker 1995; Young 1993; Dominguez 1989; Anderson 1983). Primordialists explain ethnic conflict with "blood", instrumentalists with "strategic calculations". Constructivists emphasize the idea that "ethnicity is constructed from dense web of social interactions" which are influenced by "cognitive structure" and "external forces that increase or decrease the likelihood of ethnic mobilization" (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 6; Green and Seher 2003: 521). With a constructivist approach, it is possible to incorporate important changes such as decolonization, the end of the Cold War or evolving political institutions within the ethnic conflict models (Wilmer 1997; Ignatieff 1994; Vail 1989).

Constructivism as the main theoretical perspective of this study is used to identify factors that cause ethnic conflict. In line with that approach three issues will be taken into consideration: (1) religious marginalization of the ethnoreligious minority, (2) the role of socioeconomic inequality as well as relative deprivation, and (3) interaction of religious marginalization with other factors that are found to be influential in explaining ethnic

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conflicts. Based on these three factors, seven propositions are formed. Each proposition

seeks to explain the development of ethnoreligious conflict. Figure 3-2 shows how each

of these three factors are incorporated to constructivist point of view.

[Figure 3-2 here]

A. Religious Marginalization: Role of Religious Discrimination and Legislation

As will be recalled, constructivists do not deny the importance of power and

interest or the role of religious leaders in conflicts. However, they do have atypical

position, i.e. "interests are embedded in cognitive structures that give meaning to them"

and "religious traditions are intersubjective structures that have a life of their own."

(Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 113-114). Social practices and discourses are bases of

this self-understanding (Wendt 1987). In other words, rhetorical power of leaders,

expectations of gain, reading of holy texts, cognitive structure and social practices get

together and form the "context" where we see ethnoreligious conflict. It is not aim of this

study to fully operationalize the idea of conflict-prone context. However, there is

emphasis on factors that might influence on the social context, motivations of group

members and likelihood of protest and rebellion. Religious discrimination and religious

legislation are two religion-oriented factors that can be used to specify context of

religious marginalization. Why, however, should these two factors be singled out?

Discrimination is argued to be an important factor in understanding conflict.

Specifically, from a constructivist point of view, religious discrimination has a crucial

impact on perceptions among group members regarding the possibility of conflict. It

decreases the likelihood of peaceful relations and increases group cohesion. Religious discrimination gives an incentive to members of the community to respond in some way, whether peaceful or violent. This incentive is very valuable for the religious leaders, since, according to constructivists, religious rhetoric of the leaders on its own is not sufficient to produce conflict. With religious discrimination against the minority, leaders can intensify their religious rhetoric to encourage the group to protest or rebel. In other words, religious discrimination can set the stage for a defensive and conflictive response of the discriminated group. In line with that logic, the first proposition is:

Proposition 1: Religious discrimination against a minority is likely to provoke a defensive and conflictive response from members of the group.

Sometimes, even without religious discrimination, minorities can change their cognitive structure and resultant definition of friends and foes. The high percentage of majority religion-oriented law can marginalize the group and make them feel insecure. The group's position within the society therefore deteriorates due to either legal limitations or inconsistency between minority religious rules and legal rules of the state. As a result of not feeling comfortable, a minority can begin to perceive majority and the state as the "enemy." Cognitive change might easily disturb peaceful relations between the minority and the state. This leads us to the second proposition:

Proposition 2: Higher percentage of majority religion law is likely to provoke a defensive and conflictive response from members of the ethnoreligious group.[1]

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[1]In the proposition two, "higher percentage of majority law" refers to the state law which is based on religious rules of majority religion. It is the percentage of religious legislation.

B. Socioeconomic Factors: Economic Discrimination and Political Discrimination

Instrumentalist and constructivist approaches to analyzing the impact of religion

on ethnic strife accept the importance of socioeconomic factors in understanding these

conflicts. Economic and political inequalities between minority groups and the majority

can trigger radicalization of ethnoreligious communities. Therefore, uneven distribution

of power and wealth among groups at times of economic decay might be a significant

factor in ethnoreligious conflicts (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003; Karawan 1997;

Faksh 1994). People who are suffering from marginalization and poverty can bring into

play their religion as the common denominator to fight for a better political and economic

position. Of course, religious leaders can use this situation to advance their own interest.

> The origins and dynamics of ethnopolitical conflict are highly complex. Theories that emphasize the supposedly crucial role of a single factor, such as historical animosities or religious differences, should be avoided. Such factors usually become significant because they are invoked by contemporary ethnopolitical leaders seeking to mobilize support among threatened and disadvantaged peoples, not because religious or historical differences generate a primordial urge to conflict. (Gurr 1996: 74)

The experience of poverty, marginalization, economic and political inequality can

be expressed in many different ways. This study employs economic and political

discrimination as measurements for two reasons. First, the MAR literature and the theory

of relative deprivation underline importance of discrimination in understanding ethnic

conflict. The presence of these factors facilitates comparison of this study with many

others. Second, discrimination means a deliberate act of maintaining inequalities for

members of an ethnic group in terms of material well-being, political access or cultural

status in comparison to others. In other words, it is not just inequality that is stemming

from living conditions of the minority. Contrary, it is a purposeful act of excluding a minority from economic and political benefits which are utilized by the majority. The deliberate nature of discrimination can increase insecurities of minorities. A state that discriminates either economically or politically creates a biased and unfair environment for ethnic groups. Denied access to the opportunities provided by the state, ethnic groups aim to provide security for themselves. Such actions, while defensive-minded, usually are perceived as offensive by both other groups and the government, which can trigger ethnic conflict within an existing state (Akbaba, James and Taydas, forthcoming). In line with that, the third proposition addresses impact of economic marginalization of a group in conflict:

Proposition 3: Economic discrimination against a minority is likely to provoke a defensive and conflictive response from members of the group.

Similarly, the fourth proposition is about the influence of group's political marginalization on conflict:

Proposition 4: Political discrimination against a minority is likely to provoke a defensive and conflictive response from members of the group.

C. Interaction of Religion with Other Factors

Constructivists focus attention on interaction of religion with other factors. Depending on the conditions, religion can make violence more likely or less likely (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). Previous studies had also explored the role of religion in conflicts under different circumstances. Fox (2004a: 78) writes "[t]he setting in which an ethnic conflict occurs is important." Conflicts most of the time are not primarily about

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religion, but religion plays an important role. Self-determination and nationalism cause ethnoreligious conflict, but religion intensifies that process (Fox 2002c). Out of 105 ethnoreligious conflicts religion was the primary issue in just 12 of them (Fox 1997). Yet, interaction of religion with self-determination or nationalism catalyzes conflict. It is reported that the rebellion level of groups expressing religious grievances and seeking self-determination is much higher than for groups that desire only self-determination (Fox 2000b; Fox and Squires 2001).

Along the lines of these findings, the model presented in this chapter includes interaction of religious discrimination with factors that are found to have a significant role in explaining ethnic conflicts. These factors include separatism, regime type and repression.

Studies using the MAR database have found that separatism triggers rebellion (Gurr 1993a; 1993b; 2000 and Fox 2004a). Theoretically there is near consensus on the idea that separatism or other movements seeking self-determination are major causes of conflict (Byman 1998; David 1997; Hoffman 1995). Fox (2004a: 75-77) reports separatism as a major cause of conflict and starting from 1980s; religion appears as an exacerbating factor.

> ...those ethnoreligious conflicts which do not involve separatism are consistently the least violent of all conflicts. Only when separatism is added to religion does it become a cause of ethnic conflict. (Fox 2004a: 75)

Regime type is reported to be an important factor as well. Fox (2004:78) states that "autocratic governments are less likely to have avenues available for minorities to express and address their grievances through legal channels than are democratic

governments." Gurr (2000: 70) also identifies authoritarian norms and institutions as a domestic factor that encourages strategies of rebellion in his model of the "etiology of ethnopolitical conflict."

Repression is another major source of incentive for conflict (Gurr 2000; Gurr and Moore 1997; Davenport 1996; Lichbach 1987). Gurr (2000: 71) argues that "the use of force against people who think it is unjust may inspire fear and caution in the short run but at the same time provokes resentment and enduring incentives to resist and retaliate." Therefore, repression is one of the factors that facilitate conflict.

These three variables have proved to be important in understanding conflict. Considering previous findings on religion as a factor that catalyzes conflict, in this study, interaction of religious discrimination with separation, regime type and repression are included in the model.

Thus the fifth proposition is:

Proposition 5: The effect of separatism on ethnic conflicts will increase with higher levels of religious discrimination.

A sixth proposition focuses the interaction of regime type with religious discrimination:

Proposition 6: The effect of regime type on ethnic conflicts will increase with higher levels of religious discrimination.

The final proposition focuses on a three-way interaction of regime type, repression and religious discrimination.

Proposition 7: The effect of regime type and repression on ethnic conflicts will increase with higher levels of religious discrimination.

Using constructivist approach to religion as a part of ethnic identity, seven propositions are formed under three groups: religious marginalization, socioeconomic inequality and interaction of religion with other factors. These seven propositions set the stage for the 14 hypotheses, which are explained in the next section.

III. A Model on Ethnoreligious Conflict: Hypotheses

14 hypotheses are developed for incorporation in the model of ethnoreligious conflict. In these hypotheses protest and rebellion are considered as options for defensive and conflictive response.

[Figure 3-3 here]

Proposition 1 states that religious discrimination against a minority is likely to provoke a defensive and conflictive response from members of the group. This leads us to the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis1a: Religious discrimination increases the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups.

Hypothesis1b: Religious discrimination increases the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups.

Proposition 2 discusses the increasing religious legislation, which in turn cause protest and rebellion. This leads us to the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis2a: Ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of protest when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law.

Hypothesis2b: Ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of rebellion when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law.

Proposition 3 is on the role played by economic discrimination in creating

conflict. In line with that, the hypotheses developed are:

Hypothesis3a: Economic discrimination increases the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups.

Hypothesis3b: Economic discrimination increases the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups.

Proposition 4 is on role played by political discrimination in conflict. In line with

that the hypotheses developed are:

Hypothesis4a: Political discrimination increases the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups.

Hypothesis4b: Political discrimination increases the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups.

Proposition 5 states that the effect of separatism on ethnic conflicts will increase

with higher levels of religious discrimination. This leads us to two hypotheses:

Hypothesis5a: The effect of separatism on the level of protest will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority.

Hypothesis5b: The effect of separatism on the level of rebellion will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority.

Proposition 6 states that the effect of regime type on ethnic conflicts will increase

with higher levels of religious discrimination. This leads us to two hypotheses:

Hypothesis6a: The effect of regime type on the level of protest will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

Hypothesis6b: The effect of regime type on the level of rebellion will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

Proposition 7 states that the effect of regime type and repression on ethnic

conflicts will increase with higher levels of religious discrimination. This leads us to two

hypotheses:

Hypothesis7a: The effect of regime type and repression will increase the level of protest with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

Hypothesis7b: The effect of regime type and repression will increase the level of rebellion with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

Conclusion

In this chapter, a model of religion and conflict has been developed. This model has two significant accomplishments. First, considering the fact that religion is a neglected element, this model contributes to ethnic conflict literature by bringing religious marginalization back to the agenda. Second, discussion on religious marginalization is based on primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism debate. Founding the model on such a central discussion in ethnicity broadens the level of discussion from religion to ethnic identity. The model includes 14 hypotheses that will be tested in Chapter 5.

Figure 3-1: Theoretical Background of Ethnoreligious Conflict Model

Figure 3-2 Constructivist Approach to Analyzing Ethnoreligious Conflict

Religious Marginalization

      Religious discrimination
against ethnoreligious minority.

      High percentage of religious
legislation in majority religion.

Socioeconomic Inequality/ Relative Deprivation

      Economic discrimination against
ethnoreligious minority

      Political discrimination against
ethnoreligious minority

Ethnoreligious Conflict

Interaction of Religion with other Factors

      Effect of separatism, regime type and repression
with the increase of religious discrimination against
the minority

Figure 3-3 Model of Ethnoreligious Conflict

Chapter Four
Research Design: Operationalizing the Ethnoreligious Conflict Model

In Chapter 3, an ethnoreligious conflict model is developed that can be tested in a large-N cross-sectional analysis. Before carrying out an analysis it is vital to complete five tasks. First, information must be provided regarding the datasets used. Second, the criterion for case selection has to be developed. Third, an agenda of coding issues that includes major problems faced during the coding process must be explained. Fourth, other variables that are included in the analysis must be described. Finally, questions relating to missing data, data reliability and methodology used to test the model are addressed. This chapter aims to complete all of the five tasks stated above.

I. Datasets

A. The Minorities at Risk Dataset

Much of the data used in this study are taken from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. Although the MAR data are supplemented by religious discrimination data collected by the author and the Religion and State (RAS) database, the MAR dataset forms the skeleton of the project since MAR cases are used as the pool for case selection. In other words, ethnoreligious groups are identified among MAR groups. Because of that, this dataset has a central place in the analysis.

The MAR dataset tracks 284 politically active groups throughout the world, so the unit of analysis is the minority within a specific state. With that unit of analysis, a state that has more than one MARs (like India) or a minority group dispersed to more than one state (like the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey) may appear several times in the dataset.

However, each minority-majority combination is unique and each pair is coded only once. The selection of the minority instead of the state as the unit of analysis offers major advantages. Studies using the state as the unit of analysis implicitly or explicitly suppose that groups within the state react similarly to changing conditions. Yet, different ethnic groups within the same state might respond in their own way due to their distinctive attributes.

To be selected as MAR, a minority should have "political significance." Political significance is established by two criteria: "The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society" or "the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests."[1] Also, groups are included only if, in the year of interest, they numbered at least 100,000 or, if they are fewer, exceeded 1% of the population of at least one country in which they resided.

The MAR dataset provides significant information on ethnic groups such as: the amount of protest and rebellion in which minorities are involved, level of economic and political discrimination against the group, and geographic region of the state in which minority resides. Even though some of these variables are coded for different periods, all the variables that will be included in the model are available for the period from 1990 to 2003, except repression, organizational cohesion, and group's spatial distribution.

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[1] Further information on selection criteria can be found at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about.asp. (02/01/2006)

B. The Religion and State Dataset

The Religion and State (RAS) dataset (2004) offers state-level data for all countries that have a population more than 250,000 and all Western democracies on many aspects of division between religion and state for the period from 1990 to 2002 (Fox 2004, RAS Codebook: 1). This dataset not only provides data to this study, it also serves as the source of inspiration. It is the only dataset that extensively focuses on the relationship between religion and state. Its scope is very broad yet deep at the same time. Therefore the RAS database served as a 'role model' for data collection on a very judgmental issue, i.e. religion. The religious discrimination variable was collected individually, based on the template provided in the RAS codebook (Fox 2004). Fox provides a discrimination index at the state-level annually from 1990 to 2002 that is based on 16 different variables. This project expands the list to 24 and collects the variable at the minority level, unlike the RAS dataset, which has data at state level.

The second contribution of the dataset is the religious legislation variable. This variable, as described below, measures "what proportion of the laws in a state are influenced by religion or based directly on religious codes" (RAS Codebook: 10-11). It is a very inclusive variable that helps us to see impact of religious legislation in the mobilization of groups.

Third, and maybe the most important contribution, was the availability of Jonathan Fox at times of challenge and frustration in the process of coding.

II. Case Selection: What Constitutes an Ethnoreligious Minority?

Case selection for this project is limited to groups in three regions (Western Democracies and Japan, Asia, Middle East and North Africa) of the MAR dataset. Only MAR cases, which have a different religious identity than the state they reside in, are included in the analysis. A different religious identity might refer to either a different religion than the majority group or a different denomination of Islam and Christianity.

Selecting MARs with a different religious identity is particularly relevant for an important reason. This study aims to include all cases that might have the slightest possibility to go into conflict due to religious reasons. All ethnoreligious groups do not necessarily go into religious conflict. However, when religious identities contrast, they have the potential to enter into a religious conflict. To understand under which circumstances ethnoreligious groups go into strife and how they do so, all minorities with the potential to get involved need to be included. To do otherwise raises obvious problems related to selection effects.

62 out of 116 groups in the MAR dataset meet the above criteria and are included in the analysis. Denominations of two religions are considered for this study- Christianity and Islam. Historically, denominations of Christianity and Islam have judged themselves different from each other and have gone into conflict because of religious reasons. This provides enough background for groups as well as states to perceive different denominations of Christianity and Islam as different religions. Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant sects are considered to be different religions among Christian groups.[2] Sunni and Shi'i sects of Islam are considered as different religions as well. If the group or the

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[2] This project is different from previous large-N studies on the subject matter and treats Orthodox Christianity as an analytically distinct religion from Protestant or Catholic Christians. In the literature unlike Protestant and Catholic Christians, Orthodox Christians are not analyzed separately.

state has more than one denomination, it is coded as Christian (general) or Islam (general). Other religious identities included are: Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Animist, Confucian, Sikh, and Bahai.

It is important to note that many indigenous groups have dual religions. Mostly they have adopted the religion of the majority in addition to their animist beliefs. If the group had adopted a majority religion in the past and failed to practice animism during the coding period, that group is excluded from the analysis. Even though this decision is open to debate, it is vital to underline that having a "different" religious identity than the majority is the most important case selection criterion of this study. Many indigenous groups fail to meet that criterion by embracing minority religion as well as religion of the majority.

III. Agenda of Coding Issues

Coding is an intensive process which involves putting each case with different attributes into previously constructed boxes. Although prior to coding one aims to consider as many factors as possible, it is very hard to predict all potential coding issues. For this project, a religious discrimination index that includes 24 variables for the period 1990-2004 is coded for 62 ethnoreligious groups. In this process, five challenging coding issues are identified. This section provides a brief definition of these issues and discusses solutions implemented for each.

Issue #1: Case Selection

Case selection criteria are explained above. While it seems easy to execute, there were many complications. In this study, all cases where the minority belongs to a different religion than the majority group, or to a different denomination of the same religion, are included. It is complicated when a minority belongs to multiple religions or when there is insufficient or inconsistent information about the identity of the group.

Minorities belonging to multiple religions are coded as ethnoreligious groups if 80% or more belong to different religions or denominations than the majority group. For instance, Asians in the UK constitute a religiously diverse group mostly comprised of Muslims and Hindus. The UK is dominantly Christian in general; Protestant in particular, and Asians in the UK is coded as an ethnoreligious group since more than 80% of the group was not Christian.

Lack of information is a major problem for coding. However, it complicates the process more at the stage of case selection. Sometimes exact demographic distributions within a group are not available or what is available is not consistent. For example, MAR reports that Fijians in Fiji are mostly Christians, especially Methodist.[3] However, the exact demographics of Fijians in Fiji could not be found and they are coded as Christian in general. Since Fiji is Christian in general as well, the minority is not selected as an ethnoreligious group.[4]

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[3] A list of minority group assessments can be found at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp (03/02/2006).
[4] General Christian and general Islam categories have two roles: when no one Christian or Muslim denomination is dominant or when information is unavailable or unclear or inconsistent about demographic divisions among different denominations of Christianity or Islam. Fijians in Fiji fit to this category well because they are Christian but demographic information about minority is not consistent. That is why they are labeled as "General Christian."

Issue #2: Weak State or Low Discrimination?

For some cases, low religious discrimination levels were observed not because the state is tolerant, but because it is not strong enough to discriminate. In some states, when the state fails to penetrate the society and regulate social relationships, local authorities as well as traditions might have stronger power than state authority. Since the coding aims to reflect the presence of state discrimination, the role of local powers in religious discrimination could not be incorporated. For instance, in Afghanistan, Hazaras have not faced restrictions on formal religious organizations or restrictions on the running of religious schools and/or religious education in general during the time of coding. However, religious figures were arrested, and there was severe official harassment of religious figures from 1996 to 2000. Well established, strong states do have the power to control religious organizations and education within their borders if they are willing to do so. But when the state is weak and does not have the capacity to implement social policies, religious discrimination scores naturally are lower. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that local figures holding regional authority might discriminate minority groups. This nuance could not be captured in scores because it is not easy to develop a coding scheme capable of detecting this kind of discrimination.

Issue #3: Tough Variables and Cases to Code

It was harder to code some variables in the religious discrimination index due to a variety of actions taken by the state against the minority and diversity of religions. "Mandatory education in the majority religion" and "forced observance of religious laws of another group" were two of variables that involved more challenges than the others.

Mandatory education in the majority religion is hard to code if minorities are required to take nonreligious morals/ethic education, or if withdrawing from majority religion is possible, but under the condition of approval of the school or any other local authority. For instance, in Malaysia, which is a predominantly Muslim country, public schools generally offer Islamic religious instruction, and it is compulsory for Muslim children. Non-Muslim students like Chinese or Dayaks are required to take nonreligious morals education. For this project, nonreligious moral education is considered as possibility to opt out of mandatory education and therefore coded as 0, i.e. mandatory education in majority religion is absent. It is assumed that the content of the morals education does not include information only on majority religion. Even though that might not be the case in every county, coding otherwise would bring similar, maybe even greater problems.

Sometimes, only conditional withdrawal from mandatory religious education in the majority religion is possible. For example, in the United Kingdom public schools are required to offer religious education, but the content of the courses are different in different regions. On the one hand, all parents have the right to withdraw a child from religious education. On the other hand, schools must approve this request. Locality of decisions diversifies the religious education practice in the country. It is really hard to decide if approval to withdraw from mandatory education was denied on a regular basis for minorities or not especially because this kind of information does not always appear in newspapers and country reports. In this case, the variable is coded as 1 due to discomfort and criticism of the teachers' organization of religious practices in schools (International Religious Freedom, Country Report 2005).

Forced observance of religious laws of another group is hard to detect if the minority is forced for renunciation of their religion, but not forced to follow the rules of another one. This is partially the case for Montagnards in Vietnam. From time to time they are forced to renounce their own religion, but there was no evidence of substitution with another. This variable is coded as 0, because Montagnards were not forced to absorb the laws of another group. However, forcing a group to renounce their religion is a significant restriction, and it is coded as the 'other' variable, i.e. the final variable of the index.

In addition to certain variables, some cases were harder to code than the others, such as Hmong in Laos and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. All religious discrimination codings intend to capture restrictions specific to minority religions, i.e. restrictions placed on minority religions that are not placed on majority religion. It becomes complicated when a minority suffers from the same types of discrimination as the majority group, but more so. One of the major examples of this was the Hmong minority in Laos. In Laos, the government controls the majority and minority religions, as well as any other kind of religious activity. However, Buddhism, as the majority religion, is tolerated more in its functioning than minority religions. The point that complicates the issue more is that the Hmong minority is one of the groups that has historically resisted central government control. Because of that, the government of Laos is overly cautious about any activity of Hmongs, including religious ones. However, since the government restricts the majority religion as well religious discrimination, codings of this minority are relatively lower.

Also, minorities in the midst of protracted conflicts such as the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus (South) are tough cases to code. In this case, the minority is isolated from the

rest of the population without internationally recognized independence, so, in practice,

the state does not have the means to discriminate against the minority. Therefore, it does

not make much sense to code religious discrimination against Turkish Cypriots.

However, not coding the case would cause elimination of an ethnoreligious group that fits

to the case selection criteria. To prevent such exclusion, the case indeed is coded.

Issue #4: Lack of Information

Incomplete information was one of the problems faced during the coding process.

Among the three regions coded, Asia was the most problematic, while Western

Democracies was the least challenging. For some of the minorities, such as Malays in

Singapore and Arabs in Israel, I had the opportunity to ask a political scientist who had

been in these countries for significant periods.[5] However, for others a judgment call was

made based on the information available. For instance, the "requirement for minority

religions (as opposed to all religions) to register in order to be legal or receive special tax

status" variable was quite hard to code for Kachins, Arakanese and Zomis in Burma

since, in Burma, all organizations must register, except for the "genuine" religious

organizations. The government exempts "genuine" religious organizations from

registration. Here, the question becomes "what is 'genuine' religion?" A judgment call

was made based on incomplete information, and the decision was that "genuine" religion

probably refers to the majority religion. This variable is coded as 1 for ethnoreligious

groups in Burma, i.e. there is requirement for minority religions (as opposed to all

religions) to register in order to be legal or receive special tax status.

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[5] Jonathan Fox, who is currently teaching at Bar Ilan University, generously provided his help for the project in general. Adrian Ang, who is currently a Ph. D. student at University of Missouri-Columbia, clarified points of confusion regarding Singapore.

"Restricted access of minority clergy to hospitals, jails, military bases, and other places a chaplain may be needed in comparison to chaplains of the majority religion" is a hard variable to code when there is limited information as for Arabs in Israel. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) does not have any Muslim or Christian chaplains due to frequent home leave that would allow Muslim and Christian soldiers regular access to their respective clergy and religious services at home (International Religious Freedom, Country Report 2005). It was hard to determine whether this was a religious restriction or a result of limited need for minority clergy in Israeli armed forces. Professor Jonathon Fox, who checked with an Israeli Army chaplain, had a great input to this coding. He confirmed there were in fact no non-Jewish chaplains. The Jewish chaplains take care of all the administrative work for non-Jews, and contact the appropriate civilian religious authorities to provide religious service when necessary. Even though it is easier for Jews to access clergy, non-Jewish soldiers are not isolated from religious service. Because of that, this variable is coded as 0 for Arabs in Israel.

Another case of an ethnoreligious MAR suffering from limited information was Hazaras in Afghanistan. Religious discrimination values are available for Hazaras in Afghanistan starting from 1996. One of the major reasons for that is the limited information we have on the Rabbani government period. Also, freedom to choose and to practice one's own beliefs was not well defined in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban. This prevented the identification of any religious discrimination during the Rabbani period.

Issue #5: Social Hostility

The collected religious discrimination index aims to capture religious discrimination executed by the state against the minority. It does not measure the level of social prejudice, social harassment, or violence. Even though a county's laws might show respect to religious rights of minorities, sometimes cultural differences form thick lines between majority and minority religions. In some cases, anti-minority incidents, ranging from graffiti to harassment to firebombing, occur. Although governments make efforts to promote interfaith understanding and strict anti-defamation laws prohibit religiously motivated attacks, social hostility is an important issue for ethnoreligious MARs in many countries. Not being able to include the social aspect of the issue was problematic, yet measurement of such variables is very difficult. It is really hard to decide whether an attack is religiously motivated with the available information. One of the possible dangers was the artificial inflation of religious discrimination of some countries, because of their high crime rate or their better crime reporting system.

IV. Variables

All variables used are described in this section under four major titles: religion variables, general ethnic conflict variables, control variables, and interaction variables. The main reason for this division is emphasizing the ones that have a religious aspect. Among all the religion variables included, only one of them is coded by the author. It is an index variable that is composed of 24 different variables. The criteria used by the coder are specified below in detail.

A. Religion Variables

Two religion variables analyzed: religious discrimination and religious legislation.

Religious Discrimination Variables

Religious discrimination is the independent variable in Hypothesis1a and 1b and it has a significant place in the model presented in Chapter 3. According to the model religious discrimination facilitates groups' protest and rebellion, and increases their likelihood of mobilization. Since religious discrimination is a thick concept, it is defined broadly in order to capture as many dimensions as possible. There are 24 religious discrimination variables collected at the MAR level for the period 1990-2004 that form an index of religious discrimination. Each of those variables aims to capture one aspect of state restriction on minority religion. 16 of these variables are taken from the RAS dataset, which was coded at the state level by Jonathan Fox. The religious discrimination variable in the RAS dataset is a composite indicator designed to measure the restrictions placed on the practice of minority religions by the government (RAS codebook: 5). It provides a general picture for each state regarding its approach to all minority religions within the borders of the state.

However, it is not possible to extract religious discrimination values for a specific minority from this dataset. In order to fill that gap, an extended version of the religious discrimination index, i.e. composed of 24 variables, for an extended time period (1990-2004) at minority level is collected. The coding of religious discrimination at the minority

level is one of the major contributions of this study, since it is the most inclusive religious discrimination variable available in terms of both scope and depth (See Table 4-1).

[Table 4-1 here]

The MAR reports on ethnoreligious minority, the RAS country reports, the Annual Reports to Congress on International Religious Freedom provided by Department of State, and Human Rights without Frontiers' freedom of religion and belief annual news catalogued by country are used for coding. [6]

To construct the index, confirmatory factor analysis, which is a technique to find the best index obtainable with the collected data, is used. At the end, basic summation turned out to be a good way to form the index. Therefore, the coded values of 24 variables are summed and values of this index ranges from 0 to 48.

Religious Legislation Variables

Religious legislation is the independent variable in Hypotheses2a and 2b. According to the model, ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of protest and rebellion when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law. This variable is taken from the RAS dataset. It is a composite variable that is coded based on a list of 33 types of religious legislation and it aims to measure whether religious legislation exists or not. Each variable listed in Table 4-2 is coded as 1 if the law exists in

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[6] MAR reports are available on qualitative analysis section of the MAR webpage at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp. The Annual Reports to Congress on International Religious Freedom is available on line at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt/. These reports describe the status of religious freedom in each country, and explain government policies that violate religious practices of groups, religious denominations, and individuals. http://www.hrwf.net/ is the home webpage of Human Rights without Frontiers. There is access to annual news catalogues as well as reports on special issues and projects.

a state and composite variable ranges from 0 to 32 since two religious education laws are

mutually exclusive.

[Table 4-2 here]

B. General Ethnic Conflict Variables

Protest

Protest is one of the two dependent variables in the model that incorporates

factors that facilitate protest and rebellion of minorities. The protest variable is taken

from the MAR dataset and is coded annually for the following scale from 1985 to 2003.

0. None Reported
1. Verbal Oppression (Public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.) Code
requests of a minority-controlled regional group for independence here.
2. Symbolic Resistance Scattered acts of symbolic resistance (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of
traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property) or political organizing activity on a
substantial scale. Code mobilization for autonomy/ secession by a minority controlled
regional government here.
3. Small Demonstration (less than 10,000) A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or
riots, total participation of less than 10,000.
4. Medium Demonstration (less than 100,000) Demonstrations, rallies and strikes, and/or
riots, total participation of less than 100,000.
5. Large Demonstration (greater than 100,000) Mass demonstrations, rallies and strikes,
and/or riots, total participation greater than 100,000.

Rebellion

Rebellion is one of the two dependent variables in the model that includes factors

that facilitate protest and rebellion of minorities. Rebellion variable is taken from the

MAR dataset and is coded annually for the following scale from 1985 to 2003.

0. None reported
1. Political banditry
2. Campaigns of terrorism
3. Local rebellion: Armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they prove to be the
opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the year being

coded, code the latter rather than local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority- controlled government here.

4. Small-scale guerrilla activity: All of the following must exist: 1) fewer than 1000 armed fighters; 2) sporadic armed attacks less than six reported per year); and 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales.

5. Intermediate guerrilla activity: Has one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity.

6. Large-scale guerrilla activity: All of the following must exist: 1) more than 1000 armed fighters; 2) frequent armed attacks (more than 6 per year); and 3) attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group.

7. Protracted civil war: Fought by rebel military units with base areas.

Economic Discrimination

Economic discrimination is the independent variable in Hypotheses3a and 3b.

According to the model, economic discrimination is one of the catalysts for protest and

rebellion of minorities.

The variable is taken from the MAR dataset and measures the role of public

policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing economic inequalities. This is an

index variable that is coded from 1980 to 2003 for the following scale.

0. No discrimination

1. Historical neglect/Remedial policies: Significant poverty and under representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group's material well being.

2. Historical neglect/No remedial policies: Significant poverty and under representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's material well-being.

3. Social exclusion/Neutral policies: Significant poverty and under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.

4. Restrictive policies: Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.

Political Discrimination

Political discrimination is the independent variable in Hypotheses4a and 4b.

According to the model, political discrimination is one of the catalysts for protest and

rebellion of minorities. The variable is taken from the MAR dataset and it measures the

role of public policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing political inequalities.

This is an index variable that is coded from 1980 to 2003 for the following scale.

0. No discrimination
1. Neglect/Remedial policies: Substantial under representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group's political status.
2. Neglect/No remedial policies: Substantial under representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.
3. Social exclusion/Neutral policy: Substantial under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory policies.
4. Exclusion/Repressive policy: Public policies substantially restrict the group's political participation by comparison with other groups.

C. Control Variables

The following control variables are included to the analysis due to their potential

to affect the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.

Separatism Index

The separatism index variable which measures the extent to which group is

separatist and is taken from the MAR dataset and recoded. Original coding of the variable

is the following scale:

1. Latent: Meets one or more of the conditions in AUTON, AUTONEND, and TRANS
2. Historical: The group gave rise to separatist or autonomy movements that persisted as an active political force for 5+ years in their region of origin between 1940 and 1980.
3. Active separatist or autonomy movement(s) in the 1980s or 1990s
8. Other SEPKIN Active Separatism among Kin Groups

For this study, a dummy variable is created. Old values of 1 (latent), 2 (historical)

and 8 (other) are coded as 0 and 3 (active separatism) is coded as 1 in reflection of the

literature on the subject.

Democracy and Autocracy

To measure democracy levels of the countries where ethnoreligious MARs reside Polity IV (Polity2) scores are used. Polity2 is the revised version of Polity score. The Polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Polity IV codebook: 15). Polity2 converts "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).

The following rules are used to fix the values:

-66 Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."

-77 Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral"
Polity score of "0."

-88 Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition.[7] (Polity IV Codebook: 16).

Repression

The repression variable is taken from the MAR dataset and is only available from 1996 to 2003. It is a composite variable combining 23 types of repression (See Table 4-3).

[Table 4-3 here]

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[7] "For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5" (Polity IV Codebook: 16).

Group's Spatial Distribution

This is a summary indicator of six group concentration variables of the MAR

dataset and the following scale is used:

0. Widely dispersed
1. Primarily urban or minority in one region
2. Majority in one region, others dispersed
3. Concentrated in one region

Organizational Cohesion

Organizational cohesion indicators in the MAR dataset show the amount and

scope of support for organizations that represent group interests. The organizational

cohesion variable is coded for 1990-1995 with the following scale.

0. No organizations recorded
1. Group is represented only by a "catch-all" or coalitional organization that represents diverse or collective interests.
2. One or several organizations represent the group and none have greater than "limited" support from the group.
3. One or several organizations represent the group and none have greater than "medium" support from the group.
4. Several organizations represent the group, and none have greater than "large" support.
5. One organization represents the group with "large" support from the group.
6. Several organizations represent the group. One of which has dominant support from the group.
7. Only one organization is recorded to represent the group and it has "dominant" support from the group.

D. Interaction Variables

Three interaction variables are created to see the effect of some control variables

with the increase of religious discrimination. The first one is **interaction of religious**

discrimination and separatism, which aims to show if religious discrimination will

enhance or reduce effect of separatism. Interaction of religious discrimination and

separatism is the independent variable in Hypothesis5a and 5b and it has a significant place in the model presented in Chapter 3. The second one is **<u>interaction of religious discrimination and regime type,</u>** which aims to capture how religious discrimination enhances or reduces the impact of regime type on level of protest and rebellion. Interaction of religious discrimination and regime type is the independent variable in Hypothesis6a and 6b. The third one is a three-way interaction of **<u>religious discrimination, regime type and repression.</u>** Interaction of religious discrimination, regime type and repression is the independent variable in Hypothesis7a and 7b.

Missing Data

Since there are only 62 observations due to data availability, the dataset created for this study is not very tolerant to missing data problem. In other words number of degrees of freedom needs to be large enough to allow a reliable model. Luckily, variables included in the model mostly did not suffer from missing data issue. Rebellion values were missing from 2001 to 2003 for Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. In this case, with an internet search it is seen that rebellion values did not change since 2000. Therefore, the value of the last year available is used for rebellion for this minority in 2001, 2002 and 2003. The same rule is used to fill in missing values of organizational cohesion of East Indians in Fiji from 1990 to 1994, Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus from 1990 to 1994, Shi'is in Bahrain from 1990 to 1994 and Montagnards in Vietnam from 1993 to 1994. This is done the same way for protest values of Montagnards in Vietnam for 1994; Zomis in Burma for 1995 and 1996, Baluschis in Iran for 1996, 1997 and 1998; Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus for 2001, 2002 and 2003; and Papuans in Indonesia for 2002 and 2003. Finally,

repression values are interpolated for Mizos in India for 2001 and Turkish Cypriots for 2001, 2002 and 2003 in the same fashion.

Polity scores were missing for two countries - Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 and Lebanon from 1990 to 2003. These scores were filled with mean values of polity for the region of each country. Same coding decision is used for 1 missing value of religious legislation - Afghanistan.

To fill the missing values, each case is individually focused to find the best way rather than a single method that is applied to all.

V. Data Collection, Reliability and Methodology

A. Data Collection and Reliability

The religious discrimination variables were all coded by the author of this study. Data collection process took approximately 15 weeks. Absence of a grant prevented hiring backup coders to perform a proper reliability test.

In order to test coding reliability, six of the 62 cases were randomly selected (two for each region). Out of 24 variables again randomly six of them are selected to recode. Two graduate assistants - Ozgur Ozdamar and Zeynep Taydas- recoded the backup data. Ozgur Ozdamar focused on two groups in Middle East and Zeynep Taydas recoded four groups in Western Europe and Asia. A full listing of cases and variables coded for reliability test is provided in Tables 4-4 and 4-5.

[Table 4-4 and 4-5 here]

The original and backup codings are correlated at the level of .89 and results are statistically significant. In general, religious discrimination data collected for 62 cases passes the reliability test.

B. Research Methodology

Four methods are utilized to see if results will hold even when model is run with different techniques. These include multiple regression, analysis of variance, spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement.

Multiple regression is used as the primary methodology of this study. In the model a causal relationship is hypothesized between dependent variable and independent variables. The independent variables are non-categorical and dependent variables are ordinal on a scale from 0 to 5 and 0 to 7. Under same assumption verified for this dataset, multiple regression represented a valid approximation which allows easier interpretation of results (Agresti 2002; Neter, Kunter, Nachtshem, Wasserman 1996).

Also, analysis of variance (ANOVA) model is utilized to see whether difference between religious discrimination levels of Western Democracies, Asia and Middle East are statistically significant. ANOVA model gives if distribution of religious discrimination is the same among three regions. It is important to note that ANOVA differ from normal regression models since the independent variable may be qualitative (Neter, Kunter, Nachtshem, Wasserman 1996).

Annual multiple regression runs disregard time dependency between yearly equations. In order to solve this problem, model is run using pooled data. Spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement are used with this times

series cross sectional data. The analysis of pooled time series data violates these two assumptions. Error terms are autocorrelated due to time dependency and might be heteroscedastic, i.e. errors can have different variances across units.

In the spline temporal effect model, splines are used to fix the problem of dependence of error terms. In the mixed models for repeated measurement, basically it is assumed that error terms are dependent. Since the model uses maximum likelihood estimator and assumes dependency of error terms, problem is not as challenging in the mixed models for repeated measurement. The mixed models for repeated measurement fix covariance structure to be AR (1) for error correction.

To solve heteroscedasticity problem, unstructured covariance matrix is used. However, goodness of fit statistics showed that the model under the assumption of homoskedasticity, i.e. same variance of errors across units, fits the data better than the model under the assumption of heteroscedasticity.

Conclusions

To sum up, religious discrimination data collected for this project are combined with the data from the MAR, the RAS, and the Polity datasets to test the model explained in Chapter 3. During the data collection process many coding issues came up. Five of these issues are explained in this chapter with specific reference to minorities coded. This section aims to provide a sample on problem solving logic utilized during the coding process.

In order to rest coding reliability, six of the 62 cases were randomly selected. Out of 24 variables again randomly six of them are selected to recode. The original and backup codings are correlated at the level of .89 and results are statistically significant.

The model discussed in Chapter 3 is tested using annual multiple regression, spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement. The results of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 5.

Table 4-1: Religious Discrimination Index

Coding scale of each variable   2 = The activity is prohibited or sharply restricted.
1 = The activity is slightly restricted.
0 = Not significantly restricted.

Variables coded:

- Restrictions on public observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays, including the Sabbath.
- Restrictions on building, leasing, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship.
- Restrictions on access to places or worship.
- Forced observance of religious laws of another group.
- Restrictions on formal religious organizations.
- Restrictions on the running of religious schools and/or religious education in general.
- Restrictions on the ability to make and/or obtain materials necessary for religious rites, customs, and/or ceremonies.
- Mandatory education in the majority religion (Code as 1 if some but not all students can opt out or take courses in their own religion, or if in public schools only, code as 2 if in all schools, including private schools).
- Arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, and/or members of religious parties for activities other then proselytizing.
- State surveillance of minority religious activities not placed on the activities of the majority.
- Restrictions on the ability to write, publish, or disseminate religious publications.
- Restrictions on the ability to import religious publications.
- Restrictions on the observance religious laws concerning personal status, including marriage, divorce, and burial.
- Restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols or clothing. This includes presence or absence of facial hair.
- Restrictions on the ordination of and/or access to clergy.
- Restrictions on conversion to minority religions.
- Forced conversions.
- Restrictions on proselytizing by permanent residents of state.
- Restrictions on proselytizing by foreign clergy or missionaries. (This includes denial of visas if this denial is specifically aimed at missionaries but not if it is the same type of denial that would be applied to any foreigner.)
- Requirement for minority religions (as opposed to all religions) to register in order to be legal or receive special tax status.
- Custody of children granted to members of majority group solely or in part on the basis of religious affiliation or beliefs.
- Restricted access of minority clergy to hospitals, jails, military bases, and other places a chaplain may be needed in comparison to chaplains of the majority religion.
- Anti-religious propaganda in official or semi-official government publications.
- Restrictions on other types of observance of religious law. Specify:

Table 4-2: Religious Legislation

| Coding scale of each variable | 1 = Religious legislation exists. |
| | 0 = Religious legislation does not exist. |

Variables coded:
• Dietary laws (restrictions on the production, import, selling, or consumption of specific foods).
• Restrictions or prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages.
• Personal status defined by clergy (i.e. marriage, divorce, and/or burial can only occur under religious auspices.)
• Laws of inheritance defined by religion.
• Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion.
• Restrictions on interfaith marriages.
• Restrictions on public dress.
• Blasphemy laws, or any other restriction on speech about religion or religious figures.
• Censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being anti-religious.
• Mandatory closing of some or all businesses during religious holidays including the Sabbath or its equivalent.
• Other restrictions on activities during religious holidays including the Sabbath or its equivalent.
• Religious education is standard in public schools but it is possible to opt out of this portion of the education.
• Mandatory religious education in public schools.
• Government funding of religious schools or religious educational programs in secular schools.
• Government funding of religious charitable organizations.
• Government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations (religious taxes).
• Official government positions, salaries or other funding for clergy.
• Funding for religious organizations or activities other than those listed above.
• Clergy and/or speeches in places of worship require government approval.
• Some official clerical positions made by government appointment.
• Presence of an official government ministry or department dealing with religious affairs.
• Certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by virtue of their political office (ie the Queen of England is also head of Anglican Church.)
• Certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious position (ie as in Iran).
• Some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order to hold office.
• Presence of religious courts which have jurisdiction over some matters of law.
• Seats in Legislative branch and/or Cabinet are by law or custom granted, at least in part, along religious lines.
• Prohibitive restrictions on abortion.
• The presence of religious symbols on the state's flag.
• Religion listed on state identity cards.
• Religious organizations must register with government in order to obtain official status.
• Presence of an official government body which monitors 'sects' or minority religions.
• Restrictions on women other than those listed above. (i.e. restrictions on education, jobs that they can hold, or on appearing in public without a chaperon.)
• Other religious prohibitions or practices that are mandatory.

Table 4-3: Repression

Coding scale of each variable:

0. Tactic not used
1. Tactic used against group members engaged in collective action
2. Tactic used against group members in ambiguous situations
3. Tactic used against group members not engaged in collective action.

Variables coded:
- Small scale arrest of group members
- Large scale arrest of group members
- The arrest of group leaders
- Show trials of group leaders
- Torture of group members
- Execution of group members
- Execution of group leaders
- Reprisal killings of civilians
- Killings by death squads
- Property confiscated or destroyed
- Restrictions on movement
- Forced resettlement
- Interdiction of food supplies
- Ethnic cleansing
- Systematic domestic spying
- States of emergency
- Saturation of police/military
- Limited use of force against protestors
- Unrestrained use of force against protestors
- Military campaigns against armed rebels
- Military targets and destroys rebel areas
- Military massacres of suspected rebel supporters
- Other government repression.

Table 4-4: Reliability Test Minority Information

Region	Country	Group
Western Democracies	UK	Scots
Western Democracies	France	Muslims
Asia	Pakistan	Ahmadis
Asia	China	Tibetans
Middle East	Saudi Arabia	Shi'is
Middle East	Iran	Turkmen

Table 4-5: Reliability Test Variable Information

Variable 1	Restrictions on public observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays, including the Sabbath.
Variable 2	Forced observance of religious laws of another group.
Variable 3	Mandatory education in the majority religion (Code as 1 if some but not all students can opt out or take courses in their own religion, or if in public schools only, code as 2 if in all schools, including private schools).
Variable 4	Arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, and/or members of religious parties for activities other then proselytizing.
Variable 5	Forced conversions.
Variable 6	Custody of children granted to members of majority group solely or in part on the basis of religious affiliation or beliefs.

Chapter Five
The Role of Religion and Discrimination in Protest and Rebellion of Ethnoreligious Minorities

This project started with a simple idea, i.e., religion in general and religious discrimination in particular are important in understanding ethnoreligious conflicts. Chapter 2 describes the existing body of literature on religion and conflict. It is argued that the literature lacks a comprehensive project that is centered on religious discrimination. Among the well known, highlighted variables used in the literature to explain protest and rebellion- such as regime type, separatism and repression- religion has a place. To fill this gap, a testable model is developed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, this model is operationalized by defining variables to test the model. In this chapter, the model is tested in a large-N, cross-sectional format using data collected by the author along with the RAS dataset and the MAR dataset.

The 14 hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are tested using all 62 cases in four parts. The first part displays descriptive statistics on religious discrimination in order to identify regional distribution of the variable. The second part offers multiple regressions that test the model annually from 1990 to 2003. In the third part, the available data for the period from 1990 to 2003 is pooled for time series cross sectional analysis. Finally, results are applied to ethnoreligious minorities in Iraq to provide ideas regarding future of the country. It is important to note that this section's aim is not to provide a full-fledged qualitative analysis. Instead, it aims to flesh out some of the results.

I. Descriptive Analysis of Religious Discrimination[1]

During the model development process, one of the questions that emerged was "who discriminates more?" The three regions, Western Democracies,[2] Asia and the Middle East, are diverse in terms of majority religions, such as Protestant Christianity in the United Kingdom, Buddhism in Bhutan, Sunni Islam in Afghanistan, Hinduism in India, Shi'i Islam in Iran, and Judaism in Israel, as well as minority religions such as Catholic Hispanics in the US, Christian Mizos in India, and Sunni Arabs in Israel. Within this diversity is there a geographical religious discrimination pattern? The answer is 'yes.'

Data collected on religious discrimination show that religious discrimination levels are different in three regions. When the mean values of religious discrimination over the 15 years are compared, it is seen that Western Democracies have much smaller mean values than Asia and the Middle East (See Figure 5-1).

[Figure 5-1 here]

The average values of religious discrimination give an idea about the bigger picture. However, it is not clear which region has a broader range of religious discrimination. Figure 5-2 reveals that, in all three regions, there are ethnoreligious minorities that are not religiously discriminated against. In other words, values of zero are present in all. However, when maximum values are considered, the Middle East is the highest one, whereas Western Democracies have the lowest maximum value. Maximum level of discrimination percentages vary as well. In Western Democracies it is 11.94%, in

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[1] For further information on maximum religious discrimination values of 62 ethnoreligious minorities see Table 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, 6D, and 7D in Appendix B.

[2] For this study, Minorities at Risk regional divisions are used and the MAR uses Western Democracies to refer to Western Europe, North America and Japan.

Asia 51.11% and in Middle East it is 72.92%.[3] These two figures show that, in the

Middle East, values of religious discrimination are diverse, i.e. there are very high values

and very low values. Yet, in Asia, the distribution is narrower (See Figure 5-2).

[Figure 5-2 here]

Figures 5-1 and 5-2 illustrate that three regions are quite different from each other

in terms of level of religious discrimination. Yet, it is not clear if the differences are

statistically significant or not. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) models are employed

to see whether there were significant differences in levels of religious discrimination

among regions from 1990 to 2004.

15 models were run, one for each year, to see the relationship among regions in

every year from 1990 to 2004. Results show that the contrast between Western

Democracies and Asia, as well as Western Democracies and the Middle East, are

statistically significant throughout the period. Pervasive differences reveal that religious

discrimination is a structural problem in Asia and the Middle East in contrast to Western

Democracies (See Tables 5-1A to 5-3A).

[Tables 5-1A to 5-3A here]

In sum, religious discrimination is a salient issue in Asia and the Middle East, by

contrast, with Western Democracies. Even though Middle East and Asia have similar

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[3] These percentages are calculated in the following way: (actual discrimination/ opportunities of
discrimination)*100.

values of average discrimination, the range between minimum and maximum values is broader for Middle East. In other words, Middle East has extreme religious discrimination values for ethnoreligious groups such as the Baha'is in Iran (35 out of 48) and Shi'is in Saudi Arabia (30 out of 48).

Knowing the religious discrimination profile of a region might contribute to case studies by providing the place of the specific country or minority in the broader picture of the region. Later on, in this chapter, case of Iraq and ethnoreligious minorities in the country is focused to set an example. This section utilizes descriptive analysis of religious discrimination reported above.

II. Multiple Regression

Even though understanding the level of religious discrimination in different regions is one of the objectives of this study, a more important one is finding the role of religion in protest and rebellion of ethnoreligious groups while controlling factors known to be influential in the literature. In line with that objective, the model explained in Chapter 3 is executed using multiple regression analysis.

There are two dependent variables: protest and rebellion. For each dependent variable, 26 regressions are run, and there are two models for each year. One model includes interaction variables and the other does not (interaction of religious discrimination and separatism; religious discrimination and regime type; religious discrimination, regime type, and repression). The models with interaction variables are identified with letter "I". For instance, for the year 1991, the model with interaction variables is labeled as 1991 (I).

A one-year time lag is applied to all independent variables in the analyses. In other words, when the dependent variable is protest values in 1991, all independent variables are for the 1990.

Below, the 14 hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are tested, and results are interpreted individually. The results of the data analysis in this chapter offer a fresh approach to the role of religion in conflict. While the hypotheses most receive support, they present a picture that is much more complicated than the model developed in Chapter 3. The unexpected sign of some coefficients implies that, even though the model correctly predicts the importance of the variables in understanding conflict, their impact is not well understood. In other words, direction of this impact is not correctly predicted.

Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis1b: Religious Discrimination

Hypothesis1a: Religious discrimination increases the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups.

Hypothesis1b: Religious discrimination increases the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups.

The hypotheses predict a strong positive relationship between the religious discrimination variable and the dependent variables (protest and rebellion). This expectation follows the basic argument of the model, i.e. discrimination in general; religious discrimination in particular encourages political mobilization of the groups. The data, as shown in tables 5-1P to 5-3P and 5-1R to 5-3R, contradicts with Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis1b respectively. For protest, in the multiple regression models 1992(I), 1994 (I), 1997, 1997(I), 1998, 1998 (I), 1999, 1999(I), 2000, and 2000(I), religious discrimination appears as a statistically significant variable at various

levels.[4] However, in these models the coefficient for religious discrimination is always negative (See tables 5-1P to 5-3P). In other words, higher levels of religious discrimination impede ethnoreligious groups' tendencies to protest. This is directly the opposite of the relationship predicted by Hypothesis1a.

For rebellion, in the multiple regression models 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2000 (I), 2001, 2002, 2003 religious discrimination appears as a statistically significant variable at various levels (See tables 5-1R to 5-3R). Likewise, in these models the coefficient is negative when religious discrimination is statistically significant. In other words, higher levels of religious discrimination impede ethnoreligious groups' tendencies to rebel. This is directly the opposite of the relationship that is predicted by Hypothesis1b.

Even though a statistically significant relationship between religious discrimination and protest/rebellion is correctly predicted by Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis1b, the direction of the hypotheses was not captured by the analysis. In all, the evidence provides mixed support for Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis1b. The negative correlation between religious discrimination and protest, as well as rebellion, remains consistently in multiple regressions.[5]

[Tables 5-1P to 5-3P and 5-1R to 5-3R here]

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[4] Significance <.1, significance <.05, significance <.01, and significance <.001 are reported.
[5] Due to counter-intuitive results, a curvilinear model is run (i.e. religious discrimination and religious discrimination squared) to see whether there may be a non-linear relationship. Out of 26 regressions only in three of them very slight curvilinear relation observed. For protest model 1995, religious discrimination squared is significant at .1 level with a positive coefficient. The coefficient of the quadratic term is so small compared to the coefficient of the linear term that to observe a positive relation between religious discrimination and protest we would need a religious discrimination level so high that is not observed. For rebellion, in models 1993 (I) and 1994 (I), the relation is curvilinear. It is positive for low levels of religious discrimination and it becomes negative. Yet, these are the only cases.

There are four possible explanations for this counter-intuitive finding. First, religious discrimination might be inhibiting activities of protest and rebellion due to the fear of further discrimination. Maybe ethnoreligious groups worry that any kind of political mobilization will bring further religious discrimination. To sustain existing religious freedom, groups might prefer not to attract more attention through protest or rebellion.

The second explanation is related to the first one. If there is fear of further religious discrimination, there might be fear of further political and economic discrimination. Results reported in tables 5-1P to 5-3P and tables 5-1R to 5-3R show that economic and political discrimination encourages groups to protest or rebel. So, since we do not see an identical reaction to economic and political discrimination, there is something unique about the "religion" aspect of discrimination. As explained in Chapter 2, religion constitutes a significant part of ethnic identity. It not only has some social functions, but also addresses the spiritual side of life. Instead of going out to protest or rebel, ethnoreligious groups facing religious discrimination may practice their religion secretly.

Third reason is the relatively focused nature of the study. The analysis includes 62 cases, and these are ethnoreligious groups of Western Democracies, Asia and Middle East, and North Africa. Latin American and the Caribbean, post-communist states and Sub-Saharan Africa are not included due to data limitations. Results might change with the inclusion of these regions.

The fourth possible explanation is considerably more interesting and starts with a question: What happens when a group faces religious discrimination?   At this point we

need to go back and have a look at variables included in the religious discrimination index, such as restrictions on public observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays; restrictions on access to places or worship; restrictions on formal religious organizations; restrictions on the running of religious schools and/or religious education in general; arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials; restrictions on the ordination of and/or access to clergy. When a group does not have access to places of worship or clergy, when new generation does not have the right to attend religious schools, or when there are huge restrictions for official figures, the group loses its power to mobilize. Religion, with a church, mosque, temple gathering and religious leaders, not only provides a common denominator to the members of the group, but also facilitates communication. Through religious discrimination, groups lose their "glue" and fall apart. That might be one of the explanations for the puzzling negative relationship between religious discrimination and protest/rebellion.

The Baha'is in Iran as a religiously discriminated ethnoreligious group provides a major example of the counter-intuitive results explained above. Annual protest and rebellion scores of the group for the period of 1990-2003 are all 0, according to the MAR dataset. In other words, over the period there is no protest or rebellion coded. However, the average religious discrimination score of the Baha'is in Iran is 35 out of 48, which is one of the highest scores.[6] The inverse relationship between religious discrimination and protest/rebellion is obvious in this case. The Baha'i believers form a small community which is distinctly different from dominant Shi'i majority. The Shi'i Muslim clergy of Iran has been opposed to Baha'i religion and this opposition has increased its intensity

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[6] Please note that average score of religious discrimination is around 9.89 in the Middle East and North Africa.

since the 1979 revolution. According to the MAR reports, the practice of the Baha'i faith is prohibited by the Iranian constitution, as well as the celebration of holidays and organizations that promote Baha'i culture.[7]

How can we explain the lack of political mobilization of the group based on the information provided above? "Fear," which is materialized with the constitution of Iran, forms an important aspect of the picture. Even though the constitution states that Islam is the religion of the state, it recognizes other religions, such as Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians. According to the constitution, within the limitations of law, religious freedom would be provided to members of these religions (International Religious Freedom, Country Report 2005). Baha'i is not one of the recognized religions and this is one of the major reasons behind major restrictions (International Religious Freedom, Country Report 2005). Lack of recognition by the constitution puts the Baha'is in a vulnerable position that enhances their fear of further discrimination because there is no official way to stop further religious discrimination against this group.

Moreover, Baha'i schools are not allowed; they may not teach or practice their religion; maintaining links with the Baha'i community abroad is not acceptable; they cannot form any kind of official assembly, so they have no clergy (International Religious Freedom, Country Report 2005; Fox Unpublished Manuscript). These and many other religious restrictions hinder communication among members of the community, jeopardize possibility of passing cultural traits to new generation, and limit leadership positions etc. So, even though Baha'i practitioners would prefer religious

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[7] Further information can be found in MAR Minority Groups Assessment reports at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp (02/28/2006).

freedom, they are not powerful enough to do so due to the lack of cohesion and organization that could be provided by the very thing they want.

As multiple regression analysis aims to do, the model designed for this study will consider other factors to explain the role of religious discrimination in groups' political mobilization. It is not possible to understand situation of Baha'is in Iran or other minorities by just looking at religious discrimination alone. Yet, this case illustrates the counter-intuitive results very well and is by no means atypical.

Hypothesis2a and Hypothesis2b: Majority Religion Law

Hypothesis2a: Ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of protest when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law.

Hypothesis2b: Ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of rebellion when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law.

Religious legislation is one of the two "religion" variables. It is expected that religious legislation in majority religion will encourage mobilization of groups. When a state has a high percentage of majority religion law, minorities with a different religion might feel marginalized from the legal process. According to the model provided in Chapter 3, this marginalization triggers protest and rebellion of ethnoreligious groups.

The data shown in tables 5-1P to 5-3P contradicts with Hypothesis2a. Multiple regression models 1995, 1995 (I), 1996, 1996 (I), 1998, 1998 (I), 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2002 (I) for protest include a statistically significant relationship between the level of religious legislation and the groups' protest. However, in these models, the coefficient for religious legislation, where the variable is significant, is always negative. In other words,

higher levels of religious legislation hinder the ethnoreligious groups' tendencies to protest. This is exactly the opposite of the relationship predicted by Hypothesis2a.

The data shown in tables 5-1R to 5-3R contradicts with Hypothesis2b. Multiple regression models 1991, 1991 (I), 1992, 1992(I), 1993, 1993 (I), 1994(I), 1995, 1995 (I), 1996, 1996 (I) for rebellion include a statistically significant relationship between level of religious legislation and the groups' rebellion. However, in these models, the coefficient for religious legislation is significant but always negative. In other words, higher levels of religious legislation slow down ethnoreligious groups' tendencies to rebel. This is directly the opposite of the relationship that is predicted by Hypothesis2b.

These counter-intuitive results show that the relationship between a country's religious legislation and protest/rebellion by the ethnoreligious minorities living in that country is much more complicated than suggested in Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b. When this is combined with the negative relationship between religious discrimination and protest/rebellion, it reinforces the idea that there is something poorly understood about the effects of religion-oriented variables. Intensity of religious legislation on majority religion, like religious discrimination, has a negative impact on group's mobilization and that creates an interesting puzzle.

Two possible explanations are provided in this section. First of all, religious legislation is an index variable that includes variables such as restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion; censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being anti-religious; some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order to hold office; presence of religious courts which have jurisdiction over some matters of law. When a state underlines the role of majority religion through

religious legislation, the line between rules of state and rules of religion get blurred. In the model from Chapter 3, this is described as a situation where ethnoreligious groups are marginalized and pushed to protest and rebel. However, the evidence shows that ethnoreligious groups have a tendency not to protest or rebel, perhaps out of fear. This might be due to the idea that, for the ethnoreligious group, the state loses its neutrality as the sole security provider within its borders. Consequently, religious minorities basically lose their hope for change in the absence of a neutral state.

Second, the majority religion might enhance its organizational capability through religious legislation. This asymmetry between majority and minority group might inhibit any kind of activity, including protest and rebellion.

The case of the Baha'is in Iran once again will be provided to explain counter-intuitive results. According to the RAS dataset, religious legislation in Iran is 23 out of 32, which is a relatively high score. The mean level of religious legislation in the Middle East is around 17.95- still relatively high, but a bit lower than Iran. However, as stated above, Bahai'is in Iran did not get involved in protest or rebellion between 1990 and 2003. When this is combined with the statements provided above, it becomes apparent that Iran is not neutral to the Baha'i faith, and there is an asymmetry between majority and minority religions, specifically for the Bahai faith.

Fox (Unpublished Manuscript: 9) observes that "The Bahai are subject to particular restrictions because they are considered apostates... Bahai communal property, including holy places, places of worship, and cemeteries were seized after the 1979 revolution and have not been returned." Strong restrictions accompanied by a history of policies of marginalization might have restrained Baha'is capability to protest and rebel.

Hypothesis3a and Hypothesis3b: Economic Discrimination

Hypothesis3a: Economic discrimination increases the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups.

Hypothesis3b: Economic discrimination increases the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups.

Economic discrimination should appear as a statistically significant value in multiple regression models. An examination of tables 5-1P to 5-3P, and tables 5-1R to 5-3R, provides weak confirmation for both of the hypotheses, with Hypothesis 3a being stronger. For protest, economic discrimination is reported to be statistically significant at different levels for models 1992, 1993, 1993 (I), 1995, 1995 (I), 2000. For rebellion, however, economic discrimination is reported to be statistically significant at different levels for only model 1996 (I). The coefficients are positive, so the direction is predicted correctly. However, the number of models where economic discrimination is statistically significant is low, and the trend is not consistent over the period covered, i.e., dispersed around the time period analyzed. Still, the impact of economic discrimination on protest or rebellion of groups in seven models provides a partial confirmation of the Hypotheses3a and 3b.

Hypothesis4a and Hypothesis4b: Political Discrimination

Hypothesis4a: Political discrimination increases the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups.

Hypothesis4b: Political discrimination increases the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups.

Thus there should be a strong statistically significant relationship between political discrimination and two dependent variables: protest and rebellion. As seen in

Table 5-1P to 5-3P and 5-1R to 5-3R, results provide a considerable confirmation to Hypothesis4a and Hypothesis4b. In twelve models, political discrimination appears as a statistically significant variable at different levels. For protest in models 1991 (I), 1994 (I), 1997, 1997 (I), 1998, 1998 (I), Hypothesis 4a receives support, and for rebellion in models 1991, 1991 (I), 1992, 1992 (I), 1993, 1993 (I) Hypothesis4b receives support. In the early 1990s, political discrimination seems to have had a higher impact on mobilization of groups than late 1990s.

Hypothesis5a and Hypothesis5b: Interaction of Religious Discrimination and Separatism

Hypothesis5a: The effect of separatism on the level of protest will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority.

Hypothesis5b: The effect of separatism on the level of rebellion will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority.

In all three of the interaction variables, it is argued that religious discrimination has a moderator effect. In statistics, moderator factors are claimed to be important "because specific factors (e.g. context information) are often assumed to reduce or enhance the influence that specific independent variables have on specific responses in question (dependent variable)."[8] In this case, in line with the model of the study, it is argued that religious discrimination will strengthen the effect of separatism. The interaction variable is reported to be significant in models 1995 (I), 1996 (I) when the dependent variable is protest, and 1993 (I), 1994 (I), 1995 (I), 1996 (I), 1997 (I), 1998 (I), 1999 (I), 2003 (I) when dependent variable is rebellion. Table 5-1P, 5-2P, 5-3P, 5-1R, 5-2R and 5-3R display that, while Hypothesis5a receives minor support, Hypothesis5b

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[8] Further information can be found at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed230a2/mediator.html (03/02/2006).

receives considerable, although not full support, i.e. interaction of religious

discrimination and separatism is strongly correlated with levels of rebellion, but not in the

direction expected.[9] There is a negative relationship between the religious discrimination

* separatism variable and both of the dependent variables (protest and rebellion).

Moreover, separatism alone is significant at different levels in models 1991, 1992, 1992

(I), 1993, 1993 (I), 1995, 1995 (I), 1996, 1996 (I), 1999, 1999 (I), 2003 and 2003 (I) for

protest and is negative only in 1999, and 1999 (I). In models 1991, 1991 (I), 1992, 1992

(I), 1993, 1993 (I), 1994, 1994 (I), 1995, 1995 (I), 1996, 1996 (I), 1997 (I), 1998 (I),

2001, 2001 (I), 2002, 2002 (I), 2003 (I), the relationship between separatism and

rebellion are statistically significant at different levels, and coefficient of the variable is

positive. In other words, the negative sign of the interaction variable is not consistent

with sign of the coefficients for that of separatism alone. This means in the models that,

where the interaction of religious discrimination and separatism is significant, separatist

groups have a higher protest level than non-separatist groups; but, as religious

discrimination increases, the level of protest/rebellion of separatist groups decreases

faster than the level of protest/rebellion for non-separatist groups. In other words,

separatist groups are more reactive to level of religious discrimination.

There are three explanations for these counterintuitive results. They are all in line

with the explanation provided for the puzzling relationship between religious

discrimination and the two dependent variables. First of all, fear of further discrimination

either might be more important for separatist groups, or it might have a different

connotation. A majority of the time, separatist groups have a history of conflict. Just as

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[9] Since direction of the relationships contradicts the hypothesis, in this sentence "support" refers to only
statistically significant relationship.

the governments are vigilant about the actions of separatist ethnoreligious groups, these

groups also scrutinize the government's policies. Religious discrimination, within the

context of a history of tension, might be considered as a warning to 'calm down'.

Another explanation is related to using religion and religious network as tools for

the mobilization of the separatist groups. Religious discrimination might hurt separatist

groups' ability to mobilize more than non-separatist groups, since their places of worship,

clergy, and religious schools might be a "cover" for a separatist movement. When that

cover is removed, the mobility of separatist groups is inhibited more so than that of non-

separatist groups.

Finally, as stated before, another reason may be the scope of this study. There are

62 cases included in the analysis, and these are ethnoreligious groups of Western

Democracies, Asia, and Middle East and North Africa. Latin American and the

Caribbean, post-communist states and Sub-Saharan Africa, as noted earlier, are not

included due to data limitations. Results might change with the inclusion of these regions.

Hypothesis6a and Hypothesis6b: Interaction of Religious Discrimination and Regime Type

Hypothesis6a: The effect of regime type on the level of protest will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

Hypothesis6b: The effect of regime type on the level of rebellion will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

As a moderator variable, interaction between religious discrimination and regime

type aims to capture how religious discrimination enhances the impact of regime type on

level of protest and rebellion. For protest, interaction of regime type and religious

discrimination appears to be statistically significant at different levels in models 1991 (I),

1992 (I), 1993 (I), 1994 (I), 1995 (I). Yet, the variable is not significant at all when the dependent variable is rebellion. In the models where interaction of regime type and religious discrimination is statistically significant, it has a negative sign even though regime type alone has positive coefficient where it is statistically significant in general, except for two models (for rebellion model 1991 and 1996 (I)). Since the coefficient of religious discrimination is negative, the results show that the negative incidence of religious discrimination to protest/rebel is stronger in democratic countries than in autocratic ones.

There are two possible explanations to that. First of all, we can argue that, in democracies, people face fewer restrictions than in autocracies. Religious discrimination might be "shocking" or "unexpected" for citizens of democratic countries and therefore paralyze any protest or rebellion.

Second, in democratic countries, even though citizens can elect their representatives, if a minority is not populous enough to send representatives to the institutions of the legislature or to the executive, they might be politically weak. This weakness might reduce mobilization capabilities of the group as well.

Hypothesis7a and Hypothesis7b: A three way interaction of Religious Discrimination, Regime Type and Repression

Hypothesis7a: The effect of regime type and repression will increase the level of protest with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

Hypothesis7b: The effect of regime type and repression will increase the level of rebellion with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities.

The interaction aims to reveal how these three variables enhance each other's impact on protest and rebellion. This interaction could be included in models for the

period after 1996, since the repression variable is only available for that period. For protest, it appears as a statistically significant variable at different levels in models 2001 (I), 2002 (I). For rebellion, it is significant in models 1997 (I), 2000 (I), 2001(I), 2002(I). The coefficient of the three-way interaction is always positive.

In sum, models with interaction variables illustrate that considering regime type and separatism alone might be misleading since the relationship between regime type and protest/rebellion, as well as separatism and protest/rebellion, is often influenced by the level of religious discrimination. In several models, even the three-way interaction appears as a significant factor. This means that, in order to understand why ethnoreligious groups protest/rebel, we need to know not only regime type and religious discrimination but also the repression level.

Religious discrimination has a stronger impact in democratic countries. When the three-way interaction is significant, we can see that a low level of repression boosts this effect even more.

Overall, the interaction variables in these models of protest and rebellion underline that religious discrimination has an impact on understanding the roles of variables (such as separatism, regime type, repression) that are proved to trigger protest and rebellion. Therefore, religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority might be an important piece of the puzzle.

As reported above there are two models run for each year from 1991 to 2003 to test 14 hypotheses. In order to describe the relative performances of hypotheses and years, table 5-P and table 5-R are created. These tables aim to provide the "big picture" of how the analysis worked out. (See Table 5-P and Table 5-R)

[Table 5-P and Table 5-R here]

Contradiction between predicted direction of the hypotheses and the results is a major issue. For protest, direction of hypotheses H1a, H2a, H5a and H6a contradicted with the findings at the rate of 38 %, 38%, 15.4%, and 38.5%, respectively. For rebellion, direction of hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H5b contradicted with the findings at the rate of 30.4 %, 41.8 %, and 61.6%, respectively. There is one thing shared by all three hypotheses, i.e. they include one of the religion-related variables. Contradiction refers to the negative relationship between religion-related variables and protest/rebellion. This finding may be quite important for future research on religion and conflict. It not only shows religion, specifically religious discrimination and legislation, is an important factor that needs to be considered in understanding protest or rebellion, but also highlights possibility of a counter-intuitive relationship.

Not confirmed percentages of hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a, and H7a are 60.8%, 60.8%, 76%, 76%, 84.7%, 61.6% and 71.5%, respectively. In terms of overall performance, religious discrimination (H1a) and religious legislation (H2a) variables work better than the others for protest.

Not confirmed percentages of hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b, and H7b are 68.4 %, 57 %, 95%, 76%, 30.8%, 100 %, and 42.9%, respectively. In terms of overall performance H5b (interaction of religious legislation and separatism), H7b (three-way interaction of religious discrimination, regime type and repression) and H2b (religious legislation) are ranked in the top three.

In terms of yearly performances of the models, for protest, models run for 1998 and 2000 are the best ones. In both of the years, only 25% of the hypotheses are not confirmed. However, there are years where there is no support for any of the hypotheses such as 1991, 1994, 2003 and 2003 (I).

For rebellion, models run for 1991, 1992, 1993, 1993 (I), and 1996 (I) perform better than the other years. Respectively percentages of hypotheses that are not confirmed are 50%, 50%, 50% 49.8% and 49.8%. On the other hand, analysis for 1994 does not give support to any hypotheses.

Overall performance of the models over the period 1990-2003 encourage further data collection and research on religion- related variables to figure out the role of religion in general in understanding protest/rebellion. At this point, it is not clear whether results reveal tip of an iceberg or an ice cube.

III. Time Series Cross Sectional Data Analysis

Annual multiple regression runs disregard time dependency between yearly equations. They are treated as independent analyses, but actually they are not. This section fixes that problem by pooling the data and analyzing it in two different models: spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement.

Results of this section do not eliminate the annual regression analysis, but complements it. Due to the nature and availability of the data both annual multiple regression analysis and time series cross sectional analysis are utilized. Religious discrimination data is collected for 15 years for 62 minorities. This means that for a specific minority, like Muslims in India, there are 15 observations of religious

discrimination, i.e. one for each year. Multiple regression analysis has two advantages. First, this enabled us to see if there are any fluctuations within the period covered. It is quite easy to see the differences between 1991 and 1992 with these annual runs. Second, all the variables included in the model were not available for the whole period. Some of them were covering completely different periods. For instance, organizational cohesion variable is available for period 1990- 1994, but repression variable is going from 1996 to 2003. In a pooled data, these two cannot be used together since there is no temporal intersection. Similarly, group's spatial distribution data is provided for 1990-2000 period. So, we needed to include/exclude certain variables depending on the availability. To be able to see impact of those variables that are not available for the whole period, there was need to run annual regressions.

Pooled time series cross sectional data has many advantages as well. First, the number of observations included in the analysis is larger. This increases the degrees of freedom and helps to estimate much more specified models. It is a smooth way to overcome the small-N problem. Second, with this data, it is possible to eliminate temporary effects on the dependent variable. For instance, a short term crisis or elections might have an impact on level of protest or rebellion of ethnoreligious minorities. With the annual analysis the danger of omitted variable bias is higher. However, pooled time series cross sectional data is more challenging than cross sectional data due to couple of reasons.

OLS regression equation assumes that error terms are independent from each other and they have same variances across units. The analysis of pooled time series data

violates these two assumptions. Error terms are autocorrelated due to time dependency and might be heteroscedastic, i.e. errors can have different variances across units.

To address these problems this study utilized two different models: spline temporal effect models and mixed models for repeated measurement. In the spline temporal effect model, splines are used to fix the problem of dependence of error terms. In the mixed models for repeated measurement, basically it is assumed that error terms are dependent. Since the model uses maximum likelihood estimator and assumes dependency of error terms, problem is not as challenging in the mixed models for repeated measurement (Littell et al. 1998). The mixed models for repeated measurement fix covariance structure to be AR (1) for error correction.

To solve heteroscedasticity problem, unstructured covariance matrix is used. However, goodness of fit statistics showed that the model under the assumption of homoskedasticity, i.e. same variance of errors across units, fits the data better than the model under the assumption of heteroscedasticity.

When you are using pooled data there is need to choose between fixed and random effects.

> Fixed effects regression is the model to use when you want to control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time. It lets you use the changes in the variables over time to estimate the effects of the independent variables on your dependent variable, and is the main technique used for analysis of panel data.... If you have reason to believe that some omitted variables may be constant over time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases but vary over time, then you can include both types by using random effects.[10]

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[10] This information is available at http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm (05/07/2006).

Hausman test is used to choose between fixed and random effects. Results indicate that it is safe to use random effects with the pooled time series cross sectional data employed in this study.

A. Results of Spline Temporal Effect Models

Tables 5-4P and 5-4R show results of spline temporal effect models. For each dependent variable (protest and rebellion) there are four runs where repression and interaction variables are included and excluded.[11]

[Tables 5-4P and 5-4R here][12]

Results indicate that when protest is the dependent variable both of the religion variables (religious discrimination and religious legislation) have negative coefficients and both of them are statistically significant in all four models. In other words, the puzzling negative relationship found in annual multiple regressions between religion variables and protest keep their presence in the spline temporal effect models. This contradicts with Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis2a since the expectation in these hypotheses is a positive relationship between protest and religious discrimination as well as protest and religious legislation. However, it strengthens the argument that religion is a determinant factor in understanding ethnic conflicts.

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[11] Since repression was not available for the period 1990-2003, the runs without this variable are also included.

[12] Splines are used in temporal effect models. However, it is found that smoothing with splines is unnecessary. Splines complicate the model without any reason, because linear effect is as influential as splines. So, linear time effect is used in these models.

Hypothesis3a and Hypothesis4a are supported with statistically significant findings in all four of the spline temporal effect models. This support is even higher than the overall annual regression performance for these hypotheses which were confirmed 22.8%.

Results contradict with the expectations of Hypothesis5a and Hypothesis6a. Out of the two spline temporal effect models, in only one of them interaction of religious discrimination and separatism is significant and it has a negative sign. This means that separatist groups have a higher protest level than non-separatist groups; but, as religious discrimination increases, the level of protest of separatist groups decreases faster than the level of protest for non-separatist groups. In other words, separatist groups are more reactive to level of religious discrimination. Similarly interaction of religious discrimination and regime type is significant in only one of the models and has a negative sign. Since the coefficient of religious discrimination is negative too, the results show that the negative incidence of religious discrimination to protest is stronger in democratic countries than in autocratic ones.

For rebellion, the findings are slightly different. Hypothesis1b receives partial support. In two of the models religious discrimination variable is significant and sign of the coefficient is positive. However, Hypothesis2b contradicts with results since where religious legislation appears as a statistically significant variable, it has a negative sign. Hypothesis3b is supported in only one out of four models and Hypothesis4b is supported by two models out of four. Out of the two spline temporal effect models, in two of them interaction of religious discrimination and separatism is significant and it has a negative

sign. So, this contradicts with Hypothesis5b. Hypothesis6b does not receive any support at all from any of the spline temporal effect models.

B. Results of Mixed Models for Repeated Measurement

Mixed models for repeated measurement are run in two different ways.[13] First set of runs is with year dummies and second set of runs are without year dummies. Both of them are displayed in tables 5-5P, 5-5R, 5-6P and 5-6R.

[Tables 5-5P, 5-5R, 5-6P and 5-6R here]

Models with Year Dummies

Models with year dummies show that when protest is the dependent variable both of the religion variables (religious discrimination and religious legislation) have negative coefficients and both of them are statistically significant in all four models. In other words, the puzzling negative relationship found in annual multiple regressions and the spline temporal effect models between religion variables and protest keep its presence in the mixed models for repeated measurement with year dummies. This contradicts with Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis2a since the expectation in these hypotheses is a positive relationship between protest and religious discrimination as well as protest and religious legislation. However, it strengthens the argument that religion is a determinant factor in understanding ethnic conflicts.

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[13] Mixed models for repeated measurement estimate with maximum likelihood. These models can let you use a time series effect without problem of matrix singularity. This model is run with and without year dummies.

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Hypothesis3a is supported with statistically significant findings in all four of the mixed models for repeated measurement with year dummies. Hypothesis4a is supported in three of the models. This support is even higher than the overall annual regression performance for these hypotheses which were confirmed 22.8% and it is very close to the spline temporal effect models where Hypotheses 3a and 4a received full support. Hypothesis5a and Hypothesis6a are not significant in any of the models.

For rebellion, the findings are slightly different. Hypothesis1b receives partial support. In one of the models it is significant and sign of the coefficient is positive. However, Hypothesis2b contradicts with expectations since religious legislation variable is statistically significant in four of the models and has a negative coefficient. Hypothesis3b and Hypothesis4b are not supported at all. Interaction of religious discrimination and separatism is significant in two of the models and it has a negative coefficient. These results contradict with Hypothesis5b. On the other hand, interaction of religious discrimination and regime type is not significant at all when dependent variable is rebellion.

Models without Year Dummies

Results of mixed models without year dummies are reported in tables 5-6P and 5-6R. When protest is the dependent variable both of the religion variables (religious discrimination and religious legislation) have negative coefficients and both of them are statistically significant in all four models. This is very important because the puzzling negative relationship found in annual multiple regressions, the spline temporal effect models and mixed models with year dummies between religion variables and protest keep

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their presence in the mixed models for repeated measurement without year dummies. Findings contradict with Hypothesis1a and Hypothesis2a since the expectation in these hypotheses is a positive relationship between protest and religious discrimination as well as protest and religious legislation. However, these results show that negative relationship between protest and religious discrimination as well as religious legislation is robust. Four different types of analysis confirm that increase in religious discrimination and legislation decreases likelihood of protest.

Hypothesis3a and 4a are supported with statistically significant findings in all four of the mixed models for repeated measurement without year dummies. Hypothesis5a does not receive support in any of the models and interaction of religious discrimination and regime type is significant in only one model with a negative coefficient. So it contradicts with Hypothesis6a.

For rebellion, the findings are different. Hypothesis1b receives partial support. In only one of the models it is significant and sign of the coefficient is positive. However, Hypothesis2b contradicts with expectations since religious legislation variable is statistically significant in four of the models and coefficient has a negative sign. Hypothesis3b and Hypothesis4b are not supported at all. Interaction of religious discrimination and separatism is significant in two of the models and coefficient has a negative sign. These results contradict with Hypothesis5b. On the other hand, interaction of religious discrimination and regime type is not significant at all when dependent variable is rebellion.

C. Model Comparison

These findings are quite important because they show that obviously religious discrimination and religious legislation are important factors to understand conflict, especially protest. Moreover, in general, the theoretical model explained in Chapter 3 seems to include significant determinants of ethnic conflict in general. However, the question is among these models which one is better than the other?

To compare the spline temporal effect models and mixed models for repeated measurement with and without year dummies, three fit statistics are used: AIC, AICC and BIC.

[Table 5-7P and 5-7R here.]

AIC, AICC and BIC are fitness statistics that are all based on two distinctive parts. First part measures the discrepancy between the model and the data based on probabilistic consideration. This part is the same for AIC, AICC and BIC. Second part is a penalty for complexity, which is used to avoid the choice of overcomplicated and over fitting models which are not easily generalized. This is computed differently for AIC, AICC and BIC. However, logic is the same in all three, i.e. penalty for complexity. In these fitness statistics, smaller is better.[14] When this is considered for protest, mixed models for repeated measurement with year dummies is the best model according to AIC, AICC, and BIC. For rebellion, all three fitness statistics show that mixed models for repeated measurement without year dummies are the best option. So, in general, mixed models for repeated measurement perform better than spline temporal effect models.

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[14] More information on this can be found at http://support.sas.com/ (05/07/2006).

IV. Future Prospects for Iraq: Where do we go from here?

Results of the descriptive and multiple statistical analysis are reported above. A follow up question is: where do we go from here? What are the substantive, conflict resolution-related lessons to be learned from this research? This section aims to find the place of ethnoreligious groups of Iraq in the broader picture of ethnoreligious conflict in order to offer answers to questions stated above.

Selection of Iraq is based on two attributes of the country:

1) Geographic location of Iraq is important. Among the three regions, Middle East is the one that includes maximum values of religious discrimination. Understanding Middle East may shed some light on broader questions on the role played by religious discrimination in conflict.

2) Iraq is in a transition process and at this point predictions regarding the future of the country ranges from civil war to stable democracy. This wide scope of possibilities gives a clean plate where we can brainstorm about impact of religion unlike Sri Lanka, Lebanon or Iran. In cases where previous experiences of the country restrict the way we think about the role of religion, it is hard to utilize every aspect of the findings.

As a result of the continued noncompliance of Iraq with resolutions of the United Nations (UN), coalition forces led by the United States (US) invaded Iraq in March 2003. Iraqi Interim Government had received the control on paper in June 2004. However, Iraq seems far away from being a sovereign state that is capable of providing security for its own citizens. The multi-group insurgency is principally led by Sunni Arabs, and underlines ethnic/religious divisions within a country that already exists on the Middle

East fault line. In this part, situation in Iraq from 2003 to the end of 2005 is examined. Three trends can be applied to Iraq to predict future mobilization of ethnoreligious groups:[15]

A) High levels of religious discrimination and religious legislation are serious issues that must be addressed for the Middle East and North Africa in general and Iraq in particular. The best solution, however, may not be religious freedom in the short run;

B) transitions from one type of regime to another, specifically changes from autocracy to democracy, can increase groups mobilization; and

 C) even though it is hard to predict how it will play out, religious tension will be part of the puzzle among ethnoreligious groups in Iraq for at least the short to medium term.

A. Religious Discrimination and Legislation

Above, it is reported that states in the Middle East not only discriminate more on average than Western Europe, the region also has extreme cases of religious discrimination that represent the maximum among the three regions covered in this study, such as Shi'is in Saudi Arabia.

Annual multiple regressions and time series cross sectional data analysis that control many factors like separatism, level of repression and regime type show that religious discrimination is an important factor in understanding protest and rebellion of ethnic groups. Religious discrimination seems to discourage protest and rebellion. In other words, minorities that face less religious discrimination have a higher likelihood of protest or rebellion.

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[15] These three trends do not aim to capture every aspect of results reported. Contrary, it aims to combine some of the findings with the ethnic conflict literature in general.

Another interesting result concerns religious legislation. Higher levels of religious legislation on majority religion decrease the likelihood of protest and rebellion. Therefore, if a country emphasizes majority religion in the legislature process, this decreases opportunities to protest and rebel.

How can we apply these findings to Iraq? It would be very misleading to apply these results without sensitivity to context. However, it is possible to consider the findings in the light of unique features of the country. If we assume that religious discrimination brings the fear of further discrimination and inhibits communication, then a peaceful Iraq, at least in the short term, may not be created through allowing religious freedom to minorities. Moreover, religious legislation promoting the majority religion might contribute to the country's unity in the long run. Yet, it is important to note that the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, which failed to provide religious rights to Shi'is in Iraq, did not bring peace to the country, either.

The major problem in Iraq is the presence of social and psychological lines between different sects that divide them politically. In the short term, religious freedom will provide space for religious leaders to polarize the society and facilitate further fragmentation. In order to gain political power, these local leaders will be more than happy to exploit the religious rights given to minorities.

Hinnebusch (2005:153) states that "The Middle East stands out because of its unique combination of both strong *sub-state* identities and powerful *supra-state* identities that, together, dilute and limit the mass loyalty to the state." In order to eliminate these strong sub-state and supra-state identities, Iraq needs to create an artificial, secular identity that is based on Iraqi nationalism. In this process, even though religious freedom

should be the final destination, religious freedom that will be given to religious leaders, rather than to people, might not be the best path to follow in the short-run. Limitations such as restrictions on formal religious organizations or restrictions in the ordination of clergy can prevent local leaders from intensifying the conflict between ethnoreligious groups.

In a nutshell, the religious discrimination index collected for this study aims to be as inclusive as possible. Some rights, such as public observance of religious services, or custody of children, address the members' personal lives. Restrictions on organizations or clergy, however, refer to the members' communal lives. Therefore, it is not religious discrimination, but selective religious discrimination that can contribute the unity of Iraq in the short run. It is vital to add that, religious restrictions must and should be eliminated in the long run. However, this needs to be done gradually in order to minimize the risk of full-scale war.

B. Regime Type and Regime Change

It is important to emphasize that domestic opportunities for ethnic conflict increases through the "breakup of old states and establishment of new ones," and the "transition from one type of regime to another, especially shifts from autocracy to democracy" (Gurr 2000: 70). In a successful democracy, interests of ethnic and religious groups are contained peacefully. However, during the transition to a democratic regime, "the process of transition creates threatening uncertainties for some groups and opens up a range of transitory political opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs" (Gurr 2000: 85). One of the major reasons for this is argued to be limited resources, or institutional means

to provide accommodation for all groups. Therefore, for Iraq, until institutions of the state are strong enough to accommodate all religious groups, tendencies of fragmentation will be very high. Even though regime type appears as a variable in the analysis, it does not reflect change in regime type due to the limited time period covered (1990-2003). This is a nuance within Iraq that needs to be considered.

C. Religious tension will stay

Religious identities resist efforts to change them and, as long as they stay in place, these traits can be and will be used by policy makers, local leaders, or anybody who seeks support. The more religion is used for political purposes, the stronger it seems to become. In Iraq, there is a high likelihood that religion will be one of the major factors in political life. Sectarian divisions will maintain their presence in the future. However, if institutions of the state are strong and fair, it is possible to have a peaceful Iraq for a long time. If a new generation, one that embraces this diversity through education and wealth, can be created with a strong, democratic state, then that generation can recognize Iraq's unique attributes, and bring peace to the future of the country. Yet, till then, there might be escalating religious tension on the way of Iraq's stability.

Conclusion

Data analyses are provided in four parts in this chapter. The first section displayed results of descriptive analysis and the second part provided findings from annual multiple regression analysis. Third, spline temporal effect models and mixed models for repeated measurement are used with pooled data. Finally, findings from these sections, as well as

important aspects of ethnic conflict literature, are combined together to shed light on

conflict in Iraq. Overall, the results confirm the importance of religion as stated in the

model in Chapter 3. Even though religion has an impact on levels of protest and rebellion

of ethnoreligious groups, the direction is opposite of what model predicts.

Figure 5-1

Mean Values of Religious Discrimination

Figure 5-2

Maximum- Minumum Values of Religious Discrimination

Asia, North Africa and Middle East, Western Democracies

Region

Table 5-1A: ANOVA Models for Religious Discrimination (1990-1994)

	1990		1991		1992		1993		1994	
	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F
Western D. vs. Asia	7.93	**0.0066**	7.93	**0.0066**	7.73	**0.0073**	7.92	**0.0067**	7.53	**0.0081**
Western D. vs. Middle East	6.46	**0.0138**	6.46	**0.0138**	6.34	**0.0146**	6.50	**0.0135**	6.17	**0.0159**
Asia vs. Middle East	0.01	0.9245	0.01	0.9245	0.01	0.9346	0.01	0.9345	0.01	0.9347

Table 5-2A: ANOVA Models for Religious Discrimination (1995-1999)

	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F
Western D. vs. Asia	7.33	**0.0089**	7.33	**0.0089**	7.37	**0.0087**	7.38	**0.0087**	7.31	**0.0090**
Western D. vs. Middle East	6.00	**0.0173**	6.00	**0.0173**	5.90	**0.0183**	5.83	**0.0190**	5.82	**0.0191**
Asia vs. Middle East	0.01	0.9347	0.01	0.9347	0.01	0.9049	0.02	0.8879	0.02	0.8981

Table 5-3A: ANOVA Models for Religious Discrimination (2000-2004)

	2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F	F Value	Pr > F
Western D. vs. Asia	7.67	**0.0075**	8.09	**0.0061**	8.30	**0.0055**	8.30	**0.0055**	8.30	**0.0055**
Western D. vs. Middle East	5.88	**0.0185**	6.09	**0.0166**	6.16	**0.0160**	6.16	**0.0160**	6.16	**0.0160**
Asia vs. Middle East	0.04	0.8471	0.05	0.8204	0.07	0.7994	0.07	0.7994	0.07	0.7994

Table 5-1P: Regression Models for Protest (1991-1994)

Independent Variables	1991	1991(I)	1992	1992(I)	1993	1993(I)	1994	1994(I)
Religious Discrimination	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(-0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Repression	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religious Legislation	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Separatism	0.61*	0.61	0.87**	0.95**	0.67**	0.94**	0.23	0.37
	(0.39)	(0.53)	(0.39)	(0.51)	(0.37)	(0.50)	(0.36)	(0.48)
Economic Discrimination	0.16	0.14	0.18*	0.16	0.36***	0.34***	0.14	0.12
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Political Discrimination	0.15	0.20*	0.10	0.17	-0.11	-0.04	0.12	0.19*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Group's spatial distribution	-0.06	-0.09	-0.23*	-0.27**	-0.29**	-0.31**	0.01	-0.02
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Organizational Cohesion	-0.002	0.03	0.07	0.12*	0.14**	0.16**	0.12*	0.16**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Polity IV Regime Score	0.07***	0.11***	0.08***	0.13****	0.04*	0.07**	0.04*	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-0.003	-	-0.02	-	-0.04	-	-0.02
		(0.04)		(0.72)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-0.01*	-	-0.01**	-	-0.01*	-	-0.01**
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Religious Disc.* Polity*Repr.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R-Square	0.27	0.30	0.36	0.43	0.38	0.41	0.28	0.33
Adj R-Sq	0.15	0.16	0.26	0.31	0.28	0.29	0.17	0.20
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-2P: Regression Models for Protest (1995-1998)

Independent Variables	1995	1995(I)	1996	1996(I)	1997	1997(I)	1998	1998(I)
Religious Discrimination	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.0008	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Repression	-	-	-	-	0.13****	0.14****	0.11***	0.13***
					(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Religious Legislation	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Separatism	0.69**	1.10**	0.91**	1.56***	0.11	0.34	-0.29	-0.51
	(0.35)	(0.47)	(0.39)	(0.53)	(0.37)	(0.55)	(0.36)	(0.52)
Economic Discrimination	0.21*	0.20*	0.12	0.17	-0.11	-0.08	0.07	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Political Discrimination	0.09	0.17	0.09	0.13	0.24**	0.23*	0.41***	0.41***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Group's spatial distribution	-0.29**	-0.31**	-0.13	-0.13	0.08	0.09	0.27**	0.26*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Organizational Cohesion	0.11*	0.13**	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.07)	(0.07)						
Polity IV Regime Score	0.007	0.03	0.0009	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.06**	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-0.05*	-	-0.08**	-	-0.03	-	0.03
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-0.005*	-	-0.00004	-	-0.001	-	-0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)
Religious Disc.* Polity*Repr.	-	-	-	-	-	0.0002	-	0.0003
						(0.00035)		(0.0003)
R-Square	0.33	0.38	0.23	0.28	0.38	0.40	0.53	0.54
Adj R-Sq	0.23	0.26	0.13	0.15	0.29	0.26	0.45	0.44
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-3P: Regression Models for Protest (1999-2003)

Independent Variables	1999	1999(I)	2000	2000(I)	2001	2001(I)	2002	2002(I)	2003	2003(I)
Religious Discrimination	-0.09***	-0.10***	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.005	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Repression	0.14***	0.14***	0.06*	0.09**	0.07***	0.10**	0.03	0.03	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Legislation	0.01	0.04	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.04 *	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Separatism	-0.58*	-0.86*	0.58	0.37	0.56	0.20	0.14	-0.18	0.49*	0.74*
	(0.42)	(0.62)	(0.48)	(0.75)	(0.47)	(0.70)	(0.45)	(0.60)	(0.36)	(0.52)
Economic Discrimination	0.13	0.10	0.31*	0.25	0.02	-0.07	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.08
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Political Discrimination	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.003	0.04	0.06	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Group's spatial distribution	0.29*	0.20	-0.19	-0.17	-0.14	-0.09	-	-	-	-
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)				
Organizational Cohesion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Polity IV Regime Score	0.04	0.09**	0.02	0.04	0.002	0.02	0.02	0.006	0.001	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	0.03	-	0.008	-	0.02	-	0.06	-	-0.03
		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-0.003	-	-0.005	-	-0.006	-	-0.006	-	0.004
		(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.004)
Religious Disc.* Polity*Repr.	-	-0.0002	-	0.0003	-	0.0005*	-	0.0007***	-	0.0001
		(0.0003)		(0.0003)		(0.0003)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)
R-Square	0.33	0.37	0.28	0.30	0.20	0.23	0.17	0.28	0.26	0.28
Adj R-Sq	0.23	0.23	0.17	0.14	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.13	0.16	0.13
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-1R: Regression Models for Rebellion (1991-1994)

Independent Variables	1991	1991(I)	1992	1992(I)	1993	1993(I)	1994	1994(I)
Religious Discrimination	-0.007	-0.006	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.005	0.03
	(0.35)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Repression	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religious Legislation	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.07*	-0.04	-0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Separatism	1.90****	2.53****	1.81****	1.73***	1.50***	2.18***	1.03**	2.15***
	(0.56)	(0.76)	(0.51)	(0.70)	(0.53)	(0.72)	(0.54)	(0.71)
Economic Discrimination	-0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.16
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Political Discrimination	0.58***	0.63***	0.48***	0.50***	0.23*	0.29*	0.14	0.19
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Group's spatial distribution	0.34*	0.33*	0.28*	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.30*
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Organizational Cohesion	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.006	-0.03	-0.03	-0.001	-0.02
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.109)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Polity IV Regime Score	-0.07**	-0.06	-0.01	0.01	-0.002	-0.003	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-0.08	-	0.007	-	-0.09*	-	-0.14**
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-0.003	-	-0.003	-	-0.001	-	-0.0003
		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Religious Disc.* Polity*Repr.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R-Square	0.45	0.47	0.43	0.44	0.30	0.33	0.20	0.28
Adj R-Sq	0.37	0.36	0.34	0.32	0.19	0.19	0.07	0.13
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-2R: Regression Models for Rebellion (1995-1998)

Independent Variables	1995	1995(I)	1996	1996(I)	1997	1997(I)	1998	1998(I)
Religious Discrimination	0.002	0.05	-0.02	0.02	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Repression	-	-	-	-	0.17****	0.19****	0.17****	0.19****
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Religious Legislation	-0.08**	-0.11***	-0.06**	-0.08**	0.004	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.49)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Separatism	0.85*	2.16***	0.92**	2.22***	0.56	1.60***	0.49	1.34**
	(0.55)	(0.71)	(0.49)	(0.63)	(0.46)	(0.59)	(0.45)	(0.61)
Economic Discrimination	0.09	0.22	0.16	0.26*	-0.12	-0.02	-0.13	-0.10
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(1.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Political Discrimination	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.11	0.11	0.07	0.14
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Group's spatial distribution	0.43**	0.46**	0.33*	0.36**	0.19	0.24*	0.19	0.19
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Organizational Cohesion	-0.07	-0.12	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.11)	(0.11)						
Polity IV Regime Score	-0.003	-0.06	-0.03	-0.08*	-0.003	-0.03	0.009	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-0.16***	-	-0.16***	-	-0.14***	-	-0.10**
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	0.004	-	0.002	-	-0.004	-	-0.004
		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Religious Disc.* Polity*Repr.	-	-	-	-	-	0.0007***	-	0.0002
						(0.0003)		(0.0003)
R-Square	0.22	0.33	0.25	0.37	0.37	0.52	0.35	0.43
Adj R-Sq	0.10	0.20	0.15	0.25	0.27	0.42	0.25	0.30
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-3R: Regression Models for Rebellion (1999-2003)

Independent Variables	1999	1999(I)	2000	2000 (I)	2001	2001(I)	2002	2002(I)	2003	2003(I)
Religious Discrimination	-0.06**	-0.04	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.007	-0.04*	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Repression	0.18****	0.18	0.18****	0.21****	0.14****	0.18****	0.10****	0.10****	0.13****	0.13****
	(0.05)	(0.05)****	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Legislation	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.004	-0.03	-0.0005	-0.008
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Separatism	-0.10	0.69	2.24	0.50	1.04***	1.20**	0.48*	0.81*	0.25	0.88*
	(0.45)	(0.65)	(0.36)	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.50)	(0.35)	(0.49)	(0.36)	(0.52)
Economic Discrimination	-0.08	-0.05	-0.12	-0.11	-0.02	-0.07	-0.08	-0.05	-0.12	-0.05
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Political Discrimination	-0.08	-0.01	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.001	-0.006	0.009	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Group's spatial distribution	0.32*	0.34**	0.17	0.24*	-0.06	0.03	-	-	-	-
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Organizational Cohesion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Polity IV Regime Score	0.001	-0.007	0.04*	0.02	0.06**	0.05	0.06**	0.04	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-0.09*	-	-0.05	-	-0.05	-	-0.03	-	-0.07*
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-0.002	-	-0.003	-	-0.006	-	-0.003	-	0.001
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Religious Disc.* Polity*Repr.	-	0.0001	-	0.0004**	-	0.0008***	-	0.0004**	-	-0.00007
		(0.0003)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)
R-Square	0.32	0.38	0.57	0.62	0.54	0.65	0.53	0.58	0.52	0.55
Adj R-Sq	0.22	0.24	0.50	0.54	0.47	0.57	0.46	0.49	0.46	0.46
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	60	60	60	60

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-P: Overall Model Performance for Protest[1]

	H1a	H2a	H3a	H4a	H5a	H6a	H7a	Yearly %
1991	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	100% not confirmed
1991 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 16.6% contradicted
1992	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75% not confirmed 25% confirmed
1992 (I)	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 33.3% contradicted
1993	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75% not confirmed 25% confirmed
1993 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 16.6% contradicted
1994	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	100% not confirmed
1994 (I)	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	NA	49.8% not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 33.3% contradicted
1995	not confirmed	contradicted	confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	50% not confirmed 25% confirmed 25% contradicted
1995 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	contradicted	NA	33.3% not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 49.8% contradicted
1996	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75% not confirmed

								25% contradicted
1996 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 33.3% contradicted
1997	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	NA	NA	NA	50% not confirmed 25% confirmed 25% contradicted
1997 (I)	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	71.5% not confirmed 14.3% confirmed 14.3% contradicted
1998	contradicted	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	NA	NA	NA	25% not confirmed 25% confirmed 50% contradicted
1998 (I)	contradicted	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	57.2 % not confirmed 14.3% confirmed 28.6% contradicted
1999	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75% not confirmed 25% contradicted
1999 (I)	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	85.8% not confirmed 14.3% contradicted
2000	contradicted	contradicted	confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	25% not confirmed 25% confirmed 50% contradicted
2000 (I)	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	85.8% not confirmed 14.3% contradicted
2001	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75% not confirmed 25% contradicted
2001 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	75% not confirmed

								25% confirmed
2002	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75% not confirmed 25% contradicted
2002 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	71.5% not confirmed 14.3% confirmed 14.3% contradicted
2003	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	100% not confirmed
2003(I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	100% not confirmed
Total Performance of the H	60.8% not confirmed 38 % contradicted	60.8% not confirmed 38 % contradicted	76%not confirmed 22.8% confirmed	76%not confirmed 22.8% confirmed	84.7% not confirmed 15.4% contradicted	61.6% not confirmed 38.5% contradicted	71.5%not confirmed 28.6% confirmed	

Table 5-R: Overall Model Performance for Rebellion[2]

	H1b	H2b	H3b	H4b	H5b	H6b	H7b	Yearly %
1991	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	NA	NA	NA	50 % not confirmed 25% confirmed 25% contradicted
1991 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 16.6 % contradicted
1992	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	NA	NA	NA	50 % not confirmed 25% confirmed 25% contradicted
1992 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 16.6 % contradicted
1993	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	NA	NA	NA	50 % not confirmed 25% confirmed 25% contradicted
1993 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	NA	49.8% not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 33.2% contradicted
1994	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	100% not confirmed
1994 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	NA	66.4 % not confirmed 33.2% contradicted
1995	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
1995 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	NA	66.4 % not confirmed

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[2] For some cases, percentages are not precise due to rounding up.

								33.2% contradicted
1996	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
1996 (I)	not confirmed	contradicted	confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	NA	49.8% not confirmed 16.6% confirmed 33.2% contradicted
1997	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
1997 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	confirmed	71.5% not confirmed 14.3% confirmed 14.3% contradicted
1998	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
1998 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	85.8% not confirmed 14.3% contradicted
1999	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
1999 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	85.8% not confirmed 14.3% contradicted
2000	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
2000 (I)	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	71.5% not confirmed 14.3 % confirmed 14.3% contradicted
2001	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
2001 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	85.8% not confirmed

								14.3% confirmed
2002	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
2002 (I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	confirmed	85.8% not confirmed 14.3% confirmed
2003	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	NA	NA	NA	75 % not confirmed 25% contradicted
2003(I)	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	not confirmed	contradicted	not confirmed	not confirmed	85.8% not confirmed 14.3% contradicted
Total Performance of the H	68.4 % not confirmed 30.4 % contradicted	57 % not confirmed 41.8 % contradicted	95%not confirmed 3.8% confirmed	76%not confirmed 22.8% confirmed	30.8%not confirmed 61.6% contradicted	100 % not confirmed	42.9%not confirmed 52. 7% confirmed	

Table 5-4P: Spline Temporal Effect Models with Pooled Data (D.V. Protest)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Discrimination	-0.02***	-0.04****	-0.02***	-0.04****
	(0.006)	(0.01)	(0.008)	(0.01)
Repression	-	0.06****	-	0.06****
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Religious Legislation	-0.05****	-0.04****	-0.05****	-0.04***
	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.008)	(0.01)
Separatism	0.49****	0.20*	0.68****	0.21
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Economic Discrimination	0.17****	0.10**	0.18****	0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Political Discrimination	0.13****	0.12**	0.16****	0.13**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Polity IV Regime Score	0.03****	0.02**	0.04****	0.03*
	(0.008)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-	-0.02**	-0.001
			(0.01)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-	-0.002**	-0.0004
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Year (Linear)	-0.05****	-0.09***	-0.05****	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Year (Spline)[1]	NS	NS	NS	NS
N	793	427	793	427

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

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[1] The smoothing parameter for all four models is 1. Proc GAM in SAS can distinguish between linear and curvilinear effect of the spline. This is another way to measure the value of adding extra complexity of a higher order spline rather than just linear effect.

Table 5-4R: Spline Temporal Effect Models with Pooled Data (D. V. Rebellion)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Discrimination	0.01*	-0.04****	0.03****	-0.02**
	(0.008)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.01)
Repression	-	0.13****	-	0.13****
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Religious Legislation	-0.06****	-0.01	-0.07****	-0.03***
	(0.009)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.01)
Separatism	1.44****	0.58****	2.35****	1.41****
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Economic Discrimination	0.05	-0.06	0.12**	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Political Discrimination	0.19****	0.01	0.23****	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Polity IV Regime Score	0.002	0.02**	-0.01	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-	-0.11****	-0.09****
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-	-0.0002	0.0009
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Year (Linear)	-0.05****	-0.08***	-0.05****	-0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Year (Spline)[1]	NS	NS	NS	NS
N	791	425	791	425

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

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[1] The smoothing parameter for Model 1 is 0.21, Model 2 is 1, Model 3 is 0.24 and Model 4 is 1.

Table 5-5P: Mixed Models for Repeated Measurement with Year Dummies (D.V. Protest)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Discrimination	-0.02*	-0.04***	-0.02*	-0.04***[2]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Repression	-	0.04****	-	0.04****
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Religious Legislation	-0.05****	-0.04***	-0.04****	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Separatism	0.50***	0.29*	0.67***	0.37
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.28)
Economic Discrimination	0.19***	0.12*	0.20***	0.12*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Political Discrimination	0.08	0.11*	0.10*	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Polity IV Regime Score	0.02**	0.02	0.04**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-	-0.02	-0.008
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-	-0.001	-0.0003
			(0.001)	(0.0001)
Year[3]	**	**	**	**
AIC	2439.4	1440.0	2453.6	1456.2
AICC	2439.4	1440.0	2453.6	1456.2
BIC	2443.7	1444.2	2457.9	1460.4
N	793	427	793	427

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

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[2] Level of significance is at 0.01, not <0.01.

[3] Since there is estimates and standard errors for each year only level of significance of year is indicated in the table with number of *s.

Table 5-5R: Mixed Models for Repeated Measurement with Year Dummies (D.V. Rebellion)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Discrimination	0.02	0.0009	0.04*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Repression	-	0.02**	-	0.02**
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Religious Legislation	-0.04**	-0.03*	-0.05**	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Separatism	1.55****	1.09****	1.996****	1.85****
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.47)	(0.46)
Economic Discrimination	0.06	0.01	0.10	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Political Discrimination	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Polity IV Regime Score	0.001	0.01	-0.005	0.003
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-	-0.05*	-0.09**
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-	0.0004	0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Year[1]	**	NS	**	NS
AIC	2051.2	1042.1	2064.7	1052.4
AICC	2051.3	1042.1	2064.7	1052.5
BIC	2055.5	1046.3	2068.9	1056.7
N	791	425	791	425

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

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[1] Since there is estimates and standard errors for each year only level of significance of year is indicated in the table with number of *s.

Table 5-6P: Mixed Models for Repeated Measurement without Year Dummies (D.V. Protest)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Discrimination	-0.02**[2]	-0.04***	-0.02*	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Repression	-	0.04***	-	0.04***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Religious Legislation	-0.05****	-0.04***	-0.05****	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Separatism	0.50***	0.32*	0.69***	0.41*
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.29)
Economic Discrimination	0.20***	0.13*	0.20***	0.14*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Political Discrimination	0.08*	0.10*	0.10**[3]	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Polity IV Regime Score	0.02*	0.01	0.03**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-	-0.02	-0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-	-0.002*	-0.0005
			(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	2437.0	1442.6	2450.5	1458.6
AICC	2437.0	1442.6	2450.5	1458.6
BIC	2441.2	1446.8	2454.7	1462.8
N	793	427	793	427

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

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[2] Significant < 0.06
[3] Significant at 0.05

Table 5-6R: Mixed Models for Repeated Measurement without Year Dummies (D.V. Rebellion)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Discrimination	0.02	0.0007	0.03*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Repression	-	0.01*	-	0.02**
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Religious Legislation	-0.05**	-0.03*	-0.05**	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Separatism	1.56****	1.10****	2.03****	1.86****
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Economic Discrimination	0.08	0.02	0.11	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Political Discrimination	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Polity IV Regime Score	-0.005	0.008	-0.01	0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Religious Disc.* Separatism	-	-	-0.06*	-0.09**
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Religious Disc.* Polity	-	-	0.0003	0.0001
			(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	2040.8	1030.7	2054.1	1041.1
AICC	2040.8	1030.7	2054.1	1041.1
BIC	2045.0	1034.9	2058.3	1045.3
N	791	425	791	425

*=Significance <.1, **=Significance <.05, ***=Significance <.01, ****=Significance <.001

Table 5-7P. Model Comparison of Random Effect Models for Protest with Pooled Data[1]

	Dummies for year	Spline	AR(1) with year	AR(1)
	(models without correlated errors)		(models with time series effects on the errors)	
AIC	1485.1	1487.8	**1440.0**	1442.6
AICC	1485.1	1487.8	**1440.0**	1442.6
BIC	1489.1	1491.8	**1444.2**	1446.8

Table 5-7R. Model Comparison of Random Effect Models for Rebellion with Pooled Data[2]

	Dummies for year	Spline	AR(1) with year	AR(1)
	(models without correlated errors)		(models with time series effects on the errors)	
AIC	1437.4	1435.8	1042.1	**1030.7**
AICC	1437.4	1435.8	1042.1	**1030.7**
BIC	1441.4	1439.8	1046.3	**1034.9**

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[1] For AIC, AICC and BIC smaller numbers indicate better models.
[2] For AIC, AICC and BIC smaller numbers indicate better models.

Chapter Six
Implications from the Model of Religious Conflict and Further Research

This study aims to accomplish four tasks. First, its purpose is to attract attention to

the relative lack of knowledge about religion in International Relations and efforts by

scholars to put religion back onto the agenda. Along those lines, the discussion in Chapter

2 deals with the literature on religion and ethnoreligious conflict. Second, with a new

model, we hope to find the place of "faith" in general and "religious discrimination" in

particular, in the broader picture of ethnic conflict. Chapter 3 develops a model of

ethnoreligious conflict that includes religious discrimination as a major factor. Third,

despite its theoretical importance, the lack of inclusive data on religious discrimination is

a major issue. This study, with 24 religious discrimination variables collected at the MAR

level for the period 1990-2004, fills that gap. Chapter 4 describes the data collection

process in detail and Appendices 1 and 2 provide raw data. Finally, different statistical

analyses, such as a spline temporal effects model and mixed models for repeated

measurement, are introduced to the ethnoreligious conflict literature. Empirical testing is

described in Chapter 5 and results of these analyses are reported in that chapter as well.

In general, these tasks have been accomplished. Chapter 2 focuses on the

theoretical background of religion in IR. It specifically emphasizes the relationship

between faith and conflict as well as the lack of studies focusing on the role of religion in

conflict. Among different factors, in particular, religious discrimination is discussed. In

this project, religious discrimination is seen as the sign of a thick line drawn between

"self" and the "other" among ethnoreligious groups. Deliberate and selective exclusion of

certain ethnoreligious groups unintentionally but effectively strengthens ethnoreligious

identity of the discriminated group. It might be perceived as manifestation of

irreconcilable differences between parties that may at the end open the way to protest and

rebellion by the minority. Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism

theoretically confirm the connection between religious discrimination and protest/

rebellion, but due to different reasons. A primordial approach sees religious

discrimination as a major source of cultural tension that will at the end lead to conflict.

Instrumentalists emphasize socioeconomic aspect and would say this can turn into a

conflict if it is manipulated by leaders. Constructivism accepts socioeconomic aspect of

conflict, but claims interests are embedded in cognitive structures that give meaning to

them. Based on this trilogy, the chapter sets the stage for the model that is developed in

Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 introduces the model of ethnoreligious conflict based on the literature

review in the previous chapter. We apply the constructivist approach, which is composed

of three major parts (religious marginalization, socioeconomic factors and interaction

terms), to analyze the impact of faith on ethnic conflict in the model. The model

represents a significant achievement, i.e., finding a place for religion in the ethnic conflict

literature that reflects what has been learnt from the debate between primordialists,

instrumentalists and constructivists.

Chapter 4 completes five tasks of research design. First, information is provided

regarding the datasets used. Second, the criteria for case selection are developed. Third,

an agenda of coding issues that includes major problems faced during the coding process

is explained. Fourth, other variables that are included in the analysis are described.

Finally, questions relating to missing data, data reliability and methodology used to test the model are addressed. Most research design chapters do not go further than describing the data. This chapter, however, goes one step further with the "agenda of coding issues" section. This section provides information about the coding process under major categories of interest. Coding of the religious discrimination data took around 15 weeks. This section explains the intensity of the process in a reader-friendly format. One of the advantages of the presentation is clustering of diverse information under broader sections. This division provides a general picture with details. In other words, if a reader would like to get the general picture, titles might be helpful. If details are interesting, they are available as well.

Chapter 5 analyses the data in a very broad range, from descriptive statistics to annual multiple regressions, and from spline temporal effect models to mixed models with repeated measurement. This diversity aims to test robustness of religion variables and the model introduced. It was interesting to see that in each and every type of analysis religion variables were statistically significant at different levels. 14 hypotheses are developed and each of these hypotheses is tested using three different statistical analysis techniques.

It is important to note that not every result reported was expected. We were expecting to find a statistically significant relationship between religion variables (religious discrimination and religious legislation) and conflict. We found that the relationship was in the opposite direction.

Hypothesis1a states that religious discrimination will increase the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups. In the annual multiple regression models 1992(I),

1994 (I), 1997, 1997(I), 1998, 1998 (I), 1999, 1999(I), 2000, and 2000(I), religious discrimination appears as a statistically significant variable at various levels. However, Hypothesis 1a is not supported, because in each of these runs sign of coefficient is negative. These negative, yet statistically significant results keep appearing in the spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement. So, Hypothesis 1a fails to receive support.

Hypothesis 1b states that religious discrimination will increase the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups. In the annual multiple regression models 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2000 (I), 2001, 2002, 2003, religious discrimination appears as a statistically significant variable at various levels. But Hypothesis 1b is not supported, because in each of these runs sign of coefficient is negative. In two of the spline temporal effect models a positive relation between religious discrimination and rebellion is reported. In one, mixed models with repeated measurement, Hypothesis 1b is supported as well. So, even though annual regression runs do not provide support for Hypothesis 1b, pooled data analysis is giving partial support.

Hypothesis 2a states that ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of protest when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law. Multiple regression models 1995, 1995 (I), 1996, 1996 (I), 1998, 1998 (I), 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2002 (I) for protest include a statistically significant relationship between the level of religious legislation and the groups' protest. However, in these models, the coefficient for religious legislation, where the variable is significant, is always negative. These negative, yet statistically significant results, keep appearing in the spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement. So, Hypothesis 2a fails to receive support.

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Hypothesis 2b argues that ethnoreligious minorities will engage in higher levels of rebellion when state law includes a higher percentage of majority religion law. Multiple regression models 1991, 1991 (I), 1992, 1992(I), 1993, 1993 (I), 1994(I), 1995, 1995 (I), 1996, 1996 (I) for rebellion include a statistically significant relationship between level of religious legislation and the groups' rebellion. However, in these models, the coefficient for religious legislation is significant but always negative. These negative, yet statistically significant results keep appearing in the spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement with year dummies. So, Hypothesis 2b fails to receive support.

According to Hypothesis 3a, economic discrimination will increase the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups. For protest, economic discrimination is reported to be statistically significant at different levels for models 1992, 1993, 1993 (I), 1995, 1995 (I), 2000. Hypothesis 3a is supported with statistically significant findings in all four of the spline temporal effect models and mixed models with repeated measurement with year dummies.

Hypothesis 3b states that economic discrimination will increase the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups. For rebellion, economic discrimination is reported to be statistically significant at different levels for only model 1996 (I). In one of the spline temporal effect models it is supported, while none of the repeated measurement models with dummies support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4a is that political discrimination will increase the likelihood of protest among ethnoreligious groups. For protest in models 1991 (I), 1994 (I), 1997, 1997 (I), 1998, 1998 (I), Hypothesis 4a receives support. Hypothesis 4a is supported with

statistically significant findings in all four of the spline temporal effect models. In three of the mixed models with repeated measurement with year dummies political discrimination is significant.

Hypothesis 4b is that political discrimination will increase the likelihood of rebellion among ethnoreligious groups. For rebellion, in models 1991, 1991 (I), 1992, 1992 (I), 1993, 1993 (I), Hypothesis 4b receives support. Two of the spline temporal effects models support the hypothesis while none of the mixed models with repeated measurement with year dummies supports the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5a states that the effect of separatism on the level of protest will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority. The interaction variable is reported to be significant in models 1995 (I), 1996 (I) when the dependent variable is protest, but not in the direction expected. Out of the two spline temporal effect models, in only one of them, interaction of religious discrimination and separatism, is significant and it has a negative sign. Interaction of religious discrimination and regime type is significant in only one of the spline temporal effect models and has a negative sign. Mixed models with year dummies do not support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5b argues the effect of separatism on the level of rebellion will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against an ethnoreligious minority. The variable is significant for runs 1993 (I), 1994 (I), 1995 (I), 1996 (I), 1997 (I), 1998 (I), 1999 (I), 2003 (I), but not in the direction expected. Both spline temporal effect models and mixed models with year dummies show statistically significant relationship. However, the direction is negative.

According to Hypothesis 6a, the effect of regime type on the level of protest will become greater with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities. For protest, interaction of regime type and religious discrimination appears to be statistically significant at different levels in models 1991 (I), 1992 (I), 1993 (I), 1994 (I), 1995 (I), but not in the direction expected. Mixed models with year dummies do not support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6b, states that the effect of regime type on the likelihood of rebellion will increase with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities. Annual regression runs do not support this hypothesis. For protest, it appears as a statistically significant variable at different levels in models 2001 (I), 2002 (I). Either spline temporal effect models or mixed models with year dummies support the hypothesis.

According to Hypothesis 7a, the effect of regime type and repression will increase the level of protest with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities. For protest, it appears as a statistically significant variable at different levels in models 2001 (I), 2002 (I). The coefficient of the three-way interaction is always positive.

According to Hypothesis 7b, the effect of regime type and repression will increase the level of rebellion with the increase in religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities. For rebellion, it is significant in models 1997 (I), 2000 (I) 2001(I), 2002(I). The coefficient of the three-way interaction is always positive.

This study assumed that high religious discrimination against a religious group and religious legislation in majority religion will marginalize the ethnoreligious minority

and at the end trigger protest and rebellion. However, annual multiple regressions, spline temporal effect models and mixed models for repeated measurement show that actually the relationship between dependent variables (protest and rebellion) and religion variables (religious discrimination and religious legislation) is negative. This was unanticipated. As explained in Chapter 3, the model perceives a positive relationship between religious marginalization of the group and activities of protest and rebellion. However, since these variables are statistically significant, results confirm the idea that religious marginalization matters, but not in the expected way.

These unanticipated findings lead us to an important question: what is next? This study offers broad opportunities for future research.

First, theory-building is an obvious priority. Although the number of scholars who include religion to the conflict analysis is higher than a decade ago, there is need for studies that will contribute to theory-building in particular. Broader frameworks, such as ethnic conflict literature or social mobilization theories, are areas to explore for additional insights. We need to understand where religion stands or how religion can be incorporated to these well known frameworks. It is important to repeat that the main argument is not that religion explains everything, but instead that it is one of the important factors. Since we are far behind in understanding the theoretical position occupied by religion, we need studies focusing on those aspects.

This study employed the debate between primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism as a starting point. If we think religion is an important factor like repression or regime type, we need strong theoretical arguments as a next step forward. Results of this study need to be incorporated future models as well since a surprising

negative relationship between religious marginalization variables (religious discrimination and religious legislation) and protest is reported.

Second, data collection should follow theory-building efforts. Without data to test these theories, we cannot accomplish much. Inclusive and reliable data on religion is a significant need. The RAS dataset, the World Value Survey and other databases put light on important questions on religion and they set the stage for further efforts. Due to diversity of religious practices and subjective nature of religion, data collection is quite challenging. One potential solution is to team up with area specialists. Collecting data for this study, I had the chance to consult two political scientists who were familiar with the minorities I was coding. However, to collaborate with area experts more comprehensively, there is need for a grant. With financial support, it becomes possible to collect reliable and inclusive data on religion. Specifically, religious discrimination data collected for this study can be improved. Current data collected on religious discrimination is very broad and incorporates different aspects of religious discrimination. It is possible to create potentially significant discrimination related sub-variables such as discrimination against religious education, religious leadership or access to places of worship. More nuanced variables might help us to understand the relationship between religious discrimination and protest/rebellion. Moreover, expanding the time period to 1980s would be very helpful, since that would enable Cold War vs. post-Cold War comparisons.

Third, this study aimed to provide a broad range of analysis. However, a significant tool of analysis is excluded due to time limitations, i.e. visualizing religious

discrimination data using ArcMAP.[1] With ArcMAP it is possible to make maps using spatial data and analyze spatial relationships. ArcMAP can have an open-ended utility since analysis can go to different directions after visualization of religious discrimination and ethnoreligious groups' spatial distribution on a map. The minimal contribution could be bringing a new dimension to 'geographic region' as envisioned by the MAR project.

Both ethnic conflict and ethnoreligious conflict literature built upon the MAR give a priority to region-based analysis (Gurr 1993, 2000; Fox 1997). Conflict tendencies of minorities within certain geographical divisions are analyzed frequently to answer different questions on the issue, including protest and rebellion. However, when a sub-group of minorities-like ethnoreligious groups- are analyzed, prior geographical division might not hold up as well. For instance, East, Southeast and South Asia are coded as a single region in MAR. There are 59 MARs coded in this region and only 33 of them are ethnoreligious minorities. In Western democracies and Japan there are 30 MARs, but only 10 of them are ethnoreligious groups. Ethnoreligious minorities are even more dispersed than ethnic groups. This creates some concerns regarding employment of traditional geographical divisions adopted by the MAR project. ArcMAP can be quite helpful on that count.

Another avenue of analysis using ArcMAP will be visualizing relative distance of ethnoreligious groups to capitals of states where they reside. Relative distance can be calculated by considering size of the country and landscape (for instance mountain, island etc). It would be interesting to see relative distance for ethnoreligious groups that had protested or rebelled in comparison with the ones that had not. The capital symbolizes

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[1] ArcGIS is a comprehensive name used for geographic information systems products produced by ESRI. These products can be desktop products or internet applications. ArcMAP is the main operating window where data is displayed and analyzed in ArcGIS desktops (Ormsby et al. 2001).

national identity in this case and physical distance might represent both marginalization of the group as well as geographic opportunities to mobilize.

In sum, it is argued here that religion can become an integral element of conflict. This large-N cross-sectional study provides strong empirical evidence that religious discrimination and religious legislation can be important determinants of protest or rebellion of ethnoreligious groups. Without question, much remains to be done. In that sense as well as with the answers provided so far, many questions are created. These questions will guide my future research on ethnoreligious conflict.

Appendix A- Groups Included in the Dataset[1]

Ethnoreligious Minorities in Western Democracies and Japan

Country	Ethnoreligious Minority	Majority Religion	Minority Religion
Canada	French Canadians	Christian, general	Catholic, Christian
Canada	Quebecois	Christian, general	Catholic, Christian
France	Muslim (Non-citizens)	Catholic, Christian	Sunni, Islam
Germany	Turks	Christian, general	Sunni, Islam
Greece	Muslims	Orthodox, Christian	Sunni, Islam
Switzerland	Jurassians	Christian, general	Catholic, Christian
United Kingdom	Asians	Protestant, Christian	Hindu/Islam
United Kingdom	Catholics in Northern Ireland	Protestant, Christian	Catholic, Christian
United Kingdom	Scots	Protestant, Christian	Catholic, Christian/ Calvinist
United States of America	Hispanics	Protestant, Christian	Catholic, Christian

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[1] In these tables format of MAR dataset list is used.

Ethnoreligious Minorities in Asia

Country	Ethnoreligious Minority	Majority Religion	Minority Religion
Afghanistan	Hazaras	Sunni, Islam	Islam, Shi'i---Twelver and Ismaili
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes	Sunni, Islam	Animist and Buddhist
Bangladesh	Hindus	Sunni, Islam	Hindu
Bhutan	Lhotshampas	Buddhist	Hindu
Burma	Kachins	Buddhist	Christian
Burma	Rohingya (Arkanese)	Buddhist	Sunni, Islam
Burma	Zomis (Chins)	Buddhist	Christian/ Animist
China	Hui Muslims	Officially Atheist	Sunni, Islam
China	Tibetans	Officially Atheist	Buddhist
China	Turkmen	Officially Atheist	Islam, general
Fiji	East Indians	Methodist, Christian	Hindu/ Islam
India	Kashmiris	Hindu	Islam, general
India	Mizos	Hindu	Christian, general
India	Muslims	Hindu	Islam, general
India	Nagas	Hindu	Baptist, Christian
India	Sikhs	Hindu	Sikhism

Country	Ethnoreligious Minority	Majority Religion	Minority Religion
Indonesia	Chinese	Sunni, Islam	Christian, general/ Buddhist
Indonesia	Papuans	Sunni, Islam	Christian, general
Laos	Hmong	Buddhist	Animist/ Christian
Malaysia	Chinese	Sunni, Islam	Buddhist
Malaysia	Dayaks	Sunni, Islam	Christian
Malaysia	East Indians	Sunni, Islam	Hindu (80%) Islam (20%)
Malaysia	Kadazans	Sunni, Islam	Catholic/ Animist
Pakistan	Ahmadis	Sunni, Islam	Ahmedi, Islam
Pakistan	Hindus	Sunni, Islam	Hindu
Pakistan	Sindhis	Sunni, Islam	Hindu/ Islam
Philippines	Moros	Catholic, Christian	Islam
Singapore	Malays	Buddhist/ Christian	Sunni, Islam
Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils	Buddhist	Hindu
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils	Buddhist	Hindu
Thailand	Malay-Muslims	Buddhist	Sunni, Islam
Thailand	Northern Hill Tribes	Buddhist	Animist
Vietnam	Montagnards	Buddhist	Animist/ Protestant

Ethnoreligious Minorities in Middle East and North Africa

Country	Ethnoreligious Minority	Majority Religion	Minority Religion
Bahrain	Shi'is	Sunni, Islam	Shi'i, Islam
Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots	Orthodox, Christian	Sunni, Islam
Egypt	Copts	Sunni, Islam	Christian[2]
Iran (Islam, Shi'i)	Arabs	Shi'i, Islam	Sunni, Islam
Iran	Baha'is	Shi'i, Islam	Bahai
Iran	Baluchis	Shi'i, Islam	Sunni, Islam
Iran	Christians	Shi'i, Islam	Christian
Iran	Kurds	Shi'i, Islam	Sunni, Islam
Iran	Turkmen	Shi'i, Islam	Sunni, Islam
Iraq[3]	Shi'is	Sunni, Islam	Shi'i, Islam
Israel	Arabs	Jewish	Sunni, Islam
Israel	Palestinians	Jewish	Sunni, Islam
Lebanon	Druze [4]	Islam, general	Druze
Lebanon	Maronite Christians	Islam, general	Christian
Lebanon	Palestinians	Islam, general	Sunni, Islam

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[2] While some are Catholics or Protestants, the vast majority of Copts belong to the Orthodox Church.
[3] Majority of the population in Iraq is Shi'i. However, during the Saddam period, they were treated as an ethnoreligious minority. For this period, Shi'is in Iraq are considered to be minority for Saddam period.
[4] Nominally an Islamic religion, the Druze faith departs from Islam in a number of significant ways.

Country	Ethnoreligious Minority	Majority Religion	Minority Religion
Lebanon	Shi'is	Islam, general	Shi'i, Islam
Lebanon	Sunnis	Islam, general	Sunni, Islam
Saudi Arabia	Shi'is	Sunni, Islam	Shi'i, Islam
Syria	Alawi	Sunni, Islam	Alawi

Table 1D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Europe from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	French Canadians in Canada	Quebecois in Canada	Muslim in France	Turks in Germany	Muslims in Greece	Jurassians in Switzerland	Asians in UK	Catholics in UK	Scots in UK	Hisp. inUS
Public observance of religious services										
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship			1	1	1					
Access to places or worship										
Forced observance										
Formal religious Organizations			1			1				
Religious schools, religious education										
Materials										
Mandatory education								1		
Arrest, continued detention			1		1					
State surveillance										
Religious publications										
Import publications										
Personal status				1						
Religious symbols or clothing			1	1						
Ordination, access to clergy					1	1				
Conversion to minority religions										
Forced conversions										

Proselytizing by permanent residents of state			1	
Proselytizing by foreign clergy	1		1	
Registration				
Custody				
Access of minority		1	1	
Anti-religious propaganda				
Other	1		1	1

Table 2D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Asia from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	Hazaras in Afg.	CHT in Bang	Hindus in Bang	Lhotshampas in Bhutan	Kachins in Burma	Rohingya in Burma	Zomis in Burma	Hui Muslims in China	Tibetans in China	Turkmen in China
Public observance of religious services	2				1	1	1		2	2
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship	2			1	2	2	2		1	1
Access to places or worship					1	1	1		1	1
Forced observance	1						1			
Formal religious Organizations								2	2	2
Religious schools, religious education Materials				1	2	2	2	1	2	2
Mandatory education				1	1	1	1			
Arrest, continued detention	2				2		2	1	2	2
State surveillance	1				1	1	1	2	2	2
Religious publications	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	2
Import publications	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Personal status								1		1
Religious symbols or clothing				1						
Ordination, access to clergy								1	2	1
Conversion to minority religions		1	1	2						
Forced conversions					1		1			

Proselytizing by permanent residents of state		1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Proselytizing by foreign clergy		1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Registration					1	1	1	2	2	2
Custody										
Access of minority										
Anti-religious propaganda	2							2	2	2
Other	2				1	1	1			

Table 3D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Asia from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	East Indians in Fiji	Kashmiris in India	Mizos in India	Muslims in India	Nagas in India	Sikhs in India	Chinese in Indonesia	Papuans in Indonesia	Hmong in Laos	Chinese in Malaysia
Public observance of religious services									1	
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship		1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1
Access to places or worship									1	
Forced observance									1	
Formal religious Organizations		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Religious schools, religious education										
Materials									1	
Mandatory education		1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Arrest, continued detention									2	
State surveillance									1	
Religious publications		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
Import publications		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
Personal status							1			
Religious symbols or clothing										
Ordination, access to clergy									1	
Conversion to minority religions			1		1				1	1
Forced conversions							1	1	1	

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Proselytizing by permanent residents of state	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1
Proselytizing by foreign clergy	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1
Registration									1
Custody									1
Access of minority									
Anti-religious propaganda									
Other		1		1		1	1		

Table 4D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Asia from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	Dayaks in Malaysia	East Indians in Malaysia	Kadazans in Malaysia	Ahmadis in Pakistan	Hindus in Pakistan	Sindhis in Pakistan	Moros in Phillipines	Malays in Singapore
Public observance of religious services				2				
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship	1	1	1	2	1	1		
Access to places or worship								
Forced observance								
Formal religious Organizations	1	1	1	1				
Religious schools, religious education								
Materials				1				
Mandatory education								
Arrest, continued detention				2				
State surveillance				2				1
Religious publications	1		1	1				1
Import publications	1		1	1				
Personal status				1				
Religious symbols or clothing								1
Ordination, access to clergy								
Conversion to minority religions	1	1	1	1				
Forced conversions								

Proselytizing by permanent residents of state	1	1	1	2	1	1		1
Proselytizing by foreign clergy	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	
Registration	1	1	1				1	
Custody	1	1	1					
Access of minority				1	1	1	1	
Anti-religious propaganda				1				
Other				2	1	1	1	

Table 5D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Asia from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka	Malay Muslims in Thailand	Northern Hill Tribes in Thailand	Montagnards in Vietnam
Public observance of religious services					1
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship					2
Access to places or worship					
Forced observance					
Formal religious Organizations					2
Religious schools, religious education					1
Materials					
Mandatory education				1	
Arrest, continued detention					2
State surveillance			1		1
Religious publications					1
Import publications					1
Personal status					1
Religious symbols or clothing			1		
Ordination, access to clergy					2
Conversion to minority religions					1
Forced conversions					1

Proselytizing by permanent residents of state						2
Proselytizing by foreign clergy			1	1		2
Registration	1	1	1	1		
Custody						
Access of minority						
Anti-religious propaganda						1
Other				1		2

Table 6D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Middle East and North Africa from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	Shi'is in Bahrain	Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus	Copts in Egypt	Arabs in Iran	Baha'is in Iran	Baluchis in Iran	Christians in Iran	Kurds in Iran	Turkmen in Iran	Shi'is in Iraq	Arabs in Isr.
Public observance of religious services			1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship	1		2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	
Access to places or worship					2		2			2	1
Forced observance					2		2				
Formal religious Organizations				1	2	1	1	1	1	1	
Religious schools, religious education				1	2	1	1	1	1	2	
Materials					2		1			1	
Mandatory education			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Arrest, continued detention	1		1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
State surveillance				2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Religious publications	1				2		2			2	
Import publications					2		2			2	
Personal status					2					1	
Religious symbols or clothing											
Ordination, access to clergy										1	
Conversion to minority religions			1		2		2				
Forced conversions			1								

Proselytizing by permanent residents of state	1		2		2				1
Proselytizing by foreign clergy	2		2		2			1	1
Registration	1								
Custody	1								
Access of minority					1				
Anti-religious propaganda		1	2	1	1	1	1		
Other	1		2		1			2	1

Table 7D: Highest Religious Discrimination on Minorities at Risk in Middle East and North Africa from 1990 to 2004

Religious Discrimination Variables	Palestinians in Israel	Druze in Lebanon	M. Christians in Lebanon	Palastinians in Lebanon	Shi'is in Lebanon	Sunnis in Lebanon	Shi'is in Saudi Arabia	Alawi in Syria
Public observance of religious services							2	
Restrictions on building, repairing places of worship							2	
Access to places or worship	1							
Forced observance							1	
Formal religious Organizations							1	
Religious schools, religious education							2	
Materials							2	
Mandatory education							1	
Arrest, continued detention							2	
State surveillance							2	
Religious publications							2	
Import publications							2	
Personal status							1	
Religious symbols or clothing							1	
Ordination, access to clergy							1	
Conversion to minority religions								
Forced conversions							1	

Proselytizing by permanent residents of state	1						2	1
Proselytizing by foreign clergy	1		1				2	1
Registration		1	1	1	1	1		
Custody							1	
Access of minority								
Anti-religious propaganda							1	
Other	1						1	

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