

Does Difference Make A Difference? Female Leaders and State Conflict  
Behavior

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A Dissertation

presented to

the Faculty of the Graduate School  
at the University of Missouri-Columbia

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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by

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May 2015

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LEADERS AND STATE CONFLICT BEHAVIOR

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

First, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Stephen L. Quackenbush, for all of his valuable feedback not only on my dissertation, but during my tenure as a graduate student. I would also like to thank the rest of my committee members, Dr. Laron Williams, Dr. Amanda Murdie, and Dr. Joan Hermsen for giving me feedback that will help me get publications from this manuscript.

My friends and family have also been invaluable to me for their emotional support throughout the writing process. I could not have done it without my venting sessions and the chance to get advice. Lastly, I would like to especially thank my husband, Kenneth, for putting up with me during the whole process. He was able to pick up the slack on those long writing days and did not complain. I really needed that!

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## Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory

U.S. led airstrikes against Moammar Gadhafi in 2011 happened to be urged by the first all female led diplomatic team in the United States. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, and Samantha Power, the influential director of the Office of Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, were all three proponents of using force, even after President Obama showed more reservations about it. Moreover, Madeleine Albright has been cited as saying to Colin Powell, when arguing for intervention in Bosnia, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” (*The Washington Post*, December 8, 1996). While the common notion of women is that they tend to be more peaceful and passive than men, these two small anecdotes appear to explore the other side of the debate. In other words, does difference really make a difference when it comes to the gender of world foreign policy leaders?

Gendered approaches to International Relations are often viewed as unimportant; however, ignoring this approach often overlooks a valuable variable: gender. While several theories have been used to explain the outbreak of conflict, defense spending, conflict duration, and peace durability, very little attention has been paid to the role that female executives and defense and foreign policy ministers play in these conflict processes. In this dissertation, I add gender to the study of conflict behavior and examine the role that women play in the onset of conflict, defense spending, conflict duration, and,

lastly, peace durability. Very little research has examined what role gender might play in conflict, particularly quantitatively. Thus, I first add valuable information to the IR literature. Second, this topic is worth exploring purely to answer the question: does difference make a difference? Francis Fukuyama argued in *Foreign Affairs* that if women were more involved in politics, the world would be more peaceful (1998). He also argued that men should remain in power because they are the worse sex, the impure sex. In other words, men should make the terrible decisions around national security so that women can remain pure. However, the foreign policy implications for the incorporation of women in government may not necessarily lead to a more peaceful world. In fact, the incorporation of women in the national security arena could make the world more hawkish, especially due to the stereotypical view that women are the purer sex. Thus, this research challenges “gender neutral” approaches to state conflict behavior, women leaders, and the words of Francis Fukuyama. The world may not need women in power to experience peace after all.

This dissertation is organized into five chapters. In the first chapter, I examine the previous literature on the fields of conflict onset, defense spending, conflict duration, and peace durability after conflict. I then provide the theoretical foundation for why women may or may not (in some circumstances) make a difference in various conflict processes. The second, third, and fourth chapters use quantitative analysis of women leaders in various state conflict behavior situations. The second chapter explores the relationship between women leaders and the initiation and escalation of conflict and defense spending. The third chapter looks at conflict duration. Lastly, the fourth chapter examines



if peace is more durable if a woman is in power following interstate or intrastate conflict. My final chapter provides a conclusion, implications of my research, and avenues for future research.

### **Causes of Interstate Conflict**

Traditional theories of IR trace the occurrence of war to a plethora of (“gender neutral”) reasons, but they all amount to differing causes at different levels of analysis. Literature in the field tends to be broken down by the international system, dyadic level, state level, and the individual decision-makers. The following section examines the onset and escalation of conflict through the differing levels of analysis that have been explored thus far.

Realists are most commonly associated with systemic theories of war. Issues like the security dilemma, in which one state’s actions to increase its security then decrease the security of others, and balance-of-power, which maintains that hegemony should be avoided so that an equilibrium of power provides stability, lead states to participate in conflict (Waltz 1959; Morgenthau 1967; Mearsheimer 1990). Furthermore, power transition theory, although sharing foundations similar to realism, argues that hegemons exist and set up a hierarchical system (Organski and Kugler 1980). Conflict occurs when a rising state decides to challenge the hegemon. Lemke (2002) posits that power transition can also occur outside of the international arena at the regional level. Within these theories, the larger system plays the key role in the onset of conflict. A running theme in systemic theories is state capability and conflict. The primary empirical pattern

that these scholars promote is that states with more capability, whether that is defined through military or economic or both, are more likely to experience conflict. In other words, states that could be described as major powers are more likely to experience conflict. While there are many explanations for conflict at the systemic level, other levels of analysis argue that factors beyond the system lead to conflict.

Beyond the realist assumptions about systemic levels, some scholars use a state or dyadic level analyses. For example, several scholars have found that when a state borders more countries, it will be more likely to experience conflict (Diehl 1991; Starr 1991). This is primarily due to the fact that a state may feel less secure and also perceive threats more seriously. Moreover, short distances may also provide for an increased opportunity for conflict. Others argue that when a country has more alliances it is more likely to experience conflict. Siverson and Starr (1990) argue that a state with a warring alliance is more likely to join an ongoing conflict.

Dyadic level theories often look at the regime type of states and their likelihood to participate in conflict. Democracy is the most studied regime, leading to the idea of a democratic peace (Buono de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Maoz and Russett 1992). Within the democratic peace, authors find that democracies are less likely to engage in conflict with one another. Quackenbush and Rudy (2009) find that a monadic democratic peace does not exist. This means that democracies are not less likely to initiate conflict against others. They are still willing to fight non-democracies, and in fact, there may be a selection effect in which countries democracies choose to fight (Buono de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Other societal level theories argue that in order

to provide more group cohesion for an in-group, a leader may intentionally go to war (Coser 1956; Stein 1996). Further, the diversionary theory states that leaders decide to engage in conflict in order to divert attention from a domestic issue to international conflict (DeRouen 1995). Relatedly, diversionary theory provides a framework for why leaders would want to ensure that cohesion does exist with a country, especially near an election (Morgan and Bickers 1992).

Alliances and borders also play a role at the dyadic and national level when explaining the onset of conflict in a similar way to the systemic levels. The primary finding for dyads with alliances is that a dyad is less likely to experience conflict if both states have external ties than if just one state does (Siverson and Tennefoss 1984).

Moreover, scholars also argue that contiguous states (separated by up to 150 miles of water) are more likely to experience conflict than those that are not (Bremer 1992; Senese 1996). Bremer (1992) finds that the most important factors creating dangerous dyads are contiguity, absence of alliance, absence of an advanced economy, lack of democracy, preponderance of power, and, in contrast to realist theory, the least important factor is the presence of a major power.

The bargaining model of war is another dyadic level theory used to explain the onset of conflict. The bargaining model is a rational choice approach to conflict onset and primarily examines the bargaining process that occurs between states. Fearon (1995) argues that war is costly and states prefer bargaining instead of war. War happens when bargaining fails. Specifically, Fearon states that incomplete information with incentive to misrepresent is frequently why bargaining fails. This occurs because states have an

incentive to lie and/or misrepresent within the bargaining process. This could increase the costs of war, but may also lead a state to believe the costs of conflict are lower and the benefits greater. There are also issues with commitment problems leading to a lack of trust between states. Lastly, issue indivisibilities also make the onset of conflict likely due to issues that are controversial between states without clear divisibility of who will get what.

Lastly, vast amounts of literature examine the role of individual decision makers and their role in conflict occurrence. This literature assumes that decision-leaders vary in their definitions of what a state's interest is, opposing the core realist assumption that power (and survival) are in a state's best interest. Moreover, the literature also assumes that a decision maker's beliefs, past, and personalities are all variables in the ultimate outcome. Leader's "operational codes," belief systems, and misperceptions and the influence of history on decisions are just some of the examples of what has been examined (George and George 1963; George 1969; Jervis 1976; de Rivera 1976; Levy 2003). Moreover, little research has examined what role a decision maker's gender may play in foreign policy, but not necessarily the onset of conflict (Page and Shapiro 1992; Koch and Fulton 2011).

### **Defense Spending**

Much of the research that exists on defense spending examines why and how much states spend on their defense budgets. Most of the previous research places different levels of importance on the international and domestic factors that influence

defense spending. For example, Richardson (1960) developed an arms race model that finds that a country will increase spending in reaction to a foe's increase in military spending. He finds that U.S. defense spending was particularly in response to the Soviets. Palmer (1990) puts forth a model to explain defense spending in Western Europe. He argues that a country's relationship to NATO can explain their budgets. He finds that the larger allies to NATO do not have defense spending changes from government to government. These countries do not experience a guns-butter trade off. However, smaller allies do see changes depending on if the government is free-riding on the deterrence capabilities of NATO or if the government feels obligated to create a budget that NATO would approve of. Further, Morgan and Palmer (2003) state that foreign policy behavior can be explained by a state's preference for changing the status quo and maintaining the status quo. A country will adopt a defense budget that balances their preferences for change and maintenance.

Theories that go beyond looking at just international explanations for defense spending combine domestic and international factors. For example, Ostrom (1978) and Whitten and Williams (2011) both argue that a government's ideology is important in making decisions about defense spending. The latter find that both international and domestic pressures interact with government ideology to influence defense spending, and that the traditional left-right spectrum of ideology does not adequately capture defense spending. Other research posits that governments can use defense spending as a way to encourage short-term economic management to influence naïve voters' preferences for upcoming elections (Nincic and Cusack 1979). Still other research posits that defense

spending is directly related to public opinion within the country, specifically that defense spending is representative of public opinion within the U.S. and Western Europe (Eichenberg and Stoll 2003). Lastly, Koch and Fulton (2011) use defense spending as a dependent variable for conflict behavior of OECD countries and find that as more women join parliament defense spending goes down, but that female chief executives increase defense spending.

Research on defense spending has usually focused on OECD countries, particularly because they have the money to spend. Some research that examines lesser-developed countries usually looks to the relationship between defense spending and the economies of these countries. For example, Benoit (1972, 1973) finds that, contrary to what most thought, defense spending could help the economies of LDCs. However, Grobar and Porter (1989) find that defense spending can hinder economic growth through retarding national savings. The authors argue that there is a trade off between defense and social spending, which is highlighted in the “guns versus butter” analogy often used in the defense spending literature.

Koch and Fulton (2011) are the only scholars to analyze the relationship between gender and defense spending, but only in Western, wealthy countries. Other literature, much in the same way as most IR topics, ignores gender or treats all state actors as the same. There is a large gap in the cross-national literature on the relationship between defense spending and specific characteristic of state leaders, and in my case, gender.

## **War Duration**

Theories on why war lasts as long as it does are primarily centered around realpolitik and domestic political behavior. Bueno de Mesquita (1978) initially argued that systemic tightness, or the sharing of foreign policy goals by many countries, will lead to shorter wars. However, as the tightness eases states may begin collecting resources or diverting national resources in the anticipation of conflict. With more resources for conflict, a country may experience longer war. Further, Bennett and Stam (1996) examine factors such as strategy, mobilization, military capability, terrain, democracy, and dispute history in order to find out what influences the length of war. They ultimately find that realpolitik factors play a role in the length of conflict, but democracy and repression do as well. They also point to the fact that all of these variables lead a decision maker to enter and engage in conflict. Thus, while many of these factors do influence conflict duration, it is ultimately up to the decision maker to continue the war.

Another way of analyzing the duration of conflict is using utility theory and cost/benefit analysis. Specifically, Vuchinich and Teachman (1993) argue that using utility theory to explain the duration of war is worthwhile because all actors are rational, even if they do not know that is what they are doing. Ultimately, these authors argue that actors assess the utility of conflict while it is happening in order to decide whether to continue on (benefits outweigh costs) or to end the war (costs outweigh benefits).

Moreover, Filson and Werner (2002) create a model to analyze the onset and termination of conflict, and find that war continues as the attacker overestimates the defender and her likelihood of conceding. The attacker may also overestimate how much

to give up in the event of a retreat. Wagner (2010) also examines why war endures and argues that the possibility of an agreement before the conflict may not be consistent with the combatants so they engage in conflict. What makes the conflict last longer (or shorter) is the belief that one side has of their opportunity to win as the war continues. In other words, if the agreement that could have been settled on before the war becomes less and less appealing as one side gains more power, the conflict will ensue until that side gets what it wants. However, even as Filson and Werner note themselves, the purely rational approaches have yet to take into account domestic factors like the domestic environment or, in the case of my research, the gender of the leader. Thus, the cost/benefit analysis of why war continues have not taken into account all of the details that are necessary to account for duration.

### **Peace Duration and Recurrent Conflict**

Previous research on the stability of peace and recurrent conflict in interstate war primarily focus on three key topics: issues, conflict outcome, and conflict settlement. The issues literature argues that conflict reoccurs, leading to shorter peace, because of controversial issues between countries. Diehl and Goertz (2000) posit that by analyzing why peace happens, we can see why war happens. According to them, war occurs because of contentious issues between states that cannot be resolved. Vasquez (1993) demonstrates a specific issue that is most commonly viewed as irresolvable in territory. He argues that contiguity can increase the likelihood of conflict and finds that states that are close to one another are more likely to fight. Moreover, Quackenbush (2010) shows



that territorial issues can increase the probability of recurrent conflict and unstable peace over time.

It has also been argued that the conflict outcome matters for peace duration. For these scholars, decisive victory leads to longer peace than stalemates or compromise (Hensel 1994, 1999). A decisive victory may mean that an adversary cannot fight back because they become too weak (Clausewitz 1976). Yet, Holsti (1991) argues that establishing mechanisms through compromise to resolve contentious issues in the future is the best way to deter conflict. Furthermore, Hensel (1994) finds that contentious issues in conjunction with unfavorable conflict outcomes, particularly stalemate, can lead to conflict reoccurring. Conversely, Leng (1983) finds that in cases where states bargain with an adversary first, war erupts after the third attempt. Leng's findings appear to indicate that compromise could actually lead to more conflict and not to the resolution of contentious issues. Ultimately, Hensel (1999) finds that outcomes that change the status quo (either decisive or compromise) may lead to longer peace.

The third explanation for the stability of peace after conflict focuses on settlement types. Settlement types can be described as imposed, negotiated, or no settlement. Overwhelming evidence points to the ability of imposed settlements to create longer lasting peace than either negotiated or no settlement (Maoz 1984; Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008; Quackenbush 2010). Senese and Quackenbush find at a base level that imposed settlements lead to more stable post-conflict relations. Further showing the importance of imposed settlements, Quackenbush

and Venter find that imposed settlements also lead to more stable peace as compared to the conflict outcomes from Hensel.

Another research vein that attempts to explain peace duration stems from enduring rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000). The concept of enduring rivalries is an important starting point. Primarily because enduring rivalries give us the potential dyads that are likely to experience conflict again, making the examination of why peace lasts possible. Diehl and Goertz point out that the majority of conflict takes place between countries that have already engaged in conflict with one another in the past. Goertz, Jones, and Diehl (2005) find that stalemates signal indicators for repeated conflict between two countries. Enduring rivalries are a dynamic way to evaluate why a pair of states may engage in conflict with one another multiple times, and clearly peace is linked to the stability of their relationship. Moreover, the rivalry framework allows scholars to remove war from the center of research to look at other factors that might explain the relationship.

The explanations given for why peace lasts or does not last do not discuss gender and the role it may play. This is particularly interesting because of the extant of literature that examines the role of gender and peace-building and gender mainstreaming after conflict. With the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for more inclusion of women in peace-building and acknowledges that women are affected differently by conflict than men, the push for studying female effects on the peace process have grown (see Kotze and Solomon 2008). Thus, it is worth exploring what the role of female foreign policy leaders play in why peace may or may not last.

## **What Do We Know About Women Leaders?**

International politics has historically been dominated by men, with only 3 women coming to power for the first time in both the 1960s and 1970s, 5 in the 1980s, 13 in the 1990s, and 13 in the first decade of the 2000s. In other words, only 24 countries from 1900 to 1994 had a female leader (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). The literature on female leaders is essentially two-fold. On the one hand, early arguments posit that women are different than men and prefer more peaceful outlets like defense cuts and negotiation. Yet, on the other hand, later arguments appear to indicate that women are not different than men or that conclusions cannot really be drawn. This leaves a dramatic opening in the literature. Are women really more peaceful? Are women any different than men? Or, to spin the argument on its head, are women actually more hawkish than men?

Initial findings on the preference of female leaders to cut defense spending and oppose increases in spending (Norris and Lovenduski 1989) coupled with a finding that female leaders are less likely to use force (Page and Shapiro 1992) would point to women being less hawkish than their male counterparts. However, Caprioli and Boyer (2001) find that women are not less likely to use force, but that with such a small sample of ten leaders they could not come to any hard and fast conclusions about the role of women. Further, Koch and Fulton (2011) analyze the behavior of female chief executives and defense ministers in developed countries. They examine defense spending and conflict behavior, measured using World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data. They find, first, that women leaders are more likely to increase defense spending. Second, they find that, using the Goldstein (1992) weighted scale from the WEIS data, female leaders may

actually be more likely to initiate conflict *behavior*. However, the conflict-cooperation scale is problematic in their attempt to explain the behavior of women leaders. While it does capture conflict-like behavior, it does not capture conflict itself. Moreover, they average the score of the -10 to 10 scale annually, giving equal weight to all negative scores. In other words, a -1 means that the leader merely had a negative statement about a country, yet this is treated as conflictually equivalent to engaging in conflict with another country. Moreover, they do not identify who initiated the behavior.

Qualitatively, Genovese (1993) and Jensen (2008) have done case studies of various female leaders and found that no actual female national leadership style can be pinned down. Genovese explores the regimes of both Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Corzaon Aquino in the Philippines. These two women demonstrate the complete opposite way that female leaders may act in office, with Thatcher nicknamed “The Iron Lady” and Aquino being known for her feminine leadership style. The qualitative and quantitative results appear to point to some mixed or problematic results, thus pointing to the fact that no scholar has really been able to say what role women play. The case studies that Genovese provides are only on seven women and Jensen shallowly examines many women in a more cross-national fashion. The quantitative and qualitative results are both problematic and mixed. Moreover, these scholars have all been primarily interested in either a single case, and single year, or just Western leaders. Instead, the research should move towards a full cross-national consideration of women leaders and the roles they play in country conflict behavior.

## **Theory**

Briefly, the theoretical argument that I am making acknowledges that women may have differing gender values than men because they are positioned differently in society. This has led women, in general, to prefer other avenues as opposed to foreign policy or war, thus we may expect female chief executives and defense and foreign policy ministers to act differently than men. On the other hand, I argue that the general trends we see in the population do not necessarily apply to the women (or men) that run for elite office. These are people who are different than the ordinary citizen; however, while both these men and women are different, the paths they choose as political elites differ by gender.

Specifically, the path is moderated by societal obstacles women leaders face when trying to get elected or appointed to a position. Primarily, women leaders must overcome sex role stereotypes in which women are either delegated to the private sphere or certain feminine qualities are assumed about them while men are active in the public sphere with certain masculine traits. These stereotypes are especially present when discussing foreign policy and decisions of who is in charge. Stereotypes may make women act differently than expected.

However, women also face political obstacles. A woman chief executive or defense and foreign policy minister may want to focus on aspects other than foreign policy, but may have to play to the whims of their political party. In other words, it may not be that a chief executive's gender matters, but their political affiliation. Furthermore, the institutional makeup of the country may matter. Rather than gender, it may be the

differences between presidential systems and parliamentary systems. This portion of the theory may not be that different for men or women, but does examine the specific characteristic of the decision-maker.

### *Gender Gaps: Gender Values and Sex Differences*

There are three key explanations for the difference in gender values that could potentially lead women to act differently in conflict processes than men. The first explanation is focused around structural factors. We primarily see these structural factors play out at the aggregate level. For example, in a 2012 Pew Global Studies survey across 12 different countries women were far more against the use of drone strikes by the United States than men. The ranges differed from 31-point gap in Japan to only a 13-point gap in Uganda. Further, Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop (1996) have similar gender gap findings when using the World Values Survey and asking about the Gulf War. In the U.S. context, Conover and Sapiro (1993) find, using the American National Electoral Survey, that women were far less favorable of U.S. intervention in the Gulf than men.

At the aggregate level, we see these differences because women are in different positions in society due to education, occupation, and class issues. Women have been traditionally less likely to be as educated as men. They also fill different occupations, like nursing and teaching as opposed to industrial jobs. Moreover, women have been less likely to affiliate intellectually with political parties (Inglehart and Norris 2000). Structural factors can place women in the periphery of politics, rather than in the center (Togeby 1994; Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996). Galtung (1964) argues that the center

(upper class, male) tends to form opinions more openly about politics as opposed to the periphery (lower class, female). Further, Togeby (1994) equates foreign policy topics as a center topic as opposed to a periphery political topic. In other words, women may feel less comfortable with the topic of foreign policy, so they will often answer the questions differently than men.

On the other hand, structural factors can also emphasize gender differences in policy preferences. Rather than paying attention to foreign affairs, women may be more concerned with domestic issues. Togeby (1994) finds that in Denmark the largest gender gap actually exists between men and women in the ideological center of politics (foreign affairs). This could be due, though, to the fact that women may pay attention to different political elites, like feminist groups or groups at work (Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996). Particularly, this can be influenced by structural factors because of the exposure women get through their occupations and education. While this may appear to be primarily influential at the aggregate level only, Jalalzai (2004) finds that several female chief executives were teachers and four were housewives before leading their country. Thus, it can be argued that the different experiences women bring to political office are based on structural factors. Women chief executives, defense ministers, and foreign policy ministers may translate their different experiences as members of the electorate and society to their policy preferences as leaders.

Situational factors can also influence the foreign policy preferences of women leaders. Women's primary activities are in the home because they are mothers and wives. This can affect the likelihood of women participating in political engagement and

discussion and the types of issues they find salient. Again, women's (lack of) opinions on foreign affairs could be explained by their involvement in the home. By the same token, though, because of women's roles as mothers and wives, they may be less tolerant of the loss of life that occurs in war (Chodorow 1978). A less tolerant view towards loss of life can also explain the findings from the 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey on drone strikes. Women may favor domestic spending over military spending. Domestic spending may be viewed as favoring issues that typically concern women more like education and childcare. When a woman takes office, especially after war, she may be more concerned with domestic spending and rebuilding society than the status of the country abroad or the relationship with the country with which they recently fought. In fact, this relationship may be strongest after conflict rather than before or during.

Lastly, socialization provides a third explanation why female leaders may act differently than male leaders. Women and men are socialized into different sex roles in which women are told to be feminine (nurturing, compassionate, weak, passive) and remain in the private sphere. This argument is more in line with the social constructivists' beliefs on why gender values develop. In this argument, women are taught to be more compassionate, cooperative, and less aggressive. Academically, feminists (Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992) argue for peace studies that de-emphasize the masculine way of international politics. Thus, even amongst women who are more politically active and more aware of foreign policy decisions, emphasis is placed on peaceful outlets. Accordingly, even women who are willing to form opinions and have occupations that place them in a sphere of knowledge about foreign policy, still prefer peaceful outcomes.



Whether these traits are due to the desired international outcomes by feminists, socialization, or biology (as some might argue), these all point to a preference by women for more peaceful negotiation and peaceful methods for foreign policy. In conjunction with one another, all three explanations help determine why women may view and act differently with political issues, especially in the sphere of foreign policy. Put differently, due to structural and societal factors and socialization, we can expect female leaders to be more peaceful.

#### *Societal Factors: Sex Roles and Stereotypes*

There are, however, factors that may point to the opposite expectation among female leaders. Specifically, political elites are not the same as ordinary citizens purely because of the fact that they have chosen to run for political office. I argue that male and female candidates could, in fact, have more in common with one another in choosing to follow a political path. However, as Caprioli and Boyer (2001, 507) state, “Female leaders who have risen to power through a male-defined and male-dominated political environment may well need to be more aggressive in crises than their male counterparts... women may also work harder to ‘win’... because to appear and act feminine (and therefore weak) would be political suicide.” Women running for office often face stereotypes that they are compassionate, caring, feminine, family-oriented, and weak. Traditional sex role stereotypes emphasize difference rather than similarities between the sexes. I argue that these sex role stereotypes affect a woman’s path to leadership. While men do not face, and thus have do not have to overcome, stereotypes to

be taken seriously as a leader, women do. These stereotypes eventually change women's behavior and policy choices in relation to men. In other words, while female and male leaders have more in common with one another, stereotypes are why their actions will differ from one another.

Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes (2003) argue that a "gender issue ownership" phenomenon exists. The authors explain that a candidate's gender works as a signal to voters, specifically that female candidates signal to voters a competence on issues like spending on education and the poor. Male candidates, on the other hand, signal to voters a competence in tax policy and national security. A 2008 Pew Research survey in the United States demonstrates this theory. Participants were asked whether men or women in public office were better at several aspects. Results of the survey showed that participants thought women were better than men at working out compromises (42% compared to 16%), keeping government honest (34% compared to 10%), and dealing with social issues (52% compared to 7%). However, men were viewed as better at dealing with crime and public safety (42% compared to 12%) and dealing with national security and defense (54% compared to 7%). An opposing argument to this theory could be that these differences could vary across time and across societies. However, there is cross-national evidence that citizens hold stereotypical views of feminine and masculine traits (Jalalzai 2010).

Gender issue ownership further explains why women face stereotypes when it comes to occupation selection (McGlen and Sarkees 1993). In politics, we see women overcoming more obstacles to election than men, since women's opportunities are often

restricted in areas considered dominated by men. Foreign policy is one such example of a field that has been viewed as an occupation only for men (McGlen and Sarkees 1993). McGlen and Sarkees (1993) explore the stereotype bias of American women in foreign policy, using case studies of women to demonstrate that they have faced obstacles in pursuing foreign policy. In fact, even female scholars posit that women are less interested in foreign policy than men and that men are naturally more aggressive than women (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Hartsock; 1989). These stereotypes are further fueled by the beliefs held by the public that women are less suited for foreign policy than men. Ultimately, stereotypes of women can hinder their chances of being viewed as competent in the foreign policy sphere and finally change their policy preferences.

Due to stereotype bias, women as chief executives or defense and foreign policy ministers may just play the role of token female. Kanter (1977) states that token women may have a harder time making an impact in politics. Dolan, Deckman, and Swers (2007) argue that women are subjected to more scrutiny as chief executive than men because they are not typically the people that come to mind when picturing those in power. Thus, women face different factors than men once in power. This could greatly affect what positions they take up or what issues they decide to pursue. In fact, McGlen and Sarkees (1993) argue that when women do reach powerful positions typically dominated by men, they may do nothing to change the way things are done in order to be taken more seriously. In fact, these women may act more hawkish than their male counterparts in order to be viewed as a legitimate leader. Thus, in opposition to the theoretical position on gender values, the elite level women that make it to top positions may, in fact, be

different than women in the aggregate. In this vein, I expect to see women be more hawkish in relation to conflict initiation and escalation, defense spending, and conflict duration.

However, I posit that stereotypes may work in the favor of women in a post-conflict setting. Epstein (1988, 31) states that, “Stereotypes create a self-fulfilling prophecy in that others’ behavior is mediated by the expectation created by the stereotype.” Women, particularly in developing countries, are often elected after conflict ends purely because they are different than the men that got them into conflict (Jalalzai 2004). Jalalzai (2004) finds that several women have been elected to office directly following conflict because the citizens believe women represent the values of communication and cooperation. This directly reflects the gender stereotype that women are more peaceful than men. Of course the previous statement assumes that a woman was not responsible for the conflict in the first place; however, based on the case studies conducted by Jalalzai, this was not the case.

Thus, in cases where women are elected after conflict, I would expect women to fulfill their “role” as peacemaker and negotiator. In this case, we may expect peace to last longer if women are elected because they will not seek out violence or act in aggressive ways. We could also think of this as a rational action on the part of the woman, particularly even if this may not necessarily be how the leader wants to act. If the rational choice for a leader is to do what she can to stay in power (Mayhew 1974), then she will do what the people want. In other words, she will self-fulfill the stereotype that got her into office. It is also worth exploring the role of women in peace duration because the

traditional literature does not focus on individual traits of leaders that are in office when war ends, thus providing room for not only examining if individual characteristics matter, but also if gender makes a difference.

*Political Factors: Institutional Factors as Moderating the Effects of Gender*

Following the argument that men and women may have differences, whether biological or social, it could be argued that women have different interests than men. Specifically, women may be more invested in education than men or they may be more invested in family leave policies. Some research has found links between women's descriptive representation and policy outcomes (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). One example is a finding by Kittilson (2008) that more women in parliament led to differences in family leave policies, even when controlling for influence of the parties. Further, Dolan (2000) finds that senior level women in the U.S. bureaucracy were more likely to press for substantive representation of women through advocating salient women's issues. She argues that more work to advocate women's issues was done when more elite women were present.

Better put, a "critical mass" of women may be necessary in government in order to see any real change in policy preferences. We would see a critical mass in the national government when a larger percentage of women in parliament are present, along with a female chief executive or a defense or foreign policy minister. Some evidence has been found that when women are present in larger percentages in parliament, a country is less likely to initiate conflict (Caprioli 2000, 2003). Thus, we may expect a critical mass to

affect the representation of women's issues and the actions that female leaders may take. However, other research argues that increasing women's representation may actually decrease policy responsiveness (Sanbonmatsu 2008). Crowley (2004) argues that increasing women's representation to take them to the brink of no longer being tokens can actually hurt the representation of women's interests. Many of these factors are moderated by the fact that women chief executives and foreign policy ministers are also at the whims of political parties and institutional factors in the state.

Recent research finds that a country's political system can affect its likelihood to engage in conflict. Party-centered versus candidate-centered systems have different moderating effects on gender. In parliamentary countries with prime ministers, the parties are more in charge of who is named to powerful positions (Shugart and Carey 1992). Thus, assuming a woman wants to keep her position, she will have to act in accordance with the party. Men also face this effect. Both may be limited in their foreign policy decision-making. On the other hand, in systems that are not party-centered, the candidate is free to act more independently (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). In these instances, we may expect women to pursue the issues that they want, but accounting for the fact that a woman in a powerful position has probably overcome many obstacles, she will probably not represent "women's issues." Instead, she may be more hawkish to overcome typical stereotypes.

Political ideology may also affect the decisions of political leaders. Research has found that left-leaning governments are less prone to conflict than right-leaning governments (Koch 2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004). Political ideology may be

the driving factor for foreign policy decisions and not gender, and in this case we would expect both men and women on the left to not use conflict as opposed to men and women on the right. Many might assume that most women would be from the left, and while a majority in my data are left-leaning (63%), there is still some variation in the political leanings of the female leaders.

### **Organization of the Dissertation**

The next three chapters will explore the actions of women leaders in various state conflict behaviors. Due to the abundance of case studies and single year studies on women leaders, I will conduct cross-national, quantitative analyses of women and conflict. Chapter 2 examines the role that women foreign policy leaders play in the initiation and escalation of conflict, as well as defense spending. Chapter 3 answers whether women foreign policy leaders play a role in conflict duration. The fourth chapter tests the relationship between women leaders and conflict recurrence. Finally, I conclude with overall findings and avenues for future research, ultimately assessing whether difference makes a difference.

## **Chapter 2: Female Foreign Policy Leaders and Conflict Initiation, Escalation, and Defense Spending**

On April 2, 1982 the failing Argentine military regime invaded the Falkland Islands in an attempt to oust the United Kingdom's control of the territory. On April 5, the UK sent a naval task force to engage with the Argentine forces. The Falklands had been a territory of the UK since the 1800s. Neither country declared war, but conflict occurred for 74 days before Argentina surrendered. This series of events, amongst many other foreign policy decisions, is often cited as one of the many aggressive decisions made by the "Iron Lady" Margaret Thatcher. Although, the Argentine military was the initiator of the conflict, Thatcher opted to fight back even though some questioned whether it was worth it. Often when people think of female leaders images of Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, and Golda Meir come to mind. All three of these women experienced some sort of conflict while serving as chief executive of their country.

However, many other women have served as chief executives of their country, and even more have served as defense minister or foreign policy minister. The three leaders previously mentioned seem to provide evidence that women are no less plagued by conflict than men, but there are often stereotypical views that women are more peaceful. The aim of this chapter is to answer the following questions: do female leaders spend less on defense? Does difference make a difference in the initiation and escalation of conflict? I argue that because female political elites must take a more hawkish path to be considered a legitimate leader in the realm of foreign policy, women are no less



peaceful and possibly more violent in times of conflict initiation and escalation. This could also explain why women will spend more on defense spending, even in times of no conflict.

Further, gender is an important component of leadership that is often overlooked in studying political behavior and outcomes. When it has been examined, scholars often look at the percentage of women in parliament and not the gender of the leaders in the country. Examining the careers of female leaders can help shed light on the role that gender plays in society, specifically as a way that could influence key foreign policy decisions for a country.

The following chapter will explore in more depth why women leaders follow different paths than male leaders. Primarily, stereotypes lead female leaders to act more hawkish in order to be viewed as a legitimate leader. Further, I elaborate on the coding of my original dataset on women chief executives, defense ministers, and foreign policy ministers. I finally explain my results and provide a discussion. Specifically, I find that women chief executives are more likely to initiate and escalate conflict. I argue that this is an important step in examining how gender can influence state conflict behavior. Conversely, I do not find that women chief executives are more likely to spend more on defense. This is opposite of what Koch and Fulton (2011) find; however, one key difference is that I include all countries and they only examine OECD countries.

## **Women Leaders and Conflict**

As established in the previous chapter, past literature on the initiation and escalation of conflict overlooks the gender of leaders. While this literature is better about looking at characteristics of people in power than conflict duration, peace durability, or defense spending, previous theories often treat the state as a black box with leaders acting the same in every situation. The aim of this chapter is to open the black box of the state and examine a specific characteristic of foreign policy leaders, namely gender.

While the number of women serving as chief executive of their country has increased over the past twenty years, the number is still much lower when compared to the number of men that have served the position. However, the sample increases when we include female defense and foreign policy ministers. Unfortunately it is harder to discern in which countries women serve as token appointments as defense or foreign policy minister, but their influence is still worth exploring as a first attempt at discerning what role gender may play in conflict processes. No other studies have tried to examine, either quantitatively or qualitatively, whether the presence of female defense and foreign policy ministers makes a difference.

One study, thus far, has taken a quantitative approach to looking at the effects of female chief executives and conflict. Koch and Fulton (2011) analyze the behavior of female chief executives and percent women in the legislature in Western, developed countries. I deviate from this analysis by coding for female leaders for all countries from 1981 – 2001. Koch and Fulton find that female leaders may actually be more likely to be conflictual. They use a conflict-cooperation scale in order to analyze this, averaging

scores for a given year. This is a problematic approach, since a negative score does not necessarily equate to actual militarized conflict. All they can really conclude is that women leaders are acting more negatively, but not necessarily initiating or participating in MIDs or war. They do find that female chief executives are more likely to increase defense spending.

Moreover, several case studies have looked at specific cases of female chief executives and their involvement in conflict, but nothing particularly examining defense spending. No research has fully explored the role of female foreign policy and defense ministers, and how much influence they have in a cross-national fashion. Again, it is harder to discern how much of a role they play, but as we saw in chapter 1, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was influential in openly voicing a policy of bombing Libya.

### **Culture, Ambition, and Paths**

Lawless and Fox (2010) posit that a gendered psyche is sustained through traditional gender role expectations. This psyche generates an expectation that propels men into politics and keeps women in the periphery. Moreover, this gendered psyche can be even subtler. Women often tend to be less socialized to obtain the qualities needed in the modern political arena; for example, qualities such as confidence, assertiveness, and self-promotion. At the same time, cultural attitudes about women political leaders, the expectations of women as caretakers, and the exclusivity of men in politics often suggests that it is inappropriate for women to have the previously mentioned qualities (Lawless and Fox 2010). While women have made great strides in entering careers formerly

dominated by men, women still face huge barriers in politics. Lawless and Fox argue that political ambition is not always a given for female candidates, and that this can also generate a barrier for female politicians. However, I argue that this also adds to the cultural barriers women face. While there is less stigma around female candidates, in general, a perceived lack of ambition can certainly cloud the public's judgment of female candidates, especially those running for chief executive or being appointed to top national security positions.

These barriers act as extra obstacles that female candidates (and officeholders) must face, ultimately leading female and male politicians down different paths once elected. Although there are cultural barriers and a stigma around women possessing qualities such as assertiveness, the women who choose to run for the highest office in a country are not that different, ultimately, from the men who choose to run for the same office. In other words, running for chief executive is different than running for an office in parliament. Far fewer women make the decision to run for the highest office, even women who we thought would consider running. Condoleezza Rice provides a key example. Many view a top position such as Secretary of State as one that is a launching point for a bid for the presidency. However, she adamantly rebuked Tim Russert on a March 13, 2005 taping of Meet the Press, closing the door on a future campaign. This surprised people because they figured that she would have had the same political motivations as a man. In other words, the political ambition of the women that do decide to run is most likely similar to that of the men that decide to run for office.

While the political ambition of female and male candidates is the same, the cultural views that influence the general public makes the paths for these candidates different. Female leaders have to compensate in order to be taken seriously. In chapter one, I cited a 2008 Gallup poll that found that the general public thought women in office were trustable and competent and especially good with education and healthcare, but that they overwhelmingly trusted men when it came to issues of national security, crime, and taxes. This stereotypical view of women means that they must adopt a more hawkish stance to be viewed as a legitimate leader in national security. In other words, the female leader adopts a strategy in dealing with stereotypes to help her own career (Genovese, 1993).

Women foreign policy and defense ministers face similar circumstances, and develop similar strategies to cope with stereotypes. Discrimination of women in the State and Defense Departments in the United States was not challenged until the 1970s and it took until the 1990s to challenge more of the subtle forms of discrimination (McGlen and Sarkees, 1993). Moreover, the exclusion of women from combat in many countries also perpetuates the barring of women from critical military and defense positions. Cultural stereotypes also influence women's abilities to climb ranks in foreign policy and defense positions. The traditional view that security is a man's world not only influences who is viewed as competent, but also influences women's views on whether they themselves are competent (McGlen and Sarkees, 1993).

Another factor that influences women defense and foreign policy ministers is the ability of the minister to influence the political process and whether they are a token

appointment. We cannot always know whether a woman is a token appointment, but we do know that in many democracies the defense and foreign policy appointments are coveted. Whether a woman is a token appointment or not, research has found that women involved in the foreign-policy making process do not differ in their views from the men (McGlen and Sarkees, 1993). In other words, gender is not a factor that differentiates those involved.

### **Expectations**

In both instances of female chief executives and female ministers, expectations are that, in general, women do not hold drastically different foreign policy views than the men in the same situation. However, what ultimately drives them to act differently is the need to overcome stereotypes. In order to be viewed as more legitimate, the women leaders must adopt a more hawkish stance. In adopting a more hawkish stance, women leaders are viewed as more competent in the realms of national security and crime. This leads to several hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1: Female chief executives are more likely to initiate conflict than male chief executives.*

*Hypothesis 2: Female defense and foreign policy ministers will be more associated with initiation and escalation of conflict.*

*Hypothesis 3: Female chief executives are more likely to escalate conflict than male chief executives.*

*Hypothesis 4: Female chief executives will spend more on defense than male chief executives.*

## **Institutional Factors**

While I argue that gender is a driving factor behind differences in political behavior, other institutional factors may also explain political behavior. Political ideology may affect decision-making. Left-leaning governments are less prone to conflict than right-leaning governments (Koch 2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004). Rather than gender explaining the hawkishness of a female leader, it may be her political ideology that explains why she is more likely to initiate and/or escalate conflict and spend more on the budget.

Moreover, candidate centered systems like the single-member district United States as opposed to party centered systems like the proportional representation countries of Europe may influence the likelihood to engage in conflict. In candidate-centered countries, a candidate is more likely to have the freedom to pursue their own policy agenda, as opposed to one that is party centered (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). A party-centered country will have officeholders more likely to fall in line with the party in order to remain as a party nominee in the next election. Thus, we may find that proportional representation systems experience less conflict because the party has a bigger say, and getting an entire party to agree on something can be difficult.

Finally, the percentage of women in parliament may also be a factor that influences a female chief executive or minister's ability to influence the political process. This argument still sides with the gender explanation as a key explanation for policy preferences, but advocates for a "critical mass." As explained in the last chapter, a critical mass may be necessary to see any real change come about. Caprioli (2000, 2003) finds

some evidence that larger percentages of women in parliament means less conflict initiation by that country. In these instances, scholars argue that with a critical mass of women in represented positions, a female chief executive can truly advocate for women's issues rather than having to appear hawkish to gain legitimacy. In other words, there must be a larger percentage of women in parliament in order to allow a female chief executive to behave how she would like. This is assuming that female chief executives may be more pacifist than males, but cannot act that way, without more women generally represented in government.

These institutional factors lead to some moderating hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 5: Left-leaning female chief executives will be less likely to initiate conflict than right-leaning female chief executives.*

*Hypothesis 6: Female leaders in PR systems will initiate and escalate conflict less than candidate-centered systems.*

*Hypothesis 7: Larger percentages of women in parliament will lead to less conflict.*

### **Coding Women Leaders**

No dataset existed that included whether or not a woman was chief executive, defense minister, or foreign policy minister in a country and the dates of the candidate entering and exiting office. I chose to include top security positions because it expanded my sample size and included an aspect of female leadership (ministers) that had never been studied before. I compiled this data for my main independent variable into one dataset for the years 1980 to 2011. I chose 1980 as a starting point to coincide with the starting point of several gender equality variables that exist including CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) and UN variables such as literacy, female fertility, and female school



enrollment. 1980 is also a justifiable starting point because it coincides with an increase in the representation of women in foreign policy positions. My sources included the “Guide 2 Women Leaders”, research by Black (2010), and finally a chart of data compiled from a web source called Rulers for the years 2009 to 2011.<sup>1</sup> I also cross-checked these sources using country websites, rulers.org, Lexis Nexis, and other sites.

After establishing a list of female leaders, I then coded country-year data for females in office with a 0 if a man was in office and a 1 if a woman was in office. If a woman took office after mid-November in a given year, I coded that year as a 0 (assuming a man was in office before her). If she left office before mid-February and a man took office afterwards, I also coded that as a 0. This was not always possible to do because some sources only stated the years the woman was in office, excluding months. In those cases, I recorded a 1 for the entire timespan. I was less concerned with this coding practice with defense and foreign policy ministers, and found that it was harder to find exact dates for ministers than it was for chief executives. Specifically, it was harder to find exact dates outside of the Western countries. However, there are no instances in coding chief executives where I do not have at least the month and year of entrance and exit from office.

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<sup>1</sup> I followed previous research by Koch and Fulton (2011) in using the website [www.guide2womenleaders.com](http://www.guide2womenleaders.com). This website continuously updates after the election of a leader. The list is compiled by a Danish journalist who also uses several sources including yearly worldbooks and almanacs of women in power. After cross-checking information on several websites, I did find that it provides valid information. Using this website also helps establish reliability with Koch and Fulton, since I am arguing that they are not capturing the entire relationship between female leaders and conflict.

Another important factor in coding women leaders was making sure that in cases where there was a prime minister and president, I coded the woman as chief executive only if the position she held made decisions about the military. For example, I did not code Ireland as having a female chief executive when Mary Robinson was president from 1990 to 1997 because executive powers lie in the hands of the prime minister. I also had to make a decision on how to code Switzerland's federal council. Instead of one person holding chief executive powers, five people share the responsibility and are elected in cycles. I coded Switzerland as a 1 when three of the five members were female from September 2010 to January 2012. For the purpose of this dissertation, these dates are not included in analysis.

The female chief executive, female defense minister, and female foreign policy minister variables have a total of 6,074 country years. For the chief executive variable, 5,873 (96.7%) of those country years have men in office, leaving 201 (3.3%) country years with women in office. There are fewer female defense ministers, with 166 (2.7%) country years with women in office. Finally, the female foreign policy minister variable has the most females in office with 415 (6.8%) country years. I was initially surprised to see more women serve as foreign policy minister, but this could be a product of token appointments. This is a factor that I discuss in the project, but I do not have information on whether a woman is a token appointment or not.

## Research Design

This chapter has three main goals. First, to test whether female leaders are more likely to spend more on defense. Second, explore if female leaders are more likely to initiate conflict. Third, to analyze if female leaders also escalate conflict. The argument behind these tests is that female leaders must appear hawkish in order to be considered a legitimate leader by the general public. Thus, I expect that female leaders will be associated with higher defense spending and initiation and escalation of conflict.

### *Dependent Variables*

The first dependent variable is *defense spending* and is measured using the military expenditures per country year from the National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer, Bremer, and, Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987). The variable is a continuous variable that is measured in thousands of US Dollars for the current year.

The initiation and escalation data comes from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). *Conflict Initiation* is a binary variable with '0' representing no initiation and '1' representing the initiation of conflict. *Conflict escalation* uses the MID hostility level data. With directed dyads, the first state is the potential initiator against the second state. The MID data is used to analyze the relationship between the pair of states. The variable is ordinal, ranging from '1' representing no conflict to '5' representing war. The levels that fall between include threat to use force, display of force, and use of force.

### *Independent Variable*

The primary independent variable is *female chief executive*. As previously stated, this variable is a binary variable with '0' representing a man in office and '1' representing a woman in office. Both *female defense minister* and *female foreign policy minister* are coded as binary variables with '0' representing a man in office and '1' representing a woman in office. I will use a lagged variable for chief executive in the defense-spending model in order to take into account the delayed budgetary processes that takes place within countries.

### *Control Variables*

Several control variables are included to take into account past explanations for defense spending, conflict occurrence, gender equality, and institutional factors. *Alliance* is included in the conflict models because some argue that it may decrease the likelihood of conflict (Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1992). Thus, alliance membership may decrease the number of disputes and the level of hostility reached. The data comes from the Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provisions project (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000). A '0' means the pair of states in a dyad are not in an alliance and a '1' represents that they are in an alliance. Both defensive and offensive alliances are included. *Joint democracy* is also used in the conflict models to take into account the argument that democracies are less likely to fight one another (e.g. Maoz and Russett 1993). The joint democracy variable was created from the Polity2 variable in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). The variable ranges from -10 to 10, with scores 6 to 10

representing democracy. If both states are equal to or greater than 6, the variable is coded as a '1' and if not then the pair is coded as a '0.' In the model for defense spending, I only control for *regime type* using the Polity2 variable from the PolityIV dataset. Democracies, while not engaging with other democracies, may spend more on defense because they do fight other countries (Morgan and Schwebach 1992).

A similar argument to the democratic peace, the *gender equality* peace, argument states that countries with high levels of gender equality are more likely to be peaceful (Caprioli 2000; 2001). In order to account for this, I combine the women's economic, social, and political rights scales from CIRI into one scale that ranges from 0 to 9, with 0 representing no gender equality and 9 representing full gender equality (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). *State capability* uses a country's CINC score, working from the argument that when states have access to more military personnel and expenditures, for example, they are more likely to fight. I also control for the *logged GDP* in both models, *GDP growth* in the defense spending model, and *peace years* in the conflict models. The economic environment is an important factor take into account when analyzing why a country spends as much or as little as it does on defense. Lastly, I control for a *MID count* in the defense-spending model to take into account any conflicts within the past 5 years.

Institutional factors may play a role in why a country spends on defense or engages in conflict. *Partisanship* is used to examine whether a chief executive is right, center, or left. The variable is a tripartite variable coded with '1' representing right, '2' representing center, and '3' representing left. *Proportional representation* systems are also controlled for with a binary variable. '1' represents a country with proportional

representation and '0' indicates a country without proportional representation. The previous two variables come from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Finally, I also control for *percent women in parliament*. This is a continuous variable and was compiled by Paxton and Hughes (2007) using the Inter-parliamentary Union data.

### *Methods*

I have three main dependent variables to examine in this chapter, leading to three different empirical tests. First, I use a time series cross sectional analysis with a lagged dependent variable to test defense spending for the years 1981 to 2001. I include a lagged dependent variable as opposed to running a random effects or fixed effects model due to theoretical need (Achen 2000). A country's previous military expenditures will most likely influence their current military expenditures. Moreover, a lagged dependent variable helps account for stationarity and heteroskedastic issues that occur in time series data. The unit of analysis for this test is the country year.

Second, I conduct a binary logistic regression model for the initiation of conflict, and third I use an ordinal logistic regression model to test whether women are more likely to escalate conflict. An ordinal logistic regression is more appropriate for the escalation of conflict because it ranges from 1 to 5 with no set interval indicating if each level is equidistant. Ordered logistic regression also helps account for the linear regression model assumptions that ordinal variables often violate. This is particularly important because we cannot assume that the distance between one level and another is equal. These last two

models are clustered by dyad in order to create robust standard errors. These final two are also conducted from 1981 to 2001 and the unit of analysis is the dyad year.

Moreover, in order to examine the initiation and escalation of conflict, I use directed dyads. Directed dyads provide the ability to tell which state initiated conflict, which is particularly important for analyzing if female leaders affect the likelihood of increasing hostility levels. Moreover, dyads will be selected based on politically active dyads (Quackenbush, 2006). Politically active dyads solve the “false negative” problem because they exclude cases that have no possibility to engage in conflict. It also more fully captures the role of opportunity for conflict between pairs of states than politically relevant dyads. Moreover, other issues with the data include limited availability of gender data. While the conflict data extends all the way back to 1816, data on gender equality only goes to 1981.

## **Results**

Some descriptive numbers are important to report. First, 22 of 7,992 (0.27%) conflict initiations are done by women and 350 of 259,728 (0.13%) conflicts are initiated by men. These numbers are small given that conflict is a fairly rare occurrence; however, they do point to an initial relationship between conflict initiation and female chief executives.

Table 2.1 Female Chief Executives and Conflict Initiation

	No Conflict	Conflict Initiation	Total
Male Chief Executive	259,378	350	259,728
Female Chief Executive	7,970	22	7,992
Percentages	(f).9973 (m) .9987	(f).27 (m) .13	

Moreover, no female leaders fall within the center category for political ideology. 63% of female chief executives fall on the left, leaving 37% of women on the right. Initiation of conflict by female leaders is done 59% of the time by women on the right. This leads to some initial acceptance that gender and ideology may be playing a role with one another. However, in the case of male leaders, only 39% of conflict initiations are by men on the right and 57% by men on the left. If there is an interaction of gender and ideology, it would only be taking place for women and not for men.

Another important factor worth a preliminary exploration is whether female leaders are related to democracy. It may be the case that democracies are more accepting of female leaders and that gender does not matter, but regime type. None of the female leader variables are highly correlated with democracy, though they all have positive relationships. Female foreign policy minister has the highest correlation with democracy at .168, female chief executives the next with .140, and finally defense ministers the lowest with .134. These low correlations provide further evidence that women are being elected or appointed in countries falling all along the regime spectrum.



### *Defense Spending*

Table 2.2 shows the findings for models 1 and 2 related to female chief executives and defense spending. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant. The conflict count variable is positive and significant at the  $p < .05$  level. This indicates that past conflict experience is more likely to lead to higher defense spending. This holds with previous findings in explaining why a country may spend more on defense, specifically that past experience leads to more spending (Richardson 1960). Military personnel is positive and significant at the  $p < .10$  level. This also follows from previous findings that countries with more military personnel will have to spend more on defense. The coefficient for the lagged effect of a female chief executive is positive and not significant in model 1; however, it remains positive and is significant at the  $p < .10$  level in model 2 which includes the interaction effect with ideology. Neither the interaction nor ideology are significant in model 2, which appears to indicate that regardless of partisanship of the female chief executive she spends more on defense. However, this level of significance is not as convincing of a strong relationship than lower levels. Defense spending is potentially an easy signal to her population and the world that she should be taken seriously as a leader in the foreign policy realm.

Models 1 and 2 also examine whether the percent women in parliament have a pacifying effect. In both models the percent women in parliament is negative and significant at the  $p < .05$  level. This does give some support to the argument that more women in parliament could lead to lower defense spending; however, the female chief

executive variable remains positive in both models. While women in parliament may have some effect, it does not appear to have an effect on women chief executives. Also in both models, logged GDP and GDP growth are positive and significant. In other words, countries that can afford to spend money on defense are spending more on defense. These are expected relationships.

After examining both models, I am hesitant to accept hypothesis 4 because of the lack of strong statistical support for the relationship between female chief executives and defense spending. As a related hypothesis to hypothesis 7, women in parliament do not appear to have a mediating effect on female chief executives; though they do have a stronger relationship in explaining why defense spending may decrease in a country.

Table 2.2. Female Chief Executives and Defense Spending

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Military Expenditures	.901**** (.036)	.900**** (.036)
Female Chief Executive (lagged)	.068 (.042)	.071* (.042)
Female Chief Executive x Ideology		-.018 (.030)
Percent Women in Parliament	-.001** (.001)	-.001** (.001)
Military Personnel	.0002* (.0001)	.0002* (.0001)
Partisanship of Chief Executive	.001 (.011)	.002 (.011)
Logged GDP	.123** (.041)	.123** (.041)
GDP Growth	.011**** (.002)	.011**** (.002)
Level of Democracy	-.005 (.004)	-.005 (.004)
MID Count	.026** (.011)	.030** (.011)
Constant	.344* (.189)	.350* (.191)
N	1477	1477

Time series cross-sectional analysis with panel corrected standard errors results for 1981 to 2001. p<.001\*\*\*\* p<.01\*\*\* p<.05\*\* p<.10\*

### *Conflict Initiation*

While results are not significant for chief executives and defense spending, another way to examine whether women act more hawkish in order to receive legitimacy is by looking at conflict behavior. Model 3 in table 2.3 shows that female chief executives are highly likely to initiate conflict. The positive coefficient is significant at the p<.0001 level. The institutional variables included are also significant, with one surprising result. Proportional representation systems, which should initiate conflict less because of more veto plays being involved, have a positive coefficient. This would

indicate that PR systems may be initiating conflict more. The negative coefficient for partisanship provides evidence that right leaning leaders are more likely to initiate conflict than left leaning. Lastly, the negative and significant coefficient for percent women in parliament also points to the role of a critical mass in parliament influencing a country's likelihood to avoid conflict. None of these included variables alter the positive relationship with female chief executives, however. Moreover, when including the interaction effect in model 4, female chief executive is still positive and significant. The interaction effect has no significance, and the partisanship variable goes from being significant at the  $p < .01$  level to the  $p < .05$  level.

Table 2.3. Female Chief Executives and Initiation of Conflict

Variable	Model 3	Model 4
Female Chief Executive	1.189 **** (.279)	1.763** (.621)
Female Chief Executive * Partisanship		-.323 (.279)
Alliance	-.746**** (.092)	-.744**** (.092)
Log GDP	.101 (.146)	.085 (.149)
State A Capability	18.458**** (3.188)	18.81**** (3.23)
State B Capability	6.209*** (2.249)	6.237** (2.252)
State A Gender Equality	-.108 (.090)	-.103 (.091)
Partisanship of Chief Executive	-.214** (.094)	-.187* (.095)
Proportional Representation	.652** (.230)	.687** (.237)
Joint Democracy	-.470* (.202)	-.470* (.201)
% Women in Parliament	-.009* (.004)	-.010* (.004)
Peace Years	-.203**** (.040)	-.202**** (.040)
Peace Years Squared	.003* (.001)	.003* (.001)
Peace Years Cubed	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Constant	-2.445* (1.136)	-2.417* (1.147)
N	172,155	172,155
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.2181	.2185

Logistic regression results for 1981 – 2001 with standard errors in parentheses.  
 \*\*\*\* p<.0001, \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05

Alliance and state capabilities are also significant and in the expected directions.

Countries with alliances are less likely to initiate and countries with higher capabilities

are more likely to initiate. A country's gender equality level does not appear to affect the likelihood of the state initiating conflict. Lastly, the joint democracy variable is negative and significant at the  $p < .05$  level, indicating that joint democracies are less likely to initiate against one another. This is an expected relationship based on the democratic peace argument.

The predicted probabilities for the initiation of conflict by male and female chief executives. Female chief executives are more likely than male chief executives to initiate conflict, with .0008 and .0003 respectively. These small probabilities reflect the low likelihood overall of initiating conflict, but still represent that females do have a higher probability than male leaders. The previous models and predicted probabilities provide support for hypothesis 1. Female chief executives are more likely to initiate conflict than male chief executives.

Table 2.4. Female Defense and Foreign Policy Ministers and the Initiation of Conflict

Variable	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Female Defense Minister	1.074** (.375)		.513 (.458)
Female Foreign Policy Minister		.268 (.268)	.162 (.269)
Female Chief Executive Alliance			1.069*** (.321)
Alliance	-.742**** (.093)	-.741**** (.092)	-.748**** (.092)
Log GDP	.106 (.150)	.106 (.153)	.108 (.146)
State A Capability	18.376**** (3.218)	17.646**** (3.293)	18.472**** (3.110)
State B Capability	6.245** (2.241)	6.518** (2.261)	6.122** (2.246)
State A Gender Equality	-.136 (.089)	-.119 (.089)	-.122 (.090)
Partisanship of Chief Executive	-.211* (.095)	-.217* (.097)	-.225* (.096)
Proportional Representation	.627** (.225)	.598** (.236)	.664** (.225)
Joint Democracy	-.457* (.206)	-.455* (.205)	-.477* (.202)
% Women in Parliament	-.011** (.004)	-.011** (.004)	-.009** (.004)
Peace Years	-.202**** (.040)	-.202**** (.041)	-.203**** (.040)
Peace Years Squared	.003* (.001)	.003* (.001)	.003* (.001)
Peace Years Cubed	-.000* (.000)	-.000* (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Constant	-2.315* (1.190)	-2.339* (1.20)	-2.441* (1.132)
N	172,155	172,155	172,155
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.2149	.2134	.2186

Logistic regression results for years 1980 to 2001 with standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\*\*p<.0001, \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.01

Female defense ministers also have a positive and significant relationship with the initiation of conflict, as shown in table 2.4. In the same model, the rest of the variables behave in a similar fashion to the models that included the female chief executive. Alliance is negative and significant, state capabilities are positive and significant, and percent women in parliament is negative and significant. One factor that may be influencing this result is that in some cases, such as Benazir Bhutto, the female held both the chief executive and defense minister position at the same time. This model could be capturing some of the same cases that the female chief executive model is capturing. While this variable is positive and significant, I am less convinced to accept hypothesis 2.

Table 2.4 also includes the model that tests the relationship between female foreign policy ministers and conflict initiation. The coefficient for female foreign policy ministers is positive, but it is not significant. In this case, the other variables appear to better explain the case of conflict initiation. The results in model 6 lend even more evidence for the rejection of hypothesis 2. Female defense and foreign policy ministers appear to not influence the initiation of conflict. With the overlap in chief executive and defense minister roles that occurs and the potential for foreign policy ministers being token appoints, these results are not that surprising.

However, the influence of the percent women in parliament and women in positions of chief executive, defense minister, and foreign policy minister are all included in model 7. Following hypothesis 6, I examined whether women in parliament (and women in all positions) have a pacifying effect on women chief executives. In conjunction with another, female leaders in top security positions and the percentage of



women in parliament could influence the initiation of conflict. In this case, we may see that conflict is less likely to occur (Koch and Fulton 2011). Model 7 includes all three female leader variables and the percent women in parliament in order to see if there is a pacifying effect.<sup>2</sup> The percentage of women in parliament is still negative and significant, but the female leader variables are all positive with chief executive significant as well. It does not appear that the percent of women in parliament or other positions influences female chief executives. This is the opposite of what Koch and Fulton (2011) find; however, this could be due to the expanded sample including countries outside of the OECD. It may be very likely that more women are seen in government in the West than in other parts of the world regularly. Current data shows that Europe and the Americas (Canada and the US) have higher levels of women in parliament than other regions of the world. Including the rest of the world may be washing out this pacifying effect.

The combined findings for the previous models lead to an initial rejection of the institutional hypotheses 5, 6, and 7. The rejection of these institutional variables points to the importance of gender of national leaders. The stereotype bias that women must overcome overpowers the role that institutions play in these countries. The institutional effects may act as expected for male leaders, but women have to work harder to be taken seriously and considered legitimate leaders in the public's eye.

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<sup>2</sup> I also included a variable where I summed up female chief executive, female defense minister, and female foreign policy minister. It had similar results as model 7.

### *Conflict Escalation*

Table 2.5 displays the results for models 8 and 9, which examine the relationship between female chief executives and conflict escalation. Female chief executives do appear to escalate conflict more than male leaders; however, in the model that includes the interaction of female leaders and partisanship, the main coefficient for chief executive loses its significance. It remains positive, but loses its explanatory power. Moreover, partisanship and PR systems, which were significant in the previous models, are not significant in either of these models. Alliance remains negative and significant, as does joint democracy. Joint democracy actually gains in its significance level, again emphasizing the findings that while democracies may be less likely to initiate conflict with one another, they are certainly not escalating against one another. The percentage of women in parliament is also negative and significant.

Table 2.5. Female Chief Executives and the Escalation of Conflict

Variable	Model 8	Model 9
Female Chief Executive	1.093**** (.259)	.973 (.523)
Female Chief Executive * Partisanship		.065 (.234)
Alliance	-.713**** (.078)	-.714**** (.078)
Log GDP	.466* (.199)	.469* (.120)
State A Capability	12.911**** (3.45)	12.855**** (3.452)
State B Capability	7.855**** (1.674)	7.857**** (1.672)
State A Gender Equality	-.147 (.083)	-.148 (.083)
Partisanship of Chief Executive	-.126 (.072)	-.131 (.075)
Proportional Representation	.305 (.237)	.298 (.245)
Joint Democracy	-.984**** (.189)	-.985**** (.189)
% Women in Parliament	-.012*** (.003)	-.012*** (.003)
Peace Years	-.366**** (.087)	-.366**** (.087)
Peace Years Squared	.008* (.004)	.008* (.004)
Peace Years Cubed	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Cut 1	7.76 (.896)	7.76 (.895)
Cut 2	7.99 (.899)	7.99 (.899)
Cut 3	8.02 (.898)	8.02 (.897)
Cut 4	8.47 (.901)	8.47 (.900)
Cut 5	10.53 (.953)	10.53 (.952)
N	172,155	172,155
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.2763	.2763

Ordered logistic regression results for years 1980 to 2001 with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*\*p<.0001, \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05

The lack of significance that remains in model 9 after the inclusion of the interaction between female chief executive and partisanship leads to the rejection that female chief executives escalate conflict more.

One other way to explore this relationship is with predicted probabilities. Table 2.6 shows that female chief executives do marginally display force and use force more frequently than male leaders, but there is no difference between threatening force or initiating war. This difference in the lower levels of conflict escalation (short of war) between male and female leaders does fall in line with the theory. It may help women leaders appear as capable in the realm of national security by using a display of force or use of force without having to engage in actual war.

**Table 2.6. Predicted Probabilities for Female Chief Executive and Escalation of Conflict**

	Male Chief Executive	Female Chief Executive
No Conflict	.9998	.9995
Threat of Conflict	.0000	.0000
Display of Force	.0001	.0003
Use of Force	.0001	.0004
War	.0000	.0000

The probabilities for female chief executives versus male chief executives for the display of force and use of force are .0003 and .0004 compared to .0001 and .0001 respectively. The greater difference exists with the use of force, which includes actions such as blockades, clashes, or occupations of territory (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996), could help women display acts of toughness to the general public. It appears that there is still some support for hypothesis 3, that female chief executives are escalating conflict more often than male chief executives.

Table 2.7. Female Defense and Foreign Policy Ministers and Escalation of Conflict

Variable	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Female Defense Minister	.808* (.338)		.436 (.316)
Female Foreign Policy Minister		.090 (.215)	-.026 (.217)
Female Chief Executive			1.023**** (.262)
Alliance	-.709**** (.079)	-.710**** (.078)	-.713**** (.078)
Log GDP	.479* (.205)	.482* (.209)	.472* (.198)
State A Capability	12.607**** (3.551)	12.027**** (3.50)	13.075**** (3.40)
State B Capability	8.104**** (1.69)	8.233**** (1.673)	7.815**** (1.679)
State A Gender Equality Level	-.167* (.082)	-.152 (.081)	-.156 (.084)
Partisanship of Chief Executive	-.126 (.074)	-.134 (.075)	-.125 (.072)
Proportional Representation	.272 (.242)	.235 (.243)	.317 (.236)
Joint Democracy	-.983**** (.193)	-.977**** (.193)	-.987**** (.189)
% Women in Parliament	-.013**** (.004)	-.013**** (.004)	-.012**** (.003)
Peace Years	-.365**** (.087)	-.365**** (.088)	-.366**** (.087)
Peace Years Squared	.008* (.004)	.007* (.004)	.008* (.004)
Peace Years Cubed	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Cut 1	7.74 (.903)	7.75 (.901)	7.76 (.896)
Cut 2	7.97 (.905)	7.98 (.903)	8.01 (.898)
Cut 3	7.99 (.905)	8.01 (.903)	8.02 (.898)
Cut 4	8.45 (.909)	8.46 (.906)	8.47 (.902)
Cut 5	10.51 (.962)	10.51 (.959)	10.53 (.954)
N	172,155	172,155	172,155
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.2734	.2725	.2766

Ordered logistic regress results for years 1980 to 2000 with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*\*p<.0001, \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05

Models 10 and 11 included in table 2.7 assess whether female defense and foreign policy ministers influence the escalation of conflict. The results here are similar to those of the initiation of conflict. The coefficient for female defense ministers is positive and significant, but this may be capturing the overlap with the female chief executive variable. The coefficient for female foreign policy ministers is positive, but not significant. The only institutional variable to remain significant and in the expected direction is the percentage of women in parliament. Joint democracy is also negative and significant, as well as alliance.

Finally, model 12 is meant to examine whether a critical mass exists in the escalation of conflict. In this case, there is even less likely for a critical mass to exist. The percentage of women in parliament remains negative and significant, and the coefficient for female foreign policy minister becomes negative for the first time but is not significant. However, the female chief executive variable is significant at the  $p < .0001$  level and is positive. In this case, the female chief executive is not influenced by the percentage of women in parliament or if a female defense or foreign policy minister is present.

The results here point to the rejection of hypothesis 2, that female defense and foreign policy ministers are associated with an escalation of conflict. Moreover, while the inclusion of the interaction of female chief executive and partisanship leads to a loss of significance of female chief executives in model 9, the predicted probabilities do point to a key difference in the display of force and use of force levels between female and male chief executives. In this case, there is some evidence for hypothesis 3. Lastly, there does

seem to be a lack of evidence for the institutional hypotheses. The number of women in parliament does remain negative and significant, but it does not ultimately wash out the effects of the gender of the chief executive.

## **Discussion and Conclusions**

Overall, there appears to be a relationship between female chief executives and the initiation and escalation of conflict, with a weak relationship with defense spending. Female chief executives do appear to spend more on defense, even after taking into account institutional variables like ideology and the percent women in parliament. However, the results were not as statistically significant as the findings for conflict initiation and escalation. One of the main reasons why my findings may differ from Koch and Fulton's defense spending findings is that I include all countries while they only examine OECD countries. Data is more consistently available for the OECD countries than for other countries, and more female leaders have held power in these fewer countries than across time in all countries. Moreover, my conflict findings are better at examining the relationship of gender and decision-making behavior. Koch and Fulton do not fully capture whether women are more prone to militarized disputes or war than men. I find; however, that women leaders do experience more conflict, even after controlling for some of the institutional effects.

The argument that women in parliament may alter the actions of female leaders does not appear to hold in any case. While the percent of women in parliament variable is always negative and significant in my models, it does not alter the direction or significant

of the female chief executive variable. Adding the variables for female ministers also does not make a difference on the actions of female chief executives. There are a few reasons why this may be happening. First, the defense minister and chief executive variable may have some overlap that is being picked up in the models. The significance of the defense minister models, but not the foreign policy minister models does seem to give evidence to this overlap. However, it could also be a function of powerful defense ministers. Second, the fact that there are by far more female foreign policy ministers with no significant results in those models or effect on the critical mass may lend support to the token appointment argument. It may not be the case that foreign policy ministers are included in the decision-making process as often as defense ministers in other countries (McGlen and Sarkees 1993).

The main institutional factor that appeared to mediate the findings of gender was the interaction of ideology and female chief executives and the escalation of conflict. The variable lost significant, but after looking at the predicted probabilities there was still a large difference between men and women leaders. Proportional representation appeared to work in the opposite direction of what most scholars theorized, indicating that these systems were more likely to initiate and escalate conflict. These findings may be due to the inclusion of countries that are not necessarily full democracies outside of Western democracies. In models that were not included in this chapter, I replaced the proportional representation variable for a variable on presidential versus parliamentary systems. This systems variable was not significant and did not change the results. Moreover, in the



models when ideology was significant, it did appear that leaders on the right were initiating more often than leaders on the left.

The findings in this chapter do point to an effect of gender on decision-making. Female leaders are more likely to fall within the categories of display of force and use of force than male leaders, and they are more likely to initiate conflict than male leaders. These findings support my argument that female leaders are more often in need of proving themselves in the national security arena than male leaders. The need to prove themselves may not only be coming from the views the public holds on them, but also the views that other national leaders have. One factor that I did not take into account was whether the female leader was provoked into initiating or escalating. Future research could take this into account. One argument might be that women could be viewed as an easy target by other leaders.

Lastly, one of the biggest challenges in testing whether gender matters is a sample size issue. The continued election of women into power will only be able to shed more light on the relationship of gender and the decision-making process. As more and more data becomes available, we can continue to test whether it matters. Conversely, as more and more women become elected, we may see a lessening of the effect of gender on decision-making. This could mean there is a greater acceptance culturally and politically of female leaders, making gender a less important factor in the decision-making process. However, we are not there yet. The following two chapters will examine more fully other ways that gender can impact conflict behavior in a state, examining if female leaders

have longer conflict duration than male leaders and finally if, after conflict ends, female leaders have more durable peace than male leaders.

### **Chapter 3: Female Foreign Policy Leaders and Conflict Duration**

*I have often heard that Afghan women are not political. That peace and security is man's work. I am here to challenge that illusion. For the last 20 years of my life, the leadership of men has only brought war and suffering.*

Jamila Akbarzi, founding member of the Afghan Women's Network, stated in 2001 that men are responsible for war and suffering (Gibbings 2011). However, findings in the previous chapter point to women's responsibility in initiating and escalating conflict cross-nationally. Following that women chief executives are engaging in conflict more frequently than their male counterparts, does the duration of these conflicts also differ? More specifically, does the gender of the chief executive matter for duration? Do female chief executives face longer conflicts than male chief executives? Further, do female foreign policy and defense ministers alter the duration of conflict?

Consequences for the individual characteristics of leaders may influence the duration of conflict, beyond the usual explanations of regime type or cost/benefit analyses. For example, some research finds that leaders within mixed regimes are more likely to continue war than those in democracies or autocracies (Goemans 2000). However, this research leaves out individual leader characteristics and how they may function within regimes. The aim of this chapter is to shed light on what the role of individual characteristics and gender may be, and whether we see a divide in what to expect when men and women face conflict. This chapter will explore whether female leaders face longer conflicts than male leaders. Determining if there is a gender divide in duration of conflict is an important topic to explore, primarily because much of the

research on duration focuses on systemic or state level characteristics such as relative power, terrain, and troop quality (Bennett and Stam 1996). Opening the black box of the state and focusing on individual characteristics could help contribute to preference orderings for formal models in the future and also continues to contribute to the study of how individual characteristics of leaders affect security.

### **Previous Arguments**

War duration can have many effects on leader popularity, regime stability, and costs of war. Bennett and Stam (1996) posit that military strategy and terrain are the most important determinants in explaining how long conflict will last. Specifically, they argue that maneuver strategies create shorter wars and punishment strategies create longer wars. Open terrain will see shorter war and rough terrain will see longer war. They also argue that relative power will lead to shorter war when there is an imbalance of power. Moreover, large military personnel numbers and populations will lead to longer war because they can continue to fuel the war. As for domestic characteristics, they include factors like regime type, repression, and issue salience. They do not include any characteristics of the individual leaders.

Further, Goemans (2000) is specifically interested in regime type and war termination. Goemans breaks down the characteristics of regimes by repression and exclusion. For example, democracies have low levels of repression and exclusion and autocracies have high levels of both. He argued that mixed regimes, with characteristics of both democracies and authoritarian regimes, will experience longer conflict because

leaders are more likely to be punished if they perform poorly. In other words, institutional characteristics matter, but not individual leader characteristics.

Finally, within the bargaining literature conflict endures because of commitment problems. Reiter (2009) argues that states are less likely to back down from total victory because of fears that stem from these commitment problems. Specifically, states do not know whether they can trust the other even when more information is available to them than before the war started. In the end, one side or both sides may increase their demands during war rather than agreeing to stop fighting. In this case, commitment problems lead to longer conflicts because both sides would rather have total victory rather than concede and potentially lose everything or risk another war due to commitment problems.

### **Gender and Duration**

Evidence in chapter 2 supports the argument that women chief executives are more hawkish than their male counterparts, initiating and escalating conflict at higher rates. In chapter 2, I argued that this occurs because women leaders must compensate for stereotypical views held of them so they will be viewed as a more legitimate leader. Following the steps of that argument, I also posit that conflict will last longer under the reign of a female leader for two reasons. The first reason is that the female leader must continue to act hawkish because she faces a higher level of scrutiny if she were to appear weak (Dolan, Deckman, & Swers 2007). The second reason is that other leaders may view a female leader as more vulnerable once conflict has begun. Specifically, stereotypical, gendered views make women appear as easier adversaries than men. These

two reasons can also be viewed as cyclical in nature. A female leader may have to act more hawkish in order for the other belligerent to view her as a legitimate adversary.

### *Stereotypes*

Several reasons exist as to why stereotypes form around a woman's ability to hold national office. I previously explored cultural barriers that influence not only the public's view of female candidates, but also an individual female's view that she can run for office. In the case of conflict duration, stereotypes again work in influencing the actions of the female leader. Female leaders must consistently take actions to be viewed as a legitimate leader, working against pervasive public views that women are better at "compassionate" issues and men are better at national security (Lawless 2004; Eagly 2007). To be sure, male leaders also want to be viewed as legitimate leaders. However, since "male leader" is the common picture that comes to the average citizen's mind, the level of scrutiny is not as high for male leaders as it is for female leaders.

Dolan, Deckman, and Swers (2007) assert that female leaders often face more scrutiny while in office because not only is the position high profile, but it is hard to reconcile the face of a woman in a position of power. Recent Pew social trends research asked American citizens why women have not made as many strides in politics and a majority agreed that female politicians are held to higher standards than male politicians (*Pew Research Center, 2015*). The stereotype literature demonstrates how this happens at the national level; however, I posit that this also happens at the international level. Higher levels of scrutiny place a bigger burden on the shoulders of women leaders to be viewed

as legitimate to their people, but also to the international community. This legitimacy is not necessarily that they are the real leader of the country (authority), but that they can legitimately wield military power.

Moreover, these stereotypes influence the view of the other country involved in the dispute. Emerging from this first step is a cyclical process that involves female leaders, conflict, and their adversaries. Not only are women leaders facing potential media criticism while in war (much like their male counterparts), but they may also be facing the legitimacy concern. This assumption rests on the argument that what happens within a country may be projected onto relations with other countries, as in the Maoz and Russett (1993) norms argument for the democratic peace or the structural violence argument by Caprioli (2000). Moreover, I argue that the legitimacy aspect is not about whether the female leader is the real leader, but instead it is over whether she has the capability to make sound military decisions. Further, once engaged in conflict with a female leader, Caprioli and Boyer (2001) posit that most male leaders will not want to appear to have lost to a woman. While it can certainly be argued that leaders will not want to lose at all, for a male leader a loss to a woman is even more damaging than a loss to a man.

In other words, men will have less reason to bargain with a female leader than with a male leader. Whether a female wants to be involved in a long conflict or not, she may be forced to face an uncompromising male leader for legitimacy purposes in the eyes of the people and the international community. The female leader may not face the same legitimacy concerns in duration of conflict since the common perception is that women

are good with compromise. If anything, it might work in her favor to compromise the end of a war even if she was the one that initiated it. However, by playing up the potential negotiation, the female leader could continue to lose legitimacy in the eyes of her adversary. One concern may be that, regardless of gender, if the male leader's state is disadvantaged he would be more likely to negotiate rather than face a loss. I would not argue that gender would trump the importance of a leader's attempt to get a better outcome than a loss; however, I am arguing that male leaders will work harder to not lose to a female leader. This may not always be the case, but there are consequences to a male leader losing to a female that he may not want to face.

I argue that men will be less likely to compromise with a female leader and lose, so they will push further for what they want. If the female leader pushes for negotiations, this could be a bad signal to send. Lawless (2004) argues that in a post 9/11 world, female candidates have a harder time garnering support from the public on issues of national security since national security is considered within the male realm of politics. This is an important implication for the rise of an era where "men's issues" appear to be taking hold (the war on terrorism being a key example). If women leaders are disadvantaged when national security dominates the domestic agenda, I argue that it would also follow in the international arena. Stereotypes of women leaders may alter the ability for bargaining, increasing the opportunity for misperception, while also influencing the male leader's need to "win." Caprioli and Boyer (2001) point to the need for female leaders to work harder to "win" and a male leader's need to appear "strong" against a female adversary.



### *Militarization and Women as Adversaries*

War, militaries, and militarization have long been considered the realm of masculinity and men (Peterson 2010). Militarism is an ideology that “values war highly and, in doing so, serves to legitimize state violence” (Steans 1998, 111). We can see militarism and militarization when any portion of society becomes dependent upon the military. A consequence of militarization is the domination of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995). Hegemonic masculinity recognizes the socially and culturally idealized form of manhood. While the social and cultural factors may differ from country to country, the one theme that does hold steady is the placement of men over women. Moreover, what hegemonic masculinity does lead to is the perpetual view that men are more capable than women. Further, masculinity is responsible for viewing militarization as “man’s work.” For example, militaries historically were exclusively male (Steans 1998).

While the possibilities for women serving in the military are increasing every year - for example the United States recently lifted the ban on women in combat specialties in 2013 - there are still problems with viewing women as capable in national security. Moreover, the expectations for these women are that they will conform to traditional military roles that were developed by men (Enloe 2007; Peterson 2010). Peterson (2010) argues that female military members often have to go beyond their male colleagues to prove their ability to serve in the military. Success in the military and in war has typically included qualities that are traditionally viewed as masculine. Qualities like superior physical strength, male-bonding, heroic risk taking, extremes of violence, and the

acceptance of sacrificing one's life (Peterson 2010). Women, on the other hand, are not associated with these traits and are often viewed as impeding male bonding in the military (Goldstein 2001).

Given that it is less frequent for female leaders to have served in the military before becoming chief executive, either because the country prevented women from serving or she chose not to, I argue that this could color the view that the other country has of her as a competent leader in the realm of national security. However, the same is not as frequently assumed of a man that did not serve in the military. Male leaders do not have to overcome the bias as often because of hegemonic masculinity and militarization. When a female leader faces her adversary and conflict endures, one could think of this in terms of bargaining failure. Fearon (1995) posits that three factors lead to bargaining failure including incomplete information. In combination with the need to appear strong and the view that female leaders are less capable in the realm of military matters, a female adversary makes bargaining less likely and makes misperceptions of strength more likely. These misperceptions are shaped by beliefs that women are incapable of holding military influence and power.

*Hypothesis 1: Conflict will last longer with the presence of a female chief executive.*

#### *Defense and Foreign Policy Ministers*

Similar arguments can be made surrounding whether or not defense and foreign policy ministers are taken seriously; however, it is easier to question whether they can play a role in the duration of conflict. Particularly since they are not directly responsible

for beginning or ending a conflict. It may still be worth exploring, though, whether the presence of a female defense or foreign policy minister will affect the chief executive. I argue that since these foreign policy leaders are less accountable to the people, and are less concerned with legitimacy, they may have a pacifying affect on conflict duration. However, as discussed in chapter 2, I cannot know whether these female ministers are token appointments and so there is more difficulty in coming to this conclusion. Either way, there are potential problems in examining the influence of these defense ministers because they can be token appointments.

*Hypothesis 2: Conflict will be shorter with the presence of a female defense or foreign policy minister.*

#### *Institutional and Domestic Constraints*

One concern might be that within democracy, issues of militarized masculinity do not play as big of a role and, rather, it is the institution of democracy that might shorten war (Senese 1999). Conversely, Bjarnegard and Melander (2011) posit that militarized masculinity does persist alongside democracy, potentially increasing the likelihood of political violence. Even democratic leaders can be plagued with militarized masculinity and the views that female leaders are not capable within the realm of foreign policy. The institutional factors would most fruitfully hold in joint democracies if there is an effect; however, as research has found mixed dyads are more likely to fight one another (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009). Democracy is not expected to be as peaceful in this instance as others have argued (eg Maoz and Russett 1993). In other words, militarized

masculinity can still plague democratic regimes and the democratic institution may not shorten the duration of conflict.

*Hypothesis 3: Democracy will not shorten the duration of conflict with the presence of a female chief executive.*

However, one domestic environment can affect the likelihood for men to be more willing to compromise with female leaders. In countries where gender equality is high, male leaders will be more likely to bargain with a female leader to end a conflict sooner (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). Tessler and Warriner (1997) find that individuals who are advocates for more equality between men and women are more in favor of diplomacy and compromise. Countries that have higher levels of gender equality may be faster to compromise during conflict than those that have lower levels of gender equality. This is, of course, assuming that countries with higher levels of gender equality are not the same as democracies. Several articles have shown that gender equality does not necessarily equate to good levels of democracy (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005; Burns, NP). While gender equality does not necessarily capture the beliefs of the leader, the argument here is that all people in society are more likely to hold these equitable views. How else might a leader get elected or placed in power if he or she did not hold the view?

*Hypothesis 4: Countries with higher levels of gender equality are more likely to experience shorter conflict than those with lower levels of gender equality, regardless of who is in charge.*

## Research Design

In this chapter I employ a cox proportional hazard model for the years 1981 to 2001. My dependent variable is a measure of conflict duration, thus making duration analysis necessary. I have chosen this model, as opposed to a Weibull model, because it provides a more flexible baseline hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Standard errors for these models are clustered by dyad to control for non-independence of the variables within each dyad (Lin and Wei 1989). The unit of analysis for each model is the dyad year.

### *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable for this analysis is the time elapsed in months since the start of the most recent dispute between a pair of states. Duration of conflict (not just war) is based on the dates when the dispute started and ended available in the MID dataset (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). I include conflict that may have started prior to 1981 in case a woman took office while a conflict was ongoing; however, I created a dummy variable to see whether this was the case and there were no instances of a woman taking office in 1981 with an ongoing conflict. There are three instances of conflict starting while a woman is in office beginning in 1981, all include Margaret Thatcher.

### *Independent Variables*

The main independent variable is the presence of a *female chief executive*. This variable is a binary variable, with '0' representing a male chief executive and '1'

representing a female chief executive. This variable was collected for this project and guidelines for how the data was collected can be found in the previous chapter. I also include models with *female foreign policy minister* and *female defense minister*. For each these binary variables, a '0' indicates a male minister and a '1' means a female holds the office. The coding for these variables can also be found in the previous chapter of this project. These variables can vary over the course of conflict duration, meaning that a woman could leave office and a man could take over or vice versa. The last gender variable I test on conflict duration is the *percent women in parliament*. This data is continuously measured and comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and was collected by Paxton and Hughes (2007).

There are also some potentially mediating institutional factors that may influence the duration of conflict. First, I also test the relationship *democracy* and duration. Democracy is measured using the *polity2* variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). This variable places regimes on a scale from -10 to 10, with 6 to 10 representing democracy. My last independent variable is *gender equality*. I posit that countries with higher levels of gender equality, regardless of who is in charge, will have shorter conflict. This variable is measured using the CIRI gender equality variables. I combine the political, social, and economic rights indicators into a single index that ranges from 0 (low equality) to 9 (high equality).

### *Control Variables*

Given past research on conflict duration, I also control for several factors that could also explain how long a conflict may last. Control variables I include are *relative power, military personnel, population, and troop quality*. Bennet and Stam (1996) argue that each of these can influence conflict duration, particularly countries with large populations, militaries, and good troop quality can afford to continue conflict. Moreover, conflict between relatively equal states should be shorter than those between states with an imbalance of power. Each of these variables is measured using the National Material Capabilities data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Military personnel and population are raw numbers that are logged in the models. Troop quality is measured by dividing military personnel by military expenditures for each country. Relative power is measured using CINC scores. I do not control for strategy and terrain because I am specifically interested in domestic factors and individual characteristics and conflict duration.

### **Results and Discussion**

An important part of the argument in this chapter rests upon the existence of mixed gendered dyads, rather than a female facing another female or a male facing another male. Specifically looking at conflict, there are 11,722 observations. Of those, 511 are made up of mixed dyads (one female and one male). Of these, 19 (3.7%) reached threat to use force, 134 (26.2%) reached display of force, 311 (60.8%) had a use of force, and 47 (9.2%) escalated to war. These simple descriptives demonstrate that male and female chief executives do face one another and do experience conflict between one

another. The aim of this chapter, however, is to determine whether that conflict lasts longer or shorter than when we do not take into account leadership characteristics.

Table 3.1 reports the coefficients for the cox proportional hazard model results for models 1, 2, 3, and 4. Each of these models examines whether the presence of a female chief executive, female defense minister, female foreign policy minister, or percent women in parliament affects conflict duration. The results are very interesting, with model 4 being particularly surprising.

Table 3.1 Female Leaders and Conflict Duration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female Chief Executive	-.099 (.133)			
Female Defense Minister		-.260 (.184)		
Female Foreign Policy Minister			.009 (.086)	
% Women in Parliament	-.011* (.005)			-.013* (.005)
Gender Equality	-.034 (.026)	-.033 (.026)	-.035 (.026)	.016 (.030)
Democracy	-.014 (.079)	-.012 (.079)	-.015 (.080)	-.029 (.083)
Relative Power	.640* (.290)	.639* (.291)	.636* (.290)	.674* (.303)
Logged Military Expenditure	.039 (.029)	.037 (.029)	.037 (.030)	.003 (.030)
Military Personnel	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Military Quality	.747 (1.07)	.695 (1.07)	.717 (1.07)	.276 (1.13)
Logged Population	-.108* (.040)	-.109* (.053)	-.109* (.053)	-.054 (.057)
N	8,424	8,424	8,424	7,821

Cox proportional hazard model results for years 1981 to 2001. Coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05.



Models 1, 2, and 3 include analysis with the presence of a female foreign policy leader. In none of these models are the variable for the female leader significant; however, the variables for chief executive and defense minister both have negative coefficients. A negative coefficient implies longer conflict. In this case, that would mean that conflict is more likely to continue under their reign. While the coefficient for female chief executive and defense minister is negative, I cannot conclude that women leaders actually lead to longer conflict since the variables are not significant. Moreover, female foreign policy ministers have the opposite, though not significant, effect on conflict duration. This appears to hold with the findings from the previous chapter where chief executive and defense ministers were more likely to be associated with initiation and escalation of conflict and foreign policy ministers were not. I assume this is probably due to the same reason as chapter 2, many female chief executives were also defense minister while in office. For example, while serving as prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto also served as defense minister.

In all of those same models, logged population and relative power are both significant at the .05 level. Relative power has a positive coefficient and is significant at the  $p < .05$  level. This is surprising since past findings indicate that an imbalance of power leads to longer conflict. Logged population is negative and significant at the .05 level in models 1, 2, and 3. These findings are the opposite of what is expected. Countries with larger populations are more likely to see longer conflicts. Democracy is negative, but not significant. This would follow the expectation set forth by Bjarnegard and Melander (2011) who argue that democracies can also experience militarized

masculinity. Democracies, though not significant, are likely to experience longer wars with the negative coefficient.

Logged population, however, loses significance in model 4. Relative power remains positive and significant at the .05 level. However, the variable for percent women in parliament is negative and significant at the .05 level in both model 1 and model 4. This indicates that the presence of women in parliament can lengthen the duration of conflict. While I include both this variable and the gender equality variable, other scholars have used the percent women in parliament as a measure of gender equality (Melander 2005). In other words, this variable could, instead, be capturing the gender equality effect as opposed to the gender effect. I would argue contrary to this point.

There is little evidence that more women in parliament means a country has a high level of gender equality. In fact, the correlation between these two variables is .38. There clearly is a positive relationship between the two, but this is still a low correlation level. Rwanda is a primary example of a country that has the most women in parliament in the world with 63%, but is still plagued with high levels of domestic abuse and rape. In other words, I posit that this variable is capturing some mediating effect that gender has on conflict duration. As I stated in the previous chapter, some research has found that parliaments with more women present are more likely to pass woman friendly policies and countries with more women in parliament are less bellicose. While women in parliament had no effect on preventing the onset and escalation of conflict with a female

foreign policy leader, women in parliament do appear to play a role in conflict duration. However, this role, at first glance, is not what is expected.

Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all Cox proportional hazard models, and an important assumption is that the effects of the covariates do not vary over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). In order to test this assumption Grambsch and Therneau (1994) developed diagnostics to determine if any of the covariates violate this. If any variables do violate this assumption, then they should interacted with a function of time in order to control for this effect (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). Tests for the nonproportional hazards yielded significant coefficients for all variables except democracy. The global tests for all of these models were significant at the  $p < .0001$  level. Table 3.2 reports the results for models 1, 2, 3, and 4 after taking into account the interaction between the variables and the natural log of time.

Table 3.2 Results including Time Interaction Variables

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female Chief Executive	-.235			
Female Defense Minister		-.757		
Female Foreign Policy Minister			-.175	
% Women in Parliament	-.005			-.005
Gender Equality	-.030	-.058	-.061	-.028
Democracy	.004	.004*	.004*	.004
Relative Power	.922	.715	.719	.925
Logged Military Expenditures	.123	.141*	.143*	.126
Troop Quality	5.46*	5.49**	5.57**	5.39*
Military Personnel	-.0002	-.0001	-.0001	-.0002
Logged Population	-.029	-.090	-.084	-.030
Female Chief Executive * Ln(Time)	.017			
Female Defense Minister * Ln(Time)		.106		
Female Foreign Policy Minister * Ln(Time)			.044	
% Women in Parliament * Ln(Time)	-.001			-.002
Gender Equality * Ln(Time)	.008	.004	.004	.008
Relative Power * Ln(Time)	-.069	-.027	-.029	-.066
Troop Quality * Ln(Time)	-1.19*	-1.12*	-1.13*	-1.18*
Military Personnel * Ln(Time)	.000	.000	.000	.000
Logged Military Expenditures * Ln(Time)	-.030	-.026	-.027	-.030
Logged Population * Ln(Time)	-.006	-.005	-.006	-.005
N	7,807	8,410	8,410	7,807

\*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05. Standard errors (omitted to conserve space) clustered by dyad.

In table 3.1 models 1, 2, and 3 lend no support to hypotheses 1, 2, or 4. Model 4 points to a mediating effect of women in parliament on conflict duration. However, after taking into account time effects on the covariates, the relationship does not hold. Table 3.2 demonstrates that after including the interaction of variables with time, the percent women in parliament is no longer significant. Moreover, the only variable that remains significant in all four models is troop quality. This variable was not significant in the previous models. The variable is positive and significant, indicating that countries with better troops have shorter conflicts. This result follows previous findings. However, the interaction variable is negative and significant, showing that this effect reverses over time. Democracy and military expenditures are also positive and significant, but only in models 2 and 3. This would indicate that each lead to shorter conflicts. This result makes sense given past findings, though the findings for democracy do not support hypothesis 3.

Moreover, since these results only hold in models 2 and 3 (female defense minister and female foreign policy minister), I am still hesitant to interpret these results. Again, with women potentially being token appointments, it is difficult to interpret what these results might mean. Ultimately many of the common findings in past research do not hold in table 3.2, such as relative power and population. One of the reasons why this effect may take hold is the shortened time span and smaller sample size. Gender equality has several missing data points that leads fewer cases. There are also instances where the percent women in parliament has missing data. Moreover, there are just fewer instances here of women being in charge.

Table 3.3 Mixed Gendered Dyads and Conflict Duration, Model 6 includes Time Interactions

	Model 5	Model 6
Female, Male dyad	-.62 (.143)	-.187 (.386)
% Women in Parliament	-.008 (.005)	-.009* (.005)
Relative Power	.665* (.296)	1.10 (.781)
Democracy	.004 (.002)	-.004 (.004)
Logged Military Expenditures	-.003 (.027)	.141* (.070)
Military Personnel	-.000 (.000)	-.0002 (.0002)
Troop Quality	.158 (1.08)	5.51*** (1.63)
Logged Total Population	-.032 (.058)	-.015 (.142)
Female, Male Dyad * Ln(Time)		.008 (.070)
Relative Power * Ln (Time)		-.099 (.162)
Democracy * Ln(Time)		.002 (.001)
Logged Military Expenditures * Ln(Time)		-.034* (.015)
Military Personnel * Ln(Time)		.000 (.000)
Troop Quality * Ln(Time)		-1.23** (.381)
Logged Population * Ln(Time)		-.004 (.028)
N	7,992	7,992

Cox proportional hazard results for years 1981 to 2001. Coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses, adjusted by dyad. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05

Table 3.3 examines the relationship for mixed gendered dyads, both before and after taking into account the effects of the covariates varying over time. In both of these models, the most theoretically interesting dyad pairs, mixed dyads, are not significant.

However, the negative coefficient indicates that these pairs of dyads would experience longer conflict with one another. The percent women in parliament variable is also negative and is significant at the .05 level in model 6, which takes into account the nonproportional hazard effects. This negative coefficient is, again, surprising. Research finds that countries with higher levels of women in parliament are less bellicose, but what this finding may point to is that when they do engage in conflict, they are not less likely to have shorter conflict. This could also indicate that the cannot influence the actions of the chief executive. Logged military expenditures and troop quality are significant and positive, indicating that these lead to shorter wars. This follows what previous literature has found (Bennett and Stam 1996). However, the negative interaction with time for both of these variables included to control for nonproportionality shows that the effects wane over time. In other words, over time the effect moves closer to zero and becomes negative. What this could mean is that as war wears on troop quality and military expenditures can create longer conflicts. The results from this model do not support hypothesis 1, but they do point to a potentially conflictual relationship in mixed dyads. To be sure, results may be stronger in this direction as more and more women become elected to office.

Conversely, the results could become the exact opposite. The critical mass literature posits that as more women get into power, they can start behaving “more like themselves.” As more and more women become leaders of countries and hold powerful foreign policy positions, perhaps conflict will be shorter in duration.

## **Conclusion**

Stereotypes of women in office act as barriers for women getting into office and the actions that they take; however, there is less evidence that they play a role in the duration of conflict. While the variable for female chief executive was in the expected direction as the theory, it was not significant. Driving this lack of significance could be several things including the lack of women in office or the potential for gender to not matter in conflict duration. Whichever is the case, it does not appear that control variables played a role a mediating the effect, including percent women in parliament, democracy, and gender equality.

Given the findings in the last two chapters, the next chapter will explore whether women lead to longer peace. Continuing this dissertation's aim at figuring out whether leader characteristics, more specifically gender, matters for various conflict processes. Rather than stereotypes working against female leaders, I posit that female leaders use stereotypes to their advantage in post-conflict settings.



## **Chapter 4: Female Foreign Policy Leaders and Peace Duration**

Countries around the world have seen interstate conflict with varying durations of peace afterwards. Leaders and diplomats of these countries spend time and energy to attempt to ensure that conflict will not happen again. In fact, research has found that states have a 50% chance of reentering conflict within 5 years of the termination of conflict (Rice and Patrick 2008). Previous research has found that states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to engage in interstate conflict (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005; Melander 2005). Other scholars have examined peace duration, arguing that settlement type and outcomes of war can influence how long peace will last between states (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Hensel 1994). However, none of this research opens the black box of the state to truly examine the role that women leaders may play in peace duration. Particularly, what is the impact of a female chief executive on peace duration in a post-conflict society? Does difference really make a difference? In an attempt to combine literature on female leaders and recurrent conflict, I argue that states that elect or appoint female foreign policy leaders after conflict, or one that pulls a country out of conflict, will experience longer peace than those that do not. Particularly, driven by a desire to stay in power, female chief executives and foreign policy leaders will ascribe to stereotypical views of the “peaceful” female.

## **Previous Arguments**

Three broad arguments have been made about recurrent conflict and peace duration. The first argument focuses on enduring rivalries. This literature looks at pairs of states that are prone to fighting one another (Hensel 1996, 1999; Diehl 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000). The arguments here primarily focus on why states engage in conflict with one another over and over, and does not necessarily examine the length of peace in between conflict occurring. There are two frameworks used to explain why rivalries form. Diehl and Goertz (2000) posit that a punctuated equilibrium predicts the creation and ending of rivalries. Under this framework, system level and national level shocks can affect rivalry. Factors like territorial change, regime change, or war can influence how two states view one another, either for the better or for the worse. The punctuated equilibrium model does take into account regime change, but does not take into account whether a woman took office after a man or another woman. A second approach, the evolutionary model, argues that rivalries are a product of changing interactions between rival states. Hensel (1999, 1996) examines rivalries in stages and finds that as the rivalry changes through stages so to does the amount of disputes between the states.

A second approach to studying peace duration uses bargaining. These scholars argue that all stages of conflict are related to one another, and that the outcome of a conflict can influence peace duration. Specifically, commitment problems can arise through several facets. The first way is that states may want to renegotiate terms of a settlement (Werner 1998). Werner (1998) posits that this will happen if there is a shift in the power dynamic. Furthermore, the bargaining literature also finds that third-party

involvement after conflict can help erase some of the tension between two countries. The fear is that neither side can trust one another, thus making committing to a settlement difficult. Third parties can provide security guarantees or intervene to enforce peace agreements, providing more stability in a post-conflict situation (Fearon 1995; Walter 2002).

Both enduring rivalries and bargaining theorists find that the outcome for war, whether it be decisive victory, stalemate, or a draw, can factor into how long peace may last between two countries. The third approach to studying peace duration is more specifically aimed at studying settlements. In other words, these scholars look at whether conflict ended with an imposed settlement, negotiated settlement, or with no settlement. Deterrence scholars argue that imposed settlements create longer and more durable peace than other kinds of settlements (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush 2014). This more durable peace occurs because winners are more satisfied with the new post-conflict status quo, creating a situation of unilateral deterrence (Quackenbush 2015). In these cases, the imposed upon state may be unhappy with the new status quo; however, the imposer has no need to change the status quo. On the other hand, negotiated settlements create times of mutual deterrence, which are more prone to conflict due to increases in uncertainty (Zagare and Kilgour 2000).

With some exception to the punctuated equilibrium model, these theories do not include characteristics of leaders in their analyses of peace durability and recurrent conflict. It may be that in post-conflict situations gender does not matter. However, Jalazai (2010) has found that in some post-conflict situations, particularly with Ellen

Johnson Sirleaf in Liberia, citizens choose women to lead after conflict precisely because they are women. To that end, it may matter whether the leader in a post-conflict situation is a man or a woman.

### **Peace Duration, Gender, and Stereotypes**

The previous chapters have established a stereotype bias faced by women candidates and leaders. Men and women in the aggregate mentally assign certain roles to what a male leader and female leader can accomplish, otherwise known as “gender issue ownership.” While this may work against women who seek to be elected or appointed to foreign policy positions in a general country, it may work to their advantage in a war torn society. Women foreign policy leaders’ roles in post-conflict societies are also influenced by stereotypes. I posit that stereotypes may work in the favor of women in a post-conflict setting because they can capitalize on them to gain or keep a seat in office. This differs from the past two chapters, in which stereotypes may force women leaders to act more hawkish to prove their legitimacy. Instead, I argue that if women are elected in a post-conflict society, elected to end a war, or are still in power when their own conflict ends, it would be the rational decision for the female to fulfill the female stereotype of compassionate and nurturing leader.

Epstein (1988, 31) states that, “Stereotypes create a self-fulfilling prophecy in that others’ behavior is mediated by the expectation created by the stereotype.” Women, particularly in developing countries, are often elected after conflict ends purely because they are different than the men that got them into conflict (Jalalzai 2004). Jalalzai (2004)

finds that several women have been elected to office directly following conflict because the citizens believe women represent the values of communication and cooperation. This directly reflects the gender stereotype that women are more peaceful than men. This demonstrates the results of the 2008 Pew Survey that American citizens thought female leaders would be better at compassion and negotiation, while male leaders were more suited for crime and national security (read: war). One potential problem that may arise, though, comes from the results in chapter 2. Female chief executives are initiating and escalating conflict more frequently than male chief executives. There exists a good chance that some women will be in office following conflicts that they initiated or escalated. Given this fact, I argue that they would still play into stereotypes, especially if the conflict was unpopular or the outcome was unfavorable.

Thus, in cases where women are in office after conflict, I expect women to fulfill their “role” as peacemaker and negotiator. I argue that we should expect peace to last longer if women are elected because they will not seek out violence or act in aggressive ways. This would be contrary to the reason they were elected if they came to office after conflict. Moreover, it would be contrary to actions that could make them lose their seat if they were involved in unpopular conflict. Female leaders will not need to act more hawkish in order to appear legitimate.<sup>3</sup> We could also think of this as a typical rational action. If the rational choice for a leader is to do what she can to stay in power (Mayhew

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<sup>3</sup> This could, however, mean that female leaders may need to act less hawkish than they might normally. Given that a female is elected or appointed after conflict, I expect the post-conflict setting to appease this in favor of staying in office. This is probably different than male leaders who are not elected with stereotypical views of peace.

1974), then she will do what the people want. In other words, she will self-fulfill the stereotype that got her into office or is keeping her in office. It is also worth exploring the role of women in peace duration because the traditional literature does not focus on individual traits of leaders that are in office when war ends, thus providing room for not only examining if individual characteristics matter, but also if gender makes a difference. This leads to the first hypothesis that I test.

*Hypothesis 1: Female chief executives will lead to a more durable peace if in power at the end of conflict.*

It may also be the case that female defense and foreign policy ministers are present during post-conflict situations. In line with past chapters, I posit that because these leaders are not held directly accountable by the people they do not have to overcome specific stereotypes. To this end, female defense and foreign policy ministers may advocate for peace easier than female chief executives whether before, during, or after conflict. Some of the leaders may truly be more hawkish; however, in general I expect to see them act as mediators for male leaders. If anything, female appointments to foreign policy positions could signal an acceptance of traditional female values (McGlen and Sarkees 1993).

*Hypothesis 2: Female defense ministers and female foreign policy ministers will lead to more durable peace if in power at the end of conflict.*

### *Political Institutions*

While gender may matter in the durability of peace after conflict, the political institutions in the country may also matter. In other words, it may not be the gender of the leader, but the political environment that leads to better peace. There are two specific moderating institutional effects that could influence peace: percent women in parliament and the political affiliation of the chief executive.

The number of women in parliament may have a moderating effect on the influence that a female foreign policy leader can have. As previously stated, countries that include more women in government have been linked to lower levels of conflict and are more likely to pass legislation that directly impacts women. To be sure, these countries with more women are more likely to focus on domestic spending (fulfilling the stereotype) than countries with lower levels of women in parliament. Thus, it may not be that the female chief executive or foreign policy is responsible for peace durability, it may be that a country that elects more women to parliament will have fewer reasons to be bellicose towards other countries.

Following this line of reasoning, there may be a “critical mass” effect here with the number of women represented in government. Thus, we may expect a critical mass to affect the representation of women’s issues and the actions that female leaders may take. In other words, the number of women in parliament may affect a durable peace, not just a woman in a powerful foreign policy position. With women focusing on more domestic issues, they take the spotlight and focus off of the international arena and the female leader (or male leader) can focus on issues other than conflict.

Political ideology may also affect the decisions of political leaders. Similar to the argument in the previous chapters, a female politician from a left-leaning party is more likely to be associated with peace than one from a right-leaning party. This is based on the idea that left-leaning governments are less prone to conflict than right-leaning governments (Koch 2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004). In other words, it may not matter that the female chief executive is a woman, but that she's liberal or conservative.

These two moderating effects add two additional hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 3: The presence of a larger percentage of women in parliament will lead to longer peace when a female chief executive is in office.*

*Hypothesis 4: Left-leaning female foreign policy leaders will lead to a more durable peace than right-leaning female leaders.*

## **Research Design**

Due to the nature of the dependent variable, I use a cox proportional hazard model to data for the years 1981 to 2001 to test this relationship. A cox proportional hazard model is chosen over a Weibull model because it provides a more flexible baseline hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Additionally, standard errors are clustered by dyad to control for non-independence of the variables within each dyad (Lin and Wei 1989). The unit of analysis is a dyad year.



### *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable for the duration analysis is the time elapsed in months since the end of the most recent dispute between a pair of states. This variable is reset to represent the beginning of a new peace period if another dispute occurs before 2001. Several of the data are censored because they may not experience a recurrent conflict within the time period. This type of censoring is referred to as right censoring because the true total duration of peace is left unobserved. Dyads are also censored if they exited the system. I also conducted Cox-Snell tests to examine goodness of fit for the models based on the residuals. All models show a goodness of fit.

### *Independent Variables*

The independent variables for this study separately examine the presence of *female chief executive*, *female foreign policy minister*, and *female defense minister*. All variables are coded as a '0' if no female leader is in office, and '1' if a female leader is present. This variable can be a 1 or 0 during any point of the peace duration. In other words, this variable can vary over duration of peace. I expect that female leaders will have a negative coefficient, indicating that peace will last longer with their presence.

In order to examine the modifying effects of institutional variables, an interaction between *female chief executive* and *ideology* is used. *Ideology* is a tripartite variable, with '1' representing conservative, '2' representing moderate, and '3' representing liberal and comes from the Dataset on Political Institutions (Keefer 2012). Also included in the analysis is the *percent women in parliament*. This is a continuous variable that captures

the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament from Paxton and Hughes (2007).

### *Control Variables*

Following previous research on peace duration, I control for several factors. In order to control for the potential importance of dispute settlement type, I have a binary variable that represents *imposed settlements* where '0' represents no imposed settlement and '1' represents the presence of an imposed settlement. In order to capture contentious issues, I control for *contiguity*. This variable is coded according to distance with higher numbers representing states that are further apart. I also control for *democracy*, since democracy has been seen as a pacifying influence. I use the *polity2* variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), which ranges from -10 to 10 with -10 to -6 representing autocracies and 6 to 10 representing democracies. I also control for whether the previous dispute resulted in war and the number of MIDs that occur within a dyad. The *war* is coded as '1' for peace following war and '0' for non-war disputes. This variable takes into account that dyadic history is important. It may be harder for peace to last longer after war. The *MID count* demonstrates the relationship between states that have longer histories of disputes with one another and is simply a count variable. I also control for *women's political equality* in an attempt to discern more ways in which gender may matter for peace durability, especially since many countries did not have a female in power. I use the women's political equality index from CIRI. The index is a 0 to 3 scale, with 0 representing no equality and 3 representing full equality.

## **Results and Discussion**

Initial descriptive statistics are helpful in showing what cases are included in this dataset. In the case of post-conflict settings, 9% of cases are comprised of female chief executives in office after war ends (47 of 545 cases). That means 91% of cases are instances of women in office not following war (498 of 545). This simple cross-tabulation does not mean that the woman was elected following war, just that they are in office following war. Examples include Tansu Ciller from Turkey and Margaret Thatcher from Great Britain. Margaret Thatcher is in office following her own war with Argentina. Moreover, the number of men in office following war are the same as women with 9% of cases for male leaders (985 of 11,574) and 91% (10,589 of 11,574) of male leaders in office not following war. A cross-tabulation of female chief executives and a MID count also reveals that no woman has served as chief executive with a MID count higher than 28 (Margaret Thatcher), while male leaders have reached a MID count of up to 45 under their tenure (Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both facing Russia). These descriptives indicate that there are instances where woman are in office following conflict, though this does not take into account whether they were responsible for that conflict. As chapter 2 indicates, women are more likely to initiate and escalate conflict. It would follow that they might still be office following these conflicts.

Table 4.1. Female Chief Executive and Peace Duration

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Female Chief Executive	-.066 (.239)	3.83*** (.999)	2.05 (1.28)
Thatcher Dummy			1.28 (.789)
Ideology	-.055 (.035)	-.015 (.083)	-.031 (.080)
FCE x Ideology	.028 (.103)	-3.59*** (.805)	-2.99*** (.847)
Percent Women in Parliament	-.008*** (.002)	-.000 (.004)	-.001 (.004)
Imposed Settlement	-.455*** (.130)	-.127 (.373)	-.186 (.370)
Democracy	-.268 (.248)	-.315 (.247)	-.204 (.240)
War	-.920*** (.106)	-5.98*** (1.31)	-5.81*** (1.31)
MID Count	.008 (.009)	.007 (.020)	.007 (.021)
Contiguity	.002 (.033)	-.002 (.064)	.002 (.064)
Women's Political Equality	.097 (.058)	.138 (.152)	.087 (.063)
Female Chief Executive * Ln(Time)		-.873*** (.190)	-.531* (.226)
Thatcher Dummy * Ln(Time)			-.250^ (.135)
Ideology * Ln(Time)		-.004 (.018)	.010 (.017)
FCE x Ideology * Ln(Time)		.814*** (.154)	.688*** (.160)
Percent Women in Parliament * Ln(Time)		-.002 (.001)	-.002 (.001)
Imposed Settlement * Ln(Time)		-.092 (.069)	-.077 (.066)
Democracy * Ln(Time)		.141* (.049)	.124* (.047)
MID Count * Ln(Time)		.000 (.004)	-.001 (.004)
War * Ln(Time)		.866*** (.201)	.823*** (.200)
Contiguity * Ln(Time)		.001 (.016)	-.002 (.015)
Women's Political Equality * Ln(Time)		-.010 (.033)	
N	6,683	6,683	

Standard errors reported in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001 \*\*p<.01 \*p<.05, ^p<.10. Coefficients reported. Standard errors are clustered by dyad. Results for years 1981 – 2001.

The results of model 1 in table 4.1 for female chief executives and peace duration show that gender does not appear to matter in the duration of peace since the female chief executive coefficient is not significant. The coefficient is negative, which would indicate that female chief executives do see longer peace. The interaction effect of women and ideology is not significant, and ideology is not significant on its own. The percent women in parliament variable is negative and significant at the .001 level, indicating that more women in parliament would indicate more durable peace. The variable for imposed settlement is negative and significant, which follows the literature that states that imposed settlements lead to more durable peace (Quackenbush 2010). Finally, the variable for war is significant and negative, which may indicate that following war pairs of states will be less likely to fight because war was costly.

However, one of the key characteristics of proportional hazard models is the assumption that the covariates are constant over time. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2011) argue that biased results could come about if nonproportionality is not accounted for the model. I followed techniques suggested by Grambsch and Therneau (1994) to test whether the variables in the model (and all of the models in this chapter) had covariates that varied over time. In all of my models, the global tests were significant at the  $p < .0001$  level and all of the variables were significant. Significant variables indicate that the models need to control for nonproportional hazards. To this end, I include models that interact each variable with the natural log of time.

Model 2 in table 4.1 shows the results for the model that takes into account the controls for nonproportionality. At first glance, the results for female chief executive are

surprising; however, upon further thought they make sense. The model shows that female chief executives have shorter peace than male chief executives, but the interaction variable is negative and significant. This indicates that over time this effect becomes less important. This finding does not support hypothesis 1 of this chapter. On the other hand, it does provide more support for the results of chapter 2. Recall that female chief executives are initiating and escalating conflict at higher rates than male chief executives. This model is continuing to capture this effect, though the effect of shorter peace wears off over time because women are not always involved in conflict.

One factor that I thought might be driving this relationship was Margaret Thatcher's involvement in multiple disputes while in office. I ran a model including a dummy variable for Margaret Thatcher's tenure, where a '0' indicated Margaret Thatcher was not in office and '1' indicated she was in office. The results are reported in table 4.1 in model 3. The results for female chief executive and peace duration lose significance, though the interaction with the natural log of time is negative and significant at the .05 level. The negative sign for the interaction variable indicates that as the duration of peace continues, the positive effect moves closer to zero and then eventually becomes negative. In other words, female chief executives do see some peace durability once we take into account Margaret Thatcher. However, the same effect can be said for the dummy variable for Margaret Thatcher, though it is only marginally significant at the .1 level. The results in model 3 do lend some support to hypothesis 1; however, they are not the strong results indicating that women are purposefully fulfilling stereotypes in order to stay in office. Instead, what might be happening is that female chief executives must consistently act

hawkish (or perhaps they are more hawkish) in order to be taken more seriously in the realm of foreign policy. Overall, there are data issues with Thatcher being a large portion of the observations (60%). Analysis that extends across a larger time period would be helpful in examining this relationship.

Other variables in models 2 and 3 that are significant include the interaction between ideology and female chief executive. This variable is negative and significant indicating that more liberal women see more durable peace; however, it becomes positive and significant when taking into time varying effects. This would mean that over time the effect wears off. This does give some support to hypothesis 4, that left-leaning women will see more durable peace. Moreover, the same effects can be said of war. Initially war can be stabilizing to peace, but this effect wears off. This would follow the argument that war might be too costly to fight immediately after, but those effects can be forgotten over time. Surprisingly, the effects of imposed settlements lose significance once controls for nonproportionality are included. Further, contiguity acts in the expected direction, but is not significant. The percent women in parliament variable is initially negative and significant, but after including controls it loses significance. This does not lend support to hypothesis 3.

Table 4.2 shows results for models 4 and 5 that examine the effects of defense ministers on peace duration. In the last two chapters the defense minister variable was typically significant if the chief executive variable was significant. A product, I argued, of overlap in the data. However, in this chapter, that is not the case. This effect gives

more support to the fact that female chief executives are playing a role in the duration of peace, as opposed to other gender variables included.



Table 4.2. Female Defense Minister and Peace Duration

Variable	Model 4	Model 5
Female Defense Minister	.085 (.229)	.491 (.783)
Executive Ideology	-.053 (.035)	-.026 (.083)
Percent Women in Parliament	-.008*** (.002)	.000 (.004)
Women's Political Equality	.101 (.057)	.101 (.151)
Democracy	-.218 (.240)	-.319 (.245)
Imposed Settlement	-.456*** (.130)	-.124 (.373)
War	-.922*** (.107)	-6.02*** (1.32)
MID Count	.008 (.009)	.007 (.021)
Contiguity	.001 (.033)	.002 (.065)
Female Defense Minister * Ln(Time)		-.078 (.128)
Executive Ideology * Ln(Time)		-.002 (.018)
Percent Women in Parliament * Ln(Time)		-.002 (.001)
Democracy * Ln(Time)		.126* (.048)
Imposed Settlement * Ln(Time)		-.093 (.068)
War * Ln(Time)		.872*** (.201)
MID Count * Ln(Time)		-.000 (.005)
Contiguity * Ln(Time)		.000 (.016)
Women's Political Equality * Ln(Time)		-.001 (.032)
N	6,683	6,683

Standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05. Results for years 1981 – 2001. Cox proportional hazard model with coefficients reported.

The female defense minister variable is positive, but not significant. In fact, after taking into account the controls for nonproportionality, war is the only variable that is highly significant. It is negative and significant on its own, but the interaction with time is positive and significant. This shows similar results to models 2 and 3. War initially creates durable peace, but that effect fades over time. The interaction of democracy with time is positive significant at the .05 level in model 5. This indicates that over time as the duration of peace increases, the positive effect moves closer to zero and eventually becomes negative. In other words, democracy can be more pacifying over time. Model 5 does not give support to hypothesis 2. However, as with past chapters, there are interpretation problems with the variables capturing female defense ministers and foreign policy ministers. If the defense minister variable was significant, it would be difficult to ascertain if it was because defense ministers really had a role because they can sometimes be token appointments. Table 4.3 shows the results for the models that include female foreign policy ministers and, again, this token appointment effect could still be a concern.

Table 4.3. Female Foreign Policy Minister and Peace Duration

Variable	Model 6	Model 7
Female Foreign Policy Minister	.119 (.082)	.102 (.266)
Percent Women in Parliament	-.014 (.007)	-.009 (.016)
Executive Ideology	-.042 (.038)	-.012 (.087)
Women's Political Equality	.153* (.070)	.151 (.178)
Democracy	-.225 (.240)	-.335 (.249)
Imposed Settlement	-.460*** (.131)	-.108 (.374)
War	-.940*** (.106)	-6.15*** (1.35)
MID Count	.006 (.009)	.007 (.021)
Contiguity	.001 (.034)	-.000 (.065)
Female Foreign Policy Minister * Ln(Time)		-.004 (.052)
Percent Women in Parliament * Ln(Time)		-.001 (.003)
Executive Ideology * Ln(Time)		-.005 (.019)
Women's Political Equality * Ln(Time)		-.004 (.037)
Democracy * Ln(Time)		.128* (.048)
Imposed Settlement * Ln(Time)		-.097 (.068)
War * Ln(Time)		.891*** (.206)
MID Count * Ln(Time)		-.000 (.005)
Contiguity * Ln(Time)		.001 (.016)
N	6,576	6,576

Standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05. Cox proportional hazard model with coefficients reported for years 1981 – 2001.

Table 4.3 shows the relationship of female foreign policy ministers and peace durability. I had similar results after testing for nonproportionality and included interaction effects for all of the variables in model 7. The variable for female foreign policy minister is positive, a surprising direction, but not significant. This model reiterates that there is no support for hypothesis 2. The same effects happen in this model as in model 5. War is negative and significant, but the interaction effect is positive and significant. Moreover, the interaction for democracy and time is positive and significant. Model 6 is the first model in which the percent of women in parliament is not significant, although this does not play as important of a role in these models. This variable has also consistently lost significance when nonproportionality is controlled for. Moreover, imposed settlements is negative and significant in both models 4 and 6. This relationship is expected. Imposed settlements are more durable; however, the variable loses significance in models 5 and 7. These results are surprising given the abundance of support that imposed settlements lead to more durable peace (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008; Quackenbush 2014). Furthermore, the negative sign for contiguity is also surprising. This would mean that contiguous states have longer peace, a complete contradiction to the enduring rivalry literature. However, the variable is not significant so we cannot conclude that this is the case.

One last effect that could influence peace duration is the total number of female foreign policy leaders. To capture this effect, I added together the variables for Female Chief Executive, Female Defense Minister, and Female Foreign Policy Minister. This created a variable that ranged from 0 (no females in office) to 3 (there are 10 instances of

this in which Margaret Thatcher holds all three positions). A simple tabulation shows that 90.4% of this variable is 0, 8.5% is 1, 0.8% is 2, and 0.07% is 3. Models 8 and 9 in table 4.4 show the results for this relationship.

Table 4.4. Total Number of Female Foreign Policy Leaders and Peace Duration

Variable	Model 8	Model 9
Summed Female Foreign Policy Leaders	.042 (.064)	.131 (.182)
Percent Women in Parliament	-.014 (.007)	-.009 (.016)
Women's Political Equality	.160* (.070)	.166 (.179)
Executive Ideology	-.039 (.038)	-.006 (.087)
Democracy	-.235 (.241)	-.333 (.246)
Imposed Settlement	-.458*** (.131)	-.109 (.374)
War	-.936*** (.107)	-6.17*** (1.35)
MID Count	.007 (.010)	.006 (.020)
Contiguity	.001 (.034)	-.002 (.065)
Summed FFPL * Ln(Time)		-.021 (.034)
Percent Women in Parliament * Ln(Time)		-.001 (.003)
Women's Political Equality * Ln(Time)		-.006 (.037)
Executive Ideology * Ln(Time)		-.005 (.019)
Democracy * Ln(Time)		.131* (.048)
Imposed Settlement * Ln(Time)		-.097 (.068)
War * Ln(Time)		.894*** (.206)
MID Count * Ln(Time)		-.000 (.004)
Contiguity * Ln(Time)		.001 (.016)
N	6,576	6,576

Standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05. Cox proportional hazard with coefficients reported for years 1981 to 2001.

The summed variable is positive, but not significant. This is a surprising direction if the argument is that women have a pacifying effect. A positive sign would indicate shorter peace. Following the last few models, war is negative and significant with its interaction positive and significant. The interaction for democracy and time is positive and significant. In this model, the percent women in parliament variable stays negative, but is not significant in either model.

### *Case Study*

Due to the lack of conclusive statistical findings for female chief executives, I conducted one small case study in order to look more closely at a female leader and her effect on peace durability. I was particularly interested in examining a leader that may have had to deal with civil conflict, since this is another vein of peace duration research that is worth exploring (Walter 2002). I did not include statistical analysis of civil conflict because the number of women following civil conflict was small, though notable with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in Liberia. My expectation is that women following civil war will more closely fit with the theory of this chapter. Evidence from Jalazai (2010) is that women are more often elected after civil war, not necessarily interstate war. These women may be more likely to follow the stereotypical view that they are compassionate and caring than women who are not elected following war. The case study maintains the parameters of the research design, and was selected on the following criteria: time period 1981 – 2001, female chief executive, presence of armed conflict within five years of

assuming office, tenure longer than one year, and no previous current familiar ties to the president to avoid women affiliated with political dynasties.

*Nicaragua: Violeta Chamorro, 1990-1997*

Violeta Chamorro entered political life following the assassination of her husband, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. Chamorro assumed her husband's position as editor of the political opposition newspaper, *La Prensa* (Merrill 1994). Early in her political career she served as a member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) Council of National Reconstruction, but after realizing the FSLN's biased socialist representation in the Council of State, she quickly shifted to support anti-Sandinista movements. In the late 1980's, the National Opposition Union (UNO), a unified, anti-Sandinista movement, emerged. An alliance of fourteen parties, UNO's members encompassed those from the far left to the far right. Chamorro was selected as their presidential nominee, and on April 25, 1990, Chamorro defeated incumbent president Daniel Ortega. The imagery associated with Chamorro as a female candidate portrayed her as a "loyal wife and widow, reconciling mother, and Virgin Mary" (Kampwirth 1998, 262). Chamorro became Nicaragua's first female president, and the first woman in the world to defeat an incumbent president. Chamorro's victory signified a hopeful end to egregious human rights violations that occurred under Somoza's authoritarian regime and continued under Sandinista communist rule.

The FSLN came to power following the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979, ousting dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The FSLN launched campaigns promoting land



reform, literacy, and increased human rights protections. However, in response to FSLN's victory, the United States funded *la contrarrevolucionarios* (commonly known as the Contras, short for counterrevolutionaries) to combat the communist regime (Conroy 1990). After the U.S. discontinued formal (and informal) funding and provisions of weaponry to the Contras, the Contras turned to the UNO for financial support. The Contras became the military division of UNO, performing dozens of assassinations of FSLN members prior to the elections in 1990 (Magee 1991). The fighting between the FSLN and the Contras began in 1981, and by its end in 1989, had claimed at least 30,000 lives. In 1989, Nicaragua's Election Agreement called for free, fair, democratic elections, with specific provisions for self-governance zones for the Contras (Walter 1997). In early 1990, the United Nations oversaw a peace agreement between the Sandinistas and the Contras prior to Chamorro's election. Chamorro was not only elected following civil conflict, but also as a reaction to poor human rights abuses. She ran on a platform of feminine qualities, a direct contrast to the Contras. Important to her election was the acceptance of feminist qualities by the FSLN (Henderson and Jeydel 2014).

Early in Chamorro's presidency, she sought to decrease the virility of the military state. She reduced the size and power of the military, ended the draft, offered amnesty to Sandinistas, and worked to disarm the opposition through weapons-buying programs. Further, as an effort to lessen Sandinista resistance, Chamorro maintained the Sandinista's movement for agrarian reform, appointed Humberto Ortega (Daniel Ortega's brother) as her closest advisor, and allowed Daniel Ortega to retain his position as commander in chief of the army. During her presidency, Chamorro struggled with

economic reform, and in an attempt to reduce exponential inflation rates and increase export of agricultural products, Chamorro adopted IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies (Paris 1997). The blanket policy prescriptions aimed to increase foreign investment and privatization, while reducing foreign backing and foreign debt. Not surprisingly, the economic reforms failed to control inflation rates and actually increased the levels of unemployment and underemployment (Prevost 1996).

Even though Chamorro failed to successfully implement economic reform, she brought democracy to Nicaragua, and ended decades of internal military strife (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2005). In 1994, Contras who were excluded following the 1990 election, rearmed and resurfaced, but Chamorro suppressed the violence with a peace agreement. The Recontras (rearmed Contras) and the Recompas (rearmed Sandinistas) perpetrated high levels of political violence and kidnappings for the remainder of Chamorro's presidency (Cupples 2004). However, Chamorro continued to emphasize reconciliation between the anti-Sandinista and Sandinista parties, to move Nicaragua to a pluralist, democratic regime. Aside from the resurgence in 1994, Chamorro's presidency lacked high levels of daily violent conflict. She also encouraged a peace agreement and reconciliation as opposed to seeing renewed civil war. In some respects, this does support hypothesis 1. However, given that this is about civil conflict the support would be more for encouraging analysis of the relationship between female chief executives and peace following civil conflict.

## **Conclusions**

The findings in this chapter are not that surprising given the lack of women in positions compared to men during this time frame. There was marginal support for female chief executives and peace duration; however, after taking into account Margaret Thatcher's involvement in conflict the results are not as strong. Further, this chapter is a first cut at a cross-national quantitative study to see what kind of relationships may be present. The inclusion of a simple case study helped portray that there are certainly factors that influence female leaders differently than male leaders, though I can certainly not making any generalizations about female leaders as a whole.

Gender has been included as a central tenet in discussions on the importance of the role of women in local, state, and federal levels of domestic politics, as well as when discussing peacekeeping and peace-building missions in post-conflict societies. In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the role of women in the political sphere, we must not only understand their participation in peace and post-conflict processes (formally and informally), but also strive to understand if women play a particular role in the initiation, creation, and perpetuation of peace as foreign policy leaders.

## Chapter 5: Conclusions

*The tragedy of war is that it uses man's best to do man's worst.* –Henry Fosdick

*A woman cannot be herself in the society of the present day, which is an exclusively masculine society, with laws framed by men and with a judicial system that judges feminine conduct from a masculine point of view.* –Henrik Ibsen

War may have traditionally been viewed as the realm of man, but female chief executives have not shied away from the use of force. This dissertation has examined whether or not female foreign policy leaders play a role in the conflict behavior of the state in which they hold office. I argued that stereotype bias is a key factor in looking at decisions that female foreign policy leaders make. More specifically, female chief executives must overcome stereotypes by acting more hawkish in order to be viewed as a legitimate leader in the realm of national security. Female chief executives face this threat both within their own borders, but also by leaders of other countries. I posit that female defense and foreign policy ministers are less influenced by stereotypes because they are not directly elected; however, the potential to be a token appointment may cause them to fulfill that stereotype.

The aim of this dissertation has been to look at various stages of conflict from initiation and escalation to conflict duration and finally peace duration. Of particular importance was the opening of the black box of the state to study individual leader characteristics. The primary contribution of this project has been to move beyond “gender neutrality” in the traits of leaders, and to analyze whether the gender of leaders matters for decisions before, during, and after conflict. I argue that gender is an important

variable that must be considered in the study of war. Traditional studies often look at levels of analysis other than individual characteristics; however, the characteristics of leaders are important lenses worth analyzing. If we want to have a comprehensive view of why war starts, endures, and begins again, it is imperative that we study the factors that might influence a leader's decision-making process.

### **Major Findings**

Chapter 2 demonstrated that female chief executives, to some extent, spend more on defense than male chief executives. However, these findings were only significant at the .10 level. One of the reasons why this finding may deviate from the findings of Koch and Fulton (2011) is the cross-national inclusion of countries outside of the OECD. Moreover, chapter 2 demonstrated that female chief executives are initiating and escalating conflict at higher rates than their male counterparts. While there seems to be some effect with female defense ministers, I believe that this effect is from the overlap of some female chief executives also serving as defense minister while in office. I argued that, frequently, female leaders must act more hawkish while in office in order to be taken seriously. This leads women to initiate and escalate conflict at higher rates than their male counterparts. Female leaders often have to overcome views that they are incompetent in the realm of foreign policy and national security. However, this does not mean that some women might not naturally want to engage in conflict more, or that some men may naturally want to engage in conflict less. These findings held even when controlling for political ideology.

Chapter 3, on the other hand, lacks significant findings. The lack of results is most likely due to data issues more so than gender being an unimportant explanation. My argument in chapter 3 continued the discussion of stereotypes of female leaders. However, I cannot conclude that female leaders are facing stereotypes that affect their decisions to continue conflict. An interesting dynamic worth further exploration is that of mixed dyads. The negative sign in the models for mixed dyads indicates longer conflict; however, the variable was not significant so no conclusions can be drawn from this model.

Chapter 4 examined the relationship between female foreign policy leaders and peace duration. Models that controlled for nonproportionality and the Thatcher effect showed that liberal female chief executives had more durable peace, but that this effect wore off over time. Initially the variable for female chief executives was positive and significant, indicating that they saw shorter peace. However, after taking into account the role that Margaret Thatcher was playing in the model, this finding did not hold. I continued to not get results for female defense ministers, foreign policy ministers, or a summed variable of all three foreign policy leaders. One conclusion that was drawn in chapter 4 was that, in thinking about the effects of chapter 2, it makes sense that women may experience shorter peace. However, there is anecdotal evidence available that some women in developing countries were elected because men had gotten the country into war, so women would get them out. At this point, small N research may still be required for these cases because so few women have been involved in these specific situations.

Given the findings of this dissertation, there are some important points worth exploring. Past research finds that female chief executives will be more pacifistic when more women in parliament are present (Koch and Fulton 2011). This finding does not hold in my dissertation. I argue that this is the case because executive actions are different than actions in parliament. A leader wants to stay in power, and part of staying in power is maintaining a powerful image. Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel are examples of women who, in the case of Thatcher, passed policies that were not woman friendly, and in the case of Merkel, gave credit to other government officials for woman friendly policies. Passing policies for women, when woman/female traits are not favored, could be very damaging to a leader's image. Posturing and demonstrating ability in national security, on the other hand, allows a female leader to remain a legitimate leader.

The theory and discussion in this dissertation centered heavily on stereotypes and legitimacy. Women have served as chief executive of several countries, and have been viewed as legitimate leaders. However, this does not mean that around the world the barriers to women in office have been erased. Moreover, this does not mean that in those countries where women have served as executives that barriers have been erased. With barriers in tact and the actions of female politicians being watched closely, it follows that their gender is going to influence their decision-making. While findings may not have held in chapters 3 and 4 as strongly as they did in chapter 2, I expect that women still face concerns at all stages of conflict and studies that cover a more comprehensive time span will uncover this relationship.

Lastly, there has been little discussion of defense and foreign policy ministers for two reasons. The first is that there are no results. The second, and more pressing reason, is that it is difficult to parse out what role defense and foreign policy ministers play in conflict. Some argue that women are token appointments, and that the real power lies in the hands of the male executive. If this is the case, we would need to know which women were token appointments and which were not. This data is not available and is probably difficult to ascertain in some circumstances. These two reasons, though, are not enough to ignore the effects that female defense and foreign policy ministers may play in conflict. As mentioned in the opening of the dissertation, a female foreign policy force in the United States is most likely responsible for convincing President Obama to send air strikes into Libya. An important discussion to have, though, is the effect that being a token appointment has and what female foreign policy ministers contribute to the executive's decision-making process.

### **Policy Implications**

Broadly, the policy implications for this project focus on stereotypes of female leaders. The results are not about what can be done to end war or create stable peace, but more about how actions of leaders might change if we acknowledge our inherent views of gender. Maybe peace is possible if women are more represented at the highest level of office, but what is more important is how stereotypes can alter the actions of female leaders.



One step towards decreasing stereotypes of women leaders and increasing their legitimacy would be to incorporate gender quotas within the legislature. Research has found that when more women are present in the legislature, political efficacy of girls increases (Schwindt-Bayer and Kittilson 2010). If more women and girls take an interest in politics, society may move in the direction of viewing women as capable national leaders. Gender quotas could be adopted within the legislature, carving out a certain percentage of seats for women. They could also be adopted by the political party, ensuring that a certain percentage of candidates will be women. Kanter (1977) posits that 30% is an important critical mass level. I argue that 30% would be a good starting point when adopting a gender quota either at the legislative or party level.

Another important step would be for countries to continue to encourage gender equality. This policy prescription does not necessarily mean that more women need to get elected, but stereotypical views are more likely going to decrease if men view women as their equals. Moreover, if a society values all opinions, then views that one way is better than another may be dismissed. In many societies masculine traits are valued over feminine traits (Paxton and Hughes 2007). In a society with equality, each would be valued and men and women could practice whichever traits they want. The previous statement may sound highly normative, but there are instances where women feel that they must “act like men” in the realm of politics or else their voices will not be heard (Paxton and Hughes 2007). Instead, the political arena would be one where a diverse set of values, beliefs, and actions could be practiced.

## **Remaining Questions**

While some questions were answered, many questions remain unanswered and provide avenues for future research. First, more exploration of female foreign policy leaders is needed. Very little work looks at the role these women play. Case study research could lead the way in revealing which women may be token appointments and what that effect may be. Case studies of female foreign policy ministers may also shed light on the roles they played before, during, and after war. There is a plethora of case study research on female chief executives, but very little work that looks at defense and foreign policy ministers cross-nationally.

This dissertation shows where paths of future research on female leaders may go. First, this dissertation only covers interstate war. Examining the roles of women leaders during civil war, especially post-conflict, is an important avenue for future research. It may also be worth examining more mixed gender dyad effects. Do women have settlements imposed upon them or do they impose settlements on others? Are they more likely to negotiate, and thus see more conflict? Further, are women initiating and escalating conflict against other women or men? Conversely, does gender matter in this case? Another important question worth exploring is whether or not enduring rivalries have a higher likelihood of ending when a woman is elected as chief executive. This is a potentially important question as to why peace happens and the maintenance of peace following conflict. However, the number of women in instances of enduring rivalries may be small. The time span of this dissertation has been 1981 – 2001. However, with new

data available, it will be worth examining all of these relationships over a longer time span.

Looking beyond conflict, the actions of female chief executives have not really been analyzed. Do female chief executives join alliances more frequently? Do they practice better human rights? Are female chief executives more frequently targets of sanctions? Furthermore, analyzing speeches and operational codes of female leaders may provide insight into how they must speak and carry themselves to their population and other world leaders. Moreover, future avenues of research could examine whether female chief executives are more likely to sign and implement international treaties and agreements than males.

The primary goal should be to ask a question and find out whether gender matters. Sometimes it may seem as if a topic is “gender neutral” or that gender does not matter in a given situation. However, gender is an institution that is tightly linked to other institutions like the economy and education (Paxton and Hughes 2007). It would follow that it is closely linked to politics and would clearly influence decision-making processes within politics.

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## VITA

Courtney Burns first began being interested in the study of gender and politics when she took a Gender and International Relations class as an undergraduate at the University of Wyoming. She realized that many scholars often overlook the importance that this key part to our identity may play in political processes. After completing her bachelor's from Wyoming, she went on to get a master's in political science from the University of Wyoming. This helped her further understand that she was interested in understanding more about women and politics, specifically in an international context. After finishing her master's, she was accepted to complete her doctorate at the University of Missouri. At Missouri she was able to take courses on international conflict and do her own papers on gender, gender equality, and conflict. This allowed Courtney to narrow her research interests to particularly chief executives and women in powerful positions.

Courtney attended several conferences, including the International Studies Association, Midwestern Political Science Association, Journeys in World Politics, and the American Political Science Association, where she was able to present her work on gender and conflict and receive valuable feedback. These conferences have shown that the political science community is willing to hear about research on gender and politics.