

THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL PARTY CULTURE ON
POLITICAL CAREERS

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DEDICATION

To Ember: the love of my life, my best friend, and confidant.

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ABSTRACT

Previous scholarship on the political cultures of the political parties provides anecdotal evidence regarding the distinct differences between the two major U.S. political parties. This conventional wisdom is based on one important essay authored by Jo Freeman nearly 30 years ago. To date, our understanding regarding the nature and effects of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties suffers from lack of rigorous empirical examination. This study explores the political cultures of the political parties by examining the behaviors of congressional members seeking their party's nomination for another office. In this dissertation, I measure the extent which the Democratic and Republican parties' political cultures effect progressively ambitious members of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives. In addition, I provide firsthand accounts of how these cultures impact state legislative careers. The empirical tests I present in this project largely support Freeman's earlier accounts as to the nature of the two major parties' political cultures at the national level. Based on firsthand accounts, however, I also provide evidence to suggest the political cultures of the parties are subject to short-term, localized forces at the state-level.

Chapter 1: Introduction

What is known of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties? Are the internal dynamics of the Democratic and Republican parties distinct? While we assume the parties' organizational structures are alike in form and function, little is known regarding the political cultures of these two major political parties. Freeman's (1986) work titled, "The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties," added insight into the characteristics of the two parties. On one hand, conventional wisdom tells us the Democratic Party is a collection of disparate groups of interests and activists, promoting diverse agendas. The Republican Party—on the other hand—is believed to be more unified, homogenous, and disciplined than their partisan counterparts. When nominating candidates, it is said that Republicans simply select "the next in line." Democratic nominations—at least at the national level—seem to lack the same level of uniformity, as "dark horse" candidates have seized party nominations from supposed shoo-ins (Berggren 2007).

Key's (1942) seminal work on the "tripartite" view of American political parties—the party-in-government, party-in-electorate, and party-as-organization—provided a way we can conceptualize and organize the dynamics of political parties. Despite the fact that the broader political party literature has continued to expand, in both breadth and scope, we know little regarding the accuracy of Freeman's accounts. Since Freeman's initial piece on the topic nearly thirty years ago, little attention has been paid to the subject. As a result of this

neglect, perceptions regarding the major parties' internal cultural dynamics lack rigorous examination while conventional wisdom and anecdotal evidence perpetuate untested ideas regarding the subject.

In addition to examining this conventional wisdom at the presidential-level—by assessing the nature of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties and exploring their effects on the political careers of the progressively ambitious at multiple levels of public office—this dissertation attempts to untangle these effects further down the ballot.

Since Freeman, very little has been done to confirm or contradict these earlier assessments regarding the cultural dynamics of the two major U.S. parties. Why? More recently, in explaining why so few political scientists have attempted to advance our knowledge on this topic and why more work needs to be done, Seth Masket wrote:

This is a subject that many political scientists shy away from, partially because the differences are difficult to measure with reliability and partially because they are highly sensitive to accusations of bias. Nonetheless, Freeman's remains a rich essay and, even given the passage of time, a great deal of it still rings quite true. (May 4, 2014, psmag.com)

In this dissertation I will empirically test—for the first time—Jo Freeman's characterizations of the two parties' cultures by measuring their influence over different courses of political careers at both the national and state levels. Freeman suggested that each party possessed a distinct political culture and that this culture—originally observed directly at the national party level—likely exists at the state and local levels as well. The following chapters utilize both quantitative and qualitative data sources to produce a comprehensive

examination into the effects of the political cultures within the two major U.S. parties.

In the following chapters, I advance existing literature on the matter of political party culture and political careers by testing the accuracy of Freeman's descriptions, determining the extent of the effects that the political parties' political cultures have on the behaviors of each respective party's progressively ambitious officeholders, and determining the scope of culture's impact. In addition to testing this notion at the national level—the arena which Freeman's seminal piece originated, I will also test whether or not similar patterns exist at the state level—where variation regarding the nature and impact of political party culture likely exists. This will be accomplished by quantitative analyses and interviews from those with firsthand experience on the matter—former and current elected officials.

This study not only tests the field's existing theory regarding political culture, but by examining the cultural characteristics of each party, and the effects such attributes have on candidate behavior, this effort will provide insight into the influence and practical powers of political parties in the United States. Furthermore, nearly thirty years have passed since Freeman's seminal work on political culture. The recent success of the more conservative flank of the Republican Party, the Tea Party activists in seeing their endorsed candidates win Republican nominations—at times at the cost of an established Republican incumbent—might suggest changes with regard to the political culture of the Republican Party have occurred. In other words, if Freeman were to revisit her theory of political cultures of the parties today, she might make different

propositions than she did in the 1970s and 1980s. This dissertation is intended to serve as a starting point—to put in motion continued research into this interesting topic within the party literature. Regardless of my findings, whether they support or contradict this earlier piece, my exploration into the internal dynamics of the parties' cultures and their effects on political careers will be one of the first to assess the veracity of Freeman's observations.

By probing the extent to which the parties' different political cultures affect the career paths of politicians, this work will use Freeman's conceptualization of political culture as a vehicle to improve our understanding of the political parties' effects on candidate selection—contributing to our understanding of party in the “candidate-centered” era. In his previously quoted piece, Masket acknowledged that finding a measurement to explore the nature and effects of political culture on the political parties has been a challenge to scholars. In this dissertation—an initial exploration into the party's political cultures—I will use political ambition as a vehicle to measure, and better understand, the cultural dynamics of the parties.

There are gaps in our understanding of political culture and political ambition which I believe can begin to be filled by this dissertation effort. The following will elaborate on these points and contribute to a better understanding of political party dynamics at the national and state levels. Previous descriptions of the parties suggest distinct differences in the perspectives and traditions between them. However, Freeman's accounts of the parties at the national level have not been empirically tested. Despite her proposition that such cultural aspects of the two parties should also apply to the state level, no such attempt has

been made to evaluate the accuracy of this claim. Existing literatures have explored aspects of political careers and political ambition. This scholarship—in part—explains the characteristics of who runs for higher office and why. In addition to enhancing our understanding of political careers, these studies have revealed the demographic characteristics of ambitious politicians as well as posit certain behavioral traits these individuals might possess. However, this literature—at its present state—lacks explanation for the variations in career paths between the parties. In addition to the inherent value of providing—for the first time—rigorous examination of Freeman’s influential assessments and their veracity in contemporary politics at the national and state levels, I believe a better understanding of the political implications of such cultural differences will enhance our understanding of political careers. In addition to providing insight into the topic of political culture, my study—and more specifically the measures I employ—stand to improve our understanding into the strategic actions and incentives of those individuals elected to serve an office who—all the while—harbor ambitions to seek another office.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation will be comprised of six chapters. This introductory chapter has provided a broad outline of the scope and goals of project—to explore and assess the nature and effects of political culture on the Democratic and Republican parties—and to consider the contributions such an endeavor provides in these early stages of exploring this topic.

In chapter two, I present the theoretical framework pertaining to the project’s primary focus—political culture—while also providing a detailed explanation of my approach to measure such phenomena with indicators of political ambition—specifically, progressive ambition. I will also pay attention to the operationalization of political culture—a topic perhaps most recognized by scholars of American politics in the context of Daniel Elazar (1966, 1977). Providing a more in-depth study on Freeman’s earlier essay on the topic, the definition of political culture by which she employed, as well as an explanation of what—assuming Freeman’s accounts are generalizable—I expect to transpire from the proceeding empirical tests, the second chapter provides a roadmap for the remainder of the dissertation.

The third chapter is the first of two where I conduct empirical tests using quantitative analyses in order to explore the accuracy and applicability of Freeman’s assessments regarding the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties. By measuring the extent to which progressively ambitious Democratic members of the U.S. Congress altered their roll-call voting behavior, I propose and explain the logic of this measure as well as empirically test the nature and effects of the political culture of the Democratic Party. Exploring the behaviors of Democratic U.S. Senators who sought their party’s presidential nomination between 1976 and 2008, as well as the records of progressively ambitious Democratic House members from 1975 to 2004, I am able to assess the accuracy of Freeman’s evaluation of the Democratic Party’s political culture at the national and state levels. Measuring the changes in voting behavior—as indicated by the roll-call scorecards of narrowly-focused, Democratic-aligned groups—in

the years leading up to the election for the office being sought, I am able to investigate whether or not the party's office seekers are incentivized to court disparate groups within its base. In this chapter, I use annual and biennial scores from the Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO (COPE), the National Education Association (NEA), the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). As I explain in more detail in chapter three, Freeman's characterization of the party's political culture suggests elected officials running for the party's nomination for a higher office would seek out the approval and support of disparate interests.

In the fourth chapter, I turn my attention to the political culture of the Republican Party. Following a line of inquiry similar to the third chapter, I explore the voting behaviors of progressively ambitious Republican members of the U.S. Senate who sought their party's presidential nomination between 1976 and 2008 and House members who ran for higher office between 1975 and 2004. In this chapter I use annual scores from the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS), the National Taxpayers Union (NTU), the Christian Coalition (CC), the Family Research Council (FRC), and the American Conservative Union (ACU). In contrast to Freeman's characterization of the political culture of the Democratic Party, her assessment of the Republican Party would suggest those seeking the party's nomination for higher office would not be incentivized to go out of their way to court the favor of groups within the Republican coalition in the few years before election.

In chapter five, I will report the findings from interviews of state-level officeholders. In this chapter, I consider the firsthand experiences of former and

current elected officeholders in order to investigate the nature and effects of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties by the political practitioners who have operated within the partisan environment. Based on interviews of former and current state legislators in two states—Missouri and Arkansas—I consider whether or not the political cultures depicted by Freeman similarly apply to the states—as Freeman suggest they should—or if each state's Democratic and Republican parties possess their own unique culture.

In the final chapter, I summarize the findings of my exploration and provide insight into the direction future research on the topic of the nature and effects of the Democratic and Republican parties should continue. In this study, I seek to advance the line of inquiry originally presented by Freeman nearly thirty years ago. This dissertation is a starting point—a “call to arms” for political science to continue to advance the collective knowledge of this topic.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Considerations and Contributions

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the theoretical framework of the dissertation and discuss the project's contribution in advancing the limited literature pertaining to political party cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties at the national and state levels. Attention is also paid to the theory and assumptions underlying political ambition—a literature far more developed than that of political party culture—as following chapters will rely on the precepts of political ambition (specifically, progressive ambition) in offering a new and innovative measure to study political culture.

The Political Cultures of the Political Parties

The focus of this project is to explore the nature and effects of political party culture within the Democratic and Republican parties. For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt the same definition for political culture as Jo Freeman (1986) in her seminal work on the topic. *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) defines political culture as:

...the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of the system and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience. (p.218)

Based on first-hand observations and interviews from several Democratic and Republican Party National Conventions in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Freeman (1986) suggested that each party possessed a unique political culture. She characterized the Democratic Party as a collection of diverse coalitions and the Republican Party as more centralized and homogenous. Specifically, she suggested the parties' cultures have two fundamental differences. First, structurally, “....in the Democratic party power flows upward and in the Republican party power flows downward” (328). The second major difference is a matter of self-perception of which she wrote, “Republicans perceive themselves as insiders even when they are out of power, and Democrats perceive themselves as outsiders even when they are in power” (328). According to Freeman, this worldview stems from Democrats seeking policies promoting inclusivity for those perceived to be “outsiders” of the political process. Republicans, on the other hand, operate under the assumption that their ideals and values are shared by all Americans. Regarding how political culture affects each party's power structure, Freeman writes:

Essentially, the Democratic Party is pluralistic and polycentric. It has multiple power centers that compete for membership support in order to make demands on, as well as determine the leaders. The Republicans have a unitary party in which great deference is paid to the leadership, activists are expected to be “good soldiers,” and competing loyalties are frowned upon. (329)

In essence, the Democratic Party is comprised of coalitions of disparate groups while the Republican Party's political culture is organized around a singular notion regarding the values and ideals of Americans. Freeman's

description of the parties' political cultures have led to the popular notion that—at least in party presidential nominations—Republican candidates wait their turn while Democrats have been prone to nominating dark horse candidates. These inferences have been strengthened by Berggren's (2007) work modeling the differences of the parties' presidential nomination practices. Berggren reports that Republican front-runners in the early pre-primary phase of the presidential nomination campaign regularly become the nominee. However, the eventual Democratic nominees quite often begin the process in relative obscurity.

According to Freeman, the resulting effects of each party's political culture resonates in distinct differences in terms of the career paths of partisans. Concerning the career paths of Democrats, Freeman writes, "Since the Democratic Party is composed of groups, the success of individuals whose group identification is highly salient (e.g. blacks and women) is tied to that of the groups as a whole. They succeed if the groups succeeds" (p.336). With regards to Republicans' interactions at the party's national conventions, Freeman states, "It [the Republican Party] officially ignores group characteristics, though it is obvious that it does pay attention to them when it feels the need to cater to the interest of the voting publics in a particular group" (p.336). These distinctions, I think, provide a contrast between the two parties that might become particularly apparent when examining the behaviors of Democratic and Republican officeholders seeking their respective party's nomination for higher office.

This dissertation will not only test Freeman's propositions regarding political culture—a topic rarely explored by political science (Masket 2014)—at

the national party level—something which has yet to be done—but will also apply her characteristics to the state level. Since Freeman’s work, other scholars of political parties have applied this framework to their own observations. For instance, in *The Divided Democrats* Mayer (1996) operates under this premise offered by Freeman regarding the Democratic Party’s Presidential nomination process. However, Mayer does not explore the nature and effects of the cultural differences among the two parties, but uses what has become conventional wisdom in supporting his premise.

Concerning the scope of her inferences regarding the two parties and their political cultures, Freeman writes,

...it is well established in the literature that party elites and party masses (the voters) do not always think alike. Therefore, no attempt is made to ground the description of each party’s culture in their electorates. However, if the ideas posited in this article have explanatory value, they should be generally applicable to the state parties.... (pg.328).

Despite the use of Freeman’s work to describe the parties, the observations and ideas Freeman offers regarding the political cultures of the two major American political parties has not been formally tested. To date, the application of her propositions has been limited to attempts to explain the environments of the national parties (for instance, Mayer’s 1996 work) with no intent to test her theory or even apply it beyond the national level—an idea which Freeman herself offers. Much is to be gained by applying and testing Freeman’s notion of political cultures of the two parties at both the national and state levels. First, Freeman’s work suggests differences between the parties which affect the nature of each

party's organizational operations. Also, as scholarship on the donor networks of the two major political parties suggests comity in the way in which these operations function (Dowdle et al. 2013), Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller (2008) present evidence of post-reform party elites playing strong roles in their respective party's presidential nominations processes in the post-reform era. Finally, Grossman and Hopkins (2014) suggest the Republican Party's voters are concerned with broader, ideological issues within their party, while Democrats are more inclined to value group benefits.

If these recent developments are accurate, they may be related to changes in the political cultures of one or both parties occurring since Freeman's initial work on the subject. Given this, my work contributes a means to assess the accuracy and generalizability of Freeman's assertions, or, how well it holds up over time. In addition, this effort explores whether or not these older characterizations of the two parties remain, and to what extent these cultures explain behavior of politicians seeking their respective party's nomination for political office at the national and state levels. After all, Freeman's original assessments were drawn from observations of the parties' national conventions in the 1970s and early 1980s and it is likely that political changes over the last several decades have altered the political cultures of at least one of the two major parties. For example, the Republicans had only just begun to count on the then fledgling Evangelical Christian political base at the time of Freeman's publication (Leibman and Vuthnow 1983). More recently, the Tea Party movement—originating largely among the more conservative members of the Republican Party (Abramowitz 2011) which has brought a series of intra-party primary

battles to re-elect incumbent Republican members of Congress. These changes may have led to a less cohesive Republican Party—possibly changing the culture of the party to make it more resemble the more diverse, issue oriented Democratic Party.

Not only can a test of Freeman's cultural characterizations provide insight into the parties' functions and purpose, but it can also shed light on the true strength of parties' abilities to achieve a fundamental purpose of their existence—to influence the actors who actively participate in government—a point of scholarly interest as well as an issue which possesses normative implications concerning such effects on a representative constitutional democracy such as the United States. These are contributions which this dissertation effort seeks to accomplish.

It is appropriate to clarify the notion of political culture which I apply in this dissertation. While Daniel Elazar's (1966; 1970) seminal study of the political cultures within the American states is familiar with those who study American politics and culture, my examination into culture is shaped by Jo Freeman's work on the subject and, as such, is distinct from Elazar's earlier influential works in which he presents three regional political cultures among the U.S. states—*Moral*, *Individual*, and *Traditional*. His is a study which does not focus exclusively on political parties, but rather the histories and demographics of the states and how such characteristics shape the respective states' political practices and governance dynamics. Elazar (1966) defines political culture as “the particular pattern of orientation to political actions in which each political system is imbedded” (p.79). The concept which I empirically test—a first in the literature—

will be Freeman's notion of the political cultures of the major U.S. political parties. However, Elazar's considerations of the political cultures of the states will be reintroduced in chapter five—the portion of the dissertation which focuses exclusively on the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties at the state level.

Political Ambition Theory and Political Careers

The key independent variable in this dissertation effort is party culture. The measure I employ is progressive political ambition: whether or not an incumbent office holder seeks a higher elected position. This is not a study testing political ambition theory. Instead, I will use political ambition—specifically, progressive ambition—as a vehicle to explore the nature and effects of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties. The dependent variables used in chapters three (which focuses on the nature and effects of political party culture on progressively ambitious Democratic congressional members) and four (which focuses similarly on Republicans seeking higher office) each measure the congressional member's movements—via roll-call voting behavior—toward or away from selected, narrowly-focused advocacy groups which play key roles within the Democratic or Republican Party activist base—personifying the respective party's political culture.

Schlesinger's (1966) theory of political ambition presents itself in three forms: discrete, static, and progressive ambition. Discrete ambition is reserved for those in office who aspire to only remain there for one term. Incumbents who seek to stay in their present position for a career are said to have static ambition.

Finally, progressive ambition—the theoretical observation point of this project—refers to those officeholders who seek higher office. An assumption by Schlesinger (1966) is that politicians respond and act in accordance with their political ambitions. For progressively ambitious current officeholders, positions and/or voting records may be ways to garner this activist support.

Since Schlesinger (1966), others have contributed to this literature by considering the constraints and effects of ambition in electoral politics (for example: Black 1972; Herrick and Moore 1993). A few of these studies on ambition focus on state and local offices (Swinerton 1968, Ehrenhardt 1991, and Maestas 2003), however—as Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell (2001) note—relatively little research on progressive ambition has taken place at this most numerous and varied level of government, presenting another contribution I seek to provide with this dissertation—specifically in chapter five.

Some of the most informative work on this topic of ambition examines members of Congress. More specifically, the lion's share of scholarship on the topic of study looks at United States House of Representatives seeking the positions in the Senate (Rohde 1979, Brace 1984, Kiewiet and Zeng 1993, and Hibbing 1986). Francis and Kenny (1996) find that progressively ambitious House members shift their positions on issues several years before finally announcing their intentions to run for a Senate seat.

Examinations of political careers and candidate emergence at other levels also find similar patterns regarding opportunism and risk aversion among potential office seekers (Fowler and McClure 1989; Fowler 1993; Kazee 1994).

Kazee's edited volume, *Who Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence*, seeks to provide a "satisfactory synthesis" between the characteristics of candidates for office—specifically, candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives—and the theoretical opportunity structures proposed by Schlesinger's ambition theory. However, no study has yet to consider the behavior of progressively ambitious incumbents as products of their party's political culture. My study of political culture will expand beyond the U.S. Congress, as I intend on illustrating the nature of political party culture and its effects on political behavior exhibited by progressively ambitious officeholders at several levels of elected office.

This examination of political careers will focus primarily on progressive ambition—or incumbents who seek higher elected office. It is assumed that progressively ambitious officeholders are aware of the relative likelihood of their success, are risk-averse (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Aldrich, Dowdle, and Petrow 2011), and—most importantly—behave strategically in order to produce the desired outcome, election to another public office. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that—if their aspirations to serve a different constituency in the future call for it—they may also alter their behavior to achieve their ends. Given this, these individuals present interesting cases by which to examine the effects of the parties' political cultures, as these politicians navigate their party's path to higher elected office.

Literature on political careers has focused on nascent ambition—candidate emergence—or the personal characters of candidates who exhibit progressively

ambitious behavior such as incumbents seeking higher office. Previous research has not considered the effects of political culture on these political careers. In fact, the literature has only begun to examine differences in career patterns of Democrats and Republicans—specifically focusing on differences in retirement patterns of the partisans. Ang and Overby’s (2008) work regarding congressional retirement has produced results suggesting Republican Congressional members are more likely to retire than their Democratic counterparts. This dissertation effort will cast light on what is potentially a root source of partisan difference in political careers for which—to date—we have only skimmed the surface.

For this project, I adopt Jo Freeman’s theoretical underpinnings of the political cultures of the two major U.S. political parties as well as the developing literature on political ambition. In the following chapters, to advance our knowledge on these two literatures, I will conduct a series of empirical tests examining the nature and effects of Freeman’s observations regarding political culture. If the conventional wisdom originating from Freeman’s observations is accurate, one would anticipate distinct differences regarding the internal dynamics of the parties and—consequently—the ways in which progressively ambitious incumbents behave in seeking higher office. Specifically, Freeman’s assessments of the parties suggests that Democrats seeking higher office—in an attempt to court favor with activists—would become more sympathetic to the interests for which these activists advocate. Republicans, however, given the characteristics of the party and its political culture, are much less likely to see benefit from such maneuvering in the relatively brief time before seeking another

office and—consequently—are not as inclined to ingratiate themselves with the activists who personify their party’s culture in such a way.

While Schlesinger assumes that all officeholders harbor desire to seek higher office and are risk-averse, a distinct difference among incumbents exists—term limits (Examples: a vice president whose administration has served the maximum number of years in office, a governor who has served the maximum number of terms at that position, a state legislator who is term-limited in her current seat and aspires for a seat in the state senate). I contend that progressively ambitious officeholders who find themselves unable to seek re-election in their current positions are not constrained by their desires to appeal to their present constituencies all the while courting the voters and interests whose support is necessary in attaining higher offices. These individuals can exhibit a certain raw ambition which might prove politically risky to a progressively ambitious officeholder who—in the case of a failed bid for higher office—wishes to maintain the current office they already possess.

The behaviors of term-limited officeholders are largely beyond the scope of my effort in this dissertation. With exception to chapter 5, where I report the results of several former and current state legislators—all of whom served in states that currently have term limits on state legislative positions—I will focus my attention on members of the U.S. Congress. Regarding incumbents who currently hold a position that is not term limited, I advance this line of thought further and contend that incumbent officeholders who run for higher office and are not term limited in their current position will navigate their respective party’s

road to nomination in ways which complement the party's political culture. Furthermore, given their risk-averse natures, these individuals will act in ways which enhance their chances of gaining their party's nomination—all the while behaving in such a way so as to not increase the chance of losing their current positions.

In revisiting examples of non-term-limited incumbents running for higher offices, consider progressively ambitious United States senators: Incumbent senators seek out the policy preferences of their respective state-wide electorates and supply their constituents with services which only they can provide. In addition, members in the Senate often seek to earn institutional recognition as experts in particular fields and jockey for powerful committee assignments (allowing these individuals to better represent their statewide constituents). In short, all incumbent senators continue to have two key constituencies, neither mutually exclusive from the other. However, I contend a third constituency exists for incumbent officeholders seeking another office—activists, interests, and elites whose worldviews and perspectives promote the respective party's political culture. These groups are unique, given their party's political culture. Thus, progressively ambitious incumbents—in the current example, senators—must navigate their respective roads to higher office—possibly advancing their political careers—without jeopardizing their current positions in the United States Senate.

Since Jimmy Carter's successful campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 1976 primaries, scholars have noted patterns in post-reform candidate selection. These studies are usually accompanied by

observations regarding party culture—inspired by Freeman’s original assessments. The Democratic Party’s New Deal coalition has largely been dismantled for some time now, but the networks of groups making up the party remain. Mayer (1996) writes that the Democratic Party is comprised of separate segments that are courted by presidential aspirants. Mayer argues that Democratic presidential candidates often seek support from a group within the party by reaching out to the group’s narrow interests.

Progressively ambitious Republicans, on the other hand, are members of a party which over time has patterned itself as a party that values hierarchy and party loyalty (Freeman 1986) and gives the nomination to, as Governor Mitt Romney himself said in the recent documentary ‘Mitt’ (2014), “the next old guy in line.” Governor Romney is not alone in applying this assessment (Cohen et al. 2003; Steger 2008). Since 1980, it seems to be something of a party practice that the candidate deemed most viable, but that falls short in clinching the nomination, will reappear four (or eight) years later to win it. Assuming Freeman’s assessment of the political culture of the Republican Party is valid, I would expect to see no change in behavior for the progressively ambitious incumbent. This is because there is simply no incentive to make short-term adjustments to court those within your party who have already set the criteria by which their evaluation is made.

Advancing Freeman’s description of the Democratic Party to the presidential nomination process, Mayer (1996) writes that Democrats feel the need to reach out to particular interests within the party. Therefore, Democrats

seeking higher office—in Meyer’s case, the presidency—reach out to organized interests within the party by supporting their causes. Where progressively ambitious Republicans have no incentive to change their behaviors, Democrats—in accordance to the conventional wisdom on the party’s political culture—ought to actively seek out the groups which make up its activist base.

Alternatively, an important consideration is whether or not Freeman’s observations continue to apply to one or both parties. Results suggesting little difference with regard to political culture or progressively ambitious behavior among the two parties would suggest Freeman was incorrect in her earlier assessments or that—over time—the culture of one or both parties have changed. A change in the political cultures of one or both of the parties would likely result in similarities regarding their elites and activists perceiving themselves and their parties to be more similar than when Freeman once observed, despite possessing distinct ideologies and policy preferences. In other words, the following chapters not only assess the accuracy of Freeman’s observations, but set out to determine if those making up the parties’ bases—and consequently their political cultures—have changed since Freeman’s observations thirty years ago. To this point in time, her assessments have become untested conventional wisdom with regards to how we envision and explain the parties. Given the cultural and historical variability of the 50 U.S. states, this potential outcome is even more likely at the state level, where—despite Freeman’s expectations that her descriptions of the parties’ cultures would apply—no empirical or anecdotal evidence supports this claim.

Different Cultures and Different Incentives

According to Masket (2014), the issue of political party culture in the U.S. has not been revisited—in part—because political scientists have found it difficult to reliably measure such phenomena. Why use political ambition as a means to explore the nature and effects of political party culture? Incentives. Elected officeholders who seek their respective party’s nomination for another office face different incentives depending on their party and its political culture.

Freeman’s assessment of the Democratic Party leads me to think that Democratic incumbents seeking another office are incentivized to alter their behaviors and reach out to the disparate interests which comprise the base of the party and personify its culture. I suspect that Republicans, considering the political culture of the party as explained by Freeman, lack such incentives and, thus, see nothing gained in altering their behaviors when holding an elected position while seeking another office.

By studying the behaviors of elected officials expressing progressive ambitions, I am—in effect—investigating the different incentives these individuals have to alter (or not alter) their behaviors. If the behaviors exhibited on the aggregate by Democrats and Republicans differentiate along partisan lines, I think it is safe to assume that these different behaviors lend support to the notion that different incentives exists for Democrats and Republicans. Furthermore, such distinctions shed light into the nature and effects of the political cultures of the two major U.S. political parties. Table 2.1 presents

condensed versions of Freeman's explanations of the two party's political cultures as well as my expectations prior to proceeding with empirical analyses.

Table 2.1: Expectations for Empirical Analyses

Party	Freeman-Party Culture Characteristics	Empirical Expectations
Democratic Party	-Disparate Groups -Diverse -Policy-Oriented (Grossman & Hopkins 2014)	The party's culture and the activists who personify the culture, progressively ambitious Democratic officeholders will be incentivized to reach out to narrowly-focused groups within party's base in the years leading up to the nomination for the higher office sought.
Republican Party	-Value Consistency, Loyalty -Homogenous -Ideologically-driven (Grossman & Hopkins 2014)	Considering the party's culture, progressively ambitious Republican officeholders will not be incentivized to reach out to specific groups in the years leading up to the nomination for the higher office sought

Chapter three of the dissertation will test Freeman's assessment of the political culture of the Democratic Party. To explore the nature and effects of political culture on Democratic U.S. senators and representatives, I will estimate the change in progressively ambitious Democrats' (those U.S. senators running for the party's presidential nomination and those members of the U.S. House of Representatives who are seeking another office) interest group ratings for specific, narrowly-focused groups representing the interests of activist which embody the party's political culture. Considering Freeman's assessment of the

political culture of the Democratic Party, I expect those seeking higher office will seek to closer align with these groups of activists who see the Party as a means to achieve group interests.

Chapter four will similarly test Freeman's observations regarding the political culture of the Republican Party. Here, I will measure the extent to which progressively ambitious Republican senators and members of the U.S. House of Representatives alter their own voting records to court narrow collections of activists within their own party. Freeman's evaluation of the internal dynamics of the Republican Party suggests there should be no significant changes regarding the behaviors of those seeking higher office since the party values discipline and is unified in such a way that activists see themselves as members of the Republican Party, first, and group activists, second, if at all.

While chapters three and four will, to a degree, illuminate the notion of the political culture of the parties at the state level, chapter five will provide a qualitative component to this larger exploration of political culture. Based on interviews from several former and current elected state legislators, chapter five seeks to consider whether Freeman's observations—made exclusively at the national level—resonate to the numerous political cultures of the states' Democratic and Republican parties. While Freeman herself wrote that, "if the ideas posited in this article have explanatory value, they should be generally applicable to the state parties," (328) I think Freeman's study of the political cultures of these parties at the national level is of significant explanatory value on its own. The value of her assessments is not dependent upon how well her notion

of culture applies to the national or state parties. However, my study is the first assessment in the literature that measures the degree to which her explanations fit both levels.

This dissertation is an exploration into the nature and effects of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties. In this chapter, I have described Freeman's concept of political culture in addition to explaining how political ambition and political career literature will influence the following chapters as a means to better understand and evaluate the impact of political culture of the two major political parties. Consistent distinctions between the two parties' progressively ambitious ranks contribute to our understanding of one way in which the parties' cultures influence the behaviors of political elites in the U.S., but also afford the opportunity to assess—for the first time—the veracity of Freeman's earlier assessments.

Chapter 3: Facing the Third Constituency: Party Culture and its Effects on Democratic Officials Who Seek Higher Office

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the voting behavior of Democratic members of Congress seeking their party's nomination to run for higher office. To explore how the political culture of the Democratic Party influences the behavior of U.S. Senators seeking higher office, I examine the change in specific interest group ratings for Democratic senators between 1972 and 2008. For the House, I select a cohort of members, beginning in the 94th Congress and continuing to the 108th. The selection of this time period in the House is not arbitrary. This period—from 1975 to 2004—affords the opportunity to investigate the effects of political culture on political careers that shaped Freeman's assessments of the two parties. As explained in an earlier chapter, I argue voting behavior—and ratings based on voting behavior—afford us measures to empirically test Freeman's anecdotal evidence.

Essentially, I measure changes in the legislative behavior of progressively ambitious House members and compare the relevant interest group ratings—depending on the party of the member—to that of their colleagues in the same party caucus. The party-specific interest groups employed in this chapter's analyses are provided in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Interest Groups Used In Analyses

Democratic Party Interest Groups
Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO
National Education Association
League of Conservation Voters
Americans for Democratic Action

Interest groups each select ten to forty roll call votes that the interest group found to have ramifications for their particular interests (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). These scores are often used as indicators of support or opposition in future election efforts (Frantzzich and Schier 1995). On one of these selected votes, the groups compare the action of each individual member of Congress for the issue in question to the stance of the organization and determine if the member's voting complemented that position.

Why use interest group ratings in this project? While questions have been raised regarding the validity of using interest group ratings when comparing the ideology of a Congress (Fowler 1982), this project tests a series of hypotheses with the nature of Freeman's descriptions of the political cultures of the two major parties. I am not concerned with measuring the ideological movement with these ratings. In fact, I do not expect significant shifts in ideological movement by these incumbents exhibiting progressive ambition, as per existing literature. Rather, this project will conduct several tests for different levels of political office with the expectation that Democratic incumbents running for their party's nomination for higher office will seek the approval of narrowly-focused activist bases within their party's coalition in order to gain the nomination. This effort

should be reflected in their voting records and result in increased support for these targeted groups—as indicated by the officeholders earning higher annual ratings from the organized group.

There exists a collection of consistent players within the network of groups that comprise the Democratic Party’s coalition of disparate interests. Organized labor, teacher unions, and conservation groups compose a portion of these groups. These groups offer significant resources for Democratic candidates. Organized labor unions remain a major source of financial and human capital for Democratic candidates who are seen to share these organizations’ interests (Francia 2006). Additionally, unions have employed a political strategy intended to maximize their influence in national Democratic Party political by focusing their considerable resources on presidential candidates in the nominations process (Dark 1999). Unions maintain an active presence in Washington and continually monitor senator voting behavior. The National Education Association is a public education advocate representing teachers and boasting three million members as of 2014 (nea.org)—which makes it the largest union in the United States. Finally, the League of Conservation Voters advocates for environmental issues and campaigns for candidates who are sympathetic to pro-environmental causes (lcv.org). Each of these three groups represent interests acknowledged in the 2012 Democratic National Platform (democrats.org). Given the cultural dynamics of the Democratic Party—as reported by Freeman (1986)—I expect that in the years leading up to an election in which progressively ambitious Democratic officeholders plan to seek higher office, these elected officials will court the support and endorsements of these groups which represent important,

and occasionally competing, interests within the Democratic Party. More specifically, I posit that progressively ambitious Democrats will express support in the way of key congressional votes for these aforementioned groups—as indicated by interest group scores—more so than their Democratic colleagues not seeking higher office.

In empirically testing the effects of the Democratic Party political culture on ambitious politicians, I adopt—as lagged dependent variables—scores from three narrowly-focused interest groups: the Committee on Political Educations of the AFL-CIO, the National Education Association, and the League of Conservation Voters. As a robustness test, I will later use—as a dependent variable—scores from the Americans for Democratic Action—a group that concerns itself with broader, ideologically liberal issues.

Control Variables

The following models control for whether or not Democrats held the majority in the Senate—in the case of estimates regarding the U.S. Senate—or the House—in the case of estimates regarding the U.S. House. Majority party status has been found to affect the voting behaviors of progressively ambitious (for senators, in particular, see Treul 2009). In her study of political ambition and party loyalty, Treul’s measure for majority party status yields significant results. Here, this dichotomous variable is coded 0 if the applicable chamber of Congress is under Republican control at any point in the period considered. In the case of the U.S. Senate, this period is the four years leading up to the next presidential election and 1 if Democrats held the majority throughout the period. At different

points in time between 1972 and 2008, elections resulted in changes midway through the four years leading up to the next presidential election. This is due to the fact that each four-year cohort occurs in two overlapping Congresses. In these cases, majority status was coded as 0 since Democrats did not hold a majority in the Senate for the duration of over the four years. For House members, majority status is coded in the same fashion, but considers majority status for each Congress, separately. In other words, the Senate majority status is coded for a four-year period whereas the House majority status is coded for every two years.

Because any analysis of this nature would be incomplete if it did not account for ideology, I use Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE. DW-NOMINATE scores provide a consistent measure of individual member ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) for the analyses. As a robustness check, I also account for each member's annual *Americans for Democratic Action* (ADA). The ADA is a broadly-focused, liberal interest group. The general nature of the group, and its ideological leanings, make it an appropriate control for a congressional member's ideology. Finally, a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the congressional member represents a state or district within one of the 11 states of the former Confederacy is created to account for the partisan affiliation which occurred in the South over the time studied. The reason for this is simple: Over the time period in which I draw data, Southern states are in the midst of a historical transition from electing conservative Democrats to electing conservative Republicans. Southern Democrats elected—particularly in the early portion of the period studied—were more conservative than their Democratic

colleagues from other parts of the country. Therefore, it is necessary to account for the variation in ideological predispositions among Democratic congressional members.

All incumbent senators continue to have two key constituencies, neither mutually exclusive from the other. Additionally, a third constituency exists for senators seeking their party's nomination. As I stated earlier, this constituency is comprised of those that personify the party's political culture—as described by Freeman. Senators seeking to run under their party's label for president must first present themselves to a constituency of national party elites, activists, and then only later primary voters. However, for these progressively ambitious senators, the reforms of the 1970s have changed the third constituency in size and scope.

Since a little-known, under-funded governor from Georgia swept through the 1976 primaries to become the Democratic Party's presidential nominee, scholars have noted patterns in post-reform candidate selection. The party's New Deal coalition has largely been dismantled for some time now, and the Democratic "Solid South" is no more, but the networks of groups making up the party remain. Since Freeman's essay characterized the Democratic Party as a diverse coalition of activists and elites, others have continued to advance this characteristic of the party's culture. Mayer (1996) writes that the Democratic Party is comprised of separate segments that are courted by presidential aspirants. Mayer argues that Democratic presidential candidates often seek support from a group within the party by reaching out to the group's narrow

interests, thus gaining legitimacy among organization members and all important candidate viability.

Applying this description of the Democratic Party to the nomination process, senators seeking the Democratic nomination may feel the need to reach out to particular interests within the party. Therefore, progressively ambitious Democratic senators will reach out to organized interests associated with the party by supporting their causes. A likely form which this outreach takes is roll-call votes which are sure to be scored by the interest group. In turn, the courted group of activists might endorse the senator's campaign—signaling early support which informs group members and lends viability to the candidacy (Cohen et al 2003, 2009).

In this chapter, Democratic U.S. Senators have been grouped into cohorts spanning four years before each presidential election when a Democratic President was not seeking re-election¹. Democratic U.S. Senators who filed as presidential candidates with principal campaign or authorized campaign committees with the Federal Elections Commission were coded as running for the party's presidential nomination. The total time period covered by these data is 1972 to 2007. In the case of senators who sought the party's nomination, I have

¹ Each cohort includes all Democratic senators who served the entirety of one four-year period leading up to an open seat presidential nomination. Given the structural advantages granted to incumbent Presidents over potential (interparty) challengers (Keech and Matthews 1976)—it is necessary to examine open seat presidential nominations separately from those which result in interparty challenges. This analysis includes: 1972-1975, 1980-1983, 1984-1987, 1988-1991, 2000-2003, and 2004-2007.

only included those who were established in their Senate careers long enough to record interest groups scores for the four year period leading up to the year in which they sought their party's presidential nomination. There are a total of 271 Democratic senators included in the sample¹; 28 of whom sought the party's presidential nomination² and were assessed by the advocacy groups used in this study.

The House of Representatives for the 94th Congress was comprised of 291 Democrats and 144 Republicans. For this chapter, these 291 Democrats are the subjects of my House analysis. Between 1975 and 2004, 43 of these Democratic House members sought higher office: 33 sought seats in the U.S. Senate, 7 sought election to his or her gubernatorial seat, one ran for President, one ran for Attorney General of California, and one ran for Mayor of Nashville, TN.³

In order to investigate the nature and effects of the Democratic Party's political culture, the following tests the change in COPE-AFSCME, the National Education Association, and the League of Conservation Voters interest group rating scores for Democratic House and Senate members who seek higher office. These three groups represent key components within the Democratic coalition whose members embody the political culture of which Freeman writes.

² Senator Lloyd Bentsen (TX) ran for the party's presidential nomination in 1976, 1984, and 1988. Senator Joseph Biden (DE) ran for the party's presidential nomination in 1988 and 2008. Each campaign is counted separately in the analysis for a total of 28 cases of senators running.

³ Biographical information of U.S. House of Representatives was obtained from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress <http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp>

Organized Labor

Union organizations offer Democratic candidates—and Democratic Party organizations (Cotter et al. 1984)—resources in the form of volunteers, monetary contributions, and endorsements. Thus, trade unions and organized labor make for ideal subjects of study when considering the behavior of progressively ambitious Democratic candidates.

In order to measure the change in support for these three groups—in the time leading up to the election for which these progressively members of Congress sought higher office—I use annual organized labor interest group scores. The scores received by every House and Senate member are given in various editions of Barone and Ujifusa's *Almanac of American Politics*. Over the time periods studied (1972-2008 for the Senate, 1975-2004 for the House), the biennial editions of the book switched from reporting scores from the labor interest group Committee on Political Education (COPE) to the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Both measures assess legislators' roll-call voting behavior on key labor issues. Interest group ratings are often used to allocate campaign funds and play a role in activist evaluation of a candidate while remaining relatively unnoticed by most voters (Fowler 1982). I have taken the annual scores of each progressively ambitious member of Congress who sought their party's nomination for higher office and the scores of their Democratic congressional colleagues who did not seek higher office during the same period.

Because I am interested in the potential differences in legislative behavior over time, the difference in scores for each dependent variable of each model to follow is calculated. Table 3.2 presents a list of the U.S. Senate Democrats who sought their party's presidential nomination over the time studied and their total changes in support for union causes, as indicated by annual interest group ratings⁴. With some exceptions, progressively ambitious senators—who are hypothesized to want higher COPE-AFSCME scores—increased their support of union causes, based on the scores assigned to them by organized labor.⁵

An example of the expected behavior exhibited by a Democratic senator seeking the party's presidential nomination is Senator Gary Hart leading up to the 1984 election. In 1980, Hart received a score of 47 out of 100 by COPE. In 1981, he earned a score of 77. In 1982 and 1983, he got scores of 79 and 80, respectively. This means that in the four years leading up to the 1984 primary season, the senator from Colorado (a state not historically associated with organized labor) saw his score increase substantially.

⁴ Candidates such as Barrack Obama who were not in the U.S. Senate long enough prior to running for President to earn a score four years before seeking the nomination are excluded from the sample and analyses.

⁵ Senators Dodd and Clinton began and concluded the four-year period leading up to their 2008 nomination campaigns with perfect COPE-AFSCME scores.


Table 3.2: Changes in Democratic U.S. Senators' COPE-AFSCME Scores Who Sought Presidential Nomination

Senator	State	Year	4 Years From Election	1 Year From Election	Total Change in COPE-AFSCME Scores
Frank Church	ID	1976	80	76	-4
Birch Bayh	IN	1976	88	94	6
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1976	30	59	29
Henry Jackson	WA	1976	100	90	-10
George McGovern	SD	1976	100	81	-19
Robert Byrd	WV	1976	70	50	-20
Dale Bumpers	AR	1984	53	65	12
Alan Cranston	CA	1984	88	92	4
Gary Hart	CO	1984	47	80	33
John Glenn	OH	1984	72	79	7
Ernest Hollings	SC	1984	22	53	31
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1984	39	51	12
Joseph Biden Jr.	DE	1988	80	81	1
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1988	51	51	0
Bill Bradley	NJ	1988	87	87	0
David Boren	OK	1988	38	39	1
Robert Kerrey	NE	1992	100	91	-9
Tom Harkin	IA	1992	92	90	-2
Joseph Lieberman	CT	2004	83	100	17
Robert Graham	FL	2004	85	100	15
John Edwards	NC	2004	85	100	15
John Kerry	MA	2004	85	100	15
Russell Feingold	WI	2004	100	100	0
Blanche Lincoln	AR	2008	100	86	-14
Barbara Boxer	CA	2008	100	100	0

Christopher Dodd	CT	2008	100	100	0
Joseph Biden Jr.	DE	2008	86	100	14
Hillary Clinton	NY	2008	100	100	0

Not accounting for alternative explanations, the average increase in pro-union legislative behavior—as indicated by COPE-AFSCME scores—is approximately 4.8 points. Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of score differentials for COPE-AFSCME ratings for Democratic senators not seeking their party’s presidential nomination compared to Democratic senators seeking the presidential nomination. Over the period covered in this analysis, Democratic senators who sought the presidential nomination became more pro-labor as their colleagues became less sympathetic to union causes. Of particular interest in Figure 3.1 is the relative lack of strong labor support among Democratic U.S. senators not seeking their parties’ presidential nomination. Despite seemingly falling out of favor among the overwhelming majority of Democratic senators—in fact, the average difference in the four-year segments on behalf of those who did not seek higher office is approximately 11.2 points—those senators seeking the presidency enhance their sympathies towards labor.

Figure 3.1: Comparison of COPE-AFSCME Score Differential Distributions for Democratic Senators



Controlling for the majority status of U.S Senate Democrats, senator ideology, re-election status, and geographical region, the independent variable of interest is highly significant and the positive value of the coefficient is in the expected direction. The results of the multivariate regression are reported in Table 3.3. A positive value indicates increased support over the four years leading up to the nomination. On average, Democratic Senators who sought their party's nomination resulted in a 15 point increase in COPE/AFSCME scores.

Table 3.3: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators' COPE-AFSCME Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	15.318*** (3.487)	4.39
Democratic Majority	4.351 (2.721)	1.60
Ideology	38.413** (14.879)	2.58
Years to Re-Election	-.707 (1.083)	-0.65
South	6.962* (4.107)	1.70
Constant	1.153 (5.949)	0.19
R-squared	.09	
N	271	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

On average, in the four years leading up to the next presidential election, those senators who ran for their party's nomination became considerably more pro-labor. As one might expect, the ideology of the individual senator also played a role in this analysis. The variable created to indicate whether or not a senator represented a southern state is also statistically significant at the .1 level. Other control variables—accounting for whether or not Democrats held the majority in the four-year period and the re-election status of the incumbent senator—are not statistically significant.

Table 3.4 lists the House of Representatives comprising the Democratic cohort of the 94th Congress as well as the year in which they sought higher office, and the difference in earned COPE-AFSCME interest group ratings over the four years leading up to the election of the office in question to election year. Since a four-year comparison is not possible for the first initial election cycles during the time period examined, I have also provided the change in COPE-AFSCME scores from one year prior to the election to the election year.

Table 3.4: Changes in Progressively Ambitious Democratic House Members' COPE-AFSCME Score


Representative	State	Election Year	Position Sought	4 Year Change in COPE-AFSCME	1 Year Change in COPE-AFSCME
Richard Fulton	TN	1975	Mayor	--	--
"Spark" Matsunuaga	HI	1976	U.S. Senate	--	0
Brock Adams	WA	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-23
Donald Riegle	MI	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-18
Jame Symington	MO	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-12
James Stanton	OH	1976	U.S. Senate	--	2
Jane O'Hara	MI	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-5
Jerry Litton	MO	1976	U.S. Senate	--	--
John Melcher	MT	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-12
Ken Heckler	WV	1976	Governor	--	1
Morris Udall	AZ	1976	President	--	-4
Patsy Mink	HI	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-8
Paul Sarbanes	MD	1976	U.S. Senate	--	0
Phillip Hayes	IN	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-3
Robert Roe	NJ	1977	President	--	6
Bob Kruger	TX	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-14

Max Baucus	MT	1978	U.S. Senate	--	14
Paul Tsongas	MA	1978	U.S. Senate	--	5
Ray Thornton	AR	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-41
Walter Flowers	AL	1978	U.S. Senate	--	3
Yvonne Burke	CA	1978	A.G.	--	-57
Caroll Hubbard, JR	KY	1979	Governor	-11	-19
Christopher Dodd	CT	1980	U.S. Senate	5	-14
Dawson Mathis	GA	1980	U.S. Senate	3	24
Elizabeth Holtzman	NY	1980	U.S. Senate	-1	-18
Robert Roe	NJ	1981	President	7	17
Bo Ginn	GA	1982	Governor	-13	-31
Floyd Fithian	IN	1982	U.S. Senate	50	18
Jim Santini	NV	1982	U.S. Senate	10	20
Toby Moffett	CT	1982	U.S. Senate	10	12
William Blanchard	MI	1982	Governor	5	15
Norman D'Amours	NH	1984	U.S. Senate	-3	-16
Paul Simon	IL	1984	U.S. Senate	28	0
Tom Harkin	IA	1984	U.S. Senate	-1	-42
James Jones	OK	1986	U.S. Senate	-9	27
James Weaver	OR	1986	U.S. Senate	-7	-7
John Breaux	LA	1986	U.S. Senate	78	47
Robert Edgard	PA	1986	U.S. Senate	-8	-8
Timothy Wirth	CO	1986	U.S. Senate	8	21
Don Bonker	WA	1988	U.S. Senate	27	-2
James Florio	NJ	1989	Governor	-12	-20
Les AuCoin	OR	1992	U.S. Senate	14	8
Bob Carr	MI	1994	U.S. Senate	-4	-29

Table 3.4 illustrates a stark difference in support for labor among those progressively ambitious House members seeking a U.S. Senate seat and those

running for another office. The average change in organized labor support among those 17 Democratic House members who seek a U.S. Senate seat is approximately 12 points. For those five seeking some other office, the average change is -4.8. In other words, those House members seeking a U.S. Senate seat from their respective state become more favorable to unions over the four years leading up to their election. Those seeking offices besides the Senate, however, become less sympathetic to union causes. Figure 3.2 illustrates the distribution of score differentials for COPE-AFSCME ratings for all progressively ambitious Democratic House members and those not seeking their party's nomination for higher office.

Figure 3.2: Comparison of COPE-AFSCME Score Differential Distributions for Democratic House of Representatives



Comparing the illustrations in Figure 3.2, it is apparent that the cohort is distributed similarly—regardless of the state of each member’s political ambitions. There does not appear to be a discernable difference with regard to the support in organized labor between those House members seeking higher office and their partisan colleagues.

What is apparent, from the average changes in scores among progressively ambitious House members seeking a Senate seat and those seeking other offices, is that those running for the Senate become more significantly more sympathetic to union causes while their colleagues seeking state offices—likely due to the state-level nature of the positions being sought—somewhat decrease their support for organized labor.

Table 3.5 presents three models. Model one reports the results of a linear regression equation predicting the effects of Democratic House members seeking their party’s nomination for a U.S. Senate seat—accounting for majority status, ideology, and geographic region. The model yields statistically significant results for the independent variable of interest—whether or not the Democratic House member seeks the party’s nomination. Additionally, the coefficients are in the predicted direction as those House members, running for their party’s nomination for a Senate seat increase their support of union causes—resulting in a nearly 12 point increase in COPE-AFSCME scores, on average. Model two controls for the members’ ideological placement (DW-NOMINATE) scores from one Congress prior to running for higher office to the time which they sought the other office. These results are similar to those found in Model one. Model three

predicts the average change in COPE-AFSCME scores for those Democratic House members who seek an office other than the Senate. Taken with the caution regarding its statistical reliability, it appears that—if anything—these individual seeking the approval of their party's activist base in order to secure the nomination for a state-level office are less sympathetic to organized labor.

Table 3.5: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic House Members' COPE-AFSCME Scores

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
Running for Senate	11.691** (5.381)	2.17	10.484** (5.363)	1.95	--	--
Running for Other Office	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-6.451 (4.273)	-1.51
Democratic Majority	0.765 (1.260)	0.61	-0.923 (0.822)	-1.12	-0.774 (0.823)	-0.94
ADA	0.0921** (0.027)	3.45	-- --	-- --	-- --	--
DW-NOMINATE	-- --	-- (0.0002)	-0.008*** (0.0001)	-44.04	0.008*** (0.0001)	-43.92
South	5.465** (1.665)	3.28	2.811** (0.983)	2.86	2.714** (0.982)	2.77
Constant	-6.856** (2.799)	-2.45	1.873** (0.755)	2.48	1.882** (0.755)	2.49
R-squared	0.03		0.01		0.007	
N	1787		1751		1751	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

Teachers

Another key group that seeks representation in the Democratic Party's coalition is the National Education Association (Wayne 2005). Like the AFL-CIO, the NEA exerts influence within the party and will select a Democratic presidential nomination candidate to support as early as the New Hampshire primary (Fowler, Spiliotes, and Vavreck 2005). While it is fair to say the NEA represents the interests of teachers, much like COPE-AFSCME serves its own members, the NEA's stated purpose as "the nation's largest professional employee organization....committed to advancing the cause of public education" (nea.org) is distinctly different from the policy goals of COPE-AFSCME.

The following analysis will examine if the NEA is courted by progressively ambitious Democratic senators and representatives seeking their party's nomination for higher office. NEA ratings for congressional members have been collected from Sharp's *Directory of Congressional Voting Scores and Interest Group Ratings, 4th edition* (2005). Since the sample of U.S. Senators spans from 1972 to 2008—and Sharp's directory does not extend beyond 2004—I also used the National Education Association's electronic resources. The scores were lagged in the same fashion as the COPE-AFSCME scores in order to measure the change in ratings received by Democratic senators in the four years leading up to the next presidential election. The difference variable for House members is a comparison of the rating each was awarded for the year prior to an election year.

Again, assuming Freeman's descriptions of the party's political culture affect the behavior of Democratic congressional members aspiring for higher

office, one would expect progressively ambitious senators and representative to become more sympathetic to NEA causes in the years leading up to seeking the party nomination for higher office. Therefore, I suspect these progressively ambitious Democrats earn higher overall NEA ratings—when compared to their Democratic colleagues in their respective chamber—in the years leading up to the next election.

Table 3.6 presents the overall change in National Education Association scores for progressively ambitious Democratic U.S. Senators.

Table 3.6: Changes in Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators' NEA Scores

Senator	State	Election Year	4 Years From Election	1 Year From Election	Total Change in NEA Scores
Frank Church	ID	1976	100	100	0
Birch Bayh	IN	1976	100	100	0
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1976	100	100	0
Henry Jackson	WA	1976	100	100	0
George McGovern	SD	1976	100	100	0
Robert Byrd	WV	1976	100	100	0
Dale Bumpers	AR	1984	63	91	28
Alan Cranston	CA	1984	86	89	3
Gary Hart	CO	1984	78	100	22
John Glenn	OH	1984	78	86	8
Ernest Hollings	SC	1984	44	80	36
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1984	67	73	6
Joseph Biden Jr.	DE	1988	83	100	17
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1988	73	86	13
Bill Bradley	NJ	1988	92	100	8

David Boren	OK	1988	58	71	13
Robert Kerrey	NE	1992	--	--	
Tom Harkin	IA	1992	100	100	0
Joseph Lieberman	CT	2004	87	88	1
Robert Graham	FL	2004	93	100	7
John Edwards	NC	2004	100	86	-14
John Kerry	MA	2004	100	100	0
Russell Feingold	WI	2004	93	85	8
Blanche Lincoln	AR	2008	90	100	10
Barbara Boxer	CA	2008	90	100	10
Christopher Dodd	CT	2008	80	100	20
Joseph Biden Jr.	DE	2008	90	100	10
Hillary Clinton	NY	2008	85	100	15

Overall, Table 3.6 indicates that progressively ambitious Democratic senators do become more sympathetic to NEA causes in the four years leading up to a presidential election. The average overall ratings increase for Democrats seeking higher office is approximately 7.6 points. However, a t-test comparing the mean difference in NEA ratings between progressively ambitious Democratic senators and their more static colleagues does not yield significant results. As indicated in Table 3.6, the mean is deflated by those senators who—four years out from the presidential election in which they expressed progressive ambition—were already earning a perfect rating from the NEA. When those senators with zero difference scores because of perfect NEA ratings earned throughout the time leading to the next presidential election are excluded, the 19 remaining senators do become significantly more sympathetic to causes related to the National

Education Association—suggesting that they are reaching out to this group to advance their nomination effort.

Table 3.7 reports the results from the multivariate regression with the lagged NEA measure as the dependent variable. Here, as before, the model controls for a Democratic majority, ideology, years to re-election, and geographical region.

Table 3.7: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators' NEA Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	3.187 (2.099)	1.52
Democratic Majority	-3.667** (1.785)	-2.05
Ideology	21.113** (0.016)	2.43
Years to Re-Election	.027 (0.489)	0.06
South	-3.537 (2.511)	-1.41
Constant	13.499 (3.535)	3.82
R-squared	.04	
N	270	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

Unlike the average change in COPE-AFSCME scores, NEA scores are not statistically significant, but are in the right direction and hover at the .1 p-value

with a t statistic of 1.52. If senators seeking the Democratic Party's presidential nomination were to court this powerful group—which embodies the political culture of the Party, we would expect them to yield significantly higher NEA scorecards between the years leading up to the election. The coefficient is in the expected direction as it appears that—on average—accounting for institutional characteristics, ideology, and region, that a progressively ambitious senator's NEA rating increases by three points over the four year period leading up to the next presidential election. Additional analysis, which excludes those cases where Democratic senators had consistently perfect scores—as depicted in Table 3.8. Here, the 19 senators who sought the party's nomination for president and who changed their legislative behavior—as indicated by the changes in NEA ratings—increased their support approximately six points more than their colleagues in the Senate who did not exhibit progressive ambition. This model—which excludes those whose records could not become more sympathetic over the years leading up to seeking higher office—supports the idea that progressively ambitious Democratic senators seek out the support of activists aligned with public school teachers.

Table 3.8: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators' NEA Scores (Censored)

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	5.870** (2.734)	2.15
Democratic Majority	-2.943 (1.928)	-1.53
Ideology	21.591** (8.954)	2.41
Years to Re-Election	0.062 (0.510)	0.12
South	-3.965 (2.544)	-1.56
Constant	13.429*** (3.704)	3.63
R-squared	.04	
N	262	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

If Democratic House members, seeking higher office, behave similarly with regard to reaching out to a broader constituency of diverse interests, we would expect similar results—progressively ambitious Democratic House members significantly increasing their support of causes important to the National Education Association. Table 3.9 lists progressively ambitious Democratic House members from the 94th Congressional cohort, the offices they sought, and the changes in NEA scores over the four years leading up to their elections. Since the National Education Association records biennial legislative scores, one-year comparisons are not of great value. Fortunately, the changes in

scores, over the four years leading up to the election for the seats sought, offer the analyses variation.

Table 3.9: Changes in Progressively Ambitious Democratic House Members' NEA Scores

Representative	State	Election Year	Position Sought	4 Year Change in NEA Scores
Richard Fulton	TN	1975	Mayor	--
"Spark" M Matsunuaga	HI	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Brock Adams	WA	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Donald Riegle	MI	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Jame Symington	MO	1976	U.S. Senate	0
James Stanton	OH	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Jane O'Hara	MI	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Jerry Litton	MO	1976	U.S. Senate	0
John Melcher	MT	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Ken Heckler	WV	1976	Governor	0
Morris Udall	AZ	1976	President	0
Patsy Mink	HI	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Paul Sarbanes	MD	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Phillip Hayes	IN	1976	U.S. Senate	0
Robert Roe	NJ	1977	President	-14
Bob Kruger	TX	1978	U.S. Senate	0
Max Baucus	MT	1978	U.S. Senate	0
Paul Tsongas	MA	1978	U.S. Senate	0
Ray Thornton	AR	1978	U.S. Senate	0
Walter Flowers	AL	1978	U.S. Senate	0
Yvonne Burke	CA	1978	A.G.	0
Caroll Hubbard, JR	KY	1979	Governor	-63
Christopher Dodd	CT	1980	U.S. Senate	0

Dawson Mathis	GA	1980	U.S. Senate	0
Elizabeth Holtzman	NY	1980	U.S. Senate	0
Robert Roe	NJ	1981	President	0
Bo Ginn	GA	1982	Governor	0
Floyd Fithian	IN	1982	U.S. Senate	0
Jim Santini	NV	1982	U.S. Senate	0
Toby Moffett	CT	1982	U.S. Senate	0
William Blanchard	MI	1982	Governor	0
Norman D'Amours	NH	1984	U.S. Senate	0
Paul Simon	IL	1984	U.S. Senate	0
Tom Harkin	IA	1984	U.S. Senate	0
James Jones	OK	1986	U.S. Senate	0
James Weaver	OR	1986	U.S. Senate	0
John Breaux	LA	1986	U.S. Senate	0
Robert Edgard	PA	1986	U.S. Senate	0
Timothy Wirth	CO	1986	U.S. Senate	0
Don Bonker	WA	1988	U.S. Senate	0
James Florio	NJ	1989	Governor	12
Les AuCoin	OR	1992	U.S. Senate	0
Bob Carr	MI	1994	U.S. Senate	0

Focusing on the four year differences reported in Table 3.9, the 17 House members who sought U.S. Senate seats, on average, increased their support of NEA-related issues by nearly nine points. This indicates that, similar to their voting behavior regarding organized labor issues, these Democrats sought out the approval of the NEA and its members in the lead up to their Senate bids.

Those five Democratic House members who sought offices other than seats in the U.S. Senate, on average, saw their NEA ratings decrease by nearly

four points over the four years leading up to their elections. These findings regarding the five individuals are likely indicative of state-specific concerns and more parochial interests.

Table 3.10: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic House Members' NEA Scores

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
Running for Senate	11.851** (4.400)	2.69	9.419** (4.652)	2.02	--	--
Running for Other Office	-- --	--	-- --	--	0.437 (10.367)	0.04
Democratic Majority	0.864 (1.105)	0.78	0.291 (1.115)	0.26	0.336 (1.114)	0.30
ADA	0.271*** (0.034)	8.02	-- --	--	-- --	--
DW-NOMINATE	-- --	--	-0.021*** (0.0003)	-72.15	-0.021*** (0.0003)	-72.35
South	13.005*** (2.227)	5.84	4.715*** (1.498)	3.15	4.612** (1.496)	3.08
Constant	-24.831*** (2.921)	-8.50	-4.31** (1.288)	-3.13	-3.915** (1.289)	-3.04
R-squared	0.03		0.009		0.007	
N	1776		1742		1742	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

Table 3.10 provides a more in-depth analysis—presenting three models accounting for various factors which might also account for the changes in scores indicated above.

Model's 1 and 2 share the same independent variable of interest—whether or not a Democratic House member ran for the U.S. Senate. Controlling for Democratic majority status, different forms of ideological measures (Model 1 uses Americans for Democratic Action Scores while Model 2 reports the change in DW-NOMINATE scores from one Congress to the next), and regional variation, progressively ambitious Democratic House members—on average—do increase their support of NEA issues by approximately 12 and 9 points, respectively. As predicted, these individuals seeking higher office navigate their party's culture by ingratiating themselves with this important Democratic group.

The third model's independent variable of interest measures whether or not the progressively ambitious House members sought state government offices. When institutional characteristics (majority status), ideology, and region are taken into account, Democratic House members do not appear to seek the support of the NEA in the fashion of their Senate seat-seeking peers. Much like with COPE-ASFCME scores, it appears variation at the state-level lends nuance to the story of political party culture.

Environmentalists

Environmentalists comprise another advocacy arm within the party's coalition. At least as far back as 1976—the first presidential election measured in

this chapter's analysis, the Democratic Party national platform has professed a belief in environmental improvement and protection.

The Democratic Party's strong commitment to environmental quality is based on its conviction that environmental protection is not simply an aesthetic goal, but is necessary to achieve a more just society. Cleaning up air and water supplies and controlling the proliferation of dangerous chemicals is a necessary part of a successful national health program. (1976 DNC Platform, www.ucsb.edu)

As evidenced by the statement taken directly from the 1976 Democratic Party's nation platform, environmentalists are represented among the interests embodying the Democratic Party's political culture. A group dedicated to environmental conservation, The League of Conservation Voters, was established 1970 and, "works to elect pro-environmental protection candidates to Congress" (Barone and Cohen 2009, p. 13). Like COPE-AFSCME and NEA ratings, I use the congressional scorecards of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) to determine whether or not progressively ambitious Democratic senators seek out the approval of environmentalists who comprise an organized interest within the larger party.

Table 3.11 reports progressively ambitious Democratic senators' total changes in League of Conservation scores from four years leading up to the next presidential election.

Table 3.11: Change in LCV Scores For Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators

Senator	State	Election Year	4 Years From Election	1 Year from Election	Total Change in LCV Scores
Frank Church	ID	1976	78	64	-14
Birch Bayh	IN	1976	52	60	8
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1976	26	18	-8
Henry Jackson	WA	1976	40	53	13
George McGovern	SD	1976	74	76	2
Robert Byrd	WV	1976	20	39	19
Dale Bumpers	AR	1984	58	94	36
Alan Cranston	CA	1984	78	86	8
Gary Hart	CO	1984	73	75	2
John Glenn	OH	1984	53	71	18
Ernest Hollings	SC	1984	44	75	31
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1984	31	60	29
Joseph Biden Jr.	DE	1988	94	70	-24
Lloyd Bentsen	TX	1988	60	40	-20
Bill Bradley	NJ	1988	94	70	-24
David Boren	OK	1988	33	20	-13
Robert Kerrey	NE	1992	--	--	--
Tom Harkin	IA	1992	70	73	3
Joseph Lieberman	CT	2004	86	42	-44
Robert Graham	FL	2004	86	68	-18
John Edwards	NC	2004	100	37	-63
John Kerry	MA	2004	86	53	-33
Russell Feingold	WI	2004	100	89	-11
Blanche Lincoln	AR	2008	67	67	0
Barbara Boxer	CA	2008	100	80	-20
Christopher Dodd	CT	2008	100	60	-40

Joseph Biden Jr.	DE	2008	83	67	16
Hillary Clinton	NY	2008	100	73	-27

Regarding Democratic senators, unlike the changes in scores from labor and—to a lesser extent—teacher groups, there is no discernable pattern indicating increased support for environmental issues on behalf of these progressively ambitious senators. If anything, it seems these individuals' voting behavior renders less favorable results for the LCV—as indicated by 14 of the 28 presidential aspirants overall change resulting in lower ratings from the organization in the final year leading up to the primaries than three years prior.

Table 3.12: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators' LCV Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	-3.567 (4.534)	-0.79
Democratic Majority	7.214** (2.636)	2.74
Ideology	9.825 (12.217)	0.80
Years to Re-Election	-0.303 (.754)	-0.40
South	-2.297 (4.231)	-0.54
Constant	-1.342 (5.123)	-0.26
R-squared	.04	
N	269	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

Table 3.12 confirms what is depicted in Table 3.11. The regression model yields results contrary to what one might expect. Democratic senators expressing progressive ambition do not support the League of Conservation Voters more than their other colleague in the Democratic caucus. If anything, these senators seem to be less sympathetic to environmentalists in the years leading up to the presidential election which they indicated interest in running. While a logical explanation for these findings might be that—with the interests of organized labor and environmentalists conflicting—ambitious Democratic senators are forced to favor one group within their party's coalition of disparate interests at the cost of another. However, a test to determine the nature and extent to which the interest group scores awarded to these senators by organized labor and environmentalists were related yielded insignificant results.

Table 3.13 reports the changes in LCV scores for Democratic House members seeking higher office. On average, between year_t and year_{t-4}, these individuals' environmental scores drop by two points for Democratic House members seeking Senate seats and 15 points those aspiring for a state-level office. This, compared to their colleague not seeking higher office—who record an overall average .08 increase in support between year_t and year_{t-1} indicates, ambitious Democratic House members appear—on average—to become less sympathetic to causes monitored by the League of Conservation Voters.

Table 3.13: Change in LCV Scores For Progressively Ambitious Democratic House Members

Representative	State	Election Year	Position Sought	LCV Scores
Richard Fulton	TN	1975	Mayor	--
"Spark" M Matsunuaga	HI	1976	U.S. Senate	-21
Brock Adams	WA	1976	U.S. Senate	16
Donald Riegle	MI	1976	U.S. Senate	-28
Jame Symington	MO	1976	U.S. Senate	0
James Stanton	OH	1976	U.S. Senate	-19
Jane O'Hara	MI	1976	U.S. Senate	-13
Jerry Litton	MO	1976	U.S. Senate	--
John Melcher	MT	1976	U.S. Senate	-21
Ken Hechler	WV	1976	Governor	-11
Morris Udall	AZ	1976	President	19
Patsy Mink	HI	1976	U.S. Senate	1
Paul Sarbanes	MD	1976	U.S. Senate	5
Phillip Hayes	IN	1976	U.S. Senate	1
Robert Roe	NJ	1977	President	-25
Bob Kruger	TX	1978	U.S. Senate	7
Max Baucus	MT	1978	U.S. Senate	-38
Paul Tsongas	MA	1978	U.S. Senate	-22
Ray Thornton	AR	1978	U.S. Senate	-9
Walter Flowers	AL	1978	U.S. Senate	9
Yvonne Burke	CA	1978	A.G.	-35
Caroll Hubbard, JR	KY	1979	Governor	-3
Christopher Dodd	CT	1980	U.S. Senate	-8
Dawson Mathis	GA	1980	U.S. Senate	16
Elizabeth Holtzman	NY	1980	U.S. Senate	-8
Robert Roe	NJ	1981	President	0
Bo Ginn	GA	1982	Governor	29

Floyd Fithian	IN	1982	U.S. Senate	2
Jim Santini	NV	1982	U.S. Senate	-10
Toby Moffett	CT	1982	U.S. Senate	-24
William Blanchard	MI	1982	Governor	-4
Norman D'Amours	NH	1984	U.S. Senate	-8
Paul Simon	IL	1984	U.S. Senate	9
Tom Harkin	IA	1984	U.S. Senate	-5
James Jones	OK	1986	U.S. Senate	0
James Weaver	OR	1986	U.S. Senate	0
John Breaux	LA	1986	U.S. Senate	0
Robert Edgard	PA	1986	U.S. Senate	0
Timothy Wirth	CO	1986	U.S. Senate	0
Don Bonker	WA	1988	U.S. Senate	0
James Florio	NJ	1989	Governor	-80
Les AuCoin	OR	1992	U.S. Senate	-8
Bob Carr	MI	1994	U.S. Senate	-10

Table 3.14 reports the nature and extent to which progressively ambitious Democratic House members support environmental causes leading up to their seeking the party's nomination for higher office, accounting for alternative explanations. These members appear to become less supportive of issues prioritized by the League of Conservation Voters, accounting for institutional and ideological effects. Models one and two predict the effects of running for the Senate on League of Conservation Voters' scores from year_t minus year_{t-4}. Model one accounts for ideology using ADA scores while Model two measures ideology movement from one Congress to the next with DW-NOMINATE.

Table 3.14: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic House Members' LCV Scores

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
Running for Senate	-1.713	-0.53	-1.903	-0.59	--	--
	(3.233)		(3.214)		--	--
Other Office	--	--	--	--	-14.879	-1.12
	--		--		(13.233)	
Democratic Majority	-4.238**	-2.69	-4.741**	-2.88	-4.721**	-2.84
	(1.574)		(1.644)		(1.661)	
ADA	0.006	0.33	--	--	--	--
	(0.018)		--		--	--
DW-NOMINATE	--	--	0.066***	307.25	0.066**	311.03
	--		(0.0002)		(0.0002)	
South	3.576***	3.56	3.558***		3.591***	4.81
	(1.003)		(0.737)		(0.747)	
Constant	3.223	1.54	4.114**	2.74	4.106**	2.70
	(2.088)		(1.500)		(1.523)	
R-squared	0.01		0.02		0.02	
N	1785		1751		1751	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

Model three, which boasts the largest decrease in support, predicts the effects on LCV scores for those seeking state offices. Again, as reported with COPE-AFSCME and NEA scores, it appears these individuals, albeit a small sample (5),

appear to distance themselves from traditional activist bases personifying the Democratic Party's national political culture.

Robustness Test

At this point, I have shown that Democratic senators—in particular—seeking their party's presidential nomination behave differently from their Democratic senatorial colleagues in that they seek to ingratiate themselves with unions and teachers—key groups within the Democratic Party coalition. Votes scored by these groups represent a small fraction of the total roll-call votes of a senator in any given year. Therefore, Democratic presidential aspirants are able to target these specific votes which will be considered by the group. The relatively small number of votes monitored by each group allows ambitious Democrats the ability to reach out to unions and teachers without greatly altering their overall roll-call voting behavior which—to that point—has been satisfactory to constituents back home. Thus, these senators seek the support of these key blocks in the Democratic Party's “third constituency” without drastically changing their voting behavior and potentially risking their careers in the Senate.

It could be argued that broader, more ideological interest groups might also produce similar findings for Democrats. In other words, it might be the case that Democratic senators with presidential aspirations do not target specific groups in the years leading up to the election, but instead change their overall voting behavior. This would run contrary to my argument that—given the political culture of the Democratic Party—Democratic senators seek out activist support while maintaining an overall consistent roll-call voting record. If these

were broad ideological changes, it would not be apparent that these senators were courting and sending sympathetic signals to specific interests personifying the party's political culture, but rather dramatically altering their overall behavior—simply becoming more liberal in general.

Assuming these senators would like to keep their current offices, should they not win the party's presidential nomination, it could be costly to alter their overall voting behavior in the event of a failed presidential nomination race. To ensure that my findings are not indicative of a larger ideological shift, I present the following test of whether or not these progressively ambitious senators alter their voting behavior more broadly as opposed to targeting a specific group. I test for the effects of running on Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores. The results are presented in Table 3.15. A significant ideological shift would suggest these progressively ambitious senators likely employ a broader appeal to their party's liberal base—weakening my argument that these individuals court specific interests represented within the Democratic Party.

Like the COPE-AFSCME, NEA, and LCV scores, the ADA values are derived by finding the difference in scores for each of the four years leading up to the election year. As in the first model, I control for the majority status of the Senate in the four years leading up to each presidential election of interest. The model also accounts for the ideological positioning and re-election status of the senator. The model reveals no statistically significant results. Democrats who seek their party's presidential nomination do not appear to significantly alter their voting behavior on the wide swath of issues. Instead, as I proposed earlier, these

senators seek out specific groups—in this study, organized labor and public education—within the Democratic coalition for support.

Table 3.15: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Democratic Senators' ADA Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	-2.054	-.65
	(3.137)	
Democratic Majority	2.748	1.18
	(2.328)	
Ideology	2.782	0.28
	(9.886)	
Years to Re-Election	.301	0.52
	(.575)	
South	.307	0.09
	(3.248)	
Constant	2.119	0.605
	(4.088)	
R-squared	0.0103	
N	259	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

Taken together, the findings suggest progressively ambitious Democratic senators navigate their party's coalitions of disparate interests by strategically signaling support for unions and teachers without significantly altering their voting records. Considering Freeman's (1986) thoughts on the topic, I suggest that the behavior exhibited by progressively ambitious senators is a product of the Democratic Party's political culture. The results of the previous analyses suggest that Democratic senators who seek their party's presidential nomination

become significantly more supportive of organized labor and the interests of the largest teachers union in the U.S. in the four years leading up to the election. These findings provide empirical support for earlier descriptions of the Democratic Party coalition and its culture (Freeman 1986; Mayer 1996). Subjecting themselves to this third constituency of party elites and activists, these ambitious senators reach out to a cornerstone of the Democratic coalition. While it might have once been the case that senators were willing to significantly alter their overall voting patterns to appeal to party elites (Gray 1965), this examination has found that Democrats in the post-McGovern Fraser era exhibit a more nuanced level of strategic voting. Progressively ambitious Democratic senators are not necessarily willing to risk losing their current position in an attempt to run for president. Therefore, they carefully navigate their party's political culture by ingratiating themselves to organized labor and the interests of teachers—I would argue—in the hopes of gaining support among these groups for the upcoming presidential primaries.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have set out to explore the political culture of the Democratic Party and its effect on the party's progressively ambitious U.S. Senators and House of Representatives. Based on Freeman's essay on political culture, I have suggested that Democratic senators and House members who seek their party's nomination for higher office subject themselves to a third constituency—their party's elites, activists, and primary voters. Those Democratic officeholders indicating progressive ambition, it is suggested here, seek the

support and approval of their party's faithful outside of the confines of their respective electoral constituencies. I have presented evidence suggesting those Democratic U.S. senators seeking the early support necessary to win higher office without alienating their constituents appear to be a consideration for these progressively ambitious officeholders. However, as indicated by the null findings with regard to ADA scores—an interest group that focuses on ideological issues more broadly—these changes in voting behavior among progressively ambitious senators do not appear to occur on a large scale. Instead, these individuals are engaging a single, narrowly-focused groups of influential activists of the Democratic base. I contend this strategic courting of the interests and activists personifying the political culture of the Democratic Party—without significantly altering their overall voting behaviors—allows these aspirants to effectively seek the higher office with relatively little political cost with regard to their current positions as senators.

The findings pertaining to Democratic House members seeking higher office, however, are more nuanced. On the one hand, House members seeking seats in the U.S. Senate substantially increase their support for organized labor (COPE-AFSCME) and public school advocates (NEA) over the four years leading up to election. On the other, progressively ambitious Democratic House members seeking state-level offices do not align with the behavior exhibited by their Senate-seeking colleagues. In fact, this group of individuals consistently distanced themselves from the three groups measured in this chapter.

The conflicting findings regarding House members may be due state-level variations in the political cultures of the two major parties. While Freeman proposed that the cultures she observed within the Democratic National Conventions and Republican National Conventions might have applied to the states, these null and contrary findings suggest that these House members—running for state offices or U.S. Senate positions with state constituencies—approach the activist courtship differently than those seeking national office. Moreover, it is possible these individuals court different activists altogether. Chapter five will examine the nature and effects of the political cultures of the parties at the state-level.

The conventional wisdom has been that Democrats running for president, specifically, reach out to the disparate interests who make up the Democratic coalition. In the case of this chapter, I empirically test this assumption—broadening the scope of the offices examined and empirically test this conventional wisdom. The focus has been on key groups of activists which have been key players in Democratic politics since the New Deal and beyond—organized labor, teachers, and environmentalists. While the results of this chapter do not indicate increased support for environmental causes, votes pertaining to two of the three groups studied do suggest significant increases in support for organized labor and teachers from Democratic Senators seeking higher office. Becoming more supportive of labor unions and teachers allows these presidential hopefuls to court these important constituencies—and possibly gain endorsements, campaign contributions, and volunteers which might aid

them in their national nomination efforts—without significantly altering their overall voting behaviors in Congress (which might alienate their state constituents).

Chapter 4: Rewarding the “Old Guy Who’s Next in Line”: Party Culture and its Effects on Republican Officials Who Seek Higher Office

Introduction

In the 2014 documentary “Mitt,” an exhausted Mitt Romney sits in a hotel room one late evening with his family and advisors at the conclusion of his 2008 bid for the Republican Party’s presidential nomination. Dejected, Romney says his party had “done the same thing we’ve always done. We get the old guy who’s in line.” At this point, one of Governor Romney’s sons offers, “If that’s the case, you’re the next guy in line.” Considering Romney’s resurgence in the 2012 Republican primaries and eventual presidential nomination, the brief exchange between father and son appears to have been an astute observation regarding the nature and habit of the Republican Party. In the very least, these remarks certainly contribute as an updated anecdote to Freeman’s assessment of the party in the early 1980s. If a generalizable characteristic, the younger Romney’s assertion suggests the motives and actions of progressively ambitious Democratic and Republican officeholders are distinctly different.

To this point, I have examined the behaviors of progressively ambitious Democratic legislators. Consistent with Freeman’s observations regarding the party’s political culture from the early 1960s to 1984, Democratic U.S. Senators seeking their party’s presidential nomination appear to ingratiate themselves with the activists and interests that comprise the party’s national constituency. Namely, organized labor—perhaps at the cost of environmentalists—and teachers receive significantly more sympathy from these senators than their

Democratic colleagues who do not exhibit progressive ambitions. Similar findings are not reported when I investigate the behaviors of Democratic U.S. House of Representatives who seek higher offices at the state-level—calling into question the pervasiveness of the political party culture of which Freeman wrote. In this chapter, I employ similar methodology in an attempt to flesh out the nature and effects of Republican Party political culture on progressively ambitious Republicans. I will use the scores assigned to Republican members of Congress from groups representing conservative interests. I use the same time frames—1972 to 2008—for Republican U.S. Senators and 1975 to 2004 for Republican U.S. House members—as in chapter three. As was indicated in the previous chapter, I think interest groups scores used in this manner illuminate the effects, if any, political party culture thrusts upon political careers.

The four interest groups used in this chapter's analyses are found in Table 4.1. I selected these four groups because each favors causes and issues aligned with the modern Republican Party and represents the interests of business; reduced taxation and spending; Christian Evangelicals; or—in the case of the American Conservative Union—broader conservative ideological views.

Table 4.1: Interest Groups Used In Analyses

Republican Party Interest Groups
Chamber of Commerce of the United States
National Taxpayers Union
Christian Coalition/Family Research Council
American Conservative Union

As was described in the previous chapters, the political cultures of the Democratic Party and Republican Party are believed to be inherently different from one another. In order to empirically test this convention, I inquire as to the effect—if any—many of the groups that comprise each party’s coalition have on the political careers of Democratic and Republican officeholders.

Since Freeman describes the Republican Party’s political culture as one that seeks unity over group interests—I expect distinctly different behaviors to be exhibited by progressively ambitious Republican legislators, compared to their Democratic counterparts. Fundamentally, if Freeman’s description of the Republican Party’s culture as depicted in her observations at various Republican National Conventions over the 1970s and 1980s is correct, I would not expect to see a significant difference between higher office-seeking incumbents and the behaviors of their peers. This is because the Republican Party is more homogenous than the Democratic Party (Freeman 1986) and those who comprise the party are more focused on ideological issues as opposed to group benefits and interests (Grossman and Hopkins 2014). Considering the Republican Party’s presidential practice of nominating the “next in line” (Mayer 1996), there is simply no reward—and consequently, no incentive—for progressively ambitious Republican U.S. Senators to alter their voting behavior to court the support of key party constituencies in the years leading up to their presidential nomination bid. This lack of incentive is the product of distinct differences between the Republican Party and Democratic Party political cultures.

With one exception (Christian Coalition-Family Research Council), the data collected and used in this chapter are consistent with the methodology employed for chapter three's examination into the nature and effects of the political culture of the Democratic Party. Republican United States senators from 1972 to 2008 are grouped into four-year cohorts in order to compare their legislative behaviors—as indicated by the scores garnered by narrowly focused conservative interest groups over the four years leading up to the next presidential election. A significant change in relation to congressional Republicans not seeking their party's presidential nomination would indicate an attempt by the progressively ambitious legislator to court particularized interests that operate within Republican Party politics. While this behavior was anticipated in chapter three's study of Democrats, similar results here would run contrary to my expectations. If the Republican Party, as Freeman says, is more homogenous and—as Grossman and Hopkins (2014) assert—rewards ideological compatibility over group benefits and interests, progressively ambitious Republican officeholders have no incentive to alter their behavior. Therefore, I expect no significant change among progressively ambitious Republicans, when compared to their partisan colleagues, in the level of support extended to key conservative interest groups—as measured by the changes in interest group ratings in the years leading to election.

Similar to chapter three, I have created four-year groupings of U.S. Senate Republicans who served from 1972 to 2008. The following analyses of Senate Republicans includes those members who had been in office four years

prior to a presidential election. There are a total of 163 Republican senators included in the sample. Among these cases, 14 sought their party's presidential nomination during the years studied.

To better understand the nature and effects of the political culture of the Republican Party among progressively ambitious U.S. House of Representatives, I track the behaviors of the 94th Congress Republican House cohort from 1975 to 2004. The 94th Congress had 144 Republicans. Between 1975 and 2004, 19 of those Republican House members within the cohort sought higher office. Fifteen members ran for their party's nomination for the U.S. Senate, three sought their respective state's governorship, and one sought the Republican nomination for President of the United States⁶.

Control Variables

In chapter three, I presented a more complete discussion regarding the reasoning behind controlling for party majority status, individual legislator ideology, and—in the case of U.S. Senators—the number of years prior to re-election. For this chapter, I control for election cycles in which Republicans hold the majority. I also use DW-NOMINATE scores to take into account each Republican legislator's political ideology. American Conservative Union scores are calculated and used as a robustness test in the case of Republican U.S. Senators—and an additional ideological control—in the case of Republican House members. Finally, I account for the number of years until each incumbent senator must seek re-election.

⁶ Rep. Jack Kemp (R-NY) formed a presidential campaign committee in 1988.

Business

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS) is a pro-business interest group claiming over three million members (uschamber.com).

Established in 1912, the CCUS advocates for “pro-business policies” including the reduction of government regulation and taxation for businesses. Since at least 1998, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States has disproportionately supported Republican candidates. For the 2014 election cycle, the CCUS contributed over \$25 million to Republican candidates while only giving Democratic candidates approximately \$375,000 total (opensecrets.org). In addition, the stances taken by the CCUS—specifically those regarding environmental regulation and unions—compliment the philosophies espoused by Republicans and often conflict with the issue positions shared by the Democratic Party platform.

The CCUS assigns annual legislative scores to all members of Congress. I collected these scores for each Republican member of the Senate and House. CCUS scores for Republican Senators were taken from numerous editions of Barone and Ujifusa’s *Almanac of American Politics* and Sharp’s *Directory of Congressional Voting Scores and Interest Group Ratings, 4th Edition* (2005).

For Senate Republicans, I calculated the difference in CCUS scores between one year from the next presidential election and four years out from that race beginning in the years leading up to the 1976 election to as recent as 2008. Since my primary interest is determining whether or not Senate Republicans running for the party’s presidential nomination reach out to

influential groups within the Republican Party, I compare the changes in CCUS scores from those who exhibited progressive ambition to their Senate colleagues who did not seek the presidency. Table 4.2 presents the Republican senators who formed presidential campaign committees with the Federal Elections Commission in the time period studied. In addition to the total change in CCUS scores over the four year period leading up to the next presidential election, the table provides the CCUS score each progressively ambitious senator was awarded four years out from the presidential election and their scores from one year out.

Table 4.2: Changes in Republican U.S. Senators' Chamber of Commerce of the United States Scores Who Sought Presidential Nomination

Senator	State	Election Year	4 Years From Election	1 Year From Election	Total Change in CCUS Scores
Lowell Weicker	CT	1980	29	27	-2
Robert Dole	KS	1980	75	73	-2
Howard Baker	TN	1980	67	63	-4
Robert Dole	KS	1988	83	83	0
Dan Quayle	IN	1988	72	89	17
Phil Gramm	TX	1996	100	100	0
Richard Lugar	IN	1996	100	100	0
Arlen Specter	PA	1996	60	79	19
John McCain	AZ	2000	100	75	-25
Orrin Hatch	UT	2000	92	88	4
Bob Smith	NH	2000	92	82	-10
Chuck Hagel	NE	2008	93	97	4
John McCain	AZ	2008	67	100	33
Sam Brownback	KS	2008	94	86	-8

On average, the 14 Republican Senators who sought their party's presidential nomination witnessed an increase of just over one point in their CCUS scores in the years leading up to the nomination. It should be noted, however, that two of these senators—Phil Gramm and Richard Lugar—each earned perfect annual scores in the years leading up to the 1996 presidential election and could not increase their scores. While only a very slight increase in apparent support for issues of interest to the Chamber of Commerce, their Republican Senate colleagues who did not seek higher office over the same time became less sympathetic—albeit by just over two points—of CCUS causes, on average. Given only a marginal difference between those who sought higher office and their Republican colleagues who did not exhibit progressive ambition, the results are as expected—given the political culture of the Republican Party, its homogeneity and greater appreciation for ideological symbolism over groups interests, these preliminary findings support the idea that, unlike Democrats seeking their party's presidential nomination, Republican officeholders seeking their party's nomination have no incentive to court groups within their party base.

Table 4.2 provides a useful but limited comparison. Table 4.3 presents the average change in CCUS scores among those who seek the Republican Party's presidential nomination, accounting for the party in the majority, ideology, and the number of year in which these individuals will face re-election for their Senate seats.

Table 4.3: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Senators' CCUS Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	3.993 (3.563)	1.12
Republican Majority	-4.531 (2.878)	-1.57
Ideology	-10.731 (7.653)	-1.40
Years to Re-Election	-0.525 (0.716)	-0.73
Constant	3.130 (3.087)	1.01
R-squared	0.05	
N	162	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses

As indicated in Table 4.3, controlling for a Republican majority in the Senate, the individual's ideology, and potential incumbent election calculations, Republican senators running for their party's presidential nomination do not significantly alter their voting behaviors regarding narrowly focused issues of interest. The beta coefficients indicate increased sympathy for issues of particular interest to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of approximately four points. However, this lacks statistical significance. Overall, the progressively ambitious senators appear to support CCUS interests, but by no means do they go out of their way to better align themselves with the group or its interests. In this instance, these null findings support the notion that the Republican Party's political culture does not reward those who narrowly court interests within the party, but reward those who are consistently, over time, familiar to the party's activist base.

Table 4.4 lists those Republican House members of the 94th Congressional cohort who sought higher elected offices. 19 members ran for either the U.S. Senate (15), Governor (3), or President of the United States (1).

Table 4.4: Changes in Republican U.S. House of Representatives' Chamber of Commerce of the United States Scores Who Sought Other Office

Representative	State	Election Year	Position Sought	4 Year Change in CCUS Scores	1 Year Change in CCUS Scores
James Abdnor	SD	1980	U.S. Senate	-11	-17
Mark Andrews	ND	1980	U.S. Senate	-11	-36
William Armstrong	CO	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-13
James Broyhill	NC	1985	U.S. Senate	-3	34
Thad Cochran	MS	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-17
William Cohen	ME	1978	U.S. Senate	--	1
Phillip Crane	IL	1980	Governor	-30	-36
Charles Grassley	IA	1980	U.S. Senate	-1	-20
John Heinz	PA	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-20
James Jeffords	VT	1988	U.S. Senate	4	-13
Robert Kasten	WI	1978	Governor	--	4
Jack Kemp	NY	1988	President	-4	-17
Trent Lott	MS	1988	U.S. Senate	2	5
Peter Peyser	NY	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-11
Larry Pressler	SD	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-36
Alan Steelman	TX	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-17
Sam Steiger	AZ	1976	U.S. Senate	--	0
Steven Symms	ID	1980	U.S. Senate	-20	-20
Charles Thone	NE	1978	Governor	--	-16

While a four-year change comparison is hindered due to many of the Republican House members seeking higher office early in the time period examined, it is apparent that on average, progressively ambitious Republican House members earned lower CCUS scores in the years leading up to their seeking another office. Of course, the figures in Table 4.4 do not take into account alternative explanations. For this, I rely on another multivariate

regression model. Table 4.5 reports the results of three multivariate linear regression models. The first model's independent variable of interest is whether or not a Republican member sought the party's nomination for a U.S. Senate seat. This model also controls for ideology by accounting for members' *American Conservative Union* scores. The second model, like the first, focuses on running for the Senate, but controls for ideology using DW-NOMINATE scores. Model three concerns only those who seek nominations for offices other than the Senate (specifically, President of the United States and governor). All models include a control for whether or not the Republican Party held the majority. All three models consistently indicate a stark contrast to the results reported in Table 4.3. Unlike Republican senators seeking the party's presidential nomination, the support for issues and causes important to the CCUS among progressively ambitious Republican House members significantly drops in the years leading up to the elections to these other offices.

These results indicate a limit to Freeman's notion of culture among the Republican ranks, as Republicans seeking state-wide office (with exception to Rep. Jack Kemp of New York) seemingly become less sympathetic to CCUS causes and issues as they significantly shift their voting behavior. State-specific issues and interests are likely taking the place of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in terms of political influence, as these progressively ambitious politicians court a new and broader state constituency.

Table 4.5: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Representatives' CCUS Scores

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
Running for Senate	-6.929** (3.076)	-2.25	-6.743** (2.702)	-2.50	--	--
Running for Other Office	-- --	-- --	-- (3.093)	--	-8.751** (3.149)	-2.83
Republican Majority	3.389** (1.306)	2.59	5.504*** (1.426)	3.86	5.427*** (3.149)	3.85
ACU	0.007 (0.0242)	0.30	-- -- -	-- --	-- --	--
DW-NOMINATE	-- --	-- (3.061)	11.279*** (3.149)	-3.69	11.075*** (1.010)	-3.52
Constant	0.707 (1.883)	0.38	4.097*** (1.007)	4.07	4.085*** (1.010)	4.04
R-squared	0.005		0.02		0.02	
N	880		878		878	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05,
*p < .10

Taxes & Spending

Over the years covered in this study, the *Almanac of American Politics* consistently published the scores of one interest group focused on the issues of taxation and spending, the National Taxpayers Union (NTU). The NTU was founded in 1969, and provides annual scores for legislators on issues concerning “taxes, spending, debt, and regulatory burdens on consumers and taxpayers” (ntu.org). While the NTU is a declared non-profit, non-partisan entity, between 1994 and 2004, it overwhelmingly contributed to more Republican candidates than Democrats, according to the Center for Responsive Politics (opensecrets.org).

The score differentials of Republican senators seeking their party's nomination for President are presented in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Changes in Republican U.S. Senators' National Taxpayers' Union Scores Who Sought Presidential Nomination

Senator	State	Election Year	4 Years From Election	1 Year From Election	Total Change in NTU Scores
Lowell Weicker	CT	1980	38	38	0
Robert Dole	KS	1980	50	36	-14
Howard Baker	TN	1980	64	32	-32
Robert Dole	KS	1988	47	51	4
Dan Quayle	IN	1988	53	56	3
Phil Gramm	TX	1996	64	90	26
Richard Lugar	IN	1996	62	87	25
Arlen Specter	PA	1996	31	68	37
John McCain	AZ	2000	81	87	6
Orrin Hatch	UT	2000	69	69	0
Bob Smith	NH	2000	75	84	9
Chuck Hagel	NE	2008	75	73	-2
John McCain	AZ	2008	77	--	--
Sam Brownback	KS	2008	78	77	-1

Of the 13 Republican senators who exhibited progressive ambition in seeking their party's presidential nomination, 10 saw increased ratings from the NTU—indicating voting records more aligned to the concerns of the interest group.⁷ The overall average change in NTU scores, however, is substantively small: 4.7 points.

Table 4.7 reports the results of the multivariate linear regression model measuring the average change in NTU scores of those seeking the presidential nomination, in addition to the majority status and ideological controls

⁷ Senator John McCain (R-AZ) did not receive a score from the National Taxpayers Union (NTU) in 2007 or 2008.

previously discussed. Taking to account Republican majority status, ideology, and re-election concerns, these results indicate that, on average, Republican members of the U.S. Senate who seek the party's presidential nomination do not significantly alter their behavior with regard to issues concerning taxation and spending, as evaluated by the National Taxpayers Union. While the coefficients for the independent variable of interest is positive—indicating slightly increased NTU scores in the years leading up to the party's presidential nomination, these individuals, on average, do not statistically or substantively alter their stances on issues the NTU deems most important.

Table 4.7: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Senators' NTU Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	1.853 (5.0004)	0.37
Republican Majority	-0.952 (1.615)	-0.59
Ideology	13.506** (5.853)	2.31
Years to Re-Election	0.444 (0.702)	0.63
Constant	-2.549 (2.940)	-0.87
R-squared	0.04	
N	163	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10

As was also the case in relation to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, progressively ambitious Republican senators do not appear to

make additional attempts to court the approval of narrow interests in their party. This is a difference between the behaviors of Democrats seeking their party's presidential nomination, as they significantly increase their support for interests aligned with organized labor and teachers—two major groups within the Democratic Party's base whose members personify that party's national political culture.

Table 4.8: Changes in Republican U.S. House of Representatives' Chamber of Commerce of the United States Scores Who Sought Other Office

Representative	State	Election Year	Position Sought	4 Year Change in NTU Scores	1 Year Change in NTU Scores
James Abdnor	SD	1980	U.S. Senate	1	-1
Mark Andrews	ND	1980	U.S. Senate	-13	-5
William Armstrong	CO	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-24
James Broyhill	NC	1985	U.S. Senate	3	5
Thad Cochran	MS	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-14
William Cohen	ME	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-11
Phillip Crane	IL	1980	Governor	14	2
Charles Grassley	IA	1980	U.S. Senate	-12	3
John Heinz	PA	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-11
James Jeffords	VT	1988	U.S. Senate	-12	-16
Robert Kasten	WI	1978	Governor	--	-25
Jack Kemp	NY	1988	President	-14	-21
Trent Lott	MS	1988	U.S. Senate	-22	-33
Peter Peyser	NY	1976	U.S. Senate	--	1
Larry Pressler	SD	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-24
Alan Steelman	TX	1976	U.S. Senate	--	18
Sam Steiger	AZ	1976	U.S. Senate	--	23
Steven Symms	ID	1980	U.S. Senate	1	-6
Charles Thone	NE	1978	Governor	--	-18

Table 4.8 reports the four-year and one-year differences in National Taxpayers Union scores for the 19 incumbent Republican members of the U.S. House who sought another office. The average four-year change in score among

these progressively ambitious House members is approximately negative six points. The average one-year difference—including all 19 members—is approximately -8 points. Without accounting for alternative explanations, these results indicate a decreased sympathy for the issues of interest for the NTU.

Table 4.9 reports the regression results for three models. Model 1 reports the results of a linear regression where the independent variable of interest is whether or not the progressively ambitious Republican member of the House sought their party's nomination for a seat in the U.S. Senate. Model 1 also accounts for member ideology by using *American Conservative Union* scores. Likewise, Model 2 uses a dichotomous measure for whether or not the member sought a U.S. Senate seat, but offers a different measure for ideology with DW-NOMINATE scores. In the first two models, accounting for majority status and ideology, Republican House members who seek their party's nomination for a U.S. Senate seat become significantly less sympathetic to issues of concern for the National Taxpayers Union. While the independent variable of interest focuses on the (albeit few) progressively ambitious House members who sought an office other than a senate seat, the third model reports similar findings concerning the apparent distancing from conservative stances on narrowly-focused issues regarding taxes and spending. These findings provide additional evidence of a distinct difference among the national base courted by U.S. Senate Republicans who seek their party's presidential nomination and their House co-partisans who seek more state-oriented offices. These findings, consistent with the results concerning Chamber of Commerce of the United States, suggest—

similarly to Democratic Party culture reported in the previous chapter—that the cultural characteristics theorized at the national level do not appear to apply to the state-level.

Table 4.9: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Representatives' NTU Scores

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
Running for Senate	-10.848** (3.313)	-3.27	-11.181** (3.403)	-3.29	--	--
Running for Other Office	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-9.349** (3.681)	-2.54
Republican Majority	-5.124** (1.743)	-2.94	-3.884** (1.775)	0.029	-3.926** (1.777)	-2.21
ACU	0.068*** (0.019)	3.53	-- --	-- --	-- --	--
DW-NOMINATE	-- --	-- (1.672)	-2.822* (1.657)	-1.69	-2.632	-1.59
Constant	-1.518 (1.495)	-1.02	4.234*** (0.596)	7.10	4.194*** (0.589)	7.12
R-squared	0.02		0.01		0.01	
N	882		881		881	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05,
*p < .10

Christian Evangelicals

Christian evangelicals—as an activist base within the Republican Party—were relatively new to party politics when Freeman observed the Republican Party’s political culture. The creation of the “New Christian Right” in the 1970s resulted in successful attempts to mobilize Christian evangelicals. Jerry Falwell’s founding of the Moral Majority in the early 1980s, as well as televangelist Pat Robert’s own candidacy for the 1988 Republican nomination

for President, led to this group of activists becoming a formidable group within Republican politics. In order to measure the extent to which progressively ambitious legislators court the support and approval of this voting bloc, I will measure the change in biennial legislative scores from the Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council.

The data available to measure the effect of Christian Evangelicals on progressively ambitious Republicans is limited in that both groups report the scores granted to legislators only in election years. Also, the Christian Coalition legislative scores needed for this project were only available in the *Almanac of American Politics* beginning in 1994. My request to the Christian Coalition for these data extending to 1980—the year the Christian Coalition was formed—was not fulfilled. Additionally, the Family Research Council scores replace the Christian Coalition scores in the *Almanac of American Politics* beginning in 2006. For the 2000 and 2008 election cycles, both interest group scores were used as both groups represent the same interests within the Republican Party. Finally, the fact that no Republican House member who served in the 94th Congress sought another office between the years 1994 and 2008 means there is no comparison to be made among Republican House members.

The incumbent Republican senators who sought their party's presidential nomination between 1996 and 2008 are presented in Table 4.10. Four-year and two-year comparisons are available, in addition to the total changes are reported. Two of the three incumbent Republican senators who sought their

party's presidential nomination in 1996 increased their support for issues important to the Christian Coalition.

Table 4.10: Changes in Republican U.S. Senators' Christian Coalition/Family Research Council Scores Who Sought Presidential Nomination

Senator	State	Election Year	4 Years From Election	2 Years From Election	Total Change in CHC-FRC Scores
Phil Gramm	TX	1996	--	86	14
Richard Lugar	IN	1996	--	64	18
Arlen Specter	PA	1996	--	50	-12
John McCain	AZ	2000	100	73	-9
Orrin Hatch	UT	2000	92	82	0
Bob Smith	NH	2000	100	91	0
John McCain	AZ	2008	83	62	-39
Sam Brownback	KS	2008	100	100	-12

The results of a multivariate regression model further examining these individuals in the time leading to the 1996 election are presented in Table 4.11. These results must be taken with caution as the sample size is quite low (25). Taking to account the caveat regarding the sample size and that the variable fails to meet any conventional threshold for statistical significance, the coefficient for the independent variable of interest (whether or not the senator seeks the party's presidential nomination) is in the expected direction. If Freeman's remarks on the political culture of the Republican Party are correct, these results are as expected. Republicans seeking higher office would have no incentive to alter their voting behavior since the Party favors ideological consistency and—as Governor Romney alludes—Republicans favor familiarity.

Table 4.11: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Senators' Christian Coalition Scores Leading Up to the 1996 Election

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	3.177 (8.678)	0.37
Republican Majority	-- --	--
Ideology	-2.478 (11.174)	-0.22
Years to Re-Election	-0.982 (1.313)	-0.75
Constant	6.157 (6.799)	0.91
R-squared	0.06	
N	25	

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses

The model concerning the behaviors of those Republican U.S. senators who sought the presidential nomination in 2000 and 2008 is presented in Table 4.12. While the independent variable of interest is not statistically significant, the value of the coefficient is negative, indicating that those Republican senators who sought their party's presidential nomination in either the 2000 or 2008 elections became less sympathetic to the issues important to the Christian Coalition and Family Research Council, on average. In Senators Brownback and McCain, we see this behavior depicted in Table 4.12. Over the years leading to the 2008 presidential election, Senator Brownback's Christian Coalition/Family Research Council score declines by 12 points. For Senator McCain, the difference leading to election night in 2008 is negative 39 points. Given the data limitations, it is difficult to say with a great deal of confidence, but the models in Tables 4.11 and 4.12—coupled with the individual-level data reported in Table

4.10—suggests of a waning in influence of Christian evangelicals on progressively ambitious Republican senators in more recent cycles. Most importantly, the absence of statistical significance and the mix of coefficient values from these two regression models only advances the notion that Republican senators seeking higher office do not alter their voting behaviors in courting the Christian Coalition and Family Research Council, which advocate for social issues strongly aligned with the Republican Party.

Table 4.12: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Senators' Christian Coalition/Family Research Council Scores Leading Up to the 2000 and 2008 Elections

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	-8.058 (5.209)	-1.55
Republican Majority	7.974** (2.678)	2.98
Ideology	22.699** (7.961)	2.85
Years to Re-Election	-0.958 (0.726)	-1.32
Constant	-17.502** (5.224)	-3.35
R-squared	0.28	
N	60	

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05,
*p < .10

Robustness Test

Paying attention to narrowly-focused conservative groups that are influential in Republican politics, I have shown that Republican senators who seek their party's presidential nomination do not significantly alter their voting behaviors on issues concerning the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Taxpayers Union, or the Christian Coalition/Family Research Council. To this point, it is possible that these individuals seek to more broadly appear more conservative. In other words, it is possible that progressively ambitious Republicans, unlike their Democratic counterparts, seek to appeal to a broader ideological base rather than narrowly focused group interests. While I have accounted for ideology in all previous regression models, I offer a robustness test to ensure that Republican senators exhibiting progressive ambition neither court narrowly focused interest groups nor do they become more sympathetic to broader ideological issues. Table 4.13 presents the total change in annual American Conservative Union Scores in the year leading up to the next presidential election.

At first glimpse, Table 4.13 indicates that—if anything—Republican senators seeking the presidential nomination become less sympathetic to broader conservative issues. The apparent conservative shift over time among those seeking higher office is also noteworthy. The 1980 and 1988 election cycles contained less conservative Republicans—comparatively—to those who sought the office in later years. Another noteworthy attribute is that no senator seeking higher office boasts a perfect ACU score the year prior to their seeking the

nomination. One possible explanation for the findings reported in Table 4.13 is that more conservative candidates might attempt to adjust their records to reflect more moderation while their less conservative counterparts might seek out slightly more conservative stances on issues.

Table 4.13: Changes in Republican U.S. Senators' American Conservative Union Scores Who Sought Presidential Nomination

Senator	State	Election Year	4 Years From Election	1 Year From Election	Total Change in ACU Scores
Lowell Weicker	CT	1980	29	27	-2
Robert Dole	KS	1980	76	75	-1
Howard Baker	TN	1980	57	60	3
Robert Dole	KS	1988	88	77	-11
Dan Quayle	IN	1988	83	81	-2
Phil Gramm	TX	1996	93	100	7
Richard Lugar	IN	1996	85	77	-8
Arlen Specter	PA	1996	30	36	6
John McCain	AZ	2000	95	77	-18
Orrin Hatch	UT	2000	100	84	-16
Bob Smith	NH	2000	100	96	-4
Chuck Hagel	NE	2008	87	79	-8
John McCain	AZ	2008	72	80	8
Sam Brownback	KS	2008	96	95	-1

A more complete analysis regarding the change of American Conservative Union scores is provided in Table 4.14. The regression results below, account for the party in majority as well as years to re-election. Progressively ambitious Republican senators do not significantly alter their annual ACU scores in the years leading up to the next presidential election. Earlier sections of this chapter explored whether or not these individuals altered their voting behaviors regarding the interests of narrowly-focused groups. Table 4.14 reports the regression results with a dependent variable derived from the legislative scores

from a broadly conservative group. In short, Republican senators seeking higher office do not appear to court narrowly-focused interest groups, nor do they become more conservative in the years leading up to the next presidential election.

Table 4.14: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican Senators' American Conservative Scores

Variable	b	t
Senator Running	0.293 (2.552)	0.11
Republican Majority	0.247 (1.657)	0.15
Ideology	9.541 (6.595)	1.45
Years to Re-Election	0.802 (0.680)	1.18
Constant	-8.746** (3.877)	-2.26
R-squared	0.03	
N	154	

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p <.01, **p <.05,
*p<.10

Table 4.15 presents the four-year and one-year changes in American Conservative Union scores for the Republican House members of the 94th Congress cohort who sought higher office. Overall, it would appear that progressively ambitious Republican House members become less sympathetic to broader conservative issues in the years leading up to the election for the position being sought.

Table 4.15: Changes in Republican U.S. House of Representatives' American Conservative Union Scores Who Sought Other Office

Representative	State	Election Year	Position Sought	4 Year Change in ACU Scores	1 Year Change in ACU Scores
James Abdnor	SD	1980	U.S. Senate	-1	-16
Mark Andrews	ND	1980	U.S. Senate	-19	-28
William Armstrong	CO	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-11
James Broyhill	NC	1985	U.S. Senate	-24	13
Thad Cochran	MS	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-7
William Cohen	ME	1978	U.S. Senate	--	17
Phillip Crane	IL	1980	Governor	0	0
Charles Grassley	IA	1980	U.S. Senate	-15	-15
John Heinz	PA	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-23
James Jeffords	VT	1988	U.S. Senate	-8	-5
Robert Kasten	WI	1978	Governor	--	-11
Jack Kemp	NY	1988	President	10	-6
Trent Lott	MS	1988	U.S. Senate	-1	4
Peter Peyser	NY	1976	U.S. Senate	--	-19
Larry Pressler	SD	1978	U.S. Senate	--	-8
Alan Steelman	TX	1976	U.S. Senate	--	8
Sam Steiger	AZ	1976	U.S. Senate	--	0
Steven Symms	ID	1980	U.S. Senate	-13	-13
Charles Thone	NE	1978	Governor	--	-8

Table 4.16 reports the results of two regression models. The first compares the change in ACU scores for those seeking a seat in the U.S. Senate. The second model focuses on House members seeking offices other than the U.S. Senate. Consistent with the previous regression models measuring the average difference for Republican House members seeking another office, both models in Table 4.16 indicate significantly decreased ACU scores in the years leading up to the election for the offices being sought. It seems the state-level pressures for these

individuals, on average, lead to less broad based conservative voting records between the two Congresses prior to election.

Table 4.16: Average Change in Progressively Ambitious Republican House of Representatives' American Conservative Scores

Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	t	b	t
Running for Senate	-10.211** (3.080)	-3.32	--	--
Running for Other Office	-- --	--	-6.466* (3.467)	-1.86
Republican Majority	-0.255 (1.423)	-0.18	-0.259 (1.425)	-0.18
Constant	-1.186* (0.516)	-2.30	-1.211** (0.517)	-2.34
R-squared	0.004		0.002	
N	882		882	

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p <.01, **p <.05,
*p <.10

Conclusion

I began this chapter with quotes from former Governor Romney. It is clear that the Romney family, long associated with and established in Republican politics, believe their party rewards, “the next old guy who’s in line.” I argue that this conventional wisdom relating to the political culture of the Republican Party offers no benefit to those progressively ambitious Republican U.S. Senators seeking their party’s presidential nomination. Regarding Republican senators seeking the highest office in the land, my analysis yields the expected outcome as no significant change in the ambitious senators’ votes on the matters of interest

to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Taxpayers Union, or the Christian Coalition/Family Research Council occurs in the years leading up to the party's nomination. While Democratic Senators who seek their party's presidential nomination significantly increase their support of the causes of organized labor and education activists, in this chapter's case, null results offer strength to Freeman's claims regarding the political culture of the Republican Party.

While Freeman's observations regarding national party cultures have held up well in my analyses, the examination into the behaviors of Republican House members, however, once again calls into question the breadth of Freeman's assertions on the party's political culture extending beyond national, presidential politics to the states. Seeking another office, progressively ambitious Republican members of the U.S. House—much like their Democratic House counterparts—seek the approval, support, and resources of narrowly focused groups within their respective states. Despite Freeman's assertion that the political cultures of the national parties might also apply to the states, this study provides evidence to suggest that the political cultures of the states' parties are distinctly different from the national parties' cultures. Contrary to what might be expected, Republican House members seeking their party's nomination for statewide offices appear to become significantly less sympathetic to issues of particular interest to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National Taxpayers Union. These findings are not likely the result of these individuals shunning these key national constituencies, but rather the product of

progressively ambitious Republican House members seeking out the support of different state-level constituencies and appealing to more state-centric and parochial issues. It is possible that, in an attempt to court a broader statewide constituency, these House members are moderating their positions on the issues of most concern to the groups measured in this chapter. Chapter five will consider this question further using interview anecdotes from individuals who have sought and held state-level elected offices.

Chapter 5: Closer to Home: Political Party Culture at the State-Level

Introduction

In chapters three and four, I offered a measure to test the nature and effects of political party culture on political careers. In these earlier chapters, I used interest group rating changes from select organizations thought to represent some core constituencies embodying the political cultures of the parties over the years leading up to progressively ambitious Democratic and Republican members of Congress seeking higher office. In this chapter, I report the findings of seven interviews with current and former state legislators regarding their state party's political culture and its effects on their political careers. First and foremost, this chapter is intended to provide firsthand accounts regarding the nature and effects of political party culture at the state-level. To my knowledge, this is the first examination into the extent to which Freeman's assertions regarding the Democratic and Republican parties accurately applies to the state level. The following is intended as a "jumping off point" to initiate further exploration of the topic of political party culture.

Regarding the unanswered question of whether or not her assessments of the Democratic and Republican parties' cultures applied to the states, Freeman wrote, "if the ideas posited in this article have explanatory value, they should be generally applicable to the state parties" (328). In addition to being the first empirical examination into the political cultures of the parties at the national level, I will now explore the role of political culture at the state-level.

This chapter contributes to the exploration of these political cultures by introducing a qualitative element to the project. By interviewing former and current elected officials, I am better able to consider the extent to which political party culture impacts the decisions made by elected officials. In addition, and of the upmost importance, this aspect of the project uses firsthand accounts of the applicability of Freeman's (1986) assessment regarding political culture at the state-level from those who should know best—the individuals who have operated politically in their respective state's party organizations and elected institutions.

A study into the nature and effects of political party culture—as described by Freeman—at the state level affords the opportunity to obtain first-hand accounts regarding the political careers of progressively ambitious officeholders and the influence of Democratic and Republican Party political culture on their behavior. All interviewees are current or former state legislators from Arkansas or Missouri. Despite being neighboring states, Arkansas and Missouri offer some variation with regard to political tradition (Key 1949; Elazar 1966), ideology (Enns and Koch 2013), legislative professionalization (Squire 2007), and party organization strength (Aldrich et al 1999; Cotter et al 1984; Dulio and Garrett 2007 ; Mayhew 1986). The states' political characteristics are presented in Table 5.1. The percentage liberal and percentage conservative measures are from Enns and Koch (2013) and report the percent of liberal and conservative identifiers in each state from 2010. The Squire Index indicates each state's rank regarding legislative professionalization from 2003. Squire's index for state legislative professionalization factors institutional components such as legislator salary and

benefits, time demands of service, and staff and additional resources (Squire 2007). Measures of Democratic and Republican state party organization strength are on a 0 to 15 point scale derived from Aldrich et al.'s (1999) survey of state party organizations and indexed by Dulio and Garrett (2007).

Table 5.1: State Political Characteristics

State	% Liberal	% Conservative	Squire Index	Democratic Org. Strength	Republican Org. Strength
Arkansas	12.54	53.81	41st	9	10
Missouri	16.42	45.31	21st	--	7

Between September of 2014 and January 2015, I conducted seven interviews with former and current elected officials in two states in Missouri and Arkansas. While many other potential interview participants were sought, responses—via email and by phone—were limited to these seven⁸. Six of these interviews were conducted in person while one took place over the phone. In addition to my taking notes, all participants agreed to have the interview recorded. As agreed upon, the names and other identifiable characteristics of these individuals remains private.

Seeking to permit the participants the opportunity to enhance the quality of the interviews, inspired by the likes of Fenno (1978), I encouraged open-ended discussions. However, a list of pre-written questions was made available to each

⁸ An eighth participant, a Missouri state legislator, had originally made an appointment to be interviewed over the phone but was unable to make the established appointment. Additional attempts to reschedule were unsuccessful.

participant intended as a guide in these open-ended interviews. The list of questions provided to participants is found in the Appendix.

The insight provided from these interviews proved useful as the participants produced a more complete investigation into political culture at the state level. To prevent the inclusion of self-identifiable traits of the individuals I interviewed, their names will not be used. This is not a hindrance to my study because specific details about these individuals are not necessary to better understand the nature and effects of the state-level political cultures of the parties.

Arkansas

Postbellum Arkansas, like other former confederate states, long had established itself as a part of the “Solid South” where the competition of electoral politics was between factions within the Democratic Party, as opposed to between Democrats and Republicans (Blair and Barth 2005). However, significant statewide gains by Republicans in the last decade have led to their party’s first General Assembly majorities since Reconstruction following the 2010 midterm elections.

Historically, Arkansas state legislators have not often exhibited progressive ambition. Rosenthal (1981) used Arkansas legislators as examples of officeholders possessing static ambition—ambition to remain in the current position held—and wrote:

Not many legislators in Arkansas, for instance, have any hope of higher office. In the past decade or so

those who have run for higher office have been unsuccessful. No governor in memory came out of the legislature. Indeed, if an individual were interested in higher office, he or she would probably not have run for the legislature in the first place (1981, 50).

However, since 1998—the year in which voter enacted state legislative term limits from 1992 were first enforced (nclsl.org 2013), the calculations of state legislator ambition might have changed. In fact, Mike Beebe, the former two-term governor began his state political career as a prominent member of the state's Senate before being term-limited (he then went on to win election as the state's Attorney General and was later elected Governor in 2006). Six of the interview participants for this dissertation have served in the Arkansas General Assembly.

Over the months when these interviews were conducted, Republican candidates in Arkansas continued their unprecedented electoral success in the state. In addition to the state's recent Republican trend, Arkansas' provincialism (Barth and Parry 2003) appears to have become a thing of the past. Incumbent Democratic U.S. Senator Mark Pryor—son of former Arkansas Governor and U.S. Senator David Pryor, a Democrat, suffered a lopsided loss in his bid for a third term to one-term U.S. House member Tom Cotton—a conservative Republican and Tea Party favorite. The Republican numbers among the Arkansas General Assembly increased and the open seat race for governor concluded with a Republican candidate, Asa Hutchinson, claiming victory. Needless to say, this was a time of significant change and a very interesting time to talk to current and former legislators in the state.

Legislator “A” is a former Republican member of the Arkansas General Assembly. She served three consecutive terms as a state representative for her district. An active member of the Republican Party of Arkansas for over 35 years, she had never considered running for office in the once Democratic-dominated state until she was first recruited 10 to 15 years ago. In 2007, she was encouraged to run by a co-partisan and member of her local community. She was not recruited by an individual representing her respective party’s organization.

The former legislator noted that the position of state representative—in a part-time legislature such as that of Arkansas’—offers little financial incentive or prestige, but still demands the time and attention which requires the prospective candidate to often consider the impact the job might have on his or her career. Despite this, she decided to run and—after working out details with her employer—announced her candidacy. While actively seeking her party’s nomination for the position, she sought out contacts from the state party organization. However, she noted that the Republican Party of Arkansas is not permitted to endorse candidates prior to nomination. She also sought out the support of members of her church and its pastor when seeking their support in her first primary.

Like those to which chapters three and four paid particular attention, Legislator A—at one point in her legislative career, actively sought her party’s nomination for higher office. When I asked her about her experience in representing one constituency (her state House district) while courting another group of voters, she noted that she was comfortable with her voting record in the

time leading up to pursuing another office, but was aware of the potential risks of facing another Republican in a primary for another office and having her voting record used against her. In other words, she did not feel the need to alter her voting behavior although she did seek and earn the endorsements of the National Rifle Association and a leading pro-life group. Ultimately, her bid for another office was unsuccessful. When asked about the incentive to seek out the support for these groups in her bid for another office—a position where she would potentially represent a larger—albeit similar demographically—constituency from the one she had served—she said, “I thought those things might matter more in a primary.”

When asked of the nature of the political culture of the Republican Party in Arkansas, the former representative stressed the recent changes in Arkansas Republican’s political fortunes. Earlier in her years of political involvement—prior to holding office—she saw a Democratic Party that dominated state politics. In our discussion, she spoke of a transition underway in the Natural State where the Republican Party appears—to her—to be becoming what called the “default party.” While she sees her party as more “ideologically focused” than the Democrats, culturally speaking, she also noted, “Now, we might become the default party.” She suggested the ideological focus of her state party over group interests—while consistent with findings discussed in previous chapters—might be changing. When discussing the possibility of her party’s culture changing as a result of its new majority status in Arkansas, she said “We’re [Republicans] in for some major changes...and I’m not sure what I think of those changes.”

The responses from Legislator “A” seem to suggest that Freeman’s description of the political culture of the Republican Party extends to Arkansas state politics. However, the former legislator was quick to point out the changes underway in her state. In this time of transition in Arkansas politics, it remains to be seen whether the more “ideologically-focused” Republican Party of Arkansas continues to reflect what Freeman suggested was the culture of the party at the national level remains to be seen.

Legislator “B” is a Democratic state representative in Arkansas who was first elected in 2012. Not only does he offer a perspective of his state party’s political culture, he has experience in the party politics of both Democratic and Republican parties at the state and national levels. Prior to becoming a Democrat in 1986, Legislator “B” was a registered and active member of the Republican Party. An attendant of Republican Party events at the national level, legislator “B” believed Freeman’s observations of the Republican Party in the early 1980s was “dead on.”

When asked if he must seek out the support of disparate groups within the Democratic Party base, Legislator “B” said “I don’t have to build coalitions.” This, he believes, is because the demographics and—consequently—politics in Arkansas are more or less homogenous with exception of Little Rock—a metro area in the center of the state and its capitol. Rather than see factions among—for example—unions, environmentalists, and civil rights activists, Legislator “B” believes the split between rural and urban interests are the roots of most political divisions in the state.

Since becoming a Democrat in the second half of the 1980s, Legislator “B” has been actively involved in party politics at the state and national level. When asked about the nature of the political culture of the Democratic Party of Arkansas, he noted that—as a southern Democratic Party—the organization did not have to build coalitions to compete with Republicans because—with exception to the last couple decades—the party singularly dominated electoral politics in the state. Legislator “B” offered the idea that states with similar political histories to Arkansas’ (i.e. other southern states) might be culturally different from other states with different backgrounds. According to the representative, the Democratic Party of Arkansas’ political culture does not align with Freeman’s observations at the national level.

Legislator “C” is a current Democratic state representative in Arkansas. He first sought office, and won, in 2010. In 2012, he faced his first general election opponent and won his re-election bid. In 2014, he ran unopposed. Relatively new to Democratic politics, Legislator “C” was a registered Republican until 2006. When asked what made him want to seek office, the state representative said that after the 2004 re-election of President George W. Bush, “I decided to get involved.”

The state representative he was initially recruited in 2009 by a local political elite in his town who was also a former Democratic state representative. Having been recruited by a former legislator, it is worth noting that he was not contacted by the state party organization, or any groups which might comprise a part of the political base of the state Democratic Party.

In his first election, he faced a primary opponent, a former Democratic state legislator who once served another district in Arkansas. When first running for his party's nomination in 2010, Legislator "C" sought the support and approval from key Democratic groups: the Arkansas Education Association, Sierra Club, AFL-CIO, and American Federation of State, County, and Municipality Employees (AFSCME). These efforts were largely done on his own as he has had limited interaction with the state party organization—a similarity shared by all current and former legislators interviewed.

While he did not rule out seeking another office, Legislator "C" does not see his current position in the state legislature as a "stair step." When asked whether he considers his future ambitions when voting he said he does not and does not think it would be fair for a progressively ambitious officeholder to adjust votes in order to court the support of activists or prospective constituents.

When asked whether Freeman's description of the political culture of the Democratic Party matched his experience at the state level, Legislator "C" thought there were similarities, but suggested that Arkansas' political history as a state in the former "Solid South," and its more politically and demographically homogenous nature, mitigates the cultural aspects which might be seen in a more diverse, liberal state. While his direct experience in electoral is in Democratic politics, Legislator "C" offered that the Republican Party in Arkansas—as Freeman suggests—is more disciplined and homogenous than their Democratic counterparts in the state. However, he suggested the recent electoral success of

Republicans in the state and the rise of the Tea Party may lead to a more factional Republican Party.

Legislator “D” is a Democrat currently serving his third term in the Arkansas General Assembly. He was first elected in 2010 despite significant gains made by Republicans in Arkansas and nationally in that year. A prominent member of his local business community, and active in several business and charity oriented organizations, Legislator “D” was a self-starter, politically-speaking. He was not recruited to run for office and—like the others who spoke of the fact—he did not speak with anyone associated with the state party organization. The seat was open due to the incumbent being term-limited. In our discussion, he admitted he had entertained the thought of running for another office at some point in the future, but did not seem to factor his future ambitions into his voting behavior in the General Assembly.

Our meeting took place only days after the midterm elections of 2014 in which his party suffered several key losses in the state and he had much to offer with regard to his perspective of the Democratic Party’s political culture. Reeling from a historically expensive campaign for the U.S. Senate seat—between incumbent U.S. Senator Mark Pryor, a Democrat, and his Republican opponent, U.S. Representative Tom Cotton, Legislator “D” considered this and other down ticket races as evidence of a more nationalized politics. Legislator “D” considered the current political climate in Arkansas, a state where President Obama’s approval ratings are consistently low, as one matching the description of Freeman’s political culture. Legislator “D” saw the midterm campaign issues—

largely national and, therefore, largely irrelevant to the several state and local races in which they were injected—as evidence to suggest that Freeman’s depiction of the Democratic and Republican parties’ political cultures might begin to translate at the state-level.

Legislator “D”—like other Democrats interviewed—saw little emphasis on disparate group divisions and group interests at play within his own state-level party. He believed this was—in part—due to the long-standing one-party dominance of the Democratic Party in Arkansas and the homogenous makeup of the state. Regarding the state Republican Party, Legislator “D” believed that Freeman’s explanation of the party’s political culture also fits. However, as was communicated by other interview participants—he reported of factions forming within the rank-and-file state-level Republican Party that might reflect changes in its culture, or at least in the way Freeman would assess it today.

Legislator “E” is a Democratic former member of the Arkansas General Assembly in the early 2000s. She served her district for three terms—the maximum time one could serve as a state representative in Arkansas at that time. With exception to a Republican opponent in 2006, Legislator “E” sought re-election unopposed in her career as a state representative of a “safe” Democratic district.

While Legislator “E” had been active in the Democratic Party—at the state and county levels—she was not recruited by one of these former party organizations, but rather encouraged to seek public office by her husband—himself an active participant in state and party politics. When asked about

whether she sought the approval or support of activists for interests aligned with her party, she stated she did not. However, to stave off primary competition in her first bid for the office, she did contact approximately 300 people in her community to seek their support. These individuals were business and civic leaders in her town. The names of these 300 were then published in a full-page newspaper advertisement—many of whom were members of advocacy groups more closely aligned with Democratic causes than not. However, in contacting these 300, Legislator “E” reportedly did not consider the groups which these people might represent (examples: labor, environment, etc.), officially or otherwise.

Despite not actively seeking the support of groups within the Democratic Party coalition, Legislator “E” did receive endorsements from unions and from the Arkansas Education Association. When recalling whether or not she witnessed, at the state-level, Freeman’s account of Democratic Party political culture she noted that many of her bill ideas did not come directly from her constituents, but rather groups. In explaining why inspiration for legislation seemed more often to originate from groups instead of her constituents she offered, “groups need champions.” In other words, she was not actively seeking out the political support or legislative guidance of groups, but that she was sensitive to collections of activists and causes which, she felt, lacked adequate support in the legislature.

Beginning her first term in office after term-limits imposed by Arkansas voters were enacted, and serving a district which skewed heavily Democratic, it

might have been expected that Representative “E” would seek higher office once her time as a state representative was over. However, when asked about her thoughts on seeking higher office, she reported that she never intended to run for another office.

Legislator “E” did not experience the political culture of the Democratic Party in Arkansas. She believed the behavior she witnessed from her fellow Democrats was shaped largely out of the fear of drawing a strong opponent in a state that was skewing more conservative and Republican. In other words, the actions of incumbent Democratic state legislators, in her experience, were largely based on representing the largely homogenous districts within the state in order to stave off a primary or strong general election opponent. Whether it was the homogeneity of the districts or state, a unique party culture present within the state party, or perhaps the fact that, until 2011, Democrats had held both state legislative chambers since Reconstruction, Legislator “E” did not think Freeman’s description of the Democratic Party’s political culture applied to the state party’s political culture.

Legislator “F” is a former state legislator. A Democrat, he served in Arkansas’ General Assembly in the early 1970s. After working on his first campaign in 1966, he sought office in 1970. In addition to serving elected public office, he also served as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1972 and 1980. His holding of public office combined with his time as a DNC delegate provides him with a unique perspective of the political culture of the Democratic

Party—at the national and state –levels—as well as how the party’s culture has changed over time.

Seeking office in the early 1970s, the political contexts in which Legislator “F” operated in is unique to the others interviewed for this project. He sought and served in elected office at a time when Arkansas politics—at the state- level—was dominated by the Democratic Party. In most parts of the state, securing the Democratic nomination would have most certainly meant that person would win the general election. While he agreed with Freeman’s assessments regarding the Democratic and Republican parties’ political cultures at the national level, he did not see the Democratic Party culture present itself at the state-level in his time as a state legislator. While this was largely the experience of many others interviewed who have served in public elected office more recently, Legislator “F”’s experience is unique due to the time in which he engaged in politics.

As late as the 1970s, local party leaders exercised considerable power in Arkansas politics. Rather than court the support of the narrowly-focused and disparate groups whose activists personify the Democratic Party’s culture at the national-level, Legislator “F” sought out the approval of his county’s Democratic Party Central Committee and its Chair in particular. These central committees are the county-level party groups which function under the state party organization. While these committees presently exist, Legislator “F” noted that central committees are not as powerful today and, perhaps consequently, state party organizations do not rely on them as much as they once did.

According to Legislator “F”, county committees in Arkansas were once vital for the dispensing of endorsements, mobilization efforts, and distributing information. When first running for office, Legislator “F” sought the approval of one group—the leaders of his county’s Democratic Party leadership. Rather than encountering a diverse collection of activists representing various interests, Legislator “F” sought the approval of a small group of political elites. Once in office, he served a homogenous bloc of constituents in an era of one-party domination in the Arkansas General Assembly.

Missouri

Politically-speaking, the state of Missouri is somewhere in between being a “southern border state” (Fenton 1957) and a Midwestern state (Haider-Markel 2008). Elazar (1966) in his seminal piece on state political culture, classifies the eastern and western borders of the “Show-Me State” as individualistic while the remaining share of the state is classified as having traditionalistic tendencies.

Regarding individualistic culture, Elazar wrote, “The individual political culture holds politics to be just another means by which individuals may improve themselves socially and economically” (87). Traditionalistic culture, according to Elazar:

...reflects an older, pre-commercial attitude that accepts a substantially hierarchical society as part of the ordered nature of things, authorizing and expecting those at the top of the social structure to take a special and dominant role in government” (93).

In 1992, Missouri voters approved legislative term limits which went into effect in 2002. Once considered a Democratic stronghold, Missouri's Republican Party began making electoral gains in the 1970s with the election of Governor Christopher "Kit" Bond, a Republican, in 1972 (Valentine 2008). Today, Republicans dominate the state's House and Senate as Democratic strength largely resides in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan areas. This rural-urban division in Missouri plays an important role in the state's electoral politics. Despite my efforts to contact and gain additional respondents from the state, one of the seven interview participants has served in the Missouri General Assembly.

In the late summer of 2014, I interviewed Legislator "G"—a Democrat currently serving in the Missouri General Assembly. At the time of our interview, he had served three two-year terms and was running unopposed in the 2014 general election.

Before running for office, Legislator "G" had volunteered for local campaigns in Missouri and worked in Washington D.C. as a staffer for a member of Congress. Similar to others interviewed, Legislator "G" was not recruited by anyone affiliated with his state party organization. Once he decided to run for the seat he currently holds, he began to seek out endorsements from individuals and groups (such as the NAACP, and organized labor) within his community.

At the time of our interview, Legislator "G" was months away from beginning his fourth and—due to term limits imposed on the members of the Missouri General Assembly—final term as a state representative. Legislator "G" spoke candidly of his intention to run for the Missouri Senate in the district that

includes his current House seat. In describing his considerations of his seeking higher office while currently serving as a state representative, he explained that the senate district he will seek covers a more rural area and, as he put it, a “broader universe” than his state representative district. Legislator “G” indicated that he does consider his prospective constituency when voting on legislation.

When asked if Freeman’s observations apply to Missouri politics and in the Democratic Party, more specifically, Legislator “G” said, “absolutely.” According to him, the Democrats in Missouri are more diverse today and, due to the party’s losses in rural areas, Freeman’s assessment better fits the current cultural state of the party. According to him, the 2010 and 2012 elections—which saw many incumbent Democrats from rural districts in the state lose re-election—left a more diverse party concentrated in cities in Missouri with larger, more diverse populations.

As an example of how group dynamics and identity politics now play a role in today’s Democratic Party politics in Missouri, Legislator “G” explained that following the 2010 and 2012 elections, the Democratic caucus became more liberal now and groups within the Democratic Party—such as those representing the LGBT community—are more powerful. Where in 2008, for example, a rural Democrat might not need to support same-sex marriage, a Democrat in 2014 would face stiff intra-party pressure to support gay rights and run the risk of having a campaign waged against him or her by LGBT groups. According to Legislator “G” intra-party disputes are common within the state party as identity politics are powerful forces.

Regarding the political culture of the Republican Party in Missouri, Legislator “G” thought the party enjoyed an inherent advantage in the state by being homogenous. Legislatively, Legislator “G” said, “They [Republicans] have the majority in the Assembly so they can instill discipline among the ranks.” This, according to Legislator “G” benefits the Republican Party in Missouri politically with regard to the party’s ability to reward loyalty and consistency to those who have ambitions for higher office, as opposed to Democratic officeholders who, for the most part, serve in urban areas where the possibility of seeking office in city government might be stronger than the desire to run for statewide office. As Legislator “G” put it, the “next level” is less clear to Democratic officeholder in Missouri. Another insightful example was offered by Legislator “G.” According to him, the issue of racial and sexual diversity has been an issue in the past concerning the make-up of the current Democratic Governor’s cabinet. The Democratic Party, comprised of multiple groups representing the interests of their constituents, concerns itself with the diversity of those advising the governor while Republicans in the state, overwhelmingly white and largely living in rural areas inherently avoid such conflicts.

Conclusion

The interviews of current and former state legislators in Arkansas span experiences from the past forty-five years. From Legislator “F”—who served in the early 1970s—to those currently serving in public office, these six interviews provide firsthand accounts of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties in Arkansas. While most participants agreed with Freeman’s

assessments of both parties' cultures at the national level, Democrats failed to see her depiction of the Democratic Party resonate at the state-level in Arkansas. Taken together, the consensus was that the Republican Party in Arkansas more closely resembled the Republican Party at the national-level. However, as Legislator "A" suggested, changes within the Republican Party of Arkansas might be underway, as the state is undergoing a dramatic shift from 150 years of Democratic dominance—specifically in the state legislature—to a significant Republican majority in both chambers. In other words, the political culture of the Republican Party in Arkansas may, over time, change as competing groups and collections of activists operate within its base. Of the five Democrats interviewed, most stressed the homogenous population of their respective districts or—more generally—the state as a likely reason why Freeman's explanation of the political culture of the Democratic Party does not resonate in Arkansas. Finally, while several officeholders expressed some level of interest in seeking higher office, few communicated their consideration of this fact when casting votes in legislative session.

In Missouri, Legislator "G" provided a firsthand account of how Freeman's assessments of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties—in the national context—accurately describe the cultures of the parties at the state-level. He seemed to indicate that the degree to which Freeman accurately describes the cultures of the state parties in Missouri has more recently increased. As the Democratic Party in Missouri becomes more centralized in

urban areas and Missouri Republicans remain homogenous, Freeman's explanations of both parties better apply to the Show-Me State.

These seven former or current state legislators provide insight into the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties in Missouri and Arkansas. However, the effects of these political cultures on the careers of those interviewed appear to be minimal. Perhaps this is due to internal or external forces.

Limited by the perspectives of seven elected officials in two neighboring states, it is difficult to draw generalizations. However, consistent patterns emerged from these interviews. First, those who were willing to consider the veracity of Freeman's claims regarding the cultures of their own national parties agreed with her. These individuals, some of whom have had experience within their party organization or have seen national party politics firsthand, provided firsthand support for the quantitative findings in chapters four and five of this dissertation.

At the state-level, however, Freeman's assessments did not fare as well. While Legislator "A" saw similarities between her experience within her state Republican Party political culture and that explained by Freeman at the national level, most Democrats interviewed did not experience a similar state-level political culture within their ranks. I suspect there are multiple reasons why many of those interviewed failed to see their state party's culture match Freeman's descriptions. Many of these individuals serve homogenous districts where, if groups within their parties are actively involved within party politics,

they are not—culturally-speaking—influential enough for their presences to materialize in such a way as can be compared to that which Freeman describes. Many of the Democratic legislators communicated a rural and urban divide in their state’s politics. Legislator “G”—a Missouri Democrat—explained that while his party possesses competing interests, recent electoral outcomes have resulted in most remaining Missouri Democrats representing districts in cities, where they are likely to share more similar concerns than when the party was more evenly divided in rural areas as well as the larger cities. In addition, the homogeneity of the districts these seven legislators served/serve is likely a reason why strategic voting on the part of the progressively ambitious legislator (seeking a state senate seat) is not a great concern to these individuals as the prospective group they wish to serve looks much like the district they currently represent. Both parties’ cultures—at the state district level—appear to materialize similarly as neither the Democratic nor Republican parties in the states are characterized as especially diverse with regard to demographics or interests.

Additionally, the state which factors most heavily in the sample, Arkansas, is in a time of political transition. Considering it is the final southern state to record a Republican majority in the state legislature since Reconstruction, it is safe to assume both parties in Arkansas—and the group dynamics influencing the ways in which political culture is made apparent—are undergoing changes which might impact the nature of their political cultures. Legislator “G”—a Democratic legislator in Missouri—suggested that recent electoral outcomes had exaggerated the group dynamics and identity politics within the political culture of his state

party. Perhaps, in the future, a similar culture will present itself within the Democratic Party of Arkansas.

Finally, Legislator “D” noted the recent “nationalized” political campaigns in Arkansas in which the Republican Party made gains in the state—in part—due to an unpopular Democratic president. The external political forces at play in nationalized campaigns at the state level might very well encourage the development of state-level political party cultures which better resemble those of the national parties’ cultures—as national issues, groups, political action committees, and other interests encroach further into state politics and parties.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Summary of Findings

With this project, I set out to accomplish two related goals. First, I wanted to explore the nature and effects of political culture on political careers. Using progressive ambition as a vehicle to test Jo Freeman's (1986) seminal essay on the topic of the political cultures of the Democratic and Republican parties, I offered a unique empirical test of Freeman's assessments. Second, not only examining the political cultures of the two major U.S. parties at the national level, I have also sought out to evaluate the generalizability of Freeman's work—considering whether these cultural attributes are present at the state level.

My expectations, having assumed Freeman was correct in her observations regarding both parties, were that progressively ambitious Democratic officeholders would reach out to the disparate groups and activists who operate within the party to advance their narrowed interests within the party apparatus—using the party and its elites to advance their group's policy goals. The Republicans, considering the way in which Freeman explains the party's political culture, were expected to lack the incentives Democrats would possess to change their behaviors in courting narrowly focused groups. This is because the party, as explained by Freeman, and more recently by Grossman and Hopkins (2014), favors loyalty and ideological stability in ways that would run contrary to the strategies of progressive ambitious officeholders seeking higher office. In other words, Republican incumbent officeholders—given their party's political

culture—do not see it worthwhile to risk the political costs of courting specific groups in the relatively short run up to seeking the party’s nomination for another office.

Following the presentation of the theoretical considerations, as well as a an explanation for adopting progressive ambition as a means to test the nature and effects of the political cultures of the parties on political careers in chapter two, chapters three, four, and five tested the accuracy and generalizability of Freeman’s earlier assessments.

In chapter three, I focused my line of inquiry on the behaviors of Democratic members of the U.S. Senate and House who sought higher office. In measuring whether these progressively ambitious officeholders altered their voting records on issues of specific interest to some of the narrowly-focused groups operating within their party’s base, I was able to better understand the extent to which Freeman’s assessments are correct and where they lack generalizability. Specifically, I found that Democratic U.S. Senators, seeking the party’s presidential nomination, did become more sympathetic to issues of interest to organized labor and teachers’ unions. While similar findings were reported for Democratic members of the House running for a seat in the U.S. Senate, no such statistical relationship existed among those incumbents seeking offices within state or city government. Given these findings, there is evidence to suggest the cultural effects supporting Freeman for national office and in the U.S. Senate, but not for city government or state constitutional office—suggesting the party’s political culture is distinctly different at the state level.

Chapter four tested Freeman's assessment of the Republican Party. By measuring the change in progressively ambitious Republican House and Senate members' annual scorecard scores from groups ideologically aligned with party, I was able to conclude the actions of these individuals are distinctly different from that of their Democratic colleagues—as there were significant differences between the behaviors of Republican officeholders seeking higher office and the rest of their co-partisans. Based on these results, I concluded that my empirical tests support Freeman's assessments of the Republican Party's political culture. Furthermore, differences within the behaviors of progressively ambitious Republicans existed between offices. State-level forces appear to impact the behaviors of ambitious Republicans in ways that might conflict with the party's national political culture.

In chapter five, I reported the results of interviews I conducted with former and current state legislators concerning the applicability of Freeman's assessments within their respective state party's political culture. The interviews from Democrats and Republicans from Missouri and Arkansas provided mixed support for the generalizability of Freeman's essay at the state level. The Democrats I interviewed varied in their assessments of their party's culture. The legislator from Missouri said Freeman was, "dead on," in explaining the political culture of the Democratic Party in Missouri. Arkansas Democrats, however, saw few similarities between Freeman's account of the Democratic Party culture—as seen at national conventions—and their experiences in their home state. Although, it is important to note that several of these individuals did agree with

Freeman's assessment of the parties at the national level—they simply did not see the characteristics express themselves in Arkansas. The former Republican legislator from Arkansas pointed out the historic political transition which Arkansas is currently undergoing. From her own experience of seeking higher office, she expressed surprise in how little those within her party valued endorsements from interest groups politically aligned with the Republican Party. Interestingly, the practice of attaining these endorsements might be more closely aligned to progressively ambitious Democrats at the national level.

The generalizability of Freeman's observations are complicated by federalism. Taken together, these interviews support my findings in chapters three and four. The Democratic and Republican cultures—at the national level—are conceived similarly to those interviewed. However, state variation suggests state party culture—perhaps for both the Democrats and Republicans—is subject to state-centric characteristics, political climate, and history.

Future Research

I am convinced much more can be gained by exploring the nature and effects of the parties' political cultures on partisan elites. Do the overtures to the disparate groups by progressively ambitious Democratic Senators actually benefit those seeking higher office? What are the relationships between these individuals and the groups' endorsement patterns? Why do some groups seem to court more favor than others? Moving forward, I plan to better understand the political cultures of both parties—and the behaviors of incumbent officeholders seeking higher office—by considering these questions.

Additionally, a great deal is to be done in order to understand the relationship—should one exist—between the political cultures of the parties and their partisans among the mass electorate. Do differences concerning the political party culture of partisans at the mass level exist? Culturally speaking, do discernable differences exist between Democratic and Republican identifiers regarding what they expect from their respective party and the elected officeholders which it nominates?

Finally, more attention should be paid to further exploring the state variation of the party's political cultures. Chapter five is limited by a lack of state variation and the relatively small number of interviews granted. A larger sample of Democrats and Republicans—as well as representation from more states and regions—holds promise in better understanding not only the state variations of political culture and the generalizability of Freeman's essay, but will provide a more complete account of partisan public officials' perceptions of their party's cultures at the state level.

When beginning this project, I was struck by the underdeveloped nature of the literature concerning the political cultures of the parties. I have attempted to provide a unique empirical test into the nature and effects of political party culture on political careers. With this effort, I have attempted to begin a renewed interest in advancing this literature. Moving forward, there is much more to be done in order to better understand the parties' political cultures. As is the goal of any exploratory effort, this dissertation, complete with its explanatory contributions and shortcomings has produced more questions than answers.

Appendix A: Interview Questions

Hello, my name is John Davis, and I am a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Missouri. I am currently working on a research project that looks at the nature and effects of political cultures in political parties and their effects on those seeking elected office. As part of this research I am conducting open-ended interviews of former and current elected officials. I was wondering if you would be willing to be interviewed. Your participation is voluntary and poses no foreseeable risks. With your permission, an audio recorder will be used to record this interview. This interview should take no longer than 30 minutes. If you would like to participate, I would be happy to schedule a time and place that is more convenient for you. Do you have any questions about the project at this time?

- 1.) Thank you again for your taking time to talk with me. Can you please tell me which political party in which you are a member?
- 2.) Can you please tell me what elected offices you have held?
- 3.) Can you please tell me the years in which you served/have served in elected public office?
- 4.) Can you take a moment to describe the process of deciding to run for office? For example, what motivated you to run? Where you recruited by your respective party's organization?
- 5.) Did you seek out the approval and/or endorsement of any specific groups or persons within outside of your state's party organization?
- 6.) Have you sought another public office while being an incumbent of another elected position?
- 7.) If so, can you tell me about your experience in representing one constituency while courting another group of potential voters?

8.) In your own words, can you please explain to me the political culture of your state party?

9.) On the one hand, Jo Freeman—a political scientist—describes the political culture of the Democratic Party as one in which activists and elites comprise a coalition of disparate groups of interests and represent their own constituents and press for representation within the party.

On the other hand, Freeman describes the Republican Party as being comprised by a more homogenous base of elites and activists who value party loyalty over group representation and interest, resulting in a more unified party base. In your experience as a candidate for office as a member of the _____ Party, do you believe your state party's culture fits its description?

10.) Using your own personal experience—as a partisan and elected public official—can you elaborate on your response to the previous question?

11.) Thinking back to the first time you sought elected office in a partisan race, do you believe the political culture of your party has changed or stayed the same?

12.) Is there anything else you would like to discuss?

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