SECURITIZATION AS A THEORY OF MEDIA EFFECTS:
THE CONTEST OVER THE FRAMING OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................... ii

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................. vi

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

   Securitization as a media effect

2. LITERATURE............................................................................................................................ 8

   How security begat securitization

3. LITERATURE............................................................................................................................ 31

   The memory of persistence:
   Heuristics, processing models, and understanding the news

4. RESEARCH METHODS.......................................................................................................... 46

   Content and experiment

5. CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS............................................................................................. 65

   How a War becomes a “war”

6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS.................................................................................................. 82

   The securitization frame at work

7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................... 95

   Dulce et securum est

APPENDICES

A. CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS........... 113

B. QUESTIONNAIRES.................................................................................................................. 117
C. EXPERIMENTAL STIMULUS MATERIAL .................................. 121

D. RECALL AND RECOGNITION QUESTIONS............................ 138

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................... 143

VITA.......................................................................................... 156
SECURITIZATION AS A THEORY
OF MEDIA EFFECTS

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation proposes a particular form of media framing effect from securitization, a process in which political actors seek to create consensus about security-related issues such as terrorism and immigration by portraying them as imminent threats to a state’s physical or cultural survival. The dissertation offers a two-stage model, in which securitization is first examined as an effect in news media accounts and then tested in an experiment as an effect of media accounts.

A content analysis found that a salient example of securitization, the idea of a “war on terrorism,” appeared as a consensual frame in distinct sectors of the media market after the September 2001 attacks. The frame diverged predictably in ensuing years, suggesting that the securitization frame changes in response to news organizations’ sense of audience expectations and perceptions of the boundaries of political debate.

The experimental portion found that securitization does not affect how accurately audiences comprehend the central point of a story but does appear to produce less attentive processing among those opposed to the government. The absence of securitization, on the other hand, appears to produce more attentive processing among those who consider themselves politically to the right of the media. Emotionally, the frame has no effect on opponents of the government but produces more trust in government among pro-government audiences and those to the right of the media.
What is a “war on terrorism,” and what does it mean for the United States to be embroiled in one? American political elites are far from agreement. In a skeptical view, the concept of a war on terror has created a “self-inflicted wound” that serves the demagogic ends of political leaders but hinders the nation’s ability to confront the legitimate threats that terrorism does pose (Brzezinski, 2007). No, counters the head of the newly created Department of Homeland Security; such complacent revisionism overlooks the fact that “our foes have declared their intent to make war, have demonstrated a capability to prosecute war and have laid on us the horrific consequences commensurate with war” (Chertoff, 2007). Another view comes from the governing party in Britain, the nation’s closest ally in the conflicts that have followed the September 2001 attacks: The mere phrase “war on terror” itself emboldens those foes (Branigan, 2007).

The picture is no clearer in press accounts. In one Associated Press report, the vice president promises that “America will stay on the offensive on the war on terror” (Talmadge, 2007). By the time the report reached the Web site of Fox News, the war had become a proper noun: “the War on Terror.” In yet other news outlets, the phrase rarely appears without the support of quotation marks: “Without the ability to promise confidentiality, the press would have been unable to report notorious abuses of government power from Watergate through the Bush administration's violations of fundamental rights in the ‘war on terror’” (Lewis, 2007). Clearly, different readers will find different maps to this strange territory in different sections of different newspapers –
as clear an illustration as possible of the intuitively comfortable concept of media framing.

Little wonder that the contested idea of a war on terrorism could provide such “a rich current framing case, perhaps the most important of our time” (Reese, 2007, p. 152). But at the same time, it illustrates a concern about framing to which scholars have increasingly drawn attention: Is framing an effect on media or an effect of media? This dissertation contends that it is both. The representation of a “war on terror” frame, and the larger case of framing that it represents, is an outcome of news decisions, political maneuvering, and pressure from outside groups. This dissertation suggests that those can produce predictable effects. The frame’s impact on people who read or watch news accounts, in Brzezinski’s version, amounts to “five years of national brainwashing” (2007). This dissertation tests his assertion.

Unsettled, though, is a lingering concern in framing studies: How can one concept be its own outcome and its own cause? This dissertation will introduce a theoretical link that could help solve that puzzle: securitization theory, a recent outgrowth of security studies. Securitization can be thought of as a particular form of framing that relies on a shared perception of an issue as an existential threat – an imminent peril to the physical, cultural, or social health of the community. When an issue has been securitized, a political actor has been able to cast it as such a threat and has gained a degree of public assent to use extraordinary measures to combat that threat. The news media are essential to that process. Media frames are the lens through which the public sees an issue like terrorism or immigration either as a routine matter best dealt with through the normal
workings of law enforcement and politics or as a crisis that requires extreme measures for indefinite periods.

Although securitization theory has produced a number of provocative theoretical examinations, it has seen little in the way of quantitative empirical study. The war on terror provides an opportunity to explore securitization within a framing perspective. This paper uses a content analysis of how the “war on terror” has been framed in three newspapers to suggest that a consensus securitization frame emerged in media accounts with the September 2001 attacks but has become increasingly open to challenge from multiple directions since then. That divergence in framing will suggest stimuli whose effects can then be measured experimentally.

Political violence is far from the only category of news that is subject to being securitized. Research from Europe has often concentrated on immigration and infectious disease as securitization issues, and a study released at the outset of a U.N. climate debate in April 2007 described global warming as a threat to U.S. national security (Kaplan & Maugh, 2007). The tone of current debate on how such issues are to be properly framed for news audiences suggests a significant level of heated dispute among and between journalistic and political actors alike. For its second phase, then, this dissertation will apply a “securitization” frame to news articles covering two securitizable issues, terrorism and immigration, to see whether the frame has the sort of emotional or cognitive effects that would seem to make a battle over War on Terror vs. “war on terror” worthwhile.

Terrorism draws the bulk of attention in the present research because it remains the most salient example of a securitization issue for U.S. news audiences. Explaining
how terrorism reached that level of salience requires a brief examination of the peculiar position terrorism holds in news framing.

Wars on terrorism are not creatures of the 21st century. In U.S. news texts, such wars can be found as early as the Carter administration, making them nearly as old as the concept of a “war on drugs” (e.g., “How not to fight the drug war,” 1977). Wars on terrorism have been attributed to France (Lewis, 1982), Israel (Nordell, 1984), Peru (Brooke, 1992), and Turkey (Howe, 1980), in addition to the Reagan administration (“Transcript of Reagan’s speech”). As early as May 2001, news texts described Osama bin Laden as “America’s top enemy in the U.S. war on terrorism” (Jones & Moore, 2001). But the concept took on an unusually specific set of referents after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Within days, the “war on terror” was restricted to the struggle between the United States and its shadowy antagonists.

But the meaning did not long remain so specific, and the reasons reflect some of the complex cultural attributes attached to the idea of terrorism. Nearing the end of his term as the first “public editor” of The New York Times, Daniel Okrent acknowledged a concern that surfaces regularly at his newspaper and at many other news organizations around the country: “Nothing provokes as much rage as what many perceive to be The Times’ policy on the use of ‘terrorist,’ ‘terrorism’ and ‘terror’” (Okrent, 2005). There is, he was quick to add, no such formal policy. But the perception of one can produce an effect that appears to readers much the same as a mandate from on high. Such a perception can suggest the degree to which a news organization appears to align itself with the views of the party in power. As importantly, though, reactions to that perception suggest that audiences place an unusual value on the simple word “terror” itself.
Consider, for example, the case of a pressure group convinced that CNN was dilatory in describing Palestinian attacks on Israelis as “terrorist.” The group’s demands for “progress on the T-word” (HonestReporting, 2004) led to such cascades of electronic mail that it was able to command CNN’s attention by “effectively paralyzing” the network’s internal e-mail system (Shalev, 2002, para. 39) – and, eventually, winning the sort of changes in news language its members sought.

Are those concerns an indication of some wholly new development – a sign that, indeed, “everything has changed” since transnational terrorism became a dominant topic on U.S. news agendas in September 2001? A better case can be made that such concerns reflect frames of discussion, and frames of reporting, that go back many decades earlier. The idea that one camp’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter can be traced at least to Britain’s efforts to contain the post-World War II Malay insurgency (Deery, 2003). For several decades, research has noted that terrorism is something that happens to “us,” while the same sort of violence perpetrated against others – particularly distant others – tends to wear some less judgmental name (Epstein, 1977; Rolston & Miller, 1996). An attack on the public transit system in the Indian city of Mumbai that killed scores of people, blamed on Kashmiri separatists, was not a front-page story for one metropolitan newspaper because “without an apparent direct connection to the U.S., it appears they’re not part of international terrorism” (Zeeck, 2006). It seems only natural, then, that the only political organization defined as “terrorist” in the Associated Press style manual is al-Qaida, perpetrators of the September 2001 attacks.

All this is enough to leave the newspaper reader or TV viewer with a sense that “terrorism” must be a magic word, and magic is rarely amenable to empirical testing. But
securitization theory (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998) suggests a testable proxy.

“Terrorism” is a securitizing word, and when a problem has been securitized, it has been moved out of the arena of ordinary challenges dealt with by the normal workings of society and into a realm of direct threats to a society’s political and cultural existence – an extraordinary peril justifying extraordinary measures in response.

Securitization is a kind of speech act, in which a word or phrase has the sort of performative function that occurs when a judicial authority pronounces a prison sentence or a cleric pronounces a marriage. But unlike most speech acts, securitization depends for its success on the consent of both the audience and other rival claimants: opposition parties, allied nations, notionally equal branches of government. The power to securitize is far from trivial. The party that succeeds in turning immigration into a crisis, or drugs into a war, has opened up new streams of resources, forced new solutions into the discussion, placed other solutions farther out of bounds. Little wonder that a concept like “terrorism” could invoke such a struggle for control.

That control appears to be heavily contested. In the Washington Post, the “war on terror” is a fragile construct that rarely appears without the sustenance of quotation marks. At Fox News, as noted above, the War on Terror is a proper noun. It is hard to think of a clearer example of Cohen’s assertion: “The world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors and publishers of the papers they read” (1963, p. 13).

A “war on drugs” might raise the idea of an unusual or inappropriate opponent. A “war on terrorism” is more intuitively sensible, but it raises related questions. First, to what degree does securitization create its own monster from a familiar threat that has
traditionally been handled by crime-control and investigative organizations that are already in place? Second, does securitization suggest a limitless peril: a dire threat that can only be resolved by the unconditional surrender of an enemy that can barely be identified, let alone brought to bay? Third, what does securitization demand as a cost for controlling that peril? Finally, and most relevant for the purposes of this study: What makes securitization work? Which political actors can invoke it successfully? To what degree are its decisions democratic ones, and for the purposes of media studies, what role do news media play in making those democratic decisions well-informed ones?

So this dissertation will proceed in three stages. First, it will explain securitization and how that concept arose from the broader field of security studies. Then it will seek to show that the framing of political violence in the American press is flexible – subject to an array of internal or external influences that modify the way such violence is presented to the news-absorbing public. Last, it will examine whether the securitization of a problem – the wave of the semantic wand that turns immigration into a crisis that requires military intervention, or that turns terrorism into an existential threat demanding extraordinary means for indefinite periods – affects both attitude and comprehension among news audiences. Specifically, it will suggest that successful securitization encourages a judgmental heuristic, a cognitive shortcut that suggests less-thorough cognitive processing, along with a greater willingness to leave “security” decisions in the hands of authorities. Those are effects that would make securitization worth the effort on the part of political elites – and would make it an essential form of framing for newsrooms to understand.
CHAPTER 2
Literature: How security begat securitization

The theory of securitization is new to media studies, but it is also a relative newcomer in its own domain, security studies. This chapter will begin by examining how securitization arose in the post-Cold War ferment in studies of security and international relations, then explain how it fits into the concept of framing as it is currently understood in media studies and political science. Those theoretical approaches will suggest hypotheses that can be tested through content analysis.

Securitization is a recent enough concept that its definition is easy to trace. An issue can be securitized when it is “presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object,” thus “justifying the use of extraordinary measures” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 21). Security itself has proven harder to summarize. At its simplest, physical security, the need of a nation-state to protect itself from attack and ensure the survival of itself and its people, “was the core interest most often associated in the early days of the [U.S.] republic with the concept of national security,” and “security against foreign danger” was a prime reason for centralizing power in the new federal government (Jablonsky, 2003, p. 4).

Still, although the pursuit of security is “a matter of the highest priority, part of the raison d’etre of the state,” references to security in modern politics are often “of rhetorical rather than analytic value” (Mangold, 1990, p. 1). Consequently, there are two main approaches to the definition question: leaving the matter deliberately vague or restricting security to a “narrow and traditional” approach, “stressing the study of the
threat, use and control of military force” and examining “causes, cures, and consequences for war” (Mandel, 1994, p. 18). Given the straightforwardness and utility of the latter approach, security studies have traditionally been identified with realism, the philosophical current in international relations that emphasizes the centrality of power and the self-interested behavior of states in an anarchic system (e.g., Walt, 1997). Realists reciprocate this understanding: “The main focus of security studies is easy to identify. ... It is the phenomenon of war” (Walt, 1991, p. 212). Military power might not be the sole concern, but such other concerns as arms control and statecraft are intimately linked to it. Though nonmilitary threats to states’ well-being deserve attention, they are not the real core of security, and in Walt’s argument, the discipline is weakened by efforts to widen it: “By this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to ‘security’” (1991, p. 213).

The orthodox conception of security was strengthened with the rise of what became known as the “national security state.” This phenomenon is rooted in the rapid advance of technology in the first half of the 20th century. “The unlucky discovery by an immature civilization of the internal combustion engine and the art of flying” (Churchill, 1948, p. 99) made changes in the balance of power between states much faster and much less predictable. With the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them around the globe, the idea of an existential threat to a nation or its culture arising out of the blue became more plausible, and the idea of a permanent national security establishment – one that could confront such threats as quickly as they arose – became more firmly entrenched.
Even under those circumstances, a view limited to the security of the nation-state, its borders, and its armed forces was soon subject to debate, even within the traditionalist camp. Where, for example, could threats to a nation’s economic well-being be placed? Transformative events of the late 20th century brought further questions about traditional concepts of security: whether and to what degree security is affected by globalization and the changing nature of threats themselves (Ripsman & Paul, 2005), the “growing fusion between law enforcement and national security missions” (Andreas & Price, 2001, p. 31), even the very sorts of forces that brought down the Soviet Union (Kolodziej, 1992). Indeed, the perceived need to broaden traditional conceptions of security has raised direct questions about such foundational elements of the “security state” as the lines of responsibility for military and nonmilitary threats drawn by the U.S. National Security Act of 1947. That blurring of lines is evident in a different potentially securitizable threat, the so-called war on drugs: “Give the Drug Warriors the technological edge of the Cold Warriors” (Andreas & Price, 2001, p. 40) was the plea at one anti-drug conference. By the early 21st century, the realm of orthodox security studies had even come to encompass infectious diseases (Brower & Chalk, 2003).

Even as challenges to the traditional conception of security were arising within the mainstream, other challenges were being raised from without. Critical security theory contends that just such an extension of security issues beyond the immediate concerns of the state is essential if “security” is to play a meaningful role in improving the human condition (Stamnes, 2004). The critical approach seeks to deepen conceptions of security, rather than merely broadening them (Smith, 2005); the realism of orthodox security studies “is part of the problem in world politics rather than being the problem solver”
(Booth, 2005, p. 3). As in other branches of social science, a critical security approach takes aim at what advocates consider an excessively positivist and excessively Western-oriented view of the world and its problems. Nonconventional weapons and terrorism are certainly security threats, but so are “consumerism, tyranny, massive disparities of wealth ... and brute capitalism – as well as the more traditional cultural threats to peoples’ security as a result of patriarchy and religious bigotry” (2005, p. 1). Critical theorists suggest that any study of security that does not point toward “emancipatory” practices is effectively guilty of perpetuating the oppressive systems it describes. (For a summary and rebuttal, see Taureck, 2006.)

The theory of securitization emerged in the late days of the Cold War and offers a tentative compromise: not a full-scale retreat from realism but a growing recognition in parts of the interstate community that states are ultimately made up of individuals and households (Alker, 2005). The advocates of securitization, who became known as the Copenhagen School, sought both to widen and to broaden traditional security concepts. But the Copenhagen School places two important hurdles in front of any such effort. Not only must an “existential threat requiring emergency action” be identified, but a significant part of the audience needs to accept that designation (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 27). Such a threat might not be as self-evident as an erupting volcano or an invading barbarian horde; more likely, a political actor will have to build a persuasive case for securitizing the threat using the mass media. Although securitization draws attention to a range of issues that are highly valued from a critical perspective, then, it remains “largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat” (Taureck, 2006, p. 55). Despite its greater openness,
securitization acknowledges that the advantage remains with those who begin with more power and more access to such elements as the media.

A media frame incorporating securitization involves a shared understanding of the need for extraordinary measures and, more importantly, a shared sense of peril to the nation and its identity: not just its borders or armed forces but its institutions and its sense of self. Identity, rather than sovereignty, is the focus of existential threats to society “because it defines whether ‘we’ are still us” (Buzan & Wæver, 1997). Immigration can be “securitized” because of the perception that the problems it creates go beyond the mere matter of catching more people at more border points. When unchecked immigration is portrayed as a threat to the very elements – culture, language, nationhood – that give the once-secure nation its uniqueness, securitization suggests that the result is likely to be laws mandating the use of English, for example, rather than calls for improved immigration procedures.

Securitization, then, shares both the critical theorists’ interest in expanding the scope of issues that reflect “security” (Booth, 2005) and the traditional realists’ primary emphasis on issues affecting the state (Smith, 2005). At the same time, it has come under criticism from both camps – from the latter for straying too far from the fold (Buzan et al., 1998) and from the former for not straying far enough. Others question whether it is too bound by European assumptions about society and state to effectively explain events in non-Western regions (Wilkinson, 2007). Still, even among some critical scholars (Elbe, 2006), the Copenhagen scholars’ work draws praise for its originality and its systematic study of what it means to place nonmilitary issues on the security agenda.
What sorts of issues fall into that category? As outlined by Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 22-23), securitization can take in politics (“anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority”), society (including “the abilities to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity”), or the environment (“baseline concerns about the relationship between the human species and the rest of the biosphere”). None of these threats are measured on an objective scale. Rather, they are invoked more and less successfully by political actors whose goal is to build a shared understanding of what such threats look like (Buzan et al., 1998). From a media perspective, securitization is built like any other frame. If the essence of framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52), securitization is the form of framing that highlights the existential threat of an issue and diminishes the arguments for handling it as a matter of routine.

Securitization is a distinct form of framing because, although its declarations are made by and on behalf of a vested authority, the right to wield that authority is not assured and the declarations themselves are not necessarily final. Thus, securitization poses two questions that are central to contemporary studies of media framing, which emphasize distinguishing how frames are built from how frames are processed (e.g., Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The first question parallels Lasswell’s (1950) oft-cited maxim of media studies: “Who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). The second asks whether the frame has taken hold: “When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate
violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?” (1998, p. 25). The language of securitization is a political instrument used to categorize actors and situations and to outline appropriate sets of solutions. That makes securitization a comfortable fit with conceptions of framing as outlined recently by Entman (2003, 2004).

To those threatened by an impending outbreak of avian influenza, the idea that a disease can be elevated to the level of a security concern might prove comforting, and such an expansion of the concept of security might indeed have the emancipatory effect that critical scholars hope for. But the ability to securitize an issue is far from an unmitigated good. Before returning to the discussion of how securitization works and where it fits into the wider concept of framing, it is worth spending a few moments considering the advantages that can accrue to actors who can successfully invoke this frame with regard to an issue like terrorism.

**Securitizing terrorism: Who gains and who loses?**

For nations and individuals alike, the levers of securitization are powerful tools. Identifying an opponent as a terrorist works to delegitimize that opponent’s political goals and thus to move the contest away from the gray areas of political contestation, and by implication political responsibility, and toward the black-and-white world of the existential threat that is fundamental to securitization theory (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, p. 91). Once that frame is established at home, as in the case of Sri Lanka (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, pp. 98-99), domestic political actors contradict it at their own risk. Conversely, it is evident from the array of nations identified as allies or partners in the “war on terror” that being on the proper side is a
political blessing. The chance to provide post-9/11 intelligence cooperation was a “get out of jail free” card for a Sudanese government seeking to have itself removed from Washington’s list of nations that sponsor terrorism (Jervis, 2005, p. 52).

The political actor who controls the frame draws on other assets as well. The narrative version of a conflict or dispute that becomes internationalized through media coverage is likely to be the one that gains the widest acceptance, as in the narratives of “ancient hatreds” and “warring factions” that emerged during the Bosnian secession wars of the 1990s (Campbell, 1998; Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005). The utility of “war on terrorism” as a narrative is clear in New York Post editorials excoriating 2004 presidential candidate John Kerry for suggesting, in effect, a desecuritization of terrorism. Just such a set of normal routines – emphasizing police work, cooperation, and intelligence gathering – has long been used to organize responses to terrorism (Jervis, 2005). But if terrorism is successfully cast as a war, Kerry becomes a 21st-century Neville Chamberlain: the sort of candidate who would seek to contain Nazism with border police and immigration laws. Kerry’s “reluctance earlier this year to call the war on terror an actual war” (Bishop, 2004), in the understanding of the pro-Bush New York Post, is more than semantic quibbling.¹ It defines the essential characteristic that separates an unworthy candidate from one to whom the nation’s survival can be trusted.

Because securitization relies on a sense that ordinary measures cannot resolve a particular crisis, formalizing terrorism as a war is a clear example of the political utility of the frame: “The war against terror is about opening up a space outside the established range of police operations and judicial procedures” (Oberleitner, 2004, p. 264).

¹ It is mildly ironic to find Kerry himself invoking a securitizing move – referring to organized crime as “the new communism, the new monolithic threat” – as early as 1995 (Andreas & Price, 2001, p. 37).
Securitization can be described in near-identical terms: “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). The mechanism by which securitization works this magic is derived from speech-act theory.

Securitization: Framing as a speech act

Two characteristics are essential in an issue that has become securitized (Buzan et al., 1998). First, the issue must be seen as an existential threat – one that puts the very physical or cultural continuity of the state at risk. Second, this threat must be the kind for which extraordinary, if not extralegal, measures may be invoked. Two of the justifications put forth for the 2003 invasion of Iraq – that country’s assumed intent to imperil the United States with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and its notional links to Qaida-style terrorism – suggest how an obstreperous but militarily prostrate nation could be turned into the sort of imminent menace that required full-scale preventive war.

Securitization is distinguished from other framing models because it suggests that this transformation comes about by a speech act (e.g., Austin, 1975): a particular rhetorical action in which the mere pronouncing of a condition has the force of bringing the condition about, as in pronouncing a legal verdict, declaring a couple married, or naming a vessel. These are “performative” utterances: “To utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing ... or to state that I am doing it: It is to do it” (Austin, 1975, p. 6). Wæver (1995, p. 55) explains how such statements can work in securitization: “By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves
a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”

Who controls the switch, though? Who has the power to declare some state of affairs an existential threat and, by so doing, to set forth the sorts of extraordinary or extralegal maneuvers necessary to deal with it? Securitization not only suggests the centrality of such questions but opens a number of new avenues for examining media performance, particularly in the portrayals of conflicts and crises. It is an avenue down which, for example, responses to a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina might be analyzed. First, though, securitization must be distinguished from – and set in relation to – other forms of framing.

Securitization is rooted in a different strain of scholarship, and in some ways in a different philosophical orientation, than those forms of framing known best to media studies, which draw on sociology and psychology. If securitization is a different sort of framing, then, it is one that both disciplines can recognize. Some researchers imply the interdisciplinary connection without naming its parts. Lobell (2006), for example, describes what amounts to a securitizing effect as a matter of aversion to loss (a cognitive effect known from psychology). Political actors, in this view, have a stake in making sure the public knows things are bad and bound to get worse if their proposed measures – economic, military, and the like – are not adopted (a sociology-based approach, with the frame as a way of organizing a narrative).

Securitization also draws on two disciplines that are less known in framing: international relations (particularly security) and language studies. Further, it offers to shed new light on an area that scholars in international relations (e.g., Huth & Allee,
2002; Levy, 1989) have identified as a gap in the study of interstate conflict: the impact of domestic political behavior on international behavior. As the role of the press in such processes as the “democratic peace” (e.g., Van Belle, 2000; Choi & James, 2005) and democratization itself (e.g. Kuo, 1993; Lawson, 2003) becomes more prominent, media portrayals of political performance will become even more relevant to studies of how media perform in crises.

In line with that interplay of mediated communication and policy outcome, Balzacq (2005) looks at securitization as a discursive practice aimed at persuading the audience to accept a particular development as the sort of threat that deserves an immediate policy aimed specifically at it. This persuasion, it is important to note, is based on what the audience already knows about the world. Thus, the “securitizing move” – a power-holder’s attempt to move an issue into the realm of securitization – has to rely on the audience’s own frame of reference, its trust in the would-be-securitizer and thus its readiness to be convinced, and its ability to give or deny officials the mandate necessary for security (2005, p. 192).

As noted above, securitization grows from traditional concerns of state and military security but builds a theoretical bridge toward critical studies by defining the terms under which new categories of threat can be admitted to the domain of security risks. Such a widening may be welcome in practical terms, but it creates some confusion, or at least some inconsistency, in theoretical ones. Much of that squishiness arises from securitization’s equally important grounding in language theories, particularly in speech acts. To extend an analogy from Austin (1975), a baseball umpire commits a speech act in declaring a ball foul or fair. Players might disagree, fans might disagree even more
loudly, sportswriters might mumble among themselves, but the authority to pronounce
the ball fair or foul lies with the umpire.

Although securitizing declarations are made by and on behalf of a vested
authority, the right to wield that authority is contested and the declarations themselves are
not necessarily final. It is not enough for an issue to be declared a security threat; it must
be broadly accepted as such by the audience as well (Buzan et al., 1998). It is as if an
umpire’s call of “Foul!” were met by the shadow cabinet’s declaration that if that ball is
foul, the fairs have already won – with the decision resting finally on the consensus of the
fans.

Recent studies using securitization as a framework underline its relevance to
questions of framing and news language. Bigo (2006) makes the connection explicit:
“What are the reasons for the persistent framing of migration in relation to terrorism,
crime, unemployment and religious zealotry ... rather than in relation to new
opportunities for European societies ... or for some new understanding of citizenship?”
(2006, p. 64). Jutila (2006) quotes a number of scholars as suggesting that migration
should be desecuritized – moved away from the emergency realm and into the realm of
normal politics. Mantouvalou (2005) finds that Greece’s immigration policy is defined by
shifts between tolerance and securitization, with growing concern about the likelihood
that it could be strongly securitized in future political discourse.

Other research from the current decade suggests the range of issues that can be
examined in a securitization framework. Emmers (2003) describes an effort to securitize
transnational crime by Southeast Asian political elites, though the ultimate effects were
primarily cosmetic and strong “criminalization” might have proved a more useful
strategy. Abrahamsen (2005) finds that while an overall securitization of Africa in British foreign policy might bring a slight increase in Western aid, it nonetheless offered much more assistance to the “war on terrorism” than to African development overall. Elbe (2005, 2006) and McInnes and Lee (2006) caution that securitization of such public health issues as HIV/AIDS is likely to emphasize elite health over public health and to prioritize threats to the developed world, rather than the developing world.

Securitization has clearly been a fruitful theory for normative explorations – one of the very areas that Kolodziej (1992) had suggested was implicit in the thinking of Realists like Morgenthau but absent in mainstream state-oriented security studies. To date, though, it has seen little in the way of empirical testing. This project proposes to put the theory to such a test – to determine, in other words, whether a securitization effect is actually at stake when power-holders and interest groups and media outlets wrestle over securitizing efforts, particularly in the context of a war on terrorism. The first step in such an effort is to determine how securitization in media texts can be measured.

Securitization: Defining and measuring the frame itself

The starting point for defining the securitization frame is found in Buzan et al.’s explanation of securitization’s core points: “What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience” (1998, p. 27). That means two types of scales will ultimately be required to determine how thoroughly the frame has been invoked. One will measure the way in which the threat is characterized; a second will measure the degree to which it is accepted or rejected.
Not all “crises,” of course, are security crises. The wholesale loss of textile jobs in the southeastern United States may be a crisis, but it is partly compensated in the region by the creation of other jobs and in the rest of the nation by job gains driven by the same sorts of forces that drive textile jobs offshore. The concerns of the 1980s that a then-resurgent Japan was in a position to buy rather than bomb Pearl Harbor were of a different sort. The threat, even if it never reached the level of a crisis, of overseas debt-holders’ calling in U.S. markers was accompanied by concerns that America would lose control of the cultural institutions – movie studios, national landmarks, and the like – that help provide its identity.

Nor do all uses of military power become securitized issues. The successful invasion of Grenada in 1983 resolved a minor irritant to American will in its home hemisphere; the unsuccessful attempt to rescue U.S. captives from Iran in 1980 may have deepened a sense of national embarrassment but did nothing to make the then-six-month-old “hostage crisis” into a national emergency. However dire they may be, such situations are seen as properly handled by social institutions functioning in their accepted ways (cf. Lau & Schlesinger, 2005).

Much like agenda-setting (Wanta, 1997), framing reflects a kind of social learning. The ways in which socialization can “interact with cognitive wiring” (Grabe & Kamhawi, 2006) will be underscored later as the audience effects of the securitization frame are discussed. But securitization is, at bottom, a mediated process. Before it can create consensus in the audience, it must be invoked by a political actor and passed along more or less intact by mass media. Such processes can be understood broadly under the concept of framing.
Framing: A “fractured paradigm” settling in at last

Framing has supported a rich variety of studies and paradigms and a collection nearly as large of complaints about its vagueness and imprecision. Its mixed background in both psychology and sociology points to some of the confusion that has surrounded it, and to the theoretical openness that has helped drive that confusion.

Implicitly or explicitly, framing has been a concern of media observers since Lippmann’s observation (1922) that we know the outside world only at second hand: “We can see how indirectly we know the environment in which nevertheless we live. We can see that news of it comes to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it were the environment itself” (1922/1997, p. 4).

Lippmann’s point remains true today in matters as intensely local as race relations (Shah & Thornton, 2004) and as distant as international relations (Wanta & Yu, 1993; Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003). Iyengar and Simon summarize the “psychological and social pedigrees” of the concept: from psychology, changes in judgment based on the way problems are defined; from sociology, primarily the study of “story lines, symbols and stereotypes” in media accounts (1993, p. 369). Both strains are evident in current research on news content and its effects. Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach, and Zubric (2004) reflect the psychological studies that initially cast problems in “gain” and “loss” frames; Entman (2004) revisits his exploration of the culturally congruent story lines that news magazines chose to explain the destruction of civilian airliners by Soviet and U.S. forces; Iyengar and Simon (1993) touch on both in distinguishing “episodic” frames (concentrating on single instances) from “thematic” ones (placing issues in general or abstract contexts).
The convenience of framing as an organizing tool has been especially appropriate for examining ways in which pictures of the distant world, rarely known at first hand to audiences, are constructed for U.S. news markets. “The essence of framing is selection to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others,” thus “promoting one particular interpretation” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 11) – and perhaps more to the point, a particular evaluation or solution (Entman, 2003). But useful as such frames are for organizing knowledge, they are equally good at misorganizing it. A “one-sided” frame, even one as consensually accepted as the post-Sept. 11 war on terrorism, can monopolize the organizing capacity in such a way that contradictory evidence is simply unable to enter (Norris et al., 2003).

Such convenience is an ally of political actors, particularly those seeking the consensus a securitization frame is expected to evoke. As Lippmann noted eight decades ago, “Where the incidence of policy is remote, all that is essential is that the program shall be verbally and emotionally connected at the start with what has become vocal in the multitude” (1922/1997, p. 156). Norris et al. list a half-dozen incidents of substate violence in a half-dozen unrelated conflicts to illuminate that point: “Without knowing much, if anything, about the particular people, groups, issues or even places involved, the terrorist and anti-terrorist frame allows us to quickly sort out, interpret, categorize, and evaluate these conflicts” (2003, p. 11). The power of that particular interpretation is borne out in the dominance of an accessible, unambiguous “‘good vs. evil’ frame” surrounding the campaign against terrorism, with elites implying broad support for administration policy and the media falling quickly into line (Baum, 2004, p. 332).
Framing is a useful and flexible metaphor, but a metaphor is not the same thing as a theory. That very flexibility has often left framing, in Entman’s memorable title, a “fractured paradigm”: “Despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory” to show the relationships between frames and texts or frames and thinking (1993, p. 51). In another view (D’Angelo, 2000), that lack of unity itself is a virtue, and there is no need for such a unified paradigm. Framing should continue as a framework of diverse paradigms – constructivist, critical, and cognitive – that guide both the choice of theories and the research itself.

Scheufele (1999) offers a compromise that incorporates the social-constructionist views of sociology and political communication, the critical stance implied by the groundbreaking descriptive work of such scholars as Entman, and the cognitive effects summarized in the second level of agenda-setting. Merely demonstrating the presence of a frame, he suggests, is essentially devoid of theoretical interest. But a “process model” that incorporates the ways in which frames are built and set, the individual effects of framing, and the audience-to-media feedback process can provide a common theoretical model while letting the different approaches retain their individuality. Entman’s “cascading activation” model (2003, 2004) expands on that approach by incorporating the potential influence of the audience on the political process. The most significant ability to set and control frames resides at the top: in the United States, with the president and top advisers. Organizing frames spread downward from there through other elites and journalists to the public, and with slightly more difficulty, ideas filter back upward as
well. Consensus at the top helps ensure the propagation of frames that favor the administration’s perspective; dissent gives contrary frames a higher chance at success.

Closely related to Entman’s concept is indexing, which sees an “ongoing, implicit calibration process” (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007, p. 49) in coverage of public affairs. Changes in issues or perspectives that receive coverage suggest changes in how those issues or perspectives are being considered among policymakers and other elites; the media “open the gates wider or close them more tightly as they perceive potentially decisive challenges or a lack of challenges to the most powerful institutional players and their agendas” (p. 49). The cascading and indexing models point to a close relationship between elite opinion and media opinion but leave more room for the professional norms and judgments of journalists than, for example, the propaganda model of political economy offered by Herman and Chomsky (2002).

Framing has been more clear-cut, or at least less contested, in the realm of domestic and international politics. Much of this clarity derives from the more explicitly psychological model exemplified by prospect theory, in which identical information can produce different preferences depending on whether it is presented in a way that exemplifies gains or losses. Druckman (2004) calls those presentations “equivalency” or “valence” frames, distinguishing them from “issue” or “emphasis” frames, which present considerations that are equal in presumed relevance but factually distinct. In an emphasis frame, for example, the different effects of portraying a Klan demonstration as a matter of free speech or of public safety might be examined. But a valence-oriented frame could be extended to the realm of securitization by presenting identical events as the result of a “terrorist” or a “guerrilla” attack: the product of a greater or lesser threat, rather than
merely a gain or a loss. Prospect-oriented framing has been used to illuminate case studies (McDermott 1998) and experiments (Boettcher 2004) alike. Shamir and Shikaki (2005) use a prospect-oriented approach to examine how “constructive ambiguity” in framing peace negotiations can influence public opinion.

Disputes about framing in media studies appear to have reached a point of agreement, or at least a truce: Concepts and methods from the psychological and sociological sides alike inform each other. Cognitive outcomes in particular are often explored under the banner of second-level agenda-setting (Wanta 1997, McCombs 2004), which looks at many of the elements that make up news frames as part of an “agenda of attributes.” But a central concern raised by such scholars as McDermott (1998) and Shamir and Shikaki (2005) remains: If so much is known about the effects or apparent effects of framing, why is so little done with that knowledge? The securitization frame provides another practical context in which that knowledge can be made available.

What broad category of framing does the securitization frame occupy? It resembles a “policy metaphor” (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005) in that it moves in two steps. The first is an understanding of what makes a frame appropriate; in short, whether the frames admitted to discussion involve the right actors and invoke, in Entman’s conception (2004), the right definitions of problems and solutions. The second is a matter of preferences: of the available choices, which is the best (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). Securitization, then, is a mediated process in which the media act as a gatekeeper: They originate few if any frames themselves but instead select from among those made available to them – primarily from elites, but in some cases from perceptions of audience interests or concerns as well.
Securitization, then, is both a cause and an outcome. As an outcome, it appears as a result of the ideological stances of news organizations and their staffers, of those actors’ understanding of themselves as thoughtful or passive processors of elite messages, and of the “news” itself and the quality and consonance of elite interpretations of the news. As a cause, it can affect audiences’ choice of news outlets and their alignment with the frame and its contents. And through the media, frames that have taken root in the audience can eventually reach the ears of elites (Entman, 2004; Scheufele, 1999).

From a journalist’s perspective, such discussions can seem like much ado about the square root of nothing. News is the substance detected by a nose for news; it has no frame but the one it comes in, and terrorism looks bigger than other news because it is bigger than other news. Securitization is not a complex process of creating and sustaining a consonant frame of cultural peril; it is the natural result of how newsmakers talk about news. Such views find support in the study of how news comes to be understood. When Shoemaker and Cohen (2006) explain news as a function of two predictors, deviance and social significance, the event used as an exemplar of the top end of both scales is the 2001 attack on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. As storytelling, news is biased not so much toward particular political views as toward the dramatic and the simple (Wolfsfeld, 2004). There are no prizes for the less exciting or the more convoluted story.

But such observations are clearly not universal. If there were not cases in which the securitization frame fails to take hold, or in which issues can and do become desecuritized, there would be little point in examining the frame’s progress. Nor is there an explanation for why some scents become available to the “nose for news” only with the passage of time: for example, U.S. public opposition to the Iraq war. A concept that
will help tie those concerns together is the notion of “news slots” (Wolfsfeld, 2004), or topic areas into which journalistic resources can be allotted. Slots and frames are not the same things, but the creation of new slots can support changes in the ways framing carries out its emphasis, selection, and highlighting functions. An increase in slots dedicated to a familiar perspective – covering hawkish views about the war in the legislature as well as in the executive – is likely to reinforce prevailing frames. On the other hand, alternative frames can be created or strengthened if new slots are created for talking about unfamiliar views: an erstwhile enemy as a peace partner, for example, or the advantages of an increase in immigration. A change in framing is likely to correspond with a change in the allowable range of public debate. If such a change can be found in the realm of terrorism and political violence, given its unique place in American political discourse, it can likely be found in other domains as well.

*Why the “war on terror”?*

The framing of terrorism is hardly a new field for scholarly exploration, nor is it the sole example of securitization in news coverage. But it has continued to draw attention, and increasingly (e.g. Dunn, Moore, & Nosek, 2005) it is attention to the empirical effects of framing at the lexical level: frames, in short, that can be manipulated in units as small as a single word or phrase. Demonstrating such variance in framing among national media outlets is a building block in suggesting how a securitizing frame like terrorism – or, for similar purposes, immigration or illegal drugs – can be invoked and the potential rewards that a successful securitization could mean for political actors.
The threat of terrorism is a particularly appropriate place to start in the study of U.S. news framing because of the frame’s sheer utility: The “war on terror,” in particular, seems able to organize “a large swath of political action” (Reese, 2007, p. 153). And because it seems likely that “media effects would be stronger when the audience is highly dependent on the news media” (Hindman, 2004, p. 39) – the immediate aftermath of the September 2001 attacks being exactly such a time – an effects paradigm like framing is particularly appropriate for examining a securitization model. The idea that news content indexes both journalistic judgment and the judgment of political elites points to how portrayals of this conflict, and of the set of political actions organized and captured in those portrayals, might diverge.

For its content analysis portion, then, this dissertation will propose a securitization frame that can be examined in news content and track its path in elite, popular, and populist news outlets since the September 2001 attacks. These hypotheses are proposed:

H1: Across all categories of media examined, coverage of the “war on terrorism” will reflect the securitization frame more closely in 2001 and 2002 and less closely in later periods.

H2: As the 2001 attacks become more distant in time, the securitization frame will diverge in different media, so that it will appear least frequently in elite media, more commonly in popular national media, and still more commonly in populist media aligned with the governing party.

The appearance and divergence of this frame are relevant because a securitization frame is expected to bias readers and viewers toward a series of cognitive shortcuts – judging the threat as more direct, being more willing to leave decision-making
authority in others’ hands, and thus allowing the frame to determine the amount of
knowledge they actively seek. The next chapter will examine the theories under which
the cognitive and emotional effects of such a frame can be measured experimentally and
propose a set of tests to determine whether the frame can be made to take hold.
However prominent or interesting a particular frame might be, demonstrating its presence or absence is only part of the study of how news reports shape public perceptions. It is true, in the aphorism that agenda-setting scholars cite from Cohen (1963), that news audiences are not directly told what to think, but it is equally true, as Entman (1989) noted, that they are guided toward what to think about, how to arrange their thinking, and what categories to store the resulting thoughts in. The way this material is organized and presented affects not only what audiences fear or like but what they know and how they know it – the facts and schemas they store for future retrieval and comparison. If news media are indeed the link in the democratic chain that provides “pure mental food” (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947) to would-be voters, then what audiences learn, what they learn about, and how they categorize those things – not only what goes in the mental file folders, but how those folders are organized and labeled – are intertwined with what they feel and whom they feel it toward. This chapter examines theories of how messages, including news messages, are approached and processed; how those messages affect attitudes; and how attitudes toward news media relate to the messages those media provide. The intent is to propose several effects that a securitization frame is expected to have and questions about how it might work.

In line with securitization theory in general, it is hypothesized that the securitization frame will produce a greater willingness to leave decision-making power in
the hands of authorities and a greater willingness to endorse extraordinary measures to
deal with security crises. This will be called the securitization effect, summarized in the
results as “trust in government,” and tautological as it might sound, it is the summary
hypothesis of this dissertation:

H3: News accounts employing the securitization frame will produce a higher level
of trust in government than accounts that do not employ the frame, and this effect will be
more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the
government.

Memory and heuristics

The argument thus far has been that securitization is primarily a correlate of
attitude: the securitization frame is expected to affect the ways in which an issue is
judged and the means that audiences endorse for dealing with it. But if the sociological
side of the framing debate suggests that the frame helps people organize their feelings
toward an object, the psychological camp suggests that the frame helps them organize
their thoughts. An issue that has been securitized is not just perceived differently than it
was before; it leaves behind a different set of things to think about. Securitization is not
just a frame but a heuristic – a term that refers broadly to cognitive shortcuts but also to a
mode of cognitive processing that relies on such shortcuts to help the processor (the poor
multitasking mortal who is just trying to make sure that the most important mental tasks
get their proper share of processing resources) get through the day.

Thus, the securitization frame – which appears when an issue or story has been
successfully declared a security matter, one that threatens the public’s essential physical
or cultural well-being and admits to extraordinary solutions – can produce both affective and cognitive outcomes. By its nature, it implies a condition in which members of the public are more ready to widen the range of things done in their name: to be less insistent on their (and others’) procedural rights; to be more comfortable with decisions made at the top, without much if any public input or debate; to hand over power, in short, until the crisis is over. That effect would be reinforced if those members of the public take incoming information at face value, rather than exposing it repeatedly to careful consideration and seeking out contradictory or confirmatory data.

“Cognitive miser” approaches to information processing are important because of the likelihood that run-of-the-mill judgmental biases are a sign of economical use of cognitive resources rather than of cognitive inability (Thompson et al., 1994). Lang’s limited-capacity model (2000) offers a number of propositions that help explain how and why that cognitive wealth is spent: Processing draws on a limited pool of resources, those resources need to be applied to preparing a media message for long-term storage as well as to storing it and bringing it out for comparison with later stimuli, and those resources can be allotted both deliberately and involuntarily. In the study of news, for example, the model has been used to examine efforts to make TV news reports more memorable (Lang, Potter, & Grabe, 2003).

This approach is usefully informed by a set of theories known as dual-process models, which hold that information can be processed either carefully or casually, using a series of cues and shortcuts. They share with the limited-capacity model the idea that people are “cognitive misers” but suggest that these misers are equipped with a wonderfully “adaptive toolbox” (Pachur & Hartwig, 2006, p. 983): the human mind,
constantly applying cognitive strategies that seek to maximize accuracy or similar goals while minimizing complexity, saving resources for use elsewhere.

Cobb (2005) proposes two connections between framing and its cognitive effects as tracked in dual-process models. One is accessibility: Because processing capacity is limited, a thought or concept that is handy in mind is likely to be the one applied to a judgment if there is no reason to search for a better or more applicable one. A second is salience. Frames that align with considerations the receiver considers important, such as the “core values” invoked in political advertising, will be assigned a greater value in the process of opinion formation (2005). Although these models have traditionally been used to explore changes in attitude, their applicability to memory as well is clear.

The heuristic-systematic model (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 2000; Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999; Griffin, Neuwirth, Geise, & Dunwoody, 2002) takes its name from the idea of heuristics as cognitive shortcuts – the peripheral bypass route that takes the brain on an easy ride around the congested zone of complex argument-building and comparison. It is distinguished from other dual-process models by several assumptions. One is that situations that are expected to produce effortful, or systematic, processing can include an element, sometimes a large one, of heuristic processing as well (Ziegler & Diehl, 2003). Not only can the two paths co-occur, but they can then have interactive or additive effects on attitudes (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Ziegler & Diehl, 2003). Yet it remains unclear what stimuli will steer the reader or viewer toward which path and under what circumstances. One important benchmark is the information “sufficiency threshold” (Zuckerman and Chaiken, 1998). Audience members who perceive a gap between what they know about a subject – say, a potential
health hazard – and what they think they need to know to make a satisfactory decision will be motivated to process more systematically (Griffin et al., 2002, p. 707).

Research suggests that memory is a useful measure of heuristic impact. Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) used thought-listing among other measures in examining the interplay of source credibility and message ambiguity on which mode of processing dominated. McGuire (1993) used recognition memory in comparing the strength of the primacy and recency heuristics (whether an argument is the first one or the most recent that a subject encounters). Dunn, Moore, and Nosek (2005) found higher false-memory results in news reports that used a “them” terrorism frame as opposed to an “us” patriotic frame. Drawing on Lang’s limited capacity model of mediated message processing (2000), Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) used recognition memory and recall to examine how the valence (positive or negative) of news reports interacted with gender to affect recall and comprehension. Their results indicate no main effect of gender on processing news but an interaction with valence, such that men appear to gain more information from negatively framed news and women from positively framed news – underscoring the importance of examining interaction effects as well as main effects and of measuring memory on multiple levels.

A measure of securitization could be expected to involve two sorts of recognition, with distinct effects on each. Because a securitized issue requires a shared sense of an existential threat, one that poses a danger to the very elements that make a society what it is, comprehension (Robinson & Levy, 1986; Grabe & Kamhawi, 2006) – the “big picture” presented in an article – is the first element. A securitization heuristic should not affect understanding of the central point of a news story – the specific event
that would cause a new or ongoing story to make its way into the next day’s newspaper or the evening’s broadcast. But at the same time, if it discourages systematic processing of messages, it should produce lower accuracy on a second measure: recognizing details of news reports.

The following hypothesis is proposed about the effects of the securitization frame on memory:

H4: Details of articles employing the securitization frame will be less well remembered than details of articles that do not employ the securitization frame, but “big picture” comprehension will not be affected. The effect on recognition of details will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government.

Proximity: The reader and the news

The relevance of a message and its clarity are other factors thought to play a role in determining how processing paths are chosen. A message that suggests a personal effect on the receiver would be more likely to invoke systematic processing; an ambiguous one, a greater reliance on such heuristic cues as authority or trustworthiness of the communicator. The issues that are subject to securitization might be highly salient and might show up at or near the top of “most important problem” opinion surveys, but their crisis points themselves are generally remote, increasing the likelihood that authority cues would be relevant. Americans are unlikely to have much direct exposure to terrorism or, outside the airport security line, to measures meant to deal directly with it. Similarly, if they have direct exposure to the effects of illegal immigration, it is more
likely through the service or hospitality industries than through the sort of border
lawlessness portrayed on tabloid-style news reports. These issues are perceived at second
hand through the media, and measures for dealing with them are offered at second hand.
Again, this is not only fertile ground for authority, it is an area in which news audiences
are less likely to perceive a gap between what they know and what they need to know –
and thus, more likely to find themselves on an easier processing path.

Much as the concept of “terrorism” allows the audience to organize a number of
conflicts it knows nothing about under a single rubric (Norris et al., 2003), heuristic cues
help organize political decisions for smart and lazy voters alike (Bucy & Newhagen,
1999). Cobb (2005) underscores the role of heuristics in decisions about new or
personally distant issues by pointing to the importance of elites and their credibility in
how public opinion is formed. When the public has only limited factual knowledge about
a topic, as with nanotechnology, opinions are especially susceptible to dramatic events
and new information (Cobb, 2005) – the sort of volatile attitudes that are associated with
heuristic processing, rather than the more stable, permanent ones produced by systematic
processing (Griffin et al., 2002). And the sort of repetition that makes an issue salient is
also likely to reinforce heuristic judgments. As Chen et al. (2000, p. 48) note, “the
repeated activation and application of particular heuristics to particular judgments is
likely to result in the development of strong associations between those heuristics and
judgments.”

Two more hypotheses are suggested, taking into account the likelihood that
securitization will create a sense of familiarity and stability and that it will bring about a
greater sense of personal risk and thus higher personal involvement:
H5: News accounts employing the securitization frame will be considered ongoing stories or concerns – matters that readers expect to keep hearing about as time passes – to a greater extent than the same accounts not employing the frame. This effect will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government.

H6: News accounts employing the securitization frame will produce a greater sense of personal concern and anxiety than for the same accounts not employing the frame. This effect will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government.

Congeniality of messages and messengers

The “congeniality hypothesis” (Eagly et al., 2001) suggests that generally, memory is biased toward information that is aligned with the receiver’s attitudes. But Eagly et al. (2001) propose a more complicated picture: People can encode and process noncongenial data effectively, even though they find it unpersuasive, in the capacity of building a defense against it. Eagly et al.’s meta-analysis suggests that processing motivation and capacity are more important than alignment of the message with prior attitudes in determining the route a message takes. If, as the authors suggest, congenial messages are more easily remembered anyway, without the need for systematic processing, it seems reasonable to expect a heuristic effect from a securitized message – particularly in audiences predisposed to support the political elites who are trying to securitize the issue in question. If anything, a congenial message, being trustworthy, would also be more likely to undergo heuristic processing. This would be particularly
true in the case of such controversial issues as abortion (Eagly et al., 1999) – or, for the purposes of this study, anti-terrorism measures and immigration control.

Those concepts help explain why readers and viewers choose the news they do and how well they process the messages they take in. But they leave aside a related question: Why would people choose to get news from a source they disagree with? Do dedicated conservatives really turn on CNN merely to be inoculated against some liberal news virus? More likely, several factors besides alignment with the politics of a particular news outlet are in play. Tsfati and Cappella (2005) point to the “need for cognition”: People who enjoy thinking and knowing can find material to satisfy those interests even on outlets whose politics are incongruent with theirs. Kohring and Matthes (2007) suggest that “trust” reflects a number of dimensions reflecting journalists’ selections, so that a newspaper that picks the right topics to talk about would not necessarily need to talk about them in the right way.

Another set of dual-processing concepts that would support a heuristic-processing hypothesis for securitization deals with such peripheral cues as source expertise and source likeability (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, pp. 142-143). In the realm of politics, source-related signals that are presumed to encourage heuristic processing include party cues and celebrity endorsements (Kam, 2005). Kam also found that as political awareness increases, reliance on party endorsement as a cue declines and reliance on “issue-relevant” values associated with systematic processing – in the case of her experiment, trust in scientific innovation – increases. Political awareness is often conceptualized as attention to and understanding of politics, though there is some
disagreement about whether media exposure is a component of it or should be measured separately (Cassel & Lo, 1997).

Ziegler and Diehl (2003) also point to the importance of source credibility and preference but suggest that it is moderated by the strength and clarity of the message. In an attempt to reconceptualize the idea of message ambiguity, this experiment used messages containing arguments designed to be of moderate strength rather than an equal mixture of arguments designed to be strong and weak. The idea of ambiguity is relevant to this study because news reports on potential securitization issues should be expected to contain a mixture of arguments of varying strength (with the exception, noted earlier, of references to Qaida-style terrorism). This study supported a “bias” hypothesis, in which orientation with the source of preferred messages affects agreement or disagreement with the message.

Because of the difficulty of disentangling such issues as trust in the message, trust in the messenger, and trust in the government, this literature suggests a research question about the relationship between a securitization frame and attitudes toward the news media:

RQ1: How does the securitization effect interact with participants’ sense of their political alignment with the news media?

Other media relationships

What about media exposure? The psychological literature seems to share in a certain optimism about its beneficial effects: “The dramatic development of the mass media, especially television, may have increased exposure to both sides of many issues”
(Eagly et al., 1999, p. 66). Especially in the matter of terrorism, though, media coverage that suggests a nuanced, multifaceted issue with a variety of motives all worthy of examination would be distinctly the exception rather than the rule. As noted above, U.S. media in particular are unanimous in relegating terrorism to the sphere of unallowable debate. For other matters at the center of public controversy – illegal immigration, infectious diseases, or gay marriage – news coverage might be thorough and balanced, but it might as easily devolve into the sort of “cover the debate” that reduces public issues to the loudest common denominator. Readers and viewers might be heavily exposed to two sides on an issue, but whether those two sides are both sides, let alone all sides, is debatable.

The salience of these issues, and of the polarized debates that surround them, can be highlighted by the unusual role of the U.S. president as chief newsmaker as well as chief executive. If the White House is not making news, it is responding to news: “When looking for reaction to a news event of national importance, then, it is natural to expect, and see, a presidential response” (Bucy & Newhagen, 1999, p. 63). It is hard to conceive of a securitizable issue on which the president’s views are not prominent, but what will that prominence produce? If supporters of the president are reinforced in their support, are opponents similarly strengthened, or are they drawn away from their prior positions?

Shortcuts in news do not mean an absence of news. A preference for daytime talk shows over the New York Times does not guarantee a nation of news zombies. Rather, as Baum and Jamison (2006) argue, it means politically inattentive voters have access to palatable information that helps them vote in ways that reflect their preferences. But these voters are among “the least strongly wedded to their political attitudes and
preferences” (2006, p. 958) and among the most likely to change those preferences – again, in dual-route processing, those most open to heuristic arguments.

Many factors that should in a vacuum offer clear predictions about how systematic or heuristic processing is activated, and what effects the chosen route might have on producing or changing attitudes, are more ambiguous when considered from this perspective. Ego involvement, for example, might predict that a message receiver’s attitude toward an object would be linked to the receiver’s values (Eagly et al., 1999, p. 66). “Outcome relevance” (Eagly et al., 1999) is also thought to affect attitude toward a development likely to affect “important, near-term goals,” by increasing systematic processing – exactly the opposite, though, of what might be expected from something potentially menacing but irrelevant or absent in day-to-day life, such as terrorism or the collapse of border controls with Mexico.

The “need for cognition,” a “tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982, p. 119) and generally to look for more information and process it harder, has been thought to affect the choice of processing paths. Areni, Ferrell, and Wilcox (2000) suggest that the effect is more complicated than a simple linear relationship between higher need for cognition and more thorough processing. People high in need for cognition, considered likely to reject simple cues like group opinions in favor of detailed processing, were indeed susceptible to those cues when they seemed directly connected to more relevant information. And Kam (2005) found that need for cognition provided no clear results in distinguishing people who are likely to process systematically from those processing heuristically; the need for cognition might simply not be relevant to how people approach politics.
Emotion and mood have been found to be influential in determining processing route, but Zuckerman and Chaiken (1998) suggest that no clear direction has emerged. Fear might imply a “sufficiency gap” and thus encourage systematic thinking; more in line with what the securitization frame suggests, it could also reduce the motivation to think about a topic the receiver would rather avoid. A more important effect of emotion on framing, Nabi (2003) suggests, could be played by how emotion is primed, or made accessible at the point where a decision is made. Nabi found promising, if sometimes ambiguous, indications that fear and anger primes can affect the kinds of information subjects seek (addressing the cognitive idea of the sufficiency gap) as well as the sorts of policies they prefer (the attitudinal effect of a frame like securitization).

Recent research in priming also suggests a complex interplay between immediate and cumulative news coverage and prior knowledge and attitudes. Although coverage alone may be unlikely to change attitudes, it could affect the choice of attitudes used in making political judgments (Althaus & Kim, 2006) – just as might be predicted by the successful invocation of a securitization frame on an issue that had been dealt with before by the normal workings of the system.

**Issue ownership**

Unlike a hitherto unseen image or unheard song whose novel effects on an audience can be tested with some confidence, news does not emerge from a vacuum. Securitized issues are not unprecedented developments swimming into human ken for the first time. Immigration, illegal drugs, political violence and the like occur both in their own contexts and in contexts shaped by the prior news knowledge and political and
cultural attitudes of the audience. But those bits of knowledge and attitude themselves
can be used as a measure. In the case of political violence, they help form the individual’s
“terrorism schema” (Dunn, Moore, & Nosek, 2005), which in its turn affects how that
person encodes violent acts for remembering and, later, retrieves them for comparison
with new stimuli.

Any such measure includes such political attitudes as party orientation but is not
limited to them. Issue ownership theory (e.g. Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen,
2003) suggests that the contemporary Republican Party generally “owns” issues related
to national defense and security. Such ownership reflects a combination of an individual
politician’s record and the understandings and expectations of the corresponding party’s
constituency (Benoit & Hansen, 2004; Petrocik, 1996), and there are indications that
Republican-owned issues tend more toward the “novel” – and because unprecedented,
more subject to securitizing moves – even as Democrat-owned issues resemble those
handled by the process of politics as usual (Petrocik et al., 2003). But individual
outbreaks of war or violence, like short-term fluctuations in economic indicators, fall in a
different domain; the handling of a war or a recession is a “performance” issue, open to
“lease” by whichever party can paint itself as more capable of solving the problem at
hand (Petrocik, 1996, p. 827). Thus, a measure of how prior political attitudes might
interact with securitization attempts must take into account not only political affiliation
but opinions about how the incumbent party is handling the issue at stake and how the
country itself is faring.

The following research questions are thus proposed:
RQ2: What is the relationship between the effect of the securitization frame and the identification of terrorism as the “most important problem” facing the nation?

RQ3: Is there a relationship between the channel through which a participant gets news (print, broadcast, Internet) and the effect of the securitization frame?

RQ4: Is there a relationship between those who list a specific source of news (a particular newspaper or network program, rather than “newspapers” or “TV”) and the effect of the securitization frame?

RQ5: Is there a relationship between how closely participants follow news of security-related issues and the effect of the securitization frame?

The following chapter will explain the methods by which these hypotheses and questions are tested.
This chapter begins by explaining the media outlets and variables chosen for a content analysis of securitization framing of the U.S. “war on terrorism.” The study primarily asks two questions of the data: Is there a “baseline” image of the war on terrorism? Do images of this conflict diverge from that baseline over time, and if so, in which directions? That pattern of framing provides the context for a controlled experiment meant to test whether the securitization frame has the hypothesized effects. Securitization, in which a political actor is able to characterize an issue as an existential threat justifying extraordinary measures, is expected to bias readers and viewers toward a series of heuristic judgments – judging the threat as more direct, being more willing to leave decision-making authority in others’ hands, and thus (reflecting less need to process attentively) allowing the frame to determine the amount of knowledge they actively seek. These proposals will be measured through affective and cognitive responses to news stories employing the frame, which will suggest the degree to which the political actor is able to win consent for securitization. Procedures for this experiment are described below.

*Content: Where the frame is and isn’t found*

Studies of media effects are, at bottom, studies of media content. For there to be an effect of securitization framing in news reports, in other words, there have to be more
and less securitized ways in which news can be presented. Thus, the first part of the investigation uses content analysis to propose that the maps U.S. news organizations draw of terrorism – both as a “war” and in the more familiar incarnation of substate actors demanding an audience with the state through violence directed at noncombatants – look drastically different depending on how and by whom, and in response to what pressures, they are drawn. Specifically, it will examine how and in what ways the “war on terror” is invoked by different news organizations in reporting on events that occur within the same time frame. The two content-related hypotheses predict that the securitization frame will be less widely reflected overall as that conflict wears on, but also that the frame will appear with greater or lesser frequency depending on the nature of the medium.

Content analysis, like framing itself, is an empirical extension of a familiar and comfortable everyday activity: “A formal system for doing something that we all do informally rather frequently, drawing conclusions from observations of content” (Stempel, 1989, p. 124). Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (1998, p. 20) describe content analysis as a “systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication,” categorized and studied by statistical methods with the idea of describing communication or drawing inferences about its effects and practices.

Where might such an examination find relevant differences in the framing of terrorism and other securitized issues? As contemporary agenda-setting studies have noted, a media agenda can no longer be reliably determined from a stroll past the post office in a town of 30,000. This project uses three newspapers with distinct profiles that suggest the sorts of agendas available today across several news platforms.
USA Today, the nation’s largest circulation daily newspaper, claims a circulation of 2.3 million. A mission statement describes the paper as “the easy-to-use, comprehensive source of timely news and information edited to inform and entertain today's time-pressed, affluent and influential people” (“Our mission statement,” n.d.). Because it has no specifically local or regional interests to address, USA Today’s selections of national and international news can be considered to parallel those of network television news. And much as the emergence of “objectivity” in news agency reporting is sometimes hypothesized to have emerged from those agencies’ need to sell their wares in a number of ideologically and culturally distinct markets, USA Today is the print incarnation of news designed to be equally palatable to any audience anywhere in the nation. USA Today is “popular” rather than populist (Illouz, 1994). It is widely read at a number of cultural levels, whereas the readership of the elite press is skewed toward the upper echelons of wealth and influence; its news follows a highly standardized format; and its popularity represents the “wide variety and all-inclusiveness of a highly commercial newspaper” (1994, p. 48). At the same time, it provides sufficient coverage of national politics to be studied alongside the more prestigious New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times (e.g., Aday & Devitt, 2001). It is expected to show the least variation over time – the fewest challenges to the status quo, from whatever direction – in its portrayals of the war on terrorism.

The other two newspapers in the sample also represent distinct segments of the news spectrum. The Washington Post, with a weekday circulation of about 850,000, is both a local newspaper and, given its coverage of the federal government, its international presence, and the nationally syndicated news service it contributes to, a
national one. It positions itself as a paper that breaks new ground on major stories and maintains a high standard of quality and quantity in coverage (e.g., Downie & Kaiser, 2000, chs. 3-4). It is used here as a representative of the prestige press.

The tabloid *New York Post*, owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp., is also a distinctly local newspaper, but it is used here because of the degree to which its populist coverage resembles the “fair and balanced” approach made available nationally by its corporate partner, the Fox News Channel. Fox quickly gained a wide audience among cable networks, positioning itself “not simply as another competitor, but as a brash, opinionated, and unashamedly patriotic channel” (Conway, Grabe, & Grieves, 2007, p. 199). A former editor for a British Murdoch property, the *Sunday Times*, describes Murdoch’s views as “a radical-right dose of free market economics, the social agenda of the Christian Moral Majority and hardline conservative views on subjects like drugs, abortion, law and order, and defence” (quoted in McKnight, 2003, p. 349). Style points that reflect such viewpoints, such as capitalizing “war on terror” and using “homicide bomber” rather than “suicide bomber,” can be found at Fox News’s Web site and in the *New York Post*. They underscore the distinctive point of framing that this section of the news media represents.

These papers, taken together, suggest the sort of variation available to a U.S. news audience with regard to the framing of terrorism and political violence, the easiest example of a securitization frame to operationalize.

*Methods: Sampling frame and variables*

The month of October in each year from 2001 through 2006 was chosen as a content frame. This month provides examples of coverage immediately after the
September 2001 attacks and continues with election and nonelection years alike. Files from the three papers in the Lexis-Nexis database were searched for content containing the phrases “war on terror” or “war on terrorism” in the text. Letters to the editor and non-staff-written opinion columns were not coded, because letters are assumed to represent unmediated content, and syndicated columns are often selected to present a range of views regardless of the paper’s own editorial stance. Staff-written news reports and analyses, as well as those provided by news agencies, and editorials were included in the coding. Indications of the frame could be, and were, found in nearly all sections of the newspapers, including sports, business, and entertainment.

The unit of analysis was the individual mention of “war on terror” or “war on terrorism”; articles contained anywhere from one to six such mentions. When necessary, the remainder of an article and its accompanying display type were used for context units. It was assumed that the war on terrorism could appear in different ways in an article. In several cases, several New York Post articles appearing on the same page had no specific mentions of “war on terror.” It was assumed that these were indicated by a page label, so they were coded as real, in the paper’s voice, and unspecified location.

Variables were developed through examination of content in similar media that were not part of the sample frame, primarily Foxnews.com, CNN.com and the New York Times. The securitization frame was conceptualized as lying along a continuum. Three variables were used to measure the degree to which it has been invoked (for details, see Appendix I, Coding instructions):

**Voice:** Whether the “war on terrorism” is mentioned in the paper’s voice or a source’s. Even terms as contested or incongruous as “homicide bomber,” after all, can
appear in news texts if they represent the direct words of a source. The more thoroughly the securitization frame is established, the more regularly the paper will mention the war on terrorism in its own voice, without relying on a source to say it. A “taken-for-granted use of the phrase” (Reese, 2007, p. 153) suggests that deeper structures are in play.

**Status:** Ranging from the formal status assigned by a proper noun to the highly contested status in which the name appears not in a direct quote but in quotation marks assigned by the newspaper. The War on Terror has been securitized; the “war on terror” has not.

**Location:** A geographically concentrated effort against a known and identifiable foe – the attacks in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and the Afghan government that sheltered it – is the most readily delimited and thus the least securitized. The more diffuse and less specific the war is, the more it becomes a “global” war, and the more likely it is to reach the United States, the more thoroughly it is securitized.

Data collection yielded a total of 841 articles and 1,098 mentions of “war on terror” or “war on terrorism” in the period under study. Of these, 41 articles comprising 76 mentions (7%) were double-coded to assess the reliability of the categories. Intercoder reliability using Scott’s *pi*, which accounts for agreement by chance, was .75 for the voice category and .88 for the status category.

The category of location proved more problematic. Categories comprising Iraq and the wider Arab and Muslim worlds were collapsed into a single category and articles that either coder deemed to present no identifiable location were dropped, and when a broader set of content was double-coded for reliability, an acceptable *pi* figure of .68 was reached for this category.

51
Similar constructs, such as the displacement of a threat from a specific location to a general one and the appearance of the threat in the neutral voice of the news organization as well as the biased voice of the political actor, could be applied to other securitizing issues. Immigration would be framed differently, for instance, if one news organization’s house style restricted the use of phrases like “illegal alien” to direct quotations and a competing organization used it in a wider set of contexts. But a “war on terrorism” encompasses a broader conceptual range than such issues as drugs, immigration or disease. It is thus particularly relevant for study on its own and for setting out the context in which securitization itself can be studied.

As the measures above suggest, securitization is a continuum, and many elements of it are specific to the time and place in which they are brought forth. From the perspective of the U.S. press, securitization of terrorism is operationalized as follows:

The war on terrorism is a fully securitized concept when it refers to an unambiguous, singular entity, familiar to both the writer and the news source who might discuss it; when it occurs in the writer’s voice as well as the source’s; and when it has spread beyond areas where U.S. forces are directly involved.

The war on terrorism is partly securitized when it appears as an uncontestedly real entity in the writer’s voice.

In other circumstances, when the war on terrorism is not securitized, it resembles what Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen (2003) refer to as a “normal issue.” This is not to suggest that international conflict or substate political violence is unremarkable, but that in such situations as these it is dealt with by normal workings of the state – as securitization theory predicts.
Recalling again Cohen’s observation (1963) that the world looks different to different people, depending on the maps drawn for them by the editors of the news they favor, this dissertation predicts an initial consensus on the nature of the war on terrorism that changes at different rates in the different newspapers. In the *Washington Post*, it is expected to become closely restricted to the search for al-Qaida in Afghanistan and much more contested in its other iterations, mirroring change in elite opinion about U.S. foreign-policy behavior. In *USA Today*, it will change more slowly, reflecting an attempt to correspond with a universally popular public opinion. In the *New York Post*, the war will change toward a more securitized portrayal, reflecting support for President Bush and his policies as broader approval of his policies and the war in Iraq decays, as well as a populist desire to “support our troops.”

Indicating the flexibility of the frame, of course, is not the same as demonstrating its effects. Thus, the project now turns to a method for determining whether the securitization frame produces the cognitive and affective outcomes hypothesized above.

*Why an experiment?*

As concerns were raised in the 1990s about exactly what framing was and how it could be maintained as a theory, as opposed to a set of observations, interest grew in studying the quantitative effects of framing rather than cataloging its manifestations in content. Scheufele (1999) sought to address the “theoretical and empirical vagueness” of framing by creating a model that emphasized framing as a process. Scheufele did not propose to discard the previous decades of framing studies; their “valuable contributions,” he made clear, are not diminished by their use of data “as illustrations
rather than as rigid tests” (1999, p. 109). Rather, he offers a way to bridge the gap between the sociological and psychological wings of framing – in effect, as this dissertation proposes, to put the illustrations of content analysis to the rigid test of experimental procedure.

The study of framing as a process requires assertions about cause and effect, and the controlled experiment is a valuable way of measuring the impact of the patterns that content analysis unearths – as Grabe and Westley (2003) put it, “the most powerful method of seeking answers to research questions about cause and effect available to the social scientist.” Equally, though, the experimental method rewards attention to carefully constructed, ecologically sound stimuli; parsimony of variance in messages (Reeves & Geiger, 1994); and an appreciation of context.

Such a diverse basket of requirements makes clear that experimental tests of news framing effects are not summoned by a snap of the fingers. Yet they have become more frequent in recent years. This work sprang initially from the psychological side of framing. Shah et al. (2004) sought to determine the influence of different frames and arrangements of frames on the cognitive system. Their work added to the mixture a slightly different concept of “framing,” from the work of Kahneman and Tversky (Heath & Tindale, 1994), in which “the context or ‘frame of reference’ surrounding a decision is an important consideration” (1994, p. 9). The concept that “gain” and “loss” frames have different influences on decision making leads to one of the salient features of the Shah study, its examination of multiple frames’ interaction.

Early experimental studies in the effects of framing wrestled with the dilemmas presented by the concept. Price, Tewksbury, and Powers (1997) acknowledge the
limitations posed by presenting a single constructed news item out of context. Still, their examination of the impact of different frames, such as conflict or human interest, on the sort of cognitive patterns produced by news reports suggests that mixed methods can illuminate effects of framing beyond the immediate ones reported by the subjects.

McLeod and Detenber (1999) used a set of three television reports about anarchist protests, chosen to represent different levels of status quo support, to test whether news framing influenced characterizations of police and protester actions. They found significant effects but acknowledged that idiosyncratic effects from the sample, as well as the use of three reports about the same situation, could have influenced the findings.

The need for precise manipulation of the independent variable and the need for simulated news accounts that look and feel like the real thing have remained a challenge. Thus, experimental research that accurately reflects standard news practice is particularly valuable. De Vreese (2003) persuaded Dutch public broadcasting to produce a manipulated story as the No. 2 item in a version of its standard evening news and used the result to test frames reflecting competing news values: conflict and economic consequence. New footage and interviews were recorded, but the “conflict” and “bottom-line” reports were presented by a regular anchorwoman and adhered to regular style and technical standards. De Vreese gave participants a questionnaire on demographics, media use and the like but rejected a pretest on grounds that it would cue participants “to watch the news in a specific manner.” He found that frames had as much impact as news “facts” but also found that the different frames had little influence on understanding the basic issue – European Union expansion – of the news reports. More recently, Grabe and
Kamhawi (2006) used broadcast reports from network programs, with broadcast journalists rewriting and re-editing the original audio and video tracks to create the manipulation, to examine the interaction of demographic factors (such as gender) and framing.

An experiment in which the securitization frame can be manipulated consistently in an array of news reports can be expected to address some of the concerns that researchers have wrestled with before and to provide a powerful within-subjects measure for determining the effects of a securitization frame on both knowledge and emotion.

Experimental design

This study employed a 2 (frame) x 2 (orientation toward government) mixed design. Frame was a within-subjects variable, operationalized as the presence or absence of the securitization frame. This frame was used with both cognitive (memory) and affective (feelings of personal threat, trust in the government, and the likelihood that the news event depicted in the article represented part of a larger ongoing pattern). Orientation toward government was a between-subjects factor, operationalized as high support and low support.

Independent variables

For stimulus material, this experiment uses 8 constructed news articles based on reports of events that reflect securitizable issues. Articles were edited to a range of 200 to 250 words and manipulated between the second and fourth paragraphs to present the issue as a security threat or as an event handled through the regular functions of the state.
– an issue for “normal politics” (Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003) rather than the strong reactions evoked by the securitization frame. The manipulations were done by the primary researcher, whose 25 years of daily journalism included extensive experience with national and international news. Of 10 articles originally prepared for the study and approved by the Institutional Review Board, one (dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program) was discarded because the situation produced a series of prominent news developments shortly before the experiment was to begin. A second article was then discarded to maintain a balance of four articles in each condition per participant.

The articles and questionnaires were organized using the MediaLab computer program (Jarvis, 2006) for ease of randomization and data collection.

Participants’ reports of their main sources of news were separated into three categories:

Print (n = 46), which included specific newspapers and magazines, those outlets’ Web sites (e.g., “nytimes.com”), and generic responses like “newspapers.”

Broadcast (n = 63), which included specific radio and TV stations or their Web sites (e.g., “foxnews.com”) and generic responses like “television.”

Internet (n = 38), which included Internet portal sites and generic responses like “the Internet.”

These responses were also reanalyzed to distinguish those who reported a specific print, broadcast, or Internet source (n = 81) from those who responded with a generic “newspapers,” “TV,” or “Internet” (n = 69).
Participants’ reports of the problems they deemed “most important” were sorted into 14 categories, with three – terrorism (n = 33), Iraq (n = 48), and economic issues (n = 18) – emerging as the most frequent.

Participants’ orientation toward the government, favorable or unfavorable, was measured by adding responses to the following four questions in the pretest. (Because conflict is a “performance” issue (Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003) as much as an ownership issue, it should not be assumed to be the property of either major party, so support for the incumbents is expected to be as relevant as party affiliation.) Each is measured on a 7-point scale:

*How much do you trust the government to look after your interests?*

*Do you think the country is better or worse off than it was six years ago?*

*Do you think the country is safer or less safe than it was in 2003?*

*How good a job would you say the president is doing?*

These were reversed so that lower numbers were at the left, then added and divided into two categories, high (n = 78) and low (n = 73) in orientation toward the government, at the whole number nearest the median split (17).

Orientation toward the news media was conceptualized as the degree to which participants considered their political views aligned with those of the media. A scale was created by subtracting participants’ rankings of the news media’s politics on a 1-to-7 Likert-type scale (from “very liberal” to “very conservative”) from their assessment of their own political views on the same scale, then adding 7 to place the entire scale on the positive side of 0. A rating of 7, then, meant that participants saw themselves as exactly aligned with the media. Ratings less than 7 indicated participants who saw the media as
being politically to their right; ratings greater than 7 indicated participants who saw the media as being to their left. For analysis, this was broken into three categories. Ratings of 3 through 6 (n = 47) were considered left of the media; ratings of 7 or 8 (n = 60) were considered similar to the media; ratings of 9 or higher (n = 44) were considered right of the media. Three categories rather than two were used to make the distribution more balanced.

Attention to securitized issues was measured by asking participants how closely they followed news about Iraq, terrorism, and civil liberties. The mean of these scores was taken and divided into three categories, low (n = 50), medium (n = 51), and high (n = 50). Three categories instead of two are used because the measure fell almost perfectly into thirds but no convenient median split was available.

**Dependent variables**

Participants’ recognition memory was measured by summing the number of correct responses to multiple-choice questions taken from the securitized and unsecuritized articles. Thus, each participant had a maximum score of 16 for each condition.

Comprehension was coded from responses to the “what was the main point” question, using the indicators suggested by Robinson and Levy (1986). Responses were then recoded as a binary variable, with 0 representing scores below the comprehension level and 1 indicating comprehension of the main point and possibly more details about the article. Each participant thus had a score between 0 and 4 for comprehension of securitized and nonsecuritized articles. About 15% of the responses (22 participants)
were double-coded to check reliability of the categories. Intercoder agreement using the Holsti formula was .90, but Scott’s \( \pi \), accounting for agreement by chance, was .64.

Measures of the degree to which participants perceived events in the articles as threats to their personal safety and security, how much they trusted the government to deal with the situation described in each article, and the degree to which they thought the articles represented an ongoing issue that they would expect to read about again were assembled from the questions measuring affective response presented after each news article. Multiple-item scales are useful for examining prior political beliefs, because such scales provide greater levels of discrimination and are less affected by idiosyncratic responses (Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996). Measures used in this study incorporate questions created by Brewer, Graf, and Willnat (2003) to examine the impact of framing on attitudes toward foreign countries; other measures developed specifically for this study reflect similar principles.

Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation indicated that three main factors were present:

Trust, which represents the key dimensions of the securitization frame. It comprises answers to these questions, presented on a 1 to 7 Likert-type scale, with 1 representing “strongly agree” and 7 representing “strongly disagree”:

- This sort of event represents a threat to our way of life.
- The government needs to take extraordinary measures to deal with this situation.
- I’m confident that our leaders will handle this properly.

Cronbach’s alpha for these three questions was .75.
Safety measured the degree to which the participant deemed the situation a threat to his or her personal safety. It comprised answers to these questions:

- This story is personally important to me.
- This story makes me worried.
- This story makes me frustrated.
- This story makes me anxious.
- This story makes me concerned about the country’s safety.

Cronbach’s alpha for these five questions was .91.

“Ongoing” measured the degree to which participants thought the article was important not only today, but as part of a larger pattern and thus presumably more likely to be the sort of continuing concern that would be securitizable. It comprised answers to these questions:

- This story needs to be prominent in the news report.
- This story will probably be followed up tomorrow.
- This story is part of a pattern that needs attention.
- Americans need to hear a lot more about this issue.
- I knew what was important about this story by the second paragraph.

Cronbach’s alpha for these five items was .74.

Variables were then created from these factors by making the scales’ direction consistent (so that low numbers represented low levels of the condition) and taking means of the subjects’ answers to the questions involved. These were then separated into means for securitized articles and means for unsecuritized articles, as were the answers to the comprehension and recognition memory questions.
Participants

Participants (N = 151) were recruited from an undergraduate survey class in the journalism school, which offered extra credit for participation in as many as three research projects. Experimental studies using student populations are perhaps less commonly used to test hypotheses in international relations than in media studies or communications, but they do exist. Mintz and Geva (1993), for example, found a potential mechanism for the “democratic peace” hypothesis in student responses to accounts of a potential conflict with a rival state and replicated their findings with a general adult sample as well. Beer, Sinclair, Healy, and Bourne (1995) used a student sample to test whether knowledge of a peace treaty between two (fictitious) countries affected decisions on the appropriate level of U.S. response to a fresh militarized dispute between those countries. Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz (2006) conducted a decision-making scenario experiment using military officers and repeated it later with university students. They concluded that although students are likely to be unreliable as stand-ins for political elites, “when the real-world ‘equivalent’ of a student sample is the ‘public’ rather than the leader or the elite ... student experiments may actually tell us a great deal about the behavior of the public” (2006, p. 769). In the present study, a student sample was expected to act as a representative of the public at large: a news audience before which political elites attempt to categorize security issues, sometimes working with and sometimes working against the news media that cover them.

More broadly, Basil, Brown, and Bocarnea (2002) defend the use of nonrepresentative samples – specifically, students – in studies that examine multivariate relationships, as opposed to those that try to extrapolate to a population from a univariate
estimate. If the process that underlies the relationship of one variable to another is expected to be essentially the same among students as among members of other subgroups and the wider population, they find, such a nonrandom sample is suitable. Because this dissertation examines the interaction of the securitization frame with attitudes and opinions, rather than extrapolating to the public from those attitudes, a student sample is appropriate. Further, a sample of students at similar points in the same academic program can be expected to be more homogenous on such factors as age, years of education, and socioeconomic status that traditionally interact with exposure to news and selection of news channels.

*A priori* analysis using the program GPOWER (Feld & Erdfelder, 1992) indicated that about 130 participants would produce sufficient power to avoid Type II (false-negative) error, or the failure to detect a difference that actually exists.

For measures of prior attitudes and a list of postexposure questions, see Appendix B. For stimulus material and questions to test memory, see Appendixes C and D.

*Experimental procedure*

After signing consent forms and receiving a brief overview of the study, participants completed a pretest to assess their political orientation and attitudes toward news media; where they placed terrorism among “most important problems”; and the degree to which they approved of key political actors. Each subject read all 8 articles on a laptop computer. For half the subjects (assigned at random), even-numbered stories were securitized; for the other half, odd-numbered stories were securitized. Order of presentation was randomized by the computer program.
Affective responses were measured after each article was presented. Participants were asked, among other things, whether the situation presented requires extraordinary measures, whether it is appropriate to surrender some civil liberties to handle it, whether it is part of a larger ongoing story, whether the securitization frame provides “all I need to know,” and whether the situation should be left to authorities in power without further public input or debate.

After a brief distractor task, participants undertook the memory portion of the experiment. First, they were asked to explain the “main point” of each article (Grabe & Kamhawi, 2006; Robinson & Levy, 1986). Recognition memory was measured with a set of 32 multiple-choice questions, four taken from each article. Both sets of questions were randomized, with the “main point” questions appearing first.

Participants were then debriefed and thanked. The experiment took an average of 30 to 35 minutes.
CHAPTER 5
Content analysis results: How a War becomes a “war”

The idea of waging war on terrorism, as noted earlier, is not new. Nor, to judge from a broad consensus in the U.S. newspapers analyzed for this study, was the post-9/11 incarnation of it especially controversial. How, then, could the “war on terror” have changed from a war of consensus to “a rich current framing case, perhaps the most important of our time” (Reese, 2007, p. 152)? How can those changes be documented in news content? More broadly, how would any such pattern be related to a process of securitization?

This section of the dissertation proposes two hypotheses about how the conflict will appear in news media content:

H1: Across all categories of media examined, coverage of the “war on terrorism” will reflect the securitization frame more closely in 2001 and 2002 and less closely in later periods.

H2: As the 2001 attacks become more distant in time, the securitization frame will diverge in different media, so that it will appear least frequently in elite media, more commonly in popular national media, and still more commonly in populist media aligned with the governing party.

This picture of consensus and divergence, in turn, will offer insights into how the political competition for control of the securitization switch is contested. The importance of such measures is underlined by Reese’s suggestion (2007) that the war on terrorism has become a “macro-framework”: in other words, even criticism of policies related to
the conflict is conducted within boundaries set by the “war on terror” frame. The degree
to which coverage in different papers provides alternate frames will indicate how
thoroughly the war on terror is securitized for those papers’ audiences. By extension, it
will also suggest how other securitizing moves, such as those involving immigration,
could be similarly indexed.

This chapter will address the hypotheses by setting out what appears to be a
baseline: a consensus view of the “war on terror” common to all three newspapers. Then
it will examine divergence or lack of it on the three measures involved – the papers’
willingness to speak of the war in their own voices, their portrayal of it as a less or more
contested concept, and their suggestion of whether it is geographically concentrated or
diffuse. It will conclude by examining the different pictures of the war that were available
to different audiences as time passed after the September 2001 attacks.

Results

The baseline picture of the “war on terrorism” in October 2001 is in some ways
strikingly consistent and in others unsettled. Overall, discussion of the war is similar
among the three newspapers in October 2001, the month that followed the 9/11 attacks
and the month in which the attacks on Afghanistan began, although the frequency with
which it is mentioned is divergent: 176 times in Washington Post content, 89 in USA
Today, 57 in the New York Post. A similar pattern holds true of the entire sample;
throughout the sample period, the Washington Post mentions the war more than the other
two papers combined, though the other two are nearly even across all six years.
Table 1. Number of times each newspaper mentions “war on terror” or “war on terrorism” in October of each year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Washington Post</em></td>
<td>176</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>USA Today</em></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>New York Post</em></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 89% of mentions of the “war on terror” or the “war on terrorism” during October 2001 appeared on news pages (national news, local news, editorial, and business news), and about 11% on sports or feature pages. A slightly higher proportion of mentions (91.5%) in the *Washington Post* appear on news pages than in *USA Today* (87.6%) and the *New York Post* (84.2%), but the difference is not significant, $\chi^2 (2, n = 322) = 2.63, p = .27.$

A similar overall proportion of mentions (88.2%) put the war in the paper’s own voice, compared with 7.5% in direct quotes and 4.3% in indirect quotes. Slightly more of the *Washington Post*’s mentions are in the paper’s voice (89.8%, compared with 88.8% and 82.6%), but this difference is not significant either, $\chi^2 (4, n = 322) = 6.43, p = .17.$

There is a significant difference in how the status of the war is portrayed ($\chi^2 (6, n = 322) = 15.03, p = .02,$ but this difference arises from the near-unanimity in *USA Today* (95.5%) and the *New York Post* (96.5%) that the war is unambiguously real. The *Washington Post* places the phrase “war on terror” in distancing quotes three times that month, but the last of those appears in an article October 8 about Arab reaction to the attacks on Afghanistan that had begun the day before. More frequently, the *Washington Post* introduces ambiguity by referring to the war as the president’s or the administration’s war on terror, and 8 of those 18 mentions occur at or before the
beginning of actual combat. And despite those apparent cautions, seven-eighths of mentions in the *Washington Post* (87.5%) cast the war as unambiguously real. The differences are less than meet the eye. On these two measures, the securitization frame enjoys a consensus.

More relevant are the differences that emerge in where the war is situated. In cases for which a location could be determined in *Washington Post* coverage, the war is confined to Afghanistan and al-Qaida about as often as it is a “global” threat that could reach or has reached the United States (37 to 38, respectively). The proportions are similar in *USA Today* (28 to 34); in the *New York Post*, the war is “global” as opposed to Qaida-specific by a proportion of about 3 to 1 (30 to 11). The difference in location is significant ($\chi^2 (4, n = 322), = 14.43, p = .006$). Interestingly, part of the overall difference can be attributed to articles suggesting that the war on terrorism could comprise Iraq as well; this accounts for 22 cases in the *Washington Post*.

Further, the concept itself, though “real” enough to be readily discussed without quotation marks, remains novel and unsettled. Three mentions in the *Washington Post* in the week before the Afghan fighting began describe a “new war on terrorism,” a phrase that also occurs in *USA Today* (the idea of a “war on terrorism,” as noted above, can be found as early as the first Reagan administration in U.S. news language). The October 8 editions of the *Washington Post* (“the cruise missiles and bombers that opened the war on terrorism”) and the *New York Post* (“opening salvos of a lengthy war on terrorism”) both link the war specifically to the fighting in Afghanistan. But in the same edition, the *New York Post* refers to the 9/11 attacks as “a turning point in the war on terrorism” (Blomquist, 2001).
To be sure, some confusion arises from the diffuse nature of post-9/11 policies. If the war is hard to pin down at first, that comes about in part because in its broadest sense it is, as a USA Today headline writer put it, a “war on five fronts”: military, diplomatic, financial, police work, and intelligence. It is hardly surprising, then, that within three paragraphs in the same article, the “war on terrorism” can stand for both the military campaign in Afghanistan and a diffuse campaign that could take years (Weisman & Stone, 2001). A presumptive logic in those months also tended to push unsolved mysteries into the category of the war on terrorism. Hints even arose that Iraq could be linked to the mysterious mailing of anthrax to legislative offices (Johnson, 2001).

Despite such differences, a consensus picture emerges at all three levels of media studied here. The war on terrorism is frequently or predominantly a global concern that could easily affect the U.S. homeland. There is some disagreement, within and among newspapers, on the geographic boundaries of the war, but no paper appears to rule out any particular location. But wherever the war is, it is real, and the three newspapers quickly adopt the habit of speaking about it in their own voices. No source is needed for either the phrase or the securitized concept that it entails.

The picture is slightly more divergent in 2002. For one thing, counting all three papers, there are sharply fewer mentions of the “war on terror” or “war on terrorism” in October 2002 (205) than in the previous October (322). Indeed, the frequency with which this conflict is named falls steadily throughout the study period, except for the presidential year of 2004. The three newspapers still mention the war on terrorism predominantly in their own voices, though the proportions have begun to diverge. In the Washington Post, there are 2 mentions in the paper’s own voice for every direct or
indirect quote; the ratio is about 7 to 1 in USA Today and about 4.5 to 1 in the New York Post. This difference is significant ($\chi^2 (4, n = 205) = 10.58, p = .032$). This movement suggests that in the pages of the Washington Post, the war is a less surely securitized concept. The war’s location is increasingly more likely to be specific to Afghanistan and al-Qaida in the Washington Post and USA Today, but remains strongly oriented toward the global-U.S. category in the New York Post ($\chi^2 (4, n = 205) = 18.62, p = .001$). And if the four categories in which the war’s status is measured are collapsed into two (proper nouns and unambiguously real in one, ambiguously real and artificial in the other), the difference remains significant for the 2001-02 period but is not significant for 2002 itself.

This overall picture suggests that H1 is supported. Despite some differences among the papers, the war seems to be a unified concept at its outset. The bulk of the framing could appear in any of the three papers and seem at home. The war is the unexceptional context in which many matters are discussed. Some of these are political, as in this example from USA Today: “In what is shaping up as the first major test of President Bush's political clout since the war on terrorism began, the House is heading for a showdown vote Thursday on competing bills to strengthen the nation's aviation security” (Benedetto, 2001). Others are economic, as in the Washington Post: “That would come on top of more than $55 billion already committed to bailing out the airlines, rebuilding New York and revving up the U.S. military for the coming war on terrorism” (Pearlstein, 2001). Yet others have the ring of a World War II radio broadcast, as in the New York Post: “White House officials met this week with top television executives to enlist support in the war on terrorism and find out what ‘Hollywood could do for the nation,’ participants said yesterday” (“Les: More to be done,” 2001).
Before turning to the changes in the dimensions along which the war is portrayed, it is important to note that while this picture might become fractured in many media contexts, it does not vanish. A *USA Today* retrospective at the 25th anniversary of the Iran embassy siege does not mention the “war on terrorism” by name, but its portrait of a globalized existential threat with America as its prime target is evident:

The Americans did not know it, but they were staring at the future—a militant Muslim fundamentalism that would one day replace communism as the greatest threat to their nation. What was shocking in 1979 has now become routine. A new group of extremists—this time in Iraq—almost daily takes hostages, makes threats and demands concessions. And though the circumstances are vastly different than in Iran 25 years ago, the plan is the same: Invoke Islam to crush America. (Hampson, 2004)

Those assumptions remain part of the mainstream in the news portrayals studied here. What sets the later years apart is the appearance of different mainstreams. Media that support the administration, like the *New York Post*, can make securitizing moves on their own, even in news columns: “President Bush yesterday warned America has to stay on the offensive in the war on terror—and slammed rival John Kerry for likening the life-or-death battle to a police action” (Bishop, 2004). Elite media, even if they do not necessarily oppose any of the conflicts subsumed under the heading of the “war on terror,” nonetheless challenge the premises of the frame: “The Bush administration is undercutting its ‘war on terrorism’ by embracing a Libyan regime that plotted a year ago to assassinate the ruler of Saudi Arabia” (Ignatius, 2004). Whatever may have happened to the armed search for the attackers of Sept. 11 and their enablers, it has in that sentence slipped beyond the borders of securitization. The power to invoke a securitizing move is not gone, but neither is it uncontested. An examination of those changes is now in order.
The big picture: How it changes

Several stark changes in the framing of the “war on terrorism” are evident when the election year 2004 is considered. For one, 2004 is an exception to the steady decline in mentions of the “war on terrorism” since 2001. The decline continues even more sharply in 2005, as the Iraq war approaches and enters its third year. Measuring the securitization frame during election years is particularly important because, as Reese (2007) suggests, when critics of the administration discuss the war in terms of its more or less successful conduct rather than its reality, they are discussing it in terms of the administration’s chosen frame. The tape of Osama bin Laden released in October of that year had a Kerry supporter asking: “Why haven't we captured him, if the Bush administration was going to be so effective in the war on terror?” (Milbank, 2004) – not whether “war” was the appropriate organizing concept for such an effort in the first place.

Increasingly, the war is a contested concept. The Washington Post and USA Today both mention it more frequently in 2004 than in the two preceding years, but both mention it proportionately less in their own voices: 50% of the time for the Post, 61.5% for USA Today, continuing a steady decline from 2001 in both cases. In one Washington Post article (Shear, 2004), the “war on terror” appears five times, with an array of geographic implications, but each is in a direct quote from a congressional candidate. There appears no reluctance to discuss the war – just a reluctance to mention it without making clear that it is prompted by an outside influence.

In the New York Post – a pro-Bush paper, in which the securitization frame is expected to appear most clearly – the war is mentioned more frequently as well. Indeed, this is the only paper of the three for which it is mentioned more often in October 2004.
than in October 2001. At the same time, the proportion of mentions in the paper’s own voice remains steady at 76%. The difference in voice among the three papers in 2004 is significant ($\chi^2 (2, n = 275) = 31.55, p < .001$). The war’s status also differs significantly ($\chi^2 (2, n = 275) = 13.77, p = .001$) among the papers. In Washington Post coverage, it is counted as ambiguous or artificial 13.8% of the time, compared with 5.2% in USA Today and a mere 1% in the New York Post.

By the eve of the 2004 election, the consensus picture of the “war on terrorism” across these diverse newspapers had dissipated. Examining the papers individually will shed further light on that picture’s new look.

H2 implies that USA Today would be the most stable of the three, because of its interest in maintaining a uniformly palatable package of form and content wherever it is available. In assessing the status of the war, this stability is strikingly clear. Only 4.4% of mentions ($n = 251$) across the six-year period portray the war as less than unambiguously real – not qualified, in other words, by implication that it is the president’s war or by quotation marks that would indicate writers’ distancing themselves from the idea. The proportion of mentions of the war that are made in the paper’s own voice declines steadily and significantly across the study period. Changes in the identifiable location of the war are also significant, even when excluding the disproportionately small final two years ($\chi^2 (5, n = 153) = 18.46, p = .005$). When these locations are identified, they tend to include the narrow Afghanistan conception and the broad global/US one in fairly even proportions, suggesting that the concept is neither more nor less securitized with time.

The war can be presented in different ways in the same USA Today article: “Bush calls the war in Iraq a central front in the war on terrorism” and “Kerry argues that
the invasion of Iraq has diverted important resources from the war on terrorism” (Nichols & Kasindorf, 2004). In neither case is it suggested that the war is artificial, or indeed that it is not a global issue of central concern to U.S. voters; at issue is its western border.

That too suggests a certain stability to the concept.

The Washington Post, representing the prestige press, mentions the “war on terrorism” the most frequently during the study period (597 times) and in each of the six Octobers studied. Mentions of the war are most frequent in October 2001, declining in the following two years, rebounding in the election year of 2004, then declining more sharply thereafter. (An exception to this overall trend is the New York Post, in which mentions of the war were more common in October 2004 than in any other year.) And, like the other papers, the Washington Post is hardly hesitant to mention the war in its own voice; 89.8% of its mentions in October 2001 are in that voice.

Figure 1: Percentage of mentions of “war on terror” or “war on terrorism” in the paper’s own voice.
This category presents the change that is most striking. In the following two years, the percentage is 65%, and in the election year of 2004 it falls to 48%. The overall differences are significant ($\chi^2 (10, n = 597) = 81.86, p < .001$). The *Washington Post* is clearly more reluctant to pronounce the existence of a “war on terrorism” on its own authority as time passes.

Figure 2: War’s status: Percentage of mentions suggesting ambiguity or artificiality.

The *Washington Post*’s expression of the war’s status presents a more complicated picture. Once again, there is little doubt through the years that the war is a real thing, but it is most definitively real during October 2002 – at a ratio of 14-1, compared with about 7-1 for the previous October, in which U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan. The air of ambiguity is never predominant, and indeed is never close to predominant, but during the 2004 election year the war is presented as an ambiguous or artificial construct about once in every seven mentions. And in the following years, as the “war on terrorism” continues to make fewer appearances, its ambiguity grows.
proportionately larger. These differences are significant, and they suggest that in the elite press, the idea of such a war is increasingly a contested concept.

The *Washington Post*, then, is not the “anti-war paper.” It is the most balanced across the study period in references indicating that the war is either specific to al-Qaida – “the war on terrorism launched Oct. 7, 2001” (Vogel, 2002) – or global in its implications. Intriguingly, it is also the most likely to suggest that Iraq is a part of the wider war, arguing in 2002 that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein has forced President Bush into a “two-front war on terror” (Hoagland, 2002). And it is the one that shows significant changes in all three of the variables that index the securitization frame: location, voice, and status ($\chi^2 (5, n = 597) = 11.11, p < .05$). It is the only one that makes regular use, although later rather than sooner, of a writer’s quotation marks to cast doubt on the war’s status: “What if substantial numbers of Democrats and moderate Republicans, enough to constitute a majority of the House, had questions about Iraq, or about torturing detainees, or about the whole course of this incoherent ‘war on terror’?” (Robinson, 2006). These developments support the hypothesis that the prestige press will diverge more than others toward skepticism.

No such change is evident in the *New York Post*; indeed, the picture of the war develops in quite the opposite direction. Both papers speak predominantly (if not overwhelmingly) of the war in their own voices in its first two years, 2001 and 2002. That voice remains predominant for the *New York Post*, even as it recedes – eventually into minority status – at the *Washington Post*.

Of 250 mentions in the *New York Post* over the course of the study period, only one appears in the artificial voice represented by quotation marks, and only twice does
the war appear ambiguous. The striking difference here is the rise of the War on Terror as
a proper noun – marked by capital letters as are the Korean War and the War of 1812.
These mentions, appearing almost exclusively in editorials or other commentaries,
account for nearly a third of cases in the 2004 election year and more than a third in the
following two years (again, as overall mentions revert to their pre-election decline).

An example is the editorial in which the New York Post endorses the candidacy of
President Bush, which uses the proper noun phrase “War on Terror” five times:

   Indeed, it was President Bush's vision and fortitude alone that led
   the nation to wage its fiercest war in decades.
   Nine days after the attack, Bush announced a War on Terror. It
   would begin with al Qaeda, but “not end until every terrorist group of
   global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”
   He said that in its “grief and anger” America had found its mission
   and moment – “the advance of human freedom.” And he vowed to use
   every legitimate means of warfare at his disposal (“Bush for America,”
   2004).

   Contrast those references with a Washington Post column the same month, in
which the war is “the struggle that most Americans call the war on terrorism” (Hoagland,
2004). Even if it is geographically definable, it is clearly a suspect idea:

   The related military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq -- the operational
   definition of the “war on terrorism” -- have had this clarifying effect:
   Muslim governments that for more than a quarter-century ignored or
   sought to profit from the spread of intolerance toward non-Muslims can no
   longer pursue those options with impunity (Hoagland, 2004).

   Unlike the other two papers, the use of the paper’s voice remains steady or
increases in the New York Post; it is three-fourths (76.9%) of the mentions in the
campaign year 2004, compared with 50% in the Washington Post. There is no significant
change in the war’s status ($\chi^2 (5, n = 250) = 2.613, p < .759$); only 3 times out of 250
(1.2%) is it deemed even an ambiguous idea. When a location for the war can be
determined, it is first predominantly, then overwhelmingly, a global conflict that could threaten the United States. When the securitization frame has changed in the *New York Post*’s pages, it has become more favorable toward the administration – the set of political actors with the most to gain if the U.S. effort to thwart and mitigate transnational terrorism is securitized as a “war.”

Figure 3a. War’s location: Percentage of mentions placing “war on terror” in Afghanistan or specifically against al-Qaida.

![Figure 3a](image)

Figure 3b. Percentage of mentions suggesting a “global” war that could easily reach the United States.

![Figure 3b](image)
Taken together, these findings support Hypothesis 2: Diverging from a rough consensus at the start of the study period, the prestige press grows less accepting of the securitization frame and the pro-administration press more accepting. Elements of that frame that remain consistent are most steadily portrayed in media that emphasize their ability to be all things to all readers or viewers.

Discussion

Establishing frame movement in news texts is the first step in suggesting that securitization provides an appropriate framework for explaining a particular multidimensional type of framing. The variation in these three measures – the degree to which a news organization transmits the “reality” of a concept supported by a set of political actors, the organization’s willingness to use a term favored by political actors in its own voice, and the precision or vagueness with which the threat is defined – provides a way of measuring whether the concept has been “securitized,” or understood as an existential threat requiring a suspension of normal routines and the arrogation of special powers to the actors who have been able to “call security.” The war on terrorism is a familiar and important example of an issue open for securitization, but the same mechanism can be used to study similar issues. A “war on drugs” serves not only to harden the lines of class and ethnocentrism that help to define how communities approach issues of illegal drugs (Pryce, 2006); it also may well alter the way financial resources are allocated and the role of the military in concerns that had traditionally been the province of police forces.

The ease with which political actors conflate such concepts as the “war on terrorism” with U.S.-Mexican immigration issues (an example is among the stimulus
materials used in the experimental part of this study) is a clear parallel but not the only one. The debate over whether newspapers should use terms like “illegal alien” provides a comparable semantic category for study. The language of news sources will find its way into the language of news no matter what, but the degree to which a contested term appears in the news organization’s own voice is a measure of the degree to which the security frame is passed along intact from political actors to audiences.

The divergence of this frame in different forms of daily journalism is significant as well and underscores the importance of examining multiple media outlets. The prestige press, after all, is not the one that frames the world for “the milkman in Omaha” (Cohen, 1963, p. 110) and his or her family and friends. Indeed, if they watch Fox News and read USA Today, they are seeing two distinct wars on terrorism that are both, in turn, different from the one in the pages of the New York Times. Which of these different frames is dominant, and how much securitization from which source adds up to what degree of effect, are issues for future research. But it seems reasonable to conclude that political actors fight to control the securitization switch because it is worth controlling: the ability to “speak security,” as Buzan et al. (1998) put it, promises to bring with it control of the various extraordinary rules that a securitized issue puts into play. And, as the next part of this study will suggest, that control is delimited in part by frames chosen by the media.

Media acceptance or rejection of securitizing frames is only one link in the larger chain of public acceptance, which securitization theorists deem essential to a successful securitizing move. The results of this content analysis indicate that such media choices are not monolithic, even in the face of an organizing idea as consensual as the September 2001 attacks. Journalists and media critics alike can find some elements of interest in
these findings. The divergence noted in the *Washington Post*’s framing of the war on terrorism can hardly be called opposition. Whether it represents a genuine set of alternatives introduced into discourse by an independent media watchdog or merely indexes a divergence in elite political opinion (Bennett, 1990; Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; Entman, 2004) is a different sort of question, and one beyond the scope or measuring tools of this project. But given the criticism leveled at the prestige press both externally (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; Dadge, 2006), and within the profession (e.g., “The Times and Iraq,” 2004; Getler, 2004) as the Iraq conflict wore on, the emergence of a counterframe, however belated, indicates that securitizing moves will not always go uncontested.

Meanwhile, though, what are the potential effects of securitizing an issue in news reports? Who is persuaded by a securitization frame, and how might that frame effect the information it surrounds? The focus of the dissertation turns now to an experiment that addresses those questions.
As the preceding chapter suggests, a securitization frame, in which news events are framed as imminent threats to a society’s physical or cultural survival that justify extraordinary measures, can be created, nurtured, or contested in news reports. Such a frame appeared with some consistency immediately after the September 2001 attacks and demonstrated a distinct and predictable divergence after that. But if framing is to be a theory of processes (cf. Scheufele, 1999), demonstrating a frame’s presence might complete one equation, but it is only the beginning of another: What does the frame do? This chapter discusses the experimental results of presenting articles using a securitization frame to a news audience.

These hypotheses and research questions were proposed:

H3: News accounts employing the securitization frame will produce a greater securitization effect (the situation in the article is perceived as a threat to “our way of life,” participants are confident in the government’s ability to handle the situation, and extraordinary measures are needed), and this effect will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government. This securitization effect is summarized as “trust in government.” The hypothesis is based on the central questions posed by Buzan et al. (1998): Who can invoke the security claim, how can it be invoked, and what makes it acceptable?

H4: Details of articles employing the securitization frame will be less well remembered than details of articles that do not employ the securitization frame, though
overall comprehension will not be affected. This effect will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government. This hypothesis reflects the idea of securitization as a heuristic effect that will lead to less-thorough processing of news reports.

H5: News accounts employing the securitization frame will be more closely associated with ongoing stories – issues that need to be prominently displayed in news coverage, representing patterns that need attention and matters the country needs to hear more about – than are the same accounts not employing the frame. This effect will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government. The enduring nature of this sort of issue, like the “long war” against terrorism, should be reflected in its portrayal as a long-term threat.

H6: News accounts employing the securitization frame will produce a greater sense of personal concern and anxiety than the same accounts not employing the frame. This effect will be more pronounced among supporters of the government than among nonsupporters of the government. Because a sense of personal involvement could affect the balance of systematic processing and heuristic processing, this sense of personal anxiety could also shed light on how securitized news is processed.

Several concepts of potential interest to news producers, news audiences, and political actors do not lend themselves to predictions based on extant literature and theory. They are tested as research questions:

RQ1: How does the securitization effect, both emotional and cognitive, interact with participants’ sense of their political alignment with the news media?
RQ2: What is the relationship between the effect of the securitization frame and the identification of terrorism as the “most important problem” facing the nation?

RQ3: Is there a relationship between the channel participants list as their primary source of news (print, broadcast, Internet) and the effect of the securitization frame?

RQ4: Is there a relationship between listing a specific source of news (a particular newspaper or network program, rather than “newspapers” or “TV”) and the effect of the securitization frame?

RQ5: Is there a relationship between how closely participants follow news of security-related issues and the effect of the securitization frame?

The results comprise data from 151 participants, recruited from two sections of an introductory journalism survey class. They ranged in age from 18 to 26 (M = 18.81, SD = 0.995); 116 (76.8%) were women. The experiment was conducted between March 7 and April 10, 2007.

On a scale of 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative), participants rated their own politics (M = 3.62, SD = 1.399) and the politics of the news media (M = 3.21, SD = 1.111). On a scale of 1 (very much) to 7 (not at all), they trusted the media (M = 3.61, SD = 1.286) more than the government (M = 4.01, SD = 1.288) to look after their interests, t (150) = 3.44, p = .001. They thought the country was worse off (M = 4.94, SD = 1.179) than it was six years ago and slightly less safe (M = 4.19, SD = 1.359) than it was in 2003.

On a scale of 1 (very closely) to 7 (not at all), they reported following news about civil liberties (M = 4.03, SD = 1.46) more closely than news about terrorism (M = 4.18, SD =1.26) or Iraq (M = 4.21, SD = 1.335). Asked to rate the performance of national
politicians on a similar scale (very good to very bad), they rated the president worst (M = 5.09), followed by Republicans in Washington (M = 4.70) and Democrats in Washington (M = 3.82).

Examination of the data indicated that no participants were extreme outliers on recognition memory (more than 2.5 standard deviations above or below the mean). To test the success of the randomization, responses in the pretest were compared in a paired-samples T-test, with the groups based on whether even-numbered or odd-numbered articles were securitized. For only one question, whether the country was safer than in 2003, did the difference between the two groups approach significance at the .05 level.

Table 2. Mean differences on pretest. Groups are based on whether odd-numbered or even-numbered articles were securitized. For exact wording of the questions, see Appendix B; for the articles in both versions, see Appendix C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Grp1</th>
<th>Grp2</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your own politics?</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td>.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How closely do you follow news about terrorism?</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>-.439</td>
<td>.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News about Iraq?</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>-.474</td>
<td>.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News about civil liberties?</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>-.890</td>
<td>.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust government to look after your interests?</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust the media to look after your interests?</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>-.088</td>
<td>.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate the politics of the media?</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>-1.010</td>
<td>.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the country better off than six years ago?</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the country safer than it was in 2003?</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1.883</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How good a job is the president doing?</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>-.383</td>
<td>.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans in Washington?</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>-1.230</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats in Washington?</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Hypotheses**

The hypothesis that the securitization frame would produce a greater all-around securitization effect – “trust in government” – was tested with a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the presence or absence of the securitization frame as a within-subjects condition and orientation toward government as a between-subjects condition. The interaction effect was significant, $F_{(1, 149)} = 5.016, p = .027, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .033$ (see Figure 4). Securitized articles overall produced more trust in the government, and the effect was significantly higher among supporters of the government. H3 was supported.

Figure 4: Effect of securitization frame and government orientation on trust in government.

H4, predicting that recognition memory would be lower for securitized articles than for nonsecuritized ones, was tested by the same procedure, with recognition memory for questions from the securitized vs. the nonsecuritized articles as a within-subjects

---

2 The dependent variable “trust in government” was squared to improve normality of distribution for the ANOVA and t-test calculations. Means and standard deviations are reported in original units.
condition. The interaction was significant, $F_{(1, 149)} = 4.856, p = .029, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .032$ (see Figure 5). Recognition memory in the two conditions is not different among supporters of the government, but memory for securitized articles is significantly higher among those low in orientation toward the government. H4 was partly supported. There is a main effect for the presence of the securitization frame, with the mean number of correct answers significantly lower for securitized articles than for nonsecuritized articles ($F_{(1, 149)} = 9.185, p = .003, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .058$), but the interaction with support for government is in the opposite direction from the one hypothesized.

Figure 5: Effect of securitization frame and government orientation on recognition memory.

H4 also predicted that comprehension would not be significantly different for securitized and nonsecuritized articles. This part of the hypothesis was supported. The interaction was not significant ($F_{(1, 149)} = 0.426, p = .336, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .006$), and there were no significant main effects for frame ($F_{(1, 149)} = 2.781, p = .097, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .018$) or orientation toward government ($F_{(1, 149)} = .341, p = .560, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .002$). The means, though, suggest that this “main point” question was ineffectively measured or ineffectively explained to
participants. The highest comprehension scores, for pro-government participants reading unsecuritized articles, indicate that those participants were getting the “main point” of less than one (.59) in four articles.

H5 predicted that the securitization frame would be more closely associated with ongoing stories, with that effect stronger among those high in orientation toward the government. The interaction was not significant \( (F_{(1, 149)} = 0.251, p = .617, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .007) \), and there was no main effect of the frame \( (F_{(1, 149)} = 1.065, p = .304, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .002) \) or of orientation toward government \( (F_{(1, 149)} = .121, p = .729, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .001) \). H5 was not supported.

H6 predicted that the frame would be more closely associated with a sense of personal concern and anxiety, with the effect stronger among those high in orientation toward the government. The interaction was not significant \( (F_{(1, 149)} = 2.076, p = .152, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .014) \), and there was no main effect of the frame \( (F_{(1, 149)} = .906, p = .343, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .006) \) or of orientation toward government \( (F_{(1, 149)} = .089, p = .766, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .001) \). H6 was not supported.

Research questions

RQ1 asks whether participants’ political orientation with respect to their perceptions of media political orientation (whether they perceive the media as more liberal or conservative than they are) is associated with emotional or cognitive outcomes. This “media distance” is similar but not identical to support for government (see Table 3). RQ1 was tested with repeated-measures ANOVA, with the securitization frame as a within-subjects variable and media orientation – left of the media (n = 47), about the same (n = 60) and right of the media (n = 44) – as a between-subjects variable.
Although the overall interaction of the frame and media distance on recognition memory was not significant \( F_{1, 148} = 1.337, p = .266, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .018 \), there were several significant differences among the means (Figure 6). Participants who considered themselves politically to the left of the news media had no significant difference in recognition memory \( t(46) = -2.273, p = .786, d = .04 \). Memory for securitized articles was significantly lower among those who saw themselves as similar to the media \( t(59) = -2.188, p = .033, d = .28 \) or to the right of the media \( t(43) = -3.025, p = .004, d = .46 \).

Similarly, the interaction of the securitization frame and media distance on trust in government (Figure 7) was not significant \( F_{1, 148} = 1.616, p = .202, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .021 \). But among participants who saw themselves as to the right of the media, securitized articles produced significantly higher scores on trust in government than unsecuritized articles \( t(43) = 2.628, p = .012, d = .40 \). There were no significant differences in trust for those who saw themselves as similar to the media \( t(59) = 1.467, p = .148, d = .17 \) or to the left of the media \( t(46) = -0.008, p = .994, d < .01 \).

Figure 6: Effect of securitization frame and participants’ “media distance,” or political orientation relative to the media, on recognition memory.
Figure 7: Effect of securitization frame and media distance on trust in government.

Table 3: “Media distance,” or how participants rate their own politics vs. those of the news media, and orientation toward government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Left of media</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Right of media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RQ2 asks whether participants’ identification of “most important problem” is associated with differences in their affective or cognitive responses. “Most important problem” was an open-ended question asking participants to identify the three most important problems the country faces. The first response was then coded into one of 14 categories, which were then reduced to a top three – terrorism (n = 33), Iraq (n = 48), and economic issues (n = 18) – and an “other” category. This was used as a between-subjects variable in a repeated-measures ANOVA with the securitization frame as a within-subjects variable. Both trust in government and recognition memory were used as dependent variables.

No significant interactions were found for either memory or trust. Individual t-tests found that only in the “other” category was there a significant difference for
recognition memory \((t(50) = -2.687, p = .01, d = .38)\), with memory for securitized articles lower than for unsecuritized articles. On trust in government, there were no significant differences in any of the four conditions between securitized and nonsecuritized articles.

Table 4. Effect of “most important problem” and frame on recognition memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Mem unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mem secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>2.266</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>2.713</td>
<td>-0.543</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>2.292</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>1.924</td>
<td>-1.549</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>2.016</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>2.036</td>
<td>-0.468</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>2.026</td>
<td>8.39</td>
<td>2.001</td>
<td>-2.687</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Effect of “most important problem” and frame on trust in government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Trust unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Trust secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.051</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RQ3 asks whether there is a relationship between the medium that participants list as their primary source of news and their cognitive and affective responses to securitization framing. This variable was taken from an open-ended response asking participants’ three main sources of news. The first response from each was then categorized as “print,” meaning magazines and newspapers or specific Web sites associated with them \((n = 46)\); “broadcast,” meaning television or radio outlets or their Web sites \((n = 63)\); “online,” meaning specific Internet portal sites or general responses like “the Internet” \((n = 38)\); and other or no response. The overall interaction with
recognition memory was not significant \( (p > .29) \), but the means for those giving print as their main source of news were significantly higher than for broadcast \( (p = .025) \) or online \( (p = .007) \). There was no significant difference in memory for securitized and unsecuritized articles among those getting their news from print \( (p = .12) \) and broadcast \( (p > .47) \), but for those getting their news from the Internet, recognition memory was significantly lower for securitized articles than for unsecuritized ones \( (t (37) = 2.615, p = .013) \).

Similarly, the interaction of orientation toward the government with type of news source was not significant \( (p > .18) \), but there was a main effect for type of news source \( (F_{1,144} = 6.118, p = .003, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .078) \), such that securitized articles produced significantly higher scores on trust in the government among those whose main source was broadcast or Internet than among those whose main source was print. This measure of trust in government was also significantly higher for securitized articles among broadcast subjects \( (t (63) = 2.566, p = .013) \) but not among Internet subjects \( (p = .19) \).

### Table 6. Effect of primary news medium and frame on recognition memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Mem unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mem secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Print</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>2.227</td>
<td>9.02</td>
<td>2.165</td>
<td>-1.603</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bdcst</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>2.087</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>2.100</td>
<td>-0.720</td>
<td>.474</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>2.195</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>2.062</td>
<td>-2.615</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7. Effect of primary news medium and frame on trust in government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Trust unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Trust secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>.902</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>.919</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>.842</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bdcst</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>2.330</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RQ4 asks whether there is a relationship between securitization and those who give a specific (n = 81) news source as opposed to a general “TV” or “Internet” as their main source of news. There is a main effect for securitization on trust in government ($F_{(1, \, 148)} = 5.368, p = .022, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .035$), such that trust for securitized articles is higher in both conditions, and a main effect for specificity in news source ($F_{(1,148)} = 4.673, p = .032, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .031$), such that trust is higher for both types of article among those listing a nonspecific source, but the interaction is not significant ($p > .79$). Specific vs. nonspecific source has no significant effect on recognition memory ($p > .32$), nor does it interact with the securitization frame ($p > .69$).

Table 8. Effect of specific vs. general news medium and frame on recognition memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Mem unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mem secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>2.198</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>2.173</td>
<td>-1.756</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>2.159</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>2.100</td>
<td>-2.291</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Effect of specific vs. general news medium on trust in government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Trust unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Trust secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>.942</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>1.377</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RQ5 asks if the degree to which participants follow news about security-related issues is related to the effects of the securitization frame. There is a significant effect of securitization on trust in government ($F_{(1,148)} = 4.95, p = .028, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .NNN$), such that securitized articles produce greater trust, but no effect from the degree to which
participants follow news ($p = .23$). There is a significant effect of the frame on recognition memory ($F_{(1,148)} = 8.509, p = .004, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .NNN$) but no effect of following the news ($p > .69$).

Table 10. Effect of frame and how closely subjects follow security news on recognition memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Follow</th>
<th>Mem unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mem secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>2.119</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>2.089</td>
<td>-1.875</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>2.219</td>
<td>8.39</td>
<td>2.359</td>
<td>-2.763</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>2.219</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>1.982</td>
<td>-0.441</td>
<td>.661</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Effect of frame and how closely subjects follow security news on trust in government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Follow</th>
<th>Trust unsec</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Trust secure</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>.803</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>1.701</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>.766</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.875</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>.938</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>1.553</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The securitization of news articles, then, appears to produce several effects. Some appear to be intuitively sensible: Securitization gives people who are oriented toward the government a stronger cue to perceive an existential threat and to put their faith in government to remove that threat. Some effects appear contradictory: Those who are not oriented toward the government process securitized articles less thoroughly than they do unsecuritized articles, but so do those who consider the media politically left of themselves (who are predominantly pro-government). The next chapter will consider what these findings might mean in context of how the securitization frame appears in different news accounts.
A walk to the corner drugstore for the Sunday newspapers this June morning provides an unusually clear look at the securitization frame in both its conditions. The top story on the front of the Columbia Daily Tribune reports the thwarting of a plot by a “suspected Muslim terrorist cell” to bomb a set of fuel pipelines, thus destroying New York’s Kennedy Airport and killing thousands in the bargain (“JFK Airport,” 2007).

At the New York Times, for which Kennedy Airport is a local story, the purported plot rates a one-paragraph mention in the front-page news index, referring to a full article on page 30. The word “terrorist” does not appear until the sixth paragraph; it is used only three times in the entire article and only in direct quotations from officials, one of whom refers to a suspect as “not a Grade A terrorist” (Buckley & Rashbaum, 2007).

The facts, and many of the quotations, are identical in both articles: The bomb plot is the terror plot, and vice versa. Yet it is hard to imagine a sharper example of valence framing, and in this case the valence goes directly to the questions proposed by Buzan et al. (1998): Who gets to “speak terror,” on what topics, and to what effects? And what must be present, in the message and the audience, for a terrorism frame to take hold? For the purposes of this study, another question needs to be added: What is it in the structure of that frame that links it conceptually to immigration, to infectious diseases, to nuclear proliferation among “rogue states,” and potentially to issues seemingly as far afield as climate change? How do we get from the specific topic of terrorism to the broad set of threats implied by securitization?
This dissertation has attempted to show that, along with its place in security studies, securitization has a distinctive function in framing as well. It is the process by which a series of events is organized into a problem, but it is also the process by which that problem and others like it can be organized into a particular kind of threat. Because securitization is a mediated effect, the political actors who seek the assent needed to declare a securitized threat and to prescribe the measures needed to counter it must win that assent not just from the public but from at least some of the mass media as well. And because securitization is the sort of frame that can be measured as an outcome in texts and manipulated to measure outcomes in news audiences, it offers further evidence that the sometimes “fractured paradigm” of framing has more structural and theoretical integrity than it might let on. Specifically, a process of securitization framing must involve both the way the frame is created in the media and the way it is understood in the audience. This process requires a step beyond traditional understandings of the limits of content analysis, in which content is usually “not linked in any systematic way to either the forces that created the content or to its effects” (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998, p. 9).

Those links are exactly the ones called for in contemporary critiques of framing; in this study, content stands as a bridge between antecedents and outcomes.

Framing entails cognitive shortcuts, as Lippmann (1922/1997) noted eight decades ago: Without the ability to sort by stereotype, the busy editor would soon die of excitement. Frames, like agendas, do not tell audiences what to think, but they do help audiences know what to think about, how to think about it, and – cognitively – how hard to think about it. From the evidence presented earlier, the securitization frame appears to play a role in all those developments. Depending on how and whether it emerges from the
competition through which frames are created and contested, and depending on which sectors of the audience are prepared to listen, securitization influences the way discrete events are organized into categories of threat and the degree of attention that a particular report on that threat needs before it can be understood and categorized. Before discussing how those effects play out, it is worth spending a moment looking at how threats appear among other categories of news and how threats constructed from the same elements can appear to be the wildly diverse set of perils that the securitization frame suggests.

“News” is not a naturally occurring element. It is constructed by particular journalists, in particular times and places, for what those journalists assume to be the interests, needs, and wants of particular audiences. The threat posed by the purported Kennedy Airport plot had to be distinguished from other perils, graded against other news, then cast as a particular kind of threat – the point at which the securitization frame comes in. In the Tribune headline, the plot is not asserted or alleged, but assumed: “JFK airport targeted in bomb plot.” In the Times article, the possibility of a massive death toll is framed as the second-hand musings of a man described by one of his defenders as a “two-bit grifter” (Buckley & Rashbaum, 2007); in the Associated Press article used by the Tribune, the attack is meant to “kill thousands of people and trigger an economic catastrophe.” It is the difference between an article about the normal functions of law enforcement and a look at Apocalypse Next Week – exactly the distinction drawn by the securitization frame.

As the preceding content analysis suggests, decisions like those reflected in the airport story have become much more widely contested, at least in some sectors of news. By desecuritizing the terrorism issue, at least for this one article, the Times widened the
space open to political debate. But the frame remains useful and potent – and, evidently, readily accessible for the front page. In that sense, the airport plot is a smaller-scale, single-case version of the securitization frame as it appears in the *Washington Post* toward the end of the study period described earlier.

As an effect on media, securitization appears in news texts; as an effect of media, it can be found in news audiences. But as first Lasswell and then Buzan and his colleagues would ask: How does it work, what paths does it follow, what does it do, and whom does it do it on? Before taking up those questions, this chapter will consider the antecedent stage: How the frame appears, and changes, in news texts.

*News: The frame as an outcome*

Is securitization in news texts the result of inattention (journalists allowing newsmakers to dictate the frames in which news is understood) or overattention? The short answer is both, a little, sometimes, and yes. Frames appear in media reports for a variety of reasons. They can be mandated from on high, though even in such a case the counterframe can easily appear; all it takes is a moment of carelessness amid the press of work on the editing desk for the mandated “terrorists” to become militants again, or vice versa. Frames can appear, as points of textual style do, by guesswork and imitation (Bell, 1991; Vultee, 2004). A frame can become preferred, at least temporarily, because it plays to virtues of news practice: brevity, drama, conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Wolfsfeld, Alimi, & Kailani, 2007). When a frame seems resonant or natural, it has no reason not to appear in a news account. If a novice reporter on a weekend shift is assigned to cover a picnic for military families for the Sunday local news section and the dominant discourse at the
event is about Iraq as a front in the “war on terrorism,” the Iraq-terror frame has the deck stacked in its favor.

But not all framing is accidental, nor is it all conceived in the executive suites. “Editors do not simply invent interpretive frames; they absorb them from the society in which they operate” (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 29). The language of news is what news workers expect their readers and listeners to expect; it is a form of “audience design” (Bell, 1991). These audiences are not exclusively the elites who feed the mutual influence of news and politics as described in indexing (e.g., Bennett, 1990) or “cascading activation” (Entman, 2004); they comprise ordinary readers as well, and changes in the sort of news language that is influential in securitization framing is likely to occur more quickly in popular media than in elite media (Bell, 1991). All in all, it would be unusual for any news frame to be completely stable for any length of time. It is larger and more lasting differences in framing, as described in Chapter 5, that suggest either changes pushed by the professionals assembling the news or a sense among those professionals that the national wind has shifted.

The data and examples from this content analysis suggest the occasional slip or accident. But they also point to larger patterns of frame movement and thus to the first part of the puzzle: When the frame is the dependent variable, what is at work in the independent variable? A reasonable explanation is that the variation represents the two kinds of change discussed above – roughly, change from above (as policy) and change from below (sensed in the newsroom). The news outlets representing more distinct audiences, the New York Post and the Washington Post, appear to address those audiences with greater degrees of top-down and bottom-up change respectively, while the
newspaper whose mission is to offer a product whose taste is equally palatable wherever in the country it is sampled, *USA Today*, occupies a sort of middle ground.

As suggested in Chapter 5, the *Washington Post* does not represent a “liberal” or “antiwar” pole of some notional journalistic spectrum. It does not serve as an opposition paper – but neither, as Bennett et al. (2007) suggest, did the out-of-power Democratic Party serve as an opposition between the September 2001 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. More likely, both party and paper are providing an index of the breadth of political space available for debate. The *Washington Post* did not create that breadth, but by amplifying an apparent change in the political environment (e.g., Wolfsfeld, 2004), it occupied the resulting space. The *Washington Post* becomes more reluctant to speak of a “war on terrorism” in its own voice and more willing to introduce ambiguity about it, but the war has by no means gone away (the *Post*, after all, remains the paper that mentions “war on terror” most often). Whether the conflict has been “desecuritized” – moved from the realm of existential threats back to the domain of normal legal-political workings – is a more challenging question. Desecuritization is less a frame than the absence of one, and thus it is harder to conceptualize and measure than its counterpart. But the *Washington Post*’s coverage suggests that the consensus among political elites, audiences, and news organizations that characterizes the ability to “speak security” was no longer universal by the elections of 2004. The securitization frame around the “war on terrorism” is broken for at least some readers of the *Washington Post*.

Who broke the frame – the media themselves, the elite audience, or the popular audience – is a different question. Some decay in public support for military involvement is predictable. Althaus and Coe (2007) suggest that the prominence and intensity of
coverage, more than its tone, tend to bolster support, but that effect disappears after the first year of fighting. In explaining a decline in support for President Bush and the Iraq war, Aday (2007) found that the White House’s share of news time had not declined but the tone of commentary offered by experts had become more negative. Both the popular and the elite elements of the audience, then, are making it reasonable for the news media to create new “slots,” or reallocate existing ones, to accommodate dissent over U.S. goals or performance in those conflicts.

Despite its appearance in the prestige press, such a break in consensus seems unlikely to be a precise index of some groundswell of national sentiment. The implied assent of the audience is essential to securitization, and for the dominant paper in the nation’s capital, the “audience” and “elite” points of the “media-elite-audience” triangle are to some extent one and the same. A perceived change in this audience is by no means the same thing as a perceived change in the homogenous audience that USA Today has in mind when it arranges to have its papers left outside hotel rooms in such places as San Francisco and San Antonio. Nor is it the audience addressed by the frame movement evident in the New York Post.

The New York Post is a “popular” newspaper in the sense of the British tabloids or Fox News (which shares corporate ownership with the New York Post as well as the largest-selling British tabloid, The Sun). To the extent that “popular” means shorter articles and larger headlines, a popular orientation would lead naturally toward bigger threats and less ambiguity – a welcoming culture for the securitization frame. But more is in play than that. “News is determined by values, and the kind of language in which that news is told reflects and expresses those values” (Bell, 1991, p. 2). Unlike the isolationist
press of the early 1940s, the popular press is oriented toward the classic “rally round the flag” effect (Mueller, 1973) and the concept that national political bickering stops at the water’s edge. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 5, coverage in the New York Post evokes the tone of all-pull-together World War II coverage – certainly more so than the stridently anti-Roosevelt coverage of the large Republican papers before Pearl Harbor. A popular press is not by definition one oriented toward a conservative major party; witness the ongoing support in The Sun for Britain’s Labour Party under Tony Blair.

At the same time, the New York Post’s orientation toward George Bush and his sector of the Republican Party can hardly be ignored. And if patriotism and populism are values that editors and writers might infer from or about their audiences, there are strong signs that the value of overt partisanship was directed from the top, at least in the case of the Iraq war (Greenslade, 2003). Although the New York Post’s sense of its audience helps account for the degree to which it speaks of the war in its own voice throughout the study period, it is difficult to explain the transformation of the “war on terror” into the War on Terror without taking into account the influence of senior editorial direction. A formal War is securitization in its most orthodox garb. It involves the potential suspension of social, cultural, moral, and economic norms for as long as the threat to nationhood lasts. The securitization frame remains strong in the New York Post – indeed, grows stronger through the six-year study period – because the paper deems its values, and those that by extension it shares with its audience, to be in continuing peril.

Those trends explain the widely divergent ending points of what had seemed, in a content analysis of a wide array of press models from the weeks after the September 2001 attacks, to be a widely held consensus view. Different attitudes within the
newsroom, different views directed from the glass offices, different senses of where the elusive audience’s attitudes are heading all suggest that five years on, very different frames are available to news audiences – though probably not all at the same time to the same audience.

A “war on terror” is only one example of a securitization frame, but it suggests the way such frames can arise and can be strengthened or weakened. The degree to which the frame is contested suggests the value it appears to hold for political elites and others who want to control the lens through which framing magnifies or shrinks the different elements of a news account. What is it exactly that they are contesting, though? If a consensus frame can diverge as widely as the “war on terror” appears to have, is there still an effect worth contesting?

Experimental evidence suggests that securitization – a frame that, when successfully invoked, creates a shared understanding of an existential threat that admits to any means necessary in solving it – is an effective and powerful way of inducing news audiences to organize their thoughts in a particular way. The discussion now turns to what securitization can mean to the political actors who are able to invoke it.

Effects: The frame as an influence

The experimental portion of this dissertation presented eight articles, four each in securitized and unsecuritized versions, to a student sample with the broad idea that securitization could be summarized as a heuristic: a cognitive shortcut that helps people make easier work of processing new information. The experiment measured both what participants thought about the articles and what they remembered about the articles.
Is securitization a heuristic, and if so, what kind (or kinds) is it? First, it is important to note that not all things called heuristics are alike. Cognitive biases like primacy or recency, in which the order items appear in affects the way they are remembered, are different from “expert advice is good,” which like other persuasive heuristics is a “learned knowledge structure” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 342). Securitization rests on a number of such learned structures: not only the idea of an existential threat, but the idea of a consensus for endorsing extraordinary measures to deal with it. And, as the interactions predicted in Chapter 4 suggest, previously formed attitudes toward government and toward the sources of information about security issues are also expected to play a role.

What benefits or disadvantages accrue to the political actor who can securitize an issue, and thus increase the chances that the issue appears within a securitization frame in news accounts? Participants who are not oriented toward the government are less systematic – thus, more heuristic – when they approach securitized articles compared with nonsecuritized ones. Securitizing an issue does not make the government’s supporters read harder; it seems to make the government’s opponents read less hard. A reasonable if ambiguous explanation is found in Eagly and Chaiken (1993, pp. 330-332): People want to hold “accurate” opinions while still spending their cognitive resources wisely; they try to balance an interest in processing economically with an interest in processing carefully. A change in processing route for securitized articles suggests that government opponents are the ones for whom the frame contains all they need to know. In the less ambiguous world of the childhood fable, the shepherd boy who cried “wolf” has lowered the sufficiency threshold for his skeptics but not for his supporters.
But this finding does not mean that the cry-wolf effect is the only processing outcome produced by securitization. Those who saw the news media as more liberal than themselves also approached securitized stories more systematically than those who consider themselves to the left of the media, and given that 82% of participants who fell to the right of the media were also in the pro-government category, the results suggest a contradiction. The findings could reflect a greater perceived need for information; equally, they could reflect distrust in the messenger. Given that in the context of this experiment, the political valence of the securitization frame appears to align with support of the government and distrust of how the media are portraying the government’s performance, the answer may be a combination of both ideas. Participants who saw themselves as to the right of the media were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to report a lower trust in the media to look out for their interests. It is possible that securitization is a different sort of heuristic signal here, related to the effect of source credibility (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Those aligned with the securitizing side but doubtful about the channel through which threats to security are portrayed are more attentive when the securitization frame is not present – in other words, they seem to be waiting for a cue that the media are applying the proper contextual frame for developments involving political violence or immigration.

Of potentially more interest in the political arena is the persuasive outcome. Among government opponents, securitizing a news article makes as close to no difference as possible (p = .96) in trust in the government. Supporters of the government are higher in trust under either condition, but especially so for the securitized articles. Supporters, in short, do not need to process harder to perceive a threat to “our way of
life” that the government is equipped, and obliged, to handle. They are inclined in that direction to start with, and a boost from securitization, the sort of political cue that stands out among others in the text (cf. Granberg, 1993), adds to the effect. Similarly, securitizing an article makes no difference in trust to those who see themselves as left of the news media, but it adds significantly to the already higher level of trust among those who see the media as left of themselves. These results do not indicate a greater sense of threat to personal well-being but a sense of threat to national and cultural well-being – the effect that the Copenhagen School predicts that “speaking security” should have.

Securitization appears to work independently of what audiences perceive as the nation’s most important problem, of how much they expect to see an issue covered from day to day, and of how closely they follow the news, even on security-oriented topics. But it has some relation to where they follow that news. A full discussion of how and why news audiences that are oriented toward newspapers appear less susceptible to the frame – put another way, less willing to grant the assent on which securitization relies – than those that watch TV or rely on the Internet is beyond the scope or purposes of this project. Still, it is worth noting that securitization of news articles produces greater trust among those whose main source is broadcast or Internet than among those whose main source is print, and that those who name a specific organization as their source of news are less affected by that securitization than those who offer a generic “TV” or “Internet.”

The effects of securitization on this study’s measure of trust in government support the original conception of securitization as a tool of particular value to political actors, especially those standing behind the levers of power. But the mixed direction of the cognitive effects remains puzzling: The frame appears to make processing less
thorough in two disparate groups, those who distrust the government (which stands on the political right for the issues and time period covered here) and who those see the media as standing to the political left of themselves. When the skepticism runs from left to right, as for the first group, the presence of the frame appears to be suggesting that the source of the message is crying wolf. When the skepticism runs from right to left, the absence of the frame suggests that the carrier of the message is failing to tell the whole or proper story. Those kinds of skepticism are not necessarily incompatible; indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, the heuristic-systematic model itself suggests that heuristic processing can occur at the same time as systematic processing. But the incongruity points to a concern that has been implied but not fully explored here: the alignment of securitization in this study with a single side of the left-right divide. That concern suggests not only the limits of this study and the promising ways in which securitization can be examined in the future, but some aspects of the issue that are relevant to the practice of journalism.

*Implications for the profession*

It is important to note here that securitization is not necessarily the Dark Side of security studies. The political camp that deprecates English-only laws or restrictions on the provision of public services to immigrants – clear indications that the immigration issue is being securitized – might welcome the securitization of energy or environmental issues. And, as the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests, the securitization of HIV/AIDS brings benefits in one hand and threats in the other. For media professionals, then, the relevant point of securitization is not that it is to be rooted out and destroyed everywhere it occurs – or that it should be granted an automatic four-week pass in
moments of national crisis like the September 2001 terrorist attacks. It is that the presentation of a situation as an existential crisis is likely to have collateral effects beyond the immediacy, drama, and relevance that are valued in journalism practice and education alike as core elements of making a good story better. Those effects are not by definition a “wrong” outcome; indeed they can easily be conceived as representing journalism at its highest and best. But those whose trust in government is bolstered by securitization appear to be responding to the frame as much as – or in place of – the content within it.

As Wolfsfeld (2004) has noted in the study of peace processes, the needs of peace can often seem diametrically opposed to the needs of journalism. So, perhaps incongruously, can the needs of war. As Churchill wrote to his information minister in July 1940, on the eve of the Battle of Britain:

The Press and broadcast should be asked to handle air raids in a cool way and on a diminishing tone of public interest. The facts should be chronicled without undue prominence or headlines. ... It must be clear that the vast majority of people are not at all affected by any single air raid, and would hardly sustain any evil impression if it were not thrust before them. Everyone should learn to take air raids and air raid alarms as if they were no more than thunderstorms (1949, p. 151).

If it sounds like a thinly veiled call for censorship, it might also sound like the results of research into news coverage of natural and technological disasters, which have often noted a tendency to portray damage as more widespread and generalized than it is real life (e.g., Wilkins & Patterson, 1991). And it suggests, again, that the contest over securitization is not a Manichean struggle of self-serving securitizers vs. truth-seeking desecuritizers. Desecuritization, as Churchill’s memo makes clear, can be a goal of the
party in power. Equally, securitization of an issue like water rights can easily be seen as a goal for political outgroups in parts of the Middle East.

It is difficult if not impossible to speculate in advance about which side of a securitization debate would be the “right” one for a news organization to take. The example of the purported plot to attack New York’s Kennedy Airport offers one potential guideline: Some weight should be given to the option that creates or maintains the wider space for legitimate democratic debate. To return to Wolfsfeld’s concept of news slots (2004), the New York Times’s desecuritization of the airport plot creates or makes available a new set of slots in which “bomb plot” can be discussed at the same time as “terror plot.” The plotters’ low likelihood of finding support among Caribbean radicals, the technical obstacles in the way of the plot’s success, and the effectiveness with which law enforcement was able to monitor the group are as relevant to the story as the plotters’ religion and gaudy comments about “killing Kennedy twice.” Conversely, from Churchill’s perspective, Britain’s plight in the early years of the Second World War had to be securitized in the American public before elite opposition to Lend-Lease or the repeal of the Neutrality Act could be overcome. If the mission of journalism in a democracy is to encourage the best debate as well as the most information (e.g., Ettema, 2007), a tentative answer can be suggested: The better frame is the one that keeps a wider variety of news slots in play.

Nevertheless, securitization is the sort of frame that is likely to find favor among the processes by which news is assembled into a news report. A “war on drugs” is more dramatic, and from the headline writer’s perspective infinitely more succinct, than a slow process of demand reduction and balancing penalties with inducements. As Wolfsfeld
(2004) suggested in his discussion of media and peace processes, political actors who want to promote the slower, less dramatic processes of desecuritization cannot overlook the needs of news – not by providing their own drama and immediacy, but by emphasizing a long-term view and working to keep expectations in perspective.

Noble as all that might sound, it remains ill-suited to testing by controlled experiment. These concerns point to some of the limitations of this study, but at the same time they underscore some of its potential to shed light on media performance in the future.

*Limitations and suggestions for future research*

This study tests an admittedly limited sample of securitizable issues: political violence and immigration. Future studies should broaden the scope of issues across the political spectrum and consider incorporating issues seen as more politically neutral, like disaster preparedness, to see whether the relationship between securitization and pro-government orientation is maintained under conditions in which securitization represents an anti-government frame. A broader test would also address the possibility that measures limited to the acts of an outgroup – “the terrorists” or “the immigrants” – affecting an ingroup are indexing some other effect entirely. As Sears (1993) points out, measuring attitudes toward “judicial permissiveness” can invoke an underlying race-related attitude too if a belief system connecting the two concepts is present. It is not hard – indeed, on examining the open-ended responses to the “main point” question, it is quite easy – to imagine how attitudes toward Arabs or Muslims become conflated with attitudes toward “the terrorists.”
An improved “main point” measure, which would involve more detailed instructions to participants and clearer links between the “bullet” identifier (Robinson & Levy, 1986) and the news report to which it refers, would allow for more precise comparison between recall and recognition and thus would shed more light on how – and how thoroughly – news articles are processed in the different conditions.

The construction of scales used in this study was anything but parsimonious. Thus, while a good deal of information still lies waiting to be explained and examined – and might well shed further light on some of the issues discussed here – the long-term study of securitization would benefit from more carefully designed questionnaires that offered more thoroughly tested *a priori* reasons for building well-grounded hypotheses. A particular example is trust in the news media. The measure of media distance included in this study is new and offers promise for future research, but a broader selection of media-related items would have allowed for the construction of scales that shed more light on the interplay between media trust, media use, and a frame like securitization.

Where readers get their news appears to be related to how thoroughly their news is securitized. The content analysis presented here is limited to newspapers, but it did test three newspapers chosen as stand-ins for distinct forms of news presentation that are found in other news media as well. Expanding the study of securitization into broadcasting or new media offers another potentially fruitful avenue for future study. In U.S. broadcasting, for example, the prestige press could be represented by National Public Radio and the television news of the Public Broadcasting Service, the homogenous national press by the news programs of the traditional broadcast networks, and the popular/populist press by Fox News.
As Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) have suggested, demographic variables offer another aspect of news processing and attention that could shed light on the effects of how news is made and distributed. In matters of political violence as well as the natural violence of hurricanes and earthquakes, if different news frames aid or hinder processing in ways that interact with gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status, news producers have all the more reason to reconsider the unintended consequences of framing.

If there is a final item to consider from the analysis of securitization as a new and specific form of framing, it is the likelihood of those unintended consequences. Not only is the process of framing real; its results are real, too. Journalists who decline to choose a frame, or who think the frame that looks most like “news” is the only choice indicated by professional standards, are likely to end up with whatever the house is serving. However palatable that might seem at the time, such a result could produce unforeseen consequences that run counter to the best professional intent of the practitioners.
Appendix A: Coding instructions for content analysis

Examine each article you code for the appearance of the phrases “war on terror” or “war on terrorism.” Three variables reflecting how that conflict is conceived and portrayed will be coded: the voice in which the war is presented, the degree to which the article presents its status, and the location where the war is presumed to take place.

For the story’s voice, enter:

1 if the phrase appears in a direct quote
2 if it appears in an indirect quote or as reported speech
3 if it appears in the paper’s voice.

In ambiguous cases of whether the phrase is an indirect quote or the paper’s voice, consider how far removed it is from the speaker. In a sentence like Bush said the war on terror remained his greatest concern, it would be an indirect quote. In a sentence like Ashcroft denied that his office had helped to draft the policies that allowed for indefinite detentions in the war on terrorism, the phrase should be considered the paper’s voice because the grammatical distance makes it impossible to attach directly to Ashcroft. Parenthetical inserts should generally be coded as the paper’s voice, for example: “There’s a growing concern that (the war on terrorism) is going to affect the economy in a more prolonged fashion” than wars in the past, Barthel says. If two or more different levels of the variable occur, enter the higher number. If the decision appears even or of multiple references, choose 3 rather than 2.
In cases where voice is impossible to determine, enter

4 for “other” or “can’t tell.”

For the status of the war on terrorism, enter

1 if the phrase appears as a proper noun
2 if the sentence suggests that the war is unambiguously real.
3 if the war appears ambiguous
4 if the phrasing suggests that the war is an artificial construct; it appears in quotation marks but in the writer’s voice.

A proper noun usage would be “War on Terror” or “War on Terrorism,” as in “In his most direct attack this election season, Bush flatly charged that Democrats are incapable of effectively fighting the War on Terror.”

The war is considered unambiguously real in most cases where it appears with the definite article or another determiner. In this example, it occurs in a source’s voice: Attorney General John Ashcroft said the arrests had been instrumental in “winning the war on terrorism.” In this example, it is in the reporter’s voice: With the war on terrorism shifting to a new phase of rooting out the Taliban leaders, General Franks said there was a ‘50-50’ chance he would move his headquarters closer to the combat zone.

When the war is ambiguous, it might appear with an indefinite article or be attributed solely to President Bush or his administration; it does not exist separately from them. Example: But having declared war on terrorism worldwide and begun recruiting Arab nations to that cause, President Bush has restacked priorities.
The war is an **artificial construct** if it appears in quotes placed by the paper:

“People have come to identify themselves more as Muslims in response to the U.S.-led ‘war on terrorism’ which Egyptians feel is a discriminatory campaign,” she said.

Use 5 if none of these apply or the status cannot be determined.

For the location of the war, enter:

1 for Afghanistan and neighboring border areas of Pakistan, housing or thought to house the original targets of U.S. forces after the September 2001 attacks – but not Iraq. (EX: *On the plus side, some expect federal government spending, particularly for the war on terrorism and a possible war on Iraq, to funnel money to businesses in the Washington area* – because there’s spending going on and this is distinguished from Iraq, this 2002 article is a 1. Often, “U.S.-led war on terrorism” will signal the phase involving combat)

2 for cases where the war involves Afghanistan as well as Iraq or other parts of the Middle East where U.S. troops are maintained.

3 if it appears to be primarily in Iraq or the Mideast but not Afghanistan

4 if it appears to be occurring anywhere in the Middle East or the broader Muslim world.

5 if it is a “global” war that might easily reach the United States. Use this category when the phrase “global war on terror” appears; this is often the correct choice for indications that the “war” began before the attacks on Afghanistan 10/8/01. NOTE, though, that a story before those attacks can clearly place the “war” in Afghanistan. (EX: *Immediately after 9/11 it voted the additional funds and powers the president sought for*
the war on terrorism – this is a 5 because the additional powers are intended to prevent domestic attacks)

6 if a location cannot be determined. This category will occur more frequently here than for the other variables.
Appendix B: Questionnaires

Pretest

1 Participant number

2 age

3 gender

4 On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you describe your own politics?
   Very liberal [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Very conservative [] [] [] [] [] [] []

5 How closely do you follow news about terrorism?
   Very closely [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Not at all closely [] [] [] [] [] [] []

6 How closely do you follow news about Iraq?
   Very closely [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Not at all closely [] [] [] [] [] [] []

7 How closely do you follow news about civil rights and civil liberties?
   Very closely [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Not at all closely [] [] [] [] [] [] []

8 How much do you trust the government to look after your interests?
   Very much [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Not at all [] [] [] [] [] [] []

9 How much do you trust the news media to look after your interests?
   Very much [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Not at all [] [] [] [] [] [] []

10 How would you describe the politics of the news media?
    Very liberal [] [] [] [] [] [] []
    Very conservative [] [] [] [] [] [] []

11 Do you think the country is better or worse off than it was six years ago?
   Very much better [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Very much worse [] [] [] [] [] [] []

12 Do you think the country is safer or less safe than it was in 2003?
   Very much safer [] [] [] [] [] [] []
   Very much less safe [] [] [] [] [] [] []
13 Do you agree or disagree: Sometimes, people who resort to violence have a legitimate complaint?

| Strongly agree | | | | | | | | Strongly disagree |
| | | | | | | | |

14 How good a job would you say the president is doing?

| Very good job | | | | | | | | Very bad job |
| | | | | | | | |

15 How good a job are the Republicans in Washington doing?

| Very good job | | | | | | | | Very bad job |
| | | | | | | | |

16 How good a job are the Democrats in Washington doing?

| Very good job | | | | | | | | Very bad job |
| | | | | | | | |

17 How did you vote in the most recent presidential election?

Democratic   Republican   Other/none

18 How did you vote in the most recent U.S. Senate election in your state?

Democratic   Republican   Other/none

19 How did you vote in the most recent U.S. House election?

Democratic   Republican   Other/none

20 What are your main sources of national and international news? Enter as many as three.

21 What do you think are the three most important problems facing the nation?

Questionnaire presented after each article

Q1.1 This story needs to be prominent in the news report

| Strongly agree | | | | | | | | Strongly disagree |
| | | | | | | | |

1.2 This story will probably be followed up tomorrow.

| Strongly agree | | | | | | | | Strongly disagree |
| | | | | | | | |

1.3 This story is part of a pattern that needs attention
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.4 This story will hit home with many Americans
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.5 This story will probably get too much attention in the news
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.6 Americans need to hear a lot more about this issue
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.7 We need to know a lot more about this issue before we can make decisions on it
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.8 This makes me think differently about the balance between liberty and security
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.9 This sort of event represents a threat to our way of life
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.10 I knew what was important about this story by the second paragraph
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.11 The more viewpoints we have about this issue, the better
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.12 The government needs to take extraordinary measures to deal with this situation.
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.13 This issue is personally important to me
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

1.14 This story makes me worried
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree
1.15 This story makes me frustrated
Strongly agree

Strongly disagree

1.16 This story makes me anxious
Strongly agree

Strongly disagree

1.17 This story makes me feel patriotic
Strongly agree

Strongly disagree

1.18 This story makes me concerned about the country's safety
Strongly agree

Strongly disagree

1.19 I'm confident that our leaders will handle this properly
Strongly agree

Strongly disagree
Appendix C: Experimental stimulus material

Article 1: Border

unsecuritized

SAN LUIS, Ariz. -- As commander of the N.C. Army National Guard’s work on the border in Arizona, Lt. Col. Randy Powell is getting the chance to see the beginning of the journey immigrants take into his police district in Charlotte, N.C.

“Like everywhere else, you’re seeing more and more interaction with illegal immigrants,” said Powell, a 38-year-old sergeant in the Charlotte Police Department.

North Carolina has one of the fastest-growing illegal immigrant populations in the country.

“If we’re doing our job right, hopefully we won’t see anything,” said Capt. Chris Rogers, 39, of Cary. “We’re here to deter.”

The 200 troops of the Guard battalion began patrolling the border this week in an attempt to stem the flow of immigrants from Mexico. They’re among the first of what will become 6,000 Guard troops in Operation Jump Start, announced by President Bush over the summer.

Though the battalion is armed and experienced as border enforcers themselves, having done similar work in Iraq, the soldiers here will be used solely as scouts.

It is their job to spend endless hours near the line with Mexico, radioing reports of suspicious movement to the Border Patrol. It’s up to the federal agency to catch illegal immigrants.
SAN LUIS, Ariz. -- As commander of the N.C. Army National Guard’s work on the border in Arizona, Lt. Col. Randy Powell is getting the chance to see the beginning of the journey immigrants take into his police district in Charlotte, N.C.

“Like everywhere else, you’re seeing more and more interaction with illegal immigrants,” said Powell, a 38-year-old sergeant in the Charlotte Police Department.

North Carolina has one of the fastest-growing illegal immigrant populations in the country, and Powell sees the troops’ mission of protecting the border as another front in the war on terrorism.

“We have to come to grips with the fact that our Border Patrol are now facing infiltration by members of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah,” Rep. Ed Royce of California said in a congressional debate last week.

The 200 troops of Powell’s Guard battalion began patrolling the border this week in an attempt to stem the human tide pouring into the country from Mexico. They’re among the first of what will become 6,000 Guard troops in Operation Jump Start, announced by President Bush over the summer.

Though the battalion is armed and experienced as border enforcers themselves, having done similar work in Iraq, the soldiers here will be used solely as scouts. It is their job to spend endless hours near the line with Mexico, radioing reports of suspicious movement to the Border Patrol. It’s up to the federal agency to catch illegal immigrants.

“If we’re doing our job right, hopefully we won’t see anything,” said Capt. Chris Rogers, 39, of Cary. “We’re here to deter.”
The Bush administration is moving to paralyze financially nine people suspected of having links to a Colombian rebel group that the United States says traffics in drugs.

Six of the nine people suspected of links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were indicted by a federal court in Washington as part of a narcotics conspiracy, the department said.

“Today’s action underlines the importance of the legal system in holding international criminals to account for their role in supplying cocaine to American streets,” said Adam Szubin, director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

The action by the Treasury Department means that any assets belonging to those people found in the United States must be blocked and that Americans are forbidden to do business with them.

The FARC, the largest rebel group in Latin America, is holding some 60 prominent hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, military officers, and three American defense contractors. It says it will only release them in exchange for nearly 600 imprisoned rebels.

Colombia’s government recently broke off preliminary negotiations after blaming the FARC for a car-bomb in a military base that injured more than 20 people, insisting that the hostages would be freed by military operations.

The families of the kidnapped are united in opposing such rescues, fearing their loved ones will be killed in the crossfire.
The Bush administration is moving to paralyze financially nine people suspected of having links to a Colombian group that the United States says traffics in drugs and terror.

Six of the nine people suspected of links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were indicted by a federal court in Washington as part of a narcotics conspiracy, the department said.

“Today’s action exposes key figures in the violent underworld of the FARC, a notorious Colombian terrorist organization and one of the largest suppliers of cocaine to American streets,” said Adam Szubin, director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

The action by the Treasury Department means that any assets belonging to those people found in the United States must be blocked and that Americans are forbidden to do business with them.

Three American defense contractors are among dozens of hostages held by the FARC, listed by the U.S. government as a “foreign terrorist organization.” It says it will only release the captives, who include a former Colombian presidential candidate, in exchange for nearly 600 imprisoned rebels.

Colombia’s government recently broke off preliminary negotiations after blaming the FARC, the largest rebel group in Latin America, for a car-bomb in a military base that injured more than 20 people.

The families of the kidnapped are united in opposing such rescues, fearing their loved ones will be killed in the crossfire.
MEXICO CITY -- Mexico said today that the U.S. proposal to build miles of border fence has the potential to damage relations between the two countries.

The Mexican Foreign Relations Department said it was “deeply worried” about the proposal. The 700-mile fence along the United States’ southern border is intended to keep migrants from entering the country illegally.

“The fence will be a step toward ensuring the rule of law in immigration,” said Rep. Peter Hoekstra, R-N.Y., chairman of the congressional conference committee that crafted a compromise on the bill.

The Census Bureau estimates that more than 4 million Mexican laborers are in the country without documentation.

Mexico’s Foreign Relations Department said that only a comprehensive immigration reform would stop millions of Mexicans from crossing the northern desert and swimming over the Rio Grande into the United States.

“A partial measure that is exclusively focused on security does not deal with reality and represents a political answer rather than a viable solution,” it said in the statement.

Mexican President Felipe Calderon has also opposed the wall.
The Mexican Foreign Relations Department said it was “deeply worried” about the proposal. The 700-mile fence along the United States’ southern border is intended to keep migrants from entering the country illegally.

“This is a last chance to ensure that America keeps a foothold on its own frontier,” said Rep. Peter Hoekstra, R-N.Y., chairman of the conference committee that crafted a compromise on the bill.

The Census Bureau estimates that nearly 5 million Mexicans are in the country illegally.

Mexico’s Foreign Relations Department said that only a comprehensive immigration reform would stop millions of Mexicans from swarming across the Rio Grande. One resolution notes that illegal immigration contributes to overcrowded schools, highway deaths and increased crime and points to illegal immigrants’ “lack of social and personal health care standards.”

Mexican President Felipe Calderon has also opposed the wall, calling it “shameful” and comparing it to the Berlin Wall, which divided Germany.

*Article 4: Iraq*

*BAGHDAD, Iraq --* At least 44 Iraqis died yesterday in bombings, officials said, including a coordinated car bomb attack that killed 25 in western Baghdad. Separately, the U.S. military announced the deaths of seven American soldiers, raising the death toll in what is already one of the bloodiest months for the military this year.
The three car bombs in western Baghdad also injured at least 55 people, doctors said. Three other attacks in Baghdad killed another 16 people, and a roadside bomb in the northern city of Kirkuk killed three others.

The seven Americans were killed in fighting in Anbar province. In Washington, White House Deputy Press Secretary Scott Stanzel said President Bush grieves for each member of the armed forces who has died. “The president knows that this is a long struggle,” he said.

President Bush has said the Iraq war is part of the United States’ post-Sept. 11 approach to threats abroad. Since last fall’s election, critics have increasingly questioned his decision to concentrate on Iraq rather than al-Qaida.

Meanwhile, a video broadcast by Al-Jazeera television network showed the deputy leader of al-Qaida saying the United States is negotiating with the wrong people in Iraq and implying the U.S. needs to talk to his group.

Days earlier, intelligence officials warned U.S. news outlets not to get carried away by the announcement of an impending tape because the pattern of promoting upcoming videos via the Internet had been used in the past to maximize media coverage.

securitized

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- At least 44 Iraqis died yesterday in bombings, officials said, including a coordinated strike that killed 25 in western Baghdad. Separately, the U.S. military announced the deaths of seven American soldiers, raising the death toll significantly in one of the bloodiest months for the military this year.
The three car bombs in western Baghdad also injured at least 55 people, doctors said. Three other attacks in Baghdad killed another 16 people, and a roadside bomb in the northern city of Kirkuk killed three others.

The seven Americans were killed in fighting in Anbar province.

“The war on terror is going to be a long struggle,” White House spokesman Scott Stanzel said in Washington. President Bush grieves for every soldier who has died, he said, but “we will be fighting for the security of the civilized world for many years.”

The Iraq war is part of the United States’ post-Sept. 11 war on terror. Going on the offense against enemies before they could harm Americans meant removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and seeking Saddam Hussein’s ouster in Iraq, Bush says.

Meanwhile, a video broadcast by Al-Jazeera television network showed the deputy leader of al-Qaida saying the United States is negotiating with the wrong people in Iraq and implying the U.S. needs to talk to his group.

“In terms of the propaganda war, they are way ahead of us – they are 10 years ahead of us,” said Stephen Ulph, a Mideast expert. “The Internet seems to me to be the real center of gravity for the jihad movement.”

Article 5: Mideast

unsecuritized

JERUSALEM -- A Palestinian rocket fired from the Gaza Strip exploded near the Israeli defense minister’s home today, critically wounding one of his guards and killing a passer-by.
The rocket fell in the town of Sderot, about 150 yards from the home of Defense Minister Amir Peretz.

Public Security Minister Avi Dichter told Army Radio that Israel must broaden its operations to bring about “a complete halt” to rocket fire. “The armed forces are familiar with these situations,” he said.

One woman was killed and several other passers-by were slightly wounded by shrapnel.

Another rocket landed elsewhere in southern Israel this morning, the army said.

Militants affiliated with Islamic Jihad and the Palestinians’ ruling Hamas group both claimed responsibility for the first Israeli death from a Palestinian rocket attack since August 2006. They said the rocket was to avenge the deaths of 18 civilians last week in Israeli shelling of an apartment compound in the Gaza Strip.

The Gaza shelling, which Israel said was unintended, came after Israeli troops wound up a weeklong incursion meant to curb Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel. But the attacks continued.

securitized

JERUSALEM -- A Palestinian rocket fired from the Gaza Strip exploded near the Israeli defense minister’s home today, critically wounding one of his guards and killing a passer-by.

The rocket fell in the town of Sderot, about 150 yards from the home of Defense Minister Amir Peretz.
Peretz planned to convene a special meeting of senior security officials to discuss the terror crisis later in the day. “Terrorist organizations must pay a heavy price,” he said.

One woman was killed and several other passers-by were slightly wounded by shrapnel.

Another rocket landed elsewhere in southern Israel this morning.

Militants affiliated with Islamic Jihad and the Palestinians’ ruling Hamas group both claimed responsibility for the first Israeli death from a Palestinian rocket attack since August 2006. They said the rocket was to avenge the deaths of 18 civilians last week in Israeli shelling of an apartment compound in the Gaza Strip.

The Gaza shelling, which Israel said was unintended, came after Israeli troops wound up a weeklong incursion meant to curb Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel. But the attacks continued.

*Article 6: Philippines*

*unsecuritized*

MANILA, Philippines – At least 12 people were killed and 20 were wounded when a bomb exploded during a town festival last night in the southern Philippines, where security officials have been on alert for possible attacks.

Police said the bomb, believed to be made from a mortar shell and triggered remotely by a cell phone, went off about 8 p.m. in front of the town hall of Makilala.

“We are trying to trace the origins of the bomb now,” said Federico Dulay, the province’s police chief. He added that police have several important leads.
Such bombs have been used by extortion gangs in the past, but investigators are trying to determine whether al-Qaida-linked groups like the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah and its Philippine ally, the Abu Sayyaf group, were involved.

Another bomb injured five people earlier in the day in a public market in nearby Tacurong, as U.S. and Philippine officials said they had received credible intelligence that attackers may be planning to carry out bombings in the southern Mindanao region, where the wife of a top Indonesian militant was captured last week.

The U.S. Embassy warned of possible attacks “over the next several days.”

Two Philippine security officials monitoring the area agreed, citing possible retaliation for last week’s arrest of Istiada Binti Oemar Sovie. She is the wife of Dulmatin, an al-Qaida-linked Indonesian militant who is suspected in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.

securitized

MANILA, Philippines – At least 12 people were killed and 20 were wounded when a bomb exploded during a town festival last night in the southern Philippines, where security officials were on alert for possible attacks by al-Qaida-linked militants.

Police said the bomb, believed to be made from a mortar shell and triggered remotely by a cell phone, went off about 8 p.m. in front of the town hall of Makilala, in North Cotabato province.

“Nobody can do this except the terrorists,” said Federico Dulay, the province’s police chief.
Such bombs have been used in the past by al-Qaida-linked groups like the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah and its Philippine ally, the Abu Sayyaf group, but investigators were trying to determine if other groups, like extortion gangs, were involved.

Another bomb injured five people earlier in the day in a public market in nearby Tacurong, as U.S. and Philippine officials said they had received credible intelligence that a terrorist group may be planning to carry out bombings in the southern Mindanao region, where the wife of a top Indonesian militant was captured last week.

The U.S. Embassy warned of possible attacks “over the next several days.”

Two Philippine security officials monitoring the area agreed, citing possible retaliation for last week’s arrest of Istiada Binti Oemar Sovie. She is the wife of Dulmatin, an al-Qaida-linked Indonesian militant and one of Asia’s most wanted terror suspects for his alleged role in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.

Article 7: Miami
unsecuritized

MIAMI – Three men were questioned today after their cargo truck was stopped at the Port of Miami in an incident officials blamed on “miscommunication.”

Authorities initially said the men – two Iraqis and one Lebanese national who are legal permanent U.S. residents – had been caught trying to slip past a checkpoint at the entrance. The Port of Miami is the sixth busiest in the nation for cargo and among the busiest for passenger entry.
A security officer became suspicious when the driver could not produce proper paperwork in a routine inspection, police officer Nancy Goldberg said. The driver also indicated he was alone, though security officers found two other men in the cab.

“Due to a miscommunication between the gate security personnel and the truck driver, we believed there was a discrepancy,” Goldberg said. “It could have been a language barrier.”

The three men were still talking with police this afternoon but had not been arrested, Goldberg said.

The truck was carrying automotive parts.

The port’s cargo area was shut down as the bomb squad moved the truck away to X-ray it. No dangerous material was found, officials said.

“In an abundance of caution,” the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security were initially called to the scene, Goldberg said.

Passengers in the cruise ship area of the port were unaware of the official bustle in the cargo area until notified by reporters. “That’s not good to hear right before you are going on vacation,” said Connecticut resident Allie Tetreault, 23, who described herself as “freaked out.”

MIAMI – Three Middle Eastern men were being questioned today after they were stopped at the Port of Miami when authorities became suspicious of their documentation and the contents of their cargo truck.
The terror alert began after authorities initially said the men had been caught trying to slip past a checkpoint. The Port of Miami is the sixth busiest in the nation for cargo and among the busiest for passenger entry.

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security were called to the scene, along with federal and local law enforcement officers, said police officer Nancy Goldberg. The port’s cargo area was shut down as the bomb squad moved the truck away from public areas of the port to X-ray it and scan it for radioactive materials.

“I feel freaked out,” said Connecticut resident Allie Tetreault, 23, who was waiting to board a Caribbean cruise. “That’s not good to hear right before you are going on vacation.”

A port security officer became suspicious when the truck driver could not produce proper paperwork, Goldberg said, and security officers found the two other men in the cab although the driver claimed to be alone.

Goldberg said it was possible there had been a “miscommunication.”

The three men remained in police custody for questioning, Goldberg said. They had not yet been arrested or charged, and no radioactive materials had been found by this afternoon. Goldberg said the truck was carrying automotive parts.

Officials said the men – two Iraqis and one Lebanese national who are legal permanent U.S. residents – do not appear on any terrorist watch list.

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security were called to the scene “in an abundance of caution,” Goldberg said.

Passengers in the cruise ship area of the port were unaware of the official bustle in the cargo area until notified by reporters.
**Article 8: Cleric**

**unsecuritized**

The FBI has sent a bulletin to state and local law enforcement warning of possible reprisals as the health of an imprisoned Muslim cleric fails.

Although the FBI said there is no credible indication that a plan for attacks is in place, the agency sent the warning as Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman was treated in Missouri for bleeding.

The sheik, who was convicted of plotting to blow up the U.N. Headquarters, a federal building, two tunnels and a bridge in Manhattan, has called for revenge should he die in U.S. custody.

Abdel-Rahman’s death would raise his status to that of a martyr and refocus interest on the United States among radical Islamists, says Bill Rosenau, an expert on Mideast radicalism. “He was the seminal figure for terror in the ‘80s and ‘90s, and Osama bin Laden still talks about him,” Rosenau said.

But Steven Weber, director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, doubts Abdel-Rahman’s death would be likely to spark another attack on the U.S.

“If Al Qaeda has significant assets in this country there is no reason to use them now. They can attack the U.S. in Iraq and they would conserve those assets they have here for another time,” he said.

The FBI sent out a warning bulletin to law enforcement under an “abundance of caution” because of previous statements attributed to Abdel-Rahman that called for reprisals if he should die in an American jail.
The FBI has sent a bulletin to state and local law enforcement warning of possible terrorist reprisals as the health of an imprisoned terrorist leader fails.

Although the FBI said there is no credible indication that a plan for retribution is in place, the agency sent the warning as Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman was treated in Missouri for bleeding.

The Muslim cleric, who was the alleged architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, has called for revenge should he die in U.S. custody. He was convicted of plotting to blow up the U.N. Headquarters, a federal building, two tunnels and a bridge in Manhattan.

Abdel-Rahman’s death would raise his status to that of a martyr and refocus interest on the United States among radical Islamists, says Bill Rosenau, a terror expert with the RAND Corp. “Osama bin Laden has talked frequently about him and repeatedly expressed his interest in seeing him free.”

Abdel-Rahman was imprisoned long before the Sept. 11 attacks, but he has remained important to many. “He was the seminal figure for terror in the ‘80s and ‘90s and a real precursor of what was to come,” Rosenau said.

But Steven Weber, director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, doubts Abdel-Rahman’s death would be likely to spark another attack on the U.S.

The FBI sent out a warning bulletin to law enforcement under an “abundance of caution” because of previous statements attributed to Abdel-Rahman that called for reprisals if he should die in an American jail.
Sources of edited articles:


**Colombia:** Bush administration clamps down on people with links to Colombian group. Transmitted September 28, 2006, by The Associated Press.

**Fence:** Mexican government warns U.S. border fence will harm relations. Transmitted September 29, 2006, by The Associated Press.

**Iraq:** Bombings kill at least 44 in Iraq; U.S. military announces seven soldier deaths. Transmitted December 26, 2006, by The Associated Press.

**Mideast:** Palestinian rocket fire kills 1 Israeli. Transmitted November 15, 2006, by The Associated Press.

**Philippines:** Police say bombing kills at least 12 in southern Philippines. Transmitted October 10, 2006, by The Associated Press.

**Miami:** 3 detained at Port of Miami; authorities attribute situation to miscommunication. Transmitted January 7, 2007, by The Associated Press.

**Cleric:** FBI issues warning to police after terrorist health scare. Retrieved December 15, 2006, from foxnews.com.
Appendix D: Recall and recognition questions

What was the main point of the story called BORDER?

What was the main point of the story called COLOMBIA?

What was the main point of the story called FENCE?

What was the main point of the story called IRAQ?

What was the main point of the story called MIDEAST?

What was the main point of the story called PHILIPPINES?

What was the main point of the story called MIAMI?

What was the main point of the story called CLERIC?

\textit{border}

MQ1.1-1.4:
The program putting Guard troops on the border is called:
a) Operation Good Fences
b) Operation Jump Start
c) Operation Stopgap
d) Operation Fence Busters

About how many Guard troops from North Carolina are participating?
a) 200
b) 300
c) 400
d) 600

Randy Powell is a police officer in which North Carolina city?
a) Cary
b) Greensboro
c) Greenville
d) Charlotte

Which border state are the troops working in?
a) Arizona
b) California
c) New Mexico
d) California
The Colombian rebels’ hostages include three American:
a) missionaries  
b) defense contractors  
c) oil workers  
d) executives

Colombia’s government blames the rebels for bombing:
a) power generators  
b) a bank  
c) a military base  
d) a US consulate

The Colombian rebel group is known by the initials:
a) FARC  
b) SWAPO  
c) UNITA  
d) DFLP

The Treasury Department office that took this action is the:
a) Office of Terrorism Prevention  
b) Office of International Relations  
c) Office of Foreign Assets Control  
d) Office of Narcotics and Drugs Control

How long would the US-Mexico border fence be?
a) 400 miles  
b) 700 miles  
c) 900 miles  
d) 1100 miles

How many Mexicans does the Census Bureau estimate are in the US without required documents?
a) between 2 and 3 million  
b) between 3 and 4 million  
c) between 4 and 5 million  
d) between 5 and 6 million

Mexico’s president is:
a) Vicente Fox  
b) Felipe Calderon  
c) Juan Ponce de Leon
d) Luis Echeverria

A New York legislator helped to guide the compromise on this law. That legislator is:
a) Peter Hoekstra
b) Carolyn Heilbrun
c) Charles Schumer
d) Eliot Spitzer

**mideast**

Which Israeli official’s house was near the site where the rocket landed?
a) the public security minister
b) the Arab affairs minister
c) the defense minister
d) the finance minister

Which groups claimed credit for the rocket attack on Israel?
a) Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front
b) Hamas and Islamic Jihad
c) Hamas and Al-Qaida
d) Al-Qaida and the Popular Front

How many Israelis were killed in the rocket attack?
a) 1
b) 2
c) 18
c) 21

**philippines**

The bomb in Makilala was triggered by:
a) a suicide bomber
b) a cell phone
c) a delayed fuse
d) a computer battery

The Philippine militant group mentioned in this story is the:
a) Abu Jihad
b) Jemaah Islamiyah
c) Jihad Islamiya
d) Abu Sayyaf

Fears of more attacks were raised by the arrest of:
a) an Indonesian militant’s wife
b) a Philippine guerrilla leader
c) a wanted terror leader
d) a corrupt police chief

The bomb in the southern Philippines killed:
a) at least 8 people
b) at least 12 people
c) at least 37 people
d) at least 44 people

cleric
The imprisoned cleric was convicted of:
a) the TWA 847 attack
b) the 1993 Trade Center bombing
c) the Oklahoma City bombing
d) a plot to attack New York landmarks

In which state is the cleric receiving medical treatment?
a) Missouri
b) Illinois
c) Virginia
d) Florida

Which federal agency warned law agencies to be alert about possible reprisals?
a) NSA
b) CIA
c) USAID
d) FBI

iraq
Which network broadcast the tape by the al-Qaida leader?
a) al-Sahab
b) al-Arabiyya
c) al-Iqtisadiya
d) al-Jazeera

How many American deaths are reported in this story?
a) 14
b) 9
c) 7
d) 2

Which important al-Qaida figure is mentioned in this article?
a) Ayman al-Zawahiri
b) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
c) Osama bin Laden
d) Khalid Sheikh Muhammad

How many Iraqis were reported killed in the Baghdad car bombing in this story?
 a) 16
 b) 25
 c) 44
 d) 55

miami

What two countries are the men who are being questioned from?
 a) Iran and Syria
 b) Iraq and Libya
 c) Iraq and Lebanon
 d) Iran and Afghanistan

The truck was carrying
 a) auto parts
 b) X-ray equipment
 c) agricultural products
 d) household goods

The police officer said the incident began because of:
 a) an “abundance of caution”
 b) a “failure to communicate”
 c) a “freaked out” witness
 d) a “miscommunication”

How does the Port of Miami rank among the nation’s cargo ports?
 a) Fourth busiest
 b) Fifth busiest
 c) Sixth busiest
 d) Seventh busiest


Fred Vultee was born October 21, 1955, in Washington, D.C. He graduated from high school in Greenville, N.C., in 1973 and from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1977 with a degree in radio-TV-film and journalism. He worked at newspapers in North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington before joining the professional practice faculty at the University of Missouri School of Journalism in 1999. He completed a master’s degree at Missouri in 2004 and a Ph.D. in 2007.

Vultee’s research focuses on how news media perform in conflicts and crises, with a concentration on framing and media language.