THE OTHER WITHIN:
PRISMATIC IDENTITIES AND AUTHENTIC SELVES WITHIN THE
MARGINALIZED

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of
Missouri – Columbia

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Masters of Arts

By
JAMES M. THOMAS

Dr. Wayne Brekhus, Thesis Supervisor

AUGUST, 2007
The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the thesis entitled

THE OTHER WITHIN:

PRISMATIC IDENTITIES AND AUTHENTIC SECVLES WITHIN THE MARGINALIZED

presented by James M. Thomas,

a candidate for the degree of master of arts,

and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

Professor Wayne Brekhus

________________________________________

Professor David Brunsma

________________________________________

Professor Mary Jo Neitz

________________________________________

Professor David Crespy
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many people who are responsible for the completion of my project. First, I want to thank Dr. Wayne Brekhus, who served as my thesis advisor. Wayne gave me the creative freedom to approach this topic in the way that I did, and had already established a template for how to go about doing so. His insights and mentorship along the way have been invaluable.

Second, I would like to thank my committee, consisting of Dr. David Crespy, Dr. David Brunsma, and Dr. Mary Jo Neitz. Dr. David Crespy served, unbeknownst to me at the time, as a bridge between not only Theatre and Sociology, but also between my personal and my academic life, as he once was the instructor for my fiancée when she was an undergraduate. His presence on my committee serves as an example of how life’s intricacies really do come full circle.

Dr. David Brunsma has served as both a mentor and a friend along the entire way, and I owe him a debt of gratitude for all that he has done. Without his friendship and desire to see me grow, I may not be in the position that I am today.

Dr. Mary Jo Neitz is in large part responsible for the academic direction that I have taken in the past two years, as I’ve now been through four of her graduate level courses since my inception into the Masters program (and one undergraduate course, almost four years ago). I can’t thank her enough for her
kindness, openness, and ability to open new windows of thought with every discussion we’ve had.

Lastly, I wish to thank my aforementioned fiancée, Afton Sanders. She has worn many hats during this process, but has been my rock throughout. Everything I do and everything I’ve done is because of her and for her.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SOME NOTES ON METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. THE OTHER WITHIN – A REVIEW</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PROBLEMATIZING AUTHENTICITY</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Small Note on Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study #1 – The Law of Return</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated Authenticity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study #2 – The National Jewish Population Survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PRISMATIC IDENTITY(S)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumping and Splitting – The Cognitive Factor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Falasha as the Other Within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. THE TRINARY REVISITED AND THE PROPOSAL OF THE SPECTRUM</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1. Bauman’s Prismatic Jew.................................................................15
2. The Ontology of Israeli-Jewish Authenticity.................................24
3. The Other Within........................................................................34
ABSTRACT

This article’s aims are three-fold: First, it attempts to problematize the current essentialist positions of identity formation, particularly that of the Other, within the social sciences. It attempts to explore how the identity of the Other is formulated through essentialist notions, as well as articulate how this formation of the Other is contextually situated. Secondly, the aim of this project is to offer an introductory analysis of the identity configuration which I refer to as the Other Within. This identity configuration refers to those positions of marginality within an already marginalized group. This analysis, therefore, is sociologically unique in that it attempts to articulate an epistemology of a subgroup within an already Othered category. Lastly, this article offers the concept of the spectrum model as an analytical tool within the sociological study of identity. The model of the spectrum gives the social sciences a method of practicing a more sensitive and inclusive form of identity research by recognizing the relational aspects of identity configurations within a given group, rather than creating epistemological ghettos of difference.
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the postmodern turn, most studies of identity focused on the assumption of essentialism as a characteristic of any identity configuration. That is, most studies assumed that there were fixed, authentic characteristics of a given identity, to which they could assign various individuals and construct social groups via this method (e.g. Glaser, 1958; Blue Jr., 1959; Lazerwitz, 1970).

Of the many changes that have taken place since this postmodern turn, one of those changes has to do with the actual certainty of identity, meaning that we are no longer certain of fixed, definitive identity markers (Bauman, 1996; Hall, Neitz, and Battani, 2003). While older models of identity advocated an authentic identity as that which is consistent and rigid, the postmodern challenge has forced us to consider the fluidity and contextual nature of all identities. With this postmodern challenge of fluidity and context within any given identity configuration, we are forced to not only look at those identities which stand at the forefront of any social arena, but also at those identities which stand in the background, and the relationship between these two.

Aims

This project in particular has three concerns: First, with the identity formation of the Other. I am interested in looking at how the identity of the Other
is not only formulated, but how this Other is contextually situated.1 Secondly, I am interested in what I refer to as the *Other Within*. By *Other Within*, I am referring to that identity configuration which represents those within an Other that stand on the fringes of what has historically been considered the typical Other. For instance, if one constructs gay identity to be the Other of sexual identity, what does it mean to be gay, an already socially marked category, and deviant within the gay community?

Lastly, I wish to posit the concept of a *spectrum model of identity formation*. Within this *spectrum model*, a given identity construct is taken out of a linear progression of ‘more’ to ‘less’ identity, and posited as a relational typology. In other words, if we take the concept of the color spectrum, where Red stands at one end, and Violet stands at the other, we can come to see how each color has aspects of the other, no matter where they stand within this model. Identities, I will argue, are much the same way. An identity at one end of the spectrum still has a relational component to identities within a given typology which stand at the opposite end of the spectrum. This model of identity allows for the social sciences to take the study of identities out of the epistemological ghettos within which they reside, where we have bracketed studies of socially constructed identities.

---

1 Choosing to capitalize the term ‘Other’, as well as remove it from the single quotations signifies a move which Laurel Richardson in her work, *Fields of Play: Constructing an Academic Life* (1997: Rutgers University Press) advocates as a strategy of resistance. As Richardson writes, the capitalization and removal of quotation marks serves to continually remind myself, as well as my readers, that these social groups of people are “not just ‘others’ in the ‘some…others’ grammatical construction: They are a distinct social category worthy of a collective story,” (p.20). Thus, capitalizing the term and signifying it within the text as its own pronoun takes the word out of the stigmatized context within which it has often been placed.
differences within groups without an analysis of how those within a given group share distinct similarities. ²

What makes this analysis unique, then, is that the starting point of this project is one of contestation. Not contestation of those at the margins, however, but contestation of an ontological existence of authenticity within the study of identity. Few if any works within the field of sociology have focused on the Other Within: that is, those whose identities as Others exist within an already Othered social group. The importance of such a shift in the way we study identity cannot be stressed enough. Studies of identity which explore essentialist relationships between a monolithic ‘Us and Them’ only reify the modes of domination through which ‘Us’ comes to define ‘Them’ (Said, 1978). However, the point of this article wishes to expand upon Said’s (1978) epistemological orientation, and argue that the study of the Other denies the rightful space and place of the Other Within through a denial of location to those on the margins. The Other Within, as an object of study within our field, is without space and place.

The particular Other Within that this project will turn its focus to is that of the Jewish Other. While it will be shown that the concept of the Other Within is not unique to Jewish identity, Jews as a whole represent a convenient social group with which to explore this conceptual agenda. Their location as an Other Within in almost every single society in Western history serves the purpose of highlighting how entrenched this process can become within a marginalized population, even in a group whose status as the Other has historical roots not limited to time and place. Thus, rather than focus on a social group whose

² For elaboration, see Brekhus 1998.
Othered status may be situated to a particular geographical location, or particularly located mechanisms of ascribed status, I wish to instead focus on a group whose identity is almost universally marked (Brekhus, 1996).³ Using the trinary model from Brekhus (1996), I wish to rearticulate some of the central tenets of that analytical device, extending it past configurations of sexual identity and applying the logic to the social construction and maintenance of that group the social sciences refer to as the Jews.

This project, then, is also an attempt to hash out the epistemological problems posed by previous identity theories which have often focused on identity formation and maintenance with the assumption that there are ‘authentic’ identities to be formed and maintained. Beyond the aforementioned, what makes the study of Jewish identity sociologically unique and therefore important to the overall contribution to identity literature at large is that Jewish identity is almost universally prismatic in character.⁴ Many studies exist which explore the various jeopardies that exist for certain Others particularly located societal frames. We could begin with the DuBoisian concept of double-consciousness, proposed for

³ By ‘particularly located mechanisms of ascribed status’, I wish to convey the contextual nature of markedness that we may find, for example, in the study of race. In the United States, it is generally accepted that White is the unmarked, and non-White is the marked. However, as Bonilla-Silva (2004) has shown, this racial dynamic is now taking on new meaning, with the binary model being replaced by what he refers to as a tri-racial classification. Race in the United States, then, remains a fluid construct, even while the status ascribed through racial meanings remains fixed.

⁴ I realize that with an analysis which seeks to deconstruct universal concepts of identity, the use of universal constructs is prima facie contradictory. However, I want to make clear that my approach is epistemological, and not ontological. I do not deny the history of Jewish experience, even though I recognize that Jewish experience is not universal. What I wish to recognize by the universal character of Jewish identity is that no matter how Jewish identity has been constructed in Western society, no matter which Jews we are talking about, those Jews stand in opposition to the dominant majority, and the dominant majority has been able to define not only their identity, but Jewish identity, by what they do not represent: Jewishness. The variation is in what this Jewishness has been perceived to be.
Blacks living in the United States, where their identity is constructed not only in how they see themselves, but in how others construct Blacks in relation to their own standpoint (DuBois, 1903). We could then move further to the double and triple jeopardy proposed by Black feminist thought, which suggests that as one takes on more Othered, and thus deviant, identities, one becomes more and more jeopardized by the social norms of the society in which they are located (King, 1988). In the case of triple jeopardy, one could be Black, female, and homosexual, and thus stand Othered by the social norms of a white, male, heterosexual society.

What makes Jewish identity different is that, in terms of Western society, regardless of where the Jew is located, and no matter what social position the Jew may occupy, his or her identity is always an oppositional reflection of what identities are the norm in that given location. Even with the founding of a Jewish state, that state stands as the prismatic state in relation to the rest of the world, always a State/state of existence to which the rest of the world can look upon and say that it is not.5

Structure

Having established the aims of this project, I wish to now briefly highlight the structure of my argument. I will begin with a review of the literature surrounding the concept of the Other, with a particular focus on how it has been used within the literature on Jewish identity. Within this review, the concept of

---

5 I use the term ‘State/state’ to denote a two-fold effect here, that of the State of Israel, and that of the actual state of existence. Thus, the State of Israel exists as a Jewish state, something to which the rest of the world can explicitly state it is not, and the state of existence within Israel is that of a Jewish way of life, distinct from all other ways of life no matter how one wishes to problematize the meaning behind the statement ‘Jewish way of life’.
authenticity will be problematized in a way which allows for us to expand the concept of what it means to possess an identity, throwing aside past notions of authentic selves as archaic and no longer useful for the social sciences.

Next, I want to briefly examine the concept of Prismatic Identity as it relates to the Other. This concept, articulated by Bauman (1989) and later by Cromer (2001), states that certain identities serve as reference points for what other identities are not. My argument will focus on the prismatic characteristic of Jewish Others, but I will attempt to extend this concept to the Other Within, arguing that there are Others Within that serve as references for what the unmarked Other is not.6

Afterwards, I will offer my own solution to the study of identity in the form of a new type of identity typology. I refer to this typology as the spectrum model, as it refers to identities as existing along a blurred line of juxtaposition amongst each other. As one moves along this spectrum within a particular identity configuration, it will be shown that one never moves completely away from certain aspects of the whole, but only incorporates more aspects of one part, and less of another. By using this spectrum model, it will be argued that social science research will be better informed about the commonalities within and between identity constructs, and we may be able to move beyond the epistemological ghettos within which much of our current research resides.

---

6 The term ‘unmarked Other’ refers to hierarchical design of Others within an Othered category of identity. Thus, an unmarked Jewish Other would be in reference to the essentialist notion of Jewish identity, as it compares to the marked Jewish Other, such as a messianic Jew, or a homosexual Jew. In other words, the unmarked Other is that Other which fits the ‘generic’ middle ground for which all Others in that identity group can find their point of reference.
SOME NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

Initially when setting out for this project, an essentialist notion of empiricism was embedded within the methodology. If one wants to study Jews, they must go out and find Jews, then report back their findings on Jews to the rest of the social sciences. How Jews think about their identity, how they practice their identity, and how they frame it in relation to the broader social reality were the ‘empirical’ questions of concern. However, as it happens in much of our research, when one originally sets out with an initial set of questions, one often finds themselves not only asking questions about how they formed those initial queries in the first place, but also making an attempt to answer those questions. In the case of this particular research, if we are to study Jews, then we must already know what we are looking for. But what would we be looking for? Rather than set out to produce yet another study using taken-for-granted constructs and variables to form an analysis, it was decided that perhaps the analysis needs to be done on the usefulness of those taken-for-granted constructs within a context of an always changing social reality.

Sandra Harding (1989) problematizes traditional discussions on method, methodology, and epistemology by separating those components from the traditional umbrella discourse of ‘method’ that they have all fallen under within the social sciences. A research method, she argues, is the way in which
evidence is gathered. Research methods can generally be summed up along three distinct approaches: listening to or asking questions of research subjects, observation of phenomenon, or examination of historical traces and records (1989: 2).

Working backwards from practice to theory, we can differentiate methodology from research method by constructing methodology as “a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed,” (1989: 3, emphasis added). Examples of this would be discussions of how Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory should be or is applied in particular research on race in America (Omi and Winant, 1994). If we take racial formation theory as our theoretical model, then a methodology which utilizes this theory may look at how racial formation is evolving from a White and non-White binary split to a trinary model of White, honorary White, and not White (Bonilla-Silva, 2004).

Epistemology, as Harding (1989) describes it, is a general theory of knowledge. An epistemology answers questions about who can be a producer of knowledge, and furthermore who can know in the first place. The problem, as Harding (1989) articulates it, is that we often collapse these three distinct approaches into a common description of method. This distorts analysis, and often reproduces hegemony in that the existing methods have hidden biases within in them, such as gendered or racialized notions of who can know, or who should be research subjects.

Having articulated Harding’s (1987) position on what goes into the construction of method, I wish to elaborate on how methods, methodology, and
epistemology relate to my own project. Concerning methods, my project is not quantitative. I critique quantitative methods such as that of the National Jewish Population Survey within this project for attempting to construct essentialist identity claims with rigid questionnaires and prefabricated social constructs.

Joey Sprague defines qualitative methodology as that consisting of “in-depth interviewing, field observation, the analysis of historical documents, and the analysis of visual and verbal discourses,” (2005: 119, emphasis mine). Approaches such as these, Sprague (2005) argues, emphasize interpretation and meaning, or the thick description that Clifford Geertz (1973) articulated.

Conducting interviews of those that I identify as Jewish as a means of articulating Jewish identity would only be reifying rigid concepts of identity which I wish to deconstruct within this analysis. If my project is about deconstructing essentialist identity configurations, it makes no sense to seek out the narrative of essentialist identities. Of course, I could have conducted interviews with Orthodox Jews, Reform Jews, and secular Jews, and thus established a model of Jewish identity which takes into account the variation in religious observance. However, that would still be reifying the rigid constructs of Jewish identity as an identity which operates along a linear line of religiosity, from high-observance to low-observance. It in no way takes into account the plurality within high-observance Judaism, such as Messianic Jews versus Orthodox Jews, or the plurality in low-observant Jews, such as Israeli-youth culture versus World War II survivors who’ve adopted secular attitudes in response to the trauma of the Shoah. With that being stated, I do feel as though my project is a critical analysis
of the current discourse on identity. Thus, I maintain that the methods I apply within this project are indeed qualitative because I analyze current positions held by research on identity, and I attempt to reevaluate, elaborate, and/or deconstruct those positions.

As for my methodology, or for my theory and analysis for how my research within this project should proceed, I wish to make the broad statement that it should proceed cautiously. This project is indeed about the local (Geertz, 1973), not meta-narratives, so there will be no suggestion of grand theories here. I do not wish to impose meaning upon identity constructs, but rather create a space where previous meanings can be critically examined for their essentialist positions.

Lastly, the epistemological claim that I make is that if we want to know Jewish identity, or any identity for that matter, we need to be able to leave the door open for plurality. As I will show throughout this analysis, not only Jewish identity, but many other identities as well, hold vastly different ontological positions. It is these ontological positions which shape their interpretations.
Michael Berzonsky (2005) posits the problem of modernity, identity and essentialism, through the use of a beautiful metaphor relating to a college campus tour (2005: 133). A young college prospect is being given a tour of a university to which he/she is considering attending. The tour guide takes this prospective student to see the dorms, the library, the bookstore, as well as various departmental buildings of which the tour guide feels are important in giving an overall picture of the university and what it has to offer.

At the end, of the tour, however, the student has a perplexed look on their face. Turning to the tour guide, the student asks, “This is all great, I really enjoyed the tour, but where is the university?” (Berzonsky, 2005: 133). According to Berzonsky (2005), this student has made a categorical mistake. The student is unable to see how the university is not a separate entity from all which they have seen, but is in fact a compilation of all the various components they have encountered on their college tour.

Modernity has treated identity in much the same way as the prospective student treated the university. In looking for grand explanations of essentialist categories, a great deal of identity research has lost sight of the importance of the characteristics which compose a given identity. According to Stryker and Burke (2000), there currently exist within academia three distinctly different
treatments of the issue of identity. The first is the strand that uses identity to refer to the culture of a people. Under this particular treatment of identity, there is no difference made between identity and ethnicity – the latter informs the former. This strand has been used within Jewish identity to construct essentialist paradigms of not only Jewish identity, but Jewish culture. This approach ignores context altogether, reducing Jewish culture to a few common practices, but never really responding to the question of whose culture?

The second use of identity within academia refers to a common identification with a collectivity or social category. While this seeks to create a common culture among participants, it does not acknowledge pre-existing cultures that shaped the common culture of the group of interest, nor does it address the fluidity within a particular group. For instance, this approach is often used within social movement theories (Stryker and Burke, 2000: 284). However, if we look at a social movement such as the Black Power movement, which Blacks are we talking about? Student movements such as SNCC? Or the SCLC? Both can be argued to have been empowering for Black Americans in the 1960s, but not for the same Black Americans during the same time period.

Stryker and Burke (2000) offer their contribution as a third usage of identity in academia, referring to identity as "parts of a self composed of the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated societies," (p.284). Thus, identity can be theorized to consist of multiple components, in which the total person becomes greater than the sum of each component of the person. This approach recognizes context and fluidity
within a given identity, and does not implicitly construct an essentialist category. It is from this perspective that I wish to explore the question of the Other Within, as well as problematize the notion of authenticity in the discourse of identity.

In relation to Jewish identity, this concept of authenticity becomes crucial. Prior to a postmodern turn in intellectual inquiry, most discussions of Jewish identity assumed the existence of an “essential Jewish self,” (Kaufman, 2005, p.84; see Levy, 1933; Davis, 1943; Waxman, 1958). The last few decades in particular of Jewish history reflect an ever-increasing non-linear growth of Jewish identity. The destruction of European Jewry, the founding of the Jewish state of Israel, and multiple international migrations resulting in a mass redistribution of Jews around the world are the most widely known examples (Kaufman, 2005).

Scholars of many disciplines have long argued that the existence of an ‘Other’ is an essential prerequisite for the development of a social and cultural identity (Cromer, 2001). The ‘Other’ is always the reference point by which a society distinguishes its own cultural space and boundaries. Mainstream society not only perceives and portrays the ‘Other’ as different, but it perceives and portrays them as inferior as well (Cromer, 2001). While Cromer (2001) doesn’t explicitly state this reference point of the Other as being prismatic in nature, Bauman (1989) refers to the Jew as prismatic with much of the same wording. Bauman states the Jew has almost always stood apart as the antithesis of every location which non-Jews occupy (1989: 41).

Bauman (1989) articulates the concept of the Prismatic Jew, the Jew who can serve as the reference point of non-identity for several different identity
locations at once: the villain of the working-class, working their employees to the ground for that extra percentage of personal profit; the leach of society to the wealthy elite, always begging for a handout which comes at the expense of John Q. Public. The Jew stands as the Oppressor to those beneath them in social standing, and the vagabond to those above them. Because of this prismatic character, the Jew can never belong to the country of their origin (1989: 51). They are never German, only a Jew living in Germany; never American, only here on temporary identity visas. For a visual representation of Bauman’s Prismatic Jew, see Figure 1.

---

7 Funny how John Q. Public, because they are public, cannot be Jewish. Thus, the idea of prismatic identity comes to full light. In no way can the Jew ever assimilate into society as long as they stand in contrast to society itself, which cannot bear the burden of inclusion. To include would mean that we would have to redraw reference points for our own identity, and find a new prismatic Other to establish what we cannot be.

8 And if one bothers to look at the history of identity construction within the United States judicial process, one will find many instances of when this identity visa has either been denied, redefined, or completely revoked. The irony of the Naturalization laws was that they resembled nothing remotely close to natural law as it is known within the field of biology.
Because of the multidimensional characteristics assigned to the Prismatic Jew, the generic unmarked comes to define themselves and their multiple social locations against that of the Prismatic Jew. Each side of the Prismatic Jew represents a social location from which the unmarked gathers its own identity characteristics from. For instance, the bottom of the Prismatic Jew may be the side from which they come to be defined as vagabonds and social pariahs by the wealthier of the unmarked.

The purpose of the illustration is to articulate that no matter how Jews relate to the social space they occupy, they have been defined by the rest of
society in remarkably different, contradictory ways over time (Freedman, 1998). What has been consistent, however, is the construction of the Jew as the Other, regardless of what implications this ascribed identity has had in regards to the connotation of its meaning: Jews have been regarded as the quintessential ‘Other’ in Western thought, no matter the Western location (Cromer, 2001). A consequence of this process of othering, unfortunately, has been the trend to assign to the group negative meanings with the intent to reproduce a particular form of stratification. Within English literature, the Jew has often been constructed as sexually perverse in relation to English society. One only needs to look at literary figures such as Shakespeare’s Shylock and Antonio, as well as Dicken’s Fagin (Freedman, 1998) to find these sexually immoral antagonists. Leo Frank, from which the American play, Parade, is based upon, offers up not only a literary example but a real-life example of this ‘Jew as perverse’ construction in the accounts of his trial at the beginning of the 20th century in Georgia (Freedman, 1998). Leo Frank’s character is charged with sexually assaulting and murdering a young girl who works in his factory. The charges of sexual assault and murder are rife with accusations of Frank’s Jewish qualities being probable cause for his guilty verdict, even in the face of less than circumstantial evidence.

While these aforementioned examples reflect the prismatic nature of a somewhat essentialist notion of Jewish identity, examples abound of the Other Within as constructed in other more contemporary works of literary art. An analysis of the intersections between queer and Jewish identity within the plays of Tony Kushner finds the reoccurring theme of “the wandering, rootless, shape-
shifting Jew, who never finds a home,” (Freedman, 1998: 91). Within *Angels in America*, Rabbi Chemelwitz makes the statement to two gay men, one whose grandmother the Rabbi is eulogizing. “You do not live in America,” the Rabbi states. “Your clay is the clay of some Litvak shtetl, your air the air of the steppes,” (Kushner, 1993). With this statement, the Rabbi is making a distinction between himself and these two gay men. They are not Jews of his kind, they are Other Jews, Jews which stand along the margins of legitimate Jewish identity. To be gay and Jewish is to be un-Jewish.9

---

9 Here we see what Brekhus (1996) was referring to when he discusses the weight of marked identity traits. While to be gay is looked upon as being un-Jewish, to be Jewish is not looked upon as being un-Gay. In this case, homosexuality is a much more serious step away from legitimate identity than Jewishness.
A Small Note on Gender

Shmueli (1990) identifies seven different cultural systems that have existed within Jewish history: the biblical, Talmudic, poetic-philosophic, mystical, and rabbinic, as well as the Emancipation/Israeli culture itself. However, in identifying these seven, we must realize that they are in no way exhaustive, nor are they in any way conclusive in their own right. If we take a close look at the seven cultural systems of Shmueli, we can see that they are largely cultural systems of a male Jewish population.

Biblical and Talmudic cultures have been written by men for the greater Jewish community. Laws centering on the community then have an inherent gendered component among them, with prefabricated frameworks of interaction between genders. More importantly, these two cultural systems have somewhat dictated the shape of the remaining cultural systems within Shmueli’s analysis, in that they have already set in stone the requirements for who can become a rabbi, who is a legitimate poet or philosopher, and who has the power to usher in an emancipation, or rule a kingdom. None of the identified cultural systems of Jewish thought and history speak to the cultural system belonging in part to Jewish women, in traditional or non-traditional settings. It was this recognition by many Jewish women in the 1970s which led to a feminist critique within the
American Jewish religious movement (Steinberg, 1975). For purposes of this argument, by problematizing gender within the discourse of identities we add another layer of analysis to the argument surrounding authenticity.

Acknowledging the variance within Jewish history and thought, and problematizing the original discourse provided by Shmueli (1990), what does it mean to say that one’s Jewishness is ascribed? If there has never been one set of criteria for establishing authentic Jewish identity, and if the various historical traditions have been established through a more generic patriarchal order which is not exclusive to Judaism, how do we determine authenticity?

Case Study #1: The Law of Return

The example of Israel as a Jewish state provides an appropriate model for the study of the Other Within on a large scale. Israel stands as the only sovereign nation in the world exclusively established as a nation of Jews, by Jews, and for Jews. Therefore, the dominant majority of Jews within Israel stand as the generic, or unmarked, a feature which is an anomaly compared to the rest of the world. However, even within Israel, there is an understanding of what characteristics are marked and what characteristics are unmarked. While a later analysis within this paper of the Falasha serves as an example of marked identity characteristics within an otherwise homogenous society, I wish to briefly go beyond the Falasha, and highlight how authenticity has been determined through official Israeli policy, such as the Law of Return.

Beginning in 1950, Israel initiated a law, followed by a series of amendments to the original law, which reflected a desire to portray the newly
founded state as a distinct, Jewish homeland. This law and its amendments are referred to, in whole, as the Law of Return. The subsequent amendments to the original document of 1950 reflect a desire of Israeli policy makers to use the same working definition as the Nuremberg law of Nazi Germany in determining who is a Jew.

The Nuremberg laws defined a Jew as anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent (Nuremberg Law on Citizenship and Race, 1935), and the 1970 amendment to the original Law of Return reflects that definition of who is an olleh\(^\text{10}\): the rights of any emigrant Jew to Israel are to also be handed down to the spouses and grandchildren of that Jew (Law of Return, 5710, 1950). Therefore, any descendant of a Jewish grandparent is also given full access to Israeli citizenship. The suggested reasoning behind this is that Israel, being a Jewish state founded in the aftermath of the Shoah\(^\text{11}\), largely in response to the Shoah, was conceptualized among other things as a safe-haven for Jews the world over (Jamal, 2002). Thus, one can see the utility of this law in that the State sought to protect those Jews who would otherwise be set aside for extermination under the same legal definitions as those of the Third Reich.

However, in constructing this law around the notion of a ‘one-drop rule’ of identity (Brekhus, 1996), Israel has in fact established an evaluative criteria for defining who is Jewish enough, and who is not. The enforcement of the law sets

---

\(^{10}\) The Hebrew term ‘olleh’ is translated to mean any Jew immigrating specifically to Israel. The plural form of this, in Hebrew, is ‘olim’.

\(^{11}\) I choose to use the term ‘Shoah’, Hebrew for ‘catastrophe’, rather than the common reference of the Holocaust. This is done in an attempt to remove the latter term from the epistemological ghetto within which it has resided, allowing the audience to acknowledge that there have been other equally tragic Holocausts in our world’s history.
in stone a religious criterion for determining authentic Jewish identity, and acceptable immigration: one is Jewish if one can trace roots back to an ‘authentic’ Jew. While Jewish authenticity is often seen as revolving around biblical law and practice, Newman (1998) argues that this becomes problematic when we take into account the fact that there has never existed at any time one single system of Halakhic law that has governed Jews the world over (1998: 167). Being able to claim a Jewish grandparent is not sufficient for Israeli citizenship when one has to also prove authenticity. Unfortunately, current literature on the Israeli Law of Return does not elaborate on what can be referred to as intra-multicultural conflict; that is, conflict within the Jewish community as to who is authentic and who is not. Current literature instead chooses to focus on the lack of applicability towards Arab-Israeli citizens (Levy, 2005; Jamal, 2002), or indigenous Palestinian minority rights within the existing Jewish state (Pelev, 2005; Ellis, 2000). The few examples within the literature that do wish to discuss the variance within the Israeli-Jewish community often reduce it to a secular vs. non-secular discourse (e.g. Ichilov, 2005). What needs to be addressed is the linear logic assumed within the Israeli Law of Return, and by those in power, that to be a Jew means that you must constitute only one type of Judaism.

An example of the aforementioned rigidity can be found within the article in *Ha’aretz* “Not All Children of Mixed Marriages are Created Equal” (July, 2004). This article refers to problems of authenticity when dealing with adopted children of Jewish parents. A child whose adoptive father or mother is Jewish may be issued a temporary visa, but is not issued an official card of citizenship, even
though they are being raised by Israeli-Jews. Upon reaching the age of an adult, that child could be asked to leave the country, renouncing not only their temporary visa, but also their rights to resources which are now denied to them.

The problematics addressed within this article has to do with the idea that one’s Jewishness is ascribed. Ascription, in this case through birthright, poses a problem because it does not recognize that culture is an *activity*. For a culture to take form, it involves a process of *doing*. This process of creating and maintaining culture is not a process of inherited traits or features, but one of learned codes and conducts. Furthermore, ascribing cultural status creates boundaries that, as we shall see in the next section, revolve around notions of purity and authenticity that do not exist.

*Simulated Authenticity*

Fuller (2003) notes that it is because cultural boundaries do not reflect reality in a straightforward way that they are always able to be drawn differently (2003: 4). When Israeli policy attempts to draw cultural boundaries around authentic Jewishness through the Law of Return, restricting access to those it deems unauthentic, it does not do so with the cultural concept of the generic Jew in mind, but of the *most authentic* Jew. Israeli society is predominantly secular in religiosity. The responsibility for judging what is Jewish and what is not Jewish, however, is the responsibility of the Orthodox of Israeli society, a distinct and powerful minority. Those wishing to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return are not held up to the standards of the everyday Jew living in Israel, but are instead held up to the standards of the Jew who doesn’t even exist within the
social world, the *pure* Jew. The *most authentic* identity is a cultural myth; a purity extreme existing only in theory, but never in practice (Fuller, 2003: 11). When the Law of Return follows these guidelines of who is in and who is out, based upon a simulation of Jewish identity, it sets up *all* Jews as violators of this authentic code in one way or another. While Fuller’s (2003) analysis focuses on the cultural myth of ‘pure’ rock climbers, examples abound with more serious ramifications. Numerous social policies within the United States alone, from the Naturalization Laws of the 18th century, up to the ‘one-drop’ rule of the Jim Crow South, attempted to establish purity extremes as measures of authentic national, ethnic, and racial identity, even though based upon that definition purity is almost impossible. For an illustration of the ontological typology of Jewish authenticity established by the Orthodox tradition of Israeli society, see Figure 2.

---

12 The use of the term ‘purity’ is credited to Fuller (2003). However, within the context of a Jewish state, this term becomes much more compelling than perhaps it was in Fuller’s original analysis on rock climbers’ identity. Within Nazi Germany, the idea of ‘purity’ is exactly what led to the attempted eradication of an entire population of Jews across Europe. Fast forward to the present, and we are witnessing a return to the practice of exclusion for the sake of ethnic purity within the policies and practices of the Israeli government. This time, the aim is not only to keep certain Arab, non-Jewish populations from attaining full citizenship rights within the Jewish state, but also to make sure that Jewish ‘purity’ is not challenged by ‘mixed-bloods’, or ‘questionable’ Jews.
Figure 2 – The Ontology of Israeli-Jewish Authenticity

Here we can see how this framework for determining authenticity establishes a hierarchal relationship to possessing an identity. Those at the top come to define those at the bottom by identity extremes for which those at the top cannot even achieve.

To better understand how theories of purity become overlapped with actualities of intermingling, we can turn to Brekhus’ (1996) trinary model of identity. The trinary model of identity posits that within any given social category, there exists a middle ground of generic quality. At each end of this middle ground stand poles of perversion and exceptionality (Brekhus, 1996: 501). Brekhus’ model of identity highlights a continuum of sexual deviance, with a middle ground of ‘accepted’ deviance, or generic quality, surrounded by either perverse deviation, or ‘exceptional’ deviation. For instance, when discussing one’s sexual promiscuity, the generic, or accepted and unmarked category of promiscuity is
represented by those who don’t have too many partners, or too few. Reminiscent of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, generic promiscuity is neither ‘too hot’ nor ‘too cold’, but just right.

Another example given by Brekhus (1996: 503) is that of sexual timing, or the acceptable age for when one engages in sexual intercourse. At one end, you have the sexually fast, or those who have not waited long enough; note here that ‘long enough’ implies that there is a standard, or generic age which is acceptable to engage in sexual contact, even if this age is never actually defined. At the other end of the continuum, you have the sexually slow, or those who have waited too long; again, this continuum of ‘not long enough’ or ‘too long’ implies the trinary model, with a generic, unmarked category of sexual timing existing within the middle.¹³

If we apply the binary/trinary model of identity formation posited by Brekhus (1996), then it becomes clear that we have a binary/trinary split in theory versus theory as practice. The Law of Return itself is binary, constructing you either authentic, or unauthentic. Once accepted as authentic, you are assimilated into the ‘generic’, by way of the ‘exceptional’, yet distinctly opposed to both the exceptional and the ‘perverse’ – the non-Jewish Israeli citizen. In other words, you are established as ‘generic’ through the acceptance by the Orthodox tradition, which represents the ‘exceptional’. This acceptance as ‘generic’, however, falls between the exceptional Orthodox Jews on one side of the trinary, and the non-Jewish Israeli citizens on the other side.

¹³ Brekhus (1996) actually identifies six (6) dimensions of sexual identity for which the trinary model is applicable. They are as follows: quantity of sex, timing of sex, level of perceived enjoyment, degree of consent, orientation, and social value of agents.
Case Study #2: The National Jewish Population Survey

If Jewish identity is defined through the formal organization of government policy and practice within Israel, then Jewish identity as it is conceptualized within the American framework is defined through similar bureaucratic organization as well, minus full-fledged government endorsement. While the rhetoric of Israel is built upon pseudo-solidarity, what comes to define the Jew as distinct in American culture is their exclusivity from others. Yet, there is still a degree of organized solidarity within the U.S. What makes this solidarity relevant to the argument at large within this project is how it is organized, and upon which principle (or lack thereof) this organization rests.

When determining what comes to define a Jew, perhaps no example stands out as much for its organization and wide-reaching ability as that of the National Jewish Population Survey (2004). This survey, sponsored by the United Jewish Communities and the Jewish federation system, serves as an analytical tool for determining demographic features concerning the American Jewish population. Along with demographics, the report also deals with such topics as Jewish connections, engagements, and intermarriage, as well as special topics such as the elderly, immigrants, and those living at or below the poverty line (2004: 4). While surveys such as the NJPS serve as a powerful analytic tool for social scientists wishing to study trends and variances within a targeted population, they do not come without their own methodological issues.

---

14 See Bourdieu (1984) for an explanation as to why exclusivity is fundamental to distinction.
Particularly, within the NJPS, the issue of concern is who gets to take the survey, thus constituting the portrait of American Jewish life.

Within the NJPS, a Jew was defined as such: a person whose religion was Jewish; a person whose religion was Jewish and something else; a person who has no religion and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing; or a person who has a non-monotheistic religion, and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing (2004). One needs to possess at least one of these four criteria in order to qualify as Jewish for the survey. One can reduce this list, then, to two broader means of qualification: practice and lineage. One would count as a Jew if they practice, or have ever practiced Jewish customs and traditions. One would also count as a Jew if they were born to a Jewish parent. Interestingly, the NJPS does deviate from religious doctrine in determining Jewish lineage. According to Jewish law, lineage is matriarchal; if the mother is Jewish, the child is Jewish. Within the NJPS, however, the sex of the parent makes no difference, as long as at least one of them is ‘certifiably Jewish’.

While the NJPS does not construct Jewishness as an ascribed status, but rather as an identity that is performed, there remains a larger concern with the methodology of the NJPS in that it is tautological in nature. One is a Jew if they practice Judaism, and if one practices Judaism, one is a Jew. The problem becomes defining what constitutes as Jewish, something that the NJPS fails to address in full. In fact, there is nothing to determine what exactly a Jewish practice is or looks like. Questions measuring an individual’s connections to Jewish life and identity also fall back into a tautology of strong connections being
those that exhibit high engagement with Jewish things, and weak connections being those that exhibit low engagement with Jewish things; nowhere within the NJPS is there an actual explanation or analysis of what constitutes as a Jewish organization, a Jewish book, or Jewish education. It is assumed that the underlying Jewishness of these topics is understood. Like earlier literature on American Judaism (see Heilman, 1982; Levy, 1933; Davis, 1943; Liebman, 1979), Jewish identity is a taken-for-granted concept. Because Jewish identity is taken for granted within the NJPS, implicitly then, it is also assumed to be understood as to what does not count as a Jewish organization, a Jewish book, or a Jewish education.

The missing data in the NJPS is more than just those Jews who are left out. The real 'missing data' here is the absence of any real substance for defining what Jewish means. Taking a look at the organizational structure of the United Jewish Communities, as well as the Jewish federation system, it is safe to assume that those Jews who stand on the margins are most likely not included within the pool of data. For example, Messianic Jews, whose identity as Jews is just as strong as those within more mainstream branches of Judaism, are not acknowledged as authentic by these organizations. In fact, mainstream American Judaism holds firmly to the belief that acceptance of Jesus as the Moshiach is a betrayal to the ‘true’ essence of what it means to be a Jew (Yangarber-Hicks, 2005). Yet, if we return to the previous argument of Amy Newman (1998), that there has never been a single system of Jewish law which has governed all Jews everywhere, where does that leave us in determining violations, or adherence, to
Jewish law? Or, if we return to Shmueli’s (1990) analysis of the seven (or more?)
different Jewish cultures, what does it mean to say that a practice or custom is
‘Jewish’ without explaining the context behind not only the practice, but the
judgment that is passed on that practice?

While the effect of the NJPS upon Jewish identity appears to set up
another issue of a binary model of identity, between authentic Jews and non-
Jews, what we have is actually a trinary model of Jewish identity. Yet it is not a
trinary model of identity in the sense of identity density, with an unmarked middle
ground, but instead a trinary model of Jewish identity typology. One is marked as
an exceptional Jew, or using the language of the NJPS, as one with strong
connections; these are the Jews at one end of the spectrum, and also ones who
are officially counted by the NJPS. Next, you have the middle ground, or generic
Jews; Jews who do not stand out for their intense, or strong connections, but fit
the basic description. Last, you have a third category established by the NJPS,
yet not explicitly mentioned or acknowledged – the marginal, or perverse Jew;
these are the Jews for whom the survey does not acknowledge, but whose
tautological and ambiguous methods of inclusion/exclusion allow us as social
scientists concerned with identity to acknowledge. They are the Messianic Jews
who because of their acceptance of Jesus as the Moshiach have their lineage
rejected by the NJPS, and they are the Crypto-Jews of Janet Jacobs’
ethnographic research (Jacobs, 2002).

Because they have been excluded from the data, and because they are
not made mention of, these Jews stand at the other end of the margins within the
American Jewish framework. The only way to acknowledge them as authentic is to move past the bureaucratic and organizational hegemony which exists within mainstream American Judaism, and instead turn to a more reflexive and open methodology which allows us to engage their subjectivity as identity variants, rather than identity deviants.

Having established two separate case studies where problems of authenticity remain salient, I wish now to return to Bauman’s concept of Prismatic identity as a means of articulating the standpoint of the Other Within, both in the ontological realities that the Other Within faces in everyday interaction, but also the standpoint of the Other Within as it relates to sociological research.
PRISMATIC IDENTITY(S)

As already mentioned, important to the discussion of in-group othering is the idea of a prismatic identity. Bauman (1989) writes primarily of the Jew as representing the quintessential prismatic identity, almost as if it is exclusively been a Jewish ontological experience. However, scholars such as Charles Levine (2005) have stated that the internalized contents of identities are not self-contained, and that all identities have meaning in relation to what they are not. In other words, how one comes to internalize an identity is related to how that identity is perceived by others. Levine is making an argument here that all identities have a prismatic character to them, in that they come to be defined by what they do not represent. One is female because in part one is not male, and one is Black in part because one is not White (as well as not other racial classifications).

While Bauman discusses the Jew as being the prismatic Other, scholars such as Gerald Cromer have stated that no matter who is identified by those in power as the Other, it is somewhat of a prerequisite that they possess a sense of prismaticism (Cromer, 2001). It is the Other, Cromer argues, through which greater society is able to distinguish its own cultural space and boundaries (2001). To elaborate this concept of indiscriminate prismatic identity, let us return back to DuBois (1903) and his theory of Black double-consciousness.
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is sort of a seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, - a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, - an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. – DuBois (1903: 5).

In the model of DuBois, Blacks see themselves through their eyes, as well as the eyes of others (1903: 5). Others here can be inferred as Whites. Thus, blacks come to know themselves through the eyes of Whites, because they come to know themselves as something which is not white. Their identities have meaning as Blacks in America only in relation to what they do not represent, White Americans. If we generalize this model, then, marked identities can be seen to have meaning only through their markedness, which is in opposition to unmarkedness. But what happens when the prismatic identity of the Other is reversed? Or rather, when the prismatic aspect of identity becomes prismatic from within the Other, rather than as a reflection of identities external to the reference point? What does it mean to be a vagabond (Bauman, 1996) from within an identity location?15 Similar to the concept of the vagabond is Georg Simmel’s concept of ‘the stranger’ (from Wolff, 1950). The stranger is not a

15 “Wherever the vagabond goes, he is a stranger; he can never be the ‘native’, the ‘settled one’, one with ‘roots in the soil (too fresh is the memory of his arrival – that is, of his being elsewhere before).” – From Pilgrim to Tourist – Or a Short History of Identity, p.28. It should be noted that Bauman’s metaphor is heavily laden with masculine imagery. This critique needs to be mentioned, for if we are to truly move towards a postmodern narrative of identity formation, and prismatic identity, we need to understand how a generic process like patriarchy can be found not just within the greater hegemonic society, but also within the subcultures of the Other as well.
wanderer, but instead represents that identity which remains fixed in a special location while never actually occupying that spatial location (1950: 402). Simmel writes:

“In spite of being inorganically appended to it, the stranger is yet an organic member of the group. Its uniform life includes the specific conditions of this element. Only we do not know how to designate the peculiar unity of this position other than by saying that it is composed of certain measures of nearness and distance. Although some quantities of them characterize all relationships, a special proportion and reciprocal tension produce the particular, formal relation to the "stranger." (trans. from Wolff, 1950: 408).

The Jew as the Other Within, or as Simmel’s stranger within a larger identity configuration, is for greater society closer in social distance to the Jewish Other, yet within that identity location is pushed to the margins as a perversion of the generic Jew.

What I wish to convey with the works of Bauman (1989) and Simmel (1950) is that if we look at the Jew as that prismatic Other, then they are seen as that Other to the rest of the society precisely because they are just Jews. What happens, though, when they also are othered for being Jewish and some other socially marked trait, but a marked trait that is not only a sign of markedness in relation to the unmarked generic social world, but the unmarked traits of their own reference point? In other words, what happens within the identity group of the Other to those who possess the trait which others them from larger society, but also possess certain characteristics which push them towards the margins of their own identity location? Figure 3 represents the concept of the Other Within,
using Simmel's idea of the stranger, and the concrete examples of both Messianic Jews and the Falasha.

*Figure 3 – The Other Within*

Jews who stand at the margins of Jewish identity as it has been determined for them experience a form of double, and even triple jeopardy. Not only are they the prismatic Other for greater society, which sees them as just another Jew to which they can differentiate themselves from, but they also experience that same prismatic othering from those amongst their own. An example is in how Mainstream American Judaism has pushed Messianic Jews so far to the left and right of their acceptable generic middle-ground that
Messianic Jews have become prismatic within their own in-group: they serve as the reference point by which Jews come to define themselves against. Mainstream American Jews can now identify themselves as the Jews who do not accept Jesus as the Moshiach. This logic of differentiation becomes a slippery slope in the end. Mainstream American Jews can extend this prismatic quality to seemingly any social characteristic they wish. Examples abound of this very process occurring not only in Mainstream American Judaism, but in the generic Jewish life of Israel as well as it relates to the non-Jewish Arab citizen (Ichilov, 2005; Levy, 2005; Peled, 2005). One way in which we can come to understand how the Other Within gets separated from their primary identity category is through Eviatar Zerubavel’s explanation of the cognitive process of lumping and splitting.

**Lumping and Splitting – The Cognitive Factor**

According to Eviatar Zerubavel (1996), we experience our social reality in ‘chunks’ (1996: 422). Social reality is chaotic, and in order to create islands of meaning out of these chunks, humans use the process of lumping and splitting social categories (Zerubavel, 1996: 422; see also Zerubavel, 1991). These distinctions allow us to produce order in our everyday lives (Zerubavel, 1991). Islands of meaning are described by Zerubavel as clusters of things which are regarded as more similar to each other than things outside of that particular cluster, or group (1996: 422). Lumping occurs when we group similar things into one mental cluster, and spitting occurs when we perceive different clusters or social categories as separate from one another (Zerubavel, 1996: 421). Whereas
the mental process of lumping involves us overlooking differences within a given mental cluster, the mental process of splitting involves the exaggeration of the perceived differences between these islands of meaning, thus reinforcing mental separations between them (Zerubavel, 1996: 424). These mental separations become boundaries when actualized, and these boundaries serve as both exclusionary and inclusionary processes, filtering out who or what is in and who or what is outside of our boundaries (Zerubavel, 1991).

There are two approaches to how the mind handles lumping and splitting: the rigid mind and the fuzzy mind (Zerubavel, 1991). The rigid mind cannot cope with ambiguities. Gender must be binary, temperature must be hot or cold, and it must be either light or dark outside. The fuzzy mind, on the other hand, relishes in ambiguity. In fact, Zerubavel (1991) states that the fuzzy mind is the hallmark of modernity in that it allows for us to blur the boundaries established by the rigid mind. It is no longer hot, but lukewarm. It is neither light nor dark outside, but dusk. The flexible mind, which Zerubavel advocates in _The Fine Line_ (1991), is the mind which synthesizes both the rigid and fuzzy mind, acknowledging the importance of structures yet able to cope with abandoning, rejecting, or destroying those structures when they have outlasted their usefulness.

Relating this process to the creation and maintenance of the Other, Zerubavel’s argument looks something like this: in order to perceive fundamental distances between ‘us’ and ‘them’, we exaggerate the mental divides separating certain social groups (Zerubavel, 1996: 425). Important here is that we understand, as Zerubavel does (1996: 422), that difference is not natural. In
order to perceive difference or similarity, we first have to construct that which is
similar and different. The way in which we do this has meaning, and it certainly
has its functional use, but it rarely has a consistency to it. For instance, we lump
those born on March 19\textsuperscript{th} and those born on April 4\textsuperscript{th} together as Pisces, but if
one of those is a man, and the other a woman, we engage in a process of
splitting. Why one carries more weight than another is a process of construction,
not a natural act, and this process of constructing certain differences as more
important than others is important for understanding how a certain social group
can become an Other, and even how a certain group within that Other can
become the Other Within. In the case of Jews, we can lump Jews of Spanish
descent and Jews of Eastern European descent when splitting them from what
we think of as typical American society, yet within Judaism, there is a split
between Jews of Spanish descent, or the Sephardim, and Jews of Eastern
European descent, or the Ashkenazim.

To further show the actual absurdity of this process, Zerubavel (1996; see
also 1991) asks why, on Monday, do we look back on Friday as part of last week,
and the Friday coming up as part of this week, when in fact we are closer to the
former than to the latter (1996: 426)? We see marriage as this great
transformation within a given relationship, when in fact it marks an event, a day,
which was only one day after a day in which the very same couple was not
married. This one particular event suddenly marks them, lumping them with
couples married for fifty years, and splitting them from couples who won’t be
married until next week (Zerubavel, 1996: 426). However, as Zerubavel (1991)
notes, reality is continuous, not a bunch of intervals or separations. It is social
convention, not natural order, which separates these “oceans into mental
archipelagos” (Zerubavel, 1996: 427).

An understanding of this cognitive process allows for us, as social scientists, to not only engage in a critical analysis of the construction of the Other as social convention, but creates the intellectual space necessary to challenge the Other as an essentialist category. What are we referring to when we study Black identity, or Jewish identity? Which Blacks, and which Jews? What processes have we as social scientists taken part of in order to mentally create islands of Jewish meaning, or any other constructed meaning? What about this process may neglect the diversity within a given social category, because we’ve chosen to focus on one particular construct? I wish now to turn to a discussion involving this lumping and splitting process as it relates to Jews of Ethiopian descent, living in Israel. As it will be shown, these Ethiopian Jews have been denied claims to their identity by the Israeli authority through a process of splitting, even though it was an initial process of lumping that led to the mass migration of Ethiopian Jews to Israel in the 1980s.

*The Falasha as the Other Within*

The Falasha, or Beta-Israel, are ethnic Jews of Ethiopian descent. Most of the Falasha within the Jewish state are recent immigrants, part of a national response to the discovery of a Jewish population in Ethiopia, and the recognition by the Jewish state that this population was experiencing hardships at the hands
of the Ethiopian government (Ben-Eliezer, 2004). \(^{16}\) The state of Israel participated in multiple operations over the course of two decades, airlifting thousands of Ethiopian Jews to the Jewish state as part of a policy that reflected a national sense of *Teshuva*, or return.

However, upon arrival Ethiopian Jews soon found themselves subject to policies and practices that contributed to the legitimization of their Othering within Israel. Instead of being accepted into Israeli society as legitimate Jews with legitimate rights of return, Ethiopian Jews had the very basis of their identity questioned by the state. The chief rabbinical authority even went as far as to declare that all Ethiopian Jews had to go through an official conversion process in order to become full members of the Jewish community, thus calling into question their identity as both authentic Jews and authentic Israelis (Ben-Eliezer, 2004).

Much of this question of legitimation had to do with the fact that Ethiopian Jews, having been in Ethiopia for almost two thousand years, never had access to the Talmud, or the Oral Torah. While mainstream Judaism generally accepts the Talmud as the interpretation of written Jewish law, Ethiopian Jews had a much more literal acceptance of written law as it is found in the original Pentateuch.

Rubin Patterson writes that diasporas refer to “peoples dispersed from their original homeland, a people possessing a collective memory and myth about and sentimental and/or material links to that homeland, which fosters a

---

\(^{16}\) The Falasha, or Beta-Israel, refers to those Ethiopian Jewish immigrants residing in Israel. Let the reader note that I use these terms interchangeably throughout my writing, so that there is no confusion on the reader’s behalf.
sense of sympathy and solidarity with co-ethnic diasporans and with putative brethren in the ancestral homeland…” (2006: 1896). One does not need to have visited this homeland, or be closely removed from it, in order to have this sense of collective consciousness around this homeland. The connection to the homeland is much more of a cognitive and emotional connection than a material connection. The Falasha reflect an entirely different Diaspora than the Diasporic Jews of European descent, and with this comes an entirely different historical memory (see Zerubavel, 1997). The Falasha did not experience the Holocaust, nor did they experience many of the European pogroms that have come to define the historical memory of many Israeli citizens. However, their historical memory is not devoid of tragedy, nor of an awareness of their existence as an Other within their own homeland. This collective memory, coupled with an oppressive collective experience since their arrival in Israel, has resulted in a very different construction of what Shmueli (1990) would refer to as a culture of Emancipation. Because of their different collective memory, many of the youth within Ben-Eliezer's (2004) study identified an abstract Africa as their collective Zion; their own Emancipation.

The Ethiopian youth within Ben-Eliezer’s (2004) project have a unique image of their particular Zion which is drastically different from the Zion described by the Israeli elite. The Falasha youth who were interviewed discuss an imagined Africa, with its own distinct rhythm, special foods, customs, suffering, and hope; all components that are incongruent with larger Israeli rhetoric surrounding the political and religious Zion that Israel has been made out to be for Jews. This
Israeli Zion, however, is a racially charged Zion, and has embedded within its structure a strong sense of patriarchy as well. While the youth interviewed by Ben-Eliezer (2004) established a completely different notion of Zion, one grounded in African tradition and custom, it was also heavily dominated by a masculine construction of an African Zion. For instance, how would the suffering of Ethiopian women, not just under an oppressive Ethiopian government, or an Israeli government, but under an oppressive household structure within their own subculture, be different than that described within the interviews of Ben-Eliezer’s Ethiopian youth if those questions had been asked?

For the Falasha, their historical identity is connected to the history of their own Jewish community as it has taken place in Ethiopia, largely unbeknownst to the greater Jewish population. In keeping with the process of lumping and splitting, the Falasha have been effectively split apart from their Jewish contemporaries as unauthentic because of their cultural-historical lineage. As well, they have been split from larger Israeli society because they do not represent the dominant Ashkenazim (read: White) within Israeli society. This has caused them to be lumped together with the Occidental (Said, 1978), or Arab-Israeli, yet they do not occupy the same political space as the Arab-Israeli precisely because they are seen as Jewish by their Arab contemporaries. The Falasha, then, serve to highlight how the Prismatic Other Within comes to fruition. They are Jewish to the non-Jewish world, and inauthentic to their Jewish contemporaries. They come to define what everyone else is not.
THE TRINARY REVISITED AND THE PROPOSAL OF THE SPECTRUM

Having problematized authenticity, as well explored the concept of Prismatic identity as it relates to both the Other and the Other Within, I now wish to explore what I referred to in the beginning of my project as the spectrum model of identity. This model of identity, as I will show, offers social scientists the hope of abandoning identity models of conventional differences, focusing on the shared attributes within any given social category. In order to understand how the spectrum model works, I want to revert back to the trinary model of identity (Brekhus, 1996) highlighted earlier in this article.

To restate, the argument of Brekhus (1996) establishes a trinary model of identity formation, where there exists a generic middle ground of the unmarked, and at each end of this generic stand the marked: one end is the exceptional, and the other is the perverse. This trinary model is accurate in its reflection of society’s construction of identity formation in regards to socially marked versus unmarked traits, and identity disputes regarding density and duration.17

In order to connect this trinary model to other dimensions of identity in general, I wish to change the language of Brekhus (1996) to reflect not

17 See Brekhus (2003) for a more detailed analysis of identity disputes of density versus duration. The concepts of identity commuters, integrators, and lifestylers within this work reflect the aforementioned disputes. However, they also reflect an authentic lifestyler identity, which serves as the prismatic identity for the remaining two categories. One cannot be a commuter unless one knows what they are commuting towards, and subsequently away from. As well, one cannot integrate unless they know what they do not want to become, and what is most socially acceptable. Thus, the lifestyler may serve to highlight the prismatic character of any identity if we formulate it as I have so far within this work.
necessarily a continuum, but what I would call a ‘spectrum’ of identity. Within a
ternary model, a continuum implies that at one end, you have ‘too little’ of an
identity, and at the other end you possess ‘too much’ of an identity. The
dimensions of sexual identity posited by Brekhus (1996) are shown from the
perspective of the generic, or unmarked category; they have the power to define
what is too much or too few, because they are the generic. Reminiscent of
Goldilocks and the Three Bears, generic promiscuity, for instance, is neither ‘too
hot’ nor ‘too cold’, but just right. A color spectrum of identity, however, allows for
us to take identity typologies out of the context of deviance by showing how each
configuration within a typology is relational to the others. Thus, those identity
configurations which serve as the prismatic Other are no longer a reflection of
what identity one is not, but instead reflect a necessary component within the
construction of each subsequent identity typology.

The spectrum model of identity can be said to be somewhat of an
extension from the work of Kate Bornstein’s work on gender and sexuality
(1994). Kate Bornstein problematizes previous models of sexual identity by
postulating models based off of sexual practices. We establish models based off
of which gender we have a sexual preference for. We’re left with four basic
models: heterosexual models, gay male models, lesbian models, and bisexual
models (Bornstein, 1994: 32) We could lump lesbian models and gay models
together if we base it off of a generic definition of attraction/preference for the
same sex. Thus, we really have three models of sexual identity here. Bornstein,
however, problematizes these models because they all depend on the gender of
an individual’s partner. These models ignore the complexities of relationships which could in fact be much more important than perhaps gender. Preferences for partners who are submissive versus partners who are dominant, or for multiple partners versus single partners all may outweigh the component of gender, yet previous models within the study of gender and sexuality ignored these dynamics.

Extending this logic to the study of identity, it becomes quite clear that we occupy many identities at once, and some of these identities become more active than others depending upon how we locate ourselves (for identity densities and durations, see Brekhus, 2003). If we were to establish a spectrum model of identity for Jewish identity, then, we would need to take into account the plurality within Jewish identity discussed throughout this article. Because there are multiple identity locations, there would need to be multiple spectrums we as social scientists would need to account for. For instance, to establish a spectrum of high density, high duration religious involvement, we may set up those at one end of the spectrum (e.g. Red) as Messianic Jews, and at the other end (e.g. Violet), the traditional Orthodox. We can then come to see how the Orthodox have come to define the basic principles of Messianic Judaism, i.e. Halakhic law, but we do not necessarily have to establish a hierarchy here of Jewish authenticity. Instead, we can come to not only see variance within Jewish identity, but also the mundane that exists within each. Ritual observance, obedience, conformity, community; all of these components are reflected in the
mundanity of everyday life for both the practicing Messianic Jew and the observant Orthodox.

We could then establish another spectrum for ethnic identification among these same religiously observant high density, high duration Jews, with a number of different colors representing different ethnicities. A Red (Messianic Jew) may come to align themselves ethnically with a Violet (Orthodox Jew) because they both are Orange (e.g., Latino) along the spectrum of ethnicity.

If we again set up the Orthodox to exist at one end of the color spectrum, and set up the secular Jew to exist at the other, we can come to see how perhaps a collective historical memory, or collective ethnic heritage, may come to define this specific spectrum of Jewish identity typology. One’s collective history may come to define why they have chosen to be observant, or why they have chosen to become secular, yet it does not have to determine their authenticity as a Jew, only what type of Jew they may self-identify as. For instance, Elie Wiesel’s Night (1960) is an example of how many Jews came to identify as secular, even atheist, in that they could not come to terms with how a G-d could allow something like the Shoah to take place. However, their choosing to leave behind a strict religious Judaic practice does not effectively end their existence as Jews. They share a collective memory and shared experience of the same Holocaust that many other Jews shared. Thus, they stand at one end of a spectrum of level of practice, but not a hierarchy of authenticity because of their level of practice.
Ultimately, the idea of a spectrum model of identity serves as a method of inclusion, to highlight the necessity within the social sciences to begin to practice a more sensitive and inclusive form of identity research. Through the use of the spectrum model of identity, we can allow for deviation within identity typology, without assigning perverse or deviant categories to any one type. This method of inclusion is in line with the postmodern challenge of identity issued by Zygmunt Bauman: “Indeed, if the modern ‘problem of identity’ was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the postmodern ‘problem of identity’ is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open.” (1996: p.18).


