INTUITIONS AND ADEQUATE PHILOSOPHICAL SOLUTIONS

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by

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A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

And hereby certify that that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

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…for my parents. They have been very patient.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Philosophical investigation relies on intuition. Exactly to what degree is contentious; from my experiences intuition is used heavily in philosophy. Intuition is used to discover philosophical problems, and intuition is used to discover solutions to philosophical problems. Many philosophers argue that intuition is a source of evidence. They further argue that while intuition may be a fallible source of evidence, like perception is a fallible source of evidence, it is nonetheless a reliable or good source of evidence. Some philosophers argue that not only is intuition a reliable or good source of evidence, one may very well be irrational by failing to include intuition in one's evidence or failing to consider intuition as a good source of evidence. Some solutions to problems crucially rely on intuition; i.e. the strength of the solution depends on the strength of intuition. In this dissertation I argue that even if intuition is a good source of evidence and one is irrational by failing to include intuition in one's philosophical investigation, if one's solution to some important kinds of philosophical problems crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is inadequate.

As mentioned, philosophers use intuition to discover philosophical problems and solutions to these problems. There are many different kinds of philosophical problems. For example, there are many particular judgments that, intuitively, are true: "It is immoral to steal", "I know I have hands" and "There are many objects around me." Since we have these particular judgments, we would like to either be able to explain or justify these judgments. Philosophers attempt to explain these particular judgments with general

principles. Usually, these general principles must also be intuitively true. I call the

judgments lacking an explanation or justification the no principle (NP) problem, and the

principle offered for the NP problem the NP solution. Of course, no philosopher

seriously thinks there is significant agreement on proposed NP solutions, but they

contend that there are solutions nonetheless. Since there is significant disagreement

about NP solutions, philosophers have a further problem; viz. philosophers must

determine which of the NP solutions are false and which are true. For example, the

libertarian thinks he can explain not only why libertarianism is true but show that

utilitarianism is false; or, the perdurantist believes she can explain why perdurantism is

true and show that endurantism is false. We can loosely consider this to be a problem of

competing solutions; I call this the too many principle (TMP) problem. Finally, there are

problems involving *aporia*; briefly, *aporia* are sets of individually plausible but

collectively inconsistent statements. Quite often this occurs when one's favored NP

solution has a counterintuitive implication. For example, Utilitarianism, though very

respectable as an ethical theory and intuitive (especially at first glance), has several

counterintuitive implications. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of problems

and solutions, but philosophers are very concerned with these problems.

Solutions to TMP problems and *aporia* can crucially rely on intuitions. By this I

mean, roughly and metaphorically, that the solution either stands or falls with the strength

of intuition. We can see this practice in philosophical discourse when a philosopher

rejects an NP solution due to counterintuitive implications; for example, the informal

reductio ad absurdum or the Socratic elenchus. Or, we can see this practice in

philosophical discourse when a philosopher appeals to the plausibility, rationality or

"strength" of premises or reasons for the plausibility, rationality or strength of the conclusion. My thesis is that if a TMP solution or *aporia* solution crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is not an adequate solution. To be clear, I am neither arguing that one is irrational in crucially relying on intuition, nor am I arguing that intuition is not a source of evidence—even when one is crucially relying on intuition for a solution to either one of these problems. I tend to think that one is rational and intuition is a source of evidence; however, I will provide only *prima facie* arguments for these points. I only argue that crucially relying on intuition for a solution to either a TMP problem or an *aporia* implies that the solution is not adequate.

In chapter 1 I provide an account of intuitions and some remarks on how they are used in philosophy. I follow Joel Pust's formulation. I provide *prima facie* arguments for the evidentiary force of intuition. I provide only *prima facie* arguments because a full defense is outside the scope of this work. Moreover, denying the evidentiary force of intuitions only buttresses my thesis by a different route. For it is commonly thought that a non-evidentiary source does not provide an adequate solution to a philosophical problem. So, if intuitions are not evidentiary and a solution crucially relies on intuition, the solution is not adequate.

In chapter 2 I provide accounts of three kinds of philosophical problems: "no principle problems", "too many principle problems" and "*aporia*" (see above). I do not intend for this to be an exhaustive account of philosophical problems; however, philosophers are very interested in these problems. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for each of the problems discussed. Also, I use some concepts from the

"Logic of Questions" to explain these problems. The concepts from this discussion help us to understand philosophical problems in terms of the questions that are asked.

In chapter 3 I argue for specific solutions to these problems. I base these accounts of solutions upon some more general conditions for solutions provided by Robert Nozick and Bryan Frances. I also describe what I call the "insular solution." The insular solution, roughly, is a solution one offers to resolve a problem of competing solutions (e.g. a TMP solution or *aporia* solution) by claiming that one's favored NP solution is the sole and sufficient reason one needs to reject the competing solutions. For example, suppose one rejects utilitarianism on the grounds that one has good reason for libertarianism and utilitarianism is inconsistent with libertarianism. I argue that the insular solution is not an adequate solution.

In chapter 4 I explicate what I mean by a solution's crucially relying on intuition. I build my notion of a solution's crucially relying on intuition upon an account of rationality given by Richard Foley and some comments about reflective equilibrium from Michael DePaul. From the notion of crucially relying on intuition and the previous discussion about solutions to philosophical problems, I argue for my thesis. I argue if one's solution to a TMP problem or an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is an insular solution. I argue in chapter 3 that an insular solution is not an adequate solution; so, it follows that if one's solution to a TMP problem or an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is not adequate. I also consider several feasible objections and reply to each.

Chapter 2: Intuitions and Philosophy

This chapter examines the use of intuition in philosophy. In this chapter I will provide an exposition of intuition; viz. I follow the formulation of intuition as defended by Joel Pust in *Intuitions as Evidence*. In addition to providing an exposition on intuition, I say a few words about the evidential force of intuitions. There has been recent debate regarding the evidential force of intuitions in philosophical discourse. For this dissertation, I will give only a few *prima facie* reasons for the positive evidential force of intuitions, but for the remainder of the work I largely presume that intuitions are evidential.

Pust's Account of Intuition

Pust's account of intuition draws significantly from Bealer's. So, let us begin with Bealer's explication of intuition[1]. Bealer points to examples of the kind of intuition he is dealing with. To borrow from Bealer: consider DeMorgan's Law. DeMorgan's Law (in sentential logic) states that the negation of a conjunction is materially equivalent to a disjunction where each conjunct is negated; not P and Q is materially equivalent to not P or not Q. At a first glance, it does not seem to be either true or false. However, upon reflection the Law just "seems" to be true. This seeming state is the intuition. Or, for another example, consider "fake barn" cases. Fake barn cases are popular in epistemic discourse. The traditional fake barn case is one where an agent is in an area with many

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[1] Bealer has written on these topics in two separate pieces: "The Incoherence of Empiricism" and "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy." There is significant overlap between the two. So, I draw primarily from the second later article.

convincing barn replicas; there happens to be one actual barn which is indistinguishable

from the replicas. The agent points to the actual barn and claims: "There is a barn."

Upon reflection, it simply seems to be true that the agent does not know there is a barn.

This is one aspect of intuition: it is a psychological state. Specifically, the psychological

states is a "…a sui generis, irreducible, natural…propositional attitude that occurs

episodically." (Bealer 1998, 207). Intuition is a propositional attitude in that there is an

evaluation of the proposition; e.g. different propositional attitudes are that a proposition is

true, false, dubious, or certain. To say that intuition is episodic is to point out that

intuition is not merely a disposition to have this proposition attitude; one has the

disposition but the psychological states must occur as well. Further, intuition is distinct

form other psychological states, e.g. "belief", and not derivable or definable in terms of

other psychological states, e.g. perception. We will look at Bealer's claims about the

character of this psychological state in a moment. For now, it is worth considering what

kind of propositional attitude is involved with intuition.

     With the given examples, one has the attitude that the proposition, e.g. "The agent

does not know there is a barn", is true; but, Bealer contends that not only is it the case

that the proposition seems to be true, it seems that the proposition seems—in some

sense—to be necessarily true. However, the necessity here is not easily understood. One

way to understand the necessity here is to understand it as some kind of logical necessity.

On some accounts of logical possibility, a formula is possibly true just in case there is a

row on a truth table where the formula is true. A formula is necessarily true just in case

all rows are true. A formula is necessarily false just in case all rows are false. Consider

DeMorgan's Law (for some arbitrary P and Q):

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P       Q       ~(P & Q) ≡ (~P ∨ ~Q)
T       T               T
T       F               T
F       T               T
F       F               T
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For DeMorgan's Law every row on the truth table is true; so, DeMorgan's law is necessarily true. However, this notion of necessity does not translate well into a fake barn case. Let P stand for the proposition "The agent knows there is a barn." Since there are two truth assignments possible, we have a simple truth table for the negation of P:

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P       ~P
T       F
F       T
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Since there is a row on the truth table such that ~P is false, ~P is not logically necessary. So, the fake barn intuition is not necessarily true (assuming it is necessarily true) in the same sense that DeMorgan's Law is logically necessarily true.

Steven Hales makes similar comments about the necessity of intuition; although, he thinks intuitions are intended to be logically necessary. He notes that it is common philosophical practice to provide counterexamples to proposed analyses or judgments in philosophical investigation which is a "physically impossible" case. A physically impossible case is a case that cannot occur given the laws of nature. For example, it is physically impossible for a person to swim across the Atlantic Ocean. However, one should note the proposition, "Howard swam across the Atlantic Ocean", is logically possible, for there is a row that is true on the truth table for this proposition. There are many logically possible propositions that are not physically possible. Hales contends that since it is an accepted philosophical practice to appeal to counterexamples in physically impossible worlds, the intuitions offered must be logically necessary. For example,

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supposing that one offers the following judgment: if a source of belief reliably produces true beliefs, then one is justified in having those beliefs. A common counterexample to this proposed judgment is a clairvoyant. A clairvoyant has reliably true beliefs given by some (supernatural) faculty about events that are temporally, causally, or spatially distanced from the clairvoyant. However, the clairvoyant can neither account for how the belief is true nor how the clairvoyant knows the belief is true; in short, the clairvoyant cannot provide an explanation of the belief. So, it is thought, the clairvoyant is not justified in having those beliefs. Given what we know about the laws of nature, a genuine clairvoyant is not possible; however, this scenario is still argued to be a counterexample to the proposed judgment. So, Hales contends, if one provides a situation that is considered or argued to be a genuine counterexample to a proposed analysis of some concept, and the situation is one not possible given the actual laws of nature, it follows that the intuition offered is intended to apply to all logically possibilities. (cf. Hales 2000)

While Hales thinks that the appeal to counterexamples in physically impossible worlds implies that intuitions are necessarily true, or that one is intending to show that the proposition is necessarily true, I am not completely convinced; for, there are varying accounts of necessity. For example, David Lewis discusses similarities between worlds. (cf. Lewis 1973) Hales already discussed one notion of necessity: physical necessity. We can consider physical necessity to be all the possible worlds with the laws of nature like ours. However, we can consider even more restrictions on necessity. There are many possible worlds that have the laws of nature we do and yet do not have histories like the actual world. For example, there are possible worlds that have the same laws of nature

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that we do and yet the planet Earth does not exist. So, we can restrict necessity to those worlds with not only the same laws of nature, but the same history. In this sense, we will have a kind of stipulated necessity; viz. we can restrict our modal claims only to those causally possible worlds with our same history (up to a certain point).

This example, however, deals with different necessities within physically necessity; this does not show that there are varying degrees of logical necessity (so described). Alvin Plantinga distinguishes between two kinds of logical necessity; there is the kind of necessity already described and what he calls "broadly logical necessity" (and, there is a concomitant sense of logical possibility, broadly logical possibility, and causal possibility). (cf. Plantinga 1974) Plantinga's sense of logical necessity is what we have already discussed: a proposition is logically possible just in case there is a row on the truth table that is true; a proposition is logically necessary just in case all rows on the truth table are true; and a proposition is necessarily false just in case there is no row on the truth table that is true. DeMorgan's Law mentioned above is logically necessary. However, Plantinga contends, there are propositions such as "If something is red, then something is colored" or "If something is a person, then it is conscious at some point in time" which we also consider to be necessarily true—but these statements are not logically necessary (in the sense described). We can assign R for "something is red" and C for "something is colored"; we have the following truth table.

R	C	R ⊃ C
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

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There is a row on the truth table where the statement is false; so, this proposition is merely logically possible and not logically necessary. Intuitively, however, it cannot be the case that something is red and not colored. This second statement is what Plantinga terms as "broadly logically necessary." Or, to phrase it another way, while it is logically possible that "It is false that something is red only if something is colored", it is not broadly logically possible (and, since causal necessity is more strict than broad logical necessity, this statement is not causally possible). (cf. Plantinga 1974) For Plantinga, what is broadly logically possible will depend on essences; I do not want to launch such a discussion or defense of that notion here. Furthermore, that there are essences is a contentious matter; I do not want to nor do I think Bealer wants to characterize an intuition's necessity as dependent on essences. However, *contra* Hales, there appear to be different restrictions on logical necessity.

We are still left with the problem of clarifying the sense of necessity in intuition. We can easily begin exploring different notions of necessity; for example, we can characterize the necessity employed in intuition as a conceptual necessity. To draw from the above example, it is necessarily false that something is red and not colored since the concept of colored includes the concept of red. However, we will have the same difficulty as when dealing with Plantinga's notions about necessity: the nature of concepts, as the nature of necessity, is a contentious issue. Fortunately, this is not an insurmountable problem for the claim that intuition employs a kind of necessity. We can appeal to Lewis' claims about restricting possible worlds. Recall the notion of causal necessity. If we claim that some is causally necessary, we are restricting our modal claims only to those worlds where the laws of nature are like ours. We can make a

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similar move when making necessity claims about intuition. That is, we cannot claim that the necessity of intuition is logical necessity, for there are rows on the truth table where the intuition is false. Instead, when we say that the intuition is necessarily true, we are restricting our modal claims to all and only those possible worlds where the intuition is true. Hence, even though there is a kind of necessity employed in intuition that is not understood, this need not prohibit us from employing these intuitions in philosophical investigation.

To briefly summarize up to this point, according to Bealer intuitions are a *sui generis*, irreducible, natural, propositional attitude that occurs periodically. In particular, the propositional attitude is that the proposition is true and—in some sense—necessarily true. Let us now see how intuitions are distinct from other psychological states.

Bealer spends quite a bit of effort to characterize intuitions and to differentiate them from other psychological states. First, there is a difference between "rational intuitions" and "physical intuitions." To borrow his example, if observing a house without a proper foundation, we would intuit that the house will fall. We have these intuitions due to our understanding of how physical objects operate in the actual world; these are physical intuitions. However, by rational intuition we it seems that it is not necessary that the house will fall. For example, we could suppose there is a suspension of the natural laws such that the house would not necessarily fall. Or, we can say that it is not part of the concept of the house that it should fall. Similar remarks apply with regard to rational intuitions and perceptual seeming states. While both are phenomenological states, perceptual states are different from rational intuitions. One salient difference is that propositions are not perceived. Another difference between

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perceptual states and rational intuition is the necessity involved with rational intuitions; perceptual states do not carry the necessity of rational intuitions. One can observe that an apple is red, but one intuits that the apple need not necessarily be red; similarly, one does not perceive that the apple is a fruit but one might intuit that the apple *must* be a fruit. According to Bealer, rational intuitions deal with logical possibility (this is probably best understood as either as what is possible within Plantinga's broad logical necessity), metaphysical possibility, or conceptual applicability (e.g. is a fake barn situation a case of "knowledge"?). Physical intuitions and perceptual states are silent on these matters.

While rational intuition (henceforth, unless otherwise noted, "intuition" just is "rational intuition") is a propositional attitude, it must be distinguished from other propositional attitudes. We will begin with belief. It is neither truth that one's believing a proposition P true implies that one intuits P, nor that one's intuiting P implies that one believes P; i.e. intuiting P does not imply belief nor vice versa. For an example of belief not implying an intuition, there are proofs for theorems in logic that, upon completing the proof, one believes the theorem but the theorem does not "seem" either true or false: "P ⊃ (P ⊃ P)" or, "(P ⊃ Q) ∨ (Q ⊃ P)". The second theorem in particular is almost counterintuitive. For an example of an intuition not implying belief, Bealer notes that naïve comprehension axiom (for any property there is a set of objects that exemplifies all and only that property) is intuitive, but once confronted with the paradoxes one does not believe the naïve comprehension axiom. (One might question the evidentiary force of intuition given the paradoxes; I discuss this in more detail in the following section and chapter 4.) There is a further difference: belief is much more open to change than intuition. Returning to the naïve comprehension axiom, before exposure to the

paradoxes, one is likely to believe the axiom precisely because it is intuitive. However, subsequent to one's becoming familiar with the paradoxes, one no longer believes the axiom but the intuition remains; i.e. intuition can outlast a belief. Bealer notes that others disagree with him as to the degree to which intuitions are subject to change (Bealer thinks they are highly resistant), but the salient point is made nonetheless: intuitions are more resistant to change than beliefs. So, intuitions are not identical to beliefs.[2]

Bealer considers other propositional attitudes: judgments, guesses and hunches. Bealer does not give a full exposition of each of these terms; I presume he is relying on common notions of each. Both judgments and hunches are a kind of belief; so, per last discussion, they are not intuitions. According to Bealer, a guess is more like a choice than an intuition. But, perhaps most persuasive, all three are considerably more fragile than intuition. All of these are subject to change and revision, but intuition tends to remain despite argument to the contrary.

In addition to propositional attitudes, there are certain kinds of intellectual events that are distinct from intuition; viz. memory and common sense. Intuitions are not memories; to use Bealer's example, one might remember that $25^2 = 625$ from one's calculation, but one does not have intuition to this effect. Furthermore, it is neither the

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[2] It is worth noting that Sosa disagrees with Bealer. In "Minimal Intuition", Sosa's account of intuition implies that the agent believes the proposition. (cf. Sosa 1998, 259) However, I take Bealer's arguments to be decisive on this matter; further, I have found in my own experience that certain propositions are intuitive, yet I do not believe them. The classic paradoxes are good examples: Tibbles the Cat or Skeptical Puzzles. I find each proposition intuitive, but I don't believe all of them. In fact, I tend to suspend belief with regard to many of the paradoxes.

case that one's having a rational intuition that P implies that P is common sense, nor is it the case that P is common sense implies that P is a rational intuition. To borrow Bealer's example, the infinite divisibility of space and time is intuitive but not elementary; so, they are not part of common sense. Furthermore, the intuition that a house undermined will fall is common sense; however, as discussed, this is not a rational intuition.

Much of Pust's notion of intuition reflects Bealer's. Pust provides eight desiderata of an analysis of intuition; he contends that any analysis of intuition must accommodate these criteria. We have seen six of these criteria already: (1) intuitions are psychological states; (2) intuitions are not beliefs; (3) intuitions are neither perceptual nor memory states; (4) intuitions are episodic; (5) intuitions are fallible (Since some intuitions imply paradoxes, intuitions must also be fallible.); and (6) intuitions involve some kind of necessity. (cf. Pust 2000, 43-46) The last two desiderata are (7) intuitions come in degrees and (8) intuitions are not the result of conscious inference.

That intuitions come in degrees can only be demonstrated. Consider two intuitive propositions: "If P implies Q, and P is true, then Q is true" and "One does not know that there is a barn while in fake barn country." The first is "seen" stronger than the second. Or, perhaps another way to phrase it, when considering both propositions and only one proposition is intuited, the first is more likely to intuit the first than the second. Finally, that intuition is not the result of conscious inference is shown by demonstration. Consider again "If P implies Q, and P is true, then Q is true". This is seen "upon reflection" or "when considering" the proposition. It is not the case that one is using a

reason R to infer "If *P* implies *Q*, and *P* is true, then *Q* is true"[3] Perhaps more forcefully,

"One does not know that there is a barn in fake barn country" is not inferred from further

premises; it seems to be true when one considers the case.

Now that we have the criteria, let us see Pust's account of intuition. Pust for the

most part follows Bealer's account of intuition; he makes one change to the account.

Here is Pust's formulation of Bealer's account:

> [B2] At t, S [rationally] intuits that p IF AND ONLY IF at t, it
> intellectually seems to S that p *and* also that necessarily p. (Pust 2000, 36)

Pust disagrees with the second disjunct of the *explicans* as it stands. It is a very strong

condition that, should one have the intuition that *P*, that one must also have the intuition

that *P* must necessarily hold. Consider the fake barn case. One does not immediately

intuit the necessity of "One does not know that there is a barn while in fake barn

country." On the other hand, Pust wants to acknowledge the necessity requirement; he

suggests a modification to [B2]. Instead of requiring that the agent intuit the necessity of

P, the agent intuits the necessity of *P* if the agent were to consider the necessity of *P*.

> [A1] S has a rational intuition that p IF AND ONLY IF (a) S has a purely
> intellectual experience, when considering the question of whether p, that
> p; and (b) at t, if S were to consider whether p is necessarily true, then S
> would have a purely intellectual experience that necessarily p. (Pust 2000,
> 39)

Intuitions as Evidence

To reiterate, I merely want to provide *prima facie* arguments for the evidentiary force of

intuitions. These arguments should not be taken to be decisive. I provide only *prima*

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[3] This is not to deny that one *can* infer "If P implies Q, and P is true, then Q is true" from some prior set of

reason. Only that one does not infer this when one is (merely) intuiting this proposition.

facie arguments for several reasons. First, there have already been substantial arguments for the evidentiary force of intuitions and I could do little to improve upon them. Second, were I to improve upon them, the improvements would likely constitute a lengthy project on their own; i.e. such an argument would be outside the scope of the present project. Finally, the denial of the evidentiary force of intuitions does not substantially affect my thesis. Roughly, my thesis is: If one's solution to a TMP problem or an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is not adequate. If one contends that intuitions are not evidentiary, then according to one's view intuitions will not provide adequate solutions to philosophical problems. In short, the denial that intuitions are evidentiary strengthens my argument. However, I will not merely assume that intuitions are evidentiary. So, I will proceed with merely *prima facie* arguments.

My *prima facie* arguments for the evidentiary force of intuition begins with the observation that, as a matter of fact, most (if not all) philosophers use intuition in philosophical discourse. Here is a passage from *Naming and Necessity*.[4]

> I think [something's having intuitive content] is very heavy evidence in
> favor of anything, myself. I really don't know, in a way, what more
> conclusive evidence one can have about anything. (Kripke 1980, 42)

Kripke considers intuitions not only to be a good source of evidence, but, in his words, "conclusive" evidence. I do not know if I wish to commit myself to this claim; for, as we saw, intuitions can yield paradoxes.

Plantinga makes similar remarks about the evidentiary force of intuition in *The Nature of Necessity*. He contends that the central premise of his ontological argument is "(36) *Maximal greatness* is possibly exemplified." (Plantinga 1974, 220) While there is

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[4] While the quote is from Kripke, I owe notice of it to Pust.

no obvious error in denying (36), he writes, "…a sane and rational man who thought it through and understood it might none the less reject it." (Plantinga 1974, 220) On the other hand, there is nothing irrational in accepting the premise either. Since there is nothing irrational in either denying (36) or asserting it, one must not be acting against reason with either option. Indeed, with propositions like (36), he claims that there "seems to be no argument against this proposition that need compel" one to either reject (36) or accept it. (Plantinga 1974, 220) While Plantinga is not explicit in the passage, he does appeal to accepting (36) on the basis that it is one of the "plausible propositions"; Plantinga's appeal to plausibility is congruous with the notion of intuition we have looked at. So, it is reasonable to conclude that Plantinga's considers his argument to rely on intuition.[5]

Two philosophers in particular, George Bealer and Steven Hales, emphasize that intuitions are pervasively used in philosophy. Bealer considers the use of intuitions to be part of what he calls "standard justificatory procedure." (cf. Bealer 1998, 205; 1992, 164) While he does not provide a definition or description of the standard justificatory procedures, he cites many examples (Gettier cases and Jackson's Mary example to list two of ten) of "classic" intuitions used in philosophical discourse. Hales makes similar claims. According to Hales, since philosophy attempts to provide non-empirical knowledge, philosophy relies on necessary truths. Furthermore, the only cognitive capacity that provides such necessary truth is intuition. So, philosophy relies on intuition. Indeed, to buttress Hales' claims here, Robert Audi lists four classical sources of knowledge: perception, memory, consciousness (or, introspection) and reason (or,

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[5] While the material is from Plantinga, I owe notice of it to Gutting.

intuition). (cf. Audi 2002, 71) Perception (e.g. vision) gives us knowledge about perceptual objects. Consciousness gives us information about our mental states. Memory gives us knowledge about what we already know. While Audi is not explicit here, philosophical claims are not primarily discovered through perception, memory or consciousness; so, one is left with reason (intuition). Reason, i.e. intuition, gives us knowledge about conceptual, logical, or, in some other sense, necessary truths. The salient point is that philosophy uses claims that are both non-empirical and—in some sense—necessary. The only source for these sorts of claims is intuition; thus, that one has an intuition that P is information for the truth of P—the intuition is evidence of P.

Now, none of this discussion is intended to convey that intuition always and only gives us knowledge of necessary truths, for, as we have seen before, intuition sometimes leads us to paradox. Sometimes, intuitions gives us incomplete knowledge of a necessary truths (otherwise, we would not have to explain these intuitive judgments to begin with). However, that intuitions sometimes leads one to paradox should not be sufficient for one to disregard intuition. All the sources mentioned sometimes lead one to false beliefs: we can misperceive objects through illusion, delusion or simple lack of capability; some of our mental states are unknown to us (subconscious beliefs) or are simply too unfamiliar; and, we routinely have false memories. Exactly and to what degree one should trust any of these three faculties is a difficult and significant investigation; the same is true for intuition. Richard Foley and Michael DePaul discuss this; I re-present some of their arguments in chapter 4.

We have seen that at least some philosophers assert that intuitions are used pervasively in philosophy; I take this to settle the matter. We have also seen some

arguments for the claim that intuitions are a source of evidence; viz. that intuitions are a source of evidence for some sort of necessary claims. Let me provide my own gloss on how intuitions are used in philosophical investigation. Philosophical investigation can and often begins with particular judgments; philosophers attempt to explain these judgments by providing some kind of rational support. This rational support takes the form of a general principle such that the principle subsumes the judgments. A general principle subsumes a judgment just in case the principle, taken together with relevant information about the subject in the particular judgment, implies the judgments. For example, "Socrates is mortal" is subsumed by "All men are mortal"; for "Socrates is mortal" is implied by "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man." These particular judgments are not only the product of some inference; for if they were only the products of inference philosophers would not be attempting to provide rational support for the judgments. (This is not to deny that these judgments *can* be inferred, only that these judgments are intuitions.) In other words, if the judgments were the products of inference, we would not need to explain them in the first place. Rather, philosophers begin with these judgments and attempt to subsume them under a principle. Since these judgments are not the product of inference, we must have acquired them through some other noetic activity. The only method is by rational insight or rational reflection—but this is nothing more than intuition. So, the very raw data philosophers begin with is intuition. Moreover, not just any principle is appropriate. With a little creativity, a clever philosopher can provide principles that are seemingly irrelevant or not-explanatory. The principles themselves have to be intuitive; i.e. not only are the particular judgments

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intuitive, but the principles offered to subsume the judgments must also survive reflection through intuition.

Intuition is not used only in the generation of a philosophical solution, intuition is used to test the solution. That is, a prominent method of determining the viability of a philosophical solution is investigating whether or not the theory either subsumes all the relevant particular judgments given by intuition or implies a contrary to a particular judgment. Most often when a theory is rejected, it is rejected because the theory has counterintuitive consequences. The informal *reductio ad absurdum*[6] relies on intuitions in this regard. Besides providing the raw data for constructing theories and testing material for philosophical theories, rational intuitions can generate problems on their own simply in virtue of being individually intuitive and yet collectively inconsistent. That is, one can have intuitions such that not all of the intuitions can be true together; e.g. Tibbles the Cat scenarios.

The above gloss is not an argument; it is a minimal description of how intuitions are used in philosophy. A full account would likely be more detailed and significantly longer.[7] Nonetheless, I contend that the gloss—however sketchy—is accurate and at least partially explains how intuitions are used pervasively in philosophical investigation; moreover, the quotes provided show that philosopher rely on intuition in philosophical investigation. From this pervasiveness, we have *prima facie* reason to take intuitions to be evidentiary; for if intuitions were not considered evidentiary, then given the

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[6] That is, the formal *reductio* is an argument drawing an explicit contradiction. The informal *reductio* draws an absurd, crazy or other "rationally unacceptable" consequence.

[7] I attempt such an account in chapter 2.

pervasiveness of intuition in philosophical discourse, philosophical investigation would not be rationally justified. However, philosophical investigation is rationally justified (it is thought). Moreover, I have briefly argued that intuition is the only source of these necessary claims. That we have an intuition for, say, "One does not know there is a barn in fake barn country" is evidence (however fallible) for this proposition. So, intuitions are evidentiary.

One could argue that the point has not been adequately made; for it does not follow that intuitions are evidence merely because we already consider them to be so and use them frequently. However, a philosopher making this claim would run into some problems. For the objector would either have to deny the implication the pervasive use of intuition is sufficient for intuition's being evidentiary, or the assertion that philosophical investigation is rationally justified. Consider the second option. If a philosopher denies that philosophical investigation is justified, and one notes that this is a conclusion based on philosophic inference, one wonders how the denial is coherent. Consider the first option. If the objector denies the implication, then one asserts that intuitions are not evidentiary, intuitions are used pervasively in philosophical discourse and philosophical investigation is rationally justified. Denying the implication leaves the objector in the sticky and unenviable position explaining how such investigation is rational but a prominent part of such investigation is not evidentiary. I contend that the most reasonable explanation is that intuitions are evidentiary.

These arguments are not enough, but they do underscore the fact that denying the evidentiary force of intuitions is neither obviously true nor an easy position to defend; i.e. denying the evidentiary force of intuitions creates undesirable problems. These

arguments, however, are merely negative arguments[8]—this is only half the job. To better

buttress the *prima facie* justification of the evidentiary force of intuitions, let us see some

positive arguments.

Let us consider other arguments beginning with an argument adapted from Sosa's

"Minimal Intuition" (Sosa 1998). Sosa provides what appears to be an analogy between

intuition, perception, and introspection. For Sosa, perception is directed outwards for

aspects such as color and shape, introspection is directed inwards for the contents of

one's consciousness, and intuition is directed toward the abstract and general.[9] An initial

objection to the evidentiary force of intuitions begins with its fallibility. Intuition can

systematically lead one into error with regard to certain propositions (For example,

certain paradoxes are generated by intuition, and intuition leads us to systematically make

errors in reasoning with regard to probabilities.) So, one might argue, since intuition can

lead one into error, it follows that intuition should not be an evidentiary source. Sosa

disagrees; he calls our attention to the fact that both introspection and perception

systematically lead us to error. Using Sosa's example, our perceptual faculties will

sometimes lead us astray with regard to whether or not a shape is a decagon or a

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[8] A "negative argument" is an argument showing that the denial of some *P* is false or less viable than the

assertion that *P*. A "positive argument" is an argument simply concluding or asserting *P*.

[9] It is worth noting that Sosa's account of intuition differs significantly from Bealer and Pust's. Of

particular interest, Sosa's account implies both that the agent believes the intuition and that the intuition is

true. (cf. Sosa 1998, 259, 263) These claims are odd given that Sosa admits the fallibility of intuition. (cf.

Sosa 1998, 259, 261) Despite these differences, Sosa's argument can be given in spirit (if not in letter) to

Pust's account.

dodecagon.[10] Further, our introspective faculties will sometimes lead us astray as to what we believe; suppose one is imaging a shape in one's head that is a dodecagon but, through introspection, one believes it is a decagon. If one were to reject a "faculty of belief acquisition" (Sosa 1998, 265) because of systematic error, then one would have to reject both perception and introspection. However, we are not willing to reject these modes of belief acquisition; so, we should not reject intuition as an evidentiary source.[11]

Of course, it can be argued that perception and introspection are significantly different from intuition; so the analogy will not work. Sosa, however, argues to the contrary. He contends that just as perception and introspection are reliable sources of true belief, intuition is a reliable source of true belief. For example, our knowledge of mathematics and logical inference is based on intuition. Since perception and introspection are reliable sources of belief, they should be considered evidentiary sources; similarly, since intuition is a reliable source of belief, it should be considered evidentiary.

So far we have seen that a persuasive objection against the evidentiary force of intuition is that intuition sometimes leads us to paradox. One might argue then that intuition should be discarded. However, this inclination is too fast, for, as mentioned above, other sources of knowledge (i.e. other evidentiary sources) also lead us to false beliefs. We are not willing to discard these other sources of knowledge; so, we should

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[10] A decagon is a ten-sided shape; a dodecagon is a twelve-sided shape. Assuming the shapes in question are equilateral and equiangular, most people are not able to distinguish between the two from a certain distance.

[11] I offered similar arguments previously with regard to Perception, Introspection, Memory and Reason. It is worth providing Sosa's arguments on their own; so, I do not group or amalgamate them together.

not be so willing to discard intuition. One might reply that intuition leads us to enough

paradoxes such that we should be willing to discard intuition. That is, while other

sources of knowledge, say, perception, can systematically lead us to false beliefs,

perception is reliable otherwise or perception is reliable within certain limits. So, one

might argue, there is an important difference between other sources of knowledge and

intuition. However, Bealer claims that while there are instances where intuition leads us

to false beliefs, there is still significant agreement.

> …sustained empirical studies might uncover evidence that a subject's
> intuitions can be fallible in a more holistic way; we already know that the
> theoretical output of logicians, mathematicians, and philosophers working
> in isolation can be flawed. But these negative facts pale by comparison
> with a positive fact, namely, the on-balance agreement of elementary
> concrete-case intuitions among human subjects. Indeed, the on-balance
> agreement among our elementary concrete-case intuitions is one of the
> most impressive general facts about human cognition. (Bealer 1998, 213-
> 4)

Bealer, I believe, is pointing to the widespread agreement about particular judgments. I

mentioned several already: "I have hands", "Killing innocent people is wrong", "I have

survived for some time" and so on. There is arguably much agreement on many general

principles: "If one violates another's rights, then one has done something wrong." (The

scope of this conditional is probably not perfectly general.) While there are instances

where intuition systematically leads us to paradox, the overwhelming majority of

intuitions do not. Of course, this last claim should be better substantiated; Bealer does

not provide a source and I am not cognitive psychologist. But based on my experience,

there is significant agreement on a great many judgments and perhaps a significant

number of general (though not perfectly general) principles. This widespread agreement

suggests that intuition is, for the most part, more reliable than otherwise.

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Thus far Sosa and Bealer have been addressing the faculty of intuition as opposed to any particular intuition. One might further inquire about the reliability of some particular intuition that P given that there is not agreement about P. For example, supposing that you caught sight of an odd looking man in a dark coat near a courtyard as you walked into the building. Suppose further that you mention this to your colleague; your colleague claims that there was no such man in the courtyard and your colleague claims that he walked into the building and by the courtyard shortly before on the same path. In short, you and your colleague were in basically the same circumstances, but you disagree with respect to certain facts. In such a situation, it might be argued that either you or your colleague are mistaken or somehow visually defective. Suppose that the two of you decide to settle the matter by returning to the courtyard. You see the man, your colleague does not. Again, you and your colleague are basically the same circumstance, but the two of your disagree as to the facts. In such a situation, without further evidence (say, a third colleague to settle the dispute or reason to believe one of you is visually defective), it can reasonably be claimed that vision is not a reliable source of knowledge in this instance.

Similarly, if it is granted that there is overwhelming agreement with regard to some intuitions, there is also significant disagreement with regard to certain intuitions. For example, some philosopher find utilitarianism to be more intuitive than other philosophers. There is significant disagreement about not only solutions to certain philosophical problems, but, in the case of *aporia*, which propositions are less intuitive than others. For example, a perdurantist may find the intuition that there can be only one object in a particular place and time to be more forceful than the intuition that an object is

wholly present at a particular place and time (i.e. the perdurantist finds the intuition that objects do not have temporal parts to be less forceful than the intuition that there are no coincident objects). Given this disagreement, it might be objected, the faculty of intuition cannot be considered reliable with regard to these intuitions. So, the intuition that P (with regard to these particular intuitions) cannot be considered evidence for P. Richard Foley and Michael DePaul discuss this; I re-present some of their arguments in chapter 4.

Summation

Intuitions are a cognitive state with its own phenomenological feel. When reflecting on whether or not some proposition P is true, it just "seems" to us that P is true. Intuitions in philosophical investigation in particular are those intuitions when, if we were to reflect on whether P is necessarily true, it would "seem" to us that P is necessarily true. Following Bealer and Pust, I refer to these as "rational intuitions." I have argued that rational intuitions are used pervasively in philosophy. Further, I have provided *prima facie* arguments for the evidentiary force of intuitions.

Chapter 3: Philosophical Problems

In this chapter I describe several kinds of philosophical problems. I do not intend to give a full account of philosophical problems; i.e. I will not provide a conceptual analysis of philosophical problems in general. I discuss three kinds of problems; one problem tends to lead to the next. To make these different problems intelligible, I use questions not only as a way to express the philosophical problem but to distinguish one problem from the next. Further, we can understand what counts as a solution to these philosophical problems by understanding what counts as an answer to the questions that express these problems. Roughly speaking, the first kind of philosophical problem is the problem of justifying our intuitive judgments (e.g. "It is immoral to steal"); we tend to think that such judgments are justified by an appropriate general principle. The philosopher's task is to discover this general principle. I call this the "no principle (NP) problem." The NP problem is expressed as a "why" question (e.g. "Why is stealing immoral?"). Providing an exposition of why-questions and what counts as an answer to a why-question is beyond the scope of this work. So, I make a reasonable assumption as to what counts as an answer to these particular why-questions in philosophical discourse; viz. I draw upon what philosophers usually consider to be an NP solution. The second kind of philosophical problem deals with competing NP solutions. NP solutions can be contrary; i.e. if one NP solution is true, any one of the remaining NP solutions is false. I call this the "too many principles (TMP) problem." The third kind of problem deals with sets of individually plausible but collectively inconsistent propositions; following Nicholas

Rescher, I call these *aporia*. Quite often one's favored philosophical position has counterintuitive implications; so, a purported NP solution or purported TMP solution can (and often does) lead to an *aporia*. TMP problems and *aporia* are expressed as "whether" questions; e.g. "Is Libertarianism false or is Utilitarianism false?" is an example of a TMP problem and "Is Utilitarianism false or the judgment that one should not allow injustice for the sake of happiness false?" is an example of an *aporia*. It is easier to understand whether questions if we start with a simpler question: the "yes-no" question. To that end, this chapter provides an exposition of yes-no questions followed by an exposition of whether questions. The subsequent chapter discusses solutions to the TMP problems and *aporia* in detail.

The Logic of Questions

There are several different kinds of questions. This section primarily deals with two "elementary questions."[12] These questions are elementary in the sense that their answer set is small or easily defined and in the sense that complex questions can be composed out of the elementary questions. The first elementary question is the "yes-no" question. An example is "Is two a prime number?" It can best be understood as a subject S, a predication P and a request for information as to which of the following disjuncts is true: S is P or S is not P. It has a simple answer set: "yes" and "no". That is, the available answers (though not necessarily true answers) to the yes-no question are "yes" and "no".

There are, of course, a variety of replies to this (or any) yes-no question: "I do not know what a prime number is"; "Only one even number is a prime number"; "Three is a prime number" and so on. However, not all replies to questions are answers to questions.

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[12] Most of this material is drawn from Harrah (2005) and Belknap and Steel (1976).

Some replies might just be evasive; e.g. "Shouldn't you consult the book?" or "I am not going to answer such an easy question for you." However, for the sake of this discussion we will (perhaps controversially) restrict replies only to useful replies. So, one might argue that a useful reply is an answer to a question. A reply might be useful, but utility is not sufficient for an answer; for an answer to a question provides the information requested while even useful replies do not always provide the requested information. With regard to yes-no questions, there might be an occasion when neither "yes" nor "no" is a true answer to the question. Consider the following: "Have you stopped cheating on exams?" If one answers "yes", then one has ceased cheating. In one answers "no", then one continues to cheat on exams. However, both replies may be false; for, it might be the case that one has never cheated on exams, which is contradictory to either reply. Suppose the respondent has never cheated on an exam. A true and useful reply is "I have never cheated on an exam"; however, this reply is not an answer to the question.

It certainly appears as if the given reply is an answer to the question. Let us look at some ways this might be argued. It might be objected that since one has offered a true reply, then one has provided an answer. This is false, for one can offer many true replies that are not answers. For example, one could have responded (let us also assume these are true): "I will not cheat on an exam in the future" or "I always complete my exams." Neither is an answer despite the fact that they are true.

It might be further objected that since the true reply provides the appropriate information, the true reply given is still an answer. After all, what the questioner is really concerned about is whether the respondent is currently cheating on exams. Since the reply provides the information the inquisitor is really interested in, the reply is an answer

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to the question used. Notice, however, that the question used is a different question than the question the inquisitor is really interested in; the question the inquisitor is really interested in is "Are you cheating on exams?" The true reply given does indeed imply "no"; and, on that ground, may be considered an answer to this second question, but these two questions are not equivalent. Since the questions are not equivalent, it is false than an answer to one is necessarily an answer to the other. So, replying with appropriate information does not imply that one has provided an answer.

One might press the objection further; one might object that the questions are equivalent since one is a satisfactory answer for both. After all, one who asks "Have you stopped cheating on exams?" will be just as satisfied with "I have never cheated on exams" as the one who asks "Are you cheating on exams?" Let us examine this claim. There is some similarity with regard to these two questions; and the provided answer to the second would surely satisfy the inquirer uttering the first question. The inquirer might indeed be satisfied with the answer to the second question, but satisfaction is not sufficient for an answer. To borrow from a familiar example, supposing a murderer knocks on your door and asks: "Is Smith in your house?" You are in fact hiding Smith. You know full well that the murderer intends to kill Smith, and, should you inform him that Smith is upstairs hiding in your closet, the murderer will kill him. You reply: "I do not see Smith." The murder is satisfied with the reply, the reply is even true, but the reply does not answer the question; that is to say, an answer is supposed to provide the inquisitor with the requested information. In this case, the inquisitor is requesting whether Smith is in the house. However, the answer provided neither implies that Smith

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is in the house nor that Smith is not in the house; so, the reply, even a true reply and a true reply that satisfies the inquisitor, does not answer the question.

Perhaps the easiest way to see that they are not equivalent is to note that they have different presuppositions. According to Belknap and Steel the presuppositions of a question are those statements that—in some sense—are implied by the question. With regard to the first question, "There are exams", "You take exams" and "You have cheated on exams in the past" are—in some sense—implied by the question. With regard to the second question, "There are exams", "You take exams" and "You either are or are not cheating on exams" are –in some sense—implied by the question. There is an intuitive sense of a presupposition of a question here, but Belknap and Steel provide a more explicit definition.

> A question, *Q*, presupposes a statement, *A*, if and only if, the truth of *A* is a logically necessary condition for there being some true answer to *Q*.
> (Belknap and Steel 1976, 5)

Recall the first question: "Have you stopped cheating on exams?" Answering "yes" implies that one has ceased cheating on exams; answering "no" implies that one continues to cheat on exams. Both answers imply that one has cheated on exams in the past. Recall the second question: "Are you currently cheating on exams?" Answering "yes" implies one is currently cheating on exams. Answering "no" to the second question implies one is not currently cheating on exams. However, neither answer to the second question implies that one has cheated on exams in the past whereas with both answers to the first question imply that one has cheated on exams in the past. Since there are different implications provided by the different answers, these questions have

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different presuppositions. Since the questions have different presuppositions, the questions are distinct.

One might quickly reply that there is a significant difference between the reply to this the question, "Is Smith in your house?", and the reply to the question "Have you stopped cheating on exams?" The reply "I have never cheated on an exam" to the exam question implies that both answers are false; since both answers imply that the respondent has cheated on exams in the past and this reply implies that the respondent has never cheated on exams, both answers are false. However, the reply "I do not see Smith" to the Smith question does not imply the denial of two answers—in fact it does not imply the assertion of either of the two answers. So, there is an important dissimilarity between these two cases; viz. that the reply to the Smith question has is neither contrary to nor implicative of the two answers. Since there is this difference, the reply to the exam question is an answer while the reply to the Smith question is not.

While there is an important dissimilarity between these two cases, the force of the counterexample holds: it is false that if the inquirer is satisfied with a reply, then the reply is an answer. One might modify the objection to the following: if the inquirer is satisfied with the reply to a yes-no question, and the reply implies that both "yes" and "no" answers are false, then the reply is an answer. This modified conditional has some intuitive appeal. After all, there is something that is accomplished with the reply "I have never cheated on an exam." However, allowing for this conditional has some consequences that become less and less acceptable. For example, consider the reply "I have never taken an exam". Assuming the conditional is true, it follows that this reply is an answer to the question "Are you cheating on exams?"; for the respondent would be

satisfied with this reply, and it implies that both "yes" and "no" are false. Moreover, assuming the conditional, it is an answer to the first question as well. Consider the question: "Have you taken an exam?" Assuming the conditional, this reply is also an answer to this third question. A little reflection will reveal that each question has at least one difference in presuppositions. A little creativity will uncover still further questions such that this single reply will be an answer to all of them (given the conditional); for example, "Have you ever failed an exam?", "Have you ever passed an exam?", "Have you ever received an 'A' on an exam?", and so on. This consequence is quite odd; for we tend to think that these are distinct questions. That is, "Have you ever taken an exam?", "Are you cheating on exams?", "Have you stopped cheating on exams?", "Have you ever failed an exam?", "Have you ever passed an exam?", "Have you ever received an 'A' on an exam?", and so on, are questions that request different information. And yet, the reply "I have never taken an exam" would be a single answer to requests for different information.

Odd results are just that: odd. This does not necessarily provide an objection to a view. However, I suggest that this odd result together with a plausible alternate explanation for the intuitive appeal of the conditional that accommodates Belknap and Steel's notion of a the presupposition of a question while at the same time avoiding this odd result; this gives us good reason to accept Belknap and Steel's notion. So, this alternate explanation allows us to accommodate the intuitive appeal of the conditional while at the same time maintaining Belknap and Steel's notion of the presupposition of a question; this in turn allows us a way distinguish between questions and what counts as

an answer provided for these questions while excluding "I have never cheated on exams"

to be an answer to "Have you stopped cheating on exams?"

Reconsider the conditional: "If the inquirer is satisfied with the reply to a yes-no

questions, and the reply implies that both "yes" and "no" answers are false, then the reply

is an answer." I do not deny the intuitive appeal of this conditional, but I suggest that the

intuitive appeal to this question is that there seems to be something accomplished with

the reply "I have never cheated on an exam." A ready and immediate explanation for this

purported accomplishment is that the reply must be an answer. There is an alternative,

however. Consider again the question, "Have you stopped cheating on exams?" One

thing we have yet to discuss is that this is a "trick" question. The "trick" is that the

question presumes the respondent has cheated on exams in the past. The reply "I have

never cheated on exams" is intended to refute this presupposition. I suggest there is

something more that is accomplished. When one refutes a presupposition of a question,

one is showing that there is something "wrong" about the question. This something

wrong is analogous to showing that a proposition is false; viz. demonstrating that a

question is a trick is similar to one demonstrating that a proposition is false. Similarities

and vague notions of "trick" are all well and good for a start, but we should not be

satisfied with this. Let us examine how exactly the question is a trick.

Consider the rough idea that there are some questions that do not have true

answers. This can take many forms. Consider the question: "How many humans have

existed?" There is a sense in which this question does not have an answer for we

currently have neither the information nor the resources to acquire such information to

answer the question. There is a matter of fact about the number of humans that have

existed, but, in this sense of a question not having a true answer, we simply lack the resources to answer the question. We will not be dealing with this sense of a question not having an answer. Consider the question: "How many humans are type F?" This question does not admit of a true answer for the type has not been defined; that is to say, we merely have a variable for a type but not the type itself. One might object by claiming there is a true answer: "Either no humans, some humans, or all humans are F." However, this is merely a presupposition of the question; providing a presupposition does not imply that one has provided an answer. For example, suppose one asked you "Did you eat lunch" and you replied "yes or no"; such a reply is true and yet does not answer the question. The question "How many humans are type F?" lacks a true answer in the sense that the question has not been fully articulated. We will not be dealing with this sense of a question not having a true answer either.

While in both of these cases there is not an answer, in both cases there are replies that may be appropriate. Up to now I have not given an explicit formulation of "appropriate reply." I will not give an explicit formulation for two reasons. First, my main arguments for the dissertation do not rely on an explicit formulation of an appropriate reply. Second, I am not certain that there is an explicit formulation. That is, what amounts to an appropriate reply in one situation may not amount to an appropriate reply in another; i.e. it might be the case that what constitutes an appropriate reply relies on the agents involved or their common knowledge. For instance, an appropriate reply to the question "How many humans have existed?" would be "We cannot know"; an appropriate reply to "How many humans are F?" would probably be another question—viz. "What is F?" These replies are appropriate in the sense that the first reply

demonstrates that the answer is beyond the audience's ability to answer and the second

reply demonstrates that the question is not fully articulated (or, perhaps more precisely,

the question must be reformulated using concepts familiar to the audience). However, a

reply demonstrating that a question is somehow not fully articulate or beyond the

audience's ken is not the only sense in which a reply is appropriate. While I am not

confident that there is a perfectly general sense of an appropriate reply, I am confident

that if a reply demonstrates that a question is faulty in some manner, the question is

appropriate.

Here I have discussed several examples of a question that is somehow lacking.

There is a further sense in which a reply points out that a question is lacking: a reply can

point out that the question presupposes something false. Reconsider our trick question:

"Have you stopped cheating on exams?" A presupposition of this question is that the

respondent has cheated on exams in the past; the reply "I have never cheated on exams"

shows that the presupposition is false. In this sense there is something wrong with the

question: any answer to the question implies something that is false. If an answer implies

something that is false, then the answer is false. Thus, as with the cases discussed above,

the question does not have a true answer. Let us say that a question that does not have a

true answer is an "inadequate question." I suggest that this is what is accomplished with

the reply "I have never cheated on exams"; the reply shows that the question is

inadequate. However, showing that the question is inadequate is not an answer to the

question; rather, demonstrating that the question is inadequate only demonstrates that

there is no true answer to the question.

Suppose one insists that this kind of reply is an answer. That is, suppose one insists that if a reply demonstrates that the question is inadequate, then the reply is an answer to the question. However, this is a self-defeating contention. For an inadequate question is a question that has no true answers. For the sake of argument, assume that if a reply demonstrates that the question is inadequate, then the reply is an answer to the question. The reply is either true or false. If the reply is true, then there is a true answer to an inadequate question; but this is impossible given the definition of an inadequate question. If the reply is false, then the reply no longer demonstrates that the question is inadequate. So, while a reply demonstrates that the question is inadequate, the reply is not an answer.

It might be further contended that while I have a specialized notion of an inadequate question here, the objection can be widened. That is, suppose one insists that if a reply demonstrates that the question is flawed in some way, then the reply is an answer to the question. This is false for two reasons. First, one kind of a flawed question is an inadequate question. Suppose that one shows a question is somehow flawed by showing that the question is inadequate. However, if one shows that a question is inadequate, (per the previous paragraph) one has not provided an answer to the question. Second, suppose we ignore the self-defeating arguments for a moment, a question—broadly speaking—is a request for a specific piece of information. If one shows that the question is inadequate, one shows that there is no true answer to the question. If one shows that there is no true answer to the question, one shows that it is impossible to have that particular piece of information. One might acquire other information that is relevant (for example, one might learn that there is no true answer to one's question), but that

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information is relevant does not imply that the information is an answer to the question (as discussed above).

To summarize this discussion, the first kind of elementary question is the yes-no question. It has a simple answer set: either "yes" and "no". There are a variety of replies, but that a reply is given does not imply that an answer is given. Further, if the question has no true answer, then the question is not an adequate question. Hence, a reply might be appropriate and provide the inquisitor with true and relevant information (specifically, that the question is not adequate), but this does not imply that the reply is an answer. Let us continue our discussion about elementary questions.

The second kind of elementary question is a "whether" question. An example is "Is two even or odd?" In this case we again have a subject S, but in contrast to the yes-no question, the whether question can have two predicates P and Q. The difference here is a request for information as to which of the following is true: "S is P" or "S is Q". (In the case of a single subject, there will be at least two predicates.) This disjunction also represents the available answers to the question. In this case, the correct answer is "two is even." We should not think that the whether question is limited to a single subject. It can be that the whether question can have a single subject and two predicates; e.g. "Is Broadway the quickest route, or is Main street the quickest route?" There can be two subjects and a single predicate; e.g. "Is Michael a TA or is Justin a TA?" Or, there can be multiple subjects and predicates; e.g. "Does Smith own a Ford, or does Jones own a Chevrolet?" The essential characteristic of a whether question is that a disjunction is given and one is inquiring about which disjunct (or disjuncts) is true; further, there is no limit on the subjects and predicates. Upon further reflection, we can classify yes-no

questions as whether questions with limited answer sets, subjects and predicates. Or, we can classify whether questions as yes-no questions with no limit on subjects, predicates or disjuncts. Either option is feasible.

As with yes-no questions, there are appropriate replies that are not answers. Specifically, there are replies that show the question is inadequate. Consider the question "Is two bitter or sweet?" The answer set for this question is "Two is bitter" and "Two is sweet"; however, since "bitter" and "sweet" are predications of food, both answers are false.[13] An appropriate reply is "Two is neither bitter nor sweet"; however, as with yes-no questions, that one has provided an appropriate reply (e.g. a reply that demonstrates that the question is inadequate) does not imply that one has provided an answer to the question. The available answers for this question is an assertion of one or more of the disjuncts.

There is certainly more to discuss with regard to questions. For example, exactly what counts as an answer to a "why" question, e.g. "Why does iron rust?", or a "what" question, e.g. "What is a number?", is a matter of some debate. Providing an account of all these questions is beyond the scope of this work. I will, however, make a few reasonable presumptions about answers to these questions in philosophical discourse. My discussion focuses primarily on those philosophical problems that are expressed as yes-no questions and whether questions.

In the following sections I discuss how some philosophical problems can be understood as questions. In turn then, a philosophical solution can be understood as an

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[13] I am ignoring cases of synesthesia for the purposes of illustration.

answer to that question. And, should a purported solution fail to be an answer to the question, the purported solution is not actually a solution.

No Principle (NP) Situations

Some philosophical problems begin with rather innocuous particular judgments; a particular judgment is the ascription of a predicate to a subject. For example, "Donating to charity is a moral act." In this case, the act of donating to charity is the subject while moral is predicated of the act. The judgment (roughly stated) is commonly thought to be true; there are other particular judgments that are commonly thought to be true.

> J1:   Murdering Steve is not a moral act.
> J2:   Stealing from Steve is not a moral act.
> J3:   Telling the truth to Steve is a moral act.

Of course, these examples are simplified for the sake of illustration. The problem for philosophers begins with trying to justify these judgments; that is, philosophers ask "Why are these judgments true?" Or, more precisely, "Why is murdering Steve and stealing from Steve immoral, while charitable donation and honesty towards Steve moral?" The most common approach to justifying these judgments is supplying a plausible general principle such that all particular judgments, together with relevant information about the subjects of those judgments, are implied by the principle; if a particular judgment can be so implied, we say it is *subsumed* by the general principle. For the sake of illustration, suppose the following principle is offered: "An act is moral if and only if the act does not violate a person's autonomy." Let us further suppose that we have a sufficiently robust notion of "autonomy" such that charitable donations and honesty do not violate a person's autonomy whereas murder and theft do. Thus, this relevant information, e.g. the robust notion of autonomy, together with the general principle implies each of the

proffered particular judgments; i.e. the principle subsumes the judgments. In such a situation, we tend to think that the question is answered; thus, the problem is solved.

Sometimes a plausible principle is quite easily found which subsumes all relevant judgments; all other things begin equal, philosophers tend to think the problem is thereby solved. There is a great deal of discussion as to what counts as a plausible principle. For now, let us tentatively say that a plausible principle to be one that survives reflection; i.e. if considering the truth of the principle and one continues to believe that the principle is true, then the principle is plausible.

Let us have some clear formulations of the concepts so far. First is the situation that gives rise to some philosophical problems: a philosopher presumes a set of intuitive particular judgments to be true; and, the philosopher has no general principle which subsumes these judgments. Let us call this the "no principle (NP) situation."

> A person S is in a *no principle* situation if and only if
> (i) S believes each member of a set of intuitive particular judgments $\{j_1, j_2,\ldots, j_n\}$; and
> (ii) S has no plausible principle which subsumes every member of $\{j_1, j_2,\ldots, j_n\}$.

The problem for philosophers in the no principle situation is answering the question "Why are the these particular judgments $\{j_1, j_2,\ldots, j_n\}$ true?" If one is in a no principle situation (NP situation), one has a philosophical problem. Let us call the problem posed by the NP situation a "no principle problem". We will assume that a subsuming principle is an answer to this question. An answer to this question is a solution to the NP problem. Let us call a solution to an NP problem a "no principle solution".

One might object that this account of answering this why-question in philosophy does not consider all accounts of answering why-questions. This is true. However, I am

not attempting to provide a general account of answering why-questions; as some have argued, I take it that providing an account of answering why-questions in general just is to give an account of explanation. This is too large a task for this dissertation. I take it that the approach to answering this particular why-question in philosophical discourse is plausible; from my experience most philosophers approach answering this particular why-question in the described manner. For the sake of discussion, I will assume the given account is an answer to "Why are these judgments true?" The bulk of my dissertation will focus on philosophical problems that find their genesis with NP solutions. That is, one has a TMP problem by having competing NP solutions; and, one has an *aporia* by having either a purported NP solution or purported TMP solution with counterintuitive implications.

One might further object that philosophical problems are not nearly this simple. In fact, it is often the case that a philosopher cannot subsume all the particular judgments; sometimes it is the case that a principle excludes a judgment (relevant information about the subject of the judgment taken together with the principle implies that the judgment is false) or the principle cannot subsume the judgment (although not necessarily implying it is false). For example, utilitarianism is able to subsume many of our intuitive moral judgments while either not being able to subsume all (or, in some cases, subsuming the denial of some strong moral judgments). It can reasonably be claimed that the principle, while not being able to perfectly subsume all the judgments, nonetheless subsumes enough judgments. So, the principle is a solution.

There is some intuitive force behind this objection. However, I do not think enough has been said. As mentioned, one possibility of a principle failing to subsume all

the intuitive judgments is that the principle excludes a judgment. In such a situation, we have a conflict between a plausible principle and an intuitive judgment; this is a different kind of philosophical problem which I address in the section titled "*aporia*". The other possibility of a principle failing to subsume all the intuitive judgments is that the principle does not subsume either the judgment or its denial. In such a situation we have a partial solution. A partial solution may indeed inform our investigation into a full solution. Or, to phrase the rebuttal in a different way, the NP problem is posed by the question: "Why are the these particular judgments $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_n\}$ true?" If a principle cannot subsume all the particular judgments, then it is not an answer to the question. The principle might answer a different question; e.g. "Why are j_1 and j_2 true?" However, these questions are distinct; so, they are not solutions to the same problem.

Too Many Principles (TMP) Situation

The next problem deals with competing NP solutions. The NP situation is a problem since philosophers lack a subsuming principle for the set of particular judgments. The problem is usually considered solved when one provides a plausible principle that subsumes all the relevant judgments. However, often in philosophical discourse more than one NP solution is provided for the NP problem such that at most one of the solutions can be true. In this section I provide a simplified version of such a situation.

Recall the particular judgments provided earlier:

J1:   Murdering Steve is not a moral act.
J2:   Stealing from Steve is not a moral act.
J3:   Telling the truth to Steve is a moral act.
J4:   Donating to charity is a moral act.

Further (for the sake of discussion) recall the following general principle subsumed (J1) – (J4).

An act is moral if and only if the act does not violate a person's autonomy. For the sake of discussion let us crudely call this the "rights principle." There are other general principles that subsume the given particular judgments. Consider the following:

An act is moral if and only if the act maximizes greatest overall happiness. Again, for the sake of discussion let us crudely call this the "happiness principle." Supposing that each of these individual acts do indeed maximize greatest overall happiness, this principle also subsumes these particular judgments. So, this happiness principle and the rights principle both subsume the particular judgments; so, each principle is a NP solution.

There is a problem, however. Since both of these principle purport to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for moral actions, it follows that each principle is necessary and sufficient for the other. That is, given that the rights principle asserts that a failure to violate another person's autonomy is necessary and sufficient for morality, and the happiness principle asserts that maximizing the greatest overall happiness is necessary and sufficient for morality, it follows that a failure to violate another person's autonomy is necessary and sufficient for maximizing the greatest overall happiness. On the contrary, this is false. Suppose that an innocent person is charged with a crime punishable by death. This person just happens to be despised by all that know him. Let us further imagine that the guilty party is well-loved by all those that know him (we can suppose that everyone involved knows he is the guilty party). Imagine that the despised individual can be charged, found guilty and executed with little fuss and no further

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repercussions (e.g. the kangaroo court will neither be discovered nor questioned by other communities). In this scenario the act that maximizes the greatest overall happiness is falsely charging and executing the despised man, but this act violates his autonomy. So, in this case maximizing greatest overall happiness is not sufficient for failing to violate another person's rights. Since maximizing greatest is not sufficient for failing to violate another person's autonomy, these principles are not necessary and sufficient for one another (i.e. they are not materially equivalent). Since these principles are not materially equivalent, and since each principle purports to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for morality, it follows that at least one of these principles is false (and possibly both). The problem for philosophers in this case is to determine which of these principles is false; i.e. the problem for the philosopher is to answer the question "Is the happiness principle false or is the rights principle false?"

Let us summarize the discussion so far. The problem presented to philosophers here deals with the proffered NP solutions. In this case both of the NP solutions subsume the particular judgments, but at least one of these solutions is false (as possibly both). In the example provided, we dealt only with two competing NP solutions. It might be the case that there are more than two NP solutions; in fact, this happens quite often. Let us say that a set of general principles is contrary just in case any one of the principles implies all other principles are false and it is possible that all members of the set are false. It is the philosopher's task to determine which of the NP solutions is false. Let us call this the too many principles (TMP) situation.

> A person S is in a *too many principles* situation if and only if
> (i) S believes each member of a set of intuitive particular judgments
> $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_n\}$,

(ii)   *S* has more than one general principle $\{g_1, g_2,..., g_n\}$ such that each g_i is an NP solution to the NP problem posed by $\{j_1, j_2,..., j_n\}$; and

(iii)   *S* believes all g_i are contrary.

The problem for philosophers in the too many principles situation is providing an answer to the whether question: "Is g_1 false, g_2 false,…, or g_n false?" If one is in a TMP situation, one has a philosophical problem. Let us call the problem posed by the TMP situation the "too many principles problem". Let us call a solution to a TMP problem a "too many principles solution".

That philosophers often encounter TMP problems should be evident; however, one might have reservations about the question. Recall the question that poses the TMP problem: "Is g_1 false, g_2 false,…, or g_n false?" Consider a different question: "Is g_1 true, g_2 true,…, or g_n true?" One might consider this question to either be equivalent or superior to the original question posed. Let us call the first question to "false-whether" question and the second question the "true-whether" question. The true-whether question is neither equivalent nor superior to the false-whether question. In fact, once properly understood, the true-whether question is not actually considered to be a philosophical problem. Let me explain.

Recall the earlier discussion regarding the presumptions of a question.

A question, *Q*, presupposes a statement, *A*, if and only if, the truth of *A* is a logically necessary condition for there being some true answer to *Q*.
(Belknap and Steel, 5)

In other words, a presumption of a question is what is implied by a true answer to a question. For the sake of simplicity, let us deal with only two principles: g_1 and g_2. Let us further suppose we are in a TMP situation with regard to g_1 and g_2. The false-whether question then is "Is g_1 false or is g_2 false?" The answer to this question is either "g_1 is

false", "g_2 is false", or "g_1 is false and g_2 is false." One might wonder why this third

option is included. Recall the third condition of a TMP situation: all g_i are contrary.

Since these principles are contrary, it is possible that all the principles are false. The

answers to the false-whether question imply "Either g_1 is false or g_2 is false." So, "Either

g_1 is false or g_2 is false" is a presumption of the false-whether question. The true-whether

question is "Is g_1 true or is g_2 true?" The answer to the true-whether question is either "g_1

is true", "g_2 is true", or "g_1 is true and g_2 is true." These answers imply "Either g_1 is true

or g_2 is true." So, "Either g_1 is true or g_2 is true" is a presumption of the true-whether

question. One should notice that the presumption of the false-whether question is

contradictory to the presumption of the true-whether question. Since the presumptions of

the true-whether question and the false-whether question are contradictory, these

questions are distinct. Since these questions are distinct, the problem posed by the TMP

situation is not expressed by the true-whether question.

So far, this only gives us reason to consider the problems posed by the false-

whether question and the true-whether question to be distinct. However, we have not

discussed why philosophers do not seriously consider the true-whether question; let us

discuss this now. Recall the third optional answer to the true-whether question: "g_1 is

true and g_2 is true." If this is a possible answer, then philosophers tend not to deal with

such problems for philosophers tend to deal with problems where the principles are

contrary. That is to say, when dealing with a TMP problem, philosophers deal with

competing solutions not complementary or compatible solutions. Recall the example

with the happiness principle and the rights principle. As mentioned, the happiness

principle and the rights principle both purport to give necessary and sufficient conditions

for morality; since the maximization of happiness and the upholding rights are not

mutually inclusive, it follows that these principles cannot both be true (i.e. at least one is

false). Suppose we modify both of these principles such that they are not competing; that

is, let us modify them such that they are compatible. Let us suppose that the principles

only provide sufficient conditions for morality instead of necessary and sufficient. That

is, we modify the happiness principle to "If an act maximizes greatest overall happiness,

then the act is moral"; and, we modify the rights principles to "If an act does not violate a

person's autonomy, then the act is moral". Given (only) the discussion thus far, both of

these principles can be true together. If both of these principles can be true together,

there is no TMP actual problem to be solved. In short, philosophers do not deal with

true-whether questions for there is no problem to deal with.

In summation, NP solutions often lead to TMP situations (though, TMP situations

are not necessitated by NP solutions). If a philosopher is in a TMP situation, the

philosopher has TMP problem. Where $\{g_1, g_2,\ldots, g_n\}$ is the set of general principles that

purport to be NP solutions, the TMP problem is expressed by the question "Is g_1 false, g_2

false,…, or g_n false?" Exactly what a solution to a TMP problem will look like will be

addressed in the following chapter.

The following objection can be raised. While the case involving the despised man

is used to demonstrate that the maximization of happiness and the upholding of rights are

not mutually inclusive, it was also not included in the set of particular judgments.

However, intuitively, there is something immoral about falsely convicting and

subsequently punishing a man (even if he is despised). This particular judgment, i.e.

falsely convicting and punishing a person is immoral, should be included in the set of

particular judgments. When this judgment is included, neither the happiness principle nor the modified happiness principle subsume the set of particular judgments. So, the happiness principle is no longer an NP solution; this leaves the rights principle as the only NP solution. Since the rights principle is the only NP solution, there is no TMP situation; hence, there is no reason or basis for a TMP problem.

I agree that the particular judgment about the wrongful convictions should be included. However, the resolution is not quite that easy. I used the happiness principle and the rights principle solely for the sake of illustration. The actual problems are much more complicated. However, the general approach given by this objection tends to generate a different kind of problem; that is, the inclusion of new intuitive particular judgments tends to create a third kind of philosophical problem. In fact, these particular judgments tend to cause problems even for principles that are weakened (as with the modified happiness principle). Moreover, because of the inclusion of these particular judgments, we often have the third kind of philosophical problem.

Aporia

The first kind of philosophical problem dealt with attempting to justify a set of particular judgments—viz. the NP problem. In those situations where several NP solutions are contrary, we have the second kind of philosophical problem—viz. TMP problems. The TMP problem dealt with attempting to determine which of the NP solutions are false. By using the simplified case of the despised man, we have seen how investigating these philosophical problems leads to the inclusion of further particular judgments. While including further particular judgments may give one reason to reject a proffered NP solution, this is not necessarily the only consequence. One may not think that the

particular judgment is reason enough to reject the contrary principle. Let us continue with particular judgments regarding morality.

Recall the weakened versions of the happiness principle and the rights principle. Further recall that given the weakened versions both modified principles can be true together; i.e. if one considers (and only considers) judgments (J1) – (J4) and that the modified principles only provide sufficient conditions for morality, the principles are not contrary. Moreover, both principles are intuitive; that is, there seems to be *something* right about these modified principles. However, if we consider further particular judgments, the modified principles are threatened once more.

Consider the following scenario. Reconsider the despised man once again. Suppose the despised man is having lunch next to a fountain. During lunch, the despised man slips, bangs his head on the fountain's edge, is knocked unconscious and falls in the water. The despised man begins to drown. Suppose there are several people standing around the fountain; since they despise him, none attempt to rescue the man. Subsequently, he dies. Intuitively, even though the man is despised it is immoral to let him drown in the fountain. However, since the man is despised, (let us assume) people are much happier with his death. Moreover, no person did anything to violate the despised man's autonomy. Notice that each of the following propositions appears to be true: (i) if an act maximizes greatest overall happiness, then the act is moral; (ii) if an act does not violate a person's autonomy, then the act is moral; and (iii) it is immoral to let the despised man drown in the fountain. However, letting the despised man drown in the fountain does not violate his autonomy, and letting him drown maximizes happiness; it follows then that given modified principles, letting him drown is moral. This inference,

however, is contradictory to the intuition that letting him drown is immoral. So, the three

beliefs, plus the relevant information about maximizing happiness and the definition of

autonomy, form an inconsistent set. But, the beliefs (and concomitant information) are

intuitive if not believed (prior to this reflection). Let us consider a different case.

Suppose I spot a table in front of me. While one may not have all the particular

judgments in mind, if prompted, one would most likely assent to the following:

J5:	There is only one object in front of me; it is a table.
J6:	The entire table is in front of me.
J7:	The table is composed of parts.
J8:	The table can survive the replacement of one of its parts.

However, when constructing general principles to account for all of these particular

judgments we quickly realize that not all of the judgments are subsumed. One can offer

the following: If *o* is an object composed of the sum of parts **P**, then each part of that sum

is essential to *o*. This is called *simple mereological essentialism* (Simple ME). Simple

ME is contradictory to (J8); so, Simple ME subsumes only three of the particular

judgments. One can offer the following: If *o* is an object composed of the sum of spatial

and temporal parts **P**, then each part of that sum is essential to *o*. This is called

perdurantism. Perdurantism is contradictory to (J6); so, perdurantism subsumes only

three particular judgments. There are other general principles that can be offered, but I

will stop here for the sake of brevity. One notices that there is *something* intuitive with

the general principles offered. So, one tends to either believe or accept them (absent

further reflection). As with the despised man case we have a set of particular judgments

and general principles that are all intuitive, and perhaps believed, and yet the set is

inconsistent. Finally, let us consider one of Rescher's examples.

Suppose one comes to believe the following propositions (cf. Rescher 2006, 19):

J9:   All knowledge is grounded in observation.
J10:   We can only observe matters of empirical fact.
J11:   From empirical facts we cannot infer values.
J12:   Knowledge about values is possible.

From (J9) and (J10) if follows that all knowledge is about empirical facts. From this inference and (J11) it follows that we cannot infer values from our knowledge. Since values are not inferred from our knowledge, we do not have any knowledge about values. However, this is contradictory to (J12). All four propositions cannot be true together; however, each proposition is—when considered by itself—plausible. Rescher calls these sets of individually plausible but collectively inconsistent propositions "*aporia*".

For the most part, I follow Rescher's notion of an *aporia*. However, I am only going to deal with *aporia* using the terms we have discussed thus far. While Rescher uses "plausibility" in his notion of *aporia*, I will rely only on intuition. This is not a terrific deviation from his notion of *aporia*. He incorporates three conditions for plausibility (cf. Rescher 2003, 87-90). These conditions are not intended to be a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for plausibility; rather, it appears they each contribute to the degree of plausibility. The conditions are authoritativeness, strength of evidence, and inductive schematization. The first two conditions are more or less self-explanatory; the third condition deals with the (for lack of a better description) virtues of a theory. As discussed in the previous chapter, intuitions are considered to be an authoritative source (though a defeasible one). So, I will deal with *aporia* that are given through intuition.

Following Rescher, let us call this third kind of situation "*aporia*."

A person *S* has an *aporia* if and only if
(i)   *S* believes each member of a set of intuitive propositions consisting of general principles and particular judgments $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$;
(ii)   *S* believes that $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$ is an inconsistent set.

The problem for philosophers in an *aporia* is determining which of the propositions is false; for since the set of propositions forms an inconsistent set, at least one of the beliefs must be false. In other words, the problem for philosophers is answering the whether question "Is p_1 false, or p_2 false, …, or p_n false?"

Superficially, this resembles the TMP problem; there is a key difference however. With a TMP problem one takes the particular judgments for granted; one's difficulty in the TMP problem is determining which proffered NP solution is false. Or, in other words, since there is no contradiction between one of the judgments and the NP solutions, there is no reason to reject one of the NP solutions. With *aporia*, however, the inconsistency is between a judgment and a general principle, not merely between general principles. (Note: since the general principles in an *aporia* do not subsume all particular judgments, the general principle does not qualify as an NP solution per our discussion.) Given that the inconsistency is between principles *and* judgments, it is possible that one of the particular judgments is false. So, the problem for philosophers with the *aporia* is to determine whether a principle is false or a judgment. To put it succinctly, while TMP problems and *aporia* are alike in that the question expressing the problems for each are "whether" questions, the difference between the two is that whether questions expressing *aporia* include the particular judgments as well as the general principles.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have characterized philosophical problems as answering certain questions. I have provided three kinds of philosophical problems: NP problems, TMP problems and *aporia*. An NP problem is express by questions like "Why are these particular moral judgments true?" A TMP problem is expressed by questions like "Is the happiness principle false or is the rights principle false?" An *aporia* is expressed by questions like "Is one of the particular judgments false, the happiness principle false, or the rights principle false?" The NP problem is expressed by a why-question; we have neither discussed why-questions nor their answers in detail. Such a project is beyond the scope of this work. For now, I made a reasonable assumption about NP solutions. Specifically, an NP solution is a general principle that subsumes the particular judgments. We have discussed yes-no questions, whether questions in detail, and we have made some preliminary remarks about what counts as an answer to these questions; viz. that not all appropriate replies are answers to questions. TMP problems and *aporia* are expressed by whether questions. In the following chapter we will discuss the solutions to TMP problems and *aporia* in detail. The solutions to these problems will depend on the answers to the questions that express these problems.

Chapter 4: Philosophical Solutions

The previous chapter dealt with philosophical problems. In this chapter, we examine philosophical solutions. To be clear, I neither give an exposition of actual philosophical solutions nor provide a set of conditions that describe philosophical solutions in general. Rather, I will attempt to describe what philosophers take to be solutions to the three kinds of philosophical problems discussed in the previous chapter; I will describe what philosophers take to be TMP solutions and solutions to *aporia* (I discussed NP solutions in the last chapter). This chapter will address not only solutions to these problems, but what I call "insular solutions." The insular solution, roughly, is a solution one offers to resolve a problem of competing solutions (e.g. a TMP solution or *aporia* solution) by claiming that one's favored NP solution is the sole and sufficient reason one needs to rebut competing solutions. For example, suppose one rebuts utilitarianism on the grounds that one has good reason for libertarianism and utilitarianism is inconsistent with libertarianism. As I hope will become apparent, the term "insular solution" is somewhat of a misnomer since insular solutions are not adequate solutions. This discussion lays down the conceptual framework for my thesis in the following chapter: if one's solution to a TMP problem or *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is inadequate.

Too Many Principles solutions

In his *Philosophical Explanations*, Robert Nozick distinguishes between a "philosophical proof" and a "philosophical explanation." Briefly, a philosophical explanation demonstrates to an audience how some philosophical position can be true given apparent

excluders of the philosophical position. An apparent excluder of a philosophical position is a (nonempty) set of statements such that the set of statements seem to give one reason to exclude the philosophical position. Nozick is not entirely explicit about the exclusion relation; he does claim that the "strongest mode" of the exclusion relation is logical incompatibility (it is impossible that the apparent excluders and the philosophical position are true). While Nozick is not entirely explicit about the exclusion relation, I take him to mean that a set of statements excludes a philosophical position to the extent that the set allows one to reasonably infer that the philosophical position is false. While not entirely explicit about what counts as a philosophical position, Nozick provides several examples of philosophical positions: that we are free, that there is motion, that something changes, that there are meanings, or that God is perfectly good. Nozick provides several examples of problems that philosophical explanations are intended to solve. He expresses these problems in the form of a question: "Given that the world is causally determined, how can humans have free will?"; "Give skeptical hypotheses, how can we know there is an external world?"; "Given Zeno's paradoxes, how can there be motion?"; "Given the existence of evil in the world, how can God be perfectly good?" A philosophical explanation is expressed in the form of the following question: For a philosophical position P and a set of apparent excluders R, given R how is P possible? (cf. Nozick 1981, 8-11) Nozick provides an example of a philosophical explanation: compatibilism. The problem posed is "Given that the world is causally determined and that causal indeterminism does not imply we are free, how can humans have free will?" A philosophical explanation, i.e. a solution to this problem, is compatibilism (roughly,

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the thesis that free will and causal determinism are compatible). A philosophical proof is different.

According to Nozick, a philosophical proof is intended to convince one's audience not only that a philosophical position is possibly true, but that the position is actually true. A philosophical proof involves, amongst other things, not only an argument intended to persuade one's audience that one's own favored philosophical position is the case, but that any given opponent's philosophical position is false. So, a philosophical proof for compatibilism involves not only providing a demonstration of how compatibilism is true, but that, for example, libertarianism is false. The solution to a TMP problem is closely connected to Nozick's notion of a philosophical proof.

To see how, let us return to NP problems and solutions. Let us continue with Nozick's example; viz. we will have a simpler version of the free will debate. Let us start with two particular judgments:

J13   Objects are governed by the laws of nature.
J14   Humans have free will.

For the sake of discussion, let us assume that a definition of compatibilism, together with relevant information, implies (J13) and (J14). Recall my definition of an NP situation:

A person S is in a *no principle* situation if and only if
(i) S believes each member of a set of intuitive particular judgments $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_n\}$; and
(ii) S has no plausible principle which subsumes every member of $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_n\}$.

The problem for philosophers in the no principle situation is answering the question "Why are the these particular judgments $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_n\}$ true?" Recall that we call the problem posed by an NP situation an NP problem. Moreover, the solution to an NP

problem is a general principle that subsumes all the particular judgments. Compatibilism, then by our assumption, is an NP solution.

We can use Nozick's notion of "philosophical proof" to describe what a TMP solution would look like. The situation described by Nozick that calls for a philosophical proof is very much like a TMP situation; viz., one is dealing with competing NP solutions.

> A person S is in a *too many principles* situation if and only if
> (i) S believes each member of a set of particular judgments $\{j_1, j_2,\ldots, j_n\}$,
> (ii) S has more than one general principle $\{g_1, g_2,\ldots, g_n\}$ such that each g_i is an NP solution to the NP problem posed by $\{j_1, j_2,\ldots, j_n\}$; and
> (iii) S believes all g_i are contrary.

The problem for philosophers in the too many principles situation is that one has competing NP solutions; viz. each NP solution purports to justify the intuitive judgments and the NP solutions are contrary (if one is true, the remainder are false, and it is possible that all are false). Since the NP solutions are contrary, at most one of the competing NP solutions can be true. To escape this situation, one must escape one of the conditions; more precisely, one must have only one remaining NP solution.

It might be argued that one can escape the TMP situation by eliminating one of the judgments; thus, one escapes condition (i). If one eliminates one of the judgments, one claims either that the judgment is not true or is not intuitive. Either approach creates a different problem for each of the NP solutions subsumes that judgment. If the NP solution subsumes a judgment that is either false or counterintuitive, the justificatory status of the solution is impugned. So, eliminating condition (i) is a poor solution. One might argue that to one can escape the TMP solution by finding good reason to reject the

claim that the principles are contrary; thus, one escapes (iii). I seriously doubt this is a feasible option. It might be the case that one falsely believes the NP solutions are contrary, and a demonstration to the contrary would indeed solve the apparent problem. However, it is not difficult to show that one NP solution implies that the other is false, and it is not difficult to show that two NP solutions are compatible (both can be true). So, while showing that competing NP solutions are not in fact competing would solve the problem, the approach is highly unlikely. So, I will tacitly include showing that the competing NP solutions are not in fact competing as a possible approach to escaping the TMP situation, but, given its unlikely status, I will not discuss it further.

Since eliminating a judgment (escaping (i)) leads one to a new problem, and finding good reason to believe that the competing NP solutions are not competing (thought possible) is highly unlikely, the only recourse is to escape (iii). So, one escapes the TMP situation by eliminating all but one of the competing NP solutions; the philosopher must show that all but one of the principles is false and, to maintain that the remaining principle is a solution, the philosopher must provide good reason for the remaining principle. That is, the philosopher provides an answer to the question: "Is g_1 false, g_2 false,…, or g_n false?" Furthermore, philosophers are concerned with discovering which, if any, g_n is true. Nozick's "philosophical proof" answers this question. A philosophical proof, according to Nozick, not only shows that one's favored philosophical position is true, but that all competing positions are false. Or, in the terms provided thus far, an adequate solution to a TMP problem involves two parts: one, showing that all other competing NP solutions are false, and, two, giving good reason for one's favored NP solution. Satisfying the first condition can involve quite a lot of

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argument. It is usually not that case that there is some overarching reason that excludes all but one g_i. A different approach is required.

To show that a NP solution is false, one provides a rebuttal. A rebuttal in philosophical discourse has a somewhat technical application. A rebuttal shows either of two things (possibly both). One, that the reasons for a competing position are false or otherwise faulty. That a reason is false is easily understood, but a reason can be faulty in a number of ways. For example, one can show that the terms used in one's reasons are vague or ambiguous, or that the concepts involved are fictitious, inapplicable, or simply too suspect to be credible. The second way one offers a rebuttal is to show that the reasons are non-indicative. By non-indicative, I mean that one cannot reasonably infer the conclusion. Again, this can be argued in at least a couple of different ways. We can parse (perhaps crudely) all inferences into deductive or inductive inferences. To show that an opponent's reasons are non-indicative where the opponent's argument is thought to be deductive, one argues that the reasons can be true while the conclusion can be false. Or, to show that an opponent's reasons are non-indicative where the opponent's argument is thought to be inductive, one shows that the reasons do not make the inference, say, probable (under one conception of inductive inference). In short, to satisfy the first condition, one must provide a rebuttal to all but one g_i.

One might wonder why a rebuttal is required. For instance, suppose an exponent for g_1 has good reasons R^1 for g_1 and an exponent for g_2 has good reasons R^2 for g_2 (where g_1 and g_2 are contrary). The exponent for g_1 might reasonably claim that since he has good reason for g_1 and the two principles are inconsistent, he has good reason to reject g_2. Since he has good reason to reject g_2, the exponent of g_1 has shown that g_2 is

false. This approach, however, does little good, for the exponent of g_2 can take the very same approach. There appears to be a kind of stalemate. To resolve this stalemate, one must look to the reasons offered for each view; but this just is the approach taken when one offers a rebuttal.

Satisfying the second condition may be equally tricky. Some might argue that since one has an intuition for one's favored NP solution, one has good reason to accept that solution. Some argue that one is irrational if one does not accept a proposition given by an evidentially undefeated intuition. Following Steup, something D evidentially defeats S's justification for a proposition P if and only if S has evidence E for P, but S also has E′ for a proposition D such that D and E is not evidence for believing P. (cf. Steup, 13-14) An evidentially undefeated intuition for P, then, is an intuition for P that lacks an evidential defeater. An evidential defeater can be in this instance, say, a rebuttal for one's favored NP solution or a demonstration of how the solution given by intuition is somehow self-contradictory. For a stronger stance, some might argue that one has good reason for one's NP solution only if one's reasons make the NP solution certain or indubitable. I do not think certainty is a reasonable requirement; for, as is often criticized of the certainty requirement, if certainty is necessary for good reason, one has good reason for very little. Moreover, I tend to agree with the claim that one is irrational if one does not accept the solution given by an evidentially undefeated intuition. For the sake of discussion, I will assume that a good reason to believe one's NP solution is an evidentially undefeated reason for one's NP solution (though, not necessarily limited to an evidentially undefeated intuition). To wit, intuition may count as a good reason to believe one's NP solution. For example, supposing one finds compatibilism intuitive and

one has no evidential defeaters for the intuition (e.g. the solution does not yield a

contradiction or one shows that one's intuition does not systematically err with regard to

the topic), one has good reason for compatibilism.

Given the discussion so far, we have the following.

A person S has a solution to a *too many principles* problem if and only if:
(i)   one has a rebuttal for all but one g_i; and
(ii)   one has good reason to accept the remaining g_i.

It might be thought that the second condition is superfluous. For it might be

argued that if one has provided a rebuttal to each of the remaining g_i, then one has only

one remaining NP solution. However, providing a rebuttal to each of the remaining NP

solutions is not sufficient for a solution to a TMP problem. Recall Nozick's comments:

in providing a philosophical proof one is both arguing that one's favored NP solution is

true and that the remaining NP solutions are false. Merely providing an objection to each

of the remaining NP solutions is only half the job; for while it might be thought that

providing rebuttals to the remaining NP solutions is good reason to accept the only

remaining solution, this thought is ignoring a crucial feature of the TMP problem to begin

with. Recall the question expressing the TMP problem: "Is g_1 false, g_2 false,…, or g_n

false?" Further recall a presupposition of this question: "Either g_1 false, g_2 false,…, or g_n

false." To argue that the remaining NP solutions is false and that this provides good

reason to accept one's favored NP solution is a fallacy. It is equivalent to the following

line of reasoning:

Either P is false, Q is false or R is false. I have good reason demonstrating
that Q is false and R is false. Therefore, P is true.

The fallacy committed here involves the kind of disjunction we are dealing with; viz. the inclusive disjunction. The inclusive disjunction allows for all disjuncts to be true; that is, it is possible that P, Q and R are all false. Hence, merely demonstrating that two disjuncts are false is not sufficient to show that the remaining disjunct is true. Or, another way of pressing the point, it is stipulated in the definition of a TMP problem that the competing NP solutions are *contrary*; the competing solutions are not contradictory. Thus, it is possible that all the competing NP solutions are false.

One might press the reply further. It can be argued that there are NP solutions that are contradictory; i.e. a set of solutions is contradictory if and only if, one solution is true if and only if the remaining solution (or disjunction of solutions) is false. So, a solution to this problem of competing solutions can involve merely providing a rebuttal to the competing NP solutions. Consider Nozick's example once again: the competing NP solutions (that we have discussed) are compatibilism and incompatibilism. One should observe that these are contradictory solutions (if they are NP solutions). Should one provide a rebuttal to compatibilism, it might be argued that one need not provide some supporting argument for incompatibilism for these two solutions are contradictory; i.e. should one provide a rebuttal to compatibilism, one shows that incompatibilism is true.

An initial reply is that if we are dealing with contradictory NP solutions, then we are not dealing with a TMP problem; we'll call this new problem TMP*. A TMP* problem, then, is one where the competing NP solutions are contradictory (if one is true, the other is false, and vice versa) but not merely contrary (if one is true, the remainder are

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false, and possibly all are false). TMP problems are TMP* problems are not equivalent. While there might be TMP* problems, this work does not deal with them.

A further response deals with the example at hand. While the two solutions considered, compatibilism and incompatibilism, are contradictory, there are two incompatibilist solutions: libertarianism and hard determinism. So, should one show that compatibilism is false, one still must show that one of these solutions is false. moreover, libertarianism and hard determinism are not contradictory. So, suppose that one shows that hard determinism is false; specifically, suppose that there is some indeterminacy in causal relations. Showing that there is some indeterminacy does not demonstrate that humans are free; it merely demonstrates that there might be some indeterminacy in their actions—but indeterminacy no more frees a person than determinacy. Conversely, suppose it is demonstrated that humans do not have free will as described by the libertarian. That humans do not have libertarian free will is not sufficient to demonstrate that all objects are governed by causal laws. This minor (and inadequate) lesson in the free will debate merely shows that in this particular case the competing NP solutions are contrary. So, with the case at hand we do not have a TMP* problem—we have a TMP problem. Furthermore, suppose we are dealing with the TMP* problem given by considering just compatibilism and incompatibilism, merely showing that one is false does not end our investigation. Even if we suppose that one provides a rebuttal to compatibilism, it does not follow that we have a solution to the TMP problem; since these incompatibilist solutions (libertarianism and hard determinism) are contrary, one still has a TMP problem.

These initial responses, however, do not deal with the issue in general. Let us return to the initial objection: suppose one has two NP solutions that are contradictory, g^1 and g^2, and further suppose one has a rebuttal to g^2. At first glance it appears that in providing a rebuttal to g^2 one has provided a solution to the TMP* problem involving these two solutions. Let us examine a few issues. First, there can be two and only two solutions that are contradictory. For, suppose that one has three propositions that are contradictory: P, Q, and R; further suppose that P is true. Since P is true, Q is false. Since Q is false, R is true. Since R is true, P is false. So, P is true and P is false. This is impossible; a similar line of reasoning can be applied for set of four or more propositions. So, there can be two and only two solutions that are contradictory.

Second, I can think of few, if any, actual philosophical problems that have only two contradictory positions. The only one that comes to mind would be philosophy of religion: viz. theism and atheism. These two certainly seem contradictory; however, theism and atheism are not solutions to problems as I have been describing them. Rather, the debate in philosophy of religion deals only with the existence of an object; viz. God. God's existence or nonexistence is not offered as NP solutions. (Although, the existence of God may be the topic of a Nozickian philosophical explanations). In fact, neither the assertion nor the denial of God's existence subsumes particular judgments (at least none that I am familiar with); so, neither the assertion nor the denial is an NP solution. Moreover, if we are dealing with "theism" in the sense that the belief in God is rational and "atheism" in the sense that the belief in God is irrational, these are not contradictory philosophical positions for there is a third alternative: agnosticism (neither theism nor atheism is rational). So, even if one shows that atheism (in this sense) is false, it does not

follow that theism is true. Other purported examples of contradictory NP solutions

escape me. So, that a TMP* problem is a conceptual possibility might very well be

inconsequential.

Let us leave aside the possible inconsequentiality of the TMP* problem; let us

return to the contention that providing a rebuttal to one principle is sufficient to solve the

TMP* problem. Suppose one has two NP solutions, g_1 and g_2, such that g_1 and g_2 are

contradictory (g_1 is true if and only if g_2 is false); let us further suppose that provides a

rebuttal to g_2. Recall our conditions for an NP solution: a general principle such that the

principle, together with relevant information about the subjects of the particular

judgments, implies the particular judgments. Since g_2 is an NP solution, it follows that g_2

and relevant information about the subjects of the particular judgments implies the

particular judgments. Since g_2 together with relevant information about the subjects of

the particular judgments implies the particular judgments, it follows that g_2 is at least a

conditional. (It might be that g_2 is a biconditional.) Provided that a conditional is false, its

antecedent is true and its consequent is false. Since g_2 implies the particular judgments

using information about the subjects of the particular judgments, and the particular

judgment is composed of a subject and a predicate, the consequent of the conditional

includes the predicate of the particular judgment. For example, recall the set of particular

judgments used in the previous chapter:

J1:   Murdering Steve is not a moral act.
J2:   Stealing from Steve is not a moral act.
J3:   Telling the truth to Steve is a moral act.
J4:   Donating to charity is a moral act.

With these judgments the predicate is "moral" and the subjects are various acts. A

general principle that implies these judgments (when taken together with relevant

information about the subjects) will include something like the following: where 'F' is a

predication of an act, "If an act is F, then the act is moral." Since the consequent of the

general principle includes the predicate of the particular judgments, if the conditional is

false, it follows that the there will be some subject ascribed with the denial of the

predicate. For example, suppose "If an act is F, then the act is moral" is our false

principle. Since this conditional is false, it follows that there is some act is F and is *not*

moral. However, that there is some act that is F and is *not* moral might introduce a new

particular judgment; viz. "Act *x* is not moral." An inclusion of a new particular judgment

changes the problem; in this case there are now five particular judgments that need to be

subsumed. At this point, we only have an existential claim about an act; that is, we only

know that there is an act that is F and is not moral, but we are not yet familiar with the

act. We only know that the act is both F and not moral. If we are not familiar with the

act, then it is an open question whether the remaining NP solution subsumes the act or

not. So, the remaining NP solution may not be an NP solution. Furthermore, suppose we

somehow discover this new judgment. If the new judgment is discovered, then there is a

change in the set of particular judgments. If the set of judgments changes, then we may

have a new NP problem. Thus, providing a rebuttal to all but one NP solutions is not

sufficient for a TMP* solution. Supposing two NP solutions are contradictory and one

offers a rebuttal to one NP solution, one may have a different problem.

It might be argued that satisfying the second condition satisfies the first.

Assuming one has good reason to accept one's favored NP solution and that solution is

inconsistent with the remaining solutions, it follows that one has good reason to reject the remaining solutions. It might very well be that one is rational in rejecting all other competing NP solutions provided that one has good reason for one's favored NP solution—it might be that one has good reason to reject all other competing solutions. However, it does not follow that one has provided a rebuttal for all other competing solutions. I argue for this in detail in the section titled "Insular Solutions."

So, to briefly summarize, merely providing a rebuttal to a NP solution is not sufficient for a TMP solution (or a TMP* solution). Given the nature of a TMP problem, providing a rebuttal to one solution does not give one reason to accept any other solution. Moreover, since the NP solutions are contrary, it is possible that all NP solutions are false. It might be argued that there are NP solutions that are contradictory. I find this doubtful or at the very least infrequent. However, supposing the NP solutions are contradictory, it is possible that providing a rebuttal (and only a rebuttal) creates a new NP problem. Thus, a solution to a TMP problem can and must include both good reason to accept one NP solution *and* a rebuttal for every other competing NP solutions.

Solutions to aporia

The last section dealt with TMP solutions; there will be some differences with regard to solutions to *aporia*. Recall our conditions for an *aporia*.

> A person *S* has an *aporia* if and only if
> (i)   *S* believes each member of a set of intuitive propositions consisting of general principles and particular judgments $\{p_1, p_2,…, p_n\}$; and
> (ii)   *S* believes that $\{p_1, p_2,…, p_n\}$ is an inconsistent set.

The problem for philosophers when dealing with an *aporia* is determining which of the propositions is false; for since the set of propositions forms an inconsistent set, at least

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one of the beliefs must be false. In other words, the problem for philosophers is answering the question "Is p_1 false, or p_2 false,…, or p_n false?" Bryan Frances characterizes at least some philosophical problems as sets of individually plausible and yet inconsistent set of propositions; the notion I have been trying to capture with *aporia*. He also provides two necessary conditions for solving an *aporia*. Frances states that an adequate solution to such a problem must accomplish either one of two tasks.

> 1. Identify the claims in the puzzle that aren't true, explain why they aren't true, articulate the truths we have been confusing them with (if there are any), and explain how it is that we made those mistakes.
> 2. Explain how contrary to what anyone thought the claims are all true and do not conflict with one another. In this case the solution must greatly clarify the claims so we can see that they don't really conflict. (Frances, 1)

Roughly, Frances' conditions call for an adequate solution to either explain why one of the propositions is false, or to explain why the set is consistent (despite inclinations to the contrary). Accomplishing either allows one to "escape" from an *aporia*. (In *Philosophical Explanations* Nozick provides a similar strategy for providing a philosophical explanation.)

Frances is not explicit as to what counts as an explanation. He should not be blamed for this, for there is yet to be an uncontroversial account of explanation; i.e. while there are accounts of, for example, a historical explanation or a scientific explanation, there is no uncontroversial account of what counts as an explanation in general. Providing such an account would be outside the purview of his piece; he only intended to demonstrate that there are real problems in philosophy, he did not intend to show how to solve them. So, it is up to us to provide a useable (if not uncontroversial) notion of an

explanation here. I should note that I am not going to give a deep treatment of this problem; that would be outside the purview of this work.

In the broadest sense, an explanation makes something "more intelligible" (cf. Kim, Lycan). This, unfortunately, is trading one opaque term for another. Bromberger gives a more technical description of an explanation using logic of questions; his explication begins with "why" questions. Consider a yes-no question: "Does smoking cause cancer?" A yes-no question is the inner-form of the why-question; i.e. we can construct a why-question by adding "why" to a yes-no question: "Why does smoking cause cancer?" Further, a presupposition of these why-questions is an affirmative answer to the yes-no question it is built upon: "Smoking causes cancer" is a presupposition of this why-question. Suppose that P is some true proposition and Q is a presupposition of a why-question W. An explanation is the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that P and Q must satisfy in order for P to be a true answer to W. (cf. Bromberger, 66-67) So, to use Bromberger's sense of an explanation, in order to provide a solution to an *aporia*, one must answer either "Why is p_i false?" (where p_i is a proposition in the *aporia*) or "Why is the set of intuitive propositions consistent?"

In various academic fields, answering why-questions takes a variety of approaches. It is a popular thought that a scientific explanation is one where the explanandum is subsumed under some sort of law; another account in scientific discourse is that an explanation shows why the explanandum occurred and not some other event; another account of explanation is that an explanation details "how" the explanandum occurred (i.e. what were the actual causal steps); according to "folk psychology" an explanation of one's behavior (i.e. a "rationalization"), say, purchasing a latte, is a

detailing of one's reasons for the explanandum; a historical explanation can be an amalgamation of how the explanandum occurred coupled with a rationalization of the relevant people. Philosophy is not without its own distinct explanatory practices. In philosophical practice, in explaining why some proposition P is false, one provides a rebuttal to P. As discussed above, this takes a variety of approaches. So, while Frances is not explicit, we will presume that an explanation for a propositions being false is a rebuttal; or, the answer to "Why is p_i false?" is a rebuttal to p_i and the answer to "Why is the set of intuitive propositions consistent?" is a rebuttal to the claim that they are inconsistent.

I have briefly argued that a solution to an *aporia* is either a rebuttal to one of the propositions, or a rebuttal to the claim that they are inconsistent. It might be argued that in accomplishing the second task, one has accomplished the first. For a set of propositions to be inconsistent, there must be some proposition which states that one proposition implies at least one other is false. That is, consider the set {P, Q}. This set, in and of itself, is not inconsistent; if we add the proposition "If P then not Q" to the set, then the set is inconsistent. Let us call this further proposition the "implication statement." Either the implication statement is one of the intuitive propositions or it is not. If the implication statement is not one of the intuitive propositions, then it is not a member of the set. Condition (ii) fails to obtain; hence, there is no *aporia*. If the implication statement is one of the intuitive propositions, then satisfying the Frances' second condition just amounts to "identifying the claims that aren't true"; the second condition collapses into the first. I think that something like this is right, but pushing this

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objection has no discernable consequence. For if Frances' second condition collapses

into the first, then at most we are claiming it is superfluous.

While Frances considers these to be at least necessary conditions, he is not

explicit as to whether they are also sufficient. Let us consider this for a moment. If one

explains that there is not an actual inconsistency, then condition (ii) of the *aporia* fails to

obtain. So, one has solved the problem posed by the *aporia*. Suppose one finds reason to

reject one of the propositions. It might be argued that condition (i) will fail to obtain.

However it is possible that a further *aporia* results. Thus far we have only considered

examples where one proposition in the set is inconsistent with the conjunction of the

remainder. It is possible that each member of the set is inconsistent with every other

member (i.e. the set is contrary but not contradictory). So, merely rejecting one

proposition is not sufficient. We can slightly alter Frances' language, however to

accommodate this possibility. Instead of merely claiming that one rejects a single

proposition, we can claim that one's having good reason to reject enough propositions

such that one is left with a consistent subset of the *aporia* is sufficient for a solution. So,

I will follow and expand on Frances' notion here.

> A person S has an *aporia* solution posed by $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$ if and only if:
> (i) Either S has a rebuttal for enough p_i such that one is left with a consistent subset of $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$, and if there is some further proposition p_j confused with (each of the rebutted) p_i, S has good reason to accept p_j, or
> (ii) S has a rebuttal for the claim that the set is inconsistent.

One should note a significant difference here between an *aporia* solution and a TMP

solution. With TMP solutions, one must not only provide a rebuttal for all other

competing NP solutions, but one must also provide good reason to accept one's favored

solution. Solutions to *aporia* do not require one to provide good reason to accept the

remaining intuitive propositions. Since the propositions are intuitive, and we have

assumed that rational intuition justifies beliefs (from a previous chapter), we already have

good reason to believe the remaining propositions.

Insular Solutions

We have discussed solutions to three kinds of problems. Next I want to discuss a further

kind of solution: the insular solution. It is a solution only in a very loose sense for it is

not an adequate solution. Recall our definition of TMP solutions:

> A person S has a solution to a *too many principles* problem if and only if:
> (i)   one has a rebuttal for all but one g_i; and
> (ii)   one has good reason to accept the remaining g_i.

Let us suppose we are dealing with only two principles g_1 and g_2; let us further suppose

our favored NP solution is g_1, and that we have a set of good reasons R^1 for g_1. This

satisfies the second condition of our TMP solution. As discussed, a rebuttal either shows

that one of the reasons for g_2 is false (or otherwise faulty) or that the reasons for g_2 are

non-indicative. Here is a relatively simplistic approach for the first condition of a TMP

solution claiming that one of the reasons is faulty.

> I have already provided the reasons R^1 supporting g_1, which satisfies the
> second condition. Since all other answers are inconsistent with g_1 (by
> assumption), it follows that g_2 is false. Since g_2 is false, then either at least
> one of the reasons offered for g_2 is false or the reasons are non-indicative.
> So, R^1 is a rebuttal to g_2.

Let us call this approach the "insular solution." The salient characteristic of the insular

solution is that one considers one's own position to be a rebuttal for all contrary

positions.

There are at least two things one should notice about the insular solution immediately. First, it is wholly unsatisfactory. Exponents of g_2 will not simply acknowledge this set of reasons for they do not share those reasons; and, on the assumption that one is on the fence with regard to g_1 or g_2 (i.e. they do not have reasons or intuitions for either view), one will still want to know why g_2 is false. A rebuttal is supposed to show that the competing NP solutions are false or that the reasons for the competing NP solutions are non-indicative, but the insular solution is tantamount to merely digging in one's heels. When one looks for a rebuttal, one is looking for some *further* reasons besides a set of reasons advocating one NP solution; the insular solution provides none. So, the insular solution is not an adequate solution.

Second, the insular solution is not *obviously* question-begging; so, on the presumption that the insular is flawed in the sense that one is merely digging in one's heels, it is not obvious how one is doing so. A straightforward instance of question-begging is an argument where the conclusion is assumed either explicitly or implicitly in the premises. In this case, the conclusion is "g_2 is false." This statement is not a premise in the argument. Further, this statement does not need to be assumed to justify any of the premises of the insular solution. That is to say, since g_1 and g_2 are *contrary* and not contradictory, assuming that g_2 is false does not justify one's reasons for g_1. Whether one' reasons are indicative of g_1 is independent of whether g_2 is false. Finally, that g_1 and g_2 are contrary is true simply in virtue of logical consistency. Since the conclusion of the insular solution is not a premise nor used to justify one of the premises in the insular solution, the conclusion is neither explicitly nor implicitly used to justify the conclusion; thus, the insular solution is not obviously question-begging.

While the insular solution is not obviously question-begging, neither is the insular

solution adequate. We have seen some cursory remarks as to why this is the case, but it

may not be clear why it is not adequate. My claim is that a rebuttal for a contrary NP

solution requires more than reasons for a favored NP solution; i.e. One wants further

reasons showing that contrary solutions are false. Let us examine some arguments for

this claim.

One readily available piece of evidence for the claim that a rebuttal requires

further reasons to show that some NP solution is false is that it is not standard

philosophical practice to simply assert one's reasons for one's favored philosophical

position as a TMP solution. That is, in seminar discussion, paper presentation or other

serious academic exchange, there is always an appeal for some further reasons for one's

favored NP solution when confronted by a TMP problem other than merely asserting

reasons for one's favored NP solution. Further, if someone simply digs in their heels in

this manner, we tend to think he is merely stubborn and perhaps irrational. (Nozick and

Frances apparently recognize this as well.)

While the insular solution may deviate from standard philosophical practice and

considered to be somehow erroneous, it is not obvious in what the error lies. That is,

while we have a description of some of our philosophical practices, this neither amounts

to a justification of those practices nor an adequate rejection of the insular solution. Let

us try the following approach. Suppose in place of the TMP problem, we have a different

question. Suppose one asks the question: "Why is g_2 false?" Recall that an answer to

this question is a rebuttal. A rebuttal for a general principle shows either that at least one

reason for a general principle is false (or otherwise faulty) or that the reasons for the

principle are non-indicative. Suppose one offers the insular solution as the solution to the problem expressed by the question "Why is g_2 false?" That is, one claims that since one has reason for g_1, and since g_1 and g_2 are inconsistent, it follows that g_2 is false. Since g_2 is false, either at least one of the reasons for g_2 is false or the reasons for g_2 are non-indicative. But, merely arguing that there is *some* false reason or that there is *something* wrong with the inference from those reasons to g_2 does not show us what it is. The insular solution has not given significant information about g_2—only reasons for g_1 and that the two are inconsistent; so, one has not given a rebuttal g_2 by offering the insular solution. For example, suppose one asks "Why is compatibilism false?" Suppose the respondent answered that since the respondent has good reason for libertarianism, and that libertarianism is inconsistent with compatibilism, it follows that compatibilism is false. But this set of reasons does not tell us much of anything about compatibilism—this set of reasons does not even tell us what compatibilism is. Not only does the insular solution fail to address compatibilism, the conclusion of the insular solution merely claims that there is something false about g_2 without showing what is false about g_2. Returning to our example with the free will debate, when we are asking "Why is compatibilism false?", we are looking for something like the following: "Compatibilism is X. X implies that we are not free. We are free; so, compatibilism is false." However, the only substantive conclusion from the insular solution is that compatibilism is false without even addressing compatibilism.

Compare the insular solution to a different solution. Suppose the respondent argues that since the compatibilist conception of freedom implies that robots are free, and robots are in fact not free, it follows that compatibilism must be false. With this

explanation the "flaw" in compatibilism is uncovered; viz. that at worst compatibilism is false or at best the compatibilist drastically misunderstands freedom. Moreover, this rebuttal does not involve libertarianism. This rebuttal only involves compatibilism and the relevant subject of discourse (i.e. free will). (This is, of course, an inadequate exposition of this debate and most likely a bad characterization of compatibilism; but it serves to illustrate the difference between an adequate solution and the insular solution.)

Perhaps another way to illustrate the shortcomings of the insular solution deals with any other alternative NP solution. Suppose we have any competing NP solution g_n. (We can even imagine there is an arbitrarily large number of competing solutions.) Suppose we ask for each g_n "Why is g_n false?" Recall that an answer to this question is a rebuttal. Assume (for *reductio*) that the insular provides an answer to the question "Why is g_n false?" for each g_n. The answer the insular solution provides for one instance of g_n is not substantively different from any other answer. "I have reason for g_1, and since g_1 and g_n are inconsistent, either one of the reasons for g_n is false or the reasons for g_n are non-indicative." Assuming the insular solution is an adequate solution, one now is able to offer a rebuttal for any given g_n (which is contrary to one's favored g_1) without providing any information about g_n (other than g_n is contrary to g_1). More is required to rebut any arbitrary g_n; so, the insular solution does not provide an adequate answer to why an NP solution is false.

Let us return to the TMP solution. The TMP solution requires not only reason to accept one's favored NP solution, the TMP solution requires a rebuttal for the remaining NP solutions. However, insular solution does not provide such an rebuttal. So, the insular solution is not an adequate TMP solution.

We have considered the insular solution as a TMP solution and found it to be inadequate. Now let us consider whether or not there is an analogous insular solution for *aporia*.

> A person *S* has an *aporia* solution posed by $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$ if and only if:
> (i)   Either *S* has a rebuttal for enough p_i such that one is left with a consistent subset of $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$, and if there is some further proposition p_j confused with (each of the rebutted) p_i, *S* has good reason to accept p_j, or
> (ii)   *S* has a rebuttal to the claim that the set is inconsistent.

Recall the salient characteristic of an insular solution for a TMP problem: one considers one's own reasons for one's favored NP solution to be a rebuttal to all contrary NP solutions. Let us consider whether there is an analogous insular solution to an *aporia*. Suppose one offers the following line of reasoning.

> I have a set of reasons R^1 for p_1. Since p_2 is contrary with p_1 and R^1 implies p_1, it follows that p_2 is false. Since p_2 is false, then either at least one of the reasons offered for p_2 is false or the reasons are non-indicative. So, R^1 is a rebuttal to p_2. This satisfies condition (i) for a solution to an *aporia*.

An argument like this can also be constructed to deal with more than one proposition should it be required. A similar sort of argument can be made for satisfying condition (ii) of a solution to an *aporia*.

> I have a set of reasons R^1 for each of the propositions in the set $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$; so, I have reason for the conjunction. Since I have good reason for the entire set, it follows that the set is consistent. Since the set is consistent, it follows that either one of the reasons offered for the set's inconsistency is false or the reasons offered are non-indicative. This satisfies condition (ii) for a solution to an *aporia*.

With these solutions, one is arguing that one's reason for a particular proposition, or for a set of propositions, is a proper rebuttal. This is the salient characteristic for the insular solution to a TMP problem; so, we have an insular solution to an *aporia*. The insular

solution is an inadequate solution to a TMP problem; one might wonder if the same is true for *aporia*.

Insular solutions for TMP problems had two significant shortcomings when attempting to give a rebuttal to other competing NP solutions. First, the insular solution did not address the competing NP solution. To use the free will case, provided that one has reason to accept libertarianism, and that compatibilism is inconsistent with libertarianism, the insular solution allows us to rebut compatibilism without explicating or understanding compatibilism at all. In short, the insular solution merely indicates there is something wrong with the reasons for an NP solution without showing what is wrong with those reasons. Second, which is an generalization of the first problem, the insular solution purports to rebut any arbitrary contrary NP solution with only the claim that there is an inconsistency between one's favored NP solution and an arbitrary solution. Let us examine whether or not these problems apply to providing insular solutions for *aporia*.

Recall there are two approaches to solving *aporia*: either rebutting one of the propositions, or rebutting the inconsistency. Let us deal with the contrary propositions first. With this approach the insular solution purports to rebut any contrary intuitive proposition p_n on the basis that one has good reason for the (intuitive) proposition p_1, and p_1 and p_n are contrary. The conclusion drawn from the insular solution is that the reasons for p_n are either false or non-indicative; however, as with TMP problems, the insular solution does not show which reason is false or non-indicative. So, the insular solution is not a rebuttal; so, the insular solution is not an adequate solution. Similar remarks apply for the second approach. For the second approach one is rebutting the inconsistency of

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the propositions on the basis that one has good reason for each of the propositions; so, one has good reason for the conjunction. The conclusion drawn from the insular solution is that either the reasons for the inconsistency claim are either false or faulty, or the reasons for the inconsistency claim are non-indicative. Again, the insular solution does not show which reason is false or non-indicative. So, the insular solution is not a rebuttal. Since the insular solution is not a rebuttal, the insular solution is not an adequate solution.

Concluding Remarks

The first chapter dealt with intuitions. I followed the notion of rational intuitions that Bealer and Pust have adopted. Roughly, a rational intuition that P is an intellectual seeming that P is true, and, if one were to reflect on whether P is (in some sense) necessarily true, then it would seem that P is necessarily true. I also provided *prima facie* arguments that rational intuitions are evidentiary. For the sake of discussion, thereafter I assume that a rational intuition that P provides (defeasible) evidence that P is true. The second chapter explored three kinds of philosophical problems: NP problems, TMP problems, and *aporia*. We also provided an account of NP solutions. The third chapter described solutions to these problems. Following Nozick, a TMP solution is a solution that gives one good reason not only to adopt one's favored NP solution, but the solution includes a rebuttal for the remaining NP solutions. Following Frances, a solution to an *aporia* is a rebuttal for enough of the propositions to make the set consistent, or a rebuttal for the claim that the set is consistent. We also discussed an inadequate solution: insular solutions. An insular solution for a TMP problem is a solution that considers one's reasons for adopting one's favored NP solution to be a rebuttal for all other competing

NP solutions. An insular solution for an *aporia* can take one of two approaches. On one approach, an insular solution for an *aporia* is a solution that considers one's reasons for adopting one's favored proposition to be a rebuttal for either any contrary proposition. On the other approach, an insular solution for an *aporia* is a solution that considers one's reasons for all the propositions to be a rebuttal for the inconsistency claim. The next chapter will provide my first thesis. I will argue for a notion of a solution's (TMP or *aporia*) crucially relying on intuition. I argue that a solution that crucially relies on intuition is an insular solution; so, the solution is not an adequate solution.

Chapter 5: Crucially Relying on Intuitions and the Thesis

In this chapter I discuss my notion of a solution's "crucially relying" on intuition and argue for my thesis: If one's solution to either a TMP problem or an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is inadequate. The rough idea for a solution's crucially relying on intuition is that one offers a solution to a philosophical problem such that the solution either stands or falls with the strength of the intuition. That is, if the intuition is not strong enough, then it fails to provide a solution; or, if the intuition is strong enough, the solution succeeds. To provide a fuller account of crucially relying on intuition, I provide an exposition of Richard Foley's notion of self-trust. Foley argues that there are some conditions where one is rational in trusting one's own beliefs and faculties for belief; more specifically, Foley is arguing for an account of first person or egocentric rationality. An account of first person rationality is concerned with whether one is rational in trusting one's own beliefs and faculties for producing belief as opposed to evaluating the rationality of another person's beliefs or the rationality of having a particular belief in general. I largely base my notion of crucially relying on intuition on Foley's notion of self-trust. The significant difference between the two is that Foley would consider more faculties for belief acquisition and reflection than just intuition. I tailor his notion to deal with intuition. Following the exposition of one's crucially relying on intuition, I argue for my thesis. Following the argument for the thesis, I examine two feasible objections to this thesis.

Self-Trust and Reflective Equilibrium

Foley is attempting to answer the question, "To what degree should we trust ourselves?" Foley argues for an account of "egocentric rationality" which is roughly what he calls the "Reidian account" of rationality. A Reidian account can be contrasted to a "Lockean account" of rationality; according to Foley, a Lockean account of rationality requires that one have a specific positive reason for trusting a faculty of belief (e.g. perception or introspection) before one is entitled to trust either the faculty of belief or the belief given by that faculty. For example, suppose one acquires the belief that one's chair is brown, and one acquires this belief through perception. For the Lockean, one must have a specific reason for trusting perception as opposed to one having accidentally veridical perceptions or fallacious perceptions. A Reidian account of rationality takes an "innocent until proven guilty" approach to rationality. According to Foley, a Reidian claims that one is entitled to one's opinion only if one does not have a "concrete reason" to distrust the opinion. Foley cashes out this sense of "concrete reason" in terms of the degree to which one holds on to one's belief; i.e. one is entitled to hold on to one's belief that P to the extent that one is (i) more willing to hold on to P and is (ii) more confident in P than one is either more willing to accept or is more confident in some evidence or reason against the belief.

One might question why Foley endorses a Reidian account over a Lockean account. According to Foley, the Lockean account suffers from an impending infinite regress. Consider the example I provided above. The claim is that one has reason to trust one's perceptual evidence since there is evidence that shows one's faculty of perception reliably produces veridical evidence. However, since the Lockean account requires a

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positive reason for trusting either a belief or a faculty of belief, we are now required to have a reason to trust the evidence about one's perceptions; further, we are required to have reason to trust *that* reason, and so forth. To interrupt the regress, Foley claims, one must appeal to some sort of foundationalism: "Some faculties or methods are self-certifying or some opinion is self-evident." (Foley 1998, 242) However, foundationalism is plagued by many problems such that, Foley contends, epistemology is in a "postfoundationalist" era. It seems then that Foley rejects the Lockean account of rationality since the Lockean account threatens an infinite regress, and the only recourse to interrupt the infinite regress (viz. foundationalism) is untenable.

With the rejection of both foundationalism and a Lockean account of rationality, one rejects the claim that one must have a positive reason to trust a faculty of belief in order to trust the faculty. On the other hand, it is irrational to trust a faculty of belief regardless of what other evidence one has. For example, suppose one comes to believe (and suppose the belief is well grounded) that a subtle hallucinogenic that only affects one's visual perceptions has been surreptitiously dropped in one's morning coffee. With such a belief, it is irrational to trust all of one's visual evidence; one would require corroborating non-visual evidence for each belief given by one's visual faculties. So, we have Foley's claim that one is rational to trust one's faculties for belief, or the belief itself, to the extent that one does not have a "concrete reason" to distrust the faculty or the belief. In short, one is entitled to trust one's faculties, but that trust has limits. According to Foley, the project for a first person account of rationality is discovering to what extent one is entitled to trust one's own faculties. According to Foley, this trust that one has in one's own faculties is closely connected to "responsible believing." That is, given one's

evidence and the conclusions given by one's intellectual faculties, one determines what

one may reasonably believe; this is, as Foley puts it, "putting one's intellectual house in

order." (Foley 1998, 246)

> Being rational in this sense requires that I make myself invulnerable to
> intellectual self-criticism, to the extent possible. It is a matter of having
> opinions that would stand up to further reflection and deliberation, that is,
> having opinions that are capable of withstanding my own critical scrutiny.
> (Foley 1998, 246)

Foley begins his account of self trust with trusting a belief, and gives further

conditions for trusting a faculty of belief; let us begin with trusting a belief. According to

Foley, one can trust one's self in believing P to the extent that (i) one is confident in the

belief and (ii) with the "depth" of the belief. Let's look at confidence first. The sense of

confidence here should not be understood as defensibility; i.e. whether one is confident in

a belief should not be determined by the extent one is able to defend a belief against

external scrutiny. That is, the confidence that one has in a belief is not necessarily

undermined by the fact that one is neither able to defend the belief against critical

arguments nor able to persuade an opponent of adopting the belief. Foley also contends

that this sense of confidence should not be understood as a "guarantee of truth or

reliability." He is not explicit here on what sort of guarantee he is referring to, but given

the discussion I presume he means that a confidently held belief need not be an infallibly

held belief. Foley characterizes confidence as how "sure" we are in a belief. So, an

example of a confidently held belief might be a simple belief that there is a chair in the

room. This belief is neither infallibly held nor is it invulnerable to skeptical objections,

but we are nonetheless confident that the belief is true. Perhaps another example of a

confidently held belief might be a belief in a particular moral claim; e.g. that it is morally

permissible not to donate to charity. This belief is particularly vulnerable to argument (e.g. Singer and Unger provide several arguments against this claim) and it is certainly not guaranteed to be true; however, many people are nonetheless sure that they are not morally depraved or blameworthy by failing to donate a dollar every time they pass by the Salvation Army volunteer. In short, according to Foley, we are confident in a belief to the extent that we are sure the belief is true (regardless of defensibility or guarantees of truth). (cf. Foley 1998, 244)

Foley is careful to note that confidence is not sufficient for self-trust, for the belief must also have sufficient "depth". One holds a belief deeply to the extent that reflection does not undermine the belief; i.e. a belief is held with sufficient depth to the extent that when reflecting on the truth of the belief, one maintains that the belief is true. Some beliefs when pondered are easily discarded while others withstand reflection. That a belief is deeply held does not imply that the belief must be unrevisable; as with confidence, a belief is deeply held to a degree, and not all deeply held beliefs are held to the same degree. (cf. Foley 1998, 244) It is not easy to discern the difference between confidence and depth. One should note that a confidently held belief does not imply that the belief is deeply held; for a confidently held belief may not have been scrutinized by reflection. We might think of a confident yet shallow belief as what has been called a "pre-theoretic intuition." Consider the mentioned moral claim. Many undergraduates are confident in such a belief prior to an Introduction to Ethics course; after exposure to the arguments and reflection, however, the belief sometimes does not survive. While Foley does not press the point, it might even be claimed that a deeply held belief need not be a confidently held one. Suppose that one trusts the scientific community with regard to a

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particular claim; e.g. that global warming is a real phenomenon and is caused by human activity. That one trusts the scientific community allows the belief to survive reflection, however is one familiar neither with the evidence, arguments or procedures. Further, there have been drastic reversals of scientific consensus in the past. So, one reasons, while one trusts the consensus and the belief survives reflection, nonetheless one is not entirely sure the community is right. While confidence is not sufficient for depth (and depth may not be sufficient for confidence), there are beliefs that are both confidently and deeply held. Consider the moral claim again: it is morally permissible not to donate to charity. There are philosophers who continue to confidently and deeply hold this belief.

Foley's notion of self-trust is given in terms of confidence and depth. Foley never explicitly states his conception of self trust with the standard "individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions." He does, however, give us the following judgments.

> 1. One is entitled to trust one's self with regard to a belief to the extent that the belief is deeply held and to the extent that one is confident in the belief. (cf. Foley 1998, 245)
> 2. Neither confidence nor depth are indefeasible, so trust in one's self with regard to a belief is not indefeasible.

Foley's two judgments about self trust follow from his description of what it means to be immune to self criticism; this is an "internalist" notion of rationality. This "immunity to self-criticism" consists in reflecting on one's beliefs, generating a kind of ranking of those beliefs and ensuring that one adheres to this ranking. The rank of a belief is determined by the confidence and depth of the belief. Those beliefs that are not admitted in the ranking are rejected; i.e. those beliefs which are inconsistent with a belief of greater depth, greater confidence or both are also rejected. Further, this sorting of beliefs and concepts should somehow produce an "optimal understanding" of the world as given

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by observation and empirical data; and this sorting of beliefs should not be construed as unrevisable for further data, e.g. empirical observation, may undermine the stability of some beliefs and buttress others. Despite the fact that a belief is revisable, it is not rational to presume too much about being able to forsake a belief in this ranking. That is, one might reasonably conclude that any individual belief is susceptible to revision due to as yet undiscovered and unknown evidence; so, one might merely pick out a belief and consider it to be somehow weak or imminently susceptible to rejection. However, that a belief is revisable does not now give one reason to reject a belief firmly placed in one's ranking, for to reject a belief in one's ranking is tantamount to one rejecting a belief that one now accepts. Conversely, suppose a belief currently finds no place in a ranking; one might think that though the belief may—through revision—be adopted later, one has reason to adopt the belief now. One should not now accept this belief, for to accept the belief is tantamount to accepting a belief that one now rejects. Either option gives one reason to conclude that one is irrational—either option leaves one open to self-criticism. In sorting out the ranking of beliefs according to the confidence and depth of belief and adhering to this ranking, one is immune to one's self criticism. (cf. Foley 1998, 246)

In addition to the trust one has in a particular belief, Foley also argues for a certain amount of trust one should have in one's own faculties for belief. That is, there is a distinction between a belief and the faculties one has for generating belief, e.g. perception, memory, introspection and intuition; so, if there is a degree to which one is entitled to trust one's faculties for beliefs (and, intuitively there is), this account is distinct from trusting a particular belief.

> Similarly, the degree of trust one should have in a faculty, method, or procedure should be proportionate to the confidence one has in the reliability of that faculty, method, or procedure, and the depth of this confidence. (Foley 1998, 244)

This passage can be illuminated by examining his arguments for self trust in one's own faculties. He critically examines the trust one should have in one's own faculties by examining a situation where such trust does not come easily. Let us look at that examination.

In this example, Foley is concerned primarily with one aspect of trusting one's own faculties; specifically those cases where we acquire empirical evidence that our faculties of belief in a specific area are unreliable.

> The general form of these cases is as follows: I have a confident and deep opinion that P, but I then acquire information that this opinion belongs to a class opinions about which people in general are unreliable, and at least at first glance there is no reason to think I am different from most people. (Foley 1998, 248)

To draw from examples in *Rethinking Intuition*, the evidence collected by psychologists indicates humans systematically err with regard to certain topics; for example, humans are notoriously deficient in either estimating or calculating probabilities. Suppose one estimates a particular probability in a game of chance. Let us imagine that one is confident in one's ability to estimate probabilities. Further suppose that one comes to learn that humans are notoriously unreliable with regard to such probability estimations. Such evidence challenges the rationality in believing one's own estimations of the probability. That is, upon reflecting on the probability estimation including this new evidence, one should reevaluate the confidence one has in one's capabilities. With this example, we better understand trust in a faculty for belief. One should be confident in the

belief that the faculty is reliable, and that confidence should survive reflection (i.e. it should be held deeply).

In the given case, our agent is confronted with evidence that, initially it seems, should erode confidence in one's ability to estimate probabilities; however, this is neither the only response nor necessarily the response required. Foley gives three responses to such evidence: (1) sanguine, (2) bleak and (3) recalibration. One opts for the sanguine response by rejecting the problem posed by the evidence. The sanguine response involves one believing that one is somehow (by default) immune to the systematic error; for example, one believes that one is cognitively different from others such that one makes accurate probability estimations or calculations. However, without some reason for thinking that one is cognitively different, this response is untenable. Simply disregarding the problem posed by the evidence without reason is not a rational response.

One opts for the bleak response by rejecting the beliefs produced by the relevant faculty; instead, one relies on beliefs formed by other faculties, or, absent such processes, one withholds belief altogether. This is not entirely irrational according to Foley; however, he suggests that one should not opt for the bleak response too soon. For example, suppose an agent makes a probability estimation and is confronted with the evidence that humans systematically err with regard to probability; but, this agent is well-versed in probability calculus or decision theory. It would be irrational for this second agent to conclude that he is unreliable; after all, he is better educated with regard to probability than most others. So, immediately opting for the bleak response is too quick. This brings us to the recalibration response.

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One opts for the recalibration response by considering the evidence and, by reflection, correcting one's belief accordingly. However, recalibration is viable only if one knows the source of error. Our well-versed friend would, more than likely, know the source of error. To use a familiar example, suppose a quarter is flipped several times in a row and has a streak of heads. Most people would conclude that most likely the next flip will yield a tails—the "gambler's fallacy." Most people may even act accordingly by increasing their bet in favor of tails. Our well-versed friend knows this is a common mistake and the line of reasoning that leads one to it. He concludes either that the coin is not a fair coin or that the chance of a tails is still .5. Since he is aware of the source of error (in this case), he is able to rationally conclude that he can trust his own probability estimation.

It is easier now to see how confidence and depth are applied when talking about faculties. For the sake of being immune to self-criticism with regard to one's faculties, one should be confident in one's own faculties, and that confidence should survive reflection.

While we have a better understanding of Foley's immunity to self-criticism with regard to one's faculties and the example about our well-versed friend is persuasive, one might wonder if maintaining belief using Foley's approach is irrational in other situations where there is an obvious obstacle for recalibration. Specifically, consider situations where one knows that there must be a problem with intuitions since there is a disagreement among intuitions. Philosophical discourse is brimming with disagreement, and there is significant disagreement with regard to rational intuitions (including, as we saw in chapter 1, whether they provide good evidence for a belief). While there is

disagreement in philosophy, we need not limit the scope of intuitions to philosophical inquiry; there is significant disagreement in other fields as well. In situations of disagreement, one cannot simply appeal to some privileged cognitive status; i.e. one cannot rationally conclude that there is something cognitively deficient with another's intuitions, or that one's own cognitive faculties are superior, simply because another disagrees with one's own intuitions. In contrast, our well-versed friend in probability calculus is trained enough in probability estimation to have a privileged status from the "layman"; however, there is no such training with regard to rational intuition and philosophical discourse. This is not to say that philosophers fail to be more apt at pointing out, say, invalid inferences or certain puzzles that arise from "common sense." Rather, when dealing with philosophers and disagreements about rational intuitions, there is neither training that perfects rational intuition nor an obvious difference among intuitions such that one philosopher's intuition is superior to another. That is, when the perdurantist and the endurantist disagree about coincident objects or temporal parts, and one wants to claim that their opponent's intuition is somehow faulty, there should be further evidence that one can cite such that their opponent's intuitions are "off." (Although, while I contend there should be further evidence, the evidence most often used is "That's crazy," "Surely you don't believe that" or the incredulous stare.) So, one might argue, since there is no further evidence for the philosopher to cite, there is no further evidence one can appeal to in order to recalibrate; since one requires reason to recalibrate and the sanguine response is irrational, the philosopher is left only with the bleak response.

Given such a conflict in intuitions, Foley acknowledges that one must address the disagreement to ensure one is immune to self-criticism. However, he insists that the proper way to address disagreement through intuition is reflection. That is, one must engage in reflective equilibrium to address this disagreement, but it does not necessarily follow that one must suspend belief due to disagreement. This reflection consists in one comparing the confidence and depth of one's own faculties versus the confidence and depth that one has in another's faculties, and either suspend belief, reject the belief, or maintain the belief—but not necessarily one of the three. In engaging in reflection, one will either have more confidence and depth in one's own faculties than another's, reflection will not conclusively determine a comparative level of depth and confidence, or one will have more confidence and depth in another's faculties. Should one have more confidence and depth in one's own faculties, then one should maintain belief. Should the comparison in the confidence and depth in one's own faculties be inconclusive, then one should suspend belief. Finally, perhaps odd but nonetheless possible, should one have more confidence and depth in the other's faculties, then one should adopt the other's belief.

It might objected that maintaining belief in light of such disagreement is irrational, for one has no reason to trust one's own belief over another. That is, some would contend that in the face of disagreement it would be irrational simply to reject one's own intuition, for the dissenting intuition is merely a dissenting intuition with no privileged status above one's own. On the other hand, the dissenting intuition is not worse off either; so, merely casting aside the dissenting intuition is irrational. The disagreement between intuitions is tantamount to conflicting evidence; one should

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withhold judgment until further and decisive evidence can be amassed. (Feldman 2006 provides an argument similar to this.)

Foley argues that such a line of reasoning is disregarding the "first-person" account of rationality he is describing. That is, this argument from conflicting evidence is from a "third-person" perspective; it is a line of reasoning that is impartial to whose intuitions are evaluated. The first person approach, the approach where one is attempting to make one's self immune to one's own criticism, does not necessarily give another's intuition equal footing. If one acknowledges that there is a dissenting intuition, but that one has more confidence and depth in one's own faculties than the confidence and depth in another's faculties, it follows that it would be irrational to suspend belief. For, quite simply, to suspend belief is to disregard the confidence and depth in one's own faculties. It might be the case that upon reflection one finds that one does not have as much confidence and depth in one's own faculties as compared to another; in such a case it would be rational to reject one's own belief in favor of the dissenting intuition. (I suspect this happens quite often in a teacher/student scenario.) It might even be the case that upon reflection one finds that there is an equal confidence and depth between one's self and the dissenting intuition (or, if there is a difference, that the difference is not large enough to side with one); in such a case it is rational to suspend belief. But simply suspending belief, regardless of reflecting on one's faculties as compared to another, is ignoring one's criticism of one's self. Or, perhaps more simply put, the comparison in confidence and depth in faculties is evidence; to ignore this comparison is irrational. (cf. Foley 1998, 255-256)

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I think we can make a further argument for Foley's position. Let us return to the Reidian notion of rationality: one holds a belief only if there is no concrete reason not to trust the belief. One might argue that a disagreement is a concrete reason to distrust the belief. But, when examining this argument, there are peculiar difficulties. Let us consider the following case. One philosopher has the intuition that P, call this the exponent of P; another philosopher has the intuition that not-P, call this the opponent of P. One can reasonably argue that since there is a disagreement in intuitions, at least one of the philosopher's intuitions is faulty with regard to P. So, one argues, since at least one of the philosopher's intuitions is faulty with regard to P, this counts as a concrete reason to distrust one's own belief. So, the exponent of P now has a concrete reason not to trust his own faculties.

It is not clear to me why this follows; it almost appears to be a formal fallacy. That is, that there is some faculty that is faulty does not imply that the exponent's faculty is faulty—neither does this imply that the opponent's faculty is faulty. So, we are not able to conclude that one's own faculties are faulty; i.e. there is no concrete reason to distrust one's own faculties. Suppose one is not convinced by this line of reasoning; there is a further problem. Suppose we grant that a disagreement is a concrete reason to distrust one's own faculties; by parity of reasoning one can also conclude that the opponent's faculties are faulty as well. Now however, one's concrete reason for distrusting one's own faculties originates from a distrusted source—but this is absurd. So, there does not appear to be a concrete reason to distrust one's own faculties given a disagreement in intuitions. Thus, under the Reidian account, there is not sufficient reason to distrust one's own faculties.

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Some of DePaul's comments about rationality and reflective equilibrium support

Foley. DePaul gives the following description of the method of reflective equilibrium.

> Most centrally, the method directs the inquirer to do two things as she
> attempts to construct a philosophical theory: (I) Reflect upon the logical
> and evidential relations that hold between her initial intuitive judgments
> and the other beliefs and theories she accepts, between these judgments
> and the emerging theory she is constructing to account for them, between
> this emerging theory and any relevant background beliefs or theories she
> accepts, and so on. (II) Whenever these reflections uncover some sort of
> conflict or incoherence among beliefs, resolve the conflict by revising
> beliefs in the way that comes to seem most likely to be correct upon
> thorough reflection, that is, after taking into account everything she
> believes that might be relevant. (DePaul 1998, 301)

While DePaul's characterization of reflective equilibrium is not identical to Foley's

discussion about confident and deep beliefs (or confidence and depth of faculties), it is

not hard to see how the two notions are strongly related or similar. DePaul explicitly

mentions reflection, and reflection is characteristic of Foley's notion of depth. Moreover,

it is not unreasonable to think that DePaul would agree with including the confidence one

has in a belief into one's reflection.

DePaul argues that abandoning reflective equilibrium is irrational, for if one were

to abandon reflective equilibrium, then one performs one of the following actions.

A: Abandon reflection altogether.
B: Reflect only partially; i.e. reflect only on some of one's beliefs,
       principles, and so on.
C: Reflect, but fail to act on the results of that reflection.

Abandoning reflection altogether is to abandon the project of rationality altogether.

Indeed, as DePaul notes, conceiving of a coherent description that includes one

abandoning reflection rationally is well-nigh impossible (much less defensible). Option

(C), failing to act on reflection, is also equally irrational. Suppose one concludes by

one's own reasons and reflection that one should believe P and then chooses not to act on those reasons; again, a coherent picture is well-nigh impossible.

Option (B), reflecting only on some of one's beliefs, does not fare much better than (A) or (C). Option (B) requires us to reflect only on a portion of our beliefs. Assuming we take option (B), we can reasonably two questions: "Which subset of our beliefs should we fail to reflect on?" and "Do we have a good reason to fail to reflect on those beliefs?" Presumably, the answer to the first question will follow from the answer to the second. However, if we deny that we have good reason, then, without reason, we randomly choose subset of beliefs. This is not rational. However, even if it were rational, then (briefly returning to Foley's contention) there is nothing inherently wrong with deciding to use one's confidence and depth in one's beliefs to decide on a subset. So, there is nothing inherently irrational by maintaining those beliefs that are immune to self criticism. Supposing there is good reason for a excluding a subset of one's beliefs in reflection. Using good reason to exclude a subset of beliefs just is engaging in reflective equilibrium about all of one's beliefs. So, one must engage in reflective equilibrium about all of one's beliefs in order to reject a subset of one's beliefs for reflective equilibrium. Again, this picture is incoherent.

Option (B) is closest to the situation described by Foley where one fails to consider the depth and confidence one has in one's own faculties of belief in a disagreement. Foley argues that one's confidence and depth in one's faculties is relevant to reflection; should one's confidence and depth in one's own faculties be greater than the confidence and depth one has in another's faculties, then one should maintain belief in the intuition. The objector, on the other hand, contends that one's confidence must not

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be included in reflection; i.e. that one's greater confidence and depth in one's own faculties is an irrelevant feature of either maintaining belief in the intuition. However, we can reasonably ask the objector whether one must have good reason to reject one's confidence and depth in one's own faculties. The objector must claim we should have good reason; let us call it R. For the individual then, either R is held more deeply and with more confidence that one's confidence and depth in one's own faculties or R is not held with greater confidence and depth. If R is held more deeply, both Foley and the objector would agree that it is rational to reject the belief given by one's own intuition. However, if R is not held more deeply than one's confidence and depth in one's own faculties, if the objector maintains that one's confidence and depth is not a relevant feature, then objector must claim that it is rational to reject one's intuitions—but by one's own reflection R is not as "good" as one's own faculties. This is tantamount to rejecting one's own reflection, and rejecting one's own reflection is irrational. So, provided that one is more confident in one's own faculties and more deeply holds on to that confidence than one is in another's faculties, it is rational to maintain the intuitive belief rather than either suspending judgment in the belief or rejecting the belief.

Crucially relying on intuition

I now want to discuss my notion of a solution's "crucially relying on intuition"; I base this notion on Foley's notion of self trust. Recall the rough notion of a solution's crucially relying on intuition: the solution either stands or falls with the strength of the supporting intuitions. Heretofore, I have not rigorously defined this "strength." I will adopt Foley's notions of self-trust with regard to belief and apply it only to intuition as this "strength of intuition." Specifically, in a situation where one has enough depth and

confidence in one's intuitive faculties such that one considers the reasons given by intuition to be sufficient for one's TMP solution or overriding other extant evidence against one's TMP solution, one's TMP solution crucially relies on intuition. I take this to also be the extent of one's crucially relying on intuition. So we have the following:

> A TMP solution crucially relies on intuition if and only if, one has enough confidence and depth in one's own intuitive faculties such that one considers the reasons for the solution given by intuition to be sufficient for one's TMP solution.

Similar to a TMP solution's crucially relying on intuition, in a situation where one considers one's depth and confidence in one's reasons given by intuition to be sufficient for one's *aporia* solution or overriding other extant evidence against one's *aporia* solution, one's *aporia* solution crucially relies on intuition.

> An *aporia* solution crucially relies on intuition if and only if, one has enough confidence and depth in one's own intuitive faculties such that one considers the reasons for the solution given by intuition to be sufficient for one's *aporia* solution.

Following Foley, if one is more confident in one's solution and that confidence is held more deeply than one's confidence either in the faculty or reasoning of one's opponent, or in the evidence against one's solution, one is rational in accepting one's TMP solution. Similar remarks apply for a solution to an *aporia*. So, if one's solution crucially relies on intuition, one is rational in accepting one's own solution. I underscore this point for I find no irrationality in one's solution crucially relying on intuition. In fact, in light of the previous discussion, it might be required that one's solution crucially relies on intuition, but I will not press the point here.

Feldman disagrees that one can be rational in maintaining one's solution given that one is aware of dissenting views. (This contention is directly related to TMP

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problems and *aporia*.) He argues that in the face of disagreement between two intelligent people (each of which knows the other to be intelligent) who have access to the same relevant information, it follows that the epistemically proper attitude is to suspend judgments. Let us examine his argument is some detail. Feldman asks us to imaging that through reflection one has come to believe a particular proposition; let us call it P, and let us call this person the exponent of P. Let us further suppose that unbeknownst to the exponent, a different agent has also reflected on whether P, and has arrived at the contrary conclusion ~P; let us call this agent the opponent to P. Prior to any sharing of views, each reasonably holds their own view.

Let us imagine a further scenario. Let us imagine the exponent and the opponent share their respective views; and, each shares their respective reasons for their belief. Let us further suppose that each considers the other to be intelligent and reasonable. In Feldman's words, each finds the other "trustworthy". Feldman contends that given each advocate's assessment of the other, one must suspend one's judgment with respect to P. That is, each is willing to claim that the other is generally quite reliable in their beliefs; at the very least, each is willing to claim that they are not "cognitively superior" to the other. In light of the disagreement, given the presumed epistemic equality, one has just as good reason for P as one has for not-P; i.e. one has conflicting and inconclusive evidence with respect to P. So, one should withhold judgment with respect to P. While Feldman is not as explicit about this situation, I think we can establish the problem with a set of statements.

D1: The exponent has deliberated as to whether P, and concluded P.
D2: The opponent has deliberated as to whether P, and concluded ~P.

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D3: The exponent and the opponent have shared their conclusions and reasons for their conclusion, and each holds the other to epistemically capable.

D4: If there is a disagreement with regard to P between the intelligent and reasonable people (who recognize their respective intelligence) and one is rational in maintaining belief in P or ~P, then one has good reason to believe one's opponent is epistemically deficient or one has more evidence than one's opponent.

If we pay particular attention to the consequent of (D4), we see that none of the disjointed condition obtain, for by (D3) we have the each considers the other to be epistemically capable, and they have shared all their evidence. So, since there is disagreement, it follows that neither rationally maintains belief. Thus, one must withhold judgment.

To explain (D4), imagine the following scenario (borrowed from Feldman). Suppose one peers from one's office window into a courtyard. Suppose further that one spies a tall man wearing a dark trench coat; there are no further discernable details. As it stands, most would agree that one is rational in believing that there is a man in a trench coat standing in the courtyard. Let us alter the case slightly. Suppose that upon commenting to a friend that it is strange to see a tall man in a dark trench coat, your friend comments that he saw no such person. You know your friend is reliable with respect to observations; at the very least, you know your friend is just as reliable as you. Each shares their observations with the other, but there is simply disagreement. To settle the matter, each goes to the window to report their observations. However, while one still sees the man, the other does not. One might claim that you can simply maintain belief. However, this is to deny all of your available evidence, for you already believe that your friend is reliable with regard to visual perceptions. One might argue that since you have seen the man in the courtyard and your friend disagrees with you, you are now

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justified in rejecting the belief that your friend is reliable with regard to visual

perceptions. However, simple disagreement is not enough to justify this claim; for, the

difference in visual perceptions can also be explained by a deficiency of some sort on

your part. Similar comments apply with regard to abandoning your belief in favor of

your friend's belief. In this scenario without further evidence (e.g. you have some further

reason to believe either you or your friend is visually deficient in some manner), Feldman

argues, on pain of irrationality, each must suspend judgment about whether there is a man

in the courtyard.

Feldman analogizes this situation with one where epistemic peers disagree with

respect to an intuition. Suppose that an exponent has the intuition that P and an opponent

has the intuition that ~P. Suppose that the exponent and the opponent share all the

relevant information; further suppose that they still disagree about P. Feldman argues

that for the exponent to maintain belief is to ignore evidence. That is, the exponent

already acknowledges that the opponent is an epistemic peer and (by assumption) an

intuition that P counts as evidence for P. Since the opponent is an epistemic peer to the

exponent, the opponent's intuition is evidence for ~P; it should not matter that the

exponent does not have the same intuition. For Feldman, maintaining belief in one's own

intuition is "tenacious and stubborn, but not reasonable". (Feldman 2006, 224) According

to Feldman, since all the available evidence is inconclusive, one should withhold

judgment.

Recall that Foley argues that one need not withhold judgment with regard to the

belief. For, according to Foley, in the situation described one reflects on all the evidence

including (*pace* Feldman) the dissenting opinion and (*contra* Feldman) one's confidence

in one's own intuitions over another's intuition. Provided that one is more confident in

one's visual faculties and that confidence survives reflection (i.e. the confidence is held

deeply) in the face of disagreement, then, on pain of irrationality, one must maintain

belief. Since one maintains confidence and depth in one's own visual perception, one

maintains belief and there is disagreement. The point of departure between Feldman and

Foley is whether the confidence one has in one's own intuitions is evidential (or evidence

enough to maintain belief).

An objection to Foley's account might be offered the following way. It might be

argued that given the disagreement and that both parties have shared all the evidence, by

an analog of (D4) tailored for vision it follows that there is something deficient in your

friend's visual capacities. This inference, however, is suspect at best—this is Feldman's

point. In effect, one revises one's belief about an epistemic agent largely because the

agent has a dissenting view. Further, in the perception case it is possible that you have a

visual deficiency. One cannot determine whose visual faculties are impaired (absent

further inquiry or testing); so, one must conclude that neither is rational in maintaining

belief. Analogously, in a case of conflicting intuitions, it is not possible to determine

who has the "deficient" intuition (there seems to be no extant test for intuitions); so, one

must withhold judgment with regard to P. If Foley's account of self-trust implies such an

illicit inference, Foley's account encounters a particular difficulty.

Foley, however, does not make this move and attempts to avoid it. He

acknowledges that others can be epistemically "equal", i.e. one need not claim one's

opponent is "deficient", and one is rational is accepting one's intuition over the opponent.

Siding with one's own intuition is not a matter of claiming that the opponent is somehow

epistemically flawed, it is a matter of having greater confidence in one's own intuition, and that confidence is held more deeply. Recall that confidence is not the same as "reliability" or "defensibility"; so to claim that one is more confident in one's own intuitions over another's intuitions is not tantamount to claiming that another's intuitions are unreliable or indefensible. In other words, one need not claim an opponent is somehow deficient when claiming that one trusts one's own faculties more. Rather, one only claims that one is more sure of one's own intuitions than another's.

This reply is probably not the most satisfactory; it only serves to show that given Foley's terms, he is not committed to the claim that one's opponent is "deficient." There is recourse for Foley: we need not accept Feldman's conclusion for there is a deep problem with Feldman's argument. As a matter of fact, there are philosophers who disagree with (D4). In his piece, Feldman notes that DePaul advocates a "self-trust" view (which, from what I can tell from Feldman's exposition, is similar to Foley's—neither Feldman nor DePaul mentions Foley's view by name or citation). As seen above, Foley advocates a "self-trust" view. Both DePaul's view and Foley's view imply the denial of (D4). While Feldman is not explicit, since he thought well enough of DePaul's comments to include them in his piece, I surmise that Foley considers DePaul to be an epistemic peer. And, given a footnote, each has shared the other's reasons with regard to (D4); that is, they have shared all relevant reasons or evidence. Since there is disagreement with respect to (D4), both Feldman and DePaul have shared all their relevant reasons and Feldman considers DePaul to be an epistemic peer, by (D4) it

follows that the only rational belief for Feldman is to withhold judgment with respect to (D4).[14] This consequence is disturbing for the view.

There is more to say with regard to disagreement; this brief exchange does not exhaust the discussion. However, this brief exchange provides at least *prima facie* support of my contention that one's solution crucially relying on intuition (as defined above) does not imply some irrationality. I should note that my topic deals with providing adequate solutions and not rationality in the face of disagreement; and, my thesis does not rely on the claim that crucially relying on intuition implies one is rational. In fact, if an objection is that crucially relying on intuition implies that one is irrational, then the objection probably will aid my thesis. For these two reasons, I will terminate my discussion about rationality and disagreement here.

The Thesis: crucially relying on intuitions and adequate solutions

In this section I argue for my first thesis: If one's TMP solution or solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then one's solution is inadequate. I argue for this thesis in two steps: first I argue that if one's TMP solution or solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then one's solution is an insular solution. The second part of this thesis is that if one's TMP solution or solution to an *aporia* is an insular solution, then one's solution is inadequate. I argued for the second part in the last chapter. Briefly, an insular solution is inadequate since the insular solution fails to provide a rebuttal to competing solutions. Further, an insular solution fails to provide a rebuttal to competing solutions

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[14] The strategy of this objection is not my own. It was used in a web blog and discussed in conversation among a group of graduate students. However, since then I have forgotten the name of the blog, who made the comment, and precisely when this was discussed.

since it fails to show either that at least one of the reasons for the competing solution is false or that the reasons for the competing solution are non-indicative. Since I have already discussed insular solutions at length, in this section I concentrate on the first part of the thesis.

Suppose one's TMP solution crucially relies on intuition. According to the discussion given above, one has enough confidence and depth in one's own intuitions such that one considers the reasons for the solution given by intuition to be sufficient for one's TMP solution. Recall our conditions for a TMP solution:

> A person S has a solution to a *too many principles* problem if and only if:
> (i)   one has a rebuttal for all but one g_i; and
> (ii)   one has good reason to accept the remaining g_i.

Recall the solution to an NP problem: one has a plausible general principle that subsumes the relevant particular judgments. Whether a principle is plausible will be determined, in part, by intuition. That is, while the intuition that a principle is true is not sufficient for a principle's being plausible, it is necessary. (cf. Rescher 2003) So, if a purported NP solution is plausible, it has intuitive support. Further, if an NP solution is plausible, one must also have sufficient confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties. For, while a proposition might still be given by intuition, provided that one lacks confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties, the intuition is not plausible. For example, recall the gambler's fallacy; the gambler's fallacy is still somewhat intuitive—it is hard to escape it. However, since we have good reason to believe that the faculty that produces the intuition, i.e. the cognitive faculty that deals with probability estimation and calculus, is not reliable (i.e. our confidence in this faculty has not survived reflection), the gambler's

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fallacy is not plausible.[15] So, if one has an NP solution, the confidence and depth one has

in one's own faculties is a reason for the NP solution. Now, if a TMP solution crucially

relies on intuition, then the confidence and depth one has in one's own intuitive faculties

is sufficient for the solution. So, if one's TMP solution crucially relies on intuition, a

sufficient reason for accepting one's NP solution is one's confidence and depth in one's

intuitive faculties. Since one's confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties is

sufficient for one's NP solution, it follows that if one's TMP solution crucially relies on

intuition, one considers (ii) to be sufficient for (i).

Recall the salient characteristic of an insular solution to a TMP problem: one

considers one's own reasons for one's favored NP solution to be a rebuttal to all contrary

NP solutions. That is, a solution is an insular solution to the extent that one considers (ii)

to be sufficient for (i). So, if one's TMP solution crucially relies on intuition, then one's

solution is an insular solution. As discussed in the preceding chapter, if one's solution is

an insular solution, then the solution fails to provide a rebuttal; since the solution fails to

provide a rebuttal, it is not adequate. Thus, if one's TMP solution crucially relies on

intuition, then the solution is not adequate.

Suppose one's solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition. According to the

discussion given above, one has enough confidence and the depth in one's own intuitive

faculties such that one considers the reasons for the solution given by intuition to be

sufficient for one's *aporia* solution. Recall our conditions for a solution to an *aporia*:

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[15] This is not to deny that there are other or better reasons for concluding that the gambler's fallacy is

implausible; however, the unreliability of our faculties for probability calculus is enough to render the

gambler's fallacy implausible.

A person *S* has an *aporia* solution posed by $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$ if and only if:

(i)   Either *S* has a rebuttal for enough p_i such that one is left with a consistent subset of $\{p_1, p_2,\ldots, p_n\}$, and if there is some further proposition p_j confused with (each of the rebutted) p_i, *S* has good reason to accept p_j, or

(ii)   *S* has a rebuttal to the claim that the set is inconsistent.

However, if one's solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, one's confidence and depth in one's own intuitive faculties allows one to either accept one's own favored set of propositions or accept that the entire set is consistent; i.e. one considers one's confidence and depth in one's own intuitive faculties to be sufficient for the solution to the *aporia*.

For example, at the risk of oversimplifying, reconsider an *aporia* mentioned in chapter 2.

J9:   All knowledge is grounded in observation.
J10:   We can only observe matters of empirical fact.
J11:   From empirical facts we cannot infer values.
J12:   Knowledge about values is possible.

Recall that (J9) – (J11) implies that (J12) is false. However, one might hold (J12) to be more intuitive than the conjunction of the remainder. In fact, one might hold (J12) to be more intuitive than (J10). So, one rejects (J12) in favor of holding on to (J10). Or, one might find that the conjunction of these premises is more intuitive than the claim that the set is inconsistent; so, one might reject the inconsistency claim. Regardless of the solution given by intuition, intuition is justificatory only to the extent that one has sufficient confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties; i.e. should one not find one's self reliable with regard to these intuitions (i.e. one's confidence has not survived reflection), then the solution given by intuition is not plausible. For example, supposing that one has reason to believe that one's cultural background has had a deleterious influence on one's intuitions, one's confidence in one's intuitive faculties might not

survive reflection. Should this confidence not survive reflection, the solution given by intuition is no longer plausible. So, if one's solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then one takes the depth and confidence one has in one's intuitive faculties to be sufficient for the solution. Since the remaining propositions of the *aporia* (even in those cases where all remain due to a rejection of the inconsistency claim) are intuitive propositions, it follows that the confidence and depth one has in one's intuitive faculties is a reason for accepting those propositions. So, if one's solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties is sufficient for accepting one's favored intuitive propositions.

Recall that the salient characteristic of an insular solution to an *aporia* is that one considers one's reasons for one's favored set of propositions to either rebut the remaining contrary proposition(s) or rebut the claim that the set is inconsistent. So, if one's solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then one's solution is an insular solution; if the solution is an insular solution, it fails to provide a rebuttal; if the solution fails to provide a rebuttal, it is not adequate. Thus, if one's solution to an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is inadequate.

Objection: Philosophical success and adequate solutions

An objection can be brought against this thesis regarding philosophically successful solutions. It might be argued that a TMP solution or solution to an *aporia* that crucially relies on intuition can be a philosophical success; and, since it is a philosophical success it follows that it is an adequate solution. So, instances where a solution crucially relies on intuition and is a philosophical success are counterexamples to my first thesis. Peter van Inwagen develops a notion of a philosophical success. (Cf. van Inwagen 2006) His

purpose in such a discussion is to show that the Argument from Evil is not a success. I will make no comments as to whether the Argument from Evil is a success; I merely wish to provide a reconstruction of his view of a philosophical success. Following the exposition I argue that his notion of philosophical success has deep problems. However, if we ignore these problems, it follows that if a solution is a philosophical success, then the solution is still an insular solution.

For purposes of illustration, it is fruitful to contrast van Inwagen's favored notion of philosophical success with one he rejects. The initial notion of a philosophically successful argument for some position P is an argument for P given by an ideal exponent of P that, under ideal circumstances, would persuade an ideal opponent to P that P is true. By an 'ideal exponent', van Inwagen has in mind a cognitive agent with all relevant knowledge, is sufficiently patient, has a very high degree of logical acumen, and is clear in presentation and comprehension of P. Similar remarks apply for the ideal opponent of P. Simply put, van Inwagen is trying to remove typical human limitations on rational argument without positing some variety sort of "hyper-rational" being. By 'ideal circumstances' van Inwagen has in mind sufficient time, adequate materials (e.g. chalk board, available research), and so on; again, simply put, van Inwagen is trying to remove typical mundane limitations to rational argument. According to van Inwagen, this initial account fails, for the cognitive agents will never be persuaded of one another's basic premises. A basic premise, as I understand van Inwagen, is a premise that is itself not argued for but nonetheless taken to be true. There will always be some point of disagreement about basic premises between the ideal exponent and the ideal opponent

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such that no argument (in virtue of what a basic premise is) will persuade the other of their view.

While van Inwagen rejects this initial notion of a philosophical success, he adopts some of its elements for his revised account. Instead of a debate between two interlocutors with the purpose of persuading one's opponent, van Inwagen envisions a debate between two interlocutors with the purpose of persuading an ideal agnostic audience. By "ideal agnostic audience" van Inwagen means an audience that (1) has neither an initial opinion about P nor a proclivity towards P or its negation; (2) very much would like a reasoned belief about P or its negation; and (3) does not care whether the reason belief is P or its negation. Simply put, van Inwagen has in mind an audience that would like an answer about P but has neither a preference nor a prior inclination to believe P or its negation. It is the task of the exponent to persuade the agnostics of P, and it is the task of the opponent to persuade the agnostics that the exponent's argument is unsound; i.e. it is the opponent's task to persuade the audience that one of the premises used by the exponent is either false or not sufficiently proven, or to show that the exponent's reasons are non-indicative. Notice that the opponent need not supplant P with a different view, only that the opponent needs to demonstrate that the exponent's argument is unsound. According to van Inwagen:

> A philosophical argument for P is successful just in case, under ideal
> circumstances:
> (i)   the argument used by an exponent of P would persuade an agnostic
>   audience to believe P, while
> (ii) an opponent of P attempts to persuade the agnostic audience that
>   the exponent's argument is unsound.

Determining whether an argument would persuade an idealized agnostic audience is neither something observable, nor is it discernable by appeal to meanings of terms. Rather, this must be discerned—if it is discernable at all—through insight. It is not entirely clear from van Inwagen's discussion how we can discover whether an argument is a philosophical success; in fact, he makes comments to the effect that since his notion is subjunctive in form and determining the truth value of subjunctives is notoriously difficult, we might not be able to determine the truth of this subjunctive. However, even though I contend that insight is the only option for discerning whether an argument is a philosophical success according to van Inwagen's criterion, I tend to doubt that it is discernable at all. Let me explain.

Recall an idealized agnostic audience. An agnostic idealized audience is an audience with sufficiently high cognitive capacities, a sufficiently high degree of knowledge, a sufficiently high degree of logical acumen, has no inclination towards either P or its negation, has no preference for either P or its negation, and yet desires a reasoned answer to the question: "Is P or its negation true?" Further, recall van Inwagen's first proposed notion of philosophical success: an argument for P is a philosophical success just in case an idealized exponent for P can persuade an idealized opponent against P. He abandons this notion since these agents will have a commitment to basic premises such that, since they are basic premises, are neither argued for nor argued against. So, the argument between the idealized exponent and the idealized opponent will always end in a stalemate. To avoid this problem, he conceives of an agnostic audience. Agnostic audiences lack the basic premises of the exponent and the opponent; it is the job of the exponent and the opponent to persuade the agnostics of

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those basic premises. Should the agnostic audience be persuaded of those basic premises, they will be persuaded for the conclusion that follows (either P or its negation). Exactly how this is supposed to come about is not clear. There is no clarification as to what kind of basic premises the agnostic agents can have. Which kinds of basic premises the audience can have poses significant problems for van Inwagen's account.

Suppose that there is a set of basic premises $\{P_1, P_2,\ldots, P_3\}$ that imply P; further suppose that our agnostic audience believes this set of basic premises. The agnostic audience by definition is not inclined to believe either P or its negation; however, given the audience's logical acumen, since the audience described already believes the set of basic premises, it follows that the audience is already inclined to believe P. That is, give the audience's belief in the basic premises and the logical acumen to draw the correct inference from those basic premises, the audience probably already believes P prior to the exponent's discussion. (That is, it is silly to think that an audience has the set of basic premises and—given their logical ability—recognizes that the premises imply P, *and yet* they do not believe P.) So, we have a contradiction: the audience is not inclined and inclined to believe P. One might question my understanding of the audience; however, there is little guidance from van Inwagen on how we are to understand the audience's attitude towards the basic premises. Since van Inwagen claims that the audience must not have a predilection "emotional or otherwise" towards the exponent's conclusion or the denial, I take it that this includes an intellectual predilection; and, an intellectual predilection would include the audience's intuitions. So, to reiterate, we have a contradiction: the audience is not inclined to believe P and the audience is inclined to believe P—we must reject one of the suppositions. The only available supposition to

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reject is that the audience shares the exponent's basic premises. Or, to argue another way, should the audience already accept the basic premises of the exponent, the opponent is not able to persuade the audience that the exponent's argument is unsound; we have a situation too similar to the first notion of philosophical success that van Inwagen already rejected. Or, to argue yet another way, should the audience already believe the exponent's basic premises, the exponent is not persuading the audience of anything. So, if the agnostic audience is not inclined to believe P, then the agnostic audience does not believe the exponent's basic premises.

By similar lines of reasoning, we can also conclude that not only does the audience not believe the basic premises that lead to the conclusion, the audience is not inclined to believe anything that leads to the basic premises (which in turn lead to the conclusion). For, while it is the case that basic premises are not argued for, it is possible that one can provide some argument or some means of rational persuasion in their favor. Suppose that the means of rational persuasion is simply: "Consider P." Upon considering P, by rational intuition it is possible that the audience is persuaded of P. However, this exhibits an inclination to believe P. Suppose that the audience can be persuaded of the basic premises in the same manner. This exhibits an inclination to believe the basic premises, which in turn exhibits an inclination to believe P. Soon a pernicious regress results, for consider any reason that can be used to persuade our audience of P. In order for the audience to be agnostic in the sense described by van Inwagen, the audience cannot be inclined to believe this reason. If the audience cannot be inclined to believe any reason that leads to the conclusion, then the exponent can never persuade the audience of P. The opponent's task is complete without raising a single objection.

Consider something further. Either the audience believes the basic premises or it does not. If the audience believes the basic premises, then the exponent's task is complete without raising an argument. If the audience does not believe the basic premises, then they are already convinced that the argument is unsound; i.e. if the audience does not believe the basic premises, the opponent's task is complete without raising an argument. Perhaps we stipulate that the audience only believes some of the basic premises but not all; again, the opponent's task is complete. Perhaps we say that the exponent should persuade the audience to believe the basic premises. But, whatever premises the exponent begins with are basic premises—the problem is just backed up.

We might ignore that this problem is a deep problem for van Inwagen's philosophical success. Let us grant then that there is nothing substantively flawed with van Inwagen's notion. It might be suggested then that a philosophical success as understood by van Inwagen provides a counterexample to my first thesis; i.e. a philosophical solution that crucially relies on intuition that is also a philosophical success can be an adequate solution. Let us suppose that the proffered TMP solution is a philosophical success and the solution crucially relies on intuition. Since the solution is a philosophical success, an exponent of a particular NP solution would have persuaded an ideal agnostic audience of the favored solution, and the opponent would have failed to persuade the audience that the exponent's argument is unsound. Moreover, since the solution crucially relies on intuition, the exponent has enough confidence and the depth in his own intuitive faculties such that he considers the reasons for the solution given by intuition to be sufficient for one's TMP solution.

Consider that under this supposition the exponent has persuaded the audience of P; such persuasion involves the opponent persuading the audience of the exponent's basic premises. Since the solution crucially relies on intuition, the basic premises for the exponent's solution must include at least one intuition. With the intuition, however, one must also include one's confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties. Recall earlier we discussed that an intuition is justificatory only to the extent that one has confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties. That is, one might have the intuition that P (e.g. the gambler's fallacy), but provided that one has lost confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties with regard to P, one will no longer consider the intuition that P to be justificatory. Since the exponent has persuaded his audience of his favored position and the solution crucially relies on intuition and the solution relies on at least one intuition, it follows that for each member of the agnostic audience, either the audience member is crucially relying on intuition for the solution, or the audience member simply has sufficient trust in the exponent.

It might be argued that it is false that the exponent's crucially relying on intuition implies that the audience's solution either crucially relies on intuition or that the audience has enough trust in the exponent; for while the basic premises are in fact given by intuition, it is possible that the basic premise could be acquired by some other source of knowledge. So, while the exponent crucially relies on intuition for the solution, the ideal agnostic audience need not—they can acquire the basic premise from some other source.

I do not think this objection is a proper rebuttal. Reconsider the four sources of knowledge discussed earlier: perception, memory, consciousness (or, introspection) and reason (or, intuition). (cf. Audi 2002, 71) Since the audience is agnostic, they would

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neither be inclined to believe the conclusion or its contrary; so, they would not already believe the basic premises. Since they would not already believe the basic premises, they would not acquire the basic premises from memory. Arguably, it is possible that one acquires basic premises from perceptual evidence. I do not wish to take up the banner on either side of the issue here. However, on the assumption that perception provides one with basic premises, if the agnostic audience is persuaded by the exponent, the audience does not acquire the basic premises from perception, for the audience is not different with respect to the exponent with regard to the perceptions—that is, they are both "ideal." Recall that according to van Inwagen, the idealized debaters and the idealized audience all have a sufficiently high degree of knowledge. Given this constraint, the audience and the exponent would have had relevantly similar perceptual evidence. So, if the audience is persuaded of the exponent's basic premises, it will not be because he has seen something the audience has not. Similar remarks apply to consciousness, for the only kind of basic premises that can be acquired from consciousness are those mental states commonly held. That is, should the mental state be unique to the exponent, then the audience can not be privy to that mental state. Should the audience not be privy to the mental state, then the audience could not grasp the basic premise. However, if the only kinds of basic premises that can be acquired from consciousness are those commonly held, then—in virtue of the idealization—the agnostic audience will already have those basic premises. Since all other sources of knowledge have been eliminated in this situation, if the exponent has persuaded his audience of his favored position and the solution crucially relies on intuition, it follows that for each member of the agnostic

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audience, either the audience member is crucially relying on intuition for the solution, or the audience member simply has sufficient trust in the exponent.

If a proffered solution is a TMP solution, then the solution provides both good reason for the preferred NP solution and a rebuttal for each of the remaining solutions. As discussed before, crucially relying on one's intuition does not accomplish the second task. Now, the only substantive difference between this situation and the situations I have developed thus far is the number of people with a solution that crucially relies on intuition; viz. there are a greater number of people involved. Since the only substantive difference between a philosophical success and the situations I have addressed is the number of people involved, if a philosophical success does provide a counterexample to my first thesis, then there must be something about the number of agents who crucially rely on intuition that satisfies both conditions for a TMP solution. Let us grant that convergence of belief satisfies the first condition; i.e. convergence provides a good reason for accepting the favored NP solution (I am tempted to think this is correct). The second condition is not satisfied, for merely asserting that a number of people converge on an NP solution (let us even say a large number of people converge) does not provide a rebuttal for an NP solution. A rebuttal demonstrates either that one or more of the reasons offered for a rejected NP solution is false or otherwise faulty, or that the reasons are non-indicative. We apply the same objections we discussed with insular solutions to the contention that the number of people involved provides a rebuttal, and have the same results; e.g. the number of people involved does not show the "fault" of the competing NP solutions. So, philosophical success does not provide a counterexample with regard to TMP solutions.

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One might still press the objection with regard to solutions to *aporia*. After all, with philosophical success we have a convergence of belief as to which intuitive proposition should be rejected. The convergence of belief leads greater justificatory credence to the proposed solution; so, the solution is adequate.

I think there is a difficulty in claiming that convergence lends credibility to one's solution to an *aporia*. First, if we understand convergence as a non-negligible number of competent and rational people agreeing on a particular conclusion, then mere convergence is not sufficient for a solution; for there are many camps on opposing sides of the issues (not just at this time, but across intellectual history as well). This leads to the baffling result that we have a rebuttal for each of the intuitive beliefs (implying that all the propositions that constitute the *aporia* are rebutted) and we have had these rebuttals for some time. Let's ignore this complaint; for, as van Inwagen describes a philosophical success, there appears to be a decidedly one-sided majority with philosophical successes. That is, we not only have a convergence of belief among (some of the) idealized agents, but a majority of idealized agents. Let us assume this is the case and the solution crucially relies on intuition. So, the exponent and each member of the audience considers their confidence and depth in their intuitions to be sufficient either for a rebuttal to the remaining proposition or for a rebuttal to the claim that the set is inconsistent. Let's consider a rebuttal to a particular proposition first. Such a convergence, again, fails to show the "flaw" with the remaining proposition. All that is offered in such a solution is that idealized agents believe it is false (which might be persuasive), but one lacks the fault with the remaining proposition. And, recall the condition that if there is some further proposition that is confused with the remainder,

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then one provides that alternate proposition; a convergence of belief on one subset of propositions does not provide the alternate proposition whether there is one or not. Similar remarks apply with regard to the second condition for a solution to an *aporia*, i.e. rejecting the inconsistency. Simply citing that a majority of idealized agents converge on all the propositions does not show how the set is consistent.

Since a solution that is a philosophical success and crucially relies on intuition does not provide and adequate solution for either TMP problems or *aporia*, philosophically successful solutions doe not provide a counterexample to my first thesis.

Objection: Further Evidence

One might object to the first thesis in the following way. Suppose one has a TMP solution that crucially relies on intuition; however, further suppose that one uncovers some further evidence for one's TMP solution. Imagine, for the sake of discussion, that this further evidence is empirical. Let us further suppose that this evidence is nearly decisive in favor of one's preferred NP solution. In such a situation, it appears that one has an adequate solution to the TMP problem.

This does not provide a counterexample to my first thesis, for the antecedent has not been satisfied. Recall my rough notions of a solution's crucially relying on intuition: the solution stands or falls with the intuition. I further refined this by claiming that a TMP solution crucially relies on intuition when one has sufficient confidence and depth in one's intuitions such that one considers one's intuitions for one's favored NP solution to be the sufficient reason for the TMP solution. Now, in this case one is including empirical evidence for one's TMP solution. However, if one adds such evidence, the solution no longer stands or falls with one's solution; i.e. supposing intuition fails, one

still has the evidence to bolster one's solution. Similar remarks apply if the evidence shows that the competing NP solutions are false. That is, if one adds further empirical evidence to one's solution, one is not crucially relying on intuition for that solution.

Let us suppose the evidence is different. Let us suppose that the evidence is not empirical; rather, let us suppose that one reason to think that any competing NP solution g_j to one's favored NP solution g_i is self-contradictory. Let us further imagine that the reason is given through intuition. Since the competing NP solutions are self-contradictory, it follows that one has a rebuttal to each proffered solution. In such a case, one has a solution that crucially relies on intuition and there is only one remaining NP solution. So, it might be argued, we have a counterexample to the first thesis. Let us grant that one's NP solution crucially relies on intuition and let us grant that one's reasons for rejecting the remaining NP solutions crucially relies on intuition. The situation described is not a TMP solution, for the solution provided solves a different problem. A TMP solution requires a set of NP solutions; further, if a proffered solution is an NP solution, then the solution subsumes the relevant judgments. However, if the proffered solution implies that the solution is false, it cannot subsume those judgments (if the principle is self-contradictory, then it trivially implies any other proposition; hence, it implies that the judgments are false). So, if a proffered solution is self-contradictory, it is not an NP solution. Thus, the situation so described is not a TMP situation; so, the solution might indeed be adequate, but it is not a TMP solution.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

I have discussed intuitions and solutions in philosophy. Following Pust, an intuition that P is the purely intellectual experience that, when considering P, that P is true, and, if one were to consider whether necessarily P, one would have the purely intellectual experience that necessarily P. Following Sosa, Bealer and pervasive philosophical practice, I take it that intuitions are a defeasible source of evidence. I have provided three kinds of philosophical problems, viz. no principle, too many principle and *aporia*; and, I have argued for conditions for solutions to these problems. Of particular importance is the contention that too many principle solutions and *aporia* solutions require a rebuttal. A rebuttal shows that either at least one of an opponent's reasons are false or that the opponent's reasons are non-indicative. I have also discussed insular solutions, and I have argued that insular solutions are not adequate solutions since insular solutions do not provide a rebuttal. I provided an account of one's solution crucially relying on intuitions which largely follows Foley's notion of self-trust. One's solution crucially relies on intuition to the extent that one has sufficient confidence and depth in one's intuitive faculties such that one considers the reasons given by intuition to be sufficient for one's solution. Following Foley, if one's solution crucially relies on intuition, one is rational. I have argued that if one's solution to either a TMP problem or an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then one's solution is an insular solution; thus, if one's solution to either a TMP problem or an *aporia* crucially relies on intuition, then one's solution is not adequate.

This thesis delivers some bad news. It shows that there is not (all other things being equal) a good link between rational belief in one's solution and having an adequate solution to a TMP problem or *aporia*. More specifically, there is not, all other things being equal, a good link between rational belief and having a rebuttal to another's view. That is, while one may be justified in believing one's favored NP solution, if there are competing NP solutions and one's TMP solution or *aporia* solution crucially relies on intuition, one cannot explain why an opposing view is false (I take it this is the point of offering a rebuttal). On the other hand, this disconnect between rational belief and adequate solutions at least partially explains why there is significant disagreement among rational believers: rational belief simply isn't up to the task of explaining why a view is false in cases where a solution crucially depends on intuition.

One question which I have not addressed here is to what extent and how many actual TMP solutions or *aporia* solutions crucially rely on intuitions. That is, how many extant solutions in philosophy are not adequate for the reasons I have given here? Answering this question properly requires a lot of work, and I cannot give adequate time to such a project here. Given some of the comments from Kripke, Plantinga and my own observations, I tend to think that there are many TMP solutions and *aporia* solutions that crucially rely on intuitions. It might even be the case that there are some problems that can *only* be solved by intuition. One might reasonably ask whether any meaningful work can be accomplished in either proffering solutions to these problems or investigating these problems. One might answer that if there are no adequate solutions in these areas, there is no worthwhile work to be done in these areas.

One way to characterize these concerns (though, as we shall see, not my favored way) is the "solvability skeptic". Roughly, the solvability skeptic claims that while there are purported solutions to philosophical problems, e.g. the Free Will Problem, there are no actual or real solutions to philosophical problems. This contention is better illustrated when comparing philosophy to other intellectual endeavors; i.e. when one compares the actual progress (which presumably involves solutions to problems) in mathematics and science to the apparent lack of progress of philosophy (i.e. that philosophy has been dealing with the same problems and yet has provided no (definitive) solutions to these problems), one might infer that philosophy has hit something of a dead end. Rapaport argues against the solvability skeptic. Rapaport claims both that the solvability skeptic has overly simplistic view of solutions to problems and that the progress made in other fields is not nearly as simple as the solvability skeptic would have it. Specifically, as Rapaport characterizes the solvability skeptic, whether a purported solution is an actual solution depends a great deal on convergence of belief or agreement. I do not think this is an entirely fair characterization of the solvability skeptic; I tend to think that the arguments given by Feldman regarding disagreement are better suited to such a contention. However, I do not intend to develop a notion of solvability skepticism here, nor do I especially need to. I will deal only with the original claim made above: if there are no adequate solutions that can be offered, then there is no worthwhile work to be done in these areas. Rapaport's reply to the solvability skeptic, however, is a suitable reply to this contention.

Rapaport gives us a condition for a solution to a philosophical problem.

> Any purported solution, *S*, to a problem, *P*, is really part of a *theory*,
> among whose other parts are the background principles entailing *S* and the
> further principles (or commitments) entailed by *S*. (Rapaport 1982, 292)

The upshot of Rapaport's condition for a solution is that every solution is (what he calls)

"theory-laden". That is, given one's intellectual commitments (either as given by

intuition or the conclusions of one's intellectual investigations), a solution to a problem is

entailed by one's intellectual commitments and the solution should entail some of these

intellectual commitments. While Rapaport does not explicitly use such language, it

seems that Rapaport is speaking about a kind of coherence between a solution to a

problem and one's intellectual commitments.[16] Rapaport further suggests that solutions

in mathematics and science are similar in this regard. A solution to one of these

problems is "theory-laden"; i.e. when one questions the commitments made in

mathematics and science, one has both ventured into philosophical discourse and

potentially dismantled the proffered solution.

Given this condition for a solution to a philosophical problem, there can be

meaningful work in areas where one's solution crucially relies on intuition (and, hence, is

not an adequate solution). For in the process of comparing one's view to others, say, in

the face of competing solutions and proffered rebuttals, one discovers what one's

commitments must be; i.e. one discovers which particular judgments or theories are

contrary to one's own, consistent with one's own or implied by one's own. By

discovering these commitments, one is further putting one's intellectual house in order

(to borrow from Foley). Moreover, through the challenges given by TMP problems and

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[16] One should notice that this merely tells us that a solution should cohere with our commitments but not

how it is that a solution is a solution to a problem, but we will let this pass for now.

aporia, one may discover certain refinements to one's own view. Or, one might show that there are only certain sets of intellectual commitments one *can* have given a proffered solution. (cf. Rapaport 1982)

Gutting shows us that there can be benefits to a TMP solution despite the fact that it is not an adequate solution. In proffering a TMP solution, it is possible to "make intellectual room" for the solution. That is, it is possible that by offering unique insights into the problem one might make an otherwise discarded view tenable; for example, while no one holds to the arguments given by Plato for the forms, there are nonetheless modern day versions of Platonism. By offering new insights for old problems, one may enrich a view by buttressing it with new intuitions or dissolving older problems. Or, by offering a new NP solution and concomitant TMP solution, one provides a further notion for study. In this way, there are more philosophical positions for consideration and commitment. In either case, i.e. by refining older views or offering new ones, one is contributing to the philosophical discourse. (cf. Gutting 1982)

In addition to these benefits gained by rational belief despite the inadequacy of solutions, this thesis should motivate us to work on further projects; I have three in mind. The first project I have in mind is giving conditions for the evaluation of intuitive judgments. Others have begun this project in particular areas; e.g. there is already work on evaluating probability judgments. However, while there is an independent source either verifying or disconfirming a particular probability judgment or class of judgments given by intuition (e.g. probability calculus), I tend to doubt that there is such an independent source for, say, judgments in ethics given by intuition. Should I be incorrect in this assessment, there needs to be some research in uncovering such sources; should I

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be correct, there needs to be some research in providing some further sort of evaluation of these judgments. As seen in *Rethinking Intuition*, psychologists are researching the reasons or explanation for the intuitive judgments we have. That is, an account of our intuitive judgments might conclude that our judgments are the result of cultural inculcation or an evolutionarily advantageous and yet fallacious belief forming faculty. One might quickly begin impugning an intuitive judgment because, say, it is discovered that a particular intuition is a byproduct of cultural inculcation. However, I suspect that such inferences are too quick. So, there should be further research in evaluating the products of our intuitive faculties. Such standards could involve the following: (i) How vulnerable is an intuition in a particular area, or even a particular intuition, to reflection— i.e. do people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) as a matter of fact abandon an intuition upon exposure to critical thought or in light of classical arguments or counterexamples? (ii) Are there cases where an intuition tends to change over time? (iii) Do we have hope of discovering a stable enough set of intuitions that allows us to maintain substantial philosophical positions? With such research we can begin Foley's "recalibration". That is, should it be discovered that intuitions in a particular area are not subject to further evaluation, then we can begin either reassessing the intuitions in that area or reassessing the value of investigating the field to begin with.

The second project I have in mind is a catalogue of extant intuitive judgments and how they are related to purported solutions. I do not mean those judgments that every rational investigator agrees upon; I mean those intuitions that either have served as the impetus for a philosophical position or its rejection. Or, we might say, we can create a catalogue of those judgments that are contenders for "the" intuitive judgments. With

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such a catalogue we can begin systematizing—so to speak—philosophical theories. That is, we can show which intuitions either confirm, support or otherwise buttress purported solutions (NP, TMP or otherwise) and which intuitions pose significant problems for purported solutions. This enables us to know and to teach (*pace* Rapaport) what one is committed to given a purported solution. We might even uncover what we might call "postulates" of philosophy; i.e. those intuitions that, on the whole, are largely unrevisable. I see this as having a particular pedagogical advantage. Students often have difficulty grasping the project of philosophy from the start. By providing these intuitive judgments, and allowing the students to see where their intuitions lie and showing what they are committed to, we can show why the problems in philosophy are problems for them as well.

Finally, the third project I have in mind is researching how this thesis impacts what I take to be the overarching goal of the project of philosophy. I take it that the overarching goal of philosophy is the search for Truth. I do not intend to become too romantic in this description, but I was first inspired to begin studying philosophy because it was the only field (in my minimal experience) that actually promised to provide one with a comprehensive, veridical and, in some sense, sublime understanding of the world. While I contend above that there is still meaningful work that can be accomplished in philosophy given my thesis, it seems that my thesis dims the prospects for achieving this goal. That is to say, we appear to be well-suited to, not only discover what we are committed to, but discover which solutions best cohere with those commitments. However, this is not sufficient for knowing the Truth, nor does such a coherence of one's own beliefs as opposed to another's coherent beliefs increase the probability that one's

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own beliefs best approximates the Truth. If one's beliefs do happen to best approximate the Truth, it might well be a matter of luck.

While the goal of rational belief does not guarantee the Truth, I wonder if a more *impersonal* approach might be better suited to this task. To illustrate what I mean by "impersonal," recall that Foley's project involved providing an account of egocentric rationality; i.e. under what conditions is one allowed to trust one's self with regard to a belief. This project deals solely with one's self and one's beliefs. A personal approach to discovering the Truth, then, deals only with the relationship between one's self and the Truth. The strategy to discovering the Truth here appears to be discovering the most rational position one can take. This strategy apparently also involves a process of elimination; i.e. considering each philosophical position, engaging in reflective equilibrium with regard to the position, and either judging the position to be true, false, or withholding judgment. Philosophical discourse becomes a matter of combat. Even the language we have adopted in discourse reflects this combative nature; e.g. one "defends" one's view from "attack" and dialectic itself is a matter of opposition. An impersonal approach to discovering the Truth does not merely consider the relationship between the individual and the Truth, but the species and the Truth (or, the culture and the Truth). A large part of this project is descriptive: what are the ideas of a time, what are the cultural factors of the time and how do we understand we understand the ideas and cultural influences of the past in comparison to current ideas and cultural factors? Much work is devoted to this project already. This descriptive work is the "data" for the next step: determining the patterns that exist in the history of ideas and what inferences can we draw from these patterns? What can the history of ideas tell us about the search for

Truth, and Truth itself, as attempted by a species and not merely as attempted by an individual? If there is something to be gained from this project, then the egocentric approach to philosophy, while valuable in itself, would no longer be the dominant activity in philosophical discourse; egocentric rationality would have to share the stage with the impersonal approach to the search for Truth.

In short, my thesis does not pose devastatingly bad news for philosophy. My thesis has merely shown that there are certain solutions that intuition is not particularly well-suited for. This can make room for attempts to solve different kinds of problems in philosophical discourse—problems that intuition is well suited to handle.

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VITA

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