PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS – PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This work is a defense of philosophical intuitions and the use of them in philosophy. First, I survey the main forms of intuition-based philosophical methods – conceptual analysis, explication, and reflective equilibrium – and demonstrate how each treats philosophical intuitions as basic evidential sources. Next, I will develop and argue for a conception of what a philosophical intuition is. Third, I will provide an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of a philosophical intuition. Finally, I will argue that if philosophy wishes to use intuitions in philosophical theorizing, then it must engage in practical explication. To this end, I will be developing an account of philosophical intuitions that correctly captures the nature of the intuitions used in philosophy and demonstrating how philosophers best can use those intuitions to justify their analyses of philosophical concepts.