MEDIA PERFORMANCE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE IN EAST AFRICA:
AGENDA SETTING AND AGENDA BUILDING INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES

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Doctor of Philosophy

By
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MAY 2008
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MEDIA PERFORMANCE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE IN EAST AFRICA:
AGENDA SETTING AND AGENDA BUILDING INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC
ATTITUDES

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DEDICATION

- In loving memory of my late mother, Fatuma Cissy Nanziri
- To all East Africans who wish for peace in the region and on earth
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Dr. Wayne Wanta, Dissertation Supervisor

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examined the media influence and the government influence on public attitudes on issues concerning democratic rule in the East African Community (EAC). I proceeded under the assumption that the influence of media on public attitudes could be undermined by regional variations in political experiences with the central government; and that public opinion could be shaped by regional alignment, ethnicity, political identity, and level of education. A total of 1,395 respondents from the EAC were surveyed using a multistage cluster random sampling. Results showed that the agenda setting on public attitudes towards regime legitimacy and the rule of law in each region varied across East Africans of different education levels and gender. The most revealing finding here was that EAC governments have a stronger influence on public attitudes towards democratic rule than the news media. This study shows that agenda setting is associated with regime legitimacy but not with agenda building while agenda building is associated with the rule of law and not agenda setting. I conclude that looking only at the role of media in shaping public opinion in East Africa on issues of democratic rule may not be sufficient without considering the government influence and the nature of geopolitical sectarianism in each partner-state.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ........................................Page 1
  1.1 Rationale for the Study........................................... 2
  1.2 General Research Objectives................................. 3
  1.3 Organization of the Dissertation............................. 5

CHAPTER TWO: Agenda Setting and Agenda Building............. 7
  2.1 Agenda Setting as a Media Influence ....................... 7
  2.2 Agenda Building as a Government Influence ............... 9

CHAPTER THREE: Substantive Liberal Democracy............... 13
  3.1 Substantive Model............................................. 14
  3.2 Liberal Model.................................................. 15
  3.3 Rule of Law..................................................... 16
  3.4 EAC Media Law and Policy.................................. 23
  3.5 Regime Legitimacy............................................. 27

CHAPTER FOUR: The East Africa Community..................... 36
  4.1 Why Compare these EAC Partner-States..................... 38
  4.2 EAC Economies and Regional Integration.................... 40
  4.3 EAC Political Federation?.................................... 43

CHAPTER FIVE: Geopolitical Sectarianism....................... 49
  5.1 Geopolitics in Uganda........................................ 51
  5.2 Geopolitics in Kenya.......................................... 56
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER SIX:  Media Performance in Democratizing EAC</th>
<th>67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Media Ownership/Systems</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Politics and the Media in Tanzania</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Politics and the Media in Kenya</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Politics and the Media in Uganda</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Research Questions</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER SEVEN: Methodology</th>
<th>96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Survey Overview</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Sampling Plan and Study Design</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Instrumentation and Measurement</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Nested Analysis Using HLM</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Nested Analysis Research Design</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER EIGHT: Results</th>
<th>111</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Population Sample Characteristics by Country</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Regional Sample Descriptives for Media Performance</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Regional Sample Descriptives for Regime Legitimacy</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Regional Sample Descriptives for Rule of Law</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 HLM Results for the Agenda Setting Influence</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6 HLM Models 1 and 2 for Agenda Setting</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7 HLM Full Model for Agenda Setting</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8 HLM Results for the Agenda Building Influence</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure</strong> 3.1 Agenda Setting and Agenda Building Model</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 4.1 EAC Social Economic Indicators</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 4.2 EAC Democratic Rule Indicators</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 6.1 EAC Media Type Comparison</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure</strong> 8.1 Levels of Education among EAC Respondents</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure</strong> 8.2 Media Exposure: Do Respondents Access EAC News</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.1 Indicators of Media Performance in Uganda</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.2 Indicators of Media Performance in Kenya</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.3 Indicators of Media Performance in Tanzania</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.4 Indicators of Regime Legitimacy in the EAC</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.5 Indicators of the Rule of Law in the EAC</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.6 Agenda Setting Means and Standard Deviations</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.7 HLM Models 1 and 2 - Predictors of Media Influence</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.8 Media Influence - HLM Model 3 &amp; the Full Model</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.9 Agenda Building Means and Standard Deviations</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure</strong> 8.4 Government Influence on Rule of Law</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure</strong> 8.5 Government Influence on Regime Legitimacy</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong> 8.10 Government Influence HLM Models 3 &amp; the Full Model</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure</strong> 9.1 Agenda Building and Agenda Setting - Final Model</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX</strong> A.1 List of Geographical Regions</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX</strong> A.3 List of Research Assistants</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEDIA PERFORMANCE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE IN EAST AFRICA:
AGENDA SETTING AND AGENDA BUILDING INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC
ATTITUDES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines news media performance and influence on promoting substantive liberal democracy in three East African countries: Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. These countries are the three founding members of the East African Community (EAC), which later added Rwanda and Burundi. I focus on the founding EAC members, otherwise referred to as partner-states. The EAC is touted by presidents of each partner-state as the beacon of hope for political liberalization, social justice, social welfare expansion, and sustainable economic development for East Africans (Aseka 2005). The trio has historically experienced several variations of democratic rule. Of particular interest here are regime legitimacy, the rule of law, and media performance.

This study tests the agenda setting and agenda building influence on 1,395 citizens nested within 15 regions of the EAC. Some scholars report an increasing research interest in the democratization process in Africa as a whole (Hyden, Leslie and Folu 2002). However, very little of it focuses on media and democracy in East Africa as an entity. The few scattered contributions deal mainly with individual partner-states (Ocitti 2006; Matende 2005). There is little evidence of comparative empirical work in this important area. I proceed under the assumption that the media neither perform with a
clearly defined agenda regarding a broader issue like democracy, nor are all media products equally accessible to everyone across all regions in the EAC.

The rule of law is regarded in the social science literature as an indispensable construct of democratic rule. It restrains arbitrary use of political power and thus allows citizens to enjoy equal rights, protection, and privileges (Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks 2006; Abbink and Hesseling 2003). The rule of law is also a crucial condition for any regime in a functioning democracy in order to achieve political legitimacy from citizens. Under the basic democratic practices, the citizens of a state exercise collective consent to validate the legitimacy of a regime. Legitimacy emanates from leaders who govern under democratic rule, who then gain social trust from their constituents (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005; Beetham and Lord 1998). The rule of law, regime legitimacy, and mass mobilization are some rudiments of substantive liberal democracy.

1.1 Rationale for the Study

One of the main reasons for conducting this study is to determine which communication process offers the strongest influence on public attitudes concerning the democratic rule in East Africa. The different communication processes used here concurrently are the agenda setting and the agenda building models. The dissertation is designed in a context that would allow estimation of the media influence (agenda setting) and government influence (agenda building) at the individual and regional level.

I examine the influence at the individual and regional levels because of the nature of politics and the tendency by the political elites to use ethno-regional sectarianism to coerce and shape public attitudes. Several scholars have argued that many political elites
in Africa use ethnicity and geopolitical sectarianism as a source of political mobilization and contestation to either influence the state or gain power (Nyang’oro 2004, Mamdani 1997). I examine how the media performed under such political culture, to inform and educate citizens whose opinions were probably shaped by other intervening factors such as the regime type, ethnicity, social economic status, and the prevailing rule of law. Earlier research and case studies reviewed here concerning the role of the press and democratization in these partner-states was unable to provide empirical evidence of either the agenda setting or agenda building influence on public attitudes.

In the early 1990s, professionalism and the quality of media content in most of Africa were hampered by archaic press laws, government interference, harassment, and arrest of journalists (Nyamnjoh 2005; Ukpabi 2001). On several occasions in 1999 and 2000, my father pressed me to consider changing to a more “rewarding” profession. His argument was that news on radio and television was inept, newspapers created antagonistic partisanship, news was tainted by state-propaganda, and that some journalists contributed to the enduring ethnic and regional insurrections. Readers’ letters to the editor published in local newspapers have consistently expressed similar sentiments which suggest that such attitudes resonate among other citizens. The rationale is to seek empirical explanations to my father’s conjectures regarding attitudes towards media performance.

1.2 General Research Objectives

The objective is to determine whether there is a homogeneous pattern across all East African regions in the attitudes of citizens towards the role of the media and that of
their government in a democratic society. Due to East Africa’s political culture of state patronage and geopolitical sectarianism, explicated in the subsequent chapters, I consider individual-level attitudes and nest them within the regional level characteristics. This analysis rests on the assumption that the agenda setting influence in each country is enhanced at the individual level exposure while the regional level characteristics diminish the agenda setting effects due to state patronage and the politics of identity. I test the agenda setting influence on citizens regarding the legitimacy of the regime, rules of law, and other issue concerns of democratic rule at both individual and regional levels.

Government influence on public attitudes is estimated with all individual and contextual characteristics (see figure 1 and 2) at the second (regional) level. This relationship is what is referred to as agenda building. The analysis allows estimation of appropriate media and government influences on public attitudes using the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), also known as the nested analysis. This comparative analysis tests the hierarchical nature of the EAC citizen’s attitudes nested within the regions. I argue that regimes and state institutions do not necessarily govern in the same manner, and the media do not have the same influence and freedoms in every society.

The period of concern for this study is 1992 to 2007, during which the current wave of democratization and liberalization of the news media occurred in East Africa. This is a period marked with the divestiture of public enterprises including some of the state-owned media. It is an era in which the EAC partner-states liberalized the news media and administered procedural democracy in terms of regular presidential and parliamentary (constituent) elections. In the same period, they enacted restrictive laws,
which curtailed the growing influence and power of the liberalized young media and political contestation (Rubongoya 2007; Murunga and Nasong’o 2006; Aseka 2005).

1.3 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds with chapter two reviewing relevant literature of agenda setting and agenda building. It discerns both theoretical perspectives and identifies their utility on East African citizens. The third chapter conceptualizes substantive liberal democracy, including the substantive and liberal models of democracy, the rule of law in each country, and the EAC media law and policies. Also reviewed is the literature on regime legitimacy. Chapter four discusses the establishment and role of the EAC. It discusses why a comparative analysis of these EAC partner-states is important. Chapter five explicates geopolitical sectarianism and its impact on media and democratic rule in the partner-states. I then relate specific contexts of the political landscape and democratic experience of each EAC partner-state with its identity politics. Chapter six reviews the literature on how the state-owned and privately-owned news media perform in the democratizing partner-states. Chapter seven delineates the survey methodology for this research endeavor while chapter eight and nine analyses and discusses the results from the cross-sectional survey data.

Due to the hierarchical nature of the data, political competition, and regime types in the EAC, which are enumerated in chapters four, five, and six, the research design is based on the following premise. Media influence on public attitudes may be undercut by regional variations, which have vastly different political experiences from their
government. Also, individual citizens’ attitudes may be based on regional alignment, ethnicity, political identity, or social economic status.
CHAPTER TWO

AGENDA SETTING AND AGENDA BUILDING

How citizens of the EAC learn about important issues of democratic rule and other events such as economic development continues to be an important question in the agenda setting research. How the media perform and influence citizens’ attitudes on issues of democratic rule in this understudied region of East Africa is equally an important agenda setting inquiry. Is it the government of these nations that build the public agenda through media messages? Is it exclusively the media that set the public agenda? In the last 20 years, evidence from single-nation studies in East Africa has demonstrated volatility and instability in democratic rule which suppress press freedom and media performance. But no known study has tested the agenda building and agenda setting functions in East Africa.

2.1 Agenda Setting as a Media Influence

One of the main tasks of the news media in any society is to tell the public what they consider to be important. The public enlightenment of the relative importance and reinforcement of issues through news coverage in the media is a function of agenda setting (Wanta 1997). It proposes that media exposure to issues in news content leads to attitudes towards that issue salience (Lasorsa 1997; Wanta 1997). The theory is central to the role of the news media in the formation of public opinion and attitudes. Agenda setting studies have reaffirmed the issue salience of the media on the public, even beyond the United States (Wanta et al. 2004), but this theory has yet to be tested in East Africa.
In their seminal study, McCombs and Shaw (1972) established that the positioning and prominence of a story influences the public’s ordering of priorities or issue salience. The study established the primacy of media messages on voters’ perception of issues during elections. In its fourth decade, the agenda setting theory has moved into a new dimension and expanded its scope by mounting a second level. In support of this second level, Craft and Wanta (2005) determined that the public expresses concern on similar attributes, which receive extensive media coverage, such as the extensive press coverage that followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Moreover, the core idea of the message transferal from “not what to think, but what to think about” withstood the test of time and triggered an evolution of scholarship beyond the seminal hypothesis.

The works of Kosicki (1993) and Maher (2001) share similar contentions that what eventually becomes public agenda is not the exclusive domain of the news media as the initial agenda setting hypothesized. Both scholars concur that the central hypothesis of this model was of limited media effect and called for future development of the theory. Protess and McCombs (1991) had earlier acknowledged that the audience learns what issues are salient from the news selection of the media and incorporates a similar set of weights in their own personal agendas. Recent studies have shown that when individuals are highly interested in national issues such as politics, they are more likely to show a strong agenda setting effect (Peter 2003).

On the question of agenda setting and politics, Shaw and McCombs (1977) posited that that the media exert tremendous influence over citizens in a political discourse. They argued that agenda setting cannot occur without exposure to the news
media. This was supported 20 years later by Wanta in a message transferal model. He (Wanta 1997, p.19) concluded that media exposure “serves as a catalyst for the agenda setting process.” In a more abstract conceptualization, this hypothesis assumes that the media agenda influences the priorities of the public agenda, especially during elections. Purvis (2001) contributed to this school of thought by suggesting that the media help to determine what will be discussed and deemed important by the public.

Meanwhile, political scientists have long considered presidents in most independent states around the world to possess agenda building influence on the media and the public (Huntington 1991; Kingdon 1984; Wood and Peake 1998). I must clarify that some political literature conceptualizes agenda setting as “the relative influence of interest groups or political actors and the specific designs of administrative arrangements” on the masses (Wood and Peake 1998, p.63). Also, research in that field looks at how perceived public opinion influences government officials to make critical decisions about agenda setting. Consequently, what is conceptualized as the agenda setting process in political readings in most cases is in fact the agenda building process in the subfield of journalism and mass communication research.

2.2 Agenda Building as a Government Influence

It is important to note from the outset that most literature on Africa shows that the media provide political leaders with just an outlet for their agendas as opposed to independently report without interference from state leaders (Hyden et al. 2002). Also, during parliamentary and presidential elections, the media in Africa have the ability to reinforce state actors’ policies by expanding their outreach to uninterested observers or
reluctant participants (Eribo and Tanjong 1998). Likewise in the United States, “Spokesmen and spin masters play an important role in promoting issues and symbols and establishing a feedback loop to media coverage to increase issue coverage or at least to keep the issue alive” (Scheufele 2000, p.303).

Some scholars such as Lang and Lang (1981) demonstrated that media influence or agenda setting does not function in isolation. The authors argued that elite individuals or institutions contribute with their own issues to build an agenda for public discourse. For that reason, the media influence can be examined as both an independent and dependent variable. In other words, it is a dependent variable for picking up an issue and an independent variable for keeping/increasing issue salience. Based on that understanding, it is my contention that if issues that get onto the media agenda are controlled or “orchestrated” by external sources, it is then plausible that the agenda-building model could equally have an impact on the public agenda in East Africa. That proposition has yet to be tested.

Western theorists, who established the agenda setting research tradition, have also previously conceded that the agenda building proposition has not been accorded sufficient assessment (McCombs 1992; McCombs and Ghanem 2003). “There is a vast wealth of research on the impact of mass media content on the public agenda and considerably less attention to the variety of influences shaping the media agenda” (McCombs and Ghanem 2003, p.68).

Many Western scholars have increasingly placed more attention on news sources and real-world conditions/events (conflicts or disasters) as key determinants (Berkowitz 1987; Johnson et al. 1994). Although one can argue that intervening factors such as
media ownership, the rule of law, and a regime type may shape the selection of issue concerns in media and public agendas. Individuals in power and other institutions build sociopolitical ideas they propagate through the press, and then the press imparts them as salient issues of interest to the public (Weaver and Elliot 1985).

In a widely-cited agenda building study, Behr and Iyengar (1985) combined trend data from three national surveys with a content analysis of the CBS Evening News to determine the influence of the media on the audience agenda. In addition, the data they assessed included presidential speeches to the nation on a number of issues. They found an agenda building function where presidential speeches increased coverage of issues on CBS Evening News. They established that real-world conditions and events had minimal influence on television coverage of the same issues. This suggests a relationship in which the media interact with other external forces, such as the president, to create their agenda and to influence the public agenda. Berkowitz (1987) also concluded that policy makers and other elite members of civil society dominate the agenda-building process, especially on television newscasts. He found that television journalists, more than print journalists, relied heavily on routine news events such as press conferences and comments from the elite as their primary news sources.

A strong argument about agenda building effects can be made regarding coverage of medical stories, since most health journalists are not trained in the health and medical field. In a survey of health reporters, Tanner (2004) found that journalists relied heavily on health sources in the community, particularly medical doctors, to select the salience of issues. She attributed this agenda building effect to the reporters’ lack of formal training in health and/or medicine, coupled with the technical nature of health and medical topics.
Tanner showed that more than 60 percent of respondents agreed that health sources often affect the health content that airs on TV. The agenda building effects from this health communication perspective (in which most reporters lack of formal training in health and/or medicine) could be similar to a situation in the EAC where the majority of freelance journalists, who comprise 75 percent of all practicing journalists, lack formal training in covering politics and public affairs.

In emerging democracies like the EAC partner-states, one would expect government sources to influence both the media content as well as the public political discourse just like how health sources often affect the health content that airs on TV. In most developing states in Africa, democracy is seen as an incentive for outgoing dictators because it allows them to manipulate the electorate to legitimately compete for political power. This can be achieved by state actors building the agenda of legitimacy through socioeconomic incentives in order to maximize their absolutist tendencies. Thus, to many authoritarian leaders, democratic transition is not an end in itself but a means to building an agenda of absolutism to maximize their clinging to political power. In a situation where many untrained journalists are still learning about the values of democratic rule, the agenda building effects could be strong. According to Weiler (1997, East African presidents and their lieutenants have sustained their legitimacy to political power by taking advantage of the citizens’ lack of understanding of their political rights to participatory democracy.
CHAPTER THREE

DEMOCRATIC RULE

What is referred to as democratic rule in this study is a combination of two concepts, which capture diverse forms of state power and governance in the three different partner-states. The models of democracy conceptualized here are substantive and liberal. The spotlight of substantive democratic elements in this study is mainly focused on the leadership qualities of the rule of law, while the liberal element is mainly focused on the leadership quality of regime legitimacy. Dozens of studies on democracy have underscored the endless disputes over a proliferation of concepts and definitions that try to capture the meaning of democracy. As a result, most classical studies have offered innovative conceptual models of democracy on the basis of functional and procedural approaches as necessary elements democratic rule (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Collier and Adcock 1999).

Decades of research on democracy have led many scholars to believe that there is considerable variation in the degree of democracy across states, time, and space (Elkins 2000; Rose et al. 1998). The three East African countries have variations in the way they safeguard and respect the rule of law, the legitimacy of each regime, and endurance of egalitarianism during the democratic transition. Based on these distinctions, the conceptualization of a substantive liberal democracy captures the processes by which each country has constructed democratic forms of political organization and governance. A combination of these two concepts in the study of the EAC allows a possibility for comparing and understanding all variations of democratic rule among the partner-states.
3.1 Substantive model

Substantive democracy is a process of governance requiring regulation of power, which maximizes equal participation for all citizens to have influence over public decisions, and self-determination of equal worth within a political framework (Dahl 1989; Held 2006). Democratic theorists such as Held (2006) maintained that the substantive model is primarily about an active civil society and widespread public participation and self-determination in political life. It emphasizes values such as socioeconomic justice and legitimacy of the political regime, stability of alternation, and sovereignty of the people which go beyond the formal aspects of a procedural democracy (Rubongoya 2007; Lindberg 2006; Dahl 1989). Diamond (1999) opines that the substantive model dispels the notion of procedural democracy. The idea of a procedural model is that as long as elected officials meet formal requirements, then their conduct is assumed to be democratic and is not evaluated based on actual representativeness (Lindberg 2006; Schumpeter 2005).

The primary elements of a substantive model reflect a greater influence of the legal-political alternative in conjunction with accessibility to government, citizens’ rights, and political participation which informs democracy (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). It is important to note that some scholars have castigated the utility of substantive democracy in informing full democratic values and consolidation. Critics argue that substantive conceptions of democracy run the risk of being at loggerheads with normative indicators of democracy which identify positive attributes such as sociopolitical variables and due process under the rule of law (Dahl 1989). For instance, Horowitz (2003) contends that substantive approaches fail to recognize the notion that democracy is for people to be
governed or ruled just as much as it is by the people to govern themselves or to benefit people. One other major criticism by Horowitz is that it is based on the principles of popular control for popular equality without considering other elements of the democratic currency such as separation of powers and free markets.

3.2 Liberal model

A liberal notion requires regular free and fair elections under universal adult suffrage, with an understanding of the normative core values of separation of powers (Lindberg 2006). Huntington (1991) and other scholars who followed his “third wave” composition stated that the core values of a liberal democratic society entail a commitment to fundamental human rights, equality for all citizens, rule of law, and other liberties. The liberal model fills the critical gaps missing in the substantive model which are necessary in the EAC scenario.

A basic conceptualization of liberal democracy is fundamentally about the exercise of power and the choice of rulers. Liberal politics deals with understanding individual interests and choices while exercising them under a neutral set of rules based on constitutionalism, the protection of individuals from the state, and against each other (Przeworski 2003). This model necessitates the regime to be responsive to democratic values such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, the right to private property and privacy, equality before the law and due process under the rule of law. My assumption is that neither “substantive” nor “liberal” or “procedural” conceptions of democracy should be considered in isolation or even more important than the other in the EAC state of affairs. Consequently, it is my contention that the substantive and liberal
models are complementary to dealing with the dynamics of democracy, the rule of law, and regime legitimacy in the EAC.

Meanwhile, democratization must be considered a by-product of economic development as much as it is the elite struggle for national power. In the case of democratization, the media agenda on transnational mobilization is most successful when that agenda challenges the domestic structure of authoritarian rule. This can be achieved if the media empowers and provides an outlet of discourse to domestic activists including NGOs, to market their cause to the rest of the region. When this transnational challenge and activism within the public sphere are channeled through the news media, it creates a significant independent influence and a necessity for democratic intervention from the regional body.

3.3 Rule of Law

In East Africa, state actors and law enforcement agencies refer to the rule of law in the following broad terms: constitutionalism; a well-functioning judicial system; and respected or sufficient legal policy (Schmitz 2006). As a universal paradigm, Hayek (1972, p.73) defined the rule of law as a reflection that government of any form is held accountable for all its actions, “bound by the rules that prevent it from stultifying the individual efforts by extemporized action.” This simply means that societies under the rule of law have efficient individual liberties and citizens enjoy equal rights, equal protection, and equal privileges from the state. East African leaders do not address or consider contemporary political events, respect for civil and political rights and other political virtues as tenets of the rule of law (Shivji 1995). In most cases, the
characterization of the rule of law by most state actors is so lax that it allows contradictory interpretation of law between the enforcement agencies and the judiciary.

The rule of law works in conjunction with other models of democracy which ensures political rights, instruments of accountability, and civil liberties and thus leads to political equality of all citizens. As O’Donnell (2004, 29) espouses, “Without a vigorous rule of law, defended by an independent judiciary, rights are not safe and the equality and dignity of all citizens are at risk. Only under a democratic rule of law will the various agencies of electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively, without obstruction and intimidation from powerful state actors.” Henderson (2003) argued that everyone is entitled to equal treatment in society. Henderson also states that an independent judiciary, an independent media, and an informed and engaged civil society are crucial to achieving the rule of law.

In an effort to provide a more practical and applicable understanding of this concept, Fallon (1997, p.120) made a compelling case that the rule of law shares the following sense of universal values or purposes: it “serves to protect people against anarchy; to allow people to plan their affairs with confidence because they know the legal consequences of their actions; and to protect people from the arbitrary exercise of power by public officials.” Some scholars (Dicey 1915; Bradley and Ewing 2003) summarized it as a philosophical view of a nation-state which links its basic democratic ideas to legal doctrines or constitutionalism with principles of governance conducted according to law. According to Mahoney (1999), societies are more likely to be stable democracies and achieve fast economic growth if the government safeguards the rule of law. In addition, Mahoney (1999) and Deutsch (1977) predicted that respect for the rule of law contributes
to international order. Weak states which adopt the rule of law attain pacification of society during institution-building. In this case the EAC partner-states ought to uphold the rule of law to attain pacification and sustainable democracy.

The rule of law guarantees that a regime’s power and influence are legitimately exercised in accordance with the openly disclosed rules and acts enforced on established procedure (Deutsch 1977). The rule of law is not only the enforcement of legal norms but it also connotes the principle of the supremacy of legal procedure which is fundamental for any civil order and a basic requirement for democratic consolidation (Morlino 2005; O’Donnell 2004). Some literature suggests that this standard provides established measures for the regime and the state to rule by laws that govern everyone equally. Deutsch (1977) posits that the rule of law is a principle that is intended to safeguard citizens against arbitrary governance, through legislation, constitutional provisions, relevant treaties, and an independent judiciary.

Constitutional law scholar for East Africa Oloka-Onyango (2004, 1995) argues that the rule of law requires the government’s commitment to safeguard and respect the outcome of legal rules and to enforce the orderly and nonviolent resolution of political conflicts. Some literature from Sub-Saharan Africa shows that how the legal system is set up and the rule of law is preserved depends on the regime type and the relationship between the state and a vigorous, assertive society (Okoye 2004; Juma 2004). The transition to democratic rule and stability of Africa’s volatile states depends on a strong and vigilant civil society, citizen participation, adherence to constitutionalism, and the rule of law (Carver 1990).
In Uganda for instance, the police regularly detain suspects beyond the constitutional limit of 48 hours before a court appearance or release (Schmitz 2006). The Human Rights Watch of 2005 reported that torture in Uganda had become a common occurrence under Museveni’s rule. In Kenya, hundreds of ordinary citizens were killed and thousands displaced during outbreaks of political violence during the general presidential and parliamentary elections (Brown 2003). A 2005 annual Human Rights Watch report found widespread use of lethal, excessive, and unnecessary force on civilians by the Kenyan police during arrest and while in detention. Tanzania has also suffered similar episodes of political violence across the country during and soon after the last two presidential elections.

The rule of law can be qualitatively defined in two fundamental ways: formal and substantive. Formal conceptualization emphasizes universality of enacted laws, which are created through some kind of democratic process (Stromseth et al. 2006). Formal laws require accessibility and a transparent mechanism for legal and political change. They follow the general constitutional principles protecting human rights, but their protection and enforcement emanate from the ordinary legal process as deemed appropriate by the political regime and the legal institutions. Some of the vulnerabilities of this formal (minimalist) law in transitioning democracies could be the tendency towards injustice like the discriminatory treatment of people based on ethnicity, caste, gender, political affiliation, or religion.

The substantive rule of law emphasizes the mandatory indiscriminate equality, justice, and freedom, political and economic rights, and others. Some of the normative substantive values include the respect for individual or minority rights and other legal
mandates. As for the legal system, substantive rule of law underscores an infrastructure of justness for the universal human good. Examples of the infrastructure include a decorous legislative authority to make laws, diverse ethno-political background of judges to interpret the law, and the professional, better-remunerated judicial service that would guarantee its integrity and independence. Yet all of these issues are major challenges and setbacks for the rule of law in the three East African partner-states.

The Ugandan government has come under increased criticism for the political instability instigated by police. Press reports and election observers have charged that the police and the Ugandan military forces disperse opposition campaign rallies, beat up and detain followers, and sometimes charge the entourage of opposition leaders with treason (Baker 2004). The 2006 Uganda Human Rights report determined that the government also targeted political dissent and imprisoned critics of the regime on terrorism charges. The military violated the political rights and freedoms of citizens by suppressing on the opposition (Baker 2004). This created conditions of insecurity for civilians to freely engage in the electoral process. More than 120 politicians and independent local journalists have been charged with engaging in or supporting terrorism since the Ugandan government passed the 2002 Anti-terrorism Act (Mwenda 2007).

During the past two election cycles in Tanzania in 2000 and 2005, the military police conducted unexpected operations where many citizens believed to be ‘antagonists’ of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi’s (CCM) political process were arbitrarily arrested for several days until after the Elections (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). Tanzanians became agitated by the increased arrest of human rights activists and some journalists in the late 1990s on weak charges of being idle and disorderly. The disintegration of civil order and
collapse of the rule of law increased political dissatisfaction, political violence, and
insecurity (Kaiser 2000a). Press reports alleged that President Benjamin Mkapa’s
government overlooked the situation when the administration of justice was based on
status-quo patronage. The CCM party enjoyed police protection, of the atrocities
committed in line with their political activities (Kaiser 2000b). When some of the CCM
bureaucrats faced criminal charges for extrajudicial killings and corruption, they were set
free by state prosecutors due to ‘lack of evidence.’ One such example occurred during the
2001 general elections at the Tanzanian Island of Pemba when the armed security forces
massacred more than 30 opposition demonstrators who demanded new presidential
elections. Human Rights NGOs gathered eyewitness testimonies about these extrajudicial
killings but the government never pressed charges.

In Kenya in the late 1980s and throughout 1990s, there were reports of
government repression, torture, and detention without trial of civilians who were
regularly picked up by police from their homes. Brown (2003) found that during the
second and third multiparty elections, the opposition supporters suffered constant
episodes of political motivated human rights violations at the hands of KANU politicians.
During this period, dozens of Kenyans were killed and hundreds arrested during the
episodes of ethnic clashes and political violence (Brown 2003). Many of these violent
deaths remained unsolved and the international human rights advocates who attempted to
file these cases in the courts of law were threatened with deportation. For example, two
well known human rights activists, Wangari Maathai and Kivutha Kibwana, were briefly
detained in 2001 by the former president, Daniel Moi. Two years later, Wangari Maathai
and Kivutha Kibwana joined President Mwai Kibaki’s new government with cabinet
posts. Former president Moi’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s used the practice of
detention of suspects without trial (Steeves 2006). President Kibaki also used security
operatives from 2005 to 2008 to shut down news media premises and temporarily
detained journalists.

Even though the EAC partner-states are required by Article 7(2) of the Treaty to
abide by the rule of law and preservation of human rights principles, it is not clear how
the EAC, given the current aberration of principles of good governance and the rule of
law, will promote constitutionalism and democratic rule in the Community. The
challenges for improving the rule of law in the Community seem to be affected by the
pace and scope of democratic rule in the partner-states. In light of the looming but
contested political federation, Kamanyi (2006, p.15) outlined the following necessities
for the restoration of the rule of law in the EAC:

“In the arena of the rule of law, much is left to be desired when it comes to
understanding and respecting the fact that an individual is innocent until
proven guilty; the right not to be imprisoned without trial; and that all
individuals regardless of their status enjoy the same rights before the law,
or that nobody is above the law. The independence of the judiciary needs
to be further secured in the partner states with regard to the terms and
conditions surrounding the appointment of judges that would shield them
from undue and improper personal and political pressure. Dismissal by the
executive undermines the institution of the judiciary. Judges must be
protected against unwarranted removal. The integrity of the judicial
system must be protected and accorded control over its own procedural
and administrative affairs.”

On the issue of media independence, the press and religious institutions make the
most vigilant and influential civil society in most of Africa, including the EAC partner-
states. In a “democratic” society, institutional frameworks such as the independent media
(given the existence of press freedom) help to advocate for conditions pertaining to the
rule of law. In this study, the rule of law is defined as a set of formal and substantive legal projects/codes, institutions, and rules/principles of democratic governance on the one hand. On the other hand, the existence of leaders and bureaucrats must exercise political authority by safeguarding the constitution and respect those rules and rights.

3.4 EAC Media Law and Policy

The rule of law can be sustained if institutions like non-governmental organizations, human rights activists, legal/bar associations, and the news/mass media internalize these rules and inculcate them into the everyday behavior and expectations of citizens. In building the rule of law, institutions like the news media also ought to demand for the legitimacy of the legal institutions, and the regime, and be a watchdog on the administration of justice. However, the existing media laws in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are not conducive for building the rule of law and advocating for good governance.

The amended Article 18 of the Tanzanian Constitution stipulates that every person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. It gives the right to seek and disseminate information, and the right to be informed of various events of importance to society. Since the early 1960s, journalists who exposed abuse of public office by national leaders were prosecuted by those leaders under the 1962 Regions and Regional Commissioners Act and the Area Commissioner Act of 1962 (Martin 1974). These Acts still gave the regional bureaucrats in Tanzania the power to arrest and detain journalists if they suspect a breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility (Sturmer 1998; Kilimwiko 2006).
The Prisons Act of 1967 impedes journalists to investigate and report the conditions of prisoners, even those detained for days or months without the due process. For journalists to avoid repercussion, they have to meet the expectations of the Tanzanian government to educate citizens about entrepreneurship, and contribute to shared national consciousness, identity and continuity. The Tanzanian government also expects all media (radio, television, and newspapers) to publish content which caters for culture, the arts, education pertaining to the state and society (Ramaprasad 2003).

Other legal impediments in Tanzania also prohibit journalists from playing the watchdog role towards public officials. For instance, the 1995 Revenue Authority Act and the 1995 Public Leadership Code of Ethics protects the public holdings of state actors and their personal wealth, which makes the journalists’ job at exposing corruption and tax evasion difficult. Furthermore, the 1989 Civil Service Act forbids government employees to disclose government information in their possession without the express consent of a cabinet minister or their deputy. Finally, publication of information about an illegal or poor conduct of a national leader or senior government official is not protected by the absolute privilege standard (Grosswiler 1997). Furthermore, the burden of proof lies on journalists to prove innocence rather than on plaintiffs to prove guilt of publishing false and malicious information (Sturmer 1998; Grosswiler 1997).

In Kenya, according to veteran independent journalists, throughout the 1990s, there was an absence of favorable media policy, law, and regulation, which undermined media freedom and independence (Mute 2000). The Kibaki government attempted to introduce new laws in 2004 which would produce stronger regulation of the news media. With the existing media policies, investors find it difficult to buy new media titles to start
an independent press in the newspaper and magazine sector due to high registration fees charged by government (Media Institute 2004). The Kenyan government’s Ministry of Information and Communications established a state-regulatory body called the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) by a 1998 Act of Parliament to deal with licensing, regulating and coordinating of telecommunication, TV and radio communication frequencies and equipment. Investors are required to purchase a bond of about USD15,000 to license a newspaper. According to Mute (2000), this also serves as a gag on alternative print media that the government finds suspicious in their political inclination.

The Minister of Internal Security, John Michuki, sanctioned raids on the Standard newspaper and the KTN-TV offices in March 2006 for publishing and broadcasting news stories that undermined the legitimacy of Kibaki’s regime. Four journalists from those news organizations were detained and interrogated without trial. In both Moi’s era and Kibaki’s first term in office, journalists was imprisoned for trivial offences whenever the political elite were exposed in money-laundering schemes and corruption (Matende 2005). In 2007, the CCK attempted to introduce legislation to impose registration with the state of all journalists practicing in Kenya, including editorial management. According to the Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ) and the Kenya Institute of Mass Communication (KIMC), there is an estimated 2,200 local and international journalists who work in the country. Some non-for-profit organizations, such as the Media Council of Kenya, lobby for press freedom and media self-regulation to counter the CCK’s power over the news industry.
The Ugandan media are regulated by the Press and Journalists Act of 1995, the Electronic Media Act of 1996, and the Access to Information Act of 2005. The 1995 Constitution states in Article 29(1) that the news media personnel have a right to freedom of speech and expression. The Ugandan government established a Media Council in 1997 through the Press and Journalists Act of 1995 to regulate mass media and to license journalists with practicing certificates. These certificates are exclusively issued to university degree holders by a statutory journalists’ association called the National Institute of Journalists of Uganda (NIJU). The government justifies the importance of registering media personnel with the professionalization of journalism in Uganda. According to the Media Council, practicing journalists without degrees are not journalists and their work cannot be protected as such even if it is published in a recognized news media outlet. The Media Council has the power to suspend newspapers, reprimand journalists, and restrict information and to adjudicate disputes between the state/public and the news media.

Another law presenting a major challenge to Ugandan journalism is Section 50(1) of the Penal Code Act, which states that anyone who publishes statements deemed false or rumors or which may cause public fear, alarm, and disturbance is guilty of a misdemeanor. With this law, several print and radio journalists in Uganda have faced criminal charges for allegedly printing materials the government deemed seditious (Balikowa 2002). Additionally, the Penal Code was amended in 1998 to include an offence of sectarianism forbidding publication or expression of information which degrades or evokes contempt, alienation, or disaffection based on ethnicity. The 2002 Anti-terrorism Act presents a major daunting challenge for journalists because of the
following two reasons. First, it defines any act of violence or threat of violence as a terrorist act and has been used against political opponents and freedom of the press (Rubongoya 2007; Mwenda 2007). Second, it effectively outlaws coverage of people and organizations declared as terrorists.

3.5 Regime Legitimacy

A regime can be defined as a governing body which determines who can share political power, who is at the center of leadership, and how that relates to the overall structure of the citizenry (Bratton and Mattes 2001). In the following pages and subsequent sections, I examine how regimes use the democratization process and the media to enhance their legitimacy. The term legitimacy in the study entails the notion of popular consent and validation of social trust on those who are custodians of people’s rights and wellbeing. Regime legitimacy, then, refers to how a group of political decision makers gains the right to exercise authority; and performs the basic functions according to government required by the collective needs and mutual interests of society.

Rubongoya (2007, p.14) describes a legitimate regime as one whose members attain political consent among citizens that “existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones.” He reiterates that regime legitimacy is the bedrock of democratic rule and that the regime must function in particular roles and accepted rules expressed in the constitution.

Legitimacy of the regime is also equated with enhanced consensus and ability to sustain expectations of society over the questions of human rights protection. The culture of human rights demands that the legitimacy of a regime be determined by whether or not
the government respects human rights and behaves in accordance with its precepts (van de Walle 2002). In most of Africa, regime legitimacy is based on the implicit assumption that political leaders are responsible for providing economic opportunities to citizens to fend for their families, free from civil strife and unrest (van de Walle 2002). When political leaders behave in a responsible manner by caring for the economically marginalized groups and do not engage in geopolitical nepotism or tribalistic favoritism, they sustain their political legitimacy and stabilize the broader polity (Schatzberg 2001). Research on political identity shows that state actors in East Africa erode their legitimacy if they violate public expectations of not engaging in nepotism. However, in some African societies, political leaders tend to appoint their kinship and reward their elite supporters from the same geopolitical ethnic regions in order to consolidate political ties (Schatzberg 2001).

Regime legitimacy is important to my contention of an East African substantive liberal democracy because it encapsulates what Max Weber in 1918 (Beetham 1974) distinguished as both the substantive and procedural legitimacy. According to Weber, procedural legitimacy refers to the input of a state institution or the way a government conducts its business as expected by its citizens. To be more explicit, this input conforms to the democratic process of, say, electing parliamentarians, then those parliamentarians enact laws and approve social programs, but this is done through consultations with their constituents to achieve legitimacy (Gibson et al. 2005; Jackson and Rosberg 1984). The distinction between input and output legitimacy is also important in this study. The input (procedural) legitimacy describes the manner in which the political leadership carries out its political activities on behalf of citizens.
As for substantive (output) legitimacy, Weber (Beetham 1974) documented that its quality is measured by how the act of government or the political regime is tolerable and sufficient in what it accomplishes under a democratic rule. It is based on what is asked of the citizens or the output of state actors in implementing state obligation while following and respecting the basic principles of the rule of law within a political system. In this case, we would expect the EAC governing body to ensure that the regimes at the state level not only provide the input stipulated here for their legitimacy, but also that the output is reached through guarantees that the rule of law is adhered to and the needs or aspirations of citizens are fulfilled.

Legitimacy is also defined in terms of how the procedures and directives at the national level are recognized by the masses. When citizens evaluate the legitimacy of the regime on political affairs, the government actions on procedures and directives get a nod based on accepted indiscriminate norms (Hayward and Dumbuya 1983). According to them, government decisions are regarded as binding even when they are not the desired courses of action so long as they are bound by the established rule of law. Meanwhile, in a multi-ethnic nation, if the regime is to enjoy both procedural and substantive legitimacy, it must operate under democratic rules that guarantee political accommodation for all its citizens (Nobles 2000; Herbst 1997). They stated that nations which respect the rule of law also defend the judiciary, respect minorities, the independence of congress (parliament), federalism, and empower all ethnic groups with some share of state representation through constitutional protection and decree.

Research shows that elections add value to the notion of regime accountability, while building trust in the state’s institutional purpose. Regime legitimacy then
necessitates the acquisition of power through free and fair elections, in addition to the unconstrained political contestation for all political institutions. Earlier studies show that some African countries have used the democratic transition inadvertently as a way to gain political control and consolidate the regime, while at the same time providing limited political space for opposition parties and civil society interests (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Zafliro 1988). This leads to setbacks to the legitimacy of the regime and validation of its hegemony. There is an ongoing civic education for East Africans conducted by international NGOs such as DENIVA and the International Republican Institute (IRI), and also disseminated through the news media which educates the electorate about the value of political legitimacy. In summary, citizens who access this knowledge learn that the legitimacy of a regime can be determined by evaluating that the manner in which state actors come to power (through free and fair elections) is acceptable and legal under applicable laws.

It is becoming a common theme on Ugandan and Kenyan FM radio networks to hear political talk-show debates assert that citizens should rise up and judge the regime by the degree to which political leaders and all public service institutions deliver on their promises and their ability to manage citizens’ expectations (Mwesige 2004). This theme validates the concept of regime legitimacy in the democratization process of the EAC since it concerns the acceptability of the ruling elite, the state institutions, and its policies by all geopolitical constituents. However, this is still a challenge for the EAC since the ruling state actors can contrive within the democratization constraints to manipulate the constitution to consolidate their political power and legitimacy (Mwenda 2007; Oloka-Onyango 2004).
Political parties are an indispensable fixture of democracies and their liberty and mobilization in Africa is a measure of the regime’s democratic strength (Morrison 2004; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005). Research from Africa and elsewhere shows that political parties are one of the most important instruments of democratization (Aldrich, 1995; Morrison, 2004). Political parties in Africa are an integral part of governance and enhance the quality of democracy and political accountability in a polity by augmenting the representation of different groups and views (Morrison and Hong 2006; Kuenzi and Lambricht 2007). They play a major role in facilitating citizen expression of dissenting views and also contribute to the development of a responsible state and democratic legitimacy. Political parties are essential for establishing sustainable democratic rule in Africa because political participation and democratic competition could be maintained through fragmentation in diverse societies (Morrison and Hong 2006).

In the EAC for instance, this wave of democratization has been facilitated by frequent elections in which political parties and civil society mobilize citizens to participate in democracy, particularly at the local constituencies. In African politics, elections and parties invigorate political contestation and alignments through voting from local to the state or national level, a trend considered similar to the Western voting electoral processes (Lindberg and Morrison 2005). Regular elections and the strengthening of party politics would continue to undercut regime hegemony with its neopatrimonial tendencies through electoral competition and mass mobilization by imposing regime validation and legitimacy (Kuenzi and Lambricht 2007, 2005; Morrison et al. 2006). Despite these positive predictions, there are several setbacks in the way regimes in East Africa claim substantive procedural legitimacy.
First, the news media report that the Kenyan government headed by Kibaki and the Ugandan government under Museveni have not opened up political space well enough for the opposition to contest freely in national elections. The private media in Kenya and Uganda have reported pockets of animosity and opposition in the past two years, indicating that the electorate has not given Kibaki and Museveni the mandate to govern under the existing electoral laws. In multi-ethnic (geopolitical) regions like these partner-states, attaining legitimacy becomes more complicated because the electorate expects the distribution of political power to be equitable for all state institutions including the president’s appointees to cabinet (Jackson and Rosberg 1984). Hence, this study examines whether the East African citizens rate as acceptable both the input and output legitimacy of the EAC.

Some African leaders who claim to have popular national legitimacy use a simple majority of support, which they systematically orchestrate, using ethnic identity and regional sectarianism (Mugisha 2004). This political tactic of regional sectarianism is a pre-colonial legacy used to “divide and rule” the natives who were culturally and politically loyal to the kings and traditional chiefs (Mamdani 1996). East African states cannot pass mantle based solely on a theory that a national election outcome determines regime legitimacy because regional sectarianism determines which individuals receive the best political goods from state leaders. Also, each EAC partner-state is composed of regions with individuals who speak different languages; have clans and ethnicities; and support a range of political beliefs.

Horowitz (2000) argued that building political legitimacy on the majority rule in some of Africa’s multi-ethnic states results in repudiating the reality of ethnic diversity
and legitimacy of plurality. In such circumstances, the rule of one dominant group leads to unjust treatment of the other ‘powerless’ ethnicities. For example, former president Milton Obote’s reign orchestrated the military empowerment of Northern Ugandans, mainly the Langi and the Acholi, who misused their military power by arbitrarily arresting citizens and looting their personal property. Obote was ousted in a 1985 coup by his own military. Former Kenyan president, Daniel arap Moi “ate” the national cake with his ethnic lineage, the Kalenjin, at the bemusement of other citizens from other regions in the country. In both cases, the Moi regime and the Obote II government claimed political legitimacy, yet they subjugated ethnic groups from regions of these countries. Some governments in Eastern Africa with substantive legitimacy engaged in ethnic tyranny and genocide. For example, the government of Burundi orchestrated the massacre of its Hutu citizens in 1972 and the Rwandan government coordinated the butchery of Tutsi citizens (and moderate Hutu) in 1994.

Another dilemma with the legitimacy of the regimes in East Africa is the lack of political accommodation for the opposition and denial of equal political contestation to other political parties. Much of the research on African political leadership from the early 1970s until the early 1990s has consistently shown that presidential hegemony denies legitimacy to organized political competition. Tanzania’s ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has sustained its monopolistic influence on the governing state institutions and encouraged political patronage to achieve legitimacy (Pratt 1999). Proponents of the CCM politics have argued that this dominant party has facilitated the control of ethnic cleavages without incurring a risk of internal discord, which could provoke ethno-regional instability (Pratt 1999).
Rubongoya’s (2007) assumption is that African states, which enforce questionable authority and disregard the rules of power by stifling political contestation and mass mobilization, lose their legitimacy and validation. Meanwhile, some regimes in Africa still enforce hegemony by stripping autonomy from other state organs, such as the judiciary and the state auditor, while state patronage and clientelism become part of the political game (van de Walle 2002). Consequently, a moderate level of liberty, equality, political competition, a strong civic tradition, and the rule of law are necessary ingredients of democratic rule. The following model is a schematic guide to the proposition.
Figure 3.1: Agenda Setting and Agenda Building during Democratization in EAC

Media Performance

Functions in a Democracy
- President usurps political supremacy
- Watchdog over government
- Make officials accountable
- Expose poverty and unemployment
- Expose election irregularities

Legitimacy & Rule of Law
- Unautocratic president
- Independent judiciary
- Economic development
- Legitimate regime
- Uphold human rights

Agenda setting (Media Influence)

Agenda building (Gov’t Influence)

Citizens (Attitudes and Public Agenda)
- Collapse of social welfare and services
- State-inspired social injustice exists
- State is non-democratic
- Violation of human rights
- Failure of State
- Efficient delivery of public service
- Equal rights before the law
- Free and fair elections
- Safeguards for human rights
- Legitimate regime

Figure 1 is a schematic typology of how agenda setting and agenda building will be measured on the notion of issue concerns from media performance, regime legitimacy, and the rule of law. The arrows show the influence of the media on citizens, and the government influence on citizens. It also reflects the attitudes of citizens towards the media and the regime.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

The East African Community (EAC) is located on the eastern coast of Africa and was first formed over 40 years ago by the Republics of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The countries share common borders, Lake Victoria, the Swahili language, and the same ethnicity along the borders. Rwanda and Burundi were accepted into the Community in June 2007. Other countries which form the greater East Africa are Ethiopia and Rwanda. This study is only concerned with the trio which, until recently, formed the EAC. The Permanent Tripartite Commission for East Africa Co-operation was first formed in early 1967 and became the EAC later that year (Katende and Kanyeihamba 1973). They formed it in an effort to achieve regional collaboration through common markets, mutual trust, political will, peaceful co-existence, and good neighborliness (Sircar 1990).

The EAC was dissolved in 1977 due to irreconcilable political differences in governance, economic disparities, and militarism under former dictator Idi Amin (Aseka 2005). The initiative failed for a lack of political will and a resolution to work together. The continued disproportionate sharing of benefits among the Community and their bitter disagreements over human rights violations and the disregard for the rule of law also contributed to their demise (Kaiser and Okumu 2004). The EAC of that time lacked adequate policies to address how modern African states should govern, develop, and cooperate. After a series of mediation talks between Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda that began in 1984, the heads of state signed an agreement to equitably divide the assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC (Kaiser and Okumu 2004).
In 1990, the trio called for the restoration of their former tripartite agreement to strengthen their economic, social, cultural, political, and sustainable development in an effort to foster and to promote the shared interests of East Africans (Aseka 2005). The heads of state set the bar high by calling for peaceful settlement of political and ethnic conflicts between and within each partner-state and attaining a monetary currency for the union and ultimately a political federation.

The creation of the EAC entity was a good idea but it faced a myriad of intangibles which looked good in theory but unachievable in practice (Aseka 2005; Kaiser et al. 2004). For instance, Article 6 of the treaty establishing the EAC declares that one of the fundamental principles that govern the partner-states includes:

“Good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”

In 1999, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was signed. The EAC was revived and regional partnership was set in full gear with the declaration of the EAC Treaty. The treaty was approved in 2000 by the heads of state of the partner-states. During the last seven years, the EAC Legislative Assembly was established. Since then, the EAC has established its own Legislative Assembly, issued a common passport for the citizens of the member states, and approved a new flag. By the end of 2006, the EAC had 110 million people and a combined GDP of $40 billion. During the EAC Heads of State Summit in 2007, the leaders stated that with a larger population and a combined GDP, this could stimulate further economic growth and
alleviate poverty through permanent regional common markets. The tripartite was a sure way to get triad once again and to put their past differences and hostility to rest.

In 2007, the EAC Council of Ministers and the EAC Secretariat tabled six options for the Community’s anthem for consideration in each of the partner-states. In 2007, Rwanda and Burundi were admitted to the community. In the meantime, there has been an on-going debate about the election of a common president under universal suffrage by 2013 and who would have political and executive power.

While the creation of the EAC is a good idea to some scholars, they argue that it rests upon theoretically sound but practically unachievable premises (Aseka 2005; Kaise and Okumu 2004). For example, the establishment of a political federation could cause further political volatility because of the variations in the military, judicial, and economic status of each country. Table 1 in chapter 4.2 below illustrates these and other variations within the EAC countries.

4.1 Why Compare these EAC Partner-States?

Comparative research offers unique learning prospects about the interaction of states within the international order as interstate politics, multilateral trade and business, mass communication, among other variables, foster deep global connections (Joseph et al. 2000). It has been demonstrated in Esser and Pfetch (2004) that only a cross-national perspective can enhance understanding of the imperatives that are taken for granted within one particular system. Accordingly, it is important to assess news media performance and democratic headway in the three partner-states because of the nature of the EAC formation and polity within each state.
The United Republic of Tanzania is the largest country in East Africa and it borders Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, and three others. The union government exercises state authority and controls mainland Tanzania and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. The government of President Julius Nyerere introduced a political system of procedural multi-party democracy in 1992. Tanzania has five major provinces and the following are the largest areas in population size: Mwanza, Shinyanga, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Kagera, Dodoma, Iringa, Tanga, and Kilimanjaro. About 77 percent of the population lives in the rural areas (NBS 2003). Tanzania’s estimated GDP per capita is US$390 in 2003 and 36 percent of the population lives below poverty the poverty line.

In Kenya, the eight provincial administrative regions have a total population of about 33.5 million (CBS 2005), Western, Central, Eastern, North Eastern, Coast, Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Nairobi Area. There are 42 ethnic groups in Kenya. Moi ruled under a one-party political system and the ruling party was called the Kenya African National Union (KANU). In 1992, the government repealed Section 2A of the Constitution to open up multi-party politics. KANU party had ruled for a total of 39 years before a coalition of political parties called the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), led by Mwai Kibaki, ousted it in 2002.

Uganda is divided into five regions, which are split into 79 administrative districts, central, north, east, west and southern. These regions contain 13 indigenous ethnic groups, which make up roughly 93% of the country’s population. The 2002 National Census report found that the largest ethnic group is the Baganda people from Buganda located in half of the central and southern areas. They make up 18% of the population. The name of the country – Uganda – originates from the Buganda ethnic
region and the capital city is also located in this region. Ugandans speak dozens of local
dialects but English became the official language in 1962. It is used in offices to conduct
government business, in the education system, in parliamentary plenary and caucus
proceedings, in the courts of law, and by the mainstream national media. Swahili is also
widely spoken and is used as a language of regional trade in the East African region.

4.2  EAC Economies and Regional Integration

The existence of the EAC has contributed significantly to the strength of a
common economic bloc through the East Africa Customs Union. The next phase of the
economic integration being pursued in 2007 is the creation of a common currency, which
will be handled by the finance ministers of each member state, the East African
Legislative Assembly, and the Central Banks governors. In their quest to help the EAC
countries achieve monetary integration, the Central Banks are also faced with the
challenge of promoting convertibility of their currencies amid low volume of cross-
border trade and investment flows (Podpiera and Cihai 2005).

The 2004 regional summit unveiled that in 2003, the EAC Common Market
boasted a combined population of 95 million and a total GDP of more than USD32
billion U.S. dollars. Economists argue that the progress towards the harmonization of
monetary and fiscal policy in the EAC is hampered by disparities in measuring and
computing macroeconomic indicators such as inflation (Goldstein and Ndung’u 2003).
Governors of the Central Banks and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of
Finance are examining indicators which would allow a more accurate comparison of
economic development and fiscal discipline. Economic disparities make it difficult to
compare and harmonize micro and macroeconomic performance across partner-states. Sahn and Younger (2004) argued that the regional body must consider resolving the national structure and role of the banking institutions, taxation policies, financial sector reforms, and then focus on stabilizing the macroeconomic environment among the partner-states.

In consideration of converting the partner-states' currencies, economists have proposed that the EAC enhance wage and price flexibility, equitably strengthen the financial sectors of partner-states, and harmonize monetary policy under a common monetary arrangement. All these factors challenge the establishment of a single East African currency. For instance, Tanzania is the poorest of the three member states. The 2005 IMF estimated that Tanzania’s purchasing power per capita was USD733, which is much lower than Kenya’s (USD1,455) and Uganda's (USD1,780).

The purchasing power parity calculates the income versus the cost of living in a country compared to that abroad (Holmes 2000), which allows for comparing the standards of living of two or more countries. Kenya, on the other hand, has the largest economy in the region although Uganda has experienced faster growth in the past 12 years. The Africa Development Bank estimated in 2007 that Kenya’s share of the regional GDP declined from 37% to 33%, while that of Uganda’s grew from 23% to 32% and Tanzania remained fairly constant at 27%. The challenge here is that an economic disparity and lack of social capital in one of the states could trigger an onslaught of labor forces towards a better economy of another member state.
### TABLE 4.1: EAC Partner-state Comparison: Social and Economic Indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>TANZANIA</th>
<th>UGANDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>Male = 78.9</td>
<td>Male = 78.7</td>
<td>Male = 77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female = 70.2</td>
<td>Female = 62.4</td>
<td>Female = 58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
<td>Male = 51 yrs</td>
<td>Male = 47 yrs</td>
<td>Male = 48 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female = 50 yrs</td>
<td>Female = 50 yrs</td>
<td>Female = 51 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Access to Water</td>
<td>Urban = 89</td>
<td>Urban = 92</td>
<td>Urban = 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural = 46</td>
<td>Rural = 62</td>
<td>Rural = 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy: Access to Electricity</td>
<td>Urban = 47.3</td>
<td>Urban = 27.3</td>
<td>Urban = 43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural = 4.3</td>
<td>Rural = 1.1</td>
<td>Rural = 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture: Crop Produce</td>
<td>GDP %age = 23</td>
<td>GDP %age = 42</td>
<td>GDP %age = 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self-Employed</td>
<td>Male = 49</td>
<td>Male = 53</td>
<td>Male = 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female = 38</td>
<td>Female = 39</td>
<td>Female = 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wage &amp; Salaried</td>
<td>Male = 33</td>
<td>Male = 29</td>
<td>Male = 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female = 18</td>
<td>Female = 12</td>
<td>Female = 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agricultural Labor</td>
<td>Male = 59.8</td>
<td>Male = 80.2</td>
<td>Male = 60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female = 50.3</td>
<td>Female = 84.0</td>
<td>Female = 77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Youth Unemployment</td>
<td>Overall = 34</td>
<td>Overall = 40</td>
<td>Overall = 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Data are drawn from the national Bureau of Statistics (or National Statistics System) of each country, and from the national archives and population secretariat/bureau of each country.
- The scores are reported in percent (%), unless indicated otherwise.
The data in Table 1 show significant differences in the scores of the three countries. History accounts for some of the variability. Uganda emerged from a long period of civil conflict and numerous coup d’états, while Tanzania was a socialist philosophy under President Julius Nyerere and Ali Hassan Mwinyi. But during President Mwinyi’s reign, Tanzania liberalized its economy and joined capitalism. Kenya suffered a prolonged regime of monocracy and absolutism under President Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi.

Meanwhile, a 2007 World Bank study of 178 countries’ investment climate gave a different overview of the member states and demonstrated that the broader economic environment in East Africa remains backward and volatile. The rankings consider 10 aspects as crucial for providing a transnational investment environment. These aspects dealt with the ease of: starting a business, dealing with commercial licenses, employing workers, property registration, tax payment, getting credit, contracts enforcement, trading across borders, investor protection, and closing a business. Uganda ranked 91st, Uganda placed at 118th, and Tanzania was 130th. Rwanda, the new EAC member, was the only African country listed in the global top 20 in the study.

4.3 EAC Political Federation?

A recent public opinion poll by the Steadman Group 2007 found that 46 percent of Dar-es-Salaam residents are opposed to the existence of the EAC. That poll randomly sampled 500 residents in the three partner-states whether metro citizens were aware of the community, its purpose, and whether they favored its existence. The fast tracking of the EAC political federation, harmonization of the monetary and fiscal policy, all in
2007, generated debate among citizens of the Community and within the National Assemblies. The Steadman Group found that 89 percent of East Africans in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Nairobi (Kenya), and Kampala (Uganda) were aware of the regional body. Nairobi residents were more enlightened about the existence of the regional body, at 91 percent, followed by Uganda and Tanzania at 89 percent each. The poll also indicated that citizens were doubtful about the EAC’s ability to build national economies and state societies, including the rule of law, peace, and stability.

Other polls from Infotrak, the Target Group Index by Consumer Insight, and the Harris Poll in Rochester in New York showed that East Africans expressed reservations towards the ambitions of the member-states leaders and the federal political viability of the regional body. These opinion polls seek to provide systematic and randomized public perceptions on questions concerning, social, political, economic and cultural issues. The polls conducted in 2007 found that 80 percent of Tanzanians are against a fast-track approach toward the political federation, compared to 75 percent of Ugandans and 62 percent of Kenyans who support it.

Power and regional authority would be shared between the union government and the national governments. Meanwhile, most letters to the editors in the East African newspapers and on the talk show political debates have expressed reservations towards forming a political federation. There are also suspicions among the political leadership within member states. Among residents of three major East African cities mentioned earlier, 46 percent are doubtful about the importance of this political federation to the formation of a viable and robust civil society essential for protecting and promoting democracy and good governance. These findings come against a backdrop of advanced
initiatives by the presidents of the member states to establish a federation with one
president.

The member-states are moving fast towards achieving a political federation. The
treaty stipulates that the community forms a union government with central authority,
while retaining its autonomy and distinctiveness in the regional sphere. The treaty does
not clearly define and characterize what a political federation of the EAC would
eventually be and what shape and form it should take (Kasaija 2004). In theory, a
political federation is a union of independent nation states under a federal government,
with common political objectives and a shared political jurisdiction (Mukandala 2000).
Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni argues that the EAC political federation is fast-
trapped to elect a federal president and parliament by 2013 to promote political stability
and eliminate tribalism in the region (Kasaija 2004).

Some Tanzanian and Kenyan lawmakers have been quoted in their respective
local radio talk-shows that Uganda is using its new found oil in the Albertine region as a
major negotiating tool for the fast-tracking of the political federation. Skeptics of the
political federation argue that Uganda is boldly optimistic that it can easily pay its way
through whatever regional ambitions it may have, due to its imminent wealth of oil
revenue. But the Ugandan president said during the June 2007 EAC Summit that the
motive behind his push for a political federation is to see positive adjustments in the
socioeconomic responsibility and political dynamics which improve the welfare of all its
citizens. The extraordinary summit in August 2007 chaired by Ugandan President,
Museveni agreed to delay the political federation and instead work faster to establish a
common market and a monetary union by 2012. Museveni proposed a double-track
process where those who are ready could move forward with the political integration while all partner-states collectively pursue the elements of economic integration.

The subsequent literature on democratic rule in each of the partner-states reflects the political impediments which confront civil society, state institutions such as the judiciary, media performance, and the entire democratization process. In addition, this EAC re-unification still carries some political, intergovernmental and socioeconomic huddles. The major challenge facing the future of the East African political federation is the variation in the rule of law, civil liberties, the fragility of political contestation and media advocacy to educate citizens their political rights and civic duties.

Uganda emerged from a period of prolonged civil conflict and numerous coup de tats while Tanzania emerged from a socialist philosophy. Their counterpart Kenya suffered a prolonged regime of ‘life presidency’ hegemony. The subsequent narrative will show that the current heads of state are not necessarily political bedfellows. For instance, each country has a unique political culture, ideology and regime orientations, which sometimes contradicts the common political, economic, judicial, and administrative goals of regional cooperation (Kaiser and Okumu 2004). Table 2 below illuminates some of these differences in the rule of law, civil liberties, the fragility of political contestation, and other democratic rule pointers of the three countries.
TABLE 4.2: EAC Partner-state Comparison: Democratic Rule Indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>TANZANIA</th>
<th>UGANDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Independence</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Human Rights</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for Physical Rights</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticorruption</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Accountability</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Process</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning of Government</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Elections</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Elections</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Political Rights</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The scores in Table 2 are based on a scale of 0 to 10. The weakest performance equals 0 and the strongest equals 10.
- Data are drawn from a variety of sources including: Freedom House Index; Economist Intelligence Unit (democracy index); Ibrahim Index of African Governance index; and The Africa Barometer.

Media reports also speculate that the transition stage of the EAC is regarded as a period of political uncertainty, burdened with distrust, disregard for the rule of law, state-
inspired conflicts, and the risk of reversion. I expect that media performance in each EAC
partner-state could be grounded on the premise that political news content about
democratic rule has an accessory role through both agenda-building and agenda setting.
In East Africa, the question of how the news media set the public agenda to facilitate
political debate is imperative. Are the media perceived as simply messengers who defend
dominant partisan interests based on ownership bias? Are they perceived as responsible
institutions which provide political information about the national affairs that offer
balanced political alternatives? This endeavor explores these questions based on the
traditional theoretical propositions of agenda building and agenda setting.
CHAPTER FIVE

GEOPOLITICAL SECTARIANISM

In some postcolonial African states, politicians who seek national power use all means to attain it, including ethno-regional appeals (Alcoff 2006). Research that has focused on identity politics in Africa has emphasized that ethnicity is one of the main criterion by which sociopolitical groups are characterized and defined in ethnic-diverse nations (Jackson and Rosberg 1984; Connolly 2002). Others scholars such as Berman (1998) and Cornell (2000) have argued that political elites politicize ethnicity and sectarianism as a major inspiration for their decision to contest in order to influence the state and secure a share of the national resources for their regions.

When ethnicity is labeled by the state or a legal mandate, it competes and overlaps with several characteristics of identity; such as language, culture or the shared history. These labeled attributes, based on physical and geographic identification, do not necessarily describe a person’s true ethnicity because they are not subject to alteration or conversion at any given time (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Furthermore, ethnic characterization must be based on objectivity because subjective ethnicity is detrimental to the principles of governance (Nyang’oro 2004). It is important to emphasize that ethnic structures do not necessarily determine or indicate behavior. Behavior may be symptomatic of multi-polar settings which create fragmentation due to polarization from either internal or external forces (Young 1998). Ethnic polarization can emerge when political actors employ divisive tactics or are
responsible for inequality along fault lines of geography, caste, gender, kinship, and religion (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Connolly (2002) found that many African leaders in previous regimes engaged in politics of injustice based on regional economic imbalance and misallocation of resources, which gave rise to the geopolitical construction of regional identity. It is such regimes that the neglected citizens yearned to remove, but their politics were sustained because the opposition advanced the argument of ethno-regional imbalance and declared that they were themselves victims of such oppressive structures. Fraser (1997) pointed out that the replication of sectarian politicking during the third wave of democratization shaped religious and ethnic cleavages both at the national and regional level.

Historians contend that ethnic grouping in Africa as a political tool is quintessentially a colonial legacy, which was used to divide-and-rule, control, and diffuse the administratively cohesive kingdoms/empires and their resources (Mamdani 1997). Western European colonizers readjusted the cohesive African Kingdoms into distinctive clusters by introducing administrative units they subsequently identified in ethnic, religious, or tribal terms. Since independence, the differential exposure to colonial order and incorporation into ethnic cleavages by Europeans set the stage for political opportunism punctuated by ethno-regional inequalities and discord (Gyimah-Boadi and Asante 2006).

In East Africa, one can argue that political actors use tactics such as ethno-political isolationism and other political hyperbole via the media to get people to judge them favorably while judging others harshly. We look at cases of geopolitical
sectarianism in the following pages from Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania.

5.1 Geopolitics in Uganda

Uganda is a multi-ethnic society with over 40 ethnic groups and dialects. These groups have a multiplicity of internal divisions based on religion, class, gender, and others. In terms of religion, Uganda has historically been comprised of Christians, Muslims, and traditionalists. In 1890, hostilities erupted between the Muslims from and the Ugandan supporters of the European Missionaries who brought Christianity to the kingdom (Kabwegyere 1974). In the early 1900, a civil war broke out between Protestants, Catholics, and traditionalists, which was instigated by British Christians of the Anglican Church (Kabwegyere 1974). The Anglicans broke away from Catholicism to introduce the Church of Uganda or the Protestants. When the British Christians won that war, the protestant chiefs were empowered by the British protectors (colonizers) and those Chiefs ruled in almost all divisions and counties of Buganda (Allen 1968). This historical background is important to the literature because it explains the beginning to sectarianism in Uganda’s struggle for power and supremacy.

Besides the numerous religions which led to hostile factionalism in the early 19th century, the colonizers found some well established indigenous political structures such as the Kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, Ankole, Bunyoro, and Busoga. When the British set boundaries which later established the Uganda territory, overtime they also empowered the Kingdom of Buganda as the most dominant and strategic region for the central authority and management of the colony (Kabwegyere 1974). The British colonizers deliberately recruited the people of Buganda Kingdom (Baganda) for the civil service in a
political tactic that was labeled divide-and-rule (Kasfir 1976). During that time, the northern groups were largely recruited into the army while the south-westerners and westerners were kept at bay to keep livestock and grow crops (Hansen 1977).

The leaders within the Kingdom of Buganda collaborated with the British in their occupation and the British Monarchy built up the Southern-Central region of Buganda as the largest, richest, most coherent, and most assertive political entity in the country as a payback for their loyalty (Kasfir 1976). This did not augur well with other regions, such as Lango and Toro, which resisted Buganda’s total authority and supremacy in the political arena. Geopolitical sectarianism became a central factor in post-colonial Uganda and ethnic dissonance increased when the army, dominated by northerners and led by Brigadier Idi Amin, attacked Buganda Kingdom in 1967 and forced King Edward Mutesa into exile (Kasfir 1976).

During the early founding of political organizations in the 1950s, the British allowed native Ugandans to set up political parties but they were largely linked with religious and ethnic affiliations (Kabwegyere 1974). In 1956 for example, the German Christian Democrats helped local civil activists who were predominantly Catholic, to form the Democratic Party (DP). DP mobilized support and grassroots networks along regional cleavages in central and eastern Uganda (Allen 1968). Two years later, the Anglican Church missionaries provided enormous support to a Milton Obote to create the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), which drew support predominantly from Protestants and established its grassroots networks in Southwest and Northern Uganda (Allen 1968). Even as recently as the early 1980s after the fall of Idi Amin, political parties mobilized the faithful on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and regionalism to get votes.
When General Yoweri Museveni fought guerilla warfare and captured power from Major General Tito Okello Lutwa in 1986, one of his National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) manifestos was to eliminate ethnic and religious divisions in Uganda. Museveni devoted most of his efforts in the first years of his presidency to developing a sense of national identity around a shared goal of stability and poverty reduction. In the late 1980s, Museveni made a case to citizens, civil society, and international donors that the conduct and actions of multiparty politics worsened conflicts and wasted opportunities of uniting to confront socioeconomic underdevelopment (Museveni 1997). Museveni has persistently stated that the British colonizers were architects of identity formation in Africa and fostered ethnic sectarianism and political repression. A message on the Ugandan State House website has a presidential statement that reads as follows:

“Long before colonialism, our communities had evolved a very sophisticated civilization in terms of language, culture and governance. The only great weakness of our traditional rulers was their inability to get together to confront the foreign invaders when they came to this area after 1850 AD. Once the foreigners had taken over this area, they planted a new seed of poison. Both Islam and Christianity were introduced, whose intolerance and narrow-mindedness were in marked contrast with the practices of these areas of ours, whose characteristic was symbiosis. Seeds of sectarianism involving Catholics, Protestants and Moslems were planted so much that when the political parties started in the 1950s, they automatically took on the character of that sectarianism. DP [Democratic Party] was for the Catholics, UPC [Uganda People’s Congress] for the Protestants and KY [Kabaka Yekka] for only Baganda. The British, before they left in 1962, organized the first multi-party elections in 1961 and 1962, which were badly organized, and by 1966 the regime had collapsed. This sectarianism was, partly, responsible for the coming into power of [Idd] Amin and for his stay in power for 8 years.” (Speech by President Yoweri Museveni: July 26, 2005)

Ethnic sectarianism manifested as a campaign tool used for political competition and state influence in East African regions instead of being a contest based on uplifting
the citizenry and nation-building like in Western democracies. In the 1980s, political parties in Uganda organized based on regional and religious interests, despite 70 percent of the population being peasant farmers and unemployed citizens. In other words, the central characteristic of the political party orientation and agenda was not based on social class, as one would expect. From this social class dilemma, political elites engaged in sectarianism which gave rise to the formation of patronage perpetuated by swindling state resources. Political leaders swindled state resources through revenue barreling, rent-seeking, and corruption; and the plunder was distributed among their regional kinfolk (Hayward et al. 1983).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Museveni and his government imposed legal restrictions on multiparty activities in order to suppress political dissent. In the 1990s, Museveni outlawed most activities related to political parties, such as electing party leaders and cadres, operating division offices, and holding rallies and member conferences (Mugisha, 2004). A new constitution was even promulgated with restrictions on political parties. Museveni’s early argument was that a return to the multiparty democracy of the late 1960s and early 1980s was bound to be a return to the ruthless days of ethnic politics, sectarianism, and dictatorship.

Meanwhile, the political culture under a “one-party” NRM regime continued to fuel ethnic and religious sentiments. Politicians seeking public offices from constituents to join parliament or the district leaderships polarized regions for political gains (Mwenda 2007; Rubongoya 2007). They instigated hatred by exploiting voters with the sectarian card of nepotism, arguing that other political contenders would commit religious persecution and marginalize them (Rubongoya 2007). What is also visible in the 20 years
of Museveni’s rule is the deprivation of basic social services in education, health, and economic marginalization in the northeastern and northwestern regions. For example, Moroto is the poorest region in Uganda and the district also suffers from persistent internal and cross-border conflicts. The Karamojong are pastoralists who are also involved in cattle raiding using automatic weapons. There is also a perception that the western and southwestern regions (where President Museveni hails) have benefited from the NRM regime more than other regions in terms of political/civil appointments and commercial investments.

One of the major disputes that has tainted the political culture in Uganda is the competition for control of the state between the military, who participate in civilian governance, and the civilian political elite who oppose the status quo. The fact that Museveni is a military general who allows his commanders to serve in cabinet, in parliament, and other state institutions generates disconformities to democratic values. Two army generals have been at the helm of the Uganda Police force as Inspector General in the last 10 years. The army generals have militarized the Uganda Police. Between 2005 and 2007, the government conducted illegal suppression of civilian protests by having army officers wear police uniforms, to disguise as law enforcement officers (Rubongoya 2007).

On November 25, 2005, the privately-owned independent newspaper The Daily Monitor published photos of two Military Special Forces wearing police uniforms alongside earlier photos when they were clad in army attire. The Uganda Police spokesman Assuman Mugenyi explained later at a news conference that it was because of the nature of the assignment at that time made the antiterrorist military group wear police
uniforms. The army officers had been deployed to quell civilians protest and mass riots which had spread throughout the capital city after the government had arrested the main opposition politician, Dr. Kizza Besigye. The government deployed thousands of police and special force military with ammunition onto the streets, leaving some parts of Kampala and other towns like a battered battle zone.

At the beginning of 2008, four opposition members of parliament expressed discontent over the government’s biased job appointment policy. They told a parliament caucus meeting that the regime undermines harmony in the country and demanded that Museveni reviews the national appointment policy as part of wider efforts to curb sectarianism. They presented compelling evidence of more than 70 percent of the top government agencies that are headed by people from the president’s western region. The members of parliament said that such ethno-political favoritism and nepotism undermined nationalism, worsened regional imbalances and promoted discontent. Museveni dismissed the assertions as allegations and never agreed to investigate the matter.

5.2 Geopolitics in Kenya

At least five large ethnic groups account for 70 percent of the Kenyan population: the Kikuyu ethnic group is the largest with about 21 percent of the population, the Kalenjin is the second largest but not significantly bigger than the Luhya, the Luo, and the Kamba. These latter groups have an average population of about 13 percent (Central Bureau of Statistics 2002). Other groups are Mijikenda, Kisii and Meru, which account for about 20 percent of the total population. Some of these ethnic groups are structured
within the major provinces as the primary form of alliance or coalition for recognition and political competition. For instance, Kenya has had three presidents since independence, two of whom were Kikuyu: Jomo Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki.

The second president, Daniel Toroitich Moi, was a Kalenjin and his grip on power was uninterrupted for 24 years because he tactfully fanned the anti-Kikuyu sentiment (Steeves 2006). The Kikuyu ethnic group is strategically located in the central and Nairobi provinces, the central seat of the government business. In the early 1970s, political emissaries of former president, Kenyatta and cabinet members used to insinuate that only Kikuyu women can give birth to Kenyan presidents (Brown 2004). This created discord from other regions, agitation regarding the Kikuyu hegemony, and perceptions that the consolidation of substantive democracy places all political benefits to the strategically-located Nairobi province with its majority Kikuyu ethnic group (Steeves 2006; Brown 2004).

During the colonial days, many people continued to perceive social injustices and regional parochialism as responsible for the underdevelopment and economic woes afflicting them and their societies (Ruteere 2006; Ihonvbere 1994). For example, the disproportionate control of the manufacturing industry by the minority Asian community (less than 2 percent) is considered by contemporary political candidates deplorable and detrimental for the national economic landscape. While Asians have contributed considerably to the development of the Kenyan economy since independence, the persistent subdued participation in mainstream entrepreneurial and manufacturing industry by the indigenous citizens is a major source of political rhetoric which is fanning ethno-political conflicts (Orvis 2006).
The Kikuyu is not only the largest ethnic group centrally located, but it is also the richest (Orvis 2006). Politicians and their kinship in Kenya have increasingly become more militant and influential in shaping and imposing their sectarian ethnic agenda (Ruteere 2006). Previous case studies have demonstrated political and economic favoritism toward the Kikuyu ethnic group in both receiving government personnel appointments and lucrative government tenders (Murunga 2006; Holmquist 2005). Consequently, political parties further their platform on sectarian ethnic politics by building alliances with the economically deprived minority to outbid the large ethnic groups.

This political tactic is based on what a minority ethnic group brings into the political coalition to increase the potential of winning an election, but not on how inclusive or accommodative the candidates are to the diverse ethnic interests of their electorate. Although Kenya is regarded as one of the most developed and stable countries in Eastern Africa, the December 2007 general elections exposed its ethnic enigma and susceptibility. The main opposition leader Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party is a Luo, while the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU), is a Kikuyu. Other ethnic groups including the Luo claim to be marginalized by the Kikuyu elite, who have dominated the trade/manufacturing sector and politics since Kenya attained its independence in 1963 (Hughes 2005; Brown 2004). The opposition parties, especially the ODM, have accused Kibaki’s government of continuing the former president Moi’s legacy of nepotism (Steeves 2006). As a result of the regional economic imbalance during Moi’s blanket use of patronage, the ethno-
marginalization punctuated by a culture of corruption plunged Kenya into an economic crisis.

In Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi for instance, the heads of state declared in the late 1990s that multiparty politics elevates sectarianism based on ethnic or religious identity and that a single-party political system would guarantee nation-building and national unity. During the EAC Summit of 2007, the heads of state committed to eliminating the use of ethno-political contestation at the constituent level because it undermined regional integration at the expense of the underprivileged people. The discord inherent in geopolitical sectarian formations, particularly in Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and Burundi epitomized the questions of power sharing and the demands for political accommodation and self-determination (Mukandala 2000). The legitimacy of these governments was measured by the accessibility to state resources by all rival groups notwithstanding their geopolitical characteristics (Mukandala 2000). Also, when the head of state designates the cabinet portfolios that make up the national political power, the legitimacy of which government is measured by the conspicuous equitable appointment of the cabinet members between competing ethnicities.

During Moi’s reign in Kenya and Obote’s rule in Uganda, sectionalism and ethno-regional mobilization dominated party politics at both the national and regional levels (Kanyinga et al. 1994; Miles and Rochefort 1991). Politicians resorted to exclusionary ethnic or religious appeals, patronage and social class in order to compete for the allocation of scarce resources (Kanyinga et al. 1994). While Moi built patronage and advanced the wellbeing of the Kalenjin, the Kibaki government favored his kinsmen, the Kikuyu, at the expense of more than 30 other ethnic groups (Steeves 2006). The ODM
party took advantage and politicized the frustrations of most Kenyans and mobilized some political elite of the marginalized ethnic groups to join the opposition. In the December 2007 elections in Kenya, the voting outcome between the ODM and PNU was split along ethnicity. Periods of election violence and sporadic turbulence erupted during and after the elections. The election violence was triggered when voters and bystanders clashed with police personnel upon their arrival because voters thought the law enforcement officers had planned to rig the election. Several policemen were killed across the country and dozens were injured in separate violent mob assaults in central and western Kenya.

The Kenyan press reported that the opposition party supporters vowed to shed blood should Odinga lose the elections. They pulled out and sharpened machetes on the tarmac and rocks when the Electoral Commission of Kenya postponed election results for another day. Anger and violence broke out when allegations of election-rigging spread across the country. Soon after the elections, more ethno-political conflicts erupted in major towns across the country when the incumbent was declared a winner. In the capital Nairobi, the media reported that some opposition supporters, mainly non-Kikuyu but identified as ODM Youth Brigade, attacked some slums and residential estates and stoned several Kikuyu residents.

In the Mathare and Kibera slums of Nairobi, the opposition party sympathizers burned down kiosks that they said belonged to Kikuyu retail traders. The Kenyan police shot and killed dozens of protestors. Sympathizers of Kibaki and his PNU party comprised mainly of the Kikuyu ethnic group, who deployed vigilantes to patrol their neighborhoods in response to the threats from the ODM supporters. Rioting spread
across the country, particularly in the western town of Kisumu, an opposition stronghold. In Nairobi, the Kenya Television Network (KTN) reported on December 31, 2007 that police patrolled residential neighborhoods while announcing on loudspeakers that they would shoot dead anyone found loitering on the streets. Amidst all of the political mayhem, much of the fighting pitched Odinga’s Luo group against Kikuyu group of President Kibaki. Amidst all of this mayhem, the Minister of Information, John Michuki banned live broadcasts and threatened journalists who criticized the Electoral Commission and the government for the election violence.

5.3 Geopolitics in Tanzania

There are more than 120 ethnic groups and languages in Tanzania. Some of the major ethnic groups are the Sukuma, Chagga, Yaho, Nyamwezi, Haya, Makonde, Makua, Luo and Masai. The Luo are in western Tanzania and southwestern Kenya. Tanzania also has the largest concentration of citizens of the Middle Eastern decent (Arabs) and Shirazi (from Persian) in East Africa. Religion plays a big role in Tanzania’s politics, especially on the Zanzibar archipelago, which accommodates the biggest concentration of Tanzanian Muslims. The country is divided between 50 percent Christians and 38 percent Muslims, while about 12 percent identify themselves as traditionalists (National Census of Tanzania 1999). The western and northern regions are predominantly Christian whereas the southern regions, Zanzibar, and most provinces along the Eastern Coast are predominantly Muslim.

During the colonial era from the early 1900 until the mid 1950s, their policies of divide and rule in Tanganyika and Zanzibar (which is the contemporary Tanzania) had
created divisions within the communities on the basis of racial or ethnic consciousness. According to Campbell (1999), this escalation of ethnic identification and the partitioning of land/regions resulted in the establishment of ethnic groupings. Over twenty ethno-political associations were formed in the early 19th century (Campbell 1999; Miguel 2004). Some of the strongest ethno-political groups of that time that were allowed to function by the colonizers included the Shirazi, the Indian, African, and the Arab associations (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2005). These ethno-political associations fought for the interest of their kinship, but consequently, they came together to form the racial nationalist political parties which contributed to the demise of colonial hegemony.

Shortly after independence, political organizations were also formed along racial lines (Mazrui 1971). The African National Congress (ANC) became a party of the indigenous Africans which segregated non-African political aspirants whereas the All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) was a Muslim religious party (Lodhi 1994). The United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was formed as a party for the people of European decent (Mazrui 1971). However, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius Nyerere among others, called for a rejection of ethnic identities and made all efforts to unite all ethnic, racial and religious groups.

Tanzania has been ruled by only one party since the country attained independence in 1961. The first president of Tanzania and “father of the nation,” Julius Nyerere introduced multiparty politics in 1992, but his Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has controlled state power and sustained the regime’s grip on power for over 30 years. In the 1980s, Nyerere reified regional identities with public policies which supported national unity, while his political disciple, Museveni (a Tanzania-educated
freedom fighter), also eschewed the politics of sectarianism in Uganda and advocated for political inclusiveness. When Nyerere stepped down as president in 1985 and introduced procedural democracy of regular presidential and parliamentary elections, he was regarded as a statesman and a nationalist throughout Africa. Nyerere fostered a sense of nationalism in Tanzania and encouraged East Africans to give legitimacy to only governments which allowed political reconciliation, national representation, and accountability.

When Nyerere allowed multiparty politics in the 1990s, the composition of most political parties at that time was multiethnic, yet the high levels of ethnic fragmentation did not persuade the independent candidates to run against the deliberate CCM policies of nation-building. Due to this multi-ethnic composition of most political parties including the ruling CCM, ethnic and regional equal representation have characterized the civil service and the cabinet of all the successive governments. Nyang’oro (2004) underscored these efforts of nation-building explaining that the egalitarian policies of the first 20 years of Nyerere’s reign treated regional and ethnic groups equally in the provision of basic necessities such as education, health, water. Another important consideration on this issue of national unity is the fact that there were no acute income inequalities between individuals and regions 20 years after independence.

The nation-building effort helped the regime and its institutions accomplish pacification policies supportive of political inclusiveness, civic participation and national unity (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2005). Opposition politicians, who were concerned about regional factionalism and inequality, have also resisted the fueling of ethno-regional sentiments by raising the politics of social imbalance (Mushi 2001). As a result,
the CMM has been quite successful at embracing the politics of inclusiveness by giving cabinet portfolios and institutional sector representation to all major ethnic groups.

Geopolitical sectarianism in Tanzania is not based on ethnicity unlike some other African states, because none of the 120 ethnic groups is politically or demographically dominant (Hyden 1999). Factionalism in Tanzania was perpetuated by state actors by shifting patronage groups, based on clientelistic relations, and became increasingly polarized into regional sects (Hyden 1999). Media reports indicate that the major factional groups which have emerged include the Muslim (religious) block from the Coast along the eastern region. In the western region called the lake zone, factionalism and other divisions emerged between parliamentarians from southern and northern regions. Hence, political polarization and the current trend of sectarianism and state patronage are rooted in regional politicization rather than ethnicity (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2005; Hyden 1999). Although the Tanzanian electorate does not vote along ethnic lines, a third of the opposition parties won most of their seats from their leaders’ home regions (Nyang’oro 2004). In fact, Tanzania has not experienced any major eruption of ethno-regional conflicts like Uganda and Kenya because of the propensity to align parties on a multi-ethnic platform.

Studies show that whereas Tanzanian politics is conducted under a domineering CCM party which has ruled since independence, it is credited for fostering nationalism by eradicating the identity politics based on tribalism and ethnicity (Mpangala 2004; Mpangala and Lwehabura 2005). Nonetheless, the multiparty politics in the last two presidential elections was affected by political violence resulting from religious and regional factionalism. In the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar and Pemba, political
volatility and election malpractices have undermined the legitimacy of Tanzania’s credibility of free and fair elections. In the last three general elections, CCM has been accused of instigating electoral fraud and violence (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2005) to challenge its main political opponent, the Civic United Front (CUF). In January 2001, Zanzibar and Pemba experienced indiscriminate killings of citizens who were protesting the outcome of the October 2000 elections in which CCM was declared a winner on the islands (Mpangala 2004). Media reports put the death toll at 59, while the government’s official report accounted for 23 people killed in those protests.

Elections have been inherently violent in Tanzania, especially in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar, because political parties are adversarial and discontent with the outcomes (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). The authors reported constant clashes between political parties at campaign venues in the last two national elections, in which hundreds died. In September 2005, The Guardian newspaper in Tanzania reported that more than 30 demonstrators were shot dead at five different campaign rallies within a week. Police brutality and intimidation of citizens supporting the opposition by the state led to sporadic political violence between the opposition’s followers and the supporters of CCM (Mamdani, 1996; Tripp 2000). The ruling party controls state resources and uses them to reward those who join government. All opponents who could potentially create new and lasting coalitions to challenge the ruling CCM party were destroyed politically through media rhetoric by the presidential friends (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001).

The heavy-handed rule over the electorate by CCM and state patronage over the political elite and some religious groups contributed to relative stability even under neo-liberal structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s (Campbell 1999). Besides this semi-
autocratic governance by the CCM party, successive alternation of presidential power to three different state leaders created this euphoria of electoral trustworthiness coupled with practices of symbolic distribution of power and representativeness. Nyang’oro (2004) rightly posited that Tanzania’s practices of the first-past-the-post electoral system and the electoral rules for managing ethno-political cleavages and political inequality are not pertinent in the Tanzanian national discourse. When the regime under the CCM political mantra embarked on efforts of nation-building, they also abolished traditional leadership like the land feudal lords and fiefdom chiefs (Miguel 2004).

The CCM deals with over 100 multi-ethnic groups by promoting plurality within its party ranks and constituent representation. Although the Ugandan and Kenyan political parties have some semblance of ethno-political coalition or consociation arrangements (Kanyinga 2004), the CCM in Tanzania encourages all its members seeking parliamentary seats - with aspirations of holding national positions within the party - to contest in constituencies outside of their ethnic strongholds (Nyang’oro 2004). This arrangement allows the CCM to claim legitimacy as a party which embraces ethnic coalitions rather than ethnic fragmentation and sectarianism. Political actors are forced to work with politicians and campaign coordinators from other ethnic groups who de-emphasize the role of ethnicity in politics. CCM remains a dominant and semi-autocratic political party which shapes regimes and state institutions; yet due to ethnic coalitions, its successive governments promote plurality and sustain the spirit of Ujamaa.
CHAPTER SIX

MEDIA PERFORMANCE IN DEMOCRATIZING THE EAC

This section presents the existing literature on the historical account of journalism in the EAC and how it has evolved in the last 15 years during the current wave of democratization. Some students of African politics have argued that democratization in sub-Saharan Africa did not start with Huntington’s (1991) third wave of democratization which occurred between 1974 and 1990. Mamdani (1996) and Kirschke (2000) determined that democracy existed in some form among Africans long before these waves, as they organized and governed themselves, starting with the traditional local chiefs and going all the way to the administrative political rulers. The history of democratization in Africa began as a political struggle within and against the nation-state during colonial days (Ocitti 1999). The activists organized and engaged in political protests, which resulted in civil conflicts with post-colonial dictatorships from the 1960s, to the 1980s, fighting for freedom and self-determination (Mamdani 1996).

Disaffection and use of violence to demand for political change existed since colonial days as some social or communal groups were targeted, estranged, and completely excluded from power (Klopp 2001; Crescenzi 1999). Political conflicts start as a grievance between conflicted parties with an atmosphere of discontent at an abused system (Crescenzi 1999). In East Africa, the struggle for democracy has always been characterized with violence punctuated by ethno-political sentiments (Klopp 2001). Violent political action is particularly common as ethnic groups or the citizens are
influenced by the opposition political elite to believe that the regime is unrepresentative. Citizens lose hope for any peaceful redress of their grievances (Snyder 2000).

When Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya gained independence in 1961, 1962, and 1963 respectively, the departing colonial rulers handed over the electronic and print media to the incoming governments of the sovereign states. These incoming leaders who had favorable coverage from the indigenous press since both sides were advocating for liberty, socioeconomic opportunities and the right to self-rule. The new governments and regimes expected favorable news coverage and hoped that the media were at par with their agenda for “unity, solidarity, and development.”

Regimes imposed on the media the notion of self-censorship in the interest of self-preservation as part of development journalism (Faringer 1991). Some African states outside the EAC still endorse the practice of development journalism, whose basic premise is that government has a responsibility to mobilize the news media for the role of nation-building in order to increase political consciousness and further economic development (Nyamnjoh 2005; Faringer 1991). In reality, however, the idea was used to manipulate the media into accepting and promoting government propaganda. The heads of state appointed ministers of information, who had to ensure that the media provide “development journalism” (Faringer 1991). One major obstacle for realizing the freedom and professionalism of the African press is the dilemma of relying on official sources and the culture of agenda building set up by state agencies in sub-Saharan Africa (Bourgault 1995). State-owned news media have been subject to censorship and direct political control for years (Wanyande 1996; Ochs 1987).
With the exception of two Kenyan national newspapers, all media in East Africa were state-owned and controlled before 1992. This continued until the international community, spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, pressured these governments in the early 1990s to liberalize the media under the Structural Adjustment Programs (Ocitti 2006). Through these programs, some of the state-run media organizations were divested, and turned into publicly-owned corporations or completely privatized. Still, the regimes continued to own and control the most influential media outlets in each country. These were mainly the national television and the national radio. The notion of development journalism which is enforced in Africa is not very helpful to the credibility of the news media because it signals a precursor of the agenda building influence from the EAC governments.

However, not every aspect of the media work in East Africa is sanctioned and controlled by the government. Studies have found that some politically radical independent media in Africa frequently report about the oppression of citizens (Ogundimu 2002), and have exposed the regimes’ corruption and clientelism (Lush 1998). Some independent news media have consistently taken a strong position to report on all aspects of a failed-state and have provided those in political opposition and activists from civil society a platform to frame a message of rescuing feeble citizens (Zafliro 2000).

Despite difficulties, the independent press, especially in Uganda and Kenya, had expanded the breadth of political news coverage, provided limited but vital checks to abuses of power and acted as a mouthpiece for civil society interests (Mwesige 2004; Matende 2005). Mwesige’s and Matende’s case studies demonstrate that the independent
media in the EAC usually set the public discourse on governance. From a theoretical perspective, this signals an agenda setting role on political issues related to democratization and the rule of law. This study seeks an empirical evidence of this agenda setting process concerning the independent press in East Africa.

6.1 Media Ownership/Systems

Most literature in the field of communication emphasizes that a vital professional role of journalism is to advance democratic governance and the welfare of society. Even in the industrialized world, news media performance is rarely impervious to the question of bias resulting from media ownership. Entman (1989) and McChesney (2000) posited that corporate media ownership in North America had encouraged what is typically referred to as “tabloidization of the news.” The few case studies from East Africa examining the press and democratization sparsely address the puzzle of press performance and the influence by ownership.

Recent scholarship in the fields of political science and mass communication has also debated the professional values and ideologies of journalists in relation to the politics of democratization (Ocitti 2006; Bennett 2002; McChesney 2000). Some of the literature from Africa supports a western theoretical proposition by Diamond (2001), McChesney (2004), and Bennett (2002) that emerging democracies could be destroyed by authoritarian reversals related to political influence meddling that hinder free expression, speech, and political participation.

Evidence from media scholars such as McQuail (1992) has demonstrated that the news media depend on authoritative sources and rarely resist the tendency to impose one
framework of source-prominence often provided by government officials. Hughes and Lawson (2004) also provided some convincing evidence that the news media are either predominantly an entity of major concentrated commercial interests like in the industrialized world or owned and primarily controlled by the governments as the case in Africa. As a result, literature from the developing nations in Latin America and Africa generally shows that media ownership and partisan bias in political news coverage have generated concerns for the legitimacy and independence of the news media, and decreased trust in emerging democracies (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002; Lawson 2002).

The ownership press types that shape news coverage of politics and democratization are mainly classified as state- or privately-owned (Bourgault 1995; Norris 1997; Hyden et al. 2002). On one hand, Curran (1991) and Norris (1997) argued that in a capitalist society, the private news media respond to the interests of the marketplace rather than the expectations of the public and government officials. On the other hand, Wanyande (1996) and Ochs (1986) found that state-owned news media in Africa have been susceptible to censorship and direct political control. Consequently, media performance in East Africa is related to the professional norms and editorial policies created in part by the type of ownership. The reliance on authoritative, often governmental sources in East Africa presents a daunting challenge on unsophisticated audience which is inadequately informed to critically evaluate political news.

A key part of the constitutional changes, which have occurred since the introduction of multiparty politics, has been the removal of restrictions on the media. In Uganda, the emergence of press freedom started with the liberalization of the media,
which had been controlled by the government since colonial days (Kannyo 2004). In both Tanzania and Uganda, veteran journalists, who used to work for the state-owned media, opened their own newspapers, magazines and newsletters, which criticized incompetence and corruption in the government and investigated human rights violations (Tripp 2000; Hossain et al. 2003; Dicklitch and Lwanga 2003). As a result of this liberalization and newfound freedoms, East Africa has enjoyed an independent and vibrant press since 1992, unlike the more oppressive press conditions in other countries like Burundi, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Takirambudde 1995).

The same regimes which have liberalized the news media, however, continue to intimidate journalists by charging them with libel, sedition, treason, and defamation whenever they become too critical of the political elite and the establishment (Mwesige 2004). While the media have played a central role in the fight for human rights by exposing numerous abuses, most Tanzanian and Ugandan journalists have also practiced increased self-censorship (Dicklitch and Lwanga 2003) because of the existing libel and treason laws. The constitutions of these countries guarantee media freedom (Ocitti 2006; Ochilo 1993), but the governments have occasionally shut down critical media outlets for producing material likely to damage their reputation. Table 3 below indicates how each partner-state also represents varying news media systems, press freedoms, and independence.
### TABLE 6.1: EAC Partner-state Comparison: Media Type and Outreach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>TANZANIA</th>
<th>UGANDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Radio Stations</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately-owned FM Stations</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned FM/AM Stations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Percentage of Radio Listeners</td>
<td>72*</td>
<td>69*</td>
<td>72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Television Stations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately-owned major TV Stations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned TV Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Percentage of Television Viewers</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>29*</td>
<td>33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of major Newspapers</td>
<td>7**</td>
<td>14**</td>
<td>11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately-owned major Newspapers</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>11**</td>
<td>6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned Newspapers</td>
<td>2**</td>
<td>4**</td>
<td>5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Percentage of Newspaper Readers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Data in Table 3 are drawn from research conducted by one of the authors of this chapter in 2004 and 2007; additional data from *The Africa Barometer*, and from the national registry at the Ministries of Information from each country.
- Most of these numbers change from time to time due to rapid expansion of the independent media in East Africa.
- The asterisk * refers to 2005 data; ** refers to 2006; and no asterisk refers to August 2007 data.
The independent media, however, have been questioning East African
governments on policies and decisions, and holding the elites accountable. In Uganda the
media have been in the forefront of political education by fostering public debate and
sensitizing society about the virtues of a democratic system (Kannyo 2004). In Kenya
journalists have scrutinized the government since 1991, which roughly coincides with the
timeframe of the constitutional amendment for multiparty democracy (Ochilo 1993). All
East African governments want the state-owned media to function independently when
reporting on social issues but to behave as a political mouthpiece on political issues.
Scholarly literature on press freedom shows that the independent journalists have fought
hard for their rights through a combination of defiance, legal measures, and parliamentary
lobbying (Wanyande 1996; Mwesige 2004).

In Tanzania, it is President Ali Hassan Mwinyi who liberalized the media space in
the mid-1990s to operate freely in a multiparty democratic Tanzania. Several media
monitoring and research agencies also opened up to improve the quality and
competitiveness of the news media (Sturmer 1998). These include the Steadman Group,
AC Nielson, Africa Media Portal, and Consumer Insight. A 2004 study on the state of
the press in Tanzania indicated that press freedom was growing, but access to information
was still controlled by public officials such as the police, city or district councilors
(Kambenga 2005). The news media in Zanzibar are even more hampered. Since
independence, politicians there have continued to suppress newspaper and radio
journalists who expose their abuse of power. In a country which had more than 100
community and major newspapers in five different languages registered by 2005,
including 14 major dailies and 59 weeklies, authorities continue to suppress each one of
them. Despite the existence of some 30 radio stations and 20 commercial TV stations, the electronic media do not cover more than a quarter of the country and journalists are subjected to constant harassment (Kambenga 2005).

Arguments have been made that the standards of journalism are low because 63 percent of working journalists only possess short-course training qualifications (Kilimwiko 2006). The nine journalism training schools in Tanzania are not adequately equipped with the necessary tools for journalism training and a lack of investment in training journalists. In addition, the private sector and even some of the media owners lack sufficient resources to support professional and editorial independence, thus impairing the quality of news reporting and writing (Ramaprasad 2003). Kilimwiko (2006) pointed out that most journalists work as freelancers earning an average monthly salary of US$.75 Cents per published story or photograph. On average, the freelancers earn about US$30.0 per month, which as less than the Ministry of Labor’s official minimum wage of US$36.00. Most of the employed journalists work without contracts and earn an average US$220.00. In a national survey of 200 full time employed journalists, Kilimwiko also found that 83 percent of those reporters were regularly not paid on time at the end of the month.

In Kenya, the standards of journalism are relatively better than in Tanzania and Uganda but are still universally low since 50 percent of the scribes do not possess noteworthy journalism training qualifications (Wanyande 1996; Matende 2005). The costs of these one-year journalism certificates are high and unaffordable to many aspiring journalists. Although private training institutions may have better facilities than state institutions, some of them lack modern media equipment and resources, to produce well-
trained news reporters. There are about seven technical institutes and colleges that offer basic and advanced media studies (Moggi and Tessier 2001).

Similar to the Tanzanian situation, most media owners lack sufficient resources to support professional development of the scribes, hence impairing the quality of journalism (Omosa and McCormick 2004). Kenyan journalists receive better salaries than the Ugandan and Tanzanian journalists. A 2006 newsletter from the KUJ indicates that the average salary for a full time journalist in Kenya in 2000 was US$800.00 per month, yet the majority of those permanent employees worked without contracts and earned less than US$450. Freelance reporters make up 75 percent of all journalists and earn an average US$130 per month. Most of the freelance correspondents in Kenya live in upcountry towns or in other provinces besides Nairobi, and generate most of the content for radio news and all newspapers.

There is evidence of media investors in FM radio stations who are denied a frequency on partisan grounds, especially when the government is discontent with the local investors’ political inclination (Moggi and Tessier 2001). Ethnic groups also started launching vernacular FM stations to broaden their political agendas. A recent example is the Kass FM, a vernacular station that broadcasts in the Kalenjin, which is Moi’s native ethnic language. When Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu took over power, Kass FM had its frequency temporarily suspended and the station was closed for a few weeks in 2006 for allegedly broadcasting anti-government messages (Daily Nation 2005). Kibaki’s ethnic kinship then started two vernacular stations that broadcast primarily in Kikuyu to broaden their appeal and influence in the nation.
According to the National Institute of Journalists in Uganda (NIJU), Uganda has about 800 journalists that are fully employed, partially employed, or who work as freelancers. NIJU executives told this researcher in 2007 that their unscientific survey in 2006 showed that there are more unemployed journalists (with a bachelor’s degree) than those who are employed in the media industry. The Uganda Journalists Union estimates that over 2,500 journalists are registered and licensed by government as required by the Press and Journalists Act of 1995.

Just like the Kenyan and Tanzanian situation, both the state-owned media and the privately-owned media organizations in Uganda lack sufficient capital and resources to support professional development of their journalists (Kemigisha 1998; Ocitti 2006). Broadcast stations pay exorbitant annual license fees and their revenue from advertising spots is heavily taxed by government; therefore, employers hire low-wage and poorly-trained workers (Ocitti 2006). It is commonly known that journalism institutes do not own or operate radio stations or run television stations. So, broadcast media in Uganda tend to use interns or young inexperienced journalists from these ill-equipped institutes and colleges for on-the-job training (Baguma et al. 2000).

Kenyan journalists receive slightly better salaries than their Ugandan counterparts. According to NIJU, the average monthly gross salary in 2005 for full-time journalists was US$670, yet the majority of permanently employed reporters had no contracts and earned less than US$240. Freelance journalists in Uganda earn an average monthly salary of US$2.25 per published news script or footage with text. On average, the freelancers earn about US$120.0 per month, which is equivalent to the average salary of a state-employed primary school (elementary) teacher.
6.2 Politics and the Media in Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania is the largest and most densely populated country in the EAC. Although the majority of Tanzanians speak the national language, Kiswahili, the country is multilingual with about 120 ethnic groups who speak different dialects. The customary practices and value systems make it even a more diverse nation.

Democratization has had some legitimate successes in Tanzania since the first post-independence president, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, relinquished power voluntarily in 1985. The country has done better than Kenya and Uganda in terms of presidential alternation in the last 20 years. Since its independence in 1961, Tanzania has changed three presidents willingly and without engaging in a bloody ethno-political sectarianism.

The press belonged exclusively to the CCM party and government leadership until the mid 1990s. After the liberalization of the press in Tanzania in 1995, the media have increasingly exposed political corruption and misappropriation of public and donor funds by the state. But during Hassan Mwinyi’s era, these press revelations were regularly suppressed and coerced into retractions by law enforcement agents under the directive of the Ministry of Information. Some journalists, especially editors, were under intense pressure to stop publishing critical reports about the government and were obliged to mobilize for a collective promotion of the Ujamaa principles, which is similar to ‘development journalism.’ Ujamaa refers to the family-based concept of socialism introduced by Nyerere in 1964 as a distributive policy associated with socialist communal livelihood (Shivji 1995).
After the voluntary departure of socialist and reformist Nyerere, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, took over the mantle of state power and ruled the country from 1985 to 1995. He introduced multiparty politics in 1992, as a result of the country’s adaptation to capitalist rule. Consequently, after thirty years of single-party rule in Tanzania, the country moved to multiparty democracy in July 1992 and the 1977 Constitution was changed in 1992 to allow for this change (Hyden 1999). Under multiparty elections, Ali Hassan Mwinyi became president and later retired in 1995 after two five-year terms. Benjamin Mkapa presided for two terms until 2005. He strengthened civil society structures a great deal, liberalized the economy, and partially restored press freedom (Hossain et al. 2003).

The current president, Jakaya Kikwete, was former minister of foreign affairs in Mkapa’s regime and replaced his boss in a violent election in 2005; but this violence was not instigated by ethnic sectarianism. Despite these democratic changes, euphoria gave way to animosity among the political elite, the opposition, and civil society throughout the 1990s (Tripp 2000). Case studies show that Tanzanians do not enjoy the full protection of the law and security owing to the cracked rule of law due to political interference. For instance, Kambenga (2005) found that the enduring fragility in the regime’s human rights records is considered as the greatest political deficit in 20 years. “Liberal democratic values may be compromised if they are seen to threaten social harmony or civic peace” (Hyden 1999, p.152).

Ahluwalia and Zegeye (2001) stated that in Tanzania, especially in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar, elections have been inherently violent because political parties were adversarial and discontent with the outcomes. Hyden and other media political observers found that journalists are sometimes harassed when they report
matters that are considered humiliating to the person of a government minister or the elite that are tied to the regime.

A 2004 study on the state of the press in Tanzania indicated that press freedom was taking root, but free access to information was still held by public officials such as the police, and city or district councilors (Kambenga 2005). The news media in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar is not free. Since independence, politicians there continue to crack down on newspaper and radio journalists who expose their bad acts (Ochs 1987). In a country that had more than 100 newspapers registered in 2005, including 11 dailies and 59 weeklies, authorities there continue to muzzle all the press.

Despite the existence of some 30 radio stations and 20 commercial TV stations, the electronic media do not cover more than a quarter of the country and journalists are subjected to constant harassment (Kambenga 2005). In Tanzania, Tripp (2000) reported that the government and the ruling party, CCM, still own and control a national radio station, Radio Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, a national television station, Televisheni ya Taifa, and two national newspapers: the English-language Daily News and the Swahili-language Uhuru.

Literature shows that Tanzanian voters can choose between 12 political parties for the parliamentary and presidential seats but the dominant party is the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has controlled Tanzanian politics and government since independence. My argument here is that Tanzania’s success in presidential alternation than the other EAC partner-states is not necessarily an indication of either regime change or legitimacy. The media reports have indicated that the ruling party controls state resources and uses state coffers for political machinations to influence the electorate. All
opponents from other small political parties who could potentially create new and lasting coalitions to challenge the ruling CCM party were also destroyed politically through media rhetoric and character-assassinations passed on by the presidential cronies (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001).

Another setback facing Tanzania’s electoral democracy is clientelism, where voters are bribed with material incentives and transported from other constituencies to vote for the CCM candidates at all levels of power (Tripp 2000). Hossain and colleagues (2003) also found evidence of corruption in voter registration in Zanzibar and police brutality and intimidation ahead of the nationwide elections. Mamdani (1996) and Tripp (2000) stated that such actions led to sporadic ethno-political conflicts and other types of violence between the opposition’s followers and the supporters of CCM. The question of free speech and public debate is also sparse in Tanzania. Hyden (1999) found that Tanzanians still often tend to be politely submissive and choose to keep quiet rather than to challenge authority in public.

6.3 Politics and the Media in Kenya

The Republic of Kenya has played a central role in the greater East African region. The population is made up of over 40 ethnic groups belonging to three main linguistic lineages: The Bantu, Cushitic, and The Nilotic. Just like Tanzania, the national language is Swahili and the official language English, but many indigenous languages and dialects originate from the three lineages. The country gained independence in 1963 after a protracted struggle with British colonizers. The first president was Jomo Kenyatta who took over from the British. Kenyatta is well remembered for his revolutionary
struggle against colonialism and his incarceration by the British on allegations of terrorism (Ekech 1975). That gave him the legitimacy to govern Kenya peacefully and was seen as Africa’s pre-colonial hero.

Kenyatta ruled with an autocratic style with increased restrictions on freedom of speech and expression from dissenting political views (Munene 2001). After the death of President Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel arap Moi took over the presidency in a peaceful succession. According to Munene (2001), Moi maintained Kenyatta’s autocratic leadership. Munene posited that Moi’s regime executed immense intolerance to political dissent that included opposition politicians, academics, and other elite members of civil society. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the regime continued to promote its own party political agenda dividing the opposition and instigating ethnic and regional cleavages to keep control (Munene 2001).

In Kenya, the real power center is the presidency. For instance, former president, Daniel Arap Moi brought about some political nepotism in the composition of the cabinet and solidified his influence and actions. His strength came from supporters from his own ethnic groups, the Kalenjin, and from political benefactors tied to the government such as Maasai leaders, the Luo, and the Luyia. Those that were mostly left out include the Kikuyu people whose geographical locale is the seat of government and the nation’s capital city, Nairobi. Several studies have pointed out that some Kikuyu political elite assume that they are natural Kenyan rulers and as such, they perceived Moi to have left them out of their absolute and inalienable presidency (see Klopp 2001). Between 1995 and 2002, the ethnic alliance, or fragmentation, within Kenya’s power structure intensified regional imbalances, as shown by the advantage that certain ethnic groups
used presidential patronage to exploit government. In this way, the president held direct control to key positions within the actual power structure. These positions provided easy access to significant centers of state bureaucracy which undermined the efficiency of the administration of state resources, including public enterprises.

In 1991, Kenya started a new era of transition to democratic rule when then-president Daniel arap Moi was pressured by civil society and donor governments to re-introduce multiparty electoral democracy. In December 1992, Kenya returned to multiparty democracy with the first national elections held in 1963 right after independence (Klopp 2001). The defiant spirit of prodemocracy elite such as academics and a united opposition movement de-legitimized Moi’s regime and his monopoly in the political arena. Also, for the first time in 2002, Kenyan citizens affected a regime change in multiparty national elections using a strong and vibrant civil society and a united opposition (Anderson 2003). The elections led Mwai Kibaki to victory as president. This was the first time in Kenya’s postcolonial politics that the opposition defeated a candidate that was nominated by an outgoing president as his successor (Anderson 2003).

A few courageous independent news media, such as the Nation newspaper, took on the role of advocate for civil liberties from the mid 1990s into the 2002 elections bringing the discussion of nepotism and authoritarianism in the public spotlight. The relative press freedom in the 1990s during Kenya’s great presidential authority provided a considerable outlet for the voicing of political dissatisfaction, but this kind of press coverage was significantly quelled with the intimidation of the press and journalists were never allowed to shake the regime with impunity.
Contrary to Mohan and Zack-Williams’ (2004) argument that democracy guarantees the possibility of living together despite differences, other literature shows that the Kenyan elections in 1992 and 1997 created an ethnically charged society (Klopp 2001). This led to a period of political grievances and insurgent ethnic conflicts. Those early elections and the 2002 campaigns were marred by voter intimidation from government security agencies, ethnic violence, and the displacement of thousands of opposition voters, primarily from the Kikuyu community. Journalists ended up behind bars and civic organizations were crashed, which brought back Kenya’s autocratic past and triggered political violence by the opposition (Anderson 2003; Kagwanja 2003).

The new Kibaki regime repeated many of the previous regime’s practices of ethnic favoritism, corruption and assault on human rights activists. Several members of the Kibaki government have been found guilty of massive embezzlement of public funds (Murunga and Nasong’o 2006). Several of these top cabinet officials were forced to resign as a sign of political accountability but the judicial system was curtailed to effect legal accountability through effective prosecutions of senior officials. According to Murunga and Nasong’o (2006) case study, the derailment of the rule of law remained the biggest challenge for the new regime.

In 2002, both the parliamentary and presidential elections were marred by clientelism (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004). Whereas both presidential candidates, Kenyatta and Kibaki, and several members of parliament made grand promises, these politicians had done nothing for their constituencies since the elections (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004; Kagwanja 2006). Instead, elected officials and their cronies clamped down on the press and other civic organizations that exposed graft and
mismanagement. Political clientelism went on at the grassroots level of the campaigns. The *Daily Nation* of November 11, 2002 reported that political campaign managers handed out free t-shirts and basic household essentials, such as soap, in return for votes.

Media scholars have not tested public attitudes towards the Kenyan or East African news media and whether the news media had any significant influence on the voting decisions of the public to force an alternation of the regime in 2002. What is anecdotally known, however, is that the Kenyan news media were critical of the presidential pick for candidate for the ruling political party (KANU). Moi picked an unpopular successor, Uhuru Kenyatta who is son of the first post-independent president, Jomo Kenyatta. The opposition parties all united behind Kibaki. Opposition parties rallied behind Kibaki by forming the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition. As a result of their criticism towards young Kenyatta, the incumbent party called the news media antidemocrats. During the early days of the campaign, anti-regime protagonists attempted with less success to curtail the critical coverage of elections and led to self-censorship in some of the private media and most of the state-owned media (Kagwanja 2003).

Despite these attempts to curtail the freedom of the media to cover national politics without fear or favor, President Moi’s party witnessed significant increase media boldness. This boldness in fact started in the mid 1990s when privately-owned media pushed vigilantly for the re-introduction of political pluralism in Kenya. This media trend to criticize and divert from the presidential wishes of president-for-life custom energized citizens to engage in resistance against Moi’s autocratic politics. During this time, the uproar and yearn for multi-party pluralism was widened and swept across the EAC in the mid-1990s.
A 2004 civil society annual report found that more than 80 percent of the radio frequencies were assigned arbitrarily to friends of the political establishment (Matende 2005). In other instances of press control and censorship, the judiciary has restricted press freedom through heavy fines on journalists and news outlets, licensing of journalists and regular accreditation (Matende 2005). The Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ) reported in 2004 that the political environment is not conducive to report and expose corruption and poor governance in order to promote democracy.

A few independent news media outlets, such as the Nation newspaper, took on the role of advocating for civil liberties throughout the 1990s and brought the discussion of nepotism and authoritarianism to the forefront. The relative press freedom in the 1990s during Kenya’s authoritarian government provided a considerable outlet for the voicing of political dissatisfaction, but this kind of press coverage was quelled by intimidation and journalists’ accreditation in 2000. Accredited journalists had to adhere to the professional standards by the government’s regulatory authority and failure to abide by these rules led to suspension from practice.

The Kenyan government was under pressure from institutions such as the international donor community, the media representative councils, and the Law Society of Kenya to allow greater press freedom. In the course of harassments of independent journalists by law enforcement officers and the political leaders, the Kenyan government under Moi responded to these pressure groups by instituting broadcast licenses to news organizations which were in support of the KANU ideology. The privately-owned independent broadcast stations that at long last acquired licenses resorted to self-censorship in order to keep their licenses. Towards the end of Moi’s reign, he amended
the *Books and Newspapers Act*, in 2002 as a ploy to restrain the independence of the news media.

This *Book and Newspapers Act 2002* requires publishers to deposit a bond of about $12,000 to the government as a surety to keep away from sectarian, treasonable, and malicious publication of news and literary materials. The small publishing companies that could not afford this bond were forced to either shut down their operations or merge with bigger corporations. Consequently, these small publications operated under the radar by distributing affordable newsletters which exposed misuse of political power such as human rights violations and mismanagement of financial resources/social services. These weekly or monthly investigative newsletters are known as the gutter press because they had no physical address; they were mobile as they moved from place to place to avoid arrest and persecution from state security. Their principal writers remained anonymous and admired by opposition politicians, ordinary citizens, and activists because they ventured into areas which the mainstream media could not freely publish.

The gutter press in Kenya depended on street sales and had no advertisers. The Kenyan government became frustrated by what they called clandestine press that fabricated malicious and treasonable lies about the regime and state institutions. The gutter press became the alternative popular source of news that advocated for political accountability, regime change, and the rule of law in Kenya since the early 2000.

At the start of President Mwai Kibaki’s reign in 2002, the Kenya government promised a much freer press but the rhetoric did not yield greater press freedom. For instance, the government did not answer calls from activists and some members of parliament to repeal the draconian press laws that were enacted during KANU rule. Some
of these rules include the Criminal Libel law which was used by Moi’s government to press unwarranted charges against investigative journalists. Instead of repealing the draconian legislation from the previous regime, which curtailed exposure of government wrongdoing by the news media, Kibaki’s regime charged a few journalists from the mainstream media with criminal libel charges for exposing abuses of public office.

Through his first term in office, Kibaki kept silent when his political party was discussing Article 19 Kenya Media Bill in parliament, which sought to regulate “reckless and irresponsible journalism.” The bill would require journalists to disclose all sources and to get accreditation before they can practice. Journalists would have to pay an annual fee to be accredited. Hundreds of journalists, diplomats, and members of civil society, such as human rights groups, protested the new media bill. President Kibaki was finally forced to reject the repressive clauses in August 2007.

Kenya has always enjoyed the position of being the regional centre in East Africa for mass communication and international news media. Kenya also allowed the emergency of independent journalistic enterprises. The ruling party, KANU owned a national newspaper, *Kenya Times* and government owned and controlled a radio and television station, *Kenya Broadcasting Corporation* (Ochilo 1993). The state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) was the only radio allowed to broadcast to the entire country. However, the regime after the Moi era has attempted to control the private news media, particularly radio and television (Klopp and Zuern 2003). For instance, the privately-owned radio stations are licensed to broadcast in designated zones. Some journalists and editors have been co-opted by government.
A 2004 civil society annual report reported that more than 80 percent of the radio frequencies were assigned arbitrarily to the cronies of the political establishment (Matende 2005). These developments have not been scientifically examined by students of the Kenyan media and politics. There have been other instances of press control and censorship. The judiciary has been accused of restricting press freedom, as heavy fines are imposed on journalists and news outlets (Matende 2005). The Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ) reported in 2004 that the political environment is not conducive to expose graft and poor governance the top level of the regime.

6.4 Politics and the Media in Uganda

Uganda got independence from Great Britain in 1962. Unlike Kenya and Tanzania, the country appeared to be the most stable and the less militaristic of the East African states (Nyeko 1997). Whereas Kenya’s Mau Mau rebellion that orchestrated a bloody militaristic conflict with colonizers during the British imperialism in the 1950s and early 60s, Uganda was at that time regarded as the beacon of peace and progress in East Africa. But when Tanzania challenged the imperial status quo in the 1950s through the 1960s, it faced an economic decline and social stagnation.

During the period of 1950s and 1960s, Uganda became East Africa’s inspirational story with flourishing economy and an educated African middle class and unlike Tanzania and Kenya, the British colonial rulers rewarded Uganda with independence without any struggle. All of the political opportunities and accolades reversed during the postcolonial era in East Africa. From the late 1960s until the now, Uganda turned into a political theater of military coups and mass killings based on ethno cleavages and
political dissent throughout all successive regimes. The military rule under Idi Amin in the 1970s and Milton Obote in the 1980s marked the pinnacle of brutal legacy of unrelenting political instability, suppression of liberties, and massive civilian deaths.

The contribution of Amin’s and Obote’s respective regimes to the socioeconomic and political demise was the militarization of the regime and despotic politics that led to legitimacy deficits. According to Rubongoya (2007) and Kannyo (2004), the values and attitudes of Ugandans such as trust, patriotism, and self-determination, were obliterated by state-inspired and institutionalized political conflicts and ethnic cleavages. That explains numerous successful coups and violent overthrow of regimes between 1966 and 1986. Uganda was the only African country that staged a successful internal guerrilla war, which lasted a record five years (Museveni and Kanyogonya 2000).

Uganda now has several institutional levels at which the regime and government could be held accountable but the current head of state, Yoweri Museveni, has entrenched hegemonic presidentialism and diminished political contestation and mass mobilization (Rubongoya 2007). The institutions in question include the inspector general of government who, apparently, is a presidential appointee; an upright but weakened judiciary; a vibrant but powerless human rights commission (Oloka-Onyango 2000); an independent but muzzled press (Ocitti 2006); and several sections of civil society with some elites who are prone to state patronage tendencies (Okuku 2002).

President Museveni also severely restricted multiparty politics and banned political party activities from the time he took power in 1986 until 2005. He claimed that such politics was divisive along ethnic and religious lines (Mamdani 1996; Ocitti 1999). For 19 years, Uganda was governed under a unique political system called the National
Resistance Movement (NRM). His regime and penchant for political control tend to suffocate the vigilance of civil society toward despotism rather than institutionalization (Mugisha 2004). In addition, Mugisha observed that the regime used mass political mobilization in the late 1990s to promote tribal fragmentation and nepotism. Also throughout the 1990s, there were countless state-appointed quack journalists whose mission was to destabilize newspapers and TV stations for the benefit of the regime (NIJU 2000). Independent journalists in Uganda in the mid to late 1990’s were ferried in and out of police detentions on weekends so regularly that their wives had eventually given up on asking where they had been upon returning home with a peculiar jail-scent.

Museveni had campaigned against multiparty politics and persuaded voters that political parties would divide people and create ethnic tension (Therkildsen 2002). Taras and Ganguly (2002) found that there is a tendency by leaders to dominate power by exclusion based on ethnicity and other societal differences like religion. According to Taras and Ganguly, this is termed as the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. The authors argue that some African government leaders politicize ethnicity by distorting, and sometimes stirring social disputes masked as collective concerns for wellbeing of these ethnic groups. These leaders hoodwink the underprivileged peasants or purport to represent particular tribal groups in order to gain political and economic advantage.

Local and international political observers report of constant intimidation and deaths of participants at political rallies through the use of the police and military force. The Electoral Commission has failed in its job to enforce the campaign rules and lets the incumbent violate its laws. For instance, election monitoring observers reported that the level of overt violence and intimidation in the 2006 election campaign was more intense
than in the 2001 elections. In northern Uganda for instance, most citizens could not vote and others were afraid of participating in elections for fear of the repercussions from state security agents if they voted against the incumbent. Ugandans in the north cannot fully and freely participate in politics because they continue to live under a state of emergency.

The *Political Parties and Organizations Act* (PPOA 2002) regulates the registration of political parties in Uganda. In November 2004, a court ruling nullified sections 18 and 19 of the PPOA. These sections prohibited political parties from sponsoring or campaigning for any candidate in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Later in 2005, the PPOA amendment on section 18 allowed political parties to organize and mobilize voters interested in their political platforms throughout the country. In addition, the same amendment gives the Electoral Commission of Uganda the responsibility to register parties and to provide rules for party leadership elections and political party fundraising. The parties also get the codes of conduct from the Uganda Electoral Commission. In addition, *The Presidential Elections Act* (PEA) of 2005 is largely similar to the PEA – 2001, but was amended to provide for the election of a president through multi party elections. It provides rules regarding the qualifications of presidential candidates, their nomination and campaign procedures.

On the performance of the news media, one of the biggest challenges that face Uganda, similar to other EAC partner-states, is that of media ownership. The Ugandan government still owns and controls a newspaper, *The New Vision*, a radio station, *Radio Uganda*, and a television station, *UBC*. In Uganda, journalists working at state-owned media are government employees. They are the main source of presidential and ministerial statements and the lowest paid journalists in the industry (Mwesige 2004).
Media reports claim that Museveni rewards state-owned media practitioners with exclusive interviews and presidential statements. Nyamnjoh (2004) also found that other African regimes had always praised the state media and independent journalists who reported exclusively on state functions.

Case studies show that journalists from state-owned media survive on freebies and as a result, the reporters condone state abuse of office. Rubongoya (2007) found that state-owned radio and TV stations were used by Museveni to manipulate voters by stirring ethno-political divisions, and also selectively labeling his opponents as terrorists and opportunists. For instance, shortly before the 2006 elections, registration of radio stations was suspended until order was re-established on the air waves (Ocitti 2006).

According to the National Institute of Journalists of Uganda (NIJU), radio and television stations that are seen as critics of the president have had their licenses suspended in the past. However, some FM radio stations owned and managed by the president’s cronies and by the military personnel operate illegally without a license. State-owned radio and TV stations were used by Museveni to manipulate voters by inciting ethnic divisions, selectively labeling his opponents as terrorists and opportunists and in the process dissuading critics of his regime from launching a successful campaign.

NIJU reported that radio stations that are seen as critics of the president and his lieutenants would not be allowed to operate. Before the 2006 elections, there were more than 100 FM radio stations registered and most of them did not respect the government’s election coverage guidelines. Some FM stations run by the president’s friends and by military personnel operate illegally without a broadcast license. This allows the
president’s friends to evade broadcast licensing fees and to avoid being scrutinized by broadcasting council that regulates the electronic media.

During the 2006 general elections, popular FM radio talk shows, which broadcast open forums through live interactive call-ins and had allowed people to express themselves on a wide range of subjects, were shut down indefinitely. The ban affected many radio stations, including the four most popular FMs: Central Broadcasting Service, Radio One, K-fm, and Radio Simba. Journalists protested and petitioned government a month before Election Day with more than 6,000 signed petitions opposing the ban. The ban was lifted after the elections were over.

As these case studies by Ocitti (2006), Matende, (2005), Kambenga (2005), Mwesige (2004) and other African media scholars have shown, the press in East Africa is still relevant and central to providing citizens a forum for public debate. The authors’ conclusions invariably proffer that regime legitimacy, the rule of law and democratic rule in each East African partner-state have contributed to a decline of public trust in the news media.

6.5 Research Questions

The first puzzle is concerned with agenda setting and agenda building:

1. How do issues of democratic rule in the news media impact the attitudes of East Africans towards the East African Community?

2. a). To what extent do the media influence public attitudes towards regime legitimacy in each EAC partner-state?
b). Does the government influence public attitudes towards democratic rule more than the news media?

The second set of questions provides a comparison of all individual public attitudes to regional characteristics in the three partner states using the hierarchical linear modeling:

3. Is the agenda setting influence on attitudes towards the rule of law and regime legitimacy in each region of the partner-states the same across East Africans of all education levels and gender?

4. Is the agenda building influence on attitudes towards democratic rule in each region the same across East Africans of all education levels and gender?
CHAPTER SEVEN

METHODOLOGY

A cross-sectional survey of citizens of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda in East Africa was conducted between June 2 and July 27, 2007. The goal was to survey 500 citizens of voting age from each partner-state of the East African Community (EAC). A total of 1,395 respondents were returned out of the 1,500 surveys that were randomly handed out. Public opinion and attitudes were sought on issues ranging from media use, exposure, and media performance, rule of law, governance, the presidency and many others (See survey instrument in the Appendix).

7.1 Survey Overview

In the present study, a “citizen” of East Africa is defined as an individual over 18 years of age who resides in one of three countries as a character of its democratic formation who can articulate his/her interests and attitudes based on reasoning and consciousness. Moreno (2006) informs us that citizenship cannot exist without the participation and integration of individuals into the political and democratic practice of a national state composed of government, service, and the rule of law. Citizens were randomly selected using a stratified random sampling and where required, a multistage cluster sampling technique.

The purpose of the stratified random sampling is to get comparison groups of equal size and demographics from each partner-state, despite some variations in the population parameter in each country. To avoid unreliability in the data due to unequal
probabilities of selection, respondents were stratified on a “citizen” variable instead of
the population disproportions based on either ethnicity or regional variables in each
partner-state. For instance, the national census population estimates of the year 2000 in
Uganda indicated extreme population disproportions. This unevenness is either
geographical regions or in the multitudes of ethnic groups in each partner-state. The
stratified random sampling ensured that the sample of 500 citizens from each partner-
state was proportionately categorized for comparative purposes.

7.2 Sampling Plan and Study Design

Since the EAC partner-states are heterogeneous, an equitable sample of
respondents that represents the opinions, attitudes, and demographics of citizens in each
partner-state was taken. For instance, there are over 20 different ethnic tribes and dozens
of languages in each partner-state. A stratified random sampling achieved a better
representation with a reasonable sample size than the simple random sampling would
require in these diverse societies.

The following stratification was followed in order to give every citizen an equal
chance of participating:

- Fifty unemployed workers were randomly selected from the latest records from
  the Ministry of Labor in each partner-state.

- Fifty students were randomly selected from five universities or other tertiary
  institutions of each partner-state. Ugandan respondents were selected from a
  random sample of students from Mbarara University, Makerere University, the
  International University Kampala, Islamic University in Mbale, and Nkumba
University. In Kenya, the respondents were randomly selected from Kenyatta University, Nairobi University, Egerton University, Moi University, and the United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi. In Tanzania, respondents were drawn from a random sample at the University of Dar es Salaam, The Open University, St. Augustine University, Mount Meru University, and Sokoine University of Agriculture.

- Fifty civil servants were randomly selected from a list provided by the Ministry of Public Service.
- Fifty members of the business community were randomly selected from a membership list of the Ugandan National Chamber of Commerce and Industries.
- Fifty housewives were selected from the central region of each EAC partner-state because most women do not work.
- And 150 participants representing farmers and peasants from the north, south, east, west, central regions of each partner-state. The sub sample for the farmers and peasants was larger because these particular groups constitute over 60 percent of the population of each partner-state.
- Fifty journalists and teachers were randomly selected from a list provided by the Journalist Associations and the Ministry of Education from each partner state.
- Fifty entertainers, including artists and sport personnel were randomly selected from a list provided by the Departments of Youths, Culture and Sports.

Out of each sample of respondents, gender was sampled equally at 50 percent but age was not considered a critical weighting factor during the data collection stage. Within
each stratum, the records of citizens registered with the above organizations were drawn until a stratified distribution was generated for each category in each partner-state.

In situations where there were no official records of residents such as the Ugandan and Kenyan farmers in some remote counties, a multistage cluster sampling method was used. The first stage was to randomly select a cluster of small villages from a list provided by district officers. From that list of small village towns that are located within the district, a second cluster of homes were then randomly selected. Finally, a respondent was randomly picked in a household. With both the stratified sampling and the multistage cluster sampling technique, an approximate representation of adult citizens of the population was considerably assured.

In these societies that are permeated with political mistrust and concerns over government spies and infiltrators, there were several challenges to overcome in order to have a fair representation of the national population. I recruited a total of 28 research assistants (RAs) from the EAC to administer these surveys. East Africans are usually less than willing to participate in academic projects like this one due to their personal security reasons, especially if questions concern national leaders and regime legitimacy. For instance, during data collection some of the participants demanded more assurance of anonymity and required to know how their responses would bring a loaf of bread and medicine to their households. See Appendix A.3 for a list of RAs from each country.

One research assistant (RA) from each partner-state was assigned to collect data from all the universities. Another RA collected data from the strata located within the urban centers. Other RAs were recommended by research centers: in Kenya, the African Population and Health Research Center provided two assistants that were recruited for
this study. In Uganda, the Centre for Basic Research based in Kampala will provide three RAs. All RAs had to speak both English and Swahili fluently. They had to demonstrate communication skills for eliciting voluntary respondent cooperation.

7.3 Instrumentation and Measurement

The survey instrument was given to respondents in hard copy (paper format); it was a face-to-face survey. Most respondents preferred to fill out an English version of the survey although a translated version in Kiswahili and other major languages in East Africa were at hand. A translated copy in the Kiswahili was not used at all in Uganda but nearly half of the respondents in Tanzania explicitly requested for it. Two primary reasons compelled us to conduct a face-to-face survey instead of other data collection methods. First, more than 80 percent of the population has no access to either a conventional land telephone line or cellular phone to conduct a valid telephone survey. Second, an estimated 60 percent of residences or citizens in East Africa do not have access to a physical-address infrastructure where a mail survey or self-administered survey can be effectively conducted. Those two data-collection methods can cause validity problems and social class biases if considered in a third world region like EAC.

Although the survey instrument was piloted both in the United States and in Uganda before it was approved, there were a few occasions when the RAs spent about ten minutes explaining the purpose of this exercise to individual respondents. In spite of the detailed instructions and explanation, about 20 out of 1,500 questionnaires were filled out incorrectly, as some participants marked more than one option on the seven-point-scale.
of each question. In a few cases whenever possible, RAs handed respondents another questionnaire as soon as they spotted incorrect responses.

It certainly helped to know about the literacy levels, cultural norms, and ethno-political tensions of each region prior to the fieldwork. RAs were matched with a region they are ethnically and geographically associated with and whose presence would create trust and comfort to respondents in order to minimize sensitivity, inaccuracy, and biased responses. My strong inclination based on experience and political knowledge of this region is that if I had not matched RAs to a ‘friendly’ stratum, the response rate would have been lower and the feedback would have been biased or inaccurate. The data would have been distorted by respondents to cautiously please the ‘alien’ RAs. By matching RAs to particular strata considering gender, ethnic language, religion, and appropriate caste, that possibly minimized the respondents’ perceived fears of a political trap from their governments that would have impacted the validity of the data.

First, the assistants and this researcher separately visited the locations or residences of each selected respondent to manage the survey. The assistants also managed the survey in most parts of upcountry where respondents were randomly selected. This researcher doubled as a supervisor of the self-administered exercise. Respondents who had no time to respond to the face-to-face survey right away were given three days to complete it. Research assistants picked up questionnaires those respondents on the fourth day. Whenever questionnaires were not yet completed, respondents were asked to complete and mail them at an address which was designated as a collection center at Hotel Equatoria Business Center.
All the countries had one survey instrument that asks a set of identical questions applicable to the EAC, thus making countries comparable. The first items are concerned with media exposure, measuring behavioral trends (media use) of respondents on a particular medium in a week and about a specific unit. Some items utilize perceptual measurements of news coverage to assess how citizens in EAC rate news coverage on salient issues related to governance and the rule of law. The third batch of items utilize attitude measurements on media performance, democratic rule, and regime legitimacy to assess the citizens’ degree of strong agreement or strong disagreement on matters of trust, interest, influence, thoughts, and effectiveness, and other attributes or concerns.

The RAs asked each respondent to select only one choice that best rates or indicate their opinion about the performance of the media; opinion about the news coverage; attitude about the privately-owned and state-owned media; attitude about the regime and the rule of law; and their ideas or beliefs about democratic rule. Respondents also provided their opinions on statements regarding the role of state institutions and their experiences with public service. In a scale that measured “attitudes toward the regime and other state institutions in each partner-state,” respondents were asked to check the response that best corresponded with their opinion on point values assigned for items as follows: Strongly Disagree = 1; Neutral = 4; and strongly agree = 7. All items were coded such that a more positive attitude toward the regime received the higher response value of four (7).

The survey had ten items that measured how citizens rated how the news media perform under the prevailing laws and political dispensation. The items were scored using the following 7 point scale: Very poorly = 1; somewhat poorly = 3; Neutral = 4;
somewhat well = 5; and very well = 7 (Huesman et al. 1992). A maximum score of 7 indicated a position that it is generally acceptable to infer approval of something well done, and that when performance was generally unacceptable based on their personal judgments or expectations, it was indicated with a minimum score of 1 (Huesman et al. 1992). For the 20 items measuring attitudes toward the news and the media, respondents were asked to select only point value assigned as follows: Strongly Disagree = 1; Neutral = 4; and strongly agree = 7. All items were coded such that a more positive attitude toward the regime received the higher response value of four (7).

{See Appendix B for details in the Survey Instrument}

To prepare data for the HLM analysis, all items were coded such that a more positive (accepting) attitude toward the outcome variable received the higher response value of four (4). The scale was scored by summing the point values of the responses and dividing by the total number of responses. Lower mean scores, which ranged from one (1) to four (4), indicated a strong agreement or higher level of approval for media performance. Higher mean scores indicated better rating for media performance in the coverage of the citizens’ issue concerns (Slaby 1984; Dickinson and Basu 2005). However, the scores do not provide answers to the agenda setting and agenda building influence on the media. Those scores were set up in SPSS and downloaded in HLM6 for an advanced estimation of the media influence (agenda setting) and government influence (agenda building) on public attitudes at both the individual level nested within the geopolitical (regional) context.
7.4 Nested Analysis Using HLM

In a comparative study of this nature, comparisons between the regime types of the partner states must be interpreted cautiously since there is no control over the choice of who resides in what region and their ethnicity. The survey data consist of citizens of voting age who are nested within the regions of the East African Community. To better analyze these data structures that are nested within each EAC partner-state requires going beyond the conventional multivariate techniques, which treat a country or even the community as one unit of analysis. Such simple regression techniques ignore the variation between-citizens within each region of a country and at the same time treat the partner-states as unique units of analysis by ignoring a between-geopolitical regional component. Employed is a statistical technique called hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which properly reflects the structure of the EAC dataset with citizens grouped by regions in the partner states. HLM is a class of techniques used to analyze these data that have a nested structure (Kang and Kwak 2003, Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

The following terms: multilevel, hierarchical, nested, and clustered are used interchangeably in social science research, but according to Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), they all essentially mean and do the same thing in the general linear models - GLM. All those terms refer to a type of statistical procedure that belongs to the family of the GLM, which are used to analyze data baring some inherent group membership or cluster (Bryk and Raudenbush 1988). A typical example that is given most often by researchers is a dataset that consists of students within schools or patients within hospitals. Since the present study uses comparative data, the hierarchical nature permits
us to test cross-level interactions between the contexts in which the news media perform under the current political culture and the individual characteristics (see Paek et al. 2005).

This method estimates how differentiation in attitudes towards the regime, democratic rule, and individual characteristics vary across 15 regions that shape the geopolitical alignment in the EAC provinces. The dataset includes citizen characteristics because of the existing assumption that they are open to the influence of the regional politics. The characteristics of the regional composition can bias estimates, if they are included in statistical adjustments for citizen background, namely: a) the citizens’ ethnicity or political identity; b) the gender imbalance in political discourse; and c) and the prevalence of low income and educationally disadvantaged citizens.

7.5 Nested Analysis Research Design

This study used the HLM6 program software and SPSS which handle the multilevel modeling data structure. The HLM application consisted of two sets of linear regression equations that incorporate predictor variables at each level. The output of the level 1 regression estimated how much of the variation in attitudes towards media exposure between citizens, within regions, can be accounted for by differences in individual characteristics. This lower (first) level decomposed the total variance into between-individuals on a media exposure outcome. In using the nested framework, the proposition here was to depart from a conventional OLS regression approach to a two-level model. Using the multilevel modeling (or HLM) allowed individual-level predictors of the news media exposure to be separated from differences in context and characteristics of the citizens based on their geopolitical identity.
It meant that differences stemming either from the individual attitudes towards the news media or from attitudes towards the regime, could be altered by the random effects arising from social economic status and democratic rule across all regions. Furthermore, considering that the news media type is both privately-owned and state-owned, an additional measure of media type use was useful. In reference to both types of media, respondents were asked attitude questions concerning their trust, interest, factual, accountability, and independence of the media. These measures constructed an index that afforded a dichotomous assessment and indicator of media type usage. Likewise, for basic demographic comparisons, dummy indicators of gender and education levels were analyzed and included as predictors in the multilevel estimation models. Their relevant interactions were also explored. To achieve this, the assessment was whether the various predictors tested in the first-level individual model demonstrate significance when nested in a two-level (EAC regions) hierarchical model. HLM helped to retain variable information that could have been easily lost with a simple multivariate technique.

Although most regression studies would stop at reporting findings at the OLS equation 

\[ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \epsilon_i \]

the scores on public attitudes towards the regime or democratic rule may be affected by randomization, even after adjusting for other characteristics (such as gender, education, and socioeconomic status).

The level 1 HLM questions in the first and second model for the agenda setting (or media) influence were as follows:

- What is the variability in media performance within the East African regions?
- What is the proportion of variance in media performance between the East African regions (this is also referred to as the Intraclass Correlation – ICC)?
• What is the reliability of each region’s sample mean, as an estimate of its true population mean?
• How much do individual East African citizens vary within and between the 15 regions in their attitudes towards media performance?
• Do the regions with a large highly educated citizenry vary in their evaluation of media performance within and between regions?
• Is the strength of association between gender characteristics and regime legitimacy controlling for the rule of law similar across regions? Or is being educated a more important predictor of regime legitimacy in some regions than others?

This statistical approach was important because we tested the news media influence on individual East Africans within each partner-state, and also estimated whether the predicted agenda setting influence significantly varied or diminished between regions as a function of other geopolitical characteristics. Drawing from the Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) example, we estimated whether any significant amount of random variation existed in any related individual-level predictor coefficients associated with the initial model estimation. This type of assessment involves cross-level interactions at the second level and the random variation in the second-level coefficient is predictable as a function of region-level variables (Kang and Kwak 2003). What this statistically means at level 2 is that there might be a violation of the independent assumptions, particularly the biased estimates of standard errors of means and regression weights related to the influence of the media on public attitudes (Type II error). Based on Dickinson and Basu (2005) methodology, multilevel modeling (or HLM) produces a decomposition of the
total variance established in Level 1 into a between-citizen, within-region components and between-region component.

The nested approach at level 2 in this study tested how much variation in the region-means, or adjusted region-means can be accounted for by differences in media exposure and media type. The relationship between attitude scores on media exposure (the outcome variable) and democratic rule as the independent predictor can differ from one region to another given the nature of geopolitics and regime type. Consequently, each region’s set of regression coefficients is predicted by one or more regional characteristics (media accessibility, media type, attitudes towards the regime, and demographics such as gender, the social economic status). For this study, the primary nesting centered on how inclusion of multiple predictor variables at the citizen level affected the estimated average difference in region-means between privately-owned media and state-owned media in each region of the partner-states. Four output models in level 2 estimate how much of the variation in region-means can be accounted for by differences in mean-regime type and region characteristics such as education and social economic status. The following were some of the questions tested in the multilevel models:

- How much of the explained variance within each East African region is reduced by adding gender as a predictor of media performance?

- How much variance can be accounted for by adding the individual education levels to the model?

- What is the average effect or the rate of change (regression slope) within the regions? How much of the explained variance within each East African region is
reduced by adding citizens’ attitudes towards regime legitimacy as a predictor of media performance?

- How much variance can be accounted for by adding gender to the model?
- What is the impact of variation in gender-based effect or the rate of change (regression slope) on attitudes towards the legitimacy of the regime within the regions?

Level two yields each region’s set of regression coefficients which are predicted by one or more region characteristics such as geopolitical identity, mean-regime type, and education composition. These averages are weighted at different levels in an HLM analysis in two specific components: a component applied to citizens within a region and a component applied to sets of regions. The full HLM model tests the following questions for the agenda setting influence:

- Do the Mean-Rule of Law and Mean-regime legitimacy account for variability across East African regions (predict the intercept)?
- Are there cross-level interactions within the East African regions in terms of the citizens’ attitudes towards regime legitimacy and the rule of law on media performance (predict the slope)?
- Finally, how much variation in the intercepts and the slopes is explained by using Mean-Rule and Mean-regimes as predictors of citizens’ attitudes towards media performance?

The overriding utility of the nested two-level analysis in this research is the possibility to pull out the variance into components which explain the effects of different levels of analysis. It adjusts for correlated error terms by not underestimating standard
errors and not assuming that errors within components are independent (Bryk and Raudenbush 2002). HLM partitioned the errors between individual attitude scores and across all the EAC regions in the dataset and also estimated cross-level effects in individual attitudes. Any possible increment in standard errors and the likelihood of Type 1 error were avoided or reduced within the sample size variations across units.
CHAPTER EIGHT

RESULTS

The purpose of this study is to determine the influence of the news media (radio, television, and newspapers) on public attitudes towards democratic rule in East Africa. The underlying objective is to determine whether there is a homogeneous pattern of media influence on public attitudes towards democratic rule across all 15 regions in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Before the specific objectives of the study are addressed, a description of the population sample, which represents the characteristics of all EAC respondents surveyed, is presented based on demographic information.

I examine correlation coefficients between measures of media performance and substantive liberal democracy. Regime legitimacy and rule of law are both constructs of substantive liberal democracy. Finally, I statistically utilize the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to test cross-level interactions between the EAC individual (citizens) characteristics and their attitudes towards regime legitimacy and rule of law. The HLM thus allows us to examine how public attitudes vary across regions as the outcome of either media influence or the government influence.

In summary, the news media in the EAC had a significant influence on public attitude regarding regime legitimacy from region to region. More specifically, the EAC citizens who report media influence within a region regarding regime legitimacy at the individual level, also collectively report greater media influence across regions. However, the news media did not influence citizens within and across regions in East Africa on issues of the rule of law. Meanwhile, the EAC governments influenced public attitudes
on matters of the rule of law in each region, with increased influence across regions, moderated by education.

8.1 Population Sample Characteristics by Country

East African citizens of voting age who participated in the study were asked to provide information regarding several demographic characteristics such as age, gender, region of residence, and education, among others. The first characteristic they responded to was their age bracket.

In the nationwide Ugandan population sample, 72% (n = 480) reported that they were 18 to 29 years old. In Tanzania, 53.3% (n = 466) reported that they were 18 to 29 years old; while the Kenyan population sample 76.3% (n = 448) indicated that they were within the 18 to 29 age bracket. In Uganda and Kenya, none of the respondents were 70 years or older, while in Tanzania, four respondents (less than 1%) were in the 70-79 age bracket. The main reason for this discrepancy in the age brackets of my sample is that the life expectancy of East Africans averages 41 years. Less than 4% of East Africans who are 60 years and older cannot read or write.

Female and male subjects were almost evenly divided in all three partner-states. There were 237 (49.4%) male respondents and 243 (50.6%) in Uganda, 210 (46.9%) males and 238 (53.1%) females in Kenya, and 235 (50.4%) male and 231 (49.6%) in Tanzania. Data showed an evenly divided sample between those who had completed high school and those with a completed bachelor’s degree (See Figure 8.1).
Participants also described their exposure and use of the news media, namely: newspapers, radio, television, and Internet news. In Uganda, 74.5% (n=481) of respondents indicated that they listen to the news on radio four or more days a week, compared to 66% (n=448) in Kenya and 78% (n=465) in Tanzania. In Uganda, 56.1% (n=481) watch television four or more days in a typical week compared to 58.3% (n=448) in Kenya and 49.3% (n=465) respondents in Tanzania.
When asked how many days in a typical week do respondents read, watch, or listen to news about the EAC, 40.2% (n=481) in Uganda indicated that they do so four or more days a week compared to 43.2% (n=448) in Kenya and 39.8% (n=465) in Tanzania. Figure 8.2 illustrates how often all respondents read, watch, or listen to news about East Africa in a typical week and how many days in a typical week, they follow news on current affairs about another EAC country where they do not reside.

Figure 8.2: Media Exposure: Do Respondents Access or Follow EAC News?

8.2 Regional Sample Descriptives for Media Performance

Subjects were asked to rate the performance of the news media during the democratization process in addition to covering pertinent issues relating to the rule of law, human rights, political accountability, among others. In Uganda, almost 57% of the respondents from the central and southern regions indicated that the news media in
general (both the state-owned and privately-owned media) make elected officials accountable; yet in the eastern, western, and northern regions, only 37% reported that the news media in general make elected officials accountable by region. The pattern here is that citizens’ attitudes are diametrically opposed, an issue I will explore in chapter nine.

Several differences in attitudes about media performance are consistent across all Ugandan regions. In southern, eastern, and northern Uganda, about 75% of the respondents indicated that political coverage is impartial while over 80% from the central region consider political coverage to be impartial. However, when subjects were asked which media type provides biased political news coverage, more than 79% from all five Ugandan regions reported that the state-owned news media did. Furthermore, three-quarters of Ugandan respondents indicated that the privately-owned news media cover politics and other national issues more responsibly; and about 58% (n=481) of the respondents across all regions indicated that the state-owned media are not responsible. Table 8.1 illustrates some of the questions that were asked about media performance in general.
Table 8.1:  Indicators of Media Performance in Uganda across Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Influence</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Northern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make elected officials accountable</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News content is truthful</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private media are responsible</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-17</td>
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<tr>
<td>State-owned media are responsible</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-59</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expose corruption or embezzlement</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-24</td>
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<td>-21</td>
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<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog on government</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News media are trustworthy</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>-45</td>
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<td>Political coverage is impartial</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>-21</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The positive numbers in Table 8.1 represent a mean score percentage of citizens in a region who said that the media performed that function somewhat well, well, or very well.
- The negative (-) numbers represent a mean score percentage of citizens in a region who said that the media performed that function: somewhat poorly, poorly, or very poorly.
- Note that some respondents chose to report “neutral” on some of the above items.
In Kenya, the media’s watchdog function on government received the highest approval from respondents across all regions in all three EAC partner-states. On average, about 73% of the respondents from all five regions in Kenya indicated that the news media in general (both the state-owned and privately-owned media) were a watchdog on government. However, respondents from the northern region of Kenya showed less agreement that the news media were a watchdog on government like in other regions.

In Kenya, a majority of the total number of respondents said that the news media, both private and state-owned, were not trustworthy. In the central region, 56% do not trust the news media and a slim majority of respondents from the southern region do not trust the news media. However, more than 60% (n= 448) of all respondents from all Kenyan provinces found the news content truthful. Three quarters of the respondents indicated that the news content in the privately-owned media was truthful. Respondents from the Southern, Eastern and Central regions of Kenya were skeptical about the truthfulness of the news content in the news media in general.

Meanwhile, three-quarters of Kenyan respondents indicated that the privately-owned news media covered politics and other national issues more responsibly and about 57% (n=448) said that the state-owned media were not responsible. Table 8.2 illustrates the answers to these and other questions.
Table 8.2: Indicators of Media Performance in Kenya across Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Influence</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Northern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make elected officials accountable</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>-36</td>
<td>-65</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News content is truthful</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private media are responsible</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>-59</td>
<td>-57</td>
<td>-65</td>
<td>-59</td>
<td>-43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expose corruption or embezzlement</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watchdog on government</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>-16</td>
<td>-26</td>
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<tr>
<td>News media are trustworthy</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political coverage is impartial</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The positive numbers in Table 8.2 represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who said that the media performed that function somewhat well, well, or very well.
- The negative (-) numbers represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who said that the media performed that function: somewhat poorly, poorly, or very poorly.
- Note that some respondents chose to report “neutral” on some of the above items.
A similar pattern of regional clustering of attitudes towards media performance was found in Tanzania. But unlike Uganda where almost two-thirds of respondents from the central and southern regions indicated that the news media in general make elected officials accountable, 52.8% respondents in the eastern region of Tanzania said the news media do not make elected officials accountable.

In terms of exposing corruption and embezzlement of public funds, 71% of the respondents across all regions of Tanzania said the news media in general (privately-owned and state-owned) perform that duty somewhat well, well, or very well. Furthermore, about 63% (n=465) indicated that the state-owned news media are not responsible when they cover national politics and 77% across all regions indicated that the state-owned media do not equitably provide a forum for political debates. Table 8.3 illustrates the results.
Table 8.3:  Indicators of Media Performance in Tanzania across Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Northern</th>
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<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>News content is truthful</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private media are responsible</td>
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<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned media are responsible</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expose corruption or embezzlement</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog on government</td>
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<td>News media are trustworthy</td>
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<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political coverage is impartial</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The positive numbers in Table 8.3 represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who said that the media performed that function somewhat well, well, or very well.
- The negative (−) numbers represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who said that the media performed that function: somewhat poorly, poorly, or very poorly.
- Note that some respondents chose to report “neutral” on some of the above items.
8.3 Regional Sample Descriptives for Regime Legitimacy

Data collected on questions concerning regime legitimacy in East Africa show diverse attitudes among respondents in each region from each partner-state. In Uganda, the majority of respondents from four regions found the regime under President Yoweri Museveni to be illegitimate, while residents from the western region said it was legitimate. In Kenya, the majority from the southern and western regions found the regime illegitimate while those from central and eastern regions said the regime under President Mwai Kibaki was legitimate. Meanwhile, respondents from all five regions in Tanzania supported their regime’s legitimacy. In fact, 15% (n=465) of respondents from all regions of Tanzania said the regime under President Jakaya Kikwete was legitimate.

To further explore the issue of regime legitimacy, respondents were also asked whether their president is a dictator. In Uganda, respondents from northern, eastern and central regions indicated that the president was a dictator. The data show that three quarters of respondents from northern Uganda said the president was a dictator. In Kenya, most respondents from the northern, southern, and western regions also saw Kibaki as a dictator but none of the regions in Tanzania saw Kikwete as a dictator. Table 8.4 provides detailed information about the regional contrasts for several indicators of regime legitimacy in the three partner-states.
Table 8.4: Indicators of Regime Legitimacy in the EAC across 15 Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Northern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime is Legitimate (Uganda)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime is Legitimate (Kenya)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime is Legitimate (Tanzania)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-08</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Government (Uganda)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-63</td>
<td>-61</td>
<td>-72</td>
<td>-57</td>
<td>-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Government (Kenya)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Government (Tanzania)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-81</td>
<td>-82</td>
<td>-74</td>
<td>-80</td>
<td>-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Regime (Uganda)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Regime (Kenya)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Regime (Tanzania)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President is a dictator (Uganda)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President is a dictator (Kenya)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President is a dictator (Tanzania)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The positive numbers in Table 8.4 represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who agreed or strongly agreed on several indicators of regime legitimacy.
- The negative (–) numbers represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who disagreed or strongly disagreed.
8.4 Regional Sample Descriptives for Rule of Law

As might be expected in countries that still hold onto archaic laws and authoritarian tendencies which are inimical to democratic rule, the majority of respondents across the EAC reported that there is less protection of human rights and justice than what is stipulated in the constitution.

On the question of whether the regimes violate the constitution, 60% of the respondents from central, eastern, western and northern regions in Uganda agreed that the regime violates the constitution. In Kenya, 56% from all five regions also agreed with the statement. In Tanzania however, respondents were almost split between those who disagreed (41%) and those who agreed (40%) that the regime violates the constitution (see Table 8.5). About 20% of all Tanzanians across all regions remained neutral.

I asked respondents whether all citizens have equal rights before the law. In the mean aggregate of their response, I found that more Tanzanians responded negatively than Ugandans and Kenyans. In Tanzania, about 73% (n=465) reported that they have no equal rights before the law, while in Kenya, that number is at 46% (n=448) and in Uganda at 59% (n=481). Table 8.5 provides detailed information about the regional contrasts for several indicators of the rule of law in the three partner-states.
Table 8.5: Indicators of the Rule of Law in the EAC across 15 Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Influence</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Northern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime violates the constitution (UG)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime violates the constitution (KE)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime violates the constitution (TZ)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-43</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-43</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens have equal rights (UG)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-71</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-67</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens have equal rights (KE)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens have equal rights (TZ)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-73</td>
<td>-78</td>
<td>-74</td>
<td>-69</td>
<td>-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary independent from regime (UG)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary independent from regime (KE)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary independent from regime (TZ)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a right to free speech &amp; to protest (UG)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a right to free speech &amp; to protest (KE)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a right to free speech &amp; to protest (TZ)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The positive numbers in Table 8.5 represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who agreed or strongly agreed on several indicators of regime legitimacy.
- The negative (–) numbers represent a mean score percentage of citizens in regions who disagreed or strongly disagreed.
- UG stands for Uganda, KE for Kenya, and TZ for Tanzania.
8.5  HLM Results for the Agenda Setting Influence

This comparative study investigates whether there is a homogeneous pattern of citizens’ attitudes across regions on the questions of media influence and democratic rule. The results here are drawn from 1395 East African citizens of voting age nested within 15 regions of the East African Community (EAC). The regions are Central, Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Western in each of the three partner-states. Sample sizes averaged about 92 citizens per region. I consider regions here because they account for the nature of geopolitical sectarianism and other political structuralism taking place in the EAC, which were outlined in chapter five.

Attention is restricted to three predictor variables at both levels of the analysis, which test the influence of the media on public attitudes towards democratic rule. The level-1 units are: the outcome $Y_{ij}$ which is the standard measure of media influence; and two predictors, (regime legitimacy) $l_j + (gender) \ 2j$ an indicator variable taking on a value of one for male and zero for female. Region-level variables include (mean-regime legitimacy) $l_w$, and (mean-rule of law) $2w$.

The level-1 units are the citizens’ gender, level of education, regime legitimacy, and rule of law and the level-2 units are education, mean-regime and mean-rule of law. The means and standard deviations for the individuals within each region at level-1 and level-2 predictors across all EAC regions are supplied in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6: Means and Standard Deviations: Agenda Setting Multilevel Models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE NAME</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MINIMUM</th>
<th>MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIMES</td>
<td>67.29</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>104.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RULE OF LAW</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA-INFLUENCE</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE NAME</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MINIMUM</th>
<th>MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME LEGITIMACY</td>
<td>67.35</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>64.39</td>
<td>70.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RULE OF LAW</td>
<td>42.78</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>40.83</td>
<td>44.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results simply indicate that HLM read the agenda setting variables data correctly. Level 1 N = 1395 individual citizens; and Level 2 N = 15 regions.

The initial statistical questions motivating this overall multilevel structure seek to determine how much individual East African citizens vary within and between the 15 regions in their attitudes towards the rule of law and regime legitimacy. As for the individual characteristics, I seek to know whether the regions with more highly educated citizenry vary within and between regions. Also, of importance in HLM is whether the strength of association between the respondents’ gender and levels of education predict media influence on public attitudes towards the regime and the rule of law across regions.
Or whether attitudes towards the rule of law and regime legitimacy are strong predictors of media influence in some regions and not in others when they interact with the citizens’ levels of education.

8.6 HLM Models 1 and 2 for Agenda Setting

The purpose of Model 1 of this analysis is to provide preliminary information about how much variation in the outcome lies within and between the East African regions. It determines the reliability of each EAC region’s sample mean as an estimate of the true population mean: \( Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij} \). Model 1 also allows each East African region to have unique intercepts (mean media influence), slopes (effects of the citizens’ characteristics on media influence), and error terms.

In level-1 of the first model, the outcome variable \( Y_{ij} \), which is media influence, is first tested as a One-way ANOVA with random effects to get a preliminary understanding of whether media influence in each region (the intercept as mean \( \beta_{0j} \)) is highly correlated. The model at level-1 accounts for the unique increment to that intercept associated with a particular region, \( r_{ij} \). In this case, the \( r_{ij} \) are the error terms (residuals) that estimate how EAC citizens vary around a particular East African region mean.

In addition, level 2 in model 1 estimates whether regions vary around the overall grand mean from a One-way ANOVA with random effects. When we predict the media influence in East Africa, the level-2 model, \( \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \), is fully unconditional and it helps to estimate the reliability of each region’s sample mean as an estimate of its true population mean (between region variability). Accordingly, the combined level-1 and -2
One-way ANOVA with random effects model estimates one fixed effect and two random effects: \( Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \). The three primary concerns here are:

- What is the variability in media influence within the East African regions?
- What is the proportion of variance in media influence between the East African regions (this is also referred to as the Intraclass correlation – ICC)?
- What is the reliability of each region’s sample mean as an estimate of its true population mean?

Results in model 1 show that there is variability in media influence within the East African regions. The estimated value of the variance at the individual (citizens) level, or within-regions, of the media influence scores is represented by sigma squared at 0.86. The estimated value of the variance at the region-level (level 2 or between-regions) of the media influence scores is represented by tau at 0.35. Therefore, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC), which is the proportion of variance in media influence occurring between the East African regions, is .29. This means that 29% of the total variance in the public attitude scores on media influence is accounted for by between-region differences.

The ICC variation between the EAC regions makes a statistically significant contribution to the analysis and is necessary for HLM analysis, despite the reality that 70% of the variance in the outcome of these data is at the citizen’s level (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Berger and Milem 2000). Typically, the ICC coefficient of 29% indicates that a multilevel or hierarchical model would provide considerable benefits over a standard fixed effects model for the analysis of these data. However, some research disciplines in the social sciences, such as sociology and psychology prefer an ICC which is higher than
30% to provide substantial benefits for the HLM analysis. My rationale for continuing
with the HLM despite a less than 30% ICC is based on the rationale used by several
scholars, such as Dickinson and Basu (2005, p54) who argue that, “Obviously, the degree
to which individuals within a practice are more similar than individuals in different
practices depends on the outcome of interest, as well as other factors, and will vary from
one study and situation to another.”

In model 1, the weighted least squares estimate for the grand mean of all EAC
regions on media influence is significant at coefficient $\gamma_{00} = 4.64$, with a standard error
of .038, yielding a 99% confidence interval across all citizens. The reliability estimate for
the intercept-1 or $\beta_{0j}$ is 0.544, which is a strong indicator of variability in individual
difference from the region mean. Since the fixed effects shown in Table 8.7 below show
that the parameter significantly varies across individuals, then it calls for further
examination in the second stage (from model 2 and beyond) of the analyses with
conditional models. Significant variance in the parameters must exist before researchers
attempt to account for systematic variation within each EAC region (Karney and
Bradbury 1995).

At level-2 of model 1 which measures the variance components with random
effects, the value of the likelihood function at iteration is $\ell = -1.89$. This likelihood
function is important for the veracity of the model. The Variance Component ($\tau_{00}$) as
shown in Table 8.7 is the variability within the individual EAC regions. The average
variability for individual regions/about the mean is .87. This tells us that 87% of the
variability is due to differences in media influence ($Y_j$) in each region, decomposed on the total variability of that number into the between-regions (level-2).

For Model 2, this phase of the analysis considered how the media influenced citizens’ attitudes across regions, and beyond individual differences, accounting for the citizens’ level of education and their gender. First of all, the logic of the random coefficient model is to allow both the intercept and the slope to be specified as random variables that show individual regressions for each region of East Africa. It accounts for variability in both the mean attitudes from media influence based on gender and education levels (as intercepts). Second, it accounts for the effects of gender and education levels across the regions (as slopes). The questions that inspire this consideration are:

- Is the influence of media on citizens’ attitudes based on gender or levels of education across the East African regions?
- How much of the explained variance within each East African region is reduced by adding gender as a predictor of media influence?
- How much variance exists in media influence when we add education levels? What is the average effect or rate of change (regression slope) within the regions?

Level 1 of Model 2 (the fixed effects results), shows the significance of gender as a strong factor in individual characteristics to estimating its association with media influence within-regions ($\gamma_{01}W_j = 4.643$). This simply means that the grand mean is different from a random number (0). At level-2, $\tau_{00} = .87$ is the variability (87% of the
variance) within the individual EAC regions around the mean. When gender is included in the model, there is a slight average variance increase of 6% and the Chi-Square ($\chi^2$) also increases by 2.15, yielding a 99% confidence interval.

Meanwhile, when education is added into the equation, the average gender differences from region to region remain significant (among the regions) at the intercept (4.582) but this significance drops from 99% to 95% confidence interval, P-value = .049. However, education is not a significant predictor for this model P-value = .830. It is possible that education may have less impact as a predictor of the media influence across all EAC regions. In other words, the level of education for individual citizens has no statistical significance on the outcome variable across the East African regions.

The $\beta_{02}$ in Table 8.7 shows that the relationship between media influence and education is actually negative, suggesting that when levels of education are higher across the regions, media influence tends to decrease. Since the P dimensional space at the education slope is greater than $\alpha .05$, I remove it from the next phase of the HLM model. Table 8.7 provides detailed information on the One-way ANOVA with Random Effects for model 1 in contrast with Model 2, which estimates the Means-as-Outcome Regression. For model 2, the following two predictor variables are introduced: $Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{01}$*(Gender) + $\beta_{02}$*(Education) + $r_{ij}$. 

131
Table 8.7  HLM Models 1 and 2 – Predictors of Media Influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effect</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>T-ratio</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{0j, Intcpt \gamma_{00}}$</td>
<td>4.643</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>122.15</td>
<td>14¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{0j, Intcpt \gamma_{00}}$</td>
<td>4.583</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>100.86</td>
<td>14²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender $\beta_{01, \gamma_{10}}$</td>
<td>4.643*</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>122.15</td>
<td>14²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance Components (with robust standard errors) at Level 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Var. Comp.</th>
<th>Chi-Sq.</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intcpt-1, $U_{0j}$</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>31.38</td>
<td>14¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level-1, $r_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{0j, Intcpt \gamma_{00}}$</td>
<td>4.582</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>99.88</td>
<td>14²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender $\beta_{01, \gamma_{10}}$</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>14²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education $\beta_{02, \gamma_{20}}$</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>14²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Model 1 is a One-way ANOVA with Random Effects ($Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$), without introducing any predictive variables.
- Model 2 is a Means-as-Outcome Regression ($Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_{j} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$), introducing some predictor variables.
- The asterisk (*) denotes a $p < .001$, for a two-tailed test.
- Level 1 estimates how much variance in the DV exists at the individual-level.
- Level 2 estimates variance at the EAC Region-level (or ANOVA model).
- The power $¹$ symbol (df¹) denotes Model 1 and power $²$ (df²) denotes Model 2.
8.7 HLM Full Model for Agenda Setting

In Model 3, I consider the citizens attitudes towards regime legitimacy as a predictor of media influence both at the individual level and at the EAC regional level. This is the random coefficients regression model which estimates whether there was systematic between-group variance in the intercept parameter (regime legitimacy) and the slope parameter (media influence) accounting for the citizens’ gender. The questions that inspire this model are:

- How much of the explained variance within each EAC region is reduced by adding regime legitimacy as a predictor of media influence?
- How much variance can be accounted for by adding gender to the model?
- What is the rate of change (regression slope) on attitudes towards regime legitimacy within the regions?

Model 3, level-1 of the estimated effects of gender and regime legitimacy on media influence are significant at \( p = .001 \) for regime legitimacy and \( .013 \) for gender. The average regime differences at level 2 are still significant at the slope \( U_{0i} \ p = .020 \).

The \( P \) dimensional space at the gender slope diminishes significantly when regime legitimacy is added into the model. I therefore retain regime legitimacy for the next full model as a strong predictor of media influence across regions. Results show that the largest amount of region-level variation for the conditional variance components is regime legitimacy while individual factors explain a higher level of variation for regime legitimacy than gender. The results in all of the models suggest that gender differences still have a significant effect on how the media influence public attitudes; and unless
regime legitimacy is accounted for, the effect of gender does not vary significantly across regional contexts.

In the full model, while the citizen level (Level 1) remains unchanged in terms of predictor variables, level-2 is expanded to incorporate two predictors. These are the Mean-Rule of Law and the Mean-Regime Legitimacy. These are written as follows in the full model:

Level-1 Model: $Y_{ij} = \beta_0j + \beta_{01}(\text{Regimes}) + \beta_{02}(\text{Gender}) + r_{ij}$

Level-2 Model: $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{MeanRule})_i + \gamma_{02}(\text{MeanRegime})_i + \mu_{0j}$

As in previous analyses, level-2 random effects, $\mu_{0j}$ and $\mu_{1j}$ are distributed as multivariate normal with means that are equal to zero and the residuals that finally become “conditional variance-covariance components.” This means that both components in the matrix represent the residual variance dispersion in the level-1 coefficients ($\beta_{0j}$ and $\beta_{1j}$) after controlling for mean-rule of law and mean-regime legitimacy. Building the full model allows the use of level-2 predictor variables to explain variability in all parameters with regional effects. Three questions motivate the full model analysis:

- Do the mean-rule of law and mean-regime legitimacy account for variability across East African regions (predict the intercept)?
- Are there cross-level interactions of regime legitimacy, rule of law, and individual characteristics within the East African regions to predict the slope?
- Finally, how much variation in the intercepts and the slopes is explained by using mean-Rule and mean-regime legitimacy as predictors of media influence?
Notice that regime legitimacy remains significant at the individual level in model 3, but its interaction with rest of the predictors is not significant at the full model. Yet previously, results from the random coefficient regression model indicated that there was significant variation in gender and regime legitimacy across the East African regions in predicting media influence. The data show that mean-rule of law is not needed in the model because regional-level interactions are not significant beyond level-1.

The effect of the media on regime legitimacy varies across regions and contexts, such as gender. The regime legitimacy estimates at both the individual level (within-region fixed effects) and the regional level (with random effects) is a strong predictor of media influence. Table 8.8 provides a detailed outlook of the random coefficient regression (Model 3) and the intercept- and slopes-as-outcome (Full) model.

In summary of the HLM models for agenda setting, I cautiously interpret the media influence on public attitudes towards the rule of law at a regional level, since the effect of aggregated mean-rule of law and the rule of law (at level-2) were no longer significant in the full model. What I can specifically estimate is that the news media in the EAC has a significant influence on public attitude regarding regime legitimacy from region to region. The EAC citizens who report media influence within a region regarding regime legitimacy at the individual level, also collectively report greater media influence across regions. See Table 8.8 below for details.
Table 8.8  HLM Model 3 & the Full Model – Predictors of Media Influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effect</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>T-ratio</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{0j, Intcpt} \gamma_{00} )</td>
<td>4.106</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes ( \beta_{01}, \gamma_{10} )</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1392³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ( \beta_{02}, \gamma_{20} )</td>
<td>0.125*</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1392³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{MeanRule, } \gamma_{01} )</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>13ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes ( \beta_{01}, \gamma_{10} )</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>13ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{MeanReg } \beta_{11} )</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>13ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ( \beta_{02}, \gamma_{20} )</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>14ª</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Variance Components (with robust standard errors) at Level 2 |
|------------------------|------------|------------|---------|-----|
| Random Effect          | Std. Dev. | Var. Comp. | Chi-Sq. | df  |
| \( Intcpt-1, U_0 \)    | 0.466      | 0.22       | 19.84   | 14³ |
| Regimes, \( U_{01} \)  | 0.009      | 0.00       | 26.88   | 14³ |
| Gender, \( U_{02} \)   | 0.120      | 0.02       | 18.13   | 14³ |
| \( Intcpt-1, U_0 \)    | 0.458      | 0.21       | 18.71   | 13ª |
| Regimes, \( U_{01} \)  | 0.009*     | 0.00       | 27.20   | 13ª |
| Gender, \( U_{02} \)   | 0.114      | 0.01       | 18.13   | 13ª |

- Model 3 is a Random-Coefficients Regression. It assesses region-to-region variance for intercept and slope parameters: \( Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_{j}) + \mu_{0j} + \mu_{ij}(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_{j}) + r_{ij} \)
- Model 4 is the full mixed model, or the intercept- and slopes-as-outcome model, which allows testing the main effects and interactions within and between levels.
- The power \(^³\) symbol (df\(^³\)) denotes the Model 3 and power \(^ª\) (df\(^ª\)) denotes Full Model.
- The asterisk (*) denotes a \( P < .05 \), (**) \( P < .001 \). L-1, \( R = 0.85 \) Var. Component.
8.8 HLM Results for the Agenda Building Influence

For the analysis on agenda building, the dependent variable here is a basic measure of government influence on public attitudes. It involves the summation of five interrelated items pertaining to the respondents’ stated conduct resulting from government political persuasion or authority. Attention is also restricted to two citizen-level variables that test the influence of the government on public attitudes towards democratic rule accounting for individual characteristics at the citizen-level. The level-1 units are: the outcome $Y_{ij}$ which is the standard measure of government role; and two predictors, (regime legitimacy) $lj$ + (education) $2j$. Region-level variables include (mean-regime legitimacy) $lw$, and (mean-rule of law) $2w$. The means and standard deviations for the level-1 and level-2 predictors are supplied in Table 8.9.

The initial statistical questions motivating this overall HLM analytical framework seek to determine how much the individual East African citizens vary within and between the 15 EAC regions in their attitudes towards the government. As for the individual characteristics, I seek to know whether the regions with more highly educated citizenry vary in their evaluation of state authority and influence within and between regions. Also, of importance in HLM is whether the strength of association between the respondents’ level of education and gender intervenes in their attitudes towards the regime and the rule of law across regions. Or is being educated a more important predictor of government influence in some regions than others, when the rule of law and regime legitimacy are part of the equation?
Table 8.9: Means and Standard Deviations: Agenda Building Multilevel Models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE NAME</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MINIMUM</th>
<th>MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RULE OF LAW</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME</td>
<td>25.58</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>49.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV’T ROLE</td>
<td>14.14</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>28.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE NAME</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MINIMUM</th>
<th>MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RULE OF LAW</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME LEGITIMACY</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV’T ROLE</td>
<td>14.47</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Results simply indicate that HLM read the agenda building variable data correctly
- Level 1 N = 1395 individual citizens; and Level 2 N = 15 regions.

8.9 HLM Models 1 and 2 for Agenda Building

Testing the government influence on public attitudes assumes that some of the variations are a product of regional characteristics in addition to the citizens’ experiences and thus will be estimated in the between-region (level 2) models. Results in model 1 show that there is variability in government influence within the East African regions. The results in the unconditional model (or the One-way ANOVA with no level-1 and
level-2 predictors) indicate that the maximum-likelihood coefficient for the government influence is 14.144 with a standard error of 0.24, indicating a 99% confidence interval.

When I partitioned the variance in the outcome into its within- and between-region components, the proportion of variance in government influence that exists between regions (or the ICC) was relatively higher than for the media influence. The ICC in government influence occurring between the East African regions is .32. This means that 32% of the total variance in the public attitude scores on government influence was accounted for by region-to-region differences. This ICC indicates that finding geopolitical effects is more likely than it was in the media influence multilevel structure in the previous sections of this chapter. The next step was to model the between-region proportion of variance as a function of individual and regional characteristics. The average variability for regions about the mean, which is due to differences in the mean number of within-region individuals (level-1) on government influence ($Y_i$) is .88.

In the next phase of the analysis, I added similar independent variables to model 1 (One-way ANOVA with random effects) and model 2 (the Means-as-Outcome Regression) similar to the media influence models. The first two models test whether the rule of law, regime legitimacy, gender and education levels are estimated as fixed or random effects. How much of the explained variance within each East African region is reduced by adding gender or the levels of education as predictors of influence? How much variance exists in government influence when we add regime legitimacy? What is the average effect or rate of change (regression slope) within the regions?

The $P$-value for $\beta_{01}$ (gender) at level-1 of the Means-as-Outcome Regression is 0.478; so I conclude that there is no significant variation across individuals on the
influence of government regarding attitudes towards the rule of law and regime legitimacy. This model explained only 21 percent of the variance too. I drop the gender variable from further models because each region does not have effects of government on the individual gender characteristic.

Results of the intercept-as-outcome models for the multilevel equation 

\[ Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \]

show that regime legitimacy is not a significant predictor of government influence within the regions. For education, the effect (slope) is larger than gender as a predictor of government influence when both models are compared in the first and second phase. In other words, the level of education for individual citizens was statistically significant on the outcome variable across the East African regions: P-value = .004, but not at the individual level. The slopes at the individual level-1 of government influence (outcome variable) were as follows: (Government influence \( \beta_{ij} \)) = \( \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Education}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{Rule of Law}) + \gamma_{03}(\text{Regime legitimacy}) + r_{ij} \).

Education was nearing, but not statistically significant, for the level-1 maximum likelihood fixed effect at \( (\gamma_{02} = -0.335, t = -0.106; p > 0.05) \); and regime legitimacy had no significant association at level-1: \( (\gamma_{03} = 0.021, t = 1.077; \text{P-value} = 0.30) \). Note that the slope is negative for education, meaning that government influence on public attitudes has a negative effect within each region when the scores of the citizens’ level of education are higher.

Meanwhile, education was significant at level-2, for the maximum likelihood random effects of variance components at \( (\gamma_{01} = 0.485, t = 0.149; p < 0.05) \). The rule of law had a significant association at level-2 maximum likelihood random effects of
variance components at \( SD = 0.054, \chi^2 = 24.22; p < 0.05 \); and regime legitimacy still had no significant association at level-2: \( SD = -0.029, \chi^2 = 11.16; p > 0.05 \). If one plots the predicted values of the model (See Figures 8.4), it becomes more easily comprehensible how the nature of government influence conditioned public attitudes towards the rule of law.

**Figure 8.4: Predictors of Government Influence on Rule of Law**

- From left to right, the first five regions are within Uganda (1=Central, 2=Southern, 3=Eastern, 4=Western and 5=Northern).
- The second group of five regions are within Kenya (6=Central, 7=Southern, 8=Eastern, 9=Western and 10=Northern).
- The third group of five regions are within Tanzania (11=Central, 12=Southern, 13=Eastern, 14=Western and 15=Northern).

Figure 8.4 gives side-by-side graphical summaries of the distributions of government influence for the 15 EAC regions sorted by the mean-rule of law at level-2.

The x-axis denotes region-to-region variations and the y-axis denotes estimates of public
attitudes towards the rule of law calculated by mean random effects coefficients. For example, the plot shows that the central region of Uganda (the first on the left) has a median score of about 15.15, which is close to the highest mean public attitude toward the rule of law within that region in the EAC.

The distribution of the scores of citizens in the central region of Uganda is negatively skewed, but it has no outliers. Region 2 from the left, which is southern Uganda, has two outliers at the upper end. The graphical summary shows three regions without outliers. On the whole, the scores of these 15 EAC regions display greater variability, as defined by the lengths of the boxes or interquartile ranges. The highest mean-rule of law score among the 15 regions was 16.5. Figure 8.5 provides the predicted values of regime legitimacy from government influence.
Figure 8.5: Predictors of Government Influence on Regime Legitimacy

From left to right, the first five regions are within Uganda (1=Central, 2=Southern, 3=Eastern, 4=Western and 5=Northern).

The second group of five regions are within Kenya (6=Central, 7=Southern, 8=Eastern, 9=Western and 10=Northern).

The third group of five regions are within Tanzania (11=Central, 12=Southern, 13=Eastern, 14=Western and 15=Northern).

Box-whisker markers show the range between the 25th to 75th percentiles and calculate a table of distribution statistics within each region.
8.10 HLM Full Model for Agenda Building

As I stated earlier on, building the HLM full model allows the use of Level 2 predictor variables to explain variability in all parameters with group effects. The HLM full model equation tests the following predictors:

Level-1 Model: \( Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{01} \text{(Rule of Law)} + \beta_{02} \text{(Regime)} + r_{ij} \)

Level-2 Model:
\[
\begin{align*}
\beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{(Education)}_j + \gamma_{02} \text{(MeanRule-Law)}_j + \mu_{0j} \\
\beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} \text{(Mean-Regime)}_j + \mu_{01j}
\end{align*}
\]

- Do the rule of law and regime legitimacy account for variability across East African regions (predict the intercept)?
- Are there cross-level interactions within the East African regions (predict the slope) across a two-level structure by modeling all predictors of the government influence?
- How much variation in the intercepts and the slopes is explained by using Mean-rule of law, mean-regime and education as predictors of government influence?

Results from the Full Model in Table 8.10 show that education was a statistically significant predictor of government influence across the East African regions: \( \gamma_{01} = 0.495, SE = 0.018; p < 0.05 \). The rule of law had a significant negative association at level-1 maximum likelihood fixed effects of the full model. The level-2 models depicted in Table 8.10 below shows that all predictors of government influence were significant at \( p < 0.05 \), except regime legitimacy. This was explained by 86% of the variance in the intercepts and slopes. These results underscore cross-level interaction possibilities that between-region variance exists in governments’ influence of public attitudes towards the rule of law, when levels of education are considered.
Table 8.10  HLM Models 3 & the Full Model – Predictors of Gov’t Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effect</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>T-ratio</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{0j}, Intercept$</td>
<td>13.600</td>
<td>2.011</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education $\beta_{01}, \gamma_{01}$</td>
<td>0.487*</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>12³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule-Law $\beta_{10}, \gamma_{10}$</td>
<td>-0.033*</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>12³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, $\gamma_{01}$</td>
<td>0.495*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>12ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MeanRule, $\gamma_{01}$</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>12ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule-Law $\beta_{10}, \gamma_{10}$</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>14ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime $\beta_{1}, \gamma_{20}$</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>13ª</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance Components (with robust standard errors) at Level 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Var. Comp.</th>
<th>Chi-Sq.</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept-1, $U_0$</td>
<td>2.797*</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>26.66</td>
<td>12³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule-Law, $U_{01}$</td>
<td>0.054*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>24.23</td>
<td>14³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime, $U_{02}$</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td>14³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept-1, $U_0$</td>
<td>2.779*</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>26.63</td>
<td>12ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule-Law, $U_{01}$</td>
<td>0.054*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>24.21</td>
<td>14ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime, $U_{02}$</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>13ª</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Model 3 is a Random-Coefficients Regression. It assesses region-to-region variance for intercept and slope parameters: $Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j) + \mu_{0j} + \mu_{1j}(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j) + r_{ij}$
- Model 4 is the full mixed model, or the intercept- and slopes-as-outcome model, which allows testing the main effects and interactions within and between levels.
- The power $³$ symbol (df³) denotes the Model 3 and power $ª$ (dfª) denotes Full Model.
- The asterisk (*) denotes a $P < .05$, (** $P < .001$). L-1, $R = 0.86$ Var. Component.
CHAPTER NINE

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter contains key findings, conclusions, implications and prospects for the future of the EAC. The overall purpose of this research was to determine whether it is either the agenda setting approach or the agenda building process that offers the strongest influence on public attitudes towards democratic rule in East Africa. Several objectives were articulated in the introduction and other earlier chapters. The first one was to descriptively determine how some of the important qualities that constitute the rule of law and regime legitimacy impact public attitudes in each East African Community (EAC) partner-state.

The second objective was to determine the extent to which the media influence public attitudes on matters of regime legitimacy and the rule of law in each EAC partner-state. Connected to the second objective was the question of the extent to which the EAC governments influence public attitudes on issues of regime legitimacy and the rule of law, and compare that with the media’s influence. Given the nature of geopolitics in East Africa, which is perpetuated by the political leaders, the third and central objective was to estimate whether the government influence (agenda building) and the media influence (agenda setting) on public attitudes towards democratic rule are homogenous across East Africans of all education levels and gender.

The following were the specific questions posed for this research.

1. How do issues of democratic rule in the news media impact the attitudes of East Africans towards the East African Community?
2. a). To what extent do the media influence public attitudes towards regime legitimacy in each EAC partner-state?

b). Does the government influence public attitudes towards democratic rule more than the news media?

3. Is the agenda setting influence on attitudes towards the rule of law and regime legitimacy in each region of the partner-states the same across East Africans of all education levels and gender?

4. Is the agenda building influence on attitudes towards democratic rule in each region the same across East Africans of all education levels and gender?

The results of this study support a number of significant conclusions, implications and recommendations for the future of the media and democracy in the EAC. Recommendations for the media performance in the democratization and confederation of East Africa are also discussed.

9.1 **Summary of Key Findings**

The central objective was to examine which communication process (agenda setting or agenda building) offers the strongest influence on public attitudes on issues concerning democratic rule in the East African Community (EAC). I proceeded under the assumption that the media neither perform their obligations with a clearly defined agenda regarding broader issues like democratization, nor are all media accessible equally to everyone across all regions of the EAC. My assumption was that the media’s influence on public attitudes could be undermined by regional variations in political experiences
with the central government. Also proffered was that public opinion in East Africa could be shaped by regional alignment, ethnicity, political identity, and level of education. A total of 1,395 respondents from the EAC were surveyed using a multistage cluster random sampling. This research conceptualized a hierarchy of theoretical models to estimate which communication process offers the strongest influence.

- First, the media influence on public attitudes when issues of regime legitimacy were raised was significant within and across all regions of the EAC, and moderated by gender.
- Education was not a significant predictor of agenda setting, within and across all EAC regions when issues of regime legitimacy were raised.
- The news media did not influence citizens within and across regions in East Africa on issues of the rule of law.
- When education levels are higher across the regions, media influence tends to decrease.

Second, agenda building on matters of democratic rule in each region is not the same across East Africans of different education levels and gender.

- The EAC governments influenced public attitudes on matters of the rule of law in each region, with increased influence across regions, and moderated by education.
- The influence of governments on public attitudes on matters of the rule of law at the individual level is not based on gender differences.
- The EAC governments had no significant influence on individuals within regions and across regions when issues of regime legitimacy were raised. Gender had neither a moderating influence nor cross-level effects in the full model.
- Educated individuals in each region are more likely to reject the government stance on matters of the rule of law and regime legitimacy but the majority with less than a college generally accepts that stance.

Based on these findings, I conclude that looking only at the role of media in shaping public opinion in East Africa on issues of democratic rule may not be sufficient without considering the government influence and the nature of geopolitical sectarianism. The study shows the agenda setting influence on the legitimacy of the regimes in East Africa but not on issues concerning the rule of law. The results also show agenda building influence on matters concerning the rule of law, but no significant influence on the legitimacy of these regimes.

Agenda setting is associated with differences in gender, but not education, while agenda building is associated with differences in education, not gender. Therefore, media performance on democratic rule in East Africa is undercut by government influence on matters of the rule of law but not regime legitimacy. This is the case both at the individual and regional levels. According to the intra-class correlations (ICC) and the full model cross-level results, the most revealing finding here is that EAC governments have a stronger influence on public attitudes towards democratic rule than the news media. See figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1  Agenda Building and Agenda Setting Influence in the EAC

- Figure 9.1 shows how agenda setting (AS or media influence) and agenda building (AB or government influence) influences public attitudes on key issues of democratic rule: regime legitimacy and the rule of law in the East African Community.
- Arrow A (→): AS = regime legitimacy, increased by gender at the individual level.
- Arrow B (→): AB = rule of law, increased by education at the individual level.
- Arrow C (→): AS = regime legitimacy, increased gender at the regional level.
- Arrow D (→): AB = rule of law, increased by education at the regional level.
- Arrow E (←): AS = regime legitimacy; gender not a factor within & across regions.
- Arrow F (→): AB = rule of law; increased by education within and across regions.
9.1 Evaluating the Media in the EAC

The findings indicate that there are both positive and negative evaluations of media performance in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Most respondents in all three countries state that coverage of politics is impartial. The majority of Ugandans from all regions indicated that the news media do not make elected officials accountable, whereas Kenyans were evenly divided from a regional standpoint on the same issue. In Tanzania, a slim majority indicate that the press makes elected officials accountable. In addition, most Tanzanians trust the news media, while Kenyans are evenly divided from a regional standpoint, and a slim majority of Ugandans indicate that the news media are not trustworthy. This uncomplimentary public opinion of media performance by Ugandans and Kenyans concerning political coverage is reminiscent of the prevailing political volatility and autocratic working conditions of journalists.

The uncomplimentary opinions about media performance in Uganda and Kenya can be attributed to the state’s attempts to control and suppress the independent press, coupled with the unfavorable media regulatory statutes, and intimidation of journalists by law enforcement (Dicklitch and Lwanga 2003; Kilimwiko 2006; Kambenga 2005). The press becomes a purveyor of state propaganda where the state owns the national media or when private media owners enjoy state patronage for tax relief benefits and other economic arrangements. As the literature has demonstrated, the state-owned media also deny opposition politicians a platform to have their views heard (Kilimwiko 2006; Ocitti 2006; Omosa and McCormick 2004). The findings support that assumption since more than three-quarters of all respondents agreed that the state-owned media are irresponsible.
Meanwhile, the majority of East Africans rated private media as responsible. The findings also indicate that privately-owned media had a more responsible role to play in the realization of the democratic rule, an issue that is articulated throughout this study. However, the extent of their influence was not the same in every region and every country as I later established from the HLM analysis. From these descriptive findings, I conclude that the independent media are more crucial to mobilizing and politically energizing citizens to delegitimize autocracy than the state-owned media. For instance, the privately-owned media, such as Kenya’s *Daily Nation* and Uganda’s *Daily Monitor*, exerted pressure on President Daniel Moi and President Yoweri Museveni in the 1990s to allow multiparty democracy amidst extreme hostility from those governments.

It has been argued previously that the watchdog role of the press in a substantive liberal democracy has a duty to promote transparency, the rule of law, and good governance by alerting the citizenry about misuse of power and autocracy (Ukpabi 2001; Lush 1998). The majority of respondents agreed that the media fulfill this role, which is a necessary condition for effective checks on democratic governance. The nuances of this watchdog role, as seen by the survey respondents from the media ownership perspective (privately-owned or state-owned media), were not assessed in this dissertation but certainly warrant further research.

The majority of East Africans indicated that the news media expose corruption or embezzlement of public funds. The findings suggest that the news media in all three countries have been truthful, but not impartial. However, truth in journalism has several interpretations, especially in East Africa. For instance, the news media may be a watchdog on government with an objective of promoting state propaganda and
chronicling activities initiated by the state. The media might also be truthful by accurately reporting the government business with the checks and balances. Most importantly, another form of truth may be to investigate and accurately expose wrongdoing and to expose state excesses for the public interest and wellbeing of society. I conclude that the public rated the media to be truthful in their coverage of news, and impartial because of the kind of coverage which tends to accurately report the positive side of government.

It is my submission that state leaders try to tear down the adversarial role of the press that is aimed at state institutions, which advocates and gives citizens the information needed to make the right decisions in a democratic society.

9.2 Democratic Rule in the EAC

This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate how the EAC governments influence public opinion on matters of the rule of law. The institutions which must be allowed to provide the necessary checks and balances of political power include the free press, an independent judiciary, and a functioning civil society, where citizens freely and effectively participate in their own governance. The study also conceptualized democratic rule in the EAC as based on principles of regime legitimacy, in which a government accommodates free expression, allows political competition, respects human rights, and exercises transparency and accountability.

East Africans generally agreed that the regime is legitimate and do not trust their government. Government mistrust, especially in Uganda, could be due to misuse of the treasury by officials and the misuse of presidential authority which disrupts the opposition with unwarranted arrests. In Kenya and Tanzania, citizens in some regions are
denied the right to freely protest. In all three EAC partner-states, citizens are frustrated with worsening economic and public infrastructure and the lack of basic public services such as uninterrupted distribution of electricity, healthcare services and quality education.

The findings here support the argument that the EAC governments lose public trust and legitimacy when conditions reveal that political leaders have not equitably provided economic opportunities to citizens (Bratton et al. 2005; van de Walle 2002). State leaders in East Africa reward their elite supporters from the same geopolitical ethnic regions with government jobs and other benefits to the detriment of other citizens in order to consolidate political ties (Mugisha 2004; Schatzberg 2001). That may explain a significant variation between regions on the question of regime legitimacy.

The overall descriptive findings of the public attitudes towards the rule of law indicate governments violate the constitution. Popular support of equal rights for all citizens is low. The majority of Tanzanians and Ugandans, and half of Kenyans stated that citizens do not have equal rights before the law. An absolute majority disagreed that the judiciary was independent from the regime in each partner state.

The reports of government repression, torture, and detention without trial of civilians in Uganda and Kenya during the previous and current regimes (Brown 2003; Baker 2004) may explain these public attitudes. Throughout East Africa, the sentiments of respondents are best interpreted as an outcry regarding the terms and conditions surrounding the appointment of judges. I take these results as a strong signal that citizens array their fears to the undue and improper political pressure which the EAC governments have exerted on the judiciary in the last two decades to convict the
opposition on politically motivated charges (Oloka-Onyango 1995; Mugisha 2004; Osaghae 2005).

The people of northern, central, and eastern Uganda said President Museveni was a dictator. This is not a surprising finding because of the ongoing war in the north and the extrajudicial killings, which many people in that region say was perpetuated by the military and Museveni’s government. The same regions also labeled the regime as authoritarian. Perhaps these results can be understood in the context of what occurred in the late 1980s to 1990s, when the Ugandan army under Museveni’s regime ethnically marginalized the Acholis and Langis in the north during the rebellion. In the 20 years of Museveni’s reign, the northern, eastern, central, and northeastern regions were deprived of basic social services in education, health, and economics.

In Kenya, respondents from the northern and western regions also labeled President Kibaki a dictator. However, I have come to mixed conclusions on the matter of authoritarianism and presidential dictatorship in Kenya. Kenyans could not draw a clear and remarkable distinction between those who considered the president a dictator and those who did not. Notably, Kenyans from the central and eastern regions said they do not consider the president a dictator but yet they do not trust the government. Clearly, government bureaucrats in Kenya perform poorly, but the citizens in these two regions do not attribute the country’s failures to the political head.

Most Tanzanians do not trust their government but the majority still believes the regime is legitimate. This means that Tanzanians do not associate governmental trust with regime legitimacy in which the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) continues to dominate politics, stifle the opposition, and control all state institutions. Tanzanians are
also torn between those who consider the regime authoritarian and those who do not. In fact, citizens from three out of five regions label the regime authoritarian but the number of those who label it as such is not substantial. Given the high levels of government mistrust and mixed feelings about regime authoritarianism, yet many believe that the regime is legitimate, it is likely that those who do not trust the government had the CCM in mind. For three decades, CCM has sustained its authoritative influence on the governing state institutions and encouraged political patronage to achieve legitimacy. For example, I previously stated instances where CCM bureaucrats committed extrajudicial killings and corruption in the 1990s, but were set free by state prosecutors. It controlled provincial power and sustained the regime’s grip on state power for over 30 years through “nation-building.” In other words, the CCM was quite successful at creating a multi-ethnic ruling elite and embraced regional politics of inclusiveness, which characterized cabinet portfolios and institutional sector representation to all major ethnic groups.

9.3 Agenda Setting Influence

This study investigated media influence on public attitudes towards democratic rule, both at the individual and region levels. I investigated the relationship between regime legitimacy, education, gender, and rule of law with the outcome variable, media influence. HLM results supported the theoretical argument that media exposure to issues leads to attitudes towards that issue salience (Wanta et al. 2004) and that when individuals are highly interested in national issues, they are more likely to be influenced by the media (Peter 2003; Wanta 1997). Results suggest the news media exert a positive
influence on public attitudes at the individual level based on gender differences, with increased influence within regions where citizens feel marginalized. The increment of the media influence on individual citizens when gender differences are included is .06% within the regions, especially more significant where citizens decry authoritarianism and government mistrust (regime legitimacy). However, education is not a significant factor in media influence of citizens within the regions.

Previous literature showcased the role of media and democracy in East Africa since the media have been in the forefront of political education, fostering public debate and sensitizing society about the virtues of democracy (Kannyo 2004; Ocitti 2006). What I did not expect was that the media influence on individual citizens towards democratic rule would be based on the geopolitics within a region. One possible reason for such an outcome is that the governments selectively insinuate geopolitical sentiments using regional radio stations and the national television stations to seek public support and to dissuade critics from launching successful campaigns against the regime. As previously stated in chapter 6, regional media are owned and controlled by individuals connected with the government or who purposefully seek state patronage for economic gains.

The kind of media agenda which is created in each region has a facilitative role to play as crusaders of the democratic rule in their respective markets (regions). In this case, the media had a significant influence on individuals within regions when issues of regime legitimacy were raised. The dichotomy here is that the media in some of the marginalized and unstable regions may report incidences of human rights abuse (in northern Uganda or northern Kenya), while the press in other regions may support government projects by reporting on peace, security, and justice (like the media in western Uganda, western
Kenya, and central Tanzania). In this case, both of these media agendas influence citizens in their regions in significantly differing ways. Arguably, the significance of media influence on individuals within regions on issues of regime legitimacy supports previous inference that the regional media are regarded as the voice of the nation and are used by state leaders to infuse their authority directly to the people. This is done in a way that listeners in rural areas conceive the media as a government-mouthpiece and radio used to sustain the political legitimacy of state leaders and to stabilize the broader polity (Schatzberg 2001; Ruteere 2006; Wanyande 1996).

The results indicate that the news media do not influence citizens at the individual level within regions in East Africa when issues of the rule of law were raised. The best explanation for this could be that in all three partner-states, the media are disempowered by archaic press laws and the lack of unconditional freedom of expression that would allow both journalists and citizens to express their opinions about the government through the media. As outlined in chapter 3 (sections 3 and 4), bureaucrats do not fully safeguard and respect constitution rules and rights of both citizens and the news media, and consequently, the existing media laws in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are not seen as conducive for building the rule of law and advocating for good governance (Mute 2000; Kilimwiko 2006; Balikowa 2002). For example, leaders use state-owned radio and TV stations to manipulate voters by inciting ethnic divisions, selectively labeling opponents as terrorists and opportunists and in the process dissuading critics of the regime from launching a successful campaign.

The influence of the media on public attitudes towards regime legitimacy was confirmed at the second level of the analysis, across all East African regions. The
relationship between the media and education was negative, suggesting that when levels of education are higher across the regions, media influence tends to decrease. The findings also suggest that there are gender differences moderating media influence (agenda setting) on citizens’ attitudes towards regime legitimacy both at the individual level within a region and comparatively across all EAC regions. The news media in general had the greatest impact in inducing an audience to reject authoritarian rule, especially in regions where citizens do not trust government and where the majority label the president a dictator. Listening, reading, and watching news makes Kenyans and Ugandans in particular more likely to label the regime illegitimate, although these effects of media influence are not particularly strong when we consider education.

In summary, the HLM has shown that the media enhances public attitudes on issues of regime legitimacy, with increased outcome on media influence when gender is examined between the regions. That is a function of the agenda setting tradition of the media on public attitudes toward salient issue-concerns. The reasons for this media influence should be more digested in a future study designed to look specifically at what gender (men or women) and by what media type (state-owned or privately-owned). Chapters 3 and 6 for instance proffer that the state-owned press does not fully constrain the exercise of authoritarian power and nor does it object to unethical state action against manipulation of editorial independence from state leaders.

9.3 Agenda Building Influence

Focusing on questions regarding the influence of government on public attitudes can yield useful information about regime legitimacy and the rule of law in East Africa.
The results reported in chapters 8.9 and 8.10 add considerably to what we know about the government influence both at the individual level and across regions on issues of democratic rule. Governments in East Africa do not exert positive influence on public attitudes at the individual level based on gender differences. The plausible explanation for why gender is not a significant factor at the individual level is that the issues concerning the rule of law affect both women and men in the same way. Yet in contrast, education was a significant factor in the way government influenced citizens within the regions. This is contrary to the media influence on public attitudes towards regime legitimacy and moderated by gender.

Most revealing for agenda building is the finding that the influence on public attitudes towards democratic rule has a negative effect within each region when education levels are high. The results suggest that educated individuals in each region become more likely to reject the government stance on the rule of law and regime legitimacy whether or not that region has media presence. One possible reason for this relates to the current situation where the EAC governments build an agenda of absolutism to maximize their political power by taking advantage of citizens who are less educated and lack the basic understanding of basic human and political rights (Mwenda 2007; Kaiser 2000b). Regions with a relatively high number of educated respondents are more attuned and politicized about the rule of law. The results are consistent with previous research which argues that EAC governments build legitimacy by trumpeting socioeconomic successes, justice, and voting rights in order to maximize their absolutist tendencies from unsuspecting citizens (Weiler 1997; Rubongoya 2007).
The findings suggest that East African governments had no significant influence on individuals within regions and across regions when issues of regime legitimacy were raised. The most striking aspect of these findings is just how the actions of the EAC governments under a democratic rule was not tolerable to the citizens within and across regions based on media presence or gender differences. I conclude that the state actors’ agenda was not effective in trying to influence citizens’ attitudes that the regimes exercise political accommodation in all geopolitical constituents and responsive to democratic values like protection of individuals against arbitrary governance and against each other (van de Walle 2002; Okoye 2004). In theory, when political leaders behave in a responsible manner by caring for the economically marginalized groups and do not engage in geopolitical nepotism or favoritism, they sustain their political legitimacy and stabilize the broader polity (Schatzberg 2001). Consistent with some literature, it appears that regimes in East Africa have built strong public attitudes that serves to show the governments’ mandate to protect their people from anarchy, to provide indiscriminate political and economic equality and justice for all to pacify society through established laws (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Kamanyi 2006; Museveni 1997).

Results show that the agenda building function enhances public attitudes on issues of the rule of law, with increased outcome on its influence within and across regions when education levels are considered. However, the rule of law had a significant negative association at the individual level and a positive one at the regional level. Notably in the EAC, some regions are highly populated, industrialized, and economically developed, while others are densely populated with poor uneducated peasants. This scenario creates minimal variation in government influence on the issue of regime legitimacy but with
greater variation on issues concerning the rule of law. Various enumerations in Chapter 3.5 lead me to believe that educated citizens know that the legitimacy of the EAC regimes are determined by evaluating that the manner in which state actors come to power (through free and fair elections), and that they guarantee basic human and political rights with respect to the rule of law. It is conceivable that this explains why education is not a strong predictor of government influence on public attitudes towards regime legitimacy, yet it is a moderating variable for the citizens’ negative attitudes towards the rule of law and positive attitudes across regions. The alternate set of cross-level interactions involving the rule of law and education is what produces the positive attitudes for this government influence across regions.

9.5 Conclusion and Implication

Member-states of the EAC are moving fast towards achieving a political federation; but the community is faced with a myriad of impediments which confront civil society, the general public, and state institutions such as geopolitical sectarianism, political distrust, regional economic inequality, disregard of the rule of law, and the manipulation of the state media. The question of how the news media set the public agenda to facilitate political debate is imperative. First, the initial descriptive results show that citizens rated the independent privately-owned media as more crucial to mobilizing and politically energizing citizens to delegitimize autocracy than the state-owned media. This matter will need further examination.

The implications from this study can add considerably to what we know about the government and the media influence both at the individual level and across regions on
matters of democratic rule. Public opinion in developing countries in East Africa is shaped by the extent to which the media are allowed to perform their duties and the government controls and influences public discourse. No known research has previously tested the agenda setting and the agenda setting theories as functions that influence political discourse and shape public attitudes in the East Africa Community. The study is a ground-breaking exploration of in this important area. It reveals the attitudes of citizens towards democratic rule at the individual level and across regions.

Do the media influence public attitudes (agenda setting) on the issue of regime legitimacy and matters of the rule of law in the EAC? Does the government influence public attitudes (agenda building) towards democratic rule more than the news media? A succinct answer to both questions is yes and no. This study shows that agenda setting is associated with regime legitimacy but not with agenda building while agenda building is associated with the rule of law and not agenda setting. It is my recommendation that when we examine the agenda setting function in the EAC, we have to account for other latent agenda building variables to get an overarching public opinion nested within the provinces of each member-state. These results support earlier arguments that the coming of multiparty politics and the new wave of democratization, from early 1990s to 2007, have not changed the way the news media perform. The government still impacts public opinion on several key elements of a substantive liberal democracy; for example, how the public views the basic functions of government in safeguarding the rule of law. These governments succeed in maintaining public support because the majority of citizens are less educated and are not aware of the disintegration of civil order and collapse of the rule of law in the community.
The major challenge facing the future of the East African Community is that the
governments still have control of the state media and of the independent press.
Consequently, we see that the EAC governments have a stronger impact on public
attitudes towards democratic rule than the news media. It is my belief that the
impediment on media performance to freely advocate and educate citizens about the
gross violation of the rule of law in the partner-states and the fragility of political
contestation (in Kenya and Tanzania) will continue to derail the EAC political federation.
Regardless of the EAC partner-state, citizens from regions of the presidents’ ethnicity
have greater positive attitudes towards the regime and rule of law, than other regions
where the presidents do not enjoy ethno support. Understandably, low-educated Kenyans
and Ugandans in the ten regions of these two countries who are influenced by
government are most likely to legitimize the regime; almost three quarters of citizens
with less than a college diploma favor the two regimes.

9.6 Limitations and Future Research

This cross-regional comparative analysis of media performance and democratic
rule has enriched our understanding of agenda setting and agenda building in East Africa.
The nature of data required the use of the Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). Testing
media and government influences to specific issues of democratization is a daunting task
in countries where there is a scarcity of national trend data on democracy; I collected the
appropriate cross-sectional survey data that are hierarchical in nature and have citizens
nested within higher-level groups, but the data were not all weighted or centered from to
region. These citizens were nested only in 5 regions in each country because of how the
data were clustered in stages. However, Tanzania and Kenya have slightly two extra regions which were merged into other regions. Future collection of data should apportion these regions properly.

There were also some challenges in collecting cross-sectional data without such hierarchically nested structures. Although the EAC data were sufficiently collected in respect to the proper HLM multi-stage random sampling survey design, some of the characteristics were not appropriately weighted for HLM within regions, notably the respondents’ age and social economic status. My decision of going forward with the .29 ICC instead of the required .30 ICC as the most conventional cut-off point is also debatable, because in some social science sub-disciplines, it can weaken data requirements in that consideration. The rationale for continuing with the HLM analysis on agenda setting with a .29 ICC is detailed in chapter 8.5.

On the issue of media influence in East Africa, region characteristics such as geopolitical sectarianism and media ownership may enable or impair the occurrence of agenda setting and present a third category of contingent conditions of the model, but the scope of this study did not allow an exploration of this possible weakness. Media type, whether state-owned or privately-owned media and the autocratic media impediments in East Africa do not automatically help the perceived attitudes towards an issue like the rule of law among the public but it can be a controllable latent variable which was not addressed. Issue and media correlations of this study show that the media in East Africa are important in telling people what to think about in terms of democracy and authoritarian rule, but this specific traditional “media agenda” was not content analyzed in the national and regional media of the EAC for this study. Nonetheless, the individual
characteristics and regional contexts that are traditionally required by the HLM method have shown that the agenda setting effects and agenda building aspects shape both communication processes and have significant impact on public attitudes.

Future research on East Africa should consider the interaction effects between media ownership and media performance in the coverage of political crises related to presidential elections. For instance, does political absolutism, which militates against democratic governance in many parts of Africa, restrain state-owned media in East Africa from promoting democracy? Do the privately-owned media in East Africa, which succumb to the interests of proprietors and the marketplace, restrain their journalists from informing citizens about democratic governance? How can the news media challenge an authoritarian regimes’ past leadership record while, at the same time, tout a weak opposition’s political manifesto without crossing the line of becoming partisan? Do journalists simply defend dominant partisan interests based on ownership bias or do they provide political information about national affairs that offer other political alternatives?

Another question for future research is how opposition viewpoints in the privately-owned media have contributed to the transformation of political discourse and regime alternation in Kenya and Tanzania. The relation between economic conditions, poverty, and regime legitimacy should also be examined.

9.7 Prospects for the News Media in the EAC

This study on media performance and democratic rule in the EAC has found that the East African media in general have set the agenda on a diversity of issues concerning the regimes and government leaders. The journalists have played this role albeit a series
of barriers and decrees imposed by governments to limit media influence. I found that the media are still relevant and central to providing electoral masses a forum for public debate, notwithstanding the constraints of government influence and control of the press. However, these positive developments can still be destroyed by authoritarian reversals related to political influence meddling that hinder free expression, speech, and political participation. A fully unfettered press can emerge if it can be supported with adequate training of journalists, a continued commitment to universal formal education for all citizens, and respect for the rule of law.

Despite the constraints outlined here, there is a good indication that a fairly critical independent media with the support of the civil society have played a central role in mobilizing the masses to recognize bad regimes and expose authoritarianism. This is a testament that despite the persistent draconian measures against the East African media, independent journalists continue to push for regime legitimacy to change the political landscape of presidential monocracy and absolutism. This assessment of the ongoing challenges of democratization indicates that agenda building is central to the political control of messages and attitudes towards the rule of law and has helped some EAC leaders like President Museveni of Uganda and President Kibaki of Kenya to sustain their imperial grip onto state power. It is still unknown whether the current problems with democratization are temporary conditions on the way to greater freedom and peace throughout East Africa.

This analysis paints both a gloomy picture on the question of government influence and a positive development on some aspects of media performance and democratic rule in East Africa. The next phase of research that looks at this puzzle should
consider how the privately-owned and the state-owned media differ in their coverage of critical issues facing the polity of these countries. It is still unknown whether the current problems with the performance of the news and democratic rule are temporary conditions on the way to a permanent fixture of greater prosperity in the EAC.
REFERENCES


Nyeko, Balam. 1997. “Exile Politics and Resistance to Dictatorship: The Uganda Anti-


### APPENDIX

#### A.1 List of Geopolitical Regions – Survey Data were Collected in these Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>KENYA</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Region</strong> <em>(In two Provinces)</em>: Marsabit and Moyale</td>
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<td><strong>Southern Region</strong> <em>(Coast Province)</em>: Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu</td>
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<td><strong>Eastern Region</strong> <em>(Two Provinces)</em>: Garissa area, Wajir, and Mado Gashi</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central Region</strong> <em>(Three Provinces)</em>: Nairobi, Nyeri, Embu, Nanyuki, Kiambu, and Isiolo</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Western</strong> <em>(Three provinces)</em> - Kisumu, Nakuru, Kericho, Kakamega, Eldoret, Mandera</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>TANZANIA</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Northern Region</strong> – Arusha, Moshi, and Musoma</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Region</strong> – Ruvuma, Lindi, Mbeya, and Mtwara</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Region</strong> – Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Morogoro, and Tanga</td>
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<td><strong>Central Region</strong> – Dodoma, Iringa, Tabora, and Mafinga</td>
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<td><strong>Western Region</strong> – Kigoma, Mwanza, and Bukoba</td>
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<th><strong>UGANDA</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Northern Region</strong> – Gulu, Lira, Arua, and Kitgum</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Region</strong> – Kabale, Katuna, Masaka, and Bukoba</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Region</strong> – Mbale, Tororo, Soroti, Iganga, Jinja, and Busia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central Region</strong> – Kampala, Entebbe, Mukono, Mityana, and Hoima</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Western Region</strong> – Mbarara, Rukungiri, Kasese, Fort Portal, and Bushenyi</td>
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A.2 Survey Instrument

RESEARCH INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT

This research is about media performance and democratisation in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The researcher is seeking your opinion about your country and the East African Community (EAC) in general.

You are kindly asked to voluntarily participate in this study. You may choose not to answer any of the questions or stop at any time if you wish. You must be aged 18 years and over to participate.

Your responses in this exercise are completely confidential. You will not be identified in any research presentations or publication of the results. All the information you and other participants provide will be reported as grouped data/results in this research.

The 27 simple questions should take no more than 15 minutes of your time. There are no known risks that will arise from your participation.

This research is an individual project undertaken for the fulfillment of a Ph.D. in Journalism and Political Communication. There is no involvement with your government or its institutions in this research. No one except the principal researcher will have access to the raw information on your questionnaire.

If you have any questions about your participation, please contact the following researcher:

Yusuf Kalyango, Jr.
Doctoral Candidate,
Missouri School of Journalism
Tel: 001-573-808-2831
yusuf.kalyango@mizzou.edu.

The study and its research methodology have been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) in the United States. Please feel free to contact the University of Missouri-Columbia campus IRB office at 001-573-882-9585.

By participating in the survey, you give permission to the researcher to use your information for research purposes. Please keep this document for your records.

Thank you.
1. What is your main source of news on current affairs?

1) FM Radios  
2) National State Radio  
3) Private Television  
4) State-owned Television  
5) Privately-owned newspaper  
6) State-owned newspaper  
7) Talk with friends, family, or neighbors  
8) Internet (World Wide Web)

2. How many days in a typical week do you listen to the news on radio?

1) None  
2) Once  
3) Two  
4) Three  
5) Four  
6) Five  
7) Six  
8) Seven

3. How many days in a typical week do you watch news on television?

1) Not at all  
2) Once  
3) Two  
4) Three  
5) Four  
6) Five  
7) Six  
8) Seven

4. How many days in a typical week do you read a newspaper?

1) Not at all  
2) Once  
3) Two  
4) Three  
5) Four  
6) Five  
7) Six  
8) Seven

5. How often in a typical week do you read, watch, or listen to news about EAC?

1) Not at all  
2) Once a week  
3) Twice a week  
4) Four times a week  
5) Five times a week  
6) Six times a week  
7) All the time

6. How important to you is the World Wide Web or the internet, in providing news and other information about the EAC?

1) Not important at all  
2) A little important  
3) Somewhat important  
4) Very important  
5) Extremely important
7. How do you typically learn about the EAC?

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<td>From radio news</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>From television news</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>From newspapers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>From the president</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. How many days in a typical week do you follow news on current affairs about another EAC country (not your own country)?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Once</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Three</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. How important is it that your country is part of the EAC?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. When you think about the EAC, how much of what you know was learnt from the news media organisations in your country?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Little</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somewhat little</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. When you think about the EAC, how much of what you know was learnt from other people besides the news media?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Little</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somewhat little</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. What do you think is the number one problem facing the EAC?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abuse of the judicial system</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ethnic conflicts</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Droughts</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Electricity (load-shedding)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III
The countries that make up the EAC are probably concerned with different issues.

13. What do you think is the number one problem facing Tanzania?

1) Corruption 7) Economic empowerment
2) Abuse of the judicial system 8) Poverty
3) Ethnic conflicts 9) HIV and AIDS
4) Political violence 10) Environment (Deforestation)
5) Droughts 11) Unemployment
6) Electricity (load-shedding) 12) Other: ___________________

14. What do you think is the number one problem facing Kenya?

1) Corruption 7) Economic empowerment
2) Abuse of the judicial system 8) Poverty
3) Ethnic conflicts 9) HIV and AIDS
4) Political violence 10) Environment (Deforestation)
5) Droughts 11) Unemployment
6) Electricity (load-shedding) 12) Other: ___________________

15. What do you think is the number one problem facing Uganda?

1) Corruption 7) Economic empowerment
2) Abuse of the judicial system 8) Poverty
3) Ethnic conflicts 9) HIV and AIDS
4) Political violence 10) Environment (Deforestation)
5) Droughts 11) Unemployment
6) Electricity (load-shedding) 12) Other: ___________________

16. What influenced your thinking that this was the number one problem facing your country (refer to your country in either question 13, 14, or 15)?

1) Friends, family, or neighbors 5) Workplace
2) The news media 6) Personal experience
3) Message from the president 7) Message from our local leaders
4) School/academic institution 8) Other: ___________________

17. Which one of following provides the most accurate and comprehensive news about your country?

1) FM radios 5) Privately-owned newspaper
2) State-owned radio 6) State-owned newspaper
3) Private television 7) Internet (World Wide Web)
4) State-owned television 8) Other: ___________________

IV
18. Which one of following provides the most accurate and comprehensive news about East Africa?

1) FM Radios  
2) State-owned radio  
3) Private television  
4) State-owned television  
5) Privately-owned newspaper  
6) State-owned newspaper  
7) Internet (World Wide Web)  
8) Other: ______________________________

Please circle only ONE option that best represents your opinion on each issue.

19. Please rate how the news media perform or do the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Poorly</th>
<th>Poorly</th>
<th>Somewhat Poorly</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Somewhat Well</th>
<th>Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cover corruption or embezzlement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Cover the courts and police beats</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cover civil wars and ethnic conflicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Advocate for my rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Provide a forum for political debates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Inform me on political rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Make elected officials accountable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>News content is truthful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The privately-owned press is responsible</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>The state-owned press is responsible</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On questions 20, 21, and 22, please circle only ONE option that best represents your opinion on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) through 7 (strongly agree). Number 4, which is neutral, separates the levels of disagreement (1 to 3) from the levels of agreement (5 to 7):
20. Please rate the following based on your attitudes about news and the media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>I trust radio news</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>I trust television news</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>I trust newspapers</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>I trust the Web/Internet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>I trust state-owned media with coverage of the general elections</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>I trust privately-owned media with coverage of the general elections</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>I learned my rights and privileges from the news media</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>I trust the news coverage of democracy in my country</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Democracy can thrive without the media</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>I consider the news media the watchdog on government</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>What I see or read from the news does not change my attitude about democracy</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>What I learn from news depends on the source of information/person in the news, but not the media</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Question 20 - Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M I am interested in political news</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N I trust political journalists</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O The news media have made me think about political issues</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P The news about politics is often suppressed by the government</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q The news media make our elected leaders accountable</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R The media incite ethnic conflicts</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S The media are divisive and dangerous for national unity</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T News should be about development and national unity</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Please rate the following statements about the regime and other institutions in your country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A I trust the government</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B The government protects our rights</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C I enjoy the right to free speech and protest without fear</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D There is no coercion during elections</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E What democracy really means is confusing to me</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Question 21 - Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>This regime is legitimate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>This is an authoritarian regime</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>The president is a dictator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The regime safeguards judicial independence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>All citizens have equal rights before the law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>The regime violates the constitution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>There is corruption in public service/government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 22. Please rate the following statements regarding the role of those institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Private media lead me to think that this is a failed-state</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>The president leads me to think that this is not a failed-state</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>State-owned media lead me to think that this is a failed-state</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>The state-owned media lead me to think that elections are not free and fair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>The private media lead me to think that elections are not free and fair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>The elections are always free and fair, as the president tells us</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 22 - Continued</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>The private media lead me to think that the president is a dictator</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>The state-owned media lead me to think that the president is a dictator</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The media lead me to think that my vote is valuable in an election</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>I have learnt about democracy from the NGOs</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Private media lead me to think about the insecurity around us</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>State-owned media lead me to think about peace and stability around us</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>The president leads me to think that the country is peaceful and stable</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>The media lead me to think about fleeing the country</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Politicians use the media to incite violence and ethnic hatred</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Government has weakened the media with intimidation</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>The President’s policies are more important than what the media advocate in society</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. Which one of the following is your age bracket?

1) 18 – 29  
2) 30 – 39  
3) 40 – 49  
4) 50 – 59  
5) 60 – 69  
6) 70 – 79  
7) Other: ________

24. What region of your country do you originally come from?

1) Central region  
2) Southern region  
3) Eastern region  
4) Western region  
5) Northern region

25. What is the highest level of formal education you have attained?

1) No formal education  
2) Kindergarten  
3) Primary school  
4) Completed secondary school  
5) Completed advanced high school  
6) Completed some college (diploma)  
7) Completed a bachelors degree  
8) Completed graduate school

26. What is your gender?

1) Male  
2) Female

27. What is your current occupation?

1) Businessperson  
2) Farmer  
3) Artist/Entertainer/Sports  
4) Teacher / professor  
5) Traders / hawkers  
6) White-collar professionals  
7) Manual Labourers  
8) Civil servants  
9) Journalists / Media professionals  
10) Unemployed worker  
11) Student  
12) Housewives  
13) Law enforcement officers  
14) Other _____________________

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
A.3 Consent Form

PROJECT INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT

This project is about the news media and democracy in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The researcher is seeking your opinion about your country and the East African Community (EAC) in general. One of the benefits is to understand how media or the state influences citizens to decide what is important in their lives and about democratic rule.

You should read and understand the following statement before you participate.

You are kindly asked to voluntarily participate in this study. You may choose not to answer any of the questions or stop at any time if you wish. You must be aged 18 years and over to participate.

Your participation and responses in this exercise are completely confidential. You will not be identified in any presentations or publication of the results. If you choose to respond, all information you provide will be combined with the information from other respondents and reported as grouped data in this research.

There are 27 simple questions on this questionnaire, which should take no more than 15 minutes of your time. There are no known risks that will arise from your participation and no costs to you except for your time.

This research is an individual project undertaken for the fulfillment of a Ph.D. in journalism; there is no involvement with your government or its institutions in this research. No one except the principal researcher will have access to the raw information on your questionnaire.

If you have any questions or concerns about participation, please contact the researchers: Yusuf Kalyango, Jr. (001-573-808-2831 or yusuf.kalyango@mizzou.edu and Wayne Wanta (001-573-884-9689 or wantaw@missouri.edu ). For additional information regarding human participation in research, please feel free to contact the University of Missouri-Columbia campus IRB office at 001-573-882-9585.

By participating in the survey, you are giving permission to the investigator to use your information for research purposes. Please keep this document for your records.

Thank you.

Yusuf Kalyango, Jr.
(Principal Researcher).
## A.4 List of Research Assistants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UGANDA</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>TANZANIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naomi Kabarungi Wabyona</td>
<td>Joshua Wamwara</td>
<td>Auni Ishara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Nakazibwe</td>
<td>Lillian Atieno</td>
<td>Dr. Julian Mbundu*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archie Luyimbazi*</td>
<td>Gerald Gichinga</td>
<td>Etana Mwinyimkuu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Nabaasa Gummah*</td>
<td>Evelyn Wekesa</td>
<td>Rashid Lumbwi*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. John Sentongo*</td>
<td>Justin Okini</td>
<td>Ibrahim Bilashi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Lubowa</td>
<td>Abbey Kagai</td>
<td>Furaha Najia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinah Mukasa</td>
<td>Professor Lawrence Mute*</td>
<td>Rosemary Faraja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Mutyaba*</td>
<td>Bright Mong’ina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Akiriat</td>
<td>Musa Olaka Wakhungu*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Apiro</td>
<td>Charles Olaka Kesa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- List includes survey coordinators* and data collectors, all based in East Africa.
A.5 Autobiography

VITA

Yusuf Kalyango, Jr. was born in Kampala, Uganda on April 15, 1972. His professional career started in 1993 at a state-owned newspaper, The New Vision in Kampala. Since then, Yusuf gradually progressed from being a freelance writer earning less than US$100 per month in early 1993 to managing newsrooms and winning several local/international journalism awards. He worked at a newspaper, radio, and television stations in Uganda as a features writer, columnist, political reporter, news producer, news editor, news director, and finally as head of news and current affairs in a span of eleven years. As a World Report contributor on CNN International, he received CNN’s World Report best environment report award in 2000; and also received the coveted 1998 ‘Africa’s best television journalist of the year’ award from the African Journalist Foundation, among other honors. Yusuf was a fellow of the World Press Institute at Macalester College, Minnesota in 2001. He later returned to school at the University of Missouri and earned a Master’s degree in journalism in 2004 and a Ph.D. in 2008. He specializes in international comparative political communication research. His research topics concerning media effects on public opinion can be grouped into four areas: democracy, transnational and intra ethno-political conflicts, and the universal rule of law.