

BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR: COVERAGE OF U.S.-RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY DISPUTES IN RUSSIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE U.S.

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FOREIGN POLICY DISPUTES IN RUSSIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE U.S.

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ABSTRACT

Although it counts 140 years of history, Russian ethnic press in the United States is an untapped area in media research. This study had two goals: to address this research gap and to shed light on the ethnic and political identity of Russian Americans. To achieve these goals, news coverage of eight U.S.-Russian foreign policy controversies was examined. By looking at the tone of the coverage, attributes assigned to the two countries and whether or not the conflict between them has been emphasized, this study sought to find out whether Russian ethnic newspapers in the U.S. consistently supported one side more than the other.

Most of the coverage was found to be neutral in tone. Attributes assigned to the two countries were somewhat positive, neutral, or somewhat negative, avoiding the extremes. The conflict between the U.S. and Russia was mostly de-emphasized. These findings suggest that the Russian ethnic media provide a balanced coverage of both their country of origin and the country of adoption, thereby communicating a hybrid political identity of Russian Americans.

Although a small step into the virgin area, this study offers insights into the identity and loyalties of the Russian ethnic community in the U.S. It reveals that multiculturalism is a more viable approach in ethnic media than partisanship. It also shows that ethnic press does not threaten a community's cultural integration, as some scholars feared.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Russian-language press in the United States had its beginning over a century ago and was highly politicized at inception. The first Russian newspaper in America, a bilingual *Svoboda* (Freedom)-*The Alaska Herald* (San Francisco, 1868-1873) sought to serve a political function on both sides of the Bering Strait. Published by a Ukrainian priest, Agapius Honcharenko, it attempted, on the one hand, to inspire sympathy for the anti-tsarist movement in Russia (Myroniuk, 1987). On the other hand, *The Alaska Herald* was receiving a subsidy from the United States government to facilitate Americanization of the Russian population that had remained in the U.S. after the sale of Alaska. In fulfillment of this second function, early issues of the newspaper contained translations of the U.S. Constitution into Russian. Honcharenko's subsequent criticism of the U.S. government led to a termination of the subsidy.

Despite their long and checkered history, the Russian ethnic media in the U.S. are vastly understudied. While a few scholars researched the emergence of such media (Myroniuk, 1987) and their cultural role in the Russian-speaking communities in the U.S. (Seller, 1977), little effort has been made to examine the content of the Russian ethnic press in America. This study seeks to address this research gap and promote the understanding of who Russian Americans are.

The goal of this thesis is to infer the existing loyalty patterns of Russian Americans from their ethnic media. Do Russian ethnic media take sides in the U.S.-

Russian confrontations? Do they tend to criticize one country more than the other in conflicts that country instigates? Is their coverage of one country more emotional than the coverage of the other? These questions appear especially timely as many wonder, in light of current confrontations between the U.S. policy-makers and the outgoing Russian President Vladimir Putin, whether the Cold War-period standoff between Russia and the United States is anything but over. If the U.S.-Russian relations continue to deteriorate, Russian Americans may face an emotional, social and political dilemma as to where to direct their loyalties and affiliations.

To attempt to answer the research questions, this study focuses on the coverage of eight major U.S.-Russian foreign policy disputes that took place between 1999 and 2007. They are: the 1999 NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, Russia's war in Chechnya, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the NATO entry of the Baltic states, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russian-Georgian tensions in 2007, the U.S. anti-missile defense plans in Central Europe, and the U.S. push for preemptive measures against Iran. These events were viewed from very different standpoints in Moscow and Washington and thus brought the two countries in a direct (as was the case with the anti-missile defense, for example) or indirect (e.g. the Baltic countries' joining of NATO) opposition to each other.

The Russian ethnic press coverage is expected to serve as a good predictor of Russian Americans' loyalties for at least two reasons. First, the Russian-language ethnic media have traditionally played a major role in the Russian ethnic communities and community-building in the U.S. (Seller, 1977). A 1919 survey by a Russian newspaper *Russkoe Slovo* (Russian Word) revealed that only 16 of the 312 immigrants surveyed had

read newspapers in Russia. All 312 were regular readers of the Russian press in the United States (Seller, 1977). Second, according to some studies, Russians are one of the most educated ethnic groups in American immigration history (Kliger, 2002)—and literacy levels can have a direct impact on the readership. There are more than three million Russians legally residing in the U.S., and Russian is the tenth most spoken language (U.S. Census 2000). These figures do not include Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Armenians, Uzbeks and other post-Soviet or Slavic ethnic groups who also are fluent in Russian. Hence, Russian ethnic media in the U.S. most likely reach a wider segment of the U.S. population than the official censuses calculate.

This study seeks to contribute to media scholarship in the following ways. First, it hopes to advance the understanding of ethnic media, using Russian ethnic media in the United States as an example. Second, it seeks to demonstrate how such media approach issues that potentially present a dilemma of loyalties and emotions for the audience as well as for the journalists and editors of ethnic newspapers. Third, it strives to identify markers of coverage of such issues; this knowledge could be used in future studies to test the effect of the coverage on the audience. Finally, it hopes to shed light on the cultural, ethnic and political identity of the Russian ethnic community in the United States. A majority of Hollywood films portray Russian Americans as either unpolished and seemingly not very bright individuals with bad manners or, more commonly, as thugs closely connected with Russian criminal business. By examining Russian ethnic newspapers, this study seeks to provide a more accurate picture and hopes to initiate a change of perception of Russian Americans by their fellow U.S. compatriots.

This study uses the terms *Russian-speaking ethnic community*, *Russian Americans*, etc., to mean citizens or legal residents of the United States who were born in Russia/former Soviet Union and/or speak Russian as one of their primary languages of communication. This includes non-Russian ethnic groups, such as Russian-speaking Armenians, Jews, Georgians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, etc.

The following chapter will discuss the history of the Russian-language ethnic press in the U.S. It will review literature explicating acculturation and framing theories that will serve as a theoretical and methodological basis for this work. Chapter 3 will explain the methodology of this study. Chapter 4 will provide findings and interpretation of the results. Chapter 5 will discuss the results and suggest areas for future scholarship.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The majority of framing studies have traditionally focused on the so-called elite media due to the theorized ability of such media to influence public opinion and policy decisions (Wanta & Hu, 1993; Powlick & Katz, 1998; Brewer et al., 2003; Brewer, 2006). In contrast, ethnic media received only scant attention (Echchaibi, 2001). Yet, for many immigrants and ethnic residents, ethnic media are an important alternative source of information (Echchaibi, 2001). By their very existence, such media challenge the overall hegemony of news coverage (Nossek, 2004). Because media are believed to influence public opinion and attitudes in their respective communities, ethnic media represent a promising field of study. In the United States, a home to millions of immigrants, understanding such media is a key to understanding forces that shape social and political realities in this country.

Russian Ethnic Media in the U.S.: Historical Overview

A systematic appearance of Russian-language publications in the U.S. is often dated to the 1880s, when large numbers of Russians began to arrive on the East Coast (Myroniuk, 1987). Many of the Russian newspapers established at that time promoted socialist values. Although most of these publications proved short-lived, there have been exceptions. One example of a successful socialist newspaper was *Novyi Mir* (New World), published in New York between 1911 and 1920. As one of the largest Russian dailies at the time, it was viewed as highly influential (Myroniuk, 1987). Leon Trotsky

briefly served as the publication's editor in 1917, before he returned to Russia to help overthrow the Kerensky government. *Novyi Mir* was closed down in 1920 by the U.S. government because of the paper's affiliation with the Communist Party in America. At the time of its shutdown it had about 8,000 subscribers.

Another major daily established prior to 1920 was *Russkoe Slovo* (Russian Word). It is currently the oldest and largest Russian-language daily outside of Russia (Myroniuk, 1987). In the early years of its publication the newspaper also had a volatile political history. In contrast to most Russian ethnic newspapers published at the time, *Russian Word* chose a largely pro-American editorial policy. Nevertheless, its first editor, Ivan Okuntsov, was forced to leave his post during World War I—partly due to his criticism of the U.S. government military spending. Because the newspaper, renamed *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (New Russian Word, *NRW*) in 1920, sought to maintain a democratic, pro-American position, it was boycotted by the communist faction of the Russian community and hence saw its readership plummet. To ensure viability, *NRW* then adopted a pro-Soviet tone. In 1922 the new editor, Mark E. Weinbaum, decided to restore the newspaper's democratic, anti-communist position. In protest, angered communists destroyed a large number of the issues sold on the newsstands and *NRW* found itself on the verge of collapse once again. *New Russian Word* survived thanks to the continuous influx of literate immigrants, as well as contributions from well-known writers and journalists. It became the first newspaper in the United States to publicize the famine in the Soviet Union during the early 1930s. It also consistently provided incoming immigrants with information about the American life, naturalization, Social Security and other topics, which became instrumental in the adaptation of the new arrivals. In contrast,

many of the dailies that initially promoted the Soviet ideology, such as *Russky Golos* (Russian Voice, New York, 1917-2004) and *Russkaya Zhizn'* (Russian Life, San Francisco, 1925-2000), saw themselves turn first into weeklies due to diminishing readership and, eventually, stop publishing.

Russian publishers have been very prolific. For instance, before the 1990s, the Russian-speaking community in the Chicago area alone put out 34 publications (Myroniuk, 1987). The largest of the existing publications, *New Russian Word* has a weekend circulation of 64,000 copies. Many others publish only a few thousand issues (e.g. *Russky Golos* had a weekly circulation of 3,000 copies before its closure in late 2004). Some newspapers are the U.S. editions of Russian publications (e.g. *V Novom Svete* [In the New World] is a subsidiary of Russian *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*). Such publications mostly help the Russian ethnic community in the U.S. to stay up-to-date with Russia's entertainment and culture news; yet they also offer a unique perspective on political developments in both countries.

The only area where Russian ethnic publications lag behind is in bringing their news to the Internet. Few Russian ethnic newspapers in the U.S. have even a basic website. Some hypothesize that this lack may lead to the loss by the Russian ethnic media of younger Russian Americans as their audience, which, in turn, would jeopardize the long-term survival of the publications (Mereu, 2003). To counter this trend, *New Russian Word* launched an up-to-date website (www.nrs.com), while other newspapers struggle to provide content that would appeal to the younger demographics, including features about the Russian and American pop music.

Ethnic Media or Immigrant Press?

While for many scholars the term “ethnic media” is synonymous with “immigrant press,” some disagree. According to Blau et al. (1998), *immigrant press* defines the publications that appear with the inflow of large numbers of immigrants. Such publications provide the newcomers with the necessary immigration information and cease to exist once their readers settle down and begin to absorb the new culture. A survey of the newspapers published in New York City between 1820s and 1980s showed that the majority of foreign-language newspapers fall into this category (Blau et al., 1998). While Blau and her colleagues mentioned that the term “ethnic media” is different from “immigrant press”, the researchers failed to systematize this distinction. Instead, they suggested that the term “immigrant press” is more apt than the term “ethnic media” in describing foreign-language U.S. newspapers in general.

Instead of making generalizations, this current study argues that the terms “ethnic media” and “immigrant press” should be used discriminately. *Ethnic media* will mean the newspapers produced and widely read by established ethnic communities—i.e., regardless of how long the incomers have lived in the United States. Due to the nature of Russian-language newspapers under investigation, the term “ethnic media” seems more appropriate in this study than the term “immigrant press”. These publications have existed for a significant period of time (e.g. *New Russian Word* has been published for almost 90 years). They are actively used by the Russian ethnic community as a source of information, entertainment and the link with Russia and other former Soviet states. The importance of these newspapers for long-term U.S. residents of Russian origin cannot be

dismissed as trivial, as would be the case with short-lived “immigrant press”. Hence this study will use the term “ethnic media”.

Assimilation and Cultural Identity

Robert E. Park (1922) is the pioneer of immigrant assimilation studies in the United States. In his “Immigrant Press and Its Control,” Park writes that communication is the prime medium of social integration and assimilation. However, ethnic media produced in a foreign language can also hinder the assimilation process by virtue of bolstering one’s ethnic and cultural identity (Park, 1922).

The nationalistic tendencies of the immigrants find their natural expression and strongest stimulus in the national societies, the church, and foreign-language press—the institutions most closely connected with the preservation of the racial languages. In these the immigrant feels the home ties most strongly; they keep him in touch with the political struggle at home and even give him opportunities to take part in it. Both consciously and unconsciously they might be expected to center the immigrants’ interests and activities in Europe and so keep him apart from American life. (Park, 1922, p.50)

Most recent studies have shifted from regarding cultural identity as a more or less intractable phenomenon and assimilation as the necessary prerequisite for adaptation to a new culture. Nagel (1994) argued that ethnicity is best understood as “a dynamic, constantly evolving property of both individual identity and group organization” (p.152). In contrast to the “melting pot model,” which envisaged a total fusion of various nations and cultures into a homogenous mass, the newer models stressed the socially constructed aspects of ethnicity. According to these models, ethnic boundaries, identities and cultures are negotiated, defined, and produced through social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities (Nagel, 2004). Even “assimilated” immigrants were no longer perceived as

having abandoned their “old” self to adopt a new culture. This paved the way for cultural pluralism theories.

In his study of young North Africans in France, Echchaibi (2001) argued that the majority of immigrants, especially younger people, seek to go beyond the limitations of singular cultural belonging; they adopt a more cosmopolitan identity, thereby embracing the new culture without necessarily rejecting their own. The media play a fundamental role in the formation and expression of such identities. According to the author, the production of ethnic newspapers, music and radio is one way in which immigrants—often marginalized in the mainstream media—can articulate their new hybrid identities.

If immigrants indeed develop a new multicultural identity (Echchaibi, 2001), its articulation would be most evident in the news coverage of issues that create tensions within their new identity. This study seeks to understand what happens with the articulation of this identity when the balance of affiliations and loyalties toward the two cultures is threatened.

Framing Theory

1. Definition

Although framing analysis counts 30-plus years of research history, the exact definition of frames and framing remains largely debated among scholars (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999; D’Angelo, 2002). In his seminal work, Goffman (1974) defined frames as basic cognitive structures, unconsciously adopted in the communication process to define reality. For Goffman, frames are neither manufactured, nor actively selected and can be best described as the necessary scaffolds of a news story. Other researchers, such as Entman (1993), argued that framing is about selection and salience. Nelson et al.

(1997) described framing as “a process by which a communication source constructs and defines a social or political issue for its audience” (p.221).

In seeking to systematize and explicate the differences in scholars’ approach to framing theory, D’Angelo (2002) identified three paradigmatic outlooks that a framing analysis can adopt. Depending on how the researcher examines the interaction between media frames and individual- or social-level reality, these outlooks can be cognitive, constructionist or critical. According to scholars who work within the cognitive paradigm, media professionals do not merely present frames that elicit values of the elites (cf. critical paradigm); instead, journalists are more responsive to demands of pluralistic presentation of information. Cognitivists believe that individuals can decode frames and use them to make judgments about a situation. Constructionists, on the other hand, envisage a greater hegemony of information but believe that even when a news frame pervades coverage of an issue for a period of time, it still contains a number of viewpoints that can help the public understand policy issues. The third approach is the critical paradigm. Like constructionists, scholars who work within the critical paradigm (e.g. Entman, 1993) believe that frames—thought to be the result of journalists’ newsgathering routines—dominate news coverage. In contrast to constructionists and cognitivists, critical scholars hypothesize that frames often carry values of political or economic elites (cf. Entman, 1991) and potentially influence public opinion.

Of the three approaches, the critical paradigm envisages the highest degree of journalists’ autonomy in framing a news story. It is hence the most interesting one in studies focusing on ethnic media. If one wishes to analyze the cultural identity and loyalties reflected in such media, one must allow for the possibility that at least some

choices have been made by the media professionals in the process of conveying the story to the public. This research will, therefore, adopt a definition of framing that was proposed by a critical scholar, Robert Entman (1993):

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (p.52).

Frames, according to Entman (1991), are embodied in the “keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasized in a news narrative” (p.7). By reinforcing words and images that reference some ideas but not others, frames make some ideas more salient in the text, while rendering others less salient or completely invisible.

Notably, frames are ontologically distinct from the topic of a news story (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Instead, they are manifested in the characteristics of the language employed, use of labels, choice of facts that are included and the ones that are omitted. This is best illustrated by Entman’s (1991) comparison between the U.S. media coverage of the Soviet downing of a Korean plane and the U.S. downing of an Iranian jet. These tragic events occurred five years apart and were relatively similar examples of misapplication of military force. However, a comparative content analysis of the *Time* and *Newsweek* coverage of those events showed that, by de-emphasizing the agency and victims, and by their choice of adjectives and graphics, the media portrayed the U.S. downing of the Iranian jet as a technical problem, whereas the Soviet downing of a Korean plane was depicted as a moral outrage. In other words, frames employed in the news stories resulted in a strikingly different coverage of the two events.

Entman's (1991) definition of frames is probably one of the most pragmatic ones. His frames are relatively easy to detect and measure. They can offer insight into a publication's newsgathering practices—which issues the editors/journalists choose to emphasize and which to obscure. Such practices could be the single most powerful indicator of the Russian-language newspapers' cultural identity, as well as the loyalties and attitudes they are likely to impart on their readers. In addition, Entman's approach enables a researcher to answer the question of how media frames are generated in everyday journalistic practice. Goffman (1974), Scheufele (1999) and other proponents of the cognitive or constructionist paradigms (D'Angelo, 2002) fail to get at the root of the media frames' generation. Koenig (2004) observes that it may be for Entman's pragmatism that much of the contemporary framing research only loosely relates to Goffman's work. Many media scholars followed Entman's lead in acknowledging that, in working with large quantities of information and on deadline, the media actively construct realities.

2. Types of Frames

Due to the elusive nature of the concept of framing, over the years researchers have been adding to what Koenig (2004) calls “an extensive and disparate laundry list of frames” (p.2). The gain-loss frames (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and thematic vs. episodic frames (Iyengar, 1991) are only some of the best-known examples. Some scholars (e.g. Scheufele, 2000; Ghanem, 1997) sought to address this issue by systematizing different types of frames.

Scheufele (1999; 2000) offers one way of systematizing the types of frames. According to the author, there is an important distinction between audience frames and

media frames. The audience frames are psychological phenomena by which individuals make sense of the surrounding world. Nelson et al. (1997), who asserted that frames affect audiences regardless of the extent of their political knowledge, put it most effectively: “[F]rames serve their employer by helping to make sense of a broad array of information and events while suggesting a suitable course of action” (p.222). Media frames, on the other hand, are constructed by journalists to classify and efficiently communicate information. Gamson et al. (1992) described such frames as a lens through which audiences receive images of the surrounding world.

According to Scheufele (2000), the structure of a framing study will be different, depending on whether the researcher seeks to analyze audience frames or media frames. According to the author, a study focusing on media frames will perform a content or textual analysis and will treat frames as the dependent variable. In other words, in ethnic media, the frames involved may depend on such factors as the publication’s cultural identity, the degree of acculturation in the community and assumptions the media make about their perceived audiences.

Ghanem (1997) proposed another way of systematizing different types of frames. According to the researcher, a majority of framing studies focused on identifying frames; however, one weakness of such studies is that the attributes of an issue or a topic are not generalizable across issues. She proposed four dimensions of a frame that could serve as a basis for comparison across many different agendas. These dimensions are: (a) the topic of a news item (what is included in the frame); (b) presentation (size and placement); (c) cognitive attributes (details of what is included in the frame); and (d) affective attributes (tone of the picture). To analyze these dimensions, one must consider a number of

elements—from the use of pull quotes and photographs with a news story, to storytelling techniques (such as the use of human element), to the frequency with which a topic is mentioned in the media. Ghanem argues that the analysis of these four dimensions will allow for understanding of the influence frames have on public agenda.

Following Scheufele's distinction (2000), this study will examine media frames, focusing on the cognitive and affective attributes (Ghanem, 1997) of the subjects under investigation. Special attention will be given to attributes assigned to the U.S. and Russia in the U.S.-Russian foreign policy disputes. The use of such attributes as *aggressor* vs. *protector* or *interferer* vs. *negotiator* with respect to either U.S. or Russia could serve as a clue as to the Russian ethnic media's loyalties and affiliations.

3. Framing Effects

Many scholars suggest that framing has a significant effect on public opinion (Wanta & Hu, 1993; Powlick & Katz, 1998; Brewer et al., 2003; Brewer, 2006). Factors that influence public's perception of an issue—as well as the magnitude of that influence—range from the amount of coverage of that issue (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) to the specific story frame contained in news articles (Wanta & Hu, 1993). The medium can also determine whether the agenda-setting effects will be long-term or transient (Wanta & Hu, 1994).

Wanta and Hu (1993) also discovered that the story frame contained in news articles could determine the magnitude of agenda-setting effects of international news coverage. International conflicts involving the United States, terrorism involving the U.S., crime/drugs and military/nuclear arms stories had the strongest agenda-setting

influence for the American public. The researchers argued that the high levels of conflict inherent in these stories served as salience cues for the public.

Moreover, subtle changes in wording could affect the way news stories' subjects are perceived (Brewer, 2006). The author used news articles that framed China and Russia as the United States' competitor, ally or a partner in a mutually beneficial exchange. The study discovered that the participants' response as to whether the U.S. could trust Russia/China and/or count on them in times of crisis was determined by how Russia/China were portrayed in the particular news story that the participants read. Because the news stories that Brewer used did not specifically frame the nations in a favorable or unfavorable light, but rather followed the journalistic standards of objectivity, it can be inferred that even subtlest of frames can be potent in influencing public opinion about an issue/country.

While the story frame, e.g. conflict, and subtle changes in wording can influence the audience's perception of an issue or an event, one may ask how immediate this impact would be and whether it would be strong enough in the long run to matter. In their study of five news media, Wanta and Hu (1994) discovered that the medium largely determines the time-lag and magnitude of the effect. For instance, television coverage was associated with shorter optimal time-lag for the agenda-setting effect to take place. At the same time, television coverage effects quickly deteriorated, replaced by new information. Newspapers, on the contrary, were marked by a longer time-lag but had a stronger long-term agenda-setting effect. Moreover, national and regional media had a more immediate impact than local media (Wanta & Hu 1994). In the case of Russian

ethnic media, *New Russian Word*, as the oldest national newspaper and the only daily, can be expected to have a greater impact on its audience than a small paper in Texas.

Frames in Ethnic Media

Few studies have looked at media frames that specifically apply to ethnic publications. In her master's thesis for the University of Missouri, Dulcan (2006) analyzed differences and similarities between the mainstream and Spanish-language ethnic media in terms of their use of economic, conflict, human-interest and consequence frames. She found no significant difference in the tone of the articles or the use of metaphors except in cases when the newspapers' role was clearly stated as to provide new incomers with immigration-related information and advice.

Arguably, one unique frame that could be found in a news story produced by ethnic media is that of cultural belonging. Hall (2000) wrote that by assigning roles to individuals, groups, organizations and institutions, such media can draw boundaries between "us" and "them," effectively defining the ethnic community they serve. According to the author, news frames differ across cultures, depending on assumptions editors and journalists make about their audiences.

Audiences who share the same cultural background may also share familiarity with a set of classification schemes, behavioral scripts, archetypes and narrative models. The frame of a media text, the way it presents an issue, activates specific schemata or associations in the minds of audience members. (Hall, 2000, p.233)

One way to identify and measure the cultural belonging frame is by employing a distinction, proposed by Nossek (2004), between "our" news and "their" news. In his study of media coverage of foreign news, Nossek discovered that the national identity of journalists and editors could influence the level of emotionality with which the news

story is written. A content analysis of four 1995 international conflicts covered by the New York Times, the Times of London and Israel's Ha'aretz revealed similar trends despite the fact that these three newspapers represent three different journalistic styles. Whenever the conflict was defined as "ours," the journalists employed more emotive terms, offered more commentary and provided historical references, thereby more actively influencing the readers' perception of the conflict.

The "us" vs. "them" frame could be measured by identifying descriptors, or labels (Entman, 1991), historical references, information sources (Liebes, 1992), and whether the news story relies solely on factual statements vs. commentary (Nossek, 2004, p.355). Nossek argues that a degree of openness in any given news story can be determined by whether the coverage is balanced, neutral in tone and factual in content; news stories perceived and presented as "theirs" tend to be more open, whereas "our" news stories, especially with respect to conflicts, are more likely to be more closed.

While Nossek's study may offer valuable guidance for this current study, it is important to note that the Russian style of journalism differs from the U.S. style. There is more commentary and interpretation in Russian press. In her research on what constitutes news in Russia, Bolotina (2006) discovered that Russians make no distinction between journalists and public relations practitioners. This means they are accustomed to the media that have a strong agenda.

A quick glance at the Russian ethnic media reveals a significant similarity between these media and the Russian press. Because of the journalistic style employed in both, one can expect blatant statements of partisanship, if such should occur, as opposed to subtle framing indicators that Nossek (2004) outlines. However, the distinction he

proposes between “us” and “them” is still relevant for this study and can be identified through either explicit statements of belonging or more subtly—through including metaphors and keywords indicative of an affiliation.

Because the present study deals with foreign policy controversies, the attribution of responsibility and conflict frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) may also offer insights into how the Russian ethnic newspapers’ position themselves in relation to these controversies. For instance, if the conveyed identity is more aligned with the United States, the media will avoid references to the United States as, for instance, the aggressor and will seek to describe the U.S. with more neutral terms instead. If that identity is more aligned with Russia, the media will be more likely to overlook or de-emphasize Russia’s role in the Chechen war. If, however, the Russian ethnic community’s identity remains ambivalent, the newspapers will either seek to distance themselves from the controversial issues or provide balanced coverage in both cases.

Chapter 3

Methodology

This study explores the following question: Do Russian-language ethnic media frame foreign policy controversies between the United States and Russia in such a way that one side is depicted more favorably than the other? To answer this question, a content analysis of three major Russian ethnic publications has been performed.

Content analysis is commonly defined as “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003, p.141). Content analysis is considered an appropriate methodological tool for a framing study because it deals with “symbols and messages contained in the mass media” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). It is a convenient, inexpensive research tool that allows analyzing large amounts of content.

Three major Russian-language ethnic publications were content-analyzed. The newspapers were selected on the basis of their circulation figures, period of existence and availability (only these three can be found in the New York Public Library and only one of them has an online archive dating back to 2006).

1. Novoe Russkoe Slovo (New Russian Word, *NRW*). This newspaper is an obvious choice for a number of reasons. First, *NRW* is the largest Russian-language publication in the United States with a circulation of 40,000 copies on weekdays and 64,000 copies on weekends. The readership is estimated at 3.2 readers per copy (Inforeklama, 2006), which translates into about 240,000 readers per weekend edition.

NRW is also the only Russian-language daily in the U.S. and the oldest Russian newspaper outside of Russia. *NRW* is published in New York and distributed throughout the country.

2. Russky Golos (Russian Voice, *RV*). This newspaper, established in 1919, was *NRW*'s competitor in longevity, if nothing else, until late 2004. Throughout its history, *RV* promoted a socialist ideology, and, although its circulation figures are unavailable, it appeared to be quite popular (Myroniuk, 1987) until the later years of the Soviet Union. The wind of change and the age of *RV*'s audience—the readers usually represented the older demographic—made *RV* readership figures dwindle in the 1990s. By 1999, the earliest year of coverage that this thesis examines, the newspaper published 3,000 copies a week. It had a poor quality of print and, apparently, no professional designer. The newspaper eventually closed down in late 2004, never once stepping away from its socialist ideology. *Russian Voice* was included in the analysis because of its unique ideological perspective and the impressive 85-year-long history.

3. V Novom Svete (In the New World, *INW*). This newspaper is one of the most popular Russian tabloids published in the United States (Inforeklama, 2006). It is distributed in all 50 U.S. states and in Canada. The current weekly circulation is 30,000-40,000 copies; subscriptions make up about one-third of this total. *INW* can be found in international grocery stores, news stands and, free of charge, on trans-Atlantic flights of Aeroflot, Air Ukraine and Uzbek Airlines. *INW* has been published since 1995 and is an affiliate of a major Russian tabloid, *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* (MK). This newspaper was selected due to the scope of its reach, the tabloid format and the affiliation with a Russian

publisher. The latter two factors are expected to provide this research of the Russian ethnic press with greater variety of styles and viewpoints.

Sample Selection and Timeline

This study examined these three ethnic publications' coverage of eight prominent U.S.-Russian foreign policy controversies that took place between 1999 and 2007. These are events that attracted media attention worldwide and occasionally pitted the two countries directly or indirectly against each other.

1. The 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
2. Russia's war in Chechnya
3. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
4. The NATO accession by the Baltic states in 2004
5. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine
6. Russia's conflict with Georgia involving Georgia's air space
7. The U.S.-Russian disagreement over the anti-missile defense system that the U.S. seeks to mount in Central Europe
8. The U.S. push for preemptive measures against Iran

The coverage of these events has been coded with respect to: (a) whether the event was described in a positive, neutral or negative tone; (b) the attributes assigned to the two countries as well as other possible actors (e.g. NATO, East, West); (c) whether the United States or Russia were presented as "us" or "them"; (d) whether the conflict between the two countries in each case has been emphasized.

The articles dealing with the aforementioned eight events were identified via online search engines (applicable only to *New Russian Word* in the period of 2006-2007) and by direct reading of copies by date at the New York Public Library.

1. *The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (March 24, 1999-June 10, 1999)*. This study analyzed all news stories dating one week before and one week after the start of the bombing, as well as one week before and one week after the end of the bombing.

2. *Russia's war in Chechnya (1999-)*. Although the war in Chechnya is often downplayed by the Russian and the western media, some of the most prominent events received substantial coverage in the period under investigation. This research looked at the articles published within a week from the Moscow theater hostage crisis (*Nord Ost*), which led, on October 26, 2002, to more than 100 deaths—most from a poisonous gas used by the Russian troops against the terrorists. The coverage of the killing of Chechen extremist leader Ruslan Gelaev on March 2, 2004, and the assassination of pro-Russian Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov on May 9, 2004, have also been examined for a period of one week after the incident.

3. *The U.S. invasion of Iraq (March 20, 2003-)*. News stories dating one week before and one week after the first day of the invasion have been analyzed. This encapsulates the conflict build-up period before the war and the debate that accompanied the U.S. decision.

4. *The 2004 joining of NATO by the Baltic states (March 29, 2004)*. The desire of the Baltic states to join NATO and their eventual accession angered Russia and prompted negative coverage of the event in the Russian newspapers. In the ethnic media under investigation, news stories dating one week before and after the event have been analyzed.

5. *The Orange Revolution in Ukraine (November 21, 2004-January 23, 2005)*. Ukraine is a key to Russia's geopolitical ambitions and security. The Orange Revolution

received highly negative coverage in Russia. To understand the sentiment toward the event in the Russian ethnic press in the U.S., this study analyzed news stories dating one week before the protests began and one week after (thus covering the pre-election and election period), as well as one week before Yushenko was declared winner and one week after.

6. *Russian-Georgian conflict: Airspace violations (March 11, 2007; August 7, 2007; August 21, 2007)*. All news stories dealing with three airspace violation incidents (or allegations) have been analyzed. Because there was no build-up toward these events, this study looked at one week's coverage of the incidents from the date of their occurrence.

7. *The U.S.-Russian missile defense controversy (February 2007-)*. This study analyzed the following timeframe for this crisis: one week after the U.S. announced its talks with Poland and Czech Republic to host U.S. missile defense shields; one week before and after outgoing Russian President Putin offered on June 7, 2007 to set up a joint U.S.-Russian anti-missile base; one week before and after Putin compared on October 26, 2007 the current controversy with the Cuban missile crisis.

8. *United States' push for preemptive measures against Iran (ongoing)*. The U.S. has been arguing since 2003 that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. To prevent the emergence of nuclear Iran, the U.S. pushed for measures ranging from tougher sanctions to, what is lately more common, unilateral use of force. Russia, which collaborates with Iran's nuclear energy program, sought to block most of U.S. proposals for such measures in the United Nations Security Council. A random sample of news stories covering this

issue was selected by scanning headlines and lead paragraphs of *NRW* and *INW* for the year 2007.

Subject Attributes

This study primarily focused on attributes assigned to the United States and Russia as actors in the aforementioned conflicts. Goldstein's (1992) conflict-cooperation scale was used as a basis for deriving the attributes. This scale was created by a small panel of international relations experts and is widely used in political science/international relations to code events representing a conflict or cooperation between two countries. The scale includes 61 actions that were rated according to the degree of cooperativeness or conflict they represented. For instance, the most conflictual action according to this scale was military attack. Extending economic or military aid was viewed as a highly cooperative action.

Goldstein (1992) suggested that the cooperative and conflictual categories could be grouped as follows: Conflict action, verbal conflict, participation, verbal cooperation and cooperative action. Using a similar logic, this study identified eight categories of attributes that have been assigned to the U.S. and/or Russia in the conflicts described in the previous section:

- Aggressor (descriptors characterizing military attack, aggression, invasion)
- Hostile actor (conflictual actions short of direct use of force, e.g. sabotage, spying, reduction of aid in order to punish, etc.)
- Interferer (verbal conflict, threats, accusations, diplomatic interference)
- Neutral/bystander (descriptors lacking strong action words as to the cooperation or conflict)
- Negotiator (words suggesting that the country is seeking a solution/compromise and/or is open to negotiation)

- Collaborator (offering or extending economic aid, other forms of non-military cooperation)
- Protector/defender (military support, military alliance, extending military aid)
- Self-defender (descriptors indicating that the country is defending itself/its interests against an outside force; victimization of the country)

These categories are not mutually exclusive. The same paragraph may depict a country as both an interferer and a negotiator, for instance, if the paragraph states that the country is seeking a compromise, while underlining its intention to veto a particular solution.

Self-defender is the only category that has not been addressed in the Goldstein's conflict-cooperation scale. In the ethnic newspapers under investigation, the U.S. or Russia's actions have been justified in a number of cases by portraying the country as defending itself or its constituents against a third force (e.g. striking Iran to prevent a possible terrorist attack against the U.S.; protecting Russia's territorial unity in the Chechen conflict). None of the first seven categories could adequately incorporate this attribute without compromising the logic of the results; hence a separate category was created.

With attributes assigned to the U.S. and Russia being at the core of this research, this study seeks to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: Which side was more likely to be portrayed as "us" or "them"?

RQ2: Which attributes were more likely to be assigned to the U.S. and Russia in the Russian-American ethnic press?

RQ3: Was the coverage of the events more emotional or more neutral in tone?

RQ4: Were the events framed in terms of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia?

Hypotheses and Ethnic Identity

A number of scholars have successfully argued that the “melting pot” approach to immigration is erroneous, for few immigrants assimilate into the new culture completely, and the degree of acculturation may be contingent on the degree of similarity between the country of origin and the new country. In his study of young North Africans in France, Echchaibi (2001) argued that most of younger immigrants develop a hybrid identity that transcends the limitations of singular cultural belonging. Akhtar (1995), using the psychoanalytical line of argument, wrote that the two self-representations related to the old and new home country gradually converge. “As a result of this synthesis, a capacity for good-humored ambivalence toward both the country of origin and that of adoption develops” (Akhtar, 1995, p.1060). Echchaibi (2001) also stated that ethnic media is the platform that allows for the articulation of this hybrid identity.

Based on these studies, one can expect to find the following to be true of the Russian ethnic media in the U.S.:

H1: Conflict situations will be framed as “ours” regardless of which of the two countries is involved.

According to Nossek (2004), international conflicts in news coverage can be classified as either “ours” or “theirs,” the former being marked by greater emotionality and the latter by greater neutrality of news stories. In the events under investigation, one could expect to find emotional coverage regardless of which of the two countries is involved. The hybrid identity would treat both countries, and hence the conflicts they are in, as “ours.”

H2: The ethnic media will seek not to assign extremely negative and extremely positive attributes to the two countries, maintaining a balanced depiction of the U.S. and Russia.

Personal affiliation with the country-offender may require greater allocation of cognitive resources into maintaining a positive attitude toward that country. This may be especially true of ethnic communities whose identities often come into question (Akhtar, 1995) and can thus be described as less stable. To maintain the affiliation with the country in question, ethnic media would seek to justify the country's actions, even—or especially—if those actions are seen as aggressive or questionable. Such justification could be achieved through explaining the country's actions, portraying the country as a victim or de-emphasizing the agency. At the same time, when two countries that play a significant role in the ethnic community's identity are in a state of conflict, it is unlikely that one side would be assigned highly positive attributes with respect to that conflict.

H3: News stories covering the events where Russia and the U.S. are in direct opposition to each other (e.g. anti-missile defense issue) will be neutral in tone.

Because loyalties to both countries, and hence the two prominent aspects of the immigrant identity, come into direct collision in this type of conflicts, the ethnic media will seek to stay neutral or distance themselves from the situation to avoid this conflict of loyalties.

H4: Where possible, the conflict between the two countries will be de-emphasized.

Following Echchaibi's (2001) and Akhtar's (1995) lines of argument, it can be expected that the neutrality of the ethnic residents' identity and the ambivalence to the two countries may be threatened in cases when the two countries are in conflict. To maintain the balance within their attitudes, Russian Americans and their newspapers will seek to ignore or de-emphasize the conflict to avoid the pressure to choose between the two sides.

To compare the attributes assigned to the U.S. and Russia in the events under investigation, the study tested frequencies and conducted Chi-Square tests. The results were reported as totals, as well as classified by newspaper and by event.

Chapter 4

Results


A total of 334 articles were coded using paragraph as a unit of analysis (1,541 paragraphs). A second coder and native Russian speaker read about 10 percent of the articles (34). The Holsti test of intercoder reliability yielded a coefficient of .94. According to a more conservative Scott's *Pi*, the intercoder reliability coefficient was .77, which is considered good and acceptable in most situations (Shoemaker, 2003). Scott's *Pi* is generally regarded a more trustworthy measure of intercoder reliability as it eliminates the effects of accidental agreement between the coders (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003).


H1: Conflict situations will be framed as “ours” regardless of which of the two countries is involved.

To test Hypothesis 1, this study looked at the references describing the United States and Russia as either “us” or “them”. Findings revealed no clear indication of political identity, with most articles not referencing the U.S. and Russia as either “us” or “them”. Only 6 percent of all items framed the U.S. as “us” and 1.4 percent of the items referred to the U.S. as “them”. More than 90 percent of references to the United States did not indicate the national belonging. Similarly, Russia was referred to as “us” 2.6 percent of the times and as “them” 2.7 percent of the times.

When classified by newspaper, *New Russian Word* and *In the New World* were slightly more likely to depict the U.S. as “us” (see Appendix 2). *Russian Voice* was found to be an exception, failing to refer to the United States as “us” a single time. Instead, 20.9 percent of *Russian Voice* articles referred to Russia as “us”.

All findings were statistically significant at $p=.000$ with the exception of “Russia as them” category ($p=.271$). Theoretically, three factors may explain this failure to achieve statistically significant results (Wimmer & Dominick 2006): the magnitude of the effect, sample size and wide variation within items. Because the sample size was adequate, the other two explanations appear more likely in this case: In the newspapers under investigation, a reference to the U.S. as “us” did not automatically translate into a reference to Russia as “them”. In a number of cases, the same newspaper referred to Russia as both “us” and “them”. *INW*, for instance, described Russia as “us” almost as many times as “them” (3.2 percent vs. 3.4 percent). This may mean that the newspapers were especially ambivalent in characterizations of Russia when referring to the national identity of Russian Americans.





The high level of non-references (when neither side was depicted as either “us” or “them”) testifies to the lack of national bias in most cases in the Russian-American ethnic press and thus necessitates a rejection of Hypothesis 1. (For a breakdown of the findings by event, see Appendix 3).

H2: The ethnic media will seek not to assign extremely negative and extremely positive attributes to the two countries, maintaining a balanced depiction of the U.S. and Russia.

Most attributes assigned to the United States described it as the “negotiator” (28.8 percent), “neutral actor” (26.9 percent) or “interferer” (23.7 percent). It was also more likely to be described as the “aggressor” (13 percent) than Russia (4.1 percent). All findings were statistically significant (see Appendix 4A for a detailed breakdown).

Russia was mostly described as the “interferer” (34.7 percent), “negotiator” (23 percent) or “neutral actor” (19.2 percent). It was more likely than the United States to be labeled as the “hostile actor” (10.5 percent vs. 4.9 percent). These findings suggest that if the attributes were viewed as a scale, with “aggressor” representing a negative extreme


and “protector” representing a positive extreme, most attributes assigned to the United States and Russia would lie in the middle of the scale (see the table below).

USA and Russia: Attributes by Percentage and Count

		Aggressor	Hostile Actor	Interferer	Neutral	Negotiator	Collaborator	Protector	Self-defender/Victim
USA	%	5.6%	2.1%	10.3%	11.7%	12.5%	1.7%	1.5%	0.8%
	#	87	33	159	180	193	26	23	13
Russia	%	1.6%	4.0%	13.0%	7.2%	8.6%	2.1%	0.3%	2.2%
	#	24	61	201	111	133	32	5	34

Interestingly, among the times that the attribute “aggressor” was used, 37.5 percent of the uses were associated with the United States (and 10.3 percent with Russia), but more than half of the uses were linked to the category of other political actors. This category (category 4) included such subjects as NATO, West, Kosovo Force, etc.

Attribute: Aggressor



When classified by newspaper (see Appendix 4B), *Russian Voice* appeared to demonstrate some national bias, assigning more negative attributes to the United States and more positive ones to Russia. In *Russian Voice*, the United States was described as the “aggressor” 25 out of the 48 times (52.1 percent) that this country was mentioned. Similarly, the newspaper assigned 44.2 percent of references to “negotiator” and 25

percent of neutral references to Russia vis-à-vis 4.2 percent of references to “negotiator” and 6.3 percent of neutral references assigned to the United States. Russia’s actions were justified as “self-defense” in 9 out of 52 references (17.3 percent), whereas only one out of 48 such references was made to the United States (2.1 percent).

New Russian Word was found to be slightly more pro-American than pro-Russian. Russia was described as a “hostile actor” in 13.9 percent of the references and as an “interferer” in 34.8 percent of the references. The United States was assigned the “hostile actor” and “interferer” attributes in 2.6 percent and 18.2 percent of the references, respectively. The U.S. was also more likely to be described as a “neutral actor” (31.9 percent) and “negotiator” (34.3 percent) than Russia (17.8 percent and 24.1 percent). The United States and Russia were described as the “aggressor” in 6.9 percent and 2.8 percent of instances, respectively.

In the New World was more likely to frame the U.S. as the “aggressor”, “hostile actor”, “negotiator” or “protector”. It was more likely to portray Russia as “interferer”, “neutral actor”, “collaborator” or “self-defender”. However, most indicators for the two countries in *INW* were almost equal as percentages. Only the findings in the “aggressor”, “protector” and “self-defender” categories were statistically significant.

Despite slight inclinations to one side or the other, the coverage in the *New Russian Word* and *In the New World* appeared more balanced than that in *Russian Voice*. Both *NRW* and *INW* described the U.S. and Russia as “negotiator” an almost equal number of times, with the United States having a slight advantage. While some coverage included extremely positive (e.g. “protector”) or extremely negative (e.g. “aggressor”) attributes, the majority of articles described the United States and Russia with somewhat

positive (e.g. “negotiator”), somewhat negative (e.g. “interferer”) or neutral attributes. This supports Hypothesis 2.


When viewed by newspaper, *Russian Voice* presented an exception from the generally balanced news coverage by bluntly endorsing Russia in most cases. It is notable that *RV* is also the only newspaper that has now ceased to exist and the one that had suffered from acute scarcity of readers during its last decade of existence or longer. It appears that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demand for one-sided news coverage dramatically dropped, leaving *RV* without an audience. Considering the market viability of the Russian ethnic press in the U.S., the example of *Russian Voice* appears to support, rather than challenge, Hypothesis 2.

H3: News stories covering the events where Russia and the U.S. are in direct opposition to each other will be neutral in tone.

This study examined the tone of coverage with respect to the individual events. This was done to understand the publications’ attitude toward those events. Did the Russian ethnic publications under investigation portray the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as a salvation to the long-suffering Albanian minority (positive) or an attack on a sovereign country (negative)? Was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine seen as a positive development in the democratization process of that country (positive) or an unrest dictated by outside forces and a precursor of the country’s collapse (negative)? Was the invasion of Iraq condemned (negative) or did the coverage attempt to offer different sides of the argument (neutral)?

All events were reported in a predominantly neutral tone (see Appendix 5 for a detailed breakdown), which supports Hypothesis 3. The following events received some negative coverage: the Baltic countries’ entry to NATO (38.5 percent), the Orange

Revolution in Ukraine (25.2 percent), the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 (21.5 percent) and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 received (19 percent). The issue of the Orange Revolution proved most divisive one as the number of positive references to the event (23.3 percent) was almost equal to the number of negative ones (25.2 percent). The figure below illustrates this.




Notably, the Baltic states' entry to NATO, the question of the U.S. placing anti-missile defense shields in Central Europe and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. call for preemptive measures against Iran were depicted as the most conflictual of the eight events. Nevertheless, the issues of anti-missile defense shield and measures against Iran received significantly more positive than negative coverage (16 percent vs. 1.4 percent with respect to anti-missile defense and 16.3 percent vs. 0 percent with respect to Iran).

This may suggest that although Russian Americans maintain a degree of ambivalence in their affiliation with the United States and Russia, they consider their personal interests, such as safety, to be more in line with the national interests of the United States.

H4: Where possible, the conflict between the two countries will be de-emphasized.

Conflict frame was employed less than 50 percent of the times with respect to six of the eight controversies under investigation (see Appendix 6). Thus, the Hypothesis 4 was mostly supported by the findings. The Baltic countries' entry to NATO and the question of the U.S. placing anti-missile defense shields in Central Europe represented two exceptions. The conflict frame was employed with respect to these two events in 69.2 percent and 61.1 percent of references, respectively.

Conflict frame in depiction of the eight events



To understand these exceptions, it is important to note the specific characteristics of the two events. It may be safe to assume that the U.S. plan to construct an anti-missile defense system in Central Europe received as much coverage as it did because of Russia's opposition to this plan. Hence, the conflict frame was the integral part of the story and a factor that made the U.S. initiative especially newsworthy. By employing this frame more than 60 percent of the time, the Russian ethnic media were most probably following journalistic standards as opposed to merely seeking an opportunity for expressing their ethnic identity.

The frequency of references to a conflict between the U.S. and Russia with respect to the Baltic countries' entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was more surprising. In other instances where NATO and the U.S. were both listed as political or military actors, NATO seemed to be assigned the more negative attributes, whereas the role of the U.S. was de-emphasized or mollified. One must note, however, that the event received only little coverage and about half of the articles came from *Russian Voice*, which maintained a staunch pro-Russian editorial policy. As a result, the small sample size may have skewed the results to make the depiction of the event seem more conflictual than it would have been, given an adequate coverage in the newspapers.

One reason so little attention has been given to this event could be that the Baltic countries never fully integrated in the former Soviet Union. They were the first nations to declare independence from Moscow in 1990 (Lithuania) and 1991 (Latvia and Estonia), and the Balts' poor knowledge of the Russian language was proverbial during the Soviet times. As a result, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are unlikely to be included in the Russian-speaking ethnic communities abroad. Hence, events happening in those countries

are given less prominence and are regarded with less sympathy in the Russian-language ethnic press than the developments in other former Soviet Republics.

Out of the four hypotheses under investigation, only the first one, which expected a higher number of references to the two countries as “us”, was not supported by the findings. At a closer look, rejection of Hypothesis 1 is only logical given the findings supporting the other three hypotheses. Overall, the ethnic newspapers under investigation appeared to use softer attributes with respect to the United States and Russia, present controversies between these two countries in a predominantly neutral tone and avoid, where possible, employing the conflict frame. All these testify to the ambivalence in the attitude of the Russian-speaking ethnic community in the U.S. to both their country of origin and the new home country. When controversies between these two countries arise, the ethnic newspapers generally seem to avoid blunt partisanship and opt for more balanced, less emotional coverage.

Chapter 5

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion of the Findings

This study sought to answer the following questions: Do Russian ethnic media take sides in the U.S.-Russian confrontations? Do they tend to criticize one country more than the other, especially in the conflicts that country instigates? Is their coverage of one country more emotional than the coverage of the other? The goal of this research was to infer the existing identity and loyalty patterns of Russian Americans from their ethnic media.

The findings revealed that most of the Russian ethnic newspapers' coverage was neutral in tone and avoided clear indications of affiliation with one side or the other. Very few overt "us" and "them" references have been made. Most attributes assigned to the two countries fell in the "verbal conflict" – "neutral" – "verbal cooperation" range, avoiding the extremes. In most of the conflictual events under investigation, conflict frames were employed less than 40 percent of the time.

To understand the place of these findings within the framework of media studies that deal with the manifestations of national or ethnic identity, one should turn to the two competing theories that were implicitly tested throughout this work. According to Nossek (2004), cultural and national identity manifests itself in news coverage of international conflicts in which a country is involved. He found that news articles about conflicts framed by newspapers as "ours"—for instance, due to an active role played by that

newspaper's country in the conflict—tend to be more emotional in tone, use metaphors and cite officials' explanations for the country's involvement.

This study measured the tone of the articles and examined the attributes assigned to the actors to test the emotionality of the coverage. It was also expected that the Russian ethnic newspapers would make overt references to the two countries as either “us” or “them” due to the bluntness of the Russian journalistic style. Unlike American journalists, Russians tend to make their editorial position with respect to most issues evident in news reports, as they fail to distinguish between hard news and editorials (cf. Bolotina, 2006). It was expected, following Nossek's findings, that the newspapers under investigation would cover the events in an emotional way, and, if they support one country more than the other, this would become clear through the direct “us” and “them” indications, as well as the use of softer attributes with regards to the country which is identified as “us”.

A competing theory was also tested. In his study of North African communities in France, Echchaibi (2001) discovered that the majority of ethnic residents, especially younger people, tend to go beyond the limitations of singular cultural belonging. Instead, they adopt a more neutral, multicultural identity, embracing the new culture without rejecting their own. Similarly, Akhtar (1995) argued that the two self-representations related to the old and new home country gradually converge. This paves way for a “good-humored ambivalence toward both the country of origin and that of adoption” (Akhtar, 1995, p.1060).

If Akhtar's (1995) and Echchaibi's (2001) theories were applicable to the Russian ethnic media in the United States, the coverage of the U.S.-Russian confrontations would

be marked with ambivalence, softer attributes assigned to both countries and, where possible, the emphasis on cooperation, as opposed to conflict, between the two countries. Indeed, most findings supported Echchaibi's and Akhtar's theories.

The fact that the second theory was affirmed by this study indicates that Nossek's (2004) argument that a newspaper's national identity influences its style of coverage may be inapplicable to ethnic press. Especially, his theory appears inapplicable when the two sides involved in the conflict are the ethnic residents' country of origin and the country of adoption.

While *Russian Voice* represented an exception by making overt statements as to its pro-Russian attitude, its fate serves as additional evidence for the hybrid identity of Russian Americans. By taking sides and failing to recognize that the ethnic community's interests are more likely to be aligned with the U.S. national interests, this newspaper lost most of its readers and eventually had to discontinue its publication. This example is another reminder that the Russian ethnic community in the U.S. chooses multiculturalism.

Although neutrality and balance were the dominant characteristics of the coverage, not all findings unequivocally supported this conclusion. For instance, the United States was significantly more likely to be described as both the "aggressor" and the "protector" than Russia. Both of these attributes are considered to be the extremes on the attribute scale used in this study. In addition, Russia was significantly more likely to be described as the "self-defender/victim" than the United States. Finally, coverage of the U.S. plans concerning creating an anti-missile defense system and taking preemptive measures against Iran was marked by a high ratio of positive to negative coverage. This

seemingly suggests that the Russian ethnic publications endorsed the U.S. position on these issues. All of these apparent discrepancies with the overall findings could, most of the time, be explained.

Sample selection could be one possible explanation of why the United States was the “aggressor” in more than 37 percent of the time. The U.S.-led war in Iraq commenced without the approval of the UN Security Council or endorsement from most of the NATO allies. It has been criticized as an “invasion” in newspapers on both sides of the Bering Strait. Unlike the 1999 bombings of ex-Yugoslavia, the war in Iraq could not be described as anything but a U.S. undertaking. As a result, the Iraq war contributed to the share of negative depiction of the United States.

It appears that the U.S. was more likely to be depicted as the “protector” due to its leading role in the war on terror and the alliance of this country with Israel. In fact, in the newspapers under investigation, Israel emerged as the third country that Russian Americans appeared to identify with. The U.S. call to prevent nuclear enrichment by Iran, for instance, was portrayed, in many cases, in a positive light because a nuclear Iran would be a threat to Israel. In one *INW* article, entitled “Iran the Terrible”, the Iranian regime was compared with the atrocities of the Russian czar Ivan IV. In this and similar cases, the United States was described as Israel’s protector.

While the tone of the coverage of the eight events was predominantly neutral, the high ratios of the positive to negative coverage of the U.S. plan to construct anti-missile defense shields in Central Europe and its push for preemptive measures against Iran are noteworthy. When American diplomats said the U.S. does not need to seek Russia’s approval to construct anti-missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic, *In*

the New World explained their harsh statement in the following way: “It is easy to understand the United States. How can it reach a compromise with Russia, if Russia refuses to seek a compromise?” (Chernega, 2007).

This position of the Russian ethnic press suggests that although they maintain a vivid interest in the affairs of Russia, these newspapers recognize that the interests and particularly the safety of their audience are closely associated with the national interests of the United States. Moreover, with respect to the anti-missile defense, most journalists and commentators agreed that the system would represent no threat to Russia. They interpreted outgoing Russian President Putin’s contentious statements as his desire to “resurrect Russia’s appearance as an Empire” (*NRW*) and saw Russia’s interference as a nuisance. A particular phrase used in some of the *New Russian Word* and *In the New World* articles could be literally translated as “to put sticks into the wheels” (*vstavlyat’ palki v kolyosa*). This phrase usually signifies an action performed out of sheer meanness. *New Russian Word* was especially negative in discussing President Bush’s invitation to outgoing Russian President Putin to visit the Bush family’s estate in Kennebunkport, Maine.

“Apparently, it is not enough to be a loyal ally of the United States for George Bush the senior to ride you on his boat. To obtain this privilege, one must compare America with the Nazi Germany or assert that it commits crimes far worse than Stalin’s atrocities. To obtain this privilege, one must put sticks into Americans’ wheels everywhere—from Uzbekistan to Kosovo. One must play fiddle to Iran, which kills Americans in Iraq and arms Hezbollah [...]” (Kozlovsky, 2007).

Another interesting finding is the depiction of Russia as a “self-defender/victim” in more than 70 percent of instances when this attribute was used. This was particularly evident in the case of the Chechen war. This may come as a surprise to the readers of

western press, where Russia is often criticized for its human rights record in Chechnya. However, one must note that since Vladimir Putin came to power, the conflict in Chechnya has been downplayed by most of the Russian media. The coverage was eventually reduced to reports of Chechen terrorist attacks and major “victories” of the Russian army over the “separatists”. Russian media appear to be a major source of information for the Russian-language ethnic newspapers in the United States. Lack of substantial coverage of the Chechen conflict may therefore have affected the way it was portrayed by these publications. Moreover, some bias in the findings may also come from the sample selection. One of the biggest events related to the war in Chechnya in the period under investigation was the theater hostage crisis in Moscow in 2002. This event was sometimes called the Russian 9/11. The widespread war-on-terror sentiment of the time may have led the Russian ethnic newspapers to portray Chechens mostly as barbarians and terrorists, whereas, in light of the *Nord Ost* tragedy, Russia was automatically justified for its actions in Chechnya. The fact that the Chechen war was mostly seen as a distant event that did not concern Russia and deserved little coverage is illustrated by the headline that *Russian Voice* used to describe the theater hostage crisis: “The Chechen War Storms into Moscow” (Tretyakov, 2002).

The “self-defender/victim” attribute was also used in the event of the Russian-Georgian conflict. In August 2007, Georgia announced that a Russian missile X-58 was fired into the Georgian territory. Russia denied the charges. In reporting this event, *In the New World* combined the Russian words *avianalet* (air strike) and *navet* (slander) to produce a headline “Avianavet” (air slander). Another *INW* article asserted that western diplomats and the media were only concerned with the Georgian side of the story,

whereas “as more details of the incident come to light, the Russian missile in Georgia becomes more and more like the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq” (Perevozkina, 2007).

Finally, some variance in the findings may come from the style of coverage of *Russian Voice*. This newspaper was more likely to depict the United States in the negative light, which may have influenced the percentage of references to the United States as the “aggressor”. The high proportion of positive coverage of the U.S. anti-missile defense plans and the call to deal with the potential threat of Iran may also be explained by the fact that *Russian Voice* stopped publishing before these issues became prominent. Lack of *RV*'s anti-American voice in these events may have skewed the findings to make them appear more favorable toward the United States.

Limitations of This Study

While this study drew a mostly representative sample of the Russian ethnic publications in the United States (a pro-American broadsheet newspaper, a pro-Russian nostalgic paper and a tabloid), it includes fewer publications than was initially hoped for. One explanation why so few studies focus on the Russian ethnic media in the United States is the difficulty of accessing the archives of these newspapers. Only *New Russian Word* has a website with a modest archive dating back to 2006. Few Russian-language newspapers are available in the libraries, including the New York Public Library and the Library of Congress. Although the newspapers that were accessed for this study are (or were) among the most authoritative ones, the inability to include more publications in this research puts limitations on the generalizability of the findings.

Content analysis as a methodological tool also has its shortcomings (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). First, content analysis alone reveals little about the effects of the news articles on the audience. Instead, it is a good starting point for further agenda-setting and second-level agenda-setting studies. Also, the findings are contingent upon the researcher's definitions and category systems. Different researchers may use different measurement tools in examining a single concept and as a result may come to different conclusions.

Finally, this study includes *Russian Voice* newspaper, which stopped publishing in late 2004. Hence, three of the events under investigation—Russian conflict with Georgia, the debate around the anti-missile defense system, and the controversy over Iran—were examined through their coverage in only the two remaining newspapers. This may have resulted in slightly more positive portrayal of the United States in those three events, as the singularly pro-Russian perspective conveyed by *RV* was now missing. Indeed, a test of frequencies revealed that the U.S. initiatives regarding the anti-missile defense and Iran received some of the more positive coverage among the eight events.

Areas for Future Research

This study could be further improved by including Israel as a third country which seems to be an important part of the Russian ethnic identity in the U.S. Because many Russian Americans are of Jewish origin, it may be interesting to see how the position and interests of Israel influence their perception of world events. A survey of journalists working for the Russian ethnic publications could offer insights into the journalistic traditions with which those practitioners approach coverage of news stories. It was impossible to infer from the findings of this study whether the neutrality and balance in

coverage of the U.S.-Russian foreign policy disputes resulted from the influence of the American standards of journalism or whether it was the potential conflict of loyalties and affiliations that prompted the publications to offer both sides of each argument.

Because a content analysis alone cannot serve as a basis for identifying the effects of the content on the audience, further second-level agenda-setting studies involving the potential audience of the Russian ethnic publications may be required to better understand Russian Americans' identity. It may also be interesting to see how the findings of this study compare to the coverage of the same events in the American and Russian press.

To better understand ethnic groups and their media, the findings of this study could be compared with the results of similar research involving other ethnic communities in the United States or the Russian speakers living in other countries. Such a comparison would allow for making generalizations about ethnic communities.

While ethnic newspapers may provide a predominantly neutral and balanced coverage of the country of their origin, it may be interesting to see whether partisanship would be more of an issue with respect to U.S. domestic policies. A study of questions and measures that directly affect the ethnic communities, such as immigration, work permits, etc., would be especially telling. This would allow the researcher to discuss ethnic communities' participation in the democratic process in the United States.

Conclusion

This study attempted to advance the understanding of ethnic media, using Russian ethnic media in the United States as an example. It sought to demonstrate how such media approach issues that potentially present a dilemma of loyalties and emotions for

the audience as well as for journalists and editors of ethnic newspapers. It particularly strove to identify markers of the coverage of such issues. Finally, it hoped to shed light on the cultural, ethnic and political identity of the Russian ethnic community in the United States. Majority of Hollywood films tend to portray Russian Americans as either unpolished individuals or, more commonly, as thugs closely connected with Russian criminal underworld. By examining Russian ethnic newspapers, this study sought to provide a more accurate picture and thus attempted to initiate a change of perception of Russian Americans by their fellow U.S. compatriots.

This study makes the following contributions to the scholarship of ethnic media and theories of national and ethnic identity.

1. *“Ethnic” or “Immigrant” Press*

This study emphasizes the often-overlooked distinction between the terms “ethnic” and “immigrant” media. Blau et al. (1998) described “immigrant press” as a short-lived tool for satisfying information needs of incoming immigrants. They failed, however, to draw an important distinction between the two terms by taking their definition a step further. The current research argues that “ethnic media” is the appropriate term for the means of mass communication within established ethnic communities. *New Russian Word*, which has existed for almost 90 years and remains the largest ethnic publication in Russian in North America, is the brightest example of such media and in no instance should be referred to as “immigrant press”.

2. *Frame of National Belonging*

This study failed to affirm Nossek’s (2004) findings that a newspaper’s national identity influences the emotionality of its coverage of international conflicts. Instead, this

research suggests that different criteria may be applicable to ethnic media, at least with respect to conflicts involving the ethnic residents' country of origin and the new home country. Future studies not focusing on conflicts in which both such countries are involved could further contradict or affirm Nossek's theory.

3. The "Melting Pot" Theory and Ethnic Identity

The "melting pot" theory envisaged a complete integration of ethnic communities into the new culture (Park, 1922). Subsequent studies revealed, however, that rarely does a full integration occur. Instead, immigrants form ethnic communities and appear to oscillate between the new world and the miniature recreation of their country of origin within the community. Echchaibi (2001) argues that the ethnic residents thus develop a hybrid, cosmopolitan identity able to embrace both cultures at the same time. Akhtar (1995) writes that the emergence of this identity is marked by healthy ambivalence toward both countries. This current research discovered that the news coverage in the Russian ethnic media is characterized by the inclusion of both countries' viewpoints, predominantly balanced representation and ambivalence in such references to the two countries as "us" and "them". This supports the ethnic identity theories that view ethnicity as a fluid and adaptable phenomenon.

Finally, this is the first study of its kind dealing with the Russian-language ethnic media. Although just a small step into the virgin area, it offers valuable insights into the questions of identity and loyalties of the Russian ethnic community. It reveals that multiculturalism is a more viable approach in ethnic media than partisanship. It also shows that ethnic press is not a threat to cultural integration of ethnic communities as Park (1922) feared. Instead, Russian Americans were revealed to endorse U.S. national

interests even if they read their news in Russian and continue to follow the developments in their country of origin. With future studies involving other ethnic groups, these findings could be generalized and the understanding of ethnic communities could be further advanced.

APPENDIX 1

Explication of Tables

The **newspapers** were coded as:

- 1 - *New Russian Word*
- 2 - *Russian Voice*
- 3 - *In the New World*

The **events** were coded as:

- 1 - The NATO bombing of ex-Yugoslavia
- 2 - The Russian war in Chechnya
- 3 - The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
- 4 - The accession of the Baltic countries to NATO
- 5 - The Orange Revolution in Ukraine
- 6 - The Russian-Georgian air space disputes
- 7 - The U.S. plan to construct an anti-missile defense system in Central Europe
- 8 - The U.S. call for preemptive measures against Iran

The **subjects** are the parties involved in the conflict/controversy:

- 1 - The U.S.
- 2 - Russia
- 3 - Third country also involved in the controversy (e.g. ex-Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Iraq, etc.)
- 4 - Other (e.g. NATO, East, West)

The **attributes** (Aggressor - Hostile Actor - Interferer - Neutral/Bystander - Negotiator - Collaborator - Protector/Defender - Self-defender/Victim) were divided into eight columns and coded on a binominal scale (1, when the attribute has been used; 0, when it hasn't been used).

References to the U.S. and Russia as either “**us**” or “**them**” were coded as 1 when such a reference existed or 0 when it did not.

Conflict was designated with 1, whenever the conflict frame was employed in the paragraph, or 0, when no reference to the conflict between the U.S. and Russia has been made.


APPENDIX 2

TABLE 1


Paper		US: "us"		US: "them"		Russia: "us"		Russia: "them"	
		1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	Count	57	1007	1	1063	2	1062	28	1036
	% within paper	5.4%	94.6%	0.1%	99.9%	0.2%	99.8%	2.6%	97.4%
	% of total	3.7%	56.3%	0.1%	69.0%	0.1%	68.9%	1.8%	67.2%
2	Count	0	129	17	112	27	102	1	128
	% within paper	0.0%	100%	13.2%	86.8%	20.9%	79.1%	0.8%	99.2%
	% of total	0.0%	8.4%	1.1%	7.3%	1.8%	6.6%	0.1%	8.3%
3	Count	36	312	4	344	11	337	12	336
	% within paper	10.3%	89.7%	1.1%	98.9%	3.2%	96.8	3.4%	96.6%
	% of total	2.3%	20.2%	0.3%	22.3%	0.7%	21.9%	0.8%	21.8%
Total	Count	93	1448	22	1519	40	1501	41	1500
	% within paper	6.0%	94.0%	1.4%	98.6%	2.6%	97.4%	2.7%	97.3%
Pearson Chi-Square	Value	20.546		140.212		196.348		2.608	
	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	.000		.000		.000		.271	

APPENDIX 3


USA as "us" by Event



USA as "them" by Event



Russia as "us" by Event



Russia as us
■ no
■ yes

Pies show percents

Russia as "them" by Event



Russia as them
■ no
■ yes

Pies show percents

TABLE 2

A. Percentage by Attribute

Aggressor through Neutral												
	Aggressor		Total	Hostile Actor		Total	Interferer		Total	Neutral		Total
	0	1		0	1		0	1		0	1	
1	44.5%	37.5%	43.5%	44.4%	30.8%	43.5%	46.0%	37.0%	43.5%	40.2%	55.7%	43.5%
2	42.4%	10.3%	37.6%	36.1%	57.0%	37.6%	34.0%	46.7%	37.6%	38.4%	34.4%	37.6%
3	0.1%		0.1%		0.9%	0.1%	0.1%		0.1%	0.1%		0.1%
4	13.0%	52.2%	18.9%	19.5%	11.2%	18.9%	19.9%	16.3%	18.9%	21.3%	9.9%	18.9%
Pearson	216.416			32.767			21.690			32.925		
Chi-Square	.000			.000			.000			.000		

Negotiator through Self-defense/Victim												
	Negotiator		Total	Collaborator		Total	Protector		Total	Self-defense		Total
	0	1		0	1		0	1		0	1	
1	40.6%	52.6%	43.5%	44.2%	31.0%	43.5%	43.0%	65.7%	43.5%	44.0%	27.7%	43.5%
2	38.0%	36.2%	37.6%	37.5%	38.1%	37.6%	38.1%	14.3%	37.6%	36.5%	72.3%	37.6%
3	0.1%		0.1%	0.1%		0.1%	0.1%		0.1%	0.1%		0.1%
4	21.3%	11.2%	18.9%	16.2%	31.0%	18.9%	18.9%	20.0%	18.9%	19.5%		18.9%
Pearson	24.909			10.123			9.289			27.572		
Chi-Square	.000			0.018			0.026			.000		

B. Subject and Attribute by Newspaper

Aggressor

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Aggressor	0	Count	435	343	1	140	919
			% within Subj	93.1%	97.2%	100.0%	57.6%	86.4%
	1	Count	32	10	0	103	145	
		% within Subj	6.9%	2.8%	.0%	42.4%	13.6%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Aggressor	0	Count	23	50		13	86
			% within Subj	47.9%	96.2%		44.8%	66.7%
	1	Count	25	2		16	43	
		% within Subj	52.1%	3.8%		55.2%	33.3%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	
3	Aggressor	0	Count	125	162		17	304
			% within Subj	80.6%	93.1%		89.5%	87.4%
	1	Count	30	12		2	44	
		% within Subj	19.4%	6.9%		10.5%	12.6%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 224.067, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 2: 34.164, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 3: 11.601, p=.003)

Hostile Actor

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Hostile	0	Count	455	304	0	235	994
			% within Subj	97.4%	86.1%	.0%	96.7%	93.4%
	1	Count	12	49	1	8	70	
		% within Subj	2.6%	13.9%	100.0%	3.3%	6.6%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Hostile	0	Count	45	52		26	123
			% within Subj	93.8%	100.0%		89.7%	95.3%
	1	Count	3	0		3	6	
		% within Subj	6.3%	.0%		10.3%	4.7%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
3	Hostile	0	Count	137	162		18	317
			% within Subj	88.4%	93.1%		94.7%	91.1%
	1	Count	18	12		1	31	
		% within Subj	11.6%	6.9%		5.3%	8.9%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 61.310, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 2: 4.933, p=.085; Chi-square-paper 3: 2.576, p=.276)

Interferer

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Interferer	0	Count	382	230	1	192	805
			% within Subj	81.8%	65.2%	100.0%	79.0%	75.7%
	1	Count	85	123	0	51	259	
		% within Subj	18.2%	34.8%	.0%	21.0%	24.3%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Interferer	0	Count	24	45		18	87
			% within Subj	50.0%	86.5%		62.1%	67.4%
	1	Count	24	7		11	42	
		% within Subj	50.0%	13.5%		37.9%	32.6%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	
3	Interferer	0	Count	105	103		11	219
			% within Subj	67.7%	59.2%		57.9%	62.9%
	1	Count	50	71		8	129	
		% within Subj	32.3%	40.8%		42.1%	37.1%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 32.509, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 2: 15.668, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 3: 2.785, p=.248)

Neutral

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Neutral	0	Count	318	290	1	215	824
			% within Subj	68.1%	82.2%	100.0%	88.5%	77.4%
	1	Count	149	63	0	28	240	
		% within Subj	31.9%	17.8%	.0%	11.5%	22.6%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Neutral	0	Count	45	39		28	112
			% within Subj	93.8%	75.0%		96.6%	86.8%
	1	Count	3	13		1	17	
		% within Subj	6.3%	25.0%		3.4%	13.2%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	
3	Neutral	0	Count	127	139		16	282
			% within Subj	81.9%	79.9%		84.2%	81.0%
	1	Count	28	35		3	66	
		% within Subj	18.1%	20.1%		15.8%	19.0%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 45.077, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 2: 10.765, p=.005; Chi-square-paper 3: .356, p=.837)

Negotiator

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Negotiator	0	Count	307	268	1	204	780
			% within Subj	65.7%	75.9%	100.0%	84.0%	73.3%
	1	Count	160	85	0	39	284	
		% within Subj	34.3%	24.1%	.0%	16.0%	26.7%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Negotiator	0	Count	46	29		29	104
			% within Subj	95.8%	55.8%		100.0%	80.6%
	1	Count	2	23		0	25	
		% within Subj	4.2%	44.2%		.0%	19.4%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	
3	Negotiator	0	Count	124	149		17	290
			% within Subj	80.0%	85.6%		89.5%	83.3%
	1	Count	31	25		2	58	
		% within Subj	20.0%	14.4%		10.5%	16.7%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 29.336, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 2: 34.635, p=.000; Chi-square-paper 3: 2.418, p=.299)

Collaborator

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Collaborator	0	Count	442	329	1	217	989
			% within Subj	94.6%	93.2%	100.0%	89.3%	93.0%
	1	Count	25	24	0	26	75	
		% within Subj	5.4%	6.8%	.0%	10.7%	7.0%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Collaborator	0	Count	48	51		29	128
			% within Subj	100.0%	98.1%		100.0%	99.2%
	1	Count	0	1		0	1	
		% within Subj	.0%	1.9%		.0%	.8%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
3	Collaborator	0	Count	154	167		19	340
			% within Subj	99.4%	96.0%		100.0%	97.7%
	1	Count	1	7		0	8	
		% within Subj	.6%	4.0%		.0%	2.3%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 7.102, p=.069; Chi-square-paper 2: 1.492, p=.474; Chi-square-paper 3: 4.637, p=.098)

Protector

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Protector	0	Count	450	348	1	237	1036
			% within Subj	96.4%	98.6%	100.0%	97.5%	97.4%
	1	Count	17	5	0	6	28	
		% within Subj	3.6%	1.4%	.0%	2.5%	2.6%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Protector	0	Count	48	52		29	129
			% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
3	Protector	0	Count	149	174		18	341
			% within Subj	96.1%	100.0%		94.7%	98.0%
	1	Count	6	0		1	7	
		% within Subj	3.9%	.0%		5.3%	2.0%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 3.941, p=.268; Chi-square-paper 3: 7.310, p=.026)

Self-defender/Victim

Paper				Subj				Total
				1	2	3	4	
1	Self-defender	0	Count	459	344	1	243	1047
			% within Subj	98.3%	97.5%	100.0%	100.0%	98.4%
	1	Count	8	9	0	0	17	
		% within Subj	1.7%	2.5%	.0%	.0%	1.6%	
	Total	Count	467	353	1	243	1064	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Self-defender	0	Count	47	43		29	119
			% within Subj	97.9%	82.7%		100.0%	92.2%
	1	Count	1	9		0	10	
		% within Subj	2.1%	17.3%		.0%	7.8%	
	Total	Count	48	52		29	129	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
3	Self-defender	0	Count	151	158		19	328
			% within Subj	97.4%	90.8%		100.0%	94.3%
	1	Count	4	16		0	20	
		% within Subj	2.6%	9.2%		.0%	5.7%	
	Total	Count	155	174		19	348	
		% within Subj	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	

(Chi-square-paper 1: 6.035, p=.110; Chi-square-paper 2: 11.234, p=.004; Chi-square-paper 3: 7.847, p=.020)

TABLE 3

Tone * Event Crosstabulation

	Event								Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
0 (neutral)	Count 424	94	207	8	104	79	119	154	1189
	% within Event 77.1%	89.5%	78.7%	61.5%	51.5%	98.8%	82.6%	83.7%	77.2%
	% of Total 27.5%	6.1%	13.4%	.5%	6.7%	5.1%	7.7%	10.0%	77.2%
1	Count 8	1	6	0	47	0	23	30	115
	% within Event 1.5%	1.0%	2.3%	.0%	23.3%	.0%	16.0%	16.3%	7.5%
	% of Total .5%	.1%	.4%	.0%	3.0%	.0%	1.5%	1.9%	7.5%
2	Count 118	10	50	5	51	1	2	0	237
	% within Event 21.5%	9.5%	19.0%	38.5%	25.2%	1.2%	1.4%	.0%	15.4%
	% of Total 7.7%	.6%	3.2%	.3%	3.3%	.1%	.1%	.0%	15.4%
Total	Count 550	105	263	13	202	80	144	184	1541
	% within Event 100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total 35.7%	6.8%	17.1%	.8%	13.1%	5.2%	9.3%	11.9%	100.0%

Pearson Chi-Square: 268.170, p=.000

APPENDIX 6

Conflict * Event Crosstabulation

Conflict		Event								Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
0	Count	370	105	225	4	140	49	56	112	1061
	% within Event	67.3%	100.0%	85.6%	30.8%	69.3%	61.2%	38.9%	60.9%	68.9%
	% of Total	24.0%	6.8%	14.6%	.3%	9.1%	3.2%	3.6%	7.3%	68.9%
1	Count	180	0	38	9	62	31	88	72	480
	% within Event	32.7%	.0%	14.4%	69.2%	30.7%	38.8%	61.1%	39.1%	31.1%
	% of Total	11.7%	.0%	2.5%	.6%	4.0%	2.0%	5.7%	4.7%	31.1%
Total	Count	550	105	263	13	202	80	144	184	1541
	% within Event	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.7%	6.8%	17.1%	.8%	13.1%	5.2%	9.3%	11.9%	100.0%

(Pearson Chi-Square: 159.053, p=.000)

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