

EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL NEWS
AND FOREIGN POLICY:
HOW THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY AND ITAR-TASS
DIFFERED IN THEIR COVERAGE ON THE UKRAINE CRISIS?

Xiaoqian Li (Heidi)

Dr. Beverly Horvit, Project Supervisor

Research Analysis

Introduction

As the Ukraine crisis escalated, scholars (Sirinyok-Dolgaryova, 2014, p. 20, 34) found that media around the globe were all covering the ongoing crisis with their own focuses and news frames. The differences in news coverage might be traced back to the different foreign policies these countries have adopted regarding the Ukraine crisis. Has the tension among Russia and Western countries affected their media's coverage on this crisis, and does their coverage rely on official sources who stand for the government policy? Also, with China being a third party in this crisis, how would Chinese media's portrayal of the crisis be affected by China's foreign policy?

With those questions in mind, this research is aimed at examining three countries' media coverage on the Ukraine Crisis, and the selected media include the independent New York Times of the U.S. and two state-owned news organizations, the Xinhua News Agency of China and the Informatsionnoye agentstvo Rossii TASS (TASS) of Russia. These news media are considered the most influential in each country (McCombs & Reynolds, 1994, p. 12; Hong, 2011, p. 381; Xin, 2006, p. 49; Eckler & Kalyango, 2012, p. 41).

The Ukraine Crisis has attracted the world's attention and significant news coverage since early February 2014, when protests against Ukraine's then-president, Viktor Yanukovich, broke out. The crisis in Ukraine began on November 21, 2013, when then-president Yanukovich postponed the Association Agreement with the European Union.

Background on the crisis

Since Viktor Yushchenko was declared to be the Ukraine president after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Ukraine had been seeking a closer relationship with the West, such as gaining membership in NATO (Tsygankov 2015, p. 282). Wolff (2015) found that, after the fall of Berlin Wall, NATO had adopted an expansion policy that includes Ukraine and excludes Russia (p. 1107), and the policy was strengthened further after the 9/11 attack to build an anti-terrorist front (p. 1108). However, since the end of the Cold War, Russian nationalists had called for "re-unification" of all Russian lands in the former Soviet space, including Ukraine (Tsygankov 2015, p. 280). Auer (2015) argued that the hegemonic policy that Russia had adopted in its "near abroad" and in the annexation of Crimea was just part of its plan to impose order within the region (p. 964). Not until February 2010, when Yanukovich was elected the new president, did Russia begin to improve its relations with Ukraine (Tsygankov 2015, p. 284). Russia continuously lured Ukraine with gas discounts in the hope of pulling Ukraine away from NATO, and, in November 2013, Russia offered Ukraine another major discount on energy prices and pledged \$15 billion in aid (p. 284). As a result, Yanukovich postponed the Association Agreement with the EU, which had aimed to establish a political and economic association between the two parties.

Yanukovych's decision was perceived as the leadership's unwillingness to join the European Union and led to the Euromaidan, which was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Maidan Nezalezhnosti ("Independence Square") in Kiev, demanding closer European integration (Tsygankov, 2015, 284-285). Yanukovych was ousted by the protesters on February 22, 2014, and, on May 29, 2014, Petro Poroshenko was elected to be the new Ukraine president.

Tsygankov (2015) argued that, as a response to the West's previous support for color revolutions in former Soviet nations, such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Russia eventually annexed Crimea in March 2014 after Crimea's referendum (p. 280), claiming to "guarantee the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the southeast of Ukraine."¹ Tsygankov (2014) also argued that Russia tended to adopt a nationalist and assertive foreign policy toward Ukraine that emphasized the "brotherly" cultural and historical ties between Russia and Ukraine, as well as their shared geographical borders (p. 2).

For the U.S., however, the Ukraine crisis was seen as a new threat to NATO (Ruhle, 2015, p. 81), and on March 19, 2014, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden responded to Russia's intervention, saying "as long as Russia continues on this dark path, they will face increasing political and economic isolation."² On March 17, the EU and the U.S. banned several officials from Russia and Ukraine from travelling to the EU and the U.S., and froze their assets after the annexation.³ Ruhle (2015) argued that the West felt threatened by Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis and responded with the Readiness Action Plan (p. 82), which calls for increasing

¹ Ukraine crisis & Crimea dominate Putin's annual call-in with Russian people – summary. ITAR-TASS

² <http://csis.org/ukraine/crimea.htm>

³ <http://csis.org/ukraine/crimea.htm>

the readiness level of NATO's reaction forces in Central and Eastern Europe. As the leader of NATO, the United States played a key role in this plan (p. 84).

As a third party, China remained relatively neutral on the issue of Ukraine crisis. However, some scholars found that China may have become a "reluctant" ally of Russia (Yu, 2014, p. 8; Kuznetsov, 2014, p. 51). On the one hand, on March 15, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang stated that China respects Ukraine's "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity."⁴ On the other hand, China's interest in Ukraine has also been greatly affected by the crisis, as it could have secured \$8 billion loan package to Ukraine which was cancelled after President Yanukovich was toppled (p. 8). China and Russia have long forged a close relationship in both military cooperation and economic partnership, and, in fact, China and Russia signed a thirty-year, \$400 billion gas deal on May 21, 2014, which was further expanded in November 2014⁵.

Literature Review

U.S. media and foreign policies

In the realm of international news, scholars have debated whether news media or government sets the agenda of foreign policy. One of the major assertions scholars have made about the U.S. media is that news coverage on foreign affairs tends to reflect the country's foreign policy (Wood & Peake, 1998, p. 73; Herman, 1993, p. 45). Herman (1993) argued that among all the news topics, foreign affairs is the one on which the U.S. media support their government policy

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⁵ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/russia-china-add-to-400-billion-gas-deal-with-accord>

the most (p. 23). Robinson (2002) found that policy makers tend to influence media coverage toward stances more favorable to them (p. 120).

Some scholars also found direct links between news coverage and U.S. foreign policy. Bennett (1990) developed the “indexing” theory by examining closely the media’s coverage on U.S. policy on Nicaragua in the mid-1980s (p. 112), and he found that news media tend to mirror, or “index,” the government debate and merely reflect the ideas and opinion presented in the debate (Bennett, 1990, p. 106). Mermin (1999) also used the “indexing” theory in his study on media coverage of U.S. military intervention in the post-Vietnam era (p. 12), and argued that the reliance of media on indexing government debate is significant (p. 100). Mermin concluded that in foreign policy coverage, there were no independent perspectives other than the ones reflected in the policy debate (p. 143).

Some scholars looked beyond government structures and focused on the impact of ideology and political culture on media coverage. Rachlin (1988) noted that the U.S. press’s presentation of news events related to the Soviet Union has demonstrated the great influence of the U.S. administration and the political culture of America (p. 93).

Scholars have also focused on *The New York Times*’ coverage and its relationship with the U.S. foreign policy. Some scholars found that *The New York Times* relied on government sources when reporting on foreign affairs (Herman, 1993, p. 26; Entman, 1991, p. 25). Herman (1993) stated that both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* depended heavily on official sources for international news (p. 26).

In his study on the framing of the *Times*’ coverage on the Korean Air Lines flight shot down by the Soviet Union and Iran Air flight shot down by the U.S. Army, Entman (1991) also

noted that “for breaking foreign news, official sources in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and other administration outposts hold the commanding influence” (p. 25).

However, some scholars disputed the accusation that *The New York Times* has always been a passive participant in foreign policy when reporting on foreign news. In his book on *The New York Times* coverage of the U.S. foreign policy, Barry (1990) argued that the distinction between passive and active participant would be meaningless if we don't take into account the different stages of foreign policy. Barry studied five cases of U.S. foreign policy, including the Bay of Pigs, U.S. combat in Vietnam, the Cambodian incursion, the Iran hostage crisis and the 1982-84 intervention in Lebanon. He argued that although the *Times* reported more consistently in favor of government policy when policy was still in the formulation and execution stages, the *Times* actually used more foreign officials and appeared more active in the outcome stage (p. 143).

Van Belle (2010) found that the U.S. government is more affected by *The New York Times*' coverage on U.S. foreign aid allocations than by the U.S. television news (p. 278). Bartel (1996) also found that *The New York Times* may influence the congressional activities indirectly by either stimulating executive branch activities, which “in turn prompt congressional responses a few days later,” or stimulating more ABC News coverage, which helps trigger congressional responses a week later (p. 12).

Sirinyok-Dolgaryova (2014) also discovered that the *Times* covered the Ukraine crisis with a range of perspectives toward Ukraine, from positive to negative ones (p. 20). Sirinyok-Dolgaryova also noted that the *Times* used op-eds with negative sentiments over Russia's annexation of Crimea (p. 20).

US media and sourcing

Many scholars have recognized the impact of sources on newsgathering of the U.S. media (Gans, 1979, p. 144-145; Mermin, 1997, p. 388; Rachlin, 1988, p. 131; Sigal, 1973, p. 123-124; Hallin, 1986, p. 8; Wood and Peake, 1998, p. 175; Bennett, 1990, p.114; Soley, 1992, p. 76). Gans (p. 116) compared the relationship between sources and journalists to a dance, and noted that reporters tend to rely on sources who can provide information on a regular basis, and public officials, including the president, become the best available and suitable sources in this sense (p. 144-145).

Many scholars also noticed the dominance of official sources in U.S. media coverage, including The New York Times' coverage on the Nicaraguan contras (Bennett 1990, p. 116). Sigal (1973) argued that many reporters depended on official sources (p. 54), and the "organizational routines and bureaucratic politics" have a great influence on the shaping of news (p. 119). He stated that "nearly one-half of all the sources cited in the sample of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* page-one stories" relied on official sources of the U.S. government (p. 123-124). Soley (1992) also asserted the "systematic biases" in the choice of sources by journalists (p. 17), which was reflected in the dependence on government officials.

Kern et al. (1983) stated in their study that the use of non-official sources may indicate challenges raised against dominant news frames, and they used sourcing patterns of news coverage on the crises during Kennedy's presidency to measure the influence of different types of sources (p. 7). Kern et al. found that for most of the cases, the press was a reflective institution that reflects the views of other political actors on foreign policy issues (p. 196).

Zelizer, Park and Gudelunas (2002) examined sourcing patterns of three U.S. newspapers, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *the Chicago Tribune* (p. 287). They compared the sources used by the three media on the Middle East coverage across three attributes: the rank of sources consulted (high or low rank), the explicitness of sources consulted (anonymous or named) and the nationality of sources consulted (Israeli, Palestinian and U.S./other as an individual category) (p. 292). They found that *The New York Times* relied mostly on U.S. sources when citing anonymously, as compared to Palestinian or Israeli sources. *The New York Times* was also more likely to use non-official sources when it cited from Palestinian, non-anonymous sources (p. 301). They also found that the *Times* tended to quote more U.S. sources than foreign sources. They also concluded that the *Times*' coverage on the Middle East showed more bias in favor of Israel than objective reporting (p. 303).

Comparative sourcing studies

Although many scholars have focused on media coverage within the U.S. or other single countries, there are few studies with cross-country comparisons that could reflect some universal characteristics shared by different countries' media. One of the exceptions was the study by Horvit (2006) on the Iraq War debate coverage, and she compared media coverage of AP, Agence France Presse, Reuters, Xinhua, ITAR-TASS and Inter Press Service (p. 427). Horvit categorized sources by their nationalities and status as governmental sources (p. 433) and found that there is indeed a West vs. non-West bias in sourcing for the news media (p. 438). The non-Western news media tended to cite more non-Western sources, and Western news media tended to cite more Western sources (p. 438).

Horvit (2006) also found that Xinhua's reporting on the Iraq War reflected less dependence on official sources than The Associated Press, the presumably more independent counterpart of Xinhua (p. 441). She also noted that Xinhua's coverage was more balanced in terms of its use of Western sources and non-Western sources than the Associated Press and ITAR-TASS, as it cited Western sources for 46 times and non-Western sources 52 times in total (p. 438).

Horvit (2006) also noted that the coverage of ITAR-TASS on the Iraq War used mostly Russian official sources, which accounted for more than half its sources (p. 434), and she also found that ITAR-TASS, of the six news agencies examined, reflected a strong nationalistic and regional bias (p. 437-438).

In their comparative study on framing strategies of Xinhua, Reuters and AP, Zeng, Zhou and Li (2015) have found that Xinhua's news coverage greatly relied on official sources (p. 61). Zeng, Zhou and Li focused their research on the "July 5th" Urumqi event in 2009, a sensitive topic for the Chinese government, and discovered that Xinhua's coverage of the event was hugely constrained due to its limited freedom in information distribution (p. 66).

History of Xinhua

Many scholars have examined the role of the Xinhua News Agency in Chinese foreign policy, and most of them have asserted a close relationship between the news agency and Chinese government (Xin, 2006, p. 47; Chan & Lee, 1991, p. 307; Elliott, 1997, p. 11-13; Chu, 1999, p. 32). Scholars have also found Xinhua's dual responsibilities in its past and its role in both propaganda and diplomacy (Dial, 1976, p. 302; Shambaugh, 2007, p. 44).

Dial (1976) examined how the Xinhua News Agency, identified as The New China News Agency in his study, functioned as a dual-missioned agency in China before the opening and reform in the 80s, as both a media and also a diplomatic branch of the central government (p. 302-303). He noted that Chinese foreign correspondents often “assumed negotiating roles (p. 303)” in foreign affairs between China and other countries, and the agency’s publications were presumed to be “internal” materials that served at the elites in China who made decisions on foreign policies (p. 308).

In a historical analysis on Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch, Chu (1999) stated that the Xinhua News Agency bore a dual function as a “diplomatic liaison” with Hong Kong (p. 32). In his historical study on Xinhua and Chinese newspapers, Xin (2006) also found that in the early years when the Xinhua News Agency was firstly established, it was “politically motivated” (p. 47), and it was the “only legitimate national news agency” (p. 49).

In his historical study on China’s propaganda system from 1980s to 2004, Shambaugh (2007) also noted Xinhua’s role in disseminating the Communist Party and state propaganda, and he found that the news agency functions as a part of the State Council and integrates party propaganda guidance in its daily news coverage (p. 44).

However, many scholars noted the changes that Xinhua has undergone for the past decades. Elliott (1997) noted that the news tended to be more about the future, less negative and less subjective in the 1980s compared to the 1950s (p. 11-13). Xin (2006) stated that because of the commercialization of the media in China from 1990s to 2003, Xinhua became more professional in journalism, providing more investigative stories on corruption and fraudulent business practices to compete with the metropolitan networks (p. 59).

Hong (2011) found in his historical study on Xinhua that, since 1978, the agency has transformed from a pure propaganda apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party to a media with multiple functions, including serving society and the public with news and information, and making profits as a commercial entity (391).

Keck and Tiezzi (2015) found out that Xinhua has covered the Ukraine crisis by a relative neutral tone (p. 165), but in its commentary section, it also depicted the crisis with a stance more favorable toward Russia (p. 165-166). They also noted that Xinhua's news coverage paid minimal attention to China's role in the Ukraine crisis (p. 166).

History of ITAR-TASS

Scholarship has revealed that ITAR-TASS (Informatsionnoye agentstvo Rossii TASS), a Russian news agency, constantly maintains a close relationship with the Russian government (Camaj, 2010, p. 649; Rantanen & Vartanova, 1995, p. 218).

Schwartz (1970) found that TASS, just like the news agencies from other communist countries, served mostly the government, as the latter owned and controlled the former. Consequently, it wasn't profit-driven at all (p. 743). Alleyne and Wagner (1993) stated that TASS, controlled by the government, functioned more as "an instrument of Soviet domestic and foreign policy" (p. 41). They also noted that the agency started to become diversified and technical in the 1980s as it was required by the government to focus more on "what can be taken out of Western life and introduced into the Soviet Union" (p. 46). Michiewicz (1981) noted that TASS operated under the supervision of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet government, and it was producing news both within the Soviet Union and abroad (p. 52).

Other than its coverage, TASS' function as part of the Russian government was also examined by many scholars, as well as its transformation into ITAR-TASS in 1992, and some found that the Russian then-president Boris Yeltsin re-defined the status of TASS in English and changed its name into ITAR-TASS (Rantanen & Vartanova, 1995, p. 213). Some scholars have found that since the agency was renamed as ITAR-TASS, it underwent some changes, but it also kept some traditions.

Rantanen and Vartanova (1995) noted that ITAR-TASS adopted a more Western style in its coverage, though its operations did not change greatly since its transformation. It is still exempt from taxes, and it has access to the government's communication technology (p. 214). Camaj (2010) noted in his study of 2006-2007, ITAR-TASS journalists still play more of a commentary role as they interpreted more than just presenting the facts (p. 649).

In their comparative content analysis on the coverage of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Eckler and Kalyango (2012) found that ITAR-TASS' coverage of the conflict reflected the news agency's propagandistic approach in portraying this conflict. Eckler and Kalyango found that the most prominent theme was that of Russia's success in the war and Georgia's defeat, which demonstrated its bias toward Russia's military intervention in Georgia (p. 43).

As for Ukraine crisis, Berglund (2015) noted that Russian media portrayed Euromaidan as a conspiracy led by the U.S. and European Union instead of simply a protest; they also misstated the position of the Ukraine government, the international community and international law (p. 507). Sirinyok-Dolgaryova (2014) also noted that propaganda permeated Russian media coverage on the Ukraine crisis (p. 20), and "misleading and unfair reporting" was found in whatever platform, print, broadcasting or online (p. 34).

Research Questions

This research will also focus on comparison of three media: *The New York Times*, the Xinhua News Agency and Informatsionnoye agentstvo Rossii TASS (TASS). *The New York Times* is an independent news organization based in the United States, while both the Xinhua News Agency and TASS are state-owned media based in China and Russia, respectively.

RQ1 – How do sourcing patterns differ across The New York Times, Xinhua and ITAR-TASS on the Ukraine crisis? Do they differ in the degree to which they rely on official sources? Do they rely more on sources from their own countries?

H1: *The New York Times*, Xinhua and TASS will cite more official sources than non-official sources.

H2: Russian sources will dominate TASS' news coverage on the Ukraine crisis.

RQ2 – How do sources differ in the tone of their coverage regarding Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis? Does the news coverage favor the organizations' home countries' foreign policies?

H3: There were more positive paragraphs in TASS' stories toward Russia's annexation of Crimea than negative paragraphs.

Methodology

I retrieved a random sample of about 50 stories for each news organization. I searched for English-language stories from the LexisNexis database, using "Ukraine" and "crisis" as

keywords, “between Feb. 1, 2014 and Dec. 1, 2014” as the date, and the news organization (*The New York Times*, Xinhua News Agency and ITAR-TASS) as the source. The eleven-month time period started when the conflict between the pro-Russian and the anti-government protests escalated, and, due to the constraints of the study, the end date was selected as December 1, 2014. The search results produced 1,881 stories for the Xinhua News Agency, 1,135 stories for ITAR-TASS and 120 stories for *The New York Times*. One out of every 37 stories was selected for the Xinhua News Agency (N=51), one out of every 22 stories was selected for the ITAR-TASS (N=52), and one out of every two or three stories was selected for *The New York Times* (N=49). Duplicates were excluded from the possible sample.

Each paragraph of every story was coded for the sources cited and the valence – positive, negative or neutral – toward the Russia’s intervention in Crimea during the Ukraine crisis (see Appendix). Studies by Horvit (2006), Kim (2000), Giffard (1999) and Alexseev and Bennett (1995) used a similar method. Statistics on the sources cited by each news organization could reflect the difference in their sourcing patterns, whereas data on the valence of each paragraph could demonstrate the impact of sources on the attitude of each news organization.

Sources from Ukraine, Russia, the U.S. and China were coded as either official sources or non-official sources from those countries. Sources of other nationalities were coded as official or non-official sources by whether they are from Western countries or “other” countries. The United Nations was coded as official sources from “other” countries. Other media outlets, including Ukrainian local media and Russian news media, were a separate category. Official sources included the government officials, the head of state, past or present members of the military, and legislative officials in those countries, as Kern (1983, p7) used in their study on the

Kennedy's crisis. Non-official sources included information attributed to academics, business leaders, public opinion polls and citizens.

A paragraph was coded as positive toward the Russia's intervention if it provided support for Russia's annexation of Crimea. For example, paragraphs were coded positive if they described the legitimacy of the Crimea referendum or the positive impact of Russia's intervention on Crimean people. On the other hand, a paragraph was coded as negative if it showed criticism over Russia's intervention. For example, paragraphs were coded as negative if they supported the sanctions raised against Russia by Western countries.

After the initial coding, the author and a graduate student in journalism coded the valence of paragraphs using 15 randomly selected stories to test the reliability of the coding. Of the 110 paragraphs coded, the two coders agreed on 60 paragraphs for a level of 55%. However, the level of agreement that is acceptable is 80 %, according to Riffe et al. (1998, p. 51). The two coders differed mostly in paragraphs that were not so obvious in their tone of coverage. The author tended to code paragraphs as neutral toward Russia's intervention, when the paragraphs used mostly facts and did not show a clear inclination. However, the independent coder tended to code those paragraphs into negative or positive toward the intervention when the tone of coverage was not so obvious. Since the sourcing for each paragraph was straightforward, the two coders didn't compare their coding on sourcing.

Findings

The news organizations varied in terms of story length and the extent to which they cited different types of sources. On average, Xinhua and ITAR-TASS produced shorter stories than

The New York Times, at about 369 words and 327 words respectively. *The New York Times* averaged more than 1,000 words per story. Xinhua and ITAR-TASS cited sources in a higher percentage of paragraphs than did *The New York Times*. Seven out of ten paragraphs for Xinhua and ITAR-TASS were attributed, while five out of ten paragraphs for *The New York Times* quoted sources. In total, there are 560 sourced paragraphs for the *Times*, 364 sourced paragraphs for Xinhua and 338 sourced paragraphs for TASS.


All three media also used other media as sources. Nine out of 50 stories of *The New York Times* used other media, mainly Russian media, including RIA, Interfax and Vedomosti, and the *Times* also cited a Facebook page of Ukraine's so-called Anti-terrorist Operations as source. Xinhua and ITAR-TASS cited fewer other media than the *Times*. Five out of 51 stories of Xinhua cited other media, and it cited ITAR-TASS as its source in two stories, and RIA in one story. Three out of 52 stories of ITAR-TASS cited other media, mostly Ukrainian local media.

The three news organization also varied in their datelines, and, in this sample, the *Times* delivered more reporting from the field than Xinhua and TASS. The *Times* sent reporters to multiple places in Ukraine, including Kiev, Simferopol, Donetsk and Balaklava and Lviv. In contrast, in this sample, Xinhua only assigned reporters to Kiev, and TASS only sent reporters to Kiev and Lugansk in Ukraine

Official and non-official sources

Figure 1: Sourcing patterns by agency – Official vs. Non-official
The percentage of different types of sources is showed.

The number of paragraphs in the sample is in parentheses. The sample size is recorded as N.




All three media relied on official sources much more than non-official sources (see Figure 1), and TASS' coverage relied almost solely on official sources, using non-official sources less than 1 percent of the time. *The New York Times* cited non-official sources most frequently among the three news media, at 14 percent. Xinhua cited official sources 59 percent of the time and non-official sources 6 percent. Thus, H1 was supported.

Interestingly, *The New York Times* had the highest percentage of unsourced paragraphs in its stories, as compared to Xinhua and TASS. Half of *the Times*' paragraphs are unsourced paragraphs.

Nationalities of sources

Figure 2: Mean percentage of sources by nationalities



An analysis of variance showed significant difference among the three media's use of Russian sources ($F=19.250$, $d.f.=2$, $p<0.001$, $N=152$), and post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed that ITAR-TASS' use of Russian sources was significantly higher than the other two news organizations (see Table 4.1). In total, about 52 percent of TASS' sources were Russian sources, including both official and non-official sources, while 19.6 percent of the *Times*' sources were Russian sources and 14.6 percent of Xinhua's sources were Russian sources (See Table 1). Hence, H2 was supported.

The ANOVA results also show significant difference among the three media's use of the U.S. sources ($F=9.266$, $d.f.=2$, $p<0.001$, $N=152$). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed that the *Times*' use of the U.S. sources was significantly higher than Xinhua and TASS (see Table 4.2). About 22.1 percent of the *Times*' sources were the U.S. sources, while only 1.5 percent of TASS' sources were the U.S. sources and 8.82 percent of Xinhua's sources were the U.S. sources.

Neither the *Times* nor TASS quoted from Chinese sources, and yet on average 10 percent of Xinhua's sources were Chinese sources (see Table 2). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed that Xinhua's use of Chinese sources was significantly higher than *the Times* and TASS ($F=6.376$, $d.f.=2$, $p<0.01$, $N=152$; see Table 4.3). The stories that cited Chinese sources mainly focused on the relationship between China and Russia, and emphasized China's stance on the crisis.

On average, about 29 percent of the *Times*' sources were Ukrainians, 20.3 percent of Xinhua's sources were Ukrainians and 18.1 percent of TASS' sources were Ukrainians. An analysis of variance shows that the *Times*' use of Ukrainian non-official sources was significantly higher than the other two news organizations ($F=9.98$, $d.f.=2$, $p<0.001$, $N=152$; see Table 2). On average, about 12 percent of the *Times*' sources were Ukrainian non-officials, only 3 percent of Xinhua's sources were Ukrainian non-officials and TASS didn't cite any Ukrainian non-officials (see Table 2).

On average, nearly 20 percent of Xinhua's sources were Western European sources, 18 percent of the *Times*' sources were Western European sources and 8.3 percent of TASS' sources were Western European sources. An analysis of variance shows that the *Times*' use of Western non-official sources was significantly higher than Xinhua and TASS ($F=6.92$, $d.f.=2$, $p<0.01$, $N=152$). About 4 percent of the *Times*' sources were Western European non-official sources, whereas neither Xinhua nor TASS cited any Western non-official sources (see Table 2).

On average, about 15.4 percent of TASS' sources were from other countries than Ukraine, Russia, the U.S., China or Western countries, 10 percent of the *Times*' sources were from other countries and 21 percent of Xinhua's sources were from other countries, mostly the

United Nations (see Figure 2).

Tone of coverage

Because Russia annexed Crimea after the Ukraine crisis escalated, the state-owned ITAR-TASS was expected to portray this episode with a supportive tone. On the other hand, since the U.S. foreign policy was against Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis, its mainstream news outlet *The New York Times* might be expected to present Russia's annexation of Crimea with a negative attitude. As China is not a key player in the Ukraine crisis, its news agency, Xinhua, is likely to take a neutral stance when reporting on Russia's intervention in the crisis.

A Chi-square test shows that the tone of coverage of the *Times*, ITAR-TASS and Xinhua differed from one another significantly ($\chi^2=99.27$, d.f.=4, $p<0.001$; see Table 3.1).

About 11 percent of the *Times*' paragraphs were negative toward Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis, whereas only 1.8 percent of TASS' paragraphs and 7.9 percent of Xinhua's paragraphs were negative toward the intervention. The *Times*' reporters accused Russia, without citing any sources, of using the results of the referendums in Crimea to "intensify pressure for some kind of negotiated autonomy"⁶ for provinces including Crimea. One of the *Times*' stories also depicted Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis as "a stealthy invasion by Russian forces."⁷ As a response to Russia's repeated mention of following the international law in intervention in Ukraine, the *Times* cited a Russian computer expert saying that Russia's

⁶ Neil Macfarquhar, Russia takes softer line on rebel votes in east Ukraine; Kremlin says it 'respects' will of people but stops short of full recognition. International New York Times, May 13, 2014

⁷ Andrew Higgins, Michael R. Gordon, Photos link masked men in Ukraine to Moscow; Growing accusations tie them to Russian military and intelligence forces. International New York Times, April 22, 2014

intervention was “an illegal military occupation,”⁸ and it also cited U.S. President Obama as deeming the intervention a “breach of international law.”⁹ Some of the *Times*’ stories also depicted the pro-Russian protests in southeastern Ukraine as “Russian-backed separatist rebels,”¹⁰ and that NATO members came to put a “pause in the violence” in attempt to “counter Russian aggression.”¹¹

Only two percent of the *Times*’ paragraphs were positive toward the intervention and about 86 percent of its paragraphs were neutral about the intervention. One of the *Times*’ stories cited a Russian official saying that Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine crisis was justified by “baseless threats” against Russia by the United States and NATO.¹² One of the *Times*’ stories also cited the pro-Russian protesters in Ukraine saying that they would prefer that “Russian troops invade the city.”¹³ Another *Times*’ story cited Russian Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov as saying that Russia would “defend its compatriots in Ukraine ‘uncompromisingly.’”¹⁴

By comparison, the percentage of TASS’ positive coverage was higher than the other two news organizations. About 13.25 percent of the TASS’ paragraphs were positive toward Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine crisis, whereas only 2.6 percent of the *Times*’ paragraphs and 5.5 percent of Xinhua’s paragraphs were positive toward the intervention. Hence, H3 was supported

⁸ Andrew Higgins, Alison Smale, In Crimea, heavily armed men confront an unseen enemy. International New York Times, March 4, 2014

⁹ Peter Baker, Heat rises as Obama confronts Russia; President urged to move assertively as Moscow tightens grip on Crimea. International New York Times, March 4, 2014

¹⁰ Neil Macfarquhar, Ukraine and rebels agree to cease-fire; As truce goes into effect, fighting appears to ebb, but skepticism lingers. International New York Times, September 6, 2014

¹¹ Neil Macfarquhar, Ukraine and rebels agree to cease-fire; As truce goes into effect, fighting appears to ebb, but skepticism lingers. International New York Times, September 6, 2014

¹² Steven Lee Myers and Steven Erlanger, Tensions still high in Crimea amid renewed effort to mediate. International New York Times, March 10, 2014

¹³ Steven Erlanger, Ukraine rushes to dampen secessionist mood in east; With Russia in control of Crimea, Kiev worries that region is next to fall. International New York Times, March 4, 2014

¹⁴ Andrew Higgins and Steven Lee Myers, Crimea becoming flash point in Ukraine. International New York Times, February 28, 2014

as well. Many of TASS' stories used words or phrases that supported Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis and provided legitimacy of the annexation of Crimea. The headline of one story was "Crimea not annexed but protected,"¹⁵ indicating that the intervention was more beneficial to Crimean people than harmful. Some of TASS' stories also described the anti-government protests in Ukraine, which led to the escalation of the conflict later, as a "coup" that "often turned violent,"¹⁶ and described Ukraine's former president, Yanukovich, as the country's "legitimate leader."¹⁷ Some of TASS' stories also described Western countries' sanctions against Russia as "ungrounded sanctions," and cited Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov saying that "Moscow has never sent any military to Ukraine."¹⁸ TASS' coverage on the Ukraine crisis also emphasized repeatedly, without citing any sources, that the referendum in Crimea "complied with the international law,"¹⁹ and that the anti-government protests against the new Ukraine leaders in southeastern Ukraine were justified.

Only one percent of TASS' paragraphs showed a negative attitude toward the intervention and 85 percent of its paragraphs showed a neutral attitude. One of TASS' stories cited the U.S. vice president John Kerry saying that the Russia has given "order to protester" in the southeast of Ukraine.²⁰ Another TASS' story cited EU leaders who warned Russia about serious consequence if the latter scale down tensions.²¹

¹⁵ URGENT: Crimea not annexed but protected – Putin. ITAR-TASS, August 29, 2014

¹⁶ WRAP: Ukraine is on verge of bankruptcy - parliament-appointed PM. ITAR-TASS, March 27, 2014

¹⁷ WRAP: Ukraine is on verge of bankruptcy - parliament-appointed PM. ITAR-TASS, March 27, 2014

¹⁸ Russian senior lawmaker rules out military scenarios for Ukraine. ITAR-TASS, April 25, 2014

¹⁹ Geneva agreements on Ukraine to help settle crisis - UN chief. ITAR-TASS, April 18, 2014

²⁰ Russian senior lawmaker rules out military scenarios for Ukraine. ITAR-TASS, April 25, 2014

²¹ Aftermaths of Crimea referendum, sanctions against Russia to be discussed by EU ministers. ITAR-TASS, March 17, 2014

Xinhua's coverage of the crisis used mostly a neutral tone toward Russia's intervention, with a slight inclination toward the negative side. About six percent of Xinhua's paragraphs were positive toward Russia's intervention, but more than eight percent of its paragraphs were negative. One of Xinhua's stories cited the Ukraine Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, saying that Russia "did not support the territorial integrity of Ukraine,"²² and in one story, Xinhua's reporter mentioned China's resolution to safeguard "territorial sovereignty,"²³ in response to questions on the Ukraine crisis and other foreign issues. Similarly, some of its stories also depicted the crisis as Ukraine facing "the threat of splitting up after the Crimean parliament adopted a declaration of independence from Ukraine."²⁴ Xinhua also cited many sources, including the U.S. President Barack Obama, accusing Russia of "breaking the rules" with the "illegal annexation of Crimea."²⁵

However, Xinhua's coverage on the Ukraine crisis also showed a strong neutral stance and some positive stories toward Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis. Some of Xinhua's stories cited Russian president Vladimir Putin denouncing the NATO enlargement to have pulled Ukraine closer to Western countries as a measure to "squeeze Russia,"²⁶ and urged the West "not to threaten sanctions against Moscow," as sanctions are "counter-productive."²⁷ Xinhua also cited sources that accused the Ukraine government of forcing the Crimean government "to lose control of the situation."²⁸

²² William M. Reilly, Roundup: Ukraine, Russia exchange fire at UN meeting. Xinhua News Agency, March 13, 2014

²³ Xinhua Insight: Peace-seeking China eyes more active int'l role. Xinhua News Agency, March 8, 2014

²⁴ William M. Reilly, Roundup: Ukraine, Russia exchange fire at UN meeting. Xinhua News Agency, March 13, 2014

²⁵ Roundup: Obama holds talks with Central, Eastern European leaders on security, regional issues. Xinhua News Agency, June 4, 2014

²⁶ Lu Jiafei, Qiu Xia, (Yearenders Series-Ukraine Crisis) Spotlight: Balanced approach needed to prevent possible new Cold War. Xinhua News Agency, December 19, 2014

²⁷ Roundup: Ukrainian PM says Crimea referendum illegal. Xinhua News Agency, March 6, 2014.

²⁸ Crimean leader urges Putin to help restore peace. Xinhua News Agency, March 1, 2014.

Interestingly, the Chi-square table (see Table 3.3) has shown that many of the paragraphs that filled the coverage with negative or positive sentiments were actually unsourced paragraphs for both TASS and *The New York Times*. Nearly 67 percent of “positive” paragraphs of TASS were unsourced paragraphs, and more than 40 percent of “negative” paragraphs of the *Times* were unsourced, as well. None of the *Times* and Xinhua’s unsourced paragraphs was positive toward Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, and none of TASS’ unsourced paragraphs was negative about Russia’s intervention.

Discussion

The study has found that *The New York Times*, Xinhua and ITAR-TASS varied in their sourcing patterns, as well as the overall attitude reflected in their reporting toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine. The study results showed a clear difference in three news organizations' sourcing patterns and their tone of coverage. The results also indicate an association between the news coverage and foreign policies, since the three news organizations' tone of coverage all coincided with their countries' foreign policies.

All three media organizations cited more official sources than non-official sources in their coverage of the crisis, and TASS cited officials the most frequently. Xinhua cited official sources more frequently than the *Times*, which also supported the Hypothesis 1. The reliance on official sources echoed previous studies that discovered the close relationship between news reporters and officials (Bennett 1990, p. 116; Sigal, 1973, p. 54), as officials are often the "best available and suitable sources" (Gans, 1979, p. 144-145). Especially in the realm of international news, where the cost of field reporting is comparatively high, citing officials is efficient and effective for most of the time.

The news coverage of TASS showed a great tendency for the news agency to rely on sources from Russia. Russian sources dominated in most of TASS' stories, whereas the *Times*' coverage showed a more balanced reporting in terms of the nationalities of its sources. However, whether the sourcing patterns of the three media reflects their biased reporting is still in question. On the one hand, since Russia was one of the key players in the conflict, it is relevant for TASS to cite more sources from Russia than from other countries (Galtung & Ruge, 1965, p. 70). On the other hand, if sources were cited according to the relevance of their nationalities, then we should have seen the same percentage of Ukrainian sources as Russian sources cited. However,

only Xinhua, among the three news organizations, cited nearly as many Ukrainian sources as Russian sources. About 20 percent of its sources were Ukrainians and 15.4 percent were Russians. By comparison, about 18 percent of TASS' sources were Ukrainians, while 53 percent of its sources were Russians. On average, nearly 30 percent of the *Times*' sources were Ukrainians, whereas about 18 percent of the *Times*' sources were Russians. Since Ukraine was in a position against Russia in the crisis, Ukrainian sources and Russian sources often disagreed with each other. The tendency to cite more Ukrainian sources than Russian sources may thus indicate that the *Times*' coverage was more negative toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine, which coincides with the U.S. foreign policy on the crisis. On the other hand, the tendency to cite more Russian sources than Ukrainian sources may prove TASS' support for Russia's intervention in the crisis, which coincides with Russia's foreign policy on the crisis.

Interestingly, Xinhua was the only news organization to cite Chinese sources. Despite that the Chinese sources didn't dominate its coverage. It may be explained as an attempt to establish relevance of the Ukraine crisis with China. Also, since China was not one of the key players in the Ukraine crisis, it makes sense that neither *The New York Times* nor ITAR-TASS cited any Chinese sources.

As expected, ITAR-TASS' coverage showed a more positive tone toward the intervention, which proves the association between its coverage and Russian foreign policies. *The New York Times*' coverage showed more negative tone toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine, which echoed the U.S.' foreign policy against Russia's annexation of Crimea. Xinhua's coverage showed more neutral tone toward the intervention and a slight inclination toward the negative side. When mentioning Russia's annexation of Crimea, it referenced China's stance on

territorial integrity and sovereignty, which tied back to the core of China's foreign policy (Kuznetsov, 2014, p. 56).

However, difference in the tone of coverage of three media's unsourced paragraphs indicated that the tone of stories was not solely affected by the sources cited. Many of the unsourced paragraphs for the three media carried a clear positive or negative attitude toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine. In absence of these paragraphs, the difference in the attitude for the three media was not significant as expected, as only six percent of TASS' paragraphs were positive toward the intervention. Hence, whether sources have a significant impact on the tone of news coverage were not clearly proved by this study.

What surprised me was that there were actually many unsourced paragraphs in the *Times*' stories – nearly half of all the coverage, and none of those paragraphs actually showed a positive attitude toward Russia's intervention. Some of those unsourced paragraphs were mere observation of the conflict, but some unsourced paragraphs described the conflict with a clearly negative tone toward Russia's intervention. This finding indicates an association of the *Times*' coverage and the U.S. foreign policies.

Although the tone of the *Times*' coverage on the Ukraine crisis showed its inclination to agree with the U.S. foreign policies, it did deliver the most balanced reporting among all the three news organizations. The *Times* assigned reporters to the field and delivered the most original reporting. It also cited more non-official source than the other two organizations. The non-official sources sometimes disagreed with their authorities, so, by citing more non-official sources, the *Times* gave readers a closer look at the crisis and what truly happened in Ukraine. The *Times* also cited sources from multiple countries, which showed different perspectives of the conflict. By citing contrasting perspectives of the conflict parties, the *Times* provided readers

with a more complete picture of the Ukraine crisis. In contrast, TASS' coverage was substantially dependent on official sources and showed a great bias toward Russia. More than half of TASS' sources were Russian officials, which marginalized perspectives from other countries and from civilians.

Xinhua's news coverage on the Ukraine crisis showed a more balanced reporting, as it cited sources of different nationalities. The coverage also tended to be neutral toward the Russia's intervention in Ukraine, and it was based mostly on facts other than opinionated observation. However, Xinhua also used more Chinese sources than the other two news media, and it may indicate its nationalistic bias.

Limitations of the study

Although this study highlights the association between the tone of news coverage and a country's foreign policies, it still has many limitations.

Although this study showed that the tone of coverage of each news organization coincided with their home countries' foreign policies, it did not prove that sourcing actually has a significant impact on the tone of news stories. The difference tone of coverage was not obvious in sourced paragraphs across the three media, whereas the difference was fairly obvious in unsourced paragraphs, and thus in overall paragraphs across three media. About six percent of TASS' sourced paragraphs were positive toward Russia's intervention in the Ukraine crisis, but it was only one percent higher than the *Times*. However, about 33.6 percent of TASS' unsourced paragraphs were positive toward the intervention, whereas none of the *Times*' unsourced paragraphs was positive toward the intervention.

Thus, future researchers could explore other effective measures for the influence of foreign policies on news coverage besides the tone of coverage. For example, could we examine the role these news organizations play in their countries' propaganda system by examining their organization and personnel structures, especially for TASS and Xinhua? Or could we study the different editorial policies that these three news organizations have adopted? Or rather, do the different budgets the *Times*, Xinhua and TASS have sometimes limited field and in-depth reporting? Those are all questions that future research could explore. Researcher could make the difference in editorial guidelines or in budget size an independent variable, and the foreign policies as dependent variable.

Another major limitation of this study is that the level agreement of the author and the other independent coder didn't reach 80 percent, which was "usually the standard" for reliability of the study (Riffe et al., 1998, p. 51). The independent coder for this study was a Chinese graduate student at the Missouri School of Journalism, who has the same background as the author, so future research could find an independent coder with different background to test his or her coding. Future researchers could also find more than one independent coders to assist with pre-test coding check, and, in this way, the eventual coding of valence of each paragraph would be more reliable. Future research could also explore more keywords related to the Ukraine crisis to capture additional relevant news stories, such as the "Ukraine conflict," "Crimea," "Crimea referendum," and "Crimea annexation."

This study also didn't examine the stories of Xinhua and TASS that were written in Chinese or Russian, respectively, as those stories were targeted at internal audience. The English stories of Xinhua and TASS may be targeted at external audience, which may also have an influence on their tone of coverage, as well as their sourcing patterns.

More research also is needed to compare more news media from the three countries, as one single news media could not represent the media industry of its country. Other mainstream U.S. news media such as the Associated Press, other major Russian media include RIA and Interfax, and other major Chinese news outlets include *The China Daily* and Caixin.com.

It would be also interesting to compare the news coverage on different media, such as print and digital, television or radio, to see whether “media is the message” also holds true in this specific context. To exclude the factor of media platforms, future research shall also compare news media from the same platform of media. Is it better to compare Xinhua and ITAR-TASS with Reuters or AP, or is it better to compare the digital versions of *The New York Times* with *The China Daily* and *the Moscow’s Times*. It would be interesting to compare television news from the three countries, as well, since television news is more visual than print and digital news, which could be more emotional.

The study could also be expanded in its timeframe and sample size. It would be interesting to compare the tone of news coverage as the crisis escalated and the tension between the West and Russia strengthened. The sample size of future research could also be expanded, since the population of Xinhua and TASS’ stories was so large that the proportions of the selected sample were much smaller than the *Times*’ stories. One out of every 37 stories was selected for the Xinhua News Agency (N=51), one out of every 22 stories were selected for the ITAR-TASS (N=52), and one out of every two or three stories was selected for *The New York Times* (N=49). To expand the sample size, future researchers could select one out of every ten stories for Xinhua and TASS.

Conclusion

Despite the limitations of this study, it shows the reliance on official sources when news media covered foreign news, and it also shows the great tendency for reporters to cite sources from the same countries as the news organizations they were working for. ITAR-TASS' news coverage showed the heaviest reliance on official sources, as more than 70 percent of its sources were official sources. *The New York Times*' news coverage included the most non-official sources among the three media, as 14 percent of its sources were non-official sources.

Both *The New York Times* and ITAR-TASS cited more sources from their own countries, and only Xinhua cited sources from China. Nearly 52 percent of ITAR-TASS' sources were Russian, nearly 22 percent of the *Times*' sources were American, and about 16 percent of Xinhua's sources were Chinese. *The New York Times*' coverage was most diverse in terms of nationalities of the sources it cited, whereas ITAR-TASS relied the most heavily on Russian sources.

The overall tone of the *Times*, Xinhua and TASS' news stories varied to a great extent, as the coverage of each news organization reflected the foreign policy of that country. TASS' reporting showed more positive attitude toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine than the other two media, whereas the *Times*' stories demonstrated a more negative attitude toward the intervention than the other two media. Xinhua showed China's stance on sovereignty and territorial integrity, whereas the other two media mentioned none of China's interests in the issue.

Table 1: Sourcing by agency

The percentage of paragraphs in which the type source was cited is in parentheses

	NYT	ITAR-TASS	Xinhua	Total
<i>Official sources</i>	378 (67.99%)	322 (97.28%)	325 (89.53%)	1025 (82.00%)
Ukrainian official sources	90 (16.19%)	83 (25.08%)	52 (14.33%)	225 (18.00%)
Russian official sources	82 (14.75%)	171 (51.66%)	52 (14.33%)	305 (24.40%)
U.S. official sources	89 (16.01%)	5 (1.51%)	30 (8.26%)	124 (9.92%)
Western/NATO sources	62 (11.15%)	16 (4.83%)	65 (17.91%)	143 (11.44%)
Chinese official sources	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	50 (13.77%)	50 (4.00%)
Other official sources	55 (9.89%)	47 (14.20%)	76 (20.94%)	178 (14.24%)
<i>Non-official sources</i>	155 (27.88%)	2 (0.60%)	31 (8.54%)	188 (15.04%)
Ukrainian non-official sources	64 (11.51%)	1 (0.30%)	12 (3.31%)	77 (6.16%)
Russian non-official sources	27 (4.86%)	1 (0.30%)	1 (0.28%)	29 (2.32%)
U.S. non-official sources	34 (6.12%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.55%)	36 (2.88%)
Western/NATO sources	26 (4.66%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	26 (2.08%)
Chinese non-official sources	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (1.93%)	7 (0.56%)
Other non-official sources	4 (0.72%)	0 (0%)	9 (2.48%)	13 (1.04%)
<i>Other media</i>	23 (4.14%)	7 (2.11%)	7 (1.93%)	37 (2.96%)
<i>Nationalities</i>				
Ukrainian sources	154 (27.70%)	84 (25.38%)	64 (17.63%)	302 (24.16%)
Russian sources	109 (19.60%)	172 (51.96%)	53 (14.60%)	334 (26.72%)
U.S. sources	123 (22.12%)	5 (1.51%)	32 (8.82%)	160 (12.80%)
Western/NATO sources	88 (15.83%)	10 (4.83%)	65 (17.91%)	169 (13.52%)
Chinese source	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	57 (15.70%)	57 (4.56%)
Other Countries' sources	59 (10.61%)	47 (14.20%)	85 (23.42%)	191 (15.28%)
<i>Total paragraphs</i>	556	331	363	1250

Table 2: Mean Percentage of Sources by Source Categories (for sourced paragraphs)

<i>The New York Times</i>		ITAR-TASS		Xinhua	
Ukraine official	17%	Russian official	53%	Western/NATO official	20%
U.S. official	15%	Ukraine official	18%	Other official	19%
Russian official	14%	Other official	15%	Ukraine official	17%
Western/NATO official	14%	Western/NATO official	8%	Russian official	14%
Ukraine non-official	12%	U.S. official	2%	U.S. official	9%

Table 3.1: Attitude

All the paragraphs of NYT, ITAR-TASS and Xinhua's stories.

	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Total
NYT	28 (2.57%)	122 (11.2%)	939 (86.23%)	1089
ITAR-TASS	60 (13.25%)	8 (1.77%)	385 (84.99%)	453
Xinhua	30 (5.47%)	43 (7.85%)	475 (86.68%)	548
Total	118 (5.65%)	173 (8.28)	1799 (86.08%)	2090

* Chi-square=99.27, p<0.001, d.f.=4.

Table 3.2: Attitude

All the sourced paragraphs of NYT, ITAR-TASS and Xinhua's stories.

	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Total
NYT	28 (5.04%)	73 (13.13%)	455 (81.83%)	556
ITAR-TASS	20 (6.04%)	7 (2.11%)	304 (97.75%)	331
Xinhua	30 (8.26%)	40 (11.02%)	293 (80.72%)	363
Total	78 (6.24%)	120 (9.6%)	1052 (84.16%)	1250

* Chi-square=34.18, p<0.001, d.f.=4

Table 3.3: Attitude

All the unsourced paragraphs of NYT, ITAR-TASS and Xinhua's stories.

	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Total
NYT	0 (0%)	49 (9.19%)	484 (90.81%)	533
ITAR-TASS	41 (33.61%)	0 (0%)	81 (66.39%)	122
Xinhua	0 (0%)	3 (1.62%)	182 (98.38%)	185
Total	40 (4.76%)	53 (6.31%)	747 (88.93%)	840

* Chi-square=263.74, p<0.001, d.f.=4

Table 4.1**Russian sources**Tukey HSD^{a,b}

News Source	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
Xinhua	51	.15393070980	
NYT	49	.17724275802	
TASS	52		
Sig.		.938	1.000

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 50.636.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

Table 4.2**U.S. sources**Tukey HSD^{a,b}

News Source	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
TASS	52	.02163461538	
Xinhua	51	.09580767816	
NYT	49		
Sig.		.229	1.000

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 50.636.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

Table 4.3**Chinese sources**Tukey HSD^{a,b}

News Source	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
TASS	52	.00000000000	
NYT	49	.00000000000	
Xinhua	51		
Sig.		1.000	1.000

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

- a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 50.636.
- b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

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Appendix I

Coding Protocol

Part I. Basic information: For each story, I will put the following information into a spreadsheet accordingly.

A) News source: Put in the news source, as from *The New York Times*, or the Xinhua News Agency, or TASS.

B) Headline: Put in the headline for each story in each cell under the A column.

C) Total number of paragraphs: Record the number of paragraphs for each story.

D) Word count: Record the word count of the story as listed by LexisNexis.

E) Dateline: Record the date and time of the story as listed by LexisNexis.

Part II. Sourcing: For each story, I will record the number of paragraphs for each source, including the total number of paragraphs.

F) Ukraine official: official sources, ie. Government, politicians, authorities, military personnel

G) Ukraine non-official: civilians, including experts

H) Russian official: official sources, ie. Government, politicians, authorities, military personnel

I) Russian non-official: civilians, including experts

J) U.S. official: official sources, ie. Government, politicians, authorities, military personnel

K) U.S. non-official: civilians, including experts

L) Chinese official: official sources, ie. Government, politicians, authorities, military personnel

M) Chinese non-official: civilians, including experts

N) Western European official: official sources from the European Union member countries, including EU officials

O) Western European non-official: civilians including experts from the EU member countries

P) Other official: officials from world organizations, such as the United Nations

Q) Other non-official: civilians from other countries

R) Other media outlets: Another paper or agency, such as AP, Al Jazeera etc.

S) Non attribution: No source was cited

Part III. Valence: For each story, I will record the valence of source for each paragraph, and I will then record the number of paragraphs with each type of valence in the appropriate column.

T) Positive: Positive toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine

U) Negative: Negative toward Russia's intervention in Ukraine

V) Neutral: Neutral about Russia's intervention in Ukraine

Appendix II

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Per_UO	Between Groups	.001	2	.001	.007	.993
	Within Groups	13.543	149	.091		
	Total	13.544	151			
Per_UNO	Between Groups	.356	2	.178	9.934	.000
	Within Groups	2.672	149	.018		
	Total	3.028	151			
Per_UT	Between Groups	.342	2	.171	1.469	.234
	Within Groups	17.357	149	.116		
	Total	17.699	151			
Per_RO	Between Groups	5.064	2	2.532	22.168	.000
	Within Groups	17.020	149	.114		
	Total	22.084	151			
Per_RNO	Between Groups	.030	2	.015	4.030	.020
	Within Groups	.562	149	.004		
	Total	.593	151			
Per_RT	Between Groups	4.537	2	2.268	19.250	.000
	Within Groups	17.559	149	.118		
	Total	22.096	151			
Per_USO	Between Groups	.421	2	.210	4.763	.010
	Within Groups	6.581	149	.044		
	Total	7.001	151			

Per_USNO	Between Groups	.130	2	.065	9.078	.000
	Within Groups	1.066	149	.007		
	Total	1.196	151			
Per_UST	Between Groups	.950	2	.475	9.266	.000
	Within Groups	7.635	149	.051		
	Total	8.585	151			
Per_CO	Between Groups	.193	2	.096	4.516	.012
	Within Groups	3.182	149	.021		
	Total	3.375	151			
Per_CNO	Between Groups	.022	2	.011	1.564	.213
	Within Groups	1.061	149	.007		
	Total	1.083	151			
Per_CT	Between Groups	.346	2	.173	6.376	.002
	Within Groups	4.046	149	.027		
	Total	4.392	151			
Per_WEO	Between Groups	.347	2	.174	2.076	.129
	Within Groups	12.467	149	.084		
	Total	12.815	151			
Per_WENO	Between Groups	.055	2	.028	6.885	.001
	Within Groups	.600	149	.004		
	Total	.655	151			
Per_WET	Between Groups	.396	2	.198	2.257	.108
	Within Groups	13.068	149	.088		
	Total	13.463	151			
Per_OO	Between Groups	.276	2	.138	1.482	.231
	Within Groups	13.873	149	.093		
	Total	14.149	151			
Per_ONO	Between Groups	.006	2	.003	1.202	.303
	Within Groups	.351	149	.002		
	Total	.357	151			
Per_OT	Between Groups	.297	2	.149	1.501	.226
	Within Groups	14.764	149	.099		
	Total	15.062	151			
Per_OM	Between Groups	.002	2	.001	.043	.958
	Within Groups	2.783	149	.019		
	Total	2.785	151			

Post-hoc Test:

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Per_UO	Between Groups	.001	2	.001	.007	.993
	Within Groups	13.543	149	.091		
	Total	13.544	151			
Per_UNO	Between Groups	.356	2	.178	9.934	.000
	Within Groups	2.672	149	.018		
	Total	3.028	151			
Per_UT	Between Groups	.342	2	.171	1.469	.234
	Within Groups	17.357	149	.116		
	Total	17.699	151			
Per_RO	Between Groups	5.064	2	2.532	22.168	.000
	Within Groups	17.020	149	.114		
	Total	22.084	151			
Per_RNO	Between Groups	.030	2	.015	4.030	.020
	Within Groups	.562	149	.004		
	Total	.593	151			
Per_RT	Between Groups	4.537	2	2.268	19.250	.000
	Within Groups	17.559	149	.118		
	Total	22.096	151			
Per_USO	Between Groups	.421	2	.210	4.763	.010
	Within Groups	6.581	149	.044		
	Total	7.001	151			
Per_USNO	Between Groups	.130	2	.065	9.078	.000
	Within Groups	1.066	149	.007		
	Total	1.196	151			
Per_UST	Between Groups	.950	2	.475	9.266	.000
	Within Groups	7.635	149	.051		
	Total	8.585	151			
Per_CO	Between Groups	.193	2	.096	4.516	.012
	Within Groups	3.182	149	.021		

	Total	3.375	151			
Per_CNO	Between Groups	.022	2	.011	1.564	.213
	Within Groups	1.061	149	.007		
	Total	1.083	151			
Per_CT	Between Groups	.346	2	.173	6.376	.002
	Within Groups	4.046	149	.027		
	Total	4.392	151			
Per_WEO	Between Groups	.347	2	.174	2.076	.129
	Within Groups	12.467	149	.084		
	Total	12.815	151			
Per_WENO	Between Groups	.055	2	.028	6.885	.001
	Within Groups	.600	149	.004		
	Total	.655	151			
Per_WET	Between Groups	.396	2	.198	2.257	.108
	Within Groups	13.068	149	.088		
	Total	13.463	151			
Per_OO	Between Groups	.276	2	.138	1.482	.231
	Within Groups	13.873	149	.093		
	Total	14.149	151			
Per_ONO	Between Groups	.006	2	.003	1.202	.303
	Within Groups	.351	149	.002		
	Total	.357	151			
Per_OT	Between Groups	.297	2	.149	1.501	.226
	Within Groups	14.764	149	.099		
	Total	15.062	151			
Per_OM	Between Groups	.002	2	.001	.043	.958
	Within Groups	2.783	149	.019		
	Total	2.785	151			

Xinhua:

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Per_UO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.17103599018	.328848498023

Per_UNO	51	.000000000	.666666667	.03159041394	.123855203190
Per_UT	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.20262640412	.347640889954
Per_RO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.14412678824	.289820454655
Per_RNO	51	.0	.5	.010	.0700
Per_RT	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.15393070980	.293283686822
Per_USO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.09279108690	.258251768343
Per_USNO	51	.000000000	.153846154	.00301659125	.021542770545
Per_UST	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.09580767816	.259872642472
Per_CO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.07544351075	.252275580079
Per_CNO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.02564102565	.145680745769
Per_CT	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.10108453639	.284463656808
Per_WEO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.19960671139	.365891874675
Per_WENO	51	0	0	.00	.000
Per_WET	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.19960671139	.365891874675
Per_OO	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.19450076069	.326583625004
Per_ONO	51	.000000000	.400000000	.01453470278	.068402476006
Per_OT	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.20903546345	.351362182122
Per_OM	51	.000000000	1.000000000	.03790849673	.158607777285
Valid N (listwise)	51				

TASS:

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Per_UO	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.17793862123	.351651932880
Per_UNO	52	.000000000	.166666667	.00320512821	.023112508222
Per_UT	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.18114374944	.355384645519
Per_RO	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.52823565323	.474476831416
Per_RNO	52	.000000000	.038461538	.00073964496	.005333655669
Per_RT	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.52897529819	.473666523958
Per_USO	52	.000	1.000	.02163	.139417
Per_USNO	52	0	0	.00	.000
Per_UST	52	.000	1.000	.02163	.139417
Per_CO	52	0	0	.00	.000
Per_CNO	52	0	0	.00	.000
Per_CT	52	0	0	.00	.000
Per_WEO	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.08349358975	.248363326615
Per_WENO	52	0	0	.00	.000
Per_WET	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.08349358975	.248363326615
Per_OO	52	.000	1.000	.15385	.353220

Per_ONO	52	0	0	.00	.000
Per_OT	52	.000	1.000	.15385	.353220
Per_OM	52	.000000000	1.000000000	.03090659340	.145464450189
Valid N (listwise)	52				

NYT:

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Per_UO	49	.000000000	.750000000	.17373502349	.195217728543
Per_UNO	49	.000000000	.875000000	.11778616931	.197791967193
Per_UT	49	.000000000	1.000000000	.29152119280	.318629508575
Per_RO	49	.000000000	.666666667	.14281741504	.166972704417
Per_RNO	49	.000000000	.370370370	.03442534300	.081124192804
Per_RT	49	.000000000	.833333333	.17724275802	.194483257344
Per_USO	49	.000000000	.833333333	.15037607784	.216726498458
Per_USNO	49	.000000000	.600000000	.06397584843	.147372562404
Per_UST	49	.000000000	1.000000000	.21435192627	.260888127568
Per_CO	49	0	0	.00	.000
Per_CNO	49	0	0	.00	.000
Per_CT	49	0	0	.00	.000
Per_WEO	49	.000000000	.857142857	.13843917798	.233967779940
Per_WENO	49	.000000000	.529411765	.04085445867	.111771347791
Per_WET	49	.000000000	.857142857	.17929363665	.259316991207
Per_OO	49	.000000000	1.000000000	.09013796718	.212986904741
Per_ONO	49	.000000000	.333333333	.00983030573	.049454356226
Per_OT	49	.000000000	1.000000000	.09996827292	.215465164930
Per_OM	49	.000000000	.533333333	.03762221339	.096401687614
Valid N (listwise)	49				