

POWER-SHARING AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:
NESTED ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THIRD-WAVE DEMOCRACIES

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ABSTRACT

The third wave of democratization drastically changed the world map of politics and raises a puzzle for institutionalists in comparative politics: how do political institutions play a role during the process of democratization? Previous institutional studies in Western advanced industrial democracies show that power-sharing oriented democracies, which Lijphart calls “consensus democracy” (1999), are “kinder and gentler.” This research extends the Lijphartian framework to third-wave democracies, probing whether the level of power-sharing facilitates democratic development in those new democracies. Using a mixed strategy of nest analysis (Lieberman 2005), I first conducted large-N regression models to illustrate the relationship between the level of power-sharing and the democratic development in the third-wave democracies; then I used concrete cases to demonstrate the mechanisms of power-sharing institutions. My regression models show that power-sharing institutions generally facilitate democratic development in the third-wave democracies. The effects of power-sharing institutions are well illustrated in countries such as Kenya and Benin. However, my case studies on Mongolian and Thai democracies indicate that the power of political institutions in promoting democratic

development is limited. Democratization is a multifaceted phenomenon and political institutions are not the sole force that drives democratic progress.

Chapter I

Power-sharing Institutions and Democracy

“The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry its will.”

Joseph Schumpeter (1976: 250)

Three facts ignited my interest in conducting an institutional study on democratic development in the third-wave democracies. One, the third wave of democratization since 1974 has drastically changed the world map of politics. Two, a growing trend in the literature treats institutional arrangements as one of the powerful factors that shape the dynamics of democracies. Three, current institutional studies focus mostly on Western established democracies. In general, these institutional studies employ two theoretical frameworks: the parliamentary-presidential framework and Lijphartian majoritarian-consensual democracies. The theoretical discussion and empirical examination regarding the perils of presidentialism in the past two decades is relatively thorough. However, the discussion on Lijphart’s pattern of democracy has been restricted largely to Western industrial democracies. Responding to the void, comparativists have begun to extend the Lijphartian institutional framework to the developing world, exploring how the power-sharing level implied in institutional arrangements is associated with democratic development in emerging democracies. However those efforts are hardly complete and

systematic. Therefore, my dissertation attempts to conduct a comprehensive study to address one important question. Is a power-sharing oriented democracy, what Lijphart calls the consensual democracy, also “kinder and gentler” in the non-Western setting?

Comparative Institutionalism and the Third-Wave of Democratization

One of the most influential political phenomena since World War II was a swift and successful military coup in Lisbon, Portugal on April 25, 1974 that started a huge wave across the globe, “the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993).” Ever since Southern Europe initiated the wave, Latin America quickly joined, toppling the military regimes and witnessing the return of democracies. Communism collapsed in the early 1990s and a cluster of Central and Eastern European countries hopped on the train of democracy. Africa and Asia were not immune to the infectious democratization. In the late 1980s and early 1990s a fair number of their countries joined the democratic club. According to the Freedom House 2009 report, 49 countries (46%) are now rated as free, 62 (32%) partly free and 42 (22%) not free, which means more than 78 percent of the countries around the world are now using democratic elections.¹ The spread of democracy has generated global political optimism about the victory of liberal democracy, prompting Fukuyama’s (1992) famous story of “the end of history.” However, it raises a series of questions about the stability and consolidation of new democracies. Many transitional democracies are obviously still trapped in developmental stages characterized as “delegative democracy: (O’Donnell 1994), “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997) and even derailed democracy (Fish 2005a). Despite the practice of

¹ See http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_Tables&GraphsForWeb.pdf

democratic elections, political development and stability remain significant issues in those infant democracies.

The complex process of economic and political liberalization leads comparative political scientists to examine the determining factors for democratic development in emerging democracies. While structural (e.g. Lipset 1959; O'Donnell 1973) and cultural approaches (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963) occupied democratization literature in early years, in the 1960s comparativists, led by Huntington (1968), started to examine the engineering effects of political institutions. In the 1980s the literature began to deal increasingly with political institutions as a powerful force shaping the contours and dynamics of democratic regimes. The resurgence of institutional approaches was a counterweight to the exaggerated explanatory power of socioeconomic structures and cultural values in the 1970s and early 1980s. This also created areas of theoretical convergence in the literature that brought rational choice institutionalism into use for broad cross-national comparisons of democratization (e.g. Remmer 1997).

Although increasing, the cross-national comparative analyses of institutional democratization are far from adequate. A careful examination of comparative institutional scholarship indicates that the majority of the institutional studies focus on established Western democracies. This is no surprise since, theoretically, institutionalized norms and rules are more likely to provide stable incentives, shape political actors' preferences and further influence their strategic calculations. To put it differently, scholars expect stabilized institutions to engineer democratic dynamics in a significant way. Of course, new democracies do not enjoy a long history of democratic practice like the Western countries. However, most third-wave democracies have functioned for more

than two decades. As a consequence more than four rounds of democratic elections have occurred in those new democracies. Unlike events in Latin America during the 1960s, when democracies were overthrown by military coups one after another, today's emerging democracies have generally maintained their basic democratic structures. Given the varying levels of democracy among them, institutionalists now ponder the role that democratic institutions play in explaining the variation in political development in the post-transition era.

Research Questions

If democracy is defined as “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (Lincoln, November 19, 1863), in real democratic practice, an immediate question is, what if “the people” disagree with each other? Whose interests will the government represent? The answer to the question varies in different patterns of democracies (e.g. Lijphart 1984; 1999b; Powell 2000). Power-concentrated democracies, characterized by institutions such as majority electoral rules, two-party systems and a dominant executive branch, generate an efficient and identifiable “majority” to rule for the people. Power-sharing democracies, usually characterized by proportional representation, multiparty systems and balanced legislative-executive relationships, tend toward more inclusion of broad interests into the governing process (Lijphart 1999b; Norris 2008b; Powell 2000). A well-known institutional study on 36 democracies by Lijphart concludes that consensus democracy,² which is characteristically

² The concept of consensus democracy is largely derived from the consociational democracy theory (Lijphart 1968; 1969; 1979; 1981a; 1981b; 1999b). Consociational democracy, according to Lijphart, is based on two dimensions: social structure and elites behavior (Bogaards 2000). Consociational democracy is rooted in heterogeneous societies, especially multi-ethnic societies where elites are engaged in politics in a coalescent way, whereas elites behave in adversarial ways in majoritarian

power-sharing, is “kinder and gentler” (Lijphart 1999, 275).³ Lijphart’s theoretical framework broadened consideration of institutionalism, revising traditional institutional approaches that focused on separation of powers (Kaiser 1997). Scholars applied it to broader aspects of democracy including government policy outcomes (e.g. Anderson 2001; Crepaz 1996; Hays 2003; Linzer and Rogowski 2008; Poloni-Staudinger 2008), democratic support and political participation (e.g. Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Hakhverdian and Koop 2007; Vernby 2007), the size of government (Tavits 2004; Vatter and Freitag 2007) and the evolution of democracies along the consensus-majoritarian dimension (Konig and Brauning 1999; Vatter 2007). Predictably, because of a limitation caused by Lijphart’s sample selection,⁴ these studies are largely confined to Western industrial democracies.

democracies. Later, Lijphart went beyond heterogeneous societies, extending the studies to democratic regimes in general. When doing so, he systemized the theory and established the framework of consensus-majoritarian democracy.

³ Lijphart (1984, 1999) builds a two-dimension and ten-indicator theoretical framework to measure the institutions of democracies. The first dimension is the executives-parties dimension including five indicators: 1). concentration of power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, 2). executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power, 3). two-party versus multiparty system, 4). majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation, 5). plurality interest group versus corporatist systems. The second dimension is the federal-unitary dimension which includes: 6) unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government, 7) unicameral versus bicameral, 8) flexible constitutional amendment rules (simple majority) versus extraordinary majorities, 9) legislatures have final words on constitutionality and legislations versus judicial views, 10) and dependent central bank on executive versus independent central banks.

⁴ In Lijphart’s sample (1999), out of 36 democracies, twenty-four are western advanced democracies including most Western European and Northern American democracies. Twelve democracies that belong to developing countries are Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, India, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Trinidad, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Jamaica and Malta. Those countries obviously are not well representative of the large number of third-wave democracies across the globe. See Chapter III for the included 92 cases in this study.

Recently, comparativists have extended the studies of power-sharing institutions to the third-wave democracies (e.g. Kim 2008; Norris 2008a; Powell 2000). However, the burgeoning literature of institutional studies, including those on presidentialism, electoral rules, political parties and party systems in third-wave democracies, reveal several limitations. 1). These studies usually concentrate on one of the variables, namely electoral rules or party systems (e.g. Birch 2005, 2008; Carey and Reynolds 2007; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Karp and Banducci 2007, 2008). Large-N studies that jointly address institutional aspects such as electoral rules, party systems, executive power and the executive-legislative relationship are rare. Scholars in this field have not used the Lijphartian framework to comprehensively study political institutions in new democracies. 2). These studies focus mostly on certain regions, such as African elections and parties (e.g. Bogaards 2008; Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2007; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, 2005; Lindberg 2007b; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003), Central and East European post-communist democracies (e.g. McAllister 2008; McAllister and White 2007; Tavits 2005; 2008), Latin American third-wave democracies (e.g. Madrid 2005a, 2005b; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Remmer 2008; Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and, recently, new Asian democracies (e.g. Croissant 2001; Reilly 2001; 2006a; 2007; Ufen 2008). Limited cases in particular regions make it statistically impossible to conduct large-N analyses at the aggregate level. As a result we obtained fragmentary findings about the engineering effects of political institutions on democratization in different regions, but not comprehensive conclusions. 3). Most current institutional studies of transitional democracies are descriptive. They list the electoral rules and gauge the degree of institutionalization of party systems (e.g. Bielasiak 2002b; Lewis 2006;

Lindberg 2007a; Thames 2007), but they fail to address the consequences of institutions and relationships between institutions and democratic development. In general, we have impressionistic findings that political institutions in new democracies, even those not as institutionalized as in the old democracies, do still have an impact on democratic development (e.g. Lindberg 2006b; Linz 1990; Moser 1999). However, to reach generalizable answers to the question of how these institutions matter for democratic progress in the third-wave democracies, scholars will have to apply unified frameworks to produce more comprehensive studies of all transitional democracies.

With these perspectives in mind, my dissertation attempts to identify patterns among democracies in the third-wave democratic regimes and their consequences on democratic development. I shall attempt to answer whether power-sharing institutions produce higher level democracies in the non-Western world. Specifically, I will consider these questions: do the third-wave transitional democracies differ in institutional patterns of sharing or concentrating powers? If they do, what patterns are most and least popular? Most importantly, how do such patterns affect the process of democratization? Which particular pattern is most conducive to democratization?

Nested Analysis: A Methodological Compromise

Methodologically, how do I conduct the analyses to answer the questions? I have adopted nested analysis (Lieberman 2005), a strategy combining large-N quantitative analysis and small-N studies. The methodological standoff between qualitative and quantitative studies is a long story. Ever since Lijphart famously diagnosed “comparative method,” the principal problem is one of “many variables, small number of cases” (Lijphart 1971, 685; 1975). Quantitative approaches, based on numbers, statistical

methods, regression analyses and related techniques for causal reference (Brady and Collier 2004; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 1), have been the “mainstream” methods in comparative studies (Brady and Collier 2004, 1). Theoretically, large-N quantitative methods have strengths in generalizing relationships between variables. One of the main purposes of social science is to seek a generalization of theories. A necessary condition is to pass the large-N test (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Lieberman 2005). Moreover, because of the common ground of statistical knowledge, large-N quantitative approaches are arguably more scientific (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 7-12). In general, large-N studies follow broadly recognized routines in statistical models. The clearly stated style of quantitative research makes replication possible and enhances the reliability of research results.

At the same time, qualitative oriented scholars never stopped questioning the “mainstream” quantitative methods. Interestingly, since John Gerring published “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for” in *The American Political Science Review* (2004), criticizing the mainstream quantitative methods and praising the merits of small-N studies, they have almost become fashionable in methodology discussions (e.g. Bennett and Elman 2007a, 2007b; Brady and Collier 2004; Gerring 2006; Levy 2007, 2008; Mahoney 2007). Besides the “concept stretching” problem in large-N studies identified by Sartori (1970), “the missing causal mechanisms” is understood to be another big problem in large-N analyses. The fact is that quantitative models, which mainly concentrate on the statistical relationships between independent variables and dependent variables, inadequately explain causal mechanisms. This is because the statistical models do not demonstrate *how* the relationships, positive or negative, are generated. In fact,

whether the statistical results reflect the theoretical arguments is largely untouched in this style of research because large-N studies do not test the causal mechanisms *per se*. Many argue that the weakness of large-N studies in illustrating causal mechanisms accentuates the very strength of case studies. In small-N comparative studies, analysts who are deeply familiar with their data are well positioned to specify causations and to suggest additional explanatory, contextual variables, interaction effects, and scope conditions (e.g. Collier 1999; Todd 2000; Gerring 2004; Munck 2004). Case studies present better descriptions and also give analysts the chance to investigate events inside the “black box”. In general, case studies produce more intimate views of the relationships between hypotheses and data, as well as showing a better tracing of processes (Tarrow 1995; 2004).

Realizing the inadequateness of both methodologies, many scholars have recently started to advocate mixed methods (e.g. Back and Dumont 2007; Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2006; Lieberman 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Tarrow 1995). The logic behind the mixed strategy is straight: it uses case analyses and qualitative studies to compensate the large-N and statistical methods; it uses large-N studies to generalize theories developed from case studies. The underpinning assumption is that neither methodology alone is sufficient for inference. As Lieberman (2005) points out, the promise of nested research design is that both large-N and small-N studies can inform each other providing an analytical payoff that is greater than the sum of the parts.

Thus, to answer the research questions, I first conducted large-N analyses to generalize the relationship between the level of power-sharing and democratic development in the third-wave democracies. Then I used concrete cases to illustrate the

causal mechanisms of power-sharing institutions on democratic development. My study shows that, in general, power-sharing institutions facilitate democratic development in the third-wave democracies. However, my study also indicates that the power of institutions in facilitating democratic development is limited. Power-sharing institutions are not the sole force that drives democratization. Democratic progress in the post-transition era is a multifaceted phenomenon that requires development in various aspects of the society.

My dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter I discusses the academic relevance of institutional studies in the third-wave democracies and my approach to the research questions. Chapter II is a chapter on theory, and it reviews the literature on the theoretical relationships between power-sharing institutions and democratic development. Chapter III demonstrates the empirical patterns of institutions in 92 third-wave democracies, which include electoral systems, party systems, executive powers and the legislative-executive relationship. In Chapter IV, using the perspective of power-sharing to investigate the impact of these four institutions on democratic development, I apply large-N statistical regression models. Chapter V uses a mixed model to explore how power-sharing institutions affect citizen satisfaction with democracy. Chapter VI and VII are case studies. The former adopts Most Similar System Design (MSDD hereafter) to conduct a comparative analysis on Kenya and Benin in order to illustrate how power-sharing institutions are critical in facilitating democratic development in new democracies. The latter, in contrast, analyzes two outlying cases, Mongolia and Thailand, in which power-sharing institutions are *not* necessarily a source of democratic

progress. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter VIII with a summary of the main findings and a discussion of important questions for future studies.

Chapter II

Theoretical Considerations on Power-sharing Institutions and Democratic Development

“I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.”

Robert A. Dahl (1971:1)

Democracy as an Institution

Democracy is derived from the Greek, “demo” (*dêmos*) representing “people” and “cracy” (*krátos*) standing for “power”. Democracy essentially refers to a form of government with the power ultimately in the hands of the people. In his classic work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Schumpeter illustrates the differences between “the classic theory of democracy” and “another theory of democracy.” If democracy is defined in terms of “the will of the people” and “the common good,” Schumpeter finds it a rather difficult concept to apply in modern political life. Therefore, he presents an alternative definition which conceptualizes democracy as a method to realize the people’s will: “[an] institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1976, 250-83). Following the Schumpeterian tradition, modern political theorists characterize representative democracy, as opposed to direct democracy, based on two dimensions, political contestation and participation (Dahl

1971). From this perspective, democracy is a political system in which “its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote (Huntington 1993, 7).”

Defining democracy as a host of institutional arrangements of “government for and by the people” (Lijphart 1984; 1999b), political theorists not only provide the criteria that differentiate a democratic system from a non-democratic one, but also imply how importantly institutional arrangements are associated with the substance of political systems. The aforementioned definition of democracy illustrates the fundamental values of modern representative democracy, which includes fair representation, real power alternation among competitors (political parties in modern politics) and universal suffrage with active citizen participation in elections. These values are mainly reflected through democratic elections. Thus, democratic institutions which encourage fair representation, promote equal opportunities for competing candidates in democratic elections and endorse vibrant political participation are regarded as fine designs of democracy. However, democracy is about elections, but not solely about elections. The manner in which institutions place the directly or indirectly elected representatives is also crucial (e.g. Eaton 2000; Ordeshook 1992; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997). This is because the post-election institutional arrangements, such as fused powers or separation of powers among the executive and legislative branches, are likewise important for the allocation of resources, using Lasswell’s terminology, “who gets what and how” (Lasswell 1951). The functioning of democracy depends on how the representatives make policies, how the executives implement them and how the judicial system

guarantees the ultimate justice of the regime. A fine democracy, theoretically, should facilitate the people's well-being by channeling, articulating and realizing the people's interests through just and effective political processes.

To summarize, the Schumpeterian tradition implies that the substance of democracy depends on the procedures of democracy. Such procedures consist of a host of institutions designed to operationalize the principle of "government of the people, by the people, for the people." From this perspective, institutions matter in democratic regimes, at least in theory, since they are directly associated with how democracy functions. Nevertheless, empirically, whether and how institutions matter for democracy are not simple questions. These questions have kept the institutionalists in comparative politics busy since the late 1970s.

Power-sharing Institutions and Democratic Development

The third-wave democratization since the 1970s vividly indicates that democratic development⁵ is a multidimensional phenomenon (Shin 2007). It depends on some socioeconomic requisites (e.g. Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), a group of authentic democrats with commitment to democratic values (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Shin 2007), an active civil society (e.g. Newton 2001; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993), a favorable cultural tradition (e.g. Huntington 1993, 73-85;

⁵ Democratization is a process consisting of both democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Democratic transition is the process during which the political system struggles to abolish the authoritarian regime and adopt democratic institutions, whereas democratic consolidation is the one during which the political system strives to strengthen the democratic structure and improve the quality of democracy. Comparativists have shown that the factors that facilitate democratic transitions are not those that help democratic consolidation in the post-transition era (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Rustow 1970; Schedler 2001). Thus, to explore the consequences of institutions on democratic development, my study focuses on the phase of democratic consolidation, the post-transition era.

Subramaniam 2000), a constructive external environment (e.g. Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Huntington 1993, 85-106), and, equally importantly, fair and effective institutional arrangements of democracy *per se* (e.g. Cox 1997; Lijphart 1999b; Linz 1990; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Tsebelis 2002). The relevant and critical questions here are: why do power-sharing or power-concentrating institutions make differences to democratic development? And how do they do so?

Political scientists present various answers to the questions, which can be mainly grouped into two schools, the pro-power-sharing school and the anti-power-sharing school. The former is supportive of the Lijphartian argument that power-sharing is conducive to democratic development (e.g. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Koelble and Reynolds 1996; Lijphart 2002; McGarry and Noel 1989; Muller 2001; also see Nordlinger 1972). The latter view argues that power-concentrating institutions produce more effective democracy and power-sharing is detrimental for democracy (e.g. Jung and Shapiro 1995; Lemarchand 2007; Mukherjee 2006; Tull and Mehler 2005). I will discuss both in detail.

Power-sharing Facilitates Democratic Development

“The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority” (de Tocqueville 1839, 245). To make a representative democracy work, the majority of the people must overrule and prevail over the minority. But, does it follow that the minority should have no representation at all? John Stuart Mill’s answer is explicit: “In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not

disproportionately but proportionately” (Mill, 1861).⁶ Although in practice democracies always permit some degree of disproportionate representation (Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1999b; Taagepera and Grofman 2003), fair representation is one of the essential values of an equal democracy (Riker 1982a, 7). From the perspective of fair representation, proportional representation rules of election (PR) plus a multiparty system are thought to be conducive to democracy (Blais and Massicotte 1996; 2002, 62). By definition, PR systems allow each party to gain seats in proportion to its popular votes, which provides minorities the chance to be represented in the government despite their small shares of popular votes. In contrast, minorities are usually unrepresented in democracies with majoritarian electoral rules where the elections are largely winner-take-all games. This is not arguing that PR rules guarantee perfect vote-seat proportionality. Instead, PR rules theoretically offer the minority groups more opportunities to be incorporated into the political process.⁷ With representation, minority representatives are able to articulate their interests in their own voices even if they do not necessarily swing the policies in debate. Modern representative democracy is based on representation, thus, a more representative democracy under power-sharing rules benefits the people more.

Specifically, the pro-power-sharing scholars argue that power-sharing and inclusive institutional design has positive consequences that make democracy work better. First, a power-sharing system mediates the electoral losers’ dissatisfaction with democracy (e.g. Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, and Listhaug 2005; Anderson and

⁶ See ebook on line: Mill, John Stuart, 1861. Considerations on Representative Government. <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5669>

⁷ Mathematically, it is possible that majoritarian electoral rules at the district level can lead to proportional representation at the aggregate or national level, such as the electoral system in the USA. The American democracy adopts typical majoritarian electoral rules, however, the aggregate disproportionality is surprisingly low.

Guillory 1997; Hakhverdian and Koop 2007). The legitimacy of democracy derives from the citizenry's support of the elected government. Since democracy is about winning or losing the elections, it becomes critical whether the electoral losers have positive attitudes toward democracy. Theoretically, consensual arrangements facilitate representativeness and balanced power distribution among diverse groups, which allows the minorities to be part of the policy-making process even when their parties fail to gain the majority in the elections. The seats given to the minor parties, usually electoral losers, do matter (e.g. Powell and Vanberg 2000), because the accommodation of minorities and diverse social groups touches the core spirit of democracy---compromise (e.g. Dahl 1989). The fair and equal chances of representation that social groups perceive also motivate them to realize their interests through democratic channels. To put it differently, social groups, once given equal chances to obtain representation in the elections, have incentives to sit down at the bargaining table instead of toppling the government through violent protests on the street or even military coups (e.g. Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008). In this sense, political institutions are directly associated with elites' strategic choices and the voters' satisfaction with democracy. Without the perception of the elites and the public that democracy is the "only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996; Shin and Wells 2005), stabilizing a democratic regime usually is an impossible mission. Therefore, the power-sharing and consensus-building mechanism accommodates the dissent of the losers, encourages inter-group cooperation and state unification (e.g. Lijphart 1999; Elkins and Sides 2007). Moreover, it smoothes the progress of democratic development.

The accommodation of electoral losers is especially important for multi-ethnic states, in which minority groups' adherence to peaceful political approaches is directly

related to unity of the state (Elkins and Sides 2007; Lijphart 1969; 1979; 1985; 1994b; 1999b; 2004). To keep the ethnic minorities in the democratic institutional game, empowering the minorities through institutionally inclusive channels has a better chance to make democracy work (Lijphart 1985, 89). This is because the sensitivity to ethnic minorities reduces the incentives for radical behaviors when minorities articulate their interests. Essentially, political inclusiveness helps alleviate the inter-ethnic tension (Cohen 1997; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004) and assists ethnic groups in building attachments to a united state (Elkins and Sides 2007).

Besides the accommodating effect, power-sharing institutions are also widely known to help make a vibrant democracy by facilitating political participation (Tavits 2004). On one hand, because popular votes are proportionally translated into seats under PR systems, voters, especially those supporters of minor political parties, have a stronger sense of political efficacy than those in winner-take-all elections. On the contrary, in democracies with highly disproportional systems, the votes of minor parties' supporters are mostly wasted. Thus, the PR electoral system gives voters more incentives to go to the polls whereas the majoritarian system introduces a strong disincentive to vote (Jackman 1987, 81). On the other hand, political parties and candidates under PR systems are more motivated as well. Once perceiving more chances of winning seats, political parties are more willing to campaign hard to mobilize the voters, thereby bringing more voters to the polls (Blais and Carty 1990; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Tavits 2004).

Regarding the executive-legislative relationship, conventional wisdom inherited from John Locke, Montesquieu and Madison says that the separation of powers among

the executive, legislative and judicial branches is one of the basic constitutional principles of liberal democracies (Bellamy 1996; Fontana 2009; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997, 1164; also *The Federalist*, Madison No. LI). This is because checks and balances are essential to avoid tyranny. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition” (Madison, 1788). Allocating powers to both bodies requires them to agree on public policy and thus to be able to discipline each other to the voters’ advantage. Moreover, the separation of powers, allowing debate on policies in two bodies of the legislature, helps to improve transparency in the system by disseminating more information to the voters (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997). Most importantly, in new democracies, the separation of powers presents electoral losers a second chance for access to power. For example, despite losing the presidency, parties still can control the majority in the legislature. The “government in opposition” (Fontana 2009) makes it possible to bargain with rival parties over how the resources should be allocated and to prevent any party from usurpation of power.

Overall, the pro-power-sharing scholars emphasize how political inclusion allows interest articulation by minority groups, and how it produces the feeling of being represented. It engages diverse actors, thereby making the system as democratic as possible. However, this school pays little attention to the issue of how to make democracy work efficiently. From the perspective of the functioning of democracy, the anti-power-sharing scholars see operational problems in power-sharing institutions. I turn to those arguments next.

Power-sharing Impedes Democratic Development

Some scholars fundamentally question the engineering effects of institutions. For them, political structures and institutions play a very limited role in determining choices by political actors. For example, it is argued that accommodating the radical dissents among the Basques is far more complicated than merely a matter of institutional arrangements in power-sharing institutions. An inclusive institution has obviously failed to provide sufficient incentives to bring the radical minority to the table to negotiate (Beck 2008). Recent studies of failed power-sharing governments in Africa similarly show that “more importantly than the mechanics of power sharing, the socio-political context is what spells the difference between success and failure” (Lemarchand 2007, 1).

Scholars who are skeptical about the efficacy of power-sharing argue that power-sharing institutions cut two ways. When power-sharing institutions accommodate ethnic minorities, they simultaneously reinforce ethnic identity in political competition (Elkins and Sides 2007; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004; Norris 2004). In this kind of democratic competition, political parties organize and campaign along the ethnic boundary. This behavior reinforces ethnic identity and broadens the inter-ethnic gap. The “inconvenient facts” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 24) of state-building under a democratic regime are that “the nationalist aspirations of political leaders are incongruent with the empirical realities of the *demoi* (populations) in their state” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 26). The reinforced identity of minority groups may potentially challenge the legitimacy of the central government and in extreme cases may even demand self-determination or join the neighboring countries where the ethnic group enjoys a majority status. Thus, in highly divided societies the task of consolidating democracy during the post-transition era is a very challenging one.

Another large problem that the anti-power-sharing school points out is that power-sharing institutions may prevent the formation of effective opposition in democratic contestation (Jung and Shapiro 1995; Koelble and Reynolds 1996; Mainwaring 1993). Multiparty systems, usually associated with PR electoral systems, make it difficult to build a solid opposition coalition. To effectively challenge the incumbent party or party coalition, various parties in the opposition need to negotiate with each other to form a unified political opposition. Despite the common interests of winning the elections, compromise among the opposition parties is not necessarily easy due to distinct party ideologies and fragmentation of party systems (Mainwaring 1993). A failed negotiation or the lack of solidarity among the opposition is problematic both for democratic elections as well as for post-election policy-making. According to Dahl, one of the democratic dimensions is political contestation. It requires a powerful opposition that can seriously challenge and put pressure on the incumbent. Without a competitive challenger, power alternation among parties cannot happen, in violation of one basic criterion for being substantively democratic.

Divisions and fragmentation among the opposition weakens it, thereby damaging democracy by weakening the competitive process. This deficiency is common in new democracies, such as in Latin America (Ecuador, El Salvador) and in Asia (Thailand). The combination of fragmented party systems and populism leads to unstable governments and further threatens the stability of democratic regimes. On the other hand, giving substantial amounts of political power to elites, who represent salient minorities during the process of policy making, “minimizes party competition and conflicts between executives and the legislature and renders backbenchers impotent”

(Jung and Shapiro 1995, 277-8). When a power-sharing system emphasizes consensus-building, the incentives favor cooperation among elites rather than confrontation between opposing points of view. Because political leaders will minimize their differences to build a coalition, the real political debate is overshadowed (Koelble and Reynolds 1996, 222). Then the political opposition can rarely articulate the interests of electoral minorities effectively.

Regarding the relationship between legislative and executive bodies, critics of presidentialism have long argued that the separation of powers could bring down democracy because of the frequent deadlocks in government (e.g. Linz 1990; Power and Gasiorowski 1997). However, further empirical examination can determine to what extent democratic stability is directly associated with the dispersion of powers among the executive and legislative bodies. It is inconveniently true that independently elected presidents have produced a series of democratic breakdowns in Latin America during the 1960s. However, a recent time-series-cross-national study of global democracies shows that divided government does not cause democratic breakdown of presidentialism (Cheibub 2002). The significant statistical connection between the legislative-executive relationship and democratic stability has not been empirically established in presidential democracies. Another type of power-sharing in the government is the executive power-sharing structure of combining the president and the prime minister in semi-presidential systems. [Such a combination can be devastating to some new democracies in Africa. It is argued that political division within the executive branch increases the rival party's incentive to "compete simultaneously for patronage within the executive [branch]" and leads to a strong likelihood of political breakdown (Kirschke 2007).

Conflict management research indicates that a decisive military victory for the government increases the incentives for insurgents to accept the power-sharing agreement. However, in a bargaining game power-sharing arrangements could exacerbate the commitment problem and could lead to a breakdown of peace, given a previous military stalemate (Fearon 2007; Mukherjee 2006). It is true that power-sharing institutions offer incentives for the political actors to stay in the democratic bargaining game. However, for those political actors who are ambitious and hungry for power, sharing power is not enough. This is especially true in new democracies where political actors have not yet experienced democratic practice and generally lack the spirit and habits of compromise. From this perspective, the democratic game of compromising is more than simply an institutional matter (I discuss this in details in the case studies in Chapter VII).

The anti-power-sharing school argues that power-concentrating systems have many virtues. Compared with power-sharing systems, a power-concentrating democracy, usually characterized by majoritarian electoral rules, two-party systems and executive dominance, is functioning in a different way. With power typically in the hand of the single majority party, the government is more stable than the multiparty party coalition government. A stable government is believed to contribute to a stable regime in general (e.g. Blais and Dion 1990; Blais and Massicote 2002, 41). More importantly, a power-concentrating government produces a more accountable democracy based on the theory of “clarity of responsibility” (e.g. Powell Jr. and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999). According to this theory, the accountability of democracy depends on the identification of responsibility to make possible the performance-based voting. A high

level of clarity about responsibility helps the voters identify who is responsible for government decisions, evaluate their performance and further reward or punish them in the elections. When responsibility is clear, a decisive election can directly and immediately shape the formation of an accountable regime (e.g. Powell Jr and Whitten 1993; Strom 2000). Obviously, a power-concentrating democracy provides greater clarity of responsibility because decision-making is largely concentrated in a single party in power. In contrast, a power-sharing democracy produces less clarity because the institutional lines of responsibility are blurred among multiple parties and different governmental branches (Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Powell and Whitten 1993; Samuels 2004; Tavits 2007; Whitten and Palmer 1999). Under majoritarian systems, theoretically it is easier to get rid of the government that voters evaluate negatively (Powell and Whitten 1993). That makes the power-concentrating democracy more accountable.

Overall, the anti-power-sharing scholars focus on the issue of how to make democracy efficient. They pay less attention to the question of how inclusive and representative a democracy is. Aforementioned analyses indicate that no institutional design is flawless. Power-sharing and power-concentrating systems have both pros and cons. While power-sharing institutional arrangements emphasize the inclusion of as many actors as possible to *influence* the democratic process, power-concentrating ones focus on how to allow the people *control* over the democracy process (Powell 2000; Riker 1982a). Power-sharing democracies value the representativeness of democracy more, while power-concentrating democracies emphasize the efficiency of democracy. Power-sharing democracies mediate the electoral losers' negative evaluation towards

democracy by incorporating them into the game. Power-concentrating democracies empower the voters to remove unsatisfactory politicians through a more accountable mechanism. Power-sharing institutions may produce more vibrant democracies by engaging everyone in the game, but power-concentrating institutions facilitate democratic contestation by generating strong political oppositions. Power-sharing leads to more equal and open democracies, whereas power-concentration makes more accountable and stable democracies. Although Lijphart has famously claimed that a power-sharing (consensus) democracy is “kinder and gentler,” we need a more careful examination of the third-wave democracies to generalize such a conclusion.

Before I proceed to use statistical methods to assess the effects power distributions have on democratic development, in the next chapter I will demonstrate the empirical patterns of political institutions in the third-wave democracies.

Chapter III
Empirical Patterns:
Power-Sharing Institutions in Third-wave Democracies

“The President is an elective magistrate. His honor, property, freedom and life are a perpetual pledge to the people for the good use he will make of his power.”

Alexis de Tocqueville (1969: 121)

“The influence of national factors [on party systems] is certainly very considerable; but we must not in their favor underestimate the importance of one general factor of a technical kind, the electoral system.”

Maurice Duverger (1953: 217)

Focusing on the executive-parties dimension, in this study I define power-sharing democracies as regimes with PR electoral rules, multiparty systems and balanced power between the legislative and executive branches (Lijphart 1994a; 1999b; Norris 2008a; Powell 2000); In contrast, power-concentrating democracies are regimes with majoritarian electoral rules, two-party systems and dominant executive power. In theory, these are ideal patterns of democracies. Due to complex institutional arrangements and continuing political life changes, real democracies do not perfectly reflect the typical categories of power-sharing or power-concentrating democracies. Actual new democracies fall along a continuum of combinations that vary from power-sharing to power concentrating political institutions.

The Case Selection of the Third-wave Democracies

To analyze the engineering effects of democratic institutions in the third-wave democracies, this study deals with democratic development after democratic transition. My analytical framework for democracies is Lijphartian. In authoritarian regimes, elections are largely symbolic and do not lead to real power turnovers among multiple parties, even if more parties than the ruling party are permitted. Thus, my study targets all the third-wave political systems that have transitioned to democracy since 1974, when the third-wave democratization began (Huntington 1993, 1). Democracies, for operational purposes, are regimes in which government offices are filled by means of contested elections (Cheibub 2007, 27; Przeworski 1991).⁸ First, both the chief executive office and legislature must be filled by means of elections.⁹ Second, contestation suggests that the opposition party (or party coalition) has some chance of winning office as a consequence of free and fair elections. The possibility of power alternation is the key criterion for a regime to qualify as a democracy. However, the power-alternation rule is a complicated one.¹⁰

⁸ Cheibub uses the classification of political regime first proposed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and updated in Przeworski et al. (2000). See Cheibub (2007, 26-8) for details on the operational definition of democracy.

⁹ There are different views upon this criterion. Collier and Adcock (1999) believe that having only one of the executive or legislative offices filled by elections is sufficient to qualify a regime “at least partially democratic”, whereas Cheibub argues both executive and legislative branches must be filled by elections. Here I take Cheibub’s criterion to define democracy in a stricter way. However, to note, in parliamentary systems or some presidential systems, the chief executive officers are indirectly elected by the representatives in the legislature.

¹⁰ See Cheibub’s discussion (2007, 26-32) on how the power alternation rules are associated with democracy.

For instance, since 1947, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated Japan's politics¹¹ until the very recent election in which it was defeated by the Liberal Party of Japan (LPJ). Does this disqualify Japan as a democracy? Not at all. Elections held in Japan were free and fair and LDP was subject to challenges by the opposition parties, although no actual power alternation ever occurred.¹² This is quite different from the case of Mexico, which also had a dominant party for decades. Political scientists agree that Mexico was not a democracy preceding the 2000 election. Then Vicente Fox became the first candidate not from the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), to win the presidency in seven decades. Before the 2000 election, the then incumbent PRI had manipulated the elections and no equal chances had ever been actually present for the opposition challengers. Under the PRI government, elections were hardly competitive. However, in defining democracy, we have even harder cases such as Botswana. The elections since its independence are judged largely as free and fair, but obviously not very competitive. Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has always won the overwhelming majority of seats in National Assembly.¹³ Lacking power turnovers, should Botswana be regarded as a democracy? In my sample, Botswana is identified as a democratic regime, but Mexico before 2000 is not. The justification lies in the essence of democracy: whether the power is truly in the hands of the people. Logically, power alternation among parties is not necessarily the outcome of fair

¹¹ Japan is not a third-wave democracy. Here it is used to demonstrate a case of democracy without competition.

¹² See Scheiner's institutional explanation of how the combination of electoral rules and clientism helps LDP dominates the Japanese politics (Scheiner 2006).

¹³ The only election in which BDP's seat percent dropped under 70% is the 1994 election (67.6%). In all the other elections, BDP's seat percent is around or higher than 80%. But, recently elections, BDP's popular votes have dropped to around 50%.

elections. Theoretically, it is possible that the incumbent party enjoys the majority support in consecutive elections. Consistent winning outcomes in democratic elections do not override the legitimacy of democratic elections *per se* as long as the voters are given equal rights to elect their representatives freely.

A related difficulty is in determining whether or not an election is “free and fair.” Electoral frauds are not unusual in newly-transitioned democracies (Fish 2005b; Lehoucq 2003; McCann and Domínguez 1998; Tucker 2007). Kenya’s flawed presidential election in 2007 generated serious tension about Kenya’s shaky democracy. Mexico’s controversial election in 2006 initiated a wave of street protests and acts of civil disobedience. In Russia, deception in the elections has seriously damaged the legitimacy of that democracy (Fish 2005a). Nevertheless, does this disqualify these regimes from consideration as democracies and should they be excluded from the sample? Probably not. Electoral fraud is regarded as one indicator of low democratic development, but is not sufficient to disqualify a nation’s standing as a democratic regime. Using a minimalist definition (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), this study emphasizes the basic institutions of democracy. Depending largely on Cheibub’s democracy pool (Cheibub 2007, 44-46), and also referring to other datasets including Freedom House, Polity IV, the Economists Democracy Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BIT Index) and CIA factbook, I use a total of 92 cases as third-wave democracies.¹⁴

¹⁴ For most regimes, these datasets are largely consistent in coding. In the case of lack of consensus, I mainly depend on Freedom House and Polity IV to make the final decision. Thus, some regimes are not listed as democracy by Cheibub (2007), such as Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mozambique and Georgia, are also included in my sample.

Table 3.1: Democracies in the Third Wave of Democratization

Nation	Years	Nation	Years
Albania	1991-2008	Lithuania	1992-2008
Antigua & Barbuda	1980-2008	Macedonia	1991-2008
Argentina	1973-1975; 1983-2008	Madagascar	1993-2008
Armenia	1995-2008	Malawi	1994-2008
Bahamas	1972-2008	Malaysia	1974-2008
Bangladesh	1979-1981; 1991-2008	Mali	1992-2008
Barbados	1973-2008	Mauritius	1973-2008
Belize	1981-2008	Mexico	1973-2008
Benin	1991-2008	Moldova, Republic Of	1994-2008
Bolivia	1982-2008	Mongolia	1990-2008
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1996-2008	Morocco	1993-2008
Botswana	1973-2008	Mozambique	1994-2008
Brazil	1982-2008	Namibia	1989-2008
Bulgaria	1990-2008	Nepal	1991-2008
Burundi	2005-2008	Nicaragua	1984-2008
Cape Verde	1991-2008	Niger	1993-1995; 1999-2008
Central African Republic	1993-2002, 2005-2008	Nigeria	1999-2008
Chile	1989-2008	Pakistan	1988-1998
Colombia	1973-2008	Panama Canal Zone	1989-2008
Comoros	1990-1994; 1995-1998; 2004-2008	Papua New Guinea	1975-2008
Congo, Republic of	1992-1996; 2002-2007	Paraguay	1993-2008
Costa Rica	1973-2008	Peru	1980-2008
Croatia	1990-2008	Philippines	1986-2008
Czech Republic	1990-2008	Poland	1989-2008
Dominica	1978-2008	Romania	1990-2008
Dominican Republic	1973-2008	Russian Federation	1990-2008
Ecuador	1979-2008	Sao Tome & Principe	1991-2008
El Salvador	1985-2008	Senegal	1978-2008
Estonia	1991-2008	Seychelles	1993-2008
Fiji	1973-1986; 1992-2008	Sierra Leone	2002-2008
Gambia	1972-1993, 1997-2008	Slovakia	1993-2008
Georgia	1992-2008	Slovenia	1991-2008
Ghana	1992-2008	Solomon Islands	1978-2008
Grenada	1976-1979; 1984-2008	South Africa	1994-2008
Guatemala	1973-1982; 1986-2008	Sri Lanka	1989-2008
Guinea-Bissau	1994-2003; 2005-2008	St. Kitts & Nevis	1981-2008
Guyana	1992-2008	St. Lucia	1979-2008
Haiti	1995-	St. Vincent & Grenadine	1979-2008

Honduras	1981-2008	Suriname	1987-2008
Hungary	1990-2008	Taiwan	1989-2008
India	1977-2008	Tanzania	1995-2008
Indonesia	1999-2008	Thailand	1975-2008
Jamaica	1973-2008	Trinidad & Tobago	1973-2008
Kenya	1992-2008	Turkey	1973-1979; 1983-2008
Kiribati	1994-2008	Uganda	1980-1984; 2006-2008
Korea, Republic Of	1988-2008	Ukraine	1991-2008
Kyrgyzstan	1995-1999	Uruguay	1984-2008
Latvia	1993-2008	Vanuatu	1980-2008
Lebanon	1996-2008	Venezuela	1973-2008
Lesotho	1998-2008	Western Samoa	1979-2008
Liberia	1997-2002; 2005-2008	Zambia	1991-2008

Unlike stabilized and established democracies, third-wave democracies have suffered difficulties, if not democratic breakdowns during the post-transition era. Therefore, it is imperative to explain the variation in democratic development among countries but also variation within countries over time. In order to capture institutional changes and the fluctuation of democratic levels both among and within countries, I have constructed two datasets. One is a cross-country dataset and the other is a country-election dataset. The cross-country dataset uses the country as the unit of analysis and calculates average values for democratic development and other indicators since democratic transition.¹⁵ The country-election dataset employs individual elections within given countries as the unit of analysis. For example, since the collapse of communism, Estonia has held five elections. Thus, there are five observations of Estonian elections in the dataset. The average values are calculated for its democratic level between electoral cycles.¹⁶ The country-election data differ from the conventional time-series dataset which uses country-year as the unit of analysis to capture variation from year to year. The reason for choosing election cycles as units of analysis instead of years lies in the nature of political institutions in democracies. While electoral rules for given countries are largely stable over time, effective party numbers and the cabinet structure, the main indicators measuring the party systems and the legislative-executive relationships

¹⁵ Democratic breakdowns, such as Argentina (1975-1983), Bangladesh (1981-1991), Fiji (1986-1992), Guatemala (1982-1986), (see Table 3.1 for the list), are not specifically recorded in this dataset because I calculate the mean values over all years. Democratic breakdowns lower the average level of democracy of each country.

¹⁶ The years of electoral cycles vary from country to country. For example, Estonia legislative elections are held every four years and Senegal five years. In parliamentary systems, in the case of calling for early elections, the electoral cycle becomes shorter than the maximum term limits. For example, in Croatia, elections were held in the year of 1990, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003 and 2007. No matter how long the electoral cycle is, the country-election dataset records all elections ever held since transition.

(discussed in the following section), vary from election to election instead of changing annually. For the 92 selected democracies, a total of 401 elections occurred from 1974 to 2006.

Measuring Power-sharing Institutions

Electoral Systems

Electoral systems are complicated by combinations of diverse election formulas, district magnitudes and ballot structures (e.g. Golder 2005; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Nishikawa and Herron 2004). A study of various coding and typology systems on electoral rules, including the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),¹⁷ Golder dataset (2005), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union database (PARLINE),¹⁸ suggest it is reasonable and practical in large-N studies to categorize the electoral systems into three broad electoral families: majoritarian/plurality systems, proportional systems and mixed systems.¹⁹ In coding, I mainly depended on the IDEA coding and Golder dataset (2005).²⁰ In cases of inconsistency between the two datasets, I referred to PARLINE narrative data to hand-code the electoral systems. I also relied on PARLINE database to extend the time period to the year of 2006. The data indicate that

¹⁷ See <http://www.idea.int/>

¹⁸ The PARLINE database contains information about the structure and working methods of 261 parliamentary chambers in all 186 countries where a national legislature exists. See <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp> for more information.

¹⁹ First past the post, block vote, party block vote, alternative vote are coded as plurality/majority system; listed proportional representation including open and closed lists, and Single Transferable Vote (STV) are coded as proportional systems. I disagree with Golder (2005) on a separate category of multi-tier systems in that this is not an exclusive category to the others. “Tier” is a dimension that can be combined with electoral formula, not a dimension that is exclusive to the formula. For the sake of consistence of typology, I dropped this category and adopted IDEA’s definition on mixed systems. Thus, mixed member proportional and parallel systems are both coded as mixed models.

²⁰ In addition to Golder’s (2005) article, see more information about electoral systems from his webpage, <http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html>.

minor changes of electoral rules in new democracies are not rare (e.g. Bielasiak 2002b; Reilly 2007), but the changes largely occurred within the defined electoral families. Out of 401 elections, there are only 10 cases²¹ of drastic changes in electoral systems. Similar findings in regional studies suggest that electoral rules have largely stabilized even in emerging democracies (e.g. Bielasiak 2002a; Morgenstern and Vazquez-D'Elia 2007).

Theoretically, an electoral system is a mechanism that transforms popular votes into legislative seats. Disproportionality is an indicator that directly measures the extent to which the seat share deviates from the vote share. Perfect proportionality, namely, no disproportionality, is the circumstance under which the shares of seats for parties are exactly the same as the shares of votes they receive. Thus, the lower the value of disproportionality, the more proportionally representative is the electoral system. To calculate the level of disproportionality of elections, I use Michael Gallagher's Least

Square Index (LSq) (Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1999b), $\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} * \sum (V_i - S_i)^2}$, where V_i stands for the share of popular votes Party i receives, S_i the share of seats.²² In theory, majoritarian electoral systems have a higher level of disproportionality than PR systems do. I demonstrate later that this is not always correct in the third-wave democracies.

Party Systems

²¹ The ten cases of changes in electoral systems include: Bulgaria (1991), Bolivia (1997), Croatia (2000), Madagascar (1998), Mexico (1994), the Philippine (1998), Turkey (1987, 1995), Ukraine (1998), and Venezuela (1998).

²² See the following paragraph and footnote 23-26 for the data sources.

Effective Numbers of Parties (ENP) is not the only measure of fragmentation in party systems (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sartori 1976), although it has become a standard measure on party systems in Large-N studies (see Lijphart 1999 for the review on the typology of party systems). Golder (2005) calculated the ENP of votes and seats up to the year of 2000 in global democracies. However, his results for my sample of countries often report missing data. Gallagher (2009)²³ also calculates the ENP of democratic elections, but the cases are largely limited to the Western industrial democracies. Therefore, in order to obtain the ENP for the entire third-wave democratic elections up to year 2006, I did the calculation based on the raw election data by

following the formula from Laakso and Taagepera, $\frac{1}{\sum Vi^2}$ (vote) and $\frac{1}{\sum Si^2}$ (seat), where “others [parties]” are treated as a single party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The party election data are mainly from a series of election data handbooks in Africa, Asia and Latin America, edited by Dieter Nohlen and his colleagues.²⁴ Central and East Europe election data are from “parties & elections” online database.²⁵ Recent election data missing from the handbooks are coded from various online resources.²⁶ Apparently, a

²³ Go to http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php for Gallagher’s data on effective party number and electoral disproportionality.

²⁴ This includes: Nohlen, Dieter. 1999. Elections in Africa A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nohlen, Dieter. 2005. Elections in the Americas Volume1: North America Central America and the Caribbean. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nohlen, Dieter. 2005. Elections in the Americas Volume2: South America. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann. 2001. Elections in Asia and the Pacific A Data Handbook, Volume 2: South East Asia, East Asia and the South Pacific. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann. 2001. Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, Volume 1: The Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁵ See <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/> parties & elections: the database about parliamentary election and political parties in Europe.

²⁶ The online data sources include:

African election database (online): <http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html>;

concern here is how accurate and valid the author's calculation is, compared with the Golder and Gallagher data. I computed the correlations among three sets of ENP values. The coefficients for the pairs are 0.92, 0.90 and 0.89 respectively, thereby supporting the validity of my calculation.²⁷

Executive Power and the Executive-Legislative Relation

In Lijphartian framework, executive power is measured by the percentage of minimal winning coalition years. The power-sharing level between executive and legislative branches is measured by cabinet duration. Theoretically, these measurements are more accurate for parliamentary systems than presidential systems. This is because the distinct government structure in presidential systems, marked by separation of powers and independently elected presidents, fundamentally alters the executive-legislative structures (e.g. Cheibub 2007; Linz 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels and Shugart 2003). Lijphartian measurements, in fact, have the tendency to underestimate the parliamentary-presidentialism differences.²⁸ For example, cabinets in presidential systems are not equal to those in parliamentary systems (e.g. Linz 1990; Mainwaring and

IFES Election Guide: <http://www.electionguide.org/index.php>;

Electoral Geography: <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/>;

post-communist countries' election data at Essex University: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/>

Psephos Adam Carr's Election Archive: <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>

²⁷ The differences in calculation usually come from the different coding of "other parties", which oftentimes happens in fragmented party systems where many small parties winning seats in the parliaments. I fully depend on the coding in data handbooks. The results show that minor differences in effective party numbers, voting and seats, do not affect the big picture of the party system in each country.

²⁸ In his study (Lijphart 1999), out of 36 democracies only eight (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, USA, and France) are presidentialism and half of them are semi-presidentialism with weak presidential powers. It seems a different constitutional structure of few cases does not drastically affect his empirical results in general.

Shugart 1997). A lack of consideration of presidential power in a Lijphartian framework apparently puts the measurement of the executive power in question. As a matter of fact, a large number of the third-wave democracies chose presidential systems. Thus, it is problematic to directly transplant Lijphartian measurements to the third-wave countries. Considering the differences of constitutional structures, I use alternative measurements of the executive power and the legislative-executive relationship in presidential systems.

I first follow Cheibub's criteria (Cheibub 2007, 44-46) to distinguish parliamentary and presidential systems. "Systems in which governments do not need the support of the legislative majority in order to exist," and mixed regimes in which "there is an independently elected president" and "the government is responsible to the president" (Cheibub 2007, 35) are both considered as presidentialism cases. Sixty-two percent of the third-wave democracies are presidential or semi-presidential systems.

Second, I apply Lijphartian measurements to parliamentary systems. To measure the parliamentary executive power with the percentage of minimal winning coalition years, I mainly depend on the counting of ruling party's (or parties') seats²⁹ after each election. The data source is Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2006). In the case of missing data, PARLINE narrative data on elections are the source for my hand-coding. I calculate the percentage of minimal winning coalition years in the cross-country dataset and use dichotomous values (minimal winning coalition coded as 1, otherwise 0) in the

²⁹ DPI data count the largest (gov1seat), the second largest (gov2seat), the third largest (gov3seat), other ruling parties' seats (govotheat) and total seats of ruling coalition (numgov), which makes possible the coding on coalition patterns.

country-election dataset.³⁰ Cabinet duration, the measure for the legislative-executive relationship in parliamentary systems, is measured in an indirect way. Due to the unavailability of data to identify party composition in cabinets in most the third-wave democracies, it is impossible to determine how many years ruling parties stay in power.³¹ To estimate, I use the variable “Number of Major Cabinet Changes” from Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive to measure the steadiness of cabinets. Major cabinet change means replacement of half or more of the ministers in a cabinet reshuffle. For the cross-country dataset, I calculate the average numbers of major cabinet changes each year; whereas for the country-election data, total changes before the next election are counted as the value for a given election.

Third, in presidential systems, executive power is measured by Siaroff’s presidential power index (Siaroff 2003), an additive index of presidential power that ranges from 0 (least powerful) to 7 (most powerful). The Siaroff (2003) index includes seven items of presidential power: (1) discretionary appointment powers, (2) chairing cabinet meetings, (3) right to veto, (4) long-term emergency and/or decree powers, (5) central role in foreign policy, (6) central role in government formation, and (7) ability to dissolve the legislature. Siaroff’s coding ends with the year 2003. In order to identify the changes of presidential power after 2003, I read the constitution and its amendments of

³⁰ To note, in my coding, I assume there is no substantial changes of cabinet between elections. The rationale is, given a minimal winning coalition, a drastic change in ruling coalition, such as a defection of one of the parties, will bring down the government. Then an election is called, which will be captured by the data of another election. However, this is not the case in presidentialism because of the fixed term rule. This is another reason why minimal-winning coalition is not a valid indicator for executive power in presidentialism.

³¹ Keesing’s Record of World Events (1973~ present) could potentially be a resource for hand-coding. Keesing’s record identified the changes of cabinet and lists ministers’ names after every cabinet change. However, it does not provide the partisanship of ministers, which makes coding party composition in the cabinet impossible.

each country to identify the possible changes.³² The legislative-executive relationship is measured by a dichotomous variable: divided government or not. From the perspective of consensual democracy, a divided government is more power-sharing whereas a united government is more power-concentrating. In the former type of government, by definition, the legislative and executive branches are controlled by different parties (or party coalitions). In the latter type of government, both branches are in the hands of the ruling party (or party coalition). In cases where the president's party failed to gain a majority in the legislature, the government is defined as divided.³³

Patterns of Power-sharing Institutions

Electoral Systems

Among the third-wave new democracies (see Table 3.2), slightly more than 1/3 (36.96%) adopted majoritarian electoral systems. Thirty-three democracies (35.87%) chose PR systems and 25 new democracies chose mixed systems. After a period of democratic practice, some democracies made the transition to mixed systems in the late 1990s (e.g. Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). For example, Bolivia (1997) and Venezuela (1998) incorporated majoritarian rules to transform their pure PR systems into mixed ones. The Philippines (1998) and Ukraine (1998) moved to mixed systems by including PR rules. Breaking down by region, I find, interestingly, Central and Eastern European new democracies predominately prefer PR systems. None of the 20 post-communist democracies falls into the majoritarian electoral family. In contrast, majoritarian rules

³² Data source is constitution finder: <http://confinder.richmond.edu/confinder.html>

³³ For the sake of simplicity, divided government is coded as "1" if the president's party gains a majority in the lower house of legislature. I did not consider the possible coalitions with president's party in the legislature. I also ignore the upper house party composition in the case of bicameralism.

prevail among Asian young democracies. Despite the convergence on mixed systems (Reilly 2007),³⁴ most fall into the majoritarian family. Only two democracies, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, implement PR systems. PR systems are not popular in Africa either, adopted by 28 percent of emerging African democracies. In general, Latin America is the region that best reflects the pattern of electoral systems in the third-wave democracies, with the proportion of PR systems slightly higher than average.

How do the electoral systems transform the votes into seats in the third-wave democratic elections? Data from Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1 indicate that the average value of disproportionality in majoritarian electoral systems is significantly higher than that in mixed systems and PR systems. This speaks to the conventional wisdom that PR electoral systems generate more proportional representation whereas majoritarian systems distort the vote-seat share in a drastic way (e.g. Gallagher 1991; Gallagher 2006; Lijphart and Grofman 1984; Lijphart 1999b; Powell 2006). Examining the data, I find that proportionality of representation in some PR systems is extraordinary. In democracies such as Uruguay, South Africa and Honduras, parties have nearly identical vote to seat parity. This is not to argue that PR produces perfect representation. In fact, democracies with PR systems, such as Russia, Croatia, Moldova and Macedonia, have relatively high levels of disproportionality. On the other hand, democracies with majoritarian electoral systems, such as Malawi, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Fiji, are fairly proportional. What is shown here (Figure 3.1) is the big picture that, in general, PR systems are more likely associated with low level of disproportionality and the effects of electoral systems on representation is generally present in the third-wave democracies.

³⁴ Democracies with mixed systems include Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.


Table 3.2: Electoral Systems in the Third-wave Democracies (2006)

	Majoritarian System	Mixed System	PR system	Total
Africa	12 (48.00%)	6 (24.00%)	7 (28.00%)	25
Asia	10 (58.82%)	5 (17.30%)	2 (11.76%)	17
Latin America	11 (35.48%)	8 (25.81%)	12 (38.71%)	31
CEE	0 (0.0%)	7 (35.00%)	13 (65.00%)	20
The third-wave	34 (36.96%)	25 (27.17%)	33 (35.87%)	93

Table 3.3: Electoral Systems and Disproportionality in the Third-wave Democracies

	Majoritarian System	Mixed System ³⁵	PR System
Ave Disproportionality	15.43	10.31	7.97
SD Disproportionality	6.11	5.09	4.53
Min	3.80	1.16	0.49
Max	29.67	22.72	18.80

Figure 3.1: Disproportionality by Electoral Systems in 92 Third-wave Democracies




³⁵ The calculation for the mixed system category was done by deleting an outlier: Lesotho has an average disproportionality reaching 42.68, which is caused by the extreme high value of disproportionality in the 1998 election, 76.75. Including the case of Lesotho, the average is 11.72, SD 8.19, Minimum 29.67 and maximum 42.68.

Electoral Systems and Party Systems

Duverger's law is, perhaps, the most well-known proposition in comparative politics. It specifies that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favors two party systems," but, for mechanical and psychological reasons, PR and two-ballot systems encourage multiparty systems (Duverger 1954, 217-34; Lijphart 1999b, 165). Numerous institutional studies have, either theoretically and empirically, addressed this "sociological law."

The data from 92 third-wave democracies demonstrate (Figure 3.2 and 3.3) the Duvergerian effects to some extent, but simultaneously indicate the complex relationships between electoral systems and party systems in those newly-transitioned democracies. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, democracies with majoritarian electoral systems have less effective parties in the legislature than those in mixed and PR systems. The average ENP of seats in majoritarian systems is 2.39 (min 1.42 ~ max 4.76), compared with 3.45 (1.56~ 6.67) in mixed systems and 3.76 (1.86~9.1) in PR systems. The significant differences in numbers of effective parties suggest that the relationship between electoral and party systems in the third-wave democracies resembles a similar pattern in the Western established democracies. Majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to be associated with low numbers of effective parties, whereas the PR system produces multiparty systems (e.g. Gaines 1999; Lijphart 1999b; Taagepera and Shugart 1993). The slope of disproportionality on ENP in the graph (Figure 3.3) illustrates that multiparty systems decrease disproportionality. The pattern remains, even after I break down the data by region.

Figure 3.2: Party Systems and Electoral Families in 92 Third-wave Democracies³⁶



³⁶ The outlier, Georgia, is deleted in this graph. The effective numbers of parties in Georgian legislature after 1995 and 1999 elections are extremely high, 45.94 and 98.11 respectively.

Figure 3.3: Electoral Systems and Effective Parties (Seats) in 92 Third-Wave Democracies




Figure 3.3 also shows that a block of small-sized Caribbean democracies under two-party systems are typical majoritarian democracies with high disproportionality (see Figure 3.3, the up-left quadrant). For the rest of the Latin American democracies, the Brazilian party system, unsurprisingly, is one of the most fragmented political systems on earth (Nicolau 2004). Its average number of effective parties in the legislature reaches 7.42. PR systems in Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua and Colombia produce high levels of proportional representation. Excluding the Caribbean mini democracies, Latin America generally enjoys a fairly low level of disproportionality. In Africa, a majority of democracies have less than two and half parties, which echoes the previous findings of



dominant party systems in African politics (e.g. Bogaards 2008; Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2007; Lindberg 2007b; Manning 2005), Benin, an outlying case, is an exception that is characterized by unusually high numbers of effective parties and proportional representation. (I discuss Benin's power-sharing system in Chapter VI.) In Asia and the Pacific region, party systems are generally more fragmented than those in Africa, despite a higher percentage of majoritarian electoral systems. For instance, Thailand, normally averaging around six parties in the legislature, is among the most fragmented democracies in the world. (I discuss Thai democracy in Chapter VII.) The Central and Eastern European region produces a group of typical multiparty democracies. With a mean ENP value of five, the post-communist bloc presents a fairly high level of proportional representation. In terms of electoral representation, young democracies, such as Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia and Romania, belong to the most power-sharing systems in the third-wave new democracies (see Figure 3.3, low-right quadrant). Later, I illustrate that, from the perspective of the executive-legislative relationship, power-sharing is typical in this group of democracies. In short, data in Figure 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that in the third-wave democracies, electoral systems have an impact on the numbers of effective parties in the legislature and multiparty systems promote a high level of proportionality in representation, which speaks to the findings in Western democracies (e.g. Lijphart 1999b, 169).


However, the overview does not simplify the relationship between electoral systems and party systems in the third-wave democracies. Although the big picture is largely consistent with "Duverger's law," complications appear when we examine individual cases.

Figure 3.4 demonstrates the relationship between disproportionality and the ENP of seats, conditioned on electoral systems in 92 third-wave democracies. In democracies with majoritarian electoral systems, highly-fragmented party systems are discovered in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, India, Liberia and Malawi. On one hand, these are typical multiethnic and multilingual states. Deep ethnic divisions in the societies limit the engineering effects of majoritarian electoral systems. Unifying political forces are negated.³⁷ On the other hand, democracies like Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands exercise weak party politics. Political parties are poorly organized and play relatively weak roles in election campaigns. For example, in Papua New Guinean elections, around half of the candidates are elected as independents (see Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001).

³⁷ Listed here are countries with British colonial history, which usually adopt majoritarian electoral systems. Nevertheless, history heritage may not be the sole reason for the choice of electoral systems. Existing social cleavages could be another one. These countries in fact are also multiethnic and multilingual countries. From this perspective, we have an endogeneity problem. Social cleavages could be both the reason and the consequence of certain electoral rules. Theoretically, it could be argued that, without majoritarian electoral systems, the fragmentation of political systems could be even worse. However, it is also not unreasonable to argue that the deep social cleavages restrain the institutional effects of electoral systems.

Figure 3.4: Disproportionality and Party Systems in 92 Third-wave Democracies, Conditioned on Electoral Systems





Moreover, as indicated by the increasing slope in Figure 3.4.3, democracies with PR electoral systems neither encourage multiparty systems consistently nor promote proportional representation effectively. African democracies such as South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia are characteristically one-party dominance regimes (ENP of seats less than 1.5), but their representation is fairly proportional. On the contrary, Cape Verde, Honduras and Costa Rica are well representative of the combination of PR electoral systems and two-party politics. These democracies apparently falsify “Duverger’s law” by presenting evidence of electoral systems that produce only constrained effects. The dispersed cases in Figure 3.4.2 suggest an indecisive connection between mixed electoral systems and party systems in the democracies with mixed systems, although multiparty systems do slightly decrease the level of disproportionality. Among this category of democracies, we observe the one-party dominant Senegal

democracy, the two-party regimes of Albania and Guyana, along with extremely fragmented democracies including Thailand, Ecuador and Bolivia. Mixed electoral systems exist in proportional representation democracies such as Taiwan and El Salvador, but also in highly disproportional democracies such as Madagascar and Armenia.

Overall, data on electoral systems and party systems from 92 third-wave democracies indicate that electoral systems, in general, significantly affect proportionality of representation and party systems. PR systems decrease disproportionality and increase ENP of seats in the legislature. However, the engineering effects of electoral systems are restricted. The co-existence of majoritarian systems and multiparty politics, or PR systems and dominant party politics indicates the complex relationships between electoral and party systems. The performance of “Duverger’s Law” requires further exploration in the third wave democracies.

Executive Power and the Legislative-executive Relations

Although more than two-thirds of the 92 third-wave democracies are presidential systems or semi-presidential systems, the pattern varies from region to region. Excluding Caribbean parliamentary democracies, presidentialism prevails in Southern Latin America. Africa is another region where presidential systems dominate. The Pacific democracies mostly belong to the parliamentary type, but new East Asia and Southeast Asia democracies favor presidentialism. The Central and Eastern European democracies mostly choose semi-presidentialism and reject the idea of an independently elected president (Tavits 2009).

Table 3.4: Types of Electoral Winning in 33 Third-wave Parliamentary Democracies


Type of Cabinet	Frequency	Percentage
Minimal winning, one-party	123	55.66%
Minimal winning, coalition	23	10.41%
Minority, one-party	12	5.42%
Minority coalition	25	11.31%
Oversized coalition	38	17.19%
Total	221	100.00%

As before, I measure executive power in parliamentary systems with a minimal coalition percentage for a given democracy. The higher the percentage, the less power-sharing a system is. The rationale is that the minimal winning coalition requires the least negotiation among parties during the process of policy making (e.g. Adrian and Press 1968; Koehler 1975; Lijphart 1999b; Pritchard and Slinko 2006). For example, a one-party minority government needs the opposition party or party coalition for a majority support on bills. Thus, different from the one-party majority government, the ruling party must include additional parties into the policy-making process, thereby sharing power through inter-party bargaining. For 221 elections held in 33 third-wave parliamentary democracies (see Table 3.4), the one-party majority government constitutes the majority of all types of electoral winning, which is much higher than the percentage in established democracies (see Lijphart 1999, 98). It is notable that of these 33 parliamentary democracies, 12 are Caribbean mini-parliamentary systems. Typically they have had one-party majority governments since the 1970s. Their presence contributes considerably to the high percentage of one-party majority governments.

The frequency of annual cabinet changes is used to gauge the relationship between legislative and executive branches in parliamentary systems. A low frequency

of cabinet changes implies a high level of concentration in the executive branch. Cabinets in parliamentary democracies, on average, change 0.47 times annually. Cabinet changes are much more frequent (0.70 annually) in semi-presidential systems. The dual executive, with joint service by a president and a prime minister, constitutes greater power-sharing because it incorporates more actors in politics. This is especially true in the status of “cohabitation” when the president and prime minister are elected from different parties. However, at the same time, the semi-presidential system, with power dispersed within the executive branch, results in less stable executive power. The possible combination of cohabitation and divided government entails the status with the least power concentration on the executive body in presidential systems.

Figure 3.5: Cabinet Change and the Type of Cabinet in the Third-wave Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies



Concentrated on the up-left quadrant in Figure 3.5, are the Caribbean mini-parliamentary democracies. As a group they are typical majoritarian democracies in which one-party majority cabinets ensure strong executive power and relationships between the legislative and executive branches are balanced. In addition, two African democracies, Mozambique and Cape Verde appear in the category. In contrast, dominant and steady parties are lacking in democracies such as Albania, Pakistan, Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Papua New Guinea (low-right quadrant) where there is power diffusion among parties and governmental bodies. However, the majority of parliamentary and mixed democracies, clustered at the center of the graph, fall between typical power-sharing and power-concentrating systems.

Presidential systems concentrate decision-making power in the chief executive. In general, once a country chooses the presidential system, the president is fairly powerful. More than 80 percent of the presidential/semi-presidential democracies endow the president with at least five kinds of power. But there are some semi-presidential regimes in which presidential powers are relatively weak. These are mostly in the Central and Eastern European new democracies. For example, the Bulgarian president only has discretionary appointment powers and a veto power. The presidents in Lithuania and Macedonia are slightly more powerful, with an additional power in foreign policy making (Siaroff 2003, 299-300). There are some Central and Eastern European presidents who are independently elected but play largely symbolic roles in politics. In Slovakia the president only chairs cabinet meetings. The Slovenian president holds none of the substantive powers identified by Siaroff (Siaroff 2003, 300-303). Very recent research on the independent selection of presidents in parliamentary systems shows that

the mode of presidential elections has no significant effect on the function of parliamentary systems (Tavits 2009, 1).

The indicator used to measure the legislative-executive relationship under presidentialism is divided government. The mean percentage of divided government in all third-wave presidential systems is 0.59. It means that in a presidential democracy, on average in fifty-nine percent of the cases, different parties control the government bodies. Considering the entire sample until 2006, only in five democracies (Cape Verde, Nigeria, Namibia, Kenya and Mozambique) were there never any divided governments. This clearly indicates a lack of power-sharing in those democracies. Twenty percent of presidential governments have always been divided ever since the democratic transition, including Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, South Korea and Malawi. The persistent status of divided government in these democracies can be explained by the fragmented party systems that prevent any party (including the president's party) from winning the majority in the legislative elections.

Figure 3.6: Divided Government and Presidential Power in the Third-wave Presidential and Semi-presidential Democracies




Figure 3.6 graphs the presidential systems on two dimensions: divided government and presidential power. Regimes located in the lower-right quadrant are power-concentrating democracies. Some young African democracies, including Mozambique, Kenya, Senegal, Namibia and Nigeria, belong to this category. On the other side the continuum, democracies in the upper-left quadrant lean more toward power-sharing. Several semi-presidential systems such as Lithuania, Romania, and Malawi fall into this group, which echoes the findings in Figure 3.5. Most Latin American democracies grant the presidents strong powers. However, fragmented party systems usually lead to divided governments in Latin American politics. The division between the executive and legislative bodies, with multiple parties sitting in the legislature, makes it extremely hard for the executive branch to fully control policy-

making. The combination of presidentialism and multiparty systems makes ruling difficult (Mainwaring 1993). Overall, Latin American democracies are more power-sharing than African one-party dominant democracies. At the same time they are more power-concentrating than those semi-presidential systems in Central and Eastern Europe, where the executive bodies can be divided and the presidents are usually less powerful.

Conclusion

To summarize, examining the third-wave democracies by large-N analyses does reveal the impact of electoral rules on party systems. However, the engineering effects in concrete cases are complex. “Duverger’s law” does not apply exclusively to the western countries. It can be extended to the non-Western setting, but not without caveats.

Electoral institutions do appear to shape party systems in the third-wave democracies, but it is imperative not to exaggerate their consequences. The impact of Duverger’s law on party systems in the third-wave democracies requires further exploration. In terms of the constitutional type, presidential or semi-presidential systems are popular but different in the third-wave democracies. Presidentialism is usually associated with strong executive powers, but semi-presidentialism means power-sharing with dual executive powers.

Overall, third-wave democracies reveal regional patterns in terms of the level of power-sharing. New democracies in Central and Eastern Europe enjoy a rather high level of power-sharing, in which not only electoral systems lead to proportional representation but the distribution of powers among the executive and legislative bodies helps spread the powers to multiple parties and social groups. In contrast, African democracies favor power-concentrating institutions with strong presidencies accompanied by one-party dominance. In Latin American democracies, except for the Caribbean mini-majoritarian

democracies, powers are largely dispersed among presidency and legislature as well as various parties. However, different from the constitutional choice of semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe, South America favors typical presidentialism which strongly empowers the president. Asian democracies have diverse institutional arrangements. This is a region lacking a distinctive regional feature.

Having shown patterns of political institutions in the third-wave democracies, in the next chapter I proceed by using large-N methods to examine how institutions influence democratic development.

Chapter IV

The Impact of Power-sharing Institutions on Democratic Development

“Power-sharing means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive level.”

Arend Lijphart (2002: 39)

The fundamental purpose of this institutional study is to gauge the consequences that institutional arrangements have upon the progress of democratic development. The critical question for this study is how the level of power-sharing or power-concentration, as exemplified in the institutional arrangements, affects democratic improvement in the third-wave new democracies. Such improvement should be evident in the objective level of democracy and in citizen satisfaction with democracy. I begin by using nested analysis (Lieberman 2005) to estimate the impact of political institutions on the third-wave democratic evolution. I first employ the large-N statistical approach to identify how electoral systems, party systems, executive power and the legislative-executive relationships generally affect the new democracies' development. This chapter concentrates on the general consequences of institutional arrangements upon the level of democracy. The next chapter explores the institutional effects on citizen's subjective evaluations of democracy. Then, in Chapter VI and Chapter VII, based on the residuals of democracies predicted by large-N studies, I pick typical power-sharing and power-

concentrating cases to demonstrate in detail the mechanisms of how power institutions facilitate or impede democratic development.

Theoretical Mechanisms Linking Power-sharing to Democratization

Chapter II has discussed that power-sharing institutions have both positive and negative consequences on democratic development. Theoretically, by including as many actors as possible into politics, power-sharing institutions have the strength to improve representation (Blais and Massicotte 1996; 2002, 62), mediate electoral losers' frustration (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Hakhverdian and Koop 2007) and facilitate political participation (Blais and Carty 1990; Jackman and Miller 1995; Tavits 2004). However, at the same time, power-sharing institutions can be detrimental to democracy because they may enlarge ethnic divisions by reinforcing minority identity (Elkins and Sides 2007; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004; Norris 2004). They may impede the formation of unified political opposition by fragmenting party systems (Jung and Shapiro 1995; Koelble and Reynolds 1996; Mainwaring 1993). Moreover, a lower level of "clarity of responsibility" in power-sharing democracies makes it harder for voters to hold the elected politicians accountable for their policy choices (e.g. Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Powell and Whitten 1993; Samuels 2004; Tavits 2007; Whitten and Palmer 1999).

So, which institutionalization best serves development in the third-wave democracies? No easy answer is apparent. But, I argue that for stabilizing democracy and preventing its breakdown in newly-transitioned democracies, it is vital that political actors share power. I do not argue that power-sharing institutions are sufficient to maintain democracy, nor that sharing power makes democracy work effectively. Instead,

I argue that if the institutions of emerging democracies are designed to concentrate power in one single group, that will usually lead to the collapse of such democratic regimes.

“Democracy...rests upon compromise” (Dahl 2006, 4). To make democracy work, political actors need to be willing to negotiate and bargain over the allocation of resources rather than resorting to street violence. To present social groups the incentives to compromise, it is essential to provide them institutional possibilities to actualize their interests through democratic competition. The institutional opportunity to access power is especially significant for newly-transitioned democracies. In the third-wave democracies which have made the recent democratic transition, initially the level of institutionalization of political systems is relatively low (e.g. Lindberg 2007b; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Thames 2007), which implies that in the long run political outcomes in the long run are much less predictable. Given limited experience with democratic elections, political elites and citizens are less committed to democratic values (e.g. Mattes and Bratton 2007; Shin 2007; Welzel 2007). Thus, political actors would lack patience and tend to demand access to power immediately after elections. In this case, power-sharing arrangements give everyone more leverage to stay in the game of democracy. To put it differently, the institutional design which empowers various political actors by allowing broad representation in the legislature and access to executive power is an effective way to make political actors favor democratic elections over non-democratic approaches in realizing their interests. From this perspective, sharing power among diverse groups is crucial to make *new* democracies work. Nevertheless, the willingness of the political actors to stay in democratic competition does not necessarily guarantee the quality of governance. A regime with competitive democratic elections

does not automatically produce an accountable government with its rule of law, efficient government and high economic growth (also see Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner 1999, 1).³⁸ Whereas I argue a power-sharing structure facilitates democratic development in the third-wave new democracies, I do not argue that power-sharing systems certainly make democracy work exceptionally on every aspect of governance. Here, with my focus on the level of democratic development in general, I hypothesize:

In the third-wave transitional democracies with power-sharing systems characterized by proportional representation, multi-party systems and balanced legislative-executive power relationships are more favorable for democratic development.

Research Design

There are different ways to measure the level of democratic development. It is generally agreed that a consolidated democracy is a regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives (and disincentives) has become, in a phrase, "the only game in town" (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schedler 1998, 2001). Because my purpose is to measure the democratic development in an objective sense, I considered using the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which develops a "status index [of] democracy" in all transitional democracies. However, as a recent project, it lacks the data of transitional democracies

³⁸ I make the differentiation between the level of democratic development and the quality of governance. Unusually, the measure of democratic development focuses on political contestation and citizens' rights in political participation (such as Freedom House scores and the Polity Data), whereas the quality of governance refers to the dimensions including accountability, rule of law, the control of corruption and so on (see Governance Matters data, World Bank 2009, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>). The relationship between institutional arrangements and the quality of democracy yields different causal mechanisms.

in early years and does not provide the data of democratic levels over time. Considering the time-span of my sample, I selected the conventional Freedom House scores³⁹ to measure the level of democratic development. Freedom House has complete democracy scores around the world since 1972.⁴⁰ In my calculations I flipped the original Freedom House values so that higher scores indicate higher level of democratic development.

As identified and documented in Chapter III, the four independent variables used there include electoral systems, party systems, the executive power and the legislative-executive relationship. For the analysis in this chapter, I included as control variables several that are known in the literature to affect democratic development. Two more institutional variables are considered. The effects of *federalism* on democratic consolidation are significant but the empirical results are mixed (e.g. Boix, 2003; Myerson, 2006; Treisman, 2000). I control for *federalism* according to whether the “state or province government is locally elected” (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh 2001). The variable ranges from 0 to 2 with higher scores indicating higher levels of decentralization. *Bicameralism* is another relevant institutional factor (e.g. Druckman and Thies 2002; Heller 1997; Tsebelis and Money 1997). Legislatures with two chambers are coded as “1”, otherwise “0”. Modernization theorists show that *socio-economic development* significantly influences democratization (e.g. Boix and Stokes

³⁹ Polity IV score is an alternative measurement for the level of democracy; But, like BTI data, most Caribbean states are missing from the data. I use both to check the robustness of models. Presented models use freedom house scores as dependent variable, which ensures the most complete data for my sample.

⁴⁰ Some scholars use a dichotomous variable to measure whether a democracy is consolidated or not. A consolidated democracy is that had at least two power turnovers since the opening election (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Huntington 1993; Power and Gasiorowski 1997). However, since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in 1974, a vast majority of the democracies included here have made two-power turnovers, which will leave the dependent variable constant in my models. Thus, it is not a valid measurement any more.

2003; Lipset 1959; Przeworski 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). To fit the statistical models, I logged the indicator of socioeconomic development, GDP per capita, from the World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2008). *Ethnic fractionalization* of the society also makes differences (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg 2003; Norris 2008b). The data, from Alesina's 2003 article, measured global ethnic fractionalization. The final control is *population*. Evidence shows that a large population brings more pressure on resource allocation, economic development, political mobilization and participation. All these make consolidating democracy more difficult (Bendix, 1968; Tsai, 2006).

To consider two datasets that are different in nature, I chose dissimilar modeling strategies. For the country-election dataset, an unbalanced panel dataset, I conducted a Time Series analysis using Panel Corrected Standard Errors model with correction for Ar(1) errors (Beck and Katz 1995).⁴¹ I conducted maximum likelihood estimation by employing Ordinary Least Square (OLS) linear regressions with robust standard error for the cross-country dataset. I first conducted regressions to test the impact of presidentialism *per se* by including all cases. Then, I tested key variables of power-sharing institutions in parliamentary systems and presidential systems respectively. The linear equations are different due to the distinctive measures in parliamentary and presidential systems:

⁴¹ I didn't choose the fixed effect model because some institutional variables are constant for given countries which will be dropped out in fixed effect models. This is because differencing method in the fixed effect modes is peculiar, which is to control the country specific effect by subtracting the average of each country (e.g. Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan 1982).

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1(Lsq) + \beta_2(EPNs) + \beta_3(Minimal\ Winning\ Coalition) + \beta_4(Cabinet\ change) + \dots + \beta_n X_i$$

(Equation in Parliamentary Systems)

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1(Lsq) + \beta_2(EPNs) + \beta_3(President\ Power) + \beta_4(Divided\ Government) + \dots + \beta_n X_i$$

(Equation in Presidential Systems)

Table 4.1: Presidentialism and Democratic Development in the Third-wave Democracies (Country Analysis)

	Country Analysis OLS Model		
	Model A1	Model A 2	Model A 3
Disproportionality	-.064 (.024)**	-.062 (.025)***	-.066 (.023)***
Effective Numbers of Parties(ENP)	-.040 (.071)	-.114 (.036)***	-.086 (.042)**
Presidentialism ⁴²	-.389 (.335)	-1.38 (.547)**	-1.63 (.563)***
ENP*Presidentialism		.327 (.112)***	.331 (.108)***
Federalism	.412 (.341)	.291 (.350)	.332 (.363)
Bicameralism	.516 (.304)*	.356 (.302)	.274 (.325)
British Colony	.017 (.395)	-.088 (.377)	-.216 (.352)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.16 (.856)	- 1.03 (.853)	-1.55 (.931)
GDP per capita (logged)	.752 (.213)***	.741 (.220)***	.925 (.283)***
Population (logged)	-.332 (.092)***	-.376 (.090)***	-.339 (.092)***
Africa			.884 (.528)*
Central and Eastern Europe			-.259 (.591)
Latin America			.162 (.494)
Constant	6.31 (2.26)***	7.10 (2.388)***	5.34 (2.79)**
R-square	0.5273	0.5712	0.5918
Observation	86	86	86

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses * $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed.

⁴² Here presidentialism refers to the pure presidential systems. It does not include the semi-presidentialism systems.

Table 4.2: Presidentialism and Democratic Development in the Third-wave Democracies (Country-election Analysis)

	Country-election Analysis PCSE Ar (1) model		
	Model B1	Model B2	Model B3
Disproportionality	-.040 (.009)***	-.042 (.009)***	-.043 (.010)***
Effective Numbers of Parties(ENP) Presidentialism ⁴³	-.013 (.016)	.023 (.017)	-.020 (.017)
ENP*Presidentialism	.216 (.209)	.451 (.321)	-.849 (.325)***
Federalism	.602 (.148)	-.200 (.062)***	.223 (.060)***
Bicameralism	.497 (.213)	.519 (.151)***	.462 (.155)***
British Colony	.497 (.213)*	.262 (.150)*	.147 (.155)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.497 (.213)*	.566 (.207)***	.476 (.242)**
GDP per capita (logged)	-1.81 (.370)***	-1.99 (.368)***	-2.55 (.440)***
Population (logged)	.830 (.118)***	.780 (.112)***	.808 (.135)***
Africa	-.313 (.059)***	-.309 (.057)***	-.241 (.057)***
Central and Eastern Europe			.978 (.338)***
Latin America			.172 (.295)
Constant	.579 (.230)**	4.85 (1.21)***	5.43 (1.17)***
R-square	4.655 (1.289)***	0.4067	0.4220
Observation	382	382	382

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses * $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed.

⁴³ Here presidentialism refers to the pure presidential systems. It does not include the semi-presidentialism systems.

Table 4.3: Conditional Coefficients of Presidentialism Conditioned on Effective Numbers of Parties

Effective Numbers of Parties (ENP)	Model A3	Model B3
1	-1.31 (.494)**	-.626 (.287)**
2	-0.969 (.440)**	-.403 (.257)*
3	-.638 (.409)	-.180 (.238)
4	-.307 (.405)	.042 (.235)
5	.023 (.429)	.265 (.246)

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses * $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed.

Analysis and Discussion

Presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 are the effects of the variable of presidentialism itself. Table 4.1 contains the models based on cross-country data; Table 4.2 is based on country-election data. In Model A1 and B1, the interaction between party systems and presidentialism is not considered. Neither the variable of effective numbers of parties (ENP) nor the dummy variable of presidentialism obtains statistical significance, which indicates neither party systems nor the constitutional type *per se* have independent influences on democratic development. However, when considering the interactive effects of party systems and presidentialism, not only do the interaction terms gain significance in both cross-country models and country-election models, but the significance of ENP and Presidentialism emerges. To interpret the coefficients of Presidentialism conditioning on the effective numbers of parties, we need to calculate the conditional coefficients of Presidentialism. Based on Model A3 and B3 (Regional effects are controlled), the conditional coefficients are calculated and listed in Table 4.3. Table 4.3 shows that presidentialism has a significant negative effect on democratic development when a dominant party or two-party systems is present. With the increase of effective party numbers, the effect of presidentialism loses significance. This result challenges the argument that the difficult combination of presidentialism and multiparty systems is fatal to democratic survival (Gasirowski and Power 1998; Mainwaring 1993). On the contrary, this study indicates it is one-dominant party or two-party systems combined with presidentialism that is detrimental to democratic improvement. The possible explanation is that a strong presidency with a dominant party usually leads to power monopolization in the government, thus damaging the improvement of democracy.

In short, Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 do not demonstrate “the perils of presidentialism” (e.g. Linz 1990). The impact of presidentialism is conditioned on the party systems. The combination of presidentialism and dominant parties especially damage democratic development.

In Model A3 (Table 4.1) and Model B3 (Table 4.2), the possible regional effect is considered. Using the Asian region as the baseline region in both models, Africa gains statistical significance. When compared with Asia, Africa is more likely to witness democratic progress. This is interesting given the underdeveloped socioeconomic status in African democracies in general. Central and Eastern Europe does not show important regional advantages in democratization. It appears that democratic development in Central and Eastern Europe is largely captured by the other variables incorporated in the models. Only a slight regional effect is found in Model B3 for Latin America. Africa is the only region in which democratization is facilitated by some peculiar *African* elements despite lacking the requisites for democracy.

Table 4.4: Institutions and Democratic Development in the Third-wave Parliamentary Systems

	Country Analysis	Country- election Analysis
	OLS Model A4	PCSE Ar(1) Model B4
Disproportionality	-.011 (.034)	-.021 (.010)**
Effective Numbers of Parties (ENP)	.444 (.214)**	.202 (.104)**
Minimal Winning Coalition	-1.31 (.507)**	-.111 (.084)
Cabinet Change Frequency	-3.58 (.735)***	-.148 (.134)
Federalism	.780 (.690)	.717 (.259)***
Bicameralism	-.102 (.530)	-.541 (.208)**
British Colony	1.38 (.749)**	1.91 (.446)***
Ethnic Fractionalization	-.589 (1.189)	-1.91 (.623)***
GDP per capita (logged)	.797 (.337)**	.653 (.237)***
Population (logged)	-.155 (.089)**	-.156 (.087)*
Constant	4.126 (3.14)	4.30 (2.18)**
R-square	0.8043	0.4223
Observation	30	148

*Model A4 is OLS regressions with robust standard error. Model B4 is Panel Corrected Standard Error model with correction for AR(1) errors. Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses * $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table 4.5: Institutions and Democratic Development in the Third-wave Presidential Systems

	Country Analysis	Country- election Analysis
	OLS Model A5	PCSE Ar(1) Model B5
Disproportionality	.023 (.026)	-.069 (.027)**
Effective Numbers of Parties (ENP)	.335 (.152)**	-.021 (.007)
Presidential Power	-.163 (.114)*	-.063 (.109)
Divided Government	.755 (.732)	.771 (.214)***
Federalism	.329 (.529)	.329 (.356)
Bicameralism	1.02 (.414)	.427 (.236)*
British Colony	-.179 (.633)	.526 (.605)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-2.68 (1.22)**	-1.31 (.596)**
GDP per capita (logged)	.376 (.377)	.561 (.238)**
Population (logged)	-.438 (.192)**	-.460 (.111)***
Constant	9.50 (4.22)**	8.85 (2.62)**
R-square	0.7203	0.4463
Observation	44	156

*Model A5 is OLS regressions with robust standard error. Model B5 is Panel Corrected Standard Error model with correction for AR(1) errors. Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses * $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed.

In Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the Models explain the varying levels of democracy within parliamentary and presidential systems respectively.⁴⁴ In general, the models give fairly strong support for the hypothesis that power-sharing institutional arrangements are favorable to democratic development in the third-wave democracies.

Specifically, in regard to electoral rules, negative coefficients of disproportionality across all models consistently indicate that higher degrees of proportional representation are conducive to democratization. An electoral system that highly distorts the vote share hurts democracy significantly in both parliamentary and presidential systems. However, we need to be careful about the interpretation pertaining to the effects of the electoral rules. The results here do not immediately suggest that PR rules more significantly contribute to democratization than the majority rules do. The data show that countries with PR electoral systems do have a much lower level of disproportionality than those with majority rules (see the analysis in Chapter III),⁴⁵ however, substituting disproportionality with PR or majority rules as dummy variables in the models do not give statistical significance to the variable of electoral rules themselves. The relationship between electoral rules and democratic development is more complicated than a linear relationship. This echoes the findings in the Chapter III (see the discussion on “electoral system and disproportionality”) that PR systems do not necessarily promote proportional representation and majoritarian systems do not

⁴⁴ For all models, I conduct a series of robustness test, including detecting potential outliers, employing robust regressions, using alternative dependent variables on democratization (Polity IV scores, BTI). The tests show that, despite minor changes of coefficient values, the direction of all keys variables’ coefficients and statistical significance are largely consistent, in the sense that a power-sharing structure in general is more favorable to democratic development.

⁴⁵ The average degree of disproportionality in majority system is 15.68, mixed system 11.94 and PR 7.79.

consistently lower the level of disproportionality. Therefore, the precise interpretation on the coefficients of disproportionality is that democracy suffers when the number of party seats is disproportional to the party's number of popular votes.

The different direction of coefficients of the effective numbers of parties in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 demonstrates dissimilar patterns of the impact by political parties in parliamentary and presidential systems. The positive coefficients of the effective numbers of parties in Table 4.4 indicate that multi-party systems benefit parliamentary systems strongly. This is quite consistent with the pro-power-sharing arguments. Parliamentary systems have characteristics of fused powers between executive and legislative bodies. The cabinet is constructed by the winner(s) of legislative elections, which implies that the one-party majority in the legislature gives few chances to the opposition to control any branches in the government. Therefore, to diffuse the powers in parliamentary systems, multi-party systems that represent various societal groups are of critical importance. Usually, the sign of power-sharing in parliamentary systems is coalition governments. In Table 4.4, the positive coefficients of ENP (seats in the legislatures) in parliamentary systems vividly indicate sharing power among parties significantly facilitates democratic development in the third-wave parliamentary systems.

Whereas multi-party systems facilitate parliamentary systems, they do not necessarily impede presidential systems. The significant positive coefficients of ENP in cross-country models (Model A5) suggests that in general, multiple party systems help democratization, although the effect is much weaker in presidential systems than that in parliamentary systems. In Model B5, effective party numbers have a negative effect but no statistical significance, which echoes the interactive effects between presidential

systems and presidential systems, as reported in Table 4.3. The combination of multi-party systems and presidentialism is not necessarily detrimental to democratic stability.

Compared with parliamentary systems, presidentialism with separation of powers provides the chance for the opposition party (parties) to control one of the branches, legislature or presidency, even when they lose the other. This is a story of divided government. In Model B5, the positive coefficients of dividend government give strong support to pro-power-sharing argument. In other words, a divided government, which is regarded as more power-sharing than a united government in presidential systems, is associated with higher level of democratic development. This counterintuitive finding makes sense under the power-sharing framework. It fits with recent findings that executive-legislative relationships in divided governments do not affect the stability of presidential regimes (e.g. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Cheibub 2002); it even facilitates democratic consolidation as it is more power-sharing.⁴⁶

With regard to the executive power in presidential regimes, presidents with strong powers are obstacles to democratic improvement (Model A5, Model B5), which is not a new story (e.g. Beliaev 2006; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Lehoucq 2000; Treisman 2007). Model A4 and B4 (Table 4.4) show that in parliamentary systems, minimal winning coalitions, which require the least negation among parties, do not help democratic development as shown in Again, this confirms the power-sharing arguments. Table 4.4 also shows that frequent cabinet reshuffles in parliamentary systems impair democracy progress. This is intuitively reasonable but makes cabinet change the only variable that

⁴⁶ To note, democratic consolidation is conceptually different from the quality of democracy as I argued above. Divided government may prevent a democracy from breaking down by giving opposition parties a second chance, but this by no means suggests that a divided government is promising for a highly efficient democracy.

does not support the argument for power-sharing. One possible interpretation is that cabinet change (measured as more than half of the ministers in the cabinet are replaced) is a poor measure of the power relationship between legislative and executive branches. A cabinet reshuffle does not necessarily lead to a change of party composition. In this case, cabinet change measures the stability of executive branch itself more than its relationship with the legislature. To examine the impact of legislative-executive relationship, we need a more accurate measure.

Regarding the control variables, socioeconomic development, as modernization theorists have long argued, proves to constantly contribute to democratic development. British colonial heritage helps democratization, especially in parliamentary systems, which makes sense because democracies with British colonial heritage mostly chose parliamentary systems. As expected, ethnic diversity as well as large populations hurt democratization. Lastly, decentralization assists the improvement of democratization, which is actually in agreement with pro-power-sharing literature. However, but the impact of bicameralism is mixed. To summarize, a series of regression models largely lend solid support to the pro-power-sharing arguments. The revealed positive relationship between power-sharing institutions and democratization level echoes Lijphart's findings in established Western democracies.

Chapter V

Power-sharing Institutions and Democratic Satisfaction

The civic Culture and open polity...represent the great and problematic gifts of the West... can the open polity and the civic culture...man's discovery of humane and conservative way to hand social change and participation---spread as well?

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963:7)

This chapter investigates the effects of power-sharing institutions including proportional representation, multiple party systems and presidentialism on democratic satisfaction in the third-wave new democracies. Whereas political institutions consistently mediate mass attitudes among winners and losers in Western established democracies (Anderson and Guillory 1997), power-sharing institutions have a more complex impact on mass attitudes in the third-wave transitional democracies. This chapter shows that by increasing proportional representation, power-sharing institutions improve satisfaction. More importantly, in new democracies where political systems are less institutionalized, power-sharing institutions fragment political oppositions, impede democratic contestation and hinder democratic consolidation, generally decreasing democratic satisfaction. I also argue in this chapter that divided governments in presidential systems blur the line between winners and losers, thus reducing satisfaction with democracy among winners. Using survey data from “The Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems” (CSES) Module II, I use hierarchical logistic models to test the hypotheses in 14 new democracies. The results largely confirm my hypotheses:

disproportionality, multiparty systems and a low level of institutionalization are consistently associated with a lower likelihood of democratic satisfaction. Whereas political institutions in the third-wave democracies significantly influence electoral winners' attitudes, voters who lose the elections are hardly affected by political institutions.

Introduction

An indispensable factor in consolidating democracies is democratic legitimacy, citizens' genuine support for democracy (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Schedler 2001; Shin 2007). Positive evaluations on democracy smooth the democratization process (e.g. Diamond 1999; Shin 1999) while negative perceptions of democracy as an ideal erode citizens' support for it (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008; Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999). Much research investigates what factors affect citizens' and political elites' attitudes toward democracy. Recently, the burgeoning studies on political institutions have shed light on the importance of institutional designs on mass attitudes (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson 1998; e.g. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Blais and Gelineau 2007; Cho and Bratton 2006; Wells and Kriekhaus 2006). Methodological nuances aside, the findings confirm that institutions significantly influence democratic satisfaction. Power-sharing democracies, what Lijphart calls consensus democracies, mediate the satisfaction gap between electoral winners and losers, with winners usually more likely to evaluate democracy positively (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Nevertheless, these findings are not the end of the analysis. These studies are mostly limited to Western democracies due to Lijphart's sampling of 36 democracies (Lijphart 1994a; 1999a). The limitation in case selection raises a big puzzle within this line of literature.

If in established democracies power-sharing institutional arrangements significantly affect mass attitudes toward democracy, does a similar pattern occur in transitional democracies where political systems are less institutionalized? Second, current investigations of the linkage between institutions and mass attitudes are inadequate. Students either directly borrow Lijphart's numeric measure of consensus democracy as an aggregate-level indicator of powersharing (e.g. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Wells and Kriekhaus 2006) or merely focus on the consequences of electoral systems (e.g. Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). We are left wondering, besides electoral rules, how other institutions, such as party systems, parliamentarism and presidentialism, influence mass attitudes. Does a lower level of institutionalization in transitional democracies alter the mediating effects? These questions about new democracies require theoretical exploration as well as empirical assessment.

This chapter addresses the consequences of institutional indicators, including electoral rules, party systems and presidentialism, on mass democratic satisfaction in transitional systems. I particularly focus on the effects of party systems and presidentialism, which are insufficiently studied in current democratization literature. Taking advantage of the survey data on transitional democracies from "The Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems" (CSES) Module II, I use hierarchical logistic models to test the impact of institutions on mass satisfaction in 14 the third-wave transitional democracies. The results indicate that democratic attitudes are significantly different from those in established democracies. Satisfaction with democracy among winners is not consistently higher than that among losers. At the aggregate level, winners have lower satisfaction in divided presidential systems where separate control of the legislature

and the executive branch blurs the line between winners and losers. Regarding political institutions, disproportionality, multiparty systems and a low level of institutionalization are consistently associated with a lower likelihood of democratic satisfaction. Whereas power-sharing institutions significantly reduce electoral winners' satisfaction with democracy, voters who lose the elections are barely affected by political institutions. Therefore, I reveal a different story about the effect of institutions on democratic satisfaction in transitional democracies.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first reviewed current institutional studies that address democratic satisfaction and then lay out the causal mechanisms between institutions on democratic satisfaction in transitional democracies. In the empirical section, I justify my case selection, analyze the patterns of satisfaction with democracy, and employ multi-level analyses to assess the impact of institutional variables on mass attitudes. I conclude the chapter with findings, unresolved puzzles and suggestions for further studies of political institutions on mass attitudes.

Power-sharing Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy

Democracy is “government by and for the people” (Lijphart 1984; 1999b). Modern representative democracies use elections to choose rulers, turning elections into winner-loser games (Anderson and Guillory 1997, 66). It is argued that power-sharing institutions can systematically mediate attitudes among winners and losers about the democratic process. To put it differently, losers in power-sharing consensus democracies are more likely than those in power-concentrating systems to evaluate democracy positively. Electoral winners tend to be more satisfied with democracy in power-concentrating democracies than those in power-sharing democracies (Aarts and

Thomassen 2008; Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Guillory 1997, 68; Wells and Kriekhaus 2006). There are two theoretical linkages between institutions and attitudes.

First, power-sharing institutions enhance losers' opportunities to participate in the policy process, which reduces the negative consequences of losing an election. Typically, proportional representation substantially increases the chance of representation of minorities in the legislature. In a majoritarian system, minorities are usually excluded from holding any seats. Fairer representation for minorities in power-sharing systems leads to higher satisfaction among losers toward democracy (e.g. Powell and Vanberg 2000; Blais and Massicotte 1996; 2002, 62). Second, citizens' preferences and parties are more likely to be convergent in multiparty systems (Anderson 1998; Huber and Powell Jr 1994; Miller and Listhaug 1990) in that multiparty systems allow for a broader range of party ideology and greater representation of extreme minority groups. Perceived congruent preferences in power-sharing democracies improve citizens' regard for democratic systems. Two-party systems, in contrast, lack the flexibility to allow more parties to represent minorities' interests (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 363), which leads minorities to detach from political systems.

The mediating effects of power-sharing institutions are largely consistent in empirical results from large-N statistical tests to case analyses. Wells and Kriekhaus (2006) utilize multilevel hierarchical modeling and confirm Anderson and Guillory's (1997) conclusion. Cho and Bratton's (2006) analysis on election reform in Lesotho also illustrates the mediating effects of proportional representation among winners and losers. Aarts and Thomassen's (2008) empirical study shows that citizens' perceptions about representativeness rather than about accountability explain why power-sharing

institutions enhance satisfaction with democracies. Although Huang et al.'s (2008) multilevel analysis lends weak support to this line of thought, their models do not invalidate the argument.

Despite the consistency among those empirical findings, questions remain. We do not know whether similar institutional effects occur in emerging democracies. Besides electoral rules, what are the independent effects of parties and party systems? Moreover, the most important institution in power-sharing, presidentialism, has not been addressed well theoretically. The following sections explore answers to these questions.

Multiparty Systems, Presidentialism and Democratic Satisfaction

As the aforementioned studies show, democracies with a low degree of disproportionality generate more democratic satisfaction. However, a vibrant and consolidated democracy is more than just representation. A well-functioning democracy requires active mass participation as well as an effective public opposition in power contestation (Dahl 1971, 1-16). Contestation is ignored in most institution-attitude literature. In fact, scholars who emphasize democratic contestation argue that power-sharing structures produce poorly functioning political opposition and, in turn, engender negative attitudes towards democracy (Anderson 1998; Jung and Shapiro 1995; Koelble and Reynolds 1996; Mainwaring 1993; Weil 1989).

There are several causal mechanisms to explain why power-sharing institutions can possibly reduce democratic satisfaction. First, where consensus-building is emphasized in power-sharing systems, in political bargaining, the incentives are structured toward elite cooperation rather than opposition. Thus, the real political debate is overshadowed because political leaders minimize their differences to build a coalition

(Koelble and Reynolds 1996, 222). In this sense, no genuine opposing opinions are formed and the interests of minorities remain publicly unarticulated even if they are represented in the legislature.

Second, more importantly, because multiparty systems share power among parties, they polarize and fragment the political system. It is argued that extremely polarized party systems generate “poor-functioning” opposition (Weil 1989, 684). Sartori’s “polarized pluralism” model (Sartori 1976) shows extremists are generally positioned “outside” enough to be unacceptable in coalitions but strong enough to block any opposition coalition, which usually leads to political stagnation in the government and frustration of the public. Moreover, the fragmentation of party systems also impedes mass support for democracy. Fragmented party systems complicate the negotiation process among parties each party presents the voters with unclear policy choices. The voters thus have difficulty in keeping the representatives accountable due to a lack of “clarity of responsibility” (Mainwaring 1993; Powell and Whitten 1993; Powell 1982). Furthermore, party defections are not unusual in fragmented systems. It is never easy to maintain both a stabilized governing coalition as well as a solid opposition. Government instability directly threatens the public’s evaluation on democratic performance (Weil 1989, 685).

Problems of opposition could be exacerbated in new democracies where party systems are less institutionalized (e.g. Lindberg 2007b; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Thames 2007). Without well established party organizations rooted in the society, political parties constantly split and merge. High electoral volatility of political parties in new democracies (e.g. Lindberg 2007b; Roberts and Wibbels 1999) further worsens the

chance for coalition formation and even threatens overall democratic stability. From this perspective, multiparty systems are probably not just about representativeness to the public, but, more prominently, are related to the functioning of democracy as a whole. When the public evaluates the democratic performance, the function of multiparty systems in promoting broader and fairer representation could be overshadowed by fragmented political systems and impeded political opposition. Thus, hypothetically, multiple parties in transitional systems weaken mass satisfaction with democracy. Interaction between party systems and the degree of institutionalization could make the effects more salient. Multiparty systems in combination with low institutionalization worsen democratic functioning, which further aggravates voters' negative evaluation toward democracy.

In addition to party systems, the effect of presidentialism on mass preference has not been systematically investigated to date. The literature mostly focuses on Western European parliamentary systems.⁴⁷ Presidentialism is largely missing in those studies. A study on Korean democratic consolidation shows that its presidentialism is partially responsible for Koreans' fragmented support for democracy (Diamond and Shin 2000). Huang et al. (2008) addresses the impact of presidentialism on legitimacy in a systematic way. However, with regard to presidentialism's specific effects on democratic satisfaction, the results, unfortunately, are both theoretically and empirically unclear.

I argue that presidentialism affects mass attitudes on democracy significantly because of its peculiar power structure. Presidential systems create a separation of

⁴⁷ In Anderson and Guillory's (1997) article, there are no typical presidential systems, despite that Portugal and France are semi-presidential; Wells and Kriechhaus (2006) replicated Anderson and Guillory's article without change the cases; Blais and Gelineau (2007) investigate the Canadian case.

powers between the legislative and executive branches ⁴⁸ (e.g. Cheibub 2007; Linz 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels and Shugart 2003), complicating the identification of electoral winners. Divided governments in presidentialism blur the line between electoral winners and losers. For example, both the supporters of the winning party or party coalition in the legislature (legislature winners) and those for the presidents' party or party coalition (presidency winners) can claim electoral victory. It thus becomes hard to determine who wins and who loses. Moreover, the electoral loss in the other branch of the government and the deadlock between the president's party and the legislative majority party may generate frustration on both sides. This could hypothetically reduce the likelihood that winners are satisfied with democracy. We should empirically observe whether levels of satisfaction with democracy among winners in divided presidential systems are different from what is seen in Western parliamentary democracies.

Now that I have discussed the causal mechanism of institutions, I hypothesize the following:

H1. In new democracies, proportional representation increases the satisfaction with democracy.

H2. In new democracies, multiparty systems weaken voters' satisfaction with democracy, especially if there is a low degree of institutionalization.

⁴⁸ Presidentialism has been under intensive scrutiny by comparative institutionalists since Linz's path-breaking piece published in 1990 (e.g. Cheibub 2006; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Horowitz 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels and Shugart 2003). But, surprisingly, there is rare serious investigation on its impact on satisfaction with democracy.

H3. In presidential systems, divided governments blur the line between winners and losers and thus electoral winning does not always produce a sense of democratic satisfaction.

The Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Democracy

To test the hypotheses, I examined 14 new democracies⁴⁹ that are included in the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, Module II. The sample includes four parliamentary eight presidential systems.⁵⁰ The 14 elections occurred between 2001 and 2006. Surveys were conducted after each election, and more than 20,000 respondents answered the questionnaires.⁵¹ Citizens' satisfaction with democracy is measured by a standard question in various public opinion surveys that ask the following: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?" (Variable B3012). Among 14 countries, Taiwan and Korea are located at the two extremes on the scale of satisfaction with democracy (Figure 5.1). In the wake of the 2001 election, 72.11 percent of Taiwanese were happy with how democracy was practiced. For a sharp contrast, only 26 percent of Koreans were pleased by their young democracy after the 2004 election.

⁴⁹ CSES Module II includes 17 election data in 14 countries during 2001-2006. I exclude three elections, Taiwan 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005 and Russia 2004, because the surveys do not include the key variables I exam. As a result, I have 14 cases: Albania 2005, Brazil 2002, Bulgaria 2001, Chile 2005, Taiwan 2001, Czech Republic 2001, Hungary 2002, Korea 2004, Mexico 2003, Peru 2006, The Philippines 2004, Poland 2001, Romania 2004, and Slovenia 2004.

⁵⁰ I do not make a distinction between semi-presidentialism (Bulgaria, Poland and Romania) and pure presidentialism in that dual executive in semi-presidentialism does not change my theoretical arguments regarding the effects of separation of powers and independent presidency. In actuality, "cohabitation" in semi-presidentialism, just like divided government, has similar effects in obscuring the line between winners and losers.

⁵¹ Because some questions relevant to my construction of variables were not asked in some countries, also because of lots of missing data and inconsistent answers, I in actuality have much less observations in regression models.

Other countries fall between these extremes. Considering the overall democratic status in the Philippines, it is a little surprising that more than 55 percent of Filipinos are still satisfied.

Figure 5.1: Satisfaction with Democracy in 14 Third-wave Transitional Democracies





Figure 5.2: Satisfaction with Democracy in Winners and Losers in 14 Third- wave Democracies



What are the attitudes among electoral winners and losers? Winners are defined as those who voted for the governing parties or coalitions in the parliamentary systems, and those who voted for a presidents' party or party coalition in the presidential elections⁵² (See Appendix I for the list of winning electoral parties in each country). The attitudes among winners and losers in 14 new democracies reveal novel features (Figure 5.2). Out of 14 elections, in only six elections did winners have a higher level of satisfaction than losers. In Korea and Brazil results are just slightly higher. Interestingly, in most elections, winners, not losers, are more likely to evaluate democracy negatively, which is contradictory to the pattern discovered in Western democracies (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Guillory 1997, 73; Blais and Gelineau 2007). However, it does not take much effort to find that less satisfaction among winners mostly occurred in legislative-presidential concurrent elections that resulted in divided governments in Bulgaria 2001, Mexico 2003, Peru 2006, Romania 2004 and Taiwan 2001.⁵³ As I argued above, in presidential systems, a sweeping win in both the legislature and presidency produces clear winners of elections, which generates higher satisfaction among winners, similar to what happens in parliamentary systems where government coalitions are clearly identified. This happened in Brazil in 2002, Korea 2004 and Chile 2005.

⁵² To identify winners in divided presidential systems (Bulgaria 2001, Mexico 2003, Peru 2006, The Philippines 2004, Romania 2004 and Taiwan 2001) is more complicated. As I argued above, since both legislative winners and presidency winners can claim a victory. Supporters for both sides can theoretically be identified as winners. Here I analyze the attitudes of presidential winners (those who supported president's party). In all models, I check the robustness of results by replacing presidential winners with legislative winners. No distinct patterns are discovered. Thus, throughout the article, I use presidential winners as the measurement of "winner".

⁵³ In parliamentary Albania, it is also observed in 2005 election less satisfaction than the losers. I interpret it as winners' criticism upon the violence during the election. An election official was shot dead in the capital Tirana on voting day, while another man was shot dead outside the PDA's office (see IPU election archive, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2001_05.htm).

However, when victories are split, winners, defined here as supporters of the president's party (or party coalition), are less pleased with democratic practices.⁵⁴ When I re-examined the pattern by replacing the presidential winners with legislature winners, results are similar: winners express less satisfaction. Intuitively, this is not surprising. Citing the 2003 Mexican election as an example, when Vicente Fox from the National Action Party (PAN) made history winning the presidency in 2000, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) allied with the Green party in the 2003 mid-term election and managed to win a narrow majority in the congress. It is reasonable that voters of neither side felt fully satisfied as "half-winners." The expectations among PAN voters must have soared after 2000, whereas PRI still had strong roots in the society. A similar situation occurred in Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated Kuoming Tang (KMT) and won the presidency for the first time since Taiwan's democratic transition. However, in the 2001 legislative election, KMT, together with the People First Party (PFP) and New Party (NP), won a majority of seats in the legislative Yuan. Thus, it is not surprising that supporters of DPP and the KMT coalition were both disappointed to some extent.

Figure 5.2 lends aggregate-level support for Hypothesis 3. The obscure boundary between electoral winners and losers in divided presidential systems frustrates the winners and reduces their satisfaction with democracy. Next, I use multivariate analyses to gauge institutional effects on democratic consolidation.

⁵⁴ The Philippines stands out as an exception. Although president Arroyo's party coalition failed to win a majority in the legislature, technically resulting in a divided government as defined here. However, her coalition was still obviously winning the competition out in that no a single party or coalition can even oppose the president's coalition in the legislature. Moreover, more than 60% voters supported candidates without partisanship. Thus, unsurprisingly, Arroyo's supporters strongly felt winning even they had a divided government.

Measurement, Independent variables and Multilevel Analysis

Independent Variables

The level of proportional representation is measured by *disproportionality* of elections, using Michael Gallagher's Least Square Index (LSq) (Gallagher 1991),

$$\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (V_i - S_i)^2}$$

, where V_i denotes the votes percentage of parties and S_i the seats percentage in legislature. "Others" labeled in the data sources are treated as a unitary party and "independents" are excluded from calculation. A higher value of disproportionality indicates a lower level of proportional representation channeled by electoral systems (Refer to Chapter III for the calculation methods and raw data sources). Disproportionality in 14 elections varies from 4.21 (Taiwan 2001) to 30.77 (Korea 2004).

I calculate *effective party numbers* in the legislature (ENP), by following the formula from Laakso and Taagepera $\frac{1}{\sum S_i^2}$ (seats) where "others [parties]" are treated as a single party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), to measure party systems.⁵⁵ The 2004 Slovenian election resulted in the lowest ENP with a value of 2.3. Brazil, unsurprisingly, with one of the most fragmented party systems on earth (Nicolau 2004), has 8.5 effective parties in the legislature after the 2002 elections. To measure the institutionalization level of party systems, I employ Pederson's index of *legislative seat volatility*

$\frac{\sum |1/2[S_{it} - S_{i(t-1)}]|}{\sum S_{it}}$, the net change in percentage of all parties from the last election to the current divided by two (Pederson 1983; Lindberg 2007b, 225). The

⁵⁵ Effective numbers of parties (ENP) may not be the only measurement on party system fragmentation (e.g. Lindberg 2007b; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). However, it becomes a standard measure on party systems in large-N statistical studies (see Lijphart 1999 for the review on the typology of party systems).

higher the seat volatility in the legislature is, the more fluid the party systems and the lower the institutionalization of the political systems.⁵⁶

Control variables

A number of control variables influence citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Modernization theorists have long argued that socio-economic development, urbanization, along with improvement of education and of material life, do increase citizens' democratic knowledge, awareness and attachment to democratic values (e.g. Diamond 1999; Inglehart 1997; Lipset 1959). Three indicators for each respondent, *income, education and urban residence*, constitute the measure for modernity (see Appendix I for the descriptive data). Social capital theory suggests that engagement in civic organizations improves democratic support (e.g. Jackman and Miller 1998; Newton 2001; Putnam 1995). I use *the engagement in religious service* as a measure. More religious practice at church suggests more active participation in civic society. Moreover, citizens' democratic practice, such as the affinity to political parties (partisanship) and repeated participation in elections and political movements, significantly improves their democratic knowledge and skills, which in turn increases their commitment to democratic principles (e.g. Dalton and Weldon 2007; Lindberg 2006b; Mattes and Bratton 2007). The question, "do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party", is used to measure *affinity to political parties*. I depend on the questions, "Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views about

⁵⁶ Seat volatility is not the only indicator of the institutionalization of party systems. Effective numbers of parties, party ages and their roots in the society are all indicators of institutionalization (e.g. Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; McAllister and White 2007). However, here, to quantify the variable and simplify the operationalization, I solely depend on seat volatility.

something the government should or should not be doing? (Have you) contacted a politician or government official either in person, or in writing, or some other way,” to measure the level of *political participation*. Satisfaction with democracy is also directly influenced by *government performance* (e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008; Mattes and Bratton 2007). Excellent government performance generates generally positive attitudes toward democracy. Corrupt governments and those that abuse human rights cause suspicion of democracy as a favorable regime (e.g. Evans and Whitefield 1995; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008; Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009; Wells and Kriekhaus 2006). I measure this dimension by three questions: “How good or bad a job do you think the government in [capital] has done over the past years [since last election]”; “How much respect is there if individual *freedom and human rights* nowadays in [country]”; “how widespread do you think *corruption*, such as bribe taking, is amongst politicians in [country]?” Finally, I control for respondents’ two demographic features: *age and gender*.

Hierarchical Logistic Models, a Multilevel Analysis

As shown above, both individual level and country level variables are involved in the analysis, which requires multilevel analyses (e.g. Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Wells and Kriekhaus 2006). Statistically, “naively” pooling data by ignoring the country layer, the clustered and duplicated values for respondents within each country will violate a basic assumption of OLS regressions that errors terms are independent (Burton, Gurrin, and Sly 1998; Kreft and De Leeuw 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). Also different from the conventional way of using dummy-cluster techniques, hierarchical models allow random effects of variables at individual levels and the interaction across

levels to account for the variance in the dependent variable. Moreover, because the dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy, is coded as dichotomous, it requires a logistic model. Thus, a hierarchical logistic model is justified to model the impacts of political institutions on democratic satisfaction. The equation is:

$$Y_{ij}(\text{satisfaction}) = \beta_0j + (\gamma_{0j} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Isq})j + \gamma_{02}(\text{ENPs})j + \gamma_{03}(\text{Volatility})j + \gamma_{04}(\text{ENPs} \times \text{Vol})j) + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} \dots + \beta_{nj}X_{ij}$$

**Table 5.1: Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy:
A Multilevel Analysis**

Dependent Variable Satisfaction with Democracy	Hierarchical Logistic Model (1) ⁵⁷ Satisfaction (All citizens)	Hierarchical Logistic Model (2) Satisfaction (Winners)	Hierarchical Logistic Model (3) Satisfaction (Losers)
Political Institutions (country-level)			
Disproportionality	-.008 (.004)**	-.006 (.007)	-.011 (.008)*
Effective Parties (ENP)	-.545 (.057)***	-.606 (.099)**	-.073 (.108)
Legislative Seat Volatility	-.030 (.009)***	-.043 (.016)***	-.011 (.017)
ENP*Volatility	.011 (.003)***	.015 (.005)***	.004 (.006)
Divided Government	.088 (.188)	.239 (.298)	-.051(.303)
Winner ⁵⁸	.045 (.078)		
Performance, perception and participation (individual-level)			
Government Performance	.302 (.302)***	.272 (.020)***	.325 (.017)***
Human Rights	.215 (.215)***	.209 (.017)***	.219 (.016)***
Corruption	-.078 (.013)***	-.076 (.019)***	-.081 (.018)***
Political Participation	-.040 (.027)	-.089 (.040)**	.002 (.036)
Party Affinity	-.069 (.019)***	-.035 (.028)	-.094 (.025)***
Religious Practice	.006 (.006)	.010 (.008)	.002 (.008)
Demographic (individual-level)			
Education	-.003 (.005)	-.001 (.008)	-.005 (.007)
Income	.023 (.007)***	.016 (.010)	.027 (.009)***
Urban Residence	-.028 (.008)***	-.013 (.012)	-.044 (.011)***
Age	.0004 (.001)	.002 (.001)***	-.001 (.001)
Gender	-.009 (.017)	-.033 (.026)	.006 (.024)
Constant	1.86 (.209)***	1.97 (.342)***	1.74 (.367)***
Log Restricted Likelihood	-3786.1538	-1772.1218	-1997.3034
Observation	6428	3020	3572

Note: Maximum restricted likelihood estimates followed by standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$, country=14.

⁵⁷ Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regress using multi-level analysis is required. The hierarchical logistic models are conducted by Stata 10.0 using “xtmelogit” command with unstructured covariance which allows for all variances and covariances to be distinct. In Model 1, winner is run as random-effect parameter.

⁵⁸ Winner here is presidency winners. I also test the effect of legislature winners. No differences in terms of the direction and the significance level of the coefficients are observed.

Table 5.2: The Effects of Institutions on Changes in Odds Ratio

	Hierarchical Logistic Model (1) All Citizens	Hierarchical Logistic Model (2) Winners	Hierarchical Logistic Model (3) Losers
Political Institutions (country-level)			
Disproportionality	.984 (.007)**	.997 (.014)	.961 (.021)*
Effective Parties (ENP)	.617 (.068)***	.545 (.105)**	.746 (.203)
Legislative Seat Volatility	.912 (.018)***	.882 (.029)***	960 (.042)
ENP*Volatility	1.03 (.007)***	1.04 (.120)***	1.01 (.015)
Divided Government	1.35 (.201)	2.01(.482)	.752(.248)
Winner ⁵⁹	1.10 (.273)		
Performance, perception and participation (individual-level)			
Government Performance	2.18 (.096)***	2.07 (.481)***	2.29(.137)***
Human Rights	1.74(.068)***	1.62 (.091)***	1.85 (.103)***
Corruption	.795 (.034)***	.772 (.048)***	.809 (.047)***
Political Participation	.911 (.079)	.993(.113)**	.943 (.113)
Party Affinity	.820 (.050)***	.954 (.085)	.736 (.062)***
Religious Practice	1.01 (.019)	1.02(.027)	1.00 (.028)
Demographic (individual-level)			
Education	.985 (.018)	.986 (.026)	-.981 (.025)
Income	1.04 (.023)***	1.00 (.033)	1.07 (.034)***
Urban Residence	.922 (.024)***	1.00 (.038)	.855 (.031)***
Age	1.00(.001)	1.00 (.002)***	.997 (.002)
Gender	1.01(.058)	.946 (.081)	1.04 (.083)
Constant	-3786.1538	-1772.1218	-1997.3034
Log Restricted Likelihood	6428	3020	3572

Note: Entries are Odds ratio estimates followed by standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$, country=14.

⁵⁹ Winner here is presidency winners. I also test the effect of legislature winners. No differences in terms of the direction and the significance level of the coefficients are observed.

Analysis and Discussion

Table 5.1 presents three hierarchical logistic models for satisfaction with democracy. Model 1 is a full model, including all citizens, whereas Model 2 and Model 3 explain satisfaction with democracy among winners and losers respectively. Table 5.2 illustrates the effects of each individual variable on the change rate of the odds ratio⁶⁰ of satisfaction with democracy in three models. In general, these three models confirm our hypotheses and reveal interesting patterns of mass attitudes in the third-wave new democracies.

The negative coefficients of disproportionality across the three models (Row 3, Table 5.1) indicate that disproportionality consistently reduces the likelihood that a citizen is satisfied with democracy. This is especially true for losers. In systems where the vote share is highly distorted by electoral systems, electoral losers are especially upset and more likely to evaluate democracy negatively. For example, in Model 3 (Row 3, Table 5.2), a unit change in disproportionality leads to a 0.96⁶¹ unit change of odds ratio of losers' satisfaction with democracy. This confirms Hypothesis 1. This is not only intuitive but also echoes the findings from consensus democracy research that the connection between democratic satisfaction and institutions is through the mechanism of representativeness (Aarts and Thomassen 2008). However, the distortion of representation seems not to significantly bother the winners. Note that the regressions

⁶⁰ Through model 1 to 3, "winner" is coded as presidential winners in divided presidential systems, as I clarified in footnote 56. I also run models by replacing presidential winners with legislature winners, the coefficient of winner in model1 remains negative without statistic significance. In model 2 and model 3, the direction and significance level of all coefficients remain the same.

⁶¹ If the change rate of odds ratio is less than 1, such as 0.96 here, it means disproportionality causes a higher likelihood of dissatisfaction than that of satisfaction.

use the value of disproportionality in each election, not the electoral rules *per se*. To directly examine the impact of electoral systems, I tested proportional electoral rules in the lower house as an alternative dummy variable, but it gains no statistical significance. This indicates that the electoral rules do not directly affect mass attitudes. It is the degree of representation resulting from elections that is closely connected with mass attitudes.

As hypothesized, multiparty systems have a strong negative impact on democratic satisfaction. Here, solid evidence from new democracies shows that multiple parties significantly generate negative attitudes toward democracy. The negative coefficients of effective party numbers across models (Row 3, Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) lend concrete supports to Hypotheses 2. Multiparty systems in emerging democracies are evidently problematic in the eyes of the public. This speaks to the anti-power-sharing argument that fragmented political systems are associated with less stable and effective governing and opposition coalitions. As a result, this affects citizens' evaluation of democratic performance generally. Citizens' concern with the institutionalization and stability of political systems is further illustrated by the variable of legislative electoral volatility. A low degree of institutionalization, as shown by a high volatility among elections, significantly decreases the likelihood of satisfaction with democracy (Row 4, Table 5.1). More prominently, the interacting (Row 5, Table 5.1) term between effective party numbers and volatility obtains statistical significance, which indicates that the effects of the party system on attitudes is significantly conditioned on the level of institutionalization.⁶²

⁶² Using Stata command “`lincom ENP+ ENP*Valitality, or`” gives us the conditional change rate of odds ratio, given every unit change of independent variables. Statistically,

Substantively, the models indicate that, when a large number of parties pass through the legislature from election to election, such instability seriously damages citizens' evaluation of democracy.

Interestingly, party systems affect winners and losers in distinct ways. Whereas winners are more likely to be frustrated by fragmented and poorly institutionalized party systems, losers are rarely influenced by party systems. Types of political institutions hardly affect the attitudes of losing voters toward democracy. Contrarily, winning voters do pay much more attention to the political institutional arrangement.

When controlling for other political institutions and socioeconomic status, the divided government⁶³ variable does not gain significance in the multivariate analyses. Compared with the distribution in Figure 5.2, divided governments differently affect the pattern of democratic satisfaction at the aggregate level. Divided government status is not directly connected to a low likelihood of satisfaction for individual citizens. This indicates a disconnection between individual and aggregate level effects, a matter requiring further examination of the presidential systems in constitutional governments.

The insignificance of the variable of winners in Model 1 is not surprising given the mixed patterns of the aggregate-level satisfaction among winners and losers shown in Figure 5.2. Model 1 affirms the analysis above. In new democracies, winning the election does not significantly increase the likelihood of being satisfied with democratic process, even after controlling for a series of variables.

for example, the conditional coefficient of effective party numbers in Model 1 (Table 5.1) is -0.43 (-0.54+0.11). In terms of the change rate of odds ratio, each unit variation of effective party numbers leads to 0.64 unit of change on the conditional odds ratio.

⁶³ I also directly tested the dummy variable of presidentialism, it gains no significance as well. This echoes the weak and mixed effects of presidentialism in Huang et al.(2008).

The effects of control variables are fairly consistent with conventional wisdom. Good government performance strongly creates positive attitudes toward democracy. This one factor has the strongest impact on citizens' satisfaction on democracy. Again, evidence suggests that citizens' commitment to democracy is involved with rationality (e.g. Evans and Whitefield 1995; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). Democratic governments need to perform excellently to transform more citizens into committed democrats. This is especially important for electoral losers. Whereas the aforementioned analysis demonstrates that electoral losers are barely influenced by political institutions, their evaluation of democracy depends heavily upon how they view government performance. Performance is the most important indicator for predicting electoral losers' attitudes toward democracy. Additionally, clean governments and those that effectively protect human rights produce satisfaction among both winners and losers. Citizens who are close to certain parties are more likely to evaluate democracy negatively, which again shows that political parties in new democracies do not produce citizen satisfaction. The negative coefficients of effective numbers of parties, legislative party volatility and party affiliation consistently suggest that institutionalizing party systems in transitional democracies is critical for consolidating the regimes and improving citizens' mass attitudes toward democracy. Finally, regarding modernization theory, high levels of income contribute to higher democratic satisfaction and can even compensate for losers' negative feelings towards democracy (Model 3, Table 5.1).

In general, empirical evidence from multilevel analysis reveals that political institutions play a significant role in affecting public attitudes in new democracies. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are solidly supported by the multilevel analysis. A low degree of

proportional representation hurts citizens' evaluation of democracy. Multiparty systems, contrary to existing power-sharing theories, significantly engender negative attitudes toward democracy. Political institutions affect electoral winners and losers differently. Winners are more sensitive to institutional features whereas institutional arrangements hardly change electoral losers' attitudes toward democracy. Losers care more about the government performances. Divided governments seem to have different effects on the aggregate level and the individual level, encouraging further investigation into this primary power-sharing institutional design.

Conclusion

It is not news that institutions matter. However, institutions matter in a complex way. This chapter's investigation contributes to the institution-attitude literature by examining individual power-sharing institutions and extending the research to transitional democracies.

The negative coefficients of disproportionality across the models suggest that, in both established democracies and new democracies, citizens' perceptions of proportional representation consistently enhance their evaluation of democracy. Representativeness touches the core value of democracy, which is universally recognized across democratic systems, regardless of their age. In contrast, one of the most salient features of power-sharing institutional arrangements, multiparty systems, have the least constructive effects on citizens' evaluation toward democracy. Citizens largely ignore the representation function of party systems. Instead, citizens pay more attention to whether political parties are institutionalized enough to ensure a functioning democracy, such as, an effective political opposition. At the aggregate level, presidential systems in the sample

reveal lower satisfaction among winners than among losers. That challenges conventional wisdom. However, at the individual level, divided government status has no effect on winning or losing citizens. Generally, political institutions have an insignificant effect upon the attitudes of voters who lose in elections. Such voters do care to some extent about representation. On one hand, this conclusion challenges the findings about the mediating effects of power-sharing institutions in the Western democracies. On the other hand, it also somewhat upsets institutionalists who proclaim the engineering effects of political institutions on democratization. This study shows that electoral losers are favorably affected by tangible government performance and their perception about the improvement of human rights. As a conclusion, this study sheds lights on the complex effects of power-sharing institutional arrangements in transitional democracies. My findings suggest a prudent optimism about power-sharing institutions on democratization in transitional democracies.

Table 5.3 (Appendix I, Chapter V): Coding Electoral Winners

Country	Election Year	Winning Party/Coalition
Albania	2004	Democratic Party (PD), Republican Party (PR), New Democratic Party (PDR), Christian Democratic Party (PDK), Human Rights Union Party (PBNDj), Union for victory
Bulgaria	2001	Legislature winner: National Movement Simeon the Second (NDST), Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) Presidency winner: Coalition For Bulgaria (CB)
Brazil	2002	Worker's Party (PT), Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Labor Democratic Party (PDT), Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Liberal Party (PL), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), PV, PC do B
Chile	2005	CPD coalition: Christian Democrat Party (PDC), Party for Democracy (PPD), Social Democrat Radical (PRSD), Socialist Party of Chile (PS)
Czech Republic	2002	Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), Koalice (coalition US-DEU& KDU-CSL), Christian Democratic-Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL), Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU)
Hungary	2002	Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP), Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)
Korea	2004	Our Party (Uri Dang)
Mexico	2003	Legislature winner: The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexican Green Ecological Party
Peru	2006	Legislature winner: Union for Peru (Union por el Peru-UPP) Presidency winner: Aprista Peruvian Party (APRA)
The Philippines	2006	Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats (LAKAS-CMD), Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), Liberal Party (LP), Kablikat ng Malazang (KAMPT), Coalition of Lakas-CMD, LP, NPC, KAMPI & some regional parties (K4)
Poland	2001	Coalition of the Alliance of the Democratic Left and the Union of Labor (SLD-UP), Polish People's Party (PSL)
Romania		Social Democratic Party (PSD), Humanist Party of Romania (PUR)
Slovenia	2004	Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), New Slovenian-Christian People's Party (NSI), Slovenian People's Party (People's Party)
Taiwan	2001	Legislature winner: Kuo Mingtang (KTM), People First Party (PFP), New Party (NP) Presidency winner: Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

Table 5.4 (Appendix II, Chapter V): Descriptive Data

Variable	Observation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Democratic Satisfaction	20382	2.285840	.8013743	1	4
Democratic Detachment	21914	.4464726	.4971379	0	1
Disproportionality	21914	10.51551	6.200858	4.2095	30.772
Effective Numbers of Parties	21914	4.00403	1.742873	2.3604	8.4789
Volatility	21914	31.70773	17.08144	8.39	56.085
Divided Government	21914	.4855344	.4998021	0	1
Presidential Winner	13846	.4206269	.4936775	0	1
Legislative Winner	13846	.4592662	.4983560	0	1
Government Performance	19986	2.341089	.7761712	1	4
Human Rights	20927	2.424667	.8725805	1	4
Corruption	20299	3.409133	.7248644	1	4
Participation	20378	.0895083	.2854830	0	4
Party Affinity	19855	1.545606	.4979283	1	2
Religion	17015	3.477872	1.818162	1	6
Education	21779	4.679875	1.914823	1	8
Income	18286	2.899377	1.378670	1	5
Urban	20516	2.431078	1.210554	1	4
Age	21872	43.54385	16.72382	16	102
Gender	21907	.5316565	.4990082	0	1

Chapter VI

How Power-sharing Matters in New Democracies: A Comparative Analysis on Benin and Kenya

“Opposition leaders are right to challenge Kenya's rigged presidential poll, but they can't use it as an excuse for targeting ethnic groups.”
By Georgette Gagnon, Human Rights Watch on the 2007 post election violence

BBC News (January 24, 2008)


When this West African nation ran short of funds to finance its election machinery, voters raised cash, loaned computers, and lit up vote-counting centers with their motorcycle headlights... The unusual display of people power demonstrated how a Marxist dictatorship once nicknamed "Africa's Cuba" has become an unlikely leader of Africa's checkered path to democracy.

The Washington Post (January 27, 2007)

According to Lieberman’s framework of nested analysis (Lieberman 2005, 437), the large-N studies are not the only means of research; subsequent small-N studies are indispensable for checking the robust results and building new theories for further large-N tests. The in-depth small-N analysis includes both model-testing case studies, which gain contextual based evidence that a particular causal model or theory actually “work” in the manner specified by the model (Lieberman 2005, 442); and model-building case studies, which seek to identify measures that are valid and reliable indicators of the analytic constructs within the theoretical model. More importantly, model-building

analysis must develop explanations for the puzzle of varied outcomes which are poorly predicted by the large-N models (Lieberman 2005, 443).

Figure 6.1: A Model of Case Selection in the Nest Analysis (Lieberman 2005, 445)



Following Lieberman’s nested analysis framework, I conducted two types of comparative studies, first to contextually demonstrate in the typical “on-line” cases (such as B, D F in Figure 6.1) how power-sharing institutions facilitate democratic development in new democracies; and second to illustrate in the “off-line” cases (such as H in figure 6.1) why power-sharing institutions impede democratic progress in some other new democracies. In this chapter I focused on the theory testing of power-sharing theories by comparing two African new democracies: Benin and Kenya. Chapter VII

analyzes outlying cases, viz., Mongolia and Thailand, in which the mechanisms of power-sharing are not a constructive factor of democratic improvement.⁶⁴

The Case Selection of Benin and Kenya

To illustrate how power-sharing institutions actually “work” in concrete cases, I adopted the strategy of Most Similar System Design (MSSD) under the framework of the nested analysis. According to Lieberman’s strategy, the “on-line” cases (such as B, D, and F in Figure 6.1) are ideal for model testing. In this case, we used cases to demonstrate the mechanisms of power sharing, in which power-sharing substantively facilitates democratic development (such as F in Figure 6.1), or ones in which the lack of power-sharing considerably damages democratic development (such as B in Figure 6.1). Methodologically, in MSSD, we use comparative cases with common systemic characteristics, which are conceived as “controlled for,” whereas the inter-systemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables (Gerring 2007, 139; Przeworski and Teune 1970, 179; Tarrow 2010, 234). Here the “inter-systemic differences” are the different arrangements of political institutions. According to the specification of models in Chapter IV (Table 4.1, Table 4.2), the selected cases for pair comparison must meet the criteria including:

1. Similar levels of economic development, ethnic fractionalization and population.

⁶⁴ The nested analysis methods have been adopted by many comparativists in cross-national studies. For example, in his study of how European colonizing influences the economic growing in developing countries, Kriechhaus (2007) picked the cases of South Korea, Mozambique, and Brazil for intensive investigation after the large-N statistical analysis. Another example, Howard and Roessler (2006) employed nested analysis to explore the liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regime. After the quantitative analysis, they investigated the Kenya case by showing how opposition coalitions’ strategic calculation as well as its interaction with the incumbent facilitates the liberalization in the elections. Also see (Fish 2005a) how the mixed strategy is used to study the democracy in the single case of Russia.

2. Different institutional arrangements in terms of electoral rules, party systems and the legislative-executive relationships.
3. Differences in the levels of democratic development.

Given the positive effects of power-sharing on democratic improvement, the countries that fall in the upper-right quadrant represent cases like “F” (See Figure 6.1), in which the high level of independent variable is related to the high level of the dependent variable. As shown in Figure 6.2, countries such as Slovenia, Latvia, Chile, Benin and Lithuania belong to this category (See Table 6.1). In contrast, countries locating in the lower-left quadrant resemble cases like “B” (See Figure 6.1), in which the low level of independent variable is connected to the low level of the dependent variable. These countries include Malaysia, Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria. Thus, the MSSD can be narrowed down to these two groups of countries. Considering that the geographic proximity renders culture closeness; it is better to put the comparative analysis within a single continent. Africa becomes favorable due to enough variation in democratic development across the continent. I finally juxtaposed Benin and Kenya for the comparative analysis based on the following reasons.

**Figure 6.2: Levels of Democracy (Freedom House Scores Reversed)
Predicted by the Effective Numbers of Parties**




Table 6.1: Selected Cases Based on Figure 6.2

	Power-sharing	Power-concentrating
High level of democracy	I e.g. Slovenia, Latvia, Chile, Benin, Lithuania	II e.g. Caribbean Mini Majoritarian democracies; Botswana, Mongolia
Low level of democracy	III e.g. Thailand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Central African Republic, Liberia, Russia)	IV e.g. Malaysia, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Senegal

Benin and Kenya both transitioned to democracies in the early 1990s under the wave of democratization. Both countries have common systemic characteristics which are critical to democratic progress. They are both typical underdeveloped third-world countries. In terms of socioeconomic requisites for democracy (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008; Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), neither country has characteristically favorable conditions for democratization (Bierschenk 2009; Brown and Kaiser 2007). Measured by PPP in 2,009 US dollars, Benin's GDP per capita in 2008 is around 1,500 US dollars (World Ranking 195); Kenya is slightly better, 1,600 US dollars (World Ranking 193).⁶⁵ Benin has maintained an average growth of 3 percent in the last decade, however, which is largely offset by inflation and population growth. The economy in Kenya is not doing well either, and in 2008, due to the post-electoral violence and global financial crisis, the growth was below 2 percent. During the last decade, no stable economic growth has been observed in Kenya. Both countries have a large portion of population under the poverty line (Benin 37.4% and Kenya 50% in 2007).

More importantly, both countries are ethnically deeply divided. Various ethnic fractionalization indices⁶⁶ consistently reveal that Kenya is one of most divided societies around the globe, in which multiple ethnic groups, including Kikuyu (22%), Kuyha (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Meru (6%) and other

⁶⁵ See CIA world factbook for the data, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. World Development Index and World Bank have different measures, but indicate similar socioeconomic levels in Benin and Kenya.

⁶⁶ For example, in (Alesina et al. 2003) calculation, the value of Kenyan ethnic fractionalization index reaches 0.85; The value of Fearon index (Fearon 2003), it is 0.85; the value of EFL index is 0.87 (Roeder 2004); Scarritt and Mozaffar (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999) calculate it as 0.83; and the value of Posner's PREG index is 0.57.

(16%)⁶⁷, have been historically in conflict with each other. The level of ethnic fractionalization in Benin is relatively lower compared with Kenya, but still fairly high.⁶⁸ Benin's main ethnic groups include Fon and related (39.2%), Adja and related (15.2%), Yoruba and related (12.3%), Bariba and related (9.2%), Peulh and related (7%), Ottamari and related (6.1%), YoaoLokpa and related (4%), Dendi and related (2.5%) and other (4.5%) (also see Decalo 1995; Magnusson and Clark 2005, 556). In addition to the poor socioeconomic status, ethnic fractionalization is regarded as a critical hindrance of democratic progress in both societies. However, given the strikingly similar systemic conditions in Kenya and Benin,⁶⁹ it is interesting that the outcomes of democratization are remarkably different in these two new democracies.

On one hand, Benin is a “shining example of democracy” in Africa (Bierschenk 2009), one of the few democratic models in African continent. It has been rated as a “Free” state since its transition in 1991 (Political Rights 2, Civil Liberty 2, Freedom House 2009). In the post-transition era, Benin has undergone several rounds of free and fair elections that led to power alternations of the government, which makes Benin qualified as a consolidated democracy (Cheibub 2007; Magnusson and Clark 2005, 558; Przeworski 2000). As a successful democracy, it is selected for many case or comparative analyses on democratization (e.g. Bierschenk 2009; Creevey, Ngomo, and

⁶⁷ See CIA factbook for the data.

⁶⁸ The ethnic fractionalization in Benin, according to Alesina (2003) is 0.79; Fearon (2003) 0.62; Roeder 0.62; S&M 0.57 and Posner's PREG (2004) 0.3.

⁶⁹ To note, in terms of colonial heritage, they are different. Benin was colonized by France and Kenya by the Great Britain. I argue that this does not undermine the MSSD design. Theories and empirical evidences indicate that the British colonial heritage is beneficial to democratic development. In my analysis, if the British colonial heritage is a critical explanatory variable, we should expect democracy in Kenya to be in better shape. However, Benin is a case with a higher level of democracy. Therefore, the variable of colonial heritage will not weaken the explanatory power of political institutions in Benin and Kenya.

Vengroff 2005; Gisselquist 2008; Magnusson and Clark 2005; Norris 2008a; Seely 2005). On the other hand, after almost two decades of practice of democratic elections, Kenyan democracy came precariously close to the brink of collapse in the wake of the 2007 elections (Kagwanja and Southall 2009). Kenya's half-hearted permission of a multiparty election in 1991 failed to win Kenya status as a "free" democracy. Since 2002, Kenya has become a "partly free" state (Freedom House), but also is seen as apparently lacking in democratic stability (such as the 2007 Freedom House rating). According to the 2008 Economist Democratic Index, Kenya, which falls into the category of a hybrid regime, is ranked 103 globally, slightly better than Ethiopia and Burundi.⁷⁰ However, it is the 2007 post-election horror, the deadly orgy of "ethnic" slaughter (Kagwanja and Southall 2009, 259), that brings global attention to the problematic democratization in Kenya. The critical question is what causes such divergent democratic prospects in Kenya and Benin. I argue that political institutions play a very significant role in explaining the differing political outcomes in the two new democracies. For Benin, the power-sharing institutional arrangements allow diverse forces to be incorporated in democratic competition, which makes democracy work; however the power-concentrating institutions in Kenya intensify the inter-ethnicity tension by eliminating the possible chance to access power through democratic means, which puts the Kenyan democracy in danger.

Benin is a presidential regime with a popularly-elected president for a five year term and a unicameral National Assembly in which 83 members are directly elected by popular votes in multi-member constituencies using the party-list proportional

⁷⁰ Benin, in 2008 Economist Democracy Index, is grouped as "flawed democracy", ranked 80.

representation system. According to the Benin constitution, the president is authorized with such powers as discretionary appointment, chairing cabinet meetings, the right of veto, and the central role in forming the government (Siaroff 2003, 296). Kenya is also a presidential system in which the president is directly elected for a five year term⁷¹, and a unicameral national assembly with 224 members among whom 210 members are directly elected for five year terms by popular votes in single-member constituencies using the first-past-the-post (simple majority) system (SMDP).⁷² The Kenyan president is more powerful than the Benin president. In addition to the aforementioned power, the Kenyan president is empowered to declare a long-term emergency and dissolve the legislature.⁷³ Several institutional differences are revealed: 1). Electoral systems: the proportional system in Benin and the SMDP system in Kenya; 2). the non-concurrent election in Benin and the concurrent election in Kenya; 3) Constitutionally, Benin presidents are less powerful than Kenyan presidents. As my analysis in the following paragraphs shows, these differences account for democratic progress in the two countries.

The Lack of A Power-sharing Mechanism in Kenyan Politics

In Kenya, due to the fact that political institutions have been subject to the power of a highly centralized and personalized presidency, politicians are strongly driven to

⁷¹ Kenya's electoral rules set three requirements to be elected president. A candidate must win the most voters in a national-wide count, and secure at least 25% of the vote in five of any eight provinces. The presidential victor must also win the parliamentary seat in his or her own constituency. (Gibson and Long 2009, 497)

⁷² For the rest 14 seats, 12 seats are appointed by the President and two seats (the Attorney-General and Speaker) are ex-officio member.

⁷³ Siaroff (2003) did not include Kenya as a democracy in her cases. Depending on her coding criteria on the presidential power, I code Kenyan presidential power by reading the Kenyan constitution. See Kenyan constitution online: http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php.

gain access to state resources and patronage (Mueller 2008; Murunga and Nasong'o 2006; Rutten and Owuor 2009; Southall 2009, 448). Elections are mainly seen as an opportunity to compete for the control of the state (Oyugi 1997, 48). Winning elections is overwhelmingly necessary, which turns the game into one either “to secure control of the state ‘to eat’ or to die” (Southall 2009, 448). The SMDP electoral system combined with the politics of ethnicity reinforces the zero-sum game.

Kenyan political parties are largely constructed on the base of ethnicity (tribalism), the loyalties and identification toward their own tribe/ethnic groups and group antipathy against others (Gulliver 1969; Oyugi 1997). Political parties, supported by distinct ethnic groups, are highly motivated to win the election battles to protect the tribal interests on one hand; political parties have strong incentives to manipulate ethnic feelings to campaign for elections on the other hand. Institutionalists have long argued that rules and regulations provide incentives for the political actors within the system to perform strategically in order to maximize the utility of outcomes. It is well recognized that, under SMDP, elections are a winner-take-all game (e.g. Bawn and Thies 2003; Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). Considering that there is only one chance of winning in each district (district magnitude one), the fear of violence or “ethnic others” gaining advantages over their own tribe, politicians and political parties are even more driven to mobilize voters by using ethnic arithmetic and clientage (Southall 2009). Under this circumstance, the SMDP electoral rule strengthens the pattern of ethnic politics in Kenya. Given the historical ethnic chasm and the nature of the elections, voters are rationally divided when casting their votes along ethnic lines. As a result, the ethnicity-based voting pattern in Kenya has changed little since the 1992 opening multiparty election

(Fox 2008; Gibson and Long 2009; Oyugi 1997; Rutten and Owuor 2009). In the 2007 election, candidates performed unsurprisingly well in their own ethnic groups: Kibaki obtained 94% of the Kikuyu vote (88% of the related Meru); Odinga 98% of Luos, and Musyoka 86% of the Kambas. Luhya (75%) and Kalenjins (88%) votes overwhelmingly supported Odinga despite candidates' attempts to lure voters (Gibson and Long 2009, 501).

In addition, SMDP is usually associated with a higher level disproportionality because it may drastically distort the shares of votes and seats. For example, in the 1992 election, the ruling party Kenya African National Union (best known as KANU) only gained 24.5% of the popular vote; however, it won 100 seats (49.5%) in the parliament.⁷⁴ Since being represented and having access to power in the government are of critical importance in Kenyan politics, underrepresentation may intensify the dissatisfaction among electoral losers, which generates additional tension among ethnic groups. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to state that the SMDP rule plays an important role in accelerating the ethnicization of Kenya society (Oyugi 1997).

An examination of the executive power and the legislative-executive relationship also reveals the lack of power-sharing in the Kenyan presidential system. It has been mentioned above that the Kenyan presidency is characterized by the centralization of presidential powers. This is reflected in at least three aspects. First, the Kenyan constitution empowers the president with extensive authority. The Kenyan president,

⁷⁴ The popular votes in 1997, 2002, and 2007 elections are unavailable, which make it impossible to calculate the disproportionality. The 1992 electoral disproportionality is 18.85. See Chapter III for the details of disproportionality calculation. The 1992 election data is from the African election handbook (Nohlen 1999).

along with the presidents in Ecuador, Brazil, Chile and Zambia, has the strongest executive power among presidential systems (See Figure 3.6).

Given the “big man” tradition in African political culture (e.g. Barkan 2004; Taylor 2006), it is no surprise that President Daniel arap Moi (presidency 1978-2002) took advantage of his presidential powers to adopt redistributive policies that favor his own ethnic group---Kalenjin and other groups in Rift valley where he comes from (Barkan 2004, 87). The 1992 democratic transition barely changed the nature of “big man politics.” Because of the lack of institutions of accountability in the newly-transitioned regime, President Moi continued to skillfully exploit the ethnic tension and manipulate the elections. There was a high expectation of change in Kenyan politics when Mwai Kibaki replaced Moi in the 2002 election, which was the first power alternation through democratic elections in Kenyan history. However, high expectations quickly resulted in deep disappointment. Kibaki was very “successful” for a short period of time in turning Kenyan politics into to a contest of “forty one tribes against one” and “Kenya against Kikuyu” (Chege 2008; Kagwanja and Southall 2009, 262). Kibaki, not quite different from his predecessors, continues to abuse presidential power, and play the ethnic card in politics. In his case, the strong presidency becomes one of the advantages the president uses to dominate the government, and exploit state resources for ethnic groups standing behind him.

Second, in addition to strong presidential powers, in terms of the executive-legislative relationship, the Kenyan executive dominates the legislature. The Kenyan parliament has been fairly weak. According to a global survey of legislatures, the Kenyan legislature ranks only 126 out of 158 countries, far behind other African

developing democracies, such as South Africa (48th), Benin (59th), and Ghana (82nd) (Fish and Kroenig 2008; Fish 2006). Theoretically, the purpose of the separation of powers in presidentialism is to provide balances and checks among the different branches. The weak legislative institution apparently affects the impact of opposition parties during the process of policy-making. Moreover, preceding the 2007 election, no divided government ever occurred during the Kenyan presidential regime.⁷⁵ In other words, the president's party has always controlled the majority in the parliament. Divided government is the indicator measuring the executive-legislative relationship in presidential systems (See chapter II and III). A divided government gives opposition party (parties) more leverage in political bargaining. In the Kenyan case, a weak legislative institution combined with undivided government led to the dominance of the president and his party. From this perspective, it is not hard to understand how Kenyan elections are seen as a "to eat or to die" zero-sum game: under power-concentrating institutions, the chances of the opposition are utterly slim.

The fact that the Kenyan president's party can easily control the parliament is related to its institutional arrangements. The aforementioned analysis indicates that SMDP electoral rule leads to high level of disproportionality. Besides that, SMDP helped the manufactured majority in the 1992 and 1997 elections. President Moi's party KANU failed to win the majority of popular votes, but gained the majority in the parliament thanks to the SMDP rule, which drastically transformed the vote share. Simultaneously, the arrangement of concurrent elections is another factor that may

⁷⁵ In the 2007 election, the prime minister Odinga's party, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) got 99 seats in the parliament, which is 47.14% of all seats. But after the by elections and Counting allied parties and MPs, ODM now has 103 MPs.

benefit the president's party. Theoretically, it is argued that there are presidential coattail effects in concurrent elections. Coattail effect refers to "the ability of a candidate at the top of ticket to carry into office . . . his party's candidates on the same tickets," which is typically operationalized as the correlation between the presidential and legislative vote in a given constituency (Samuels 2000, 3; Sorauf and Beck 1988). Empirical evidence shows that opposition majorities rarely occur in elections held concurrently with the presidential election⁷⁶ (e.g. Jones 1994; Samuels 2004; Shugart 1995). In Kenya, the presidential and legislative electoral cycles overlap, and this, in turn, encourages the coattail effect in legislative voting. Moreover, because the SMDP rule does not encourage personal votes, and legislative candidates have more incentives to campaign by following the party lines (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Chang 2005; Edwards and Thames 2007; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005), the effects of a president's party on legislative elections are even stronger. Therefore, there is a lack of institutional sources for a divided government in Kenya, which is conducive to the centralized presidency in this presidential system, even though the separation of powers is theoretically designed for the purpose of improving the checks and balances among government branches. As Figure 3.6 indicates, based on the dimensions of the executive power and the legislative-executive relationship, Kenya is a case located in the lower-right corner, which makes it an exceptionally power-concentrating presidency.

⁷⁶ But, if legislative candidates enjoy electoral independence from their parties due to the feature of electoral rules, divided government is more likely to happen (Shugart 1995). Obviously, the SMDP rule in Kenya does not help cultivate personal votes. For the institutional sources of personal votes, see (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Chang 2005; Chang and Golden 2007; Negretto 2009; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005).

The power-concentrating institutional arrangement mixed with ethnic politics almost brought down the shaky Kenyan democracy in the 2007 general election. Realizing the problem in the institutional design, political scientists have advocated changing the Kenyan democracy into a more power-sharing one (Reilly 2001; Reilly 2006b; Southall 2009), just like the practice in Benin democracy.

Benin as a Power-sharing Democracy

The inclusiveness of Benin's democracy has been well defined by the nature of its democratic transition (e.g. Bierschenk 2009; Brown and Kaiser 2007; Heilbrunn 1993; Seely 2005). Although the transition government was small, it is characteristically inclusive of a wide range of political perspectives (Seely 2005, 366). Despite plenty of uncertainty during the process of transition, President Kerekou's willingness to convene a national conference by bringing together representatives of all Beninese society to discuss the country's future set the tone of democratization in Benin. "Teachers, Students, the military, government officials, religious authorities, non-governmental organizations, more than 50 political parties, ex-presidents, labor unions, business interests, farmers, and dozens of local development organizations" were present at the national convention for comprehensive negotiating and bargaining (Brown and Kaiser 2007, 1136; Magnusson 1999). It is no surprise that the post-transition institutions chosen by the transitional government are exceptionally inclusive.

Table 6.2: Effective Numbers of Parties in Beninese Elections Since 1991

	Effective Numbers of Parties (Votes)	Effective Numbers of Parties (Seats)	Disproportionality
1991	9.94	8.97	3.75
1995	15.70	7.43	11.08
1999	n.a.	6.76	n.a.
2003	n.a.	4.79	n.a.
2007	n.a.	4.01	n.a.

Data sources: African Election Database (<http://africanelections.tripod.com/ke.html>) and Inter-Parliamentary Union (<http://www.ipu.org>)

Under the party-list proportional representation rule,⁷⁷ Benin is a democracy with a typical multiparty system. The effective numbers of parties in the legislature are fairly high (See Table 6.2, column 3 ENP; also see Figure 3.3). In the first two rounds of democratic elections, the level of party fragmentation is almost equivalent to that in Brazil (also see Figure 6.2).⁷⁸ Although the 2003 and 2007 elections witnessed a decrease of effective legislative parties, which could be deemed as a sign of institutionalization of the party system, the Beninese party system remains highly power-sharing oriented. A multiparty system contributes to proportional representation in Benin. Based on the election in 1991 and 1995, the electoral system did not radically transform the vote shares, especially the 1991 election in which disproportionality is exceptionally low.⁷⁹ Comparatively, Benin democracy falls into the category of low

⁷⁷ Specifically, for Beninese PR system in legislative elections, each party list bears as many names of candidates as seats to be filled. Seats are allotted to the different lists on the basis of the so-called departmental (simple) quotient. Following this computation, remaining seats are allocated under the rule of the greatest remainder. See African Election Database (<http://africanelections.tripod.com/ke.html>) and Inter-Parliamentary Union (<http://www.ipu.org>) for election.

⁷⁸ In my data, the ENP of Brazil elections are 8.66 in 1990, 8.16 in 1994, and 8.47 in 1998.

⁷⁹ No data about the voting in the elections since 1999 are available, which makes it impossible to calculate the disproportionality in those elections.

disproportionality (see Figure 3.3 for the relative position of Benin among all third-wave democracies).

The patterns of power allocation among the executive and legislative branches also reflect the nature of power-sharing in Beninese democracy. First, the Beninese president is less powerful than his counterpart in Kenya. The president is empowered with extensive powers such as to legislate by decree, to chair cabinet meetings, to control the budget and so on (Bierschenk 2009, 350). However, compared with the Kenyan president, as mentioned above, Beninese president is lacking two critical powers: declaring long-term emergencies and dissolving the legislature (Siaroff 2003, 302). Thus, on one hand, this provides the president with no chance to monopolize the power in the case of a national emergency. It is not rare that, in transitional democracies, political leaders appropriate the power with the excuse of a so-called emergency. Given the fact that Benin is a multiethnic society in which unstable factors are not unusual, restricting the presidency by denying it the power to act during an emergency greatly decreases the possibility of centralizing power in the presidency. Moreover, the inability of the president to dissolve the parliament strongly increases the strength of the legislative branch as an independent institution in Benin. If the survival of parliament does not depend on the president, the chance for the president to dominate the government becomes slim. With a relatively balanced relationship between the legislative and executive, it is not surprising that the power of the Beninese legislature is ranked 59 out of 158 globally, compared with the Kenyan parliament at number 126 (Fish and Kroenig 2008; Fish 2006).

The balanced legislative-executive relationship can be explained by additional institutional features. Beninese presidential and legislative elections are not concurrent elections. The electoral cycle of the presidential election is every five years, whereas the legislative cycle is every four years. After the founding elections, which were held simultaneously in 1991, there will be no concurrent elections until the year 2011. For example, the 1995 legislative election was held a year before the second round of presidential elections. The next legislative election was held three years after the president election. Given the lag in time, the coattail effects of the presidential election are little, which becomes one of the institutional underpinnings of a divided government in the Beninese presidential system (Shugart 1995). Thanks to the combination of a non-concurrent election, the PR electoral system and diverse ethnic groups, the president's party in Benin has a hard time in winning a majority in the parliament. In the wake of the 1991 democratic transition, the Beninese government was only not politically divided for around three years; this started with the 2003 legislative election and ended with the 2006 presidential election. The undivided government during this period of time was due to an unusual coalition among the parties. Political parties, including the Union for the Benin of the Future (UBF), African Movement of Democracy and Progress (MADEP), Key Force (FC), Impulse for Progress and Democracy (IPD) and other small parties⁸⁰ formed an alliance to support President Kerekou, under the banner of the Presidential Movement

⁸⁰ The Presidential Movement (MP) coalition included UBF, MADEP, FC, Movement for Development by the Culture-Salute Party-Congress of People for Progress Alliance (Alliance MDC-PS-CPP), (Impulse for Progress and Democracy) IPD, (Alliance of Progress Forces) AFD, (Movement for Development and Solidarity) MDS and Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP). The opposition parties included Renaissance Party of Benin (RB), Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), (Star Alliance) AE and New Alliance (NA). See African Database for the list of parties. http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html#2003_National_Assembly_Election.

(MP), which won 52 out of 83 seats. However, this coalition did not occur in other legislative elections, which normally gave the biggest legislative party less than 40 percent of the seats in parliament. As a result, so far, 80 percent of the time the Beninese government is divided, which is more divided than most of the presidential systems (See Figure 3.6). Therefore, unlike the Kenyan case, no party can dominate the government. The minority parties in a relatively powerful parliament gain a sufficient amount of leverage in influencing the policy process.

The foregoing analysis indicates, which is different from Kenyan democracy in which institutions encourage ethnicity politics and the dominance of certain ethnic groups, that the Beninese democracy engages in institutionally power sharing. No political party can manage to control the government. The survival of the president and parliament is mutually independent. The constitution empowers the president comprehensively, but is limited in terms of any control over the legislative branch. By spreading power broadly among various groups and institutions, Benin democracy is able to maintain its political inclusiveness and competitiveness (e.g. Bierschenk 2009; Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff 2005; Gisselquist 2008; Seely 2005). This inclusiveness of institutions is self-enforcing. Once social sectors perceive the possibility of realizing interests through institutional channels, they are driven to bargaining for interests through democratic competition. At the same time, recognizing the impossibility of monopolizing the state resources by any group, politicians are motivated to seek cooperation and coordination among parties to pass bills and allocate resources. It has been widely accepted that Beninese democracy has successfully consolidated and stabilized (Brown and Kaiser 2007; Gisselquist 2008; Lindberg 2006a; Norris 2008b).

Peaceful turnover in the office of the presidency and free and fair elections have placed Benin in the category of a free country.⁸¹

Political Institutions and Changes in Kenya

The purpose of this MSSD research is to illustrate the impact of the independent variable, political institutions, on democratic development, by controlling for systemic variables such as socioeconomic development and demographic patterns. The aforementioned analysis demonstrates that institutional arrangements, power-sharing oriented or power-concentrating oriented, do have significant consequences on Kenyan and Beninese democratization. Although it is absurd to imagine that institutional reform alone will address the illness of a Kenyan stumbling democracy (Mueller 2008; Southall 2009, 456), the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya has put on the table the necessary reformation of the Kenyan political incentive system (e.g. Reilly 2006b; Southall 2009).

The proposed options focus on the Kenyan majoritarian electoral system. The successful cases of electoral engineering in Benin, Lesotho and South Africa provide alternative electoral rules for Kenya.

Earlier analysis indicates that SMDP produces high disproportionality by over-representing the winning party (winning the majority of seats). And the single chance in a given constituency fosters a confrontational and winner-take-all mentality in elections (Southall 2009, 450). To change the consequences of SMDP, which reinforces the

⁸¹ Again, to argue that Benin is a consolidated democracy is not to say Beninese democracy is highly effective and of high quality. As I have argued in Chapter II, whereas a power-sharing institution encourages representation and inclusiveness of diverse social groups, which makes democracy work, it does not necessary imply that it makes democracy work well. As a matter of fact, a power-sharing democracy is also a fragmented democracy, which makes it a competitive democracy without development (Bierschenk 2009).

ethnicization in Kenyan political competition, political scientists propose two main options, mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) based on single ballot and a closed-list PR system (Southall 2009, 450-454). The main purpose is to motivate the politicians to reach across ethnic lines and thereby constrain ethnic politics.

MMP is considered by some institutionalists to be the “the best of both” systems because, under MMP systems, the PR party seats are awarded to compensate for the disproportionality produced by single-member district seat results (e.g. Karp 2009, 41; Shugart and Wattenberg 2003). In most models, the voters cast two votes in a single ballot, one for a constituency representative and one for a party. If a candidate wins the constituency seat, he/she will be crossed off the party list. Thus, this system is also called “compensatory mixed members”.⁸² Ideally, by awarding the parties which fail to win seats in given constituencies, improves the overall proportionality. However, theoretically, it is possible that the single-member district result is so great that the additional party seats cannot compensate for the gap. The adoption of MMD in the Lesotho 2002 election has proven to effectively reduce the disproportionality in elections (Cho and Bratton 2006; Southall 2009),⁸³ which suggests the possibility of MMP in Kenya in reducing the disproportionality by presenting the opposition parties more chances to win seats. More importantly, MMP provides the incentives to form inter-party coalitions⁸⁴ in the elections, because the political parties see the opportunity to form a

⁸² See ACE, the Electoral Knowledge Network, <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd03/esd03a>; and IDEA, A handbook of Electoral System Design.

⁸³ Other countries that adopt the MMP system include New Zealand, Germany, and Quebec in Canada.

⁸⁴ It is debatable as to whether the coalition formation is good for Lesotho democracy or not. Some scholars argue that the formed coalition in Lesotho preceding the election is a sign that political

legislative majority through the PR seats under MMP (Kapa 2008; Likoti 2009).

Evidence shows that there are “contamination effects” in elections (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Karp 2009). Namely, the single-member seats and PR seats are not independent of each other. Political parties strategically use the party list to win electoral advantages. The 2007 election in Lesotho well reflected this. In addition, district level data of MMP systems indicate that a large portion of voters cast split-ticket votes when given a single ballot (Johnston and Pattie 2002). This also motivates the candidates to campaign across party lines, and broaden their policy positions, when they are placed in a disadvantageous position on the party list. In short, the MMP system improves proportional representation and encourages inter-party politics, which theoretically is what the Kenyan democracy is looking for.

Closed- list PR rule is also suggested by some scholars, which was largely inspired by the South African electoral system (e.g. Bogaards 2007; Reilly 2006b; Southall 2009), which was also adopted by the Beninese democracy. The PR list would allow for minority representation, while discouraging political mobilization around ethnicity. But there is a big disadvantage of the closed-list PR system, which is that it empowers the party leaders with enormous influence in selecting the candidates on the party lists. Theoretically, a closely-list PR with a large district magnitude encourages party-based campaigns, which may cause problems in Kenyan politics. To restrict ethnic parties and develop multi-ethnic political parties, Reilly also suggests strategies of other

parties exploited and manipulated the MMP electoral systems. The coalition actually dominated the political system, which went against the original purpose of MMP, which was designed to break the power dominance of parties under SMDP (Likoti 2009).

institutions such as cross-regional party registration which has been broadly adopted in Latin America and Asian Pacifica multiethnic societies (Reilly 2006b, 816-819).

Conclusion

Comparative analyses on Kenyan and Beninese democracies illustrate the engineering power of political institutions, but it does not imply that institutions determine the destiny of democracy, as I have repeatedly argued. The Kenyan electoral system requires reform. However, to keep Kenyan democracy on the right track will also depend on other critical requisites of democratization: satisfying socioeconomic development, the formation of a democracy-prone civil society, the cultivation of interpersonal trust and inter-ethnic communication, and a group of dedicated democrats in the society. Thanks to the inclusive institutional arrangements, Beninese democracy is being sustained. Nevertheless, a sustained democracy does not guarantee the quality of governance in Benin. Whereas power sharing does keep Beninese democracy from deviating, its negative effects, including the fragmentation of political systems, the lack of clarity of responsibility and the low efficiency, are also an indispensable part of the story. In short, even in the typical cases, such as Benin and Kenya, the impacts of power-sharing political institutions on democratic development are not deterministic. In the following chapter, I demonstrate in Thailand that political institutions are powerless in engineering politics, and in Mongolia power-concentrating institutions are not a hindrance to democratic consolidation at all.

Chapter VII

Do Power-sharing Institutions Really Matter? Mongolia and Thailand

"We made our democracy ourselves, we will defend it ourselves," Oyungerel said. "I love democracy. I want to give this society to my children."

The New York Times (July 28, 2008)

The prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, has failed to make any headway with the red shirts. On April 10th he hastily sent in troops to clear another protest site, with the loss of 25 lives.... Yet even on May 18th an 11th-hour ceasefire had appeared close. But mistrust on both sides proved impossible to bridge, and the talks failed.

The Economist (May 20, 2010)

Preceding intensive case studies of how power-sharing institutions actually “work” in Beninese and Kenyan democracies are only one-half of the way to complete the nested analysis. According to Lieberman, in-depth studies focusing on deliberately selected “on- and off-the-line” cases are also required to build possible new and coherent theoretical models, which are subject to further large-N tests (Lieberman 2005, 437). Namely, further case studies, which may suggest alternative independent variables, rather than power-sharing political institutions to explain the democratic development, are of necessity. Thus, in this chapter, I first choose a deviant case of democratization, Mongolia (e.g. Bulag 2009; Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008; Fish 2001; Fritz 2002; Fritz 2008), to show that even some power-concentrating aspects have not been a hindrance to consolidating Mongolian democracy; and second choose a deeply troubled

democracy, Thailand (e.g. Connors 2008; Croissant and Kuehn 2009; Kitirianglarp and Hewison 2009; Lintner 2009; Pye and Schaffar 2008; Ufen 2008), to illustrate how a democracy is caught in a dilemma between adopting power-concentrating institutions to consolidate the fragmented political system, and power-sharing institutions to keep political actors within the game of democratic negotiation. Both cases reveal the limitation of political institutions in engineering democratic development in new democracies.

The Case Selection of Mongolia and Thailand

The large-N study in Chapter IV demonstrates a positive relationship between power-sharing institutions and democratic development in new democracies. Therefore, cases selected for model-testing in the preceding chapter are from Category I and IV in Table 6.1 (based on Figure 6.2). Logically, the off-line cases (“F” and “G” cases in Figure 6.1) should be found from Category II and III in Table 6.1, in which either power-sharing institutions are associated with trapped democracies (Category III) or power-concentrating oriented institutions do not impede democratic progress (Category II).

The data and graphs in the preceding chapters indicate that the Caribbean mini countries⁸⁵ are a group of typical stabilized majoritarian democracies (see the upper-left quadrant in Figure 6.2), which are perfect “outliers” with regard to the revealed positive consequences of power-sharing institutions on democratic development. However, they are not ideal cases for the model-building analysis in this study due to the following

⁸⁵ These democracies include Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadine, Trinidad & Tobago, and Costa Rica. According to Freedom House, they are all rated as free countries, but they are not included in Polity IV dataset.

reasons. Thanks to the British colonial heritage, the Caribbean states became typical Westminster parliamentary democracies with First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral rules and two-party systems when turning independent. In other words, the well-functioning democracies in this region are largely explained by one of the control variables in the multivariate regressions: British colonial heritage. As a matter of fact, similar to the democracies located in those tiny pacific islands ⁸⁶ which also inherited the British political system, Caribbean democracies are seldom regarded as representatives of third-wave democracies, due to their peculiar history and small geographic and demographic size. For example, the Polity IV dataset does not even include these cases. It is established that in these mini democracies majoritarian political institutions in actuality engineer democratic development, but it is hard to extend the conclusion to other third-wave democracies, which are characterized by far more complicated demographic, socioeconomic and cultural conditions. Also with a majoritarian democracy system, Botswana is another possible case. However, I choose not to focus on this country. On one hand, as I have discussed in Chapter II, whether Botswana is a typical electoral democracy is still a bit controversial (e.g. Cheibub 2007; Good 1996; Good and Taylor 2008). Different from Caribbean democracies, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has overwhelmingly dominated the government since its independence in the 1960s. On the other hand, the heavy influence of British colonial legacy on this minimal democracy diminishes the role of political institutions *per se*. Therefore, this case was excluded.

The final case, Mongolia, is a deviant case as a successful democracy without the normal prerequisites of democratization (e.g. Fish 1998a, 2001; Fritz 2002, 2008), but in

⁸⁶ Such as Solomon islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.

fact does not perfectly meet the requirements as an “outlier”. It has been rated as a “free country” since the 1991 democratic transition (Freedom House, 2009). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy in 2008, it is ranked 58 out of 167 countries, with excellent scores in “electoral process and pluralism” and “civil liberty.”⁸⁷ In terms of political institutions, they are largely power-concentrating, but the powers are not utterly as centralized as they are in typical majoritarian systems (I discuss details later) because of its adoption of semi-presidentialism (e.g. Fish 2001, 331), which is the reason why it is not a perfect outlier. However, the amazing coalition formation under majoritarian electoral systems (e.g. Bulag 2009) and the dominant party, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party’s (the MPRP) remarkable commitment to democratic values (e.g. Fritz 2002; Fritz 2008; Pomfret 2000; Rossabi 2009) speak to a fact that some power-concentrating oriented institutions do not necessarily damage the democratization process, which makes the case of Mongolia as “outlying” and ideal for this study.

To find a troubled power-sharing democracy is the most difficult case selection in this study. For most problematic new democracies, power-concentrating institutions, such as superpresidentialism, and SMDP electoral systems, are somewhat the problems in deepening democratization. Based on Figure 6.2, problematic democracies including Armenia, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Thailand characteristically have multiparty systems. However, strictly speaking, cases like Armenia, Liberia, and Thailand are not typically consensual. In terms of electoral systems, Liberia and the Central African Republic both adopt SMDP electoral rules; Armenia has constantly

⁸⁷ See <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf>.

changed its electoral system; and the Thai electoral system also experiences significant changes. Besides its changing electoral system, Armenia's superpresidentialism (Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001; Ruiz-Rufino 2008) equally indicates it is not a typical power-sharing democracy since the 1991 transition. Moreover, the constitutional change to balance the power between the executive and legislative branches well confirms the power-sharing theories (Ruiz-Rufino 2008, 369), which disqualify it as an "outlier" in the model-building case study. Democratic elections came after civil wars in Liberia, the Central African Republic and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1990s. I exclude these cases because whether they should be regarded as typical democracies is still contested (e.g. Cheibub 2007; IDEA dataset).

For example, Bosnia implements exceptionally power-sharing institutions. Bosnian democracy is a semi-presidential system with a three-member rotating presidency among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Forty-two seats in the House of Representatives are distributed equally among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, which are decided by party-list proportional electoral rules.⁸⁸ However, it was not until 2002 that Bosnia achieved an independent status and was responsible for conducting an election under a national election law (Burwitz 2004). Thus, Bosnia so far has only held two-rounds of independent elections. Gauging the influence of political institutions in democracies with limited experience in conducting elections runs the risk of underestimating the impact of political institutions since those democracies have not been

⁸⁸ See Parties and Election in Europe, <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/bosnia.html>; also IPU, Parline database on national parliaments, <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>.

given enough time to institutionalize democratic competition.⁸⁹ Moreover, evidence shows that power-sharing institutions in Bosnia, if they do not necessarily facilitate democratic development (Bieber and Keil 2009; Hayden 2005; Ottaway 2003), they do not fixate on accentuation on ethnicity in politics (Simonsen 2005).

I finally use Thailand to demonstrate the difficulty and limits of power-sharing institutions, although it is not a perfect choice either. Thailand is not a typically power-sharing democracy (details discussed later). Moreover, the power monopolization by Thai Rak Thai under the leadership of Thaksin Shinawatra was one of reasons for the 2006 military coup (e.g. Albritton 2006; Connors 2008; Kuhonta 2008; Kuhonta and Mutebi 2006), which may somewhat disqualify it as an outlier in this case. However, in Thailand, both coalition governments and the majority dominant government failed to prevent unrest and military coups, which well illustrates the pros and cons of both power-sharing and power-concentrating institutions in consolidating inchoate democracies. This makes it ideal to show how new democracies, even when lacking in adequate societal and cultural requisites, are in an awkward predicament to arrange appropriate institutions in consolidating democracy.

Political Elites and Democratic Commitment in Mongolia

As the only post-communist country outside the Central and Eastern Europe rated as free country by Freedom House (Freedom House 1991-2009), Mongolian democracy

⁸⁹ Here, I am not arguing that the longer a democracy persists, the more institutionalized the democratic institutions. We have observed a large number of Latin American democracies in which party systems fail to get institutionalized long after the transition (e.g. Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). On the contrary, some African political party systems quickly institutionalize after transition (e.g. Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007a). However, in general, institutionalization takes time. Experiences are accumulated from practice. Thus, I argue that countries that have installed democracy after recent civil wars are not good cases for the analysis of the impact of political institutions.

is exceptional (e.g. Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008; Fish 2001; Fritz 2008; Pomfret 2000). In the early 1990s, an inner Asian former Soviet Union country surprisingly embarked on democratic transition without favorable prerequisites (Fish 1998a, 139). Equally extraordinarily, the post-transition consolidation has been fairly successful. Multiple peaceful power turnovers through free and fair elections have been achieved in the post-transition era including the 1996 and 2000 elections (Fish 1998b; Ginsburg 1998); and the 2004 election brought for the first time coalition government to Mongolia. Democracy boosts Mongolian economic growth (Fritz 2007); citizens show high levels of trust in the president and parliament (Fritz 2008, 783). Despite some alleged rigging of the 2008 election, Mongolia generally is impressive in its excellent democratic performance.

It is imperative to ask why Mongolia (so far) is quite successful in playing the democratic game. Mongolia, included in the Soviet bloc since the 1920s, had no democratic history preceding the transition in 1990. Geographically, it is a highly isolated country, far from the influence of Western democracy, which is an important factor in democratic transition (e.g. Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Huntington 1993). Various indicators show that Mongolia has not been a prosperous country.⁹⁰ Ethnically, Mongolia is not homogenous. It contains many minorities. According to the Alesinan indicator of fractionalization, Mongolian ethnic fractionalization is at the level of 0.368, largely equivalent to that in Belarus, Croatia and Iraq (Alesina et al. 2003, 185-189). For

⁹⁰ Based on the indicator of GDP per capita from World Bank, IMF, World Development Indicator, the Mongolian GDP per capita is round 1700 US dollars in 1990. The follow years witnessed a decline of GDP per capital due to the dual transition process. According to empirical study of modernization theory (e.g. Przeworski 2000; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), socioeconomic development in Mongolia is not in a favorable condition for democratization.

this study, a useful question is whether or not political institutions facilitate Mongolian democratization. If they do, is that because of powers-sharing arrangements? The answer is yes and no. “Yes”, it is because the adoption of semi-presidential systems reflects the power-sharing orientation of political actors when designing the democratic institutions. “No”, it is because the Mongolian electoral system is a typical majoritarian electoral system, which has proved not to impair the new democracy. In Mongolian politics, the absence of the attempt of a single political leader or political party to grab power (Fish 1998b; Fritz 2008, 778) is unusual, even given the one-party dominance resulting from the elections. Extraordinary commitment to democratic principles of compromise and inclusiveness on the part of political actors mostly transcend the constraints of political institutions.

Starting from the beginning of the political opening in Mongolia, custodians of the old regime and anticommunist opposition leaders widely and consistently share dedication to the principle of nonviolence in constructing a new democratic regime (e.g. Fish 2001, 1998b). The tolerance and incorporation of the opposition into political negotiation occurs largely because the leaders from the communist party, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), were driven by the desire to share the blame for the economic distress that existed (Fish 1998a; Fritz 2002; Pomfret 2000). This self-interested motivation, however, paved the way for compromise in future battles and created a virtuous circle of mutual reassurance between governing party and its opposition (Fish 1998b, 131). The choice of a semi-presidential system is one of the products of compromise. It was divided among the constitutional framers. Due to the Soviet past, pro-parliamentary advocates argue that parliamentary systems, in which

powers are distributed among many elected officials, help prevent the monopolization of power, which makes it impossible for a single power to manipulate the Mongolian sovereignty (Fish 1998b, 133). At the same time, pro-presidency advocates argue that a president's checks and balances on the legislature and the separation of powers is a cue to a possible dictator, like Tsedenbal (the previous autocrat in Mongolia), in the parliament. The negotiation resulted in a mixed system with the president being granted the veto power. The dispersed powers among the executive and legislative branches, and the limited power of the president (Bulag 2009; Siaroff 2003, 300) arguably contribute to Mongolian democratization, especially when compared with the suprapresidentialism in other failed democracies within the former Soviet Union bloc (Fish 2001; Gel'man 2006; Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001). From this perspective, Mongolian democracy is not "abnormal" or "deviant" enough as an "outlying" case. Nevertheless, what makes Mongolia atypical is its politicians' commitment to democratic principles even given an opportunity to monopolize power.

Mongolian 1992 electoral law adopted a majoritarian electoral system with a simple majority vote in 26 multi member constituencies. The electoral system remains except for the change preceding the 1996 election; when there was a switch from 26 multi-member to 76 single-member district. The nature of the electoral system presents the chance for Mongolian parties to win a majority in parliament without a majority of the popular votes. As a matter of fact, the MPRP won the elections overwhelmingly. For example, in the 1992 elections, whereas the MRPR won 56.9 percent popular seats, it got 70 of 76 seats in the parliament, which resulted in 1.175 effective parties in the parliament, basically a one-party dominated legislature (see Table 7.1). A similar pattern

occurred in the 2000 election when the MRPR won 51.6 percent popular votes, and 94.7 percent seats in the legislative election. The effect of plurality electoral rules in manufacturing the majority does not reside exclusively in the MPRP. It equally helped the opposition parties in the 1996 election, in which the democratic alliance, a democratic coalition led by the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MDNP), the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), won 47 percent of the popular vote, and 50 seats (65.8 percent) in the parliament. The first peaceful power turnover came to Mongolia in the second round of democracy elections, a significant symbol of Mongolian democratic consolation heading in the right direction.

The illustrated electoral results in the Mongolian post-transition era reflect the typical pattern of party systems under majoritarian electoral rules: the one-party domination with high level of electoral disproportionality. Nevertheless, Mongolian politics does not in actuality function in a one-party manner even when a single party institutionally dominated the government. Both political elites and the masses under the leadership of opposition parties behave under the framework of democracy.

Table 7.1: Parliamentary Electoral Results in Mongolia

	1992		1996		2000		2004	
	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat
MPRP	56.9%	92.1%	40.9%	32.9%	51.6%	94.7%	48.23%	48.68%
Democratic Alliance	17.5%	5.3%						
MSDP	10.1%	1.3%						
MCUP			1.8%	1.3%				
DU			47%	65.8%	13.4%	1.3%		
MDNS					11%	1.3%		
PCC-MGPv					3.6%	1.3%		
MDC							44.27%	46.1%
Republican Party							1.38%	1.3%
Green Party								
Others	13.5%	0	7.2%	0	17.5%	0	2.72%	0
Independent	3%	1.3%	3.1%	0	2.9%	1.3%	3.4%	3.95%
Effective Parties (Votes)	2.714		2.577		3.236		2.321	
Effective Parties (Seats)	1.175		1.841		1.114		2.218	
Disproportionality	27.367		14.81		33.25		2.334	

Note: the MPRP, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party; the MSDP, the Mongolian Social Democratic Party; the MRDP, the Mongolia Democratic Religion Party; the DU is the coalition of the MDNP, the MSDP, the MGP and the MRDP, which won the 1996 election; the MDC is a coalition of Motherland Democratic Coalition (Ekh Oron-Ardchilsan); Democratic Party (Ardchilsan Nam); Motherland Party (Ekh Oron Nam); Civic Will Party (Irgenii Zorig Nam); Others, Parties that won vote share but failed to gain seats are grouped into others.

Data source: Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann. 2001. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific A Data Handbook, Volume 2: South East Asia, East Asia and the South Pacific*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; also see IPU data archive: <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>.

After the 1992 election in which the opposition democratic parties only won five seats with more than 40 percent of the popular vote. It could have ended up with violence on the part of the electoral losers, a group which had been extremely under-represented in the election results. The post-election hunger strikes were organized by the opposition parties. However, demonstrators challenged the government but carefully avoided demanding the resignation of the MPRP or claiming the election was illegitimate (Fish 1998b; Severinghaus 1995). Simultaneously, the MPRP, the governing authority, chose to provide some concession without forceful repression. Under the leadership of President P. Ochirbat, the force of negotiation and compromise prevailed (Severinghaus 1995, 71). Three opposition leaders sat down with the MPRP and signed documents to resolve the disputes. Both the government and the opposition showed incredible patience and restraint in handling the unbalanced power allocation problem resulting from the election, and sought alternative ways to proceed in future elections.

The national Democrat-Social Democrat coalition defeated the MPRP for the first time in the 1996 election thanks to the on-going economic recession (Fritz 2002, 90), the public's desire for change (Pomfret 2000), and the manufactured majority under plurality rules. With the historic loss of power, the MPRP did not even consider blocking a transfer of power to the new governing coalition. Instead, the MPRP focused on the upcoming by-elections and presidential election (Fish 1998b).

N. Enkhbayar, the New chairman for the MPRP, won the by-election, which gave the MPRP 25 seats in the parliament and successfully prevented an override of a presidential veto of legislation (Fish 1998b; Ginsburg 1998, 65). It is extraordinary that the MPRP, which had never had to worry about staying in power, learned quickly to use principles of

parliamentary procedure and constitutional laws to actualize its interests (Severinghaus 2001, 62). The behavior of the MPRP in the 1996 election indicates that the former communist party has passed the test of transforming into a true player of the democratic game. The fresh-handed democratic coalition DU ⁹¹ also showed incredible commitment to democratic rule. For example, in facing the situation where a single-seat loss to the MPRP would jeopardize the coalition's attempt to obtain a quorum of two-thirds of the parliamentary membership, the DU coalition complied with the court's decision to form the government exclusively with non-MPs (Ginsburgh and Ganzorig 2000, 313). Amazingly, both the electoral winners and losers regard democracy as "the only game in town," and strictly follow the rules of the democratic game.

The sweeping victory of the MPRP in the 2000 parliamentary elections even surprised the group itself. The presidential election in the following year further ensured the MPRP's dominance in government. However, by the year 2001, the new government seemed to move in the right direction. The media had been largely independent of government control. The NGOs became unprecedentedly active without repression from the MPRP. The constitutional amendment was passed with the support of president Bagabandi (Finch 2002; Severinghaus 2001). When the 2004 election resulted in no majority for both the MPRP and the democratic coalition, ⁹² Mongolian democracy encountered an impasse. Both sides tried hard to mobilize the public to win the critical seats, but the attempts quickly dissipated. They both recognized cooperation and

⁹¹ DU is the coalition of the MPRP, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party; the MSDP, Mongolian Social Democratic Party; the MRDP, Mongolia Democratic Religion Party and Green Party, which won the 1996 election.

⁹² Independents won three seats in the parliament, which constitutes 4% in the parliament. The MPRP won 37 seats and the MDC won 35 of the total 76 seats.

compromise, not confrontation, were needed to overcome the impasse (Tuya 2005). The MPRP and the MDC (the democratic coalition), as they had been practicing in the past elections for a decade, reached the deal by splitting the legislative and executive posts evenly between them (Tuya 2005, 68). The new round of elections in 2004 witnessed the tradition of compromise and cooperation entrenched in Mongolian politics carried on.

Considering post-transition politics in Mongolia, the post-election riot in 2008 was a little unusual. With a clear victory by the MPRP in winning 46 seats in parliament, the opposition DP leader Taskhiagiin Elbegdorj refused to concede, claiming the election was rigged. Due to the fear of a “color revolution,” which had happened in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the authority exercised excessive power (Bulag 2009, 130). However, it shows that the Mongolian tradition of compromise, negotiation and dedication to nonviolence are rather strong and finally prevailed. Another leader of the DP coalition, Norovyn Altankhuyag, who was inclined to accept the election, won majority support in the opposition (Bulag 2009, 131). Simultaneously, the MPRP leaders understood that without the support of the DP, there was no chance to pass the critical bills on the mineral law, which was regarded as crucial to reach the deal with foreign investors (Bulag 2009; Fritz 2002). The reconciliation from both sides paved the way for the formation of the MPRP-DP coalition government. Once again, the governing party and the opposition managed to compromise and cooperate with each other to eschew the damage on democracy.

I have stated that institutionalists emphasize the importance of institutional arrangements because institutions create the incentives based on which political actors use rationality to maximize their utility in the game. The rationale of the pro-power-

sharing scholars is, that in order to keep everyone in the game of democracy, it is imperative for every group to be represented through democratic elections (see Chapter II for theoretical arguments). Nevertheless, the Mongolian case, an “odd” case to the power-sharing argument, challenges the pro-power-sharing school at least in two aspects.

Institutions are not the sole source of political elites’ and the public’s commitment to democratic values. With the overwhelming winning in the elections after the democratic transition, both the MPRP and the opposition democrats were presented with multiple chances to dominate the government substantively. However, neither side took advantage of the sweeping electoral victory to reject the opposition completely in order to monopolize power. Theoretically, under the majoritarian electoral rules, elections are a “winner-take-all” game. Nonetheless, the MPRP, even when they did win and take all, did not play the “winner-take-all” game. Leaders of the MPRP *chose* to resolve disputes by negotiation, and the opposition was invited to constitute the government. The MPRP handed over power in a professional style as democrats, when they lost the elections. The opposition democrats were equally impressive. They complained and protested but *chose* not to challenge the fundamental legitimacy of democratic elections. The president of Mongolia, from Ochirbat to Bagabadni, whose persistent commitment to political openness and fairness, created enormous trust among political elites while nourishing the public’s trust in democratic institutions. Such behavior obviously could not simply be explained by the rational choices under the given political institutions. The politicians’ commitment to democratic principles in the post-election era was largely independent of Mongolian institutions. Instead, the politicians’ intentional choices do matter, and are not merely utility-maximization driven. There could be a variety of reasons why the

interaction between the authority and the opposition would deviate from the democratic track similar to what has occurred in other former Soviet Union bloc countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Russia itself. But, even in the absence of influence from the Western democracies, Mongolian politicians' willingness and determination to stay in the democratic game are exceptionally strong, which well illustrates the limitation of the institutional explanation of democratization under the rational choice framework. It seems that the critical conjuncture in Mongolian democratization came during the 1991 transition, when inclusiveness and compromise prevailed, setting the tone of Mongolian politics ever since then. Interestingly, to recall that the style of inclusiveness and compromise embedded in the transition was started because the dominating MPRP was willing to "share" the blame of economic distress. This is hardly a structural or institutional explanation since economic distress is so common that almost every transitional democracy is faced with it. In fact, it is not uncommon for the governing authority to choose not to "share" the blame. It is possible that the MPRP played tough and still won the election given its apparent advantage in party organization, and due to the fact that the opposition parties were barely in shape to do so back then. But, the MPRP chose not to do that. Therefore, under given institutions and societal conditions, political actors have plenty of room to make their choices, which can lead to political landscapes which are completely different from what is hypothesized under rational institutionalism.

Having discussed how remarkable it is that Mongolian democracy benefits from a group of committed democrats, I proceed to analyze a troubled democracy, Thailand, in which democracy is decaying despite the efforts to choose appropriate institutions.

Thailand: A Democracy Failed to Compromise

In Southeast Asia, Thailand has the longest experience of independent and democratic rule (Freedman 2007, 197), which, however, seems not helpful to a stable democracy at all. Thai democracy has been characteristically vacillating between democratic elections and military control (e.g. Freedman 2007; Lintner 2009; Ockey 2007; Schafferer 2009). The democratic election in 1992 was usually regarded as a serious end of military rule, and a start toward seeking democratic order in Thailand (Bunbongkarn 1993).⁹³ In the following years, Thai democracy seemed on the right track. It witnessed power turnovers through peaceful elections and strong economic growth preceding the Asian financial crisis. The 1997 constitutional reform aimed at a better institutionalized political system with more checks and balances. Nevertheless, with Thaksin triumphant with one-party dominance in the government, thanks to the unexpected consequences of a constitutional amendment (Kuhonta 2008; Punyaratabandhu 1998), Thailand was deemed as struggling for democratic consolidation (Albritton 2006; Martinez Kuhonta and Mutebi 2006). When the military force once again overthrew the Thaksin government through a coup in 2006, Thai's precarious democracy was pushed to the brink. Despite the attempt to restore the democratic order in the 2007 election (Schafferer 2009), anti-government unrest has never stopped. April 2010 saw the worst political violence in Thailand in nearly 20 years (Mydans and Fuller

⁹³ Thailand started democratic elections after 1975. However, the democratic practice in the late 1970s and 1980 was normally deemed as tenuous (Freedman 2007). Scholars usually regard that the Thai transition to democracy came with the 1992 election when military rule was overthrown by democratic election.

2010, New York Time, April 10, 2010).⁹⁴ Thailand is battling for the survival of its democracy (Lintner 2009).

Why is a country with many more favorable prerequisites for democracy, rather than countries such as Mongolia and Benin, tottering in its democratic consolidation? A more compelling question for this institutional study is: What is the relationship between institutional arrangements in Thailand and its shaky democracy?

Thailand is a parliamentary system with multiple political parties. Despite the diffused power between the executive and legislative branches under parliamentarism, political power is mostly dispersed among the political parties with the exception of the Thaksin government (Croissant and Pojar 2006; Martinez Kuhonta and Mutebi 2006). Thai democracy had been characterized as having coalition governments prior to the 2005 election, which resulted in an historic majority government. The 2006 military coup seemed to indicate that a one-party majority government is barely welcome in this country with a tradition of fragmented powers. The coalition government returned after the 2007 election, with a slim majority consisting of a shaky alliance, which does not appear to be a step toward a stable democracy. In fact, from the perspective of institutions, Thai democracy well demonstrates, for new democracies, the difficult choice between a power-sharing system with fragmented powers, and a more effective democracy, but without sufficient inclusiveness of various groups.

⁹⁴ See The New York Times topics on Thailand for a series of reports on Thai antigovernment unrests in 2010.
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/thailand/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Thailand&st=cse>.

The power dispersion among parties in Thailand has been characteristic of a malfunctioning power-sharing system. Before the 1997 constitution, Thailand adopted the block vote electoral system⁹⁵ which allowed voters to cast as many ballots as the seats in a district. Voters were not permitted to cast all their votes for a single candidate, but could split their votes between candidates nominated by different parties. For example, in the 1996 elections, there were 66 two-member districts and 88 three-member districts. The voters could cast two votes in 66 districts and three votes in those 88 districts. Voters' splitting votes caused a proliferation of political parties, and encouraged a candidate oriented campaign (Schafferer 2009, 167). This is well reflected in a series of indicators regarding the Thai party system (See Table 7.3). In the 1992 and 1995 elections, effective party numbers of parties (votes) were more than seven, and that of seats in the House of Representatives were over 6.5, which generated fairly proportional representation in the system (See Table 7.3, disproportionality on the fourth Row). Before the 1997 electoral system reform, each election allocated seats to 11 parties in the parliament, and the largest party could win no more than one-third seat share in parliament, which led to unstable coalitions in the parliament. Between 1992 and 2000, the average frequency of significant cabinet changes, which means one-half of the cabinet members were replaced, reached 0.89: almost every year saw a reshuffling of the cabinet.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ In the 1992 election, the total representatives for the House of Representatives was 360; 1995, 391 representatives and 1996, 393 representatives. It was a mixed system. For example, in 1996, there were seven single-member districts and 61 two-member districts and 88 three-member districts.

⁹⁶ The cabinet change data source is from Pippa Norris data: <http://www.pippanorris.com/>.

Table 7.2: Thai Party System and Cabinet Changes

	1992	1995	1996	2001	2005	2007
Effective Parties (Votes)	7.49	7.32	4.66	4.34	2.37	3.73
Effective Parties (Seats)	6.53	6.70	4.36	3.05	1.65	2.75
Disproportionality	4.87	6.94	2.75	9.58	12.6	8.35
Legislative Parties	11	11	11	9	4	7
New Legislative Parties	4	1	0	3	1	4
Parties Elected Out	8	1	0	5	6	1
Seat Share of Largest Party	21.9%	23.5%	31.8%	49.6%	75.4%	48.5%
Seat Volatility	32%	49%	42.8%	30.1%	49.1%	49.5%
Coalition Government	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Cabinet Change Frequency	3	1	2	1	n.a.	n.a.

Data Source: Chambers, P. (2006) 'Consolidation of Thaksinocracy and crisis of democracy: Thailand's 2005 election', in A. Croissant and B. Martin (eds) *Between Consolidation and Crisis: Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia*, M^unster: LIT, p. 296; Ufen, A. (2008). "Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand." *Pacific Review* 21(3): 336; Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann. 2001. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific A Data Handbook, Volume 2: South East Asia, East Asia and the South Pacific*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sharing power among various parties *per se* is not problematic. The problem with Thai democracy is that powers were too fragmented. There is little or no unity and cohesion in Thailand's fledgling democracy (Punyaratabandhu 1998, 164). In fact, by 1997, the fragmentation of party systems had severely threatened the stability of its democracy. Therefore, the purpose of the 1997 constitutional reform was to improve the institutionalization level of the political system, and construct a more stable and efficient democracy (Kuhonta 2008; Ufen 2008). Under the 1997 constitution, 400 members were elected in single-seat constituencies, and a further 100 in a nationwide PR constituency with a five percent threshold (Schafferer 2009; also see IPU dataset). The institutional engineering effect was obvious. Combined with Thaksin's populism (Kuhonta 2008; Martinez Kuhonta and Mutebi 2006; Phongpaichit and Baker 2008) and his outstanding campaign skills, Thais Love Thais (Thai Rak Thai) swept to win the elections, especially

in the 2005 parliamentary election in which the TLT won 377 of a total 500 seats (75.4 percent). This was an historic majority government emerging in Thailand for the first time.

To some extent, the one-party majority government was what Thai wanted (e.g. Albritton 2006, 143). Under the new constitution, small parties were wiped out of the parliament. Minor parties could no longer impose disproportional influence and their constant defection could not bring down the coalition government. And, the ruling party, with a majority in the parliament, was able to pass bills expeditiously. Unfortunately, Thaksin is not a committed democrat like the leaders of the MPRP in Mongolia. He quickly turned the unprecedented opportunity of one-party majority government into an authoritarian style of governance.

To be fair, Thaksin has a mixed record of leadership (Case 2001; Freedman 2007, 201). He actually fulfilled some of his bold promises including universal health care, and the expansive provision of micro-credit to rural areas (Connors 2008, 483; Freedman 2007, 201). The government spending helped boost the Thai economy, for example, which grew by 5.2 percent in 2002, and more than six percent in 2003. This was its strongest performance since the 1997 financial crisis (Bank of Thailand 2004). However, Thaksin, who believes “democracy is just a tool...the goal is to give people a good lifestyle, happiness and national progress”, (Shinawatra December 11, 2003), proved not to be a true democrat (Lintner 2009). After coming into power, he quickly embarked on a series of campaigns against civil liberty, political rights and any improvement in democratic quality. Thaksin did everything he could to centralize power, and weaken any real or potential sources of opposition (Martinez Kuhonta and Mutebi 2006, 42). The

prime minister tried to engage in greater manipulation, and he exercised control over the media by exerting financial pressure on the media directly, or by purchasing elements of the media (Freedman 2007, 202; Martinez Kuhonta and Mutebi 2006; Ockey 2007).⁹⁷ Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) including the human rights groups, environmentalist groups, and local rural collectives were regularly harassed by authority (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004).

The eruption of anger that arose because of Thaksin's authoritarian style was triggered by the Shin Corporation scandal. The opposition coalition intensified protests against Thaksin. Finally, the fear of violence, perceptions of corruption, and the apparent undermining of democracy and royal authority led to the decision of military leaders to stage a coup (Ockey 2007, 137). Still under some martial law, the 2007 parliamentary elections were held in order to restore democratic order. This time, the electoral system was changed again. In order to prevent the dominance of Thaksin and his followers, institutions moved back to a more power-sharing mode. The previous 400 single-seat constituencies were combined into larger districts with varying magnitudes. There are now four single-seat constituencies, 63 constituencies with two seats, and 90 with three. The Block Voting (BV) system used prior to the 1997 constitutional reform was re-introduced. The number of PR list seats has been reduced to 80 (now there were only 480 seats in the House of Representatives), and they are now proportionally allocated to political parties in eight regional constituencies of roughly equal population. The 5% threshold was removed (Ockey 2008; Schafferer 2009, 168). Thus, the 2007 election

⁹⁷ For example, in 2003, Transport Minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit's family (close Thaksin allies) purchased the largest stake in the corporation that owns The Nation. In February 2004, the editor of the Bangkok Post, Veera Prateepchaikul, was shifted out of his post.

resulted in seven parties winning seats in parliament (2.75 effective parties), with no party enjoying a majority (See Table 7.2). Palang Prachachon (Thaksin's supporter) invited all parties, including three small parties, the Ruam Jai Chat Phattana, the Matchimatippatai, and the Pracharaj, to form the cabinet, but in doing so refused two medium-sized democratic parties, Chat Thai and Phua Phaendin, to participate. The familiar slim majority coalition based on small parties' support returned to Thai politics. When the red-shirt protestors, under the leadership of antigovernment democratic parties, stormed on the street and shed blood, another early election in Thailand was expected to be approaching (New York Times, April 12, 2010).

The democratic trajectory in the Thailand since 1992 vividly reflects the pros and cons of power-sharing and power-concentrating institutions. The 1997 constitutional reform was an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of over-dispersed powers, the lack of stability in government. But, an overcorrection of fragmented political system easily leads to one-party dominance. To break the monopolization of powers, Thailand retreated to the unstable but more power-sharing coalition government. Obviously, Thai democracy is caught between the dilemma of the shortcomings of power-concentrating and power-sharing institutions. In the Thai case, the electoral system's effects in shaping party systems and further influencing the power allocation among parties are strong and immediate. Nonetheless, whereas Thai institutions do engineer politics, they do not necessarily facilitate democratic development. It seems that the positive effects of designed institutions are swept away by non-institutional factors. To put it differently, there are a variety of factors beyond the institutional incentives that prevent the constructive effects of institutions, power-sharing or power-concentrating from taking

roots in the Thai political system. Institutions in Thailand surely change the game by shaping politicians' incentives and preferences. However, the case shows institutional arrangements *per se* do not automatically cultivate democratic values and guarantee a well-functioning democracy. To stimulate the positive effects of power-sharing or power-concentrating institutions, it requires the spirit of compromise among elites and the public.

First, democracy is not “the only game in town” in Thailand because military force has been persistently vigorous in politics even after the 1992 transition (Connors 2008; Croissant and Kuehn 2009; Ockey 2007; Schafferer 2009). Different from Taiwan and South Korea in which military force has been successfully tamed under the civilian control, the Thai military has shown itself more or less resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the postauthoritarian era (Croissant and Kuehn 2009, 187). The activity of military forces suggests the possibility of a military coup to break the political standoff in the government. In face of political crises, there is no urgency in Thailand to solve the predicament under the democratic framework, given the option of military intervention. The failure to subject military force under stringent civil control becomes a constant threat to Thai democratic regime.

Second, aforementioned analysis on the Mongolian case shows that Mongolian democracy benefits enormously from the democratic commitment of political elites and the public. In contrast, compromise and inclusiveness are not frequent words in the dictionary of Thai politicians, no matter what type of institutions are introduced. This happens to both the governing party (party coalition) and the antigovernment parties. We not only observed Thaksin's hegemonic government excluding the opposition, but also,

for example, the Somchai government behaved similarly. In Somchai's government, the largest party, the People's Power Party (PPP, Phak Palang Prachachon, pro-Thaksin) refused to invite any leaders from long-time rivalry democratic parties to help in forming the government. The PPP would rather depend on small parties (some of them were anti-Thaksin) to make a tenuous majority. The opposition, mainly the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD, Phanthamit Prachachon Phuea Prachathhippatai), reciprocally, did not back down. Instead of using their seats in the parliament as leverage to negotiate with the PPP, the PAD rejected the 2007 constitutional amendment plan from the PPP; they mobilized a broad spectrum of anti-Thaksin social forces and organized a series of protests (Pye and Schaffar 2008). No sign of compromise was observed during the standoff between the PPP and the PAD until the verdict of the Constitutional Court, which dissolved the PPP and banned its executive board from political office after finding it guilty of election fraud. After Adulyadej from the PAD was voted prime minister, the confrontation between the PAD and the anti-PAD (now the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, the UDD, after the PPP was banned) continued. In April 2010, while thousands of red-shirted (UDD) protestors barricaded in the streets of Bangkok (*The New York Times*, April 13, 2010), Prime Minister Adulyadej did not suggest any sign of reconciliation either. It appears that, after decades of conflicts between pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin forces, Thai politics is trapped in a vicious circle of confrontation, a self-reinforced process of the lack of compromise. When the standoff between the authority and anti-government forces becomes deeper, it turns out to be more difficult to convince each other to sit down to negotiate a settlement. As the red-shirted

protestors shouted jubilantly on the street, they believed “there is no more negotiation” (*The New York Times* April 11, 13, 14, 2010).

If Mongolia is an extraordinary case in which the spirits of democratic compromise and inclusiveness transcends institutions and help stabilize democracy, Thailand, on the other hand, is a typical case in which the lack of democratic compromise makes a working democracy difficult to achieve, no matter what types of institutions it installs.

Conclusion

In nested analysis, small-N case studies are both critical for theory-testing and theory building, the latter of which is based on the investigation into the outlying cases in the large-N patterns. In this study, the exploration of Mongolian and Thai democracies implies the limitation of power-sharing institutions in facilitating democratic development which is found in large-N models. Power-sharing institutions are not the sole source of commitment to democracy, as the Mongolian case shows. Political elites’ and the public’s choice to compromise can be present when there is a lack of favorable institutions. Moreover, power-sharing institutions do not assure democratic compromise either, which is demonstrated by the Thai democracy. Political elites and the public may choose confrontation even if power is institutionally shared, in which case a power sharing structure is transformed into divided powers. We then witness the fragmentation of political systems and the instability of government and democratic regimes. Thus, the case studies on outlying cases in this chapter invite further large-N tests on how power-sharing institutions are culturally conditioned in smoothing the progress of democratic development.

Chapter VIII

How Power-sharing Has Affected the Third-Wave of Democratization: Assessments and Recommendations

Democratization is a multifaceted phenomenon. That conventional wisdom is again confirmed by this institutional study of third-wave democracies. This research contributes to the literature of democratization by extending the Lijphartian framework of democratic institutions to the third-wave democracies. With the large-N study, I reach a generalizable conclusion that power-sharing institutional arrangements generally facilitate democratic development not only in the established democracies but also in newly-transitioned ones. The case studies following the large-N investigation test the generalized conclusions on the one hand and demonstrate the limitations of quantitative research on the other hand. Substantively, I have systematically demonstrated the relationships between democratic institutions including electoral systems, party systems and the executive-legislative power structure and democratic development. I examined the effects and limits of political institutions. Methodologically, this research is one of only a few institutional studies on the third-wave democratization that employ nested analysis. The large-N and small-N studies speak to each other, compensating for each other's shortcomings and strengthening each other's virtues. This study largely shows that the influences *and* limits of the institutions' engineering effects are equally important. In other words, democratization depends on more factors than institutions. Whether or not political elites and the public are willing to play the game of democratic compromise has a critical role in the third-wave democratization. This chapter

summarizes the contributions of this study from the findings and analyses in the previous seven chapters.

Power-sharing: its Significance and Limits

Overall, sharing powers among diverse societal groups is critical for stabilizing newly-transitioned democracies. This institutional study analyzes the power-sharing mechanisms including electoral systems, party systems and the executive-legislative structure. I show that the level of electoral disproportionality is a factor that has the most persistent consequences on democratic development and citizenry evaluation on democracy. In all the models presented here, the variable of disproportionality is negatively associated with the democratic level in a significant and consistent way. One robust conclusion is that when electoral systems proportionally transform the popular votes into seats, results are conducive to democratic progress in new democracies. By and large, PR electoral systems produce high levels of electoral proportionality, whereas majoritarian systems produce high disproportionality. Nevertheless, electoral systems are not the only aspect that influences party systems. Socioeconomic structures and historical conditions are important as well. While emphasizing the negative impact of disproportionality in elections, we must not exaggerate the facilitating role of PR systems or the possible damage caused by majoritarian systems *per se*. Social, structural and historical factors shape the consequences of electoral systems on representation.

The effects of party systems are complex. Multiparty systems, usually together with PR or mixed electoral rules, help reduce electoral disproportionality and, in turn, benefit democratic development. More importantly, to make democracy work, it is imperative that opposition and minority parties have access to power for resource

allocation and bargaining with the ruling party (or party coalition). Multiparty systems, with powers dispersed among various societal groups, prevent the monopolization of governmental powers. That is especially significant for parliamentary systems with fused governmental powers. Multiparty systems combined with presidential systems also promote democratic stability in the third-wave democracies. As a matter of fact, multiple parties can counter the negative consequences of possible presidential dominance in presidential systems. However, multiple parties occur in poorly-institutionalized party systems. In new democracies, political parties split and merge constantly from election to election making the preferences and strategic calculation of political actors unstable. Weak institutionalization of party systems not only reduces voters' evaluations of democratic performance but also directly threaten smooth alternations of power and governmental stability. Party fragmentation is a major issue in new democracies. If well-functioning new democracies fail to strongly institutionalize their party systems, democratic development suffers or breaks down due to weak and fragmented party systems. Latin American and some Asian democracies with deep social divisions confirm this generalization. It appears that most of the Central and Eastern European democracies have found the balance between multiple parties and the institutionalization of parties and party systems. This balance benefits this group of democracies significantly.

In terms of the executive-legislative relationship, the pro-power-sharing arguments favor those withof separation of powers but not those suffering under the “perils of presidentialism.” This study does not lend support to the latter. Namely, the independent presidency *per se* does not affect democratic development negatively, although to a degree it does reduce electoral winners' satisfaction with democracies. Only

when presidentialism is interacting with party systems does it affect democratic development. Specifically, it matters significantly only when no multiple parties exist in the democracies. It provides more chances for the president's party to control the legislative majority. In cases of a strong presidency, this may result in the monopolization of power. In presidential systems with divided government, in which the opposition controls the legislative majority, the division greatly helps to make democracy work by preventing a presidential concentration of power. This is one of the strongest pieces of evidence that support pro-power-sharing arguments in this study. In parliamentary systems, minimal coalition (or one-party majority) governments are harmful to democratic development. It appears that when parliamentary institutions fail to elicit coalitions among various groups, democratization suffers. This also lends support to the pro-power-sharing arguments.

However, it is imperative not to exaggerate the positive effects of power-sharing institutions. On one hand, institutions oriented to power-sharing do not guarantee real power sharing and democratic negotiation in democratization. As is repeatedly discussed in the study, democracy is about political inclusiveness and compromise through negotiation between the governing parties and the opposition. This requires, first of all, that powers are not monopolized by a single party or a dictator. It also requires, given dispersed powers, that various social groups are willing to actualize their interests through bargaining. This study indicates that power-sharing oriented institutional arrangements usually can solve the power monopolization problem by dividing powers among various parties or different governmental branches. However, spreading powers *per se* is not sufficient for the bargaining game. This is partly because over-dispersion of

power causes difficulties in coalition formation and institutionalization of preferences. Moreover, the spread of power does not necessarily cultivate the commitment to democratic compromise. Unless political actors have spirits of compromise and are willing to negotiate with each other, division of powers is only a fragmentation of powers, not true power sharing. It has been observed in many democracies, powers are that divided and fragmented but cooperation and negotiations are rare. The Thai democracy is an example. Many multiparty third-wave democracies, including Ecuador, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, have similar problems with democratic compromise and institutionalization of the system. Therefore, institutions with separation of powers do not certainly result in democratic negotiations, although they may facilitate the process by empowering diverse societal groups.

On the other hand, power sharing and democratic compromise may happen in the lack of power-sharing institutions. The Mongolian democracy is an exceptional case in this regard. New democracies such as Benin and Mongolia, with authentic democrats who are open to political opposition and eager to incorporate various societal groups for political discussion, do manage to succeed. Maintaining democracy at the minimal level, if not necessarily at a high level of quality in governance, is relatively easy. Importantly, the attitudes of elites and the public are affected but not determined by political institutions. Authentic democrats, despite opportunities to monopolize power, may stick to the principles of democratic compromise and inclusiveness. Their choices, strategically or non-strategically, may transcend the constraints of institutions. Thus, democratic progress requires more than pure rational choice behavior with utility maximization under given institutions. Institutions generate incentives and affect the preferences of

political actors but additional considerations shape political choices. Another significant conclusion drawn from this institutional study is to recognize the limited effects of institutions.

The Importance of Mixed Strategy in Methodology

Besides the substantive conclusions, this study also demonstrates the strength of nested analysis in comparative research. To some extent, the statistical significance of certain variables is hard to interpret in concrete cases. Usually, the purpose of large-N research is to report about statistical significance and the post-estimation of key independent variables. But the risk in large-N statistical results is that they oversimplify the causal mechanisms of independent variables. Possible misspecification of models may even distort the causality between variables. The disconnection between the large-N statistical pattern and the complexity of reality is evident. For example, in this study, it is encouraging to find the statistical significance of main power-sharing variables. However, when studying the cases, it is actually hard to identify authentic power-sharing or power-concentrating democracies. When considering specific cases, it is fairly difficult to identify the causality of power-sharing institutions because many more variables than those specified in the large-N models are involved in explaining the dependent variable. The conclusion from the large-N studies, that power-sharing institutions are significant for democratic development, is diminished somewhat by the case studies. The complication in intensive case analyses implies that we need to be careful with the so-called strong evidence from large-N models, at least in this study. But at the same time the in-depth case analyses reveal the complexity of democratic development, also suggesting more theories for examination using large-N tests. For instance, to make

democracy work, how are power-sharing institutions are conditioned with citizenry's democratic commitment? It seems that the analyses on outlying cases are especially important because they reveal those possibly misspecified variables, such as civic culture in this case. Somehow, numbers in quantitative studies lose their meaning if they fail to connect to real politics. The disconnection between the numerical significance and real democracy may lead to innovative theories. Overall, both large-N studies and case analyses are indispensable for solid empirical studies. Generalized patterns based on large-N studies without evidence from real cases are just a pile of pointless numbers.

Implications for the Future Research

This institutional study reaches several conclusions but, equally importantly, discloses many interesting puzzles in the third-wave democracies for future research.

First, it is essential to examine the relationship between electoral systems and party systems in the third-wave democracies. Despite the findings that electoral systems do structure party systems, we need to further ask *how* electoral systems matter in new democracies. In fact, Duverger's law remains a relevant topic for institutional studies (e.g. Blais and Carty 1991; Colomer 2005; Da Silva 2006; Dewan and Myatt 2007; Duverger 1954; Endersby and Shaw 2009; Fey 1997; Humes 1990; Palfrey 1989; Riker 1976; Riker 1982b). Nevertheless, current research on third-wave new democracies is relatively weak, although several comparative institutionalists have already headed on this direction (e.g. Diwakar 2007; Hsieh and Niemi 1999; Lindberg 2005; Singer and Stephenson 2009). The promise of institutional studies of electoral systems in the third-wave democracies lies in the opportunity to examine the underlying assumptions of the theories. These ask how socioeconomic, cultural and historical environment influence the

preferences of political actors. Do they alter the structuring effects of electoral systems in general? Moreover, there is promise in future changes of the electoral systems in the new democracies. Although electoral systems in the third-wave democracies have largely stabilized, continuing adjustments will take place in their electoral systems. Those adjustments may not be drastic but will bring enough variations to the independent variable to call for use of the most similar system design (MSSD) in given democracies. We have noticed that the electoral reform in New Zealand has stimulated a large number of articles (e.g. Boston, Church, and Bale 2003; Gallagher 1998; Johnston and Pattie 2002; McLeay and Vowles 2007; Vandervorst 2003; Vowles 1995). In fact, electoral adjustments in the third-wave democracies present more opportunities for such institutional studies. In short, the investigation of Duverger's law in the third-wave democracies is not only to examine the generalizability of the proposition but also to discover significant implications in democratic development in new democracies.

Second, like most institutional studies in the third-wave democracies, this study focuses on the consequences of power-sharing institutions. However, theoretically, there is an endogeneity problem in the study. For example, in some multiethnic societies, majoritarian electoral systems are adopted to encourage the cooperation cross ethnic lines and prevent further fragmentation of the society. However, the deep social cleavages are one reason why the majoritarian system fails to effectively structure the party systems. Thus, many comparativists have begun to seek explanations about the choice of electoral systems instead of their consequences (e.g. Benoit 2007; Benoit 2004; Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005; Chan 2001; Herron 2004). In new democracies, institutional choices and reforms actually offer opportunities to

examine important, but unexplored, research questions. For example, why did some democracies choose PR systems while others selected majoritarian ones? Why do some democracies fail to reform obviously problematic electoral systems while others do manage such reform? In short, political institutions are not simply independent variables. They also are dependent variables for the study of democratic development in the third-wave democracies.

Third, it is imperative to investigate the relationship between power sharing and the quality of democracy. This study explains democratic development in terms of democratic contestation and political participation by political elites and the public. However, an institutional arrangement that increases the level of democratic competition and facilitates political activity does not necessarily help the government function efficiently. Because the primary concern in new democracies is the stability and institutionalization of democratic elections, current institutional studies in the third-wave democracies mostly focus on these aspects. However, with a large number of new stabilized democracies, it is equally important to extend the institutional analyses to the quality of governance. For example, how are power-sharing institutions associated with the effectiveness of policy making? How does power-sharing affect the control of corruption and rule of law? How do power-sharing institutions affect the quality of regulations? Do power-sharing institutions facilitate democratic development while at the same time becoming an obstacle for governance? Democracy is not merely about elections. The aspects of governance quality are equally and fundamentally important as well. This is especially true for the largely consolidated democracies. Moreover, institutional studies in the third-wave democracies should not be confined to democratic

elections. They need to be extended to broader aspects of the quality of democratic regimes.

In the past three decades the third wave of democratization has changed the global political map completely. Currently, we are interested whether this wave can transform additional authoritarian regimes into democracies. We are also curious whether the new democracies truly improve the quality of life for their citizens. Finally, there is a question for comparative institutionalists that will never be out of date. What role do political institutions play during the process of democratization?

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