THE EFFICACY OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION-LED INTERVENTIONS INTO ONGOING AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS

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by
Rachel A. Dicke

Dr. Stephen L. Quackenbush and Dr. Bryce W. Reeder, Dissertation Supervisors
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The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled:

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ONGOING AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS

presented by Rachel A. Dicke, a candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy, and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

_________________________________________________
Stephen L. Quackenbush, Ph.D.

_________________________________________________
Bryce W. Reeder, Ph.D.

_________________________________________________
Laron K. Williams, Ph.D.

_________________________________________________
A. Cooper Drury, Ph.D.

_________________________________________________
Victor R. McFarland, Ph.D.
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ABSTRACT

The past 30 years have seen the international system undergo definite change in both the nature of conflict and the way in which it is responded to by international actors. Interstate wars have largely given way to civil conflicts, which have themselves arguably changed in character over the last few decades. International responses have turned towards third-party military interventions; although not a new expression of force, the rules upon which these interventions are based have changed, and so correspondingly have their form and targets. These military incursions by states, coalitions, and International Organizations (IOs) external to the conflict have taken on a new importance, an increasingly multilateral character, and a (nominally and truly) humanitarian bent.

This increasing prevalence in IO-led interventions in particular has tapered off slightly since its peak in the 2000s, but the persistence of these missions around the world speaks volumes of their continued importance. Since the conditions prompting intervention have not been eradicated, and states and IOs still appear to be invested in intervening in these situations, understanding what a successful outcome looks like and what factors influence the effectiveness of these interventions is a task that holds not only theoretical but also practical value. This dissertation contributes to this strand of literature by explicitly theorizing about what effective means, introducing the explanatory variable level of formalization, and incorporating multiple IOs into a single analysis.

Because the time horizons of an intervention into an ongoing conflict and a post-conflict situation are different, the measures of what makes an intervention “effective” and the factors influencing its effectiveness will also necessarily be different. Ongoing conflicts have shorter, more urgent time frames and shorter-term goals: reducing civilian
casualties and achieving victory for whichever side is supported if the intervention is biased. Post-conflict situations have less urgent time frames and longer-term goals: rebuilding physical and political/social infrastructure. Fulfilling the mission’s mandate applies to both ongoing and post-conflict missions.

The level of formalization of an IO varies based on the unity and clarity of the mission’s command and control structures, the severity of national caveats, and the number and integration of troop-contributing countries. Essentially, higher formalization shows a unity of effort that means the IO is able to effectively utilize the resources at its disposal to create a mission that is more than the sum of its parts. Greater levels of formalization increase the likelihood of the intervention achieving its goals, the ability to quickly and decisively determine where resources are best applied and move those resources where they are needed increases the mission’s ability to reduce civilian casualties, help a chosen side achieve victory, fulfill its mandates, and rebuild the host state’s infrastructure.

To fully develop and test this theory, this dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach, first presenting a quantitative analysis that operationalizes the key concepts and explores through simple and multiple regression the relationship between a mission’s level of formalization and to what extent it achieves its goals. This time-series cross-sectional analysis shows promise, but necessitates further research. To that end, the following chapters are case studies of interventions into Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s and Kosovo starting in the late 1990s respectively. Tracing each UN, NATO, and EU mission’s level of formalization across its lifespan and how that relates to the mission’s outcomes is one benefit of utilizing case study research, and in this instance,
shows more clearly and in greater detail how higher levels of formalization increase a mission’s ability to achieve its goals, while lower levels of formalization can make a mission less effective.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction, Literature Review, and Theory

Introduction

The past 30 years have seen the international system undergo definite change in the nature of conflict and the way in which it is responded to by international actors. Interstate wars have largely given way to civil conflicts, which have themselves arguably changed in character over the last few decades. International responses have turned towards third-party military interventions; although not a new expression of force, the rules upon which interventions are based have changed, and so correspondingly have their form and targets. These military incursions by states, coalitions, and International Organizations (IOs) external to the conflict have taken on a new importance, an increasingly multilateral character, and a (nominally and truly) humanitarian bent (Choi 2013; Finnemore 2003; Walter 2017a).

The UN’s first intervention, UNEF I, was deployed during the Cold War, but it was small, lightly armed at best, and had a limited role, as did most of the pre-1990 interventions. After the Cold War, UN peacekeeping saw expanded forces, mandates, and participation (UN 2018). NATO’s first operation came in 1990, and its first out-of-area operation came at the end of that decade (NATO n.d.a). The EU conducted its first operation in 2003, and has conducted over 30 operations since, with 17 of those currently on the ground, seven of which are military in nature (EU 2021; EU Institute for Security Studies 2017). Other organizations like the African Union (formerly the OAU), the
Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of American States, etc. followed similar timelines (Jetley 2010; Suzuki 2020; Williams 2009). Overall, the 1990s and 2000s saw a boom of IO-led interventions that has only slightly decreased in the 2010s, with little indication that these interventions will cease to be conducted. General public opinion as well still seems to favor the idea that third-party intervention to protect civilians is a moral obligation, despite occasional ebbs and flows in support and an ever-changing international environment that has moved away from the original conditions undergirding the Responsibility to Protect norm, which has not developed as strongly as its founders may have hoped, but is by no means defunct (Finnemore 1996; Ignatieff 2021; Kreps and Maxey 2018; Western 2009). For humanitarian purposes especially, states and their publics prefer to intervene as one part of an international mission as it distributes costs while providing the opportunity to make a positive humanitarian impact (Recchia 2015). It is reasonable to predict, then, that states will continue to participate in third-party interventions, so knowing which factors are likely to increase the chances of their success is a useful academic and practical exercise.

**Research Question**

What makes some International Organization (IO)-led third party interventions effective while others have not only failed to mitigate the problem, but exacerbated an already tragic situation? For example, the French-led mission in Mali halted the advance of separatist rebels and secured the Malian government; the NATO missions in Yugoslavia and Kosovo helped to end the ethnic conflict, restore Kosovo’s autonomy, and maintain a
stable peace; and the UN mission in Sudan navigated the complicated waters of creating a new state with relative success (Boeke and Schuurman 2015; Lambeth 2001; van der Lijn 2010). However, US interventions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were a quagmire for well over a decade, and the UN missions in the Central African Republic and Haiti have been hailed as unmitigated disasters (Autesserre 2010; Walter 2017b).

The UN interventions in Somalia (UNSOM I and UNSOM II) were arguably less disastrous than the previously mentioned missions, but still largely ineffective and resulted in intervener casualties. One example stems from the United States’ reluctance to place its forces entirely under UN control, particularly when suffering casualties. Splitting the chains of command between US troops and non-US troops during UNSOM II resulted in a serious delay in rescuing the crew of a downed Black Hawk helicopter, as the Pakistani and Malaysian forces were not informed that the US forces were conducting an operation (Bensahel 2007; Gordon and Friedman 1993). This illustrates part of an overlooked explanation that I will develop below, in addition to addressing the timing of an intervention, its goals, and expanding the scope of an individual analysis to create a more comprehensive picture of how actors (in)effectively conduct third-party interventions.

First, the timing of an intervention is key to understanding what qualities will make it effective; because interveners have different goals depending on the point in the conflict at which they intervene, the same explanatory factors will not have an equal impact on interventions into ongoing conflicts as those conducted after a conflict has ended. The more traditional explanations for conflict outcomes, e.g. relative power, force
deployment, etc., will have a greater impact during an ongoing conflict while alternative explanations, e.g. troop composition, financial support etc., hold sway in post-conflict situations. Once the definition of effective has been brought more in line with practice, we can examine an overlooked factor that influences efficacy: the mission’s level of formalization. More formalized missions should be more effective than less formalized missions because they are able to successfully manage member states to create a more politically and militarily unified force.

**Review of the Literature**

**Intervention**

The answer to the questions of when an IO-led third-party military intervention is likely to be most effective has not only theoretical value that could enhance our understanding of conflict and peace dynamics, but also practical value that could lead to more effective and less costly interventions. However, there are several elements of this question that must be clarified before an answer can be given. The key concepts of intervention and effectiveness as seen in the literature are discussed, on the basis of which I formulate how those concepts are used in this project.

First, what is meant by a third-party military intervention? Regan (1998; 2000; 2002) uses the metric of convention-breaking activities with the intention of changing or preserving authority structures. As this definition includes both military and economic interventions however, I depart from Regan by excluding the latter and taking a broader
interpretation of the intervention’s relation to authority structures so as to avoid unnecessarily ascribing narrow motives to interveners. Third-party interveners include states, coalitions, and IO-led interveners that are not the primary belligerents in a conflict. Although many of these interventions are into civil conflicts, some have attempted to alter the outcome of interstate conflicts. There is also a divide between intervention literature writ large and peacekeeping literature more specifically; while there are good reasons for studying them separately, there is also reason to study them together.

Peacekeeping can be viewed as a subset of military intervention which largely refers to UN operations and generally has a humanitarian purpose, and which may be subject to additional constraints like the consent of the target state, however loosely defined. The literature also at times refers to peace enforcement, peacemaking, conflict management operations, or crisis management operations, all of which I argue fall under the umbrella of third-party military intervention (Mockaitis 1999). In each case, an actor intervenes in some stage of a conflict to which they were not an original party using military force in an attempt to alter the outcome from its original projected course. The above categories are useful delineations for certain research topics, but for this particular research question, the distinction we may lose in combining categories is less important than the explanatory power we retain by examining interventions as a whole concept.

When a state decides to intervene in a conflict, they have a range of options for how to do so. They could intervene unilaterally and incur far heavier costs, but without the need to coordinate with other states; they could form or join a coalition, which would negate some of the monetary and physical costs, but would require coordination without the legitimacy provided by an IO; and finally, they could participate in an IO-led
intervention, which sacrifices some speed and autonomy but mitigates costs and provides legitimacy (Kreps 2011). How a state chooses to intervene is beyond the scope of the current project, but indicates that considering all types of IO-led intervention together is appropriate. It is also appropriate because once the form has been selected and the intervention begun, the same factors apply across the types of intervention and makes it possible to study them together rather than separately, as the literature currently tends to do. Additionally, even UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) into ongoing conflicts resemble military interventions more broadly because they are becoming participants in a conflict; while they may be attempting to freeze a conflict they are doing so through the use of military force, so the literature on military effectiveness can be fruitfully applied to peacekeeping operations as well as the rest of the broader category of interventions. Further, a “combined approach” has become prevalent among IO-led interventions since 2001, combining military and civilian capabilities in a coordinated effort within an operation (Kammel and Zyla 2018). While this dissertation will briefly address the broad spectrum of intervention, the specific focus will be on interventions conducted by international organizations, leaving opportunities open for future research into other types of actors.

Effectiveness

Next, what is meant by effective? The literature on interventions and peacekeeping is an ever-growing body of work, among which are two prominent definitions, though very few studies explicitly engage with one another on this point. Carefully defining what constitutes an effective intervention has serious implications for which interventions are
then considered to be effective and which factors influence that designation. Two of the main definitions in the literature currently are the reduction of (civilian) casualties and the duration of post-conflict peace (Bove and Ruggeri 2015; Fortna and Howard 2008; Hultman 2010; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; 2016; Kathman and Wood 2016). Both of these have at their core an inherent emphasis on the value of saving lives and reducing violence, but prioritize different timelines – one immediate and one long-term.

*Reducing Civilian Casualties*

Reducing the violence associated with an ongoing conflict is at least a goalpost a mission must pass before achieving a more permanent resolution to the conflict and end to the atrocities of war, and at most a goal in and of itself. Studies focusing on reducing casualties frequently specify civilian casualties, likely to emphasize the human cost of conflict and the importance of a resolution. UN troops have been shown to reduce civilian casualties not only at the country level, but also sub-nationally, and with the added specification of which side of the conflict peacekeepers are more effective against (rebels) and various characteristics of the peacekeeping force that are discussed below (Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2018). Those few studies that are situated in a post-conflict situation use reducing civilian casualties as a metric of success because the instability and potential danger of the immediate post-conflict situation is often overlooked, but can be quite deadly (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016; Kathman and Wood 2016, 150).

Another conceptualization of effectiveness is the composition of peacekeeping forces, generally interpreted as greater numbers of armed troops, especially relative to
civilian elements. This is less a definition of effective however, and more a factor influencing effectiveness. Troops are arguably the element of a UN force most capable of physically interceding between combatants and most often used for that purpose.

Increasing numbers of troops, or troops and police, relative to observers then decreases civilian casualties (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Bove and Ruggeri 2015; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; 2016; Kathman and Wood 2016). The differentiation of UN troops, police, and observers has led to a strong strand of literature arguing that troops, and sometimes police, make for effective interventions while increasing the proportion of observers is actually counterproductive (Bove and Ruggeri 2015; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; 2016; Kathman 2013). This is an important conceptual difference, as the categories of UN personnel are distinct in their function and their abilities. The UN itself only explicitly defines military and police personnel, with the role of Civil Affairs Officers detailed separately. The main difference in function among these categories of personnel is between the armed and unarmed peacekeepers. Military and police personnel are intended to intercede between civilians and combatants to actively prevent or contain violence, while observers fulfill a purely informational role – they serve as the link between UN forces and local authorities and communities. The main difference between troops and police is in the type of violence they are authorized to control; military personnel most directly engage in combat while police focus on criminal activity and rule of law (Kathman 2013). The theoretical and empirical differentiation of UN troops indicates that the overall composition of multilateral missions more generally could play a role in how effective they are.
Another aspect of composition is the variation seen in the quality of the troops deployed; some countries send troops to UN missions with the express purpose of receiving training or funding, while others send highly trained and professional forces; this variation will affect how well the overall force is able to carry out its duties (Bove and Elia 2011; Kathman and Melin 2017). Higher levels of technological sophistication and professionalization of troops increases their military effectiveness for the armed forces of individual states and for multilateral operations. Skilled armies are more able to inflict casualties on their enemies while minimizing their own vulnerabilities to lethal modern technology on the battlefield (Biddle 2007). UN PKOs with larger contingents of troops from countries with higher military spending have been found to reduce the number of civilian casualties (Haass and Ansorg 2018). The gender composition of the mission also matters, as higher proportions of women in UN operations has been shown to decrease allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, increase access to and trust by civilians, and help promote gender equity in the host country (Ghittoni, Lehouck, and Watson 2018; Karim and Beardsley 2016). In a study of several ISAF PRTs as well, the increased presence of women consequently increased the trust of the local population and aided in the gathering of intelligence, which improved security in ISAF (Olsson and Tejpar 2009).

Peace Duration

Another common conceptualization of success is the duration of peace after a conflict has ended. The fundamental logic is similar – maintaining peace after a conflict inherently means that fewer innocent lives will be lost – though it stems from a very different
underlying goal. In this case, an intervention is effective because it stabilizes a state and creates a lasting peace, likely through the creation or re-establishment of domestic institutions and the monitoring and prevention of violence during the process. UN missions, even those into difficult situations, have been shown to increase the duration of peace after a civil conflict compared to similar conflicts without intervention (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). This is particularly true for consent-based missions, though is true to some degree for all forms of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War (Fortna 2004; 2008). Much like the composition of UN forces matters for reducing civilian casualties, it also matters for reducing the risk of falling back into war; greater numbers of UN troops reduce the risk of a recurrent civil war, though police and observers are insignificant (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016). Institutions like democratic elections, the inclusion of minority groups into government, stable infrastructure on the ground, and building up local police forces contribute to the creation of a foundation for future peaceful governance.

Additional Definitions of Efficacy

Additional definitions of intervention efficacy implied by other studies include shortening the duration of a conflict, the outcome of the conflict (whether it ends in victory for the supported side or a negotiated settlement), and the force composition of UN peacekeeping operations PKOs (Balch-Lindsey, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Regan 2002; 2010). Again, although these are not explicitly linked, they are inherently connected; shortening the duration of a conflict will reduce the casualties stemming from that conflict, and often if an IO conducts a biased intervention, the bias is towards the side
being victimized, though of course both sides in a conflict commit violence. Regan (2002, 55, 59) argues that ending the conflict may not be the ultimate goal of the intervener, but interventions can generally be thought of as conflict management attempts, the cost and duration of which are “critical to an effective outcome.” Civil wars that are subject to interventions, however well-intentioned, are more likely to endure, particularly if the intervention is neutral or balanced. Neutral interventions into civil wars do not oppose either or any of the warring parties; both neutral interventions and a civil war in which there are multiple interventions in support of each belligerent are much more likely to extend that conflict than to result in victory or a negotiated settlement. When an intervention is biased, or conducted in support for (or opposition to) one of the sides, the conflict is more likely to end in a victory for the side receiving support (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Regan 2002; 2010).

**Explanatory Factors**

As for what makes an intervention effective, there were also a few explanatory variables that were prominent that can be seen in the literature above; there are also several not present above that nonetheless impact the likelihood of a military intervention’s success.¹

*Strength and Composition of Forces*

Some of the most common explanatory factors include the strength and composition of armed forces. Greater peacekeeping strength allows the intervener to physically intercede

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¹ There is also a robust strand of literature that addresses the question of whether such top-down factors should even be the focus of study when compared to a more local-focused, bottom-up approach. See Autesserre (2010; 2014); Osland and Peter (2019) for a start.
between the combatants and civilians, maintaining distance and decreasing access to civilians. Each of the authors above arguing for increasing UN troops supports this. UN troop strength is a derivation of the broader key explanatory factor which applies to military operations in general; military strength has long been identified as key to achieving victory.

*Strategy and Tactics*

The use of combined arms has been shown to help states increase the likelihood of winning a war, so it is highly likely to contribute to the effectiveness of military interventions as well. Combining troops and air warfare allows for the strengths of one element of the fighting force to complement the strengths of another and to cover for weaknesses, increasing the flexibility, coordination, and lethality of the force as a whole.

For example, ground forces are more able to accurately assess the landscape and call in airstrikes on specific targets, or aerial vehicles can be used to drop troops and supplies into areas of rough terrain. Air power works best when it is combined with ground forces, particularly in an informative capacity. Troops on the ground can help to more quickly and easily identify targets for the air campaign to strike, especially for nonselective campaigns, and may signal resolve (Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Martinez Machain 2015). Primarily these benefits should accrue within an intervention, though occasionally weaknesses in one IO’s intervention can be compensated for by explicit cooperation with another IO-led mission.
Additional Third-Party Actors

The presence of other outside actors refers to if and how many other interveners are present during the course of the conflict or post-conflict situation. When outside actors work in concert, they can enhance their strengths while supplementing their weaknesses. However, the presence of multiple interveners can also muddy the waters of the chain of command and hinder accountability. Among military alliances, for example, a state’s instance on retaining authority over their own forces can result in overlapping chains of command that increase the time it takes to respond to events on the ground. Aggregation in general can decrease the overall skill level of the multinational force relative to its most capable member, and make information-sharing more difficult, which also decreases responsiveness and integration (Bensahel 2007). When states cooperate with one another – communicate to develop an explicit plan for how they will work together and agree on a common goal and command structure, or at the very least which tasks should be assigned to which state, it is more likely that their capabilities will be complementary rather than create duplication and delay.

The OECD provides guidelines and a rationale for international aid coordination that is instructive: to efficiently and effectively deliver resources, contributions “should be complementary and allocated in line with indigenous priorities and policies… [and] managed so as to ease the burdens on partner countries and not add to their own co-ordination problems” (OECD 2001, 95). Essentially, properly coordinated aid increases its ability to achieve a common strategic goal while reducing the burden on individual donor states. This should hold true for the coordination of military resources as well.
There is still a certain level of volatility in post-conflict situations, so active cooperation among multiple actors is still important (von Hippel 2000).

**Terrain**

The terrain of a host state has been shown to influence the likelihood of onset for conflicts, particularly asymmetric conflicts, terrorist actions, and hindering UN PKOs, as well as their outcome and duration. The logic is similar for each, with rough terrain creating favorable conditions for rebels and terrorists by providing cover and concealment while making it more difficult for government or intervening forces to fully utilize their material advantages. This can increase the incentive to begin an insurgency, draw out the conflict once it begins, and deter interveners from entering the conflict, as rough terrain makes it more difficult for intervening troops to physically engage with rebels. (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Nemeth, Mauslein, and Stapley 2014; Townsen and Reeder 2014).

**Gaps in the Literature**

There are a few theoretical and empirical weaknesses in the literature that, while important overall, can always be improved. The first is the lack of explicit theorizing about the relationship between timing and efficacy. Although the definitions discussed above are each valid, none of them fully address the timing of the intervention and all simplify in some way the intentions of the intervening entity. To more closely reconcile theoretical simplification with real-world complexity, this dissertation explicitly theorizes
about the relationship between the timing of an intervention and its goals, and broadens the scope of those goals, allowing for multiple ways of classifying intervention effectiveness. Few existing studies have taken effectiveness as a more comprehensive total concept, potentially missing not only a more realistic application of theory to practice, but also potentially underestimating the impact of these missions (Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019). Very little of this literature addresses the disparity in timelines or the differing universe of cases to which they apply, fleshing out the details in the operationalization rather than including it in the theory.

Another weakness is an overemphasis on UN operations; this dissertation also focuses on the UN, but many of these studies only examine the UN and do not attempt to speak to non-UN interventions. Others speak to non-UN interventions but do not differentiate among unilateral, coalitional, or IO-led interventions. Empirically, the level at which we address the question of efficacy should be more fine-grained than national and annual analysis to accommodate the often fast-paced changes on the ground that directly influence the course of an intervention. And finally, I argue that the literature above does not adequately take into account the level of formalization of a mission.

Definitions Used in This Work

Given the discussion of what constitutes an effective mission, I now present the definitions that will be used in this dissertation going forward.

The type of intervener and the timing of the intervention strongly influence both how effective the intervention is and what we mean by effective. For interventions into an ongoing conflict, “effective” is reducing the severity of the conflict, and thus the
casualties associated with it, and victory for the supported side if there is one. Casualty reduction during an ongoing conflict is a theoretically valid way to operationalize mission success that enjoys broad support within the field and should be combined with victory where applicable, and to what extent the mission’s mandate is fulfilled. For interventions into post-conflict situations, “effective” is the preservation of negative peace as well as the building of foundations for a more positive peace, including developing the social and physical infrastructure of the state, and to what extent the mandate has been fulfilled.

While negative peace is simply the lack of violence, positive peace incorporates economic and institutional reconstruction and betterment, gender considerations, and focusing on local considerations (Diehl 2016; Fischer 2007; Galtung 1996; Guarrieri, Drury, and Murdie 2017).

Of course, neither of these is a perfect definition, but each incorporates standards of the field, fits within the theory, and allows for the derivation and testing of relevant hypotheses. Once these definitions are in place, it becomes evident that the factors with the most impact on one situation will not have the same influence over the other. The strength of the intervening force, the composition of the force, and a higher level of formalization will be more important in an ongoing conflict while greater economic assistance and a higher level of formalization (IO-led) will be more important for a post-conflict intervention.
Theory and Contributions

Level of Formalization

In addition to a lack of explicit theorizing about timing and narrowing interveners’ intentions, the literature also leaves out an explanatory factor that I argue is just as important as those elements listed above. The level of formalization of an intervention is a term I have borrowed and adapted for the concept of the number of intervening actors and their command and control structure – unilateral interventions have one or one primary state; coalitions involve two or more states with one acting as the leader; and IO-led interventions involve two or more states (often more) under the formal control of an international organization (Kreps 2011). In much the same way as the timing of an intervention lacks a coherent theoretical explanation, so too does the type of intervener. Most studies neglect to differentiate between types of intervening actors in a meaningful way, either focusing on the UN exclusively, single states, or glossing over the inclusion of all different types of intervener. This is an issue for two reasons: similarly to how the composition of a UN mission has implications for its success, so too should the composition of an intervention overall; and incorporating multiple types of intervener increases generalizability while meaningfully differentiating among them increases the validity. The level of formalization also applies within each type of intervention, as the chain of command and control that governs the mission can be more or less formalized depending on a number of factors internal to the state, coalition, or IO at any given point. By delving into this concept and applying it to different cases than the original, we can increase the generalizability of the theory, altering it but not stretching it beyond use.
(Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1971). The concept as introduced differentiates among unilateral, coalitional, and IO-led interventions in terms of centrality of control and ability to act quickly and decisively. I theorize that this fundamental concept also applies to within-IO dynamics. Future work will focus on incorporating unilateral and coalitional interventions into this theory.

Unilateral interventions have the greatest ability to respond quickly and with flexibility because there are no disagreements among allies to settle, national restrictions on the movement or actions of troops, and no layers of command to go through. Coalitional interventions introduce the possibility of conflicting national interests without the centralized control of an overarching organization or a single state, though still experiencing potentially fewer coordination problems due to the fewer number of coalition partners. IO-led interventions may still experience coordination problems, but there is also frequently a centralized chain of command to clarify the mission’s chain of command and national responsibilities.

Within IO-led missions, the same principles apply, though may differ in their expression. The fewer the veto players and national differences in goals or willingness, and the more centralized and clear the command and control of the mission, the more formalized it is and the more likely it is to be effective. When the chain of command is clear and followed, all levels of the military and/or civilian components are aware of which responsibility falls to which actor and there should not be much, if any, duplication of effort. Strong, clear strategic direction followed through by a military leadership capable of communicating and ensuring the mission’s goals are achieved makes for a swifter and more unified force. When there is little coordination between states and each
seeks to control their own forces without any formalized lines of cooperation, it is easy for states that should be working together to at best duplicate the efforts of their fellows and at worst be working at cross-purposes, hindering the achievement of the overall goal. When states have very different organizational structures and practices and do not integrate well into a singular framework, or are not willing to integrate, attempting to acclimate and incorporate each element can waste valuable resources, create misunderstandings among components, and impede effectiveness (Brooks and Stanley 2007; Morgan 2015). Clear goals handed down from the leadership, clear translation of those goals into operational directives, and clear communication of those directives to the individuals ultimately responsible for carrying them out provides the opportunity for actions to be taken on the field of combat that are quickly and precisely executed. Relatedly, the presence of fewer national caveats allows the International Organization to fully utilize the resources under its command. Caveats place restrictions on what actions a national contingent may take, when they may use force, and where they are allowed to deploy (Kingsley 2014). Greater numbers of participating states may mask caveats initially, but also make it difficult for operational and tactical commanders to effectively plan actions or coordinate among the different national restrictions. The degree to which an IO has and effectively wields control over its component members – the degree to which is it more than the sum of its parts – has an impact on its efficacy as a mission, particularly for interventions into ongoing conflicts.

Of course, this does not mean such a rigidly structured chain of command that lower-level personnel must run every decision up to their superiors; doing so would result in a slow, inefficient system. Allowing for some autonomy at each level allows responses
to evolving situations on the ground to be fast and flexible. There should be centralized control but decentralized execution; top-level commanders should clearly express the overall objectives and the military “end states,” or (mission-type orders; i.e. adversary will have ceased offensive combat operations) so that operational and tactical level leaders as well as those carrying out the orders are well aware of their role in the mission and its goals so they can make decisions “at the speed of the problem.” (Carpenter 2016; Dempsey 2012, 4). The availability of good information quickly is also key. A more formalized intervention will formally incorporate the troop-contributing countries into a singular, capable IO-led command and control structure, to which the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) give authority without excessive caveats. This formalized unity of effort makes it easier to make decisions and move quickly and efficiently at all levels of command, putting the resources provided by member states to best use.

States and IOs select into interventions for a variety of reasons, though most include, if not are completely driven by, a desire to improve the situation in a given state in crisis either during or following the worst of the violence. Of course, there are differences in where states and IOs choose to intervene. It is possible that there are observed or unobserved factors of the situations into which IOs intervene that impact their levels of formalization, or that there are observed or unobserved factors influencing the likelihood of certain IOs maintaining a higher level of formalization overall than other IOs. Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will note that there is little to suggest that the conflicts into which the UN, NATO, and the EU are so systematically different as to impact the results. The UN has tended (unsurprisingly but encouragingly) to act in a truly humanitarian manner, intervening in severe conflicts
with large numbers of civilian casualties and those with escalatory potential rather than according to the interests of its primary leadership, though it has responded more quickly to conflicts in weaker states and European states (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hultman 2013). Further, both UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions are effective in reducing government violence, and though regional deployments can deploy more quickly and aggressively than the UN, the UN also deploys to violent conflicts, not simply maintaining peace after a regional organization secures it (Bara and Hultman 2020). Additionally, IOs intervene in a variety of conflicts and post-conflict situations, there is a range of capability among regional organizations, there tends to be some regionalism seen in the composition of UN deployments, and most tellingly, the level of formalization within each IO varies over time. Some research also suggests that individual states as well as IOs intervene in a humanitarian manner, as they are more likely to intervene in severe conflicts, but may also be sensitive to previous failed peacekeeping attempts (Aydin 2010; Choi 2013). Future additions to the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 2 could incorporate a Heckman model, propensity score matching on key variables of interest, or a two-part model to account for what selection bias there may be, as there is no one ideal method of addressing this issue (Simmons and Hopkins 2005; Vance and Ritter 2014).

The above reasons and the subsequent selection of venue are important, but again, beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purposes of determining effectiveness, it is sufficient to state that once the intervention has begun, the goals of the intervener narrow and coalesce according to which stage in the conflict the intervention is being conducted. This is because the immediacy of the conflict influences the time frame of the goals, and
thus of the instruments used to attain those goals. The more urgent the situation in which
the actor intervenes, the more immediate the goals, and the more important the
militaristic factors are for success. Ongoing conflicts are urgent situations that necessitate
more immediate goals for the intervener(s). These include more militaristic goals like
reducing civilian casualties, achieving victory for the supported side, and fulfilling the
stated goals of the mission whether they are codified in a mandate, official statement, or
simply publicly put forth by the IO’s leadership. All of these operate in a short time
frame; civilians are more likely to be actively and widely targeted in a conflict and
stopping these killings as quickly as possible will save as many lives as possible.
Achieving victory if the intervention is biased in favor or opposition to one of the sides is
also something the intervener will want to accomplish as quickly as possible; drawing out
the conflict only increases the human and material cost to every actor involved. Fulfilling
the mandate is a more specific and inclusive way of thinking of victory, and there would
be little purpose in drafting and approving a mandate if it were not intended to be
successfully fulfilled. Because of this foreshortened time frame, the strength, speed, and
reaction time of the actor is critical. Therefore, the values of factors that influence
whether or not an intervention will be effective in these conditions as defined by these
goals are likely to be different than the values of factors that influence the efficacy of
interventions into post-conflict situations with longer-term goals.

Post-conflict situations are less urgent, though no less important, shaping the
intervener’s goals into less immediate ones. Once the worst of the fighting has passed, the
urgency of the situation drops and the time frame lengthens; although some violence
often lingers past cease-fires or military victories, the scale drops dramatically
(Autesserre 2010; Schuld 2013) and so a lack of alacrity no longer has as deadly a consequence. Because the speed and strength with which the intervener must act is lessened, other goals come to the forefront. These include improving the human security of the residents and rebuilding physical and political infrastructure. Moving past simply preventing civilians from dying, although that may remain one of the secondary goals of the intervention, the intervener focuses on longer-term outcomes like improving life expectancy, societal institutions, educational attainment, etc. Beyond minimizing the human and material cost of conflict by achieving victory as quickly as possible, interveners can focus on outcomes like rebuilding the physical infrastructure of the state as it has likely been damaged by the conflict, and rebuilding the political infrastructure to attain lasting stability. The longer-term outlook of these goals means that different values of certain factors and some different factors altogether will be of use in achieving them than those which hold sway over the previous phase of the conflict. Post-conflict interventions outcomes can be further divided into immediate post-conflict situations and the longer-term effects, where the ultimate goal is of course, a stable and fully functional society.

**Addressing the UN Bias**

Many studies considering multilateral peacekeeping operations center on just one international actor, and a good deal of these focus exclusively on UN PKOs. While this is understandable to a degree, given the greater quantity and variety of data available concerning UN operations, it also leaves out a good deal of potentially valuable information. Both NATO and the EU have dramatically increased their participation in
this manner since the end of the Cold War and 2003 respectively, and remain significant crisis management actors (Rice 2016). As of the mid-2000s, three-fifths of the post-WWII civil conflicts that attracted intervention did so from multiple interveners (Findley and Teo 2006). Including missions undertaken by multiple IOs will increase our understanding of what makes these missions effective while maintaining a distinction between unilateral, coalitional, and IO-led interventions maintains clarity.

Given the weaknesses outlined above, namely the lack of explicit theorizing as to what effectiveness means for a given mission, the level of formalization, and the UN bias, I aim to contribute to the literature through the development of a theory of intervention effectiveness predicated on the timing of the intervention, taking into account formalization, and introducing multiple IOs into a single analysis. As previously argued, the current literature on military interventions considers a range of outcomes to be “effective” without explicitly addressing the discrepancy, and frequently simplifying or not addressing what constitutes a desired outcome and therefore an effective intervention. Without taking the timing of the intervention into account, and therefore the goals of the mission, assessing its effectiveness becomes a much more difficult task. The most common explanations, casualty reduction and peace duration, still fail individually to capture the full range of range of what makes an intervention effective from the intervener’s perspective. Introducing the level of formalization as an explanatory factor will also add to the literature, taking into account the internal, formal mechanisms of control that allow an IO to fully utilize the strengths of its members and achieve its goals.
Conclusion and Layout of the Dissertation

This chapter has identified the current weaknesses in the intervention effectiveness literature, posited the importance of timing in determining which goals an intervener selects and therefore which factors are likely to impact success, and laid out a theory of mission formalization that applies across and within all types of intervention. By taking the timing of a mission into account we can more easily theoretically justify the selection of intervener goals and thus speak to the explanatory factors that are likely to be influential. Ongoing conflicts are fast-paced, immediate crises, which leads to short-term, militaristic goals. Post-conflict situations are less immediate and so foster longer-term, more civilian goals. It then stands to reason that the same factors influencing effectiveness in one situation are not the same factors that will influence effectiveness in the other.

The level of formalization of a mission applies not only across the types of intervention (unilateral, coalitional, or IO-led), but also to the internal dynamics within each of those categories. Within IO-led interventions in particular, a higher level of formalization refers to command and control clearly in the hands of the IO; a central IO-led chain of command coordinates the individual efforts of member states and brings them into a singular effort rather than experience a difference of goals, capabilities, and willingness that may result at best in a duplication of effort and at worst in damage to the overall mission. Clear political goals are passed through a unitary framework respected by the member states, though the chain of command is not so rigid that every decision must be passed up the line. The concept is centralized control, decentralized execution. Other important factors include strategy/tactics employed by a mission and the presence
of other interveners. How the intervention is actually carried out is also of import; a combined arms strategy is a more effective way of utilizing one’s military resources than separating out each element. If the multiple intervention actors are explicitly cooperative, then we should see capability aggregation and burden sharing rather than duplication of efforts or working at cross-purposes.

To address the issues laid out above, this dissertation will use a mixed-methods approach to analyze what makes an intervention effective, given the definitions of effective derived and selected herein. Chapter 2 presents a quantitative analysis of IO-led interventions into ongoing and post-conflict situations, operationalizing the level of formalization for quantitative analysis and applying it to interventions from 1990-2000 comprehensively, and a few interventions coded where possible from 2000-2010. Results are in the expected direction for simple analysis, indicating that higher formalization yields greater effectiveness, but lack statistical significance. Multivariate analyses do not show significant results. Although the results are inconclusive, expansion of data collection efforts in the future may yield results in which we can place more confidence. Noting the difficulties present in small-n quantitative analysis, Chapters 3 and 4 are case studies tracing the course of two sets of interventions into an ongoing conflict and a post-conflict situation respectively to more clearly trace the effects of a mission’s level of formalization through each situation. Chapter 3 examines UN and NATO interventions into the Bosnian conflict of the early 1990s, finding that where the missions were less formalized, the disorganization and inefficiencies resulted in a less effective outcome, while greater levels of formalization resulted in higher levels of success. Chapter 4 examines UN, NATO, and EU interventions into Kosovo starting in 1999. Similarly to
the Bosnia case, greater levels of formalization appear to be linked to a greater likelihood of achieving the goals of an intervention. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes, presents policy implications, and suggests directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2

Quantitative Evaluation of Interventions into Ongoing and Post-Conflict Situations

Introduction

This chapter presents a quantitative evaluation of the impact of an intervention’s level of formalization on its effectiveness, with attention paid to the point in the conflict in which the mission intervenes. I first review the literature surrounding the operationalization of variables in general and my variables in specific, I then reiterate my theory, describe my research design, present findings, draw conclusions, and outline the limitations of this analysis. In the upcoming chapters, I will explore the concept of a mission’s level of formalization and its impact on the mission’s effectiveness for an intervention into an ongoing conflict (Chapter 3) and into a post-conflict situation (Chapter 4).

Literature Review: Operationalizing Concepts

The way in which a concept is operationalized can have a strong impact on the results one gets from using it in quantitative models; variables are quite sensitive to specification in a way that can completely alter the results of a study (Gartzke and Li 2003). It is therefore important to operationalize a concept in a way that adheres most closely to one’s theory and intended use. Higher validity of a construct or concept not only enhances confidence in the results of the individual study in which it is used, but allows for more informed dialogue within the social science subfields using that concept.
(George and Marino 2011). Clear definition of the concept and its scope and level of abstraction can again enhance confidence that we are measuring what we intend to measure and also maintain the integrity of the concept across subfields of research, and maintain clarity and continuity of the concept across different research agendas (Sartori 1970; George and Marino 2011). The following sections of this chapter present key elements of the concept of my key independent variable, a mission’s level of formalization, and map those elements onto existing data to operationalize it in such a way that it retains conceptual validity while being translated into a quantitative setting.

**Formalization**

*Command and Control (C²)*

The level of formalization variable relies on a series of proxies for the concepts laid out in previous chapters to operationalize for quantitative analysis. The first of these is turnover in key positions in the missions’ chains of command. It will be useful, then, to briefly outline what the general structure of the chain of command is for each IO. The UN command structure is fairly consistent overall and tends to vary by mission in the number of links present rather than the actual structure. At most, a UN mission will consist of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), one or more Deputy SRSGs, a Force Commander (FC), Police Commissioner (PC), and/or Chief Military Observer (CMO), one of more Chiefs of Staff or Chief Administrative Officer, one or more Division heads, one or more Sector heads, one or more Battalion Commanders, and the heads of any further sub-units. I have chosen to analyze turnover at the SRSG and FC/PC/CMO level as this represents the highest political or politico-
military authority with direct control of the mission, and the highest functional military authority. Turnover at strategic and operational levels of authority can create inconsistency and disunity, as each new occupant of the position may have a different vision of how best to accomplish the overall goals of the mission, which of these goals should take priority, or even how to interpret the situation on the ground at any given point in time (Forsyth 2011).

The SRSG serves as the Head of Mission, is a civilian, and not only directs the strategic direction of the mission by serving as the liaison between the SG and the mission, but also coordinates the activities of any other UN agencies in the area to ensure “unity of effort” (UN 2003). The FC is a military position and commands the troops committed by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs); The PC is a military position and commands the police forces committed by TCCs; the CMO is a civilian and commands the military observers committed by the TCCs. If there is no SRSG, the highest ranking of these, or where there are multiple of these positions represented, the highest ranking of the individuals present, serves as the head of mission. Part of this job is to communicate with the individual states since they retain “administrative control” over their personnel; this has been an issue when caveats are uncovered. Any of these three positions can occur individually or in combination with the others. This structure has remained unchanged since the 1990s, although each mission may contain a different combination of these command positions. For example, while most missions have one or two DSRSGs, UNMIK had five, one for each pillar of the mission and a Principal DSRSG to coordinate them.
NATO’s command and control structure in the 1990s was more compact, with the SACEUR leading the Allied Command Europe (whose counterpart was SACLANT, heading up Allied Command Atlantic) and deciding the direction of the mission. Under SACEUR were three operational levels of command: AFNORTHWEST, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH. AFNORTHWEST had three subordinate levels: air, naval, and regional command North. AFCENT also had three subordinate levels: land, air, and Baltic Approaches. AFSOUTH had six subordinate levels: three land commands, air, naval, strike force. Under the air command (AIRSOUTH) were two additional task forces: FIVEATAF and SIXATAF. In 2004, the structure changed again, with ACE becoming Allied Command Operations, under which were three joint commands: JFC Brunssum, JC Lisbon, and JFC Naples. Three other operational commands, AIRCOM, LANDCOM, and MARCOM. JFC NAPLES was the new AFSOUTH, and was comprised of a land, air, and maritime component. Although this chain of command changed during missions according to overall changes, there do not tend to be deviations in terms of the number of commanders or commands involved; if AFSOUTH has the lead, for example, AFCENT would not be involved. These changes were intended to improve cooperation and reduce duplication of effort by emphasizing joint commands over the individualized commands of earlier years, and by further reducing the number of headquarters and manpower (Pedlow 2009).

Caveats
The control a mission’s command structure wields over its troop contributing countries varies in large part by the restrictions placed on those forces. Caveats are limitations or
restrictions that states place on their troops while deployed as part of a multinational operation; these restrict commanders from fully utilizing the national assets under their control and can impede the integration of a mission (AAP-06 2020, 24; Cruz, Phillips, and Cusimano 2017). In their broadest form, they can restrict the geographical areas in which national troops may operate and/or the way in which those troops operate. Geographical restrictions typically concern where troops deploy or where they can be moved if necessary. Restrictions on how troops operate include what kind of activities troops can participate in (e.g. riot control), what constitutes an enemy combatant, whether lethal force can be used, and a host of other restrictions on equipment, intelligence, aid, and even weather conditions (Kingsley 2014). Caveats can be written or unwritten, and presented to the mission commander at the outset, or only discovered when attempts to utilize a given state’s troops are met with a so-called “red card,” wherein national commanders can refuse to comply with their multinational commander’s orders if they conflict with domestic instructions or restrictions (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, Kingsley 2014; Auerswald and Saideman 2014).

Geographical Distribution

The degree to which a mission’s resources are concentrated or dispersed can also affect how complete its control over the contributing nations is. Larger areas of operation per mission subdivision (the larger the geographical area covered by each sector) require more personnel, supplies, communications, and coordination.
Number of TCCs

The number of states contributing to a given mission varies over time. A large number of contributors speaks well of the mission’s legitimacy, but lowers the level of formalization due to the increased heterogeneity of language, competency, materiel, and national rules of engagement (ROE) require higher levels of coordination to effectively utilize. Interoperability among a varied group of nations occurs at the strategic, operational, and tactical level, and includes a number of factors, from linguistic interoperability, to integrating chains of command, to ensuring that technical and weapons systems can work together, and that personnel are trained in those systems and the chains of command in which they operate. To ameliorate a fundamental issue of interoperability, NATO has implemented an English language exam for senior officers, and several language training programs have been instituted since the 1990s, but still the level of competence varies, which can put soldiers in dangerous situations or lead to a misunderstanding of orders (Crossey 2005). Other tactical-level issues include resource gaps, performance capability, communications, and C² capabilities.

At the operational level, national control over personnel and resources can create issues with force planning and maintaining a unified chain of command. At the strategic level, divergent political objectives, commitment, and coalition-building can hamper the mission’s performance (Larson et al. 2003). The more states contribute troops, the greater the issues at each level can be; at the strategic level, more countries must agree to the mission and its objectives and what they are willing to contribute; at the operational level, more countries with conflicting or constraining national restrictions complicates the job
of the mission commander; and at the tactical level, more countries with varied levels of professionalism, resources, and capabilities can make coordination difficult.

**Control Variables**

The strength of a mission is one of the more well-known and well-documented elements that impact the ability of an international intervention to reduce the severity of a conflict during and after that conflict, contain conflict, and even potentially prevent it (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Kathman and Wood 2016; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019). Greater number of armed troops especially are better able to physically separate combatant groups and prevent them from reaching as many civilians. They may also have a deterrent effect. Adding nuance to these results, it has also been found that missions with higher quality troops can offer better civilian protection (Haass and Ansorg 2018) and greater numbers of UN armed troops relative to police and observers reduces conflict-related deaths (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014).

The roughness of a state’s terrain makes it more difficult for larger, organized forces like state militaries to utilize the full extent of their military, manpower, and intelligence resources, and so often favors rebel groups (Siroky and Dzutsati 2015). Because of this decrease in state capacity and relative favoring of rebel groups, rough terrain can increase the risk of civil war directly and indirectly (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hendrix 2011). Once the fighting has begun, rough terrain can increase targeting of civilians, while terrain and weather conditions can increase casualties of a multinational force fighting insurgents (Siroky and Dzutsati 2015; Carter and Veale 2013).
Development has been considered important to the success of peacebuilding operations as it helps perform a number of functions, including supporting the functioning of host governments, providing services where the government is unable to, facilitating reforms within institutions that support the rule of law, and improving the economic situation of the country (Gisselquist 2018). Of course, there are conditions under which these functions are more effective than others, including a more community-based approach - including local partners especially when the central government is weak, political buy-in, and international support - particularly that which is coordinated and includes high quality technical advisors as well as development assistance, among others (Baranyi and Desrosiers 2012; Gisselquist 2018).

**Theory**

Here I will again provide a brief review of my theory, which emphasizes the importance of the timing of an intervention as a precondition for determining what “effective” means in the context of the intervention, and consequently which factors will be most useful in making that intervention effective. Since the time frame of the conflict influences the time frame of the goals, the intervener’s goals for missions into ongoing conflicts are going to be more immediate in nature while the intervener’s goals for interventions into post-conflict situations will be longer-term and broader in nature. These goals are reducing civilian casualties and securing victory for whichever of the belligerents the intervener supports in the former case, encouraging broader social, political and economic growth in the latter, and fulfilling the mission’s mandate for both.
While civilians may continue to be targeted after a conflict ends, the scale of death is much higher for ongoing conflicts and so reducing it is a much more immediate and urgent task since the consequences of delaying are more severe. Relatedly, achieving victory for a supported side, if there is one, is also a task that should be accomplished as quickly as possible to minimize human and material losses. Often, the mandate of the mission spells out its goals and can change to accommodate changes in the situation on the ground. Fulfilling the mandate is also simply one of the easiest ways to determine whether or not an intervention has been successful. To secure a successful outcome in terms of these three requirements, the most important element is the formalization of the intervention. In the case of post-conflict interventions, the formalization of the mission at any given point is also important, but should be less influential than in the former case. A slightly different set of variables should also influence the outcome of the mission (e.g. strength is more important to ongoing conflict interventions than post-conflict interventions).

**Research Design**

The analysis for this chapter differs from the upcoming chapters in that it explores quantitatively the concepts laid out in the prior theory chapter and which will be explored further in two case studies. Where these concepts map neatly onto existing variables and data, those are utilized; where this is not the case, compound measures are developed to most closely approximate the heart of the concept using available resources. These data are combined into a single dataset, and multiple regression is used to determine if there is
a causal relationship between different sets of dependent and independent variables. The time frame is 1990-2000, though some variables have data through 2010.

**Dependent Variables**

*Mandate Fulfillment*

Because the mandates authorizing international interventions can be multifaceted and diverse, varying between missions and even evolving over the course of a single mission, it is necessary to simplify them somewhat to facilitate a broader comparison. To this end, three categories are identified within mandates: military/violence, political/social, and economic goals. Military/violence elements are those that concern protecting civilians, halting existing conflict and preventing future conflict, monitoring borders, and other goals that are martial in nature. Proxies for this category are the number of civilian casualties and violent crime, measured by the UCDP one-sided violence data and the UNDOC homicide rate. Since the goal of military-oriented mandates is to use the mission to stop violence from occurring in the host country, measuring the violence occurring in the country is appropriate.

Political/social elements are those dealing with reforming or rebuilding political or social institutions. Proxies for this category are the ratio of returned refugees and internally displaced persons to the total refugees and internally displaced persons. Since many of the political/social mandates deal with creating a safe environment for the return of refugees and with creating, reforming, or training a national police force, it is appropriate to select proxies that reflect the desired outcomes of these goals. Economic
elements are those that concern economic reforms and development. GDP per capita and unemployment rate will be the proxy for this category.

Each mandate is identified in its initial form and as it changes over time, categories are assigned to the individual mandate elements, identified through a binary variable indicating the presence or absence of that element in each mandate for each year. To create an index of mandate fulfillment, percentiles were used in each of the component proxies to create a scale from 1-3, 1 indicating the least positive outcome and 3 indicating the most positive (e.g. higher homicide rates indicate a less positive outcome, so the highest homicide rates receive a ranking of 1, middle-range receive a ranking of 2, and the lowest homicide rates receive a ranking of 3; this was combined with the scaled values for one-sided violence into a single value for military mandates; and so on for each component variable). Each of these are added up in each year for which the mandate contained that element to create a total value of mandate fulfillment.

_Civilian Casualties_

The number of civilians killed by belligerents. The data comes from the Georeferenced Events Dataset housed by UCDP. Civilian deaths are incidences of either state or non-state perpetrators killing “one or more civilians… as an effect of fighting [and may include] civilian bystanders receiving fatal injuries [or] imprecise shelling or bombing…” (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Högbladh 2021, 24).
GDP per Capita (Growth from the Previous Year)

The percentage of growth of a state’s GDP per capita since the previous year. This data is taken from the World Bank.

**Independent Variables**

*Formalization*

This is a compound variable comprised of the severity of national caveats within a mission and strength of leadership. The presence and severity of national caveats stands in here for the more lengthy examination of a mission’s command and control that is appropriate for the following qualitative chapters. Caveats indicate an IO’s lack of control of over the national elements under its command and affects what can be done with those forces. The severity of caveats is rated on a scale of 1-3 based on how restrictive the caveats were to the movement and ability of international personnel to complete their mission. A score of 1 does not necessarily indicate a complete lack of caveats, but rather that what underlying caveats existed were not disruptive enough to negatively influence the commanders’ abilities to control national contingents in a way that negatively impacted the mission – e.g. France’s vetoes of certain targets on the ground in Operation Allied Force caused NATO leadership to delay air strikes to those targets or to shift targets altogether, but there was no significant restriction on involvement and few other vetoes (Cordesman 2000). A score of 2 indicates that caveats were severe enough to be noted in academic and public sources – e.g. UNTAC forces’ differing levels of ability to respond and interpretation of the mission ROE, where Pakistani, Dutch, and French troops enacted a strong defense while Japanese and
Indonesian troops did not. Japanese troops in particular would not act to protect other UNTAC member nations and had further restrictions on their actions (Findlay 1995; Wang 1996). A score of 3 indicates that the caveats were severe enough to cause substantial harm to the mission, and often to civilians in the host state – e.g. the numerous national contingents that refused to react to violence and were geographically limited, particularly after the mission intensified after attacks on peacekeepers during UNOSOM II (Bullock 1994). Strength of leadership is approximated through the turnover in the political and on-the-ground leadership of a mission, the number of sectors into which it is divided, and the national complexity of the mission (number of participating member states; wider participation is a boon for international legitimacy but a bane for coordination and integration). Turnover of the political leadership position (the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary General or NATO’s CINC South) and the highest position on the ground (the UN’s Force Commander, Police Commissioner, or Chief Military Observer and NATO’s operational commander, e.g. COMKFOR) were noted for each year, where 1 indicates a change in leadership and 0 indicates continuity. The number of sectors into which the mission is divided (based on the presence of regional headquarters or field sites) was divided by the geographic area of the deployment in square kilometers and was obtained from mission-specific documents. The number of states participating was drawn from UN documents or from NATO Review documents. To create the formalization index, the latter two were divided into three categories indicating low, medium, and high values for ease of combination.

The sectors per square kilometer, caveats, and number of countries were normalized to obtain a value between 0 and 1 to match the minimum and maximum
values of the turnover variables. These are analyzed individually below. Additionally, each of the five non-normalized measures were added to create a final scale from 0-11, where turnover at the strategic level, operational level, number of sectors into which the country is divided by geographic area, number of TCCs, and severity of caveats are combined. Because combining these measures results in a scale whereby 1 indicates the highest level of formalization and 11 the lowest, the scale is inverted, so I modified the scale so that a 1 indicates the lowest level of formalization and an 11 indicates the highest level of formalization. Among the individual normalized components of the index, the most impactful should be the degree to which the mission is afflicted by caveats, followed by the number of countries involved, turnover of both positions, and the geographical area per sector.

H 2a: Higher levels of formalization are more likely lead to lower levels of civilian casualties particularly in ongoing conflicts

H 2b: Higher levels of formalization are more likely lead to higher levels of mandate fulfillment

H 2c: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to lead to higher levels of economic growth particularly in post-conflict situations

Control Variables

Strength

The strength of the mission is the number of personnel deployed. For the UN missions this is drawn from Kathman’s 2013 dataset. For NATO missions this is drawn from the Military Balance for each year. The personnel contribution of each state to each NATO mission was gathered and aggregated to a total annual number. Where questions arose as
to the personnel count of various military groupings (i.e. an Egyptian motorized infantry battalion), best estimates based on standard unit sizes were substituted.

**Terrain**

Terrain ruggedness is taken from Shaver, Carter, and Shawa (2019)’s improved measure and is based on elevation relative to the elevation of surrounding 1x1km squares, the change between all of which is summed and normalized to produce a more accurate measure of terrain than previously available.

**Material Resources**

The budget of each mission for each year would need to be gathered from informational pages about those missions individually. To approximate financial support, official development assistance is used. This data is taken from the World Bank.

**Findings**

As a simple first step in determining association between the level of formalization and civilian casualties, mandate fulfillment, and economic growth, each variable was condensed into three categories – low, moderate, and high – to create a more manageable, at-a-glance visualization of any potential relationship between them. Figure 1 below shows this distribution graphically, from which it is evident that missions with low formalization have higher levels of casualties, missions with moderate formalization have the highest number of moderate casualties, and missions with high formalization have the
lowest ratio of civilian casualties. A chi-square test and a gamma test of association however, do not indicate that this relationship is statistically significant, with p-values of 0.196 and 0.170 respectively.

**Figure 1:** Formalization and Civilian Casualties

The same test performed on the level of formalization and mandate fulfillment shows a slightly weaker pattern of association, with high levels of mandate fulfillment tending to cluster in the moderate formalization category. Figure 2 shows this relationship, though it is statistically insignificant with p-values for chi-squared and gamma measures of association at 0.448 and 0.177 respectively.
Performing the same simple crosstabulation with the simplified level of formalization and a simplified measure of economic growth, we can again see similar patterns. Low levels of formalization have mostly negative or moderate growth, while moderate and high levels of formalization are mostly associated with higher levels of economic growth. A chi-square test and gamma test however still do not show statistically significant association, with p-values equivalents of 0.219 and 0.214 respectively. Figure 3 below shows this relationship.
Preliminary simple regressions conducted on the level of formalization and civilian casualties, mandate fulfillment, and economic growth produce coefficients that are in the expected direction, but lack statistical significance at the .10 level. Table 1 below shows these results.
Table 1: Simple Regression, Formalization Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Civilian Casualties (in thousands)</th>
<th>(2) Mandate Fulfillment</th>
<th>(3) Economic Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formalization</td>
<td>-4.688</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.142)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(1.817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>36.38</td>
<td>6.585***</td>
<td>9.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.97)</td>
<td>(0.984)</td>
<td>(11.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (within; between; overall)</td>
<td>0.0732; 0.0002; 0.0141</td>
<td>0.0481; 0.1257; 0.0325</td>
<td>0.0162; 0.0569; 0.0033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of panels</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For each increase in the level of formalization, civilian casualties decrease by 4,688, however the level of significance is 0.362. The R² value for this simple model is 0.0141 overall. Similarly, for each increase in formalization, the level of mandate fulfillment increases by 0.117 and the GDP per capita annual change from the year prior increased by 0.086, though at significance levels of 0.440 and 0.962 respectively.

Table 2 below shows simple regressions of formalization on civilian casualties, mandate fulfillment, and economic growth, though uses the individual components of formalization rather than the index.
A simple regression using the component elements of the formalization index shows similar patterns. Care should be taken with interpretation of these elements, as greater values indicate less desirable outcomes; e.g. greater values for turnover at the strategic level indicates less stability of leadership and therefore the positive value of the coefficient for civilian casualties is the expected direction of that relationship. Of the two variables that reach statistical significance in Model 1, the result for turnover at the operational level is surprising, with increasing turnover reducing civilian casualties by 33,070, significant at the 0.1 level. The other significant result is that increases in the severity of caveats during a mission increase civilian casualties, though by very small
amounts, significant at the 0.05 level. This is in the expected direction and statistically significant, though the effect is smaller than anticipated.

As for the other variables, increases in the geographical area per sector decrease the number of civilian casualties. To see if this relationship is parabolic, it was graphed against civilian casualties, showing a distribution largely clustered at the extremes, though not parabolic. There was however, one outlier, but when removed the models did not change. The number of countries involved also increases the number of civilian casualties, which is in the expected direction but statistically insignificant.

In Model 2, increasing turnover and increasing caveats decrease mandate fulfillment, which is in the expected direction, but statistically insignificant, while increasing sector size and the number of participating countries increases the amount of the mandate likely to be fulfilled; which are not in the expected direction but also statistically insignificant. In Model 3, all variables except the number of participating countries have negative effects on economic growth, as expected, though again these results lack significance. Increasing the number of countries involved in the mission, however, increases economic growth to a statistically significant degree. As this could indicate not only complicated chains of command, but also indicate greater legitimacy and commitment, it is not entirely out of line with expectations.

Incorporating a full set of controls along with the formalization index shows admittedly puzzling results; see Table 3 below for details.
None of the variables in Model 1 reach statistical significance, and formalization, mission strength, rugged terrain, and development assistance all are shown to increase civilian casualties, which is the opposite of our expectations based on theory and prior research. When looking only at active conflict years, the coefficient for formalization increases from 0.304 to 0.731 and increases in significance from 0.551 to 0.268; it is however still in the incorrect direction. This holds for mission strength and rugged terrain as well, which increase in effect and significance, though still not reaching traditional levels of significance and still not in the expected direction. Development assistance decreases in effect and significance, which is to be expected.

In model 2, the results are much the same; lacking statistical significance and in the incorrect direction. In model 3, mission strength increases economic growth by far.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Civilian Casualties (in thousands)</th>
<th>(2) Mandate Fulfillment</th>
<th>(3) Economic Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>1.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>(0.510)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(2.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission strength</td>
<td>6.75e-05</td>
<td>-2.06e-05</td>
<td>0.000825**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission strength</td>
<td>(9.29e-05)</td>
<td>(3.60e-05)</td>
<td>(0.000377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>(0.656)</td>
<td>(0.570)</td>
<td>(4.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>0.00755</td>
<td>-0.00482</td>
<td>0.0644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>(0.0123)</td>
<td>(0.00476)</td>
<td>(0.0604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.149</td>
<td>8.437***</td>
<td>-14.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(3.571)</td>
<td>(1.985)</td>
<td>(21.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.0059; 0.4055; 0.0476; 0.1551; 0.0531; 0.7759; 0.1528</td>
<td>0.0296; 0.2864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of panels</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
less than one percent, but it is statistically significant at the .05 level. Formalization and
development assistance also increase economic growth by small amounts but are
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for rugged terrain is also positive, which is
unexpected, but also statistically insignificant, which was to be expected. There are not
enough observations to run this model using only post-conflict years. Part of the reason
for these results is likely that the number of cases drops to 23, 43, and 40 for each model
respectively, which is likely to call these numbers into question.

Table 4 adds control variables into the models with the elements of formalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Casualties</td>
<td>Mandate Fulfillment</td>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover, strategic</td>
<td>-2.230</td>
<td>-0.633</td>
<td>-5.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.465)</td>
<td>(0.622)</td>
<td>(7.387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover, operational</td>
<td>-0.994</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>3.894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.739)</td>
<td>(0.699)</td>
<td>(8.557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Km² per sector</td>
<td>-0.714</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>-13.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.592)</td>
<td>(2.254)</td>
<td>(22.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caveats</td>
<td>143.728</td>
<td>-57.909</td>
<td>-116.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(312,850)</td>
<td>(204,090)</td>
<td>(2.012e+06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>-12.212</td>
<td>14.511</td>
<td>4.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25,782)</td>
<td>(10,358)</td>
<td>(116,324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission strength</td>
<td>0.000137</td>
<td>-1.76e-05</td>
<td>0.000939**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.32e-05)</td>
<td>(3.70e-05)</td>
<td>(0.000448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>-0.456</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>-1.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td>(5.922)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>0.00191</td>
<td>-0.00497</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0158)</td>
<td>(0.00496)</td>
<td>(0.0725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.939</td>
<td>6.283***</td>
<td>1.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.452)</td>
<td>(1.836)</td>
<td>(18.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (within; between; overall)</td>
<td>0.1729; 0.5391; 0.0724; 0.5811; 0.1031; 0.6919; 0.3760; 0.2196</td>
<td>0.2822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of panels</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When control variables are added to the models with the individual components of formalization, the issues of unexpected signs for the coefficients and an overall lack of significance persists. In Model 1, turnover, increasing square kilometers per sectors, and increasing the number of participating countries all decrease the number of civilian casualties; the only component of formalization that behaves in the expected manner is that increasing caveats also increases civilian casualties. Among the control variables, the signs are also all in the opposite direction, with mission strength and development assistance increasing casualties and rugged terrain decreasing casualties. When looking only at active conflict years, again none of the formalization variables reach statistical significance, though operational turnover and square km per sector come a bit closer than in the model with all observations.

In Model 2, turnover at the strategic level and increasing caveats have negative coefficients, which are in the expected direction, while turnover at the operational level, increasing square km per sector, and increasing number of countries increases the level of mandate fulfillment. As for the control variables, they are all also the opposite of what we should expect to see. In Model 2, turnover at the strategic level and increasing caveats decrease the level of mandate fulfillment, but turnover at the operational level, increasing square km per sector, and increasing the number of countries increases the level of mandate fulfillment. In Model 3, the only variable that attains statistical significance is mission strength, which increases economic growth, though to a substantively small degree. Turnover at the strategic level, increasing square km per sector, and increasing caveats all decrease economic growth, while turnover at the operational level and increasing the number of participating countries increases economic growth, though none
of these are statistically significant. There were not enough observations to run this model using only post-conflict years. Again the issue of a small number of cases is likely to have an impact on these models.

Conclusion

Although initial evaluations showed promising relationships in the correct directions between the level of formalization and civilian casualties, mandate fulfillment, and economic growth, further analysis fails to find statistical significance for these relationships at the traditional levels. In certain models, particularly those disaggregating the formalization index, several variables not only lack statistical significance, but also have impacts in the opposite direction from what we would expect.

Therefore, I fail to find support for Hypothesis 3.1a (higher levels of formalization should lead to lower levels of civilian casualties particularly in ongoing conflicts) overall, as formalization did not have a statistically significant impact on civilian casualties when including all observations, nor did it reach significance during active conflict years. However, simple regression of the component elements of formalization shows that operational turnover and caveats had a statistically significant impact, decreasing and increasing casualties respectively. This, and the odd behavior of the full models, warrants further investigation.

I also failed to find support for Hypothesis 3.1b (higher levels of formalization should lead to higher levels of mandate fulfillment); again, the formalization index fails
to reach statistical significance when regressed on the level of mandate fulfillment. Of the component pieces, none achieved statistical significance.

Finally, the third hypothesis, 3.1c (higher levels of formalization should lead to higher levels of economic growth particularly in post-conflict situations) also fails to find support, as neither the formalization index nor the component elements were statistically significant. However, the small sample size and at times surprising and even contradictory results indicate that further inquiry is necessary to fully explain how the concept of an intervention’s level of formalization plays out during and after a conflict, and how it interacts with the complex environment of a conflict zone or a recent conflict zone, often with multiple international organizations present concurrently in a volatile situation.

Finally, a quick note concerning the limitations of this chapter. There are some significant limitations to bear in mind when considering the above results. First and foremost, the sample size is quite small, which rather severely impacts the size and significance of the results. Future work could increase data collection efforts and so increase the sample size of this analysis, but the current efforts can be considered small-n. Second and relatedly, the time frame is also relatively limited; more data on a greater number of international interventions may produce different results. Finally, the concept of formalization is operationalized to the best of the available data but of course, there are potential nuances that are necessarily missing from this type of analysis. For this reason, the following chapters explore the details of how a mission’s formalization is determined and plays out over the course of an intervention into an ongoing conflict and into a post-conflict situation.
CHAPTER 3

Intervention into an Ongoing Conflict: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

Third-party military interventions, while long a feature of international politics, have undergone something of a sea-change in recent decades. This is likely in response to the changing nature of international conflict; interstate wars have given way to civil conflicts and the characteristics of the latter are themselves arguably different from ages past. Military interventions by states, coalitions, and International Organizations (IOs) have taken on a new importance, an increasingly multilateral character, and experienced varying degrees of success (Finnemore 2003; Walter 2017a). For example, the French-led mission in Mali halted the advance of separatist rebels and secured the Malian government; the NATO missions in Yugoslavia and Kosovo helped to end the ethnic conflict, restore Kosovo’s autonomy, and maintain a stable peace; and the UN mission in Sudan navigated the complicated waters of creating a new state with relative success (Boeke and Schuurman 2015; Lambeth 2001; van der Lijn 2010). However, US interventions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been a quagmire for well over a decade, and the UN missions in the Central African Republic and Haiti have been hailed as unmitigated disasters (Autesserre 2010; Walter 2017b).

This chapter analyzes an intervention into an ongoing conflict to trace the development of mission goals and how different factors influence the attainment of those goals. Specifically, IO-led interventions into the Bosnian conflict in the early-to-mid 1990s will be examined. Limiting the scope of inquiry this way allows me to more
completely tease out the causal mechanisms of the first stage by tracing them through a singular conflict without attempting to tackle overwhelming amounts of information. To do this, I will first provide a background of the conflict and overviews of each IO’s intervention efforts, then explain each variable in the context of the conflict and interventions, and finally analyze each intervention and draw conclusions and policy implications. This relates to the dissertation as a whole, which explores what makes some interventions successful while others have not only failed to mitigate the problem, but exacerbated an already tragic situation. My contention is that timing is a key precondition; without theoretically connecting the timing of an intervention to its goals, and therefore its determinants of efficacy, our understanding of what makes an intervention effective will continue to be muddled. Interventions into ongoing conflicts have more immediate, militaristic goals while interventions into post-conflict situations have longer-term, more holistic goals. What “effective” looks like is different at each stage and therefore which factors make an intervention effective are also different at each stage. In Chapter 4, I will analyze a post-conflict situation, and in Chapter 5 I will compare and summarize the results.

Literature Review: Conflict and Intervention Background

Conflict Background

The conflict that led the international community to intervene most proximately began with the breakup of Yugoslavia, though it emerged along ethnic lines that had long been sources of tension in the region. The three main ethnic and religious groups (Serbs,
Croats, and Bosniaks; Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim) were distributed around the country without a clear majority for any of them. Also making things more difficult was the fact that ethnic communities tended to cluster in ways that did not line up neatly with administrative districts and that nationalist parties, particularly Serbian nationalism, had risen after the fall of communism (Burg and Shoup 1999). Nationalist politics had emerged in the other constituent republics as well, culminating in the successful but violent bids for independence of Slovenia and Croatia (Cousens and Cater 2001). The war in Croatia intensified the nationalist sentiments inside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosnian Serbs formed “Serbian autonomous oblasts” throughout the territory and making moves suggestive of a nationalist bid for independence separate from any state-wide efforts.

Particularly after the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian Serbs strongly favored remaining in the now Serbian-dominated, smaller Yugoslav Federation or separating from Bosnia and becoming part of a greater Republika Srpska. These actions were supplemented by actions taken outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina to create a greater Serbia, including the transfer of Bosnian Serbs from the Yugoslav Army and Serbia into Bosnia in further preparation for a conflict (Cousens and Carter; Burg and Shoup 1999). A referendum was proposed for Bosnia-Herzegovina in February and March of 1992; Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, while Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted almost entirely in favor of independence. In March of 1992 the fighting began in earnest.
UN Intervention

While UNPROFOR was not authorized or deployed until 1992, in September of 1991 the UN adopted Resolution 713, which called for a cease-fire and imposed an arms embargo on all territories of the former Yugoslavia. Cyrus Vance, a former US diplomat, was appointed Special Envoy to the Secretary-General in October, and in November negotiated an agreement to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission, previously opposed by both Serbs and Croats for different reasons (Burg and Shoup 1999). In February of 1992, the UN adopted Resolution 743 authorizing a peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an initial period of twelve months to secure the UNHCR mission and the UN Protected Areas (S/RES/743 1992). In March, the mission’s headquarters were moved from Banja Luka to Sarajevo despite the violence targeted at that city by Serbian artillery from the hills surrounding it (Burg and Shoup 1999). Advance elements of the full force were deployed quickly. In May of 1992, the UN passed Resolution 757, which explicitly invoked Chapter VII and authorized a no-fly zone for any state or IO to implement (S/RES/757 1992).

In October of 1992 Cyrus Vance and David Owen developed a plan to try and negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict incorporating the territorial sovereignty of the former Yugoslav states, respect for individual rights, minority rights, and tolerance by creating a decentralized state with several regions possessing a high degree of autonomy. This attempted to find a middle ground between the Bosnian government’s preference for a strong unitary state and the Serbs’ preference for three independent states; one for each major ethnic group. However, the groups could not agree to any proposed territorial divisions, and the US and European powers were reluctant to commit the force necessary
to implement the plan, in addition to disagreeing on what such a commitment would even
look like (Burg and Shoup 1999). In June of 1993, Resolution 836 expanded
UNPROFOR to deter attacks against safe areas, promote withdrawal of paramilitary
units, and occupy some key points on the ground, as well as continuing to participate in
the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the wording was vague enough to allow for
interpretation in its implementation.

NATO Intervention

Although the primary missions analyzed in this chapter are Deny Flight and Deliberate
Force, NATO initially participated with Operations Maritime Monitor and Sky Monitor,
followed by Operation Maritime Guard, which played a monitoring rather than an
enforcement role. Maritime Monitor was in effect from July to November of 1992 and
involved ships patrolling the waters around the former Yugoslavia for violations of the
UN embargo. This marked the first time NATO ships patrolled the Adriatic, but they did
not encounter any combat. The follow-up Maritime Guard was in effect from November
1992 through June 1993 to enforce the newly enlarged UN sanctions. Sky Monitor ran
from October 1992 through April 1993 and simply monitored the no-fly zone over the
former Yugoslavia, which was intended to combine UNPROFOR observers and NATO’s
AWACS aircraft (Palmer 2012; Leurdijk 1997).

Operation Deny Flight was approved by a foreign ministers’ meeting in
December of 1992 and began in April 1993 with US, French, and Dutch aircraft
(Bucknam, 2003; NATO n.d.b). Later, aircraft and personnel from Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Turkey, and the UK were also deployed. It
intensified in June 1993 when the foreign ministers council agreed to provide close air
support to UNPROFOR and deployed the appropriate aircraft. In August 1993, the NAC
approved air strikes (NATO n.d.b; Larson et al 2003). In February of 1994, the NAC
required that heavy weaponry around Sarajevo be turned over to the UN or the artillery
and mortar positions would be targeted by NATO aircraft; the weapons were withdrawn.
Later in the month however, the no-fly zone was violated by six aircraft that ignored
warnings from two NATO aircraft and were subsequently shot down, marking the first
actual use of force by NATO. In April, NATO expanded its military exclusion zones (UN
safe areas within which military action was permitted given aggressive action by Bosnian
Serbs) to include Bihać, Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Žepa as well as Sarajevo
(NATO n.d.b). Bihać is a region in the northwest of Bosnia-Herzegovina, bordering
Croatia and the Una river valley, that prior to the war experienced little ethnic or cultural
strife. Strategically important, yet vulnerable, control of the region grants access to Banja
Luka and Knin and its lack leaves residents “effectively imprisoned,” which is exactly
what happened in 1992 (O’Shea 2012, 3; Hoare 2011). Goražde is a city in the southeast
of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was close to 70% Bosniak at the outbreak of war. Srebrenica
is a town and now municipality in the middle of the easternmost area of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, bordering Serbia. Žepa is between the previous two cities, just upstream
from Srebrenica. All three were Bosniak enclaves close to Serbian territory.

Operation Deliberate Force was the stronger follow-on air operation to Deny
Flight. Since the taking of UN hostages in May 1995, alliance attitudes towards a
stronger, more coercive role had been building; the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 was
the tipping point of political will, as the scale of the killings outraged the world. The
North Atlantic Council decided that any further offensive action would be met with NATO airpower. The immediate precipitating event then, was the August 28th Serbian attack on a Sarajevo marketplace that left 38 civilians dead (Hendrickson 2005). The operation began in August of 1995 and lasted only until September of 1995. The United States provided 43% of the aircraft for the mission and flew nearly two-thirds of the 3,515 sorties. The remainder were contributed out by the 7 other NATO members and NATO’s aircraft participating: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and the UK, though nearly all member states contributed in some way (Larson et al 2003; Hendrickson 2005). The already brief operation was divided into two parts: August 30-September 1 and September 5-14. The air campaign began at midnight to allow the UNPROFOR ground forces time to withdraw from remote outposts so as to be less of a target for hostage-taking. The first 40 targets were part of Operation Deadeye and were concentrated on the Sarajevo area, as well as around Pale, Sokolac, and Tuzla. By the end of the first day of combat, NATO aircraft had flown 364 sorties. Talks were ongoing all the while, and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General Yasushi Akashi and Force Commander General Janvier sent another letter to the Serbian commander demanding primarily an end to the Bosnian Serb attack and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo, which was responded to late on the 31st, so air strikes were suspended early on September 1st (Owen 2000).

The pause was to allow Bosnian Serbs to respond to NATO’s immediate demands: 1. Cease attacks on UN safe areas 2. Remove all heavy weapons from Sarajevo, and 3. Allow UN personnel and personnel from other humanitarian agencies unrestricted freedom of movement (Miller 1997). Despite the request for a pause, Mladic
attempted to renegotiate the terms of the cease-fire. On the 3rd, Secretary-General Claes gave Mladic an ultimatum – comply by the next day or bombing would resume. The Serbs did not comply, so on the 5th, NATO resumed Operation Deliberate Force (Owen 2000; Miller 1997). On the 7th, planning was underway to expand the campaign, and on the 9th Deadeye Northwest was implemented in three parts, taking out most of the Serb Integrated Air Defense Systems while NATO aircraft also continued to hit other targets. By September 15th it appeared that the BSA was complying with NATO’s demands, and by the 20th Admiral Smith and General Janvier noted that the “resumption of airstrikes [was] currently not necessary” (Owen 2000, 158).

At the end of the war, the Dayton Accords split the territory into the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO created the Implementation Force (IFOR), which would remain to oversee the process.

**Theory**

A brief review of my theory: the timing of an intervention is an important precondition for determining what “effective” means in the context of the intervention, and so for which factors will be most useful in making that intervention effective. The time frame of the conflict influences the time frame of the goals. Ongoing conflicts are urgent situations, which makes the intervener’s goal(s) more immediate than those of other stages of conflict. These goals often include reducing civilian casualties, securing victory for whichever of the belligerents the intervener supports, and fulfilling the mission’s mandate. While civilians may continue to be targeted after a conflict ends, the scale of
death is much higher for ongoing conflicts and so reducing it is a much more immediate and urgent task since the consequences of delaying are more severe. Relatedly, achieving victory for a supported side, if there is one, is also a task that should be accomplished as quickly as possible to minimize human and material losses. Often, the mandate of the mission spells out its goals and can change to accommodate changes in the situation on the ground. Fulfilling the mandate is also simply one of the easiest ways to determine whether or not an intervention has been successful. To secure a successful outcome in terms of these three requirements, the most important element is the formalization of the intervention.

**Research Design**

The most effective way to explore how the causal mechanisms introduced above influence IO-led interventions is to first provide an in-depth analysis of a single case of civil conflict where interventions were present and then provide the same analysis for a post-conflict case. Cross-case analysis combined with within-case analysis allows for both the broader identification of a causal relationship and greater detail about a particular causal process to be traced, and for the links between possible alternate causes or intervening mechanisms to be more fully uncovered (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2007; Starke 2013). In situations like third-party military interventions, where there are many and varied moving pieces, case studies are the most appropriate way to follow the logic underlying sequential actions taken by each of those pieces. Case studies are also appropriate for this research in particular because of the need to carefully
operationalize several novel concepts for which there are no extant measures readily to
hand. The qualitative analysis begins with interventions into an ongoing conflict because
it will allow for a fuller exploration of the way the independent variables function before
selecting another case of intervention into a post-conflict situation. Comparing the two
should make it clear that different explanatory factors matter more (or less) depending on
when the intervention takes place. Limiting the scope to a single conflict standardizes the
context of the interventions, making them inherently comparable. Using process tracing
to systematically examine evidence from an individual case provides greater confidence
in the internal validity of concepts and theories, and insight into causal mechanisms
(Bennett 2008; Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010; Collier 2011). Focusing on a single
conflict allows this dissertation to explore what this new conceptualization of the
formalization of an intervention looks like in reality, and the process by which it and the
other explanatory factors influence the ultimate success of the mission. It also allows for
a greater emphasis on timing and sequence. This will be a development and preliminary
test of whether my theory and concepts function in the way this dissertation asserts that
they do, and the lessons learned in this chapter and the next will further explicate the
theory and results from the previous, larger-N chapter. In keeping with the benefits
ascribed to a mixed methods approach, this mutually supportive strategy combines case
studies informed by quantitative parameters, where each element strengthens the whole
by mitigating the other’s weaknesses (Honig 2019).

This chapter examines the Bosnian War from 1992-1995. The UN intervened with
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 and continued the operation
until 1995, when it split into three separate missions in Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Operating simultaneously, NATO conducted Operation Deny Flight in 1993-1994 and Operation Deliberate Force in 1995. This case is appropriate because it is one of the few where multiple international organizations are present in an ongoing conflict with a high degree of overlap and substantial military contributions.\(^2\)

Because case studies allow for greater specificity than larger, more entirely quantitative studies, I can examine both relevant dependent variables: the level of civilian casualties and whether or not the conflict ended favorably for the side the interveners were supporting and secondarily whether their mandates were fulfilled as measures of success. These are appropriate dependent variables for each intervener; aside from civilian casualties being commonly used in the literature, a strong impetus for both IOs getting involved was the humanitarian crisis in the country; the series of escalating UN Resolutions attempting to address the problem along with UN Secretary-General’s reports indicate UN members’ concerns. NATO members were also concerned with violence against civilians, though the alliance’s Secretary-General was initially a stronger proponent of taking ameliorative action than contributing member states. Both IOs were clear which party they were holding responsible for the bulk of the violence. The independent variables are the level of formalization, the strategy/tactics employed, the presence of other actors, and terrain. Control variables include the relative strength of the interveners, length of time until personnel reach areas of violence, and the composition of the intervention. Once the causal mechanisms have been teased out in this environment, the next chapters will focus on a post-conflict case and a larger-N study. The case studies

\(^2\) There was also a great deal of intentional, formal cooperation between the two missions, meaning that the success of one did necessarily influence the success of the other. However, there is a temporal difference in the missions, as UNPROFOR began well before NATO’s air operations, and the way that each employed force was different.
of interventions into each phase of a conflict allow for more thorough examinations of how exactly the interventions play out and what the roles of the independent variables are within those specific contexts, but they lack generalizability. A larger-N study will allow for conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness of interventions more broadly.

Variables

To maintain a sense of continuity between this chapter’s qualitative analysis of interventions into an ongoing conflict, Chapter 4’s qualitative analysis of interventions into a post-conflict situation, and Chapter 2’s quantitative analysis of interventions into both, the language of dependent, independent, and control variables will be used to signify the outcomes of the interventions and their characteristics.

Dependent Variables

Overall, there are three main outcomes on which I will evaluate the effectiveness of these interventions: reduced civilian casualties, victory, and whether the mandated objectives of the mission were met. Because the primary concerns of interventions into ongoing conflicts are immediate and visceral in nature, stopping the violence is a crucial and common objective. If the intervention is explicitly stated to support one side or another in the conflict, then helping that side to achieve victory is also a desirable outcome, and one that is likely to occur in ongoing conflict interventions, though not in post-conflict interventions. Finally, the degree to which the stated goals of the mission (as laid out in the mandate) are achieved is also an important indicator of a mission’s success or failure.
Civilian Casualties

The first dependent variable is the number of civilian casualties and comes in part from the UCDP one-sided violence dataset, which records violence against civilians. One-sided violence is “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized civilian group which results in at least 25 deaths” (Pettersson 2021, 3). As this is a quantitative resource whose 25-death threshold may at times lack necessary nuance, supplementary sources documenting civilian casualties will also be applied where relevant during this case study analysis.

Victory for the Supported Side

The second dependent variable is whether or not the supported side emerged victorious and can be obtained from a qualitative review of the conflict. The objectives of each intervener are identified in order to determine which of the actors in the Bosnian conflict they support, or alternately, against which actor they set themselves. Statements made by UN and NATO leadership provide clear indications of the bias of the intervening organizations. Next, the outcome of the conflict is examined to determine whether or not the supported conflict actors were successful.

Fulfillment of the Mandate

The final dependent variable is to what extent the tenets of the various mandates authorizing the interventions and declaring their objectives were met. To this end, the text of the mandates are examined and compared with the outcomes of the interventions.
Independent Variables

Similarly to the above discussion around dependent variables, the factors affecting those outcomes will here be called independent variables. The most important of these, I posit, is the intervention’s level of formalization. Also important is the presence of and interaction with other interveners into the same conflict. In this case, the concurrent NATO- and UN-led interventions.

Formalization

The level of formalization within an international organization is primarily about the centralization of leadership. Higher levels of formalization are characterized by greater command and control capabilities primarily, and communications, computers, and information secondarily. Strong, clear strategic direction based on quick, accurate information and followed through by a military leadership capable of communicating and ensuring the mission’s goals are achieved makes for a swifter and more unified force. It will be conceptualized as a highly centralized command with few national restrictions placed on the authority of the IO’s leadership. Of course, this does not mean such a structured chain of command that lower-level personnel must run every decision up to their superiors; doing so would result in a slow, inefficient system. There should be centralized control but decentralized execution; top-level commanders should clearly express the overall objectives and the military “end states,” or (mission-type orders; i.e. adversary will have ceased offensive combat operations) so that operational and tactical level leaders as well as those carrying out the orders are well aware of their role in the
mission and its goals so they can make decisions “at the speed of the problem”

(Carpenter 2016, 12; see also Dempsey 2012).

H 3.1a: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to lead to a greater reduction in civilian casualties

H 3.1b: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to lead to victory for the supported side

H 3.1c: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to lead to a higher likelihood of fulfilling the mandate

Strategy/Tactics

The presence and execution of a combined arms strategy can be determined from an examination of the course of the operation. Correctly implementing a combined arms strategy can create a more effective force because each element compensates for the weaknesses of the other; this is related to the concept of modern force employment, as maneuver can best be employed through combined arms. The general idea is that it is not enough to have a capable military force, you must also correctly employ it. Generally the phrase combined arms refers to the combination of multiple military elements, like infantry, artillery, aviation, intelligence, etc.

H 3.2a: A combined arms strategy is more likely to lead to a greater reduction in civilian casualties

H 3.2b: A combined arms strategy is more likely to lead to victory for the supported side

H 3.2c: A combined arms strategy is more likely to lead to a higher likelihood of fulfilling the mandate
Presence of Other Interveners

Intervention rarely happens in a vacuum. In addition to the complications dealt by attempting to pacify or negotiate multiple conflict actors with potentially conflicting goals, the presence of other interveners can complicate a situation. One possibility is that the interveners unintentionally work at cross purposes, muddying the waters of authority and hindering the effectiveness of both. Another possibility is that working together allows for the strengths of each IO to make up for the others’ weaknesses to some degree. Cooperation can increase the capacity of each IO and reduce the burden on each in terms of troops and expense (Brosig 2010). If the interveners are working together, cooperation should be explicit and formal. Communication between the intervening actors and an agreed-upon means of working together within the same area towards the same or similar goals is likely to reduce the duplication of effort or the outright bungling that may occur without a more formal arrangement, so that all levels of command are aware of their areas of responsibility and to whom they report. If the interveners are on opposite sides of the conflict, then obviously the tasks of each will be more difficult, as the opposing side’s capabilities and resolve are likely to have increased.

H 3.3a: The presence of other interveners, if explicitly cooperative, is more likely to result in a greater reduction in civilian casualties

H 3.3b: The presence of other interveners, if explicitly cooperative, is more likely to result in victory for the supported side

H 3.3c: The presence of other interveners, if explicitly cooperative, is more likely to result in a higher likelihood of fulfilling the mandate.

For this chapter, because the focus is on intervention into an ongoing conflict, the control variables included are those which relate most closely to war, civil war, and conflict
literature. These are: terrain, the strength of the intervener, time until troops reach the conflict, and the composition of the (UN) troops.

**Analysis**

**Dependent Variables in the Bosnian Context**

*Civilian Casualties*

Civilians are non-combatants, in this case those residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were not fighting on behalf of any side. A successful outcome would be that fewer civilians died as the intervention continued on.

*Victory for the Supported Side*

For both UNPROFOR and NATO, the organizations intervened to stop the Bosnian Serbs from executing violence on the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Serbian army was supporting the Bosnian Serb Army. For the UN, not only did Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali condemn the actions of Milosevic, but nearly all members of the Security Council expressed concern bleeding into outrage from 1991-1992, and in fact requested of the President of the Council to meet and consider the situation in Yugoslavia (UN 1991). The Secretary General also stated in a May 12, 1992 report that “all international observers agree that what is happening is a concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the acquiescence of, and at least some support from, JNA, to create ‘ethnically pure’ regions…by military force and intimidation of the non-Serb population” (UN S/23900). NATO’s Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, pushed hard
for NATO to intervene to stop the violence in Yugoslavia and was integral in achieving this goal. Both his personal belief and that of the North Atlantic Council was that “primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs” (NATO 1992). A NAC press release following the siege of Sarajevo places the responsibility for it and for the “tragic loss of civilian life” square on the Bosnian Serbs (NATO 1994). Once NATO was involved, he favored a stronger response than some member states were willing to offer (NATO n.d.c; Burg and Shoup 1999). He then set the stage for overcoming those remaining objections through a lobbying effort that included an appearance at a 1994 council meeting straight from his hospital bed, with his feeding tubes still attached to his body (Johnston 2017). His successor, Willy Claes, held the same preferences for action though was less obvious their expression. Therefore, a successful outcome would be the defeat of the Bosnian Serb Army, and by default a victory for the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

Fulfillment of the Mandate

For the UNPROFOR, the mandate specified first that the peacekeeping force was to create the conditions necessary to find a political solution to the crisis and to protect UN designated safe areas. The mandate was enlarged in 1992 to establish a security zone around Sarajevo and its airport, create the necessary conditions for humanitarian supplies to be delivered, and take “all necessary steps” to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR personnel (UNSCR 758 1992). Additional enlargements included more border control in UNPAs (UNSCR 769), monitoring demilitarization, and a no-fly zone (UNSCR 781). A successful outcome would be securing the Sarajevo airport, unimpeded delivery of
humanitarian supplies, strong borders around UNPAs, demilitarization of the combatants, and a zone over the state where no enemy aircraft are flying.

For Operation Deny Flight, the initial mandate was a relatively simple one – monitor and enforce the no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia. It was extended to include close air support in July 1993, the possibility of airstrikes in August of 1993, and airstrikes against Croatian territory to preempt flights in October 1993. For Operation Deliberate Force, the mandate included maintenance of the no-fly zone and airstrikes, as well as adding three explicit conditions during the UN-requested pause on September 1, 1995. The conditions were: remove heavy weapons from the Sarajevo UNPA, stop attacking other UNPAs, and accept a state-wide cease-fire. After the second pause, the final condition was dropped and instead General Janvier demanded unrestricted freedom of movement for humanitarian and UN personnel and unrestricted use of the Sarajevo airport (Owen 2000; Atkinson 1995). A successful outcome would be the removal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo, a cessation of Serb attacks on UNPAs, unrestricted movement for humanitarian personnel, and unrestricted use of the Sarajevo airport.

Table 5 shows the status of mandate fulfillment using the three categories established in Chapter 2 and utilized in Chapter 4 as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Mandate Fulfillment, Bosnia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandate Category</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As will be discussed further in the outcomes section, the militaristic portions of the mandate were met by NATO, but only partially met by the UN, whereas the political
elements of the mandate were mostly met by both organizations, though in different ways. There were no economic components to the mandates.

**Independent Variables in the Bosnian Context**

*Formalization*

First, for a mission to be effective, the IO must have functional control in that its chain of command is primary over national chains of command, and the member states do not exert greater control over the direction and execution of the mission than the IO. Second, the IO’s chain of command must be effective. Politically, the UN Secretary-General leads the Security Council, the decision-making body. The UN military structure was largely dictated in theory by Chapter VII, which lays out that the Military Staff Committee determines military requirements and develops a plan that it submits to the Security Council, and once forces are deployed it provides strategic direction with command functionally exercised by a military officer on the ground (Houck 1993). In practice, the United States played an outsized role in command at the operational and tactical levels during the IO’s first few outings. In early peacekeeping missions, the Secretary General supervised day-to-day operations; the SG’s Military Advisor translates the SG’s political goals into military objectives, but by 1992 this had become difficult (Houck 1993). Although a steady stream of resolutions and statements were coming out of the Security Council and the President of the Council, there was little political consensus about how to translate the desire to take action into a military reality. Members generally agreed that the situation warranted intervention, but not on what precise form it should take.
Ideally, the UN uses a dual chain of command, wherein a force commander has full control over the deployment of national contingents and handles the military elements while a civilian chief administrative officer handles the budgetary and logistics; both report to the Special Representative, a civilian head of mission who juggles the military and political demands of a mission (Houck 1993).

In practice, both because it was early days still for the United Nations as an international intervener, and because the initial mission was focused solely on the distribution of humanitarian aid, authority was split between UNHCR and UNPROFOR. A full-time Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, to lead the mission was not appointed until 1994 (GAO/NSAID 94-156BR). Once Akashi was designated the Special Representative, the Secretary General delegated to him the authority to approve the mission’s requests for NATO air support, streamlining what had been a “time-consuming, inefficient” process (Owen 2000, 41).

Russia was initially somewhat problematic as well; during the February 1994 siege of Sarajevo, UNPROFOR attempted to deploy the Russian battalion in Croatia to Bosnia, but the Russian Defence Ministry directed the battalion commander in no uncertain terms not to move because Russia did not feel it was properly consulted on actions taken in Bosnia and that NATO was overstepping its bounds. Instead, Yeltsin’s special envoy contacted Milošević and Karadžić with Yeltsin’s proposal. The Bosnian Serbs withdrew their heavy weapons within the NAC-directed time frame and the Russian battalion asked and was granted permission from the UN Secretary-General and the UNPROFOR commander to redeploy to Sarajevo (Headley 2003).
A related problem was the initial lack of a clear objective; one of the few strategic-level documents released was a document from the Secretary General “describing operations” without offering goals or operational-level objectives. This meant that the troops were left largely to their own devices in the face of changing military and political contexts and responded differently. In 1993, UNHCR and UNPROFOR coordinated to develop command orders, but these were hampered by distrust between military and civilian UN personnel (GAO/NSAID 94-I56BR). Finally, each troop-contributing country had a “red-card” officer who was capable of vetoing coalition action for their state, and had a position in the chain of command, complicating matters somewhat (Ripley 1999). There was also a disconnect between the political and military leadership of UNPROFOR in 1993, where the political leadership was unable to provide clear direction and refused to grant full authority over the airpower (Bucknam 2003). When the intentions of the UN were clear, there were still disconnects between the actions laid out by UN leadership and actions taken on the ground. Part of this was the reluctance of member states to contribute resources, and part of this was due to individuals bucking chains of command. The Bosnian Force Commander from July 1993 to January 1994, General Francis Briquemont, exemplified this feeling when he said “I don’t read Security Council resolutions anymore because they don’t help me,” expressing frustration with the rhetorical support for the mission, but lack of actual support. He noted that UNPROFOR had a “fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute these resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field” (Srebrenica Transcripts 2-2; UN Report A/54/549, 32). For example, in January
1994 less than 3,000 of the authorized 7,600 additional troops had been deployed (UN Report A/54/549, 32).

For NATO, the Secretary-General chairs the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s main decision-making body. The Secretary-General from the beginning of the crisis through 1994 was Manfred Wörner, a German politician who was one NATO’s more activist leaders, unafraid to challenge other members and a full-throated advocate for what would be the alliance’s first use of military force (NATO Declassified). Down the chain of command, because France insisted on a non-British European leader, NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Airforce headquarters in Vicenza and its Italian commander were selected to be the base for the air operations. The chain of command was thus Admiral Boorda (US Navy, commander in chief CINCSOUTH) → General Ashy (US Air Force; commander in chief CINCAFSOUTH) → General Rossetti → General Chambers (director of Combined Air Operations Centre; simultaneously US JFACC, commander of US air operations in the region) (Bucknam 2003). Additionally, the decision to use force to shoot down helicopters violating the no-fly zone was not given to anyone ranked below General Chambers (Bucknam 2003). In April of 1994 however, the NAC instructed SACEUR Shalikashvili to delegate the authority for implementing council decisions to CINCSOUTH and issued a blanket authorization for air attacks, which previously had to be individually authorized by the Secretary General (Owen 2000). Also in 1994, structural changes were implemented to streamline the organizational structure of the alliance after recognition that the types of activity NATO would be undertaking in the future required updating the way it currently functioned. The most important changes were the introduction of combined joint task forces (CJTF), which were intended to
increase flexibility while reducing redundancy, and the recognition that “multiple institutions with similar goals of peace and security in Europe could be mutually reinforcing of one another” (Johnston 2017, 158).

In terms of the coherency of the directives coming down through the organization, recall that the Secretary-General directs the North Atlantic Council, which directs the International Military Staff and the International Staff. Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic (now combined into SHAPE under the ACO) were responsible for planning and carrying out NATO’s military operations through several geographically dispersed Allied Headquarters. First, the Secretary-General. Wörner’s leadership was strong; he had tight control over council meetings and believed that the coherence of the alliance was linked to its response in Bosnia (Johnston 2017).

Wörner had strong opinions about the actions NATO should be taking and was vocal in their expression, making his directives perfectly clear. Initially he was hampered by the caution of some of the 16 member states and the lack of unanimity, but the changing situation on the ground in Bosnia and the sea change in the United States gave him openings to further urge his colleagues to action. The initial three priorities were using aircraft to enforce the UN’s no-fly zone, creating safe areas for civilians, and preventing the conflict from spreading (Wood and Binyon 1992). Wörner systematically advocated for a military role for the alliance in Bosnia, targeting hold-outs as they arose and pushing the UN towards action while maintaining that NATO would not go beyond UN directives. Once NATO had agreed to maritime and air patrols, Wörner pushed for enforcement of the no-fly zone; once that too was granted, Wörner began advocating for air strikes.
Willy Claes was no less opinionated than Manfred Wörner, but was less vocal about his expressing his preferences for NATO action within the Alliance, choosing instead to support the course of action already set by delaying meetings of the North Atlantic Council to forestall potential debate. This was a particularly influential tactic going into Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995. He also manipulated meeting times in that he refused to close a meeting until all states took a policy position and reached consensus. He also was dismissive of the dual key arrangement and at times the UN more broadly, and was instrumental in moving the UN’s “key” from Akashi to Field Commander General Bernard Janvier to pursue more aggressive military options. When the NAC met it July of 1995, a general direction was agreed to, but the articulation of that direction was still necessary. Claes was instrumental in setting up three sets of target options and allowing NATO to strike them upon the next provocation (Hendrickson 2004). Thus, throughout Claes’ time as Secretary General there was a strong and increasingly strongly and clearly articulated preference for decreased reliance on the UN and a more aggressive military position through the use of air strikes.

The North Atlantic Council held a special meeting on August 2 of 1993, the results of which were another declaration stating the alliance’s readiness to “provide protective air power” since July and a notice that the NAC requested the NATO Military Authorities to “urgently” draw up “operational options for air strikes” (Press Statement 1993). Seven days later the NAC approved three operational options for airstrikes (OTAN Handbook 109). A February 9, 1994 decision called on the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw the Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from around Sarajevo within 10 days, place government-controlled heavy weapons around Sarajevo under UN control, and
authorized NATO to determine if the conditions had been met and to conduct air strikes if they had not (NATO Press Release (94)15). The North Atlantic Council meeting on July 25, 1995 further extended NATO’s position in deciding that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorzade would be met with a rapid, “substantial and decisive” response of air strikes (Press Statement 1995). This ultimatum was shortly extended to include other safe areas as well. In addition to the clarity of intention from the Secretary General then, the North Atlantic Council echoed that intent and prompted military planning to carry it out.

There was little of the political-military tension UNPROFOR experienced with Operation Deny Flight initially, because plans for the campaign had been underway since December of 1992 and the political authorities were able to better communicate their desired objectives to those carrying it out (Bucknam 2003).

Strategy/Tactics.

Twenty-nine UN member states participated in UNPROFOR with a mix of infantry, engineers, construction, signals, logistics, armored reconnaissance, and medical assistance. The operation also had use of four aircraft, six helicopters, and light tanks. The UN police were tasked with working with local police to ensure order in UN protected areas while civilian observers aided in returning displaced persons to their homes and protecting human rights in areas secured by the UN (Tatalovic 1993).

NATO’s air force had nine primary tasks: combat air patrol, close air support, battlefield air interdiction (airstrikes), suppressing enemy air defenses, airborne command and control, maritime patrol, airlanding, and airdropping (Miller 1997). These military tasks were in service of the greater political goals laid out above, including maintaining
UN safe areas by stopping violence in and around them and removing heavy weaponry in and around them. NATO personnel were first authorized on October 8, 1992 and NATO forces began patrolling the Adriatic on November 22, 1992. The Alliance flew its first sortie on April 12, 1992 but its first combat mission on February 28, 1994 (“Balkan Crisis” 1995 CIA). Addressing each of these tasks in turn, the first will be maritime patrol. NATO’s Foreign Ministers decided to establish a maritime monitoring force on July 10, 1992 to complement the WEU naval force. By July 11, all standing ships were moving towards the Ionian Sea in preparation for future orders; by the 15th the NAC and DPC finalized an implementation plan, and by the 16th NATO ships were patrolling international waters (“The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia” 2018). Maritime Monitor ended on November 22, 1992 but was immediately succeeded by Maritime Guard, which included enforcement operations as well as monitoring. For the duration of the operation, all ships entering or leaving the waters around the former and current Yugoslavia were halted and examined.

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), combat air patrol is the patrolling “over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a combat zone, or over [in] an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets” (DOD 2021, 37). Close air support is “air action by… fixed wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (DOD 2021, 35). For the entirety of Operation Deny Flight, NATO aircraft maintained an almost continuous air presence over Bosnia to monitor the no-fly zone. During this period, because helicopters were a bit of a grey area
in the NATO rules of engagement, around 5,000 unauthorized helicopter flights were observed by NATO aircraft. They fared better in monitoring and stopping fixed wing aircraft; for example, when Bosnian Serb aircraft bombed targets in February 1994, NATO F-16s responded by shooting those fighters down (Beale 1996).

Suppressing enemy air defenses is “activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (DOD 2021, 206). Battlefield air interdiction (airstrikes) are operations “conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear (DOD 2021, 11). NATO conducted the first air combat mission in its history in February 1994, and conducted many more airstrikes in the following months. On August 5th, 1994 NATO aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb tankbuster; quickly thereafter the Bosnian Serb army returned the weapons they had stolen that prompted the airstrikes. Just over one year later, NATO carried out Operation Deliberate Force, which consisted of air strikes on Bosnian Serb military targets after the BSA attacked civilians in Sarajevo. Sixty alliance aircraft took off for the southeast of Bosnia, around Sarajevo and Pale, and struck 56 targets. The BSA retaliated by taking two NATO troops hostage after shooting down a jet; airstrikes did not let up until they returned the crew. On September 5, 1995 airstrikes were resumed after Janvier’s request to give the Bosnian Serb Army the opportunity to remove heavy artillery from Sarajevo in compliance with the ultimatum had failed (Beale 1997). On September 10th, NATO utilized cruise missile and long-range bombs to extend airstrikes into the northwest of Bosnia as well, taking out communications sites near Banja Luka (Schmitt 1995).
Another pause was taken on September 14th, again to allow for fulfillment of the ultimatum. This time however, it was evident that the Bosnian Serbs were complying.

*Presence of Other Actors*

The presence of other international organizations, if cooperative, is likely to enhance the effectiveness of the mission if carried out well. However, it is also possible that introducing another level of complexity hinders the actions of each IO. It is clear that the UN and NATO operated not only simultaneously but in close coordination with one another. In addition, the European Community attempted to conduct peace talks in January of 1992, and when war broke out it attempted to mediate peace; although they negotiated several cease-fires, each quickly failed. Relatedly, the Western European Union attempted naval support of NATO naval operations (Johns 1993).

The UN’s command structure for UNPROFOR and NATO’s command structure for Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force were largely separate for the first year, though they did work in close concert. The inefficiency of the UN command not only hindered its own operation, but made cooperation with NATO difficult as well. For example, a March 1994 request for close air support for French troops in Bihać resulted in NATO aircraft flying uselessly above the fray until Bosnian Serbs withdrew. Because requests had to be made by the Secretary General in consultation with the Security Council, there was a wait time of over four hours between Akashi’s request and permission being granted. Wörner’s subsequent intervention and Akashi’s order streamlined the procedure by delegating authority to the UN’s Special Representative (Schulte 1997; Srebrenica Transcript Session, 2-10).
Control Variables

Intervener Strength

There is no shortage of literature indicating that the strength of a participant in conflict, particularly its relative strength, has a significant influence on its likelihood of success; although much work also shows that strength alone is insufficient, it is still important (Most and Starr 1989; Reiter and Stam 1998; Bennett and Stam 1998; Mason, Weingarten Jr., and Fett 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Balch-Lindsey, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Mason 2009; Henderson and Bayer 2013). Because interventions into ongoing conflict (ideally) place the intervening troops in the middle of the action, their ability should therefore be important in the same ways. The strength of the intervener will come from the number of personnel and when available the amount of equipment deployed. In order to determine the strength of each intervener, the raw numbers of personnel as well as the personnel relative to the population of Bosnia will be used.

Terrain

The terrain of a host state can influence the efficacy of an intervention in several ways; rough terrain makes it more difficult for intervening troops on the ground to physically engage with rebels. A relatively well-maintained system of roads that spans much of the

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3 The general idea for militarized interstate disputes is that capability influences a state’s ability to inflict costs on its opponent, which coupled with the willingness to endure costs influences a state’s chances for victory. This two-part dynamic holds on its own and as part of bargaining literature, civil war literature, and civil war bargaining literature. It also holds for intervention literature and peacekeeping bargaining literature in that third-party interventions influence the balance of capabilities between the belligerents. Additionally, UN troops are thought to be more effective precisely because they have the greatest military capability of the UN personnel types.
territory makes for easier access for the intervening forces, as does a system of well-maintained airports. A lack of infrastructure also makes it more difficult to engage belligerents as well as making it more difficult to quickly transport troops, equipment, or supplies to where they need to go. Urban areas may have relatively more developed infrastructure, but also may contain greater numbers of concentrated civilians, potentially increasing the likelihood of unintended casualties and influencing the decision calculus of interveners.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is surrounded by Croatia to the North and West, Serbia to the East, and the FYRM to the South and Southeast. It has only 12 miles of coastline along the Adriatic Sea. At the outset of war, it was divided into 7 administrative districts that did not map well onto the ethnic distribution of the country. In terms of the roughness of the terrain, the territory is crossed by mountains and rivers. The Dinaric Alps are present in the West, while several other ranges spread through the rest of the country. The south and southwest is characterized by limestone plateaus, though there is land suitable for farming between the ridges. The center of the state is often forested (Britannica). In some parts of Bosnia, the urban-rural divide broke down into Muslims predominantly inhabiting the cities and Serbs occupying the countryside. However, in other regions the populations were more evenly mixed (Burg and Shoup 1999).

Time to Conflict

The length of time until troops reach a region in conflict is simply the number of months it takes troops to be present in a region experiencing conflict. The faster troops deploy to conflict zones, the more effective they can be. An alternate measure is taking into account
the severity of the conflict – more intense conflict should prompt a quick deployment as a response. However, due to data limitations, this project will focus on annual data for the time being.

*UN Troops*

Previous literature indicates that for UN interventions, UN troops are the personnel type most likely to result in a successful outcome. Because troops are armed, provided with military equipment, and trained for combat, they are better able to engage combatants on the battlefield, physically separating them and aiding in disarmament (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). Thus, greater levels of troops relative to police and observers during an active conflict should increase the likelihood of a UN intervention being effective.

*Outcomes*

Overall, UNPROFOR, Operation Deny Flight, and Operation Deliberate Force resulted in a reduction in civilian casualties after intense bouts of increased casualties, the defeat of Bosnian Serb forces, and the fulfillment of the mission’s mandates. The scale of the violence against non-combatants was one of the reasons given for intervention, so initially it was quite large. There are some discrepancies between estimates made within the former Yugoslavia and those made outside the region and each has its drawbacks. The estimates compiled by the International Criminal Tribunal may provide an alternative. The minimum war-related civilian death estimate was 2,130 Serbs, 22,225 Muslims, 986 Croats, and 1,241 others (Tabeau and Bijak 2003). One of the largest single
attacks of the war was Srebrenica in July 1995, when 7,079 mostly Muslim men were killed by the Bosnian Serb Army (Daalder 1998). The outcome of the overall conflict was the defeat of the Bosnian Serb Army, the dissolution of the independent Bosnian Serbian enclave Krajina, and the loss of more than 3,000km$^2$ of territory for the Bosnian Serbs (Beale 1997; DCI Intelligence Report 1995). Serbian leadership agreed to withdraw heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo and allow access to the city (DCI Intelligence Report 1995). Over the course of the conflict, there were several instances of concerted effort by the BSA and their allies to achieve victory, which will be examined in greater detail below.

Several episodes of Bosnian Serb violence in designated UN safe areas throughout 1993 and 1994 were responded to by the UN and NATO with varying levels of success. On February 4th and 5th in 1994, Bosnian Serbs attacked Sarajevo, killing 78 civilians and injuring 160 civilians. The next day the UN requested NATO air strikes if the attacks did not stop, and weapons were not moved outside of Sarajevo or placed under UN control. On February 9th NATO issued the threat and gave Serb forces ten days to comply. The terms and consequences were clear; any heavy weaponry within 20km of Sarajevo would be subject to air strikes along with whatever facilities were hosting the weaponry. Although the Secretary General requested air strikes, this was the first threat not explicitly authorized by the UNSC (GAO report; Headley 2003). By the end of those ten days, the BSA had “substantially complied with the ultimatum” and air strikes were not needed (GAO report 1995).

In March and April 1994, the Bosnian Serbs attacked Gorazde (likely with the weapons they evacuated from Sarajevo), targeting civilians and the UN refugee center.
and equipment. NATO bombing did not work immediately, as sorties on the 10th and 11th of April were met with hostage-taking. The UN did not request further air support until the 22nd, when further NATO threats resulted in heavy weapons being withdrawn, but continued harassment of UN forces. Part of this delay was due to the UN Force Commander, Michael Rose, who worked to “undermine the use of air power [and] the use of it as a credible dissuasive action” (Srebrenica Transcript, 2-11). He was adamant that UNPROFOR not cross “the Mogadishu line” and put personnel in danger by acting more aggressively towards the Bosnian Serbs (O’Shea 2001). A change was only observed when his successor, Major General Rupert Smith, arrived. In late May 1995 the UN weapons collection sites around Sarajevo were raided. Smith ordered both sides to return the weapons and ordered air strikes when Bosnian Serbs were slow to comply. An escalating series of air strikes and hostage taking led to a final count of some 400 UN personnel being held hostage and the suspension of air strikes (High Commissioner’s remarks).

In November 1994, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs used missiles and air strikes against Bihać. At the UN’s request, NATO bombed only the Ubdina airport to minimize Serbian ability to attack, though made it clear the alliance was ready and willing to go further. The UN instead attempted to negotiate a cease-fire as hostages continued to be taken (GAO report 1995; Srebrebnica Transcripts). Starting on November 4, 1994, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs used missiles and air strikes against Bihać. At the UN’s request, NATO bombed only the Ubdina airport to minimize Serbian ability to attack, though made it clear the alliance was ready and willing to go further. The UN instead attempted to negotiate a cease-fire as hostages continued to be taken (GAO report 1995;
Srebrebnica Transcripts). Going further back however, to October 24 of 1994, the 5th Corps of the ABiH broke through the BSA’s siege of the area, captured Serbian territory and military equipment, and achieved victory over four VRS brigades. By the 29th the offensive had run its course and these gains were later mostly lost, but the initial victories were significant (O’Shea 2012; Hoare 2011). The importance of this event is three-fold: it influenced the peace settlement reached in 1995, further exposed the differences among the Western allies, and revealed how small the military advantage of the Bosnian Serbs had become (Hoare 2011). The Bosnian Serb counter-attack was “punitive and disproportionate” and quickly regained the losses suffered. In a November 15 report, Akashi referred back to an April 29 report that had yet to be acted upon in which UNPROFOR noted the lack of resources to properly enforce a safe area around Bihać. An additional difficulty faced in November was the lack of equipment as well as manpower, as the Bangladeshi contingent had deployed without all of their equipment; there was “one rifle between every four of them” due to a system in the UN where states provided troops with the understanding that wealthier states would provide the equipment (O’Shea 2012, 118).

Perhaps the most well-known instance of violence is the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, which is widely considered to be a turning point in Western attitudes on how to conduct the war and led to aggressive NATO airstrikes that eventually aided in ending the conflict. While the NATO airstrikes were conducted too late to save thousands in Srebrenica, they were nevertheless eventually effective. The UN’s role in this episode was arguably detrimental to its stated goals and thus to Bosnian civilians. A Canadian battalion was initially assigned to the safe area, designated in 1993, that was replaced by
a Dutch battalion of around 600 troops. The massacre of July 11 was in no way unpredictable, but instead of preventing or even protecting civilians during the massacre, the Dutch troops first failed to report troop movements leading up to the massacre, accepted only a fraction of the mostly Muslim refugees seeking shelter on the UN base (the only safe place in the city), and finally expelled the few civilians they had allowed onto the UNPROFOR base. They went so far as to make a list of the men on the base that was turned over to the Bosnian Serb army as they separated the men from the women and children just outside the gates of the compound. It was widely known that this separation was a prelude to near certain death for the men, while the women and children were subjected to imprisonment and abuse. UN translator Hasan Nuhanovic’s family were among those expelled from the UN compound; his father was immediately separated and never seen again. His mother died in a Bosnian Serb prison after breaking a window in the interrogation room and slitting her own wrists before the six Bosnian Serb soldiers could get into the room to rape her. Those men are still free (Nuhanovic 2006).

Although the ethnic cleansing was anticipated as early as two years before its occurrence in 1995, and NATO airstrikes could have been called prior to the worst of the atrocities, and in fact were anticipated by other contingents on the ground, the UN did not call for airstrikes until it was far too late (Salignon 2001; Nuhanovic 2006).

Contrast the Dutch inaction in Srebrenica with the Nordic Battalion’s experiences in the Tuzla Safe Area the year prior. Commanded by a Swedish Colonel, Nordbat 2 arrived in Bosnia well aware that their mission was civilian protection and there would be few if any limitations on their actions to this end. Successive battalion commanders drew their mission objectives from the text of the UN mandate rather than political or
international leadership, and were trained in a more individualistic, assertive command and control culture. At several points in their deployment, similarly to the Dutch deployment, the Bosnian Serb Army launched attacks on Nordbat 2 personnel; however, these troops fired back. They routinely returned enemy fire, refused to give up Muslim civilians, intervened to project refugees, and ultimately are regarded as having successfully achieved mission objectives (Ingesson 2017).

Part of the reason for Dutch inaction is likely that the UN troops were not provided with adequate resources to truly protect the safe area. Additionally, the UN had begun to concentrate its forces after hostages were taken in spring of 1995, and France in particular allowed their soldiers to carry out only a humanitarian mandate, which likely also sent a signal to the Bosnian Serbs that the UN was unwilling to use necessary force. In the words of a Médecins Sans Frontières doctor on the ground at the time, “to give a humanitarian mandate to military forces in an open conflict situation… is tantamount to disarming them” (Salignon 2001). Additionally, neither Akashi and General Janvier were inclined to use NATO air power, and had denied prior requests by a new UN commander more inclined towards the use of air power. In fact, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and General Janvier had never intended for the UN to protect the UNPAs, preferring to pass the task to the Bosnian Army, who neither wanted nor were able to take it on (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2012). Despite this reluctance, the massacre proved this attitude untenable, and a greater willingness to cooperate with NATO to apply air power yielded greater successes in future instances of violence. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali delegated the power to approve air strikes down the line of command, reducing not only layers of individual objections, but also the amount of time between the request and the
outcome, crucial in situations of ongoing violence. Additionally, increased dedication to aggressive responses to Serb actions led to policies and NATO air power plans being initiated that made a significant difference in other UNPAs and played a significant role in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table for the final time. For example, coordinating the removal of UN personnel in Gorazde in 1995 allowed for more effective NATO air strikes to be called in and the area to be saved, prompting one official to state that “my wish, of course is that the policies that helped save Gorazde… had been applied five weeks earlier. That might have made a difference to the 8,000 people who were killed in Srebrenica” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2012; Lynch 2015).

**Conclusion**

The impact of formalization, the presence of other interveners, and the interveners’ strategy/tactics on decreasing the level of civilian casualties, victory, and mandate fulfillment are generally positive. The UN was initially at quite a low level of formalization, with split authority and a clear chain of command with strong leadership emerging belatedly and never fully. NATO, conversely, had strong leadership from the Secretary General, clear goals, few national exemptions, and little political-military tension. The UN and NATO worked closely together, with NATO’s air campaigns complementing the UN’s mission on the ground, though the relationship was not without its complications. Separate chains of command initially created inefficiencies, but were later shortened and more integrated. The UN initially experienced some disconnect between the political direction of the mission and the force necessary to carry it out, and
national differences in capability, direction, and willingness to carry out necessary actions. NATO had a stronger connection between the political and military leadership, the actions taken to carry out the goals, and the ability of personnel to do so.

Initially, the number of civilian casualties was very high, peaked in 1995 with the Srebrenica massacre, and decreased. The UN and NATO both entered the conflict to stop the violence perpetrated by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, which eventually was the result, along with an international criminal tribunal to hold those responsible to account. Finally, some of the components of the UN mandates were fulfilled; conditions were created to find a solution to the crisis, but not all of the designated safe areas could reasonably be considered safe. NATO’s mandate was also quite simple: enforce a no-fly zone, provide air support, and continue airstrikes until weapons were removed from Sarajevo. NATO fighters shot down planes violating the no-fly zone, provided air support (more effectively as the conflict went on), and achieved the removal of Serb heavy weaponry from Sarajevo.

As the level of formalization seems to have played an important role in the varying success experienced by the UN and NATO interventions into Bosnia-Herzegovina during its conflict, the next chapter examines how this concept plays out when the interventions are conducted in post-conflict situations, and to observe whether different independent and control variables play larger or smaller roles in the desired outcomes given the differences in those desired outcomes based on the fact that the conflict is no longer ongoing.
CHAPTER 4

The UN, NATO, and the EU in Kosovo

Introduction

The years-long campaign of ethnic violence in Kosovo that came to a head in early 1999 took tens of thousands of lives and forced over one million people to flee their homes, devastated. By some accounts, near to 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed in a concerted effort by Serbian forces to ethnically cleanse the area, and over 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians were driven from their homes; 460,000 people between March 1998 and March 1999 alone were displaced, either internally or as refugees in neighboring states (UNHCR 1999; US Department of State 1999b). Seventy-eight days of NATO air strikes and two of the longest-running, most comprehensive UN and NATO missions calmed the ethnic tensions in the region to a simmer as the people of Kosovo began rebuilding its physical infrastructure and civil administration in the hopes that the worst of the violence was behind them, and that a stable, democratic, multiethnic Kosovo was on the rise.

In March 2004, those hopes were dashed as ethnic tensions exploded once again and Kosovo experienced the highest level of violence it had seen since 1999. On March 16, 2004, three Albanian children fell into a river where two of them drowned; the surviving child was then coached into saying that they had been chased into the river by Serbian men with dogs. The interview was shown on Kosovar Albanian public and private television channels, which gave much more airtime to speculation than to the
UNMIK representative’s more mild, though more accurate account (Bouckaert and Ivanisovic 2004; Haraszti 2004). Riots erupted, spreading quickly until authorities counted 33 major riots as the whole region was swept up in the violence. NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops arrived on March 18 but before the situation was brought under control, 19 people had been killed, 550 homes had been burned, and over 4,000 Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities had been forced from their homes (Bouckaert and Ivanisovic 2004; Daltveit 2007; Honzak 2006). This violence came during a period of force reduction and restructuring for KFOR, leaving 17,500 troops in the region, along with national caveats on the use of their forces that further hampered response and prevention. However, KFOR’s early failures were quickly remedied as 3,000 additional troops were redirected from Bosnia. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) fared much worse. Similar national issues restricted their efficacy in containing the violence but was compounded by the fact that their police force had no extant crisis management structure ready to guide a response to riots like these, and no plans for leading the Kosovo Police Service which was under their nominal control. This created a situation where ad hoc responses by these organizations led to a poor outcome for the Kosovar population under their protection (Daltveit 2007; Gowan 2006; Honzak 2006).

This chapter explores how international organizations’ level of formalization influences their effectiveness in a post-conflict situation, further shedding light on how this variable plays out at all stages of a conflict. In the previous chapter, I traced the impact of formalization on interventions into an ongoing conflict and the role it plays in achieving the participating organizations’ goals; this chapter will follow the same path in a different context. I first provide an overview of my theory, a brief introduction to the
context of the conflict, its aftermath, and the ensuing international interventions. The independent and dependent variables are then given context within this case, analyzed, and discussed, before conclusions and policy implications are drawn.

**Literature Review: Conflict and Intervention Background**

**Conflict Background**

The war in Kosovo had its roots in the conflict that prompted international action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRYM, and led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was an autonomous province in the south of Serbia where inter-ethnic tensions between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians had been brewing for decades. These tensions, and increasing Kosovar Albanian demands for republican status for Kosovo, escalated until Serbian President Slobodan Milošević abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. Parallel governance and social structures were developed as Serbs excluded Albanians and Albanians withdrew from Serb institutions. Amid further deteriorations in inter-ethnic relations, Kosovar Albanians held secret referendums and elections in 1991 and 1992, proclaiming an independent Republic of Kosovo and electing Ibrahim Rugova as president (Wolff 2003). As Kosovo was politically important to Milošević, his interest was in maintaining interethnic conflict within the region to stoke his nationalist base in Serbia while preventing Albanians from participating in governing and presenting himself as a stable choice of leader to the international community. He attempted to maintain the conflict while marginalizing the Kosovo issue in the early 1990s, likely due to the secession and conflicts in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Violence against Kosovo Albanians continued to increase, and in response the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created to oppose the Serbian forces militarily; originally a very small, guerrilla group, by 1997 it had gained enough recognition to draw the attention of the Serbian Special Forces, who increasingly used excessive retaliation on not just the KLA, but civilians, which only served to further mobilize recruitment. After an incident in March 1998, where Serbian forces killed 56 members of a KLA commander’s family and KLA membership correspondingly rose to over 10,000 volunteers, a shift was necessary in the organization of the group. It also intensified fighting between the groups across Kosovo. As the violence increased, the international community continued to call for an end to the conflict through 1998, when over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians had been killed, 400,000 people had been internally displaced or sought refuge in neighboring states (Wolff 2003).

The North Atlantic Council indicated their willingness to act and the UN opened the door to a Chapter VII resolution, which by October led to a ceasefire that would only last through January 1999. February negotiations in Rambouillet and March negotiations in Paris resulted in a peace agreement that was signed by the Kosovar Albanians but met with silence by the Serbs. Immediately after this, Serbian troops moved into Kosovo, violating the October ceasefire. On March 23, 1999, after Milošević failed once again to comply with orders to withdraw, NATO commenced air strikes in an intervention called Operation Allied Force. Thirteen of NATO’s nineteen member states contributed aircraft and 8 member states hit 53 targets on the first day of bombing. By the end of the 78-day air campaign, NATO planes had flown 37,465 sorties and hit over 900 targets (Beckaj 2010; Human Rights Watch 2000). A Military-Technical agreement was drawn up June
9, and after confirming that a full withdrawal of Serbian troops had begun, air operations were suspended on June 10. Also on June 10, the UN passed Resolution 1244, authorizing international missions, leading to UN, NATO, and eventually EU missions in Kosovo that have lasted until today (NATO 1999).

**UN Intervention**

The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established in June 1999 under UNSCR 1244. It was intended to help “ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advance regional stability in the Western Balkans.” Its tasks originally included authority over the legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary, but after Kosovo declared independence in June 2008, the tasks now focus on the promotion of security, stability, and respect for human rights. UNMIK’s Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) *ad interim* arrived in Kosovo on June 13 (three days after the mandate authorizing intervention) and was followed by most of the advance team in the next several days, and the full deployment well after that (UN Security Council 1999).

**NATO Intervention**

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed on June 12, 1999 after the 78-day air campaign Operation Allied Force. It is authorized by Security Council Resolution 1244 and an agreement between NATO, Yugoslavia, and Serbia (the Military Technical Agreement, or MTA). Its original objectives were to: deter renewed hostilities, establish a secure
environment and ensure public safety and order, demilitarize the KLA, support the international humanitarian effort, and coordinate with the international civil presence.

On the last day of the withdrawal of Serbian Forces (June 18), 16,100 of the waiting 17,500 NATO troops in the FYRM took up their posts; in a matter of days a headquarters was established in Pristina and five regional headquarters were established in Prizren (MNB-South, led by Germany), Pec (MNB-West, led by Italy), Mitrovica (MNB-North, led by France), Pristina (MNB-Center, led by the UK), and Camp Bondsteel (MNB-East, led by the US) (US Department of State 1999b). In the first year, KFOR troops not only provided security to all civilians with a special focus on protecting minorities, but also repaired homes and other buildings, cleared mines, distributed supplies, and provided medical treatment (Muharremi et al 2003; Robertson 2000; Shea 1999; US Department of State 1999c). As time has gone on, KFOR restructured several times in response to changing conditions on the ground.

**EU Intervention**

The European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was established in 2008 to support relevant rule of law institutions in Kosovo on their path towards increased effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, free from political interference and in full compliance with international human rights standards and best European practices. It is also authorized under UNSCR 1244. EULEX Kosovo is implemented through the EU’s Monitoring and Operations pillars, which monitor judicial cases and support the Kosovo Correctional Service, and support the Kosovo Police Service with limited capability as a second security responder respectively.
Theory

The impact of the level of an intervention’s formalization on its effectiveness is not restricted to ongoing conflicts; higher levels of formalization are important for the success of a mission at each stage of conflict’s lifecycle. Greater formalization allows IOs to direct their resources towards the desired end goal for the mission to a greater degree, making that end goal more likely to be achieved. The clearer the goal, stronger the chain of command, and fewer internal conflicts and restrictions, the more likely the IO is to see the fruits of its labor. To some degree, this will include institutional strength or coherence as a relative constant within an organization, but not entirely. For example, NATO has relatively greater institutional strength from a relatively greater unity of purpose, smaller membership, and narrower scope than the UN. This should grant it a higher level of formalization relative to the UN and potentially relative to the EU. However, this is not to say that within-organization variation is non-existent, it should just be relatively more impactful in the UN, where effectiveness may vary more widely depending on how formalized their mission is at any given point.

Because the effectiveness of a mission also depends on what goals it is trying to achieve, and because post-conflict situations have longer timelines and are less urgent than ongoing conflicts, the desired end states are slightly different, and thus the factors that make an IO more or less effective are also going to differ. Whereas formalization should be relatively more important in an ongoing conflict, it may only matter greatly during the beginning stages of a post-conflict mission or during times of increased violence, while other factors should attain greater import as the mission proceeds. Thus,
the dependent variables for this chapter will still include fulfillment of the mandate and
civilian casualties, but reordered and also include the development of infrastructure.

**Research Design**

**Case Selection**

The 1999 war in Kosovo and the three international peacekeeping missions that followed
was selected to illuminate the effects of mission formalization in a post-conflict setting.
Stemming from the same root conflict as the one that led to the interventions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina several years earlier, the Kosovo conflict simmered in the early 1990s
before escalating into war in 1997-1998. Failed peace talks and further violence
prompted NATO to initiate a bombing campaign in March 1999 that lasted for more than
two months, after which both sides agreed to stand down. The bombing ceased and
NATO and UN peacekeeping missions were established that continue to operate to this
day, joined by an additional EU-led mission in 2008. Post-conflict situations are
necessarily more complex than ongoing conflicts for interveners; they are often longer
and the end goal is broader in scope – rather than seeking merely an absence of violence,
they often aim as well to introduce positive peace through rebuilding decimated
institutions both material and societal.

**Variables**

To maintain a sense of continuity between this chapter’s qualitative analysis of
interventions into a post-conflict situation, Chapter 3’s qualitative analysis of
interventions into an ongoing conflict, and Chapter 2’s quantitative analysis of interventions into both, the language of dependent, independent, and control variables will be used to signify the outcomes of the interventions and their characteristics.

**Dependent Variables**

Overall, there are three main outcomes on which I will evaluate the effectiveness of these interventions: fulfillment of the mandate, reduction of violence against civilians, and the rebuilding of physical and political or social infrastructure. The degree to which the mission fulfills its mandate is a valid means of determining whether or not the mission has met its stated goals. Violence against civilians does not cease immediately upon the cessation of conflict, and the decline of even lower levels of violence in the population can indicate the presence and strengthening of a police presence, often the goal of post-conflict mission. It should, however, not be as primary a concern in post-conflict situations as it is in ongoing conflicts. The rebuilding of physical infrastructure, like roads and bridges, and political or social infrastructure, like judicial or policing institutions, can help build a positive, lasting peace.

**Independent Variables**

*Formalization*

The level of formalization present in an intervention is essentially the level of centralized control exercised by a given IO over its members during the course of a mission. A unified, formal structure of command and control with functional lines of communication to carry clear strategic direction to a military leadership willing and able to carry it out
will help an IO to bend the many states of which it is comprised to a single purpose. The degree to which an organization’s intervention efforts are formalized can change depending on the strength and clarity of its leadership, the capability of its personnel, and the changing national interests of its member states; even if the structures and pathways of communication and action are themselves firmly established and well-worn, the ability of leadership to put them to use will still vary. This also influences an IO’s ability to cooperate with other international interveners. Higher levels of formalization better allow an IO to fulfill the terms of its mandate, reduce violence against civilians, and rebuild the infrastructure of the host state for the above reasons.

H 4.1a: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to result in greater fulfillment of the mandate.

H 4.1b: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to result in lower civilian casualties and violent crime.

H 4.1c: Higher levels of formalization are more likely to result in greater rebuilding of infrastructure.

**Presence of Other Interveners**

Interventions are rarely conducted individually, even less so when IOs are involved and in post-conflict situations. Thus, how the interveners interact becomes an important variable to consider. If the mechanisms for their interactions are formalized and conducted with relative unity, they are more able to pull in the same direction, so to speak. At minimum, duplication of efforts can be reduced and at best the skills sets of the IOs can work in concert to achieve a more successful outcome than would have resulted from individual efforts alone. Greater and more institutionalized coordination and cooperation between interveners can help each to achieve its end goals. When
coordination and cooperation are nonexistent or messy and ad hoc, the missions should do see much, if any, benefit from each others’ presence.

H 4.2a: Higher levels of cooperation and coordination with other interveners are more likely to result in greater fulfillment of the mandate.

H 4.2b: Higher levels of cooperation and coordination with other interveners are more likely to result in lower civilian casualties and violent crime.

H 4.2c: Higher levels of cooperation and coordination with other interveners are more likely to result in greater rebuilding of infrastructure.

Control Variables

Of course, there are multiple other factors that influence the success or failure of an international intervention; among these are the strength of a mission, the resources devoted to it, and local-level engagement. These will be discussed only briefly however as they are not the focus of this chapter.

Strength

The number of troops in a mission and the amount of equipment have been shown to be important in determining the success of a side in conflict. The more trained and armed personnel in a mission, the easier it is to physically separate combatants and reduce violence by reducing the opportunity to commit it. Greater intervener strength should also make it easier to respond to violent events around the region, as more troops can be deployed where they are needed. More personnel should also make it easier to complete tasks like removing mines, rebuilding roads and buildings, and training local personnel to run local institutions.
Resources

The amount of financial resources devoted to the task is of relatively greater import in a post-conflict intervention than an ongoing conflict due to their increased complexity, scope, and length. Unfortunately, it is also frequently well below the amount pledged for a given intervention. Conflict generally does a great deal of damage to the economy, and this increases the risk of the conflict re-igniting; economic growth significantly reduces the risk of reversion to conflict, particularly when paired with higher levels of UN peacekeeping spending, even compared with political reforms like the introduction of democratic elections (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008).

Local Engagement

Because post-conflict interventions are on the ground for longer and have broader scopes than interventions into ongoing conflict, they require a greater level of buy-in from the local population. Interventions with simpler, more militaristic goals do not rely on the cooperation or investment of the locals to such an extent because their goals are to stop the fighting and the best way to do that is to physically force it to happen; in post-conflict situations the cessation of hostilities is merely a baseline and local investment in the process is necessary to achieve the desired end state.
Analysis

Dependent Variables in the Kosovar Context

*Mandate Fulfillment*

This dependent variable may assume greater significance in post-conflict situations simply because the mandates tend to not only be more complex, signaling a greater intricacy and breadth of goals, but also because civilian casualties should have already been minimized.

The guiding document for the UN, NATO, and the EU is UNSCR 1244, which lays out many goals for the international organizations intervening in Kosovo to meet. The military responsibilities were: deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and enforcing a ceasefire, ensuring the withdrawal of Federal and Republic military, police, and paramilitary forces, demilitarizing the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian armed groups, establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can do so, supervising de-mining until the civil presence can do so, supporting and coordinating with the civil presence, monitoring borders, and ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of all international organizations. The civilian responsibilities are: promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions when required, organizing and overseeing the development of provisional autonomous democratic institutions pending a political settlement, transferring administrative responsibilities to those institutions once established but maintaining oversight, facilitating a political process to
determine Kosovo’s future status, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to those established under a political settlement, supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction, supporting humanitarian aid, maintaining civil law and order, establishing police forces, protecting and promoting human rights, and assuring the safe return of all refugees and displaced persons.

The guiding documents for NATO are UNSCR 1244, the Military Technical Agreement, and NATO’s operational plan (OPLAN 10413). The Military Technical Agreement was signed June 9, 1999 between KFOR and the governments of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia, and covers the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC), and the authority of the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) to interpret this agreement. The forces of FRY and Serbia were to immediately cease all hostilities, withdraw ground forces while clearing and marking mines in 12 days, and withdraw air forces in 4 days. It established a Ground Safety Zone 5km around Kosovo and an Air Safety Zone 25km around Kosovo (Military Technical Agreement 1999). As Serbian forces were phasing out their troops, KFOR would phase theirs in. OPLAN 10413 is the Agreed Principles for Russian Participation in KFOR; signed on June 18, 1999 it states that UNSCR 1244 provides a common mission/purpose to be carried out according to its principles and the framework of the MTA. All contingents of KFOR were to operate under common rules of engagement and a unitary command, though the Russian contingent could exercise full control over their own troops while they were seconded to NATO until 2003. Air and ground movement were to be conducted under KFOR movement control procedures, so the Russians should provide
a liaison group to match KFOR’s liaison arrangements; intelligence sharing was to be exchanged on an agreed basis; while national contingents were responsible for their own logistics operations, KFOR would assist in coordination if necessary; and COMKFOR has the authority to order KFOR forces from any sector to assist any other sector if a sector or national commander declines to accept his order (Agreed Principles… 1999).

Because the mandate for these missions is extensive, to allow for manageable interpretation it has been grouped into three main categories of interest based on the themes found in each individual tenet: violence/military, political, and economic. Those elements of the mandates concerning the cessation and deterrence of violence, demilitarization, and protection of civilians are combined into the violence/military category. Indicators of success in achieving this portion of the mandate include civilian deaths and crime rates. Those concerned with creating or rebuilding a civilian administration or performing those tasks until they can be resumed by the local institutions, maintaining law and order, and protecting human rights are classified as political. Indicators of success for this category are the development of democratic institutions, the creation of a police force, and the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. Finally, those elements supporting economic reconstruction and aid are categorized as economic. This can be reasonably proxied by GDP growth. Each of these three mandate categories can be measured on a four-point scale with the points of: not met, partially met, mostly met, and completely met. Not met indicates that none of the tasks in that category of the mandate have been completed; partially met indicates that some progress has been made, but less than half of the individual points have been
fulfilled; mostly met indicates that anywhere between half and all of the tasks are complete; and completely met indicates that all of the individual tasks have been met.

Table 6 shows the three categories of the UNSC 1244 mandate that provided the justification for the interventions and to what extent they were fulfilled in 1999-2000 and 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate Category</th>
<th>Status 1999-2000</th>
<th>Status 2008</th>
<th>Met By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence/Military</td>
<td>Mostly met</td>
<td>Mostly Met</td>
<td>KFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Partially met</td>
<td>Mostly Met</td>
<td>UNMIK, EULEX, KFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Not met</td>
<td>Partially Met</td>
<td>UNMIK, KFOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civilian casualties and violent crimes
This assumes less significance in post-conflict situations because the preceding intervention into the ongoing conflict should have already largely accomplished this task. Because rarely is a post-conflict situation completely safe however, the reduction of civilian casualties will be used as a dependent variable that should have more import in the missions’ earlier days. However, once the situation has largely been stabilized, there should not be many, if any, civilian casualties in a year, so once the absence of targeted violence has been largely accomplished, a more granular measure can be introduced, like the level of violent crime, which in this case includes the murder rate and assault rate.

Post-conflict societies, particularly in the time immediately following a conflict, do not simply cease to be violent. The underlying causes of the conflict do not disappear with the signing of a peace agreement, and the economic devastation and decreased state capacity that generally accompany conflict also contribute to a high level of violence in
the aftermath of a conflict, in part because an influx of ex-combatants increases violent crime when they are not involved in a reintegration program (Muggah 2005; Schuld 2013; Peña González and Dorussen 2020).

Infrastructure

The rebuilding of physical and political infrastructure is an attempt to not only stop the violence, but to fix and even improve the society that was damaged by the conflict. This should assume greater relative importance as the mission goes on and the focus shifts from simply stopping the violence to rebuilding the region. Roads and homes rebuilt, landmines removed, and institutions rebuilt would all constitute an increase in the infrastructure of the state.

Independent Variables in the Kosovar Context

UN Formalization

During the period of 1999-2000, UNMIK had a generally low level of formalization; despite clear communication from the Secretary General concerning the necessity of the intervention and its goals, the Security Council was much more divided; the organizational structure was clear though complex, and the actual deployment of the mission was slow and limited in geographical scope. In following years, the strength of the mission’s leadership waned until the mid-2000s, before increasing again in the aftermath of the 2004 riots. Consequently, the earlier parts of the mandate that were fulfilled were mostly done so by KFOR, and UNMIK made comparatively little progress. By 2008, the mission was relatively more coherent though damage had been done in the
early years to its efficacy and its reputation among the population, which further decreased its efficacy.

Leadership and Communication. One issue that arose in the UN’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a lack of clear direction from UN leadership and of clear definition of the role of commanders on the ground. Compounded by a vague mandate, this lack of clarity led to reactionary policies and role definitions, and successes were possible but required exceptional political skill as well as competence in carrying out the military and civilian tasks at hand (Honig 2012).

Kofi Annan served as the Secretary General of the United Nations at the time of the Kosovo conflict and well into the missions intended to stop the violence and preserve the tenuous peace. Annan did not preside over the genocide in Rwanda nor the conflict in Bosnia, but was nonetheless deeply affected by them, and called for the lessons learned there to be applied to Kosovo; primarily the need for intervention in the case of human rights violations and for NATO and the UN to cooperate in service of this goal. He was vocal and unambiguous in his belief that violations of human rights be met with resistance from the international community, led by the UN, and that the Security Council should be “able to rise to the challenge.” The UN at large, however, remained difficult to convince initially, as the UNSC was divided over how to proceed in Kosovo, and so NATO began conducting airstrikes absent a Security Council resolution; the operation received his full-throated support (Phillips 2018). Annan argued for a new interpretation of national sovereignty, one that allows room for individual freedoms, and thus a new interpretation of intervention, one that allows for coercive actions as well as peaceful and preventative actions. He identified states’ pursuit of their own national
interests during crises as problematic for intervention and called for their subordination to the greater good. Annan’s commitment to the UN leading this charge is evident, as he called on the Security Council to be not only committed to combat, but also to the peace that follows (Kaplan 2010; Phillips 2018; UN 1999b).

Where the Secretary General directs the mission strategically, the Special Representative of the Secretary General is the operational head of the mission; in the case of UNMIK Sérgio Vieira de Mello was appointed the acting SRSG for the first month to head the advance team, which aimed to create joint civilian commissions with Serb and Albanian representatives to address reintegration issues. As the civilian leader of UNMIK, de Mello also took over some functions of government, including appointing regional and municipal administrators and beginning to re-establish a judicial system; these appointments were not to be changed without UNMIK’s approval (Annan 1999). In early July 1999 Bernard Kouchner was appointed as the permanent Special Representative. Also appointed was James P. Covey as the Principal Deputy Special Representative to coordinate the four Deputy Special Representatives, one for each of the mission’s four pillars: interim civil administration, humanitarian affairs, institution-building, and reconstruction.

The Special Representatives were met with varying degrees of success in carrying out their continuous mission, though on the whole, the SRSGs who did not serve out an entire term did so for reasons unrelated to their performance. Søren Jessen-Petersen (8/2004 – 6/2006) experienced particular success. Following Harri Holkeri’s resignation for health reasons, Jessen-Peterson presided over UNMIK only a few months after the worst violence the region had seen since 1999. The primary challenge as he saw it was
the question of Kosovo’s status, and from his first press conference he made it clear that
his method of implementing “standards before status” would differ significantly from
previous attempts. He emphasized dialogue, partnership, and local ownership, and
offered Kosovar Albanians an accelerated transfer of functions from UNMIK to local
governance structures and status negotiations if the majority implemented the necessary
changes and committed to better protection of minorities. Jessen-Petersen did indeed
transfer more competencies to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG),
create five new ministries and the Kosovo Judicial Council, remove local politicians
coverely when necessary, and by early 2006 saw the initiation of UN-facilitated status
negotiations. He did not, however, succeed in integrating Serbian-controlled areas into a
single governance structure, nor make significant progress in security or rule of law
(Jakobsen 2012).

National Interests. Of the 185 states in the UN in 1999, 52 committed troops to
UNMIK at some point throughout the year. Of these, a handful committed one single
individual, but several countries provided a significant number of troops. In addition to
the lackluster breadth of participation, the UN also faced issues with unity of purpose and
action; not only did they have to accommodate member states like Russia and China that
were reluctant to support action in Kosovo lest it embolden independence or separatist
movements within their own borders, but also member states pursuing their own interests
within UNMIK through funding conditionalities or personnel within mission structures

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4 Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belguim, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Egypt, Estonia, Fiji Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy,
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tazmania, Tunisia, Turkey, US, Ukraine, UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
(Newman and Visoka 2019). A lack of committed resources also negatively affected the functioning of the mission, particularly in 1999-2000. UNMIK police functioned as a national police force while the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was not yet ready to do so; they patrolled the areas where they were deployed, investigated crimes, trained new KPS officers, collected intelligence, and performed traffic control duties. However, even in the summer of 2000 not all officers had weapons (even the UNMIK police chief brought his own weapon from home), there was a lack of equipment available to communicate internally (e.g. radios, telephone lines), and no standard uniforms were provided so each national contingent wore their own uniforms. Additionally, the police provided by each state were supposed to have certain basic skills and equipment necessary to the job, but this was not the case. A fair amount of personnel did not speak English, could not drive, had limited patrolling experience, or arrived without the necessary equipment (Wentz 2002; O’Neill 2002).

Command and Control. UNMIK was originally structured into four pillars under the SRSG and DSRSGs: humanitarian affairs (Pillar 1), interim civil administration (Pillar 2), democratization and institution-building (Pillar 3), and economic reconstruction (Pillar 4). Although the head of each pillar reported to the SRSG and directly to the UN, different organizations were responsible for each pillar. The UNHCR was in charge of Pillar 1, the UN as a whole was in charge of Pillar 2, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led Pillar 3, and the EU was responsible for Pillar 4 (Daltveit 2007). In June 2000, Pillar 1 was discontinued and there were three pillars until May 2001, when a new pillar was created to oversee “Law Enforcement and Justice.” This structure was intended to provide the coordinating structure lacking in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in practice the pillars operated separately with little coordination (Brand 2003). Further contributing to this complex structure and the slow deployment of UNMIK personnel that kept the mission understaffed and underperforming were the UN’s “inflexible procedures” and need to go through the UN Secretariat, which complicated the hiring of personnel from UN and OSCE member states. Delegating this authority to UNMIK sped up the process, but some reputational and substantive damage had been done in that first year (Dziedzic 2006, 348). Overall then, UNMIK’s level of formalization was quite low during the early days of the mission, though it began to increase towards the end of 2000.

**NATO Formalization**

In contrast to UNMIK, KFOR achieved a relatively higher level of formalization in 1999-2000. The Secretary General was clear and decisive in both his communications and his actions, participation in the mission was robust, and though national interests diverged and caused issues in the early stages of the mission in 1999, those had been largely worked through by 2000. KFOR deployed quickly and competently to five established regions of control and set to work accomplishing their given tasks.

**Leadership and Communication.** When Javier Solana took office as the Secretary General in December of 1995, NATO had only recently completed its mission in Bosnia and undertaken its first peacekeeping mission, the Implementation Force (IFOR). A skilled negotiator, he preferred consensus, did not hesitate to apply pressure to recalcitrant governments to get it, and occupied a uniquely powerful moment as the Secretary-General that allowed his preferences more weight (NATO n.d.d). He used this
moment to prompt NATO into action, bypassing the uncertainty in both the Security Council and the North Atlantic Council to declare sufficient legal basis to act without a UN resolution, leading the organization into a 78-day bombing campaign before ceding primary responsibility to the UN after the conflict had ended (Kaplan 2010). Solana’s desire for consensus led to his determined reaching out to Russia for participation in KFOR, which eventually bore fruit in their agreement to participate and to conduct operations separately from but not in opposition to KFOR. While Russia is not a member of NATO, their membership on the UNSC created issues for the UN and would create further disagreement for years.

Command and Control. NATO’s force structure changed over the years of its deployment, at times as a response to unforeseen crises on the ground, and at times because original goals had been largely met. KFOR began the mission with close to 50,000 troops from 36 states – all NATO members at the time and additionally some NATO partners and non-NATO states. The structures of cooperation already extant in NATO helped encourage cooperation, and the Multi-National Brigade (MNB) structure was intended to streamline the organization of KFOR; each of the five MNBs reported directly to COMKFOR, the head of the mission, who had the power to decide where and how to use the troops under his command.

Despite NATO’s extant structure of cooperation, there were some issues for smaller states especially, which rarely lead multinational units or even have autonomous duties within units. Using the Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian Multinational Land Force (MLF) as an example, English was the common language agreed upon to communicate within the unit because it was NATO-led, but Italian officers, who were more used to
participating in NATO, were more fluent in English than the Hungarian or Slovenian officers. As these officers spent more time in the MLF however, they had less trouble communicating effectively. However, both the Italian officers and later the German officers when they were integrated into the HQ Brigade South-West in 2004 and 2006 tended to use their native languages more extensively before translating only basic orders into English. This hampered the development of unit readiness. In this particular case, Slovenian officers learned basic Italian in the MLF and had prior knowledge of basic German and so could translate among the groups, but the issue at hand is that communication is important to function effectively (Jelušic 2007).

Early rounds of deployments were hampered by how different the situation on the ground was to their pre-mission training; the set of tasks that soldiers were being asked to perform was outside of their usual tasks, and it quickly became apparent that a clear and coherent communication of the commander’s intent was necessary given the interactions taking place down the chain of command on the ground (Wentz 2002, 394-5).

After the violence in March 2004, the Multinational Task Forces were joined by Joint Regional Detachments intended to liaise with Kosovar municipalities and provide better information to military decision-makers. In June 2008, NATO took on additional tasks of disbanding the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which had been established as an emergency force and was always intended to be transitional, and creating the Kosovo Protection Force (KPF). The structure overall also changed, as the overall goal and troop levels changed as objectives were accomplished. Focused Engagement gave way to Deterrent Presence as troops were reduced from the 20,000 to which deployment had spiked after the 2004 violence to 10,200, and again to 5,000 (Vogel 2015).
The participation of NATO members was initially very robust, with all 19 (at the time) NATO states participating, as well as 18 non-NATO states. Substantial contributions were made by the US, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain, Greece, and the Netherlands (Brand 2003; Cimbala and Forster 2010). However, despite broad national participation, national caveats not only made leaders’ jobs more difficult, as when they were present the mission commander was forced to balance what was necessary with what was possible given the troop distribution, and they negatively impacted the morale of the troops (Jelušić 2007). Early conflict between NATO and non-NATO contributor Russia eased after a tense standoff at Pristina airport in 1999, and demonstrated both how NATO’s “red card” policy could utilize national vetoes but turn out for the betterment of the mission, and how national interests were still a threat to mission unity. One early example is the French-led MNB-N, deployed to the fraught Northern region of Kosovo; French commanders’ concerns for their own safety and resulting “minimalistic interpretation” of their mandate led to a limited geographical deployment and ethnic separation that would have negative consequences for years to come (Triantafyllou 2014). Although the NATO commander was intended to have the military and political power to carry out the mission with unity of effort, in practice vague definitions of command and control left an opening for individual states to interpret them to their own benefit, and dictate how their national troops were used. Attempts were made to subvert this problem though “agreement and common understanding of the objectives and desired end-state of the operation” which was largely established though leadership on the ground during the first year (Wentz 2002, 402). This issue only grew as time went on and the number of troops in the region decreased; the
increasing restrictions on where and under what circumstances troops could be deployed resulted in a stilted response to a crisis in March 2004, where the inability to use all available resources caused needless death and destruction of Serb property, most notably in MNB sectors and regions where caveats were most restrictive (Wentz 2002; Kingsley 2014). After the riots and the subsequent international outcry, many states who had imposed caveats removed them and sent additional troops. Later NATO renewals of commitment through Kosovo’s status negotiations specifically stressed that KFOR would not introduce any additional caveats and mentioned that a number of Allies were working to reduce existing caveats (Appathurai 2007).

Overall then, KFOR’s level of formalization was moderately high in the very early days of the mission, but high overall in 1999 and only decreased slightly in 2000. It dipped further in the early 2000s before rising again later in the decade. Strong leadership from successive Secretaries-General and COMKFOR provided clear direction to the constituent member states, broad and relatively deep participation indicated a willingness to pull together toward the goal of securing the civilian population of Kosovo especially, and the mission was structured in a unified way that made command and control quick and easy to exert. As the intervention continued on, national caveats and troop drawdowns meant that COMKFOR did not always have use of the full strength of the mission and so their decisions were hampered somewhat by limitations placed on troop movements and activities.
EU Formalization

The European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo enjoyed broad support and consensus among EU members states, though was hampered by internal division as to Kosovo’s legal status. It achieved moderate successes in some areas, though consistently failed in others.

Leadership and Communication. The High Representative has conditional authority over the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions, and therefore over the EU’s peacekeeping efforts. Javier Solana was the first permanent HR, filling the position immediately after leaving his position as NATO secretary general in 1999. His leadership continued to be instrumental in advocating for the launching of the mission, as his position allowed him access to high-level political officials and member states, and his tenure with NATO added to his authority, particularly in the Balkan region. He was an important factor in the political drive for EULEX and was heavily involved in the agenda-setting process; interestingly, he also played a role in the appointment of Søren Jessen-Petersen as SRSG after the 2004 riots (Dijkstra 2012). The Head of Mission was Yve de Kermabon, a former KFOR commander who had also served in UNPROFOR, and was followed after two years by another French general who commanded KFOR (EU 2008; Palokaj 2010).

Command and Control. The Head of Mission has control of EULEX, followed by a Deputy Head of Mission. These positions supervise a monitoring pillar and an operations pillar. The mission had a headquarters in Pristina as well as several regional offices, and police presence stationed at several border-crossing points and with KPS units, customs presence stationed with the Kosovo Customs Service, and a justice
presence stationed with the Kosovo judiciary, Property Agency, and Correctional Service. The Head of Mission provides information to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who reports to the EU Council (EU n.d.b).

National Interests. All member states and a few non-EU member states contributed. It was the largest CSDP operation in the organization’s history, at 3,000 initial personnel a €205 million budget (Rashiti 2019). Although all 27 (at the time) EU member states agreed to launch the EULEX mission, there was disagreement among the member states as to the legitimacy of such a mission without a specific UNSC mandate and about whether or not to recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Five EU member states chose not to do so. This lack of consensus meant that the mission was reframed from a strong political one to a neutral, technical one. This did not create trust among Kosovar Albanians, but the EU’s dangling of potential membership was an important motivator (Peters 2010; Zupancic and Pejic 2018). EULEX personnel also have a hands-on approach within their particular area of specialty, teaching and monitoring Kosovar police, prosecutors and judges from inside their own offices (Pond 2008). This is because not only is EULEX Kosovo the largest EU civilian mission, but also the first to integrate staff for “police, rule of law, and customs and border patrol” with the authority to directly intervene, rather than monitor, if necessary (Chivvis 2010).
Outcomes

UNMIK Mandate Fulfillment

UNMIK did not make progress or made very little progress on the violence/military category of its mandate, started to make progress on the political category of its mandate, and made little to no progress on the economic category of its mandate.

Violence/military: Although KFOR was intended to be responsible for much of the military aspect of UNSCR 1244, UNMIK was not entirely divested of responsibility for ensuring the safety of Kosovar civilians. Initial attempts to deal with low level violence included the promise of inclusion in the KPC for KLA members in return for disbanding the paramilitary group. Unfortunately, the KPC became exceedingly corrupt and violent itself, necessitating later crackdowns and creating a lack of trust between the KPC and the other international organizations present. This lack of trust and information played into the intelligence gathering and analyzing failures that caused the March 2004 violence to come as a surprise and hampered IO response. UNMIK in particular did not have an existing structure to handle such violence, and where special police units were deployed to areas where they could be of help, they were often “outmaneuvered” by the rioters. UNMIK also failed to direct the KPS or support it so that could assist the international contingents properly (Gowan 2006, 28).

Political: The creation of democratic institutions in Kosovo came in fits and starts. The process of rebuilding a police force to enforce rule of law in the power vacuum that followed the end of the NATO airstrikes began almost immediately. The KPC and the KPS were created from scratch, with the KPC as an emergency response group and the KPS as the official local police service. UNMIK was given ultimate authority over
policing, but as it took several months for the mission to reach its capacity to do so, KFOR ended up taking this responsibility for much of 1999. Further, UNMIK’s police personnel were geographically diverse and often did not know the applicable laws to enforce, despite KFOR personnel’s similar experiences earlier on, and so enforced their own national laws instead. As UNMIK became more professionalized and coherent, this began to change; UNMIK only published an official guide in September 2000 to reinforce the unofficial rules laid out in UNMIK Police Operational Bulletins (Brand 2003, 43; O’Neill 2002, 109). Also in 2000, though a few months earlier, UNMIK deployed Special Police Units, which not only were trained for civilian policing tasks like crowd control, but also deployed as a single unit, negating some of the issues with cohesion in units with many different nationalities and skill levels (O’Neill 2002). This growing consensus on how to police and the growing quantity and quality of the UN officers provided aided in the development of the Kosovo police such that by the summer of 2002 enough quality graduates had been trained that they could take over some low-stakes tasks like traffic control (Brand 2003).

Institutionally, there was no overarching “blueprint” for developing governing institutions and no previously specified timetable or set of criteria for handing these institutions over to local actors. As such, the process was ad hoc. A Kosovo Transitional Council was led by the SRSG and was intended to bring together Kosovar leaders from the KLA, the LDA, and minority populations; the first meeting was held the day after SRSG Kouchner arrived. Participation was initially low, as one group or another refused to participate before Kouchner finally succeeded in bringing all three to the table (in part by deciding that the applicable law of the land would be the 1989 Kosovo law) and
getting them to agree to an interim administrative structure. The first meeting of the Interim Administrative Council was held immediately after this agreement was signed. A month later, in January 2000, the JIAS became law and all existing Kosovo administrative structures were intended to be abolished by the end of the year. In addition to the KTC, there were to be 14 Administrative Departments, which grew to 20 for domestic political reasons. They were intended to be fully functional by April 2000 but in actuality were not all formally established until December 2000, with one department never formally established at all (Brand 2003). SRSG Kouchner wanted to draft a constitution for Kosovo, but without developed democratic institutions this was not possible; Kosovars also wanted a constitution but the international community was not open to the discussions on status that this would almost certainly entail and the endeavor was abandoned. Before Kouchner departed his post, he created a “Working Group” to determine what a central legislative body would look like. In May 2001 Haekkerup signed the Constitutional Framework that had been developed, which avoided the question of statehood while acknowledging Kosovo’s unique position and preserving UNMIK’s authority. This Framework established Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, which included a president, prime minister, assembly, judicial system; the intention was to govern Kosovo until these institutions were fully able to, with a gradual transfer of authority (Brand 2003).

Rebuilding the judicial system took longer. After the ethnic violence in 2000, UNMIK brought in international judges for cases where local judges could be intimidated or biased (Traub 2004). The international presence was expanded after ethnic Albanian judges proved unreliable in their application of the law and Serbian prisoners went on a
hunger strike to demand to be tried by international, not local, judges. The arrival of these professionals throughout winter 2000 was accepted by local members of the judiciary (Dziedzic 2006).

*NATO Mandate Fulfillment*

KFOR mainly completed the violence/military category of its mandates. Hostilities ceased, the KLA was disarmed and demobilized, the Serbian and Yugoslav armies retreated from Kosovo, Ground and Air Safety Zones were established, and civilian deaths decreased on the whole. Within 11 days, by June 20th, all Yugoslav forces had fully withdrawn from Kosovo’s territory; the very next day the KLA signed an agreement to disband, and by September 21 the KLA had been completely demobilized (Jackson 1999). Economically, the EU though UNMIK was responsible for economic recovery programs. Unemployment remained high, at over 90% in 2000 (Wentz 2002). KFOR soldiers escorted Serbian children to and from school in the early years.

*EU Mandate Fulfillment*

EULEX Kosovo was approved for 1,800-1,900 people as early as December 2007, yet the final authorization was not given until February 16, 2008. The next day, Kosovo declared independence. Originally, EULEX was intended to take over from UNMIK, to support Kosovo authorities with rule of law issues, but political considerations and lack of consensus turned the mission into a technical one, and delayed deployment until December 2009 (Zupancic and Pejic 2018). As of 2012, the EU had not made much progress in supporting the rule of law and as of 2018, the mission had made limited
progress towards its goals related to organized crime. Directly referencing UNMIK’s largely reactionary policies, EULEX aimed to have clear, pre-established direction. This was hampered by the delay in fully deploying and by being largely barred from the North.

**Civilian Casualties**

The death rate of civilians in 1998 was fairly low in the first few months of the year, not reaching over 100 per month until May, then spiking to 295 in July and 323 in September, before dropping back below 50 in the last few months. Figure 4 shows the number of civilian deaths by month mapped over the number of UN and NATO personnel for all of 1999.

**Figure 4: Civilian Deaths and IO Personnel, 1999**
The number of civilian deaths per month dropped steeply after peaking in April, approximately a month after the NATO airstrikes began, and continued to fall as NATO personnel deployed.

Figure 5 shows the number of civilian deaths by month mapped over the number of UN and NATO personnel for all of 2000.

**Figure 5:** Civilian Deaths and IO Personnel, 2000

![Graph showing Civilian Deaths and IO Personnel, 2000](image)

There is a less direct relationship between IO personnel deployments and civilian deaths, ticking up slightly every few months, at times in concert with slight declines in personnel, though the changes are all within 5,000 people for the personnel and 20 people for the civilian casualties.

**Crime Rates**

Following a similar though delayed trend, the reported crime rates were initially quite high, due to poverty and the vacuum of law and order left between the disbanding of the
KLA and the substantial deployment of IO personnel, before dropping steadily. The weekly murder rate dropped by a factor of ten since NATO deployed. The rates of less serious crimes, however, actually rose in 2000 compared to 1999, before dropping again in 2001. Some of this can be attributed to increased trust in the newly rebuilt police and judicial system.

*Infrastructure*

Although rebuilding the basic infrastructure of a society is not generally within the purview of NATO’s troops, because UNMIK was not ready to take on such responsibilities KFOR was required to for the first year or so. In each of NATO’s five MNB areas, KFOR troops not only cleared mines from large tracts of land, roads, and buildings but also repaired bridges, emergency vehicles, and radio transmitters, and in some areas conducted community services like refuse collection (Jackson 1999).

Regarding mines and unexploded ordinance, KFOR leadership made a concerted effort to inform their own troops of the danger and proper procedures, and also to inform the Kosovar public of the dangers (Wentz 2002).

**Other Factors**

*Presence of Other Interveners*

In general, there is a great deal of overlap between the members, functions, and priorities of the three IOs in question, though NATO and the EU share a greater proportion of members and a more similar geography, and the UN and NATO share a strong history of US leadership, at least as it pertains to the use of force. NATO and the EU are deeply
connected, with formalized arrangements between the two IOs for cooperation in both planning and material capability sharing. This includes the Berlin Plus agreements and a 2003 document jointly authored, outlined a cooperative approach to security in the Western Balkans. It called NATO and EU activities “mutually reinforcing” and pointed to the EU’s operation in Macedonia using NATO assets and capabilities. It explicitly mentions the “exchange of relevant information” and the necessity of a focus on the rule of law (EU 2003).

The framework for cooperation between the UN, NATO, and later the EU was ostensibly accounted for early on to allow for clear lines of command and smooth transitions of responsibilities. The reality of the situation was, as ever, more complicated. Much of the planning for the operation(s) was not conducted in advance, but rather the lessons of Bosnia were hastily applied as a guide to the creation of KFOR (Grgic 2019). The UN granted UNMIK primacy among the international agencies to coordinate their efforts until the task had been accomplished or control could be turned over to local authorities (Dursun-Ozkanca 2009). Despite differences among the allies throughout the Kosovo conflict, “the chain of command unquestionably began and ended with the UN,” as evidenced by language in UNSCR 1244 requiring that the NATO secretary general report to the Security Council on the activities of KFOR (Kaplan 2010, 181). In practice, NATO’s KFOR was the only force on the ground immediately after the conflict had ended, so the force ended up handling civilian tasks like clearing mines, repairing bridges and power stations, rebuilding railways, etc. As UNMIK was deployed, KFOR gradually handed these tasks over until its primary activity was providing a secure environment in which the international agencies could work (Dursun-Ozkanca 2009; Jackson 1999).
However, UNMIK initially faced funding issues, which resulted in civil servants not being paid and hampered the mission’s ability to conduct “Quick Impact Projects” like repairing water supplies and buildings and acquiring computers for judges to resume their work (UN 1999a). Little wonder then, that the responsibilities should fall to KFOR.

NATO did not always share information with the Kosovo Police, or even with the United Nations. The overlapping jurisdictions also created some confusion and made prosecution more difficult (Newman and Visoka 2019; Smith 2001). Friction between the organizations also hampered their crisis responses when faced with the 2004 riots, though communication between the two improved as a result of that failure (Gowan 2006).

When the EULEX mission was created in 2008, it faced three primary challenges: how to take over responsibilities from UNMIK, how to address a “parallel structure” Serbian forces had built up in the North while UNMIK was relatively permissive, and how to handle the snap Serbian election. Russian opposition to this transfer of power made the UN cautious to the point of inaction, so the EU relied instead on a direct invitation from the newly independent Kosovo and branded their mission as a “reconfiguration” rather than a replacement of the UN mission. They also had to deal with the UN Secretary General’s clear reluctance to authorize EULEX specifically, as Ban Ki-Moon withheld his acknowledgement for four months so as not to trigger Russia’s disapproval. His inaction caused the buildup of EULEX personnel to temporarily stop, postponing full deployment by 120 days (Pond 2008). Once the staff were deployed however, many of them were already familiar with the area and the tasks assigned because they had previously been part of UNMIK (Chivvis 2010).
EULEX and KFOR worked closely together, as EULEX included police elements that were put into service mostly in the North, where the Serbian opposition had always been strongest. The two missions were often deployed simultaneously, where KFOR troops protected EULEX troops and gathered information regarding crimes committed by the local populations. However, on occasion the division of labor was not clear and KFOR found itself acting outside of its mandate (Mahr 2020).

**Resources**

A lack of resources, or a slow distribution of resources, negatively impacted many outcomes of importance. In UNMIK in 1999-2000, that manifested in a lack of necessary supplies and equipment for the UNMIK police. In 2008, UNMIK had a budget of €160 million, while EULEX had a budget of €125 million (Zupancic and Pejic 2018).

**Local Engagement**

UNMIK. UNMIK’s engagement with local-level issues and individuals has been lacking. Initially the mission did not engage with locals hardly at all; they stayed in their vehicles and offices and did not interact with people. This started to change with the appointment of Soren Jessen-Petersen as SRSG. The locals took a dim view of UNMIK initially, and that impression only grew with time, as they failed to protect minorities, and were later perceived as hindering the path to independence.

Also damaging UNMIK personnel’s relationship with Kosovars was the prevalence of sexual exploitation and assault (SEA). Due in part to a peacekeeping culture in the region that emphasized having “fun” while lacking adequate accountability,
the UN eventually recognized that SEA was a problem, with training for personnel that includes acknowledgement that “[they] are part of the problem” and arrests and jail time issued for officials that commit acts of SEA (Lutz, Gutmann, and Brown 2009).

**KFOR.** As a whole, KFOR enjoyed a higher level of support and cooperation from the local population, particularly ethnic Albanians, though ethnic Serbs respected KFOR more than the other international organizations in the area. This is not to say, however, that they enjoyed an entirely smooth relationship with locals; KFOR vehicles were still attacked occasionally during particularly bad bouts of ethnic violence.

**EULEX.** The EU mission started with a relatively high level of local support, particularly as Kosovo’s population was increasingly negative towards UNMIK. EULEX was initially welcomed by Kosovar Albanians in particular, who were generally pro-European and receptive to the mission’s goal of improving the justice system and fighting corruption. Kosovar Serbs were more skeptical from the outset. As the mission went on however, the EU’s lack of a united acknowledgement of Kosovo’s independence, reluctance to enter the Serb-controlled north of the country, and failures relating to rooting out high-level corruption gradually resulted in greater contestation by the population (Mahr 2018).

**Conclusion**

The impact of the level of formalization and coordination with other interveners on the UN, NATO, and the EU’s interventions into Kosovo after the war was generally positive. In these cases, particularly the UN and NATO, where levels of formalization were lower,
there were lower levels of mandate fulfillment, higher levels of violence, and less infrastructure built. When the UN lacked unity, committed resources, clear mission structure, and leadership willing to cooperate to the fullest extent, they were unprepared for a resurgence of ethnic violence and did a poor job of rebuilding policing institutions. Where NATO was prepared, had clear leadership and goals, and few caveats, they were able not only to create a safe environment, but assist in refugee return and assist in rebuilding infrastructure. When divergent national interests hampered mission effectiveness, the existing NATO command structures and leadership allowed for a relatively quick change in course. While the EU began with a relatively clear, if ambitious, mission, internal divisions and failures to achieve results eroded its efficacy. I find support then for hypotheses 4.1a-c, and 42.b, regarding the importance of formalization on mandate fulfillment, civilian violence, and infrastructure, and the importance of cooperation and coordination with other interveners on civilian violence.

As in Chapter 2, a mission’s level of formalization can influence its effectiveness, demonstrating the importance of taking this factor into account for both ongoing and post-conflict situations. It seems that greater attention should be paid to the potential for violence even in post-conflict societies and the ability of a mission’s level of formalization to either exacerbate or ameliorate such violence.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

In this dissertation I have argued for the necessity of explicitly theorizing about what makes an intervention effective, differentiating among interventions into an ongoing conflict and those into post-conflict situations, as each brings unique challenges the interveners must overcome. I also introduced the theory of an intervention’s level of formalization and how it influences that intervention’s effectiveness. Chapter 1 situated this dissertation within the literature, Chapter 2 operationalized these concepts for a quantitative analysis, followed by more in-depth case study analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 to more fully explore how the theory plays out in interventions into an ongoing conflict and into a post conflict situation, respectively. A brief example may be instructive.

The United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia is widely considered to be a successful example of intervention bounded on either side by far less successful UN interventions. Limited in scope and grand in size, the largely US-led mission had a clear chain of command, declassified and permissive ROE that was offered to and accepted by the TCCs, and established means of communication among HQ and national contingents (Findlay 2002; Tubbs 1997). Although there was still some friction, particularly around the use of less than deadly force in the American zone, the Australian and French zones were quite successful, and the various national contingents coordinated well with one another and carried out the clear strategic and military direction with little challenge to the chain of command (Findlay 2002; Tubbs 1997). The result was successful protection of humanitarian aid organizations and the consequent increased delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and the creation and maintenance of a secure environment for the duration of the mission that saved an estimated 100,000 lives. However, UNITAF was also considered unsuccessful in that it was too limited in scope, did not make disarmament a stated goal, the ROE was still unclear in some cases concerning the use of less than deadly force, and that the warlords simply waited until the US had left to resume violence as the US had vowed to remain neutral (Clarke and Herbst 1996). This example not only shows what can be accomplished when a mission is highly formalized, but also how important it is to clearly define the yardstick by which we are measuring success, and why these measures are appropriate. Several other “successful” operations follow a similar pattern, with some claiming victory based on a given set of criteria while others cry defeat based on a different set of metrics. See EUFOR Chad, UNOCI, or Operation Unified Protector, which seems to inspire particular fervor on both sides, for further examples. Clearly defining effectiveness and understanding what makes an IO-led intervention effective are important tasks that remain relevant to current affairs.

The increasing prevalence of IO-led interventions after the Cold War has tapered off slightly since its peak, but the persistence of these missions around the world speaks volumes of their continued importance. As of 2021, the UN maintained 12 active peacekeeping operations (UN n.d.c), NATO maintained three named missions and provided support to a further two missions (NATO n.d.a), the EU maintained seven military missions and 11 civilian missions (EU 2021; SIPRI 2021), and the AU maintained six ongoing missions. There were also multilateral peace operations led by the OAS, the OCSE, ECOWAS, to say nothing of the coalitions and individual states conducting interventions (SIPRI 2021). Further, conditions similar to those which have
prompted such waves of humanitarian interventions can still be found globally today; civil violence has not been, nor is likely to be, entirely eradicated and threats from outside powers are still being made. Though it may have evolved in tone and interpretation as states internalized and acted on it, the Responsibility to Protect norm is not obsolete. All of which is to say that the utility of furthering our understanding of what makes a third-party intervention effective is not contained to the ivory tower of academia. Building, testing, and developing this theory contributes to the cumulation of knowledge, always a goal of academic study, but also ideally to the practical application of theory as well.

**Advancing the Research Agenda**

Chapter 1 introduces the theory and concepts that are developed throughout the rest of the dissertation, explaining the need to explicitly theorize about the definition of efficacy, based upon when in a conflict an IO intervenes. Ongoing conflicts have a much shorter time frame and thus more urgent and immediate goals that lend themselves to more militaristic means of achievement. Post-conflict situations are less urgent, and tend to have longer time horizons, and a slightly different constellation of explanatory factors. One of these explanatory factors that is currently overlooked is the mission’s level of formalization; a concept I borrow and adapt from Kreps (2011). In its original form, the concept differentiates among unilateral, coalitional, and IO-led interventions based on how formalized the cooperation is; I expand this to include within-unit variation.

In much the same way as IOs differ in their levels of formalization from states and coalitions, so too do they vary amongst themselves, and even internally over the
course of a given intervention. I further expand the concept to explicate what constitutes higher or lower levels of formalization and theorize that it can positively or negatively impact an intervention’s effectiveness. Within an International Organization, the level of formalization varies based on the unity and clarity of the mission’s command and control structures, the lack of national caveats, the unity and clarity of the strategic leadership, and the number and integration of troop-contributing countries. Essentially, there should be a unity of effort that is able to effectively utilize the resources at the IOs disposal to create a mission that is more than the sum of its parts. The more formalized cooperation within the IO-led mission is, the more strength and speed with which they can act, all of which should combine with the increased legitimacy often granted to IO-led missions, particularly those with a humanitarian element, to increase the likelihood of the mission achieving its goals. In ongoing conflict situations, this is primarily focused on negative peace; the reduction and prevention of civilian casualties and fulfillment of the mandate. In post-conflict situations, this often includes more of a positive peace; improving the physical and political infrastructure and fulfillment of the mandate.

Chapter 2 explores this theory in a quantitative analysis, operationalizing this theory and applying it to a dataset constructed to include IO-led third party interventions into ongoing and post-conflict situations from 1990-2000 inclusive, and through 2010 as possible. Although initial, simple results are in the expected direction, adding multiple explanatory variables decreases the N to such a degree that statistical significance is not achieved. Chapters 4 and 5 then take this emerging theory and these conflicting results, and trace the application narratively through case studies of interventions into the
Bosnian conflict in the early-to-mid 1990s and the Kosovo conflict and its aftermath in the late 1990s and beyond, respectively.

Chapter 4 explores the NATO and UN missions in Bosnia in the 1990s, tracing the structure of these IO-led missions over the course of the interventions and the impact on the level of civilian casualties, victory for the supported side, and mandate fulfillment. NATO’s chain of command was relatively stronger and cleaner than the UN’s, particularly under the leadership of Secretaries-General Wörner and Claes. The goals of the mission and the role of NATO members were clearly communicated and there were few, if any, countries restricting the use or command of their personnel. This allowed for two successful air campaigns (Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force) that achieved their stated goals within the stated time frame, the second more so than the first. The UN started at a lower level of formalization, lacking a Special Representative and an overly complicated chain of command. This gave way to the presence of a SRSG, streamlined chain of command, and individuals who understood and were willing to carry out the goals of the mission. Unfortunately, increasing national fractionalization led to a severe casualty incident before international shaming decreased these impulses and progress could again be made. Chapter 5 explores the NATO, UN, and EU missions in Kosovo starting in 1999 and continuing on until today. NATO again is the more formalized of the early interventions, though experienced difficulties with incorporating Russian participation. The UN mission (UNMIK) largely failed to reduce residual violence, though saw limited success in creating institutions, but struggled to maintain those institutions or generate local buy-in. Under early NATO leadership, a large percentage of refugees and internally displaced persons were able to return, and repairs
were made to the physical infrastructure of the area. Once the UN was able to deploy (and then to fully deploy), they began assisting with the development of a national police force and political institutions, though national differences in abilities, interpretations of the mandates, and corruption damaged not only the mission’s functioning, but its credibility among the Kosovar citizenry. The EU rule of law mission, established years after the NATO and UN missions, achieved limited success, hindered by lack of unity by member states on Kosovo’s legal status.

**Policy Implications**

From these chapters, then, a few lessons may be drawn. The level of formalized cooperation within an IO-led intervention can be affected by several factors that the IO might be able to influence. Because clear strategic direction carried down the line of command contributes to a higher level of formalization, and unclear strategic direction can cause tactical- and operational-level confusion, IOs should ensure to the greatest extent possible that the Rules of Engagement reflect the strategic goals of the mission and are clearly explicated at all levels. When peacekeepers fail to understand the conditions under which they are authorized to use force, hesitation and inaction can cost civilian lives. In post-conflict situations, there may still be enough residual violence to merit clarifying ROE, or they may influence how the peacekeepers interact with the population or the commanders interpret the mission. These ROE should be standard across the mission, present and superseding national ROE.
Relatedly, IOs should do their best to ensure that where national caveats cannot be avoided, they are at least transparent and available to the operational-level commanders prior to deployment. Restrictive national caveats hinder the provision of resources where they are needed, whether it is military protection for civilians under fire or what kinds of material or physical support can be brought to bear in areas where it is most needed. Caveats not only decrease the control of the IO infrastructure over its component pieces, but also can cause rifts among the individuals constrained by them and the individuals who then bear the greater share of a given burden.

Finally, IOs should strive to ensure that the individuals in positions of command have access to standardized training and channels of communication so that an understanding of the political and military goals of the mission is present and up to date. While there will always be individual-level differences in ways of operating, having fewer disruptions in the command may lead to greater stability on the ground. Of course, this does not mean stamping a particular way of conducting a mission onto each new situation; the goals and training should be situationally-based. For example, ensuring that all Heads of Mission and Force Commanders share a common understanding of the ultimate goals of the mission, how those goals are to be accomplished in the context of the situation on the ground, and how to communicate this to all relevant personnel. The means of achieving these may still vary by the individual but not a great or detrimental degree. Of course, these policy implications are intertwined, and essentially speak to the need for a singular direction, clearly understood by individuals capable of and willing to carry it out.
The Future of Third-Party Intervention Studies

This dissertation presented a largely exploratory process of the development and initial exploration of a theory of IO-led intervention effectiveness through a mixed-methods approach. The strengths of this include a first pass at quantitatively exploring and qualitatively tracing a theory of formalization of IO-led missions, explicating this theory and setting it up for future research. It explicitly theorizes about what we consider to be effective and how that can change depending on the time frame of the intervention, introduces formalization as an overlooked explanatory variable, and considers multiple interveners in one analysis. By clarifying what effective means for a given international intervention, and grounding it in theory balanced with the complexities of reality, we can more clearly and uniformly evaluate its outcome. Though the quantitative analysis suffers from a relatively small number of observations and this data limitation warrants caution, it serves as a strong foundation for future research, as the translation of the concept of formalization into a quantitative set of variables is sound, the incorporation of multiple IOs is a necessary next step for the subfield, and initial results are promising, if at times inconclusive. The case studies remedy some of these data-driven challenges, tracing the application of this theory through specific instances and incorporating basic analyses of subnational deployment characteristics. The more in-depth nature of these analyses is well suited for teasing out complex casual mechanisms, particularly in situations with multiple factors exerting an influence on the eventual outcome, and for defining key concepts, refining and testing theories, and supplementing potentially inferior data (Henke 2019; Mahoney 2007).
Future Research

To expand the quantitative analysis conducted in this dissertation, first and foremost the number of observations in Chapter 2 should be increased. This includes expanding the time frame as well as the breadth of International Organizations included. Additionally, subnational or geospatial analysis and monthly, rather than annual, analysis should be incorporated more into this field of study in the future. Finally, adding an analysis of how the formalization of an international intervention interacts with the local elements of the conflict may also be fruitful.

Understanding where in a country a mission’s personnel go as well as when they move and why could go a long way towards explaining the success or failure of the missions over time. If troops are deployed immediately to conflict hot spots, then they have a greater ability to intercede between combatants and reduce violence. Current literature suggests that the UN does in fact deploy its personnel to those areas of a country experiencing violent clashes, though potentially after some delay, and that it does work (Costalli 2013; Townsen and Reeder 2014; Powers, Reeder, and Townsen 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Grizelis 2017; 2018). Mobility is a crucial characteristic of many rebel groups as well as an emphasis of modern conflict management in general, and active conflict zones flow among regions within a state as well as across state borders during a single conflict (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). Aside from mobility, certain areas within a country are more likely to be the site of combat than others. Incorporating subnational variation will add an important layer of accuracy to the analysis of civilian casualty reduction and the restoration of necessary political and societal institutions on
the one hand, and of the ability of commanders to distribute the mission personnel under their command as necessary and how fractured the chain of command is, on the other hand.

Another area ripe for development is the time span focused on. First and foremost, the level of temporal aggregation remains annual. Examining the deployment of an intervention at the subnational level captures the variation in where troops actually go within a state, which strongly influences how effective they can be. However, the situation on the ground and the interveners’ responses to new situations can change rapidly, making yearly data too imprecise to effectively track changes in subnational deployment. For example, French intervention in Mali was requested in January of 2013 precisely because of how quickly Tuareg rebels were moving towards the capital. By the end of the month, French forces had recaptured a good deal of territory, by April a withdrawal had begun and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was authorized, and by August the French had turned over full control to MINUSMA (“Mali Profile – Timeline” 2017; Boeke and Schuurman 2015). Deployments can alter their location, strength, and composition according to the unfolding of events on the ground and the reports of personnel on the ground. How quickly and accurately an intervener does so should play an important role in how effective that intervention is, both during and after a conflict.

Finally, incorporating a bottom-up, local approach to intervention may not be as antithetical as it at first seems. Incorporating an understanding of the local drivers of conflict and how that is likely to impact the mission’s chances of success, particularly in post-conflict situations, could be accounted for at the strategic level. From deciding how
best to allocate the resources at hand, to what should be the immediate focus of the
mission, to which nation’s troops should be deployed to a given geographical subunit
could be introduced. Though the level of formalization largely does not concern the
content of the strategic and military direction of a mission, focusing instead on its
structure and the degree to which it is adhered to and carried out, these are not necessarily
competing theories.

To conclude, furthering our understanding of what constitutes an effective
international intervention and how to achieve it are crucial to ameliorating the horrific
conditions that can result from intrastate conflicts. Conducting missions more effectively
can save not only civilian lives, but potentially the lives of the interveners as well, as they
accomplish the mission’s goals more quickly and encounter resistance with a greater
understanding of how and when to respond.


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VITA

Rachel Anne Dicke was born in Columbus, Ohio to Tom and Judy Dicke. After completing an International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme at Central High School in Springfield, Missouri, Rachel attended Truman State University, where she earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science. In 2013, she earned a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Eastern Illinois University. In 2014, Rachel began a PhD program at the University of Missouri and earned her Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in 2022. During the last several years of her tenure as a graduate student, Rachel worked as a research consultant for the Institute of Public Policy at the University of Missouri – which conducts independent, non-partisan analysis to inform public policy and benefit all Missourians – and plans to continue on in this vein.