IN THE HANDS OF NOBLE MEN:
A HISTORY OF THESSALY FROM THE ARCHAIC PERIOD TO THE END OF THE THIRD
SACRED WAR
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“IN THE HANDS OF NOBLE MEN:” A HISTORY OF THESSALY FROM THE ARCHAIC PERIOD TO THE THIRD SACRED WAR

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ABSTRACT

Modern analysis has understood the history of Thessaly in the Archaic and Classical periods as divided into two distinct phases. The first was defined by Thessalian expansion in the seventh and sixth centuries over central Greece, most notably Phocis and the religious complex at the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. The second was one of fifth century decline, followed by fourth century civil war. The conflict was ended through the intervention of Philip II, who brought Thessaly under Macedonian control.

What prompted the Thessalians to expend the political, social, and military resources to embark upon a hegemonic project in central Greece? What caused the subsequent upheaval and stasis of the fifth and fourth centuries? This work attempts to answer these questions by creating a framework for interpreting Thessalian actions in the Archaic and Classical periods, arguing that the Thessalian hegemonic project was motivated by the desire to control the overland trade routes of central Greece. The late Archaic failure of this venture produced Classical-era political and social unrest amongst the factions of elites in Thessaly, creating a political situation in the fourth century in which ruling legitimacy was based on successfully recreating Archaic expansionism. With this framework, the actions of the Thessalians can be given proper context within the larger historical drama of the Classical era, and allows a richer, more dynamic, and more complex world to emerge.
Introduction: In the Hands of Noble Men

In 498, the poet Pindar created an *epinician* for Hippocleas, a Thessalian boy who won a foot-race event at the Pythian games.\(^1\) However, it is clear that Hippocleas was not the primary subject for the poet, instead the work was concerned with furthering the political agenda of Pindar’s sponsors the Aleuadae, at that time the politically dominant dynastic faction in Thessaly. The closing lines of the poem represented how the Thessalian elite wished to be seen by their constituents and contemporaries:

ἐν δ’ ἀγαθοῖς κεῖναι/πατρώιαι κεδναὶ πολίων κυβερνάσιες.\(^2\)

Descendants of the semi-mythical founder Aleuas the Red, the Aleuads believed in their ἀγαθός, but many men in Thessaly were noble and good; what were the characteristics of their goodness as it related to the legitimacy of Thessalian rulership? To that end, this project is the culmination of an effort to create a history of Thessaly from the Archaic period to the end of the Third Sacred War in 346, with a focus on the identifying a set of consistent political, social, and military objectives which the Thessalian *koinon* used as a benchmark for the legitimacy of any pan-Thessalian ruling mandate. While hereditary power and privilege may have offered a route to rule, what social or cultural values allowed the elite of Thessaly to maintain their regimes?

As with most studies of the Greek periphery, a lack of literary and material sources is a significant issue. Material evidence from Thessaly is rare; ancient sites are overlaid with contemporary habitation obstructing excavation efforts, and resources have largely gone to other, more high-profile areas. The vast majority of significant discoveries related to Archaic and

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1 Pind. *P.* 10.
2 “…the good piloting of states, handed from father to son, rests in the hands of noble men.”
Classical Thessaly occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Recent archaeological activities in Thessaly have focused on Hellenistic Halos and Vlochos, both of which ceased active fieldwork operations after 2018 and have not resumed as of writing.

In terms of literary evidence, there are no extant works which were created by the Thessalians themselves. This complicates using written sources, as ancient authors were rarely interested in an accurate depiction of Thessalian history. Instead Thessalians often exist only as a stereotype to serve the function of the author. The fifth century Athenian statesman Antiphon was targeted by Aristophanes in *The Wasps* as having gone on a diplomatic mission to Pharsalus only to have spent time with the unfree *penestae*; was this a reference to an actual event, a slur against unperceptive Antiphon, or a jab at Thessalian society, which to Athenian eyes was chaotic and disordered? Regardless, Aristophanes’ was clearly playing on stereotypes of Thessaly as a place of disorder and chaos; yet these stereotypes are predominant in extant literature.

Moreover, Thessaly and the Thessalians are most often referred to tangentially, bit players in the larger narrative of Athens, Sparta, Boeotia, or Macedonia. In 457 a Thessalian contingent of cavalry betrayed their Athenian allies at the Battle of Tanagra, ensuring a Spartan

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victory. But why did this happen? Thucydides offered no clear ideological or practical for the Thessalian betrayal. The action was significant enough to warrant a mention, but not sufficiently important to digress and give greater context to the event. In these cases where there is so little extant evidence, it is easy for modern audiences to conclude that the Thessalians were solely reacting to the actions of other peoples, or simply acting without a clear purpose. When there are literary records of Thessalian activities which provide details vital to the modern historian, often the only accounts were written significantly later than the events in question. The chronological distance creates issues with accepting the veracity of the events described.

And yet, methodological leaps of faith are necessary to construct a coherent narrative of Thessalian history. Hay must be made of the smallest detail, and issues of phrasing, word choice, and action must be elaborated upon. Rather than dismissing accounts which were written chronologically later and provide the sole attestation for an event, this dissertation accepts that they represent a kernel of historical truth. The Phocians likely did not cover themselves in chalk when they launched a night attack that drove off a Thessalian army at the end of the Archaic period, but it is reasonable to accept that a folk legend evolved around a surprising route of Thessalian forces outside the city of Hyampolis. Similarly, modern historians examining the First Sacred War can discount later reports of romantically-linked soldiers, poisoned aqueducts, and year-long sieges, but the idea a coalition of Greek polities sought to take control of the Apollonian sanctuary for their own benefit is not unreasonable.

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7 Thuc. 1.107.5-7; Diod. 11.80; Paus. 1.29.9.
8 Hdt. 8.27.2-5, 8.28.
As well, a lack of comparable sources often hampers interpretation of material finds. The Theotimos monument, a gravestone for a fallen Thessalian soldier – covered in depth in chapter seven – is a particularly fascinating piece of Thessalian history.\textsuperscript{10} However, there are no comparable monuments in the Classical period, Thessalian or otherwise.\textsuperscript{11} It would be perhaps more methodologically sound to wait until the discovery of similar pieces in Thessaly or other areas of Greece before offering commentary on the meaning and implications of epigraphy or monumental sculpture. However, given the limited resources and interest in archaeology on the peripheries of mainland Greece it seems unlikely that new material will be available in any reasonable window of time. Similarly, retrojection of material evidence into the past – in particular, see chapter two on the Delphic Amphictyony – is necessary to attempt to untangle and understand chronologically earlier events. This often necessitates treating institutions as static over the course of years or centuries, which they certainly were not. But again, if modern scholarship is to reject these methodologically questionable lines of inquiry, then there is no way to assemble a framework to understand the actions and motivations of the Thessalians in the Classical period.\textsuperscript{12} In order to create a “Thessalian” narrative, in which the actions of the Thessalian polity are the result of both external stimuli and internal social, political, and economic dynamics, evidence which would otherwise be discarded in a situation in which more extant data was available must be used.

\textsuperscript{10} In addition to chapter seven in this work, see: Bruno Helly, \textit{L'Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi} (Lyon: Maison de l'Orient Mediterraneen, 1995), 226–27.
\textsuperscript{11} Grave Stele of Dexileos is the closest analogue but has neither the elaboration nor the larger political connotations of the Theotimos monument.
\textsuperscript{12} It should be acknowledged that Herodes Atticus’ \textit{Peri politeias}, a source which has been relied upon by Thessalian historians – most notably Marta Sordi, \textit{La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno} (Rome: Studi Pubblicati Dall’Istituto Italiano Per La Storia Antica, 1958). – has been omitted from this work. \textit{Peri politeias} is far too general of a work to provide sufficient insight into Thessalian politics or society in the fifth and fourth centuries; there is no clear indication that the work is about Thessalian activities in the fifth century. While Sordi accomplishes a remarkable feat using \textit{Peri politeias} in her analysis of Thessalian politics, her conclusions with regard to the work were insufficiently backed by corroborating evidence of any kind to be useful here.
Given these limitations, this work sought to accomplish two goals. The first was to provide an updated history of Thessaly from the arrival of the Thessalians to the end of the Third Sacred War. Significant surveys of Thessalian history have not been written since the millennium, and the foundational works were written over six decades prior.\textsuperscript{13} Without a doubt these are excellent scholarly works which deserve praise and attention; however, they are products of their time, and are subject to the dominant contemporary analysis. In particular, both Westlake and Sordi subscribed to the then-popular theory that ancient Greek political development was a linear path directly linked to the development of the \textit{polis}, an assumption which has been discarded, most notably thanks to the work of Catherine Morgan.\textsuperscript{14} Monographs on Thessaly have been produced more recently, but the larger sweep of Thessalian history is outside of the purview of these works, and as such they are unable to connect their arguments to a larger historical schema. Considering new ideas and data that have been made available in the last twenty years, this dissertation offers an updated historical interpretation of Thessaly in the Archaic and Classical periods.

It must be acknowledged that the following chapters offer a fairly orthodox interpretation of Thessalian history. The first phase of lasting from the ethnogenesis of the Thessalians in the Larisa-Trikala basin in the early Archaic period was expansionary: the Thessalian \textit{ethnos} extended its hegemony over its \textit{periocic} neighbors as well as into central Greece, most notably Phocis.\textsuperscript{15} This project was likely overseen by the Larisaean Aleuadae, who also appear to have presided over its failure at the end of the Archaic period. The second phase of Thessalian history,


\textsuperscript{14} Catherine Morgan, \textit{Early Greek States Beyond the Polis} (New York: Routledge, 2003), 24–25.

\textsuperscript{15} The most thorough examination of Thessalian \textit{penestae} is: Slawomir Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period,” in \textit{1st International Congress on the History and Culture of Thessaly}, 2006, 131–37.
from the end of the Persian Wars to 404 was seen as a period of inactivity, in which the Thessalian poleis were unable to act in a coherent and unified fashion to execute their will on an international stage. This dissertation argues that fifth century political paralysis was the result of a dissolution of consensus amongst the Thessalian elite, who no longer subscribed to a political order in which the Alueadae claimed a pan-Thessalian ruling mandate. Evidence suggests that this was in part due to Aleuad stewardship over the end of the Thessalian hegemonic project.

Finally, the third phase of Thessalian history prior to the region’s submission to Philip II was marked by a series of brutal civil wars. Pan-Thessalian regimes were only able to take control of the Thessalian koinon through the application of force and define themselves in opposition to other factions within Thessaly. Moreover, competing factions were waiting for any opportunity to restart conflict; as soon as a successful Thessalian leader died, violence immediately resumed. This seemingly intractable conflict led to Thessalians looking for outside assistance to shore up their internal political and military strength, a practice which allowed a series of foreign powers to exert control over Thessalian politics. Thanks to a canny program of combining symbolic and material benefits to the Thessalians, Philip II was able to secure his election to the office of Thessalian archon and effectively ended Thessalian self-determination; and as such seemed a reasonable mark to end this analysis.

Despite adhering to a generally orthodox structure of Thessalian historical narrative, this dissertation is unique in its examinations of the motivations – the Thucydidean ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν – for the actions of the Thessalian koinon. While modern historians have done
excellent work reconstructing Thessalian history, for the reasons discussed above very rarely have they attempted to explain why these actions were undertaken. This is certainly understandable, as ancient writers rarely had more than a passing interest in Thessaly or the Thessalians. Yet, throughout the roughly four hundred years there are a number of key data points which suggest that certain social and political values which were consistently culturally important to the Thessalians in determining the legitimacy of rulers and their regimes. Primarily, Thessaly appears to be a society which spent the fifth and fourth centuries deeply impacted by the loss of regional hegemony in the late Archaic period. The failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project began the destabilization and decline of consensus amongst the Thessalian elite, displacing the Aleuad clan of Larisa as the dominant force in Thessalian politics and enabling other factions to challenge them for leadership. This led to a political situation in which governmental legitimacy in Thessaly was derived from the willingness of the ruling party to address the loss of hegemony through attempts to recreate the Thessalian expansionary project in central Greece. This political goal manifested itself in two ways. First, as a deep antipathy towards the Phocians, who were perceived to have played an integral part in the failure of Thessalian hegemonic ambitions at the end of the Archaic period. Successful Thessalian regimes were able to define themselves in opposition to the Phocians, and those which were perceived as insufficiently hostile were unlikely to garner critical social and political support. Second, through attempts to reestablish influence over the Apollonian oracle at Delphi. Control over Apollo’s sanctuary both materially benefitted the Thessalians and symbolically recalled the First Sacred War, understood to be an integral part of the Thessalian hegemonic project.

This dissertation is broken up into seven chapters, each exploring aspects of the Thessalian hegemonic project and attempts of Classical period Thessalian leaders to link their
regimes to that mytho-historic Archaic golden age. The first chapter offers an overview of Thessaly in two different formats. First, a non-chronological survey of Thessalian geography, economy, and social structures to orient readers with a macro-level picture of the region. Second, a chronological narrative of Thessalian history, focusing on the interactions between Thessaly and the wider Greek world in order to establish contexts for all subsequent chapters.

The second chapter discusses the connection between Thessaly and the Apollonian oracle at Delphi. Many talented scholars have examined the First Sacred War and the mythological and historical traditions relating to the conflict. While this is addressed, the primary goal of the chapter is to posit reasons why the Thessalians might have prosecuted the conflict, and why the relationship between Thessaly and Delphi held such power in Thessalian culture. In particular, the chapter focuses on one possible explanation: control over the trade in sacrificial animals for sale to pilgrims coming to the sanctuary.

The third chapter traces the decline in elite consensus in Thessaly through the Classical period; despite limited extant information on the region, it seems clear that there was an accelerating process of social and political upheaval. This turbulence had its roots in the Phocian revolt and the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project.

The fourth chapter offers an analysis of Thessalian governing policies in the Classical period. It seems clear from extant information that governmental legitimacy in Thessaly hinged upon the willingness of a leader to repudiate the losses of the late Archaic period, and materially or symbolically connect their regime with the past.
The fifth chapter explores the status of the *penestae*, the unfree class of peoples who existed in Thessaly. Most often compared to Spartan *helots*, this chapter argues that a reinterpretation of the institution of the *penestae* is necessary.

The sixth chapter discusses the specific policies of the major extant Thessalian regimes in the fourth century: those of Jason of Pherae, the Aleuad-led Thessalian Federation, and Philip II, whose policies with regard to Thessaly mimicked those of indigenous rulers.

Finally, the seventh chapter examines Thessalian actions at the Battle of Tanagra in 457. During the battle the Thessalians betrayed their Athenian allies and created conditions for a Spartan victory. This chapter argues that this behavior was motivated by deeply-held Thessalian antipathy towards the Phocians, and the betrayal was a manifestation of popular frustration that the ruling Thessalian regime would support an ally – Athens – who was also supporting the Phocians.

Using a speculative framework to explain the actions of Greek peoples on the periphery of the major historical narratives of the Classical period allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding, not only of those on the margins, but also the actions of those peoples and polities which are well-attested. The schema proposed in this work creates a Thessalian narrative, which allows for Thessalian actions motivated by Thessalian needs. The Thessalians expanded into central Greece not for vague hegemonic ambitions but to benefit economically, politically, and socially through controlling overland traffic through the mountain passes in Phocis and Locris.17

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Meno I of Pharsalus sent soldiers and money to support the Athenian siege at Eion in the 470s not because he was ideologically aligned with the democracy, or was desperate for Athenian citizenship, but in an effort to shore up his political status in Thessaly through the cultivation of powerful allies.¹⁸ Jason of Pherae’s raid through Phocis after the Battle of Leuctra was not motivated by opportunity or convenience, but was fulfilling specific political criteria his regime required to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents. The Thessalians did not submit to Philip II in 352 because they were overawed by his military or diplomatic skills, but because the Macedonian king offered the Thessalians specific material benefits as his allies.¹⁹ This dissertation offers a schema through which the actions of the Thessalian ‘noble men” can be analyzed and interpreted, and as such opens possibilities for further understanding of the interlocking relationships of peoples and polities in the Classical period.

¹⁸ See chapter three for further discussion, also Dem. 13.23, 23.199.
¹⁹ See chapter six for further discussion of both Jason of Pherae and Philip II.
Chapter 1 – An Overview and Narrative History of Thessaly

Thessalian history is by nature a specialized field; extant historical accounts rarely display interest in the region unless it is part of a narrative centered around the other Greek powers. Creating a coherent linear and chronological narrative requires using material from a variety of sources, often written significantly later than the events in question. Moreover, suppositions and extrapolations are necessary for assembling a coherent narrative, much must be made of literary asides and references which lack detail. Due to a lack of archaeological exploration in Thessaly, when material evidence is available there are rarely comparable finds which could offer context. As such, even a specialist in Greek history could not and should not be expected to be aware of the intricacies of this subject.

In order to contextualize the following chapters that delve into the minutiae of Thessalian history, this chapter seeks to orient any reader who might not be familiar with a historical narrative with Thessaly as its central concern. This chapter will do so in two parts. First, a broad overview of Thessalian geography, economy, early history, and society, which due to a dearth of extant sources necessarily focuses on the dynastic elite which ruled Thessaly in the Archaic and Classical periods. Second, a chronological narrative of Thessaly from the Archaic period through the Third Sacred War which identifies a number of recurrent patterns which will be explored further in the following chapters. The primary historical analysis understands Thessaly to have been an expansional regional hegemonic power in the Archaic period. This hegemonic project faltered in the late sixth or early fifth century, which led to increasing social and political instability in the fifth century, and open civil war in the fourth. In addition to this escalating conflict, Thessalian actions in this period must be understood in the context of the desire to
reestablish regional hegemony over central Greece, with a focus on controlling Phocis and the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.

I. The Geography and Climate of Thessaly

In antiquity, Thessaly was comprised of two plains encircled by mountain ranges: the western “Upper” plain, the Trikala-Karditsa basin and the eastern “Lower” plain, the Larisa-Karala basin. These two vast depressions are divided by a low-lying range of hills running northwest to southeast, ranging in height from between 200 to 600 meters tall.1 The two plains encompass a combined area of roughly 4,000 square kilometers, making Thessaly – when it was unified – one of the largest political units in ancient Greece.2 These two plains form the greater part of the Pineos River basin, which defined Thessalian landscape in the ancient period.

Strabo and Diodorus believed that the plain had at one point in an even earlier period been covered by a body of water, contemporary Thessaly was dry lakebed. Modern geologic surveys have corroborated this finding.3 The Pinios River was and continues to be the major river system in Thessaly, and its tributaries flow throughout the Thessalian plains. The Pinios is primarily fed by two waterways, the Ion and Malakasiotis rivers, and supplemented with snowfall runoff in the spring. The river runs from the northwestern border of Thessaly into the

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Aegean Sea, passing through the Vale of Tempe, known for its location as a staging area for the first and unsuccessful attempt by the pan-Hellenic army to stop the invasion of Xerxes in 480.4 The Pinios and its tributaries – the Portaikos, Enippeuis, and others – fed into large lakes that existed in the pre-modern period, such as Lakes Karla, Voiviida, and Boebis. The preponderance of waterways caused issues with drainage, and flooding seems to have been a constant threat, especially in the upper plain.5 This is perhaps why Thessalians were known to have practiced turning their legume crops back into the soil, to combat anaerobic soil issues due to oversaturation.6 However, the consistency of these waterways was not always a given. From May to October the Pinios river may be entirely waterless, farmers and ranchers must rely on dammed areas or ponds formed in depressions near the river or its tributaries; it is likely this was both an ancient and modern practice.7

The climate of Thessaly in the ancient period is unfortunately unknown to us. However, Strabo recorded that Thessalian peasants wore the thickest clothes of any Greeks, because they lived far to the north.8 It is unclear how accurate Strabo’s information was, but his statement does illustrate the remarkable variation in temperatures that could afflict the Thessalian herdsman or farmer. Contemporary seasonal climactic variations even within the area of historical Thessaly corroborate this observation. The Trikala-Karditsa basin receives significantly more rainfall than the rest of Thessaly. One of the most recent studies shows that Karditsa, which is on the plain itself, receives only 666mm per year, with 108mm in the dry

4 Hdt. 7.172-173
6 Osborne, Classical Landscape with Figures, 41.
7 Migiros et al., “Pinios (Peneus) River (Central Greece): Hydrological - Geomorphological Elements and Changes During the Quaternary,” 218.
season between May and August. In the mountains at higher elevations above 700 meters the amount of rain can double or triple. The Larisa-Karala basin receives significantly less rainfall than its western counterpart. The northern portion of the lower plain receives 467mm on average per year, with only 100mm in the dry season. As with the western plain, the lowlands receive little rain during the year, but rainfall increases dramatically at higher elevations. While Larisa is only 73m above sea-level, the village of Verdikousa sits at an altitude of 863 meters in the northern foothills and receives 847mm per year and 189mm during the dry season, nearly double the rainfall that Larsia receives. Volos, called Pagasae in antiquity and the port of nearby Pherae, receives even less rainfall than Larisa, averaging 446mm for the full year with only 88mm in the dry season. While Strabo’s assertion that latitude was the motivator of unusual Thessalian attire, seasonal variation in the modern period similarly seems to corroborate the author’s findings. Temperatures on the western plain range on average from 6.3°C in the winter to 26.3°C in the summer, reaching up to 33.9°C. In the northeast of Thessaly, Larisa is on average 5.3°C in the cooler months and 25.9°C in the summer. However, temperature can fluctuate between extremes of .8°C to 33.8°C between the winter and summer months. It must be acknowledged that these are climactic records from almost three millennia later, and they should not be taken as exact data, only guidelines. Based on climate modeling, it seems likely that the surface temperature in Archaic and Classical Greece was more moderate, on average a full degree

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10 Γκουβά and Σακελλαρίου, 17.
11 Γκουβά and Σακελλαρίου, 15–17.
Celsius cooler. Based upon the relatively unique topography of Thessaly it is difficult to say how this may have affected rainfall, vegetation growth, cloud cover, and other important data points often taken for granted when performing modern climatic studies. The Thessalian plains were certainly well watered during the wet periods, with rivers irrigating the Pineos basin. In these cooler months the weather was relatively mild, and conducive to raising and herding livestock. However, the tendency towards flooding and resultant marshes the plains would make farming a dicey proposition. In the summer, the heat combined with a lack of water in the lowlands would similarly discourage farming, but would have encouraged pastoralism and a limited transhumance, with animals grazing in the plains during the cooler winter months and being driven to the mountains during the dry period in the summers.

The peaks and foothills that ringed Thessaly, where shepherds drove their herds in the hot and dry summer months were also the homes of the Thessalian perioeci. To the east of Thessaly, the Pindus range runs north to south into Albania forming the barrier between Thessaly and Epirus. Out of these mountains a hot and dry wind called the “livas” blows down upon the plains, destroying crops and bringing locusts. The Cambunian range in the north provided a barrier between Thessaly and Macedonia. This area was inhabited by the Perrhaebians, perioeci dependents of the Larisaeans. The Pelion mountains borders Thessaly to the West, separating the country from the Aegean and ensuring the dominance of ancient Pagasae and modern Volos as the primary port in the region. This mountainous region between the plains of Thessaly proper

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12 Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years and Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, *Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years* (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2006), 106.
14 The perioeci of Thessaly lived in the foothills and mountains surrounding the Pineos River basin. For an excellent investigation into the perioeci see: Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period.”
and the sea was inhabited by the Magnesians, subordinate to Pherae. To the south, Mt. Othrys and its foothills were the home of the Pthiotic Achaeans, a dependency of Pharsalus. This region provided a buffer between Thessaly and the small polities of Malis, Dolopia, and Aeniania, who were understood to be in the sphere of influence of the Thessalians.

Thanks to its unique geography and climate Thessaly occupied a unique position in the Greek world. Broad flat plains ringed by formidable mountains encouraged unity and an inward focus, but the location of the plains on the major North-South trade routes ensured a lively international element in Thessaly, encouraging the elite to maintain strong political and social connections to the outside world. Despite the availability of flat arable land, the climate and unpredictable rivers promoted large-scale ranching and herding rather than agriculture and played a significant role in the Thessalian economy. However, the sale of livestock was not the sole focus of Thessalian trade, despite appearances: Thessaly’s economy was just as developed and complex as that of her southern neighbors.

II. The Economy of Thessaly

In order to give greater context to understanding the behavior of the Thessalian people in the wider Greek world, both as individuals and as a political-social unit, a brief overview of the

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17 The use of “economy” here is consciously focusing on a “pure capitalist” interpretation of Greek interstate relationships. There were absolutely social and political functions operating in parallel and in conjunction with economic relationships in the Greek world. The confluence of these themes will be explored in later chapters. For the Archaic period in specific, see also Ian Morris, “Gift and Commodity in Archaic Greece,” Man, New Series, 21, no. 1 (1986): 1–17. For the Classical period (focusing on Athens) see: Darel Engen, Honor and Profit (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010).
The Thessalian economy is necessary. As with most of the Greek polities, the wealth of Thessaly was largely derived from agricultural sources. This is not to say that industry was unknown in Thessaly, the economic portfolio of the region was highly diversified, at least as much so as her southern neighbors.

One of the major “industries” in Thessaly in the Archaic period seems to have been mining and bronzeworking. There are a significant number of local bronze pieces such as fibulae and pins that begin to appear in the sanctuaries and religious complexes in eighth and seventh centuries, especially in the sanctuary of Ennodia at Pherae. Sites that have been identified as copper mines and workshops have also been found in these areas, suggesting that a metalworking industry operated in conjunction with some form of larger-scale fabric or textile production. The preponderance of non-monumental bronze items suggests a “consumer” market, which could indicate that Thessaly had a population that was not simply a feudal elite ruling over a backwards peasant class, but a society that was significantly more complex than literary evidence would suggest.

Macedonian protogeometric pottery has been found in Larisa, suggesting that earthenware and bronze items were part of a larger trade network and associated political and social connections north and south. Based on extant accounts the Larisaeans and Argeads collaborated in 481/0 to stymie the first allied Greek expedition to repel the Persian invasion at

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19 Mili, *Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly*, 56. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that the production of these items seems to drop off in the fifth century, at the same time as construction of monumental stone architecture increases. It is difficult to explain this shift fully, as many of the bronze items that have been found were functional and not solely votive items, and while demand might have diminished slightly it is difficult to see the market drying up.
20 Mili, 54.
the Vale of Tempe in northern Thessaly. When Brasidas marched Thraceward in 422, one the Thessalian agents who assisted the Spartan expedition was ἐκ Λαρίσης Νικονίδας Περδίκκας ἐπιτήδειος ὁν. In the fourth century, it was Larisa and the Aleuadae who invited Philip to intervene on their behalf against the tyrants at Pherae. In addition to Macedonian pottery, a large number of Archaic Macedonian bronzes have been found in caches in Pherae. While Pherae does not appear as a political player in the literary history of Thessaly until the late fifth century, that imported metalwork has been found in the city which controlled the only major port in Thessaly suggests that the Pherean port of Pagasai was a waystation for goods traveling overland from the Balkans and transferred to trading ships going further south. While corroborating has not yet been found, this would place a previously unattributed importance on the port at Pagasae, and potentially justify Thessalian participation in the Lelantine War, discussed below in Sec. IV.

These connections between the elite of Thessaly and Macedon were no accident, the geographic position the Thessalian *ethnos* was advantageously placed to take advantage of any North-South trade and communication. The plains of Thessaly would have been a welcome respite for any traveling overland through the mountainous Doris-Lokris trade corridor. Goods shipped on the Aegean would have found a harbor at Pagasae, in the protected Pagasetic gulf. Thanks to this prime position, Thessalian merchants were entrenched in the wide-spanning trade network on the Greek peninsula. The slave trade seems to be one of the industries in which Thessaly was a locus between the southern Greek polities and the northern regions, most likely

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22 Hdt. 7.172-173.
23 “…Niconidas from Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas [the King of Macedon].” Thuc. 4.78.2.
operating through the port at Pagasae. While we unfortunately know little about the actual mechanics of human trafficking in the Archaic Period, by the late fifth century Thessalians had cemented their reputation as one of the preeminent slave-dealers in Greece. Aristophanes refers to Thessalians as the greatest slave-dealers, “πλείστων ἀνδραποδιστῶν.” The Thessalian position in this trade did not diminish in the political realignments of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, Athenenaeus highlighted Pagasae’s importance as a source of slaves in the 3rd century AD. It is unlikely that the slaves that were trafficked through Thessalian sources were Greeks. In Athens especially, we are aware that slaves seem to come from a variety of non-Greek sources, especially the Black Sea area. It is tempting to imagine that the penestae, the unfree class of agricultural workers in Thessaly were the source of this industry, but they appear to have possessed some sort of basic rights or traditional privileges that prevented them from being sold at chattel slaves. Moreover, the penestae seem to have been freed en masse in the fourth century, eliminating the possibility of drawing from that population to sell in foreign markets in the Roman period. While we know little of the functional details of the slave trade, Thessalian prominence in this industry suggests that the merchants and elite of Thessaly had significant social and economic connections throughout the Aegean.

28 Aristoph. Pl. 521.
29 Athenaeus, Dein. 1.27 F.
31 BNJ Archemachos von Euboia f1
It was not only slaves that Thessaly exported to southern Greece, but livestock was also a key part of the Thessalian export economy.\textsuperscript{33} As discussed above, the broad plains and rainy mountains of Thessaly were particularly conducive to ranching and herding.\textsuperscript{34} Two types of livestock are emphasized in the historical record, cattle and horses. The management and trade of cattle is discussed further in chapter three, but it is important to note that while many non-urban dwellers in Greece may have raised livestock, animal husbandry as a commercial venture required a level of resources only elite members of a society had access to.\textsuperscript{35} Unfortunately, our knowledge about the cattle trade in Thessaly is limited. Plutarch recorded that in the fourth century Alexander of Pherae offered to sell cattle to the Athenians particularly cheaply, asking a half-\textit{obol} for a quantity of beef which usually cost a \textit{mina}.\textsuperscript{36} This is almost certainly an exaggeration, but it does speak to the scale with which Thessaly could raise and export animals for consumption.

Horses were another of the high-profile export items for which Thessaly was known. In his \textit{Georgics}, Virgil claims that the Lapiths, the mythical inhabitants of Thessaly were the first people to introduce the tools for horse riding to the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{37} While this is certainly historically inaccurate, it speaks to the close association that people in the ancient world saw between Thessalians and their horses. Xerxes, when marching through Thessaly organized a race between Thessalian and Persian horses.\textsuperscript{38} The Persian horses were victorious in the contest (one

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} For an excellent rundown of ancient sources that discussed Thessalian ranching and livestock-raising see: Mili, \textit{Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly}, 261.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Timothy Howe, “Pastoralism, the Delphic Amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: The Creation of Apollo’s Sacred Pastures,” \textit{Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte} 52, no. 2 (2003): 132.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Plut. \textit{Mor.} 193e. Athenaeus reports a similar sentiment about Thessaly: Ath., \textit{Dein.} 1.27E.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Verg. \textit{G.} 3.114.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Hdt. 7.196.
\end{itemize}
suspects that it was the best outcome for all involved, regardless of the actual abilities of the horses) but the association is clear: Thessalian horses were so famous around the eastern Mediterranean that even the King of Kings was aware of their caliber.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, Thessalian horses were numerous enough that the region was able not only to field exceedingly large numbers of cavalry but sell excess stock as a commercial venture.\textsuperscript{40}

The Greek world was highly aware of the quality of Thessalian animals – especially horses – and the trade in these animals was highly lucrative. A collection of tablets found in the Athenian Agora and Kerameikos which detailed information about the provenance of the mounts of Athenian cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{41} The Pharsalian boukephalos mark, made famous by Alexander the Great’s steed, was common, as was the double axe of Pherae, and the centaur, associated with the Thessalian city of Larisa.\textsuperscript{42} These Thessalian associated brands were present in thirty-five of the two hundred entries, quite a significant quantity given that the vast majority of the horses are of Athenian provenance.\textsuperscript{43} While Thessalian horses were certainly a luxury object, that so many

\textsuperscript{39} For example, see Eur. Andromache Ln. 1231, which references τῶν ιπποβοτῶν Φθίας “horse-pasturing Phthia.”
\textsuperscript{40} Xenophon asserted that the Thessalian confederated army could field six thousand cavalrmen, and if this were true it would represent a mounted force of remarkable size: Xen. Hell. 6.1.8. In support of this see: Noel Robertson, “The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 96 (1976): 109. Attica, larger by geographic area than Thessaly, could only field a force of twelve hundred horse: Thuc. 2.13. At Mantinea, one of the largest ground battles in the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian forces only consisted of 300 cavalrymen: Thuc. 5.61. Alexander’s expeditionary force at the Battle of Issus fielded 5,800 cavalry and Alexander theoretically had access to all the resources of the Hellenic peninsula: Ian Worthington, By the Spear: Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 165. In Sparta and the Peloponnesus, it appears that military-adjacent horse-culture was so atrophied that in the fifth century there was no polis-fielded cavalry force until 425, and even then it was not deemed particularly important: Hans van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2004), 67.
\textsuperscript{43} Emma Aston and Joshua Kerr, “Battlefield and Racetrack: The Role of Horses in Thessalian Society,” Historia 67 (2018): 14. It is also likely that some of these horses were supplied to Athenians through the bonds of xenoi relationships: ritual guest-friend links that were deeply intertwined within the social bonds the Thessalian elite made with their external allies, Slawomir Sprawski, “Alexander of Pherae: Infelix Tyrant,” in Ancient Tyranny, ed. Siann Lewis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 138; Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of
Athenian cavalrymen chose to purchase such an ostentatious display of wealth suggests significant economic connections between Thessaly and Athens as well as significant social cache for Thessalian animal products.

Though the examples listed above represent a picture of Thessalian commercial activity over the course of many centuries, it should be clear that Thessaly as a political or social unit was integrated within the economic fabric of the Greek world. The geography of Thessaly enabled the fractious clans of Thessaly to act as a lynchpin in north-south travel, trade, and communication routes of ancient Greece. Moreover, even in the Archaic Period, the epoch for which we have the smallest amount of hard data the narrative of Thessaly is straightforward. The Thessalians acted as an aggressive, expansionary political and social unit, looking to expand their economic and political control over central Greece.

III. The Aristocratic Clans of Thessaly

There are two traditions in modern scholarship regarding the distribution of economic and political power in Thessaly. The first and more traditional interpretation saw Thessaly as a feudal society of landed barons, who administered vast estates and holdings from rural fortresses, and who passed political offices between themselves and excluded the vast majority of the Thessalian populace. A second tradition saw Thessaly as a far more pluralistic society. In this

interpretation Thessaly was dominated by aristocratic clans, but these elite were integrated into
the social and political life of the urban centers of Thessaly, an arrangement which offered urban
oligarchs access to power they would not have had otherwise. Until further evidence is found
there is unlikely to be a conclusion to this disagreement, however given that extant attestation
focuses on the aristocratic elite in Thessaly, an overview of the Thessalian dynastic families is
useful in contextualizing Thessalian history.

There is literary attestation for three distinct family groups in Thessaly: the Aleuadae,
Scopidae, and Creonadae. The Thessalian family with the greatest longevity and attestation
were the Aleuadae, based out of the northern city of Larisa. The earliest literary mention of the
Aleuad clan is found in Pindar, in an *epinician* written for Hippocleas of Pelinna. While the
ostensible subject of the poem is the young man who won the double foot race at Delphi in 498
BC, the work is bookended by a paean to the family that commissioned the work, the “sons of
Aleuas.” The eponymous Aleuas of the Larisaean family was Aleuas the Red, one of the
foundational mytho-historical figures of the Thessalian *ethnos*. There is little extant about the life
of Aleuas, though later tradition regarding his life is illustrative of Thessalian perceptions about
their own history. Perhaps most important was the connection between Aleuas and the Pythian
Oracle at Delphi, which was the institution which supported his rise to power.

In the mythological tradition reported by Plutarch, the Delphic Oracle chose lots to select
the man to be the king of Thessaly, and it was Aleuas that chosen. This echoes colonization
myths in which the Oracle was consulted prior to initiating colonial ventures; while Thessaly

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45 Mili, *Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly*, 140.
47 Pind. *P.* 10
49 Plut. *Mor.* 292b-c.
does not seem to have founded any colonies, the Aleuas myth dovetails with the historical narrative of the Thessalians as a migratory, invading people in the Pineos River basin. This mythological tradition gave religious justification to the Aleuad ruling mandate, and likely reinforced the position of the unfree *penestae* of Thessaly. Aleuas was also thought to be Aleuas was responsible for reorganizing the Thessalian state, both politically and militarily. These reforms similarly echo colonization mythology in which colonies were required to establish constitutions and institutions in new settings. While Aleuas’ historicity is unclear, his ancestor Thorax of Larisa was one of the few Thessalians whose existence was corroborated by multiple sources. Active in the late Archaic period, Thorax was a key player in instigating the medizing of Thessaly, and an individual that was closely connected to both the Persian general Mardonius and the Macedonian King Alexander I. While other Aleuadae are generally unnamed in the historical record, the relationships Thorax cultivated with the Argead dynasty reappear in the fifth and fourth centuries as the Larisaean elite looked to Macedon for assistance in their conflict with Pherae.

The other major Thessalian clan was the Scopadae, whose earliest literary appearance was in Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, in which the author described how Jason of Pherae προείπε δὲ τοῖς περιοίκοις πᾶσι και τὸν φόρον ὀσπερ ἐπὶ Σκόπα τεταγμένος ἤν φέρειν. At some point in the Archaic period, the tribal states of the Perrhaebians, Magnesians, and Pthiotic Acheans in the mountain and foothills surrounding the Pineos River basin were brought under control of the

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50 Morgan, *Early Greek States Beyond the Polis*, 130.
52 Hdt. 7.6.2, 7.130.1, 9.58.2. Aleuad politics in the early fifth century are discussed in Ch. 3.
53 Jason “ordered to all who dwelt round about to pay the same tribute as had been fixed in the time of Scopas.” Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19.
Thessalian *ethnos.*\(^{54}\) It is unclear to what degree the Thessalians dominated their highland neighbors; the *perioicoi* were responsible to contribute manpower and to provide economic support when the Thessalians requested, though this was only the case when the Thessalians were sufficiently unified to enforce their will over their highland neighbors. It seems likely that whatever actions Scopas and his family took with regard to the *perioicoi*, it made the family fabulously wealthy; over six centuries passed after the political dominance of the Scopadae and their proverbial wealth was still known.\(^{55}\) The Scopadae were well-connected in Greece, it was reported that the family took Simonides in after his flight from Athens and the Peisistratids.\(^{56}\) Herodotus recorded that one of the members of the family competed to marry the daughter of the tyrant of Sicyon in the early sixth century; if historically accurate this account speaks to the connections aristocratic Thessalians maintained throughout Greece.\(^{57}\) However, at some point in the Archaic period the Scopadae were afflicted by a mysterious accident in which the majority of the family perished, there are no historical references to the group in the Classical period.\(^{58}\)

While the Scopads had no specific urban center associated with their family, the Creonadae were connected with Crannon, a city which sat on the western side of the foothills southwest of Mount Titanos. Like the Scopads, there are few extant historical accounts of the family. In the opening years of the Peloponnesian War Crannon sent assistance to Athens as part of a larger Thessalian effort, and likely was able to mobilize this effort thanks to the political

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\(^{54}\) Wade-Gery believed that the conquest of the *penestae* may have occurred in conjunction with the First Sacred War, though we have no details to confirm this: HT Wade-Gery, “Jason of Pherae and Aleuas the Red,” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 44, no. 1 (1924): 56. Sordi argued that the conquest came later, after the creation of the Delphi Amphictyony: Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno*, 21–22.

\(^{55}\) Plut. *Cim*. 10.5


\(^{57}\) Hdt. 6.127.4.

\(^{58}\) Quint. *Inst.* 11.6.15.
organization of the aristocratic family. It also may be that the Creonadae and the Scopads had a familial connection; the father of Scopas the younger was a man named Creon, himself the son of the eponymous Scopas. Moreover, the member of the Scopad dynasty who competed for the hand of Agariste, the daughter of the tyrant of Sicyon was from Cranon, which would suggest that the Thessalian aristocracy was tied closer together than most modern scholars have generally understood.

There is one family group that appeared in the material record but is not extant in literary accounts: the Daochids of Pharsalus. This kinship group is known thanks to a statue group commissioned at Delphi in the late fourth century by Daochos II, a hieromnemon in the Delphic Amphictyony and likely a partisan of Philip II. The statue group highlighted a number of Daochos’ ancestors, including Daochos I, who ruled Thessaly in the late fifth century, during the Peloponnesian War. Daochos I’s father was identified as the Olympic victor Aigas, who won the pankration in 484. Aigas’ father Aknonios, was listed as having been a “tetrarch” of Thessaly; his tenure must have been in the early sixth century, though we know nothing else of the man or his rule. It has generally been assumed that Daochos and the Daochids were unconnected to the other Thessalian clans, however this is an argument ex silencio, nothing is known of Daochos I.

The other two proposed Thessalian familial groups are somewhat more unclear in their formation. After Spartan king Leotychidas’ failed expedition into Thessaly in 478/7, another

59 Thuc. 2.22.2.
60 Athenaeus, Dein. 10.48C.
62 Evans, “The Daochos Monument,” 141–42.
63 It has been argued that Daochos ruled Thessaly throughout the majority of the Peloponnesian War, from 431-404, though this cannot be confirmed: Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 – 370 BC, 29–30.
family has been identified by modern scholarship as taking the lead in Thessalian politics: the
Menonidae. This particular “family” has never been identified in the historical record as a
specific kindship group, the reconstruction of this dynasty has been entirely modern, taking its
name from a number of Thessalian aristocrats named Meno who appear in the historical record.
The earliest Meno appears just after the end of the Persian Wars. In two separate speeches
Demosthenes identified a Meno from Pharsalus who assisted the Athenians at the siege of Eion.
The contributions that Meno gave the Athenians was sufficient to grant him honors in Athens,
either he was given Athenian citizenship for sending three hundred cavalry, or an immunity from
public taxes – ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκαν – for sending two hundred horsemen to assist at the siege.64 This
is a significant amount of cavalry, suggesting that the Meno was a particularly wealthy and
powerful member of the Thessalian aristocracy. The appearance of Meno coincided with the
appearance in the literary record of Pharsalus, a polis which seems to have been second in
importance to Larisa throughout the fifth century. Meno II appeared during the early
Peloponnesian War, leading a contingent of Thessalian cavalry on an expedition to assist
Athens.65 His son was the eponymous Meno of the Platonic dialogue, and the same Meno who is
featured in Xenophon’s Anabasis.66 After the death of Meno III near Babylon, the family no
longer appears in the historical record.

Modern scholarship is aware of the Echecratidae thanks to a brief entry in Thucydides.
After the Thessalian betrayal of their Athenian allies at the Battle of Tanagra in 457, the
Athenians responded by launching an expedition in 454 to restore the exiled aristocrat Orestes to

64 Dem. 13.23. Dem. 23.199.
65 Thuc. 2.22.3.
66 Xen. Anab. 1.2.6.
Pharsalus. Thucydides specifically noted that Orestes’ father Echecratidas was τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως. Neither Orestes nor Echecratidas appeared on the ex voto of Daochos. Thucydides did not mention Meno II of Pharsalus in connection with Orestes or Echecratidas, and Xenophon does not connect his friend Meno III with any of the Thessalian kinship groups attested in extant literature. As such, it seems reasonable to accept that while little is known about the Daochids, Echecratids, and Menonids, all three were separate familial lines and all made their home in Pharsalus.

It should be noted that there certainly are methodological issues with the identification of these latter three clans. The Scopads, Creonadae, and Aleuadae are identifiable and distinct, largely thanks to Theocritus. The Menonidae are never identified in the historical record as a distinct and separate aristocratic family, modern understanding that Meno and his lineage were a separate clan has in part revolved around the location of their power base in the southern city of Pharsalus. Given that Meno III was an “ancestral friend” of the Great King, and Thorax and the Aleuadae were closely connected to Xerxes in the early 5th century, it is tempting to see Meno as an Aleuad. Morrison and Wade-Gery have reasonably argued that the deposed Orestes and his father Echecratidas were both Aleuads, and who were in fact through marriage also related to the Scopads. The only major issue with placing the Menonidae and the Daochids in the Aleuad family tree – or part of another more well-known clan – is the lack of identification of these individuals as belonging to another family. Herodotus quite clearly identifies Thorax and his brothers as Aleuadae, and the Daochōs monument includes ancestral figures. If the Menonidae or

67 Thuc. 1.111.
69 Plat. Meno 78d. Hdt. 7.6.
70 Morrison, “Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias,” 61.
Echecratidae were Aleuadas, it seems almost inconceivable that such information would not have been recorded by Thucydides, Herodotus, Xenophon, Plato, or Daochos II himself.

Two interpretive options thus present themselves:

1) By the late Archaic period Larisa was ruled by the Aleuadas alone, and other noble families made their homes in Pharsalus, and in the fifth century began jockeying for position amongst themselves and with their northern rivals for power.

2) Any tension between the Thessalian elite should be seen as conflict between two major urban centers each ruled by offshoots of the same dynasty, rather than between feuding noble families. This would suggest that the Thessalian elite felt greater connection to their geographic home rather than their kinship groups.

Regardless of which interpretation is followed, what is clear from extant evidence is that the Aleuadas in Larisa were the dominant kinship group at the end of the Archaic period. Whatever support they had from the other factions of Thessalian elite dissipated after Thessaly lost its regional hegemony over central Greece in the late Archaic period, and challenges to Aleuad rule accelerated throughout the fifth century until the outbreak of a civil war in 404.

IV. Thessalian Expansion into Central Greece in the Archaic Period
The arguments of the following chapters rely upon the interpretation of Thessaly as an expansionary power in the Archaic period, which has been the orthodox opinion of modern scholars for the last century.\textsuperscript{71} This era is not well attested, but extant accounts offer evidence that Thessalian interstate aggression expressed itself in four different forms:

- The subjugation of the \textit{perioicoi} of Thessaly, the peoples who lived in the mountains around the Larisa-Trikala basin. These were the Malians, Oitaians Aenians, Dolopians, Magnesians, Perrhaibians, and the Phthiotic Achaeans.\textsuperscript{72} The exact nature of the relationship between the Thessalians and their \textit{perioicoi} is unclear, as is the timeframe in which these smaller mountain communities were brought into the Thessalian sphere of influence. However, it appears that the process through which the Thessalians and their neighbors were integrated was complete by the end of the sixth century. This relationship is examined later in this chapter.

- The First Sacred War, in which Thessaly and a number of other central Greek \textit{ethne} removed the Apollonian oracle at Delphi from the control of pre-Phocian peoples around Mount Parnassos at the beginning of the seventh century. The members of the victorious coalition would form the Delphic Amphictyony, which was responsible for the administration of the Delphic oracle throughout the Classical period. The possible motivations for this action are examined in Chapter Two.


\textsuperscript{72} Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period,” 131.
The Thessalians conquest of Phocis in the sixth century. The process through which the Phocians were brought under the control of the Thessalians lacks attestation in ancient sources, but the ramifications of the late Archaic failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project in Phocis are apparent in the hostile relationship between the Phocians and Thessalians throughout the Classical period. The impact of the Phocian revolt on Thessaly’s political system is explored primarily in Chapters Three, Four, and Six.

- The Battle of Ceressus, which likely represented the furthest extension of Thessalian power in the Archaic period. Unfortunately, there is very little extant information about this conflict; what is available is covered below.

The First Sacred War has been the subject of dispute, and understandably so, as literary references to the event do not appear until several centuries after it is alleged to have taken place. The two most complete — though chronologically late — literary entries which directly reference Thessalian involvement in the conflict are found in the pseudepigraphic writings of Hippocrates, and in the hypotheses to scholia on Pindar’s Pythian odes. Both of these sources follow the same historical tradition: a Thessalian general named Eurylochos led the Thessalians and their allies to victory against the Crisaeans and liberated Delphi from their control.

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73 There is no extant data which suggests when the Thessalians brought Phocis under their control, but as discussed below it seems reasonable to link the process to the First Sacred War, which took place at the beginning of the sixth century.
75 The Pindaric scholia is thought to be informed by the Pythionikai, a list of victors at the Pythian games created by Aristotle and Callisthenes in the mid-330s. The most thorough translation of the relevant portions of the text can be found in Paul Cristesen, Olympic Victor Lists and Ancient Greek History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 180. The entirety of Pindaric scholia on the Pythian odes is found in Drachmann, Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina. The most up-to-date analysis of the pseudepigraphic writings of Hippocrates is Hippocrates, Pseudepigraphic Writings, trans. Wesley Smith, vol. 2, Studies in Ancient Medicine (New York: E.J. Brill, 1990).
76 The Crisaeans have never been identified archaeologically. Cristesen, Olympic Victor Lists and Ancient Greek History, 193; Drachmann, Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina, 2 Scholia in Pythionicas:3–4; Hippocrates, Pseudepigraphic Writings, 2:115.
members of the victorious coalition are thought to have then formed the membership of the Delphic Amphictyony. The details of the conflict are at the very least exaggerations, but it stands to reason that accounts of the conflict reflect the memory of a historical event.

The Thessalians were not the only Greek power which was understood to have been in a leadership position in the First Sacred War, other traditions place both the Athenians and Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon as the leaders of the confederation. However, it stands to reason that if the First Sacred War was a historical event then the Thessalians were the prime mover; the Delphic Amphictyony was most likely established by the victors of the conflict at Delphi, and neither Sicyon nor Athens appears on extant membership lists.

Membership Rolls of the Delphic Amphictyony

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The theory that the Thessalians were most likely to have been the major actor in the First Sacred War is largely due to the consistent presence of their *perioicic* dependencies across all iterations of the membership rolls of the Delphic Amphictyony, in addition to the presence of the Thessalians themselves. Four of the Thessalian *perioicoi* – the Dolopians, Magnesians, Malians, and Pthiotic Achaeans – appear on all lists, and the rest appear intermittently. As mentioned above, it is unclear when the *perioicoi* became the subject-allies of the Thessalians, but if modern scholarship is to treat records of the members of the Delphic Amphictyony as historical documents, then it would make sense for the Thessalians to insist that the small communities which they had influence over – whether at this point Thessalian power was co-optive or coercive is unimportant– to be given voting rights in the organization. Whether the First Sacred War was the impetus for establishing formal control over the *perioicoi* is unknown, but it is reasonable to accept that the presence of the Thessalian *perioicoi* in the venture indicates

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The theory that the Thessalians were most likely to have been the major actor in the First Sacred War is largely due to the consistent presence of their *perioicic* dependencies across all iterations of the membership rolls of the Delphic Amphictyony, in addition to the presence of the Thessalians themselves. Four of the Thessalian *perioicoi* – the Dolopians, Magnesians, Malians, and Pthiotic Achaeans – appear on all lists, and the rest appear intermittently. As mentioned above, it is unclear when the *perioicoi* became the subject-allies of the Thessalians, but if modern scholarship is to treat records of the members of the Delphic Amphictyony as historical documents, then it would make sense for the Thessalians to insist that the small communities which they had influence over – whether at this point Thessalian power was co-optive or coercive is unimportant– to be given voting rights in the organization. Whether the First Sacred War was the impetus for establishing formal control over the *perioicoi* is unknown, but it is reasonable to accept that the presence of the Thessalian *perioicoi* in the venture indicates
Thessalian leadership during the First Sacred War and of the Amphictyony. The presence of Thessaly and its dependencies on the Amphictyonic council strongly suggests an expansionary process through which the Thessalians brought neighboring polities under their control to further their political and military aims in central Greece.

Accepting Thessalian leadership in the First Sacred War requires using late or circumstantial evidence, but when put in context with other historical traditions regarding Archaic Thessaly, the expansionary nature of the Thessalian polity in the sixth and early fifth century is difficult to deny. Plutarch recorded that at some point during the Archaic period the Thessalians fought the Boeotians at Ceressus, not far from Thespiae. Unfortunately, the only attestation regarding this event comes from Plutarch, who cited the battle twice in his works but gave two different dates for the conflict: 571 and in the decade prior to the second Persian invasion. Plutarch believed that this conflict was exceedingly important in the history of Greece, asserting that the Boeotian victory τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσαν. This was a bold statement for what amounts to a chronological reference point in his narratives; it is difficult to see why the writer would invent a fictional battle which played no part in his overall account.

While the battle lacks corroboration in other sources, there was another historical tradition that placed the Boeotians and Thessalians in conflict. A fragment attributed to Archemachos of Euboea, a writer of the third century, stated that the unfree penestae of Thessaly were the

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78 Moreover, the presence of Phocis in the Amphictyonic membership lists suggests a connection between the First Sacred War and the Phocian conquest – discussed further below – but it is impossible to establish a concrete, evidential link between the two events without further evidence.


80 571: Plut. Cam. 19.2 Between 490-480: Plut. Mor. 866e. Sordi believed that the conflict took place in 484: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 93. Fossey believed the battle took place in the late seventh century; Corinthian pottery and fibula begin appearing in northern Boeotia after this period, and Fossey argued Thessalian domination kept that Corinthian goods out of the area: John Fossey, Boiotia in Ancient Times (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 33.

81 “Set the Greeks free…”
descendants of native Boeotians who were subjugated by the Thessalians when they arrived
arrived in the Larisa-Trikala basin. The fragment provided no other useful details as to this
historical tradition, but it is reasonable to suspect that these accounts relating to the Boeotians
and the Thessalians are representative of a conflict that occurred as part of Thessalian efforts to
push their influence southward.

Perhaps the most significant extension of Thessalian power over central Greece was the
conquest of Phocis. Unfortunately, there is no extant evidence as to the initiation of the process,
but by the late fifth century it was understood that there was a long-standing Thessalian desire to
subjugate Phocis. Herodotus believed that the famed Phocian wall at Thermopylae was initially
constructed to fortify the pass and prevent Thessalian incursions South. The historian
understood that the construction of the wall took place shortly after the arrival of the Thessalians
in the Larisa-Trikala basin, an event far back in the mytho-historic past. While the specific
provenance of the conflict between Phocis and Thessaly is unknown, at some point in the
Archaic period the Thessalians brought Phocis under their control; whatever the Thessalian
policies were with regard to Phocis, it clearly engendered significant and long-lasting hostility
between the Phocians and the Thessalians. The Phocian rebellion, which saw the destruction of

82 Ath. Deipn. 6.85.264ab, BNJ Archemachos von Euboia f1. For more on the penestae see Chapter Five.
83 This work subscribes to Sordi’s dating of the battle to the early fifth century, as it seems most reasonable that a
Thessalian loss in Boeotia produced a domino effect encouraging the Phocian rebellion, which is also dated to the
late Archaic period: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 93.
84 Hdt. 7.176.4-5.
85 While Herodotus does not attempt to provide any further details as to the timeline of events, Thucydides believed
that the Thessalians had arrived in the Larisa-Trikala basin sixty years after the Trojan War. While this cannot be
corroborated in any way, it speaks to the perception in the Classical period that the Thessalian desire to establish
hegemony over Phocis was long-standing: Thuc. 1.12.3.
86 Herodotus recorded that the Thessalians were unwilling to forgive the Phocians for their revolt: Hdt. 8.29. The
relationship between Thessaly and Phocis is covered extensively below and in other chapters – see especially
Chapters Four and Six – but one clear indication of the relationship between the two ethne is recorded in Herodotus.
While the majority of the central Greek polities sided with Xerxes in 480, the Phocians chose to ally themselves
with the southern Greek alliance; this was not done for any ideological reason but because the Phocians so deeply
hated the Thessalians and refused to take their side in any endeavor: Hdt. 8.30.
several Thessalian armies, was remembered as being a bloody, no-holds-barred affair; historical tradition recorded that the Phocians were prepared to kill all of their non-combatants in case of a Thessalian victory, and both sides executed prisoners.\(^{87}\) However, the Phocians were victorious and the Thessalians were ejected from Phocis, in what seems most likely to have been the end of the Thessalian hegemonic project in central Greece. This work argues in Chapter Three that the expulsion of Thessaly was the key event which caused civil strife and political inaction in Thessaly throughout the Classical period.\(^{88}\)

When modern scholarship has acknowledged Archaic period expansionary efforts of the Thessalians, scholars have often avoided exploring possible motivations for these activities.\(^{89}\) Both the prosecution of the First Sacred War and the conquest of Phocis represent massive investments of material and political resources; Chapter Two offers one possible explanation as to the motivations of the Thessalians in this period. As well, historians have ignored the ramifications of the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project. Based on circumstantial but compelling evidence, the defeats in Phocis created or exacerbated deep rifts in the cohesion of the Thessalian elite, and realigned politics in Thessaly during the Classical period, as discussed in Chapter Four.

V. A Brief Narrative History of Thessaly

\(^{87}\) Hdt. 8.27-29. Paus. 10.2.3-11. Plut. Mor. 244b-4. Sordi believed the conquest of Phocis occurred between 514 and ended in 491, while the terminus date seems reasonable, it seems far more likely that the conquest happened earlier in the sixth century, corresponding with the First Sacred War: Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno*, 55. See also: JAO Larsen, “A New Interpretation of the Thessalian Confederacy,” *Classical Philology* 55, no. 4 (1960): 230.

\(^{88}\) Westlake argued that the growth of urban centers in the late Archaic and early Classical periods was responsible for Thessaly’s declining fortunes throughout the fifth and fourth centuries; this is unsupported by current evidence: Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 1935, 29–32.

The very early history of the Thessalians is unknown, however by the fifth century the Thessalians believed themselves to be a migratory peoples who were not native to the Pineos River basin. Thucydides recorded that the Thessalians arrived in Thessaly sixty years after the fall of Troy.\textsuperscript{90} Herodotus understood that the Thessalians had come from Thesprotia in Epirus, in Northwest Greece.\textsuperscript{91} While there is no archaeological evidence to confirm this theory, there are a number of reasons to suggest why this theory was so widely accepted in the ancient world. First, the presence of the \textit{penestae}, an unfree agricultural class most often compared by contemporary authors to the \textit{helots} of Sparta.\textsuperscript{92} Given that the \textit{penestae} were culturally similar to their Thessalian masters and Greek sensitivity to the enslavement of other Greeks, the narrative that the \textit{penestae} were pre-Greek Πελασγοί may have been a simple solution to the issue.\textsuperscript{93} Second, the Thessalians spoke an Aeolic dialect, which existed in isolated pockets in the Greek mainland. Colvin has argued that the Aeolic dialect developed innovative “modern” features later than other dialects such as Attic-Ionic and Arcadian; regardless of when or how the Thessalians established themselves in the Pineos River basin, that the Thessalian dialect was notably different from other mainland dialects may have encouraged mytho-historical traditions about the Thessalian invasion.\textsuperscript{94} It seems likely that the Thessalians encouraged this mytho-historic narrative for political or social gain: in the late Archaic period an \textit{epinician} written by Pindar and commissioned by the Aleuadae deliberately associated Thessaly and Sparta, highlighting a

\textsuperscript{90} Thuc. 1.12.  
\textsuperscript{91} Hdt. 7.176.4.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ch. 5 deals with the \textit{penestae} in detail, but for a few key primary sources see: Aristoph. \textit{Wasps} Lns. 1270-1274; Aristot. \textit{Pol.} 2.1264a, 1269a-b; Plat. \textit{Laws}, 776c-d; and Jean Ducat, \textit{Les Penestes de Thessalie} (Besancon: Universite de Franche-Comte, 1994), 13–63.  
\textsuperscript{93} Hdt. 1.57.1.  
\textsuperscript{94} Stephen Colvin, \textit{A Historical Greek Reader: From Mycenaean to the Koiné} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 40–41.
common ancestor in Herakles and thus linked Thessaly to the “Return of the Herakledae” myth which in turn was connected to the Dorian Invasion.

The first extant appearance of Thessaly into the “international” stage appears to have been the Lelantine War, fought on the island of Euboea between the poleis of Eretria and Chalcis during the late eighth or early seventh centuries.\(^9^5\)

This conflict was initially referenced by Herodotus and Thucydides as a conflict between the two cities which involved coalitions of allies on either side.\(^9^6\) Plutarch offered the fullest elaboration on the conflict: in his account, Thessalian troops under the command of the aristocrat Cleomachus came to the assistance of the Chalcidians.\(^9^7\) Strabo added further detail, arguing that the conflict was fought over the Lelantine Plain, situated between Chalcis and Eretria.\(^9^8\) This would seem reasonable, archaeological evidence of a significantly lower water table suggests that Greece was afflicted by a long-running drought, and the Lelantine Plain therefore represented an increasingly vital agricultural resource.\(^9^9\) Additionally, both Chalcis and Eretria were heavily involved in colonization expeditions in the Archaic period, is possible that competition between the two over desirable land to colonize contributed to the decline in relations between the two.\(^1^0^0\)

While specific strategic actions in the conflict were not reported by extant accounts, according to Plutarch, it was the Chalcidians and their allies – including the Thessalians – who were victorious. While the addition of the Thessalians into the narrative only appears in an account many centuries later,

\(^{96}\) Hdt. 5.99.1; Thuc. 1.15.3.
\(^{97}\) Plut. *Mor.* 760e-761a.
\(^{98}\) Strab. 10.1.12.
there are a number of factors that would explain and justify accepting that the presence of Thessalians in the conflict. First, the only port in Thessaly was at Pagae, which is now modern Volos. The northern tip of the island of Euboea sits the mouth of the Pagasetic Gulf and could have potentially controlled maritime traffic in and out of Pagae. While Chalcis and Eretria were further south on Euboea, given the influence they seem to have held over much of the island, it is not unreasonable to suspect that these poleis could have made it difficult for ships to enter and exit the Pagasetic Gulf, and thus limiting maritime trade available to the Thessalians. Second, while it is not mutually exclusive of another explanation, chronologically the Lelantine War sits at the beginning of an Archaic-era pattern in which the Thessalians began to project power southward, in an effort to secure regional hegemony over central Greece.

Much like the Lelantine War, extant attestation from the First Sacred War appears significantly later than the event is thought to have taken place. Modern scholarship has very understandably been caught up in issues relating to the Delphic Amphictyony and skepticism about the historicity of event itself, but it is the position of this work that some form of conflict occurred relating to the Pythian oracle and associated sanctuary of Apollo in the opening years of the sixth century. The chronologically earliest reference to the conflict appears in the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo, in which Apollo warned the first priests at his sanctuary that outside powers would attempt to assert control over the oracle. While there are no extant accounts of the conflict that appear until the mid-fourth century, by this point the mytho-historic tradition appears to have solidified. The broadest outlines of the conflict as was understood by ancient

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101 The First Sacred War and Thessalian participation in the conflict is covered in depth in Ch. 2.
102 Forrest, “The First Sacred War,” 33.
103 HH 3, Lns. 540-543.
104 Both Demosthenes and Speusippus refer to the conflict: Dem. 18.149; Speusippus Letter to Philip 8.
literary sources is as follows: peoples living around the sanctuary, known as the Crisaeans, prevented the free flow of traffic to Delphi.\textsuperscript{105} A coalition of Greek allies in turn attacked the Crisaeans and liberated the shrine.\textsuperscript{106}

There is no set tradition as to the identities of the defenders of Delphi freedom, various powers including Sikyon, Athens, and Thessaly are all ascribed as having led the coalition to eject the Crisaeans.\textsuperscript{107} Additionally, it was understood that there were two resulting effects from this conflict. First, the establishment of the Delphic Amphictyony, the body of \textit{ethne} who managed the infrastructure around the sanctuary. This institution was likely formed from the membership of the Anthelic Amphictyony, named for a shrine at Anthela near Thermopylae.\textsuperscript{108} Second, the creation of the “Plain of Crisa,” agricultural land below Delphi which was dedicated to Apollo.\textsuperscript{109} Both the Plain of Crisa and the Amphicyony are established as historical fact, and as such it is reasonable to accept that there was some form of conflict around Delph. Given the association with Thessaly and the Delphic Amphictyony in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, as well as the conquest of Phoci, it is reasonable to accept that the Thessalians played a significant part in this conflict, and it was likely the key event which allowed the Thessalians to establish hegemony over the Phocians and much of central Greece.

It was understood by ancient authors that a key stage of Thessalian expansion in the Archaic period was the subjugation of the \textit{perioicoi}. The peoples in the mountainous regions around the Pineos River basin were brought into the Thessalian sphere of influence over the

\textsuperscript{105} Drachmann, \textit{Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina}, 2 Scholia in Pythionicas:3. Strab. 9.3.4.
\textsuperscript{107} The best survey of sources for the conflict can be found in John Davies, “The Traditions about the First Sacred War,” in \textit{Greek Historiography}, ed. Simon Hornblower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Forrest, “The First Sacred War.”
\textsuperscript{108} Hdt. 7.200. See also: Anaxim. FGrHist 72 F 2; Androt. FGrHist 324 F 58; Soph. \textit{Trach.} 633-639.
\textsuperscript{109} Aeschin. 3.107. Howe, “Pastoralism, the Delphic Amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: The Creation of Apollo’s Sacred Pastures.”
course of the Archaic period, likely in connection with the First Sacred War. While there are a number of traditions as to the membership of the Delphic Amphictyony, Thessalian perioicoi appear consistently. It is possible that the conquest of the perioicoi gave the Thessalians the resources to extend their regional hegemony into central Greece, and it is believed that the presence of the perioicoi in the Delphic Amphictyony’s membership lists suggests that the Thessalians largely dictated policy to the rest of the Amphictyony. Moreover, the perioicoi were required to pay tribute to the Thessalians, this was a potentially significant boon which enabled the Thessalians to extend their hegemony into Phocis.

While there is no extant account of the beginning of the Thessalian conquest of Phocis, at the end of the Archaic period the Phocians threw off the Thessalian yoke and routed an expedition sent to reconquer the polity. The Thessalian regional hegemony failed in Phocis, near Hyampolis, which sat in the key pass connecting the Cepissus River valley – itself a key overland transit route linking Boeotia, Phocis, Doris, and Malis – to Opuntian Locris and the coastal plain.

The arrival of Xerxes in 480 offered an opportunity for the Aleuadae, who looked to the Persian Empire to restore their status in central Greece. However, there are signs of the dissolution of elite consensus in Thessaly, and it appears that other Thessalian factions looked to undermine and perhaps supplant the Aleuadae, whose actions during the Persian invasion make clear why the Aleuadae would back an invading force. A rival group of Thessalians who were

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112 Hdt. 8.27-28.
113 Hdt. 7.6.2.
unhappy with the pro-Persian policy of the Aleuadae sent messengers to the southern Greeks requesting assistance.\textsuperscript{114} Ultimately, this attempt was unsuccessful and the Thessalians led their Persian allies into Greece, and specifically through Phocis, where Herodotus noted that the Phocian religious sites were specifically targeted for destruction.\textsuperscript{115} Given the loss of regional hegemony, it seems very likely that this was an attempt on the part of the Aleuad leadership to repudiate their losses and to reassert control over Phocis.

When the Persian armies finally retreated from Greece, the Aleuadae were targets for reprisals by the southern Greeks, and rival Thessalian factions continued to undermine and challenge their monopoly on rulership. In 478/7, a Spartan army under the command of King Leotychides marched into Thessaly to subdue the region in order to punish it for medizing. The Spartans were successful in entering Thessaly, but their ultimate aims were stymied when King Leotychidas was accused of taking bribes from the Aleuadae.\textsuperscript{116} While unsuccessful in eliminating the Aleuadae, the expedition was successful reorienting the balance of power in Thessaly, as the next Thessalian who entered the historical narrative the aristocrat Meno of Pharsalus. Meno offered money and troops to the Athenians at the siege of Eion in 475, and for this act Meno was offered citizenship.\textsuperscript{117} It is likely that the Menonidae or Echecratidae took control of Thessalian politics at this point, as in 464 a treaty was established between Athens and Thessaly.\textsuperscript{118}

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Hdt. 7.172.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Hdt. 8.31-33.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Hdt. 6.72.1. Plut. \textit{Mor.} 859d.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Dem. 13.23, 23.199.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Thuc. 1.102.4.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
This alliance did not last, as at the Battle of Tanagra in 457 the Thessalians betrayed their Athenian allies and ensured a Spartan victory.\footnote{Thuc. 1.107.5-7. Diod. 11.80. Paus. 1.29.9. This subject is covered in depth in Ch. 7.} There are no extant accounts which detail the motivations of the Thessalians, however the Athenians were Phocian allies and were fighting on behalf of the Phocians. Moreover, in 448 the Athenians put the Phocians in control of Delphi, it seems likely that this was the intent of the Athenians for many years given the longevity of the the Phocian-Athenian alliance, and it should come as no surprise that the Thessalians were unwilling to support an alliance which would have this effect. It has been argued that the Thessalian actions at Tanagra were the result of a political uprising and change in government; this may be true, but it was predicated on the enmity between Thessaly and Phocis over the control of Delphi, rather than any sort of political or ideological position.

Nevertheless, Thessaly appears to have swung back into the Athenian orbit at the end of the fifth century. A cavalry expedition was sent in 431 to assist the Athenians, though it does not appear to have affected the course of the war in any meaningful way.\footnote{Thuc. 2.22.2-3.} Rather, in this period there seems to have been an inability on the part of the Thessalian government from effecting its will inside or outside of Thessaly. When Brasidas marched across Thessaly in 424, he was met with an anti-Spartan party outside of Pharsalus, ostensibly part of the Daochid government.\footnote{Thuc. 4.78, see also: Evans, “The Daochos Monument”; Anne Jacquemin and Didier Laroche, “Le Monument de Daochos Ou Le Trésor Des Thessaliens,” Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique 125, no. 1 (2001): 305–32.} The Thessalians who attempted to block Brasidas’ crossing were unsuccessful and the Spartan general was able to cross Thessaly and pursue a campaign against the Athenians in the Chalcidice. This inaction was yet another symptom of the political disorder in Thessaly; it would not be surprising if Brasidas’ crossing was a plot on the part of the Alueadae to expose the
weakness of Daochos’ regime and cultivate relationships with Sparta.

This dissolution of elite consensus, jockeying for position, and attempts to undermine rivals came to a head in the late fifth century, when it appears that Thessaly descended into open civil war. While there is unfortunately no extant information on the beginning or course conflict itself, in 404 Lycrophron of Pherae seized power in Thessaly, destroying an Aleuad coalition arrayed against him.\textsuperscript{122} From this date on, the Thessalian state entered an intermittent period of stasis which lasted through 346 and the end of the Third Sacred War. In this period, Thessaly was divided into two coalitions. The first, Lycophron and Jason of Pherae, seems to have largely subdued and brought the entirety of Thessaly under their control. However, their governments seem unable to have established any institutional legitimacy; when Lycophron died, Jason apparently needed to reconquer Thessaly and put down any Aleuad competitors in the early 370s.\textsuperscript{123} The faction which opposed the Pheraeans was headed by the Aleuadae in Larisa, after Jason’s death it appears to have solidified into a political entity referred to as the Thessalian Federation. While we know little about the policies and practices of Lycophron, there is more extant attestation regarding the government of Jason and the rival Thessalian Federation.\textsuperscript{124} The specific policies of these individuals are covered in depth in Ch. 6, but in the case of both Jason and the Thessalian League, there is a clear attempt on the part of these regimes to attempt to connect themselves to the Archaic regional hegemony that Thessaly possessed in the sixth century. This was done through emphasizing the Thessalian connection to the Apollonian oracle at Delphi, as well as through military action against the Phocians.

\textsuperscript{122} Xen. Hell. 2.3.4.
\textsuperscript{123} Xen. Hell. 6.1.5.
\textsuperscript{124} For more on the policies of Jason and the Thessalian Federation, see Ch. 6. See also: Sprawski, \textit{Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC}; Westlake, \textit{Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.}, 1935.
It is unclear when Jason took control of Thessaly, but by the mid-370s it appears that all of the Pineos River basin and the Thessalian _perioicoi_ were under his control. The primary source for his reign was Xenophon, who reported that while Jason’s rule was total in Thessaly, it was not without its detractors. In 375, Polydamas of Pharsalus went to the Spartans asking for assistance in unseating Jason.\textsuperscript{125} The action was unsuccessful, and the Spartans rejected the request of Polydamas, and Jason brought the whole of Thessaly firmly under his control.\textsuperscript{126}

While Jason’s reign was limited, he was able to undertake two actions which give insight as to the political motivations of the Thessalians in this period. In 371, Jason led an expedition through Phocis, sacking the area around Hyampolis and capturing Heraclea Trachis.\textsuperscript{127} While extant accounts give little context to his motivations, a few suppositions can be made. First, Hyampolis was the site of the Thessalian defeat during the Phocian rebellion, and the shields of the fallen Thessalian soldiers were dedicated at the Apollonian temple of Abae, which was less than five miles from Hyampolis.\textsuperscript{128} As Xenophon reports that Jason took no other hostile action in Phocis, it seems reasonable that this was a direct symbolic repudiation of the losses of the Aleuadæ. Second, the sacking of Heraclea Trachis would have been a signal to the Thessalians and Greece that Jason intended to re-establish regional hegemony over central Greece. Established in 426 by the Spartans in an effort to control central Greece, the city overlooked the coastal plain on the eastern end of the Malian Gulf, an important route for north-south travel. Additionally, the city was not far from Anthela, the sanctuary which the Anthelic Amphictyony administered, that institution being the originator of the Delphic Amphictyony. Finally, the

\textsuperscript{125} Xen. _Hell._ 6.1.1-19.
\textsuperscript{126} Xen. _Hell._ 6.1.17.
\textsuperscript{127} Xen. _Hell._ 6.4.27-28.
Heraclea in Trachis could command the pass between the coast and Doris, which sat on the Cephissus River valley and provided an entry into Phocis skirting the north side of Mount Parnassus. Controlling these routes suggested that Jason intended to extend Thessalian power South. Finally, prior to his assassination, Jason was preparing to lead a huge procession of sacrificial animals to the Pythian games, which was to be accompanied by Thessalian soldiers. This would have symbolically recollected the First Sacred War in which the Thessalians understood themselves to have led a coalition of allies to liberate Delphi. Moreover, Xenophon reported that Jason intended to have himself declared the director of both the secular and religious aspects of the Pythian games.\textsuperscript{129} This was a remarkably aggressive act on the part of the tyrant of Pherae.

However, Jason’s procession did not come to pass, Jason was assassinated in 370, while reviewing a group of Pheraean cavalry.\textsuperscript{130} His brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron took control of Pherae.\textsuperscript{131} Unfortunately, there is little extant information about Jason’s immediate successors. Shortly after the death of Jason, the brothers left on an expedition to Larisa, presumably to put down any attempts to reassert Aleuad power. On the journey from Pherae, Polydorus became ill and died, leaving Polyphron in control of Thessaly. Polyphron appears to have moved quickly and violently to consolidate power after the death of Jason, executing a number of Pharsalian elite and exiling a number of Larisaeans, presumably Aleuadae. It seems likely that Polyphron continued his predecessor’s policy of a Theban alliance; in 370 the Thebans launched a massive raid into the Peloponnese, supplemented by soldiers from the Thessalian \textit{periöcoi} of Locris,

\textsuperscript{129} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.30.  
\textsuperscript{130} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.32.  
\textsuperscript{131} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.33. Diodorus believed that it was Polydorus who was behind the assassination: Diod. 15.60.5.
Malia, and Heraclea in Trachis, as well as Thessalian soldiers.\textsuperscript{132} These events are all that is extant about Polyphron’s rule, within a year he was assassinated by his nephew Alexander, the son of Polydorus.

In the wake of the assassination and seizure of power by Alexander, a number of other powers attempted to challenge the regime in Pherae. In 369 the Aleuadae in Larisa sent an embassy to Macedonian King Alexander II for assistance against Alexander of Pherae. Sensing an opportunity, Alexander II sent soldiers to garrison Larisa and Cranon but refused to remove them.\textsuperscript{133} Having been outmaneuvered but apparently learning nothing, the Larisaean ambassadors arrived in Thebes requesting Theban support. Like Alexander II, the Thebans realized the strategic possibilities that control of Thessaly offered, the potential danger if the Thessalians were united under one leader and sent an expedition under Pelopidas to ensure that Thessaly was in a position to serve Theban interests.\textsuperscript{134} Pelopidas was able to expel the Macedonian garrisons from Thessaly and helped to negotiate a truce between the Aleuadae and the Larisaens. At this time, the Thessalian Federation led by the Aleuadae concluded an alliance with Athens, bringing them into the Boeotian-Athenian sphere.\textsuperscript{135} It seems likely that at this time Alexander of Pherae was also a Theban ally, and thus while both factions would be responsible for providing military aid should the Thebans require it, neither the Pheraeans or the Thessalian League was in a position to defect and risk an attack from their rival and the Thebans. Hoping to create a similar scenario in Macedon, Pelopidas left for the North to arbitrate in a dispute between Alexander II and Ptolemy, a rival claimant to the throne.

\textsuperscript{132} Xen. \textit{Hell} 6.5.23; Diod. 15.62.4.
\textsuperscript{133} Diod. 15.61.4-5.
\textsuperscript{134} Diod. 15.67.3-4; Plutarch \textit{Pel.} 26.
\textsuperscript{135} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1.116. Westlake argued that this treaty was a direct result of Pelopidas’ intervention: Westlake, \textit{Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.}, 1935, 136.
Roughly a year later the Thessalian League again requested assistance from Thebes, citing fears of aggression on the part of Alexander of Pherae. Pelopidas returned to the Thessaly, but receiving news that Alexander II of Macedon had been murdered by Ptolemy, enlisted a force of Thessalians as mercenaries and marched to Macedon. Ptolemy was able to bribe the Thessalian mercenaries away from Pelopidas but acquiesced to sending hostages to Thebes. Returning to Thessaly, Pelopidas was confronted by an army under the command of Alexander of Pherae, who promptly took Pelopidas hostage. The Thebans sent two separate expeditions to secure the release of Pelopidas: the first was outmaneuvered and badly mauled by Alexander’s forces, and the second was able to secure his release, though it is likely that the Thebans were required to give up support of the Thessalian Federation to do so. From this period on, the Thebans were unable to recapture any momentum and bring Thessaly to heel. In 364 Pelopidas once again marched on Alexander of Pherae, but at Cynocephale despite routing Alexander’s forces, Pelopidas was killed in battle. The next six years saw Alexander attempt to reestablish himself and increase the power of his regime, but in this he was ultimately unsuccessful. In 358, Alexander was assassinated by the brothers of his wife Thebe, herself the daughter of Jason of Pherae.

Once again, the Aleuadae of Larisa looked to an outside power to settle their dispute and believed the newly established Philip II of Macedon was the ideal candidate. The Thessalian policies followed by Philip closely mirror those of Alexander, and suggest that there was a consistent political ideology, explored in depth in Ch. 6. In order to secure social alliances to

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136 Plut. Pel. 27.
137 Paus. 9.15.2; Diod. 15.71.3-7; Plut. Pel. 28-9. Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935, 144.
138 Plut. Pel. 32.
139 Diod. 16.14.1, 16.37.3; Plut. Pel. 35; Xen. Hell. 6.4.36-7.
140 Diod. 16.14.2. Dem. 18.295
support his political allies, Philip married two Thessalian woman, one a Larisaean and the other a Pheraean. Additionally, Philip used several key levers to ensure Thessalian support for his regime. Primarily, the Third Sacred War gave Philip the opportunity to take military action against the Phocians, who had transgressed by violating the sanctity of the Apollonian sanctuary at Delphi. This not only allowed Philip to cast himself as continuing the work of the First Sacred War, but to promise the Thessalians control over the Amphictyony if they would support him. As well, throughout the fourth century the Thessalian perioici were able to assert independence in the face of Thessalian weakness, Philip placed Magnesia under the control of the Thessalian Federation; this offered to not only supplement national pride but also to augment the Thessalian treasury as well. With the conclusion of the Third Sacred War and the re-establishment of the Delphic Amphictyony, the Thessalian Federation had much of its Archaic period glory restored, but as a staunch Macedonian ally lost its independence. When Philip II’s son Alexander took the Argead throne, the Thessalians were some of the first to fall in line behind the young king.

141 Plut. Alex. 77; Justin. 9.8.2, 13.1.11
142 Dem. 5.23.
143 Diod. 17.4.1.
Chapter 2: Thessaly and Delphi: The Delphic Amphictyony and Motivations for the First Sacred War

Through their success in the Lelantine War in the mid-seventh century, the Thessalians positioned themselves to project economic, social, and political power southward into central Greece. Likely as part of this southward trajectory, the Thessalians were involved with two institutions established in the Archaic period: the Delphic and Pylaean Amphictyonies. These were not only religious assemblies, the sacred sites these organizations maintained sat at the intersection of important overland trade routes. The stewardship of these sites would have enabled the members of the Amphictyony to assert influence over religious and secular traffic in these areas, and likely provided the Amphictyons significant social, political, and economic. However, not all Greek communities were happy with this arrangement, and in the early sixth century Greeks living in the vicinity of Delphi attempted to assert control over the sanctuary and reject the mandate of the Amphictyons. This was the impetus for what has been termed the First Sacred War, one of the key conflicts in the mytho-history of Archaic Greece, in which the Thessalians and other members of the Delphic Amphictyony “liberated” the sanctuary of Apollo from the Crisaeans, a local people who transgressed against the sanctity of the sanctuary and its pilgrims. This struggle was a vital part of the Thessalian hegemonic project, giving the Thessalians the opportunity to extend control over the nascent Phocian ethnos and the trade

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1 For more on the Lelantine War, see Thuc. 1.15.3, as well as chapters 1 and 3.
2 Unfortunately, specific dating for the establishment of these organizations is impossible: Pierre Sanchez, *L’Amphictionie Des Pyles et de Delphes : Recherches Sur Son Rôle Historique, Des Origines Au IIe Siècle de Notre Ére* (Stuttgart: Historia Einzelschriften, 2000), 32.
routes of Central Greece. Modern scholars have done significant work on this subject; however, a key issue has been overlooked. The two causes of the First Sacred War – the sacrilegious appropriation of the sacred Crisaean Plain, on which sacrificial livestock was raised, and interference with travelers to Delphi – suggest that there was anxiety about the ability to supply the sanctuary of Apollo with oblationary animals; by eliminating local competitors, the Amphictyony could monopolize the sacred animal “trade” at Delphi.

I. The Role of the Delphic Amphictyony in the Archaic and Classical Period

The Delphic Amphictyony was one of the most well-known “international” institutions in Greece, recognized as the steward of a vital religious institution by both Greeks and non-Greeks alike. While the Amphictyony was established in Delphi during the Archaic period, by the fifth century the foundation of the Delphic Amphictyony had been already integrated into the mytho-historical narrative of early Greece. In order to understand the benefits of the Amphictyony, and the role of the Delphic Amphictyony in the Thessalian “golden age,” it is necessary to examine what is known about the organization and the operation of the Amphictyony itself. While the majority of our extant information does not specifically discuss the Thessalian relationship to the

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4 For more on the struggle between Phoci and Thessaly see: Ch. 3.
7 Much modern scholarship has accepted that the Thessalian ethnos was an important part of the Delphic Amphictyony: Frank Adcock and DJ Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 22; Morgan, *Early Greek States Beyond the Polis*, 130; McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos*, 164; Parke and Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, 1:102; Mili, *Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly*, 244; Forrest, “The First Sacred War,” 82.
Amphictyony, identifying the broader outlines of the function of the organization offers greater context for Thessalian actions in the Archaic and Classical periods.

In the mid-sixth century the Alcmaeonidae, an Athenian aristocratic family, was unsuccessful in challenging the ruling Peisistratid family and its members were exiled. After an initial failed attempt to reverse their exile through military force, the Alcmaeonidae retreated to regroup and attempt to find new allies in their quest to return to Athens and displace the Peisistratids. While it is likely that the Alcmaeonidae approached a number of powers for assistance, Herodotus reported that the Athenian exiles settled upon the Amphictyony as the institution through which they could raise their political capital in Athens and recruit allies to their cause. In 548 the temple of Apollo at Delphi burned down, and after the Amphictyons had raised three hundred talents to reconstruct the temple, the Alcmaeonidae seem to have deployed their connections so that they were appointed as managers of the reconstruction project. According to Herodotus, the funds for reconstruction were raised from a variety of sources, including the city of Delphi which contributed one-quarter of the costs.

It is not particularly surprising that the Amphictyony was responsible for the fundraising effort to rebuild the temple. However, when describing the contributions from the polis of Delphi, Herodotus used the term ἐπιβάλλω. When the historian uses this term in his work elsewhere, it is generally used for the actions of placing one object on another, often as a stamp or brand. However, in a number of the instances in which Herodotus uses the term there are

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8 Hdt. 5.62.2.
9 Pausanias is the only source which describes the destruction of the temple: Paus. 10.5.13. Herodotus describes the collection of funds: Hdt. 2.180.
10 Hdt. 2.180.1.
11 Hdt. 2.180.
12 For example, see Hdt. 2.83.3 or Hdt. 3.128.2.
clear power-dynamics on display. Herodotus uses the term twice to discuss work or goods which were “allotted” by one group to another. In the first instance, the verb was used when young men requested their inheritance from their still-living parents.\textsuperscript{13} In the second, Herodotus recounts how the Phoenicians, subjects of the Persian empire, were assigned by Xerxes in 483 to dig a section of the great canal at the base of Mount Athos.\textsuperscript{14} In both cases, the verb was used when a greater power (the Persian Empire/biological parents) gave something to a lesser power (subject peoples/children) who had little ability to appeal or negotiate. Two other instances make this power dynamic clearer, where the term is understood to mean “to lay upon as a tax or fine.” In Book I, Herodotus recounted the activities of the Scythians prior to the formation of Achaemenid power and used ἐπιβάλλω to describe the Scythian collection of tribute.\textsuperscript{15} As with the examples above, there was a clear power dynamic in play between the Scythians those from whom they collected tribute, with the added threat of violence. In a second instance, the Argives are described as levying a fine upon the Sicyonians and Aeginetans whom they have recently defeated in battle.\textsuperscript{16} Again, there is an implied threat of force against those who were weaker, with the further understanding that the groups had little recourse to these fines. This language suggests that the Delphians had little choice in the matter and that the Amphictyony had significant influence over internal economic – and by extension, political – decisions in the city. This view reappears in Plutarch, who described the wrangling between Athens and Sparta over the sanctuary during the Second Sacred War in the mid-fifth century – see Ch. 7 on the actions of Thessaly and the Battle of Tanagra – it seems likely that the Delphians themselves had little

\textsuperscript{13} Hdt. 4.115.1.
\textsuperscript{14} Hdt. 7.23.3.
\textsuperscript{15} Hdt. 1.106.1.
\textsuperscript{16} Hdt. 6.92.2.
control of the sanctuary in their territory.\textsuperscript{17} When the Delphians took control of the sanctuary, it was only through the support of other powers.

Amphictyonic domination of Delphi strongly suggests that the institution was flexible in the scope of its mandate. The Amphictyony was willing to extend its power over the secular and political activities of a free \textit{polis} like Delphi. However, an episode in the late sixth century potentially complicates our understanding of the Amphictyony, and the organization’s desire or ability to extend its control beyond central Greece. In 511, after being granted the right to rebuild Delphi by the Amphictyony, the Alcmaeonidae used their newfound prominence to enlist the Spartans in a military campaign to unseat the Peisistratid regime, which had forced the exile of the Athenian family decades earlier. In response, the Thessalians dispatched a cavalry force to relieve the embattled Peisistratids.\textsuperscript{18} The Alcmaedonidae had previously attempted to unseat the Peisistratids, and for contemporary observers of the political climate in Athens, there would have been every reason to assume that the Alcmaeonids would attempt to return to Athens. However, since it appears that the Thessalians were important members of the Amphictyony, why would the Thessalians and their associates in the Amphictyony be willing to grant the Alcmaeonidae, enemies of their Peisistratid allies an important and public role related to the Pythian Oracle?\textsuperscript{19} If the Thessalians were not involved in the Amphictyony, why did not Amphictyonic members back the Alcmaeonid effort?

Three different possible scenarios present themselves. First, the Thessalians were not members of the Delphic Amphictyony in the mid-sixth century and thus unable to prevent the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{17} Plut. \textit{Per.} 21.
\textsuperscript{18} Hdt. 5.63.3-4.
\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, even if the Thessalians were not involved in the Amphictyony, why did no Amphictyonic members back the Alcmaeonid effort?
\end{footnotesize}
council from engaging the Alcmaeonids. Second, the Thessalian-Pesistratid alliance was not in force in the mid-sixth century, and the Thessalians saw no benefit in taking sides in the political upheaval in Athens. These two options are plausible but difficult to accept. Extant information about membership in the Amphictyony is inconsistent, but historical tradition suggests that the Thessalians maintained seats on the Amphictyonic council from a very early period. There is no indication that the membership of the council fundamentally changed from the seventh through the early fifth centuries. It also is difficult to accept that the Peisistratids maintained an alliance or bond with members of the Amphictyony yet had no supporters or friends who would object to the appointment of the Alcmaeonidae.

Whenever the inception of the Thessalian-Athenian treaty, by the late 5th century, the treaty had been in force long enough for Thucydides to describe it as παλαιός – an ancient one. The Thessalians maintained this alliance through the fifth century regardless of the faction that dominated Athenian politics. The longevity of this relationship suggests that it was constructed on a multi-generational xenia relationships, and it seems reasonable to accept that the Thessalian-Peisistratid relationship existed in the mid-sixth century. Regardless of the nature of the relationship between Thessaly and Athens, it is difficult to accept that the Amphictyons did not suspect the long-term goals of the Alcmaeonidae. After using their own funds to supplement the construction of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, the Alcmaeonidae used their newfound influence

21 Thuc. 2.22.3. A less clear piece of evidence is the existence of a Peisistratus “Thessalos,” named in honor of the family’s connection to Thessaly. However, Aristotle is the only source to my knowledge which noted the existence of Thessaos, and there is no extant evidence which would back up such an assertion: Aristot. Const. Ath. 18.2.
22 Herman has argued that xenia relationships were intended to mimic and parallel long-term kinship ties: Gabriel Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 69.
to encourage any Spartan delegation visiting Delphi to use military force to eject the Peisistratids from Athens. 23 If the Amphictyons took an anti-Peisistratid stance, why did none of the other members participate in attempts to unseat the tyrants at Athens?

The long-term political project of the Alcmaeonidae cannot have been obscure to the other members of the Amphictyony. Thus, a third option presents itself: the Delphic Amphictyony, either because of an official mandate or tradition saw its role as divorced from non-Amphictyonic political activities. This is not to say that the Amphictyony was unwilling to attempt to enhance its prestige. Shortly after the Battle of Plataea, the Spartans set up a tripod with an inscription which commemorated the “Spartan” victory over the Persians. 24 The Plataeans, furious at what they saw as the erasure of their participation, used the Amphictyony brought suit through the Amphictyony and forced the Spartans to efface the inscription. 25 Neither the Plataeans nor the Spartans were members of the Amphictyony, and so the prominence of the institution was enhanced. 26 Bonner and Smith compiled a list of a number of individuals tried in the court of the hieromnemons. 27 None of these were members of Amphictyonic states. While the rights and privileges of the Oracle, its staff, and the Amphictyony were jealously guarded, unless there was a clear transgression against the Oracle – such as its seizure by the Phocians in the Third Sacred War – the justice of the Amphictyony was for outsiders.

If this was the case, the Amphictyons were willing to allow their institution to be used for the political goals of others, in return for funds which would further advance the status of Delphi

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23 Hdt. 5.62.3 - 5.63.1.
24 Thuc. 1.132.2; Paus. 3.8.2.
25 Dem. 59.97-98.
26 It seems likely that the Amphictyony desperately needed a boost to its stature in the Greek world after 479, as the majority of the members medized.
and line the pockets of those who were involved in the administration of the Oracle. Moreover, the economic benefit of participation in the Amphictyony could not have been limited to the elite who acted as *hieromnemones*; given the importance that later Thessalians placed on their membership in the Amphictyony, it is likely that the economic benefits were felt by a large segment of Thessalian society in a direct, material way. It was for tangible wealth as well religious and social status that centered the Amphictyony as a key institution in the minds of those states which made up the council, and this produced an irresistible nostalgia for Archaic-era Amphictyonic dominance in a Thessalian population which had suffered setbacks to its pride at the end of the Archaic period.

In 380, the Delphic Amphictyony erected a stele on Athenian-allied Aegina detailing the obligations and prerogatives of both the Amphictyony and the *hieromnemones*, representatives of the *ethne* which made up the Amphictyonic council. The stele itself was broken and shows signs of significant wear, but a sufficient amount of the text has survived to supplement literary information about the Amphictyony. For the full text of the inscription, see Appendix B.

The responsibilities of the *hieromnemones* and the *pylagorae* were remarkably mundane: maintaining buildings, organizing games, and ensuring a general peace during the Pythian games. However, as has been discussed above, it seems likely that there was an economic

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28 There are of course, exceptions to this. Herodotus reported that the Oracle of Apollo took a particularly direct response in questions regarding how the anti-Persian Athenians should respond to the impending invasion: the Pythia instructed the Athenians to flee, as the Persian armies would ruin Hellas. Was this a politically motivated decision? Herodotus reported that a number of central Greek polities which were also members of the Amphictyony sided with the Persians, most notably the Thessalians: Hdt. 7.6.2, 7.140.2-3.
29 IG II² 1126. Also categorized as CID 1:10 and SEG 29-128. The physical object is in the collection of the Louvre, Accession number Ma 133 (LL 130 bis). It is of course an issue to treat the Amphictyony of the fourth century the same as the Amphictyony of the fifth century or the Archaic period. However, to my knowledge there are no sources which detail any changes to the Amphictyony. Given the work of Philip II and his propagandists (see below), this may have been something approaching policy for the Amphictyony, or it simply may be a lack of extant evidence.
30 The primary ancient source for discussing the two different roles is Aeschines: Aeschin. 3.115. Modern scholars have interpreted various responsibilities for these officials, with the *Hieromnemones* acting as judicial officials, or
calculus that gave particular weight and importance to the relationship between the
Amphictyonic member populations – especially Thessaly – and participation in the
Amphictyony.

Two pieces of the Amphictyonic oath stand out. Line 14 begins to detail the
responsibilities of the *hieromnemens*, which included judging the animals which are brought for
sacrifice to the Apollonian sanctuary. There are other unnamed but presumably Amphictyonic
officials who are responsible for evaluating the hekatombs of oxen that came to Delphi.
Presumably, these officials determined if the animals were acceptable to sacrifice; the most
appropriate victims were ones which were raised from birth for oblatory purposes and performed
no manual labor.\(^{31}\) The inscription gives unfortunately little further detail as to the qualifications,
the rather bland τὸν ὄνος is used. Following Froener, I have translated that the officials will
“judge if bulls are flawless,” but the phrase is open to interpretation.\(^{32}\) While we are unaware of
the specifics related to the judgement process, scholarship agrees that the Amphictyonic officials
had decision-making power over whether an animal could be used as an offering in religious
activities at Delphi.\(^ {33}\) Additionally, a clause beginning in line 40 requires the Amphictyonic

clerks, or overseers of the Pythian games.\(^ {30}\) The *pylagorae*, ostensibly named as such because of the Amphictyony’s
original home at the Shrine of Amphictyonid Demeter at Anthela near Thermopylae, are variously understood to be
organizers of the games or judicial advocates. As judicial officials: Sanchez, *L’Amphictionie Des Pyles et de

Antiquity*, vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 87. Imperfect animals might be sacrificed but
only by marginal members of the community and would be unlikely to be evaluated as acceptable by Amphictyonic
officials at Delphi.

\(^{32}\) Roberts and Gardner understand the word to be ὄνος and translate the phrase as “those that have passed
inspection.” While the spirit of the meaning is there, the technical distinction between this and Froehrer’s is both
important and likely wholly unknowable: E.S. Roberts and E.A. Gardner, eds., *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*,

\(^{33}\) Jeremy McInerney, *The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient Greeks* (Princeton:
members to maintain roads and bridges in their territories which lead to Delphi.\textsuperscript{34} Taken by itself, this should not be entirely surprising as Delphi was a destination shrine, both for Greeks and non-Greeks alike.\textsuperscript{35} However, in expanding the scope of analysis beyond the responsibilities of the Amphictyonic officials, another possibility about the role of the Amphictyony and travel to Delphi begins to emerge.

It is reasonable to accept that given the mountainous nature of Greece, the preferred method of travel was by sea. Distances could be covered significantly more quickly, and while there certainly were issues with the threat of piracy, it seems as though it was likely much safer than overland travel.\textsuperscript{36} However, sea travel was limited in its utility: while it has been argued that Greek cargo ships of the fifth century regularly hauled one hundred tons of cargo or more, this does not seem to have applied to large bodies of men or animals.\textsuperscript{37}

Instead, it seems likely that Delphi was connected to – and possibly at the intersection of – many different trade routes running through the central Greece.\textsuperscript{38} The plain of Crisa and its littoral sat at the southern end of a corridor that took trade through Delphi, Doris, through the

\textsuperscript{34} Roberts and Gardner argued that the \textit{hieromnemons} were not responsible, but the member states themselves, which seems a reasonable enough interpretation: Roberts and Gardner, 2:96.


\textsuperscript{36} Thucydides discusses the prevalence of piracy in both the Archaic and Classical periods, given the relatively straightforward nature with which he presents his beliefs it seems that the practice was both relatively common and a limited enough threat that he felt no great anxiety about the matter: Thuc. 1.5.

\textsuperscript{37} Lionel Casson, \textit{Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 172. While it is certainly likely that on long voyages animals were transported as food for the crew, commercial transportation is unknown in the Classical period, the only reference I am aware of is from Theodoridas in \textit{Anth. Pal.} 6.222, and this is from Casson’s translation, I can find no other translation which uses his terminology: Casson, 169.

Dhema gap and ended at the Malian Gulf. Archaeological evidence of an increase in Corinthian pottery in Phocis and around Delphi beginning in the eighth century suggests that Delphi was the hub for an expansion of the Corinthian pottery trade. There was similarly a Doris-Lokris corridor through which precious metals from Thrace and northern Europe were transported south. We are also aware of the “Sacred Way” which ran between Phocis and Delphi, this was the famous road on which Oedipus killed his father. Even if a traveler or cargo arrived at Delphi, a network of roads would have been required to take the cargo up to the sanctuary in the mountains. Moreover, there were many land locked communities in central Greece which would rely on overland trade, whether those goods were brought to a nearby port or travelled overland from their point of origin. Given the presence of such routes, it is most likely that significant traffic moved through the passes and trade routes of central Greece. It must be acknowledged that there are those who have questioned assertions that a significant amount of traffic flowed through central Greece, instead arguing that the majority of traffic went via ship. This is certainly plausible and it may be that overland travel in central Greece was relatively rare and largely consisted of armies, large groups of pilgrims coming to Delphi for the Pythian Games. The presence of pilgrims, either coming to Delphi for the games or to consult the oracle would surely be sufficient reason for the Amphictyony to ensure the bridges and roads to Delphi

39 Kase, The Great Isthmus Corridor Route: Explorations of the Phokis-Doris Expedition, 98.
41 Morgan, Athletes and Oracles, 116.
42 Soph. OT 733-734
44 McInerney has argued that the majority of communities in Phocis were primarily accessible through the Cephissus River valley, which would have necessitated overland travel: McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 55.
45 Strabo in particular refers to Delphi as the center of the Greek world: Strab. 9.3.6. For an excellent summation of scholarship and extant ancient evidence see: Wagner-Hasel, Der Stoff Der Gaben: Kultur Und Politik Des Schenkens Und Tauschens Im Archaischen Griechenland, 266–68.
were maintained. By facilitating traffic to Delphi, both for consultation of the Oracle and the Pythian Games, the members of the Amphictyony could cultivate both national pride and international goodwill. However, I suspect that membership in the Amphictyony – and especially dominance of the institution – produced another, more compelling opportunity not only for the elite of a state, but for a significantly larger portion of the population: the ability to control the sale and trade of sacred animals to religious officials and pilgrims at Delphi.

The Crisaean Plain, specifically dedicated and set aside for the sacred herds of Apollo was insufficient in both size and fertility for the sacrificial needs of Delphi. This suggests that there was a need for animals to be brought to Delphi for sacrifices, either to replenish the sacred herd or to be sacrificed directly. If the Amphictyony, composed of the states of central Greece, controlled both the routes into Delphi and throughout the isthmus, then the organization would be in a position to determine which individuals or groups would be able to resupply Delphi with sacrificial animals. This could provide a huge economic windfall to the powers which controlled the Amphictyony. In the Archaic period the Thessalians appear to have dominated central Greece, were members – and possible leaders – in the Amphictyony and possessed grazing land of a quality and dimension unmatched by most Greek powers; Thessaly would have been in a prime position to exploit the economic possibilities offered by the Amphictyony to “oversee” the overland trade routes in central Greece.

II. The First Sacred War
With the Thessalians exerting leverage on the other 
ethne on the northern coast of central 
Greece through the mechanism of the Pylaean Amphictyony, it should come as no surprise that 
the Thessalians leapt at the chance to expand their influence over the shrine at Delphi in the sixth 
century. Events from the Archaic Period are difficult to assemble into a coherent narrative; the 
First Sacred War is an event which the Greek world seemed to view as formative but has a 
chronology which is at best murky.

Davies has sensibly argued that “our various pieces of evidence [regarding the First 
Sacred War] are pieces from different jigsaw puzzles…which cannot be made to interlock.”
Assembling a coherent and detailed narrative from the extant reports is nearly impossible, 
especially as the vast majority of those accounts begin appearing in the fourth century, at least 
two hundred years before the war was supposed to have taken place. Robertson denied the 
historical reality of the conflict itself, pointing to the letters of Speusippus as justification for his 
skepticism. In a letter to the Macedonian King Philip II, the fourth century philosopher 
complained that Antipater, then Philip’s representative to the Amphictyony, had been attempting 
to encourage a particular narrative of the league’s creation. Speusippus does not record the 
details of the narrative that Antipater was encouraging as historical reality, but Robertson argued 
that the Macedonian envoy was attempting to create direct parallels between the First and Third 
Sacred Wars, to give Philip II’s actions religious and historical legitimacy.

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47 Davies, “The Traditions about the First Sacred War,” 201.
49 Forrest, “The First Sacred War,” 50.
51 Paus. 10.2.4.
reservations are reasonable, evidence of political manipulation does not wholly invalidate the event. As it stands, the elaborate stories of poisoned aqueducts and years-long sieges may be disregarded, but the seed of the myth – that some form of conflict occurred between local powers around Delphi, resulting in a coalition of other Greek ethne intervening – should be accepted as based in reality. In short: sometime in the early sixth century – scholars have generally accepted the dates of 600-590 – an alliance of Greek peoples attacked the peoples living around the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi and drove them from their homes.

It is not within the scope of this work to discuss the intricacies of the conflict itself, but a few key observations about the conflict can be made. First, there is and was a strong tradition of Thessalian involvement in the ancient period. Strabo suggested that two cities existed in the area, “…Cirrha and Crisa…the latter [having been destroyed] by Eurylochos the Thessalian during the Crisaian War.” This was corroborated by both Polyaeus and a scholia to Pindar, which identify Eurylochos as the Thessalian as the commander of the Amphictyonic army. Though equivocation regarding the specific details remains, modern scholars have largely accepted the narrative that Thessaly was one of the major powers in the First Sacred War.

Second, the membership lists of the Delphic Amphictyony strongly suggest that Thessaly took a leading role in the organization, and thus likely a significant role in the conflict. While only two of the four lists of Amphictyonic members include Thessaly, all list the perioicic dependencies of Thessaly. While we are unaware of when Thessaly conquered its neighbors,
the process appears to have been completed by the late sixth century.\textsuperscript{56} The evidence is circumstantial, but without further archaeological or literary information it is difficult to see how the Thessalian *ethnos* in the early sixth century did not already have some sort of political influence over its soon-to-be dependent neighbors, though whether this was direct control or simply through political influence is unclear.\textsuperscript{57} Lastly, as discussed above a Thessalian-led attempt to secure control over an important economic and religious hub of central Greece fits with what we know of Thessalian expansion in the Archaic Period. Thessaly was geographically positioned to act as a key segment in the overland trade and communication route between the northern and southern portions of the Greek Peninsula. Delphi was similarly an important part of the “great isthmus corridor” route between the Southern Greece and the Balkans, and it would have benefited the Amphictyony – and Thessaly, in particular – to claim institutional ownership over this route, and thus ensure their control over the flow of goods and overland traffic through Central Greece.\textsuperscript{58}

Archaic mythology informed later historical accounts of the First Sacred War. Modern scholars have pointed to three mythological traditions: the Hesiodic Shield of Herakles, the “Struggle for the Tripod,” legend, and the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo. While these sources do not directly reference the First Sacred War, evidence from multiple sources suggests that there was real anxiety about the status of Delphi in the Archaic period. The Shield of


\textsuperscript{57} Issues regarding the *penestae* are discussed in detail in Ch. 5.

Herakles details the confrontation between Herakles and Cycnos, the son of Ares. The genesis of the conflict between the two is unclear, but in Hesoid’s retelling of the myth, Herakles encountered Cycnos in the τέμενος of Apollo and was “stirred” by the Sun God – Hesiod uses the term ἐπόρνυμι – to fight and kill the son of Ares. Using the First Sacred War as a lens it is not particularly difficult to see a correlation between Herakles as the Amphictyony and Cycnos, the son of a god who was not particularly well liked, as the transgressing Crisaeans. Moreover, that the encounter took place in the τέμενος of Apollo, the term for area specifically demarcated as sacred, suggests that Hesiod was following the same mytho-historical tradition as Pausanias and Strabo.

A similar narrative can be seen in the “Struggle for the Tripod,” a myth which was popular in the Archaic and Classical period. According to the legend, afflicted by an illness he was desperate to cure, Herakles went to the Pythia for guidance. The priestess of Apollo refused to prophesy for him, and in response the demigod attempted to make off with a tripod dedicated to Apollo. The Sun God attempted to stop the theft, and the ensuing fight was only stopped through the intervention of Zeus. Herakles’ attempt to remove a sacred tripod from Delphi did not just represent irreligious theft but symbolized an attempt to steal and take control of the oracle itself. This mythological tradition reflects fears of outside powers attempting to take control of Delphi, much like the Shield of Herakles myth. The conquering ethne of the Delphic Amphictyony were represented by Herakles – Pindar highlights a common ancestral connection between the Thessalians and the son of Zeus – and the reconciliation between Apollo

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59 Hes. Sh. 56 – 74. See also: Kase, The Great Isthmus Corridor Route: Explorations of the Phokis-Doris Expedition.
60 Hes. Sh. 68.
61 Paus. 10.37.5. Strab. 9.3.4.
and Herakles signified the absorption of Delphi by the Amphictyony. Again, it seems to suggest that there was conflict and contention over the oracle at Delphi, a dispute which was preserved in mythological format.

The Homeric Hymn to Apollo also echoed fears about outsiders taking control of Delphi. After having enlisted a group of shipwrecked Cretans as priests for his new sanctuary at Delphi, Apollo issued his newfound attendants the following warning:

αλλ᾽ ἀλογήσει

.ordinal τι τηύσιον ἔπος ἔσσεται ἰδι ἔργον

ὑβρὶς θ’, ἦ θέμες ἐστὶ καταθνητῶν ἄνθρώπων,

ἄλλοι ἐπειθ’ ὑμῖν σημάντορες ἄνδρες ἔσονται,

τὸν ὑπ’ ἀναγκαί ἐκδομὴσθ’ ἡματα πάντα.

εἰρηταί τοι πάντα: σὺ δὲ φρεσὶ σήσι φύλαξαι.

Who these “other men” were is unclear. Perhaps the poem is pro-Phocian and represented concern on the part of the local powers and fears that interlopers would remove Delphi from the

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63 Pind. P. 10, ln. 3. It should be noted that it is unclear whether the Delphic Amphicyony was established prior to the First Sacred War, if the organization was formed after the conflict by the conquering ethne, or if the Pylaean Amphicyony was expanded to include Delphi. For the Pylaean Amphicyony see: Hdt. 7.200.2.

64 Sordi has argued that the Struggle for the Tripod was a “resistance myth” in which the peoples of Thessaly – represented by Herakles – were stymied by Apollo. Rather than link this myth to the First Sacred War, Sordi believed that the myth represented anxiety on the part of the Phocians of Central Greece who were attempting to repel Thessalian advances into their territory. Given that Pindar’s epinican about Thessaly argues that the ancestor of the Thessalians was Herakles, this is not an unreasonable conclusion: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 34–37.

65 HH.3, Ln.539-544: “…But should there by any rash word or deed./The arrogant violence customary among mortals./Then other men will become your masters./Forever subduing you under their force.” Homer, The Homeric Hymns, trans. Diane Rayor, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014).
complex regional political, social, and economic connections in which the shrine had grown up. It may be that the poem was written on behalf of the Amphictyony, who retroactively used this tradition to justify their “liberation” of Apollo’s sanctuary from regional power dynamics.66

If modern scholarship accepts the reality of some form of conflict around Delphi in the sixth century, it is necessary to examine the motivations of the actors: why did this group of polities that would form what is now known as the Delphic Amphictyony prosecute conflict at all?67 There are three major accounts of the causes of the First Sacred War. At their root all of these legends deal with the same basic issue: economic conflict between the institution of Delphi and those peoples living in the areas around the sanctuary.68

Strabo asserted that the war was instigated because the nearby Crisaeans ἐπὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀφικνουμένους καὶ παρὰ τὰ προστάγματα τῶν Ἀμφικτύων.69 Following a similar tradition, scholia from Pindar argued that the cause of the war was that the peoples around Delphi were “attacking and killing the men in the region of the gods.”70 It is certainly easy to believe that the local powers near the sanctuary were extorting those coming to the shrine; despite whatever sacredness or inviolability pilgrims possessed, those coming to

67 Thessaly has been suggested as the leader of the Amphictyony thanks to the consistent presence of its periōiotic dependencies on the lists. The assumption being that if Thessaly had control of at least a third of the voting members of the Amphictyony, then it would also have de facto control of the institution. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos*, 164.
68 There has been debate as to the particular name of the peoples, if they were the “Crisaeans” of the “Cragalidai” as per Aeschines 3.107. As well, the name of the particular city the Amphictyons went to war with is unclear. Strabo 9.3.4 suggested it was both “Cirrha and Crissa.” Polyaenus 6.13 suggested Cirrha, as did Pausanias. Frontinus *Strat.* 3.7.6. used Crisa. Based on the total lack of Archaic and Classical archaeological remains that would correspond to a city or particular non-Delphic people in the area, I would argue they were proto-Phocians, and let the specifics lie.
69 The Crisaeans “imposed harsh taxes on those who came to visit [Delphi], even contrary to the decrees of the Amphictyons.” Strab. 9.3.4.
Delphi must have been tempting targets. If pilgrims came to Delphi overland, they were likely following a well-known path through mountain passes and deep ravines.\(^7\) The roads to Delphi were steep and difficult to traverse any individuals or groups with less than beneficent intentions would be able to easily track a party of pilgrims.\(^7\) Even chance meetings on the road could turn violent quickly: Sophocles recorded that Oedipus killed his father on the road from Delphi, in part because the narrow road could not accommodate more than one traveler at a time.\(^7\) Plutarch described an episode in which a group of pilgrims travelling to Delphi from the Peloponnese were attacked by a group of Megarians. The Peloponnesians were made vulnerable because of their exposed position and weighed down because of their baggage and wagons, enabling the Megarians to assault and ransack the pilgrims’ camp.\(^7\)

In addition to the inherent vulnerability of travelers moving through rough country, baggage would have been an issue for pilgrims and an opportunity to those who might prey upon them. Supplicants needed to take supplies for their journey. While during peak season markets were set up for travelers to Delphi, it would be foolish to forgo having multiple days’ worth of supplies. Large groups of supplicants would be unwieldy despite any advantage of numbers, and from Plutarch’s account of the Peloponnesian pilgrims it seems unlikely that many groups were armed. Cargo in the form of offerings for Pythian Apollo would have been a burden and driving numbers of sacrificial animals would have slowed down travel. If an animal were to fall ill or become injured, it would necessitate a slower rate of travel to care for the creature. Losing an animal on the road would be a tremendous setback, requiring pilgrims to obtain a new beast from

\(^7\) Dillon, *Pilgrims and Pilgrimage in Ancient Greece*, 35.
\(^7\) Paus. 10.5.5. Dillon, 37.
\(^7\) Soph. *OT* 800-814.
\(^7\) Plut. *Mor*. 304e-f.
a roadside market or at the shrine itself, once again delaying travel and offering greater opportunities for predation. If one’s sacrificial offerings were not mobile, but instead were precious metals or statuary then that would make the journey even more difficult.\textsuperscript{75} Delphi is roughly 2,000 feet above sea level, even in a period in which the roads were good, hauling heavy cargo to the shrine of Apollo would have been a slow and arduous process, and have made for easy pickings by those wishing to prey upon groups of pilgrims.

Travelling to Delphi by ship may have circumvented many of these issues and seems to have been a relatively regular occurrence.\textsuperscript{76} Detailing the mythological creation of the shrine, the Homeric Hymn to Apollo quite clearly links Delphi to the sea: the first priests brought to Delphi by Apollo are Cretans, whose ship is waylaid by the sun god. These mythological first priests of Pythian Apollo set up their altar on the beach where they landed, at the foot of the plain of Crisa.\textsuperscript{77} However, if pilgrims came on ships to the anchorage at Crisa, they still risked both bad weather and the threat of piracy. Thucydides believed that many Mediterranean groups practiced piracy virtually from the inception of nautical travel, and that even in the late fifth century it was practiced by a number of Greek states.\textsuperscript{78} This is perhaps why In the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo, the disguised Sun God asked a group of Cretans who have arrived on the beach at Crisa if they were pirates.\textsuperscript{79} It stands to reason that this was in some way based on a very real fear that travel by sea, even for a religious pilgrimage, made one potential prey for buccaneers. For Greek polities that relied on the sanctuary at Delphi as a social or religious institution, having both land

\textsuperscript{75} Plutarch, \textit{De E apud Delphos} contains an excellent list of examples of offerings at Delphi, though it seems likely that Archaic offerings were humbler in nature than those of later eras.
\textsuperscript{76} Dillon, \textit{Pilgrims and Pilgrimage in Ancient Greece}, 29.
\textsuperscript{77} HH 3.490.
\textsuperscript{78} Thuc. 1.5.1-3.
\textsuperscript{79} HH 3.453-55.
and sea routes to the sanctuary threatened would almost certainly have been a serious issue.

Thus, it is plausible that some local groups were preying on those who were coming to supplicate themselves before Pythian Apollo, as Strabo and the scholia to Pindar suggest. Whether this was disorganized banditry, or some form of “official” policy is unclear, given our lack of knowledge of the political organization of central Greece and the area which would later comprise Phocis in the Archaic Period. The tradition that local groups were preying on or inhibiting travel to Delphi seems reasonable, but it is not the only tradition as to the cause of the First Sacred War. 80

Pausanias and Strabo followed a tradition that the Amphictyony objected to the appropriation of Delphi’s sacred land by the Crisaeans. 81 The sanctification of the Plain of Crisa would have displaced indigenous peoples living around Delphi and denied them access to productive agricultural land. The consecration of land points to an important part of the local economy that used the plain as its lynchpin: the sale of sacrificial animals to the pilgrims coming to Delphi. It should be noted that there is no specific hard evidence for the sale of sacrificial animals at Delphi, but it seems logical that the market at Delphi for sacrificial animals existed prior to the First Sacred War. 82 The desire to influence this trade was at least partially what drew the Amphictyony to come into conflict with the powers around Delphi.

The sacrifice of an animal was necessary to consult the oracle of Apollo, but this was not necessarily the only situation in which animals were sacrificed, especially at Delphi. 83

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81 Paus. 10.37.5. Strab. 9.3.4
82 Jameson (1988) and McInerney (2010) deal extensively with markets at sacred locations, though primarily those that dealt with the flesh of an animal after sacrifice.
takings were instances in which animals might be offered to the gods.\textsuperscript{84} To request that Apollo give the Greeks reprieve from the plague, Achilles suggested that the Achaean army offer goats and lambs to propitiate the god.\textsuperscript{85} Trygaeus in Aristophanes’ \textit{Peace} sacrificed a lamb for his wedding.\textsuperscript{86} Jason of Pherae intended to drive a herd of one thousand cattle and ten thousand other animals for the Pythian Games, and it is unlikely that he intended to allow thousands of his countrymen and allies to consult the Pythia; instead his efforts should be seen as an attempt to garner social capital through a demonstration of wealth.\textsuperscript{87} While this is by no means exhaustive, it is hopefully illustrative that the sacrificial needs of Delphi went far beyond the scope of consulting with Apollo’s priestess. Certainly, not all who went to supplicate themselves at Delphi would have sacrificed an animal, but it seems difficult to believe that those who invested the time and resources to travel to the sanctuary would skimp on their offering.

As discussed above, travel to Delphi was not easy. The sanctuary is high in the mountains, and the route to it is a difficult one. If a pilgrim was to bring an animal from their home, this would assume that the pilgrim raised or purchased the beast at the beginning of their trek. Our individual or individuals would be required to maintain the animal at least during the journey, feeding and driving it. Those animals which could not be herded, such as fowl, would need to simply be carried, a less than appealing option given the steep trek to Delphi. Certainly, while most people in ancient Greece had familiarity with animals but it is unlikely that a significant proportion of the population were professional herders. Urban dwellers of more limited property or monetary means would likely have difficulty raising animals much larger

\textsuperscript{85} Hom. \textit{Il.} 1.66-67.
\textsuperscript{86} Arist. \textit{Peace}, ln. 937-938.
\textsuperscript{87} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.29.
than fowl, and larger animals like swine or cattle required significant amounts of space and resources. Those who lived in rural districts might have had the ability to raise larger animals on their farms, but the ideal sacrifice was an animal raised from birth to be offered, and which had not participated in agricultural labor. To raise and maintain an animal which could not be worked – or could not labor to its full capacity – would be prohibitive for many Greeks in urban or rural environments. For groups of pilgrims that intended to sacrifice multiple animals, driving them would slow down their travel, making them easy prey for bandits and raiders. For those that arrived via sea, it is hard to imagine that they would bring animals with them on any sort of extended voyage. During major events such as the Pythian Games certainly a great deal of traffic came by sea; of Pindar’s twelve Pythian odes, nine of the winners have travelled from overseas. The idea that a significant amounts of livestock was ferried across the Mediterranean is difficult to accept.

Instead, another option presents itself which would explain the importance of the Plain of Crisa in the in the conflict between Delphi, the local powers, and the Amphictyony. For those travelling to Delphi, it would have been significantly easier to simply purchase an animal upon arrival. This would not only enable pilgrims to move more quickly on their journey and allow

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89 McInerney points to two men, Phormio and Herakleidas, who sacrificed a hecatomb at Delphi. Coming from the Pontic Chersonese, it seems unlikely that they drove the cattle overland from their home. McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 151. Even the great Athenian war fleet of 415 BC was only able to field one horse-transport vessel with thirty berths: Thuc. 6.43.

90 Pind. P. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12 all feature individuals who must have arrived at Delphi by ship. For Aristomenes of Aegina, the subject of ode 8 the journey by ship to the mainland may have been quite short.

91 To my knowledge Dr. Timothy Howe was the first to propose that livestock markets operated for the benefit of pilgrims at Delphi. Howe, “Pastoralism, the Delphic Amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: The Creation of Apollo’s Sacred Pastures.”
them to circumvent the need to maintain an animal for sacrifice but would also remove the
necessity of the specialized knowledge required to breed and maintain livestock, especially
prohibitively resource and space intensive animals such as cattle. We are aware that other
“destination” shrines, such as those on Delos, had an elaborate system of leases for those that
raised sacred sacrificial animals. In a symbiotic relationship, lessees of land around Delos raised
animals for sacrifice under the oversight of the priests of Apollo. On the mainland, villages
outside of Athens set up markets for the state to purchase animals for public sacrifice. In
Phocis, the temple of Artemis at Hyampolis owned land and leased it out. Given the increasing
importance of Delphi in the late Archaic Period, it seems reasonable to assume that there was
similarly a growing market for sacrificial livestock to be sold to pilgrims when they arrived at the
mountain sanctuary. Thessaly and the Amphictyony, as the “liberators” of Delphi, would be in
an economic position to control these markets, and potentially to drive their own animals for sale
at the sanctuary. Especially during high-traffic periods, such as the Pythian games, the need for
sacrificial animals must have been extraordinary, and the potential profits immense.

Moreover, by sanctifying the Plain of Crisa, the Amphictyons deprived local groups
around Delphi of a vital agricultural area, ensuring that these power blocs would be pushed away
from the sanctuary to exploit new arable land. Like the formation of the Pylaean Amphictyony
and participation in the Lelantine War, the First Sacred War gave the Thessalians an opportunity
to extend their reach south with religious backing. Delphi was at the nexus of economic, social,
and religious interest in the region. Once the Amphictyony was able to establish influence in

92 McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient Greeks, 156–58.
93 Howe, “Pastoralism, the Delphic Amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: The Creation of Apollo’s Sacred
Pastures,” 145; Vincent Rosivach, The System of Public Sacrifice in Fourth-Century Athens (Atlanta: Scholars
Press, 1994), 84.
94 McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 103.
Delphi, it seems reasonable that the Thessalian elite would attempt connect their spheres of influence on the Malian Gulf and the Corinthian Gulf through the conquest of Phocis, which would ensure all north-south traffic in the Greek peninsula would pass through Thessalian controlled territory.

III. The Carrying Capacity of the Crisaean Plain

Thessaly’s hegemonic expansion into central Greece was concurrent with its control of the Amphictyony during the Archaic period. After the failure of Thessaly’s hegemonic project at the end of the Archaic period Thessalian participation in the Amphictyony served as a point of “national” pride as it recalled a lost “golden age” of Thessalian power. Reinforcing Amphictyonic vigor and Thessalian dominance of that institution became an avenue through which the Thessalian elite could justify and legitimize their rule. That pan-Thessalian governmental legitimacy contingent on the relationship between Thessaly and Delphi suggests that there was a collective opinion among a greater portion of the Thessalian population that there was a material as well as psychological benefit in being part of the institution.

What were the material benefits shared by the larger Thessalian populace? The vast majority of Thessalians would visit Delphi irregularly at best, and the right of promanteia – priority consultation of the Oracle – would have been applicable to only those who went as supplicants and ambassadors to Delphi, those hearing word second-hand would likely be negligibly affected. Sacred Wars organized through the Amphictyony and the opportunity for booty as part of a successful military campaign were limited; only four such conflicts occurred
within recorded history by the mid-fourth century. Fundraising for sanctuary construction and
maintenance may have offered the opportunity for graft, but this likely would largely have
affected officials, not the Thessalian population on a large scale. Instead, the provisioning of
sacrificial animals for priests and supplicants at the sanctuary at Delphi could have been the
incentive for initial Archaic-era Thessalian participation in the Amphictyony, as well as
motivation for fifth and fourth century Thessalian governments to reassert Amphictyonic power.

The Homeric Hymn to Apollo is one of the earliest literary accounts that discusses the
sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. The author repeatedly emphasized the importance of the sacred
precinct and the land around the oracle of Apollo.95 Even in this early period it appears that the
sacred land of Apollo was demarcated, and permanent agricultural cultivation was prohibited.96
The importance of maintaining the integrity of the land dedicated to Apollo was consistent across
centuries. Preserved oaths of the Amphictyonic officials required that the hieromnemens ensure
that there was no cultivation of the sacred land.97

If agricultural cultivation was prohibited on the Crisaeian Plain, what was the purpose of
this land? Scholars such as Howe and McInerney have suggested the Crisaeian Plain was
designated for animal husbandry, both for raising and maintaining sacrificial animals animals.98
A comparable situation was found at Delos, where lessees of land around the sanctuary raised
animals for sacrifice under the oversight of the priests of Apollo.99 The Hiera Syngraphe
inscription, dated to approximately 300 details the operation of the sanctuary and temple at Delos.100 The inscription concerns private actors who used the temple land around Delos, leasing from the Delian boule the right to raise livestock year-round.101 Private lessees were required to replace any cattle they sold which were owned by the temple.102 The inscription does not make clear to whom the lessee ranchers would sell animals. However, given that the animals were specifically identified as being “branded” as property of the temple, and the small size and limited population of the island, it seems likely that a significant portion of the buyers of these animals were visitors to the sanctuary. McInerney has argued that this was a mechanism through which the sanctuary could ensure a steady supply of sacrificial animals.103 While it is one of the most well attested Delos was not the only sanctuary with an associated animal market, animals could be bought for sacrifice at Athens, Eretria, and Phocis.104

As discussed above, maintaining a steady supply of animals at a sanctuary for purchase by suppliants seems reasonable; for those travelling to Delphi, it would have been significantly easier to simply purchase an animal upon arrival.105 This would have enabled pilgrims to move more quickly on their journey and allow them to circumvent the need to maintain an animal for sacrifice. In addition, it would remove the necessity for the specialized knowledge required to

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100 IDelos 503.
102 IDelos 503, Ins. 25-27. Kent, 278.
105 To my knowledge Dr. Timothy Howe was the first to propose that livestock markets operated for the benefit of pilgrims at Delphi. Howe, “Pastoralism, the Delphic Amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: The Creation of Apollo’s Sacred Pastures.”
breed and maintain livestock, especially prohibitively resource- and space-intensive animals such as cattle. Given the increasing importance of Delphi in the late Archaic Period, it seems reasonable to accept that there was a growing and profitable market for sacrificial livestock to be sold to pilgrims when they arrived at the sanctuary.106

Moreover, given that the sacred land around Delphi was dedicated to Apollo and therefore prohibited from agricultural cultivation, this area would be an ideal location for raising and maintaining a supply of sacrificial animals, ready to be purchased by pilgrims who had made the trip into the mountains.107 To this end, our overriding question must be: how many animals could the Plain of Crisa theoretically support, and would this alone be enough to support the needs of Delphi’s priests and pilgrims?108

There is a distinct lack of information on the specific animals that may have occupied the plain, or the human population that may have been required to maintain them. It has been suggested that the Delphic Oracle preferred goats as sacrificial victims, but there is no attestation that this preference extended to all religious activity at the sanctuary.109 Instead, there are indications that suggest that the priests of Delphi were open to a wide variety of sacrificial animals, including cattle, horses, sheep, and swine.110 The type and number of animals required

108 HH3, L. 536. For The Hymn and the First Sacred War, see Forrest, “The First Sacred War,” 34; Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond the Polis, 125; Robertson, “The Myth of the First Sacred War,” 50.
109 Dillon, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage in Ancient Greece, 82.
for oblation at Delphi are one portion of the calculus in evaluating a possible sacrificial animal trade, the geography of the sacred land is key. While there is no hard evidence as to what areas constituted the sacred area in the Archaic and Classical periods, two scholars who have offered estimates of the size of the sacred area. McInerney estimated that Apollo’s sacred pasture encompassed some thirteen square kilometers, or roughly 3,212 acres. This estimation included only the Plain of Crisa which was the pastureland below Delphi which led to the sea. The other estimate was made by Rousset, who believed that the area dedicated to Apollo included the Kirphis massif, the promontory south of Delphi which seems to be devoid of archaeological remnants, suggesting that the area was largely unoccupied. This area would encompass some thirty-seven thousand acres, roughly twelve times larger than the Plain of Crisa alone. Maps of both of these areas can be found in Appendix A.

This reconstruction will focus on cattle as these were the most visible, prized, and culturally important sacrificial animals to the Greeks, dating at least as far as the Archaic period. Moreover, these are the animals about whose habits we possess the most supported non-sacrificial horses, possibly for use as racehorses in the Pythian Games: It may be that these horses were also sacrificed, but there is no extant evidence to suggest one way or another. McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient Greeks, 152.

It is not the purpose of this work to judge the accuracy of these estimations, however I am inclined to preference McInerney’s estimation in terms of discussing the Archaic and Classical periods. I suspect that the sacred area was expanded after the Third Sacred War when the Delphic Amphictyony took on greater importance under Philip II, but this is purely conjecture.

McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient Greeks, 150. McInerney claims that his estimate “includes all land between sea level and 80 meters above sea level, bounded by Chrysso (NE), Sernikaki (NW), the slopes of Mount Ghiona (W), Xerovouni (E), and the Gulf of Corinth (S).”

Denis Rousset, Le Territoire de Delphes et La Terre D’Apollon (Paris: De Boccard édition-diffusion, 2002), 172. For his estimation, Rousset points to a line in the Pseudepigraphic speech attributed to Hippocrates “The Embassy.” Given the state of extant evidence it is certainly possible that the area around Delphi sacred to Apollo encompassed the Kirphis Massif, the writing follows the same tradition that the prologue of Pindaric scholia, which was written significantly after the Classical period. Hippocrates, Pseudopeiographic Writings, 2:111; Drachmann, Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina.

Hom. Il. 6.236 in particular showed the importance placed on animal wealth. Homeric heroes understand the value of armor, which possessed tremendous utility and displayed social status in terms of the amount of cattle the suit might be worth.
information. The oldest known type of Greek cattle is derived from the “Grey Steppe” strain and is known locally as Sphakia. Rouse has identified two different subcategories, “large” and “small.” Mature cows from the large stock average 600 pound in weight, and the small type averages 400 pounds. McInerney, taking his data from an unpublished paper by Dr. Georgios Arsenos of the Aristotle University in Thessaloniki, has suggested that these native cattle weighed between 550 and 660 pounds at maturity, roughly in line with Rouse’s findings. Arsenos also describes another native breed, the Shorthorn, which is slightly smaller, averaging 440 pounds for a cow and 660 for a bull.

Extant sources suggest that Crisaean plain was not available for traditional agriculture. However, in order to maximize the number of animals that could be supported it seems reasonable to suspect that there was some sort of “mixed” agricultural and pastoral farming on the sacred plain. Rangeland was periodically seeded with cereal crops, harvested, and then reseeded as pasturage, which Kron asserted increased the overall productivity of the land two to five times. If breeders and herdsmen wished to maximize their pasturage, it seems logical that some sort of agriculture – though perhaps not widespread – was practiced on the plain which even today supports a thriving olive-growing industry.

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115 See especially Aris. HA 596a.
117 McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient Greeks, 48.
120 McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient Greeks, 151. McInerney argues that “Pausanias found [the plain] bare…because the ban on cultivation was still in force.” Pausanias himself records that the plain was barren “because [the Delfians] know that the ground is useless for growing trees” (Paus. 10.37.5). I find this explanation difficult to accept, as well as Aeschines’ description of a total prohibition on farming the area. I would be more inclined to believe that the prohibition is against unlawful or unsanctioned farming of the plain. The population that lived on the plain managing the animals would have needed food beyond animal products, as
Beyond simple dimensions, the agricultural production capability of the land itself is a key component in any calculation regarding carrying capacity. If in fact the plain was farmed in some fashion – primarily to create fodder for its livestock – then an estimate must be made of the potential yield of the land itself.\footnote{I suspect is that the animals raised and quartered on the sacred plain relied entirely on “wild” plant material, however in a heuristic attempt to get as much data for calculations, I will be using farming information.} Some of the earliest reliable information available for the region is a British Foreign Service Report on the wheat yield of Thessaly from the years 1902 – 1910.\footnote{I have chosen Thessaly as a comparison largely because the Crisaean Plain and Thessaly are suspected to have had better than average irrigation, given the prevalence of rivers nearby. Thessaly: Howe, Pastoral Politics: Animals, Agriculture and Society in Ancient Greece, 69. Halstead, “Strategies for Survival: An Ecological Approach to Social and Economic Change in the Early Farming Communities of Thessaly, N. Greece,” 42; Paul Halstead, “Counting Sheep in Neolithic and Bronze Age Greece,” in Patterns of the Past: Studies in Honour of David Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 325; Semple, “The Influence of Geographic Conditions upon Ancient Mediterranean Stock-Raising,” 23. Crisaean Plain: McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 63.} This reconstruction uses a seed: yield ratio of 1:3.9 for my calculations, which is the lowest of the eight years surveyed in an attempt to compensate for more efficient modern agricultural practices unavailable in the ancient world.\footnote{This is greater but roughly in-line with Sallares' calculations regarding sowing rate in Italy, which he bases upon the works of Columella: Robert Sallares, The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 374.} The data for pre-war Thessaly suggest that the sowing rate was 150kg per hectare.\footnote{Osborne has suggested that in the Classical period in Greece a hectare (2.47 acres) could provide a yield of “1000 to 1500 kg.” with a seed: yield ratio of 1:10. This is significantly higher than the highest yield (1:7.1) in Garnsey’s data, from a harvest which took place in the year 1902. Despite Osborne’s general usefulness, this particular statistic seems farfetched: Osborne, Classical Landscape with Figures, 45.} Given the seed-to-yield ratio, the net yield would be 490 lbs. of plant material per acre.\footnote{Gar- nsey, Gallant, and Rathbone, “Thessaly and the Grain Supply of Rome During the 2nd Century B.C.,” 41. I have similarly chosen the lowest ratio in an attempt to account for the potential addition of the mechanical harvester in these statistics, which began appearing in the US in the 1830s.}

The third component in calculating carrying capacity is the consumption rate of the cattle. The National Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), an office of the United States Department
of Agriculture, has placed the consumption rate of cattle at 4% of their total bodyweight.\(^{126}\)

However, other reports have suggested cattle will consume closer to between 15 – 17% of their total body weight.\(^{127}\) Given that ancient agriculture was significantly less effective than more modern practices, the cattle on the Crisaean Plain most likely would need to be herded greater distances for fresh or usable forage, necessitating greater fodder consumption than cattle who are more stationary. As such, the latter estimation of 15-17% should be preferred for building an estimate. However, since the available data and knowledge of animal husbandry in the ancient world are scarce, this chapter will offer a range of calculations.

It is possible to calculate a very rough estimate of how many head of cattle the area set aside for Apollo might support.\(^{128}\) In order to do so, a formula developed by the National Resources Conservation Service, a department of the United States Department of Agriculture for guidelines on stocking rates will be used (Figure 1):\(^{129}\)

![Figure 1: Formula for estimating carrying capacity of an area](image)

\[
\frac{\text{Total Number of Animals Supported}}{\text{(Total Acreage) x (Average Yield per Acre)}} = \frac{\text{(Fodder Consumption by Bodyweight Percentage) x (Average Animal Weight) x (Yearly Grazing Days)}}{} \\
\]


\(^{128}\) While evidence from the Archaic and Classical periods is circumstantial, an inscription in the second century makes clear the function of the sacred land of Apollo around Delphi: Syll.³ 636.

\(^{129}\) See above n. 125.
To begin, using McInerney’s more conservative “small plain” estimate with a 15% fodder consumption by bodyweight, 47 head of cattle could be supported year-round on the Plain of Crisa (Figure 2):

Figure 2: McInerney’s Small Plain with 15% fodder consumption

47 total animals supported

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.212 acres)} \times (490 \text{ lbs. forage}) \\
&\text{(15% consumption by bodyweight)} \times (605 \text{ lbs average animal weight}) \times (365 \text{ grazing days})
\end{align*}
\]

Utilizing the 4% fodder consumption by bodyweight, the Plain of Crisa would have been able to support a significantly larger animal population, some 178 animals (Figure 3).

Figure 3: McInerney’s Small Plain with 4% fodder consumption

178 total animals supported

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.212 acres)} \times (490 \text{ lbs. forage}) \\
&\text{(4% consumption by bodyweight)} \times (605 \text{ lbs average animal weight}) \times (365 \text{ grazing days})
\end{align*}
\]

If the 4% fodder utilization by bodyweight is accurate, then the sacred land of Apollo could have supported a more sizable number of animals. Moreover, given the greater metabolic needs of herded cattle, a 4% fodder consumption by bodyweight is unlikely to be accurate.
Employing Rousset’s estimation of the sacred area of Apollo, which included both the Plain of Crisa and the Kirphis Massif, using the 15% fodder consumption by bodyweight figure, the number of cattle which could be reliably supported in this areas is much greater.

Figure 4: Rousset’s Large Plain with 15% fodder consumption

![548 total animals supported](37.065 acres) X (490 lbs. forage)

(15% consumption by bodyweight) X (605 lbs average animal weight) X (365 grazing days)

Over five hundred head of cattle would have been a sizeable herd in the ancient world. However, maintaining a herd of this size would have added tremendous logistical complication and required individuals with highly specialized knowledge. Herds of 300 animals can require almost an entire day to water effectively, leaving little time for moving through different pasturages to prevent overgrazing.130

Figure 5: Rousset’s Large Plain with 4% fodder consumption

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With Rousset’s dimensions, as well as the minimal fodder consumption, the sanctuary at Delphi could potentially have thousands of cattle or other animals on hand for use in sacrifice and transport needs. However, as discussed above, the likelihood that the cattle in ancient Greece consumed only 4% of their bodyweight in fodder daily is negligible. Moreover, there are additional factors that cannot be accommodated by the NCRS equation or through ancient evidence, but which would have further limited the number of cattle which the area around Delphi would have supported.

To begin, the equations about carrying capacity assume a completely flat area, all of which would be accessible to grazing animals. However, grazing efficiency is inversely proportional to the gradient of the land on which an animal feeds. Geographical data has been compiled on the area which included McInerney’s “small” estimation which included on the Plain of Crisa, and Rousset’s “large” area which included both the Plain of Crisa and the Kirphis Massif.

Figure 6: Breakdown of proposed sacred areas by slope percentage

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131 Patrick Reece, Jerry Volesky, and Walter Schacht, “EC08-158 Integrating Management Objectives and Grazing Strategies on Semi-Arid Rangeland” (Historical Materials from University of Nebraska-Lincoln Extension, 2008), 4.

132 As per the United States Geological Survey: “Percent of slope is determined by dividing the amount of elevation change by the amount of horizontal distance covered, and then multiplying the result by 100.”
As slopes of greater than 20% rarely exist in nature outside of cliff faces, data has been broken down into three categories: slopes of between 0-10%, which would provide somewhere between 100-90% grazing efficiency, slopes of 10-20% which offer 90-80% grazing efficiency, and slopes of greater than 20%, which offer 80% or less efficiency. While including the Kirphis Massif in the sacred precinct of Apollo would greatly increase the number of livestock which could be raised in that area, the terrain would have been a significant limiting factor. Figure 5 above accounts for the largest proposed number of animals which could be supported. However according to the data for the “large” area roughly a third of the area could only provide grazing land at 80% efficiency or less. Calculating based on an 80% grazing efficiency for 30% of the land area, this would immediately reduce the amount of land which could support animals by 6% overall. Factoring in the area of the Kirphis Massif which has a slope of between 10-20%, estimations of the number of animals which could be supported on the “large” sacred area would need to be reduced by a full 10%. This would reduce the number of animals which could be supported in the most generous estimate of figure 5 from 2,056 animals to 1,850.

Additionally, calculations must take into account the “culling rate” of a herd. In order for a pastured herd to be self-sustaining without introducing new animals, taking into account calf mortality, sickness, and complications associated with pregnancy, only 8% of the healthy cattle
from a herd can be removed without threatening the long-term reproductive opportunities of that group. For even the most generous calculation, Rousset’s “large plain” and a 4% consumption of fodder by bodyweight, taking into account the availability of grazing due to slope, this would limit the number of animals which could be culled from the herd to only 148 head per annum.

Finally, while it is not possible to obtain data on rainfall in the Archaic and Classical periods, it is increasingly difficult to raise animals the further the pasturage is from a water source. There is no archaeological data which points to rivers existing in the area. It seems reasonable to accept that smaller, mountain-fed streams or springs watered the area, but major rivers were not present, and would have presented a hinderance in watering a significant number of animals. The stocking rate for animals falls to roughly 50% between 1-2 miles from a water source, and it is logistically almost impossible to raise animals more than 2 miles from a water source on a consistent basis. While there is no data on ancient water sources, it seems most likely that no matter how lush the area of the Kirphis Massif and Plain of Crisa were, the availability of water to sustain livestock would have further limited the number of animals which could be sustained around Delphi.

All of these factors strongly suggest that the area around Delphi which was specifically demarcated for Apollo and the sacred sacrificial animals was insufficient for the needs of the sanctuary at Delphi. A herd on this land could not be self-sustaining. Given the difficulties in bringing an animal to Delphi, three options – which are not necessarily mutually exclusive – present themselves. First, only irregular and important ceremonies involved sacrificing the

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135 A second century inscription describes some of the sacrificial practices at Delphi, it seems that it was not irregular for a over a hundred animals to be sacrificed in a single ritual, though not all of these animals would be cattle: Syll.³ 604.
animals which were quartered on the Plain of Crisa. Second, animals were brought in from the surrounding area and then sacrificed after having been dedicated to the god.¹³⁶ Third, the sacred herds of Apollo were regularly restocked from sources beyond the local area.

The first option is certainly plausible, but if animals were only sacrificed irregularly at Delphi, then it stands to reason that these would be ceremonies in which many dozens or hundreds of animals were ritually destroyed. This would represent a significant strain on the animal population quartered on the sacred plain, even if they only represented a fraction of the overall animals sacrificed at a religious ceremony. Instead, the second and third options of animals being imported to Delphi and dedicated to Apollo for sacrifice seem more likely. There is possible evidence for local importation of animals: McInerny identified an inscription from the town of Panopeus near Delphi, which seems to suggest that the priests at Delphi accepted cattle from local communities for sacrifice.¹³⁷ However, if such importation existed then it is likely that the practice sat at the intersection of a number of different social, economic, and political forces. Groups or powers which offered animals to the priests would have benefitted economically; cattle and other large livestock are expensive to raise and maintain, there is every reason to assume that the owners of such animals were compensated, either in-kind or through some other method. Moreover, it seems very likely that if there were any sort of large-scale importation of animals, then such a group could claim a closer or more legitimate connection to the sanctuary of Apollo. It is not difficult to imagine that providing animals could act as a symbol of connection – and thus, one way to demonstrate de facto control – to the Apollonian oracle. As such, the right to supply sacred animals to Delphi would act as a signifier of the legitimacy of the group or

¹³⁶ One of the clearest examples of this process can be found in Syll.³ 407.
polity to oversee the sanctuary. There were struggles for control of Delphi in the fifth and fourth centuries, these involved both outside powers and Amphictyonic members; even if the First Sacred War was totally ahistorical, the idea that there could have been a struggle for control over the sanctuary at Delphi between local and regional powers was clearly a reasonable paradigm in the Classical period.

The traditions about the First Sacred War described above make this framework of political struggle clear. One tradition argues that the Crisaeans cultivated the sacred land – what would later be known as the plain of Crisa – around Delphi. It is difficult to ascertain the origin of this tradition but given its relatively late appearance – after the fourth century – it is likely influenced by the events of the Third Sacred War. The second tradition argues that the First Sacred War was prompted by the predations of the Crisaeans on visitors to Delphi.\textsuperscript{138} Scholia on Pindar followed this tradition, though it did not identify the group which was interfering with travel to the sanctuary of Apollo.\textsuperscript{139} It is not difficult to imagine that these complaints were in fact dim recollections of power struggles for control of the Delphic Oracle and associated sanctuary.

If insufficient sacrificial animals could be raised on the grounds of the Apollonian religious complex, it would follow that the Amphictyons would be in a position to make the determination as to which individuals or groups was able to import animals for sale to pilgrims. These same animals would be transported along roads and bridges that the Amphictyony was responsible for maintaining and monitoring. Pilgrims coming to Delphi would need lodging, food, and security, it seems possible that through their control of the trade and travel routes that

\textsuperscript{138} Strab. 9.3.4.  
\textsuperscript{139} Drachmann, \textit{Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina}, 2 Scholia in Pythionicas:3.
the Amphictyony would have the opportunity to make decisions as to which persons or groups could host pilgrims or provide services for them. It was this economic opportunity that motivated the Thessalians. Control of the Amphictyony and Delphi did not mean just enriching a few elite Larisaeans, but the wealth could potentially flow to the many people in Thessaly responsible for the labor-intensive tasks of raising animals and herding them from the Pineos River basin to the Crisaean Plain. The decline in the power of Thessaly and the inability of the Amphictyony to manifest itself in an economically meaningful way encouraged the Thessalians to look back on a time in which the Amphictyony provided the opportunity for a better life. Jason of Pherae capitalized on this nostalgia and following Jason’s example Philip II was able to use these visions of a “golden age” to unite the Thessalians under his control.
Chapter 3 – Tracing the Decline of Elite Consensus in Thessaly

The Lelantine War was the first recorded Thessalian entry onto the Greek political stage. Success in the conflict ensured not only strong economic ties between the island of Euboea and the port at Pagasae but also cast the Thessalian *ethnos* as a defender of the Delphic Oracle. Success in the conflict encouraged the Thessalians to push further South, “liberating” Delphi from local powers and ensuring that the Thessalians and their allies would have command over the shrine and the flow of supplicants to Apollo’s sanctuary. This southern conquest did not stop with the First Sacred War but continued as the Thessalians subjugated the Phocian cities in order to have greater control of the north-south trade routes that ran through the mountain valleys of Phocis. Many wars were fought between the Greeks in the Archaic period, but few states were able to extend dominion over their neighbors, and even fewer were able to establish a continued hegemonic presence in these regions. However, the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project seems to have shattered the consensus of the Thessalian elite. After the Thessalian rout at Hyampolis, the Aleuadae lost their ruling mandate, and almost immediately dissident factions of Thessalians appear in the historical record to challenge the established Thessalian leadership. By fits and starts the process continued throughout the fifth century until in 404 Lycophron of Pherae conquered Thessaly by force. Through the fourth century Thessaly was locked in a stalemate between the Thessalian Federation and the tyrants of Pherae. The elite of Thessaly would require Philip II of Macedon to reunite Thessaly politically.
I. The Lelantine War and the Beginnings of the Thessalian Hegemonic Project

Unlike many Greek communities in the Archaic period, there are no extant accounts of political strife in Archaic Thessaly. Instead, based on the success of the Thessalians in projecting power in Central Greece, it seems likely that the Thessalian polity maintained internal cohesion against outside forces until the fifth century. While a lack of evidence hampers modern scholarship’s ability to understand early Thessalian governance, the political and military organization of the Thessalian people seems to have produced an expansionary state, perhaps significantly more so than most of their central Greek neighbors. One of the first extra-Thessalian conflicts that the Thessalians participated in was the Lelantine War, which seems to have occurred in late eighth or early seventh centuries, though extant accounts are vague in their chronology. While it is not the goal of this work to argue that in fact this conflict was presented exactly as the details have come down to us, it seems reasonable to accept that the historical accounts all hold some germ of truth and are indicative of the Thessalian entry onto the wider Greek political stage.

Thucydides believed the Lelantine War was the closest historical precedent and parallel to the Peloponnesian War, a conflict which stretched across multiple years and involved many different polities. The war began over the Lelantine plain, shared and coveted by both Chalcis and Eretria on the island of Euboea. Both Eretria and Chalcis were major contributors to the

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1 Bradeen, “The Lelantine War and Pheidon of Argos,” 226. Sordi places the war between 590 and 582, but this seems far too recent given the apparent importance of the event and the minimal level of detail that survives: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 43. See also: S.D. Lambert, “A Thucydidean Scholium on the ‘Lelantine War,’” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102 (1982): 220.

2 Thuc. 1.15.3.
Archaic period colonization efforts of the Greeks, and as part of this process created trade networks and communications channels throughout the Greek communities of the Mediterranean. AR Burn has proposed that this was the genesis of the conflict between these two cities: competition over markets overseas eventually translated to armed conflict between the two cities at home. Alternatively, tensions between the two cities may also have been exacerbated by a drought affecting the Balkan peninsula in the eighth century; the vital agricultural and pasturage land of the Lelantine Plain situated between Chalcis and Eretria was watered by the Lelas river, and a reduction in the water available for irrigation could have threatened vital food supplies.

Details about the conduct of the war itself are similarly scant. Herodotus, when describing the Ionian Revolt gave the conflict a brief mention, asserting that in the war between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians, the Samians and Milesians were involved. This corroborates Thucydides’ account of the conflict as an “international” war in which polities from around the region fought. The most thorough – though chronologically seven centuries later – account of the conflict comes from Plutarch:

\[ \text{Ἢκεν ἑπίκουρος Χαλκιδεύσι τοῦ Θεσσαλικοῦ, πολέμου πρὸς Ἐρετριεῖς ἄκμαζοντος: καὶ τὸ μὲν πεξόν ἐδόκει τοῖς Χαλκιδεύσιν ἐρρώσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἵππεας μέγ᾽ ἔργον ἦν ὡσάσθαι τῶν} \]

3 Burn, “The So-Called ‘Trade-Leagues’ in Early Greek History and the Lelantine War,” 16. This explanation has been dismissed by Bradeen, who argued that the two powers were interested in fundamentally different areas with Chalcis and Corinth exploiting the West, and Eretria the central Cyclades: Bradeen, “The Lelantine War and Pheidon of Argos,” 235.


5 Hdt. 9.99.

6 Strabo, having seen epigraphic evidence on an inscribed pillar on the island from the time of the war, believed that the combatants agreed to not use missile weapons in prosecuting the conflict, though if this was accurate it is unclear why this may have been the case. Strab. 10.1.12.
Given Plutarch’s focus as a moralist rather than a historian, the romantic elements of Cleomachus and the part he played for Thessaly the Lelantine War may be disregarded. However, the mytho-historical tradition that Plutarch tapped into, in which Thessalians soldiers participated in the conflict between Eretria and Chalcis seems reasonable to accept. The island of Euboea controlled access to the city of Pagae in the Pagasetic Gulf, the only significant harbor in Thessaly. While much of Thessalian animal wealth would have been traded via overland routes, imported good from southern Greece would likely have come by sea to Thessaly. Eighth century Euboean pottery has been found in Thessaly, indicating economic contacts and accompanying social relationships between the two areas. Euboea would have been an island of tremendous strategic value to any powers wishing to control access to the Pagasetic Gulf, and as such it

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7 Plut. Mor. 760e-761a: “In the heat of the war between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians, Cleomachus [the Pharsalian] went with the Thessalian force to aid the Chalcidians; at what time it was evident that the Chalcidians were the stronger in foot, but they found it a difficult thing to withstand the force of the enemies' horse. Thereupon they requested Cleomachus, being their confederate and a man signalized for his courage, to give the first onset upon the enemies' cavalry. Presently the youth whom he most entirely loved being present, he asked him whether he would stay and be a spectator of the combat. To which when the lad gave his consent, and after many tender kisses and embraces had put on his helmet, Cleomachus's love redoubling his courage, being surrounded with some few of the flower of the Thessalian horse, he charged into the thickest of the enemy and put them to the rout.”

would have been key for the Thessalian elite to maintain friendly relationships with strong Euboean allies.

Given the above information, it seems reasonable to accept a number of suppositions based on more concrete Archaic-era Thessalian evidence. Firstly, if Cleomachus existed he was a member of the Thessalian elite, perhaps a member of the Scopadae or Creonadae given that Plutarch noted he was a Pharsalian, rather than one of the Aleuadai of Larisa. Secondly, because of the lack of extant contemporary sources on the structure of the Thessalian government in the Archaic period, it is unknown whether this was some sort of a “state” action or a private venture, though likely there was no functional difference between public and private activity on the part of the Thessalian leadership. However, modern scholarship still must resolve a key issue: why would the Thessalians be involved in such a conflict? Even if the Thessalians were allies of Chalcis, what would the cavalrymen of Thessaly have to gain from leaving the plains of their homeland? Economic gain was likely the driving force behind Thessalian participation in the conflict on Euboea, and given subsequent Thessalian expansion into central Greece, it seems likely that the Lelantine War was the first sign of Thessalian power extending South, ultimately allowing the Thessalians to extend their hegemonic influence over central Greece.

The chronology of the Lelantine War is helpful in placing the conflict not simply as one of the first “large-scale” conflicts in Greece, but one of the first steps in Thessalian hegemonic expansion. The earliest date for the beginning of the Lelantine War must be 725, based upon modern understanding of the colonization projects of Eretria and Chalcis, who seem to have worked in conjunction with one another on colonial projects. One sign of early cooperation

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9 This activity would thus resemble the assistance Meno I rendered towards the Athenians at Eion, see above.  
10 Forrest, “The First Sacred War,” 42.
between the poleis was the colony of Mende, founded by Eretria.\textsuperscript{11} Late Mycenaean and early Geometric-period pottery has been found at this site which is quite similar to material found at Lefkandi on Euboea, suggesting a peaceful trading relationship between the Euboean metropolises and their colonies through the beginning of the eighth century.\textsuperscript{12} Given that Mende survived the conflict despite being situated in a largely Chalcidian area, it seems likely that the colony was firmly rooted prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Eretria and Chalcis.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, the colony of Pithekoussai was founded as a joint Euboean colonial venture between 750 – 725, indicating that the \textit{terminus post quem} must have come after the foundation of this colony.\textsuperscript{14} While modern scholarship cannot be certain, it seems most likely that this collaborative project would have been initiated prior to hostilities, rather than afterwards. Other scholars have suggested a more recent date, sometime in the first half of the seventh century. Donlan, relying in large part on Strabo’s account of the conflict, argued that the supposed prohibition on missile weapons during the Lelantine War dated the conflict between 700-650, which he believed correlated with the adoption of hoplite tactics in Greece.\textsuperscript{15} Bradeen argued for a \textit{terminus post quem} for the conflict of 720, after the establishment of Rhegium in Calabria, the last Chalcidian colony west of Greece.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, relying on a fragment of Archilochus which Bradeen believed references the Lelantine War, Bradeen argued that the war must have ended prior to 660, when Archilochus is thought to have died.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{11} Thuc. 4.123.1.
\textsuperscript{12} Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen, \textit{An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 831–32.
\textsuperscript{13} Burn, “The So-Called ‘Trade-Leagues’ in Early Greek History and the Lelantine War,” 16.
\textsuperscript{16} Bradeen, “The Lelantine War and Pheidon of Argos,” 226.
\textsuperscript{17} Bradeen, 228.
It must be admitted that fixing any range of dates for the Lelantine War is at best an uncertain proposition. However, in order for modern scholarship to accept as historical Thessalian participation in the conflict, placing the Lelantine War in the seventh century rather than the eighth is more likely, because of the Apollonian sanctuary at Delphi and its relationship with the Thessalian *ethnos*. The Apollonian oracle at Delphi was a key part of the colonization process in the Archaic period. In order to ensure the success of its colonial venture to Rhegium in 725, the people of Chalcis consulted with the Pythian Oracle at Delphi, and only undertook the venture after it was blessed by Apollo. While the details of the foundation of Sicilian Naxos have been lost, the central location of the Archaic-era temple of Apollo Archegetes “the founder” in the city strongly suggests a relationship between the Delphic Oracle and the foundation of the polis.

During a period in which international institutions seem to have been rare, the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi was one of the most important and widely acknowledged powerbrokers in central Greece. Control of the sanctuary at Delphi offered tremendous social, political, and religious opportunities for a power which could exercise its influence over the sanctuary of Apollo. The Lelantine War was the first step in an expansionary and hegemonic Thessaly. Moreover, this conflict was the first step in a southward extension of Thessalian influence; the second phase – discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2 – involved the First Sacred War, the mytho-historical conflict which saw the creation of the Delphic Amphictyony and allowed the Thessalians and the other Amphictyonic *ethne* to make themselves “protectors” of the Oracle of

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19 Thuc. 6.3.
Apollo, governing one of the most important cultural institutions of the Greek world. The Thessalian hegemonic project however did not stop at Delphi, at some point in the sixth century the Thessalians brought Delphi under their control. This was a turning point in Thessalian history: it symbolized the apex of Thessalian expansion and power, and the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project in Phocis shattered the elite consensus in Thessaly.

II. The Conquest of Phocis and the Apex of Thessalian Expansion

Unfortunately, there is little extant evidence regarding the subjugation of Phocis and the chronology of events is unclear. Herodotus recorded that the Phocians built a wall at the pass at Thermopylae specifically to prevent Thessalian expansion not long after the arrival of the Thessalians in central Greece. Thucydides believed that the Thessalians arrived in the Pineos River basin sixty years after the fall of Troy; if Herodotus was following the same mytho-historical tradition then their understanding of the conflict between the two peoples was that it stretched far back into the past. The Phocians rebelled against Thessalian control sometime in the early fifth century; Herodotus recorded that the resulting conflict occurred a few years before the expedition of Xerxes in 481/0. Obviously there is a massive temporal gulf between these two events – if we are to accept the Trojan War as a historical event – and unless material evidence is uncovered which provides answers specific dating is impossible. Otherwise, it seems most plausible that the Phocian conquest happened in conjunction with the First Sacred War in

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20 Hdt. 7.176.4. Paus. 10.1.3.
21 Thuc. 1.12.3.
22 Hdt. 8.27.2.
the early sixth century, as Delphi was firmly in the territory the Phocians perceived to be theirs. There are no extant details of the Thessalian occupation, it produced an enmity which was particularly contentious and brutal. Plutarch recorded that the Thessalians had installed ἄρχοντας and τυράννους, “rulers” and “tyrants,” which suggests that their rule was permanent.²³ It is unclear whether these were native Phocian quislings or Thessalian administrators, but it is not difficult to imagine that their authority was reinforced with occupying Thessalian soldiers.

Why would the Thessalians be so interested in conquering their Phocian neighbors? The historical record is unclear, but it can be suspected that the desire was largely economic as well as political. As mentioned in chapter 2, the economic motivations for the “liberation” of Delphi during the First Sacred War likely involved the ability influence overland traffic around Delphi. This would have included offerings: a tremendous number of sacrificial animals were needed for obblatory purposes at Delphi and the sacred plain of Crisa was insufficient for these needs. The Amphictyony could have determined which groups or individuals were able to supply animals to the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.

The trade routes around Delphi were similarly important, as the port of Itea on the Crisaean Plain below Delphi provided an important anchorage for traffic on the Corinthian Gulf. Moving goods from the port to Delphi and back was simple enough, but to distribute them in the wider area would require access to the mountain passes in and around Mount Parnassus, solidly in Phocian territory. Thus, to ensure that trade and military access through central Greece was unhindered, the Thessalians conquered Phocis. In particular, two areas stand out:

1) The Caphissus river valley in central Phocis runs from Lake Copais in Boeotian territory and into Doris. While there is not a tremendous of extant information amount regarding the economy of the region it was clearly an important waterway: when the medizing Thessalians led Xerxes’ Persians on their invasion into Greece, they specifically directed the invasion through Doris and along the Cephisos river to do as much damage to Phocis as possible.24 The majority of Phocian life seems to have been along the “Great Isthmus Corridor” that was the main source of trade for central Greece.25

2) The other main corridor for trade and communication in central Greece was the “coastal road” that ran southeast from Thermopylae along the coasts of the Malian and Euboean Gulfs.26 The Thessalians were extending their influence southward along this path from an early period, if Herodotus’ account of the Phocian wall is accurate. Thessalian participation in the Pylaean Amphictyony, which controlled the key coastal routes near Thermopolyae suggests a longer-term project of southern expansion on the part of the Thessalians. The passage along the coast was key, not necessarily for overland travel as the coastal road could be treacherous, but to facilitate shipping up and down the Gulf of Euboea. The coast provided anchorages and inlets, and access to the mountain communities of Epicnemidian and Opuntian Locris.27 The conquest of Phocis would have ensured a consistently open and safe route for Thessalian trade goods and livestock into

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24 Hdt. 8.32
25 Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture, 143.
26 While technically the coast road is in the territory of Epicnemidian Locris, it has been argued that the Phocians controlled the area from the sixth century onward: McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 80; Papakonstantinou and Zachos, “The Dipotamos Valley and the ‘Phocian Corridor,’” 202. It seems surprising that the Thessalians would extend their power over the whole of Phocis but be unable to do so in Locris.
the southern portion of Greece. Additionally, control over these trade routes would have allowed the Thessalian elite to be the benefactors of whatever taxes or fees were placed on trade.

The conquest of an already occupied area is a time and resource intensive process and successful, long-term occupation can only be performed by a motivated, organized, and aggressive power. The physical geography of the Pineos River basin encouraged social unity, and Thessaly’s position on the major trade routes gave the Thessalians an outlet to expend its energy outward, rather than amongst its own citizens. The Thessalian citizenry, united by their own invasion mythology and needing to differentiate themselves from the unfree class of *penestae*, developed a sense of social unity and cohesion that allowed the polity to extend political and social power southward. Despite our limited information, a clear narrative of Thessalian expansion can be seen. The Lelantine War was the first step, involving the Thessalians in the power-politics of Greece, attaching themselves to the influence of the Delphi Oracle, and ensuring that trade from Euboea would be favorable to their interests. The liberation of Delphi by the Amphictyony during the First Sacred War offered the same intersection of religious, economic, and political motivations. Similarly, the conquest of Phocis was a clear next step in the program of southern expansion prosecuted by the Thessalians. However, the unity of the Thessalian aristocratic clans was shattered by the failure of the hegemonic project in Phocis and the decision to medize. Whatever the socio-political power structure that held the

\[28\] See chapter 1.
internal ambitions of the Thessalian elite in check no longer held sway in the Classical period, and the *ethnos* of Thessaly began to fall into disarray.

III. The Phocian Rebellion

In the early fifth century, the Phocians threw off the Thessalian yoke in what was understood by ancient historians to have been a particularly violent and bitter conflict. The earliest account of the conflict comes from Herodotus, who detailed the Thessalian attempts to suppress Phocian independence. Herodotus detailed two battles in which the Thessalians lost control of Phocis. The first, known as the “Battle of Chalk,” reportedly took place as a group of Phocians were besieged at a camp on Mount Parnassus. Unfortunately, there are no accounts which describe the sequence of events which led to siege, but according to Herodotus, the beleaguered Phocian soldiers covered themselves with chalk and attacked the Thessalian camp at night, in the hopes of frightening the Thessalian army. The Phocian gambit was remarkably successful, and the Thessalian army fled; Herodotus recorded that they suffered four thousand casualties in their flight. The other battle – though when chronologically it occurred is unknown – related to the Phocian destruction of a force of Thessalian cavalry. Predicting a Thessalian cavalry movement through a pass near the Phocian city of Hyampolis, the Phocian army buried amphorae throughout the pass, creating holes into which horses would step, break their legs, and

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29 Hdt. 8.27.
30 The historian argued that the Thessalian sentinels fled because they feared a supernatural response, though it seems more likely that a successful night attack was the cause of the Thessalian rout. In the better-attested Classical Period, successful night attacks were tremendously decisive stratagems: Roel Konijnendijk, *Classical Greek Tactics: A Cultural History*, vol. 409, Mnemosyne: Supplements (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 182.
31 Hdt. 8.28.
throw their riders. Herodotus does not detail a specific battle taking place, but it seems likely that the Phocians pursued any confusion in the Thessalian cavalry with an attack on the horsemen.

These two events are nested in Herodotus’ account of Thessalian actions during the Persian invasion of 480. While the historian was largely concerned with detailing the conflict between the Greeks and the Persians, it was this conflict and the Phocian rebellion which fundamentally altered the trajectory of Thessalian political and social orientation in the fifth century. While details about Thessalian expansion in the Archaic period are limited, there was a significant change in Thessalian society after the Phocian rebellion which manifested itself in two ways: a dissolution of social unity among the Thessalian elite, and a deep-seated need on the part of the Thessalians to recapture their “golden age” of hegemony over Phocis and central Greece. The Thessalian response to Xerxes and the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 are the first extant signs of the upheaval that the Phocian rebellion produced in Thessalian society, and signs that the dominance of the Aleuad clan was being challenged by other Thessalian elites.

IV. The Persian Wars and the First Signs of Thessalian Disunity

The Phocian Rebellion and the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project in central Greece damaged the reputation of the dominant Aleuad clan in Thessaly. In search of some way to reassert the legitimacy of their ruling mandate, the aristocrats from Larisa looked to the great power of the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Empire. The Aleuadai, led by Thorax and his brothers Eurypylus and Thrasydeius sent a messenger to Xerxes affirming Thessalian loyalty to
the Great King and offering to act as his agents. According to Herodotus it was the Aleuad emissaries along with the exiled Peisistratids who were instrumental in convincing the Persian King to invade Greece. It is unclear when the Thessalian population was made aware of the plans of the Aleuad, but prior to the Persian crossing of the Hellespont, a dissident group of Thessalians unhappy with the decisions of the Aleuad sent a request for aid to the pan-Hellenic council on the Isthmus of Corinth, which had been assembled to plan the resistance to the Persian invasion. This was the earliest chronological reference to any disunity amongst the Thessalian elite; however, challenges to Aleuad dominance in Thessaly would mount over the course of the fifth century. Thanks to the persuasion of the Thessalian emissaries a pan-Hellenic army was dispatched to the Vale of Tempe, a narrow river gorge to the northwest of Larisa, where it was hoped the Greeks could turn back the Persian armies. However, Macedonian King Alexander I informed the Greek commanders of a route which would allow the Persian army to bypass and flank the Greek army. As a result, Greek army withdrew and the Thessalians were forced to medize in defenseless anticipation of the Persian Great King.

The actions of the Aleuad clan are the first known manifestation of a largely hidden conflict in fifth century Thessaly. Eschewing military solutions, the aristocratic Aleuad family exploited personal connections and alliances with external powers in an attempt to gain and hold political control over the rest of Thessaly beyond Larisa. The Aleuad were not alone in this desire, the powerful Echecratidae and Daochid clan in Pharsalus struggled against the aristocrats

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32 Hdt. 7.6.2; 9.58.1. It is commonly accepted that the Aleuad were the rulers of the northern Thessalian town of Larisa. See: Aristotle, Politics, 5.1306a, Diodorus., 15.61. For modern discussions: H.D. Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. (London: Meuthuen & Co., Ltd., 1935); McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 174; Wade-Gery and Morrison, “Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias,” 57–78.
33 Hdt. 7.7
34 Hdt. 7.172.
35 Hdt. 7.173.3.
in Larisa for political supremacy of Thessaly by manipulating foreign administrations for their own ends.

It is unclear when diplomatic connections between the Persian Empire and the Thessalian elite began. According to Herodotus, when Xerxes received the Aleuad emissaries in the 480s, he claimed that the relationship between the Persian King and the Thessalians had been in effect for some time. It is possible that Herodotus’ account refers to connections established as early as early as 512 during the expedition of Megabazus, or during the conquest of Macedonia by Mardonius in 492. Coins in Larisa appear to have been struck on a Persian standard in the late sixth and early fifth century, possibly an indicator that the Aleuadæ were cultivating Persian connections prior to Herodotus’ narrative. It may be that this is coincidental as the evidence of the coins is not necessarily a sign of pro-Persian sympathies of the Aleuadæ. There were undoubtedly many Persian coins in the northern Aegean, if the Lariseans (and Thessalians in general) were intending to engage in long-distance trade, coins minted to Persian weight standards would have made trade with Ionia and the surrounding areas much simpler.

Alternately, Herodotus could have exaggerated the early conception of the Persian-Thessalian alliance as a way to underscore and explain the contacts between the Thessalian and

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37 Hdt. 7.130.2.
40 Robertson, “The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.”, 108. This explanation has been rejected by Kagan: Kagan, “The So-Called Persian Weight Coins of Larissa.”
Persian elite that was recorded in the literary history of the fifth and fourth centuries. It is also possible that Persian court protocol exaggerated the venerable nature of alliances either in order to pay deference to guests or to underscore the importance of maintaining a treaty with the Empire, though these options are not mutually exclusive.

Regardless of when the treaty was established, Herodotus made it quite clear that the Aleuadae were pursuing a policy which was not supported by the majority of the Thessalian population until the pan-Hellenic withdrawal from the Vale of Tempe left them with no choice but to submit. The existence of a dissention faction among the Thessalian elite, agitating against the Aleuadae strongly suggests that if the “sons of Aleuas,” lionized by Pindar at the end of the 6th century as the rulers of Thessaly, were by the 480s no longer seen by the Thessalian population as possessing a monopoly over any ruling mandate. If the Aleuadae were acting contrary to traditional power arrangements in speaking for all Thessalians, it seems reasonable that this would appear in Herodotus’ narrative. Furthermore, Thessalian advocacy for meeting the Persian army at the Vale of Tempe suggests that the Aleuadae were in fact in a position of leadership, and it was the dissenting Thessalians who were operating outside of their governmental structure.

The Pineos River begins in the Pindus Mountains on the border with Epirus, and spreads across the broad Thessalian plains, emptying into the Aegean. For travelers coming from the coast inland to Larisa, the Vale of Tempe offers one of the easiest passes into Thessaly.

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42 Pind. P. 10.
43 Compare with Thucydides’ narrative of Brasidas’ march across Thessaly, in which Thessalians made clear that they felt their countrymen were acting outside of their purview: Thuc. 4.78.3.
navigating between the Mount Olympus Massif and Mount Ossa. As such, the pass seems to have been a key strategic site for both ancient and modern armies, and it is not surprising that it would have been seen as a likely site from which to prevent a Persian incursion into southern Greece. The choice of the Vale of Tempe likely served another important purpose: the passage is roughly twenty miles from the site of ancient Larisa.

Ancient sources do not specific whether the dissident faction of Thessalians informed the allied Greek forces of the Aleuad plans. If the Thessalians soliciting southern Greek assistance were open about Aleuad intentions, this disclosure may have engendered fear of a trap orchestrated by duplicitous medizers. If the Aleuadae were sending messengers to the court of the Great King, then the position of the rulers of Larisa could not have been a secret unknown outside of Thessaly. At the same time, ancient writers do not record any action taken against Larisa or the Aleuadae prior to the Persian entrance into Thessaly. The lack of any operations against Larisa may have been the result of an unwillingness on the part of Classical Greek armies to assault cities. However, the proximity of the Greek position at the Vale of Tempe would have prevented the Aleuadae in Larisa from openly assisting the Persian entry into the Pineos River basin and taking action against any Thessalians who resisted Aleuad plans.

Ten thousand Greek soldiers were dispatched to the Vale of Tempe, with the hope that their limited number could hold the narrow pass against the much larger Persian army. This situation was an issue for the Aleuadae who had pledged themselves to Xerxes, as well as to Argead king Alexander I. Beyond his political affiliations, it seems unlikely that the King of Macedon would have wanted the enormous Persian host setting up camp on his southern border

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44 App. Syr. 3.16, Plb. 18.27, Liv. 32.15.9; In the modern period, the Vale of Tempe was one of the points at which ANZAC forces delayed the 1941 Nazi invasion of Greece: Craig Stockings, “The Battle of Pinios Gorge,” *Australian Army Journal* 8, no. 3 (2014): 141–68.
with Thessaly: the logistics of supplying Xerxes’ army from the Macedonian countryside would likely have wreaked tremendous havoc on Alexander’s domain.\textsuperscript{45} As such, it seems as though Alexander took actions to exploit Greek fears about the Aleuadae.

The allied Greek army arrived in the Vale of Tempe prepared to defend the pass against invasion, but after a few days they received a messenger from the Macedonian king Alexander I who advised them to depart, citing the size of the approaching Persian army. Taking the Macedonian king’s advice, the Greek force withdrew.\textsuperscript{46} Herodotus claimed that the allied Greeks abandoned their position not due to the size of the army, but because the leaders of the army learned of an alternate route through Perraibia, near the city of Gonnoi.\textsuperscript{47} Speusippus, writing in the fourth century, claimed that Alexander informed the Greek army of the plans of the Aleuadae and this is what caused the Greeks to withdraw.\textsuperscript{48} These are not mutually exclusive; Speusippus’ explanation likely played a major part of the Greek retreat, it is the “discovery” of an alternate passage that could be used to flank the Greek army that is suspect.

Not only were both the Aleuadae and Argeads Persian allies, but it seems implausible that they did not have strong diplomatic contacts between themselves. Larisa is the northernmost major city in Thessaly and would have been a prime waystation for commerce moving between

\textsuperscript{45} No matter the logistical abilities of the Persians, it is most likely that the Persian troops expected to live off the land to a significant degree. Large groups of soldiers required significant caloric intake that would have stretched the resources of even an incredibly verdant area. Herodotus believed that every soldier in Xerxes’ army would have required at least a kilogram of flour per man per day: Hdt. 7.187.2. J.F. Lazenby, “Logistics in Classical Greek Warfare,” \textit{War in History} 1, no. 1 (1994): 16. This is not including the wine, cheese, and fruit that was the staple of the Greek diet. It is unclear what the Persian soldiers would have eaten, but it is not unreasonable to assume that Xerxes’ allies would have been expected to provide something similar.

\textsuperscript{46} Hdt. 7.173.3.

\textsuperscript{47} Hdt. 7.173.4.

\textsuperscript{48} Anthony Francis Natoli, \textit{The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary}, Historia: Einzelschriften (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 103. I find Speusippus’ explanation to be difficult to accept: it is hard to believe that the Thessalians at the conference on the isthmus did not make the allied Greek army aware of the plans of the Aleuadae. The decision to hold the Persian advance at the Vale of Tempe, so close to Larisa, cannot have been for strategic reasons alone – hmm, the Vale of Tempe is vitally strategic on routes between North and south Greece and has had strategic importance as late as WW2
the Thessalian port of Pagasai and northern Greece and Macedonia. Given the lack of Macedonian ports the Aleuadae must have maintained diplomatic connections with the Macedonian aristocracy, who would purchase the goods traveling overland from central and southern Greece through Thessaly. These xenia bonds existed between the Aleuadae and the Argead dynasty in the fourth century, Philip II was active in Thessaly and married a woman from Larisa, Philina, and there is no reason to assume that these relationships were newly developed.

It is this connection that makes the disclosure of an alternate pass into Thessaly questionable. The route relayed to Xerxes and the Greeks was near the town of Gonnoi, in Larisa-controlled Perrhaibia. Given the importance of overseas trade, it seems very likely that the Aleuadae would have been extremely familiar with the region and its routes to the coast. Like Alexander I, it seems likely that the Aleuadae wanted the allied Greek army out of their territory, not only to remove the strain of feeding so many soldiers, but also to pave the way for their Persian allies, ensuring that any battles took place outside of Aleuad-controlled territory. As Herodotus argued, the lack of an allied Greek presence able to repel the Persians ensured that the isolated Thessalians would feel forced to throw in their lot with the invaders and the population would fall in line behind the Aleuadae once again.

V. Phocis and Thessalian Governmental Legitimacy

49 Given Philip II’s focus on Pagasai in the fourth century (see John Buckler, Philip II and the Sacred War (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 79.) Macedonia was deficient in good ports. The Aleuadae of Larisa must have capitalized on their geographic position to control and tax commerce going through their territory.


Persian military power temporarily quelled dissent against Aleuad rule but did not provide the political legitimacy the Aleuadae lost during the Phocian rebellion. In order to regain broad Thessalian support, a successful pan-Thessalian government needed to repudiate the Phocian rebellion through military action “punishing” Phocis. Herodotus’ account of Thessalian actions during the Persian invasion makes clear that the political and social dynamics of Thessaly were very much determined by the Thessalian relationship to Phocis.

As the Persian army bore down on the Greek peninsula and the southern Greeks abandoned the Vale of Tempe, the first action on the part of Thessalian leadership was to extort the Phocian *ethnos*, threatening to direct Persian forces through Phocis unless the Phocians produced a bribe. The historian explicitly attributed this behavior on the part of the Thessalians to deeply-held and socially-ingrained resentment over military defeats at the hands of the Phocians in the late sixth century. The Phocians rejected Thessalian extortion; Herodotus believed that the Phocians sided with their southern countrymen solely because the Thessalians were Persian allies, if the Thessalians had resisted the Persian invasion the Phocians would have supported it. Once the Persians arrived, Thessalian guides deliberately took the Persian army through Phocis, encouraging the invaders to raze any temples and cities which they encountered. Herodotus noted that there was an economic component to the destruction of

53 Hdt. 8.29.  
54 Hdt. 8.28.  
55 Hdt. 8.30.  
56 Hdt. 8.32.
temples in Phocis, as these were repositories for significant amounts of wealth that were taken as booty by the Persians and their Thessalian allies.\textsuperscript{57}

However, the actions of the Thessalians had significantly greater ramifications for the Aleuadae than short-term monetary gain. Thessalian hegemony over Phocis was lost while Thessaly was under Aleuad leadership. The subsequent disorder and loss of a ruling mandate allowed rival factions of Thessalians to challenge the Aleuadae, as discussed above. The deliberate targeting of Phocian cities and religious sites was an attempt to repudiate Thessalian losses and restore both the Thessalian hegemony over Phocis and the political power of the Aleuadae. Herodotus specifically identified both Hyampolis and the Apollonian temple at Abai as sites which the Thessalians targeted. Hyampolis was the location of major Thessalian military defeats in the Phocian rebellion and shields from Thessalian soldiers who died in these battles were dedicated at the temple at Abai.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, Abai was one of the major centers for the Phocian \textit{koinon}.\textsuperscript{59} It seems clear that the Thessalian objective was not the simple subjugation of a region, but the elimination of a coherent Phocian identity through the destruction of cities and politically important religious centers. This suggests a conflict motivated by an entrenched anxiety about the political legitimacy of the Thessalian elite while an independent and unified Phocis existed.

The sites of Thessalian defeats in the late Archaic period were clearly deeply important to the Thessalian \textit{koinon} as a failure which demanded rectification through the destruction of the Phocians as a political entity. The Aleuadae who led Thessaly into the disastrous defeats in Phocis lost their monopoly on power, and in order to regain the mantle of leadership, the dynasts

\textsuperscript{57} Hdt. 8.33.  
\textsuperscript{58} Hdt. 8.27.  
\textsuperscript{59} McInerney, \textit{The Folds of Parnassos}, 59.
in Larisa hoped to use Persian military might to repudiate their failures. The defeat of Xerxes’ invasion prevented the Aleuadae from regaining their previous stature, and this accelerated the process of the dissolution of political consensus in Thessaly.

VI. The Spartan Expedition to Thessaly and Meno the Pharsalian

The Thessalians who opposed the plans of the Aleuadae were forced to fall in line, unable to compete with a Persian-backed Aleuada regime without the support of the southern Greek alliance. After the remnants of the Persian army had been driven across the Hellespont, Spartan ire turned against those states that had medized and assisted the invading Persian forces. In the early 470s, a Spartan army under the command of King Leotychides marched into Thessaly to subdue the region in order to punish the Thessalians for medizing. The Spartans failed in their goal of eliminating the Aleuadae, but their actions accelerated the dissolution of Aleuada power and enabled the allowed the Echecratidae of Pharsalus to pursue a policy independent of Larisa. That the targets of the campaign were the Aleuadae confirm Herodotus’ assessment that Thorax and his kin had been the impetus behind Thessaly’s pro-Persian policy. Herodotus recorded that the majority of the Thessalians assented to the plans of the Aleuadae only at the last

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60 Hdt. 7.172.1.
61 The year of this expedition has been disputed, with both Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 109., and Mili, Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly, 163., placing the incursion in the 460s. A.S. Schieber, “Leotychidas in Thessaly,” L’antiquite Classique 51 (1982): 10–14., rejects this and places the expedition in 478/7, which seems much more reasonable given the lack of Lacedaemonian involvement in the wider Greek world after the campaigns at Byzantium, and the subsequent behavior of the Thessalians in the mid-470s. Moreover, Pausanias 3.7.9 links the engagement at Mycale with the expedition to Thessaly, suggesting they are much closer in time than the 460s.
moment, after the Greek army had retreated from the Vale of Tempe.\textsuperscript{63} That no other Thessalian faction held sufficient political capital to challenge the Aleuadae suggests that the Larisaeans were dominant in the Pineos River basin even after the failure of the Persian expedition.

The Spartan foray into Thessaly in the 470s ended as a debacle. The Spartan general Leotychides was accused of taking a bribe (by whom we do not know), and the invaders withdrew to deal with this judicial issue, rather than continue to prosecute the campaign. Herodotus implied that the bribery occurred even before the army entered into conflict with the Thessalians, despite the Spartans appearing to have a stronger position.\textsuperscript{64} Plutarch offered further details regarding the event, asserting that two of the dynasts, Aristomedes and Agelon were deposed thanks to the work of the Spartan army.\textsuperscript{65}

Spartan efforts – as well as those of the Aleuadae – produced three results between 478 - 454. First, the political legitimacy of the Aleuadae was further diminished after the debacle of the Phocian rebellion. Second, the political vacuum enabled another city and Thessalian family to come to the fore, the Echecratidae of Pharsalus. Third, Thessaly swung back to the Athenian orbit, resuming its old alliances with the newly ascendant polis. The reassertion of the Athenian and Thessalian alliance was formalized in 461 after Meno I of Pharsalus pursued relationships with the Athenian elite, beginning with donations supporting the Athenian-led siege of Eion.\textsuperscript{66} It seems that even if the expedition of Leotychidas was wholly unsuccessful, Spartan presence in

\textsuperscript{63} Hdt. 7.174.
\textsuperscript{64} Hdt. 6.72.1-2. Pausanias recorded that conflicts between the Spartan army and the Thessalians occurred prior to the bribery, but also concludes that Leotychides could have conquered all of Thessaly: Paus. 3.7.9.
\textsuperscript{65} Plut. \textit{De Herod.} 21
\textsuperscript{66} Thuc. 1.102.4
Thessaly encouraged or enabled other members of the Thessalian elite to cultivate external alliances to supplement their own political power outside of Aleuad control.

Much like the Aleuadae cultivating support for Xerxes’ in the 480s, the Menonidae of Pharsalus looked outward, to find alliances and fortify their political position in Thessaly. Leotychides’ expedition did not fully eliminate the Aleuad clan; their power receded. The Athenians were an obvious choice of ally for any challengers to the Thessalian status quo. After the failure of the campaigns in Thessaly and the disgrace of Spartan King Pausanias at Byzantium, the Spartans abandoned any heremonic designs on the wider Greek world, wishing only to secure their control of the Peloponnese.67 Conversely the Athenians emerged as the leaders of the Delian League, pursuing a wide-ranging policy across the Mediterranean.

Meno of Pharsalus seems to have been a leading Pharsalian figure in the 470s, and he took advantage of the political situation in the Aegean to align himself with the Athenians. Only a few short years after the Spartan invasion, Meno contributed both money and cavalry to the Delian League siege at Eion – a significant enough occurrence that it was recalled by Demosthenes over a century later.68 What part the Thessalian cavalry of Meno played in the action is unknown, but it seems likely the Thessalian horsemen nullified the usual Persian cavalry advantage.

The contributions that Meno gave the Athenians was sufficient to see him granted honors in Athens: either he was given Athenian citizenship for sending three hundred cavalry,69 or an immunity from public burdens for sending two hundred horsemen to assist at the siege.70 This is

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68 Dem. 13.23; 23.199.  
69 Dem. 23.199  
70 Dem. 13.23.
a significant amount of cavalry, suggesting that the Meno was a particularly wealthy or powerful member of the Echecratidae, most likely the leader of their clan. By comparison, the Athenians were only able to muster twelve hundred cavalry at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431.71

It seems likely that Meno of Pharsalus, a leader of the Echecratidae, was angling to obtain Athenian support in solidifying his clan’s hold on Thessaly and attempting to create a *proxeny* relationship with Athens, a ritual friendship between an outsider and a *polis*. Meno’s donation of silver and cavalry to the siege were part of the ritual gift exchange, for which he could expect to receive Athenian political and military support in return.72 Aiding Athens, however, was not an action that intended to reinforce any common notion of Hellenism or Thessalian democracy. Instead, this relationship was intended to cultivate a powerful ally against the remnants of Aleuadae power in Larisa.

VII. Daochos I and Brasidas in Thessaly

71 Thuc. 2.13.8.
72 The cavalrymen that Meno sent to the siege of Eion were most likely his πενέστης, who were generally seen as an agricultural serf class, much like the *helots* of Sparta, as per: Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 28; Jeremy McInerney, *The Fords of Parnassos* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 174. Many scholars have taken issue with this, Graninger, “Macedonia and Thessaly,” 2010, 314., Argues that the *penestae* are free but poor Thessalians. Zelnick-Abramovitz, *Taxing Freedom in Thessalian Manumission Inscriptions*, 128., Points to IG(2) 234, which gives citizenship to “those who have “lived beside and fought beside [the Pharsalians] from the beginning” as a sign that the *penestae* were liable to be freed and had some form of social mobility. Jean Ducat, *Les Pénestes de Thessalie* (Besançon: Université de Franche-Comté, 1994), 72–73., agrees with this interpretation, but highlights that unlike the *helots*, the *penestae* were subject to individual masters, not the state as a whole. Bruno Helly, *L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi* (Lyon: Maison de l’Orient Mediterraneen, 1995), 305., Argues that these were full Thessalian citizens, accompanied by exiles from Athens. His interpretation is interesting, but not wholly convincing.
In 431 Daochos I of Pharsalus gained power in Thessaly. Little is known about Daochos I; there is no recorded information on his familial connections, his background, the circumstances of his rise to power, or the extent of his control within Thessaly. No extant information links Daochos to Meno or the Echecratidae, so it seems reasonable to accept that the Pharsalian cultivated a power-base independent of these other powers. The most modern scholarship can say about his rule is that his tenure was apparently quite long, spanning the second Peloponnesian War. Daochos’ name does not appear in extant textual sources, and modern scholarship is only aware of him thanks to a monument his ancestor commissioned in Delphi in the fourth century. His ancestors have been identified as Olympic victors in the early fifth century, but no Meno exists on the monument, an indication that he was from a different aristocratic clan in Pharsalus. Nevertheless, synthesizing the information available from his monument with the available literary information suggests that his rule was both one of the last pan-Thessalian regimes, and a government which was largely unable to exercise its policy in any meaningful way.

Thucydides’ account of Brasidas’ march to Thrace has little in the way of detail, but what can be ascertained gives tremendous insight into the political tensions in Thessaly during the Peloponnesian War. Aleuad agents were able to assist Brasidas in crossing Thessaly despite opposition from pro-Athenian factions in Pharsalus in an attempt to undermine Athenian

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73 Unfortunately, the transition between the Echecratidae and Daochos I is non-existent in any textual sources, speculation on the subject is not much more than wild conjecture.
74 Morrison, “Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias,” 31., makes the most reasonable assertion that the reign of Daochos I was after the expedition of Meno and ended with the Lycophron’s victory over Thessaly in 404. Slawomir Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431-370 BC (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 1999), 29–30., concurs. Simon Hornblower, The Greek World 479 - 323 BC, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 98., argues that his reign was between 440 – 413, but does not explain his reasoning.
interests in the northern Aegean and thus the Thessalian alliance with Athens and the political power of any challengers to the Aleuadæ. In the summer of 424 the Spartan general arrived at Heraclea Trachis with 1,700 hoplites in tow. Thucydides stated that Brasidas stopped there and sent for friends in Pharsalus. The individuals who Brasidas met in 424 are something of a mystery, but a few clues suggest an underlying plan. Two in particular stand out: Strophacus, a was the proxenos of the Chalcideans and Niconidas from Larissa, whom Thucydides noted was connected to the Macedonian king Perdiccas.

To begin with, it is important to note Thucydides’ language: προπέμψαντος αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἔπιτηδείους. These men were in Pharsalus, but not necessarily from Pharsalus, suggesting that they had come to the city specifically to meet Brasidas.

Strophacus was a key component of this plot because he was a proxenos of the Chalcidians. It was the Greek cities of the Chalcidice, along with Perdicas II who had invited Brasidas north. The Chalcidians revolted from Athens in 433/2 at the urging of Perdiccas II of Macedonia, who was pursuing his own anti-Athenian policy. The Athenians chose to back one of Perdiccas’ rivals, and in response the imperiled King of Macedon cast about for allies to counter the Athenians. It seems likely that Strophacus was almost certainly assisting Brasidas on behalf of his Chalcidean and Macedonian allies.

The other individual specifically highlighted by Thucydides and who confirms the Aleuad participation in these machinations was Niconidas from Larissa, Περδίκκας ἔπιτηδείος

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76 Thuc. 4.78.1-2.
77 Thuc. 4.78.1-2.
79 Thuc. 4.87.1. For proxeny, see above as well as Gabriel Herman, Ritualized Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 130–36.
81 Thuc. 1.57.3-5.
While the family of Niconidas is not specified, the fact that he is designated as a Larisean and had enough social capital to be a xenos of the King of Macedonia indicates that he was a powerful aristocrat, and it is difficult to conclude that Niconidas was not an Aleuad. The Aleuadai seem to have maintained a pro-Spartan policy, contrary to the other factions in Thessaly who seemed to largely fall into the Athenian orbit. In 431 a cavalry expedition was sent by the Thessalian cities to assist the Athenians, this would have been at the beginning of Daochos’ tenure, which suggests a pro-Athenian policy on the part of the government in Pharsalus. That a Thessalian power was in turn attempting to undermine this alliance suggests that the Chalcidians, Macedonians, and Aleuadai were attempting to use the expedition of Brasidas for their own ends; in the case of the Aleuadai, to undermine the authority of the government in Pharsalus.

Buoyed by his co-conspirators, Brasidas marched into Thessaly in 424, and at the river Enipeus, Thessalians Thucydides referred to as ἄλλοι τῶν τὰναντία met with the expedition in an attempt to stop the Spartan army’s crossing of Thessaly. The Enipeus is within the territory of Pharsalus and given the motivations of the architects of this project, it is most likely that the Pharsalians led Thucydides’ “opposition party.” This group attempting to deter Brasidas asserted they were doing so at the behest of the majority of the Thessalians. It is likely these Thessalians represented the Daochid regime in Pharsalus, concerned about a resurgent Larisa.

82 “…who was friendly with Perdiccas.”
83 Robertson, “The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.,” 118.
84 Thuc. 2.22.
85 “…certain of the opposition…” Thucydides was either totally uninformed or purposely circumspect about the provenance of this group. Thuc. 4.78.3.
86 Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 1996, II:260., translates this as “without the consent of the whole Thessalian people.”
Thucydides stated that it was because Thessaly at this time was governed by a δυναστεία, that Brasidas was able to cross Thessaly in spite of any opposition, however the historian did not elaborate on this premise.\textsuperscript{87} Morrison argued that the rule of Daochos I was weak, and Brasidas was able to cross Thessaly due to the inability of Pharsalus to summon either the political will or resources to stop the Spartan expedition.\textsuperscript{88} He asserted the aristocratic faction was hampered by an oligarchic party, which had grown thanks to expanding urbanization and the increased availability of coinage. The suggestion of a lack of authority on the part of Daochos I is reasonable given his lack of textual appearances, though Morrison’s argument that an oligarchic party existed in Thessaly is difficult to support, as there is no solid evidence to corroborate the existence of an oligarchic faction in Thessaly.\textsuperscript{89}

Sprawski believed that the perpetrators of the event were disenfranchised aristocrats, who were acting contrary to the common will of the Thessalians.\textsuperscript{90} However, he failed to connect this group with Larisa, and thus to the Aleuadae. As discussed above, the Aleuadae had a long association with the Macedonians, no other extant Thessalian group had either the means or the motivation to align themselves with the Spartans and the Macedonian Argeads and could so boldly ignore any resistance from the Daochids and the rest of Thessaly. Kent argued that the crossing was allowed thanks to the tacit assent of Daochos I.\textsuperscript{91} This is difficult to believe, as

\textsuperscript{88} Morrison, “Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Isemnias,” 63. See also: Ridgeway, \textit{Hellenistic Sculpture}, I:46–47.
\textsuperscript{89} To back up his assertion, Morrison cites an episode in which a Thessalian force of cavalry, which appears to have consisted of two distinct units of Larisaeans were sent to assist the Athenians in 431. Thuc. 2.22.3. Morrison pointed to Thucydides’ phrase Δαρίσης Πολλωμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἐκάτερος to suggest that there was some form of strife within Larisa perpetrated by an oligarchic party; the fact that there were two leaders for the Larisaean troops suggested two feuding factions both sending soldiers. This is certainly possible, but it seems unlikely that openly hostile groups within the same foreign expedition would be realistic.
\textsuperscript{90} Sprawski, \textit{Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431-370 BC}, 28.
\textsuperscript{91} Roland Kent, \textit{A History of Thessaly from the Earliest Historical Times to the Accession of Philip V of Macedonia} (Lancaster: The New Era Printing Company, 1904), 10.
supporting the Aleuadae in Larisa would undermine Daochos’ government in Pharsalus. If Daochos was an ally of the Aleuadae, he seemingly did little to prevent the Thessalian opposed to Brasidas’ crossing from confronting the Spartan army.

Instead, another explanation seems most probable to attempt to understand how the Aleuadae were able to bypass the Pharsalian resistance. Thessaly was an aristocratic society which took great stock in guest-friend relationships, and the Thessalian elite understood and accepted the rights and responsibilities of becoming a *xenos*. The Aleuad agents invoked their *xenia* relationship with Brasidas, describing him as a friend who was due the protections of an escort.92 In doing so, the Aleuad agents were able to frame their decision – though clearly attempting to curry support from external powers to undermine Daochos I – as fulfilling a basic and vital responsibility of aristocratic life.

Regardless of what justification the enemies of Daochos I’s rule used, it seems clear that the regime in Pharsalus had little ability to enforce its will. If Daochos I wished to enable Brasidas to cross Thessaly, he was unable to prevent a dissident faction of Thessalians from confronting the Spartan army. If Daochos did not want the Spartans expedition to travel through his domain, he was unable to muster Thessalian support to stop Brasidas’ march. Moreover, it seems clear that Brasidas’ arrival caught the Pharsalian ruler by surprise: his government was unable to prepare a forceful and consistent response, and from Thucydides’ account it seems that the Aleuad agents were acting independently of the government in Pharsalus. Whatever the case may be, Thucydides painted a picture of a Thessalian elite which was at war with itself, unable to muster a coherent and unified response to the political upheaval in the late fifth century.

92 Thuc. 4.78.4.
VIII. Thessaly at the Beginning of the Fourth Century

Both literary and epigraphic evidence for the late fifth and early fourth centuries of Thessaly is significantly more accessible than earlier periods but given the focus of ancient historians and the condition of much of the material evidence, assembling a narrative of Thessalian history raises as many questions as it provides answers. Foundational surveys such as Westlake’s *Thessaly in the Fourth Century BC* and Sordi’s *La Lega Tessala Fino ad Alessandro Magno*, as well as specialist studies like Sprawski’s *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC* have shed light on the status of Thessaly in the fourth century. However, these works have often ignored the dissolution of Thessalian political and social unity in the fifth century, and the subsequent period of civil wars in the first half of the fourth. The loss of Thessalian hegemony in the Archaic period and the resulting need to return to this “golden age” drove competing factions within Thessaly to attempt to repudiate Archaic losses and establish themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the pre-Phocian Rebellion Thessalian regime.

Beginning with the rule of Lycophron in the late fifth century, the tyrants of Pherae accelerated the process of Thessalian political dissolution and pushed the struggle for a unified Thessaly into a military contest. At the same time, Lycophron and Jason of Pherae began to cast themselves as the legitimate inheritors of pan-Thessalian political legitimacy. As the regimes of the tyrants were usually seen as breaking with traditional political practice, Jason and Lycophron needed to demonstrate that their regimes both provided continuity between the Thessalian Archaic era “golden age” and the fourth century and reject the political and social turmoil of the
fifth. However, after Jason of Pherae was assassinated in 370 his successor Alexander changed political course, looking for allies among the Phocians, the traditional enemies of the Thessalians. This shift in policy was a signal that Alexander was ceding any attempt at pan-Thessalian rule to his competitors the Aleuadae, ultimately sealing the fate of his regime.

Thessaly is absent from the literary record between 424, when the Spartan general Brasidas crossed Thessaly, until 404.93 Based on the monumental sculpture group erected by his ancestor in the late fourth century, it would appear that during this period Thessaly was ruled by Daochos I of Pharsalus, though we know almost nothing of his rule or the internal dynamics of his regime.94 The manner in which Daochos’ regime ended is unknown, but summarizing the events of the year 404 Xenophon off-handedly referred to “Lycophron of Pherae, who wanted to make himself ruler of all Thessaly, defeated in battle those among the Thessalians who opposed him, namely the Larisaeans and others, and slew many of them.”95 Unfortunately, Lycophron and the Thessalian civil war that Xenophon is not referenced in any other extant literary or epigraphic source. Given that Lycophron’s successors in Pherae and the Aleuadae of Larisa carried on a civil war for several decades, Lycophron must have been particularly adept in prosecuting his conflict, though it is difficult to intuit how Lycophron’s strategies or situation differed markedly from his most successful heir, Jason of Pherae. As well, open conflict represented a fundamental shift from what is know about internal Thessalian political struggle in the earlier fifth century. As discussed in the previous chapter, competition among the Thessalian

93 For a discussion of Brasidas see above.
95 Xen. Hell. 2.3.4.
elite seemed largely bloodless, and the struggle for political power seemed to largely take the form of acquiring external allies whose power could be used to threaten rivals.

What can be said about this late-fifth century civil war? To begin with, the prominence of Pherae in the narrative is surprising. In the fifth century, the two centers around which power gravitated were Pharsalus and Larisa.\textsuperscript{96} The dynastic clan of the Aleuadae in Larisa competed with the families of the Menonidae and Daochids in Pharsalus for social and political dominance, allying themselves with the Athenians or Spartans. From its central position on the eastern Thessalian plain, Larisa had great influence over the north-south overland trade routes, which encouraged a close connection between the Aleuadae and the Macedonian Argead dynasty. Given its geographical position it is no surprise that Larisa emerged as one of the centers of power in Archaic and Classical Thessaly.

There is a less clear-cut case as to why Pharsalus became the other great power center in fifth century Thessaly. Nestled in the foothills on the eastern end of the western Trikala-Karditsa basin, Pharsalus commanded the Enipeus valley.\textsuperscript{97} This was the key military route which provided access to southern Greece, controlling access to the famous Krokion Pedion.\textsuperscript{98} The Pharsalians, like most Thessalians were heavily involved in animal husbandry and trade, selling warhorses and other livestock both north and south. The coinage of fifth century Pharsalus highlights the strong associations between the city and horse-raising.\textsuperscript{99} Despite the commonalities in culture, the Pharsalians actively worked to differentiate themselves from their Larisaean competitors in several spheres. Pharsalian coins seem minted specifically to

\textsuperscript{96} Pharsalus: Thuc. 1.111, 4.78. Larisa: Thuc. 2.22, 4.78, 8.101; Hdt. 9.1, 9.58. See also: previous chapter.
\textsuperscript{97} For an analysis of the Enipeus valley and its military importance see: Decourt, \textit{La Vallee de L'Enipeus En Thessalie}, 77–96.
\textsuperscript{98} Diod. 16.35.4–5, 16.38.1, Justin 8.2.1-4.
\textsuperscript{99} For examples, see: Appendix C Group 1.
differentiate Pharsalian issues from the Larisaean coinage of the fifth century, which largely produced coinage featuring the eponymous nymph Larisa, or the “pan-Thessalian” sport of taurokathapsia, bull wrestling. The lack of pan-Thessalian imagery on Pharsalian coins, and a focus on the Pharsalian civic association with Athena suggests a rejection of the unifying symbolism on Larisaean coins. If Larisa was part of a “coinage league” in fifth-century Thessaly from which Pharsalus was notably absent, it seems reasonable to assume that forming a distinct identity apart from the city of the Aleuadae was a key component of the Thessalian struggle for political and social dominance. This also seems to be the case in terms of burial customs. In the fifth century elite Pharsalian burial practices seem to have involve re-using or creating Mycenean-style tholos tombs, but without their conversion into a heroon. According to Stamatopoulou, this practice indicates an interest in “deliberate but not systematic reference to the past.”

While extant information is limited, both coinage and burial practices suggest that, in the fifth century, the struggle for supremacy of Thessaly involved a struggle over identity. Larisa had a strong link to the imagined Thessalian foundational past through Aleuas the Red and his family, and despite blows to their authority in the late Archaic and early Classical periods, the Aleuadae had the strongest historical claim to argue for primacy of Larisa in Thessalian politics.

101 See Appendix C Group 1.
The coinage and burial practices were attempts by the Pharsalian elite to both differentiate themselves from the Aleuadae at Larisa, but also to claim a share of the mytho-historical past and reinforce any political power they gained as a result of failures of Aleuad policy.\textsuperscript{104} Rejecting Aleuad claims of political control meant breaking whatever association the Thessalian populace made between the Aleuadae family and the “creation” of Thessaly. Challengers such as the Menonidae of Pharsalus or the tyrants of Pherae needed to establish their own independent identity, and then associate this distinction with Thessaly as a whole. It seems most likely that this was part of an overall archaizing tendency, attempts were made by modern regimes to highlight their connection to the successes of past Thessalian governments, arguing that they, rather than their competitors, possessed the only legitimate ruling mandate.

The first literary reference to the city of Pherae comes from Thucydides, identifying it as the home of a unit of cavalry sent to support the Athenian war effort in 431. Unfortunately, the city is only name checked, but it does suggest that the elite – and possibly the general population – of Pherae were pro-Athenian, or at least behind the cause of the Daochid government of Pharsalus.\textsuperscript{105} Nonetheless, Pherae seems to have been a relatively minor player in fifth century Thessalian politics. Westlake argued that the city’s rise to prominence was due to its control of the port city of Pagasae.\textsuperscript{106} Pharae was located roughly eight miles from Pagasae – the only port in Thessaly – which allowed Pharae control of the Bay of Volos.\textsuperscript{107} According to Westlake, this situation allowed Pharae to control the export of Thessalian grain. The chaos of the Peloponnesian war and the demand for grain gave the traders and merchants in Pharae an

\textsuperscript{104} Specifically, the Phocian Rebellion and the failure of the Aleuad-backed Persian expedition of 480.
\textsuperscript{105} Thuc. 2.22.3.
\textsuperscript{106} Westlake, \textit{Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.}, 1935, 48.
\textsuperscript{107} Strab. 9.5.15.
economic opportunity which Lycophron capitalized on. However, this caused friction between Pherae and the Aleuada aristocrats in Larisa.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, Westlake argued that due to the late appearance of the Pherae in the literary record, none of the major aristocratic dynasties held sway in the city. As such Lycophron was essentially a land-redistributing autocrat tyrant in the manner of a Dionysos of Syracuse who relied upon popular rather than elite support.

Sordi linked the rise of Lycophron to the supposed activities of Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens. In the last few years of the Peloponnesian war Critias was accused of having been in Thessaly during his exile a few years prior, working to encourage the penestae to revolt against their pro-Athenian masters.\textsuperscript{109} In Sordi’s view, Critias and his accomplice – whom Sordi believes was Lycophron – were involved in encouraging the penestae to rise up against the Aleuadae.\textsuperscript{110} Sordi bases her argument on reports of Critias’ pro-Spartan leanings, as well as the Spartan alliance Lycophron was believed to have made in 395.\textsuperscript{111} In her view, Lycophron had the backing of the “moderates,” the Pheraean urban merchant-class which profited from the grain trade, and who were the natural competitors of the aristocratic Aleuadae.\textsuperscript{112} It was through this power base, as well as Spartan support that Lycophron was able to come to power and achieve dominance.

\textsuperscript{108} Westlake, \textit{Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.}, 1935, 49. In this interpretation he follows Meyer, \textit{Theopompos Hellenika}.

\textsuperscript{109} A further discussion of the penestae and their position in Thessalian culture may be found in chapter 5, but it is not unreasonable to assume that given the disappearance of this unfree people from the literary and material record in the fourth century, that there was some form of emancipation or integration in this period, very possibly as the result of agitation on the form of the penestae. Xen. Hell. 2.3.36.

\textsuperscript{110} Sordi, \textit{La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno}, 143–44. This assertion was also accepted by Wade-Gery and Morrison, “Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias,” 65.

\textsuperscript{111} Critias: Dem. 58.67; Lycophron: Diod. 14.82.5-6.

\textsuperscript{112} Sordi, \textit{La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno}, 145.
There are a number of issues in both Westlake and Sordi’s theories. Sordi is particularly committed to a vision of a great social revolution in Thessaly during the mid-fifth century, with a major turning point at the Battle of Tanagra in 457. In brief: the social structure that Sordi saw in Thessaly did not have sufficient material or literary backing to corroborate her theory. Her assertions that there were some sort of “knight” and “hoplite” class in Thessaly take too much from our understanding of Athenian social hierarchy. While there is no doubt that Thessalian society was one in which a number of strata existed, we have no indication that the socio-economic classes within Thessalian society were direct analogues to Athenian ones. It is entirely possible that there was social upheaval in Thessaly in the fifth century, but there is no direct evidence to support this idea.

Regarding Critias, it is difficult to accept without reservation that his aim was indeed to stir up the *penestae* on behalf of the Spartan alliance. While the ancient sources seem to believe that the *penestae* were ready and willing to rebel against their masters, what we know of Thessalian society suggests that this was not of a major point of concern for the Thessalian elite. In addition it seems unlikely that Sparta and its agents would encourage a servile revolt, even quite some distance from the Peloponnesian. The revolt in 464 was a particularly difficult issue for Sparta, and Athenian efforts during the latter parts of the Peloponnesian War must have made Spartan leadership skittish about wide-ranging emancipation. Moreover, if the *penestae* were in fact similar in situation to the *helots*, then it seems unlikely a state with a significant emancipated population would be willing participants in a political program which involved a

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113 As discussed in chapters 1 and 7, which cover the conflict and its associated issues in greater depth.
114 Arist. *Pol.* 2.1269b. For further discussion of the *penestae* in Thessalian society see chapter 5.
115 For the revolt after 464 see: Diod. 11.63.4-11.64.1; Plut. *Lyc.* 28.6. For the Peloponnesian War see: Thuc. 4.41.2-4, 7.26.2.
Spartan-Thessalian alliance. If the *penestae* had – through whatever means – convinced their former Thessalian masters that they should be emancipated, then it seems unlikely that those same masters would turn and alienate this new constituency. Finally, the accusation against Critias was made in a speech attacking Critias and is suspect. It may be that Critias was agitating for revolution in Thessaly, though it is just as likely that he was taking refuge with one the Thessalian elites with whom he had a *xenia* relationship.

Westlake’s argument is the more convincing, as Pagasae was used as a port throughout the late Classical and Hellenistic periods, but there is no direct evidence to suggest that the grain trade was the cause of this conflict. Additionally, Westlake’s analysis is based upon his understanding of a set order of Greek political evolution. Westlake assumed that tyrannies naturally evolve out of a less-organized *ethnos* political organization, which would then – had Philip II not become involved in Thessalian politics – have become a democracy or republic. This view on the “primitive” nature of the *ethnos* as a political organization has been compellingly rejected by both Catherine Morgan (2003) and Maria Mili (2015). While Westlake’s theory is attractive – as is Sordi’s – the lack of direct evidence makes them both tenuous.

It is difficult to establish the most basic pieces of information about Lycophron and his rule. Only Diodorus refers to Lycophron as a tyrant, Xenophon simply calls him “Lycophon of Pherae.”116 However, based on the limited material evidence available, it seems likely that Lycophron understood himself – or at least, wished to portray himself – as a traditional leader in the mold of his Larisaean counterparts. Both the early Pheraean tyrants and the Larisaen

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116 Diod. 14.82.5; Xen. Hell. 2.3.4.
Aleuadae minted coins using similar visual language: a horse or cow on one side, and a deity on the other; in the case of Pherae this took the form of the goddess Ennodia, and in Larisa the nymph from whom the city took its name. Late fifth and early fourth century Thessalian cities generally identified their coins by imprinting the name of the polis, this was a shift from fifth century Thessalian coins which seem to have preferred the inscription of “Thessaly” regardless of where the coin was minted. Nevertheless, if modern scholarship is to understand that a regime’s propaganda or political program is in some way represented in its coinage, then the symbolic imagery on the specie of the tyrants of Pherae does not differ in substantial ways from that of the aristocratic Aleuad elite of Larisa. It is only in the regime of Alexander of Pherae is there a distinct break, and this comes in the form of the inscription: rather than “Pherae” or “Thessaly,” coins minted during the tenure of Alexander of Pherae bear the tyrant’s name.

Among the coin issues from Lycophron’s era that have been found, a silver hemiobol bears a steer’s hoof and a horse’s head. The horse is common on Thessalian coinage and signifies little. Copper coinage is more numerous from the early fourth century in Pherae and generally displays a lion’s head on one side and the goddess Hekate on the other. The divinity may be the goddess and the lion is representative of a fountain that was regionally famous in Pherae, associated with Melas, the son of Posiden. More Larisean coinage survives, and while the imagery differs from the Pheraean coinage, there are remarkable parallels. The majority of

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118 Edgar Rogers, *The Copper Coinage of Thessaly* (London: Spink & Son, 1932). Plates 511 – 517. Despite its age Rogers’ work is still the most comprehensive work on Thessalian coinage and is regularly cited by 21st century works.
fifth and early fourth century Larisaean copper coinage features the eponymous nymph Larisa, who is paired with a horse, or a horse and rider.\textsuperscript{120} This combination of divinity and a symbol of local importance that both cities used on their coins suggests that Lycophron understood himself or wished to portray himself not as a tyrant occupying an extra-constitutional or unusual position, but a Thessalian \textit{archon} in the mold of an Aleuas, Thorax or Daochos. It was only when the Pheraean rulers like Alexander truly began to see themselves as tyrants, the coinage they issue changes dramatically.

Thus, it seems that in his attempts to assume control of Thessaly, Lycophron attempted to portray himself not as a usurper but a defender of traditional Thessalian political institutions. The struggle between Lycophron and his Larisaean counterparts was likely a struggle between aristocrats who were competing to control the same social and political power structures that already existed, Lycophron was not a revolutionary leader attempting to reorient the structure of Thessalian society. Instead, like his successor Jason of Pherae, Lycophron most likely attempted to wrest control of historical precedent for rulership from the Larisaeans, positioning his administration as one which was the inheritor of the ruling mandate lost through the failures of the Thessalian hegemonic project. This competition for legitimacy between Lycophron and his Larisaean enemies would eventually result in the loss of true political autonomy for Thessaly.

Moreover, the drawn-out conflict that broke out amongst the Thessalians ensured that the Thessalian \textit{koinon} would be weakened, necessitating that the competing factions of Thessaly had to look outside their borders for allies. These allies would subsequently recognize the weakness

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of the Thessalian polity and use the region – to borrow an excellent phrase from M. Sordi – as a “testing ground for imperialism.”

As a consequence of Lycophron’s victory, the Larisaean aristocrats looked outward for assistance. One year after his faction’s defeat, Aristippus, the leader of the Aleuad faction capitalized upon his relationship with Cyrus the Younger to hire mercenaries for his conflict with Lycophron.121 It should be no surprise that the Aleuads maintained a relationship with the Persian imperial family, as there seems to have been a connection between the two since at least the early fifth century.122 It seems that the acquisition of mercenaries with Persian funds enables Aristippus to renew the conflict, but there is little precise information about any military actions that may have occurred. Aristippus’ mercenaries were recalled by Cyrus in 402, and Xenophon cryptically reported that the Aleuad was ordered to “effect a reconciliation with his adversaries at home.”123 As Westlake argues, this was unlikely a victory on the part of Aristippus, but one which resulted in multiple political factions sharing power within Larisa.124 One of these factions was the Aleuadae, but it seems likely that another was a more moderate, oligarchical party which was enabled by Lycophron’s victory. It is this faction that was responsible for the creation of the pamphlet Peri Politeias, often misattributed to Herodes.125

The Aleuad decision to enlist outside help created a cascading effect in the Thessalian civil war. Archelaus of Macedon seems to have taken Larisa in the chaos and installed a garrison

121 Xen. Anab. 1.1.10.
122 For further reference, above.
123 Xen. Anab. 1.2.1.
124 Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935, 56.
there, though its tenure was limited. By 399, Archelaus was dead and it seems unlikely that in the turmoil resulting from his assassination the Argead successors maintained a garrison in Larisa, as four years later the Aleuad Medius enlisted Argive and Boeotian soldiers for his cause. While we know little of the alliance Aristippus made, it seems clear that the Larisaens bound their allies to their cause with more than ideology or common political cause.

Lorber makes a compelling case for an abrupt shift in Larisaen coinage from approximately 404 – 370. The facing-head drachms minted in Larisa show not only a significant decline in the quality of minting, but a die analysis suggests that coins of the same type were minted on at least two different anvils. There is a strong case that for a short period during this timeframe Larisa was minting “emergency coinage.” This would correspond with the civil wars in Thessaly and suggest that the soldiers fighting for the Larisaens were not simple citizen-soldiers fighting for a political cause, but that the Boeotians and Argives – and very possibly the Thessalian forces – were in a sense “state-sponsored” mercenaries, interested in lining their own pockets just as much as advancing the goals of their polities.

In response to the Macedonian incursion and the threats from a resurgent Aleuad Larisa, Lycophron enlisted the assistance of the Spartans. We do not know the specific details of the alliance, but it seems that Heraclea Trachis – the city established by the Spartans in 426 to act as the lynchpin of their central Greek military and political efforts – rebelled against their metropolis in the same year as the death of Archelaus. Lycophron, whether he was already in

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126 Given the close relationship between the Larisaens and the Macedonians it should be no surprise that the Argead kings looked to Larisa to expand their hegemony. If Aristotle is correct, at least one exiled Aleuad participated in the assassination of Archelaus and did so because Archelaus refused to fulfill his promise of allowing the exile to return home: Arist. Pol. 5.1311b.
127 Aristippus falls out of the narrative, perhaps having died in the conflict with Lycophron. Diod. 14.82.5.
control of Pharsalus, or through his Spartan allies, installed a garrison of Spartan soldiers at Pharsalus. Four years later Pharsalus was seized by Medius, who sold the garrison off into slavery. These Boeotians and Argives then parted ways with Medius and took Heraclea Trachis in a clear attempt to stymie Spartan hegemonic ambitions in central Greece.

By 394 it seems that Lycophron of Pherae’s alliance with the Spartans was no longer in force. In that year, Agesilaus marched through Thessaly on his way south, and was opposed by Larisa, Cranon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus. Outside of Pharsalus, the Thessalian forces were roughly handled by the Spartan army, whose heavy infantry and superior discipline carried the day. The details of the conflict are not particularly relevant within the context of this narrative – but it is surprising that Lycophron and the Pheraeans were either unwilling or unable to assist their allies. Three options present themselves. First, the Pheraeans were unable to come to the aid of their allies, due to some internal political issue that we are unaware of, or some logistical failure. Second, Lycophron saw no benefit to assisting the expedition of Agesilaus. This is certainly possible, but it is difficult to ascertain why Spartan assistance – so welcome in securing Pharsalus a few years previously – had become politically untenable to Lycophron and his regime. Thirdly, in some instance that is unknown to us the alliance between the Spartans and Lycophon had deteriorated to the point in which Lycophron was unwilling to assist Agesilaus. Given that Jason was later an ally of the Spartans the first option seems the most likely but it is difficult to know if this was a long-term programmatic decision or one based on more immediate political or military needs.

While it is difficult to say much about the policies of Lycophron and the effects his tenure

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130 Diod. 14.82.6.
131 Diodorus compresses a great deal of time in Thessaly into one short passage: Diod. 14.82.6.
132 The march of Agesilaus is covered in three primary sources: Xen. Hell. 4.3.3-9; Xen. Ages. 2.2-5; Plut. Ages. 16.
had on the political and social structure of the Thessalian *ethnos*, his regime marks a distinct break in Thessalian history. The failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project in central Greece seems to have disrupted the political unity of the Thessalian *koinon* in the fifth century, as the Pharsalian elite competed with the Aleuadēs of Larisa for dominance of the region. This political conflict also likely took place within the context of a struggle for identity, as the Pharsalians sought to differentiate themselves from the other Thessalian elites. In the fifth century competition seems to have been non-violent, cultivating outside alliances as a way to reinforce internal political positions. However, Lycophron opened the door to intra-group violence within Thessaly, by seeking not to differentiate himself from traditional Thessalian group identity but to mimic and appropriate the Aleuad precedents for rule. This struggle for identity became increasingly clear during the regimes of Jason and Alexander of Pherae. Moreover, intra-group violence initiated under Lycophron created an environment in which the Thessalian state was perceived as weak and chaotic, and the next five decades would see increasing encroachment by foreign powers in an attempt to pursue hegemonic policies in central Greece.
Chapter 4: Thessalian Political Institutions

I. Ethnos, Koinon, and Tetrad

While there were many different social, political, and economic relationships that defined identity in the ancient world, it is most likely that the organizational foundation that connected the Thessalians to one another was ethnos, the social and ethnic identity that the Thessalian people on the Larisa-Karditsa plain shared. While this has been largely accepted by modern scholarship, there is little extant information that articulates the understanding of ethnos or ethnic groups with relation to political organization in ancient Greece, let alone a poorly attested area such as Thessaly. Nevertheless, an examination of the Thessalian ethnos is important in identifying the workings of the Thessalian state and to better understand the koinon, the political manifestation of the ethnos.

At its core ethnos was a common identity, defined by habitual usage of regionally important religious sites and worship of locally distinct iterations of Hellenic gods. Modern scholarship has accepted that the Thessalians, like many Greek polities, saw themselves as a unified cultural group despite their internal political disagreements. The Thessalian position as a

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2 It seems most likely that the cult of Athena Itonia, Zeus Eleutherios, and Ennodia were the three “national” gods of the Thessalians. Graninger, Cult and Koinon in Hellenistic Thessaly, 45. Denver Graninger, “Apollo, Ennodia, and Fourth-Century Thessaly,” Kermos 22 (2009): 113. Two particularly excellent works on Greek concepts of ethne may be found in Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture; Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond the Polis. For a work more focused on Thessaly, see Graninger, Cult and Koinon in Hellenistic Thessaly.

conquering minority within Thessaly may have helped the invaders to see themselves nominally as a unit in contrast to the native population, but this is unfortunately conjecture until further evidence is discovered. Internal references to a common ethnicity by Thessalian sources do not appear until the fourth century, prior to which they were only described in extant literary evidence as a unified *ethnos* by other Greeks.

Given the consistent characterization of the Thessalians as a single Greek people and a lack of extant sources which argued for non-political divisions within Thessaly modern scholarship must accept that the Thessalians did perceive themselves a distinct and coherent as an ethnic subunit of the Greeks. Among early 20th century scholars of Thessaly, it was believed primitive societies were organized around ethnic identity, but the natural evolution of Greek socio-political identity involved reorganization centering around the *polis*. The Thessalian reliance upon the *ethnos* as an organizing principal through the sixth century rather than transitioning to a system dominated by the *polis* as a method of representation was seen by scholars as a sign of Thessalian backwardness which contributed to the eventual stasis that would consume the region in the fourth century. This binary between *polis* and *ethnos* has more recently been challenged, most notably by Morgan who argued that there was no linear relationship between sociopolitical complexity and the growth of urban centers. Morgan asserted that Greek *poleis* varied wildly in terms of laws, citizenship demographics, and

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4 For more on the very early history of the Thessalians see chapters 1 and 5.

5 A few examples: Aeschin. 2 116; Aristoph. *Wasps* Ln. 1245; Dem. 5 14; Eur. *Alc.* Ln. 425; Thuc. 1.12.3; Plut. *Per.* 17.


economic models, as there was no universal taxonomy for political systems in the ancient world. While Morgan’s analysis can be frustrating because of its inherent inability to categorize Greek polities it most likely reflects the situation on the ground more accurately given the evidence currently available.

One of the earliest pieces of information about Archaic Greek ethnic and political organization is the Iliad’s Catalogue of Ships, which potentially reflects the desire of the early Iron Age Greek populace to connect themselves with the late Bronze Age and the associated heroic mythology which took place before the fall of the Mycenaean palace system. Scholars have noted that Homer’s early mapping of Greece seems to be a mix of ethnic groups and poleis, and in the Larisa-Karditsa basin, the Thessalians are nowhere to be found. Settlements in Thessaly’s Sperchios valley are identified in the Iliad, but none of the peoples referenced are understood to be “Thessalian.” This could be explained by the Thucydidean account of the Thessalian invasion into the Larisa-Karditsa basin, which the historian argued took place sixty years after the conclusion of the Trojan War. However, as argued in chapter 3, Thessalian interest in promoting invasion mythology connected with to the Dorian invasion or the “Return of the Herakleidae” dovetailed with the Aleuada need for external allies to shore up their internal political position in the late Archaic period. That the earliest attestation of this Thessalian legend occurred in a period of political unease does not necessarily indicate that the Thessalian migration was fictional, but it is clear that by the mid-fifth century that the legend was

9 Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 88. Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond the Polis, 207. Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture, 152.
10 Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture, 127.
11 Thuc. 1.12.3.
12 In particular, one of Pindar’s epinicians, commissioned by the Aleuadae makes specific reference to Sparta and Thessaly both being “divinely blessed.” See Pind. P. 10.
sufficiently established as to be promoted in one of Pindar’s epinicians, and Greeks outside Thessaly saw the Thessalians as a discrete ethnic and political unit. This is corroborated by the membership lists of the Delphic Amphictyony, in which polities were listed not in terms of their Archaic or Classical poleis organization, but as ethne. Unfortunately, for the Archaic and the majority of the Classical period our epigraphic evidence for the Thessalian ethnos is limited. Nevertheless, while attestation is scanty and late, it does seem that the Thessalians saw themselves as a unified ethnos and that this belief was reflected in the writings of other Greeks. For instance Aristotle referred to the individual constitutions of a number of Thessalian cities but often refers to Thessalians with a collective term. This is a convention followed by other ancient authors, who clearly saw the Thessalians both as an ethnically-unified polity that acted as a whole and as a grouping of cities in which each polis pursued its own political agenda to a greater or lesser degree. However, it should be reiterated that the ethnus was not a political institution or understood to be an alternative to the poleis model in the ancient world. Instead, the ethnus acted as the “glue” for Thessalian political life, offering an avenue through which the Thessalians could coordinate as a unified whole.

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13 For a brief discussion of the challenges to the Dorian invasion see Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture, 78–82.
14 For a list of various ethne in the Delphic Amphictyony see Hall, 137.
15 Graninger points to an inscription, originally discussed in 1934 but “largely ignored since” that uses the term Πετθαλοι, understood to be a term that theoretically covered the whole ethnus of the Thessalians. Graninger, “Apollo, Enmodia, and Fourth-Century Thessaly,” 122. Modern scholars have suggested that coinage is representative of the shared Thessalian ethnus. See Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935, 12; Thomas Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 34–38.
17 A few examples: Diod. 11.80.1, 16.37,3. Thuc. 1.102.4, 2.22.2. Rather than identifying the actors or factions within all of Thessaly with poleis, it may be more accurate to see the various power struggles within the polity as the result of competing Thessalian aristocrats, rather than a particular city possessing a particular program or policy, which is argued in chapter 3.
19 This position has been taken by a number of scholars: Helly, L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi, 1995, 149. Sordi, “La Grecia Degli <<ethne>>: Genti e Regioni Settentrionali e Centrali.” Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond the Polis, 207; Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture, 168. Graninger discussed the
This leads to another issue in Thessalian politics that is difficult to parse: Thessalian group identity must have not only have been established through positive values – “we as Thessalians have such attributes” – but also in terms of comparisons to outgroups – “we are Thessalians because we are not those people.” The genesis of this identity may have developed in conjunction with the Aleuad reforms (see below, section III), but a major issue exists: much of the foundational work on Thessalian *ethnos* was done in the middle of the 20th century, before the idea of a Dorian invasion fell out of favor.20 If we are to reject the idea of the Dorian invasion, is it possible to accept the idea of an armed and hostile Thessalian migration from Thesprotia?21 Moreover, is it possible to establish a date for the ethnogenesis of the Thessalian people? Unfortunately, until further evidence is found, the answer to the latter of these questions is negative. It might be tempting to hope that archaeological data would confirm the sudden appearance of a distinct cultural group on the Larisa-Karditsa plain. However, material cultures do not map onto social or ethnic groups in a linear fashion; there is no reason why peoples would change the objects they use while coalescing around a new set of otherwise archaeologically invisible values or social criteria. Nevertheless, while modern scholarship cannot verify the historicity of the Thessalian migration, given the relative abundance of ancient attestations to the event, it is reasonable to accept that by the Classical period the Thessalians believed that their ancestors had been an invading people. It certainly seems possible that if this was mythological rather than historical, it was done to justify the social position of the unfree *penestae* in contrast with the free Thessalians. Additionally, given the presence of the Thessalians in the early

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21 As per Hdt. 7.176.4.
Delphic Amphictyony, whose membership was allocated on an ethnic basis, it is reasonable to accept that the Thessalians saw themselves as unified along an ethnic framework.

While *ethnos* seems to have been the unifying element of Thessalian society, the impulse to create a consolidated polity was the *koinon*, the term for the collective political will of the Thessalian people. While a full-scale analysis of the *koinon* in the ancient Greek world is beyond the scope of this work, a brief examination into this basic element of political thought and organization is necessary to understand the government of the Thessalian polity. The word κοινός can simply mean some commonality, as in a feast that was open to all.\(^{22}\) Aeschylus used κοινός to describe the common people or the greater body of citizens.\(^{23}\) The term could also be used to describe political assemblies: for example, Aeschines uses the term to discuss a meeting of the *ethne* of the Delphic Amphictyony.\(^{24}\) Modern understanding of the Thessalian *koinon* comes from several important pieces of evidence. The oldest is a reference in Herodotus, in which he claims the Thessalians sent an army to assist the Peisistratids in 511 at the behest of the κοινῇ γνώμῃ.\(^{25}\) This strongly implies that there was an avenue for political expression available to a significant body of Thessalian citizens by the late sixth century. An inscription commemorating the alliance between Athens and the Thessalian League in 361/0 described the Thessalian government as a *koinon*.\(^{26}\) This was almost certainly a more technical term, specifically describing a “federal state” which the majority of Thessaly had become in the fourth century.\(^{27}\) Outside of these two instances, the use of the specific term κοινός is not used, though

\[^{22}\text{Hes. WD. In. 723}\]
\(^{23}\text{Aesc. Ag. In. 523}\]
\(^{24}\text{Aeschin. 2 139.}\]
\(^{25}\text{I preference the translation of this term as “common/collective public opinion.” Hdt. 5.63.3. For more on this event and Thessalian foreign policy in the Archaic period see chapter 3.}\]
\(^{26}\text{IG II}\text{\textsuperscript{c} 116.}\]
\(^{27}\text{For more on the political organization of Thessaly}\)
some other events – such as the march of Brasidas across Thessaly— seem to corroborate the
existence of such a political and social structure. However, this lack of evidence should not be
entirely surprising. If the concept of the koinon was as foundational as it seems to have been to
the Thessalian understanding of their government, then it seems likely that Thessalian sources
addressing a Thessalian audience would see a discussion of the koinon as assumed and therefore
unnecessary.

In Thessalian scholarship the koinon has been interpreted as existing in a number of
different forms. Often, the koinon can be used as shorthand for the political entity that was the
“state” of Thessaly. What was the genesis of this institution? Westlake believed that in the
Archaic period the koinon was a military expression of the Thessalian ethnos. In his view
Thessaly was a patchwork of petty kingdoms and tribal subunits; local strongmen came together
for military expeditions and were otherwise virtually autonomous. Westlake argued that the
ethnos organization was more primitive than the poleis-system and as such the Thessalians were
unable to form a politically unified government in the Archaic period. For Westlake, Herodotus’
account of the κοινῇ γνώμῃ backing the Thessalian expedition of 511 did not refer to pan-
Thessalian sentiment but only the assent of the elite of Conium, who launched the venture. The
“military expedition” theory as the genesis of a unified Thessalian government was also
advanced by Carlier, though he believed that the koinon took shape in the seventh century and
encompassed a not only military but also political character. Sordi argued that the koinon came

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28 Thuc. 4.78.3, covered in further depth below.
29 Sprawski likens the term koinon to a “cohesive whole.” Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of
Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC, 17. See also: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 2; Bouchon and
31 For a greater discussion of the episode with Brasidas and issues with Thessalian “common opinion” see below.
32 Pierre Carlier, La Royauté En Grèce Avant Alexandre (Strasbourg: AECR, 1984), 417.
into existence when the Thessalians settled in the Larisa-Karditsa basin as an invading people, though she did not address the specific nature of the Archaic *koinon*.

Given our lack of concrete information regarding early Thessalian political systems, it is difficult to accept one interpretation or another as conclusive.

However, modern scholarship can inspect another aspect of the *koinon* more effectively: the manifestation of the *koinon* as political expression of the *ethnos*. Helly discussed the *koinon* only in terms of the executive office of Thessaly and believed Thessaly was essentially a feudal kingdom in which the *koinon* existed only as an intangible concept.

Carlier suggested that the *koinon* began through the cooperation of a number of petty warlords and kings in Thessaly but had little to offer beyond that.

Sordi and Hatzopoulos argued that the *koinon* was the diplomatic mechanism for the many *poleis* of Thessaly to interact with one another, and this took the form of a number of assemblies or councils which determined policy for the Thessalian polity. It was this collective decision making body which was the Thessalian “federal” government.

Unfortunately, all of these interpretations rely on ancient evidence from outside Thessaly, these accounts tend to be relatively oblique in their interest in Thessalian politics. The two most cited passages regarding a possible Thessalian council come from Herodotus and Thucydides. As discussed below, when the Thessalians sent Cineas of Conium to assist the Peisistratids in 514, Herodotus recorded that the expedition was undertaken thanks to *κοινῇ γνώμῃ*. While we cannot know the exact original intention of this phrase, given that it appears only once within all

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37 Hdt. 5.63.3. The exact specifics of the term are unclear, but it seems most probably that the majority of the decision-making and influential Thessalians held pro-Athenian feeling.
of Herodotus’ work, it is clearly meaningful. In their commentary on Herodotus, How and Wells simply offered that “the Thessalians in foreign affairs often acted in common.”\(^{38}\) Expanding on this limited approach, both Sprawski and Larsen have argued that Herodotus’ statement was evidence of a representative institution which made political decisions on behalf of all Thessalians, often in the context of electing a pan-Thessalian executive.\(^{39}\) Literary and epigraphic evidence corroborate this interpretation of Thessalian political life.

In 423, the Spartan general Brasidas crossed through Thessaly on the way to Thrace. At the river Enipeus, ἄλλοι τῶν τίναντία attempted to stop the Spartan army’s crossing of Thessaly.\(^{40}\) While this period of internal Thessalian history is poorly attested, it is most likely that the Diochid clan ruled Thessaly from the city of Pharsalus in this period.\(^{41}\) The political affiliations of the regime are unknown, but if any power were to have organized the resistance to Brasidas’ expedition it would have been this group, especially as the river Enipeus is inside Pharsalian territory.\(^{42}\) The “opposition party” attempting to deter Brasidas claimed they were doing so because the Spartan expedition did not have the permission of all the citizens.\(^{43}\) The nuances of this phrase are lost, but as with the expedition of Thessalian Cineas of Conium – specifically noted by Herodotus as “their own king,” discussed further below – it points to the...
existence of a decision making body of Thessalian citizens to whom the executive was in some way responsible.\textsuperscript{44}

At that point in Thessalian history, it is unclear what this body may have been. Thucydides wrote that Brasidas was ultimately able traverse Thessaly because the government was δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομία ἐχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον.\textsuperscript{45} This statement is one of the few from primary sources that directly addressed the governmental structure in Thessaly. The term δυναστεία appears only 3 other times in Thucydides’ work, and seems to have a connotation of “cliquishness,” as well as implying a close, familial or kinship-group based oligarchy.\textsuperscript{46} Given the predominance of dynastic families in Thessaly it is not a particular surprise that the government in the late fifth century was dominated by a single Thessalian clan.\textsuperscript{47} Despite the apparently limited nature of power-sharing in Thessaly, other groups expected the leadership to follow what modern scholarship might approximate as the “will of the people” and felt justified to openly protest if this mandate was not followed. This was not the only instance of Thessalian resistance to unpopular policies of pan-Thessalian leadership.

In 481 a delegation of Thessalians was sent to the southern Greeks in an attempt to stop the alliance between the Aleuadae and the Persians.\textsuperscript{48} It is likely that the genesis of open dissent in Thessaly was the result of the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project under Aleuada leadership. However, this strife never resulted in a “secessionist” movement; instead, dissident

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Hdt. 5.63.3.
\item \textsuperscript{45} “a customary close dynastic government rather than a more equal one.” Thuc. 4.78.3.
\item \textsuperscript{47} More on the government of Thessaly and its changes in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century will be dealt with in chapter 7 on the revolution in Pharsalus after the Battle of Tanagra.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Hdt. 7.172.1.
\end{itemize}
Thessalians wished to take control of the koinon themselves rather than establish a new polity. This points to a unified group who saw their government as legitimate only when acting with their consent, which in turn implies the existence of a social and political tradition in which a body of stakeholders had the right to comment upon the policies of the dominant dynastic clan.

Herodotus seems to have also had this perception of the Thessalian polity. He described the Thessalian leader Cineas of Comium as τὸν βασιλέα τὸν σφέτερον. The use of the possessive adjective σφετέρος was unusual for Herodotus. Variations of σφέτερον appear in Herodotus’ work sixty-four times, but only once in relation to kingship, in the historian’s descriptions of the Scythians in book 4. Herodotus referred to Scythian leader Ariantas as τὸν σφέτερον βασιλέα; this was the same terminology that Herodotus used to describe Cineas of Comium. The Scythians were seen as a united ethnos with individual political or social factions, much in the same way that the Thessalians were understood by the southern Greeks to be a united people with distinct political, cultural, social, or geographic sub-groups. Unfortunately, this was the extent to which Herodotus detailed his understanding of Scythian political organization. Rolle has argued that in the Classical period, the Scythians maintained a triple kingship, one of whom was politically or socially dominant over the others. Rice has suggested that while there were “kings” of Scythia, the majority of society was constructed around chiefdoms. In her interpretation the Scythian kings had institutional rights or prerogatives were

49 “…their own king.”Hdt. 5.63.3.
50 Hdt. 4.81.5.
51 Specifically, see Hdt. 4.71.1 in which Herodotus notes that the “Royal Scythians” were distinct from the Scythian Plowmen, Hdt. 4.52.3, the Scythian Farmers, Hdt. 4.53.4; the Greek Scythians, Hdt. 4.17.1; the Scythian Nomads, 4.55. The Thessalians distinctions were less socio-cultural and more political, but nonetheless the divisions were deep.
enforceable only as long as the ruling party possessed the social and political capital to do so. If Rice was correct, this suggests that the phrase “τὸν σφέτερον” implies a sense of obligation to the constituency of the “king.” This would additionally suggest that kings in Scythia, like the elite of Thessaly were constrained by a political tradition in which their constituency had the ability to comment on their policies.

This evidence suggests that there was some sort of communal decision-making process in Thessaly during the Classical period, and it seems reasonable to accept this was a foundational element of the koinon. This is a position that has been championed by both Hatzopolous and Sordi, though it has gained little wider traction. Despite the limited of evidence, it does seem that the most reasonable interpretation of Thessalian governance is that there was an assembly to whom the executive was responsible, at least superficially. Given the predominance of a dynastic elite in Thessalian society, it seems probable that the koinon was a body of these dynasts who claimed to represent the ethnos of the Thessalians as a whole. The powers of this assembly are unclear, but given the evidence discussed above, it seems likely that the council was responsible for ratifying the decision to project military force outside of Thessaly, as occured with Cineas of Comium. Additionally, as the Thessalian encounter with Brasidas’ suggests, it seems likely that

54 Rice claimed that “the Royal Scyths were relatively few in number, but there were such efficient rulers and such fearless fighters that they had no difficulty controlling with ease a population consisting of their own husbandmen and the indigenous agriculturalists…who greatly outnumbered them.” Similarly, “…if a king displeased his bodyguard, they likewise did not hesitate to put him to death.” This hardly speaks to a united kingdom governed by institutions and tradition. Rice, 52–53.

55 Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 329; Hatzopoulos, “Thessalie et Macedonie: Affinites et Convergences.” Hatzopolous specifically points to the existence of an assembly in Macedonia. He points to the close connections between northern Thessaly and Macedon and suggests that the because of these close diplomatic and social ties, the existence of an “assembly” in Macedon should corroborate the limited evidence for an assembly in Thessaly.

Westlake references the koinon and suggests that there may have been some sort of council but spends little time on the issue: Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935, 136.
the Thessalian koinon had some sort of ability to advise and legitimately override the chief executive in matters of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{56}

One further piece of circumstantial evidence suggests that there must have been an institution which existed to act as a mediator between the general populace of Thessaly and the pan-Thessalian executive office: the tetrad system. While there is little direct evidence for the Thessalian koinon, one of the governmental structures for which extant attestation exists is the tetrarchy, the division of Thessaly into four distinct administrative units called tetrads: Pelasgiotis, Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, and Histiaeotis.\textsuperscript{57} A fragment of Hellanikos of Lesbos thought to have been written in the fifth century and preserved in the \textit{Lexicon of the Ten Orators} is the earliest piece of evidence which clearly articulates both the tetradic division of Thessaly and the names of the administrative units.\textsuperscript{58} Similarly in the late fifth century, King Admetus in Euripides’ \textit{Alcestis} references the cities of the “four regions” of Thessaly, a sign that the system was readily understandable to viewers of Athenian tragedy and was perceived as an institutional organization that existed in the semi-mythical past.\textsuperscript{59} This institution was referenced repeatedly throughout the course of the Classical period. As discussed in Sec. II, one of the ancestors of Daochos II that was commemorated at Delphi in the late fourth century was a ruler of one of

\textsuperscript{56}Hatzopolous rejects this conclusion, and instead suggests that the Thessalian koinon only had the ability to grant proxenies and other honors to foreigners, which I find suspect. One of the few extant grants of honors to non-Thessalians is the “Sotairos” inscription, in which the town of Thetonion granted the Corinthian Sotairos freedom from taxation for his services to the town. It seems much more likely that individual poleis granted these honors, rather than some pan-Thessalian council. It certainly may be that there were assemblies of citizens in Sotairos inscription: IG 9.2.257, see also Colvin, \textit{A Historical Greek Reader: From Mycenaean to the Koiné}, 93.

\textsuperscript{57}The names of the tetrads are unusual, and it is difficult to say how these designations originated. It certainly seems that the names may be linked to ethnic groups who lived in the Larisa-Karditsa basin prior to the Thessalian arrival. For more on this see section III on the Aleuad Reforms below.

\textsuperscript{58}The “oldest” evidence for the Tetrads is Hellanikos of Lesbos, BNJ 4 F 52. See also: Morgan, \textit{Early Greek States Beyond the Polis}, 22.

\textsuperscript{59}Euripides specifically uses the term τετραρχία. Eur. Alc. Ln. 1154-1155.
these tetrads, Acnonios. An undated fragment attributed to Aristotle described the division of Thessaly into tetrads, which the author ascribed to the mytho-historical figure and founder of the Aleuad dynasty, Aleuas the Red. The relevant portion of the fragment seems quite straightforward: ἐπὶ Ἀλεύα τοῦ πυρροῦ δῆρητο εἰς δ μοίρας ἡ Θεταλία. This organization of the Thessalian polity seems to have been a long-lasting institution; writing in the 1st century CE, Strabo also made reference to the system in his discussion of Thessaly. While we know little about the tetrad system in terms of its institutional functionality, the fact that for over 500 years authors writing about the Thessalian state highlighted the institution as foundational is remarkable. This consistency is indicative of far more than a geographical bond; instead, it strongly suggests that a shared sense of ancestry and culture – the ethnos – was particularly strong amongst the Thessalians and as a people they were loath to give up institutions that had been established by their ancestors.

In terms of functionality, the management of these tetrads was undertaken by the tetrarchs, about whose identity little extant evidence exists with the exception of Daochos II, who as tetrarch and hieromnemon dedicated a statue to his family at Delphi in the 330s. However, given the nature of the tetrarchy wherein each official was responsible for one quarter of Thessaly, it seems likely that there was some sort of council or assembly infrastructure which

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60 Interestingly, Acnonios is not listed as having been from a particular city of Thessaly, though his descendants are identified as Pharsalians. It is tempting to argue that this lack of geographic identifier is meaningful in terms of Thessalian political philosophy. However, several of those who were not identified as government officials are not identified as Pharsalians, whereas the native poleis of Daochos II who ruled “all of Thessaly” was listed.

61 “…in the time of Aleuas the Red Thessaly was split into 4 [units].” Aristotle, *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta*, ed. Valentin Rose (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886), 314. For further discussion of the Aristotelian fragment, see below.

62 Strab. 9.5.2.

63 Beyond his likely role as Philip II’s man, modern scholarship knows little about Sordi has argued that the tetrarchs were appointed by the central government, rather than having been elected by the inhabitants of the tetrad. While this is possible and perhaps probable, it relies heavily on theories and guesswork which cannot be corroborated by evidence. Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno*, 317.
allowed these offices to coordinate with one another. The representatives and officials of the tetrads may have met through the mechanism of the koinon, the collective decision-making body which represented the Thessalian ethos; however, we do not have the luxury of corroborating evidence from textual or material sources. It certainly seems likely that there was a broader franchise in Thessaly, perhaps a more wide-ranging aristocratic council or some sort of pan-Thessalian oligarchy.

The final issue that must be addressed when examining the framework of Thessalian government is chronology. As with most ancient Greek scholarship, establishing a clear timeframe for events in the Geometric and Archaic periods is difficult. While modern scholarship has largely avoided this question, if we are to reconstruct the governmental structure of Thessaly an attempt must be made. It is impossible to do more than speculate as to the ethnogenesis of the Thessalians and the creation of the Thessalian koinon. However, given the consistency with which Greeks in the fifth century outside of Thessaly discussed “the Thessalians” as a corporate entity it seems most likely that this process had been completed by the Classical period. As argued in Sec. III, it is likely that this process began significantly earlier than extant evidence can firmly prove.

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64 This is assuming that ancient authors who described the actions of the Thessalians as a whole were in fact correct, rather than referring to “the Thessalians” as a collective when actions were undertaken by a particular faction or individual polis.
65 In the late 5th century Thucydides referred to the government of Thessaly as a δυναστεία μᾶλλον or “narrow oligarchy.” However, as has been discussed elsewhere in this chapter it seems clear that the ruling faction in Thessaly did not possess a monopoly on political power, nor does it seem the population expect to be ruled by authoritarians.
66 Helly argues that the creation of a Thessalian “space” began in the eighth century. I prefer this explanation, but as with the rest of the periodization and dates in this section, this is wholly without foundational evidence. Helly, L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi, 1995, 139.
II. Basileus, Archon, and Tagus: The executive office of the Thessalians

Broadly, depictions of Thessalian leaders can be divided into two discrete groups: Thessalian sources and non-Thessalian sources. Those authors who wrote about Thessaly but who were not Thessalian seem to have believed that the Thessalian leader was a hereditary king, or βασιλεύς. The meaning of βασιλεύς can be flexible, referring to a wide range of attributes of rulership from the Šāhanšāh Xerxes to the petty kings of the Odyssey. In the case of extra-Thessalian sources, the categorization of the Thessalian leader as a βασιλεύς implies the existence of a hereditary elite whose legitimacy was founded upon the assent of the Thessalian koinon. Herodotus was the earliest non-Thessalian source who attempted to articulate the role and powers of the Thessalian leader. In the early fifth century the Aleuada clan seems to have been dominant in Thessalian politics. Describing their attempts to align their regime with that of Xerxes, Herodotus described the dynastic clan as “Thessalian Kings.” This phrase does not necessarily imply autocratic authority on the part of the Aleuadæ, but instead the kinship group’s role in Thessalian society: they were kings in – not of – Thessaly. From Herodotus’ account the power of the Aleuadae was not absolute, it was predicated on the approval of the populace. The elite of Thessalian society – how broad this segment may have been is unclear – felt justified in undermining the policies of the dominant regime if they believed they could

67 Xerxes: Hdt. 4.43.2 Odyssey: Hom. Od. 18.64.
68 The exact phrase is “Θεσσαλίης βασιλέες,” Hdt. 7.6.2.
69 Unfortunately, Herodotus uses the term βασιλεύς loosely – it can refer to both constitutional kingship like that at Sparta or the absolute kingship of the Persian Empire – and context clues are necessary for deconstructing the historian’s meaning. A. Keaveney, “The Medisers of Thessaly,” Eranos 93 (1995): 30; Noel Robertson, “The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 96 (1976): 106.
amass sufficient support from the greater population for their dissent. In the case of the
Aleuadae, their decision to medize was not supported by the *koinon*, and a rival group attempted
to hinder their plans.\(^70\) This was not only applicable to the Aleuadae in Larisa, as Herodotus also
highlighted the necessity of the Thessalian executive to obtain popular backing in his description
of the expedition of Cineas of Comium. In the previous section the importance of the phrase τὸν
βασιλέα τὸν σφέτερον with regard to the existence of a Thessalian assembly was discussed.\(^71\) In
this context, Herodotus’ report on Cineas of Comium serves to emphasize the consistency with
which the Thessalian executive was presented by non-Thessalian sources.

The approval of the *koinon* being necessary for the ability of the executive to exercise
its will is corroborated by internal Thessalian sources. Chronologically, the earliest literary
sources regarding the Thessalian executive are from the Archaic period. Pindar composed an ode
to a Thessalian victor at the Pythian games at the behest of Thorax of Larisa, head of the Aleuad
clan and the leader of Thessaly in the early fifth century.\(^72\) Pindar’s work does not to describe the
official titles of Thorax, but the poet highlighted the Aleuad leadership as ὑψοῖ φέροντι νόμον
Θεσσαλῶν ἀξοντες, language which bears a striking resemblance to an inscription from the *ex
voto of Daochos*, commissioned by a fourth century Thessalian aristocrat.\(^73\) Moreover, given that
the approval of Pindar’s Aleuad patrons would likely have been necessary in the creation of his
epinician, the choice to characterize the Aleuadae not as “kings,” but instead “navigators of the
state” was almost certainly a conscious and possibly programmatic decision on the part of the
rulers of Larisa.\(^74\) The Thessalians were not a well-known seafaring people, and as such the

\(^{70}\) Hdt. 7.172.1 “…διὸ τούτῳ σφι ἤρξαντο τὰ τοὺς Ἀλευαδᾶς ἐμηχανώντο”
\(^{71}\) Hdt. 5.63.3.
\(^{72}\) Pind. P. 10.
\(^{73}\) Pind. P. 10, Ln. 69-70: “…extolling and glorifying Thessalian law,” see also: Anthony Verity, *Pindar: The
\(^{74}\) “…κέδναι πολίων κυβερνάσεις.” Pind. P. 10 Ln. 72.
nuance of this metaphor is difficult to identify without further context. However, taking the nautical metaphor to its conclusion the decision to portray the executive as the navigator suggests that other Thessalian citizens were crewmembers, all of whom on the “boat” needed work in unison in order to sail without issue, as disaster for the navigator is a disaster for the entire crew, and vice-versa. The use of this metaphor suggests that the Aleuadae and Thessalian leadership in general wished to portray itself as part of a hierarchical but collaborative process, rather than as a purely authoritarian hierarchy. As well, given that the metaphor of the “ship of state” would have been more culturally accessible to the seafaring southern Greek world, it seems very likely that Pindar’s work was designed for an extra-Thessalian audience. To whom or what the Aleuadae were appealing is unclear, but it seems reasonable to accept that Pindar’s work was intended to facilitate social and political connections between the Aleuadae and the southern Greek elite.

The emphasis that Thessalian leaders placed on their adherence to traditional laws – νόμος – is a consistent theme throughout Thessalian history, and the importance that Thessalians placed on continuity of tradition is a key aspect in an examination of Thessalian governance. While internal Thessalian sources are few and far-between, two inscriptions from the fourth century confirm the importance that the Thessalians placed on the connection between operating within a constitutional framework and legitimacy of rule. In 361/0 the Athenians and the Thessalian Federation signed a treaty in an attempt to combat the power of Alexander of Pherae. In particular, the Athenians were made to swear to fight any power which attempted to

76 *IG II²* 116.
overthrow the leader “whom the Thessalians chose.”

This again suggests that there was a mechanism in Thessalian politics in which the legitimacy of the leadership required the assent of the governed. Despite the distance of over a century between the Pindar’s ode and the treaty of the Thessalian Federation, the cultural imperative for a leader to obtain the assent of the koinon seems to have remained in full force. This also seems to have been the case for tetrarch and hieromnemon Daochos II, who commissioned a sculpture group dedicated to his family sometime between 339 and 333. Including Daochos himself, nine of his kinsmen were commemorated on the monument with each member being displayed as a freestanding figure. Of particular interest is Daochos I, the father of Daochos II and the who ruled Thessaly in the late fifth century. The full inscription on the plinth which once supported a representation of Daochos I read Δάοχος Ἅγια εἰμί, πατρὶς Φάρσαλος ἀπάσης Θεσσαλίας ἄρξας, οὐ βία ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἔπτα καὶ εἴκοσι ἐτη, πολλῇ δὲ καὶ ἀγλαοκάρπῳ εἰρήνῃ πλούτῳ τε ἔβρυε Θεσσαλία.

It was key for Thessalian leadership to emphasize their adherence to legal procedure and emphasize their accountability to the Thessalian population. Certainly, modern scholarship might see propaganda in these pronouncements, believing that Thessalian rulers emphasized these values to discourage popular resistance to arbitrary or self-serving regimes. However, that these principles were seen by the Thessalian elite as important to promote suggests that the tradition of an idealized “constitutional,” non-hereditary leadership which was accountable to at least some portion of the population was present in Thessalian social and political thought, and it follows that at some point in the history of the Thessalians that this political structure did exist.

77 IG II2 116, Ln. 18. “…εἵλοντο Θετταλοὶ.”
78 The treaty makes repeated use of the term κοινός in discussing the Thessalian federation.
80 “I am Daochos, son of Agias, from Pharsalos, and I ruled all of Thessaly, not by force but by law, for twenty-seven years, and Thessaly flourished in a long and fruitful peace.” Evans, 143.
The lack of an official Thessalian βασιλεύς is corroborated by Aristotle in his description of Cineas of Conium’s expedition in 511. The philosopher did not refer to the Thessalian leader as a “king,” though he used that term for the Spartan king Cleomenes subsequently. Given Aristotle’s interest in taxonomy, this suggests that he saw the institution of the Thessalian executive as distinct from Spartan Kingship. In his Politics, Aristotle described the position of the Spartan king as a “hereditary generalship” and this is perhaps where the distinction could be made between the Thessalian and Spartan leadership. Spartan kings had a hereditary right to govern, the Thessalian leader did so only because they “officially” received the mandate to rule through popular support.

If the Thessalian executive was not a basileus, it was likely that the position was given the general title of archon. While evidence as limited, internal Thessalian sources use this terminology when discussing the leader of the Thessalian koinon. The inscription for Daochos I specifically used a participle of the verb ἄρχω to describe his tenure over Thessaly. This verb, meaning “to rule” is a cognate of the noun ἄρχον, which was a title used for a wide variety of leadership roles regularly throughout the Greek world. If Daochos was officially a basileus, it would seem reasonable that his title would be emphasized by his ancestors. As this was an inscription commissioned by a Thessalian individual, the lack of designating Daochos I as a basileus suggests that this was not the terminology that was used by Thessalians for pan-Thessalian leadership. Moreover, the Athenian-Thessalian treaty of 361/0 specifically names the leader of the Thessalian Federation as an archon. Given that the Thessalian Federation was

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82 Aristot. Pol. 3.1285a.
83 For a discussion of Spartan kingship see: Paul Cartledge, Spartan Reflections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 57–64.
84 IG II2 116, ln. 34.
deliberately attempting to define itself against the revolutionary government of Alexander of Pherae, and that the only Thessalian-generated sources refer to the Thessalian executive as an archon, it is most reasonable for modern scholarship prefer this term over others.\(^{85}\)

The other Thessalian office which warrants a re-assessment is the position of tagus, an office which would be largely unknown except through machinations of Jason of Pherae.\(^{86}\) As Jason embarked on an ambitious program of unification and expansion in the 370s, he took the title of “tagus of all the Thessalians;” a position which until this chronological point in the literary record of Thessaly was unknown.\(^{87}\) Was Jason’s tagus the historical Thessalian term for archon, and as such the chief executive of the Thessalian koinon?\(^{88}\) Or, did the office of the tagus occupy a different position within Thessalian government and society which Jason then repurposed?\(^{89}\)

Confusion with regard to the position of tagus is understandable. The office is poorly attested to, and the term seems to have been used throughout the Greek world. The root of the noun ταγός has a common ancestor with the verb τάσσω – “to draw up in order of battle, form, array, or marshal,” and the title seems to have carried a militaristic connotation throughout the Classical period. In The Persians, Aeschylus refers both to commanders of individual ships as

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\(^{85}\) This is also the position of Sprawski and Helly: Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC*, 23. Helly, *L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi*, 1995, 190. It must be acknowledged that attestations of this term are late, but to my knowledge there is no Thessalian source from the late Archaic or early Classical periods which.

\(^{86}\) The tagus as a unitary, executive position was championed by Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alesandro Magno*, 62–63.


\(^{88}\) This is the position taken by Larsen and to a lesser degree Sordi. Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, 14; Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alesandro Magno*, 345.

well as Persian admirals who commanded entire fleets as tagot.\textsuperscript{90} The term refers to Zeus as the ultimate cosmic authority in Prometheus Bound, suggesting the title could also connote a command of unquestioned and legitimate supremacy.\textsuperscript{91} Antigone’s Creon, ruling from outside the line of Thebes’ succession perhaps referred to himself as a tagus to ideologically reinforce his legitimacy, using this archaic term to justify his regime.\textsuperscript{92} Adrastus of Argos is called a tagus by the chorus in Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis, and in this context the term was specifically associated with a naval command.\textsuperscript{93} Characters in Aristophanes’ Knights referred to the villainous Paphlagonian and stand in for Athenian politician Cleon as the Athenian tagus; given the playwright’s distaste for Cleon’s bellicocity – it seems likely that by the late fifth century the connotation of a tagus as a military office was firmly solidified in Athenian culture.\textsuperscript{94} The belief that the tagus was a key martial position in Thessaly has been the orthodox position of scholars through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.\textsuperscript{95} Many scholars understood the tagus to be a singular official, a pan-Thessalian executive responsible for prosecuting conflict with Thessaly’s enemies, but Helly has argued that the position of tagus was a local military official, who mustered the forces of their polis to be integrated into the larger Thessalian army.\textsuperscript{96} As the Thessalian cities came under the sway of other powers and increasingly were not fielding armies

\textsuperscript{90} Aesch. Pers. In. 23, 324, 329, 480.
\textsuperscript{91} Aesch. PB In. 96.
\textsuperscript{92} Soph. Ant. In. 1057.
\textsuperscript{93} Eur. IA In. 269.
\textsuperscript{94} Aristoph. Kn. In. 159.
\textsuperscript{96} Helly’s theory is agreed upon by Sprawski, who points to Plato’s Laws (738a) and Aristotle’s Politics (1274b) who use “the word τάξις to designate an army unit composed of citizens…” Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431-370 BC, 16. This view is not that of Sordi, who believed the tagus held a much broader commission. For more, see below. Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Aleksandro Magno, 71–74.
themselves, the *tagoi* appear to have transitioned into becoming civic officials in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, giving a sense as to the cultural importance of the position in Thessaly.\(^9^7\)

Given the lack of Thessalian information in literary evidence, it is necessary to turn to the surviving epigraphic evidence regarding the role of the *tagus*. The earliest evidence has been dated to the third quarter of the fifth century, from Atrax in western Thessaly.\(^9^8\) It is reproduced below in full:

\[
2 \text{Θετόνιοι ἐδοκαν Σοταῖροι τοῖς Κ-}
\]

οικιάσι καὶ γέμει καὶ ἐ-

οικιάσι καὶ χρέμασιν ἀσυλία-

5 ν κάτελειν κεύσασι τοῦ ἐ-

ποίεσαν κέν ταγὰ κέν ἄταγ-

ιαι. αἱ τὶς ταῦτα παρβαίνοι, τὸ-

ν ταγὸν τὸν ἐπεστάκοντα ἐ-

ξέφανάκαδεν. τὰ χρυσία καὶ τὰ

10 ἀργόρια τῆς Βελφαίω ἀπολ-

όμενα ἐσοσε. Ὄρεσταο Φερεκράτ-

\(^9^7\) For a summary of Hellenistic and Roman *tagoi* see Graninger, *Cult and Koinon in Hellenistic Thessaly*, 164–72.

ες ἡυλορέοντος Φιλονίκο ἡυῖος.

Colvin has provided the translation which most closely captures the meaning of this inscription:

(2) The Thetonians gave to Sotairos the Corinthian, to him and to his family and to his household, both immunity for his property (5) and freedom from taxation, and made him their benefactor both in tagia and in atagia. If anyone contravenes these provisions, let the tagus in office enforce them. He saved the gold and (10) silver objects lost from Delphi when Orestes (?) son of Pherecrates son of Philonicos was hyloros.99

The primary difficulty in interpreting this inscription revolves largely around the sixth and seventh lines, which refers to ταγά κἐν ἀταγίαι. This phrase does not appear in any other extant literature or epigraphy. Modern scholarship has interpreted the phrase in two different ways. Both Sordi and Helly argued that κἐν ταγά κἐν ἀταγίαι refers to two different states of the Thessalian government: when tagoi have been elected and when one has not.100 Colvin has suggested the phrase referred to a period in which the Thessalian state was at war, and the period when it was not. Certainly, if the Thessalian state was engaged in a conflict, it would be reasonable to accept that taxes for wealthy resident foreigners like Sotairos would have been

99 Colvin, A Historical Greek Reader: From Mycenaean to the Koiné, 93.
increased to fund the war. If we are to accept that the phrase possesses both connotations, then it would logically follow that the office of *tagus* was only periodically filled in times of crisis.

An inscription which was originally published in 1974, but which has been largely ignored or only briefly touched upon since suggests that not only were there multiple *tagoi*, but that it was likely a lower-level office in the Thessalian *koinon*. Dated to the end of the sixth century or the beginning of the fifth, the inscription was found in the city of Argoussa, formerly in the tetrad of Pelasgitis. This inscription has been reproduced below:

Θέμιστι Αγοραίαι

οἱ *tagoi* ὀνέθεκεν

οἱ ἀμφὶ Κόρρον

καὶ Φανείαν

καὶ Ὀμφαλίονα

Helly argued that this was a dedicatory inscription to Themis of the Agora, and it was given by “les tages Korros, Arneias et Omphalion et leur entourage.” Based on a lack of

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104 Helly, 32.
identification with any known Thessalian kinship group, Helly argued that that multiple tagoi existed in Thessalian cities as minor officials in the Classical period. If modern scholarship accepts the interpretation that there were multiple tagoi at one point in the fifth century who were not Aleuads, this would suggest that the position was local or regional and not seen as one which was vital to the general operation of the Thessalian koinon or any sort of pan-Thessalian political structures.

Based on this information a number of conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, that through the fifth century the Thessalians were organized under an executive office that functioned similar to a hereditary kingship. Many of the chronologically earlier literary references identify the Thessalian leader as a basileus. However, the inconsistency with which the title was used, as well as the pervasive notion that the office was empowered by the assent of the populace, rather than through some sort of divine mandate suggests the use of basileus by extra-Thessalian sources was only indicating the informally hereditary nature of the office. Given the Thessalian willingness to oppose their own leadership, it seems likely that a portion of the Thessalian population had the prerogative to criticize the leader; it is not a significant jump to imagine that these rights were the result of requiring a leader be accepted by a representative body of Thessalians.

Because of the use of the title archon in one of the few extant epigraphic documents produced with Thessalian input, this is the title that should be preferred for the Thessalian executive going back as far as the Archaic period. The Thessalian archon was a consistent

105 Helly went on to argue that this inscription was further corroborated by a dedication in the city of Atrax: SEG 27.184. However, this inscription does not refer to the office of tagus, and while it is tempting to believe that the names listed in the inscription are a number of tagoi it is not supported by the evidence.
“federal” position which oversaw the governing of the tetrads.¹⁰⁶ The unity with which the Thessalians are described as operating outside their borders suggests significant internal coordination which would require a regular and consistent governing apparatus. Although conjectural, I would argue that the position of the Thessalian archon may originally have been a military office formed during periods in which the various power blocs in Thessaly united to go to war, however it had been codified as a permanent position by the Thessalian hegemonic period.¹⁰⁷ Given the consistent expansionary policy of the Thessalians in the Archaic era it seems difficult to believe that this program was not in some way stewarded by a constitutional executive, supported by an oligarchic council. Given the extraordinary position of the tagus, it seems unlikely that the office was part of this assembly.

It is necessary to admit that this analysis is in many ways achronological, treating the positions as having been crystallized at a certain point rather than having undergone change over time. However, as will be discussed further in section IV, the Thessalians specifically looked back to an earlier, idealized government in order to justify socio-political developments in the late fifth century and the early fourth century. As described elsewhere in this work, the Thessalians seem to have had a need to repudiate or erase the failures of their hegemonic project at the end of the Archaic period. As part of this process, the Thessalians settled upon a vision of a “golden age” government and society to which they consistently strove to return. This is especially clear in the fragments of the “Aleuad Reforms” which highlight the importance that the Thessalians placed on their Archaic-era government in the context of developments in the fourth century.

¹⁰⁶ In this I follow Sordi’s interpretation: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 90.
¹⁰⁷ I suspect the Thessalian hegemonic project was in existence in the period of the First Sacred War at the beginning of the sixth century.
III. The reforms of Aleuas the Red

According to two fragments suggested to be part of the lost Aristotelian *Constitution of the Thessalians*, at some point in what is thought to be the late sixth century the mytho-historical Thessalian *archon* Aleuas the Red reorganized the administrative and political structures of the Thessalian state.¹⁰⁸ These fragments were published and numbered by Valintin Rose and are as follows:¹⁰⁹

Rose Fragment 497:

καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Θετταλῶν πολιτείᾳ ἐπὶ Αλεύα τοῦ πυρροῦ διηρήσθαι εἰς δ ὑ ῥ θετταλίαν.

Rose Fragment 498:

διελὼν δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν Ἀλευας ἑταξε κατὰ τὸν κλῆρον παρέχειν ἐκάστους ἱππέας μὲν τεσσαράκοντα ὀπλίτας δὲ ὑγδόνκοντα.


¹⁰⁹ Rose’s fragments contain a significant amount of excess language unnecessary for in the scope of this chapter. I have chosen to use the portions of the fragments highlighted by Wade-Gery, who has purged the document of emendations and made some linguistic updates to the text. Wade-Gery, “Jason of Pherae and Aleuas the Red,” 58. The source fragments can be found in Aristotle, *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta*, 314–15.
My translation is as follows:

Rose Fragment 497: Aristotle in the *Thessalian Constitution* [wrote] in the time of Aleuas the Red Thessaly was split into 4 [units].

Rose Fragment 498: Having divided the polity Aleuas prescribed that each *cleros* should muster forty horsemen and eighty hoplites.

Before investigating the possible ramifications of these fragments, it is necessary to acknowledge the difficulties with treating them as historical documents. References to this work only begin appearing in the 2nd century CE, 500 after Aristotle’s lifetime.110 Additionally, the composition of the Thessalian army and the system through which warriors were mustered outlined in Fragment 498 seems anachronistic to the Archaic period.111 The fragment describes the mustering of hoplites, though the earliest chronological use of this term is in Pindar’s Isthmian ode to Herodotus of Thebes, which has been dated to the second-quarter of the fifth century, too late for an Archaic institution.112 If the fragment accurately describes the recruitment of hoplites into a Thessalian army in the late sixth century, this would put Thessaly on the cutting-edge of Greek military advances, which is not corroborated by ancient sources.113

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110 Slawomir Sprawski, “Remarks on Aristotle’s Thettalon Politeia,” *Electrum* 19 (2012): 140. As Sprawski further points out, there are a number of ancient sources on Thessalian history which have been lost.
111 Sprawski, 144.
112 Pind. *I* 1.23; Sprawski, 145.
113 For the existence of Thessalian hoplites, see below. It should be noted that there has been disagreement about the historical appearance of hoplites in the Hellenic world. If the Protocorinthian “Chigi Vase” accurately portrays a phalanx, then the existence of hoplites could be dated to approximately 640. However, this is debatable as the depictions of the “hoplite warriors” on the vase do not appear to match the description of hoplite warriors in Tyrtaios 8.33-34. Jeffrey Hurwit, “Reading the Chigi Vase,” *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 71, no. 1 (2002): 15. Roisman has argued that the hoplite soldier was in its “mature” phase by the
Moreover, in a seeming non sequitur the author of fragment 498 transitioned from discussing hoplites as part of the Thessalian mustering system to describing the shield that peltasts in the Classical period carried.\(^{114}\) This has prompted a number of scholars to argue that the language in the fragment is corrupt, and that the infantry being enrolled into the Thessalian army were peltasts, not hoplites.\(^{115}\)

Very little extant evidence is available on the Thessalian army in the Archaic and Classical periods; Herodotus provided the earliest attested conflict between the Thessalians and another power in the event modern scholarship understands as the “Phocian Rebellion.”\(^{116}\) Herodotus described the Thessalian army as consisting of both cavalry and infantry, though these wings seem to have operated independently of one another. The term he used for the Thessalian infantry was τὸν πεζὸν, “those on foot.”\(^{117}\) This language seems to be non-technical; Herodotus uses the term throughout his writing to describe “infantry” in the abstract, applying it to foot soldiers without any specificity.\(^{118}\) Other literary reports of the existence of Thessalian hoplites are similarly vague. In the last years of the fifth century, Xenophon described the arrival of the Thessalian commander Meno at the camp of the Greek mercenary army marching to Persia under the command of Cyrus the Younger. Meno was noted as having “one thousand hoplites and five


\(^{116}\) Hdt. 8.27, 8.28. For more on the Phocian Rebellion see chapter 3.

\(^{117}\) Hdt. 8.28.

\(^{118}\) Some examples: Hdt. 2.159, 6.9.1, 7.57.2, 9.102.4, 9.96.2. Herodotus also uses the term interchangeably for both Greek and non-Greek sources: 4.201, 9.32.2, 9.71.1, 9.98.2.
hundred peltasts, Dolopians, Aenianians, and Olynthians." Xenophon’s language is unclear, only Meno is specifically described as a Thessalian, grammatically both the \( \pi\varepsilon\lambda\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma \) and \( \omega\pi\lambda\iota\tau\alpha\varsigma \) could be Thessalians or from a different \textit{ethnos}. Only Jason of Pherae in the 370s specified that he would be raising a force of Thessalian hoplites. However, while Jason claimed to able to recruit 10,000 hoplites, during the only extra-Thessalian operation he seems to have undertaken the Tyrant of Pherae was accompanied only by a mercenary bodyguard whose equipment was not identified. This does not seem to have been an accident or an oversight on the part of the author as in the same episode Xenophon described the Spartan infantry as hoplites, and quite clearly identified their Phocian allies as peltasts. It is unclear why Xenophon would make this distinction, but the lack of identification of the Thessalian troops as hoplites makes it difficult to accept that Jason fielded a significant amount of native heavy infantry.

When Thessalian soldiers are specified in terms of their equipment and role, they are most often identified as cavalry. Herodotus described the expedition of the Thessalian \textit{archon} Cineas of Conium of 511, which consisted of a thousand horsemen. Thessalian cavalry participated at the Battle of Tanagra and in the early phases of the Archidamean War. In the fourth century Isocrates claimed that Thessaly could field 3,000 cavalry, and Diodorus recorded that there were 1,800 Thessalian cavalrymen in the army of Alexander. Thessalian cavalry was

\begin{itemize}
  \item 119 Xen. Anab. 1.2.6.
  \item 120 Xen. Hell. 6.1.19.
  \item 121 He describes Jason’s infantry as \( \pi\varepsilon\xi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma \), rather than as hoplites. Xen. Hell. 6.4.21., 6.4.28.
  \item 122 Spartan Hoplites: Xen. Hell. 6.4.19; Phocian peltasts: Hell. 6.4.9.
  \item 124 Hdt. 5.63.3, 5.64.2.
  \item 125 Thuc. 1.107.7, 2.22.
  \item 126 Isoc. 8.118. Jason believed he could raise 8,000: Xen. Hell. 6.1.19. Diod. 17.17.4.
\end{itemize}
present and noted for being particularly effective in the army of Pyrrhus and at the Battle of Cynoscephale.\textsuperscript{127} The foot soldiers of Thessaly seem to have been largely uninteresting to ancient authors, suggesting that their presence on the battlefield was difficult to categorize and they unlikely to have been soldiers who served in a phalanx.

Based on the significant lack of information about Thessalian hoplites, it seems unlikely that the Thessalians developed a strong “hoplite culture” along the lines of their southern counterparts. The broad and flat expanse of Thessaly would seem to be far more suitable for a mobile force of cavalry and light troops rather than a relatively static phalanx, which could be easily flanked if their enemy had a strong cavalry or light infantry wing.\textsuperscript{128} As such, the substitution of peltasts for hoplites in Fragment 498 would seem more reasonable from a military perspective. However, the decision by a number of modern scholars to do so has encouraged the misunderstanding that the peltasts who were enrolled into the Thessalian army were from neighboring subject-ally \textit{perioicoi}.\textsuperscript{129} This opinion was informed by Xenophon’s account of Jason of Pherae, who asserted in the 370s that his pan-Thessalian army would integrate peltasts and archers from the \textit{perioicic} regions around Thessaly.\textsuperscript{130} However, under closer examination the decision to link Jason’s recruitment schema to the Archaic period does not hold up to scrutiny.

\textsuperscript{127} Plu. \textit{Pyrrh.} 17.3; Livy 3.33.
\textsuperscript{128} Greek commanders were quite aware of the limitations of the phalanx in terms of mobility: Thuc. 3.107.3, 4.96.5, 5.71.1; Xen. \textit{Anab.} 4.8.11.
\textsuperscript{129} Sordi, \textit{La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno}, 65–67; Wade-Gery, “Jason of Pherae and Aleuas the Red,” 58–59; Meyer, \textit{Theopomps Hellenika: Mit Einer Beilage Über Die Rede an Die Larisaer Und Die Verfassung Thessaliens}, 221. Helly believed that the peltasts were not from the \textit{perioicic} settlements but the \textit{penestae}. As discussed below, I think part of his argument is quite reasonable. Helly, Helly, \textit{L’État Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tétrades et Les Tagoi goi}, 184–86,
\textsuperscript{130} Xen. Hell. 6.1.9.
Fragment 498 quite clearly articulates that each cleros should raise both infantry and cavalrymen. If the peltasts of the Thessalian army were recruited from the perioicoi, why would the Thessalians also be enrolling cavalry from these peripheral mountainous border areas? The fragment makes clear that it was Thessaly that itself was divided into cleroi, not periocic dependencies.\textsuperscript{131} Thessaly was more than capable of fielding a significant body of cavalry, and it seems likely that horses were far more readily available than in Southern Greece as on at least one occasion the unfree penestae were fielded as cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{132} If horses were so readily available that subservient agricultural laborers were able to be trained in cavalry tactics, it seems surprising that the Thessalians would need to recruit horsemen from an area which was mountainous and not conducive for large-scale horse breeding. Moreover, Thessaly was famous for the quality of its horses, and it is difficult to see why lesser soldiers would be recruited to supplement the Thessalian cavalry.\textsuperscript{133} It seems more likely that the soldiers recruited under the organization attributed to Aleuas the Red were Thessalians, not perioicoi.\textsuperscript{134}

Helly argued that the peltasts enrolled into the Thessalian army after the Aleuad reforms were penestae, the unfree class of people in Thessaly most often compared to the Spartan helots.\textsuperscript{135} While Helly’s interpretation seems more reasonable than those who believe the peltasts to have been recruited from populations outside the Larisa-Karditsa basin, the same issue remains: why would the Thessalians rely on cavalry and peltasts from penestic settlements instead of their own? If the population of penestae was so significant that in order for the

\textsuperscript{131} The language in the fragment is somewhat confusing, but it has been generally accepted that τὴν πολιτικὴν means Thessaly proper. Helly, \textit{L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi}, 1995, 154; Sprawski, “Remarks on Aristotle’s Thetatlon Politeia,” 142.
\textsuperscript{132} Dem. 13.23, 23.199.
\textsuperscript{133} Herod. 7.196.
\textsuperscript{134} This of course does not mean that the Thessalians did not have perioicic allies, but they were likely integrated into the Thessalian army through other mechanisms.
Thessalians to act as a coherent military power outside their territory the unfree were required to be enrolled into their ranks, it seems surprising that this would not have warranted mention in some ancient source. While chapter 5 argues that the status of the *penestae* requires a re-evaluation, relying on an even nominally unfree population for national defense seems to be an unwise strategy. If we are to see the Aleuad reforms as standardizing the recruitment practices of the Thessalian *koinon*, it seems reasonable that soldiers were drawn from the populations in the Larisa-Karditsa basin. However, these were not purely Thessalian populations. Fragment 498 describes the process through which the non-Thessalian communities in the Larisa-Karditsa basin were integrated into the Thessalian *koinon*.

Archaeological evidence from Thessaly has unfortunately produced little information as to the details of Thessalian society in the Archaic and Classical periods. The majority of usable evidence comes from Iron Age tombs, and these finds often do not provide sufficient context for a greater analysis. However, using literary sources modern scholarship can speculate about some of the early political and social processes that may have been part of the formation of the Thessalian *koinon*. While the exact details of the process are no longer available as discussed above, it seems that the mytho-historical foundation of the Thessalian people involved the migration of the Thessalians into the Larisa-Karditsa basin, driving out or subjugating the indigenous peoples. However, a fragment attributed to Simonides suggests that the Thessalian

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136 For example, one survey of Iron age burial goods included swords, knives, and one arrowhead but these finds lack any context which would give further information about the occupants other than they were elite members of society which was generally in line with other Greek societies at the time. Ioannis Georganas, “Early Iron Age Tholos Tombs in Thessaly (c.1100-700 BC),” *Mediterranean Archaeology* 13 (2000): 52. See also: Ioannis Georganas, “Constructing Identities in Early Iron Age Thessaly: The Case of the Halos Tumuli,” *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 21, no. 3 (2002): 295.

137 The two Classical sources which cover the Thessalian migration or invasion are Hdt. 7.176.4 and Thuc. 1.12.3.
settlement in the Larisa-Karditsa basin was somewhat more complicated. In his survey of the Roman world, Strabo quoted the poet concerning Thessaly:

Σιμωνίδης Περραιβοὺς καὶ Λαπίθας καλεὶ τοὺς Πελασγιώτας ἀπαντάς, τοὺς τὰ ἐδὰ κατέχοντας τὰ περὶ Γυρτόνα καὶ τὰς ἐκβολὰς τοῦ Πηνειοῦ καὶ Ὁσσαν καὶ Πήλιον καὶ τὰ περὶ Δημητριάδα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ, Λάρισαν Κραννώνα Σκοτούσσαν Μόψιον Ἄτρακα, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Νεσσωνίδα λίμνην καὶ τὴν Βοιβήδα.

The Perrhaebians were one of the Thessalian perioicoi, subject-allies who had their own geographically distinct territory to the north of Thessaly. This group is understood to have been a subject-ally of the Aleuad clan in Larisa. However, Simonides seems to have understood that in the Archaic period the Perrhaebians also lived in settlements around cities like Larisa as well as Scotussa and Lake Boebis, which lay significantly further south in the territory of the Magnesians, another perioicic dependency of the Thessalians. The poleis that Simonides lists are all understood to have been ethnically Thessalian settlements by the Classical period. Given that Simonides seems to have stayed in Thessaly sometime during the late sixth and early fifth centuries, there is no reason to question the historicity of his statement.

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138 “Simonides uses the terms Perrhaebians and Lapiths of all the Pelasgiotes who occupy the region about Gyrton and the outlets of the Peneius and Mount Ossa and Mount Pelion, and the region about Demetrias, and the region in the plain, I mean Larisa, Crannon, Scotussa, Mopsium, Atrax, and the region about Lake Nessonis and Lake Boebeis...” Strab. 9.5.20.
140 Hom. Il. 2.712; Hdt. 7.129; For more on the perioicic dependencies of Thessaly see McInerney, The Folds of Parnassos, 9; Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond the Polis, 29; Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period.”
However, if there were settlements of non-Thessalian peoples in areas scholarship has traditionally understood to have been exclusively Thessalian in the late Archaic period, then a new interpretation regarding the process of Thessalian migration and settlement is possible. While we know little of the method through which the Thessalians occupied Thessaly, any subjugation or displacement of the indigenous populations must have been piecemeal. Winning a battle as an invading force required a significant number of soldiers, but forcibly ejecting or subjugating entire populations on a hegemonic level would have necessitated coordination and manpower that seems unlikely to have been available to a migratory Archaic group. Instead, modern scholarship should understand the arrival of the Thessalians as a group of people who carved out a portion of the Larisa-Karditsa basin for their own. If Simonides’ report is accurate, then the Thessalians were one of a number of different ethne on the “Thessalian” plain through the end of the Archaic period. However, ancient writers seem to have understood that in the Classical period only the Thessalians lived in Thessaly proper. As such, a new interpretation of the “reforms” of Aleuas the Red may help to reconcile these issues. The attribution of a system of cleroi as the mechanism through which soldiers were mustered into the Thessalian army provides clues.

Extant evidence on Cleruchies is monopolized by Athenian sources, for whom these divisions were the mechanism for colonization. Cleruchies were instituted in the territory of

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143 Thessaly seems to have been heavily populated by the Middle Bronze Age, further compounding this issue. Nikolas Papadimitriou, “Both Center and Periphery? Thessaly in the Mycenaean Period,” in Conference Proceedings Περιφέρεια Θεσσαλίας, 1ο Διεθνές Συνέδριο Ιστορίας Και Πολιτισμού Της Θεσσαλίας, Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, 9-11 Νοεμβρίου 2006 (Athens, 2008), 106.

144 Westlake’s belief that the Thessalians “won their victories not through superior numbers but superior arms” may have been more correct than not, though I reject the idea that the Thessalians were part of the Dorian migration. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 1935, 22.


146 While the use of cleroi was in a Thessalian milieu, if Aristotle did indeed write the fragments of the government of Aleuas the Red, then it seems likely that the use of this term was in an Athenian context.
Athenian subject-allies as a method of economic subjugation: land was seized from natives and given to Athenian citizens; the former owners were required to work the land and give the produce to the new Athenian masters.\textsuperscript{147} For the Athenians, the populations in the cleruchies do not seem to have served with Athens in a military capacity, instead they provided monetary resources for the Athenian \textit{cleruchs} who could use their profits to serve in garrisons or afford a panoply.\textsuperscript{148}

In a Thessalian context, I suggest interpreting the division of land into \textit{cleroi} as a form of “internal colonization.” After the arrival of the Thessalians on the Larisa-Karditsa basin, the newcomers were surrounded by a variety of peoples in established settlements which were strong enough that they could not be fully enslaved or driven out of the area.\textsuperscript{149} Perhaps under the command of Aleuas the Red, the Thessalians established an administrative organization that would make a Thessalian official responsible for recruiting cavalry and peltasts and integrating them into Thessalian expeditions against external enemies. These \textit{cleroi} were likely under the purview of the Thessalian dynastic families as well as the Thessalian “federal government” in the form of the tetrarch, though likely these two hierarchies overlapped significantly.

As has been suggested in Sec. I, the Thessalian \textit{koinon} was the political expression of the \textit{ethnos}, and this was foundational to the Thessalian polity. However, as Hall has argued

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{148} Figueira, “Colonisation in the Classical Period,” 458. Zelnick-Abramovitz, “Settlers and Dispossessed in the Athenian Empire,” 334. If the Athenian landlords were present at their kleroi, a significant number of them could also have served as a garrison or security force, however given the size of the Thessalian \textit{kleroi} it seems unlikely that this was the case in Thessaly. For Athenian \textit{klерuchs} as “security forces” see: Plut. \textit{Per.} 11.5. Figueira, “Colonisation in the Classical Period,” 442; Russell Meiggs, \textit{The Athenian Empire} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 260.
  \item \textsuperscript{149} This could also explain the belief of many ancient authors in the Classical and Hellenistic periods that the unfree \textit{penestae} were ethnically different than their Thessalian overlords.
\end{itemize}
extensively, the process of *ethnogenesis* occurred in Thessaly in different stages in different regions.\textsuperscript{150} There is no reason to accept that the Thessalian *ethnos* emerged fully formed. Instead, while its political structures were established early on, the Thessalian identity could be adopted and through the *cleroi* the many different populations on the Larisa-Karditsa basin could be integrated into the *koinon* to supplement Thessalian military power. This process of military and cultural integration would have produced a situation which encouraged the longevity of a “federal” government in which individual settlements and communities had a significant amount of autonomy but at the same time saw themselves as a unified whole. While this reconstruction is speculative, it is my belief that the fragments supposed to describe the “reforms” of Aleuas the Red are not a reorganization of the Thessalian *polity* but instead a mytho-historic recollection of its genesis. As such, the fragments of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Thessalians* do not describe a process in the late sixth century, but one that occurred much earlier.

Most modern scholars have accepted that the changes which were attributed to the eponymous Aleuas the Red took place in the late sixth century, however the logic placing them at this point is unsound. The earliest ancient reference to Aleuas the Red and his descendants was made by Pindar, who called the Larisaean Thorax and his brothers “the sons of Aleuas.”\textsuperscript{151} These same individuals appeared in Herodotus’ narrative of the second Persian invasion, firmly planting their adulthoods in the 20 year period between 500-480.\textsuperscript{152} Several hundred years later Diodorus Siculus referenced the Aleuad clan in his discussion of Thessaly during the reign of Alexander of Pherae (369 – 356), suggesting that the clan’s ability to hold onto power was significant, as would understandably befit the descendants of a major lawgiver of a Greek

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*, 134–54.}
\footnote{Ἀλεύα τε παῖδες. Pind. *P.* 10, ln. 5.}
\footnote{Hdt. 7.6, 7.172, 9.1, 9.58.}
\end{footnotes}
In the 1st century CE Plutarch recorded that Aleuas had been chosen by the Pythia at Delphi to lead the Thessalians. It is difficult to accept Plutarch’s account as fully historical, but it likely represents the cultural memory of the close relationship between the Thessalians and the oracle at Delphi, thanks to their position on the Delphic Amphictyony.

Modern scholarship has spent significant energy attempting to establish a chronology of the Aleuad dynasty. In particular, Wade-Gery and Morrison have assembled an elaborate family tree, which lists seven generations of Scopads and Aleuads from 630-450. This is without a doubt a remarkable achievement of scholarship, collecting and interpreting a wide range of sources. However, is it reliable? I would argue that despite the seductive nature of this collection of evidence, any attempt at a reconstruction of an Aleuad family tree is ultimately flawed. All reconstructions of the Aleuad lineage rely upon a single line in Pindar which refers to Thorax and his brothers as the “sons” of Aleuas. However, from Pindar’s language and metaphor it is clear that he is attempting to compress and combine a number of mytho-historical events and center them around the Aleuad dynasty in a way that makes taking his words at face value suspect.

Pindar opened his ode to Hippocleas of Thessaly connecting both Sparta and Thessaly, claiming that both the Aleuad dynasty and the Spartan kings were descended from Herakles. While this may have been an established myth, the historical context in which it was written suggests ulterior motives. After the Phocian Rebellion the political capital of the Aleuadae was

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153 Diod. 15.61.3.
154 Plut. De Frat. 21.
155 As Morgan points out, Plutarch’s account plays on tropes common with colonial powers: Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond the Polis, 130.
157 Even the term “sons of Aleuas” could be suspect. Pindar’s canon does include the use of the noun παῖς in a metaphorical sense, referring to wine as the “son of the vine,” and clearly wine is not the direct biological child of a grape vine: ἀμπέλου παῖς. Pind. N. 9, Ln. 52
limited, and the clan was casting about for allies in the late sixth and early fifth centuries. The poet further discussed two forces which inspired his composition: the Pythian oracle at Delphi and the city of Pelinna, likely the home of Hippocleas, the ostensible subject of the ode.

Certainly as Hippocleas won the Pythian Games, it should come as no surprise that Pindar would reference Delphi. However, the Delphic Oracle seems to have been linked to the Thessalians since the First Sacred War of the early sixth century, and in none of the extant accounts are Aleuas or the Aleuadae linked to its conquest. Pelinna was not the home of the Aleuadae. Rather, this small city was originally Perrhaebian, one of the *perioicic* subjects of Larisa. According to Xenophon it was the Thessalian noble Scopas who was responsible for the subjugation of the Thessalian *perioici*, not the Aleuadae. This suggests that the poet was actively attempting to appropriate a number of different, potentially disparate “national myths” into the history of the Aleuad dynasty. There is every reason to suspect that Pindar’s work is significantly influenced or motivated by Aleuad propaganda which sought to connect their dynasty to the high points of Thessalian expansion and the successful phase of the Thessalian hegemonic project, rather than their shaky position at the turn of the sixth century. This could also be corroborated by the actions of the Aleuads with regard to Xerxes’ invasion, in which the Thessalians deliberately led the Persian forces to ravage Phocian territory with the express purpose of repudiating their losses in the Phocian Rebellion. For these reasons that I am skeptical of accepting that Thorax was the biological child of Aleuas the Red, who reorganized the Thessalian state in the late sixth century.

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158 See chapter 3 on the Phocian Rebellion and the loss of ruling mandate by the Aleuadae.
159 *Pind. P.* 10 Ln. 4. Πυθώ τε καὶ τὸ Πελινναῖον ἀπελέλει.
160 Strab. 9.5.19.
162 See chapter 3 on intra-Thessalian politics and their role in the second Persian War.
Instead, as I argue in Section I the division of the Larisa-Karditsa basin into tetrads as described by Fragment 497 and elsewhere represents the earliest stages of the Thessalian koinon and “federal” government. This process occurred in the late seventh or early sixth centuries in conjunction with the First Sacred War. While the reconstruction presented above is speculative, it offers a way to reconcile what has traditionally been unknown: the process through which the Thessalians established themselves in the Larisa-Karditsa basin. The division of Thessaly into both tetrads and cleroi was an administrative and military reorganization, but it was also the process through which the Thessalian population integrated their non-Thessalian neighbors into a political and martial force which helped to enable and promote a hegemonic project which ultimately ended with the Phocian Rebellion in the years before the second Persian invasion. Aleuas the red certainly may have been the figure to organize Thessalian political structures, but if he did so it was far before the regime of Thorax and his brothers.
Chapter 5: Thessaly and the Penestae

The Thessalians did not see themselves as an autochthonic people. Instead, the Thessalians believed that their ancestors had come from outside the Pineos River basin, subjugating the native inhabitants and forcing them into an unfree status. Extant versions of this narrative were articulated by non-Thessalian authors in the Classical period, and literary elements of the mytho-historical genesis of Thessaly can be traced back to the late Archaic period. Operating from the position that the Thessalians were not native to Thessaly, the “invading” Thessalians needed to distinguish themselves from the indigenous population of the Pineos River basin. Othering is key to the colonization process, and it is likely that the Thessalian arrival in the area demanded the creation of the penestae, the unfree class of Thessaly similar to the Spartan helots, in order to establish economic dominance and maintain cultural cohesion of the invaders. In an era in which most Greek polities were unable to organize their populations for large-scale external political projects, maintaining a distinct ethnic identity from their subjugated population and subject-ally neighbors empowered the Thessalians to extend their hegemony over significant portions of central Greece.

Thucydides and Herodotus were the earliest authors to offer a historical narrative of the Pineos River basin and the genesis of the Thessalian ethnos. According to the Athenian historian, the region of Thessaly was known as being a target for depredations of outsiders.¹ While Thucydides did not elaborate further on his statement, the rich agricultural and ranch land of Thessaly must have been the object of desire for many in pre-Classical Greece. Furthermore, the historian offered a distinct timeline for the arrival of the Thessalians: the ethnos arrived sixty

¹ Thuc. 1.2
years after the end of Trojan War. This migration displaced a Boeotian population that was living in the vicinity of Arne, and later historians believed that these displaced Boeotians became the Thessalian *penestae*. Herodotus’ account of the genesis of Thessaly followed a similar pattern: the Thessalians were ethnically Dorian and were part of the migration of Dorian peoples around Greece in the Dark Age. Under mythological King Deukalion, the Dori ans travelled around northern Greece, at one point settling in Pythia, or southern Thessaly.

The Dorian migration united these two narratives. Thucydides’ account transitioned immediately from discussing the arrival of the Thessalians in Thessaly to the Dorian and Heraclid conquest of the Peloponnese, drawing a clear parallel between the two. Herodotus, though he was interested in discussing the movements of the Dorian people, did not in indicate he believed that the Dori ans fled from Homeric Pythia *in toto*. Instead, it seems far more likely that Herodotus believed that the Thessalians were a branch of Dori ans who stayed in Pythia while the majority moved on. Why would these authors, even obliquely, refer to a common ancestor between the Thessalians, who spoke an Aeolic, rather than Doric dialect? By at least the early fifth century, the Thessalian aristocracy was promoting a connection between the Dorian invasion or migration, and the supposed Thessalian invasion of Thessaly. Pindar opened his *epinician* ode for Hippocleas of Thessaly by making a reference to this mythology:

“Lacedaemon is prosperous; Thessaly is divinely blessed. Both are ruled by the race of a single

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2 Thuc. 1.12.3.
3 BNJ Archæmachiæ von Euboia f1. Unfortunately, Thucydides did not offer any further details as to the fate of the native Boeotians, only recording that they were “driven out.” Furthermore, Thucydides recorded that the population around Arne was only a fragment of the Boeotian population in central Greece, there were Boeotians living in the boundaries of Classical Boeotia who participated in the Trojan War: Hom. *Il.* 2.494-510; 4.406.
4 Hdt. 1.56.3.
5 This does not account for the *penestae*, whom neither Herodotus nor Thucydides mentions.
6 D. Gary Miller, *Ancient Greek Dialects and Early Authors* (Boston: de Gruyter, 2013), 231–33.
ancestor: Heracles, the best in battle.” In doing so, the ruling Aleuadae family – of whom Hippocleas was a dependent if not a member – were not only explicitly linking themselves to the Spartan Agiad and Eurypontid dynasties, but also implicitly to the myth of the “return of the Heracledae” and the Dorian invasion. This connection between the Thessalians and the Dorian Spartans is surprising, if the mythology was developed in the Archaic period one would expect to find in the *Iliad* a connection between Tlepolemus, the Rhodian son of Heracles, and the immediate subsequent detailing of the inhabitants of the area which would become Thessaly. As described above while both Herodotus and Thucydides seem to implicitly connect the Thessalians to the Dorian peoples, neither make the connection explicit.

Two options present themselves: either the understanding of Thessalian split from the Dorian migrations was not preserved from the Dark Age, or this narrative only came to exist much later, and was not well known or accepted by southern Greeks. Clearly, there is no way to find a sure answer to this question without further data. However, given the lack of corroboration that other sources offer as a connection between the Thessalian elite and the Dorian Heracledae, it seems most likely that even if this mythology existed prior to Pindar’s tenure in Thessaly, that it was not of particular interest to Southern Greeks. Instead, it seems more likely that the Aleudae had political and social motivations for promoting this narrative: it was an attempt on the part of the Aleuadae to generate or reinforce ties with the Spartan elite, who in turn as allies and kinsmen would help stabilize Aleuad power in Thessaly at the end of the Archaic period.

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7 Pind. *P.* 10 ln. 1 – 3.
10 A discussion of the political instability in Thessaly at the end of the Archaic period can be found in the next chapter.
Moreover, the promotion of this narrative would have been used to reinforce the existing social and political distinctions in Thessaly.

According to Isocrates, the descendants of Heracles conquered the Peloponnese, including Messenia, as punishment for its inhabitants’ transgressions against the demi-god Heracles.¹¹ This seems as if it would have been an important justification for the continuing subjugation of the Messenian and Laconian helots. Given the similarity that ancient authors saw in the social and political status of the helots and penestae, it seems likely Thessalian elite would have settled upon this “return of the Heracledae” mythology as a way of reinforcing their dominance over the penestae, the unfree agricultural serf class which outsiders considered to occupy the same social and political rung as the Spartan helots. If the Thessalian elite were adopting or attempting to emphasize their mythological connections with southern Greek powers in late Archaic, a narrative which could be used to justify the social divisions in Thessaly and recruit outsiders to help support those divisions, then it stands to reason that at the time the narrative was being promoted, the social cohesion of the Thessalians was breaking down.

What then can conclusively be accepted about the genesis of the Thessalian ethnos? The invasion mythology, either was part of a Dorian migration or as independent peoples is poorly attested, but rejecting this framework offers few alternatives. If the Thessalians were indeed an indigenous people, then it seems unlikely that a mythology invented out of whole cloth would have been widely accepted. Moreover, if the Thessalians were native to the Pineos River basin, why would Homeric references to the area not identify the Thessalians? If modern scholarship accepts the invasion narrative, then it seems unlikely that the Thessalians arrived with the Dorian

¹¹ Isoc. 6.19.
migration or invasion, or as part of the “return of the Heracledae,” given the lack of explicit corroborating evidence from other authors. Instead, if the Thessalians migrated to Thessaly it is most likely that they did so as part of a different wave of displaced or migratory peoples into Central Greece. This alternative certainly leaves much to be desired, but without any new evidence it is difficult to offer any further detail. However, if the Thessalians were an invading people, that would speak to the sense of unity and drive that the Thessalians displayed in the Archaic period. Few other states in the Archaic period were able to consistently project political and military power outside of their borders, and that the Thessalian elite were able to do so suggests an unusual level of coordination amongst the Thessalians. It seems very possible that this was a product of invasion: a disunited invader does not make for a successful invasion.

In ancient literary sources, one of the most noted institutions of Thessalian society was that of the *penestae*, the “unfree” class between full citizens and chattel slaves most often compared to the *helots* of Sparta. In the eyes of the southern Greeks who wrote about the region, that the aristocratic dynastic clans were the dominant political and economic force in in Thessaly. These elite were supported, and their wealth and position maintained by the labor of the *penestae*, a class of agricultural serfs whose lives revolved around the seasonal rhythms of farming and animal husbandry. However, beyond a few key details we know little about what seems to have been a foundational institution in Thessalian society.

The Thessalian dynastic families were deeply tied into the social fabric of Greece and connected to their elite counterparts in the south through *xenoi* or *proxeno* relationships in the fifth and fourth centuries, and as such many of the authors who wrote about Thessaly were in a position to have come into direct contact with Thessalians. However, the surviving texts are not an analysis of Thessalian society and neither the free nor the unfree peoples of Thessaly seem to
have held much interest for the southern Greeks. As a result, the foremost expert on the *penestae*, J. Ducat quite reasonably argued that the best available option is to attempt to reconstruct what other Greeks thought of the *penestae*.\(^{12}\) However, this is unsatisfying from a position of attempting to build a model of Thessalian society. Building from previous work, this chapter will attempt to further elucidate the role and institution of the *penestae* by the following two methods. Firstly, to attempt to reconstruct as best as possible the actual role of the *penestae*. This is of course a challenging proposition. As with the majority of Thessalian history – and especially Thessalian history prior to the fourth century – our sources are disjointed, but it is necessary to come to some sort of positive conclusion as to who the *penestae* were, where they fit into Thessalian society, and their role in the history of Thessaly. Secondly it is useful to examine extant comparisons between the *penestae* and the group which seemed to provide the most comfortable analog, the *helots* of Sparta.\(^{13}\) Like the *penestae* in Thessaly, *Helots* and helotage seem to have been a fundamental aspect of Spartan society. Yet, despite the persistence with which ancient authors compare the two, it seems unlikely that these two institutions were in fact similar, especially in terms of the relationship between the free and unfree. While Spartan society was organized around the subjugation and management of the *helots*, Thessalian society does not seem to have similar or comparable social instructions or structures that would involve the continued suppression of a large, united underclass. Instead, the relationship – and as such, the

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institution as a whole – between the *penestae* and their Thessalian masters was significantly
different than that of the *helots* and Spartans.

I. The Origins of the Penestae

It seems likely that the *penestae* as a legal or social class disappeared in the fourth
century, roughly contemporaneously to the earliest chronological mentions of the group.\(^\text{14}\) The
earliest sources in the literary record come from Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and Xenophon.
However, when these authors described the *penestae* they were mainly interested in the
relationship between the unfree and the free in Thessaly. While fears of a servile revolt were in
the forefront of political theorists like Aristotle and Plato, the tension between the *penestae* and
their masters tells us little about the group itself. Writings about the *penestae* and their formation
as a social group or legal designation within Thessalian society came later, in the 3\(^{rd}\) century and
beyond. Ammonius Hermiae, writing in the fifth century AD, perhaps following what is alleged
to be a fragment of Aristotle, argued that the *penestae* were the product of some forgotten
conflict, much like the *helots*.\(^\text{15}\) This seems as though it would correspond with the other major
explanation as to the genesis of the *penestae*, which suggested that the group were the remnants
of Boeotians living near the ancient town of Arne, who remained in Thessaly after the arrival of

\(^\text{14}\) Sprawski and Westlake argue for the disappearance of the *penestae* in the late 4\(^{th}\) century. Sprawski, *Jason of
Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC*, 109; Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 1935, 144. Mili and Ducat suggest this group was no longer in existence in the Hellenistic period, but do not offer a
more specific timeframe. Ducat, *Les Penestes de Thessalie*, 105–13; Mili, *Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly*, 233. Sordi believes the *penestae* became Thessalian citizens after the Battle of Tanagra in 457; for more on the
Battle and its aftermath see chapter 7, also: Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno*, 237.

\(^\text{15}\) Ammonius, *Ammonii, Qui Dicitur Liber De Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia*, ed. Klaus Nickau (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1966), 100; Paul Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History*, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge,
2001), 83. Arist. FGrHIST 601 F2; Ath. Deip. 6.264 A. Strab. 12.3.4.
the Thessalians in the early Archaic period. It certainly could be that the arrival of the Thessalians was a hostile one, which would support the idea that the *penestae* were ethnic Boeotians who were captured in battle with the migrating Thessalians. This would also allow modern scholarship neatly to slot in Thucydides’ discussion of the Thessalian migration, which recounted the Thessalian conquest of the area sixty years after the Trojan War. Westlake, writing his early and still foundational history of Thessaly accepted this narrative, as it is almost uniformly followed by ancient writers.

If there were a significant influx of Aeolic-speakers into Thessaly in the Mycenaean period, this wave of immigration had limited impact on the material record of Thessaly. While it would be a mistake to assume a one-to-one connection between material and social culture, the lack of a significant shift in material evidence suggests that the lifestyles of the “invaders” and “natives” was broadly similar. As such, we should be skeptical of chronologically later Greek explanations as to the creation of the *penestae* as a specific class of people; these accounts were likely developed to parallel the perceived establishment of *helotage* in Sparta and assist the Thessalian elite in cultivating social and political connections with their Spartiate counterparts.

Sadly, the opacity of the origins of the *penestae* prevents modern historians from concretely distinguishing an ethnic or cultural identity outside of extra-Thessalian ancient

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16 BNJ Archemachos von Euboea f 1.
17 Thuc. 1.12. For a further discussion of the Thessalian migration, see above.
20 The only migration which appears to have significantly changed material culture on the Greek peninsula is the Mesolithic/Neolithic interface. For a more in-depth discussion see: Kostas Kotsakis, “Mesolithic to Neolithic in Greece. Continuity, Discontinuity or Change of Course?,” *Documenta Praehistorica* 28, no. 63 (2001); Kostas Kotsakis, “From the Neolithic Side: The Mesolithic/Neolithic Interface in Greece,” *British School at Athens Studies* 10 (2003): 217–21.
21 See Pindar, *P.* 10, also chapter 2.
sources, who were largely uninterested in the finer details of the process by which the *penestae* became unfree. As discussed above, Archemachos of Euboea suggested that the *penestae* were Boeotians. Writing in the middle of the third century, Theopompus of Chios believed that the *penestae* were a combination of the Perrhaebians and Magnetes, *periöic* peoples who later inhabited marginal areas around Thessaly.\(^{22}\) Interestingly, the author seems to imply that the term *periöici* is somehow a portmanteau of the names of these two peoples. Lastly, a scholiast on Aristophanes suggested that the penestae were somehow a branch of Thessalians. The unfree class of Thessaly took its name from Penestes, an ancestor of Thessalos, the son of Herakles.\(^{23}\) Slave-owning societies such as Sparta in which a specific ethnic or cultural group is enslaved took great pains to emphasize the difference between free and unfree. To do otherwise was to open the entirety of the system to scrutiny. The explanation that the *penestae* were descended from an eponymous ancestor whose genealogy was directly linked to the originator of the Thessalian people is difficult to accept at face value but does indicate that the relationship between the *penestae* and the Thessalians was perhaps more fluid than one would expect.

Unfortunately, the extant texts on the origins of the *penestae* have issues which make it difficult to accept any of them at face value. Scholia on Aristophanes is chronologically uncertain; not only would the marginalia most likely have been produced significantly later than the events in question, the absence of any corroborating literary attestation regarding “Penestes, the son of Herakles” suggests that the author was drawing on a mythological tradition which was established much later than the Classical era. Theopompus’ explanation, recorded by the 3rd century CE Athenaeus of Naucratis is similarly problematic. In the early fifth century the


Perrhaebians were minting coinage of their own, and that the periocic peoples of Thessaly were at least nominally independent dependencies. A situation wherein ethnic Magnetes and Perrhaebians were enslaved as a unified group while their brethren lived as free citizens of their own territories is difficult to accept, and the process by which this distinction would have been established is not one which has any parallel in the Greek mainland, at least during the Archaic and Classical periods.

Archemachus believed that the *penestae* were the descendants of Boeotians captured during the Thessalian invasion.²⁴ This is certainly the most satisfying solution in terms of its internal logic, as the mytho-historic Thessalian migration was a relatively long-standing accepted narrative for Thessaly in the ancient world. However, it seems unlikely that Boeotians would not have an issue with members of their *ethnos* living enslaved in Thessaly for centuries. In addition, there is nothing in the material record to suggest that the *penestae* were in any way culturally different from their free countrymen. If the Messenian *helots* in Sparta maintained some form of cultural or ethnic group cohesion for centuries after their subjugation, it seems reasonable to assume that there would at least be echoes of a similar process in Thessaly.²⁵

What can modern scholarship definitively suggest about the origins of the *penestae*? Were these individuals related to the Thessalians by blood, as opposed to foreign peoples having been conquered? Non-Thessalian Greeks, at least after the fifth century, believed that the *penestae* were in some way a unified people; though whether culturally, legally, ethnically, or socially we cannot say. As noted above, the two traditions – one that the *penestae* were foreign,

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²⁴ For other commentary on Archemachus see: Ducat, *Les Penestes de Thessalie*, 97.
the other that the group was somehow ancestrally connected to the Thessalians – each have problems. As such, it seems reasonable to avoid taking either explanation as the absolute truth, instead we can see these two mythological “histories” of the *penestae* as coming from two different points in time. It has been argued by many scholars that the *penestae* disappeared from the historical record at some point in the late Classical or Hellenistic periods, as a result of large-scale emancipation.\textsuperscript{26} It is not unreasonable to assume that the “alien” nature of the *penestae* was emphasized by the Thessalians at a date prior to the emancipation of the group – regardless of how historically accurate this may have been – and once the *penestae* had been integrated into Thessalian society, the similarities between the former slaves and masters were lessened.\textsuperscript{27} Given that the older narratives about the *penestae* as “foreigners” connect with the idea of the Thessalian migration or invasion, this seems to be the most coherent explanation, or at least the fullest explanation that can be accepted unless new evidence is found. Even if modern scholars are unwilling to commit to accepting the factuality of the invasion and conquest narrative, it still seems reasonable to accept two suppositions: first, the invasion narrative seems to have been accepted by the fifth century\textsuperscript{28} Secondly, that regardless of the historical origins of the *penestae*, given the consistency of the “foreign” tradition, the *penestae* were understood to be separated politically and culturally from full-Thessalian citizens. Whether any perceived ethnic distinction was an incipient from the arrival of the Thessalians in Greece, or a myth that the Thessalians developed to justify their oppression of the *penestae* is unclear, and likely will never be fully understood.

\textsuperscript{26} See n. 14 above.
\textsuperscript{27} This theory is based on the chronology and work done by Ducat, see further: Ducat, *Les Penestes de Thessalie*, 84–87.
\textsuperscript{28} The most recent discussion of *penestae* and the invasion tradition in the fifth century see: Mili, *Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly*, 221–23.
II. The Status and Role of the Penestae in Thessalian Society

The general consensus of both ancient and modern authors is that the *penestae* were some form of serf, agricultural workers bound either to the land or to an aristocrat’s estate.\(^{29}\) Writing in the third century CE Theocritus directly connected the *penestae* with the animal wealth of Thessaly, and implied that the unfree were primarily employed as herdsmen under the supervision of the elite.\(^{30}\) The use of *penestae* as agricultural workers, especially as shepherds would not be surprising. Thessaly was known for its plains and tremendous animal wealth, and slaves were often used as shepherds.\(^{31}\) In a similar vein, Archemachus of Euobea argued that the *penestae* “worked the land” for the Thessalians.\(^{32}\) Beyond these generalizations however, ancient accounts offer little in the way of detail.

As with most issues regarding the *penestae*, these statements raise more questions than answers. Theocritus’ poem noted that the *penestae* received a “monthly allowance” – ἁρμαλιὴν ἔμμηνον – from their masters.\(^{33}\) it is unclear what this may be referring to, though Ducat argued that this language appears in Hesiod’s *Works and Days* and Plato’s suggested “redistribution” system of his ideal state in *Laws*.\(^{34}\) It certainly is possible that Theocritus was writing early


\(^{30}\) Theoc. 16, ln. 34-35.


\(^{33}\) Theoc. 16 ln. 35.

enough in the 4th century to have possessed first-hand information about the penestae, but his work is complicated by Plato’s discussion of slave systems in which the philosopher declared that the allowance system was also in effect in Crete, which modern scholarship cannot confirm. A number of other ancient authors maintained a parallel between the unfree class in Crete and Thessaly, which suggests that Plato’s idea was widely adopted, often by those who would have had no ability to interact directly with the penestae.\(^{35}\) Was Theocritus’ brief digression on the penestae an accurate representation of the system under which they lived, or simply conforming to some sort of idealized semi-mythological practice which would confirm Theocritus’ position as a well-read member of the Greek intelligentsia? Until new evidence is available, it is unlikely that we will be able to conclusively take a position on one side or the other.

However, if modern scholarship is to take Theocritus’ account at face value, then this may point us to a possible role the penestae played in the Thessalian economy. Thessaly was known for its great wealth, and despite the fact that the Thessalians seem to have maintained a slightly different relationship regarding animals than many of their southern counterparts, it is unlikely that elite attitudes about herding animals significantly diverged.\(^{36}\) Animal herding was seen as a low-status task, and one which was fit for the poor and the unfree: perfect for a people such as the penestae. Thessaly’s geography, which offered relatively mild winters and hot summers would have been ideal for the practice of some form of pastoral transhumance, with livestock alternating their grazing between the flat plains and the high mountains.\(^{37}\) If Theocritus’ monthly allowance for the penestae was recalling – either from some dimly remembered past or


\(^{36}\) For example, see Aelian, NA 12.34.

with some sort of mytho-historic license – the return of the penestae from the pastoral circuit to the estates of their aristocratic owners, to sell or butcher their livestock for sale in the South. If the penestae communities were serving a settled agricultural function in Thessaly, like their Messenian helot counterparts, then perhaps the monthly allowance represents some form of ritualized interaction between the penestae and their elite masters. It may be that the monthly allowance was some form of tithe: the penestae brought their agricultural production from a given time to the Thessalians. A fragment supposedly from the Athenian Sophist Kallistratos linked the penestae with the Mariandyni, who are otherwise unknown, and described these individuals as the “carriers of presents.” As with the First Sacred War – see chapter 2 – there is always a concern in attempting to fit together evidence that is disparate both in terms of time and function, but due to a dearth of evidence it is worthwhile in this instance. While modern scholarship cannot state with certainty, it is not unreasonable to believe that the penestae lived in semi-autonomous agricultural communities, owing some form of tribute to the Thessalian elite.

III. The Penestae in the Thessalian Military

The penestae almost certainly played an essential role in the agricultural and pastoral production of ancient Thessaly. Evidence also suggests that they played a part in the ability of the Thessalian state to project military power. The primary source for this information is Demosthenes, who stated that during the Siege of Eion in 475 the Thessalian dynast Meno of

38 Ath. Deip. 6.263 D-E.
Pharsalus gave money and troops to support the Athenian cause. Demosthenes specifically used the phrase “ἱππεῦσι πενέσταις” in both of his speeches. This can only have been a conscious distinction on the part of Demosthenes, who consistently used only the noun ἱππεύς without an accompanying terminology to describe the “regular” citizen cavalry of other Greek polities, including Athens. Modern translators of Demosthenes speeches have similarly followed this convention. While this may be a minor point, the consistency with which Demosthenes uses this term is a welcome respite from the lack of clarity regarding the role and position of the penestae in Thessalian society: the penestae – or at least, Meno’s penestae – acted as cavalrymen.

This fact both offers insight into the role of the penestae but similarly complicates the relationship between the unfree and their masters. To begin with: horses were an elite possession in southern Greece. Warhorses were especially valuable, as they could not do double-duty as work horses and required specialized training for their use in combat. The apparent preponderance of horses and other livestock in Thessaly seems to have made horse-ownership a much more attainable goal for the average Thessalian. However, despite a potential lack of initial cost regarding purchasing a horse, the time and cost involved in maintaining an animal,

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39 Demosthenes mentions this event in two separate speeches: 13.23, and 23.199. For more on Thessalian participation in the Athenian-led Siege of Eion see chapter 3. For a comparison of military roles of the penestae and the helots, see below.
42 For a discussion of cavalry training, and the tremendous amount of time and energy that was required to bond a horse and rider to ensure their effectiveness in combat, see Xenophon’s Cavalry Commander, especially chapters 1 and 2.
especially one which could not contribute economically to daily life would have been prohibitive.

The training for cavalry – or at least for quality cavalry, which Thessaly was perceived to possess – was similarly time consuming. While we know few specifics about the composition of the mounted branch of the Thessalian army, Xenophon detailed the importance of developing training for unit cohesion for cavalrymen and the importance of selecting competent officers, men who both knew how to command and set an example for their subordinates. Other unfree peoples, such as the Spartan helots, were employed by their masters either as lightly armed peltasts or hoplites. While there is no doubt that standing in a battle line in the ancient world required tremendous courage, the skills involved in hoplite combat were relatively accessible to the untrained. The ability to stand in the phalanx holding one’s shield and not fleeing was the key to warfare for the average citizen in the Classical period. The use of the hoplite spear was secondary to staying firm within the battleline.

These same skills were ineffective for mounted combat, and it is difficult to accept that a group that was so closely associated with horses and cavalry would be unfamiliar with this fact. In order to serve effectively as a cavalry unit, penestae would have needed to train regularly both with their horse individually and their colleagues as a unit. Moreover, a lack of stirrups would have hampered the effectiveness of physical combat on horseback, necessitating significant training to effectively attack enemy troops. If penestae were spending their time training as cavalry, this would prevent the maximization of agricultural production. Additionally, training unfree peoples to fight as a unit, able to act independently, and giving them access to expensive

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44 Xen. Cav. 2.7-9.
animals which needed to be bonded with their rider is hardly an effective strategy for the sustaining the unfree status of those people.

If the *penestae* were unfree and distressed by their status, then it seems a remarkable gamble to arm and train them as cavalry. How, then, are we to make sense of this description of the *penestae*? Unfortunately, there are only three references in extant texts that discuss the role of the *penestae* in combat. Two of these are by Demosthenes, as noted above, and discussed the *penestae* acting as cavalrymen. The other was made by Polydamas of Pharsalus, the Thessalian noble attempting to rally the Spartans to combat the threat of Jason of Pherae. In describing the immense potential military capacity of Thessaly, Polydamas – relaying the boasts of the tyrant of Pherae – argued that the Thessalians would be able to crew ships even more effectively than the Athenians, thanks to Thessalian ability to draw upon the population of *penestae*. What are we to make of this claim? The Athenians used the population of poor but free citizens – the *thetes* – to crew their ships. The participation of the *thetes* in the navy has often been associated with the development of the Athenian democracy. However, there is no indication that the Pheraean proposal to include the *penestae* is in any way associated with the practice of democracy, Athenian-inspired or otherwise. As described above, it seems that the *penestae* as a group disappeared sometime in the late 4th century; perhaps in order to encourage the *penestae* to join his navy the Jason of Pherae may have offered manumission to this unfree group, attempting to give himself an edge in his civil war with the Aleuadae in Larisa. As the ultimate source of this speech was the Athenian Xenophon, could he have been careless with his terminology, confusing the *penestae* with the poor of Thessaly? Given Xenophon’s close association with the Thessalian elite it seems unlikely that he would confuse the unfree *penestae* for another group, especially

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45 Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11.
given the importance which Greek societies placed on distinguishing slaves from citizens. Unfortunately, it may be that this particular mention of the *penestae* in a military capacity is notable not for the regularity of *penestae* in military service, but due to its novelty. The Thessalians do not seem to have been a well-known seafaring people, having only one major port in their territory. Extant authors do not discuss any sort of Thessalian navy before or after the reign of Jason which would necessitate the kind of manpower that the poor masses could provide.\(^46\) Polydamas’ speech suggests that the Thessalian *poleis* regularly employed *penestae* in a military capacity and using this manpower to further supplement a prospective navy was unusual. As the purpose of this speech was to provoke the Spartans into conflict with Jason, it may have been that this was an empty threat. However, thanks the assassination of Jason in 371 it is not possible to know how legitimate reports of the creation of a Thessalian fleet were.

These mentions of the *penestae* participating as cavalrymen sparked debate in modern scholarship. Were the *penestae* who fought at the Siege of Eion helping to further Thessalian foreign policy as official members of the federal army? Or was this purely a private venture on the part of a powerful aristocrat who could train his bondsmen as soldiers and muster his own private army? Elsewhere, ancient descriptions of Thessalian armies simply use the catch-all term of “the Thessalians” which offers little insight into this dilemma. If we are to accept that the *penestae* of Meno represent some portion of the federal army, as scholars like Bruno Helly have, then this has far-reaching implications for the position of the *penestae* in Thessalian society.\(^47\)

Regular participation of the *penestae* in the armed forces of Thessaly, wherein the unfree were trained and armed as regular citizens would be remarkable in the ancient world. The amount of

training and the regular practice required to be an effective horseman in combat would have necessitated some form of barracks to house the *prenestae* if they were consistently supervised by Thessalian overseers, and we know of no such institution. If the *penestae* were regularly integrated into the army with full Thessalian citizens, this would suggest that the *penestae* were not fundamentally unfree or slaves as we understand them, and that their relationship with the Thessalians was significantly more symbiotic than extant ancient accounts would lead us to believe.

There is some circumstantial evidence that may back up Helly’s views. A third century inscription from Pharsalus, studied extensively by Decourt in 1990 and largely ignored since, detailed the granting of citizenship and land to those who participated in συμπολιτευομένοις καὶ συμπολ[εμε]στε[ρ]ε[ν]σι πάνσα προθυμία. These individuals who had fought and exercised political rights with the Pharsalians did so “from the beginning”: οὗς ἐξαρχᾶς. It is difficult to know what to make of this statement or the subsequent list of honorees. The inscription registered the names of 176 individuals to whom the privileges were granted but does not offer ancestral or locative information that would give further context to the inscription. Decourt argued that this group of individuals consists of at least 13 family groups; given the lack of geographic specification as to their origin and the presence of family groups, it is likely that these were not mercenaries or a warband but individuals who had been settled around Pharsalus for some time. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the recipients of the land grants were

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48 B. Helly has offered an interpretation of the Thessalian federal state and its relationship to the army muster, which is interesting though contentious in modern scholarship. Helly, 185–86. For a brief discussion of Helly’s work on the organization of the Thessalian state see chapter 4.

49 “…the exercise of political rights and have taken part in military actions with all their zeal.” IG IX 2.234. J.C. Decourt, “Decret de Pharsale Pour Une Politographie,” Zeitschrift Für Papyrologie Und Epigraphik 81 (1990): 163–84.

50 Decourt, 176.
wealthy or socially important. Decourt argued that the total grants equaled only slightly more than 35 square miles, which would be sufficient for small farmers but not enough for the creation of great estates for powerful aristocrats. In a massive area like Thessaly, 35 square miles could have been easily appropriated from around Pharsalus, or perhaps these were lands on which the individuals already resided.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus, if this group were not part of some sort of warband or mercenary contingent, and their integration within the fabric of Pharsalian society was unobtrusive, it is reasonable to accept that these individuals were penestae.\textsuperscript{52} This inscription represents only a snapshot of the history of the penestae, but it does offer possibilities for how modern scholarship could interpret the penestae in the Thessalian army. The inscription does not offer information on any actions which these individuals undertook which earned them recognition and a change in status. By contrast, in instances in which chattel slaves were manumitted there was clear notation as to the legal process that was followed and the fees which were paid to facilitate the change in status.\textsuperscript{53} This points to a clear distinction in Thessalian culture between the penestae and chattel slaves.

By omitting any specificity pointing to a previous unfree status, commissioners of the inscription seem to have emphasized the continuity of the integration between the individuals granted citizenship and the city: they – and ostensibly, their ancestors – had been involved in civic life for a significant amount of time. Thus, if the process of manumitting penestae was a function of the state and this was done on behalf of those individuals who regularly participated in armed

\textsuperscript{51} Decourt, 182.

\textsuperscript{52} Zelnick-Abramovitz, Taxing Freedom in Thessalian Manumission Inscriptions, 7.

\textsuperscript{53} Zelnick-Abramovitz, 29–53.
conflict along full Thessalian citizens, it seems reasonable that the *penestae* were regularly integrated into the Thessalian army and Thessalian society as a whole.\(^{54}\)

On the other side of the debate, a number of scholars have argued that the *penestae* of Meno represent a private army.\(^{55}\) Initially, the belief that the *penestae* of Meno and the general unfree population was enlisted into private armies hinged around the view of Thessalian society as being completely dominated by the elite. This is particularly true for Westlake and Sordi, who saw the *penestae* as soldiers who were recruited by their aristocratic landlords, and only integrated into any regular Thessalian army on an *ad hoc* basis. Other scholars such as Ducat and Mili, despite their reevaluations of Thessalian society as less stratified have largely treated Demosthenes’ speech as “unshakeable” in its veracity.\(^{56}\) If these scholars are correct, and the *penestae* were not regularly integrated into the social and political life of Thessaly, this would fall much more closely into what has been traditionally understood as the status and function of the *penestae*. The troops that Meno sent to the siege of Eion would thus have been rather unusual in the Greek world.\(^{57}\) As discussed above regarding the Pharsalus inscription, it may have been that the *penestae* recruited into private, aristocratic armies were induced by the offer of manumission or other benefits. Decourt’s Pharsalian inscription is the most detailed but its lack

\(^{54}\) There are other issues relating to this inscription that have been discussed by scholars, including the fact that the individuals were manumitted by Pharsalus, not by any “federal” organization such as the tetrad of Pelasgiotis, of which Pharsalus was a part. This has been used by modern scholarship – especially Helly – to argue that the “federal” government of Thessaly had failed, and society became oriented around the poleis sometime in the fifth century. I do not necessarily disagree, but given our fundamental lack of information on the structure of the Thessalian government, Helly’s complex arguments about the structure of the Thessalian government seem somewhat moot.


\(^{57}\) Certainly, the Spartans armed Helots and the perioioci as hoplites, but arming troops as hoplites is a far cry from cavalry. Moreover, the individuals were led by Spartan officers, as in the most famous case of Brasidas and the neo-damodais. There is no indication that the *penestae* at Eion were led by Meno or any of his subordinates.
of detail allows for endless speculation that can neither be confirmed nor denied. Information that may shed some light on the situation comes from a 5th century CE writer, Hesychius of Alexandria. The only study of this particular reference was undertaken in 1955 by A.E. Raubitschek, and unfortunately his interest was largely in the ancestry of Meno, the son of Menekleides, who was ostracized by the Athenians in 457. The Hesychius passage is as follows: Μενωνιδαι <ὁνομα> τὸν εὐφήμων ἐκ Μένων<ος> ἰδίων; Τινὲς δὲ φασί τὸν Μένωνα ἔξωστρακίσθ(αι). The translation of this is difficult: εὐφήμων, the plural genitive of εὐφήμος is generally translated as “religiously silent” and as such the word in this context must have some unknown meaning. Nevertheless, if this entry from Hesychius is in some way accurate, it does suggest that Meno maintained an entourage when he travelled. More importantly, while the gloss does not directly address the issue, it has been suggested that these “Menonidai” are in fact penestae who have accompanied Meno to Athens, acting as his bodyguard. If the individuals whom Hesychius describes are in fact penestae, it would seem it is a reasonable assumption that they were an armed bodyguard, and the cavalry sent to Eion were, in fact, similarly armed retainers of Meno, rather than part of the “regular” citizen Thessalian army.

Evidence regarding the participation of the penestae in conflict on behalf of the Thessalian state is unfortunately unclear. Neither Hesychius’ gloss, nor the Pharsalian inscription analyzed by Decourt offer any concrete evidence. As the focus of this chapter is to create a positivist sketch of the penestae in Thessaly, any “private versus public” interpretation of the Thessalian military is in fact an illusion: as the government of Thessaly seems to have been

59 Raubitschek translated the phrase as follows: “Menonidai: (name) of the εὐφήμων belonging to Menon; some say Menon has been ostracized.” Raubitschek, 286.
dominated by the elite it seems likely that there was very little distinction in Thessaly between public and the private in relation to the dynasts who controlled the region. The power of the federal government and its offices seems to have been directly proportional to the personal power of the individual occupying the office. The *penestae* cavalry sent by Meno of Pharsalus to Eion may have been personally beholden to Meno, but they were fulfilling a function of the Thessalian state’s “foreign policy.” Although we know little of the way in which Thessalians mobilized their army, it is is not unreasonable to suggest that the elite who played a part in the mustering brought their personal retainers with them, not unlike the feudal lords of medieval Europe. If this were the case and the *penestae* were expected to fight alongside their masters, then it seems very likely that they were regularly – perhaps as part of the larger cultural institution – offered the possibility of manumission, citizenship, and land grants for their service.

The integration of the *penestae* into the social fabric of Thessaly, as a subservient people but a group which had a clear pathway to citizenship through military service would perhaps explain a rather obtuse anecdote in Aristotle’s *Politics*. Discussing the qualifications and ancestry required for citizenship, the philosopher related a statement of Gorgias of Leontini, who claimed that “καθάπερ ὁλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὔτω καὶ Λαρισάιους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους: εἶναι γάρ τινας λαρισοποιούς.” In calling the magistrates who enfranchised new citizens “Larisa-makers” Aristotle was making a jibe at the ease with which Larisa inducted masses of new citizens, apparently doing so as casually as if they were potters throwing pots. Unfortunately, Aristotle offers little context for this joke beyond

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61 One of the scholars who has created the most detailed theory of Thessalian social dynamics and governance is M. Sordi. My issues with Sordi’s interpretation of the Thessalian government are discussed further in chapter 7 which deals with the Battle of Tanagra and the use of that event to understand mid-5th century Thessalian history.

62 “...just as the vessels made by mortar-makers were mortars, so the citizens made by the magistrates were Larisaeans, since some of the magistrates were actually larisa-makers.” Arist. *Pol*. 3.1275b.
the quoted passage. However it seems reasonable to assume that the new citizens of Larisa were *penestae*, rather than foreigners or *proxenoi*. As such, this digression in Aristotle’s work may be describing a similar Thessalian cultural intuition that was exemplified by the Pharsalian inscription discussed above. If there was some sort of pipeline of new Thessalian citizens, some sort of codified process through which the unfree could gain citizenship, it seems as though it would have been a relatively effective way of not only administering a subjugated population but ensuring that new citizens had military training – thanks to their participation as retainers for their aristocratic landlords – and were already integrated into the social fabric of Thessalian society. Certainly, this method would similarly help with one of the major fears of slaveowners throughout the Greek world: servile revolt.

IV. The Revolts of the Penestae

In three separate entries in Aristotle’s *Politics*, the philosopher mentioned the willingness and tendency of the unfree in Thessaly to turn against their masters.63 A native of Stagira in the Chalkidice, and throughout his life Aristotle travelled north and south through Greece. Given the importance of Thessaly on overland trade routes, it seems possible that the philosopher may have had first-hand experience with the *penestae*. However, Aristotle was primarily invested in creating schema for analysis, and not particularly interested in the sociological details that differentiated unfree groups in the Greek world. In his discussions of servile revolts Aristotle saw all unfree groups as essentially the same, which calls into his question the analysis of the

63 Arist. *Pol.* 2.1264a, 2.1269a, 2.1269b.
Aristotle was not the only ancient writer to discuss the potential of the *penestae* to revolt. Xenophon related a speech made by the Theramenes in 404, in which the Athenian oligarch accused his former colleague Critias of having been in Thessaly during the war, arming the *penestae* against their masters in order to foment ferment a democratic revolution in the country. Theramenes’ speech itself may be historical, but the likelihood that it is factually accurate is difficult to accept. If the Athenians did not pursue a policy of liberating the helots during the revolt of 464/3, it seems unlikely that that Critias, a key member of the oligarchic Thirty would have attempted to encourage a revolution that would have produced widespread servile enfranchisement in any Greek polity, regardless of the greater geopolitical situation. This accusation seems more likely to have been slander than anything else. As an elite Athenian connected to the web of xenoi relationships that were the backbone of the aristocratic social networks of ancient Greece, it would be no surprise if Critias had connections in Thessaly. Given that Theramenes’ speech was designed to attack Critias and smear his character, not necessarily to detail the factual history of Critias’ behavior during the war, it is difficult to credit the *penestae* with such behavior.

Nevertheless, when modern scholarship has discussed resistance of the unfree in Thessaly it has largely accepted the possibility of the revolt while disagreeing about the details. Westlake, one of the earliest modern Thessalian scholars accepted the accusation without question. Helly argued that “Prometheus,” supposedly the Thessalian co-conspirator of Critias was in fact the Pheraean tyrant Lycophron, and the two men attempted to instigate a servile uprising as part of

64 For more on the comparison between the helots and the *penestae* see Sec. 6, below.
65 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.36. ἐν Θετταλίᾳ μετὰ Προμηθέως δημοκρατίαν κατασκεύαζε καὶ τοὺς πενέστας ὁπλίζει ἐπὶ τοὺς δεσπότας
the civil war between the city of Pherae and its Aleuad competitors in Larisa.\textsuperscript{68} Arming the 
penestae and creating moderate democracies built on enfranchised penestae would have then resulted in a friendly government aligned with the regime in Pherae, and ideally Athens itself.\textsuperscript{69} However, thanks to Demosthenes’ account of the siege of Eion we know that penestae were in fact armed, at least on an irregular basis, and this does not seem to have produced violent rebellion. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that there were strong democratic ideals amongst Thessalians, free or otherwise.\textsuperscript{70} Ducat was more qualified and conservative in his analysis, only arguing that Thessaly never seems to have been in danger of a revolt.\textsuperscript{71}

It is difficult to accept the accusation that Critias was attempting to foment insurrection in Thessaly. While it seems reasonable to accept that Critias may have left Athens during the war to concoct some kind of scheme with his Thessalian counterparts, there is no indication that it was either fruitful or that it was based around the penestae. If Critias fled Athens due to political strife, there is no reason to assume he took any actions in Thessaly beyond plotting his return to Athens. It seems most likely that the charge made against Critias was spurious, simply designed to blacken his character rather than to highlight a violation of some law.

Despite the assertions of Aristotle, we know of no uprising on the part of the penestae. If Critias was attempting to convince the penestae to rise against their masters, it was unsuccessful. Unlike the great helot rebellion of 464, there are no known instances in which the penestae

\textsuperscript{69} This stance is potentially complicated by Lycophron’s later alliance with Sparta, as discussed in Diod. 14.82.5-6. However, it seems likely that the Thessalians – despite their general pro-Athenian leanings – were overtly ideological. Instead, the Thessalian elite was more than willing to make alliances with whomever seemed to be the most useful in their competition against their countrymen.
\textsuperscript{71} Ducat, \textit{Les Penestes de Thessalie}, 104.
successfully revolted.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, as discussed above, it seems likely that the *penestae* had significant social mobility and were participants in Thessalian society. The unfree status of the *penestae* was likely not permanent, and this may have prevented the uprisings and rebellions that seem to have plagued Sparta.\textsuperscript{73} Ultimately, the integration of the *penestae* within Thessalian society and their integration into the army – either as the retinue for their dynastic Thessalian master or as part of some sort of institutional mustering – seems to have prevented large scale revolts, the types of which so occupied Aristotle. While it is difficult to second-guess one of the ancient sources, there is no surviving text that would corroborate the sort of potential social conflict that Aristotle saw in Thessalian society.

V. The Ownership of the Penestae and the Rights of the Unfree

Modern scholarship has generally been unified in accepting the position that the *penestae* were privately owned by aristocratic landlords, though the level of control that an elite Thessalian exercised upon his serfs depends on the interpretation of the *penestae* in Thessalian society. Ancient authorities tend to describe the *penestae* and their ownership in very general terms: they seem to have been linked to private owners but there is little information as to the specific mechanisms that governed the arrangement. However, there seems to have been a perception in the ancient world that some form of cultural stricture governed the relationship between the free and unfree in Thessaly. Both Archemachus and Strabo – the latter, more

\textsuperscript{72} Thuc. 1.102.2; Diod. 11.63.4-6; Plut. *Cim.* 17.2.
\textsuperscript{73} This is not to say that the Thessalians did not possess chattel slavery, as well as relying on the *penestae.*
obliquely – refer to an agreement or contact between the unfree and their masters. Strabo compared the *penestae* to the Mariandyni, a people native to the area around Heraclea and about whom we know little, and asserted that both these groups held some sort of cultural agreement with their overseers. In Strabo’s account, the Thessalians had the right to sell the *penestae*, but only within the borders of Thessaly. In an extant fragment Archemachus of Euboea, the historian argued that the agreement between the *penestae* and the Thessalians prevented their removal from Thessaly, as well as an exemption from capital punishment. In exchange, the *penestae* would act as agricultural workers and pay a tax to their landlords. This exchange is perhaps what Theocritus referred to in his poetry about the Thessalian elite.

This “contract” between the *penestae* and the Thessalians relies upon a number of assumptions regarding the status of the unfree in Thessaly, most notably that both ancient authors assumed that the *penestae* were in fact the product of invasion and conquest. Moreover, if this social or legal agreement existed, it would have required institutions that we are unaware of. How would a member of the *penestae* who had been sold air their grievance, and to whom? Certainly not the buyer, nor the aristocrat who sold the unfree individual in the first place. Perhaps there was simply a societal injunction against selling *penestae*, as a way of ensuring the relative tranquility of the unfree in Thessaly. If this were the case, it seems likely that the “contract” likely involved significantly more complex social structures than we are familiar with. Certainly, this could explain a fragment of Aristotle that is found in the Deipnosophistae. According to this work, Aristotle claimed that the Thessalians celebrated a festival to Zeus

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74 Strab. 12.3.4.
75 BNJ Archemachos von Euboea, f 1.
76 Theoc. 16 ln. 35. For other aspects of the poem, see above.
Pelorios, in which the slaves were fed by their masters. Unfortunately, there is no other extant evidence which refers to this festival. If we are to take the statement at face value, it may represent part of the social contract that created some sort of “release valve” for tensions between the unfree in Thessaly and their masters. However, the author did not specifically reference the *penestae*, instead simply lumping foreigners and slaves together as participants in the festival. This may be due to the late date of the work, at a point at which the institution of the *penestae* seems to have disappeared. If we are to accept that the festival of Zeus Pelorios was in fact historically performed in the Classical periods in which the *penestae* are most clearly attested, then this may speak to integration between the *penestae* and “full” Thessalian citizens inside Thessaly. Unfortunately, until evidence is unearthed providing further context, the issue of the festival of Zeus Pelorios will remain an odd digression into the history of Thessaly.

The idea of a contract may instead be an attempt to disguise the inherently violent nature of human bondage has been put forward by Ducat, and this seems to be a reasonable assertion. The ancient Greeks do not seem to have been particularly concerned by the status of slaves and the unfree in the ancient world beyond their potential to rebel against their masters. If Ducat is correct, then the social contract between the *penestae* and the Thessalians was a sort of public relations. However, it is unclear whom exactly these attempts to disassemble the true status of the *penestae* would be for. The *penestae* would certainly be aware of the limitations to their freedoms and the ability of the Thessalian elite to break any social norms they wished.

Papering over these distinctions would do little to distract the unfree from their situation. The concept of a “contract” would not be particularly useful in terms of hiding the situation of

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the *penestae* from other Greeks, who seem to have had little interest in the group. When the penestae come up in other extant Greek literature, their low social status is most often highlighted. We have already seen the *penestae* used to blacken the character of free Greeks in connection with Critias. A line in Aristophanes’ *Wasps* referring to Amyinias – the eponymous Archon of Athens the year before the production of the play – accused the archon of living amongst the *penestae*. Aristophanes went so far as to call Amyinias πενέστης ὄν ἔλαττων οὐδενός. It seems unlikely that Greeks outside Thessaly would be particularly swayed by the social contract between the unfree and the free in Thessaly; the *penestae* were objects of derision because of their status, regardless of their exact situation. This leaves us with a final alternative: that the idea of a social contract was created for internal Thessalian consumption.

This was Ducat’s assessment of Decourt’s Pharsalian decree – discussed above – which enfranchised individuals around Pharsalus and gave them land in the 2nd century. Ducat argued that any “contract” between the Thessalians and the *penestae* as well as the Pharsalian decree inducting those on the margins of Pharsalus into the rolls of the city were attempts to disguise the true nature of slavery.

In Ducat’s assessment, while the situation of the *penestae* was perhaps not as overtly hostile as the relationship between the *helots* and their Spartan masters, the *penestae* were nonetheless constantly subject to potential violence and possessed limited freedom of movement. The Pharsalian decree and the majority of the information we have regarding any social agreement between the Thessalians and the *penestae* is quite late, very likely after the institution had been dissolved. It is likely that this historical fiction – that the *penestae* “enjoyed” their

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79 Aristoph. *Wasps* ln. 1274. “…the worst of the *penestae*.”
unfree and exploited position within Thessalian society – was an attempt by the Thessalians to effectively integrate their former slaves into free society in a way in which the *penestae* would be less likely to bear grudges against their former masters. These newly enfranchised Thessalians may have encouraged or at least accepted the fiction in order to separate themselves from their past, in order to ensure a smooth transition into full and free members of society.

Nonetheless, this returns us to our original question: what was the situation of the *penestae* with regard to their ownership? If Ducat is correct and the *penestae* during the Archaic and Classical periods were in fact subject to significant violence in their day-to-day lives, then this suggests that the *penestae* as a class had fewer social protections than later evidence might imply. Does this mean that ownership of the *penestae* was largely private, with Thessalian masters exercising the power of life and death over their unfree bondsmen? Despite Ducat’s position that the *penestae* were subject to some form of public ownership, this is the position that most scholars who have concerned themselves with the question have taken. Given the paucity of evidence and the accompanying lack of social institutions that would suggest public ownership, this does seem to be the most reasonable interpretation.

VI. Ancient Comparisons of the *Penestae* and the *Helots*

Unfortunately, none of the extant ancient authors who wrote about Classical Thessaly were Thessalian. Instead, the way in which these authors understood the place of the *penestae* in
Thessalian society was through a comparison to the helots, the unfree serf class in Sparta.\textsuperscript{81} The comparisons are often sadly fragmentary or limited, with a simple one-to-one comparison. The helots were the bedrock of the Spartan state, and surely if the penestae occupied the same, or even a similar place in Thessalian society, then there would be hints as to the commonalities between the two in contemporary sources.

The helots were largely (though not exclusively) Messenian, an ethnic group who resided in the Peloponnese who were conquered and subjugated by the Spartan state in the Archaic period.\textsuperscript{82} By the 5\textsuperscript{th} century, these different groups seem to have been subsumed under umbrella of Messenian ethnic identity. If the Messenians saw themselves as different ethnically from Laconian helots, their attitude towards their Spartan overlords indicated a class-consciousness. According to Diodorus, after the great earthquake of 464 Messenian and the Laconian helots made common cause with one another and revolted as a united group, regardless of geographic or ethnic differences.\textsuperscript{83}

Functionally the helots were agricultural workers upon whom the entirety of Spartan society was built. Helots owed a portion of their produce to their Spartan masters, who were thus freed from the requirements of subsistence farming.\textsuperscript{84} As a result, Spartiates were ostensibly able to focus solely on preparing for conflict and the prosecuting warfare.\textsuperscript{85} Finely-honed skills in hoplite combat led to the Spartan state becoming the predominant power in the Peloponnese in

\textsuperscript{81} Ducat is particularly adamant that Simonides was directly citing Theocritus, who had personal knowledge of Thessaly in the late 6th and early 5th centuries: Ducat, 71.
\textsuperscript{82} Nino Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6–12.
\textsuperscript{83} Diod. 11.63.4.
\textsuperscript{84} Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, 140. For the clerus, see Arist. Politics, II.9.
\textsuperscript{85} Arist. Rh. 1367a28-33 on Spartans as the “freest men in Greece;” Xen. Const. Lac. 2.2 on the agoge; for adult training see Plutarch, Lyc. 22.2.
the Classical period, and indeed their dominance over much of Greece during periods of the 6th and 5th centuries. However, this freedom and political hegemony came at a price: this relationship created great enmity between the helots and the Spartiates. Unlike chattel slaves, who were disunited in terms of ethnicity and social position, helots were not only united but thanks to the nature of agricultural production in Greece, were spread out over a wide area. This distribution allowed the helots significantly more freedom of movement and private property ownership, as well as limited social rights. It was these privileges, Talbert argued, along with their connection (or bondage) to the land which allowed the agricultural workers under Spartiate control to unite in a singular body.

This relationship was particularly contentious. It has been estimated that the population disparity during the fifth century between the helots and the Spartans was somewhere in the range of seven to one, and in the fourth century roughly one hundred to one. Thanks to this demographic imbalance and the unfree nature of the helots, the Spartan state developed a number of institutions in order to ensure the oppression of the helot population and the continuation of the helot system. While there was often manumission and enrollment of helots as auxiliaries into the Spartan army, the Spartans were just likely to liquidate Helot populations that were

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86 Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.6.
88 Thuc. 4.26.7 notes that the Spartans trapped on Sphacteria were resupplied by Helots, including those who had their own boats; one imagines that these were coastal fishing vessels. Richard Talbert, “The Role of the Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta,” *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte* 38, no. 1 (1989): 23. suggests that the helots paid a “rent” to the Spartans, based off of his interpretation of Plutarch’s *Inst.*, however the Greek word Plutarch uses is ἀποφορά, which Herodotus uses to describe a “tax” (2.109) and Pseudo-Xenophon uses to describe the money a slave made having been hired out by his master (*Const. Ath.* 1.11). While I suspect the Helots and Penestae had access to currency of some sort, the idea that they would “pay rent” seems unlikely. For helot unions, see Tyrtaeus, Frag. 7.
89 Talbert, 29.
90 Hdt. 9.28; Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5
potentially restive.\textsuperscript{91} At the same time, both Messenian and Laconian helots developed a strong culture of resistance to Spartan rule.\textsuperscript{92}

It was this relationship that ancient authors saw as the most obvious model for interactions between the Thessalians and the penestae. Of the thirty-five literary references to the penestae, thirteen directly compare the serf class of the Thessaly to that at Sparta. While the sample size is small, it does make it quite clear that contemporary perception was that the Helots were essentially the same as the penestae:

\begin{verbatim}
Λακεδαιμόνιοι μεν γαρ και Θετταλοὶ φανήσονται κατασκευάσαμενοι τὴν δουλευάν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν οἰκούντων πρότερον τὴν χώραν ἡν ἐκείνων νῦν ἵχουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἀχαιῶν, Θετταλοὶ δὲ Περραιρῶν και Μαγνητῶν, και προσηνόρευσαν τοὺς καταδουλωθέντας οἱ μὲν Εἰλωτας, οἱ δὲ Πενέστας.\textsuperscript{93}
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
δομοὶ τοῖς παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις Εἰλωσι καὶ παρὰ Θετταλοῖς Πενέστας καὶ παρὰ Κρησὶ Κλαρώταις.\textsuperscript{94}
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{91} Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History}, 305., has assembled an excellent list of the sources for helot enrollment in Spartan armies.

\textsuperscript{92} Thuc. 4.80.3. Despite their opposite views on the condition of the helots, both Talbert and Cartledge commit fully to the idea of the \textit{Krypteia}, as well as the veracity of Thucydides account of the liquidation of 2000 hoplites in 425.

\textsuperscript{93} In fact, examination will show that the Lacedaemonians and the Thessalians constituted their servile category from the Greeks who previously inhabited the country they now occupy, namely, in one case, the Achaeans, and in the case of the Thessalians Perrhebes and the Magnetes; they called the enslaved people Helots, the other Penestes. Theopompos of Chios, Fragment 122.

\textsuperscript{94} ...They \textit{[the kallikyrioi]} are similar to the Lacedaemonian Helots, the Thessalian penestae, and the klarotes of Crete. Aristotle, Fragment 586b Rose.
...σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰλωτεία πλείστην ἁπορίαν
παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν... ἐλάττω δὲ ἢ τε Ἡρακλεωτῶν δούλεια τῆς τῶν Μαριανδυνῶν καταδουλώσεως
ἐριν ἄν ἔχοι, τὸ Θετταλῶν τ᾽ αὖ πενεστικὸν ἔθνος...95

Λέγει δὲ καὶ Καλλίστρατος ὁ Ἀριστοφάνειος ὃ τοὺς Μαριανδυνοὺς ὄνομαζον μὲν
dωροφόρους ἀφαιροῦντες το πικρόν της τῶν οἰκετῶν προσηγορίας, καθάπερ Σπαρτιαται μὲν
ἐποίησαν εἰπὶ τῶν Εἰλῶτων, Θετταλοὶ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν Πενεστῶν, Κρητες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν Κλαρωτῶν.96

All other ancient authors follow the same construction: the situation of the helots was
essentially the same as the penestae.97 Other than the assessment of the subservient or unfree
nature of the penestae, what aspects of the penestae seem to correspond to the situation of the
helots in Sparta?

95 For probably the most difficult problem in all Hellas is the problem of the Helot system of the
Lacedaemonians... a less violent dispute rages around the subjugation of the Mariandyini to the Herakleotes, and the
class of the Penestae to the Thessalians... Plato, Laws 776c-d.
96 Kallistratos, a student of Aristotle, said they called the Mariandyines “carriers of presents” to spare them the
unpleasant name of “slaves,” as did the Spartans for the Helots, the Thessalians for the Penestae, and the Cretans for
the Klarotes... Kallistratos, Jacoby 348.
97 See also: Aristotle Pol. 2.1269a; Ath. Deip., 6.263b; Dionysos of Halicarnassus Etymologicum Geninum 13 and
14; Philip of Theangela Jacoby 741, Polydukes Onom. 3.83.
It seems clear that Greek perceptions of Spartan society saw the Spartans as being gripped by a tremendous fear of helot revolt. The anxiety surrounding the possibility of servile revolt may have been similar in Thessaly, Aristotle was quite clear as to the discontent felt by the penestae as to their status. One of the few writers who could have had firsthand knowledge of the penestae thanks to his contacts in northern Greece, Aristotle seemed convinced of the desire of the penestae to revolt. He claimed that not only were the penestae and helots willing to rebel but did so regularly. 98 Aristotle suggested that the first of these revolts took place early in the Archaic period, when the Thessalians were at war with the Achaeans, Perrhaebaeans and Magnesians. 99 Unfortunately, we have no other records of the penestae doing so. There certainly is an argument to be made that records for Archaic and early Classical Thessaly are limited, and it may be that these records were lost. However, I hope to make the case that despite the lack of evidence these assertions are suspect. Greeks did not envision rebellious slaves staying in their homes or overthrowing the society that oppressed them, rather their understanding was that large groups of serfs desired to remove themselves from their oppressive system entirely and form new and independent communities like Messene and Naupaktos. Aristotle asserted that in Sparta the presence of enemies and political rivals in the Peloponnese, such as Corinth or Argos, encouraged helot rebellions. 100 Conversely, the serf class in Crete may not have revolted largely due to geographic factors: once they had thrown off the yoke of their masters, they had no friendly powers to flee for sanctuary. If a Greek power wished to support an unfree rebellion on Crete, this would have required coordinating logistical aid over both land and sea. The Cretan model may have also applied to Thessaly. While the Thessalians were in conflict with their

99 Arist. Pol., 2.1269b.
100 Arist. Pol., 2.1272b17-20, Fragment 586b Rose.
southern neighbors for much of the Archaic and Classical periods who no doubt would have supported a revolt of the *penestae*, it was also surrounded by mountainous *perioicic* communities allied to the Thessalians, who likely had no desire to draw the ire of the Thessalian *koinon* for supporting a revolt of the unfree.¹⁰¹ Unless a major power was able to take an overland route into the Pineos River basin, any rebellious *penestae* would be without support.¹⁰² It seems reasonable to suspect that the “isolation” of the Thessalian *penestae* played a significant role in the lack of revolts.

It was understood by the ancient authors that the Spartan system for the subjugation of the *Helots* was not only the axis around which Spartan society organized itself, but also a cause of tremendous anxiety. In order to deal with the fear of Helot rebellion, the Spartans instituted a number of policies to suppress the *helots*. Plutarch’s *Life of Lycurgus* details these practices most fully, including the annual declaration of war by the *gerousia* as well as the *krypteia*, the assassination of *helots* by Spartan youths.¹⁰³ In addition, casual brutality and generally cruel behavior seems to have been the default setting for Spartan interactions with the unfree. The veracity of these practices and how widespread they might have been, or how often they were practiced has been debated, but for our purposes the fact that the Spartans gave the perception to outsiders that they oriented their society around the oppression of the *helots* is key. Despite the

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¹⁰¹ On the conflict between Thessaly and Phocis in the early 5th century see: Hdt. 8.27-28; Paus. 10.1.13, 10.1.11. For a discussion of Thessalian relations with their *perioicic* dependencies see: Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period.”
¹⁰² There are of course instances of hostile Greek armies entering Thessaly, it does seem unlikely that a Classical power would have had sufficient political will and logistical ability to field a hostile army in Thessaly for any significant length of time.
¹⁰³ Plutarch, *Life of Lyc*. 28. Talbert argues that the practice of *krypteia* ended in the mid-fifth century, as the population of Spartiates sharply declined. He argues that the continued practice would have been “senseless,” though if the Spartans were fully committed to a system which made sense, it is hard to see how they would not have also tried to reform the helot system.
parallels insisted upon by the ancient authors, there is no clear evidence of such institutional practices in Thessaly.

Regarding Thessaly, regardless of historical interpretation about the socio-economic makeup of the region, no ancient or modern author has come forward to suggest that Thessalian society had systems or institutions in place to ensure the constant subjugation of the *penestae*. The one extant instance of a “*penestian* revolt” in Thessaly was encouraged and perpetrated by an external agitator, rather than having been generated organically. Moreover, the most “horrific” aspect of the charge to an Athenian audience (associations with democracy notwithstanding) was that Critias was inciting a foreign body of individuals to attack the citizens of a polity.  

Sprawski quite rightly asserted that the issue in this case was a fear of outsiders, rather than a concern of a servile uprising.

Aristotle forcefully argued that the *penestae* and the *helots* were similar, that both groups were ready to fight against their masters at a moment’s notice. In his utopian *Politics* he suggested that institutional controls, like those found in the Spartan state, were necessary for the maintenance of any serf class:

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ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δὲὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀμιλῆσαι τρόπον: ἄνιεμενοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἰσον ἀξιούσιν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μισοῦσιν.  
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105 “…apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of policing a serf class is an irksome burden—the problem of how intercourse with them is to be carried on: if allowed freedom they grow insolent and claim equal rights with their masters, and if made to live a hard life they plot against them and hate them.” Arist. Pol., 2.1269b.
Admittedly this is a departure from what we understand to be the general methods of the Spartan system, but the message is the same.

Great pains were taken to ensure that helots were clearly differentiated from their Spartiate masters. In addition to the violent institutional practices such as the annual declaration of war and the krypteia, the Spartans practiced methods by which the helots were reminded of their servile nature: forced public humiliation, degrading dress, and public beatings without cause were apparently common. Grote dismisses these actions as “less...cruelty than ostentatious scorn,” but for our purposes the effect is the same: the Spartiates made clear through social practices the vast gulf between themselves and the helots.

Conversely, the only reference to Thessalian methods of control of the penestae comes from Dionysos of Halicarnassus, writing in the 3rd century CE. He claimed that the “the Thessalians … treated their [penestae] with haughtiness, imposing on them duties unbecoming to free men; and whenever they disobeyed any of their commands, they beat them and misused them in all other respects as if had been slaves they had purchased.” This instance seems to have been comparable to Spartan scorn and disdain for the helots that was described by Plutarch. However, Dionysos of Halicarnassus draws an important distinction, the Thessalians deal with the penestae as if they were ἀργυρωνήτοις, “bought with silver” or “common slaves.” Pseudo-Xenophon, writing about his distaste for the Athenian democracy in the fifth century – a society he saw as dangerously fluid – complained that he was unable to strike slaves, because he could

106 Plutarch, Lyc. 28. See also Myron, FGriH F 2.
107 George Grote, A History of Greece, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 497. Ducat, Les Penestes de Thessalie, 114. Cartledge has suggested that these practices were “played up” in ancient scholarship: Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, 152.
108 Dio., RA, 2.9.2.
109 Ducat, Les Penestes de Thessalie, 30. This term for slave appears in Isoc. 14 18.
not differentiate between slaves and free men.\textsuperscript{110} According to the Athenian Law on the Approvers of Silver Coinage, slaves that broke the law were subject to exceedingly harsh punishment like public flogging.\textsuperscript{111} Given the lateness Dionysos’ account, some five centuries after the disappearance of the penestae, this is suspect. Moreover, while we have no ancient descriptions from Thessalian authors, it seems clear that the Greeks saw the penestae as a group clearly delineated from chattel slaves. If we are to accept that Dionysos’ account is accurate, it contains none of the ritualistic overtones that characterized Spartan oppression.

Thessalian aristocrats, on the other hand do not seem to have adopted the practices of the Spartans or instituted their own local types of differentiation. If anything the perception of Thessaly was not that its society was rigid and hierarchical, but instead it was afflicted with πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία.\textsuperscript{112} Thessalian aristocrats were known for their love of philosophy – as it was a “trendy” sign of sophistication – but also for their general lack of discipline and commitment to gluttony.\textsuperscript{113} Socrates rejected Crito’s suggestion to flee prison Athens for Thebes, asking τί ποιῶν ἢ ἐ沃χοῦμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ δείπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν?\textsuperscript{114} The Thessalians were known for their voracious appetites, and it appears to have been a fairly common trope in Athenian comedy.\textsuperscript{115} Their gluttony, it seems was part and parcel of a society that placed little concern on self-control, and to the southern Greeks, a culture in which it was difficult to tell the difference between master and servant.\textsuperscript{116} This perception as in full force at

\textsuperscript{110} Ps. Xen. Const. Ath. 1.10.
\textsuperscript{111} P.J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, eds., Greek Historical Inscriptions 404 - 323 BC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 117.
\textsuperscript{112} “…great disorder and intemperance…” Plat. Crit. 53d.
\textsuperscript{113} Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935, 41. Mili, Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly, 263.
\textsuperscript{114} “what will [I] do except feast in Thessaly, as if [I] had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet?” Plat. Crit. 53e.
\textsuperscript{116} Mili, Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly, 263.
least by the late fifth century. In Aristophanes’ Wasps, the playwright took aim both at the politician Amynias and Thessalian society, and the textual joke gives an important insight as to southern Greek perceptions of Thessaly: ἀλλὰ πρεσβεύον γὰρ ἔς Φάρσαλον ὄχετ’, εἴτε ἐκεῖ / μόνος μόνος / τοῖς Πενέσταισι ξυνῆν τοῖς / Θετταλῶν… While certainly Aristophanes was attempting to malign Amynias – the ambassador was so uncouth that he preferred the company of the uncultured unfree to the cultured freeborn citizens – this points to the perception among Athenians that Thessaly was a “chaotic” society where the traditional distinctions between the servile and the citizen were blurred.

Aristophanes and Socrates were not the only Greek authors who comment on the chaotic nature of Thessaly. Both Athenaeus and Archemachos of Euboeae claimed that the penestae that were τῶν κυρίων ἐαυτῶν εἰσιν εὐπορότεροι. We might examine this statement in a number of ways. A system in which the slave-class was able to generate resources equivalent (or greater) to the ‘masters’ would indicate a lack of control over civil society, a result of the Thessalian focus on satiating appetites and vices, rather than the self-control necessary for an orderly political system. In addition, there is an inherent conceptual contradiction in the idea of a slave possessing wealth, despite the reality of institutions of Greek slavery. Again, there was the appearance of a disordered society, and one which seemed unconcerned with any sort of structure comparable to that of the Spartan system.

If the Thessalians did not have social institutions designed to keep the penestae separated socially or culturally, as the Spartans did with the helots, then perhaps diplomatic or extra-state practices were part of the process by which the serf population was kept in check. It seems quite

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117 “He went on an embassy to Pharsalus, and there he lived solely among the Thessalian penestae…” Aristoph. Wasps 1270 – 1275.
118 “richer than their masters.” Ath. Deip. 264B.
clear that the Spartans utilized their diplomatic energies not only to push their foreign policy goals, but to ensure that they had assistance should the *helots* revolt.\textsuperscript{119} During the great earthquake of 464 a large number of Spartans were killed, and helot communities took the opportunity to rebel and create a fortified position to resist the Spartan state on Mt. Ithome. The Spartans immediately summoned their allies, including the Mantineans, Aiginetans, Plataians, and the Athenians.\textsuperscript{120} Thucydides claimed that the Athenians were summoned specifically to provide assistance in siege operation against *helots* in a fortified position on the mountain.\textsuperscript{121} The Spartans, fearing that the Athenians might turn and side with the *helots* subsequently dismissed their Athenian allies, laying the groundwork for the second Peloponnesian War.

It is reasonable to accept that the Athenians undertook this expedition as part of their treaty obligations to Sparta. Cartledge put forward the suggestion that all Spartan treaties in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century (and possibly earlier) had terms that required the ally to come to the aid of Sparta should the *helots* revolt. He argued that language in the treaties may have not specified the eventuality of a servile uprising, but it was understood within the general “friends and enemies” clauses that Greek treaties seem to have consistently articulated.\textsuperscript{122}

Given the response that Sparta was able to garner from its allies, Cartledge’s interpretation seems reasonable. The relationship between Athens and Sparta was clearly tense, given that shortly before the earthquake, Thucydides claimed the Spartans agreed to secretly attack Attica at the behest of Thasos.\textsuperscript{123} There has been disagreement about the veracity of this

\textsuperscript{119} Adcock and Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, 14.
\textsuperscript{120} Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, 1991, 1:158.
\textsuperscript{121} Thuc. 1.101.
\textsuperscript{123} Thuc. 1.101.1.
story, but it clearly indicates a breakdown in the relationship between the two states.\textsuperscript{124} If the relationship was as poor as Thucydides reports, why would the Athenians be so willing to assist the Spartans, especially if they were not obliged to by the treaty? Moreover, the Spartans would hardly request assistance from an ally they were willing to betray only months before if their panic was not near-total. Based on the institutional evidence, as well as the willingness of the Spartans to request assistance during the helot uprising, it seems clear that the Spartans viewed the revolt of the helots as a mortal danger to their state. If the Spartan government felt this way, why would they not include such language that assistance should be rendered in case of a helot rebellion. Given the Athenian response, it seems likely that treaty obligations should be the key motivating factor in this area, and the Spartan state used treaty obligations as insurance against such an eventuality.

If the penestae were so similar to the helots, one would imagine that the Thessalians, if they did not have specific internal controls on the penestae, would, like the Spartans, expect their allies to assist them in the case of an uprising. Given the lack of extant works by Thessalian authors, accounts of Thessalians receiving assistance from treaty partners is limited, most often in the literary record the Thessalians come to the aid of allies. However, we are lucky enough to have the full inscription of an alliance between Athens and the Thessalian League, dated to 361. The only stipulation – though general – is that the Athens are to assist the Thessalian League \textit{ἐὰν τι[ς] ἴῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Θέτταλων ἐπὶ πολ[έμι]ωι ἢ τὸν ἄρχοντα καταλύει, ὃν εἰλοντο Θετταλοί, ἢ [τ]άρανον καθ[π]ὶ στῆ ἐν Θέτταλίαι.}\textsuperscript{125} In the treaty there is no mention of having the same

\textsuperscript{124} Ernst Badian, \textit{From Plataea to Potidaea: Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentecontaetia} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993), 134–35.
\textsuperscript{125} “…if anyone attacks the federation of the Thessalians in war, or overthrows the ruling officer whom the Thessalians chose, or establishes a tyrant in Thessaly.” IG II\textsuperscript{2} 116, Ln. 16-19.
“friends and enemies” or any language that might obligate the Athenians to assist the Thessalian League in circumstances that states might wish to only obliquely mention, like a servile revolt.\textsuperscript{126}

Instead, the language of the treaty is focused solely on the city of Pherae, the seat of a tyranny and locked in decades-long civil war with the League. The first stipulation in the treaty, “τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Θετταλῶν ἐπὶ πολ[ἔμι]ωι” suggests an organized conflict with “regular” armies, such as those Pherae might field, or those of the allies of the Pheraeans. The third clause, “[τ]ύραννον καθ[ι]στῇ ἐν Θετταλίαι” is much more clearly aimed at the tyrants, who upon conquering the League would likely install their family members or associates as tyrants of the League cities. Perhaps the concern is more general, but the coincidence seems too pat that the treaty would refer to some general fear when specifically engaged in a war with a tyranny. The second clause, regarding overthrowing the Thessalian archon “τὸν ἄρχοντα καταλύει, ὃν ἐἷλοντο Θετταλοῖ” might be one which could refer to a servile uprising. If the penestae were a subject populace with their own separate cultural or ethnic identity like the Messenian helots, they likely would not be interested in overthrowing the political system of the Thessalian league and assuming its offices but instead creating their own polity.\textsuperscript{127} When given the option, the helots did not attempt to integrate themselves into Spartan society with a different social status (whether that would have even been an option) but instead chose to form their own state. The Athenian establishment of Messenians in Naupactus, or the Messenian withdrawal to a fortified position on Mt. Ithome in the fifth century make it quite clear that the helots wished to remove themselves from the Spartan system, rather than remake it. Epaminondas’ decision to re-found

\textsuperscript{126} Adcock and Mosley, \textit{Diplomacy in Ancient Greece}, 208.

\textsuperscript{127} Aristotle’s formula regarding the rebellious klarotes of Crete is accurate; it seems unlikely that self-emancipated serfs would want to integrate themselves into their former master’s political systems.
the city of Messene on Mt. Ithome in 369 is a clear example of this impulse.\textsuperscript{128} Pausanias records that this new city was built on the “fatherland” of the Messenians, demonstrably separating the newly freed *helots* from their Spartan master in both a physical and symbolic way.\textsuperscript{129}

Instead, the language in the Thessalian League’s treaty with Athens is specifically about the overthrow of the “legitimate” government, with the understanding that the newcomer would then act as the head of the Thessalian League instead of the chosen official. This would not be a new government, which is covered in the next clause, nor would it be an attack from the outside, which is covered in the first clause of the statement. Instead, what this refers to is a group of discontented Thessalians, perhaps partisans of Pherae, who overthrew the government of the Thessalian League and placed themselves at the head of a similar government. These are all issues that deal with Thessalian citizens of the league, or rival Thessalians from Pherae, and not a concern about an uprising from a servile class.

It seems likely that if the tyrants of Pherae were operating some sort of “revolutionary” government, one method by which the tyrants might undermine their enemies, the Thessalian League, led by the Aleuad clan in Larisa, would be an offer of emancipation to their serfs. If this was the case, one would expect the Thessalian League insist that their allies be willing to assist in the case of a mass slave uprising. The fact that the treaty does not mention a slave uprising or the *penestae* in general, rather it suggests two different options. First, the Thessalians had little concern or fear of an uprising or were reasonably sure that they could suppress any uprising, despite the ongoing civil war. Given the length of the civil war in Thessaly – lasting roughly from the end of the Peloponnesian War until the arrival of Philip II – it seems surprising that the

\textsuperscript{128} Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History*, 255.
\textsuperscript{129} Paus. 4.26.6.
Thessalians would be so casual about their ability to suppress a slave revolt if a league of *poleis* lacked the resources to conquer a single rival. The more likely explanation for this construction was that the Thessalians had no concern of an uprising of the servile class.

The *helots* were particularly ready to revolt, a volcano upon which the Spartiates built their homes. Strict social controls were needed to continue the oppression of the *helots*. If the Thessalian *penestae* were of a similar status and situation, we would expect to see at least some sort of echo of a similar situation. This is not borne out by the available evidence. Instead of a strict, ordered society like Sparta, where the differences between free and unfree were starkly delineated, Thessaly is presented as a chaotic society where the aristocratic rulers of the area have little concern beyond their own comfort. In the literary record, we find no instances of institutions that would indicate there was an unusually large population of unfree workers, upon whose back society functioned. Despite the consistency in the external comparison between *helots* and *penestae*, when looking solely at the internal makeup of Thessaly, there appears to have been confusion on the part of the Greeks. In Euripides *Electra*, Aegisthus claimed that Ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κομποῦσι τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς/ εἶναι τόδ’, ὁστὶς ταῦταν ἀρταμεὶ καλῶς/ ὑποῦς τ’ ὑμᾶξει: λαβὲ σίδηρον, ὦ ξένε,/ δεξίον τε φήμην ἔτυμον ἀμφὶ Θεσσαλῶν. 130

Perhaps this was Euripides’ way of suggesting that Thessalian culture was one not quite as “modern” as its southern counterparts: more Archaic and aristocratic, existing in a different time. Yet as Maria Mili points out, to a contemporary Greek audience, this might be striking for another reason; the work that Euripides describes Thessalians believe to be τῶν καλῶν, “the best,” is the type of work that would be expected to be performed by slaves.131 As discussed

130 “They boast that this is among the honorable accomplishments for the Thessalians: to cut up a bull rightly and to tame horses.” Eur. *El.* 815 – 816.
above, a scholiast on Aristophanes’ *Wasp*s wrote that the *penestae* were names after a Penestes, whose ancestor was Thessalos, son of Herakles.\(^{132}\) While this scholia may be as late as the 12th century, if it is accurate regarding Thessalian internal mythology and identity then it indicates an important factor in Thessalian perceptions of their own culture: namely that the *penestae* were as “Thessalian as the Thessalians themselves.”\(^{133}\)

Thus, without further evidence that would shed light on the situation, it seems most reasonable to reject the ancient sources when they associate the Thessalian *penestae* with the Spartan *helots*. Despite the vehemence with which ancient authors insist upon the comparison, it is one which seems as though does more to obscure the social, cultural, and political situation in Thessaly than it illuminates.

VII. Towards a New Interpretation of the Penestae

The most important – and only – scholarly work dedicated to the unfree in Thessaly was written in 1994. Ducat’s aim was to interpret the historical perception of the *penestae* by the ancient Greeks during the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Specifically, Ducat wished to analyze how other Greeks understood the *penestae* and their condition. This is an admirable goal, and one which has a firm backing in evidence and methodology. Nonetheless, it is important to attempt to reconstruct the role of the *penestae* in Thessaly; who were these individuals were that

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made up the backbone of agricultural labor in a land famed for its agricultural wealth? What were the institutions that linked the unfree into the social fabric of Thessaly?

First, it seems reasonable that despite any later myths regarding eponymous heroes, culturally the *penestae* were not distinct from Thessalians of low socio-economic status. No evidence has been found that would indicate that there was any culturally distinct sub-group within Thessaly. Whether this is indicative of a people conquered by invasion who quickly assimilated with the culture of their masters, or a free people forced into servitude is unclear. While the explanation of the Thessalians as an invading force is certainly appealing – given the fifth century date for the assertion – it cannot be taken with certainty. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to accept that by the fifth century the *penestae* were firmly established as a distinct class of people in Thessaly, however this distinction was legal and economic. It may be that over time a distinct culture arose as *penestae* were enfranchised and integrated into Thessalian society.

Second, while there may have been some sort of contractual or public ownership of the *penestae*, functionally the unfree in Thessaly were subject to individual owners who dictated their lives and behavior. While this control may not have been manifested on a day-to-day level, the *penestae* were likely linked to an individual elite Thessalian or his family, and these masters were owed some form of tribute, whether cash, labor, or in-kind goods. Like the *helots* and other agricultural serfs in the ancient world, in their day-to-day lives it is likely that communities of *penestae* were self-administered due to their distance from major population centers of the estates of their elite masters. We know little about the relationship between the Thessalians and the *penestae*, but it seems unlikely that the relationship was as contentious as that between the Spartans and the *helots*. Despite Aristotle’s assertions that the *penestae* were ready to revolt we
know of no major servile revolts in Thessaly, and there is no available evidence of social institutions that would indicate that the Thessalian elite used to suppress and monitor the *penestae*. Certainly, Greeks from outside Thessaly were dismissive of the *penestae*, but it seems likely that this reflects a larger tradition relating to fears of loss of autonomy rather than specifics related to the institution of the *penestae* itself. If Decourt’s Pharsalian inscription and the opaque joke about “Larisa-makers” reflects a historical reality rather than an imagined one, it seems possible that the *penestae* did not revolt thanks to a path through which they could become full Thessalian citizens. If this was the case, whether this process was social or legal, it could account for later ideas regarding some sort of contract between the Thessalians and the *penestae*.

Third, it seems that given the likely *de facto* private ownership of the *penestae*, that the unfree could indeed act as private armies for Thessalian noblemen. Demosthenes’ discussion of Meno’s actions with regard to the Siege of Eion was a response to the scale of the assistance, rather than the fact that Meno sent his own retainers. The fact that *penestae* could be trained as cavalry suggests a significantly different experience than most unfree peoples in Greece who were drafted into the military forces of their *polis*. Moreover, there is no reason to suspect that the *penestae* did not compose a significant portion of the Thessalian “federal” army, or the armies of the combatants during the civil wars of the fourth century. It seems likely that the involvement of the *penestae* in the Thessalian army would have been linked to the process of integrating the unfree into the political life of the region.

Finally, ancient sources maintain a consensus that the situation of the *helots* and of the *penestae* were similar, if not the same.¹³⁴ Social institutions designed to manage, control, and

¹³⁴ The only author that really deviates from this position is Plato, who seems to imply that the subjugation of the *penestae* is less onerous than that of the *helots*. Plat. *Laws* 6.776c-d. Most notably Morgan has accepted the Platonic analysis in her interpretation of the situation of the *penestae*: Morgan, *Early Greek States Beyond the Polis*, 190.
Oppress the unfree are well-documented for the *helots* in Sparta. These practices were foundational to Spartan society, which required a clearly delineated hierarchy to function successfully. Similar institutions do not appear in Thessaly; instead, the perception of the region was one in which society was chaotic and fluid. While our information on Thessalian society is limited, the prominent lack of social structures to maintain the status of the unfree lead to a conclusion that whatever the situation of the *penestae*, it was not the same as the *helots*. 
Chapter 6: Thessalian Political Programs and Ambitions in the Fourth Century

I. Jason of Pherae and the attempted re-establishment of Thessalian Hegemony

Xenophon’s account of the career of Jason, the Tyrant of Pherae – the most comprehensive of any ancient author – begins *in media res.* In 374 Polydamas of Pherae travelled to Sparta in an effort to enlist help against Jason, the successor of Lycophron whose armies seemed poised to conquer the whole of Thessaly.¹ On one hand, it might be surprising that any of the Thessalian powers would reach out to the Spartans, who had throughout the Classical period repeatedly attempted to increase their influence over the Pineos River basin and central Greece. In 426 the Spartans established the colony of Heraclea in Trachis, which could control traffic through the Sperchios River valley, and thus prevent the Thessalians from extending their influence into central Greece.² In response, the Thessalians and allied *perioicoi* attacked the city and killed the Spartan commander there, ostensibly bringing the city into a Thessalian orbit.³ Seven years later, an expedition led by Spartan king Agis invaded a number of Thessalian *perioicoi* and forced their elite to surrender hostages with the hope of bringing the polities into the Spartan coalition.⁴ In 400, the Spartans recaptured Heraclea in Trachis from the

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¹ It is unclear as to the relationship between Jason and Lycophron. I believe that Sprawski is correct in rejecting the theory that Jason was Lycophron’s son, due to a lack of corroborating evidence: Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC*, 58. This is contra to Westlake, who argues that it is a “natural inference” that they were father and son: Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 1935, 68. Sordi follows this interpretation: Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno*, 157.
² Thuc. 3.92.1.
³ Thuc. 5.51.
Thessalians, killing 500 citizens in the process. Only five years later Diodorus recorded that the Aleuada aristocrat Medius and his allies captured Pharsalus and sold the Spartan garrison there into slavery. It is unknown when the Spartans installed a garrison in Pharsalus, but it seems most likely it occurred after the recapture of Heraclea in Trachis. In 394, as Spartan king Agesilaus marched through Thessaly, his army was harassed by soldiers from Larisa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus, all of whom were allied to the Boeotians. While details about Thessaly in the 480s are limited, it would be surprising if there was a radical change in Spartan policy that involved abandoning designs on Thessaly and central Greece. Whatever the goals of the Spartan coalition, the Pharsalians or Larisaeans cannot have been foolish enough to believe that it would be in the interest of ally for a powerful central government to rule Thessaly; as is discussed in Chapter 1, after the death of Jason the Boeotians and Macedonians pursued policies of ensuring that Thessaly stayed locked in a state of civil war and unable to pursue goals of regional hegemony in central Greece.

On the other hand, there were limited avenues the Thessalian factions could pursue towards gathering external support. When they harried Agesilaus in 394, the Pharsalians were allied with the Boeotians, and Lycophron was likely in the Spartan sphere. By 374, when Polydamas went to petition the Spartans for support, Jason was allied with the Boeotians, and had been in talks to formalize a treaty with the Athenians as well. As such, the Spartans were the only other Greek power to whom any anti-Jason faction in Thessaly could appeal. As with Thessalian politics in the fifth century, there appears to be no consistent or coherent ideological

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5 Diod. 14.38.4-5.
6 Diod. 14.82.6.
7 Xen. Hell. 4.3.3.
8 Xen. Hell. 6.1.10.
9 Apparently at this point the Argead dynasty was weak, Jason bragged about his ability to bring Macedon under his control: Xen. Hell. 6.1.11.
program of alliances, the Thessalian elite were content to settle on whichever power seemed to be most useful in the moment.

Taken at face value, Xenophon’s report of Jason’s resources and capabilities is relatively straightforward. Polydamas described the size and competence of Jason’s armies, the pool of manpower available to the Pheraean tyrant, and the size of his treasury. These were understandably the most relevant and concerning details to a Spartan audience. However, Jason’s speech – filtered through Polydamas – similarly indicated that his interest was not to reject traditional Thessalian political practice, but instead to use traditional terminology and symbolism to justify his rule, and to appropriate the historical precedent of rule from other Thessalian elites. While our information is limited, there seems to have been social pressure among the Thessalian elite for rulers to portray themselves as conforming to established customs. Pindar’s ode for Hippocleas of Thessaly – ostensibly about the winner of the boys’ foot race – spends a significant time its Aleuad commissioners. The poem closes praising the Aleuadai who ὑψοῦ φέροντι νόμον Θεσσαλῶν αὐξοντες which was κεῖναι πατρώιαι, clearly paralleling the relationship between Aleuas the Red, founder of the dynasty and his dependents ruling in the late Archaic period. The statue at Delphi which honored Daochos I, the Pharsalian ruler in the late fifth century emphasized that he ruled Thessaly “not by force but by law.” Martin articulated the key Thessalian attitude towards political power: “nomos remained king of all.”

Jason was clear that he was not interested in taking Pharsalus – and by extension, the rest of Thessaly – by force, but instead desired to bring the Pharsalians over to his side through

10 Xen. Hell. 6.1.5, 6.1.7, 6.1.8.
11 “…they exalt and strengthen the traditional laws of the Thessalians; …handed from father to son…” Pindar. P. 10. In. 68-72.
12 Evans, “The Daochos Monument,” 143.
13 Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece, 111.
constitutional channels.\textsuperscript{14} However, rather than pursuing his election as archon, the traditional high office of the pan-Thessalian government, Jason instead pursued a policy in which he was acclaimed as the tagus of all Thessaly, traditionally an elected position whose purview was limited to military matters in times of national emergency.\textsuperscript{15} In appropriating the traditional military title of tagus as the chief executive, Jason was signaling that his regime was to be distinct from his Aleuada competitors in Larisa who had lost their unchallenged ruling mandate in the fifth century, but still maintain his archaizing connection to the “golden age” of the Thessalian past. His decision to choose the title of tagus was likely a pragmatic one: by doing so Jason may have been preventing propaganda that he had usurped the mandate of leadership from the rightful rulers of Thessaly. Moreover, by changing the scope and scale of the powers but retaining the title of a position that had been present in Thessalian society for generations, Jason was likely able to lessen the fear many may have felt about the threat he posed to the autonomy of the poleis of Thessaly as an autocratic ruler.\textsuperscript{16} For those who were dissatisfied with Aleuada political power, the choice of a new title may have suggested his intention to upend the contemporary social order. There is no extant information about Jason’s parentage; while he was likely from a wealthy background, he was never referred to as being connected to the Thessalian dynastic clans.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, the late entry of Pherae into pan-Thessalian politics suggests that the city was not one of the centers of dynastic power. By ensuring his election as tagus, Jason was

\textsuperscript{14} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.1.7.
\textsuperscript{16} Xenophon suggests as much when describing the reception Jason’s assassins had when they fled Thessaly looking for safety: Xen. Hell. 6.4.31. See also: Sprawski, \textit{Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC}, 22.
\textsuperscript{17} Polyain. 6.1.2, 6.1.5, 6.1.6.
not only attempting to reject the image of himself as an autocratic ruler, but he was clearly placing himself amongst the great Thessalian dynastic families which had led the country for generations. Finally, the choice to elevate the authority of an office which was specifically military emphasized his intentions to turn the martial energies of Thessaly outward.

Jason’s assumption of the title of *tagus* should not be understood as a free election in the modern sense, the importance of having popular consensus for government officials seems to have been foundational in Thessalian society. When the Spartan general Brasidas was attempting to cross Thessaly, the main argument by those Thessalians who wished to prevent his journey was that he was doing so without the common consent of the *koinon*.\(^\text{18}\) It was vitally important to his ancestors that archon Daochos I’s public facing representation emphasized that his rule was “not by force but by law.”\(^\text{19}\) The Thessalians sent messengers to the southern Greeks to attempt to prevent the plans of the Aleuadae for a Thessalian-Persian alliance in the early fifth century because it did not have the backing of the majority of the citizenry.\(^\text{20}\) Jason’s attempts to establish himself as a pan-Thessalian *tagus* through some sort of electoral mechanism was an attempt to adhere to older Thessalian traditions that required the common consent of some form of citizen council or electorate body, and promote his regime’s historical credentials.

Part of the Jason’s archaizing policy involved linking the tyrant of Pherae’s regime to the Archaic-era conquest of the Thessalian *perioicoi* through claiming to reestablish the “tribute of Scopas.”\(^\text{21}\) While we know little about the process, at some point during the Archaic period the Thessalian *archon* Scopas established Thessalian political control over the *perioicic settlements*

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\(^{18}\) Thuc. 4.78.3. “…ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον”
\(^{19}\) Evans, “The Daochos Monument,” 143. “…οὐ βίᾳ ἄλλῳ νόμῳ…”
\(^{20}\) Hdt. 7.172.1.
\(^{21}\) Xen. *Hell*. 6.1.19
around the Pineos River basin. It is likely that this was one of the major steps in the Thessalian expansion into central Greece, and by attempting to reestablish this tribute from the perioicoi, Jason was broadcasting that his regime would be attempting to recreate the Thessalian hegemonic project, which had failed under the leadership of the Aleuadae in the Phocian rebellion at the end of the Archaic period.

In Polydamas’ speech, Jason also emphasized his connection with the Thessalian historical narrative and his right to rule through his subjugation of the perioicic peoples around Thessaly. As ever, with Thessaly, while we are aware of the broad strokes of the relationship between the perioicic peoples and the Thessalians, but the details of these relationships are unclear in extant material. There were three regions traditionally understood to have been “subject-allies” of the Thessalians were Malis, Magnesia, Perraibia, and Achaea Phthiotis. While these polities were distinct ethnic and political units, it has been hypothesized that they fell under the orbit of Thessaly for purely material reasons: these mountainous regions were lightly populated and composed of communities which would be largely isolated without access to the Pineos River Basin. While they could pursue their own political program, these communities were mostly aligned with Thessaly as their material needs intersected.

While epigraphic evidence as to this arrangement is absent, coinage from these regions further suggests that they were semi-autonomous. Perraibian minting from the fifth century is

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22 Sprawski offers an interpretation on the mechanics of the relationship between the Thessalians and their perioicoi in the Classical Period: Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period.”
23 See chapter 3 on Thessaly in the Archaic period.
25 This is the position of Sprawski, who rightly points out that there is very little material about the relationship between Thessaly and its neighbors. There certainly is no tradition of resistance to Thessalian domination as is seen in the Thessalian relationship with Phocis. Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period,” 136.
remarkably similar to coinage from Thessaly, following the pattern of a divinity on one side of
the coin and livestock on the other.\textsuperscript{26} One issue showed the “pan-Thessalian” scene of the
taurokathapsia, which suggests that there was a significant cultural connection between the
Perraibians and their southern neighbors in the form of a common symbolic library. If this was
coinage that was intended to highlight the lack of \textit{perioicic} independence, one might expect the
“pan-Thessalian” ethnic of ΘE-TA to appear on the coinage.\textsuperscript{27} Instead the Perrhaebian coins
display the ethnic Π-E-Ρ-A, which suggests some form of autonomy. While issues from Achaea
Phthiotis are extremely rare for this period, a Meliteian coin dated to the first half of the fourth
century similarly displays the ethnic M-E-Λ-I.\textsuperscript{28} It must be acknowledged that this alone does not
indicate a political orientation, but given that in the late fifth century the fractious ethnically
Thessalian city-states were also producing coins designating the minting as being specific to that
\textit{polis}, it stands to reason that the \textit{perioicic} issues were demonstrating the same political or social
impetus.

The literary record tells a similar story: while the \textit{perioicoi} could establish and develop
their own independent policies, when the Thessalians had the strength to dictate governmental
positions to their neighbors and bend them to their will, they did so. Non-Thessalian certainly
understood the \textit{perioicoi} to have been political entities who could pursue differing policy goals.
Herodotus recorded the different Greek \textit{ethne} and states that medized in the fifth century, and in
doing so clearly delineated the Thessalians from her neighbors.\textsuperscript{29} In Diodorus’ account of
Xerxes’ invasion, the Perrhaebians indicated their intent to submit to the Persian army before the

\textsuperscript{26} For images see appendix C, group 3.
\textsuperscript{27} For examples of this see appendix C group 4. Also: Liampi, “A Hoard from Thessaly Containing Aiginetan
Staters and Thessalian Issues of the Taurokathapsia Type”; Westlake, “The Medism of Thessaly,” 1936, 12.
\textsuperscript{28} See appendix C group 5.
\textsuperscript{29} Hdt. 7.132.
Thessalians did themselves.\textsuperscript{30} Yet three decades earlier when the Peisistratid Hippias fled Athens in 510 BC, the Thessalians – given the date, likely the Aleuadae – offered the tyrant Iolkos in Magnesia as his personal domain.\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, the \textit{perioicoi} seem to have been required to give troops and pay a tax when the Thessalians went to war.\textsuperscript{32} Sprawski has argued that the \textit{perioicoi} were generally aligned and subject to the Thessalians “because they were too small to have their own independent policy.”\textsuperscript{33}

Modern scholarship has come to the consensus that the political relationship between the Thessalians and the periocic communities around Pineos River basin became solidified in its final form by the turn of the fifth century.\textsuperscript{34} However, regardless of the historical reality it seems likely that in 374 when Polydamas gave his speech, the Thessalians believed that one of the pillars on which Thessaly was historically built upon was the subjugation of Perrhaibia, Achaea Phthiotis, and Magnesia. Specifically, the conquest of these areas was linked to one of the mytho-historical figures of Thessaly, Scopas the Drinker, the eponymous founder of the Scopad family.\textsuperscript{35} Polydamas argued that Jason was reinstituting the taxes that Scopas imposed on the subject-allies. This might have been cause for alarm in Sparta, as it was a sign Jason was able to muster greater resources and manpower, but for the Thessalians this would have specifically placed Jason and his regime as the defender of the privileges of the great mytho-historical

\textsuperscript{30} Diod. 11.3.2.
\textsuperscript{31} Hdt. 5.94.1.
\textsuperscript{32} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.1.19.
\textsuperscript{33} Sprawski, “Thessalians and Their Neighbors in the Classical Period,” 136.
\textsuperscript{34} Graniger and Wade Gery argue for some time in the 6\textsuperscript{th} century: Graniger, “Macedonia and Thessaly,” 2010, 308; Wade-Gery and Morrison, “Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias,” 62. Sordi, basing her chronology on the time Simonides of Cos was reportedly in Thessaly, believed that the conquest of the \textit{perioicoi} took place somewhere between 520-512: Sordi, \textit{La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno}, 62–63. Rogers placed Aleuas in the late eighth or early seventh centuries, perhaps attempting to associate the Thessalian leader with the timeframe of the First Sacred War: Edgar Rogers, \textit{The Copper Coinage of Thessaly} (London: Spink & Son, 1932), 15.
\textsuperscript{35} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.1.19.
foundational families of Thessaly. Jason’s imposition of this policy would likely have been a clear signal to the Thessalians that the internal strife which consumed their country under Lycophron, Aristippus, and Medius – preventing the enforcement of this tax – was at an end.\textsuperscript{36} If Sordi was correct, and the extant fragments of the Aristotelian Constitution of the Thessalians indicate that the conquest of the perioicoi was linked to Aleuas and his military reforms then this would undercut Aleuadae claims to rule.\textsuperscript{37} Regardless, by reasserting Thessalian control over the perioicoi, Jason’s regime could claim that it was restoring Thessaly to its former glory in a way that the Aleuadae in Larisa could not.

The Spartan unwillingness to confront Jason, and his alliance with the Boeotians allowed Jason to aggressively pursue consolidation and expansion before his assassination, in a manner in which it seemed that Thessaly would recreate its hegemony over central Greece. Military history is not the purview of this work, and Sprawski goes into excellent detail regarding the various military campaigns of Jason; it is unnecessary to cover well-trod ground here.\textsuperscript{38} Instead, what modern historians have largely overlooked is the internal socio-political motivations for Jason’s actions. Jason was not only looking to recreate Thessalian hegemony in central Greece, but he was also attempting to portray himself as the inheritor of traditions of historical Thessalian rulers. Two particular events in the life of Jason of Pherae indicate his program of re-enacting historical issues.

In 371, near the town of Leuctra a Theban army decisively defeated a Spartan force under Spartan king Cleombrotus.\textsuperscript{39} Jason and a small army arrived too late to assist his Theban allies in

\begin{itemize}
  \item Diod. 15.57.2.
  \item Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 66.
  \item Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC.
  \item Xen. Hell. 6.4.3-15.
\end{itemize}
battle, but was presented by the Thebans with plans for a joint offensive to destroy the reeling Spartan army. Jason instead convinced the Thebans not to follow up their attack, arguing that if their second assault failed, it would invalidate the strategic gains of the first. Playing both sides, the Pheraean tyrant also sent messengers to the Spartans, citing his familial connections with the city and encouraging the Spartan army to request a truce. Jason’s motivations are not specifically stated, but it seems likely that his suggestions were made in order to prevent either Sparta or Thebes annihilating one another and gaining the upper hand: If the Boeotians and Spartans were locked in a stalemate, they would expend their energy on one another rather than concern themselves with Jason’s growing power. While Jason’s behaviors with regard to the southern powers were designed to obscure his long-term goals, his actions on his return to Thessaly would have signaled his intentions clearly to a Thessalian audience.

Leaving Boeotia, Jason guided his army through Phocis and the Pheraean tyrant sacked the suburbs of Hyampolis. There seems to be no particular strategic reason for this action, especially if Diodorus is to be believed and Jason had already taken Locris, which would have provided overland access to Boeotia. Moreover, the countryside of Phocis was not known as a particularly wealthy area, it seems unlikely that the booty carried off by a small force would have measurably increased Jason’s treasury. However, the city of Hyampolis was the site of the two great Thessalian defeats of the Phocian rebellion, the Battles of Chalk and Amphorae. Additionally, the Apollonian temple at Abae, where the Phocians dedicated the shields of the Thessalian soldiers fallen in those battles to Apollo was just outside Hyampolis. While the

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41 Xen. Hell. 6.4.27.
42 Diod. 15.57.2.
43 Hdt. 8.27.3, 8.28.
44 Hdt. 8.27.4.
strategic goals of this particular action might have been minimal, there should be no question as to the symbolic power of sacking the area around Hyampolis: it was a direct appropriation of the Thessalian dynastic elite’s perceived right to rule. The Aleuad-engineered alliance between Xerxes and the Thessalian nobles in Larisa during the second Persian invasion resulted in the Persian and Thessalian sack of Phocis; Herodotus noted that the combined Persian-Thessalian armies went out of their way to raid Hyampolis and συλήσαντες ἐνέπρησαν the temple at Abae.45 This was a signal that the Aleuad-controlled the Thessalian hegemonic project in central Greece and could have been used to justify Aleuad control over Thessaly.

Through his sack of Hyampolis Jason was promoting several important political and symbolic goals. First, Jason was taking revenge for the Thessalian losses at Hymapolis during the Phocian rebellion, and the subsequent loss of Thessaly’s central Greek hegemony. Second, by performing this action, Jason was demonstrating continuity with the Archaic Aleuad regimes: as Thorax and his brothers sacked Phocis in the fifth century, so too was Jason choosing to repudiate Thessalian losses at the Battles of Amphorae and Chalk during the Phocian Rebellion. Jason was able to take this action and his competitors in Larisa or Pharsalus had been unable to, and thus the Tyrant of Pherae was able to diminish the legitimacy that the Aleuad family had to rule. Third, Jason was establishing himself as one of the great Thessalian leaders like Aleuas or Scopas who expanded and enhanced Thessalian prestige.

Sacking the suburbs of Hyampolis and reestablishing control of the perioicic subject-allies were not simply strategic actions, Jason of Pherae was attempting to graft himself into the mytho-historical tradition of Thessaly. He was assuming the mandate to rule that the Aleuad family,

45 “…plunder and burn…” Hdt. 8.33.
Daochids, Menonidae, and others possessed. This intention is nowhere clearer than his plan to lead a procession to Delphi in 371 for the Pythian Games:

ἐπιόντων δὲ Πυθίων παρήγγειλε μὲν ταῖς πόλεσι βοῦς καὶ οἶς καὶ αἴγας καὶ ψ

παρασκευάζεσθαι ώς εἰς τὴν θυσίαν: καὶ ἔφασαν πάνω μετρίως ἐκάστη πόλει ἑπαγγελλομένῳ
gενέσθαι βοῦς μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους χιλίων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα βοσκῆματα πλείον ἢ μύρια. ἐκήρυξε δὲ καὶ νικητήριον χρυσοῦν στέφανον ἔσεσθαι, ἣτις τὸν πόλεων βοῦν ἤγεμόνα κάλλιστον τῷ θεῷ θρέψει. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς στρατευσομένοις εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς
pαρασκευάζεσθαι: διενειτό γάρ, ὡς ἔφασαν, καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοὺς ἀγάνας αὐτὸς
dιατιθέναι.46

Jason was unable to accomplish his goal, as he was assassinated in 370 while reviewing a body of Pheraeian cavalry.47 It is unclear what the result of the expedition would have been had Jason lived and executed his plan, but this particular scheme was remarkable in its far-sightedness, addressing both the symbolic and material interests of the Thessalian koinon.

It cannot have passed unnoticed by the Thessalian population that Jason’s expedition mirrored that of the First Sacred War, in which a Thessalian led group of Greek ethne marched

46 Xen. Hell. 6.4.29-30: Now when the Pythian festival was approaching, Jason sent orders to his cities to make ready cattle, sheep, goats, and swine for the sacrifice. And it was said that although he laid upon each city a very moderate demand, there were contributed no fewer than a thousand cattle and more than ten thousand of the other animals. He also made proclamation that a golden crown would be the prize of victory to the city which should rear the finest bull to lead the herd in honor of the god. Furthermore, he gave orders to the Thessalians to make preparations for taking the field at the time of the Pythian festival; for he was intending, it was said, to be himself the director both of the festal assembly in honor of the god and of the games.

47 Xen. Hell. 6.4.31; Diod. 15.60.5.
south and “liberated” Delphi from the local powers.\textsuperscript{48} This conflict established – or was at least perceived to have established – the Delphic Amphictyony, and which Thessaly was understood by the fourth century to have taken a leading role. Control of the Amphicyony was a point of pride, especially as it was responsible for administering the religious complex at Delphi.\textsuperscript{49}

Moreover, in proposing this religious procession to the Pythian games, Jason would also have recreated an important element of the worship of Apollo, the act of bringing laurel from Tempe to Delphi. Sprawski associated this with a festival known as “Septerion,” in which laurel brought from Thessaly was used in the creation of crowns for winners in the Pythian games.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, by this religious pilgrimage Jason was not only displaying his piety, but he was symbolically recalling Thessalian influence over one of the most important religious sites in the Greek world and emphasizing the importance Thessaly played in administering the Pythian oracle and associated religious sites. Similarly, he was tying himself and his regime into a pan-Thessalian sense of mythology and history, and a “golden age” of Thessalian dominance in central Greece. Additionally, in collecting animals from the entirety of Thessaly and creating a competition for bringing the finest bull, Jason was deescalating internal Thessalian violence and moving those conflicts into the sacred space of religious worship.\textsuperscript{51} Graninger argued that Jason’s goal was to “build a Thessalian identity” but it seems more appropriate to argue that Jason was re-establishing a perceived ancient Thessalian identity — which would have created a sense of pride and purpose in a people who for over a century had been wracked by the failure of their

\textsuperscript{48} Westlake suggests that Jason may have even intended to call for a new Sacred War as part of his expedition to Delphi: Westlake, \textit{Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.}, 1935, 98.. For a full discussion of the First Sacred War, the Delphic Amphictyony and the potential Thessalian involvement see chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{49} For one epigraphic example see: IG I\textsuperscript{1} 9.

\textsuperscript{50} Sprawski, \textit{Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC}, 122. Certainly, the use of laurel was a potent symbol in the Hellenic mind, as Philip II understood.

\textsuperscript{51} Graninger, “Apollo, Ennodia, and Fourth-Century Thessaly,” 112.
hegemonic project, whether or not it had ever actually existed.\textsuperscript{52} Jason was recalling a period in which the Thessalian \textit{koinon} was a united and powerful polity, able to project their power outside of their own borders.

The material aspect of the procession to Delphi is similarly key to understanding Thessaly and Jason’s attempts at re-establishing Thessalian communal identity. As discussed above and in chapter 3 the decline in Thessalian socio-political unity seems to have occurred as a result of the Phocian rebellion in the late Archaic period. Jason did in fact muster a thousand cattle and ten thousand other animals, then this represented immense animal wealth, on a scale which would have dwarfed the wealth of any individual and likely rivaled many of the political entities in central Greece. Despite the religious nature of the procession, it would have been a target for thieves, brigands, large predators, and other hungry pilgrims. Herdsmen needed to guide the procession, likely in addition to a significant number of soldiers to protect the animals and whatever retinue that Jason brought with him to Phocis. This would have been a tremendous show of wealth and military strength, all proceeding through Phocis under the guise of a religious function, through a region which was almost certainly actively hostile to Jason and the Thessalians.\textsuperscript{53}

Much like Jason’s return from Leuctra, this was a show of force designed to repudiate Thessalian losses at Hyampolis and recall the mytho-historic Thessalian victory in the First Sacred War. Jason was intent on linking himself and his regime to the period of Thessalian

\textsuperscript{52} Graninger, 110.
\textsuperscript{53} By the 370s Phocis and Thessaly were engaged in a war with one another: Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.21. Xenophon used the term \textit{ἀκηρύκτω} πολέμω. The use of \textit{ἀκηρύκτως} is unusual, Xenophon used it only once, in this instance. It seems to convey a lack of communication between the sides, an unwillingness to treat with one’s opponents. Herodotus (Hdt. 5.81.2) chose the term to describe the ancestral bitter conflict between Athens and Aegina, and Thucydides (Thuc. 1.146) used it to convey the unusual nature of the competition and rising tensions between Sparta and Athens before the outbreak of hostilities before the second Peloponnesian War.
history prior to the collapse of unity in the wake of the Phocian rebellion and signaling his intent
to recreate Thessalian regional hegemony in central Greece. Had Jason not been assassinated it is
not difficult to imagine that the Thessalians would have established themselves as the preeminent
power in central Greece.

II. The Political Archaism of the Thessalian Federation

While Jason of Pherae’s actions were the most well-documented of any singular
Thessalian leader in the fourth century, his policy of archaism and connecting his regime to past
glories is not unusual. The Thessalian Federation, a coalition of Thessalian cities led by the
Aleuadæ in Larisa which opposed Pheraean rule followed a similar political program.

Our primary source on the governance of the Thessalian Federation revolves around an
alliance established with Athens in 361/0.54 Seeking allies in their fight against Alexander of
Pherae to balance the scales in their civil war, The Thessalian Federation turned to Athens. The
impetus of the Thessalian Federation is quite apparent: the Athenians were required to swear an
oath pledging to βοηθήσω π[α]ντί σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐὰν τι[ζ] ἵππι τὸ κοινὸν τὸ
Θετταλῶν ἐπὶ πολ[έμ]υοι ή τὸν ἄρχοντα καταλύει, ὃν ἐπὶ τὸ [κοινὸν] τὸ
Θετταλίαν ἐν Θετταλίαι.55 This was clearly intended to assert that the Thessalian federation was the only
legitimate ruling power in Thessaly. It is tempting to see the inclusion of the language insisting

54 IG II² 116.
55 “…go in support with all [their] strength as far as possible if anybody goes against the federation of the
Thessalians forward, or overthrows the ruling officer whom the Thessalians chose, or establishes a tyrant in
Thessaly.” IG II² 116, Ln. 16-19.
that the government of Thessaly required the assent of the Thessalian population as a balm to the Athenian democracy. However, the insistence of collaborative government had deep roots in Thessalian political thought, as discussed elsewhere in this work. Moreover, the Thessalian Federation treaty emphasized the continuity between the Federation and previous Thessalian governments through the titling of their officials and their connection to the Apollonian oracle at Delphi.

While the Thessalian Federation’s treaty is rather sparse in terms of describing the mechanics of governance, the title of the Thessalian executive suggests that the Aleuadae were deliberately attempting to connect themselves to an earlier Thessalian period. In the Athenian-Thessalian treaty, the leader of the Thessalian Federation is listed as τὸν ἀρχοντα.\(^{56}\) As discussed in chapter 4, this was the traditional name for the elected leader of the Thessalian koinon. This is surprising: two major political upheavals occurred in the fifth century in Thessaly which should have caused significant realignment of Thessalian political ideals: the revolution of 454 and the conquest of Thessaly by Lycophron of Pherae in 404.\(^{57}\) Yet from all extant evidence it seems as though in the fourth century the Thessalian governments of both Jason and the Aleuadae went to great lengths to emphasize the continuity between older regimes of Thessaly and their own. This was perhaps similar to the process Athens underwent after the fourth century, in which the city maintained much of the terminology of an independent democratic government despite being subordinate to external powers.

Through the mid-fifth century archon was the title of the Thessalian executive. Despite the disenfranchisement of the Aleuadae from Larisa by Lycophron of Pherae, when the Aleuadae

\(^{56}\) IG II\(^2\) 116, Ln. 23.

\(^{57}\) For a discussion of the Revolution of 457 see chapter 7 on the Battle of Tanagra. For Lycophron see Xen. Hell. 2.3.4.
was able to reassert their power, they did so within the context of previously established titles. In asserting that the leading office of the Thessalian federation was the archon, The Aleuadae were emphasizing their coalition’s connection to the past and the continuity between itself and previous Thessalian administrations, which had been dominated by the Larisaean dynasts in the late Archaic period.

Similarly, the inclusion of the Thessalian ἱερομνήμονας, the representatives of Thessaly on the Amphictyonic council which oversaw the sanctuary at Delphi is both unusual but clearly part of the program of anachronism. In 1961 Mosley assembled a list of known treaties in the ancient Greek world which included details about the signatories from the Archaic period through 341/0.⁵⁸ Although the dataset is limited, of the 27 treaties Mosley identified only one treaty which involved the hieromnemones: the alliance between the Thessalian Federation and the Athenians. To be a hieromnemon was a prestigious position, a state’s representative on the Amphictyonic council would have been in a position to influence the government at the highest levels.⁵⁹ Given the Thessalians’ history with Delphi and the Amphictyonic Council, this inclusion suggests more than the presence of an important religious official to add weight to the treaty. As described in chapter 2 and below, the First Sacred War was a key stage in Thessalian expansion in which Thessaly and a coalition of other Greek ethne displace the local population around Delphi and “liberate” the sanctuary. These same Greek polities in turn assumed control of the management of the sanctuary, separating it from local influence. The connection with Delphi seems to have been a particularly foundational part of Thessalian identity, especially with regard

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⁵⁹ Daochos II was a Hieromnemon, which he listed only second to his position as a tetrarch of the Thessalians. When choosing the members of the Athenian βουλή, the Hieromnemones were included third on the list behind the generals and the archons: Arist. Const. Ath. 30.2.
to Aleuas the Red. While the attribution is late, according to tradition Aleuas was understood to have been chosen by the Pythia to rule Thessaly, thus giving his rule divine support. For a Thessalian audience the inclusion of the *hieromnemones* in the treaty would indicate the closeness of the Federation’s government to Delphi and would recall legends regarding Aleuas the Red, not only recalling military success but also allowing the government in Larisa to capitalize on Aleuas’ mytho-historic legitimacy.

Thus, in attempting to reconstruct the government of Thessaly, a theme emerges that seems to have been present throughout much of the fourth century: a trend towards archaism and interest by leaders to achieve legitimacy for power by connecting their regimes to those of the glories of Thessalians past. The failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project seems to have been a tremendous complication for the population of Thessaly, and there seems to have been an inability to move beyond this setback and into a new mode of thinking. Thessalian regimes and rulers, regardless of their individual ideological goals, may have felt the need to frame their mandate to rule the Peneos River basin within the context of the mytho-historic successes of Archaic Thessaly.

III. Alexander and the embrace of Thessalian Tyranny

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60 Jason’s actions with regard to Delphi, especially his intended procession to the Pythian Games seems to corroborate the importance of the Thessalian connection with Delphi: Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431-370 BC*, 120–21. See also: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.29-30.

The death of Jason reinvigorated the possibility of civil war in Thessaly. His brothers Polydorus and Polyphron assumed control of the region, seemingly without the political and social consent that Jason worked so hard to obtain.\textsuperscript{62} There were clearly rumblings of discontent from the traditional power centers in Thessaly, and whatever social unity Jason had created through his program of connecting his regime to Thessalian history began to crumble. The older Thessalian families which had traditionally held power likely attempted to reassert their own political power within Thessaly, as the important Pharsalian and Larisaean elite were executed or exiled by Polyphron.\textsuperscript{63} Within a year Polyphron was assassinated by Polydorus, who was in turn poisoned by his nephew – and Polyphron’s son – Alexander.\textsuperscript{64} At this stage Alexander appears to have continued his uncle’s policy of asserting the traditionalist \textit{bona fides} of his regime; Alexander portrayed himself as a tyrannicide, a man who was ready to defend \textit{nomos} and rule in the traditional mold of Thessalian custom, rather than as an unconstitutional usurper like his uncle.\textsuperscript{65} Clearly many in Thessaly were not convinced by Alexander of Pherae’s actions. In 369 the Aleuadae looked to Alexander II of Macedon and the Boeotian League for assistance.\textsuperscript{66} The back-and-forth between Alexander, the Aleuadae, and the Thebans has been covered in depth by modern scholarship, but what is particularly trenchant is the propaganda that these sides produced.\textsuperscript{67} In the wake of Jason’s assassination both Alexander and the Aleuadae attempted to

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.33. Diod. 15.60.5. Diodorus records only that Polydorus took office, which is very likely an oversight. Sordi argued that the familial passing of the office of \textit{tagus} “Con Polifrone la taiga si transform in tirannide.” Sordi, \textit{La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno}, 191.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.5.23.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Diod. 15.61.2.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.34.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Diod. 15.61.4, 15.67.3; Plut. \textit{Pelop.} 26. The Aleuadae similarly intrigued with the Macedonian king during the invasion of Xerxes, and to enable the march of Brasidas across Thessaly. See chapter 3.
\end{thebibliography}
put forth their vision for not only Thessalian government but how that government was understood in the context of Thessalian history.

Despite the waxing and waning political fortunes of the Aleuadae through the Classical period, the coinage minted in Larisa remain consistent in its imagery. The head of the eponymous nymph Larisa is shown on the obverse, and a scene with an animal – usually a horse – appears on the reverse. While there were pan-Thessalian coins minted in the fifth century, often identifiable by the legend ΤΑ ΘΕ, an abbreviation for τὰς θεσσαλίης, the coinage of Larisa was explicitly civic, difficult to interpret as anything other than specifically referencing Larisa. However, as Jason’s program of activities and propaganda was implicitly – and though there are no records of it, most likely explicitly as well – designed to place himself as the inheritor of any mandate to rule maintained by the Aleuadae, it would have been important for the Larisaean clan to respond, at least after the death of the tyrant.

In the years following Jason’s assassination, the mint in Larisa produced the “Aleuas” coin, which was strikingly different from previous issues. The vast majority of divinities on the

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68 The earliest profile-head coins of Larisa also display the sandal of Jason. For an explanation on the legend of Jason in Thessaly see: Samuel Birch, “On the Coins of the Thessalian Larissa,” *The Numismatic Chronicle* 1 (1839): 223–25. Westlake argued that these coins were struck on a Persian standard. This has been disputed by Jonathan Kagan, who makes a convincing argument for their appearance after the Persian Wars, and instead a strong connection to the coinage of Alexander I of Macedon. See chapter 3 on Thessaly after the Persian wars, as well as Westlake, “The Medism of Thessaly,” 1936, 12; Kagan, “The So-Called Persian Weight Coins of Larissa.”

69 Nonetheless, it should be noted that Thessalian coinage, regardless of the specificity of its images maintains a consistent set of symbols – usually involving a goddess and livestock – which strongly suggests a common set of outlook and values, corroborating the idea that the Thessalian ethnos was more than a construction of southern Greek authors.

70 These coins have been dated “on stylistic grounds” to 363-361 but given the seeming immediacy with which hostilities broke out in 369 there is no reason to believe that the Aleuadae would wait six years to reassert their control over Thessalian mytho-history: Catharine Lorber, “Thessalian Hoards and the Coinage of Larissa,” *American Journal of Numismatics*, AJN Second Series, 20 (2008): 120.

71 For two extant examples of these coins see appendix C, group 10.
coinage of the Thessalians are female. On the Aleuas issue, Zeus in the form of an eagle holds a thunderbolt on the reverse, with two inscriptions: the ethnic [Λ]ΑΡΙΣΑΙΑ, and the letters EΛΛΑ. As Zeus was understood to have been the divine source of justice, this connection with Larisa was likely implicitly contrasted with the “tyrannical” government of the Pheraeans. Jason of Pherae’s focus on obtaining electoral consent from the Thessalian koinon for his rule suggests that this was a particularly sensitive issue during his rule. The obverse side of the Aleuas coin is perhaps even more unusual, instead of a deity the head of Aleuas the Red, eponymous ancestor of the Aleuadae clan appears at three-quarters left facing next to an inscription: AΛΕΥ[...]. The dress and design of Aleuas is somewhat of a mystery, one might expect to see the progenitor of the Aleuadae clan in the traditional Thessalian petastos, instead Aleuas was outfitted with a variant on a pilos-type helmet, or a Chalcidian helmet without cheek pieces. Additionally, adjacent to the head of Aleuas is a πελεκευς. This double-axe seems to have been fairly pervasive symbol in Thessaly, one of the earliest Larisaean minting, the “Persian-weight” coins, display a double-headed axe. One of the Thessalian branding marks on horses traded outside of Thessaly was the double-axe. The double-headed axe seems to have had associations with royalty: it appears on Odyrisan coins, and some of Alexander’s own didrachms – unfortunately inaccessible in a private collection – have this symbol as well. Given this information, it seems quite likely that through this issue the Aleuadae and the Thessalian

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72 ΕΛΛΑ likely refers to the leader of the Thessalian Federation at this time, Hellanocrates: Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, 1935, 146.
75 Kroll, “An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry,” 88. Kroll identifies the double-axe as of specifically Pheraean provenance, though it is unclear why he has made this connection.
Federation were articulating their ruling mandate through connecting their regime to the mytho-historic past.

Much like the Thessalian Federation’s Aleuas coin, which ignored pan-Thessalian imagery in favor of more pointedly localized mythology, Alexander’s minting suggest that his regime looked to associate his political power with his own person. Alexander’s extant coinage was relatively standard in terms symbolism, with the exception of two important deviations: Alexander began the introduction of the goddess Ennodia on his issues, and he also began putting his own name onto his coins.\(^77\) Ennodia was a chthonic deity in some capacity associated with Artemis, whose cult seems to have been centered at Pherae.\(^78\) This worship likely began in the 8\(^{th}\) century but spread outward throughout the Classical period. This seems to not only have occurred in Thessaly – we are familiar with inscriptions from Larisa relating to Ennodia – but also to the south. While evidence is unclear for the overall extent of Ennodia worship, in examining the available information, a few items become clear about the worship of Ennodia, especially in contrast with Jason’s policies.

Much of Jason’s intent was to link himself and his regime at Pherae with the larger Thessalian context. His policies of linking himself and his administration with the past glories of the Thessalian \textit{ethnos and} operating within traditional Thessalian custom seem to reflect a policy of inclusion. Jason’s goal was to bring himself to the Thessalians, ideally by choice rather than by force. This was a policy of assimilation through the re-creation of the common Thessalian

\(^{77}\) See: appendix C group 7.
identity, an identity which had been shattered by the Phocian rebellion and the subsequent scramble for political control in the fifth century.

Alexander, on the other hand seems to have rejected the policy of linking himself to the Thessalian past, instead focusing his rule on a Pherae-centric model. Ennodia may have been worshipped throughout Thessaly, but by choosing an image that originated in Pherae, Alexander was in effect insisting that the Thessalians come to him, rather than attempt to bring himself to his countrymen. Similarly, Alexander’s policy of adding his name to his coins indicates that he saw his political power as personal: the Thessalians were supporting the man, rather than the office which Jason occupied.

In 369, while Alexander was establishing his new Pheraean regime, the Larisaeans enlisted the assistance of the Boeotians under Pelopidas and Epaminondas to combat Jason.79 Despite initial successes Alexander was unable to be reined in and attempts on the part of Pelopidas to convince the tyrant to assume the office of tagus were a failure.80 The “Aleuas” coins of Larisa appear in the time period after this encounter, indicating that the Aleuadae were perhaps attempting to unite the Thessalian koinon in a similar manner to Jason of Pherae. Unfortunately, we can say little about the Thessalian anti-Alexander federation in this period, since the extant histories focus almost exclusively on the tyrants of Pherae.81 Nonetheless, from our limited perspective it seems clear that the conflict between Alexander and the Thessalian Federation continued intermittently for several years until the Aleuadae once again asked for assistance from the Argead dynasty. In 353 Philip II ejected the last tyrants of Pherae, and

79 Plut. Pel. 26-27; Diod. 15.71.2; Paus. 9.15.1.
81 For a discussion of IG II² 116, the alliance with the Athenians, see chapter 4 which covers the Thessalian government and the changes in the fourth century.
Thessaly became a client state of the Macedonians. Despite attempts by Jason of Pherae to unite the Thessalians under the banner of restoring their regional hegemony, the Phocian rebellion over a century earlier shattered the social and political cohesion that had existed within Archaic Thessaly, which was never to be reattained.

IV. Jason of Pherae, Philip of Macedon, and the restoration of the Thessalian “Golden Age”

As discussed above, the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project at the end of the Archaic period was one of the major turning points in Thessalian history, creating significant disruption both in elite consensus and requiring that successful Thessalian governments repudiate their ancestors’ failures. After this point, Thessalian regimes – especially those of “outsiders” like Jason of Pherae and Philip II – would need to demonstrate their legitimacy by recreating the Thessalian hegemonic project through reestablishing control over Delphi and the Delphic Amphictyony, and military action against the Phocian ethnos. If leadership neglected conflict with the Phocians, as the Pharsalian regime did during the early 450s, that government lost political capital and was vulnerable to challenges from other factions within Thessaly who could argue their rule represented a more legitimate continuity with past glories.


83 See chapter 7 on the Battle of Tanagra.
There is unfortunately no extant literary or material evidence which would offer a coherent timeline as to when the Delphic Amphictyony was established, or at which point the Thessalians became involved. However, as discussed in chapter 2 above, by the Classical period the perception that the Thessalians had been part of the Amphictyony from its inception and was a foundational part of Thessalian mytho-history.84 Moreover, as argued above, the connection between Thessaly and the Amphictyony was not important to the Thessalians for purely religious or social reasons: it is also likely that there was an important economic component in the control of the overland trade and pilgrimage routes around Delphi and in supplying sacrificial animals for religious operations.

After the second Persian invasion in which the majority of the Amphictyonic membership — including the Thessalians — medized, it seems that the organization lost much of its prominence and this severely limited the Amphictyony’s ability to organize and project military power.85 As such, after the defeat of the pan-Thessalian government in Pharsalus by Lycophron of Pherae in 404, in order to successfully unite the various Thessalian factions under one banner any faction that hoped to rule needed not only to prosecute conflict with the Phocians but attempt to restore the Thessalians to prominence in the Delphic Amphictyony. Jason of Pherae and Philip II of Macedon were the only two leaders in the fourth century who were able to unite the people of Thessaly. Extant evidence suggests that Jason pursued policies and propaganda which highlighted his efforts to restore Thessaly to its pre-Phocian rebellion state, in which Thessaly had control of the Delphic Amphictyony and hegemony over central Greece. Thessalian resources were a tremendous prize to any power which could unite the Peneos River basin, and it

84 For an extensive discussion of the First Sacred War and Thessalian involvement see chapters 1 and 2.
85 The Second Sacred War seems to have involved only the Athenians, Spartans, and Phocians, and only the last were members of the Amphictyony: Thuc. 1.112.5. Plut. Per. 21. See also: Robertson, “The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.,” 100; Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431 - 370 BC, 39.
seems clear that Philip II, a canny politician, diplomat, and general, understood Jason’s stratagems and used them to bring Thessaly into a Macedonian orbit.

While the actions and policies of Jason of Pherae have been attended to in depth elsewhere in this work, it is appropriate to revisit some specific actions and policies on the part of Jason and his regime that were pointedly imitated with great success during Phillip II’s reign. Jason of Pherae’s policies were designed to unite Thessaly and provide the Pheraean’s regime legitimacy through a number of contexts: rejection of the loss of Thessalian hegemony over Phocis through military aggression against the Phocian ethnos, reestablishment of Thessalian domination of the Delphic Amphictyony and thus monopolizing the sacred animal trade, and assertion of popular rather than military appointment of leadership. Ultimately, these acts signaled to the population of Thessaly that Jason’s government would assert Thessalian military and economic power over the communities of central Greece, directly recalling the acme of Thessalian hegemony in the Archaic period.

First, by successfully prosecuting conflict against the Phocian ethnos in a manner which directly referenced the failures of previous Thessalian regimes, Jason undercut the legitimacy of the Aleuadae of Larisa, whose ancestors lost hegemony over Phocis in the late Archaic period. Jason’s campaigns outside of Thessaly were limited; the only one for which significant detail exists took place just after the Battle of Leuctra in 371. Marching a small force through central Greece, Jason sacked the suburbs of Hyampolis and pillaged a significant portion of Phocis. This action is most easily explained as being a manifestation of the enmity between the Thessalians and Phocians, which is a reasonable assessment but obscures the deeper symbolic

86 There is no direct evidence as to the supremacy of the Aleuad clan in Thessalian politics, they are the most likely candidates for the architects of Thessalian policy in the majority of the sixth and fifth centuries.
87 Xen. Hell. 6.4.27.
meaning behind the campaign. Jason’s subsequent target was Trachinian Herakleia, which suggests a larger strategic goal. Sprawski has argued that Hyampolis and Herakleia both commanded access points to the Cephissus River valley and the western coastal plain of central Greece, two of the key thoroughfares through central Greece. The subjugation of these regions therefore signaled Jason’s intention to extend Thessalian power south.

Sprawski’s interpretation is reasonable and offers greater insight and nuance into the actions of the Pheraean tyrant. However, Jason’s campaign against Phocis offered a symbolic as well as material reward, one perhaps even more appealing to the Thessalian *ethnos*. Herodotus recorded that after the Phocians broke the Thessalian domination of their country and repelled their armies in the late Archaic period, the victorious Phocians dedicated statues as well as the shields of fallen Thessalian soldiers at the shrines of Delphi and Abai. The conflict in which the Thessalians were ejected from Phocis took place near Hyampolis, and Xenophon’s description of Jason’s campaign in Phocis notes that Jason did not sack Hyampolis itself but the suburbs, using the term: προάστιος. The shrine to Apollo at Abae is only a few miles from the Hyampolis and it is difficult to interpret Jason’s sacking of the villages in the area where the Thessalians lost their hegemony over Phocis and the site of very public dedications and celebrations of Thessalian losses as anything other than a clear declaration of an intention to reestablish and extend Thessalian power. Jason could succeed in repudiating the Phocian victories whereas the Aleudae, who traditionally held the mandate of leadership in Thessaly could not, and thus gain

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89 Diod. 15.57.2; Xen. *Hell*. 6.4.27.
91 Hdt. 8.27.4-5.
legitimacy and support as the ruler who would “restore” Thessaly to its position of dominance in central Greece.\textsuperscript{93}

Second, after the successful campaign against Phocis, in 370 Jason of Pherae arranged to bring an immense herd of animals to the Pythian Games to publicly demonstrate Thessaly’s connection to Delphi.\textsuperscript{94} As part of his preparations for this event, Jason issued request to the cities of Thessaly for animals and offered a golden crown for the city which donated the finest sacrificial bull to the expedition. As the Thessalian \textit{koinon} had been fractured and fractious for many years, offering this prize would subvert intra-Thessalian political and military competition into peaceful agonistic interaction. At the same time, Jason intended to project force outward; when the call was issued for sacrificial animals a decree was sent for the Thessalian army to prepare to take the field, presumably to accompany the procession to the Pythian Games.\textsuperscript{95} The Tyrant of Pherae looked to both deescalate martial hostility within Thessaly by unifying its citizen-soldiers through recalling the mytho-historical First Sacred War, in which the Amphictyonic \textit{ethne} waged a military campaign against the peoples around Delphi to liberate the sanctuary and oracle. As with his action against Hyampolis, Jason’s policies deliberately recalled past glories of Thessalian hegemony and portrayed his rule as the restoration of Thessalian power in central Greece.

Furthermore, it was no accident that Jason offered a golden crown to the winner of his competition; the prize for victory at the Pythian Games was also a crown. Awarding the winning Thessalian \textit{polis} a crown for contributing an animal that would be sacrificed at the Pythian Games symbolically made the action of participating in Jason’s endeavor an event in the games

\textsuperscript{93} For more on the Aleuadae and the Persian invasion see chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{94} Xen. Hell. 6.4.29.
\textsuperscript{95} Xen. Hell. 6.4.30.
itself. As the judge who determined the winner of the competition and the recipient of the crown, Jason was performing the action of the Amphictyonic officials who oversaw the games.\textsuperscript{96} Jason’s efforts and goals were apparently quite clear to a contemporary audience: Xenophon recorded that many believed Jason intended to make himself the director – Xenophon used the term πανήγυρις – of the Pythian Games.\textsuperscript{97} It seems unlikely that this was the limit of Jason’s ambition, once Jason was director of the Pythian games his goal was almost certainly to assume a dominant position in the Delphic Amphictyony. As discussed above, the sacred land around Delphi, demarcated for sacrificial animals dedicated to Apollo was very likely insufficient to support the needs of the suppliants coming to the Oracle. Given this issue, it seems likely that Jason’s plan to ostentatiously drive thousands of sacrificial animals to the Pythian Games with the ultimate goal of taking control of the Amphictyony should be understood not only as a display of Thessalian wealth and power, but also a declaration that Thessaly would assert its control of the sacred animal trade to Delphi. Unfortunately, Jason of Pherae was assassinated before his expedition to the Pythian Games could take place and his plans could come to fruition. These policy goals Jason of Pherae pursued were replicated by Philip II only a few decades later; the Macedonian King’s ability to appeal to the Thessalian people by defeating Phocis and placing the Thessalian \textit{ethnos} at the head of the Delphic Amphictyony, brought the country firmly into the Macedonian orbit.

While extant information on Philip II’s Thessalian policies is limited, what survives seems to closely parallel the activities and plans of Jason of Pherae. It is reasonable to accept that the Macedonian elite kept itself well-informed of political and social events in Thessaly;

\textsuperscript{96} Paus. 10.7.6.
\textsuperscript{97} Paus. 10.7.5.
Thessaly was a powerful neighbor – according to Diodorus, the Thessalians may have occasionally taken control of parts of Macedonia – and the broad plains of Thessaly provided the most hospitable overland route between Macedonia and southern Greece.\(^98\) It seems unlikely that both Jason and Philip II were creating these unified objectives and policies out of whole cloth but rather that they were responding to and fulfilling Thessalian cultural requirements for legitimating their sovereignty.

While it is unquestionable that some Thessalians were unhappy with Jason’s rule, and certainly Philip II must have had his detractors, what is startling is that extant commentators seem to suggest that the Thessalians were largely unified behind Philip. The most consistent source for information on Thessaly in this period is Demosthenes, who stressed the widespread support for Philip II among the Thessalian population:

\[\text{oùk} \; \text{ή} \; \text{άσφαλ} \; \text{ές} \; \text{λέγειν} \; \text{ἐν} \; \Thetaετταλίᾳ \; \text{τὰ} \; \Phiιλίππου \; \muὴ \; \text{sūn} \; \text{εῦ} \; \text{πεπονθότος} \; \text{τοῦ} \; \text{πλήθους} \; \text{τοῦ} \; \Thetaετταλόν} \; \text{τῷ} \; \text{τοῦς} \; \text{τυράννους} \; \text{ἐκβαλεῖν} \; \text{Φιλίππον} \; \text{αὐτοῖς} \; \text{kai} \; \text{tēn} \; \text{Πυλαίαν} \; \text{ἀποδοῦναι}.\]

Demosthenes was not an impartial observer of Greek politics and was more than happy to paint the Thessalians in a negative light in his orations.\(^{100}\) Nevertheless, despite any enmity the orator may have held for the Thessalian koinon, Demosthenes repeatedly stressed his analysis that the Thessalians were allied to Macedon not only because of the Philip’s military campaign

\(^{98}\) Diod. 14.92.3.
\(^{99}\) “It would not have been safe in Thessaly to plead Philip's cause, if the commoners of Thessaly had not shared in the advantages that Philip conferred when he expelled their tyrants and restored to them their Amphictyonic privileges.” Dem 8.65.
\(^{100}\) Demosthenes referred to the Thessalians as “natural traitors” Dem 1.21-2.
against Phocis in the Third Sacred War but, equally important, due to Philip’s willingness to put them in a position of power in the Amphictyony.101

The Third Sacred War allowed Philip II to ingratiate himself to the Thessalian population in full, pursuing policies which seemed explicitly to dovetail with Thessalian designs on establishing regional hegemony in central Greece and militarily dominating Phocis. In 363 Delphi was wracked by internecine conflict.102 We know little about the inciting details of this strife. However, the fact that open civil war was occurring in Delphi suggests that the Amphictyony was not a particularly active or strong organization at the time; it is reasonable to suspect that, if they had been, members of the Amphictyony would have prevented potential disruption of the activities at the sanctuary.

The Amphictyonic council was eventually able to force the ejection of one of the factions of the Delphians, and further issued sweeping declarations about Amphictyonic rights and privileges, most notably the right of the organization to levy taxes on Kirrha. Kirrha was the port closest to Delphi and supposedly the polis which had instigated the First Sacred War.103 Shortly thereafter the Delphians – likely at the prompting of the Amphictyonic-allied faction which now controlled the city – issued an injunction against the Phocians, demanding that they stop cultivating the sacred land of Apollo and levying a fine. The Phocians rejected this offer and with Spartan backing sent an army to Delphi, seizing the treasury of Apollo.104 In response, a Theban and Amphictyonic expedition engaged and routed the Phocian army at Neon but failed to follow up the victory with an invasion of Phocis. Extant accounts do not detail the makeup of the

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101 Dem. 2.7; 5.19, 5.23; 6.22; 8.65. Aeschines also corroborated Demosthenes’ assessment: Aeschin. 2.140.
103 Buckler, 400. Given the importance of the First Sacred War in Amphictyonic history, it seems reasonable to see this as an effort on the part of the Amphictyony to reconstitute the organization as a political force in central Greece.
Amphictyonic force, but the fact that the Thessaliens did not merit a mention suggests that if a Thessalian army was present their contributions and numbers were limited.\textsuperscript{105}

It seems likely that this produced a significant amount of consternation in Thessaly. In the mid-fourth century Thessaly was split into two camps: the oligarchic faction of the Thessalian Federation led by Larisa and the Aleuadae, and the tyrannical government under the successors of Jason of Pherae. While the actions and coinage minted by Jason suggest that the propaganda of his regime involved portraying him as a ruler in the traditional Thessalian mold, his Pheraean successors seem to have chosen to emphasize their heterodox nature, purposefully distinguishing themselves from their competitors, the Aleuadae in Larisa. The lack of Thessalian soldiery at Neon suggests that neither the Aleuadae nor the Tyrants of Pherae were willing to spare troops from their civil war in Thessaly in any useful number to fight the Phocians. However, in failing to further prosecute conflict against their longtime enemies, both the Aleuadae and the Pheraeans likely took a significant blow to the legitimacy of their claim to pan-Thessalian leadership.

Furthermore, and perhaps even more damningly, the Phocian general Onomarchus was able to bribe the Thessaliens – Diodorus, the only source for this accusation does not give details as to which faction he was referring – into remaining neutral in the conflict. There is no further detail about the Thessalian response, but the willingness with which the Thessalian population supported Philip II suggests that this action created a significant loss of faith in the elite of Thessaly. Philip II was shortly thereafter invited into Thessaly by the Aleuadae, who were losing

\textsuperscript{105} The battle is poorly attested, the primary sources are: Diod. 16.31.2-5 and Paus. 10.2.4. Buckler has argued that a Thessalian contingent was not present in the conflict, which seems likely – it is almost certain that if the Thessaliens were part of the victory then there would have been significant pressure on the Theban general Pammenes to continue to pursue the broken Phocian army into their homeland. Buckler, \textit{Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century}, 407.
the conflict with Pherae. As Philip stepped into this internal Thessalian conflict so too did the Phocians under the general Onomarchus, both powers sensing the opportunity to bring the resources of Thessaly under their control. Musterling an immense Thessalian army, the Macedonian king and his allies defeated the Phocians at the Battle of the Crocus field.

The Roman historian Justin added a key detail to his account which modern commentators have understandably seized upon: prior to the battle, Philip II ordered his soldiers to wear laurel wreaths, a traditional symbol of the god Apollo. As the Phocians had violated the sanctuary at Delphi and looted the treasury of Apollo, it has often been understood as a sign that Philip II was casting himself as a pious mortal defender of the Sun god. This is an important piece of the analysis, but what is often overlooked is that by outfitting his soldiers with laurel wreaths, Philip II was recreating the procession by which pilgrims going to the Pythian Games would carry laurel wreaths to crown the winners. Moreover, this must be viewed in conjunction with another factor, surely on the minds of the Thessalians: the Pythian Games were understood as having been established as a result of the First Sacred War, in which a Thessalian-led Amphictyonic army defeated peoples who lived around and transgressed against the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. This action closely resembled the procession Jason planned in the late 370s.

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106 Diod. 16.35.1.
107 Diod. 16.35.5; Justin 8.2.3-4.
108 Justin 8.2.3.
In Philip’s action, we see one of the key intersections of the policies of both Jason and Philip II: military attacks on the Phocians with clear symbolic connections to the First Sacred War, and a mytho-historical recollection of Thessalian dominance over central Greece. In the case of Jason’s campaign against the Phocian city of Hyampolis, the Tyrant of Pherae as a native Thessalian was specifically recalling and attempting to reify the defeat of the Thessalian hegemony. Philip, a Macedonian without this cultural baggage could instead portray his actions as symbolically restoring Thessalian power without the need to repudiate Thessalian losses.

While the policies of Philip II are not well attested, it was clear to contemporary observers that the Argead king was intentionally attempting to draw parallels between his actions in the Third Sacred War and Amphictyonic operations the First. The fourth century Athenian philosopher Speusippus wrote to Philip II complaining that Antipater, one of Philip’s agents in Athens, was deliberately misrepresenting accounts of the First Sacred War:

ἐβουλήθην σοι φράσαι μὴν παρ Ἀντυοάτρου, τίνα τρόπον πρῶτον οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες συνέστησαν...ἀν ένίους σὲ φησι μεμιμῆσθαι καὶ λαβεῖν ἄθλον Πυθίως τῆς εἰς Δελφοὺς στρατείας παρὰ τῶν Ἀμφικτύων τὰς δύο Φωκέων ψήφους.¹¹²

Historicity of the conflict aside, it seems most likely that various iterations of stories about the First Sacred War existed in the Classical period, and Philip II’s attempt to frame his

¹¹² “I would like to relate to you Antipater’s account of the way in which the Amphictyons first came into existence...Antipater says that you have imitated some of the [members of the Amphictyony in the First Sacred War] and received a prize at the Pythian Games, the two Phocian votes, on account of your Delphic expedition.” Natoli, The Letters of Speusippus to Philip II, 107.
actions as replicating these stories was designed to have a broad base of appeal across Greece.\textsuperscript{113} However, Philip’s attempts to create a narrative paralleling his own actions with the First Sacred War would also have been a signal to the Thessalians that Philip intended to restore their influence and domination over central Greece. This followed the policy of Jason of Pherae, whose procession to the Pythian Games in 370 would have symbolically recreated Thessalian actions in the First Sacred War and recalled the growth of Thessaly’s power over Delphi and central Greece through the instrument of the Amphictyony, a clear message that he intended to initiate a period of Thessalian expansion.

As discussed above, Xenophon reported that Jason of Pherae’s intention was to take his procession of sacrificial animals and Thessalian soldiers to the Pythian Games, and through this show of wealth, power, and potential violence, would be declared the chairman of the games. Similarly, at the conclusion of the Third Sacred War and the surrender of the Phocians, Diodorus recorded that Philip intended to host the Pythian games, in conjunction with the Thessalians and Boeotians.\textsuperscript{114} Unfortunately Diodorus used the fairly flexible and nondescript verb τίθημι to describe the production of the games under Philip which gives modern historians little information as to the authoritative provenance. Given Philip’s strong military and political position at the end of the Third Sacred War, it seems likely that the Macedonian king was behind the declaration. It is also worth noting that Diodorus clearly identified Philip’s allies in Boeotia and Thessaly as his co-sponsors of the games, rather than the Amphictyony. This points to the primacy of the Thessalians amongst Philip’s allies, and his intention and desire to appease the Thessalian population through emphasizing their connection to Delphi.

\textsuperscript{113} Scholia from Pindar identifies many different Greek ethne as having been involved in the conflict, doubtless each of these placed the actions of their ancestors as the most central to the myth and deemphasized the others.

\textsuperscript{114} Diod. 16.60.2.
Thus, while records Philip’s political program have largely been lost, what remains makes a strong case that both Philip and Jason were attempting to use the Thessalian desire for a renewed hegemony over central Greece to unite the population of Thessaly behind them. Given the consistency with which the two leaders pursued similar policy objectives, it seems reasonable to suspect that Philip modeled his Thessalian strategy on the successes of Jason of Pherae. However, the component missing from accounts of Philip’s replication was the movement of sacrificial animals from Thessaly to Delphi. While it is unexpressed in contemporary accounts, the limited nature of the sacred area of Apollo around Delphi would have prevented the sanctuary from relying on the animals exclusively raised there. Jason’s procession to Delphi was a signal to the population of Thessaly that he intended to monopolize this trade, and Philip’s Thessalian policies too closely adhere to those of the Tyrant of Pherae to have omitted this. The “golden age” that both Jason and Philip wished to evoke included not only expanded political and military influence for Thessaly but economic gains as well, explaining the willingness of the koinon to unite under a foreign leader for both national pride and increased affluence.
Chapter 7 – The Battle of Tanagra: A Thessalian Revolution?

In 457, the Phocian people of central Greece invaded the neighboring polity of Doris.¹ The Phocians were reasonably successful in their venture, capturing one of the three small towns that made up the Dorian polity.² No extant literary account offers an explanation as to the causes of the Phocian-Dorian war, though given Phocian actions in the fourth century, it is likely this was part of a larger attempt on the part of the Phocians to assert control over Central Greece and the sanctuaries at Delphi.³

In the overall scope of events in Greece during the 5th century, the expansionary ambitions of a relatively unimportant polity in Central Greece should have aroused little interest for Athens and Sparta, the two great Greek powers of the fifth century. However, in the ancient world, Doris was believed to have been the ancestral homeland of the Spartans, and regardless of the limited strategic or economic importance of Doris, its status as the metropolis of Sparta necessitated a bold reaction.⁴ The only literary source that recorded the initial Spartan response was Thucydides, who reported that a massive force of eleven thousand Spartans and their allies marched north under the command of the general Nicomedes to assist their metropolis. On their arrival, the Spartans forced the Phocians to abandon the captured Dorian settlement and agreed to withdraw.⁵ The events that followed led to one of the more inexplicable actions on the part of

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¹ Diod. 11.80. Paus. 1.29.9. Thuc. 1.107.5 – 7.
² Thucydides specifically uses the term “πόλισμα” to describe the towns or villages, as opposed to larger urban settlements. Earlier in his work Thucydides uses the term in context with Bronze Age cities, and specifically notes that the settlements he is describing with this term were “μικρόν.” Thuc. 1.10.1.
⁴ Szemler has argued that in the fifth century, Doris was one the fringe of the road network that ran through the Isthmus, and as such was both economically and strategically unimportant: Kase, *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route: Explorations of the Phokis-Doris Expedition*, 88–89.
⁵ Thuc. 1.107.2. One suspects given the size of the Spartan force this “agreement” was one-sided and more of a euphemism than anything else.
the Thessalians in the fifth century: the decision on the part of the Thessalian cavalry to betray their Athenian allies and ensure a Spartan victory. Yet, the Thessalians do not seem to have followed up on this victory and returned to the Athenian orbit by the late 430s. What prompted the betrayal at Tanagra, and did it reflect social upheaval in the Thessalian cities of the Pineos River basin?

I. A Detailed Narrative of the Battle

From ancient accounts, the sequence of events in Doris seems rather straightforward. However, the return of the Spartan-led army to the Peloponnese proved to be more complex. Two separate accounts of the Spartan march back from Doris are extant. Thucydides recorded that the Spartan army did not wish to sail across the Gulf of Corinth, fearing that their transport ships would be intercepted by the Athenian navy. The overland route across the Isthmus of Corinth was hazardous due to Athenian control of the cities of Megara and Pegae, and the Spartan general Nicomedes believed anti-Spartan forces intended to harass his army while it was in transit and vulnerable. Faced with this dilemma, Nicomedes elected to remain in Boeotia to consider his options. Thucydides argued that this was a cover for a more sinister plan: Spartan leadership had received information from a pro-Spartan faction in Athens that wanted the assistance of Nicomedes’ army to overthrow the democracy. Thucydides did not articulate how widespread this plot or how widespread knowledge of it was in Athens, but the Athenian demos

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6 Thuc. 1.107.3.
7 Thuc. 1.107.4.
was tremendously wary of the Spartan army bivouacking in Boeotia. Suspicious that the Spartan army intended to take hostile action against the Athenian democratic government and perhaps hoping that the immobility of Nicomedes’ troops would provide a strategic advantage, the Athenians sent out the entirety of their army – Thucydides’ used the term “πανδήμει” – and a significant number of allies, in total roughly fourteen thousand troops.8

The other extant account of the battle written by Diodorus, is unfortunately less detailed. Discarding Thucydides’ analysis of the political machinations, the historian claimed that the Athenians simply decided to attack the Spartan army while it was on the march.9 Nevertheless, in accounts of the Battle of Tanagra itself a key element across all narratives was the participation of a contingent of Thessalian cavalry sent to assist the Athenians, likely as part of the terms of a formal treaty between Thessaly and Athens signed in in 464/3.10

The armies of Athens, Sparta, and their allies met on the plains outside the town of Tanagra in eastern Boeotia. The battle seems to have been a bloody affair, without a clear victor. Both Diodorus and Pausanias stated that the conflict was inconclusive, with the Athenians victorious the first day and the Spartans the second.11 Thucydides recorded that the Spartans and their allies were victorious.12 Despite these discrepancies, all three authors agreed about the actions of the Thessalian cavalry: at some point during the battle, the Thessalians abandoned their Athenians allies and sided with the Spartans. Given that all three extant accounts of the

8 Thuc. 1.107.5 – 6.
9 Diod. 11.80.1.
10 Thucydides, Pausanias, and Diodorus all record the Thessalian presence at the Battle of Tanagra, but none of these authors provided any further detail about the group. The only piece of material evidence, an inscription dedicated at Delphi by some of the Thessalian cavalrymen at Tangra is similarly lacking in detail: Daux, “Dédicace Thessalienne d’un Cheval à Delphes.” On the treaty: Thuc. 1.102.4.
11 Paus. 1.29.9. Diod. 11.80.
12 Thuc. 1.108.1.
conflict describe the Thessalian betrayal, it seems likely this action played a significant role in the battle.

The treachery of the Thessalian contingent at Tanagra is given little context in any extant ancient accounts and is rather confusing, as the Thessalians seem to have generally supported Athenian causes throughout the late Archaic and early Classical periods. For example, Cineas of Comium came to the aid of the Peisistratids in 511, Meno of Pharsalus assisted the Athenians at the Siege of Eion with troops and specie in the 470s, and the Thessalians signed a treaty with the Athenians just a few years before the battle of Tangara in 461. After the battle, the Thessalians seem to have once again aligned themselves with the Athenians. At the beginning of the second Peloponnesian War in 431 the Thessalians sent a contingent of cavalry to assist the Athenians against a Spartan army, and as Brasidas crossed Thessaly on his campaign to Thrace, a group of Thessalians who claimed to represent the majority of the Thessalian citizens attempted to prevent the passage of the Spartan general.

Unfortunately, the ancient accounts offer little in the way of explanation for Thessalian actions at Tanagra. Diodorus gave the fullest detailing of the event, describing the Thessalian cavalry’s betrayal and subsequent raid on the Athenian supply train. However, his account lacks key information; neither the names of the Thessalian commanders or the personnel makeup of the contingent was detailed. Moreover, one would expect the decision to betray important

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13 Cineas of Comium: Hdt. 5.63.3. Meno of Pharsalus: Dem. 13.23, 23.199. Athenian-Thessalian treaty: Thuc. 1.102.4. In the later 5th century while the Thessalians seem to have been largely inert in the confrontation between Athens and Sparta, Thessaly as a whole seems to have been more pro-Athenian than not. As discussed in chapter 3, this is likely because factional strife within Thessaly stymied the regions abilities to project military power in any significant way.

14 Thuc. 2.22.2 – 4; 4.78.3.

15 Diod. 11.80.3.
allies on the field of battle would warrant an explanation or at least a description of the decision-making process.

Instead, Diodorus described the debate amongst the Thessalians – if there was discussion and the action was not prearranged – with the verb κρίνω. This term, which connotes judgement with regards to a contest or legal case gives little insight into what undergirded the Thessalian decision. Additionally, the long-term goals on the part of the Thessalians is unclear. The Athenians had been the key players in driving the Persians out of the eastern Mediterranean and bringing a new political order to Greece and as a result had become rich, aggressive, and supported by numerous allies.

If the Thessalians were worried that they had backed the losing side in the battle and that their Athenian allies would be unsuccessful against the army of Nicomedes, why did they not simply abandon the field before the battle began? Instead, it seems that the Thessalians returned to Thessaly only after betraying the Athenians and stymying their plans. If the Thessalian cavalry was committed to the success of the Spartan venture, then it seems reasonable that they would be present and visible at the Battle of Oenophytae, which was fought only a short time afterward. In the end, the Battle of Oenophytae was a resounding Athenian victory and emboldened an Athenian reprisal against the Thessalians.

Two pieces of material evidence corroborate the Thessalian actions at the battle of Tanagra and complicate our understanding of Thessaly in the mid-fifth century. A partially preserved *ex voto* monument of a horse was found in the early twentieth century at Delphi,

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16 For an account of the Thessalian actions against the Athenians see: Diod. 11.80.3- 6.
17 Oenophytae: Thuc. 1.108.3. The Athenian revenge expedition took place a few years later: Thuc. 1.111.1.
dedicated as an offering to Apollo by the cavalrymen who survived the battle. First examined by Daux in the 1950s, the sculpture no longer exists but a portion of the dedicatory inscription does. As with most offerings, the information contained lacks the context that modern historians would desire. However, two particular points stand out. First is the mention of a Thessalian polemarch in the inscription, a military office which was well known throughout the Greek world but lacked attestation in Thessaly prior to this point. What was this position, and why was it highlighted rather than the more well-attested positions of tetrarch, tagus, archon, or basileus? Second, the language and messaging of the inscription seems to be explicitly pan-Thessalian. The cavalry at Tanagra betrayed an ally who only four years before had made a formal treaty with the Thessalian government, it is unlikely that these men were following the orders of the Aleuad leadership in Larisa who orchestrated the Athenian-Thessalian alliance. Moreover, the monument was placed in Delphi, suggesting that the Thessalians who betrayed their Athenian allies had no interest in hiding their participation in the event. What happened in Thessaly that encouraged the Thessalian cavalry at Tanagra to portray their betrayal of a longtime ally as an act performed on behalf of the Thessalian people?

The cavalry monument at Delphi is not the only material record of Thessalian actions at Tanagra. A funerary monument discovered in the northern Thessalian city of Atrax – itself in the sphere of influence of the powerful city of Larisa – commemorated the death of Theotimos, a Thessalian soldier who fell at the Battle of Tanagra. On his gravestone, Theotimos is depicted as a hoplite. This is curious, given that literary accounts of the battle only discuss the presence of

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18 Daux, “Dédicace Thessalienne d’un Cheval à Delphes.”
19 For a few examples of a πολέμαρχος in the Classical period see: Aesch. Lib. Ln. 1072, Aesch. Seven Ln. 830; Aristoph. Wasps Ln. 1042; Dem. 18.165, 19.264; Hdt. 6.109, 6.110, 7.173; Thuc. 5.47, 5.66; Xen. Hell. 2.4, 3.5, 4.2.
20 For a discussion of the Thessalian government see chapter 4.
Thessalian cavalry. Whatever role Theotimos played at the Battle of Tanagra, the language of the inscription on his grave marker, as with the cavalry monument at Delphi, portrayed the betrayal at Tanagra as a pan-Thessalian action; at Tanagra Theotimos brought “a crown of glory” to all of Thessaly. How should modern historians understand the messaging of these monuments in with the context of heir discrepancy with the literary accounts? What was occurring in Thessaly, and do the Thessalian actions at the Battle of Tanagra reflect a change in the political or social situation?

For most scholars, the Battle of Tanagra is an isolated incident. It occurred during a period in which the Thessalian polity was mostly dormant in Greek affairs; Thessalian influence would not extend outside its borders in any significant way until the reign of Jason of Pherae in the 370s. In an attempt to interpret this apparent passivity, Marta Sordi has proposed a relatively ambitious and largely unchallenged theory about 5th century Thessaly. In her interpretation, the Battle of Tanagra was the manifestation of political upheaval in Thessaly and a widespread oligarchic revolution that temporarily put an end to the dynastic leadership of the Thessalian elite.21 This chapter will examine the Thessalian behavior at the Battle of Tanagra and offer an alternate explanation for the event: the long enmity between Thessaly and Phocis. Once this has been established, it will examine the evidence supporting Sordi’s argument for a Thessalian oligarchic revolution in the fifth century. Sordi proposed that the growth of urban centers and increasing political self-awareness amongst a metropolitan oligarchic class prompted the dissolution of a pan-Thessalian dynastic government.

While an increasingly influential urban population may have contributed to the development of Thessalian political and social attitudes in the late Archaic and early Classical periods as Sordi has suggested, it seems more likely that any political or social strife in fifth-century Thessaly was related to the loss of ruling power amongst the Aleuad clan in Larisa. As has been argued in chapters 4 and 6, available evidence suggests that in Thessalian culture there was immense political and social importance placed on re-establishing Thessaly’s dominant position in Central Greece, especially with regards to the subjugation of Phocis and control over the Delphic Amphictyony. The failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project under the leadership of the Aleuadae created a vacuum in leadership that other factions in Thessaly looked to exploit. This struggle for power was likely non-violent at first, but the decision of the Aleuadae to support Athenian enforcement of Phocian claims on Delphi, which were virulently opposed by the majority of the Thessalian populace, at the Battle of Tanagra was the cause of political strife within Thessaly, rather than being merely a symptom of the process.

II. The Material Evidence

Unlike many events in Thessalian history, there is both literary and material evidence which corroborates Thessalian participation at the Battle of Tanagra. Two extant pieces offer greater insight and depth as to Thessalian actions at Tanagra: a dedication to Apollo at Delphi on behalf of the Thessalian cavalry which fought at Tanagra and a gravestone for Theotimos, a Thessalian soldier from Atrax who was killed in the conflict.
These monuments are designed for fundamentally different audiences: the *ex voto* at Delphi is intended to be seen by primarily non-Thessalian viewers at a heavily trafficked sanctuary, whereas the grave stele of Theotimos was intended for a primarily Thessalian audience which would present the deceased soldier in context with other members of his family. Yet they both present similar messaging, and this consistency between two monuments suggests they were part of a larger political program to justify the betrayal of the Athenians and a subsequent political reorientation which took place in Thessaly in the mid-fifth century.

In 1957, during the construction of a home near Delphi, a broken limestone block of classical-era provenance was discovered. Roughly 1.5 meters long, 0.6 meters wide, and 0.3 meters high, the block had two post-holes to anchor a statue which has since gone missing. Carved into the face of the monument is a dedication which was published by Daux in 1958.²²

²² Daux, “Dédicace Thessalienne d’un Cheval à Delphes.” To my knowledge, no other scholar has attempted to reinterpret or reevaluate Daux’s analysis since the publication of his article.
His transcription is below:

1 Θεσσαλοι τὸν ἠππον ἀνέθεν τὸπόλλοιν δεκάταν τὸν ἄ[τ]ο Ταναγ[ρ]ον
2 Πολεμαρχεύοντον τὸν ἄ
3 Ἄμυντα 8 Μένες
4 Ἀρχαγόρο 9 Ἡυβρίλαος
5 καὶ 10 Πολυδάμας
6 Προτίδας
7 Ἐὐκρατίδας

My translation of the inscription is as follows:

1 The Thessalians gave the horse and a tenth [of the spoils] from Tanagra to Apollo

2 When these were polemarchs

3 Amyntas 8 Mennes

4 Archagoros 9 Hubrialaos

5 and 10 Polydamas

6 Proteas

7 Echecratidas

The use of the letter heta with the word ἵππον on line 1 is unusual for the Aeolic dialect used in Thessaly. Daux argued that this was indicative of the influence of a Delphic-derived dialect in Thessaly and that overall the formation of the letters suggested that the inscription was made sometime during the second quarter of the fifth century, which would corroborate its connection
with the Battle of Tanagra in 457. While the dating is important, the use of a Delphic dialect would further indicate that the statue was likely made on location. Moreover, given the placement at Delphi it seems most likely that the audience for the statue would be “Panhellenic,” rather than Thessalian. As such, it is reasonable to understand the cavalry monument as one which was deliberately constructed to highlight the political, religious, and social link between Delphi and the Thessalians at the Battle of Tanagra, implicitly legitimizing the actions of those on the field. The ramifications of this will be discussed below, however a few other salient details present themselves. The word τοπολλονι appears to be a rather unusual crasis of τῶ ἀπόλλωνι, which may be particular to Delphi. The only other extant appearance of this term was found on a victory monument dedicated at Delphi by Hieron of Syracuse in 480/79, which celebrated the victory of the Sicilians at Himera. The connection between these two monuments further corroborates Daux’s dating of the monument, as well as highlighting the importance the Thessalians placed on their actions at the Battle of Tanagra.

Unfortunately, the names inscribed on the base of the statue do not provide much context or information as to the identity of the Thessalians that commissioned the Tanagra monument. Names such as Amyntas, Mennes, and Echicratidas are relatively common in Thessaly and

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25 Syll 34. James Whitley, “Hybris and Nike : Agency, Victory and Commemoration in Panhellenic Sanctuaries,” in Sociable Man: Essays on Ancient Greek Social Behaviour in Honour of Nick Fisher (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2011), 183. Another instance of this term was found on a kylix in Adria in Northern Italy. The assessment of this inscription was that it was part of an archaeological find from the sixth century connected to a local sanctuary frequented by travelers from Aegina. However, without further information it is difficult to connect the two instances of this term, other than the religious context: Stephane Bourdin, “Fréquentation Ou Intégration : Les Présences Allogènes Dans Les Emporta Étrusques et Ligures ( vi e - Iv e Siècles Av. J.-C.),” in Espaces d’échanges En Méditerranée: Antiquité et Moyen Âge (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 30.
appear across the region in major urban areas such as Pharsalus, Pherae, Larisa, and Gyrton. However, none of these individuals are identified as having a political connection to a specific polis. Instead, the inscription simply uses the collective term θεσσαλοί – “the Thessalians.” The absence of high-profile Thessalians or familial information does suggest that the soldiers who fought at Tanagra were not the dynastic elite but likely lower-status men, and as such, the betrayal of the Athenians represented a “grassroots” effort rather than an action orchestrated by the great dynastic families of Thessaly. This will be revisited in section III when discussing the possibility of a political revolution in Thessaly in the second half of the fifth century.

Much has been made in modern scholarship of the inclusion of the term πολέμαρχων in line one of the inscription, a form of the more common πολέμαρχος. This is a fairly common military title in the literature of the Classical period, and while contemporary written sources primarily use it in reference to the Athenians and Spartans, epigraphic evidence supports the existence of the office across the Greek world from Paros, Aetolian Archarnia, Eretria, and even as far afield as the Black Sea coast. In these non-Thessalian contexts the polemarch was a high-level military officer, the commander of at least a significant portion of an army. The Daux inscription is the earliest appearance of the position in a Thessalian context, which has led some scholars to suggest that the position was created at this period, as the Thessalian polemarch is

26 The LGPN 3b records 11 instances of the name Amyntas in Thessaly. Menneias appears 8 times in conjunction with Thessalians but Mennes only once, in this particular instance. While it is difficult to ascertain what exactly happened in this case, it seems likely that Mennes and Menneias are connected. Outside of this instance the name Polydamas appears once in the fourth century. P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews, eds., Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, vol. IIIB (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 158.
28 Athenians: Hdt. 6.109.2, 6.110, 6.111.1, 6.114; Thuc. 5.47.9, Spartans: Hdt. 7.173; Thuc. 5.66.3, 5.71.3; Xen. Hell. 2.4.33, 3.5.22, 4.2.22, 4.3.21, 4.3.23, 4.4.7, 4.5.11. Paros: IG XII,5 129; Aetolian Archarnia: IG IX,1² 2:603; Eretria: SEG 64-778; Thracian Apollonia: IGBulg P 463(2).
relatively well attested to through the fourth century. Polemarchs from Pharsalus appear on a dedicatory inscription at Delphi from 363, which Westlake has argued was installed at Delphi after the destruction of Halos in Phthiotic Achaia at the hands of a Macedonian and Pharsalian army. If Westlake is correct, then this would suggest that the office of polemarch as one which was a standard participant in celebratory dedications for military victories at Delphi, especially as the military character of the office seems to be quite consistent. The position of polemarch is included in the Athenian-Thessalian League treaty of 361 and was listed in context with the military office of the hipparch as well as with the Thessalian representative to the Amphictyonic council at Delphi. Given the relative consistency in the attributes of the office of the polemarch in epigraphy, it seems likely that either the position was created in this period or that the responsibilities of the office were solidified in the mid-fifth century. The inclusion of the polemarch in the cavalry monument is one of the key pieces of evidence in the claims of Sordi with regard to a Thessalian political revolution in the fifth century and will be examined further in sections II and III.

What then can we determine from the Daux inscription with regard to Thessaly in the mid-fifth century? While the monument was commissioned by Thessalians, given the location of the monument at one of the most heavily trafficked religious centers in Greece it is almost a

31 IG II² 116. Polemarchs may have possessed civil authority as well: in the 4th century Pheraean πολέμαρχοι are included on an inscription granting a proxeny to Thoas of Aitolia – a civic award that does not appear to have to do with military conflict: SEG 49-627.
certainty that the audience was non-Thessalians. The expansion of Thessalian influence in central Greece through military force in the Archaic period was closely associated with the First Sacred War and Thessaly’s control over the Amphictyony, and we should understand this high-profile public dedication as an attempt to legitimize the Thessalian betrayal of the Athenians through connection to a mytho-historical past. The inclusion of the office of the polemarch in the inscription, a common and recognizable office throughout the Greek world would have provided further legitimacy to non-Thessalian Greeks who may have viewed the monument at Delphi. Rather than acting against the wishes of a legitimate government, the presence of a polemarch would have suggested to Greeks visiting Delphi that the Thessalians were in fact operating at the behest of their government, obscuring the existence of any political strife in Thessaly. Through a lack of specificity in naming those who commissioned the monument and the use of the generalizing θεσσαλοί in the first line to identify those who fought at Tanagra, the actions of a small group come to be portrayed as the actions of all Thessalians. The strategy and messaging towards non-Thessalians through the medium of the monument at Delphi is consistent with the other major piece of material evidence which was designed for an internal Thessalian audience.

In 1977 a grave stele was found which commemorated the death of Theotimos, a Thessalian who fought at Tanagra but was buried at his home city of Atrax, not far from the Aleuad stronghold of Larisa.32 The funerary monument of Theotimos is unusual for its size, complexity, and most of all, for the elaborate inscription describing the dead man. The inscription has been reconstructed as follows:

1 ἄνδρ<υ>ς Ἐλλήνων ἐν Τανάγρας πεδίῳ

32 SEG 34-560. See also Bouchon et al., Corpus Des Inscriptions d’Atrax En Pelasgiotide (Thessalie), 220.
The inscription strongly suggests that Theotimos was not the only Thessalian to die at Tanagra. While we know little about how many Thesslians were involved or how many casualties they incurred, the death of Theotimos as almost certainly one among many suggests that the Thessalian forces not only participated in the melee but also encountered significant resistance. Furthermore, if the Thessalians at Tanagra were willing to risk such an outcome, then there must have been significant hostility on the part of the Thessalians towards their Athenian allies, otherwise it is difficult to identify the reward in relation to the risk associated with betraying allies on the battlefield. The motivations behind the Thessalian action will be examined in the next section.

Unfortunately, the inscription tells us little about the circumstances of the death of Theotimos and the wider context in which he died, which is likely purposeful. As individuals were often buried in the city in which they lived, there seems to have been little motivation to identify their native polis on a grave marker. When individuals are commemorated as having fallen in battle on personal burial markers, the epitaphs are largely formal, and the language used is generic and heroizing. Often, the only way to identify that individuals died in battle rather

34 Diodorus offers a plausible explanation for Thessalian participation in battle: Diod. 11.80.
35 For instance, the “Kroisos Kouros” – the grave marker of a young attic man named Kroisos, whose epitaph reads “Stand and mourn at the sema of dead Kroisos, whom one day, fighting in the front rank, wild Ares slew.” Donna Kurtz and John Boardman, Greek Burial Customs (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 262. There are certainly also outliers, such as the grave stele of Pollis, who died during the Persian Wars fighting against the Thracians.
than of natural causes was through the sculptures accompanying their epitaphs. In funerary inscriptions, only rarely do personal circumstances or details regarding the cause of death appear. The fact that Theotimos’ epitaph notes that he died on the field at Tanagra is an unusual detail for monuments of this type, and suggests that there was significant cultural importance for displaying his participation in the conflict to the local community.

The name Theotimos is relatively well attested across Thessaly, though this particular individual does not seem to appear in any further sources, literary or otherwise. Likewise the name of his father, Menulos appears only twice elsewhere in the literary record, neither of which appear to be the man in question. Theotimos’ home was Atrax, a Perrhaebian city aligned with Larisa, which would theoretically connect Theotimos to the Aleuad dynasty. While it cannot be known for certain, despite the resources that the deceased’s family invested in a grave marker it seems likely that Theotimos and his father were relatively unimportant Thessalians, not necessarily connected to the dynastic powers of the region. Moreover, while Theotimos was identified as being from Atrax there is a distinct universalizing tone in the epigram; Theotimos

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36 For instance, the stele of Philoxenos: Grossman, *Greek Funerary Sculpture*, 15. The stele of Athanas the Boeotian displays similar marital imagery without naming the specific mode of its occupants’ demise: Grossman, 101.
38 This sort of politicized grave marker is rare, but not unknown. A clear parallel to the Theotimos stele is the stele of Dexileos, an Athenian cavalryman who died in the early 4th century: David Pritchard and Robin Osborne, eds., “Democratic Ideology, the Events of War and the Iconography of Attic Funerary Sculpture,” in *War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 250–57.
40 Fraser and Matthews, IIIIB:282.
41 Liv. 32.15.
was one of many Greeks at Tanagra, and his martial glory was applicable not just to Atrax but to all of Thessaly itself. The heroizing elements of the inscription elevated the death of Theotimos and his participation in the betrayal of an ally in a relatively minor battle into a mytho-historic action, a conflict undertaken on behalf of all Thessalians. This strategy, like the use of the generic θεσσαλοί in the cavalry monument at Delphi points to a desire to eliminate individual responsibility and instead make the Thessalian koinon accountable.

Perhaps the most challenging element for modern scholars regarding the stele of Theotimos, beyond the unusual use of language and omission of political affiliation, is the relief which depicts an infantryman holding a spear and carrying the shield of a hoplite. was Theotimos among the ranks of the Thessalian hoplites at Tanagra? There is written evidence that Thessalian infantry was in existence in the Archaic and Classical periods, which would corroborate the presence of Thessalian hoplites at Tanagra. Iconographic evidence as to the existence of Thessalian infantry is similarly sparse, though there is some available. It is reasonable to accept that unlike their southern neighbors, the focus of the Thessalian military was on its cavalry wing, though Thessalian infantry did in fact exist in the Classical period. However, literary evidence from the Battle of Tanagra only identifies the action of the Thessalian cavalry, and operating under the assumption that this is accurate, why would Theotimos’ gravestone portray the fallen citizen of Atrax as a foot soldier?

42 Herodotus mentions Thessalian infantry in the late Archaic period: Hdt. 8.27 – 28. Xenophon gave some detail as to the recruitment of infantry into the Thessalian army: Xen. Anab. 1.2.6, Hell. 6.5.23. For a modern interpretation of the Thessalian army see: Helly, L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi, 1995, 193–201. 43 A mid-fourth century Ainian hemidrachm very clearly shows a javelin thrower (identified as the Odyssean hero Phemius) which suggests that horsemen were not the only individuals venerated in Thessalian culture: Triton XV, Lot: 26 (https://www.cngcoins.com/Coin.aspx?CoinID=198636). This is also true for a late-fifth or early-fourth century coin from Pelinna, which is understood to have been a Thessalian city: Nomos 8, Lot: 134 (https://www.cngcoins.com/Coin.aspx?CoinID=243793). 44 Daux’s inscription is silent on the manner in which any Thessalians at Tanagra fought. The inclusion of a horse sculpture on the monument was not necessarily indicative of Thessalian cavalrymen as the dedicators; the Serpent
The simplest, but perhaps most unsatisfying explanation is that the stele was purchased by his family as a ready-made piece. This seems to have been a regular occurrence in Athens, and there is no reason to suggest similar efficiency measures did not occur in other regions.\(^45\) However, given the size and complexity of the funerary marker this seems unlikely to be the case for the grave of Theotimos.\(^46\) The family clearly went to significant lengths to procure an elaborate funeral marker for him and it seems unlikely that Theotimos’ relatives went to the trouble to obtain an elaborate monument but were unable to afford a carving that accurately represented the deceased’s role in battle. While hard data is unfortunately not available, given the understood centrality of the horse in Thessalian culture, the importance of horse-raising in Thessaly as a commercial undertaking, and the animal husbandry-friendly geography of the Pineos River basin, it seems likely that horse ownership was more widespread in Thessaly than in southern Greek polities. That the family of Theotimos would highlight his participation as a foot-soldier would suggest that either Theotimos’ family was attempting to portray him as a hoplite in order to emphasize their cultural connection to contemporary southern Greek culture where the hoplite was the idealized combatant, or Theotimos did in fact fight on foot with hoplite equipment. The former is possible, given the relationships Thessalian elites cultivated with their southern counterparts, especially Sparta. However, the inscription on Theotimos’ grave highlights his connection to Thessaly rather than its southern allies. As well, unlike Thessalian cavalry statue at Delphi, the stele at Atrax seems to be designed for an internal Thessalian audience. As such, it seems most reasonable to accept that the family of Theotimos chose to


\[^{46}@my knowledge the most complete collection of Thessalian grave stelae is in Bouchon, et al., in Corpus Des Inscriptions d’Atrax En Pelasgiotide (Thessalie).\]
portray him as a hoplite, either because he fought in a phalanx, or because there was specific cachet in Thessalian society for doing so. On this basis, it seems most likely that the Thessalian role at Tanagra was more robust than originally thought; a combined force of infantry and cavalry betrayed and fought their Athenian allies. While extant evidence does not allow us to speculate further on the interplay – martial, social, or political – between the Thessalian infantry and cavalry, it is most likely that those Thessalian citizens who fought on foot were less wealthy than those who fought on horseback. The presence of Thessalian cavalry at Tanagra does not necessarily indicate that only a narrow socio-economic group participated in the conflict; as discussed above it is likely that the group was more representative of Thessaly as a whole than a mounted unit from another Greek polity. As to Theotimos’ role on the battlefield however, modern scholarship can offer few certain assertions.

While modern audiences might find the lack of specificity regarding their subjects peculiar, extant victory trophies and ex voto objects with accompanying inscriptions are incredibly rare, and those which have survived tend to highlight the collective rather than the individual. The only extant victory monument similar to the one commissioned by the Thessalian cavalry at Tanagra and erected at Delphi is the ex voto of the Arcadians, a statue

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47 The possibility that Thessalian actions at the Battle of Tanagra were representative of a middle-class or anti-aristocratic political revolution are discussed below. If this was the case, then perhaps portraying Theotimos as a hoplite reflected a desire to move away from a perceived “aristocratic” mode of fighting.

48 There is of course the issue of Meno’s penestae who fought at the Siege of Eion, this is dealt with in chapters 1 and 3.

49 Kinnee has written an excellent monograph which details the difficulties with examining Greek battle trophies, especially given that the primary construction material for these monuments was wood: Lauren Kinnee, The Greek and Roman Trophy: From Battlefield Marker to Icon of Power, Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 46–60.
group which was dedicated at the sanctuary in 369 to celebrate their participation in the campaign with the Thebans against Sparta.\textsuperscript{50} The inscription on the statue group is as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
Ἀρκάς τούσδ’ ἐτέκνωσ’ οἱ τούτων [δ’ ἐκγεγαγωτες]
στήσαν, ἐφείσαντες γῆν Λάκεδ[αιμόν].
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{51}

As with the cavalry monument, the language of the Arcadian \textit{ex voto} was designed to be generalizing and collective; there is no specificity in terms of which Arcadians or \textit{poleis} within Arcadia were responsible for the victory or the erection of the statue group. The inscription also ties into the mytho-historic past of Arcadia by highlighting the autochthonic origin of the Arcadian people, and in doing so the victory over the Spartans is not the work of specific Arcadian soldiers but belongs to all Arcadians who share a common lineage. The victories against Sparta thus become a communal effort and part of the history of the whole community. This is quite similar to the Thessalian dedication at Delphi; while some of the officers of the Thessalian cavalry are identified by name in the inscription, their home cities and any dynastic affiliation they may have possessed were not highlighted. Instead, they were identified simply as Θεσσαλοὶ τὸν ἱππόν, “the cavalymen of Thessaly.” While the inscription on the grave of Theotimos of Atrax is designed for a Thessalian audience rather than a very public monument designed to be seen by religious pilgrims and government officials, Theotimos’ inscription uses


\textsuperscript{51} “The Arcadians gave this [monument], the ones being born of those who came up [from the earth], who destroyed the land of the Lakedaimonians.” FD III 1:6
language to imply that the actions of the Thessalians at Tanagra were performed on behalf of and with the legitimate backing of all the Thessalians.

The attempt to associate the actions of perhaps a few hundred Thessalians at the Battle of Tanagra with the totality of Thessaly is vital to the overall political purpose of the Thessalian dedication at Delphi. Putting aside the religious function of the dedication at Delphi, the physical placement of the Arcadian monument was strategically designed to stand opposite an earlier Spartan monument and ideally to eclipse it in an attempt to de-emphasize the importance of past Spartan victories and to highlight the anti-Spartan position the new Arcadian confederacy would take. The Thessalian monument at Delphi would have served the same purpose, legitimizing the Thessalian action at the Battle of Tanagra in the pan-Hellenic space at Delphi. Thus, the messaging of the monument becomes clear: those that dedicated the statue wished to portray the betrayal of a formal ally as a collective Thessalian decision, and not as the actions of a faction or interest group. The monument at Delphi, placed in a space that was both intensely sacred and highly public served both to legitimize the actions of the Thessalian cavalry and to justify that act through the creation of a monument on behalf of all Thessalians.

While the monument of the Thessalian cavalry at Delphi was designed for an external, non-Thessalian audience, the grave-marker of Theotimos was written for an internal Thessalian audience. Those who would see the monument would be Thessalians, either other members of his community or Theotimos’ family members. Yet the language that Theotimos’ inscription uses is remarkably similar in spirit to that of the Thessalian cavalry monument at Delphi.

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Theotimos is identified by his patrilineal family and home city but despite its geographic closeness to the Aleuade, the famous Thessalian clan are not referenced. Instead, as discussed above, the language of the monument is generalizing, connecting Theotimos with Thessaly as a whole, rather than a particular family or city. Additionally, the representation of Theotimos as a hoplite specifically highlights the presence of a wider variety of Thessalians at the Battle of Tanagra in contrast to the literary accounts. Presumably Thessalians with a spectrum of political and economic interests saw the betrayal of the Athenians as a necessary one, or at least those who fought at Tanagra wished to portray the situation as such.

Why would two monuments which are designed for fundamentally different purposes and disparate audiences share such similarities? The possible motivations of the cavalry at Tanagra will be discussed below, but the attitude of both the monument at Delphi and the Theotimos gravestone suggests that those Thessalians at Tanagra felt the need to justify their actions and make it clear that they were acting on behalf of all Thessalians. Given the possibility that the Battle at Tanagra produced a political upheaval and a new, revolutionary government in Thessaly, it seems most likely that the monuments reflected a self-conscious need of the partisans of this new system to justify their actions and legitimize their regime in the eyes of their neighbors domestically and internationally.

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54 It would be fair to argue that the inclusion of the Aleuadae or any other noble family would be unusual in a funerary inscription. However, this argument ignores a larger issue: the epitaph for Theotimos is quite unusual for this genre of inscriptions, both in its detail and length. For comparison, see the epitaph of Nikias, son of Mikrion: Ducat (1995) I.Thess I 121.
The Grave Marker of Theotimos. From the Diachronic Museum of Larissa, inventory number AEMΑ 78/5.
III. Thessalian Motivations at the Battle of Tanagra

Unfortunately, no extant ancient source has articulated the motivations behind the actions of Theotimos and his cavalrmen compatriots at the Battle of Tanagra. The three literary accounts which describe the event are sparse in detail and given the paucity of evidence available to modern scholarship regarding internal Thessalian politics, untangling the motivations of the Thessalian cavalry is left to guesswork.\textsuperscript{55}

As discussed above and in chapters 1 and 3, the Thessalians by and large seem to have possessed an affinity for the Athenians. We know of a number of individual Thessalians who seem to have had strong social and political connections to Athens – the Menonidae of Pharsalus in particular – and as a whole the Thessalian people saw a political utility in aligning themselves with Athenian interests in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{56} Of course, there certainly were pro-Spartan partisans or factions within Thessaly. The march of Brasidas on his campaign to Thrace was enabled by a group of Thessalian nobles with ties to the Aleuadæ of Larisa and the Macedonian Argead dynasty.\textsuperscript{57} However, until the ascension to power of Lycophron of Pherae and his successors in the late fifth and fourth centuries, pro-Spartan elements in Thessaly were largely ineffectual. Therefore, what motivated the Thessalian cavalry to betray their Athenian allies and

\textsuperscript{55} The three ancient literary sources which describe the battle are: Diod. 11.80. Paus. 1.29.9. Thuc. 1.107.5 – 7. Diodorus is the only author to give any detail as to the specific actions of the Thessalians, and his account omits any reference to what may have motivated the betrayal.
\textsuperscript{56} Dem. 13.23, 23.199. Thuc. 2.22.2 – 3, 4.78.2.
\textsuperscript{57} Thuc. 4.78.
side with the Spartans at the Battle of Tanagra?

Writing in the 1930s, Westlake saw the betrayal at Tanagra as the result of conflict between poorer urban Thessalians and the aristocratic dynastic families. In particular, the friction between these two groups followed a broad pattern which is theorized to have occurred in southern Greece a few generations previously: increasing urbanization upset the socio-political hierarchy which was based upon land ownership, which enabled the urban artisan and merchant classes to gain economic power through new commercial networks which, in turn, allowed them to forcibly agitate for greater political power. However in Westlake’s analysis Thessaly was not simply a region which belatedly followed the same of political development of the southern Greek states. Relying on Theocritus’ *Idyll 16 Χάριτες ἢ Ἱέρων* which described the great estates of the landed Thessalian aristocracy, Westlake believed the region to be dominated by a feudal elite. Land consolidation led to the dispossession of small farmers, who either fled to establish new lives in the growing urban centers of Pharsalus, Larisa, and Pherae, or fell into debt bondage making their lives little different than the unfree *penestae* of Thessaly. Once the population of the disaffected urban elite and dispossessed farmers reached a critical mass in the mid-fifth century, they formed a coalition that exiled some of the Thessalian dynasts and disenfranchised others. In Westlake’s interpretation, the Thessalian betrayal at the Battle of Tanagra was the inciting event for an urban revolution in Thessaly, which released the pent-up

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60 Theoc. 16.

61 Westlake believed one of these exiled Thessalian dynasts was “Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king” whom the Athenians attempted to install in 454 in response to the Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra: Thuc. 1.111.1. For dating this expedition, I follow Merritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor: Benjamin Merritt, HT Wade-Gery, and Malcom McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, vol. 3 (Athens: The American School of Classical Studies, 1950), 178.
anger of the disenfranchised urban elite towards the dynastic Echecratidae, who would flee after
the betrayal of Athens and the collapse of the Thessalian-Athenian alliance.62

While Westlake’s cause of political strife in Thessaly was internal, Marta Sordi saw the
tension as a result of external forces.63 After the Thessalians medized and threw their military
and political support behind the failed Persian expedition of 480, the Spartan King Leotychidas
led a reprisal expedition against Thessaly a few years later in 476.64 Despite the fact that the
Spartans were unable to dislodge the Aleuadae from Larisa, Sordi argued that the overall goal
was to disrupt the political unity of the Thessalian koinon, in which they were successful. While
the campaign in Thessaly led to the prosecution and exile of the Spartan King Leotychidas, Sordi
argued that the campaign was effective in its long-term strategy of activating a fifth-column of
pro-Spartan Thessalians.65 Moreover, Leotychidas was successful in politically isolating Larisa
by enabling the southern Thessalian poleis of Pharsalus and Scotussa to break with the
Thessalian koinon and establish their own individual governments.66

62 Westlake seems to believe that the Echecratidae were separate from the Aleuadae, though is unclear on who the
Pharsalians rulers were beyond this: Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935, 31.
63 Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 106. The possibility of a Thessalian revolution will be
discussed in the next section.
64 Hdt. 6.72; Paus. 3.7.9. Plut. Mor. 859d.
65 This explanation is also followed by Morrison and Wade-Gery, see: Wade-Gery and Morrison, “Meno of
Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias,” 62. For ancient accounts of the expedition see Hdt. 6.72, Paus. 3.7.9, Plut.
Mor. 859d. This work discusses the expedition in depth in chapter 3. The date of this event is disputed. Both Mili
and Sordi date the expedition to the 460s: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 99; Mili, Religion and
Society in Ancient Thessaly, 163. I follow Scheiber’s argument in placing the Spartan revenge expedition in 478/7:
66 To support her argument, Sordi points to a “coinage league” in Thessaly, which was believed to involve Larisa but
neither Pharsalus nor Pherae: Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 103. This theory was also
championed by Westlake, Morrison, and Wade-Gery: H.D. Westlake, “The Medism of Thessaly,” The Journal of
For a more recent synopsis of the theory see: Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece, 36–41. While I
am hesitant to fully subscribe to Sordi’s theory, the existence of coinage groups in Thessaly is popular: Fritz
Herrmann, “Die Thessalische Münzunion 1m 5. Jahrhundert,” Zeitschrift Für Numismatik 23 (1922): 37; Mili,
Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly, 178; Bouchon and Helly, “The Thessalian League,” 240. For the most
detailed description of this theory see: Colin Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins (Los Angeles: University of
Sordi followed Westlake’s interpretation of political issues in Thessaly, arguing that that the individuals that made up the dominant faction of dissenting Thessalians were urban oligarchs who were dissatisfied with their position in Thessalian society under the power of the Aleuadae. The Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra was a manifestation of this political strife, an attempt on the part of the urban oligarchs to undermine the alliances developed by the Aleuadae and promote a pro-Spartan oligarchic political agenda to isolate and supplant the ruling clan. However, Sordi was clear that, in her view the Thessalian actions at Tanagra were not an end unto themselves, rather that they were simply one portion of the spontaneous political revolutionary spirit that gripped the Thessalian urban elite.

These are the two major lines of thought in Thessalian history regarding the Battle of Tanagra. While the assessments of Sordi and Westlake are appealing, there are significant issues in accepting either in its entirety. To begin with: at this point there is no archaeological evidence which clearly displays the growth of Thessalian cities in the fifth century, let alone in earlier periods. This certainly does not eliminate the possibility that such evidence might be obtained, a lack of funding as well as permanent occupation of ancient urban sites makes excavations difficult. Additionally, at the time that Westlake and Sordi were writing, both authors were promoting the association between the appearance of Thessalian silver coinage with an increase in urbanization in Thessaly. As a social group increases in complexity, it becomes increasingly integrated into the social and economic networks of neighboring communities. It seems reasonable that in order to facilitate trade, a state would mint its own coinage to further monetize

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and exploit new commercial routes; this was Aristotle’s belief.\textsuperscript{69} However, this explanation has largely been challenged by theories regarding the social use of coinage as a way to evaluate one’s social standing against others within a community.\textsuperscript{70} While it seems more than reasonable to accept that there was an acceleration in the growth of urban populations in Thessaly in the late Archaic and early Classical periods, it does not necessarily follow that this was accompanied in Thessaly by the minting of coins.\textsuperscript{71}

Additionally, we know little about social conflicts in Thessalian society until the late fifth century when the tyrant Lycophron of Pherae rose to power.\textsuperscript{72} Given the Thessalian reputation for high-quality agricultural and animal products, it is likely that much of the wealth of Thessaly was based around land ownership.\textsuperscript{73} However, agrarian pursuits were not the only economic activity in Thessaly. We are aware of Thessalians who made a living through trading goods, and the pan-Mediterranean nature of the Thessalian slave trade was well known in the Classical period.\textsuperscript{74} But there is no Thessalian-specific evidence which would suggest that there was a conflict between a land-owning elite and urban merchants and artisans. Westlake’s belief in a consolidation of landholding which dispossessed smallholding Thessalians has no basis in any extant data on Thessaly in the Archaic or early Classical periods. Moreover, despite Westlake’s interpretation that the Thessalian dynastic clans held the countryside around the cities, there is

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Aristot. \textit{Pol.} 1.1257a.
\item As well, coins were likely used within polities for basic retail trade. See: David Schaps, \textit{The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient Greece} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 97–101.
\item While major \textit{poiloi} like Athens, Sparta, Argos, and Thebes seem to have developed earlier, regions like Tegea coalesced into a unified polity in the late Archaic and early Classical periods. It is not unreasonable to accept that the cities of Thessaly took shape after some of their southern counterparts: Mait Koiv, “Urbanization and Political Community in Early Greece,” in \textit{Patterns of Urban Societies} (Munster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2013), 169. However, as Martin has argued, evidence does not support a connection in the Classical Greek world between the creation of coinage and the sovereignty of a state. Martin, \textit{Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece}, 219.
\item Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.4.
\item Mili, \textit{Religion and Society in Ancient Thessaly}, 259–67.
\item For Thessalian traders see: Plut. \textit{Cim.} 8. On the Thessalian slave trade see chapter 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{flushleft}
little to suggest that there was a rural/urban dichotomy in Thessaly in this period, or that the elite were not integrated into the social and political life of the Thessalian cities. Westlake’s connection of the expulsion and attempted installation of the Thessalian aristocrat Orestes as an Athenian puppet-ruler certainly seems chronologically likely in conjunction with the Battle of Tanagra.\(^7^5\) However, there is no clear information as to the actual reasons for the exile of Orestes. If Thessalian dynasts were fleeing *en masse* why would the Athenians choose to install Orestes, rather than one of the Menonidae of Pharsalus? The line of Meno seem to have been deeply integrated into Athenians society from at least by the 470s and maintained social connections with the Athenian elite until the end of the century.\(^7^6\) Evidence suggests that the aristocratic Menonidae were politically connected with the Athenian elite, so would be surprising if they were supportive of an anti-Athenian movement.\(^7^7\) While Westlake’s analysis of this situation is certainly possible, it contains far too many unfounded assumptions about the social and economic situation of Thessaly to provide a useful foundation for elaborating upon events in Thessaly in the middle of the century.

Sordi’s explanation is similarly attractive but suffers from using the examples of other Greek *poleis* to offer a lens to analyze events in Thessaly. It seems clear that the target of the Spartan reprisal expedition under Leotychidas was the Aleuadae, the dynastic Thessalian family

\(^7^5\) In brief: Thucydides recorded an Athenian expedition in 454 which had the objective of installing “Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king” as the ruler of Thessaly. Unfortunately, Thucydides offers little context or commentary which would give greater insight to the action: Thuc. 1.111.

\(^7^6\) The actions of Meno I have been discussed above and in chapters 1 and 3. His son Meno II was one of the cavalry commanders that went to assist the Athenians in 431, and his grandson Meno III was in Socrates’ circle and participated in Xenophon’s mercenary expedition, which suggests that he was well connected with the Athenian elite. Thuc. 2.22.3; Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.6, Plat. *Meno* 70a-b briefly discusses some of the Thessalians’ background.

\(^7^7\) Meno of Pharsalus sent troops to the Athenian siege of Eion in the 470s, for which he was granted Athenian citizenship and immunity from taxes: Dem. 13.23, 23.199. His son Meno II fought for Athens in the Peloponnesian War: Thuc. 2.22.3. Meno III is the subject of one of Plato’s dialogues, This is very likely the same Menon who traveled with Xenophon in the *Anabasis*. 
that architected the alliance with the invading Persians.\textsuperscript{78} While there may have been a faction or group of Thessalians who saw the possibility of capitalizing on the Spartan attempt to unseat the Aleuadæ from their position of dominance in Thessaly, it is difficult to imagine that pro-Spartan sentiment was particularly widespread. As Greek armies marched through enemy territory, the inhabitants of that land were often subject to depredations, raids, and theft.\textsuperscript{79} Given that there was tremendous emphasis in Greek society placed on defending agriculturally productive land, it is unlikely that the majority of the Thessalians – who were involved in agrarian pursuits – would be willing to align themselves with an invading Spartan army, even if they held similar political goals.

Sordi also argued that the Thessalian cavalry at Tanagra who were instrumental in achieving political changes within Thessaly were a unified class with monolithic socio-political interests.\textsuperscript{80} In a similar vein to Westlake, Sordi believed that the oligarchic Thessalian “knights” were a mirror of their Athenian counterparts, a group in which the members came from similar socio-economic backgrounds and saw a benefit as representing themselves in city politics as a united front.\textsuperscript{81}

While we know little of the makeup of the Thessalian army, it seems unlikely that there was a similar socio-political group in Thessaly whose identity was formed by their participation

\textsuperscript{78} On the Aleuadæ and the Persians: Hdt. 7.6.2. For the campaign against the Aleuadæ see: Paus. 3.7.10.
\textsuperscript{79} While there is no extant evidence on the activity of Greek armies in enemy territory in this period, the actions of the Spartans are reasonably well attested in later periods: Thuc. 1.108.2, 2.57, 3.26.3. Hell. Oxy. 12.4. See also: W.G. Hardy, “The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and the Devastation of Attica,” Classical Philology 21, no. 4 (1926): 346–55. Hanson came to the conclusion that a Greek army’s depredations on enemy land was more psychologically traumatizing than physically effecting, for our purposes the difference is moot: Victor Davis Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, Second (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Ober followed Hanson’s general conclusions: Josiah Ober, Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, Supplementum Octogesimum Quartum (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 35–37.
\textsuperscript{80} Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 109.
\textsuperscript{81} Aristotle mentions the consistent class-interest of the Knight-class in Athens: Aristot. Const. Ath. 38.2.
as cavalrymen in battle on behalf of the koinon. As discussed in Section II, horse ownership in Thessaly was likely far more attainable to poorer men than it was in the South.\(^2\) Given that the wide plains of the Pineos River basin were likely far more conducive to mobile cavalry combat than the mountains and valleys of their southern neighbors, it seems reasonable to accept that the Thessalians placed a premium on enlisting as many men as possible who could effectively fight on horseback, regardless of their wealth. Additionally, our only information about the soldiers who served in the Thessalian cavalry comes from an episode with Meno of Pharsalus in 475. The Thessalian grandee sent penestae, an agricultural serf class within Thessalian society to fight with the Athenians at the Siege of Eion.\(^3\) There is little extant information on the makeup of the Thessalian forces at the Battle of Tanagra, but if the Thessalian cavalry contained members of the penestae it would be difficult to see that they would support an alliance with Sparta, a state whose defining characteristic was the brutal suppression of the unfree helots. If the Thessalian cavalry was composed of free citizens, it seems most likely that they came from diverse backgrounds and were not monolithic in their political and material interests. While it is reasonable to see the Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra as a reflection of some sort of internal dissent against the leadership of the Aleuadæ, it is unlikely that the Thessalian cavalry represented a narrow, oligarchic faction that was attempting to gain greater political representation.

Additionally, Sordi’s assessment of a pro-Spartan political ideology having been the engine behind the Thessalian actions at Tanagra is difficult to accept. As discussed above, it

\(^3\) Dem. 13.23, 23.199. There are signs that the penestae did possess the social mobility and the opportunity to become full Thessalian citizens. An inscription from Pharsalus in the third century suggests that penestae were freed thanks to military service, and Aristotle relays an anecdote from Gorgias – who spent a significant portion of his life in Thessaly in the fifth century – that Larisa was known for enfranchising a surprisingly large number of new citizens, see: Aristot. Pol. 3.1275b. For a more in-depth discussion of the penestae see chapter 5.
would be surprising if a significant portion of Thessalians were willing to align themselves with the Spartan cause after Leotychidas led a materially and psychologically destructive raid deep into Thessaly. Moreover, the Battle of Tanagra was not the only battle in the Spartan-Athenian conflict in Central Greece. According to Thucydides, only two months after the initial Battle at Tanagra, the re-formed Athenian army defeated the Spartan-allied Boeotians at Oenophytae and took control of Boeotia, Locris, and Phocis. While the Spartan army had left Central Greece and was likely demobilized in the Peloponnese, the use of Boeotia as a counterweight to Athenian influence in Central Greece would have been a key component in preventing further Athenian military actions. However, this does not seem to have happened, and the Thessalians abandoned the Boeotians to Athenian aggression.

While we know little about Thessalian and Boeotian relations, it seems that the Boeotians played a part in checking Thessalian expansionary plans sometime in the Archaic period at the Battle of Keressos in Northern Boeotia. Although the specific date of the battle is a mystery, the fact that centuries later Plutarch felt comfortable in describing the enmity that existed between the Thessalians and the Boeotians suggests that the intensity of this feud and its cultural memory lasted significantly longer than any political disagreement. If the Thessalian oligarchs were committed to the Spartan cause on an ideological level, then it would follow that the Thessalians would have assisted the Boeotians. Instead, cultural grudges seem to have trumped any sort of realpolitik or ideological realignment that the Thessalian revolutionaries may have been encouraging.

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84 Thuc. 1.108.2 – 3.
85 Diod. 11.81. For a brief discussion of this strategy see: Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1969), 89–90.
86 Plut. Camillus 19,138a; Plut. Mor. 866f.
If the betrayal at Tanagra was part of a larger political revolution in Thessaly that was motivated by a nominally pro-Spartan faction, then it seems reasonable that the Thessalians would continue to support Sparta in the conflict. To do otherwise would be to invite inevitable Athenian reprisals. Instead, all extant evidence suggests that the Thessalian contingent quit the field after Tanagra, and did nothing to resist the subsequent Athenian conquest of Locris and Phocis, which were traditionally part of the Thessalian sphere of influence. The fact that the Thessalians did not continue to support Spartan efforts – and by the opening years of the second Peloponnesian War were once again supporting the Athenian cause – suggests that the betrayal at Tanagra was prompted by something other than an ideological commitment to a Spartan-backed oligarchy.

Additionally, there are other barriers to bringing the Thessalians to the Spartan cause. In the years after the Persian invasion the Spartans attempted to eject those members of the Amphictyony who had aligned themselves with the Persians, quite clearly a policy which was directed at Thessaly. As I have argued elsewhere in this work Thessalian prominence in the Delphic Amphictyony was central to Thessalian mytho-historical identity a psychologically important part of Thessalian “national” pride, and it was only through the machinations of Themistocles and the Athenians that the Thessalians stayed as members of the the Amphictyony. Given these actions in the 470s, it seems unlikely that such actions created a pro-Spartan faction in Thessaly of any significance. In the mid-fifth century, while there may have been a segment of Thessalian society who were pro-Spartan, it is most likely that this group was quite small and

87 Helly has suggested that it is possible a Thessalian contingent assisted the Boeotians at Oenophytae but to justify this position he points to the Daux inscription, which does not corroborate this position: Helly, L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi, 1995, 228.
88 Plut. Them, 20.3. For more on this, see chapter 3 on Thessaly in the Archaic period, as well as chapter 2 on Thessaly’s relationship to the Amphictyony.
given the lack of a consistent pro-Spartan policy, it is difficult to see their influence as being particularly effective or long-lasting.

Lastly, Sordi’s assertion that the Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra was both a manifestation of revolutionary fervor and prearranged with the Spartans is difficult to accept. If the Athenians had just cemented an alliance with the Thessalians only a few years earlier, were the architects of this treaty unaware of the political strife in Thessaly? If the unrest in Thessaly was significant enough that the Thessalian koinon had lost its political cohesion, it seems surprising that the Athenians would be clueless as to this development. If they were aware, why would the Athenians enlist soldiers whose loyalties were potentially unknown? If the Thessalians prearranged this action with the Spartan army, what was their end goal? What was the intended benefit for betraying the Athenians? The Thessalians do not seem to have supported the Spartan cause after the battle, nor do the Spartans or their Peloponnesian allies seem to have worked to limit the Athenian reprisal expedition against Thessaly a few years later. If we are to understand that the Thessalian elite were integrated socially into Athenian culture, and the revolution or political unrest that Sordi and Westlake believed was occurring in Thessaly was primarily driven by urban oligarchs, then it is reasonable to accept that as a response these individuals perhaps saw the Spartans as natural allies. However, the lack of follow-through suggests that the action at Tanagra was not part of a larger strategy on behalf of either Sparta or Thessaly.

Given these issues, it seems reasonable that the Spartans were at best a means to an end for the Thessalians at Tanagra. Yet, if the motivations of the Thessalians identified by Westlake and Sordi do not entirely make sense, what should we see as the cause of the Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra? While I suspect that both Sordi and Westlake are both partially correct in their
interpretation of the political unrest in Thessaly, the cause of the Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra was rooted in a far older historical enmity than that between Athens and Sparta.

The virulent hostility between the Thessalians and the Phocians has been discussed in-depth in other areas of this work, but in brief: perhaps from the period of the First Sacred War in 590 the Thessalians extended their political control over Phocis.\textsuperscript{89} The Thessalian hegemonic project in Phocis ended sometime in the late Archaic period after a series of battles.\textsuperscript{90} When the Thessalians allied themselves with the Persian invasion, the Phocians elected to join the southern Greeks in resisting the invasion; however this was not for any high-minded idealism, Herodotus makes clear it was purely because the Phocians wished to oppose the Thessalians in any of their endeavors.\textsuperscript{91} This enmity was not one sided. When the Thessalians led the invading Persian army into Greece, they specifically guided Xerxes’ army through Phocis, ensuring that Phocian territory was ravaged.\textsuperscript{92} Jason of Pherae, in his bid to become unite and lead Thessaly specifically took a detour to raid Phocian territory.\textsuperscript{93} The Battle of Tanagra was an attempt on the part of the Spartans to eject to Phocians from Doris. In resisting the Spartans, the Athenians were supporting Phocian expansion. Moreover, we are aware that after the conflict Phocis became a subject-ally of Athens, and it seems likely that this process had begun before the Battle of Tanagra.\textsuperscript{94} The ramifications of these alliances cannot have escaped notice of the Thessalian rank and file.

\textsuperscript{89} For more on the First Sacred War and the beginnings of the Thessalian-Phocian conflict see chapters 2 and 3 on the Delphic Amphictyony and the First Sacred War. If Herodotus is to be believed, the conflict between the Thessalians and the Phocians may have its origins from the entry of the Thessalian people into the Pineos River basin: Hdt. 7.176.4.
\textsuperscript{90} Hdt. 8.27, 8.28. Paus. 10.1.3 – 9. Plut. Mor. 244b-e.
\textsuperscript{91} Hdt. 8.30.
\textsuperscript{92} Hdt. 8.32.
\textsuperscript{93} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.4.27.
\textsuperscript{94} In the Second Sacred War around 448, the Athenians ensured that Phocis had control of the religious complex at Delphi: Plut. \textit{Per.} 21.2.
Given the history of Thessalian-Phocian relations and the seemingly inexplicable lack of continued Thessalian participation in military operations during the First Peloponnesian War, it seems reasonable to accept that the Thessalian betrayal of their Athenian allies was not part of an ideological conflict, but instead was a reaction to being asked to fight on behalf of the Phocians and their allies. The alliance between the Athenians and the Thessalians, enacted after the Great Helot Revolt of 465/4, was likely architected by the Aleuadai who were looking for allies to shore up their shaky hold on power. While there may have been Aleiad officers in the Thessalian contingent, it is likely that the soldiers themselves were from a number of different areas of Thessaly. Orders to attack an army which was preventing the hated Phocians from expanding their influence must have upset the rank-and-file Thessalians tremendously.

It is likely that the Aleuads were gambling that the strength of their Athenian alliance would afford them greater support than siding against Phocis and attempting to repudiate Thessalian losses at the beginning of the fifth century. However, this ill-conceived plan gave an opening to those Thessalians who were looking to supplant the Aleuadai, who could claim that the “sons of Aleuas” had presided over the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project and were supporting those who had caused its failure. Whether the defection was planned prior to the entry onto the plains of Boeotia, or as the battle commenced is unclear. However, as discussed in the following section it is most likely that this act was spontaneous and represented a shift in Thessalian politics from political discontent into open hostility and produced a reorientation in Thessalian politics.

95 For the treaty, see: Thuc. 1.102.4.
96 During the Persian invasion the Thessalians prevented the Persian armies from ransacking Doris; Hdt. 8.31. It also seems likely that a not insignificant portion of the Thessalian elite saw themselves as descended from the Heracleidae, and as such felt an ancestral connection with Doris, as suggested in the opening lines of Pind. P. 10.
IV. A Thessalian Revolution?

In the Archaic period, the Thessalians embarked on a political and military expansion into central Greece with the goal of extending their influence over Delphi and the important religious and trade routes through the region. Part of this program involved the subjugation of the Phocians, who would violently break free of Thessalian political control in the late Archaic period and end Thessaly’s hegemonic ambitions and its dominating influence on the Delphic Amphictyony. As argued in chapter 4 on Thessalian governance, presiding over the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project weakened the ruling legitimacy of the Aleuad clan in Larisa, and almost immediately cracks in the façade of Thessalian unity appeared. On the brink of the second Persian invasion, when the Aleuadai of Larisa aligned themselves with the Persians in an attempt to gain outside help to reinforce their position, a discontented faction of Thessalians sent a messenger to the southern Greeks to ask for their assistance in repelling the Persians. It is difficult to see this action as anything other than a deliberate attempt to undermine the power of the Aleuadai as the anti-Persian forces sent ten thousand soldiers to block the invasion at the Vale of Tempe, only thirty kilometers from Larisa. While this initial attempt to oust the Aleuadai was unsuccessful it seems likely that the power of the dynasts in Larisa was reduced by

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97 Hdt. 8.27, 28.
98 Hdt. 7.172.
99 Hdt. 7.173.1.
the 470s: when the Thessalian elite make a reappearance in the literary record after the second Persian invasion, none are identified as being part of the Aleuad clan.

However, in all likelihood in 457 the Aleuadæ remained in power and they were the faction that engineered the alliance with the Athenians in 461. As with their alliance with Xerxes, the Aleuad clan looked outside Thessaly for assistance to reinforce their political position. Unfortunately for the Aleuadae, the network of alliances in Central Greece created a no-win situation for the dynasts in Larisa. While the Thessalians historically had positive social, economic, and diplomatic connections with the Athenians, Athens was in turn allied with Phocians, who had ended Archaic Thessalian expansion. While the Athenians were fighting the Spartans, they were also indirectly supporting Phocis and greater Phocian influence over central Greece and Delphi. By extension, the Aleuad regime – which had constructed the alliance and sent a cavalry contingent to support the Athenian army – was not repudiating the failure of the Thessalian hegemonic project but was instead implicitly supporting the aims of Phocian power at the expense of Thessalian pride and political influence. This was the cause of the Thessalian betrayal of their Athenian allies at Tanagra. However, what were the ramifications and results of this betrayal? As Sordi argued, was there a political revolution in Thessaly in the mid-fifth century, of which the Thessalian action at the battle of Tanagra was a manifestation? As discussed above, the dominant contemporary view is that the Thessaly underwent a political revolution in the mid-fifth century, and the Battle of Tanagra was a symptom of that strife. Instead, I have argued that it seems far more reasonable to accept that the Thessalian betrayal at Tanagra was the precipitating event for any political revolution that may have followed.

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100 Thucydides was convinced about the Thessalian affinity for the Athenians: Thuc. 4.78.2.
Based upon material evidence discussed in section I, the Thessalian soldiers who betrayed the Athenians at Tanagra were sufficiently proud of and comfortable with their actions to erect public monuments which highlighted their actions on behalf of all Thessalians. This strongly suggests that the actions of the Thessalians at Tanagra were favored by whatever faction ruled Thessaly after 457. Given these parameters, a number of possibilities present themselves:

1) The ruling regime in Thessaly that was in power prior to the alliance was supportive of the actions of the cavalry at Tanagra. However, it is difficult to understand why this government would create ally itself with Athens and only a few short years later change policy, especially as there appears to have been no continuation of Thessalian operations in the first Peloponnesian War against the Athenians. To betray a powerful ally and fail to capitalize on any successes seems a remarkable – though admittedly, not implausible – misstep.

2) The ruling dynastic faction that allied with the Athenians in 462/1 lost power sometime after the treaty was signed and was replaced by a pro-Spartan or anti-Athenian faction prior to the Battle of Tanagra in 457. This is Sordi’s position, but it is difficult to accept for a variety of reasons. The Athenians had sufficient social and political contacts with the Thessalian elite to engineer an alliance, and it is surprising that a regime change would go unnoticed. Moreover, if the betrayal at Tanagra was part of a larger program or policy, it is difficult to accept that the Athenians would be unaware of such a position on the part of the dominant Thessalian factions. If we are to accept this scenario, then the Athenians would have placed their trust in new allies of unclear loyalty. Again, this is not impossible but such a failure in communication and intelligence seems unlikely.
3) The politically dominant Thessalian faction which signed the treaty in 462/1 was replaced after the Battle of Tanagra by another group with greater popular support. If this were the case, then it follows that the betrayal at Tanagra was not a conspiracy on the part of the central Thessalian government but was perpetrated by the cavalry on the field. It is most likely that this action was near spontaneous, though the social and political discontent of the Thessalian cavalry was most likely rooted in the loss of Aleuad legitimacy after the end of the second Persian invasion. Being asked to fight on behalf of the Phocians by the unpopular Aleuad regime provoked the Thessalian cavalry at Tanagra into action. It is difficult to envision a scenario in which this action was not impulsive, it would have been a remarkable failure of leadership on the part of the Thessalian rulers to dispatch a body of soldiers whose loyalties were in question, especially in support of a powerful ally which was in the process of expanding its power into Central Greece.

Of these three scenarios, the third seems the most likely: it would follow that once the Thessalian cavalry returned to Thessaly after the Battle of Tanagra, news of this action lit a spark which further inflamed political unrest.

Operating from the position that Thessalian actions at the Battle of Tanagra were related to political and social unrest amongst various Thessalian factions, it is necessary to address the potential ramifications of this unrest: a political revolution in mid-fifth century Thessaly. Sordi has been the champion of this theory, and of modern Thessalian scholars she has most fully sketched out her vision of an oligarchic revolution in Thessaly in the 5th century. As discussed in the previous section Sordi placed the beginning of Thessalian political troubles with the Spartan
expedition against the Aleuadae. She argued that the expedition of Leotychidas was a “war of liberation” on the part of the Spartan King, which deposed the tyrants of Pherae and Scotussa and created a political situation in Thessaly in which the government of Thessaly was divided between the Aleuad northwest and the “oligarchic” south. In conjunction with the Thessalian actions at the Battle of Tanagra, popular unrest in 457 created the opportunity for the assassination of the Aleuad tagus Echecratidas and the exile of his son Orestes, who fled to his allies in Athens. The Aleuadae were contained in Larisa, and Thessaly became a country led by urban oligarchs who would reorganize the political structure of the country for the next five decades.

In Sordi’s view, Thessaly had originally been organized in a hierarchical, top-down fashion, with the central government imposing the system of tetrads ruled by tetrarchs on the koinon. These tetrarchs were the intermediaries between the koinon and the chief official of the tagus and were ultimately subservient to the elite and the “central government” who enforced the diktats of the dynasts. The urban, oligarchic nature of those Thessalians who spearheaded the revolution in 457 reoriented the political dynamics of this system, instead of the position of tetrarch the revolutionary position of polemarch was established. The polemarchs were the representatives of the koinon and the urban centers of Thessaly, advocates for their constituency rather than administrators who would impose control upon them. To support this argument, Sordi pointed to the Daux inscription which identifies a polemarch but not a tetrarch.

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102 This is discussed in Plut. *Mor.* 859D.
104 Sordi, 110. The organization of the Thessalian government – including Sordi’s theories – in the seventh though mid-fifth centuries is discussed more fully in chapter 4 on the Thessalian government.
105 The position of polemarch appears in two inscriptions in the fourth century: IG II² 116 and IG II² 175.
interpretation, this was a sign that the position was newly created and specifically related to the revolution of which the Thessalian betrayal at the Battle of Tanagra was a part. The creation of a polemarch as the new intermediary between the Thessalian koinon and the executive signified the increased powers of the tetrads and the urban oligarchies at the expense of the dominance of the dynastic elite. This was enabled by the emancipation of the penestae, whose role as an unfree agricultural labor force made the social and economic position of the Thessalian elite possible. Sordi believed the servile workforce of the Thessalians was freed by the oligarchic revolutionaries and enlisted into the ranks of the citizens in order to bolster their political power base. To corroborate this assertion, Sordi pointed to Aristotle’s observation that in Larisa, the poor and middle class citizens elected the city magistrates, choosing from among a pool of the oligarchic elite. Sordi believed that this was a direct outgrowth of the revolution of 457, reflecting on the polis-level the increased power of the koinon thanks to the newly grown citizen body. The creation or extension of voting rights extended beyond local government, as the revolutionary Thessalian government further insisted upon each polis participating in election of the tagus, the chief federal executive.

While the basis for earlier Aleuad rulership was the clan’s connection to the Heracledae, the new federal executive – also called tagus – was only legitimized by the assent of the Thessalian poleis. Sordi argued that the inscription commemorating late fifth-century Thessalian leader Daochos I which highlighted his rule “not by force but by law,” and

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107 Aristot. Pol. 5.1305b.
109 Sordi, 116–17. As discussed in chapter 4, Sordi believed that the chief executive of the Thessalian koinon was the tagus, which I do not share.
110 Sordi, 109–15. She based this on Pindar’s epinician whose opening line highlighted the connection between Thessaly and Sparta: Pind. *P.* 10 Ln. 1.
Xenophon’s assertion that Jason of Pherae became *tagus* through “common consent” of the Thessalians confirmed her theory.\(^\text{111}\) The prominence of the *poleis* as the organizational basis of the new Thessalian political paradigm was not limited to electoral politics, the Thessalian army was reorganized and mustered by *urban* center, rather than by *tetrad*.\(^\text{112}\) Sordi saw the evidence of this development in the Thessalian expedition of 431, whose contingents Thucydides identified on a city-by-city basis.\(^\text{113}\) Unlike earlier appearances of Thessalian forces in the literary record which are simply referred to with the catch-all “the Thessalians,” the expedition was specifically detailed as containing contingents from Larisa, Pharsalus, Cranon, Pyrasis, Gyrton, and Pheraea. In Sordi’s estimation – as well as that of Helly – this represented a more “democratic” system that fundamentally changed how the Thessalian army was mustered, as well as reflecting the more inclusive nature of the new Thessalian government.\(^\text{114}\)

Sordi’s reconstruction is particularly appealing. But how well does it hold up to scrutiny? The assessment that the *polemarch* was a new position created in the mid-fifth century is reasonable, given that known examples of the position only appear from 457 onward. Arguing a position *ex silentio* is unsatisfying but perhaps the best that modern scholarship can hope for. However, what is unsupported is both Sordi’s assessment of the office of *polemarch* as the replacement of the *tetrarch* and *polemarch’s* role as agent of the urban oligarchs. There is nothing in the historical record to support this interpretation. It certainly may be that the process of voting for an executive was instituted in this period, as there were citizen councils and


\(^{112}\) Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno*, 113.

\(^{113}\) Thuc. 2.22.3.

\(^{114}\) Helly, *L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi*, 1995, 232–33. While Helly does touch on a possible Thessalian revolution his theories are focused on the Thessalian army, and a possible organization of Thessaly into sixteen units; while reconstructing the history of Thessaly requires educated guessing and suppositions, Helly’s work is particularly theoretical.
deliberative bodies in other federal states such as Boeotia which could have served as a model for new Thessalian practices. This could account for the language used by Daochos, or Jason’s desire to obtain the consent of all of Thessaly. However, this sort of terminology is not unknown in early Thessaly; Pindar’s ode to Hippocleas of Thessaly from the early fifth century highlights that the Aleuadae ruled through and strengthened the “traditional laws” of the Thessalians.

While the exact meaning of this phrase is unclear, it is not difficult to accept that because Thessaly was decentralized and a koinon composed of a number of different cities that the formal or informal assent of each city’s ruling body was necessary for any “federal” regime to function.

However, we have no real historical context from which we might better understand the ramifications of statements about the Thessalian constitution. Thucydides reported that in 423, Thessaly was traditionally a “close oligarchy,” a δυναστεία. He discussed Thessaly in earlier periods and did not differentiate the government in the early fifth century from the regime in power decades later, which suggests that either the political reorientation was relatively limited, or the revolutionary regime that took power in in the mid-fifth century was no longer dominant by the 430s.

There is nothing in Jason’s case to indicate that his actions were fundamentally different than those of earlier Thessalian rulers, and as argued elsewhere in this work, the actions of Jason of Pherae seem to suggest that his regime was in many ways attempting to assert his traditionalist bona fides. The propaganda of Jason’s regime indicated that he wished to associate his rulership with an older mode of Thessalian governance present in the late Archaic period. His desire to gain the assent of the cities may be recalling a traditional Thessalian institution, rather than a

115 Larsen, Greek Federal States, 33–34.
more recent practice. Finally, Thucydides’ detail regarding the city-based contingents in the Thessalian expedition of 431 lacks any context which could help modern scholarship to understand his digression. It is possible that this mustering was unusual for Thessaly, however at the same time this may have been one of the few instances in which the historian simply had details that were usually unavailable to him. The Thessalian contingents do not appear to have behaved markedly differently than soldiers referred to as “the Thessalians” elsewhere in his work, and none of the commanders of the contingents appear elsewhere in the historical record.¹¹⁷

Additionally, Sordi argued that the presence of two Larisaean commanders in the Thessalian expedition of 431 – “from each of the two factions” —meant that there were two rival factions in the city, one revolutionary oligarchic and the other traditionalist dynastic.¹¹⁸ For Sordi this confirmed the theory that Thessaly had undergone a political revolution in the mid-fifth century, and in the dynastic stronghold of Larisa the new oligarchic movement had been unable to fully supplant the power of the Aleuadæ. Again, this is an attractive theory but difficult to accept. The rest of the city contingents described are as singular units, and following Sordi’s logic, this would indicate that the rest of the poleis in Thessaly had unitary government which was consistent across cities. If this were the case, why would the theoretically dominant oligarchic faction in Thessaly work with their aristocratic enemies? It seems like a particularly poor plan for a military expedition to contain contingents which would be opposed to one another, and quite detrimental to the long-term success of any such mission. Instead, it is much

¹¹⁷ However, it is likely that the Pharsalian Meno who was involved in the action was the son or grandson of the Pharsalian Meno who sent money and troops to the Athenians at Eion, and the father of the Meno in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. We know little regarding this particular Meno.

¹¹⁸ The specific phrase Thucydides uses is “ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολιομῆδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἕκτερος.” It seems clear that there were two factions, but there is no real indication as to whom those factions may have represented: Thuc. 2.22.3. Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino Ad Alessandro Magno, 119.
more likely that in this instance Thucydides possessed more details about the makeup of the Thessalian contingent, and as Helly has suggested, the two “faction leaders” are instead the heads of two different units of cavalry.\textsuperscript{119}

Given the issues with Sordi’s theories, is it possible that there was an anti-dynastic revolution against the Aleuadæ in Thessaly in the mid-fifth century? As discussed above, beginning in the period of the second Persian invasion there are signs that there was political unrest in Thessaly. Given the chronology of events it seems likely that factions within Thessaly aimed at supplanting the Aleuadæ, whose credibility was at a low point after aligning themselves with Xerxes’ failed expedition. A lack of information prevents a full and detailed account of the political struggles, but the appearance of the city of Pharsalus in the historical narrative suggests a shift in the center of power away from Larisa. This struggle seems to have manifested itself at the Battle of Tanagra; as discussed above, the most logical interpretation of the sequence of events suggests that the Thessalian cavalry at Tangra was acting against the instructions of the central government. The messaging of both the Daux cavalry monument and the gravestone of Theotimos make the argument that the Thessalians at Tangra were representatives of the entire population of Thessaly, and their betrayal – constantly present but never mentioned – should be seen as the legitimate policy of a government supported by the popular will of the people. It seems unlikely that the Thessalian government which dispatched the expedition was the same regime which allowed the rebellious cavalrymen to highlight and legitimize their actions. Therefore, it is most reasonable to accept that some form of political shift occurred. This is further corroborated by Athenian attempts to return exiled Thessalian

\textsuperscript{119} There are of course issues with this assertion; while Helly’s theory makes sense, there is no direct evidence to support his arguments: Helly, \textit{L’Etat Thessalien: Aleuas Le Roux Les Tetrades et Les Tagoi}, 1995, 233.
aristocrat “Orestes, son of Echecratidas” to power shortly after the betrayal at Tanagra.\textsuperscript{120} It is unlikely that the administration that signed an alliance with the Athenians in 461 was only a few years later a committed foe which required Athens to embark on an attempt at regime change.

Beyond this, however it is difficult to argue as to the character the new regime in fifth century Thessaly. Aristotle’s writing on the expanded citizenship of Larisa may be reflective of a post-Tanagra paradigm, but he was writing in the fourth century, in a period in which Thessaly had likely undergone significant changes thanks to the emergence of the regimes of Lycophron and Jason and the civil wars which accompanied their ambitions.\textsuperscript{121} The appearance of the position of polemarch may be indicative of the newfound power of the urban oligarchs, but the lack of information with regards to Thessalian government prevents any certain analysis. The presence of multiple leaders within the Larisaean contingent in Thessalian expedition of 431 may suggest some sort of stasis in Larisa between oligarchic and dynastic factions, though without more contextual information it is difficult to accept this interpretation given the practical difficulties discussed above.

In the end, it seems reasonable to accept that there was a revolution in Thessaly of some sort, and the subject of popular ire was the Aleuadae of Larisa. The spark that lit the match was the Battle of Tanagra, but this was not reflective of an ideological struggle in Thessaly between those that supported democratic Athens or oligarchic Sparta. Instead, it was due to the loss of ruling legitimacy on the part of the Aleuadae, who were unable to repudiate the failure of the

\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, it is unclear what political or social affiliation Orestes possessed, while Thucydides mentioned that the Athenian expedition only reached Pharsalus, this was not the ultimate objective, and it seems very likely that the Orestes was meant to rule from Larisa: Thuc. 1.111.1.
\textsuperscript{121} Xen. Hell. 2.3.4; 6.1.2-19.
Thessalian hegemonic project and further pursued an alliance indirectly supporting Phocian expansion, which the Thessalian population could not accept.
Conclusion: A Thessalian Narrative

Thessalian self-determination began to decline 352, when Philip II was declared *archon* of the Thessalian League.¹ Once in control of the League, Philip was able to isolate Pherae and use the combined strength of Thessalian and Macedonian resources to take the city and bring Pagasae, the only significant port in Thessaly, under his control in 352. Despite Philip’s successful imitation of Jason’s policies, it seems to have become clear to the Thessalians that Philip was very much not a Thessalian ruler, Philip pursued his own goals and expected the Thessalians to conform. Philip installed a Thessalian garrison at Thermopylae, but this was to serve the Macedonian King’s strategic interests, not Thessalian goals.² While taking control of the port of Pagasae helped to ensure that Pherae would be less able to act as a base from which a new tyrant might challenge the Thessalian federation for control over Thessaly, Philip also was entitled to the revenue from the port; a native Thessalian ruler would likely have spent that money in Thessaly, it seems unlikely Philip felt compelled to do so, when he had many other pressing concerns.³ Most damningly in the eyes of the Thessalians, despite Philip’s successful campaigns against the Phocians he chose not to raze the entirety of Phocis at the end of the Third Sacred War; instead the Macedonian king punished the polity while still ensuring that its people could be organized under Philip’s banner to act as a counterweight against Theban power.⁴

Realizing far too late that Thessalian and Philip’s interests only aligned when it was convenient for the Argead king, the Thessalians revolted against Macedonian domination of the Larisa-Trikala basin. In 344, Philip returned with the Macedonian army, expelled many of the

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¹ Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia*, 65.
² Dem. 6.22.
³ Dem. 1.22.
⁴ Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia*, 102.
elite, and reorganized the country into a tetrarchy. As discussed in Chapter Six, this was likely part of an archaizing program designed to symbolically link Philip’s actions – and the rule of the partisans he installed to govern as tetrarchs – to Archaic era Thessalian expansionism. It seems not unreasonable to believe that this would have been the policy of any indigenous pan-Thessalian ruler with political and military power to do so, given that Philip was adapting their political programs – at least symbolically – for his own ends. In dividing the country administratively, Philip could claim that he was returning the Thessalian koinon to an earlier mode of governance, one in which the Thessalians successfully extended their hegemony over central Greece. At the same time, this political reorganization represented an end to an independent Thessaly. Politically divided, the Thessalians were subjects of Alexander, then the Antipatrids, Antigonids, and finally Rome.

The overall goal of this work was to create a Thessalian history through a Thessalian lens, in which the actions taken by the Thessalian koinon were given a Thessalian context. Archaic period Aleuad stewardship over Thessalian politics during the Phocian rebellion not only caused a fracturing of the elite consensus but made reestablishing the lost Thessalian hegemony over central Greece a key component of governmental legitimacy. Various factions would attempt to recreate these Archaic period successes, largely through military action against the Phocians, in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of their rule. However, this inability to look forward ultimately led to a loss of Thessalian sovereignty, as intense and intractable competition for rule paved the way for outsiders to take control of Thessaly in the fourth century. While not every action taken by the Thessalian governments or people throughout the Classical period was motivated by this dynamic, repeated attempts to recall or recreate Archaic-period Thessalian

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5 Worthington, 110–11.
hegemony on the part of Thessalian regimes suggests that deeply held anxiety about Thessaly’s status in central Greece was a consistent feature of Thessalian culture.

It seems reasonable to accept that the loss of regional hegemony was a psychological blow to the Thessalians and undermined the legitimacy of the Aleuadæ. However, it is likely that the failure of the Thessalian expansionary project caused significant consternation for material reasons. There are no extant accounts as to motivations for the First Sacred War and the expansion of Thessalian hegemony, but as discussed in chapter two, it does seem likely that controlling trade routes through mountainous central Greece would have been a significant economic benefit of hegemonic expansion. The plain of Crisa was insufficient for raising the quantity of sacrificial animals that would have been necessary for religious observation, necessitating an outside source. Thanks to the success of their actions in the First Sacred War, Thessalian koinon held political and military dominance over central Greece as well as a strong position in the Delphic Amphictyony, dominating these well-trod paths would have allowed the Thessalian government to influence which groups supplied oblationary animals for religious functions at the sanctuary of Apollo. The failure of this project at first led to the fracturing of the consensus of the Thessalian elite, as various factions attempted to take control of the pan-Thessalian government. None of these powers were able to assert their political dominance through constitutional methods, leading to stasis and open civil war.

While Jason and Lycophron were able to unite Thessaly under their control in the fourth century, their regimes lacked the political legitimacy that came with generations of rulership. Nevertheless, throughout the Classical period Thessalian elite continually attempted to circumvent this issue through policies which would portray their regimes as inheritors of the pre-Phocian revolt koinon. This dynamic has largely been overlooked by modern scholars and is key
to understanding the actions of the Thessalians in the Classical period. The “noble men” Pindar described did not possess ἁγαθός because of any personal actions or characteristics, but because of their perceived connection to Thessalian expansion in the sixth century. This was the trait that Thessalian elite who wished to rule the Larisa-Trikala basin wished to emulate through their policies.

Given the limited availability of resources for archaeological excavation in Thessaly, it is unlikely that further material will become available. As such, establishing a speculative schema or framework in order to understand the motivations for the peripheries of the Greek world creates a more vibrant, dynamic society outside of the traditional foci of scholarship. The Thessalians were not bit players caught up in the conflicts of the Athenians, Spartans, Boeotians, and Macedonians, but actors in a uniquely Thessalian drama. The Thessalian koinon took actions which were influenced by external forces, but the calculus of Thessalian leadership was far more concerned with factors which would secure political and social capital for their own internal use. When the goals of the Thessalians and their allies dovetailed, the Thessalian elite were happy to follow the lead of a more powerful state, but only as long as those goals provided the leaders of Thessaly with the possibility of solidifying their rule and recreating Thessalian hegemony in central Greece. The same can and should be understood about other poorly attested Greek polities, their participation in the great conflicts and power games of the fifth and fourth centuries were only as important as their ability to affect local or regional concerns.
Map of Thessaly in the Classical Period

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Appendix A: Maps of the Plain of Crisa and the Kirphis Massif

The Plain of Crisa, Slope Percentage
The Plain of Crisa, Topographic Map
The Plain of Crisa, Elevation
The Plain of Crisa and the Kirphis Massif, Slope Percentage
The Plain of Crisa and the Kirphis Massif, Topographic Map
The Plain of Crisa and the Kirphis Massif, Elevation
Appendix B: Full text and translation of Amphictyonic Obligations from Aegina, IG II² 1126

A translation following Roberts and Gardner of the extant readable text follows with approximate line numbers in brackets:¹

Under Archon Pytheas, the Hippothontid tribe during the Third Prytania

[3] I will judge the cases according to the fairest opinion ...

[5] I will use all my power to make and execute sentences ... I will not take any share of Amphictyonic funds ... and I will give to another from common funds ...

[7] I swear by Pythian Apollo and by Leto and by Artemis, and if I keep this oath, all good and beautiful things will always fall on me; But if I perjure myself bad things instead of good ... As for registers, I will only enter on the order of the hieromnemons...

¹ There are many different scholars who have worked on this text and offered their own emendations, interpolations, and additions. I follow the work of Froehner, which is the preferred source for the Louvre, in whose collection the object rests: Froehner, *Les Inscriptions Grecques Interprétées*, 40–52. See also: Georges Roux, *L’Amphictionie, Delphes et Le Temple d’Apollon Au IVe Siècle*, Série Archéologique 8 (Lyon: Maison de l’Orient Mediterraneen, 1979), 137–92. Roberts and Gardner, *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, 2:191–96.
[11] (I will tax such and such an object) according to its fair value, and I promise never to accept a gift;

and I swear it by Pythian Apollo and by Leto and by Artemis, if I keep my oath, may they give me happiness,

if I perjure myself, misfortune... I will make the clerks of the sanctuary and the *hieromnemons* take the oath also.

[14] (such magistrates) will collect the tithe and all the victims (of the Apollonian sacrifices), some will judge if bulls are flawless... (other magistrates)

will examine the hecatomb, after having taken the same oath as *hieromnemons*.

Inspection of the Holy Land. If someone cultivates

The territory which the Amphictyons have declared sacred, they will pay, at the time of the inspection, to the clerks of Amphictyons…Aegintian Staters per cultivated acre.

The clerks must enter the name of the farmer and its fine, and require that the farmer pay. [18] But if they neglect the inspection or
do not claim payment, they will pay themselves

the 30 staters that they will neither have registered nor

claimed. In the event that the debtor does not pay

no fine, the hometown of the clerk will be excluded

of the sanctuary (of Delphi), and the Amphictyons will

make war against its citizens ...

[21] (It is forbidden) to take manure out of the sacred ground.

As for the dwellings ... those which are located

by the sea may be private property, but

the porticos will be common to all ... and will not charge

any rent whatsoever. The same person

will only be able to inhabit them for thirty days and not beyond, and

neither mill nor mortar should be found. But if someone breaks these

laws, the hieromnemons will impose on him the punishment that

will seem fair. Half of the fine will belong to

those who will report to the hieromnemons.

[26] Price. The price of the statue of Amphiction will be:

For the body… Aeginetan staters; for the coat
150 Aeginetan staters; for the gold fibulae

Coats, 100 Aeginetan staters; for the crown,

100 Aeginetan staters; for the curiass and the

Legs… and 10 Aeginetan staters; for the shield

200 Aeginetan staters; for helmet and

cheek covers… Aeginetan staters; for the plume,

15 Aeginetan staters; for the spear… Aeginetan

Staters; for the sword… Aeginetan staters.

And the fibulae and the crown must be in

or… The price of the hero's ox will be 100 Aeginetan staters.

[32] If anyone refuses to deliver ... he will have to ...

Aeginetan staters; the one who will not deliver the

victim, will be fined 100 staters… Offer to

a triple burnt sacrifice to [Apollo], a

triple burnt sacrifice ... The temple

of Pythian Apollo and the courtyard of the sanctuary and the temple

of Artemis…and the racetrack and the fountain in

the plain will be repaired if something is missing
during the Pythiad by the *hieromnemons* of the Amphi-ctyons before
the Pythians games. [37] If the *hieromnemons* of the Amphi-ctyons
did not make all the necessary repairs
to the temples (and other buildings), in the sacred Pythias, the clerk will be excluded,
until he pays.

[40] As for the damaged roads ... the Amphi-ctyons
must, each in his country, repair the bridges (and
take care that nothing) damages them. Clerks
of the Amphi-ctyons will take care of the racecourse ... and the *hieromnemons* will punish (the offenders); and on
rivers ...

[43] Pythian feast. Everyone can attend

At the annual Pythian feast ... We will celebrate the Pythian Games
in the Delphic month of Boucataios; (the Amphi-ctyons
will also have to send their ambassadors) in
the Delphic month of Bysios; but if they don't send them, they
will pay a fine of... Aeginetan staters...
to the god, and they will give everything to the Delphians. But if they
don't give them anything, they'll pay… staters.

[48] If some do not keep the truce of

God, their hometowns will be excluded from the sanctuary (of Apollo)
δικαίως τάς δίκας ώς καὶ δικαιότατας γνώμαι, τάμη μέγη γεγραμμένα κατά τός νόμος, περί ὑπὲρ δὲ μη γέ-

γράφαι κατά γνώμαι τάν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐγχερα ἁνά νά τάν δικαιομαί οὔτ’ αὐτός οὔτ’ ἄλλος ἐμοί(?) οὔδεν-

5 ποικί [καί] τά καταδίκασθέντα ἐκπραξέω ἐν δύνασιν [καί] τά εν…………c.30…………..

τώι ἐξουσίας οὔδε τῶν χρημάτων τῶν Ἀμφικτιονικῶν ὑποβαλέομαι οὐδέν…………c.23…………..

ἐμίγνα οὔδ’ ἄλλως δωσώ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων ὑποβάλλομαι[λε] ὑποθεῖ…………c.22………… οὕτως ποί

τῷ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Π[υθ]έων καὶ τάς Λατός καὶ τᾶς Αρτάμος τῶν ὑπίσχομαι, καὶ εὔορκέοντι μέμοi μοi πολ-

λά [καί] τάγαθά, αἱ δ’ ἐφιορκέομι, τά κακά ἀντί τῶν ἀγαθῶν [δόμεν: ορκος γραμματέος: ὑπίσχομαι
tῶν γραμμάτων μή ἀπογραψέν, ἀλλ’ ὅν κατά τοι ἰερομνάμονες κε[λευσέοντι ………c.21………..


τός καὶ τᾶς Αρτάμος, καὶ εὗορκέοντι μέμοι πολλά καὶ ἀγαθά, [αἱ δ’ ἐφιορκέομι, κακά δόμεν’ τῶς δὲ]

ἰερομνάμονας ὀρκιζέω καὶ τᾶς κάρυκας τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρκον. Π[…………c.19………… ἐκπρασσόντων]

τόμ φόρον καὶ τά ιερήθη αἵρεσα συναγόντων τός ὅνος τόν δοκιμασθέντων ἀποδόντες, ὁ δὲ ἐπί τάν ἐκ-

15 ἀτόμβαν ὄρ[κ]ον ὁμόσας εἴπερ τοι ἰερομνάμονες δοκιμαζέτω: π(έροδος γὰς ἱαράς· αἱ τάς τῶν ἀν

evento τοι ἰαρῶν καὶ στρατευόντων ἐπ’ αὐτός Ἀμφικτίονες [κατά καὶ ντο ἰερομνάμονες ἐπαγγέλλ]-

λαντ[ι. ἐκ] τάς ἱερὰς γὰς κόπον μὴ ἂγεν μηδεμίαν. νω [οίκήσιος: ἐπί …………….c.37……………….

ἐν ηδίας[ν] ἐπὶ θαλάσσαι, τάς δὲ παστάδας κοινάς εἴμεν πάντεσσι [τοῖς ἰερομναμόνεσι] …c.8… μι-

θόν μη[ν]δένα φέρεν μηδένι, μηδ’ ἐνοικῶν τόν αὐτὸν πλέον τριάκοντα ἀμέραν …c.9… μηδὲ γυναίκα[?]}

ἐνοικεὶ[ν μη]δεμίαν, μηδέ μόλιεν ἐνείμεν μηδὲ ὀλιμον’ αἱ δὲ τις τ[ός νόμους τούτους παρθένοιν, τοι]

25 αρομ[νάμ]ονες ἥμισυντων ὁτιν καὶ δικαίως οὖν δοκῆ εἴμεν ἐπί[ζαμιwi …c.7… δὲ τοι θέλωντες]
κάζαγ[γε]λλόντων ποι τός ιαρομνάμονας: λύτις' ἀ λύτις τάς Αμφ[κτιον... C.13.... στατ[ήρες] Αίγινα[ιο]τ' τ' δ' ἀμπέχον πεντήκοντα καὶ ἐκατόν στατήρ' ε[ς Αίγιναϊοι, τόν δ' ἐπι τούτω πορπαμά]-
t'ων ἐκατόν στατήρες Αίγιναϊοι τ' αῖς στεφάνας ἐκατόν στατήρες Αίγιναϊοι... C.9... πεντεκαί?]-
δεκα στατήρες Αίγιναϊοι τ' ἄσπιδος διακάτιοι στατήρες Αίγιναϊοι... C.17.... στα]-
30 τ'ῆρες Αίγιναϊοι' λόφου πεντεκάideκα στατήρες Αίγιναϊοι' δόρατ[ος... C.15.... στατήρε]-
ς Αίγιναϊοι καὶ τ' πορπάματα καὶ ἀ στεφάνα χρύσα ἐόντων' πι... C.18....
ἐνέστω [τ]οῦ βοὸς τιμὰ τοῦ ἤρως ἐκατόν στατήρες Αίγιναϊοι τας........... C.26............
ὁφειλέτω' χρηστήριον αἰ τις καὶ μή παρέχη ἐκατόν στατήρας ὁφ[ιλετῶ ....... C.21........ . ἐ]-
ς ἐφοδον θ' εν Ἀνεμαίας τρικτέυαν κηύαν, τώι τρικτεύαν κηύαν [.... C.20.... ἀκέσ]-
35 ιος' τόν ναὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τὸ Πυθίο καὶ τάν αὐλάν καὶ τόν τάς Α[θάνας τάς Προναίας ναὸν καὶ
tόν]
δρόμον καὶ τάν κράναν τάν ἐμ' πεδίῳ τοί ιαρομνάμονες τοί Αμφ[κτιονικόι κατά τάν Πυθιάδα έκά]-
σταν ἐφακείσθων πρὸ Πυθ[ίων ὅτινός κα δέωνται' αἰ' κα' μή τοί ιαρομ[νάμονες τοί Αμφ[κτιονικόι]
ἐν τ'αί Πυθιάδι τ' αἰαὶ ἐπικοσμήσωντι, ὅτινός κα δέωνται, ἀπο[τεισάτω ἐκαστος ... C.9...]
stατήρας Αίγιναϊος' αἰ' κα' μή ἀποτίνη τ'[ο]ίς ιαρομναμόνεσι τοί[ς Άμφικτιονικοίς, εἰλέσθω τοῦ τ']-
40 αροῦ' ἀ πόλις ἐξ ἂς κ' ἐ' ὁ ιαρομνάμων, ἐντε κα' ἀποτείσι: ὀδών' τ' κ' ......... C.22........ καὶ τ']-
ἀς γεφύρας ἐφακείσθαι Αμφικτίονας κάτ τάν αὐτὸ ἐκαστον κ[α] ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐς τ' λοιπὸν ὅτινως'
μή σίνηται καὶ τοῦ δρόμου τούς ιαρομνάμονας τούς Άμφικτιονικούς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅτινός κα δ]-
ἔηται καὶ ξαμιούντων τοί ιαρομνάμονες κήπι τοῖς ποταμοῖς.............. C.20........ ιερομνην]-
α Πυθάς: ἐνιαυτία ἀ ἱερομνηνία ἀ Πυθάς ίσα πάντεσι ἐκ τάς ής... C.8... ποτ' τάν ιερομνηνίαν τάμ] 45 Πυθιάδα ἐόντων τοῦ Βουκατίου μηνός τοῦ ἐν Δελφός, τός δὲ π[..... C.17.... πεμπόντων οἱ Δ]-
elφοτοῦ Βουκίου μηνός' α'[ι] δὲ κα μή πέμπουντι, ἀποτεισάντων .. C.8... στατήρας Αίγιναϊος ... C.5.
πότ τόν θεὸν κάτ τά πάτρια διδόντων τοῖς Δελφοῖς' αί δὲ κα μ[ή ........... C.26......... μηδὲ]
[δὲ]χωράται τάν ἐκεχηρίαν, εἰλέσθων τοῦ ἱαροῦ π ------- c.40 ------- ------
[... τάν ἐκ]εχηρίαν ιερομην[ι]άς ... C.5.τοῦ ------- ------- ------- ------- c.45 ------- ------
Appendix C: Thessalian Coins

Group 1 Pharsalian Coinage in the fifth century

SNG Cop 217

Hemidrachm, c. 480-440

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

Lavva 5

Hemidrachm, c. 440

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Sear SG 2187; BCD 630; Hoover HGC 630; BMC 1

Hemidrachm, c. 480-450

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 2 Larisaean Coinage in the fifth century

BCD Thessaly II 349.2; Hoover HGC 4, 403; Sear SG 210

Obol, c. 479-460

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

BMC 37; de Luynes 1836; Sear 2106 var

Drachm, 430-400

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 3 Perrhaibian Coinage in the fifth century

BCD Thessaly 550; SNG Ashmolean 3904

Obol, ca. 480-400

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

BMC 4; SNG Cop 195; Sear SG 2171; Philipsen 671b

Obol, c. 480-400

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Traité IV, 572; McClean 4661; BMC 1

Hemidrachm, late 5th century

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 4 Pan-Thessalian Coinage in the fifth century

BCD Thessaly 20

Hemiobol, c. 470s-460s

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

BCD Thessaly 22.4.

Obol, 470-460

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 5 Meliteian Coinage

BCD Thessaly 458; Rogers 398; SNG Cop. 173; Pozzi 2814

Unknown denomination, c. 400-344

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 6 Coins of Pherae in the 5th century

Liampi 47

Hemiobol, 5th century

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

BMC 1

Drachma, 460-440

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 7 Coins of Pherae under Lycophron and Jason

Rogers 513; SNG Copenhagen 241

Unknown Denomination, c. 404-369

BMC 20, SNG Cop 239

Triobol, 4th century

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 8 Coins of Alexander of Pherae

BMC Thessaly 15; Kraay 389

Drachm, 369 – 358

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

BMC 18-19 var; Rogers 524 var

Unknown denomination, 369 – 358

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 9 Coins of Larisa after the death of Jason of Pherae

Herrmann vi, 4; SNG Cop 124

Drachm, c. 380-360

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

BCD Thessaly II 292; L-S series 5; BCD Thessaly I 1152

Drachm, c. 380-365

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Sear SG 2122; SNG Cop. 124; BMC 64; Lorber 7-16

Drachm, c. 370-360

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]

SNG Cop 143

Drachm, c. 395-344

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Rogers 287

Obol, c. 400-344

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
Group 10 The Larisaean Aleuas Coins

Herrmann vii, 11

Drachm, c. 370-360

[Removed due to copyright restrictions]
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Vita

Taylor Gruman was enrolled at the University of Missouri-Columbia between the years of 2014 and 2022.