AN INVESTIGATION OF AESTHETIC APPRECIATION

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by

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This dissertation is dedicated to my loving parents, Xiong Beibei and Zhou Xiping,

and to

my friends who are my cheerleaders as always.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation comprises three papers in investigating the essential topics around aesthetic appreciation. The first paper examines George Dickie's Institutional theory on defining artworks and challenges his theory by analyzing the critical concepts like artifactuality and the candidacy of the status of appreciation. Further, it introduces a perceptional approach, an innovative method of interpreting one's perceptual experience combined with imagination, to defining art. The second paper proposes an evolutionary account of one's aesthetic engagement with artworks, which indicates a plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion of the standard of taste and the puzzle it generates. The third paper reconstructs Edward Bullough's Distance theory in response to his critic, George Dickie. Based on the clarification of the original ideas proposed by Bullough, the principle of distance is proved to be practical for understanding the various states of one's aesthetic appreciation.

A Perceptional Account of Defining Art

— In Responses to George Dickie's Institutional Theory

Thesis: The current prevailing view is that art is for aesthetic appreciation. For example, a functionalist account proposed by Patrick Grafton-Cardwell (Cardwell, 2021) stating that "an artwork iff the fulfillment of its function by a subject requires that the subject aesthetically engage it" (Cardwell 2021, 243). However, this is not the dominant account of defining art in aesthetics[1]. Moreover, given the multitude of artistic practices, spanning centuries and being tied to different cultures, involving various participants and objects, a clear-cut definition is difficult to offer, not least due to all the multi-perceptional approaches. Among the theories exploring different ways of defining art, I will examine the institutional approach proposed by George Dickie (1969, 1983). His theory, which has been very influential in the development of contemporary aesthetics, challenges critical concepts like artifactuality and the candidacy of the status of appreciation in defining artworks. I will argue that the institutional theory does not reveal the essence of art in terms of artworks, regardless of another critical element, the aesthetic appreciation, in defining art. I argue that, from a perceptual perspective, aesthetic appreciation is essential in defining artworks for the sake of distinguishing objects or artifacts from artworks. To solve this issue, I will provide a perceptual approach to defining art based on Wittgenstein's views on artifacts and the contextual frame, which demonstrates the unique characters of artworks in the context of its origin in the particular cultures or

[1] For the opposing accounts on defining art, see the historical account by Jerrold Levinson (1989), the cluster account by Berys Gaut (2000, 2005).

practices. Finally, I will explain why a definition of art that takes appreciation into consideration fares better than a definition that was based on an institutional theory.

1. George Dickie's Institutional Theory of Defining Art

George Dickie first constructs his theory (Dickie, 1969) responding to a popular view that "works of art cannot be defined" (Weitz, 1956). The latter view claims so because it takes the artifactuality as an unnecessary condition for defining artworks. Dickie points out that the denial of artifactuality being the necessary condition of defining artworks, or even the possibility of defining art in general, results from the evaluative use of the term "work of art." He insists that the discourse of defining artworks should be taken in the frame of descriptive use of "work of art," which I agree with. Such a descriptive way to define artworks allows us to focus on the unique characteristics of objects, either in nature or manmade, that interact with us in the sense of aesthetic experience. To define work of art, as both Weitz and Dickie agree, we need to clarify a particular kind of artifacts that are different from other artifacts; the former group is seen as being constituted by works of art due to some specific reasons that differentiate them from "regular" artifacts, such as tools used in our daily life. In other words, the descriptive characters of artworks like artifactuality are the key to defining works of art, not the evaluative judgment of the quality of works of art, which is the following issue we will discuss after reaching a consensus on the definition of a work of art.

1.1 Two Versions of Dickie's Institutional Theory

Dickie constructs his institutional theory in two steps: the original version (Dickie, 1969) and the new version (Dickie, 1983). In the original version, Dickie proposes the fundamental argument of defining a work of art as follows:

(1) An object is an artwork iff it acquires artifactuality.

(2) Specific candidates can only acquire such artifactuality if immersed in an artworld, an institution.

(3) So, an object can be an artwork only if it belongs/is immersed in a relevant institution.

There are three key features of defining a work of art in the argument above: artifactuality, the status of candidates, and institution. Later, Dickie revises his institutional theory in response to some of his critics like Monroe Beardsley (1976). Beardsley targets Dickie's interpretation of the concept of the artworld as the "established practice" (Dickie, 1969) in the old version and challenges its authority of conferring the status of candidates of a work of art. Dickie accepts this challenge and revises the argument as the new version that "A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public" (Dickie, 1983). Though the argument is simplified in the new version, the definition of the key features like artifactuality and artworld (institution) remain the same. These remaining key concepts reveal that, even though Dickie takes the new version to be a more plausible account, the nature of the institutional theory stays the same in defining works of art. Therefore, I will examine the key concepts like artifactuality and artworld (institution) in two versions to show that the institutional theory is not a plausible account of defining artworks not because of the arguments, but the problematic understanding of the essential concepts.

1.2 Analysis of Key Concepts in the Institutional Theory

1.2.1 Artifactuality: the necessary condition of defining works of art

As stated above, possessing artifactuality is the most essential feature and necessary condition for an object to be an artwork. In the old version, Dickie sets up the argument by placing "acquiring of the artifactuality" (Dickie, 1969) at the center of his project to emphasize the importance of this unique feature that belongs exclusively to a work of art. However, despite assigning such an essential role to artifactuality in the whole argument, Dickie does not offer a solid definition of this concept nor a convincing explanation of the necessity of artifactuality in defining a work of art.

I will use the example of natural objects like a piece of driftwood that Dickie has taken to be a good case of illustrating the differences between an object and a work of art to demonstrate the deficiency of his interpretation of artifactuality. A piece of driftwood on the beach is an object made by nature and by no means a work of art if it stays in this scenario. But we can ask a hypothetical question: under what conditions can a piece of this driftwood become a work of art? A short answer, from Dickie's view, is that when it acquires artifactuality. To make this answer more specific, Dickie says that "of course, driftwood and other natural objects can become works of art if any one of a number of things is done to them" (Dickie, 1969). It seems that Dickie defines artifactuality as some work done by a human being to a natural object, which necessarily allows the latter to become a work of art. This seems too simple a requirement for something to become a work of art: how is this able to differentiate among other types of manmade objects, like hammers or sofas? Furthermore, Dickie does not specify the features, nor the nature of such work qualified to be seen as the necessary condition that legitimately turns an object

into a work of art. It is unfair to claim that Dickie has done nothing to explain the concept of artifactuality, however, his explanation is unsatisfying to show how this feature is essential in defining artworks. He argues that there are two ways of turning a piece of driftwood into a work of art. By either way, the driftwood is used as an "artistic medium" (Dickie 1983, 17), which allows such simple object to become a more complex object in the sense of being an artwork. First, if someone brings the driftwood back home and hangs it on the wall in her room, this particular piece of driftwood is now a work of art[2]. Second, if a piece of driftwood is placed in an exhibition, it is qualified to be a work of art. The latter method of acquiring artifactuality reveals the core of Dickie's institutional theory by emphasizing the role of an institution in defining works of art, where exhibitions are customarily held. But it also leads to another problem in Dickie's theory: the authority of people who are entitled to define artworks. So, there are two different problems relating to Dickie's interpretation of acquiring artifactuality: the nature of the act that transforms objects or artifacts into artworks; the validity of a person or institution that can claim their authority in defining artworks. In his institutional theory, Dickie focuses on the latter issue and dissociates the key feature, artifactuality, from a work of art: the necessary condition for defining a work of art is not established within it but from an external source like an institution.

Dickie later revises his theory and offers an updated explanation of the concept of artifactuality under the artifact rule, which is a non-conventional rule that can be used to formulate the new definition of artifactuality. The artifact rule states that "if one wishes

[2] This way of turning a piece of driftwood into an artwork indicates Dickie's medium view in defining artworks. By hanging the driftwood on the wall, the act transforms the object into an artwork for the sake of its artistic medium use instead of its original tool use.

to make a work of art, one must do so by creating an artifact" (Dickie 1983, 20). Accordingly, the updated definition of artifactuality refers to "… an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public" (Dickie 1983, 20). Dickie regards artifactuality as a "'built-in' characteristic of the interest of philosophers in works of art" (Dickie 1983, 17). However, this updated explanation still does not reveal any actual features of artifactuality that sufficiently show how it works in defining artworks. He himself has admitted that even this updated definition is circular, though it is not viciously so in his view. I argue that he does not offer a solid definition of the concept itself, nor does he fully explain the necessity of institutionality in conferring artifactuality to either natural objects or manmade artifacts. He offers another example of Duchamp's *Fountain* to further explain the use of an artifact as artistic medium that turns a normal manmade artifact into an artwork. In his view, a urinal, same as the driftwood, turns from a simple object to a complex object when "being used as an artistic medium" as "Duchamp's artifact" (Dickie 1983, 17). In my view, Dickie needs to solve two questions in his interpretation of turning a urinal into *Fountain*. First, what is the relationship between artifactuality and artifact medium in defining work of art? Second, who is entitled to use an object or artifact as an artistic medium if it is essential for transforming something into an artwork? From Dickie's explanation, especially Duchamp's case, it seems that the urinal can be used as an artistic medium only because of Duchamp being an artist in the artworld. If so, institutionality plays the key role in defining artworks instead of artifactuality as Dickie proposed. Therefore, the foundation of the institutional theory is unstable.

1.2.2 Artworld: The sufficient condition of defining works of art

In contrast with the vague attitude on defining artifactuality, Dickie clarifies the concept of artworld directly, in the old version: it refers to "some society of sub-group of society" known as the institutions (Dickie, 1969). They have the authority to "conferring the status of candidate for appreciation" (Dickie, 1969), which lies at the center of the artworld being the sufficient condition of defining works of art. Among the candidates for the status of artwork-hood, it is in the power of the relevant institution or artists in the artworld to confer the artifactuality to those candidates. Based on this idea, Dickie claims that the way or process of such conferral is the critical element that turns an object into a work of art by an institution in the artworld.

The original concept of artworld comes from Author Danto (Danto, 1964). Danto applies the examples of Andy Warhol's *Brillo Carton* and Rauschenberg's *Bed to define artworld* as "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot de[s]cry–an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of history of art: an artworld." (Danto 1964, 580) Dickie finds the content of such an "atmosphere" elusive but does not offer any further explication of this idea. But it is undeniable that Danto's artworld is exclusive, perhaps even at a high level of exclusiveness. It requires at least sufficient knowledge of art history and even artistic theory, which generally marks the art critics or (educated) artists in society. Danto's exclusive definition of artworld raises a question for Dickie when he attempts to broaden the realm of artworld, especially for those who are "outsiders" in Danto's view concerning artworld.

To solve the question above, Dickie, in the new version of his institutional theory makes a significant change in defining an artworld. He declares that he has "abandoned as too formal the notions of *status conferral* and *acting on behalf of* as well as those

aspects of the earlier version which connect up with these notions. … Being a work of art is not, however, a status which is conferred but is rather a status which is achieved as the result of creating an artifact within or against the background of the artworld" (Dickie 1983, 18). He declares so in response to Beardsley's criticism (Beardsley, 1976), who has challenged the validity of the institution to act on behalf of the artworld in conferring the status of candidacy of being artworks. He expresses a similar concern I have about the authority that "Status-awarding authority can center in [a formal institution], but practices, as such, seem to lack the requisite source of authority" (Beardsley 1976, 202). I side with Beardsley on this point because of a potential problem that the authority that confers the status of art to an artifact is doing so post-factum, whereas artists would seem to think that what they are making, while making it, is art, in virtue of their making it. So, there seem to be at least two types of authorities that have the power to grant artwork-hood to an object or artifact: the authority involved in the making of the object or artifact and, the authority involved in the engagement with the object or artifact. According to the institutional theory, institutions and artists have the first kind of authority, which validate their act on behalf of the artworld in conferring the status of artwork-hood. However, I doubt about the priority of the first type of authority. Furthermore, a more challenging question for Dickie is that who is entitled to prioritize the institutions or artists in defining artworks.

Based on the declaration, Dickie continues to offer a revised definition of the artworld in the new version states that "The claim is then that works of art are art as the result of the position or place they occupy within an established practice, namely, the artworld." (Dickie 1983, 18) To differentiate from the old version, Dickie introduces a

supplementary concept to expand the boundary of the artworld: the public. He states that "Such a public is not just a collection of people. The members of an artworld public are such because they know how to fulfill a role which requires knowledge and understanding similar in many respects to that required of an artist." (Dickie 1983, 19) However, the revised concept of the artworld public does not solve the old challenge raised by Beardsley, nor does it turn the artworld into a more comprehensive group including diverse participants in art as a practice because it still holds on to a highly selective requirement for being a part of the artworld with enough knowledge of art. Even worse, in the new version, members of the artworld should have understanding and knowledge similar to an artist. In other words, to be an artworld public, one should at least 1) be aware that what is presented is art; 2) have a minimal understanding of the media of a particular art form[3]. Either requirement is highly exclusive in selecting the members of an artworld public. The revision Dickie introduces, thus, has the effect of narrowing down, rather than expanding, the circle of people and practices that can constitute an artworld, which seems to be contrary to Dickie's intention. In both versions of the argument, Dickie does not emphasize the qualification of an institution or an individual to be a part of the artworld; however, he turns to the function of the artworld in defining works of art. In his argument, artworld/ artworld public is legitimate to recognize a work of art, even though in the new version he has abandoned the notion of conferral of a particular art-hood status to candidates, the core of the role of artworld remains the same for its authority in defining works of art. Dickie confirms such authority by claiming that "An artifact's hanging in an art museum, a performance at a

[3] James Grant summarizes these two requirements in his aesthetic lectures given in Oxford.

theater, and the like are sure signs that the status has been conferred." (Dickie 1969, 254) Even without the notion of conferral the status, this claim can be interpreted in the new frame of artworld by saying that any artifacts presented in an art museum are works of art regardless of their content or their effect on audiences. Therefore, the sufficiency of artworld/ artworld public as an external element in defining works of art is deficient. We can ask a further question about declaring something as artworks regarding the institutional theory: what else do we need to sufficiently declare an object or artifact to be a work of art besides placing it in the right context like museum or gallery? Duchamp, for example, seems to prove the sufficiency in transforming an artifact, a urinal, into an artwork, the *Fountain*, by placing it in an exhibition. However, there is a precondition that allows him to do so: he is an artist, who is part of the artworld that has the authority to confer the status of artwork-hood. In other words, he is privileged to turn such an artifact into an artwork based on his position. But what if a handyman, who is an outsider of the artworld, does the same as what Duchamp has done to the urinal? It is unlikely that, at least in the view of institutional theory, such an act has the power to declare something as artworks appealing to the external element. Therefore, I will turn to the discussion of artist as an essential part that consists of the artworld in defining works of art.

1.2.3 Artist: the person who defines art by creating artworks

"There really is no such thing as Art. There are only artists" (E.H. Gombrich, 1950). The claim proposed by Gombrich is representative on the emphasis of the role played by the artists' intentions in defining art. Dickie criticizes such a view for being too narrow;

however, he embeds a related idea when he describes the role of the artists in establishing new works as art.

Dickie does not offer any direct definition of artists in his theory rather than discussing the role of an artist in the context of specific cases. One representative example is Duchamp's *Fountain*. In both versions of his institutional theory, Dickie consistently uses this case to demonstrate how an artifact can be a work of art when an artist changes it in some way. Initially, Dickie compares *Fountain* with an exact same piece of urinal that a salesman presents to his customers that is not a work of art. Duchamp, the artist who placed the urinal (with his signature) in that famous art show, transforms a ready-made into a work of art. Interestingly, Dickie does not discuss the nature of such an action (work) of signing on the urinal as an essential element in turning an artifact into a work of art. In contrast, he claims that the validity of Duchamp's act that turns an object into an artwork lies in his entitled role of an artist. In other words, he is authorized by the artworld, where he is already a member of, to confer the status of candidates of appreciation on behalf of the institution. It has nothing to do with the effect of the urinal that has resulted from Duchamp's work— his signature or even the action of placing it in an art show, or the experience of audiences who see it in the art show. His role as an artist, a member of the artworld, has guaranteed the change of the status from a commercial artifact to a work of art. Furthermore, such a position should be recognized by the artworld, a particular society, or a group of people in the field instead of the commons or the audiences. This leads to the circular problem that an artifact can be seen as a work of art that acquires artifactuality from an artist. And the title of an artist can only be assigned by the artworld, a particular society, or a group of people in the circle. It

cannot explain various works of art that were not made by an artist initially but are now displayed in museums and galleries worldwide. Religious art constitutes a forceful counterexample to Dickie's view. Dickie claims that, in the view of institutional theory, a particular object or artifact turns into an artwork when it reaches an institution that is already designated as an art institution. For example, the six stone horses in Zhaoling, one of the most famous imperial mausolea in Tang Dynasty, were made to depict the heroic image of the emperor Tang Taizong fighting in the war on his warhorses. They are part of the mausolea and supposed to be never seen by the public. But all six pieces of the stone craving are placed at two different museums[4]. By doing so, they are artworks that transformed from their original roles for glorifying the emperor in his afterlife. The questions regarding this case are as follows: 1) How the six stone horses become artworks? 2) Why they are eligible to be selected to replace in art institution that turns them into artworks? The first question can be simply answered in the view of the institutional account by saying that they are artworks because of the replacing from the mausolea to the museums. But the second question is hard to answer even we accept the answer to the first question supposing that art institutions and artists have the authority to do so. To answer the second question, we need to go back to the discussion of artifactuality as the essence of defining an artwork rather than discussing the authority of art institution or artists. A more intractable question concerning this case is that what if the six stone horses are not replaced and stayed in the temple like the Buddhist statues. We regard the statues and the wall paintings as artworks even though they are not placed in any art institution. For those artifacts, there is no "right institution" or even action of

[4] Two of them, Fenglu Zi and Quanmao Gua, are stolen and sold to Eldridge R. Johnson. He donated them to Penn Museum. The other four are placed at Beilin Museum in Xi'an, Shaanxi China.

"conferring status" of artwork-hood that turn them into artworks. Therefore, I claim that, in against the institutional theory, a perceptual approach is a more plausible way to interpret the artifactuality of artifacts or objects, which appeals to the appreciators in any cultures or societies.

A more severe issue of Dickie's description of the artist lies in his revised account of the institutional theory. He characterizes the role of an artist in establishing artifacts as artworks with two specific features: 1) A general aspect characteristic of all artists, namely, the awareness that what is created for presentation is art; 2) The ability to use one or more of a wide variety of art techniques which enable one to create art of a particular kind. (Dickie 1983, 19) For the second aspect, Dickie does not clarify what kinds of art techniques one must possess to be an artist. He regards this issue to be a new topic that concerns artistic creation that is irrelevant to the theme of defining artwork in the institutional system. In addition, the particular art techniques are too complicated to figure out before we have drawn on a consensus on clarifying the definition of artworks. I agree with Dickie's view about the second issue and will focus on the first one in this paper.

The first aspect confirms the importance of an artist's intentions, which relates to the new notion—the public in revising the concept of the artworld as the object for presentation. Dickie has mentioned such an intention that connects artists and the public by presenting the art. He claims that "Whenever art is created there is, then, an artist who creates it, but an artist always creates for a public of some sort. Consequently, the framework must include a role for a public to whom art is presented." (Dickie 1983, 19) I take it to be a very arbitrary hypothesis that presupposes all artists are creating for the

public. Such cases may exist for a portion of artists who intend to make something that will be presented to the public one day. However, many counterexamples show that in many cases artists create for themselves; they just need to express themselves by creating artworks. Once their works are done, they do not keep track on the public reaction to the artworks because they did not have an audience (an individual or collective) in mind when creating the artworks. Dickie himself has realized the fact that many artists did not intend to create for an audience in the first place. Still, he does not take them to be the opposing view rather than a phenomenon of "double intention" — two intentions of creating for presenting and not to present when the work is done, and these two intentions are not in conflict for artists. I disagree with his reconciliation of the conflicting intentions that artists may have because it does not hit the point of the problem in defining works of art. The intentions are private to artists; even though they may intend to create for the public, such an intention cannot justify their authority in defining a work of art, which relies on their identities as artists. I will continue to discuss the role of artists later in the paper, together with my responses to Stephen Davies's defense (Davies, 1991) of the institutional theory.

So far, I have analyzed the three essential concepts in Dickie's institutional theory to show why his arguments, both in the old and the new versions, are not strong enough. As I have indicated above, even though he has noticed some of the problems himself and tried to solve them, as long as he is still constructing his argument in the frame of the institutional view, the fundamental problems like the ambiguous description of artifactuality and doubts about the authority of institutions that entitles an artifact to be a work of art will not be solved.

In the following part, I will expand my criticism of the three problematic concepts in Dickie's theory in response to Davies' defense of the institutional theory. By doing so, I shall show why the problems can only be solved with a different approach to defining works of art.

2. Davies' Criticism of Dickie's Institutional Theory

Stephen Davies (Davies, 1991) defends the institutional theory, but criticizes some of Dickie's views concerning the concepts discussed so far. He offers better explanations of some of the key concepts, such as the artworld, artist, and the nature of artifactuality to make the institutional theory a plausible account for defining art (works of art).

2.1 Artworld: an informal institution with a more considerable extent of participants

Davies points out that, which I partly agree with, Dickie's theory involves an elementary mistake which defines works of art "by virtue of their being placed within the appropriate institutional context." (Davies 1991, 78) Although Davies has tried to interpret the term of an institution as the context of art practice, he still criticizes the way Dickie defines works of art based on their placing at an exhibition or gallery as a formal art institution. A crucial issue Dickie's theory faces is that the nature of a work of art relies on its placing in an appropriate institution, which requires a necessary action by its creators to present them to the public—the artworld public in the new version. This crucial issue gives rise to two issues regarding the fundamental state of the artworld in defining art. First, once artists do not present their works to the public, the institutional context (artworld public) is no longer necessary for defining art. Second, "if not everything hung inside the door of

an art gallery (for example, an artist's raincoat) thereby becomes an artwork, then the institutional context is not sufficient for the creation of art." (Davies 1991, 79) I think the second issue raised by Davies seems to be a misunderstanding of Dickie and contradicts his view for connecting the artworld (institution) with the creation of art. Dickie emphasizes the role of the artworld in defining art rather than in creating art. So, I will take Davies' first concern to be a proper one to consider and respond to, and I will table the second one as irrelevant.

Davies describes the artworld as "structure" on an informal basis (Davies 1991, 79), which entails the context-based consideration of different acts in defining art. For example, as mentioned above, the act of hanging a raincoat and hanging a painting in an art gallery can have different significances, even though they are both conducted by the same artist. In the view of the institutional theory, the latter can be the act that defines a work of art, but not the former. This case challenges Dickie's understanding of artworld as the necessary condition in defining works of art. In this case, a raincoat presented in an art gallery hung by an artist does not guarantee its state of being a work of art. In contrast, a painting presented by the same artist in the same art gallery is qualified to be seen as a work of art. The question arises as follows: what turns an artifact, a raincoat or a canvas with shapes and colors, into a work of art?

Davies answers the question by characterizing the structure of the artworld as an informal institution. He criticizes Dickie for emphasizing the formal elements of the artworld comprising theatres, museums, and art galleries. He claims that "As an institution the Artworld is structured in terms of its various roles–artist, impresario, public, performer, curator, critic, and so on—and the relationships among them." (Davies

1991, 87) From Davies's description of the artworld, I can see an extended artworld that comprises the institutions which Dickie has referred to in his account. However, such an expansion is not enough, even with an emphasis on people and their relationship that constitute the artworld, to diminish the exclusivity shared by artists and other "insiders" in the artworld regarding defining artworks. Although Davies mentioned the public as a part of the group that consists of artworld, it is still hard to find any further information besides Dickie's interpretation of the updated concept "artworld public" in the new version. Therefore, Davies fails to defend the institutional theory by his first attempt of recharacterizing the term artworld.

2.2 Artist: a person who is entitled to the authority in defining art

Is everyone equally an artist? It may not be a question for contemporary art at all, as its answer will be a yes without any hesitation. However, for both Dickie and Davies, this is a serious question that is hard to answer. Dickie, though he does not pay particular attention to the discussion of the qualification of being an artist, has made his attitude very clear that his answer to this question is "no". Interestingly, Davies gives a more ambiguous answer, which we can interpret as a "no", based on the role he ascribes to the artist his version of the institutional theory. Davies claims that "An artist is someone who has acquired (in some appropriate but informal fashion) the authority to confer art status." (Davies 1991, 87) He distinguishes his view from Dickie's by referring the term "authority" to "entitlement," which means "to employ the conventions by which art status is conferred on objects/events." (Davies 1991, 87) Dickie compares the authority of an artist in conferring the status of a work of art to the procedure of conferring the status of common-law marriage within a legal system (Dickie 1969, 254). Davies refuses Dickie's

strong claim in characterizing the role of an artist by interpreting the term authority in the frame of an informal institution where artists can acquire the entitlement to confer the status of art. I will apply this updated description of the artist to the same case of Duchamp and the salesman to examine its feasibility.

I mentioned the case of a salesman who may present the same urinal as Duchamp has presented to an art exhibition, which Davies has used in demonstrating the distinctiveness of an artist. Davies claims that it is not the artistic skills that distinguish Duchamp and the salesman, but "the conventions employed in conferring art status change through time, as does the possible membership of the roles in which there is authority to confer art status through the activation of these conventions." (Davies 1991, 88) An essential term— *convention*— lies at the center of the interpretation of the artist's role in defining art that entails the entitlement of an artist. A changing convention in time empowers an artist with authority to confer art status according to a changing circumstance. He admits that gaining such authority in some conventions is more common to confer art status; in contrast, a stricter standard may be applied in other conventions that do not allow people to confer such status. However, Davies does not consider cultural or social elements essential in defining art even though he has recognized the differences among conventions in different cultures or societies. I shall discuss the critical roles in these elements when proposing a perceptional approach to defining art.

Therefore, I argue that Davies fails to revise the interpretation of an artist for ignoring the critical elements of culture and society to defend the institutional theory of defining art.

2.3 Clarify two kinds of artifactuality

In this part, I will scrutinize Davies' clarification of two kinds of artifactuality to reveal a plausible way to go forward with his interpretation. As discussed above, the concept of artifactuality is the necessary condition for defining works of art in Dickie's institutional theory. However, it still faces difficulties that cannot be solved in the frame of institutional theory, like the circular problem.

Davies, in his criticism of Dickie's theory, clarifies two kinds of artifactuality, Type-A and Type-B, in terms of being the necessary condition of defining work of art as follows: Type-A–the primary sense means that which is modified by work, by contrast with that which occurs in its natural state; Type-B– (the secondary sense) that which has significance for the members of a culture[5]. (Davies 1991, 123-124) Davies confirms the essential role of artifactuality in the sense of Type-A interpretation and criticizes Dickie for failing to offer a proper characterization of it. However, I disagree with Davies for characterizing artifactuality as Type-A; comparatively, Type-B is a more plausible approach to interpret artifactuality in defining works of art. I will explain why I take Type-B to be a more plausible one later when I propose an alternative to defining works of art. For now, I will first point out the problems of Davies's.

In Davies's view, the first issue of Dickie's account in interpreting a work of art in the sense of Type-A is that he claims that an artifact can achieve Type-A artifactuality by *being used* as a work of art. For example, back to the driftwood case, a natural object can be used in two ways: 1) a tool for digging; 2) a work of art for decorating. In Dickie's interpretation, the different intentional uses distinguish the nature of the same piece of

[5] I will use Type-A and Type-B to refer to these two kinds of artifactuality in the rest of my paper for convenience.

wood. In other words, it does not matter who acts in this scenario of using the driftwood to decorate her room, but only the intention associated with the act confers the status of art to the object, even if such a piece of driftwood is not an artifact at all. Davies is not satisfied with this intentional account given by Dickie; instead, he emphasizes that the work done to a thing should be the critical element in characterizing artifactuality. His revision becomes clear in the example of Duchamp and the salesman, which he has mentioned before to distinguish an artist from non-artists. Davies continues with this case to show that the work Duchamp has done to the urinal confers the status of art to it even though such a urinal is already a serial ready-made. In contrast, the work done to the same urinal by a salesman cannot confer the same status of art when he presents the same piece to his clients for selling. But the question is that if the salesman does the same work, presenting the urinal to an art exhibition with his signature on the same artifact, would he, therefore, turn such an artifact into a work of art? This seems to be in conflict with two other conditions used by the institutional theory to distinguish artworks from other types of artifacts: the salesman isn't an artist, as he is not part of the artworld, even when considered in the broadest sense possible.

Another example one should discuss in connection to the issue of Davies's Type-A account of artifactuality is constituted by paintings done by chimpanzees or other non-human great apes[6]. Dickie argued that paintings made by chimpanzees can be seen as works of art if a person or institution confers the status of art upon them. By contrast, Davies refuses to accept that these paintings are works of art. He firmly believes that artists have an essential role in the making of art. He argues that "the people who, in

[6] This case is mentioned in Dickie's old version of the institutional theory where he claims that some chimpanzee paintings exhibited at Natural History Museum in Chicago are not works of art. (Dickie, 1969)

making an artwork, do no more than confer art status on physically unmodified natural objects, on the products of animals' 'typing' or 'painting,' or on objects manufactured outside the Artworld context, do not act as artists in doing so." (Davies 1991, 89) The conflict appears in his interpretation of artifactuality and artists that can draw an opposite conclusion of the same case. According to Davies's view, the paintings by the chimpanzees are the products of the animal, so they are not works of art. In contrast, based on his interpretation of artifactuality, especially his emphasis on the work done on artifacts, those paintings should count as works of art, because of the original work that has been done on the canvas, regardless of who the agents doing the work were. I am afraid that such a conflict within his interpretations cannot be solved in the frame of the institutional theory.

I side with Davies on his clarification of the two kinds of artifactuality as the necessary condition of defining works of art; however, I argue for Type-B as the one that deserves more discussion on its role in characterizing artifactuality, which will work better in the context of a cultural context and a perceptional approach in defining art. I will analyze the details of Type-B artifactuality in my construction of a perceptional approach in defining works of art in the following sections. So far, I have discussed the main issues with Type-A artifactuality, which impede it from being the necessary condition for defining works of art.

2.4 My Review of The Institutional Theory

I have discussed both versions of Dickie's institutional theory, the old and the new, and Davies's criticisms (or amendments) of it in detail to show that there are vital issues and

conflicts among its essential elements in the framework of the institutional approach for defining work of art.

The reasons why I argue against the idea that the institutional theory is a plausible account of defining art are the following:

(1) The idea of an artworld, either as a sufficient condition to define works of art (Dickie) or an informal institution (Davies), does not offer solid support in defining art despite both Dickie and Davies thinking so. Although Davies has attempted to explain this concept in a more modest way, relating it to an idea of an informal institution, the partial modification of the concept cannot solve the structural issue resulting from the institutional theory as a whole.

(2) The concept of the artist, as the essential participant in the art practice, is not authorized nor entitled, at least in the sense of Dickie and Davies's theories, to define works of art rather than create a work that has the potential to be a work of art. In other words, artists cannot be athletes as well as judges at the same time in the field of. Yet, according to the institutional theory, this is an inevitable, problematic aspect.

(3) Among the three key concepts in constructing the institutional theory, I take artifactuality to be the one that can continue to play a part in defining art, if we can offer a reasonable modification. I agree with Dickie's claim that artifactuality is the necessary condition for defining works of art. However, as I have argued above, the nature of artifactuality should be reconsidered on a cultural ground rather than some specific work done on an artifact, as Davies maintained.

I have argued against Dickie's institutional theory for its misleading approach by offering obvious counterexamples to its key concepts. To respond to the issues left

unsolved by the institutional theory, I will now discuss a theory inspired by Wittgenstein's views regarding the possibility of defining art.

3. From Artifacts to Works of Art: The Difficult Cases of Defining Works of Art

As I have discussed above, the institutional theory has limited the authority of defining art in an exclusive circle in artworld, which is not enough to explain the source of validity in conferring artifactuality in a broader realm outside of artworld. However, I will expand the boundary of the discussion in response to the institutional view on defining art. To do so, I will include the objects not only the fine art or the forms of art that have been widely accepted nowadays, but also the various artifacts in history and other fields like science and religion that were not seen as works of art. Especially for the latter group, I will discuss the situation that how these artifacts made for religious or scientific purpose now attract the aesthetic appreciation as works of art in museums and galleries worldwide. With such an expanded discussion, I will set up a solid context for reconsidering the essential concept— artifactuality as the necessary condition for defining works of art.

I will start my exploration of the progress of the transition of artifacts to works of art with the example of the driftwood that Dickie has discussed. In my understanding of his interpretation of this natural object, the misleading factor he has emphasized is the act, hanging the driftwood on the wall in one's living room or placing it in an art gallery, taken by an agent to the object. However, the decisive factor that turns an object or artifact into a work of art is not the act taken by any individuals but the aesthetic experience or appreciation of a perceiver when engaging with an object or artifact regardless of its original status. The examples can be found in science and religion, given

that artifacts, which we now sometimes judge to be artworks, have been used for practical purposes like helping scientific research and enhancing religious practice before they were used for aesthetic appreciation.

3.1 Scientific Artifacts

We use artifacts like sketches of mechanisms, botanical drawings, photos of the galaxy to scientifically understand and explore the natural world. Nevertheless, people may also perceive their beauty beyond their practical value. For example, the sketches drawn by Leonardo da Vinci as part of his scientific investigations, including his famous anatomical or mechanical sketches, are appreciated for the vivid representation of the human body and the well-designed structure of the aircraft. However, they originally served as the practical purposes to know the human body's structure and investigate the principle of operation for a machine to fly.

Similar artifacts are found, more widely, in the field of botany. From Charles Darwin to Elizabeth Blackwell, botanists have drawn pictures of the plants they discovered or cultivated as a way to study the species' origins or fulfill other research purposes. Their illustrations have served as a tool in keeping records of research objects but can also impress people, even those who may know nothing about botany, artistically. People's artistic impression of botanical illustrations consists of appreciating the plants' colors and shapes, which is similar to appreciating a still-life painting of a bunch of flowers.

Examples from astronomy, especially the photos of asters and galaxies and other objects in the universe, elicit another kind of scientific "appreciation" of artifacts, even though they were produced by recently developed technology. The publicly available

NASA photo file[7]; that includes HD photographs taken by the Hubble telescope, for instance, attract us immediately with their stunning combination of colors and lights. They are far more than simple photographs to be filed in the lab for astronomy research; they could be exhibited in any gallery like any other photographs shown by a professional photographer.

In the latter two areas of botany and astronomy, neither the botanists nor the astronomers are artists in any relevant sense; more importantly, the work— the artifacts as the illustrations and the photo of the galaxy are done for practical purposes for research rather than presenting to the artworld. So, first, it cannot be the act of presenting those artifacts to an artworld that turns them to works of art in the view of the institutional theory; second, there is no agent as an artist who is authorized or entitled to do so; third, it is the aesthetic appreciation perceivers have on those artifacts that converts them to works of art.

3.2 Religious Artifacts

Artifacts do not only support us in the journey of exploring and understanding the world for practical purposes; more importantly, and even much earlier in our history, certain artifacts have had an impact on our spiritual life. I will discuss religious artifacts as the second area where artifacts serve a practical goal like the scientific artifacts and then become works of art in the eyes of their appreciators. The connection between art and religion has been a subject of study by art historians and philosophers from multiple perspectives. (Elsner, 1996; Gell, 1998; Wuthnow, 2008) Nearly a third of the National Gallery's paintings (London, UK), especially in their Western European collection, have

[7] https://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/index.html

religious themes. Take wall paintings in Christian art as an example: Christians appreciate those paintings for the Christian faith they express based on their acknowledged theological formulas and ethical norms, especially certain forms (Van den Bercken, 2005) accessible to most believers. In Bercken's view, the cult form plays the role of artifactuality in institutional theory, which turns religious artifacts to works of art. As a work done on the objects, such a form is embodied in church architecture, religious paintings, and music. He introduced the idea of a cult form to explain a Christian's enhanced appreciation for specific classical visual artworks, which incorporate religious themes. For a Christian who is more familiar with the themes and stories, even ethical norms incorporated in the artifacts, her appreciation results from the cult form belonging to religious artifacts. In other words, the cult form is one of the necessary conditions in defining works of art initially belonging to religion. However, a precondition of its working is the faith or knowledge of the Christian audiences, which enables people to appreciate the artifacts as works of art. In a broader range of audiences, it cannot explain people's appreciation for these artifacts without a religious background. Instead, the perceptional approach may offer a better account of the reasons why certain artifacts, which are not created with the goal of being appreciated as artworks, are actually seen as such. Statues of Buddha in Buddhism constitute another example of religious artifacts, showing a similar phenomenon in Eastern culture. There are usually several statues of different Buddha in a Buddhist temple, and each has a unique power that can help believers realize their wishes. For example, people who want to have a child will pray in front of the statue of Guanyin, whose image is usually a gracious woman holding a baby in her arms. The believer "appreciates" the symbolism of motherhood's beauty; the

believers' faith in Guanyin, rather than their perception of the statue itself, allows them to understand its symbolic beauty. Although one's religious practice enhances such "appreciation," it cannot explain why museum audiences have an aesthetic appreciation, which may be based on a similar perception of motherhood's beauty but without any religious knowledge. Another example of a Buddha statue, the Leshan Giant Buddha, shows how the aesthetic appreciation of the artifact remains even when the religious impact fades. The Leshan Giant Buddha was built in the Tang Dynasty to protect the local people. Given the large size of the statue, believers were impressed by the sense of solemnity it offered. Therefore, they came to pray and donate as they believed that the unusual size of the statue also enhanced the power of the Buddha. Nowadays, very few people visit the statue for religious reasons; interestingly, the large scale of the artifact still impresses the viewers even without a religious context.

Despite these artifacts serving a specific practical purpose, they often exercise a different type of attraction on their audiences. However, beyond such a particular attraction to believers, those artifacts are seen as works of art in the broader population who engage with them in museums and galleries. Although most religious artifacts creators did not see themselves as artists, the artists do not define art as the institutional theory supposes. Let alone the so-called artworld entitles anyone to confer the status of art to the artifacts and legitimately labels them as works of art. Therefore, the institutional theory cannot tackle the difficulties presented in the two areas discussed above, which leads me to explore another account on a different track that can better solve the problems in defining works of art.

4. A Perceptional Approach to Defining Art

After a thorough scrutiny of the institutional theory, I have argued that it is not a proper account of defining art, because essential concepts, like artifactuality, artist, and artworld are not well defined and thus engender circular problems. Therefore, I propose another approach to avoid the issues above and offer a more plausible account of defining art. I take Wittgenstein's contextual framework to be the one that shines a light on my exploration for an appropriate account.

4.1 Wittgenstein's Practice View of Defining Art

Wittgenstein's view on aesthetics is commonly read as a criticism of the traditional aesthetic theories, especially the scientism view[8]. Such a common understanding leads us to think that this theory is mainly deconstructive rather than constructive when it comes to aesthetics. However, I will try to offer a constructive perspective of understanding Wittgenstein's view on aesthetics that may assist us in building a refreshing outlook on defining works of art.

I shall start with his general view on art, which regards it as a practice requiring one to obey certain rules. This view originates from his well-known concepts of family resemblances and games. He explains the idea of family resemblances by pointing out the similarities in the first place "66. …we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail"; and then characterize those similarities that "67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait,

[8] For the discussion on Wittgenstein's criticism of traditional aesthetic theories and scientism, see *'Too ridiculous for words': Wittgenstein on scientific aesthetics*, Severin Schroeder.

temperament, etc., overlap and crisscross in the same way. And I shall say: 'games' form a family… And for instance, the kinds of number form a family in the same way." [9] Although Wittgenstein does not refer to art when he mentions the two concepts, some scholars (Arthor Danto and William Kennick) have applied his view on defining works of art. Kennick claims that "There is some truth in the contention that the notions of Art and Work of Art are special aestheticians' concepts. This follows quite naturally from the absence of any distinguishing feature or features common to all works of art as such, and from the absence of any single demand or set of demands which we make on all works of art as such." (Kennick 1958, 329) In my view, this is a superficial understanding of Wittgenstein's view on art. A more meaningful indication one can draw from Wittgenstein's interpretation of the game is to understand art as a contextual practice like games rather than an abstract activity that rests on a certain kind of necessary and sufficient conditions in defining art. Since we cannot specify necessary and sufficient conditions for defining art, not least because of the diverse variety of the artifacts we need to consider, as pointed out before, that must include religious artifacts and contemporary artistic practices, we should try to look elsewhere for understanding this phenomenon.

Thus, if we see art as a contextual practice, starting from the model of Wittgensteinian games, may be the way to go. This picture abandons the unrealistic searching for certainty in setting a universal standard for external elements like artworld but focuses on the certainty of perception or experience in defining art. Compared to the focus on the role of artworld and artists by the institutionalist, Wittgenstein emphasizes

[9] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967)

the importance of aesthetic experience in defining artworks (Garry L. Hagberg 1952, 155). He claims that "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; —but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language game."[10] Art, which can be seen as the language[11], is also a kind of practice (interaction) more than seeing or creating. Accordingly, in such a practice, one's perception of an artifact or object lies at the center of defining works of art. I have indicated the problems of exaggerating the role of artists as participants and the artworld as an institution in attempting to artworks. Now I will turn to another essential part that the institutional theory has overlooked: the perceivers of works of art, more specifically, their aesthetic experiences (perceptions) when engaging with an artifact or object.

In the next part, I will provide a perceptional account of defining works of art in the frame of Wittgenstein's view.

4.2 Art as Language: A Perceptional Account Based on Wittgenstein's Cultured View on Aesthetics

As I have discussed above, art can be seen as language in the sense of contextual practice. I focus on two following points in this section: 1. The importance of an individual's perception or aesthetic experience in defining art if artworks are seen as being like languages; 2. Why aesthetic appreciation as an experience should be understood in a cultured view in defining works of art.

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[10] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. Dennis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), sec. 204.

[11] For the idea of seeing art as language, see *Art as Language: Wittgenstein, Meaning and Aesthetic Theory* by Garry L. Hagberg. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1952)

For the first task, Severin Schroeder (2017) has offered a reasonable interpretation of a Wittgensteinian cultured view of aesthetic appreciation, which has three main characteristics as follows:

(1) It is informed by an uncommonly detailed knowledge of its subject matter, a keen awareness of particulars and nuances that others might overlook (LC,7);

(2) It is based on (though not fully determined by) a loose set of conventional rules (LC, 5);

(3) It manifests a certain consistency of judgment (LC, 6).

Schroeder reveals the importance of the cultured view that one's aesthetic experience is built upon a certain context. The idea of a cultured view indicates that one's aesthetic experience is shaped by, but not determined, one's social conventions, fashions, ideological background, and other elements. More importantly, Wittgenstein points out that the cultured view can explain the delicate nuances of the different aesthetic experiences of individuals with different cultural backgrounds. With the help of this view, we may understand the origin of a specific appeal or aversion that people may experience when engaging with the same artwork. The cultured view, with these characteristics, sets aesthetic perception at the center of defining works of art, which fixes one flaw of the institutional theory that relied on an institution to confer the status of art to an object or artifact. Any language can work only if it is appropriately understood and perceived by the people who hear it. Wittgenstein has made a clear statement about how languages work upon context. I interpret his view in art by narrowing down the scope of the context shaped by various cultures. The characteristics of the cultured view of aesthetic appreciation raised by Schroeder are rooted in Wittgenstein's views on certainty

and game when he discusses the nature of language. Therefore, it is consistent to define art in a cultured view according to Wittgenstein.

More importantly, such a cultured view of aesthetic appreciation does not claim that the latter is determined directly by the social norms or conventions where one lives. Instead, Schroeder's view emphasizes how one's appreciation of art is "anchored in a specific culture" that gives substance and significance to it. In other words, it paves the way for a perceptional account of defining works of art that sees one's aesthetic appreciation as fundamental in the process.

I stand with Schroeder on the affirmation of the importance of context in aesthetic appreciation, under Wittgenstein's cultured view; however, I find some concerning features with Schroeder's position:

(1) Aesthetic appreciation is not totally formed by one's culture but rather is, to a large extent, shaped by individual inclinations. Then the question is to explore how a specific artwork can trigger one's aesthetic appreciation.

(2) Even if we accept the cultured view as a legitimate account of aesthetic appreciation, how can we explain a phenomenon that people from very different cultures and ages are similarly impressed by specific artworks? For example, a mixed experience of oppression, fear, and resilience has been experienced by generations of audiences worldwide when listening to *The Symphony No. 5 in C minor Op.*67 by Ludwig van Beethoven. This leads to a more complex question: how do some artworks speak to perceivers from very different cultural backgrounds?

These two questions bring us back to the concept of artifactuality, which is oversimplified as the work done to an object or artifact in the institutional theory. As I

have mentioned earlier, I agree that artifactuality plays an essential role in defining works of art; however, I shall attempt to offer an alternative understanding of this concept in association with one's perception to prove my claim that an artifact or object can only be seen as a work of art when it arouses one's aesthetic appreciation (experience). Therefore, works of art should be defined for their being perceived by individuals instead of the work done by artists or being presented to an artworld.

4.3 Redefine Artifactuality

I have discussed Davies' clarification of two types of artifactuality in the second part and argued that Type-A– which is modified by work, is not a proper interpretation of artifactuality in defining works of art. Though I am sympathetic to the Type-B clarification of artifactuality, it also lacks some essential features for being a good candidate in the process of defining artworks. In this section, I redefine artifactuality with the help of Heidegger, precisely his well-known thoughts on the origin of the work of art (Heidegger, 1963).

Before giving the details of my view, I shall briefly explain why a Heideggerian view on artifactuality may fit in the Wittgensteinian frame I have described above. Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein see art as language or at least playing the role of language in practice. I have explained Wittgenstein's thoughts above, and Heidegger has also made a statement that artworks have "the naming power of the word" (Heidegger, 1963, p.171). In addition, he shares a similar attitude with Wittgenstein on seeing works of art, which is against the scientific account of understanding and emphasizing the characteristics of changing, conflicting, and mutual affecting among participants in an art activity.

4.3.1 Two Features of Artifactuality

Heidegger does not mention the concept of artifactuality in his writings; instead, he discusses the essence (origin) of the work of art. I read his claim that "art essentially unfolds in the artwork." (Heidegger 1963, p.144) as artifactuality should also unfold in artworks. This indicates that I take an opposite approach from the institutional theory where I seek the essence or nature of artwork from inward instead of relying on an external factor like the institution to confer the status or present an artifact or object to entitle them to be an artwork.

I propose that, based on my understanding of Heidegger's thoughts on the artwork, artifactuality— as the essence of artwork, is a dynamic, changing *strife* that consists of creation and appreciation (preservation[12]). Two points to be clarified in this statement: (1) artifactuality is not an unchangeable element or procedure; (2) both creation and appreciation play an equally important role in defining a work of art. I will focus on the second point when explaining artifactuality in the Heideggerian view, especially in responding to Dickie's institutional account that I have criticized.

According to Heidegger, there are two essential features of an artwork (artifactuality) as follows: (Heidegger 1963, 173)

1. The setting (opening) up of a world.

2. The setting (bringing) forth of earth.

These two features "belong together" in the unity of an artwork. To explain artifactuality based on these two features, I shall focus on the acts they refer to setting (opening) up and setting (bringing) forth[13], which I regard as appreciation and creation

[12] Heidegger uses the term preserver/ preservation to refer to appreciator/ appreciation in his paper.
[13] Heidegger interchangeably uses opening up and bringing forth in his paper.

that constitute the essence of an artwork. Accordingly, like the two features being united in an artwork, creation and appreciation also co-exist in artifactuality where in this unity "we seek when we ponder the self-subsistence of the work and try to tell of this closed, unitary repose of self-support." (Heidegger 1963, 173)

Besides the co-existence, more importantly, creation and appreciation also form strife together in an artwork. To understand such strife, which includes an internal tension, I shall turn to the two key concepts: world and earth. Though I will not present Heidegger's discussion on these two concepts in detail, it is helpful for us to understand this idea of strife, the conflicting relationship between creation and appreciation in artifactuality. In a sense, such strife takes root in the conflicting relationship of world and earth: "The earth is not simply the closed region but rather that which rises up as self-closing… Earth juts through the world and world grounds itself on the earth only so far as truth happens as the primal strife between clearing and concealing." Therefore, "World and earth are always intrinsically and essentially in conflict, belligerent by nature." (Heidegger 1963, 180) Accordingly, as the two acts that deal with the two concepts in an art activity, they are also in a conflicting relationship. To define a work of art, one should see the two acts, two agents in such a dynamic interaction to grasp its essence– artifactuality. Such a view on artifactuality supports my criticism of the institutional theory for its being superficial, which regards artifactuality as modification done on artifacts or objects. Heidegger also claims that "The artwork is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other than what the mere thing itself is…" (Heidegger 1963, 145) If one accepts the institutional view on artifactuality, she will only see the artwork as a made-thing rather than something that affects her. Such effect does not emerge from

the modification (work) done by an artist; instead, it can be found only in an artwork that requires a consideration of both the artist's creation and the preserver's (appreciator's) appreciation.

4.3.2 Reply to Dickie's Institutional Theory

As I have mentioned, the two main participants in redefining artifactuality are: the artist and the appreciator. In this section, I further respond to Dickie's institutional views that overemphasize the artist's role and overlook the appreciator when discussing the concept of artifactuality.

Let us go back to the example of Duchamp's *Fountain*. In Dickie's view, *Fountain* is an artwork because of Duchamp's entitlement as an artist, who is entitled to either confer the status of artwork to the urinal or present it to the public. However, though Heidegger has also admitted that artwork is primarily a product "of the activity of the artist," he points out a more serious concern that "The emergence of createdness from the work does not mean that the work is to give the impression of having been made by a great artist. The point is not that the created being be certified as the performance of a capable person, so that the producer is thereby brought to public notice." (Heidegger 1963, 190) The concept of createdness plays a critical role in distinguishing an artwork from an artifact or object instead of the role of artists. It releases artwork from the control of external factors like an institution and resets it back to the place where it should be: artifactuality. The createdness can only be found in artifactuality in the sense of bringing forth.

Interestingly, Dickie himself does not consider *Fountain* to be a good work of art even though he uses it as an example in demonstrating the role of an artist. He doesn't

explain why he thinks it's not a good artwork, so, to make the discussion easier, let us use another example frequently mentioned by Heidegger to see what a "good" artwork should be. Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant's shoes[14] exemplifies the necessary characteristics of an artwork. Similarly, the painting depicts an ordinary object like the urinal signed by Duchamp. However, the difference lies in the work regardless of the artists. The painting of shoes is an appropriate case that shows what a great artwork can tell us. In other words, how it reveals the dynamic and conflicting relationship of a world and earth to us as appreciators. The createdness of this painting is not "something at hand is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes beings as a whole-world and earth in their counterplay—attain to unconcealment." (Heidegger 1963, 181) In Heidegger's own words, "Truth happens in Van Gogh's painting." (Heidegger 1963, 181) As I have said at the beginning of this part, I do not intend to entangle with the concept of truth that has been discussed in detail in Heidegger's text. However, I doubt whether Dickie would deny that Van Gogh's painting is a good work of art in his view even if the artist himself was not certified by a so-called "artworld" in his own time.

Van Gogh's painting has demonstrated the importance of creation in artifactuality. Now I shall turn to discuss its related part: appreciation. Artifactuality emerges from the artist's creation; however, it can only be preserved in appreciation. In this sense, the preserver, proposed by Heidegger, is the most appropriate name for people who appreciate the artwork. In my perceptional approach of defining a work of art, it weighs more than creation in deciding whether an artifact or object is a work of art. I will

[14] A Pair of Shoes, 1886 by Vincent Van Gogh. Collected in Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam.

explain how this modified definition of artifactuality can offer a reasonable answer to the difficulties raised above that cannot be solved by institutional theory.

4.4 Reply to The Problems Posed by Difficult Cases of Defining Art

Case#1: The driftwood (and the starry sky)

I have mentioned the case of driftwood when analyzing the institutional theory. The difficulty it faces is to decide the critical element that turns a piece of natural object into a work of art. In Dickie's view, it is the work—placing the driftwood on the wall in one's living room, done on the object that makes it a work of art by conferring it the status of art. However, it is insufficient to answer a more fundamental question: what is the reason why one may pick up a piece of driftwood and hang it on the wall at home? In my view, it is the similar question I raised in the third part: the photos of the starry universe, which were initially used for scientific research but can be works of art in an exhibition. This example indicates that the role of an institution like NASA is not the reason why an artifact or object can be seen as a work of art. However, the perceptional approach with a refreshing definition of artifactuality may explain this case better.

The artifactuality of both objects, driftwood and starry sky, is reflected in the strife, including creation and appreciation, which enables them to open up in the sense of being created by nature and bring up in the sense of being appreciated (preserved) by appreciators (preservers). This is the fundamental reason motivating one to pick up driftwood and see it as a work of art, similar to appreciating the starry universe's photos aesthetically rather than scientific materials. In addition, appreciation plays a more essential role based on the artifactuality they contain. A perceptional way of seeing those

artifacts or objects paves the way for the artifactuality to present, which is impossible to happen in the frame of the institutional approach.

Case#2: The statue of Buddha

Another problematic case of defining works of art is the religious artifacts. I mentioned the changing views of the status of Buddha, The Leshan Giant Buddha, to show how the issue of defining work of art in terms of the religious artifacts that were intentionally built for non-aesthetical reasons. I will borrow a similar case from Heidegger to demonstrate how my redefinition of artifactuality can offer a better candidate solution to this problem in the perceptional frame.

Heidegger discusses an example of a Greek temple to illustrate the relationship of the world and earth, in my redefinition the core of creation and appreciation, reflected by this building. (Heidegger 1963, 167-168) The most enlightening point he has made is relating its original purpose of worshiping the god to artifactuality as the essence of being an artwork. “By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct.” (Heidegger 1963, 167) As the presence of the god, once it was built, the temple opens a world of historical context for its visitors to appreciate it aesthetically even if they know nothing about the ancient Greek gods. The temple, or the temple-work in Heidegger’s view as a work of art, represents a “unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human beings.” (Heidegger 1963, 167) These are common topics shared among human societies and can be generally perceived by people from various cultural backgrounds.

Similarly, The Leshan Giant Buddha is a work of art for the same reason as our appreciation of the Greek temple. The original religious purpose has faded in time, but the artifactuality of these artifacts is preserved in aesthetic appreciation.

5. Conclusion

Though I have scrutinized the institutional theory and pointed out its problems, I have not claimed that the perceptional approach I proposed is a fully worked-out account of defining a work of art. This paper aims not to offer a perfect theory of defining art but instead to explore the possibility of understanding our aesthetic appreciation when engaging with various artifacts or objects. A lesson we can learn from my criticism of the institutional theory is that such a narrow vision of defining work of art and the emphasis of the art circle: artworld and artist do not seem to be a promising account. Instead, I attempt to explore a perceptional approach in defining a work of art. I have provided the reasons for constructing an account in the Wittgensteinian frame; however, I also want to leave it open for further discussion.

The fundamental topic this paper deals with is to find the key feature of artwork. What distinguishes an artwork from an artifact is of course difficult to capture. I consider the perceptional approach of defining work of art is on the right track because it provides a more plausible frame for interpreting art activity in general. Then, with the help of a refreshing definition of artifactuality, I shall offer a more plausible answer to the difficult cases that the institutional theory cannot respond to and, more importantly, confirm the validity of such a definition in my response.

It may appear to be the question of understanding one's aesthetic appreciation at first sight. However, the hidden and more essential question is to clarify the essence of artworks in art practice. Unlike the institutional view, which overlooks the role of the audience, an artwork, in my understanding, always needs an audience, an appreciator if it can "work." This is also the opinion that art is language in a sense, which Wittgenstein proposes, and I agree with. Therefore, in this paper, I would again emphasize that a proper understanding of art requires equal attention to both creation and appreciation.

An Evolutionary Account of Hume's Standard of Taste

Thesis: In this paper, I will argue that an evolutionary explanation of our aesthetic engagement with artworks is a plausible approach to understanding Hume's account of the standard of taste. Hume argues that there is a standard of taste that entitles one to an interpretation of artwork over any others. Based on this idea, Hume claims that some tastes are superior to others and offer "better" responses to artworks. However, there are disputes on Hume's principle of taste proposed by scholars[15] from opposite standpoints. These debates focus on an intractable puzzle in Hume's theory: the circularity in finding true, objective judges in the aesthetic evaluation of artworks and the rules of judging that derive from true judges, which seem to be subjective. Among the discussions of this puzzle, I will examine three representative interpretations of Hume's standard: 1) the rules of art view by Peter Jones (Jones, 1976); 2) the joint verdict view by Peter Kivy (Kivy, 1975); 3) a reconciling view that combines 1) and 2) by Jeffrey Wieand (Wieand, 1984). By reviewing the three interpretations of Hume's view on the standard of taste, I argue that none of them can eliminate the circularity in Hume's account. In my reading of Hume's aesthetic account, his view lacks a cogent account of the possibility of aesthetic appreciation, which is a fundamental issue hidden in the circularity issue. Therefore, I will propose an evolutionary account based on Stephen Davies' view, which argues that we, as a species, are "programmed" to respond to art by appreciating it. Finally, by shifting the focus from recognizing true judges to proper appreciators, I argue that this

[15] I will mention some of them in this paper including Peter Kivy, Peter Jones, and Jeffrey Wieand. Besides them, Mary Motherstill, Noel Carroll and others have also contributed to this discussion.

evolutionary account can better guide us in understanding aesthetic experience compared to Hume's original discourse on finding a standard of taste.

1. Hume's Standard of Taste

Seeking a standard of beauty and taste, especially for distinguishing people's diverse tastes or preferences in aesthetic experience, has been a long-standing topic in the history of aesthetics, especially in 18th Century Britain. Among the British philosophers who have actively engaged in this discussion[16], Hume provides enlightening ideas on the discourse of aesthetic experience based on an empirical standpoint against the skeptical views that aesthetic responses are impossible to judge or clarify. To better understand Hume's account of taste, I will look back on the historical context that indicates the origin of Hume's view on aesthetics.

1.1 Historical background: From Hutcheson to Hume

In the early writings of David Hume (T, 460), he briefly mentions that beauty is the quality (or property) of the objects when one claims that something is beautiful. However, in his later work, he turns to an empiricist approach that interprets one's aesthetic responses as the sentiments stimulated by objects (OT, 224). Such a view, shifting from the focus on objective properties to subjective sentiments, indicates that Hume was influenced by the work of Francis Hutcheson, who offered a groundbreaking theory of taste at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Hutcheson claims that beauty is perceived in different objects and can be interpreted as a subjective experience based on one's senses. He further distinguishes two

[16] For the in-depth discussion on the topic of beauty and taste, see Lord Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, and Edmund Burke.

kinds of senses: external senses and an internal sense of taste; the latter is relevant to the aesthetic experience in Hutcheson's view. Such an idea of division influences Hume when clarifying the conditions of a standard of taste. He points out two kinds of obstacles to finding an objective standard: external and internal obstacles that prevent one from becoming a true judge in aesthetic experience. Furthermore, Hume agrees with Hutcheson's ideas of pleasure and beauty in aesthetic experience, which become the foundation of Hume's account of aesthetic judgment.

According to Hume, the true judge is the one who can find and apply the true standard of taste. A true judge is an ideal person who has the proper ability to be responsive to artworks. Hume seems to have been inspired by Hutcheson's view. As mentioned above, Hutcheson distinguishes two kinds of sense and interprets aesthetic experience in terms of the internal sense. Thus, upon encountering certain 'artistic' objects, we perceive the compounding ideas by feeling the way they affect us aesthetically. For example, one may see colors perfectly or hear sounds perfectly; however, this does not necessarily entail that that person is good at appreciating a piece of painting or a song. More importantly, Hutcheson claims that recognizing colors and sounds by our ordinary senses does not generate the necessary pleasure in the mind. Only the power to perceive the composition of colors or sounds enables one to perceive pleasure when engaging in an artwork. Following this distinction, Hutcheson defines taste as the "greater capacity of receiving such pleasant ideas we commonly call a fine genius or taste." (Hutcheson, 1738) Hume accepts this definition of taste and develops his idea of the standard based on it.

1.2 Hume's Subjective Account of Taste

1.2.1 Aesthetic Response: Sentiment vs. Taste

Hume starts with observations of the operation of the human faculties of the mind in responding to artworks to indicate that sentiments themselves are what the aesthetic judgment is all about. Hume believes that beauty is the feeling one has when one's taste is stimulated in the right way by an object that makes one state that the object is beautiful. Accordingly, the taste is the product that derives from human psychology with the operation of sense organs and "borrowed from internal sentiments" (EPM, 294). Such an internal sentiment "constitutes our praise or admiration" (T, 471), which indicates that "all sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it." (SOT, 230) Hume does not see any factual correspondence between what one is feeling— the aesthetic response— and the actual qualities of the object that make one feel in a certain way. In other words, one's taste does not seem to have a standard anchored in the external world. Because "no sentiment represents what is really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind, and if that conformity did not exist, the sentiment could never possibly have been." (SOT, 230)

However, the potential issue, setting a standard of one's taste consisting of sentiment has appeared in Hume's definition of taste above, resulting in an insurmountable problem with his way of characterizing the standard of taste. Hume briefly mentioned that "the sentiments of men often differ with regard to beauty and deformity of all kinds, even while their general discourse is the same." (SOT, 227) He does not distinguish the concepts of sentiment and taste in terms of one's aesthetic response regarding the mechanism of aesthetic experience. But when describing the

standard of taste, he regards taste as the judgment of an artwork that reflects one's ability of perception; in contrast, sentiment is neutral in the sense of describing one's aesthetic response to either an artwork or an object as long as it generates pleasure or even other feelings[17] in mind. This ambiguity in mixing the two concepts is one of the main reasons Hume's account of the standard of taste is circular.

1.2.2 The Puzzle in the Standard of Taste

Another point of unclarity with Hume's account is how to interpret the nature of the standard of taste. Given the diversity of tastes, either within or across cultures, people may respond to the same artwork differently even though they may have the consensus on some sentiments that are praised in the aesthetic experience, like the feelings of harmony or elegance. However, the need for a standard of taste lies in the disagreement in the further query of artworks: how to decide which ones are more harmonious or elegant than others in terms of taste? For example, even though poem lovers agree that romance is good when reading a poem written by a romantic poet, they may still disagree about whether Lord Byron or John Keats's work is more romantic.

Unlike a sentiment, which can be neither true nor false as all sentiments are self-contained and purely subjective, taste as the judgment of artworks, can be labeled as good or bad if we can find a reliable standard. Hume writes that "it is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste" (SOT, 229) based on his observation of the widespread disagreement in aesthetic responses. He is also optimistic about the possibility of finding such a standard: "The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature: Where men vary in their judgments, some defect or perversion in the faculties may commonly be

[17] Hume has discussed other feelings like sadness or horrors in aesthetic experience in the article "On Tragedy".

remarked; proceeding either from prejudice, from want of practice, or want of delicacy; and there is just reason for approving one taste, and condemning another." (SOT, 243) However, I hold my reservation of the uniformity and "just reason" Hume claimed when establishing a standard of taste. I will discuss the problem of such an understanding of human nature in aesthetic experience later in this paper. Now I will examine Hume's expression of the standard to clarify the puzzle in the following part.

Hume defines the standard of taste as "a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another." (SOT, 229) The divergence appears in his definition where he leaves it for open discussion of the nature of the standard to be either "a rule" or "a decision" regarding sentiments in aesthetic experience. Counter evidence can be found in his own thoughts that support both interpretations. The rule view focuses on rationalizing the sentiments in correspondence with the objects or artworks. From the perspective of utility, Hume claims that "a fine house is beautiful primarily because of the convenience of the apartments, the advantages of their situation, and the little room lost in the stairs, anti-chambers and passages" (T 2.2.5.16). He further argues that "Utility can even make an artifact more beautiful than geometrical regularity would. A ship with a useful shape is more beautiful than one with a more regular but less useful shape" (EPM 5.1).

In contrast, Hume also confirms another way to interpret the standard of taste known as the verdict view when introducing the concept of "true judge" (OST, 241). He claims that the "joint verdict, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty" (OST, 241). The validity of a joint verdict lies in the "true judges/critics" who are free from external obstructions. However, the principal Hume proposes

recognizing those people as "true judges/critics" relies on examining their qualities in responding to artworks. As a result, such an interpretation invokes the aforementioned issue with Hume's account of taste: the circularity of the account that lies in the validity of an objective standard of taste rooted in subjective sentiments.

When connecting the dots, a puzzle inevitably appears in the form of circularity that weakens the soundness of Hume's standard. According to Hume, we can only confirm objects or artworks to be beautiful, or at least more beautiful than others, with the guidance of true critics. Then the task for us is to find the true critics. However, the symbol of a true critic is that she can recognize beautiful objects. Therefore, Hume's attempt to set up a solid standard of taste fails because of the circularity in his argument. The disputes on the puzzle are relevant to the inconsistency in his expression of the standard I have mentioned above. I will scrutinize three representative approaches to interpreting Hume's standard from different perspectives and see if any of them can successfully break the circle.

2. Three Approaches in Interpreting Hume's Standard of Taste

In this section, I will examine three possible ways of interpreting Hume's account of the standard of taste. Although they vary in analyzing the nature of the standard, they all intend to solve the circularity puzzle I have raised to defend Hume's view.

I will argue that none of these interpretations manages to save Hume's account from the vicious circularity pointed out above. The first approach, which Peter Jones (Jones, 2009) and Stuart Brown (Brown, 1938) proposed, claims that the essence of the standard consists of *rules*. By contrast, the second approach proposed by Peter Kivy

(Kivy, 1967) and Ted Cohen (Cohen, 1979) claims that the standard of taste is the *joint verdict* of "true judges" (as Hume calls it). The third approach, which combines the first two views above, proposed by Jeffrey Wieand (Wieand, 1984), interprets the standard from two aspects containing both the rule and the verdict with different roles that, Wieand argues, help the standard operate in practice.

2.1 Approach 1: The Rule Interpretation

According to Jones and Brown, an independent standard of taste consists of rationally justifiable rules, which is the fundamental condition for aesthetic appreciation as a proper response to an artwork. We, spectators, can specify particular rules that constitute the standard of taste that can be used to check whether the response is correct. The correctness lies in the appreciation once it meets the standard. Reason enables us to find such rules based on observing the correspondence of one's response to an artwork.

Jones makes three claims to argue for his rule interpretation of the standard of taste as follows:

1. It is empirically grounded.

2. It is rationally justifiable.

3. The essence of it is public behavior and culture-relative.[18]

I will explain why this approach is implausible by evaluating each of Jones's claims.

Hume defines the standard of taste as "Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to

18 In Jones's view, the essence of the standard of taste varies from culture to culture.

be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty" (OST, 241). According to Hume's definition, the standard of taste is a synthesis that originates from one's sentiments and can be refined by practice. The original sense, which arises from one's faculty as sensing the properties of an object, is empirical (EPM, 5.1). Thus, the standard of taste applied in judging the perception of an artwork is also empirically grounded. He states that "the justification of such a standard lay in its utility, and implied that the standard had been empirically established and was revisable" (EPM, 5.1). Jones clarifies Hume's view based on his interpretation of the standard, which shows that he is aware of the nature of the aesthetic response Hume proposes. One is supposed to refine her taste, the aesthetic response, by practice, comparison, and the clearance of prejudice. However, it is unclear to see how the empirical grounded standard can be rationally justified in Hume's account. Jones admits the empirical ground of the standard of taste, but he does not see this as the essence of the standard rather than its rational justifiable characteristics.

Thus, in his next move, Jones explains the rational justification of the standard as the essential condition for Hume's account of aesthetic response. First, Hume claims that "it is requisite to employ much reasoning to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species" (EPM, 15). Hume confirms the crucial role of reason in creating proper aesthetic responses as "the proper sentiment." Such an important role can be found in his discussion of moral beauty; an idea that claims that virtue is a kind of beauty and deformity. In Hume's view, moral beauty is a secondary quality of agents, just like artistic beauty is a secondary quality of compositions. Jones seems to overstate the function of reason in Hume's discussion of

the isomorphism of morality and beauty and ignores other critical steps like practice and comparison in defining the standard of taste. Besides, it is questionable whether reasoning plays a decisive role in feeling the proper sentiment. Hume emphasizes the importance of reasoning in cultivating one's taste, especially for a good critic. Applying reason in practice and comparison is essential to achieve a "proper discernment of the object" (SOT, 237). Depending on the differences in the discernment of an artwork, Hume claims that not everyone is equally good at responding to artworks. The good critics among us can be recognized by those whose sentiments are better refined with the help of reason. However, he also acknowledges the limitation of reason's role because "no criticism can be instructive which descends not to particulars and is not full of examples and illustrations" (SAR, 194). Jones does not sufficiently illustrate how reason can help cultivate one's taste, nor does he show that the standard of taste is rationally justifiable. Second, Jones takes an example from artistic creation to demonstrate the role of reasoning. For a writer, Hume states, "it is requisite that (he) has some plan or object… there must appear some aim or intention in his first setting out, if not in the composition of the whole work" (EHU, 33). It is reasonable to infer from the example of the writer that the reasoning (or intelligibility) of an artist's performances rests on her purpose and intention. However, it is not crucial to the aesthetic appreciation of a spectator, even though she is undoubtedly related to the artist via the artwork. In his works, Hume does not guide us to a precise clarification of the causal connection of the behaviors between an artist and a spectator that can achieve a proper response to an artwork. Thus, I argue that Jones failed to provide a solid argument for the second claim essential to support his view on the standard of taste being rationally justifiable.

The third claim, which should have been the final chance for Jones to support his argument, is overlooked in his interpretation of Hume's view. Even though Jones has correctly noticed that Hume is reluctant to insist on the possibility of public behavior as a criterion of taste, he does not explain why Hume is reluctant to claim so but still places the general behavior and culture-relativity in a critical position. Moreover, it is hard to find the discussion of the culture-relativity in Jones's interpretation of the essence of the standard of taste. Therefore, it is hard to understand how exactly the standard of taste is rationally justified in terms of the rules found in public behavior and cultures, even on the assumption that Jones's interpretation that the standard consists of rules is correct.

Given these reasons, the first approach, which sets the fundamental condition for a proper aesthetic response as rationally justifiable, should be rejected.

2.2 Approach 2: The Verdict Interpretation

Kivy (1967) and Cohen (1979) emphasize that the nature of the standard of taste is constituted by a decision in the sense of the joint verdict of "true judges."[19] I partly accept this interpretation because their arguments help validate aesthetic appreciation in the aesthetic experience, which Jones and even Hume himself ignored. However, several issues prevent it from offering a satisfactory solution to Hume's puzzle.

Kivy starts his account with an argument meant to distinguish two kinds of judgments (Kivy 1967, 59):

P1: If I make an empirical judgment, it is judged true or false based on whether what I assert is or is not the case.

19 Hume uses the two terms "judges" and "critics" in the same sense in his works, which both refer to the people who have good sense according to his standard.

P2: Therefore, this kind of judgment is the factual judgment that is the province of reason.

P3: If I make an aesthetic judgment (appreciations), it does not merely "run over" the object of thought "as they are supposed to stand in reality" without adding anything to them.

P4: In aesthetic judgments, a spectator does add something, one's feelings or so, to the objects she perceives.

Therefore, we lack the pure objectivity of factual judgments in aesthetic judgments.

I agree with Kivy on his understanding of the aesthetic appreciation that requires a fundamentally different standard from the one we apply in factual judgments. The latter refers to the correspondence between one's perception and the object, whose accuracy or objective standards can be examined for correctness. In factual judgments, Kivy points out, the "standard of reason consists in correspondence to the facts of the case" (Kivy 1967, 59). In aesthetic judgments, by contrast, we lack these kinds of external standards. More importantly, Kivy says that the taste, our feelings engendered by an artwork, varies with our subjective states: "nor can the same object, presented to a mind totally different, produce the same sentiment" (Kivy 1967, 59). The critical factor differentiating an aesthetic judgment from a factual one is the lack of such correspondence. Compared to Jones's view that reasoning plays a crucial role in aesthetic judgments, Kivy recognizes the complexity of the interaction between the spectator and the artwork in aesthetic judgment. Accordingly, a more deliberated account is necessary to sufficiently elaborate on the various elements that the standard of taste consists of. Jones's account is not

implausible for this reason as it only focuses on reason as the single element in explaining the essence of the standard of taste.

According to Kivy, Hume's view is that a good critic has five qualities or characteristics[20] that enable them to offer reliable judgments of artworks. Kivy points out that focusing on three of them, which are delicacy, lack of prejudice, and good sense, can help us break the circle for the following reasons:

1. These qualities are not limited to critics alone.

2. These qualities are requisite not only for aesthetic judgment but also for other activities.

3. These qualities are identifiable by marks other than the critic's approval of good art.

First, the delicacy of taste, related to a broader reading of Hume's work[21], is identified by a delicacy of passion that is not limited to the realm of aesthetic appreciation. One can possess a delicacy of taste not based on their critical judgments but their general emotional reactions to non-aesthetic situations. Identifying the delicacy of taste, the definition of good art (proper aesthetic appreciation) is approved by a quality not rooted in aesthetics, but a quality found in a broader range of perceptions.

Second, lack of prejudice, a quality that belongs to a good critic in Hume's view, is not unique to aesthetics. Lack of prejudice, being free from bias, in other words, is understood as follows: "considering myself as a man in general, [I must] forget, if

20 Hume distinguishes five qualities as practice, use of comparisons, delicacy, lack of prejudice, and good sense to be the necessary condition of a good critic.

21 Hume, Davide, Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion

possible, my individual being, and my peculiar circumstances."[22] This is an essential view of Hume's moral philosophy[23], and it is at play in his taste theory, as well.

Third, the quality of good sense is more difficult to evaluate in Kivy's account than the other two qualities above. I can barely accept his purely empirical observation as the reason to support the view that good sense is found beyond the area of aesthetics. He simply claims that "fools seldom make good critics, and clever people usually do—nor need we make any reference to critical ability in separating the two."[24] My understanding of the quality of the good sense as a quality of a proper aesthetic appreciation falls into a similar circle like Hume's account of taste faces. Therefore, it fails to lead us out of the circle like the other two qualities above.

I partly accept Kivy's approach, which at least points out a plausible direction to take to attempt to break the circle. However, it is unsatisfactory in reconciling all the contradictions in understanding the essence of aesthetic appreciation based on one's faculty in perceiving artworks. The sentiments of a perceiver are stimulated by artworks and enable them to perceive the artwork's aesthetic value.

2.3 Approach 3: The Reconciling Interpretation

Since neither Jones's nor Kivy's approach can solve the puzzle in Hume's account of taste, I will turn to the third interpretation mentioned above, which attempts to reconcile the two previous approaches and shows that the operation of the standard of taste relies on both of them. Although Wieand holds such a reconciling view regarding the standard

22 Hume, Davide, The Standard of Taste.

23 Hume, Davide, Treatise.

24 Kivy, Peter, Hume's Standard of Taste: Breaking the Circle.

of taste, he inclines to the rule approach when discussing the true judges as the crucial role in Hume's account, in his view.

On the one hand, Wieand confirms the importance of true judges in providing judgments of artworks; on the other hand, he rejects the claim held by Kivy that verdicts function in the same way as the rules regarding aesthetic judgments. In other words, Wieand sees the rules as the primary principle when interpreting Hume's standard, and the verdict plays a supplementary role in assisting the rule in the second place. He claims so by pointing out two problems in the verdict as follows:

1) The rules can only specify what true judges *would* say under certain circumstances, but not what they *actually* say when offering aesthetic judgments.

2) The *actual* verdicts given by the true judges cannot count as the general standard as Hume supposed.

Wieand challenges the verdict view by distinguishing the factual and ideal judgments given by the true judges in different circumstances. He worries about the potential elements that may interfere with the true judges' judgments, including external hindrances and internal disorders (Wieand 1984, 139). I stand with him on this point that reveals an essential fact that even true judges are human beings who perceive artworks or objects with their faculties, as Hume proposes; more importantly, they may be influenced by external factors that can impact their judgments. Although Hume has emphasized that true judges have trained themselves over long periods, it does not mean that they will never offer flawed judgments on some occasions. If we cannot dispel such potential risks in the verdicts approach, it cannot function properly as the standard of taste even though it comes from true judges. An enlightening point of Wieand's view is that he pushes us to

"think of the true judges as real people having certain qualities (the five characteristics)," therefore, "we must admit that they may fail to judge correctly" (Wieand 1984, 140). We may find the right direction to break the circle in Hume's account by admitting so.

Wieand introduces his reconciling view by proposing that the true judges function in two ways that combine the rule and verdict views in the same picture.

First, the true judges function "as a kind of court of appeal" (Wieand 1984, 141). In line with Hume's view, this refers to the decisive opinion regarding disputes on tastes. For example, A and B may disagree about whether an artwork C is beautiful. Their disagreement may come from two origins: 1) both A and B agree that *F* is something that makes C beautiful, but they disagree about whether *F* can be perceived in C based on their own aesthetic experience; 2) A and B disagree about whether it is the *F-ness* they have perceived in C that makes C beautiful. Wieand points out the differences between these two cases. In the first case, A and B have a consensus on the content of the rule but disagree about its application; in the second case, A and B disagree about the rule in the first place. In the first case, A and B will appeal to the true judges for their verdict to decide who is right about C. In this sense, the verdict view has a say in the aesthetic judgments but does not play the same role Kivy thought. Because the rule is set in this case, the true judges are just a group of people who are better at applying the rule in making judgments of artworks.

Then, the true judges take more responsibility for solving the disagreement regarding the second case. But Wieand limits their responsibility within the scope of helping "in determining what the rules are" (Wieand 1984, 141) instead of making the rules all by themselves as Hume proposed. I agree with his prudence in clarifying the

boundary of the true judges' function. But his view is still problematic for the following reasons: 1) Hume does not clearly state anything about formulating artistic rules regarding aesthetic judgments in his work. Wieand's reading (Wieand 1984, 142) on Hume presupposes that he may have similar thoughts in mind. According to my understanding of Hume's account, he focuses on applying the standard rather than the previous task of confirming the consensus among people when engaging in artworks; 2) It is difficult to see how true judges can help determine the rules in the second case. More importantly, this goes back to Hume's circularity puzzle: true judges are the ones who have a say in setting up the standard, as well as the ones to who we appeal to when we disagree about an artwork. Therefore, the reconciling approach fails to break the circle, just like the previous two approaches.

None of these approaches gives enough attention to an essential issue: the necessary distinction between aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgment when dealing with the disputes people have as responses to artworks. In my view, it is essential to distinguish appreciation and judgment, which are often confounded, since both of them are relevant to the aesthetic response. In my understanding, aesthetic judgment is an evaluative term used to clarify post-appreciation responses. In contrast, aesthetic appreciation is a descriptive term that associates with the ongoing status when one engaging artworks. Hume does not clearly define these two terms in his work, and neither do the scholars who try to solve the issue of circularity in his account. However, in my view, it is essential to tease them apart, if we seek a standard that can help us to deal with disputes about the aesthetic qualities of artworks.

Therefore, I will propose a new approach to interpreting Hume's standard based on aesthetic appreciation instead of judgment. By doing so, I intend to show that, in aesthetic experience, an eligible appreciator does not need to be a true judge in Hume's sense to engage with artworks properly.

3. A New Approach in Interpreting Hume's Standard

As I have mentioned above, my approach is based on the central role of aesthetic appreciation. To ensure that the foundation of the new approach is sound, I will offer an account focusing on the possibility of aesthetic appreciation for human beings as a species. Hume has briefly mentioned in his work that it is the internal mechanism that our faculty (sense organs) operate when engaging in artworks (SOT, 236). A question that lies in his oversimplified account of human psychology is how our faculties in common with other creatures, like dogs or cats, do not develop into the ability to appreciate objects or artworks. Specifically, Hume's faculty-center view on appreciation cannot distinguish it from a common response to an object that other creatures can have with similar faculty. Nick Zangwill (Zangwill, 1994) mentioned the need for an evolutionary account in interpreting Hume's account; however, he also pointed out the difficulty of finding such an evolutionary account because "an evolutionary explanation of our aesthetic life seems hard to come by because it is not obviously adaptive" (Zangwill 1994, 12). I find Stephen Davies's theory (Davies, 2012), which is based on evolutionary theory, to be able to help us see how aesthetic appreciation (as part of human artistic behaviors)[25] is rooted in our

25 Though Davies has discussed artistic creation in his work, I will not touch this area in this paper.

evolved human nature; in other words, how we are "programmed" to appreciate artworks in evolution.

Davies explores the idea that our aesthetic experience is connected to the way human nature has evolved. He analyzes three possible positions concerning the connection between art behaviors and evolution as follows:

Position#1: Aesthetic response is an evolutionary adaptation.

Position#2: Aesthetic response is the spandrel of evolution.

Position#3: Aesthetic response is a culturally (and socially) acquired technology.

The first two positions gain the most attention in Davies' discussion because they represent two main streams in evolutionary research that regard the aesthetic response differently in the process of evolution. So I will focus on these two, based on Davies' examination, and, because of some critical issues with both of them, I will argue that a third path, which Davies proposed to be a middle position, is the most plausible one in understanding the essence of aesthetic appreciation and recognizing proper appreciators.

3.1 Position#1: Aesthetic response is an evolutionary adaptation.

The first path claims that particular art forms involve evolutionarily adaptive behaviors that are distinctive (Davies 2012, 158). Ellen Dissanayake (Dissanayake, 2001), Denis Dutton (Dutton, 2009), and Brian Boyd (Boyd, 2008), who are the proponents of this path, agree on the primary claim but diverge on the particular issues in their interpretations[26]. Davies treats them differently based on their views, and he pays most attention to Boyd as he regards Boyd's view as the most convincing one compared to the others.

26 I will explain their interpretations in detail in the paper.

Dissanayake stands closest to anthropology and ethology when proposing her views on artistic behavior. She claims that art phenomena and behaviors involve the "making special" of human objects and events (Dissanayake, 2001). The behavior of "making special" has been central to human evolution. In such behaviors, humans' psychological resources are part of the essential psychological toolkit with which all humans are equipped. According to Dissanayake, the universality of art behaviors lies in identifying us as a unique species in the process of adaption. However, a critical question to Dissanayake's account is that, as a general theory, it cannot explain why artistic behavior functions uniquely in human evolution that not shared by non-artistic practices. In Dissanayake's account, art has adaptive value in "making special" in human evolution; however, such adaptive value is not exclusive to artistic behaviors. In addition, such an adaptive value is also shared by non-artistic behaviors like communication. Dissanayake's theory does not provide a satisfying answer to the question of the uniqueness of art in human evolution because it only explains how art makes us special compared to other creatures, but is unable to distinguish the role of artistic behaviors from non-artistic behaviors when functioning in adaption.

Dutton, from a different perspective, whose view focuses on the function of art behavior in production, claims that an "art instinct" is an adaptation advantageous to attracting mates (Dutton, 2009). Such an instinct has evolved in us, and our artistic behaviors can be traced to evolutionary adaptations made by *Homo Sapiens* during the Pleistocene. Similar to my doubt about Dissanayake's theory, Dutton's account is too narrow to explain the widespread engagement with artwork irrelevant to production. Dutton claims that artistic behaviors mainly function in the way to improve sexual

attraction in evolution. He takes literature as an example to show that "a large vocabulary is a reliable sign of intelligence and that the skillful use of language offers many opportunities for displaying wit, erudition, originality and playfulness" (Davies 2012, 165). It is true that literature, even not for all works, can demonstrate one's attraction. But it is not the only goal of literature as a form of art, regardless of other art forms like music and paintings. Dutton's view is reasonable to explain many specific cases of origin of art; however, it is insufficient to explain artistic behavior in a broader scope when considering human beings as a species beyond the single aim of production.

Boyd claims that artistic behaviors are an evolutionary adaptation geared towards stimulating creativity and open-ended thinking in humans. Davies considers this the most convincing view regarding the adaptation position on artistic behavior. It is a relatively moderate view that tries to avoid the problem of universality, which the two views above do not do enough to justify. Although Davies admits that artistic behaviors are not incidental and are rooted in evolution, he rejects this path because it is a hypothesis without solid evidence or arguments. He argues against the first position, which fails to solve the problem of universality. Even if the propensity to engage in artistic behaviors is an inherited trait, universality does not prove that a trait is an evolutionary adaptation. Furthermore, the problem multiplies when we ask whether the capacity for aesthetic response consists of a single trait or several. I agree with Davies on his criticism of the evolutionary adaptation position and will turn to the second position to see if it fares any better in explaining why we are engaging with artworks in the way we are.

3.2 Position#2: Aesthetic response is the spandrel (by-product) of evolution

To start with the detailed discussion of this position, I shall first explain the term "spandrel." This term, introduced by the evolutionary biologists Stephen Jay Gould (Gould, 2002) and Richard Lewontin (Lewontin, 1979), refers to the evolutionary by-products with no functional significance of their means as a by-product of a particular process or object[27]. To give an example from human evolution: the armpit is a spandrel, formed inevitably where a movable limb joins the trunk. We can attach no evolutionary significance to armpits; their value as adaptations is null.

For the second position, Stephen Pinker (Pinker, 2003) claims that art and artistic behaviors are spandrels of evolutionary adaptations and are not themselves adaptations. He considers this position a more moderate one than the first, which rests on the inadequate ground. Pinker attempts to set the spandrel view on solid ground with empirical evidence based on experimental psychology and cognitive science. He targets music by questioning its role, as the adaptationists argue, in conferring "no survival advantage" (Pinker 2003, 534). He takes music to be (an) "auditory cheesecake, an exquisite confection crafted to tickle the sensitive spots of at least six of our mental faculties." Therefore, music as "a standard piece tickles them all at once, but we can see the ingredients in various kinds of not-quite-music that leave one or more of them out" (Pinker 2003, 534). Based on this, Pinker generalizes his view to other forms of art to claim that they are all spandrel (by-product) of evolutionary adaption from the cognitive neuroscientific perspective.

Davies rejects the spandrel view, focusing on criticizing Pinker's account, for two main reasons: 1) the way artistic behavior triggers one's sensations is doubtfully the same

27 The term is borrowed from architecture, which originally illustrates the tapering triangular spaces formed by the intersection of two rounded arches at right angles.

as ordinary behaviors like eating and exercising; 2) Pinker's criticism of music as lacking informational content is unsatisfactory (Davies 2012, 140). For the first reason, Davies argues that artistic behaviors have their own "cognitive value" in the way of allowing one to "explore various scenarios…. via imaginative engagement" (Davies 2012, 140). And such value cannot be carried out by ordinary behaviors like eating and physical exercise. For the second reason, Davies raises counterexamples of language, which Pinker takes to be an informational content carrier, that lacks informational content like "small talk, chatter, and genuinely idle gossip" (Davies 2012, 141).

In addition, Davies is unsatisfied with the evidence provided by cognitive neuroscience and argues that the evidence should fit the following conditions to sufficiently support the view.

(1) Art originates naturally in the progress of human evolution, like the spandrel comes up when the structure of the building is done.

(2) To consider that art has an independent role in human life, either for individuals or in general for human beings, requires showing that there are art-specific neural circuits in one's brain that support certain appropriate artistic behaviors (Davies 2012, 137).

Therefore, Davies rejects the second position that generalizes the forms to the norms in interpreting art behavior as spandrels in evolution. Being spandrels, a form of adaptation, requires further justification in the application as norms in understanding artistic behaviors relevant to evolution.

3.3 Position#3: Aesthetic response is the signal of fitness

After giving the details of the two positions above and criticizing them for falling short to explain the aesthetic response, Davies proposes a middle path in which artistic behaviors and dispositions became universal because of the comparative advantages they conferred to groups of people. By claiming so, he accepts the plausible part from the adaptation view that whatever qualifications may be made, artistic behavior is in some way associated with our biological evolution. However, the difficulty of universality that the above positions encounter does not arise for this view. According to Davies, the middle path reflects the diversity and flexibility of artistic behaviors, which the other two positions cannot do, in the following ways:

1. The higher level of artistic behavior signals a higher fitness.

2. The lower level of artistic behavior signals less fit on account of their comparative ineptitude.

3. Artistic behaviors are also the drives that indicate our differences and our shared commonalities.

We can apply these ideas to solve the circularity noticed in Hume's view by separating the standard of taste into two parts: first, it indicates one's fitness in terms of one's sensory faculties when engaging in artworks; second, a further reflection of one's judgment of artworks that can be refined by the practices Hume has suggested. The circle was engendered by the requirement that we are both in need of recognizing proper aesthetic appreciators by providing the validity of aesthetic appreciation for human beings and finding true judges among various perceivers. According to Davies, we are "programmed" to develop artistic behavior in the evolution process, both for creation and appreciation. Such a "programmed" view of the aesthetic experience, especially for

aesthetic appreciation, paves the way for us to discuss the necessary conditions of the qualified states of aesthetic appreciation by focusing on the appreciator's own response without worrying about finding a proper judge in the first place. Although Davies does not propose his theory to solve the puzzle I identified in Hume's theory, the "programmed" view, in my understanding, can offer a refreshing perspective to understand Hume's standard in a broader realm.

The fact that we, human beings, are programmed for artistic behaviors, answers a fundamental question hidden in Hume's standard inquiry that does not receive enough attention: why is it *natural* for us to seek a standard of taste? Hume does not regard it as a question and departs on the journey of finding such a standard immediately in his essay. However, the programmed view holds us back from reflecting on this essential question and indicates a promising way to answer it. Davies claims that "aesthetics and art behaviors are aspects of our evolved human nature" (Davies 2012, 46); accordingly, the act of finding a standard of taste that can apply to judge one's artistic behavior is a natural tendency that emerged along with human evolution. Furthermore, the programmed account also explains the diversity of artistic behaviors when examining its development after emerging spontaneously. Like other human behaviors of languages, artistic behaviors are developed along with human evolution "across historical and cultural boundaries." Therefore, forms of artistic behaviors, especially art creations, are both temporally and culturally different. Besides the common ground that the programmed view sets for us to understand the artistic behaviors, it helps us understand the differences in aesthetic appreciation, which is the critical issue Hume tries to resolve

in his work. The programmed account, on the one hand, shares the common sense with Hume as he proposes that different sentiments excited by the same objects are all correct.

On the other hand, it explains the fact that some perceivers are "better" equipped to appreciate artworks than others. Davies explains that aesthetic appreciation as a form of artistic behavior signals the level of fitness when people react differently to the same piece of artwork. Despite the content of their responses, the status of engagement can reflect their operation of faculty, which is a sign of a higher or lower level of fitness. This view remains the idea from Hume's original view on sentiments, which are purely subjective and cannot be wrong in any sense. In addition, it suggests a new direction to explore the issue of finding an objective standard of taste. The aesthetic responses as sentiments can be interpreted in the way of evolved human nature that every perceiver commonly shares. Based on this, the standard for judging this kind of aesthetic experience should be limited in examining faculty operation. For example, someone is good at telling the subtle differences among colors when looking at a painting. It does not entail that she is, therefore, better at aesthetically appreciating the painting, nor does it reflect her good taste by Hume's definition. To examine one's aesthetic appreciation requires further inquiry into the specific status when one is engaging in an artwork, which relates to Hume's discussion of taste. An appreciator's ability to engage in an artwork originally derives from her faculty operation; however, in the sense of taste, it is profoundly shaped by the social and cultural environment. Though both Davies and Hume have briefly mentioned these elements, they do not thoroughly discuss them in their works. I take it to be the following necessary step to solve Hume's puzzle of taste.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I start with a common issue in Hume's account of taste, a puzzle of circularity that lies in the relationship between various subjective sentiments and an objective standard. Instead of participating in the debate of whether we can find such a standard of taste in Hume's theory, I am interested in a more fundamental issue hidden in Hume's puzzle: how is aesthetic appreciation possible for us as human beings? Hume constructs his theory based on a fundamental claim that aesthetic appreciation consists of the sentiments generated by the human faculty. However, he rushes to the next task to find a proper standard in recognizing good taste. I attempt to pull back from his discussion to a more practical and fundamental question of the possibility of aesthetic appreciation, which is the precondition for Hume's whole discussion on recognizing true judges.

I propose that, with the help of Davies's theory, we, human beings, are "programmed" to appreciate artworks or any objects in evolutionary progress aesthetically. Although our faculty (sense organs) functions similarly to other creatures, aesthetic appreciation is unique for human beings. The uniqueness of aesthetic appreciation requires us to further distinguish various states in the process of one's engagement with artworks[28]. Therefore, the standard, which Hume tries to find, is not the one that lacks validity when evaluating various sentiments, but a principle that will be applied under certain circumstances and appropriate psychological states with the function of one's faculty. Once we recognize the complexity of aesthetic appreciation, we

[28] I will discuss this topic in another paper on Distance Theory in aesthetic appreciation.

will not rush to call someone a true judge before we can ensure that she is a qualified appreciator in the first place.

Step Away to Lean in?

—How Distance Theory Helps Us Appreciate Artwork

Thesis: What do you *see* in an artwork? One can immediately answer this question by describing the surface objective properties, like the colors, structure, and light in a painting, for instance. But a more complex question follows: how are we to explain the feelings engendered by an artwork? This question is still not settled, despite the long-lasting debate concerning the state of appreciation (experience of a perceiver) when engaging with an artwork. The answers are open to discussion.

In this paper, I will revisit the Distance theory initially proposed by Edward Bullough in 1912 in order to argue that it is a plausible account that can help us better understand aesthetic appreciation. Distance theory sets up a principle—*being psychologically distanced*— as a plausible desideratum that, when met, enables appreciators to engage with artworks properly. In what follows, I first reconstruct Distance theory based on Bullough's original ideas. Then, I respond to one of his most famous critics— George Dickie (1964), by clarifying some key elements that Dickie has misunderstood. Finally, I apply the principle raised in the Distance theory to different art forms to show that it can work in a broader sense of art.

1. Revisiting Bullough's Distance Theory

Setting aside the debate on interpretations of one's feelings about artwork, based on the past research on aesthetics and art history, we have, at least, reached a consensus that the connection between artworks and perceivers is called aesthetic appreciation. It is a state

of consciousness distinctive from other kinds of consciousness, which is particularly associated with artworks. For aesthetic appreciation, an audience engages with an artwork, either for visual art like paintings or plays in theatres, in a particular way of perceiving combined with her understanding of the artwork. Such consciousness is different from other kinds of consciousness, like paying attention to others' words in a conversation or simply being conscious of one's current mental state, like being happy or sorrowful. To clarify the nature of aesthetic appreciation, then, we must explain the various states experienced by perceivers when engaging with different artworks. In Wittgenstein's view, to investigate what appreciation consists of. Wittgenstein points out in his lecture on aesthetics[29] that it is "not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in, we would have to describe the whole environment" (Wittgenstein 1967, 7). He claims so because he is concerned about the different reactions of people when reacting to the same object or other artworks[30]. However, in my view, a good theory should explain the various states of aesthetic appreciation, the second part of the question. It would be good to have a practical theory that can help us better understand our engagement with artworks. Thus, I will focus on this issue in the rest of the paper. With a clear understanding of the changing states of a perceiver and the differences among diverse states of appreciation, we will be in a better position to appreciate an artwork by sometimes having a refreshing look at it.

[29] Wittgenstein, L., 2007.*Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics*, Psychology and Religious Belief. University of California Press.

[30] Wittgenstein discussed two examples to illustrate such difficulty in describing appreciation. The first example describes an appreciator of material when he responds to the materials in a tailor's. The second example describes one's response to music by claiming that it is not harmony. However, both examples are not sufficient to show what exactly appreciation consists in in Wittgenstein's eyes.

Distance theory is the proper candidate, here, due to its functional features in describing diverse states of one's appreciation of artworks. Bullough initially proposed distance (attitude) theory to help distinguish different (psychological) states of appreciators when they engage with artworks. Thus, distance theory describes the appreciation of artwork not just as one's preference for (attention to) the artwork, but, more importantly, as a psychological state that refers to her *distance* from the artwork. Bullough describes "distance" as an aesthetic principle applied in demonstrating aesthetic appreciation, which works properly to generate an aesthetic attitude towards artworks. A proper range for being distanced should be neither too close that the appreciator is obsessed with an artwork nor too far from the artwork without any perceptional connection. In addition, aesthetic attitude (distance) is the condition that enables us to form a connection with the artworks as an audience and enter the state of aesthetic appreciation.

Since Bullough argued that the distance between appreciators and artworks primarily constitutes aesthetic appreciation, the task of reconstruction is narrowed down to an explication of the concept of *distance*, which is the crucial notion in his theory. As with any term of art, some agree with the necessity of its introduction, while others think that it doesn't add anything to an aesthetic theory based on appreciation. For those who agree with Bullough, distance occupies a spectrum, from the strongest, where distance is the equivalent of disinterest (Stolnitz, 1978), to the weakest, where distance is seen as a kind of attendance (Tomas, 1959). However, none of them captures the core of distance for its practical value in helping us understand aesthetic appreciation. Therefore, I will reconstruct the theory by revisiting Bullough's original thoughts to show its value.

Bullough initially proposed distance theory to explain how aesthetic attitude functions in aesthetic appreciation (as well as in creation)[31]. However, his original construction of the idea is ambiguous for its lack of sufficient clarification of the multiple layers of the critical features of the essential concept: distance. Consequently, the whole theory is at risk of being simplified by proposing a single turning point that divides states of aesthetic consciousness and non-aesthetic consciousness. In addition, this is also a primary reason that invites its critics like George Dickie, who challenges the theory for its "simplicity." Therefore, to reconstruct distance theory, I will clarify the features of distance as a fundamental notion and then illustrate how it works in an art activity to show how it can be applied as a principle of aesthetic appreciation.

1.1 The Features of Distance

To clarify the multiple layers of the concept of distance, I shall first illustrate the features which enable it to be a principle of aesthetic experience. Such features lie in how psychological distance, different from physical distance, reveals the micro differences of interaction between appreciators and artworks. More specifically, distance shows how we are psychologically affected by artworks to varying degrees. According to Bullough, this should be understood broadly to include our sensations, perceptions, and emotional states (Bullough, 89). In other words, on the one hand, distance pushes one away from reality and triggers a particular way of being affected when one interacts with an artwork; on the other hand, it also pulls her to the state of aesthetic appreciation and enables her to engage with that artwork.

1.1.1 Objectivity versus Subjectivity of Aesthetic Appreciation

[31] Though Bullough has also mentioned artistic creation in his paper, I will not discuss the creation in this paper but only focus on the appreciation.

For Bullough, both “subjective” and “objective” are terms used to describe aesthetic appreciation. I shall explain the distinction between his understanding of “subjective” and the common understanding held by the public in this section. In common understanding, objective features refer to the physical characteristics of artwork like the colors of a painting; subjective elements are used to describe the sensational experience of a perceiver. However, Bullough uses these two terms differently to explain aesthetic appreciation from inside distance theory.

It is helpful to look at an example to understand Bullough’s intention to use these two terms differently. Bullough invites us to imagine that we are on a ship at sea on a foggy day. On the one hand, “it is apt to produce feelings of peculiar anxiety, fears of invisible dangers, strains of watching and listening for distant and unlocalized signals; and that special, expectant, tacit anxiety and nervousness, always associated with this experience, make a fog the dreaded terror of the sea for the expert seafarer no less than for the ignorant landsman” (Bullough, 88). This is the subjective side of such a phenomenon because such inference of terror and anxiety originates from one’s rational reflection based on her knowledge and practical experience. On the other hand, “a fog at sea can be a source of intense relish and enjoyment… the veil surrounding you with an opaqueness as of transparent milk, blurring the outline of things and distorting their shapes into weird grotesqueness; observe the carrying-power of the air, producing the impression as if you could touch some far-off siren by merely putting out your hand and letting it lose itself…” (Bullough, 88) This is the objective side of the phenomenon, which accounts for aesthetic appreciation because of one’s immediate sentiments generated by the objective features of the phenomenon without rational analysis.

According to Bullough, the objective features of the phenomenon one captures are not the direct depiction of the characteristics of the phenomenon itself; on the contrary, it relates to the aesthetic perspective, which describes a perceiver's experience. The reason why he calls it "objective" depends on the way he illustrates this phenomenon from the standpoint of a perceiver who has stepped away from reality with its practical concerns. When one experiences the phenomenon in the latter way, she enters the state of aesthetic appreciation while looking at the fog *objectively*, which means she puts the phenomenon "out of gear"[32] with her practical or actual self. The "gear" refers to the subjective reflection we assign to a phenomenon based on our knowledge in real life. At this moment, she detaches from the feeling of fear in the actual world that the fog at sea typically makes one feels. So, it is reasonable to interpret the subjective features as one of the characteristics of the experience triggered by the phenomenon, but which is not constituent of aesthetic appreciation.

Bullough's description of subjective and objective features of one's experience of artworks (or any objects that are thus appreciated) seems awkward at first sight. However, it reminds us of the precondition that all the discussion above happens in the circumstance of aesthetic consciousness, not the practical or actual life. It is a unique state that cannot be viewed in a typical framework. Based on the clarification of the two features above, Bullough continues to claim that to enter the realm of aesthetic appreciation, one needs to transit from subjectivity to objectivity, which means that one should be distanced from the practical side of life and attached to the aesthetic side when she encounters an artwork and intends to appreciate it aesthetically.

[32] Bullough explains the term "out of gear" as a state that one does not concern about the reality when engaging an artwork.

The first feature of distance theory is to shift one's focus from subjectivity to objectivity when engaging with an artwork; this is fundamental to distance theory.

1.1.2 Personal versus Impersonal (Emotional versus Intellectual)

Based on the illustration of the first pair of features, we might think that the concept of distance implies an impersonal relationship between a perceiver and an artwork, with the affirmation of the objective feature of aesthetic appreciation. But it is a misunderstanding that Bullough tries to avoid when discussing another pair of features: *personal* and *impersonal*. This pair of features aims to show the difference between intellectual and emotional features of distance. According to Bullough, the *impersonal* feature refers to the "purely intellectually interested relation" (Bullough, 91) and cannot, thus, be seen as the character of distance. By contrast, Bullough describes the *personal* feature as a "highly emotionally colored but of a peculiar character" (Bullough, 91) of distance, which is the essential characteristic that enables the concept of distance to be a principle of aesthetic appreciation.

When watching a drama in a theatre, the characters appeal to the audience like persons and events of a specific experience to trigger an imaginative, emotional reaction in the audience. If the audience sees the whole setting and performance from an impersonal perspective, the response will be intellectually explained as an unreal experience caused by the imaginary characters and events. However, one enters into a personal relationship with the drama when she has an emotional reaction. In other words, such a personal perspective allows one to be distanced, again by stepping away from

reality, so she can appreciate an artwork rather than pay attention[33] to it. According to Bullough, distance reinforces the effect of such a reaction resulting from the personal perspective and opens the door for entering the realm of aesthetic appreciation. The states of aesthetic appreciation in this realm cannot be achieved through intellectual analysis of the content of an artwork. In contrast, the latter state is commonly seen among professional critics and is described as *over-distanced* in Bullough's view, which is a state one should avoid if one wants to appreciate an artwork properly. I shall discuss it in detail in the following section.

As a principle of aesthetic appreciation, the discussion above follows that distance can be described thus: it originates from an objectively personal relation with artworks that directs one's consciousness to an aesthetic state that distances her from practical life. Such a fact is strange to Bullough because it reveals one of the fundamental paradoxes of art as "the antinomy of Distance." Such antinomy is reflected in applying distance as a principle for aesthetic appreciation.

1.2 The Application of Distance

Having laid the foundations of distance theory above, I shall continue to discuss the application of distance as a principle in aesthetic appreciation by highlighting its way of presenting different states of consciousness in order to pick out the ones qualified to constitute aesthetic appreciation.

1.2.1 The Difficulty of Maintaining Distance

[33] I will respond to George Dickie's criticism that misinterprets distance as attention later in this paper.

Bullough claims that: “It (Distance) has a negative, inhibitory aspect— the cutting-out of the practical sides of things and our practical attitude to them— and a positive side— the elaboration of the experience on the new basis created by the inhibitory action of Distance” (Bullough, 89). As the objective feature of distance, the negative aspect is the first step that enables us to enter the realm of aesthetic appreciation by moving from subjectivity to objectivity. Such a shifting, from rational reflection to perceptual consciousness, is the necessary preparation for us to enter the realm of aesthetic appreciation. Followed by this step, when considering the positive element, which is the essence of aesthetic appreciation entailed by distance, we realize that it is a complicated task to keep the appreciator in a proper position in the realm of aesthetic appreciation; that is, properly distanced from their practical life. This task brings up the difficulty of applying distance: it requires a balance between maintaining and losing distance when one engages with an artwork.

Such a difficulty concerns a conflict that requires one to be distanced from her practical life to enter the realm of aesthetic appreciation; meanwhile, the personal connection between her and the artwork is necessary for the work to appeal to her. Sheila Dawson (2006) calls this the requirement of being “appropriately distanced” (Dawson, 164), which refers to the state of maintaining distance in a proper range. The difficulty lies in the points at the boundary between the range of maintaining distance and losing distance. There is no clear guidance for us to find out when and where we will approach the point of losing distance, so it is the Sword of Damocles over our heads as we should always keep the potential danger of losing distance in mind to avoid such a state. The difficulty of maintaining distance appears as the absence of a concordance between the

character of a work and the spectator. According to Bullough, "such a principle of concordance[34] requires a qualification, which leads at once to the antinomy of Distance" (Bullough, 94).

1.2.2 Degrees of Maintaining Distance

When discussing the difficulty in maintaining proper distance when appreciating an artwork, we must account for the various degrees of maintaining distance, since one can easily slip and lose distance: either by being over-distanced or by not being distanced enough. Bullough claims that "Distance… admits naturally of degrees and differs not only according to the nature of the object… but also varies according to the individual's capacity for maintaining a greater or lesser degree." (Bullough, 94) Even for the same individual, her ability to maintain distance is different when facing different artworks and objects. So, I will start my illustration with the different degrees in individuals.

According to Bullough, the capacity to maintain distance can be understood as the "most general explanation of the absence of concordance between the characters of a work and the spectator as 'tastes'" (Bullough, 92). As a saying that there are a thousand ways to interpret Hamlet, aesthetic appreciation reveals how different the interpretation can be for individuals when they all engage with the same object. Here are some factors that influence one's view of an artwork: personality, educational and cultural background. All the factors above may impact the distancing-power. The distancing-power is the ability for individuals to maintain the required distance, enabling them to enter and stay in the state of aesthetic appreciation. Accordingly, an artwork's

[34] The concordance between the subjective and objective features of aesthetic appreciation.

characteristics can also trigger the psychological states as distanced when an individual engages with such an object. In short, taste, in terms of maintaining distance in aesthetic appreciation, represents one's ability to perceive the aesthetic characteristics of the object. The degrees of distance that different individuals have with the same object reflect their respective distancing-power, which shows the differences of what they perceive from the object.

When discussing the same individual facing different objects and artworks, the various degrees of distance is affected by the objects' or artworks' characteristics in a certain period. In other words, the differences are possibly generated by what objects or artworks offer us. The instance of this situation is widely found in aesthetic appreciation. Suppose one is wandering in the Metropolitan Museum of Art when she steps into a room on the second floor with the collection of European paintings encompassing works of art from the 13th through the 19th centuries—from Giotto to Gauguin. She sees the most famous pieces of work belonging to Impressionism works by Manet, Monet, Degas, and others. Although they are categorized as belonging to the same school in art history, the experience for this individual in front of different paintings by different artists varies with the colors, structures, and even emotions she perceives in other works. It is understandable that she may have a stronger affinity towards Monet than Degas because, say, the features that a painting by Monet has triggered her distancing-power more vividly.

Above all, we need to see the factors that affect the degree of distance when applying distance in aesthetic appreciation. As a result of maintaining a proper distance from artwork, the positive aspect of applying distance as a principle in aesthetic

appreciation allows us to step away from practical life and lean in the world of art. On the other hand, the negative aspect of the application of distance as losing distance is essential to my investigation. I will discuss two cases that exemplify the scenario of losing distance in the following section.

1.2.3 Two Ways of Losing Distance

I have mentioned two terms, *under-distance* and *over-distance*, to describe how one may lose distance when facing an artwork. Bullough defines under-distance as the "commonest failing of the subject…(and) looks almost as if Art had attempted to meet the deficiency of Distance on the part of the subject and had overshot the mark in this endeavor." (Bullough, 94) Accordingly, o*ver-distance* refers to the case that "Art is specially designed for a class of appreciation which has difficulty to rise spontaneously to any degree of Distance." (Bullough, 94) But such a definition is not clear enough for me to form a further argument to defend distance theory. I will reinterpret these two terms with the help of Dawson (2006). She provides a table (see below) that clearly illustrates the "optimum point" (Dawson, 163) regarding the relationship between *under-distance* and o*ver-distance* when putting them together as losing distance in a whole picture of distance theory.

Under-distanced	Appropriately distanced	Over-distanced
subjective 'wallowing'	aesthetic appreciation	detached, critical, technical, intellectual attitude

According to the graph above, the middle part, as the appropriately distanced state, stands for the range of aesthetic appreciation, the ideal state Bullough described as “utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance” (Bullough, 94). The two parts on the left and right, under-distance and over-distance, stand for the two states of losing distance.

For the state of under-distance: an excess of distance which “produces the impression of improbability, artificiality, emptiness or absurdity.” (Bullough, 94) Briefly put, I describe it as an appreciator being swallowed or controlled by distance, which is commonly seen in the statement as one’s being obsessed with an artwork. According to Bullough, this state of losing distance appears more frequently in individuals as perceivers.

In contrast, for the state of over-distance, it is another state of losing distance that appears more commonly in a narrow group of people like experts or critics who constitute only a small portion of any society. In addition, the state of over-distance contains the reaction in closer relation to the character of an object, which is the result of the artist’s creation. For the same reason, the number of artists also takes up an even smaller number of people than the individuals as audiences and experts.

Therefore, I will further analyze the differences of losing distance among different participants in an art activity.

1.2.4 Manifestations of Losing Distance in Different Participants of Art Activity

As I mentioned above, almost everyone in art practice, including spectators, critics, and artists, bears the risk of losing distance. However, they may lose distance in very different ways, depending on their background.

For spectators: distance is easy to lose when obsessed with an artwork. Bullough gives an example of a jealous husband when he witnesses a performance of *Othello*. As being jealous himself, the husband, compared to others who are not as jealous as him, seems more perfectly positioned to appreciate the situation, conduct, and character of *Othello*. In turn, Othello's experiences and feelings seem to coincide with his own closely. However, such a person is not actually appreciating the play. Instead, he is conscious of his jealousy, which is triggered by the play. He may claim that the play touches him deeply because he feels the same when Desdemona betrays Othello. Still, the content of his feeling is not the same as Othello's, but his own, given that he is in an analogous situation with his wife in reality. It may be easier for us to understand such a situation when considering the example of watching a movie. Suppose you are watching a romantic movie, like *La La Land*, with your friend Sarah, who just broke up with her boyfriend. She bursts into tears when she sees Sebastian and Mia separate with regrets after spending such a wonderful time together. You may cry simultaneously and take it for granted that the movie touches her, just as it touches you. However, when you ask her why she cries, she replies that the movie reminds her of her own story, so she feels the characters' sorrow. The situation is similar to sympathy but also different because of the subtle difference in the origin of the emotion. These two instances show what happens when we lose distance. To be more specific, they are instances of being under-distanced when engaging with an artwork. There is another way to lose distance, which I will explain later: one could be over-distanced when she is in the state of aesthetic appreciation.

For art critics: it is more common to find the second type of losing distance among this group of people, who may easily become *over-distanced*. Bullough claims that they constitute bad audiences "since their expertness and critical professionalism are practical activities, involving their concrete personality and constantly engendering their Distance." (Bullough, 93) It seems different from the first kind of situation in which one loses her distance because of her feelings. When engaging with an artwork, critics are more likely to lose distance from being controlled by their intellectual knowledge. According to Bullough, the impersonal feature of the distance is relevant here, as I mentioned above. In addition, when tracing back to the core of this situation, it is the same as the first one because mastery and critical professionalism exist in one's practical life. For instance, when a music critic attends a piano recital of the *Goldberg Variations*, she may unconsciously judge the pianist's performance based on her professional background. It does not affect her appreciation of the performance, but when she has her judgment in mind, according to Bullough, she is no longer in the state of aesthetic appreciation because she is over-distanced from the music.

For artists, it is a more complicated case to consider in terms of the creation of art. The artist's personal experience is the source of their creation. On the other hand, to create an artwork and not simply express one's feelings, the artist has to work artistically, which involves a certain detachment from her own experience to create the space for spectators to relate themselves to her work. Such a controversial relationship, which requires both the personal experience as an origin of art creation and the detachment as access for spectators to engage with an artwork, makes it very hard for artists to create an artwork that can fully express their opinion, feeling, and experience while also keeping

their proper distance from them. As the creation process is private in terms of conveying an artist's own thought or experience, it is hard to provide an instance to illustrate how an artist successfully creates artworks that clearly show them being distanced from their own experiences. However, I try to explain this situation from the standpoint of a perceiver who cannot appreciate an artwork that is too personal to understand. Although the failure of understanding an artwork may be caused by a lack of distance maintained by the audience, if an artwork is widely unreachable for a majority of the audience, it may also reveal an issue of its creator. The artwork may lack universality because of the insufficient detachment an artist should have had when creating the work. But it is hard to find an actual example to illustrate this since the appreciation of artwork varies upon all kinds of factors.

My explanation above has illustrated that the difficulty resulting from the antinomy of distance heavily influences aesthetic appreciation, thus affecting all the participants in an art activity. Distance, understood in this manner, shows us a path to separating our practical life from a world given to us in artworks when we successfully distance ourselves; however, it is easy for us to lose distance by becoming either under-distanced or over-distanced.

1.2.5 Distance-Limit Effects on Different Participants in Art Activity

When one looks carefully at the table above, it is worth noticing that the points separating each status of aesthetic appreciation are at the equant position, which sets the line into three equal parts. However, it is impossible to find such equant points when distinguishing between maintaining and losing distance in actual aesthetic appreciation. This is what Bullough called the "Distance-Limit" (Bullough, 95). It mainly exists

between artists and the public, leading to misunderstandings between them. The distance-limit reveals the ability to decrease distance but prevent it from disappearing. In Bullough's view, artists are gifted so that they can decrease the distance to a remarkable extent without losing it; however, the average individuals rapidly reach the limit and easily lose their distance. Although this claim seems convincing, it is still impossible for us to measure the tipping points by a scientific method like applying statistics on quantifying one's state of losing or maintaining distance.

However, the significance of such a claim is not to show that artists are superior to the public in aesthetic practice; on the contrary, Bullough aims to bridge the gap between artists and their public. He sufficiently explains the gap between artists and the public regarding the distance-limit as the primary source of misunderstanding between the two groups. It is the misunderstanding of the artists' original intention when they create their work, especially when the public misunderstands an artwork, which means they ignore the artists' intention for how their work should be engaged with and read them based on their habituated patterns of thinking and judging. Bullough sees such a situation as an injustice to the artists.

Two cases can be used to illustrate this situation. One is the judgment of many artworks as immoral when the public lacks the distancing-power and stands out of the distance-limit. They are too closely tied up to the practical life shaped by a particular convention or ethics, so they cannot appreciate the artworks from a proper distance. It results in the consequence that they prematurely tag an artwork as immoral without even entering the world the artist has created, without being able to appreciate it aesthetically. A representative example of this situation is people's common reaction to the novel

Lolita. It is immediately viewed as immoral due to the love story between an adult and a teenage girl.

Another case is constituted by the "'problem plays' and 'problem novels' in which the public have persisted in seeing nothing but a supposed 'problem' of the moment." Where is this quote from? The tricky thing, in this case, is that the public cannot tell what exactly the problem is when they are asked to describe it. But they do feel uncomfortable when actually engaging with the respective artworks, and such uncomfortable feeling is striking to them in the sense of aesthetic appreciation. In contrast, such artworks are only an expression of artistic creativity as the product of the distance from the subjective view of the artists. It is commonly seen in contemporary practice, especially in performance art; one of the most famous performance artists, Marina Abramović, has provided many impressive performances that may engender in their audiences extremely intense reactions. One of her performances, called *Ritmo 0,* invited audiences to do anything to the performer during the six hours of the performance. She just stands still, presenting herself as an object. It is a typical example to observe the reaction of audiences when they participated in the performance itself, and even after it ended. Some of them hurt the artist during the performance, but when the performance ended, not even they could face their action when they were detached from the aesthetic circumstance. Compared to the public, Abramović only takes account of the acts that occurred during the performance as an aesthetic creation, which reaches the goal that she designed for the performance: to test how far a person may push their humanity. From her perspective, all the actions done to her in the performance are acceptable from an aesthetic point of view.

Based on my reconstruction of Bullough's distance theory above, the application of distance can be seen as a practical principle in aesthetic appreciation. Specifically, the features and various degrees of distance enable it to guide one's aesthetic appreciation in an appropriate range that is distanced from the practical world without cutting off its connection.

In Bullough's view, the value of distance lies in three aspects: (1) it works as a criterion in some standing problems of aesthetics; (2) it presents a phase of artistic creation; (3) it characterizes the feature of the "aesthetic consciousness." However, such a view is too broad to illustrate the application of distance in aesthetic activity. So, I did not dig into particulars of the second aspect (only with some supportive cases in artistic creation) and focused on the first and third ones as they are (partially) related to aesthetic appreciation. In particular, distance plays an essential role in distinguishing the essence of art activity from the practical or social phenomenon for all the participants, especially for perceivers.

2. Response to Dickie's Criticism of The Distance Theory

Among the critics of distance theory, George Dickie is probably the most influential. In his paper "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude" (1964), Dickie ranks attitude theories from the strongest—Bullough's distance theory— to the weakest—Vincent Tomas' close attendance statement—in terms of the role played by a particular attitude. Dickie mainly criticizes distance theory for not providing us with any new approach to understanding aesthetic appreciation compared to the traditional term "attention," the term we already commonly apply in interpreting aesthetic appreciation. The concept of attention works as

a switch that controls aesthetic appreciation. According to Dickie, there are two states with a clear boundary when one faces an artwork: one can either pay attention to the artwork or not. Based on this view, attention and distance play the same role in aesthetic appreciation, so there is no need to introduce a new concept such as distance to describe aesthetic appreciation. Therefore, he calls "attitude theory" a myth, implying that it is meaningless to use the term to describe our aesthetic activity.

I have reconstructed Bullough's distance theory based on my interpretation of the essential concepts and relationships. It is a sophisticated theory that includes many details in both aesthetic appreciation and creation with distance as a practical principle. In this part, with references to my discussion above, I will respond to Dickie's criticism of distance theory by pointing out his misunderstanding to defend Bullough's view.

2.1 Dickie's Misunderstanding of The Features of Distance

Dickie understands distance as "a psychological process by virtue of which a person puts some object 'out of gear' with the practical interests of the self." (Dickie, 56) Dickie's understanding is partially correct as he takes distance as a process; however, he misses the more important point: the process contains a shift between two steps. He mentions the critical term "out of gear," but he reads it in the way that the process is done with the help of distance in one shot. On the contrary, based on my clarification of the features of objectivity in the first part, the process of being distanced contains a transition from the focus on subjectivity to the objectivity of an artwork or object.

In my view, two possible reasons may lead Dickie to misunderstand the concept of distance. First, he does not see the transition from subjectivity to objectivity in Bullough's interpretation of the features of distance; secondly, he oversimplifies the

process of being distanced, which can be done in one action without observing the further step in it. As I mentioned in the first part, Bullough's explanation of subjective and objective features of an artwork or object depends on the perceiver's perspective. This results in his explication of these two features, which is different from common usage. However, Dickie ignores the fact that Bullough uses these concepts as terms of art and instead sides with the common view of subjectivity and objectivity. Based on this view, it is understandable that Dickie interprets the process as an action that separates the object from her interests. According to Bullough, the process is much more refined as peeling the practical concerns of the practical experience generated by an artwork; however, in Dickie's view, this is done in a single shot without separating one's practical interests from the artwork.

In addition, I see the economy of ontology as a possible resource of Dickie's misinterpretation of Bullough's distance theory. As David Fenner points out, "He is interested in keeping to a bare minimum the ontological furniture regarding appreciation of artworks and other aesthetic objects." (Fenner, 100) The consideration of the ontological economy partially explains why he misinterprets Bullough in terms of distance as an aesthetic principle. With his rejection of the experience of being induced into a state of being distanced, he refuses the necessity of introducing "new technical terms" (Dickie, 57) in describing aesthetic appreciation. I will respond to this rejection later with the investigation of Dickie's understanding of the application of distance.

2.2 Dickie's Misunderstanding of the Application of Distance

When considering the application of distance, or the states of aesthetic appreciation, Dickie doubts the necessity of distinguishing two terms as *to distance* and *being*

distanced as he regards them as the same. He questions whether there are "actions denoted by 'to distance' or states of consciousness denoted by 'being distanced'?" (Dickie, 57) The question contradicts Dickie's understanding of distance, which entails that distance is both a process and an action in aesthetic appreciation. On his understanding of distance as a process, Dickie should not raise the question concerning actions as *to distance*. According to Bullough, there is no doubt that distance is a process or a status (can remain for a while) that may include some actions that enable us to stay in the state of aesthetic appreciation.

Furthermore, Dickie assumes that *to distance* and *being distanced* both mean one's attention is focused. He interprets these two statuses as being the same, namely that someone who is actively engaging with artwork is doing nothing more nor less than paying attention to that artwork. This assumption also explains his economy of ontology mentioned above. If he equates *distance* and *attention*, there is no need to introduce distance as a "new technical term" (Dickie, 57). If being distanced and paying attention were the same state, it follows that the psychological activity must be the same in both situations. However, according to distance theory, being distanced is much more complex than paying attention, even though they both refer to a particular psychological state appreciator of artworks may enter. In general, no matter whether maintaining or losing distance, one's attention is focused on the artwork in both of these cases, as explained by distance theory. But Dickie claims that losing distance, including both under-distance and over-distance, means not paying attention to the respective artwork from an aesthetical point of view. "In both cases something is being attended to, but in neither case is it the action of the play (*Othello*)" (Dickie, 57). He explains that when one is either *under-*

distanced or o*ver-distanced*, she only attends to the artwork physically, not psychologically. This explanation ignores the different causes and effects of the two instances of losing distance. In other words, Dickie misunderstands distance theory to be a two-part structure that only shifts between two states of maintaining or losing distance. He does not see the dynamic side of distance theory, which has a changeable range with varieties of maintaining distance and degrees of losing distance when practically applying to aesthetic appreciation.

Above all, I have responded to Dickie's criticism by showing that paying attention is different from being distanced as an aesthetic consciousness. More importantly, the latter is a more sophisticated process than paying attention to demonstrating aesthetic appreciation. Meanwhile, in my response to Dickie, I defended distance theory by clarifying the ambiguities in Bullough's original version that probably provoked Dickie's misunderstanding.

3. Conclusion

I have not claimed that distance theory is the best account to explain aesthetic consciousness. Instead, this paper aims to show how an aesthetic theory can shine a light on our art practice. As I have announced, the value of distance theory is the guidance it may offer us to better appreciate artworks rather than how it can win over other accounts in explaining what aesthetic appreciation shall amount to.

The theory's diversity and dynamics enable us to better understand one's aesthetic appreciation when engaging with emerging new art forms like performing art, installation art, land art, and others. Like the example of Abramović's *Ritmo 0*, the appreciation of

such kinds of artworks cannot be phrased in a conventional view of seeking aesthetic properties under a universal standard. In contrast, for those new forms of artworks, investigating one's specific states of appreciation in the framework proposed by distance theory can be a more plausible way to find out how aesthetic appreciation may arise when engaging with an artwork.

Although I have responded to some critics, for instance, Dickie, in this paper, I admit that a challenge like the one raised by Dickie helps remind us of the uniqueness of aesthetic appreciation, especially when comparing it with other similar terms like attention. As D.H. Lawrence says, "The essential quality of poetry is that it makes a new effort of attention, and 'discovers' a new world within the known world" (Lawrence 1928, 107).

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VITA

Tieying Zhou was born and raised in Xi'an, China. Her journey of exploring the philosophical world started with her question, "Who is the good (bad) guy?" when watching TV shows with her father. She always got the same answer telling her there was no absolute goodness or badness to tell whether a person is good or bad.

She carried the question to the university and started to learn philosophy, which was the instinctive choice for her to figure out the long-existed question she had. She was one of the top students at Shaanxi Normal University and was selected for the graduate program at Fudan University with a waiver of the entrance exam. During her tenure at Fudan University, Tieying took various academic roles as program assistant and conferences organizers. By taking those duties while continuing her philosophical research, she gradually broadened her horizon when associating with scholars from worldwide. She decided to challenge herself by applying to study abroad even though she was close to graduating from her current program.

After being accepted by the Ph.D. program at Mizzou, Tieying flew to the United States alone and started a new journey at Columbia, Missouri. She earned her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in aesthetics after five years of hard-working. She is now working toward the next goal to apply her passion and knowledge to educate the youth like her who are curious about the world.