DAMN WITH FAINT PRAISE:
A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON PLUTARCH’S
ON THE FORTUNE OR VIRTUE OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
University of Missouri

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

By
DAWN L. GILLEY

Dr. Ian Worthington, Dissertation Supervisor

May, 2009
The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate School, have examined the
dissertation entitled

DAMN WITH FAINT PRAISE
A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON PLUTARCH’S ON THE FORTUNE OR
VIRTUE OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Presented by Dawn L. Gilley
A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
And hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

____________________________________________________
Professor Ian Worthington

____________________________________________________
Professor Lawrence Okamura

____________________________________________________
Professor Lois Huneycutt

____________________________________________________
Professor A. Mark Smith

____________________________________________________
Professor Barbara Wallach
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe my gratitude to many people. First, this dissertation could not have been written without the support and advice of my advisor Ian Worthington whose demands have helped me to be a better scholar. I would also like to acknowledge my other committee members, Professor Lois Huneycutt, Professor Lawrence Okamura, Professor Mark Smith, and Professor Barbara Wallach for putting up with the never-ending stream of emails I sent their way. I have greatly appreciated the comments and thoughts of Professor Christopher Pelling, Professor Tim Whitmarsh, and Professor Sulochana Asirvatham who read previous drafts despite having busy schedules. A special note of thanks goes to my fellow graduate students in the basement of Read Hall for listening to me pontificate on Plutarch for the last three years and for providing endless hours of napkin toasts. A special thank you to Kris Maulden for Caddyshack and Buffalo Wild Wing Tuesdays. Nothing quite says “study break” like gophers and forty cent wings. As always, I am eternally grateful to my family for their endless support and love.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

SPECIAL NOTES...........................................................................................................v

ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................................vi

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................ix

INTRODUCTION

I. LIFE AND WORKS......................................................................................................2

II. THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT..............................................................16

III. THE SOURCES AND ALEXANDER.........................................................................30

- Primary Sources
- Secondary Sources
- The *DFAM* as a Source for Alexander’s Life and Reign
- Alexander’s Wounds
- Alexander’s Cities
- Alexander and the “Unity of Mankind” Theory
- Alexander’s Orientalism
- Alexander’s Divinity

IV. PARADOXICAL ENCOMIA.......................................................................................54

*On the Fortune of the Romans*

*On the Glory of the Athenians*

*On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* 1

*On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* 2

Rhetoric
Paradoxical Rhetoric

The Nature of Encomia

The logos-ergon antithesis

Plutarch versus the Philosophical Schools?

The Purpose of the DFAM

Plutarch’s View of Alexander

V. THE RELATIONSHIP OF DFAM 1 TO DFAM 2………………………………………88

VI. PLUTARCH’S STYLE..................................................................................106

VII. DATE.........................................................................................................123

VIII. TEXT AND TRANSMISSION.................................................................131

COMMENTARY.................................................................................................136

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................346

VITA................................................................................................................370
SPECIAL NOTES

On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great

The Greek title of this work is Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου Τύχης ὡς Ἀρετῆς, but it is commonly called by its Latin version, De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute, and this is the title I use. The work consists of two speeches; this dissertation is a detailed study of only the first speech.

Text

The text I use of the De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute is F.C. Babbitt’s Plutarch’s Moralia 4 (Cambridge, 2005) in the Loeb Classical Library. Any translations of the Greek text are my own unless otherwise noted.

Transliteration

Greek names and titles of works are anglicized, but some terms are transliterated, and these will be obvious when they appear.

Dates

All dates are BC except where indicated.
ABBREVIATIONS

Ancient sources follow the abbreviations of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Abbreviations of journals follow the conventions of *L’Année philologique*.

For the sake of convenience and common usage, the two speeches commonly referred to by the single title *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* (“On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great”) will be referred to as *DFAM* 1 and *DFAM* 2. The speech *De Fortuna Romanorum* (“On the Fortune of the Romans”) will be referred to as *DFR* and *De Gloria Atheniensium* (“On the Glory of the Athenians”) as *DGA*.

The following frequently cited modern works are abbreviated as follows:

**Critical Editions of the De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute**

- **Babbitt, Plutarch**
- **Frazier and Froidefond, Plutarque**
- **Nachstadt, Plutarchi**
- **Wyttenbach, Animadversiones**

**Secondary Literature**

- **Barrow, Plutarch**
- **Berve, Alexanderreich**
Worthington, I. (Editor-in-Chief), *Brill’s New Jacoby* (Leiden, 2005-).


*D’Angelo, La Fortuna*  

Jacoby, F., *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden, 1923-).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>IG</em></td>
<td><em>Inscriptiones Graecae</em> (Berlin, 1873-).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>TLG</em></td>
<td><em>Thesaurus Linguae Graecae</em>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Plutarch’s *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great* is as much a revelation of Plutarch’s philosophical thought as it is a display of his rhetorical skill. Writing during the Second Sophistic movement, Plutarch challenged basic conceptions of philosophy by asking whether it was theory or practice that made a philosopher. He used the life and reign of Alexander the Great as his general framework for analysis. Also, by casting Alexander as a philosopher, an artificial paradox, Plutarch took advantage of events in the king’s life, about which his audience would have been well aware, to play on common perceptions of the king, thereby causing some modern scholars to suggest that the work has no historical value. It was through rhetorical exploitation that Plutarch denigrated the Macedonian king, revealing him to be a megalomaniac who cared little for his own men or newly conquered subjects, but more for his own glory. Through this paradox of Alexander as a philosopher, Plutarch concluded that philosophy is both a theoretical and practical pursuit, and that it should be practically applied to one’s life.

This dissertation not only sheds light on Plutarch’s rhetorical skill and view of Alexander, but also elevates the work’s standing as a source for the life and reign of the king.
I

Plutarch’s Life and Works

The exact dates of Plutarch’s birth and death are unknown. The scant information that is known is derived from passing statements in the 120 surviving works, which he is said to have written, and a few inscriptions from Delphi. From these, a shadowy picture of the author emerges, one that reveals a man devoted to his hometown and to his work.

Plutarch was born in the small Boeotian town of Chaeronea, which by Plutarch’s time was large enough to support a few wealthy families including his own.\(^1\) Based on information given in *The E at Delphi* (385B) an approximate date for his birth would be in the mid to late 40s AD because it refers to a trip to Delphi to visit Nero who was on his grand tour of Greece in 67 AD.\(^2\) Plutarch made the trip from Athens with his teacher, Ammonius of Lamptrae, who was an Alexandrian Platonist (385B).\(^3\) Plutarch went to study with Ammonius in his late teens/early twenties, thereby placing the date of his birth some time between 46 and 49 AD.

Quite a bit is known about Plutarch’s family members because they are included as participants in his works, especially the dialogues *The Intelligence of Animals, Table Talk, The Banquet of the Seven Wise Men*. The picture Plutarch paints is of a family that commonly discussed philosophical, religious, and political matters. It is easy to see why he took such an interest in these things. His grandfather, Lamprias, was an educated and

---


easygoing man (669C, 678D-679E, 684A-D) who loved his wine (622E). His father, whose name was probably Autobulus, was no different and frequently advised the young Plutarch in political matters (816D) and was also an avid horseman and hunter (959B, 642A). In The Intelligence of Animals, Autobulus mentions that hunting can inflame young and old alike and he himself despaired of succumbing to the fervor of hunting (959B).

Nothing is known of Plutarch’s mother other than that she gave birth to at least three sons (Lamprias, Plutarch, and Timon) and one daughter, and she may have died young, perhaps in childbirth. Lamprias frequently makes appearances in dialogue scenes as a sharp, witty, and amusing individual (617E, 76D, 740A). At 726D, Plutarch refers to him as ύβριστής (“ostentatious”) and φιλόγελως (“joke-loving”), and he is also the speaker in some of Plutarch’s religious works: The E at Delphi and The Decline of Oracles. Plutarch’s other brother, Timon, is spoken of in the most loving terms. We are told that Timon’s love for Plutarch transcends all others’ (487D-E), and he too makes frequent appearances in Plutarch’s works God’s Slowness to Punish, Table Talk, and On the Soul.

Little is known of Plutarch’s youth. He was more than likely educated in the same manner as young Greeks of his class. Education began with reading and writing and progressed to the study of mathematics, poetry and rhetoric. In his teens, he began his higher education, which included rhetorical training. In his late teens/early twenties, he travelled to Athens, where he later received Athenian citizenship (628A), to study

---

5 Ziegler, “Plutarchos,” 645.
philosophy and mathematics under Ammonius, an Alexandrian and a Platonist (Dem. 2). Ammonius plays a large role in Table Talk, The E at Delphi, and The Decline of Oracles. In particular, Ammonius took special care to instruct his students in moderation and self-control which certainly influenced Plutarch because he saw σωφροσύνη (“moderation”) as one of the highest virtues (70E). Moreover, Plutarch favored the Platonic and Aristotelian ideal of moderation over the Stoic and Epicurean ideal of apathy which colored those works that were directly aimed at pointing out the contradictions in both schools of thought (451B). Probably while studying under Ammonius, Plutarch began to develop a disdain for sophists. He considered sophistry to be beneath philosophy and believed that it required a less intelligent mind, and sophistry, for him, was nothing more than smoke and mirrors.

It is not known when he married Timoxena, the daughter of a Chaeronean named Alexion, who is mentioned only once in all of Plutarch’s works (701D). They had at least four sons, two of whom survived into adulthood, Autobulus and Plutarchus (Chaeron and Soclarus died before reaching adulthood, 609D), and one daughter, who died in infancy. The death of the daughter was the subject of a letter Plutarch wrote to his grieving wife, Consolation to my Wife (608A-612B) in which he depicts her as a devoted mother educated enough to have written To Aristylla, On Personal Adornment, which dealt with ethical matters (145A). She must have been a fitting partner for

---

8 For a discussion of Plutarch’s anti-Stoic and anti-Epicurean views, see below pp. 11-12, 75-78.
9 Mor. 815B, Luc. 7.4, Cic. 51.1, Lyc. 9.5, Pomp. 77.3.
10 Mor. 41D, 43F, 46F, 80A, 131A.
11 Mor. 543E-F, 558B, 1118A.
Plutarch because the letter to the unknown Aristylla argues for moderation, the virtue that Plutarch held above all others.

His two surviving sons, Autobulus and Plutarchus, shared their father’s interests and carried on his legacy. They were participants in the dialogue *Table Talk* (725E-F, 734C) and the Platonic work *The Creation of the Soul in Plato’s Timaeus* was dedicated to them. The *Suda* mentions another son of Plutarch named Lamprias who was said to have compiled a list of all the titled written by his father, the so-called Lamprias Catalogue (*Suda* 96). However, none of Plutarch’s works mentions a son called Lamprias. It is possible that the compiler was a descendant of Plutarch, perhaps a grandson or a nephew, because the name appears to be a family one as Plutarch’s grandfather and brother shared it.

It is evident from reading his works that Plutarch was well travelled. He moved throughout Greece like other wealthy educated men of his class, and he mentions visits to Tanagra (608B), Helicon (749B), Patrae (629F), Chalcis (667C), Eleusis (635A), and Sparta (*Lyc.* 18.2, *Ages.* 19.10). At some point, he must have visited Alexandria (678C) and, perhaps, Smyrna, one of the centers of the Second Sophistic (501E-F).

Plutarch also visited Rome at least twice in his lifetime. His first trip occurred under Vespasian in the mid-late 70s and he was apparently back in Athens by the early 80s (974A). On this early journey to Rome, he went to festivals, visited friends, and was

---

12 A. Adler (ed.), *Suidae Lexicon* 3 (Paris, 1933), 233.


14 For more on Plutarch’s trips to Rome, see pp. 128-129.
essentially a tourist in the empire’s capital.\textsuperscript{15} By the time of his second excursion to Rome in the early 90s, he was famous, and his reputation was such that he attracted large audiences to his lectures. Interestingly, he lectured in Greek because he failed to become competent in Latin (\textit{Dem.} \textit{2.2}).

Plutarch already had contact with Rome in his youth because he was sent as part of a delegation to the proconsul of Achaea on behalf of Chaeronea (\textit{Mor.} \textit{816D}).\textsuperscript{16} For some unknown reason, the other members of the embassy were left behind, and Plutarch continued on alone. His father advised him to accept only half of the credit when he returned because he was still a young man and it would not ruin the family’s reputation (\textit{816D-E}). His other early experience with Rome was with Nero’s visit to Greece in the late 60s (see above). Plutarch was not overly fond of Nero, seeing him as subject to his vices, but most of Plutarch’s adulthood was spent under Flavian rule.\textsuperscript{17} He did not like the Flavian emperors, especially Domitian who was responsible for the execution of one of Plutarch’s friends, Arulenus Rusticus, apparently because of the emperor’s envy (\textit{522D-E}).\textsuperscript{18}

During his trips to Rome, Plutarch made many notable friends. One of these, L. Mestrius Florus, was a friend of Vespasian and a senator (Suet. \textit{Vesp.} \textit{22}). Plutarch owed his Roman citizenship to Florus and took his surname so that he was formally known as L. Mestrius Plutarchus (\textit{Syll.} \textit{3 829A}).\textsuperscript{19} However, the relationship might not not

\textsuperscript{15} Ziegler, “Plutarchos,” 653-654.
\textsuperscript{16} μέμηναι νέον ἐμαυτόν ἐπὶ προσβεβλημένη μεθ’ ἐτέρων πεμφθέντα πρὸς ἀνθόμασατον (“I remember that as a young man myself I was sent with another to the proconsul”).
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Mor.} \textit{488A, 505C, 815D, Ant. 87.9, Galba 1.9 and 4.1}.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{276E, 771C, Numa 19.7, Publ. 15.3-6}.
\textsuperscript{19} Jones, \textit{Plutarch}, 11, 22 n.15.
have been as close as the name suggests, for Plutarch habitually dedicated his works to his friends and his family, but none (of those that survive) were dedicated to Florus. Another devotee of Plutarch’s lectures was a Roman consul, Arulenus Rusticus (mentioned above), whom we are told received a letter from Domitian while attending one of Plutarch’s presentations (522D-E). He was so taken with Plutarch’s speaking that he did not bother to open the letter. Rusticus, however, was executed for treason in 93 AD which is probably what prompted Plutarch to leave Rome for the last time.

Plutarch spent most of his life in Chaeronea, which was the site of Philip II’s defeat of the Greeks in 338 BC (Diod. 16.85.2-86.6) and Sulla’s defeat of Archelaus, a general of Mithridates IV, in 86 BC.20 Plutarch’s great-grandfather, Nicarchus, remembered Antony’s harsh treatment of the Greeks leading up to Actium in 31 BC (Ant. 68.4-5).

Early in his career, Plutarch exhibited concern for the affairs of his hometown to the extent that he served as building commissioner (811B-C) and eponymous archon (642F, 694A). He also refers to himself as a member of the governing council of Boeotia (785C). His political career was not limited to local dealings, however, as Trajan granted him the consular insignia and Hadrian appointed him imperial procurator in his old age.21 Both were likely honorific titles but they denote the esteem in which Plutarch was held by Roman emperors.


21 Barrow, Plutarch, 49 and Jones, Plutarch, 28-29 and 56.
Plutarch may also have founded a school in his hometown though the date is unknown.\textsuperscript{22} It has been suggested that his family inherited and maintained it so that it “became something of a cultural center for the influential.”\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, it must have been relatively informal for there is no school of philosophy named after him. It probably consisted of household discussions with his family and neighbors as seen in several of his works. For instance, \textit{The Intelligence of Animals} mentions a discussion about hunting which occurred the day before. The participants included his sons and four other individuals about whom we know nothing. On other occasions, Plutarch mentions that he and, presumably, a student were walking and discussing issues, much like students in the Peripatetic academy (937D-F, 100E). Hamilton maintains that the works collected in the \textit{Moralia} were the discussions of the school written down.\textsuperscript{24} There is no evidence to corroborate Hamilton’s conclusion. In fact, one of the works, \textit{Table Talk}, specifically mentions that it was written in Athens while Plutarch was attending a festival of the Muses (736C). Hamilton further argues that the school itself was laid out like the Academy and students were educated by means of lectures and dialogues.\textsuperscript{25} Again, there is nothing to suggest that the school was anything more than a gathering of family and friends meeting to discuss major issues. However, Plutarch’s prominence in Chaeronea may have caused the curious to flock to hear him giving the impression that a structured school was in place.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Mor}. 937D-F, 1086D, 1100E, 1107E-F.

\textsuperscript{23} D.A. Russell, “On Reading Plutarch’s \textit{Moralia},” \textit{G&R} 15 (1968), 133.

\textsuperscript{24} Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch}, xxi.

\textsuperscript{25} Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch}, xxv.
Like the date of Plutarch’s birth, that of his death can only be approximated. Shortly after he fled Rome in 93 AD, he was appointed priest at Delphi, an office that he held until his death (SIG\(^3\) 829A). While priest at Delphi, he dedicated a statue, date unknown, to Hadrian who reigned from 117-138 AD. A similar dedication was erected in 125 AD by another priest of Apollo, T. Flavius Aristotimus (SIG 835B). Plutarch’s statue, then, could only have been erected between 117-125.\(^{26}\) Moreover, Eusebius, in his *Chronicles*, mentions that Plutarch was an old man in 119 when Hadrian appointed him an imperial procurator.\(^{27}\) Therefore, it is probable that Plutarch died sometime between 119 and 125 AD in his seventies.

Plutarch’s life in Chaeronea as well as his visits abroad and the friends he acquired influenced the eclectic outlook permeating his works. He is most famous for his *Parallel Lives* in which he compares the lives of illustrious Greeks and Romans to 69 AD.\(^{28}\) Forty-eight of these biographies survive and most were written in Plutarch’s middle and old age. Jones has posited dates for their composition after Plutarch left Rome for the last time, c. 96-c. 120 AD.\(^{29}\)

Plutarch’s own life showed little resemblance to the great men he wrote about in his *Parallel Lives*, which propelled him into the ranks of the literary elite. Of the Greek biographies, ten are of Athenians,\(^{30}\) four are of Spartans,\(^{31}\) two are of Thebans,\(^{32}\) and two


\(^{27}\) Barrow, *Plutarch*, 49.


\(^{30}\) *Theseus*, *Solon*, *Themistocles*, *Aristides*, *Cimon*, *Pericles*, *Nicias*, *Alcibiades*, *Demosthenes*, and *Lysander*.

\(^{31}\) *Lycurgus*, *Agesilaus*, *Agis*, and *Cleomenes*. 
of Macedonians.\(^{33}\) The Roman lives span from Romulus and Numa, two of Rome’s kings, to Scipio Africanus and Cato in the Punic Wars and Pompey, Caesar, and Cicero at the end of the Republic to the short-lived emperors Galba and Otho. In all, these biographies extend from the mythical hero Theseus to the Roman emperor Otho in 69 AD. They are arranged in comparative pairs (one Greek and one Roman) with the exception of the single lives of Aratus, Galba, and Otho.

Plutarch has a sympathetic view toward Rome in all of his works. Therefore, the intent of these comparisons was not to determine Greek superiority but to use great lives as a standard of a moral life (\textit{Tim.} prol. 1-3), which is why he tells us he wrote biographies:

\begin{quote}
For it is not history that I am writing but lives, and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always the appearance of virtue or vice but many times something slight like a word or jest reveals something greater about someone’s character than where thousands fell in battle, or the greatest armaments or city sieges (\textit{Alex.} 1.2-3).
\end{quote}

Because he makes the distinction between history and biography, and is in fact a biographer and ethicist, we must expect mistakes in geography, chronology, and historical fact because his focus is on what he deems to be the most important aspect of his subjects: character. Written at the end of his career, the \textit{Lives} reveal Plutarch’s concern for virtue and vice, which is often expressed in the \textit{Moralia}, and he tells us that virtue can be learned from the actions of the great men about whom he is writing (\textit{Per.} 2).

\(^{32}\) \textit{Pelopidas} and \textit{Epaminondas} (which has not survived).

\(^{33}\) \textit{Alexander} and \textit{Demetrius}.
Apart from the *Parallel Lives*, the other 76 works which have survived are traditionally referred to as the *Moralia*, although they would better be titled *Miscellany*. They cover a wide range of subjects including physics, religion, ethics, politics, psychology, and zoology revealing the author’s assorted interests. It should be noted, however, that of those 76 works, which are in the form of dialogues, lectures, and letters, ten have had their authenticity questioned.

Plutarch writes mostly on philosophical matters. He was a Platonist in that he revered Plato’s ethical standards. For instance, two of the works, *The Creation of the Soul in Plato’s Timaeus* and *Epitome of the Creation of the Soul in Plato’s Timaeus*, discuss Plato’s *Timaeus* and attempt to analyze the relationship of psyche (“soul”) and nous (“mind”). Plutarch also appropriated from other philosophical schools. He often quotes Aristotle (e.g. 422A, 944E, 1022E), Pythagoras (e.g. 44B, 169E, 413B), Heracleitus (e.g. 28D, 382B-C, 1089F), and Empedocles (e.g. 370E, 728E, 1103F). However, he was openly critical of the Stoics, Cynics, and the Epicureans. In *The Gods’ Slowness to Punish*, he reveals his acceptance of the Platonist and Peripatetic idea that happiness or a “good life” is achieved through likeness to God rather than through likeness to nature as the Stoics and Cynics believe (550D-E). Five different works deride

---


the Stoics and Epicureans in particular for the contradictions in their teachings: *Contradictions of the Stoics, Stoic Paradoxes are Stranger than Poets, Common Notions against the Stoic View, Not Even a Pleasant Life is Possible on Epicurean Ideals, and Against Colotes.* He even urges his students to fight against Stoics because they pervert common beliefs (985C, 1059F). Despite his hostility to Stoics and Epicureans, Plutarch accepts and even at times praises their ideals. For instance, in *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander,* Zeno, Stoicism’s founder, is a positive point of comparison for Alexander the Great (329A-B).

Plutarch’s philosophical beliefs tend to lean more toward the leading of a virtuous life. In the essay *Can Virtue Be Taught,* he viewed virtue as an art to be learned and without which, one could not be successful. However, he was not above exploiting his beliefs for rhetorical effect. In *On The Fortune or Virtue of Alexander,* virtue is a gift from the gods rather than something to be learned which highlights the role of the gods in Alexander’s life and shows him to be a virtuous man. Furthermore, he also discussed those things that should be avoided: anger, envy, curiosity, avarice. For instance, *The Control of Anger, On Envy and Hatred, On Talkativeness, On Curiosity,* and *On the Love of Money* stress characteristics that one must control.

Plutarch’s emphasis on moderation and self-control may explain his interest in Sparta, the subject of three essays. He seems especially intrigued by Spartan society in the *Institutions of the Spartans,* and in *Spartan Sayings* he chose the sayings of great Spartan kings and commanders to illustrate virtue, especially temperance. For instance, when asked about Sparta’s lack of walls, Agesilaus responded, “it is not necessary that cities be built with stones and timber, but with the virtues of its inhabitants” (210E-F).
Like the *Spartan Sayings*, there is the more famous *Sayings of Spartan Women* in which a Spartan mother tells her son, “your father saved this shield for you; keep it safe or do not come home” (241F).

Plutarch’s tenure as a priest of Apollo at Delphi allowed him to develop religious topics. The dialogues *The Pythia’s Prophecies* and *The Decline of Oracles* attempt to explain the form that oracular responses have taken in the past (verse) and present (prose) and especially their ambiguity. While mostly using Egyptian religion as a vehicle for a discussion of metaphysics, the end of the *On Isis and Osiris* is devoted to religion in general.\(^{38}\) Plutarch concludes that the peculiar things in life should be revered as they are gifts from the gods (382A-B). In general, his interest in religion sets him apart from other authors of his age.\(^{39}\)

Plutarch also wrote on the subject of politics such as the unfinished work *To an Uneducated Ruler*, which reveals the problems inherent in a young ruler and why such a person should be philosophically educated.\(^{40}\) Again, an emphasis on restraint is shown because, to Plutarch, a philosophical education brings self-control to a ruler (780A-B). In *Old Men in Politics*, Plutarch concludes that old age is no excuse for failure to participate in political life (783C-D), which helps to explain his own activity well into his old age. Probably the most interesting work is the essay *Advice on Public Life*, about the benefits and pitfalls of public service and how an individual should conduct himself in office. The essay is the advice of an experienced man given to a young man, Menemachus,

---


\(^{40}\) G.J.D. Aalders, *Plutarch’s Political Thought* (Amsterdam, 1982).
beginning his career. Interestingly, the author’s emphasis on character is made clear when he tells Menemachus that τρέπεσθαι χρή πρὸς κατανόησιν τοῦ ἣθους τῶν πολιτῶν (“it is necessary that a statesman understand the character of the citizens,” 799B). Ultimately, Plutarch believed that politics as an occupation was a noble profession (786B) which is in direct opposition to Stoic (1033EF) and Epicurean (1125C) concepts of abstinence from pleasure or pain.41

Finally, Plutarch was also interested in science. He exhibited an interest in the minds of animals in The Intelligence of Animals42 and Gryllus,43 both of which use the Platonic dialogue format and conclude that all animals have intelligence. The mutilated work On Eating Flesh seems to be a defense of vegetarianism on the grounds that the human body is not naturally carnivorous (994F, cf. 988E) and because eating animals is inhumane (993A-D).

His knowledge of physics is displayed in a letter to Favorinus, a Roman equestrian and close friend of Hadrian, titled The Primary Cold.44 In it, Plutarch asserts that cold is a substance and proceeds to determine what that substance is: air (948A-949F), water (949F-952C), or earth (952C-955C). Ultimately, he concludes that earth is to cold what fire is to heat. He also makes an attempt to discuss planetary science, especially the occurrence of eclipses, in The Face in the Moon.

42 H. Martin, “Plutarch’s De Sollertia Animalium 959 B-C: The Discussion of the Encomium of Hunting,” AJP 100 (1979), 99-106.
44 On Favorinus, see Barrow, Plutarch, 25-27 and Jones, Plutarch, 60-61.
Plutarch’s enduring influence has a great deal to do with his focus on human life and character which he exhibited in both the *Parallel Lives* and the *Moralia*. The humanism that he advocated influenced Christian writers such as Clement of Alexandria and St. Basil, as well as Renaissance authors such as Montaigne, Shakespeare and Ben Jonson. The universal truths of human existence which were the focus of Plutarch’s works resonate as much today as they did nearly two thousand years ago when he was writing.

---


46 R. Hirzel, *Plutarch* (Leipzig, 1912), 74-206, discusses Plutarch’s legacy in detail but is quite out of date. Russell, *Plutarch*, 143-158, is an attempt to briefly sketch Plutarch’s influence and legacy as well as the transmission and translation of his texts.
Alexander the Great (356-323): An Overview

Alexander was born to Philip II and his fourth wife Olympias of Epirus in July 356.¹ There are stories that show he was special from conception. For example, Zeus came to Olympias in a dream as a thunderbolt and impregnated her, and in another story Zeus had sexual intercourse with Olympias in the form of a snake (Plut. Alex. 2.3-4). When Alexander was born the temple to Artemis in Ephesus burned down (Artemis at the time was helping to deliver Alexander into the world), which was taken to indicate that the Persian Empire would fall.² Although Alexander had an older brother, Arrhidaeus (the mentally handicapped son of Philip and his third wife Philinna), Alexander was groomed to succeed Philip. Much of Alexander’s youth was spent under the guidance of Leonidas, a relative of his mother. He taught Alexander to ride a horse, fight, and march. Aristotle fostered in Alexander a love of literature, philosophy, and medicine (Plut. Alex. 8.1), and he tutored Alexander from the age of fourteen to sixteen. With the Iliad and Odyssey as his guide, Alexander tried to mirror the virtues ἀρετή (“excellence”), τιμή (“honor”), and κόσμος (“glory”), embodied in such figures as Heracles and Achilles (who were also his ancestors).³

¹ For the most recent treatment of Philip II, see Worthington, Philip II. On Olympias, see E. Carney, Olympias: Mother of Alexander (New York, 2006).
² Hegesias, FGrH 142 F 3 = Plut. Alex. 3.5-9.
Alexander’s physical training would pay off early, for at age sixteen (in 340), Alexander put down a revolt by the Maedians, and at the age of eighteen (in 338) he was given the command of the Companion Cavalry at Chaeronea and annihilated the Theban Sacred Band.

In 336, Philip II was assassinated and Alexander succeeded him as king. He immediately set about solidifying Macedonia’s hold on Greece, which on Philip’s death had revolted from the Macedonian hegemony imposed in 337 by Philip by means of the League of Corinth. Philip at that time had also revealed his plan to invade Asia to seek revenge for what the Greeks had suffered during the Persian War and to liberate the Greek cities of Asia Minor from Persian rule. He was elected commander-in-chief of a combined Greek army. A few months after Philip’s murder, Alexander ended the Greek revolt and re-imposed the League of Corinth with himself as its leader, and as commander of the Greek army, and he prepared to put into action his father’s plan to invade Asia.

In early 335, Alexander and a Macedonian army attacked Thracian and Illyrian tribes who were threatening to invade Macedonia. Later that year, Alexander was forced to deal with the insurrection of the Thebans after they heard a rumor that Alexander died.

4 Just. 9.1.8, Plut. Alex. 9.1.
5 Diod. 16.85.2-86.6. The battle of Chaeronea is discussed in the commentary on 327C.
6 For Philip’s assassination, see Bosworth, CE, 22-26, Hammond, Genius, 24-29, and Worthington, Philip II, 172-186.
8 Diod. 17.4.9. For the discrepancies between ἠγεμόν and στρατηγὸς οἰκοκρατόρ, see Bosworth, Arrian 1, 48-49.
9 Arr. 1.5.1. On Alexander’s Thracian and Illyrian campaigns, see the commentary on 327C.
while fighting in Illyria. Provoked by the Thebans’ capture of a Macedonian garrison, Alexander laid siege to the city and razed it to the ground (with the exception of a few temples and the house of Pindar), executing and enslaving its inhabitants to show the rest of Greece the price of rebellion.10

Finally, Alexander could turn to Asia, and in 334 he and his army crossed the Hellespont.11 After visiting the site of Troy and paying his respects at the tomb of Achilles, an ancestor on his mother’s side,12 he turned to deal with the Persians. A Persian force was camped on the east bank of the Granicus River in northern Anatolia blocking his advance.13 He deployed his troops down the river’s steep west bank, across the swift-flowing river, and up its east bank. He sent across a small cavalry unit first as a decoy to distract the Persian cavalry, thus allowing the rest of the Macedonian line to cross the river relatively unharmed. Once the army had crossed, the decisive charge of the Companion cavalry effectively split the Persian forces. In the hand to hand combat, Alexander was nearly cut down by a Persian sword, but Cleitus, one of his generals, saved him.14 This was Alexander’s first victory over the Persians and the first step towards liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor from Persian tyranny.

10 See I. Worthington, “Alexander’s Destruction of Thebes,” in W. Heckel and L.A. Title (eds.), Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander (Claremont, 2003), 65-86, also suggests that Alexander destroyed Thebes for supporting a pretender, probably Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, to the Macedonian throne and that the byproduct of Alexander’s need to staunch the rebellion was the message that it sent to the other Greek states. For further discussion of Thebes’ destruction, see the commentary on 327C.

11 Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont is discussed in the commentary on 331D.

12 Alexander’s descent from Achilles: Diod. 17.1.5, Arr. 1.11.8, Just. 11.3.1, Plut. Alex. 2.1. For more on Alexander’s visit to the tomb of Achilles, see the commentary on 331D.

13 On the battle at the Granicus River, see the commentary on 327F.

14 Diod. 17.20.7, Arr. 1.15.7-8, Plut. Alex. 16.5.
Alexander marched south along the coast of Ionia, in the process receiving the surrender of places like Sardis and Ephesus, but also encountering resistance at places such as Miletus and Halicarnassus. After successfully besieging them, he reached Pamphylia (on the southern coast of modern Turkey), and from there he turned into the interior of Asia Minor to reach Gordium in summer 333. Gordium was the setting for one of the more legendary tales in Alexander’s reign: the untying of the Gordian knot. The knot bound the yoke to the pole of the wagon supposedly dedicated to the gods by King Midas. Legend had it that the man who loosened the knot would become lord of Asia, and Alexander either cut it or unraveled it. His actions must have caused the Persians to lose morale and added to his mystique since the gods had, it would seem, ordained him as the conqueror of Asia.

From Gordium, Alexander marched to meet Darius at Issus where the two armies met in battle in the middle of 333. It was another decisive victory for Alexander and it marked the beginning of the end of the Persian Empire. During the battle, Darius fled and his army scattered, and in the pursuit, hundreds if not thousands of Persians were

---

15 Arr.1.17.3-18.2; cf. Bosworth, CE, 44-45 and Worthington, Alexander, 57-58.


17 Arr. 2.3.6-7, Curt. 3.1.16, Just. 11.7.4, Plut. Alex. 18.2-4; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 21-23, Lane Fox, Alexander, 149-154, Green, Alexander, 210-215, Bosworth, CE, 53-54, Hammond, KCS, 89, and Worthington, Alexander, 64-66.

18 Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 7 = Arr. 2.3.7, Plut. Alex. 18.4.

19 Worthington, Alexander, 66.

20 For a discussion of the battle of Issus, see the commentary on 326F.
mowed down.\textsuperscript{21} A significant outcome of the battle was that Darius left behind his treasury and entourage including his family, who fell into Alexander’s hands.

After Issus, the Macedonians marched south along the Levantine coast. At Tyre in 332, city leaders surrendered the city to Alexander who then notified them of his intent to sacrifice to a local deity whom he recognized as Heracles, one of his paternal ancestors.\textsuperscript{22} The Tyrians then refused to allow any Macedonian within their city walls, thus angering Alexander.\textsuperscript{23} He therefore besieged Tyre, and after a six month siege, it fell but with heavy losses on both sides. After Tyre, Alexander laid siege to Gaza (332), and its fall four months later opened the way for him to enter Egypt.\textsuperscript{24} There, he was met by Mazaces, the Persian satrap, who surrendered Memphis and hence Egypt to him without bloodshed.\textsuperscript{25} While in Egypt, Alexander founded Alexandria in 331, which would become the economic and cultural center of the Hellenistic world,\textsuperscript{26} and he also visited the oracular site of Zeus Ammon at Siwah, two hundred and fifty miles southwest of Alexandria,\textsuperscript{27} perhaps in emulation of his ancestors Perseus and Heracles (Arr. 3.3.2). There, Alexander was met by the priest, but misinterpreted (perhaps intentionally) the priest’s greeting \textit{ὦ παιδίον} (“o boy”) for \textit{ὦ παι δίος} (“o son of Zeus”). Although, much of

\textsuperscript{21} Diod. 17.34.5-6, Arr. 2.21, Curt. 3.11.27, Just. 11.9.10, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 20.5.

\textsuperscript{22} Diod. 17.40.2-3, Arr. 2.16.1, Curt. 4.2.2, Just. 11.10.10, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 24.2.

\textsuperscript{23} Diodorus 17.40.3 suggests that their refusal to allow Alexander to enter the city was because of their loyalty to Darius. On the siege at Tyre, see the commentary on 332A.

\textsuperscript{24} For the siege of Gaza, see the commentary on 327A.

\textsuperscript{25} Arr. 3.1.2, Curt. 4.1.32.

\textsuperscript{26} For more on Alexander’s founding of Alexandria in Egypt, see the commentary on 326F.

\textsuperscript{27} Diod. 17.49.2-51.4, Arr. 3.3.1-4.5, Curt. 4.7.1-32, Just. 11.11, Plut. \textit{Alex.}, 27.3-6, Strabo 17.1.43; cf. Tarn, \textit{Alexander} 1, 43-44, Lane Fox, \textit{Alexander}, 200-209, Green, \textit{Alexander}, 272-277, Bosworth, \textit{CE}, 71-74, Hammond, \textit{KCS}, 126-130, and Worthington, \textit{Alexander}, 86-89.
Alexander’s visit is a mystery, the sources reveal a change in him for he now openly called himself the son of Zeus.\(^{28}\)

Alexander then returned to Memphis, and arranged for an Egyptian, Doloaspis, to govern Egypt in his absence and a Greek, Cleomenes, to see to its finances.\(^{29}\) By appointing a foreigner, Alexander cemented a policy of putting non-Macedonians in control of satrapies. In April 331, he left Egypt and marched to meet Darius again. He crossed the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and both sides met near the small village of Gaugamela. Despite his large forces, Darius lost the battle of Gaugamela decisively,\(^{30}\) and, as at Issus, he fled.

The destruction of the Persian army at Gaugamela left Babylon unprotected and Alexander immediately marched to capture it.\(^{31}\) Mazaeus, a Persian commander, met him outside the city’s walls and formally surrendered the city to him.\(^{32}\) Alexander entered as a victorious king and the Babylonians recognized him as such. He spent five weeks in Babylon organizing his administration (such as appointing officials to oversee taxation and reorganizing the structure of military command — before he left he appointed Mazaeus as satrap), and waiting for reinforcements. Once they arrived, he prepared his assault on the capitals of Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Ecbatana. Late

\(^{28}\) Curt. 4.7.30-31, Plut. Alex. 28.1.

\(^{29}\) Arrian gives Doloaspis the title of nomarch (3.5.2).


\(^{31}\) Arr. 3.16.4-5, Curt. 5.1.17-23. On Alexander’s entry and stay in Babylon, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 51-52, Lane Fox, Alexander, 156-157, Green, Alexander, 300-304, Bosworth, CE, 86-87, Hammond, KCS, 164-165, and Worthington, Alexander, 101-102.

\(^{32}\) Curt. 5.1.17-18.
in 331, Susa capitulated and surrendered its treasury. Early the next year, Alexander took Persepolis and, as one tradition suggests, he intentionally burned the palace to the ground, to symbolize the downfall of the Persian Empire, an act he seemed to regret later. The other two capitals, Pasargadae and Ecbatana, yielded shortly afterward, garnering Alexander more funds for his treasury.

Darius was still alive, however. He had left Ecbatana shortly before Alexander arrived and fled to Bactria, the territory of the satrap Bessus. Soon after his arrival in 330, he was arrested and then murdered by Satibarzanes, a Persian nobleman, and Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana, at Hecatompylus (modern Qummis), the Parthian capital. Bessus wasted no time proclaiming himself king as Artaxerxes V, and Alexander, enraged by Bessus’ actions, gave Darius a funeral befitting a king and then went in pursuit of Bessus who was mobilizing the Bactrian cavalry. While Alexander was at Maracanda in 329, Spitamenes and Dataphernes, two Sogdianan noblemen

---

33 Diod. 17.65.4, Arr. 3.16.9-17.1, Curt. 5.2.8-16, Just. 11.14.9, Plut. Alex. 35-38; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 52-53, Lane Fox, Alexander, 251-254, Green, Alexander, 304-308, Bosworth, CE, 55-64, Hammond, KCS, 94-110, Briant, Cyrus, 719-726, and Worthington, Alexander, 100-107.

34 Diod. 17.70.1-6, Curt. 5.6.1-8, Plut. Alex. 37.3-5; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 53-53, Lane Fox, Alexander, 258-264, Green, Alexander, 310-321, Bosworth, CE, 91-94, Hammond, KCS, 166-170, and Worthington, Alexander, 107-111.


37 Diod. 17.73, Arr. 3.20, Curt. 5.13.15-25, Just. 11.15.1-15, Plut. Alex. 43; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 56-57, Lane Fox, Alexander, 268-270, Green, Alexander, 325-331, Bosworth, CE, 98-100, Hammond, KCS, 171-174, and Worthington, Alexander, 111-113.
orchestrated a revolt of Bactria and Sogdiana, and the Macedonian army endured brutal guerilla style fighting for two years.\textsuperscript{38}

Meanwhile, at Phrada there was a plot to murder Alexander, the so-called Philotas affair, led by Dimnus, a minor associate of the king, and Demetrius, a bodyguard.\textsuperscript{39} The plot was betrayed by Dimnus’ lover, Nicomachus, who confided in his brother Cebalinus. Cebalinus immediately told Philotas, Parmenion’s son and the commander of the Companion Cavalry, about the plot, but Philotas did nothing. Philotas was then arrested, put on trial, and executed for his alleged involvement. Alexander used Philotas’ connection to the plot to eliminate the family and sent orders for Parmenion’s execution to Cleander, the mercenary commander at Ecbatana where Parmenion was located. Cleander wasted no time carrying out his orders. Since Philotas and Parmenion had a history of criticizing the king’s growing orientalism,\textsuperscript{40} Alexander may have taken advantage of this conspiracy to engineer their downfall.\textsuperscript{41}

A year later (329) Bessus was betrayed by Spitamenes and Dataphernes and handed over to Ptolemy, one of Alexander’s commanders. He was put on trial for regicide, tortured, and executed.\textsuperscript{42} Alexander then moved northward through the Hindu Kush. The army was in Maracanda (Samarkand) in 328 where one of the most infamous


\textsuperscript{40} For more on Alexander’ orientalism, see pp. 48-51.


\textsuperscript{42} Diod. 17.83.7-9, Arr. 3.28-30.5, Curt. 7.5.38-39, Just. 12.5.11, Plut. Alex. 43.3.
events in his reign occurred: the murder of Cleitus. The sources vary on the details of the incident. What is known is that, for whatever reason, Cleitus felt the need to praise Philip in such a way that Alexander was offended. Cleitus’ words occurred at a dinner party at which everyone was drunk. Alexander was angered by them, and after a lengthy altercation, he struck Cleitus with a pike killing him instantly.

The year 327 marked a radical change in policy for Alexander, one that intensified the estrangement of the Greeks and Macedonians. First, he began the practice of including foreigners in his army. Second, in Bactra he attempted to introduce the Persian practice of proskynesis at his court. According to Persian custom, an individual prostrated himself before the king (Hdt. 1.134) or bowed and blew the king a kiss as the Persepolis Treasury reliefs indicate. For the Greeks, the procedure was viewed as blasphemous since it appeared to be an act of prostration to the gods. Alexander’s action could indicate that he now thought he was a god, given that he would have known how his men would react to such a religiously charged act. His attempt was a failure mainly because his court historian, Callisthenes, refused to participate.

---


44 Curt. 8.1.22-27, Arr. 4.8.4-6. Plutarch in the biography (Alex. 50.5 and 51.1-2) suggests that Cleitus’ comments were about Alexander’s orientalizing.


46 Arr. 4.9-10, Curt. 8.5.5-22, Just. 12.7.1. Plut. Alex. 54.3-6; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 77-80, Lane Fox, Alexander, 320-330, Green, Alexander, 372-376, Bosworth, CE, 284-287, Hammond, KCS, 201-202, and Worthington, Alexander, 140-141.
Also in 327 at Bactra, another plot to kill the king was revealed, the so-called Pages’ Conspiracy.\textsuperscript{47} The Royal Pages, teenage sons of Macedonian noblemen, were given free access to the king, even protecting him while he slept.\textsuperscript{48} Four of them were reportedly planning to kill Alexander while he slept, but Alexander stayed up all night drinking and did not return to bed on the night that the assassination was to take place. Once the plot was brought to the king’s attention, he had the conspirators tried and also took the opportunity to implicate Callisthenes, despite the fact that the accused pages never said anything of his involvement even when tortured. The suspect pages were executed and Callisthenes was imprisoned for his alleged involvement in the affair — he later died or was killed.\textsuperscript{49}

In the same year Alexander married a Bactrian princess, Roxane, which caused some derision from the Macedonians.\textsuperscript{50} The marriage was likely politically motivated because Alexander needed the support of her father, Oxyartes, who had been an opponent, to maintain the passivity of Bactria and Sogdiana after he ended the revolt in 329. After subjugating Bactria and Sogdiana, Alexander moved into India. Here, the people of one of the villages, Nysa, recognized him as Dionysus reborn, which to him further cemented the idea of his godhead.\textsuperscript{51} Alexander fought the last major battle of his Asian campaign in India at the battle of the Hydaspes River in 326. Here, he was

\textsuperscript{47} Arr. 4.13.4, Curt. 8.6.11, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 55.9; cf. Tarn, \textit{Alexander} 1, 81, Bosworth, \textit{CE}, 117-119, Hammond, \textit{KCS}, 200-201, and Worthington, \textit{Alexander}, 141-143.


\textsuperscript{49} The conspiracy involving the Royal Pages is treated at length by E. Badian, “Conspiracies,” in A.B. Bosworth and E. Baynham (eds.), \textit{Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction} (Oxford, 1996), 71-72.

\textsuperscript{50} On Alexander’s marriage to Roxane, see pp. 39-40, 46-47, and the commentary on 332E-F.

confronted by an Indian army led by Porus, ruler of the region between the Hydaspes (Jhelum) and Acesines (Chenab) Rivers. Despite fierce fighting and battling Porus’ elephant corps, the Macedonians were victorious, although Alexander allowed Porus to continue to rule the lands beyond the Hydaspes as a client king.

Alexander wanted to continue moving into the Indian interior much to the dismay of his men. He was looking to cross the Hyphasis River, a tributary of the Indus, in 326 when his men refused. To the army, Alexander had already accomplished what he had originally set out to do: to conquer the Persian Empire. He controlled all four of the Persian capitals (Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Ecbatana) and Darius III had been killed in 330 at Hecatompylus. Conquering India was not part of the plan — but then neither had been the conquest of Bactria and Sogdiana. Hence, pushed to the limit, the men mutinied at the Hyphasis, and Coenus, one of the generals, told Alexander that further movement eastwards was unacceptable because too many lives had been lost already. Alexander was forced to give in, and the army began what it thought was the long march home. Coenus died suspiciously a few days after the mutiny.

The Macedonian army marched westward to the Indus, and there turned south but was confronted by hostile tribes such as the Oxydracae and the Mallians. Alexander suffered a near fatal wound while besieging Malli, but after some time he recovered, and he and the army continued southward along the Indus (which he sailed down and

---


53 Arr. 5.27.1-29, Curt. 9.3.3-5.

54 Arr. 6.2.1, Curt. 9.3.20.

55 For more on the campaign against the Mallians and Alexander’s near fatal wound, see the commentary on 327B.
then out into the Indian Ocean). A terrible march then followed as he and part of his army turned westward to march through the Gedrosian desert.\textsuperscript{56} It was a sixty day hike through harsh terrain without provisions and with little water in which one third of the army and most of the pack animals perished. Alexander’s forces regrouped in Carmania in 324 and celebrated for a week in the form of a Dionysiac revel complete with Alexander dressed as the god.\textsuperscript{57}

Leaving Carmania, Alexander and the army marched to Susa. Here, in 324, he arranged the marriage of ninety of his men to Persian noblewomen.\textsuperscript{58} Alexander himself took two brides, Stateira, the daughter of Darius, and Parysatis, the daughter of Darius’ predecessor, Artaxerxes III, in keeping with the Macedonian custom of polygamy.\textsuperscript{59} The wedding ceremony followed Persian custom unlike Alexander’s marriage to Roxane which followed Macedonian. The mass marriage was a purely political move to ensure that the bloodlines of the Persian nobility were diluted with Macedonian blood.\textsuperscript{60} This would prevent any Persian from claiming the throne or becoming a rallying point for the people to overthrow Macedonian rule.

From Susa, the army moved to Opis, where Alexander decreed that the Macedonian and Greek veterans and wounded were to return home. This would leave

\textsuperscript{56} Diod. 17.105.3-4, Arr. 6.23-24, Curt. 9.10.8-10, Plut. Alex. 66.6; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 106-108, Bosworth, CE, 139-146, Hammond, KCS, 234-238, Green, Alexander, 433-436, Lane Fox, Alexander, 398-399, and Worthington, Alexander, 168-171.


\textsuperscript{58} On the mass marriages at Susa, see pp. 48 and the commentary on 329E-F.

\textsuperscript{59} Arr. 7.4. Diodorus (17.107.6), Curtius (10.3.12), Justin (12.10.9), and Plutarch (Alex. 70.2) only mention the marriage to Stateira.

\textsuperscript{60} For more on the political motivation for the marriage ceremonies, see pp. 48 and the commentary at 329D-F.
him with a high proportion of Persians in the army, and this is probably why his men mutinied again. Refusing to surrender to their demands, Alexander began to give select Persians commands in the army and Macedonian military titles were conferred on Persian units. The Macedonians and Greeks in the army quickly begged forgiveness, which Alexander accepted as planned. He then held a great banquet of reconciliation, at which he prayed for concord and harmony between Persians and Macedonians.

From Opis, Alexander marched to Ecbatana. Here, Hephaestion, his closest friend, fell ill following a night of heavy drinking and died one week later. Alexander was devastated. When he came out of his grieving days later, he sent an embassy to the oracle of Zeus Ammon in Siwah to ask that heroic honors be conferred on Hephaestion, which the oracle granted.

In early 323, after Hephaestion’s funeral, Alexander left Ecbatana for Babylon. While there, he received foreign embassies and conducted matters of imperial administration. Then one night he became violently ill after a drinking party. His health deteriorated rapidly, and he died on June 10, 323. Justin 9.14.9 suggests that he might have been poisoned, but there is no evidence to support his assertion and he probably

---

61 Diod. 17.109.2-3, Curt. 10.2.8-4.3, Just. 12.11.4-12.6, Plut. Alex. 70-72; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 115-116, Lane Fox, Alexander, 427-430, Green, Alexander, 453-456, Bosworth, CE, 159-161, and Worthington, Alexander, 182-183.

62 Diod. 17.108.3, Arr. 7.11.1-4, Curt.. 10.3.5, Plut. Alex. 71.4-6.

63 See pp. 47-48 for analysis of the prayer following the mutiny.


65 Arr. 7.24.4, Plut. Alex. 72.3, 75.3; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 131-132, Lane Fox, Alexander, 456-458, Bosworth, CE, 238-239, and Worthington, Alexander, 189.
died from malaria or pancreatitis.\textsuperscript{66} Following his death, his kingdom immediately began falling apart as his generals carved it up among themselves and the mainland Greeks revolted from the League of Corinth in what is referred to as the Lamian War.

III

The Sources and Alexander

The sources on Alexander are controversial given their nature and fall into two categories: primary and secondary. Primary sources are those that were written in Alexander’s time or shortly thereafter and exist today only in fragments quoted in the accounts of later writers. Secondary sources are those that were written centuries after Alexander’s death and provide more comprehensive narratives of his reign. This chapter addresses the source tradition for Alexander the Great and the place of *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great* in it.

**Primary Sources**

Most of the fragments are from Aristobulus of Cassandria (*FGrH* 139), Callisthenes of Olynthus (*FGrH* 124), Chares of Mytilene (*FGrH* 125), Cleitarchus of Alexandria (*FGrH* 137), Nearchus of Crete (*FGrH* 133), Onesicritus of Atypalaea (*FGrH* 134), and Ptolemy, son of Lagus (*FGrH* 138).\(^1\) Despite existing only fragmentary form, it can be said that the image of the Macedonian king is not consistent in them because of their personal agendas. As Pearson argued, “different writers illustrated different sides of Alexander’s personality; each writer had a different personal story to tell and it was his personal part in the expedition which gave him his excuse for writing.”\(^2\) For instance, the

---


2 Pearson, *LHA*, 20.
contemporary court historian Callisthenes wrote a work, *The Deeds of Alexander*, in which he sensationalizes his account of Alexander’s visit to Siwah and the army’s survival on the Pamphylian coast,\(^3\) to earn the king’s favor. His account, then, played to Alexander’s vanity and was as rhetorical as Plutarch’s speeches.\(^4\) Later, Polybius would later show Callisthenes’ ineptitude as a historian by analyzing his account of Issus (12.17.1-22.7), in which the numbers of the Persian army were exaggerated (12.18.2) and the difficulties of the terrain were intensified to enhance the Macedonians’ victory (12.18.11-12).\(^5\) It is entirely likely, however, that Callisthenes, who was an eyewitness, was actually correct in his account of the battle, but only the salacious details of it were subsumed into the secondary tradition.\(^6\) Aristobulus, a technical officer, and Onesicritus, a naval captain, both eyewitnesses, were also considered by later authors to have flattered the king excessively in their narratives.\(^7\) Even Ptolemy, one of Alexander’s generals, was not immune to self-embellishment, for Curtius says that he wrote about Alexander only to glorify himself.\(^8\) Bosworth argues, however, that Ptolemy may have had a practical reason for elevating himself because, during his struggles with Alexander’s other

---

\(^3\) Arrian 1.26.1-2 and Plutarch, *Alexander* 17.3 claim that the path along the coast was covered with water until a change in the winds blew it off the path so the army could march across. The changing winds were attributed to the gods.

\(^4\) Pearson, *LHA*, 32-37 and 48-49.

\(^5\) However, as Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 6, points out, Polybius’ critique was faulty because he assumed that all of Alexander’s infantry was massed as one phalanx (12.19.1-4, 12.20.6-8).


\(^8\) Ptolemy, *FGrH* 138 F 26b = Curt. 9.5.21.
successors following the king’s death, it was in his best interests to emphasize his relationship with Alexander and to denigrate his rivals, such as Perdiccas (cf. Diod. 18.33-37). Cleitarchus, who was too young to go on Alexander’s campaign to Asia, also embellished his account of it (Cic. Brut. 42-43), such as his story of the Amazon queen’s visit to Alexander’s camp in Hyrcania, where she offered herself to him in order to conceive a child. Also, among other things, Cleitarchus says that Ptolemy saved Alexander during siege of Malli in 326 although Ptolemy was not present at it. Cleitarchus might have felt it necessary to exaggerate the actions of Ptolemy since he was writing in Alexandria during Ptolemy’s rule. These sources were not particular about presenting a consistent characterization of Alexander and, therefore, we should not be surprised that the later, or secondary, sources do the same.

Secondary Sources

The earliest narrative history of Alexander that we have is from the first century BC by Diodorus Siculus. He wrote a universal history from the mythical times of Greece to 54 BC in forty books, but only fifteen are extant, and those dealing with Alexander, (17 and 18.1-2) are incomplete. Diodorus preserved fragments of Cleitarchus’ work, although some scholars have supposed that Diodorus’ account does not reflect his own

---

9 Bosworth, Arrian 1, 23.

10 Cleitarchus, FGrH 137 F 15 = Plut. Alex. 46, and F 16 = Strabo 11.5.4; cf. Diod. 17.77.2-3, Curt. 6.5.24-32. Aristobulus (FGrH 139 F 21 = Plut. Alex. 46, Arr. 7.13.2-3) and Ptolemy (FGrH 138 F 28a = Plut. Alex. 46) claim that the story of the Amazon queen meeting Alexander was fiction.

11 Cleitarchus, FGrH 137 F 24 = Curt. 9.5.21; cf. Arr. 6.11.8.


opinions, merely those of others.14 However, it has been convincingly argued that he included his own interpretations of events in his work.15 Unfortunately, his narrative is marred by errors in chronology16 and he confuses names and places.17 Diodorus’ Alexander was a man of virtue; indeed he was a Homeric hero.18 For instance, at 17.37.3-38.7, while discussing Alexander’s treatment of Darius’ wife and mother in 333, he mentions that Alexander demonstrated his kindness in his actions and as a result the Persian women hailed him as a god. Diodorus also defends Alexander’s actions when he says that dishonorable actions were foreign to his decency, as the Philotas affair in 330 when Alexander exploited an opportunity to rid himself of one of his detractors (17.79.1).

Quintus Curtius Rufus, a Roman soldier and politician, wrote a History of Alexander in ten books in probably the middle to late first century AD.19 The first two books are lost and the remaining ones are riddled with lacunae. Similarities with


16 Diodorus dates the war of Agis III of Sparta against Macedonia, to the archonship of Aristophon of Athens in 330/329 (17.62.1), but the battle of Megalopolis, which ended the war, was in 331, a year after it began.

17 Diodorus 17.3.4-5 states that it was the Arcadians alone who did not participate in the League of Corinth, yet it is well known that the Spartans refused to do so (Arr. 1.1.2, Just. 11.2.5; cf. Mor. 240A-B). Also, at 17.46.6 he records that Alexander installed Ballonymus as king of Tyre in 332, but Curtius 4.1.15 and Justin 11.10.8 preserve the name as Abdalonymus.


19 The date of Curtius’ work is unclear. J.R. Fears, “Parthi in A. Curtius Rufus,” Hermes 102 (1974), 623-625, argues for a date after the fall of the Parthian Empire, while E. Baynham, Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius Rufus (Ann Arbor, 1998; repr. 2001), 201-219, argues for a date before its fall in 228 AD, probably a time between the reigns of Augustus and Trajan; cf. A.B. Bosworth, “Cornelius Tacitus and Quintus Curtius,” CQ 54 (2004), 551-567. Atkinson, Curtius, 19-42, suggests a date no earlier than 14 AD when Tiberius became emperor and no later than the fall of the Parthian Empire in 228 AD.
Diodorus’ account show that Cleitarchus was their common source. Curtius is by far the most hostile to Alexander and sees him as a megalomaniac who could not control his emotions or his drinking. He attributes Alexander’s murder of Cleitus in Maracanda in 328 not only to Alexander’s heavy drinking but also to his arrogance at praising his own achievements (8.1.22).

Marcus Junianus Justinus (Justin), a Gaul living in probably the third century AD, epitomized a first century BC narrative history of the known world to the time of Augustus by Pompeius Trogus (the Philippic History), who also made use of Cleitarchus’ work. It is difficult to discern from Justin’s Epitome whether he was expressing his own opinions about the subject matter or merely echoing those of Trogus, although a recent linguistic study leans toward the former view. Books 11 and 12 deal with the life and reign of Alexander, who is treated superficially compared to the narratives of Diodorus and Curtius. The image of Alexander is less than flattering since Trogus/Justin believed that Alexander aimed at divinity (11.11.2-12), and that emotional excess was one of his failings, as seen in the criticism of Alexander lacking kingly decorum following the death of his closest friend, Hephaestion in 324 (12.12.12).

20 Hammond, Three Historians of Alexander the Great, 116-159.
21 Tarn, Alexander 2, 91-122 and Baynham, Quintus Curtius Rufus, 10-12, 165-200.
22 R. Syme, “The Date of Justin and the Discovery of Trogus,” Historia 37 (1988), 358-362, suggested the fourth century AD. Heckel and Yardley, Justin, 1, argue for early in the third century.
23 J.C. Yardley and R. Develin, Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus (Atlanta, 1994), 4-6.
25 Tarn, Alexander 2, 122-126 and Heckel and Yardley, Justin, 40-41.
Lucius Flavius Arrianus (Arrian) was a Greek from Nicomedia in Bithynia writing in the early second century AD. The seven books of his Campaigns of Alexander made frequent use of the works of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Arrian appears to balance praise with apologetics in the work making it a much more sobering account. On the one hand, Alexander is shown to be a heroic figure, but, on the other, he is flawed and subject to the same vices as any man. For example, while lauding Alexander’s virtues (fearlessness, boldness, intelligence, honesty), Arrian also suggests that the king’s orientalizing was not scandalous but understandable if taken in context (7.29.2-4). Arrian seems to be much more critical of his sources, although he does include details that he does not believe or of which he is not sure, as in his account of Alexander’s dream which predicted his victory at Tyre in 332 (2.18.1-2), the treatment of the Gordian knot in 333 (2.3.6-8) or his discussion of the Amazons at 7.13.2-4. Because if his reliance on Ptolemy, Arrian’s accounts of battles and sieges are more reliable than those of other writers, and in general his approach to his sources and the way he presents information make for a more realistic history of Alexander.

Strabo (late first century BC – early first century AD) wrote a Geography dealing with Europe, Asia, and Africa, and Alexander is featured in parts of Books 11 (11.5.5, 6.4, 7.4, 11.4), 15 (15.1.2-3.24), and 16 (16.1.3-2.11). Strabo relies heavily on the accounts of Nearchus, Onesicritus, Cleitarchus and Aristobulus for Alexander’s

---


27 Bosworth, Arrian to Alexander, 135-156.

28 For Arrian’s use of his sources, see Bosworth, Arrian to Alexander, 38-60.

campaigns in India (Book 15), and Persia (Book 16). However, in Book 11 (about Alexander’s cities), he is very clear about his disappointment with sources that glorify Alexander and cared more for flattery than the truth (11.5.5, 6.4, 7.4). Strabo casts Alexander as an explorer discovering new lands with the emphasis of such explorations placed on the king’s virtues: desire, courage, and endurance.

Plutarch, a Greek in the late first – early second century AD, wrote biographies of prominent Greeks and Romans from the the mythical Theseus to the emperor Otho in 69 AD as well as a collection of ethical essays known as the Moralia. Among these are the biography of Alexander and a rhetorical work titled On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great, in which he argued that the king was a philosopher and that he was hindered by Fortune. Plutarch used a wide array of sources, but primarily Cleitarchus, Aristobulus, and Chares. Nevertheless, he was less concerned with history and more with character (Alex. 1.2), and he included sensational stories to reveal τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα (“signs of the spirit,” Alex. 1.3): Zeus’ sexual relations with Olympias which resulted in Alexander’s conception (Alex. 2.2-4), the story of Timocleia of Thebes, who in retaliation killed the Thracian who raped her when Alexander took Thebes in 335, and the story of the burning of Persepolis instigated by the courtesan Thais.

---

32 The DFAM has survived as two speeches in the Lamprias Catalogue (on which see pp. 103, 131), but more than likely it is one speech that was delivered on two separate days (see pp. 98-102).
33 The biography was likely written in the early second century: C.P. Jones, “Towards of Chronology of Plutarch’s Works,” JRS 56 (1966), 66-70 and Hamilton, Plutarch, xl-xliii. For the date of the DFAM, see pp. 123-130.
34 Hamilton, Alexander, Iv-lxvii and Hammond, Sources, 5-162.
35 Alex. 12.1-3, 46.1-2; cf. Mor. 259D-260D, 1093D-F.
These salacious stories are tempered with anecdotes about the king’s vices: the conspiracy plot involving Philotas which Alexander exploited to have Philotas and Parmenion killed (49.14), the murder of Cleitus caused by the king’s drunken rage (Alex. 50-51), the impact of flatterers who enhanced Alexander’s belief that he was divine (Alex. 57.3), and the mutiny at Opis in 325 in which the army was angry at the attention Alexander was paying to the Persians in the ranks (Alex. 71.8). Ultimately, Plutarch paints a picture of Alexander in which his character deteriorates over time; for him, Alexander was simply a flawed man who was corrupted by his own success. It is a vastly different picture of the king than the one presented in the DFAM, to which we now turn.

**The DFAM as a Source for Alexander’s Life and Reign**

In the DFAM, Plutarch seems to present an image of Alexander as philosopher and man of action, who conquered territories on a large scale, suffered many wounds, founded many cities, spread Greek culture, and even tried to unite the races. It also provides us with valuable information about the Macedonian financial and even political situation when Alexander became king, and his relationships with Roxane, Hephaestion, and his subjects. However, it has been argued that since it is an encomium, its overly laudatory nature and Plutarch’s silence on certain aspects of Alexander’s kingship, mean that it should not be taken seriously as a source for his reign.37

Like the Alexander, the DFAM examines Alexander’s character, but Plutarch has chosen one specific aspect of his character, his virtue, and how it is shown by his philosophy. For Plutarch, the comparisons made between Alexander and great

---

36 Alex. 38.1-4; cf. Diod. 17.72, Curt. 5.7.2-7.
37 Hamilton, Plutarch, xxxvi-xxxvii.
philosophers such as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle validate him as a man of action or, as Onesicritus put it, a “philosopher in arms” (FGrH 134 F 17). The encomiastic nature of the work does present problems of historical accuracy, but as I shall argue, it is a paradoxical work that required a certain level of historical fact to facilitate the argument,\(^\text{38}\) and hence needs to be treated seriously.

Plutarch uses Alexander as a vehicle to criticize common philosophical understanding. He praises Alexander, but that praise was not to be taken seriously because of what the work was about — hence the paradox. In fact, Plutarch’s opinion of Alexander was not great. That Alexander was a philosopher was not the point Plutarch was trying to make; rather, he was attempting to shed light on ideas about whether words or actions make a philosopher, and using Alexander as the means to this end. His belief was that philosophy was as much a theoretical as a practical pursuit.

Plutarch is inconsistent in the way that he records information in the DFAM. For instance, he treats Alexander’s supposed drunkenness with disbelief at one point (337F) while at another he attempts to show a drunken Alexander’s restraint when he found out about Philotas’ plot (339F). He also blatantly refers to Alexander’s pretensions to divinity when he says that is was Fortune’s fault that no one believed he was the son of Zeus Ammon.\(^\text{39}\) However, at 331A, he mentions that poets flattered him by saying that he was the son of Zeus. Then at DFAM 1, 327 D-E, Plutarch cites Onesicritus, Aristobulus, and Duris as his sources for Alexander’s debt prior to the expedition to Asia but at DFAM 2, 342D-E, he cites only Phylarchus and Aristobulus.

\(^\text{38}\) On paradoxical encomia, see pp. 62-66.

\(^\text{39}\) 341F: διά τὴν Τύχην Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπὸλεξε τὸ δοκεῖν Ἀμμωνὸς εἶναι (“because of Fortune, Alexander lost the reputation that he was the son of Ammon”); cf. 343A.
At the same time, the DFAM has information that is corroborated elsewhere, such as the battle of Chaeronea in 338 (DFAM 1, 327C),\textsuperscript{40} the aftermath of Philip II’s assassination in 336 (327C),\textsuperscript{41} and Alexander’s debt in 334 when he left for Asia. In the case of the debt, for example, Arrian says that Alexander inherited from his father only sixty talents and a debt eight times as much (7.9.6; cf. Plut. Alex. 15.2) and claims that he had to borrow eight hundred talents. Curtius 10.2.24, on the other hand, records a debt of only five hundred talents. Thus, although inconsistent, Plutarch was not wrong in stating that Alexander was financially broke when he began the Asian campaign. The inclusion of Onesicritus, Aristobulus, Duris, and Phylarchus lends a sense of credibility to the work.

The DFAM speaks of Alexander’s relationship with Roxane, which is romanticized by suggesting that Alexander was in love with her, and his marriage to Stateira, Darius’ daughter, both of which are part of a larger historical tradition. Plutarch specifically mentions the depth of emotion Alexander felt for Roxane (DFAM 1, 332E-F, DFAM 2, 338D),\textsuperscript{42} and that he loved (ἐξαζζείο) only her. However, it is only in DFAM 1 that he mentions that Alexander did not violate her (οὐχ ὠβρισεν) because he loved her. Arrian (4.19.5-6) and Curtius (8.4.25) refer to Alexander’s love of Roxane to differentiate that marriage from the politically motivated marriage to Stateira to which Plutarch refers.

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. Diod. 16.85.2-86.6.

\textsuperscript{41} Amyntas, for example, was accused of trying to overthrow Alexander in 336 and was tried and executed: Diod. 17.2.4-6, Curt. 6.9.17, 6.10.24, 7.1.3.

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. Plut. Alex. 47.4.
in *DFAM* 2 (338D).\(^{43}\) In the first speech, Plutarch alludes to Alexander’s marriage to Stateira (μητέρας νυμφίος) but it is part of his larger argument of Alexander’s alleged unification of the races which can also be construed as politically motivated (329D-F). Diodorus (17.107) and Justin (12.10) also make reference to Alexander’s political agenda at the mass marriage at Susa including the marriage to Darius’ daughter.

A major problem with the *DFAM* is that certain information in it lacks better support by other sources or has created controversies about Alexander that still feature in scholarship. These include in particular his wounds, the cities he founded, and his apparent attempt to unify the races. Some discussion of these is now warranted.

**Alexander’s Wounds**

Plutarch records eleven different wounds that he said Alexander suffered (*DFAM* 1, 329 A-B):

Πρώτον ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς λίθῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὑπέρφο δὲ τὸν τράχηλον ἡλοίηθην· ἔπειτα περὶ Γρανίκου τὴν κεφαλὴν βαρβαρικὴ μαχαίρα διεκόπην, ἐν δὲ Ἰσσῷ ξεῖρε τὸν μηρόν· πρὸς δὲ Γάζῃ τὸ μὲν σφυρὸν ἐτοξεύθην, τὸν δὲ ώμον ἔκπεσον ἐξ ἱδρας περειδίνησα· πρὸς δὲ Μαρακανδανόις τοξεύματι τὸ τῆς κνήμης ὀστέον διεσχίσθην· τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ Ἰνδῶν πληγαὶ καὶ βίαις λιμαν· ἐν Ασσασιοίς ἐτοξεύθην τὸν ώμον, ἐν δὲ Γανδρίδας τὸ σκέλος· ἐν Μαλλοῖς βέλει μὲν ἀπὸ τοξοῦ τὸ στέρνον ἐνερεισθέντα καὶ καταδύσαντι τὸν σιδηρὸν, ὑπέρφο δὲ πληγὴ παρὰ τὸν τράχηλον ...

First among the Illyrians my head was struck by a rock, and afterward my neck. Then, at the Granicus my head was cut open by a barbarian sword, and at Issus my thigh was cut open by a sword. At Gaza, my ankle was struck by an arrow, and my shoulder hit by a falling rock casing me to whirl round and round. At Maracanda, the bone of my leg was split open by an arrow. The rest of the blows and the force of famines I received among the Indians. Among the Aspasians, my shoulder was hit by an

\(^{43}\) Arrian 7.4 is the only author to mention that at Susa, Alexander took two wives, Stateira, the daughter of Darius III, and Parysatis, the daughter of Artaxeres III; *contra* Diodorus 17.107.6, Curtius 10.3.12, Justin 12.10.9, Plutarch *Alex.* 70.2, who only mention Stateira.
arrow, among the Gandridae my leg. Among the Mallians, the shaft from an arrow was sunk deep into my sternum and the iron was buried there, afterward I was struck on my neck by a cudgel …

Some of these eleven wounds are unsubstantiated by other sources although Plutarch’s biography corroborates seven of them.\(^4^4\) *DFAM* 2, 341 B-C, gives seven wounds and one (an arrow in the ankle while fighting the Assacenians) is new. Of these seven, only three are corroborated elsewhere.\(^4^5\) There is also substantially more detail for the wounds suffered at Issus and Maracanda in the second part of the speech (341B-C). Didymus, the first century scholiast, states that Alexander suffered ten injuries, thereby revealing the possibility of a rhetorical tradition (*Dem.*, col. 13.7-12). The only wounds that the sources agree on are the thigh wound at Issus (in 333)\(^4^6\) and the arrow to the chest suffered in the siege of the Malli (in 326/5).\(^4^7\)

Plutarch’s accounts are inconsistent and in some cases inaccurate. However, in the *DFAM* he wanted to emphasize Alexander’s increasing suffering at the hands of Fortune, and hence he manipulated the image of Alexander. The presentation of the wounds in *DFAM* 1 substantiates this assertion since he describes them with increasing detail and lavishes the most attention on the two injuries Alexander received fighting the Mallians. The effect emphasizes the growing intensity of the wounds so that Plutarch’s

\(^{44}\) Plut. *Alex.* 16.5 (wound at the Granicus River), 20.5 (thigh wound at Issus), 25.4 (two wounds at Gaza), 45.3 (wound at Maracanda), 63.3-5 (two wounds fighting the Mallians).

\(^{45}\) Curtius and Arrian corroborate the shoulder wound at Gaza (Arr. 2.27.2, Curt. 4.6) and the wound at Maracanda (Arr. 3.30.11, Curt. 7.6). The chest wound suffered while fighting the Mallians is substantiated by Diodorus (17.99.3), Arrian (6.9.10), Curtius (9.5.9-10), and Strabo (15.1.33).

\(^{46}\) Diod. 17.34.5-6, Arr. 2.12.1, Curt. 3.11.10, Just. 11.9.9, Plut. *Alex.* 20.5, *DFAM* 1, 327A, *DFAM* 2, 341B.

audience will be shocked by the severity and number of Alexander’s injuries. The escalating severity of the injuries enhances the argument that Fortune was a hindrance and therefore was not responsible for Alexander’s success because she put him in a position to be hurt or killed. That he did not die was a result of Philosophy which granted him the virtues necessary to survive and be successful (327E). Plutarch’s treatment of Alexander’s war wounds is therefore rhetorical exploitation and not historical.

**Alexander’s Cities**

At 328E, Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy cities (ὑπέρ ἐβδομήκοντα πόλεις), but he names only five at 328F:

> Οὕκ ἂν εἶχεν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν Ἁγιωπτος, οὐδὲ Μεσοποταμία Σελεύκιαν οὐδὲ Προφθασίαν Σογδιανή οὔδὲ Ἰνδία Βουκεφαλίαν, οὐδὲ πόλιν Ἑλλάδα Καύκασος παροικοῦσαν

Egypt would not have Alexandria, nor Mesopotamia Seleucia, nor Sogdiana Prophthasia, nor India Bucephalia, nor the Caucasus a Greek city

Plutarch’s first number is grossly exaggerated and probably includes smaller military fortifications, not *poleis per se*, as Fraser has argued.⁴⁸ The *Alexander Romance* gives thirteen cities founded by Alexander and the sixth century AD compiler Stephanus of Byzantium lists twenty.⁴⁹ Moreover, the ancient sources agree on only two cities in

---

⁴⁸ Fraser, *Cities*, 188.

Plutarch’s list: the Egyptian Alexandria and Bucephala, founded on the banks of the (modern) Jhelum River.

Seleucia was founded by Seleucus in 305 as the capital of his eastern empire (App. Bell. Syr. 9.58). Prophthasia as a foundation depends upon a reworking of the text to read οὐδὲ Προφθασίαν Δραγγανή (“nor Drangiana its Prophthasia”) suggested by Tarn in order to make it concur with the Drangian capital of Phrada. Tarn felt Plutarch was writing in haste and his careless of detail accounts for the mistake. However, no source suggests a city foundation in Drangiana, but rather a renaming of an existing city.

Moreover, in this passage Plutarch seems to be using chiasmus (which requires that one component bookend or repeat another, thus A-B-B-A). Here, Plutarch uses the poleis as the first and last component and the regions in which they are located are sandwiched between: Ἀλεξάνδρεια (A) Αἴγυπτος (B), οὐδὲ Μεσοποταμία (B) Σελεύκιαν (A) οὖδὲ Προφθασίαν (A) Σογδιανή (B) οὖδ’ Ἰνδία (B) Βουκεφαλίαν (A). The mention of the Greek city in the Caucasus is extraneous as it does not fit into the chiastic structure, but it serves another purpose as I discuss below. Each polis-region pair is connected by οὐδὲ revealing another rhetorical figure, polysyndeton. There is no reason to emend the text to correct the geography, for this was not important to Plutarch. Rather, he was showing his rhetorical skill.

-----

50 Diod. 17.52.1-6, Arr. 3.1.5-2.2, Curt. 4.8.1-6, Just. 11.11.13, Plut. Alex. 26.2-6.
51 Diod. 17.95.5, Arr. 5.19.4, Curt. 9.3.23, Just. 12.8.8, Plut. Alex. 61.1.
52 Tarn, Alexander 2, 257-258.
53 Fraser, Cities, 123-130.
That Alexander founded a city in the Caucasus Mountains in 329/8 (Alexandria-by-the-Caucasus) is attested by Diodorus (17.83.1), Curtius (7.3.23), and Arrian (3.28.4), and Curtius explicitly mentions that 7,000 Macedonian veterans were settled in it (7.23.3). It has been argued that Plutarch’s text is corrupt because it does not mention the name of the city as it does with the others, but this apparent failure is not surprising. Plutarch jolts the reader with something different at the end of a long list as he did with the Mallians in the catalogue of wounds at 327A-B. The sudden departure from the pattern brings the evidence to a conclusion before presenting something significant — in this case it is the statement that Alexander brought an end to savagery in the east with the foundation of a Greek city. As such, the reference to the general “Greek city” (πόλις Ἑλλάδα) is more striking than if Plutarch named it. Alexandria-by-the-Caucasus is not included in Fraser’s list of cities that Alexander founded since the sources are unclear and there appears to have been a city already there.

Fraser’s study concludes that Alexander only founded six cities and not seventy as Plutarch suggested: Alexandria in Egypt, Alexandria in Aria, Alexandria Eschate, Alexandria in Susiana, Alexandria-Bucephala, and Alexandria among the Oreitai. Only two in Plutarch’s list, then, are supported by the other sources.

---

54 J.E. Powell, “The Sources of Plutarch’s Alexander,” JHS 59 (1939), 236 n. 3 and Tarn, Alexander 2, 255-259.

55 Fraser, Cities, 140-151, 201.

56 Fraser, Cities, 201.
Alexander and the “Unity of Mankind” Theory

One of the most controversial issues in Alexander’s reign, his alleged intention to unite the races, owes its origin DFAM 1, 329C:

οὐσπερ ἐν κρατηρὶ φιλοτησίῳ μείζας τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ τοὺς γάμους καὶ τὰς διαίτας

as if mixing in one loving cup the lives and the characters and the marriages and the customs

Tarn interpreted this passage to mean that Alexander intended to try to create a brotherhood of mankind, as a result of which other events have been taken to indicate an actual policy on Alexander’s part. The latter include his attempt to impose the Asian custom of proskynesis (genuflection) on his own men at Bactra in 327, his marriage to the Bactrian princess Roxane, also in 327, his integration of foreigners into the army and administration, the mass marriage at Susa in 324 when he and ninety of his senior staff married Persian noblewomen, and his prayer for concord between the races after the mutiny at Opis in 324. Of these, the DFAM only mentions Alexander’s marriage to Roxane and the multiple wedding ceremonies at Susa (329E-F).

Bosworth and Worthington dismiss these events as indicative of any type of actual “policy.” Most had a pragmatic purpose, but the attempt to introduce proskynesis had a much more personal motivation. Proskynesis was an Asian act of obeisance to the Persian king, but the Greeks and Macedonians considered it a religious


act, which Alexander would have known. Therefore, he may have been using it to see whether his men would accept him as a god.\textsuperscript{59}

Alexander’s marriage to the Bactrian princess Roxane in 327 is also considered evidence for a unification policy.\textsuperscript{60} Tarn argues that the marriage was intended to “reconcile the eastern barons and end the national war,” and he dismisses any suggestion that Alexander might have loved her.\textsuperscript{61} Plutarch admits that there might have been a political motivation behind the marriage, but he does not dismiss the possibility of genuine affection (\textit{Alex.} 47.4). We are told that Alexander was so in love with her that he refused to violate her (\textit{DFAM} 1, 332E-F, \textit{DFAM} 2, 338D, \textit{Alex.} 47), and his passion for her is corroborated by Arrian 4.19 and Curtius 8.4.23. However, Curtius 8.4.25 also claims that the marriage was intended to unite the races and consolidate the empire. The reason for the marriage more than likely has to do with Roxane’s father, Oxyartes, whose support Alexander needed in securing Bactria and Sogdiana.\textsuperscript{62} Tarn is right that perhaps Alexander was trying to consolidate his hold on Bactria, but to see this as a way to unite the races is erroneous because the marriage followed Macedonian custom (Curt. 8.4.27).\textsuperscript{63} Alexander had been adopting various components of Persian dress prior to 327 (see pp. 47-50), showing that his willingness to accept foreign customs. If he were attempting to fuse the races, presumably he would have held the ceremony according to native customs — as was the case with the mass marriage at Susa in 324 (see below).


\textsuperscript{60} Arr. 4.19.5-6, Curt. 8.4.23-26, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 47.4, Strabo 11.11.4, \textit{ME} 28-31.

\textsuperscript{61} Tarn, \textit{Alexander} 1, 76.


Perhaps Alexander was following his father’s policy of marrying for diplomatic reasons.\textsuperscript{64}

Alexander’s use of oriental troops is not mentioned in the \textit{DFAM}. The first attested use of foreign soldiers was during the Sogdian revolt in 328/7 (Arr. 4.17.3). Bactrians and Sogdians were used in conjunction with Amytnas’ troops and there were cavalry units from Arachosia and Parapamisadae in addition to those from Bactria and Sogdiana at the battle of the Hydaspes River in 326 (Arr. 5.11.3, 5.12.2). In 324, a phalanx of Persian troops (the so-called \textit{Epigonoi}) was present at Susa following an order in 327 to train 30,000 youths in Macedonian methods of warfare.\textsuperscript{65} This new phalanx was not integrated into existing battalions, however.\textsuperscript{66}

The use of foreign troops caused the Macedonian soldiers to mutiny at Opis in 324.\textsuperscript{67} It has been argued that this mutiny has been misconstrued because Alexander played on the enmity between the Macedonians and the Persians in an effort to end it since he threatened to give Persians military commands.\textsuperscript{68} As a result, his men quickly apologized (Arr. 7.11.8). What followed the mutiny’s resolution was a banquet for all at which Alexander prayed for concord among Persians and Macedonians (Arr. 7.11.9). The prayer has also been seen as evidence that Alexander wanted to unite the races, but this is not so. We should expect Alexander to make such a prayer as could not afford

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Worthington, \textit{Alexander}, 140.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Diod. 17.108.1-3, Arr. 7.6.1, Curt. 7.5.1, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 71.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Diod. 17.109.2-3, Arr. 7.8.1-12.1, Curt. 10.2.8-4.3, Just. 12.11.4-12.6, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 70-72.
\end{itemize}
dissension in the ranks, given his forthcoming invasion of Arabia. Alexander simply manipulated the events surrounding the mutiny at Opis to keep the peace between the Macedonians/Greeks and foreigners in the army.

A similar practical reason is evident for the mass marriage at Susa in 324. By marrying Persian noblewomen to Macedonian men, Alexander ensured that any noble Persian born would have Macedonian blood making it less likely that one would grow up to overthrow Macedonian rule. Alexander himself married daughters of his predecessors (Stateira and Parysatis) to ensure there would be no uprising. The most important facet of this event is that no Persian men were married to Macedonian or Greek women. These ceremonies, although performed according to Persian custom, were in the interests of the Macedonians, and so the weddings cannot be seen as an element in a “policy of fusion” because there was no parity. Even more, Alexander’s men were not pleased at the prospect of marrying barbarian women (Arr. 7.6.2), and on Alexander’s death all of them apart from Seleucus divorced their wives.

Alexander’s Orientalism

Another controversial issue presented in the DFAM, one that is linked tangentially to the so-called “unity of mankind” theory, is Alexander’s orientalism, in which his adoption of foreign dress (329F-330C; cf. Alex. 45.1) and use of barbarian troops (see above) plays a part:

Πρὸς τοῦτον ἀποβλέπων τὸν κόσμον Ἀλέξανδρος οὐ τὴν ἔσθητα προσήκατο τὴν Μηδικήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Περσικὴν πολλὰ τῆς Μηδικῆς

69 See above pp. 27 n. 59.
εὐτελεστέραν οὖσαν. τά γὰρ ἐξάλλα καὶ τραγικὰ τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ κόσμου Παρατηθήμενος, οίον τιάραν καὶ κάνδυν καὶ ἄναξερίδας, ἐκ τοῦ Περσικοῦ καὶ Μακεδονικοῦ τρόπου μεμειγμένην τινὰ στολήν ἐφόρει.

Consider carefully the order of things, Alexander did not favor the Median dress, but the Persian since it was simpler than the Median. Since he deprecated the customary and theatrical sorts of the barbarians, such as the tiara and the jacket and the trousers, he wore a mixed dress from both the Persian and Macedonian manner …

Plutarch is unique in making a distinction between Persian and Median dress, although he makes no mention of the Persian royal diadem or the Macedonian kausia. It has been argued that the kausia was adopted after Alexander’s journey into the Hindu Kush in 327, thus in keeping with his acceptance of foreign dress and customs. However, there is evidence to support an earlier origin of the kausia and that after Darius’ death in 330 the king adopted the mixed garb (cf. Eratosthenes, FGrH 241 F 30). Plutarch is clear that the dress only consisted of royal Persian, Median, and Macedonian elements (329F-330C), and he says in the biography that Alexander refused to wear the Persian tiara (Alex. 45.2; cf. Strabo 11.13.9). However, Diodorus 17.77.5, Curtius 6.6.4, Arrian 4.7.4, and Justin 12.3.8 state that the crown was part of the adapted dress. It is likely that Alexander somehow melded the Macedonian kausia and the cone-like diadem of the Persians so that both were plainly visible. In any event, nowhere does Plutarch state that any Indian elements were adopted. Alexander did not conquer all of India because

---

72 For further discussion, see the commentary on 329F.
he was forced westward after a mutiny of his troops at the Hyphasis River in 326. If his men took issue with his wearing Persian clothing in 330, then they certainly would have taken issue with the adoption of Indian dress in 326.\textsuperscript{74}

Plutarch gives two possible reasons why Alexander chose to wear foreign clothing (\textit{Alex}. 45.1). The first came from his desire to adapt himself to native customs in the belief that it would appease his conquered subjects, given that he began wearing Persian dress once he entered Parthia in 330 (45.1; cf. Diod. 77.4, Curt. 6.6.1). After Gaugamela in 331, Alexander claimed to be the legitimate king of the Persian Empire, yet, as Bosworth points out, Alexander did not adopt Persian court dress until several weeks after Darius was murdered (330).\textsuperscript{75} Ritter argues that Alexander’s acceptance of Persian dress and protocol at this time was because Bessus, who was of royal blood, declared himself Great King.\textsuperscript{76} The new clothing was propaganda to appease the conquered Persians and to have them accept Alexander over Bessus as king. The second reason is that the adoption of foreign clothing was to pave the way for \textit{proskynesis} before Alexander and slowly ease his men into acceptance of such a custom by allowing them to grow accustomed to changes in his everyday life. However, we are told that the Macedonian veterans abhorred Alexander’s adoption of Persian dress and vocally objected to it at the mutiny at Opis in 324.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Curt. 6.6.7 and Plut. \textit{Alex}. 45.2.

\textsuperscript{75} Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” 6.


\textsuperscript{77} Diod. 17.77.7, Curt. 6.6.9-12, Just. 12.4.1; cf. Arr. 7.6.2, 8.2, Plut. \textit{Alex}. 47.7-12.
There is, of course, the possibility that both of Plutarch’s reasons are accurate in that Alexander wanted to appease his new subjects by wearing something familiar to them and ease his men into accepting a religiously charged foreign custom (*proskynesis*). Taken together, Plutarch’s reasons suggest that Alexander desired to unite his new subjects and his Macedonians and Greeks. However, the reactions of the Macedonians against these foreign customs indicates that Alexander had lost sight of the traditions and values of his men which in turn suggests more personal motives.

*Alexander’s Divinity*

Whether Alexander had pretensions to personal divinity is arguably the most contentious facet of Alexander scholarship. On the one hand, there are scholars who refuse to see that the king had this belief\(^78\) and, on the other hand, there are those who believe in it because of the repercussions of his visit to the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah, his attempt to introduce *proskynesis*, and his visit to Nysa in India and growing association with Dionysus.\(^79\)

Plutarch emphasizes the divine aspect of Alexander’s life in his biography by citing his divine conception and Artemis’ assistance during his birth (2.3-4), his visit to the oracle at Siwah (27.4-6), and his attempt to introduce *proskynesis* (54.3-4). At *DFAM* 1, 329C, Plutarch refers to Alexander as a θεόθεν ἀρμοστής (“heaven sent governor”),

---


and at 331A, he puts the words ἐγὼ Διὸς μὲν νιὸς (“I am the son of Zeus”) into the mouth of someone else (ἄλλου ἀνδρός) when referring to the king (cf. Alex. 27.4-6). Plutarch also included passages that affirm Alexander’s emulation of Heracles, Perseus, and Dionysus (332A-B), from whom Alexander claimed ancestry, although the achievements of Heracles and Dionysus took on special significance. For instance, on some Macedonian coinage Alexander wears the lion’s head and bull’s horns commonly associated with Heracles, although the latter often appeared on Macedonian coinage dating back to the middle of the fifth century. More importantly, Alexander dressed as Dionysus (the only one of the three born a god) in the Carmanian march of 324, to which Plutarch alludes when he mentions the Bacchic revels after a victory (332B). Alexander’s divinity is further emphasized in the second speech of the DFAM when Plutarch blames Fortune for ruining the belief that Alexander was the son of Ammon (341F) and when he blatantly states that a god fathered the king and gave him many virtues (εἶπερ ἐκ πολλῶν συνήρμοσε καὶ συνέθηκεν ἁρετῶν ὁ γεννήσας θεός, 343A).

**Conclusion**

The source material for Alexander is problematic as both primary and secondary writers had a particular view of Alexander in mind. In the case of the DFAM, Plutarch focused on Alexander’s character to challenge popular conceptions of philosophy, and so he engineered an image of the king to suit his purpose. That Alexander was not the

---

80 Most texts have Ἀλέξανδρος, which Babbitt emended to ἄλλου ἀνδρός because the name is included two lines above it as part of another clause. Wyttenbach, *Animadversiones*, 117, suggested a lacuna in which the finite verb is lost. For discussion on this, see the commentary at 331A.

actual focus of the work should not detract from using it as a source for the king. The 
*DFAM* is indeed highly rhetorical in nature, but Plutarch included facts in it that can be 
verified by other, less rhetorical and more reliable authors. For that reason, his 
encomium on Alexander deserves more credit than it has received in the past.
IV

Paradoxical Encomia and the DFAM

Plutarch wrote a number of works in different genres such as the Parallel Lives (biography), On the Principle of Cold (physics), Precepts of Statecraft (politics), and a series of epideictic speeches commonly referred to by the Roman term “declamations.” Of these, four survive: On the Fortune of the Romans, On the Glory of the Athenians, and On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander the Great, which is two speeches under the one title.\(^1\) These works are epideictic and can be classed as encomia because they are all praising someone or something. However, the DGA and the DFAM are unique in that they are (also) paradoxical encomia.\(^2\) They are as much a revelation of Plutarch’s philosophical thought as they are a display of his rhetorical skill. DFAM 1, in particular, challenges basic conceptions of philosophy by asking what makes a philosopher.

This chapter examines how Plutarch expresses his personal philosophical views through the paradox of Alexander the king and general as a philosopher and then assesses why he does to shed light on his own views of Alexander. But first, I include brief summaries of those four encomia: On the Fortune of the Romans, On the Glory of the Athenians, and the two speeches of On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great.

---

\(^1\) I argue on pp. 100-102 that the two parts of the DFAM should be considered one speech. For the sake of convenience and common usage, the two parts are henceforth referred to as speeches (DFAM 1 and DFAM 2).

\(^2\) Plutarch’s speech on the Romans is a city encomium rather than a paradox. Its basic framework closely follows the outline provided in Menander Rhetor for this particular class of epideictic speeches (359.16-365.9). It does not seem to be attempting to elucidate any greater philosophical truth unlike DFAM 1 and 2 and DGA. For an analysis of the DFR, see S. Swain, “Plutarch’s De Fortuna Romanorum,” CQ 39 (1989), 504-516.
On the Fortune of the Romans

In the *DFR*, Plutarch applies the age old battle between Fortune (Τύχη) and Virtue (Ἀρετή) to Rome’s success (316C). If Fortune and Virtue work together, they can create the most beautiful of human works. Unfortunately, the two are at odds with one another. Virtue is patient while Fortune is always in a hurry making her responsible for the death of Rome’s heroes. However, Fortune surrounds herself with men who are great warriors such as the Cincinnati, Decii, the Claudii Marcelli and the Scipios (318B).

According to Plutarch, it was only in later Roman history that the Romans honored Virtue with temples (318D-E), although they had been honoring Fortune since Rome’s foundation (318E). Plutarch claims that Fortune was responsible for the achievements of Caesar, Augustus, Numa (321B-322B), Servius Tullius (322C-323E), and, most importantly, for the origin and birth of the founders and builders of Rome (320B). Virtue may have made Romulus great, but it was Fortune that protected him so that he could achieve that greatness (321B).

Plutarch, then, moves away from kings and men and focuses on Rome’s success in wars. That success was a result of the influence of Fortune (323E-F) who helped the Romans defeat the Macedonians, the Seleucids, the Carthaginians (323F-324A), and the Gauls (324D-326A). What survives of the *DFR* concludes with a comparison of Alexander and Rome (326A). While Fortune was responsible for the success of the Romans, she can also be credited with the demise of Alexander, thus making a startling departure from what is presented in the Alexander encomium.

---

On the Glory of the Athenians

The De Gloria Atheniensium does not deal with the theme of Fortune and Virtue but focuses on the origins of the Athenians’ fame. Plutarch begins by suggesting that if it were not for great men of action, then the men of letters would have nothing to write about (345C). For instance, if there had been no Pericles, Phormio, Nicias, or Demosthenes (the general), then Thucydides would not have been able to write his History of the Peloponnesian War (345D). He concludes that historians need men of action to achieve their goal (345F).

Plutarch then turns his attention to artists (345F-346A). He suggests that writers and painters are much alike in having similar subjects. The major difference is the medium in which they produce their work (346F-347A). Again, he uses Thucydides as an example since he was striving for vividness in his writing (347A). Essentially, Thucydides attempted to paint a picture with words.² Plutarch surmises that the best historian is the one who makes his writing like a painting with emotions and characters (καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν κράτιστος ὁ τὴν διήγησιν ὀσπερ γραφήν πάθεσι καὶ προσώποις εἰδολοποιήσας, 347A).

Plutarch next turns his attention to playwrights (348B). He dismisses the comedians outright because the Athenians considered comedy vulgar.⁵ Tragedians, on

---


⁵ Aristotle, Poetics 1149a20 stated that comedy was comprised of blunder or ugliness and at first it was not treated seriously. That there was a vulgar and insulting component to comedy is discussed at length in N. Worman, Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2008), who treats comedic invective and defamation. I am unaware of any source that mentions that members of the Council of the Areopagus were banned from writing comedies.
the other hand, flourished in Athens. However, Plutarch asks what glory did these tragic playwrights bring to Athens that could compare to the deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Miltiades, or Cimon (348C-D). This question leads to Plutarch discussing these men of action, whose emblems he sees as the Parthenon, the Long Walls, the Propylae, the Chersonese, and Amphipolis (349D). Their actions during battle saved the city and so they were honored with state burials when they died (350C-D). Plutarch then compares the speeches of Demosthenes the orator to the victories of Demosthenes the general. Ultimately, Plutarch presents a sort of “chicken or the egg” paradox since, for him, the writings of Demosthenes the orator, whom he praises (351B), spur the men of Athens into action so that, in turn, the men of letters could write about their deeds.

On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great

The work comprises two speeches which I refer to as DFAM 1 and DFAM 2. The first speech opens with a vague statement of intent and returns to the contest between Fortune and Virtue discussed in the encomium of the Romans. Plutarch suggests that Fortune can claim credit for Alexander’s success (326D), but he then states that something needs to be said on Alexander’s behalf lest he become angry that Fortune was responsible for his achievements. Plutarch has Alexander speak his own heated response to Fortune by stating that she can claim responsibility for the successes of barbarian kings such as Darius and Sardanapalus (326E-F). Fortune can only say she interfered in

---

6 Plutarch would have been correct if he was discussing tragedy in the fifth century, but as the fourth century wore on, it was not as popular; cf. B. Zimmerman, Greek Tragedy: An Introduction (Baltimore, 1991), 1-15 and P. Freund, The Birth of Theatre (London, 2003), 63-66.

7 For instance, Miltiades at Marathon, Themistocles at Salamis, Cimon at the Eurymedon River, and Demosthenes (the general) and Cleon at Sphacteria.
Alexander’s life as the many wounds the king suffered, the route he took in the Asia, the affairs in Greece (the Greeks were still recovering from conflict with Philip II), and the financial woes of Macedonia on his accession in 336 indicate (327A-327E).

However, Alexander was able to survive these hardships because Virtue armed him with the necessary qualities of magnanimity, intelligence, moderation, and courage, and so he should be compared to philosophers who are the embodiment of virtue. This evaluation of the Macedonian king is contingent upon Plutarch’s analysis of Alexander’s teachings, sayings, and actions. For instance, it was obvious (δῆλαδη) to Plutarch that Alexander wrote nothing about philosophy, but neither did Pythagoras, Socrates, and Arcesilaus (328A-B). Alexander taught the Hyrcanians to practice monogamy, the Arachosians to farm, and the Sogdians to refrain from killing their parents (328C-D). Alexander’s lessons presumably taught these barbarian peoples Greek ways not unlike Carneades’ lessons to Cleitomachus, a Carthaginian, which made him adopt Greek ways or Zeno’s education of Diogenes (328D). Moreover, Alexander brought civilization to the barbarian peoples of Asia by founding cities (328F) and appeasing them with his clothing (329C-D, 329F-330A). Alexander’s desire for unity amongst the various peoples of his newly formed empire shows a philosophic mind.

Even the king’s sayings display his philosophic spirit. For example, he told his father, who was suffering from a thigh wound, to see it as a symbol of his valor (331B). Also included is the famous exchange between Alexander and Diogenes in which the king is reported to have told the philosopher that if he had not been born Alexander, he would be Diogenes (331F).
Alexander’s actions toward Porus (an Indian prince), Roxane (his Bactrian wife), and Hephaestion (his closest friend and confidant) reveal his compassion, moderation, and greatness of spirit all of which are philosophic qualities (332E-333A). His actions are pitted against Socrates’ denial of Alcibiades’ affections and Xenocrates’ refusal to accept a monetary gift (333A-B).

DFAM 1 concludes with the assessment that only philosophers have the appropriate equipment (i.e. logic) to face dangerous situations (333B-C) and philosophers are strong enough in their powers of logic not to succumb to fear (333C). The other side of the philosophical coin here is that Alexander faced and survived dangerous situations because he possessed the necessary qualities to do so, thus making him a philosopher.

On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great 2

The second speech in the DFAM emphasizes Alexander’s virtue much more than the first, which needed to negate the role of Fortune by showing the king as a philosopher. The speech implies that it is the continuation of an earlier one by changing tactics to address Alexander’s patronage of the arts, which, taken with the first speech, shows the king to be a well-rounded virtuous individual. He is compared with other kings (Dionysius of Syracuse, Alexander of Pherae, Ateas of the Scythians, and his own father, Philip II) who did not favor the arts, thereby revealing them to be banal and harsh (334A-D). Alexander’s patronage of actors, musicians, painters, and sculptors enhanced his virtuous character (334E-335E). Even sculptures of him capture his virtue, which could only have been accomplished with the assistance of Virtue herself and not that of Fortune (335E-F).
Plutarch returns to the contest between Fortune and Virtue by further comparison with royalty, Semiramis and Sardanapalus in particular, who are shown to be the work of Fortune (336C). Fortune was, however, bolstered by the success of one man, Alexander, and once that man was gone, she lost her glory as his empire fell into the hands of less virtuous men (337B-C).

Plutarch concedes that Alexander’s successes in Asia may be the work of Fortune (339A), because they were simply military victories. Moreover, it was not because of Fortune that Alexander possessed the superior qualities to help him endure those campaigns (339A-B). Alexander showed his compassion to Tarrias, a man who falsely claimed to be a debtor so that he could take advantage of Alexander’s debt-eradication gift (339B-C), when he absolved him of the lie and to Antigenes, who had himself enrolled among the sick so that he could return to Macedonia with his lover, Telesippa, when the king went himself to persuade her to stay (339C-D).

The speech then recounts the king’s wounds (341B-C), most especially the near fatal wound suffered fighting the Mallians (344D-345B), thereby showing both Virtue’s assistance (i.e. Alexander’s survival) and Fortune’s interference. According to Plutarch, if one considers the achievements of Solon, Miltiades, and Aristides (343C-E) to be the work of both Fortune and Virtue, then so too must Alexander’s successes be considered the product of both.

Rhetoric

Plato defined rhetoric as πεηζνυμδεκηνπξγόο (―practicing persuasion,‖ Gorgias 453a) and ψυχαγωγία διά λόγων (―the winning of souls through words,‖ Phaed. 261a7-8). Aristotle defined it as τὸ ἱδεῖν τὰ υπάρχοντα πιθανά (―to see the means of
persuasion,” *Rhetoric* 1355b14), and, over four centuries later, Quintilian (c. 35 – c. 100 AD) said that it was *bene dicenda scientia* (“the science of speaking well,” 2.15). Ancient Greek scholars distinguished three rhetorical sub-categories: forensic (δικαστικόν), deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν), and epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν).* These types correspond to the occasion in which each was performed. Thus, forensic speeches were delivered in the law courts and deliberative speeches in the Assembly.⁹ Epideictic oratory, however, is the rhetorical step-child of this categorization because it was considered to have no practical purpose unlike forensic and deliberative speeches which serve the interests of the state in legal and political settings.¹⁰ Its chief purpose was the demonstration of the praiseworthy or shameful to spectators such as in a funeral oration (e.g. Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides 2) or festival speech (e.g. Gorgias’ *Olympicus*).¹¹

Menander Rhetor, in the late third century AD, concluded that the term ἐπίδειξις (“demonstration” or “display”) was made of encomia (ἐγκωμιαστικοῦς) and criticism (ψευκτικοῦς).¹² Menander’s categorization follows centuries of literary thought because

---


¹¹ Epideictic pieces originated in the epitaphios (funeral speech) like that of Pericles in Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* and in festival speeches (panegyricos logos) such as the Olympic speeches of Gorgias. Lysias 2, a funeral oration delivered during the Corinthian War, is yet another example of the epitaphios: see S.C Todd, *A Commentary on Lysias: Speeches 1-11* (Oxford, 2007), 149-274. For further discussion of epideictic oratory, see C. Carey, “Epideictic Oratory,” in I. Worthington (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford, 2007), 236-252.

he uses the same rhetorical classifications (“praise and blame”) as Gorgias (Helen 1), Aristotle (Eth. Eud. 1219b8), and Anaximenes of Lampsacus (Rhet. Alex. 1425b34-35). He further breaks encomia into four subcategories (346.9-23; cf. [Cic.], Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.3.5). Ἐνδόξα concern the gods and their blessings while ἄδοξα deal with the antithesis, demons and evils. Ἀμφίδοξα treat issues of praise and blame, similar to Aristotle’s conception and Παράδοξα address paradoxical themes. It is into this last category that Plutarch’s DFAM and DGA fall while the DFR is more of an ἄμφιδοξον as it praises Rome and criticizes Alexander.

Paradoxical Rhetoric

As a rhetorical figure, a paradox is a statement that is contrary to mass opinion (contraque opinionem omnium: Cic. Para. Stoic. 4). As a genre, it is a humorous, or satirical, argument filled with serious ethical content. Aristides (Rhet. 160-165) suggested that the paradoxical encomium praised qualities or subjects that did not often receive praise, hence Alcidamas’ Praise of Death, Synesius’ Encomium of Baldness, and the praise of courtesans of which Athenaeus spoke (13.592C).13 Hence, the praise or blame dichotomy established by Aristotle is maintained.14 Gibbs and Izett have argued that writers “express certain ideas by ironically highlighting the contrast between other people’s beliefs or expectations and some reality.”15 Thus, in the DFAM, Plutarch seems

---


to laud an individual, Alexander the Great, who in the previous generation was seen by the Romans as a quintessential despot and was therefore unworthy of praise.\textsuperscript{16} However, the king also served as an intellectual framework for the explanation of contemporary issues. The \textit{DGA} praises Athens’ warriors over its artists and orators, which was unusual for an author who was practicing rhetoric himself.\textsuperscript{17}

The primary, or obvious, paradox is the absurdity of Alexander as a philosopher. If paradoxical encomia are, as Aristides suggested, the praise of something/someone not usually praiseworthy, then Alexander as a subject of encomia is fitting as the paradox. In the Hellenistic period, Alexander was a model of virtue.\textsuperscript{18} The Romans, who saw Alexander as a despot, did not question the king’s military skill (cf. Livy 9.18). However, in the generation before Plutarch, Alexander was a common rhetorical tool for elucidating the problems with Roman imperialism, moral decadence, and single man rule.\textsuperscript{19} By Plutarch’s time, he seems to have been rehabilitated to a degree as seen at the end of Book 7 of Arrian’s \textit{Anabasis} which is a virtual panegyric on Alexander, but authors continued to point out the king’s vices, especially his drinking.\textsuperscript{20} Roman

\textsuperscript{16} D. Spencer, \textit{The Roman Alexander} (Exeter, 2002) argues that Alexander provided Roman authors with an “archetype for monarchy and charismatic autocracy” which was necessary in evaluating issues of Roman identity including the criticism of contemporary values (xix, 95). Alexander, then, becomes a stand-in for the political and cultural changes in Rome and it is only when the Romans came to terms with their expanding influence that Alexander is tamed, at least politically, since he still embodied the characteristic traits of a despot: pretensions to divinity, a court of flatterers, excessive drinking and immoderate emotions. This Roman epiphany seems to have been achieved after Curtius’ narrative history of Alexander’s reign because the prevalence and significance of the east still plays a role during the reign of Nero (Spencer, \textit{Roman Alexander}, 198-201).

\textsuperscript{17} Russell, \textit{Plutarch}, 33.


\textsuperscript{19} Spencer, \textit{Roman Alexander}, 39-118.

\textsuperscript{20} G. Anderson, \textit{The Second Sophistic} (London, 1993), 113-114. Arrian 4.8.2 discusses Alexander’s drinking as a contributing factor to the murder of Cleitus as does Curtius 8.1.22, Plutarch, \textit{Alexander
philosophers used Alexander’s life as a social commentary to voice their concerns about the new imperial regime. He is shown to be blood-thirsty, hell-bent on conquest and world domination, and subject to the worst sort of moral depravity. For instance, Cicero’s slanderous remarks against Alexander were written (e.g. Att. 13.28), in general, during Julius Caesar’s dictatorship of Rome. The Tusculan Disputations in particular were written a mere year before the dictator’s assassination. In addition, Seneca’s and Lucan’s remarks seem to be a reaction against the reign of Nero, who frequently imitated Alexander. Seneca insists that Alexander was a cruel tyrant with an insatiable appetite for conquest. His nephew Lucan portrayed the Macedonian king as a vicious warrior laying waste to every nation. In the end, Cicero, Seneca, and Lucan, use Alexander as a stand-in for Caesar or Nero to highlight the negative aspects of single-man rule.

Moreover, it was not unusual to use Alexander as a tool. Authors who subscribed to the Cynic way of life attempted to explain the nature of a true king by considering whether a conqueror or a good man was the ideal ruler. Stoneman has argued that Cynic writers used Alexander as a “tool for thinking with” rather than as an “object for


21 Spencer, The Roman Alexander, 103.
praise or blame.”\textsuperscript{28} For instance, Lucian wrote a dialogue in which Hannibal and Alexander argue over who is the better general (\textit{Dial. Mort.} 12). The Macedonian king again becomes the instrument for explicating some greater meaning about the characteristics of a good leader. Seneca, who was especially hostile to Alexander, wrote two declamations about the Macedonian king, one debating whether Alexander should sail the ocean (\textit{Suasoria} 1) and another on whether he should enter Babylon (\textit{Suasoria} 4). \textit{Suasoria} 1 attempts to explicate the nature of the ocean while \textit{Suasoria} 4 discusses astrology and prophecy. The point is that Alexander’s life was exploited by these authors to suit their aims.

This class of epideictic literature originated in the fifth century with Gorgias’ \textit{Encomium of Helen} and then found unparalleled popularity in the fourth by orators such as Isocrates in his \textit{Busiris} and \textit{Helen}.\textsuperscript{29} These rhetorical demonstrations discovered their niche in education as a means of teaching the young the proper methods of argumentation. One of the hallmarks of ancient education was \textit{mimesis} or imitation.\textsuperscript{30} An example of the teacher’s own work was given to the students either orally or by means of a written text. The students then proceeded to imitate their teacher in style and form.\textsuperscript{31} Encomia, in general, were a way for the \textit{rhêtôr} or sophist to attract students as well as a way to teach through example.

\textsuperscript{28} R. Stoneman, “Legacy of Alexander in Ancient Philosophy,” 335.

\textsuperscript{29} Nightingale, \textit{Genres}, 100-102.


Apart from its pedagogical aims, paradoxical praise had another purpose, that is, “an oblique criticism of absolute judgment or absolute convention.”\(^{32}\) Put simply, it is a way for the \textit{rhêtôr} to challenge socially accepted norms and philosophical constructions.\(^{33}\) Cicero’s \textit{Paradoxa Stoicorum}, for example, takes difficult Stoic principles and emphasizes the contradictions in an effort to make them understandable and accessible to his audience.\(^{34}\) For instance, Cicero treats the idea that only the wise man was wealthy (\textit{Para. Stoic.} 6). Stoic logic held that wealth was derived from virtue and, since the philosopher was the embodiment of virtue, he must, therefore, be wealthy. But Cicero points out that not every one who is wealthy is virtuous because any individual could, in fact, be subject to avarice (\textit{Off.} 1.109, 3.73-75). Likewise, in the \textit{DFAM}, Plutarch challenges popular understandings of virtue and philosophy by forcing his audience to reassess what makes a philosopher. The exploitation of Alexander’s life reveals that the characteristics which make a man a philosopher do not necessarily make him virtuous and \textit{vice versa}. For instance, Socrates and Pythagoras did not write any philosophical works, yet they were great and virtuous philosophers (328A-B). Alexander did not write anything either so, according to Plutarch, he too should be considered a philosopher. It is a false paradox.\(^{35}\) As Wardman has argued, “it is fair to ask of a philosopher that he should practice virtue as well as discuss it; it is another matter to say of a practical man that, because he is virtuous, he is a philosopher.”\(^{36}\) Thus, Plutarch


\(^{33}\) Nightingale, \textit{Genres}, 102.

\(^{34}\) M.V. Ronnick, \textit{Cicero’s “Paradoxa Stoicorum”} (Frankfurt, 1991), 42.

\(^{35}\) Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 97.

\(^{36}\) Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 97.
presents another question for his audience to consider: is philosophy a theoretical or practical activity?

**The Nature of Encomia**

The genre as a whole was subject to the whims and aims of its writers. Certain features could be adapted or manipulated for the author’s own ends. Anaximenes outlined these in his *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (225.6): προοίμιον (“introduction”), γένος (“genealogy”), γένεσις (“genesis”), ἀνατροφή (“growing up” or “youth”), ἐπιτηδεύματα (“deeds of choice”), πράξεις (“deeds”), σύγκρισις (“comparison”), and ἐπίλογος (“epilogue”). It seems most authors, such as Isocrates (*Helen* and *Busiris*) and Lucian (*Praise of the Fly*) stuck to Anaximenes’ order, although we will see below (pp. 67-72) that Plutarch felt free to play with the order, with the exception of the προοίμιον and ἐπίλογος.

Moreover, speeches of praise or blame relied heavily on the exploitation of the four Socratic (or rather Platonic) virtues of justice (δικαιοσύνη), temperance (σωφροσύνη), courage (ἀνδρεία), and wisdom (φρόνησις), which, generally, were included in the πράξεις (Pl. *Symp.* 196b-197a, *Rep.* 427e). These four virtues form the core of praise/blame and cross the boundaries of genre, thus revealing their universality. For instance, Aeschylus employs them to praise Amphaiarus in *Seven Against Thebes* (610) and Demosthenes uses them in *On the Crown* to speak generally of great men (18.215). Three of the four virtues (courage, wisdom, and justice) are given by Isocrates in his encomium of Evagoras (written c. 374) at 23 and by Xenophon in his *Agesilaus*

---


Plutarch employs the four virtues in the speeches on Alexander as the moral framework for the discussion of philosophy in general (DFAM 1.326E, 327E, 332C-D, DFAM 2.342E-F). 39

The genre demands that the prooimion grab the audience’s attention in a memorable and startling way. Plutarch immediately startles his reader/audience by invoking Fortune and Philosophy as Homer invoked the Muses and then proceeds to use the rhetorical figure of prosopopoilia, an imaginary monologue from a famous individual — in this case Alexander (326D). The prooimion ends with the application of the four Platonic virtues to the Macedonian king (326E). Plutarch, then, summarizes Alexander’s conquests despite the hindrances of geography and people by tracing the king’s accomplishments through the Asian campaign (not in chronological order): from Arbela to Susa and Egypt to the Hellespont (326F-327A). Even the list of wounds shows the king’s exceptional ability to survive the worst sort of bodily harm and the extent of his conquests, from Illyria to India (327A-B).

The genealogy and genesis components are vague as there is little mention of Philip and nothing is said of Olympias or even Zeus, whom Plutarch suggested was Alexander’s true father in the Alexander (2.3-4; cf DFAM 2, 341F). Plutarch does however mention that Alexander’s education by Aristotle was greater than anything the future king had learned from his father Philip (327E-F). Next, Plutarch includes the actions of Alexander’s youth (ἀνατροφή) at 332B when he states that he will now review τὰ παιδικὰ (“the things of youth” or the ἀνατροφή). Alexander’s statements about entering the Olympics (331B), the wounding of Philip (331B-C), his visit to Troy (331D-

F), and his meeting with Diogenes in Corinth (331F-332B) are included as part of the
events of his youth but are chronologically out of order, and as such echo the list of
Alexander’s campaigns at 326F-327A. Chronology and geography are insignificant for
Plutarch’s argument.

Following a brief analysis of Alexander’s actions and virtues, Plutarch moves on
to the actions (πράξεως) of a mature Alexander. Anecdotes involving Porus, Roxane, and
Hephaestion are presented with the word φιλοσόφως (“as a philosopher”) serving as a
transition device as well as the analysis of the act itself. Throughout most of the work,
Alexander is compared to foreign kings (326E-F, 327A, 330E-F) and notable
philosophers (328A-E, 329A-B, 331F) fulfilling the σύγκρισις of the framework. Finally,
the ἐπίθυμος has Plutarch’s final judgment in the form of philosophical truisms: “Best is
one omen,”40 “Death is the end for all men”41 and “Fear drives out memory.”42 These
maxims imply the universality of philosophy and challenge the idea of the philosopher as
the only individual armed with virtue.

DFAM 2 does not follow the traditional framework as closely as DFAM 1, but it
does share the Fortune-Virtue antithesis, though with a different goal in mind. Plutarch
uses that antithesis to show Alexander as a good and virtuous king not as a philosopher
(as in the first speech). While the opening words imply a continuation of either the first
speech or another,43 Plutarch begins by stressing Alexander’s virtues and his patronage of
the arts (333D-335E), rather than Fortune’s interference, ending with the same line of

41 Dem. 18.97, Plut. Mor. 166F,
42 Thuc. 2.87.
43 On the relationship of the two speeches, see pp. 88-105.
reasoning that he began in the first speech: Alexander’s success was a product of Virtue and not Fortune (337C-338C, 343B-345B). It is not a traditional prooimion because the speech seems to be following an earlier one. Instead, Plutarch immediately engages the argument about Fortune and Virtue and de-emphasizes Alexander’s military abilities, thus suggesting that such factors are the realm of Fortune (339A-340A). He stresses the king’s use of virtue in the face of adversity (caused by Fortune). It is at this point that Alexander’s genealogy (γένος, 340C-E) and genesis (γένεσις, 341F) enter the speech and are quickly followed by three key components, which connect this speech to the previous one: Fortune’s attack on Alexander’s body (catalogue of wounds, 341B-C; cf. DFAM 1, 327A-B), Fortune’s hindrance at the beginning of the Asian campaign (342B-E; cf. DFAM 1, 327C-E), and Alexander’s virtuous armaments (342E-F; cf. DFAM 1, 327E). The presentation of these situations and events more closely follows the traditional outline than the beginning of the speech does because these actions address Alexander’s youth (ἀνάτροφή) and adulthood (πράξεις) according to the four Platonic virtues plus a few more thrown in for good measure (piety, frugality, self-control, experiences, fearlessness, courage, philanthropy, steadfastness, and good repute, 342E-F). Alexander’s actions are the heart of the speech in that it presents the evidence that the king withstood Fortune’s onslaught of trials because of Virtue making him a virtuous king. The ἐπίλογος begins with a rhetorical question (344E) and ends with a quote (345B) which ideologically speaking connects to the end of DFAM 1 indicating that

44 Διέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔοικε χθές εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ τέχνας πολλάς καὶ φύσεις μεγάλας ὁ κατ’ Αλέξανδρον χρόνος ἐνεγκεῖν εὐτύχησεν — note the χθές.

45 μηδεὶς ἔστω μηδ’ ὑπέρ ὑμοὶ δειλός ἀπετεύθυμα μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θάνατον, εἰ τὸν ἐμὸν φοβεῖσθ’ ύμεῖς (“Let no one be terrified on my behalf. For no one will believe that I do not fear death, if you fear mine”).
perhaps these two speeches were meant to be heard or read together.\textsuperscript{46} As with \textit{DFAM} 1, comparisons (σύγκρισις) are present throughout the work, although those comparisons are not in the form of philosophers, but rather kings. For instance, Alexander is compared to Darius (337E, 338E) and Demetrius (338A), Antiochus, Artaxerxes, and Ptolemy II (341A).

The \textit{DFR} and \textit{DGA} are quite different in scope since they are encomia of a single group of people, rather than an individual, and as such they have a different set of characteristics. Menander Rhetor is most useful in our understanding of this class of encomium, and further adds to the the content of epideictic oratory by including cities and their successes (332.8-11, 359.16-367.8). Cities are to be judged by their political system (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; cf. 359.22-360.16), their culture (knowledge and the arts; cf. 360.17-32), and their abilities and activities (rhetoric, athletics, orderly running of the city; cf. 361.1-4). Similar to the encomia of individuals, the actions of cities should be assessed in accordance with the four virtues espoused by Plato: courage, justice, temperance, and prudence (361.14-365.9).

Plutarch’s declamation on the Romans shows some similarities in thought with the \textit{DFAM}. The contest between Fortune and Virtue is continued and he notes that success is determined when Fortune and Virtue work together to benefit an individual or state (316E-F). This cooperation can be seen in the achievements of the Romans such as the arrival of rhetoric and sophistry (318D-E; cf. Men. Rhet. 361.1-3). Moreover, Plutarch argues that Fortune was responsible for the success of Rome and points out the good character of many Romans, most notably Romulus and Remus (320A-E), and Numa

\textsuperscript{46} See pp. 88-105 for the relationship of the two speeches.
who reigned in the early seventh century (321B-322C). The discussion of Roman kings is roughly parallel to Menander’s assessment of a city’s political system as well as the praise of notable men, rulers, and kings (Men. Rhet. 365.10-15). Frequently occurring in the work is the Romans’ construction of temples (318E, 319A, 322F-323A) which, to Menander Rhetor, suggested that they had a well ordered city (361.4). Plutarch then proceeds to discuss Rome’s actions in foreign wars, the Gallic conflicts of 58-51 in particular (324A-325D). The speech abruptly ends with a brief comparison of Rome at its height (in Plutarch’s day) and Alexander at his. It is not unlike the discussion in Livy (9.16.19-9.17) which argues that had Alexander lived, the Romans would have conquered him because they had many virtuous men but Alexander was only the one virtuous man.

The DGA,47 on the other hand, responds to the second antithesis in the DFAM, logos - ergon (discussed below), which does not appear in the DFR. Plutarch discusses whether the Athenians were more celebrated for their military or cultural achievements which is echoed in Menander Rhetor’s work.48 Plutarch lauds the martial masterminds of Athens, such as Phormio for his naval victories in 428, Nicias for his victories at Megara and Corinth during the Peloponnesian War, and Cleon for his 400 captives at Sphacteria,49 while vilifying the graphontas (“men of letters”) like Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. He intimates that if Athens had not won great military victories, then it would have had no need to celebrate festivals or write tragedies (349E-350A; cf. Men.

---

47 For a discussion of the DGA, see Russell, Plutarch, 31-34.

48 D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, Menander Rhetor (Oxford, 1981) is still the best treatment of this author.

49 Plutarch specifically states that Cleon took τετρακοσίως αἰγιμαλώτος (“four hundred captives,” 345D) and later mentions his victory at Sphacteria when he brought back Brasidas’ shield (349D). However, Plutarch is inaccurate. There were 420 Lacedaemonian hoplites on the island at first but only 292 Spartans are taken to Athens alive (Thuc. 4.38.5) hence there were only 292 captives.
Rhet. 361.1-4). Cultural pursuits, for Plutarch, serve no useful purpose. For example, he claims poetry was a childish pastime (350B). In the end, he argues that the function of orators, who were the mediators between war and art, was to incite people either to make war or not to make it (350B-C). Plutarch criticizes Demosthenes who did not practice what he preached when in the De Corona 18.208 he took an oath swearing on the memories of warriors rather than teachers (350C). The speech as a whole is an encomium of Athenian achievements and the assessment of those accomplishments included the necessary elements outlined by Menander Rhetor two centuries later. Moreover, the paradox in this speech is that a man of letters, Plutarch, is writing against his own position, but by pitting warriors against intellectuals, it also a return to the antithesis presented in the DFAM: logos versus ergon, or theory versus practice.

**The logos-ergon antithesis**

In the DFR, DGA, and DFAM, Plutarch presents a pair of extremes which serve as the exterior framework of the speech and provide the foundation for the praise of the subject. The greater meaning, however, is found embedded in that antithesis. Fortune and Virtue, for example, provide Plutarch in DFAM 1 with the platform from which he can launch his critique of philosophers and logos and ergon do the same for DGA. The logos-ergon antithesis was one made popular by Thucydides who spoke of his methods in terms of erga (“events”) and logoi (“speeches;” 1.22).\(^50\) Plutarch’s use of this antithesis may indicate his familiarity with Thucydides’ work. A superficial analysis of DFAM 1 concludes that Alexander is a philosopher because he has virtue which he exhibited

through sayings, way of life, and teachings which in turn supply the underpinning of Plutarch’s ultimate goal: the examination of philosophy. That goal takes the form of yet another pair of extremes, logos-ergon, and is supported by a number of syllogisms.

The study of the opposites logos and ergon and their relation to philosophy appears to have been an age old debate. There are those who believed that philosophy was a theoretical (logos) pursuit rather than a practical (ergon) one and vice versa. In the Symposium, for instance, Plato uses the character of Socrates to show that philosophy is more than words; it is also a way of life.\(^5\) Aristotle, on the other hand, values the theoretical activity of the mind over a philosophical way of life.\(^5\) The Stoics seemed to return to the stance of Plato and believed that the duty of philosophy was to understand Nature so that one can ultimately achieve eudaimonia (“happiness”).\(^5\) To achieve that goal, one must live a life in harmony with the teachings of other Stoics. Thus, Epictetus used the metaphor of the athlete who shows his muscles as a product of his training to illustrate the practical application of philosophy (Diss. 3.21.3-4). In other words, the Stoics subordinated the theoretical side of philosophy to the practical (Epict. Diss. 1.4.14, 1.17.13-18). The Cynic ideal was considered in antiquity not to be a philosophical school but a way of life, thus echoing Plato (Diog. Laert. 6.69). Lastly, the Sceptics, or the Pyrrhonists, who developed relatively late and were not too dissimilar from the Cynic way of thinking, believed that philosophical discourse (a theoretical pursuit) was

---


pointless leading them to favor a way of life that promoted philanthropy (a practical pursuit; cf. Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 1.16-17, 3.280).  

**Plutarch versus the Philosophical Schools?**

I mention the Platonists, the Aristotelians, the Stoics, the Sceptics, and the Cynics because these are the schools of thought that Plutarch continually brings up to measure Alexander. Socrates is used as an example four times (328A, 328B, 331A, and 333A), Plato on three occasions (328B, 328D-E, and 331A), Aristotle twice (329B, 331E), Zeno, a Stoic, twice (328D and 329A), various Cynics thrice (331E, 331E-F, 332B), and the Sceptics twice (328A, 331E). Plutarch himself was a Platonist, though a critical one especially in ethical matters, and it was a facet of the philosophy of his time to write polemics against other schools, hence *Contradictions of the Stoics, Stoic Paradoxes are Stranger than Poets*, and *Common Notions Against the Stoic View*. This line of thought has caused some scholars to view the *DFAM* as a polemic against the Peripatetics, Cynics, and Stoics. Long ago, Hirzel and Tarn proposed that Plutarch was attacking Alexander’s philosophical critics. Hirzel believed that Plutarch was aiming

---


55 Russell, *Plutarch*, 64.

56 Plutarch also “attacked” the Epicureans in *Not Even a Pleasant Life is Possible on Epicurean Ideas*, but they are not a factor in *DFAM 1*; cf. Russell, *Plutarch*, 65-66.

directly at the Stoics and Cynics since Alexander’s actions surpassed those of the philosophers, while Tarn added the Peripatetics. Furthermore, Tarn suggested that Plutarch was “righting what he considered a great wrong” when he wrote both speeches (DFAM) on Alexander. To him, Plutarch was arguing against these philosophical positions by saying that Alexander was a better philosopher than his philosophical critics and was not wholly bad.

However, we cannot assume that there were homogenous Stoic, Cynic, and Peripatetic opinions of Alexander since writers of these schools were inconsistent in their disapproval. Cicero, for example, argued that once Alexander became king he changed into a cruel and prideful man (Att. 13.28), but he also offers a favorable opinion of him (Off. 2.5.16). Arrian, who studied under the Stoic Epictetus, casts Alexander as some sort of superhuman being in his Anabasis. Onesicritus, one of Alexander’s own men and a professed Cynic, saw Alexander as the “philosopher in arms.” Other Cynics, such as Teles and Crates, lambasted him for his pretensions to divinity.

---

58 Hirzel, Dialog, 78 and Tarn, Alexander 2, 296.
59 Tarn, Alexander 2, 296.
60 That there was a monolithic hostile view of the Alexander by the Stoics is argued by J. Stroux, “Die stoische Beurtheilung Alexanders des Grossen,” Philologus 88 (1933), 222-240, and Tarn, Alexander 2, 69.
62 Onesicritus, FGrH 134 F 17 = Strabo, 2.2.
63 Teles in Stobaeus Ecl. 97.31, Diog. Laert. 6.2.23; cf. R. Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man (Lund, 1948), 207, argued that Cynic vitriol was directed against Alexander as early as the first half of the third century BC.
As for the Peripatetics, there is little evidence to indicate any tradition at all let alone one that contradicts itself. Tarn bases his so-called Peripatetic tradition on two references to Theophrastus by Cicero that have nothing to do with Alexander but rather with the death of a close friend, Callisthenes. The only “full” Peripatetic account of Alexander which survives, according to Tarn, is that of Quintus Curtius Rufus. However, Curtius’ account cannot be labeled Peripatetic simply because it is an attack on Alexander’s character. Indeed, Badian and Mensching have both shown that there was no Peripatetic tradition from which Curtius could have drawn. Moreover, there is also a story from Dicaearchus regarding Alexander and the eunuch Bagoas. According to Tarn, Dicaearchus invented the story to explain Alexander’s moral deterioration late in his reign because he was angry over the death of Callisthenes. Badian, however, has shown that Dicaearchus was disillusioned with the direction of the Lyceum particularly


69 Plut. *Alex.* 67.3 and Athen. 13.603b.

after Theophrastus succeeded Aristotle.\footnote{Cic. 	extit{Att.} 2.16.3; cf. Badian, “Eunuch Bagoas,” 154.} Theophrastus was the teacher and friend of Demetrius of Phalerum who was elected as ἐπιμελητής (“overseer”) in Athens in 317 by Cassander, Antipater’s son.\footnote{Diod. 18.74.3; cf. S.V. Tracy, “Demetrius of Phalerum: Who was He and Who was He Not?,” in W.W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schutrumpf (eds.), 	extit{Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation, and Discussion} (New Brunswick, 2000), 331-345 and C. Habicht, 	extit{Athens from Alexander to Antony} (Cambridge, 1997), 53-60.} Thus, Cassander effectively curtailed Athenian democracy and policy was subject to the whims of Demetrius, hence of Cassander.\footnote{G. Shipley, 	extit{The Greek World After Alexander, 323-30 BC} (London, 2000), 120-121.} Dicaearchus’ vitriol then is more likely indicative of his dislike of Macedonian rule, Cassander in particular, rather than of Alexander. Moreover, it does not follow that Dicaearchus lied simply because he was a Peripatetic. His reputation would have been at stake since he lived during a time when Alexander was a recent memory.\footnote{E. Martini, “Dikaiarchos [3],” 	extit{RE} (1905), col. 547 and Badian, “Eunuch Bagoas,” 153.}

The assessment of Hirzel and Tarn seems to me to be an attempt to rationalize the \textit{DFAM} with the biography of Alexander rather than a treatment of the work in its own right. In my opinion, it seems to be less about Alexander and more about the meaning of philosophy using an examination of \textit{logos} and \textit{ergon}. Plutarch states at 328A τούτους γὰρ ὀρίζουσι φιλοσοφιὰν οἱ λόγον αὐτήν οὐκ ἔργον νομίζωντες (“these are the definitions used by those who think that it is a theoretical rather than practical activity”), thus spelling out his challenge to the audience.

**The Purpose of the DFAM**

According to Plutarch, Alexander can be seen as a philosopher if he is compared to some of the greatest of those who represent the major philosophical movements in
Plutarch’s time (Platonism, Peripateticism, Stoicism, Cynicism, and Scepticism). For instance, Pythagoras, Socrates, Arcesilaus, and Carneades left no writings behind and neither did Alexander (328A). Therefore, the Macedonian king is a philosopher. Plutarch, here, takes the literal meaning of *logos* rather than the abstract resulting in a non-sequitur which makes for a feeble argument. He passes over the fact that Pythagoras, Socrates, Arcesilaus, and Carneades practiced the virtue that they preached so that the comparison between Alexander and these men was feasible.

Plutarch then provides three standards of measure which will supply evidence: ἀπὸ τούτων κρινέσθω καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος· ὁφθήσεται γὰρ οἷς ἐπεν οἷς ἔπραξεν οἷς ἐπαιδεύσεις φιλόσοφος (“from these let Alexander be judged: by his sayings, his deeds, and his teachings, he will be seen as a philosopher,” 328B). He inverts his list and begins with Alexander’s teachings which are introduced by καὶ πρῶτον τὸ παραδοξότατον, εἰ βούλει, σκόπει (“and consider the first paradox, if you will”) which is a key indication that these two speeches are paradoxical. Nevertheless, he maintains that the students of Plato and Socrates betrayed their philosophical training, but Alexander’s students did not (328C-D). More importantly, Plato and Socrates Πολλοῦς οὐκ ἔπεισαν (“did not persuade many”) whereas Alexander supposedly convinced the Hyrcanians, Arachosians, Sogdians, Persians, Indians, and Scythians to adopt Greek customs (328C-D). Thus, Plutarch argues that, even on a theoretical front, Alexander was more successful than

---

75 Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 97.

76 Little is known of Pythagorean philosophy, but Plato praises Pythagoras in the *Republic* (600b) for proposing a philosophic way of life. Therefore, if Plato is correct, we can assume that at the very least Pythagoras balanced the theoretical with the practical facets of philosophy.

77 Cf. above, pp. 74 n. 51.

78 Arcesilaeus and Carneades were Sceptic, or Pyrrhonist, philosophers, who believed in a philanthropic way of life, see the commentary on 329B-C.
Plato and Socrates, which casts the king at the least as a theoretical philosopher like the Peripatetics who followed Aristotle.

Moreover, Plato wrote the *Politeia* which no one followed, but Alexander established more than seventy cities which changed the barbarians’ way of life (328D-E). Even more, Plato wrote the *Laws* which no one follows (328E). Yet, Alexander put forth many laws which myriads of people continued to use (χρονοκαλοι). Plutarch then proceeds to rationalize Alexander’s conquest by suggesting that those who were conquered by Alexander are more blessed (μακαριώτεροι) than they were before, presumably because of the king’s teachings (328E-F). Plutarch appeals to the Greek ethnocentric mindset when he suggests that Alexander’s civilizing practices were superior to the wretchedness (ἀθροισμοῖς) of the Asian lifestyle suggesting that his audience/readership was Greek.79 Nevertheless, the passage “succeeds” in casting Alexander as a teacher who is valued by his pupils and taken seriously, unlike Plato. This conclusion is the second paradox since a knowledgeable audience could easily say that Alexander forced his subjects to accept his “instruction” or his “command” at the point of a sword rather than through any regard for their intellectual well-being. Plutarch is taking the practical leader and casting his actions in a different light to make him appear philosophical. Ultimately, Plutarch concludes that it is the philosopher’s duty to teach others virtue, thereby suggesting that philosophy is theoretical as well as practical.

When Plutarch moves on to Alexander’s actions he focuses on one aspect, his cosmopolitanism, on which much scholarly ink has been spilled. He singles out Stoic beliefs as his point of comparison. Zeno wrote about a community of common laws and manner of life, but Alexander actually put those ideas into action (329A-D) even going so far as to adopt native dress so as to appease his new subjects (329F-330A). Alexander’s dress is significant for establishing him as a philosopher. Philosophers should be apathetic toward external appearance, namely with regard to clothing (330A). Plutarch then goes on to point out how ridiculous it is to criticize someone for his clothing because what one chooses to wear reveals nothing about one’s philosophy (330B-D). With regard to Alexander, in particular, it shows him to be more of a benevolent and politically intelligent king because he recognized how best to gain the favor of the Persians (330A). Alexander cared more for his subjects than he did for himself and was willing to take care with his clothing to appease them. In other words, he cared so little for the external trappings of his position that he would change them to help others. His choice reveals his virtue, μεγαλοψυχία (“greatness of soul” or “magnanimity”) in particular. At any rate, it is not an attack on a particular school of thought but rather a polemic against a popularly held belief. For example, Socrates (parodied in Aristophanes’ Clouds; cf. Plato, Apology 31b5-c3), Aristippus, a student of Socrates, (Horace, Epistulae 1.17.23-29; cf. 330C) and Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.22) were notable for their tattered clothing and acceptance of a life of poverty.

---

80 For the controversy regarding Alexander’s cosmopolitanism, see pp. 44-51 and the commentary on 329B-C.

81 For more on Socrates and comedy, see L. Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes (New York, 1966). On Socrates and frugality, see J.A. Colaiaco, Socrates Against Athens: Philosophy on Trial (New York, 2001), 150-168.
For Plutarch, even Alexander’s sayings reveal his philosophic spirit. For instance, when Alexander remembered Diogenes, he said εἰ μὴ Ἀλεξανδρὸς ἤμην, Διογένης ἄν ἤμην (“If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes,” 331F), which Plutarch interprets to mean ἥσχολούμην ἄν περὶ λόγους, εἰ μὴ δι’ ἐργῶν ἐφιλοσόφουν (“If I were not philosophizing actively, then I would be concerned with theories, 331F). Plutarch again takes a more literal meaning to the word logos as in 328A-B. His analysis of Alexander’s statement openly points to the second antithesis (logos-ergon). Thus, by using Diogenes for comparison, Plutarch calls attention to the Cynic belief that virtue (philosophy) does not need logic (Diog. Laert. 6.11). Cynics, in general, tried to avoid writing philosophical discourse, hence the reason the writings which have survived from Crates are in verse.82

Plutarch does not expect his audience/reader to be persuaded that Alexander was a philosopher, hence the paradox. Indeed, he even acknowledges popular conceptions of Alexander in 332C when he asks whether the king’s actions reveal the violence of war (βίαν πολέμικῆν) and the might of conquest (χειροκρατίαν) and at 332D when he states that Alexander himself is a man of contradictions. By attempting to show Alexander as a philosopher, Plutarch suggests that philosophers should exhibit their principles in their sayings, way of life, and teaching. In other words, they should practice what they preach, thus balancing the theory with the practice. Moreover, he suggests that it is the obligation of philosophers to educate others in ethical matters.

Plutarch’s View of Alexander

In general, Plutarch saw Alexander as a military genius, but a flawed man corrupted by his own success.\(^\text{83}\) In the *Life*, he is shown to be prone to drinking (23.7), fits of anger (49.7, 50.2, 51.1, 51.10, 70.4, 74.3), and cruelty (42.4, 57.3). At the same time, however, he is praised for his frugality (5.6, 22.7, 23.9-10), military skill (20.7, 40.4), and for being serious-minded (5.1-3, 42.10). However, Alexander seems to have made a change for the worse after *proskynesis* in 327 because he began showing a lack of restraint and pretensions to divinity.\(^\text{84}\)

The *DFAM* becomes even more complex when Plutarch’s own views of Alexander filter in. The negative undercurrents of the argument balance the absurdity of Alexander as a philosopher and reveal Plutarch’s skill as an orator. Alexander was not Onesicritus’ “philosopher-in-arms” but rather a “conqueror-in-arms.” Alexander the Great becomes exactly what one would expect. In other words, Plutarch is walking a tightrope in which he is attempting to balance the distorted portrait of Alexander as philosopher with that of the king as a conqueror. Furthermore, a paradox depends upon an interpretation arising out of a perception that another meaning exists beneath the superficiality of the surface meaning and that the underlying meaning is the true one.\(^\text{85}\) In the case of *DFAM* 1, the surface meaning is the depiction of Alexander as a philosopher, but the underlying meaning and thus true one is the negative image of the king. Plutarch’s image of Alexander as an exceptionally virtuous man is only superficial; in reality it is ironic. Without openly saying so, Plutarch alludes to Alexander’s recklessness and excesses when he discusses the king’s wounds (327A-B, 331C), his


civilizing of barbarians (328C-D, 328F-329A), his orientalism (329C-D, 329F-330A), the luxuriousness of the wedding ceremonies at Susa (329E-F), and his pretentions to divinity (330F-331A), for example. He even includes language in the form of similes, allusions and metaphors such as hunter/prey (330B) and robber/robbed (330D), that undermine the argument that Alexander was a philosopher (330B, 330D)

Plutarch introduces Alexander in a fit of rage over Fortune’s claims that his success was her achievement (326A). The portrayal of Alexander does not highlight his virtue since an exhibition of anger showed a lack of self-control. The discussion of Alexander’s character is further shown through the king’s relationships with his conquered subjects and friends and his reaction to adversity (or Fortune’s interference). His actions in both settings reveal his virtue because every action is an example of his superior philosophical mind. However, Alexander falls short of that philosophical spirit due to reality, the truth of Alexander’s life.

The most glaring of the contradictions between Plutarch’s presentation and reality is the image of Alexander as a world unifier (329B-D). The Persian Empire consisted of many culturally disparate peoples. Simply wearing Persian dress or trying to impose Asian customs (like proskynesis or genuflection) was not going to endear Alexander to the Persians, let alone, for example, the Scythian tribes in the north, the Bactrians, the Sogdians, or the Indian tribes, and especially his own men. If anything, Alexander’s orientalizing would hurt his credibility as king with his own men, as indeed happened. At Alexander 45.1, Plutarch gives two reasons for Alexander’s acceptance of foreign

---

86 Arist. Rhet. 1378a30-32.

87 See the commentary on 329C-D, 329E-F, and especially 330A.
customs, particularly his adoption of aspects of Asian dress. He was either attempting to appease the native population or (not mentioned in the DFAM) trying to impose *proskynesis* on the Macedonians by accustoming them to small changes in his way of life. Most scholars agree with Plutarch’s first assessment⁸⁸ and DFAM 1 echoes this when Plutarch states that Alexander was τὴν τῶν καιροτιμέων ἀνακτόμενος εῦνοιαν (“striving to gain the goodwill of those whom he conquered,” 330A).

Furthermore, the mass marriage at Susa in which ninety-one Macedonians, including Alexander himself, wed Persian noblewomen is presented as an example of Alexander’s attempt at a brotherhood of mankind (329E-F). However, it calls to mind the failure of his idealism since his men were not pleased to be joined with “barbarian” women and, as a consequence, all but one of those marriages ended when Alexander died.⁸⁹ Plutarch unknowingly spawned a debate among modern scholars regarding the theory that Alexander had a policy to unite the people of his empire. Droysen, Berve, and Tarn saw in Alexander’s rule a formulated plan to fuse the cultures of his new empire.⁹⁰ Tarn states that there is clear evidence of such a policy: Iranians appointed as satraps, mass marriages, and resettlement of populations in the new cities.⁹¹ To be frank, the evidence is as clear as mud. It has been argued that the sources are vague and that

---


⁸⁹ See the commentary on 329C-D and 329E-F.


Alexander was reacting to problems within the empire which required him to appease the Persian masses.\textsuperscript{92} Such ambiguity is present in the biography when Plutarch gives only the barest details, thus refraining both from passing judgment and from giving an assessment of the reason for the event (70.2-3).\textsuperscript{93} However, in \textit{DFAM} 2 he mentions that the marriages were τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι (“for imperial and pragmatic reasons,” 338D). Therefore, he presents a picture of Alexander as the unifier of mankind, but, in reality, he put forth propaganda to ease his conquest of the Persian Empire. Moreover, it is another moment in which Alexander is the man of action (τοῖς πράγμασι).

At 330B, Plutarch writes about a hunt in which men wore the skins of their prey as a lure. Then, he suggests that a king who wears the garb of his subjects should not be maligned. With this anecdote, Alexander is cast as a hunter seeking out his prey, in other words his subjects. Such a portrayal detracts from the image of Alexander as a world-unifier. Similarly, at 330D, we are told that Alexander did not run over Asia like a robber nor tear it apart as if it were the spoils of war as did Hannibal in the Italian countryside during the Second Punic War, or Treres who often raided the Pontic region, or even the Scythians who invaded Median lands in 653/2.\textsuperscript{94} However, Alexander did do these things. He took control of Darius’ several treasuries, and captured his family after Issus. Whether accidental or intentional, he burned down the palace at Persepolis. Again, Plutarch is ironic when he mentions that Alexander is not a robber. Moreover, in the \textit{Alexander}, Plutarch uses a similar line of thinking with the simile of hunting dogs to illustrate the Macedonians’ new lust for wealth (24.2-3): ὥσπερ κόνες ἔσπευδον

\textsuperscript{92} Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” 1-21.

\textsuperscript{93} Hamilton, \textit{Alexander}, 194-195.

\textsuperscript{94} For more on Hannibal, Treres, and the Scythians, see the commentary on 330D.
ἁψάμενοι στίβου διώκειν καὶ ἀνιχνεύειν τὸν τῶν Περσῶν πλοῦτον ("just as dogs setting upon a path hurry to pursue and to track down the wealth of the Persians").

According to Aristotle, a good persuasive argument allows the audience to arrive at the truth on its own rather than having the orator present the truth to it (Rhet. 1355a1-2). If this was commonly accepted, then it would not have been necessary for Plutarch to spell out his intent. Instead, he could mask it in the rhetoric of Fortune, Virtue, Philosophy, and logos-ergon, and his audience would arrive at the “truth” of his argument by using its own knowledge. Plutarch enhanced his argument by including enough historical fact to make his thesis appear credible. But, once discussion began about Alexander’s sayings, way of life, and instruction, the audience was left to compare its knowledge of the king’s reign to Plutarch’s presentation. It must be remembered that many in Plutarch’s audience would have been as educated as he was. They would have known the details of Alexander’s reign and indeed have a sound knowledge of Greek history as a whole. As a result, they would have been able to discern Plutarch’s purpose and arrive at his “truth” about philosophy: that it is both practical as well as theoretical.

DFAM 1 represents another example of Alexander’s use as a rhetorical topos in the Roman world. Plutarch displays his rhetorical skill by manipulating philosophical ideas to elucidate an image of the king. In this regard, he follows other writers of the period such as Seneca and Lucan who use Alexander as an example of a king without virtue. Yet, Plutarch would hesitate to go so far as others in saying that the king was a tyrant. The image put forth in both the DFAM and the Alexander suggests that Plutarch’s

---

image of the king was one of a flawed human. Therefore, perhaps the *DFAM* better reflects Plutarch’s early humanism\(^{96}\) rather than his disdain for certain philosophical schools.

\(^{96}\) Plutarch assumes in *Cimon* 2, for instance, that it is profitable to examine a great man’s flaws without over-emphasizing them.
The Relationship of DFAM 1 to DFAM 2

Apart from attempts to determine Plutarch’s intent, the study of the two speeches of the DFAM has generated several theories regarding their authenticity and relationship to each other.

The first theory challenges Plutarch’s authorship of the second speech and suggests that it is a forgery due to the different pieces of information presented, such as the frequency of source citations, the name of the individual who saved Alexander in battle against the Mallians, and details about Greece and Macedonia. The second theory is that one (or both) of the speeches survives in a revised form, which accounts for the discrepancies. A third theory is that someone else might have written down the speeches after hearing Plutarch perform them. That person might have taken liberties with the information due to lack of knowledge or an attempt to enhance the work. Another theory is that the first speech, given its opening, is actually the continuation of an oration that has not survived. The final theory, the one that is the most widely accepted, maintains that the two speeches naturally follow one another despite the differences.

---

1 I will argue that DFAM 1 and DFAM 2 are one single speech, and for the sake of convenience and common usage, I will refer to parts 1 and 2 of the DFAM as speeches 1 and 2.


3 F.H. Sandbach, “Rhythm and Authenticity in Plutarch’s Moralia,” CQ 33 (1939), 196 n. 3.

4 E. Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Historia 7 (1958), 436 and D’Angelo, La Fortuna, 137.

Whether Plutarch wrote these two speeches has been an issue since the late nineteenth century. The authorship of the second speech in particular was questioned by Weber based on a variety of discrepancies between the two works.\(^6\) He argued that *DFAM* 2 was a forgery because it cites sources with less frequency (341B and 342D) than the first (327D, 327E, 329D). Plutarch’s citation of his sources is a minute difference and one which by itself cannot rule him out as the author.

Weber argued further that since certain information is not corroborated in the *Life of Alexander*, the *DFAM* cannot be Plutarch’s. One instance of the disparity is the record of Alexander’s chest wound which occurred during the campaign against the Mallians in 327. This event is recounted with only two variations (*DFAM* 1, 327B, *DFAM* 2, 341C, *Alex.* 63.3). The first is the size of the arrow, which penetrated Alexander’s breastplate. In *DFAM* 2, Plutarch says it was two cubits long (341C; cf. Curt. 9.5.9) and in the biography it is three fingers broad and four long (63.5-6). *DFAM* 1 omits the detail entirely. The disparity between the biography and the second speech in addition to the omission in the first speech is not enough to rule Plutarch out as the author since it could simply be a mistake in memory or a conscious choice not to include it. The second difference between the speeches and the *Life* is the names of the two individuals who protected the king while he was wounded. The two encomiastic speeches agree that Ptolemy was involved even though he was not present (*DFAM* 1, 327B, *DFAM* 2, 344D; cf. Arr. 6.12, Curt. 9.5.21). The other individual reported in the *Alexander* and the speeches was Limnaeus (*Alex.* 63.4, *DFAM* 1, 327B, *DFAM* 2, 344D). However, Arrian

---

says that it was Leonnatus and Peucestas who were with Alexander (6.10.2).\textsuperscript{7} Plutarch’s biography agrees with Arrian that Peucestas was one of the individuals (\textit{Alex.} 63.4, Arr. 6.10.2).\textsuperscript{8} Interestingly, the second speech includes Limnæus and Ptolemy and adds Leonnatus (344D). Bosworth has suggested that Plutarch was “operating from memory and patently contaminates the historical material with rhetorical practice,”\textsuperscript{9} revealing that Plutarch was unconcerned with historical fact but rather with the illusion of fact to legitimize his claims.

Weber also suggested that the fact that there is more evidence and detail in the second speech than in the first regarding the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece when Alexander became king in 336 is evidence enough to question Plutarch’s authorship. Plutarch cites in the first speech a loan by Onesicritus (327D), Aristobulus’ record of seventy talents, and Duris’ account that there were only enough funds to provide for thirty days ($\tau\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}κοντα \mu\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron \de\mu\epsilon\mu\rho\omicron\circ\omicron \varepsilon\pi\omicron\pi\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\omicron\circ\omicron\zeta$, 327E). However, in \textit{DFAM} 2 Phylarchus and Aristobulus are cited, but Plutarch seems to have confused Phylarchus with Duris when he says that there were only provisions for thirty days ($\de\mu\epsilon\mu\rho\omicron\circ\omicron \tau\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}κοντ\acute{\iota} \varepsilon\chi\omicron\circ\omicron \varepsilon\phi\omicron\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron$, 342D). The \textit{Alexander} (15.1-2) records the same information as \textit{DFAM} 1. However, a forger who was trying to imitate the biography, as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Arrian frequently used Aristobulus and Ptolemy as his sources: see Tarn, \textit{Alexander} 2, 29-43, A.B. Bosworth, \textit{From Arrian to Alexander} (Oxford, 1988), and N.G.L. Hammond, \textit{Sources for Alexander the Great} (Cambridge, 1993), which also includes an analysis of Plutarch’s sources for the \textit{Life of Alexander}.
\item Hammond, \textit{Sources}, 265-271.
\item Bosworth, \textit{Arrian to Alexander}, 77.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Weber suggested is the case, would have cited sources with more frequency since Plutarch does so in the *Alexander*.\(^{10}\)

Apart from identification errors, Plutarch makes mistakes in chronology, such as in his list of Alexander’s campaigns at 326F-327A in the order of Arbela, Susa, Cilicia, Egypt. He seems to have attempted to correct his own mistake in the following sections by stating that Alexander’s arrival in Cilicia followed the battle at the Granicus River, but still the chronology is mistaken because Arbela and Susa both occurred after the Granicus and after the events in Cilicia. *DFAM 2* presents a different, though more detailed, list of Alexander’s campaigns, but one that is also chronologically inaccurate: Arbela, Cilicia, Tyre, Egypt, Halicarnassus, Miletus, the Euphrates River, and Babylon (339A). Moreover, the large number of cities that Alexander supposedly founded is erroneous and is evidence of Plutarch’s emphasis on character building rather than historical accuracy (328E).\(^{11}\) These blunders could be a byproduct of public performance or of an unrevised written draft or even of the nature of encomia in general.\(^{12}\) Nevertheless, one also has to take into account that Plutarch’s professed goal was character revelation: chronological accuracy was not his primary aim (cf. *Alex*. 1.1-2).

In addition, stylistic differences, such as the use of anecdotes, are used to question Plutarch’s authorship.\(^{13}\) The first speech has ten anecdotes and the second has fifteen.\(^{14}\)

\(^{10}\) Frazier and Froidefond, *Plutarque*, 77-78.

\(^{11}\) Fraser, *Cities*, 188.

\(^{12}\) For more on the nature of encomia, see pp. 66-72.

\(^{13}\) W. Nachstadt, *De Altera Plutarchi Declamatione quae est ‘de Alexandri fortuna’* (Diss. Berlin, 1894), 109-123.

It is quite possible that the first speech did not require more anecdotes to enhance the argument. These discrepancies at the very least call into question Plutarch’s attention to detail but do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he was not the author.

Nachstädt challenged Weber’s conclusions insisting that the ideas presented in the speeches and the *Alexander* were consistently Plutarch’s.\(^\text{15}\) For instance, in the *Alexander* Plutarch gives two possible reasons for Alexander’s adoption of Persian dress and customs: (1) to appease the native population and (2) to accustom his men to the changes in his lifestyle (45.1). The first speech does not address the second reason, but does emphasize that Alexander was attempting to placate those he had just conquered (*DFAM* 1, 330A). In any event, while the image of Alexander might be varied, Plutarch’s sources, anecdotes, and facts are similar. For instance, he makes frequent use of Aristobulus in all three works as well as Onesicritus who is cited in the first speech as well as the biography.\(^\text{16}\) In addition, Plutarch recycles the story of the exchange between Alexander and the philosopher Diogenes (*DFAM* 1, 331E-F, *Alex.* 14.3) as well as the story of Alexander’s desire not to enter the Olympic Games (*DFAM* 1, 331B, *Alex.* 4.5-6).\(^\text{17}\) At 328F, Plutarch applies a famous saying by Themistocles (when he received gifts from Artaxerxes) to Alexander to suggest that those conquered by the Macedonian king

\(^{15}\text{Nachstadt, *De Altera Plutarchi*, 6-7.}\)


\(^{17}\text{The exchange between Alexander and Diogenes is also recorded in *To an Uneducated Ruler* (782A-B). The anecdote about Alexander and the Olympic Games is also told in *The Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (179D).}\)
were better off than they were before his arrival.\textsuperscript{18} The same quotation is used at 185F in the work \textit{The Sayings of Kings and Commanders} and again at 602A in \textit{On Exile}. Moreover, at 329F-333A, a scene between Alexander and Hephaestion is included in which Alexander seals his friend’s lips with his signet ring after Hephaestion had been reading a letter over the king’s shoulder. The same scene occurs in the \textit{Alexander} (39.5-7) and in \textit{The Sayings of Kings and Commanders} (180D).

In fact, Plutarch frequently recycled his facts, anecdotes, and quotations in more than one work and not just in those pertaining to the Macedonian king. Van der Stockt argued that Plutarch frequently used these hypomnemata (“clusters”) in his works.\textsuperscript{19} For instance, he records in three different works the story of Caesar’s crossing of the Adriatic Sea during a storm (\textit{Mor.} 206D, 319B-D, \textit{Caesar} 38). Similarly, there are four instances of Demosthenes’ anguish at the loss of his daughter (\textit{Mor.} 118D, 119 B-C, 847C, \textit{Dem.} 22), and Pericles’ refusal to commit perjury for a friend is told three times (\textit{Mor.} 186C, 531C-D, 808A-B). On occasion, the same story is told but it involves different individuals. The best example of this is Lysander’s response to a priest when asked to confess his sins (\textit{Mor.} 229D).\textsuperscript{20} At 217D, the words are put in the mouth of Antalcidas and at 236D the words are spoken by a random Spartan. Because of the repetition of various events and sources, it is probable that the two Alexander declamations were written by the same individual who authored the \textit{Alexander}.

\textsuperscript{18} ὧ παῖδες ἀπωλόμεθ’ ἂν εἰ μὴ ἀπωλόμεθα (“O children, we should be ruined now, if we had not been ruined before”).


\textsuperscript{20} Σοὶ τοῖς ἐκποδόν μοι μεταστῆθι κἀκεῖνος ἔρω ἐὰν πυνθάνονται (“Remove yourself from my path and I will ask them (the gods) whenever they ask”).
Furthermore, the encomiastic presentations of the Second Sophistic movement required improvisation, which could explain the variant pieces of information. In other words, if the speeches were performed, it is possible that their differences were due to Plutarch’s errors in memory; an idea which even Weber conceded at one point. For instance, the discrepancies in the list of wounds in both speeches (DFAM 1, 327A-B, DFAM 2, 341A-C) could suggest a lack of a prescribed method as used in the recitation of Homer’s epics. In DFAM 1, Plutarch lists eleven of Alexander’s different wounds briefly: two among the Illyrians, one at the Granicus, one at Issus, two at Gaza, one at Maracanda, and one among the Aspasians and the Gandaridae. The most detail is recorded on the severest of the wounds, the arrow to the chest suffered fighting the Mallians, although Plutarch records a second wound here. The second speech, however, records the single wounds Alexander suffered at the Granicus, Gaza, Maracanda, Hyrcania, and in Assacenia. More detail is included regarding Alexander’s thigh wound at Issus and, again, significantly more detail is added to the account of the near fatal Mallian wound. Without a rhythmic pattern or epithetical phrasing, it would be difficult to recite the wounds with any sort of detail which may explain why there is so little to begin with and why the information is inconsistent (for example, the wounds and the names of those protecting Alexander when he fell fighting the Mallians). These


23 DFAM 1 mentions eleven different wounds while the second speech mentions six of those eleven and introduces two new wounds. For more on the wounds, see the commentary at 327A-B and appendix. On Homer’s mnemonic method, see M. Clark, “Formulas, Metre, and Type-Scenes,” in R. Fowler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Homer (2006), 117-138.
differences could be simple human error as opposed to having incorrect information, since they are not at all consistent.

It has also been suggested that one, or both, of the speeches has survived in a revised form. The similarities between the two speeches imply a shared theme yet the second discourse seems more polished. Alexander’s desire to bring the disparate peoples of his land under one rule, for instance, is repeated in both speeches though it is expressed differently (DFAM 1, 330D, DFAM 2, 342A-B). Both speeches also stress the fact that Alexander was in financial and military dire straits when he became king (DFAM 1, 327C-D, DFAM 2, 342D-E; cf. Alex. 15.1-2). The first discourse is brief when discussing these hardships while the second specifically factors Fortune into these problems (342C) such as when Plutarch accuses Fortune of causing the Illyrian rebellion (342C) and the Theban revolt (342D).

Additionally, the wound received fighting the Mallians could be evidence of the revision of historical information. The names of the individuals who protected an injured Alexander mentioned in the accounts of the Mallian campaign discussed above are different in all three of Plutarch’s works on Alexander. His addition of Leonnatus in the second oration and its corroboration with Arrian (6.11.7) may indicate that the author went back and edited his text to reflect the accurate name. However, if it was a revision, why did Plutarch retain Ptolemy’s name in both speeches and add that of

---


25 It is most likely that Peucestas and Leonnatus were the two individuals who saved Alexander during the melee, as they were the two who received awards for their efforts (Arr. 7.5.4). Curtius (9.5.14) also corroborates Arrian account. For more on Alexander’s wounds suffered fighting the Mallians, see the commentary on 327B.
Leonnatus when the other sources agree that the other individual was Peucetas (Curt. 9.5.14, Arr. 6.11.7)? The likelihood that what has survived is a revision calls into question Plutarch’s own knowledge of events or, at the very least, his attention to detail.

It is possible, however, that what has survived was written down by someone other than Plutarch, perhaps even his son Lamprias who was credited with compiling a list of the titles of his father’s works which is commonly referred to as the Lamprias Catalogue. However, there is also the possibility that someone else unrelated to Plutarch edited the texts. If it were someone who was not as well read or as educated as Plutarch, then it is possible that person could have preserved Plutarch’s errors such as the inconsistencies in the lists of wounds or even have made his own changes not knowing that these were wrong. It could also explain why the first part of the second speech does not follow smoothly from the first. The excursus on Alexander and the arts seems out of place and has little if any connection to the first speech except that it tangentially reveals the king’s virtue (333E-F). Apart from the digression on the king’s patronage of sculptors, painters, and musicians, the discrepancies between the two declamations could be the errors in memory of the man, not Plutarch, who was preserving the speeches whether it was one or both of them.

Another theory on the relationship of the two speeches is that the first speech is actually the second part of a pair in which the first, presumably on Fortune, has not survived. This view relies on a narrow reading of the opening line: Οὗτος ὁ τῆς Τύχης λόγος ἐστίν (“this is the account of Fortune”). Such a reading implies that if “this” is Fortune’s work, then presumably there was a balancing work on Virtue, hence the title in

26 E. Badian, “Unity of Mankind,” 436 and D’Angelo, La Fortuna, 137. F. Brenk, In Mist Apparalled (Leiden, 1977), 158, takes a similar position with the essay on the Romans.
the Lamprias Catalogue: Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀρετῆς. Wardman disagreed with this theory suggesting that the opening words were a dramatic way of stating the view against which Plutarch was to argue. On the other hand, as Froidefond suggested, it was perhaps a dramatic way of beginning the work in medias res. The reading Οὔτος ὁ τῆς Τύχης, in my opinion, calls to mind the invocation to the gods, the Muses in particular, at the beginning of epic poetry. In any event, there is no substantial evidence that supports there being a previous speech.

The Οὔτος can also serve as the antecedent for the opening words of the Roman encomium (Αἱ πολλοῖς πολλάκις ἡγωνισμέναι καὶ μεγάλους ἁγῶνας Ἀρετῆ καὶ Τύχη, “Having fought many times, Virtue and Fortune are in a great contest”) if one understands that the DFR is an ideological parallel to DFAM 1, as Wardman suggested. Moreover, these lines echo one in the second speech, Τύχης μέγαν ἁγῶνα καὶ Ἀρετῆς (“the great contest between Fortune and Virtue,” 344E), which indicate a continuity of thought. The Roman speech is to some extent a defense of Fortune while the first Alexander declamation appears to be an attack on it. Wardman goes so far as to suggest that the defensive tone of the Alexander speeches is to be taken together with the work on the Romans “in order to understand the theme of virtue and fortune.” Plutarch argues in the DFR that Rome’s success is due to Fortune and virtuous men whereas in the DFAM

27 Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 100 n. 5.
28 Frazier and Froidefond, Plutarque, 70 n. 1.
Fortune is the antagonist and Virtue is the savior (336B, 345E-F). He believes that both Fortune and Virtue are the necessary factors for the unity of humankind (DFR 316F). Rome’s success is an example of Fortune and Virtue working in accord with one another while Alexander’s success is an example of the failure of one of these ingredients. Both speeches have a shared train of thought that makes one the logical counterpart to the other. At the same time, each one can stand alone, perhaps indicating that the two were not performed together, or were not written down at the same time.

There is more evidence to suggest that the second speech may be a continuation of a work that has not survived. However, the argument for this theory is not convincing in my opinion. First, the χθὲς at the beginning indicates that something occurred the day before that was in some sense its ideological predecessor. It is debatable whether this previous speech was Plutarch’s first speech or some other person’s (see below). The discussion of Alexander’s patronage of the arts in DFAM 2 (333E-335E) may shed some light on the issue. This digression, which goes on for over one hundred and fifty lines of Greek, takes up roughly a quarter of the speech’s discussion and has only a tangential connection to the first speech. In fact, the beginning of DFAM 2 reveals two startling contradictions to DFAM 1:

Διέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὡς ἦκει χθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ τέχνας πολλὰς καὶ φύσεις μεγάλας ὁ κατ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου χρόνος ἐνέγκειν εὐτύχισεν.

It seems that yesterday we forgot to say that the time of Alexander was fortunate to have produced many artistic works and naturally talented men.

First, the reference to the “time of Alexander” does not appear to refer to the first speech at all. The first speech is concerned with Alexander the man, not the age in which he
lived. The closest the first speech comes to such an argument is the discussion of Alexander’s education of foreign people at 328C-D and his patronage of philosophers at 331E. The focus, however, was on Alexander’s actions, despite Fortune’s interference, and not the people of his empire. Second, \textit{DFAM} 2 mentions specific people who benefitted from Alexander’s love of the arts: Thetallus and Athenodorus (334E), Apelles and Lysippus (335A), and Stasicrates (335C). There is a parallel here to the first speech in that Plutarch lists the groups of people whom Alexander instructed and who thus benefitted from his wisdom (328C-D): Hyrcanians, Arachosians, Sogdians, Persians, Indians, and Scythians.

In addition, \textit{DFAM} 1 emphasizes Fortune’s obstruction of Alexander’s goals, not her favor of him, and \textit{DFAM} 2 speaks more positively of Fortune’s role in Alexander’s life. At 336E-F, Plutarch states that Fortune was made more famous by Alexander’s reign, which contradicts the first speech.\textsuperscript{32} However, he explains himself when he says that Fortune can take credit for Alexander’s victories, but not the qualities which the king exhibited in those victories (339A-B), thus maintaining the line of thought presented in the first speech. Nevertheless, the second speech seems to be parallel with the ideas in the \textit{DFR} particularly that Fortune and Virtue must work together for the benefit of a man or a state (316E-F). Plutarch argues that Fortune was responsible for the military victories (339A) which would not have occurred without Alexander’s virtues (339A-B).

Despite the disparities between the two Alexander speeches, they share similar lines of thought indicating that perhaps one work was cut short and finished on the next

\textsuperscript{32} Similar contradictions occur at 337A and 338E-F.
day, hence the χθές ("yesterday") at the beginning of the second speech. The work *Monarchy, Democracy, and Oligarchy*, which is an analysis of the forms of government, is another example of a work that Plutarch began on one day and finished the next in which he uses the variant ἐχθές. Although it is included in the Lamprias Catalogue, Plutarch probably did not write this work, but it does suggest that it was not unusual for a speech to be presented in parts over two days due to time constraints or other interruptions. The abrupt ending of all of Plutarch’s encomia has led to the supposition that there might have been a time limit placed on performances similar to that placed on speeches in the law courts of fourth century Athens.

The consistent ideas and information in the speeches such as the list of Alexander’s campaigns and his virtues can be explained as another example of Plutarch’s reusing events and information in various works, which I discussed earlier (pp. 92). Furthermore, there appears to have been some sort of rhetorical tradition for Alexander’s wounds, which could explain the catalogue’s incorporation in both speeches. The inconsistencies in the lists could be simple errors in the author’s memory. Or, the tradition itself was faulty and Plutarch used what came to mind at the time he was


35 For a discussion, see C.J. Gianakaris, *Plutarch* (New York, 1970), 123.

36 Babbitt, *Plutarch*, 321. In one day, the Athenian courts in the fourth century heard four private cases and one public suit giving us a sense of the time factor involved in forensic speeches (Arist. *AP* 67.1, 4). However, I. Worthington, “The Duration of an Athenian Political Trial,” *JHS* 109 (1989), 204-207, argued that major public trials could extend up to two or three days. Roman legal procedure of the Republic and early empire dictated that civil trials could only last for the length of one day, but there is no indication that individual speeches within a trial were limited in time (XII Tables I.9: *Solis occasus suprema tempestas esto*; cf. H.F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1972), 185-186).

composing the speeches. If anything, the similarities between the two Alexander encomia and the one on Rome reveal a common rhetorical *topos*: Fortune and Virtue.\(^{38}\) That *topos* was manipulated to fit with the subject matter (i.e. Romans, Alexander, or Athenians) which explains the ideological differences in the two Alexander speeches and their similarities with the Roman speech.

However, another antithesis, *logos*-*ergon*, prevalent in both speeches, suggests that they were in fact one. The Fortune-Virtue antithesis is only superficial serving as the secondary and, thus, less important line of thought in the first speech. Through λόγος and ἔργον, Plutarch casts Alexander as a man of words and a man of action suggesting that philosophy/virtue was both a theoretical and practical pursuit.\(^{39}\) It is a line of reasoning present in both speeches, but Plutarch returns to the Fortune-Virtue comparison in the second speech to emphasize that Alexander was a virtuous king and subordinates the λόγος and ἔργον antithesis.

The two lines of thought, Alexander as philosopher and Alexander as a virtuous king, are not mutually exclusive. In the first speech, Plutarch does not distinguish between the two. For instance, at 327E, he lists Alexander’s virtues which Philosophy provided. A philosopher was the embodiment of virtue (*DFAM* 1, 333 B-C), so by proving that the king was a philosopher, Plutarch was in fact also proving that he was virtuous. This can be seen in the comparisons on which Plutarch bases the speeches. In *DFAM* 1, Alexander is compared to famous philosophers, but the second speech takes a different angle by comparing him to other kings who were fortunate men, but not


\(^{39}\) For further discussion, see pp. 73-75.
necessarily virtuous: Dionysius (334A, 334C), Alexander of Pherae (334A-B), Archelaus (334B), Ateas (334B-C), and Philip II (334C-D).

Another look at the presentation of the two wounds which Alexander suffered fighting the Mallians (DFAM 1, 327B, DFAM 2, 341C) provides further evidence that these two speeches were originally one. As I have already suggested, the variant names (Ptolemy and Limnaeus in DFAM 1 and Ptolemy, Leonnatus, and Limnaeus in DFAM 2) given in both speeches raise concerns about Plutarch’s knowledge of people and events. However, it is plausible that, if this is one speech (delivered over two days), Plutarch recalled the name on the second day of presentation and added it to his list of names including all three names to cover his bases in an effort to correct himself.

Assuming the two speeches make up one lengthy one, as I believe, the lists of the campaigns (DFAM 1, 326F, DFAM 2, 339A), wounds (DFAM 1, 327A-B, DFAM 2, 341A-C) and hardships before the campaigns (DFAM 1, 327C-D, DFAM 2, 342D) provide convenient bookends for the speech. Moreover, the consistent appearance of Alexander’s virtues provides some cohesion as well (DFAM 1, 326E, 327E, 332C, DFAM 2, 336E-F, 337E-F, 342E-F). In addition, the second speech — or rather part — brings closure to the first part, which opens with Alexander apparently angry that anyone might think he did not conquer Asia on his own (326D-E). DFAM 2 concludes with Alexander suffering from a near fatal wound but still insisting that he did not fear death (345A-B). Both scenes cast him as a man of virtue but the only difference is that in DFAM 1 he is a man of words and in DFAM 2 he is a man of action, thus maintaining the λόγος-ἐργον antithesis. Ultimately, for Plutarch, Alexander is both a man of action and of words as philosophy is both a theoretical and practical pursuit.
Interestingly, in the collection of titles of Plutarch’s corpus (the Lamprias Catalogue), the two speeches are not listed together but are given as two different titles.\footnote{For more on the Lamprias Catalogue, see pp. 131.} $DFAM$ 1 (No. 176) is titled Πεπὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου Τύχης and $DFAM$ 2 (No. 186) is titled Πεπὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀρετῆς. The first speech succeeded the Roman speech (No. 175) in the catalogue. While the order of speeches in the catalogue could be an error in transcription or a simple mistake on the compiler’s part, it does suggest that the two speeches were seen, at least at the time of the list’s compilation, as two separate entities. The catalogue dates from about the fourth or fifth century AD.\footnote{F.H. Sandbach, \textit{Plutarch’s Moralia}, 15 LCL (Cambridge, 1969), 3-7 and Russell, \textit{Plutarch}, 18-19.} It cites 227 titles, of which forty are \textit{Lives} and the remaining 187 are the miscellaneous works of the \textit{Moralia}.\footnote{Babbitt, \textit{Plutarch’s}, xviii.} However, only eighty of the works of the \textit{Moralia} survive and of those only sixty are in Lamprias’ list. Hence, we have less than half of what Lamprias thought Plutarch wrote. But, the catalogue also includes works known to be spurious.\footnote{Barrow, \textit{Plutarch}, 193-194.} Due to the problems with the Lamprias Catalogue, it is plausible that, in Plutarch’s own time, these two speeches were actually a single work. The first part was performed on one day, the second on another day, and compilers later mistook it as two separate speeches.

The problems associated with the discourses have led some scholars to query Plutarch’s skill as an orator and rhetorician, not least because of the overly laudatory nature of the encomia.\footnote{F. W. Walbank, “Plutarch” \textit{OCD}, 14, Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch}, xxxix, and D.A. Russell, “Plutarch” \textit{OCD}$^{1}$, 1200.} Hamilton has argued that both speeches should not be taken
seriously because of the “perfection of Alexander.” He further argues that a serious treatment of Alexander would have included all events in the king’s reign and not just those that serve the argument at hand. Unfortunately, this position takes the speech only at face value and does not take into account the genre in which the author was writing and/or performing. Even the critical Badian suggested that the disparity between the biography and the speeches is the result of the fundamental differences between biography and declamation.

Biography, like history, is (generally) confined to the biographer’s understanding of fact. Encomium, however, had no such limitations. It was an intellectual avenue that valued originality in such a way that the author had “no overall plan or conception to satisfy.” The only limitations were the pre-approved subject matter or format (forensic, deliberative, epideictic). In an encomium, fact can be, and often is, manipulated and is highly selective. It would not have been necessary to mention every single event in Alexander’s reign or to do so in chronological order especially if there was a time limit. That Plutarch did not mention proskynesis, the murder of Cleitus, the demise of Callisthenes or the downfalls of Philotas and Parmenion, for example, should not cause us to view the speech as less valuable as a source on Alexander than the biography. Plutarch’s intent in writing the Alexander was very clear from the beginning when he stated that he was concerned with writing about character and not history (Alex. 1.1-3). He clearly stated that he has not mentioned every event in his biographies (Alex. 1.1).

---

45 Hamilton, Plutarch, xxxv.
47 Russell, Greek Declamation, 112.
48 Russell, Greek Declamation, 113.
We can view the *DFAM* in the same light, though it is much narrower in focus than the *Alexander* and because it was written in a different genre. As such, it takes one aspect of Alexander (his philosophic nature) out of context and examines it in a historical vacuum. The result is that Plutarch used Alexander as a tool for illuminating certain fallacies in popular philosophical thought.
Plutarch’s style is reflective of contemporary literary movements, the epideictic genre, and his own feelings toward rhetorical display. His distinctive method of expression follows the Atticists in their manipulation of language and syntax by using traditional characteristics such as the avoidance of hiatus and a carefully selected vocabulary. However, because Plutarch thought that the Attic style was bland (Mor. 42D) and lacked clarity (Mor. fr. 186), he incorporated eastern elements to enhance his work and make his style unique, such as the limited use of the optative and the use of abstracts. He employs a multitude of rhetorical devices such as antithesis, aphorisms and quotations, anecdotes, and allusions. He was also fond of abstracts, compound verbs, and complex sentences. The result is an especially vibrant writing style.

The general conclusion that Plutarch cared little for technique may have been drawn because he considered himself less of a writer and more of a philosopher (Mor. 617, 798A-C), or because he believed that a speaker should not altogether neglect style, but it should be a secondary concern after addressing the substance of an argument (Mor. 42D). Certainly, Plutarch was aware that an orator walked a tightrope in attempting to balance style and content. Nonetheless, his own statements indicate that he was conscious of his own style.

---


It goes without saying that aspects of Plutarch’s style reflect the literary tradition into which he was born. On the one hand, the era in which he lived was facing a world that struggled with the comingling of eastern and western literary elements, a direct result of Alexander’s Hellenizing in the east centuries earlier. The spread of Greek culture during the age of Alexander’s successors produced a new, common form of the Greek language, *koinê*. This was a simplified version of the classical Greek, but it had lost a great deal of its eloquence and sophistication in the merging of east and west.³ To compensate for the shortcomings of the adapted Greek, authors adopted new ways of literary expression (Asianism) in addition to imitation of the old ways (Atticism).

Asianism was everything that the Greek rhetoric of the fourth century, in which oratory was the supreme example of prose composition, was not. It was ostentatious and redundant, causing both Greek and Roman writers to attack it.⁴ Cicero, for example, maintained that Asianist authors were so concerned with padding their works that they inserted words that do not add to the meaning of the sentence (*Brut.* 46, 51, 325). Nor are they concerned with a variety of prose rhythms (*Or.* 212, 230), and Asianism has been summarized as “inciting mass audiences with theatrical fervor.”⁵ Ultimately, the result of contact between east and west and the renewal of interest in Greek rhetoric was a melding of the Asianist and Atticist styles, which can be seen in the works of Plutarch. Similar conclusions can be drawn about Silver Latin which pulled from not only the

---


⁴ Hegesias of Magnesia, a proponent of Asianism, was condemned as an author for his style (Dion. Hal. Comp. 4). See also on the Asianist style, D.H. Berry and M. Heath, “Oratory and Declamation,” in S. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period* (Boston, 2001), 395-396.

Greek and Latin traditions but also Rome’s contacts with the expanses of its empire (i.e. from Hispania to Parthia and from Britannia to Egypt).  

Furthermore, in the first and second centuries AD, the philosophical and rhetorical movement known as the Second Sophistic appropriated the style of the Atticists in its writings. The authors of the Second Sophistic were known for their preference for the rhetorical treatment of a given subject without special attention to a specific person, place, or time (Cic. De Or. 1.31.138, Orat. 14.46). This sort of epideictic exercise involved, as Aristotle explained, the “praise and blame” of individuals (Rhet. 1366a22-1367b39). The author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum stated that encomium was centered on the exaggeration of an individual’s actions, sayings, and goals (1425b13). In this regard, the DFAM speeches are model encomia as the discussion is centered on the three tenets outlined above.

Nevertheless, epideictic speeches became the method for imparting rhetorical skill and knowledge to students and for the teachers themselves to display their own skill. These made-up speeches were performed publicly and privately by members of the

---


8 It was first dubbed the “Second Sophistic” by Philostratus (Lives 481). The earliest appearance of the term declamation occurs in the treatise Ad Herennium when the author is discussing the matter of delivery (3.11 and 12.20): see S.F. Bonner, Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire (Liverpool, 1969), 2-6, 22-25.

9 See also Quintilian 3.7.6. Apart from epideictic oratory, there was deliberative and judicial, on which more information can be found in D.A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge, 1983).

10 It is generally thought that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum was not written by Aristotle, but by Anaximenes of Lampascus, a student of the philosopher: see P. Chiron, Rhetorique a Alexandre: Pseudo-Aristote (Paris, 2002) and “The Rhetoric to Alexander,” in I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric (Oxford, 2007), 90-106.

11 Russell, Greek Declamation, 1
educated elite in order to show their rhetorical capability as well as “parading and exercising their status.”12 Schmitz saw them as a display of one’s paideia (“education”), and by extension an individual’s elite status, which explains why they were predominately about mythical or historical events and characters. The subject matter stimulated controversy and discussion but was open to originality and creativity.13 It was intended to challenge traditional understandings of history, politics and even culture by exploiting figures of the past, such as Helen (by Gorgias), Odysseus and Ajax (by Antisthenes), Socrates (by Libanius), and Alexander the Great (by Seneca and Dio Chrysostom). Arguably, the best surviving examples for Alexander the Great are Plutarch’s two encomia commonly referred to as On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great.14

In the DFAM, Plutarch attempts to show that Alexander, despite being continuously hampered by Fortune, was ultimately successful because he was armed with Philosophy and Virtue. The two speeches are highly rhetorical suggesting that style was not of the utmost importance. That is not to say, however, that Plutarch did not take care with how he manipulated language.

12 Whitmarsh, Second Sophistic, 1, 3, Russell, Greek Declamation, 9-15, and Anderson, Second Sophistic, 47-68.


14 E. Gunderson, Declamation, Paternity, and Roman Identity, 19. Take, for example, Plutarch’s work On the Malice of Herodotus in which he objected to the common view of Herodotus as a great historian. Though not a declamation but an address to a friend, Alexander, the work picks apart Herodotus’ work and talks about how history should be written. The subject matter of the declamations was not limited to historical or mythical individuals. On occasion, they were known to have used some stock characters from drama: the misanthrope (Liban. Decl. 27), the rich man, and poor man (Himer. Or. 4 Colonna), or the parent-child relationship (Liban. Decl. 40, Hermog. 41). The Alexander declamation of Dio Chrysostom, a contemporary of Plutarch, has not survived.
In general, Plutarch’s attention to style is apparent in his use of long periodic sentences and his attempts to avoid hiatus.\(^{15}\) Depending upon how the text is punctuated, Yaginuma has pointed out that Plutarch has certain idiosyncrasies in his sentences: those at the beginning of chapters are long and in the middle of the work either lengthy sentences are amassed or they are found among several short sentences.\(^{16}\) Yet, Plutarch averages twenty-two words per sentence, which, according to Yaginuma, is about average for a prose author.\(^{17}\) The average length of a sentence in *DFAM* 1 is twenty-one words; his longest sentence has sixty-two words (329F-330A) and the shortest has three (οὐ μὲν οὖν: 327E). Compared to other works in the Plutarchan corpus, the Alexander speeches are no different with regard to sentence length. Thus, for example, in his *Life of Alexander* (40.1-2), one sentence has 103 words and a sentence in *A Letter to Apollonius* (105A-B) has fifty-nine.\(^{18}\)

Yaginuma suggests that Plutarch’s sentence length at the beginning of a work was to make the opening passages sound more dynamic and captivating.\(^{19}\) For instance, the opening of the biography on Alexander has only three sentences and each sentence has between forty and fifty words.\(^{20}\) The opening passage of the *Pericles* (1.1-5) has six sentences with the longest having 64 words. The introductory chapter of *DFAM* 1 has

\(^{15}\) Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 137.

\(^{16}\) S. Yaginuma, “Plutarch’s Language and Style,” *ANRW* 2.33.6 (1991), 4729.

\(^{17}\) Yaginuma, “Plutarch’s Language and Style,” 4728, including a sentence-length comparison with other prose writers: Herodotus (18 word average), Xenophon (15), Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* (30) and Demosthenes’ First *Philippic* (25).

\(^{18}\) Other examples of long sentences appear in *Caesar* 28.2-4, 58.4-7; cf. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, lxxv.

\(^{19}\) Yaginuma, “Plutarch’s Language and Style,” 4729.

\(^{20}\) Other examples include *On Virtue and Vice* in which the opening sentence has 57 words and *To an Uneducated Ruler* 779D-F in which the opening sentences have about forty words.
only two sentences, of thirteen and sixty-two words, respectively. Also, in the middle of a work, Plutarch has one or two excessively long sentences amidst several short constructions (331C, 332D-E, cf. *Mor.* 100F-101B, *Alc.* 23.1-7, *Per.* 17.2-18.3) or a continuous string of several lengthy sentences (329F-330D; cf. *Alc.* 21.3-6, *Per.* 15.1-3).

What makes Plutarch’s sentences seem excessively drawn out is the collection of many subordinate clauses, participles, and instances of anacoluthon. For example, a sentence of *Alcibiades* 6.1 has eight participial clauses in it, three of which are genitive absolutes. In the *Pericles* there is a sentence with fifteen participles most of which are accusative (12.1-2). Stadter argues that this “rich style” is a way to embellish the arguments of Pericles’ slanderers who suggest that his building programs were detrimental to the polis. Plutarch shows no favoritism toward any one particular type of clause but rather is more intent on painting a complete picture: “the effect is of accumulation rather than suspense, of piling on riches of words and ideas, rather than of a tightly ordered and controlled structure of thought.” In other words, the sentences are technically/linguistically hard to follow but the train of thought is not. The composition is further complicated by anecdotal inclusions that also serve as evidence for his overall argument. For example, at *DFAM* 1, 331B, an anecdote illustrating Alexander’s philosophical spirit contains three participial clauses (three genitive absolute clauses) before the main clause. Similarly, in the *Alexander* (6.1-2), one sentence (about the


22 Stadter, *Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles*, 145.

23 Stadter, *Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles*, lvii.

24 Τοῦ δὲ πατρὸς Φιλίππου λόγῳ τὸν μηρὸν ἐν Τριβαλλοῖς διαπαρέντος, καὶ τῶν μὲν κίνδυνον διαφυγόντος, ἡχομένου δὲ τῇ χολότητι, “Θάρσει, πάτερ,” ἔρη, “καὶ πρὸθε φαιδρός, ἵνα τῆς ἀρετῆς
taming of Bucephalus) has nine participial constructions to relate fully the origins of the event.

Despite his tendency for long-windedness, Plutarch still has moments of brevity.\textsuperscript{25} In listing Alexander’s war wounds he gives the barest details for each wound before moving on to the next topic (327A-B).\textsuperscript{26} The list of eleven wounds occurs in short clauses, usually with the verb at the end to denote the end of one entry and the beginning of the next.\textsuperscript{27} Many of the clauses contain between five and nine words. However, there is significantly more detail involving the injuries suffered against the Mallians.\textsuperscript{28} The result of the structure is a sense of increasing intensity of the damages to the king so that by the time that the people in the audience heard the catalogue of wounds endured against the Mallians, they are amazed at the severity and number of Alexander’s injuries. This, of course, plays into Plutarch’s argument in the \textit{DFAM} that Fortune hindered Alexander instead of helped him.

One of the most important characteristics of the Attic orators was their avoidance of hiatus. The cacophonous effect of two vowels at the end/beginning of two succeeding

\begin{flushright}
κατά βήμα μνημονεύ&eta; (“when the thigh of his father Philip was pierced by a spear among the Triballians, and when he fled from danger being frustrated by his deformity, “Cheer up, father,” he said, “and go forth joyfully, so that you may recall your virtue with each step”).
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{25} A. Wardman, \textit{Plutarch’s Lives} (Berkeley, 1974), 226-228.

\textsuperscript{26} A similar treatment of the wounds is given in the second oration at 341B-C.

\textsuperscript{27} For example, \textit{επειτα περί Γράνικον τήν κεφαλήν βαρβαρ&iotilde;η μαχαίρη διεκόπην, ἐν δ’ Ἰσσό ἐξεις τόν μηρόν· πρός δὲ Γα&omicron;ζη τό μὲν σφυρόν ἐτοξεύ&omicron;θην, τόν δ’ ὧμον ἐκπεσόν ἐξ ἔδρας περιεδίνησε· πρός δὲ Μαρακανδάνους τοξεύματι τό τῆς κν&omicron;μης ὀστέων διεσχί&sigmaf;θην… (“Then, at the Granicus my head was cut open by a barbarian sword, and at Issus my thigh was cut open by a sword. At Gaza, my ankle was struck by an arrow, and my shoulder hit by a falling rock casing me to whirl round and round. At Maracanda, the bone of my leg was split open by an arrow…”).

\textsuperscript{28} Three dative participles are subordinated to a temporal clause with the finite verb.
words detracted from the prose rhythm in the delivery of the speech.  

Plutarch tried to adhere to this idea in his writings. There are 58 occurrences of hiatus in DFAM 1. Of these, Plutarch tends to follow the rules for acceptable uses of hiatus: twenty-eight times after kai, twelve after the definite article, four times after prepositions like dia or peri, and once after names. Nonetheless, he does make some slips in attempting to avoid hiatus. In Pericles 21.1 and Agesilaus 18.4, he fails to make an elision after μέγα and before ἔργον, although, in Lysander 29.2 he places a particle (μὲν) between the two words. A TLG search reveals that the un-elided μέγα ἔργον is found mostly in poetry.

At 327A of DFAM 1, Plutarch fails to make an elision or add a separating particle to avoid hiatus: θρόνος ἐνίδρυσας (“put on the throne”). A similar situation occurs at 327C with ἄφορα ὅψη (“birdless heights”). These inconsistencies reveal that Plutarch was not always going to go to extremes to avoid the rhetorical taboo.

29 Sandbach, “Rhythm and Authenticity in Plutarch’s Moralia,” 194-203.

30 Hamilton, Alexander, lxxiii, mentions that Plutarch’s usage often results in a puzzling word order but no examples are given and it does not necessarily apply specifically to the DFAM.


33 326F, 327B, 328A, 331F.


35 Also at Luc. 16.2 and Ages. 18.4.


37 327E, 331C, 331F, 332B, 332D, 332E, 333B, and 333C.
Plutarch’s greatest attempt at Attic imitation was his vocabulary which indicates his extensive reading of various prose authors and poets throughout Greek history. He borrowed terms frequently from both genres and manipulated language with precision and subtlety. As Russell stated “lavishness with imagery in any reflective or discursive context is one of the most distinctive characteristics of his prose.” Take for example the prooimion of the first speech of the DFAM in which he selects words specifically for their alliterative effect: ἀμάχους ... ἀπειρα ... ἀπεράτους ... ἀτοξεύτους. In another example, Plutarch embeds alliteration in a stunningly obvious display of antithesis:

τίς ἐμειξε πολέμοις ἑορτάς; τίς δὲ κόμοις στρατείας; τίς δὲ πολιορκίας καὶ παρατάξεις βασιλείας καὶ γάμους καὶ ὑμεναίους; τίς ἀδικοῦσιν ἐχθρότερος ἢ δυστυχοῦσιν ἥμεροτέρος; τίς μαχομένοις βαρύτερος ἢ δεομένοις εὐγνωμονέστερος; 42

Who combined festivals with wars? Who combined campaigns with revels? Who combined Bacchic rites and weddings and wedding hymns with sieges and battlefields? Who was more hostile to wrongdoers or kinder to the unfortunate? Who was harsher to his enemies or more considerate to the needy?


40 Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, liii-liv.

41 Russell, Plutarch, 28.

42 DFAM 1, 332D-E.
Moreover, his allusions play a crucial role in creating a particular image in the minds of the audience. In my opinion, the most famous allusion in the *DFAM* 1 is κρατηρὶ φιλοτησίω ("the loving cup"), which at first sight creates the sense that Alexander was attempting to unite all the races he encountered which inspired the early belief that he was attempting a possible policy of fusion of the races (329C).

\[\text{\textit{\textit{ωσπερ \ εν κρατηρὶ φιλοτησίω μείζας τούς βίους καὶ τὰ ήθη καὶ τοὺς γάμους καὶ τὰς διαίτας}}\]

\[\text{just as in a loving cup mixing lives and character and marriages and ways of life}\]

That belief has since been dismissed. Another example of the use of allusions by Plutarch occurs in the *Lysander*, when he alludes to the theater by comparing Lysander’s conspiracy to overthrow the Spartan monarchy to a \(\text{\textit{τραγωδία μήχανη}}\) (25.2):

\[\text{\textit{ἐπείτα τὴν ἀτοπίαν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ καινοτομομένου πράγματος ὅρων Ἰταμωτέρας δεόμενον βοηθείας, \ωσπερ \ εν \ τραγωδία μηχανήν αἶρων ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας,}}\]

\[\text{Then seeing the extraordinary and great deeds of innovation, he needed aid, just as in tragedy when the stage machinery bearing upon the citizens...}\]

He uses the language of the theater to provide a framework of understanding for his audience. Vocabulary such as \(\text{\textit{πλασμάτως}}\) ("fiction," 25.5) and \(\text{\textit{ύποκριτῶν}}\) ("actors,"

---

43 See the commentary on 329C.

26.6) serve to enhance further the allusion and cast the situation in a particular light. So too do similes and metaphors, which abound in Plutarch’s works. In keeping with the idea of the theater, Plutarch compares the extravagance of Menelaus’ house with the stage decked out for a performance (Mor. 527F).

Τῇς γυναικὸς ὀρθείλων παρελεῖν τὴν πορφυρὰν καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἵνα παύσηται τρωφόσα καὶ ἕνομανοῦσα, τὴν οἰκίαν πάλιν καλλωπίζεις ὡς θέατρον ἢ θυμέλην τοῖς εἰσοδοσί

You ought to remove from your wife her purple and adornment in order that she might cease living luxuriously and her love of foreigners and do you adorn your house as though it were a theater or stage for guests?

These rhetorical flourishes denote Plutarch’s concern for meshing style with painting a picture for his audience. It enables the audience to understand better the argument by giving it a frame of reference, something to which it can relate.

Plutarch is also known to have borrowed from poetic and dialectic vocabularies such as θήμβος (“amazement,” Per. 6.1, Sulla 16.3), κόρος (“boy,” Per. 7.7), and κομιστήρ (“care-taker,” Per. 12.6). In the DFAM, poetic eloquence intensifies the interference of Fortune such as at 326F: κόσμει σεαυτήν καὶ σεμνόνου βασιλέων ἀτρότοις καὶ ἀναμάκτοις (“adorn yourself and exalt yourself over kings that are

---

45 Other examples of allusions to the theater include Numa 8, Marius 17, and Aratus 15. For more on Plutarch and drama, see P. de Lacy, “Biography and Tragedy in Plutarch,” AJP 73 (1952), 159-171.

46 Other similes and metaphors include Ant. 36.1-2, Per. 12.1-2, Pelop. 34, Demet. 18, Mor. 857B, 445B-C, DFR 319F, and DGA 345F-346A.

invincible and shed no blood”). The terms ἄτρωτος (“unwounded” or “invincible”) and ἁναμάκτως (“without blood stain”) were frequently used by poets. It has been argued that melding the language of prose and poetry “amounted to a distinctive art-form.” Knowledge of the elements of both prose and verse would have further heightened Plutarch’s status among his educated peers and perhaps aided his performance if the speeches were delivered publicly.

While Plutarch employed some of the characteristically Attic devices and forms, he was not an Attic purist. In other words, he loosely followed the tenets of Attic grammar and syntax, which, perhaps, led to Hamilton’s suggestion that he “was largely unaffected by the prevailing Atticism.” It is virtually impossible to determine the extent to which Plutarch was influenced by Atticism because he used both classical (the attempt to avoid hiatus and attention to his vocabulary) and non-classical elements (the use of the optative, abstracts, and compound verbs) with regularity. Hamilton’s supposition, therefore, is an overstatement because it fails to take into account those classical elements which were commonplace in the rhetorical schools of Plutarch’s time and which Plutarch himself would have learned and used. In this regard, he has been dubbed a reformed Hellenistic Greek.

48 Cf. DFAM 2, 340B.


51 On which, see Introduction VI.

52 Hamilton, Alexander, lxxii. Hamilton does concede that Plutarch’s vocabulary and syntax follow the trends of the “literary koinê, which itself contains a large Attic element.”

53 For more on Plutarch’s education, see pp. 3-4.

54 Russell, Plutarch, 22; contra Hamilton, Alexander, lxxiii.
Plutarch’s use of the optative is of course non-classical because the occurrences of
the optative in his works fall between Plato and Xenophon (who use it frequently) and
Polybius and Diodorus (who use it sparingly). He only uses the optative five times in
*DFAM* 1 and those occasions occur close together and concern Alexander directly (329A,
331B, 331C, 331D, 333A). In *DFAM* 2, the optative is used even less, three times (334C,
334D, and 338C) to refer to the actions of others, not Alexander. Plutarch’s reluctance to
use the optative is no surprise. In an argument of the sort presented in the Alexander
encomia, he deals with what he considers facts; he does not deal with potentiality. Often,
the potential optative with ἄν connotes the opinion of the speaker. The use of the
optative in a statement about Alexander being superior to other philosophers, such as
those at *DFAM* 1, 328D-E, gives Plutarch’s opinion on the subject, but at the same time
detracts from his argument. In other words, the use of the optative would give the sense
that perhaps the king might not have been a philosopher.

Plutarch’s use of abstracts also has an Asianist flourish. However, the use of
substantive abstracts was not uncommon in the classical period, especially in orators like
Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates who aimed at a superior style. The fundamental
difference between the Asianist and Attic styles in this area is the frequency with which
those abstracts are used. Plutarch’s application is seen most readily in the *DFAM* when
he personifies Τύχη (“Fortune”) and Φιλοσόφια (“Philosophy”). The presence of both

---

55 For more on the non-classical elements of Plutarch’s style, see Russell, *Plutarch*, 18-41. Ziegler,
“Plutarchos von Chaeronea,” col. 932, counts that Plutarch used the optative 52 times in the *Lives*, and
48 in the *Moralia* compared to Plato (330), Xenophon (250), Polybios (28), and Diodorus (13).


58 Stadter, *Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles*, Iv.
abstracts permeates the work and is a fundamental component of his argument that Philosophy and not Fortune claims responsibility for Alexander and his success. After the use of Τύχη and Φιλοσόφως, the speech is devoid of abstracts until the very end when they are strung together. Φύσις ("Nature," 333B), καιροι ("crises," 333C), κρίσεις ("judgment," 333C), and φόβος ("fear," 333C) are used to relate philosophical truisms. The speech as a whole shows a dearth of abstracts other than those associated with the role of Τύχης/Φιλοσόφως, which is the catalyst of the argument, and the rushed stockpile at the end. However, when abstracts do appear, they are critical to the argument that Alexander was a philosopher in word and deed. In other Plutarchan works, abstracts serve to enhance further the image or event under discussion. For example, in the Pericles (13.1-2), Plutarch was amazed at the reconstruction process of the buildings on the Acropolis, and he uses several abstract nouns to enhance his description: καλλιτεχνία ("beautiful workmanship"), τάχος ("speed"), διάδοχη ("succession"), ἡλικία ("generation"), τέλος ("end"), ἀκμή ("prime"), and πολιτεία ("administration").

It has been posited that Plutarch might have made up terms when traditional Attic phraseology was unsuitable and that he was responsible for coining certain terms in the Alexander such as φιλαναγνώστες ("love of reading," 8.2) and ιδιοστόλον ("fitting a ship at one's own cost," 34.2). In DFAM 1, it is possible that Plutarch invented ἀτοξεύτους ("arrowless," 326E) and ἐγκτίζοντες ("establishing," 328B) as they do not appear elsewhere. Also, Plutarch frequently added multiple adverbial prefixes to his verbs: συνεπείλουσιν (Per. 13.1), προκαταλαμβάνοντα (Alc. 4.1), προσεγκελεσώσαμεν (Alex.

59 Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, lv. For examples of the inventions of Atticists, see Schmid, Der Atticismus 4, 685-713.
60 Frazier and Froidefond, Plutarque, 79.
10.4), and αντιπαραβαλλῶν (DFAM 1, 328B).\textsuperscript{61} Between making up words and adding emphasis to verbs (in addition to those classical elements like the use of alliteration, simile, and averting hiatus), Plutarch clearly took great care with the language of his day, and hence shows more attention to style than is often thought.\textsuperscript{62}

Plutarch melded Attic and orientalizing elements; he coupled verbose sentence constructions with Hellenistic vocabulary, which makes for a complex but conscientious style. Whitmarsh has said that his style was “linguistically ambitious” and lacked the “ostentatious archaism of ‘full’ Atticism.”\textsuperscript{63} As Hamilton has suggested, Plutarch favored content over style, and he carefully balanced both.\textsuperscript{64} At times, that balance was easily achieved. However, there are other occasions when he appears to have fallen short of that goal, as in the Alexander speeches.

The nature of encomiastic exercises has some bearing on the style of the \textit{DFAM} and sets it apart from the \textit{Lives}. Public performance during the Second Sophistic can account for Plutarch’s apparent deviations in style and even those in content. The speeches may have been improvised to reveal not only the speaker’s knowledge but also his ability to think quickly while constructing a lucid argument.\textsuperscript{65} His sentence structure in the encomia is proof of the difficulty of composing an improvised logical argument.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{61} Other examples: συναναγνώσκοντος (333A), παρεμφαίνοντι (Per. 16.1), προσδιώβαλλε (Alc. 28.1), κατεχανιστάμενου (Alex. 6.1), and ἐπεμβάλλοντο (Alex. 12.2).

\textsuperscript{62} Stadter, \textit{Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles}, lv.

\textsuperscript{63} Whitmarsh, \textit{Second Sophistic}, 42.

\textsuperscript{64} Hamilton, \textit{Alexander}, lxxiii.

\textsuperscript{65} Whitmarsh, \textit{Second Sophistic}, 20, has argued that these speeches with their Attic flourishes were improvised and later written down for posterity which is possibly what has survived in \textit{On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great}.

\textsuperscript{66} See pp. 60-73.
This, perhaps, is suggestive of an early dating for the speeches as a practiced orator would plausibly avoid such mistakes.\textsuperscript{67} Then again, any stylistic deviations could be the result of transmission. It does not necessarily follow that the speeches that have survived were written down exactly as Plutarch might have performed them.\textsuperscript{68} Therefore, it is plausible that they come down to us in a revised form in which errors were made.

The prevalence of rhetorical devices (such as simile and allusion) and abstractions aid in the delivery of a coherent and lively tale. For example, the metaphor of the hunt at \textit{DFAM} 1, 330B illustrates Alexander’s desire to ease the concerns of his new Persian subjects by wearing clothing similar to their own. However, the fact that Alexander is cast as the hunter undermines the view that he craved a unity of the races. Alexander as the predator hunting his conquered subjects as his prey is not the image of a philosopher wanting to unite the races “in one loving cup” to use Plutarch’s own words (329C).\textsuperscript{69}

The problem of assessing Plutarch’s style is compounded by the fact that we simply do not know in what form the speeches have survived. Obviously, they were written down, but the question is by whom? If Plutarch wrote them down, why did he not correct his stylistic (and historical) errors? Perhaps Plutarch died before he could revise them himself and the extant speeches are, in effect, the oral version which included the errors. Hence, it would be plausible to assume that someone else wrote the speeches

\textsuperscript{67} For more on the dating of the speeches, see pp. 123-130.

\textsuperscript{68} See pp. 95-104.

\textsuperscript{69} In fact, Alexander’s orientalism (adoption of foreign customs) did not sit well with his own men (Diod. 17.77.7, Curt. 6.6.6-12, Plut. \textit{Alex.} 45.2, and Just. 12.4.1; cf. pp. 48-51).
down and retained the mistakes (knowingly or ignorantly), although there is, of course, no evidence to support the theory.

Plutarch’s style and the highly rhetorical nature of the *DFAM* are not enough to warrant the criticism that has resulted in the past century of scholarship on the speeches. At the very least, the speeches provide the modern scholar with an example of the blending of two different literary styles.
VII

The Date of the DFAM

It is commonly accepted that the DFAM was a product of the Second Sophistic movement.¹ Plutarch lived from c. 45 – c. 120 AD, during that movement’s heyday, so his dates give us a terminus ante and post quem for the DFAM. However, its actual date is elusive.

Most scholars believe that the speeches of the DFAM were written during Plutarch’s youth while he was still a student of a rhêtôr between the ages of 14 and 17 (c. 60-64 AD), and that they were perhaps performed as part of an educational exercise.² From Quintilian, we learn that there were four stages in rhetorical education. The first stage began with reading and practicing historical narratives (Inst. Orat. 2.4.2-4). Then, they went on to learn to take a stance, pro or con, on these narratives (Inst. Orat. 2.4.18).

The third phase was the composition of speeches in praise or condemnation of famous men (Inst. Orat. 2.4.20). The last phase was an analysis of laws (Inst. Orat. 2.4.33). The DFAM falls into the third phase of training because it appears, at least upon first glance, to praise Alexander the Great.


Hamilton proposed that Plutarch’s idealization of Alexander was evidence of the author’s youth. That the subject matter of the speeches might have had more in common with a rhetorical education does not necessarily limit its date to his youth, and Plutarch’s idealized portrayal of the king was not innovative. The sophist Dio Chrysostom, a contemporary of Plutarch, wrote a treatise *On Kingship* in which Alexander serves as an example *par excellence* for Roman patrons (*Orat. 2, Orat. 4*). The kingship orations were written later in Dio’s life under the emperor Trajan, who often emulated the Macedonian king.

Those that argue that the speeches are *Jugendschriften* ("young works") suggest that the moments of confusion and the overly elaborate rhetoric would have been disdained by a more mature Plutarch. Errors indicative of a lack of research such as at 328C, when Plutarch mentions that Alexander educated the Hyrcanians in marriage and the Arachosians in farming, in addition to geographical errors (e.g. Arachosians for Gedrosians at 328C, Sogdiana for Drangiana at 328F), suggest a lack of attention to detail. Tarn, for instance, suggested that the “mistakes” could only be the result of a “young man bent on righting what he considered to be a great wrong.” That is, Plutarch was correcting the denigration that had been heaped upon Alexander by the Cynics.

---


Stoics, and Peripatetics. Tarn’s assessment is flawed and does not contribute to the argument for an earlier dating. Geographical errors were common in oratory and are often rhetorical. Furthermore, “rhetorical allusion to a particular event or period inserted into a speech was calculated to have the desired effect on the audience and thus lend weight to the overall thrust of the speech.” In the case of DFAM 1, the errors appear in two lists, one about Alexander’s teachings (328C-E) and the other about the foundations of his cities (328F). In those lists, the geography itself is insignificant because Plutarch’s point in this section, that Alexander brought civilization to the barbarians, concerns his actions and not where those actions occurred. Plutarch more than likely did not bother with a precise location about a remote part of the world.

The overly elaborate rhetoric may have more to do with the genre (paradoxical encomium) in which Plutarch was writing than with his age. Whitmarsh suggested that the insistence that the DFAM was a part of Plutarch’s education is a result of the refusal of modern scholars to see “a mature Plutarch besmirched by sophistry.” However, encomia, as a form of sophistic display, emphasized the grandiose language and syntax of

---

9 I treat the negative views of the various philosophical schools on pp. 74-77.

10 Tarn’s issues with Plutarch’s geography are debated: see the commentary on 328C and 328F.

11 Take for example Dinarchus 1.34, a speech against Demosthenes for bribery, in which the author states that Alexander was in India when Agis III declared war against Macedonia. At the time of Agis’ war in 331 Alexander was in route to Persepolis. The effect of the geographical error is to cast Demosthenes as a man who did not aid in a Greek revolt when the opportunity presented itself, namely when Alexander was so far away in India that he could do nothing (I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus (Ann Arbor, 1992), 186-187). See also, L.L. Gunderson, “Alexander and the Attic Orators,” in H.J. Dell (ed.) Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of C.F. Edson (Thessaloniki, 1981), 189-190.


14 Whitmarsh, Second Sophistic, 68 n. 45.
the author’s style. In addition, the influences of both Asianism and Atticism can account for the ostentatious vocabulary and syntax and perhaps even some artificiality.

The focus on virtue seems to be derivative of the genre as well as the influence of Aristotle who suggested that these sorts of speeches should concern the “praise or blame” of their subject. It has also been argued that the speeches on Alexander reflect “the mature Plutarch’s interest in the characters of great men and in weighing ethical issues.”

But, as a self-proclaimed philosopher, Plutarch probably had an interest in ethics and character fairly early in his training as there is evidence of his ethical point of view in nearly all of his works, most especially the *Moralia*. Moreover, the analysis of an individual’s virtue appears to have been a stock component to these early exercises.

There is one more factor to consider when suggesting an early date: Plutarch’s attitude toward sophists. His loathing for sophists filtered into many of his works, and for Plutarch, a sophist was just another name for a charlatan (80A, 131A, 408C-D, 1113F, 116F-117A, 118A). The arguments of sophists are laughed at by kings (192C, 215E, 217D-E, 223F, 330E) and their teachings are ridiculous (343C, 543E-F, 992C,

---

15 See pp. 105-121 for an assessment of the author’s style.

16 Ziegler, “Plutarchos,” cols. 931-932.

17 Kennedy, *Quintilian*, 63.


This contempt probably began to develop very early in Plutarch’s career, more than likely in Athens under his teacher Ammonius. It is important to note that Plutarch seems to make a distinction between the sophists, or professional teachers, and practicing philosophers (318E, 580B, 1059A). Therefore, it is plausible that the DFAM dates to Plutarch’s teens when he was educated under a rhêtôr rather than later when he became much more philosophical by training. Before he developed a negative attitude to sophists, it is likely that he would have given such exercises for the purposes of his education. However, his disdain for sophistry increased as he grew older and it is hard to believe that he would have performed or written works such as these two speeches in his later years. Moreover, the change in attitude can explain why there are only the three encomiastic speeches later, such activity was simply pointless to him. Dodds has concluded that the art of public speaking escaped Plutarch early. Thus, Plutarch may have refrained from excessive rhetorical displays after failing in the attempt. Regrettably, there is no evidence regarding how these speeches were received or if they were publicized at all. However, Dodds position, in addition to Plutarch’s well known views on sophistry, can explain why there are only the three encomia.

22 It is difficult to date many of Plutarch’s works in the Moralia, however, Jones, “Towards a Chronology of Plutarch’s Works,” 61-74 and Plutarch, 135-137, makes an effort to date most of his works and suggests that the DFAM was one of Plutarch’s earliest works.

23 Barrow, Plutarch, 127 and Jones, Plutarch, 14.

24 I argue on pp. 101-104 that the two parts of the DFAM are one speech that was presented on two separate days and later compilers kept them separated.


More recently, some scholars have suggested that these speeches were delivered later, while Plutarch was in Rome during the reigns of either Vespasian or Hadrian.\textsuperscript{27} Plutarch himself tells us of one journey to Rome, during Vespasian’s reign, and suggests that he was there to participate in philosophical discussions as well as to act on behalf of the Greeks \textit{(Dem. 2.2)}.\textsuperscript{28} Vespasian only ruled for a decade (69-79 AD) and a passage in \textit{The Intelligence of Animals} indicates that Plutarch was in Rome in the mid part of that decade (974A) when Vespasian left to campaign in Campania. There, the emperor became seriously ill and was incapable of much activity in the last few years of his reign (\textit{Suet. Vesp.} 24). By then, Plutarch would have been nearing 30 years of age.\textsuperscript{29} Plutarch was also in Rome during the reign of Domitian (81-96 AD) but left when one of his friends, Arulenus Rusticus, was executed for treason.\textsuperscript{30} Plutarch would have been in his late 40s at that time. Upon fleeing from Rome, it appears that he retired to Boeotia to serve Chaeronea in a political capacity (642F, 694A, 811B-C, 785C), and he was also a priest at Delphi (700E; cf. \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 829A). A later visit to Rome in the reign of Hadrian would make Plutarch a retiree living in Greece by then. If these two speeches were a component of Plutarch’s rhetorical training in his youth, as I suggest, and he only visited Rome in his middle age, then he would have been well out of the schoolroom on his


\textsuperscript{28} Barrow, \textit{Plutarch}, 37.

\textsuperscript{29} For Plutarch’s views on the Flavian emperors, see Barrow, \textit{Plutarch}, 37-39, Jones, \textit{Plutarch}, 20-27.

journeys to Rome and could not have performed the work as part of his training under a rhêtôr.

Another piece of evidence for a later date is the manipulation of the traditional formulaic method of encomia. Anaximenes’ *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* gives a blueprint of how an epideictic declamation should be laid out.31 It includes eight *topoi*: προοίμιον (“introduction”), γένος (“genealogy”), γένεσις (“genesis”), ἀνατροφή (“growing up” or “youth”), ἐπιτηδεύματα (“deeds of choice”), πράξεις (“deeds”), σύγκρισις (“comparison”), and ἐπίλογος (“epilogue”).32 Plutarch uses these *topoi* with the exception of the genealogy and the genesis which are vague in the first speech but more apparent in the second.33 If the work was a product of his education, one would expect the author to imitate more closely Anaximenes’ outline since part of ancient rhetorical education relied on imitation (*mimēsis*).34 Therefore, clear delineated sections should be apparent in the speeches, but they are not. An older Plutarch would have been willing to manipulate the outline for his own purposes which might have been the education of his own students. These speeches, as paradoxical encomia, are far more philosophical in content and design. The lesson is not to be found in Alexander but in the philosophy that the author wants him to represent. Plutarch could very well have been presenting these

---


speeches in his informal school in Chaeronea, and they could have served a dual purpose: as examples of rhetorical encomia and as lessons in philosophy. Perhaps, then, he would have had his own students imitate him.

Ultimately, there is no way to prove definitively that the declamations were presented in Plutarch’s youth as a training exercise or in his maturity as a means to keep up his interest in virtue. There is also no internal evidence to suggest that they were delivered at all let alone in Rome. However, the dearth of other encomia, in addition to Plutarch’s feelings toward sophistry, is highly indicative of youthful educational experience.

35 On this, see pp. 8.
The earliest information we have on Plutarch’s works is derived from a list supposedly compiled by his son, Lamprias, shortly after Plutarch died in about 120 AD (Suda 96). That list, known as the Lamprias Catalogue, contained some 227 titles of which forty are Lives and the remaining 187 are miscellaneous works classed as the Moralia. Of the eighty titles of the Moralia that have survived, only sixty are in Lamprias’ list; the remaining twenty are not in the list, but are known to be Plutarch’s.

Most of Plutarch’s works were lost in the centuries following Justinian’s decree abolishing the schools of philosophy in 529 AD. Before the schools were closed, Plutarch’s works were often quoted or referenced by other authors. Some time in the tenth century, abstracts of some of Plutarch’s works were produced, which eventually replaced the original texts. It is believed that Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere, Aristophanis et Menandri comparatio, and De animae procreatio epitome survive in this

1 A. Adler (ed.), Suidae Lexicon 3 (Paris, 1933), 233. For more on Plutarch’s life and death, see pp. 2-9.
3 For a discussion on the authenticity of Plutarch’s works, see K. Ziegler, “Plutarchos,” RE (1951), cols. 696-718 and Russell, Plutarch, 164-172.
5 Russell, Plutarch, 143-146.
6 F.C. Babbitt, Plutarch’s Moralia 1 LCL (Cambridge, 1927), xix.
manner. The 122 works of Plutarch that we have today were preserved in the tenth and eleventh centuries through repeated copying and subsequent printing.

**Manuscripts**

Wegehaupt counted at least 100 different manuscripts. In the thirteenth century, the largest collection of Plutarch’s works, known as the Corpus Planudeum, was assembled. It was believed that Maximus Planudes, the editor of the Palatine Anthology, was responsible for the compilation, hence the name. It included numbers one through sixty-nine of the Lamprias Catalogue, which survived in the extant ‘codex Parisinus 1671’, now in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. The subsequent ‘codex Parisinus 1672’ included an additional two manuscripts: *Quaestionum Convivialium, libri IX* and *De animae procreation in Timaeo*. Most manuscripts contain various groupings of Plutarch’s works. Five of the most important manuscripts are in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris: MSGR no. 1672 (13th or 14th century), MSGR no. 1675 (15th century), MSGR no. 1955 (11th century), MSGrR no. 1956 (11th or 12th century), and MSGR no. 1957 (11th century). Other important manuscripts include one dating to the tenth century in Rome (Urbinas 97), and two in Venice dating to the eleventh century (Marc. Gr. 249 v1 and Marc. Gr. 250 v2).

The two speeches of the *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*, nos. 176 and 186 in Lamprias’ list, appear in part or in full in forty-one manuscripts of which Parisinus

---


8 H. Wegehaupt, “Beitrag zur Textgeschichte der Moralia Plutarchs,” *Philologus* 64 (1905), 391-413 and *Plutarchstudien in italienischen Bibliotheken* (Cuxhaven, 1906); however, he omitted manuscripts that contained only a single essay.

1671 (A), Parisinus 1675 (E), and Barberinianus 182 (G) are the most significant. A, E, and Ambrosianus 859 (α) form a manuscript family as they are derived from Maximus Planudes’ compilation (c. 1296). A and E are the most often used because of their general agreement for they differ at only six points (327E 12-13, 328E 8, 330C 11, 327C 8, 328E 7, 329D 2). Babbitt, *Plutarch* and Frazier and Froidefond, *Plutarque* prefer A and E. Nachstadt’s 1935 Teubner edition uses Parisinus 1957 (K) which occasionally supports A and E (e.g. 332C 2).

*Translations*

The spread of Greek manuscripts to the west in the fifteenth century increased Plutarch’s popularity. By the middle of the century, all of Plutarch’s works had been translated into Latin. Early in the sixteenth century, his works were available in the vernacular languages: Italian, French, Spanish, English, and German. Translating Plutarch’s works became a popular pastime; for example, Elizabeth I translated *Curiosity* from the Latin into English in 1598.

The first printed translation, the Aldine edition, was published in Venice in the sixteenth century under the title *Plutarchi Opuscula LXXXXII (Venetiis, in aedibus Aldi et Andreae soceri)* and was based on a manuscript belonging to a Roman Catholic cardinal, Bessarion. Later that century, an edited edition with a Latin translation was published, the Xylander edition, in which the lives of Galba and Otho were separated and placed with the other biographies. The Xylander edition was followed shortly by the thirteen volumes based on the Aldine edition translated by Henri Stephanus in 1572.

---

Stephanus’ ordering of the works has been the basis for many modern text collections, for example the Loeb, the Budé and the Teubner editions.

Certainly, the most influential translator, at least to modern scholars, was Jacques Amyot, who by 1572 had translated all of Plutarch’s *Lives* and *Moralia* into French for Henri II. Thomas North was responsible for translating the *Lives* from Amyot’s French version into English in 1579. North’s vernacular translation gave way to unprecedented popularity for Plutarch’s works. As a consequence, it was essentially North’s interpretation of Amyot’s translations of the *Lives* of Caesar and Antony that Shakespeare used for his plays.\(^{11}\) However, Shakespeare on occasion ignores Plutarch’s interpretations of certain individuals’ character.\(^{12}\) For instance, in *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare overlooks examples of Antony’s cruelty (e.g. Antony’s joy at seeing the decapitated head and hands of Cicero: Plut. *Ant.* 20.1-3) to depict a more sympathetic love story.\(^{13}\)

While the *Lives* were the most popular of Plutarch’s works, the *Moralia* too managed to impact writers and philosophers. Sir Francis Bacon used select passages of the *Moralia* in his *Essays* (1597), specifically Essay 17, *On Superstition*, in which he quotes Plutarch who stated that he would rather people think he never existed than think that he was morally depraved (*Mor.* 169F-170A).

---


\(^{13}\) Roe, “Character in Plutarch and Shakespeare,” 182-186.
Modern Editions

The editions of the Loeb Classical Library (LCL), the Teubner, and the Budé are the traditional modern collections of the *Moralia*. The fifteen volumes of the *Moralia* in the Loeb edition have in all eleven translators with F.C. Babbitt translating the *DFR*, *DFAM*, and *DGA* in volume four (which also includes textual variants and limited notes and cross references with other works). The Teubner edition, edited by G.N. Bernardakis in the late nineteenth century, has the most extensive *apparatus criticus* and textual cross references. The relatively recent Budé edition is translated with copious notes and textual information by F. Frazier and C. Froidefond.

COMMENTARY
Section 1, 326 D – E

Overview: Plutarch opens the speech by invoking Philosophy to defend Alexander against the claim of Fortune that she is responsible for Alexander’s success. The evidence Plutarch puts forth suggests that Fortune was more of an obstacle for the Macedonian king, but it is couched in rhetorical embellishment and irony. The end of the prooimion leaves the audience with a contradictory image of Alexander. On the one hand, he has succeeded where no other individual ruler had and did so armed with every virtue Philosophy could afford him. On the other hand, that depiction is only superficial since the audience has enough knowledge regarding Alexander’s reign to recognize Plutarch’s verbal irony.

326 D

Οὖν τῆς Ἀλέξανδρον: The opening gives a sense of dramatic immediacy to the speech. οὖν has no clear antecedent and the effect catches the audience/reader’s attention instantly. The opening word also lends emphasis to Plutarch’s argument that this speech, and none other, is Fortune’s discourse and not his own.

In an attempt to posit an explanation for οὖν, Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 100 n. 5, suggests that it was “a more dramatic way of stating the view against which Plutarch is to argue.” In a similar vein, the Budé editors argue that Plutarch used οὖν as the quickest means to begin in medias res. It was used to catch the audience by surprise and thereby garner its attention immediately rather than build to a climax which is the effect of the following words.

However, E. Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Historia 7 (1958), 436 and D’Angelo, La Fortuna, 137, have suggested that οὖν indicates that we have the second part of the speech. The first part, presumably suggesting that Alexander’s success was due to Fortune and had nothing to do with ἀξεηή (literally “excellence” but often translated “virtue”), has been lost; cf. W. Hoffman, Das literarische Porträt von Alexanders des Grossen im griechischen und römischen
\textit{Altertum}, Diss. (Leipzig, 1907), 90. Despite this being the only occasion where Plutarch begins a work in such a way, there is no evidence, in my opinion, to suggest that there was a previous speech: see pp. 96-98.

Neither of these assessments adequately explain Plutarch’s use of οὐτος. Instead, I suggest that it should not be taken by itself but with the words which follow. Taken as a whole, the opening sentence echoes the epic tradition such as, for example, when Homer opens the \textit{Iliad} with Μῆληλήδης θεά (‘Sing Goddess of the wrath’) or the \textit{Odyssey} with Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μοῦσα (‘tell me Muse about the man’). In both works, Homer invokes the divine to tell the tale (cf. Hes. \textit{Theog.} 1-16: see C.R. Beye, \textit{The Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Epic Tradition} (New York, 1966), 15-16, 204). The Roman epic tradition as well employs divine invocation at the beginning (cf. Verg. \textit{Aen.} 11, Ov. \textit{Met.} 2). Similarly, Plutarch calls attention to Fortune before changing tactics and invoking Philosophy. Moreover, if Plutarch is emulating Homer in the \textit{Iliad} then it is no surprise that he included the catalogue of wounds (327A-B), which would be roughly parallel to the \textit{Iliad}’s catalogue of ships in Book 2.

If his opening is meant to call to mind the \textit{prooimion} of Homer’s epics, as I suggest, then the audience’s attention is drawn to Alexander’s Homeric emulation which would have been common knowledge. He was known to have slept with the so-called “casket-copy” under his pillow (Plut. \textit{Alex.} 8.2, 26.1-2; cf. Strabo 13.1.27, Ath. 12.537d, Plin. \textit{HN} 7.108, Dio Chrys. \textit{Or.} 2). In fact, Plutarch is the only author to mention that Alexander carried copies of both epic poems on his campaigns (\textit{DFAM} 1, 327F). Moreover, Alexander aimed at Homeric \textit{aretē} casting himself as the Homeric hero on more than one occasion (Diod. 17.97.3, Curt. 4.6.29, 9.3.19, Arr. 5.28.3, 7.14.4, Plut. 138
Alex. 15.8-9, 62.5, 72.3, Ael. VH 7.8), and that emulation is alluded to later at 331D and 332A-B. For a treatment of Homeric aretê, see A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Ethics (Oxford, 1960), 30-60.

Arrian (1.12.1-2, 4.1.1, 5.7, 6.2) recognized Alexander’s affinity for the epic poet by peppering his history with Homeric references. Plutarch also includes Homeric quotes and allusions throughout DFAM 1 (326E, 331C, 331D, 333C) in an effort to put the king’s aretê front and center and undermine Fortune’s position. Because of this emphasis, the speech greatly embellishes Alexander’s actions since “he had to personify every attribute of an increasingly diverse and strained metaphysic of masculinity:” A. Stewart, “Alexander in Greek and Roman Art,” in J. Roisman (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great (Leiden, 2003), 33. That rhetorical exaggeration manifests itself in the king’s “philosophic” actions in which he is shown, at least superficially, to be far superior to the quintessential models of virtue, i.e. philosophers.

Fortune was often used rhetorically, as at Polybius 1.4.1: ὅτι καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἀπαντά τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἐν ἔκλινε μέρος καὶ πάντα νευεῖν ἴνα γκασε πρὸς ἑνα καὶ τὸν σωτὸν σκοπὸν (―and that accordingly Fortune bends nearly all the matters of the inhabited world in one turn and forced everything to incline towards one and the same aim‖); cf. 1.4.4-5, 1.87.7, 4.81.5, 36.17, 9.6.5, Men. Rhet. 2.376.25, 420.27-31 and see further F.W. Walbank, A Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1957), 16-26. In his famous Alexander excursus, Livy 9.17-18 argues that Alexander was a product of only Fortune while the Romans were bolstered by both Fortune and virtue. Alexander was generally considered to be a favorite of Fortune (S. Swain, “Plutarch, Chance, Providence, and History,” AJPh 110 (1989), 282), but Plutarch is reacting
against this particular assessment by arguing that Fortune did more to hinder than help him. Unfortunately, the other source material for Alexander, apart from Livy, suggests the opposite (Curt. 10.5.35, Dio Chrys. Or. 1-4, 64). If the Alexander speeches are to be taken with the DFR, then Plutarch consistently argues for Fortune’s interference in Alexander’s life (DFR 317F). He maintains that Roman success was due to both Fortune and Virtue, but Alexander lacked the involvement of Fortune though he had the virtue (DFR 317F). Moreover, in his life of Alexander, Plutarch continues the idea that Fortune was a hindrance to the king (26.7).

δεῖ δ’ ἀντεπεῖν ... τὴν ἡγεμονίαν: Plutarch begins by painting a favorable picture of Alexander as a typical Macedonian king. He feels it is necessary to defend an irate Alexander against Fortune’s claims that he did not win his empire on his own, a notion which irritated the king. Plutarch’s Alexander seems to adhere to Homeric conceptions of moral responsibility which did not condone excuses of divine interference in one’s actions unless the god was physically present: see A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 16-17. Aristotle takes Homeric thought a step further by saying that it is ridiculous to blame external factors for one’s actions, or successes and failures (Eth. Nic. 110b9, 111a24). Therefore, Alexander’s reaction to Fortune’s claims is justifiable in light of ancient Greek thought on moral responsibility.

Alexander’s reaction also calls to mind the murder of Cleitus the Black in 328 when, after praising Philip’s achievements, Cleitus belittled Alexander’s success by intimating that the king οὐκον μόνον καταπράξαι αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ γὰρ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα (“had not done these things alone but they were in large part Macedonian accomplishments,” Arr. 4.8.5). Alexander was so angry at those words that,
in a drunken rage, he speared Cleitus killing him instantly. However, in a speech in 324 to his mutinous troops at Opis, Alexander played up Philip’s successes but went on to laud his own achievements and claimed that he was better than his father (Arr. 7.9).

Plutarch does not mention that Alexander “inherited” Greece when Philip was assassinated in 336. That inheritance is not distinguished from his conquest of Asia, which began in 334 and is referred to as ἡ ἡγεμονία (“the hegemony”). For purposes of the argument, Alexander’s inheritance and hegemony were the result of his own actions the consequence of which was the loss of blood and men.

Hamilton, Plutarch, xxxv, has argued that Plutarch’s insistence that Alexander was a philosopher was a means to an end namely that a philosopher was the embodiment of all virtue (Pl. Rep. 485a-487a), thus proving Alexander as a philosopher is the equivalent of showing his virtue. A statistical analysis of the term φιλόσοφος (“philosopher”) and its various derivatives in DFAM 1 (thirteen occurrences) reveals that they are used almost interchangeably with aretē (used on two occasions: 331B, 331C); the only exceptions are when Plutarch wishes to emphasize particular virtues such as those at 326E: εὔβουλία (“wise counsel”), καρτερία (“steadfastness”), ἀνδρεία (“masculinity”), σωφροσύνη (“self-control”), 327E: μεγαλοψυχία (“greatness of soul”), συνέσις (“intelligence”), σωφροσύνη, ἀνδραγαθία (“bravery”), and in 332C we have ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη (“justice”), σωφροσύνη, συνέσις. Given the goal of DFAM 1, Plutarch needed to establish Alexander as the greatest philosopher to show that he was a man of virtue; the argument hinges on his actions because they best illustrate his virtue.

ἡν ὅνιον ... ἐπαλλήλων κτώμενος: Alexander’s injuries are meant to reveal Fortune’s interference in Alexander’s life and show that Fortune did more to hinder the
Macedonian king by allowing him to be wounded than to aid him as it did with other kings such as Darius, Sardanapalus, and Artaxerxes Ochus (326E-327A). It is only through his virtue (or by Philosophy), Plutarch argues, that Alexander was able to overcome those obstacles and succeed. The idea sets up the sentiment expressed by the Homeric quote which follows. For more on Alexander’s wounds, see the commentary on 327 A-B.

326 E

πολλάς μὲν ... πολέμιζων: In the first of four references to Homer (326E, 331C, 331D, 333C), Plutarch directly quotes Achilles’ response to Odysseus’ pleas for him to join the battle against the Trojans (Il. 9.325-326). Achilles states that he would not go to battle after fighting endlessly and receiving no appreciation for his efforts. The depiction of Achilles is not a favorable one, and he appears as an ill-tempered child. Thus, the quote begins the negative picture of Alexander: μᾶλλον δ’ ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος (“but rather on behalf of Alexander, who is annoyed and angry,” 326D). Plutarch’s audience would have recognized the quote and its original context given the role of Homer in education: see R. Barrow, Greek and Roman Education (London, 1976), 21-22, 39-40 and M. Griffith, “Public and Private in Early Institutions of Education,” in Y.L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden, 2001), 56-57. Moreover, Alexander’s emulation of Achilles was common knowledge and is rampant in the source tradition (e.g. Diod. 17.97.3, Curt. 4.6.29, 8.4.26, Arr. 7.14, Plut. DFAM 2, 343B). On Alexander’s emulation of heroes, see Lane Fox, Alexander, 61-67, Bosworth, CE, 282-282, and E.A. Fredricksmeyer, “Alexander’s Religion and Divinity,” 142
in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden, 2003), 257-258.


The inclusion of this passage with all of its connotations immediately raises questions about Plutarch’s intent. The quotation serves a gnomic purpose: “Maxim (γνώμη) is a summary statement, in universal terms, dissuading or exhorting in regard to something, or making clear what a particular thing is” (G.A. Kennedy (trans.), *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden, 2003), 77). T. Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge, 2007), 290-291, has argued that Plutarch often uses *gnomai* to “modify or disagree with them” causing a shock effect in the audience who expects to believe the quotation because it is a gnomic quotation. The audience is then forced to reevaluate the subject under discussion. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, xxxvi, has argued for Plutarch’s perfect image of Alexander in the speeches, but the inclusion of this quote does more to undermine that perfect image of Alexander and forces the audience to reexamine what it has just heard/read. Was Alexander the battle-weary soldier or the petulant glory-monger who wanted praise for his conquests? Ultimately, the answer leads the reader back to the δυσχεραίνοντος (“irritated”) and ἀγανακτοῦντος (“angry”) mentioned a few lines earlier (326D). Alexander becomes the type of king who was not at all modest and required constant pandering. Moreover, the quote further serves to highlight the excess of combat Alexander experienced on campaign the further east he went, an excess of his own making (*pothos*) since Plutarch argues that Fortune had no part in Alexander’s life. In

The quote draws a parallel between Achilles and Alexander and the result is two-fold. On the one hand, Alexander is the quintessential Homeric warrior-king, and on the other hand, the quote illustrates that the king sought conflict for his own glory like was insinuated in the Iliad when Achilles abstained from war because he was not properly appreciated.

πρὸς ἀμάχους ... πέτρας ἀποξεύτους: This sentiment is echoed at the start of 327C where Plutarch reiterates Alexander’s many obstacles. It is an exemplary moment in Plutarch’s style as he employs various rhetorical devices. We have a chiastic tetracolon, each pair is isosyllabic, and Plutarch also incorporates alliteration in four adjectives: ἀμάχους (“irresistible”), ἀπειρα (“innumerable”), ἀπεράτους (“impassable”), and ἀποξεύτους (“cannot be reached by an arrow”). The result is almost poetic, as if he is continuing his adaptation of Homer to try to emulate him, and he does this in order to cast Alexander as a Homeric hero.

However, in this use of rhetorical style, Plutarch may also be setting up another less-flattering facet of Alexander: his deification. The author’s use of the alpha-pritive adjectives serves to amplify the king’s feats. As D’Angelo, La Fortuna, 139, points out,
this amplification is achieved “ingigantendo il numero e il valore dei nemici, nonché le avversità derivanti da sfavorevoli condizioni logistiche.” Pearson, *LHA* 6, has suggested that the exaggeration of Alexander’s deeds by contemporary writers, like Onesicritus, Nearchus, and Ptolemy served to glorify the king and put him in places “where no ordinary human being could have been expected to go” (cf. P.A. Brunt, “The Aims of Alexander,” *G&R* 12 (1965), 209). Thus, the magnification of Alexander’s deeds in the source material contemporary with Alexander may have led later writers, like those of the ‘vulgate’ tradition (see introduction pp. 30-37), to link these deeds with his deification. However, it would be taking Plutarch too far here to suggest that his use of these adjectives was meant to infer Alexander’s divinity. Later, he alludes to this issue directly (329C, 331A, 332A-B). The choice of the alpha-pritive adjectives more than likely was due to the alliterative aspect in an effort to show the author’s rhetorical finesse. For more on Greek prose style and rhetorical figures, see J.D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford, 1952), H. Lausberg, *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Einführung für Studierende der klassischen, romanischen, englischen und deutschen Philologie* (Munich, 1967), and K.J. Dover, *The Evolution of Greek Prose Style* (Oxford, 1997).

Plutarch suggests that Alexander did things that no one had done before (after all, he was Alexander the Great) such as facing powerful and innumerable tribes, crossing impassible rivers, and traversing excessively lofty mountains. However, there were things Alexander could not do and Plutarch’s selection of feats is a paradox intended to bring those failings to the minds of the audience. There were, in fact, tribes that Alexander had trouble subduing such as those in Bactria and Sogdiana, who wreaked havoc on his forces at Gaugamela (Curt. 4.9.3, Arr. 3.13), and who challenged him later
in a massive rebellion, during which they slaughtered one of his garrisons (Curt. 7.6.13-15, Arr. 4.1.4). Later, however, Alexander subdued these tribes for a time making them not wholly “irresistible.” Furthermore, the Mallians of the lower Punjab, in particular, nearly killed the king in battle in 326 (Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 4, Curt. 9.5.25, Arr. 6.10.1, Plut. *Alex.* 63.9; cf. *DFAM* 2, 341C). Plutarch was certainly grasping at straws when he vaguely mentioned “irresistible forces,” but there would have been the expectation that the audience would have come to its own conclusions about Alexander’s troubles in this regard.

The reference to the πνημονῶς ἀπεράτους (“impassable river”), in my opinion, immediately calls to mind the Hyphasis River since Alexander was forced to retreat from it in 326 after his men mutinied (Diod. 17.94.5, Arr. 5.25.2, Curt. 9.2.13, Just. 12.8.10-6). In 330/29, Alexander could not cross the Araxes River (in Armenia) and was forced to build a bridge hastily (Diod. 17.69.1-2, Arr. 3.18.6, 10, Curt. 5.5.2-4). A parallel can be found in Vergil’s *Aeneid* (8.725-728), where Augustus is praised for crossing the Araxes. It is likely that this incident of Augustus outdoing Alexander would have resonated with Plutarch’s audience in the first century AD.

Alexander was also faced with lofty mountains like the Sogdian Rock (Curt. 7.11.1-27) and the Rock of Aornus (Diod. 17.85.3-86.1, Arr. 4.29.1-30.4, Curt. 8.11.2-8). In both situations, Alexander had to pay someone either to climb the cliffs or to show him a way up the side, for he could not do it alone (cf. the commentary on 327C). Therefore, Plutarch’s alpha-primitive phrases single out Alexander’s failures and are contrary to the audience’s expectation. That expectation relies on the audience’s knowledge of the genre of encomia. It would have been expecting excessive praise of the subject under
discussion because this speech was probably given as an educational exercise under the
direction of a \textit{rhētōr} (see pp. 123-130 for the dating of the speech). The way in which
Plutarch presents these events in Alexander’s reign serves a purpose other than the
obvious one that Alexander overcame seemingly impossible tasks. Rather, Plutarch’s
paradoxical use of these phrases serve to undermine the image of Alexander presented on
the surface.

\textit{εὐβουλία καὶ ... παραπεμπόμενος}: The list of virtues bears a striking resemblance to
Plato’s catalog of philosophic qualities mentioned in the \textit{Republic} (485a-487a; cf. \textit{Meno}
74a, \textit{Leg.} 963a-964b). It is no surprise that Plutarch appropriated such a list as he was a
Jones, \textit{The Platonism of Plutarch and Selected Papers} (London, 1980), 7-153, R.
Volkmann, \textit{Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea} (New York,
1980). Plutarch’s list, in various incarnations, has a pervasive presence in the oration as
it is repeated on three different occasions (326E, 327E, 332C).

This catalogue of virtues builds up to the most important quality, \textit{σωφροσύνη}
(“moderation”). Excess was considered unmanly in to the ancient Greeks (e.g. Lys.
14.25, 28, 41, [Dem.] 59.33) and men who lacked self-control were seen as consumers,
which was the common stereotype of women: see J. Roisman, \textit{Rhetoric of Manhood:
Masculinity in the Attic Orators} (Berkeley, 2005), 89. Moreover, for the Greek soldier,
temperance was necessary to acquire \textit{ἀρετή} (“excellence,” Roisman, \textit{Rhetoric of
Manhood}, 105-107). It was considered by Plutarch to be the most important of the
virtues (\textit{Mor.} 70E). In addition to the powers of logic, these qualities fortify the
philosopher so that he is able to face conflict without succumbing to fear (DFAM 1, 333C).

The *prooimion* ends by insinuating that Alexander’s difficult campaigns were aided by his virtues. However, Plutarch had already begun to undermine that image of Alexander as a virtuous man by mentioning his anger at Fortune’s presumption. Plutarch considers anger to be a form of excess and, like Plato, believes that it causes evil to grow in the soul (Mor. 454B-C; cf. Pl. Rep. 411B-C). The image of an angry king carries over into the next section with Alexander’s angry reply to Fortune leaving the audience to question the king’s virtuous state.
Overview: Plutarch begins the narrative portion of the argument with Alexander’s retort to Fortune’s assumption that she was responsible for his success. It is a heated reply in which the king (1) challenges Fortune’s role in the lives of other kings and (2) lists every point where he suffered because of Fortune. He first suggests that Fortune elevated men who were low-born (Darius III), prone to frivolity and excess (Sardanapalus), or were fortunate enough to be noble born and have their destiny chosen for them at birth (327A: Artaxerxes Ochus and Artaxerxes IV). The fact that Alexander too was royal born is never mentioned. Instead, Plutarch focuses on Alexander’s actions (in this case, his campaigns) and the wounds he suffered as a result of those actions. At 326F-327A, Plutarch specifically mentions that Fortune claimed those rulers who never suffered a wound (ἀηξώηνηο) or caused blood to flow (ἀλαηκάθηνηο). At nearly every stage of the Persian campaign, Plutarch records a wound making it clear that Fortune could not claim credit for Alexander’s success. Moreover, Alexander’s entire reign was mired in conflict whether it was against Greeks, Persians, or Indians. The entire section demonstrates that Alexander was a warrior. If others (Ptolemy and Limnaeus) had not saved him, Alexander would have died in a foreign country. Fortune had no part in Alexander’s survival. Instead, the passage opens the door to the following sections which serves as proof (pistis) that Philosophy governed Alexander’s life.

326 E

Οἶκαη δ’ ἂλ ... τὴν δόξουν: Plutarch puts forward a suggestion as to what Alexander’s response to Fortune’s claims would be. However, it is interesting that while his Alexander wants his virtues intact he also wants his glory which seems antithetical to a Roman mind particularly in the age in which Plutarch was writing. Roman writers often chastised Alexander for his τῶφος (“vanity”) and glory-mongering (Cic. Att. 13.28, Sen. Ep. 94.60-67,113.29, Luc. Phars. 10.20-52, Juv. 10.168-169). Seneca’s Suasoria 1.5-6 goes so far to state that Alexander should be classed among those who are the most arrogant and inflated beyond mortal standards: Alexandrum ex iis esse quos superbissimos et supra mortalis animi modum inflatos accepimus (“from these we consider Alexander to be the most arrogant and inflated beyond the norms of human intellect”). However, the desire for glory is a large part of Homeric aretê (“excellence”
or “virtue”) in that the Homeric warrior strives for glory through military prowess (Il. 1.225-284); cf. S.S. Meyer, *Ancient Ethics: A Critical Introduction* (London, 2008), 9. Alexander’s emulation of Homeric models is well attested in the sources and Plutarch is directly alluding to that facet of the Macedonian king (e.g. Diod. 17.97.3, Curt. 4.6.29, 8.4.26, Arr. 7.14, Plut. *DFAM* 2, 343B). He does so with full knowledge of the fact that the Romans could not reconcile an Alexander modeling himself on Achilles with an Alexander who displays Roman concepts of imperialism.

**Δαρεῖος ἦν ... Περσῶν ἐποίησας:** Darius III became the Great King of Persia in the summer of 336 (Diod. 17.6.2), and reigned until he was murdered in 330 (Diod. 17.73.3, Curt. 5.12.1-13.18, Arr. 3.21.10). His background and accession to the throne are controversial. Diodorus 17.5.5 asserts that he was not of the royal family, but a member of the royal court (ἐν τῶν φίλων Δαρεῖον ὄνομα τούτῳ συγκατεσκέψας τὴν βασιλείαν; cf. Strabo 15.3.24, Just. 10.3.3), while Arrian 2.14.5 hinted that he was not of royal blood when he accused him of being complicit in the death of his predecessor (Artaxerxes IV) and illegally taking the throne. Aelian claimed that Darius was not of royal blood but was a slave (*VH* 12.43), and Plutarch added that he was a courier (ἐξ ἀστάνδου) of the royal court (*Alex.* 18.5). Aelian’s account corroborates Plutarch’s because at Persepolis a courier would have been a servant of the king: see E. Badian, “Darius III,” *HSCP* 100 (2000), 239-240. Nevertheless, Strabo 15.3.24 sums up the situation succinctly when he states that the succession of Darius I (i.e. the end of the Achaemenid line) ended with Arses (Artaxerxes IV) at which point the eunuch Bagoas installed Darius III, thereby intimating that he was not of the royal blood line.
The manner in which Darius came to power was in large part due to the machinations of Bagoas, who had earlier poisoned Artaxerxes Ochus (Diod. 17.5.3) and assassinated his son, Arses (Diod. 16.50.8, Arr. 2.14.5). After the death of Arses, Bagoas selected a member of the court circle, Artasatu, who took the name Darius as king (Diod. 17.5.3-6, Curt. 6.3.12-13; cf. Badian, “Darius III,” 241-252).

It is possible, however, that Darius was from a tangential royal line; cf. Bosworth, *CE*, 34. Briant, *Cyrus*, 772, claims that Darius was a great-grandson of Darius II and a cousin to Artaxerxes III. He plausibly suggests that Darius’ illegitimacy was put forth by the Macedonians as propaganda. However, Persian sources indicate that Darius was selected by Bagoas because he had proven himself in battle as Badian, “Darius III,” 241-252, has argued (cf. Diod. 17.6.1, Just. 10.3.2), and, hence, he was installed as king for that reason. I, however, follow Briant’s assessment (*Cyrus*, 770-772), that the story of Darius III’s lineage from Darius II was more than likely constructed after he attained the throne in an effort to legitimize his reign (cf. Badian, “Darius III,” 249).

The inclusion of Darius among those whom Fortune aided is a one-sided antithesis in that the other half of the contrast (that Alexander was royal-born) is assumed. Darius was a proven warrior who was awarded the throne because of his military skill, presumably with the help of Fortune. In contrast, Alexander inherited the throne upon the assassination of his father even though he had proven his skill when he defeated the Maedians in 340 (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1, Just. 9.1.8) and led the left-flank of the cavalry at Chaeronea in 338 which shattered the Theban line (Diod. 16.85.2-86.6). That he would succeed his father was not in doubt because the only other possibility, Alexander’s half-brother, Arrhidaeus, was mentally handicapped (Plut. *Alex.* 77.8).
Thus, Alexander inherited the throne upon his father’s death. Plutarch underhandedly emphasizes that Alexander’s accession to the throne was an accident of birth (or perhaps Fortune) not unlike that of Artaxerxes III and Artaxerxes IV whom he mentions at 327A. The comparison also serves to downplay the king’s military skill or his Homeric *aretē*.


Καὶ Σαρδάναπαλλός ... ξαίνοντι περιέθηκασ: S.S. Ahmed, *Southern Mesopotamia in the Time of Ashurbanipal* (Paris, 1968), 27 n. 3 and 43-45, has suggested that Sardanapalus, a Greek name, was an amalgamation of Ashurbanipal (r. 669-626: cf. S. Smith, “The Age of Ashurbanipal,” *CAH* 3, 88) and two other Assyrian kings, and that some events in the lives of these three kings coincide with events in the life of the legendary Sardanapalus. For instance, Sardanapalus and Shamash-shum-ukin committed suicide by fire: M. Streck, *Asurbanipal und die letzten assyrischen Könige bis zum Untergange Ninivehs* 1 (Leipzig, 1916), 158, 386, 387. If the Sardanapalus referred to here is the Ashurbanipal who ruled the Assyrian Empire from 669-626, then a reference in Diodorus (2.21.8) that tells of the loss of the Assyrian Empire to the Medes and in Arrian that mentions the foundation of an Assyrian city (2.5) is, in fact, accurate.

The Greek depiction of Sardanapalus is hardly favorable revealing the Greeks disdain for non-Greeks, on which see Hall, *Hellenicity*, 172-188. For example, Aristotle depicts Sardanapalus to be concerned only with his own happiness (*Eud. Eth.* 1216a, *Nic. Eth.* 1095b19). Plutarch repeats at *DFAM* 2, 336C a scene with Sardanapalus carding purple wool amongst his concubines. In that passage, however, he is contrasted with
Semiramis, an Assyrian queen who made it through the harsh Gedrosian Desert (Strabo 15.2.5, Arr. 6.24.2-3) while Sardanapalus, an Assyrian king, is doing women’s work. A similar scene is recorded in Athenaeus (12.528F) in which Sardanapalus is spinning purple wool while painted up like a woman and wearing women’s clothing. Arrian 2.5.2-4 records an episode in Asia Minor when Alexander came upon the tomb of Sardanapalus with the inscription “you, stranger, eat, drink, and play since other human things are not worth this” which illustrates Sardanapalus’ love of all things pleasurable. It was this decadence that led to a Median war in the mid-seventh century (Diod. 2.23-28). While Darius is mentioned to illustrate Fortune’s raising men of low birth to the throne, Sardanapalus is used here to demonstrate Fortune’s poor judgment in the selection of kings. Sardanapalus is an example of excess where the contrast is Alexander’s temperance. However, buried within the superficial praise of Alexander’s virtues is an inordinate amount of excess: five different victories (326F: Arbela, Susa, Cilicia, Egypt and Granicus) one of which concludes with the image of a bridge of corpses, eleven different wounds (327A-B), the myriad of problems when he took the throne (327C-E), all the peoples he civilized (328C-D: Hyrcanians, Arachosians, Sogdians, Persians, and Scythians), the seventy cities he was said to have founded to bring Greek culture to the barbarians (328E), the mass marriages at Susa (329D-E), and the adoption of Persian/Median clothing (329F-330A).

ἐγὼ δ’ εἰς ... καὶ Κηιηθία: Plutarch refers to the Battle of Gaugamela (331), the capture of one of the Persian capitals, Susa (331), and the Battle at Issus (333). Later, he mentions the expedition into Egypt (331) and then the battle at the Granicus River (334). He does not follow the chronological order of events but moves backward in time and has to correct himself. He attempts to rectify the error by saying that Alexander went to Cilicia (Issus) having crossed over from the Granicus (διεπέρασα) to keep the order in reverse chronologically. In other words, he places them in the following order: Gaugamela, Susa, Egypt, Issus, and the Granicus. Yet, the order is still incorrect since Alexander reached Susa only a few months after Gaugamela and his stay in Babylon, which is not mentioned at all. Later (327A-B), Plutarch discusses the injuries suffered by Alexander in chronological order without error. This passage is indicative of the sort of improvisational style that was characteristic of the encomia of the Second Sophistic: see pp. 94.

Gaugamela was less than one hundred miles from Arbela. Alexander, although outnumbered at the battle, defeated Darius by employing the same tactics that he had at Issus (Diod. 17.55.3-61.3, Curt. 4.12.1-16.33, Arr. 3.8-15, Plut. Alex. 31.3-32.7, Just. 11.13.1-14.7). Diodorus 3.8.6 recorded that Darius fielded some 200,000 cavalry, though a more reasonable number is Arrian’s 40,000 (cf. Bosworth, Arrian 1, 293). Curtius 4.12.13 records that Darius’ infantry numbered about 200,000 men (cf. J.E. Atkinson, A Commentary on Quintus Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam, 1980), 410), and Arrian numbers Alexander’s forces at 7,000 cavalry and

After Gaugamela, Alexander’s army marched through Babylonia to Susa, one of the Persian capitals of Darius I (Strabo 15.3.1; cf. A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), 162-171 and Briant, *Cyrus*, 21), and took it (Diod. 17.65.5-66.6, Curt. 5.2.8-15, Arr. 3.16, Plut. 36.1-2, Just. 11.14.9). The verbal form ἀναβέβηκα reveals Plutarch’s lack of concern for geographical correctness for its literal translation is “having went up,” yet Susa is southeast of Gaugamela (by about four hundred miles).

Alexander sent Philoxenus, a financial officer, from the field of battle at Gaugamela to Susa to ensure its surrender (Arr. 3.16.6). The Persian satrap, Abulites, willingly handed over the city and the treasury to him, and when Alexander arrived he took control of some 40,000 talents of gold and silver bullion and 9,000 talents in gold darics: Diod. 17.66.2; cf. Curt. 5.2.11, Arr. 3.16.7, Plut. *Alex*. 36.1, Just. 11.14.9.

Two years earlier in 333, Alexander’s army had been similarly outnumbered at Issus. Diodorus 17.31.2 and Justin 11.9.1 state that Darius had 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. Curtius 3.2.4-9 records his forces at 250,000 infantry and 62,000 cavalry. Arrian (2.8.8) and Plutarch (Alex. 18.4) both note that Darius’ forces numbered 600,000 (Anonymous, FGrH 148 F 44, col. 2). The sources are most likely exaggerating the size of Darius’ army: see Tarn, Alexander 1, 25-28, Bosworth, Arrian 1, 209, Hamilton, Alexander, 48. On the other hand, Alexander only had about 26,000 infantry and 5,300 cavalry at his disposal: see Hammond, Genius, 87 and Worthington, Alexander, 70. Nevertheless, Alexander’s forces routed the Persians causing Darius to flee leaving behind his baggage train which included his family (Curt. 3.13.12-13, Arr. 2.12.3-4). However, with Darius still roaming about the Persian Empire, Alexander could not legitimately claim the Persian throne. For an analysis of the Battle of Issus, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 24-27, C.L. Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus,” Historia 21 (1972), 399-423, Lane Fox, Alexander, 164-174, Green, Alexander, 225-235, Hammond, KCS, 94-110, A.M. Devine, “The Strategies of Alexander the Great and Darius III in the Issus Campaign (333 BC),” AncW 11 (1985), 25-38, Bosworth, CE, 58-62, and Worthington, Alexander, 71-3.

μοι πλατείαν ἀνέφεξεν Αἰγύπτων: Alexander’s entry into Egypt in 331 was uneventful. Herodotus 2.7.1 refers to Egypt as broad, but uses εὐρέα instead of πλατεία. The Alexander sources seem more concerned with the fact that the region was sandy and without water (Diod. 17.50.1, Arr. 3.3.3-4) than with its expanse.

Pelusium was the first line of defense for Egypt and the Macedonian fleet sailed into the harbor without resistance (Diod. 17.49.1-2, Curt. 4.7.3, Arr. 3.1.1). Mazaces, the
Persian satrap of Egypt, surrendered Memphis to Alexander, and so Egypt fell under Macedonian control. The Egyptians openly accepted Alexander’s dominion because the Persians, under Artaxerxes III Ochus, committed atrocities against them (Diod. 17.49.1-2), including slaughtering the bull of Apis (Ael. VH 6.8) and looting and destroying Egyptian temples (Diod. 16.51.2).

While in Egypt, Alexander visited the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah. There, the priest allegedly told him that his real father was Zeus and Philip was only his mortal father, as Amphitryon was to Heracles (Diod. 17.51.1-2, Curt. 4.7.25, Plut. Alex. 27.5, Just. 11.1.2-12; cf. Arr. 3.4.5 and Bosworth, Arrian 1, 274). The visit to Siwah was critical to Alexander’s belief in his own divinity, something which came to a head in 327 in Bactra with his attempt to introduce proskynesis (on which see Curt. 8.5.5-22, Arr. 4.9-10, Plut. Alex. 54.3-6, Just. 12.7.1). Before leaving for Siwah, Alexander selected the site of Alexandria and construction began, but on his return (April 7), he officially founded it (Diod. 17.52.1-7, Curt. 4.8.1-6, Arr. 3.1.5-2.2, Plut. Alex 26.2-6, Just. 11.11.13).


Κηιηθία δὲ Γξάληθνο ... δηεπέξ: The Battle at the Granicus River in 334 was Alexander’s first victory in Asia (Diod. 17.19-20, Arr. 1.12.6-16, Plut. Alex. 16, Just.
11.6.8-13). The sources record anywhere from 30,000-43,000 foot soldiers in the Macedonian army with 4,000-5,500 cavalry (Ptolemy, *FGrH* 138 F 4 = Plut. *DFAM* 1, 327D-E, Polyb. 12.19.1). The sources for the size of the Persian forces are not as close. Arrian 1.14.4 mentions 20,000 mercenary soldiers and a little less than 20,000 cavalry. Bosworth, *Arrian* 1, 113, suggests that Arrian’s numbers for the Persian army do not factor in native troops, and therefore are too low. Diodorus 17.19.3-5 and Justin 11.6.2 note a total contingent of about 600,000 which is plausible.

Although outnumbered, Alexander’s exploitation of the terrain to deploy his forces and distract the Persians and the training of his army were factors in the victory. After burying his dead, Alexander sent dedications to the Parthenon and Greek mercenary captives to Macedonia where they were forced into hard labor (Arr. 1.16.7, Plut. *Alex.* 16.18).


كنيسة Μιθριδάτη ... νεκροῖς έπιβύς: Mithridates, identified by Arrian (1.15.7) as one of Darius’s sons-in-law, was killed by a spear thrown by Alexander (Arr. 1.16). Arrian also mentions a Spithridates who was the satrap of Lydia and Ionia among the Persian dead (1.12.8, 1.16.3; cf. Briant, *Cyrus*, 701-702). However, there is some confusion in the
sources regarding what happened when Alexander was attacked. Arrian records that Rhoesaces, Spithridates’ brother, rode straight at the king and struck Alexander’s helmet (1.15.7-8), but was pulled from his horse by the Macedonian king who then killed him. At this point, Spithridates lifted his sword to strike Alexander but Cleitus struck first severing the arm at the shoulder killing him (Arr. 1.15.8). Plutarch (Alex. 16.5) agrees with Arrian that Rhoesaces attacked Alexander first, but it was Spithridates who struck the king’s helmet. Diodorus and Curtius’ accounts diverge from that of Arrian and Plutarch. Diodorus records that Spithridates was killed first (17.20.5) and then Rhoesaces attacked the king breaking his helmet before Cleitus severed his arm (17.20.6-7, Curt. 8.1.20). I agree with Bosworth, Arrian 1, 123, that Plutarch’s account is more plausible and that Arrian, in his confusion, inferred that Rhoesaces both attacked Alexander and broke his helmet.

The gruesome image of a “bridge of corpses” indicates Plutarch’s familiarity with the narrative of Ptolemy. Arrian 2.11.8, citing Ptolemy (FGrH 138 F 6), uses the same description in his depiction of the aftermath of Issus and Bosworth suggests that Ptolemy was adding a “touch of romantic fiction” because of how unlikely it was that enough Persians had died to form a bridge across the ravine (Arrian 1, 217). Similarly, Plutarch uses the phrase (repeated at DFAM 2, 340E) for rhetorical embellishment since the Granicus River was eighty feet wide and it would have taken more than the bodies of Mithridates and Spithridates to have filled it up enough to walk across. It is a gruesome image of the king defiling the dead bodies of his enemy.

N.G.L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 1992), 34-36, has suggested that Plutarch used Aristobulus for his account of the battle of Granicus in
the *Alexander*, and Aristobulus was also one of Arrian’s sources. Hamilton, *Alexander*, xxxviii, however, pointed out the similar language in the accounts of the Opis mutiny in Arrian 7.11.9 and Plutarch *DFAM* 1, 330E, and he suggested that “Plutarch borrows, perhaps unconsciously, from Arrian’s source.” It is probable that Arrian borrowed heavily from both Aristobulus and Ptolemy (A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 38-61), and not unlikely that Plutarch did the same for the *Alexander* as well as the *DFAM*.

For more on Mithridates and Spithridates, see Briant, *Cyrus*, 782,823. For more on the ancient sources, see Introduction pp. 30-37.

κόσμει σεαυτήν ... ἀναιμάκτως: This passage is Plutarch’s attempt at sarcasm. The insinuation is that Fortune favors those who have not been wounded or shed blood and since Alexander too suffered wounds and shed blood (as recalled by the quote from Homer at 326D), she does not favor him. However, both Persian kings were assassinated so obviously they suffered wounds (Briant, *Cyrus*, 690, 774), and Artaxerxes III Ochus was known to have brutally attacked Egypt shedding blood in his attempt to regain it (Diod. 17.49.1-2).

The image is of an almost hateful Fortune who decided very early in the Macedonian king’s life that she would despise him favoring others who were quite similar to Alexander in history, temperament, and military skill. However, it also reveals something about Alexander’s own character since the words are placed in his mouth. He appears as a petulant child whining over Fortune’s lack of interference in the lives of other kings. He then goes on to discuss every wound he suffered over the course of his life showing how similar he was to those other kings.
Plutarch argues that Fortune appointed others as kings at birth while Alexander had to fight for his empire. However, he fails to mention that Alexander inherited his kingdom as well (see pp. 16). He will point out that Fortune is actually acting against Alexander (Τύχης ἀνταγωνιζομένης) by causing his wounds, which are listed at 327A-B. Moreover, at 331 B-C, Plutarch states that the wounds and their scars are symbols that Alexander survived the machinations of Fortune, and they are evidence of his superior ἄρετή.  

327 A

ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ... Ὦχοι καὶ Ἀρταξέρξει ... ἐνιδρύσας: Ochus was known formally as Artaxerxes III. According to Diodorus, 17.5.3, he was a cruel king who, upon his accession to the throne, slaughtered relatives and noblemen (cf. Just. 10.3.1). His youngest son, Arses, or Artaxerxes IV (referred to here simply as Artaxerxes) succeeded him for a short period of time (338-336) until he, like his father, was assassinated by Bagoas (Diod. 17.5.4, Just. 10.3.4), who selected Darius to succeed Ochus and Arses as king (see further 326E with commentary). The mention of the two kings prior to Darius III illustrates that, with the exception of Darius, Fortune appointed kings from birth. Furthermore, it reveals that Fortune does not choose the most worthy or virtuous for positions of authority. The other side to this antithesis calls to mind that Alexander inherited his throne after the assassination of his father not unlike Artaxerxes III or Artaxerxes IV. And, by extension, Alexander’s virtuosity is challenged.

In addition, Plutarch is being ironic because Artaxerxes III Ochus was excessively ruthless during his reign which contradicts his use of Ochus as a king who never shed
blood (ἀναμάκτος). He supposedly buried alive his stepmother/sister, Atossa, and had his uncle and one hundred sons and grandsons killed in a hail of arrows (Val. Max. 4.2.7; cf. Just. 10.3.1).


Cyrus the Great overthrew Median rule and established the Achaemenid dynasty in 559 (Hdt. 1.107-130, Arist. *Pol*. 5.1310b, Diod. 9.21) and is referred to as the first king of the Persians (Diod. 17.71.1). Alexander visited Cyrus’ tomb in 330 at Pasargadae and found it looted and Cyrus’ bones scattered on the floor (Arr. 6.29.7). He ordered the coffin to be restored with Cyrus’ remains placed within it and to repair the remainder of the tomb. He then had the Magi, the guardians of the tomb, arrested and tortured in the hope that they would reveal who desecrated Cyrus’ resting place. He had to release them when it was found they knew nothing. For the reign of Cyrus, see Olmstead, *Persian Empire*, 34-58, V. Gray, “The Rise of Cyrus,” *CAH* 4, 2-6, J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York, 1983), 25-43, M. Mallowan, “Cyrus the Great,” *CHI* 2, 392-419, Briant, *Cyrus*, 31-49. For Alexander’s visit to the tomb of Cyrus, see Lane Fox, *Alexander*, 273-274, Green, *Alexander*, 317, Bosworth, *CE*, 154, Hammond, *KCS*, 170, and Worthington, *Alexander*, 109.

τούμον δὲ σώμα ... οὐ συμμαχούσης: Since some of the wounds in this list are mentioned nowhere else, I suggest that Plutarch uses them rhetorically to give the extent

162
of Fortune’s interference. Plutarch generally uses injuries to indicate valor and how the individual is tormented by Fortune — which is a typically Roman perception of valor (C. Salazar, *The Treatment of War Wounds in Graeco-Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, 2000), 186-194). However, this use of the wounds is exploited at 331B-C when he uses Philip’s leg wound suffered fighting the Triballi in 339 as a vehicle for illustrating Alexander’s philosophical outlook. Here, Alexander overcomes his own injuries and succeeds despite Fortune’s interference especially in light of the previous line in which Fortune is vaunting her control over un-warrior-like kings. The νὐζπκκαρνύζεο here further emphasizes the relationship between Fortune and Alexander. However, Didymus uses Alexander’s wounds to suggest that the king was fortunate, at least more so than his father (*Dem.*, col. 12.39-13.10). Didymus’ interpretation is in keeping with Polybius (1.4.1, 1.6.39, 9.6.5) and Livy (9.17-18) who both maintain that Alexander was Fortune’s favorite. For more on Alexander’s wounds, see pp. 40-42.

πρώτον ἐν Ἴλλυριοῖς ... τράχηλον ἤλοθην: Alexander campaigned against the Illyrians in 335 shortly after he became king. According to Arrian 1.5.1, Cleitus, son of Bardylis, was launching an invasion of Macedonia (cf. Bosworth, *Arrian* 1, 65-66). Alexander quickly moved to engage Cleitus, who had taken refuge in a fortress (named Pellium by Arr. 1.5.5) at the Macedonian border. Alexander laid siege to Pellium but was attacked by Cleitus’ allies, the Taulantians. After a tactical withdrawal, Alexander re-engaged his enemy in a night attack wreaking havoc and causing any survivors to flee to Pellium. It was a victory for Alexander but he was forced to end the campaign when news of the Theban revolt reached him and so he was not able to force the kings into formal submission. At some point during the Illyrian campaign, news reached Greece
that Alexander had died on campaign (Arr. 1.7.2, Just. 11.2.8; cf. Bosworth, *Arrian* 1, 75 and Heckel and Yardley, *Justin*, 88-89), which played a role in the Thebans’ decision to defy Macedonian rule. The news supports the view that Alexander had been wounded while campaigning against the Illyrians and it is probably to this scenario that Plutarch refers.

These two wounds are recorded nowhere else in the literary tradition. However, the second gash resembles one that Alexander received against the Mallians (Plut. *Alex.* 63.4, *DFAM* 1, 327B, *DFAM* 2, 341C and 344D). At *DFAM* 2, 341C, however, Plutarch adds that Aristobulus was his source for the wound (*FGrH* 139 F 46 = Plut. *DFAM* 2, 341C), but the detail bears a striking resemblance to Ptolemy’s account in Arrian (*FGrH* 138 F 26 = Arr. 6.11.7). It is entirely possible that Plutarch has confused the injuries of Alexander in an attempt to further his idea of the problems which Fortune put in his path. For more on Alexander’s campaign against the Illyrians, see Bosworth, *CE*, 30-32, Hammond, *Genius*, 36-40, and Worthington, *Alexander*, 41-42. See also pp. 40-41 and the commentary on 327B for the wound suffered against the Mallians.

**ἔπειτα περὶ ... μαχαίρα διεκόπην:** At *Alexander* 16.5, Plutarch stated that at the battle of the Granicus River Spithridates’ axe cut through Alexander’s helmet and “stopped at the top of his hair” and a similar account is given at *DFAM* 2, 341B, and by Diodorus (17.20.6-7) and Arrian (1.15.7). Then, Cleitus the Black struck down Spithridates saving the king’s life. The impression that Plutarch gives is that it was not a wound at all but a close call and lends to the idea that he was “padding out” the wounds to make it seem as though there were more.
Alexander’s near death experience so early in his reign showed the fragility of the Macedonian monarchy, since he was not married and had no heir. Leading from the front was expected in a Macedonian king, but in the case of Alexander it was a sign of his recklessness because he was known to have rushed headlong into battle (Diod. 17.19.6, Arr. 1.15). For more on the battle of the Granicus River, with bibliography see pp. 18.

ἐν δ’ Ἄισσῳ ξίφει τὸν μηρόν: According to Chares, FGrH 125 F 6, this wound was caused by Darius himself (DFAM 2, 341C, Plut. Alex. 20.4-5), but Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin make no mention of it and Darius and Alexander never fought each other in hand to hand combat. For more on Issus, see the commentary on 326F.

πρὸς δὲ Γάζῃ ... βαξὐο πεξεδίλεζα: In Alexander 25.3, Plutarch reports that a bird dropped a large chunk of earth on the king’s shoulder wounding him while Arrian recounts that a missile from a catapult struck him on the shoulder (2.27.2). In addition, Arrian adds that a bird dropped a stone on Alexander’s head (2.26.4), but it did not wound him. Curtius, however, records two different injuries at Gaza (4.6.11). He states that a boulder fell on Alexander’s head (4.6.11) and that an arrow stuck in his shoulder causing substantial loss of blood and unconsciousness (4.6.18-20), which could explain Alexander’s whirling around (βαξὐο πεξεδίλησα) here. The account of this wound is the only one in the list that records Alexander’s physical reaction to the injury. The loss of blood and, possibly, a fall in blood pressure may have caused Alexander to faint, a condition referred to as syncope: T.L. Stedman, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (Baltimore, 1982), 1382).

For more on the ancient treatment of dislocated joints, see E. D. Phillips, Greek Medicine (London, 1973), 96-102. For a more thorough analysis of ancient medical

πρὸς δὲ Μαρακανδάνοις ... ὡστέον διεσχίσθην: In 329, on the way to Maracanda (modern Samarkand in Uzbekistan), Alexander and his troops faced the Memaceni who had taken refuge within their city’s walls (Curt. 7.6.17-23). Alexander proceeded to lay siege to the town after the Memaceni slaughtered the fifty horsemen whom Alexander sent to offer the terms of surrender. In the course of the siege, Alexander was seriously wounded.

The sources do not agree on the wound. Curtius (7.6.22) states that Alexander was struck on the neck by a stone and fell unconscious. Arrian records an injury similar to the one Plutarch mentions here (Arr. 3.30.11), but is more specific noting that it was the fibula that was broken by the arrow. Plutarch, *Alexander* 45.3, records a comparable wound in detail, but it does not appear to have occurred at Maracanda, but somewhere in Parthia.

In any event, the army mourned as if the king had died. Alexander quickly regrouped, but before the wound had completely healed, he intensified the siege. He was able to take the city after tunneling beneath its walls and then ordered its destruction. For more on the events at Maracanda, see Tarn, *Alexander* 1, 67-70, Green, *Alexander*, 357, Bosworth, *CE*, 109-114, F. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria* (Leiden, 1988), 52-55, H. Sidky, *The Greek Kingdom of Bactria* (Lanham, 2000), 59-86, and Worthington, *Alexander*, 130-131.

τὰ λοιπὰ δ’ Ἰνδῶν ... βίαι λιμῶν: Alexander reached India in the summer of 327 and shortly thereafter arrived at Nysa where he was recognized as Dionysus reborn and he
celebrated a bacchic revel (Curt. 8.10.15-17, Arr. 5.2.5-7, Just. 12.7.6-8). Late in 327, he took control of the Rock of Aornus (Diod. 17.85, Curt 8.11, Arr. 4.28-30, Plut. Alex. 58, Just. 12.7.12-13). In 326, Porus, who ruled the region between the Acesines and the Hydaspes Rivers, forced Alexander to battle at the Hydaspes River (Diod. 17. 87.1-89.3, Curt. 8.13-14, Arr. 5.15-19, Plut. Alex. 60, Just. 12.8.1-7). Porus was defeated and, at the spot where Alexander crossed the Hydaspes, Alexander founded Nicaea and Bucephala (Curt. 9.1.6, Arr. 5.19), the latter in honor of his horse who died from wounds in the battle. As the army approached the Hyphasis River it mutinied forcing Alexander to turn back (Curt. 9.2.12-3.25, Arr. 5.25-28). Eventually, Alexander made camp at Nicaea and Bucephala before moving south where he later faced the Mallians mentioned by Plutarch. Once Alexander reached the Indus, he and the army moved south reaching Patala where they followed the coastline. Ultimately, the route would take them out of India and into the region of Gedrosia. Plutarch’s mention of famine refers to the treacherous march through the Gedrosian desert (325) where Alexander lost a great many men to fatigue, dehydration, and hunger (Diod. 17. 105. 6-106.1, Strabo 15.2.5-6, Curt. 9.10.8-17, Arr. 6.23-25, Plut. Alex. 66.3, Just. 12.10.7).

ἐν Ἀσπασίων ἐτοξεύθην τὸν ὦμον: In Arrian 4.23.2-3, Alexander’s objective after entering India was to subdue the territory of the Aspasians, Guraeans, and Assacenians (in the modern day regions of Bajaur and Swat). Arrian is the only other author to refer to the Aspasians and to record a battle between them and Alexander in which he was wounded by an arrow. However, Diodorus may have also referred to these people because his text at 17.84 is corrupt for the years 328/7 and 327/6 BC: see A.B. Bosworth, “A Missing Year in the History of Alexander the Great,” JHS 101 (1981), 17-39. Interestingly, Diodorus does record a conflict between Alexander and the Assacenians at Massaga (Mazagae in Curtius 8.10.22), which occurs later in Arrian (4.26), though no injury to Alexander is noted (Diod. 17.84). At DFAM 2, 341B, Plutarch mentions this conflict with the Assacenians and mentions an arrow wound in the ankle, but does not mention the Aspasians.


ἐν δὲ Γαλδξίδαηο ηὸ ζθέινο: This line is the only record of this wound. Other leg injuries mentioned are the thigh wounds at Issus and the arrow wound at Maracanda (327B). All the other entries are relatively detailed compared to this one where Plutarch simply states that there was some sort of trauma to the leg. Therefore, the wound is probably fictitious and Plutarch uses it to augment the amount of damage Alexander suffered at the hands of Fortune.
The evidence for the Gandaridae is muddled. According to Pliny, there was a group of people called the Gangaridae who lived near the mouth of the Ganges River (NH 6.65), which Alexander never reached because of the mutiny at the Hyphasis. However, Tarn, *Alexander the Great* 2, 277-285, asserts that the Gandaridae were actually a branch of the people who lived to the east of Hyphasis River, the Gandhara, dismissing Pliny outright because a journey to the Ganges by Alexander is nothing more than myth. Moreover, Tarn faithfully stands by Cleitarchus, a contemporary of Alexander, on this matter because it was not Cleitarchus’ aim to glorify Alexander (Tarn, *Alexander* 2, 282). Due to the nature of our sources, it is absurd to say that the information is mythical because of inaccurate information or the assumption that information could not have traveled to Alexander (cf. Heckel and Yardley, *Justin*, 252).

A discussion of a possible expedition against the Gandaridae is recorded in Diodorus (17.93.4-94.5), Arrian (5.25-28), Curtius (9.2.12-3.19), Justin (12.8.10-17), and Plutarch (*Alex.* 62.4). The ‘vulgate’ sources suggest that Alexander’s army refused to go on this particular expedition which is perhaps a conflation of the events at Opis when the men refused to go to Arabia (Diod. 17.109.2, Arr. 7.8.3, Just. 12.11.6).

ἐν Μαλλιῶι βήλει ... κλίμακες ἐκλάδησαν: Plutarch ends his catalogue of Alexander’s wounds with the most severe so as to give the audience a sense of the increasing intensity of his injuries. By the end of the list, the audience is meant to be amazed that he could have died because he received no assistance from Fortune.

In 325, Alexander campaigned against the Malli who were reputed to be great warriors and hostile to him (Arr. 6.4.3). Prior to the siege of the Mallian capital, the king divided his forces sending Nearchus south with the fleet and Craterus down the west bank
of the Hydraotes. Ptolemy and Hephaestion were to lead another force along the eastern bank as a rear guard. Alexander led the main force into the region attacking from the north and laid siege to the Mallian capital. He had his men encircle the city walls in close ranks forcing the Mallians to retreat into the inner portion of the city. Then Alexander ordered the positioning of scaling ladders on the walls of the inner stronghold to allow him and his men to breach the city’s inner defenses. As they climbed the walls, a scaling ladder broke, forcing Alexander to jump down into the city where he was shot with an arrow through his breastplate.

Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch agree that an arrow measuring two cubits struck Alexander on his right side. Arrian states that the arrow struck the breast piercing the lung (6.10.1 = Ptolemy, FGrH 138 F 25). Plutarch, using Aristobulus, adds another blow to the neck (Plut. Alex. 63.9 = Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 4; cf. DFAM 2, 341C). Arrian presents two accounts of the treatment of the wound: either Critodemus, a physician from Cos, cut the arrow out or Perdiccas (of the King’s Guard) did so with his sword (6.11). In Curtius’s account, the name of the physician is given as Critobulus (9.5.25). Because it is attested elsewhere (Arr. Ind. 18.7, Plin. HN 7.124), I am inclined to believe that Critobulus was responsible for treating the wound rather than Perdiccas: see also W. Heckel, “Two Doctors from Cos?,” Mnemosyne 34 (1981), 396-398 and Who’s Who, 100. For more on the Mallian campaign, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 101-104, Green, Alexander, 423, Hammond, KCS, 219-222, Bosworth, CE, 135-137, and Worthington, Alexander, 162-163.

ἐκὲ δ’ ἡ Τύχη ... τηλικοῦτον ἔργον: According to Plutarch, Fortune did not favor Alexander by sending him worthy adversaries, but rather barbarians, leaving him to
suffer the consequences. The lines appear to downplay his military prowess by stating that he suffered his wounds at the hands of uncivilized barbarians, or unworthy challengers. This line of thought is echoed again at 331B when Alexander refuses to participate in the Olympics next to mere commoners. Yet, Plutarch, speaking for Philosophy, will use worthy philosophers to show that Alexander is superior.

εἰ δὲ μὴ Πτολεμαῖος ... βέλεσιν ἐπέσεν: Ptolemy was part of the rear guard along with Hephaestion and thus was not present when Alexander was wounded (on Ptolemy and his background, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 668, W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire* (New York 1992), 222-227 and *Who’s Who*, 235-238). Arrian, the only author to record the events in detail, tells us that Peucestas and Leonnatus (see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 466, and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 147-151) followed Alexander up the scaling ladder before it broke (6.9). Diodorus (17.99.4), Arrian (6.9), and Plutarch (*Alex.* 63.4) record that Peucestas held the shield over Alexander to protect the wounded king from further harm.

However, the identity of the other individual credited with saving Alexander’s life is vague. Arrian mentions Leonnatus (6.9.3, 11.7) while Diodorus omits the names of the other soldiers (μετὰ δὲ τούτων ἔτεροι πλείους ἐπιφανέντες) with Peucestas (17.99.4). The author of the *Metz Epitome* mentions that Alexander was accompanied up the scaling ladders by three others (76) including Leonnatus (77). Here, Plutarch refers to Peucestas and Leonnatus, but in the second speech he adds Limnaeus (344D), who was one of the royal hypaspists in Alexander’s army (Heckel, *Marshals*, 296), and Ptolemy. In *Alexander* 63.4, Plutarch mentions that Limnaeus climbed the ladder after Peucestas and Alexander, but he was later killed (63.5; cf. on Limnaeus, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2,
no. 474 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 152). Curtius names Timaeus (Limnaeus), Leonnatus, and Ptolemy’s rival, Aristonus (9.5.14; cf. Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 133, M. Errington, “Bias in Ptolemy’s History of Alexander,” *CQ* 19 (1969), 233-242, and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 50). His sources included Cleitarchus and Timagenes (9.5.21) who were inaccurate in this instance because they mention Ptolemy’s presence. Because he was absent from these events, Ptolemy denied holding the shield over Alexander (Timagenes, *FGrH* 88 F 3 = Sen. *De Ira* 3.23.4-8, Curt. 9.5.21, Arr. 6.11.8; cf. J. Roisman, “Ptolemy and His Rivals in His History of Alexander,” *CQ* 34 (1985), 382-384) contesting Cleitarchus’s account (Cleitarchus, *FGrH* 137 F 24 = Curt. 9.5.21). I am inclined to believe it was not only Peucestas and Leonnatus, who climbed the ladder with Alexander, because of the frequent inclusion of Limnaeus in the accounts (Curt. 9.5.15, 17, Plut. *Alex.* 63.4, *DFAM* 1, 327B, *DFAM* 2, 344D) and because in the accounts of Diodorus and the *Metz Epitome*, multiple people are mentioned who were with the king. In any event, as the king lay unconscious and bleeding, the men must have been distracted, hence the discrepancies in the sources, particularly those who mention Ptolemy. Furthermore, Bosworth, *CE*, 136, has pointed out that it is not surprising that this confusion has developed due to the propaganda value “of a claim to have preserved Alexander’s life.”


μωρίους ἀπαντήσας βέλεσιν: The term μωρίους is most frequently used by Herodotus (twenty-eight times) and Homer (sixteen in the *Iliad* and fifteen in the *Odyssey*).
However, it also calls to mind the feared Persian Immortals, an infantry force of ten thousand (Hdt. 7.83) created by Cyrus the Great. Nonetheless, the number is probably nothing more than rhetorical embellishment to emphasize the importance of the two individuals that saved Alexander who surely would have been a target for every Mallian.

شدداساءد ثميود ... كميمغجروثأي: Alexander was seen as the quintessential despot during the last years of the Roman Republic and the early years of the Roman Empire: see D. Spencer, *The Roman Alexander: Reading a Cultural Myth* (Exeter, 2002), 165-204. By Plutarch’s time, his reputation had been redeemed by historians such as Arrian, but the rhetoricians of the Second Sophistic continued to depict the king as morally defunct; see G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic* (London, 1993), 182-183. Plutarch, revealing the influence of the Second Sophistic, reinforces Alexander’s recklessness as well as Fortune’s involvement by stating the possibility that he could have died. It was Macedonian custom for the king to lead his men in battle, thereby emulating the Homeric drive for glory through military prowess, and because the Macedonian kings were held “on a higher plane” than others given their descent from Zeus: Hammond, *KCS*, 15. Alexander’s wounds point to his mortality, but the list of battles and wounds indicates that Fortune might have interfered in Alexander’s life but was not successful in destroying him.
Section 3, 327 C - E

Overview: The following section discusses the specific problems Alexander faced prior to and during his campaigns (famines, floods, revolts, and lack of funds) because of Fortune. He also briefly treats the size of the Macedonian army citing Aristobulus, Ptolemy, and Anaximenes as his sources.

327 C

Καὶ μὴν ... χειμῶνες: In addition to the list of wounds at 327A-B, Plutarch summarizes some of the natural trials of Alexander’s expedition: storms (e.g. at Gordium, in India, and at Patala), droughts (e.g. in the Caucasus and in the Gedrosian desert), and deep rivers (e.g. Cydnus, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus, Tanais, Oxus, and Hydaspes) to further show Alexander’s obstacles.

Arrian is the only source to mention a thunderstorm at Gordium saying that it was seen as a sign from Zeus ordaining Alexander as Lord of Asia (Arr. 2.3.8). He also records the monsoon which hit Patala while Alexander’s forces were regrouping along the Indus (6.21; cf. Curt. 9.9.9-22). Another storm caused confusion amongst Alexander’s army and the king used its darkness to deploy his boats (Diod. 19.94.3, Arr. 5.10-13, Curt. 8.13.23, Plut. Alex. 60.2-3). There was also a hail storm when Alexander was gathering his forces to attack the Gazaba region causing the soldiers to break rank and wander the woods until Alexander could re-assemble them (Curt. 8.4.3).

αὐρκνί: Alexander crossed into the Caucasus in 330 during a drought (Curt. 7.4.22). The extended march caused a shortage of grain supplies and, as a result, the army suffered from starvation. The march through the Gedrosian Desert in 325 which lasted sixty days
is probably the drought/desert conditions which come more readily to mind (Diod. 17.105.6-106.1, Arr. 6.23-25, Curt. 9.10.8-17, Just. 12.10.7, Plut. Alex. 66.3-7, Strabo 15.2.5-6; cf. 327B). For more on the march through the Gedrosian Desert, see Tarn, Alexander, 106-108, Lane Fox, Alexander, 392-394, Bosworth, CE, 139-145, and his Alexander and the East (Oxford, 1996), 166-185, Hammond, KCS, 234-238, Bryant, Cyrus, 758-762, and Worthington, Alexander, 168-171.

βάθη ποταμῶν: Alexander’s campaign took him across many rivers but the sources either do not record the same ones or refer to them by different names. The following are the rivers, notable for their depth, that played a role in Alexander’s Asian campaigns. At the Cydnus (Curt. 3.5.1, Arr. 2.4.7-8, Just. 11.8.3, Plut. Alex. 19.1-2), Alexander was severely ill after bathing due to the frigid temperature of the water, and at the Nile (Arr. 3.1.3, Curt. 4.7.3) he was fascinated by the fauna around the river (Plut. Alex. 26.4). Curtius mentions the violence of the moving water (4.9.15-16) at the Tigris and Euphrates (Curt. 5.1.29-30; cf. Arr. 3.7.5), and at the Tanais (Arr. 3.30.7-8, Curt. 7.8.7, Just. 12.5.12), Alexander needed rafts to cross quickly because of the enemy troops on the other side of the river. Alexander also had difficulty in crossing the Oxus (Arr. 3.29.6, 3.4.16, Curt. 7.10.15, Plut. Alex. 57.4). Ptolemy (FGH 138 F 22 = Arr. 5.20.8-9) specifically mentioned the size of Acesines (Arr. 5.20.8-9, Just. 12.9.1), and Nearchus gives a vivid picture of the river while discussing the flooding which caused the Macedonian army to seek higher ground (Nearchus, FGH 133 F 18 = Strabo 15.1.18). Curtius and Arrian engage in a comparison of the Indus and the Ganges River arriving at the conclusion that the Indus is smaller (Arr. 5.4, Curt. 8.9.4; cf. Just. 12.10.5). The Hydaspes (Arr. 5.9, Curt. 8.13, Plut. Alex. 60.1) was notable for the depth of the water.
during the summer solstice according to Arrian (5.9; cf. Strabo 15.1.18), although Arrian later (5.19.3) states that the battle there was fought in the Attic month of Munychion (mid-April to mid-May; cf. Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 271-272, 310-311). According to Bosworth, the discrepancy can easily be explained by the variations in dating by Alexander, who was known to have tampered with the calendar, and by Arrian himself (*Arrian* 2, 310-311). At the Hyphasis (Arr. 5.25, Curt. 9.1.35-2.1), Alexander and the army had difficulty crossing because of the rocks obstructing the river (Curt. 9.2.1).

αἵρα ὑπερ: Plutarch is referring to the Rock of Aornus (Pir-Sar in modern Pakistan; cf. Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 178-179) which Alexander captured in 327/6 (Diod. 17.85, Arr. 4.28-30, Curt 8.11, Just. 12.7.12-13, Plut. *Alex.* 58). Alexander surveyed the rock and deemed it impossible to capture (Diod. 17.85.3), but he was later assisted through the foothills by an old man and his two sons (Curt. 8.11.3; cf. Arr. 4.29.1 states that it was a few natives).

The capture of the rock of Aornus plays a significant role in the legend of Alexander as it is seen as a feat by which he surpassed his hero (and ancestor), the demi-god Heracles. However, Heracles was unable to capture the rock because of earthquakes (Diod. 17.85.2, Curt. 8.11.2, Just. 12.7.12). Arrian (4.28.1-2), in an attempt to rationalize the event, states that Heracles is only brought into the story to boost Alexander’s accomplishment. Arrian is probably not far from the truth. The inclusion of this particular geographic feature in the list is meant to call to mind not only Alexander’s trouble to capture it but also its connection to Heracles, one of Alexander’s heroic models. These geographic features are, then, cast as heroic trials not unlike the twelve labors of Heracles.
Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 180, argues that the name (Aornus) was the Greek version of the Sanskrit *avarana*. There is also indication that the Greek name was derived from the mountain’s height in that birds were unable to reach the peak (Philostratus, *VA* 2.10). For more on the feat, see Tarn, *Alexander* 1, 90-91, Lane Fox, *Alexander*, 343, Green, *Alexander*, 351-353, Bosworth, *CE*, 123, Hammond, *KCS*, 205, and Worthington, *Alexander*, 148-150.

**θηρίων ὑπερφυῆς:** Diodorus notes that snakes, notable for their size, and a variety of clever monkeys were observed in India (17.90.1). At the battle of the Hydaspes River, Porus employed well-trained elephants to fight Alexander and his army (Diod. 17.87.4, Arr. 5.9, Curt. 8.14.9-13). Plutarch even states that Alexander feared the elephants (*Alex.* 60.5), possibly to the extent that, as Arrian specifically mentions, Alexander liked to have elephant hunters in his retinue so he could hunt with them (Arr. 4.30). Megasthenes’ *Indica* described Indian techniques for hunting the elephants which involved digging large holes and luring male elephants with strategically placed female elephants (*Brill’s New Jacoby* 715 F 20a). D.W. Roller, “Megasthenes (715),” *BNJ* (Leiden, 2009), suggests that elephants were first seen in Greece because of Alexander and as a result they became a “mainstream” in Greek knowledge. For an analysis of these techniques, see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (1988), 43-45.

**ἄγριοι δίαται:** Following the catalogue of wounds, the long list of problems which Alexander faced during and prior to the campaign enhance the idea that Fortune hindered him. Plutarch elaborates on “the uncivilized manner of life” in detail later at 328C-D when he writes of Alexander’s civilizing education to the tribes of Asia. However, it is surprising that this phrase is buried in the middle of the chapter when it will become the
focus of the remainder of the work. Generally speaking, scholars have understood the work to be a praise of Alexander as κοσμοκράτωρ (“lord of the world”) because of later passages (see Tarn, *Alexander* 2, 255-259). However, if that was the image that Plutarch wanted to convey, why was this line obscured in a list of campaign troubles especially when the logical antithesis (Alexander civilizing these people) follows later? He may simply have been listing all of Alexander’s problems to illustrate that the king did not easily subdue Greece and the Persian Empire. The entire list, which to some degree suggests that the Macedonian king had many problems because of Fortune, also serves to highlight Plutarch’s own knowledge of places and events. If this speech was intended as an educational exercise in his youth (on dating, see pp. 123-130), then Plutarch would have needed to include such a listing to show his skill and vast knowledge.

μεταβολαὶ δυναστῶν παλιμπροδοσίαι: It is interesting that Plutarch uses the term δυνάστης rather than βασιλεὺς since δυνάστης is a general term for a “leader” or “ruler,” rather than a “king” (βασιλεὺς). Moreover, the Loeb translator takes liberties with the text when he translates the line as “the constant succession of petty kings and their repeated treachery.” Presumably the word Babbitt was using for “petty” was part of the many meanings of δυνάστης but in this instance it can better be translated as “the changing of rulers.” Plutarch places no value judgment on the rulers until the παλιμπροδοσίαι (“constant treachery”). The word choices here cast the rulers as those who were beneath Alexander in status and in virtue.

During his campaign, Alexander was faced with various rulers who objected to Macedonian rule. The passage, however, likely refers to Bessus, the Bactrian satrap and relative of Darius III, who after Darius was murdered appointed himself Great King as
Artaxerxes V (Diod. 17.73, Arr. 3.20, Curt. 5.13.15-25, Just. 11.15.1-15, Plut. Alex. 43). Bessus was later betrayed by Spitamenes and Dataphernes, two Sogdian noblemen, and given over to Ptolemy. He was put on trial for regicide, tortured and executed (Diod. 17.83.7-9, Arr. 3.29-30.5, Curt. 7.5.38-39, Just. 12.5.11, Plut. Alex. 43.3).

In India especially, Alexander faced rulers who balked at Macedonian authority. At Massaga, Alexander engaged Assacenus, who ruled the valley of the lower Swat (Arr. 4.25.5). The Assacenians later took refuge on the Rock of Aornus (see above pp. 176-177) which Alexander took in 327/6 ending the Assacan resistance. At Taxila, Alexander was met by representatives of Abisares, king of the Indian hill tribes (Arr. 5.8). Arguably, the most well known of the kings was Porus, the ruler of the Pauravas, whom Alexander faced at the Hydaspes River in 326 (Diod. 17.87.1-89.6, Arr. 5.8-19.1, Curt. 8.13.3-14.46, Just. 12.8.1-8, Plut. Alex. 60.3-13). Porus was later made a client-king who was permitted to rule the region in Alexander’s name. For more on Alexander’s campaigns in India, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 82-100, Lane Fox, Alexander, 336-372, Green, Alexander, 379-430, Hammond, KCS, 202-231, Bosworth, CE, 119-139, Worthington, Alexander, 140-171, and the commentary on 327A.

τὰ δὲ πρὸ τῆς στρατείας ... Ἡ Εὐλαξι: Plutarch highlights Alexander’s difficulties prior to the Asian campaign by discussing the weakness of the Greeks after their dealings with Philip, the tensions in Macedonia regarding pretenders to the throne, the wars with the Illyrians to the north, and the Macedonian debt. It is a selective list in that it only points out those circumstances that were the result of Philip’s actions. There is no mention of Alexander’s campaign in Thrace against the Triballi and Getae in 335 or the siege of Thebes also in 335, which resulted in him razing the city to the ground.
In 357, Philip II laid siege to Amphipolis. The Athenians expected that he would give them Amphipolis, but when it fell to him after a short siege, he retained it causing the Athenians to declare war on him. Later, in 353, Philip became involved in a dispute in Thessaly when Larisa called on him for help against Pherae, which in turn asked for aid from the Phocians in central Greece (Diod. 16.35.1). The Phocians were at that time embroiled in the Third Sacred War (355-346) over their illegal seizure of Delphi. Philip was defeated by a Phocian force in 353 in Thessaly, but in 352 he returned and defeated the Phocians at the battle of Crocus Field (Diod. 16.35.5-6). In 347, he intervened more formally in the Third Sacred War, siding with Thebes against Phocis, and in 346 he ended that war (but used his power to lessen the punishment of the Phocians) and also the war against Athens over Amphipolis. Deteriorating relations with the mainland Greeks led eventually to the battle of Chaeronea in 338, at which he defeated a Greek army and established Macedonian hegemony over Greece. On the above, see N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia 2 (Oxford, 1972), 216-347 and 450-646, S. Hornblower, The Greek World: 479-323 BC (1983), 239-260, J. Buckler, Philip II and the Sacred War (Leiden, 1989), and Worthington, Philip II, 38-73, 147-151.

ἀπεσείοντο ὅ’ αἱ Θῆβαι ... χεῖρας ὀρέγονσαι: At age 18, Alexander led the Macedonian cavalry on the left wing at the battle of Chaeronea and annihilated the Theban Sacred Band (Diod. 16.86.1; cf. Hammond, Philip, 143-154 and Worthington, Philip II, 147-151). After the battle Philip imposed a Common Peace settlement on the Greeks, maintained by an executive council commonly referred to by modern scholars as the League of Corinth. All Greeks (except Sparta) were members and Philip was its ἱεγεμόν. When Philip was assassinated in 336, Alexander, aged twenty years old,

In 335, the Thebans besieged a Macedonian garrison on the Cadmeia (Diod. 17.8.3-14.1, Arr. 1.7.1-8.8, Just. 11.3.6-8, Plut. *Dem* 23.1), which had been stationed there by Philip after Chaeronea. They appealed to other poleis for assistance but received none (Diod. 17.8.5; cf. Arr. 1.7). Alexander returned from a campaign in Illyria and besieged Thebes, and after it capitulated he razed it to the ground with the exception of Pindar’s house, thus setting an example for the rest of Greece. For more on Alexander’s destruction of Thebes, see Green, *Alexander*, 143-151, Bosworth, *CE*, 32-33, Hammond, *KCS*, 58-65, and Worthington, *Alexander*, 42-45 and “Alexander’s Destruction of Thebes,” in W. Heckel and L. Tittle (eds.), *Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander the Great* (Claremont, 2003), 65-86.

Plutarch dramatically anthropomorphizes Greece in this passage to highlight its suffering. He mentions that Greece was gasping (ἐπέσπαρεν), Thebes was staggering (ἀπεσείόντο) and shaking off dust (κόνιν ἀνιστάμεναι), and Athens was reaching a hand out for help (τάς χεῖρας ὀρέγουσαι) all of which were the direct results of a Macedonian rule first established by Philip II.
πᾶσα ὁ' ὅπουλος ... Ἀμύντον ἀποβλέπουσα: When Alexander succeeded to the throne in 336, he took the opportunity to rid himself of individuals who could potentially threaten his position. These included Amyntas, who was the young son of Perdiccas III and the rightful heir to the throne in 359 when Philip, his uncle, was acclaimed king by the Macedonian Assembly (Diod. 16.2.1-6), who was accused of treason and summarily executed (Diod. 17.2.4-6, Curt. 6.9.17, 6.10.24, 7.1.3). His family soon suffered the same fate (Just. 11.5.1). There was also Attalus, the uncle of Cleopatra (Philip’s seventh and last wife), who was accused of treason in 335 (Diod. 17.2.3-5, 17.5.1, Curt. 7.1.3); cf. Tarn, *Alexander* 1, 3-4, Bosworth, *CE*, 21-2, 27, and Worthington, *Alexander*, 32-33. For a discussion of the problems surrounding Alexander’s accession to the Macedonian throne, see J.R. Ellis, “Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II, and Alexander the Great,” *JHS* 91 (1971), 15-24 and I. Worthington, “Alexander, Philip, and the Macedonian Background,” in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden, 2003), 87-89 and “Alexander’s Destruction of Thebes,” 69-74. On Amyntas, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 61 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 23, and for Attalus, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 182 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 62.

καὶ τοὺς Αέρόπου παῖδας: Two of Aeropus’ children (Arrhabaeus and Heromenes, members of the Lyncestian royal house) were executed for their perceived role in the murder of Philip II (Arr. 1.25.1, Curt. 7.1.6, Just. 11.2.2). The third brother, Alexander Lyncestis, was spared (Curt. 7.1.6, Just. 11.2.1-2), perhaps because he was the son-in-law of Antipater (cf. Diod. 17.80.2) and had sworn loyalty to Alexander (Arr. 1.17.8). Bosworth has argued that the sons could not gain enough support to rival Philip since Lyncestis was incorporated into Macedonia early in his reign and, therefore, were not

ἀλεξέγαλπλην δ’ Ἱιιπξηνί: In 335, the Illyrian tribes to the northwest revolted (Diod. 17.7.1-2, Arr. 1.1.4-6.8 and there were also threats to Macedonia from the Thracians, Triballians, and Getae. Alexander marched against them where he encountered problems obtaining food for his army during these campaigns since he was forced to send a relatively large contingent of men under Parmenio to seek supplies (Arr. 1.5.9). The fighting during the pitched battles was intense if the numbers of casualties reported by Arrian is any indication (1.1.13, 1.2.7). Plutarch recorded that Alexander suffered a head and a neck wound (DFAM 1, 327A), but these are not recorded by any other source. Since there was a rumor that Alexander had been killed in Illyria (which prompted the Thebans to revolt), it is plausible that he did suffer these wounds in this campaign (cf. pp. 17-18). See further Tarn, Alexander 1, 5-6, N.G.L. Hammond, “Alexander’s Campaign in Illyria,” JHS 94 (1974), 77-87, Green, Alexander, 124-131, Bosworth, CE, 29-32, and Worthington, Alexander, 39-42.

καὶ τὰ Σκυθῶν ... προσοίκοις νεωτερίζουσι: In attempts to clarify the line, translators have taken liberties with the text. Babbitt translates it as “trouble with the Scythians was impending for their Macedonian neighbors, who were in the throes of political change” and Frazier and Froidefond as “et la menace des Scythes planait sur leurs voisins de
Macédoine occupés par la crise dynastique.” Nowhere are the Macedonians mentioned in the Greek text. The nearest reference to them is two lines above in the text and it is the subject of ἦλ. Therefore, the line could better be translated “the affairs of the Scythians threatened their neighbors who were experiencing political change.” It makes sense to identify “the neighbors” with the Thracians because of the νεωτερίζονσι (“attempting political changes”) since Thrace had been subdued by Philip in 340 (Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 217-218, Polyaen. Strat. 4.4.1), and then, when Alexander took the throne, he was forced to return to the region. For more on Alexander’s campaigns against the Thracians, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 4-6, Lane Fox, Alexander, 81-85, Green, 124-135, Hammond, Genius, 32-36, Bosworth, CE, 29-31, and Worthington, Alexander, 38-42.

The Scythians were always a threat to the Macedonian throne because of their proximity to Thrace. They were known to make their living looting and causing war (Curt. 4.6.3). Alexander founded a city on the Tanais, known as Alexandria Eschate, for the purpose of launching a future invasion of Scythia (Arr. 4.1.3-4, Curt. 7.6.25, Just. 12.5.12; cf. Fraser, Cities, 66-67 and 151-153). This new city was the direct cause of the following battle in 329 (Arr. 4.4.1-6.1, Curt. 7.7.1-9.22). However, problems with the Scythians occurred long before that battle. At the battle of Gaugamela in 331, they fought alongside the Persians and attempted to seize Darius’ baggage train which had been taken at Issus in 333 by Alexander (Arr. 3.8.3, 11.4, Curt. 4.15.12-13). Later, Bessus mustered the Scythians to fight for him against Alexander (Arr. 3.25.3, Curt. 6.6.13, 7.4.32). Eventually, the Scythians sent an embassy to Alexander asking for peace and for Alexander to marry one of their princesses (Arr. 4.15, Curt. 7.8.8). There was also a Scythian embassy present in Babylon in 323 (Arr. 7.15). Bosworth, CE, 109-111,

327 D

tò δὲ Περσικῶν ... τὴν Πελοπόννησον: The Spartans were not members of the League of Corinth at its inception because of their refusal to submit to the hegemony of another state (Arr. 1.1.2, Just. 11.2.5; cf. *Mor.* 240A-B). In 333, the Spartan king Agis III sailed to meet the Persian fleet at Siphnus to ask for money and ships for a war against Macedonian rule (Arr. 2.13.4-5). He received the paltry sum of thirty talents and ten triremes, but nonetheless declared war. Joining him in it was the Achaean League (except Pellene) and the Arcadian cities (except Megalopolis), which explains Plutarch’s general use of the Peloponnese rather than Sparta specifically (Aeschin. 3.165, Diod. 17.62.6-7, Curt. 6.1.16, Just. 12.1.4; cf. E.I. McQueen, “Some Notes on the Anti-Macedonian Movement in the Peloponnesus in 331 BC,” *Historia* 27 (1978), 40-51 and Heckel and Yardley, *Justin*, 183-188). Antipater met Agis in battle at Megalopolis in 330 and defeated and killed him (Diod. 17.62.1-63, Curt. 6.1.1-16, Just. 12.1.1-11), after which the Spartans probably became members of the League of Corinth. For more on Alexander’s relationship with the Greek *poleis*, see Bosworth, *CE*, 187-228, N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3 (Oxford, 1988), 56-85, M. Faraguna, “Alexander and the Greeks,” in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden, 2003), 99-132. For more on Agis III’s war, see also E. Badian, “Agis III: Revisions and Reflections,” in I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into*

κενοὶ δ’ οἱ Φιλιπποῦ ... διακοσίων ταλάντων: Macedonian currency became the strongest in Europe because of Philip. For instance, he took advantage of the mines at Crenides when the people there asked him for aid against a Thracian force, but he was forced to deal with a threat in Illyria and the siege of Potidaea before returning with Macedonian settlers and renaming Crenides as Philippi in 356: see Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia 2, 358-361 and Worthington, Philip II, 45-46. Also, in 340, his absorption of Thrace into his empire meant he could exploit the gold and silver mines there. Diodorus records that the revenue from the Mt. Pangaeum mines was 1,000 talents (16.8.6-8).

In a speech recorded by Arrian, Alexander says that he inherited from his father sixty talents and a debt eight times as much (7.9.6; cf. Plut. Alex. 15.2). Arrian 7.9 claims that Alexander had to borrow 800 talents in addition to the debt incurred by his father, although Curtius 10.2.24 records that the debt was only 500 talents. Alexander exempted the Macedonians from all tax burdens except military service (Just. 11.1.10), which may have exacerbated the problem. Diodorus 17.2.2 mentions the concessions made to the Macedonian people, but does not specify what these were. Heckel and Yardley, Justin, 79, argue that they were similar to the ἀπέλεια (“exemption from public burden”) granted to the parents and children of the dead at the Granicus; i.e. exemption from property taxes and personal services (Arr. 1.16.4). In any event, the treasury could not have been bankrupt for immediately after Philip’s assassination Alexander took an army south to quell the revolting Greek states (Diod. 17.4.9, Arr. 1.1.2, Just. 11.2.5), and a year later he
campaigned in Thrace and Illyria (Diod. 17.8.1-2, Arr. 1.1-7, Just. 11.1.6, Plut. Alex. 11.2-3). Alexander had to have had some way to pay the troops on those campaigns. More than likely, Philip’s financial administration was still generating revenues from taxes as well as the mines and, from these, Alexander was able to pay for his campaigns. In 335, Alexander was able to acquire 440 talents after selling off Theban captives (Diod. 17.14.4) and probably more money through plunder after defeating the Triballians and Getae (Arr. 1.2.1, 4.4). For more on the Macedonian economy, see A.R. Bellinger, Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great (New York, 1963), 35-79, Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia 2, 358-360, H. Montgomery, “The Economic Revolution of Philip II – Myth or Reality,” SO 60 (1985), 37-47, Bosworth, Arrian 1, 126, N.G.L. Hammond, “Philip’s Innovations in Macedonian Economy,” SO 70 (1995), 22-29, Worthington, “Alexander, Philip, and the Macedonian Background,” 85-86, and Philip II, 7-8, J.R. Ashley, Macedonian Empire (Jefferson, 1998), 377-382.

ὁς Ὅνησίκριτος ἱστορεῖ: Onesicritus, a student of Diogenes, participated in Alexander’s naval expedition down the Indus as the helmsman and, later, returned to Macedonia (Arr. 6.2.3): see Berve, Alexanderreich 2, no. 582, Heckel, Who’s Who, 183-184, and Pearson, LHA, 83-111. Little is known of him before the naval expedition, but it appears that he was a part of Alexander’s Persian expedition from the beginning (Diog. Laert. 6.84). He wrote a treatise on the education of Alexander that Arrian blatantly states is full of lies (6.2.3, cf. Strabo 15.1.28).

ἐν τοσαῦτῇ πενίᾳ ... παραλλάττων ἡλικίαν: Alexander was only eighteen when he commanded the Macedonian cavalry at Chaeronea in 338 (Diod. 16.86.1, Plut. Alex. 9.1-2). When he succeeded to the Macedonian throne in 336 following his father’s
assassination (Diod. 16.91.1-94.4, Arr. 1.1.1, Plut. Alex., 10.6), he was twenty years old (Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 61, Arr. 1.1.1, Just. 11.1.9). When he died in 323 at the age of 32 (Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 61 = Arr. 7.28.1, Just. 12.16.1, Plut. Alex. 3.5), his empire spanned from the Adriatic to the Indus and from the Black Sea to Egypt (Diod. 17.1.3-4, 117.5).

ἐθάρρησεν ἐλπίσαι Βαβυλῶνα καὶ Σοῦσα: Babylon and Susa were both capitals of the Persian Empire (Strabo 15.3.1): see A.T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire (Chicago, 1948), 162-171 and Briant, Cyrus, 21. Alexander began the march to Babylon after the battle at Gaugamela in 331 (Arr. 3.16.4-5, Curt. 5.1.17-23; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 51-52, Lane Fox, Alexander, 156-157, Green, Alexander, 300-304, Bosworth, CE, 86-87, Hammond, KCS, 164-165, and Worthington, Alexander, 101-102). A Persian commander, Mazaeus, met Alexander outside the walls and surrendered the city without bloodshed (Curt. 5.1.17-18). Alexander spent a little over a month in Babylon resting and preparing for the campaign against the remaining Persian capitals: Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Ecbatana. Late in 331, Alexander took Susa and the treasury there (Diod. 17.65.4, Arr. 3.16.9-17.1, Curt. 5.2.8-16, Just. 11.14.9, Plut. Alex. 35-38; cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 52-53, Lane Fox, Alexander, 251-254, Green, Alexander, 304-308, Bosworth, CE, 55-64, Hammond, KCS, 94-110, Briant, Cyrus, 719-726, and Worthington, Alexander, 100-107). Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Ecbatana fell shortly thereafter (see pp. 21-22). It was necessary for Alexander take control of the Persian capitals in order for him to succeed in conquering the Persian Empire and it is probably to this that Plutarch refers.
μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν πάντων ... ἐμβαλέσθαι: Alexander clearly wished to fulfill his father’s aim to invade Persia as attested in his address to the League of Corinth in 336 (Diod. 17.4.9, Arr. 1.1.2, Just. 11.2.5; cf. pp. 17). Indeed, when Alexander landed on Asian soil in 334, he cast a spear into the soil claiming it as spear-won territory (Diod. 17.17.2, Just. 11.5.10) like Protesilaus had done before him when the Greek fleet landed on Trojan shores (Hom. Il. 2.695).

Plutarch implies that Alexander planned (εἰς νοῦν ἐμβαλέσθαι) world dominion with the phrase τὴν πάντων ἄνθρωπων ἀρχήν (―rule of all men‖). The extent of his so-called “final plans” is often debated. Diodorus (18.4.2-5), Arrian (4.7.5, 7.1.2), Curtius (10.1.17-18), and Plutarch (Alex. 68.1) tell us that they involved a campaign into Arabia, and one to Libya against the Carthaginians. Also, Alexander appears to have planned journeys to the pillars of Heracles, to Spain, and to the Italian coast. Tarn asserts that Alexander’s hypomnēmata (“diaries”), recorded in Diodorus (18.4.2-5) were a late forgery, probably by Heironymous of Cardia (Tarn, Alexander 2, 378). E. Badian, “A King’s Notebooks,” HSCP 72 (1967), 183-204 and Hammond, KCS, 300-305, argue against Tarn’s position, insisting that the accounts of the sources fit with the personality of Alexander as Arrian 7.1.4 suggests.

Alexander obviously had plans for the future as the invasion of Arabia and the embassies from various states that came to him at Babylon indicate (Diod. 17.113.1-2, Arr. 7.15.4, Just. 12.13.1-2; cf. Bosworth, CE, 165-166 and Worthington, Alexander, 191). Diodorus, Arrian, and Justin record that Carthage, Rome, Gaul, and Iberia had representatives sent to Alexander to congratulate him on his new kingdom. And, it may be to these plans that Plutarch refers when he mentions that Alexander intended to

τοῖς τρισμυρίος ... ὡς Αριστόβουλός φησιν: Aristobulus was with Alexander from the beginning of the Persian campaign until the king’s death in 323 (Arr. 1.2, Strabo 15.1.17, 1.45; cf. DFAM 2, 342D) and was entrusted with the task of restoring Cyrus’ tomb (Arr. 6.29.4-10, Strabo 15.3.7). He wrote a history of Alexander’s campaigns and was one of the primary sources Arrian used for his Anabasis due to his favorable view of Alexander (FGrH 139 T 5).

The size of Alexander’s army is difficult to determine. Arrian records that when Alexander left for the Hellespont he took with him 30,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry (1.11.3), thus confirming Ptolemy’s numbers (FGrH 138 F 4) but not those of his other source Aristobulus (FGrH 139 F 4; cf. Livy 9.19.5). Plutarch’s Alexander uses Anaximenes’ tally: 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry (15.1). Justin possibly using Cleitarchus, cites 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry (11.6.2), and Callisthenes cites 40,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry (Polyb. 12.19.1). To further complicate matters, Diodorus has 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry (17.17.3-4). Discerning the number of the infantry is relatively simple because the sources are for the most part close in number with Anaximenes and Callisthenes being the exceptions. Deciphering an accurate tally for the cavalry is not nearly as easy. P.A. Brunt, Arrian 1, LCL (Cambridge, 1976), lxxi
and Hamilton, *Alexander*, 36, suggest that Arrian and Diodorus’ accounts are the most likely. However, Bosworth, *Arrian* 1, 99, has argued that Ptolemy, Arrian’s source, cannot be trusted in this instance because he is the only author with the number of 5,000 for the cavalry. Brunt, Bosworth, and Hamilton disregard Anaximenes tally of 5,500 because they believe that it is too high. It must not be forgotten, however, that Ptolemy, one of Alexander’s generals, and Callisthenes, the court historian, would have had a good sense of the sheer size of the army, and so I disagree with Bosworth regarding Ptolemy’s numbers.


---

327 E

ὁδὲ Πτολεμαῖος ... δ’ ἰππεῖς: Ptolemy, son of Lagus, was one of Alexander’s leading generals. After Alexander’s death in 323 in Babylon, he took control of Egypt (*Arr. FGrH* 156 F 1), and in 305, he was crowned king (*Plut. Demetr.* 18), hence Plutarch’s use of ὁ βασιλεύς. Moreover, he was also one of Arrian’s sources: see Pearson, *LHA*, 188-211, Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 38-40, and pp. 35. For

ὡς δ’ Ἀναξιμένης ... ἰππεῖς: Anaximenes, a student of Diogenes, wrote a history of Philip II and Alexander’s campaigns along with a work which spanned the birth of the gods to the death of Epameinondas in 362 at the Battle of Mantinea (Diod. 15.89.3, Paus. 6.18.2). It is not clear what relationship Anaximenes had with Alexander although Pausanias claims that Philip and Alexander knew who he was (6.18.2-5). Diodorus mentioned that he was memorable like Isocrates, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, and Epameinondas (15.76.4). According to Pausanias, Anaximenes, imitating the style of Theompompus, wrote a treatise insulting the Athenians, Thebans, and Spartans (6.18.5), and he also wrote a treatise on rhetoric, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which influenced Plutarch’s epideictic speeches (see pp. 67-71). On Anaximenes as a historian, see Pearson, *LHA*, 243-245, and on the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, P. Chiron, *Pseudo-Aristote: Rhetorique a Alexandre*, Budé edition (Paris, 2002) and “The Rhetoric to Alexander,” in I. Worthington (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford, 2007), 90-106.

tὸ δὲ λαμπρὸν ... ἡμερὸν ἐπιστιτισμός: Curtius and Arrian record only sixty talents in the Macedonian treasury when Alexander inherited the throne (Arr. 7.9.6, Curt. 10.2.24; cf. *DFAM* 2, 342D). However, Plutarch notes that Aristobulus said that not more than seventy talents were in the war chest for travel expenses (*Alex*. 15.2 = *FGriH* 139 F 4). A.R. Bellinger, *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great* (New York, 1963), 36-42, discounts Aristobulus’ and Duris’ numbers. Bellinger further argued that these reports were nothing more than gossip (*Essays*, 37). The issue leaves one wondering how
Alexander paid for the Persian campaign. The answer is simple: plunder. Diodorus mentioned that 440 talents were acquired after selling the captives at Thebes in 335 (17.14.4). Also, Arrian recorded the plunder acquired after the Triballian and Getic campaigns (1.2.1, 4.4), though no specifics are given.

Furthermore, vast sums of money came into Alexander’s hands when he needed it to pay for the army. For instance, the treasuries which Alexander acquired at Susa and Persepolis were substantial enough to allow Alexander to send 1,000 talents to Taxiles (Curt. 8.12.15, Plut. Alex. 59.3). And, the money captured at Susa was between 40,000 (Diod. 17.66.1-2, Just. 11.14.9, Plut. Alex. 36.1) and 50,000 talents (Arr. 3.16.7, Curt. 5.2.11). At Persepolis, the sources agree on 120,000 talents (Diod. 17.71.1, Curt. 5.6.9; cf. Plut. Alex. 37.2: νομίσματος δὲ εὑρεῖν πληθοὺς ὃσον ἐν Σοῦσοις). The consensus of the sources leads me to believe that the numbers were not far off. For more on the finances of Alexander, see the commentary on 327D and Bellinger, Essays, 35-79.

ὁς δὲ Δουρίς: Duris of Samos was born in the 340s and must have spent much of his life in exile since Athenian cleruchs occupied the island and exiled the previous inhabitants in 365 (Diod. 18.18). He claims to have been a descendant of Alcibiades (Plut. Alc. 32.2). We are told by Athenaeus that Duris wrote a history (only fragments remain) and that he was a tyrant of Samos (12.337d), and it is also recorded that he wrote about Alexander’s style of writing (Plut. Phoc. 17). For more on the life and works of Duris, see R.B. Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos (Wiesbaden, 1977) and A. Dalby, “The Curriculum Vitae of Duris of Samos,” CQ² 41 (1991), 539-541.
Section 4, 327 E - 328 B

Overview: Plutarch uses the comparison of Alexander with famous philosophers who wrote nothing as evidence that philosophy was as much a practical as a theoretical pursuit. He then lists the ways in which Alexander was a practical philosopher: his military prowess and his cosmopolitanism. Plutarch argues that traditional understandings of philosophy are too constricting and should be reassessed. He wants his audience to reexamine the question of what makes a philosopher.

327 E

Ἄβουλος ... οὐ μὲν οὖν: For Plutarch, Fortune failed Alexander by putting obstacles in his path prior to the Asian campaign: revolts in Greece and Thrace (327C), the pretenders to the throne (327C), and debt (327D-E). She also neglected him during the Asian campaign by allowing him to be wounded (327A-B) and by forcing him to march through harsh terrain and weather (327C). Moreover, Plutarch will argue that Fortune did not adequately prepare Alexander for his role as a world conqueror and suggests that Philosophy single-handedly prepared Alexander for his destiny as king of the world by giving him the qualities necessary to conquer and civilize barbaric peoples. For the purposes of the argument, Alexander is a philosopher-in-arms (Onesicritus, FGrH 134 F 17 = Strabo 15.1.64). However, it must be noted that Plutarch is not looking solely at matters of war in his assessment of Alexander the Great. According to G.J.D. Aalders, Plutarch’s Political Thought (Amsterdam, 1982), 9, “Plutarch attempted to sketch the moral personality of the person he was dealing with.” That “rhetorical” personality is couched in excessive and unrealistic praise of the king’s actions, sayings, and teachings, few of which can be corroborated by other sources for Alexander’s life.
Furthermore, Plutarch seems to be continuing an argument which he began in his work on *De Fortuna Romanorum*. Fortune and Virtue are in an epic battle to determine which of the two had done the work and held the greatest power (διαδικαζόμεναι ποτέρας γέγονεν ἔργον καὶ ποτέρα τὴν τηλικάωτην δύναμιν γεγέννηκεν, 316C). He argues in *De Fortuna Romanorum* that Rome’s success was due to the foundations (ὑποβολᾶς) of Fortune (320A-B). Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 96, has suggested that the line of thought involving Fortune’s impact was inspired by Livy’s discussion of Rome and Alexander (9.17-19). Livy maintains that matters of war Fortune must be considered when discussing who would win in a battle between the Romans and Alexander (9.17). The reason for Fortune’s consideration is that it *per omnia humana maxime in res bellicas potens* (“has power over human things especially in matters of war,” 9.17.3). Plutarch, however, insists that Fortune must not be the only consideration. Rather, Virtue should be assessed as well since both bring unique characteristics to the discussion (*DFR* 316E-317A).


**τῖς γὰρ ... πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν:** Plutarch suggests that Philosophy granted Alexander magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία), moderation (σωφροσύνη), intelligence (συνέσεις), and courage (ἀνδραγάθια), thus preparing him for his role as the great civilizer. These virtues are similar to the stock Socratic qualities incorporated in most encomiastic speeches.

However, of the four virtues, Plutarch only repeats σοφροσύνη to describe Alexander. In *DFAM* 1 alone, the term is used three different times (326E, 328A, 332C) when referring to Alexander’s superior qualities. It is not, however, used in *DFAM* 2 although a synonym is mentioned (σώφρον, 339A). Indeed, Plutarch sees self-control in general as a means to guide reason (*Mor.* 445B; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1151 b33). σοφροσύνη was a democratic virtue (Dem. 21.71-76, 61.8, Arist. *Pol.* 1260a20-24) inextricably linked with andreia which was a fundamental component of one’s ability to partake in political life (H. North, *Sophrosyne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca, 1966), 170-173 and J. Roisman, “The Rhetoric of Courage in the Athenian Orators,” in R.M. Rosen and I. Sluiter (eds.), *Andreia* (Leiden, 2003), 137-139).

Magnanimity (“greatness of soul,” μεγαλοψυχίας), though not often used, is an Aristotelian quality concerned with honor and greatness further emphasizing Alexander’s innate ἀρετή (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1123a3-1124a1, *Eth. Eud.* 1233a). As with σοφροσύνη, a synonym, ἀνύφραστος, is used in the second speech (336E) thus maintaining a constant thought. H. Cullyer, “Socratic Echoes in Stoic ‘Manly Courage,’” 229, argues for the heroic connotations of the word. For instance, Achilles displays his magnanimity when rushing into the thick of battle to save his friend (Aeschin. 1.145.1-12). In his *Posterior Analytics* (97b15-20), Aristotle suggests that Socrates exhibits “greatness of soul” in
Plato’s *Apology* because he is oblivious to the danger he faces. Socratic and Stoic belief held that there was a heroic standard of behavior where “death and danger are not only despised but embraced” when acting for the good (Cullyer, “Socratic Echoes,” 229). Plutarch’s inclusion of the term is in keeping with popular ethical thought, but it also casts Alexander further as a heroic figure, not unlike Achilles.

The term συνέσια ("intelligence") is used only twice in the first speech (327E and 332C) and not at all in the second indicating that perhaps Plutarch saw Alexander’s intelligence as a virtue needing no further discussion. Intelligence, or wisdom, was one of the fundamental virtues of philosophers. Socrates argued that wisdom was necessary for rulers was what allowed them to rule (Pl. *Lys.* 210b-c). For Aristotle, wisdom was a means to an end with the end being virtue itself (*Eth. Nic.* 1145a4-6; cf. W.W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle’s Practical Side* (Leiden, 2006), 189-198). For Plutarch, Alexander displayed his fitness to rule because he possessed wisdom in political and military matters as can be seen in such episodes as the scene with Porus at 332E (see the commentary) and the scene with Hephaestion at 332F-333A (see the commentary).

Plutarch emphasizes the military side of Alexander with the use of ἀθρομή. It is a term frequently associated with the resources for war (Thuc. 1.90, And. 1.109, Xen. Hell. 4.8.33, Polyb. 1.41.6), but it can be more broadly applied to mean “asset” (Lys. 24.24, Xen. Mem. 3.12.4, Dem. 3.33, 14.30, 36.11, 44). He also uses the term at 327F when comparing the education Alexander received from Aristotle and Philip. A synonym (ἐθόδηνλ, “provisions”) is used at 327F and 328A (cf. Hdt. 4.203, 6.70, Arist. Rhet. 1411a12). Plutarch’s vocabulary in these instances is a startling contrast to Aristotle’s education of Alexander which was primarily philosophical. In the case of Alexander’s preference for Homer’s works, the use of ἐθόδηνλ (“equipment” or “provisions”) makes it seem as though the epic poems were as necessary to Alexander as his sword when on campaign in Asia. Moreover, by using such terminology, Plutarch manipulates something commonly seen as λόγος (philosophy and literature) and turns it into ἔργον, thus, maintaining his underlying thesis that philosophy is both theoretical and practical.

Plutarch concludes that Aristotle better prepared Alexander for success than his father by giving him philosophical instruction (i.e. virtue). However, the resources that Aristotle (Philosophy) provided Alexander alone could never have brought the king success because he needed the education he received from his father (politics, diplomacy, and military matters) as well.
In 343/2, Philip hired a Macedonian from Stagira, Aristotle, to tutor his fourteen year old son, Alexander (Just. 12.6.17, 12.16.7-8, Plut. Alex. 7-8, Diog. Laert. 5.4, Ael. VH 4.19). Philip may have selected Aristotle because of his connection to the tyrant of Atarneus, Hermias (Diog. Laert. 5.3), and because Aristotle’s father was the personal physician of Amyntas III, Philip’s father (Diog. Laert. 5.1). In 340, Alexander was appointed regent of Macedonia while Philip was dealing with affairs in the Propontis (Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 217, Plut. Alex. 9.1). V. Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks (Oxford, 1938), 62 n. 2, has argued that Alexander’s new position as regent terminated his education with Aristotle (cf. Worthington, Alexander, 26). However, Hammond still holds the view that Alexander’s regency merely interrupted his studies (Genius, 6; cf. Berve, Alexanderreich 2, 71 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 51). Alexander’s new position of authority came with responsibilities which must surely have interfered with his education. He had to deal with a possible revolt by the Maedians on the Upper Strymon (Plut. Alex. 9.1) although this might have been an expedition ordered by Philip (Worthington, Philip II, 130-131), which clearly would have occupied his attention. Later, he was dealing with revolting Thracian tribes (339) and fighting at Chaeronea (338). In 337, after a fight at the wedding banquet to celebrate Philip’s seventh marriage, he left Pella for Epirus and then Illyria (Plut. Alex. 9.5). The following year Philip was assassinated leaving Alexander the Macedonian throne (see pp. 17 and the commentary on 327C). All of these things left little to no time for him to have continued any sort of formal education with Aristotle.

The extent of Aristotle’s influence over Alexander is strongly contested. Green, Alexander, 60 and Hammond, Genius, 5-7, have argued that Aristotle’s impact was

It is unclear exactly what Aristotle imparted to his young student. If the letter to Alexander by Isocrates (*Ep*. 5) is genuine, Alexander was taught to debate (much to Isocrates’ dismay). Both Athenaeus (9.398e) and Pliny (*NH* 8.44) refer to Alexander’s interest in animals though no connection is made to Aristotle. In addition to philosophy, according to Plutarch, Aristotle encouraged Alexander’s love of literature (φιλολόγος, φιλαναγνώστης) and healing (φιλιατρείν, *Alex*. 8.1).

Plutarch’s comparison of Aristotle to Philip suggests that Alexander was better prepared for the campaigns of Asia due to the education he received from Aristotle (philosophy) rather than what he learned from his father (i.e. how to be a king and
commander). This assessment is in keeping with Plutarch’s thesis that Philosophy and
into Fortune aided Alexander.

On Alexander’s youth and education, see Tarn, Alexander the Great 1, 1-3, Lane
Fox, Alexander, 43-61, Green, Alexander, 37-45, Bosworth, CE, 19-23, Hammond,

327 F

ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γράφουσιν ... σχολῆς γλυκείας: Regardless of what texts were carried
with him, Alexander was an ardent reader of literature (Just. 12.16.71). He possessed a
thorough knowledge of Homer as well as Euripides (Nicobule, FGrH 127 F 2; cf. Athen.
12.537d), and this coupled with the proclaimed descent from Achilles through
Neoptolemus (Curt. 8.4.26), may have led to his emulation of Achilles. The pattern of
emulation continued throughout his reign with varying models (i.e. Heracles and
Dionysus): see J.R. Hamilton, “Alexander and his so-called Father,” CQ 23 (1953), 151-
157, Tarn, Alexander 2, 347-374, Bosworth, CE, 278-290, P. Cartledge, Alexander the
Great (New York, 2004), 237-249, Worthington, Alexander, 199-217, and D.L. Gilley,

No other author specifically mentions Alexander bringing copies of both the Iliad
and the Odyssey along with him on his campaigns. In his life of Alexander 8.2 and 26.1,
Plutarch only mentions the “casket-copy” of the Iliad (Onesicritus, FGrH 134 F 38; cf.
Strabo 13.1.27, Athen. 12.537d, Pliny HN 7.108, Dio Chrys. Or. 2). For more on
Alexander’s relationship with the Homeric texts, see Lane Fox, Alexander, 59-67.

328 A

εφόδιον δ ἀληθῶς καταφρονοῦμεν: The line echoes an earlier statement in which Plutarch insists Alexander set forth on his Persian campaign with the greatest provisions Philosophy could offer (μεγάλοψυχίας, συνέσεως, σωφροσύνης, ἀνδραγαθίας). The addition of ἐκ φιλοσοφίας λόγου (philosophic theory) is intriguing in light of the fact that Plutarch was trying to establish Alexander as a philosopher of deeds, not words, like Pythagoras, Socrates, Arcesilaus, and Carneades. Moreover, Plutarch, a Platonist (Russell, *Plutarch*, 63-83), includes fearlessness (ἀφοβίας), a Stoic ideal, into his catalogue of Alexander’s philosophical virtues (N. Sherman, *Stoic Warriors* (Oxford, 2005), 101-129). He used it again at the end of the second discourse (342F) in a list of virtues that the king held in his own right. Plutarch was solidifying the idea that Alexander’s accomplishments were not achieved by Fortune, as were Rome’s (316C), but rather by Virtue.

Nothing is known about the ὑπομνηματισμοί (“memoranda” or “treatises”) dealing with fearlessness, courage, moderation, and magnanimity to which Plutarch refers. Diogenes Laertius records that Thrasylos affixed a double title to Plato’s works so that the *Charmides* represents *On Temperance* and *Laches On Courage* (3.59), and Aristotle is known to have written works, the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, which deal with virtue. Zeno discussed the tripartite division of philosophy including ethics in his *Exposition of Doctrine, On Exposition*, and *On the Nature of Man* according
to Diogenes Laertius 7.39-40, 87. Since ethics was a major component of philosophy as stated by Aristotle and Zeno, then it is possible that it was a common subject of letters, diaries, and published writings. This line could be one of those instances in which Plutarch is drawing upon common knowledge.

ὁτι δηλαδή ... ἀξιωμάτων ἔγραψεν: Aristotle defined philosophy as a science in which axioms and syllogisms play a part in analysis and deduction (Metaph. 1003a21-26). He was known to have developed categorical syllogisms (An. Pr. 45b15-20, 46a3); cf. J. Allen, “Rhetoric and Logic,” in I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric (Oxford, 2007), 353-359. Aristotle defined συλλογίςμος as “an argument in which, certain things being posited, something else is different from the things posited results of necessity because of their being so;” in other words, a syllogism is “a deductively valid argument, and moreover one of a particular kind, namely one where the conclusion is different from its premise or premises” (An. Pr. 24b18-20): see J.M. Cooper, “Aristotle,” in D. Sedley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (Cambridge, 2003), 134. Seneca poked fun at this philosophical form of argument with a syllogism of his own: “No evil is glorious. Death is glorious. Therefore, death is not an evil” (Epist. 82.9).

An ἀξίωμα (“axiom” or “judgment”), as defined by Chrysippus in his Dialectical Definitions, was a judgment which is either true or false (Diog. Laert. 7.65). Examples of axioms include “it is not day” (Diog. Laert. 7.69) or “since it is day, the sun is above the horizon” (Diog. Laert. 7.74). Stoics, particularly Zeno, were well known for their use of syllogisms and axioms: see K. Ierodiakonou, “Stoic Logic,” in M.L. Gill and P. Pellegrin (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 2006), 508-513.
Plutarch claims that Alexander is a philosopher who, like others before him, wrote nothing. Moreover, for a Platonist like Plutarch, he slides in an insult about the Stoics here: Alexander is nothing like the Stoics who used syllogisms and axioms. For more on Aristotle’s syllogism and axioms, see D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1995), 31-44. For more on the Stoics, see B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2003), *passim* and Ierodiakonou, “Stoic Logic,” 505-529.

οὐδ’ ἐν Λυκείῳ ... θεσείς εἶπεν: The Lyceum was a sanctuary for the worship of Apollo the Wolf-Slayer (Plut. *Thes.* 27). By the time of Aristophanes, it was a place for public exercise (*Peace* 353-357). Sometime after 334, Aristotle established his own school of philosophical learning there (Diog. Laert. 5.2). He chose the peripatos, or place for walking, in the Lyceum for the education of his students, thus the name Peripatetics (Diog. Laert. 5.2, Clem. *Strom.* 1, 14). The Peripatetic school was set up to be different from that of the Academy indicating the divergence of Aristotle’s philosophy from that of the Platonists. The Lyceum maintained its position as a sanctuary and a place of learning well into the second century AD (Paus. 1.19.3-4).

The location of the Lyceum is controversial. The textual evidence appears to contradict the archaeological. Plato (*Lys.* 203a-b), Strabo (9.1.19), Livy (31.24.18), and Plutarch (*Sulla* 12.3) indicate that its location was somewhere outside the city walls between Mt. Lybettos and the Illissus in the sacred grove of Apollo Lyceius. Other sources giving geographic details refer to its being in the eastern section of the city (Plut. *Thes.* 27.4, Strabo 9.1.24, 9.1.19). An first century inscription (*IG*² 3, 2875) on which the name Lyceum was inscribed, was found two blocks south of modern day Syntagma Square, and based on this it has been argued that the Russian Orthodox Church of
Lykodemos was built above or near the ancient site of the Lyceum: see J.P. Lynch, *Aristotle’s School* (Berkeley, 1972), 19-21.

The Lyceum was a popular locale for philosophical education prior to Aristotle. Plato mentions that Socrates often spent time there (*Euthphr.* 2a) and his presence there is noted in the *Lysis* (203a-b). People apparently gathered together in the Lyceum to discuss poetry and to criticize Isocrates (12.18, 33). For a thorough discussion of the Lyceum’s location and relationship with the Academy, see Lynch, *Aristotle’s School*, passim.


The antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον is Plutarch’s reminder that there are other meanings of λόγος besides the written word. He is emphasizing that philosophy is more than a “theoretical ethical system” but is also tied to action, ἔργον (Barrow, Plutarch, 106 and 121). Plutarch believed that philosophers should remain active for the advantage of others (Mor. 776b). Moreover, because it is tied to action, Alexander can be considered a philosopher in the same light as Pythagoras, Socrates, Arcesilaus, and Carneades. However, as Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” 97, has pointed out, Plutarch’s assessment of Alexander as a philosopher on these grounds is a “paradox of the most artificial kind.” Plutarch failed to recognize that Socrates, while practicing moral virtue, also talked about the theory (λόγος) of virtue (Pl. Meno 72c). Plato’s Socrates clearly states that to talk about virtue daily is the greatest good to man: ἔντι αὐτῷ λέγω ὅτι τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθόν ὅν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο (Ap. 38a1-3), whereas Plutarch only shows that Alexander practiced virtue not that he discussed it, again emphasizing his action (ἔργον).


Pythagoras believed in the immortality and transmigration of the soul (Porph. Plot. 19). Every living thing was once someone or something else. Hence, a comment in Xenophanes that mocks Pythagoras by saying “Stop hurting that
dog! I recognize the spirit of a friend from his cries” (G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987), 260). It was a way of life, which may explain Plutarch’s comments about the lack of writings from Pythagoras, characterized by its *akousmata*, or prohibitions. The prohibitions included such things as not eating beans, or picking up crumbs, or eating white roosters (Diog. Laert. 8.33-34).

It is impossible to date the life of Pythagoras. According to Aristoxenus, Pythagoras left Samos when he was forty to escape the tyrant Polycrates (Porph. *Plot. 9*), on whom see A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956), 118-123. Polycrates’ tyranny over Samos lasted from 540-522, which would place Pythagoras’ birth around 570 or so (Hdt. 3.39-45). Pythagoras relocated himself to Croton in Southern Italy where he quickly involved himself in political and moral affairs (Diog. Laert. 8.3; cf. M. Schofield, “The Presocratics,” in D. Sedley (ed.), *A Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2003), 51). W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 1 (Cambridge, 1962), 146, has stated that Pythagoras was as much a religious and political teacher as a philosopher. However, by the fifth century the Pythagorean School had evolved into separate, scattered communities with different understandings of Pythagorean ideas. It continued to exist well into the fourth century.

It is unclear whether Pythagoras wrote anything down for his disciples to follow and Diogenes Laertius reports that it was impossible to have knowledge of Pythagorean beliefs (8.15). Yet he states that Pythagoras wrote three books: *On Education, On Statesmanship*, and *On Nature* (Diog. Laert. 8.6).

It is this mystery clouding the understanding of Pythagorean beliefs that Plutarch references here. For Plutarch, Pythagoras was the start of a line of well-known
philosophers who either have no surviving works in his time or wrote nothing at all. For more on Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, see Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* 1, 146-340, C.H. Kahn, *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans* (Indianapolis, 2001), and Schofield, “Presocratics,” 51-56.

**οὐδὲ Σωκράτης:** Socrates was born in Athens in 470/69 and executed in 399. Like Pythagoras, he wrote nothing, and our knowledge of Socratic thought is derived from the writings of his pupil, Plato, and other sources such as Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Aristotle. Socrates taught that all virtues were one, that virtue was knowledge and that only through ignorance will an individual act wrongly (Pl. *Meno* 87e-89a); cf. C. Rowe, “Socrates in Plato’s Dialogues,” in S. Ahbel-Rappe, and R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates* (Oxford, 2006), 164-165. Socrates refused to take money for things he did not know, and he admitted that did not know virtue (Pl. *Lach.* 190b7-c2). Instead, he exhorted others to think about the acquisition of virtue, shaming those who did not do so (Pl. *Ap.* 29d). Because he claims not to know virtue, Socrates did not write about it, hence Plutarch’s comments here. For more on Socrates and his philosophies, see W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 3 (Cambridge, 1969), 323-507 and S. Broadie, “The Sophists and Socrates,” in D. Sedley (ed.), *A Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2003), 73-97.

**οὐδ’ Αρκεσίλαος:** Arcesilaus (c. 318-c. 243), a Sceptic, was originally a student of Theophrastus in the Lyceum (Diog. Laert. 4. 29). He was considered a mob-lover hungry for fame (Diog. Laert. 4.41-42), but was unrivalled in his ability to persuade (Diog. Laert. 4.37). He took over Plato’s Academy in 272 and led it in opposition to the new Stoic philosophy of Zeno (R.J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in B. Inwood (ed.), *The
Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), 66-68. Pyrrho, Carneades, Aenesidemus, and Arcesilaus were the four greatest exponents of Scepticism yet wrote nothing. It is because of this that Plutarch uses Arcesilaus as a model to which he can compare Alexander.


οὐδὲ Καρνεάδης ... τῶν φιλοσόφων: Carneades (c. 219-c.129) was another Sceptic philosopher who was seen as a master dialectician, conversationalist, and a great lecturer (Diog. Laert. 4.62). He differed from Arcesilaus in that he had a habit of agreeing with deductions which he thought were convincing but known to be fallacies (Brunschwig and Sedley, “Hellenistic Philosophy,” 178). Like Arcesilaus (and Plutarch), he directed his attacks against Stoic philosophy. Also, like Pythagoras, Socrates, and Arcesilaus, Carneades wrote nothing. According to Eusebius, he established a third Academy (Praep. Evan. 14.7.15). Eusebius erred about the school that Carneades was head of in
the mid second century, for it was founded by Arcesilaus, who used it as a podium against the growing popularity of Zeno and Stoicism (Brunschwig and Sedley, “Hellenistic Philosophy,” 176-177). Cicero, who was a follower of this Academy, says that others call it new, but he thinks it is old and sees it as a continuation of Plato’s Academy (Acad. 1.44-46). What we have gathered about Carneades and his philosophical leanings is derived from his successor Clitomachus, the teacher of Philo of Larissa who in turn taught Cicero. For more on Carneades, see Brunschwig and Sedley, “Hellenistic Philosophy,” 178-179.

καὶ οὖκ ἡσυχολοῦντο ... τοῖς σοφισταῖς: In accordance with his thesis that Alexander was a civilizing philosopher-king, Plutarch outlines in general terms Alexander’s accomplishments.

Plutarch also takes the opportunity to cast aspersions on sophists, a dislike that he seems to have developed early in his career (see pp. 126-127). To Plutarch, a sophist was just another name for a charlatan (Mor. 43F, 80A, 131A, 408C-D, 547E, 814C, 1113F, 116F-117A, 118A). Plutarch seems to make a distinction between sophists, or professional teachers, and practicing philosophers (318E, 580B, 1059A) which comes through in this passage. It is another reference to the λόγος-ἐργον antithesis casting philosophers who write nothing in the same light as sophists who make their living by teaching. Both are λόγοι to Plutarch’s way of thinking.

328 B

Πόλεις ... ἥριοις ἐθνεὶς: Cf. 328E.
Greek attitudes toward barbarians were polarized after the Persian wars, as can be seen in Aeschylus’ *Persians*, produced c. 472: E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian* (Oxford, 1989), 57-58. According to Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 1, the Greeks used the barbarians to define themselves seeing barbarians as their natural antithesis. However, Hall, *Hellenicity*, 227, suggests that the “elite environment” of the Olympic Games during the sixth century facilitated Hellenic identity through alliances between the ruling families and the promotion of hegemonic claims. The Persian Wars caused the “ethnic foundations” of Hellas “to implode and retreat rapidly before more cultural criteria” (Hall, *Hellenicity*, 227). In other words, the Greeks already had an idea of themselves in relation to each other, but, when faced with outside interference, retreated within their cultural similarities, and hence the idea of the barbarian as antithetical to themselves became deeply entrenched. Herodotus 8.144.2 defines what makes the Greeks Greek when he states that they share common blood, a common language, and common religious practices; cf. R. Thomas, “Ethnicity, Genealogy, and Hellenism in Herodotus,” in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (Cambridge, 2001), 213-233. Herodotus 4.106 characterized various barbarian tribes as unjust and lawless (ὅπερ δίκην νομίζοντες ὀντε νόμο) and suggested that νόμοι (“customs” or “laws”) were central to society in that they governed both social protocol as well as state-mandated rules of behavior: F. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus* (Berkeley, 1988), 310-370. A lack of laws corrupted the innocent and brought chaos (Hes. *Op.* 258-264) and is closely connected to *hypbris* (Hes. *Op.* 190-192, 213-216); cf. N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris* (Warminster, 1992), 187.
For the purpose of *DFAM* 1, Plutarch too exhibits Greek attitudes toward barbarians with an antithesis revealing the Greeks’ disdain of lawlessness (*ἀθεσμα* or *ανόμοι*). The antithesis relies on the ethnocentrism of Plutarch’s audience in that it believes that Greek justice and law are hallmarks of a civilized society (P. Cartledge, *The Greeks* (Oxford, 2002), 70-77). S. Humbert, “Plutarque, Alexandre, et l’Hellenisme,” in S. Said (ed.), *ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ. Quelques jalons pour une histoire de l’identité grecque* (Leiden, 1991), 169-182, has argued that this entire conception of Alexander by Plutarch is meant to cast the king as a paradigm of *paideia* in which Alexander becomes the vehicle for the transmission of Greek culture. As Hall, *Hellenicity*, 221, points out though, this *paideia* was still being defined in Atheno-centric terms which explains why “it is no accident that the Attic-Ionic dialect should have formed the basis of the ‘common dialect’ (*koine*) spoken in the Macedonian court.” Alexander, then, is cast as the harbinger of urbanity, of civilization with all of its justice and laws, but the civilization that he brought with him was Greek, not Macedonian.

Πόθεν οὖν ἐπιστεύθησαν ... ἐπαίδευσε φιλόσοφος: Plutarch claimed that Alexander deserved to be seen as a philosopher because he has surpassed the greatest ones in his virtues, his deeds, and his teachings. In the next section, he cites specific evidence to substantiate his claims. However, Plutarch’s evidence in these areas is selective. He fails to mention Alexander’s irrationality during the Philotas Affair in 330 at Phrada, as a result of which Alexander had Philotas and his father Parmenion executed for alleged treason (see pp. 23), nor does he mention Alexander’s drunkenness which led to the murder of Cleitus in 328 at Maracanda after a heated, emotional argument.
Plutarch’s criteria (sayings, teachings, actions) for judging Alexander to be a philosopher are faulty. For one, Alexander’s statements are more than likely entirely fictitious (331B, 331D, 331F-332B). Moreover, he compares Alexander’s sayings to those of other kings (Antigonus, Dionysius I, and Sardanapalus) but there is no comparison to sayings of philosophers other than a summation of Zeno’s philosophy at 329A-B and Aristotle’s advice on the treatment of barbarians at 329B (which Alexander ignored). Plutarch discusses the famous meeting of Diogenes of Sinope and Alexander at Corinth in 335 in which Alexander is supposed to have said “if I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes” (331F), but he does not mention their initial greeting in which Alexander said “I am Alexander, the great king,” and Diogenes’ responded “and I am Diogenes the dog” (Diog. Laert. 6.60), which shows the philosopher’s sarcastic wit. Plutarch’s use of sayings, then, is unbalanced and highly rhetorical.

Furthermore, the inclusion of Alexander’s apparent teachings reveals Plutarch’s lack of attention to detail because from what he says at 328C-D it appears that he did not do his research on the Hyrcanians, Arachosians, and Sogdianans. The examples given for the teachings of philosophers show their general failure as educators of philosophy, for Socrates failed to introduce foreign deities (328D) and no one followed Plato’s Laws (328E). The exceptions are where we are told Carneades taught Cleitomachus Greek customs (328D) and Zeno educated Diogenes the Babylonian (328D), although Plutarch does not mention that it was Chrysippus who was Diogenes’ teacher (Diog. Laert. 6.81).

Alexander’s actions provide the most numerous examples and are peppered throughout the work, although little or no context is given for them. For instance, at 329D-F Plutarch discusses the mass marriage at Susa in 324 and gives enough detail to
provide his audience with a visual image and especially to highlight Alexander’s desire to unify the people of his kingdom. That detail may have been intended to overshadow the fact that there was a practical purpose to the marriages which had nothing to do with uniting the races, for Alexander used them to dilute the bloodlines of the Persian nobility (see pp 47). Similarly, Alexander’s behavior toward Roxane, discussed at 332E-F, is meant to show his moderation or restraint, but the marriage had a pragmatic purpose to it because Alexander needed the support of her father, Oxyartes, to keep Bactria and Sogdiana passive (see pp. 45-46).

Ultimately, Plutarch’s evidence for Alexander as a philosopher detracts from his argument because it shows a lack of knowledge. However, Plutarch’s rhetorical skill is shown in his ability to select and manipulate information, however inaccurate it may be, for a particular purpose.
Overview: The following section begins the paradoxical portion of the speech by highlighting Alexander’s abilities as a teacher while not straying from the role of Philosophy. Plutarch compares Alexander’s “students” to those of famous philosophers and asserts that Alexander civilized foreign tribes. Also, a comparison of Plato’s Laws and Alexander’s practical application of laws serves to show Alexander a force of peace and urbanity in a chaotic world. Finally, he concludes that if philosophers are responsible for teaching character and virtue in a theoretical manner, then Alexander is a wise man for he did the same but in a practical way.

328 B

Καὶ πρῶτον τὸ παραδοξότατον ... σκόπει: The use of τὸ παραδοξότατον explicitly implies that Plutarch is writing a paradoxical work. It is a critical moment in the speeches drawing the audience’s attention away from what has been argued (that Alexander should be considered a philosopher) and toward what is coming (that he is virtuous). By doing so, Plutarch intentionally lets his audience know that what follows will be unexpected and challenge their understanding of not only Alexander but also philosophy.

Τοὺς Ἀλέξανδρου ... ἀντιπαραβάλλων: Plutarch now examines Alexander’s application of philosophy. For Plutarch, the expectation is that the students of Plato and Socrates should be superior to those of Alexander, hence τὸ παραδοξότατον (“the paradox”). However, Socrates denied being a διδάσκαλος (“teacher”) altogether when charges were brought against him for corrupting the youth (Ap. 33a5-b8). For Plato’s Socrates as well as the Athenian audience at the time, a διδάσκαλος instructs others in a specific subject area, accepts payment for the instruction, and teaches through exposition and demonstration in private tutorials (G.A. Scott, Plato’s Socrates as Educator (Albany, 2000), 24). Socrates follows most of those requirements with the exception that he
refuses to take payment for his conversations which would have also made him a sophist
(σοφιστής). That Socrates insisted that he was not a teacher is a point which Aristophanes mocks at Clouds 194 when he attributes an entire school (φοντιστήριον or “a thinking school”) to him. Aristophanes associates the φοντιστήριον with the teaching of unjust logic and the corruption of the youth (Clouds 239-246, 882-885), which was one of the charges brought against Socrates in 399 (Pl. Ap. 19a8-24b2; cf. C.D.C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis, 1989), 16-21).

Moreover, the bedrock of Socratic education is the principle that both teacher and student harbor knowledge and ignorance: see P. Woodruff, “Socrates among the Sophists,” in S. Ahbel-Rappe, and R. Kamtekar (eds.), A Companion to Socrates (Oxford, 2006), 43-44. Plutarch’s Alexander, while having the knowledge and sharing it with his students, who for Plutarch were the uncivilized peoples of the East, would never profess his ignorance. In this regard, Alexander is superior to Plato and Socrates as a philosopher and educator.

However, Plutarch considers that Alexander’s conquered subjects were his students. This assessment is ironic in that one would think that they would either be reticent to adopt new cultural practices or, out of fear, would do so to avoid the wrath of a new ruler. Plutarch makes it seem as thought these people recognized their less than civilized state and were perfectly willing to accept what Alexander was offering (see the commentary on 328C-D). The reality must have been quite different, for after Alexander’s death his empire was dismembered by his generals. Ultimately, at Triparadeisus in 320, an arrangement was reached in which Ptolemy controlled Egypt as satrap (Diod. 18.39.5, Just. 13.6.18-20), Antigonus ruled Asia Minor (Diod. 18.40.1),

216
Antipater retained Macedonia and Greece (Diod. 18.39.7), and Seleucus was given Babylonia (Diod. 18.39.6).


εὐθείας οὖτοι ... Ἐλληνιδός συνιέντας: Plutarch’s statement about Plato’s and Socrates’ students speaking the same language (ὀμογλώσσους) refers back to 328B where he casts Alexander as the bringer of civilization to foreign peoples. He argues that Alexander is superior because he broke the language barrier and brought culture to the barbarians. Later, Plutarch mentions Aristotle’s ethnocentric attitude toward barbarians and his advice to Alexander to treat them as though they were beneath him (329B). It is advice that Alexander rejects, thus setting him apart from even Aristotle.

The use of ὀμογλώσσους is significant as it is also used by Herodotus when he elucidates the defining features of Hellenism: common blood, language, religious practices, and customs (8.144.2; cf. Hall, *Hellenicity*, 189-198). Thucydides too suggests that the Greek language was a defining characteristic of Greek culture (2.68.5) when speaking of the hellenization of the Argives of Amphilochia (cf. Isoc. Ep. 9.8). Plutarch is thus maintaining the centuries-old dichotomy of Greek and barbarian based at least in part on a breakdown of culture similar to Herodotus’. Here, he employs language as a
way to differentiate between Greek and barbarian, and later (329B-D) he will use custom in a similar way. In the *Alexander* 47.3, he presents a similar scenario when he records that Alexander taught thirty thousand boys the Greek language and trained them in Macedonian weaponry (διὸ καὶ τρισμυρίους παίδας ἐπιλεξάμενος ἐκέλευσε γράμματα τε μανθάνειν Ἐλληνικὰ καὶ Μακεδονικὸς ὀπλῶς ἐντρέψεσθαι). Those boys are mentioned again in the *Life* at 71.1. It is probable that Alexander had young boys trained in the Macedonian manner of fighting since other sources mention it (Diod. 17.108.1-3, Curt. 8.5.1, Arr. 7.6.1). The paradox in both works is that Alexander blurs the lines between Greek and barbarian, but, in the end, Hellenism wins out because the king spreads Greek culture and makes the barbarians civilized or “Greek.” For more on the linguistic connection to ethnicity, see Hall, *Hellenicity*, 111-117. On general issues of ethnicity, see E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian* (Oxford, 1989) and R. Thomas, “Ethnicity, Genealogy, and Hellenism in Herodotus,” in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (Cambridge, 2001), 213-233.

328 C

καὶ πολλοὶς οὐκ ἔπεισαν: The failure of Plato and Socrates to influence large numbers of people is, for Plutarch, useful for illustrating a parallel with Alexander thus challenging popular understanding of the role of philosophers. The *Apology* of Plato indicates that many of Socrates’ ideas were unacceptable to the leaders of the Athenian community. In 399, Socrates was executed as a political scapegoat and his ideas came under the censure of the Athenian law courts. Furthermore, Plutarch maintains that the number of followers does not necessarily indicate one’s quality as a teacher and
philosopher. Alexander instructed entire civilizations whereas Socrates and Plato only touched the lives of a handful of people in Athens, yet they are considered great philosophers. According to Fraser, *Cities*, 173-187, Alexander did not want to destroy the cultures that he was conquering which is evident in his adoption of foreign dress (see the commentary on 329C-D), where he placed his city foundations, and the fact that Alexander used local populations with Macedonian and Greek soldiers to settle them. Nevertheless, the entire concept of Alexander introducing Greek culture to the barbarians is antithetical to his supposed desire to unite the races (329C) because as Fraser, *Cities*, 181-183, has argued, Alexander had no wish to cause native cultures to disappear. However, it was important to Alexander to ensure that his foreign subjects did not rise up against Macedonian rule resulting in the mixing of bloodlines (i.e. Alexander’s marriage to Roxane and the mass marriages at Susa). It seems that Alexander only cared about foreign culture when it did not conflict with his own agenda. See also the commentary on 328D-E for Alexander and the unification of the races.

ἀλλὰ Κριτίας ... πη παρετράπησαν: Here, Plutarch relies on the audience’s knowledge. Critias (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12-34), Alcibiades (Plut. *Alc*. 4.1-5), and Cleitophon (Pl. *Cleit*. 410C) were students of Plato and Socrates; Critias and Alcibiades were proficient writers but were also to some degree individuals whose moral fortitude was questionable, thereby providing a stark contrast to the “students” of Alexander on whom Plutarch will later elaborate. Critias was one of the more vicious members of the Thirty Tyrants in 403 (cf. Xen. *Hell*. 2.3.15, 2.3.2). Alcibiades is more widely known as the man who persuaded the Athenians to invade Sicily in 415 and later defected to the Spartans (Thuc. 6.61, Plut. *Alc*. 23.1-2). Cleitophon was well-known for his political fickleness (Ar.
Frogs 965-7); he was the student who failed to understand his master and subsequently sought another teacher, Thrasymachus (Pl. Cleit. 410C).

Plutarch selected three students who turned away from their teachers revealing the failure of those teachers like Aristotle whom Alexander seems to have ignored regarding the treatment of barbarians (329B) and also about whom Plato wrote dialogues (Critias, Alcibiades, and Cleitophon). What follows is the contrast with Alexander’s students who supposedly did not turn away from his teachings, thus making him the better teacher and better philosopher. One must remember that Alexander’s students did not completely accept Hellenic culture (see the commentary on 328B-C). However, “it is beyond all doubt that within a generation or so of his death Greek civic life and traditional Greek culture had spread to some remote corners of the Iranian world”: Fraser, Cities, 181. While Greek culture did spread in pockets to some areas, it was not as widespread as Plutarch would lead us to believe. For more on the career of Critias, see P. Krentz, The Thirty at Athens (Ithaca, 1982), on Alcibiades see W.M. Ellis, Alcibiades (London, 1989), and on Cleitophon see D. Nails, The People of Plato (Indianapolis, 2002), 102-103.

Τὴν δ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου ... γαμεῖν ἐπαιδεύεσθαι: None of the sources mention anything about the education of the Hyrcanian people with regard to marriage. Wyttenbach, Animadversiones, 112, doubts that Plutarch researched any of these remarks on the cultural advances caused by Alexander, although Plutarch mentions other Hyrcanian customs at Moralia 499D. Babbitt in the Loeb suggests that the lack of marriage is from a “hazy recollection” of Herodotus’ account of the Massagetae whom Briant associates with the Hyrcanians, Parthians, Saca, and the Bactrians (Cyrus, 39; cf. Arr. 4.16.4 and Bosworth, Arrian 2, 115). Herodotus mentions two things of significance in these
passages (1.215-216). The first is the contact these Central Asian people had with the nomadic Scythian population (1.215). The Scythians must have had an impact on the customs of the people of Hyrcania, though to what degree is unknown. In fact, the only mention of marriage in Hyrcania occurs when a Scythian king offers his daughter and his nobles’ daughters in marriage to Alexander and his men (Arr. 4.15.2) which Alexander refused (Arr. 4.15.5; cf. Bosworth, Arrian 2, 102-103). The second issue (1.216) is that every man has a wife, but the wives are used promiscuously (ἐπίκοινα).

In the Alexander (57.4), Plutarch mentions that the barbarian peoples were emboldened by the partnership of Alexander and his barbarian wife Roxane (ἐθάρρησαν γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ γάμου) which is recorded while the king is still in Hyrcania. Plutarch implies that the purpose of Alexander’s marriage to a non-Greek woman was to set an example for the barbarian peoples (Alex. 57.7; cf. Curt. 8.4.25). Other sources, however, do not record his marriage to the Bactrian Roxane until 327, when he was in Sogdiana (Curt. 8.4.23, Arr. 4.19.5-6; cf. Bosworth, Arrian 2, 131). Possibly, the inclusion of this particular instruction was meant to overshadow the change in Alexander’s attitude which most of the sources agree occurred during or shortly after Alexander’s visit to Hyrcania (Diod. 17.77.4-5, Curt. 6.6.1-8, Just. 12.3.8-12, Plut. Alex. 45, 47) and emphasize his good works (ἔργα). Tarn insists upon the political nature of the marriage and its implications for the kingdom: “It was a marriage of policy, intended to reconcile the eastern barons and end the national war” (Alexander 1, 76, 134; cf. Green, Alexander, 369, Bosworth, CE, 117, Worthington, Alexander, 139). Lane Fox takes the opposite approach stating that Alexander loved Roxane and that “there were other Iranian ladies who would have served his purpose as well” (Alexander, 317; cf.
Hammond, *KCS*, 261). It is possible that these two theories can coincide. Alexander could have loved Roxane and still furthered his political plans.

Γεωργεῖν ἐδίδαξεν Ἀραχοσίους: Here, we have evidence of Plutarch’s lack of research on the matter of settled agriculture in the Arachosian region. Briant, *Cyrus*, 444-445, discusses the category of estates called *irmatam*. In 522, Vivana won a battle at a fortress in Arachosia, also known as the satrap Vivana’s *irmatam* (*Bisutun Inscription of Darius* 47; cf. J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York, 1983), 29-30). In Briant’s estimation, these *irmatam* were “agricultural estates;” evidence of settled agriculture in the outlying areas (*Cyrus*, 445). H. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* (Wiesbaden, 1968), 252, even mentions the illustriousness of the Arachosian wine indicating that they practiced viticulture.

Συγκίνησε πατέρας μή φονέαν: As with the Hyrcanians above, Wyttenbach, *Animadversiones*, 112-113, suggests that Plutarch did not research the subject matter. On this, I agree with Wyttenbach as there is no evidence to suggest that the Sogdians practiced patricide/matricide. Plutarch may have confused the Scythian tribes reported in Herodotus with the Sogdians. Herodotus mentioned that the Scythians sacrificed their elderly parents (1.126).

Πέξζαο ζέβεζζαη: A tradition that possibly dates to Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F44) mentions that Cyrus the Great’s mother, Parysatis, engaged in intercourse with her younger son (Ael. *NA* 6.39). Briant does not lend any credence to the stories of Ctesias (*Cyrus*, 986), nor does Pearson, who points out that Ctesias often wrote “romantic oriental tales” (*LHA*, 60, 95). Herodotus, however, does mention an incestuous marriage between Cambyses and his sister Smerdis (3.32.4). Strabo agrees with Plutarch on this custom of marrying one’s mother (15.3.20). The Persians practiced “next-of-kin marriages” which was an important component of the Zoroastrian religion: see A.M. Schwartz, “The Old Eastern Iranian World View According to the Avesta,” *CHI* 2, 656. Under these religious dictates, a man could marry his sister, daughter, or even his mother. These types of marriages were a regular component of the Ptolemaic dynasty beginning with Ptolemy II’s marriage to his sister, Arsinoē II.

Nevertheless, Plutarch’s knowledge of Persian marriage customs probably comes from the well-known tradition of the royal harem (Diod. 17.77.6, Curt. 6.6.8, Plut. *Artax. 27.2, Mor. 140B, Ath. 13.556b*). Justin 10.1.1 states that Artaxerxes II had 115 sons of which only three were legitimate and the remainder were from his concubines. For more on the 360 concubines of the Persian king, see Briant, *Cyrus*, 280-285. As far as general
marriage customs are concerned, Strabo clearly states that the Persians are polygamous and continue to have concubines for the purpose of many children (15.2.17; cf. Hdt. 1.136). It must not be forgotten, however, that the Macedonians practiced polygamy as well. Philip II had seven wives, all but one was married for political purposes (Worthington, *Philip II*, 172-174), and Alexander married at least twice (E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman, 2000), 52-76 and Worthington, *Alexander*, 139-140, 180). They did not however, practice next-of-kin marriages. Athenaeus 13.557b-e contrasts Philip’s marriages with Darius’ harem and concludes that while Darius brought the harem with him on campaign, Philip married a wife for each campaign he undertook. While the point of Athenaeus’ excursus is that women bring confusion, the passage reveals that Philip married for political reasons, with the exception of Cleopatra whom he married for love (13.557d). M. Brosius, *Women in Ancient Persia*, 559-331 BC (Oxford, 1996), is a fount of information on Persian marriage practices: see especially, pp. 35-82.

ὁ θαυμαστῆς ... προσκυνοῦσι: With the Indians and Scythians, Plutarch is stressing that Alexander’s instruction is due to Philosophy.

Alexander’s recognition of the Indian gods as Greek gods was common for Greeks in general. In Diodorus, the episode in India with the people of Nysa only comes to us through the table of contents which states ὡς τὴν Νυσίαν ὀνομαζομένην πόλιν εὕρηκε διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ Διονύσου συγγένειαν (“how he helped the city called Nysa because of his relationship to Dionysus”). In Curtius, the Nysians appeal to Alexander as the third son of Jupiter (Zeus) to arrive in India (8.10.1). Curtius uses the episode at Nysa to strike at Alexander’s base nature (8.10.15-18). Arrian uses the episode to indicate
Alexander’s desire to instill morale in his troops; to create a competitive spirit between his troops and Dionysus (5.2-3). Justin (12.7.6) does not question the existence of a cult to Dionysus in India. He also does not suggest that Alexander was descended from the gods as the other vulgate authors do. In his life of Alexander, Plutarch fails to mention the episode at all, only mentioning a deep river (58.4). Tarn questions the existence of Dionysiac cults in India, insisting that Alexander “welcomed the identification” of a local deity as a Greek one (Alexander 1, 90; cf. Bosworth CE, 121-122). This sort of identification was not uncommon even for Alexander. He had done the same with Melqart at Tyre (Diod. 17.40.2-3, Curt. 4.2.10-24, Arr. 2.16.7, Just. 11.10.10-14, Plut. Alex. 24.2-25.2) and Ammon at Siwah (Diod. 17. 49.2-51.4, Strabo 17.1.43, Curt. 4.7.1-32, Arr. 3.3.1-4.5, Just. 11.11, Plut. Alex.27.3-6). For more on the Nysians and Dionysiac cults, see Lane Fox, 333-334, 340-342 who does not question the identification at all; Hammond, Genius, 163 insinuates that the Indians promoted the connection themselves, also Worthington, Alexander, 148 and Green, Alexander, 384, who see confirmation in the ivy growing on the mountainside. The plant was probably scindapsos which looked enough like ivy for Alexander to exploit the connection with Dionysus (Worthington, Alexander, 148).

Σκύθαι θάπτουσι ... οὕ κατεσθίουσι: The Scythians were a nomadic people consisting of many different tribes. The Greeks distinguished the Scythians from Europe (modern Romania and Bulgaria) and those from Asia (modern Kazakhstan, Hdt. 4.4-12). It is impossible to know exactly to whom Plutarch is referring here. Herodotus mentions that the Scythians drank the blood of their first human kill (4.64.1). They also used as much of the corpse as they could in everyday products, like cups and skins (4.64.1-65). But

328 D

Θαυμάζειν τὴν Καρνεάδον ... ἐκληπτεῖν ἐποίησε: Plutarch stresses that philosophers who teach well have students who succeed in philosophy. For instance, Cleitomachus and Diogenes were students of philosophers who made a name for themselves as directors of their philosophical schools: Cleitomachus for the Sceptics, and Diogenes for the Stoics. Cleitomachus is a shadowy figure in ancient philosophy. One ancient author mentions that Cleitomachus was the most illustrious student of Carneades, a notable Sceptic (Diog. Laert. 4.66-67; cf. DFAM 1, 328A). Athenaeus tells us that he was second to none in the New Academy in his philosophical attitudes (402c). Furthermore, he succeeded his mentor, Carneades, as director of the new Academy from 129 to 110 (Diog. Laert. 4.67). For more on the Sceptics, see R.J. Hankinson, The Sceptics (1995) and J. Brunschwig and D. Sedley, “Hellenistic Philosophy,” in D. Sedley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (2003), 163-175.
Apollodorus of Athens wrote a chronicle, of which only fragments remain, that mentions Cleitomachus’ change of name from Hasdrubal (*FGrH* 244 F 56). Diogenes Laertius states that Cleitomachus taught philosophy in Carthage before moving to Athens to study under Carneades (4.67). No ancient source mentions why Cleitomachus changed his name from Hasdrubal. It is likely that, in the second century during which Rome was fighting Carthage in the Punic Wars, it would have been unpopular to make known one’s Carthaginian origins.

**Θαυμάζομεν τὴν διάθεσιν ... ἔπεισε φιλοσοφεῖν:** Zeno of Citium is credited with founding the Stoic school of philosophy (Athen. 344d and 370c). Diogenes of Babylon is said to have been a student of Chrysippus (Strabo 16.1.16, Diog. Laert. 6.81). He was one of three philosophers to go to Rome in 155 (Cic. *Acad.* 2.137) as part of an embassy significant for “the introduction of Greek philosophy to the Roman world” (J. Sellars, *Stoicism* (Berkeley, 2006), 8). For a general look at the principles of Stoicism, see Brunschwig and Sedley, “Hellenistic Philosophy,” 163-175 and Sellars, *Stoicism*.

**ἀλλ’ Ἀλεξάνδρον ... τραγῳδίας ἔδων:** It is significant that Plutarch refrains from mentioning Alexander’s conquest of Asia. Instead, Alexander’s loftier goal is cast in the moral/philosophical language of τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐξημεροῦντος (“taming” or “humanizing Asia”), which was similarly expressed at 328B.

Alexander’s personal interest in Homer is then given a wider scope as part of that “civilizing” program. This idea is yet another paradox in that the audience would have been aware of Alexander’s love of Homer, but they would not have seen it as part of a larger policy so it would have come as a surprise to hear it couched in this manner. These lines follow the examples of Carneades and Zeno who taught foreigners Greek
culture and are intended to show that Alexander was no different. Plutarch is, then, taking something that his audience would have been familiar with and casting it in a new light in an effort to make them re-think their conception of philosophy.

The mention of Homer is the second time Plutarch points out the epic author and Alexander’s interest in him. Homer was read extensively in the Greek world in general. He was a “paradigm to be cited, invoked and emulated on all manner of occasions” and was a fundamental component of paideia (M. Griffith, “Public and Private in Early Institutions of Education,” in Y.L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden, 2001), 56-57, 70). Competitive recitations of Homer were a regular feature of Macedonian symposia: see E.N. Borza, “The Symposium at Alexander’s Court,” Archaia Macedonia 3 (Thessaloniki, 1983), 51. In 330, Alexander left the royal Persian women whom he had captured at Issus in Susa where they were to be taught Greek (Diod. 17.67.1; cf Curt. 5.2.17). They might have been taught in the Greek fashion which could indicate that the Persian women were taught Homer’s works.

The addition of Sophocles and Euripides is new in this particular work (cf. DFAM 1, 327F, Alex. 8). In his life of Alexander, Plutarch says that Harpalus sent Alexander the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides (8.3). In this passage of the DFAM, however, Plutarch omits Aeschylus. Sophocles and Euripides dealt with the importance of law which would conjure certain ideas in the audience’s mind especially in light of an earlier passage which mentioned Alexander bringing law and peace (328B).

Καὶ Σωκράτης ... Καῦξασος προσεκώνησε: The continuing comparison of Socrates and Alexander demonstrates that Alexander’s audience allegedly found no fault with his teachings unlike Socrates’ audience who accused him of corrupting the youth (Pl. Ap.
23D, 24C) and impiety (Pl. Ap. 24B-C, Xen. Mem. 1.1.1; cf. J.P. Euben, Corrupting Youth (Princeton, 1997), 32-63 and K. Quincy, Plato Unmasked (Spokane, 2003), 131-150), although Socrates’ situation was probably the result of the actions of sycophants. Indeed, Plutarch uses συκοφάντη ("sycophant") when referring to those who brought Socrates to trial.

D. Harvey, “The Sykophant and Sykophancy: Vexatious Redefined,” in P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. Todd (eds.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society (Cambridge, 1990), 103-107, argues that the sycophant in Athens abused their role as prosecutor; contra R. Osborne, “Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens: Sykophants and Sykophancy,” in P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. Todd (eds.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society (Cambridge, 1990), 94-102, and hence sycophancy became a crime in an individual bringing a case to trial was required to acquire one of the jury’s votes or he could be fined or, in some instances, lose some of his citizen rights. The significance of sycophancy is best explained by Lysias (27.26) and Demosthenes (55.35) who claimed that sycophants caused stasis and were detrimental to the workings of democracy. For instance, sycophants were known to have intimidated generals and other political officials (Pl. Rep. 553b, Dem. 23.15, 25.49-50, Plut. Arist. 26.1). Nicias, for example, feared the Athenian sycophants if he abandoned operations in Syracuse 415 (Plut. Nic. 22.2; cf. Alc. 24.7, Phoc. 12.2).

While Socrates was executed for his teachings and supposed impiety, Alexander is honored by the sustained practice of the worship of the Greek gods among the Bactrians and those in the Caucasus (probably the foundation Alexandria–of-the-Caucasus). Zeus, the patron-deity of the Diodotid dynasty of Bactria (third century), can

328 E

Πλάτων ... πολιτείαν ... καὶ χρόνται: Plutarch is continuing his comparison of Alexander to Plato which he began in the opening paragraph of this section (328B). He elaborates more fully on the comparison to Plato than on the one to Socrates, giving two different examples of Plato’s inferiority to Alexander: πολιτεία and νόμος. Both of these works (one untitled but about the ideal constitution and one about laws) are denigrated by Plutarch as either difficult to read or unpopular. It is not certain whether he was referring to the Republic and the Laws, but it is possible since he was considered a Platonist who followed Plato’s ethical tenets and would have been familiar with Plato’s works.

Aristotle frequently attacked Plato’s ideas in the Republic (Pol. 1261a-1264b), but not necessarily his style. The issue of the Republic’s austerity may be Plutarch’s own judgment, but it is an assessment of scholars today. “Plato’s dialogical style yields poor results” when a reader wants to understand a Platonic point (N. Pappas, Plato and the Republic (London, 1995), xi). Cicero used Plato’s Laws often, although not many other ancient authors have, lending to Plutarch’s idea that the text was unpopular: S. Bernardete, Plato’s Laws (Chicago, 2000), 353-368. For further analysis of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Republic, see R. Mayhew, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic
On Plato’s style in the *Republic* and for a brief overview, see Pappas, *Plato and the Republic, passim.*

Ἀλέξανδρος ... ἐκράτησε διαίτης: Plutarch’s statement that Alexander founded more than seventy cities is a gross exaggeration: see Tarn, *Alexander 2*, 233, Fraser, *Cities*, 188, and Bosworth, *CE*, 245. Among those Alexander is said to have founded are Alexandria-in-Egypt (modern Alexandria), Alexandria-in-Ariana (modern Herāt in western Afghanistan), Alexandria-in-Arachosia (modern Kandahar in Afghanistan), and Alexandria Eschate (modern Khojend in Tajikistan), however the only polis that the sources agree on is Alexandria in Egypt, which was established prior to his visit to Siwah in 331 (Diod. 17.52.1-6, Curt. 4.8.1-6, Arr. 3.1.5-2.2, Plut. *Alex.* 26.2-6, Just. 11.11.13; cf. *DFAM* 1, 326F). Due to the ancient authors’ confusing geography, it is hard to pinpoint the remaining cities, and in some cases what they regard as a city (πόλις) is merely a garrison outpost (φυλακή). For example, Arrian 5.29.3 records a settlement, which Hephaestion had been ordered to build and fortify with wounded mercenary troops. Arrian uses πόλις though the foundation did not include a market square or temples as at Alexandria in Egypt (Arr. 3.1.5-2.2). For a full analysis of Alexander’s foundations, see Fraser, *Cities, passim.*

328 F

μακαριώτροι τῶν διαφυγόντων ... εἰ μὴ ἐκρατήθησαν: Plutarch insists that the conquered subjects of Alexander were happy to be conquered because he had brought Greek culture with him, hence their uncivilized manner of life came to an end. According to Diodorus 17.49.1-2, the Egyptians welcomed Macedonian rule because
previous Persian rulers, such as Artaxerxes III, committed horrendous acts against temples and had governed harshly (Curt. 4.7.1; cf. Arr. 3.1.2, who says only Mazaces, the Persian satrap, was friendly). This account lends credence to Plutarch’s statement, but it cannot be extrapolated to include all of the areas Alexander conquered. Thus, in 330, after Darius was murdered, Bessus proclaimed himself king as Artaxerxes V meaning that Alexander had not yet conquered the Persian Empire (see pp. 22-23). Then in 329 Alexander learned that Bactria revolted led by the assassins of Darius, Spitamenes and Dataphernes, and that the Sogdians had joined them (Curt. 7.6.13-15, Arr. 4.1.5). Later still, in India in 325, Alexander almost died during fierce fighting with the Mallians (see the commentary at 327B).

Nevertheless, Plutarch further expresses the idea that the Asians and Indians were happy with Macedonian rule with a common Greek proverb generally attributed to Themistocles: ἀπωλόμεθα ὁν εἰ μὴ ἀπωλόμεθα (“we would be destroyed if we had not already been destroyed,” Thuc. 1.138, Polyb. 39.11). Plutarch quotes it three different times in the Moralia (185F, 328F, 602A) and once in the Lives (Them. 29.7). Here, it is used as evidence that Alexander’s conquests produced positive results whether the inhabitants of the various lands thought so or not.

οὐκ ὁν εἶχον Ἀλεξάνδρειαν Αἴγυπτος: Alexander’s cities in Plutarch’s list are not placed in chronological order. A paradoxical encomium, however, is not history in which the purpose was to narrate events and present facts with some objectivity (Burgess, “Epideictic Literature,” 116; cf. pp. 62-66). Rather, it offers information with a singular goal in mind. In this case, the goal is the presentation of Alexander as a philosopher, evidence of which is his city foundations. Those poleis span from Alexandria in Egypt to
Bucephalia and Nicaea in India to show the geographical extent of Alexander’s Hellenizing in the east. By doing so, Alexander’s cosmopolitan policy supersedes the goals of other philosophers in scope.

By far the most famous of Alexander’s foundations was Alexandria-in-Egypt in 331. After the king’s death, thanks to the policies of Ptolemy I and Ptolemy II, it became the center of the intellectual world containing the famous library that drew philosophers, poets, and historians from around the Mediterranean to study. There are two traditions regarding when it was founded. Diodorus 17.52.1-6, Curtius 4.8.1-6, and Justin 11.11.13 place this after Alexander’s journey to the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah (cf. Tarn, Alexander 1, 41, Lane Fox, Alexander, 198-199, Hammond, Genius, 100-102). Arrian 3.1.5-2.2 and Plutarch Alex. 26.2-3 date it prior to that visit (Green, Alexander, 271-276, Bosworth, CE, 72-74, and Worthington, Alexander, 86-90, who suggest that Alexander plotted the location of the new city before leaving for Siwah, but officially founded it on April 7 on his return from Siwah, thus reconciling both source traditions).

οὐδὲ Μεσοποταμία Σελεύκιαν: The foundation of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris is reported in Appian’s Syrian Wars (9.58). Seleucus chose it as the capital for the eastern half of the Seleucid Empire to overshadow Babylon. It was situated at the point where the two great rivers of Mesopotamia, the Tigris and Euphrates, come within 25 miles of one another (E.R. Bevan, House of Seleucus (New York, 1966), 153-155), and was a populous city (Plin. HN 6.122). This is the only Hellenistic foundation that Plutarch notes here showing that he got his facts wrong by including it in a list of Alexander’s cities (see pp. 42-44). However, he may have intentionally included the city to illustrate that Alexander’s successors continued his policy of founding cities for administrative and
military reasons. In this regard, Alexander as a teacher of philosophy is no different than Carneades and Zeno, who are mentioned at 328D, since his successors are his students who were “successful” in civilizing the east. They are contrasted with the pupils of Socrates and Plato (DFAM 1, 328B-C), who turned away from their teachers’ philosophy (άλλη πη παρετράψησαν).

οὐδὲ Προφθασίαν Σογδιανῆ: Justin 12.5.13 mentions that Alexander founded twelve cities in Bactria and Sogdiana, though he does not mention them by name. Tarn, Greeks in Bactria and India, 14, suggests that Prophthasia was originally called Alexandria and nicknamed Prophthasia after the Philotas affair (cf. Fraser, Cities, 129-130). The second century AD geographer, Claudius Ptolemy, however, placed Prophthasia in Seistan and an Alexandria on the Oxus in Sogdiana (6.12.6; cf. Tarn, Greeks in Bactria and India, 234-235). Tarn’s Prophthasia, preserved by its original name of Alexandria, can be found in the Chinese historian Pan-ku as O-ik-san-li (text recorded in A.F.P. Hulsewe, and M.A.N. Loewe, China in Central Asia (Leiden, 1979), 112). Fraser refuses to accept Tarn’s assessment based on the Chinese text alone (Cities, 126 n. 43). Nevertheless, Fraser hesitates to suggest that this was an Alexander foundation, but rather an “old Achaemenian capital of Drangiana” (Cities, 130). Still, the problem with this location is that Prophthasia was located on the route between Aria and Drangiana, not in Sogdiana as Plutarch asserts (Strabo 11.8.9; cf. Fraser, Cities, 123, Bosworth, Arrian 1, 358-9). The geographical error may have been confusion on Plutarch’s part. Perhaps he confused Prophthasia with Alexandria Oxiana in Sogdiana like Claudius Ptolemy may have done (6.12.6).
Tarn, *Alexander* 2, 258-259, suggested emending the text to include Drangiana to correct Plutarch’s geographic error. However, if the text is left as is, then a form of rhetorical chiasmus becomes apparent (A-B-B-A) with the *poleis* sandwiching the region in which they are found (Alexandria-Egypt-Mesopotamia-Seleucia) and are connected by polysyndeton in the form of negatives (οὐδὲ). The chiasmus can be extended to include Prophthasia and Bucephalia: Prophthasia-Sogdiana-India-Bucephalia. The construction as a whole reveals Plutarch’s rhetorical finesse and indicates that this was a performance piece (or a reading) intended to reveal the author’s skill; cf. pp. 67-73.

οὐδὲ Ἰνδία Βουκεφαλία: Bucephal(i)a, generally spelled Bucephala, was founded in the early summer of 326 to honor Alexander’s horse, Bucephalas, which had died from wounds suffered at the Hydaspes (Onesicritus, *FGH* 134 F 20 = Plut. *Alex.* 61, Diod. 17.89.6, Strabo 15.1.29, Curt. 9.1.6, Arr. 5.19.4, 29.4). Bucephala was founded on the banks of the Hydaspes River (modern Jhelum), and it became the capital of the Greek kingdom of Hippostratus in the mid-first century BC. Plutarch’s inclusion of Bucephala is interesting in that it was not necessarily an economic or cultural center in the Hellenistic world. There are three possible reasons for its inclusion. One, Plutarch is attempting to highlight Alexander’s humanity in honoring his valiant steed. Two, Plutarch was simply unaware of another significant Indian city with which Alexander could be connected. Third, Plutarch wanted to show the furthest point of Alexander’s Hellenizing of the east. For the location of the two cities (Nicaea and Bucephala), see further Tarn, *Alexander* 2, 236-237, Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 311-312, and Fraser, *Cities*, 161-162.
Alexandria in the Caucasus was founded in the winter/spring of 329 in the Hindu Kush and settled with 7,000 older Macedonian soldiers and a substantial native population (Diod. 17.83.1, Curt. 7.3.23, Arr. 3.28.4, 4.22.4, 5.1.5). It was of strategic importance as it was the crossroads for the entry into India, Bactria, Arachosia: Tarn, *Greeks in Bactria and India*, 460-462 and F. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria* (Leiden, 1988), 20-28.

329 A

Plutarch presents the foundation of cities by Alexander as another paradox to illustrate the contradiction that philosophy is a solely theoretical pursuit. The king’s foundations are the practical expression, or tangible results, of his personal philosophy. Yet, many of his subjects did not accept his rule (see the commentary on 328E). Plutarch’s conclusion that Alexander successfully Hellenized the east, then, is faulty.

This syllogism concludes Plutarch’s argument that Alexander should be considered a philosopher. Henceforth, he works from the stance that Alexander is a philosopher and attempts to discern Alexander’s philosophical leanings. In effect, Plutarch has proven his point that Philosophy had a hand in making Alexander a philosopher and that it forever impacted his empire. However, as far as historical accuracy is concerned, Alexander was hardly successful in civilizing the barbarians of Asia (see the commentary on 328E), which contributes to the paradox.
Overview: Plutarch elaborates on the civilizing nature of Alexander which he mentioned in the previous section by discussing Zeno’s Republic. Like the discussion of philosophical teachings, he expounds on the theoretical versus practical application of philosophy. Ultimately, Plutarch insinuates that the practical application makes one a better philosopher which is seen in his treatment of foreign people. This section has arguably done more for Alexander scholarship than any other because of its emphasis on Alexander’s cosmopolitanism.

329 A

Καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ ... Ζήνωνος: While still a student of Crates the Cynic, Zeno wrote his Republic in reply to that of Plato (Plut. Mor. 1034E, Diog. Laert. 7.4). Like Plato’s work, it was a design for a utopian community (Plut. Lyc. 31). However, while Plato’s Republic was a formula for a society of the good and just, that of Zeno focused on the role of the wise man (σοφιστής) in the community. For purposes of the DFAM, Plutarch is equating Alexander with Zeno’s wise men.

For both Plato and Aristotle, the philosopher-ruler gains his wisdom from the polis itself. But Alexander, for Plutarch, is larger than the polis. He is like Zeno, κοσμοπολίτης, owing his allegiance to the universe (Diog. Laert. 6.63). Interestingly, this idea of κοσμοπολίτης is more a Cynic ideal than Stoic illustrating Zeno’s influence by the Cynic school in his youth. For more on Zeno’s Republic and the source material, see H.C. Baldry, “Zeno’s Ideal State,” JHS 79 (1959), 3-14 and J. Sellars, Stoicism (Berkeley, 2006), 129-130.

ίνα μὴ κατὰ ... κοινὸς συντερεφομένης: Most of our knowledge concerning Zeno’s political philosophy is derived from this important passage. Zeno recognized that the current state of affairs in his time was pointless (Diog. Laert. 7.32-34). In his Republic,
discussed above, Zeno attempts to create a society where the citizens live together in peace and harmony and are bonded together by philosophic wisdom (Baldry, “Zeno’s Ideal State,” 14). It is a blueprint for changing the way men live to “suit the life of wisdom” (Baldry, “Zeno’s Ideal State,” 14). As Baldry points out, Zeno’s ideas are often confused with the idea of the “brotherhood of man” and its presentation of men of all races living in one community under common law (“Zeno’s Ideal State,” 14-15). Zeno is proposing a community pertinent only to the wise not an empire with a variety of different peoples, like that of Alexander.

τοῦτο Ζήνων ... τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν: Plutarch specifically continues the contrast of λόγος versus ἔργον. Zeno dreams (ὄναρ) while Alexander puts his ideas into action (ἔργον). In other words, Zeno can be credited with theorizing about cosmopolitanism, but Alexander took his theories and used them in his dealing with his subjects. It is a line of thought similar to that expressed at 328E in which Plutarch states that few people read Plato’s Laws but many used Alexander’s actual laws. For further discussion of the beliefs of Zeno and the Stoics, see D. Sedley, “The School, From Zeno to Arius Didymus,” in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (2003), 9-13 and Sellars, Stoicism, 129-135.

οὗ γάρ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ... προσφερόμενος: Tarn takes it for granted that the advice originated with Aristotle (Alexander 2, 439). It is nowhere else attributed to him. Strabo 1.4.9 records that similar sentiments were expressed to Alexander, but does not credit them to Aristotle. Strabo prefers the position of Eratosthenes of Cyrene who took a more cosmopolitan approach in his differentiation of man according to virtue and vice rather than Greek and barbarian.
The inferior status of barbarians was, however, a common idea in Greek thought particularly after the Persian Wars (H.C. Baldry, *Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, 1965), 22). Aeschylus’ *Persians*, for instance, established Greek and barbarian as an antithesis which grew out of the “response to the increasing threat posed to the Greek-speaking world by the immense Persian empire” (E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian* (Oxford, 1989), 57). Herodotus too differentiated Greek from barbarian but his account lacks the pejorative sense that is sometimes attributed to it (Hall, *Hellenicity*, 181-182). One can see in Xenophon, however, that attitudes toward barbarian customs had become negative (*Anab*. 3.2.25; cf. J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London, 1995), 62). However, even Xenophon suggests that barbarians can be redeemed through hellenization, that is, through adoption of Greek ways as seen in Cyrus’ adoption of hoplite warfare (*Cyr*. 2.1.7-9) and Greek education (1.2.6-8; cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* 3 (Oxford, 1944), 160 and Hall, *Hellenicity*, 210-211). Aristotle wrote that barbarians are more servile in nature (*Pol*. 3.1285a16-20; cf. 1252a34, 1327b23-24), but his assessment seems to derive from the fact that, in the Greek world, most slaves were foreign connoting a geographic differentiation rather than a moral position (Hall, *Hellenicity*, 217-219). Nonetheless, ancient political writers took the accepted status of the barbarian in their world to justify violence toward them. Take, for instance, Plato who states that it is “just” to wage war on barbarians (*Rep*. 470c-471a), and Isocrates who declares that barbarians were the Greeks’ natural enemies (4.184, 12.163). Consequently, Greeks should declare war (4.3).

Plutarch more than likely paraphrased his source, possibly Eratosthenes, and put words into the only logical teacher Alexander would have had on the subject. The point,
however, is that Alexander did not follow Aristotle’s advice and, according to Hall, Plutarch exposes the Macedonian king as the “paradigm of *paideia* — the now uncontested vehicle for the transmission of Hellenicity to all those who could afford a Hellenic education” (*Hellenicity*, 221; cf. S. Humbert, “Plutarque, Alexandre et l’Hellenisme,” in S. Said (ed.), *ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ. Quelques jalons pour une histoire de l’identité grecque* (Leiden, 1991), 169-182).


φίλων καὶ ... φυτοῖς προσφερόμενος: This passage is reminiscent of Plato’s *Republic* 470c2-471b, where the differences in the actions of Greeks and barbarians, and then citizens in his ideal society, are discussed. Both Plutarch and Plato use a form of οἰκείος. Instead of using Plato’s συγγενής (“relative” or “kinsman”), Plutarch uses φίλος. The variance could be indicative of Plutarch’s young age at the time he wrote the *DFAM* and also reveals his knowledge of Plato’s works. It is also worth noting here that Aristotle developed a philosophy on friendship even stating that it is a virtue, or from a virtue, necessary for life (*Eth.* 8.1.1155a3-5). By connecting Alexander and the Greeks with friendship, Plutarch is elaborating on a virtue seemingly irrelevant to his thesis. For more on Aristotle’s ideas on friendship, see P. Schollmeier, *Other Selves* (Albany, 1994) and L.S. Prangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge, 2004).
However, when one looks at how Alexander actually treated the Greeks, one wonders if Plutarch is actually criticizing him. Take, for instance, the destruction of Thebes in 335. I. Worthington, “Alexander’s Destruction of Thebes,” in W. Heckel and L. Tritle (eds.), Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander (Claremont, 2003), 65-86, argues that the motivation behind Thebes’ destruction was probably its support for Amyntas as a claimant to the Macedonian throne. Diodorus is quite clear in stating that Alexander wanted to prove a point: opposition would be met with force (17.9.4; cf. Plut. Alex. 11.5-6, Bosworth, CE, 196-197). Also, the Exiles Decree in 324 was sure to evoke some negative feelings from the Greeks since it might have coincided with a demand for Alexander’s deification (Din. 1.94); cf. I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus (Ann Arbor, 1992), 262-264. Diodorus refers to this decree as a cause of the Lamian War (18.8.2-7). Curtius 10.2.7 states that the Athenians actually barred the exiles from entering the city. Bosworth points out that the decree violated a tenet of the League of Corinth as well as directly striking at Greek autonomy (CE, 220). However, Worthington has argued that, even with the Harpalus situation and the demand for the return of their exiles, the Greeks were willing to resort to diplomacy before revolt since life under Macedonian rule was “not so harsh”: I. Worthington, ”The Harpalus Affair and the Greek Response to Macedonian Hegemony,” in I. Worthington (ed.), Ventures into Greek History (Oxford, 1994), 330.

Alexander’s relationship with the islands of the Aegean was volatile. Chios, for instance, revolted in 333 and, through betrayal, sided with Persia. A year later, the Persian garrison was defeated and Alexander regained control instituting a democratic constitution, a new code of laws, and exiled those responsible for the revolt (Diod.

Πολέμου πολλῶν ... τῆν ἡγεμονίαν: Plutarch insinuates that Alexander’s refusal to follow Aristotle’s apparent advice was due to his foresight. The king recognized beforehand the problems that would arise with such a policy of prejudice. In this, Alexander had surpassed his own philosophical teacher.

329 C

ἄλλα κοινῶς ... ὅλων νομίζων: In light of the immense scholarship surrounding the divinity of Alexander, a moment must be taken here to examine Plutarch’s contribution to the discussion. Plutarch spends time in the *Alexander* discussing Alexander’s parentage and whether he was divine (2.3-4, 3.1-2, 27.5-28.2). It is intriguing that in his *Alexander*, Plutarch mentions that Alexander acted pompously toward the barbarians of Egypt (28.1) after hearing that he was the son of Zeus Ammon from the oracle at Siwah in 331. From then on, Alexander flaunted his new divine parentage (Diod. 17.51, Curt. 4.7.25, Just.
11.11.2-12, Plut. *Alex.* 27.8-10). In other instances, where ancient authors heighten the debate over the issue, like *proskynesis* (Curt. 8.5.5-21, Arr. 4.10.5-12.5, Just. 12.7.1-3, Plut.* Alex.* 54.3-6) or the recognition of Alexander as Dionysus at Nysa (Diod. 17.85.1-103.8, Curt. 8.9.1-9.8.30, Arr. 4.22.3-6.22, Just. 12.7.4-8.17, Plut.* Alex.* 58.4-62.4), Plutarch is silent revealing nothing of divinity even though there was an opportunity to do so. In this passage, we have a clear statement revealing Plutarch’s stand on the issue: ἀιαθνηλ οὗθελ ζεόζελ ἄξκνζη ἤθο ῶθηηλ ζεόζελ (―but he believed that he was sent from the gods as a governor and mediator for all‖). Nothing is mentioned of his parentage, such as in the *Alexander* (2.2-4), but we would not expect it to be. On the surface, it does not suit Plutarch’s purpose to see Alexander as anything other than a mortal man faced with extraordinary circumstances. Had Plutarch insinuated such, his point would be moot. What would be the reason behind arguing that Alexander was a philosopher if he was a god?

However, there is another distinction to be made, one which can easily be glossed over if one is not paying attention. Plutarch uses νομίζων with the infinitive ἤκειν indicating that Alexander thought he was sent from the gods. It is not a statement of fact, but rather a statement of belief. It does not detract from Plutarch’s overall argument because he is not saying that Alexander thought he was divine, and as a divinity, should be worshipped. Rather, it can be seen as an underhanded comment directed at Alexander’s growing megalomania. For more on the issue of Alexander’s divinity, see Tarn, *Alexander* 2, 347-373, L. Edmunds, “The Religiosity of Alexander,” *GRBS* (1971), 363-391, Lane Fox, *Alexander*, 210-218, Green, *Alexander*, 272-277, Bosworth, *CE* (1988), 278-290 and “Alexander, Euripides, and Dionysus: The Motivation for

ἀιθρὸν ἐθνῆς... W.W. Tarn, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* (1933), 123-166, saw in these lines a dream of unity for Alexander’s empire. His Alexander was a dreamer; a man who saw a unification of the races in his empire (Tarn, *Alexander 2*, 400; cf. F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* (Vienna, 1973), 490). Tarn seeks to prove that the concept of the “unity of mankind” originated with Alexander as a stark departure from the ideas of his own teacher Aristotle (cf. *DFAM* 1, 329B). A community of shared ancestry, shared customs, and shared equality is the ideal concept that Tarn believed Alexander was working toward (*Alexander*, 2, 400; cf. Tarn, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” 123-166). In keeping with these three aspects, Tarn places emphasis on the term *homonoia*, as the orator Isocrates (4.3) conveyed to Alexander’s father Philip and others (“Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” 126 and *Alexander* 2, 402-404). It was an idea that was prevalent before Alexander, and especially after his death in 323. However, the problem in this instance is that Plutarch does not use the term in the passages Tarn cites (here, at 329C and 330D). The absence of the word does not mean that Plutarch was unaware of it, but it is striking that he failed
to use such a catchword in a rhetorical exercise, if that was the image/concept he was trying to convey in the first place.

E. Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” *Historia* 7 (1958), 425-444, has subsequently fleshed out some of the errors in Tarn’s methodology. According to Badian, “Unity of Mankind,” 427, Tarn over-emphasized a passage in Plutarch’s life of Alexander (27.6) in which an Egyptian philosopher, Psammon, said that “God was the common father (κοινὸν ἄνθρωπων πατέρα) of all men.” Put in context, Alexander had just been told he was the son of Zeus Ammon at Siwah. Badian also debunks, upon closer inspection of the language of Arrian’s text (7.2.8-9), the idea of shared customs which Tarn associates with Alexander at the prayer for concord following the mutiny at Opis. Furthermore, Tarn misunderstands the seating arrangements at the banquet (Badian, “Unity of Mankind,” 429; cf. Bosworth, *CE*, 156-157). The language Arrian used is explicit: ὃμω’ ἄτον μὲν Μακεδόνων, “around him Macedonians.” A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” *JHS* 100 (1980), 2, argues that Alexander was playing on the Macedonian fear and resentment of the Persians around Alexander to destroy the mutiny. Therefore, the speech had a practical purpose to quell the anger of Alexander’s men rather than to unite the Macedonians and Persians. The final concept, a shared part in the commonwealth, is for Badian a case of semantics (“Unity of Mankind,” 431). Alexander was the ruler of his empire, and no one else ever shared in that position. No matter how the words are manipulated, that fact is still evident and uncontestable. C. Thomas, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” *CJ* 63 (1968), 258-260, has argued that while Tarn’s argument is flawed and Badian’s opposition valid, there is still merit in the idea that there was some sort of idea of a “brotherhood of man” that
originated with Alexander. For her, it is possible that Alexander never had the chance to put his views into practice or to see to it that his programs stayed viable. What, in fact, matters is that thinkers and rulers of the Hellenistic period perceived that the idea originated with Alexander the Great (Thomas, “Unity,” 260).

To compound the problem, Tarn sees a difference between his “unity of mankind” concept and that which H. Berve, “Die Verschmelzungspolitik Alexanders des Grossen,” Klio 31 (1938), 135-168, defined as Verschmelzungspolitik or “policy of fusion.” Tarn’s idea was “a dream, an aspiration, an inspiration” that had yet to take practical shape whereas Berve’s “policy of fusion” had its practical aspects; i.e. the integration of Iranians into army, the mass marriage at Susa and the prayer for peace after the mutiny at Opis. Most scholars fail to see this distinction and do not agree with Tarn’s position at all, stating rather that Alexander’s actions were pragmatic, a means to an end, and that this did not indicate a desire to unite the races in “one loving cup”: Lane Fox, Alexander, 427-429, Green, Alexander, 446, Bosworth, CE, 156-157, and Worthington, Alexander, 180-184; cf. Hammond, KCS, 269.

A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” JHS 100 (1980), 1-21, elaborated on these ideas and their relation to the rhetoric of the period in which Plutarch was writing. He argued for a topos of fusion which existed in the early empire (Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” 4). In his systematic analysis of the evidence, Bosworth rightly concludes that “there is little that can be said to approximate careful premeditated policy” (“Alexander and the Iranians,” 20). On the DFAM and the “unity of mankind” theory, see pp. 44-48.
This passage has raised serious concerns about not only Alexander’s ideas but also Plutarch’s own sources. Tarn, for instance, concluded that it is proof that the loving cup mentioned by Eratosthenes, recorded in Strabo (1.4.9), did in fact exist (Alexander 2, 440). The extent to which Plutarch used Eratosthenes’ work for this discourse has generated debate. Tarn believes that Plutarch was quoting Eratosthenes (Alexander 2, 438-444) while Badian believes he was simply paraphrasing (“Unity of Mankind,” 432-440).

Furthermore, according to W.W. Tarn, “Alexander, Cynics, and Stoics,” AJPh 60 (1939), 66, this loving cup is the one that was used at the banquet at Opis. Badian, “Unity of Mankind,” 438, has denied Tarn’s position, though he does agree that the cup is more than likely the same ceremonial cup used by Darius and other Persian kings. He insists that the cup is the one used at the mass marriages at Susa, not at the Opis banquet (“Unity of Mankind,” 439), but Badian’s argument is flawed. He reminds us that Plutarch is speaking of Alexander as a unifier of races (the policy of fusion). Furthermore, the policy of fusion “found its chief expression in the Susa marriages” (Badian, “Unity of Mankind,” 438), where everyone shared in the libations from one cup. Badian maintains that at Opis only those Macedonians around him (Arr. 7.2.8-9: ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν) partook of the libations from the cup with Alexander himself thereby removing the aspect of fusion. As has been mentioned above, Opis was a pragmatic display of solidarity meant to quell the anger of the mob after the mutiny (cf. pp. 47-48).

The same could be said of the mass marriages at Susa in 324 in which Alexander and ninety of his men took Persian wives. Of the 91 wedding ceremonies mentioned in the sources, all of them joined Macedonian/Greek men to Persian women (Diod.
None of the sources indicated Macedonian or Greek women being brought over to marry Persian men as one would expect for a fusion policy, and Worthington has argued that “Alexander could not afford Asian noblewomen to marry their own races, and so provide the potential for revolt” (Alexander, 180; cf. Bosworth, CE, 156). Alexander was acting to avoid conflict whether it was a real threat, like at Opis, or a perceived one, as indicated at Susa.

τὸ δ’ Ἑλληνικὸν ... κάνδυι διορίζειν: The *chlamys* was a short cloak that formed the outer-wear for most Greeks. Generally, it was made of wool and could be in a variety of colors and designs. It was the clothing of hunters and soldiers because of its adaptability to riding horseback. Also, it appears to have originated in Macedonia and Thessaly: Poll. *Onom.* 7.46; cf. D.M. Johnson, *Ancient Greek Dress* (Chicago, 1964), 53-54. For further discussion of the *chlamys*, see F.B. Tarbell, “The Form of the Chlamys,” *CPH* 1 (1906), 283-289.

W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* 2 (Oxford, 1912), 157, suggest that the *peltê*, a small wooden shield covered with leather, makes its first appearance in literature in Herodotus (7.75). The *peltê* was a common piece in Thracian military armor (Thuc. 2.29.5, 7.27.1; cf. R.W. Macan, *Herodotus* 2 (New York, 1973), 100). J.R. Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire* (Jefferson, 1998), 44-45, mentions that there were peltasts in the Macedonian army which specifically carried the *peltê*, were armed with throwing javelins and a sword and were mostly from the lower classes. These units differed from the hoplites in the phalanx who carried a large shield, a sword, and a spear (Ashley, *Macedonian Empire*, 40-41). The hypaspists, members of the nobility, were
also known to have carried the smaller shield depending on whether they were serving along side the heavy infantry or the peltasts.

It is interesting that the Persian items Plutarch mentions here are not the ones adopted by Alexander as Plutarch specifically mentions later (329F-330A). Plutarch mentions both the *akinakês* and the *kandus*, two items associated on occasion with the Great King of Persia. The *akinakês* is often translated as scimitar, but this translation would be inaccurate (Macan, *Herodotus* 2, 76). It would be better translated as a short, straight sword. How and Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus*, 149, have discerned that this weapon was approximately a foot in length and used for thrusting, rather than cutting. Curtius mentions that Darius III had the shape of the weapon changed to the shape of the Greek sword, which was straight (3.3.6). A reproduction of the *akinakês* can be seen in H. Herzfeld, *Iran in the Ancient East* (Oxford, 1941), fig. 368 with commentary on p. 266.

The *kandus* was a cloak with long, wide sleeves and was made of wool (Plut. *Alex.* 45.2; cf. Hamilton, *Alexander*, 121). It was a sign of power along with the bow and the shield, and it could be a variety of colors, but most often was purple (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.3.10, 13, Ephippus, *FGrH* 126 F5 = Athen. 12.537E, Diod. 17.77.5, Curt. 3.3.17) Briant, *Cyrus*, 187, connects the purple *kandus* with the royal robe worn by the Median and Persian kings. According to Plutarch, Alexander rejected the *kandus* for a more mixed dress because he did not like it referred to it as ἔξαλλα ("bizarre") and τραγικὰ ("in tragic style," *DFAM* 1, 329F-330A; cf. Diod. 17.77.5, Plut. *Alex.* 45.2).

It is interesting that Plutarch does not mention any headgear in this passage. Arrian records that Alexander wore the Persian tiara, a conical headdress worn upright

329 D

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ... τεκμαίρεσθαι: Plutarch reveals a tradition of Hellenic ethnocentrism that dates back to at least the eighth century. Prior to the Persian Wars, however, the discussion was limited to ethnic identity or rather their ethnic differences from the Greeks. Homer and Herodotus both write in these terms (Hom. Od. 9.175-6, Hdt. 2.158). Criticism of barbarian morality was a by-product of the polarization of Greek and non-Greek after the Persian Wars — “the conceptualization of the conflict with Persia as a struggle of united and disciplined Greeks against alien violence was one impetus behind the invention of the barbarian”: E. Hall, Inventing the Barbarian (Oxford, 1989), 58. Plato’s Republic lists the fundamental Hellenic virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (4.427e1-11). It also discusses the vices of ignorance, cowardice,
licentiousness, and lawlessness (Rep. 4.44b7-8). Each of these vices is the polar opposite of Plato’s listed Greek virtues, and they are the attributes which barbarians in Greek literature often possess. Common stereotypes of barbarians in the literature of antiquity tend to be limited to language, behavior, and customs (Hall, Inventing the Barbarian, 101-159). Plutarch’s mention of Plato and Socrates being fortunate enough to teach those who speak the same tongue (DFAM 1, 328B) takes on a new light when understood in the context of Greek ethnocentricism. Plutarch was well aware of Plato’s Hellenic virtues and vices. What does it mean, then, if Alexander is seen cavorting with those who do not speak Greek? Plutarch is again taking a moment to slide a veiled criticism of Alexander into his work. The world that Plutarch was attempting to create here for Alexander is not a brotherhood of man, as was argued by Tarn (see above pp. 44-48), but one in which the iniquitous, those who are classified still as barbarians (βαξβαξηθολακη), inhabit, and the common Greek ethnocentric ideals prevail. Plutarch has not effectively created a world where differences between individuals are non-existent. He also may be insinuating that Alexander is not Greek precisely because he blurs those lines between Greek and non-Greek by instituting shared customs and clothing.


κοινώς δ’ ἐστήτας ... ἀνακεραυνημένους: The mention of clothing is leading up to Plutarch’s discussion of Alexander’s orientalizing dress (329F-330B). Also, Plutarch is directly referencing the mass marriages at Susa (Diod. 17.107.6, Curt. 10.3.11-12, Arr. 7.4.4-8, Just. 12.10.9-10, Plut. Alex. 70.2-3, Ath. 538b-539a, Ael. VH, 8.7), which he will discuss in detail later (DFAM 1, 329E). He also intimates the reason for the marriages with mention of blood and children. If there was a common blood bond between the Greco-Macedonian and Persian races, the likelihood of revolt is diminished (Bosworth, CE, 156, Worthington, Alexander, 180). However, W. Heckel and J. Yardley, Alexander the Great: Historical Sources in Translation (Oxford, 2004), 175, have pointed out that these actions were “a betrayal and sign of instability” on Alexander’s part in that he appears to sacrifice his own beliefs and customs at the same time that he seems to reveal a lack of confidence in his ability to rule.
Overview: Plutarch states that he would rather have seen the mass wedding ceremony at Susa than to have seen the moment that Alexander sat on the Persian throne since the spectacle was the act of a wise king rather than the work of Fortune. He, then, mentions that the reason behind the marriages was to unite Persians, Greeks, and Macedonians.

329 D

Δημάρατος μὲν...καὶ φίλων: Demaratus was born around 400 in Corinth. He was prominent enough among the pro-Macedonian faction in Corinth to be considered a traitor by Demosthenes (18.295); cf. J. Cargill, “Demosthenes, Aischines, and the Crop of Traitors,” AncW 11 (1985), 75-85. Plutarch’s depiction of the relationship of Demaratus and Philip gives a false impression since there is little to indicate that he was in Philip’s inner circle of friends. Diodorus states that it was Demaratus who brought Bucephalas to Macedonia (17.76.6). Plutarch, however, disagrees and states that it was Philonicus of Thessaly (Alex. 6.1). Hamilton, Alexander, 15, stresses the fame of Thessalian horses as reason to believe Plutarch on this matter (cf. A.R. Anderson, “Bucephalus and his Legend,” AJPh 50 (1930), 1-21 and Bosworth, Arrian 2 (1995), 314), and also suggests that Philonicus was the middle-man in the transaction; Demaratus paid Philonicus the price of the horse which was given as a gift to Philip. According to Plutarch, Alexander 9.6, Demaratus was able to advise Philip to reconcile with his son in 337/6 after Alexander had fled to Illyria following a quarrel (cf. Mor. 70B-C, 179C). Heckel, Who’s Who, 107, insists that Demaratus was “almost certainly present” at the murder of Philip in 336. He apparently transferred his loyalty to Alexander upon his accession to throne
since Arrian 1.15.6 indicates that he went on the Asian campaigns (cf. Hamilton, *Alexander*, 157). He died of old age prior to the Indian campaigns and was given an honorary funeral procession (Plut. *Alex.* 56.1). It is certainly possible that Demaratus achieved *proxenos* (representative of the Macedonian state) status (hence the *εἷς ὁν τῶν Φιλίππου ξένων καὶ φίλων,* “one of Philip’s foreigners and friends”) for his services like Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas (*IG* 7.3055, 7.4251), and Amyntas, son of Antiochus (*IG* 7.4250). For more on Demaratus, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 253 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 107.

*ὅτ’ Ἀλέξανδρον ... θρόνον καθεξόμενον:* When telling this anecdote, Plutarch uses μεγάλης ἡδονῆς at *Alexander* 37.4, 56.1 and *Agesilaus* 15.3. In all three instances, the phrase indicates the great pleasure Greeks derived from seeing Alexander upon Darius’ throne. However, here an entirely different word, χαρᾶς (from ἡ χαρά), is used, a term more commonly used in poetry (e.g. Sappho, *Supp.* 1.6, Aesch. *Ag.* 270, Soph. *Elec.* 934, *Trach.* 179, 201, Eur. *Alc.* 579, 1125, Ar. *Wealth* 637) unlike ἡδονῆ, which is more often found in prose authors (e.g. Hdt. 2.137, 3.126, 7.101, Thuc. 1.99, 2.37, 2.65, Pl. *Rep.* 328d, 389e, Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.22, 6.1.4, Dem. 18.4, 138). Plutarch is showing his rhetorical skill by varying his vocabulary (see pp. 106-122 on Plutarch’s style).

Another interesting variation is that in this work and the two instances in the *Alexander* the overall phrasing is similar: “those having died before” (τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν τεθνηκότας). However, in the *Agesilaus*, Plutarch simply states “those that have not seen” (τοὺς μὴ θεασαμένους, 15.3), which suggests a more general population (living and dead) of those deprived of seeing the event while the *Alexander* only specifies those Greeks that had died prior to Alexander taking the Persian throne.
Also, Demaratus, who made the statement paraphrased here by Plutarch, saw Alexander take the Persian throne at Susa. Curtius 5.2.13 records an incident in Susa when Alexander sat on Darius’ throne. The king’s legs did not touch the ground because the seat was too high. One of the royal pages placed Darius’ dinner table under Alexander’s feet, which distressed a Persian eunuch who thought that the action was disrespectful (Diod. 17.66.3-4, Curt. 5.2.14). Alexander, ashamed, ordered the table removed but Philotas encouraged him to see the situation as an omen from the gods that the end of the Persian Empire had come (Diod. 17.66.7, Curt. 5.2.15).

ἐγὼ δ’ οὐδὲ ... ἐπέρων βασιλέων: Plutarch rarely interjects his personal opinion so forthrightly as he does here. Interestingly, in the Agesilaus (15.3), he states that he does not envy those who have not seen Alexander on Darius’ throne because his success was a result of the Greek battlefields at Leuctra, Coroneia, Corinth, and in Arcadia which killed great Greek generals. In other words, Alexander and the Macedonians would not have been able to conquer the Persians if the Greeks had not already paved the way with their own victories which killed great generals. Here, Plutarch dismisses Alexander’s accomplishment by simply saying that Fortune caused the demise of Darius and other kings (κοινὸν ἑπέρων βασιλέων). After all, it was Satibarzanes and Barsaentes who assassinated Darius at Hecatompylus, not Alexander (Arr. 3.21.10). In other words, the natural course of things sees the end of one king and the rise of another.

This passage and one at 332C are the only two occasions in DFAM 1 in which Plutarch inserts an oath (μὰ Δία, μὰ τοῦ θεοῦ), and it is used so that he can interject his view into the text and add force to the idea being presented. The oath is prevalent in epic poetry (J. Fontenrose, “The Gods Invoked in Epic Oaths: Aeneid, XII, 175-125,” AJPh 89
(1968), 20-38) and in Aristophanic comedy (M. Dillon, “By Gods, Tongues, and Dogs: The Use of Oaths in Aristophanic Comedy,” G&R² 42 (1995), 135-151). Aristotle argued that persuasion is achieved through the display of the speaker’s character or through an appeal to the audience’s emotions (Rhet. 1356a), both of which can be accomplished through the invocation of the gods such as for example in Demosthenes’ On the False Embassy 299 when he reminds his audience that they were urged by Zeus (through an oracle, 297) to ensure that Philip would not be victorious; cf. D.B. King, “The Appeal to Religion in Greek Rhetoric,” CJ 50 (1955), 363-376. It is not unusual for the gods to be invoked in epideictic oratory (Aristid. Or. 50.69, 50.14-18, Lucian, Meta. 11.28.6, 11.30.2); cf. G. Anderson, The Second Sophistic (London, 1993), 200-203. However, the appeal to the gods used here by Plutarch is much more reminiscent of the sort of rhetoric used by Homer (Il. 1.234, 1.86, 23.43) and the playwrights (e.g. Soph. Antig. 758, Elec. 626, 881, Eur. Medea 1059, Ar. Frogs 174, 779, 951) suggesting that its usage was a display of Plutarch’s rhetorical skill, probably during his training under a rhêtôr (see Introduction VI).

Plutarch has been building Alexander up as a great philosopher and civilizer of men. Now, he almost appears to be degrading the military side of Alexander, the side of Alexander that would best be labeled “the conqueror.” On a side note, Fortune is quietly brought into the picture. The last mention of Fortune in this work was at 327E when he mentioned Fortune’s aid in the treasury.

ἀλλ' ἐκείνης ... καὶ Ἑλληνας: Plutarch refers to the mass marriages at Susa in 324 during which ninety-one Persian noblewomen were joined with Macedonian noblemen and Alexander himself took two brides, Stateira and Parysatis (Diod. 17.107.6, Arr. 7.4, 256
Curt. 10.3.11-12, Just. 12.10.10, Plut. Alex. 70.2-3, Ael. VH 8.7). Athenaeus, citing Chares, is the only author to give any detail to the surroundings of the event (538B-E = Chares, FGrH 125 F 4). He mentions a structure held upright by thirty gilded and silvered columns with encrusted jewels. There were also rich curtains with animal prints in gold. Nothing, however, is mentioned of a golden canopy, but there was certainly a great deal of extravagance. E.D. Carney, “Alexander and Persian Women,” AJPh 117 (1996), 578, states that the elaborate nature of these weddings is indicative of Alexander’s desire to “impress and convince” those around him as well as those he conquered. The marriages, she argues, were crucial to his seizure of control and to the way he wanted his power understood. Furthermore, A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” 100 (1980), 217, suggests that this passage and one in Curtius (10.3.11-14) reflect first century AD rhetorical topoi rather than an understanding of ideas and policies contemporary with Alexander. For more on the mass marriages at Susa, see Introduction III and the commentary on 329C.

Plutarch is the only author to give 100 as the number of couples. Athenaeus’s 92 (91 plus Alexander himself) is the generally accepted number, though Arrian gives eighty (7.4). Plutarch was more than likely embellishing the number for rhetorical purposes.

Bosworth tends to agree with Arrian’s depiction of the event but follows Athenaeus’ tally of 92 (CE, 156). Worthington, Alexander, 179-180, however, follows Athenaeus in description and number, but adds the details which Arrian included, namely that the ceremony took place according to Persian custom which probably was a concession for the Persians. In the end, the ceremony was pointless and achieved
nothing. After Alexander died, all of the Macedonians, except Seleucus, divorced their Persian wives (Memnon, FGrH 434 F 1).

It is striking that in the Alexander none of the enthusiasm for the event recorded here appears. In fact, Plutarch seems to be stressing Alexander’s generosity in relieving his men of their debts worth a total of 9,870 talents (Alex. 70.2-3), which probably made the men more amenable. Nothing of the uniting of peoples is mentioned either (Alex. 70.2-3). For more on the mass marriages at Susa, see Tarn, Alexander, 1, 110-111, Lane Fox, Alexander 417-420, Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” 217-220 and CE, 156-157, Hamilton, Alexander, 133-135, and Worthington, Alexander, 179-181.

Plutarch surprisingly distinguishes between Macedonian and Greek here which seems to be a golden opportunity to highlight Alexander’s melding of the races as well as his hellenizing. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the Macedonians were Greek in a cultural if not ethnic sense: see J. Hall, “Contested Ethnicities: Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity,” in I. Malkin (ed.), Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity (Harvard: 2001), 159-186 and Worthington, Philip II, 216-219.

329 E

αὐτὸς ἔστεφανωμένος ... ξυγὰ συνήπτεν: Plutarch records that Alexander, wearing a wreath (ἔστεφανωμένος), was doing three things: singing the marriage song, getting married himself, and accompanying the other brides. On the implications of Alexander’s role in these marriages, see below pp. 260-261.
The wreath was traditional ritual attire for weddings (J.H. Oakley and R.H. Sinos, *The Wedding in Ancient Athens* (Madison, 1993), 12). Generally, the wedding party wore garlands of plants which were believed to garner the favor of the gods and ensure a successful wedding (Oakley and Sinos, *Wedding in Ancient Athens*, 16). As far as Alexander’s actions, none of the other sources indicate that he led the marriage hymn or escorted the other brides, but Athenaeus recorded that there was music, dancing, and dramatic performances at the ceremony (538b-e). Diodorus (17.107.6), Curtius (10.3.11), Justin (12.10.10), and Plutarch (Alex. 70.2, *DFAM* 2, 338D) state that he married Darius’ eldest daughter, Stateira. Arrian, however, says that he married Barsine (7.4). Hamilton, *Alexander*, 195, states that Arrian correctly recorded her name as Barsine and the other authors were confused (cf. Tarn, *Alexander* 2, 334-335). Her proper name was Stateira, but she was called Barsine, presumably to avoid confusing her with her mother, Stateira. Arrian, citing Aristobulus, states that Alexander also married the youngest daughter of Artaxerxes III Ochus, Parysatis (7.4; cf. Green, *Alexander*, 448, Bosworth, *CE*, 156, Hammond, *Genius*, 188, Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 192, Worthington, *Alexander*, 180). Hamilton points out that, if true, these two additional marriages meant that Alexander linked himself to both Persian royal houses (*Alexander*, 195; cf. Frazier and Froidefond, *Plutarque*, 220). However, modern scholars’ ready acceptance of Arrian’s account should be questioned (Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 607, Lane Fox, *Alexander*, 418, Green, *Alexander*, 448, Bosworth, *CE*, 156, Hammond, *Genius*, 188, Worthington, *Alexander*, 180; cf. Tarn, *Alexander* 1, 111, who does not specify a second wife at the Susa ceremony). Arrian is using one of his typical sources, Aristobulus, here (7.4 = Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 52). However, just because the eyewitness Aristobulus
states that Alexander also married Paryatis does not necessarily make it so. The wording of the passage is questionable. Why would Arrian say that Aristobulus specifically referred to Paryatis but not Stateira-Barsine? Another eyewitness, Chares (FGrH 125 F 4), mentions marriages (γάμους … ἐπηντο) Alexander made along with others, though no specific details are given as to whom he married.

It is surprising that Plutarch does not note Alexander’s marriage to Artaxerxes Ochus’ daughter considering that the Persian king was discussed at 327A as having been placed on the throne by Fortune. Plutarch even specifically mentions Fortune’s involvement in placing Alexander on Darius’ throne (329D). Moreover, at 338D, Plutarch remarks on only two of Alexander’s wives, Roxane and Stateira (or Barsine). It does not make sense for Plutarch to have knowledge of Artaxerxes III (DFAM 1, 327A) and not refer to his daughter marrying Alexander on the two occasions that he actually discusses it (Alex. 70.2 and DFAM 2, 338D). Furthermore, Plutarch is very explicit here with just how many wives Alexander took at Susa in 324: one. He specifically uses the phrase μιᾶς νυμφίος which literally translated means “bridegroom of one.” While the justification cited by many modern scholars for the two marriages appears valid, we still cannot overlook the fact that only one source mentions it.

Plutarch’s casting of Alexander as a father and sponsor (πατήρ καὶ ἄρμοστής) of the brides calls to mind his treatment of the royal Persian women after they were captured at Issus in 333 (Diod. 17.35.1-4, 17.38.1-4, Arr. 2.12.3-8, Curt. 3.11.21-26, Just. 11.9.12-16). Alexander assumed the role of Darius as kyrios to his family, promising dowries to his daughters and providing a royal burial for his wife, Stateira, when she died. Alexander also left instructions that these women were to learn Greek language and
culture (Diod. 17.67.1, Curt. 5.2.17). The relationship of the Macedonian king to these Persian royal women was cemented in 324 with the mass wedding at Susa. Alexander, in effect, had become responsible in 333 for all Persian women in the same way that, as king, he was responsible for the members of his own family including arranging marriages for the women in it.

ἡδέως γὰρ ἄν ... ἀσυμπαθέσι δεσμοίς: Plutarch uses the metaphor of the bridge to compare the means by which Xerxes and Alexander thought they could unite Asia and Europe. In 481, Xerxes took a literal approach when he had two bridges constructed at Sestos and Abydos which were subsequently destroyed in a storm raising the ire of the Great King (Hdt. 7.33-36). On the second attempt, the Persians roped together ships. According to Herodotus, a total of 674 ships were used for the crossing (7.36).

Alexander managed to cross into Asia with little trouble. Arrian states that he used 160 triremes and a large number of cargo ships (1.11.6, cf. Diod. 17.17.2: 60 ships, Just. 11.6.2: 182 ships), but Plutarch downplays his achievement. By mentioning Xerxes’ problems at the Hellespont, he contrasts that and his failure in the Persian Wars using warfare to conquer and control the Greeks with Alexander’s more “diplomatic” methods to try to unite the people of his Asian empire. It is worth noting that Herodotus said that Xerxes’ pride led to his defeat (μεγαλογροσύνης, 7.24, ἀγαφότατα, 7.57), and, in bridging the Hellespont, that he was guilty of hubris. This view would have been known to Greeks of the fourth century, so Alexander may not have wanted to appear as though he was imitating Xerxes and as a result suffer hubris himself. For more on Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont, see Lane Fox, Alexander, 115, Green, Alexander,
329 F

άλλ’ ἔρωτι ... γένη συνάπτοντες: Plutarch reiterates his unity of mankind idea by mentioning the purpose for the mass marriages: children to join the nation together. This sentiment is held by both Curtius (10.3.12) and Justin (12.10.10). Furthermore, for Plutarch it is evidence that Alexander put into action the philosophy of Zeno, i.e. cosmopolitanism (329A-B). For more on the “unity of mankind theory,” see Introduction III and the commentary on 329C.
Section 8, 329 F – 330 E

**Overview:** Plutarch emphasizes the non-military means by which Alexander was able to unify Europe and Asia. He begins by discussing Alexander’s mode of dress which incorporated Asian elements. At the same time, however, Alexander cared little for his clothing like most philosophers, but he recognized that he needed to appease his new subjects in some way and, for this, he should not be criticized. For, ultimately, Alexander’s goal was to unite the world under one law, one government making them one people.

329 F

Πρὸς τοῦτον ... εὐτελεστέραν οὖσαν: The sources indicate that Alexander adopted the “foreign raiment” after the Hyrcanian expedition in the autumn of 330 (Diod. 17.77.1, Curt. 6.5.25, Plut. Alex. 45.1). H.W. Ritter, Diadem und Königsherrschaft (Munich, 1965), 47-49, points out that the adoption of the foreign costume was not a reaction to Darius’ death, but rather a reaction to Bessus who had claimed the throne and wore the Persian royal garb (Arr. 3.25.3, Curt. 6.6.12-13); cf. A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” *JHS* 100 (1980), 5-6. Moreover, it was another way for Alexander to gain the favor of the powerful Persian aristocratic families whose support he needed; cf. I. Worthington, “Alexander the Great, Nation-building, and the Creation and Maintenance of Empire,” in V.D. Hanson, Makers of Ancient Strategy (forthcoming: Princeton, 2010). With Darius and Bessus dead, it was necessary for Alexander at this point to make a conciliatory effort to appease his new subjects to legitimize his own rule over them. Thus, he made himself appear the more legitimate ruler, rather than Bessus, and made his new regime more acceptable to the Persian aristocracy (Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 49).

Only Plutarch (*DFAM* 1, 329F-330A, *Alex*. 45.1-3) makes the distinction between Median (the Medes were conquered by Cyrus II in 550, Hdt. 1.125) and Persian dress.
Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 49, suggests that Alexander was adopting certain items of the Persian king “as a manifesto to his subjects, particularly his Asian subjects.” Most of the other sources fail to make such a distinction and simply refer to a generic “Persian” costume (Diod. 17.77.5, Arr. 4.9.9, 7.6.2, 7.8.2, Curt. 6.6.4, Just. 12.3.8). The “barbaric and strange” (βαρβαρικήν καὶ ἄλλοκοτον, Plut. *Alex.* 45.2) Median costume apparently revealed all the excesses of the Median throne. However, the Persian royal dress had a distinctly Median origin (Hdt. 1.135, 7.61-62). Strabo 11.13.9 specifically mentions that the tiara (*tiara*: a cone-like head-dress encircled with a diadem, Xen. *Anab.* 2.5.23), headress (*kitaris*), and trousers (*anaxurides* — the Persian trousers were loose and sometimes made of leather, Hdt. 1.71, and embroidered, Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.8) were more suitable for the northern regions of the Median kingdom. Curtius 3.3.17 describes Darius III’s dress in detail. In his description, the notable features worn by Darius were the purple tunic, the gilded belt, and the *kitaris* which Curtius identified as the Persian royal head-dress. All three that Curtius recognized are shown on the reliefs at Persepolis (see E. Schmidt, *Persepolis* (Chicago, 1953). If the Persian dress was originally Median, it is difficult to speculate on the differences to which Plutarch refers.

ηὰγὰξμαίια ... ζηνίλθεθος: The only condemnation given in the sources regarding the Median/Persian style of dress occurs in Plutarch (*Alex.* 45.1-2). However, Curtius places his own disdain in the mouths of the Macedonians (6.6.7). At *Alexander* 45.2, Plutarch mentions the three items Alexander refused to wear: the tiara, the short-sleeved jacket (*kandus*), and the trousers (*anaxurides*). Strabo mentions the tiara, a long-sleeved tunic, and the trousers in his list of Persian dress (11.13.9). For the *kandus*, see above 329B.
Diodorus confirms two of the three items excluded: the trousers and the *kandus* (17.77.5). He included the tiara in the assumed dress of Alexander as does Curtius (6.6.4), and Justin (12.3.8). Arrian specifically mentions the exchange of the Macedonian traditional headdress for the Persian *kitaris* or tiara (4.7.4). However, W. Heckel and J. Yardley, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (Oxford, 1997), 204, suggest that this was Arrian’s own idea and was not based on Aristobulus or Ptolemy. Therefore, in this instance, Arrian could be inaccurate. Bosworth, *Arrian* 2, 50, has pointed out that these errors in recording what Alexander wore traditionally and what he adopted may be a reproduction of a rhetorical error since Lucian (*Dial. Mort.* 12.4) also recorded that Alexander wore both the tiara and the *kandus*.

Athenaeus, quoting Ephippus, records the specific Macedonian Persian elements which Alexander wore to form his composite dress (537e-538b = Ephippus, *FGrH* 125 F 5). To accommodate the Persians, he wore a purple tunic with white stripes (cf. Curt. 3.3.17). The Macedonian element was limited to the purple cloak (*chlamys*) and the *kausia* which the Persian royal diadem had been wrapped around. B. Kingsley, “The Kausia Diadematorphos,” *AJA* 88 (1984), 66-68 and “Alexander’s Kausia and Macedonian Tradition,” *Cl. Antiq.* 10 (1991), 59-76, argued that the *kausia* was an adaptation of a hat originating in the Hindu Kush. If this is true, then Alexander’s garb was more foreign than Macedonian. However, E.A. Fredricksmeier, “Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Kausia,” *TAPA* 116 (1986), 215-227 and “The Kausia: Macedonian or Indian?,” in I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford, 1994), 135-158, has persuasively argued for the Macedonian origin of the *kausia*.

265
καθάπερ Ἐρατοσθένης ἱστορίκης: Eratosthenes of Cyrene (276-194 BC) was a notable poet, geographer, and philosopher (Strabo 1.2.3). He apparently wrote a treatise, Geographika, more than likely cited by Strabo (1.4.9). It is doubtful whether Plutarch had a written copy of this work in hand while composing this speech, but it is clear that Plutarch had some such work of Eratosthenes in mind. K. Geus, Eratosthenes von Kyrene (Munich, 2002), 89-90, has suggested that Plutarch did in fact have one of Eratosthenes’ works in his possession when writing because of the close connection to 329A-D. Unfortunately, Geus’ suggestion is flawed. A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” JHS 100 (1980), 3, states that there is nothing to suggest that “Plutarch’s interpretation of mixed dress comes from Eratosthenes.” However, it is entirely possible that Plutarch had read and was aware of Eratosthenes’ work but did not directly consult it for his own. E. Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Historia 7 (1958), 437, has convincingly argued that Plutarch was more than likely paraphrasing Eratosthenes. Badian further argues it is a highly rhetorical piece “ill-planned, confused in thought” (“Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” 436). The lack of planning and confusion Badian refers to could be indicative of Plutarch’s youth when writing this rhetorical discourse. For more on Eratosthenes, see K. Geus, Eratosthenes. For Plutarch’s age at the time of composition, see pp. 123-130. For the nature of rhetorical discourse in the age of Plutarch, see pp. 60-73.

ός μὲν φιλόσοφος ... ός πολεμίους: Plutarch reinforces Alexander as a diplomat and philosopher as well as a warrior and benevolent king (ἡγεμών κοινὸς καὶ βασιλεὺς
furthering his idea that Alexander was a philosopher-king. Philosophers were known to care little for their clothing as Plutarch mentions later (330C). The passage here takes on added significance when compared to the exchange between Diogenes and Alexander when the king is said to have uttered, “If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes” (331F). If Alexander admired Diogenes above all other philosophers as indicated here, then it is not surprising that Plutarch includes the statement about Alexander not caring about his clothing. However, Plutarch just mentioned that Alexander adopted foreign clothing to appease his new subjects. He is forced to remark on Alexander’s role as commander and king to rationalize the change in clothing since Alexander obviously cared enough to change it.

Also, Plutarch states that Alexander showed respect for the foreign clothing ἵνα βεβαίως παραμένωσιν ἀγαπώντες ὡς ἄρχοντας Μακεδόνας ("so that they might remain constant loving the Macedonians as rulers"). The subjunctive παραμένωσιν in the purpose clause introduced by ἵνα connotes a continuing action, one that had already been in process. The construction thus indicates that the Persians already loved Alexander and that he wanted to ensure that they continued their affection for Macedonian rule. This sentiment is a gross over-generalization on Plutarch’s part for presumably the Persians were not glad to have a foreign king; cf. I. Worthington, “Alexander the Great, Nation Building, and the Creation and Maintenance of Empire,” in V.D. Hanson (ed.), Makers of Ancient Strategy (forthcoming: Princeton, 2010). If Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” 6, is correct that Alexander did not adopt Persian dress until after Darius was dead and after Bessus proclaimed himself Artaxerxes V in 330 when it seemed that Alexander had successfully conquered Persia, then Plutarch’s statement is simple
rhetorical embellishment intended to cast Alexander as the beloved king of all. For Plutarch, there is no way that a conquering warrior could garner the affection of a conquered race simply by a change of clothing. For more on Alexander’s administrative policies, see Bosworth, CE, 229-240 and Worthington, “Alexander the Great, Nation Building,” (forthcoming).


τοῦναντίον γὰρ ... τίτθη περιέθηκε: Greek clothing was made in a variety of colors and in the military sphere color depended upon one’s rank (M. Sichel, Costume of the Classical World (London, 1980), 27-28). A tunic with purple trim, however, was traditionally associated with a ruler. For instance, the depictions of Darius III in the sources show him wearing a purple striped tunic (Curt. 3.3.17). In fact, it appears to be the same sort of garment worn by Cyrus the Great (Xen. Cyr. 8.3.13). In Rome, the purple border (latus clavus) is connected with the city’s policy makers and is usually referred to as the toga praetexta (Sichel, Costume of the Classical World, 45). There is no evidence to suggest that the purple border was the sole demarcation of the emperor by the time that Plutarch is writing in the first century AD. Indeed, Dio Cassius credits Julius Caesar with first introducing it to distinguish magistrates from the masses (49.16).
However, Alexander was not alone in adopting foreign raiment. Some of his men wore purple and gold cloaks according to Diodorus (17.77.5-6) and Justin (12.3.10), but Curtius 6.6.7 reports that they were forced to wear Persian fashions. For more on Craterus, see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2, no. 46 and W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire* (London, 1992), 107-133 and *Who’s Who*, 95-99.

In his reference to stubbornly holding to tradition, Plutarch is likely calling to mind Craterus, who was one of Alexander’s infantry commanders and who openly rejected Alexander’s orientalizing (Plut. *Alex.* 47.9, *Eum.* 6.3). He was much loved among the soldiers in the army and involved himself in several disputes with Alexander on their behalf (Plut. *Eum.* 6.2-3), for example, after Alexander was seriously wounded in the siege at Malli, Craterus approached the king on behalf of the army and urged him not to risk his life needlessly (Curt. 9.6.6-14).

330 B

*Ζῶα θηπεδόντες ... καὶ διαθηριοῦται*: Plutarch is comparing Alexander to a hunter who must camouflage himself to get closer to his prey. In this case, Alexander wears the clothing of the Persians to gain their loyalty. The allusion casts Alexander as the hunter stalking the Persians who are his prey. This characterization is not surprising since Alexander was a conqueror bent on subduing the Persians. However, Plutarch has been discussing Alexander’s adoption of Persian clothing as a means to garner their loyalty and affection. The allusion is, then, at odds with the image of Alexander that Plutarch is trying to portray. It is not a positive image of the king, but is one in keeping with Macedonian custom since hunting was a regular part of Macedonian life and one which
Alexander continued even while on campaign in Asia: see N.G.L. Hammond, The Macedonian State (Oxford, 1989), 142 and J. Roisman, “Honor in Alexander’s Campaign,” in J. Roisman (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great (Leiden, 2003), 313-316. Hunting was a right of passage for Macedonian men since a man was not allowed to recline at a symposium until he had killed a boar without a net (Hegesander, FGrH 81 F 11 = Ath. 1.18a).

At 144D, Plutarch used this particular illusion in which he speaks of the bright clothing used to provoke an elephant and the purple cloth used to provoke a bull, not unlike the modern-day running of the bulls in Pamplona. Again, Plutarch emphasizes Alexander’s strategic skill rather than his combat skill, which is another way of assessing the logos-ergon antithesis.

εἰ δὲ βασιλεὺς ... ψυχὰς προσαγαγόμενος: It is interesting that Plutarch begins the sentence with βασιλεὺς μέγας (“great king”) considering that by Plutarch’s time, the Macedonian king was being called Alexander the Great. The first attested use of the posthumous nomenclature occurs in the first century in Plautus’s Mostellaria (775-778) in which Tranio, a slave, asks Alexandrum magnum atque Agathoclem aiunt maximas duo res gessisse: quid mihi fiet tertio, quis plus facio facinora immortalia (“Alexander the Great and Agathocles were two men that did mighty things. What about me as a third, who alone am doing immortal things”)? Babbitt in the Loeb edition translates the phrase impersonally (“a great king”) rather than referencing Alexander directly presumably due to the absence of a definite article preceding the βασιλεὺς μέγας. However, the work is about Alexander and Plutarch may be slyly acknowledging the
Macedonian king and the common epithet associated with him without directly referring to it.

The imagery of this passage bears a remarkable similarity to Alexander’s speech to his men at Opis (Arr. 7.9), except that the civilizer was Philip and not Alexander. In that address, Alexander casts his father as the man that civilized Macedonia when the people were still wearing animal skins and feeding on sheep in the hills. Philip saved Macedonia from subjection and slavery. However, Alexander then goes on to say that his father’s actions are not as great as his own because Philip left him in debt and because he had greater victories. The parallels between Arrian 7.9-10 and Plutarch here suggest some sort of rhetorical topos in which either Philip or Alexander was shown as a civilizer. Moreover, it also suggests that the successes/failures of father and son were often contrasted such as in the comparison of wounds by Didymus (Dem., col. 12.39-13.10).

The two rhetorical questions in this passage serve to further accentuate Alexander’s idealistic (or philosophical), non-warring side in that he allegedly civilized and earned the loyalty of a conquered people simply by wearing their clothing. There is brief mention of Alexander’s conquest by force of arms (τοῖς μὲν ὀπλοῖς τῶν σωμάτων ἐπικρατήσας) but it is buried between references to Alexander’s apparel. The significance, for Plutarch, is that Alexander conquered these people by doing something as innocuous as changing his clothing. One must, however, remember that Alexander wore a mixed dress of both Macedonian and Persian elements (cf. 330A). The Macedonian elements would have served as a constant reminder to the conquered that
they did, in fact, have a foreign ruler albeit one who appeared on the surface to be sympathetic to their customs.

However, Plutarch romanticizes the reason for Alexander’s actions. There were parts of Central Asia that Alexander had significant problems subduing. After Darius was assassinated and Bessus proclaimed himself Artaxerxes V, the Macedonian king moved against the revolting satrapy of Areia which was the former domain of one of Darius’ assassins, Satibarzanes (Diod. 17.78.2-4, Arr. 3.25.5-8, Curt. 6.20-34). Also, in 329, led by two noblemen, Spitamenes and Dataphernes, Bactria and Sogdiana revolted (Arr. 3.28.8-30.3, Curt. 7.6.13-24). In the last year of his reign well after he had adopted the composite fashion of Persian and Macedonian elements, Alexander led an attack on the Cossaeans, who controlled the territory between Ecbatana and Susa (Diod. 17.111.4-6, Arr. 7.15.1-3, Plut. Alex. 72.3). Thus, even while wearing foreign clothing he did not gain the loyalty of all of these people as Plutarch suggests, and therefore the adoption of foreign dress failed. Plutarch’s audience would have been aware of this failure on Alexander’s part, but their knowledge helps to maintain the paradox of Alexander as a philosopher at the same time that it calls to mind the king’s faults.

330 C

καίτοι γ’ Ἀρίστιππον ... τὸ εὐσχῆμον: Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435 – 350 BC), a friend and student of Socrates and contemporary of Plato, is credited with the founding of the Cyrenaic school of hedonistic philosophy: see A.A. Long, “The Socratic Legacy,” in K. Algra and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), 632. He wrote several works on education, virtue, and his
philosophy which Diogenes lists in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (2.84-85). The Cyrenaic school attributed to him taught that there were two states: pleasure and pain (Diog. Laert. 2.86-87). Pleasure is the goal of all action and knowledge is based on the sensations derived from pleasure and pain. Hedonists believed that the only reality is the present: see A. Bonnette, *Xenophon: Memorabilia* (Ithaca, 1994), 159 n. 1.

Xenophon took an apparent disliking to Aristippus and his beliefs. The philosopher makes an appearance in his *Memorabilia* disagreeing with Socrates on excess and virtue (2.2.1-34, 3.8.1-9). Horace mentions that Aristippus was able to adapt to any situation (*Epist.* 1.17.23-29), which is more than likely what Plutarch is referring to here and is using his clothing, whether it was a tattered cloak or the finest cloak, as a way to connect him to Alexander. Plutarch states that Aristippus was able to maintain his decency (ἐὔζεσκεμον) no matter what he was wearing. Therefore, no one should criticize Alexander for his clothing since virtue can be maintained no matter the clothing. Moreover, Plutarch seems to be challenging the stereotypical image of the philosopher as immune to worldly goods and possessions by suggesting that a greater good can be achieved through those possessions. Plutarch seems to be arguing that Alexander cared more for his subjects than he did for his clothing which explains why he did not appear to have a problem with changing it. This view could be construed as an example of Alexander’s μεγαλοψυχία (“greatness of soul”). For more on Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, see Long, “Socratic Legacy,” 632-639.

Ἀλέξανδρῳ δ’ ἐγκαλοῦσιν ... καταβαλλόμενος ἀρχάς: Plutarch refers not only to the Greeks and Macedonians in Alexander’s army who blatantly detested Alexander’s foreign attitudes, but also historians of Alexander’s life and reign such as Ephippus of
Olynthus. Curtius specifically mentions the distaste the Macedonians felt at Alexander’s new dress (6.6.7). These men were ordered to wear the Persian dress, and were too scared of Alexander’s wrath to refuse. Justin too, records a general feeling of resentment about Alexander’s failure to follow Macedonian customs (12.4.1). The most extreme case of disdain for Alexander’s new dress is recorded in Arrian (4.8.4), who reports that one of the reasons for the conflict between Alexander and Cleitus at Maracanda in 328 was the latter’s distaste for Alexander’s orientalizing dress. The conflict led to Alexander killing Cleitus in a fit of rage. Diodorus states that Alexander was aware of his men’s disdain and bought them off with gifts (17.78.1).

Interestingly, Plutarch makes no mention of the men in Alexander’s army who also wore Persian clothing. Granted, they might have been forced to do so by the king (Diod. 17.77.5-6, Curt. 6.6.7, Just. 12.3.9). The Companions, in particular, were given cloaks with purple borders (Diod. 17.77.5-6). Justin 12.3.9 suggests that in order for Alexander to avoid excessive animosity, he gave his men gold and purple cloaks. By not mentioning that some of Alexander’s men wore the clothing or that they were forced to wear it, Plutarch emphasizes the actions of the king, that he was the only one to do such a thing, making it a novel idea. However, it also serves to emphasize Alexander’s growing orientalism which to Plutarch’s Greek audience would have been repulsive since the Second Sophistic movement maintained Athenocentric ideology: see E.L. Bowie, “The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic,” Past and Present 46 (1970), 3-41 and Hall, Hellenicity, 225.

Ephippus of Olynthus, a contemporary of Alexander and Callisthenes, whom Alexander conspired to have killed, wrote a scathing pamphlet denigrating the
Macedonian king for his drinking (FGrH 126 F 5 = Ath. 10.434a-b) and extravagance (FGrH 126 F 5 = Ath. 12.537f-538a). More importantly, Ephippus specifically pointed out that Alexander wore the Persian dress (τὴν Περσικὴν στολὴν, FGrH 126 F 5 = Ath. 12.537e) and at other times he wore a purple cloak with white stripes (cf. Curt. 3.3.17), which by the time of the Roman Republic was the sign of a tyrant (Plut. Ti. Gracchus 14.3; cf. J.R. Dunkle, “The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic,” TAPA 98 (1967), 170 and J.E. Atkinson, A Commentary on Quintus Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam, 1980), 127). For more on Ephippus, see Berve, Alexanderreich 2, no. 331, Heckel, Who’s Who, 118, and Pearson, LHA, 61-68.

330 D

οὐ γὰρ λῃστρικὸν ὃς ... ἀνασύρασθαι διανοηθείς: Alexander is characterized here by Plutarch as a good commander as well as a good king, who is not prone to excess. Furthermore, Plutarch reiterates the lack of Fortune’s positive influence in Alexander’s reign by suggesting that to tear and rend Asia, which according to Plutarch Alexander did not do, was the work of Fortune. However, Plutarch overlooks the events at Persepolis in 330 when the city was looted and the palace burned to the ground (Diod. 17.70.1-6, Arr. 3.18.10-12, Curt. 5.6.1-9). In the Alexander, Plutarch mentions a courtesan named Thais as the instigator of the burning of the palace (38.1-2). Perhaps Plutarch fails to mention the episode because he saw it as other sources did: punishment for Persia’s destruction of Greek temples during the Persian Wars of the fifth century. Nor does Plutarch take into account the many cities that surrendered to Alexander without shedding blood: Sardis and
Ephesus (Arr. 1.17.3-18.2), those in Egypt (Arr. 3.1.2, Curt. 4.1.32), as well as Babylon (Curt. 5.1.17-18), Susa (Arr. 3.16.6), and Drapsaca in Bactria (Arr. 3.28.4-29.1, Curt. 7.4.22-24), for example. Alexander was not provided with a justifiable opportunity in those instances to pillage because he could not very well raze a city that had surrendered and then expect loyalty from the people. Had he done so, he would have been no different from the Persian king or any other tyrant.

What follows are a few examples of those whom Plutarch believed aimed at total destructive conquest rather than the reconciliation of the conquered to their new rule: Hannibal, Treres, and the Scythians.

καθάπερ ὁστερον ... Ἀννίβας Ἰταλίαν: Plutarch intentionally included Hannibal in this list of conquerors as he was Rome’s archetypal arch-rival. Hannibal was meant to be a foil to Alexander. Hannibal looted and plundered Italy, but Alexander, according to Plutarch, did not ravage Asia. Hannibal invaded the Italian peninsula in what is commonly referred to as the Second Punic War (218-201) and scoured the battlefield after his victory at Cannae in 216 in search of spoils (Livy 22.51.5-9). He was later defeated at the battle of Zama in 202 by Scipio Africanus. After Cannae, Hannibal appealed to the Italian population’s hatred of oligarchy to cause their defection. For instance, Tarentum defected in 214 (Polyb. 8.24-31, Livy 25.7.10-10.10) and Metapontum, Thurii (Livy 25.15.5-17), and Heraclea (App. Hann. 35.149) shortly thereafter. However, not all of Italy defected as he thought it would and he was forced to leave Italy in 203. See further, N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars (London, 1990), S. Lancel, Hannibal (Oxford, 1998), and D. Hoyos, Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC (London, 2003), 98-121.
πρότερον δὲ Τρῆρες Ἰονίαν: Plutarch recalls the Trerians, a tribe of the Cimmerians, who often raided the areas in the Pontic region (Strabo 1.3.21) and were led by Treres. In alliance with Rusa I and probably the Assyrian Empire, the tribe destroyed the Phrygians and took over most of Asia Minor in 679/8: see I. Diakonoff, “Media,” CHI, 95. Herodotus 1.15 suggests that the Scythians who were pressing westward prompted the Cimmerians to migrate and eventually they seized Sardis. Later, they were pushed out by the Scythians (Strabo 1.3.21). The Trerians, then, proved that they had no desire to assimilate the conquered Cimmerians and Phrygians into their kingdom unlike Alexander who adopted the clothing of the conquered to aid in the assimilation process.

cαι Σκύθαι Μηδίαν ἐπῆλθον: Herodotus dates the Scythian invasion into Median lands to around 653/2 (1.15, 103-106). However, Assyrian texts suggest a date of around 700 for this early contact: see Diakonoff, “Media,” 97. The nomadic Scythian tribes lacked central organization and therefore found it difficult to hold territory for any length of time succeeding only in random looting raids. This fact explains why the Median king, Cyaxares, mentioned by Herodotus (1.106), was able to recover his kingdom. For more on the history of the Median kingdom, see Diakonoff, “Media,” 36-148, and on the Scythians see T. Sulimirski, “The Scyths,” CHI, 149-199.

ἀλλ’ ἐνὸς ὑπῆκοα ... ἐαυτὸν ἐσχημάτιζεν: Plutarch repeats once again Alexander’s intent for a “unity of mankind.” As at 329C, he reiterates the plan for a kind of “one world” under his authority lending credence to the idea that Alexander did in fact intend to conquer more than Asia and India. The sources indicate that Alexander had plans which would lead him westward. Curtius records that the expedition would take the army to Carthage, then to the Pillars of Hercules, on to Spain, across the Alps, then on to
Epirus (10.1.17-19; cf. Plut. Alex. 68.1). This path would effectively circle the Mediterranean basin bringing it too under his control should he have succeeded. Arrian records a similar path; though, he does leave out mention of the Alps (7.1.4).

There is also an indication that Alexander’s route would have brought him into contact with Rome for an embassy from there apparently came to him at Babylon in 323 (Cleitarchus, FGrH 137 F 31 = Plin. NH 3.57, Aul. Gell. 17.21.33). However, Diodorus 17.113.2 fails to mention it, Arrian rejects it outright (7.15.5-6), and modern scholars tend to be skeptical: see Bosworth, CE, 167 and Worthington, Alexander, 190-191. In 323 Rome was still asserting its authority over Italy and was not powerful enough to challenge anyone, let alone Alexander or be seen as a potentially lucrative target for invasion.

The overall sentiment here is interesting because it is a blatant statement of imperialism and implies that Alexander intended to impose his monarchy on τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ("those on earth"). That Alexander had plans for conquest on a global scale is debatable (see above). However, this statement perhaps reveals more about Plutarch’s own world rather than the one about which he was writing for he makes a distinction between the Republic and the monarchy of the Empire. The civil wars of the late Republic were spoken of as kakopoliteia ("bad government," Plut. Pomp. 75.5, Plut. Caes. 28.4, Plut. Sulla 25.4-5). Brutus was cast as the roadblock to the peace and prosperity that monarchy would bring (Plut. Brut. 47.7). This unfavorable view of the Republic and its supporters is not surprising considering Plutarch’s background. He more than likely grew up hearing stories of the harsh treatment of the Greeks during Antony’s occupation since his great-grandfather lived through it (Ant. 68.4-5). Augustus’ assumption of the
imperial mantle ushered in an age of peace after fifty years of civil war. However, Plutarch grew up as Rome was expanding its borders north and east and died when it had reached its greatest extent under Trajan (see Introduction I). Thus, Plutarch was raised in an era of imperial prosperity. For more on Plutarch’s views of Roman rule, see Jones, *Plutarch*, 122-130, S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, (Oxford, 1996), 135-186, and R. Preston, “Roman Questions, Greek Answers: Plutarch and the Construction of Identity,” in S. Goldhill (ed.), *Being Greek Under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire* (Cambridge, 2001), 86-119.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ... ἐπέβιενλ θῶ: The gods played a major role in Alexander’s life so this inclusion by Plutarch is not at all odd; cf. L. Edmunds, “The Religiosity of Alexander,” *GRBS* 12 (1971), 363-391. In fact, it seems to be in keeping with the tradition as a whole. One source cited by Plutarch in the *Alexander* mentions that at the birth of Alexander the temple to Artemis in Ephesus burned down, thus foreshadowing the end of the Persian Empire (Hegesias, *FGrH* 142 F 3 = Plut. *Alex.* 3.5-9). There is also the story that Olympias had sexual intercourse with Zeus Ammon in the form of a snake (Plut. *Alex.* 2.3-4), which calls into question Alexander’s real paternity. Alexander’s early death was foretold before he entered Babylon by Chaldean prophets in 324 (Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 54 = Arr. 7.16.1, Diod. 17.112.2-3, Plut. *Alex.* 73.1). Arrian 7.2 records a prediction of the king’s death, although at that time Indian wise men gave it in 336. When Alexander visited the tombs of the Assyrian kings in 323, his hat flew into the water and the diadem around it landed in some reeds near one of the tombs, which was seen as an ill omen (Diod. 17.116.5-7, Arr. 7.23). Plutarch mentions that, after the
successive unfavorable omens and predictions about his death, Alexander grew increasingly paranoid and that he even doubted his friends (Alex. 75.1-3).

I am aware of no other source which refers to Alexander’s rule as either sunlight (ἀνήλιον) or a source of light (φῶς). The sun and light were important symbols of life and knowledge in antiquity, and the sun was even worshipped as Helios. Homer used light and dark as symbols of life and death (Il. 4.461, 5.120), and Aeschylus employed light/sun for knowledge in the Agamemnon (632-633). In the seventh Olympian, Pindar equates the glory of Rhodes with light. For Plato, the sun/light stands in for the Good (Rep. 507a). His analogy of the sun is part of a greater debate on the justification of philosopher-rulers to rule. It is certainly plausible that Plutarch is revealing his knowledge of Plato here as this passage is reminiscent of the sun analogy in the sixth book of Plato’s Republic (507a-509c). For Plato, the sun is a civilizing force much like the way that Plutarch sees Alexander. In addition, Plato’s sun embodies the virtue of goodness which all rulers must have to rule justly: see K. Dorter, The Transformation of Plato’s Republic (Lanham, 2006), 165. This goodness, in Plutarch’s eyes, is Alexander’s way of appeasing his subjects which he does by changing his traditional clothing and adopting that of his new subjects. Together, these ideas lend themselves to the supposition that Alexander is the ideal philosopher-ruler who understands his position and responsibility as leader of disparate peoples. For more on Plato and his use of sun/light, see J. Notopoulos, “The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the Republic of Plato, I,” CPh 39 (1944), 163-172 and “The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the Republic of Plato, II,” CPh 39 (1944), 223-240, and Dorter, Transformation of Plato’s Republic, 165-252.
νῦν δὲ τῆς ... οὐκ εἴδεν: The passage is rhetorical (hyperbole) since it refers to only part of the world (τῆς γῆς μέρος) instead of mentioning specific locations. The ambiguity of the Greek phrase calls attention to Plutarch’s deficiencies in geography which are evident at 326F when he gets the route of Alexander’s campaigns wrong. It is a broad generalization to cover those areas of which Plutarch is unaware and has not mentioned, i.e. the known world. Moreover, the passage is reminiscent of 328F and 329D in which Plutarch suggests that those who have not had the benefit of Alexander’s presence were somehow in a worse position than those who had seen him.
Overview: Plutarch concludes his discussion of Alexander’s actions by suggesting that they do not indicate a man trying to gain luxury and live an extravagant lifestyle. He then turns to sayings, those by others about him and those by the king himself. Alexander is compared to other rulers (Antigonus, Dionysius, and Sardanapalus) as well as philosophers (Socrates, Plato, and Pythagoras). In the end, it is argued that even Alexander’s words indicate that he is a man of virtue.

330 E

Οὐκοῦν πρώτη ... παρασκευάσαν διανοηθέντα: Plutarch sums up the previous passages on what is usually termed Alexander’s plan for the “unity of mankind” (cf. 329C). His selfless desire to bring peace to these conquered lands is, for Plutarch, what makes Alexander a philosopher. Plutarch believed that philosophy and politics were inextricably linked and that the best statesman is a philosopher (Mor. 796D-F). In several of his works, he discusses the relationship between the two (A Philosopher ought to Converse with Powerful Men, To an Uneducated Ruler, Precepts of Statecraft and Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs). He argues that philosophy can only achieve maximum impact if ἄν ... ἀρχοντὸς ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάσπηται καὶ τούτον ἀναπλήσῃ καλοκαγαθίας (“it is connected to a man who rules, politics and public life, and fills him with nobility,” Mor. 777A). Thus, Alexander’s political idealism is in keeping with Plutarch’s philosophic thought in that in the king, politics and philosophy are one.

The surprising use of homonoia (ὁμόνοια) here bears some thought. Isocrates stated that the duty of a Macedonian king included promoting homonoia, but only among the Greeks (3.41, 4.3). Tarn, Alexander, 2, 417, attributes to Alexander the extension of
homonoia to all men furthering his own thesis of a “unity of mankind” policy (cf. 329C).

For Tarn, the ideas of homonoia reach their greatest expression at the “Prayer for Concord” following the mutiny at Opis in 324. E. Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Historia 7 (1958), 430-432, however, was the first to effectively argue against Tarn’s interpretation of those events. Tarn’s thesis continues to be challenged, most recently by A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” JHS 100 (1980), 1-21. Alexander was not praying for some greater harmony among those he had conquered. The prayer followed a mutiny by the army and occurred at a banquet. Alexander was attempting to appease the army whose anger at the king was rapidly escalating. In effect, it was a strategic political move to subdue the ire of his men and not some attempt to unify everyone in, to use Plutarch’s own words, “one loving cup.” Plus, Alexander needed to unify the army in advance of the Arabian expedition given the integration of foreigners into the ranks by this point (Worthington, Alexander, 183).

Δεύτερον δ’ αὐτῷ ... ψυχαὶ προβάλλουσιν: Here, Plutarch places more weight on what an individual says rather than what he does, thereby maintaining the logos-ergon antithesis. Previously, he had emphasized actions over words (327E-328B). This preference does not detract from his overall supposition that Alexander was a man of action. In his work The Sayings of Kings and Commanders, Plutarch clearly wants his audience to understand his preference. Actions, he says, can be influenced by chance or fortune, tychê (Mor. 172D), which is a major facet of this work and is generally consistent with Plutarch’s manipulation of history: see S. Swain, “Plutarch: Chance, Providence, and History,” AIPh 110 (1989), 292-298. Sayings, however, are a conscious effort (Mor. 172D) providing a glimpse into the mind of each man (τὴν ἑκάτου διάνουσαν
Ἀποθεωρεῖν. Plutarch frequently includes statements like these in his works lending a sense of credibility to his arguments. Other works, such as the aforementioned The Sayings of Kings and Commanders or Sayings of Spartan Women list the various sayings of individuals to reveal character.

Ἀντίγονος ὁ γέρων ... λέγεις περὶ δικαιοσύνης: Antigonus Monophthalmus was one of Alexander’s generals appointed by him as satrap of Phrygia in 333 (Diod. 18.3.1, Arr. 1.29.3; cf. Curt. 4.1.35 who says he was satrap of Lydia). After Alexander’s death, Antigonus was the first of the Hellenistic rulers to proclaim himself king (Diod. 20.53.2, Plut. Demet. 17.2-6), and he died on the battlefield at Ipsus in 301 attempting to consolidate his rule of Asia (Plut. Demet. 29.7-8). His words are meant to characterize him as a morally depraved man and king. He was apparently arrogant (Plut. Eum. 15.3, Demet. 28.8) and ruthless (Diod. 18.45.3, 47.3, 19.44.1) and his insatiable ambition vexed Alexander (Ael. VH 12.16, 14.47a). Plutarch juxtaposes the reference to justice and Antigonus’ destruction of cities to Alexander’s noble and idealistic actions. Plutarch did the same with Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, Treres’ assault on Ionia, and the Scythians’ sacking of Media at 330D. Incidentally, this phrase is not reported in Plutarch’s The Sayings of Kings and Commanders. Its authenticity is nowhere attested.

For more on Antigonus Monophthalmus, see Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 87 and Heckel, Who’s Who (2006), 32-34, with R.A. Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed (Berkeley, 1990).

Διονύσιος δ’ ὁ ... ὑρκοῖς ἔξαπατᾶν: Plutarch refers to Dionysius I, the tyrant of Syracuse from 405-367. As with Antigonus, he uses these supposed words of Dionysius to highlight the fact that he had a degenerate character as opposed to Alexander’s virtuous
Ancient writers speak of Dionysius as being evil (Plut. Mor. 1090E), impious (Ael. VH 1.20), effeminate (Ath. 535e), and ruthless (Ath. 544d, Ael. VH 13.45, 13.10). Aristotle has a lengthy excursus illustrating Dionysius’s corruption (Oecon. 1349a-1350a). B. Caven, Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily (New Haven, 1990), 222-253, argues that Dionysius did not see himself as king or tyrant, but as war-leader of Syracuse and the defamation of his character was the result of antiquity’s loathing of despotism.

These words are more frequently attributed to Lysander (Diod. 10.9.1, Plut. Mor. 741C, Dio Chrys. Or. 74.15, Polyaen. Strat. 1.45.3). Aelian, VH 7.12 claims that they are sometimes attributed to Lysander and on other occasions to Philip II. Since this passage is the only instance that attributes these words to Dionysius, it is likely that Plutarch is using Dionysius for rhetorical effect. Plutarch took a popular statement and put it in the mouth of a notable tyrant to enhance the image of Dionysius as a ruthless and hubristic man thus providing a more startling contrast with Alexander’s virtue. For more on Dionysius I of Syracuse, see Caven, Dionysius I.

330 F

τοῖς δὲ Σαρδαναπάλλου ... καὶ ἔφυβρισα: In 327F, Plutarch mentioned the excesses of Sardanapalus (on whom, see the commentary on 326E-F), and he often uses him as an example of a king doomed by his own extravagance (Mor. 1065C, 1095C, DFAM 2, 336C-D). His extravagances and moral decadence are recorded in other authors as well: see Diodorus 2.23-28 and Athenaeus 12.528f.

τίς οὐκ ἂν ... καὶ πλεονεξίαν: In the unlikely event that his audience was unaware of the three rulers mentioned for the moral depravity, Plutarch concludes with a rhetorical
question guaranteed to garner an understanding of the excesses of certain kings. It is a stark contrast to his picture of Alexander, whom he sees above the immoderate character of these three rulers.

The use of πλεονεξία ("greedy") in conjunction with Antigonus is deliberate. Antigonus is not well depicted in the sources (see the commentary on 330E), but it appears that this is the only reference to his greed that uses this term. Polybius uses the word twenty-eight times in his Histories in reference to the Carthaginians (1.81) and Hasdrubal in particular (3.8, 9.11), the Aetolians (2.43, 2.49), and even the Romans (10.16), but not in connection with Antigonus. Plutarch suggests that an individual’s virtue, or lack there of, is revealed by their sayings and the statements of Antigonus, Dionysius, and Sardanapalus show them to be lacking. For Plutarch’s purposes, one vice would have been as good as another. Sardanapalus was cast as a hedonist, Dionysius as impious, and Antigonus was unjust and greedy. Their words are meant as a foil to those of Alexander (331B-332A), which are intended to show him in a virtuous light and, unlike, Antigonus not base because he did not love pleasure, nor was he impious, unjust, or greedy. It is significant that in the generation prior to Plutarch, Alexander was all of these things (his sayings discussed below will reveal this moral depravity), but by Plutarch’s time (i.e. during the Second Sophistic) Alexander’s reputation was in the process of being rehabilitated (D. Spencer, The Roman Alexander (Exeter, 2002), 165-204). Plutarch has presented his audience with another paradox.

τῶν δ’ Ἀλεξάνδρων ... σοι φανόνται: By removing all of the material trappings of a king such as a crown and royal birth, Alexander could be thought of as a philosopher who was no different from Socrates, Plato, or Pythagoras. In other words, if Alexander’s
position as king is taken away and he is nothing more than an ordinary man, then he could be considered a philosopher. However, those very things that made him an extraordinary king like his crown, royal birth, and relationship with Zeus Ammon, are also what made him who he was.

More importantly, Plutarch calls attention to Alexander’s megalomania by mentioning the relationship with Zeus Ammon. That relationship elevated Alexander above the ordinary man and also philosophers. The “vulgate” sources indicate that there was in fact something more than god and worshipper between Alexander and Zeus Ammon. In 331, Alexander went to the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah (Diod. 17.49.2-51.4, Arr. 3.3.1-4.5, Curt. 4.7.5-32, Just. 11.11.2-13, Plut. Alex. 26-27) and Arrian (3.3.2) and Curtius (4.7.8) echo Aristobulus (FGrH 139 F 13-15) who mentions that Alexander’s intent was to discern his origins or to say that he had learned them (τὸ μὲν τι τῷ θεῷ ὁ χρησόμενον, ὅτι ἄτρεκές ἐλέγετο ἐναι τὸ μαντεῖον τοῦ Ἀμμωνος καὶ χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ Περσέα καὶ Ἡρακλέα, ... Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ φιλοτιμία ἦν πρὸς Περσέα καὶ Ἡρακλέα, ἀπὸ γένους τε ὄντι τοῦ ἁμφῶν καὶ τι καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς γενέσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐς Ἀμμωνα ἀνέφερε, καθὼς ὁι μοῦθοι την Ἡρακλέους τε καὶ Περσέως ες Δία). After leaving Siwah and the oracle, however, the situation was vastly different. Alexander was now claiming that he was the son of Zeus Ammon calling into question his relationship with Philip (Diod. 17.51.1-2, Curt. 4.27.5, Just. 11.11.2-8).

Plutarch’s version of the visit to Siwah in his biography of Alexander reveals his incredulity (Alex. 27.5-6). The account intimates that Alexander intentionally manipulated the oracle’s response to suit his own purposes. The treatment of the visit to the oracle is coupled with Plutarch’s tale of Zeus Ammon sending a thunderbolt to
impregnate Olympias (*Alex*. 3.1-2) as well as his visit to her bed as a snake on the night Alexander was conceived (*Alex*. 3.2-3). The stories lead one to conclude that perhaps Plutarch was unsure of what to believe himself.

Without being blatant, Plutarch is bringing attention to an aspect of Alexander’s reign, which he has only barely hinted at earlier (329C). Furthermore, the placement of this part between the crown and noble-birth may have been intentional. He places a non-flattering part of Alexander’s reign immediately before a discussion of his noble birth which seems to contradict the idea that the king had a divine parent. Two conclusions can be drawn because of the placement. First, Plutarch may be voicing his own opinion about Alexander’s birth. Plutarch may not have believed, or was unsure of, the tales of Alexander’s divine birth. In his life of *Alexander*, two variant accounts of Alexander’s conception are recorded. In the first, we are told that on the night before Olympias’ marriage to Philip, her womb was struck by a thunder bolt impregnating her (*Alex*. 2.2). In the other version, Olympias had intercourse with a snake, which was really Zeus (*Alex*. 2.3-4). The second conclusion drawn from the placement of this line is that it was an underhanded attempt by Plutarch to disparage Alexander’s character. Of course, a third possibility is that both conclusions are correct. I am, however, more inclined to follow the first possibility because later Plutarch suggests that the “son of Zeus” idea is nothing more than flattery (331A), in addition to the account in the *Alexander* which uses the oblique ἔγνωσιν (“they say”) like Arrian (A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 39-40) to cast doubt on a tale. For more on Alexander and Zeus Ammon, see J.R. Hamilton, “Alexander’s So-called Father,” *CQ* 3 (1953), 151-157, P. Cartledge,

331 A

μὴ γαρ ἄς ... στοχαζόμενοι σκοποῦμεν: Only one inscribed statue of Alexander, the Azara herm, has survived, and it is probably a Roman copy of Lysippus’ first statue, discussed by Plutarch at DFAM 2, 335B, where he remarks that Lysippus was Alexander’s sculptor of choice as he depicted his character and virtue: see G.M.A. Richter, The Portraits of the Greeks 3 (London, 1965), 255-256. In Lysippus’ sculptures, Alexander looks upward toward the heavens (Plut. Alex. 4.1). The verse quoted here (see below) was to be inscribed on Lysippus’ first statue of Alexander in which the king was looking upward (DFAM 2, 335B). However, the inscription on the reproduction is not the one quoted here by Plutarch but rather it reads Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππων Μακεδόν (―Alexander of the Macedonians, son of Philip‖).

There are other sculptures of Alexander, but most of these seem to be depicting him in his youth: see M. Bieber, Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art (Chicago, 1965), 25-28. One of these shows traditional Lysippean characteristics including the turned head and straight hair. Another statue, in bronze, of a youthful horseman (found in Begram, modern Afghanistan) has similar features that show parallels with Lysippus’ work; cf. Bieber, Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art, 37.

Another bronze statue exists (now in the Louvre) that Bieber, Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art, 34-35, suggests is closer to the one described by Plutarch at DFAM 2, 335B. It may indicate that Lysippus created the original for Alexandria in
about 330 since it was found in Egypt. Lysippus may also be credited with the bronze statue of a youthful rider which shows some affinities with Alexander (Bieber, *Alexander the Great*, 37).

In the main chamber of Tomb II at Vergina, an ivory head was found with its eyes “fixed upwards and filled with resolution as well as with a veiled tenderness” (M. Andronikos, *Vergina: The Royal Tombs and the Ancient City* (Athens, 1989), 129-130). He felt certain this head was that of Alexander because of Plutarch’s statements (*DFAM* 2, 335B, *Alex.* 4.1) and the so-called Alexander mosaic from Pompeii, and he further concluded that Plutarch presented a naturalistic portrait of the king in his works. Andronikos’ conclusions are contested, however, because the ivory heads lack hair, which as A. Stewart, *Faces of Power: Alexander’s Image and Hellenistic Politics* (Berkeley, 1993), 45, argued would have been the best way to identify the individual. Stewart further claims that Lysippus’ Alexander statues were often replicated, such as the Azara herm, but they do not show Alexander looking toward the heavens (*Faces of Power*, 162). Much more seems to be made of Alexander’s hair in those statues. The *anastole* adds to the king’s character showing him to be virile and leonine, as Plutarch suggests at *DFAM* 2 335B (Stewart, *Face of Power*, 76-78).

Apelles (late fourth-early third century), another artist of Alexander, was noted for his painting of Alexander wielding a thunderbolt (*DFAM* 2, 335A, *Alex.* 4.2, *Plin. NH* 35.10, 92). In *Alexander*, however, Plutarch condemns Apelles’ work stating that it was too dark and dirty (4.3). Lysippus himself criticized Apelles for making Alexander appear as a god (*Mor.* 360D). Hamilton, *Alexander*, 10, points out, though, that Alexander probably knew and approved of Apelles’ depiction. Unfortunately, nothing of

αὐδασουνι δ’ ... Ὄλυμπον ἔχε: The epigram itself was supposedly on a statue of Alexander by Lysippus (mentioned above) and was longer; the first two lines are missing here and at *DFAM* 2, 335B: see J. Clack, *Asclepiades of Samos and Leonidas of Tarentum: the Poems* (Wauconda, 1999), 70. The epigram was included in the *Planudean Anthology* dated around 1299 AD (16.120), but its authorship is difficult to pinpoint. In the *Anthology*, the line was a part of a section of epigrams on representations of Alexander (16.119-122). There, the author is identified as Archelaus, but that is the only mention of an author of that name in the entire collection. Most scholars attribute this epigram to Asclepiades: see W. Wallace and M. Wallace, *Asklepiades of Samos* (Oxford, 1941), 86-87 and A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page, *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* 1 (Cambridge, 1965), 55 with commentary in Vol. 2, 146-147. The epigram is positioned next to one of Posidippus, but Clack, *Asclepiades*, 70, has argued that the style is not that of Asclepiades.

καὶ ἄλλου ἄνδρός ... μὲν υἱός: Most manuscripts have ἄλεξανδρος but Babbitt, in the Loeb edition, emended the text to ἄλλου ἄνδρος (“other man”). Wyttenbach, *Animadversiones*, 117, suggested a lacuna after υἱός which might have clarified the genitive ἄλλου and connected to the following sentence.
Babbitt’s emendation changes the reading of the text entirely because his change puts the words “I am the son of Zeus” into another man’s (ἄλλο ἄνδρος) mouth rather than Alexander’s (ἄλεξανδρος). If the text was left with the ἄλεξανδρος then the words are being uttered by Alexander himself. Thus, D’Angelo, La Fortuna, 121, translates the passage “and I am Alexander, the son of Zeus.” However, Babbitt’s suggestion has merit since the subjects being discussed before and after this passage are the poets’ flattering words.

Accepting Babbitt’s emendation, however, leaves us to ponder the identity of the person who said such a thing. One possibility is Anaxarchus, a philosopher and flatterer at Alexander’s court (Arr. 4.9.7, Plut. Alex. 52.4, Athen. 6.250f-251a), since it was he who, in 327, supported Alexander’s imposition of proskynesis and suggested that Alexander had a better claim to be a god than Dionysus or Heracles (Arr. 4.11). Due to the context of the passage dealing with poets (unnamed) who flatter the king, however, it is more likely that this line is not referring to anyone in particular. Plutarch seems to be well versed in the playwrights and artists at Alexander’s court in DFAM 2 (334E-335E) and the failure to mention any specific names with regard to the sculptors or poets indicate to me that he was fabricating this statement to fit in with his argument.

The effect of this passage serves to highlight further Alexander’s megalomania. Alexander already believed he was Zeus’ son prior to Siwah (Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 13-15). He had probably heard stories of his divine birth from his mother (Plut. Alex. 3; cf. Worthington, Alexander, 23, who suggests that Alexander had these stories circulated later). The priest’s linguistic greeting if Alexander as ὦ παῖ δίος served to further corroborate the king’s divinity in his mind. The issue at hand for Alexander was to make
his men believe he was a god. From the sources, we can infer that Alexander put the
question of his parentage to the oracle and received a response (Arr. 3.4.5, Strabo
17.1.43; cf. J.R. Hamilton, “Alexander and His So-called Father,” *CQ* 2 3 (1953), 151-
157), which resulted in him professing divine parentage to his men.

Alexander’s alleged divine status met with opposition (Curt. 4.7.31). In 327, he
attempted to introduce the Persian custom of obeisance (*proskynesis*) which Greeks and
Macedonians perceived to be a religious act of worship to the gods (Arr. 4.9-10, Curt.
8.5.5-22, Just. 12.7.1, Plut. *Alex.* 54.3-6). Callisthenes, the court historian, refused to
participate. The murder of Cleitus in 328 at Maracanda may have been the result of
derogatory comments about Alexander’s pretensions to divinity (Arr. 4.8), and in 324 at
the mutiny at Opis, Alexander’s men mockingly referred to Zeus as the king’s father
(Arr. 7.9) For more on Alexander’s visit to Siwah, see Tarn, *Alexander*, 1, 42-44, Lane

ταυτα μεν ουν ... τυχην προσειπον: Plutarch also wrote a work entitled *How to Tell a
Flatterer from a Friend* in which he records several of the known flatterers in
Alexander’s entourage: Agis (60B; cf. Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 1, no. 16 and Heckel,
*Who’s Who*, 8); Crison of Himera (58F; cf. 471F, Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2, no. 451 and
Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 100); Medius (65CD; cf. Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2, no. 521 and
Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 158); Hagno (65D; cf. Alex. 22.3, Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2, no. 17
and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 128); Bagoas (65D; cf. Ath. 13.603b, Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2,
10); and Demetrius (65D; cf. Plut. Alex. 54.6, Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 258 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 109). Of these, only Agis was known to be a poet, whom Curtius and Arrian refer to as one of Alexander’s worst flatterers (Curt. 8.5.8, Arr. 4.9.9), and a participant in proskynesis along with Anaxarchus and Cleon of Sicily (Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 437 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 89). He may have written an epic poem about Alexander (Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 16), as did Choerilus of Iasus, another poet and flatterer in Alexander’s court (Curt. 8.5.8; cf. Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 829 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 85). Choerilus’ poem supposedly cast Alexander as Achilles and Alexander allegedly said that he would rather be Thersites in the Iliad than Choerilus’ Achilles (Anonymous, FGrH 153 F10a), which is a testament to the quality of Choerilus’ poetry.

Another flatterer at Alexander’s court was Callisthenes, who wrote an embellished history of Alexander’s reign (Pearson, LHA, 22-49; cf. Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no, 409 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 76-77). Diogenes Laertius 9.60 records an exchange between Anaxarchus and Alexander (see above pp. 292), who was bleeding from a wound, in which Anaxarchus states that the king’s blood was not the “ichor which courses through the veins of the blessed gods.” A different story is recorded in Plutarch’s Alexander which states that Alexander himself said his blood was not that of a god (28.3), and in another version of the same story Dioxippus, an Olympic champion, stated the words (Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 47 = Ath. 251A; cf. Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 284 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 115). Another flatterer, Demetrius, fearing his position, pointed out that Callisthenes failed to participate in proskynesis (Chares, FGrH 125 F 14 = Plut. Alex. 54.6, Arr. 4.12.5).
In 324, Gorgus of Iasus, a hoplophylax (*IG* 42 616 and 617) and another flatterer, supposedly offered Alexander a golden crown worth three thousand drachmas in addition to armor and equipment for a siege of Athens (Ephippus, *FGrH* 126 F 5 = Ath. 12.537e-538b). Moreover, Gorgus addressed the king as the son of Ammon. He was honored by the Iasians for his assistance in appealing to Alexander to get a waterway to the city (Tod, *GHI*, no. 190 and A.J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia Minor* (Norman, 1980), 173). He also was involved in restoring the Samian exiles who lived in Iasus presumably in connection with the Exiles Decree (*SIG*3 312). On Gorgus, see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2, no. 236, Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 127, with Heisserer, *Alexander the Great*, 169-203.

At Maracanda in 328, some flatterers (whose names are not mentioned) suggested that Castor and Pollux should be compared to Alexander while others added Heracles (Arr. 4.8). This sort of talk angered Cleitus and led to his furious exchange with Alexander and his death.

331 A

Τὸν δ’ ἀληθινὸν ... δὲ βασιλεὺς: This anecdote is also told in *Alexander* 4.5-6. Plutarch may be attempting to illustrate Alexander’s self-restraint and mercy in that he was showing his concern for others. However, it can also be said that the depiction shows Alexander as an arrogant man, who would not lower himself to compete with commoners. Thus, the inclusion of this story is antithetical to the argument that Plutarch is trying to make and indicates, perhaps, that this tale was a “cluster” (*hypomnema*) or common story recycled often when discussing Alexander: see L. Van der Stockt, “A

At another point in the *Moralia*, Plutarch has Philip urging Alexander to participate in the Olympics (179D). Alexander I of Macedonia apparently ran the foot race and participated in the pentathlon in about 500 (Just. 7.2.14) after proving that he had Argive ancestry (Hdt. 5.22), which may have set a precedent that Alexander the Great could have followed.

### 331 B

τοῦ δὲ πατρὸς ... τῇ χωλότητι: As Philip returned to Macedonia from besieging Byzantium in 340, his route was blocked by the Triballi (a group of Thracian tribes located in in the region where the Danube met the Oescus River). During the ensuing battle, the sarissa of one of his men apparently pierced his thigh killing his horse under him (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 226 = Didymus, *Dem*. 12.50,55 and 13.1-10, Just. 9.3.2, Plut. *Mor*. 739B, Frontin. *Strat*. 2.8.14, Ath. 6.248F). He lost consciousness and had to be carried to safety. When Alexander became king in 336, he led an army against the Triballi and resoundingly defeated them (Arr. 1.1.4-6).

Θάρρει, πάτερ...μνημονεύης: Plutarch records this response in his *Sayings of Spartan Women* (241E), as do Stobaeus (*Flor*. 7.29) and Cicero (*De Or*. 2.61). Plutarch suggests that Alexander was virtuous even in youth and foreshadows his superior virtue in adulthood, and he implies that Alexander saw his (and his father’s) injuries as symbols of their bravery in battle. Plutarch previously implied that Alexander did not wallow in his own battle wounds but saw them as constant reminders of his glory (331A). The
exchange between father and son also appears to contradict Plutarch’s closing passage of the section. If Alexander was attempting to console his father’s suffering by recalling the bravery exhibited in the act, then, by extension, Plutarch calls attention to Alexander’s eleven wounds which he catalogues at 327A-B and the valor they must represent.

Plutarch only mentions one of Philip’s wounds, though we are aware of two others: in 354, he was hit in the eye by an arrow at the siege of Methone (Dem. 18.67, Diod. 16.34.5, Plut. Mor. 307D, Alex. 3.2, Ath. 6.248) and in 345 he suffered a broken collar bone in battle against the Illyrians (Dem. 18.67, Plut. Mor. 177F9). For more on Philip’s injuries, see A.S. Riginos, “The Wounding of Philip II of Macedon: Fact and Fabrication,” JHS 114 (1994), 103-119 and Worthington, Philip II, 49, 108, 140.

331 C

ταῦτ’ οὖν ... ἀνδραγαθίας περιφέροντα: Again, Plutarch casts Alexander’s actions as those of a philosopher by addressing the king’s wounds (Cf. 327A-B). Alexander saw his scars as memorials of his experiences, each one the evidence of a military victory. Plutarch’s use of Alexander’s wounds serves two purposes. First, evidence of physical flaws highlights his humanity and is evidence against the belief that he had pretensions to divinity, which Plutarch addressed at the beginning of the section. Second, Plutarch emphasizes Alexander’s virtue (aretê), which was highlighted at 327E, and serves also to emphasize his masculinity (andreia). Bravery (andragathia), which is synonymous with andreia because it is evidence of one’s masculinity, is the highest virtue according to Plato (Lach. 191D-192D) and Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 2.7). It was also a vital component of the Hellenic contest (agôn) as it provided a visible way to see one’s aretê: see J.
Roisman, “Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest,” in I. Worthington (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford, 2007), 394. The contest (ἀγάλ), frequently a component for rhetorical manipulation by the Attic orators, “gave speakers considerable latitude in claiming superiority over others or denigrating their accomplishments”: Roisman, “Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest,” 400. In some ways, the *DFAM* represents Plutarch’s inheritance of this Hellenic competitive spirit. To show Alexander’s aretê, Plutarch created a rhetorical contest (ἀγάλ) in which the king is compared to philosophers and kings. The favorable comparison to philosophers reveals Alexander’s virtue and all that it entails. Similarly, he is shown far superior to barbarian kings, tyrants, and even his own father in those virtues expected of a ruler, especially bravery.

For more on courage in philosophy, see T. Nisters, *Aristotle on Courage* (Frankfurt, 2000). A discussion of andragathia/andreia and its importance in Greek life can be found in the commentary at 327E.
Section 10, 331 C – 332 C

Overview: Plutarch concludes the evidence of Alexander’s sayings with a discussion of the king’s favorite Homeric verse, his response when offered the lyre of Paris, and the infamous exchange between the king and Diogenes the Cynic in Corinth, in which, according to Plutarch, Alexander determined that he should change the coinage of his empire (as Diogenes had done at Sinope in 362) in order to be a philosopher. Also, Plutarch puts a comment among these anecdotes about Alexander’s megalomania and his view of the gymnosophists.

331 C

Καὶ μὴν εἴ ... Ἀλεξάνδρου μεμάντευται: Alexander’s love of Homer was well known (see the commentary on 327F-328A), and competitive recitations of Homer and the playwrights were a regular feature of Macedonian symposia: see E.N. Borza, “The Symposium at Alexander’s Court,” *Archaia Macedonia* 3 (Thessaloniki, 1983), 51. The Homeric line quoted here is *Iliad* 3.179, and describes Agamemnon, the king of Mycenae and commander of the allied Greek force which went to Troy. No other source asserts that this was Alexander’s favorite line, and Plutarch seems to be casting Alexander as another Agamemnon because of their similarities. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon is shown as a greedy (1.112-128), selfish (1.34-40, 140-149), and vengeful (1.183-198) similar to Alexander during the Philotas affair (Diod. 17.79-80, Arr. 3.26, Curt. 6.7-7.2, Just. 12.5.1-8, Plut. *Alex.* 48.1-49). Both Agamemnon and Alexander led panhellenic expeditions, and both met premature deaths. Agamemnon’s death was a result of his own *hubris* according to Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 733-747, and some later sources, indicate that Alexander’s death was due to his own excesses or his own *hubris* (Diod. 17.117.1-2, Curt. 10.5.31-32, Ael. *VH* 3.23). If Plutarch is recalling the epic (Homer) and dramatic traditions (Aeschylus), then it can be assumed that he expected his audience to do the
same. By doing so, Alexander is cast in an unfavorable light because of his quest for glory and luxury.

331D

διαβάξ τοίνυν ... ἡρωκάς πράξεις: Alexander crossed the Hellespont in spring 334 (Diod. 17.17.1, Just. 11.5.3-4, Plut. Alex. 15.1-3). According to Diodorus 17.17.2 and Justin 11.5.10, he was the first on shore and hurled a spear into the soil claiming the land as spear-won, like Protesilaus had done at Iliad 2.695. Arrian 1.11.7 agrees that Alexander was the first to disembark but makes no mention of the spear. The act has affinities with the Roman procedure for declaring war as outlined in Livy, in which a spear is thrown onto enemy territory after a formal declaration of war (1.32.14).

When Alexander arrived at Troy (modern Hisarlik), he visited the tombs of the heroes. Diodorus (17.17.3), Arrian (1.12.1), and Plutarch (Alex. 15.4) specifically mention his offerings at Achilles’ tomb, whereas Justin vaguely mentions sacrifices offered at Troy before the tombs of fallen heroes (11.5.10-12). Aelian, VH 9.38 also mentions Alexander’s visit to Troy, but focuses on the story of Achilles’ lyre to which Plutarch refers at 331D. The story of Achilles at Troy was common enough for Plutarch’s audience to be familiar with it.

Achilles held a special place for Alexander for he claimed him as an ancestor through his mother, Olympias (Curt. 8.4.26, Just. 17.3.1-14), and he was a hero after whom Alexander modeled himself (Diod. 17.97.3, Arr. 7.14, Curt. 4.6.29, 8.4.26). Curtius is the most blatant about suggesting that Alexander emulated Achilles (4.6.29, 8.4.26), while Diodorus makes an off-hand comment that Alexander compared himself to.
Achilles after wrestling with the Indus River (17.97.3). Arrian is more ambiguous, merely insinuating that after Hephaestion’s death in 324, Alexander cut his hair to imitate Achilles’ grief over Patroclus (7.14). Plutarch makes the comparison between Alexander and Achilles at *DFAM* 2, 343B when he claims that Alexander was far more magnanimous than Achilles.


καὶ τινὸς αὐτῶ ... ἔσταλε μέλεσι: Plutarch, *Alexander* 15.5 and Aelian 9.38 also record this exchange. All three accounts quote Homer, *Iliad* 9.189, which in the *DFAM* is the third of five Homeric quotations (326E, 331C, here, 331D, and 333C). At 332A-B, Plutarch names those whom Alexander emulated as Heracles, Perseus, and Dionysus, yet despite Alexander’s well-known imitation of Achilles, he is not mentioned in that list. Plutarch seems to de-emphasize Alexander’s emulation of Achilles, his maternal ancestor (Plut. *Alex.* 2.1), and instead focuses on those heroes/gods from whom Alexander was descended on his father’s side. Plutarch’s reasoning for emphasizing Alexander’s paternal lineage may have something to do with the king’s pretensions to divinity, which was based on the belief that his father was Zeus not Philip II.
Paris, although a womanizer, was often depicted effeminately and his lyre was an object of ridicule. Hector mocked both in the *Iliad* 3.54-55 and called his brother a pretty boy (6.809) and a coward (3.35-36, 6.342-343, 549) and the lyre a gift from Aphrodite, the most feminine of the goddesses (3.54-55). Horace later wrote an ode (1.15.14-15) in which Paris and his lyre were maligned (*grataque feminis inbelli cithara carmina divides*, “sing songs to women on your unwarlike cithara”).

331 E

*φιλοσόφου τοῖνυ ... τῶν βασιλέων:* This sentence bears remarkable resemblance to a passage at *Alexander* 8.4 in which Plutarch discusses Alexander’s devotion to philosophy. However, the list of respected philosophers in that passage, which includes Aristotle, Anaxarchus, Xenocrates, Dandamis, and Calanus, is different than the list here: Aristotle, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, Xenocrates, and Onesicritus. The sentiment in both works is the same as that presented throughout the work: Alexander had a truly philosophic soul as illustrated by his “gifts” to philosophers, either monetary or placement within the Macedonian forces.

Plutarch suggests that Alexander respected philosophers more than any other king, yet Perdiccas III, Macedonian king from 369-359, was advised by a former student of Plato, Euphræus of Oreus (Carystius, *FGrH* 356 F 1 = Athen. 11.508e); cf. N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* 2 (Oxford, 1979), 203-209. Plato’s successor as head of the Academy, Speusippus, wrote to Philip II asking for his patronage of the Academy (*Epistle to Philip*), but Philip apparently was not persuaded (cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, 121-122). For more on the relationship between Macedonian
kings and the Academy, see A.F. Natoli, *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II* (Stuttgart, 2004), 32-49.

καὶ πῶς μὲν ... Ἄριστοτέλην ἐρηται: Plutarch mentioned Alexander’s relationship with Aristotle at 327F (see the commentary), but Aristotle is only mentioned in terms of his role as the teacher who gave the king a copy of the *Iliad*, and his advice about the treatment of the Greeks, which Alexander did not follow, at 329B-C (see the commentary). Plutarch highlights the deterioration of the relationship between teacher (Aristotle) and pupil (Alexander). E. Microyannakis, “Aristotle and Alexander: On the Gradual Deterioration of their Relationship,” in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322-229 BC* (Oxford, 2003), 38-39, cites a poem in which Aristotle praises the virtue of Heracles, Ajax, Achilles, the Dioscuri and Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus, as evidence of Aristotle’s bitterness toward Alexander since he is left out of this list of virtuous men. This possibly indicates that Aristotle believed Alexander was overcome by his own ambition (*pothos*).

Microyannakis also suggests that Alexander gave money to Aristotle for his school founded in 334 (“Aristotle and Alexander,” 37). Aristotle’s time at Athens lasted from 335 to 323 when the anti-Macedonian sentiment on Alexander’s death forced him to flee (J.M. Cooper, “Aristotle,” in D. Sedley (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2003), 125-126). It is not unreasonable to think that, with unprecedented wealth flowing into Macedonian coffers during the Asian campaigns, Alexander gave money to Aristotle, given his donation to Xenocrates (see below pp. 306-307). Plutarch mentions the money Alexander sent to other philosophers a few lines later (Pyrrho and Xenocrates; cf. below pp. 305-307).

303
καὶ ὃτι τὸν ... φίλον ἐνόμισε: Frazier and Froidefond, in the Budé edition (pp. 222-223), take it for granted in their translation that the Anaxarchus mentioned here is the philosopher from Abdera of the same name, but this identification is problematic. Plutarch’s use of ἄρμονικὸς suggests that there could have been two people with this name at Alexander’s court: one the philosopher and the other a musician. However, it is more likely that Plutarch was referring to the philosopher and simply used an adjective (“harmonious”) to describe him. Every time Anaxarchus of Abdera is mentioned in the sources his name is either closely followed by σοφιστῆς or the passage makes clear in other ways that he is a philosopher. For example, Diodorus 17.112.4-5 mentions that Anaxarchus is a philosopher (τὸν φιλοσόφον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀλάξαρχον). Justin 12.13.5 also qualifies the name with the word philosopher (ab Anaxarch φιλοσοφό), and on the two occasions when Arrian discusses Anaxarchus he uses σοφιστῆς (4.9.7, 4.9.9). On three different occasions, Plutarch uses either a specific term, σοφιστῆς (Alex. 28.2), or clarifies who he is through context (Alex. 8.4, 52.2, Mor. 466D). In this case, Plutarch identifies this individual by placing him in a list of other known philosophers. Therefore, the variant use of ἄρμονικὸς is probably nothing more than an aberration or rhetorical embellishment.

Anaxarchus of Abdera was regarded as one of Alexander’s flatterers (Arr. 4.9.7, Plut. Alex. 52.4, Ath. 6.250f-251a, Diog. Laert. 9.60), whom Alexander held in esteem because of his philosophy (Alex. 8.4). Alexander’s good opinion of him more than likely was a result of Anaxarchus’ support of his desire for deification. Thus, in 327 at Bactra Anaxarchus supported the king’s attempt to introduce proskynesis, which was rejected by Callisthenes, Anaxarchus’ rival (Arr. 4.9.9); cf. E.N. Borza, “Anaxarchus and
Callisthenes: Academic Intrigue at Alexander’s Court,” in H.J. Dell (ed.), Ancient Macedonia Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson (Thessaloniki, 1981), 73-86. If Plutarch was referring to the philosopher (and not a musician), then Plutarch’s inclusion of Anaxarchus in this list may serve yet again to highlight an unfavorable aspect of Alexander’s personality, his growing megalomania. For more on Anaxarchus of Abdera, see further 331A with the commentary.

Πύρρονι δὲ ... χρυσοῦς ἔδωκε: Pyrrho of Elis (c 360s- 270s) was said to be a pupil of Anaxarchus of Abdera (Diog. Laert. 9.61). He accompanied Alexander on his campaigns, even to India (Diog. Laertius 9.69), where he too would have met the gymnosophists (on whom see 332B). Sextus Empiricus, Against the Learned 1.282, suggests that Alexander’s gift of ten thousand gold pieces was a reward for a poem honoring the Macedonian king which could have been presented on their first meeting, as Plutarch suggests here. Diogenes Laertius (1.16, 9.102) and Aristocles (Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.18.2) say Pyrrho left behind no writings (οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπεν), but plausibly, he may have written the poem mentioned by Sextus Empiricus but by the time of Diogenes and Aristocles it had been lost.

Plutarch includes the gift to Pyrrho to illustrate Alexander’s generous nature. That it was given when the two men first met (πρῶτον ἔντυχόντι) serves to emphasize, for Plutarch, the king’s love of philosophy. A similar inclusion is the gift sent to Xenocrates, mentioned below, but it, at least, is recorded elsewhere (Plut. Mor. 181E, Diog. Laert. 4.8, Val. Max. 4.3).

The encounter with the gymnosophists particularly influenced Pyrrho (Diog. Laert. 9.61), for it helped him to formulate his own philosophic ideas, and, as a result, he
is credited as the founder of the Sceptic school: see E. Flintoff, “Pyrrho and India,” *Phronesis* 25 (1980), 88-108. However, R. Bett, *Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy* (Oxford, 2000), 169-178, argues that we should not make too much of this encounter based on shared views on suffering and the use of quadrilemma. Nevertheless, Pyrrho’s beliefs have been clouded by those who subscribed to them three centuries later and called themselves Sceptics (Bett, *Pyrrho*, 105-111). Ultimately, Pyrrho argued that happiness is dependent upon how an individual deals with nature. There is, however, no way of ever knowing nature and, therefore, the individual should suspend judgment to attain tranquility: see A.A. Long, “The Socratic Legacy,” in K. Algra, J. Barnes, et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 639-640. One suspends judgment by abstaining from strong emotional reactions and abstaining from pain and suffering (Bett, *Pyrrho*, 106-108). Pyrrho’s philosophy of life was practical rather than theoretical, and the practical aspect may be the reason why Plutarch included him in this list since Anaxarchus and Onesicritus could be considered philosophers of the same pragmatic ilk unlike Aristotle and Xenocrates. For more on Pyrrho, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 682 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 239 with Bett, *Pyrrho, passim*.

**Ξενοκράτει δε τῷ ... δώρειν ἐπεμψεν:** Xenocrates was a pupil of Plato (Diog. Laert. 4.6) and headed the Academy from 339 until his death in 314. He allegedly refused an offer by Alexander to accompany him on his campaigns (*Mor.* 1043D). Both Plutarch and Diogenes record Alexander’s monetary gift to Xenocrates, though the amounts differ, Plutarch saying fifty talents (181E, 333B, *Alex.* 8.4) and Diogenes Laertius 4.8 mentioning only that Xenocrates returned 3000 drachmas to Alexander with the message
that the king’s needs were greater than his own. If the sources are to be believed, this gift could not have occurred prior to 334 since Alexander was in debt (the commentary on 327D-E). The episode is meant to be a testament to Alexander’s devotion to philosophy and his esteem for wise men in addition to his magnanimity. However, there may have been a political motive behind the gift since it had to have been offered after Alexander had left for Asia and there may have been a similar offer of money to Aristotle (see the commentary on 331E). The donation to Xenocrates may have been intended to garner the favor of the young men in Athens who attended the philosophical schools.

Furthermore, Xenocrates’ presence in this list also returns the audience to the *logos-ergon* antithesis. Xenocrates believed that the purpose of philosophy was the eradication of conflict in life: “the ‘end’ of human existence is, then, life according to Nature, which implies life according to Virtue:” J.M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 BC to AD 220* (Ithaca, 1996), 34. For Xenocrates, true wisdom (*sophia*) was unattainable (Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.5). Unlike Aristotle, who thought that *phronēsis* was practical knowledge, Xenocrates determined that human wisdom was theoretical *phronēsis* (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 37). In other words, seeking wisdom was a theoretical pursuit, which differs from the belief of Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, Onesicritus, and Diogenes that philosophy was in essence the practical application of wisdom. On Xenocrates, see further, Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 576 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 271-272, with J.M. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347-274 BC)* (Oxford, 2003), 89-177.

Ονησίκριτον δὲ ... πλειώνων ἱστόρηται: Onesicritus was a historian and Cynic philosopher (taught by Diogenes) in Alexander’s entourage. Alexander held him in such
high regard that he made him the chief pilot of the navy (Arr. 7.5.6, 20.9, Plut. Alex. 66.3, Strabo 15.1.28, 2.4). As a historian, his credibility was questioned (Arr. 6.2.3). The favorable view by Plutarch is not surprising considering that Onesicritus was one of his own sources; cf. Pearson, LHA, 91, N.G.L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 1993), 21-23. Onesicritus closes out Plutarch’s account of those wise men Alexander favored, and, thus, shows Alexander as a lover of wisdom and a magnanimous soul, and so brings the audience back to Alexander’s virtuous traits, which Plutarch mentioned earlier at 327E. Now, his magnanimity (megalopsuchia) is emphasized. Moreover, the inclusion of Onesicritus in this list recalls the logos-ergon antithesis because Cynicism maintained that it was a way of life rather than a school of thought: see R. Bracht Branham and M. Goulet-Caze, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy (Berkeley, 1996), 2-5. For more on Onesicritus, see Berve, Alexanderreich 2, 288-290 no. 583 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 183-184, with Pearson, LHA, 83-111.

Διογένει δ’ ... καὶ Ἀργεάδης: Diogenes was a Cynic philosopher from Sinope (modern Sinop in Turkey). The epithet “Cynic” is derived from the alleged exchange between Alexander and Diogenes at Corinth in 335, when Alexander said “I am Alexander the great king” (ἐγὼ εἰμί Ἀλέκανδρος ὁ μέγας βασιλεύος) to which Diogenes replied “And I am Diogenes the dog” (κἀγὼ Διογένης ὁ κύων): Diog. Laert. 6.60. Diogenes also seems to have poked fun at Alexander’s desire to be a god suggesting that if Alexander was Dionysus, then, he (Diogenes) was Sarapis (Diog. Laert. 6.63). The historicity of the meeting is doubtful.
Cynicism, which was not a philosophical school but a cultural movement, rejected shame, which allowed Cynics to live a way of life that was scandalous to others but “natural” to them; cf. Branham and Goulet-Caze, *The Cynics*, 2-5. Their freedom from convention allowed them “to use any place for any purpose” (Diog. Laert. 6.22) and to flaunt their differences, thus making the “dog-like” epithet apropos as they lived no differently from a dog. The whole point of the Cynic way of life was to live well, free from the constraints of society, in order to be happy. It emphasized actions over words because there was no other way to achieve a natural state of happiness than to remove social norms and customs from one’s life. This way of thinking has led to the association of cosmopolitanism with Cynicism because of Diogenes’ claim that he was without a *polis* and was a citizen of the universe (Diog. Laert. 6.38, 6.63).

Most of Diogenes’ life was spent in exile in Athens and Corinth because he defaced the coinage at the Sinope mint in 362 (Diog Laert. 6.20). When Alexander allegedly met him at Corinth, he was amazed at the philosopher’s arrogance and strength of spirit, and was purported to have said “If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes.” Other sources record the phrase, but not the events surrounding it (Diog. Laert. 6.32, Val. Max. 4.3.4, Juv. 14.311-314). Plutarch mentions it in at least two other places in the *Moralia* (605D, 782 A-B). Even Arrian records it, but he refers to it as a *logos* or story (7.2.1; cf. A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 39-40, for Arrian’s use of *oratio obliqua*). Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, 417 n. 3, records at least 22 citations of the quote including those already mentioned.

The anecdote and Plutarch’s subsequent analysis serve to further illustrate Alexander’s philosophical spirit. Plutarch is quick to add, though, that Alexander was
not suggesting that he would rather be a philosopher than a king. In fact, Plutarch wants his audience to believe that Alexander desired to be a philosopher who did not succumb to moral depravity and excess, but the reality was that Alexander was a king who could be considered to have succumbed to those vices. Furthermore, Plutarch emphasizes the *logos-ergon* antithesis which he introduced earlier at 327E, but here he concludes that merit can be found in both words and actions as they are placed on equal footing. For more on Diogenes, see Berve, *Alexanderreich* 2, no. 22 and Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 113, with L. Navia, *Diogenes the Cynic: The War against the World* (Amherst, 2005).

The Macedonian royal house was descended from the Argead house of Temenus, a descendent of Heracles (Hdt. 5.20, 22, Thuc. 2.99.3, 5.80.2, Diod. 17.1.5, Arr. 4.8.4, Plut. *Alex.* 2.1). Through his mother Olympias, Alexander was descended from Achilles’ son, Neoptolemus (Plut. *Alex.* 2.1). Plutarch tends to focus more on Alexander’s paternal side in *DFAM* 1 (see the commentary on 331D).

331 F

οὐ γὰρ προέκρινε ... τοῦ τρίβωνος: Plutarch continues to highlight the philosophical side of Alexander with two comparisons. In the first, he pits Fortune against Wisdom, so that Fortune’s role in Alexander’s life is downplayed while Wisdom’s role, and by extension Philosophy’s role, is elevated. The second antithesis sets royalty in opposition to philosophy and poverty, subjugating the royal aspect of Alexander to his love for wisdom. It also refers back to earlier statements (331E) regarding Alexander’s magnanimity. Here, Plutarch intimates that Alexander, as a man, would give up his wealth for poverty which is characterized by the philosopher’s wallet and tattered gown,
but since he was a king, he could not. The wallet and tattered cloak exemplified the garb of the philosopher and their rejection of luxury (Ar. Wealth 298, Clouds 923, Frogs 273). For example, Diogenes, who flaunted social convention, wore only a cloak to sleep in and kept a wallet for his food (Diog. Laert. 6.22). Antisthenes, who as a Socratic developed the basic tenets that would become Cynicism, was reportedly the first to wear the cloak doubled over and carry the wallet (Diog. Laert. 6.13); cf. A.A. Long, “The Socratic Legacy,” in K. Algra and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), 625-627. Lucian records a similar description of a philosopher, in that case Peregrinus carries the wallet and wears the robe (Pereg. 15).

332 A

ἀλλ᾽ εἶπεν ... Διογένους εὐτέλειαν: Plutarch recasts his previous statements by saying that had Alexander not had a higher purpose (apparently melding Hellenic culture with foreign cultures, civilizing nations, expanding Macedonia’s dominion, and bringing peace and justice to all), then Alexander would have been a philosopher of Diogenes’ ilk. As it was, Alexander was busy with his grand mission which was to bring “justice and peace” (εὐδικίαν καὶ εἰρήνην) to every nation. The word εὐδικία (justice) is used at 781F-782A of the Moralia where Plutarch records that Plato believed justice and knowledge to be the model virtues that philosophers should imitate. It is the same term used in Homer’s Odyssey 19.111 when Odysseus tells Athena that upholding justice is the responsibility of a king. In other words, the king should be just and wise. The term is used to enhance the image of Alexander as a just king. However, the lines following seem to contradict this image because Plutarch specifically mentions the king’s emulation of Heracles, Achilles,
and Dionysus calling attention to Alexander’s growing megalomania (cf. 331D and pp. 51-52). However, Plutarch seems almost to be granting Alexander the gift of foresight, or at the very least a heaping dose of self-confidence. In this passage, it seems the king had known while in Corinth in 335 (when he met Diogenes) that he would stretch the borders of his kingdom and civilize the east by introducing Greek culture.

\textit{νῦν δὲ σύγγνωθ...μημοῦμαι:} Evidence of Alexander’s emulation of Heracles is abundant in the sources (Arr. 3.3.1-2, 4.10.5-6, 5.3, 5.26, Curt. 3.10.5, 8.5.8, 8.5.11, 9.2.29, 9.4.21, Just. 11.4.5, 12.7.13, Strabo 3.5.5); cf. Tarn, \textit{Alexander} 2, 51-52 and 58-60, Lane Fox, \textit{Alexander}, 333-334, Hammond, \textit{KCS}, 266-269, Bosworth, \textit{Arrian} 1, 269-270 and \textit{Alexander and the East} (Oxford, 1996), 118-120, E.A. Fredricksmeyer, “Alexander’s Religion and Divinity,” in J. Roisman (ed.), \textit{Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great} (Leiden, 2003), 261-264. It is closely associated with his ancestry: see the commentary on 331E. His imitation of Heracles is also a factor in the siege at Tyre in 332 (Diod. 17.40.2-46.6, Arr. 2.16.1-7, Curt. 4.2.2-4.8.16, Just. 11.10.10, Plut. \textit{Alex.}, 24.3); on which, see Lane Fox, \textit{Alexander}, 181-182, Green, \textit{Alexander}, 246-248, Bosworth, \textit{CE}, 65-67, Hammond, \textit{Genius}, 94-96, and Worthington, \textit{Alexander}, 77-81, and the capture of the rock of Aornus in 327/6 (Diod. 17.85.2-96.2, Arr. 4.28.1-5, Curt. 8.10.1-11.2, Just. 12.7.12-13, Strabo 15.1.8); on which, see Tarn, \textit{Alexander} 1, 90-93, Green, \textit{Alexander}, 383-385, Hammond, \textit{Genius}, 162-164, Bosworth, \textit{CE}, 282-284, and Worthington, \textit{Alexander}, 149-150.

The inclusion of Heracles, Perseus (below), and Dionysus (below) contradicts the image of a frugal and philosophical king. Alexander did not sit quietly on his throne in Pella, but rather he went out to surpass the exploits of heroes and gods (\textit{DFR} 326B). The
idea of a great panhellenic expedition (implied in the mention of the Homeric quote at 331C) against the Persians is lost. Instead, Plutarch is stressing Alexander’s personal longing, his *pothos*, which was determined by a “mythical and historical consciousness and pride” and hence denigrates him: V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford, 1938), 52-61.

καὶ Περσέα ζηλό: Alexander’s emulation of Perseus is not as prevalent in the sources as that of Heracles, Achilles, and Dionysus. Arrian is the only author to mention the connection between Alexander and Perseus (3.3.2). Like the connection with Heracles, Alexander could trace his lineage back to Perseus, the supposed great-grandfather of Heracles (Apollod. *Epit.* 2.4); cf. the commentary on 331E.


Dionysus was a god whom Alexander emulated, although he did not appear as a model for Alexander until the events at Nysa in India in 326 where the king thought he saw ivy, a symbol of Dionysus, growing wild and took its presence to mean that he had been to India (Arr. 5.1.1-3.3, Strabo 15.1.8). They ivy was most likely *scindapsos* (Worthington, *Alexander*, 148) which is more commonly referred to as devil’s ivy. Curtius and Justin go so far as to say that Dionysus founded Nysa (Curt. 8.10.7, Just. 12.7.4-10.9). The most blatant example of Alexander’s emulation of Dionysus was during the march through Carmania in 324 when he dressed as Dionysus: Diod. 17.106.1, Arr. 6.28.2, Curt. 9.10.24-29, Plut. *Alex.* 6.28.2. Like his exploitation of Heracles, Alexander exploited the
legend of Dionysus in an effort to further the issue of his divinity but he took it further by imitating a being born a god (Dionysus) rather than a mortal man who later became a god like Heracles; cf. D.L. Gilley, “Alexander and the Carmanian March of 324 BC,” *AHB* 20 (2006), 12-14. Alexander’s manipulation of the Dionysus myth for his own purposes is also interesting in light of his interest in Euripides (see the commentary on 327F and 333C), author of the *Bacchae* (about Dionysus’ punishment of Pentheus, king of Thebes, for failure to worship the god), because many of Alexander’s men had difficulty believing that he was a god (Arr. 4.8, 7.9, Curt. 4.7.31).

There was no familial connection between Dionysus and the Macedonian royal house (other than common descent from Zeus) as Plutarch claims here. It was well-known, however, that Olympias was a devout worshipper of Dionysus (Plut. *Alex.* 2.5): see E.D. Carney, *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York, 2006), 96-100.

The statement that Alexander wanted Greeks to dance in India and revive the Bacchic revels refers to the myth of Dionysus in India (Apollod. *Epit.* 3.5.2). Arrian does not believe the account of Eratosthenes when he discusses the Dionysiac revel at Nysa (5.2.7). Curtius and Justin, however, recount the event in some detail. Alexander and his men wore ivy-garlands on their heads, while they feasted and drank heavily (Curt. 8.10.15-18). Justin adds that the men called out to the god in a frenzy with Alexander standing by in dismay (12.7.8). Plutarch does not record this episode in his life of Alexander. A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 67-72, has argued that the story was probably a later interpolation; cf. N.G.L. Hammond, *Sources for Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1993), 248-250. One can infer from Plutarch and Arrian’s failure to mention the incident that it was fictitious and was added by other
authors like Curtius and Justin who were hostile to Alexander and wanted to show his megalomania.

332 B

κάκει τίνες εἶναι ... ἐκείνους: The only “vulgate” account to record a meeting between Alexander and the gymnosophists is Plutarch at *Alexander* 64-65. Supposedly, these philosophers were instrumental in the revolt of one of the Indian satraps, Sambus/Sabbas, who controlled the region between the Indus and the Kirthar Mountains (Diod. 17.102.6-103.8, Arr. 6.16.3-5, Curt. 9.8.13-15). Alexander captured ten of them, but their identity is unknown. This passage and the one in the *Alexander* show that they were an ascetic group devoted to nature. Diodorus 17.103.1 and Arrian 6.16-17 refer to a group called the Brahmans who were a sect of wise men living at Harmatelia, which was either in the land of Sindimana (Curt. 9.8.17) or the land of the Oreitae (Strabo 15.2.7); cf. P.H.L. Eggermont, *Alexander’s Campaigns in Sind and Baluchistan and the Siege of the Brahmin Town of Harmatelia* (Leuven, 1975), 125-134. Strabo, citing Ptolemy, mentions two sects of the Brahmans: those who followed the king and those who followed nature (15.1.66). Megasthenes, *BNJ* 715 F 33, recorded by Strabo 15.1.58-60, names two different groups: the Brahmans and the Garmanes. Both groups lived ascetic lifestyles, which coincides with Plutarch’s statements here: see D.W. Roller, “Megasthenes 715” *BNJ*. However, Plutarch uses τίνες λέγονται (“some say”) to introduce these philosophers, and the impersonal nature of the phrase may indicate that Plutarch is unsure about his information. It is also likely that the story was transmitted via an oral tradition,
Like that of Herodotus, when it is unnecessary to cite one’s source: A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 39-40.

J.W. Sedlar, *India and the Greek World* (Totowa, 1980), 70, however, argues that the episode with the gymnosophists is fictional because (1) the wise men would not have visited other people uninvited (Strabo 15.1.63), and (2) Alexander would not have deigned to seek them out himself. Yet, Sedlar’s evidence does not negate the fact that Alexander came into close contact with the Brahmans in the course of his Indian campaigns, as one of them, Calanus, accompanied him from India and died in Ecbatana in 324 (Arr. 7.3.1; cf. Bosworth, *CE*, 155). On Alexander’s contact with the Brahmans, see R. Stoneman, “The Brahmans in the Alexander Historians and the Alexander Romance,” *JHS* 115 (1995), 100-114 and *Alexander the Great: A Life in Legend* (New Haven, 2008), 91-106.

The comparison between the gymnosophists and Diogenes reiterates the philosopher’s rejection of luxury which was also discussed at 331F (see the commentary above pp. 310-311). Alexander’s contact with these foreign philosophers, in Plutarch’s mind, gives credibilty to his suggestion that Alexander would have been frugal if he was an ordinary man.

δεῖ κἄμε ... Ἐλληνική πολιτεία: Diogenes is reported to have debased the coinage of Sinope and as a result he was forced into exile (Diog. Laert. 6.20-21) at Athens and Corinth (see the commentary on 331E). Plutarch’s suggestion that Alexander wanted to change the coinage of his new empire is not surprising since Philip II had set a precedent for this during his reign when he began minting his own coinage; cf. G. Le Rider, *Le Monnayage d’Argent et d’Or de Philippe II* (Paris, 1977), 387, 354-356. Some time in the
late 340s, he issued a gold stater, which replaced the Persian *daric* in northern Greece; cf. Le Rider, *Le Monnayage*, 432-434, V. Poulios, “Macedonian Coinage from the 6th Century to 148 BC,” in J. Vokotopoulou (ed.), *Greek Civilization: Macedonia, Kingdom of Alexander the Great* (Athens, 1993), 88, N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* 2 (Oxford, 1972), 662-666, and the commentary at 327D. After his accession, Alexander began minting coinage, which still had Philip’s name, from the royal mints at Pella and Amphipolis, and in 335 his own iconography (a young Heracles) began appearing on them. After Issus in 333, royal coins bearing Alexander’s name were struck at mints in Tarsus, Byblus, Sidon, and Babylon replacing local currency; cf. A.R. Bellinger, *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great* (New York, 1963), 60-68 and H. von Aulock, “Die Prägung des Balakros in Kilikien,” *JNG* 14 (1964), 79-82. He even had coins struck to commemorate the victory at the Hydaspes River in 326, although this was probably for political reasons; cf. A.B. Bosworth, *Alexander and the East* (Oxford, 1996), 6-8. Alexander more than likely had very little to do with the everyday minting of coinage since he was on campaign far from his mints: see Bosworth, *CE*, 245, who suggests that it was the royal treasurer who took on this responsibility. Nevertheless, Plutarch suggests that Alexander’s desire to change the coinage of his empire was philosophical since Diogenes had done so, though illegally. The act itself seems to be tied to Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism (discussed above at pp. 309) and hence serves to highlight yet again Alexander’s desire to unite the races (see above pp. 44-48).
Overview: Plutarch begins his epilogue by stressing that all of Alexander’s actions reveal his superior virtue, but also his actions reveal a man of contrasts. In addition, Plutarch throws in a few more anecdotes (involving Porus, Roxane, and Hephaestion) which reveal Alexander’s philosophical mindset.

332 C

Ἐἶνεν· αἱ ὁμοια ἐν μορίαν πάντα πράτοντος: Plutarch’s debt to classical Attic authors (on which see pp. 106-122) is shown in his use of the particle ἐἶνεν which was used in Attic dialogue and oratory. Plato, for example, used it in his works (*Apol.* 19a, *Rep* 350d, *Syp.* 213e). However, it seems that in this instance Plutarch was imitating the tragedians who followed the particle with one or more rhetorical questions (*Soph.* Philoc. 1308, Eur. *Med.* 386).

In moving to his conclusion of *DFAM* 1, Plutarch uses this long rhetorical question to restate his thesis that the source of Alexander’s actions is not just Fortune (cf. 326DE). The question pits the possible unfavorable origins of his actions (whim of Fortune, brutality of war, might of conquest) against his virtues (great courage, justice, great moderation, noble behavior, and intelligence). For Plutarch, the origins of Alexander’s actions and his virtues are not clear cut and lines have been blurred. He wants his audience to see that in Alexander’s complexity he was a war-monger and conqueror as much as a mild-mannered, moderate, courageous and intelligent philosopher-king. The results of his actions and the process by which the results were achieved can be viewed in different ways, but that does not mean that his actions reveal the presence or even lack of virtue. Plutarch saw Alexander as the handiwork of both
Fortune and Virtue (326D). Their involvement in the king’s life cannot be separated, but Virtue’s influence is far superior to that of Fortune, and it was, according to Plutarch, what made Alexander a philosopher.

The terminology of the rhetorical question itself correlates to the prooimion where Alexander’s virtues are seen as εὐβουλία, καρτερία, ἀνδρέας, and σωφροσύνη. They are reiterated again at 327E, though the list there is varied: μεγαλοπνυχίας, συνέσεως, σωφροσύνης, and ἀνδραγαθίας. The one constant in all three lists is σωφροσύνη (moderation).

Plutarch’s statement that Alexander did everything with sober and prudent judgment (νήσφωντι καὶ πεπνυμένῳ ὁ λογισμῷ πάντα πράττοντος) is rhetorical (hyperbole) because there are episodes in Alexander’s life that show his vengeful and narcissistic behavior. For example, Alexander laid siege to Tyre in 332 because the Tyrians refused to allow him into the city to worship Heracles (Diod. 17.40.2-3, Arr. 2.16.1, Curt. 4.2.2, Just. 11.10.10, Plut. Alex. 24.2). Also, the attempt to introduce proskynesis in 328 at Bactra was part of Alexander’s desire to be worshipped as a god (Arr. 4.9-10, Curt. 8.5.5-22, Just. 12.7.1, Plut. Alex. 54.3-6), and in 328 at Maracanda when in a fit of drunken rage Alexander killed Cleitus (Curt. 8.1.29-51, Arr. 4.8.8, Plut. Alex. 51.8).

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ... τῶν ἁρετῶν μεμεῖχθεναι: Plutarch interjects his text with an oath to the gods that it is impossible to suggest that Alexander’s actions can indicate one single virtue. One cannot say that Alexander is only brave (ἀνδρείας), humane (φιλανθρωπίας), or only self-disciplined (ἐγκρατείας), but rather that he is all of these.
He further suggests that Alexander is not the product of one particular entity, but rather a combination of all the efforts of Fortune and Virtue (see the commentary on 326D).

Βεβαιούντος αὐτῶ τὸν ... πρὸς τὸ τέλος: For those that argue that Plutarch was anti-Stoic, his acceptance of a Stoic principle here is surprising. Plutarch, however, was accepting of the principles of other philosophical schools: see R. Barrow, *Plutarch and His Times* (London, 1967), 102-108. He was a selective philosopher and only chose certain aspects of various philosophies to formulate his own understanding. The particular principle here, that every act represents every virtue, is one which he appropriated from Socratic and Stoic beliefs, and it is also mentioned in connection with the Stoic Zeno by Diogenes Laertius 7.125. It appears to have been a bone of contention among ancient philosophers, even within the Stoic sect (Diog. Laert. 7.161). Ethical virtue was such a major issue that Plutarch, the quintessential ethicist, devotes an entire essay, *On Moral Virtue* (440D-452D), to its plurality. He concluded that virtue was the median (τὸ μέσον) between defect and excess which is an idea put forth by Aristotle, who argues that virtue is the state of mind between two vices, but not every action indicates that mean or virtue (*Eth. Nic.* 1107a1). To use Plutarch’s example, courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness (*Mor.* 445A). Virtue is a result of choice, not action. It is an intellectual pursuit where the end result is *eudaimonia* (“happiness”).

That virtue is a composite made up of various characteristics was discussed as early as Socrates, who argued for its unity not its plurality (Pl. *Pyth.* 329CD). It was a concept which formed a part of the foundation of Stoic philosophy and was more than likely laid out in Zeno’s *Ethics*, which has not survived (Diog. Laert. 7.4); cf. M. Schofield, “Stoic Ethics,” in B. Inwood, (ed.) *A Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*
Aristotle appears to have argued for its plurality when he delineates virtues that are moral, which are a result of habit, and intellectual, which are a result of education (Nic. Eth. 1103a3-7). Furthermore, he argues that an action in and of itself is not virtuous unless the individual doing the action is in the right frame of mind. That individual must know what he is doing, and he must choose to act the way he does without any benefit for himself, and the act must stem from a firm and unchangeable character (Eth. Nic. 1105a28-34). Aristotle’s arguments add to the idea that virtue is a choice and therefore it is an intellectual pursuit. Alexander’s actions, in this context, reveal a highly virtuous mind and a steadfast character.

ιδεῖν γονόν ἔστιν ... οὐκ ἄπαραμύθητον: Plutarch employs antithesis, a common rhetorical device, to show that Alexander embodied all virtues (humanity, manliness, economy, tolerance, temperance, a hardy work ethic), as well as vices (war-like, effeminate, rash, lazy), and it is similarly used in DFAM 2 at 337C to suggest that the absence of virtue from a fortunate man makes him wicked. The effect in both cases further emphasizes the virtue of moderation, that all virtue is balanced in one man: Alexander. It also serves to show Alexander as more human pulling him down from the lofty position where Plutarch had placed him in the first few chapters of the oration by suggesting that he has both negative and positive qualities. It effectively makes him a mortal man whose virtues should be emulated.

Plutarch uses different terms for the virtues here (φιλάνθρωπον, ἄνδροδες, οἰκονομικόν, εὐδιάλλακτον) than those at 327E (μεγαλοψυχίας, συνέσεως, σωφροσύνης, ἄνδραγαθίας). Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, 62-64, suggests that authors aimed at synonymy, which was a conscious effort to avoid monotony. For example, philanthrôpia is often synonymous with σοφροσύνη, and andreia and andragathia with andrôdes (cf. Dover, Greek Popular Morality, 164-167). Plutarch’s variations, then, reveal his rhetorical skill.

τίς ἔμειξε ... καὶ ὑμεναίους: Plutarch follows the preceding antithesis of negative qualities and positive virtues with examples of these opposites in action: i.e. the practical application of Alexander’s virtues (ἐργον).

Banquets, festivals, and games were a regular component of Alexander’s court. Prior to the march to the Hellespont in 334, Alexander organized a banquet for his friends and ambassadors in anticipation of the Asian campaign (Diod. 17.16.3-5, Arr. 1.11.1).
After his victory at the siege of Tyre in 332, he organized a ceremonial parade and athletic contests (Arr. 2.25). On his return from Egypt in 331, he held religious celebrations and games at Tyre again (Arr. 3.6; cf. Curt. 4.8.16). At Maracanda in 328, a banquet was held which eventually led to the murder of Clitus (Arr. 4.8.1-9.9, Curt. 8.1.22). Surprisingly, Plutarch, in his biography of Alexander, mentions only three occasions where Alexander hosted games or festivals: following Issus in 333 (20.8), after leaving Egypt in 331 (29.1), and the revel with Medius that led to his death in Babylon in 323 (75.3). In Diodorus and Arrian, battles and times of conflict are often followed by festivals and games in an effort to boost morale, as were funerals, in which feasting and athletic contests were part of a ritual of lament: D. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (Ithaca, 1971), 202. Thus, after the gymnosophist Calanus’ ritual suicide at Ecbatana in 324, a party with gymnastic and musical performances followed by a drinking contest was held (Diod. 17.107.2-6, Arr. 7.3.1-6, Plut. Alex. 69.6-7).

The sources focus on two wedding celebrations in their accounts (Alexander’s marriage to Roxane in 327 and the mass marriage at Susa in 324), but they do not indicate that there were any festivities after Alexander married Roxane. This perhaps was because his men were not as accepting of this marriage as Plutarch indicates in the *Alexander* (47.4-5). Plutarch, *Alexander* 70.2-3 and Athenaeus 12.538a are the only authors who state that there was a banquet following the wedding ceremony at Susa. Other authors may have omitted the banquet because it was a traditional part of the festivities and needed no comment; cf. J.H. Oakley and R.H. Sinos, *The Wedding in Ancient Athens* (Madison, 1993), 35-38. For more on Alexander’s marriage to Roxane,
see 332E-F. For more on the mass marriages at Susa, see 329C and the commentary on 332E-F.

In addition to banquets, festivals, and games, Alexander organized κόμοι, which were drunken processions, like the one at Nysa in 327 when the army recognized ivy as proof of Dionysus’ travels and then celebrated (Arr. 5.2-3; cf. the commentary on 332A). Another komos occurred at Carmania in 324 (Diod. 17.106.1, Curt. 9.10.24-29, Just. 12.7.7-8, Plut. Alex. 67.1-4). Justin mentions only one κόμος, the one that precipitated the king’s death (12.13.7), a detail that most of the ancient authors included (Diod. 17.117.1, Arr. 7.24-25.1, Plut. Alex. 75.3, Ael. VH 3.23).

τίς ἄδικοδυν ἐχθέτερος … Δεομένοις εὐγνωμονέστερος: Plutarch seems to insist on a one-dimensional view of Alexander seeing only his positive qualities and ignoring the obvious negative ones. Alexander was frequently hostile to those whom he believed opposed him, and on several occasions, his self-control (σωφροσύνη) was called into question. In 335, the Thebans sent him into a blinding rage for calling him a tyrant (Diod. 17.9.5-6, Plut. Alex. 13.1-2), which led to him besieging their city and razing it to the ground (Diod. 17.8.3-9.6, Just. 11.3.6-7, Plut. Alex. 11-12); see the commentary on 327C. Then in 330, Alexander had Philotas arrested, put on trial, and executed for failure to tell him about an assassination plot (Diod. 17.79-80, Arr. 3.26, Curt. 6.7-7.2.34, Just. 12.5.1-3, Plut. Alex. 48-49.7). Alexander then took the opportunity to remove Parmenio, Philotas’ father, who frequently questioned the king’s plans (Curt. 4.13.4, Arr. 1.13.2, 1.18.6-9, 3.10.1-2, Plut. Alex. 16.3.31.11-12); cf. E. Badian, “The Death of Parmenio,” TAPA 91 (1960), 324-338 and “Conspiracies,” in A.B. Bosworth and E. Baynham (eds.), Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction (Oxford, 2000), 64-69. In 329,
Alexander had Bessus ritually mutilated and sent to Ecbatana for execution in a public assembly for his role in the assassination of Darius III (Arr. 4.7.3, Curt. 7.5.40-42, 7.10.10, Plut. Alex. 43.6). Alexander’s motivation here, however, may have had more to do with Bessus claiming the Persian throne as Artaxerxes V and threatening the security of his position in Asia.

Probably the most well-known of Alexander’s emotional actions is his murder of Cleitus in 328. During a drinking party in Maracanda, Cleitus publicly objected to the changes in Alexander, both personally and politically (Arr. 4.8.4, Curt. 8.1.28-32, Plut. Alex. 50.6), in addition to lauding the achievements of Philip (Curt. 8.1.33, Just. 12.6.2-5). In a drunken rage and after two fierce exchanges between the two men, Alexander murdered Cleitus (Arr. 4.8.8-9.1, Curt. 8.1.49-52, Just. 12.6.3, Plut. Alex. 50.1-51.6). He was immediately remorseful, but the damage had been done (Arr. 4.9.2, Curt. 8.2.1, Just. 12.6.7-11, Plut. Alex. 52.1-2). On the murder of Cleitus, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 73-75, Lane Fox, Alexander, 309-314, Green, Alexander, 361-366, Bosworth, CE, 114-116, Hammond, KCS, 197-198, and Worthington, Alexander, 136-138. Then in 327, Callisthenes was tortured and executed for his alleged role in the so-called Pages’ Conspiracy to murder Alexander (Arr. 4.13.1-14.4, Curt. 8.8.27, Just. 15.3.3-5, Plut. Alex. 55.4-5). It was due to Callisthenes’ defiance that Alexander’s attempt to introduce proskynesis at Bactra in 327 failed (see pp. 45-46), and most of the sources agree that Alexander was fixated on ruining Callisthenes (Arr. 4.12.7, Curt 8.6.1, 8.8.24, Plut. Alex. 55.1-2, Just. 15.3.3). On the Pages Conspiracy and Callisthenes, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 81, Bosworth, CE, 117-119, Hammond, KCS, 200-201, Badian, “Conspiracies,” 71-72, and Worthington, Alexander, 141-143.
In 326, Coenus, one of Alexander’s generals, vocally objected to advancing further into India during the mutiny at the Hyphasis River (Arr. 5.27.1, Curt. 9.3.3-5). Coenus worsened his situation by suggesting that a successful man like Alexander should know when to stop. After manipulating the omens so that further advance eastward was unfavorable, Alexander ordered his army to turn back. Coenus died of a mysterious disease a few days later (Curt. 9.3.20, Arr. 6.2.1), and it is possible that Alexander had a hand in his death because of his opposition. On the mutiny at the Hyphasis, see Tarn, Alexander 1, 98-99, Bosworth, CE, 132-134, Hammond, KCS, 246-247, and Worthington, Alexander, 158-161 and 208-209.

In general, those that defied Alexander suffered harshly. For instance, the people of Halicarnassus refused to surrender to Alexander in 334 and as a result he laid siege to the city eventually razing it to the ground (Diod. 17.27.6, Arr. 1.23.6). Tyre was besieged in 332 for failure to allow Alexander to enter the city to worship Heracles. Alexander had all the Tyrians who did not flee to the temples executed and then he burned all the buildings in retaliation (Curt. 4.4.13; cf. Arr. 2.24.5, who says that some 30,000 Tyrians and foreigners in the city did not flee to the temples and were sold into slavery). After Tyre, Alexander marched to Gaza and laid siege to it (Diod. 17.48.6-7, Arr. 2.26.1-2, Curt. 4.6.7), and, when the city fell, he sold the women and children into slavery (Arr. 2.27.7). In 329, he accepted the surrender of the alleged descendants of the Branchidae, who had surrendered the temple of Apollo at Didymus to Xerxes in 479 on his return from Greece, but then massacred them on the following day (Curt. 7.5.28-35, Strabo 517-518); cf. H.W. Parke, “The Massacre of the Branchidae,” JHS 105 (1985), 59-68.
In 323, Alexander returned to Babylon where he met with Greek embassies protesting the implementation of his Exiles Decree (Diod. 17.113.3-4). This ordered the return of all Greek exiles, except the Thebans, and those accused of sacrilege (Diod. 18.18.4, Just. 13.5.2-6). Their return would have caused further economic instability in Greece, which at the time was recovering from a famine. Alexander must have refused the Greeks’ pleas regarding the decree since only Tegea received its exiles back (M.N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions 2 (Oxford, 1948), no. 202, 48-57), and the Athenians refused the return of their exiles who were gathering at Megara (Din. 1.58, 94).

Alexander’s behavior, however, was inconsistent for often an enemy who exhibited skill and excellence was rewarded. For example, Alexander allowed Porus, an Indian prince who ruled the region between the Hydaspes (Jhelum) and the Acesines (Chenab) Rivers, to retain his kingdom as Alexander’s vassal because he proved himself in battle at the Hydaspes in 326 and showed courage when he was brought before Alexander afterwards (Diod. 17.89.6, Arr. 5.19, Curt. 8.14.45, Plut. Alex. 60.15); cf. the commentary on 332E.

There are also several examples of Alexander’s kindness to the unfortunate. For instance, during the looting of Thebes in 335, a Thracian captain entered the house of a Theban woman, Timoclea, and raped her (Aristobulus, FGrH 139 F 2b = Plut. Mor. 259D-260D). She lured him to a well, pushed him in to it, and stoned him to death. She was then arrested and brought before Alexander who asked her who she was. With courage and dignity, she replied that she was the sister of Theagenes, the man who fought Philip II at Chaeronea and may have led the Theban Sacred Band (Plut. Alex. 12.3).
Alexander was so impressed by her comportment that he spared her life. In 330, on the road to Persepolis, he came across a large number of Greek refugees, many of whom were elderly and disfigured (Diod. 17.69.3-4). He gave them three thousand drachmas each, five men’s robes, some oxen, sheep and fifty bushels of wheat (Diod. 17.69.8, Curt. 5.5.24).

Of course, his actions were often for practical reasons, for example in 334, Ada of Caria appealed to him to restore her to her kingdom after Alexander had successfully besieged Halicarnassus (Diod. 17.24.2-3, Arr. 1.23.7-8). He agreed and allowed her to rule Caria as vassal. His magnanimity was politically motivated, for placing Ada on her rightful throne allowed him to leave the region in the hands of someone intimately acquainted with it. Ada was aware of the intricacies of ruling Caria, in Alexander’s name, and had the loyalty of the people as well. More famously, after the battle of Issus in 333, the Macedonians captured Darius’ mother, wife, and his daughters (Diod. 17.35.1-36.4, Arr. 2.11.9-10, Curt. 3.11.21-23, Just. 11.9.11-13, Plut. Alex. 20.6-8). Alexander treated them with great respect, as befitted their status. Again, there was a political side to his actions, for he was assuming Darius’ position of kyrios over his family to help legitimize his rule over Asia: see the commentary on 329E.

332 E

'Ἐπεισί μοι τὸ ... γὰρ πάντ’ ἐνεστὶ: Alexander’s army confronted and defeated Porus at the Hydaspes River in the spring of 326 (Diod. 17.87.1-89.6, Arr. 5.11-19.2, Curt. 8.13.3-14.45, Just. 12.8.1-7, Plut. Alex. 70.1-8). The story provided here is Porus’ response when he was questioned by Alexander after his capture. It is intended to further prove
the Stoic principle mentioned at 332D that every action represents a virtue. Here, Alexander’s actions reveal justice (δικαιοσύνη), which was mentioned in Plutarch’s list of Alexander’s virtues at 332C. Ultimately, Alexander allowed Porus to rule his kingdom as his vassal, a move that had pragmatic reasons. It suited Alexander’s interests to keep Porus on his own throne because he was intimately aware of the complexities involved in ruling his own territory. In addition, it kept Alexander from having to station a large number of men in the region to hold it.

The story is recorded by a variety of authors (Arr. 5.19.2, Curt. 8.14.41-45, Plut. Mor. 181E, Mor. 458B, Alex. 60.8, Metz Epit. 61, Them. Or. 7 88D-89B). Because of Arrian’s qualification in his account (λόγος ὅτι; cf. A.B. Bosworth, From Arrian to Alexander (Oxford, 1988), 39-40, on Arrian’s use of oratio obliqua), N.G.L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 1993), 108-109, has suggested that this indicates a variant source, possibly Chares. However, Bosworth, Arrian 2, 309 and E. Baynham, Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius Rufus (Ann Arbor, 1998), 123, argue that it clearly points to a common source, Ptolemy or Aristobulus, since, despite Arrian’s use of λόγος in this instance, the remainder of the passage bears a striking resemblance to Plutarch’s account and that of the Metz Epitome. The only variant in the exchange between Porus and Alexander occurs in Curtius (8.14.41-45) when the Indian prince reminds Alexander of the dangerous nature of Fortune. Curtius further emphasizes one of his major themes in this episode and highlights “the morally corruptive effect of unbroken success”: Baynham, Alexander, 124.

Ῥοξάνης ἐρασθείς ... φιλοσόφως: It is commonly reported that Alexander fell in love with Roxane, the daughter of the Bactrian nobleman Oxyartes, at first sight (Arr. 4.19, Curt. 8.4.23, Plut. *Alex.* 47 and 338D). Tarn suggests that this marriage was one “of policy” (*Alexander* 1, 76) dismissing the ‘love at first sight’ idea presented in the sources as “the proper thing to say” (*Alexander* 2, 326). Worthington, *Alexander*, 140, insists that the marriage was for more pragmatic reasons, which included following in his father’s legacy of multiple diplomatic marriages. Plutarch speculates that the marriage could serve a political purpose (*Alex.* 47.4), but does not dismiss Alexander’s love (ἐρωτεί) for the woman. Even Curtius, who is more often than not hostile to Alexander, records that he fell in love with Roxane, but also that it was an attempt to unify the races (8.4.23-25).

The most likely scenario deals more with Roxane’s father, Oxyartes, a Sogdian nobleman who fought against Alexander in the Bactrian-Sogdian revolt in 329, and explains Plutarch’s choice of words: ἐρασθείς and ὑβρίσεν. E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman, 2000), 106, suggests that Alexander’s treatment of Roxane prior to their marriage (no sexual relations) “probably precipitated her father’s surrender”; cf. F.L. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria* (Leiden, 1988), 66 and Bosworth, *CE*, 117. In other words, Alexander did not have sexual intercourse (οὐκ ὑβρίσεν) with Roxane before their marriage; he only lusted (ἐρασθείς) after her. These actions were politically motivated because Alexander needed the assistance of Oxyartes to assist in securing
Bactria and Sogdiana, which he would receive as his son-in-law (Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria*, 66).

Alexander’s two other marriages to Stateira, the eldest daughter of Darius III, and to Parysatis, the youngest daughter of Artaxerxes III, were for political reasons (Plut. *Mor.* 338D) as the weddings occurred during the mass marriage at Susa in 324 (Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 52 = Arr. 7.4.4-8, Chares, *FGrH* 125 F 4 = Ath. 538b-539a, Diod. 17.107.6, Curt. 10.3.11-12, Just. 12.10.9-10, Plut. *Alex.* 70.2-3, Ael. *VH* 8.7); cf. pp. 45-47.

The entire scene reiterates Alexander’s self-control (σωφροσύνη) which Plutarch expounded on at the beginning of this section and earlier in the speech (326E, 327E). Since Arrian too notes Alexander’s restraint when it came to Roxane (4.19), there is the possibility of a common source (Hammond, *Sources*, 82-83).

Darius was murdered in 330 by Satibarzanes and Barsaentes at Hecatompylus because they did not want the Great King to fall into the hands of the Macedonians and become a vassal (Diod. 17.73.2, Arr. 3.21, Curt. 5.9.2, Just. 12.5.10, Plut. Alex. 42.3; cf. Bosworth, CE, 96). Darius apparently was stabbed and left for dead in his royal carriage according to Curtius (5.13.15), Justin (11.15.5), and Plutarch (Alex. 42.3). Justin (11.15.5) and Plutarch (Alex. 43.1) also indicate that Darius was still alive when Alexander’s advance troops reached the carriage, but he died before Alexander himself arrived. Diodorus qualifies his account with the phrase ἐπόμενος γεγράφασιν, thus indicating that he did not believe that Darius was still alive at this point (17.73.3-4). Neither Arrian nor Diodorus record the manner in which Darius died, nor is the anecdote recorded in DFAM 2. Plutarch is, however, the only author to mention that Alexander placed his cloak over Darius’ corpse. M.A. Levi, Introduzione ad Alessandro Magno (Milan, 1977), 250, has argued that these actions have moral as well as political implications. He maintains that it was Alexander’s duty to respect his former rival and to avenge the murder to justify his own claims to the Persian throne. According to Plutarch, Alexander did not offer sacrifice nor sing in triumph that Darius was dead and the war over, which is meant to indicate that his actions reflect his decency (κόσμου). It is a continuance of the Stoic idea that there is an action for every virtue (332D). However, Plutarch fails to mention that the war was not over because Bessus set himself up as Great King calling himself Artaxerxes V, thus forcing Alexander to chase after him. On Darius and his murder, see Berve, Alexanderreich, 2, no. 244 and Heckel, Who’s Who,

**ἐπιστονήν δὲ ποτε ... τίν’ ἐστιν ἄλλα**: This anecdote is recorded elsewhere by Plutarch (*Alex*. 39.5, *Mor*. 180D, *DFAM* 2, 399F-340A). Since only he mentions the exchange, he may have invented it either to highlight the relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion or to reveal something of the nature of the king himself. D’Angelo, *La Fortuna*, 240, suggested that it is a story illustrating Alexander’s *megalopsuchia* and *sòphisynê*, and Froidefond, in the Budé edition (p. 225 n. 5), maintained that the scene suggests that Alexander knew to reconcile his self-control with the obligations of war. However, in terms of the structure of this part of the speech, it better represents the king’s κόσμος or συνέσεως because of what the letter might have contained.

Plutarch relates the tale elsewhere and indicated the secretive (ἀπόρρητον) nature of the letter, so perhaps it concerned matters of state in Macedonia or more personal matters involving Olympias and Antipater (*Mor*. 180D, *Alex*. 39.1). The veracity of Olympias’ letters has come under scrutiny in modern scholarship (J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt, 1972), 4-5, E.D. Carney, *Olympias* (New York, 2006), 53), although Tarn maintains that this letter is genuine on the grounds that it is “exactly what any mother of strong character must have written to a son in Alexander’s position” (*Alexander* 2, 302). Indeed, it would not have been surprising for the sort of strong-willed mother that Olympias was to attempt to influence her son (cf. Carney, *Olympias*, 54-55). Nor would it have been unusual for Olympias to write letters to her son advising him or apprising him of matters in Macedonia during his absence, particularly about her
problems with Antipater (Diod. 17.114.3, 17.118.1, Arr. 7.12, Just. 12.14.3). The sources also indicate that Olympias often warned Alexander about untrustworthy individuals in his entourage as well as admonishing him for his own actions (Curt. 7.1.36-40, Plut. Alex. 39.4-5).

Since the letter in question could deal with matters of state, Alexander’s action involving the ring might have been necessary to ensure Hephaestion’s silence. The action does not necessarily detract from our understanding of the depth of the relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion, but rather, highlights an interesting characteristic of the man and king. It would seem that, even among those whom he considered his most trusted friends, he never lost sight of his role as the king.

Plutarch wants his audience to believe that Alexander’s actions were those of a philosopher. If we take into account the practical reasons for allowing Porus to retain his kingdom, or the marriage to Roxane, or even the demand for Hephaestion’s silence, then Alexander’s actions are pragmatic. In other words he was a man of action (ἔργοι) rather than of words (λόγοι). Plutarch ultimately argues that philosophy is not theoretical (λόγος), but practical (ἔργοι), and is a way of life that affects all aspects of one’s decision making.
Overview: *DFAM* 1 ends with another assessment of the actions of philosophers compared with those of Alexander. He concludes that men are born with the capability to form correct judgments in the face of conflict. By using the Cynic belief that Nature leads men to the Good, Plutarch is able to suggest that philosophers are naturally endowed with the capabilities necessary to arrive at the right conclusions in any given situation.

333 A

Παραθώμεν τὰ τῶν ... Ἀλκιβιάδου: Previously, Plutarch evaluated Alexander and famous philosophers on the basis of their written teachings or deeds (Pythagoras, Socrates, Arcesilaus, and Carneades, 328A) and concluded that the written word is not adequate to assess whether one is a philosopher. In addition, he examined philosophers and their students (Critias, Alcibiades, and Cleitophon, 328B-C) and deduced that a philosopher cannot be judged solely on the activity of his students. He has also argued that Alexander surpassed Socrates (328D), Zeno (329AB), and Plato (328DE) because his teachings were “successful.”

In this section, Plutarch argues that actions prove one to be a philosopher. He begins by comparing Alexander to Socrates and his relationship with Alcibiades. Plato mentioned that Socrates avoided a sexual entanglement with Alcibiades (*Symp.* 218CD); cf. Diogenes Laertius 2.31, who says that Socrates scorned Alcibiades’ beauty. The connection draws attention to Alexander’s own sexual proclivities and excesses, which is a subject of heated debate: see below.

Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ... κολακεύσης ἡδοναῖς: Plutarch draws a parallel between Socrates’ virtuous refusal of Alcibiades’ sexual proposition and Alexander’s rejection of
Philoxenus’ inappropriate offer. By having Alexander take offense to Philoxenus’ gift of young boys, Plutarch draws attention to Alexander’s sexual appetite at the same time that he highlights the king’s virtuosity.

Philoxenus was one of Alexander’s generals and was appointed satrap of Ionia (Polyaen. Strat. 6.49). He was also temporarily Alexander’s financial officer after Harpalus’ first flight in 333, but lost the position when Harpalus returned in 331 (Arr. 3.6.4, Plut. Alex. 22.1). The exchange between Philoxenus and Alexander is recorded elsewhere in the Plutarchan corpus. In a work criticizing Epicurean ideals, Not Even a Pleasant Life is Possible on Epicurean Ideals, Plutarch includes the anecdote to indicate that statesman-like ideas and actions prohibit the experience of pleasure (1099D). In his biography of Alexander, Plutarch includes the story along with one regarding the sexual activities of some Macedonian soldiers (22.1-2). He then specifically states that sleep and sexual intercourse (ἐκ τοῦ καθέοδειν καὶ σινοούσιάζειν) reminded Alexander that he was mortal (θνητός) because he succumbed to such weaknesses. On Philoxenus, see Berve, Alexanderreich 2, no. 793 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 220.

Discussion of Alexander’s sexual activities is found in ancient and modern scholarship. The ancient sources intimate his activities with women, particularly Barsine, to whom Alexander allegedly lost his virginity (Diod. 20.20.1-3, Curt. 10.6.11, Just. 11.10.2-3, 12.15.9, Plut. Alex. 21.7-9, Eum. 1.3, Paus. 9.7.2), and Roxane (see the commentary on 332E-F). There are even rumors of liaisons with the Amazonian queen Thalestris (Diod. 17.77.1-3, Curt. 6.5.24-32, Just. 12.3.5-7). Theophrastus, recorded in Athenaeus (10.435a), mentioned that as a boy Alexander was so unmoved by the notion
of sexual relations that Olympias and Philip, worried that their son could be γόνης ("womanly"), arranged to have a Thessalian prostitute, Callixeina, lie with him.

There has been much salacious speculation regarding Alexander’s male relationships, especially those with Hephaestion and the eunuch Bagoas. Due to Alexander’s frequent comparisons of himself and Hephaestion with Achilles and Patroclus, many have taken the relationship as homosexual (Tarn, Alexander 2, 319-326, Hamilton, Plutarch, 130, T.W. Africa, “Homosexuals in Greek History,” Journal of Psychohistory 9 (1982), 411-412, J.M. O’Brien Alexander the Great and the Invisible Enemy (London, 1992), 57-5). Most modern biographers of Alexander maintain that the relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion was one of close friendship as they were friends since boyhood (Tarn, Alexander 1, 12, Green, Alexander, 55, Hammond, KCS, 116 and Genius, 2, and Worthington, Alexander, 53, 186). O’Brien, Invisible Enemy, 57, however, insists that because of the celebration of the Achilles/Patroclus relationship within the court, Alexander may have encouraged the comparison to “indicate a similar bond between himself and Hephaestion.” Because of evidence of institutional pederasty in Macedonia (on which see E. Carney, “Regicide in Macedonia,” La Parola del Passato 38 (1983), 260-272), Alexander’s parents would not have objected to youthful relations between the boys until it became apparent that Alexander showed no interest in women (O’Brien, Invisible Enemy, 58). Moreover, there is a line in a letter by Diogenes the Cynic (24) that claims that Alexander was ruled by Hephaestion’s thighs. Alexander did not take his first female lover, Barsine, until 333 when he was about twenty-three years old (Just. 11.10.2-3, 12.15.9, Plut. Alex. 21.7-9); cf. P.A. Brunt, “Alexander, Barsine, and Heracles,” RFIC 103 (1975), 22-34. Thereafter, Alexander’s
only known sexual relations were with his first wife Roxane and probably Stateira and Parysatis, both of whom he married at Susa in 324 (see the commentary on 329D-E).

The only conclusion that can be drawn from the sources is that Alexander and Hephaestion had a very close relationship, one which sent Alexander into deep grieving when Hephaestion died (Diod. 17.110.8, Arr. 7.14.1, 7.18.2-3, Just. 12.12.11-12, Plut. Alex. 72). The depth of his grief has a parallel to Achilles’ anguish at the death of Patroclus and we must remember that Alexander often emulated Achilles (see the commentary on 332A-B).

Tarn dismisses any sexual relations with Bagoas as fictitious and insists that it is a product of the hostile attitude of the Peripatetics toward Alexander found especially in Curtius (Alexander 2, 319-326; see too L.L. Gunderson, “Quintus Curtius Rufus,” in E.N. Borza and W.L. Adams, Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage (Washington, 1982), 184). Hammond, KCS, 322 n. 114, agreeing with Tarn, suggested that the “sexual and rhetorical color” was programmed for an audience that was familiar with the debauchery of Nero. E. Badian, “The Eunuch Bagoas,” CQ 8 (1958), 150-157, however, strongly disagrees with the view that Bagoas was a fictitious invention of the Peripatetics. He argues that Dicaearchus, the main source for the story of Bagoas’ kissing Alexander, probably got his information from an eyewitness (“Eunuch Bagoas,” 156). Moreover, Badian, “Bagoas,” 154, argues that Dicaearchus was already displeased with the Lyceum and would not have necessarily needed to defend his position on Alexander.

For more on Hephaestion, see Berve, Alexanderreich 2, no. 357 and Heckel, Who’s Who, 133-137, with Tarn, Alexander 1, 117, Lane Fox, Alexander, 434-438,

333 B

Ξενοκράτην, ... τὸν χαριζόμενον: Xenocrates was previously mentioned at 331E (see commentary). The episode is used to emphasize not only Alexander’s admiration of philosophers, but also his philosophical attitude toward monetary gain.

οὐκ ἐδεῖτο πλούτου ... χαρίζηται: To highlight his previous evaluation of Xenocrates and Alexander, Plutarch again states that philosophers have little need of money. This point was alluded to earlier in the discourse (330A) with Aristippus, a pupil of Socrates, who was revered for his threadbare cloak. Plutarch transfers the idea of the philosopher’s frugality to Alexander at 327A in the famous exchange between the king and Diogenes when he insists that Alexander did not view a royal crown and robes as more significant than a philosopher’s wallet and threadbare cloak. However, Alexander hardly gave up his own clothing and in Asia he dressed even more finely by adopting some Persian clothing (see the commentary on 329F-330A).

Plutarch credits Philosophy with causing Alexander to need money so that he could be benevolent to philosophers. At 331E, he recorded two monetary gifts: ten thousand gold pieces to Pyrrho (accepted) and the gift of fifty talents to Xenocrates
(refused). On no other occasion does Alexander give money to philosophers despite being surrounded by them (cf. 331E with commentary).

τοῦτο ποσάκις ... εἰσβιαζόμενος: There is a possible lacuna in the text here because of the τοῦτο, which does not logically refer to the preceding text. It may have included what Alexander apparently said at the battle of the Hydaspes River as recorded in the *Alexander* (60.3): Ὡ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀρά γε πιστεύσατε ἂν ἡλίκους ὑπομένων κινδύνους ἕνεκα τῆς παρ’ ὑμῖν εὐδοξίας (“O Athenians, can you believe the dangers I undergo in order to earn glory in your eyes?”), with Onesicritus cited as the source. The lacuna, however, is only shown in one codicil (N = Leidensis Voss. Gr. Q. 2, saec 15). Pearson, *LHA* 102, argues that we should be cautious about interpreting this utterance as we do not have the context in which Onesicritus wrote it (cf. Hamilton, *Alexander*, 165). By extension, we should be careful about drawing too many comparisons between that passage and the one here. Nevertheless, Froidefond in the Budé edition suggested that, if the lacuna does not exist, then Plutarch is highlighting Alexander’s selflessness: “Mais la leçon explicite qu’en tire Plutarque est tout autre: seul le philosophe peut garder la pleine maîtrise de soi dans le peril.” However, there is no reason to include the lines from the life of Alexander since the text that follows the τοῦτο continues the line of thought.

Plutarch is, then, suggesting that Alexander prosecuted every siege and fought every battle in order to garner funds to advance philosophy, an idea that is completely antithetical to Alexander’s professed reasons for going on campaign in the first place. In 336, after re-imposing the League of Corinth on the Greeks, Alexander had himself appointed commander-in-chief of an allied invasion army whose purpose was to exact revenge on the Persians for the suffering of Greece during the Persian War (Diod. 17.4.9, 340.
Just. 11.2.5). Nothing is mentioned of any personal philosophical reason and many of Alexander’s actions (visit to Siwah, adoption of foreign clothing, *proskynesis*, introduction of foreign troops, mass marriage at Susa) during the campaigns show more selfish or practical motivations: see pp. 45-51.

καίτοι κρίσεις ... τὸ καλὸν: Plutarch appears to accept Stoic and Cynic views on nature. Stoics believed that a life lived in line with virtue is equal to living in accordance with human nature, and both required correct reason (Cic. *Off.* 3.21-8). Cynics too believed that a life lived in accordance with nature would lead one toward happiness (Diog. Laert. 6.70-71).


οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι ... προλήψεων: Plutarch reaffirms Socrates’ ideas regarding the superior distinction of philosophers endorsed in Plato’s *Republic*. Socrates argued that some people are naturally suited to understand philosophy and become leaders whereas
others are not equipped to grasp such things (Pl. Rep. 484D). In other words, the vast majority of people in the world are incapable of understanding philosophy and therefore should not rule. Plutarch argues that Alexander is a philosopher to justify his rule of Macedonia, Greece and Persia. However, the paradox is that Alexander was not a philosopher but was a ruler. In this way, Plutarch negates this Socratic precept.

Socrates further expounds on philosophers’ greater powers of discernment while discussing the necessary characteristics of philosophers: love of learning, truthfulness, self-discipline, greatness of spirit, courage, justice, quickness of mind, a good memory, and refinement (Pl. Rep. 485a-487a). The analysis of a philosopher’s virtues is highly reminiscent of Plutarch’s own lists of Alexander’s virtues mentioned previously (326E, 327E, 332C).

333 C

εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος: In the fourth and final quotation from Homer (Il. 12.243), Plutarch omits the second part of the line (ἁμώνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, “to fight for one’s country”). The omission is surprising considering the fact that Alexander claimed to be fighting a war of revenge for Greece (Diod. 17.4.9, Just. 11.2.5). D’Angelo, La Fortuna, 226, argues that the insertion of Homeric quotations is common in epideictic rhetoric for it contributes documentation and confirmation of the facts discussed. In this case, the quotation from the Iliad serves to further prove the difference between common men and philosophers. They are fundamentally dissimilar in that philosophers have a greater breadth of knowledge, which included knowledge of Homer, from which they can draw their conclusions aiding them in making the right judgment.
καὶ “πέρας ... ὁ θάνατος”: The quotation is cited elsewhere in the Moralia regarding a discussion on the eternal qualities of superstition (On Superstition 166F) and it is also quoted by Demosthenes (18.97) when the Athenians are being reminded of their courage in the face of battle. Babbitt in the Loeb edition (pp. 420-421) suggested that both Plutarch and Demosthenes are incorrectly citing a Euripidean trimeter that would appear more like ὁ θάνατος ἐσθ’ ἄπασιν ἀνθρώποις πέρας.

In the DFAM, Plutarch tends to focus more on Homeric quotations than ones from the tragedies (326E, 331C, 331D, 333C; cf. in the second oration 341A, 341B, 342B, and 343A). Homer’s Iliad alone is quoted 581 times: see W. Helmbold and E. O’Neil, Plutarch’s Quotations (London, 1959), 39-43. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides are, like Homer, also used by Plutarch. Euripides is only quoted twice in the entirety of the DFAM (here, and at DFAM 2, 337F) and 363 times, either quoting directly or paraphrasing, in Plutarch’s corpus (cf. Helmbold and O’Neil, Plutarch’s Quotations, 30-33) while Sophocles is only mentioned, not quoted, once at 328D (135 occurrences in all of Plutarch’s works; cf. Helmbold and O’Neil, Plutarch’s Quotations, 66-67). Aeschylus is quoted at DFAM 2, 334D (64 times in all of the Plutarchan corpus; cf. Helmbold and O’Neil, Plutarch’s Quotations, 2) to illustrate that Alexander took his role as commander very seriously. Plutarch’s references to and quotations from these authors highlight his knowledge and rhetorical skill.

ἄλλα θραύσειν ... σοφία περιτέθηκεν: Plutarch contends that a philosopher’s abilities in logic can get him out of a critical situation which would cause the common man to forget his abilities, for the common man is not fortified by wisdom and logic (see above).
Plutarch frequently uses quotations from Thucydides in his works. They appear on 156 occasions in the *Moralia* and the *Lives*; cf. Helmbold and O'Neil, *Plutarch’s Quotations*, 71-72. In the case of *DFAM* 1, Plutarch closes with Thucydides 2.87.4, in which two Peloponnesian commanders, Cnemus and Brasidas, at Rhium in 429/8 were attempting to boost their troops’ morale because of fear of the nearby Athenian fleet. One of the commanders (unnamed) tells his men that a stout heart is more important than skill in the face of danger, thus continuing that Spartan ethos of standing firm. The Spartan then goes on to say that “fear drives out memory” to remind the men that they must keep in mind that they have advantages that will ensure their victory.

By taking the line out of its Thucydidean context, Plutarch embellishes Thucydides’ rhetoric by adding that fear also drives out purpose, ambition, and impulse, presumably leaving one without the necessary capabilities to make correct judgments. The only thing that can save an individual from being overcome by fear is supreme intellect and reasoning, which are received from Philosophy. Alexander was not overly influenced by fear because he possessed purpose, ambition, and drive as Plutarch has shown throughout *DFAM* 1 with his discussion of the king’s wounds, the trials of the campaign, the unification of the races, and gifts to the philosophers. Therefore, Alexander must have been influenced and aided by Philosophy.

Babbitt, in the Loeb edition (p. 380), Hamilton, *Plutarch*, xxxii, and D’Angelo, *La Fortuna*, 242, have argued that the speech ends abruptly, which suggests that a portion of the text has been lost or that there was a time limit placed on these performances (on which see pp. 100). This assessment is a convenient way to explain the ρζὲ (―yesterday‖) at the beginning of *DFAM* 2 to indicate that Plutarch picked up there where
he left off on the previous day of speaking. However, the last line of *DFAM* 1 ([εὶ μὴ] μηρίνθους φιλοσοφία περιτέθεικεν: “unless Philosophy has tied a cord”) neatly connects to the thesis of the speech at 327E, in which Philosophy granted Alexander with the necessary equipment (i.e. virtue) for his campaigns. The line also links the rhetorical imagery itself, with Philosophy literally holding together (almost in a protective sense) those things necessary for correct thought. Philosophy, in some sense, become Alexander’s own commanding officer. It is a logical ending to a work that seems at first glance to argue that Philosophy governed the life of a great king and general. For more on the relationship between *DFAM* 1 and *DFAM* 2, see pp. 88-105; cf. the commentary on 326D.
Aalders, G.J.D., *Plutarch’s Political Thought* (Amsterdam, 1982).


Asirvatham, S., “Classicism and Romanitas in Plutarch’s De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute,” *AJPh* 126 (2005), 107-125.


Babbitt, F.C. (ed.), *Plutarch’s Moralia* 1, LCL (Cambridge, 1927).
----, (ed.), *Plutarch: Moralia* 4, LCL (Cambridge, 2005).
----, “The Death of Parmenio,” *TAPA* 91 (1960), 324-338.

----, *Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, 1965).


Beloch, J., *Griechische Geschichte* 3 (Berlin, 1925).


Bonner, S.F., *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire* (Liverpool, 1969).


----, “History and Rhetoric in Curtius Rufus,” *CPh* 78 (1983), 150-161.


----, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman, 2000).

----, *Olympias, the Mother of Alexander the Great* (London, 2006).


Carney, T.F., “Plutarch’s Style in the *Marius,*” *JHS* 80 (1960), 24-31.


----, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (New York, 1957).


----, *The Persian Empire* (New York, 1983).


Dover, K.J., Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis, 1974).

----, The Evolution of Greek Prose Style (Oxford, 1997).

Droysen, J.G., Geschichtes des Hellenismus (Basel, 1877).


----, “Pausanias, the Assassin of Philip II,” *Athenaeum* 53 (1975), 111-135.


Gentili, B. and G. Cerri, History and Biography in Ancient Thought (Amsterdam, 1988).


Geus, K., Eratosthenes von Kyrene (Munich, 2002).


----, Alexander to Actium (Berkeley, 1990).


----, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture* (Chicago, 2002).


----, *Alexander the Great, King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, 1980).


----, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1983).


----, *Sources for Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1993).

----, *Philip of Macedon* (London, 1994).

----, *The Genius of Alexander the Great* (Chapel Hill, 1997).


Hoffmann, W., *Das literarische Portrat von Alexanders des Grossen im griechischen und römischen Altertum* (Leipzig, 1907).


----, *Quintilian* (New York, 1969).


----, (trans.), *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden, 2003).


Martini, E., “Dikaiarchos (3),” *RE* (1905), cols. 547-549.


Nachstadt, G., *De Altera Plutarchi Declamatione quae est ‘de Alexandri fortuna’* (Diss., Berlin, 1894).


----, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of His Source material,” *JHS* 100 (1980), 127-140.


Powell, J.E., “The Sources of Plutarch’s Alexander,” *JHS* 59 (1939), 229-240.


----, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge, 1983).


365


Ströblich, A., Plutarch und die Sprachen (Stuttgart, 1997)


---, “Alexander, Cynics, and Stoics,” AJPh 60 (1939), 41-70.

---, Alexander the Great, 2 vols. (Boston, 1956).

---, The Greeks in Bactria and India (Cambridge, 1938; repr. Chicago, 1985).


Tracy, S.V., “Demetrius of Phalerum: Who was He and Who was He Not?,” in W.W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schutrumpf (eds.), *Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation, and Discussion* (New Brunswick, 2000), 331-345.


----, *Plutarch’s Lives* (Berkeley, 1974).


Wegehaupt, H., “Beiträge zur Textgeschichte der Moralia Plutarchs,” *Philologus* 64 (1905), 391-413.

----, *Plutarchstudien in italienischen Bibliotheken* (Cuxhaven, 1906).


----, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus* (Ann Arbor, 1992).


----, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven, 2008).


Yaginuma, S., “Plutarch’s Language and Style,” *ANRW* 2.33.6 (1991), 4726-4742.


VITA

Dawn Gilley was born in Houston, Texas to Fred and Debbie Gilley and is the oldest of three. Graduating from Tomball High School in 1996, she then went to Baylor University where she graduate in 2000 with a Bachelor of Arts in History with a minor in Classical Greek. She attended the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and received her Master’s degree in Classics in 2003, after which she went to the University of Missouri-Columbia for her Doctorate in History.